

**THE IMPACT OF THE EXTERNAL ACTORS AND THEIR
INTERESTS IN THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESSES (2000-2004)**

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BY

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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Abstract

This study examined the impact of external interests on the Somali peace processes through a close look at the last two peace processes, Arta and Mbagathi, respectively hosted by Djibouti and Kenya. It made an attempt to establish the main external factors and interests that had ruled against the attainment of lasting settlement in the Somali conflict despite various initiatives made to this end. The study made use of extensive consultations with diplomats, academicians and politicians; both Somalis and non-Somalis, and reviewed vast literature on the subject of study.

The study found out that there are layers of external actors who took an interest in the conflict or in its management acting out of security, geopolitical, cultural, economic and humanitarian concerns. The relationship between the conflicting parties and their sponsors abroad, colonial relations, weapons, aid resources, the issue of terrorism are, among other things, identified as some of the factors that internationalised, exacerbated and prolonged the conflict.


The study attributes the shortcomings in the Somali peace process to three major factors; First, the Somali factions who dominated the Somali peace processes in the last several years possess neither functional hierarchy nor represent a coherent ideological position or political platform. They multiply in number by the day and continue to shift alliances. It is hard to imagine to work out a solution in such situation even with the best intentions of the external parties; secondly, the regional competitions within neighbouring states has resulted in proliferation of parallel initiatives which supplanted rather than supplement each other. The regional tension replicated by political cleavages inside Somalia exacerbated the volatile internal situation; thirdly, Somalia remains very low on the priority of the major world powers. The peace building objectives of the United States and the European Union - if there are any - are weak and heavily reliant on IGAD which is divided among itself and has no resources and leverage in terms of carrots and sticks to induce a settlement in the Somali conflict.

The study recommends that the Somali leaders seek credibility and legitimization from within the country not from outside and through external patronage. It also urges IGAD to push ahead the consensus that apparently emerged within the sub-region towards the Somali peace process in the last part of the Nairobi talks. This unprecedented cooperation has created a new momentum and hope for both Somalis and international community and needs to be consolidated.

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other college, institution or university other than University of Nairobi for academic credit.



30th November 2004

Khalif Hassan Farah

Date

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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed university supervisor.



8th Jan 05

Dr. Josephine Odera

Date

DEDICATION

To my wife and children

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I am thankful to Allah for His guidance and the countless mercies he bestowed on me. Only with His help are achievements possible, and without His company all efforts are doomed to fail. Alhamdu Lillaah !

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Khalif H. Farah
University of Nairobi,
November, 2004

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	African Caribbean Pacific Countries
AU	African Union
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task-Force –Horn of Africa
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of West African States
EPRDF	Ethiopia Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
G-12	Group 12
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICSS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IFC	IGAD Facilitation Committee
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Draught and Development
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
IRIN	Integrated Regional Integrated News
KCCT	Kenya College of Communication Technology
LAS	League of Arab States
LGS	Liaison Group on Somalia
MPs	Members of Parliament
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Salvation Council
OAU	Organisation of African Union
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference

OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
ORH	Operation Restore Hope
RAP	Rapid Assistance Program
RRA	Rahenwein Resistance Army
SACB	Somali Aid Coordination Body
SADC	South African Development Council
SCS	Standing Committee on Somalia
SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNF	Somali National Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SACB	Somali Aid Coordination Body
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TC	Technical Committee
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNC	Transitional National Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
TNSC	Transitional National Salvation Council
U.S	United States
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNCAS	United Nations Consolidated Air Service
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNSONM United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID United Nations Agency for International Development
USC United Somali Congress
USF United Somali Front

CHAPTER ONE

External Responses to Somali Conflict

Introduction

Somalia presents a classic example of a failed state. Fourteen years after the collapse of the state, Somalia is the only country in the world without a government. The Somali conflict has been rightly described by Uganda's president as a "slow genocide"¹. United Nation's Secretary-General also described the Somali situation as one of the most dangerous environments in which the UN operates: the peace process as "incomplete" and "stymied", and regional neighbors as divided over the way forward².

The Somali conflict is one of the complex conflicts in the post cold war era, and responding to such conflict needs a concerted and well-coordinated effort to bring about peace to the country. However, external intervention in Somalia's peace process has so far lacked consensus on how to achieve peace in Somalia and, sometimes, even well-intentioned efforts have had undesired consequences. This is manifested by IGAD's inability to forge a common approach towards the management of the process, sometimes for reasons that have nothing to do with Somalia.³ The IGAD states have used divergent approaches in line with their different interests to the management of the conflict in Somalia. Deep and persistent rivalries within these states have rendered peace efforts fruitless and done much to sustain and exacerbate the Somali crisis.

This study focuses on the management of the peace processes in the period between 2000 and 2004 which marks certain interests and events impacting on Somalia and the process. Firstly, it marks the beginning of the new Millennium in which hopes to achieve peace in

¹ "Somali talks begin despite raw", BBC News, January 2004 quoted in ICG Africa Report No 79, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, 4 May 2004.

² "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia" (S/2002/189

³ ICG, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, Africa Report No 70, 4 May 2004.

Somalia were attached. Indeed, the president of the Transitional Government who was elected in Arta was among the world leaders who attended the Millennium Summit at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in September 2000.

Secondly, the regional differences crystallized into a showdown of exerting influences on the Somali peace process through direct intervention and the use of surrogate forces. Ethiopia and Djibouti, two of the immediate neighbors of Somalia, differed on how the Somali peace should be managed with the former contesting the outcome of the Arta process and the latter disapproving the management of the Mbgathi process, at least for the first one and half years, and pulling from it temporarily as a member of the Technical Committee which has been guiding the process. The two processes have been the most substantive, widely participated reconciliation conferences that raised some hopes that peace for Somalia is in the horizon. The two processes also provide unique features and aspects in terms of external influences as well as the inherent weaknesses and strengths of the IGAD sub-regional organization in the management of the Somali conflict.

Thirdly, September 11 attack on the United States brought about some security concerns stemming from suspected terrorist elements allegedly operating inside Somalia. This generated relatively greater external interests in the Somali peace process. This renewed interest partly explains the fact that almost all external stakeholders including all IGAD member states, Arab League, European Union, United Nations and African Union participated in different ways in the recently concluded Somali peace talks in Kenya.

Background to the Somali Peace Processes: Actors, Interests and Impacts

Following the collapse of the state, Somalia has become an international commodity⁴- an object of international manipulation- and had no means of exercising its sovereignty to choose the course of its reconciliation and reconstruction, thus being at the mercy of the international community. The outbreak of the civil war in Somalia in 1990 coincided with

⁴ Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (London: Lynne Renner Publishers, 1993), p. 13

the end of the cold war which diminished external interests in non-strategic conflicts like the one of Somalia. For instance, it took 18 months for the United Nations to respond in any meaningful way to the Somali crisis. The crisis in the Gulf, Balkans, and the neighboring Ethiopia had consumed much of international attention. .

However, while the Western countries generally maintained a low-level engagement in Somalia confining themselves to humanitarian roles, regional states had led the peace initiatives. All Somalia's immediate neighbors- Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti- have made some attempts to mediate the conflict. Other extra-regional actors, including Egypt, Libya, Yemen and the UN have also intervened at different times to broker a settlement.

In 1991, Djibouti government hosted the first two reconciliation conferences with the Support of Egypt and Italy. While Djibouti wanted to restore peace in Somalia, Italy and Egypt, on the other hand, maintained close relations with Siyad Barre's regime until his fall and wanted their protégés to fill the power vacuum. The major internal actors and parties to the conference were six armed and non-armed factions. The conference declared a new Somali government led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a businessman and moderate politician who was favored by Italy and Egypt over his rival, General Aideed. General Aideed, the chairman of United Somali Congress (USC) which ousted-Siyad Barre contested the outcome of the Djibouti conference and the appointment of Ali Mahdi alleging Italy and Egypt of masterminding a plot to alienate him from the leadership of the country. Ethiopia and Eritrea which are led by former guerilla leaders representing what was termed the "young generation of African leaders" vying for influence in the Horn of Africa region tacitly supported Aideed's claim for power. The outcome of Djibouti conference split the USC and led to a bloody 4-month confrontation between General Aideed's supporters and those of the interim president.

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During 1993 and 1994, the United Nations organized four ill-fated peace conferences; three in Addis Ababa and one in Nairobi. In March 1993, the United Nations, assisted by the United States and Ethiopia apparently desiring to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement in Somalia, organized conferences in Addis Ababa and brought

together fifteen factions in Addis Ababa with the aim of establishing transitional institutions. Although an agreement to establish a Transitional National Council (TNC) composed of representatives of Somali factions was reached in the March conference, the perceived bias of United Nations and the United States towards Ali Mahdi and his Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) antagonized General Aideed and his Somali National Alliance (SNA) leading to clashes between his militias and the international force, as result of which the UN completely abandoned Somalia. The UN desired to have some face-saving settlement for Somalia before it pulled out and organized subsequent talks in Nairobi in 1994 but with no avail.

The United Nations then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, a former Egyptian minister of state, had an interest in the Horn and turned the attention of the world to the Somali crisis, but the uncompromising positions of the Somali warlords militated against any peaceful settlement by the UN. The disagreements between the United States and the UN over the conduct of the mission and the differences between and among the troop contributing countries compounded by the rift between the regional powers such as Ethiopia and Egypt each trying to exert its influence had exacerbated the situation and complicated the UN attempts process of managing the crisis in Somalia.

In October 1996, former Kenyan president , Daniel Arap Moi, invited some key faction leaders in Mogadishu and brokered an understanding between Ali Mahdi, junior Aideed and Osman Atto to pacify the capital. President Moi looked for a statesmanship and prestige in mediating the Somali conflict. However Moi's attempt achieved less as Ethiopia called for a parallel conference in Sodere, Ethiopia, in November the same year, to forge a coalition of like-minded factions against Hussein Aideed's self-proclaimed Salballar government. Ethiopia accused Hussein Aideed of collaborating with Islamic terrorists which were threatening its national security. It established an anti-Aideed coalition of 26 factions calling themselves National Salvation Council (NSC) and used them to legitimize its military incursions into parts of Somali territories to root out the alleged terrorist bases. The Sodere conference created renewed tensions and aggravated the already volatile situation in Somalia.

In May 1997, Yemen offered to mediate between Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto whose supporters had been fighting in South Mogadishu. Yemen had historical and cultural ties with Somalia. It hosts large number of Somali refugees who fled from the civil war in Somalia. The meeting of the two faction leaders which complemented the Nairobi Understanding of Mogadishu-based faction leaders ended the hostilities in South Mogadishu.

In November 1997, Egypt with the backing of the League of Arab States (LAS) and Libya hosted the Cairo Conference attended by two opposing camps; Hussein Aideed's Salballar government, and the NSC which was formed in Sodere, Ethiopia. Although the conference was initially conceived as complement to Sodere conference, Egyptian plans to mediate between the two rival groups were frustrated when several factions aligned with Ethiopia pulled out from the talks. As the Cairo talks failed, Egypt supported the creation of an administration in Mogadishu, the capital, co-chaired by Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi, while Ethiopia supported the creation of Puntland state led by its staunch ally, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Egypt has been in favor of a strong unitary Somali state with its capital in Mogadishu as opposed to Ethiopia which promotes polarized administrations in Somalia which are vulnerable to its influence and manipulation.

In May 2000, Djibouti convened a reconciliation conference in Arta which had established the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG was challenged by Ethiopian backed coalition of faction leaders, Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) which was formed in Ethiopia at the behest of Ethiopian government in March 2001. Djibouti sees to Somalia's rebirth as balancing factor in the power configurations in the region. Although there are no immediate threats from Ethiopia to its security, Djibouti has been concerned with the hegemonic tendencies of the Addis Ababa regime. Having been newly elected, president Ghelle had personal ambitions of becoming a peacemaker in the region and submitted his peace plan to mediate the conflict in Somalia to the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1999. Ethiopia perceived Djibouti as meddler in the internal affairs of Somalia giving itself an exclusive

mandate in Somalia. It formed SRRC to counter the Arta outcome and cripple the authority of the TNG allegedly preempting the emergence of strong Somali state.

In December, 2001, Kenya's former president, Daniel Arap Moi, invited TNG and SRRC to talks in Nakuru, Kenya. Some members of the SRRC declined to join the Nakuru talks insisting that TNG should abandon its claim of being a national government before they join the talks. The Nakuru talks ended in a deal to share power between the TNG and some SRRC defectors. President Moi wanted to use his cards as impartial and neutral player in the Horn of Africa sub-region. However, Ethiopia undercut the prospect of Nakuru talks as it invited its SRRC allies to parallel consultations in Godei, Ethiopia.

As the deadlock between the TNG and SRRC backed by Djibouti and Ethiopia respectively continued and the rivalry between the IGAD states over the way Somali peace process should be conducted deepened, the 9th Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government held in Khartoum in January 2002 mandated the three frontline states; Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to coordinate their efforts to hold a fresh peace conference under the auspices of IGAD. The Somali National Reconciliation Conference opened at Eldoret on October 15, 2002, and was attended by all major players in the Somali conflict. The talks have been intermittently disrupted by struggle between frontline states mandated to steer the process, particularly between Ethiopia and Djibouti each wishing to shape the nature of future Somali state and its leadership. The 10th Summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government extended the mediators and included all IGAD member states and AU. The Somalia National Conference which lasted for two years was financially supported by European Union/ European Commission which has been the major donor for Somalia in the last several years. The IGAD Partners Forum also assisted the IGAD facilitation committee as observers.⁵ The conference culminated into the formation of a Transitional Federal Parliament which, in turn, elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president of Somalia for a 5-year term on October 10th, 2004. The President appointed a prime minister who, in turn, formed a cabinet. The whole process of creating these key state institutions took

⁵ IPF comprises a number of European countries, United States, Japan, UN, EU and Egypt

place in Kenya. The government is yet to move to Somalia at the time of this writing (December 2004). One of the great challenges facing the government is to foster its credibility with the Somali masses who were disillusioned by the previous peace initiatives which promised hopes but never delivered.

The Problem

The Somali conflict represents a classic example of Clausewitz's aphorism that war is politics by another means⁶. The state was torn asunder by rival gangs and armies. The international community remained passive at the onset of the conflict and its late interventions have been fraught with failures. Even international intervention, replete with 30,000 UN peacekeeping troops and a multibillion-dollar budget, was unable to promote national reconciliation.

Critics label quality of international diplomacy in Somalia as incompetent, uninformed, and inconsistent, and which as a result sometimes fuelled the very conflicts it sought to mediate⁷. Regional politics and security concerns continue to play themselves out-often violently- within Somalia. Regional tensions have influenced political cleavages inside the country and the tendency of regional powers to use surrogate local militias to advance their goals has been apparent⁸.

External engagement in resolving Somalia's political crisis has taken two somewhat incompatible forms.⁹ One, the so called "building block" approach initially embraced by the neighboring countries particularly Ethiopia, and the executive committee of the Somali Aid coordination Body (SACB). The second approach is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national

⁶ Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian intervention in Somalia (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers) 1993 p. 24

⁷ Ken Menchaus and Lou Ortmayer, Somalia: Misread Crisis and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy in Bruce W. Jentleson (ed.), the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Seized, and Lessons to be Learned (NY, Carnegie, 1999) p. 2

⁸ ICG : Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State. Africa Report No 45, 23 May 2002

⁹ Mark Bradbury, Somalia: aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism. Oxfam GB Report, February 2002, p. 18

government. The Arta process which embraced the latter approach was in clear contrast with Ethiopia's favored "peace dividend, building blocks, bottom-up" strategy which advocated support for de facto authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, and Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) controlled areas. The Transitional National Government which emerged from the Arta peace conference was received by Ethiopia with coolness but by Egypt and other Arab countries with relative enthusiasm.

The IGAD-led Somali peace talks have met several hurdles which sometimes threatened the collapse of the talks. The three frontline states initially assigned to manage the talks on behalf of IGAD were paralyzed by chronic disagreements between Ethiopia and Djibouti with the latter suspending its participation for some time and accusing Kenya of mismanagement.¹⁰ After the Technical Committee was expanded to include all IGAD member states less Somalia and renamed 'Facilitation Committee', Djibouti has returned but Ethiopia conspicuously absented itself.

In the two years the talks continued in Kenya, there were not face-to-face effective negotiations between protagonists. The October 2002 signing of cessation of hostilities has never been honored and violations went unpunished. Flow of arms from the neighboring countries continued unchecked. The report of the UN Panel of Experts mandated to collect information accuses regional actors including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Egypt of violating the arms embargo on Somalia¹¹.

Despite providing financial support and some limited technical support, donors have failed to offer political commitment to the talks. Notwithstanding high level declarations of support, the UN, U.S. and EU have not had any noticed leverage on the process and their engagement was hardly beyond low ranking diplomats based in Nairobi and was symptomatic of international neglect. This stands in contrast with their stewardship and commitment towards the Sudanese peace talks.

¹⁰ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet. Africa report No 79, 4 May 2004

¹¹ Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia. S/2003/223

In the view of the above, the study attempts to answer the following questions:

- 1) What are the external interests in the Somali peace process ?
- 2) How did these interests affect the peace processes?
- 3) What are the factors that underlie the failure of the peace initiatives ?
- 4) How did the rivalry between external players affect the prospect of attaining peace in Somalia?

Rationale of the Study

The study deserves to be undertaken as it takes a march through the Somali peace processes and illuminates those external interests which are at play, and which might have diminished the chances of achieving lasting peace in Somalia.

At this juncture, when the two-year long fourteenth externally sponsored Somali peace conference, probably the last one, was just concluded in Kenya culminating into the election of parliament and president, it could not have been more timely and more appropriate than now to evaluate, in retrospect, the complexities of the Somali peace processes and the external factors that may have been holding the achievement of peace at bay for the last decade or so despite all attempts made to this end.

Somalia's situation is a classical example of failed state representing unprecedented phenomena in the near history of the society of states. The Somali peace process continues to have consequences for the security and stability of Somalia and the region. Given these challenges and considering the negative effect of the divergent and incompatible external interests, the study may enhance the awareness and sensitize the

consciousness of the regional and extra-regional to invest further efforts in Somalia's peace and stability.

The study is justified as it draws some lessons from peacemaking efforts in Somalia for the benefit of future peace undertakings in the region or else where, and contributes to the available literature on the external management of the peace processes, its challenges, weaknesses and strengths.

Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study is to investigate the impact of the external interests in the Somali peace process.

Specific Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are:

- (1) To identify the role of external actors and their interests in the Somali peace processes.
- (2) To establish the link between divergent external interests and the failure of the peace initiatives in Somalia.
- (3) To sensitize the external stakeholders in the process to harmonize their efforts in the quest to restore a viable state at peace with its own people and at peace with its neighbors.

Hypothesis

The study tests the following three hypotheses:

- (1) The management of peace process by external actors who lack cohesion and pursue incompatible interests is bound to fail.
- (2) Coordination and cooperation between regional actors enhances prospects for their peacemaking efforts in the region.
- (3) Internal divergences and polarization of domestic politics are breeding ground for competing external influences which lead to the failure of peace processes and protraction of conflicts.

Literature Review

The literature will be reviewed under four sub-headings: literature on conflict, ending civil wars, and on the external response to Somali conflict.

General Literature on Conflict

Dougherty and Pfaltsgraff define the term conflict as referring to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings is in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible¹².

¹² Cited in Hassan Farah Shirwa's M.A Dissertation, the Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict, University of Nairobi, and October 2001.

Zartman argues that implicit meaning of conflict is the incompatibility that is inherent in multi-issue and multiparty situations¹³. The explicit definition of the term refers to the violent stage or expression of that incompatibility. P. Godfrey Okoth¹⁴ simplifies the definition of conflict as just an issue in dispute between or among parties.

Mwagiru, et al¹⁵ take the same line of conflict definition and contend that conflict exists where people have incompatible goals and each believes that their point of view is the only correct one.

Whether conflict is necessary or not is a matter of debate between the conflict scholars. Zartman describes conflict as an inevitable aspect of human interaction¹⁶. This notion is also concurred by Burton who argues that conflict is a necessary creative component in human relationships. He describes conflict as the means to achieve social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development¹⁷.

Deng and Zartman¹⁸ argue conflicts in Africa have many underlying causes: incomplete nation building, differences in identities derived from ethnicity, religion, culture and language: economics and competition for limited resources, political demands that exceed state capabilities.

The categorization of conflicts as either domestic or international is now widely disputed. They may have both domestic and external sources. Deng/Zartman point out internal

¹³ I. William Zartman, Conflict Resolution: Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991)

¹⁴ P. Godfrey Okoth, Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000) p.1

¹⁵ Mwagiru, M., Munene, M. and Karuru, N., Understanding Conflict and Its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives (Nairobi: CCR-WLEA, 1998), pp.4-5 in Hassan Farah Shirwa's M.A Dissertation, the Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in The Somali Conflict, University of Nairobi, October 2001. p.8

¹⁶ Zartman, I.W., ' Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution' in Deng, F.M. and Zartman, I.W. (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington , D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991) pp.299-319

¹⁷ Burton, J.W., World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1972), pp. 137-138.

¹⁸ Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991). pp 4-5

conflicts get internationalized through external patronage. They argue ¹⁹ that, although African power to pursue conflicts is limited, additional power comes from outside. This is an important characteristic of African conflicts. Internal insurgencies frequently build ties with neighboring states to gain access to safe havens and military resources, thereby internationalizing a conflict that originated in domestic environment²⁰. External sources of power are activated primarily through alliances for political support and through arms for military. Internal insurgents have to build external ties for patronage.

Different reasons exist for the involvement of external actors in domestic conflicts. Deng/Zartman contend²¹ that more distant foreign powers get involved in internal conflicts for ideological or strategic reasons that have often been linked to superpower rivalry and proxy confrontations.

When conflicts trigger, it is often difficult to arrest them and that is why it is imperative to foresee the omens from distance. Sahnoun explains this point and asserts that it is necessary to capture the early signs of the conflict to arrest it in time by responding immediately and appropriately. He argues the ingredients of crisis gather like clouds before the storm and suggests that early action is required to prevent conflicts before clouds turn into storms²².

Deng/Zartman argue that given the multiplicity of actors in African conflicts and complexities of the issues at all levels, from local to global, speculations on the prospects for conflict resolution can not be optimistic in the short run. The study ascribes to this notion and argues that there are no easy solutions to the Somali conflict unless the potential external players reconsider their positions in the interest of peace for Somalia.

¹⁹ I. William Zartman: Ripe for Resolution : conflict and intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1989) p.16

²⁰ *ibid* p.7

²¹ Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991) p.11

²² Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: the Missed opportunity (Washington D.C, the United States Institute of Peace, 1994) p. IX

Peter Anyang' Nyong'o²³ traces the conflicts in Northeast Africa to the colonial past arguing that major European powers scrambled for the control of this part of Africa, principally because of the Nile river. He argues that upper Nile Valley countries, except for Kenya have the Nile to blame for their conflicts: the origin of their conflicts is closely related to the colonization of these countries because of their proximity to the Nile. However, this could not mean to exonerate the blame from domestic players who perpetuate conflicts either for their own ends or as surrogates for regional or extra-regional interests.

Literature on Ending Civil Wars

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A third party often intervenes in conflict because of some interests that are at stake for it either in the conflict or its settlement. Peter Wanyande argues that external intervention in the conflicts is justified on the ground that conflicts are very costly to the governments and the peoples of the region as a whole and the individual countries they affect.²⁴ These consequences are sometimes very far-reaching that affected countries need to act. ICISS also contends that many international human catastrophes have direct effects on neighboring countries including massive refugee flows and use of territory as a base by rebel group. Thus states bordering on the war zone usually have strong interests, only partly humanitarian, for dealing with internal conflicts.²⁵ Conflicts affect the power balance, hence their settlement is not only meant to bring peace to domestic crisis but also to restore power balance in the affected region. This point is further elaborated by Mwagiru who contends that a state's motives to mediate a conflict include the desire to maintain a certain balance of power in international or regional relations²⁶.

²³ Peter Anyang' : the Implications of Crisis and Conflicts in the Upper Nile Valley in Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991) pp.95-114

²⁴ Peter Wanyande, State Driven Conflict in the Greater horn of Africa, paper Presented to the USAID Organized Workshop on Conflicts in the Great Horn of Africa, May 21-23, 1997. p. 1

²⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, International Development Research Center, 2001) p.160

²⁶ Mwagiru, M., Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management (Nairobi: Watermark publications, 2002), p.55. cited in Hassan Farah Shirwa, the Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Diibouti Peace Initiative in The Somali Conflict, M.A Dissertation, University of Nairobi, October 2001 p. 126

Some scholars underline the need for understanding the conflict as a precondition for its management. Deng and Zartman argue²⁷ that the conceptual understanding of the reasons behind conflicts is important to conflict management because it helps policy makers identify the root causes and suggest formulas for mediators to use to reduce disputes. Mwangiru also argues that there is a need to understand the regional setting of a conflict as an integral part of the process of its management. He argues that there are discernible threads running through the conflicts in a region which are to be pulled together, and their lessons be brought to bear on the management of the conflict at hand²⁸.

But while understanding the conflict is necessary for its management, that alone does not guarantee a success. Other pre-conditions have to be met. Rubin pinpoints some of the conditions for successful and timely interventions; disputants must realize the limits of their unilateral actions, they must also be aware of the political and economic costs of non-agreement; the representatives of the disputant parties must also have sufficient authority to commit their parties to an agreement; the international and regional stakeholders must also exert pressure for resolutions; and finally the intervener must enjoy trust and confidence of the all sides²⁹. He further argues that any form of intervention in any conflict setting requires three things: disputant motivation to settle or resolve conflict in question; mediator opportunity to get involved; and mediator skill. For disputants to be motivated to settle their conflict, they either must believe that negotiations offer rewarding opportunities or those alternatives to negotiations are sufficiently unattractive³⁰.

²⁷ Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991) p. 6

²⁸ Mwangiru, M., The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1994 pp. 24-25.

²⁹ Jeffrey Z. Rubin, International Mediation in Context in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (London: Macmillan Press, 1992) pp. 31-35

³⁰ *ibid.* pp. 251-252

Other pre-requisites for intervention include leverage of the mediator. Amoo and Zartman outline four sources of leverage for third party interventions: the ability to provide solutions, shifting weight, persuasion, and side payments³¹. Control and possession of resources in the form of carrot and stick, as Jacob Bercovitch argues, is equally important to achieve a favorable outcome or other desired objectives³².

Stedman concurs with this argument and points out, in his extensive coverage of the international mediation in the Zimbabwe, that the resources of the mediators are important element in mediating conflicts. Stedman attributes the British success in the mediation to their leverage with both parties and the mandate and support given to the process by the frontline states³³. Raven and Rubin also argue that six different bases of power exist for influencing another person's behavior: reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, reference, and information³⁴.

Leverage includes the benefit of international support from the states and regional organizations that have leverage with the one or more of the disputants. The mediation to be effective, argue Susskind and Babbit, the international or regional interests with a stake in the dispute must exert pressure for resolution; and the mediator must be acceptable to all sides.³⁵ Rothchild explains the role of external actors in the management of the African conflicts. He classifies their initiatives into five basic types:

³¹ Samuel G. Amoo and I. William Zartman, Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization for African unity (OAU) in Chad in International Relations in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 132-133

³² Jacob Bercovitch, The structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 18-19

³³ Stephen John Stedman, Peace-making in Civil War-International Mediation in Zimbabwe (1974-1980), Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner publishers, 1991) pp. 213-223

³⁴ quoted in Jeffrey Z. Rubin, International Mediation in Context in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 255

³⁵ Lawrence Susskind and Eillen Babbit, Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 31-35

pressures on internal actors to negotiate; indirect mediatory act; direct mediation; military/diplomatic interventions; and the implementation of agreements³⁶.

Depending on the nature of the conflict to be mediated, there are many forms of interventions that need to be tailored to the conflict in hand. Mwangiri, et al suggest that conflict management takes many forms such as judicial settlement, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation and problem-solving workshop. Apart from negotiation, others involve third party intervention. Interventions take place not only to manage conflict, but also to secure a successful outcome to the conflict³⁷. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), on the other hand, suggest that external actors in the process of conflict management should take five broad actions to stabilize domestic situations; facilitating dialogue between warring parties; preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict; strengthening infrastructures; improving local security and facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability³⁸.

There are difficulties and dilemmas surrounding the efforts made to end civil wars. Stedman's discussion of the British mediation in Zimbabwe civil war offers some useful insights for mediators in internal conflicts exacerbated by external influences. Stedman highlights³⁹ strategic dilemmas in negotiations aiming at ending a civil wars; a) actors seek to eliminate their adversaries through the negotiation; b) insurgent movements are diversified; c) there is a fear of settlement and lack of trust as the integration of armed force and police, the establishment of transitional government provide opportunity for some adversary to take advantage over another; d) leaders of insurgencies and governments negotiate with one face looking outwards to the opponents and one face looking inwards to the political competition within their own parties. These dilemmas apply to Somali situation where the political system is fragile and the confidence in

³⁶ Donald Rothchild, United States as Mediator. Peace and Its Limitations in Africa p. 224 in Macharia Munene, J.D.Olewe Nyunya, and Korwa Adar(eds.), The United States and Africa from Independence to the End of the Cold War (Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995)

³⁷ Makumi Mwangiri, Macharia Munene, Njerei Karuru (eds.), Understanding Conflict and its Management (Nairobi, Centre for Conflict Research and Women and Law in East Africa, 1998) p.32

³⁸ UNIDIR, Managing Arms in Peace Processes. Somalia (NY, United Nations Publications, 1995) p. XI

³⁹ Stephen John Stedman, Peace-making in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe (1974-1980), (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) pp. 15-22

settlement is very weak as each party fears that the outcome may be hurting. Most importantly, the internal compositions of the factions are not intact; they continue to shift alliances and changing positions. This complicates the search for solutions.

In ending civil war, there must be a hurting stalemate for both internal and external players. Stedman attributes the success of the British mediation in the Zimbabwe civil war to a number of factors; first, the military and economic situation had deteriorated to such a point that the whites were losing; secondly, the war took a large toll on the guerillas' patrons; thirdly, the British kept the carrot of full recognition.⁴⁰ The mediator in civil war negotiations has to muster the support of the external players who have leverage and influence on the internal parties. Stedman asserts that the British were able to create a game whereby the first player to leave the table would lose. They also manipulated the commonwealth countries who gave her a mandate from common wealth.⁴¹ One large benefit that the British mediator, Carrington, had was the benefit of control and coordination that came from being the sole mediator. He had the big prize of recognition and lifting sanctions. He could also count on the support of frontline states in pressurizing the Patriotic Front to compromise.⁴² Stedman suggests ripe moments when the mediator can step in: a) all actors perceive a mutually hurting stalemate; b) mutually hurting stalemate can be manifested at the patron level and be efficacious in bringing about settlement if that patron holds a monopoly on assistance to its clients ; c) ripeness, paradoxically, can come from a situation where both sides believe that a settlement will produce a victory for them; d) military wings must perceive a mutually hurting stalemate.⁴³

There are some practical problems that are involved in the conflict management. Mwangi et al suggest some of these problems and suggest that the moment must be ripe; the mediator has also to fraction the conflict and structure it so that it can be managed; and finally all parties involved and those who are affected by the conflict must be

⁴⁰ *ibid.* pp. 213-214

⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 215

⁴² *ibid.* pp. 219-221

⁴³ *ibid.* pp. 238-241.

involved in the management process. They stress the need that those who are able to sabotage the process and its outcome should be involved.⁴⁴ Equally important is to notice that each party to a conflict is associated with other people and interests – allies, friends, constituents who have an interest in the outcome of the conflict.

The question that often arises is whether the outside party which is mediating the conflict should be neutral. Stedman argues that the British mediation in Zimbabwe civil war, on the one hand, was willing to accept any part coming to power in Rhodesia through ballot box, but on the other hand, Britain moved away from the myth that 'Rhodesia's problems are for Rhodesians'. They moved from mediation to arbitration. They were not mediators in a classic sense, they dictated a solution to the participants.⁴⁵ Touval and Zartman argue that the mediator is a player in the relations surrounding the conflict, and has some interest in the outcome, or else it would not mediate. The results of any settlement must please the mediator as well as players involved.⁴⁶ Mwangiri et al argue that modern research refute the traditional notion that mediator must be impartial. They argue that the mediator has resources that the parties value regardless of his partiality such as knowledge, a persuasive ability and certain leverage.⁴⁷

Literature on the External Responses to Somali Conflict

This section reviews the literature which highlights some relevant facts to Somalia's peace processes. It pinpoints , among other things, the interests of the external interveners and the causes of the failure of the various peace initiatives.

⁴⁴ Makumi Mwangiri, Macharia Munene and Njeri Karuru, Understanding Conflict and Its Management (Nairobi, Center for Conflict Research and Women and Law in East Africa (Kenya), 1998) p.62
⁴⁵ Stephen John Stedman, Peace-making in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe (1974-1980), (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) p. 223

⁴⁶ cited in ibid p.25

⁴⁷ Makumi Mwangiri, Macharia Munene and Njeri Karuru, Understanding Conflict and Its Management (Nairobi, Center for Conflict Research and Women and Law in East Africa (Kenya), 1998) pp. 64-65

Interests that Motivated Interventions

Some of the interests in the Somali peace processes are highlighted by some writers like Ahmed Yusuf who argues that countries in the greater Horn region and in Africa (Ethiopia, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan) and Gulf states (Yemen, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates) all have interests and try to influence events unfolding in Somalia⁴⁸. Cirino Hiteng raises two important security concerns in the Horn of Africa; the proliferation of light weapons; and the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of the people across the porous borders from one country to another⁴⁹.

ICG argues that Egypt perceives a strong, unified Somali state can support her strategically in her perennial dispute with Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile and use Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopian influence in the Horn.⁵⁰ Stedman also argues Strategic concerns inform Ethiopia's military incursions into Somalia. Ethiopia is a Christian enclave surrounded by Arab countries and fears that Somalia serves as a base for armed groups opposed to her⁵¹.

Humanitarian interests also inform some of the interventions in Somalia's conflict, but these do not necessarily entail long-term commitment and sacrifices as Kissinger argues in the case of the United States involvement in Somalia which considered the alleviation of suffering in Somalia and made financial and economic sacrifice, but was not prepared to expend American lives⁵². He attributes the failure of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to the fact that Somalia lay at the fringe of even the broadest

⁴⁸ Ahmed Yusuf, Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National Government (TNG) after the Arta Peace Process in Richard Ford, Hussein Adam and Edna Adan (eds.), War Destroys, Peace Nurtures (NJ, The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2004) pp. 131-132

⁴⁹ Cirino Hiteng, Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa in Makumi Mwangiru, African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization (Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p. 12

⁵⁰ ICG, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report No 59, 23 May 2002.

