

**THE YOUTH IN PROCESSES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF
SOMALIA 2000-2011**

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R50/75474/2009

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, TO THE INSTITUTE OF
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)**

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

NOVEMBER, 2012

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DECLARATION

This research project is my own work and has not been presented to any other university.

Signature.....

Date.....17th November 2012.....

Joyce Kathambi Muchena

This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.

Signature.....

Date.....17/11/2012.....

Dr. Ibrahim Farah

ABSTRACT

Somalia has witnessed one of the longest, most intractable and unrelenting conflicts in the world for over two decades. The first two decades following the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, witnessed an avalanche of largely uncoordinated initiatives and interventions aimed at foiling the conflict, which seemed to conspire with natural disasters to consume the country. Ranging from the failed attempts by the United Nations and the United States of America to pacify the state of affairs via military means, to humanitarian and development actors, all eyes seemed to be on Somalia, which has been seen by many as the sick man of the Horn of Africa region. The first decade of this millennium witnessed a growing concern from both local and international actors and what appeared to be a resolve that something needed to be done to bring this futile conflict to an end. Somaliland has continued with the quest for international recognition since declaring her autonomy in 1991. Puntland has achieved a measure of normalcy since its formation in 1998 but also remains connected to the efforts aimed at rebuilding the Republic of Somalia. It is within the South and Central regions of Somalia where violent conflict has devastated communities with leadership being either weak or non-existence for most of the period since 1991. Most peace processes undertaken in or out of the country have mainly focused on the issues and actors from these South and Central areas. A lot of locally driven efforts are credited for the relative peace enjoyed by Somaliland and Puntland. While the agency of various actors to the conflict and conflict management processes has been acknowledged, almost taken for granted, is the capacity of young people to contribute positively to the outcomes of these processes. This seems to have continued without any questions as there are unwritten societal norms and policies that guide the behavior, entitlements and responsibilities of different individuals within the Somali Society. This study was concerned with how the youth (both young men and women) experienced and engaged with, if at all, the processes that were aimed at managing the conflicts that afflict their communities and the country at large. The study involved secondary and primary data collection and analysis with key informant interviews, self administered questionnaires and focus group discussions with Somali youth aged between 18 and 35. Most respondents in this study identified more barriers to than the enabling factors. Education, skills building and resources (employment creation and other livelihood opportunities) were highlighted as the factors that had the highest impact of on how the youth participate or fail to participate in these processes. The study found out that in the recent years, there has been an increase in the focus on youth development, with Somaliland and Puntland polities at least having drafted policies that address youth issues. A deliberate and coordinated approach to developing young people in Somalia is seen as an immediate prerequisite for their effective participation in civic processes including conflict management.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACRWC	-	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
APD	-	Academy for Peace and Development
ARS	-	Alliance for Re-libration of Somalia
AU	-	African Union
CHD	-	Center for Humanitarian Dialogue
CM	-	Conflict Management
CRC	-	Convention on the Rights of Children
CRD	-	Center for Research and Development
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
GoNU	-	Government of National Unity
ICG	-	International Crisis Group
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
NWZ	-	North West Zone (Somaliland)
NEZ	-	North East Zone (Puntland)
PDRC	-	Puntland Development Research Center
RRA	-	Rahanwyne Resistance Army
SNF	-	Somali National Front
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	-	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRRC	-	Somali Reconciliation and Restore Council

SSDF	-	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	-	Somali Youth League
TNG	-	Transitional National Government
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
UIC	-	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	-	United Nations
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly
UNITAF	-	Unified Task Force
UNOPS	-	United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNOHCHR	-	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operations in Somalia
USC	-	United Somali Congress

DEDICATION

To my late father, Sereno Muchena and my mother Lucy Muchena who taught my siblings and I the true meaning of a peaceful co-existence by example; and to my sons Victor and Fadhili.

To all Somalis of goodwill for their tireless efforts in search of a sustainable peace.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would be infeasible to list all those from whose advice and assistance I benefited in this work. Yet this study would be incomplete if I fail to mention certain persons and groups of people without whose advice and assistance the study would have been much poorer.

Foremost I am grateful to God the Lord Almighty for his providence and protection without which every effort would have been in vain.

To my family for their staying moral support, without which, the long hours that went into both the coursework and the writing of this project, would have been unbearable. To my two lovely sons, Victor and Fadhili, my nephew Dicken and my house manager Cicyline for being there and often making jokes about my unfinished homework; you always renewed my energy. To all the Muchenas out there who, even without knowing it, eased the pressure of the studies through their obvious love and concern.

I am indebted, greatly, to my supervisor Dr. Farah Ibrahim for his tireless support. When other commitments seemed to push this work into the back seat, it was he who through his professional support, made this product appear all very doable. To the entire staff at the University of Nairobi with a special mention to the nice staff at IDIS, for their tireless efforts in shaping me up to achieve this in various ways. Special thanks go to my fellow classmates who graduated in 2011 and took it upon themselves to urge me onto the finish line.

This work would not have been possible without the generous support of all the fantastic and peace loving Somali youth, women and elders that I spoke to and interviewed for this research. I reserve special accolades for Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame (aka Hadraawi) for granting me an interview and sharing invaluable gems of wisdom on this topic.

To all the colleagues at Oxfam in Somalia Programme and many other friends working in Somalia for the many times we discussed Somalia and the issues affecting young Somalis in-country and in the Diaspora, for your knowledge and the commitment to making a difference through various civil society capacity building programmes. Last but not least to Abdulrahman Wandati for proofreading my work.

May God all of you and keep you well.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0. Background of the Study

Since the 1991 fall of the Somali government, the various factions seeking the top leadership of the country in Mogadishu have failed to establish themselves into an authority accepted by all the people of Somalia. This reduced the country into what social anthropologists describe as acephalous or lacking of formal leadership or permanent political authority¹. One part of the former state, Somaliland, also referred to as the North West Zone, has since declared itself independent from the rest. Its neighboring territory, Puntland also known as the North East Zone, set up a semi-autonomous polity albeit insisting that it is still part of the whole. The remaining regions that form the Southern and Central regions of the country continue to look to Mogadishu as their capital in spite of some of them running some form or other of administrations at the local levels. Two new administrations (Gal-Mudug and Jubbaland) which emerged in Puntland and South Central respectively are examples of recent political entities to declare an autonomous existence from the centralized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) then under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.

Puntland, though identifying itself as part of any future polity along the internationally recognized borders of Somalia, has registered stability and peace at a more sustainable level than Mogadishu and other cities of the South-Central regions that share

¹ Jary D. and Jary J, *The Dictionary of Sociology*, 2nd edition, Harper Collins Publishers, Glasgow, 1995 pp3

with it the dream of a resuscitated Somalia. Somaliland - the break-away region which marked her twenty years of 'independence' in May 2011- has not minced any words in emphasizing her intention to secede from the whole. With that resolve, Somaliland has systematically prevailed over conflicts and consolidated the peace negotiated in the early period of the Civil War. Through a number of presidential and municipal elections both polities have created democratic institutions though a bit weak. Somaliland still lacks international recognition and is on a diplomatic offensive to attain it. Puntland on the other hand does not seek to secede from the TFG.

There a series of Peace and Reconciliation Conferences and other forums, a majority of these Conferences have been held within Somalia(for instance the Borama,,Garowe,Mudug-Galmudug peace processes) while most of the internationally-led processes were held in other countries-the most significant being the Conferences in Djibouti (2000 and 2008/2009) and Kenya (2002-2004). Aside from the political actors, there is also a number of Somali Civil Society organizations (CSOs), including women, the youth, artists, intellectuals and academics have also focused on what can be viewed as a genuine reconciliation of the Somali People that goes beyond power sharing deals among the ruling elite. The Internationally-led Somali peace and reconciliation processes have been implemented and even documented from the perspective of power-politics and have thereby highlighted the role of the political players and in the processes underreported and /or ignored the contributions and in some cases the accomplishment of the other actors in securing agreements and peaceful resolutions. This for instance, includes the role played by women not just as providers of logistical support to the peace processes but as pressure groups in engendering dialogue and positive outcomes in the processes.

This study sought to explore the role played by the Somali youth in the various local and international processes aimed at containing and resolving the conflict in Somalia between 2000 and 2011. The study also highlighted achievements made and challenges encountered by young people in the process. The study interrogated at least three local initiatives that took place in various parts of Somalia, that is the Borama, Garowe and Mudug-Galmudug peace processes and three international conferences that took place in Djibouti (2000 and 2008/2009) and in Kenya (2002 – 2004).

1.1. Problem Statement

The conflict in Somalia has been one of the most protracted in the world with both internal and external actors seeking to define it and find a lasting solution and a solid political future for the country and its people. While Somalia has become almost synonymous with violence, the desire for a peaceful resolution has equally interested and occupied both actors perhaps in even greater proportions. Although the protagonists have been recognized as the principals and main target of various conflict management approaches, the influence, leverage and impact that other social groups bring upon them to give peace a chance remain grossly unaccounted for. While the role of interest groups such as women has been acknowledged and documented in conference reports and academic literature² to some extent the contribution of young Somalis to the conflict management processes and their outcomes remains largely unrecognized.

² See for instance, Warsame A.M. *Queens without Crowns: Somaliland women are changing roles in peace building*. LPI ISBN 91-87748-52-5; UNESCO *Peace and Peace in Africa: Case Studied of Traditional Conflict Resolution Practices*, Printed in France, 2003; Timmons D.M., *The sixth Clan-Women organize for peace in Somalia: A Review of Published Literature*, University for Peace, 2004; Tabifor M. N. *A Critical Analysis of the role of women in Peace building: A case study of Burundi and Somalia*, UON, IDIS, MA Thesis October 2001

Many authors have dealt with various aspects of the conflict in Somalia conflict;. Warsame (2003) studied the role of women in the peace building efforts concluding that religious and cultural setting in Somali was a major factor that affects how women participate in the efforts. Mwangi (2006) in the study of contemporary conflicts in Africa observed that the wealth of a nation in Africa was the source of political power implying that the poor do not get a chance in peacemaking efforts. Other scholars to study conflict in Africa include Sommers (2003) who studied youth and conflicts in Africa in general concluding that they were the foot soldiers with no say whatsoever; Galtung (2002) studying conflicts in Africa has concluded that the intercultural mix of various peoples needed harmonizing in order to address conflicts across the African continent. Tongeren (2005) writing on people building peace in success story of civil wars concluded that politics and the local people played a crucial role in settling civil wars and conflicts³.

These authors have tended to concentrate their studies on the political and cultural differences. Similarly, there is a group that has focused on resources control and foreign influence on the African development. This therefore creates a gap in which youth have not been studied to gauge their contributions to the conflict and peacemaking processes. Again, most of the above studies have mainly focused on the period just before and right after the regime of 1991, leaving out the years between 2000 and 2011, which is a more recent period, a gap that this study seeks to fill. Following the many conferences and peace workshops that have taken place since 2000 on Somalia, and held in Djibouti,

³ Sommers M., *Youth and conflict: A Brief Review of Available Literature*: (Equip 3/Youth Trust, 2006); Timmons D.M., *The sixth Clan-Women organize for peace in Somalia: A Review of Published Literature*, University for Peace, 2004; Tongeren V.P., et al (eds) *People building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Lynne Reiner (Publishers 2005) pp 11

Kenya, Uganda and London, involvement of youth has gained prominence. Not only was the study of youth as actors in conflict management generally not in the mainstream academic lexicon, but youth in Somalia and the position they find themselves in vis-à-vis the conflict and conflict management processes have yet to be critically examined.

The question that this research sought to answer is, is there a critical role for the youth in managing conflicts in Somalia?

1.2. Objectives of the Research

1.2.1 Overall objective

1. To track and evaluate the 'footprints' in the search for sustainable peace in Somalia between 2000 and 2011.

1.2.2 Specific objectives

1. To locate the role, scope and benefits of participation of the youth in the Conflict Management processes
2. To identify and outline the enablers and obstacles to the effective participation of Somali Youth in the Conferences and other local Conflict Management processes
3. To highlight the contribution of Somali Youth in the Peace and Reconciliation conferences that took place in Borama,,Garowe,Mudug-Galmudug, Djibouti (2000 and 2008/2009) and Kenya 2002-2004)

1.3. Justification

Youth as a category of Society and as a generational marker complete with peculiarities and idiosyncrasies has been subjects of sociological studies all over the world over the years- mostly from the perspective of cultural *otherness*. Of particular concern are the present youths who can be said to understand clearly issues of the happening in the decade

2000-2011 period. In this respect, literature in these areas has tended to explain youth behavior in relation to external stimuli or as a response to physical and emotional developments. The points of convergence in these studies have generally tended to depict youth either as passive victims of trauma or active security threats⁴. Conflict and Peace-building as themes have been significantly studied with impressive amounts of literature produced and corresponding policy interventions undertaken. Most literature in this area has characterized youth as active participants in conflicts either as perpetrators or victims – but mostly amongst the foot soldiers.

Considering that most youth get involved in conflicts, and suffer the adverse effects, it goes without saying that they can and do play a van role in the eradication of these conflicts. However, literature casting youth as conflict managers remains limited and not adequately publicized. Youth in conflict management as a theme of academic inquiry seems to run against the grain and almost an oxymoron with very slim chances of occurrence. Perhaps due to the old adage of wisdom residing with the elderly or elders⁵, very little thought is directed towards the ability – nay – willingness of young people to expend energies and efforts towards reconciling people in conflict. Profilled as central actors in conflicts, their image as peacemakers is yet to clearly assume visual stability among most academics.

Yet, some relatively young persons have been awarded for their efforts in peace building – efforts certainly expended during their most active youthful years⁶. This

⁴ Sommers M., *Youth and conflict: A Brief Review of Available Literature:* (Equip 3/Youth Trust, 2006) p5

⁵ According to Lewis I. the term 'elders' in Somalia connotes all adult men who also control all clan affairs.

⁶ For instance, in 2005 Fatmire Feka – an 18 year old girl from Kosovo - was among one of the 1,000 women nominated for the collective Nobel Peace prize and in 2009 the Kids for Peace project was the winner of the

research therefore sought to challenge the age – old perception which assigns the work of conflict management and reconciliation exclusively to the elders – and male ones at that in the largely patrilineal society that is Somalia⁷ like many other (African) Societies. The study sought to characterize the contribution made by the youth during the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conferences in Djibouti and Kenya as Peace building – within the meaning of the contemporary definitions of conflict management. Most importantly, the study defined the space and meeting point for youth and conflict management in an engagement that respects the characteristics of Youth and their contributions to these processes.

A clear highlight of youth specific impetus to conflict management, that this study generated, could define the policy options for direct involvement of young people in conflict management. For over 20 years, Somalia has not had a state in the classical sense of the word. All Somalis currently aged 20 and living in Somalia have no experience of a state and those aged 35 were only about 15 years old when the Somali state disintegrated. It is very well possible to argue that there are young people in Somalia who have not experienced a society without armed violence. However, many a young people in Somalia have also featured in the many peace-related activities some that have been reported in the media or written about and many others that may not have received any such attention. The Djibouti (2000), Djibouti (2008/2009) and the Eldoret/Mbagathi Peace Processes produced the Transitional National Government (TNG), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

World Vision International Peace prize. Fatmire had in 2002 given the idea of the kids for peace clubs to a World Vision staff member.

⁷ Bulhan H.A., *Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crises in Somali Politics and Society*, Tayosan International Publishing, Maryland, 2008, pp 9

and the Government of National Unity (GoNU). Young people contributed significantly in the Conferences at various levels using various identities. Some of the young people were even elected or appointed to occupy significant positions.

Research in any field of study affects epistemology in the area under inquiry. Both local and international policy making processes will benefit from this piece of work that seeks to bring out the youth as the axis of peace in Somalia. This study documented in a systematic manner the young people's contributions to, motivations for, and approaches to peace participation with a specific focus on the Djibouti and Kenya Peace and Reconciliation Conferences. The Study also highlighted the enablers and obstacles to their participation and finally assessed the outcomes of the participation by young people in the Conferences in the short and medium terms. For Somali young peace builders such documentation could form part of recorded recognition of their contribution to the process which in turn could motivate them to apply themselves even more pro-actively in the search of peace in their country. No such study or documentation has been undertaken in the past and therefore, findings of this study could not only be a contribution towards building up knowledge base in this area but are also expected to provide useful insights to policy makers and interlocutors in future Somali reconciliation Processes.

This study was also against the backdrop that young Somalis in the Diaspora have managed to get good education and can and do provide valuable intellectual resources in the resolutions of conflict and reconstruction process. The anonymity of youth in conflict management processes in light of the foregoing therefore merits research. If the youth (Diaspora) have something (intellectual resources) to bring to the conflict management

table, how come their presence has not been visible as such? Has their story been told? This in a sense further justifies this study. The choice of study case period was 2000-2011 and was necessitated by the need to include a period in which technology has played a big role in preservation on conflict history. This period was also one in which youth have been actively involved in the conflict as opposed to the previous decades in which mainly the adults groups were the major actors

1.4. Literature Review

Multiple sources including published and unpublished research by academics, studies undertaken by non-governmental organizations, think tanks and international organizations, as well reports on Somalia were reviewed. Firstly literature on conflict including definitions and typology is presented, followed by literature on conflict management. A review of literature on the Somali conflict is also done as well as that of Youth. Finally, literature on youth in conflict management is presented in relation to the various conflict management processes in and on Somalia.

1.4.1. Literature on Conflict

Conflict as a terminology defies a simple and straight forward definition. A conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something⁸ or as a result of pursuance of incompatible goals by different groups⁹. Coser defines conflict as,

⁸ Mitchell C.R., *The Structure of International Conflict*: Macmillan, London 1998 pp 15-25 in Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 3-13. See also Galtung J., *Rethinking Conflict: the Cultural Approach*, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project, (Council of Europe, 2002) pp 5

“a contest over values and demands to limited status, power and resources in which the aims of the rival are to off-set, ruin or get rid of their rivals”

Potential for Conflict exists in all aspects of life¹⁰ and there is general consensus that conflict is not only ubiquitous and endemic but also primordial¹¹. Galtung argues that words such as *violence, strife, exploitation or at least conflict* are more frequent in defining the non-harmonious world that we live in¹². Dahrendorf presents the society as *Janus-headed* or as having two faces looking in the opposite direction which vividly illustrates conflict and integration as two sides of the same coin, that is, the society. He asserts that potential conflicts become actual conflicts to the extent that opposing groups become mobilized¹³. Most conflict is also about attitudes ranging from boiling hatred to apathy¹⁴ which is perceived as for instance friendship, cooperation, hostility, envy, anger aggressiveness are perceived¹⁵. In this sense it subjective as it about values and perceptions.¹⁶

Conflict is further understood through a definition that distinguishes armed conflict that is violent and deadly from the non-violent type that can sometimes also be viewed

⁹ Ramsbotham O. et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. Polity Press, Cambridge 2006, 2nd ed pp 30

¹⁰ Tongeren V.P., et al (eds) *People building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Lynne Reiner (Publishers 2005) pp 11

¹¹ For various perspectives on this see, among others, Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006; Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972; Galtung J., *Rethinking Conflict: the Cultural Approach, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, (Council of Europe, 2002; Dahrendorf R. 'On the Origin of Inequality Among Men', pp 151-178, in Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society*. Stanford: Stanford University press, 1968.

