

**DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: FAILURES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS IN SOMALIA, 1992 - 2010**

BY
JOHN ONYANGO ODULLAH
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
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
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
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This is to confirm that this thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the candidate's Supervisor.

Signature: 

PROF. OLEWE NYUNYA

Date: 

Dedication

This project is dedicated to my little daughter, Mary Atieno, whom we named after my beloved late mother, and the rest of my family for their invaluable love and support.

Acknowledgement

This project is a culmination of contributions and motivations from several people, all of whom I would like to immensely thank. Personally, the project made me learn more about the Somalia conflict than I could have imagined at the beginning when starting it. It also made develop a lot of interest in the Somalia peace process.

I am particularly grateful to my beloved wife, Petnora Ogito, for the unconditional support, love and encouragement that she gave me during the entire period of this research. My sincere gratitude also goes to the Embassy of the Czech Republic, especially to its former Ambassador to Kenya, H.E. Mrs. Margita Fuchsová for the invaluable support with the project during my tenure at the Embassy. This made me attend all the Somalia-related meetings, access all the necessary documents, meet all the people I needed to get information from, follow Somalia news, and travel to places like Dadaab refugee camps for more data. It really gave me a lot of insight and made my research easier. To all my former colleagues at the Czech Embassy, I salute you as well for your support and encouragement.

To my dear Supervisor, Prof. Olewe Nyunya, I am truly grateful for your inputs and constant guidance. I should also thank my colleagues at the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), with whom I worked towards the tail end of my research. Working at UNSOA was a great opportunity as it helped me polish my project. I have to admit however that I was rather confused on how to proceed, and almost dropped my project, upon joining UNSOA since I found it quite uncomfortable to criticise my employer. I thank my Supervisor again for giving me the courage to continue with the project despite the new developments, instead of dropping it midstream.

For all those who, in one way or the other, played an important role in this project but are not mentioned herein, I acknowledge your contributions and assistance, and respectfully salute you all. To you all, I say, THANK YOU.

Abstract

This study sought to investigate the reasons why the numerous interventions in Somalia between 1992 and 2010 never bore any meaningful fruits. It deliberately picks on the United Nations for criticism. This was informed by the fact that it is the UN, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The UN was also picked for criticism because it has led, either directly or indirectly, all the interventions in Somalia during the period under review.

To achieve this, the study reviewed conflict situations in the world and narrowed down to explain the historical background of the Somalia civil war. It then looks at how the Somalia internal conflict was internationalised and then discusses the effects of such internationalisation. The study then proceeds to critically analyse the various diplomatic strategies used in Somalia between 1992 and 2010 and takes a swipe at the UN for its failure to decisively put in place concrete measures that can end the Somalia conflict.

While it is worth noting that it would require the efforts of all and sundry, including the Somalia population, the international community, states and non-state actors, to completely and successfully fix the Somalia problem, the lead role of the UN would be important in ensuring that these efforts succeed. That is why it would be important if the UN could take into consideration the recommendations made at the end of this study in dealing with the Somalia crisis.

The study concludes that the UN has not put its best foot forward in dealing with the Somalia problem. At best, its efforts have been minimal and slow. In terms of future reviews, it is hoped that this study would be useful in terms of informing future studies on the subject matter. Further review and/or criticisms of this study will be highly welcome.

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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	- African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia
ARS	- Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
AU	- African Union
BBC	- British Broadcasting Cooperation
CGPCS	- Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
COE	- Contingent Owned Equipments
CSS	- Council of the Secretaries of State
DDR	- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	- Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	- East African Community
EASFCOM	- East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECHO	- European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ECOWAS	- Economic Community of West African States
ETA	- Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	- European Union
EUNAVFOR	- European Union Naval Force
FAO	- Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC	- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FRY	- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GCC	- Gulf Cooperation Council
ICG	- International Contact Group for Somalia
ICTY	- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICU	- Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	- Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	- IGAD proposed its Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IMO	- International Maritime Organisation
KLA	- Kosovo Liberation Army
LAS	- League of Arab States
MOD	- Dulbahante, Ogaden and Marehan clans

NGHA	- Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
SPLM/A	- Sudan People Liberation Movement/Alliance
SRC	- Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRSR	- Special Representative for the United Nations Secretary General
SRSP	- Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SYL	- Somali Youth League
TCCs	- Troop Contributing Countries
TFC	- Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	- Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	- Transitional Federal Institutions
TNG	- Transitional National Government
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF	- United Task Force
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
UNOSOM	- United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPKO	- United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNPOS	- United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	- United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	- United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOA	- United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
US	- United States
USC	- United Somali Congress
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USD	- United States Dollars
WFP	- World Food Programme

INTRODUCTION

Building lasting peace in post-conflict societies has been a difficult task and often without success. Many post-conflict countries return to conflict after a period of international peacekeeping operation. The story is the same right from East Timor to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur and Somalia. These are hotspots that have given the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions a very difficult time, with very limited success, if any.

The reasons for such limited success in these conflict areas vary from one place to the other, though they have some commonalities. This therefore puts the UN diplomacy into sharp focus to see where and why it has gone wrong. The study therefore seeks to investigate the role played by diplomacy in conflict management, with specific focus on the role and failures of the UN in Somalia, 1992 – 2010, bearing in mind that it is the UN (through the UN Security Council), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that has the primary responsibility when it comes to maintaining international peace and Security.

Specifically, the study will try to examine why the various efforts by the UN since the Somali war started in 1991 have all failed. The two variables here are “diplomacy in conflict management” (independent variable) and “UN failures in Somalia” (dependent variable).

Background to the Study

Somalia has been in civil war since 1991 when the former President Mohamed Siad Barre was deposed by a coalition of armed factions. The situation has led to serious political instability, displacement of the civilian population and humanitarian crisis spanning into two decades now. Somalia has also lost its “oneness” in the process as Somaliland and Puntland have since declared themselves semi-autonomous states.

A lot of international community efforts and diplomacy have been deployed to help Somalia out of this instability with no success. Warlords and insurgent groups have continued to emerge with goal posts being shifted quite often. The International Community, led by the UN, United States (US) and European Union (EU) has made several frantic efforts in Somalia since 1992. African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), League of Arab States (LAS), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have also employed a lot of diplomacy to salvage the situation with limited success, if any. The role played by the frontline (neighbouring) states, led by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, has also been enormous.

On military diplomacy, there have been a number of interventions by the international community to restore peace in Somalia. In April 1992, UN passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751, which authorised intervention in the Somali civil war and led to the creation of the first United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). This led to the deployment of fifty unarmed military observers to Somalia who proved to be very ineffective.

In December 1992, the UN Security Council declared the situation in Somalia a “threat to international peace and security”. US responded by initiating “Operation Restore Hope” and led a 28,000 military force to a UN sanctioned multinational coalition known as United Task Force (UNITAF).

UNITAF remained in Somalia till 1993 when the second UN operation, UNOSOM II was sent. UNOSOM was finally withdrawn in March 1995, having lost control of Mogadishu in a continually deteriorating security situation. Others followed, including Ethiopian interventions (2006-January 2009), and currently there is African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), attempting to keep peace in Somalia.

Likewise, on conference diplomacy, there have been several international reconciliation conferences convened on Somalia since 1991 to form an interim government. They include, among others, the Djibouti Talk First (June-July 1991), the Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Talks (January-March 1993), the Sodere Conference (Ethiopia, 1996-97), the Cairo Conference (1997) the Arta Peace Conference (Djibouti, 2000), the Mbagathi conference (Kenya, 2002-04) and finally, the Djibouti Peace Process (2008-2009). The Mbagathi talks culminated in the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 2008/09 Djibouti talks centred on strengthening TFG as an entity by bringing in the rebels who were then out of government.

As is evidently clear however, nothing has changed in Somalia and the anarchy still continues. The political situation continues to be in tatters while the humanitarian problem has reached a crisis level. Other incidental problems like terrorism and piracy have shot up as well.

Statement of the Research Problem

As mentioned above, despite all the intensive mediation and diplomatic efforts, the security situation in Somalia has only deteriorated, leading to one of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Somalia has remained a failed state¹, without an effective government since the war started. The diplomatic interventions have been met with failure and have only succeeded in hardening the resolve of insurgents and extremists to fight more against what they have called “western” governments’ intrusion in Somalia².

TFG has repeatedly warned that if things proceed the way they are, insurgents will soon take over. A lot of fears have been expressed both by the TFG and the international community that the war in Somalia could be lost to the

¹ Though the former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Oud Abdallah argued that the situation in Somalia is moving from “failed state” to “fragile state”. See United Nations Political Office for Somali (UNPOS) Press Release 003/2010 of 12th February 2010.

² Moller, B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors*, (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009)

insurgents, and this could dash the hopes of ever getting peace in the troubled Horn of Africa state, of course with tragic consequences to the country, the region and the whole world.

TFG has not hesitated to lay the blame where it should fall, that is, at the doorstep of the international community. Despite several hopes that the international community would help Somalia to defeat the insurgents, that has not been fully realised. It seems that another opportunity to fix the conflict has been lost and even the several efforts by the international community, especially the UN, have turned out to be missteps.

This research therefore seeks to pose the question: Has the work of the UN in Somalia been satisfactory in providing the minimum stability envisaged?

Purpose of the Study

This research will concentrate on the external interventions to the Somali conflict and investigate the repeated and several failures of the UN diplomacy and strategies in resolving the conflict. The effectiveness and seriousness of such strategies will be closely examined in the study. It is however noted that the Somalia crisis has been as a result of several factors and its resolution needs more than the UN. However, this study picks on the UN since it has through its Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the primary responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security. Given this role, it has led international interventions in Somalia since the war broke out.

Objectives of the Study

In this research, the specific objectives are:

- a) To investigate the effectiveness or otherwise of the UN strategies employed in dealing with the Somali conflict from 1992 to 2010.

- b) To examine the level of seriousness of the UN and the international community, especially in terms of fulfilling their various commitments to Somalia
- c) To suggest effective strategies for dealing with the Somali conflict

Justification of the Study

This research is informed by the fact that continued anarchy in Somalia is not only a threat to Somalia alone but also the whole world³. Neighbouring countries, especially Kenya, are already feeling the pinch of lawlessness in Somalia, ranging from insecurity, piracy to influx of refugees. Terrorists have found a safe haven in Somalia and are transferring their bases from places like Afghanistan to Somalia. Extremists are recruiting and training suicide bombers in Somalia, especially children. If this problem is not addressed urgently and things remain the way they are, chances are that Somalia will slide deeper into anarchy and become a base for international crimes. This has serious regional and international repercussions.

It is important for the UN and the entire international community to concentrate on strategies that can make TFG acceptable to the hearts and minds of Somalis, first and foremost. To gain this, it is important to ensure that nobody in Somalia feels left out during the negotiations to stabilize the government. The next stage should be to develop more creative transitional security and stabilization mechanisms that are designed to maximise the sense of security for anxious communities during early phases of implementing peace accords. This is important for any government to get legitimacy and acceptability.

An evaluation and reassessment of the strategies employed by the UN and international community is therefore urgently necessary.

³ Momanyi, L.S., *The Role of Actors and Processes in the Conduct of Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of Somalia National Reconciliation Process in Kenya 2002 –2003*, Masters Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2003

Research Hypotheses

This study is premised on the following hypotheses:

- a) The strategies hitherto employed by the UN in the war-torn Somalia are negatively correlated with the desired peace and stability.
- b) UN diplomacy in Somalia may still bring the desired peace if well revised and implemented in a timely fashion.

Research Questions

Some of the questions that will guide this study are:

- a) Why have all the efforts and strategies in Somalia failed in bringing peace and stability?
- b) Was the approach used in the previous Somali peace efforts relevant to the realities in Somalia?
- c) As part of post-conflict civilian strategy, is it possible to win the hearts and minds of people simply by providing security alone or others like reconstruction and development as well?
- d) Is the UN respecting and implementing its own commitments to, and Resolutions on, Somalia and are these Resolutions having the maximum impacts intended?
- e) Is the UN concerned with effectively empowering TFG to take care of its own security and bureaucratic needs?
- f) Do the ordinary Somalis still have confidence in the peace process? Do they feel it is legitimate?
- g) Wouldn't it be better for the UN to encourage and actively support open dialogue between TFG and everybody including the insurgents, Puntland and Somaliland instead of dismissing some as terrorists?

Theoretical framework

This research is informed widely by the paradigm of Conflict Researcher in international conflict management⁴. Specifically, the study is based on the **problem solving workshop theory** whose lead proponent is John Wear Burton⁵. The theory rejects the strategist (realist) approach perfected by the UN in Somalia whereby all efforts seem only to be geared towards supporting the otherwise weak TFG against the insurgents. This has only succeeded in alienating the TFG from the masses and limits reconciliation and inclusivity in the peace process.

The problem solving workshop theory thus opines that the needs of state security and the drive to dominate are never the all-embracing pursuit. It argues that the best strategy in conflict management is to bring together all the parties to a conflict from their environment, let them cool down their temperaments then assist them to come to an understanding. The setting where the combatants are brought together is regarded loosely as a workshop. The overriding idea here is that nobody should be left out of the negotiations. The theory advocates for sorting out all the underlying issues in dealing with the conflict.

This theory has been applied before with a considerable degree of success. For example, the Addis Ababa negotiations of 1970 for the Sudan conflicts was conducted in a “workshop” that brought together the Sudanese government, Sudan People Liberation Movement/Alliance (SPLM/A) and all other interest groups⁶.

However, there are those who opine that the legitimate government will always be unwilling to engage in dialogue with the insurgents because by so doing, they may thereby give international standing and recognition to the insurgents.

⁴ See Groom A.J.R. “Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher” in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

⁵ Burton, J.W., *World Society*, (Cambridge University Press, 1972)

⁶ Heskias, A., *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies in the Sudan Conflict*, (West View Press, 1987)

Mwagiru⁷, while supporting this fear, adds that international institutions have also insisted only on having dialogue with governments in power and reaffirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

The problem solving workshop theory, when put within the context of the Somali warfare, would definitely lead one in expecting that any diplomatic interventions and negotiations would involve all the combatants, that is, the existing government structure, the representatives of all the militia groups, representatives from the main clans of Somalia⁸, religious leaders, civil society and the international community.

It is against this background that Bronwyn E. Bruton, a democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa and a former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, urged US to change its foreign policy on Somalia and get ready to negotiate with everybody, including the dreaded insurgents instead of military operations⁹.

It is however critical to stress that everything always goes wrong at the point of selecting the representatives. Many a time, those purporting to be representatives do not actually have the mandate of those they purport to represent. The danger follows soon when their supposed constituents disown them as not representing them. It is therefore important that the representatives be chosen keenly to ensure that they have a broader mandate from their people¹⁰.

Puntland and Somaliland must also be included in the negotiations as important stakeholders in search for peace in Somalia. If for any minute, they decide

⁷ Mwagiru, M., *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*. PhD Thesis, Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994.

⁸ There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq and Daarod. There are other small clans which are usually grouped together and referred to as "Point 5" thus the common term 4.5.

⁹ Bruton, B. E., *Somalia: A New Approach*, Council on Foreign Relations, 10th March 2010

¹⁰ A case in point is when several leaders of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a dismissed the agreement initialled on 15th February and signed on 15th March 2010 between Ahlu Sunna representatives and TFG in Addis Ababa.

to go their separate ways and get recognition from the international community as independent states then the bigger Somalia can be undermined. Recently, there were reports that Israel has said it is ready to recognise Somaliland¹¹. This can only serve to undermine the peace efforts in Somalia and must be discouraged at all costs.

The international community must also pull in the same direction and be united in their approach to Somalia since any division in ideology or foreign policy among them on Somalia has the potential of derailing the peace efforts in Somalia. This has been seen in the differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea that end up making Somalia a theatre for their proxy wars¹².

This theory will therefore inform the entire research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

To achieve the objectives of this research, I intend to review literature focusing on the following themes:

a) Conflict, Conflict Management and the Somali Case

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff¹³, the term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings - whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other – is in conscious opposition to one another or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible.