⁵¹ Stephen John Stedman, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: a Conceptual Framework in Francis M. Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991) p. 379

⁵² Henry Kissinger, Does America need a foreign policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st Century (NY/London: Simon and Schuster, 2001) pp. 258, 265, 266

definition of concerns for the vast majority of the nations⁵³. Indeed the U.S. reluctance to respond to the Somali conflict immediately is partly explained by Somalia's perceived insignificance in the aftermath of the cold war⁵⁴. The U.S. switched from Somalia to central Europe where high security stakes were involved. The former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Mr. T. Frak Crigler put this bluntly: U.S. "turned out lights, closed the door and forgot about the place"⁵⁵.

Although Some countries may have legitimate concerns to intervene in the Somali conflict, it is apparent that some states did more harm to the peace and stability in Somalia in the name of pursuing their legitimate interests. Mark Bradbury, for instance, argues that accusations of terrorism have served to create a permissive environment for regional states to pursue their own agenda in Somalia. Ethiopia in particular has taken the opportunity to increase support to anti-TNG forces.⁵⁶ These abuses of interests were also mentioned by the UN report of the panel of experts mandated to collect information on the violations of the arms embargo on Somalia which cited several countries namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt and Libya to have supplied arms to different factions in Somalia. The report states that since the adoption of the Security Council resolution 733(1992) there have been numerous and regular violations of the arms embargo by outside state actors. The report particularly charges that Ethiopia played an overt military role in Somalia and also blames the UN for contributing to a perception that the embargo need not be taken seriously.⁵⁷ ICG also contends that IGAD member states have utilized the peace process as an instrument to pursue rival national interests.⁵⁸

⁵³ *ibid* p. 260

⁵⁴ John L. Hersch and Robert B. Oakly, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking (Washington, D.C. , United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995) P. 36

⁵⁵ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing Arms in Peace Processes Somalia(NY/ Geneva, United Nations Publications, 1995) pp. 24-25

⁵⁶ Mark Bradbury, Somalia: the Aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism, Oxfam Report Series, p. 18

⁵⁷ Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2003/233, 25 March 2003.

⁵⁸ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, p. 18

Poor Diplomacy and Lack of Neutrality

There are different views on the causes of the failures of the Somali peace processes. Ken Menchaus and Lou Ortmayer blame the poor quality of diplomacy of the external actors for the failure of external responses. They label quality of international diplomacy in Somalia as incompetent, uninformed, and inconsistent, and which as a result sometimes fuelled the very conflicts it sought to mediate⁵⁹. But others blame the lack of neutrality and vested interests on the part of the interveners for all the mess that had occurred in the quest of peaceful settlement for the Somali problem. Peter Wanyande contends that a close examination of the conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa reveal that states in the region have not always demonstrated neutrality in any of these conflicts. Instead they have behaved as interested parties and actors.⁶⁰ Mark Bradbury argues that UNOSOM's policies and actions in Somalia were dominated by the political agendas of the United Nations and United States than those of the Somalis.⁶¹ He further argues that those vested interests impeded UNOSOM's ability to respond adequately to the situation.

Regional Rivalry

Some arguments have also been made that regional rivalry hampers the Somali peace process. ICG points out that the best diplomacy in the world, if limited to internal Somali matters, will not succeed because of the deep differences within the region over their objectives in that country.⁶² It suggests that regional rivalry has played havoc both at peace conference and inside Somalia. It gives the example of Ethiopian sponsorship of SRRC which has been matched by Djibouti and Arab patronage of the TNG creating deadlock and causing the peace process to puncture.⁶³ It also contends that regional

⁵⁹ Ken Menchaus and Lou Ortmayer, Somalia: Misread Crisis and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Seized, and Lessons to be Learned edited by Bruce W. Jentleson (NY, Carnegie, 1999) p. 2

⁶⁰ Peter Wanyande, State Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa, paper presented at the USAID organized workshop on the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa, May 21-23, 1997

⁶¹ Mark Bradbury, Somaliland, Country Report 3rd ed. (Totton, Hobbs the Printer Ltd, 2001) p. 41

⁶² ICG, Somalia: Countering Terrorism In A Failed State. Africa Report No 45, 23 May 2002.

⁶³ ICG, Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, Africa Report No 59, 6 March 2003, p.3

tensions have often been replicated by political cleavages inside Somalia and that IGAD's crippling divisions have rendered it an inadequate forum for tackling the challenges of conflict resolution in Somalia⁶⁴. It further asserts that IGAD member states have utilized the peace process as an instrument to pursue rival national interests and have failed to enforce the UN arms embargo, and some have willfully violated it. The armed factions usually exploit the differences within the regional actors to get arms to consolidate their positions. The steady flow of arms and ammunition that fuels the conflict and spills over into the neighboring states is part of the cost of negligence.⁶⁵ Prendergast and Bryden argue that involvement of Ethiopia and Eritrea in proxy wars in Somalia in 1998 gave new life to the warlord Mafiosi and factional militias in Somalia, undercutting alternative forms of authority.⁶⁶

The crux of the political difference within the regional actors is whether state building in Somalia should start from the top or from the bottom. ICG points out, whereas the Arab states perceive a strong, unified Somali state as an essential counterweight to Ethiopia's influence in the Horn, Ethiopia prefers "bottom-up, peace dividend approach" widely known as "building block".⁶⁷

Coordination of Responses

Lack of coordination and cooperation of the external responses to the conflict situation in Somalia has been a major hindrance to peacemaking attempts that had been deployed in Somalia. UNIDIR argues that peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is coordination and cooperation between the international efforts and the nations which immediately neighbor the strike country⁶⁸. It further points out that the divergence between United Nations and United States on the disarmament mandate had a profound

⁶⁴ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004 p. 18

⁶⁵ *ibid*, p. 13

⁶⁶ John Prendergast and Matt Bryden, War and Peace in Somalia and Somaliland. A report of the Center for Strategic Initiatives of women, July 1999 p. 3

⁶⁷ ICG, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report No.59, 23 May 2002.

⁶⁸ UNIDIR, Managing Arms in Peace Processes. Somalia (NY/Geneva: United Nations Publications, 1995), p 15

negative consequence on the United Operations in Somalia in early 1990s. It states that UN lacked the capability to disarm the Somali militias; the U.S. with capacity lacked the will to do so⁶⁹. Lyons and Samatar⁷⁰ argue that UN military Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) had a diplomatic strategy but lacked capacity to pressure militia leaders, and the large and powerful U.S.-led United Task force (UNITAF) had the resources but insisted that its mandate was limited and nonpolitical. They also point out the sharp differences among officials in New York, Washington, Rome and other capitals who produced ideas in response to their perceptions of developments in Somalia. Sahnoun states that heads of state of the Horn of Africa were disappointed that UN did not support some of their moves toward Somalia and charged UN was reluctant to include them in the search for peace⁷¹. Ibrahim Farah contends that peace initiatives in Somalia would have worked well if there had been a well-coordinated information sharing network between and among the major stakeholders⁷². Shirwa argues that lack of cooperation among the IGAD member states emanated from poor governance within the member states whose ruling elites are only interested in political survival. He further contends that cooperation and alliances are not durable and often changing⁷³.

Leverage

Lack of leverage on the parties to the Somali conflict is a lacking factor in the Somali peace processes as some scholars point out. ICG contends that peace building in Somalia must be matched by equally determined efforts to reconcile regional actors, address their concerns, and secure their support for long-term reconstruction⁷⁴. Walter Clarke argues

⁶⁹ UNIDIR, Managing Arms in Peace Processes. Somalia (NY/Geneva: United nations Publications, 1995), P. 69.

⁷⁰ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington DC, the Brookings Institution, 1999) p. 36

⁷¹ *ibid* p.27

⁷² I.Q. Farah, Dual diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiatives in Somalia. Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2000 p.3

⁷³ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Dibouti Peace Initiative in The Somali Conflict. M.A Dissertation, University of Nairobi, October 2001 pp. 150-151

⁷⁴ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No.79, 4 May 2004

that peace operations require the highest level of political-military skills⁷⁵. ICG seems to argue for a greater world attention to the Somali conflict. It asserts that international indifference has practical and diplomatic consequences for Somali peace process⁷⁶. Ibrahim Farah points out that leverage in terms of political and economic power was one of the basic elements the United Nations lacked in Somalia operations⁷⁷.

Competing Approaches

The incompatible approaches and strategies off peacemaking in Somalia are also cited as major hindrance to the peace process. Two competing approaches were at play in Somalia; one which emphasizes the role of the warlords, and another alternative approach which reduces the role of the warlords and creates a room for the civil society to play an active role. Mark Bardbury again argues that UNOSOM I and II operations in Somalia only enhanced the prestige of warlords, strengthened their political role and left little room for other political leaders to emerge.⁷⁸

Lyons and Samatar contend that international community's political action in Somalia wavered between two implicit strategies; one labeled "Accommodate Existing forces" which focused on reconciling the warlords, and the other "Encouraging New Initiatives" which induced the emergence of new moderate political actors⁷⁹. Mark Bradbury attributes the failure of the United Nations Operations (UNOSOM) in Somalia for its emphasis on military strategy. He argues⁸⁰ that UN- in its interventions in Somalia in 1993- prioritized the military rather than humanitarian role of UNOSOM; it consumed vast amounts of resources, and reinforced a negative perception of Somalia which affected donors. He states that the United Nations Intervention in Somalia had

⁷⁵ Walter Clarke, Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia, p. 10 in Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, West view Press, 1997) pp. 16-17

⁷⁶ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet. Africa Report No.79, 4 May 2004, P.13

⁷⁷ I.Q. Farah, Dual Diplomatic Approach in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiatives in Somalia 1991-1999. Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2000 p.107.

⁷⁸ Mark Bardbury, Somaliland: Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd. 1997) p. 15

⁷⁹ *ibid.* P. 37

⁸⁰ Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace. Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 (Oxfam: Oxfam Printing Unit, 1993) Part III

repercussions on other peacekeeping operations in the world. Ibrahim Farah⁸¹ argues that both state and non-state actors which have been involved in Somali reconciliation have been using different approaches relevant to their status rather than to the situation in Somalia.

Regionalizing versus Internationalizing of Peacemaking Efforts

It is debatable whether the peacemaking efforts in general and the peace initiatives in Somalia in particular should be internationalized such that neutral distant parties should respond to the conflict or whether the responses to the conflict should be regionalized. Kissinger argues⁸² that African security issues- largely civil wars and ethnic conflicts- should be left largely to African nations. Mwangiru agrees and argues that US policy shift to regional approach in mitigating African conflicts was based on the notion that African leaders who have negotiated democracy at home may be best suited to help Somalis negotiate an incremental return to the rule of government.⁸³ But Hassan Shirwa differs with the notion of regionalising the conflict management processes in the case of Horn of Africa where he argues there is no hegemonic stabiliser which can throw its weight behind a peace process like Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC⁸⁴.

Missed Opportunities/ Missing Elements

Some writers argue that the Somali conflict could have been avoided by an early, timely response of the regional and extra-regional actors. Sahnoun emphasizes that prevention of the Somali conflict has been neglected. He states that ingredients of crisis gather like clouds before the storm and early action to prevent conflicts before clouds turn out storms

⁸¹ I.Q. Farah, Dual Diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management : The international Peace Initiatives in Somalia 1991-1999, Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2000 p. 3

⁸² Henry Kissinger, Does America need a foreign policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st Century (NY/London: Simon and Schuster, 2001) p.209

⁸³ Mwangiru, M, Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa, paper presented at IRG Conference, Mombassa, Kenya, November 6-9, 1996 p.11 at www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%20PEACE/MwangiruIRG96.html

⁸⁴ Hassan Farah Shirwa, the Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in The Somali Conflict. M.A Dissertation, University of Nairobi, October 2001 p. 150

is required⁸⁵. He points out three opportunities that international community missed to prevent the Somali civil war; the uprising in the North in 1988, the signing of a manifesto by moderate political leaders calling for a national conference in 1990, and the fall of Siyad Barre. He argues that these events offered opportunities for timely intervention⁸⁶. On the same note, he says that there were no shortage of external actors who could respond to the conflict as Somalia is member of number of international organizations such United Nations, League of Arab States, Organizations of African Union, IGAD and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Kenneth Menkhaus concurs with Sahnoun and argues that the complete collapse of the state and the country's subsequent descent into heavily armed anarchy could have been avoided had there been sustained and effective diplomatic engagement in the crisis.⁸⁷

There are some missing elements which have militated against the success of the Somali peace processes. ICG alleges that external actors do not encourage Somali ownership in the Somali peace process. It describes the Somali peace process in Kenya as neither "Somali, nor "a peace process". It raises doubts on the Somali ownership of the process as there has not been any face-to-face negotiation of the Somalis. It further alleges that the Nairobi talks lacked substantive depth and failed to build either trust or a spirit of conciliation.⁸⁸

Walter Clarke also points out that traditional peacekeeping approach is not applicable in Somalia. He argues that various Security Council resolutions and periodic Secretary General reports regarding Somalia manifest that traditional peacekeeping doctrine had no

⁸⁵ Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: the Missed opportunity (Washington D.C, the United States Institute of Peace, 1994) p. IX

⁸⁶ Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia, the Missed Opportunities (Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 1994) pp.5-6, 28

⁸⁷ Kenneth Menkhaus, Somalia: A situation Analysis and Trend Assessment (Writenet Paper, August 2003) p. 3

⁸⁸ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet. Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004, p. 15

utility in securing the cooperation of the Somalis, and was probably counterproductive⁸⁹. He further contends that distortions created in the Somali intervention by adherence to traditional peacekeeping techniques favored unscrupulous leaders who gained legitimacy, enhanced credibility, international standing and recognition through special relations with the intervening authority⁹⁰.

He suggests intervention in Somalia did not apply the right approaches. He argues formal intervention doctrine should accommodate the requirement of "hard cases" in territories where there is no state, as in Somalia, or where there is disputed, ineffective, or unclear sovereignty. He further contends that where there is immense suffering from unacceptable inhumanities, common morality warrants that responsible states, preferably in coalition, should mount a coordinated political-military intervention to create conditions that may lead to the restoration of civil order. He further states that intervention should address political issues as they are the underlying causes of starvation and human suffering in stateless society. Military tactics are also needed to support political agenda and to neutralize the hold of warlords on local communities, which are a prerequisite for traditional problem-solving mechanisms⁹¹.

Kissinger asserts that the UN humanitarian operation in Somalia in 1993 began as humanitarian intervention, but quickly turned into an exercise of 'nation-building'. This impelled the United States to take sides in the civil war- a task it was unwilling to sustain to its conclusion.⁹²

⁸⁹ Walter Clarke, Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia p. 10 in Learning from Somalia : The Lessons of armed humanitarian intervention edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, West view Press, 1997) p.10

⁹⁰ ibid p.12

⁹¹ ibid pp.13-14

⁹² Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st century (NY/London: Simon and Schuster, 2001) p.208

Brief Assessment of the Literature

There is sufficient literature regarding the causes of conflict and its management. There is also a vast literature on the Somali peace processes and external responses that were made to mitigate the Somali conflict. However the literature does not delineate the external actors. It does not also comprehensively elaborate the nature of external interests pursued by the different actors in the Somali peace processes and how these interests interact with the interests of the local actors. The study fills these gaps in the literature and analyses the interests of individual countries and those of the multilateral-regional and international-organizations. It brings to light some of the subtle motives of the various external stakeholders and how these influence the internal political landscape in Somalia.

Theoretical Framework

The study uses the theory of internationalization of conflict. The theory implies that internal conflict turns into an international one and vice versa because of the economic, political, and social and security interdependence of the contemporary world.

The categorisation of conflicts as either internal or international was influenced by the realist school of thinking. It legitimised the dichotomy between domestic and international politics. Article 2(7) of the United Nations which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of states was a reflection of the dominance of the realist paradigm at the time of the UN founding. The non-interference principle has also been copied subsequently by the emerging regional organisation such as the OAU and League of Arab states whose charters immunise the states from external interference when dealing with their domestic problems. The Cold War vision which saw that only conflicts that arise from international dispute constitute threat to international peace reinforced the interpretation of the sovereignty in favour of the notion that internal conflicts should be

left unattended and treated as matters of domestic affairs not meriting outside intervention.⁹³

As the time went on, the categorisation of conflicts as either internal or international got eroded and was later abandoned thanks to agents like interdependence, humanitarianism, media, refugees, proliferation of arms, and ethnicity. The interdependence of international society makes it impossible to draw a hard and fast line between internal and international conflicts. The human rights violations in the course of the conflicts also give internal conflict an international dimension as derogation of human rights has international standards⁹⁴. Indeed, the availability of power to a third party enables it to define the conflict as either internal or international, and therefore to dictate the approaches to its management⁹⁵.

Internationalisation of conflict means that the previously internal conflicts become endowed with many international characteristics which render it no longer purely internal⁹⁶. Indeed, no analysis of internal conflict can ignore its external element as Duner notes:

“A complete analysis of the internal war must ... take into account the relations of several kinds: first... there is the purely internal constellation (the split within the country), then the relations of the internal parties to the actors in their surroundings, and finally, the relations between the external actors.”⁹⁷

⁹³ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-regional Management of the Internal Conflicts in Africa: An analysis of the Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August, 2000), M.A. Dissertation submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2001.

⁹⁴ See Donnelly, J. International Human Rights (Boulder, Co.: Westview press, 1993) cited in Mwangi, M., The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation 1985, a doctorate Dissertation in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, October 1984. p.27

⁹⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶ Makumi Mwangi, Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and practical Perspectives. Presented at the IRG conference Mombassa, Kenya 6-9 November 1996.

⁹⁷ Duner, B, the Intervener: Lone Wolf or ...? Cooperation between the Interveners in a civil wars (1983) pp. 197-213: 197 cited in Makumi Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation 1985, a doctorate Dissertation in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, October 1984. p.27

The introduction of external actors or factors in an originally 'internal' conflict internationalises it. Such external factors may include exogenous third parties as mediators or facilitators⁹⁸. The mere contacts of external actors with the parties of the internal conflict are bound to internationalize the conflict. The local actors become ipso facto legitimised by such contacts which could be well-intentioned as delivering humanitarian assistance, for example, entails negotiating with warring parties.

The internationalisation of conflict also affects the perception of the security. The notion embraces that insecurity is not defined in terms of military threat, but more broadly defined as threats to values and identities. An expanded definition of security includes not only the internal security of the state, but also secure systems of food production, health, trade, provision for basic human needs, environmental degradation, small arms, poverty, illiteracy, ethnicity, refugees problems, uncontrolled population growth, drugs, terrorism and bad politics⁹⁹. In this view, the security arrangements serve the individual in the final analysis. Those issues that do not serve the well-being of the individual fall in the realm of the insecurity.

The internationalisation of conflict makes the military-centred notions of security obsolete in a highly interdependent region that faces multiple security threats that are not amenable to traditional solutions. Common regional security assumes that there are regional vulnerabilities which threaten the entire system, and which can not be simply solved by protecting boundaries¹⁰⁰.

The very idea of internationalisation of conflict invokes the rationale for regional action in the management of the conflicts. The creation of the sub-regional groupings including IGAD is itself a response to the consequences of the conflicts, and is inspired by the purpose of promoting peace, security and stability, and resolving conflicts in the sub-

⁹⁸ *ibid.* p. 29

⁹⁹ John Koech, Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD in Makumi M(wagiru (eds). African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization (Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p. 128-129

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.* p. 128-129

regions.¹⁰¹ The intermeshing of the economies and the shared interests in regional stability means that security has become collective good¹⁰². States can no longer provide the well-being of their citizens alone nor can they insulate themselves from outside influence because of the globalisation of both domestic and international politics, hence states seek collaborations with each other to work towards realising the aspirations of their citizens.

Intractable internal conflicts can not be contained within the borders of the state. They have the habit of crossing to the neighbouring countries, entangling and bringing together adversaries and strange bedfellows, thereby assuming a complex international character. As a result, it gives national, regional, and global level participants a broad opportunity either to pursue their own interests in the conduct of conflict or to see their interests in conflict's management¹⁰³.

The theory of internationalisation of conflict is useful for this study because it explains why external actors intervene in the Somali conflict and its management. It brings to light those interests which motivate both mediators and spoilers to play their influence in the peace process. More importantly, the theory is useful for explaining the diversity of the players, the competing interests in the peace process and the parallel initiatives which so far militated against a lasting settlement in the conflict. The peacemaking initiatives and concerted efforts currently being made by regional and extra-regional actors to bring about a sustainable solution can be also explained by this theory. The theory highlights the interplay between the internal and external actors, and captures those issues and concerns which turn an originally internal conflict into an internationalised one.

¹⁰¹ See the Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Nairobi, 21 March 1996

¹⁰² op.cit.

¹⁰³ Zartman, I.W., 'Changing Forms of Conflict Mitigation' in Slater, R.O., Schutz, B.M. and Dorr, S.R. (eds.), Global Transformation and the Third world (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp.325-338 cited in Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-Regional Management of An internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict, M.A. Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, October 2001

Methodology

The study made use of both primary and secondary sources. The study was informed by extensive interview with number of diplomats and officials from IGAD, Arab League, EU, AU and United Nations Political Office for Somalia, as well as consultation with Somali politicians and leaders. Various secondary sources including the IGAD Communiqués and Resolutions on Somali Peace process, Reports of the Secretary General, Security Council Resolutions, journals, reports, unpublished dissertations and publications of academic proceedings had been widely reviewed. The documents of the past agreements of the Somali peace conferences had also been closely examined and analyzed. The author's observations and intuitions had also informed the study. To generate comments and contributions, some of the preliminary findings of the study were circulated to few academicians and politicians.

The study used a historical and descriptive approach and examined the internationally sponsored past Somali peace conferences to analyze the external interests and their impact on the process.

Chapter Outline

The study comprises five chapters, with its main substantive issues in Chapter Three and Four.

Chapter One introduces the study and gives an overall picture of the Somali peace processes. The Chapter is entitled: '*External Responses to Somali Conflict*'. It highlights, among other things, the background of the current peace process, actors, interests and impact; the problem to be investigated; the objectives; hypotheses and rationale of the study. The chapter also presents the literature review and theoretical framework of the study. It defines principal terms and outlines the methodology to be used in order to gather information contained in this study.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the Somali peace conferences in the years 1991-1999. It is entitled: '*Somali Peace Process (1991-1999): A Decade of Failed Peace Initiatives*'. The chapter examines externally sponsored peace conferences and agreements preceding Arta conference and the factors that led to their failures.

Chapter Three examines the latest sub-regional peace initiatives in Somalia: the Chapter is entitled: '*The Sub-Regional Management of Peace Initiatives in Somalia: The Case of Arta versus Mbagathi Peace Processes*'. The focus of this chapter is to compare and contrast the two initiatives respectively undertaken by Djibouti and IGAD in terms of the processes and outcomes and the impact of external interests. These two processes are separately dealt with because they are marked by substantive discussions. They are the most widely participated in processes, and they have attracted a relatively greater international attention. Both of them produced a Somali government which initially seemed to have ended Somalia's statelessness promising hopes for both the Somalis and international community at large.

Chapter Four critically analyses the roles and interests of the external actors in the Somali peace processes. It is entitled: '*Critical Analyses of the Roles and Interests of the External Actors in Somalia's Peace Processes*'. The major external actors whose interests are analyzed in the chapter are IGAD member states, League of Arab States, European Union, United States, United Nations, and African Union. This chapter also tests the hypotheses of the study.

Chapter Five summarizes the main arguments of the study. It is entitled: '*Conclusions: Findings, Lessons Learned and Recommendations*'. It presents major findings of the study, the lessons to be learned from the Somali peace processes, and gives recommendations for both Somali and international stakeholders.

Definition of Principal Terms

External Intervention

J. Schraedr defines intervention as the purposeful and calculated use of political, economic, and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic politics or the foreign policy of another country¹⁰⁴. Lionel Cliffe identifies five types of interventions in Africa¹⁰⁵.

- (i) cases where movements and conflicts have been initiated from outside-characteristic of Southern Africa
- (ii) those which are only sustained because of external backing like several Somali movements of the 1980s
- (iii) Those where conflict has been significantly escalated by the involvement of the neighboring states (as in the Sudan insurgency)
- (iv) Those where neighbors' involvement hinders resolution of the conflicts- as perhaps in the Northern Uganda , and to some extent in Somalia;
- (v) Those where external influences were present but not determinant- the Eritrean and Tigray liberation movements would be the most notable examples.

For the purpose of this study, the relevant interventions fall in the realm of facilitating the peace process through mediation and financing, setting the agenda for the process, determining the participants of the reconciliation conferences, campaigning and lobbying for the leaders to be elected, influencing the nature of the Charter and governance systems for future Somali state. On the negative side, External interventions also entail supporting factional clients by providing them political and military support and derailing peace initiatives. For instance, the recently concluded peace talks in Kenya were

¹⁰⁴ Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Intervention in the 1980s, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, (Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 2

¹⁰⁵ Lionel Cliffe, Regional Dimensions of Conflicts in The Horn Of Africa, Third world Quarterly, Vol 20. No.1 p.105

facilitated by IGAD under the chairmanship. IGAD decided who participated in the process, selected the venue and guided the whole process of the election of the parliamentarians and the president. EU, Arab league and United States also provided financial support the process. United Nations and African Union left their imprints on the process through their resolutions which threatened sanctions on those who obstruct peace, and reaffirmed the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia.

Interests

Danial Papp defines interests as those values that a given country or institution hold them dear. A state's interests are called the "national interests", and the methods and actions it employs to attempt to achieve its national interests are "called national policy"¹⁰⁶. However there are regime and individual interests which are often covered as national interests to serve the regimes and the individuals in power.

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Interventions are led by interests in either the conflict or its settlement. According to ICISS¹⁰⁷, many observers deem national interests as a necessary condition for a successful humanitarian intervention. For many countries, there is an interest in maintaining solidarity within regional groupings and military alliances. For other countries, international expectations and images remain influential. The foreign policy strategies, priorities, and capacities of individual countries are key determinants in decisions by individual governments to participate in robust military missions.

For the purpose of this study, interests are classified into three inter-woven categories; those interests of the state actors like Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti; and those of the organizations like IGAD, UN and African Union; and those interests pursued by individual actors like presidents of the countries that host peace processes. External interests that are relevant for this study which most of the state external actors in the

¹⁰⁶ Danial S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations. Frameworks for Understanding, 3rd edition (NY, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), p. 38

¹⁰⁷ ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, International Development Research Center, 2001) pp.211-212.

Somali peace processes pursue are mainly security and humanitarian related interests. Organizations also pursue image, reputation, and strive to fulfill the mandates and objectives for which they were established. Individual leaders and presidents also desire to achieve publicity, statesmanship and to leave legacies. The three interests are inter-related and none of them can be analyzed in isolation since state interests are defined by the individual leaders, and organizations embody the sum of the interests of the states that created them. These interests cut across in the Somali peace processes.

External Actors

The term “actors” refer to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties. All actors have certain interests in the process which is what makes them become involved in the first place.¹⁰⁸ The term refers to individual states, regional and international institutions which had either hosted, supported, or even sabotaged, the peace initiatives. The concept of actorness also encompasses those who did not act because by not acting they have influenced certain course of action in the Somali peace processes. For the purpose of the peace process, external actors mean:

- 1) IGAD and its member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Uganda)
- 2) United States and European Union Countries
- 3) League of Arab States/ Arab countries (i.e. Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and United Arab Emirates)
- 4) United Nations, European Union and African Union

Peace Process/Peace-Making

The term refers to efforts to contain and reduce the amount of violence used by parties in violent conflict and engage them in a process to settle dispute and terminate the violence.

¹⁰⁸ Makumi Mawagiru, Community Based Approaches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis prevention and conflict management (Nairobi: GTZ, 2001) cited in *ibid*.

The peace-making is a long-time process which addresses cycles of violence.¹⁰⁹ The process is cyclic and does not end with the conclusion of peace agreement; where one cycle ends, another starts. It embodies both the process and outcome. For the purpose of this study, peace process is used to mean reconciliation conferences that are held outside the country and the outcomes produced by these conferences. The Somali peace process is traceable to 1991 when the first Somali reconciliation conference was held in Djibouti. A number of attempts were made in the subsequent years by United Nations, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt and Yemen. Arta and Mbagathi peace processes are counted as the most substantive and the most widely participated ones.

¹⁰⁹ Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper no. 9 (Oxford, Oxfam Print Unit, 1994) p.3

CHAPTER TWO

Overview of the Somali Peace Processes (1991-1999): A Decade of Failed Peace Initiatives

Introduction

Subsequent to the fall of the Somali government, the country slipped into factional warfare and was divided into tribal-controlled areas making it difficult for unified rule by one leader. One of the most difficult tasks was how to control the many clan-based militia groups who rampaged the country and looted public institutions as well as private properties. The victorious United Somali Congress (USC) which captured the capital Mogadishu split into two rival groups led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed respectively. Mr. Mahdi was appointed interim president by supporters of USC, but General Aideed and other armed movements challenged his rule. The northwest of country declared its independence from the rest of Somalia and created a never-recognized Republic of Somaliland.

To seek solutions to the internal conflict, a number of attempts had been made by various countries and organizations, but one peace initiative after another, things regenerated into polarized political landscape exacerbating the situation further instead of improving the chances of political settlement. The chapter discusses the externally sponsored peace conferences in the period between 1991 and 1999.

By way of conclusion, the chapter also analyses the interests of major sponsors of the conferences and other external actors, namely Djibouti, Italy, Egypt, United States, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Yemen, and United Nations.

Jibouti Conferences

When United Somali Congress (USC), the victorious faction of Hawiye clan in southern Somalia evicted Siyad Barre from Barre, Ali Mahdi Mohamed supported by one wing of JSC was appointed interim president in late January 1991. Mr. Mahdi appointed Omar Arte Ghalib, a former foreign minister, as the new prime minister. The president pledged to form broad based government and to rule with justice, democracy and equality. Persistent political wrangling and division within USC prevented the realization of Mahdi's objectives. His appointment was contested by General Aideed, a leader of one wing of USC. Two other movements, Somali Patriotic movement (SPM) and Somali National Movement (SNM) also challenged the interim president. These three armed movements claimed credibility for the overthrow of Siyad Barre and saw Mahdi's appointment as interim president tantamount to a power grab.

Ali Mahdi described his government as a caretaker government which would stay in power until all the leaders of the armed oppositions and un-armed oppositions meet for consultations on the future of the country. He called for a consultation conference to be held on 28th February in Mogadishu to discuss, inter alia, holding of a national conference to discuss Somalia's future.¹¹⁰ His call was rejected by SNM alleging USC of having made political mistakes by setting up unrepresentative government and taking initiatives in holding national conferences without involving SNM in any prior consultations.¹¹¹ On 18th May, 1991, SNM declared the secession of British Somaliland and set up the republic of Somaliland. They justified the secession on the historical mistreatment the North suffered when they united with the South in 1960, and on the actions of USC which set up an interim government without consulting them squandering the goodwill of the SNM.

¹¹⁰ The Horn of Africa Bulletin Vol. 3 No. 3 March -April 1991 pp. 13-20

¹¹¹ *ibid* p.16

As the deadline of 28th February for consultation failed, the conference was postponed to 14th March, and later indefinitely, as factions failed to show up in Mogadishu. Consequently the provisional government declared that it would agree to hold the national unity talks outside the country if that improves the chance of success and, for this sake, sought the support of Djibouti government.¹¹²

The then-president of Djibouti backed by Egypt and Italy invited the Somali factions to a preparatory meeting in June, 1991. The trio wanted to realize a smooth transition in Somalia and put the moderate politicians with whom they had relations in power. Italy and Egypt made previous offers to mediate between Siyad Barre and armed opposition groups, but the latter declined these offers. Indeed, they were frustrated by the radical stance taken by USC and the SNM, the two most powerful groups who ousted Siyad Barre's regime. Djibouti was shaken by the secession of Somaliland with which it soon developed some border problems. It was also struggling with the burden of refugees including military personnel who ran away with their military hardware from the areas captured by SNM. Egypt had a vested interest in a stable and united Somalia with a government extending its control over the whole territory. It was worried with the Somaliland which it feared could become a Trojan horse for Ethiopian influence. SNM and USC, the two staunch oppositions to Djibouti conference started their rebellion inside Ethiopia and enjoyed military support from Addis Ababa even after they ended Siyad Barre's rule.

The first Djibouti conference was attended by prominent politicians representing the SSDF, SPM, USC and SDM in June but was rejected by SNM. An agreement was reached for an immediate cease-fire on all fronts, and a call to all parties to participate in a second Peace Conference on 15th July 1991 to form a broad-based government to lead the nation to a process of democratic rule. The second conference was held as scheduled. The USC, SDM, SSDF and SPM factions who participated in the preliminary meeting attended, and two others, SDA and the USF, who were not present at June meeting,

¹¹² *ibid*

joined. The SNM again declined to attend the reconciliation conference arguing that it no longer sought a role in Somalia since its May 1991 Declaration of Independence.

A panel of former civilian government political leaders, Aden Abdulle Osman, former president; Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein, former speaker of the House of Parliament; Abdirizak Haji Hussein, former Prime minister and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, former Prime Minister (he later became the Somaliland president) chaired the conference. The conference which only lasted 6 days from July 15-21, 1991, resolved the re-adoption of the 1960 constitution and confirmed Ali Mahdi as an interim president for two years. On 18 August 1991, at Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi was sworn in as interim president, and in October 1991 a government was formed.

The outcome of the 1991 Djibouti peace conference split the USC and led to bloody confrontations between the supporters of the interim president Ali Mahdi, and those of General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Prior to Djibouti conference, Aideed was overwhelmingly elected the chairman of USC at its annual congress on July 4, 1991 in a bid to appease him and extract his concession for Ali Mahdi's interim presidency. However General Aideed refused to accept the appointment of Ali Mahdi as interim president although he himself had nominated his faction's (USC) delegation to the Djibouti conference where Ali Mahdi was appointed for the top job. He believed that only the USC had the legitimacy to form a central government for Somalia along with its struggle partners SNM and SPM who overthrew Siyad Barre. Most of the participants at Djibouti conferences were civilian politicians opposed to Siyad Barre's rule.

General Aideed had also felt the Djibouti conference was a conspiracy plotted by Italian, Egyptian and Djiboutian actors whom he saw in the context of their earlier support for Siyad Barre, hence inimical to him.¹¹³ He alleged them to be undermining the struggle of the resistance movements and trying to restore the remnants of Siyad Barre.

¹¹³ Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia And Operation Restore Hope, Reflections On Peacemaking And Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p. 15

Because of the legitimacy conferred on him by the Djibouti conference, Ali Mahdi's government was recognized by several countries including Djibouti, Egypt, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. The outcome of the conferences was also backed by Arab League, OAU and organization of Islamic conference. But as more states had shown good-will to the interim government of Ali Mahdi and pledged support, Aideed became increasingly intransigent about the move of Mahdi to establish his rule in Mogadishu. He shot at Italian plane carrying the Italian under-secretary of Foreign Affairs Andrea Borruso who was going to visit Mogadishu to boost the interim government. On 17th November 1991, he attacked Ali Mahdi's headquarters and his militias rampaged and looted Italian Embassy in Mogadishu. The conflict in the capital sealed the fate of the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi and also increased the resolve of the SNM to chart its own course as an independent entity from the rest of Somalia.