¹² Galtung J., *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, International Peace Institute, Oslo 1978, pp167

¹³ Dahrendorf R., 'On the Origin of Inequality Among Men', pp 151-178, in Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society*. Stanford: Stanford University press, 1968.

¹⁴ Galtung J., *Rethinking Conflict: the Cultural Approach, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, (Council of Europe, 2002) pp 6

¹⁵ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 55

¹⁶ *Ibid* pp 153

positively¹⁷. Thus conflict can be either overt evidenced by hostile behavior or violence or it can structural¹⁸ in the sense that it is embedded in the structure of relationships and its victims may be experiencing the negative effects without realizing¹⁹. Conflict also happens at various levels, individual, group, national and international. Galtung presents the view of micro conflicts, which are basically within the individual, micro conflicts between groups in a particular state and mega conflict which are among states²⁰. Mwagiru views political conflicts as conflicts between two groups and whose major characteristic is a high level of organization. Mwagiru further argues that social conflicts also tend to be politicized due to communication technological advancement which makes it easy for conflicting parties to muster support for their cause and presents three categories of conflict as internal, international and internationalized conflict²¹.

Causes and levels of conflicts are different causes²² but the consequences amount to a denial of basic human needs which include identity, security and survival, albeit at varying degrees. This, as propounded by Burton, also implies disputes about negotiable interests that can be settled by compromise and more deep-seated conflicts that involve human needs which are resolved by removing underlying causes²³. Morton views a conflict from the disruption of normal desirable social interactions, a dysfunctional state of social

¹⁷ Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 3-13

¹⁸ For discussion about structural conflict see Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 71 and Galtung J., *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, International Peace Institute, Oslo 1978, pp167

¹⁹ Mwagiru M., (note 17)

²⁰ Galtung 2002(note 14)

²¹ Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 3

²² *ibid*, pp 4-5

²³ Burton J., *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. Macmillan, London 1990

relations²⁴. The negative consequences of conflict in all societies cannot be overemphasized. Mwangiri contends that the effect of conflict regardless of where it is located is to dislocate valued relationships and to cause stress on the structure on which relationships are based²⁵. The dehumanizing effects of conflicts cause immense suffering, loss of lives and properties, displacement of persons, destruction of institutions, depriving people of their means of livelihood and having many more thrown into exile as refugees²⁶.

Burton opines that conflict can be either beneficial or destructive²⁷. In its beneficial form conflict can serve as a warning that things are not going right, and can therefore provide a chance to re-examine relationships and undertake remedial action²⁸. Burton defines conflict as an essential creative element in human relations²⁹. Burton asserts that conflict it is important for people to learn how to manage conflicts properly and posits that conflict is neither to be deprecated nor feared but that the concern of people in societies is management and not elimination of conflict.³⁰ Conflict is seen as entwined with the process of change and is an intrinsic feature of social justice³¹ and Mwangiri asserts that a society without conflict would be both 'stale and sterile'³². From these definitions and perspectives conflict management efforts gain credence in the fact that conflict is not

²⁴Morton D., *Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influence*, (ed) Vaymire R., *New Directions of Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict transformation*(Sage London, 1991)

²⁵ Mwangiri M., (note 21)

²⁶ OAU, *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for Action*, Addis Ababa. (OAU Press Information Series 1 1992) pp 3

²⁷ Burton J.W.(note 23) pp 71

²⁸ Mwangiri M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 6

²⁹ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 137

³⁰ Mwangiri M.,(note 28)

³¹ Tongeren V.P., et al (eds) *People building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Lynne Reiner (Publishers 2005) pp 11

³² Mwangiri M(note 28)

inherently negative but the way people respond to a conflict makes it either a force for destruction or a catalyst for positive change³³.

1.4.2. Literature on Conflict Management

In defining conflict, scholars are faced with the task of not only classifying various types of conflicts but also unraveling their nature and content for purposes of managing it effectively³⁴. Taking into account the functional value of conflict, Burton contends that conflicts must not be prevented or suppressed through threats neither should they be settled merely to maintain the status quo³⁵. Since conflict is largely a matter of perception, its manifestations are many and varied according to contexts and levels and so are the processes and techniques of management.

Conflict management also includes the concepts of containment and settlement of violent conflicts³⁶. Inherent in the concept of “Conflict Management” is the ambitious responsibility to detect the fault lines -that could develop into or accelerate conflict – and prevent escalation. Burton posits that an approach that is concerned with conflict generally is more effective than an approach to conflict at some particular level of interest³⁷. Mwangi also suggests an understanding of conflict management which broadly encompasses any management process by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and do something about their conflict. This view of conflict management

³³ Tongeren V.P., et al ((note 31)

³⁴ Mwangi M.(note 28)

³⁵ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 137

³⁶ Ramsbotham O. et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. Polity Press, Cambridge 2006, 2nd

³⁷ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 139-140

includes methodologies and processes such as conflict settlement and conflict resolution.³⁸

Conflict management in this sense looks at processes, actors and factors that influence the outcomes³⁹.

Conflict management therefore is the process of planning to avoid conflict where possible and organizing to resolve conflict where it does happen, as rapidly and smoothly as possible. Managing conflicts that could arise around rights may require the development and enforcement of legal mechanisms while Agreements, Conventions and Covenants may suffice to forestall or mitigate in conflicts around interests. Effective management of conflicts depends a great deal on the awareness by the intervening party on the stages of the conflict along the escalation-de-escalation continuum. Insensitivity to a number of diversities, latent conflict in proposed processes and activities and incidents that could trigger open conflict in a set-up could be a potential cause of conflict. If there is an awareness of this, then appropriate steps can be taken to manage the adverse effects of such insensitivity⁴⁰.

In managing conflicts it is important to note that there are people who derive satisfaction from promoting and aggravating conflict and as such do not accept responsibly for finding solutions. There are those who call for law and order, seek to suppress conflict and also. Attempts to resolve conflicts at different levels should be done separately⁴¹. The major concern of conflict management is the transformation of as situation of power

38 Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 43

39 Burton J.W., (note 37)

⁴⁰ Ramsbotham, O. , Woodhouse T and Miall H., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. (Polity Press, Cambridge 2005 2nd ed)pp 30

⁴¹ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 143

bargaining or win-lose one into a problem-solving one in which both sides can gain.⁴² Conflict management also acknowledges that it is not possible to re-establish the pre-conflict social environment. However, conflicts have to be resolved to the satisfaction of parties and as much as possible by the parties⁴³. Since conflicts are dynamic as the structure, attitudes and behaviors are constantly changing, conflict management becomes a task that is continuous in society as new conflict forms and sources arise⁴⁴

In this study conflict management encompasses, as Galtung asserts, those activities and initiatives that contribute to 'positive peace'-a stable equilibrium in the conflict cycle in which the surfacing of new disputes do not escalate into violence and war⁴⁵

1.4.3. Literature on the Somali Conflict

Somalia enjoyed relative peace in her first seventeen years of independence, that is, between 1960 and 1977. However, between 1977 and 1991, the country underwent three major armed conflicts including the 1977–78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia in, in which Somalia lost⁴⁶. This war also sowed the seeds of future internal conflict, prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements intent on overthrowing the military regime of Siyad Barre. Among these movements was Abdullahi Yusuf's Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), mainly made up of Majerten clan in the Northeast, the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over Northwest Somalia and a number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements included

⁴² Ibid pp 153

⁴³ Ibid pp 138

⁴⁴ Ramsbotham O. et al, note 40

⁴⁵ Galtung J. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. (Sage: London, 1996) pp 1-3

⁴⁶ Samatar A, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, London: Zed Press, 1998, p.137.

the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten clan). Post-1991 Somalia still suffers from the impact of the days when the state was oppressive and exploitative, and was used by some political leaders to dominate others, monopolize state resources, and appropriate valuable land and other assets. The leadership skillfully manipulated and politicized clan identity over two decades of divide-and-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan divisions and grievances⁴⁷.

In conflict situations there are many components involved⁴⁸ and the Somalia conflict is not an exception. Most conflict management processes in Somalia can be viewed as being largely attempts at democratization which Wallensteen describes as,

'a system of political parties, with freedom of association, safeguards for human rights, access to media, security for election campaigns, independent electoral commissions, fair elections and the free-forming of new governments on the basis of election outcome'⁴⁹

The conflict in Somalia has also received the attention of so many actors but without sustained effort to take the problems to a logical conclusion. This view is shared by Wallensteen who asserts that one problem with the conceptually vague international community⁵⁰ is its inability to maintain interest in one issue (in this case the Somali conflict) for an extended period of time.⁵¹ The 2006 statement by the International Crisis

⁴⁷ See for instance The World Bank, *Conflict in Somalia. Drivers and Dynamics*, 2005, pp113

⁴⁸ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972 pp 140

⁴⁹ Wallensteen P., *Understanding Conflict Resolution, War, Peace and Global System*, 2002, London, pp 65

⁵⁰ Wallensteen argues that much as there is no consensual definition of what constitutes the international community, it includes no doubt, the leading western countries and EU organs but also international organizations (UN, UNHCR, UNHCHR), popularly based action groups and association's media, and religious societies

⁵¹ Ibid pp 255

Group that a decisive international action on Somalia is long overdue⁵² stands as valid today as it was then, with lack of coherence and sometimes conflicting agendas⁵³ by the external efforts in conflict management in Somalia providing opportunities for saboteurs of peace to exploit the processes. This is further complicated by a focus as in many other conflicts in Africa, to promote dialogue among leaders of warring parties based on the assumption that they are legitimate representatives of the people⁵⁴.

The Westphalian type of state-building-cum-peace building attempts made in Somalia have been criticized as an imposition and suggestions made for a more indigenized process that puts peace building in the hands of Somalis the use of the “Heer” customary laws and promotion of the tolerant form of Islam⁵⁵ Attempts at tapping into this systems have been made with significant success in both Somaliland and Puntland⁵⁶. Peace processes in the South are however characterized by high levels of distrust and a “zero-sum game” mentality toward political power and the state.⁵⁷ From this perspective, it is little wonder that the 15 international and over 130 local peace initiatives since 1991⁵⁸, with a superfluity of actors have not yielded the peace ideal that that is everyone’s dream. This situation creates an impression of a country running out of options in its pursuit of peace with no clarity on whom to give credit for the successes or blame for the failures. In the

⁵² See for instance, International Crisis Group, *Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?* Africa Report No. 116, August 2006

⁵³ See for instance, International Crisis Group, *Somalia, To Move beyond the Failed State*, Africa Report No. 147, August 2008

⁵⁴ Murithi T., Peace building in Africa in Francis D.J., (ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*.(ZED Books :London, 2008) pp 16.

⁵⁵ See for instance Mukhtar M. H., *Somali Reconciliation Conferences: The unbeaten track* ,Holler Africa, 2007

⁵⁶ Bradbury M, *The Search for Peace, A synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study*, Somali Programme, edited by Johnson, P., Interpeace, 2009

⁵⁷ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford,University Press, 2004.

⁵⁸ Bradbury M, (note 56)

case of Somalia figuring out what has had a positive impact towards building a sustainable peace is even more complicated.

The existence of established and rooted regional polities in Somaliland and Puntland presents fundamental challenges in approaching Somalia as a unitary state within a single diplomatic framework. Somaliland has maintained relative peace since May 1993, based on a 'charter' negotiated and passed by traditional *clan elders*. As such the Somaliland case can be seen as one of the success cases of bottom-up approach⁵⁹ to peace building. Puntland also made significant strides in the area of local peace processes⁶⁰. The changing nature of the Somali conflict and peace building has seen a movement from decentralized governance to unitary state discussions in Arta⁶¹. Part of the Arta settlement was power-sharing on the *4.5. formula (one each for the Hawiye, Dir, Darood and Rahanweyne clans)* and the point 5 assigned to the minority⁶²Clans. There is no mention of the youth either within the four main clans or as part of the *point five*.

1.4.4. Literature on Youth

The definition of Youth as an age category remains a little bit ambiguous. The definition of youth varies across cultures and in time. While the UN General Assembly (UNGA) defines youth as population between the ages of 15 and 24, the World Development Report 2007 includes those between 12 and 24 (World Bank 2006)⁶³. The variety in definition increases

⁵⁹ Albert.I.O., *Understanding Peace in Africa*. In. Francis D.J., (ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, (ZED Books,London) 2008pp 31-45

⁶⁰ Abdiselam C. F., *Towards the Social Integration of the Militias and Armed youth* in {WSP Somalia Programme, WSP International, Haan Association, London, 2001

⁶¹ Omar M.O., *Somalia: Between the Devils and the Deep Sea*, Somali Publications, Mogadishu, 2004

⁶² Bradbury M, *The Search for Peace, A synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study*, Somali Programme, edited by Johnson, P., Interpeace, 2009, pp18-21

⁶³ The World Development Report (WDR) 2007 (World Bank 2006) focuses on five transitions: learning for work and life, going to work, growing up healthily, forming families, exercising citizenship, 9-14

as youth is perceived as being anywhere between the above mentioned ages and 35 years in some societies⁶⁴. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) as well as the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam define a child as any person below the age of 17 years, 18 years and age of maturity according to the law applicable to him/her respectively. Youth therefore, includes some people who are also defined as children as well as young adults.

Youth is a very heterogeneous group encompassing people of various ethnicity, religion, race, gender, and class. The concept of youth is itself debated and being redefined by various social and demographic changes in the recent decades. Some authors favour biological markers and suggest youth as the period between puberty and parenthood, while others use cultural markers to define youth as a distinct social status with accompanying roles, rituals, and relationships⁶⁵

International instruments and protocols such as those prohibiting the recruitment of children⁶⁶ in the Armed Forces and their use in war, provide safeguards that cushion children at least by law, from active participation in armed conflict . This, according to Danesh is in keeping with the tendency of most cultures to seek to safeguard the innocence of children, and recognize within children an affirmation of human capacities for

⁶⁴ See for instance, Kurtenbarch S., *Youth in Conflict and Peace building: Between Protection and Neglect*, ISA Conference, San Fransisco, USA , March 2008, pp12-15

⁶⁵ Del Felice, C. & Wisler, A., *The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders*, Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue 11, November 2007 available from www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk

⁶⁶ See for instance the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Optional Protocol 1 and 2 to the Convention

goodness⁶⁷. This perception of children sadly does not necessarily apply to the youth as they are commonly associated in many societies and traditions with danger and volatility. Since youth are often viewed in connection with violence, it is challenging to view them as agents of peace. This challenge is associated by Danesh to the complexity of defining the category 'youth' as both the formal and functional definitions of youth are not without variations. Similarly with peace building whose definitions are also varied.

“The varied definitions of 'youth' as well as some of the term's predominant meanings and expectations have acted as barriers to the emergence of youth as a focus of either research or programme delivery. As one report notes, 'in contrast to children, who are covered under the UN Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC), the 'in-between' status of youth has been largely excluded from the agenda of international peace and development efforts. Most conflict related data simply omit them, making analysis and targeted programming extremely difficult. Youth have entered public debate and discourse mainly as accomplices in crime, suicide bombers, soldiers, or simply rebels.' As recently as 2005, youth were still being identified as a 'new target group' in peace building processes”⁶⁸

The impact of armed conflict on education for children and youth including targeted attacks on schoolchildren, teachers and schools remains one of the most damaging consequences of armed conflict. Children and youth (mainly boys) are abducted and forced into military service while girls are subject to threat of widespread systematic rape and

⁶⁷ Danesh R., *Youth and peace building*, Encyclopedia of Peace education, Teachers college, Columbia university, 2008 p3

⁶⁸ *ibid*

other forms of sexual violence. ⁶⁹ In many societies youngsters usually reflect how the society is generally organized and what values it upholds. They represent the problem-solving and negotiating techniques they see adults practice in the sense that if violence is constantly applied as a means to an end children will adopt it as a legitimate natural part of dealing with the work. If the environment in which they grow is unpredictable and their needs remain largely unmet, they may perceive the world as chaotic and only responsive to power and violence.

From this point of view youngsters learn to exert and express themselves through violence whenever they feel powerless. ⁷⁰ The youth of Somalia are not immune to this kind of impact and their involvement in violence and armed conflict is a reflection of the situation in which the country finds itself. Participation of the youth in peace processes provides an opportunity for them to unlearn violent behavior and build relationships of trust towards a sustainable peace in Somalia.

1.4.5. Literature on Youth in Conflict Management in Somalia

Some studies acknowledge the contribution of Somali youth in the involvement of youth in the Diaspora and in-country in peace processes⁷¹. There is however, a gap in literature on involvement of youth in peace building generally and that of young women in particular in the peace processes. In Somalia today, a child who was ten years old at the disintegration of the Somali Republic is over 30 years old while anyone born at the outbreak of the Civil

⁶⁹ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011) pp28-183

⁷⁰Hostetler L.L., *Preparing Children for Peace* in Elias R.and Turpin J., (eds) *Re-thinking Peace*, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, 1994, pp202-204

⁷¹ Bradbury M, *Whose Peace is it Anyway?* edited by Johnson, P., Interpeace/ ACCORD, 2009, pp7-11

War is past teenage or there about. So in terms of memory of violence and ability to process and deal with it, Somalis aged between 12 and 35 hold very divergent perspectives. Some of them, 26-35years old have reminiscence of days of peace gone by while others have no inkling of how life is like without the sounds of guns, grenades and mortar shells. It is for this very reason that involvement of the youth in conflict transformation becomes a matter of urgency as the Somali Society will sooner than later be under the leadership the very (young) people who are now considered as 'lost generation'.

