YOUTH IN PEACEBUILDING IN KENYA'S NORTH RIFT REGION: A CASE STUDY OF BURNT FOREST, 1992-2010

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RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.

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DECLARATION

This project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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IMBIAKHA CHARLES OKONGO

C50/75163/2009

11/11/2012

Date

We confirm that the work reported in this project report was carried out by the candidate under our supervision

.....

DR. GEORGE GONA.

28/11/2012

DATE

.....

DR. AMATSIMBI H. MISIGO

28/11/2012

DATE

DEDICATION

To my parents, Mama Daphne Ahembelwa and the late Vincent Bitinyu who struggled to bring me this far. Dad in your eternal abode, how I wish you would have witnessed this part of my academic step. At such a time I recall your emphasis that the best gift of a parent to a child is education which would make one 'belong' and have 'strong wings.' Huuh!! 'I can fly'

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Special thanks to members of staff in the Department of History and Archaeology at the University of Nairobi for their contributions that made this work successful. Equally I thank my wife Agnes Zainabu, our children, brothers and sisters for their encouragement and forbearance throughout my study. I recall that on the 3rd of March 2011 on our way home from the field, we got involved in an accident occasioning the loss of my wife's left arm but she still endeared herself to support in the completion of this project.

I acknowledge the contribution of Caroline Amunga to this study. Carol inspired me, took her time to go through my work while editing it with precision. To Lt Col Waiganjo and Major Simiyu, I thank them for their forbearance as housemates as I occasionally used the house for group discussions.

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AP	Administration Police
ACRWC	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
CDA	Collaborative for Development activities
C.R.AD.L.E:	Christian Rights Advisory Documentation and Legal Centre.
CJPC	Catholic, Justice and Peace Commission
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
D.D.R:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
DOD	Department Of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAPH	East Africa Publishing House
E.C.O.W.A.S:	Economic community of West African States.
GSU	General Service Unit
GTZ	Greater Than Zero
H.R.W:	Human Rights Watch
I.D.P:	Internally Displaced Persons.
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNA	Kenya National Archives
KPTJ	Kenya for Peace with Truth and Justice Coalition
LCP	Local Capacity for Peace
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MEDICAP	Medical Campaign
MCC	Memonite Central Committee
MOSD	Ministry of State for Defence
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NDC	National Defense College

NGO:	Non- Governmental Organizations
NSC	National Steering Committee
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PBC	Peace Building Committees
POKATUSA	Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana and Sabiny
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
SACDEP	Sustainable Agriculture Community Development Programmes
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SARDEP	Sustainable Animal and Range Development Programme
SLDF	Saboat Land Defence Forces
SNV	Synovus
U.N.	United Nations.
U.N.D.P:	United Nations Development Programs
U.N.E.S.C.O:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
U.N.F.P.A:	United Nations Population Fund.
U.N.H.C.R:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
U.N.O.	United nations Organizations
WWP	Wajir Women for Peace
WPG	Wajir Peace Group
Y.I.H.R:	Youth Initiative for Human Rights.

ABSTRACT

This research focused on the role of youth in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest region of Uasin Gishu County. The study tries to change the tendency of disproportionately placing the burdens of war and violence on youths. Instead it avers that the youth occupy important institutions in the society and are understood as unique contributors, indeed, likely leaders, of successful peacebuilding efforts, and they are infact the primary enablers of social change.

The research begins with an examination and analysis of the relations of communities living in Burnt Forest and the reasons for the conflict. This provides a background to the need for peacebuilding efforts and role of youths in these efforts. The study was carried out among the heterogenous Kenyan communities living in Burnt Forest; it explored the people who live in Kiambaa village, Rurigi farm, Rukoine farm, Nyakinywa farm, Kimumu farm, Ngeria location, Kesses and Burnt Forest town. The study aimed to test three hypotheses, first, that the youth were active participants in peace building in the Burnt Forest, secondly that the youth participation in peace building in Burnt Forest caused positive peace and thirdly that the military youth engagement in post-conflict reconstruction contributed to positive peace in Burnt Forest.

As detailed in this study the youth including School going children are actively involved in peacebuilding through their activities which are meant to, among others, building relationships and reconciliation. These activities range from youth choirs, sports, welfare groupings, reconstruction and peace think tanks. Another significant element of youth involvement in peacebuilding that the study brings on board is the military youths. The study reckons that most of the military who were involved in reconstruction in Burnt Forest are Youths. Reconstruction activities of roads, bridges and medical campaign were significant in peacebuilding. Furthermore the military operations in the entire region of North rift pacified the region for peace building.

The study concludes that youth involvement in peace building is *sine-qua-non* in the entire spectrum of peace studies.

WORKING DEFINITIONS

Peacebuilding: The term "peacebuilding" came into widespread use after 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his *Agenda for Peace.* Initially, the UN's definition was limited to when a violent conflict subsides or stops altogether, occurring after peacemaking and peacekeeping. Activities were associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation. Since then, peacebuilding has come to be understood and used as an umbrella concept reflecting a more comprehensive and long-term approach to peace and security including: early warning, conflict prevention, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, the establishment of peace zones, reconciliation, reconstruction, institution building, and political as well as socio-economic transformation.[1]

Armed conflict: This is an event that has degenerated to the use of violent physical force between combatants or upon civilians resulting into damage of property, injury and loss of life. It is a situation where war has broken out either between two sovereign states or between the armed forces of a particular state and a rebel group.[2]

Youth: The United Nations, for statistical purposes, defines 'youth', as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States. This definition was made during preparations for the International Youth Year (1985), and endorsed by the General Assembly (A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981). By this definition, therefore, children are those persons under the age of 14.

Children: Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines 'children' as persons up to the age of 18. Also the African charter on the rights and welfare of the child (ACRWC) defines a child as every human being under age 18.[3] By

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[1]Michelle Maiese, "What it Means to Build Lasting Peace", Electronic document, 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacebuilding/ accessed on October 31, 2007.
[2] Child Rights Documentation and Legal Centre (CRADLC), *A Guide for children in armed conflict,* Nairobi: CRADLC, 2004, p.1.
[3]African charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.1990: Article 2.

this definition, therefore, this study will also take into cognizance issues related to this category in Peace building.

African charter on the right and welfare of the child (1990 article 2) considerations are important in defining youth. Youth is not a homogeneous group and being young might be less relevant in shaping individual identities than religion, ethnicity or class.[4]

Many countries also draw a line on youth at the age at which a person is given equal treatment under the law – often referred to as the "age of majority'. This age is often 18 in many countries, and once a person passes this age, they are considered to be an adult. However, the operational definition and nuances of the term 'youth' often vary from country to country, depending on the specific socio-cultural, institutional, economic and political factors. In the Kenyan case it will consider persons up to 35 years. The study will not be devoid of this category.

Within the category of "youth", it is also important to distinguish between teenagers (13-19) and young adults (20-24), since the sociological, psychological and health problems they face may differ.

'Military youth' in this study refers to the personnel in the armed forces, officers, men and women ranging from 18 to 35 years who were engaged in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. The study reckons that 75 per cent of military personnel who form a battalion are youth.

[4] UNDP, *Youth and Violent Conflict*, New York, 2006, p. 3.

BURNT FOREST AREA MAP



CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

Africa has been affected by continuous conflicts both within and between states for a long time. For instance, since the end of the cold war, countries such as Algeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and the entire Horn of Africa were characterized by war. Most of these conflicts were intrastate, partly due to resource allocation and distribution. In East, Central and the Great Lakes regions of Africa, armed conflicts have been increasingly within rather than between states.[5] Even countries that were once regarded as islands of peace and tranquility such as Cote D'Ivoire and Kenya fell victims of the escalating intrastate conflicts.[6]

In these conflict scenarios, innocent civilians are the principal victims rather than members of the disciplined armed forces. These conflicts have left a lot of destruction of lives and property with women and children being the most affected. In Kenya's North Rift, conflicts have centered on election years.[7] This region has been a hotbed of politically instigated conflicts. For instance, in Burnt Forest area election related violence has been common phenomenon since the inception of multi-party elections in 1992, 1997 and 2007/2008. During these periods, the successful regimes used violence to intimidate supporters of political opponents. This became a tool to retain political monopoly in geographical zones designated as exclusive to particular ethnic communities and political parties and to make it difficult for opposing political parties to penetrate or sustain support in these zones.[8] Violence therefore became part of electoral processes in most parts of the North Rift. In Burnt Forest for instance, violence has been a part of the region's electoral processes since the restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the violence that broke out after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the most deadly and the most destructive violence ever experienced in the area.[9]

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[5] Ruto Pkalya, Mohamud Adan, Isabella Masinde, *Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms*, Nairobi: I.T.D.G 2004, P.1.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] NRC, *Profile of Internal Displacement-Kenya: Compilation of the Information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council*, Geneva: NRC, 2004, pp. 8-9.
[9] Philip Waki Report, *The Report of the Commission to Investigate Post Election Violence 2008*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008, pp 52, 376-379.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

Since 1991, election related violence in Kenya tainted the image of the country which had been seen as the island of peace. The 2007-2008, for instance was one of the most violent periods of Kenya's history. The post election attacks left more than 1, 100 people dead, 3,500 injured and up to 600, 000 forcibly displaced. In Burnt Forest for instance, although violence had been a part of the electoral processes, the 2007/8 violence was by far the most deadly and the most destructive.[10]

Due to the protracted ethnic conflicts in the region, there have been attempts at peace initiatives from various actors. The government efforts at peacebuilding processes saw the establishment of the National Steering Committee (hereafter, NSC) on Peace Building in 2001. This committee was operationalised during the 2002/3 financial year within the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. The objective of NSC was to work towards peacebuilding and conflict management in Kenya. Equally, sometimes the youth in Kenya have formed various peace building organizations yet they continue to be marginalized in the available scholarly researches.

The story of peace building among the communities in Burnt Forest can only become truer if the youth story is investigated and told. Hizkias Assefa noted that World Council of Churches whose membership included the youth mediated in the Sudan conflict.[11] Peter Wallensten argued that, civil societies whose larger membership was of the youth played important roles of solving conflicts in society.[12] McEvoy-Levy presents youth as dynamic agents who can be both positive and negative agents during peacebuilding.[13] She describes how youth in post-conflict zones like Kosovo have educated peers about conflict resolution, organized community service projects, started a union of taxi and motorbike drivers to serve their community and organized sports competition to encourage cross-cultural reconciliation as a method of peacebuilding. Yet in Burnt Forest

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[10] Waki Report, *The Report of the Commission to Investigate Post Election Violence 2008*, p. 52, 376-379.
[11] Hizkia Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies: the Sudan Conflict*, London: West view Press, 1987, p. 95.
[12] Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 161.
[13] McEvoy-Levy Siobhan (ed), *Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord in Peace Building*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p 25-38

neither children nor youth appear as important variables in the literature on peace processes.

In light of this scholarly marginalization of youth in Burnt Forest, this study was conceived not only to enhance but also to document the effective youth participation in peacebuilding. The study poses the critical question of what is the role of the youth in peacebuilding. Similarly, the military was visibly seen in Burnt Forest. Was their presence related in any way with peacebuilding? The larger populations of the foot soldiers that were seen in Burnt Forest were the youthful members of the army and yet little is known whether they played any role in peacebuilding. If the military took part in post conflict reconstruction, did it in any way contribute to peacebuilding? The study documented the role that the youth of Burnt Forest played in peacebuilding.

1.3 Aims and objectives of the study

The objectives of this research were as follows:-

1. To examine peacebuilding efforts in Burnt Forest, 1992-2010
2. To assess the involvement of youth in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest, 1992 -2010.
3. To evaluate military youth participation in the post-conflict reconstruction in Burnt Forest, 1992 -2010.

1.4 Scope and limitation

This research examines youth involvement in Post conflict Peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. It is limited to the youth engagement in peacebuilding, peacemaking and reconstruction (reconstruction is part of peacebuilding). The period of study was between 1992 and 2010. In 1992 ethnic clashes were first witnessed in Burnt Forest. These were as a result of hate campaigns by politicians as the country moved towards multiparty elections. In December 2007 the election process in Kenya was characterized by irregularities leading to the worst ethnic conflict in Kenya's history leading to deaths, displacement of populations and loss of property. The conflict resulted to peace building efforts that restored calm experienced in the area to 2010. The study focused on the youth in cognizance with United Nation's (UN) definition of the term youth. The area of study is

Burnt Forest in Uasin Gishu County. Burnt Forest provides a heterogeneous representation of the Kenyan population and is a region that has experienced recurrent conflicts which intensified with the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991.

1.5 Justification of the study

Young people, as members of a dynamic group in society, play crucial roles in positively transforming conflict situations and in building the foundations of peaceful societies. This is mentioned in several statements and reports of governments, international inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. However, there is limited data to back up these statements which are more rhetorical than scholarly substantive. Academic research has yet to focus on youth's positive role in peacebuilding. This justifies the purpose of this study which is to explore the role of youth as peace-builders in Burnt Forest an area which experiences recurring conflict. When thinking of youth in this area we think about them in conflict, rarely thoughts turn to the positive, preventive and transformative role of youth both in violent as well as non-violent conflicts. Hence, one of the most important deficiencies in the conflict and peacebuilding literature is the sidestepping the youth in the discussion of conflict resolution mechanisms.

1.6 Literature Review

The literature on youth that exists mostly depicts the youth as victims and as troublemakers without providing comprehensive understandings of youth in peacebuilding. Most of such literature overlooks youth's positive participation during peace processes.

According to Rodgers most of the literature that exists on the youth in Latin America and Caribbean depict the youth as gangs responsible for violence. Rodgers contends that, while much hearsay exists of youth's positive contributions to peacebuilding, the single most glaring gap in youth related research is the lack of attention to youth's role as peace

builders.[14] If youth can be such a powerful force that can destroy a whole nation through gang activities and violence, it is significant to explore whether such energies can be resourceful in building peace, particularly in Burnt Forest.

McEvoy-Levy represents youth as dynamic agents who can be both positive and negative agents during peacebuilding.[15] She describes how youth in post-conflict zones like Kosovo have educated peers about conflict resolution, organized community service projects, started a union of taxi and motorbike drivers to serve their community and organized sports competition to encourage cross-cultural reconciliation as a method of peacebuilding. Yet in Burnt Forest neither children nor youth appear as important variables in the literature on peace processes.

Del Felice and Wisler argue that in Serbia a youth group known as Otpor, opposed Milosevic's regime while Peace Links empowered marginalized youth in Sierra Leone through music and dance as a means of network of the youth in peacebuilding.[16] Do similar youth-led initiatives developed according to youth preferences exist in Burnt Forest?

The authors further argue that in Israel, Serbia and Sierra Leone, the youths were actively involved in grassroots peacebuilding through groups created to resist compulsory conscription to serve in the national armies. That in Israel the youth formed a group known as Shministim whose members resisted taking part in Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory. The Kenya Defence Forces were vividly present in Burnt Forest. It would be interesting to find out whether their presence and role in reconstruction contributed to peace building.

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[14] Dennis Rodgers, "Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Literature Survey", in *Latin America and Caribbean Region, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development SMU*, New York: World Bank, 1999, pp. 5-27.

[15] McEvoy-Levy, Siobhan (ed), *Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord in Peace Building*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p 26-40.

[16] Celina Del Felice and Andria Wisler, 'The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-Builders,' *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, Vol. 11, 2007, p 10-24

According to Miller, Ladouceur and Dugal, the government of Sierra Leone initiated the community arms collection and destruction programme in which the youth were active participants.[17] The youth in Sierra Leone took part in asking civilians to voluntarily surrender arms. The Sierra Leone case is a classic example of the youth participation in peace building through arms collection.[18] It will be interesting to investigate if the youth in Burnt-Forest of Kenya contributed in any way in peace building in a similar manner, owing to the presence of the military in Burnt Forest during the period under study.

According to Svirsky some adult-led initiatives of peacebuilding have extensive youth input. Such initiatives include programmes where youth have performed in street theatre shows and ran radio programmes for youth as a campaign for peace.[19] Svirsky holds that such programmes assisted to promote peace between the Israeli and Palestinian people. This research wonders if such programmes have been developed to promote coexistence between communities living in Burnt Forest.

Fraenkel argues that in Macedonia television programmes were developed to encourage children to appreciate ethnic diversity and view it positively.[20] This included children television programmes such as *Nashe Maalo* which played a key role in peacebuilding in Macedonia. Slachmuijlder argues that similar programmes were initiated in Burundi where through studio Ijambo, the youth initiated peace talks.[21] Similarly, the "Talking Drum Studio" in Sierra Leone is a well-known example of youth being engaged in all aspects of a project, with youth working as producers, reporters and actors as well as identifying issues for and about youth.[22] This demonstrates youth's ability to employ

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[17] Derek Miller, Daniel Ladouceur and Zoe Dugal, *From Research to Road Map: Learning from the Arms for Development initiative in Sierra Leone,* Geneva, UNIDIR, 2006, P.16.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Gila Svirsky, "The Israeli Peace Movement since the Al-Aqsa Intifada" in Roane Carey (ed) *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid,* New York: Verso, 2001, p 20.
[20] Eran Fraenkel, "Changing Attitudes through Children's Television: Nashe Maalo in Macedonia", in Paul van Tongeren, et al (ed), *People Building Peace 2: Successful Stories of Civil Society,* London: Lynne Reinner Publishing, 2005.
[21] Lena Slachmuijlder, "Unsung Heroes: Studio Ijambo in Burundi", in Paul van Tongeren, et al (eds), *People Building Peace 2: Successful Stories of Civil Society,* London: Lynne Reinner Publishing, 2005, p 9.
[22] Jane Lowicki, *Youth Speak Out: New Voices on the Protection and Participation,* New York: WCRWC, 2005, pp. 10-18.

music and dance as an alternative mode of engaging in dialogue and resolving conflict and yet little is known of this kind of initiative by youth in Burnt Forest.

Masuda argues that youthful women in Afghanistan engage in peacebuilding through radio programmes. Radio in Afghan has emerged as a critical tool for informing and educating people on peacebuilding, because it helps to reach the approximately 65 percent of the total Afghan population that is illiterate. The author holds that, despite the challenges to the establishment of women's radio programming such as the conservative culture, threats from warlords, and families that are reluctant to allow women to work for peace many organizations and donors are using radio to reach out to Afghan population on peacebuilding.[23] If this is one of the most well-known peacebuilding initiatives now operating inside Afghanistan, do we have similar initiatives by youthful populations working in local radio stations that operate in Burnt Forest?

Schwartz in her research on youth in Mozambique, the DRC and Kosovo examined the effects of local and international policies on the emergence of youth participation during post-conflict reconstruction. Her findings confirmed that the youth are key actors in peacebuilding through reconstruction programs which are aimed at meeting youth needs which sometimes act as a driving force to conflict.[24] Such peacebuilding programmes are effective in shaping youth's roles during post-conflict periods yet scholars have rarely talked about them in Burnt Forest.

According to Ellis, youth initiatives were critical in helping ex-combatants in Liberia and South Africa exercise their leadership skills positively by volunteering in crime patrols and community peace programmes.[25] While such youth initiatives have contributed to peacebuilding in the above countries, little is known if such efforts existed in Burnt Forest.

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[23] Sultan Masuda, *From Rhetoric to Reality: Afghan Women on the Agenda for Peace*, Kabul: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2005, pp. 18-20.
[24]Stephen Schwartz, *Youth in Post-Conflict Reconstruction- Agents of Change*, Washington DC: USIP Press, 2010, pp. 63-152.
[25]Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No.375, 1995, pp.165-197.

According to Harris and Forcey the youth are the primary actors in grassroots community development and relations work. They are at the frontlines of peace building.[26] Harris argues that the youth take part in activities such as the International Youth Parliament which is urging an increasing number of young people to reject violence and become involved in peace-building efforts at the grassroots, national and international level. How have the young people of Burnt Forest changed their societies? What is their specific power? How can their unique potential be harnessed? This research answered these questions.

Ardizzone studied the activities and motivation of youth organizations in New York City. She highlighted the activities of Global Kids, an organization which conducts student-run conferences on children's rights. She also analyzed the activities of the Youth Force organization which teaches teens on how to respond when stopped by the police and Youth Peace/Roots which tries to counter the active role military recruiters take with inner-city youth by educating about alternatives to militarism. She emphasizes that young people whom she interviewed show a commitment to changing the situation of their peers and the image adults have of youth.[27] And that a number of examples indicate that young people proved to be positive agents of change in order to embrace peace. Were the youths in Burnt Forest agents of change towards peace?

According to Kratli and Swift, customary approaches to conflict management focus on the needs and desires of people rather than on results, and stress values of respect, honesty, dignity and reciprocity.[28] Although the authors acknowledged peace efforts in the North Rift, the absence of youth in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms leave the question, has it changed and worked than when the youth are involved? This is the gap that this research hopes to fill.

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[26] Ian Harris and Linda R. Forcey (Eds.), *Peacebuilding for Adolescents*, New York: Peter Lang,1999, p 17.
[27] Leonisa Ardizzone, "Generating Peace: A Study of Nonformal Youth Organisations", *Peace and Change Journal*, 28-3, 2003, pp. 420-44
[28] Saverio Kratli and Jeremy Swift, *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict: A Literature Review*, University of Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 1999, p 33.