The above description very well defines what has been happening in Somalia for the last two decades now. According to David Kikaya and Tajudeen

¹¹ The media quoted Mr. Yigal Palmor, Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman <http://www.unpo.org/content/view/full/10712/81/>

¹²Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) Report, *Ethiopia-Eritrea Proxy War in Somalia*, http://icar.gmu.edu/ICAR_News_Sp07.pdf, Spring 2007

¹³Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L. Jr, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, (New York: Cambridge, M.A. Harvard University Press, 1960)

Abdul-Raheem¹⁴, because of conflict, Somalia has been reduced to a strife-torn and impoverished African nation. Zartman¹⁵ however describes conflict as an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions.

Burton¹⁶ argues that conflict, like sex, is a necessary creative component in human relationships. For him, conflict is the means to achieve social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development. Burton further argues that conflicts are a part of our everyday life and are not always bad for the fact that they are signs that there is something wrong with our relations that needs to be changed.

Mwagiru, *et al*¹⁷ divide conflict into structural and violent conflicts. They state that violent conflict is the most visible while structural conflict is yet to evolve into violence but could, if not addressed in time. They further say that the challenge of conflict management is not how to do away with conflict but is how to deal with them so that their harmful effects do not affect our societies and ruin our relationships. Mwagiru¹⁸ further argues that the language, philosophy and methodologies postulated by settlement and resolution should be inclusive enough to cover almost any management effort that third parties might resort to.

In deed, it has been fluently argued by writers like Ahmed¹⁹ that there were forces beyond clanism and the regime of Barre that contributed to the collapse

¹⁴ Kikaya, D. and Raheem, T.A, *The Dynamics of the Conflict in Somalia and Prospects for Peace*, in *Interventionism and Human Rights in Somalia: Report of an Exploratory Forum on the Somalia Crisis*, (Kenya Human Rights Institute, 2007), pg 15

¹⁵ Zartman, I.W., *Conflict Reduction, Prevention, Management and Resolution*, in Deng F.M. and Zartman, I.W. (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pg. 299 - 319

¹⁶ Ibid at pg 137-138

¹⁷ Mwagiru, M., Munene M., and Karuru, N, *Understanding Conflict and its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives*, (Nairobi: CCR-WLEA, 1998), pg. 4-5

¹⁸ Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), pg. 36-47

¹⁹ Ahmed, I., "Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland", In Adedeji A. (ed) *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, (London and New York Zed Books, 199), pg. 238-252

of the Somali state. This is well summarised by Bradbury²⁰ who stated that no single factor can explain the causes of the war in Somalia. He says that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, contradictions between centralised state and a pastoral culture, cold war politics, militarisation, marginalisation and uneven development, ecological decline, lack of power sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict have all contributed to the Somali conflict.

b) Diplomacy and Internationalisation of the Somali Conflict

Berridge²¹ defines diplomacy as the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiations. This definition is relevant because it, by and large, explains how the international community has handled the Somali conflict. That is, through negotiations and mediations.

The Somali conflict was internationalised because of its immediate or potential effects to the international community. Mwangi²² argues that no line can be drawn between internal and international conflicts. He says that all international conflicts have domestic sources and become internationalised when external actors or factors are introduced in an originally internal conflict. Somali conflict was therefore first internationalised in 1992 when diplomatic interventions were introduced by the UN through UN Security Council Resolution 751 that authorised sending of UN peacekeepers to Mogadishu.

Eighteen clean months passed after the fall of Siad Barre without any intervention from the international community despite the civilian population being

²⁰ Bradbury, M., *Somaliland: Country Report*, (London: CIIR Publication, 1997), pg. 1

²¹ Berridge, G.R., *Diplomacy: Theory and Practise*, (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1995),

pg. 1

²² Mwangi, M., *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, PhD Thesis, Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994. pg. 27-29

killed in the ensuing anarchy. Moller²³ states that by March 1992 alone, the population of Mogadishu had been decimated, at least 300,000 people having died of hunger and related diseases, and the direct death toll from the fighting amounting to around 44,000. The international media then picked the suffering of Somalis and brought it to the attention of the international community, which then decided to intervene.

Apart from UN, neighbouring (regional) countries also intervened in the Somali conflict. Ghebremeskel²⁴ states that one of the regional efforts in settling the Somali conflict was the Ethio-Eritrean initiative, which aimed at bringing about a broad-based conference in which all parties to the conflict were supposed to take part. He however says that the initiative failed as the international community was not willing to support it.

Ghebremeskel adds that the initiative continued at the sub-regional level with Ethiopia organising the first meeting on Somalia in May-June 1992. Other initiatives were to follow with IGAD and Djibouti playing a pivotal role²⁵. Kenya was later to play a key role that led to the creation of TFG in Nairobi²⁶.

Leonardo Paz Nevez and Marcelo M. Valenca²⁷ say that the regionalization of the UN peacekeeping helps to tackle more effectively the causes of the conflicts and its consequences in the post-conflict society. They argue that the increasing participation of neighbour countries in the Somali conflict reflects the importance of legitimising the peacekeeping operations by involving countries that share similar backgrounds, development levels and cultural aspects. They however

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ghebremeskel, A., *The Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience*, Dissertation, University of Vienna, http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_2gheb.pdf, retrieved on 10 March 2011

²⁵ Shirwa, H.F., *The Sub-Regional Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of the Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict, May-August 2000*, M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2005

²⁶ Momanyi, L.S., Ibid

²⁷ Neves, L.P., and Valenca, M.M. "Issues of Regionalising the Peacekeeping: The Somalia Crisis in 2007", <http://www.peace-building.de/11-0-Panel-5-External-Actors-in-Conflict-and-Post-Conflict-Situations.html>

warn that this may also provoke doubts regarding the motivation of these actors, whether they are trying to reconstruct the socio-political institutions or to threaten the sovereignty of the country targeted by the peacekeeping.

c) Special Envoys

Berridge²⁸ says that special envoys (messengers) are important where special emphasis is needed for a message. Indeed, the Somali conflict cannot be discussed without discussing the role played by the various special envoys appointed by the international community to Somalia.

Okoth John Patrick Oyuga²⁹ says that special envoys have had different effects on the peace process. He argues that for a special envoy to be effective, he must have both access to and the support of the appointing authority in addition to being skilled in conflict management.

It is instructive that there were allegations that some of the envoys to the Somali peace process mishandled the process for their own selfish gains. For example, Kenyans for Justice and Development lobby group recently produced documents they claimed revealed that Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, who mediated the Somali peace process in Kenya in 2004, mismanaged the peace process. The lobbyists added that Mr. Kiplagat hired unqualified people in the secretariat and also traded in the process through his NGO, Africa Peace Forum³⁰. Dietrich Kappeler³¹ rightly adds that diplomacy becomes difficult once it is conducted publicly by persons more concerned with impressing the media and their own public than with the search for a solution acceptable to all concerned.

²⁸ Ibid, pg. 40

²⁹ Okoth, J.P., *Special Envoys in Internal Conflicts: A Case Study of the Somali National Reconciliation Process 2002 – 2006*, Master Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2008

³⁰ Daily Nation Newspaper, March 11, 2010, pg 11

³¹ Kappeler, D., *Iraq: Have Diplomacy and the UN Really Failed?*
<http://textus.diplomacy.edu/thina/TxGetXdoc.asp?IDconv=2979>, 2003

d) Failures of Strategies Employed by the International Community in Somalia

One would expect that the many strategies so far employed by the UN and the international community would have yielded some good results. However, it seems some mistakes have been repeated by the international community over and over again. Shirwa³², for example, points out the faults in the selection criteria for negotiators in Djibouti in 2000. He says that Djibouti selected only civil societies as parties but left out the warlords. This shows that it was never representative and was bound to fail.

Okoth³³ also says that some special envoys did not have proper skills in conflict management to enable them properly negotiate a deal in Somalia. In fact, some of them did not even have a clear understanding of the Somali problem. This also contributed to the exclusive nature of subsequent negotiation efforts.

UN strategies could also have failed in Somalia because they were not devised to deal with the root causes of the problem but with the problem itself. Roy Licklinder³⁴ in his article "Obstacles to Peace Settlements" argues that the reason why peace efforts in civil wars or violence fail is because they do not solve the problems that caused the civil wars.

Nuredin Netabay³⁵ supports the above argument and says that the top-down approach that was employed in Somalia failed to properly identify and address the root causes of the conflict, which he says were unequal power distribution, poor sharing of resources among different Somali clans, negative clanism, marginalisation of intellectuals, misrepresentation in the government, and negative external influences. He therefore proposes a bottom-up approach to solve the conflict on

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Licklinder, R., "Obstacles to Peace Settlements", in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington, D.C: United States Institute Peace Press, 2001), pg. 697-698

³⁵ Netabay, N, *Bottom-Up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somali Conflict*, Master Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2007

Somalia by dealing with the problem from its causes and empowering the local people, raising public awareness, and ensuring representation and participation of all sections of the community in the process. He says that accessible sections of the community like women and elders should play a crucial role in the peace process. This he terms “indigenising the peace building process”.

Curiously, Mohamed Sahnoun³⁶, the veteran Algerian diplomat who served as UN Special Representative to Somalia until his controversial resignation six weeks before the landing of U.S. troops in December 1992, argued that between the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, the United Nations missed at least three opportunities to prevent large-scale loss of life. He said that when the UN began efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, its performance was far surpassed by Non-Governmental Organizations, whose competence and dedication highlighted the UN's bureaucratic inefficiencies and excessive caution. Sahnoun argued that unless sweeping reforms are made, the UN will continue to respond with inept improvisation.

The “exclusive” strategy has failed and UN must adopt the “all-inclusive” strategy. All the stakeholders in the Somali peace process, including the radical Islamists and insurgents must be considered for talks. While the latest efforts by IGAD to bring the Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a to support TFG in an agreement³⁷ signed in Addis Ababa on 15th March 2010 are welcome, a lot more needs to be done.

Bruton³⁸ advances a strategy of “constructive disengagement” that calls for the US to signal that it will accept an Islamist authority in Somalia - including the dreaded Al Shabaab - as long as it does not impede international humanitarian activities and refrains from both regional aggression and support for international jihad. This is the best way to go instead of the past mistakes of branding these groups

³⁶ Sahnoun, M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Foreign Affairs Publication of March/April 1995

³⁷ Daily Nation Newspaper March 16, 2010, pg. 17

³⁸ Ibid

as terrorists and maintaining that negotiating with them is out of question. Indeed, the US policy on Somalia has always been that of containment³⁹.

e) Problems Posed by a Lawless Somalia to the World

A lawless Somalia is a problem to Somalis themselves, the regional countries and the whole world. Terrorism is the biggest threat that such state of anarchy poses to the region and the entire international community. Jonathan Stevenson⁴⁰ argues in his paper “Jihad and Piracy in Somalia” that Islamist elements in Somalia have helped propagate terrorism. He adds that the explosives used in the December 2002 attack on Israeli tourists in Mombasa, Kenya, probably came from Somalia, and perpetrators of that attack and the nearly simultaneous attempted shoot-down of an Israeli airliner leaving Mombasa used Somalia as a bolt-hole. Stevenson further says that a number of Somalis reportedly went to Lebanon to help Hizbullah battle Israeli forces in the 2006 ‘summer war’ in exchange for military training.

Piracy is another negative effect of the lawlessness in Somalia as it affects international shipping⁴¹. Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy. Piracy has contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the WFP’s shipments arrive by sea, and ships have required a military escort. The insurance and ransom demands have ended up increasing the cost of international trade via Somali coastal waters.

Another problem that the Somali crisis has created and is likely to get out of hand is that of refugees and displaced persons. According to United Nations High

³⁹ Abdulahi, O., *The Role of Egypt, Ethiopia the Blue Nile in the Failure of the Somali Conflict Resolutions: A Zero-Sum Game*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hawaii, March 05, 2005, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71766_index.html

⁴⁰ Jonathan Stevenson is a Contributing Editor to *Survival* and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2010/year-2010-issue-1/jihad-and-piracy-in-somalia/>

⁴¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_in_Somalia

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ⁴², by the end of February 2011 alone, there were a total of 373,889 refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya. Out of these, 309,181 were from Somalia⁴³. Other Somali refugees in the region were 2,870 (Tanzania), 11,265 (Uganda), 59,010 (Ethiopia), 10,700 (Djibouti), 4,760 (Eritrea) and 161,468 (Yemen). The total number of IDPs in Somalia was 1,393,000.

Warlords are also very busy conscripting children to fight in Somalia. This is so widespread and entrenched in Somalia that it is becoming a norm. BBC reports⁴⁴ indicate that child soldiers, some as young as eight years, are lured with money and good salary. Some end up being recruited as suicide bombers.

Several reports point to a very disturbing human rights violations in Somalia. Human Rights Watch⁴⁵ says that Somalia is all littered with reports of innocent people crushed to death in their homes after indiscriminate bombardment; injured by shrapnel from mortars, heavy artillery, and bullets and dying slow, agonizing deaths when they are unable to reach medical care; deliberately executed by members of armed groups on all sides; and caught in ceaseless crossfire in densely-populated neighbourhoods. Thousands more have been injured, assaulted, raped, and looted of all their property as they fled the violence in Mogadishu.

All the above literature and other relevant ones will be considered while conducting the study.

⁴² UNHCR Somalia Fact Sheet, March 2011.

⁴³ UNHCR's Statistical Survey as at 28th February 2011

⁴⁴ BBC Report, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8173079.stm>

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch Report, *The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia*, March 30, 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/30/human-rights-crisis-somalia>

METHODOLOGY

The following methods will be used to collect data:

1. Research Design

a) Primary data

- Interview UN, EU, AU and IGAD staff based in Nairobi
- Interview TFG officials who may be in Nairobi
- Interview representatives from Somali civil society, churches, youths and moderate militias who may be in Nairobi
- Interview Somalia refugees and local community representatives in Dadaab camps, Northern Kenya.
- Personal observations

As much as possible, personal interviews will be conducted. However, should appointments for the same not be granted by the respondents, I will use questionnaires and phone interviews.

b) Secondary Data

- Review of all UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council Resolutions on Somalia and their implementations
 - Review of available literature on Somalia and UN actions
 - Review media, conference and internet reports about Somalia

2. Research Population

The study will focus on the UN as the population. However, the target population will be UN in Somalia.

3. Sampling Designs

Biased sampling will be used since the study will focus on targeted informative respondents to get in-depth information.

Limitations of the Research

While all the efforts will be made to accomplish the study using the above methodology, I envisage the following limitations:

- Access to Somali officials may be difficult even when they come to Nairobi due to security and bureaucracy issues.
- Some relevant documents necessary for review may not be easily available
- Limited time and finances to carry out an extensive research

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The Chapter outline for this study will be as follows:

Chapter One: Introduction

This Chapter introduces the topic of my research study and then gives the background of the research problem, statement of the research problem, purpose of the study, objectives of the study, justifications of the study, research hypotheses, research questions, theoretical framework, literature review, methodology and limitations of the study.

Chapter Two: The Genesis of the Somalia Civil War

This Chapter will start by giving a broad overview of conflicts generally and proceed to discuss the history of the Somalia civil war.

Chapter Three: Internationalisation of Internal Conflicts: Case Study of Somalia

This Chapter will use Somalia as a case study and look at how internal conflicts can become an international concern. It will explain how the Somalia civil war has been internationalised by various actors, led by the UN, and the effects of such internationalisation.

Chapter Four: A Critique of the Diplomatic Strategies used by the UN in Somalia between 1992-2010

Here, the various strategies employed by the UN in its numerous attempts to contain the Somalia conflict right from 1992 to 2010 will be critically examined. Emphasis will be given to why they have not yielded positive results to-date.

Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations

This Chapter will provide conclusions of the study and give recommendations necessary after the research.

Chapter Two: The Genesis of the Somalia Civil War

Introduction

This Chapter will start by giving a broad overview of conflicts generally and proceed to discuss the history of the Somalia civil war. The Chapter attempts to explain that while, in general terms, conflicts could be taken to be inherent in society⁴⁶, clannism, power, manipulation, poverty and several other underlying issues have been the major triggers of conflicts and war in Somalia.

Conflicts in the Society

Conflict normally arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something⁴⁷ and according to Mwangi⁴⁸, the incompatibility usually arises because the parties may both have different perceptions, goals, and ideas about how to achieve something. When this incompatibility is not reconciled positively, it most often leads to violence.