Somalia like most countries in the world experience a youth bulge"—usually defined as a high proportion of 15-to-29 year olds relative to the adult population⁷² with the youth more often than not being drawn into conflicts either because they are not educated, are poorly educated, unemployed, because of poverty, social control as well as ideological convictions. The Somali Youth League (SYL) succeeded in a way in uniting different Somali clans under its flag and leading the country to independence. The word 'Youth' in the name may not necessarily be in reference to the age bracket of all the members of the 'League' neither did they originally have a political agenda going by Bulhan's assertion that *'members of this organization were young and middle age clerks and businessmen who wanted to form a social club with little over political overtones'*⁷³. Similarly, the currently *Al Shabaab* ("the youth") was once a minority extremist faction embedded within the Courts Union before the Ethiopian invasion⁷⁴. It is now one of the

⁷² Cincotta R., *Youth Bulge*, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict: State of the World 2005 Global Security Brief #2, pp36

⁷³ Bulhan H.A., *Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crises in Somali Politics and Society*, Tayosan International Publishing, Maryland 2008 pp 50

⁷⁴ Omar M.O., *Somali: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*, Somali Publications, Mogadishu, 2004

most formidable antagonists against the TFG in the power struggle for political control of Somalia together with Hizbul Islamiya, a group that is also largely made up of the youth.

A new phenomenon introduced into the Somali society by the on-going conflict is the 'retirement' by Al-Shabab of elders in the areas under their control from their traditional role of conflict management. This has been achieved hand in hand with the promotion of 'religious leaders' from amongst the ranks of Al-Shabab – most of them quite young – to the role of societal interlocutors and dispensers of justice and guarantors of the rule of law. This clearly becomes a game-changer in as far as actors to conflict management and the search for a sustainable peace is concerned.

1.5. Conceptual Framework

A Conceptual framework is a hypothesized model identifying the model under study and the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. A research conceptualizes the relationship between variables in the study and shows the relationship graphically or diagrammatically⁷⁵. It is argued that in a conceptual framework, description categories are systematically placed in broad structure of explicit prepositions, statement of relationships between two or more empirical properties to be accepted or rejected. A conceptual framework mainly consists of Independent, and Dependent variables. The variable is a concept, which can take on qualities of quantitative values⁷⁶. A dependent variable is the outcome variable, the one that is being predicted and

⁷⁵ Sekaran, U. *Research Methods for Business: a skill building approach*. (4th ed.) London: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.

⁷⁶ Mugenda, A. and Mugenda, O. *Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, ACTS, Nairobi, 2003

whose variation is what the researcher tries to explain. In the study, the dependent variable is conflict management. The independent variables, also known as the predictor or explanatory variables, are factors that explain variation in the dependent variable which in the study will comprise youth involvement, community involvement and socio-economic environment in Somalia.




Fig. 1.1: Conceptual Framework for Conflict Management

Processes of conflict management and factors influencing them cannot be explained by one theory but by a combination of many theories. However some theories provide a more accurate framework for analysis, than others depending on the subject of inquiry and its specific focus. Analyses of the findings of this study will be guided by two main conceptual approaches, that is, Galtung's concept of positive peace and Burton human needs theory. Galtung's approach views peace as being double-sided; with negative peace, that is the absence of violence and positive peace, viewed as social justice. Galtung

proposes three principles that are applicable in seeking to define peace thus; firstly the term peace is used for social goals at least agreed by many, secondly these goals may be complex and difficult but not impossible and finally that peace implies absence of violence. Galtung further defines violence as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual and views building as involving the removal of structural conditions which impede realizations of actual potential by individuals and other entities, which goes beyond the cessation of physical violence.⁷⁷

Galtung further distinguishes various other concepts which offer an effective way of analyzing violence which in turn give a clearly understandable framework for analyzing resolution of the conflict in question. Violence is seen as physical and psychological, positive or negative peace, whether or not there is an object that is hurt, whether a conflict is person/direct or structural or indirect, whether violence intended or unintended and finally whether the conflict was latent or manifest. This study relates to the question of the potential for peace building that resides in young people of Somalia, but is either not yet fully actualized or not acknowledge⁷⁸, and analysis of the findings based on the various tenets of Galtung's peace building model will provide an all-round presentation of the findings.

An analysis based of Burton's human needs theory is based on the view that if people's basic needs are not fulfilled within the existing, "status-quo" system; they may create parallel, "revolutionary" systems of seeking satisfaction. Conflict is seen as a function competing means chosen to achieve the common goals of survival, security and

⁷⁷ Galtung J., *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, International Peace Institute, Oslo 1978, pp167-190

⁷⁸ *ibid*

human development⁷⁹. These ontological needs are indivisible and non-excludable⁸⁰ can be the drivers of many contracted conflicts including the Somali conflict that is the subject of this study. Addressing the devastating conflict in Somalia calls for attention to the development needs of all members of the society but more so of the youth. Once the needs for survival, security and recognition are met, the youth will have the incentive take to develop attitudes and behavior that contribute to management of conflict and sustainable peace.

1.6. Research Questions

This study sets out to contribute to the discourse on the place of young people in managing conflict in Somalia. The following questions guided the study:

- a. In what ways was the participation of youth critical to the conflict management processes in Somalia between 2000 and 2011”?
- b. What are the enablers and obstacles to the effective participation of Somali Youth in the Conferences and other local Conflict Management processes?
- c. What are the enablers and obstacles to the effective participation of Somali Youth in the Conferences and other local Conflict Management processes?
- d. What were the contributions of Somali Youth in the Peace and Reconciliation conferences that took place in Borama,,Garowe,Mudug-Galmudug, Djibouti (2000 and 2008/2009) and Kenya 2002-2004)?

⁷⁹ Burton, J. W. *EACE Begins at Home, International Conflict: A Domestic Responsibility*; in the International Journal of Peace Studies Spring 2001 ISSN 1085-7494 Volume 6, Number 1, pp 26-32

- e. How is youth participation defined, by whom and based on what notions about young people?

1.7. Research Methodology

1.7.1. Data Collection and analysis

The study used a descriptive survey research design to gather both qualitative and quantitative data on the study topic. The choice of this design was informed by the need to allow a better understanding of the players' conceptions and values⁸¹. Cooper and Schindler, describe a research design as a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering a questionnaire to a sample of individuals. It can be used to collect information about people's attitude, opinions, habits or any other social issues. A descriptive research is used to obtain information concerning the current status of the phenomena to describe "what exists" with respect to variables or conditions in a situation. This was also a correlation descriptive research. This is because the variables under study (Somali youths and efforts towards conflict management in Somalia) were measured as they naturally occur and were not manipulated or controlled. This also referred to as positivism in which observable human behavior or phenomena is the key guide in uncovering laws of relationships and causality that apply to all people all the time⁸².

Study subjects require to be well versed in the subject matter and scope of the study as recommended by Kothari. In order to have objective responses, the study obtained data through interview guide designed to create a feeling of full participation by the

⁸¹ See Cooper D R and Schindler P S (2008) *Business Research Methods* McGraw Publishing Company limited, pp76-81

⁸² Sekeran U. *Research Methods for Business, A Skill Building Approach* ,(2009) John Wiley and Sons UK

respondents. The choice of the instrument was necessary as interviews give an in-depth review of the phenomena in the study and were more objective in giving correct opinion by the respondents as they feel closer to the study during interview sessions⁸³. The study population included all youths in the age bracket 15-35 years who can be defined by the UN as falling in the youth age. The target respondents, which is the unit of analysis for this study, was the Somali youths including youth leaders. The selection of youth leaders was driven by the fact that these are key youths that help run the affairs of the community and would be a natural link in conflict management processes. For primary data, purposive methods of sampling were used to select respondents to this study; this involved the selection of respondents from three youth groups each from the three Somali polities.

The data collection method for this study, involved booking interviews with the respondents using telephone, skype and face-to-face meeting. Interview responses were recorded on the interview guide and extra recording material provided as recommended by statistical gurus⁸⁴. This study generated both qualitative (open-ended questions) and quantitative data (open-ended questions). Only the relevant non-redundant content was presented.

1.8. Chapter Outline

Outcomes of this study are presented in five chapters. Chapter One introduces the research study by contextualizing the research problem and provides justification and objectives of the study. The chapter also presents a literature review where the relevant literature from various scholarly and non-scholarly, but critical information, is analyzed and interpreted

⁸³ Kothari C.R. (2004). *Quantitative Techniques*, 3rd Ed, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, India

⁸⁴ See, Kothari C.R. (2004). *Quantitative Techniques*, 3rd Ed, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, India

relative to the study. The theoretical review of each variable has been dealt with and authors who have dwelt on the conflict management topics briefly introduced and methodology of research elaborated. Chapter two gives a background of conflict in Somalia, in the various time blocks in which the conflict dynamics have been distinct and discusses the actors and factors conflict. The chapter is mainly descriptive in nature and offers insights into how the conflict in Somalia has evolved with time.

Chapter three presents the conflict management process and present findings of the case study. This chapter presents the various drivers of the conflict management process in Somalia between 2000 and 2011 as well as the outcomes of those processes. The chapter also discusses the aims and means of conflict management, participation by three category of actors (the elders, women and the youth) as well as ownership of the processes. Towards the end of the chapter, focuses on the missing link in conflict management in Somalia and discussed how the various actors have related to each other. In chapter four a critique of the study is done with a focus on the aims, actors and barriers to participation by various groups. The chapter presents emerging issues from the study and makes a critical analysis of these and sheds more light on the interpretation of findings brought forth in chapter 3. Chapter five encompasses the summary, key findings, the conclusions and recommendations of the study. In this chapter, the research question is revisited and suggestions made on related areas of further research.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOMALI CONFLICT: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

The distinction between war and conflict is often unclear. Some scholars separate war from conflict by applying a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths before a conflict can be called a war⁸⁵. This distinction was not made in here and conflict and civil war in Somalia are used interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon. Both are defined as armed interactions between at least two groups of which one can be, but not necessarily is a state or government in power just as has been the case in Somalia. Somalia's modern history of 'contact, conflict and expansion'⁸⁶ began in the late 19th century, when various European powers began to trade and establish themselves in the area. The British East India Company's desire for unrestricted harbor facilities led to the conclusion of treaties with the sultan of Tajura as early as 1840. It was not until 1886, however, that the British gained control over northern Somalia through treaties with various Somali chiefs who were guaranteed British protection. British objectives centered on safeguarding trade links to the east and securing local sources of food and provisions for its coaling station in Aden. The boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland was established in 1897 through treaty negotiations between British negotiators and King Menelik⁸⁷.

⁸⁵ Zartman, I.M., 2006. *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

⁸⁶ Harper M, *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*; Zed Books, New York, 2011: 45-70

⁸⁷ Riley, S. (1994). *War and Famine in Africa*. Conflict Studies 268 (London: Res. Inst. for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism) p.16-27.

The boundaries were the first features for creating the conflicts that have bedeviled Somalia as the chronicles in the next sections will indicate. The Somali-populated region of the Horn of Africa stretches from the Gulf of Tadjoura in modern-day Djibouti through Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, and down to the coastal regions of southern Kenya. Unlike many countries in Africa, the Somali nation extends beyond its national borders. Since gaining independence in 1960, the goal of Somali nationalism, also known as Pan-Somalism⁸⁸, has been the unification of all Somali populations, forming a Greater Somalia. This issue has been a major cause of past crises between Somalia and its neighbors--Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It is an irony that present conflicts are now causing more disintegration as opposed to the initial unification target of Somalia.

2.2. Pre-colonial and Colonial Somalia

During the first two decades of the 20th century, British rule was challenged through persistent attacks by a dervish rebellion led by Mohamed Abdullah, known as the "Mad Mullah" by the British. A long series of intermittent engagements and truces ended in 1920 when British warplanes bombed Abdullah's stronghold at Taleex. Although Abdullah was defeated as much by rival Somali factions as by British forces, he was lauded as a popular hero and stands as a major figure of national identity to many Somalis⁸⁹.

In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Aluula, who placed their territories under Italy's protection. Between 1897 and 1908, Italy made

⁸⁸ Doornbos, M. and Markakis, S (1994). 'Society and state in crisis: what went wrong in Somalia?', *Review of African Political Economy*, 59, pp 82-98;

⁸⁹ *ibid*

agreements with the Ethiopians and the British that marked out the boundaries of Italian Somaliland. The Italian Government assumed direct administration, giving the territory colonial status⁹⁰.

Italian occupation gradually extended inland. In 1924, the Jubaland Province of Kenya, including the town and port of Kismayo, was ceded to Italy by the United Kingdom. The subjugation and occupation of the independent sultanates of Obbia and Mijertein, begun in 1925, were completed in 1927. In the late 1920s, Italian and Somali influence expanded into the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Continuing incursions climaxed in 1935 when Italian forces launched an offensive that led to the capture of Addis Ababa and the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936⁹¹.

Following Italy's declaration of war on the United Kingdom in June 1940, Italian troops overran British Somaliland and drove out the British garrison. In 1941, British forces began operations against the Italian East African Empire and quickly brought the greater part of Italian Somaliland under British control. From 1941 to 1950, while Somalia was under British military administration, transition toward self-government was begun through the establishment of local courts, planning committees, and the Protectorate Advisory Council. In 1948 Britain turned the Ogaden and neighboring Somali territories over to Ethiopia⁹².

In Article 23 of the 1947 peace treaty, Italy renounced all rights and titles to Italian Somaliland. In accordance with treaty stipulations, on September 15, 1948, the Four

⁹⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report 1997*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1977, pp32-37

⁹¹ Ibid, pp 43-47

⁹² A. Simon, 'Somalia: the structure of dissolution', in L Villalon & P Huxtable (eds), *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp6

Powers referred the question of disposal of former Italian colonies to the UN General Assembly. On November 21, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence for Italian Somaliland. In 1959, at the request of the Somali Government, the UN General Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1, 1960⁹³.

Meanwhile, rapid progress toward self-government was being made in British Somaliland. Elections for the Legislative Assembly were held in February 1960, and one of the first acts of the new legislature was to request that the United Kingdom grant the area independence so that it could be united with Italian Somaliland when the latter became independent. The protectorate became independent on June 26, 1960; five days later, on July 1, it joined Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. In June 1961, Somalia adopted its first national constitution in a countrywide referendum, which provided for a democratic state with a parliamentary form of government based on European models⁹⁴.

2.3 The first Republics: 1960 and 1969

The root cause of the 1960s Somalia crisis or conflict can be traced to the rapid union of the two Somali territories to form the 'United' Somali state in 1960. Soon after independence, the Somalilanders became disillusioned with the way the union was proceeding and indeed voted 'No' in the unification referendum. In the interest of

⁹³ World Bank, *World Development Report 1997*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1977, pp 32-35

⁹⁴ R Gerson, 'Why Somalis flee: synthesis of accounts of conflict experience in northern Somalia by Somali refugees, displaced persons and others', *Bureau for Refugee Programmes, Department of State, USA, 1989*, pp9

preserving a 'union', Somaliland initially (while briefly independent) accepted conditions demanded by southern leaders. Mogadishu became the capital and the base of the newly created Somali parliament. Southern Somalis also held all major posts in the new government, and a majority of seats in the parliament⁹⁵.

In spite of the increasing discontent, southern officials adopted measures aimed at enforcing rapid integration, serving to further alienate their northern counterparts⁹⁶. The government's development programmes also failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socioeconomic stratification in the north, problems inherited from the colonial administration. Despite the integration of the two administrative systems, latent corruption has been attributed to the residual Italian influence (the 'Italian factor') in the public sector. However, northerners were not the only group disillusioned with the union. The Rehanwein from the inter-riverine region, who had an equal number of seats with the two other major clan families of Hawiye and Darod in the south before unification, became marginalised⁹⁷.

The concentration of political power in the former Italian Somalia capital of Mogadishu and a southern-dominated central government, with most key government positions occupied by southern Somalis, producing increased disenchantment with the union in the former British-controlled north. Pan-Somali nationalism, with the goal of uniting the Somali-populated regions of French Somaliland (Djibouti), Kenya and Ethiopia into a Greater Somalia, remained the driving political ideology in the initial post-independence

⁹⁵ The World Bank, *Conflict in Somalia. Drivers and Dynamics*, 2005, pp17-19

⁹⁶ Ali Mazrui, 'Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Overview', in Furley *Conflict in Africa* (note 56) pp.19-27

⁹⁷ *ibid*

period. Under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (prime minister from 1967 to 1969), however, Somalia renounced its claims to the Somali-populated regions of Ethiopia and Kenya, greatly improving its relations with both countries. Egal attempted a similar approach with Ethiopia, but the move towards reconciliation with Ethiopia, which had been a traditional enemy of Somalia since the 16th century, made many Somalis furious, including the army. Egal's reconciliation effort toward Ethiopia is argued to be one of the principal factors that provoked a bloodless coup on October 21, 1969 and subsequent installation of Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre as president, bringing an abrupt end to the process of party-based constitutional democracy in Somalia⁹⁸.

Following the coup, executive and legislative power was vested in the 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), headed by Barre. The SRC pursued a course of "scientific socialism" that reflected both ideological and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The government instituted a national security service, centralized control over information, and initiated a number of grassroots development projects.

Barre reduced political freedoms and used military force to seize and redistribute rich farmlands in the interriverine areas of southern Somalia, relying on the use of force and terror against the Somali population to consolidate his political power base⁹⁹.

2.4 Somalia under Barre, 1969 and 1990

The conflict that that has rocked Somalia cannot be said to have been abrupt. Mwagiru asserts that the signals and early warning of the Somali conflict had been there for many

⁹⁸ A Farah & I Lewis, *Somalia: the roots of reconciliation. Peace making endeavours of contemporary lineage leaders: a survey of grassroots peace conferences in Somaliland*, ACTIONAID, London, 1993, pp 45

⁹⁹ Bradbury, M. *The Search for Peace, A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study, Somali Programme*, 2009, pp 67-69

years before the ouster of the Barre regime¹⁰⁰. The 1960 constitution guaranteed not only the unity of two Somali territories but also democracy and a forum that sanctioned multi-partyism with guarantees to *de jure* freedom of expression. Significant political differences encouraged a proliferation of parties 'to the point where Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel'. During the country's last multi-party elections, held in March 1969, more than 60 parties contested. Little civil governance or service delivery existed. It was against this background that the successful coup, which brought Barre to power in 1969, took place¹⁰¹.