Number of factors underscored the failure of the Djibouti initiatives to reincarnate the collapsed state. Firstly, the poor diplomacy of the mediators and the lack of international leverage led to the sterility of this early initiative. The organizers of the Djibouti conference lacked experience and could not exert pressure on the parties to the conflict.¹¹⁴ The government of Djibouti reportedly requested the support of the United Nations but it was turned down with no explanation except that the matter was too complicated. Had the United Nations, together with the regional organizations been involved in the preparation of this meeting, the reconciliation could have gotten off to a good and serious start and subsequent blood-shed could have been avoided.¹¹⁵ Secondly, the poor preparation of the conference compounded by the untimely unripe moment of the conference militated against its success. The victorious USC which drove Siyad Barre out of power in Mogadishu was not willing to compromise with defeated groups and newly created or reincarnated civilian movements. It wanted to dictate for others who were no ready to give in. Thirdly, the perceived bias of Djibouti, Italy and Egypt towards

¹¹⁴ Mohamed Sahnoun, Prevention In Conflict Resolution In Adam & Ford (Eds). Mending Rips in the Sky. Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century (Lawrenceville, The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1997) p. 307

¹¹⁵ *ibid*

the Manifesto Group undermined the trust of some Somali factions¹¹⁶. The armed groups such as SNM and USC were suspicious of the Djibouti talks and regarded it as an Italian attempt to move its new allies in the Manifesto Group including Ali Mahdi, into positions recently vacated by their old ally, Siyad Barre.¹¹⁷

United Nations Intervention in Somalia.

Following the failure of the Djibouti conference and the interim government of Ali Mahdi, factional fighting engulfed Somalia throughout 1991 and most parts of 1992. Armed factions who were jockeying for power in Somalia lacked the institutional bases and political vision to cooperate once Siyad Barre had been overthrown. Somalia's strategic insignificance after the cold war and the legal complications regarding sovereignty debate arising from article 2(7) of UN charter which prohibits intervention in internal matters of the sovereign states constrained any meaningful international action to avert the crisis or limit the state collapse in Somalia. The international community was largely indifferent to Somalia and the UN had been scared into lethargy, frightened by both the danger and the lack of rules and precedent."¹¹⁸

The United Nations started to consider Somalia seriously when Boutros Ghali became secretary general in January 1992 when he prepared his Agenda for Peace in which he proposed new ideas about peacekeeping and peacemaking. He embarrassed the Security Council by comparing its preoccupation with Yugoslavia, where it had just committed 14,000 peacekeeping troops, to its indifference to Somalia. This triggered a public debate about racial double standards for global humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁹ As a former Egyptian

¹¹⁶ Manifesto group is comprised of old politicians, elders, intellectuals, and businessmen who in 1990 wrote a manifesto calling for a national reconciliation conference to end the country's problems. Ali Mahdi, the interim president who was appointed in Djibouti conference was one of them.

¹¹⁷ Abdi Samatar, "Social Class and Economic Restructuring in Pastoral Africa: Notes from Somalia," Africa Studies Review, vol.35 (April 1992), pp.101-27 cited in Samatar & Lvons, Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington D.C, The Brookings Institution, 1995) p. 29

¹¹⁸ "The Squeezing of Sahnoun". The Economist, 7 November 1992, p.48 in ibid p.63

¹¹⁹ Charles Radin, "Forgotten War, forgotten People." Boston Globe, April 5, 1992 cited in Ken Menkhaus and Lou Ortmyer, Somalia: Misread Crisis and Missed Opportunities. (New York, Carnegie , 1999) p. 35

minister of state for foreign affairs, the Secretary General has had a long-standing interest in the Horn. He was leading the ill-fated attempt to bring together Siyad Barre and opposition movements in mid-1990.¹²⁰ He was convinced that the UN had an opportunity to achieve the great objectives for which it was established including maintaining international peace and security. The UN had several objectives in Somalia as stipulated by the Security Council Resolutions resolution 733 of 23 January 1992; to arrange a ceasefire between warring factions; to organize and deliver humanitarian assistance; and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement.¹²¹

The United Nations appointed James Jonnah as UN special envoy and dispatched him to Mogadishu on a fact-finding mission on new years' eve in 1991. He mediated a ceasefire between Ali Mahdi and Aideed on March 3, 1992 in Mogadishu. The ceasefire agreement was followed by the UN Security Council resolution 751 of April 24, 1992 which established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) providing for dispatching of fifty unarmed UN observers to monitor the ceasefire.

The UN involvement in Somalia was resisted by General Aideed who had been antipathetic to the UN Secretary General whom he considered responsible for Egypt's strong support of Siyad Barre while he was minister of state for foreign affairs. General Aideed believed he could easily eliminate Ali Mahdi within weeks and feared the UN involvement would prevent him to assume power in Somalia. Ali Mahdi was on weaker position and welcomed UN role hoping that the UN would balance the power which was tilting towards his opponent General Aideed.

The Secretary General dispatched the seasoned diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to Somalia as his special representative to Somalia in April 1992. Sahnoun intensified consultations with the Somali factions and neighboring countries. But his style of diplomacy was not liked by the UN Head Quarter He was accused of entertaining Aideed's illegitimate claims of leadership. Sahnoun requested UN for greater flexibility and restraint when it

¹²⁰ The talks were boycotted by Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC)

¹²¹ Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia And Operation Restore Hope, Reflections On Peacemaking And Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p.61

comes to deal with General Aideed who was opposed to UN involvement. He often ignored much of the Aideed's anti-UN posturing in the interest of obtaining his cooperation. When he was advised to avoid laissez-faire diplomacy, Sahnoun resigned from his position in protest of restrictions imposed on his diplomatic movement.

As the situation worsened and the political stalemate became intractable, pressure mounted up on the US administration to act to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Somalia. The United States kept Somalia off the agenda of the Security Council in the early stages of the crisis fearing that the rapidly increasing costs of UN peacekeeping would trigger a congressional backlash. However the pressure coming from media, congressional members who visited Somalia and the humanitarian relief agencies operating in Somalia was getting too strong to be resisted by the administration. Reputed newspapers and electronic media put Somalia on top of their coverage and reported the crisis in depth. The situation of Somalia became an electoral issue with democratic candidate Bill Clinton criticizing President Bush for neglecting the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia. After consultations at the UN, President Bush announced that he would send U.S. forces to Somalia for humanitarian mission.. The United Task Force (UNITAF) mission named Operation Restore Hope (ORH) was limited to securing a safe environment for the delivery of relief supplies and the consolidation of the security framework so that it can be handed over to UN forces. The U.S. administration envisaged a short operation which would smooth out all bottlenecks for a peace building by the UN. The Secretary General, however, did not agree that the United Nations should take charge for Somalia in the near future, replacing the UNITAF with a UN peacekeeping force. He called upon U.S. to go beyond their humanitarian mandate and conduct a full-scale, total disarmament program over the entire country, using whatever force might be required.

The UN-led Peace Initiatives in Addis Ababa and Nairobi

As the time ticked towards the conclusion of the UNTTAF mission, the UN was urged by the United States to speed up reconciliation. With the support of Ethiopia, the UN hosted three consecutive conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993. It also organized a fourth one in Nairobi in April 1994.

First Addis Ababa Conference

The first preparatory conference was held in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and was officiated by the UN Secretary General. About 14 factions invited by the UN attended the meeting. General Aideed initially resisted the Addis Ababa conference because of his distrust of the United Nations and partly because of his demand for special status. After intense debate and political posturing followed by an intervention of President Zenawi of Ethiopia, the participating factions signed a ceasefire-agreement and agreed to hold full-scale national reconciliation conferences in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. However neither the UN nor UNITAF under the leadership of United States was willing to undertake monitoring of ceasefire agreement or disarmament program. The US forces were preparing to depart were not willing to take on more responsibilities, and the UN was equally reluctant to assume it, even though they had finally acknowledged nominal responsibility. The ceasefire agreement was violated by Somali National Front (SNF) forces led by General Morgan which captured the port town of Kismayo which was under the control of Aideed's SNA faction.

Second Addis Ababa Conference

In the midst of tensions and the UNITAF pullout, The United Nations convened a second Addis Ababa meeting for the same fourteen faction leaders who attended the pervious meeting, but also invited 250 nonmilitary people including traditional leaders, religious groups, and NGOs, thus pursuing two incompatible different strategies; one to

accommodate the militia leaders and the other to encourage alternative forces from civil society. Many hopes were placed on this conference. It was the Fourth internationally sponsored reconciliation conferences. People feared that if this fails, there would not be another chance. The political meeting was preceded by humanitarian conference chaired by Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs to devise a program for humanitarian assistance and encourage the factions to reach a political settlement.

The participants of the conference differed on whether the political reconstruction should start with local administrative structures on a decentralized , regional basis or should move towards a national framework. The former stance was championed by General Aideed and his allies as it gave power to his group which occupied relatively more regions than others , while the latter was advocated by Ali Mahdi and his allies. The deadlock was broken by the intervention of the Ethiopian president Melez Zenawi and UN mediator Lansana Kouyate who produced a compromised agreement and presented to the fourteen factions on March 17. The agreement contained a renewed commitment to implement the nation-wide ceasefire and disarmament plan agreed upon by the faction leaders in January 1993 and a deal to form seventy-four-member two-year Transitional National Council(TNC) with legislative powers. Each of the fifteen factions would have one seat , and each of the eighteen regions would have three representatives, one of them women. Mogadishu would be represented by five people including Ali Mahdi. The TNC would be headed by a rotating president. The TNC was the top level of a three tiered provisional government. Regional and district councils would be established, together with central administrative departments staffed by professionals and under the oversight of the TNC. The TNC was expected to be established by July 1 1993 after the approval of the charter of the TNC on June 8.

The second Addis Ababa conference was concluded at a time of critical threshold when the international operation simultaneously went through an organizational and leadership transition. Immediately after the Addis Ababa agreement, UNOSOM replaced the UNITAF with new military and political command taking control of the operations.

The most important gap in carrying out the Addis Ababa accords pertained to disarmament which was far from self-enforcing. The UNITAF's mandate did not cover disarmament; the UN was unwilling and unable to accept the responsibility, and the NGOs had neither the cohesion nor the resources required to do so. The factions were reluctant to disarm on their own as they feared both serious attacks from their enemies and the loss of future power and position. Aideed's SNA prepared to challenge the UN peacekeepers as soon as U.S forces had departed.¹²²

On the same day of signing the Addis Ababa peace agreement, the UN Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN charter and unanimously adopted Resolution 814(93) to expand UN's role in Somalia under a UN administration to be named UNOSOM II. The objective of two-year mission was defined to assist the provision of relief and economic rehabilitation, promote political reconciliation and the maintenance of peace and stability, and to assist in the re-establishment of national and regional administrations in the entire country.¹²³ Under chapter VII of the UN charter, UNOSOM was given powers of "peace-enforcement" and was given a de facto, international authority to make decisions for and on behalf of the Somali people.

The conflict that broke out in June 1993 between general Aideed's forces and UN forces sealed the fate of the outcome of the Addis Ababa conference. The conflict primarily arose from perceived bias within the UN/US body against Aideed's faction, and attempts by the UN to marginalize Aideed and promote the status of his rival politico-military leaders.¹²⁴ The regional actors also came into scene. Ethiopia and Eritrea supported, at least politically, General Aideed and used their relations with him to extract concessions from the U.S. and UN to recognize their regional leadership. In contrast Djibouti and Egypt, and Italy had favored moderate leaders such as Ali Mahdi or Mohammed Abshir to take leadership of the country. This regional competition reinforced the division and rivalry between the two camps jockeying for the control of the country.

¹²² Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p. 99.

¹²³ Mark Bradbury, The Somali conflict: Prospects for Peace (Oxford: Oxtam Print Unit, 1994) p.25

¹²⁴ *ibid* p. 25

The Addis Ababa conference suffered the last blow after 24 Pakistani peace keepers were killed by general Aideed's supporters on 5 June 1993 when they entered Radio Mogadishu controlled by Aideed for inspection. On 6 June, The UN Security Council met and unanimously adopted resolution S37 which authorized "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the killing of peace keepers which implied a go-ahead for the arresting of Aideed and his senior aides. The Special Representative of Secretary General, Admiral Jonathan Howe, called Aideed a fugitive and put \$25,000 as reward for any information leading to his arrest.

Events following from the June 5 confrontations produced disarray in the command and control of UNOSOM II. The forces began reporting to, and getting orders directly from, their capitals instead of from the force commander and the UN Special Representative. Italians, for example, refused to participate in actions against the SNA and were publicly accused by UN and U.S. officials of collaborating with Aideed's forces. UN under-secretary general Koffi Anan publicly rebuffed the criticism of UN policies by the Italian commander, General Bruno Loi, and called for his replacement.¹²⁵ The French and Italians alleged a lack of adequate consultation, planning, and advance notification by UNOSOM of military operations in Mogadishu.¹²⁶

The UN-SNA confrontation reached its peak in October 3, when U.S Rangers' attack to capture Aideed failed and resulted in the death of 18 soldiers and capture of US pilot, Michael Durant by Aideed's militiamen. As result of this event, Clinton convened an urgent policy review with key military and civilian people in his administration¹²⁷ On October 7 he publicly announced a major change in course in which he ordered his forces to stop hunting down Aideed acknowledging that it had been a mistake for U.S. forces to be drawn into a UN decision "to personalize the conflict" in response to Aideed.¹²⁸ The

¹²⁵ Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking And Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p. 119

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia and operation Restore hope. reflections on peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p. 128

¹²⁸ *ibid*

U.S. administration decided to withdraw its forces in March 1994. The Security Council adopted Resolution 885 sponsored by United States which suspended the hunt for Aideed and use of force against him.¹²⁹ The U.S. policy shift came as shocking to Boutros-Ghali and threw the whole operation into disarray with major countries pulling out their troops. To facilitate U.S. disengagement from Somalia, The Clinton administration drummed up for greater regional involvement in Somalia's peacemaking efforts under the banner of "African solutions to African problems".¹³⁰ The U.S. special envoy, Robert Oakley, who has been again dispatched to the region consulted with Ethiopia and Eritrea who had been designated to represent the OAU in mediating Somali political reconciliation. Both countries had diplomats in Mogadishu and they had some leverage over Gen. Aideed.

The Third Addis Ababa Talks

After the scathing failures of the UN to capture Aideed, the U.S. urged UN headquarters and President Zenawi to plan another third conference in Addis Ababa at the end of November in 1993. President Zenawi assisted by UN acting Special Envoy, Lansana Kouyate, managed the talks. Aideed who was afraid of being assassinated was transported by U.S. aircraft which angered his rivals who interpreted the arrangement as a U.S. endorsement of Aideed's political ambitions rather than a logistical assistance for facilitating political dialogue. It also created controversies in United States. Oakley compared the abrupt change in the treatment accorded to Aideed to the abrupt change in policy toward PLO chairman Yasir Arafat. In pursuit of peace, Oakley argued, it is sometimes necessary to come to terms with those previously considered enemies.¹³¹

The conference again faced difficulties as the two main protagonists, Group-12¹³² of Ali Mahdi and SNA of Aideed got locked in political maneuvering and uncompromising

¹²⁹ Resolution 885 authorized the establishment of Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel."

¹³⁰ Op.cit.ibid p. 132

¹³¹ ¹³¹ Hirsch & Oakly. Somalia and Operation Restore hope, Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington D.C., Institute of Peace Press, 1995) p. 140

¹³² G-12 is an alliance of anti-Aideed factions comprising twelve groups led by Ali Mahdi.

wrangling. Where Aideed insisted on altering the TNC composition which was agreed in the second Addis Ababa conference to reflect his increased influence after defeating UNOSOM, G-12 pushed for constitution of TNC even if that is without SNA. The talks failed and there was no significant breakthrough although the Ethiopian president and United Nations acting special representative of the Secretary General, Lansana Kouyate tried to get the factions reach on compromise.

G-12 Meeting in Cairo

After the final Addis Ababa talks floundered, G-12 gathered in Cairo to make up for the embarrassment they suffered in Ethiopia where General Aideed was received as hero giving the impression that U.S. and regional states succumbed to Aideed's claim for leadership. In the meantime Aideed visited IGAD capitals and was accorded a head of state visit-like reception.

Egypt which hosted G-12 felt that Aideed was accorded undue treatment and his aggression was not rewarded with due punishment. Egypt was one of the troop contributing countries in UNOSOM and general Aideed often criticized Egypt and Italy of trying to restore the remnants of Siyad Barre as the leadership of the country. The regional states such as Eritrea and Ethiopia had close relations with Aideed where Egypt basked on G-12 and promoted their political legitimacy.

The G-12 who met in Cairo from 1-7 March, 1994 proposed the establishment of a Transitional National Salvation Council (TNSC) composed of Seventeen members comprising of the fifteen chairmen of the Somali Political Organizations who signed the Addis Ababa agreement including General Aideed plus Ali Mahdi, and chairman of SNM which participated in the Addis Ababa reconciliation conference in March 1993 as an observer.¹³³ The TNSC would have a chairman and two vice Chairmen on a rotational basis for every three months until the proposed TNC in Addis Ababa conference comes

¹³³ See Results of the Consultations amongst the Somali G-12 political Organizations, Cairo, 1-7 March, 1994

into existence. The function of the TNSC is to supervise formation and supervision of the provisional government, and the completion of the formation of the TNC as agreed in Addis Ababa agreement. Although Group-12 explicitly made a position for General Aideed on the TNSC, his position was reduced to minimal proportion.

The UN-Sponsored Peace Talks in Nairobi (1994)

By mid-1994, UNOSOM had largely abandoned any pretense of political or security objectives in Somalia. However some late attempts were made in March 1994 by the acting United Nations representative, Lansoune Kouyate. He organized informal talks of the political organizations in Nairobi and got General Aideed and Ali Mahdi sign an agreement On March 24 in Nairobi. The two men signed an agreement on behalf of their allies which called for the repudiation of any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and implementation of ceasefire and voluntary disarmament. The parties also agreed to hold a meeting of the signatory factions of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) on April 15 April 1994 to set up rules and procedures of voting and criteria of participation in National Reconciliation Conference to be convened on 15 may 1995 to elect a president, vice president and appoint a prime minister.¹³⁴

The agreement which was reached was never implemented because UNSOM pressurized on political leaders to reach an agreement before it pulls out. It did not come out from a calculated consideration and will of the faction leaders. The United Nations wanted to have an honorable safe exit from Somalia with an interim government in place as a face-saving for the UN. The Secretary General and Security Council set March 31, 1995, as the final date for withdrawal of UNOSOM forces as they saw no sensible alternative but to withdraw military forces. They made desperate moves to broker a sort of deal between the factions and bring about a government before pulling out. However the priority of the most of factions was to strengthen their hands by seeking alliances or realigning internal factional politics.

¹³⁴ Nairobi Declaration by the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations, March 24, 1994

UN Blunders in its Peace-Led Initiatives

The factors that led to the failure of the UN peace initiatives relate both to the approaches used and the interests that were pursued by the UN and the other internal actors. Firstly, Operation Restore Hope (ORH) gave limited attention to long term political and humanitarian needs. Local expectations were more than securing of routes for relief supplies. The U.S. was not ready to provide long term commitment but wanted “quick fix” temporary solution. Despite such actions as brokering ceasefires, the United States avoided to engage in activities with profound political implications, and wanted to limit the mission in terms of time, expense, and risk of casualties, whereas the UN Secretary General was anxious to have the U.S. forces take on as much as possible while the forces were muscular and popular and disarm Somalia militias.¹³⁵ U.S. interests did not go beyond the intentions of President Bush, the senior, to leave a legacy of having stopped starvations in Somalia and averting the mounting criticism that it is only interested in strategic conflicts like the one in Iraq which allegedly was intervention for the sake of oil. President Clinton also looked for regional actors to step in and take the responsibility of mediating the Somali conflict. He adopted a hands-off style policy. The U.S. led operation lacked any vision for the restoration of a Somali government and much of the burden was left for the UN which was less prepared and less willing to take the challenge.

Secondly, UNTAF and UNOSOM sought to tilt the balance away from General Aideed and other militia leaders toward alternative, moderate groups. This was referred to as the “plucking the bird.” According to Robert Oakley, if “you take one feather at a time... the bird does not think there is anything terrible going on. Then one day he finds he can not fly.”¹³⁶ Aideed resisted UNTAF’s attempts to disarm his militias and sabotaged all the UN activities towards the establishment of governance system in the country.

¹³⁵ Samatar & Lyons, Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington D.C, The Brookings Institution, 1995) pp. 40-41

¹³⁶ Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, pp. 13, 110 cited in Samatar & Lyons, Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington D.C, The Brookings Institution, 1995) pp. 40-41

Thirdly, the change of mandate of the UN, which took a total nation-building responsibility as result of the UN Security Resolution 814(93), provoked Somali resentment and charges were made that the UN is "colonizing" Somalia. In this process, the goals of UN were in direct conflict with those of the Somalis particularly the warlords who were afraid of being stripped of their status.

Fourthly, failing to implement 'plucking the bird' policy, the United Nations conferred legitimacy on the fourteen militia groups who participated in the Addis Ababa talks, hence became the major players in future reconciliation efforts. The UN established the principle that political rehabilitation primarily focused on reconciling militia leaders.¹³⁷ This was a bad precedent set by United Nations and turned out to be a major obstacle for the attainment of peace in Somalia in the subsequent years. The UN accommodated militia leaders not because they are the legitimate voices for Somalia, but rather to prevent attacks on their forces. Although some traditional leaders, academicians and local NGOs representatives attended the second Addis Ababa conferences, they were just peripheral players.

Fifthly, The United States and UN paid the scantest attention to the relatively peaceful areas in Northwestern and northeastern regions controlled by SNM and SSDF respectively and did not provide assistance to encourage stability. By concentrating in Mogadishu and allocating much of the resources to Mogadishu, the UN operation intensified the tensions and competitions between the warring factions in Mogadishu.

Nairobi Understanding in 1996

After the death of General Aideed, there was a feeling that some peace initiatives can be undertaken. The former Kenyan president invited key Mogadishu faction leaders for consultations in Nairobi in October 1996. The meeting brought together Hussein Aideed, son and the successor of General Aideed, his rival Osman Hassan Ali (Atto), and Ali Mahdi Mohammed. President Moi assisted by his security aide General Lazaro Sumbeiy

¹⁷ *ibid.* p.45

focused on the pacification of Mogadishu which is the hub of Somali conflicts as a prelude to a full-fledge reconciliation in Somalia.

The Somali leaders who met in Nairobi from 9th to 15th October , 1996 signed the Nairobi Understanding which declared secession of hostilities including media propaganda, allowing of free movement of people in the capital and removing of roadblocks leading from one region to another. The Nairobi Understanding also rejected any attempt to initiate bilateral negotiations that may detract, divert attention from or undermine the Somali peace process.¹³⁸ One of the major obstacles to reconciliation at this stage was the continued claim by Hussein Aideed who inherited his father's so-called "Salballar government as a president of Somalia.

Sodere Conference

As the Nairobi meeting of the Mogadishu factions reached what was called Nairobi Understanding was proceeding, Ethiopia extended invitations to other Somali factions opposing 'Salballaar' government of Hussein Aideed to meet in Sodere, Ethiopia. The anti-Aideed coalition of twenty-six factions (26) met in Sodere from 22nd November 1996- 3rd January 1997 for what was called 'High Level Consultations'. The result was the establishment of the National Salvation Council(NSC) comprising forty-one members and an eleven-member Executive Council of whom five were elected as the rotating chairs to the NSC. The meeting also agreed to work for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order, to help reconcile the differences among the clans in the zones of conflict, and to hold a National Reconciliation Conference in Bosaso in Mid 1997.¹³⁹ With Hussein Aideed's absence there was, however, little possibility of a breakthrough. The planned conference was never convened and the agreement floundered as its precedent accords faltered away. The Mogadishu-based factions fearing marginalization watered down the holding of the Bosaso conference which would have taken the political importance away from Mogadishu.

¹³⁸ See Press Statement on Somalia Issued by the Kenyan State House, October 16, 1996

¹³⁹ See "Solemn Declaration" by the High Level Consultations of the Somali Political Movements, January 3, 1999, Sodere, Ethiopia

Many observers saw this coalition of Sodere factions as merely a marriage of convenience for the sole aim of countering Hussein Aideed's Salballar government. The conference also saw the proliferation of the existing factions and their further fragmentation.¹⁴⁰ In the past, the two opposing camps, Aideed's SNA and Ali Mahdi's SSA dominated the political landscape, but the failure of either to extend its control across the country led to polarization of factions. The Sodere conference served to further legitimize the warlords at the expense of the wider civil society actors in the country.

The hosting country, Ethiopia, was mandated by the OAU summit in Cameroon in July 1996 to settle Somali conflict. IGAD also gave the same mandate to Ethiopia in its summit in Djibouti in November 1996. Both OAU and IGAD failed to consider the ramifications of this mandate which was given to a country with bitter historical relations with Somalia and without due consultations with the Somalis themselves. Ethiopia campaigned for support for NSC at the OAU and IGAD forums. Some NSC members had been invited to the OAU summit at Harare in January 1997 as observers at the behest of Ethiopia. The Summit endorsed the outcome of the Sodere conference. The IGAD Summit which followed in Nairobi from 8-9 July, 1997 supported the NSC but called upon them to bridge the gap between them and Hussein Aideed to make sure that the planned National Reconciliation Conference in Bosaso is not boycotted by any one, and that no one was excluded.¹⁴¹

Sana'a Meeting in May 1997

After Aideed was killed by supporters of Osman Atto in August 1996, Hussein Aided who took over from his father and his rival Osman Ato continued jockeying for leadership and sporadic fighting continued between their supporters. Yemen invited the

¹⁴⁰ The number of factions almost doubled since March 1993 when fifteen factions attended the UNOSOM sponsored conference.

¹⁴¹ See Speech made by Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Closing Ceremony of the Second Session of the National Salvation Council of Somalia, Addis Ababa, 10 July, 1997

two faction leaders to Sana'a for discussion which continued between 4th and 12th May 1997. The meeting was a follow-up to the Nairobi Understanding reached in October 1996 in Nairobi by the three leaders including Ali Mahdi Mohamed. The two leaders declared an immediate and permanent end to conflicts in Benadir Region, South Mogadishu, putting in place a ceasefire and cessation of all hostilities including acts of violence and negative propaganda.¹⁴²

Although the Sana'a agreement was limited in scope and focused on the pacification of Southern Mogadishu where militias of Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto had been engaged in one of the bloodiest battles in the capital, it is counted one of the most successful agreements so far honored by the faction leaders. The success can, however, be attributed to the war weariness within the supports of the two warlords who are the next of kin of each other and share close clan lineage.¹⁴³

Cairo Accord

In late 1997, Egypt invited the members of the National Salvation Council (NSC) which was set up in Sodere, Ethiopia and Hussein Aideed' group of Salballar government. The two groups led by Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed signed an agreement on 22 December 1997 to convene a reconciliation conference in Baidoa on 15 February 1998 to be attended by 465 delegates as precursor of forming a government with a 13-member presidential council, a prime minister and a 189-member council of deputies with constituent powers.¹⁴⁴ The presidential council would have three members from each of the four main tribes and one from a minority clan. The agreement also obliged Hussein Aideed to end his occupation of Baidoa town. Baidoa was captured by the late Gen. Aideed in September 1995 from the Rahanwein clan. The faction leaders also agreed to reopen Mogadishu seaport and airport which had been closed since 1995, and to dismantle the green line dividing the capital city.

¹⁴² See Sana'a Joint Declaration, Sana'a, 12th May, 1997; Horn Africa Bulletin Vol: 9, No: 3 May-June 1997 p. 18

¹⁴³ both groups belong to Saad sub-clan of Habargidir

¹⁴⁴ Horn Africa Bulletin Vol: 10 No: 1 Jan-Feb 1998 p. 14

The Cairo conference which was supported by the League of Arab States and other Arab countries particularly Libya and Yemen was originally conceived as a complement to Sodere conference. It intended to bring on board the principal warlord Hussein Aideed and his Salballar group who have boycotted the Sodere conference. Egypt and Ethiopia had reportedly coordinated their efforts on this end, but Ethiopia later denounced the outcome of Cairo Conference as it deferred from the way Ethiopia wanted and took a new course of its own for the reconciliation in Somalia. Ethiopia has shown reluctance over Hussein Aideed accusing him of collaborating with Islamic fundamentalists and condoning Ethiopian rebel groups. The agreement had also caused the discontent of two faction leaders, Abdulahi Yusuf of SSDF and Aden Abdullahi Nur(Gabyow) of SPM who had been among the promoters of the Sodere accord. The deal was also dismissed by Rahanwein Resistance Army(RRA) which was fighting to reclaim Baidoa, the presumed host of the reconciliation conference, from Hussein Aideed. They vowed to drive him out by the way of bullet by which he captured the town.¹⁴⁵ The Cairo agreement was also denounced by the breakaway republic of Somaliland. As part of the Cairo deal, Hussein Aided ended his claim of being president of a government, but he violated his pledge to de-occupy Baidoa which was to host the reconciliation conference.

IGAD apparently influenced by Ethiopia rebuffed the Cairo Accord and alleged it favored Mogadishu-based faction leader Hussein Aideed at the expense of the rest of the clans. Kinfe Abraham, the acting-secretary general of IGAD accused Egypt of failing to involve all Somalis in the process.¹⁴⁶ It warned Egypt not to interfere in Somalia. It argued that the proliferation of parallel initiatives undermines the central objective of accelerating the peace process in Somalia.¹⁴⁷ IGAD mandated Ethiopia to conduct peace negotiations on Somalia and the warning against multiple track talks was meant to retain this mandate for Ethiopia and resist Egypt- not an IGAD member – which has taken an active role without IGAD blessing.

¹⁴⁵ Horn Africa Bulletin Vol: 10 No: 2 March-April 1998 p. 17

¹⁴⁶ op.cit p. 17

¹⁴⁷ Horn Africa Bulletin Vol: 10 No: 2 March-April 1998 p. 16

Actors and Interest in the Failed Peace Initiatives

The major external actors in the decade-long peace processes which failed were Djibouti, Italy, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, United States, Yemen, and United Nations. In the first and second peace conference, Djibouti, Italy and Egypt were united in pursuit of establishing a smooth power transition in Somalia. They wanted to put some allies in power. The trios were not in good terms with the opposition movements which overthrew Siyad Barre. Italy and Egypt made some earlier attempts to mediate between Siyad Barre and opposition groups which the latter refused. The armed groups spearheaded by General Aideed who was suspicious of the sponsors of Djibouti conferences in which Ali Mahdi was appointed as interim president rejected the outcome of the conference and confronted the interim government finally leading to bloody confrontations in the capital, Mogadishu. Djibouti and Egypt, two Arab countries, had vested interests in the unity of Somalia. The Secession of Somaliland was worrying for the Arab nations as it signaled a looming threat of Israeli and Ethiopian influence in Somalia, and as such the restoration of the Somalia as a unified state was of a paramount importance for these countries. Djibouti received large influx of refugees including military personnel who ran away with their military hardware from the areas captured by SNM.

In the UN-led peace initiatives, the then-Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali, took an increasing interest in the settlement of the third world conflicts. He was former minister of state of Egypt and had an eye on what was happening in Somalia. He focused the world attention on the humanitarian disasters in Somalia and embarrassed the international community of not acting in the face of the disaster while its resources and attention was consumed in what he termed as the "rich man's war". The UN wanted to fulfill its mandate of protecting international peace and security. It invoked chapter VII of the UN charter as the Somali situation, in the eyes of the Secretary General, represented a threat to international peace and security.

United States which spearheaded the UNITAF and was the de facto leader of the UNOSOM had basically wanted to address humanitarian situation in Somalia as a response to the growing criticism that resulted from its obsession with the Iraqi crisis in early 1991 while it neglected the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia. The pressure to act came from media, relief organizations and members of the congress. The outgoing president Bush (Snr) wanted to leave a legacy as a man who managed both the Iraqi aggression and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia successfully. Clinton regionalized the peacemaking efforts and engaged Ethiopia and Eritrea to avoid any more burdens on the U.S as the cost of the operation in terms of finances and lives became too heavy for the United States as result of Gen. Aideed's intransigence. The administrations' last efforts were focusing on withdrawing their forces from Somalia while the minimum governance systems were in place.

Both UN and United States were antipathetic to Gen. Aideed's influence and they wanted to curb his ambitions for the leadership of the country. This caused bloody confrontations which undercut the peacemaking efforts of the UN and United States. General Aideed resisted to what he has seen as UN and American bias towards Ali Mahdi and his G-12 alliance. He confronted the UN attempts to establish regional and district administrations and alleged that United Nations was putting Somalia under trusteeship. Italy which is Somalia's former colonial master vied for the leadership of the UN operation in Somalia. Its desire was frustrated by the U.S refusal to allow any dominant role for Italy in both UNITAF and UNOSOM. Consequently Italy sabotaged the UN operations and reportedly leaked some vital information to Gen. Aideed during his hunt by the UN.

The regional actors in the UN-led peace conferences were Ethiopia and Eritrea who were perceived to be supporting Gen. Aideed in a bid to influence the UN operation in Somalia. Both countries were led by former insurgent leaders who shared much in common with Aideed who was also a rebel leader. The Ali Mahdi's alliance of G-12 always looked to Ethiopia with an eye of suspicion. Ethiopia wanted to shape the nature of Somalia's rebirth and was naturally interested in who takes the top leadership in the country.

The timing of the Sodere conference was not incidental. It coincided with the emergence of powerful civic movements including the establishment of Shari 'a courts in many parts of Somalia which have restored some degree of stability in their zones of operations. The Shari 'a courts¹⁴⁸ were accorded popular support by the traditional leaders, religious groups and business community. These trends undermined the role of the warlords and encouraged the emergence of alternative forces. Ethiopia used the Sodere conference to incarnate the warlords and promote their political status as a counter force for emerging civic groups. The conference might have also served as cover and legitimization of Ethiopia's incursions in Gedo region in 1996 where it claimed extremist elements destabilizing Ethiopia were operating. It attacked border towns of Bula-Hawo and Dolo as the Sodere conference was proceeding. It also reportedly shipped arms to many factions to counter Hussein Aideed and Islamic groups. The Sodere conference created new tensions and renewed hostilities in many parts of Somalia and did not achieve its stated aims of promoting reconciliation in Somalia.

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Yemen had cultural and commercial ties with Somalia, and it hosts one of the largest Somali refugees outside the Horn region. These refugees mostly come from Southern Somalia where security problems are more prevalent. The meeting between Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto which Yemen hosted came as a prelude to the Cairo meeting in November 1997 and it looks, according to some observers, Yemen was aiming to bridge the gap between Mogadishu factions before Cairo meeting, a move that seemed to have been coordinated with Egypt and intended to water down the results of Ethiopia's sponsored preceding Sodere conference. The Arab countries often focused their diplomatic initiatives on Mogadishu, the capital. This is in line with the unitary approach of nation-building championed by the League of Arab States.

