

REFUGEES AND INTER-STATE CONFLICTS IN EASTERN AFRICA; 1960-1996

BY

STEPHEN MWACHOFI/SINGO

THIS THESIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MA 1996  
AND A COPY MAY BE PLACED IN THE  
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of  
Master of Arts in International Relations at the Department of Government, University of  
Nairobi.


FOR USE IN THE LIBRARY ONLY

August 1996.

Afr.  
JX  
4292  
R4556


## DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.



Stephen Mwachofi Singo

This Thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University supervisor



Dr. Amukowa Anangwe  
Senior Lecturer, Department of Government.

## DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents Mr. S. R. Singo and Mrs Juliana Singo as well as my grandmother Meriana for their struggle, their courage, and their sacrifice to ensure that I attained a meaningful level of education.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the University of Nairobi for granting me an opportunity to pursue a Masters degree. I would particularly like to thank the staff of the Department of Government for their selfless dedication to duty even during very difficult times.

I wish to very specially and deeply thank my supervisor Dr. Amukowa Anangwe who meticulously guided me throughout the difficult period of writing this thesis. Dr. Anangwe was to me, more than a teacher. He went beyond his professional duties, besides spending some of his most precious time going through my work. He was always available whenever I needed him. It is obvious to me that without him, this work would probably never have come to this successful end.

I would like to thank a number of other people whose contribution to the writing of this thesis proved phenomenal. My fiancée, Magdalene for her immense emotional and material support. When the going at times proved too rough, she was always there to urge me to go on. Her encouragement and patience kept me going throughout the period of this study.

To Mr. Duncan S. Owiso, his wife Betty and their entire family, I would forever treasure their hospitality. Mr. Owiso's fatherly care and words of wisdom and his general outlook towards life always gave me the motivation to work harder. Special thanks to my great friend, Masumbuko Muhindi who always seemed to "appear" at moments I needed him most. He often told me that I owed it to myself to finish this work successfully.

My colleagues at the Department, G. Kennedy Mokaya, D. Lekupe Kaspol and Owuoche Solomon for their companionship. Mr. Mokaya besides being a close friend was to me the

pace-setter in academics. He never wavered even once in his belief that we would one day successfully "earn" a Masters degree.

Special thanks also to Monica Kathina of Moi University's Centre for Refugee Studies for introducing me to Research Methods. I say thanks again for her close interest in both my undergraduate and postgraduate work, as well as her suggestions and criticism during the initial and final stages of this thesis.

Thanks also to United Nations staff both in Nairobi and Kakuma as well as Government of Kenya officials and all the other fine persons who provided useful data for this thesis. Special thanks to Mr. Maithya Mutua of the Kenya Health Care programme and Mrs. Emma Ogaye of Informatics Partners Africa for helping in the typing of this thesis. I can not forget to thank Mr. D.J. Onyango and Mr. Isaac Barasa both of Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, Utalii House for helping to analyze my data and for their great help during the final stages of this work.

Lastly, but not the least, I would like to deeply thank my parents Mr and Mrs S.R. Singo and my grandmother Meriana for doing everything within their ability to educate me. It is their sheer hardwork even when sometimes it seemed impossible, that has enabled me to go this far academically. I should also mention my late brother Tom, and brothers Harun and Chedi, as well as my sisters Nampojo and Marianne for their encouragement. To Mrs Passy Wasonga, I say "asante sana" for her generous contribution towards the preparation of this thesis. I am most grateful too, to Mr and Mrs M. Muthiga for their confidence and encouragement.

And finally thanks to my son, Singo for being a great source of inspiration.

To all of you, I say God Bless.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Declaration . . . . .	(ii)
2. Dedication . . . . .	(iii)
3. Acknowledgements . . . . .	(iv)
4. Table of Contents . . . . .	(vi)
5. List of Tables . . . . .	(xi)
6. List of Abbreviations . . . . .	(xii)
7. Abstract . . . . .	(xiv)
8. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
1.0 Statement of the Problem . . . . .	1
1.2.0 Objectives of the Study . . . . .	4
1.3.0 Justification and Significance of the Study . . . . .	5
1.3.1 Policy Justification . . . . .	5
1.3.2 Academic Justification . . . . .	6
1.4.0 Literature Review . . . . .	6
1.5 Theoretical Framework . . . . .	12
1.6 Hypotheses . . . . .	20
1.7 Methodology . . . . .	20
1.7.1 Secondary Sources . . . . .	21
1.7.2 Primary Sources . . . . .	21
1.7.2.1 Sampling . . . . .	22
1.7.2.2 Refugees . . . . .	23
1.7.2.3 Local People . . . . .	27