Taking his place among Africa's 'Big Men', Barre immediately suspended the country's constitution and banned all forms of political and professional association. 'Promising to cure all of the country's ills', he also decreed in the following year the adoption of Scientific Socialism, an ideology that was (he claimed) 'fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society'. Under the slogan of 'socialism unites, tribalism divides', clan and kinship ties were officially banned and the new government promised to root out any reference, verbal or written, to clanship.

In an effort to limit the tradition of blood money payments between groups, the regime introduced the death sentence for those convicted of homicide¹⁰². Sweeping political and legal changes were also introduced in the first few years of the coup. These included the establishment of a repressive security apparatus accountable to Barre himself.

¹⁰⁰ Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp10

¹⁰¹ Mohamed Osman Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair - A Case of Leadership Failure* (New Delhi: Somali Publications 1996) p.31-39.

¹⁰² Daniel Compagnon, 'Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factions'. in Christopher Clapham (ed.) *African Guerrillas* (London: James Currey 1998) pp.73-90.

To consolidate power he established a formidable propaganda machine. 'Countless posters, poems, songs of praise, and speeches proclaimed his sublime role as the "father" of a nation whose "mother" was the Revolution.' The leadership's political propaganda machinery was particularly effective in misleading the outside world. Some observers took its spin seriously, confusing rhetoric with reality¹⁰³.

In the first few years most sectors of the economy were brought under government ownership. A wave of nationalisation (*qarameyn*) of all medium-size business, including banks, schools, insurance firms, imports, and wholesale trade started in the early 1970s. Many new state-owned agencies, maintaining absolute monopolies, were created as a foundation for a socialist economy. Private traders were prohibited by law from importing, storing, purchasing or distributing food items. It became increasingly clear that nomads and agropastoralists, including wealthy nomads and farmers who owned large herds, were to be treated as *lumpenproletariat* rather than capitalists.

But in spite of erecting cooperatives for rural communities, the government found nomads largely uncooperative¹⁰⁴. The socialist experiment—and perhaps more crucially, the political hostility to an 'opposition' area—turned the 1974–75 drought into a major famine in the north, resulting in over 20 000 deaths, forcing 10% to 15% of the entire pastoral population to register in relief camps. There was a serious shortage of food and sudden collapse of entitlements throughout the northern regions. The nationalisation process and the introduction of price controls seriously disrupted food markets in the northern regions. Even more damaging was the effective shutting down of the major

¹⁰³ Omar, M.O., *Somalia: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*, Somali Publications, 2004, pp60-64

¹⁰⁴ Bradbury, M., *Whose Peace is it Anyway?* Interpeace/ACCORD, 2009, pp 11-14

historic Arabian–Somaliland–Ethiopian trade axis, with closure of the Ethiopian border and tight controls at the Red Sea port of Berbera. This was further exacerbated by the failure of the food rationing system, introduced by the government to replace the free market system. Hundreds of government-owned shops selling food items at fixed prices were opened in major towns and villages. Residents were issued with identity cards to buy fixed amounts of food every week, but because of a shortage of supplies, only small numbers of people managed to buy sufficient food in these shops. In rural areas, unregistered pastoralists relied on food purchased on the black market at exorbitant prices¹⁰⁵.

The widespread crop failure and the subsequent food shortages in neighboring Ethiopia also contributed to the food crisis in the region. The toll of the drought was enormous, killing an estimated five million animals in Somalia/Somaliland and having far-reaching consequences on the rural economy in both Somaliland and the adjoining Haud area of Ethiopia. While the effects of the drought were received differently throughout Somalia, the rural population has never fully recovered from the disaster. Pursuing its objective of settling and converting pastoralists to farmers, the government carried out a resettlement experiment involving the transfer of over 100 000 nomads from relief camps in the north to three sites in the more arable lands of southern Somalia. Although pastoralists resisted the idea of suddenly changing their way of life and engaging in a

¹⁰⁵Stephen Riley, *War and Famine in Africa*. Conflict Studies 268 (London: Res. Inst. for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism 1994) p.16-37

farming livelihood in which they had no experience, they were coerced into accepting their new host environment¹⁰⁶.

The Ogaden war was one of the single most important turning points for the Siad Barre regime. At the outset the conflict caused a flood of mainly ethnic Somali refugees. By 1979 there were officially 1.3 million refugees in the country. More than a half were settled in the north, where one in four of the population were refugees. The arrival of forced migrants intensified pressure on limited physical resources and services, further aggravating tensions between local inhabitants and refugees. Resentment intensified as the Issaqs were reduced to second-class citizens in their own territory. The government's policy of recruiting refugees into the army also spurred on tensions. More generally the failed war wholly eroded the credibility of the army and police, the asserted guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism¹⁰⁷.

Somalia's defeat in Ogaden led to an attempted coup in April 1978 by senior military officers from the Majerteen clan. Although the government crushed the rebellion, some senior officers who escaped after the coup formed the first opposition movement, called Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), with its headquarters in Ethiopia¹⁰⁸. With support from the Ethiopian army, these groups carried out guerrilla warfare across the border. The government's reaction to both the coup attempt and the formation of SSDF was repression and vicious reprisals against the Majerteen clan in the northeast.

¹⁰⁶ R Gerson, 'Why Somalis flee: synthesis of accounts of conflict experience in northern Somalia by Somali refugees, displaced persons and others', *Bureau for Refugee Programmes, Department of State, USA, 1989*

¹⁰⁷ J A Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', *World Development*, 25(12), 1997, pp 2027-2041

¹⁰⁸ R Hitcock & H Hussein, 'Agricultural and non-agricultural settlements for drought-afflicted pastoralists in Somalia', *Disasters*, 11(1), 1987, pp 30-39

The second opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in 1981 by a group of businessmen, religious leaders, intellectuals and former army officers drawn from the Isaaq clan. Following its formation, the government intensified its repressive policies against the Isaaq. To create enmity between clans, senior military officers in the Somali army from Isaaq clans were deliberately posted in the Majerteen regions where the government was waging war against local people¹⁰⁹.

The Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in Italy in 1987, by which time the formal service provision role of the state had virtually ceased to function.¹¹⁰ It was immediately divided into two rival factions based on different sub-clans. The armed faction had an alliance with the SNM, which provided arms to General Aideed who was to become the leader of the faction.

The Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) was formed in 1989 following the arrest of General Gabyo, the then minister of defence and the highest ranking Ogadeni in government. A few more opposition movements were formed during the civil war in the south, but the large number of factions with S-prefixed acronyms appeared after the intervention of UNOSOM¹¹¹. Following the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, desperate to find a strong external alliance to replace the Soviet Union, Somalia abandoned its Socialist ideology and turned to the West for international support, military equipment, and economic aid. In 1978, the United States reopened the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Somalia. Two years later, an agreement was concluded that gave

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*

¹¹⁰ G Haaland & W Keddeman, 'Poverty analysis: the case of rural Somalia', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 32(4), 1984, pp 843-860

¹¹¹ R Gerson, 'Why Somalis flee: synthesis of accounts of conflict experience in northern Somalia by Somali refugees, displaced persons and others', *Bureau for Refugee Programmes, Department of State, USA, 1989*

U.S. forces access to military facilities at the port of Berbera in northwestern Somalia. In the summer of 1982, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia along the central border, and the United States provided two emergency airlifts to help Somalia defend its territorial integrity. From 1982 to 1988, the United States viewed Somalia as a partner in defense in the context of the Cold War. Somali officers of the National Armed Forces were trained in U.S. military schools in civilian as well as military subjects¹¹².

Following the Ogaden war, the Barre regime violently suppressed opposition movements and ethnic groups, particularly the Isaaq clan in the northern region, using the military and elite security forces to quash any hint of rebellion. By the 1980s, an all-out civil war developed in Somalia. Opposition groups began to form following the end of the Ogaden war, beginning in 1979 with a group of dissatisfied army officers known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In 1981, as a result of increased northern discontent with the Barre regime, the Somali National Movement (SNM), composed mainly of the Isaaq clan, was formed in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing of the Barre regime¹¹³. In January 1989, the United Somali Congress (USC), an opposition group of Somalis from the Hawiye clan, was formed as a political movement in Rome.

A military wing of the USC was formed in Ethiopia in late 1989 under the leadership of Mohamed Farah "Aideed," a former political prisoner imprisoned by Barre from 1969-75. Aideed also formed alliances with other opposition groups, including the SNM and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogadeen sub-clan force under Colonel

¹¹² Galtung J, *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, International Peace Institute, Oslo 1978, pp 167-90

¹¹³ Ali Mazrui, 'Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Overview', in *Furley Conflict in Africa* pp.19-27

Ahmed Omar Jess in the Bakool and Bay regions of Southern Somalia. In 1988, at the President's order, aircraft from the Somali National Air Force bombed the city of Hargeisa in northwestern Somalia, the former capital of British Somaliland, killing nearly 10,000 civilians and insurgents. The warfare in the northwest sped up the decay already evident elsewhere in the republic¹¹⁴.

Economic crisis, brought on by the cost of anti-insurgency activities, caused further hardship as Siad Barre and his cronies looted the national treasury. By the end of the 1980s, armed opposition to Barre's government, fully operational in the northern regions, had spread to the central and southern regions. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes, claiming refugee status in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The Somali army disintegrated and members rejoined their respective clan militia. Barre's effective territorial control was reduced to the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu, resulting in the withdrawal of external assistance and support, including from the United States¹¹⁵.

With the crises looming, and the international community failing to read the signs of times and effectively apply preventive diplomacy to arrest the Somali Conflict¹¹⁶, the situations was destined to worsen. By the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse. In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM forces advanced toward Mogadishu. In January 1991,

¹¹⁴ Omar M.O., *Somalia: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*, Somalia Publications, Mogadishu 2004, pp9

¹¹⁵ Farah A., and Lewis, I (1993) 'Somalia: the roots of reconciliation. Peace making endeavors of contemporary lineage leaders: a survey of grassroots peace conferences in Somaliland', ACTIONAID, London, 1993, pp16-20

¹¹⁶ Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp11

armed opposition factions drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government. Barre later died in exile in Nigeria¹¹⁷.

2.5 War torn Somalia, 1991 to 2011

The Somali National Movement (SNM), a group of exiles from clans in the north of Somalia, had been training with the help of Ethiopia to overthrow the regime of President Siad Barre." Barre had been in power since 1969 after a military coup, and held a tight reign with the help of his clansmen.' Since the early 1980s, the SNM had been carrying out hit and run attacks against government forces in the north¹¹⁸.

After Ethiopia decided to cut its support for the SNM, the exiles invaded the country in the spring of 1988. Their aim was to oust the president¹¹⁹. Violent repression, mass murders and a scorched earth policy were what the Barre government used to combat the invasion. Bane's army was badly trained, underpaid and dominated by soldiers from a supporting clan.

Bane forcibly recruited men in the north for the government army to fight against their own clans and families. The invasion spread disorder throughout Somalia¹²⁰. New factions were established which the SNM supported in their common fight against Bane. Soldiers who defected from the government army formed the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and started attacking the army in the south of Somalia. The SPM was led by Colonel Jess. The United Somali Congress (USC) started the war against Bane in

¹¹⁷ Farah A., and Lewis, I (note 115)

¹¹⁸ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State*. Africa Report, No.147 2008, pp9

¹¹⁹ Mohamed O., O., (1996) *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair - A Case of Leadership Failure* (New Delhi: Somali Publications 1996) p.31-39.

¹²⁰ International Crisis Group, (note 118)

central Somalia. There were two rival USC bases, one in Ethiopia and one in Mogadishu¹²¹.

Both recruited from the same clan, the Hawiye. General Muhammed Farah Aidid, the former Somali ambassador to India, was fighting from Ethiopia. The other faction was led by Ali Mahdi, a wealthy Mogadishu businessman. Their common aim of removing Barre prevented a confrontation between the two factions.¹²²

Barre fled office in January 1991 after an attack on the capital by the USC forces led by Aidid. Ali Mahdi proclaimed himself interim-president of Somalia and Aidid refused to recognise his appointment. Aidid's main grudge was that he and his men had done all the fighting and therefore he should have more right to rule the country than Ali Mahdi. The disagreement over who should be president led to armed confrontations between their followers. Barre, who had fled south, was still present on Somali territory and was planning his comeback¹²³.

A faction called the Somali National Front (SNF), led by Barre's son-in-law Colonel Morgan, was fighting in the south of Somalia. Aidid and his men again took on Barre and caused him to flee into exile in Kenya. After defeating Barre, the war focused on the rivalry between Aidid and Ali Mahdi. They heavily contested control over

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Stephen Riley, *War and Famine in Africa*. Conflict Studies 268 (London: Res. Inst. for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism 1994) p.16-37.

¹²³ Daniel Compagnon, 'Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factions'. in Christopher Clapham (ed.) *African Guerrillas* (London: James Currey 1998) pp.73-90.

Mogadishu, the seat of power. After exhausting themselves a ceasefire was reached in March 1992. However, the armed confrontations changed to rivalry over food supplies¹²⁴.

The majority of the population was suffering from hunger as a result of the destruction in the country. Famine threatened 95 per cent of the population. The different faction leaders were vying for lucrative positions, in particular the port and airport were highly contested because food aid, the only liquid asset in the country, arrived there. The food aid served as a way to financial gain by selling it.

The United Nations intervened and first sent a peacekeeping mission to the country to supervise the 1992 ceasefire. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM, later UNOSOM I) arrived with 50 monitors in Mogadishu. Later the monitors were reinforced with 500 peacekeepers¹²⁵. Due to a deteriorating situation for the suffering population, a peace-enforcement mission was mounted. On 9 December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States, started Operation 'Restore Hope'. American troops landed on the beaches of Mogadishu, and they managed to create a secure environment for the safe delivery of emergency aid¹²⁶.

On 4 May 1993 United Nations troops took over from most of the Americans. The United Nations force, UNOSOM II, aimed at consolidating the secure environment and extending it throughout the whole of Somalia. The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was not without problems. The population slowly turned against the

¹²⁴ M Doornbos & J Markakis, 'Society and state in crisis: what went wrong in Somalia?', *Review of African Political Economy*, 59, 1994, pp 82-88;

¹²⁵ World Bank, *World Development Report 1997*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997, pp 67-70

¹²⁶ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State*, Africa Report No.147, 2008, pp8

intervention troops. UNOSOM II did not manage to carry out the mandate, and losses were suffered by its personnel. Aidid was held responsible and was supposed to be hunted down. A raid on a hotel where Aidid and his cabinet were expected to meet in October 1993, turned into a disaster for the American troops¹²⁷.

In March 1995, all the United Nations troops were withdrawn and the country was left to the warring factions again. In Somalia, clan identity was flexible and learned, and it was used by the leaders when circumstances required to create followings. This is also illustrated by the fact that the fighting often focused on the internal Hawiye clan conflict between Aidid and Ali Mahdi; if the clan was the primary source for identity this could not have happened. Furthermore, the faction leaders, especially later on in the war, had difficulty in recruiting new followers. The clans were used to create a recruiting base, 'those fighting each other for power I used the name of tribes for their personal advantage'¹²⁸.

In Somalia, the aim of removing Barre united the opposition forces, they even helped each other. However, once Barre was removed, disagreements between the factions started, the seeds for these divisions had been sowed long before the invasion started. These quarrels did not so much focus on the basis of power but more on who should rule the country. Ali Mahdi pre-empted Aidid by declaring himself interim-president; Aidid could not accept Ali Mahdi's presidency and neither could the other faction leaders. This power wrangling invited other factions and clans to rally support for their claims to power¹²⁹. As proliferation of factions occurred, Ethnic and clan labels were used to

¹²⁷ World Bank, 1977(note 125) pp 24-29

¹²⁸ Samatar A, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, London: ZED Press, 1998, pp 129-143

¹²⁹ A. Simon, 'Somalia: the structure of dissolution', in L Villalon & P Huxtable (eds), *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp30

reinforce claims to the presidency. Unfortunately for the faction leaders, these labels had boundaries and could not provide an all encompassing claim on the state. The use of these ethnic and clan labels invited others, some until that point not involved in the war, to rally along the same lines out of fear of losing out. This led to fragmentation and proliferation of the parties.

Economic incentives played a double role in providing funds to keep the factions in the field by paying for arms and training and in attracting the fighters who had to represent the factions in the field. Often this last element was taken care of in leading the fighters to areas where looting was lucrative, for example, the agricultural areas or the ports and airports so the fighters could help themselves to pay¹³⁰.

Indeed, Somalia has lacked any internationally-recognized central government since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991¹³¹. In recent years, despite the establishment of a fragile transitional government, the country has been controlled by various political and regional factions, as well as local warlords. Islamic militias have also held sway and were driven from the capital in 2006 following an intervention by Ethiopian troops into Somali territory on behalf of the weak transitional government¹³².

Since that time, resurgent Islamists, known as al-Shabab, have been launching a violent insurgency and now control significant swaths of the country's territory. A ceasefire pact between the government and insurgent forces in June 2008 has had little

¹³⁰ R Hitcock & H Hussein, 'Agricultural and non-agricultural settlements for drought-afflicted pastoralists in Somalia', *Disasters*, 11(1), 1987, pp 30-39

¹³¹ At the time of doing this research a president was elected in August 2012 as the term of the Transitional Federal Government came to an end. This study did not carry out any analysis of what the new establishment portends for the youth in the areas they control.

¹³² CountryWatch retrieved at: www.countrywatch.com/somalia/ (accessed on 27th October 2012)

positive effect since some factions did not sign onto the deal. Indeed, as of 2010, al-Shabab - which is allied with the notorious terror enclave al-Qaida -- has been carrying out a violent offensive aimed at overthrowing the government, and even carrying out terrorist acts outside national borders. As discussed above, al-Shabab was responsible for two deadly bombings in Uganda in July 2010, indicating an increasingly jihadist orientation, in which attacks do not stop at the national borders¹³³.

From the start of the insurgency in 2007, although no official figures are available, estimates suggest that tens of thousands have died and hundreds of thousands have been made homeless by the fighting in Mogadishu. As people have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety, there are now as many as one million people are internal refugees in Somalia. With the state of lawlessness increasing in Somalia, a dire security situation plaguing the country, and the mass scale of population displacement, the United Nations warned that half the entire Somali population has been in need of humanitarian aid since the second half of 2008. As of 2009, the situation could be characterized as both a political and human crisis¹³⁴.