In the Cairo conference, Egypt refocused the peacemaking efforts on the capital, Mogadishu, which is the center of the political problems in Somalia. The Arab countries notably Egypt considered the road of reconciliation starts from Mogadishu, thus giving

¹⁴⁸ Shari 'a courts operated both as judiciary and law enforcement institutions with security personnel and jurists.

political prominence to Mogadishu-based factions as opposed to Ethiopian preference of “ building block approach” which advocates for creating of as many independent administrations as possible from the capital thus facilitating the penetration of Ethiopian influence deep into every corner of Somalia. Ethiopia supported the creation of Puntland state by leaders of SSDF whose hopes to convene the national reconciliation conference in Bosaso as per the Sodere agreement had been frustrated by the Cairo agreement which shifted the venue to Baidoa.¹⁴⁹

Although the SSDF chairman, Mohamed Abshir Muse, signed the Cairo agreement, the rest of the SSDF leadership boycotted the outcome of the Cairo conference which they saw was biased to Mogadishu-based factions and gave undue prominent role to Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, both of them from Hawiye. Egypt shattered the loose anti-Aideed coalitions which were set up in Sodere conference by Ethiopia. Prominent members of National Salvation Council(NSC) such as Ali Mahdi, Abdulkadir Zoppe, Osman Atto, all of them members of the five-member rotational chairs of NSC, and Omar Haji Mohamed, a prominent ally of Ethiopia's fight against the alleged extremist groups in Gedo region broke ranks with Ethiopia. Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed jointly set up Benadir administration as co-chairs with financial assistance from Libya and Egypt. Ethiopia saw the Cairo conference and the alliance that it has produced as an affront to her long-standing manipulation of Somalia affairs since UNOSOM pulled out from Somalia. It perceived Egypt and other Arab players such as Yemen , Libya and Sudan as threat to her uncontested role as the sole peace broker in Somalia using the mandate given to her by IGAD and OAU. Subsequently it provided arms to splinter groups of Mogadishu based factions such as Muse Sudi and Hussein Haji Bod, close aides of Ali Mahdi Mohamed, to foil the establishment of Benadir administration and the opening of the sea-port and airport which could have been an important breakthrough. Ethiopia also increased its incursions into Somali territories and support for RRA finally expelling Hussein Aideed out of Baidoa in mid 1999 after four years of occupation.

¹⁴⁹ see Press Statement by Abshir Muse Said, the Acting Chairman of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), December 1st, 1997

Conclusion

There is a cross-cutting interest for all those external actors who tried to mediate a settlement in Somali conflict; that is to influence the shape of the future Somali state. A broad coordination of the peacemaking efforts had been noticeable shortcoming in these initiatives. Each new initiative supplanted its predecessor starting everything afresh rather than supplement and build on what its predecessor achieved. The regional competitions and parallel initiatives pursued unilateral interests and had reinforced political cleavage and created tensions in the internal environment. Some of the attempts were genuinely geared at restoring viable state but produced negative consequences, others were viewed with skepticism. Popular participation of the Somali people was missing in all those peace initiatives agreements. They had overlooked important and fundamental issues such as the governance systems and were mainly confined to power-sharing issues. They sought short-term solutions to long-term problems. There were no substantive issues. The contentions remained at the level of the individual or clan interests. The processes lacked inclusivity and sidelined some major players in a way or the other. Somaliland did not attend in any of these conferences. The participants of these conferences did not enjoy legitimacy as they represented their militias at worst and their clans at best. The conferences were used by the faction leaders to advance their status and gain international recognition instead of seeking solutions to the conflict. The conferences had repercussions on the internal political setting as they produced more factional players. They resulted in splitting of the existing political forces and shift of alliances. From the second Addis Ababa conferences in March 1993 in which 15 factions participated to Sodere conference in November 1996 which was attended by 26 factions, the number of factions almost doubled. In such polarized situation where parties to conflict are not divided on ideologies, values or other fundamental issues but over personal interests and parochial matters, it is hard to find a workable and lasting solution even with the best intention of the mediators.

The failure of these peace agreements led to one positive thing; the grassroots people started to mobilize themselves and seek some home-grown solutions. The general despair

of the Somali communities from the externally held peace conferences invoked the creation of localized administrations in some parts of Somalia, while in other areas traditional leaders and religious groups have established Sharia courts and local law enforcement mechanisms to restore law and order. Civic movements started to emerge and the power of the armed factions seemed to be gradually fading away. The Arta peace initiative was anchored in these civic movements which have promised some hopes and political settlements over which the warring factions have no longer monopoly.

CHAPTER THREE

The Sub-Regional Management of Peace Initiatives in Somalia : Arta versus Mbagtahi Peace Processes

Introduction

Chapter two discussed the externally sponsored peace conferences from 1991 to 1999. This chapter focuses on the last two-sub-regional peace initiatives; the Arta and Mbagathi peace conferences. The two initiatives share some similar characteristics while they differ fundamentally in many aspects. Both focused on the restoration of national government structures, and had the backing and endorsement of IGAD. They differ in the nature of participants; while the major internal players in the Arta were civil society actors, the Mbagathi process gave prominence to warlords. Arta was primarily Djibouti-driven process with minimal participation of external observers, while the latter process was collectively managed IGAD and supported by the IGAD Partners forum.

This chapter analyzes the process, the outcome, the role of the facilitators and external. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will focus on Arta process, while the second section looks at the Mbagathi process. The third section will look at actors and interest. The last section draws comparisons between the two processes, highlighting the weakness and the strengths of each of them, and the interests of the external stakeholders. The chapter will illuminate by way of conclusion on whether the two processes supplemented or supplanted each other.

Arta Peace Process: Background

After twelve internationally sponsored conferences in which faction leaders dominated failed to make significant progress, leaving Somalia without a central government for nearly a decade, the IGAD council of ministers, at its Seventh Ordinary Meeting at

Djibouti on March 14-15, 1998 attributed the lack of improvement in the peacemaking efforts in Somalia to the increase of simultaneous peace processes, lack of a visionary compromise on the part of the Somali leaders and the inadequate humanitarian assistance from the international community to support the peace process¹⁵⁰.

To bring about cohesion among the various parallel initiatives, IGAD Heads of State and Government ratified the establishment of an instrument that permitted the involvement of other interested countries in the Somali peace process. The Liaison Group on Somalia (LGS) under the aegis of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) was created. Another consultative body, the Standing Committee on Somalia (SCS) whose membership is open to IGAD, IPF, LGS and other interested state and non-state actors was also constituted.

Former Djibouti president and the then-chair of IGAD Hassan Guled Aptidon suggested that any Somali peace process should be moved away from the faction leaders and warlords. President Aptidon emphasized the role and importance of "civil society" namely academics, NGOs and women who had been sidelined in the previous initiatives which revolved around faction and militia leaders. Aptidon's initiative was taken over by the newly elected president, Ismail Omar Gelleh, who as chairman of IGAD negotiated with Ethiopia to move the Somali peace mandate to Djibouti.¹⁵¹ Djibouti put forward its peace plan at a meeting of Standing Committee on Somalia (SCS) on July 29, 1999. The plan proposed some measures to resolve the crisis in Somalia including holding of "a true reconciliation conference" in which civil society would take greater responsibility. The peace plan also suggested charging warlords who obstruct peace with crimes against humanity and redressing of the prevalent anarchy in Somalia through the regional organizations to which Somalia belonged - principally the OAU and the League

¹⁵⁰ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-Regional Management of An internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August 2000), M.A. dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, October 2001, p.103

¹⁵¹ IRIN News, 30 June, 2000

of Arab States - using "all necessary means" with the support of the UN.¹⁵² The peace plan was welcomed by the members of the SCS.

Consensus Building for Arta Initiative

The President encouraged by some consultations he made with Somali politicians, faction leaders as well as cross sections of civil society groups who paid visits to Djibouti saw the moment was ripe to launch Somali peace process afresh and put up a peace plan. He elaborated his plans in a speech he delivered at the 54th session of UN General Assembly on September 22nd 1999. President Ghelle stated that continued anarchy in Somalia was due to international indifference and the lack of vigorous and visionary action, "indicative of the failure of global governance to serve poor countries."¹⁵³ He alleged that Somali warlords gave no indication that they would ever agree on a lasting settlement, and the challenge for the world community was to establish an authority to fill the vacuum that was continuously exploited by the warlords.

The Djibouti plan was also presented to the 7th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Djibouti on 26 November, 1999. The summit welcomed the proposal contained in the speech of the president of Djibouti before the 54th session of the United States General Assembly on 22nd September 1999, but some reservations had been made by some countries, notably Ethiopia which demanded that further elaboration of mechanism of the proposal's implementation be put in place.¹⁵⁴ Ethiopia which was previously mandated by IGAD and OAU to settle the Somali conflict was not apparently satisfied with the plan and was just giving lip service consent to Ghelle's initiative.

President Ghelle undertook a number of overseas visits to explain his peace plan agenda starting with the immediate neighbors of Somalia (Ethiopia and Kenya, and extending it to Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates(UAE), Qatar, and Algeria, the current chairman of the OAU. They all gave their

¹⁵² ibid

¹⁵³ IRIN News, 23 September, 2000

¹⁵⁴ Resolution of the 7th IGAD Summit, Djibouti November 26, 1999

unequivocal backing to his initiative. On February 7, 2002, the Djibouti government held one-day IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) to exchange views with them on the kind of the actions deemed necessary for the success of the conference.¹⁵⁵

On the Somali front, the Djibouti government consulted with various stakeholders including faction leaders, Puntland and Somaliland administrations. It organized a series of Somali consultative meetings: one by Somali professionals (21-20 March 2000); another one by selected highly respected Somali elders and religious personalities (2-4 April, 2002); and third one by the business community (8-11 April, 2000).¹⁵⁶ These consultative symposiums attended by people from different backgrounds furnished with the host government with a number of key recommendations aimed to enrich the "Ghelle initiative." An 8-member technical committee of key academics was established to liaise with the Djibouti government and act as advisory board for members of the Djibouti government from the foreign ministry and the president's office. Djiboutian delegations traveled to different regions in Somalia to elaborate the plans for holding the reconciliation conference and encourage attendance.¹⁵⁷ A general invitation was put out, directed at Somali traditional leaders and civil society actors.

Although some prominent faction leaders and other prominent personalities such as Ali Fahdi Mohamed, leader of the USC/SSA, Mohamed Abshir, former police chief, and Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali "Tur", the first president of Somaliland (1991-1993) accepted to come to the conference in their own personal capacities, most of the faction leaders such as General Mohamed Said Hersi (Morgan), Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf of Puntland, Hussein Mohamed Aideed, Osman Ali Atto, Mohamed Khanyare, Muse Sudi Yalahow and Aden Abduulahi Nur (Gabyow) boycotted the conference. Moahmed Ibrahim Igal, president of the breakaway republic of Somaliland also denounced the conference and publicly stated fierce opposition to the conference. Hassan Mohamed Nor (atigadud), leader of Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), and Omar Haji Mohamed, IF chairman attended the conference but later fell out and denounced the outcome.

¹⁵⁵ Press Release by the Somali National Peace Conference Secretariat, 12 February 2000.

¹⁵⁶ Press Release by the Somali National Peace Conference Secretariat, 12 February 2000

¹⁵⁷ IRIN News, 30 June, 2000

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¹⁵⁷ IRIN News, 30 June, 2000

These faction leaders feared to be marginalized and stripped of the status they enjoyed in the last ten years at the negotiation tables. The Djibouti peace conference did not give them such special privileges which they were accorded in the past peace talks in which they were the major players. There has been much debate about the importance of faction leaders and warlords. Although the official position was not to extend special invitations to them, there has been constant "behind the scenes" diplomacy to encourage reluctant faction and administration leaders to attend the peace conference.

The Djibouti government outlined the roles of the various stakeholders in the Somali Peace process before convening the conference.¹⁵⁸ It had taken the role of facilitator and its people would mobilize resources and raise funds for the peace conference. The Somali people would be the principal actors in the debate on the future of Somalia and on the best ways and means of handling the peace process. The role of International partners and donor community had been envisaged as crucial after the conference to support the outcome and emerging structures by putting up a comprehensive program of reconstruction.

Djibouti authorities mobilized its people and government institutions to assist the peace initiative. Despite economic hardships at the time of the conference, the people and the government have decided to share their meager resources with the Somalis in their hour of need. Djiboutian women played a leading role in fund-raising campaigns. Government employees had offered the equivalent of one month salary as contribution towards the covering the costs of the Somali peace process. There were no formalities and no sophisticated logistical settings involving huge costs, such as the hire of expensive hotels. The media and all existing communication facilities were utilized to raise the awareness of the hosting and hosted people. The RT TV which was watched by the Somalis in the Diaspora and inside the country gave extensive coverage of the event shaping the perception of Somalis towards the conference. The government also put in place fax

¹⁵⁸ Press Release of Djibouti National Commission for Peace in Somalia: Progress Report II: Djibouti, 9 March 2000

machines and telephones to receive suggestions and comments from concerned Somalis which were carefully analyzed and taken into considerations.

Structure of the Arta Conference

The conference was structured into three phases. **The First Phase** was assigned for reconciling the various clans who had grudges against one another. It started on 2nd May, 2002, and lasted for one month using track two diplomacy by going through the history of the conflict to reconcile the differences and heal the wounds of the civil war. The principal actors at this phase were the traditional leaders. The Somali clans forgave each other, paid to each other a token compensation known in Somali culture Xaal for the wrongs committed in the past, discussed their future relations and chartered the course of their interactions.

Although all differences were not completely settled, most of the participants were happy with the results achieved in the first phase of the Peace conference. The first phase was concluded on 13 June 2000 with a six-point declaration: (1) to spread peace and reconciliation throughout Somalia, (2) to institute state authority jointly by all Somalis, (3) to emphasize that Somalia is sacrosanct, (4) to return all stolen and occupied properties to their original owners, (5) to respect human rights, (6) to call the international community to assist the Djibouti peace process on Somalia and recognize its outcome¹⁵⁹.

The Second Phase focused on the selection of the of the conference delegates who chose among themselves committees to work on technical themes. This phase which started on June 15, 2000 and lasted 35 days selected about a thousand official delegates of the conference. The number later increased to over three thousand. The conference resolved

¹⁵⁹ See 'General Reconciliation : Djibouti , Arta. June 13, 2000' cited in Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-Regional Management of An internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August 2000). M.A. dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, October 2001, p.109

to establish clan representatives with each 4 major clan having 175 delegates and small clans' alliance taking 90 seats at the conference. Women were allotted 100 seats. There was initial reluctance on the part of academics and NGO members to organize the conference on clan basis, but it was eventually decided that clan was a crucial organization factor that can not be done away with. After the clan delegations appointed their representatives, the conference split into working committees to debate on special issues, and proposals. The major committees were Charter Committee; Economic Development Committee; Security Committee; and Mogadishu Committee. The conference also appointed secretariat which served the whole conference taking minutes and preparing documentations. Other sectoral committees for Education; Health; Industry and Trade; Agriculture and Animal Husbandry; and Developing Sectors were also constituted. The committees submitted their proposals to the conference for debate and adoption.

The Third and Final Phase was concerned with the selection of the parliamentarians, house speaker and deputies, and the election of the president by the members of the Transitional National Assembly. The selection of the parliamentarians was the most difficult task that the conference faced as each clan jockeyed for greater share in the assembly. Djibouti president wanted the Somali government to be in place by 1st July, the 40th anniversary of Somalia's independence, but that has been deferred as the selection of the parliamentarians became more problematic. The stalemate was broken by the intervention of the President Ghelle on August 8, 2000 who implored the participants not to shame him in front of the international community which is waiting him as he promised before 54th General Assembly to bring his peace plan to fruition. He pleaded with the conference participants to produce a Somali government that would accompany him to the upcoming 55th United Nations General Assembly. Suddenly the emotions went high and delegates speeded up the selection of their parliamentarians. 225 MPs were selected on 4.5 clan formula with each of the four main clans receiving 44 seats, and the alliance of small clans getting 24 seats. Women were allotted 25 seats. An additional 20 MPs were appointed by President Ghelle from individuals who contributed to the success of the talks after he got the approval of Somali delegates. The 245 MPs of the

Transitional National Assembly(TNA) were constituted on August 13, 2000. They elected the house speaker and his deputies on 20 August. The TNA elected Mr. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, as the interim president of Transitional National Government for a term of three years on 26 August. On 28 August, Mr. Hassan was sworn in a colorful ceremony. The guests at the inauguration ceremony of President Abdiqasim Hassan included the presidents of Yemen, Sudan and Eritrea, and the prime minister of Ethiopia. Officials from France, Italy, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab governments, Arab League, and Kenya were also at hand in Arta, Djibouti. The elected president was one of the architects and initiators of the Arta conference. He paid series of visits to Djibouti and had been advising President Ghelle on the peace plan.

Internal and International Reaction to Arta Initiative

The call by president Ghelle to hold a Somali reconciliation conference was greeted with euphoria and a lot of enthusiasm by the Somalis themselves across the country and the Diaspora. The initiative was seen to have come at a time when the Somali conflict was ripe for solution. More importantly, the initiative used different approach from previous endeavors which looked more promising, and coincided with a growing movement of Somali academics and other civil society actors agitating for peace. Djibouti, mainly populated by Somali ethnic community, was seen as suitable host for such conference as there are no language barriers and people share common religious and cultural values. The Djibouti media particularly the RT TV which was launched for the purpose of informing the Somalis on the initiative and the proceedings of the conference had greatly contributed to the positive reaction of the Somalis. The TV organized public debates and made live coverage of the events that were taking place in the conference venue.

Despite the popular support for the initiative, there was some negative reaction in some parts of Somalia. There had been arrests of people supporting the process in Somaliland. A Djibouti delegation who wanted to see Somaliland president to explain the peace initiative was prevented from visiting Hargeisa. The late Somaliland president, Mohamed Ibrahim Igal endorsed the initiative in previous meetings with president Ghelle, but later

changed his mind. In Puntland where the administration initially supported the process, there were demonstrations against Abdullahi Yusuf's hardliner stance against the conference.¹⁶⁰

Internationally, the outcome of the Arta initiative was received with a mixed reaction. The UN Security Council welcomed the establishment of the new interim parliament, the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and urged all political sides in the country to support the new peace process urging Somali factions to lay down their weapons and engage in peaceful dialogue with the Transitional National Government (TNG).¹⁶¹ The Council called on neighboring states to refrain from any action that would be detrimental to the peace, to honor arms embargo on Somalia, and to coordinate their efforts in support of the peace process.¹⁶² In supporting Gelleh's efforts, the Secretary General of the UN stated that the establishment of a central authority for Somalia based on wide consultations and agreement would be the only way to reach a lasting settlement to the conflict in Somalia.¹⁶³ Upon his election, the TNG president was invited to attend both UN Millennium Summit and 55th Session of the UN General Assembly in September where he was received cordially.

The Arab states spearheaded by Egypt hailed the outcome of the Arta process. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid tribute in separate statements to Djibouti President Ismail Omar Gelleh for successfully hosting the Somali peace conference and welcomed the establishment of government institutions for Somalia and urged all factions to join reconciliation efforts.¹⁶⁴ They also wished President Abdulqassim Salad Hassan "success in achieving stability and peace for the Somali people."¹⁶⁵ Libya's leader organized a meeting between the TNG president and Hussein Aided in October 2000 shortly after the formation of the TNG to convince the latter to

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ *ibid* 28 August, 2000

¹⁶² IRIN News, 12 Jul 2001

¹⁶³ IRIN News, 25 January 2000

¹⁶⁴ IRIN News, 28 August 2000

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*

join the TNG. He provided a jet for the TNG president to use for his international trips. He also financed the recurrent costs of the TNG for some time.

The Arab league invited the elected president to Egypt to attend a ministerial meeting in September 2000. It welcomed the formation of the TNG and called all Arab states to contribute and provide all possible assistance to the president and the established institutions.¹⁶⁶ Arab countries pledged to shoulder the expenses of Somalia's diplomatic missions accredited to foreign countries, to intergovernmental organizations and regional organizations.

Apart from diplomatic support, the Arab countries provided about twenty-five million dollars for the recurrent costs of the TNG in the first two years.¹⁶⁷ However their contribution fell far short of the TNG's expectations which appealed to Arab countries to design a program of reconstruction for Somalia equivalent to that of Marshal Plan by the United States for the reconstruction of Europe after the World War Two. The TNG formation coincided with the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) which diverted Arab attentions and resources from Somalia. The September 11 attack on the United States and the subsequent allegation of Somalia as being haven of terrorist groups also discouraged Arab financial contributions to the TNG and to the humanitarian Arab NGOs operating in Somalia. The TNG's poor performance and reported mismanagement of the funds had also squandered the goodwill of the Arab countries who gradually discontinued the financial support. However, Arab countries maintained their diplomatic recognition for the TNG and consistently advocated for the unity and the territorial inviolability of Somalia.

The United States and other Western countries did not receive the outcome of the Arta peace conference with so much enthusiasm. However they issued statements of support to the progress made in Arta. The United States whose ambassador in Djibouti witnessed the election procedure of the TNG president cautiously supported the outcome. French

¹⁶⁶ see Arab League Resolution No. 6010 dated 3/9/2000

¹⁶⁷ ICG Africa Report No 45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002.

president whose country had close relations with Djibouti praised president Ghelle and Djibouti government for hosting the peace process and achieving results in the Djibouti initiatives. He said, in a statement of support. "Powerful nations had failed to address Somalia's problems but Djibouti succeeded."¹⁶⁸

With the notable exception of Ethiopia, IGAD countries who endorsed the Djibouti initiative generally welcomed the outcome of the Arta peace conference and allowed TNG to retake its seat in IGAD. Sudan, Eritrea and Sudan welcomed the new government which sprang from Arta peace process. Kenya also showed some support to the outcome of the Arta process.¹⁶⁹ It also indicated its readiness to restore diplomatic relations with Somalia with TNG opening its embassy in Nairobi. Kenyan President Denial Arap Moi made some attempts to reconcile between the TNG and the opposition groups who were outside the Arta process. He met Somali faction leaders from the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council [SRRC] and the Somali interim president Abdiqassim in May 2001 during which the latter requested Moi to assist in the Somali reconciliation process in his role as the region's elder statesman.¹⁷⁰ Kenya brokered a peace deal between TNG and some of its opposition groups signed in Nakuru on 24 December 2001 to establish an all-inclusive government to ensure equitable power-sharing among all Somali clans.¹⁷¹ Major SRRC players were not, however, part of this deal. They declined Kenya's invitation and instead went to Ethiopia for consultations apparently at the urge of Ethiopian government.

Ethiopia's Role in the Failure of the Arta Initiative

Ethiopia was given exclusive observer status at the Arta conference. Although it initially cooperated with Djibouti and encouraged some of its allies such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army(RRA) to attend the conference, Ethiopia later on showed discontent with the process which was dominated by civil society and traditional leaders with whom

¹⁶⁸ IRIN News, 23 August, 2000

¹⁶⁹ BBC Focus on Africa, 30 September 2000

¹⁷⁰ IRIN News, 28 May 2001

¹⁷¹ IRIN News, 27 December 2001

it had no previous relations. Despite welcoming and describing the establishment of TNG as major achievement, its relations with the TNG quickly soared. According to the Ethiopian officials, the attendance of Abdiqasim's inauguration in Djibouti by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had been merely "a symbolic recognition of progress in the Somali peace process".¹⁷²

Ethiopia frustrated the initial TNG successes in reconciling with some of the opposition groups and in gaining diplomatic recognition. It obstructed the efforts of the TNG to establish its authority at many fronts; Firstly, it sponsored an anti-TNG coalition meeting in March 2001 in Awase, Ethiopia, where a number of factions opposed to TNG formed a new alliance, 'Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council' (SRRC). The SRRC alliance which never agreed anything beyond affronting the TNG denounced what they called "all destabilization and renewed conflicts waged by the unholy alliance of the Arta faction (a reference to the interim government in Mogadishu) and extremist groups."¹⁷³

Secondly, Ethiopia intensified its military incursions and armament of the Anti-TNG forces which culminated in a major offensive launched by SSRC forces on areas controlled by the TNG and its allies from Merca to Kismayo in July 2001. The TNG also faced major destabilization activities by Ethiopia's protégés in Mogadishu who received large consignments of weapons from Ethiopia including heavy and small armaments.

Thirdly, Ethiopia set some diplomatic obstructions for the TNG in the international forums to bar it from gaining international recognitions. It watered down the TNG president's participation in the UN Millennium Summit and the 55th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000. It accused the TNG that its entire diplomatic activity had been geared towards soliciting money and support for vanquishing those who have not yet joined Arta Process, and of trying to create artificial

¹⁷² IRIN News, 6 December 2000

¹⁷³ IRIN News, 29 January 2000

enemies to generate support for political legitimacy.¹⁷⁴ Ethiopia promoted the de facto administrations in Puntland and Somaliland and lobbied for them to be given an equal treatment as TNG in international forums.¹⁷⁵ It unsuccessfully lobbied for exempting TNG from participating in the 8th IGAD Summit in Khartoum in November 2000 on the pretext that Somalia did not pay its arrears which accumulated during its absence from IGAD and that it can only be allowed to take its seat by a prior decision of IGAD member states. Other IGAD member states, however, rejected Ethiopia's stance and allowed TNG president to take Somalia's seat in the sub-regional organization. Ethiopia had also unsuccessfully attempted to undermine the TNG at the OAU summit in Lusaka which was held in 5-8 July, 2001 by bringing in members of SRRC to make corridor lobbying at the summit to discredit the TNG. However, the TNG scored diplomatic gains at the summit as the decisions adopted by the Summit strongly condemned the warlords who block peace efforts in Somalia.

Fourthly, after the September 11, Ethiopia alleged that members of the Al-Ittihad Group, which had threatened Ethiopia's national security in the past, and with links to Al-Qaeda network believed to be headed by Osama bin Laden, Washington's prime-suspect in the 11 September attacks, had fully participated in Arta peace process which had culminated in the appointment of the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG). It alleged that this serves as evidence that the TNG contained terrorist elements.¹⁷⁶ Ethiopia received the US hearing on these allegations. The U.S. Secretary of State charged that some Bin Laden followers are operating in Somalia.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ See letter dated 10 January to the United Nations addressed to the president of the Security Council from Seyoum Mesfin, Minister for Foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia forwarded by the Permanent representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations, Amb. Abdulmajid Hussein.

¹⁷⁵ See letter dated 30 Jun 2001 addressed to OAU Secretary General from Seyoum mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, federal Republic of Ethiopia, and the other one dated 29 October 2001 addressed to the president of the Security Council from Ethiopia's permanent representative Dr. Abdulmajid Hussein.

¹⁷⁶ IRIN News, 24 October 2001

¹⁷⁷ ICG, Somalia: Combating Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report No 45, 23 May 2002

The TNG Attempts to Mend Fences with Ethiopia

Two months after his election, the TNG president Abdulkasim Salad Hassan visited Ethiopia in November 2000 to address his government's uneasy relations with Ethiopia. He met Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and other senior officials and gave assurances that the transitional government would do everything possible to remove "all elements" that use Somali territory as a springboard to threaten regional peace and stability.¹⁷⁸ There were also two high level delegations of TNG who later visited Addis Ababa. The first delegation visited Ethiopia in June 2001 and was led by deputy prime minister Usman Jama. The second one was led by the newly appointed Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah in November 2001.

Despite these attempts on the part of TNG to build confidence between the two countries, there was no tangible improvement on either diplomatic or security fronts. The TNG accused Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs and backing opposition forces to seize control of new areas, while Ethiopia consistently denied repeated accusations that it has a military presence in Somalia, and that it backs opposition factions.¹⁷⁹ However Ethiopia repeatedly stated that it deserves the right to intervene in Somalia with or without approval of the international community. Its ambassador to the United Nations underscored his government's determination to counter Islamist influence in the region: "If you allow these people to infiltrate Somalia, our multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic country will pay a price ... if the Somalis do not solve their problems, then we will do for them ... we won't wait forever".¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ IRIN News, 22 November 2000.

¹⁷⁹ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 10 August 2001.

¹⁸⁰ IRIN, 26 February 2002 quoted in ICG Africa Report no 45, 23 May 2002

Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya

Introduction

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya is the fourteenth attempt to revive Somali state. The conference was initially conceived as complementary to the Arta peace process, but it later took its own shape as new reconciliation conference. The duration of the conference was originally envisaged to be two weeks¹⁸¹ but turned into two years.

In confirmatory with the 9th IGAD Summit Resolution issued in January, 2002, which mandated three frontline states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti) to jointly coordinate their efforts in the mediation of the Somali groups, Kenya hosted the 14th conference which began in Eldoret, Kenya on 15th October 2002 under the auspices of IGAD.¹⁸² The new peace initiative was initially conceived as a compliment to Arta with the purpose of reconciling the TNG and the SRRC group opposing its authority, but it was reversed as it took shape of new reconciliation initiative. The TNG has lobbied for Kenya to host the conference but later doubted its neutrality.¹⁸³

Following the Khartoum IGAD Summit in January 2000, the IGAD foreign ministers Committee (TC) on Somalia met on 14th February, 2002, and established a Technical Committee on the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. The Committee was mandated to, inter alia, draw up the Terms of Reference; determine the criteria for participation; monitor and guide the process; and work out a budget for the peace process. Some differences have appeared within the TC soon after its formation. Djibouti had declined one of the two brief field missions which the TC undertook to Somalia to consult various political actors in Somalia as it felt that her concerns were not addressed,

¹⁸¹ See Report of the Technical Committee on the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, 3rd-5th April, 2002

¹⁸² See Report of the Technical Committee on the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, 3rd-5th April, 2002

¹⁸³ interview with TNG president, Abdulqasim Salad Hassan, Nairobi, August 6, 2004

and although it participated in the second one, it still held some reservations on the report of the mission refusing to endorse it. The crux of the differences within the TC concerned the status of the TNG. Ethiopia maintained that the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia should simply attend the talks as one of faction and the process should start from scratch. Djibouti, on other hand, refused that the peace process starts all over again stressing that all international and regional organizations supported the idea that Arta peace process should be the most viable basis for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia, hence TNG should be recognized as a government.¹⁸⁴ Djibouti also criticized the way the preparations were conducted which it described as hazy. It maintained that the crucial details and necessary measures to guarantee the best chance of success for the conference had been overlooked.¹⁸⁵

The TNG expressed skepticism over Ethiopia's role in the Technical Committee alleging that it is not a neutral player in Somali conflict as it continues occupying and invading parts of Somalia and pouring arms into the country. It maintained that it can not be an honest broker in the reconciliation talks.¹⁸⁶ Somalia's ambassador to the UN appealed for imposing sanctions on Ethiopia accusing it of wanting a balkanized Somalia with small fiefdoms it can rule over, and becoming the bully of the sub-region.¹⁸⁷ The TNG allegation was, however, dismissed by Ethiopia describing it as cynical attempt on the part of the TNG to scuttle the forthcoming peace talks.¹⁸⁸

After delays and postponement of the conference from the its originally proposed date of 15 April 2002, the Technical Committee finally settled to extend invitation to three hundred-fifty delegates to the Eldoret conference which was opened on 15 October 2002. The participants at the conference were divided into four main groups namely; the Transitional National Government (TNG); the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council(SRRC); the Group of Eight (G8), Signatories to the Nakuro Accord, and the

¹⁸⁴ IRIN News, 22 May 2002.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 17 April, 2002

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 21 May 2002

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

civil society organizations and other personalities. The distribution of delegates to different groups was disproportionate in favor of SRRC factions who had been given 200 delegates, while the TNG and civil society got 66 and 100 respectively. The number of delegates later reached 800 persons and the whole process was rocked by confusion, ambiguity and mismanagement. For instance most of the invited civil society representatives were former politicians and other personalities who have nothing to do with civil society and were arbitrarily handpicked by the Technical Committee.

Notwithstanding the absence of Somaliland, the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, had been more inclusive than the past peace initiatives both in terms of Somali and international stakeholders' participation. The involvement of all three neighboring countries stood the process a better chance of success. Previous initiatives had been rocked by the regional differences as admitted by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia at the opening ceremony of Eldoret peace conference. He said , “ Each of us have in various degrees failed the people of Somalia .. Attempts at coordination were formal and not practical ... finally we are speaking with one voice in our sub-region and coordinating our efforts for peace in Somalia than in the past.”¹⁸⁹ The frontline states which formed the Technical Committee(TC) facilitating conference was later extended and renamed the Facilitation Committee(FC) after some divergences appeared between Ethiopia and Djibouti, and the process was paralyzed. The IGAD Partners Forum which combines most of European countries, United States, Japan, EU, UN and others was also involved as observers and supported the process financially.

Structure of the Conference

The conference was structured into three phases. **Phase One** finalized the list of delegates and culminated into signing of the Declaration on Cession of Hostilities on 27th October, 2002. It also established the so-called “six reconciliation committees”. Phase One has been characterized by a lot of political posturing by TNG and SSRC respectively

¹⁸⁹ www.igad.org/library/newsletter/igad%20special%20issue.pdf. see also Daily Nation, October 16, 2002

supported by Djibouti and Ethiopia. The two sides jockeyed for getting more representatives at the negotiation table. For the first few days of the talks, the two sides were squabbling on minor issues pertaining to the "Rules of Procedure" such as whether the name of TNG will be written in the "Rules of Procedure". After interventions by the international community particularly the EU and United States, the two sides agreed on the "Rules of Procedures", and later signed a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities. The Declaration had also endorsed the principle of a decentralized federal system of government for Somalia, and invited IGAD, the African Union and the international community to support and monitor the implementation of the declaration, while the signatories committed themselves to abide by the conclusions resulting from the Somali national Reconciliation Process.¹⁹⁰

Although the Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities was hailed by the UN, Arab League, AU, United States, EU, and IGAD as significant step and progress towards final peace in Somalia, it was violated sooner than the ink dried as hostilities continued unabated in Puntland, Mogadishu, Baidoa and other parts of Somalia. It proved to be wishful thinking on the part of the international community to expect that the fighting in a war-ravaged country would fizzle out with the pact. Ironically, The 24 signatories of the never-honored pact claimed legitimacy over the process calling themselves "leaders committee". They maintained veto power over the course of the conference and reduced the plenary to mere onlookers.

In Phase Two, six reconciliation committees were constituted.; the committee One dealt with issues pertaining to the Charter; Committee Two looked at Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) issues; Committee three examined Land and Property Rights; Committee Four was on Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization; Committee Five dealt with issues of Regional and International Relations; while Committee Six dealt with Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution. These committees were assisted by foreign experts. Apparently, contrary to

¹⁹⁰ See Declaration On Cessation Of Hostilities And The Structures and Principles Of The Somalia National Reconciliation Process. Eldoret, 27 October 2002

the name of the committees, there was nothing “reconciliation” about these committees some of whose reports created new controversies. Most of the committee members had no professional experience on the themes they were dealing with and were arbitrarily drawn on clan bases rather than on qualifications and familiarity with issues they were addressing.