The causes of conflicts are as diverse as the conflicts, and the parties to them. Some scholars however argue that the major causes of conflict in the society are the lack of fulfilment of needs like recognition, participation, and dignity⁴⁹. This implies that conflicts will always arise whenever these needs are not satisfied.

In as much as conflict may appear to be destructive, scholars aver that conflicts are very important in the society and cannot be eradicated. In fact, conflict is defined by some as natural, normal and neutral⁵⁰. It is natural in the sense that it has lived and still lives with us and therefore cannot be eliminated. It is also neutral as it affects everybody irrespective of age, social status, colour, race and sex. It is normal

⁴⁶ Webb K, *Conflict: Inherent and Contingent Theories*, World Encyclopaedia of Peace, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986) pp. 169 - 174

⁴⁷ Mitchell C.R, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London: Macmillan, 1998) pp. 15 - 25

⁴⁸ Mwangi, M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p.3

⁴⁹ Burton, J., *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

⁵⁰ Apollon M., *Working for Peace: New Thinking for Peace building*, (Centre for Conflict Resolution, Kenya, 2008) p. 13

as it is a usual occurrence and part and parcel of lives. Conflict can therefore not be wished away in a society.

Mwagiru says that a society without conflict would be both stale and sterile⁵¹. This is in so far as conflicts help people in re-examining their relationships and thereafter making those relationships better and stronger. Conflicts therefore make people understand each other more. This is true even for violent conflicts. For example, violent conflicts helped in deposing despotic regimes in Uganda (Idi Amin), Egypt (Hosni Mubarak), Tunisia (Zine El Abidine Ben Ali) and many others around the world. The end result was beneficial to the people of these countries and to democracy in principle.

Conflicts can also be classified as continuous conflicts, periodic or episodic conflicts, and terminal conflicts.⁵² Continuous conflicts are unplanned conflicts within a stable social system but are usually not very defined. These are found in all organisations and include sibling rivalry, marital discord, office politics, schisms in churches, religious and ethnic hostilities, among others. By and large, continuous conflicts are often a symptom of organisational breakdown.

Periodic or episodic conflicts on the other hand are the recurrent conflicts regulated by rules that participants and witnesses accept as legitimate. They occur at scheduled times and under set conditions, and the weapons or instruments to be used are determined in advance, together with the rules for determining winners and losers. Examples of these include elections conflicts, lawsuits, games, races.

Lastly, in terminal conflicts, the object of at least one side is to destroy the other. Each side thus protects its vital interests against the other. Examples of terminal conflicts are the 1994 Rwanda genocide, Kenya's 2007 post elections violence, conflicts in DRC, Somalia and Darfur.

⁵¹ Mwagiru, M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) at p. 6

⁵² See Apollos M., *Armed Conflict and the Law* (The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Kenya, 2010) pp 5-6

In conclusion, it can be said that conflict is often inevitable. At times, it is even positive in society because it can provide the basis of societal transformation from social, political, economical, environmental and other points of view. If ignored, conflict can turn out to be very violent and destructive. However, if well managed, conflicts can produce involvement, direction, production, and improvement.

Conflict Situations in the World

Global history is replete with conflict and war situations. Today, the global community seems to be chasing a very elusive peace as guns refuse to go silent in many countries. In Afghanistan, remnants of the Taliban, the ultra-strict Islamist government that ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, and their *al-Qaeda* allies are trying to overthrow the country's democratically elected government. They are also trying to force several thousand foreign troops, mostly from the United States, and peacekeepers from several other countries, to go home. These two battles are taking place against a backdrop of longstanding interethnic conflict and violence surrounding a highly lucrative drug trade⁵³.

Even developed European countries like Spain have not been spared. At its heart, this is a conflict over whether or not the Basque people have the right to break away from Spain. Although serious tensions between the Basques and other Spaniards date back to the 1800s, things heated up in the 1930s when General Franco, a fierce opponent of all regional independence movements, assumed power. In the 1960s, in response to the intense persecution Franco dished out, a terrorist group (best known by its Basque acronym - ETA) emerged. The Spanish government has been trying to defeat this group ever since.

In Russia, the war is basically over whether or not Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation⁵⁴. The Chechens believe they are engaged in a legitimate struggle

⁵³ Council on Foreign Relations, *The Taliban in Afghanistan*, (August 3, 2009) <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551> retrieved on 23 May 2011.

⁵⁴ Matthew E., *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

for independence, while Moscow considers Chechnya a Russian province and brands former Chechen leaders as terrorists. The deeply-seated hostility between the two sides has made ending this brutal conflict so difficult.

Latin America also has its share of the problem. In Colombia, for more than 45 years, left-wing guerrillas, notably the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), have been fighting the Colombian government, which they blame for the country's great social inequality. In the 1980s, right-wing paramilitary groups, many of them sponsored by rich drug lords, emerged to fight the guerrillas. Colombia's civil war, which has roots in Spanish colonialism, has evolved over the years and continues to threaten peace and tranquillity in the region⁵⁵.

Iraqis on the other side are suffering the effects of a brutal insurgency as well as a bloody sectarian conflict, which was triggered by a U.S-led invasion in March 2003. Insurgents, mostly Sunni Muslims intent on regaining the power they enjoyed under former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, carry out attacks meant to destabilize the Iraqi government, and violence between Iraq's Sunnis and its majority Shi'is, though it has declined considerably since 2007, still continues.

Still in Asia, India and Pakistan (both nuclear powers) have, twice since 1999, been on the verge of war. This has been, to a large extent, because they cannot agree on who should control the mountainous Himalayan region of Jammu and Kashmir. It thus remains a volatile conflict situation⁵⁶.

Another hot potato has been the Israeli – Palestine war. In 1947, the United Nations voted to divide Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas and, in 1948, Israel declared itself an independent state. Outraged, Arab armies attempted to take Israel back but were soundly defeated. Israel has since sustained its efforts to secure

⁵⁵ Livingstone G., *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War* (Rutgers University Press, 2004)

⁵⁶ Ali T., *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*. (Penguin Books Ltd, 1983)

its borders while Palestinians have made frantic efforts to reclaim some of the land that was once theirs.

North and South Korea have also not had it easy. The two countries separated shortly before the Korean Peninsula was embroiled in a war involving the United States and its Cold War foes, China and the Soviet Union. Even though the Cold War is long over, North and South Korea are technically still at war and North Korea's recent pursuit of nuclear weapons has turned an already tense situation into a crisis.

In Ireland, even long before 1921 when the country was split into two countries, there were tensions between the primarily Protestant and industrialized north and the mostly Catholic and agrarian south. Struggled ensued between those who want to see Northern Ireland become a part of what is now the Republic of Ireland and those who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Conflicts in Africa

Africa, otherwise referred to in some quarters as the Black Continent, has borne the brunt of conflicts and wars, the causes of which have been as complex and varied as the culture of its people. Africa's conflicts can be attributed to historical factors such as the European and Arab slave trade, colonial rule, decolonisation as well the Cold War rivalries. However, after the Cold War, some of the most notable causes of conflicts are inter-state boundaries, authoritarian rule, poverty, demographic pressure, ethnicity and ethnic manipulation and neo-colonial manipulation⁵⁷.

In all, the history of post-colonial Africa is replete with many accounts of political conflicts. Millions of people have been slaughtered from a number of conflicts and civil wars in the continent. Statistics show that since World War II, while civil strife, regional crises and overall international outbreaks of violence have averaged about thirty per annum, over 90 per cent of these conflicts have taken place in

⁵⁷ Apollos M., *Armed Conflict and the Law* (The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Kenya, 2010)

the third world and most have been protracted and socio-ethnic rather than strategic conflicts.⁵⁸

In Darfur, a large region in western Sudan and home to numerous ethnic groups, violence broke out in 2003, when African rebels demanding better treatment for Darfur attacked a Sudanese military site. The Sudanese government retaliated by arming Arab militias and pitted them against the rebels. These militias have fought the rebels and massacred a lot of their civilian supporters⁵⁹.

Recently, a wave of protests erupted throughout the Middle East and North Africa over a combination of issues, namely, global financial crisis, rising costs of living, high unemployment - especially of educated youth, and frustration from decades of living under authoritarian and corrupt regimes. Some protests have become revolutions as governments such as those in Tunisia and Egypt have been overthrown. Others have not got that far but have sometimes been peaceful, other times met with very brutal repression. In Lybia, peaceful protests against the long-running oppressive Qaddafi regime in February resulted in a violent crackdown which metamorphosed into a full civil war.

In Cote d'Ivoire, following elections in October 2010, both President Laurent Gbagbo and opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara, claimed victory. International observers agreed that the Ouattara had won, but Gbagbo refused to accept this. Negotiations failed and the situation became volatile and violent outbursts turned into the country's second civil war which continued for sometime before Gbagbo was thrown out of power.

⁵⁸ Azar E., *Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations.* In Zinnes D.A. (ed), *Conflict Processes and the Breakdown of International System*, Vol. 20 book 2. Monograph Series in International Affairs, (Colorado: University of Denver, 1984) p. 84

⁵⁹ Wamwere K, *Negative Ethnicity: From Bias to Genocide*, (Seven Stories Press, 2003) p. 152.

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the other hand has largely been resource-based. There have been a number of complex reasons, including conflicts over basic resources such as water, access and control over rich minerals and other resources and various political agendas. This has been fuelled and supported by various national and international corporations and other regimes which have an interest in the outcome of the conflict.

In Nigeria, the epicentre has been the Niger Delta and the main reason for tensions and violence has been oil. Religious differences between the Muslim North and Christian South have also been a major trigger for the violence.

Sierra Leone is also another statistics when it comes to conflicts in Africa. Its civil war erupted in 1991 and this was linked to factors such as diamond connection, the gross abuses committed by both rebel and government forces, and the problems of the then peace treaty.

Another conflict situation has been Ethiopia and Eritrea. Even after Eritrea's independence, relations between them have deteriorated and resulted into war a couple of years after Eritrea introduced its own currency in 1997. War again resulted over what seemed to be a minor border dispute in May 1998.

Conflicts in Africa can not be discussed without mentioning the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The genocide was basically caused by the ancient tribal hatreds, international economic policies, power politics and corruption of the elite.

Recently, in 2007/08, post-elections violence erupted in Kenya over serious underlying issues like historical injustices, land problems, youth unemployment, corruption and ineffective legal systems. Thousands of people were killed and/or injured, and others displaced. A similar situation repeated itself in Uganda after its 2011 elections.

It can be concluded, as has been argued by Nasong'o,⁶⁰ that though the phenomenon of political conflicts in Africa has traditionally been explained in terms of the inter-ethnic hatred theory, they are caused by contests over state resources in a context that is devoid of effective political institutions.

The Somalia Problem

History of Somalia

Despite the existence of minority groups, Somali society is relatively homogenous linguistically (Somali) and religiously (Islam). Lineage underpins Somali society, with divisions defined along clan and sub clan lines. Therefore, to understand conflicts in Somalia, one should, alongside other dynamics, first understand clannism. This was perpetuated by the colonial masters for selfish motives and has been used both as a unifying factor and, at times, a divider.

Traditionally, the main clan families of Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn, along with minority clans, constituted Somali society. Within each of these clans, there are many sub-clans and sub-sub clans⁶¹.

Historically, Somalia was granted independence in 1960 by the Italian administrators. This followed a trusteeship role given by the UN to Italy in 1949 over Somalia, but only under close supervision and on the conditions proposed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and other nascent Somali political organizations that Somalia achieves independence within ten years. To the extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave the Somalis the opportunity

⁶⁰Nasong'o, S.W., "*Resources Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa: Beyond the Inter-Ethnic Hatred Thesis*", in Okoth P.G, et al, (eds) *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, (Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2008) pp. 44-54

⁶¹ There is no agreement on the sub clan structure, with Somalis themselves disputing clan affiliations, further complicated by fluid sub clan identity affiliations.

to gain experience in political education and self-government. Independence was therefore to be granted to the well developed Somali political culture⁶².

The freshly independent Somalis, including women, loved politics and were always carrying their radios to enable them listen to political speeches. Despite this promising start, there were remarkable structural and underlying problems, most notably the north/south economic divide and the Ogaden issue. Another issue was the longstanding distrust of Ethiopia and the deeply rooted belief that Ogaden was actually part of Somalia. These issues were, unfortunately not addressed before Somalia got independence hence remained as underlying problems. The north and south spoke different languages (English and Italian respectively) and had different currencies.

The beginning of tensions in Somalia

From early 1960s, worrying trends began to emerge when the north started to reject referendums that had won a majority of votes, based on an overwhelming southern favouritism. This worsened in 1961 when northern paramilitary organizations revolted when placed under south's command. The north's second largest political party began openly advocating secession. Subsequent attempts to deal with these divides with the formation of a Pan-Somalian party proved to be ineffective. The end result was that one party attempted to unite the bickering regions (north and south) by rallying them against their common enemy, Ethiopia, with a view to re-conquering Ogaden. Other nationalistic party platforms were seen in attempts to reclaim northern Kenya, which was largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis.⁶³

By the late 1960s, the Somali democracy that had enjoyed a good start began to crumble. In the 1967 election, due to complicated and dynamic clan loyalties, the winner was not properly recognized and instead a new secret vote was taken by already elected members of the National Assembly (senators). The main

⁶² Tripodi P., *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) p. 68.

⁶³ Women's Rights Project, *The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women's Human Rights*, (Yale University Press: 1995), p.121

election issue then was whether or not to use military force to bring about the long lived dream of pan-Somalism, which would mean war with Ethiopia and Kenya and possibly Djibouti to reclaim what was widely called “the Greater Somalia”.

A lot of factors colluded to set the stage for a coup d'état and on 15th October 1969, a bodyguard killed the then President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke while Prime Minister Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal was out of the country.⁶⁴ Egal, who was from the Isaaq clan, later returned to Mogadishu to arrange for the selection of a new president and his choice was, like Sharmarke, from the Daarood clan. However, government critics, particularly a group of army officers, saw no hope for improving the country's situation by this means. They also perceived the government as being so corrupt. Disillusionment therefore reigned within the military. On 21st October 1969, therefore, when it became clear that the assembly would support Egal's choice, army units, with the cooperation of the police, took over strategic points in Mogadishu and rounded up government officials and other prominent political figures.

The military takeover succeeded and army commander Major General Salad Gabeire Kediye and Mohammad Siad Barre assumed leadership of the officers who overthrew the civilian government. The new governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) leader Salad Gabeire, installed Siad Barre as its president. The SRC then arrested and detained leading members of the democratic regime, including Egal at the presidential palace, and banned political parties, abolished the National Assembly, and suspended the constitution. The new government swore to support national liberation movements and Somali unification. The country was thus renamed the Somali Democratic Republic⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ Mwakikagile G., *The Modern African State: Quest for Transformation* (Huntington, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001) p. 110

⁶⁵ Africa Watch Committee Report, *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, (New York: 1990).

Other promises given by the SRC were rapid economic and social development through "crash programs", efficient and responsive government, and creation of a standard written form of Somali as the country's single official language. A lot of powers were vested in the president, his twenty-five-member military junta and a subordinate fourteen-man secretariat - the Council of the Secretaries of State (CSS), which functioned as a cabinet and was responsible for day-to-day government operation, although it lacked political power. In February 1970, the democratic constitution of 1960, suspended at the time of the coup, was repealed by the SRC.

What followed was that military and police officers, including some SRC members, replaced civilian district and regional officials and headed all government agencies and public institutions. Meanwhile, civil servants attended reorientation courses that combined professional training with political indoctrination, and those found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were fired.

Siad Barre and scientific socialism

The SRC took its toughest political stance in the campaign to break down the solidarity of the lineage groups. Tribalism was condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity. Siad Barre denounced clannism in a wider context as a "disease" obstructing development not only in Somalia, but also throughout the Third World. The government meted out prison terms and fines for a broad category of proscribed activities classified as clannism. Traditional headmen, whom the democratic government had paid a stipend, were replaced by reliable local dignitaries known as "peacekeepers" (*nabod doan*), appointed by Mogadishu to represent government interests.