It should be noted that, as chaos reigns supreme in the heartland of Somalia, there are also two "republics" in the north. The former British colony of Somaliland---consisting of five districts in the northwest---declared independence in 1991, and the northeastern region---known as Puntland--- declared autonomy in 1998. Neither is recognized as a sovereign independent state by the world even though both have tried to get recognition from the

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Bradbury, M. *The Search for Peace, A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study, Somali Programme, 2009*

UN¹³⁵. In practice it could be seen on several occasions that a mass rising of a clan occurred, in particular in the example of the raid on a Mogadishu hotel by the American forces. The local commander of Aidid's forces alerted his clansmen including women and children who performed roles in combat. Thus the question rests why this rising of the clan network only occurred at certain occasions and was not a continual feature of the conflict.

These questions seem to give the most potent explanation to conflict. In Somalia, clan identity was flexible and learned, and it was used by the leaders when circumstances required to create followings. This is also illustrated by the fact that the fighting often focused on the internal Hawiye clan conflict between Aidid and Ali Mahdi; if the clan was the primary source for identity this could not have happened. Furthermore, the faction leaders, especially later on in the war, had difficulty in recruiting new followers. The clans were used to create a recruiting base, those fighting each other for power used the name of tribes for their personal advantage. Just as with ethnic or clan identity, economic weaknesses among the population were pounced upon by the faction leaders to entice the fighters to join their factions. The faction leaders would lead their men to lucrative areas then fill the other clans with envy and fuel the conflict even more. The political angle in the conflicts also remains a key factor fuelled by the fight to control both scarce and abundant resources.

In Somalia, political opposition was stifled. The modern conflict started out over the rule of Siad Barre. Dissidents of the Barre regime had gathered in neighbouring countries.

¹³⁵ CountryWatch retrieved at: www.countrywatch.com/somalia/ (Accessed on 29th October 2012)

Criticism of Barre was not possible. It was thought Barre had abused the state long enough. The control over the state had become the main prize, The attitude towards the state itself was one of plunder. The state has always been treated as a great treasure chest in which a citizen can grab at everything. That's the way the Marehan (Barre) ran the country since 1978. The danger was always that the Hawiye (Aidid and Ali Mahdi) may decide that it was now their turn, and alienate other clans in the process. That is exactly what happened to fuel the present Somalia conflict¹³⁶.The exclusive control over politics, or the monopolisation of political power, is an important feature of Somalia conflicts. Other power sources are economic and military force. As described above, political power was sought by the factions first, when they invaded the states, second, when they moved to the capital Mogadishu which was the seat of power and third, when they continued the war after the removal of the president against whom they initially fought¹³⁷.

Economic sources of power were brought under control by occupying lucrative parts of the country; agricultural areas, the ports and airports where food aid would arrive and by looting. The re-distributive system, which was not a fundamental break with the past either just as personalised rule was not, created a following for the faction leaders. Barre had ruled Somalia with the aid of a patron-client network which made favours and financial advantage flow down the hierarchy of patrons and clients. The invasions did not question this patron-client system of redistribution but set up their alternative system. As illustrated above, the control over the economic sources of power was relatively easy to achieve because of the physical and tangible nature of economic

¹³⁶ Galtung, J., *Rethinking Conflict: The Cultural Approach, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, 2002 (Council of Europe)

¹³⁷ *ibid*

power, for instance, the occupation of the ports and airports in Mogadishu, Kismayu, Bosaso and Galkacyo have had some of the most intense fighting in the conflict¹³⁸.

To finalize the present conflict, the aim of removing Barre united the opposition forces, they even helped each other. However, once Barre was removed, disagreements between the factions started, the seeds for these divisions had been sowed long before the invasion started. These quarrels did not so much focus on the basis of power but more on who should rule the country. Ali Mahdi pre-empted Aidid by declaring himself interim-president; Aidid could not accept Ali Mahdi's presidency and neither could the other faction leaders. This power wrangling invited other factions and clans to rally support for their claims to power. A proliferation of factions occurred and the conflict seeds were firmly planted¹³⁹.

2.6 Conclusions

Generally, conflicts of different countries take various patterns. In Somalia, the structure of society and the clan had created the conflict. It is also the precipitous decline of the constraining role which the household economy played in the social affairs of the community, as well as the rise of an influential minority (Barre and his clan) whose command of the state machinery "liberated" them from the rules of the Xeer (the clan and kinship conventions) and the values of Islam, which led to the Somali calamity.

This could have been compounded by the mythical nature of the clan system, which was not based on factual history but on a cultural construct of nomadic life in

¹³⁸ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: Can the Crisis be Contained?* Africa Report No.116, 2006, pp 9-15

¹³⁹ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State* Africa Report No.147, 2008, pp 9

Somalia, which could find little foundation in real blood relationship. However, as noted above, clan identity was flexible and learned. If one belongs to one clan in one situation and to another in a different situation, how can clans fit into a social network? If clan membership rests on a network, it could be called upon.

In summary the conflicts in Somalia have all along appeared to be resource conflicts to the extent that the economic advantages of the war economy are used to keep the war machines going. The conflicts were not simply about economics. The money that was made in the war economy was re-distributed and the fighting over political and economic advantage overlapped. Economic opportunities were used and the profits made were invested in new weaponry by the faction leaders. With increased strength on the battlefield, the factions could capture more aid and extend their influence as a force to be reckoned with.

CHAPTER THREE

YOUTH IN PROCESSES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF SOMALIA 2000-2011

3.1 Introduction

The study looked at the various ways in which the Somali Youth have been involved in both conflict and peace. This chapter presents findings of the study in which both primary and secondary data were collected and collated to main questions of the study; “in what ways was the participation of youth critical to the conflict management processes in Somalia between 2000 and 2011”? What are the enablers and obstacles to the effective participation of Somali Youth in the Conferences and other local Conflict Management processes? What were the contributions of Somali Youth in the Peace and Reconciliation conferences that took place in Galckayo, Garowe and Hargeisya Djibouti (2000 and 2008/2009) and Kenya 2002-2004)? From the responses in face-to-face interviews, key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions, and self administered questionnaires, these questions were fully exploited to come up with documentary evidence that youth were either involved or scantily involved in the processes and that a lot needs to be done to fully integrate them into the peace and reconciliation processes.

The research for this study was undertaken between July and October 2012. Data collection was done physically and electronically in Nairobi, Somalia and from the Somali Diaspora community. A set of questions were developed to guide interviews and elicit responses. Six key informants (three male, 2 female and one youth leader) were selected to

give their opinions of the peace processes as they experience them, highlight youth participation and the dynamics of the same. Thirty youth were selected to respond to a self administered questionnaire, and two Focus Group discussions were undertaken in Hargeisa and Nairobi. The researcher¹⁴⁰ applied observation in her work with various stakeholders in Somalia which also provided anecdotal evidence that was corroborated and/or clarified in the course of the research. Secondary data collection involved reviewing and analyzing documented reports and publications and unpublished material on the various Somali peace processes and young people's involvement in the same.

Youth, as a social category in conflict and peace processes, is better understood if variables such as ethnicity, religion, race, gender, class and exposure to violence are taken into account. In both conflict and post conflict situations the needs of people affected in various ways have to be taken to account. As this study found out often times, there are those youth, both male and female, who were forcibly mobilized as well as those who volunteered to take part in the violence that necessitated the peace processes. There are those who fought in low intensity conflicts and those who were responsible for destruction of great magnitudes, while there are those who were in a conflict minority and those in a majority, those from poor families and the wealthy, those demobilized to their homes communities and those in refugee camps or displacement camps¹⁴¹. There is a growing recognition of 'the special situation of girls' in warzones. Girls may need to be treated for the mental and physical symptoms of sexual abuse: including sexually transmitted

¹⁴⁰ Joyce Muchena was a Programme Officer for Oxfam in Somalia and worked with various Civil Society Organizations between 2005 and 2012.

¹⁴¹ McEvoy, L. 'Youth, Violence and Conflict Transformation', *Peace Review. A Transnational Quarterly*, 13:1, March: 2001, 89-96.

diseases, war-rape pregnancies, feelings of worthless and shunning by their families and communities¹⁴². Some respondents acknowledged that this is a big issue which affected young woman especially in South-Central areas of Somalia,

It has been observed that youth make different choices (however, socially constructed) about their modes of engagement with society – and even if they engage at all – some choose crime others political activism while some straddle both worlds. As this study revealed, even in the most extreme cases of conflict, some choose to go into hiding or exile while others under a variety of pressures join roaming militias. In low intensity conflicts, in particular, youth involvement in armed struggle may be part-time or fragmentary¹⁴³, a phenomenon that appears to have taken root in several parts of Somalia, especially Puntland.

3.2 Conflict management in Somalia

3.2.1 Local Conflict Management Mechanisms

On the local scene several efforts to have local conflict management through elders and the youth coming together for meetings have not bore fruit. This has taken place with at different times since 1991 with varying degrees of success. Some of these processes addressed the social conflicts while others addressed the political conflicts. Accordingly, the local processes dealt to different degrees on matters dealing with disputes over natural and economic resources. This called for clan elders to handle issues of inter-group

¹⁴² Brett, R and McCallin, M. Children *The Invisible Soldiers*. Stockholm: Radda Barnen, 1996, pp22-24

¹⁴³ McKay, S., and Mazurana, D. 'Girls in Militaries, Paramilitaries, and Armed Opposition Groups'. Paper submitted to International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg, Canada, 2000

breakdown of relations due to displacement of people from their lands and widespread availability of weapons among the people¹⁴⁴.

The South-Central Somalia has perhaps recorded the largest local peace processes with over 90 such cases. They normally involved the local communities' elders managing conflicts over resources, containing violence and commercial contests in Mogadishu and beyond. Local peace processes in the South-central Somalia were centered on the control of such economic hubs as Beledweyne, Mudug and Galgudud regions.¹⁴⁵ The other local processes totaling over 39 in Somaliland and Puntland have also taken place mostly with the local council of elders restoring relations between communities, redistributing stolen property, restoring order, demobilizing militias and establishing governance structures. While broad inclusion of the Somali people was singled out as prerequisite to state-building that would also nurture mutual trust and lasting reconciliation¹⁴⁶ from the key informant interviews conducted, this study found out that not enough attention was given to the involvement of youth as a category of Somali people and how this could best be achieved.

The study however noted a trend of noticeable progress in the way in which the processes shaped up over the years. This study looked at a number of local processes some which fall outside the period under review but which gave insight into the issue under research. One such process reviewed was the 1993 Mudug peace agreement between the

¹⁴⁴ Clarke, W. and Herbst J. "Learning from Somalia: The lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention" Westview Press, 1997

¹⁴⁵ International crisis group: *Negotiating a blueprint for peace in Somalia*. 6 March 2003). <http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1689&l=1> accessed on October 23rd.

¹⁴⁶ Center for Research and Dialogue, Dialogue not Guns, *Promoting Security and Stabilization Among the Communities of South-Central Somalia*, July 2006, pp 8-23.

late General Aideed and the SSDF which established a ceasefire and opened trade routes in the northeast and northwest areas of Somalia¹⁴⁷. The process also involved the local councils in Bay, Bakool and Benadir areas of Somalia operating to varying degrees of constructing a consultative peacebuilding process.

The local peace processes in Somalia were by and large Somali 'owned' since they were locally designed, locally mediated, locally managed and locally financed. In the local processes, there was the benefit of traditional mechanisms of consensus with sufficient timeframe. The process normally involved the use of sanctions against "spoilers" who are bent on disrupting the process. The local processes also had the agreed joint security and popular endorsements to establish implementation of the peace proceedings.¹⁴⁸

Some of the well recognized groups to make local reconciliation efforts include the Somali Reconciliation and Restore Council (SRRC)¹⁴⁹. This was a huge coalition of political groups and leaders, initially held together only by the common thread of Ethiopian Patronage. It composed of: a) Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) led by Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shatigaduud". b) Hussein Aideed (son of the late General Farah Aideed who fought UN during the operation "Restore Hope") with his militia. c) General Morgan, who commanded the Majerteen militia currently based in Bakool region. d) The Abgal/ Warsangeli clan militia led by Mohamed Dhere who declared himself Governor of Middle Shabelle region. e) The Biimal clan, based in the Merka area and in Lower Jubba

¹⁴⁷ Menkhaus, K. 1999. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary African Crises: Theory and Praxis from the Somali Experience" in William Zartman (ed) *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, pp. 183-89

¹⁴⁸ Bradbury, M. (2008) *The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study*, PDRC, pp56-

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¹⁴⁹ Luling V. *Come back Somalia? Questioning a collapsed state*, *Third World Quarterly* 18 (2), 1997, pp.287-302

region. f) The late Abdullahi Yusuf: the Puntland administrator and the most influential figure in the SRRC¹⁵⁰.

Another opposition front was Group of eight (G-8), a coalition set in Southern Somalia (especially in Mogadishu). They were openly opposed to the TNG administration but, on the other hand, were neither clients of the Ethiopian patronage. They allied not because of a common interest, but rather because they concluded that collectively, they are a more powerful opponent to the larger militia groups in Mogadishu. The Business community empowered during the UNOSOM operation turned out to be the real nexus of power, with the Mogadishu business community considered the most powerful in Somalia at that time¹⁵¹.

Despite the fact that Somalia is the only country in the Horn of Africa in which the population is almost entirely Muslim, it was her neighbors like Ethiopia and Sudan that are internally religiously divided¹⁵² in which for long time radicalism found a home. However, in the latter years of the conflict this 'Muslim homogeneity' of Somalia would be exploited to woo youths into the various factions. The name Al-Shabaab which means 'the youth' in Arabic is in itself a pointer to the void that left Somalia youths in general, a disfranchised group. From the peace processes mentioned, most of them aim at political stability and there was recognition of the agency of women¹⁵³. The clan militia leaders were used to

¹⁵⁰ Menkhaus, K: *Somalia: a situation analysis and trend assessment* UNHCR Report, (August 2003) pp9

¹⁵¹ Little, P. "*Somalia, Economy without State*" Indiana University Press; Hargeisa: Btec Books, 2003, pp3

¹⁵² Menkhaus, K. *Political Islam in Somalia*, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol 9 No 1 March 2002.

¹⁵³ See for instance, King E.M(ed) *The sixth Clan-Women Organize for Peace in Somalia: A Review of Published Literature*, University for Peace,2004

mobilize their communities for peace and pressurizing elders to reach agreement.¹⁵⁴ The youth interviewed for this study confirmed that their participation was not in their capacity as representatives of the youth but rather as leaders in NGOs who had lobbied for their space in these meetings.

It is important to note that the local processes were not isolated from the influence of external players with Somalis having linkages through Diaspora, aid and trade. The bottom-up approach and the building blocks approach reinforce the importance of using local reconciliation efforts as successive failures of internationally led efforts have contributed to establishment of local administrations. Such are the local peace processes like Garowe community consultative conference which had clear political objectives creating inter-regional administration and the Idale process which focused on social and reconciliation issues in the Sanaag regions. Other local peace processes created resources redistribution, security between the communities, governance and structural considerations¹⁵⁵

An analysis of their involvement the study noted that the youth (mainly armed young men) were mainly used in key areas of providing security to the clan leaders and doing other fringe works including driving military-like vehicles and taking care of any form of writing in the meetings¹⁵⁶. This kind of involvement as one youth leader observed only served to perpetuate stereotypes about the place of youth in conflict and conflict

¹⁵⁴ Bradbury, M. *The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study*, PDRC, 2008 pp33-37

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*, pp43-47

¹⁵⁶ Del Felice, C. & Wisler, A. The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders. *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue 11*, November ,2007

management, where they are viewed as either victims of mobilization or the perpetrators of violence.

3.2.2 International Mechanisms

There have been several reconciliation conferences aimed at bringing together Somalia's divided population through international efforts at various points during the period under study. Before the turn of the millennium, about 12 international attempts to convene a national reconciliation conference since Somalia's government collapsed and the country was plunged into civil war had been made. Most of these if not all, had failed, and many observers held little hope that any other future ones would succeed. However, the last decade has witnessed three major conferences that have worked towards a major reconciliation effort with varying degrees of success.

3.2.2.1 The Arta peace process, 2000

In May 2000, a reconciliation conference aimed at bringing together Somalia's divided population began in Arta, Djibouti. Djibouti's new president, Ismail Omar Guellah, first mooted the idea of a national reconciliation conference in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1999¹⁵⁷. His plan differed from previous ones in that it focused on 'civil society' — including elders, professionals and intellectuals from Somalia and the Somali Diaspora, as well as the business community and women's groups. The faction leaders, who had held sway for so long in Somalia and who had derailed all previous reconciliation attempts, were conspicuous in their absence. This explains the Arta

¹⁵⁷ Crocker, C.A Hampson, FO and Aall, P *Cooperation and Competition*. In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, 2nd edition, M Deutsch, PT Coleman and EC Marcus(Eds). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2009

conference's (apparent) success and, at the same time, points to its greatest potential weakness.

Given that there was very little agreement among the participants regarding the nature of civil society, and that the decade-long civil war had destroyed almost all social institutions in Somalia, the conference ultimately had to rely on clan as the only commonly acceptable form of social organisation, hence all negotiations regarding the future government and distribution of power were conducted along clan lines.

According to documentation reviewed and interviews undertaken in the course of this study, negotiations at Arta were painfully slow, and it took four months of wrangling before agreement was reached on how power would be distributed. Eventually, power was distributed along clan lines according to a complex formula. Seats in the new transitional assembly were to be divided between the four main clans — the Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle — and further among a multiplicity of sub-clans and sub-subclans. According to information availed by a key informant who participated in this process, it was apparent that clan representatives were chosen not because of the military arsenal under their control, but because they had won the respect of their clans. This was an indicator that the actors were nurturing confidence in the process. The youth were however more visible in the security fronts for the clan leaders and at most they could be said to have provided logistical support and much by way of negotiation.

One of the very well documented dynamics of this peace process as with others was that the business community emerged initially as an offshoot of the faction leaders, controlling the latter's business interests, thereby allowing them to finance their wars. With

time, however, as the business community's ventures grew more successful and expanded, this relationship was inverted. There was less and less money to be made by the faction leaders in the business of war, and more to be made by entrepreneurs operating in the absence of any government regulation. The faction leaders and their militias were often little more than private security guards for businessmen and fully employed male youth either through cohesion or clan affiliation. As these tendencies grew in the late 1990s, businessmen began to free themselves from their relations with the faction leaders and establish their own militias, whose *raison d'être* was no longer clan allegiance but profit¹⁵⁸. In a country that has one of the highest illiteracy levels, business people got militia from among the large numbers of unemployed and untrained youth.