The proceedings of the Phase Two were affected by the political changes in Kenya. The exit of Moi from power negatively impacted the conference. Moi looked for statesmanship and reconciliation of Somalia was one of the priorities of his government. He was familiar with the political setup in Somalia and knew most of the faction leaders. The new NARC government initially seemed less interested in the process. Other priorities diverted its attention from the conference. The proceedings of the conference were also disrupted by the replacement of Elijah Mwangi by Bethuel Kiplaget as the special envoy and the chairman of the technical committee. The delegates accused the former of corruption and mismanagement of the conference while they also perceived the latter’s diplomatic approach as a sign of weakness.¹⁹¹

After some disruptions due to the political changes in Kenya , the committees re-started their work and presented their reports to the plenary which passed most of them in March-April 2003. However, the Committee on the Charter failed to produce one unified draft. Two different versions , one in favor of centralized form of central government, and the other one with a pro-federalist structure were produced. The Technical Committee engaged a group of Somali experts headed by Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar to harmonize the two documents, but their report was refused by SRRC and Ethiopia. Eventually confusion reigned on the process as the Technical Committee ended up with seven different versions. On 15th September 2003, non-inclusive plenary dominated by SRRC group passed Transitional Federal Charter causing deep rifts within the Somali participants as well as within the Technical Committee, and between the

¹⁹¹ Ochieng Kamudhayi, the Somali Peace Process in Makumi Mwagiru (ed.), Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization (Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pp.111-112

Technical Committee and IPF members. Instead of restoring peace and effective government, a one-sided outcome threatened more tension and instability.¹⁹²

The charter was disowned by TNG and National Salvation Council (NSC)¹⁹³ who were, after 2-month absence from the talks, were just persuaded to join the talks by member of the IPF who visited Mogadishu. They came to Nairobi one day before the passing of the charter and requested three days to review it before it is endorsed, but the Mbagathi group which comprises SRRC, members of G-8, Puntland administrations and TNG defectors hurriedly organized the plenary and passed the Charter which was also endorsed by the Kenya's Special Envoy and chairman of the TC who declared the end of 2nd phase and the beginning of the 3rd phase. The TNG and NSC withdrew from the talks describing the process as an orchestrated show which aims to crown Ethiopia's allies for Somalia's top leadership. In the next few months, the TNG and NSC groups toured Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti to muster diplomatic support.

The adoption of the Charter also led to the fallout between the TNG top leadership. The Prime minister of TNG and House Speaker had endorsed the Charter along with SRRC. The president had denounced dismissed his prime minister and house speaker and went ahead to replace them by the vote of the National Assembly in Mogadishu.

Members of the international community also denounced the passing of the charter by one-sided plenary and temporarily stopped funding the conference.¹⁹⁴ Djibouti also pulled out from the Technical Committee accusing Kenya and Ethiopia of mismanaging the talks in favor of one group. Djibouti's suspension of its membership in the Technical Committee and withdrawal of the TNG and SNC was a heavy blow to the process

In the mid of the stalemate, The 10th Ordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government was held in Kampala, Uganda from 24th and 25th October, 2003. The summit

¹⁹² ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004, p. 5

¹⁹³ The NSC also known as Balad group is an alliance formed from various groups and persons who fell out from the conference seeing it as being dominated by Ethiopia and SRRC group. They also made political alliance with the TNG of Abdiqasim to counter Ethiopia and SSRC group.

¹⁹⁴ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004, p. 5

decided to expand the Technical Committee to make it more effective and renamed it the Facilitation Committee under Kenya's Chairmanship with all IGAD states being members of the committee (excluding Somalia). The summit also announced convening of Leaders Retreat in early December to break the impasse and set the stage for final phase. The Summit directed the Facilitation Committee to meet in Nairobi on 28th October, 2003, at the Ministerial level to re-examine the peace process and report to the chairman of the Summit. The summit also requested the current chairman, the president of Uganda to evaluate the peace process in order to decide on measures that would remove obstacles to the Peace process.

Ethiopia was particularly displeased with this decision to expand the membership of the technical Committee. The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign affairs described the process as "not going anywhere"¹⁹⁵. Ethiopia toned down its engagement in the next several months. It had shown reservations towards the ministerial meetings of the facilitation committee which it mostly attended at ambassadorial level from October 2003 until May 2004 when Ethiopia's foreign minister joined the monthly IGAD Ministerial Meetings on the Somali peace process. As result of this conspicuous absence, the Ministerial meeting of the facilitation Committee convened on 28th October 2003 in Nairobi to revitalize the talks did not achieve anything tangible.¹⁹⁶ Cognizant of the fact the peace process can not move ahead without Ethiopia's support, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs urged the Ethiopian government to support the Somali Peace Process and the outcome of Safari park Consultations.¹⁹⁷

The Leaders Retreat did not take place as differences within the Somali faction leaders persisted over who is a 'leader'. 20 leaders who are predominantly SRRC groups also known as Mbagathi Group were unwilling to meet other than Abdikasim and the other four signatories to the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities signed in Eldoret. This gave rise to the a formula known as 24+1. On the other hand, the NSC and the TNG insisted

¹⁹⁵ ICG Africa Report No 79, Biting the Somali Bullet, 4 May 2004.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. p.3

¹⁹⁷ See Press Release by Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Minister for Foreign Affairs Urges Ethiopia to support the Somali Peace Process", 13th February, 2004

that it would not attend the talks unless they were all recognized as Somali leaders on equal terms at the talks. After troika consisting of IPF, IFC, and FC visited Mogadishu, this latter position was adopted on the grounds of inclusivity. The pressure of members of the international community and IFC made the discordant group of the 20 leaders accept to attend consultation with TNG and NSC which began on 8th January 2004.

President Yuweri Museveni of the Republic of Uganda and the Chairman of the IGAD Assembly Heads of State and Government launched the Somali Leaders Consultations at Safari Park Hotel. On 29th January, 2004, following intensive consultations with the various rival factions, and shuttle diplomacy carried out by members of the international community, eight Leaders signed Declaration on the Harmonization of Controversial issues of Transitional Federal Charter on behalf of their constituencies at State House before Kenya President Mwai Kibaki. The declaration was to be adopted by the plenary in Mbagathi and The Transitional National Assembly in Mogadishu to adopt the Amendments made on the charter.

The new developments shifted the balance of influence away from Ethiopia and its SRRC allies. Some of SSRC groups and Puntland administration, which saw that the latest initiatives had given the TNG president and the Balad group considerable concessions, denounced the Safari Park deal arguing it gave special privilege to TNG president who only signed the Declaration alongside president Kibaki as a witness rather being a signatory at par with other groups.¹⁹⁸ They were also discontent with the amendment of article 30 of the charter concerning the selection of the parliamentarians which the Safari Park Declaration amended and stipulated that the selection of the parliamentarians will be done by 'the leaders who were invited to Safari Park Declaration', and will be endorsed by the genuine traditional leaders'. The version of the Charter which was passed on 15 September 2003 by SRRC vested the mandate of selecting the MPs exclusively with the faction leaders who signed the cessation of hostilities on 27 October 2002.

¹⁹⁸ Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, Press Statement, Nairobi, 4 February 2004.

Divergent interpretations emerged over what is meant by “ the leaders invited to the Safari Park Consultation in Nairobi “ who would nominate the MPs.¹⁹⁹ The Mbagathi group insisted that the only 24 signatories to the October 2002 Cession of Hostilities, plus Abdulqasim are authorized to nominate the 275-member Transitional Parliament. This would guarantee significant SRRC control over the new parliament. The TNG and NSC argued that all 38 leaders invited to Nairobi would do the selection which is bound to eliminate SRRC to an edge. Contrary to the SRRC’s position that only the 24 signatories of the October 2002 cessation of hostilities plus TNG president are the only recognized leaders and the ultimate peace makers, Safari Park Consultation tried to accommodate every one.

Although the discontent leaders left the talks for Jowhar on 19 February on 2004, where they announced the formation of the National Organizing Council for Somalia (NOCS), IGAD Facilitation Committee pushed ahead with the endorsement of the Safari Park agreement by the Mbagathi plenary²⁰⁰. Kenya’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Moses Wetang’ula tightly managed the plenary session and obtained approval by acclamation. The Transitional National Assembly also endorsed the declaration.

In the months following the Safari Park Declaration and the subsequent stalemates, there were a lot of diplomatic activities in IGAD. Ethiopia and Djibouti exchanged high-level visits to narrow their differences on Somalia’s peace process. As result of these visits and negotiations, the Djibouti and Ethiopia who had been bitter adversaries over the management of the process had apparently closed ranks. The Puntland president who has been the most important player in the talks and close ally of Ethiopia visited Djibouti in May 2004 and met with President Ghelle. The President of TNG had also visited Djibouti in the same month. These positive developments compounded by a pressure of the international community on IGAD, particularly on Ethiopia, to reconsider its policies towards the process have borne fruits and revitalized hopes that stalemate can be overcome.

¹⁹⁹ ICG, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004, p. 7

²⁰⁰ The majority of the delegates which make Mbagathi plenary are members and supporters of SRRC; TNG and NSC have pulled out from Mbagathi talks in May 2003.

In its 5th and 6th GAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting in Nairobi on 5th -6th and 21st – 22nd May 2004 respectively, the IGAD ministers suddenly displayed an unprecedented unity of purpose and approach towards the process. They expressed their commitment to a strong regional consensus for the conference, and threatened with punitive measures against those who are found obstructing and frustrating the finalization of the remaining part of the peace process²⁰¹. Ethiopia's foreign minister had attended these ministerial meetings for the first time since October 2004.

The Phase Three which dealt with the selection of the parliamentarians and the election of the president was launched by the 6th IGAD Ministerial Meeting in Nairobi on 22 May, 2004.²⁰² The third phase involved the selection of the parliamentarians on clan bases with each of the four major clans getting 61 slots each and the fifth clan 31 slots. In May 2004, most of the Somali genuine traditional leaders were brought to Nairobi and the process made relative progress. Although IGAD Ministerial meetings decided that the power sharing is carried out on clan bases and the selection of parliamentarians is done through transparent clan consultation between the recognized leaders, traditional leaders and the constituent politicians at the sub-sub clan levels, the faction leaders still maintained their exclusive power and influence in the selection of the MPs by the clans. Contrary to the principle of consultations within the sub-sub clans which had been endorsed by IGAD, the Puntland president (later elected as Somali president), for instance, threatened he would withdraw from the talks if the list of MPs he had appointed is not ipso facto accepted by IGAD Facilitation Committee. This caused standoff until IGAD finally succumbed to his threat and accepted his list after making slight changes.²⁰³

The Somali clans had appointed Presidium Council to play intermediary role between the IGAD and Somali clans and Arbitration Committee to resolve disputes within the

²⁰¹ Joint Communiqué Issued by the 6th Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, 22nd May, 2004, Nairobi, Kenya

²⁰² *ibid.*

²⁰³ Four names from Abdullahi Yusuf's Harti clan who are not of his choice were included in his list.

clans over the distribution of the parliamentary seats. The Arbitration committee had intervened in two clans who could not agree on the distribution and made binding decisions which had also been endorsed by IGAD Ministerial facilitation Committee. However, where consensus proved difficult within the clans, the IGAD Facilitation Committees intervened and appointed the MPs from the concerned sub-sub clans. There were allegations raised by the traditional leaders of at least three sub-clans that IGAD picked up their MPs without consulting them. Other sub-clans protested the exclusive power given to the warlords in appointing the MPs by IGAD, but their pleas were unheeded. The list of parliamentarians selected by the sub-sub clans were tempered with in the last minute during the swearing-in ceremony when some names who showed up for the swearing had been replaced with other names. There were reports of fraudulent dealings in the selection of the legislators by the three ambassadors of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia in the facilitation committee, all of them belonging to Somali ethnic. These three ambassadors worked with the Somali clans to finalize their selection. Members from the arbitration committee later charged that 60 MPs out of the 275 MPs of the Somalia Federal Parliament were selected fraudulently without the consent of their respective sub-sub clans. This charge was not, however, confirmed by the chairman of the arbitration committee who said that the mandate of the arbitration committee did not have anything to do with the nominations done by the sub-clans. Their job was only to apportion the parliamentary seats for the five major clans if disagreement arose.²⁰⁴

The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) which was constituted in August 22, 2004 elected speaker of the parliament on September 15, 2004. On October 10, 2004, the parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) after garnering votes of 189 MPs out of the 275-member assembly. Twenty-six presidents contested for the seat of the presidency. The Somali peace process in Kenya culminated into the inauguration of the elected president in Kasarani Stadium in Nairobi in the presence of Seven Heads of State and Government including the Nigerian President, the Chairman of the African Union, and Ugandan President, the current Chairman of IGAD.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Hussein Osman, Chairman of the Arbitration Committee, Nairobi, 29 November, 2004

External Actors, Interests and Influences in the Two Processes

This section briefly examines the roles and interests of the external players in both Mbagathi and Arta process. The section will look at the interests of IGAD, Arab countries and members of the IPF. The next chapter will discuss these interests in detail.

IGAD

IGAD countries comprise six states in the greater Horn of Africa. They are Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya and Sudan. In Arta process, Djibouti was the main architect. Its interests in mediating Somali conflict are informed by both economic and security concerns. According to Hassan Shirwa, Djibouti wants to have a strong unified Somali state, which is likely to balance the power disparities in the sub-region, and institute Somali leadership that owes its coming to power to Djibouti.²⁰⁵ The business people from Djibouti used Somalia as an outlet market for their imports from overseas. Over the years, they built lucrative business partnerships with Somali business owners. In Mbagathi conference, Djibouti strived to safeguard the results of Art. It propped up the TNG and other like-minded groups politically and diplomatically.

Ethiopia's interests in Somalia are informed by the past bitter relations with Somalia. The two countries share a long border of 2000 km and fought more than three times over territorial disputes.²⁰⁶ It wants to shape the future of Somalia to ensure that a strong Somalia which can challenge its hegemonic desires in the region is not born again. This explains Ethiopia's obstruction to Arta outcome which had promised the revival of central Somali state. It supported the creation of SRRC to sabotage TNG. Ethiopia saw the mediation of the Somali conflict as its inviolable preserve since it got mandate from OAU in 1996 for brokering truce in Somalia. It also made sure that her allies dominate

²⁰⁵ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-Regional Management of An internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August, 2000), M.A. Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, October 2001, p.126

²⁰⁶ Ocheing Kamudhayi, The Somali Peace Process in Makumi Mwangi (ed.), Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization (Nairobi, Henrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p.117

the Mbagathi process in terms of writing the Charter, selecting the MPs and election of the president through its influence in the Technical Committee (later renamed facilitation Committee).

Kenya's interests in the peace process stems from her position as the host of the largest number of Somali refugees in the Horn. Its border security concerns and ambitions for becoming a leading peacemaker in the region inform its role in the peace process. The former president Moi engaged in many peacemaking missions as a way of maintaining his statesmanship and diverting attention from domestic problems.²⁰⁷ For the current government of Kibaki, regional issues are not at the top of his government's priorities, and that is why the Somali peace conference in Nairobi lacked leadership and vision which caused it to drag unnecessarily for two years. Kenya was not able to articulate an independent and efficient policy position towards Somali peace process. It made fragmented efforts in the last several years to mediate the Somali conflict. It tried to compliment Arta process by mediating between the TNG and the opposition groups, however her attempts were foiled by Ethiopia. In the current peace process, Kenya swayed between Ethiopia and Djibouti who battled for supremacy in the outcome of the process, but was often accused of being co-opted by Ethiopia with which it shared common historical strategic security concerns towards Somalia. As a result of the latter's past territorial claims in both countries.

Uganda's president considers himself as the right heir to the regions' statesmanship after Moi's exit from power. He used his influence in his capacity as the Chairman of IGAD Summit Heads of State and Government to break the deadlocks in the process and launch Safari Park Consultation of the Somali leaders on January 2004. In fact, he outwitted Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti by being able to persuade Somali leaders who were adversaries embrace and talk each other for the first time in one and half years since talks began in Eldoret. Uganda reportedly wanted to transfer the peace conference to Kampala, but Kenya and Ethiopia resisted its plans. Kenya's lack of enthusiasm and

²⁰⁷ Ochieng Kamudhayi, Somali Peace Process in Makumi Mwangi (ed.) Africa Regional Security in the age of Globalization (Henrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p. 118

leadership to manage the talks and Ethiopia's apparent bias in the process has provided space for Uganda to step in and look for regional leadership.

Eritrea's interests are explained by the maxim 'your enemy's enemy is your friend'. Its conflict with Ethiopia meant that it recognized the outcome of Arta and supported the TNG with arms. It sought alliance with Djibouti to counter Ethiopia's influence in the region. The extension of the Technical Committee which was renamed facilitation committee to include all IGAD member states offered an opportunity to Eritrea to become an insider in the process and work against Ethiopia's interests. The unsettled conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a looming threat for the peace process as both will naturally engage in proxy conflict in Somalia if war flares up between the two countries as they did in the past.

Sudan has been less active in Somalia peace process. It supported the Arta conference and recognized the TNG by offering diplomatic support within IGAD where Ethiopia strived to block the Somalia from taking its seat in the sub-regional organization. Sudan and Somalia used to be the closest countries in the Horn. They are tied by cultural and brotherhood bonds. Its aloofness in the Somali peace process is informed by the magnitude of internal problems which it faces. Its improving relationship with Ethiopia is also another excuse for Sudan to stay out to avoid confrontations with Addis Ababa.

Arab Countries

Somalia is in the Arab fold. The engagement of Arab League is justified on the ground that Somalia is the only member state which has not a functional government. Arab world has been the biggest patron of the TNG. The Arab countries are interested that Somalia retain its Arab identity in the face of the growing attacks by the western world and Ethiopia on the fast-growing Arabisation project in Somalia since the civil war started in Somalia. Thousands of Somali students go to Egypt and Sudan for higher education. A high percentage of schools throughout Somalia use Arabic as medium of instruction and Arab charities provide valuable social services in the absence of Somali government.

Islam is another bond that attaches Arab countries to Somalia. Since the collapse of the Somali state, the greatest market and source of Somali exports and imports is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The League of Arab States (LAS) has been represented in both Arta and Mbagtahi peace process by special envoy who participated in the process as an observer. Attempts were made by members of SRRC to relegate the Arabic language to the third language of Somalia during the writing of the Charter presumably at the behest of Ethiopia. This drew the wrath of the Arab League and Arab countries that resisted this attempt and made their protest over the draft charter public. They felt offended and put down their feet until the charter was amended and Arabic language was adopted as the second official language for Somalia as it always used to be.²⁰⁸ Despite the election of Abdullahi Yusuf who is Ethiopian lenient as president, the Arab League maintains that they are in the forefront and has a lot of enthusiasm in supporting the new government. It has stand-by funds to be deployed immediately in support of the new government.²⁰⁹

IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)

It is hard to lump the interests of all IPF members of whom the most active ones in the Somali peace process are Italy, Britain, USA, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Egypt, United Nations, African Union and the European Union. However, most of these players tend to be engaged in the process for pure humanitarian reasons rather than for vested interests with the notable exception of Britain and Italy, Somalia's former colonial masters. EC was the most important financial provider for the Somalia National Reconciliation Process in Kenya. Its support is justified on the bases of Cotonou²¹⁰ agreement's requirement for the engagement of non-state actors at all level of development including dialogue on policy priorities and through information and capacity building.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Interview with the Special Envoy of the Arab League Secretary General for Somalia, Amb. Salim Khusaibi, Nairobi, October 22, 2004

²⁰⁹ *ibid*

²¹⁰ The Cotonou Agreement is ACP-EU partnership in which the ACP countries are granted trade concessions as well as development aid.

²¹¹ Judith Gardner, Evaluation of EC support to the IGAD Somali National Reconciliation Process, August 14, 2003.

Number of countries and organization in IPF are undertaking humanitarian services in Somalia which can not achieve its objectives without secure and stable environment. Nordic countries, for instance, particularly Sweden, Denmark and Norway fund many humanitarian activities in Somalia through UN, EU and international organizations.²¹² They also have provided critical financial support to the peace process. Their interests stem from their foreign policy objectives which are based on advocating peace in the world. They also host large number of Somali refugees, some of whom acquired citizenship and are potential voters for the ruling parties. They perceive that stable Somalia may reduce the inflow of refugees into these countries and create a conducive environment for those who are already there to return.

Italy colonized Somalia and Eritrea, and occupied Ethiopia briefly. It is the chair of IPF and always maintained that the Horn falls in the sphere of her influence. It is also a major donor in the EU projects in Somalia. It provided bilateral funds to the peace process in Kenya. Italy reportedly resisted the appointment of non-Italian senior EU special envoy to Somalia.

Britain, on the other hand, as a former colonial master of the Northwest regions of Somalia which declared independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991 and formed what is known Somaliland Republic, tacitly encouraged the independence of Somaliland while also showing respect to the international resolution regarding the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. Somaliland attended neither Arta nor Mbagathi talks, but some of its clans attended both processes in an unofficial capacity. British interest in the Somali peace process is of twofold; first, to support the adoption of federal system which would give minimum guarantees to the autonomy of Somaliland, and the election of pragmatic leaders who would engage in dialogue with Somaliland; secondly, to create a safe environment for the large Somali refugees in Britain. Britain has not been a significant financial contributor to the conference, but has been active in the IPF trying to influence the process on some controversial issues. In the immediate aftermath of the election of the president at the conclusion of Mbagathi conference, Britain sent a high

²¹² See Somali Aid Coordination, Donor Report 2002

level delegation to Somaliland led by Chris Mullin, minister of African affairs to apparently give assurances that Britain would not abandon them in their quest for full independence and recognition and allay their fears emanating from the government that emerged from Mbagathi. The minister told the Somaliland parliament that Britain will not be party of any agreement that forces Somaliland into marriage with the rest of the Somalia.²¹³

Despite their critical support to the peace process, IPF countries have not often played the due leverage on the process for number of reasons. Some members of the team brought with them the interests of the countries. IGAD Facilitation Committee was also resisting IPF intrusions into the process and often ignored their suggestions. According to one IPF member, IGAD was listening to them but did not necessarily implement their advice. The IPF observers were too many to have any proper coordination and consultations among them in the Somali peace process. They are about fifteen members in contrast with only four IPF members who are observing the Sudan Peace Process.

African Union took permanent position in the Facilitation Committee after the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government in Kampala in October 2004. It led two reconnaissance missions to Somalia to assess the possibility of deploying AU ceasefire monitoring force. Since it was launched in South Africa in 2001, the AU and the subsequent establishment of the AU peace and Security Council, AU took an increasing interest in the stabilization of the troubled areas in Africa. Somalia is considered as wound in the AU which can infect the whole region.²¹⁴

The UN is member of the IPF. UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) had been engaged in consensus building among the regional states. After suffering scathing failure in Somalia in 1992-1995 and its subsequent withdrawal, the UN created the UNPOS to monitor the Somali situation. By creating UNPOS, the UN wanted to avoid the

²¹³ BBC Somali Service, 25 October 2004

²¹⁴ Interview with Amb. Mohamed Ali Fourn, AU special envoy to Somalia peace process, 24 September, 2004, Nairobi

perception that it is abandoning Somalia. UNPOS supported the Arta process technically and politically . In the current process, The UN was not seen an important player.

Comparisons and Contrasts between the Two Processes

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The Arta peace initiative was appreciated as turning-point in the history of the peacemaking in Somalia. It shifted focus from the warlords to civil society actors and adopted a traditional mechanism of reconciliation. It had the widest representations from cross walks of the Somali society. The host government made extensive consultations and invited inputs from Somalis both from the Diaspora and within Somalia. The process was also Somali-managed and had minimal external influence. However not enough effort had been made to bring the faction leaders on board and accommodate some of their concerns. The host government used antagonistic language against the Somali factions. This did not encourage the warlords to join the process. President Ghelle launched stinging attacks on the faction leaders describing them as “ power-hungry individuals ... who imposed themselves through the power of the gun by triggering fratricidal violence and putting weapons in the hands of clan militias... carried out systematic dismantling, destruction and looting of the Somali nation, creating little “Bantustan” enclaves of their own.”²¹⁵ The Djibouti’s peace plan which the president presented at 54th session of the United Nations Assembly contained some proposals to impose sanctions on leaders who refused to be part of the process and later sought to disrupt peace.²¹⁶ Djibouti Ambassador to the UN , Mr. Robleh Olhaye echoed the president and said, “ appeasing warlords had not worked and never would... the people must come together as an alternative to the squabbling of the warlords.”²¹⁷ The elected president equally used non-reconciliatory remarks towards the faction leaders. He said that he is not going to deal with warlords actually, but will be dealing with the people. He was complacent that they can not stand against the will of the people.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ See statement by H.E. President Guelleh at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Newly Elected President of Somalia, 27th August 2000

²¹⁶ Babafemi A. Badejo, Somalia: United Nation's Role in the Peace Process and Future Comments

²¹⁷ see verbatim of Security Council Debate on Somalia, 22 October, 2001

²¹⁸ IRIN interview with president Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, 28 August, 2000

The peace talks in Kenya , on the other hand, initially appeared to offer the best opportunity in many years to restore peace and government to Somalia after Arta initiative had floundered.²¹⁹ All the key political actors, with exception of the Somaliland administration, showed up for the opening of the conference. Indeed, most of the faction leaders are now parliamentarians. The elected president has been one of the principal faction leaders who opposed the Arta outcome and the TNG. The conference was, however, thrown into disarray by lack of clear guiding vision compounded by political posturing and ceaseless arguments over who should sit at the tables. The formation of the “leaders committee” intended to solve the participation problem, only made things worse: it gave faction leaders veto over the conference, demoting most delegates to mere spectators.

The peace conference in Kenya was not popular with the masses inside Somalia as its predecessor. Regional rivalry has also played a destructive role both at the conference and inside Somalia. The IGAD had squandered goodwill deposited with the process by the Somalis and the international community. The Ethiopian backing of the SRRC has been matched by Djibouti patronage of the TNG.²²⁰ although some consensus has been achieved at the final stages of the conference; the IGAD Technical Committee lacked a unified approach to manage talks.²²¹ Ethiopia’s proactive involvement had reinforced the suspicion of the Somalis that it wanted to dominate the conference to get the government it wants or prevent any government from coming into being.²²² Djibouti, on the other hand, subtly encouraged its allies to boycott the talks in the beginning. It declined to join the preparatory IGAD mission which visited Somalia before the conference started. It also temporarily pulled out from the conference in September 2003 after it felt sidelined by other members of the Technical Committee, namely Ethiopia and Kenya.²²³

²¹⁹ ICG Africa Report No 59, Negotiating Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, 6 March 2003

²²⁰ ICG Africa Report No45, Somalia: Combating Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002.

²²¹ ICG Africa Report No 59, Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, 6 March 2003

²²² *ibid.*

²²³ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004, p. 5

Many Somalis questioned the authenticity of the process. The leadership at the conference was awarded to the faction leaders who had failed to implement the previous peace agreements. As potential spoilers, they could not of course be excluded, but they should not have been allowed to enjoy exclusive veto and sideline the role of the titled traditional leaders, business leaders and civil society representatives. Although some of the faction leaders present in the talks were significant military and factional forces who declined to attend Arta conference, others were perceived not to control more than a few kilometers if any at all. They joined the talks only at the behest of Ethiopia. Neither do these factions possess a functional hierarchy, represent a coherent ideological position or political platform, or can claim exclusive representation of a clan or geographical area. Several of the signatories to the Eldoret Declaration had long been inactive and stayed outside the country in the last several years. Some are seen as occupiers in the areas they control, others rule by the barrel of the gun rather than by consensus. An appeal signed by the dozens of respected academics, professionals and traditional leaders headed by former Prime Minister Abdirizak Hajji Hussein (1964-1967) for example, urged the international community to cease the “legitimization of illegitimate entities” (faction leaders) and to support a new kind of initiative based on more credible and representative leadership.²²⁴

In contrast to Arta conference where civil society actors enjoyed some degree of organization under different groupings, Mbagathi peace process had weakened and diluted the civic groups. Those who have not appeared on the list of factions including veteran politicians, former generals, and officials from former Siyad Barre regime had been sandwiched into the list of the civil society. The EU which was the major financial provider for the conference tried to promote the civil society’s role in the conference but this provoked the suspicion of the faction leaders. The civil society group has finally been divided into two competing camps with one block cooperating with the warlords and Ethiopia, and the other taking sides with Djibouti and the other anti-Ethiopian camp led by TNG.

²²⁴ “An Appeal to Salvage the Somali Peace Process in Kenya and Next steps”, January 2004

Where in Arta, the participants saw Djibouti's role as neutral and one of honest broker, The IGAD Technical Committee (later named Facilitation Committee) which managed the conference until the selection of the parliament drew criticism for failing to be neutral players in the process. There were speculations that the outcome had already been predetermined which undermined the confidence of the delegates. The process had also been shadowed by corrupt practices. Ambassador Bethuel Kiplaget had admitted that some fake Somali delegates had colluded with some members of the technical committees appointed to vet participants to accommodate them illegally into KCCT.²²⁵ As result of the increasing reports of corruption cases, the EU which is the major financier of the peace conference set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) at Kenya's Ministry of Foreign affairs and hired an audit firm to ensure the proper management of the finances.

The selection of the parliamentarians was more transparent in Arta and was done through clan consultations. Clan chiefs endorsed MPs nominated by the clans . In Mbagathi, the warlords have usurped the right of nominating their MPs contrary to the agreed procedure that the selection should be done by the trio of faction leaders, traditional leaders and constituent politicians of the sub-sub clans. IGAD Facilitation Committee was also implicated of arbitrarily handpicking MPs for some sub-clans, most notably Marehan, Hawadle, and Ogaden. In both Arta and Mbagathi, the election of the president was preceded by intensive lobbying and bribing of the MPs. The election of the president was not also without the influence of external actors. There are some allegations by the Somali delegates that Djibouti eschewed the Arta process in favor of the election of Abdiqasim Salat Hassan, while Ethiopia was implicated to have lobbied aggressively for the election of Abdullahi Yusuf in Mbagathi.

In Arta conference, important external stakeholders such as EU stayed out from the conference because Djibouti never invited them. The burden of financing of the conference was borne by the Djibouti government and its people. Djibouti government categorically stood against any external direct interference with the course of the conference, and allowed some limited observers, most notably Ethiopia and UN.

²²⁵ Daily Nation, May 8, 2003

President Ghelle thought the UN involvement would impart legitimacy on the conference and its outcome and requested its assistance. The UN willingly accepted the request and temporarily moved the operations of the Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to support the process. Ethiopia's accommodation was meant to appease it and solicit its support for the process.

The Nairobi talks had seen the widest representation of external stakeholders. The IPF which combines most European countries, United States, Egypt, Japan, EU and UN had observed the talks. The African Union and Arab league also supported the process and were represented by special envoys. All IGAD member states were also involved in the talks as direct players. The conference was primarily financed by EU/EC, but individual countries such as Sweden, Germany, Italy, Finland, and United States also contributed towards the financing of the conference. IGAD member states, Arab league and China also made some modest financial contributions. In short, every one with interest in Somalia was on board in away or the other.

While the TNG received some limited financial support from Arab countries, it was largely ignored by the European countries and United States. This is partly explained by the tendency of external actors not to support any outcome which does not involve them. Djibouti did not accommodate some important external stakeholders like the European Union. The Italian special envoy for Somalia was declared persona non grata in Djibouti during the conference. Another top official from the EU which is the major contributor of the aid to Somalia was mistreated and prevented from proceeding to a ceremony to which he had been officially invited to by Djibouti tycoon Abdurrahman Bodhe who accused the diplomat of interference with the process.

It is too early to speculate the level of assistance the Transitional Federal Government of Abdullahi Yusuf which emerged from the Nairobi talks would receive, however the initial signs show that there is some goodwill by the international community to support the vital institutions of the government. The deployment of peacekeeping force from AU is also contemplated. However, according to the protocols of the Rapid Assistance

Program(RAP) which are being worked out by members of the international community to meet the immediate needs of the government, there are a number of benchmarks including reconciliation and entering into dialogue with Somaliland authorities against which the assistance will be granted for the new government.

The Transitional Government which had been elected in Arta had faced formidable challenges, notably the opposition groups and Ethiopian obstructionist activities. Internal squabbling of the TNG's top brass and narrow selfish interests had also hindered its activities. It failed to take the momentum forward and establish their authority. It never established a capacity to control and administer more than a portion of the capital city. It was holed up in a hotel for the first one and half year which resulted in the disappointment of the public which greeted the arrival of the TNG with high expectations. There was also an alleged misuse of funds donated by Arab countries making generation of further international assistance very difficult. The TNG's first prime minister told the author that the prime responsibility for the failure of the administration rests with the leadership." We have sabotaged ourselves", he said.²²⁶

The government of Abdullahi Yusuf has so far many of those faction leaders who opposed to Arta on board. They are members of the Transitional Federal Parliament. It is likely the faction leaders will continue to make more political demands. Some may resort to violence if their demands are not met. The government's credibility at home is lingering. Two months after the president has been elected, the 275-member parliament, the president and the prime minister are hosted in Kenya. As far as external obstacles are concerned, there seems to be an emerging consensus and unity of purpose in the IGAD member states towards Somalia which was not there in Arta. The elected president enjoys good relations with Ethiopia which has been the principal spoiler of the Arta outcome. This reduces the external threats for the new government, but the president has to redress the legitimacy problem at home where he is perceived as being under Ethiopian influence.

²²⁶ interview with former TNG Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galaydh, Nairobi, July 11, 2004

The Arta conference focused on reconciliation and building trust between and among the clans who were represented by their traditional chiefs. In the Kenya's conference, no reconciliation has been achieved as the whole attention shifted toward power sharing. The belligerents at the beginning of the talks remained belligerents throughout the talks. Indeed TNG, SRRC, Group-8, NSC and civil society split into competing groups as the personal and clan interests, political patronage and opportunism which bound together disappeared.²²⁷ These are some of the problems that the president and his governments have to tackle in the post-Mbagathi period.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed Arta and Mbagathi processes. Djibouti had an interest in Arta process to create a strong Somali state to redress the sub-regional imbalances and counter Ethiopia's hegemonic desires in the Horn. It had the support of the Arab world and the Arab League whose interests coalesced with that of Djibouti. They provided crucial financial assistance to the TNG. Djibouti engaged the UN in the process to give legitimacy to the outcome, but has kept other external influences at bay to minimize interference with the process. Despite the merits of this policy position, it had repercussions on the outcome of the process as crucial political and financial assistance from the Western world had been withheld. Ethiopia's reluctance to endorse the Arta outcome was due to the fact that the initiative did not reflect its hegemonic position in the sub-region. Its direct military interference and support to obstructionist forces that opposed to the Arta process and its product was the single most important obstacle which had derailed Djibouti peace initiative.

Arta was a good start for the reconciliation after 10 years of civil strife and factional warfare. Arta process was inclusive in terms of clan representation. Although Djibouti encouraged faction leaders to participate in the process, it did not accord them any special privileges. It rather shifted focus on the civil society actors who had been sidelined in the previous peace conferences. This discouraged faction leaders from participation.