To increase production and control over the nomads, the government resettled 140,000 nomadic pastoralists in farming communities and in coastal towns, where the erstwhile herders were encouraged to engage in agriculture and fishing. By dispersing the nomads and severing their ties with the land to which specific clans made collective claim, the government may also have undercut clan solidarity. In

many instances, real improvement in the living conditions of resettled nomads was evident, but despite government efforts to eliminate it, clan consciousness as well as a desire to return to the nomadic life persisted. Concurrent SRC attempts to improve the status of Somali women were unpopular in a traditional Muslim society, despite Siad Barre's argument that such reforms were consistent with Islamic principles. In the years to come, Siad Barre fostered the growth of a personality cult.

Somalia's adherence to socialism became official on the first anniversary of the military coup when Siad Barre proclaimed that Somalia was a socialist state, despite the fact that the country had no history of class conflict in the Marxist sense. For purposes of Marxist analysis, therefore, clannism was equated with class in a society struggling to liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation⁶⁶.

Despite the revolutionary regime's intention to stamp out the clan politics, the government was commonly referred to by the code name MOD. This acronym stood for Marehan (Siad Barre's clan), Ogaden (the clan of Siad Barre's mother), and Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre's son-in-law). These were the three clans whose members formed the government's inner circle. In 1975, for instance, ten of the twenty members of the SRC were from the Daarood clan-family, of which these three clans were a part.

Creation of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

One of the SRC's first acts was to prohibit the existence of any political association. Under Soviet pressure to create a communist party structure to replace Somalia's military regime, Siad Barre had announced as early as 1971 the SRC's intention to establish a one-party state. The SRC already had begun organizing what was described as a "vanguard of the revolution" composed of members of a socialist elite drawn from the military and the civilian sectors. The National Public Relations Office (later renamed the National Political Office in 1973) was formed to propagate

⁶⁶ Samatar A., *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, (London: Zed Press, 1998) p.137

scientific socialism with the support of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance through orientation centers that had been built around the country, generally as local self-help projects.

The SRC convened a congress of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in June 1976 and voted to establish the Supreme Council as the new party's central committee. The council included the nineteen officers who composed the SRC, in addition to civilian advisers, heads of ministries, and other public figures. Civilians accounted for a majority of the Supreme Council's seventy-three members. On July 1, 1976, the SRC dissolved itself, formally vesting power over the government in the SRSP under the direction of the Supreme Council but power still resided in Siad Barre and a few people.

The Ogaden War

Having toyed around with the idea of "Greater Somalia" for long, in 1977, Siad Barre, was able to muster 35,000 regulars and 15,000 fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front. His forces began infiltrating into the Ogaden in May - June 1977, and overt warfare began in July. By September 1977, Mogadishu controlled all of the Ogaden and had followed retreating Ethiopian forces into non-Somali regions of Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo.

However, thanks to Cold-War rivalry, Ethiopia gained support from USSR and Cuba and regained control over the Ogaden in 1978. Siad Barre therefore proved unable to return the Ogaden to Somali rule, and this made his people grow restive. Subsequently, in northern Somalia, rebels destroyed administrative centres and took over major towns. The Ogaden war ended in 1988 when the two Somalia and Ethiopia withdrew their armies.

The beginning of an End for Siad Barre

Faced with shrinking popularity and an armed and organized domestic resistance, Siad Barre unleashed a reign of terror against the Majeerteen, the Hawiye,

and the Isaaq clans⁶⁷. This only gave the president a temporary reprieve till 1986 when he was severely injured in a road accident which occasioned a power struggle among senior army commandants, elements of the president's Marehan clan, and related factions, whose infighting practically brought the country to a standstill. Broadly, two groups fought for power: a constitutional faction and a clan faction. The constitutional faction was led by the senior vice president, Brigadier General Muhammad Ali Samantar; the second vice president, Major General Hussein Kulmiye; and Generals Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah and Ahmad Mahamuud Faarah. The four, together with President Siad Barre, constituted the politburo of the SRSP.

Opposed to the constitutional group were elements from the president's Marehan clan, especially members of his immediate family, including his brother, Abdirahmaan Jaama Barre; the president's son, Colonel Masleh Siad, and the formidable Mama Khadiija, Siad Barre's senior wife. By some accounts, Mama Khadiija ran her own intelligence network, had well-placed political contacts, and oversaw a large group who had prospered under her patronage.

In November 1986, the dreaded Red Berets unleashed a campaign of terror and intimidation on a frightened citizenry. Meanwhile, the ministries atrophied and the army's officer corps was purged of competent career officers on suspicion of insufficient loyalty to the president. In addition, ministers and bureaucrats plundered what was left of the national treasury after it had been repeatedly skimmed by the top family.

In the same month, the SRSP held its third congress. The Central Committee was reshuffled and the president was nominated as the only candidate for another seven-year term. Thus, with a weak opposition divided along clan lines, which he skilfully exploited, Siad Barre seemed invulnerable well into 1988. The

⁶⁷ Metz, H. C., "*Siad Barre's Repressive Measures*" in Library of Congress (ed) *Somalia: A Country Study*, (Washington, D.C.: 1992)

regime might have lingered indefinitely but for the wholesale disaffection engendered by the genocidal policies carried out against important lineages of Somali kinship groupings. These actions were waged first against the Majeerteen clan (of the Darod clan-family), then against the Isaaq clans of the north, and finally against the Hawiye, who occupied the strategic central area of the country, which included the capital. The disaffection of the Hawiye and their subsequent organized armed resistance eventually caused the regime's downfall.

The end of Siad Barre and the beginning of civil war

With worsening conditions in Somalia, rebels of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Mohamed Farrah Aidid attacked Mogadishu and on January 26, 1991, Barre's government was taken out of power. The ouster of the Barre regime was followed not by a replacement government but by a prolonged period of violent anarchy and warfare. Armed conflict raged across southern Somalia through 1991 and 1992, pitting clan-based militias against one another for control of valuable towns, seaports, and neighborhoods⁶⁸.

The wars, which began as struggle for control of the government, quickly degenerated into predatory looting, banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering clan militias. Powerful merchants and warlords were implicated in this war economy too. The principal victims of this violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting. Looted of all their belongings, they faced a massive famine in late 1991 and early 1992, prompting large international relief operations. The food aid quickly became part of the war economy, a commodity over which militias fought and that warlords diverted to fund the wars.

In May 1991, the north-western Somaliland region of Somalia declared its independence. This Isaaq-dominated governing zone is not recognized by any major

⁶⁸ Aidid, M. F., and Satya P.R., *"Somalia: From the Dawn of Civilization to the Modern Times"* (Civic Webs Virtual Library: 2001), http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/somalia/1994/dawn_of_civilization/index.htm. Retrieved on 23 May 2011.

international organization or country, although it has remained more stable and certainly more peaceful than the rest of Somalia.⁶⁹

UN Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed on December 3, 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States to form UNITAF, tasked with ensuring humanitarian aid being distributed and peace being established in Somalia until the humanitarian efforts were transferred to the UN. The UN humanitarian troops landed in 1993 and started a two-year effort (primarily in the south), known as UNOSOM II, to alleviate famine conditions.

Many Somalis opposed the foreign presence. In October, several gun battles in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers resulted in the death of 24 Pakistanis and 19 US soldiers (total US deaths were 31). Most of the Americans were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu. The UN withdrew its troops in March 3, 1995, having suffered more significant casualties.

Unfortunately, the various Somali militias had at this point developed into security agencies for hire. A free state of anarchy therefore started prevailing. The government completely collapsed.

In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected to lead the Transitional National Government (TNG). This was followed in 2004 by the establishment in Nairobi of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia,

⁶⁹ Another secession from Somalia took place in the northeastern region. The self-proclaimed state took the name Puntland after declaring "temporary" independence in 1998, with the intention that it would participate in any Somali reconciliation to form a new central government. A third secession occurred in 1998 with the declaration of the state of Jubaland. The territory of Jubaland is now encompassed by the state of Southwestern Somalia and its status is unclear. A fourth self-proclaimed entity led by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was set up in 1999, along the lines of Puntland. That "temporary" secession was reasserted in 2002. This led to the autonomy of Southwestern Somalia. The RRA had originally set up an autonomous administration over the Bay and Bakool regions of south and central Somalia in 1999.

the most recent attempt to restore national institutions to the nation after the 1991 collapse of the Barre regime and the ensuing civil war.

Though internationally recognized, the TFG's support in Somalia was waning until the United States-backed 2006 intervention by the Ethiopian military, which helped drive out the rival Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu and solidify the TFG's rule.⁷⁰ Following this defeat, the ICU splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and opposed the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the country, leaving behind a small and weak African Union (AU) peacekeeping force⁷¹.

Over the next few months, several Somali factions gathered in Djibouti under the so-called Djibouti process and a new President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected from amongst the more moderate Islamists. TFG, with the help of a small team of African Union troops, began a counteroffensive thereafter to retake control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its control of southern Somalia, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union and other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. However, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam refused to join the Djibouti process and vowed to stay in opposition, and wage war against TFG and AU forces.⁷² Even the intended truce announced in March 2009 by

⁷⁰ O'Kasick J., *Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia*, Global Policy Forum: 2007

⁷¹ USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - *The Commission's Watch List: Somalia*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/USCIRF/4a4f272bc/0.html>, retrieved on 24 May 2011

⁷² BBC News, *Islamists Break Somali Port Truce, 21 October 2009*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8318798.stm>

TFG that it would implement shari'a as the nation's official judicial system did not please the insurgent opposition.⁷³

Conclusion

As has been seen in this Chapter, Somalia's history of conflict reveals an intriguing paradox, that is, many of the factors that drive armed conflicts have also played a role in managing, ending, or preventing war. For instance, clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict, used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve. Most of Somalia's armed clashes have been fought in the name of clan, often as a result of political leaders manipulating clannism for their own purposes. Yet traditional clan elders are a primary source of conflict mediation, clan-based customary law serves as the basis for negotiated settlements, and clan-based blood-payment groups serve as a deterrent to armed violence. The importance of clannism in Somalia politics further explains why attempts to make peace in the region have always involved community elders, in the hope that they would use tradition to resolve communal conflicts.

Likewise, the central state is conventionally viewed as a potential source of rule of law and peaceful allocation of resources, but, at times in Somalia's past, it was a source of violence and predation. Economic interests, too, have had an ambiguous relationship with conflict in Somalia. In some places, war economies have emerged that perpetuate violence and lawlessness, while in other instances business interests have been a driving force for peace, stability, and rule of law.

The next Chapter will seek to explain how the Somalia civil war was internationalized by the entry of the international community and the politics that

⁷³ Arab News, *Shariah in Somalia*, 1 March 2009
<http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=4§ion=0&article=119757&d=1&m=3&y=2009>

followed the interventions. The successes and failures of such interventions will be examined.

Chapter Three: Internationalisation of Internal Conflicts: Case Study of Somalia

Introduction

This Chapter will use Somalia as a case study and look at how internal conflicts can become an international concern. It will explain how the Somalia civil war has been internationalised by various actors, led by the UN. It will also show how the Somalia population and the local actors reacted to the entry of international actors in the civil war and the ultimate effect and consequences of the internationalisation of the conflict.

Definition of terms

From the onset, a number of concepts need to be defined as follows:

a) Internal and International conflicts

Whereas internal conflicts take place within territorial borders of a state and involve only local actors within the borders of that state, international conflicts involve two or more countries with actors from outside the borders of one state⁷⁴. A civil conflict like the one in Somalia falls within the purview of internal conflict.

b) Internationalised conflicts

Even though internal conflicts take place within the borders of a country, there is potential that it can cross over the borders to the other country, thus involving communities on the other side of the border. This brings a direct relationship between internal and international conflicts and Mitchell goes further to explain that internal conflicts become internationalized once they cross an international border into other countries⁷⁵.

⁷⁴ Mitchell C.R., *The Structure of International Conflict* (London Macmillan, 1998) pp.15-25.

⁷⁵ Ibid

Internationalization of conflicts therefore, is where the internal conflicts cross the borders of the countries where they started by involving the communities in neighbouring countries. This means that internal conflicts in one community can easily become internationalised and have elements of international character just by virtue of crossing international borders. To a conflict manager, this has serious implications and challenges because they must develop effective conflict management approaches to cater for such developments⁷⁶.

The Internationalisation of Internal Armed Conflicts

Brown⁷⁷ defines *internal armed conflict* as a “violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systematic factors and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state. These could include violent power struggles between civilian or military leaders, armed ethnic conflicts, criminal organisations attacking the state sovereignty, armed ideological struggles, and revolutions.

It therefore follows that the term “*internationalised armed conflict*” describes internal hostilities that are rendered international. Mwangi⁷⁸ however argues that no line can be drawn between internal and international conflicts. He says that all international conflicts have domestic sources and become internationalised when external actors or factors are introduced in an originally internal conflict.

Examples of internationalised internal armed conflicts in recent history include NATO’s intervention in the armed conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999⁷⁹ and the intervention undertaken by Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and others, in

⁷⁶ Mwangi M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p. 68

⁷⁷ Brown M.E. (ed), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 1

⁷⁸ Mwangi, M., *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, PhD Thesis, Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994. pg. 27-29

⁷⁹ Egorov, S.A., *The Kosovo Crisis and the Law of Armed Conflicts*, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 2000, p.183.

support of opposing sides of the internal armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998⁸⁰. Somalia is a rich case study for “internationalised armed conflicts” due to various interventions by the international community on its long conflicts.

It has been argued that internal conflicts are presently more numerous, brutal and damaging than international conflicts, despite the fact that the State remains the main war-waging entity⁸¹. This has in essence increased the need for interventions and consequently internationalisation of otherwise internal conflicts.

However, some states have taken refuge in the fact that UN Charter does not allow for the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and/or interference by one state in another’s internal affairs⁸². This has given humanitarian interventions wide acceptance in conflict states.

The test for internationalisation

In the *Tadi’c Appeal Judgement*⁸³, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stipulated that:

“It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.”⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Shaw, M., *From the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 to the Congo Civil War*, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/rwanda.htm>, Retrieved on 20 June 2011.

⁸¹ De Schutter and C. Van De Wyngaert, *Non-international Armed Conflicts: The Borderline Between National and International Law*, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, 1983, p. 279.

⁸² Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the UN Charter

⁸³ Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40277f504.html>

⁸⁴ Para. 84

c) Internationalisation of the Somalia conflict

The Somalia conflict was internationalised because of its immediate or potential effects to the international community. The interventions became necessary because the civilian population was being mercilessly butchered in the ensuing anarchy. Bjorn Moller states that by March 1992 alone, the population of Mogadishu had been decimated, at least 300,000 people having died of hunger and related diseases, and the direct death toll from the fighting amounting to around 44,000⁸⁵. The international media then picked the suffering of Somalis and brought it to the attention of the international community, which then decided to intervene.

Apart from UN, neighbouring (regional) countries also intervened in the Somali conflict. Ghebremeskel states that one of the regional interventions in settling the Somali conflict was the Ethio-Eritrean initiative, which aimed at bringing about a broad-based conference in which all parties to the conflict were supposed to take part⁸⁶. However, this initiative failed as the international community was not willing to support it.

Ghebremeskel adds that interventions continued at the sub-regional level with Ethiopia organising the first meeting on Somalia in May-June 1992. Other interventions were to follow with IGAD and Djibouti playing pivotal roles⁸⁷. Kenya was later to play a key role that led to the creation of TFG in Nairobi⁸⁸.

In fact, the Somali conflict has been so much internationalised that a contact group, the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia has been established. ICG is an informal group of mainly western UN Ambassadors that was established at the United Nations headquarters in New York in June 2006 to support

⁸⁵ Moller B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors*, (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009)

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Shirwa, H.F., *The Sub-Regional Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of the Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict, May-August 2000*, M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2005

⁸⁸ Momanyi, L.S., *The Role of Actors and Processes in the Conduct of Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of Somalia National Reconciliation Process in Kenya 2002 –2003*, Masters Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2003

peace and reconciliation process in Somalia⁸⁹. ICG for Somalia has since had several meetings in different capitals around the world, the latest being its 19th meeting held in June 2011 in Kampala, Uganda, under the Chairmanship of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Augustine Mahiga, which reiterated its concern at the continued instability and dire humanitarian situation for many Somalis and also reiterated its call for a comprehensive strategy to encourage peace and stability in Somalia.