The business leaders are said to have undermined the faction leaders by recruiting their militiamen. The faction leaders, their power weakened by the split with the business community, found access to revenue curtailed and consequently, were no longer able to pay their militiamen who had been defecting to the business community.¹⁵⁹ These shifts in power and resources had the effect of shifting the allegiance among armed male youth, who then participated in meetings attended by their bosses either as bodyguards or as part of private security.

Many observers and political commentators did not expect this conference to achieve any tangible results. The election of the TNG, president and the appointment of an interim government, which also won the support of the international community and the

¹⁵⁸ Lewis, I.M. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. London: Hurst Publishers.2008, pp 18-25

¹⁵⁹ Coleman, P.T. *Cooperation and Competition*. In the handbook of conflict resolution second edition, M. Deutsch, PT Coleman and EC Marcus(Eds). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2006 pp 11-19

vast majority of ordinary Somalis who are desperate for a government — any government - therefore came as a surprise. The interim government further confounded observers by moving into Mogadishu, backed by more than 1 000 militiamen who were recruited and organized by the business community and the Islamic clerics. This show of force was enough, at least momentarily, to silence any attempts by the Mogadishu faction leaders to resist the new government by force¹⁶⁰

The respondents from field research showed that while the society was generally euphoric about this outcome and the youth (both male and female) were part of the humpty-dumpty that followed the outcome of this process they were clearly not so on the negotiating table as a distinct group. Decision makers in the process of the Arta peace process were the clan elders and in this case, they included the men and women, media representatives and just a few youths representing other interest groups like NGOs. The youth were therefore found not to play an active role and some respondents identified resources as a barrier in this, as most of the young people 'have no funds of their own and their sources of income are quite limited'. During the Arta peace conference, the youth were again used as fringe actors in security roles. The agenda for youth would most likely involve education and creation of viable environment for business exploitation.¹⁶¹

3.2.2.2 The Eldoret/Mbagathi Peace Process, 2002-2004

On 27 October 2002, Somali political leaders gathered in the Kenyan town of Eldoret signed a new declaration that envisaged an end to the protracted crisis in their country.

¹⁶⁰ Mayer, B.S. *Beyond Neutrality Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2004, pp12-17

¹⁶¹ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004., pp 34-43

After more than a decade as the only country in the world totally devoid of a functioning central government and no less than twenty unsuccessful national-level peace initiatives since 1991, the Eldoret Declaration raised hopes that a resolution of the Somali crisis was within reach¹⁶². The East African regional organization the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – represented a unique opportunity to restore governing institutions and move Somalia towards peace. The framework for the dialogue that was still needed was sound and comprehensive, most major political movements (with the exception of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the Northwest of the country) were represented, and key members of the international community had been closely engaged at every step.

Monitoring visits by the International Crisis Group to Eldoret in November 2002 found that the process still faced considerable difficulties. A combination of mismanagement, regional rivalry, insufficient outside political support and financial constraints almost brought the talks to the verge of collapse. Somali delegates were frustrated and disillusioned with the lack of progress that followed the Declaration¹⁶³. Donor representatives expressed deep misgivings with one Nairobi-based diplomat stating that the process had made progress ‘in spite of itself’.

The Eldoret process was salvaged through an extension to Mbagathi, Nairobi Kenya. Most Somali delegates were committed to moving forward¹⁶⁴. Literature on this

¹⁶² Mayer, B.S. *Beyond Neutrality Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass., (2004) pp 22-27

¹⁶³ Menkhaus K. *Warlord and Landlords*, non-state actors and humanitarian norms in Somalia, draft paper presented at the curbing human rights violations by armed groups conference, Liu Institute of Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Canada, 14 – 15 November 2003

¹⁶⁴ Menkhaus, K. *Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism*. London: Routledge. 2004, pp5-12

process captures the mood at the conference at that time; “this process is different from all the others, people realize that they cannot achieve what they want through force” this was a quote from a senior figure in the Puntland administration (in the Northeast). However, as the conference entered its second, main phase of negotiations, a number of measures needed to be taken urgently. Visible and sustained international political support for the conference – including readiness to adopt and implement targeted sanctions against recalcitrant warlords and to enforce the international arms embargo were not easily achievable. Rivalries between regional powers needed to be addressed and conference management improved.

The Mbagathi Peace Conference was convened at a time when the international situation was greatly altered by the September 11 events. Lewis¹⁶⁵ alleges that the Mbagathi peace process repeated all the mistakes of the previous peace processes which never enjoyed popular support in Somalia. It was within this context of the post- 9/11 that failed states were perceived to be a safe haven for international terrorists, that the conference was held, thus influencing the manner in which the Somali conflict was viewed by the then Bush administration, which subsequently influenced countries of the region.

Menkhaus¹⁶⁶ challenges the conventional wisdom that collapsed states constitute a safe haven for international terrorists by arguing that Somalia appears to have all the ingredients for an ideal safe haven for Al Qaeda by suggesting that researchers may have been partially mistaken in their assumption about the relationship between terrorism and collapsed states. Significantly, he asserts that terrorists preferred and found safety in weak

¹⁶⁵ Lewis, I.M. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. London: Hurst Publishers.,2008, pp 12-15

¹⁶⁶ Menkhaus, K. (2004) *Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism*. London: Routledge, pp 45-49

states with youths who had disillusionment with the fragile government. In fact, transnational criminal and terrorists have found zones of complete state collapse like Somalia to be relatively inhospitable territory from which to operate. Instead they flourish in states where the institutions of governance are weak and easy to corrupt especially with the unemployed youth, unschooled population and absentee parents who cannot act as guide or mentor to their youth¹⁶⁷.

The argument can be made that the Mbagathi peace process's main content was to address the international perception about collapsed states and their relations with international terrorism, more than resolving what was setting Somalis apart. Mediation failed to establish the sources of the conflict, which this paper argues are mainly agricultural land, water and grazing land. Clearly, there was no place for the youth in the processes and this was a major concern for scholars in the field of peace reconciliation. The Somali way of life revolves around these three issues and a failure to address them will perpetuate the conflict further. The Mbagathi process produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)¹⁶⁸. According to Brons (2001), Somali conflict resolution mechanisms are embedded in the clan structure, hence perhaps a confederation of clans with regard to the Mbagathi process. The field findings point to clan elders, clan women groups and Diaspora that was also clan based.

¹⁶⁷ Menkhaus, K. *Political Islam in Somalia*, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol 9 No 1 March 2002., pp 26-29

¹⁶⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), Somalia: to move beyond the failed state, *Africa Report* 147, Nairobi/Brussels, 23 December 2008, 10

Though the Mbagathi process made an assumption to deal with the clan political structure, it failed to give meaning to this political statement. Van Notten¹⁶⁹ in locating the clan structure argues that the Somali nation is organised as a confederation of sovereign families. These sovereign families are without clear demarcated territories. It is difficult to create clan border areas in a situation where the population is constantly on the move in search of grazing land and water. The Somali migration patterns have always been informed and influenced by the search for grazing land and water with regard to the pastoralist clans and arable agricultural land in the case of sedentary clans. To this end it has been argued that identities which derive from production patterns are a critical component of the Somali body politics.

The Somali conflict is all about means of survival, which in this case are resources such as ports, pasture and water in the nomadic setting, and other land in the farming setting. These are issues which the mediation needed to pay more attention to in order to ensure sustainable peace¹⁷⁰. However, the Mbagathi-Eldoret did not pay much attention to the youth issues and at the very least, the youth were not fully represented at the meetings. It was noticeable that even the few youths who attended the meetings were from the Diaspora as few local Somalia youth could afford to easily participate in the expensive process funded by UN agencies and other players in the international community.

¹⁶⁹ Van Notten, M. *The law of the Somalis*. Asmara: the Red Sea press., 2005 pp 34

¹⁷⁰ Bestemen and Cassanelli: *"The struggle for the Land in Southern Somalia"*. Westview Press, 1996, pp38

3.2.2.3 The Djibouti Process, 2009

Prior to the 2008/2009 peace conference, Djibouti had organized three other Somali peace conferences, two in 1991 and one – the Arta Process – in 2000¹⁷¹. This Djibouti peace conference began in May 2008 when, under the auspices of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), members of the TFG and the moderate wing of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) got into peace talks. After the defeat of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), its leaders regrouped in Eritrea and Yemen. The reconstituted UIC finally transformed itself into what became known as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007. This organization was a broad coalition of former leaders of the UIC (Sheik Sharif and Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys), as well as Islamists, disaffected TFG parliamentarians and the Diaspora. The stated aim of the group was to fight the Ethiopian occupation forces and the TFG¹⁷².

The ARS leaders lived in Asmara, Eritrea, for a while but then became divided on how to approach the issue of talks with the TFG. The hard-line group led by Sheik Aweys opposed any talks with the TFG led by President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Ade; the moderate group under Sheik Sharif favored entering into negotiations with the TFG. As a result of their differences, the majority of the moderate elements led by Sheik Sharif decided to relocate to Djibouti. The breakup of the ARS reflected the divided opinion of those who wanted to hold peace talks with the TFG and those who wanted to continue fighting until an Islamic state has been established in

¹⁷¹ Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, *The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: results and problems*, *Journal of Contemporary African Affairs* 28(3) (2008), 272.

¹⁷² Jakkie Cilliers, Henri Boshoff and Festus B Aboagye, *Troop surge in Somalia won't solve anything*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010, pp 65

Somalia. The relocation of the moderate wing of the ARS paved the way for the start of the 15th peace and reconciliation conference for Somalia between the ARS-D and the TFG¹⁷³.

This process was composed of four rounds of negotiations between the TFG and ARS-D, resulting in three agreements. The process was initiated against the backdrop of mounting Ethiopian military woes, the escalating insurgency, the worsening humanitarian crisis, and the TFG's inability to consolidate its authority. Thus there was 'a genuine consensus that the only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists, eventually leading to a power-sharing accord'. The overall aim of the architects of the process was 'to create a powerful political alliance, capable of stabilizing the country, marginalizing the radicals and stemming the tide of Islamic militancy'¹⁷⁴.

The first round of negotiations began on 9 May 2008 and lasted a week. The atmosphere was highly charged with delegates refusing to meet face to face, let alone staying in the same hotel. The ARS-D feared that its participation would be portrayed as tacit acceptance of the TFG's legitimacy. It presented the following demands: an Ethiopian withdrawal with a clear timetable and an international guarantee; accountability for war crimes/justice/compensation/reparation; a multinational peacekeeping force with predominantly Muslim troops; and a power-sharing deal which would be discussed after the Ethiopians had pulled out. The TFG had three key positions: it was the legitimate and internationally recognized government; the Ethiopian withdrawal was contingent on a

¹⁷³ Little, P. "*Somalia, Economy without State*" Indiana University Press; Hargeisa: Btec Books, 2003, pp16-27.

¹⁷⁴ Jakkie Cilliers, Henri Boshoff and Festus B Aboagye, *Troop surge in Somalia won't solve anything*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010. pp29-36

political settlement and the deployment of a multinational force; and the opposition must lay down its arms and renounce all forms of violence¹⁷⁵.

The two sides made claims and counter-claims with the ARS-D claiming that it controlled 95 per cent of south-central Somalia and that it was more legitimate than the TFG, while the latter in turn claimed that it was the constitutionally legitimate government of Somalia, and thus had veto powers over the process. In the end, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, managed to get both sides to tone down their rhetoric and designate chief negotiators. The ARS-D designated Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and the TFG Ahmed Abdisalaan Adan¹⁷⁶.

The third round of negotiations started on 25 October and ended on 26 October 2008 with the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation. The accord broadly dealt with two specific issues, namely the declaration of a ceasefire and the relocation of the Ethiopian troops. It provided for a phased security arrangement in which a ceasefire would begin on 5 November 2008, followed by the deployment of a joint ARS-D/TFG force in Mogadishu and other sectors by 10 November 2008. To complement these arrangements, the accord envisaged a 10 000-strong joint ARS-D/TFG police force to be trained and equipped by the international community. This force would eventually fill the

¹⁷⁵ Crocker, C.A Hampson, FO and Aall, P .*Cooperation and Competition*. In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, second edition, edited by M Deutsch, PT Coleman and EC Marcus. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass , 2009, pp19-23

¹⁷⁶ Harper, M. *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. London, Zed Books, 2012, pp 23-29

security vacuum left by the departing Ethiopian troops, whose phased withdrawal was envisaged to begin on 21 November 2008¹⁷⁷.

The fourth and last round of negotiations began on 22 November 2008 with a workshop on the issues of justice and reconciliation in Somalia. The Working Group on Justice and Reconciliation at the workshop drew representatives from the international community (from selected member states, including Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, the United Kingdom and the United States), international and regional organizations (including the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights and UNPOS) and international non-governmental organizations (such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue), members of the ARS and TFG, Somali civil society, and experts¹⁷⁸.

IGAD intervened at both council of ministers and heads of state levels to reconcile Yusuf and Nur Ade but with no success. For example, on 29 October 2008 the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Nairobi and issued a stern declaration with regard to Somalia by expressing their 'profound concern regarding the political paralysis in Somalia contributing to the continuing deterioration of the security situation in the country as well as to the near hopelessness of the existing situation with respect to achieving the objectives of the transition period as evidenced in the complete failure to establish institutions of governance only nine months before the end of the transitional period'. In addition, they regretted 'the lack of unity and unhelpful competition

¹⁷⁷ Lewis, I.M. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. London: Hurst Publishers., 2008, pp 34-36

¹⁷⁸ Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: results and problems, *Journal of Contemporary African Affairs* 28(3) (2008), 272.

among the leadership of the TFIs [Transitional Federal Institutions] as their working at cross-purposes had been the principal factor that had allowed the deterioration of the security situation in the country, and led to lack of progress in the national reconciliation effort'. Despite IGAD's call for the TFIs to work together, disagreements between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Ade continued¹⁷⁹.

The IGAD Council met again on 21 December 2008 and this time expressed its support for Nur Ade while condemning President Yusuf for attempting to appoint a new prime minister. The council noted with serious concern the continued lack of unity and cross-purpose workings among the leadership of the TFIs, and accordingly decided to impose sanctions on President Yusuf's Prime Minister and all his associates immediately¹⁸⁰. The council further supported the intention of the government of Kenya to take action in the form of targeted sanctions against Somali leaders considered to be obstacles to the Somali peace process, including President Yusuf. This decision appeared to have played some part in accelerating the resignation of President Yusuf. He did so on 29 December 2008, thus paving the way for a new presidential election.

3.3 The Role of the Youth in Conflict Management in Somalia

Young people, as members of a dynamic group in society, play a crucial role in positively transforming conflict situations and in building the foundations of democratic and peaceful societies. As this study found out the Somali Society is not an exception.

¹⁷⁹ Crocker, C.A Hampson, FO and Aall, P *Cooperation and Competition*. in, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, second edition, edited by M Deutsch, PT Coleman and EC Marcus. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2009 pp 41-45

¹⁸⁰ Lewis, I.M. (2008) *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. London: Hurst Publishers., pp23-26

As highlighted throughout this paper, peace building is multidimensional and includes the full range of activities from post-war reconstruction to preventive measures. Peace building encompasses all activities which aim to eliminate or mitigate direct, structural and cultural violence. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation can only be possible if diverse needs, interests and expectations are addressed, and if sincere and future-oriented processes of healing and reconciliation take place. Consequently, the role of youth becomes more relevant from this approach as the emphasis is put on addressing structural causes of violence as well as attitudes and behavior, building on creativity and local capacities¹⁸¹.

Respondents mainly indicated that one of the most generalized ways of perceiving youth is as victims. It is recognized that violent conflict situations have devastating effects on any human being and can be particularly shattering for young people. Youth is “an important period of physical, mental and social maturation, where young people are actively forming identities and determining acceptable roles for themselves within their community and society as a whole. They are increasingly capable of abstract thought and decision-making in new ways. Their sexuality is also emerging, as their bodies continue to change, and they are presented with new physical and emotional feelings, social expectations and challenges.”¹⁸² Violence disrupts this process of maturation and affects young people’s physical and psychological health. One common interpretation of the phenomenon of youth involvement in warfare suggests that

¹⁸¹ Harper, M. (2012). *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. London, Zed Books, pp 34-39

¹⁸² *ibid*, pp 27-35 ,

exceptionally large youth cohorts, referred to as “youth bulges” make countries more susceptible to political violence. Studies suggest that when young people—particularly young¹⁸³ men—are uprooted, unemployed, and with few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to activate violence.

Field responses indicated that workers and educators in several contexts suggest that there are many youth who are peace-builders. They are pro-active agents in their communities, in their schools, work places, sports teams, youth groups and universities. The youth¹⁸⁴ in this study have witnessed injustice and, rather than becoming hopeless and apathetic, or perpetrators of direct violence, have chosen to work for social change. In this case, youth take up the role of a generation of adults who are either hopeless, too comfortable to change or incapable of implementing transformation. Both young men and women involved in this study agreed that young people should have access to training opportunities in conflict transformation, mediation, negotiation skills, facilitation of group decision making processes, project and organizational management and other themes of their interest and/ or relevant to their social contexts¹⁸⁵. The need for psychological support, economic and career development facilities was also highlighted as necessary for equipping youth with the capacity for active citizenship, which will in turn enhance their scope of participation in all processes of development including conflict management at different levels.

¹⁸³ International Crisis Group (ICG), Somalia: to move beyond the failed state, *Africa Report* 147, Nairobi/Brussels, 23 December 2008, 10.

¹⁸⁴ Van Notten, M. *The law of the Somalis*. Asmara: the Red Sea press, 2005 pp 11-13

¹⁸⁵ Sutterlin, J.S. *The United Nations and the maintenance of international Security*, 2nd edition. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003, pp 21-16

3.4 Conclusions

From the interviews and questioning of various stakeholders in Somalia, it was conclusive that the youth can be very productive if there is spread of peer education in which young people especially teenagers spend a lot time with their friends, and on many occasions they listen more to them than to their parents or teachers. Clan elders also acted as an influence to the youth since no mass action can take place without the blessings of these elders. According to the field research, the clan elders were the source of wisdom to the youth and also the main hindrance to their development. They also have a greater flexibility and openness to new ideas¹⁸⁶. They can build bonds and relationships easier with other young people to overcome old barriers. The key to success is allowing youth the space, time and trust to take up the initiative. Similarly youth participation should be encouraged at all levels of social interaction, from the neighborhood, school, and local community to the national and international levels in a multi-track diplomacy approach. They should be given responsibilities according to their capacities and be taken seriously.