Kamenju, Singo and Wairagu argued that various civil societies play an active role in peacebuilding in the North Rift.[29] The authors maintain that the world vision assisted to implement a programme of peace and reconciliation amongst the Pokot, Turkana, Karamojong and Sabiny (POKATUSA). The world vision uses a multi- pronged approach to peace building where they sponsor children from various communities by paying fees.[30] Although the authors recognized the need to educate the youth they did not explain how education will make the youth to be active in peace building. This study purposed to investigate the role of education in peace building in the North Rift. Is educating the youth a panacea to peacebuilding?

McGrew, Frieson and Chan argue that nonviolent activism has grown in recent years, and youthful women are now the majority of Cambodians with conflict management and peacebuilding expertise. They are often at the forefront of addressing disagreements between authorities and citizens over local resources. For instance, they have forestry network, a human rights and environmental network that works for peacebuilding through environmental conservation. Traditional peace NGOs such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) have provided significant support to individuals and local NGOs and helped produce a strong group of Cambodian peacebuilders, the majority of whom are women.[31] This is a notable exercise that this research wonders whether such efforts have been used in Burnt Forest.

Masuda argued that Afghan women contributed in peacebuilding by providing an important counterbalance to the political and religious extremism that threatens to undermine peace and democracy in Afghanistan. Women served as a moderating force against extremists, in part because they were the prime victims of political violence and extremist interpretations of Islam, before and during the Taliban regime. The author points out that Afghan woman are liberal voters progressive in their views and that by

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[29] Jan Kamenju, Mwachoti Singo and Francis Wairagu , *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling small Arms and Insecurity*, Nairobi: SRIC, 2003 p.91.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Laura McGrew, Kate Frieson and Sambath Chan, *Good Governance from the Ground Up: Women's Roles in Post-Conflict Cambodia*, Washington: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2004, pp. 5-19.

allowing Afghan women to make greater contributions to the peace process Afghanistan's government is undermining the extremists and the spoilers and promoting peace. The author acknowledges the contributions of millions of Afghan women and their ability to engage in peacebuilding through economic and political reconstruction of their country.[32] Among these women were those who are youthful. From this experience, it is clear that the youth of both genders are instrumental in peacebuilding and yet the Burnt Forest youthful women roles remains severely limited in scholarly works.

Pearce argues that realistic peacebuilding must take into account the power relations, persistent exclusions, and the social implications of the post-war political economy. Pearce used the Latin American case-studies to show that the most important steps towards a sustainable peace are those which foster and strengthen local capacity to deal with the past, to engage with the present, and to shape the future in ways which do not exclude, oppress, or divide. The author maintains that long term peacebuilding is the responsibility of local people among the youth, many of whom have been involved in the war in different ways: some as victims/survivors, some as protagonists, and some as relief workers and peacebuilders.[33] The processes of local peacebuilding from below that the author talks about can only be effective if the youth are at the centre. The Latin American case acts as an eye opener to this study on Burnt Forest.

Krätli and Swift argued that the most successful example of large-scale conflict management in northern Kenya is what started in Wajir district during the clashes in 1992-1995. The peace process in Wajir began in June 1993, prompted by a group of Somali women the Wajir Women for Peace (WWP) who gathered around two educated women and a traditional woman leader. Very soon WWP established linkages with the elite of educated Somali professionals in Wajir town (both men and women), that led to

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[32]Masuda, *From Rhetoric to Reality: Afghan Women on the Agenda for Peace*, Kabul: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2005, pp. 27-41.

[33]Jenny Pearce, "Sustainable Peace-Building in the South: Experiences from Latin America", in the *Development in Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Special Double Issue (Nov., 1997), pp. 438-455Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GBStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4029014 Accessed on 17/11/2010 05:30.

the creation of the Wajir Peace Group (WPG). One of the first concerns of WWP and WPG was to involve the District Security Committee, elders, women and youth. In case of disputes or outburst of violence the group would travel to the area and usually convene a meeting and resolve the conflict. The peace work also included the organization of workshops for elders, women, youth, chiefs, administration, security forces and religious leaders, as well as of training of trainers.[34] The argument by Saverio and Jeremy suggest that in Wajir the youth were at the centre of peacebuilding. It is the interest of this study to observe if the Burnt Forest youth were equally at the centre of peacebuilding.

According to Pollak, the youth in the Inter-Church Group in Northern Ireland played a very important role in the politics of reconciliation. They assisted in the transformation of violent inter-communal conflict to peaceful co-existence. Pollak observed that the youth in the church groups made it possible for a social and spiritual breakthrough which changed people's views of one another.[35] The author believes that the church groups assisted in the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing. Burnt Forest region has a considerable number of churches with a large number of youth memberships of which this research investigated if they played reconciling roles as was the case in Northern Ireland.

In another observation of the youth in the inter-church groups in the Northern Ireland, Bloomfield argues that their efforts simply assisted the people to find a way to live alongside former enemies not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share the society with them, so that they all have better lives together than we have had separately.[36] The author believes that the youth played a central feature of many religious approaches to reconciliation and peacebuilding. It was of interest to investigate if similar conditions existed in Burnt Forest.

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[34] Krätli and Jeremy Swift, *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya*, London: Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex, UK, 2000, pp. 38-47.
[35] Andrew Pollak, *A Citizens' Inquiry: The Opsahl Report on Northern Ireland*, Dublin: Lilliput Press for Initiative, 1993, p.348.
[36]Bloomfield Barnes and Huyse, L., *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003, p.12.

Agger argues that if the youth are not involved in the approach to post-violence peacebuilding, the process can be counterproductive and breeds resentments. He says because the youth will live in the society for a longer period the psychological wounds inflicted by the atrocities committed during and after the War are supposed to be properly addressed.[37] He uses an example of the Tito government in Yugoslavia where the post-war communist government was anxious to push the idea of 'Yugoslavism' and therefore saw no purpose in raising matters that might contradict the official view of dealing with the psychological wounds inflicted. The author believes that that was just a superficial form of harmony. For sidelining the youth means that the underneath grievances remain a well of resentment that can then effectively lead the youth to implode. The author raises key issues which to this research are very important if peacebuilding was to be successful in Burnt Forest.

Dzathor argues that the youth can build peace through sports. The author observes that team sports by their very nature require a lot of cooperation and collaboration among individual members of a team in order to be effective. Thus athletes in a team sport need to communicate effectively with each other and understand each other to achieve good results. This necessity creates esprit de corps among members of a team. Generally, team players tend to be less selfish, are more tolerant towards other people and are more likely to adopt a pacifist approach to resolving disputes in society. The author uses an example of George Opong Weah, the Liberian former world number one footballer of the year who became a symbol of hope for his countrymen and was actively involved in bringing peace to war torn Liberia in the late 1990s. Sports may be used to promote peace and friendship as their themes. Peace and friendship seem to be the themes of many existing sports festivals even if particular sports events have not been explicitly dubbed so. Therefore, all modern sporting activities, including games and festivals fundamentally and implicitly promote friendship. At the end of a game, athletes from both the victorious and the vanquished sides could be publicly seen shaking hands, exchanging shirts,

[37] Ian Agger, "Reducing Trauma during Ethno-political Conflict: A Personal Account of Psycho-social Work under War Conditions in Bosnia'. In: *Peace, Conflict and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century* (edited by D.J. Christie, R.V. Wagner and D.D. Winter), Upper Saddle River, NJ., 2001, p.245.

hugging each other or consoling one another. This happens even at the end of martial sports such as boxing and wrestling. Such gestures epitomise empathy, tolerance, acceptance and love- all constituting a good recipe for peace.[38] Dzathor's argument is plausible as an eye opener to this research which investigated the youth in peacebuilding.

1.7 Theoretical framework

This study is guided by a nonviolent peacebuilding and conflict transformation approach, mostly based on the work of Johan Galtung and his "transcend" method.[39] By transcendence Galtung means creating a new type of reality by using something that potentially was there to achieve peace. Transcendence means redefining the situation so that what looked incompatible or blocked, is unlocked and a new landscape opens up. Creativity is the key to that lock or block. The conflict has been transformed[40] hence peacebuilding. In this case the youth is turned into becoming empirically a reality. Transcendence introduces a new reality, opening a new landscape which transforms a conflict to transplant it to new reality. Galtung argues that the road to fruitful transformation goes through complexification with the possibility of bringing on board some groups, youth, which were seen as guarding against peace.

For this case the youth were always seen as agents of conflict but have to be considered in peacebuilding. And that we should accept that the youth may both be a source of destruction and of peace so we should act so that the creativity aspect of the youth dominates.[41] Other approaches such as conflict management, peace-keeping put more emphasis on the role of the state and also intergovernmental bodies, while the peacebuilding approach as understood here, offers more room for civil society actors and for actions addressed at changing attitudes and behaviour among the youth in long term.

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[38]Augustine Dzathor, *Sports for Peace and Development*, Mutara: Africa University, Faculty of Management Administration, 2003, Pp. 5-10

[39] Celina Del Felice and Andria Wisler The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue* 11, November 2007 available from www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk Accessed on 10/9/2011.

[40] Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means: The Transcend Method*, New York, United Nations, 2000 p. 26.

[41] Ibid, pp 20-26.

The reason for this choice is that it appears to be the most appropriate theory for reflecting on the role of youth in peacebuilding and in social change processes in general.

1.8 Research Hypothesis

The study tested three hypotheses. These are:

1. There were peacebuiding efforts in Burnt Forest in the period 1992-2010
2. The youth were actively involved in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest during the period 1992- 2010.
3. Military youth involvement in post-conflict reconstruction promoted peace in Burnt Forest during the period under study.

1.9 Methodology

Both Secondary and primary sources were used to gather information for this study. Secondary sources included books and articles published in scholarly journals. Newspaper articles were used as well as website articles. Newspaper articles and website material were very significant in complimenting secondary sources and the field material. Libraries that were used include, the University of Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, Egerton Conflict Centre Library, Nation Media housed in Nation House, The Standard Media housed in I & M house in Nairobi. Equally important was Ministry of State for Defence (MOSD) libraries at the Defence Staff College at Karen, International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) and at the Kenya Military Academy, Lanet.

Primary sources such as unprocessed written materials for example reports from NGOs, humanitarian organizations working in the North Rift were used to fill the gaps found in the books and journals. These helped in providing information about youth in conflict and peacebuilding. Archival materials and oral interviews were used. Classified archival materials from the Kenya National Archives (hereafter, KNA) that were used in this study included provincial annual reports.

The archival material provided assisted in developing a historical perspective that helped in seeing how communities from outside the Rift Valley moved into Uasin Gishu and

particularly in Burnt Forest therefore laying a fertile ground for ethnic conflicts. I used different institutions archives to compliment what I got from the KNA before proceeding to the field. In the field, there were various categories of informants that I interacted with. These were chosen according to their knowledge about the area, age, gender and status in society. For smooth data collection, I worked closely with the provincial administration leaders, village elders and church leaders. These helped to identify informants with desired characteristics for the research similarly I visited the ministry of social services to know the youth organizations in Burnt Forest. I used oral interviews with open-ended questionnaire leaving the interviewee with room to talk and give additional information regarding the research. I carried out oral interviews to supplement secondary data. Detailed information was obtained through indepth interview with women and men both old and young on the role of youth. Focused group discussion was also used. One major challenge was the refusal of the respondents to be recorded for fear of victimization confining the interviews to note taking.

A total number of fifty two respondents were interviewed but only twenty nine allowed their names to be used for the study. The remaining group of interviewees was not comfortable to be quoted citing their position in Government and society and for fear of victimization. The study was largely qualitative in nature; data collection and analysis were purely qualitative

CHAPTER TWO

UNDERSTANDING BURNT FOREST: FROM HISTORY TO CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

Burnt Forest is one of the divisions in Uasin Gishu County. It has a cosmopolitan population comprising of the Kalenjin, Luhya and the Kikuyu people among others. The region has a high agricultural potential. This potentiality makes it prone to competition over land between members of the Kalenjin community who perceive themselves as the indigenous of the region against the immigrants.[42] For most of Burnt Forest resident's the region is home to diverse communities with varied history. This chapter therefore is a background history of the people of Burnt Forest area.

2.2 The Burnt Forest inhabitants

From oral traditions of the communities living in Burnt Forest, the Maasai were the early inhabitants of not only Burnt Forest but also the entire Uasin Gishu County. At the beginning of the 19th Century, they had firmly established themselves in the region. However, as the 19th Century advanced the Maasai were beset by problems such as prolonged drought, rinderpest and diseases which made them to lose many of their cattle. They were forced to turn to cattle rustling and fought over water and grazing rights.[43] The subsequent results were wars between the Purko and the Uasin Gishu Maasai fought between 1810 and 1815. The Uasin Gishu Maasai were defeated and scattered marking the end of the Maasai domination of the region. Their end led to the emergence of the Nandi, one of the Kalenjin communities as a dominant group in the region.[44]

In the 19th Century the Nandi were largely a pastoral people. They had inherited a new institution from the Maasai, the Orkoiyot.[45] The institution assisted them to engage and

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[42] KNA/ Uasin Gishu District Annual Report 1981, P. 3.

[43] M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, a Study in Government Policy,* Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.1-10.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Orkoiyot was the supreme spiritual leader and also had the authority to make decisions regarding security, including the waging of war.

win a series of battles against the Luo, Bukusu and Uasin-Gishu Maasai.[46] The Nandi would then expand to new areas such as Burnt Forest in the Uasin Gishu Plateau. This expansion would go on until the coming of the colonial rule at the end of the 19th century. With the establishment of colonial rule then White highlands and creation of reserves led to the displacement of "Natives."[47]

In 1895 the British Imperial East African Company rule came to an end with the British declaring the East Africa protectorate. The declaration placed Kenya under direct administration of the British through the Kenya colonial office in London. By 1901, the colonial government had assumed authority through the East Africa (Lands) Order in Council of 1901, and the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 which enabled it to alienate African land to pave way to the settlement of the European immigrants.[48]

Equally, the Order in Council gave legal effect to land policy by defining Crown Land not as unoccupied or wasteland, but as all 'public' land subject to the control of His Majesty the King of England.[49] Another Ordinance in 1902, gave the colonial government powers to sell or lease the crown land to Europeans at 2 rupees per 100 acres or rent the land at 15 rupees per 100 acres annually. In 1921, the Kenya Annexation Order in Council was passed. It alienated native rights over land in areas reserved for white occupation.[50] This resulted in massive landlessness, particularly in Central, Rift Valley and Western Kenya and subsequent creation of Native reserves.[51]

Most of the landless were then forced to seek labour in the created White Highland in the Rift Valley. Majority of them were the Kikuyu people whose population had risen to significant numbers by the end of the 1930s. This population growth raised concern

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[46] Simokin Wanjala "Land Ownership and use in Kenyan: Past, Present and Future in Smokin, C. Wanjala *Essays on land law: The reform Debate in Kenya.* Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi 2000, pp. 26-36.
[47] Ibid.
[48] M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country,* 1967, pp 5-7.
[49] Ibid.
[50] George Gona and Barak Muluka "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities", Nairobi: UNDP, 2010, pp. 53-54.
[51] Wanjala "Land Ownership and use in Kenyan: Past, Present and Future''pp. 26-36.

among the European settlers. To counter their population rise in the White highlands, the White settlers did away with squatter system. This led to the eviction of some Kikuyu from the region. In 1941 the Government started a settlement scheme in Olenguruone north of Nakuru where most of the evicted Kikuyu squatters were settled. Since the Olenguruone scheme could not absorb all the evicted Kikuyu, those who missed out were forcefully repatriated to Central Kenya between 1946 and 1952. This cyclical pattern of Kikuyu removals from Central Kenya, then settlement in the Rift Valley, followed by forceful evictions and painful repatriation back to Central Kenya generated bitterness and inflamed the Kikuyu in Central Kenya. These reactions ignited the 1952 Mau Mau uprising.[52]

In response to the uprising, the colonial government initiated land reforms in the African reserves, referred to as the Swynnerton Plan of 1954. The plan focused on securing individualized land tenure to stimulate farm investment, agricultural growth and the emergence of a land market. The plan focused on three main issues; increasing agricultural productivity among the Africans, conservation of the environment and conservation of natural resources. The main tenet of the plan was to replace customary tenure system with private land ownership in form of individualized holdings akin to White settlement areas.[53] Although it appeared to be a good programme the plan was not able to solve the land issues, especially redistribution or inequalities in ownership between settlers and Africans, or between and within various African communities. The colonial government responded by establishing settlement schemes for persons displaced from the White highlands. These schemes were mostly in low agricultural potential areas of Makueni and Machakos districts in Eastern Province; Shimba Hills and Gedi in the Coast Province; and Olenguruone in Rift Valley Province, among others.[54] Most of these areas were also infested with tsetse flies and prone to human wildlife conflicts. The

[52] Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau 1905-63*, Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya 1987, pp. 11-22.
[53] Karuti Kanyinga, *Redistribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000, pp 15, 24-30.
[54] Okoth Ogendo, W. H. O., "African Land Tenure Reform", in J. Heyer (ed.) *Agricultural Development in Kenya*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1976, p 12.

individualization of land rights ultimately replaced the communal land regimes and encouraged commoditization.[55]

In 1963, the government initiated a programme of African settlement in the White Highlands namely the Million Acre Scheme aimed at resettling the landless. The programme was facilitated through the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT).[56] Through the 1960s and 1970s, the SFT invited applications for allocation of land in the created settlement schemes. The process of designing these schemes involved amalgamation and sub-division of parcels of land by use of aerial surveys into economically viable units. It also included the provision of access roads and the conversion of the land registration system from the complex Registration of Titles Act (RTA) to the simpler Registered Land Act (RLA). The government also made loans available not only for the purchase of land, but also for the acquisition of livestock, farm input and other developments. These loans, which were part of a revolving fund, were administered by the SFT.[57]

As individuals responded to the advertisements and applied for allocation of land, grassroots leadership and enterprise were ultimately critical of the ways in which communities organized to make the best of the emergent SFT opportunities. For instance, it was the power of what John Lonsdale defines as positive ethnicity that saw non-Kalenjin communities namely the Kikuyu, the Akamba, the Meru, the Maragoli, the Abanyore and the Abagusii people among others congregate to purchase land in Uasin Gishu district. The Abagusii embrassed their communal tendency to make use of the available forest for lumbering. There was no political patronage in this manner of settlement rather; it was solely the desire for productive land that drove these traditionally agricultural communities to participate in these schemes.[58]

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[55] Okoth Ogendo, W. H. O., "African Land Tenure Reform", pp15-25.
[56] Cleophers Leo, *Land and Class in Kenya*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984. pp. 80-90.
[57] Karuti Kanyinga, "Beyond the Colonial Legacy, The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" in Smokin C. Wanjala, *Essays on Land law: The Reform Debate in Kenya*, Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi. 2000. p. 46.
[58] Ibid.

As the government intensified settlement of the landless, members of the Kalenjin communities became more apprehensive about the massive arrival of the Kikuyu in Burnt Forest. The Kikuyu large presence was seen in their purchase of Rukuini, Rurigi, Nyakinywa, Kondoo, Munyaka and Kiambaa farms among others.[59] The large numbers of non-indigenous people's presence in Burnt Forest remained a borne of controversy in the area. This puts in the picture intense political and ethnic conflict between the various African communities in Burnt Forest.[60] For instance, in 1992 the land problem emerged again during the call for re-introduction of multi-party politics. KANU used the land issue to counter the proponents of multiparty. KANU elite mobilized the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu by reviving the KAMATUSA alliance as a platform to fight for the group's political and land rights. They began calling for a Majimbo system of government in 1991, leading to the re-activation of ethnic differences that had previously threatened to evict non-Kalenjin communities from the Rift Valley.[61]

2.3 The causes of Burnt Forest Conflict 1992 – 2008

Although it might not be easy to categorize the causes of the ethnic conflicts that took place in Burnt Forest, the practice of ethnicity is subterranean most of the time. Nevertheless, the causes of conflict in Burnt Forest fall under broad categories such as social, economic, political, religious, environmental as well psychological problems. There was therefore an inter-play of socio-cultural and economic forces seated in the meaning, values, and norms of states. The conflict was an outcome of an imbalance in these factors that existed between the communities living in the region as argued below.

2.3.1 Reasons Responsible for Burnt Forest Conflict

Post-colonial Kenya is an excellent case study in the myriad difficulties that multiethnic states face during the processes of development and democratization. In most African states these processes were historically manipulated by the executive, an important arm

[59] Oral interview, Peter Njenga, Rukoine Farm, 29/12/2010.
[60] Kanyinga, "Beyond the Colonial Legacy. The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" pp.45-58.
[61] Gona and Muluka "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities" pp. 53-54.

of government which schemed conflict for political gain.[62] In Kenya for instance, the executive initiated policies that favoured people from the president's ethnic group. Such acts of favouritism influenced resource allocation and development. This explained why some areas were developed more than others. For instance, since independence in 1963 there have been three presidents of Kenya; Jomo Kenyatta (1963 – 78), Daniel Arap Moi (1978 – 2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002 – present). Jomo Kenyatta has been accused for favouring his Kikuyu ethnic group particularly in matters relating to land allocation in Burnt Forest area. Moi on his part was accused for favouring his Kalenjin people and the same pattern repeated with Kibaki for the Kikuyu case.[63] Presidency was therefore associated with economic benefit to the community that controlled it. This made such a community to use all means to protect the presidency even by use of violence. It was from this perception that the Kalenjin would rise against any community that threatened Moi's presidency leading to ethnic clashes witnessed countrywide including in Burnt Forest.