²²⁷ ICG Africa Report No 79, Biting the Somali Bullet, 4 May 2004

President Ghelle tried to build regional consensus and mobilize international attention for the process, but he did not succeed to muster an adequate regional and international support for the outcome of the process. Ethiopia's reservations and the absence of the warlords from the process sent some negative signals to the international community and discouraged it to support the outcome of the process.

As opposed to Arta which was Djibouti initiative, the Mbagathi process was a sub-regional initiative and attracted relatively greater international attention. This latter process was inclusive only in terms of the participation of the armed factions. The wider sectors of the Somali society including traditional leaders, religious groups, women and other civic groups had been largely marginalized in the process. Although IGAD collectively led this initiative and it was under the watch of the IPF and other interested external parties, the process was initially paralyzed by the competition between Ethiopia and Djibouti who were battling for supremacy in the outcome. In the end, the process reflected, to a great extent, Ethiopia's interests in terms of determining the participants, charter writing, the selection of members of the parliament and the top leadership. In the final stages of the Mbagathi process, apparently sub-regional consensus was achieved, but it remains to be seen whether that cohesion will be maintained in the interest of Somalia's peace and stability.

Taking into consideration the fact that thirteen other efforts to bring peace to Somalia failed, it is necessary that policy makers do not continue creating misplaced expectations this time round. The success of the new government which emerged from Mbagathi conference will largely depend on the support given to it by the neighboring countries and the international community. But it can not peg its legitimacy on outside support. So far the government does not enjoy popularity at home; it needs to mend its lingering credibility stemming from the fact that it was produced by a process that was very much eschewed in favor of Ethiopia and its allies. As the Mbagathi process did not effectively deal with reconciliation, and only concentrated on power-sharing issues, the new government needs to make it a top priority when it goes home.

CHAPTER FOUR

Critical Analyses of the Roles and Interests of the External Actors in Somalia's Peace Processes

Introduction

Chapter Three of the study looked at the last two sub-regional peace initiatives in Somalia; Arta and Mbagathi processes, managed by Djibouti and IGAD respectively. The chapter made some comparisons between the two processes and explored major interests that influenced the processes. This chapter critically analyses the roles and interests of the notable external actors in the Somali peace processes. These are IGAD states, Arab States, United States, European Union, United Nations, and African Union. The chapter also tests the hypotheses of the study.

The term "actors" refer to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties. Mediators are all those groups who help the conflicting parties by bringing them together, gaining trust, setting the agenda, clarifying issues and formulating agreements.²²⁸ All actors have certain interests in the process which is what makes them become involved in the first place.²²⁹ The interests of the various external stakeholders vary from security to humanitarian. They also stem from ambitions for leadership and statesmanship.

Following the collapse of Somali state, Somalia became an international commodity.²³⁰ Early neglect of Somalia by the international community and the neighbouring states was

²²⁸ Hugh O.Rambootham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: polity Press, 1999) pp. 158-159 quoted in Ochieng Kamudhayi, Somali Peace Process in Makumi Mwangi (ed.) Africa Regional Security in the age of Globalization (Henrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p. 116

²²⁹ Makumi Mawagiru, Community Based Approaches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis prevention and conflict management (Nairobi: GTZ, 2001) cited in *ibid.*

²³⁰ Samuel Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993)

followed by proliferation of parallel initiatives without coherent agenda as to how peace can be achieved in the country. The repercussion of the proliferation of peacemaking initiatives has been acknowledged by the seventeenth meeting of the council of ministers of IGAD held in Djibouti on 14-15 March, 1998. It attributed the lack of progress in Somalia to the proliferation of parallel initiatives which has encouraged the Somali faction leaders to continue to play one external actor against the other in order to ensure the status quo is maintained in the country.²³¹

A number of measures had been taken to bring all initiatives aiming at Somali reconciliation under one roof. IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) Committee on Somalia was created in January 1998 to support the IGAD peace process in Somalia. Liaison Group on Somalia whose membership includes IGAD states, United States, Norway, France, Egypt, and European Commission was also formed under the aegis of the IPF and met in Addis Ababa on June 12, 1998 under the chairmanship of Italy. Another Consultative Body, the Standing Committee on Somalia, whose membership is open for IGAD States, IGAD Partners Forum Liaison Group members, OAU and Arab League Secretariats, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya and other interested states and organisations, was formed which met on November 1998 at Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of Ethiopia. Although these forums strengthened international consensus behind IGAD peace initiatives and generated ideas to help the peace process, the membership in these forums did not mean every member country has avoided taking measures to exacerbate the situation in Somalia.²³²

Given the fragmentation of Somali institutions and the current inability of any group to impose its will on the country, Somalia became vulnerable to the influence of the external actors and competing geopolitical agendas.²³³ The mere absence of a central state to

²¹ See Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/1999/882, 16 August 1999

²² *ibid.* p. 23

²³ Dr. Pat Johnson. Somalia: Land, Political, Economic and Social Analysis. A report for Oxfam GB, April 1999 p. 13.

articulate national interests and priorities is a breeding ground for competing influences within the region.²³⁴

IGAD Member States

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Draught and Development (IGADD) established in 1986 by the draught afflicted six African countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia. The State of Eritrea joined the sub-regional grouping as the seventh member on September 1993 after it took its independence from Ethiopia. One of the stated objectives of the organisation is to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue.²³⁵ Somalia is a founding member of IGAD. Three of the IGAD countries namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti have borders with Somalia, hence called frontline states.

Some of the peace initiatives by the IGAD member states were genuine but had negative results; others were seen to be driven by ulterior motives. The divergent approaches of the IGAD states in the Somali peace process is counted as one of the major obstacles to Somalia's peace and stability. This section analyses the interests of the individual IGAD countries and their roles in the Somali peace process.

Ethiopia

The bitter historical relations between Ethiopia and Somalia had not disappeared with the collapse of the Somali state. President Zenawi and Moi who met in Addis Ababa in November 1991- almost a year after the collapse of the Somali state – declared their determinations to protect their territories against any external power's claim with indirect

²³⁴ *ibid*

²³⁵ See Article 7 of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Nairobi, 21 Mmarch 1996.

reference to Somalia²³⁶. After the fall of Mingistu in 1991, there was short détente in the relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. The EPRDF regime which came to power gave goodwill gestures to the Somalia. It hosted thousands of Somali refugees. Ethiopia also served as transit route to the Somalis travelling to Europe and United States. They easily obtained citizenship papers including passports. Some of Somalia's senior elites and government officials who hail from region V of Ethiopia were even appointed to senior posts in Ethiopia including the presidency of the regional government.

Ethiopia's vulnerability to "Greater Somalia" ideology has been greatly diminished by the collapse of Somali state, but the disintegration of Somalia has in itself brought ever-growing danger to Ethiopia as the crisis in Somalia has allowed, according to Ethiopia's official point of view, religious extremism to take hold.²³⁷ Some fanatics in Ethiopia's ruling elite say that the establishment of a viable government in Somalia would once again resuscitate the ideology of "Greater Somalia" and that peace, democracy and development in Somalia would, in that case, not benefit Ethiopia.²³⁸ This extremist view has been reinforced by the independence of Eritrea and the subsequent conflict that erupted between the two countries. Since the fighting broke out at Badame border town between Ethiopia and Eritrea, some nationalist elements who advocate for pre-emptive actions to avoid another "appeasement" to secessionist forces within the oppressed communities of Ethiopia took the centre stage of Ethiopia's ruling party.

Considerations about internal ethnic arithmetic have influenced the Ethiopian behaviour towards Somalia. Many Somalis in region V of Ethiopia are agitating for independence through armed oppositions such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Ethiopia alleged some Islamic groups operating in Somalia have carried out destabilising activities inside Ethiopia including unsuccessful assassination attempt of Abdulmajid Hussein, the then- minister of transport in the federal government in mid-1996.

²³⁶ Odougo Cyprine Onyango. Territorial Claims as the Model of Determinant of Inter-State Conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, 1960-1991 in Okoth and Ogot (eds), Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000), P. 92.

²³⁷ Ministry of Information. "Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy", Addis Ababa, November 2002 p.2

²³⁸ *ibid* p.4

Since time, Ethiopia has pursued what has been seen as destabilising policies in Somalia. It has made continuous incursions into parts of Somalia to root out groups it suspects are making common cause with its internal opposition groups. These military incursions intensified in 1999 after Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict broke out. The two countries armed allies inside Somalia and played the one group against another. The situation worsened after Hussein Aideed with the help of Eritrea offered bases for Oromo Liberation Front.

According to Ethiopia's policy direction towards Somalia, Ethiopia pursues three damage limitation objectives in Somalia; firstly, to try to help those regions which are comparatively stable and do not shelter extremists and terrorists. These are the regions known as Somaliland and Puntland. The two administrations had been cooperative with security apparatus of Ethiopia and extradited some individuals wanted by Ethiopian authorities. Secondly, to create the capability to defend Ethiopia and foil any attack by forces of extremism, terrorism and other anti-peace elements originating in Somalia. Thirdly, to work in cooperation with the Somali people in the region, and the international community as a whole, to weaken and neutralise those forces coming from any part of Somalia to perpetuate attacks against Ethiopia.²³⁹

Given secessionary tendencies in Ethiopia, it has tended not to support a creation of strong Somali state with greater influence in the Horn of Africa, and rather would opt a weaker one, more potential for Ethiopian control and influence and with less threat to Zone V borders.²⁴⁰ Ethiopia has been the author of the 'building block approach' which encourages the emergence of polarised regional governments.²⁴¹ Cynics note that this approach coincides with Ethiopia's interest in the possible use of the Somali ports as alternative ports to Djibouti and Eritrea. Somaliland and Puntland are obvious possible "building blocks". Ethiopia has been a quiet partner to both administrations and

²³⁹ Ministry of Information, "Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy". Addis Ababa, November 2002 pp.6-7

²⁴⁰ Dr. Pat Johnson, Somalia/Land: political, Economic and Social Analysis. A Report for Oxfam GB, April 1999, p. 12

²⁴¹ P.S. Gilkes, Somalia/ Somaliland. Is There a Way Forward? London, August 1999

cooperates with them on shared security matters. It also channels some of its imports through Berbera port.

The building block approach with all its merits aims at distancing the possibility of forming strong central government which Ethiopia fears may resume the redemption policy. The idea of creating decentralised governance system is also a countercheck at Arab influence in the region. Ethiopia's apparent support to Somaliland's stability is contrasted with its negative involvement in the south where it views as breeding ground of the unitarist orientations in Somalia.

The Ethiopia claims that its most immediate concern in Somalia is its own national security.²⁴² However, one wonders whether the provision of arms to Somali factions and the thwarting of any effort to establish national government in Somalia serves the security interests of Ethiopia. Fragile and instable security situation in Somalia is prone to create more security problems to Ethiopia, and its internal opposition groups are more likely to enjoy more sanctuary in unstable Somalia. It is also ironical that Ethiopia demanded the TNG to fight Islamic extremist groups while undermining its authority to extend its control over the country.

In 1996, Ethiopia was mandated to mediate the Somali conflict by OAU and IGAD. However, it used the mandate to play blurred multiple part of mediator, regional power and spoiler.²⁴³ Perhaps, a glance at the Ethiopia's sponsored conferences may indicate its motives in the Somalia's peace process. It was more than willing to host UN-sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa because it saw the opportunity offers it a chance to promote its status as diplomatic hegemony and peace broker in the region. United States groomed the new regime in Addis Ababa as the mediator of the conflicts in the region. Ethiopia advanced its leverage through its relationships with General Aideed who was then the most important player in the Somali conflict. General Aideed shared guerrilla warfare ideologies with leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea. He had also strong antipathy towards

²⁴² Abshir Omar, The Impact of external Political Interventions on the Peace Process: The Case of Somalia, Dissertation for the Degree of Masters of arts , The university of York, August 2003 p.50

²⁴³ Ulf Terlinden, IGAD- Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks, Berlin, February 2004

Arabs and particularly towards Egypt which he accused of supporting Siyad Barre regime for a long time. General Aideed was reportedly given political cover by Meles Zenawi during his confrontations with UNOSOM.

The Sodere conference was hosted by Ethiopia in November 1996 at a time when Ethiopia was increasingly worried with the Islamic influence in Somalia. It used the conference to cover and legitimize its military incursions inside Somalia to destroy suspected bases of Islamic groups. The conference also coincided with the establishment of Islamic courts in many parts of Somalia as response to the failure of the faction leaders to restore law and order. The conference strengthened the hands of the faction leaders against the growing civic movements who posed formidable challenges to factional politics.

Ethiopia has become more and more of a spoiler since 2001 through its open antagonism to the Transitional National Government.²⁴⁴ It hosted a gathering of anti-TNG factions at Awasa in Ethiopia in March 2001 in which SRRC alliance was created. Ethiopia used SRRC to confront the TNG and strengthen its influence in Somalia which has been weakened by Arta peace conference. Arta outcome was not reflective of Ethiopia's hegemonic weight and interests in the region. Ethiopia maintained that the tiny Republic of Djibouti could not be reputed with a landmark success in Somali reconciliation. It polarised factional politics in the aftermath of Arta. Some new players came into being at the behest of Ethiopia. Some of these factions are splinter groups from previously existing factions. Ethiopia portrayed the number of functions as being reflective of their influence in Somalia and lobbied for them to be given 200 delegates at the Eldoret conference. More than half of the official delegates were Ethiopia's allies. The greater role of the factions the conference is not matched by control on the ground. Most of them wield the power of disrupting but do not have any legitimate constituency beyond scores of militias.

²⁴⁴ Ulf Terlinden and Tobias Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development, Peace, Conflict and Development-Issue four, April 2004, p.16

Since 1996, Ethiopia has been increasingly and continuously coveting a total monopoly of the Somali peace and reconciliation process to enhance its hegemonic interests, and derailed any other peace initiative which does not promise an outcome in favour of its interests.²⁴⁵ The record speaks of many such attempts by other countries that had been foiled by Ethiopia. It undermined Kenya's initiative in brokering understanding among the warring factions in Mogadishu in 1996 when former president, Moi, invited key players in the capital to Nairobi. Ethiopia hurriedly convened a parallel meeting in Sodere resort town of Ethiopia. It also sabotaged the accord which was reached in Cairo in late 1997. Those who dropped out of the talks headed to Addis Ababa. Other splinter groups from the factions who signed Cairo Accord have also been encouraged and supported by Ethiopia with hefty arms supplies.

Another two attempts by the Kenyan government to mediate between the Transitional National Government and SRRC in 2001 had been aborted after the Ethiopia-backed SRRC which declined to attend the conference despite their earlier approval. Their previous decision to attend the meeting was apparently succeeded by Ethiopian dictation to the contrary after they were summoned to Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia's proactive engagement in the recently concluded peace talks left little doubt that the outcome would be tilting in favour of Ethiopia and its allies. Indeed, the peace talks were a field day for Ethiopia. Its allies dominated the process and elected a president who is counted as Ethiopia's closest ally in Somalia. It diverted the talks which were originally supposed to bring together the TNG and the opposition groups so as to compliment the Arta outcome to be honoured. Despite the IGAD Summit Resolution of January 2002 in Khartoum which called for broadening and deepening of the Arta peace process, Ethiopia wanted everything to be started from scratch. Allegations that delegates were screened on the bases of their allegiance to Ethiopia were made. According to some observers, Ethiopia manipulated the screening of the delegates at the conference so that it can "bet on the horse that can come out of the race".²⁴⁶ The TNG president Mr.

²⁴⁵ Jama Mohamed Ghalib, *Who is a Terrorist?* (Mogadishu, Mogadishu Printing 2002) p. 49

²⁴⁶ Interview with Ali Khalif Galayr, Nairobi, July 12, 2004

Abdiqasim Salad Hassan told the 10th Summit of the IGAD held in October in the Ugandan Capital of Kampala that the rules of the conference were violated to the extent that the TNG's official delegates became a minority and were overshadowed by more than a dozen factions created and supported by Ethiopia.

Given its military strength and ability to prop up any dissenting groups from any agreement reached, Ethiopia effectively proved it exercises veto power over political developments in Somalia and that it is hard to imagine a workable agreement in Somalia without the Ethiopians.²⁴⁷ As the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Mr. Meles Zenawi stated that any peace initiative which is not endowed with Ethiopia's blessing faces the risk of being sabotaged. In an interview with Al-Hayat Newspaper, he stated that his country is more experienced in Somali affairs than any other country in the region. "No Somali government would be realised without Ethiopia's involvement in its foundation."²⁴⁸ Indeed Ethiopia's attempts at restoring the warlords and engaging them in proxy confrontations with those who stand against its influence in Somalia had reinforced the perception that it desires neither a unified nor a stable Somalia. By keeping Somalia in the status quo, Ethiopia believes that it would eliminate a historic enemy.²⁴⁹

Since May 2004, Ethiopia had taken some what lenient position in the Somali peace talks. It is only after its cooperation had been secured that the process moved speedily and made some notable progress. Some analysts and diplomats suggested that Ethiopia's positive re-engagement in the final stages of the peace talks was due to its fear of being blamed for the failure of the process, and risking another loss of face with the international community after it rejected the decision of the Boundary Commission in Ethiopia-Eritrea's border dispute. Ethiopia's hegemonic policies in the region have earned it a bad reputation of being spoiler, and it seems that it has submitted that these policies had isolated it regionally and internationally.

²⁴⁷ ICG Africa Report No 45, 23 May 2002.

²⁴⁸ Cited in Abshir Omar, The impact of External Intervention on the Peace Process: The Case of Somalia, Masters Dissertation, the University of York, 2003. p. 54

²⁴⁹ Abdullahi Ahmed Barise and Afyare Elmi, Somalia is in the Hen in a Fox-Brokered Peace, at www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.2000409020.wcosudan19/BNStory/...9/21/2004

Djibouti

Djibouti is a member of Arab league and IGAD. It is a founding member of IGAD and hosts its Headquarter. The majority of its population are Somalis who share historical and cultural ties with Somali people. Since independence, the country was ruled by leaders from the Isse clan of the Somali ethnic. Djibouti owes her independence to Somalia which has supported its struggle for independence and feels it has moral reasonability to reciprocate the Somalia's investment in its independence.

Although Djibouti's role as mediator in Somali conflict was not consummated by her resources and diplomatic experience, it was the first country to respond to the Somali crisis and hosted the first two reconciliation conferences in 1991 as the consequences of the conflict were felt in Djibouti. Thousands of people fleeing from the civil war sought refuge in Djibouti. Djibouti was also encouraged by the backing of Italy and Egypt which were experienced with the political developments in Somalia and made earlier attempts to mediate between the Siyad Barre regime and the opposition groups.

Since the failure of its first two attempts to mediate Somali conflict, Djibouti played a low profile role in Somali peace process until 1999 when the new president of Djibouti Ismail Ghelle announced his plan before the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999.

The Djibouti's interests in restoring Somali state are multiple. Djibouti's ruling Isse clan face constant threats from Afar population who are scattered in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Afar are eyeing the top leadership of the country which has been in the hands of the Somalis since independence. Another uncertainty that Djibouti faces is presence of the French troops in Djibouti. Any sudden French policy shift to end its military presence and the security treaty between the two countries can make Djibouti vulnerable to external threats. Ethiopia's hegemonic tendencies in the region are also a source of growing concern for Djibouti. Djibouti perceives that the power imbalances in the region put it in a disadvantaged position. This perception was reinforced by bullying

character of the Ethiopian regime and its attempt to dictate the terms of agreement on the use of Djibouti port. The restoration of the Somali state is thus a strategic goal for Djibouti to address the power imbalances in the region.

Commercial and financial linkages between Somali and Djiboutian business people partially explain Djibouti's engagement in the Somali peace process. These commercial interests have apparently been reflected in Arta conference. There have been some business ventures between Djiboutian and Somali business men. In the absence of Somali government, Djibouti served as conduit for some of Somalia's international trade which brought gains to both parties.

Djibouti's vigorous leadership of Arta conference left it with little choice other than to recognise and throw its weight behind the Transitional National Government. Djibouti made some diplomatic protests against Ethiopia's obstruction of the outcome of the Arta peace conference. Its foreign minister has charged that Ethiopian statements on Somalia seriously damage the prospect of peace and constitute a serious act of interference, which poses a threat to regional stability.²⁵⁰ Ethiopia initially endorsed president Ghelle's peace plan within the IGAD framework. It encouraged some of the warlords to join the talks and sought some guarantees for them at the conference. Djibouti was reluctant to give any assurances that they will be given any special privilege since the process the process was Somali-owned but has accommodated some of those demands of the warlords.²⁵¹ The RRA chairman who joined the conference at behest of Ethiopia was given the exclusive monopoly of nominating all the MPs of Digil and Mirifle clan contrary to the basic understanding that all members of the parliament would be selected and endorsed exclusively by the traditional leaders. Despite these concessions, the RRA chairman defected after securing all his demands and headed to Ethiopia. Some faction leaders quit the talks before it was completed and others who secured parliament seats deserted after failing to get ministerial posts. They all headed to Ethiopia where they joined others and established SRRC in an attempt to flounder the TNG.

²⁵⁰ IRIN, 26 February 2002

²⁵¹ an interview with Djiboutian diplomat in Nairobi, 10 July 2004

Djibouti remained passively engaged at the onset of the Somali peace talks in Kenya. Its discontent was manifested by the conspicuous absence of its president from the opening ceremony of the conference. Djibouti aligned itself with the TNG and other anti-Ethiopian forces in the Somali peace talks and strived to make Arta process alive. Indeed, it stressed that Arta process should become the bases of the Somali reconciliation. As the Ethiopian influence in the talks had increased, Djibouti minimised its role in the talks and encouraged the disaffected Somali parties to walk out from the conference. Its aim was to minimise the influence of Ethiopia. After the passing of Somali Charter by delegates mainly composed of Ethiopian allies in September 2003, Djibouti pulled out from the Technical Committee in protest of alleged mismanagement of the talks by the Kenyan special envoy and lack of inclusivity.²⁵²

Djibouti returned to the talks after Technical Committee was expanded to include all IGAD member states and renamed Facilitation Committee. Ethiopia and Djibouti have shown unprecedented cooperation since the 6th IGAD ministerial meeting in Nairobi on 22 May, 2004.²⁵³ Their cooperation had enabled the process to move ahead and make a progress within few months. According to Djibouti diplomat, the understanding between the two countries stems from the realization that a stable Somalia is in the best interest of the two countries.²⁵⁴ Djibouti finally abandoned any pretence of defending the Arta outcome and propping the TNG which grew weaker by the day and lost its credibility both inside and outside Somalia. Although Djibouti was supporting another candidate for the seat of the presidency, it has welcomed the election of Abdullahi Yusuf who is Ethiopia's ally as the president of Somalia. Djibouti president, Ismail Guelle, was among the seven Heads of State and Government who were present at the inauguration ceremony of the new president. Interestingly president Guelle did not mention anything about Arta in the speech he delivered at the occasion, an indication of Djibouti's disillusionment with their grand Arta peace plan.

²⁵² ICG Africa Report no 79, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, 4 May 2004

²⁵³ see Joint Communiqué Issued by the 6th Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, 22nd May, 2004, Nairobi, Kenya

²⁵⁴ Interview in Nairobi, July 10th, 2004

Kenya

Kenya's engagement in peacemaking efforts in Somalia should be seen against the former president's ambition to become the sub-regional statesman. As one of the eldest leaders in Africa, he took special interest in mediating conflicts in Africa to earn publicity and to divert from the growing pressures at home. From Brundi to Sudan, Angola to Mozambique, Somalia to Uganda, Moi personally intervened to bring solutions to the conflicts raging in those countries. Moi also initiated the process of "IGAD Revitalisation" which changed the mandate of IGADD profoundly. The strongest motivation of the revitalisation of IGAD was the need to find regional strategies for the resolution of numerous inter-and intra-state conflicts.²⁵⁵ President Moi used the IGAD process to make his country and himself internationally presentable again after the withdrawal of IMF and World Bank.²⁵⁶ Moi's pursuit of greater regional integration manifested in the revitalisation of IGAD and East African Community was meant to work against the alienation of his regime by its Western friends in early 1990s. In his speech at the conclusion of the Djibouti hosted conference for Somalis in 1991 conference, Moi stressed that resolution of the sub-regional conflicts should be sought within the confines of the IGADD and said:

" We expressed concern that the continuation of the present conflicts in our sub-region would lead to further loss of life and property and increase misery among our people, thereby retarding development. For the leaders and the Somali groups and movements assembled in this hall, the choice is very clear and simple: It is either peace or perpetuation of misery, confusion and anarchy ... you can lay a firm foundation for Peace and tranquillity in the sub-region, the Horn of Africa.... We underscored the urgent need to resolve these conflicts peacefully through our own efforts and to strengthen peace and cooperation among the states of the sub-region and prevent foreign interferences and all their negative consequences." ²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Ulf Terlinden, *IGAD- Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*, Berlin, February 2004

²⁵⁶ *ibid*

²⁵⁷ Speech by Moi at the Occasion of Somali national reconciliation talks, Djibouti, on 15th July, 1991

Apart from Moi's ambitions for statesmanship, Kenya has other vital interest in Somalia's peace as it hosts huge number of Somali refugees and allegedly faces security problems spilling over from Somali into her territory. It had suffered two terrorist attacks in the last six years. It suspects that these terrorist activities have been organised from inside Somalia, and closed its borders with Somalia many times in the last several years. The security threats from Somalia were apparently exaggerated in the aftermath of September 11. Kenya restricted the entry of Somalis into Kenya and invalidated the Somali passport. It also raided the Somali-inhabited estates in Kenya and made a number of arrests. Kenya is one of U.S allies on the fight against terrorism in East Africa and has received some assistance to this end.

Although Somalia is not necessarily the only source of external security problems Kenya faces, other conflict- ridden neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, which also export security problems and refugees to Kenya, have governments, and there are diplomatic avenues through which problems with them can be sorted out. Somalia is exceptional where there is no authority to deal with on the insecurity that is worrying Kenya.²⁵⁸

Other Kenya interests in Somalia range from trade to employment opportunities for Kenyan citizens. Most of international organisations and UN agencies operating in Somalia have their operational and logistical bases in Kenya since UNOSOM pulled out from Somalia in early 1995. These organisations are staffed with many of Kenyan expatriates. They also rent premises and employ local Kenyan staff. The Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) which brings together international organisations, UN agencies and donors is based in Nairobi where most expatriates working in Somalia spend their time and aid resources. A number of Kenya-based flight companies are operating lucrative business in Somalia including ECHO and UNCAS flights which are used by the humanitarian organisations in Somalia, and a large fleet of Kenya-owned light planes which transport Miraa, passengers and other commodities to and from Somalia. There are almost 12 daily flights to Somalia transporting Miraa (the mild

²⁵⁸ Interview with Ambassador Mohamed Abdi Afey, Nairobi, 28 July, 2004.

narcotic leave) which is grown in the Meru province of Kenya. The revenue from this trade is estimated worth of 120 million US dollars a year.²⁵⁹

Kenya is also keeping an eye on the possible opportunities that may arise after situation normalizes and government is established there. Somalia is potential destination for Kenya's manpower and companies when peace is achieved there and reconstruction efforts start. Kenya provided the elect-president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed , a Sh12 Million Mercedes Benz to ensure that he has status of a president. They also have provided him with three other Mercedes for his escort and other head-of-state facilities. This is part of Kenya's crusade to help to find a lasting peace in Somalia and trap the new Head of State who is counted as Ethiopian close ally.²⁶⁰

Kenya's potential for becoming a de facto regional diplomatic leader and mediator of conflicts has increased as result of Ethiopia's deteriorating image resulting from its war with Eritrea, and meddling with Somalia's internal conflict. Its improved relations with the West after conducting a successful democratic transition added to Kenya's advantage to play a prominent role in the IGAD sub-region.. But to the extent Kenya exploited these prevailing opportunities for its own advantage is debatable.

Before the current Somali peace process, Kenya's peacemaking efforts in Somalia were erratic and were confined to occasional diplomacy carried out by the head of state. In 1991, former president, Moi, attended the Djibouti conference which resulted in the formation of interim government led by Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed. It also supported Arta process although it did not give official recognition to TNG. It organised two meetings between TNG and SRRC in November and December 2001 which did not make any progress as the latter declined Kenya's mediation.

Kenya was the leading mediator in the recently concluded Somali peace talks, but its role has been overshadowed by Djibouti and Ethiopia which were battling to determine the

²⁵⁹ Khalif H. Farah , "Mira Export to Somalia", Paper Presented to IDIS, July 2003

²⁶⁰ Daily Nation, October 14, 2004

outcome of the conference. Some Somali factions accused Kenya of colluding with Ethiopia which was intent on micro-managing the talks to ensure an outcome favourable to her interests and allies. Despite Kenya's chairmanship of the Technical Committee, Ethiopia's dominance of the conference was apparent. It was closely involved in conference mechanics such as the organisation of the daily agenda and screening of delegates. This had produced an increasingly noticeable bias in favour of SSRC and damaged the Kenyan reputation as a neutral player in the Somali problems.²⁶¹ This led to interpretations that Kenya either lacks any vision for the conference or it has been co-opted by Ethiopia.

Kenya's credibility as neutral player in the Somali peace process suffered when its special envoy Ambassador Bethuel Kiplaget endorsed a controversial charter which had been passed by those factions backed by Ethiopia on September 15, 2003. Kiplaget called the occasion "a historic day".²⁶² Statement made by former Kenyan president three days after the passing of the charter added to the mistrust of some Somalis who believed that Kenya is not a neutral player. The former president implied that Kenya and Ethiopia could not be trusted with the Somali peace process since they "fear that a reunited Somalia and a prosperous nation might resurrect Somalia's territorial claims."²⁶³

Kenyan officials downplayed Moi's statement and stated that it does not reflect Kenya's foreign policy. Kenya's Special Envoy to the Somali peace talks, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplaget, dismissed the allegations that Kenya is not serious in bringing about peace in Somalia. He said that the neighbouring states including Kenya want "Somalia at peace with itself and at peace with its neighbours."²⁶⁴ He also argued the irredentism had cost Somalia a lot and there are no such fears that any future Somali government will resort to territorial claims on its neighbours. Kenya spent \$3.6 million to pay for the accommodation of the Somali delegates and issued visas to over 3000 delegates some of

²⁶¹ *ibid*

²⁶² Ulf Terlinden, *IGAD-Paper Tiger facing the Gigantic Tasks*, Berlin, February 2004 p.10

²⁶³ Salad F. Dhuhul, "Washington urges Somalis to advance Peace Process", www.aljazeera.com, 26 September 2003 quoted in ICG Africa report No 79, *biting the Somali bullet*, 4 May 2004.

²⁶⁴ Interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplaget, Kenya's special Envoy to Somalia National Reconciliation Process, Mbagathi, Nairobi, 24 July 2004

them self-sponsoring. Kenya's ambassador to Somalia, Mohamed Abdi Afey, stated the Somali peace conference is a burden to Kenya's resources and security, but Kenya has to make some sacrifices to get peace in Somalia because it has been trusted by the Somalis to do that for them.²⁶⁵

Kenya developed somewhat relatively better increased contacts with Somalis after the civil war through business links, people-to-people interactions and hosting of international organisations operating in Somalia. In addition to that it hosts large number of Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa. Kenya remains for the Somalis- albeit restrictions often imposed on them-the next international port for their external contacts. Despite all these advantages Kenya has over other countries in the region, it has no well-defined policy on Somalia and, despite the expertise of their officials, it is not keeping abreast with the political dynamics in Somalia and has no noticeable leverage on the Somali peace process.

Other IGAD Member States (Uganda, Eritrea, Sudan)

The other non-frontline states of IGAD had been relatively less active players in the Somali peace process, but occasionally showed interest in what is happening in Somalia. Eritrea supplied arms to Somali factions and Ethiopia's opposition groups in Somalia during the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. It recognised TNG and reportedly provided arms. Eritrea's involvement has been occasioned by the war with Ethiopia. Somalia and Eritrea share a history of struggle against the imperial state in Ethiopia. Eritrea depended on Somalia for military support and training during the liberation struggle. Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti are all vulnerable to be swallowed by Ethiopia and feel they need to cooperate for strategic reasons to counter Ethiopia's influence in the region. Eritrea is now an active player in the IGAD Facilitation Committee. It has a special envoy in the talks which shows the interests and importance Eritrea attaches to the process. It has also contributed \$50,000 towards the IGAD fund for the peace talks. Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan also contributed the same amount each.

²⁶⁵ Interview with Ambassador Mohamed Abdi Afey, Nairobi, 28 July, 2004

Sudan had maintained close relations with Aideed whom they regarded as hero who defeated the American imperialism in the region. The United States and United Nations both alleged that Sudan offered military and financial support to Gen-Aideed during the confrontations between SNA and US-led forces in Somalia. Sudan sought closer relationships with the Somali groups during early 1990s as it desperately tried to break its isolation by the United States and its neighbours.

Because of the improved relationship with Ethiopia since 1998, Sudan adopted a hands-off style from the Somali politics to avoid clashing with Ethiopia which is deeply mired in the conflict. It, however, supported the TNG Diplomatically within IGAD. Sudan in its capacity as the chairman of IGAD appointed special envoy to mediate the Somali factions and the TNG in 2001 but that did not work.

Sudan is the only IGAD state which has an embassy in Somalia since 1993. It had cultural ties with Somalia. It had been the destination of largest number of Somali students pursuing higher education since the fall of Somali government. Over three thousand Somali students received higher education or are currently schooled in Sudan. The internal problems Sudan faces and its other priorities explain its relatively passive role in the Somali peace process. Sudan's foreign minister rarely attended IGAD ministerial meeting which has been taking place in Nairobi almost every month since October 2003.

Uganda, as the chair of IGAD, had shown some interest in Somali peace process. Following the IGAD Summit in Kampala in October 2003 and the failure of the frontline states to build trust within the Somali groups, Uganda sought to take over the mediation of the conference. But this has been resisted by Ethiopia and Kenya. The Ugandan president had launched the Safari Park Consultation of the Somali leaders in January 2004 and has succeeded in working out some breakthrough-albeit temporarily. He organised face-to-face meeting of the Somali factions for the first time in one and half years. After Moi's exit from power, Ugandan president considers himself as the natural

heir to sub-regional statesmanship. Uganda had contributed \$250,00 to IGAD Fund for the Somali Peace Process. It comes second to Kenya in terms of financial contributions made by IGAD member states to the process.

Arab Countries

Somalia is a member of the Arab League. It joined the League in 1974 and has been an important player in the Arab world before the fall of the government because of its geopolitical position. It has special status within the Arab fold because it is the only Arab country without an effective government.²⁶⁶ The Arabs are tied to Somalis by cultural, political and commercial relations. Somalis are 100% Muslims. Islam is the official religion of the most of the Arab states.