In particular there should be an emphasis on advocacy such that young people should learn from other movements' histories and achievements. In this respect, the efforts that led to Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council of October 31st 2000, which recognizes the role of women in peace-building, is an example to follow. A similar resolution would help to raise awareness and develop processes towards the inclusion of young people in peace-building. Somalia as a stabilizing country require gender

¹⁸⁶ Richard Cornwell, *Hopes for a settlement in Somalia fade*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1 August 2008, pp 32-37

mainstreaming where processes and decisions should be analysed taking into consideration how different generations are involved. Different generations have different opportunities, roles and needs¹⁸⁷, and thus political decisions affect them differently. This analysis should not be only restricted to how young people are treated in conflict situations but rather how are they treated in general in society. Partnerships between adults and youth should be fostered. Information technology could be used such that young people are attracted by and easily learn to use ICTs to support and improve their work and extend their outreach¹⁸⁸. This would lead to networking and self-organization where young people create networks, mutual support structures and common platforms for advocacy, sharing resources, know-how and ideas.

¹⁸⁷ Lewis, I.M., *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. London: Hurst Publishers. 2008, pp11-18

¹⁸⁸ Harper, M. *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. London, Zed Books, 2012 pp 19-26

CHAPTER FOUR

YOUTH IN PROCESSES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of the findings recorded in chapter three in regard to the place of youth in conflict management in Somalia. There have been various players in the conflict from its historical foundations in which competing European powers took control of a share of the Somali inhabited territory¹⁸⁹ to the subsequent independence and merger to form the Somali Republic, to the serious challenge to reconcile the different systems of administrations inherited from the two colonial backgrounds and the various political/power brokers at stages of the conflict thereafter.¹⁹⁰ This study found out the main actors in the Somalia Conflict Management processes, are the elite who often enjoy the blessings of powerful clan lords.

Apart from the SYL discussed in chapters one and two, another example of radical youth involvement in political processes was when in 1982 a popular uprising was led by high school students started in Hargeisa and other major towns of the then Northern regions of Somalia¹⁹¹. This was in part triggered by the imprisonment of group of young professional, the UFO Group, who mobilized themselves to do something about the neglect of social services and the political marginalization of northern regions. The military dictatorship had no tolerance for opposition real or perceived and hence brutally

¹⁸⁹ Burton J.W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp 20-25

¹⁹⁰ Tongeren V.P., et al (eds) *People building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Lynne Reiner (Publishers 2005), pp 6-7

¹⁹¹ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011)

confronted the youth demonstrations and cracked down on the professionals and subsequently handed them down severe prison terms. It imposed emergency laws on all Isaaq territories and designated them as enemies of the state, especially after the Somali National Movement which was Isaaq based started armed incursion from across the border with Ethiopia¹⁹². One respondent for this research was a man who was among the demonstrators who now uses literature and youth outreach to nurture a generation of peace builders.

Most of the players in Somalia conflicts involved armed movements against Siyad Barre led by strong military men who would not even consider holding a democratic congress, let alone giving up the leadership. Examples include, General Caydiid of USC; Colonel Cabdillahi Yuusuf of SSDF and Colonel Ahmed Omer Jees of SPM. In post Barre Somalia, Somalia became a free-for-all environment with war lords, foreign peace-keepers, the Diaspora community and NGOs both local and International all claiming the tag of peace builders of one kind or other.

4.2. Emerging Issues

4.4.1 Strategies employed by the youth in conflict management in Somalia

The role of the youth in relation to process of peace-building in Somalia is one of gradual transformation continuum in line with the overall conflict transformation process in which the society has been undergoing¹⁹³. The youth are very much engaged in this recovery stage where Somalia society has succeeded to consolidate and sustain peace and to embark

¹⁹² Mwagiru M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 34

¹⁹³ Murithi T., Peace building in Africa in Francis D.J., (ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*.(ZED Books:London, 2008) , pp 45-47

on an unfolding process of democratization and state building. Conflict sensitivity and transformation are key ingredients of Somalia society's psych and are integrated into its approaches to socio-economic development. The youth are also engaged in this process in spite of existence of cultural and legal barriers in having access to the decision-making levels. Some of the strategies the youth have used in the recent past, for example include lobbying for the change of policies that impede their political participation. As this study found out the Somaliland National Youth Organization (SONYO) recorded some success, in late 2011, in getting the constitutional age of vying for public office reduced from 35 to 25 years.

One issue that comes out of this study is that the youth remain a potent structure whose energy can be harnessed positively. Youth in learning institutions and those working in various organizations and companies appeared to have an insatiable thirst for knowledge and skills that would enable them to contribute to the change they so much crave for. In Somaliland youth are very active in the political parties' work. Their role is conspicuous during campaign period when one sees how they embrace the political freedoms and become mobilizing machines of the political parties and candidates. Youth have shown remarkable maturity in handling group sensitivities and diversity of views and political positions of the society¹⁹⁴. They adorn themselves with different colors of the political parties and transcend during the campaign any gender discrimination attitudes. Boys and girls ride together, march together, dance together and rub shoulders when in the political campaigns. There is hardly any experience of youth engaging in political violence

¹⁹⁴ Wallensteen P., *Understanding Conflict Resolution, War, Peace and Global System*, 2002, London, pp9

or intimidation acts in Somalia as has been witnessed in other countries including neighboring Kenya.

In conducting the elections youth play a very important role as: a) polling station officers representing the National Electoral Commission b) as political party observers c) as conflict resolution team member's active outside the polling stations, d) as members of domestic and international observers¹⁹⁵. This is for the youth an active civic duty performance; it gives them sense of engagement and pride as contributing citizens of the development and democratization of their country. Universities have played a significant role in preparing the students for this role.

It is therefore, important to highlight that the youth has taken ownership of the prevailing peace and the democratization process in some parts of Somalia especially the Northern territories of Somaliland and Puntland to some extent¹⁹⁶. They contribute to it, but they also become conscious of their rights and the ample possibilities open to them to organize themselves and to pursue them. The youth in these parts are characterized as one of marginalized sectors of the society in the same categories as women, the disabled and the segregated. In this framework, the youth have initiated organizations and associations which advocate for human rights, for social equity and for good governance. Youth

¹⁹⁵ Murithi T., Peace building in Africa in Francis D.J., (ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*.(ZED Books:London, 2008)

¹⁹⁶ Del Felice, C. and Wisler, A. The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders. *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue 11*, November 2007, 4-5

networks active in these fields have links with international networks individually and through their umbrella organizations¹⁹⁷.

Sport is a very important youth development factor. This is an area that the Somalia society can develop in providing opportunities for the youth in their healthy physical and mental development. The youth of different levels can be empowered to organize their own clubs and youth national bodies should facilitate youth national tournaments, between schools and universities, between regions and among the Horn of Africa region youths¹⁹⁸. Efforts have been made by some clan leaders to ensure youth representation at all levels of government, non-government and community decision making. The strategy should be focusing on cultivating a youth common identity and ownership of its empowerment ambitions across clan, gender, geographic and occupational divisions. This could eventually lead to the formation of youth parliaments in the various polities which works to overcome the constitutional barriers and to coalesce the youth voice¹⁹⁹.

Another emerging issue among the youth is encouraging volunteerism, and youth peer support through promoting programs that encourage and offer community service. The Somalia youth also engage in media through journalism since Youth issues coverage need to be strengthened with youth-led initiatives. By involving young people in the process of designing and implementing sustainability of peace programs, the Somalia people will strengthen peace education in all levels of school curriculum and provide

¹⁹⁷ Hostetler L.L., *Preparing Children for Peace* in Elias R. and Turpin J., (eds) *Re-thinking Peace*, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, 1994, pp202-204

¹⁹⁸ Omar M.O., *Somali: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*. (Somali Publications, Mogadishu 2004), pp9

¹⁹⁹ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004, pp 21-24.

trainings to the young people on peace, security and conflict management.²⁰⁰ Some interesting initiatives in this area have been spearheaded by various local NGOs, usually with the financial support of the UN or International NGOs, across the three polities of Somalia. These initiatives include sporting and training of upcoming youth facilitators as was found to be the case with the youth at the Galkayo Center²⁰¹ organizing reading clubs, literature and poetry as witnessed annually the Hargeissa book Fair since 2007²⁰². The UN-supported Youth at Risk projects implement across Somalia seek to tackle among other ills the fact that young people who are at a productive age, if not positively engaged are vulnerable to mobilization.

4.4.2 Barriers to youth participation in conflict management in Somalia

From the field study, the three most important impediments to the participation by young people in civic activities are lack of employable skill opportunities, lack of employment opportunities and lack of family support all related to poverty and underdevelopment of the Somalia society²⁰³. The youth have no clear right to decide on their ambitions and interests, not within the family and not within the society. This results in lack of communication between the youth, their parents and the elders in society. In an earlier study by Professor Ken Menkhaus, male respondents who did not go to any kind of school show a much lower frustration level. Among the female youth the highest frustration levels are registered by those completing primary school and the lowest by those still in school. The uncertainty in the labour market was also note as a major factor contributing to

²⁰¹ <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/highlights-faits/EquippingSomaliYouth-EquiperJeunesSomaliens2011.aspx?lang=en&view=d> accessed on October 25th 2012

²⁰² <http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastafrica/?p=4828> accessed on October 25th

²⁰³ Ibid pp 34-37

youth's low participation in conflict management.²⁰⁴ This study confirmed this with most respondents indicating the state of unemployment, hence limited access to resources hampered many youths from engaging actively in political processes. It was clear that the rampant cultural and economic frustrations combine with the social frustration of poor education to make the youth almost impossible to participate meaningfully in any conflict management. Not all youth have the morale, physical and economic strength to form a group or awareness campaign for their cause²⁰⁵. This structural exclusion and lack of opportunities faced by young people effectively block or prolong their transition to adulthood and can lead to frustration, disillusionment and, in some cases, engagement in violence.²⁰⁶

The many factors that underlie youth exclusion and lack of opportunity, which are likely to increase youth engagement in violence as evidenced from the field interviews in Somalia. The first one is unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities. The youth form about 70% of the population - the bulk of that available work force - suffers from rampant unemployment and under-employment²⁰⁷. The mainstay of Somalia's economy is pastoral and agro-pastoral sectors, which are essentially quasi-subsistence sectors, where salaried work is not the norm and hence a situation of rampant under-employment prevails. Direct unemployment is more in the urban areas for both schooled and unschooled youths. The situation of unemployment among the Somalia youth is aggravated by the traditional aversion of young males to manual work. Menial jobs as security guards, house boys,

²⁰⁴ *ibid*, pp 31-33

²⁰⁵ Wallensteen P., *Understanding Conflict Resolution, War, Peace and Global System*, 2002, London, pp7

²⁰⁶ Galtung J. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. (Sage: London, 1996) , pp 32-39

²⁰⁷ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011), pp 73

garbage collection, gardening, etc are occupied by immigrants. Somalia government jobs are often occupied by older people, many of whom have passed the retirement age. Since there are no pension and old-age insurances systems, older people continue to occupy job position without any solution in sight to accommodate the youth who are coming out from educational institutions and from rural areas in growing numbers and into an unresponsive labour market²⁰⁸.

The second factor is insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills (as a mismatch between the content of education and job opportunities available can be a source of frustration). While the great enthusiasm from parents and from youth drive strong growth of educational institutions of all levels, the quality of teaching and eventual skills acquired are very deficient. Key informant interviews in the study revealed that, the skills and occupational attitudes acquired by the Somali youth are not matching with the job opportunities in the market. This is noticeable as various colleges were found to spring up with no directional concern for career development²⁰⁹. However the female youth are worse off than their male counterparts as tradition demands that they get into marriage at an early age. This is also complicated or made worse by the religion which allows for multiple marriages normally from an early age of 14 years.²¹⁰

The third factor was found to be weak political participation (as the formal political system often does not provide an outlet for youth to express their needs, aspirations and grievances). The youth in Somalia are well engaged in the realm of the civil society but are

²⁰⁸ Omar M.O., *Somali: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*. (Somali Publications, Mogadishu 2004), pp9

²⁰⁹ Del Felice, C. and Wisler, A. The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders. *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue 11*, November 2007, pp 11-19

²¹⁰ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004.

very much excluded from the political and administrative decision-making processes. The political/cultural exclusion of the young from the decision-making processes has taken root also in the Somali modern political culture. Ambitious young people who aspire to take leadership or political positions have always the age factor to confront. It has been formalized in the Somalia constitution, which limits the ages of candidates to run for parliamentary and presidential elections. These are serious legal barriers, which limit Somalia youth's right to participate in the political process and access to leadership political positions²¹¹.

The fourth factor is social exclusion e.g. access to services (education, health, water, sanitation and housing). There is also a social exclusion perspective to the challenges facing Somalia youth. Somalia social services infrastructure has been totally destroyed in the civil war. The fragile governments have no capacity either to rehabilitate the destroyed educational facilities or to run it and maintain it if revived. Therefore, communities and private individuals started to provide the services, which is a departure from the culture of free education prevailing before the civil war era²¹². Communities have to pay teachers and parents have to pay for their kids to get education from the Quranic kindergarten/madrassa to the university levels²¹³. Poor parents, are therefore, not able to pay for the education of their kids and large portions of the society loose out in this respect. The same is true for all other social services, including health and water supply. According to the interviewed respondents, gone are the days of free healthcare, free

²¹¹ Del Felice, C. & Wisler, A. (note 209), pp 17-25

²¹² Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004., pp22-29

²¹³ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011), pp 34-39

education and free water and sanitation services. And there are no safety net strategies and programmes for the young of the poorer strata of the society to have access to essential social services. Youth groups from the poorer social strata of the society will therefore be more vulnerable to be exploited for youth gangs or drift anti-social trends²¹⁴.

The fifth factor was found to be cultural status e.g. lack of recognition of group's cultural practices, discrimination, loss of status/respect, humiliation/honour, lack of identity. In the Somali culture being young is tantamount to having no rights other than the protection and care of the extended family and clan in case of physical harm. The youth age is not clearly determined in any legal form, and whether somebody is a youth or not is dependent on conception of the beholder and in the context of discourse; it is often a relative concept with no fixed boundaries²¹⁵, which is often employed to sideline or even humiliate a competitor of lesser age or a way perpetuating the gerontocracy culture prevailing in the Somali society.

In the cultural context, the youth are considered to be immature and in need of guidance. This Somali saying tells it all "Nin yari intuu geed ka boodo ayuu talo ka boodaa" – A young man can deliver a sound judgement as much as the height of the bush he can scale in jumping²¹⁶. This means simply the young are not trusted to make sound decisions for themselves and for others; but still male youth have always been allowed to be in the "Shir"- the all-male group meetings, in which decisions are reached and affairs of

²¹⁴ Del Felice, C. & Wisler, A. The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders. *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development Issue 11*, November 2007, pp 17-25

²¹⁵ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004. pp16

²¹⁶ Omar M.O., *Somali: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea. (Somali Publications, Mogadishu 2004) pp7*

the clan are settled. The young are expected to listen and to learn²¹⁷. A critical missing link in this conversation is the issue of corruptibility of elders and the subsequent loss of legitimate respect as corrupt practices are seen as contracting ideal values of a respectable elder.

The influence of clan as the unit of social organization perpetuates the exclusionary culture of youth. Since the revival of Somaliland started with clan power sharing, which gave elders and the traditional leadership a prominent role, it meant that the youth role was put in the backburner. While the peace processes was led by the elders, the youth populated the clan militias and congregated into the notorious “day-day” gangs which terrorized the population in the early 1990s²¹⁸. When war ended as in the early context of Somaliland formation, the youth were neglected and marginalized, many of them feeling that when the war was over, nobody cared about them and they were treated as spent force.

The transition from childhood to adulthood has a crucial gender dimension. During this stage, societal expectations and personal aspirations of young men and women begin to diverge. Young males are likely to gain much more autonomy and mobility while girls begin to experience new restrictions and attitudes, behaviour and conduct. The traditional cultural norms dictate that females are sheltered during the stage of puberty for reasons such as purity and marriageability and for family reputation. In many societies, it is also socially and culturally acceptable for the stage of youth to be longer for young males than

²¹⁷Abdiselam C. F., *Towards the Social Integration of the Militias and Armed youth* in {WSP Somalia Programme, WSP International, Haan Association, London, 2001., pp23-29

²¹⁸ Morton D., *Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influence*, (ed) Vaymerø R., *New Directions of Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict transformation*(Sage London, 1991), pp 11-19

for young females²¹⁹. Young women and girls suffer disproportionately from violent conflict.

The Somali girls in the youth category are subject to all kinds of exclusions, primarily from their own families for protection both from physical harm and for the name of the family. The women folk usually perpetuate it. Many drop out from schools during this period to either get married or await marriage²²⁰. Sometimes the mere fact that girls receive more thorough training in home-based life skills from their mothers and other female relatives makes them indispensable for the family household work and usually render them as second mothers.

The culture, the religion, and the family priority in educating their young all lean on the girl to lose her rights to be empowered as free human being. In fact neither the formal rule of law nor the customary law recognizes or enforces any rights a youth female might have²²¹. However, things are slowly changing, especially in the field of education, where girls' enrolment is rising and also employment in the civil society organizations. The free media, the internet and cheap mobile networks in Somalia are also creating opportunities for the young girls to communicate and to acquire information²²².

4.4.3 The Somali youth as vanguards of conflict management

Despite the many obstacles that the young people of Somalia have to contend with, there are a lot of success stories, to their credit, on issues that directly contribute to a peaceful co-existence in their communities. For the first time in the history of Somalia the United

²²⁰ Tongeren V.P., et al (eds) *People building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Lynne Reiner (Publishers 2005)

²²¹ Galtung J., *Rethinking Conflict: the Cultural Approach, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, (Council of Europe, 2002)

²²² Omar M.O., *Somali: Between the Devil and the Deep Sea*. (Somali Publications, Mogadishu 2004)

Nations Development Programme(UNDP) dedicated its human development report to the theme of youth in it 2012 released in October 2012, asserting that 'Future of Somalia depends on empowering youth'²²³. From the respondents it was recognized that violent conflict situations have devastating effects on the youth and were particularly shattering for young Somalia people. For Somalia youth in perpetual war situations, many are subjected to forced labor, recruitment into armies or militias, and child prostitution. Many more are displaced, separated from their families, or orphaned, and must undertake a long, painstaking processes to rebuild their lives after war²²⁴. Because of violent conflict in the 1990s, young people find themselves heading households, unemployed, their traditional livelihoods are disrupted.