1.7.2.4	Opinion Leaders	29
1.8	Data Analysis	29
1.9	Definition of Concepts	30
1.9.1	Conflict	30
1.9.2	Refugee	30
1.9.3	National Security	31
1.9.4	Eastern Africa	32
1.10	Research Problems	32
1.11	Endnotes	33
9.	CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS IN THE RELATIONS OF EASTERN AFRICAN STATES	42
2.0	Introduction	42
2.1	Conflicts in Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania Relations since Independence.	43
2.2	Conflicts in Uganda-Sudan Relations	62
2.3	Suspicious, Tensions and War in Somali-Ethiopia Relations, 1960-1980	66
2.4	Conflicts in Kenya-Somalia Relations: 1963 - 1980	70
2.5	Tensions and Conflicts in Kenya-Sudan Relations in Mid 1980s and 1990s.	74
2.6	Conclusion	77
2.7	Endnotes	78



10.	CHAPTER THREE: THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN EASTERN AFRICA. . . .	84
3.0	Introduction. . . . .	84
3.1	Background to the Refugee Problem in Eastern Africa. . . . .	85
3.2	Refugee Population in Eastern Africa : Origin and Destination . . . . .	88
3.3	Conclusion . . . . .	100
3.4	End Notes . . . . .	101
11.	CHAPTER FOUR: REFUGEES AND INTER-STATE CONFLICTS IN EASTERN AFRICA . . . . .	104
4.0	Introduction . . . . .	104
4.1	Refugees as the Cause of Conflicts in Uganda-Tanzania Relations: 1971- 79 . . . . .	105
4.2	Refugees as a Key Contributing Factor to Conflicts in Kenya-Uganda Relations: 1980-1995 . . . . .	113
4.3	Refugees and Conflicts in Uganda-Sudan Relations since Independence. . .	123
4.4	Refugees as the Significant Source of Tensions in Kenya-Sudan Relations: 1985 - 1995 . . . . .	132
4.5	Endless Tensions in Sudan-Ethiopia-Somali Relations since Independence: A Function of Refugees. . . . .	137
4.6	Refugees and Conflicts in Rwanda-Burundi Relations and their Neighbours. . . . .	145
4.7	Refugees and Conflicts in Kenya-Somali Relations since Independence . . .	151

4.8	Conclusion . . . . .	153
4.9	Endnotes . . . . .	155
12.	CHAPTER FIVE: REFUGEES AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF A HOST COUNTRY: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA . . . . .	161
5.1.0	Introduction. . . . .	161
5.1.1	Kenya's National Security Interests. . . . .	161
5.1.2	Study Area and Population. . . . .	162
5.2.	The Pre-Refugee Security Situation in Kenya. . . . .	164
5.3.1	General Information about the Respondents. . . . .	173
5.3.2	Relationship between Refugees and Local people. . . . .	176
5.3.3	Physical Safety of the People and their Property. . . . .	178
5.3.4	Illegal Weapons, Drugs and Illicity Brew. . . . .	181
5.3.5	Subversion . . . . .	187
5.3.6	Environmental Destruction. . . . .	189
5.3.7	Business Activities. . . . .	193
5.3.8	Rivalry between Refugees themselves. . . . .	195
5.3.9	Riots and Arson . . . . .	197
5.3.10	Other Issues of Concern . . . . .	198
5.4	Implication to Kenya's Relations with Her Neighbours. . . . .	200
5.5	Conclusion . . . . .	201
5.6	Endnotes. . . . .	203

13. CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 205

6.0 Introduction ..... 205

6.1 Summary of Findings ..... 205

6.2 Policy Recommendations ..... 213

14. BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 218

15. APPENDIX ..... 229

## LIST OF TABLES

### Chapter Two

Table 2.1	Level of Kenya's Military Expenditure (ME), Arms Imports (AI) and size of her Armed Forces (AF), 1975-83 . . . . .	53
Table 2.2	Uganda's Trade with Tanzania, 1969-1982 (value in US\$ M) . . . . .	60
Table 2.3	Tanzania's Trade with Uganda, 1969-1982 (value in US\$ M) . . . . .	61
Table 2.4	Kenya's exports to and imports from Somalia, 1965-70 and 1976-85 (K£000) . . . . .	73