Acts of favouritism were also seen in the process of Africanisation of the civil service after independence. Africanisation involved employment of Africans who formally worked as labourers on White Highlands into the civil service as a way of empowering Africans economically.[64] Although these policies were well intended, they did not balance all ethnic groups. Most of the jobs went to the communities that controlled the presidency. This led to animosity between the community that controlled the presidency and other ethnic groups. This was well expressed in the conflict in Burnt Forest. During Kibaki's presidency, some members of the Kalenjin community who were working in the civil service lost their jobs. This led to resentment among the Kalenjin who felt that they were being targeted due to the mistakes that Moi committed. Most the Kalenjin, therefore, aligned themselves with the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which they believed would protect their interest. They were convinced that ODM would unseat Kibaki from State House, but when they failed they unleashed violence to his ethnic

[62] Craig Murphy, "Power and Responsibilities in Global Community", in Antonio Franceschet, (ed), *The Ethics of Global Governance*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 105-189.
[63] Murphy, "Power and Responsibilities in Global Community", pp 105-189.
[64] Oral interview, George Ngetich, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.

group some of who were living in Burnt Forest.[65] The political leadership in Kenya therefore played a crucial role in fueling ethnic clashes in the Burnt Forest region.

Political leadership incited communities against each other particularly through misinterpreting the concept of pluralism and majimboism. To some of these politicians majimboism was taken to mean eviction of non-indigenous people back to their ancestral land.[66] Majimbo slogan was introduced by the KANU elite as a means of countering calls for the re-introduction of a multiparty political system. This became a source of ethnic conflicts in Burnt Forest as members of the Kalenjin community called for the eviction of other communities living in the area.[67] KANU elites from the region vehemently rode on the majimbo debate to persuade the community to reject leaders who were perceived to be against the status-quo. As reported by the weekly review of May 1, 1992:

> "At Kapkatet, as was the case earlier in Kapsabet, speakers alluded to the Rift Valley as the homeland of the Kalenjin and warned other communities residing there that they risked being "evicted" if they were found identifying with opposition politics. Mibei was quoted as urging Rift Valley residents to "crush" government critics in the area, while Biwott, speaking along the same lines stated that leaders from the province were ready to take "stern measures" to counter government critics. At the end of it all, the leaders issued an "order" banning three leaders of the nascent Ford Pressure group, Messrs. Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro and Martin Shikuku, as well as the Law Society of Kenya chairman, Mr. Paul Muite, from setting foot in Rift Valley Province.[68]

As indicated above the majimbo debate was a recipe for chaos, ethnic animosity and conflict that befell the people of Burnt Forest starting from 1991, 1995 and 2007/8. By using the platform of majimbo the Kalenjin politicians claimed that, "the Kalenjins would not succumb to threats and harassment from any quarter and would fight for equal rights with other Kenyans".[69] They claimed that the Kikuyu wanted to dominate the indigenous

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[65] Kiraitu Murungi, *Ethnicity and Multi- Partism in Kenya*, Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1995, pp. 1 – 10.
[66] The Editor, "Majimbo Debate", in the *Weekly Review* June, 29 1993.
[67] Ibid.
[68] The Editor, stop this heinous atrocity / the Kalenjin factor, in the *Weekly Review* May 1st 1992, pp. 12 – 13.
[69] The Editor Weekly Review, "Ethnic Clashes in the Rift Valley", in *The Weekly Review* October 7, 1994, p.5.

people who had welcomed them in the Rift Valley. And that it was the members of the Kikuyu community who instigated ethnic clashes in Rift Valley province in order to tarnish the name of President Moi. They asserted that only majimbo could ensure the end of economic exploitation of the minority ethnic groups by the bigger ethnic groups like the Kikuyu and that Kenyans were for the re-introduction of majimbo and predicted that those few who were opposed to the system would be swept aside by the current.[70]

The crusaders of majimbo held a meeting in Kapsabet on 8th September, 1991, shortly before the clashes and called for reviving federalism based on ethnicity and not one based on universal principles. The proponents of majimboism had the intention of diverting the attention of the people from the multiparty politics that was by then sweeping across Africa, particularly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.[71]

The roots of majimbo politics can be traced in the British colonial legacy of divide and rule in the 19th Century. During their rule in Kenya, the British created boundaries between communities that had earlier lived together. These boundaries were meant to restrict movement of some communities. As such they created territorial ownership. The British approach not only divided communities along ethnic lines but also polarized their relationships. This contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups in one nation-state called Kenya.[72] This condition encouraged ethnic violence that was witnessed in Burnt Forest.

The boundaries introduced by the British equally contributed to the land question that remained a thorny economic and political problem not only in Burnt Forest but also in the entire nation. The colonial creation of the White Highlands for European agricultural practice covered the high potential areas of the country such as Burnt Forest. As a result, many Africans were pushed into the infertile native reserves which were sometimes

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[70] Ibid.
[71] Human Rights Watch/Africa November, 1993.
[72] Peter Shilaro " Colonial Land Policies: The Kenya Land Commission and Kakamega Gold Rush, 1932 – 4 in William Ochieng' *Historical Studies and Social Change in Western Kenya Essays in Memory of Professor Gideon S. Were*, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers 2002 pp. 110 – 122.

hostile and not conducive to arable farming.[73] Land grievances therefore became central to all ethnic groups not only during the period of nationalism and decolonization but also after independence.[74] The African expectation during the struggle for independence was that the land would be freely distributed to the people since it had in the first place, been forcefully taken away from them. But this was not to be the case because under the independence agreement with Britain, the Kenya government was to buy the land from the white settlers and sell it to Africans. This meant that there was no free land for distribution to the poor Africans who had lost it. These very Africans did not even have the money to purchase the land hence they were left at the mercies of the elite who took over the government.[75]

Since the elite who controlled the independence government were mostly Kikuyu, land distribution was biased. According to Karuti Kanyinga, the Kikuyu were given over 40% of the land in the former White Highlands.[76] The distribution of land formerly occupied by the white settlers to the Kikuyu people and with extension development was perceived by other ethnic groups as unfair. This was seen through parliamentary debates that called for equal distribution. Unfortunately, these debates did not address the issue of ethnic imbalance, and the subsequent animosity that later on degenerated into ethnic conflicts between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjins in Burnt Forest area.[77] However, it can be argued that land in itself is not a cause of the conflict in Burnt Forest but it has been used as a tool to instigate conflict. To quote 'The cursed Arrow':

> "...Clashes which started off with the advent of multiparty politics (i.e. October 1991) in Kenya have a profound political undergirding and therefore it is unfair to term them exclusively as 'tribal' or 'land' clashes. People have always lived where they do either because it is their ancestral land bequeath them by their forefathers or it is a property they bought. By virtue of the very fact that Kenya is not only multi-ethnic but also multi-racial, any citizen, as provided for by the laws

[73] Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, a Study in Government Policy,* Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 1967, p. 17.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Kanyinga, "Beyond the colonial legacy: The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" in Smokin C. Wanjala, *Essays on Land law: The Reform Debate in Kenya,* Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi. 2000, p.45.
[77] Ibid.

of the land is endowed with freedom not only by association but also of movement and settlement."[78]

2.4 Ethnic Violence in Burnt Forest 1991-1995

From September 1991, organized bands of arsonists calling themselves Kalenjin warriors unleashed terror on Luo, Luhyia, Kikuyu, and Kisii in the Rift Valley region of Burnt Forest. They targeted farms populated by these ethnic communities, looted and destroyed homes, drove away the occupants, and killed indiscriminately. The attackers were armed with traditional bows, arrows, and machetes. Ethnic clashes first erupted at Meteitei farm in Tinderet, Nandi District, on the border of Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western Provinces, when Kalenjin warriors attacked members of the Luo community. Although the incident began as a land dispute, the fighting escalated within days. The attackers intended to expel non-Kalenjin and political opponents from the Rift Valley Province. Leaflets signed by a group calling itself the Nandi Warriors, were distributed in the area calling on non-Kalenjin to leave the area by December 12, 1991.[79]

The agitation for non-Kalenjin to leave was partly as a misinterpretation of the Majimbo debate and therefore Rift Valley was to be zoned out purely as a KANU preserve for political expedience. Against this background, it can be understood how the multiparty debate took on ethnic overtones. Moi identified the threat of losing power, as well as the resources he had used to maintain his power base. Consequently, Moi reinforced his power by fuelling the flame of ethnic identity that had been rekindled by the multiparty debate. He did this by instigating ethnic violence. Through such violence, the non-Kalenjin would be evicted from the Rift Valley to enable Moi an easy win against the Kikuyu opposition leaders.[80] It would also have denied the kikuyu the required 25% therefore giving Moi an upper hand in the elections.

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[78] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow: The NCCK Contemporary Report on the Politisized Land Clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Province*, Nairobi: NCCK 1992, p.1.
[79] African Watch, *Divide and Rule: state sponsored Ethnic violence in Kenya* (1993). P.3.
[80] Ibid

The intensity of the violence forced Moi to announce the re-introduction of a multi-party system in Kenya, although it did not stop the violence that by then threatened the country's stability. The Kalenjin went on with their attacks on non-Kalenjin communities residing in Burnt Forest, looting and burning their homes. Throughout 1992 reports of ethnic violence were commonplace in the Kenyan and international press. The Kalenjin politicians declared North Rift a KANU zone and stated that the Kalenjin youth in the area had declared war on the non-Kalenjin communities who opposed Moi's presidency.[81] This caused retaliatory attacks against Kalenjins in many areas. Fighting between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu in the Burnt Forest area, Eldoret and Uasin Gishu Districts at large displaced 15,000 people mainly from Kikuyu and Luhya communities by December 1992.[82]

The violence in the North Rift region between 1992 and 1995, though sparked by the call for multiparty system of government, had its roots in deeply entrenched, long-festering anti-Kikuyu sentiments within certain segments of the Kalenjin, particularly the Nandi. The Nandi continued to feel aggrieved by the settlement of the Kikuyu in their home areas after independence and often viewed the Kikuyu community as unscrupulous and greedy land-grabbers, who had historically manipulated the political system to ensure their dominance in commerce and politics.[83]

As the pressure on Moi regime intensified for the re-introduction of multiparty system, Kalenjin youths armed with machetes, arrows and jerry cans of kerosene and petrol attacked Kikuyu settlements. The attacks were directed on large areas with a heavy concentration of Kikuyu families near Eldoret. Most of the Kalenjin youth were ferried to the areas on Lorries.[84] According to oral accounts multiple sources of funding for these

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[81] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow* p1.
[82] KNCHR, *On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence Final Report*, Nairobi: KNCHR 2008 p.63.
[83] Moi, a Tugen from Baringo, was made vice president by Jomo Kenyatta in 1969 to quell Nandi and Kipsigis opposition to the settlement schemes that brought tens of thousands of Kikuyu into the North Rift Valley.
[84] International Crisis Group, *Kenya in Crisis: Crisis Group Africa Report N°137*, 21 February 2008, Brussels.

operations, were mainly from members of the Kalenjin political and business establishment of the North Rift related to the Moi regime.[85]

There was a certain amount of anti-Kikuyu incitement by local elders the suggestion there was a systematic, well-orchestrated campaign to purge the region of the Kikuyu community. The Kalenjin mob hunted for members of the Kikuyu community to kill. Much of the violence around Eldoret was perpetrated by well-organised groups of Kalenjin warriors. These young men usually took orders from the elders of their settlements, who still wield considerable influence over some sectors of rural communities. Among most of the Kalenjin communities, warriors are cattle herders, farmers and traders, who lead a routine existence and are only mobilized when the community is believed to be in danger. Warrior units are autonomous, non-hierarchical and without central command but between 1992 and 1995 in particular, when ethnic clashes were organized by senior Kalenjin members of the Moi regime, this social institution was manipulated by business people and politicians, often to settle scores with perceived enemies.[86] The warriors' arsenal is predominantly traditional bows and poisoned arrows, spears, machetes and clubs but lately it included guns.

Some Kalenjin ethnic groups who joined the Nandi in the Burnt Forest conflict, especially the Tugen and the Marakwet, are known to have guns, the bulk of which were given to them during the later Moi years, ostensibly, to help them defend themselves against heavily armed cattle rustlers from the Pokot community.[87] The wealthy members of these communities easily mobilized these warriors, paid them some money to evict non-Kalenjin communities. The motivation for giving the raiders cash and transport is said to be partly economic. They allegedly wanted the Kikuyu evicted so they can take their farms and property.[88] Many Luhya, Kikuyu and members of other ethnic groups were attacked, over 600 died in Burnt Forest alone and 60,000 reportedly displaced.

[85] The report of the 2001 Akiwumi Commission recommended investigations on a number of individuals believed involved in the organisation of the violence in the ethnic clashes of the 1990s.
[86] Oral interview, George Ngetich, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[87] Oral interview, Grace Mukami, Ngeria Location, Burnt Forest, 28/12/2010.
[88] Ibid.

2.5 The December 1997 elections

Although the 1997 elections passed off with less violence than had been the case in 1992, events in January 1998 were a sign that political violence was still associated with Kenyan elections. On the night of 11 January 1998, some members of the Pokot ethnic group raided the home of a Kikuyu widow at a place called Mirgwit in the Laikipia District of the Rift Valley Province. The raiders raped the woman and stole some livestock from the household. A group of Kikuyu men followed the raiders but, having failed to catch up with them, entered a Samburu compound where, in retaliation, they mutilated livestock that they found there.[89] Mutilation of livestock is highly taboo for pastoralists such as the Kalenjin. Accordingly, it was almost inevitable that there would be some kind of response by the owners of the livestock.

On the night of 13 January 1998, some Pokot men attacked Kikuyu communities in the Magande, Survey, Motala, Milimani and Mirgwit areas of Ol Moran in Laikipia. It appears that the attackers were armed not only with spears, bows and arrows, but also with guns. It was claimed that some of the attackers were dressed in military-type clothing. It was estimated that over 50 members of Kikuyu community were killed during these attacks and over 1000 others fled the area and sought refuge at the Roman Catholic Church at Kinamba, from where they were later relocated to temporary shelters at Sipili and Ol Moran.[90] On 21 January, about 70 unidentified people invaded three farms in the North Rift including one belonging to the newly elected DP Member of Parliament for Molo Constituency, Kihika Kimani. Three days later, groups of what local residents described as Kalenjins attacked members of the Kikuyu community in parts of the Rift Valley.[91]

There were varying explanations given for these attacks. One version of events blamed them on the refusal of local Kikuyu traders to supply goods and services to members of Kalenjin community in response to the events in Laikipia. Another suggested that this

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[89] The Reporter, "The Violence in the Rift Valley", in the *Daily Nation*, 11 March 1998.
[90] Edge Kanyongolo, "Kenya Post-election political violence", *Global campaign for Freedom of Expression*, Article 19, December, 1998, p 12.
[91] Ibid.

was simply an unprovoked attack on members of the Kikuyu community by local Kalenjin youths.[92] According to police reports, 34 members of the Kikuyu community and 48 from Kalenjin community were killed during these attacks and over 200 houses were burnt down. Hundreds of people from both communities were displaced by the fighting, and many of them fled to temporary camps at Kigonor, Sururu, Larmudiac mission and Mauche. Sporadic fighting continued during February and March 1998. By 11 March, police reports were estimating that at least 127 people had been killed since the 'clashes' had begun in January.[93]

2.6 The 2002 General Elections

As stated earlier, sporadic fighting continued in 1998 as the country prepared for another general election in 2002. In November 2001, President Moi nominated Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the late President Kenyatta, to Parliament and appointed him to the Cabinet, in an effort to rejuvenate the KANU leadership ahead of the 2002 General Elections. In March 2002, the ruling KANU party absorbed the National Development Party led by Mr. Raila Odinga who became KANUs Secretary-General. Having served two terms after 1992, President Moi was constitutionally barred from any further term in office, and publicly stated that he would stand down in 2002.[94]

In July 2002 President Moi announced that Mr Uhuru Kenyatta was his preferred choice as the ruling KANU party candidate for the 2002 Presidential Election. Leading KANU politicians opposed to Mr Kenyatta's nomination as Presidential candidate formed a faction within KANU, known as the Rainbow Alliance. Earlier in 2002 leading Opposition politicians had decided to form an alliance ahead of the election. This resulted in the formation of the National Alliance for Change in February 2002, composed of the Democratic Party, Ford-Kenya and the National Party of Kenya. Ten other parties, together with two pressure groups, later joined these three to form the National Alliance

[92] See *Economic Review*, 30 March–5 April 1998.
[93] Daily Nation Reporter in the *Daily Nation*, 11 March 1998.
[94] Commonwealth Secretariat, "Kenya General Election 27 December 2007", *The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group*, London, 2008, p 587-612.

(Party) of Kenya. In September 2002 the National Alliance Party of Kenya announced that their presidential candidate would be Mr Mwai Kibaki.[95]

Dissent increased within KANU, the ruling party, over President Moi's choice of Mr Kenyatta as the party presidential candidate. On 14 October 2002, the day of Mr Kenyatta's official nomination, influential politicians carried out their threat to leave the ruling party, and took over the then little known fringe party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Talks immediately began between the LDP and other opposition groups which resulted in the creation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Two days later, 30 KANU MPs led by Secretary-General Mr Raila Odinga publicly crossed the parliamentary floor and took seats on the opposition benches. On 22 October 2002 the fourteen parties and two pressure groups comprising the National Rainbow Coalition announced that Mr Mwai Kibaki would be their joint presidential candidate. A steady stream of defections from the ruling party, including Cabinet Ministers, began.[96]

On 25 October 2002 President Moi dissolved Parliament, paving the way for Kenya's eighth General Election since independence. The 2002 election pitted political veteran Mwai Kibaki against Uhuru Kenyatta. Mr Kibaki won a landslide election victory on 27 December 2002, securing 62.21% of the popular vote, while NARC won 132 seats of the 210 elected seats in Parliament. Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta accepted defeat hence no ugly incidents of violence were witnessed. Kibaki's key campaign promises included a pledge to fight endemic corruption and to address Kenya's economic woes and provide Kenyans with a new Constitution within 100 days which he failed to deliver.[97] Pressure increased on President Kibaki to fulfil his promise by giving Kenyans a constitution leading to a referendum in 2005.

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[95]Ibid.

[96]Commonwealth Secretariat, "Kenya General Election 27 December 2007", *The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group*, p 780-795.

[97] KNCHR, "Still Behaving Badly: Second periodic report of the Election- Monitoring Project", *Kenya National Commission on Human Rights* (KNCHR), December 2007.

2.7 The 2005 Constitutional Referendum and the Road to 2007 Violence

As pressure for a new constitution increased, President Kibaki initiated the constitutional review process. The process marked the beginning of the biggest disagreement within the NARC coalition over completion of the constitutional review process. A lengthy public consultation process produced a new Draft Constitution (known as the Bomas Draft) in March 2004. But its provisions, notably those reducing the executive powers of the presidency, proved unacceptable to the Kibaki Government.[98]

After a protracted legal wrangle, and amid violent protests in Nairobi, the government secured Parliamentary approval for certain key amendments to be made to the Draft Constitution, and a new Constitution Bill was published. This new Draft Constitution was felt by some to have been illegitimately modified. The new Draft Constitution was rejected by 58% of voters when it was put to a referendum in November 2005. This result was also widely viewed as a vote of no confidence in President Kibaki's government. This prompted President Kibaki to dismiss his entire government and started with a new team which excluded all those Ministers (mainly from the LDP faction of the NARC Coalition) who campaigned and voted against the Draft Constitution. Some ministerial nominees rejected their appointments. This effectively marked the end of the NARC Coalition.[99] The referendum left Kenya divided than it was before and laid ground for the formation of the Orange Democratic Party which challenged President Kibaki.

President Kibaki's main challenger was Mr Raila Odinga, leader of the Orange Democratic Movement that emerged from the successful campaign against the Government's Draft Constitution referendum in 2005. The key issues in the Orange Democratic Movement manifesto included delivering a new Constitution in six months, fight against corruption, the eradication of poverty and reducing unemployment. The ODM also promised free secondary education and subsidised tertiary education. In addition, the ODM pledged equitable distribution of resources, improved security, and affirmative action for women in Parliament and government. The ODM also promised to

[98] KPTJ, "Countdown to deception: 30 hours that destroyed Kenya", *Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice* (KPTJ) coalition, 17 January 2008.
[99] Standard Reporter, "Live bullets stirred up lakeside town", *The Sunday Standard*, 17 February 2008.

devote additional resources to infrastructural development, ICT, sports, agriculture and tourism. The ODM party advocated '*majimbo*', a quasi-federalist arrangement that would devolve political and financial powers to provincial administrations.[100] This made the party to have a large following among the Kalenjin who have a long history of land grievances against the Kikuyu.