Not only were their daily lives affected, but their futures were also jeopardized; many youth grow up with the weight of hopelessness that influences their adult life choices. The roles of children and youth organisations are not considered in Somalia as part of the solution or as relevant positive actors in the conflict yet they are at the forefront of all the suffering from the continuous conflicts. The lack of children and youth participation in decision-making processes at all levels is also a form of structural violence. Decisions are often made *for* them, but not with them, losing their valuable perspectives and insights²²⁵.

²²³ <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/future-somalia-depends-empowering-youth> accessed October 10th 2012

²²⁴ Menkhaus K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004, pp 17-23

²²⁵ Morton D., *Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influence*, (ed) Vaynere R., *New Directions of Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict transformation*(Sage London, 1991), pp 17-25

On the other hand Somalia youth were seen as violent actors. Some respondents observed that youth who are reared in and into a culture of violence and especially those who have been direct victims of violence will likely use violence as way of dealing with conflict. Extensive field work, provided important evidence of wide youth involvement in conflict, the reasons for that involvement, the processes of induction into armed militias, the activities of children in these groups—as fighters, cooks, spies, couriers, and in providing forced sexual services—and their immediate-term rehabilitation needs once the fighting has ceased²²⁶. Large youth cohorts, referred to as “youth bulges” make countries more susceptible to political violence. Respondents suggested that when young people—particularly young men—are uprooted, unemployed, and with few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to activate violence. This is how Al-shabaab gained a foothold easily into Somalia through utilization of idle youth whom the local elders were not fully utilizing.

Even in a society where there is not wide-scale armed conflict but which experience high unemployment rates and inequality urban gangs appear. Young people group themselves to protect each other from the police, from other groups and to create sources of income, in most cases through illegal activities. The gang's identity is clearly defined and its members express that they feel a sense of “family” who would do anything to protect the group. Further, structural inequalities are at the root of violence-prone youth gangs. The forces of the market economy have encouraged floods of rural migrants to crowd the urban centers, and it is here that youth gangs and urban violence flourish. The

²²⁶ Galtung J., *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, International Peace Institute, Oslo 1978, pp15-22

emergence of youth gangs and youth-led armed groups has been the answer to a system that excludes young people from important conflict management processes. They organize themselves for survival and to conduct illegal activities, all of them with varying degrees of sophistication. They feel powerful and claim to have found their identity in these groups. Research should look into these processes of exclusion and inclusion and reflect on the reasons why young people only find protection, feeling of belonging and power “outside” society in Somalia²²⁷. This remains a reality in many corners of the world and therefore exclusion of the Somali youth has to be analyzed with this dynamic in mind.

4.4.4 Ownership of the Somali Peace Processes

In the past, the main owners of Somalia peace process included the Somali Reconciliation and Restore Council (SRRC) composed of Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) led by Hassan Mohamed Nur “Shatigaduud”, Hussein Aideed (son of the General Farah Aideed who fought UN during the operation “Restore Hope”) with his militia, the Abgal/ Warsangeli clan militia led by Mohamed Dhere who declared himself Governor of Middle Shabelle region, The Biimal clan, based in the Merka area and in Lower Jubba region, and Puntland state players²²⁸. Puntland is a non-secessionist, trans-regional state, it was the unique region in the country which managed to remain without conflict in its territory. Another opposition

²²⁷ Galtung J., *Rethinking Conflict: the Cultural Approach, Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project*, (Council of Europe, 2002)

²²⁸ Abdiselam C. F., *Towards the Social Integration of the Militias and Armed youth in WSP Somalia Programme*, WSP International, Haan Association, London, 2001.

group interested in Somalia peace process was the Group of eight (G-8), a coalition set in Southern Somalia (especially in Mogadishu)²²⁹.

The Business community, empowered during the UNOSOM operation were the real nexus of power, and perhaps the Mogadishu business community is the most powerful in Somalia owning the peace process. For the most of the last decade these Mogadishu businessmen faced the lack of government and security by paying taxes to the warlords in return for their militia protection²³⁰. There was also a small group of Isaaq businessmen in Somaliland. During 1990s they supported Somaliland President Egal, in exchange for their assistance; the President exempted them from having to pay seaport taxes.

The Somali Civil Society which also included NGOs, religious groups, and clan elders²³¹ has been at the center of most peace process. The Ethiopia which has been one of the 'owners' in a country where about half of the population is Muslim, has over the years been concerned with political danger posed by political Islam and has therefore influenced those within the religious fraternity who get to participate in peace initiatives on Somalia²³².

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However Arab states seek a strong and central government in Somalia in order to create a counterbalance to Ethiopia in the region. The Islamic states therefore have a stake in the conflict peace process as well. Similarly, the UN agencies and superpowers have had a big

²²⁹ Mwangiri M., *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management*. CCR Publications, Nairobi 2006, pp 11-20

²³⁰ *ibid* pp24-25

²³¹ Abdiselam C. F., *Towards the Social Integration of the Militias and Armed youth in WSP Somalia Programme*, WSP International, Haan Association, London, 2001., pp 28-35

²³² Mwangiri M., (note 229)pp 27

hand in the process of bringing peace to Somalia and can be rightly said to own the process.²³³ When it comes to participation in conflict management processes, this study found that the exclusion young people has not even been fully acknowledged let alone addressed. For instance while discussing down participants (clans and parties, third parties, elders, leadership, women, Diaspora, local authorities, media and spoilers) to the various local and international peace building processes in Somalia processes a peace study mapping report fails to acknowledge the exclusion of the youth as a category though women and internally displaced population are mentioned and often excluded²³⁴. The need for participation which Burton underscores as one of the most important human needs therefore remains unmet among the majority of the youth in Somalia. The findings of this study point to an unyielding drive by the youth to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level, which could be seen as one of the primary causes of the protracted conflict in Somalia.²³⁵

4.3 Conclusions

In order to have the youth coming on board, the research concluded that several issues should be handled jointly with the input of the youth. Largely reforming weak public governance institutions – the majority of public institutions struggle with inadequate financial, human resources, an outdated administrative and operational mechanism²³⁶. The poor diversity in the economy, coupled with high inflation and limited investment sources – result in a massive unemployment and under employment situation, which affects the

²³³ Morton D., *Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influence*, (ed) Vaynere R., *New Directions of Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict transformation* (Sage London, 1991)

²³⁴ Bradbury, M. *The Search for Peace, A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study*, Interpeace, Somalia Programme, 2009, pp 33-50

²³⁵ John Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979)

²³⁶ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011), pp44-48

youth adversely. Another area includes limited public infrastructure – due to the destruction of so many facilities during the civil war and inadequate public budget. The study also confirmed findings of past research with respondent noting that extensive khat (chewing) addiction – which causes social problems and financial misuse resulting in cash flow out of the country that exceeds the annual national budget is a key factor in youth delinquency. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) – currently one person in five is either an IDP or a returnee²³⁷. Such youth are living on the margins of society, with limited resources and employment opportunities. Of important observation was that gender bias and stereotyping – cultural, social, biological and economic barriers hinder gender equality and was very hard to remove from the minds of Somalia people. To compound the bad situation, the field study has revealed that the Extent of poverty – the per capita income of Somalia citizens is too low both in urban and rural areas making life difficult to Somalia youths.

²³⁷ ibid

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Summary

Chapter one of this study made a case for choice of the research topic. From the literature review it was clear that this area of study is still virgin and a lot more in-depth research and analysis is called for to be able to do justice to the research question. Chapter has traced the Somali Conflict along the history of the country further revealing a gap in deliberate attempts to bring along the voices of the young people in managing conflict as various levels in different times in Somalia, The fact that elders are viewed as the back-bone of conflict management processes under the male-based clan system was confirmed in chapter three. Participation of young people, and more so young women in any political processes including negotiations for peace building, therefore is to be understood in this context. The study finds that resources play a major role in enabling or o impeding processes.

The low access to wealth by a majority of the youth denies them the leverage that comes with the ability to mobilize and facilitate expensive ventures such participation in conflict management processes. The speed at which peace talks are convened was found to be a factor that youth cannot control. This was because of the high expenses of holding such meetings and the long distances of bringing together various clans. The peace processes happened all the time of the year and it made difficult considerations for youth to attend since they are assigned duties either in school or on the grazing fields.

The study finds that the conflict management processes which are meant to launch a lasting peace to enable the Somali leaders to come up with a power-sharing arrangement have borne fruits to some extent. The entry of IGAD and AU their military involvement in the country, maintaining peace in Somalia, introduced a new dynamic in the Somali conflict and has had an effect on the livelihoods²³⁸. A peaceful country would provide the much needed opportunity for all players to craft and implement. This would also address the issue of scant youth involvement which has left them not addressed by the clan elders.²³⁹

This study also finds that independent thinking and engagement is not sufficiently nurtured among the youth. To achieve the kind of active citizenship that will profile the youth as a constituency of conflict managers, there is a need to have a vibrant education system that permits peace dialogue not just as a stand-alone but that is mainstreamed in education system across all levels and all disciplines²⁴⁰. This will also tackled the issue carried from generation to generation through conflict memory, usually carried by those who experienced and took part in it, with grievances being passed to generations hence cementing historical inter-clan rivalries. The final recommendation is therefore that the time to train the on peace and give them opportunities to contribute constructively in various important community events is now and not in the future.

²³⁸ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011), pp13-15

²³⁹ *ibid* pp36-41

²⁴⁰ Freire, P. (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London: Continuum; Freire, P. (1998) *Pedagogy of Hope*, London: Continuum in J. Wood, *Young People and Active Citizenship: An investigation*, PhD Thesis, De Montfort University, 2009 pp 55

5.2. Key Findings

This study found out that young people in Somalia are both victims and perpetrators of conflict and yet they are scantily involved in the peace processes. Given the leverage enjoyed by those with resources and the vehement focus on titled elders as peace interlocutors and protagonist clearly brought out by both the secondary data and primary responses, it did not come as a surprise that the youth of Somalia have fared very well in the peace processes prior to and during the period under consideration. The findings of the study concur with the assertion made several decades ago about young people in Africa by Ake Claude thus,

'the young are often made to feel insignificant in a world that values wealth and power, assets that are not usually accessible early in life' ²⁴¹.

Low levels of education as a result of destroyed learning systems as well as the fight for land resources, which often make it difficult to construct learning facilities for the majority of the pastoral Somalia communities, has left many Somali youth without the chance for a decent education.²⁴² From the field work, the low levels of education to the youth also meant that they grew into adulthood with poor literacy levels making it hard to effectively take part in meetings proceedings leading to further conflicts in successive meetings as there are no proper records for previous meetings.

²⁴¹ Ake, Claude. *WASU in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone*. In the Role of African Students Movements in the Political and Social Evolution of Africa from 1900 to 1975. Paris: UNESCO pp 56

²⁴² UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011)

Key peace processes and the players involved have not had an easy time bringing together the main factions due to the cultural and regional beliefs which are very difficult to change in the Somalia context. Even though religious conflicts have not been an issue in Somalia, divisions have emerged in recent years, regarding political Islam and the risks of radicalization of the youth through the Al-Shabaab and other like-minded groups. Considering the internationalized nature of the Somali conflict and the implications of profiling of such groups as terrorist organizations, engaging with them in conflict management process, either local or internationally-led becomes quite intricate.

Another key finding is that women seemed to have a more participatory role in the peace processes as opposed to the youth. In most cases, they seemed to be the ones providing communication channels even though they are not necessarily at the decision-making table. Given this recognition, women were bound to have an influence on the male decision-makers²⁴³ as opposed to the youth.

It was also observable that while the Somali youth have the spirit of forgiveness it could also block efforts to find the cause of conflict in a situation where psychological healing facilities are limited. This could lead to repressed grievance which could later erupt into revenge conflicts especially in the face of religious extremism and skewed information. It emerged that conflict prevention is not so much entrenched in the youth system meaning that as the youth grow into adults, they have no mechanisms of avoiding conflicts but only try to adhere to the xalay-dhalay principle (principle of forgiveness).

²⁴³ See for Warsame A.M. *Queens Without Crowns: Somaliland Women's Changing Roles and Peace Building*, LPI, 2002

5.3. Recommendations

The Somali Society has to strike a healthy balance so that the country does not find itself in the situation, as one respondent put it, described best by the proverbial old man who realizes much later that *'when I had the energy to do things, I did not have wisdom, when I have the wisdom, I do not have the energy'*²⁴⁴. Youth in-country and in the Diaspora will need to work in collaboration with the current crop of leaders to come up with a comprehensive and inclusive plan for nurturing active and effective youth participation in all areas of the society. This will raise their capacity hence their agency in matters of conflict management.

The various governing structures in Somalia need to put in place education, counseling and rehabilitation for the displaced and conflict affected youth among their population. For this major reconstructive requirement the various polities will need to boost the already existing relationships with neighbors like Kenya and Ethiopia to promote peace and development through investment in educations²⁴⁵.

Foremost, there is need for both quantitative and qualitative research data on youth to help develop sound policies and strategies for youth empowerment interventions. The economic losses of on the uneducated and skilled youth need to be quantified. The multifaceted loss from uneducated girls to the society need to be quantified and qualitatively analysed. Apprentice and internships opportunities to train young researchers in the existing Research Institutions should be nurtured in a proactive way. This will deal

²⁴⁴ A Somali proverb used by a respondent to express the need for deliberate involvement of the youth in all sectors of life and conflict management in particular

²⁴⁵ UNESCO, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and education*. EFA Global Monitoring Report, (UNESCO Publishing 2011)

with the needs and also address structural issues that are at the core of poor participation of the youth in conflict management processes. Since as Galtung asserts structural violence and direct violence, including family violence, are highly interdependent,²⁴⁶ addressing the structural issues affecting the Somali youth will not only dissuade them from participating in violence but also has the potential to steer them towards the use of non-violent means as advocated for by peace practitioners²⁴⁷ to achieve their goals and contribute the countries development.

Limitation of time, scope and space did not permit a very detailed analysis of participation of youth in conflict management processes in Somalia. This study however concludes that the plight of most of the youth in Somalia is dire in many structural and practical aspects. Critical remedial policy and practical actions are required. Nurturing the participation of young people as active citizens in all aspects of the society will build their skills and clout to naturally fit into the roles of peace builders and earn coveted title of *nabadoon*²⁴⁸. The urgency with which the Somali Society needs to address the issues affecting the young people and get them to effectively participate in bringing sustainable peace can be summarized in the adage, "*The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now.*"²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Galtung, Johan. "*Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191

²⁴⁷ Miller C. A. , *Only Young Once*, An introduction to Nonviolent Struggle for Youths, University for Peace, 2006

²⁴⁸ A Somali word for a peace maker/peace seeker which as the study found out is currently reserved almost exclusively for (male elders).

²⁴⁹ Chinese Proverb

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: SELF ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 1-Introduction

I Joyce Muchena am collecting information which will be analyzed to contribute to the final report for an academic Thesis entitled, *Youth in Processes of Conflict Management: The case of Somalia 2000-2011*. This is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the award of a **Master of Arts Degree in International Conflict Management (ICM)** by the University of Nairobi, which I am currently pursuing.

I would like you to assist me towards this end by answering the questions in this questionnaire. The total scope of findings will then be recorded and information you provide will be treated confidentially.

Please do not write your name on this questionnaire.

Part 2: Respondent information

1. In what age group are you
- 19 and under 20 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60+
2. Gender: Male Female

3. Location(please write down where you live currently)

4. Would you rate your highest level of Education to be:

Primary Secondary Tertiary University Graduate Post graduate

7. In terms of your current occupation, how would you characterize yourself?

A Civil Servant Academic A Businessman Farmer

An Elected Official Administrator/Manager A Professional

Technical Expert Journalist Student Pastrolist Fisherman

Part 3: Knowledge on conflicts and actors in conflict in Somalia

1. Which conflicts in Somalia are you aware?(list them in order of year of occurrence)

2. What in your view were the causes of these conflicts in Somalia?

3. Who were involved in these conflicts in Somalia?

4. How were the youth involved in the conflicts in Somalia?

a. As perpetrators

b. Victims

5. How did the participation of the Somali youth in these conflicts begin?

6. What is your opinion were the factors that caused the youth to be involved in the conflicts?

7. On a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 is the least and ten is the highest) indicate what in your view is the rating of the youth:

a) As perpetrators of conflicts.....

b) As victims of the conflicts.....

c) As managers of Conflicts.....

Part 4: Knowledge of peace building initiatives and actors in those initiatives in Somalia:

1. Which peace building initiatives in Somalia are you aware of?(list them in order of year of occurrence)

2. Who were involved in these Somalia peace building efforts?

3. How were the youth involved in these peace building initiatives in Somalia?

4. How did the participation of the youth in these peace initiatives begin?

a. As mediators

b. As parties

5. What is your opinion were the factors that led the youth to be involved in the peace building initiatives?

Part 5: Recognition of the role of youth in peace building in Somalia and their effective involvement :

1. List down instances when youth have been recognized as peace makers in Somalia.

2. Who recognized them?

3. In what ways can the youth become effectively involved in conflict management and peace building in Somalia?

Thank you very much for your time

APPENDIX II: KEY INFORMANT AND FGD GUIDE

Part I-Introduction

I Joyce Muchena am collecting information which will be analyzed to contribute to the final report for an academic Thesis entitled, *Youth in Processes of Conflict Management: The case of Somalia 2000 and 2011*. This is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of an award of a **Master of Arts Degree in International Conflict Management (ICM)** by the University of Nairobi, which I am currently pursuing.

I would like you to assist me towards this end by responding to the below. The total scope of findings will then be recorded and information you provide will be treated confidentially.

Please do not write your name on this questionnaire.

Part II-Bio data (for the FGDs the general characteristics of the participants were noted)

Age _____ Gender _____

Location: _____

Part III-Questions

1. Which Somali peace building/conflict management processes (both local and international) are you familiar with? (mention then in order of dates)
2. Who were the main players in these peace building/ conflict management processes?
3. What role did the youth(both young men and young women) play in these peace building/ conflict management processes
4. What are/were the enabling factors to the participation of youth (both young men and young women) in these peace building/ conflict management processes?
5. What are/were the barriers to the participation of youth (both young men and young women) in these peace processes?
6. What recommendations would you make for effective participation of youth(both young men and young women) in peace building/conflict transformation processes in Somalia

Thank you very much for your time