### Chapter Three

Table 3.1	Estimated Number of Refugees in Eastern Africa by December 1972 . . . . .	92
Table 3.2	Number of Refugees in East Africa; 1979 . . . . .	93
Table 3.3	Estimated Number of Refugees in Eastern Africa: August 1983: . . . . .	95
Table 3.4	Estimated Refugee Numbers in Eastern Africa as of December 31st 1990 . .	97

### Chapter Five

Table 5.1	Major Crimes known to the Police, 1985-93 . . . . .	166
Table 5.2	Annual Out-patient Morbidity Statistics for selected years and Areas . . . . .	168
Table 5.3	Annual Out-patient Morbidity Statistics, 1992-1993 for Turkana District and Nairobi Area . . . . .	169
Table 5.4	AIDS Cases by District of Reporting Site . . . . .	171

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>GOK</b>	-	<b>Government of Kenya</b>
<b>RPF</b>	-	<b>Rwanda Patriotic Front</b>
<b>OAU</b>	-	<b>Organisation of African Unity</b>
<b>UNO</b>	-	<b>United Nations Organisations</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	-	<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>
<b>SPLA</b>	-	<b>Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army</b>
<b>SPLM</b>	-	<b>Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement</b>
<b>LRA</b>	-	<b>Lords Resistance Army</b>
<b>PFLP</b>	-	<b>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</b>
<b>EAC</b>	-	<b>East African Community</b>
<b>IMF</b>	-	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>WSLF</b>	-	<b>Western Somalia Liberation Front</b>
<b>NFD</b>	-	<b>Northern Frontier District</b>
<b>UNLF</b>	-	<b>Uganda National Liberation Front</b>
<b>KANU</b>	-	<b>Kenya African National Union</b>
<b>FEM</b>	-	<b>February Eighteen Movement</b>
<b>FERA</b>	-	<b>February Eighteen Resistance Army</b>
<b>KBC</b>	-	<b>Kenya Broadcasting Corporation</b>
<b>NRA</b>	-	<b>National Resistance Army</b>
<b>NRM</b>	-	<b>National Resistance Movement</b>
<b>HSM</b>	-	<b>Holy Spirit Movement</b>
<b>DTM</b>	-	<b>December 12th Movement</b>

<b>ELF</b>	-	<b>Eritrean Liberation Front</b>
<b>USA</b>	-	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>USSR</b>	-	<b>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</b>
<b>SDSF</b>	-	<b>Somali Democratic Salvation Front</b>
<b>SNM</b>	-	<b>Somali National Movement</b>
<b>NGO</b>	-	<b>Non-Governmental Organisation</b>
<b>AIDS</b>	-	<b>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</b>
<b>STD</b>	-	<b>Sexually Transmitted Disease</b>
<b>DC</b>	-	<b>Disctrict Commissioner</b>
<b>DO</b>	-	<b>District Officer</b>
<b>OCPD</b>	-	<b>Officer Commanding Police Division</b>
<b>WFP</b>	-	<b>World Food Programme</b>
<b>ME</b>	-	<b>Military Expenditure</b>
<b>AI</b>	-	<b>Arms Imports</b>
<b>AF</b>	-	<b>Armed Forces</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

Conflict between and among states is an important characteristic of interstate relations. Usually the consequences of inter-state conflicts are often very costly. For this reason, states in the international system have shown a lot of concern in understanding the factors that breed conflicts among them with the aim of establishing mechanisms for managing or reducing such conflicts. Indeed, many scholars have concerned themselves with the subject of inter-state conflict and its causes. In Eastern Africa, the problem of inter-state conflicts has persisted since the 1960s and the causes are many. This study seeks to address this problem.

The main objective of the study is to undertake a careful examination of the impact of refugees upon inter-state relations in Eastern Africa. It seeks among other objectives, to demonstrate whether or not refugees have been responsible for tensions and conflicts in the relations of Eastern African states. The study has largely been motivated by the existence of a serious theoretical gap, manifested by the existence of little or no studies that have been carried out to explain the critical causes of inter-state conflicts in the sub-region. In order to address the problem fully, we have adopted the national interest approach of the power theory and argued that, perceived national interests of states, particularly the pursuit, protection and promotion of key national security interests are principal determinants of the manner in which states behave towards each other. The main hypotheses of the study include: That refugees have impacted negatively upon relations of Eastern African states; That refugee population in Eastern Africa increased during the period covered by the study, that is 1960-1995 and that refugees in Kenya have had a negative impact upon Kenya's national security interests.