2.8 The December 2007 Post-election Violence

Kenya has been riddled with conflict and violence throughout its brief history as a nation. The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, however, was of a different magnitude. In this section provides an analysis of the conflict in order to examine why widespread violence erupted in the wake of Kibaki's presidential re-election. The foundation of this conflict was rooted in a weak national constitution. The then Kenyan constitution progressively lacked a healthy checks and balances system between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Over the span of three decades of independence, amendments to the constitution were made to systematically erode these balances in favour of strengthening presidential powers. The result of these broad powers effectively made the presidential office equivalent to a dictatorship, which gave the president the ability to use and abuse this power without restraint.[101] This is exactly what the Kibaki administration would do when it won the elections without knowing whether it won.

This irony was clearly expressed by the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya Mr Sam Kivuitu when in 2007 he certified that Kibaki won the election apparently without actually knowing whether or not he had won. Kivuitu noted that, "I don't know whether Kibaki won the election".[102] This quote is rich with irony and is an indication of why the violence was witnessed. The first episode of violence occurred on the evening of 30th December 2007 immediately after the announcements of the presidential results.[103] The main theater of violence was Eldoret town and nearby Burnt Forest areas where the most targeted people were from the Kikuyu community.

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[100] Ibid.
[101] Herve Maupau, Revisiting post-election violence", in Lafargue, J. (Ed.). *The general elections in Kenya*, 2007, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 187-223.
[102] Samwel Kivuitu, Kenya Election Committee Chair, Jan 2, 2008.
[103] Kenya National Commission on human rights 2007, pp. 14-19.

On 30th December 2007 Kikuyu houses and property were burned down in Burnt Forest. People were killed and others injured during the attacks and counter attacks resulting in mass exodus of members of the Kikuyu community from the area. Bows and arrows were the weapons used by the Kalenjin against the Kikuyu community. Estimations by Kenya Human Rights Commission indicate that at least seven people were killed in Burnt Forest, 3000 houses burned to ashes and more than 80 business premises destroyed.[104] The violent Kalenjin youths in Burnt Forest claimed that they wanted to send a very strong message to Kibaki and that because they could not get him; they were going to work on his ethnic group, the Kikuyu. To them it was the Kikuyu who were responsible for the success of President Kibaki and therefore they should carry his cross.[105]

The carnage was horrific: 1,500 dead, 3,000 innocent women raped, and 300,000 people were internally displaced. Most of these atrocities happened in the first 14 days after the 2007 Kenyan general election. The severity of this conflict unfolded in a span of 59 days between Election Day, December 27th, 2007 to February 28th, 2008, when a political compromise was reached. The magnitude of the trauma and structural violence that took place in Kenya after the fourth multi-party general election took Kenyans and the international community, alike, by surprise.[106]

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter set out to discuss the peopling of Burnt Forest to 1991. Secondly, it discussed the development of conflict in the area. The chapter indicated that different factors were responsible for the conflict that affected the region. The chapter ushered the reader to the understanding of the communities that conflicted, why and how they conflicted. It was observed that communities in Burnt Forest fought because of an amalgamation of issues, both political and social, some which were interdependent. For example issues like land and ethnicity have been used for political expediency. This

[104] The Daily Nation Reporter, "Kenyan election Violence", *Daily Nation* article 29th January 2008.
[105] KNCHR interview in Eldoret on 7th February 2008 and at Kirathimo IDP camp in Limuru for a description on how raiders dropped off in lorries, KNCHR interview with an MO, 28th Feb 2008.
[106] Maupeu, "Revisiting post-election violence", in Lafargue, J. (Ed.). *The general elections in Kenya, 2007*, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd, 2008, pp. 187-223.

argument explains the reason why communities that have hitherto lived peacefully as neighbours have risen up in arms against each other during electioneering periods.

It is out of this explanation that different actors in peacebuilding can be situated, significantly the role of the youth in Burnt Forest. After understanding the reasons why communities in Burnt Forest conflicted, it will be of interest to understand the peace processes that were put in place. This is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

PEACE BUILDING EFFORTS IN BURNT FOREST, 1992-2010

3.1 Introduction

Post-conflict peacebuilding has been shaped by concerted efforts to reconcile and regenerate conflict-torn societies in ways that inhibit relapses into violence. One way has been to review the peace policies and institutions societies affected by conflict. Peace involves profound social transformation with better and harmonizing measures. These measures may include state-centered conflict prevention institutions which also impose legitimate changes aimed at sustaining peace and providing a conducive environment that supports peacebuilding. This chapter discusses the peace efforts that were put in place to prevent further conflict in Burnt Forest region. These efforts include those by the state, international community and the private sector.

3.2 State Efforts

The Kenya government is a major player in efforts at peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. The concern of the government in the face of conflict was first and foremost ending the violence. This was evident when the government formed commissions of enquiry from time to time to investigate causes of violent conflict in the country. Among others, the Akiwumi Commission investigated the ethnic clashes of 1990/91. Following the post-election violence of 2007, the Waki and Kriggler Commissions were created to investigate the causes of the ethnic violence that threatened the nation into civil war. The two commissions came up with recommendations which included the constitutional reform process that resulted in a new constitution meant to address some of the grievances responsible for the violence that frequently occurred.[107] The state also formed structures and institutions to promote security and prevent violence in society. The

[107] Oral interview, George Ngetich, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.

government did this through the provincial administration which acted as the government principal public relations officers in its day-to-day functions.[108]

Burnt Forest is beset by a multitude of local conflicts that have the potential to escalate at any moment, as a result of resource crises, land tenure issues and political machinations. Because of this problem the Kenyan government developed a bottom-up process to establish the peace architecture. The government started the District Peace and Development Committees which were the brain child of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 and the National steering committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.[109] Following the post-election violence in 2007, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 recommended the establishment of District Peace Committees in all of Kenya's districts. The peace committees became successful, especially in Burnt forest area. They demonstrated their ability to manage inter-community conflict and to contain or prevent violence. The committees provided the forum for discussing issues related to conflict. They also provided opportunities for dialoguing and interaction between the respected members of Burnt Forest communities.

In 2001, the government established the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management in the Office of the President. The Office of the President, through the NSC, embarked on a process towards the development of a national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management in 2004. The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was published at the end of September 2009 by the Office of the President. The mission of NSC was to promote sustainable peace through a collaborative institutional framework between state, non-state actors and communities at national and regional level. In order to attain its mission, the mandate of NSC was; to enhance coordination and networking between the Government, donors and implementing agencies in peacebuilding and conflict management, to mobilize resources for peacebuilding and conflict management, to promote and advocate for peace in the

[108] George Amara Odongo, MA Thesis, "Role of Women in Peace Building in Kenya- Focusing on the 1992 Rift Valley Land Clashes", 2004 ,pp.34-35.
[109] Andries Odendaal, "Local Peacebuilding in Ghana", Paper presented at the Experience-sharing Seminar on Building Infrastructures for Peace in Naivasha, Kenya, 2010, pp. 3-9.

country through community based initiatives and to establish sub-committees with specific thematic areas.

To ensure that its presence is felt at every level where conflicts were frequent, the NSC established the District Peace and Development Committees which were commissioned with the responsibility of bringing peace and sustaining that peace.[110] The government of Kenya also engaged in strengthening and improving local governance arrangements through this decentralization mode. By following the principles of the new constitution there has been a policy of political settings and various attempts have been made to issue guidelines to steer the decentralization process in Burnt Forest region. One of the main objectives of such efforts was to develop and guarantee the political, administrative and financial independence of local people. Strengthening and developing local governance has been seen as fundamental to increasing the quality and coverage of services to citizens, fostering local development and strengthening participatory governance at the local level. Strong local governments and inclusive local governance arrangements are also increasingly seen as essential building blocks of the peacebuilding process in post-conflict Burnt Forest environments.[111] Strengthening some form of local government in Burnt Forest is crucial for delivering peace dividends.

Local governance authorities are pivotal in bringing formal state institutions into direct contact with their citizens and thus play a crucial role in establishing inclusive patterns of post conflict governance, responsively providing services to divided populations and consolidating resilient law and order in Burnt Forest.[112] Furthermore, attention to local governance gave voice to the local population, and enhanced their participation in the reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts and thus assisted in alleviating tensions based on social exclusion, polarization and regional disparities that are often at the origin of conflicts.

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[110] Van Tongeren, Paul and Christine van Empel (ed.): GPPAC Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, Issue paper 4, Den Haag, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, pp. 46-54.
[111] Philip Waki, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, October 15, 2008*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2009, pp. 53, 378–379.
[112] Ibid.

After the post-election violence, the Kenyan government established the National Cohesion and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as mediation and conflict resolution mechanism to deal with the issues of trust among the communities, as restoring confidence and relationships was crucial. A range of consultations were organized with many different stakeholders at local, regional and national level. The outcome of these consultations was the development of the documentation of all injustices committed against some communities. These commissions consist of representatives of relevant stakeholders as well as individual Kenyans who enjoy high levels of trust and respect in society.[113] In Burnt Forest the youth felt that this is a nerve-renting effort by the government instead of taking a 'wait and see' position

These state efforts were instrumental in ensuring a peaceful referendum for the new constitution through discreet meetings with stakeholders that defused considerable tension. The commissions were entrusted with the following functions: to harmonize and coordinate conflict prevention, management, resolution and build sustainable peace through networking and coordination; to strengthen capacities in relation to its objectives; to facilitate the amicable resolution of conflicts through mediation and other connected processes; to monitor, report and offer indigenous perspectives and solutions to conflicts in the country; and to promote understanding about the values of reconciliation, tolerance, confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict.[114]

Equally, the Ministry of Justice and Constitution and the Ministry of Education is working with non-profit organizations to implement a national plan for peace promotion, such as initiating mediation programs in schools all over the country and organizing Peace Festivals. Communities are invited to a public place for example at Burnt Forest market, where peace messages were delivered and a social network was organized to help prevent crime and promote social peace. There is a National Council for Security and Social Peace, in which all the highest authorities of the government work towards promoting security and peace as a national policy. With respect to the coming elections

[113] Ibid.
[114] Oral interview, Jane Wanjiku, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.

Kenya has a Permanent Framework for Dialogue and Consultation, which was set up by the government, together with representatives of political parties, civil society, church leaders and some resource persons. The main role of this framework is to reflect and discuss political, economic and social issues that threaten peace. The objective is to be proactive and take decisions before conflicts escalate.[115]

3.3 Peacebuilding through Institutional Change

Capitalizing on the weakness of the independence constitution that had allowed loopholes that led to ethnic clashes not only in Burnt Forest but the entire country, Kenyans called for constitutional and legal change. The changes that were called for were to ensure a participatory, stakeholder-centered, conflict prevention focus. NGO began the process by engaging in public information and sensitization campaign and executed skills-building workshops in conflict resolution, facilitation, and leadership development.[116] The NGO's work was in helping to design an effective constitution that addressed Kenyan people's grievances and the one that would ensure equity, provide a safe place to voice grievances and discuss disputes, monitor institutional capacity, and provided technical guidance by ensuring development progresses and socio-economic changes.

The government using its established institutions has worked towards building of cohesion among Kenyan communities especially in conflict prone areas like Burnt Forest. It established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as independent advisory bodies to provide an interdisciplinary peace advice to the government. They provide additional professional and technical perspective and local guidance on peacebuilding. The commissions consisted of experts from various fields such as politics, anthropology, philosophy, law, and humanity. The commissions also serve as mediators to mitigate and resolve communal disputes.[117]

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[115] Gona and Barak "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities", Nairobi: UNDP, 2010, pp. 53-54.

[116] Waki, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, October 15, 2008*, pp. 53, 378–379.

[117] Johann Kriggler, *Report on the Post Election Violence*, Nairobi: Government Printers, 2008, pp 8-12.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission recognized some elements of all problems that affected the communities. For instance, they investigated through holding some hearings where women were present, an act which many women regarded as successful in addressing the problem.[118] The point is not merely to avoid omitting the particular sufferings of women, but also for their experiences to be integrated into the whole story of peacebuilding.

Direct support to establish conflict resolution bodies outside of formal court systems is a useful peacebuilding component. For example, conflict committees were formed which composed of traditional and opinion leaders nominated based on the trust their constituents have in them. They were mandated to discuss and make decisions about disputes within their communities. They provided an outlet where such groups as Kalenjin and Kikuyu can express their frustration and seek guidance from trusted leaders.[119] Conflict committees also created a facility where corruption can be spotlighted, inspiring community responsibility to blow the whistle on illicit behaviour.

A great variety of approaches to peacebuilding are to be found in the realm of politics, but mainstreaming gender as a concern is also useful and necessary here. Nurturing a human rights culture through the establishment and support for human rights organizations is a common mechanism used in peacebuilding. The government of Kenya started the Kenya National Human Rights Commission through which the Kenyan people's rights have received a lot of publicity in recent years.[120] Attempting to make politics 'more democratic' is also commonly seen as important in peacebuilding. Increasing the representation of some groups which were formally marginalized such as women and youth is a common objective in peacebuilding.

Over the years, the communities in Burnt Forest had grown to mistrust the police. This mistrust came about because the residents felt that the police were not prompt at dealing

[118] Waki, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, October 15, 2008*, pp. 53, 378–379.
[119] Ibid.
[120] The parliament passed a bill that established the Commission of Human rights.

with the conflicts and showed disinterest or bias in their interventions. Since peacebuilding could not take place in an environment of insecurity, other than the presence of state security in Burnt Forest area, the communities saw the necessity for an initiative namely community policing. Community policing initiatives provided new avenues for citizen involvement in peacebuilding in partnerships with police. Residents were called upon to help identify and prioritize neighbourhood problems to be dealt with collectively and in this way they became involved in problem-solving efforts, and to help shape police policies and operations.[121] This idea was conceived on the fact that conflicts erupted frequently in Burnt Forest because the police and residents had a history of not cooperating due to mistrust the public had towards the police.[122]

The mistrust of the police necessitated a reorganization of the manner in which they operated in conflict areas. For example, a large segment of the patrol division was reorganized into special teams and assigned to specific regions in Burnt Forest. These teams have enough free time to work with the community and engage in proactive problem solving. Ideally, this reconfiguration resulted in officers becoming more familiar with the communities and residents growing more familiar with the police who serve there. Citizen involvement in planning and strategizing has been vested in district advisory committees that regularly meet with commanders and their management teams to discuss local problems and priorities.[123] The advisory committees sponsor subcommittees that focus on specific issues ranging from economic development to social events. The initiative is part of important venues for the formation of partnerships between police and residents around problem-solving projects. Similarly, cooperation between the residents is visible in their effort to voluntarily assist the police in construction of police posts like the one in Kiambaa area.

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[121] Mark Moore, Robert Trojanowicz and George L. Kelling, *Crime and Policing: Perspectives on Policing*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice and John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 1988, p.10.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Odongo, MA Thesis, "Role of Women in Peace Building in Kenya- Focusing on the 1992 Rift Valley Land Clashes", 2004, p. 28.

Over time, meetings involving police and the public grew as the people found new purposes for public gatherings. In these meetings the local communities play a very important function of informing the police of any threat to peace for a quick response. The goal of community policing in Burnt Forest was to reduce crime and disorder by carefully examining the characteristics of problems in neighborhoods and then applying appropriate problem-solving remedies to avoid ethnic conflicts. They were assisted by immediate supervisors, other police units, and appropriate government and social agencies. The community and the police were jointly responsible for ensuring that the ethnic groups lived in harmony. Effective community policing in Burnt Forest depended on optimizing positive contact between patrol officers and community members. To ensure contact with the people the police departments supplemented automobile patrols with foot and bicycles to bring police closer to the community.[124] Equally, regular community meetings and forums afforded police and community members an opportunity to air concerns and find ways to address them. This was an initial purpose for establishing trust that served to reduce fear of ethnic conflict between different communities living in Burnt Forest. It therefore, helped create neighbourhood security.[125]

3.4 Civil Societies and NGOs in Burnt Forest Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding can be understood in different ways. In general it is recognized that peacebuilding incorporates economic, political, social, humanitarian and cultural issues.[126] Spencer argues that understanding the role of NGO's will affect the type of intervention that it carries out during peacebuilding.[127] Peacebuilding is a term used loosely to encompass a range of activities which aim to prevent, alleviate, or resolve conflict. In general, peacebuilding aims to address the underlying causes of conflict and create institutional and socio-economic structures which promote lasting peace.[128]

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[124] Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling, *Crime and Policing: Perspectives on Policing*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice and John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 1988, p.10.
[125] Oral interview, Grace Mukami, Ngeria Location, Burnt Forest, 28/12/2010.
[126] John Goodhand and David Hulme, *NGOs and Complex Political Emergencies: Working Paper No. 1: NGOs and Peace building in Complex Political Emergencies: An Introduction*, Manchester: University of Manchester, 1997, pp. 46-50.
[127] Spencer, Can Third Party Conflict Resolution Interventions Promote Peace in the Context of Internal War? Unpublished Masters degree dissertation, 1997, pp. 15-29.
[128] Hendrickson, "Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New Relief 'Agenda' and Its Limits" in *RRN Network Paper* (April 1998) no. 25, London: Relief and Rehabilitation Network/ODI, 1998, p. 9.

Peacebuilding must be therefore understood as a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict toward sustainable, peaceful relationships and outcomes. NGOs that engage in peacebuilding work involve various activities and functions that precede and follow formal peace accords or agreements.

Peacebuilding entered the international lexicon in 1992 when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it in 'An Agenda for Peace' as post-conflict action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict. According to Boutros, peacebuilding is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.[129]In this sense peacebuilding is in itself an idea of the NGOs. Since the pronunciation by Boutros Ghali peacebuilding has developed into a catchall concept, encompassing multiple perspectives and agenda.

The premise of the new peacebuilding agenda as envisaged by the former UN Secretary General was that the international community among them NGOs would intervene collectively as a third party to help resolve violent conflicts in areas such as Burnt Forest. The impetus for peacebuilding in Burnt Forest came from multiple sources but found its strongest expression at the United Nations and its allied NGOs. Throughout the conflict period under study, the UN through UNHCR, World Vision, Red Cross and other NGOs provided both the rationale and the operational principles for post-conflict peacebuilding.[130] These NGOs engaged in demilitarization of communities living in Burnt Forest, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development which are valuable actions in preventing conflict.

Accordingly, the NGOs employed the peacebuilding tools and strategies which included the adoption of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), the creation of a fund for reconstruction

[129] Charles Call, "The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years," draft paper prepared for DPA, 27 August 2004, p 12, 23-38.
[130] Oral interview, Jane Wambui Njeri, Kimumu Farm, 28/12/2010.

and reintegration.[131] For instance the US-AID and UNDP provided funds that assisted reconstructing income generating projects such as Burnt Forest market which had been destroyed during the conflict.[132] By building markets, the international community through NGOs, assisted in engaging the local Burnt Forest community in more economically productive activities rather than idling. This similarly brought members of the different communities together and provided a forum for them to talk about their development agenda. The NGOs through such forum did an extensive overview of the needs and capacities of the recipient community and began working on a general, conflict-sensitive approach with the Burnt Forest communities.

The QIPs provided opportunities through which different communities of Burnt Forest could properly work together to devise communal peacebuilding strategies and to implement them together, in the context of the community team. Arrangements for peacebuilding by QIPs were coherent, flexible and field-driven, mobilizing all relevant resources in support of initiatives, and building or reorienting ongoing activities so that they contribute to peace. NGOs like World Vision, NCCK and the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission provided resources necessary for community teams to promote peace in Burnt Forest.

In Burnt Forest peacebuilding was part of a larger NGO national agenda. Throughout the 1990s, a series of peacebuilding workshops were held that sought to generate a national agenda on issues ranging from population and sustainable development to human rights and gender. These workshops served to underline the importance of multilateral approaches to addressing communal problems.[133] This research observed that, many external actors became actively involved in post-conflict peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. They undertook longer-term socio-economic reconstruction efforts which lie at the heart of peacebuilding. A lot of material and human resources were mobilized to enable the peacebuilding through reconstruction. Resource mobilization remained one of the

[131] Odendaal and Spies, "You have opened the wound, but not healed it: The Local Peace Committees of the Western Cape, South Africa," Peace and Conflict: *Journal of Peace Psychology*, 3(3), 1997, pp. 261-273.
[132] Oral interview, Jane Wanjiku, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[133] Ibid.

important yardsticks for gauging the NGO commitment to post-conflict peacebuilding in Burnt Forest.[134]

In order to clearly understand the role of civil society in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest the study proposes a functional approach and outlines a framework of seven civil society peacebuilding functions, which can enable better understanding of their peacebuilding initiatives in the region.[135]It will be noted that the seven civil society functions in peacebuilding, as will be discussed in this chapter, are complex and varied but these seven functions encompass the core roles of civil society which offer a suitable framework to better understand the potential contribution of civil society to peacebuilding in Burnt Forest.