The main intention of the ICG has been to mobilise international support and attention for the Somalia peace process, both in the areas of security (on-shore and off-shore), politics and humanitarian. It can be said that this has helped in internationalising the conflict and maintaining it as a top agenda internationally.

d) Interventions

As has been seen above, once the conflict is internationalised, third party (external) actors will get in to help the internal actors manage the conflict. This is the process of intervention. Third parties can be outsiders with no stake in the outcome, or partisan but viewed as legitimate and essential by all involved. Third party intervention is a typical response to destructive and persistent social conflict and comes in a number of different forms attended by a variety of issues.⁹⁰ Third party interventions can either be through mediations, judicial settlements, good offices of the UN Secretary General, peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, among others.

⁸⁹ The original members of the group were US - at whose initiative the group was formed, Norway - which chaired the first meeting, Italy, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom and EU. Invited as observers were AU, IGAD, The League of Arab States and UN.

⁹⁰ Fisher R. and Ury W., *Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991)

Interventions in Somalia

When hell broke loose in Somalia following the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, it was by all accounts a civil war. However, it quickly degenerated into a humanitarian crisis and caught the attention of the entire world. A lot of people were killed in the ensuing war and several others displaced. Thanks to the international media that highlighted the Somalia crisis and the subsequent humanitarian problem, a lot of interventions followed as follows:

a) Military Intervention and Peacekeeping

In April 1992, UN passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751, which authorised intervention in the Somali civil war and led to the creation of the first United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). This led to the deployment of fifty unarmed military observers to Somalia who proved to be very ineffective.

In December 1992, the UN Security Council declared the situation in Somalia a “threat to international peace and security”. US responded by initiating “Operation Restore Hope” and led a 28,000 military force to a UN sanctioned multinational coalition known as United Task Force (UNITAF).

UNITAF remained in Somalia till 1993 when the second UN operation, UNOSOM II was sent. Between June and October 1993, several gun battles in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers resulted in the death of 24 Pakistani Soldiers and 31 US soldiers. UNOSOM was finally withdrawn in March 1995, having lost control of Mogadishu in a continually deteriorating security situation and having suffered more significant casualties.

The security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate and Somalia continued without a central government. In 2004, the international community intervened by having the several factions and clans from Somalia agree on a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Nairobi, Kenya. Since matters were still

too chaotic inside Somalia, TFG could not relocate to Mogadishu and continued to operate in Nairobi

However, in early 2006, with the help of Ethiopian forces, the TFG moved to establish a temporary seat of government in Baidoa, Somalia. Militancy still continued against TFG under the auspices of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU allegedly obtained the support of Ethiopia's rival, Eritrea and foreign mujahideen (religious fundamentalists), and declared Jihad against Ethiopia in response to its occupation of Gedo and deployment around Baidoa areas.

The ICU and TFG war continued and this was later called the Battle of Baidoa. In January 2007, the United States officially militarily interceded in the country for the first time since the UN deployment of the 1990s by conducting airstrikes using AC-130 gunships against Islamist positions in Ras Kamboni, as part of efforts to catch or kill Al Qaeda operatives supposedly embedded within the ICU forces. No sooner had the ICU been routed from the battlefield than their troops dispersed to begin a guerrilla warfare against Ethiopian and Somali government forces. Simultaneously, the end of the war was followed by a continuation of existing tribal conflicts.

To help establish security, the African Union, with the approval of the UN Security Council through Resolution 1744 (of 2007), established the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 with the intention of deploying as many as 8,000 peacekeepers to the country⁹¹. This mission widened the scope of countries that could participate over the earlier proposed mission led by the Horn of Africa-based nations of IGAD.

The creation of AMISOM shows a new attempt to regionalise the Somali conflict and mandate the regional states and bodies to take the front seat in tackling

⁹¹ AMISOM was initially deployed for 6 months but has had its term successively renewed by the UN Security Council. Its initial intended force strength was 8,000 but this was increased by UNSC Resolution 1964 (2010) to 12,000 and is intended to be achieved by end of 2011. The current Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are Uganda and Burundi.

the crisis in Somalia. Leonardo Paz Nevez and Marcelo M. Valenca⁹² say that the regionalization of the peacekeeping helps to tackle more effectively the causes of the conflicts and its consequences in the post-conflict society. They argue that the increasing participation of neighbouring countries in the Somali conflict reflects the importance of legitimising the peacekeeping operations by involving countries that share similar backgrounds, development levels and cultural aspects. They however warn that this may also provoke doubts regarding the motivation of these actors, whether they are trying to reconstruct the socio-political institutions or to threaten the sovereignty of the country targeted by the peacekeeping.

However, the creation of AMISOM and the subsequent liberal interpretation of its mandate has been a clever attempt at moving away from the conservative view that peacekeeping only deals with “keeping the peace” or maintaining ceasefires. This could not have worked in Somalia since there is neither any peace to keep nor ceasefire to be implemented. AMISOM has therefore been involved in both peace support and peace enforcement activities. It is however hoped that it will soon be taken over by the UN peacekeepers once reasonable stability is restored⁹³.

Today, the Somali peacekeeping operation is a regional issue with its offices in Nairobi and controlled by the African Union and other regional bodies but supported heavily by the UN. The Somali government is just one of the partners in this operation.

b) Humanitarian Interventions

Even though Article 2(7) of the UN Charter disallows interference by one state in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state, humanitarian intervention has been accepted as an exception to this rule. Article 4 (h) of the African Union Constitutive Act went as far as recognising the right to intervene under

⁹² Neves, L.P., and Valenca, M.M. *Issues of Regionalising the Peacekeeping: The Somalia Crisis in 2007*, <http://www.peace-building.de/11-0-Panel-5-External-Actors-in-Conflict-and-Post-Conflict-Situations.html>

⁹³ See UN Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009)

humanitarian circumstances⁹⁴. This however has been described by other scholars as a radical departure from, and in stark contrast with, the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, the very cornerstones of the UN Charter. Although intervention had traditionally been opposed by African States and regarded as imperialism, under the AU Act, AU Member States have themselves accepted sovereignty not as a shield but as a responsibility where the AU has the right to intervene to save lives from mass atrocity crimes.

Today, human rights are not a purely domestic concern and sovereignty cannot shield repressive states. Thus, if a state is unable or unwilling to protect its people the responsibility falls on other states to intervene and provide humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, for example, the provision of medical care, food to starving populations, clean water and sanitation, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in times of humanitarian crises. The primary objective of humanitarian action is to save lives, alleviate human suffering and to maintain human dignity.

The rationale for humanitarian aid is embodied in international customary law- a duty in certain cases to disregard state sovereignty to preserve common humanity. Traditionally humanitarian action was oriented to shorter, lifesaving interventions with a clearly defined exit strategy.⁹⁵ Intervening across state borders was justified on the basis of humanitarian need. The aim was to relieve suffering whether caused by natural calamities or by war.

More recently however, Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHA's) have been urged to extend their activities into developmental relief and peace building as donor governments have looked to humanitarian assistance as a form of leverage and influence to be exercised for conflict management purposes. As

⁹⁵ Andrew Rigby, *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management: The View From the Non-Governmental Sector*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001 p. 957

Bercovitch states, third parties do not involve themselves in conflict resolution purely for altruistic reasons.⁹⁶ Mwangiru too agrees that individuals and institutions get involved in conflicts based on what they can gain from their involvement. Because of this self-interest, third parties choose the roles and strategies of conflict management that will augment their rewards.

Humanitarian aid normally presupposes that there is a ceasefire or other efforts in place to secure and stabilize the environment e.g. through peacekeepers. This is necessary because most of the humanitarian personnel are either volunteers or professionals who have no military background and for them to provide the humanitarian aid effectively a safe and secure environment is important.

Based on the foregoing arguments and given that after years of conflict and drought in Somalia, almost half the population are in need of life-saving assistance with about 1.4 million people displaced, access to basic services such as health or safe water is seriously lacking⁹⁷, a lot of humanitarian interventions have taken place in Somalia to save the suffering civilian population. The main agents for this have been the UN Agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations who distribute food and non-food items. Examples are World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Food and agriculture Organisation (FAO), and European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)⁹⁸.

To ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid to Somalia, a lot of naval forces have been stationed off the Coast of Somalia to protect the aid from pirates in the Indian Ocean. For example, the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)

⁹⁶ J. Bercovitch, *The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations* in J Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin (eds), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches for Conflict Management* (London: Macmillan, 1992) pp. 1 -29

⁹⁷ Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia, *Special Brief— Post-Deyr '09/10 Analysis*, <http://www.fsasomali.org/fileadmin/uploads/1648.pdf>.

⁹⁸ Workshop Report: *Humanitarian Action in Somalia*, RSC, University of Oxford, 8-9 June 2009

operates from the Port of Mombasa and accompanies humanitarian aid from Mombasa to the Port of Mogadishu.

Agencies that have promoted Internationalisation of Somalia Conflict

There are key agencies that have helped in the internationalisation of Somalia conflict. These are discussed below:

a) Refugees

By their cross border movements, refugees easily internationalise a conflict since they move from the conflict area to the neighbouring peaceful country to seek refuge. At times, like in the case of Rwandese refugees, refugees move with their guns and other crude weapons of war to their host country. The Rwandese Interharamwe refugees moved to Eastern DRC camps with their guns.

A lot of Somalia refugees have settled in Kenya under the care of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with majority of them being settled in Northern Kenya camps. According to UNHCR statistics, Dadaab camps alone have a total of 357,553 refugees, with 339,352 being Somalis while Kakuma camp has a total of 78,480 refugees with 42,611 being Somalis⁹⁹. Other 49,783 refugees have settled in Nairobi, out of whom 26,661 are Somalis.¹⁰⁰ This brings the total to 485,816 refugees in Kenya, with 408,624 being from Somalia. A lot of the time, issues of insecurity and environmental conflicts have featured between the refugees and the local community.

b) Piracy

Piracy has been a very big convergence point for the international community in so far as Somalia crisis is concerned. Since it destabilise international trade and shipment of humanitarian aid and shipment of humanitarian aid by disrupting shipping activities, attention of the entire world has been drawn to the

⁹⁹ See UNHCR Camp Population Statistics by Country, Sex and Age Groups of 12 June 2011.

¹⁰⁰ See UNHCR Statistical Summary as of 31 May 2011.

Somalia off-shore problem, with the UN and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)¹⁰¹ taking the lead in dealing with the problem. Other actors have included NATO, China, European Union and US. The most prominent effort has been that of the EU, which in 2009 launched EU Naval Force (Operation Atalanta) in the Somalia waters to keep away pirates. This has been very helpful in escorting humanitarian shipments.

The UN has passed several Security Council Resolutions on piracy, with the latest one being UN Security Council 1976 (2011)¹⁰² in which it “*recognizes* that the ongoing instability in Somalia is one of the underlying causes of the problem of piracy and contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy and its underlying causes by the international community”. The Resolution goes ahead and “*requests* States, UNODC, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and regional organizations to assist the TFG and regional authorities in Somalia in establishing a system of governance, rule of law and police control in lawless areas where land-based activities related to piracy are taking place and also requests the TFG and regional authorities in Somalia to increase their own efforts in this regard”. As such, piracy off the Somalia coast has been a major agent for internationalising the Somalia conflict.

c) Ethnic Inter-relationships

This has been a big factor in Africa and a major agency for internationalisation of conflicts. In most cases, communities that live along the borders share some ethnic background. When conflict breaks up in one country, the affected community enjoys sympathy from their brothers and sisters on the other side.

¹⁰¹ The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created on January 14, 2009 pursuant to UNSCR 1851. This voluntary, ad hoc international forum brings together countries, organizations, and industry groups with an interest in combating piracy. Participating states seek to coordinate political, military, and other efforts to bring an end to piracy off the coast of Somalia and to ensure that pirates are brought to justice. The Group meets three times a year at the United Nations, while its four Working Groups meet regularly around the world to develop and implement national counter-piracy policies and programs.

¹⁰² Adopted by the Security Council at its 6512th meeting on 11 April 2011.

In some instances, the sympathetic community can, in one way or the other, support their colleagues in the affected country or allow them to cross over to the peaceful side for refuge. This automatically internationalises the conflict.

Somalia Somalis share this kind of relationship with their Kenya Somali counterparts in Northern Kenya. That is why they find it very easy to cross over to Kenya whenever there is trouble in Somalia.

d) Media

Media is perhaps the biggest agency for internationalisation of conflicts. In today's "global village" the world is intertwined and made simple by the media so that whatever happens in one corner of the world is easily picked up and transmitted to every corner of the world. Interventions in Somalia, right from 1992, have been because the media highlighted the plight of the suffering Somalis, thus enabling the international community to intervene to help in stopping the war.

e) Mandated Bodies

Bodies like the UNHCR, Red Cross and World Food Programme, among others, have obligatory mandates which allow them to intervene in any conflict in any country to provide humanitarian support. Once they enter into the conflict, they help in internationalising the conflict. They have continued in the same breadth in Somalia.

f) Rebels/insurgents

Rebels have a tendency of crossing over the borders to either seek refuge in the neighbouring country whenever they are being pursued by the government of the affected country or to recruit more people into their cause. This has been the case with the Somali insurgents (Al Shabaabs) who have been accused of recruiting young Kenya Somalis to go and fight against the TFG in Somalia. This has also been the

case with Ugandan, Rwandese and Congolese rebels, who cross their borders to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

g) International Interventions

This involves interventions like humanitarian support and peacekeeping operations which have been discussed above.

Main Actors for Internationalisation of the Somalia conflict

The main agencies that have really succeeded in making the Somalia crisis an international affair are as follows:

1. The United Nations

As has been explained above, the UN has played a consistent role in attempting to restore normalcy in Somalia ever since the country fell into anarchy in 1992. Apart from the roles described above, the UN has played a major role in supporting AMISOM through UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which has its headquarters in Nairobi with a Support Base in Mombasa¹⁰³. UNSOA, whose mandate was recently extended until 30th September 2011 by the UN Security Council Resolution 1964 (2010) was established to provide logistical support to AMISOM and has continued to provide the support in several areas with a view to building AMISOM's capacity.¹⁰⁴

UNSOA has thus ensured that the Somalia issue is highly internationalised and maintained as an international agenda that requires the attention and support of all and sundry. In fact, UNSOA administers a Trust Fund in support of AMISOM, through which donors voluntarily contribute money to support AMISOM in areas that cannot be supported through the UN assessed budget. It is the first time that UN has

¹⁰³ UNSOA was established through UN Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009) to offer logistical support to AMISOM. UNSOA has offered life support to AMISOM in areas like: food, engineering works/constructions, aviation, fuel, medical, transport and training.

¹⁰⁴ It was envisaged by UN Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009) that AMISOM would be supported to build its capacity and also bring minimum peace and stability in Somalia for UN Peacekeepers to take over.

supported a regional peacekeeping operation and this has been hailed by many as a noble and creative idea.

UN has also been very active in providing humanitarian support to vulnerable Somalis. For example, WFP, FAO and UN OCHA have all been involved in providing various life support to suffering Somalis, while UNDP helps in providing reconstruction assistance. On the other side, UNHCR has been leading in providing humanitarian assistance to Somali refugees in Kenya.

2. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD has been a key-stabilizing factor in the Somali conflict, and remains key to the very existence of Somalia. According to H.E. Engineer Mahboub M. Maalim¹⁰⁵, IGAD is the one organization that has never abandoned Somalia. Maalim argues that it is mainly thanks to IGAD's efforts that everyone else in the international community is also involved in the Somali peace process.

Indeed, IGAD member states decided to intervene in Somalia after the thirteenth reconciliation attempt had failed¹⁰⁶. It also supported the Arta (Djibouti) Conference in 2000 that led to the formation of Transitional National Government (TNG), although the hosting and mediation was provided by the Djibouti Government. IGAD made a strategic break-through in 2002 with the start of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) in Kenya, which has been the most inclusive forum in the last decade.