As a background of the study, an attempt is made to demonstrate that relations between Eastern African states have been conflictual, followed by a careful examination of the nature

and causes of the refugee problem in the sub-region. The study then goes on to show that indeed, refugees in Eastern Africa have been largely responsible for the tensions and conflicts that have characterized relations among states in the sub-region since independence in the early 1960's. It is also shown through the findings of an empirical investigation that refugees in Kenya have not only seriously hurt her national security interests, but have also threatened those of their home states. Finally, the study presents a summary of findings and recommendations.

Among the findings of the study are that, first, refugee numbers in the sub-region increased throughout the period covered by the study. Figures for various years are shown which clearly demonstrate that there has been a steady rise of refugee population in the sub-region. Second, refugees have been the most single important source of conflicts between and among Eastern African states. It was also found out that although an increase in refugee numbers tended to result in increased tensions between states, even a single individual refugee could be a source of bitter conflicts between two or more states. Third, refugees in Kenya have had a negative impact upon Kenya's national security interests and those of their home countries and have, therefore caused strains upon Kenya's relations with her neighbours. The study recommends that, first, Eastern African states should work towards eradicating conditions that give rise to massive influx of refugees into neighbouring states. Second, the host states in Eastern Africa in collaboration with UNHCR should come up with appropriate and timely measures aimed to monitor and bring under control, refugee movements once the refugees start flowing into the host country. Third, host states in Eastern Africa that abate subversive activities by refugees within their territory must willingly stop. Fourthly, a piece of legislation should urgently be put in place preferably by the U.N. outlining the activities that refugees within the host states should engage in and those that they should not, with the



host state being empowered to enforce this piece of legislation and not UNHCR. Fifthly and finally, regular meetings should be held between Eastern African leaders, especially the respective chief executives to iron-out any differences that might arise among them whatever the causes of such differences.

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.0 Statement of the Problem**

Conflict is an important characteristic of inter-state relations. Within the Eastern African sub-region and other sub-regions in the world, patterns of conflict have prevailed in response to specific factors and circumstances at specific times. A conflict situation in the international system may be defined by the existence of two or more states with mutually incompatible goals or values. Necessary to a conflict situation is that nations are aware of these incompatible values, an incompatibility usually demonstrated by some issue or issues arising between them, like a border dispute, the repayment of foreign debts, the nationalisation of foreign property, aid to a subversive movement, distribution of economic aid, self-determination among others.<sup>1</sup>

Emminent international relations scholars such as James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff have observed that conflict is a universally ubiquitous and permanently recurring phenomenon within and between societies.<sup>2</sup> This implies that conflict is a common feature in the relations of states. Inter-state conflict may either be of a low-density or high density nature. Low-density conflict situation does not involve violence. It may involve exchange of hostile political utterances between leaders and officials of two or more states, expulsion of diplomats and severing of diplomatic relations, closure of common borders, harassment and arbitrary arrest of foreign citizens, cross border incidents of cattle rustling, diplomatic protests, reduced volume of trade, significant reduction in the exchange of visits between leaders and cross-border movement of citizens among other important indicators. High density conflict situation involves violence and war between the states concerned and is characterised by extremely costly consequences. Death and destruction of property stand out as the most severe. Among

states embroiled in a high density conflict, hostilities remain very deeply rooted hence, little or no interaction whatsoever. The point to note here is that conflict between states may be violent or non violent (in terms of physical force), dominant or recessive, controllable or uncontrollable, resolvable or insoluble under various sets of circumstances.<sup>3</sup> But whether violent or non-violent, inter-state conflict, more often than not, tends to have consequences that are largely negative particularly among the states that are party to the conflict. These negative consequences are what makes conflict an important feature of inter-state relations and, hence, a subject of concern to international relations scholars.

In Eastern Africa, inter-state relations have mainly been characterised by low-density conflicts. Since independence, cross border interactions between and among a good number of states within the sub-region have exhibited prolonged periods of intense low density conflicts. Throughout 1970s and during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, relations between Kenya and her western neighbour, Uganda, remained conflictual as demonstrated by accusations and counter-accusations by leaders of both states. Kenya's relations with Sudan also deteriorated rapidly at the beginning of mid 1980s. Indeed, in 1989 Sudan expelled a number of Kenyan diplomats from Khartoum as hostilities heightened.<sup>4</sup> Conflicts also marked Kenya's relations with Somalia, her eastern neighbour for much of 1960s and 1970s and it was only in early 1980s that relations between the two states started to improve.