The first function associated with civil society activities in Burnt Forest is that of protection. During the ethnic clashes in Kenya the security agencies were overstretched, making it unable to protect citizens. Civil society role during conflict and its aftermath focused on protection of citizen life, rights and property against threats by conflict actors. Protection functions were performed by International NGOs that acted as monitoring watchdogs.[136] The UNHCR, Red Cross and other NGOs dispatched their personnel into conflict zones to protect the relative peace attained and human rights. They negotiated zones of peace where no arms were allowed. In these zones they engaged representatives particularly from Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities to request their people to demobilize and reintegrate. Churches that operate in the area launched a follow-up demobilization and reintegration campaign after the international NGOs ended their operation.[137]

Secondly, civil society played a monitoring and early warning function as part of the peacebuilding process in Burnt Forest. Observing and monitoring the activities of conflict actors is a means to protection of the achieved peace. International and local NGO groups

[134] Oral interview, Francis Ngetich, Youth leader, Wareng Youth initiative, Burnt Forest. 18/10/2011.
[135] Odendaal and Spies, "You have opened the wound, but not healed it: The Local Peace Committees of the Western Cape, South Africa," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 3(3), 1997, pp. 261-273.
[136] Charles Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War, Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka," PhD Dissertation, Department of Peace and Development Research, University Göteborg, 2004, pp. 2-10.
[137] Oral interview, Jane Wambui Njeri, Kimumu Farm, 28/12/2010.

monitored the conflict situation and made recommendations to decision makers, provided information to advocacy groups, and provided inputs for early warning as a measure to avert conflict.[138] This civil society function is relevant in all conflict phases and its impact is maximized when all actors coordinate closely.

Thirdly, peacebuilding NGOs opened political space for civic engagement within communities by providing volunteers to organize community activities. They engaged with authorities, security forces, civil society and the international community. For example, during the construction of Burnt Forest market Americans engaged the local communities in Burnt Forest. This ensured that violence against local communities attracts international attention. The international attention made the conflict actors to refrain from violence related activities because the NGOs were documenting human rights violations which are highly sensitive.[139] In the field of early warning, there is increasing cooperation between local, national and international NGOs. The NGOs cooperate with local groups and maintain close links. These international ties provide a safer space for local groups to perform their monitoring tasks. For instance, early warning systems of regional organizations (CEWARN) cooperated with local civil society groups and communities in Burnt Forest in monitoring situations that can degenerate into conflict and avert it.[140] Monitoring disseminates information which peacebuilders use to lobby conflict parties. Monitoring identifies the problems of the conflict, aiming to improve prospects for peace and reconciliation.

Fourthly, NGOs involved in peacebuilding through advocacy. Advocacy is one of the core functions in peacebuilding.[141] Civil societies like Peacenet, working in Burnt Forest articulated the interests of social groups, especially from the Kalenjin and Kikuyu groups, and created communication channels to raise public awareness and facilitate the inclusion

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[138] Tongeren, Brenk, Hellema, and Verhoeven, (eds.) *People Building Peace II, Successful Stories of Civil Society*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.
[139] USAID, *The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace: A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa: Synthesis Report, DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Service*, Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001, pp. 2-18.
[140] Oral interview, Francis Ngetich, Youth leader, Wareng Youth initiative, Burnt Forest. 18/10/2011.
[141] Peter Aall, "What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?" In: Crocker, C., F. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 365-83.

of issues in the public agenda. Peacebuilding through advocacy involves influence of civil society on conflict management and communication role, as well as applying pressure on negotiating parties and advocacy for specific issues. The NGOs and civil societies in Burnt Forest succeeded in bringing specific conflict issues such as land grievances in the region on the national agenda. The NCCK and the Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI) advocated for the need to adopt a people-based peace process in Burnt Forest, the special role of women in peacebuilding and the need to fund people's involvement. Its main advocacy instrument was to continuously provide information and lobbying for a bottom-up solution to the post-election crisis.[142] During the conflict, civil society tended to advocate for peace, for broad based participation in the peace process, and for addressing specific issues such as land. The civil society advocacy tended to focus on implementation of the peacebuilding projects. Through the bottoms-up approach the NGOs ensured many members of the communities in Burnt Forest were involved in the peace process. This provided an opportubity for people to meet and talk to one another hence rebuilding relations.

Similarly, as a fifth function, the independent media played an important role in peacebuilding by reaching a wider range of the population, facilitating public communication, expanding the audience for advocacy campaigns, and raising awareness on the need for and feasibility of non-violent solutions.[143] They disseminated objective and non-partisan information which became a critical media contribution to peacebuilding. UNESCO, UNDP, and UNHCR collaborated with the media to promote reconciliation and peace education sometimes through socialization.[144]

Socialization as a sixth function of civil society aims to inculcate a culture of peace in divided conflict societies by promoting attitude change toward peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation. Most activities in Burnt Forest adopted a conflict resolution

[142] UN Secretary-General. 1992, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace keeping, Report of the Secretary-General*, 17 June 1002, A/47/277-S/24111 http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html accessed on 4/10/2010.
[143] UN Secretary-General, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, New York, NY: United Nations, 2001.
[144] USAID, *The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace: A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa: Synthesis Report, DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Service*, Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001, pp 2-18.

approach and included dialogue projects, reconciliation initiatives, peace education, exchange programs and peace camps, conflict resolution training and capacity building. Research indicated that civil society initiatives which supported attitude change and a culture of peace were effective and reached large number of people.[145] Civil societies and NGOs worked directly with local communities to empower community leaders and enable them to practice civic engagement, rebuild communities and promote peacebuilding. This was enhanced in Burnt Forest through formation of inter community groups such as 'Muungano Burnt Forest Self Help group'. 'Muungano' is a Swahili word for coming together. This is a group whose name depicts peace efforts. The group not only fostered togetherness but also brought in a sense of helping each other.[146]

Lastly, socialization enhanced social cohesion. Enhancing social cohesion is an important civil society function in peacebuilding, as conflict usually destroys bridging social capital. Restoring and bridging social capital helped to curb inter-group violence, and revitalized group interactions, interdependency and solidarity.[147] Engagement and participation in voluntary associations has the potential to build and strengthen social capital and builds bridging ties across adversary groups. The main activities used by NGOs and civil society in Burnt Forest to enhance social cohesion focused on joint activities between adversary groups namely the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. This included joint associations (parents, teachers, multi-ethnic church groups), joint cultural events, and even mixed team football games like the Burnt Forest Football team. This assisted to strengthen social cohesion through mixed engagements.

World Vision officials working in Burnt Forest confirmed the importance of bridging social capital, identifying how development projects helped increase levels of contact, interaction and communication across geographic, religious, ethnic, cultural and class divides. This in turn led to improved cooperation, unity and interdependence between

[145] Oral interview, Jane Wanjiku, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[146] Oral interview, Rodah Koech, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[147] Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Post-conflict Societies, Strategy and Process*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2005.

groups.[148] Conflict sensitive social cohesion initiatives have greater potential to influence peacebuilding. Finally, the NGOs and the civil society engaged in peacebuilding through intermediation and facilitation. An important civil society function is to intermediate between interest groups and the state. In peacebuilding, intermediation and facilitation can take place not only between the state and citizens, but also between conflict parties, within groups and on different levels of society.[149] The main activities within this function were facilitation initiatives (formal or informal) between and those of Kalenjin communities.[150] At the centre of such formal and informal initiatives were women roles in peacebuilding.

3.5 Women and peacebuilding in Burnt Forest, 1992-2012

Women's involvement in peacebuilding is as old as their experience of violence. Women have a long traditional role that leads to building peace in their communities. As earlier explained, Masuda Sultan argued that Afghan women contributed in peacebuilding by providing an important counterbalance to the political and religious extremism that threatens to undermine peace and democracy in Afghanistan. Women served as a moderating force against extremists. Masuda further argues that by allowing Afghan women to make greater contributions to the peace process Afghanistan's government is undermining the extremists and the spoilers and promoting peace. The author acknowledges the contributions of millions of Afghan women and their ability to engage in peacebuilding through economic and political reconstruction of their country.[151]

The traditional roles of women in peacebuilding received a boost in 1995, when the United Nation's Fourth World Conference on women was held in Beijing, China.[152] The conference created a rippling of new ideas and conversations among women involved not only in peacebuilding but in all the society's life. Women who attended the conference

[148] Oral interview, Wellington Omondi (Not real name), Staff with World Vision, 31/12/2010.
[149] Aall, "What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?" In: Crocker, C., F. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 365-83.
[150] Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003, p. 67.
[151] Masuda, *From Rhetoric to Reality: Afghan Women on the Agenda for Peace*, Kabul: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2005, p. 27.
[152] UNESCO, *Women and Peace in Africa: Case Studies on traditional conflict resolutions practices*, Paris: UNESCO Workshops, 2003, pp. 56-64.

returned home with a new sense of empowerment and began to clearly articulate the challenges women around the world faced and to work toward articulating not only women's rights but human rights in global and national policies and legislation.[153]

In 1999, the UK-based organization International Alert launched a Women Building Peace global campaign with the support of 100 civil society organizations around the world. The campaign aimed to address women's exclusion from decision-making processes that address peace, security, and development. The civil-society campaign on women in peacebuilding led to the October 2000 signing of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. Resolution 1325 has led to a variety of approaches to supporting women in peacebuilding. These include doing gender training to sensitize women on the different needs of women and men throughout peacebuilding processes and of the importance of including women in all levels of peacebuilding.

3.6 What women did for peacebuilding in Burnt Forest, 1992-2010

Women of Burnt forest played important roles in all categories of peacebuilding. As activists and advocates for peace, women waged non-violent campaigns by pursuing democracy and human rights. They called for dialogue and respect of democratic decisions as a means of fostering peace. In Burnt Forest the dialogue enshrined the women traditional roles. The Kikuyu and Kalenjin women are traditionally assigned to the role of educator. Such education starts from childhood and passes the values of understanding that peace is not born but made and that the culture of peace in traditional African societies was implanted in a child through responsible upbringing and socialization undertaken and supervised by mothers.[154]

Indeed the central message here is that peacebuilding is taken seriously among the women who moulded the behaviour and personality of the young.[155] All this was done through the agency of the mother. In particular, elderly women were responsible for training from early childhood, where each child was exposed to a variety of songs,

[153] Ibid.
[154] Oral interview, Francis Ngetich, Youth leader, Wareng Youth initiative, Burnt Forest. 18/10/2011.
[155] Emecheta, *The Joys of Motherhood*, London: Allison & Busby Ltd, 1979, p. 78.

stories, proverbs and sayings directed by the mother or the aunt and conveyed at the fireplace or after the evening meals, which aimed at reducing conflict. The songs, stories, proverbs and sayings contain simple but clear messages and moral teachings. Women taught their daughters and sons, proper behaviour and the ethos of society, and impressed on them the importance of such values as honesty, uprightness and the necessity to compromise.[156] As such, women, among them youthful women, have always been active promoters of harmony in the community, which can be referred to as a culture of peace.

In all African values, traditional customary principles state that women and children should not be killed. This made women to play a key role in crisis management and conflict resolution. Thus, when a conflict degenerated into armed violence, Kalenjin women in Burnt Forest could block their warriors from going to fight by refusing to tie the belt of life famously known as leketio or place it on the path which the warriors could use. This would stop them from proceeding to war because they believed no one would return safely.[157] Among the Kikuyu women were usually used as third parties, like in the Afghan example, to calm the tension and reconcile the combatants. Such an appeal for mediation was usually made to a woman who enjoyed the consideration and respect of all who knew her. Equally, the oldest women of the community would go to meet opposing groups to interpose themselves between the fighters in order to make them see reason. When words proved fruitless, the women would threaten to expose their nakedness or to go down on their knees. In either case, the gesture signified a curse for those who bore the responsibility for such grave acts. Because of the respect that the enemy soldiers had for the women, they would usually put down their weapons before the fateful acts were accomplished.[158]

The study in Burnt Forest showed that in some regions like Rurigi and Kiambaa, older women who could no longer conceive were used as peace envoys. They formed groups like; Women of Hope and the youthful ones formed the Jovial Adventure club.[159] Before

[156] Oral interview, Joan Kiptarus, Burnt Forest area, 28/12/2010.
[157] Oral interview, Christopher Lelech, Kiambaa, Burnt Forest 28/12/2010.
[158] Waciuma, *Daughter of Mumbi*, Nairobi: EAPH, 1969, pp. 22-30.
[159] Oral interview, Milly Chepkemboi, Kiambaa, Burnt Forest 28/12/2010.

the 2008 conflict women were the only ones who could move across the zones of conflict freely and without much danger. It was women who studied the situation, assessed the prospects for peace, and facilitated contact and communication between the warring parties. Women used to send peace delegations. They carried messages of peace and reconciliation, and they mobilized and encouraged the forces of peace from both sides.[160] When the real cause or causes of the war were figured out, the aggressors acknowledged their mistake, submitted themselves to mediation and accepted the verdict.

3.7 Elders in Burnt Forest Peacebuilding

The Elders of Burnt Forest are an independent group of eminent local leaders, brought together by the influence of conflict in the region. They used their influence and experience to support peace building, help address major causes of human suffering and promote the shared interests of humanity. They did this by offering advice and used their experience to resolve problems. The idea of the elders started with the escalation of conflict. They looked to traditional societies, where elders often shared wisdom and help to resolve disputes.[161] The Elders committed themselves to listening to ordinary people affected by crisis and conflict, especially women and young people who so often struggled to be heard. They worked both publicly and behind the scenes and at all levels in the locality by lending support and advice when invited, and sometimes when it is not.[162] Since the 1992 ethnic clashes in the region the Elders have focused their peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts on communities living in the area. The elders elicited a lot of competence within Burnt Forest as one interviewee had to say:

> Although the traditional Kikuyu and Kalenjin society was organized and structured in ways that encouraged cohesiveness and peaceful coexistence from time to time, like any other human society, it experienced conflict. Conflicts arose between individuals, within a family, between different families or between the inhabitants of different territories. To manage such conflicts, traditional society had well-organized regulatory machinery in which the youth were expected to respect the word of the elders. This respect generally played a major part in ensuring peace and harmony. Under this system elders were recognized as having an advisory role, behind the scenes, mainly where the youth threatened peace and stability

[160] Oral interview, James Kipyegon, Kondoo Farm Burnt Forest, 28/12/2010.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Oral interview, James Kipyegon, Kondoo Farm Burnt Forest, 28/12/2010.

and as playing an active part in strengthening solidarity and social harmony. Within this structure, the youth played the more respectful yet leading substantial role both in their families and within their own circle.[163]

3.8 Conclusion

The persistence of conflicts in Burnt Forest, the breakdown of peace processes and the relapse of the region back to conflict after every election period ensured that post-conflict peacebuilding will continue to require different actors assistance in the coming years and decades. Different actors were actively involved in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest through a number of ways that I categorized as state roles, NGO roles, women and elders. The following conclusions can therefore be made having discussed different groups' roles in peacebuilding. The above groups have actively participated in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. It is clear that institutions have played a greater role to involve different groups to participate in peacebuilding initiatives. Through the different strategies and interventions for example the government of Kenya has made sure that the ethnic clashes in Burnt Forest has come to an end. However, an important ingredient to peacebuilding is sidelined in these efforts. That is, the specific role of youth. This is the concern of the next chapter.

[163] Oral interview, Jane Wairimu a resident in Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BURNT FOREST YOUTH IN PEACEBUILDING

4.1 Introduction

Predominant images of youth and violence serve as justification for using young people as soldiers. They often also serve to reinforce structures, practices and policies aimed at containing expressions of youth violence-excepting those expressly sanctioned such as war-so that such violence does not form a serious threat to established order.

Viewing youth as agents of peace challenges these images of youth in war and violence. As opposed to viewing youth as a period of life which violent behavior is something to be channeled and checked- a reconceptualization of the qualities of youth takes place and they are seen as essential to the challenges of building peace. Such a reconceptualization remains, relatively speaking, in its infancy. Nonetheless, researches recently have shown that such a reconceptualization is possible and practical too. Youth in post-conflict zones like Kosovo have educated peers about conflict resolution, organized community service projects, started a union of taxi and motorbike drivers to serve their community and organized sports competition to encourage cross-cultural reconciliation as a method of peacebuilding. In Africa, Peace Links empowered marginalized youth in Sierra Leone through music and dance as a means of network of the youth in peacebuilding.[164]It is argued that similar dynamics are to be found elsewhere in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and many other countries around the world.

This chapter focuses on activities and programmes of youth as agents of building peace in Burnt Forest. The idea is to recognize how essential they are to peacebuilding. What roles did they play in peacebuilding? Did they develop any programmes to be used in peacebuilding? Were youth women equally active in peacebuilding activities? The chapter is organized in three parts. The first part introduces cases where the youth have taken part in peacebuilding, and thus attempts to link the youth with peace at communal

[164] Del Felice and Wisler, 'The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-Builders,' *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development,* Vol. 11, 2007, pp. 54-60.

level. The second part addresses the process of peacebuilding in Burnt Forest that the youth were actively involved.

4.2 Conceptualizing the Youth in Peacebuilding

The purpose of this section is to present the conceptual approach of youth in this study, based mostly on the concepts of violence and youth, youth and peacebuilding and conflict transformation. A starting point is the existent debates on whether the youth are inherently violent. The youth as is anybody in any society often respond to problems and conflicts using violence and force. Yet, this does not mean that the youth are by nature violent. In 1986 a group of scientists met in Sevilla, Spain and drafted a joint statement known as, the Seville Statement.[165] The purpose of the statement was to dispel the widespread belief that the youth are inevitably disposed to war as a result of innate, biologically determined aggressive traits. The statement claimed that it is scientifically incorrect to say that human beings inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors.

Although fighting occurs widely throughout animal species, it is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent behaviour is genetically programmed in the youth. This is an important starting point when studying youth who are condemned by media and society as violent and trouble makers. Against some popular beliefs young delinquents or soldiers are not born evil and human beings are not by nature violent or criminals. This section is guided by a nonviolent peacebuilding and conflict transformation approach, mostly based on the work of Johan Galtung and his transcend method.[166] Consequently, the role of youth becomes more relevant from this approach as the emphasis is put on addressing structural causes of violence as well as attitudes and behaviour, building on

[165] The Seville Statement on Violence was drafted by an international committee of 20 scholars at the 6th International Colloquium on Brain and Aggression held at the University of Seville, Spain, in May 1986, with support from the Spanish Commission for UNESCO. UNESCO adopted the Seville Statement at its 25th General Conference Session in Paris, October 17 to November 16, 1989. The Statement has been formally endorsed by scientific organisations and published in journals around the world which calls for teaching young people about non-aggressive approach.

[166] Jahan Galtung, "The Editorial", *Journal of Peace Research,* Oslo: the Peace Research Institute, 2000, p 7.

creativity and local capacities. The role of the youth in peacebuilding can first be understood from three fronts; first as victims of conflict, perpetrators and peacebuilders.

4.2.1 The Youth as victims

One of the most generalised ways of perceiving youth is the view that the youth are victims of violence or conflict. Peace scholars such as Anatole Ayissi have recognised that violent conflict situations have devastating effects on any human being and can be particularly shattering for young people.[167] They argue that youth is an important period of physical, mental and social maturation, where young people are actively forming identities and determining acceptable roles for themselves within their community and society as a whole. They are increasingly capable of abstract thought and decision making in new ways. Their sexuality is also emerging, as their bodies continue to change, and they are presented with new physical and emotional feelings, social expectations and challenges.[168]

Violence disrupts this process of maturation and affects young people's physical and psychological health. In conflict situations, many are subjected to forced labour, recruitment into armies or militias, and child prostitution. Many more are displaced, separated from their families, or orphaned, and must undertake a long, painstaking processes to rebuild their lives after conflict. Because of violent conflict, youth find themselves heading households, unemployed, their traditional livelihoods are disrupted. Not only are their daily lives affected, but their futures are also jeopardized. Many youth grow up in hopelessness that influences their adult life choices. In this sense, a violent family environment or up-bringing affects the youths.[169] Direct, conflict as that witnessed in Burnt Forest affected the youth indiscriminately economically and politically.

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[167] Anatole Ayiss, *Bound to Cooperate: Women in Sierra Leone Conflict*, New York: UNIFEM, 2005
[168] World Youth Report 2005, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr05book.pdf Accessed 24/11/2011.
[169] Ibid.

4.2.2 The Youth as perpetrators

The other view to look at before understanding the youth in peacebuilding is the view of youth in conflict as violent actors. From the notion of the youth as victims, it comes out clear that youth who are reared in and into a culture of violence and especially those who have been direct victims of violence will likely use violence as way of dealing with conflict.[170] Evidence from Palestine shows that when the Israeli forces bombed the Palestinian homes the children became angry and could only express their anger through games and paint. However, years later, the only options perceived by these youth seem to either become a suicide bomber or to fight violently.[171]

There is a growing body of literature on the roles of youth as combatants in armed conflict and the effects of their involvement on development. Literature, based on extensive field work from other areas around the world, provides important evidence of wide youth involvement in warfare. This literature states the reasons for that involvement, the processes of induction into armed groups, the activities of children in these groups as fighters, cooks, spies, couriers, and in providing forced sexual services and their immediate term rehabilitation needs once the fighting has ceased.