The Eldoret Declaration signed on 27 October 2002 provided for a Cessation of Hostilities and for the specification of Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process, in particular the creation of federal governance structures and commitment to the principle of decentralisation. This led to the signing of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) that created the Transitional

¹⁰⁵ Healy S., Interview with Mahboub M. Maalim, the Executive Secretary of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/somalia/igad-interview.php>

¹⁰⁶ IGAD set in motion its own Peace Process in Somalia in 1997

Federal Government (TFG) and other Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) like Parliament. TFG was later supported to relocate to Somalia¹⁰⁷. According to Bjorn Moller¹⁰⁸, IGAD physically “midwife” the TFG.

On military intervention, IGAD proposed its Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was later approved by the AU on September 14, 2006, and by the UN Security Council on December 6, 2006 with a mandate of six months. AMISOM later took over from IGASOM in 2007. IGAD has also been leading reconciliation efforts between TFG and different factions in Somalia¹⁰⁹.

3. African Union (AU)

AU and IGAD work hand in hand on the Somalia issue and always keep the crisis in Somalia top on their agenda, whenever they meet. AMISOM is just one of the areas where they cooperate. In many instances, the two organisations even make recommendations to the UN Security Council for adoption as Resolutions on Somalia.

AU has also been very loud in urging its member states to support the Somali peace process by contributing troops to AMISOM. Apart from Uganda and Burundi which have contributed troops to AMISOM, other African countries like Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Algeria, among others have given in-kind support to Somalia. In fact, some of these countries like Kenya and Ethiopia have given immeasurable support to the Somali peace process by either capacity building the Somali institutions or giving in-kind support to the security sector.

4. East African Community (EAC)

Even though EAC has not acted directly to support Somalia in a tangible manner apart from the statements always issued by its leaders whenever they meet, it

¹⁰⁷ World Bank Report, *supra*

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ IGAD coordinates its Somalia activities through its Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation, headed by Hon. Kipruto arap Kirwa.

has done so in many ways through its individual member states. However, at the time of writing this paper, EAC, through its East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) had started discussions with AU to support AMISOM by deploying a number of civilian staff to AMISOM headquarters for support. EASFCOM had indicated that it would deploy around 15 staff by end of July 2011 and would gradually increase their numbers with time.

This engagement by the regional bodies within the Horn of Africa region shows that the Somalia matter is being treated with a lot of seriousness both regionally and internationally. This obviously is because of the impacts the crisis has on the region.

5. League of Arab States (LAS)

The Arab League has remained a very close collaborator in the Somalia peace process and has mobilised its members towards contributing to the Somalia peace process. A representative of the Arab League attends most of IGAD's ministerial level meetings on the conflict in Somalia. It remains very supportive of IGAD and AU efforts in helping the TFG and entire peace process.

LAS has also opened permanent headquarters in Mogadishu with a Special Envoy to Somalia to help in direct contacts with the Somali Government and all the other parties in Somalia and providing humanitarian services¹¹⁰.

6. European Union (EU) and United States of America (US)

EU is another long-time partner in the Somalia peace process. Its partnership as such was supported by its 2006 regional policy partnership for the Horn of Africa that proposed a strategic partnership between the EU and the Horn of Africa to promote peace, security and development in the region.

¹¹⁰ All Africa News, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808180126.html>, Retrieved on 23 June 2011

The strategy provided for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention that tackles the sources of instability. It also provided a political framework for concrete regional initiatives by AU and IGAD to find lasting solutions in Somalia. In addition, it provided the framework for structured dialogue between the EU and the countries of the Horn of Africa¹¹¹. This strategy was further bolstered by the EU's "Instrument for Stability" programme of 2007¹¹².

Based on this partnership, EU has remained actively seized of the Somalia peace process and has supported TFG in many peace and security issues, including capacity building, paying allowances to the AMISOM troops and police, and salaries to AMISOM civilians. EU also, through its humanitarian agency ECHO, provides humanitarian support to suffering Somalis. EU has also put in place a naval force, EU Naval Force, popularly known as "Operation Atalanta" with a base in Mombasa to help in escorting humanitarian aid and other shipments destined to Mogadishu from the Port of Mombasa.

Another military engagement by the EU is the EU Training Mission (EUTM) for the TFG troops being conducted in Uganda through EU funding. This mission was approved by the Council of the European Union in March 2010 and launched in April the same year, with a view to training 2000 Somalia forces to bolster TFG¹¹³. It has since been renewed to-date.

The US has been another worthy partner and has, apart from keeping the Somalia agenda high on the international radar, provided a lot of bilateral support to Somalia. It is obvious that US has been driven more by its strategic interests, and more particularly, its war against terrorism in its support to Somalia. US remains the biggest single contributor to the Somalia peace process. It is however difficult to

¹¹¹ See Communication from the EU Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 20th October 2006, *Strategy for Africa: An EU Regional Political Partnership for Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa*, COM (2006) 601 final

¹¹² Instrument for Stability (IfS) – EU in action, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/index_en.htm

¹¹³ See Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia).

exactly say how much the US has contributed since a lot of its support is bilateral and goes directly to Uganda and Burundi in various areas that their troops to AMISOM need assistance. For example, it provides equipments and training to new AMISOM troops (battalions) before they are deployed to Mogadishu.

7. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

GCC has also been an active agent in the Somali peace process, either on its own or in cooperation with UN, AU, LAS and IGAD. Gulf Council of Ministers discusses the security of Gulf of Aden in their meetings and Somalia has indeed been among the top agendas. Apart from contributing finances towards peace processes, GCC also has been consistent in exerting pressure on the warring factions in Somalia to dialogue and stop violence¹¹⁴.

8. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

OIC is another agent. It has actively supported the negotiations and the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement, in most cases working together with other partners. OIC has also helped in providing humanitarian aid to Somalia and promised to open a humanitarian office in Mogadishu in 2010¹¹⁵.

9. Frontline States

Somalia's neighbouring countries have also played a big role in internationalising the country's conflict. Kenya, for example, has played host to a number of Somalia activities, including refugees. Major offices dealing with Somalia – UN and foreign embassies – are also based in Nairobi.

Other countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi have also played a major part, with Uganda and Burundi being the two troop contributing countries to AMISOM. However, as will be seen in the next Chapter, some of these

¹¹⁴ See for example, The Final Communiqué of the 29th Session of the Supreme Council of The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council, 29-30 December 2008, <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=290>

¹¹⁵ Relief Web, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/JBRN-7YTHUT?OpenDocument>, December 17, 2009

engagements by the neighbouring states have been criticised as interference. For example, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been accused of using Somalia as a theatre for their proxy wars¹¹⁶.

Effects of, and Current Debate on, Internationalisation

Generally, internationalisation helps in exposing to the whole world, a hidden internal crisis. It is as a result of globalisation and helps in rescuing the suffering civilian population of the affected country from their miseries by their global brothers and sisters. In Somalia, the effect of this has been the increased awareness of, and active engagement with, the Somalia crisis and peace process. The positive side of this has been the increased support and funding by the international community of the Somalia peace process, through the several interventions explained above.

Internationalization generally has several effects on the conflict and the structure of its management. Firstly, it broadens the conflict, and brings in external perspectives. This broadening of the conflict and the structure of management requires the conflict manager to choose a wider repertoire of management methodologies and approaches. For example, in the DRC conflict, internalization involved diverse actors such as Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The entry of the other actors gave the conflict a multi-level dimension. This contained elements of the original internal conflict and its mooring in the governance patterns in the DRC, international characteristics based on the international relations of the whole region, and the relationships between the state actors in that conflict. The same is also true of the Somalia conflict, where all the regional states, among others, have been engaged as actors.

Therefore, effective conflict management in an internationalised conflict requires attending to all the dimensions of the conflict. This involves digging deeper

¹¹⁶ See Abdulahi, O., *The Role of Egypt, Ethiopia the Blue Nile in the Failure of the Somali Conflict Resolutions: A Zero-Sum Game*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hawaii, March 05, 2005, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71766_index.html

to the repertoires and methodologies available for the management of these two aspects of the conflict. And this perhaps has been the failure in Somalia.

Internationalization also necessitates a third party to seek a broader and more sophisticated view and appreciation of the conflict. This in turn enables a more sophisticated analysis of the conflict. This has vital consequences; it means that the conflict manager must adopt more complex methods of managing the conflict in order to reflect the new complexity of the conflict. This is partly true of the responses to the internal conflict in Sudan by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

IGAD member states became jointly involved in the management of the Sudan conflict on the realization that the conflict had become significantly internationalized. These states were inspired by the larger dimensions of the conflict which required a more sophisticated conflict management approach. However, the management methods adopted, just like in Somalia, have not reflected the essentially complex nature of the conflict. The management of the conflict has proceeded as if what was on the table was a simple conflict between two internal parties. The internationalization of the Sudan conflict and the complex inter-mediator relations developed suggest for a complex and sophisticated approach for the management of the conflict.

Spill over effects in an internationalised conflict are more or less the same and this is due to the fact that borders between countries have little effect on the communities and their life. These communities continue to have relationships with each other and some actually belong to the same clans, intermarry and carry out trade.

Involvement of neighbours or external actors in a conflict through support worsens conditions of a settlement. For example, the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) in Northern Uganda got support from Khartoum Government in terms of fresh supplies of food and medicines and this enabled the

LRA to regroup and spread to different countries such as Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan committing atrocities in those villages they passed including murder, rape and body mutilation.¹¹⁷ This explains how the Al-shabaab in Somalia has been surviving courtesy of the support it receives from their sympathisers in other countries in the region.

Internationalization of conflict also brings in the element of movement of vast numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons who relocate the unrest to the host countries. The problem of Somali refugees has been explained above. In Congo war (1998-2003), it is estimated that over 5.4 million people died and millions were displaced. Also following the Rwanda Genocide 1994, the Interahamwe (Hutu Paramilitary group) who fled to Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo, moved with guns and caused unrest in the country, for instance, in 1996 they joined the Zairian armed forces to massacre Tutsi civilians.

While a detailed analysis and critique of these interventions will be tackled in the next Chapter, it is important to mention that many scholars and analysts point out that internationalisation has escalated the prolonged anarchy in Somalia. Bjorn Moller reserves some of the harshest criticisms against interventions in Somalia, thus:

International organisations such as the UN, AU and IGAD have not fared much better. ... The AU's deployment of a peacekeeping force to Somalia has accomplished nothing at all, and IGAD has not even tried to do anything except helping bring into being a quasi-government (the TFG), which has effectively been a pawn of Ethiopia. The country's neighbours, especially Ethiopia and the US have consistently meddled in its domestic affairs...¹¹⁸

It is also important to briefly mention here that the Somali government, TFG, has not been very comfortable all the time with the interventions in Somalia by the international community. At times, they have felt that they are being denied their sovereignty too much and demanded to be left alone to chart their own destiny. Even

¹¹⁷ New Vision, Ugandan Newspaper; 5th April 2010

¹¹⁸ Supra, at page 29

though this sounds funny, it is important since this is also the thinking that has been turned into a narrative which has been sold to the Somali populace by the insurgents and even Somali politicians.

In their efforts to win the hearts and minds of Somalis, the insurgents have tried to portray interventions as interferences in the Somalia affairs by the international community and urged Somalis who care to listen to reject these interventions. This is the reason they also give for lodging attacks at AMISOM forces in Mogadishu. They swore to fight until AMISOM forces leave Mogadishu.

Likewise, the politicians have also charged that these interventions are a way of interference by the international community on the Somalia internal affairs. For example, when the TFG Prime Minister, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” was recently urged to resign under the so called “Kampala Accord”, he and his followers dismissed the Accord and accused the international community of interfering on their internal affairs and undermining Somalia’s sovereignty¹¹⁹.

Conclusion

In summary, it can be said that the otherwise internal armed Somalia conflict became highly internationalised because of its effects to the international community. This has led to a number of interventions in Somalia since 1992, with many actors, but with limited success. Critics of these interventions have dismissed them as not serving the interests of Somalis. These critiques will form the basis of the next Chapter.

¹¹⁹ Kampala Accord was signed by TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden on 9 June in Kampala after a lengthy meeting brokered by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and UN Special Representative for the Secretary General, Dr. Augustine Mahiga. This was after the ICG meeting on Somalia held in Kampala between 2-3 June 2011.

Chapter Four: A Critique of the Diplomatic Strategies used by the UN in Somalia between 1992-2010

Introduction

This Chapter will focus on giving a critique on the diplomatic strategies employed by the UN in Somalia between 1992 and 2010 with a view to explaining why they have not yielded positive results to-date. The critical analysis will be guided by the research questions which are listed below for ease of reference:

- a) Why have all the efforts and strategies in Somalia failed in bringing peace and stability?
- b) Was the approach used in the previous Somali peace efforts relevant to the realities in Somalia?
- c) As part of post-conflict civilian strategy, is it possible for AMISOM and UN to win the hearts and minds of Somalis simply by providing security alone or others like humanitarian interventions, reconstruction and development as well?
- d) Is the UN respecting and implementing its own commitments to, and Resolutions on, Somalia and are these Resolutions having the maximum impacts intended?
- e) Is the UN concerned with effectively empowering TFG to take care of its own security and bureaucratic needs?
- f) Do the ordinary Somalis still have confidence in the peace process? Do they feel it is legitimate?
- g) Wouldn't it be better for the UN to encourage and actively support open dialogue between TFG and everybody including the insurgents, Puntland and Somaliland instead of dismissing some as terrorists?

These will be discussed in details below. At the end of the Chapter, it is expected that the research analysis will help in diagnosing the problem with the ongoing peace process in Somalia. This will inform the next Chapter which will come up with recommendations for a better UN engagement in the Somalia peace process.

a) Failure to implement effective measures on Somalia

A keen observer would realise that while Somalia crisis has been with us since 1991, there has been little efforts to implement decisive measures against the spoilers of peace there. Could this be because of limited interest from the western powers? It could as well be as a result of conflicting interests among the major powers.

A case in point is when UN passes arms embargos on Somalia but the same are not fully complied with. For example, in January 1992 the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed an open ended arms embargo on Somalia in Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 733.

In June 2001 UNSCR 1356 allowed for exemptions to the embargo for supplies of non-lethal military equipment for use in humanitarian operations and in July 2002 UNSCR 1425 clarified the scope of the arms embargo, making it clear that it prohibited the financing of arms acquisitions as well as the direct or indirect sale or supply of technical advice or military training.

In December 2006 UNSCR 1725 partially lifted the UN arms embargo on Somalia. The Resolution authorized IGAD and AU Member States to deploy a regional intervention force to protect Somalia's TFG and to arm and train the TFG security forces. The Resolution maintained the existing embargo but stated that its provisions do not apply to transfers of military equipment, technical training and assistance intended for the regional intervention force.

UNSCR 1744 of February 2007 limited the embargo to non-state actors. It allowed the supply of weapons and military equipment intended solely for the purpose of helping develop Somali security sector institutions. In such a case, the sanctions committee on Somalia must be notified in advance of such supplies and has the possibility to halt them.

It is clear that arms embargos were well-meaning, with the intention of stopping or controlling the flow of arms into Somalia since this could find its way into the hands of insurgents and could be used to destabilise the peace process in Somalia. However, arms continued to flow into Somalia in the very watchful eyes of the UN and in the very presence of the arms embargos. This continued even after the embargo was amended to only target non-state actors. According to the UN Monitoring Group Report¹²⁰, arms embargo against Somalia has been constantly violated with weapons mainly coming from Yemen and financed by Eritrea as well as Arab and Islamic donors. The Report noted that:

“Most serviceable weapons and almost all ammunition currently available in the country have been delivered since 1992, in violation of the embargo. Commercial imports, mainly from Yemen, remain the most consistent source of arms, ammunition and military material to Somalia. Weapons from Yemen continue to feed Somali retail arms sales and the needs of armed opposition and criminal groups. This illegal trafficking is fuelling the bloody armed conflict in the Horn of Africa country, which has been wracked by a civil war since 1991, and is aiding rampant piracy off the Somali coast.”

In November 2008, UNSCR 1844 amended the arms embargo to target entities that have violated the arms embargo or obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to or in Somalia as mentioned in the Monitoring Group Report. In December 2009 the UN, through UNSCR 1907 imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea, partly in response to reports that Eritrea had violated the arms embargo on Somalia. This included an open-ended embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to and from Eritrea.