Bilateral relations between Uganda and Sudan have also remained extremely tense since independence upto the present day. The two neighbours have never really stopped harbouring deep suspicions and hostilities against each other since their independence. Evidence of this conflict abounds. For well over two decades also, Sudano-Ethiopian relations remained deeply strained as were Ethiopian - Somalia relations. Tanzania's relations with Uganda also

deteriorated rapidly in the 1970s. Relations between Rwanda and her twin neighbour Burundi and their neighbours in Eastern Africa have also remained very shaky.

High density conflicts in the sub-region have been relatively few. Remarkable ones include the 1978 - 79 Tanzania - Uganda war during which Tanzania send<sup>t</sup> troops into Uganda to help Ugandan rebels to topple Idi Amin's government. The other high density conflict was symbolised by the 1976 - 1980 war between Ethiopia and Somalia commonly referred to as the Ogaden war. This was largely occasioned by Somali irredentism.

In Eastern Africa, both low density and high density conflicts have had severe consequences. The most telling include reduced trade interactions leading to very low economic growth levels particularly in several states in the sub-region, negative implications with regard to regional political and economic integration, specifically the break-up of sub-regional politico-economic bodies such as the East African community, severing of diplomatic relations as has been the case between Sudan and Uganda and worst of all loss of life and destruction of property. These and other negative consequences imply that conflicts constitute a serious threat to peaceful coexistence among states and the benefits that go with such coexistence. Conflict therefore is a problem which states must address themselves to. Indeed, inter-state conflicts must be resolved wherever they arise and measures must be taken to prevent them from arising in the first place. A number of studies have been carried out analysing inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa. These studies have been diverse in methods, time frame and states included in the analysis.<sup>5</sup>

The persistence of the problem of inter-state conflicts in the Eastern African sub-region has necessitated this study. It is noteworthy that a multiplicity of factors whether singly or collectively help to bring about these conflicts. Indeed, Robert Lieber has correctly remarked that the causes of conflicts between states constitute the primordial question in the study of

international politics.<sup>6</sup> This is because if conflicts are to be resolved, or stopped from recurring, then a thorough understanding of the factors that breed such conflicts is extremely necessary. Our study, therefore focuses on the persistence of inter-state tensions and conflicts in Eastern Africa and the role of the ever increasing number of refugees in the sub-region as a factor in these conflicts.

The study undertakes a careful examination of conflictive relations between and among states in Eastern Africa, and centres on the impact that refugees, who have fled their home countries into neighbouring states have had upon such relations. The central question that this study aims to find answers to is whether or not refugees have been responsible for conflicts and tensions that have been manifested in the relations between and among Eastern Africa states. The study covers the period immediately after independence, that is from the early 1960s upto the mid 1990s.

### **1.2.0 Objectives of the Study**

- 1.2.1 This study seeks to achieve the broad objective of examining the impact of refugees upon inter-state relations in Eastern Africa. Specifically, the study seeks to:
  - 1.2.1.1 Demonstrate that conflict has been an important characteristic of inter-state relations in the Eastern Africa sub-region.
  - 1.2.1.2 Examine the origins, nature and magnitude of the refugee problem in Eastern Africa.
  - 1.2.1.3 Illustrate the extend<sup>e</sup> to which refugees have been responsible for tensions and conflicts in the relations of Eastern African states.

1.2.1.4 Suggest possible solutions to the problem of refugees with a view to minimizing or possibly eradicating inter-state conflicts particularly in the Eastern Africa sub-region.

### **1.3.0 Justification and Significance of the Study**

This study is justified by its policy and academic significance.

#### **1.3.1 Policy Justification**

A study addressing itself to inter-state conflict and aiming to propose solutions to such conflicts is justified particularly by the high costs such conflicts inflict upon the peoples and leaders of the states concerned. Of great significance is the desire for peace and the benefits associated with it in the contemporary international system.<sup>7</sup> Research on the nature and causes of conflict between states helps to bring about a better understanding and new insights into the problem making it easier for statesmen and policy makers in general to be in a position to manage inter-state conflicts and thereby reduce their costs. A study like this is rendered important and therefore justified by its relevance and usefulness to policy makers in Eastern Africa who must make informed decisions that are beneficial to their people and the sub-region as a whole. The study findings and recommendations, it is hoped will go along way in providing policy makers in Eastern Africa with alternative ways through which they can view the problem of refugees as a major source of inter-state tensions and conflicts in the sub-region and how the policy makers and leaders themselves can, having acquired a better understanding of the problem, work towards arriving at sound and effective solutions. It is also hoped that this study may prompt Eastern African policy makers to re-examine their national security policies in the face of an increasingly volatile and unpredictable environment.