In countries where there is not wide scale armed conflict but which experience high unemployment rates and inequality, research has found that urban gangs appear.[172] Young people group themselves to protect each other from the police, from other groups and to create sources of income, in most cases through illegal activities. The gang's identity is clearly defined and its members express that they feel a sense of family who would do anything to protect the group. The birth of urban youth gangs or neo-tribes is

[170]Henrik Urdal, "The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict" (1950-2000), pp. 23-27.
[171] McEvoy, "Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post-Settlement Peace Building".
[172] Jan Abbink, Wilhelmina Kessel, *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa,* Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2005; Clive Glaser, Bo-tsotsi, *The Youth Gangs of Soweto,* Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000; Malcom W. Klein, Barbara G. Myerhoff, *Juvenile Gangs in Context: Theory, Research and Action,* Los Angeles: Englewood Cliffs, 1967, p 67.

often attributed to young people's opposition to the individualism that has come to dominate modern civilization.[173]

Further, structural inequalities are at the root of violence-prone youth gangs. The forces of the market economy have encouraged floods of rural migrants to crowd the already overpopulated urban centres, and it is here that youth gangs and urban violence flourish. For example, in South Africa, traditional rural society provided a sense of direction and support for young people in their transition to adulthood. In the urban context, young people created new structures and rituals that worked for them. Carving their identity into the walls of the ghettos and arming themselves with fearsome weapons, they demand at gun-point what they cannot win with individual respect.[174]Burnt Forest market provided an urban set up where the youth could congregate and socialize.

4.3 Burnt Forest Youth in Peacebuilding

Humanity, throughout history, has disproportionately placed the burdens of war and violence on young people. Article 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child obligates signatories to prevent young people from directly participating in hostilities, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention increases this age to those under 18.[175] Article 38 states that, "state parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that young people do not take a direct part in hostilities and that states shall refrain from recruiting such persons into their armed forces. Such international legal norms are accompanied by widespread political condemnation of the involvement of the youth in war.

At the same time, developments in other sectors, including the emergence of the discipline of peace education, speak to the central role of children and the youth in the global project of achieving peace. The youth often serve to reinforce structures, practices,

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[173] Susan O'Reilly, *The Contribution of Community Development to Peacebuilding: World Vision's Area Development Programs*, World Vision, 1998, pp. 20-27.

[174] Amanda Dissel "Youth, Street Gangs and Violence in South Africa", in *Youth, Street Culture and Urban Violence in Africa, proceedings of the international symposium held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast*, pp. 405-411, 5-7 May 1997. http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papganga.htm accessed on 13/11/2010.

[175] Ian Harris and Linda R. Forcey (eds.), *Peacebuilding for Adolescents*, New York: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 18-26.

and policies aimed at containing expressions of violence and accepting those who expressly sanctioned conflict so that violence does not form a serious threat to the established order. This perception challenges the traditional images of youth in violent conflicts.[176]

Although the people of Burnt Forest had coexisted peacefully since independence, the conflicts that occurred in 1992, 1997, 1998 and 2007 indicated that for a long time people had 'enjoyed' negative peace. This was equally an indication to the youth that they must do something to assist in peacebuilding. The youth of Burnt Forest soon started engaging in the formation of youth groups like the Youth Assembly group, Jovial Adventure group and Rural Women Youth group. These groups were registered by the Ministry of Culture and Social Services to carry out programmes which focused on various issues pertaining to peaceful coexistence, ethnic tolerance and inter-ethnic marriages. They collaborated with religious groups such as churches, mosques and elders from all communities living in the area as a mechanism of promotion of peace. These groups jointly called meetings that were forums that discussed issues of peace in society and peaceful co-existence between different ethnic groups.[177] The relative calm that ensure after this initiatives alludes to the role of youth in building peace.

In the meetings held jointly the youth were taught important peace lessons to reinforce what they had learnt in school and at home. This type of education was meant to promote transmission of knowledge acquired to the practical lessons of coexistence with people from different backgrounds.[178] Practical lessons were meant to make the youth responsible citizens that were expected to engage in building a unified society and country.[179] The youth in Burnt Forest were taught how to peacefully live in society or why it is important to be involved in peace activities; they were also encouraged to be active and to think critically if they are incited before they take any step. As Kenyan

[176] Harris and Forcey (Eds.), *Peacebuilding for Adolescents*, pp. 18-26.
[177] Gona and Muluka, "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities", Nairobi: UNDP, 2010, pp. 53-54.
[178] Oral interview, Jane Wambui Njeri, Kimumu Farm, 28/12/2010.
[179] Crails Cliffton, "The youth Gangs of Soweto, 19350-1976" in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol: 33 No. 33 No.3 2000pp.717-718. Accessed on 10th July 2008. http://www.jstors org.

citizens, they were also informed of their rights and opportunities. The youth were encouraged to think through questions such as, how much time should they spent building their self-esteem and self-confidence while capitalizing on ethnic group dynamics and group learning? These efforts became successful with much support of the NGOs in Burnt Forest.

One organization that assisted in youth peacebuiding efforts was World Vision Kenya. This organization was inspired by the vision of young people in the area determined to restore peace. The organisation was determined to promote peace in this section of the Rift Valley. The objective was straightforward treating all people with respect regardless of tradition, gender, or ethnic background. This wasn't easy to do.

Since 1991 Burnt Forest had become irrevocably associated with unrest and hatred. The depth and breadth of that hatred in some quarters was almost incomprehensible to anyone not bred in these environments. The hatred that seethes was rooted in historical injustices associated with land issues.[180] As discussed in chapter two, there is debate on the causes of the rivalry and fighting in Burnt Forest and this can be a subject of endless interpretation.

Those with a stake in the reconstruction and development of the province like to point to the infusion of aid that followed the ethnic conflict. People of Burnt Forest, on the other hand, were expected to appreciate the international community as playing important role in peacebuilding while accepting the status quo that holds them in a state of political and economic stalemate. This is where World Vision Kenya inserted itself in a bid to counteract the cycle of violence and the polarisation of ethnic groups. World Vision programmes were aimed specifically at unifying members of civil society from all ethnic groups, including those in smaller, lesser known communities. An important component

[180] Oral interview, Jane Wambui Kimani, Kimumu Farm, 28/12/2010.

of promoting values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence was a focus on children. The objective was to enable youth to construct a future of their choosing.[181]

During the period directly after the ethnic conflicts in 1991, 1992, 1997 and 2007, World Vision's work focused mainly on relief, with large-scale aid efforts serving the internally displaced and others suffering from the effects of conflict. In this initial post-conflict phase, World Vision Kenya ran community stabilization programmes. Starting with relief projects involving all community groups aimed at trauma healing, tolerance building and participatory education, World Vision Kenya built a good relationship base in a number of communities where it would start development projects at a later stage.[182] Relief efforts were gradually transitioned into development programmes, out of which World Vision Kenya's peacebuilding programme was started.

The development phase aimed at strengthening and enhancing the capacity of key stakeholders. By building and strengthening community networks and developing conflict-resolution strategies, World Vision encouraged youths from different ethnic communities living in Burnt Forest to take a more active role in building a peaceful and tolerant society. Building peace is about creating space and developing relationships in the face of a complex set of dynamics and time frames. The youth were to be flexible and to be able to recognise and respond to emerging predicaments and opportunities.[183] World Vision Kenya programmes involved teaching the youth skills of observation in order to attempt to observe the degree of change in trust, communication, transparency and the general lessening of tensions among communities in the area.[184]These tenets were witnessed through the ability of the residents of Burnt Forest to mix through social activities like games and mixing in churches.

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[181] David Fromkin, *Crossing: The Reality of American Intervention in Conflicts*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1999, p 160-167.
[182] Ibid.
[183] UNDP, *The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and Choices*, UNDP Human Development Report, 2004, p. 133.
[184] Oral interview, Samuel Rubia, Keses, 26/12/2010.

For instance, the youth were taught to identify if a story accelerates through the communities about a terrible event. Do the ethnic parties immediately cry foul or do they call for an explanation? They were taught that, peacebuilding activities must always be in the moment, so to speak, responding to what is happening on the ground. They must connect empirical reality to the idealist vision for change. World Vision utilised the local capacities for peace (LCP) methodology developed by the Collaborative for Development Activities (CDA) for World Vision staff and the communities in Burnt Forest. The youth were used to do an assessment in the area to ensure that programme activities did not exacerbate conflict and that wherever possible they contributed to improved inter-ethnic relations. Through a "do no harm" assessment, World Vision staff identified community-level "dividers" and "connectors," analysed their interaction with programme activities and adjusted implementation strategy as needed to encourage a positive impact. Examples of peacebuilding projects included establishment of a Committee for Peace and Tolerance, Community Mediation project funded by the Swiss government and Interfaith Peace Forum project funded by the United States Institute of Peace.

Since the first incident of ethnic clashes in Burnt Forest in 1991, as discussed in chapter two, the situation preceding subsequent election years has remained erratic-shifting quickly from relative calm to violence as was witnessed after the 2007 General elections in Kenya. When word broke out that the PNU Presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki had been declared a winner, Kalenjin mobs that were supporting ODM Presidential candidate Raila Amolo Odinga stated battling with Kibaki supporters. Within days Burnt Forest region was immersed in anti-Kikuyu rioting and had regressed to levels of violence not seen earlier. By January 2008 the violence in Burnt Forest mutated into almost ethnic cleansing of entire non-Kalenjin farms and neighbourhoods.[185] This unprecedented and unexpected blow-up was to prove a major setback to the youth.

Confidence was being destroyed between members of different communities. It is in exactly such a sensitive, volatile and emotionally charged environment that the youth peacebuilders had to employ their understanding of the cultural and social values of each

[185] Oral interview, Miriam Wairimu, Kamuyu, 27/12/2010.

group in order to anticipate responses. African communities are family focused; they possess strong and admirable loyalty to their own kind. Yet, the intense closeness to "their own" posed a subtle alienation from "the other." The family unit is very important among the Africans. The ingrained sense of loyalty common to Africans starts there and extends outward into the wider ethnic community. Ethnic conflict reinforces bonds starting in the wider unit and feeding back down to the family. Ethnic identity is also reinforced by perceived and real outside threats when the attacker's rationale is clothed in another ethnic garb.[186] Here the attack is perceived to be on the very core of the embattled value system.

Ethnic identity is exactly responsible to the violence that flamed into conflict in Burnt Forest pushing the security situation near the breaking point and forcing the youth in peacebuilding practices to be well organized. The main objective of the youth at this point was to create relationships and empower people to deal with conflict in non-violent ways. Peacebuilding is clearly a preventive function. The youth had an important role to play in addressing the causes of conflict after an incident had taken place. What could this mean? Peacebuilding deals with the so-called soft issues of conflict, such as confronting the reasons for negative attitudes, stereotypes and opinions between conflicting parties. In other words, the youth in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest dealt with the human issues.[187]

The youth initiated dialogue between parties who would normally be very reluctant to convene. This fostered trust among them and helped them to develop mutually supportive relationships that combat the spread of false information. Rumours were quashed by the youth using phone calls to trusted contact on the other side. In these phone calls the youths targeted elders, women leaders, school teachers and the police. These groups were targeted because they can influence those at grassroots levels and advocate for peace[188]and they are uniquely positioned to campaign for positive change in their

[186] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Collapse in Kosovo," ICG Report no. 155 (22 April 2004.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Oral interview, Eunice Wambui, Kamuyu Farm, 27/12/2010.

communities. In the section that follows six approaches employed by the youth in Burnt Forest in their efforts in peacebuilding are discussed.

4.4 The Six Functions in Practice

The following section presents the six youth functions in peacebuilding. These six approaches are; protection, youth choir, socialization, youth women, solidarity visits and structural dimension and reconstruction. The section argues that these six functions encompass the core roles of the youth and that taken together offer a suitable framework to better understand the potential contribution of the youth of Burnt Forest to peacebuilding.

4.4.1 Protection

As earlier explained in chapter three, the ethnic clashes that erupted in various parts of Kenya in 1991, 1992, 1997 and 2007 overstretched the government security system making them often unable to protect the communities including those living in Burnt Forest. Communal youth group initiatives frequently emerged during conflict and its aftermath to protect lives, rights and property against threats by conflict actors. Protection functions were generally performed by the youths through their presence as monitoring watchdogs of any danger.[189] The youth groups, for example, would send their representatives into conflict zones to protect and negotiate for peace or monitor arms movement.[190] Another aspect of protection done the youth is support to security related interventions such as, small arms control, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former members of militia groups. For instance in Burnt Forest youth groups in churches launched a follow-up peace monitoring programme after the conflict ended. Their main work was observing and monitoring the activities of conflict actors. This was meant to enhance accountability and a precondition for the protection and the advocacy for peace. The inter-denominational Youth for Peace Group in Burnt Forest is one such group which monitors the conflict situation and makes recommendations to

[189] Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War, Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka," PhD Dissertation, Department of Peace and Development Research, University Göteborg, 2003, p 28.
[190] Christian Barnes, "Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace." In: P. van Tongeren, et al., eds., *People Building Peace II, Successful Stories of Civil Society, 7-24,* Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp. 7-24.

decision makers, provide information to advocacy groups, and provide inputs for early warning as a means of guarding the achieved peace.[191] The Burnt Forest Inter-denominational Youth Group also had a choir through which they used to preach peaceful coexistence.

4.4.2 Youth Choir and Peacebuilding in Burnt Forest

When questioned about what makes music and dance useful tools for peacebuilding, many of the young people in Burnt Forest identified the importance of music and dance in providing alternative modes of expression, which can play a vital role in dealing with conflict. Too often the common traditional frameworks for expression are clouded by our deeply ingrained, typically antagonistic responses to conflict, which may continue to lead us down the same tired and frustrating paths that have allowed enduring conflict to worsen in the first place. By offering creative alternatives, music and dance the youth in Burnt Forest knew music may lead to new and effective mechanisms for resolving or transforming conflict in ways that may not have been. Stressing the significance of songs the youthful Tabitha Wambui said:

> A pamphlet no matter how good is never read more than once. But a song is learned by heart and repeated over and over again.[192]

Music is not only important for the youths directly involved in its making but it is also particularly useful for conveying their message in a way that encourages the development of peace culture as well as inspire action to embrace peace by those who listen to it.

At the same time, the youth in Burnt Forest noted that participation in song and dance helped them practice and improve their skills in traditional dialogic engagement, leaving them well placed to use all the tools in their know to peace build. Music and dance contributed to the cause of peacebuilding by serving a vital role in offering relevant alternative modes of dialogue and communication, which also supplemented and encouraged more traditional ways of exchanging ideas with young people participating in the music making as well as with people of all ages in the wider public that consume the

[191] Oral interview, Jane Wairimu a resident in Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.
[192] Oral interview, Tabitha Wambui, Intercommunity Choir, Tarakwa Location, Burnt Forest, 27/08/2010.

product as audience members.[193]A teacher who is a member of the Burnt Forest Intercommunity Peace choir overemphasized the role of singing together:

> Singing together helps us experience in the body our connection to each other and the planet, summons our collective courage, enlivens us and inspires us to play our part in creating a life-sustaining society[194]

The key thing here was that young people in Burnt Forest viewed music and dance as creative and different ways to engage in dialogue. This is in contrast to more traditional, limited definitions of dialogue as speech or purely linguistic exchanges. Examining these experiences indicated a need for a broader understanding of what may be understood as ineffable dialogue. Engaging through these alternative modes also enabled the young people to 'explain' themselves with confidence, as this was a mode of dialogue that was not predicated on typical notions of intelligence. One particular relevant aspect of this deployment of unconventional forms of dialogue in Burnt Forest was that it served as an alternative mode of dispute resolution through offering non-violent means for addressing conflict.[195]

4.4.3 Socialization

The socialization function of the youth aims to inculcate a culture of peace in divided conflict societies by promoting attitude change toward peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation. Most activities tend to adopt a conflict resolution approach and include dialogue projects, reconciliation initiatives, peace education, exchange programs and peace camps, conflict resolution training and capacity building. This research found out that the youth initiatives which supported attitude change and a culture of peace were more effective and reached a critically large number of people.[196] Evaluations of dialogue projects in Burnt Forest conflict found that since dialogue processes mainly work at the

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[193] Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, *Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in the 20th Century*, 1998, p 188-192.
[194] Oral interview, Linah Cherotich, Intercommunity Choir, Tarakwa Location, Burnt Forest, 27/08/2010
[195] Derk Richardson cited in Nancy Love, "'Singing for Our Lives": *Women's Music and Democratic Politics'* (2002) 17(4) Hypatia, pp. 71, 84.
[196] Anderson and Rieff, "Global Civil Society: A Sceptical View", in: Anheier, H., M. Glasius, and M. Kaldor, eds, *Global Civil Society 2004/5,* London: Sage, 2004, pp. 12-20.

level of individuals, communal and national there is big link between local initiatives and the macro peace processes.

Culture of peace activities such as sports and exchange programmes tend to also further limits the potential to attain critical mass.[197] Communal sporting in Burnt Forest were small initiatives with positive effects at the local level in terms of peacebuilding. In football for example, the teams started competing in small village teams, then the best players would be selected to comprise a wider area the size of a location regardless of the ethnic orientation of the players. Burnt Forest team is an amalgam of such an arrangement. The youth through sporting proved to be a long term engagement in promoting a culture of peace and reconciliation. In the absence of genuine government protection due to conflict and social disintegration, sports worked directly to cement local communities by uniting the players from different communities. This was one way of empowering them in sports and enabling them to practice civic engagement, rebuild communities and promote peacebuilding. Although the sporting project started as project initiated by the NCCK jointly with World Vision Kenya, the program quickly gained youth ownership.

Sporting is usually followed by price giving ceremony whereby the sponsoring NGOs and International civil society take up important communal advocacy functions. Through such initiatives, they have succeeded in bringing specific conflict issues such as land, ethnicity and other crucial grievances not only on the national agenda but also on the international agenda or directing international attention to the plight of particular conflict areas. The Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI) has used such forums in Burnt Forest to advocate internationally for the need to adopt a people-based peace process in Burnt Forest, the special role of women in peacebuilding and the need to fund people's involvement.[198] Its main advocacy instrument was to continuously provide information

[197] Aall, "What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?" In: Crocker, C., F. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 365-83.
[198] Oral interview, Linah Cherotich, Intercommunity Choir, Tarakwa Location, Burnt Forest, 27/08/2010.

and lobbying for a bottom-up solution to the crisis in various international forums, such as UN bodies and the civil societies.[199]

Advocacy is relevant in all phases of conflict, but its nature would vary according to conflict phases. During conflict civil society tends to advocate for peace agreements, against violence and human rights violations, for broad based participation in the peace process, and for specific issues. Information campaigns and opinion polls ran by the youth can link the public at large with official negotiation processes or official parallel civil society forums can provide a more direct link to track negotiations.[200] Independent media in which the youth form the largest employees play an important role in peacebuilding by reaching a broad range of the population, facilitating public communication, expanding the audience for advocacy campaigns, and raising awareness on the need for and feasibility of non-violent solutions.[201] Disseminating objective and non-partisan information on conflict, human rights violations, and truth and reconciliation efforts is a critical media contribution to peacebuilding.[202]

4.6.4 Youth Women as Socializing Agents

During the land clashes and after, women, as mothers, acted as peace builders by teaching their children and talking to their husbands about learning to live peacefully with their neighbours. They demonstrated this by helping children from the warring communities who needed refuge, food and clothing.[203] This shows that their nurturing role is part of their natural duty and it makes them love peace so as to create an enabling environment to take care of their children. Women, used storytelling, traditional songs and riddles to teach their children to love one another and to live peacefully with their neighbours. Similarly teachers, make sure that the pupils used friendly language so as not

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[199] Oral interview, Linah Cherotich, Intercommunity Choir, Tarakwa Location, Burnt Forest, 27/08/2010.
[200] Accord., "Owning the Process, Public Participation in Peace Making," *Accord Series, Reconciliation Resources*, London, 2002.
[201] Leonard Reychler and Thomas Paffenholz, *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p 26.
[202] Cheema, *Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries,*" Kumarian Press, 2005, pp. 5-11.
[203] Donna Pankhurst, "The 'Sex War' and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building", in *Development in Practice,* Vol. 13, No. 2/3, London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd, May, 2003, pp. 154-177.

to hurt children from other communities and encouraged the idea of sharing stationery and group visits.[204]

Women being the social cement of every society are taught as young children, most often by their mothers, their peace-making skills and the roles which they will have to perform after marriage, within the family and with their neighbours. This confirms what a youthful woman at Burnt Forest had to say:

> We are often original and starking [sharply clear] in our creativity as peace builders because we have been trained by our mothers on how to bring peace right from childhood.[205]

This suggests that men and women have different styles of handling interpersonal conflicts. To some extent this is reflected in the differential socialization boys and girls are exposed to in the society. Girls are socialized to value relationships and maintain harmony while boys are socialized to value status and seek victory. This is thought to translate into women taking a cooperative stance in conflict situations while men are more competitive.[206]

4.4.5 Youth in Solidarity Visits

Different youth groups, especially those organized by Rural Youth Peace Link, in all the affected areas of Burnt Forest conducted solidarity visits during and after the conflict. These efforts led to formation of solidarity groups like Jovial Adventure club and Youth Assembly group.[207] These youths engaged in reconciling the warring ethnic groups using traditional peace-making methods and exchange programmes. They visited and donated food to the victims or exchanged peace messages with their counterparts. During the visits, the youths prepared the ground and invited other youths, elders and women to attend. After the visits, issues related to and affecting peace were written down during the discussion and left with the chief of the area and divisional officer to take action. This

[204] Oral interview, Jane Kimani, Head Teacher, Boror Primary School, Burnt Forest, 24/12/2010.
[205] Oral interview, a youthful District Officer, Burnt Forest, 24/12/2010.
[206] Pankhurst, "The 'Sex War' and Other Wars", pp. 154-177.
[207] Oral interview, Concyline Chepkwamoi, Jovial Adventure club, 28/12/2010.