The sanctions were imposed in reaction to the findings by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that Eritrea had provided political, financial and logistical support to armed groups in Somalia and to the Eritrean refusal to withdraw its forces from disputed territory on the border with Djibouti and engage in diplomatic dialogue about this issue. However, even the arms embargo imposed on

¹²⁰ See Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), submitted on 10 March 2010

Eritrea could not be implemented as intended. In its recent meeting, IGAD called on the AU and the UN Security Council to “fully implement the existing sanctions and impose additional Sanctions selectively on the Eritrean Regime especially on those economic and mining sectors that the regime draws on including the Eritrean Diaspora as well as ensuring compliance with previous decisions of the UN.”¹²¹

The above shows a worrying trend where serious UN Resolutions that could bring some notable change in Somalia are not strictly implemented. In essence, this has promoted impunity and encouraged spoilers of the Somalia peace process like Eritrea. This has been a major problem even in West Africa where, like in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, UN arms embargoes were flouted with utmost impunity. The member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) even pledged, in 1998, not to import, export, or manufacture these weapons. This was never to be as these measures were flouted. Machira Apollos opines that contributing factors for this included lax arms export controls in supplier countries, regional allies who provide cover and sometimes financing, and transitional arms traffickers motivated by profit¹²².

On the other side, the UN has failed to pass certain Resolutions that could be helpful in Somalia. For example, AU has consistently asked UNSC to back a naval and air blockade of Somalia¹²³. Even though a blockade and a no-fly zone would be helpful in stopping piracy and the flow of arms reaching insurgent groups fighting the transitional government, this call has not been heeded by the UNSC.

It is disturbing however that when the Libyan problem in March 2011, the UN was quick to pass two Resolutions imposing a no-fly zone, arms embargo and

¹²¹ See Communiqué of the 18th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Activities in Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, issued in Addis Ababa, 4 July 2011

¹²² Apollos M., *Armed Conflict and the Law* (The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Kenya, 2010), p. 26

¹²³ Ramtane Lamamra, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security urged the UNSC in October 2010 to back a naval and air blockade of Somalia, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11603023>.

assets freeze on Libya¹²⁴. The no-fly zone was meant to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of Libya “in order to help protect civilians”. The ban however does not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from Libya. In Somalia, such a ban would help in cutting arms supplies to the insurgents. A blockade to airports and sea ports would even go further to help in cutting sources of income to the insurgents. This would starve them of cash.

This has led to speculations that there is more at stake in Libya to the western powers than just a threat to international peace and security. Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, criticized Western powers for applying double standards over imposing a no-fly zone on Libya and wondered why appeals to the United Nations to slap a no-fly zone on Somalia had gone unheeded yet it is home to Al Qaeda-linked rebels blamed for regional instability¹²⁵. Could this be because of Libya’s oil, which Somalia does not have? It is not for this paper to verify that hypothesis.

b) Failure to strengthen the Military Intervention in Somalia

In as much as there have been military interventions in Somalia, it is a fact that not enough has been done to make it have the maximum effect desired to restrain insurgency. This could be looked at in different angles:

1. Failure to convert AMISOM into a Peace Enforcement Force

AMISOM was established by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate¹²⁶. On 21st February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate¹²⁷. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African

¹²⁴ See UNSCR 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011)

¹²⁵ See http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/2011/03/110322_museveni_on_libya.shtml

¹²⁶ 69th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council held on 19th January 2007

¹²⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007)

Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorized by the United Nations Security Council, with the latest one being UNSCR 1964 which extended AMISOM's mandate till 30th September 2011. This is because the UN Charter gives the UN Security Council the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.¹²⁸

However, peacekeeping missions work best where there is "peace to keep". There are minimum standards in such a case. For example, there would be a ceasefire already in place, agreement or accord among the warring parties. In fact, peacekeepers do monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist the rival groups in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development.

In Somalia, these conditions for peacekeeping do not exist, making the work of AMISOM very difficult. Somalia is still in a state of war and peacekeeping, which is only derived from a liberal interpretation of the UN Charter, is not ideal here¹²⁹. This would mean that instead of authorizing a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, the UNSC could have authorized a peace enforcement mission. Even AMISOM itself has requested UNSC severally before to change its mandate and make it a peace enforcement instead but this is yet to be heeded.

AMISOM has also joined other peacekeeping missions around in experiencing common problems like lack of funds, staff, equipment and quality troops. When AMISOM was established in 2007, it was mandated to raise a force of 8,000 troops. This was only achieved in November 2010, courtesy of Uganda and Burundi. Even when UNSCR 1964 increased the force strength to 12,000 in

¹²⁸ Articles 24(1) and 39 of the UN Charter

¹²⁹ The UN Charter does not expressly provide for Peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has only been developed with practice over time and normally said to be under Chapter "Six and a half" of the Charter. This means that it falls somewhere between Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.

December 2010, it only envisaged that this will be achieved in the second half of 2012.

2. Failure to convert AMISOM into a UN Peacekeeping Operation

In the event that AMISOM's mandate cannot be changed into a peace enforcement mission, it could have been better to transit it into a UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO). In fact, UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009) had envisaged that AMISOM would eventually be transitioned to a UNPKO. This is yet to be.

This failure has left AMISOM struggling to raise funds and troops since, as it remains a regional peacekeeping operation, only AU Member States are eligible to contribute troops. A lot of these countries have been willing to contribute troops but lack financial capacity to deploy. Even Uganda and Burundi have only deployed courtesy of the bilateral support of US and other donors.

Even though UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) has been very helpful to AMISOM in terms of providing logistical support, its support package is limited only to a number of things since AMISOM is not a UN peacekeeping mission. UN rules therefore do not allow it to support a mission other than a UNPKO in certain areas. For example, UNSOA cannot support AMISOM in reimbursing Contingent Owned Equipments (COE) to the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). UNSOA can also not support AMISOM troops with self-sustainment items¹³⁰.

The logistical support package to AMISOM contained in the UN assessed budget only includes food rations, construction of facilities, transport and fuel, medical services, supplies, medical evacuations, communications, public information, aviations, and training. This leaves UNSOA with a big challenge on how to fund

¹³⁰ COE are equipment owned and brought by the troops to a peacekeeping mission from their countries. These include crew served machine guns, metal detectors, and other handheld equipment, to Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), heavy engineering equipment, cargo/utility vehicles, and generators and containers. Self sustainment services include catering, communications, medical, accommodation, field defense, and all of the services required to enable a formed military or police unit to sustain itself and function in the field.

COE, self-sustainment, troop welfare and medical care follow-up for injured AMISOM troops.

UNSCR 1863 (2009) foresaw these challenges and established a Trust Fund in support of AMISOM, which is administered by UNSOA, to allow donors to voluntarily contribute for AMISOM. However, this support has not been forthcoming and the Trust Fund remains active only courtesy to a few countries like UK and Japan. By the time of conducting this research, the Trust Fund was almost depleted and had only managed to reimburse COE for the TCCs till end of March 2011. The other main challenge to the Trust Fund mechanism is that countries earmark their contributions to only cover specific areas.

For example, the Government of Korea donated USD 0.5 million and the same was earmarked only for outreach activities in Mogadishu. A lot of other donations were only earmarked for non-lethal activities of AMISOM. This makes it difficult for UNSOA to spend the money in supporting AMISOM since AMISOM is a military operation and most of its activities are military. If funding is only meant for non-military purposes then, by and large, it defeats the purpose.

To remedy this, it could have been wiser either for the UN to include major logistical support packages to AMISOM in the assessed budget so that the funding “envelope”, as it is referred to within the UN, covers all critical areas of the mission, or to convert AMISOM into a UNPKO. This would ensure that major items like COE reimbursement and self-sustainment are well covered from the UN assessed budget.

c) Failure to see through the selfish interests of some Partners

The words of Bjorn Moller would offer a good explanation here, thus:

“International organisations such as the UN, AU and IGAD have not fared much better. ... The AU’s deployment of a peacekeeping force to Somalia has accomplished nothing at all, and IGAD has not even tried to do anything except helping bring into being a quasi-government (the TFG), which has effectively been a

pawn of Ethiopia. The country's neighbours, especially Ethiopia and the US have consistently meddled in its domestic affairs...¹³¹.

These have become common accusations against countries that intervene in Somalia. Ethiopia has borne the harshest criticisms and, together with Eritrea, was accused of using Somalia as a theatre for their proxy wars. This accusation was levelled against the two countries when it was suspected that they were supporting different/opposing factions in the Somalia crisis. For example, when the Djibouti Agreement was signed in June 2008 between TFG and the then rebels, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a faction of the latter that did not support the Agreement remained in Eritrea and promised to continue with its rebellion against TFG. The Eritrea-based faction formed Hizbul Islam.

It is important to note that at this time, Ethiopian troops were still in Mogadishu, giving support to TFG. After refusing to be part of or signatory to the Djibouti Agreement, Hizbul Islam insisted on the withdrawal of Ethiopian Government troops as a precondition to any dialogue. Following the Accord, it insisted that "the Djibouti exercise has no validity and shall not be binding on the ARS and the Somali people." It invited the Somali people "to redouble their heroic struggle against the occupation." The al-Shabaab, another fighting group, denounced the Djibouti Agreement as "futile" and inconsequential.¹³² The two groups later merged under al-Shabaab leadership and lodged a strong and sustained offensive against TFG, allegedly with Eritrean support. This later culminated into Eritrea being slapped with a ban by the UN as explained above.

What is clear here is that there are countries which would want to be engaged in the Somalia peace process but would not at the same time sit on the same table with others, typical cold war style. What happens in such a case is that if one state supports the government, the other would support the opposition. The peace

¹³¹ Moller B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors*, (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009), p. 29

¹³² IRIN, "Alliance" Divided Over Djibouti Peace Accord." (2008) <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=78667>, retrieved on 7/07/2011

process becomes an instant casualty in this absurdity. UN has not directly dealt with this issue and has only continued to treat Ethiopia as the blue-eyed boy to lead, in most cases, the Somalia peace process initiatives.

d) Limited engagement on the non-military activities

In as much as Somalia requires a stronger military intervention, it is also a fact that war cannot be won only by guns. A balance must be struck between military and non-military interventions. Non-military interventions would focus on areas like reconciliation, humanitarian interventions, reconstruction (building the economy), and political stability, among others.

For a long time, not much was done in these areas and focus was only given to military interventions. The contemporary meaning of peace support encompasses these non-military aspects in order to win the hearts and minds of the local population. This is the part that AMISOM has been lacking. For example, once reconstruction starts in a failed state like Somalia, jobs would be created for the otherwise idle youths and this would give them an alternative from joining either insurgent groups or pirates. A lot of Somalia youths join these illegal groups because of lack of any economic activity, following the collapse of the country's economy. Reconstruction would therefore be important to get the economy running.

But still, the lack of a strategy or programme on how to deal with demobilised insurgents (defectors) undermined the military operation. Such a strategy would include Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).¹³³ AMISOM came in and was supported to continue with its military work but there remained a glaring lack of a DDR programme to take care of the defectors. This in a number of

¹³³ Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations. Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.); demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups; while reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into the society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict.

ways discouraged the defectors. Even some who crossed over to TFG had to go back to the insurgent forces for lack of proper care by the TFG or AMISOM.¹³⁴

Another grave concern is the political instability despite security gains. The moment that the UN or AU only focuses on supporting AMISOM to make military advances in Mogadishu and forgets about organising the politics of Somalia, these gains cannot be sustained. First and foremost, Somalia's problem is political. It fell into anarchy because of political failure. Its politics must therefore be fixed to support the security sector developments.

It has become a common phenomenon in Somalia that once leaders are appointed, they start their political differences and begin to form different groups. This seriously undermines the gains made in the security front since the insurgents capitalise on these cracks in the government to advance their course. Previously, a divided TFG has also failed repeatedly to take advantage of the divisions within the insurgents to wipe them out. In fact, even the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which is meant to deal with these political challenges, has been accused severally either of not doing enough to fix the problem or taking sides in the war.

e) Failure to have a fool-proof humanitarian aid system

Even though there are a lot of humanitarian interventions going on in Somalia as already explained above, a lot of it is uncoordinated and has loopholes that have been exploited by the rebels and other spoilers before. To start with, humanitarian aid is normally a very sensitive issue which if not monitored properly can advance the course of rebels. For example, food aid that is not well monitored ends up in rebels' hands and will always help the rebels to cut on cost of food so that they concentrate on buying arms and continue fighting in full stomachs.

¹³⁴ UN and the international community only started implementing a defectors programme in May 2011.

Another possibility is that the insurgents will zone off areas they consider as their territories. For aid distributors to access these areas and help those in need of humanitarian aid, they might be required to negotiate with the insurgents for protection, in which case a “protection fee” is paid in the form of food aid being distributed or cash. This of course helps the insurgents survive. Whichever way one looks at it, it amounts to funding the illegal gangs indirectly.

Unfortunately, all of the above possibilities apply to Somalia, as was found out by the UN Monitoring Group.¹³⁵ The Group, in its Report noted the following about Somalia:

“Even where aid agencies can function, monitoring and delivery of assistance is often difficult or even dangerous, creating opportunities for diversion and fraud. Some aid agencies routinely pay off local authorities for their own “protection”. Aid convoys are “taxed” or forced to surrender some of their cargo at checkpoints. As in other conflict zones, armed groups not only control access to needy populations but also seek to exert a degree of control over aid resources for their own purposes. Under such circumstances the aid community has come to accept a certain level of risk, loss, theft and diversion as “the cost of doing business” in Somalia.”

The UNSCR 1844 (2008) prohibited acts that obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia. This would mean that UN would not entertain any diversion of assistance away from its intended beneficiaries, whether to the advantage of an armed group, or simply for the purpose of profit.

However, the vast majority of humanitarian assistance to Somalia consists of food aid, which is particularly vulnerable to diversion. The largest single provider of food aid is WFP, whose transportation contracts to Somali businessmen constitute the greatest single source of revenue in Somalia and, according the Monitoring Group Report, just three contractors receive 80 per cent of this business. The transportation budget for WFP in 2009 was approximately \$200 million. According to WFP transporters and other sources involved in food aid distribution interviewed by the

¹³⁵ Ibid at pp. 59-66

Monitoring Group, the system offers a variety of opportunities for diversion all along the supply chain.

The Report goes further to state that diversion involving collusion between ground transporters and implementing partners is a common form of fraud, especially where transporters and implementing partners are actually owned or controlled by the same people. WFP requires that implementing partners certify the delivery of food as proof that ground transporters have fulfilled their contracts. Implementing partners and transporters, as well as other interested parties, may therefore agree to divert food aid and share the proceeds.

Percentages vary, but sources interviewed by the Monitoring Group describe an approximate division of 30 per cent for the implementing partner and local WFP personnel, 10 per cent for the ground transporter, and 5 to 10 per cent for the armed group in control of the area. Worse still, according to a WFP spokesman, Al-Shabaab controls 95 per cent of the WFP areas of operation. The remainder of the consignment is distributed to the recipient population.

With this in mind, it is unfortunate that a lot of food and other humanitarian aid would be channelled to Somalia only to end in undeserving and/or illegal hands. It is more shocking that all this happens under the full eyes of a UN body, WFP. This happens at a time when the humanitarian situation in Somalia is getting out of hand and the number of people genuinely requiring humanitarian support has continued to shoot up.

Still, there is the issue of refugees coming from Somalia. A lot of these, as explained above, settle in Kenya and are confined mainly in three camps in Dadaab area in Garissa District, Northern Kenya¹³⁶. The other camp, Kakuma, has a fewer number of refugees. A visit to the Dadaab camps instantly confirms a humanitarian crisis. In the three highly populated camps that were opened in 1991 to accommodate

¹³⁶ The three Dadaab Camps are Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera.

only 90,000 refugees, there are today a total of 357,553 refugees, out of whom 339,352 (95%) are from Somalia¹³⁷.

With the highly exploded numbers, resources are also overstretched. This has caused a lot of tension between the local community and the refugees. An interview with both of them revealed the level of suspicion, and even hatred, with which they view each other. The local community blames the refugees for nearly all their problems, including environmental degradation, lack of jobs (since most of the NGO jobs available reportedly go to the refugees) and, most importantly, insecurity.