During the cold war, the Arab countries acting as middle-powers have played their cards on Somalia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia had convinced Siyad Barre to kick out Soviets from Somalia in 1977 and courted him to the Western camp. Somalia was one of few Arab countries that had maintained their diplomatic relations with Egypt after it made an agreement with Israeli in 1979 during which most of the Arab countries severed their diplomatic relations with Cairo. Egypt and Saudi Arabia sponsored Somalia's joining of the Arab league in 1974.

The Arab countries see strong, unified Somali state as an essential bulwark against the Ethiopian influence in the region. Somalia has particular strategic significance for the Arab world in both strategic and economic sense. Its geographical location at the Red Sea and at the mouth of Babel-Mandeb, the petroleum exporting shipping lanes, is an important determining factor of Arab-Somali relations.

Economically, Somalia has become one of the biggest trade partners for United Arab Emirates after the civil war. The Saudi Arabia also imported 90% of its meat from

²⁶⁶ Interview with Amb. Salim Khusaibi, the Arab League Special Envoy for Somalia, 22 October, 2004

Somalia before it imposed ban on Somali livestock in 1999 due to the alleged Rift Valley fever.

The disinterest from the west means that Somalia has been an open book for Arab countries to have a greater influence.²⁶⁷ The cultural ties between Somalia and the Arab world had further been reinforced during the civil war. Arab countries have provided thousand of scholarships to Somali students for higher education since the fall of the government. This had strengthened Somalia's Arab orientations.

The Arab official policy is in favour of unitary Somali state. This is understandable because the Arab world perceives that a decentralised political system in Somalia is prone to Ethiopian influence and Israeli intervention. With the exception of Egypt and Libya, Arab countries are less equipped with any expertise to deal with fragmented political factions and micro-politics of Somalia, thus stressing the formation of unitary national government. The Arab role to pursue an effective diplomatic engagement of their own is, however, constrained mainly by three factors; firstly, there is lack of deep understanding of the Somali conflict dynamics by most of Arab states, they have been lacking the determination and will to pursue Somali reconciliation persistently and consistently.

Secondly, Arab involvement is resisted by the IGAD member states, most notably Ethiopia, which claims that sub-regional actors have the exclusive preserve and mandate of peacemaking in Somalia. The Arab countries have often avoided confrontations with IGAD states on the Somalia peace process and have maintained some degree of neutrality in Somalia, although often criticised of meddling with Somali affairs by Ethiopia and its Somali allies. Indeed, Egypt invited the wrath of IGAD member states particularly Ethiopia when it held reconciliation talks for the Somali factions in late 1997.

²⁶⁷ Mark Bradbury, Somalia: The Aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism, February 2002 P.18

Thirdly, the effectiveness of the League of Arab States to respond to crisis in the Arab world including the Somalia conflict has also been constrained by the growing divisions within the Arab world and subsequent weakening of the Arab bond due to the crisis in the gulf and relations with Israeli.

The leading Arab heavyweight, Egypt, had maintained closer watch to Somali situation throughout the Somali civil war. It offered mediation between the Siyad Barre Regime and opposition groups. It hosted the Cairo conference in 1997. It had also worked closely with Djibouti to strengthen the Transitional National Government and counter Ethiopian influence. It had maintained its diplomatic presence in Somalia at ambassadorial level for the last several years. Egypt's interests favour a centralised Somali state which can balance Ethiopia's hegemony in the Greater Horn of Africa which is the source of the Nile waters. However, despite allegations that Egypt continues to use Somalia as an element in its efforts to influence Ethiopia's policy on Nile, Egyptian diplomats are discounting such allegations pointing out that an agreement had been reached between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia on the common use of the Nile water in December 2003.²⁶⁸ They argue that strong Somalia is not only beneficial to Egypt, but also to other countries in the Horn who do not want to be bulldozed by a dominant and hegemonic power.

Egypt had shaped the Arab opinion towards Somalia after the Arta conference when the Arab countries hurried up with diplomatic and some financial support for the TNG. The fact that Arta conference was hosted by Djibouti who also a member of the Arab League and whose interests largely coalesce with those of the Arab countries also encouraged the Arab support for the Arta process.

There is an Arab tendency to wait until such a time when a government is established with which they can deal instead of meddling directly with confused and polarised political situations which they can hardly understand. Thus, the establishment of TNG served as a window of opportunity for the Arab countries to have some role in the Somali

²⁶⁸ Interview with Egyptian Diplomat, Nairobi, August 16, 2004

affairs and influence the matters relating to Somalia. The offering of a support to a united Somali state is seen by the Arabs as necessary, if not sufficient, guarantee against the building block approach championed by Ethiopia.

The Arab countries provided financial support to TNG, however, the level of support fell far below the expectation of the TNG. The Arab Summit in Amman, Jordan, in 2001 pledged 56 M dollars for the reconstructions of Somalia but that has never materialized. Until February 2002, Arab states had given the Transitional Government approximately U.S. \$ 25 million in grants. Saudi Arabia was the largest financier of the TNG followed by Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Libya. The Arab League also established Somali Fund for countries to donate but no significant contributions have been made towards the fund by member states. The TNG ambitiously asked for Arab reconstruction assistances equivalent to that of Marshal Plan which United States carried out to help Europe recover from the destruction of the Second World War. Despite their limited financial support, the Arab countries recognised and lobbied for TNG to enable it occupy the Somali seats in many international forums such as the African Union, The United Nations and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

The Arab countries initially supported the TNG, but their support had declined later on for a number of reasons. Firstly, Arab resources and attentions had been consumed by the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) which had coincided with the formation of the TNG. The Arab governments, being aware of the sympathy of their citizens towards the Palestinian cause, are naturally inclined to make Palestinian cause as a top priority of their foreign policies. Secondly, the September 11 attack on the United States was also another setback for TNG to mobilize more Arab support. Arab countries could not ignore the U.S. and Ethiopian allegations that that their donations to Somalia are falling into the terrorist hands, thus reducing their support to TNG and to the Arab charity organisations working in Somalia. As consequence of these allegations, Saudi Arabia closed the biggest Islamic charity organisation in Somalia, Al-Harameyn foundation, which had been sponsoring over 3,000 orphans and had been funding other welfare projects including schools and health care facilities. Thirdly, the lack of progress on the part of the TNG to

consolidate its power in Somalia and the fact that no other bilateral or multilateral support was forthcoming from members of the international community discouraged Arab countries to continue assisting the TNG. Fourthly, the Arab countries who do not want to be seen as partisans in the Somali conflict were vulnerable to the growing criticisms that they are propping up a non-inclusive government. Such allegations were made by the Somali factions as well as Ethiopia.

Egypt and Arab League attended the Somali peace talks in Kenya as members of the IPF observers. At the onset of the process at Eldoret, the Arab League envoy and the Egyptian delegation had been given unwelcome treatment and were considered outsiders in the talks by IGAD fearing that they may influence the process in their favour.²⁶⁹ According to some Egyptian diplomats, their presence was particularly viewed with suspicion. Egyptian diplomats at the talks had been finger pointed and accused of trying to foil the process and were at times barred from observing the talks. But as time went on, the Arab representatives at the talks proved that they are not spoilers. According to one Egyptian diplomat, the scepticism has gradually faded away as they have proved to be constructive and non-partisan players in the process. Egypt is a member of the IPF sub-committee on Somalia and Sudan and has been increasingly following the peace processes in the two countries. In fact, the Arab League were instrumental in discouraging the forum shopping and dualism whereby those dissenting from the process in Kenya looked for Arab support for a parallel initiative. The TNG and NSC who pulled out from the talks in September 2003 toured some Arab capitals to muster Arab support for a parallel initiative, but have not been successful in gaining Arab sympathy for their arguments.

There was some diplomatic outrage by the Arab countries when the Arabic Language was relegated to the third official language of Somalia at the time of the charter drafting in the Somali peace talks in Kenya. Somalia maintained Arabic as its second official language in its constitutions since independence. According to the Special Envoy for the

²⁶⁹ interview with Amb. Salim Khuseibi, Arab League Special Envoy for Somalia, 22 October, 2004

Arab League Secretary General, they put down their feet and resisted the attempts by some elements to change the Somali identity.²⁷⁰

Generally, the Arab countries are complacent that Somali leaders can not do without the diplomatic and financial support of the Arab world; hence, they are less likely to favour any certain personalities to take the leadership in Somalia as opposed to Ethiopia which strived to crown one of its favoured faction leaders for Somalia's leadership. The Arab countries also tended to favour an acceptable resolution of the Somali crisis, irrespective of whoever mediates as opposed to Ethiopia which always insisted a resolution of the Somali problems should be only under its auspices and brokerage of its own terms.²⁷¹ This Arab complacency stems from the Arab countries' conviction that Somalia's historical and geographical links with the Arab world can not be eliminated by any other influence. The Arab League and the Egyptian envoys maintained that Somalis should be left to decide their own destiny without external interferences.

The total contribution of the Arab countries to the process was minimal. The Arab League had provided \$250,000 to the IGAD peace fund. Egypt also provided \$50,000. Kenya's minister of foreign affairs visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to mobilize political and financial support of the Arab countries for the process. These visits have been occasioned by the understanding that the involvement of the Arabs gives the peace process more legitimacy as Somalia falls under the influence of IGAD and LAS.²⁷²

United States

The United States led a humanitarian mission in Somalia on behalf of the UN in Somalia in 1992. The mission had much less to do with Somalia per se than with issues of domestic politics and Bush's reputation for decisive overseas action. It wanted to demonstrate to Europe which was reluctant to intervene in the Balkans what decisive

²⁷⁰ Interview with Amb. Salim Khusaibi, Arab League Special Envoy for Somalia, 22 October, 2004.

²⁷¹ Jama Mohamed Ghalib, *Who is a Terrorist?* (Mogadishu, Mogadishu printing, 2002) p.65

²⁷² Three of the IGAD member states are members of the Arab League, namely Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia.

military action could achieve.²⁷³ The mission also intended to repair the American image after cynics criticised it for having intervened in Iraq for oil while failing to stop human suffering in Somalia. The U.S. experience in Somalia where 18 of its rangers were killed in 1993 in one incident in the streets of Mogadishu had become a major deterrent factor of its intervention policies in the world. The White House had even hesitated to raise a finger in the face of the Rwandan genocide as the debacle in Somalia haunted the American administration.

Since its pullout from Somalia in mid-1990s, the U.S. moved away from direct engagement in Africa's conflict and encouraged regional actors to address conflicts in their sphere of influence. It mainly played a catalyst role for other actors to move in and resolve the conflicts in the continent. This catalyst model of American policy was used in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in which United States used partnership conflict management approach in which the European Union, Organisation of African Unity were involved.²⁷⁴ In Somali conflict, United States had initially supported the Ethiopia's mediation efforts. It also encouraged IGAD peace initiatives in Sudan and Somalia.

Since September 11, one of the U.S foreign policy priorities is to combat the so-called terrorism forces. The Administration's East African counter-terrorism initiative recognises that there are real threats in Somalia and cooperates with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti in many areas including patrolling the Somali coasts and exchange of intelligence.

United States' fight against terrorism had increasingly allied itself with Ethiopia and heavily relied on intelligence provided by Ethiopian intelligence services which claimed there are terrorist training camps in some parts of Somalia. It is on the bases of this faulty intelligence provided by Ethiopia that the United States closed the biggest remittance company in Somalia, Albarakat, which was providing vital services to the public alleging

²⁷³ Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations (London, I.B. Touris publishers, 1996) p.147

²⁷⁴ Prendergast, J, US leadership in Resolving African Conflicts. The Case of Ethiopia-Eritrea. United States Institute of Peace Special Report, September 7, 2001 p.1 at www.usip.org

that the company supports terrorist activities in Somalia. The U.S. administration also put some Islamic organisations in Somalia on the list of the terrorist organisations which have been described as being linked to Al Qaeda. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell charged in December 2001 that some Bin Laden followers are holed up in Somalia, taking advantage of the absence of a functioning government.²⁷⁵

Some of the warlords opposed to the TNG backed by Ethiopian which has had regional ambitions in Somalia are the sources of much of the information alleging Al-Qaeda involvement in Somalia, passed by the Ethiopian government to the US administrations. Ethiopia wanted to see the TNG government emasculated and its propaganda alleged that not only dozens of Islamic radicals but also senior members of the TNG government, including the president Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, are working with Al Qaeda. The US administration ignored the invitation of the TNG to come and investigate the alleged terrorist presence in Somalia. The former Somali Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah strongly rejected the charges of an Al-Qaeda presence and sent the Bush administration a letter of invitation to come to Somalia and see what is there.²⁷⁶ The president and his prime ministers were among the first world leaders to condemn the September 11 terrorist attack. The TNG created a "national anti-terrorism task force" after September 11 to show a more moderate, pro-western stance than its opponents would like to portray.

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After the terrorist attacks in America which killed 3,000 people, it was realised that failed states [like Somalia] can create a danger to themselves, to their neighbours and to the United States.²⁷⁷ However, the American war on terrorism lacked any component of nation-building in Somalia. It has not provided any significant political and financial support to the peace process. It shifted its efforts towards intelligence gathering and individualised dealings with warlords in Somalia which, according to some observers, legitimised faction leaders and created some perceptions that the United States is

²⁷⁵ Alan Sipress and Peter Slevin, "Powel Wary of Iraq moves," Washington Post, 21 December 2001 cited in ICG Africa Report No 45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002.

²⁷⁶ BBC interview, December 9, 2001.

²⁷⁷ Jim Fisher-Thompson and Lindsey Brooks, "Eldoret Conference Could Mean Peace for Somalia". Washington File Staff Writers, October 9, 2002 at www.somalilandnet.com/warva/2002_somalinevs/11289.shtml visited on 22/11/04

reinforcing the brutal grip of the warlords on the Somalis. The U.S- led war on terrorism lacked any broader international political engagement and led to an already unstable situation to deteriorate, thereby creating potential for more violence and lawlessness of the sort that can offer the alleged terrorists greater opportunities.²⁷⁸

United States has reconnaissance missions in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea coasts and created the Combined Joint Task-Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) whose mission is to detect, disrupt, defeat and deny terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa.²⁷⁹ The CJTF-HOA is a joint and combined effort of personnel from all US services and allied forces from numerous other countries. The CJTF-HOA helped the countries in the region in creating counter terrorism units. The United States reportedly spends about 280 Million US dollars on the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa every month.²⁸⁰ This is in marked contrast with its negligible contribution towards the Somali Peace Conference. One wonders why the vast resources devoted to the deployment of military force in the region and investing in anti-terrorist projects was not devoted to peace-making efforts in Somalia.

Apparently the United States did not discover any terrorist bases in Somalia in the last two years despite the exaggerated reports and allegations made by the Ethiopian government and the Somali warlords that several terrorist elements are operating in Somalia. Senior American experts on Somalia pointed out the US policy makers should avoid an over-reliance on information from the Ethiopian government, since it has a vested interest in exaggerating terrorist activities in order to receive assistance in combating its opposition groups. Similarly most of the local groups who allegedly provided information concerning terrorism to United States were only interested in receiving US resources and political backing than eventually terrorist threats.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ ICG Africa Report No 45, Somalia Combating Terrorism in A failed State, 23 May 2002.

²⁷⁹ Report on the IGAD Conference on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, Addis Ababa, 24-27 June 2003. pp 12-13

²⁸⁰ interview with Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar, Nairobi, 24 July, 2004

²⁸¹ Chris Talbot, US proposes Limited Operations in Somalia, 18 December 2001.

The United States attended the electoral process of the President and the Transitional Assembly in Arta , Djibouti, but U.S. support for peace initiatives did not go beyond occasional statements by the State Department. The State Department issued a statement of support for the Arta conference. However, the U.S. administration never recognised the TNG. American diplomat visiting in Mogadishu in April 2002 declared that the United States does not recognise the TNG as Somalia's legitimate government.²⁸² In contributing Security Council debate on Somalia in October 2001, a statement by the US mission at the United Nations had supported Ethiopian stance in discounting TNG's claim for legitimacy as the national authority of Somalia. The statement read: "The search for political legitimacy must proceed inside Somalia.... in our view, no single group has yet succeeded in achieving that legitimacy. It is not for the U.S. government, the United Nations Security Council.... To determine who the legitimate representative of the Somali people is."²⁸³ These pronouncements had weakened the TNG attempts to consolidate its control in Mogadishu as they sent negative signals to the warlords opposing its authority.

In the recently concluded Somali National Reconciliation Process in Kenya, the United States gave some limited political support to the IGAD initiative by encouraging various Somali parties to participate in reconciliation conference. This fits in with American broader policy of helping failed states grapple with governance problems articulated by Assistant Secretary of the African Affairs Walter Kansteiner in senate testimony in February 2002.²⁸⁴ The administration dispatched a special observer delegation led by Lauren Morirty, Director of the State Department's office in East African Affairs to the opening of the Somali reconciliation conference at Eldoret, Kenya. It, however, contributed only \$350,000 to help finance the talks in contrast to EU countries which had born the burden of financing the peace talks. The US representation at the talks has been task of a "Somali watcher" rather than a full fledged envoy. The term "watcher" connotes the low priority the United States attaches to Somalia.

²⁸² Qaran Press, 12 April 2002

²⁸³ See Press Release # 144(01) by the US Mission at the United Nations, New York, 19 October, 2001

²⁸⁴ Jim Fisher-Thompson and Lindsey Brooks ' Eldoret Conference Could Mean Peace for Somalia, U.S. Official says, Washington File Staff Writers, 9 October 2002 at www.somaliwatcher.com/warya/2002/somabpqs/11282.html visited on 22/11/04

The lack of evidence linking Somalia to any terrorist activities had consequences for the position of the American administration in the Somali peace process. There seems little prospect of enhanced engagement in the near future even if Somali government is formed. As One American official put it if no serious threat of terrorism is discovered, no one will give a damn about Somalia.²⁸⁵ The American attention to the Somali peace process was in marked contrast to the interest and attention it gave to Sudan peace. The secretary of state paid a high profile visit to the venue of the Sudan peace process in October 2003 to show American commitment to the process and encourage the parties to reach an agreement. In his press conference with president Kibaki, the secretary hardly mentioned the Somali peace talks. Disappointed by the lax attention of United States and its minimal contribution to the Somali peace talks, Kenya's foreign minister has been calling on United states to show a keener interest and more support for the long-running peace talks being held in Kenya.²⁸⁶

Despite America's disinterest, the Somali peace process played the tune of fighting against terrorism to please America and buy its support. The Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities signed by the faction leaders on October 27, 2002 contains a commitment to combat terrorism.²⁸⁷ The report of the Regional and International Relations Committee, which is the fifth committee of the Reconciliation Committees, highlights cooperation in the combat of international terrorism, mechanism for enforcement, preventive and combative measures.²⁸⁸

Despite its dwindling political commitment to Somalia, the United States, however, increased humanitarian support to Somalia after September 11. From 2000 to 2002, it has provided almost \$60 million in assistance, mainly food, to Somalia through USAID. In fiscal year 2002, for the first time in recent years, the United States also approved Economic Support Funds (ESF) for use in Somalia including \$1.3 million allocated to

²⁸⁵ ICG Africa Report No 45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002

²⁸⁶ Cathy Majtenyl, Kenya Calls on US to Show More Support for Somali Peace Talks, 14 May 2004.

²⁸⁷ See Article 5 of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities, 27 October 2004

²⁸⁸ The Report of the Regional and International Relations (Committee Five), KCCT, Mbagathi, Nairobi, March 2003, pp.14-16

fund basic education.²⁸⁹ The U.S humanitarian assistances targets particular areas such as Gedo regions and towns at Kenyan border where the Islamists had influence in the past which shows that aid is meant to neutralise the areas prone to Islamist influence, and to create a parallel non-Islamic educational programs.

Generally, Somalia does not rank on the top of US foreign policy priorities in the near future. As the evidence of terrorist presence in Somalia fades away, the U.S. interest will further be decreased. The Americans are also enmeshed with other crisis in the world such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although short-term initiatives such as patrolling sea coasts may not be the optimal policies for realising the national security interests of the United States, The United States is avoiding to engage in state-building program in Somalia which is costly and complicated, and it is instead using other multiple sources and factions to help her tackle the problem of the alleged terrorism in Somalia. Somali factions are cooperating with American counter-terrorism agencies in many parts of Somalia. This cooperation already resulted in handing over some suspects who were captured in Somalia to American authorities. Some analysts argue that there are few other alternative options for United States in failed states where things get out of the formal politics and there is no single authority that can be dealt with. Some cynics note that United States is not interested to establish Somali state again, but one analyst rightly contended that in the international politics there are humanitarian services to feed starving people but there are no humanitarian services to build states.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹ Jim Fisher-Thompson and Lindsey Brooks ' Eldoret Conference Could Mean Peace for Somalia, ' U.S. Official says, Washington File Staff Writers, 9 October 2002 at www.washington.com/warj/2002/somali/news/11289.html visited on 22/11/04

²⁹⁰ Interview with Prof. Abdi I. Samatar, Nairobi, 24 July 2004.

EU/ European Countries

The EU has been the most important donor for Somalia during the last ten years. It is represented by the EC Somali Unit which is hosted by the EC Kenya Delegation. The European Union sponsored some high-level intellectual consultations in 1995 which studied menu of options for Somalia's governance. These EU efforts have encouraged decentralised governance system for Somalia and formation of regional governments to serve as "building blocks" for eventual national reconciliation and state building after the failure of the United States and United Nations-led national level peace conferences in Somalia.²⁹¹

The broader EU objectives towards Somalia as spelled out by the 2447th meeting of EU council of ministers are: 1) the restoration of peace and stability in all parts of the country and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of the country, and the rights of the Somali people to determine their own future consistent with the purpose of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2) the establishment of legitimate and effective governance structures; 3) and the promotion of friendly and cooperative relations with other countries in the horn of Africa.²⁹² The Overall long-term objective of the EC strategy for Somalia is to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to the promotion of more peaceful , equitable and democratic society.²⁹³

Apart from the humanitarian interests, EU engagement in Somalia is informed by two major issues; terrorism and refugees. Europe wants to stem unwanted immigration to its member states by creating decent living conditions and job opportunities in the developing countries. Few hundred thousands of Somali refugees are living in Europe causing a heavy financial burden to their hosting countries. The prejudicial influence of

²⁹¹ See an Important Document Which Laid The Foundation For Donor Thinking on Decentralized Political Structures In Somalia, A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options, London School of Economics (London , August 1995)

²⁹² see EU Council of Ministers-General Affairs and External Relations- from the 2447th council meeting , Brussels, 2002 at http://www.somali-civilsociety.org/peaceconference/section3_councilconclusion.asp visited on August 15, 2004

²⁹³ European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia , 2002-2007

alleged terrorists in the failed states like Somalia also motivates the EU to restore Somali state and its social services. According to EU Foreign and Security Policy Chief, Javier Solana, Somalia has not been forgotten by the European Union. EU has been following the reconciliation process and supporting the Kenyan mediation (acting under IGAD Auspices) and maintaining contacts with various parties.²⁹⁴ Solana announced that Europe is ready to offer financial help to the new Somali government. He made this announcement in Addis Ababa where he met the elect-president, Abdullahi Yusuf in October 2004.²⁹⁵

Somalia was a member of Lome Convention, later named Cotonou Agreement which is an arrangement Europe uses to assist its former colonies known as African Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) through development and trade. Being without an internationally recognised national government since the beginning of 1990s, Somalia did not ratify the Fourth Lome Convention and Cotonou agreement and there has been no functioning National Authorising Officer (NAO). The Council of EU ministers adopted a resolution on 18 November 1992 entrusting the Chief Authorising Officer of European Development Fund with the authority of National Authorising Officer, acting on behalf of the Somali government. Hence, EC, the executive arm of European Union manages funds allocated for Somalia under article 93.6 of the ACP-EU partnership agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000.²⁹⁶ It is currently managing 8th and 9th European Development Fund allocated for Somalia which amounts almost 200 Million euro for the period 2002-2007. The financing of the Somali peace talks is partly sourced from these funds and partly from EU bilateral donations.

The EC organised consultative processes for Somali academicians and prominent figures in 1995 to review Menu of Options for Somalia's governance system designed by experts from London School of Economics. These consultative processes recommended the "building block " approach which solidified Somaliland and catalysed the establishment of Puntland and the Ranhanwein Resistance Army's administration of the Bay and Bakol

²⁹⁴ at [http:// www.finsom.com/interview%20about%20Somalia.htm](http://www.finsom.com/interview%20about%20Somalia.htm) visited on 22/11/04

²⁹⁵ BBC Somali Service, 24 October, 2004

²⁹⁶ See European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007

regions in Southwest Somalia. EC also spearheaded the establishment of Somali Coordination Body (SACB), a forum of international Non-governmental organisations, UN agencies and donors which are working in Somalia. One of the major approaches of EC/SACB is the concept of peace dividend which aims to support areas in which basic standards of governance and security are assured to encourage crisis-ridden areas to follow in suit.

EC/EU did not play any direct role in Arta process, but it has taken a more active role in the Somali peace talks in Kenya. Apart from shouldering the larger part of the financing the Somali national reconciliation conference, it has been very active politically in the conference, by providing advice and assistance to the mediation through IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in which EU is a member. EU has been exercising diplomatic pressures on IGAD states to unify their approaches and efforts towards peace process and has been urging them to honour their commitment to a stronger involvement in overseeing and supporting the reconciliation conference.²⁹⁷

EU spectacularly focused on streamlining civil society participation in the institution of good governance and safeguarding space for them. Its support to civil society participation in the process is justified on the basis of the Cotonou agreement's requirement for the engagement of non-state actors at all levels of development including dialogue on policy priorities and through information and capacity building.²⁹⁸ The Cotonou agreement obliges ACP partners to involve non-state actors (NSAs) in the political dialogue, policy formulation, and monitoring and evaluation of progress. Funding by EU and the EC to Somalia is predicated on these principles.

Apart from direct funding the recently concluded peace talks in Kenya, the EC financed three other projects connected to the Somali peace process ; 1) information dissemination strategy within Somalia which was implemented by NOVIB (OXFAM)

²⁹⁷ Declaration by EU Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on violations of the Somalia Cease-fire Agreement. 23 June, 2003

²⁹⁸ Judith Gardner, Final Report on the Evaluation of EC Support to the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation Process. August 14, 2003

and UNDP/IRIN to fill the gap left by IGAD's lack of information strategy to disseminate the details of the conference discussions to the Somali public. NOVIB's intervention targeted the Diaspora through dissemination of weekly situational reports on the process, special reports and regular engagements with core groups in Somalia and the Diaspora. IRIN prepared radio news reports and special radio programs transmitted through their partner radio stations in Somalia.; 2) Support to women's participation through Horn Relief to encourage women's input in the constitution drafting process and strengthen and consolidate the participation of women in the peace process; 3) Technical support to two of the six reconciliation committees, namely the Disarmament , Demobilisation and Reintegration Committee , and the Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Committee implemented by GTZ and WSP respectively. However IGAD did not provide the EC with terms of reference for this support and was subsequently withdrawn.

As with the case in many international organisations, EU, however, was not able as corporate entity to act and speak on behalf of the European countries with regard to the Somali peace process. Individual countries with vested interests pursued their agendas outside the framework of EU principles and objectives which are purely humanitarian. Italy and Britain, both of them being former colonisers of Somalia, are actively involved in the process both at bilateral and EU levels. These two countries are motivated by historical and commercial ties with Somalia. The British government swayed between wanting to give recognition to Somaliland, its former protectorate, and respecting UN and OAU (AU) founding charters which enshrine the territorial integrity of the state borders. Britain which had assigned a senior official from British High Commission in Nairobi to the peace talks tended to encourage the writing of a Federal Charter to safeguard the autonomy of Somaliland. After the conclusion of the Mbagathi process where Abdullahi Yusuf, who is perceived by Somaliland as non-negotiable person, was elected president of Somalia, British government dispatched a minister to Somaliland for the first time to allay their fears and assure them of the British support to their cause.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ BBC Somali service, 25 October, 2004

Before the civil war, Italy had close relations with Somalia. It had one of the biggest commercial banana plantations in Somalia. Somalia had also been a market for Italian products. The banana export in which Italy had been greatest beneficiary was revived briefly after the civil war and was alleged of financing the war. Since there was no central government in Somalia, Italian companies, most notably, Somali fruit, had also benefited for a while from the subsidies given by the European Union to banana sector in Somalia under the Lome Convention (now renamed Cotonou agreement). The agreement offers a number of trade concessions and technical assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries including Somalia.

Italy is the chair of the IPF and it is the biggest bilateral donor and funds projects carried out mostly by Italian NGOs. During the period of the peace conference in Nairobi (2003), Italy was also the rotating president of the EU. Along Germany, Italy has been a leading financial contributor to the process. Italy is the only European country with special envoy to Somalia, but had not articulated its policies very well. It was often criticised by the Somalis and members of international community of not acting in good faith with regard to the peace and stability of Somalia. Its policy is often branded as faceless with no clear agenda. According to one Somali political analyst, "Italians never leave Somalia, nor do they help it meaningfully."³⁰⁰ The Italian NGOs who benefit the largest sum of both EU and Italy's financial support to Somalia are not, in the eyes of the Somalis, accountable.

Italy did not provide leadership on the Somali conflict as other former colonials did in the war-ridden former colonies; French in number of francophone countries, Australia in East Timor, British in Sierra Leone, which led to the end of the civil strife in those countries.³⁰¹ Instead of shaping world opinion towards Somalia, Italy has been deflating the attempts by other external actors so as to maintain its influence not only in Somalia but also in the Horn of Africa sub-region where it colonised Somalia and Eritrea, and briefly occupied Ethiopia. The Italians monopolized Somalia as their sphere influence in the EU often objecting to other countries' involvement in Somalia. Sources close to EU

³⁰⁰ Interview with Abdullahi Shirwa, Mogadishu, May 2004

³⁰¹ Abshir Omar, The Impact of External Political Interventions on the Peace Process: The Case of Somalia, Masters Dissertation in Post-war Recovery studies, The University of York, August 2003. p. 64

told the author that Italy sabotaged EU plan to appoint a senior special envoy to Somalia insisting that the envoy must be an Italian citizen.

Other important European players in Somalia are Scandinavian countries which host a large number of Somali refugees with Sweden hosting 26,000 and Norway 16,000. In 2002, the total aid pledges for Norway, Denmark, Norway and Finland was \$ 20,839,505 mainly allocated for peace and governance oriented programs and basic social services.³⁰² Sweden delegated the deputy of its Kenya mission to support the process. It has also undersecretary in the foreign ministry directly following the process. Swedish involvement was requested by Kenya's special envoy when he met the minister of development and international cooperation in late 2003. Sweden also funds humanitarian programs including the largest education project in Puntland run by Diakonie Sweden, and the activities of Life and Peace Institute which has been working in Somalia since 1992. Swedish donations for Somalia in 2004 amounted to \$ 8 Million.³⁰³ It also funds UN programs in Somalia. The Nordic are the major contributors towards the UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia which is launched every year by the UN agencies operating in Somalia. Norway's minister of development and cooperation attended the inauguration ceremony of the elect-president while the Norwegian prime minister was the first highest European official who met the president after his election.

In general, European Union and European countries have been positive on Somalia's peacemaking efforts. They are spearheading the conceptualisation of Rapid Assistance Program (RAP) for Somalia. The RAP package is meant to avoid the experience of the previous peace initiatives which failed partly due to lack of proactive international engagement to support and sustain the agreements reached. The essential aim of the RAP is to ensure that the new transitional federal institutions survive and to make time and expertise available for more comprehensive plans to be developed. Various meetings had taken place in Rome, London, and the latest one in Stockholm on October 29, 2004 to find ways and means of pooling resources and expertise of the external actors in Somalia

³⁰² Somali Aid Coordination Body Donor Report 2002

³⁰³ interview with Per Lingarde, Deputy Head of the Swedish Embassy in Kenya, 14 October 2004

to support the emerging national institutions from Mbagathi process. The latest donor consultation meeting in Sweden estimated that Somalia needs more than \$250 million to re-establish its government, finance a peacekeeping force and fund the reconstruction of the country.³⁰⁴ Major part of this reconstruction cost is expected to be borne by the European Union.

United Nations

The UN primary objective as stipulated by Article 1 of the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security and disputes likely to endanger the international stability.³⁰⁵ The UN intervention in Somalia in early 1990s has been gauged, at least theoretically, on the bases of preserving international peace and security. The intervention came when a world body was so anxious to realise the objectives for which it was created, and it was led by a Secretary General who took special interest in the conflicts in the third world countries, and particularly in Somalia in which he had an experience as Egyptian minister of State and tried to mediate the Siyad Barre regime and armed oppositions in late 1990s.

After the demise of the UNOSOM II on 31 March 1995, the former UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghalli decided to put in place the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). The office came into existence on 15 April 1995 and was based in Nairobi. UNPOS was charged with the role of keeping alive the interest of the United Nations in the political process in Somalia. The mandate of UNPOS is, inter alia :

- 1) to monitor developments in Somalia as a whole and keep the secretary general informed about the situation in the country;
- 2) to assist the people of Somalia to achieve national reconciliation;
- 3) to liaise with the neighbouring countries and concerned organisations on political developments relating to Somalia to assist the external actors

³⁰⁴ The East African Standard, November 22-28, 2004

³⁰⁵ Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, fourth Edition, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) p.841

on Somalia towards a uniformity of approach in the Somali National Reconciliation Process.³⁰⁶

The United Nations through its Nairobi-based Political Office for Somalia has been closely cooperating with IGAD in efforts to foster national³⁰⁷ reconciliation in the country. The head of the UNPOS represents the Secretary General and serves as a conduit between the Somali Peace Process and the Secretary General and the Security Council which resulted in Security Council Presidential Statements and Resolutions having direct bearing on Somali peace process.

The UN left its imprints on Somali peace process mainly through its resolutions. The Security Council repeatedly called on all states to abide by the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733(1992) of 23 January 1992 and strongly condemned the illegal supply of weapons to recipients in Somalia although the security council never mentioned names of the states who are responsible for the supply of weapons in Somalia until recently when it established Panel of Experts who investigated the matter and came up with a report which mentioned the countries that are exporting weapons to Somalia.³⁰⁸ UN resolutions have legal status but mostly remain recommendations incumbent upon members to comply with. This is because the UN is a union of member states and not a supranational organisation, it has only limited powers to enforce its resolutions. Hence, these statements and resolutions on Somalia have not actually made a difference as the UN was toothless to enforce them. However, the Panel of Experts caused embarrassment to those countries who export arms to Somalia by naming them in their report.³⁰⁹

Although the UN Security Council was not able to impose sanctions on faction leaders that obstructed peace in Somalia as demanded by President Ismail Gelle's initiative and has been expected by the Somali people, its resolutions on Somalia repeatedly reaffirmed the Council's commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence

³⁰⁶ <http://www.unsomalia.net/UNPOS/index.htm>, 17/11/04

³⁰⁷ Report of the Secretary General, S/2002/189, 21 February 2002, Para 64.