program worked so well in highlighting the problems that affected the people and how to solve them in a peaceful way.[208]

The messages of peace that were disseminated challenged the parents as to why they allowed their sons to be used by politicians who used them for selfish gains and dumped them later on. They also challenged the parents why their children wallowed in poverty while their masters were very rich. After attacking their neighbours and torching their houses, they were only paid five hundred Kenya shillings. Was that just? They asked the parents why their sons were either rotting in filthy, stinking jail cells or even being killed while the politicians' children were studying overseas. Solidarity meetings entailed, the need for peaceful co-existence, the need for everyone playing a role in peacebuilding and how the youth could be great leaders if the opportunity was given. They insisted on children going to school. Equally, through solidarity visits children were advised against the traditions which insisted on negative heroism in relation to the art of war and the techniques of killing.[209]

4.4.6 Structural Dimension and Reconstruction

Structural dimension of peacebuilding focuses on the economic and social conditions that foster peace. Peace must be built on social, economic and political foundations that serve the needs of the populace. In Burnt Forest as earlier observed the root causes are complex but are mainly economic and political. Hence for peace to be realized, efforts at addressing these problems must be put in place in order to achieve lasting peace. Formally, the youth in Burnt Forest felt excluded from participating in the country's development and peace building due to unemployment, inaccessibility to information, low education level, vulnerability to HIV and AIDS, non-involvement in governance and human right issues. These factors made the youth vulnerable to violence since they were polarized and marginalized. But after the 2007/8 political violence in Kenya in which more than 1000 people died and development that had been realized in some parts of the country destroyed within a period of one month, raised the question of the important role

[208] Pankhurst, "The 'Sex War' and Other Wars", pp. 154-177.
[209] Gona and Muluka, "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities", Nairobi: UNDP, 2010, pp. 53-54.

of the youth in this process. Statistics showed that the majority of those who participated in the violence were youth and over ninety percent of those who died were also youth.[210]

One key issue that made youth to be involved in conflict was unemployment. Inadequate employment opportunities contribute to idleness. As a means of curbing idleness which in most cases made the youth vulnerable to manipulation by politicians resulting in their involvement in conflict, young people initiated economic projects as a means of reconstructing their economies. The youth in Burnt Forest initiated motorcycle transport industry where they played an important role in peacebuilding. The motorcycle transport initiative was started as an informal economic activity by the unemployed youth with an objective of creating employment for themselves. The transport system is used to transport people in the rural areas where there are no other means of transport due to poor roads. Through this transport system, members of the community were able to move around without feeling insecure. This initiative that involved the use of bicycles and motorcycles has now grown into a thriving business that includes the use of the advanced Tuktuk (Rigshaw).[211] This type of transport has made the youth understand the need for security if they have to continue with their business. Through this economic activity the youth are able to participate in peacebuilding by sensitizing their peers on the importance of peaceful environment not only as a prerequisite for their bicycle transport but also for agricultural development.[212]

Agriculture has played a key role in the development of human civilization and reconciliation. Until the Industrial Revolution, the vast majority of human population laboured in agriculture. Development of agricultural techniques has steadily increased agricultural productivity and the widespread diffusion of these techniques during a time period is often called agricultural revolution. A remarkable shift in agricultural practices has occurred over the past century in response to new technologies.[213] The youth in Burnt

[210] Oral interview, Peter Mwaniki, Tarakwa, 27/12/2010.
[211] Through this transport business the youth in Tuktuk business have also organized themselves into small groups (associations) in which they contribute Ksh. 50 monthly towards welfare in support of funerals, hospital bills or any other problem faced by the members.
[212] Oral interview, George Ngetich, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[213] Oral interview, Jane Wambui Njeri, Kimumu Farm, 28/12/2010.

Forest engaged in agriculture as a need to address these complex problems by focusing resources on youth development needs. Such an initiative was aimed at communicating a more positive image of the youth and reaching out and creating a larger pool of youth through high school agriculture and related agricultural literacy programs for youth, guidance counselors, science teachers, parents, and policy-makers. The Burnt Forest youth run inter-community agricultural projects where they grow maize, Irish potatoes and even keeping poultry.[214]

Equally at the core of every social movement in society is a surge of youth activism. The youth in Burnt Forest established general and special interest environmental organizations, which marked the perennial rise of the youth environment non-profit organizations. By providing young people with meaningful experiences, such projects benefited communities, supporting not only peaceful coexistence but also our environment socially as well as ecologically. Around Burnt Forest, the confluence of improved information technology, access to education, and the rise of civic organizations have led to an increased awareness by youth and their communities on peacebuilding through environmental conservation enhancing their potential contribution to joint projects through voluntary action.[215]

In Burnt Forest youth are becoming involved locally through new programmes and infrastructure. Numerous programs are being established to provide education, leadership training and opportunities for youth to serve as peaceful resources to their communities. The government through the Ministry of youth has established policies and programmes which support on-going service by youth through service and conservation corps, volunteer-based learning reform in the schools and peace service. With support from donors and other associations the government, begun to focus on how to stimulate greater support for methodologies which promote positive youth development and youth volunteering for peace in Burnt Forest.[216]

[214] Oral interview, Jane Wairimu a resident in Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.
[215] Oral interview, Sarah Mwaura, Kamuyu, 29/12/2010.
[216] Oral interview, Josephine Wanjiru, Tarakwa, 29/12/2010.

As recognized by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the involvement of youth in environment issues, development and decision-making is critical to the implementation of policies of sustainable development and peace. Young people should be involved in designing and implementing appropriate environmental and peace policies.

More environmental programs have started in Burnt Forest. This is an outreach program which focuses on youth awareness of not only the global threats to the environment but also for peace. Considering only social benefits of youth engagement in non- profit organizations, teenagers are really important because participating in such organizations not only improve problem solving skills of children but also deepen their critical consciousness. It assists them develop a greater sense of purpose and concern for social and ecological justice in their communities. Young people involved in volunteering are more likely to become active citizens through voting, participating in civic groups, and giving philanthropically. In addition, young volunteers have been found to have higher educational and economic achievement rates. Likewise young people who volunteer are 50% less likely to abuse drugs and alcohol, become involved in delinquency, or drop out of school.[217] Youth volunteering is an effective strategy for building strong youth and strong communities, while also reducing negative social behaviours.[218]

Despite this pivotal role, the youth have increasingly engaged in activities, such as the rebuilding of infrastructures in Burnt Forest after the conflict was resolved. During the conflict many houses, schools, shops and schools were burnt down leaving thousands with no homes or houses to live in. In this scenario the youth gave assistance to the humanitarian groups which were providing food, water, tents and other basic needs required to enable the victims to survive. In addition they were also required to act as mediators, building trust within previously suspicious sections of the local communities

[217] Cliffton, "The youth Gangs of Soweto, 19350-1976" in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol: 33 No. 33 No.3 2000pp.717-718. Accessed on 10th July 2008. http://www.jstors org. Accessed on 28/10/2010.
[218] Oral interview, George Ngetich, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.

and providing training for their counterparts in youth peace issues and training.[219] The youth leaders, worked closely with the civilian population and local leaders. This brought a lot of stability and peace to the region forcing the militia groups out of the area by peaceful means rather than through the use of military force. This was achieved by a mixture of activities, which included having the vigilante groups living within the local communities working on communal projects, including the rebuilding of roads, building schools, and forming a robust working relationship with the local politicians and ethnic factions.[220]

The youth have played a dynamic and positive role in post-conflict reconstruction processes, countering the popular belief and common depictions of youth as teenage terrorists and agents of war. The Burnt Forest case study has revealed that youth influence peace building and post-conflict reconstruction process. The common threads and traces throughout the reconstruction periods in Burnt Forest showed that youth meeting certain critical needs of physical and mental health to reintegration, education and social, political and economic empowerment is essential to successful youth engagement in building peace. The youth provides a new framework to analyze incentive structures for youth during post-conflict reconstruction and the relative success of intervening policies and programs in empowering youth to contribute to their communities.[221]

4.5 Conclusion

While most scholars and policymakers focus solely on their potential for violence, this study revealed that the youth are in fact dynamic agents of change, capable of pushing the societies towards peace.[222] The dynamic role of youth suggests that successful long-term policies and programs can both reduce the youth demographics' destabilizing potential, invest young people in the reconstruction process and empower the next generation to

[219] Gona and Muluka, "Cultural Methods of Peacemaking and Reconciliation in Selected Kenyan Communities", pp. 53-54.
[220] Oral interview, Joseph Maina Kinyua, Kamuyu, 27/12/2010.
[221] Pankhurst, "The 'Sex War' and Other Wars", pp. 154-177.
[222] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defense College Journal*, Nairobi: National Defense College, 2006, pp. 11-17.

support sustainable peace. The government of Kenya should emphasize that this programming is essential, not only for the well-being of the youth population, but also for the overall success of the peacebuilding mission.[223]

This chapter has revealed that for the people living in Burnt Forest, peace is equivalent to health, wellbeing and freshness and so peace does not thrive on poverty, insecurity, unemployment and waywardness and other types of misfortunes. Secondly, Burnt Forest youth roles as peace makers were put to effective use in peace building and conflict resolutions. They participated, and still participate, firmly in inculcating the culture of peace in Burnt Forest and in the practice of conflict mediation among warring factions within the family and the community.

The youth also commanded important positions in conflict resolution rituals and as envoys through songs in the inter-community peace choir. Thirdly, people in Burnt Forest were convinced that lasting peace does not grow in a vacuum. In their view, sustainable peace rather feeds and grows on enduring human values, implanted in children at tender ages, through storytelling, songs, proverbs and myths. The chapter therefore affirmed that the youth played a key role in Burnt Forest peacebuilding. One other category of the youth that the chapter did not discuss is the military youth. It would therefore be interesting to find out the significant role of the military youth in Peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. This will be the concern of the next chapter.

[223] Oral interview, Jane Wairimu a resident in Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY YOUTH AND PEACEBUILDING IN BURNT FOREST

5.1 Introduction

As stated earlier in the introductory chapter the Kenya military has been involved in post conflict peacebuilding in Burnt Forest and in particular post-conflict reconstruction. It is significant to analyze the extent to which the youth in the military have been involved in this aspect of peace building in the region. The bulk of the work force in the military lies in the lower ranks of Private [224] to Sergeant whose ages rank between eighteen years to thirty five fitting perfectly in this study's definition of youth. It should be noted that most of military commanders who form the officer Cadre are always elderly but the command that they are in-charge remain youthful. The organization system takes a 'pyramid' form. When deploying, it is a battalion which is deployed therefore no deliberate effort to deploy the youth but naturally they form the larger part of the battalion. The structure of a battalion is such that over three quarters of its personnel are youths ranging between 18 years, the age of recruitment to 39 years, retirement age of a captain who fails to be promoted to next rank. This chapter examines the place of the youthful military in post-conflict reconstruction and its engagement with the civilian youth in this aspect of peace building in Burnt Forest.

5.2 Military Civil Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The term 'Civil-military relations' is generally taken to include a wide range of issues ranging from command and control (the issue of civilian/political control of the military instrument) to all forms of interaction between the military and wider society. However, for the purposes of this study, a more narrow view of this subject is examined, that is; the interaction between civilians and armed forces during conflict period. The military engaged in Peacebuilding in Burnt Forest by participating in activities designed to prevent and help resolve violent conflict. The military were more directly concerned

[224] A Private (Pte) is the junior most rank in military that is attained immediately after attainment of basic military training of approximately 9 months The enlistment age is between age 18 years and 26 years.

with fostering a context in which violent conflict is less likely to occur, as opposed to dealing with specific issues or actors as implied by other terms. The military employed measures which consolidate peaceful relations and societal institutions in order to contribute to the creation of an environment which deters the emergence or the escalation of tensions which may lead to violent conflicts.[225]In this kind of interaction most of the activities the military engaged in were meant to pacify the communities in Burnt Forest setting ground for other peacebuilders to operate.

The Kenya Defence forces acted more as a buffer in a combat role to impose a solution, by patrolling the conflict area, it is clearly not conducive to fostering a non-violent solution to a conflict. The military forces provide a secure environment for peacebuilding to occur whereas aid agencies help build stable relations amongst war affected communities. Peacebuilding perspective with the military entails an engagement with civilians and humanitarian agencies a view to achieving a wider goal, namely, the fostering of peace and stability. Where these actors operate in close proximity and where the actions of each will impact on the other, enhanced management of the relationship between them may in some cases contribute to peacebuilding. This point will be further clarified in the following sections.[226]

5.3 Legality behind use of Military in Domestic Duties

There is legislation that governs the engagement of the military to respond to threats or acts of threat at domestic level. During a domestic crisis involving usage of sophisticated weapons and in situations where the police confess being overwhelmed, the Kenya military may be called upon to assist in actual combat operations as was the case in Mt. Elgon. The law also allows it to loan specialized equipment for use by law enforcement agencies in the crisis such as during rescue operations. The Ministry of State for Defense (MOSD) has directives establishing policy involving assigning responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authorities including specific policy for assistance to

[225] International Alert, *Code of Conduct: Conflict Transformation Work*, London: International Alert, 1999, p. 29.
[226] Ibid.

civil law enforcement officials in emergencies.[227]It is through this that a conducive environment for reconstruction and peacebuilding is generated.

The Kenyan military involvement in direct law enforcement activities within the country is normally prohibited by law. The law prohibits the use of the military in activities such as, Arrest, seizures of evidence, search of persons, search of a building, investigation of a crime, interviewing witnesses, pursuit of an escaped prisoner, search of an area for a suspect and other like activities. But it must be noted that this does not mean that the military should sit back in times of crisis. The law, however, has not precluded the military from providing logistical support, technical advice, facilities, training, and other forms of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies even though that assistance may aid those activities. This is why it is called Aid to Civil Authority. Technical support activities such as, explosive ordinance disposal and providing specialized equipment and expert advice in times of emergencies is highly acceptable.[228]This situation from the Australian experience speaks to the Kenyan case because Kenya is not different from her commonwealth counterparts.

In an emergency situation, the codes governing the military are clear that when providing assistance, the military units and personnel will remain under the military chain of command at all times. The senior on-scene law enforcement official may request support directly from the senior military commander at the crisis site but the planning and execution of all military support will remain the responsibility of the military commander. The commander of the military unit determines the appropriate technical assistance procedures based on the priority of protection of human life or prevent injuries, including injury to the military personnel involved.[229]

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[227] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defense College Journal*, Nairobi: National Defense College, 2006, pp. 11-17.

[228] James Cotton, "Peacebuilding in the Pacific: the Australian military experience", *Journal of Peace*, Conflict and Development, Issue 14, July 2009, p 17.

[229] DoD, "Kenya Army in Aid to Civilians", *Kenya Armed Forces Journal*, July 2008, pp. 11-16.

Normally, military units providing technical assistance to the civilian law enforcement authorities will not be armed unless specifically requested through the military chain of command. Members of military units, whether armed or not, will not be placed in hostile fire situations and are only authorized to use force in self-defense as defined by Peacetime Rules of Engagement. The rules specify self-defense as the reasonable, necessary, and proportional force to defend him or herself and to defend the unit against hostile intent and/or acts. Deadly force is authorized against any person demonstrating hostile intent or committing hostile acts if there is a reasonable belief that the person poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the member or to another person.[230]

Notwithstanding the prohibitions which allow the military, among other things, to loan, maintain and operate equipment when supporting civilian law enforcement agencies may extend technical advice and assessment to law enforcement personnel including providing expert advice on all matters pertaining to the search, location, identification, seizure and render safe through disarmament. The police and the senior military commander will determine the procedures to use when performing the technical assistance requested based on safety to the public, the unit, and surrounding property. The military may consider preservation of forensic evidence when choosing the assistance technique. Military personnel will not compromise safety standards in order to enhance the survival or collection of evidence for law enforcement purposes.[231] This is done with recognition that order is important as a prelude to peace and security.

Employing a military tactical force in response to a domestic law enforcement emergency could take place only if armed conflict-like situations that threaten the continuity of government and a threat endangering public safety that is beyond the tactical response capability of law enforcement authorities as was the case in Mt. Elgon. The more likely scenario for employment of a tactical military force in a domestic situation is only when alleviating a public safety threat that requires capabilities exceeding the traditional law

[230] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defence College Journal*, Nairobi: National Defence College, 2006, pp. 11-17.
[231] RSP, *The role of the military in humanitarian work*, Oxford: The Refugee Studies Programme, 2008, p.2.

enforcement functions of arrest and prosecution. Only the President after consultations with senior military chiefs can authorize the employment of the military to active duty in a domestic situation. Although not expressly stated in the Constitution, it is a generally accepted constitutional interpretation that the President has authority under his Commander-in-Chief Powers to direct the conduct of military action to include the employment of a military force to repel a sudden attack against the nation of Kenya.[232]

If the President finds that the military should be called in a domestic situation outside the traditional military support to law enforcement, he may request the legislature to approve the use of the military. Normally the police authorities will specify to the President that the violence cannot be brought under control by police and other local law enforcement agencies. The President would then immediately issue an executive order authorizing the Minister of Defense to use active duty members of the armed forces to suppress the violence described in the proclamation. The Minister would be authorized to determine when the active military forces should be withdrawn from the area after completing their duty.[233]

The commander of the operation will directly consult with the police and use military intelligence in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the tactical situation. Technical assistance operations may run in concert with military tactical assistance planning. When presidential approval to use military force is granted, the commander of the military task force will begin coordination with the police on the ground for transfer of operational control of the operation to the military. Responsibility for the tactical phase of the operation is transferred to military authority when the police relinquish command and it is accepted by the military commander.[234]

[232] Cotton, "Peacebuilding in the Pacific: the Australian military experience", *Journal of Peace*, Conflict and Development, Issue 14, July 2009, p 23.
[233] Oral interview, KDF legal officer (Name withheld for confidentiality as he requested).
[234] Ibid.

5.4 Kenyan Military in Burnt Forest Peacebuilding

The Kenyan military was active in the Rift Valley during the post-election violence, most prominently by securing major roadways. They patrolled the highways to ensure safety of the road users who were threatened by violence.[235] The Kenyan military was praised in the aftermath of the clashes for not becoming involved in the propagation of violence and for its professionalism in adhering to its designated roles under civilian control.[236] The military was involved in various humanitarian tasks. These took the following main forms, protecting humanitarian relief workers, such as those representing international agencies and NGOs, from attacks by belligerents and generally from the dangers of the ethnic conflict in the North Rift. Apart from such protections, they also directly engaged in humanitarian action, for example, delivering humanitarian relief supplies, maintaining essential services and reconstructing damaged buildings, facilitating contacts between adversaries over such matters as resettlement of IDPs and visits to grave sites. This involved establishing certain designated areas ('safety zones') where a high degree of protection was intended for the inhabitants from the threat or use of force.[237]

Such tasks were a key part of the Kenyan military effort in Burnt Forest. Although these roles have not always been reflected in general statements about the purpose and character of Kenyan military, it must be acknowledged that the military has played a key role in peace building. Through the military presence in Burnt Forest many lives were saved and IDPs flows limited by some of these humanitarian actions. The military maintenance of supplies of medical facilities, water, as well as food and material brought in by land convoys did effectively mitigate many of the extreme cruelties of ethnic clashes in Burnt Forest. This achievement would have been impossible without Kenyan military. The military engaged in various operations to facilitate the peace efforts such as Operation Rudi Nyumbani.[238]

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[235] Waki, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, October 15, 2008, p 52, 378-379.

[236] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defence College Journal*, Nairobi: National Defence College, 2006, pp. 11-17.

[237] RSP, *The role of the military in humanitarian work*, Oxford: The Refugee Studies Programme, 2008, p. 2.

[238] RSP, *The role of the military in humanitarian work*, Oxford: The Refugee Studies Programme, 2008, p. 2.

5.4.1 Operation Rudi Nyumbani[239]

In early 2008, an estimated 650,000 Kenyans were displaced and a further 1,300 lost their lives during two months of intense communal violence after the announcement of presidential and parliamentary election results.[240] The President, Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU), was declared winner of the election against Raila Odinga, the leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in the presidential contest, despite the fact that PNU won fewer parliamentary seats. Both local and international observers questioned the results. Soon after the results were announced the country degenerated into violence between Kibaki's and Raila's supporters. Some families were displaced by post-election violence.[241]

Following the disturbances that arose after the general elections, the country experienced its worst humanitarian crisis since independence. Economic activities such as agriculture were seriously hampered as farmers moved away from their firms, posing long-term risks for the country's food security already threatened by drought and soaring fertilizer prices. During this crisis, the Ministry of State for Defence mobilized her resources to restore order. This mobilization came to be known as 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani'. Operation Rudi Nyumbani was developed by the government to resettle and reintegrate the IDPs as a means of enhancing development, alleviating suffering, improving Kenya's negative image, ensuring security and enhancing enjoyment of human rights. Judging from its design and implementation, Operation Rudi Nyumbani spearheaded by the Kenyan army had a positive contribution towards peacebuilding. The main activities were transportation of internally-displaced persons, provision of food supplies and reconstruction of schools. In the IDP camps the military also engaged the victims in counseling and treatment. This also provided congregations to whom peace messages and importance of co-existence could be emphasized. About 137,000 IDPs were transported back to their homes by members of the military.[242]This also included assisting travelers by providing periodic escorts to buses plying the Nakuru-Eldoret route on which Burnt

[239] Operation Rudi Nyumbani is Kiswahili for Operation Go back home.
[240] KNCHR, *On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence Final Report*, Nairobi: KNCHR 2008 p.63.
[241] DoD, "Kenya Army in Aid to Civilians", *Kenya Armed Forces Journal*, July 2008, p 11-17.
[242] Ibid.