This research chooses to blame the UN, through its humanitarian agency, UNHCR, for doing little, or nothing to decongest the camps. While some efforts have been made in this area and currently there is a plan to open a new camp (Ifo 2) to create a fourth camp within the region, this, according to interviews with the locals, might not address the real problem. It will add to the problem of depletion of resources since it is also located just within the same area as the others. The Government of Kenya and the local community were initially reluctant to grant the land for this expansion citing all these fears. In fact, the Government and the local politicians even asked UNHCR to consider getting land in the neighboring countries for extra camps to decongest the Dadaab camps.

It is however not clear if UNHCR ever considered acquiring land in the neighboring countries for this purpose. This is an idea that could have been explored long time ago. If the situation in Dadaab continues the way it is, then UNHCR must be prepared for a very bad environmental conflict in the near future¹³⁸.

¹³⁷ According to the UNHCR Camp Population Statistics as at 12 June 2011

¹³⁸ Environmental conflicts are public policy conflicts that involve issues associated with the natural environment and how humans will or will not be allowed to interact with it. Examples include disputes over air and water quality, biodiversity issues, outdoor recreation issues, natural hazards issues, toxic chemical and waste issues, and public lands management and use issues.

f) Failure to act decisively on ransoms paid to pirates

In as much as the UN is doing a lot on piracy through the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), the UN has failed to deal with the huge ransoms paid by captured ships, especially from major economies. It is a fact that the ransoms provide a good incentive for piracy since the rewards are so generous. These ransoms are also used to fund insurgency on-shore (within Somalia).

In as long as the ransoms continue to be negotiated, paid and channelled through well-established legal firms to the pirates, dealing with piracy will be very difficult since returns seem to outweigh risks, thus attracting powerful brokers who benefit from the proceeds of piracy by using young, poor and desperate youths. It was encouraging when, recently, an aircraft transporting ransoms was intercepted at the Mogadishu's Aden Adde International Airport by TFG. A whopping USD 3.6 million in US currency were intercepted and confiscated.¹³⁹ Questions are asked as to why such actions can not be stepped up and coordinated to deter the pirates from accessing the cash. In any case, planes that deliver the ransoms are registered and can always be traced.

g) Failure to establish a propaganda machinery to counter that of insurgents

Propaganda, which is defined as any attempt to persuade persons to accept a certain point of view or take a certain action,¹⁴⁰ is a very important instrument for the promotion of interests in international politics. Persuading the masses in a particular way is the intention of any faction in a war. In Somalia the propaganda war has not been fought well by TFG and in this, it has been outdone previously by the insurgents.

For a long time, the insurgents thrived on a narrative that they were only protecting the local Somalis from foreign interference. They would even provoke

¹³⁹ New York Times, *Westerners Held in Somalia for Delivering Pirate Ransom*, 18 June 2011

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/world/africa/19somalia.html?_r=1

¹⁴⁰ Palmer N.D and Perkins H.C, *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, Third Edition (CBS Publishers: 2001), p.110.

AMISOM into a fight and would then blow up the issue of civilian casualties by telling people that foreigners are killing them. This worked in some instances. However, UN took long to come up with a very strong counter-strategy to spread its own propaganda in Somalia.

However, it is worth noting that improvements have been made of late and UNSOA has stepped up its Public Information support to AMISOM. This has led to the establishment of an FM station in Somalia, Bar Kulan, which reaches the masses with the TFG and AMISOM agenda.

h) Failure to engage all stakeholders in the peace process

As argued by Conflict Researchers¹⁴¹, a pragmatic world society view needs to be employed when dealing with conflict management, so that a conflict manager recognises that there are more actors than the state in management of conflicts. Because of the existence of these many actors, no single actor can be used as a source of analysis but the interactions between all the actors, including non-state actors. Peace is therefore achieved by bringing all the actors together on board to come up with a mutual agreement. This is what John Wear Burton calls problem solving workshop theory¹⁴².

The word “all” here means a lot and explains largely why the UN has found it difficult to deal with the Somalia problem. In a number of the cases, there are factions that form the critical mass that get left out of the peace process. This has been common in almost all the Somalia peace agreements and accords signed so far. Wouldn't it for example be needful for the UN to start negotiations with Al Shabaab and all other insurgent groups in Somalia on how to end the conflict in the country? Though the UN has always dismissed this thinking, it could be worth trying.

¹⁴¹ See Groom A.J.R. “Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher” in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

¹⁴² Burton, J.W., *World Society*, (Cambridge University Press, 1972)

Bronwyn E. Bruton, a democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa and a former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, captures this better by urging US to change its foreign policy on Somalia and get ready to negotiate with everybody, including the dreaded insurgents instead of military operations¹⁴³. The same can be said to the UN.

Bruton argues that the current U.S. policy of supporting the TFG is proving ineffective and costly. He says that “the TFG is unable to improve security, deliver basic services, or move toward an agreement with Somalia's clans and opposition groups that would provide a stronger basis for governance.” She also cites flaws in two alternative policies, a reinforced international military intervention to bolster the TFG or an offshore approach that seeks to contain terrorist threats with missiles and drones.

Instead, Bruton advances a strategy of "constructive disengagement" and this calls for the United States to signal that it will accept an Islamist authority in Somalia, including the Shabaab, as long as it does not impede international humanitarian activities and refrains from both regional aggression and support for international jihad. This strategy of negotiating with the insurgents is already being implemented by the US in Afghanistan where it has started talks with the Taliban¹⁴⁴.

The problem is that the UN is yet to embrace this thinking and still insists on only talking to legitimate leaders. This strictness could impede the peace process because as long as the insurgents, who at times are in the UN list of terrorists, feel that they are being targeted, they keep on fighting and might keep the crisis going for as long as they are still alive. Maybe negotiations with them and a promise to remove their names from the terrorist list could make them soften their stands and support the peace process.

¹⁴³ Bruton, B. E., *Somalia: A New Approach*, Council on Foreign Relations, 10th March 2010

¹⁴⁴ Guardian Newspaper, *White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taliban*, 19 June 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/obama-afghanistan-strategy-taliban-negotiate>

i) Limited attention to the root causes of violence as well as limited bottom-up approach

It could also be true that the UN strategies failed in Somalia because they were not devised to deal with the root causes of the problem but with the problem itself. According to Roy Licklinder,¹⁴⁵ the reason why peace efforts in civil wars or violence fail is because they do not solve the problems that caused the civil wars. Nuredin Netabay¹⁴⁶ also supports the above argument and says that the top-down approach that was employed in Somalia failed to properly identify and address the root causes of the conflict, which he says were unequal power distribution, poor sharing of resources among different Somali clans, negative clannism, marginalisation of intellectuals, misrepresentation in the government, and negative external influences.

Netabay therefore proposes a bottom-up approach to solve the conflict on Somalia by dealing with the problem from its causes and empowering the local people, raising public awareness, and ensuring representation and participation of all sections of the community in the process. He adds that accessible sections of the community like women and elders should play a crucial role in the peace process. This he terms “indigenising the peace building process”.

The UN has not fully indigenised the Somalia peace building process. Even though few attempts are currently being made to engage Somali clan elders, youths, women and civil society, these just started recently and are yet to be given a lot of prominence. A lot of attention is still on the military intervention and a top-bottom approach of dealing with the TFG from the top.

¹⁴⁵ Licklinder, R., “*Obstacles to Peace Settlements*”, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington, D.C: United States Institute Peace Press, 2001), pg. 697-698

¹⁴⁶ Netabay, N, *Bottom-Up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somali Conflict*, Master Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2007

Conclusion

As has been explained in this Chapter, the UN stands accused, though not entirely, for the failure to fix the Somalia problem. This owes to the fact that it is the UN, through its agencies like the Security Council, which is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability and which leads international efforts in such interventions. The next and last Chapter will conclude the research and make necessary recommendations on the subject, Somalia peace process.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

This last Chapter will provide a summary of the whole study and then give conclusions and recommendations from the study. It is hoped that these recommendations will be helpful for the peace process in Somalia and even for those who would wish to conduct further research in this subject.

Summary

This study sought to examine the failures of the UN interventions in Somalia since war broke out there in 1991. In doing so, the study was divided into several Chapters. Chapter One of this study was on the Research Proposal and provided a detailed background and justification to the study, among others. Various strategies of conducting the study were discussed. In Chapter Two, the Genesis of the Somalia Civil War was looked at. To understand the Somalia crisis, other conflict situations in the world were also discussed in brief.

Chapter Three on the other hand discussed the how internal conflicts can be internationalised. It then used Somalia as a case Study and looked at how the otherwise Somalia internal conflict was internationalised. In Chapter Four, the study narrows down to an in-depth critique on the Strategies used by the UN in Somalia between 1992 and 2010, and looks at what the UN did not do between the period under review which it ought to have done to effectively deal with the war in Somalia. Finally, in Chapter Five, the study makes conclusions and recommendations based on its findings.

Conclusion

It is important to note that all the objectives of the study were achieved and all the research questions answered. However, while the study relied on quantitative methods of data collection, survey research methods (personal interviews and questionnaires) were limited because of challenges related to access and time.

Secondary data and personal observations therefore formed the core of data collection.

The recommendations herein below are drawn from the critical analysis in Chapter Four above. It is worth noting that the study has confirmed its first hypothesis above, that is, the strategies hitherto employed by the UN in the war-torn Somalia are negatively correlated with the desired peace and stability. This might call for a policy shift within the UN to effectively deal with the Somalia crisis.

Recommendations

The recommendations are as discussed below:

a) Full and strict compliance with UN Resolutions

The UN should enforce, ensure and/or demand strict compliance with all its Resolutions on Somalia by its member States. For example, UNSCR 1744 on arms embargos in Somalia should be strictly enforced to ensure that arms that get into Somalia are known and controlled. This will ensure that no arms get into illegal hands that use them to spoil the peace process. Member States that do not comply with the Resolutions of the Security Council should be sanctioned by the community of nations.

b) Passage of necessary UN Resolutions

Again, it would be helpful if the UNSC could pass Resolutions that can hinder the operations of the insurgents. For example, UNSC should consider earlier requests from the AU and IGAD to impose no-fly zones and blockades on Somalia. This would help in zoning off Somalia and regulating the movements of people and goods in and out of the country with a view to destabilising the movements of insurgents.

c) Change the Mandate of AMISOM to peace enforcement

It would also be helpful to change the mandate of AMISOM from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement mission. This is because Somalia is still in war and there is no peace or ceasefire to keep yet. The force needs to have a mandate to enforce peace at this point in time. It is important to note that peacekeeping, in principle, is a non-coercive instrument, based on the consent and cooperation of both the parties. Force is generally not the means which it utilises to achieve its mandate, unless in self-defence. Peacekeepers should only keep a buffer zone between the combatants and help in facilitating dialogue among the parties.

d) Convert AMISOM into a UN Peacekeeping Mission

While this was envisaged by UNSCR 1863 (2009), it is yet to be done. It is time UN considered transitioning AMISOM into a UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO). This would help in ensuring that the mission is not starved of cash as it is today. As lot of countries will also be willing to contribute then since there will be money to take care of the needs of new troop contributing countries, in terms of buying for their troops necessary equipments and enablers, reimbursing COE, paying self-sustaining and even deploying the troops to the mission area.

e) Securing predictable and sustainable source of funding

The current trend of funding major AMISOM operations from the Trust Fund mechanism is neither predictable nor sustainable since the Trust Fund in support of AMISOM, being administered by UNSOA, only depends on the voluntary contributions from Member States. It would be important for the UN to consider funding major AMISOM operations like COE reimbursement and self-sustainment from its assessed budget.

On the other side, the UN should continue urging Member States to contribute generously, and without caveats, to the Trust Fund in support of AMISOM. This would ensure that other logistical support packages offered to

AMISOM by UNSOA, like administrative flights and medical follow-ups for injured AMISOM personnel, continue uninterrupted.

f) Increase non-military activities

There is urgent need to step up non-military activities in Somalia so as to touch the hearts and minds of as many civilian Somalis as possible. These would include outreach programmes for the civilian population, reconciliation among different Somali clans, reconstruction of the Somalia economy, increasing humanitarian aid activities, putting in place a long-term strategy to deal with the defectors, and working with politicians so that they appreciate the importance of working together in harmony for the sake of peace.

g) Monitoring Humanitarian Aid flow in Somalia

The UN, through its agency, WFP, should tighten its monitoring procedures for humanitarian aid flowing in Somalia to ensure that it does not benefit the insurgents. Diversion of food aid to rebels either as protection fee or for money amounts to corruption and is illegal. This calls for the strict compliance with UNSCR 1844 (2008) that “prohibits acts that obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia”.

In dealing with the refugees’ problem, it is advisable for the UNHCR to start discussions with other countries with the Horn of Africa to host refugees from Somalia. This will ease the burden from Kenya’s shoulders and help in decongesting the Dadaab camps in Northern Kenya, which are currently a humanitarian crisis themselves.

Another option worth exploring is setting up a camp in Somalia for fleeing Somalis. Even though this will limit the participation of UNHCR since it does not have mandate over Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), other humanitarian agencies could come in to help Somalis within Somalia. This is important since currently, most

of those fleeing Somalia to Kenya and other areas are running away largely because of hunger, as opposed to war.

h) Discouraging Ransoms

It is a pity that illegal ransoms continue to be paid right before the watchful eyes of the UN and the entire international community to pirates by international shipping companies. This must be discouraged. Further research is hereby recommended on how the UN can put mechanisms in place to intercept these ransoms before they reach the pirates. Companies that negotiate ransoms for, or on behalf of pirates should also be targeted for necessary actions. This would discourage piracy.

On the other side, the UN should discourage its Member States from giving in to pressure to pay ransoms. Two wrongs do not make a right! It is not likely that the pirates will continue with their illegal activities if countries or international companies are not cooperating with them in paying ransoms. Besides, measures against piracy should also be stepped up. These include maritime patrols, training Somali coast guards to take care of Somalia waters, trial and imprisonment of pirates.

i) Intensify Propaganda Machinery

The current AMISOM and UNSOA Public Information services need to be stepped up to out-do the propaganda machinery of the insurgents. This should help in shaping the opinion of the masses in Somalia, and in explaining the agenda and activities of AMISOM, TFG, UN and the international community in supporting Somalia in its peace process. It should also help in discounting lies spread by the insurgents as fast as they release them and explaining the true position of things.

j) Engage all stakeholders in the Somalia peace process

It is important to appreciate that peace in Somalia must be home-grown and can only come from the Somalis themselves. UN and the rest of the international community are just facilitators to assist the Somalis realise the desired peace. With

this in mind, it is important to engage all the stakeholders in Somalia in finding lasting peace for their country. These stakeholders include, among others, Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), clan elders, civil society, youths, women, media, businessmen, Somalia Diaspora, insurgents (Al Shabaab and allied groups), TFG-friendly military groups (Ahlusunna Waljama'a and others), regional states (Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug (South Galkayo), Jubaland, and Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (Buuhoodle).

No group should feel left out of the peace process since experience shows that such exclusion leads to rebellion by the excluded group and undermines the peace process. By engaging all shades of opinion in Somalia, the peace process becomes Somalia-owned and gains acceptability by a bigger section of the population.

k) Deal with the root causes of the violence

Long-term solution in Somalia can only be found if the main root causes to the Somali conflict are identified and addressed. This means adopting a bottom-up approach that indigenises the peace process. UN should conduct a thorough research to identify all these root causes with a view to dealing with them. Some of the root causes are: negative clannism, marginalisation of clans by the government, negative external influence, youth unemployment, and collapse of Somalia economy.

Experience has shown that issues underlying wars between or within countries cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. In fact, conflicts the UN is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peace-making efforts of others. Their resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences. Such processes often encounter frustration and setbacks and almost invariably take longer than hoped. It is always necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up.

In conclusion, this study notes that the UN response in Somalia has been very minimal and slow. The much needed UN support has not been realised in full and this has frustrated and delayed the peace process. It would therefore be better if UN could do better and incorporate the recommendations above as it tends to decisively deal with the Somalia crisis. Further research is therefore hereby recommended to come up with effective policy directions for the UN operations in Somalia with a view to effectively dealing with the war.

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