³⁰⁸ See the Reports of the Panel of Experts, S/2003/223, 23 March 2003, and S/2001/27, 10 January 2001

³⁰⁹ For Detailed Information on The Countries Supplying Arms to Somalia, See The Report Of The Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant To Security Council Resolution 1425(2002), S/2003/223, 25 March 2003

and unity of Somalia. These resolutions worked as necessary, although not sufficient, guarantee against the designs of the countries to dismantle Somalia into mini-states. They also sealed the fate of Somaliland to solicit recognition from any of the world states.

The UN offers a platform where the Somali agenda is discussed and provided limited technical support to the peace conferences in Arta and Mbagathi. The United Nations General Assembly was used by Djibouti in its 54th and 55th session for the commencement and conclusion of the Gelle's initiative respectively.³¹⁰ Present Ghelle explained and presented his peace proposal to the captive General Assembly to remind the world about the violence, denial of basic human rights and the lack of national governance structures in Somalia. He challenged the international community to find a solution to the only example of a state that went into full coma, for almost a decade, since 1648 when the idea of nation-states was adopted in the treaty of Westphalia. He alerted the International community about the consequences of continued negligence of Somali situation and contrasted the response of the international community in Kosovo to the benign neglect that Somalia was facing.

The legitimising of the interim presidency of Abdulkasim Salad Hassan was also done through the general assembly. His participation at the Millennium summit and the 55th session of the General Assembly gave him the widest acceptance by the world community in general. He had the opportunity to address both the Millennium Summit and the General assembly. He also carried out a number of bilateral contacts with states at the highest levels.

Both the Security Council and Secretary-General backed Ghelle's Arta peace initiatives and issued a number of statements to encourage the peace process and serve as pressure tools on those who were hesitant to join the conference. The Secretary General of United Nations, Koffi Anan, took personal interest in Somali reconciliation processes in Arta and

³¹⁰ Babafemi A. Badejo, Somalia: The United Nation's Role in the Peace Process and Future Commitments. paper Presented at the Som-Can Institute for Research and development/Partnership Africa Canada conference Titled: " Rebirth of the Somali State-Policy Options and Program Opportunities for Canada," Held in Ottawa, Nov 3-4, 2000

Mbagathi . He put the services of the UNPOS and its head, David Stephen, at the disposal of Djibouti for the execution of peace conference successfully. In a speech delivered on his behalf on the occasion of the inauguration ceremony of the elected president, Mr. Abdulkasim Salad Hassan, the Secretary General said "this event is a milestone in the history of Somali people to re-establish Somalia as a member of the community of nations, through an inclusive, consultative process. Having said that the search for peace and prosperity in Somalia would not be smooth, nor would it be achieved. United nations would continue to assist the people of Somalia in their efforts to meet the challenges ahead."³¹¹ Mr. Annan visited Kenya and met with Somali delegates at Mbagathi in July 2004 to boost the process. He appealed to the Somali leaders to rise beyond their differences and stated that Somalia could not afford another false start.³¹² He underlined that Somalis are primarily responsible for making peace in their country, but he reassured them of commitment and support of the international community to Somalis in their efforts to bring peace and stability into their country.

The UN platform was used by TNG to further its legitimacy and bring its uneasy relations with Ethiopia to the attention of the Security Council. The TNG has brought allegations against Ethiopia including occupation of towns in Gedo region, giving arms to groups opposed to the TNG contrary to Security resolutions, recruiting militias in different regions of Somalia, and carrying out diplomatic and media campaigns against Arta and the TNG.³¹³ Ethiopia also used the same UN forums to discredit the TNG and undermine its legitimacy. In the UN forums, Ethiopia labelled the TNG as group of people holed in one hotel and has no legitimacy across pockets in Mogadishu With no authority anywhere.³¹⁴ The elect-president in the Mbagathi conference , Abdullahi Yusuf, also used the UN platform and addressed the Security Council which convened in Nairobi on 18-19 November, 2004. He asked the Security Council to take an urgent

³¹¹ see this information on the UN Political office for Somalia at www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/somalia.pdf

³¹² Meeting of Secretary General with Somali delegates, Mbagathi, Nairobi, 8 July 2004 in which the Author was present.

³¹³ see Statement by the Somalia Prime Minister to United Nations Security Council, 11 January 2001

³¹⁴ Letter distributed as Security Council document, S/2001/325, 4 May 2001.

resolution to deploy peacekeeping force to Somalia. However, the council did not take a resolution on Somalia in this sitting.³¹⁵

Although UN is trying to keep Somalia alive in the reckoning of the international community, it is getting difficult to do that because much of the good will and devotion towards Somalia had been blown during 1992-1995 when UNOSOM with its vast resources and troops failed to restore order.³¹⁶ Somalia is not on the top priority of the UN any more because those who wield power in the world body are no longer interested in Somalia. The major powers in the UN often bring the conflicts and crisis affecting their friendly countries or their former colonies to the attention of the security council, shape the opinion of the UN, and lead operations aiming to solve those crisis, however Somalia remains on fringe of world attention and is not of great concern to any of the powerful countries and members of the security council, therefore it often falls on the Secretary General to inform the security council and offer recommendations about what to do about Somalia.

Having dispirited by the failure of the Arta process in which it had invested a lot of energy, the UN did not take an active role in the Somali Peace Conference in Kenya. The UNPOS is member of IPF observer team and does not have any distinguished status in the process. However, the United Nations Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia has so far raised Four Million US Dollars which contributed by Italy (\$2,775,350), Ireland (\$34,668.65, and Norway (\$836,533.39). The fund is expected jumpstart the new government initiatives in the areas of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ The Standard, November 20, 2004

³¹⁶ interview with Babafemi A. Badejo, Senior Advisor to UNPOS, August 9, 2004

³¹⁷ Babafemi A. Badejo, "Getting it Right this Time" paper presented to Conference of Somalia business Community, Djibouti, 21 July, 2004

African Union

Regional Peace and security is an essential foundation for the African Union. One of the objectives of the Union is to promote peace, security and stability in the continent. The creation of Peace and Security Council reflects the interest attached to this objective by the Union, and is a response to an increasing demand from international community that Africa plays its due role in mitigating conflicts at its own peril. As correctly said by Chairman of the Commission of the African Union, AU is not the OAU. The Constitutive Act of the African Union broke with the OAU charter and provides for the right to intervene in a member state for reasons ranging from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.³¹⁸ The Act gives overwhelming powers for security management. Moving away from the long-standing principles of non-interference of internal affairs of sovereign countries, AU embraced the management of intra-state conflicts and the establishment and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent.³¹⁹ With the African Union in the driving seat, Africa has demonstrated a strong resolve and its security agenda is fast becoming a reality. In the past, the narrow interpretation of sovereignty has created difficulties for OAU in its efforts to formulate procedures for resolution of conflicts between its member states. The crisis of state in Africa has meant that individuals or sectional interest have been able to use the principle of “non-interference” for selfish, rather than national, reasons.

Somalia’s conflict is one of the major challenges the African Union is to tackle to maintain its relevance. The Union has an interest in Somalia’s peace and stability as the Somalia’s conflict is a wound in the continent which can infect the region, and particularly its neighbours.³²⁰

³¹⁸ John Koech, Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD in Makumi Mwagiru (ed.), African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization ((Heinrich Boul Foundation, 2004) p. 125

³¹⁹ International Peace Academy Report by Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, *Africa’s Internal Conflicts: The Search for Response*, March 1992

³²⁰ Interview with Amb. Mohamed Ali Fom, Special Envoy of the Chairman of the Commission of African Union to Somalia.

The OAU engagement in search of peace in the Somali conflict was minimal at the beginning and did not go beyond declarative statements calling Somalia factions to end hostility. It observed most of the peace conference since 1993. When the UN and US peacekeeping operations in Somalia failed, the U.S sought the help of African leaders and the new focus on negotiations took a regional perspective. US policy shift to regional approach in mitigating African conflicts was based on the notion that African leaders who have negotiated democracy at home may be best suited to help Somalis negotiate an incremental return to the rule of government.³²¹ African cultures may also bring a better understanding of Somalia's conflict. The US devoted to help African initiatives as an alternative and less costly way of addressing the crisis of the continent. Thus, the idea that the conflict should be seen in a regional context in which neighbouring countries would have a role to play gained ground. As Warren Christopher noted, "We are going to try to use the African leaders' assistance to provide an African solution to what is really an African problem."³²²

OAU/ AU was supportive to Arta process. It recognised the TNG leadership and decided to give the TNG the Somalia's seat at the OAU in its 72nd ordinary session of the council of ministers of OAU. The OAU urged OAU member states and the wider international community to provide the necessary assistance to support the reconciliation efforts pursued by the transitional national government of Somalia.³²³ The OAU council of ministers and its subsequent summit meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia 5-8 July, 2001 blocked Ethiopian attempts to invite some of its allied faction leaders to 74th session of the OAU and reaffirmed its support to TNG and condemned warlords who persist in their stubbornness in blocking the peace efforts in Somalia".³²⁴

The 10th Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government in Kampala in October 2003 in which the then-chairman of African Union, president Chisano of Mozambique,

³²¹ Mwagiru, M, Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa, paper presented at IRG Conference, Mombassa, Kenya, November 6-9, 1996 p.11 at www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%20PEACE/MwagiruIRG96.html

³²² see *ibid*

³²³ see speech made by the TNG at the 74th Session of the OAU council of ministers held in Lusaka, Zambia, July 2001

³²⁴ see CM/DEC.14(LXXIV) Para 7 & 8

attended had resolved to give the African Union a more prominent role. The Special Envoy of the Chairman of the Commission of the African Union had since been a member of the Facilitation Committee which has been leading the process comprising of representatives from all IGAD member states less Somalia. The inclusion of the African Union in the Facilitation Committee was occasioned by the rifts within the IGAD member states which had paralysed the peace process for almost one and half years. IGAD mandate for Somali reconciliation has been originally given by the AU and that is why AU is legally mandated to intervene in the process unlike the Arab League or the United Nations.

After signing of the Declaration of the Cessation of the Hostilities by the Somali faction leaders in October 2002, AU was called to monitor the ceasefire agreement and Monitoring Committee led by African Union visited the country to explore the possibility of deploying military observers. The 16th meeting of the Peace and Security Council held in Addis Ababa on 17 September 2004 asked the Commission to expeditiously pursue its efforts towards the deployment of an AU peace support mission to support the reconciliation process and DDR process at the appropriate time.³²⁵ The elect-president, Abdullahi Yusuf, asked the African Union to deploy 20,000 African peace keepers. The African Union is currently overstretched and is involved in peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Liberia and Darfur region of Sudan. This compounded by the Financial constraints and the past experience in Somalia with regard to peacekeeping operations may militate against any effective engagement of the African Union in Somalia. The AU's realistic presumed role in the post-Mbagathi period could be to deploy small military observers in the country to monitor the ceasefire signed by the faction leaders at Eldoret conference on 27 October, 2002. The operation may be financed from the Peace Facility Fund which has been provided by the European Union to promote African peace keeping in Africa.

Like the UN Security council resolutions, the AU resolutions sounded rhetorical and did not directly bear on the process. There were threats to impose sanctions on the leaders

³²⁵ see PSC/PR/Comm. (XVI), page 2, see also PSC/AHG/Comm. (X) page 3

and parties whose activities undermine the cause of reconciliation, peace and reconstruction in Somalia, but none of these resolutions have been enforced against those who violated the Ceasefire agreements signed in Eldoret in 2002.³²⁶ The AU through its resolutions always reaffirms the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia and condemned the violations of the UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia, but its member states particularly Somalia's neighbors have often treated these resolutions with disdain.

Unlike other sub-regional groupings of Africa such as SADC and ECOWAS in which hegemonic powers like South Africa and Nigeria are playing an active role and are leading AU stabilization efforts of the crisis in those sub-regions, IGAD has no hegemonic stabilizer which can offer leadership to African Union to embark on stabilization mission in Somalia. Indeed, there is sensitivity within the region and inside Somalia towards the deployments of peacekeepers from the neighboring states since these states are not seen as neutral in the Somali conflict.

³²⁶ see communiqué No. 2 of the Interim Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, 18 March 2003

Hypotheses of the Study Revisited

Hypotheses are tentative answer to research question. It is a suggested explanation of a situation which has not yet been proven to be true. In view of this, the study proposed three hypotheses for testing: 1) The management of peace process by external actors who lack cohesion and unity of purpose, and with incompatible interests is bound to fail; 2) Coordination and cooperation between regional actors enhances prospects for their peacemaking efforts in the region; 3) Internal divergences and polarization of domestic politics are breeding ground for competing external influences which lead to the failure of peace processes and protraction of conflicts.

This section examines the validity of these hypotheses. Hypotheses are untested assumptions and offer tentative answers to the research questions.

Hypothesis One: The management of peace process by external actors who lack cohesion and unity of purpose and pursue incompatible interests is bound to fail.

The evidences put forward by the study confirm this assumption. The management of the Somali peace process has been rocked by lack of cohesive approach within the various external actors. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken since 1991, most of which ended in failure. The failures are partly attributable to lack of cohesiveness within the external and internal actors in the peace process. The Djibouti initiative in 1991 had not been backstopped by the United Nations, United States and Europe to revive the collapsed Somali state as early as possible. Rifts have been apparent between Italy, Djibouti and Egypt, on one hand, who favored moderate and civilian politicians to fill the power vacuum, and Ethiopia and Eritrea, on the other hand, who supported the armed movements, at least tacitly, to take control of the country.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992-1995 has also seen divergences between the UN and US and among the troop contributing countries on nature and conduct of the operation. United States was initially reluctant to use force to

restore law and order and confined its role to delivery of humanitarian assistance to the starving people while the UN preferred power showdown with the warlords and country wide disarmament to be carried by the multinational forces. The UN operation in Somalia was not assisted wholeheartedly by the regional states who might have seen the UN as intruding into Somalia without consulting them properly.

The subsequent attempts by Ethiopia and Egypt have added to the confusion reigning on the Somali peace process. Divergent approaches had been applied towards state formation in Somalia. The most notable differences are concerning the Unitary State versus Building Block approach championed by Ethiopia, and Arab countries respectively. Ethiopia's designs to encourage polarized mini-administrations in parts of Somalia have been resisted by Egypt and other Arab countries.

The lack of cohesion and unity of purpose has played negatively in the latest two initiatives, the Arta and Mbagathi peace undertakings. Both processes had been endorsed by IGAD although the former was single-handedly managed by Djibouti as opposed to the latter that was collectively managed by IGAD member states. The failure of the Arta process was partly attributed to the sabotage by Ethiopia which undermined the Transitional Government which had emerged from the Arta conference. The Somali peace talks in Kenya was also paralyzed for the first one and half years by regional posturing which had deepened and reinforced the divisions within the Somali factions.

Hypothesis Two: Coordination and cooperation between regional actors enhances prospects for their peacemaking efforts in the region

The study has pinpointed that regional cooperation and coordination can bear positively on the Somali peace process. The inclusivity of external actors in the management of the process is essential for achieving peace and stability in Somalia. Indeed, the consensus within the IGAD states which has been achieved in the latter part of the Somali National Reconciliation Process in Kenya had enabled the process to make some strides in a short period and resulted in the formation of parliament and election of the president. Had there

not been some coordination and cooperation of the frontline states, particularly Ethiopia and Djibouti, this relative achievement could have been a distant dream.

Hypotheses Three: Internal divergences and polarization of domestic politics are breeding ground for competing external influences which lead to the failure of peace processes and protraction of conflicts.

The polarization of the domestic politics had rendered the peace processes to fail time and again. Somalia's political leaders had lacked any ideological organization or any sort of institutional structure to articulate their agendas. In fact the proliferation of the political factions had mitigated against the traditional conflict management mechanisms which require the parties to the conflict to be identified and their differences be defined. The Somalia's political environment has been characterized by continuous splintering and shifting alliances. The Somali factions seek external patronage to consolidate their powers, and external influences are often played through them. They are an open book for those who want to use them. For instance, they are conduit for the supply of arms which has been one of the major obstacles to the attainment of peace in Somalia.

Conclusion

The Chapter examined the roles and interests of IGAD member states, Arab countries, United States, European Union, United Nations and African Union which had played some roles in the last two peace initiatives for Somalia; Arta and Mbgathi processes with varying interests and commitments. The analyses show that security concerns both in the short-term or long term are cross-cutting for all actors in the peace process. The neighbouring countries have been particularly affected by the stateless situation in Somalia; small arms proliferations and refugees are some of these problems. This explains their involvement in the peace process both as facilitators and, to some extent, spoilers. Some of the regional states fear that strong Somalia will resuscitate its claims over their territories. For others, restoration of Somali states redresses the power imbalances in the region and offers an element of stabilization in the region.

Somali is torn between IGAD and Arab influence. Influences have been played in the peace process through which the nature of the future Somali state and its leadership is to be determined. Each interested party wants the outcome to be in its favour. Arab countries including the neighbouring Djibouti favour a strong unitary Somali state whereas Ethiopia and the donor community at large including European Union most notably Britain prefer-sometimes for good reasons- a decentralised governance system with federal structures. Cynics note that despite the merits of the idea of creating Somali state through a process of 'building block', the approach is recipe for impairing the Somali unity and polarising Somalia into ungovernable mini-states. The main concern of the Arab countries is to maintain Somalia's Arab identity and restore the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. However, any meaningful role for the Arab countries in Somalia is often constrained mainly by their lack of understanding the micro-politics in Somalia.

The engagement of the European Union is mainly informed by humanitarian concerns. The issues of terrorism and refugees have also motivated Europe to seek peace and stability in Somalia. Europe is the largest donor for humanitarian activities in Somalia.

They supported the latest peace process financially to ensure that there is an enabling environment for their assistance to make a real impact. The two former colonial masters of Somalia, Italy and Britain, have been viewed as being acting outside the framework of the general objectives and principles of the European engagement in Somalia in pursuit of some vested interests. America's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is currently geared towards fighting terrorism. Somalia is currently of low priority for United States. The lack of evidence linking Somalia to any terrorist activities reduces the prospect of enhanced U.S. engagement in Somalia in the near future.

Both United Nations and African Union are mandated to maintain international and regional peace and stability. Their contributions to the Somali peace process are minimal, but their resolutions affirming the territorial integrity of Somalia, condemning the violations of arms embargo and threatening to impose sanctions on those who obstruct peace have served, to some degree, as deterrent for peace spoilers. Both organisations offer platforms where issues concerning the peace process are discussed. The lack of international or regional interested power to guide the efforts of these organisations with regard to Somalia is a constraining factor for their meaningful engagement.

Overall, the chapter suggests that there is a declining interest of the western countries, namely Europe and United States, in the Somalia's peacemaking efforts. In the aftermath of the cold war, it is understandable that non-strategic conflicts in Africa in which significant geopolitical interests are not involved are less likely to attract the attention of the major powers. In contrast, the regional and sub-regional organizations – AU and IGAD in the case of Somalia- are motivated to end the violence and conflicts raging in their spheres of influence as the spillover effects of these conflicts in terms of refugees, proliferation of small arms etc are consequential and immediately felt in the neighboring countries. However, the unstable and polarized political situation in Somalia compounded by the inherent institutional deficiencies of IGAD, lack of political will, suspicions, misperceptions and competing interests within the neighboring states have obstructed the peace process.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion: Major Findings, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Major Findings

The study took a tour into the externally sponsored peace initiatives in Somalia since 1991 when Somali government collapsed. The peace process was long and torturous. It has seen many meddlers and spoilers. The externally sponsored peace processes not only failed to produce positive results, they also delayed possible emergence of a national solution to the Somali crisis. However well intentioned, the record speaks clearly those external peace efforts tend to complicate the Somali crisis. Certain vested interests lay at the heart of the prolonged conflicts and lack of sustainable solutions to the Somali problems.

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There are layers of actors- regional and extra-regional actors- who responded to Somali conflict for different reasons and interests, and with different levels of commitments and consistencies. These include IGAD Member states, Arab States, The United Nations, African Union, United States and European Union. These actors acted out of security, geopolitical, cultural, economic and humanitarian concerns. They took an interest in the conflict or in its management. One cross-cutting interest for all external actors is security. The sub-regional countries, namely IGAD member states, are concerned with the spill-over effects of the Somali conflicts including refugees, arms proliferation and the fear of their internal oppositions getting sanctuaries inside Somalia. For some of the neighbouring countries restoration of peaceful Somalia offers potential market for their products and manpower. For others, viable state in Somalia is bound to redress the regional imbalances and offers an element of stabilisation. There are, however, those who worry that strong Somalia may not go well with their national and regime interests. The Arab league and the Arab countries' interest is to maintain Somalia's unity and identity as an Arab country. Given Somalia's geopolitical position and proximity to Arab countries through the Red Sea, dismemberment of Somali unity exposes more dangers to

Arab commercial and security interests as this is recipe for Ethiopian and Israeli influences. Europe and United States are grappling with refugee and terrorist concerns. Failed states like Somalia are bound to export more refugees and create safe havens for alleged terrorist elements. For the United Nations and African Union, tackling the Somali problem is matter of relevance for their existence. Their primary mandates are the preservation of security and stability in their spheres of influence. These interests and concerns had manifested in the peace processes in different ways. While the sub-regional and regional actors including the Arab countries tried to played instrumental role in shaping the future Somali state and its leadership through the peace processes, European countries and United States are yet to translate their interests into concrete actions of nation-building in Somalia. Overall, there is an emerging realisation that in a globalized world, a failed state is a contagious infection which may spread easily to the rest of the world..

In the light of the above discussions, it is acceptable to describe the Somali conflict as the product of an internal conflict internationalised by circumstances beyond the control of the Somali people.³²⁷ Since external interests entailed contacting one of the parties of the conflict or the other for the purpose of exercising influence, the Somali conflict became internationalised bringing into picture a complex of issues. A pattern of relationships that cross internal borders and enter into the international realm exist in the Somali conflict, and is such internationalised.³²⁸ The relationship between the conflicting parties and their sponsors abroad, colonial relations, weapons and aid resources, the issue of terrorism are, but some of, the factors that internationalised, exacerbated and prolonged the conflict.

A close look at the Somali peace process reveals three major problems which constrain the search of peaceful settlement to the Somali conflict. Firstly, the factions that dominated the political scene in Somalia lacked any coherent political agenda and

³²⁷ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-regional Management of an internal conflict in Africa: An Analysis of the Djibouti Initiative in the Somali Conflict(May-August, 2000) p. 50

³²⁸ To Paraphrase Statement, in Mwagiru, M. Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), P. 58

ideology. They continued to multiply by the day and every peace conference added more players to the political scene. In 1991, four armed movements, namely SNM, USC, SSDF and SPM claimed victory for the ousting of Siyad Barre's regime. In the first Djibouti conference in June 1991, six factions participated. The number reached fifteen in the UN-sponsored conference in Addis Ababa in 1993. Sodere conference in Ethiopia in 1996 increased the number to twenty-six factions. About forty factions attended the Safari Park Consultation in Nairobi in January 2004. Although they are potential spoilers, none of these factions possess a functional hierarchy, represent a coherent ideological position or political platform, or can claim an exclusive representation of a clan or a geographical area (chapter 3). The difficulty of the plans of mediation in Somalia is, on the one hand, to gather all important political actors with power at one table, and on other hand, to give civil society opportunities for participation. The typical diversity of the conflicting parties and stakeholders needed for such inclusiveness can make negotiations much more difficult. At the same time, excluding important actors takes its toll during the implementation phase.³²⁹

A continuing external interest in Somali reconciliation found the "warlords" and faction leaders as willing partners and bestowed legitimacy on them.³³⁰ This enabled them to play a central role in most of the reconciliation initiatives. The externally sponsored peace conferences which enhanced the prestige of the warlords and strengthened their political role left little room for other alternative leaders to emerge. These factions see themselves as the legitimate authority to make decisions on all issues, and perceive all other groups as their 'public'. They want reconciliation, but only on their own terms.³³¹ They hope that their participation in the peace process will give them the option to hold political office and gain access to external resources; but ending the war is not an original goal.³³²

³²⁹ Ulf Terlinden and Tobias Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development, Peace, Conflict and Development-Issue Four, April 2004, p.20

³³⁰ Ahmed Yusuf, Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National government (TNG) after the Arta Peace Process in Richard Ford, Hussein M. Adam and Edna Adan (eds.), War Destroys, Peace Nurtures (Lawrenceville, NY, The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2004) p. 130

³³¹ Khalif Hassan Ahmed, Somali Peace Conference: An Insider's Assessment, September 24, 2004

³³² Ulf Terlinden and Tobias Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development, Peace, Conflict and Development-Issue four, April 2004. p.19

There seems to be no immediate solution to this problem as long as the use of military means continues to be the politics of the day and a way of gaining a position at the negotiation table. Now that violence paid off handsomely to these warlords who became MPs in the Transitional Federal Parliament which had been constituted at the end of the Mbagathi peace process, it remains to be seen whether they will embrace peace over violence, and national interests over parochial and sectional interests.

Secondly, the regional competitions have exacerbated the volatile internal situation and distanced the attainment of peace in the country. Each of the regional states sought a role in the peace process either because it has interest in the conflict or in its settlement. IGAD itself admitted that lack of improvement in the Somali peace process is attributable to the proliferation of parallel initiatives which had supplanted rather than supplementing each other.³³³ The case of Sodere conference (1996) and the Cairo conference (1997) are examples of such contradictions. The latest two attempts, the Arta and Mbagathi, also show the inherent contradictions in the sub-regional management of the peace initiatives (Chapter Three). The strongest indication that the Somali peace process has been hostage to regional considerations came from none other than Ethiopia's prime minister who admitted in his speech at the opening of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference at Eldoret that each of Somalia's neighbors has in various degrees failed the people of Somalia in the past as the coordination of the peace initiatives were just formal and not practical.³³⁴ The regional states are concerned with future relations with Somalia and makeup of the Somali government. Some of them are intensely involved in Somalia and are supporting certain groups to meet their own ends. In particular, Ethiopia increasingly took on an inscrutable and complex role as mediator, regional power and trouble-maker. It has become more and more of a spoiler since 2001 through its open antagonism to the Transitional National Government.³³⁵ It gave just symbolic lip service consent to Arta conference, and then went on to sabotage its outcome by sponsoring internal oppositions

³³³ Hassan Farah Shirwa, The Sub-regional Management of an internal conflict in Africa: An Analysis of the Djibouti Initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August, 2000) p. 103

³³⁴ www.igad.org/library/newsletter/igad%20special%20issue.pdf, see also Daily Nation, October 16, 2002

³³⁵ Ulf Terlinden and Tobias Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development. Peace, Conflict and Development-Issue four, April 2004, p.16

to the TNG. Djibouti reciprocated and resisted Ethiopian domination of the Kenya peace talks.³³⁶

The regional tensions have often been replicated by political cleavages inside Somalia³³⁷. This has become obvious during the Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict when the two countries engaged in proxy wars in Somalia in 1998 which gave new life to the warlord Mafiosi and factional militias in Somalia, undercutting alternative forms of authority.³³⁸ The armed factions usually exploit the differences within the regional actors to get arms and other facilities to consolidate their positions.

Although various measures had been taken to bring about cohesion among the parallel initiatives such as creation of the IGAD Partners Forum and its off-shot committees such as the Standing Committee on Somalia and the Liaison Group on Somalia, regional and extra-regional actors continued to act outside these set frameworks and pursue some unilateral agendas through proxy groups. The latest arrangement in which three frontline states, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia were given a collective mandate to spearhead the Somali peace process did not bring cohesion either in the process. The expansion of the Technical Committee by including it all IGAD member states and renaming it the Facilitation Committee has provided an opportunity for IGAD member states to pool their resources, leverage and expertise together and hammer out a solution to the Somali problem, but that did not please Ethiopia which wanted to monopolise the process. It conspicuously absented itself and stopped to attend IGAD Ministerial Meetings at the appropriate levels.

It remains to be seen whether the apparent consensus and unity of approach achieved at the last part of the Somali peace process among the rival regional actors, particularly between Ethiopia and Djibouti, will be sustained to nurture the nascent government institutions that had been created in Nairobi and move the peace process forward. A

³³⁶ ICG, Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, Africa Report No 59, 6 March 2003, p.3

³³⁷ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, 4 May 2004 p. 18

³³⁸ John Prendergast and Matt Bryden, War and Peace in Somalia and Somaliland, A report of the Center for Strategic Initiatives of women, July 1999 p. 3

strong and unified regional engagement is essential for the success of the government. It serves as deterrent for those who want to shop in the regional differences and make nonsense of whatever agreement reached at the Nairobi talks.

Thirdly, Somalia remains very low on the priority of the major world powers. Neither the United States nor the European Union has shown serious political interest and heavy handed commitment towards the Somali peace process which could have motivated regional states to get their act together. This is in stark contrast to the Ethiopian-Eritrean and Sudanese conflict. Their diplomatic engagement is at level of low ranking diplomats. European Union is represented by EC Somali Unit hosted by the EC Delegation in Kenya and has no special envoy for Somalia. The Europe's concern with issues like refugees and terrorism is obvious, but that has not been translated into concrete actions of nation-building in the case of Somalia. The European Union has been the major financier of the peace talks in Kenya, but its engagement is hardly beyond humanitarian purposes. The United States' diplomacy was geared towards fighting terrorism and does not currently encompass any longer-term commitment to Somalia's stability. It is represented by the 'Somalia Watch Office' based in its embassy in Kenya.

The peace building objectives of both United States and European Union in Somalia are heavily reliant on IGAD as potential peacemaker in Somalia. But given IGAD's lack of adequate leverage and resources in terms of carrots and sticks to induce a settlement in the Somali conflict, it can hardly be expected that peace agreement can work without the engagement of the Western powers in terms of offering the funds needed for the construction of the country, disarmament and demobilization of the combatants and revitalizing economic, social and political institutions which are vital for the peace to hold on. Previous peace initiatives partly floundered due to negligence and lack of high-powered engagements which can wield real influence and provide the carrot and stick incentives for the parties in the conflict to abide by the peace accords.

A recently concluded international donor consultation meeting in Sweden estimated that Somalia needs more than \$250 million to re-establish its government, finance a

peacekeeping force and fund the reconstruction of the country.³³⁹ These resources can hardly be mobilized by IGAD member states who facilitated the process. The concerns regarding the lingering international support for Somalia were raised by President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya in his address to the UN Security Council meeting in Nairobi on 18 November, 2004 when he appealed to the international community to assist in the speedy relocation of the interim government. Ugandan president also reminded the international community that Somalia was of an immediate concern and the security implications of being stateless could no longer be ignored.³⁴⁰ The Security Council, particularly the powerful Western members, showed no indication that they are acquiescing these appeals of the regional heads of the states and the one made by the President Abdullahi Yusuf himself to the Security Council for peacekeepers.³⁴¹ They would rather prefer African Union to lead as it has done in Darfur. But African Union is itself guided by the priorities of the western powers who are currently focusing on Sudan which is going to consume much of the resources contributed by EU and the other donors towards the AU peace facility fund.

Lessons Learned

Perhaps the first lesson to learn from the Somali peace process is that there is no 'quick fix' solution delivered by agreements reached at the high-level talks in foreign capitals. These agreements create misplaced expectations both for the Somalis and the international community but do not result into sustainable peace. Not only has the political will for solution been lacking among the Somali protagonists who are invited to these so far, but freelance militias and the semi-warlords left back home tend to make nonsense of these agreements. This is partly because the participants of the peace conferences have no strong constituencies and do not have control on territories they claim to rule. There is also a communication breakdown between these high-level talks and the masses on whose name peace is made. This why, although Most of the peace

³³⁹ The East African Standard, November 22-28, 2004

³⁴⁰ *ibid*

³⁴¹ Sunday Nation, November 21, 2004

conferences ended in agreements and declared hopes for the Somalis, they were violated sooner than the ink was dry.

A second lesson to reckon with regard to peacemaking efforts in Somalia is the need for Ethiopia's cooperation whose support for the peace and stability of Somalia is essential more than that of any other neighbouring state. As long as Ethiopia continues to behave as hegemonic destabilizer interested in the perpetuation of the conflict in Somalia, peace will be elusive. Addis Ababa regime proved it maintains veto over the peace processes by sponsoring functional polarisation and emergence of mini- structures which are inherently irreconcilable. Many observers think it is unlikely to secure a genuine cooperation of Ethiopia because of its vested interests in Somalia, but now that enough appeasement has been given to Ethiopia which largely dictated the terms of the Somali reconciliation conference in Kenya, it remains to be seen whether any policy shift will occur in Addis Ababa's predisposition towards Somalia.

The third lesson to draw from the peace processes is that the success of external peace initiatives largely hinges on the availability of leadership in the regional and international circles around which all other efforts can coalesce. The availability of hegemonic stabilisers in the ECOWAS and SADC sub-regions have been recognised as facilitating solutions in the conflicts in South and West Africa. Nigeria and South Africa respectively provided the much needed leadership in the stabilisation of the conflicts in their spheres of influence. Britain and France also contributed or spearhead the operations in Sierra Leon and DRC which respectively fall in the Anglo-phone and francophone blocks. In the case of Somalia, neither regional hegemony nor a distant interested power has so far been able to coordinate efforts aiming at bringing peace to Somalia.

Recommendations

Now that the fourteenth Somali peace conference has been concluded in Kenya and new leadership has been elected, there are challenges for both the new leadership and the international community who invested in the process. Needless to say that the critical

test, judging from the previous thirteen conferences, will lie in the quality of commitment and political will of the related groups to implement stability and governance on the ground and, notably, to come to grips with the larger interests of the country.³⁴² The Somali leaders should seek credibility and legitimization from within the country not from outside and through external patronage. There is a limit of what can be expected from outside given the declining international interest in Somalia. They should summon a spirit of repentance. Justice should be the keynote for the new order yet scores ought not to be settled through vengeance. There should be the courage on the part of individuals and communities to ask for forgiveness and by the same token extend to others.³⁴³

The consensus that had apparently emerged within the IGAD member states in the last part of the Somali peace talks created a new momentum and hope for both Somalis and international community. This needs to be consolidated. A continued dialogue within the Arab and IGAD states with the view of resolving regional differences, accommodating legitimate interests and concerns of regional states while putting Somalia's interest at the front is of paramount importance to clear misperceptions and suspicions that had resulted from the past unilateral approaches. The IGAD and Arab states should undertake a collective lobbying in the international circles for Somalia's stabilization in terms of resource mobilization for the reconstruction of the country. The international community should invest in the establishment of the forces of order and justice and actively promote the recognition of the new order by the rest of the world.³⁴⁴

Finally, no one should be complacent that a complete breakthrough has been made in the Somali peace process with the conclusion of the peace talks in Nairobi. The most difficult part of the reconciliation remains ahead. Power sharing is not synonymous with reconciliation. The Somalis and international partners should not relent in their efforts to pursue true peace in the country.

³⁴² Iqbal Jhazbhay, *the Horn of Hope*, Africa Security Review 13(2), 2004, p. 2

³⁴³ *Somalia's Transition: The Role of Senior Professionals and Scholars*, a seminar held in Windsor Club, Nairobi, Kenya, September 20-24, 2004

³⁴⁴ *ibid*

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Map of Somalia

GEOGRAPHICAL MAP OF SOMALIA