Forest lies. The escorts were conducted by military sections and platoons[243] These comprised largely military youths.

Operation Rudi Nyumbani was meant to stitch the country back together. Packed buses with heavily armed soldiers in tow rumbled across a scarred landscape back to IDPs burned homes. It should be noted that the army did not just dumb the IDPs in the conflict region. They also initiated other operations that would guarantee that peace prevailed not only in Burnt Forest but in the entire North Rift Region. It is in this light that 'Operation Dumisha Amani'came into existence.[244]

5.4.2 Operation Dumisha Amani[245]

Operation 'Dumisha Amani' was necessitated by the fact that the security situation in North Rift Valley had deteriorated over the years. The region had been ravaged by raging politically related violence and cattle rustling activities between ethnic groups in this region. Cross border raids had also increased between the Kenyan and Ugandan pastoralists in the region. Among the major causes of conflict in these areas are political, proliferation of small arms, cattle rustling, competition for pasture and water, land and the limited presence of local administration. The government regularly called upon the Army to assist in containing the situation. The Army actively participated in resettling displaced people, recovery of stolen livestock, branding of livestock, construction of roads, medical assistance, reopening of schools and peace negotiations making the region to experience relative calm.[246] Some of these practices particularly those that involved branding of animals were meant to minimize stealing of livestock which caused conflict between other communities. Building of schools helped children to go back to school where they met from different back grounds. Schooling assisted in cementing relationships.

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[243] A section is the smallest infantry fighting unit of about nine soldiers. Three sections plus the section headquarter elements make up a platoon. Several platoons make up a company and several companies make up a battalion.

[244] DoD, "Kenya Army in Aid of Civilians", *Kenya Armed Forces Journal*, July 2008, pp. 11-17.

[245] Operation Dumisha Amani is Kiswahili for Operation Keep or maintain peace.

[246] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defence College Journal*, Nairobi: National Defense College, 2006, pp. 11-17.

5.4.3 Peace through Medical Campaign (MEDICAP)

The Kenya military promoted peace in Burnt Forest through offering medical services to the communities affected by the post election violence. The medical personnel have often taken outreach medical campaigns (MEDICAP) to various parts of the country. Campaigns against malaria, medical assistance to people displaced by election violence have been their humble contribution to the welfare of society. In the dental hygiene programme, the medical team went round in Burnt Forest teaching school children how to keep their teeth clean. In these efforts children from all walks of life or different communities came together therefore promoting peace and coexistence.[247] The military did not just stop at schools but went on to organize seminars and workshops which were aimed at benefiting the entire society. At these seminars, issues of peace and co-existence were emphasized. The choice to engage schools is borne out of the view that children would always carry goodwill messages to their families hence contributing extensively to peacebuilding.

5.4.4 Operation Okoa Maisha[248]

Though this was a military intervention to quell violence, it was a pacification effort to create an enabling environment to subsequently engage in matters of peacebuilding and in particular post-conflict reconstruction. Operation Okoa Maisha was launched in Mt. Elgon to flush out members of the SLDF. Although Operation Okoa Maisha took place in Mt. Elgon, it was important for peace in Burnt forest and the entire North Rift region. According to media interview with the SLDF leaders' wife the SLDF had intentions of creating an independent state which was to be headquartered in Eldoret. Furthermore, during conflict in Mt. Elgon many people were displaced to as far as Eldoret disturbing the peace in the region. The operation which started on the 10th of March 2008 main objective was to arrest and bring to justice persons responsible for the crimes committed in this area, recover all illegally held firearms, create an enabling environment for the population to cooperate with the Police in the investigation of serious crimes reported

[247] DoD, "Kenya Army in Aid of Civilians", *Kenya Armed Forces Journal*, July 2008, pp. 11-17.
[248] Operation Okoa Maisha is Kiswahili for Operation Save Lives.

without fear of retribution, prevent commission of further crimes in the area and restore law and order in the region.[249]

The Operation led to the arrest of over 1735 suspected persons, 1324 were released after interrogation, 37 were detained in custody pending further investigations and 374 were charged in court with the relevant criminal offences. The army also assisted in recovery of illegally held firearms which had been used to terrorize not only the citizens of Mt. Elgon but the entire North Rift in which Burnt Forest is found. 41 AK47 rifles and over 1000 (1027) rounds of assorted ammunition, hand grenades and other incendiary materials were recovered. The army registered the greatest success in building peace by enabling people cooperation between the locals and the security agents. For example, on the 2nd of April 2008, a gang of six bandits from a local criminal gang abducted 3 married women and forced them to carry potatoes into the forest. They warned the relatives of the poor women not to report to security officers on patrol.[250]

Unfortunately for them and fortunately for their victims, the local population had been emboldened by firm action by Operation Okoa Maisha. No sooner had they turned their backs than a member of public rushed and reported to security officers on patrol. The gang was immediately pursued and found in a river bed subjecting the women to inhuman torture. Their attempt to resist arrest by firing at the security team led to a shootout. Three of the assailants were fatally injured and 2 AK47 rifles loaded with 43 rounds of live ammunition were recovered. Since the operation started no case of murder, rape, extortion, stealing of livestock has been reported in the region. Several schools in the area which had been closed down were reopened and swung fully operational and teachers who had fled the area reported back to their working stations.[251]

[249] DoD, "Kenya Army in Aid of Civilians", *Kenya Armed Forces Journal,* July 2008, pp. 11-17.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Ibid.

5.5 International Army in reconstruction

In the aftermath of Kenya's December 2007 to January 2008 post election violence; U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) teams began a series of school rehabilitation projects in Burnt Forest region. The post election conflict had completely disrupted the people's economic life. Markets and public places were destroyed, and schools were burned to the ground. The destroyed public places were central to the survival of the communities living in Burnt Forest. The U.S. and Kenyan governments through their militaries initiated efforts to assist the people return to normal way of living. The army recognized that getting children back into school, particularly where multiple ethnic communities attended the same schools, would provide an important step for community healing. The U. S. Army teams' in conjunction with the Kenya Army engaged in the school rehabilitation projects from 2008 to 2010 in Kenya's Burnt Forest area.[252]

Over the course of approximately 2 years (April 2008– July 2010), four different U. S. Army teams supported the rehabilitation or reconstruction of facilities at 14 schools, mostly in and around Burnt Forest that included Rukoine primary and secondary schools and Rurigi secondary schools.[253]When these efforts were just beginning in mid-2008, Burnt Forest and the entire Rift Valley were still highly insecure and relations among the different communities were still tense.[254]

The U.S. military began school rehabilitation and reconstruction in 2008. Civil Affairs (CA) teams facilitated the provision of resources to build new classrooms, teachers' quarters, administration buildings, and secure storage for school compounds. These efforts were an important step in preparing local schools shared public institutions to reopen. By extension, the CA teamwork also encouraged displaced persons to return to their home communities and farms and get their children back into school. The U.S. military was received by the Burnt Forest locals unanimously. The communities were still recovering from trauma and had acute needs related to certain events. The military

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[252] Duncan Rogers, "U.S. military convoy rolls through Rift Valley", in *New York Times,* July, 2010, p. 18.
[253] Oral interview, Francis Ngetich, Youth leader, Wareng Youth initiative, Burnt Forest. 18/10/2011.
[254] NDC, "The Role of the Military in Diplomacy: A Perspective", in *National Defence College Journal,* Nairobi: National Defence College, 2006, pp. 11-17.

brought tangible projects in response to these issues. The people also felt trust in the Americans who even in peace time have an existing strong, positive relationship with the communities living in Burnt Forest area of Kenya. Apart from rehabilitating the destroyed infrastructure, the military represented a trusted presence in an insecure situation.[255]

The highly visible structures and obvious utility of the schools were much appreciated. Schools were commonly described as a public good, a way to affect change in the future of Kenya, opportunities for peace-building between communities, and important steps toward stability. The people of Burnt Forest felt they were safe because the military team was present. The strong feeling on the ground was that some projects were destroyed because they were associated by some leaders and therefore if the military built them, people would not try to destroy them. The locals frequently recounted that having the military in Burnt Forest made it safe. In some villages the military was either the first or among the first to arrive. Being the first to arrive to help in an unstable situation gained credibility and trust among community members.[256]

5.6 Local People's View on the Role of the Military in Burnt Forest

The nature of complex peacebuilding and reconstruction missions in Burnt Forest increasingly forced the military and civilian actors to operate in the same space at the same time thereby challenging their ability to remain impartial, neutral and independent. The purpose of this section is to explore the people's perspective on the role of the military in peacebuilding picking the arguement from the fact that there are cultural, organizational, operational, and normative differences between civilian and military. Cooperation between the civilian and military elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need. At the outset, civilian in Burnt forest and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing the conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures. Initially, civil-military relationships were formed in the

[255] Rogers, "U.S. military convoy rolls through Rift Valley", in *New York Times*, July, 2010, p. 18
[256] Oral interview, Col. Akhulia Job, officer in-charge of the Armed Forces Environmental Programme, Defence headquarters, 23/04/2011.

field, when troops stepped in to fill gaps in civilian capabilities. In response to the growing complexity of operational requirements, the Kenyan state has been increasingly recognizing the intensifying working relationship between military and civilian actors.[257]

In essence, civil military cooperation in stability operations in Burnt Forest included three core functions namely liaison between the military and all civilian actors in the area of operation, assistance to the civilian environment, and support to the force. For instance, during implementation of the Peace Accord provisions of settling IDPs, military personnel coordinated with the Implementation Force for increased security presence when cargo of a strategic nature and IDPs were transported through contested territory and worked closely with a number of civilian agencies to install and facilitate the repair and reconstruction of roads and bridges, and perform periodic joint environmental inspections of the local water supply.[258]

5.7 Civilian Dilemmas

Recognizing the potential of military presence for undermining the neutrality and independence of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, the ICRC began already in the early 1990s to advocate the concept of humanitarian space which describes the ability of humanitarian agencies to "work independently and impartially without fear of attack in pursuit of the humanitarian imperative. This means they are free to assist populations in need, and are not constrained by political or physical barriers to their work.[259] In theory at least, the military becomes involved in humanitarian operations only in extremis, where people are dying, or at risk of dying, and only the military can safe them.[260] In practice, however, the civilian population in Burnt Forest was especially concerned with military

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[257] Volker Franke "The Peacebuilding Dilema: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations", *International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2006*

[258] Oral interview, Col. Akhulia, Nairobi, DoD.

[259] Sida, Lewis. 2005. "Challenges to Humanitarian Space: A Review of Humanitarian Issues related to the UN integrated Mission in Liberia and to the Relationship between Humanitarian and Military Actors in Liberia." Study for the Humanitarian Information Center. <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/Liberia/infocentre/general/docs/Challenges%20to%20humanitarian%20space%20in%20Li beria.pdf> Accessed April 6, 2006, p. 5

[260] *Ibid*

forces undertaking assistance work as part of their strategy to win the hearts and minds of the local population.[261]

The military objectives behind this strategy included enhancing force protection and information gathering as a result of gaining the people's trust. The military's hearts and minds approach easily resulted in a confusion of the role of humanitarian agencies and military forces on the ground. The problem observed, was that while the military has emphasized the need for 'complementarities' in this new situation, the local population of Burnt Forest groups have been wary of its impact on their ability to remain impartial, neutral, and independent.[262] Military encroachment on humanitarian space is viewed critically not only by civilian relief providers. Peacebuilding as a core operational responsibility is also contentious within the military establishment.

Conducting interviews with local people in Burnt Forest and humanitarian aid officials with experience on the ground found major differences in institutional cultures. Generally, they argued, that militaries are paid, trained and equipped to use organized and regulated violence to accomplish objectives set by the government. The military's institutional culture is characterized by considerable investments in human resources management, including extensive training at all levels, redundancy of staff, lessons learned exercises, and, where possible, well rehearsed responses in the field. By contrast, civilians tend to be less hierarchical, place higher priority on process, how objectives are accomplished, and generally view redundancy as needless duplication of efforts.

These cultural differences contribute not only to discrepant mutual expectations, but, at times, also to negative perceptions of members of the other group. Military units, by their very nature, are trained to respond to and operate in a low context culture relying on directives, specific orders, and standard operating procedures that are communicated clearly down the hierarchy. This stands in stark contrast to the high context cultural and operational requirements of complex emergencies where nonverbal signals, family or

[261] Oral interview, Jane Wanjiku, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.
[262] Oral interview, Samuel Rubia, Keses, 26/12/2010.

tribal status, age, gender, or ethnic differences, or social roles and expectations carry a lot of meaning.[263]

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has endeavoured to bring to the fore the legality of military intervention in local conflicts by highlighting the role the Kenyan military played in Burnt Forest during the conflicts that affected the area. It is these reconstruction efforts that form a firm basis upon which peacebuilding thrives. This augments Galtung's transcend method within which this study operates. Indeed engagement of the military youth as new dimension in peacebuilding is important in order for positive peace to be realized. In this vein the involvement of military youth in peacebuiding in Burnt Forest provides a new dimension to the study of the important role of the youth not only as perpetrators and victims, but also as significant in peacebuilding.

[263] Oral interview, Eunice Wambui, Kamuyu Farm, 27/12/2010.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This project was conceptualized around the notion of youth as agents of peacebuilding. It set out to negate the view that youth are distrustful and violent. While evidence has it that youth are largely at the core of violent conflict this project has demonstrated that when their energies are channeled to meaningful courses the youth can be a critical source of peace. Significantly this study set out to investigate the role of the youth in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. It is against this notion that this study provides a departure by viewing youth as agents of peace as evidenced in Burnt Forest. This perception challenges the traditional images of youth in violent conflicts. As opposed to viewing youth as a period of life in which violent behavior is something to be channeled and checked a re-conceptualization of the qualities of youth that is seen as essential to the challenges of building peace has been emphasized by this study.

In order to achieve this focus the study brought on board the historical background of Burnt Forest, looking at the peopling of Burnt Forest, the relations that led to conflicts, their causes and course. It is by doing this that the research intended to extrapolate that there has been need for peacebuilding because there has been conflict. The research took into cognizance the fact that since the conflicts of 1991, there have been efforts towards peace but more significantly the unexplored role of youth has been brought to the fore. The research therefore set out to realize three objectives first, to investigate peacebuilding efforts in Burnt Forest after the conflicts, 1992-2010, secondly, to assess the involvement of youth in peacebuilding in Burnt Forest and thirdly, to evaluate Military youth participation in the post-conflict reconstruction in Burnt Forest in the period under study.

The research revealed that settlement in Burnt Forest was informed by the desire of the communities search for economic opportunities which most people will do because they want to make themselves and their children comfortable in a home. It is this economic desire and an amalgamation of issues, both political and social, some interdependent, that led to the conflicts in Burnt Forest. The issue of settlement in this area is significant

because it set the background to the conflict hence the need for peace efforts in Burnt Forest.

The conflict and relations in Burnt Forest are as old as the history of the advocacy of multiparty politics in Kenya. This argument is informed by the way issues like land and ethnicity have been used for political expediency-regime after regime since independence. This explains the reason why communities that have hitherto lived peacefully as neighbours have risen up in arms against each other during electioneering periods.

Indeed this research contends that during the period under study there have always been peace efforts in Burnt Forest. The international community through the American government constructed the Burnt Forest market which is a base for economic activities. African Development Bank assisted farmers with water storage tanks. This has assisted communities in Burnt Forest to alleviate the problem of water. The government has increased policing by setting up a police post at Kiambaa to enhance security. The government has also increased the number of security personnel serving in the area, particularly the regular police and the administration police. Women, some of whom fall in the definition of youth, have played important roles right from peacemaking to peacebuilding. They have been used by NGOs in Burnt Forest in Counselling and modeling their children in peace matters. These among other efforts add value to the intent of this study.

This study observes that in Burnt Forest while schools are at least partially charged with the task of communicating and transferring societal norms and expectations, they are naturally important breeding grounds for both war and peace. Through their schooling experience, youth emerge prepared to re-generate conflicts or move beyond them. Peace-oriented behaviors and attitudes, similar to conflict-oriented behaviors and attitudes, can, at least partially, be learned. This is why peace education takes a centre stage be it in schools, churches, Barasas and even during sporting events as demonstrated by this study.

This study revealed that the youth are in fact dynamic agents of change, capable of pushing the societies towards peace. In Burnt Forest youth have been instrumental in reconciliation, relationship building, and reconstruction. In relationship building Burnt Forest youth have engaged in solidarity visits, sporting activities, peace debates, engaged in exchange programmes, continued to participate in and acknowledge intermarriages and have formed development and welfare groupings that are beyond ethnic considerations. Reconciliation being a key dimension of peacebuilding has witnessed youth participate in mediation and youth choirs. Youth in Burnt Forest have demonstrated their ability in peacebuilding by engaging in post conflict reconstruction of physical facilities like roads, schools and administration facilities. They have also engaged in income generating activities like poultry, livestock keeping and even motorcycle business. All this youth efforts are geared towards addressing the underlying economic issues like poverty.

As the study revealed, it is important to reemphasize that, for the people living in Burnt Forest, peace is equivalent to health, wellbeing and freshness and an enemy of poverty, insecurity, unemployment and waywardness. Burnt Forest youth's roles as peace makers were put to effective use in peace building and conflict resolutions. The study revealed another significant and peculiar category of the youth, this is the military youth. The study has attempted to move away from the usual negative depiction of the military as rapists and drunkards instead shown that their role in post conflict reconstruction indeed contributed to peacebuilding in Burnt Forest. As a result, particularly in societies emerging out of protracted conflict where stability is absolutely necessary for social reconstruction, targeting military youth as agents of peacebuilding takes particular importance as evidenced by the study.

The chapter also provides a conceptual overview of a nonviolent peacebuilding and conflict transformation approach, mostly based on the work of Johan Galtung and his "transcend" method which means creating a new type of reality by using something that potentially was there to achieve peace. In this line of argument, the youth who are subject of this study have been in Burnt Forest and been associated with violence however, this study brings them out as a new instrument of achieving peace.

Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how a society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include an active and egalitarian civil society, inclusive democratic political structures and processes and open and accountable government institutions. It also encompasses inclusivity of the societal members. Therefore the engagement of youth in Burnt Forest provides a significant paradigm for positive peace. This study therefore achieved its goals.

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Grace Njeri, Leinguse Location, Keses, 26/12/2010.

James Kariuki, Kiamba Farm, 28/12/2010.

James Nyangao Arisi, Lurugi Farm, Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.

Jane Wairimu a resident in Burnt Forest, 27/12/2010.

Jane Wanjiku, Burnt Forest Town, 25/12/2010.

John Mwangi, Rukoine Farm, 28/12/2010.

Joseph Maina Kinyua, Kamuyu, 27/12/2010.

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APPENDIX A

Above,the reseacher (centre) and Mr Masika (in white shirt) after a focused group discussion at Kiambaa and below members of the Intercommunity Peace and Development committee.

Kenya Army Corps of transport conveyed internally displaced persons back to their original homes during 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani'.

These photographs show the participation of the Kenya Defence Forces in returning IDPs back to their homes for peacebuilding to start.



Photograph indicating the Kenya army medical unit treating children after a medical seminar. Below one of the projects initiated through partnership in which the youth participated

Photograph indicating the Kenya army medical unit treating children after a medical seminar. Below one of the projects initiated through partnership in which the youth participated





These two photographs show some of the ways the NGOs and international community helped in supporting livelihoods. This is in an effort to address some of the causes of conflict

Joseph Mutai (left) got a calf in the peace project. The cows remind recipients of their vows not to fight.

A destroyed building at Rurigi Secondary School in Burnt Forest and below the school building after reconstruction. The youth participated in the reconstruction

APPENDIX B

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

MASTERS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES

Dear respondent, I am a masters student from the University of Nairobi, pursuing my masters degree, in Armed Conflict and Peace studies at the University of Nairobi. I request the information that will assist me complete the study. Information is strictly for academic purposes and if anonymity is requested, I will do observe it. Thanks in advance.

PART ONE

Name ..... Age

District.....Division

Location Date

PART TWO

1. What is the name of your district?
2. Why the district is called so?
3. Who are the indigenous inhabitants of this region
4. When did they settle here?
5. Who are the current inhabitants of this region
6. Where did they come from and when?
7. Why do you think they come?

PART THREE

8. In your opinion why do you think there is a conflict in this region?
9. What causes the conflict?
10. Who are the main actors in the conflict?
11. Do the youth play any role in the conflict?
12. Which one?
13. Why do they play these roles if any?

PART FOUR

PEACE BUILDING

14. Has there been any efforts to restore peace in during conflict?
15. Which efforts?
16. Who participated in these efforts to restore peace?
17. Were the youth involved in peace- building?
18. How were they involved?
19. Did they have any impact on peace building?
20. How did they impact?
21. Did the security agents play any role in peace building?
22. Which group of the security agent (eg. Army, police or AP.)

i. Army

ii. Police

iii. Administration police

23. How else can the youth be involved in peace building?