### **1.3.2 Academic Justification**

This study is also justified by the lack of a detailed, incisive and systematic analysis of the place of refugees as an important factor in the relations of Eastern African states. Evidence suggests that there has been a dearth in studies on the role of refugees in inter-state relations in this sub-region and indeed, the few that have been carried out have not focused on the role refugees have played in inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa. Put another way, it is a fact that the mere presence of thousands of refugees in most states in this sub-region, and the social, economic and political implications of their activities and the subsequent impact of those activities upon inter-state relations in the sub-region, has largely escaped any meaningful attention by scholars for a very long time indeed. This is what our study seeks to investigate and by so doing, add new knowledge onto the little that is presently available.

### **1.4.0 Literature Review**

The literature on inter-state relations in Eastern Africa is enormous. Regional integration, conflict resolution and management, political economy and public administration are some of the major issues that scholars of political science have addressed themselves to. A number of scholars have undertaken studies on inter-state conflict in various parts of Africa in general. Others have identified factors responsible for such conflicts,<sup>8</sup> and still other scholars have isolated certain specific factors as key explanations or causes of specific conflict situations in Africa in general and in Eastern Africa in particular.

According to the literature reviewed, the causes of inter-state conflicts vary in nature and degree. Daniel K. Orwa <sup>9</sup> has identified what he considers as leading causes of conflict in African inter-state relations. In his view, the main causes of inter-state conflict in Africa fall under two clusters. The first cluster, Orwa observes, includes domestic sources of inter-state

conflicts. These are ideology, military coups and civil wars. The second cluster comprises territorial disputes, natural resources, decolonization and what he calls the military factor. Orwa classifies this second cluster as external sources of inter-state conflict. He proceeds to briefly examine each of the causes he has identified. What is conspicuously lacking however, is an analysis of the refugee problem as an important facet of inter-state relations in the continent. Orwa has only just mentioned that refugee problems are a cause of conflict in African inter-state relations. Although this is a very important acknowledgement, the late Professor has failed to identify specific conflict situations and examined them against the background of the presence and activities of refugees. He has not shown exactly how refugees bring about conflict between states.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, Orwa has tended to over-emphasise the role of ideology and military coups as sources of inter-state conflicts in Africa while at the same time failing to bring to the fore the fact that military coups may create refugees who, in turn flee into neighbouring states where they may engage in activities that are detrimental to relations between the refugees' home countries and the host state. Orwa's study also fails to address any specific sub-region in Africa. We find it too generalised and "shallow" not so much for its tendency to draw examples from across the continent but for its lack of in-depth analysis of causal factors that cannot be ignored in a study addressing itself to causes of inter-state conflicts in Africa. One such factor is the refugee problem.

Other scholars who have analysed relations between specific states in Eastern Africa and have sought to explain factors responsible for tensions and conflicts in their relations include Humphrey Tirimba<sup>11</sup>. In his study, Tirimba has argued that Kenya's frequent conflicts with Uganda can be explained by a number of factors which include: economic factors, certain Uganda's internal political developments and finally the disintegration of the East African Community. His thesis is that these factors form the basis of the conflictive and



co-operative relations that have characterised Kenya's relations with Uganda since independence. Our strong feeling however, is that these are not the only causal factors of the sometimes bitter conflicts that have been a major stumbling block to the two state's peaceful interactions. In his analysis of political developments in Uganda and their impact upon Kenya-Uganda relations from 1970 to 1989, Tirimba has mentioned that Kenya and Uganda quarrelled during different times between 1987 and 1989 over support to subversive groups threatening the security of either state. Kenya accused Uganda of supporting "MwaKenya" dissidents in 1987 while Uganda complained bitterly about Kenya's alleged support to Ugandans threatening to overthrow the Ugandan Government during various times until 1989. But while Tirimba's analysis is correct and successfully brings out his argument, he has failed to acknowledge that thousands of Ugandan refugees who fled to Kenya during the turbulent years of Idi Amin's dictatorship and the chaos in that country in mid 1980's upto and after Museveni seized control of the reigns of power cannot have failed to significantly affect the relations of both neighbours. Besides, Tirimba's thesis covers the period upto 1990. A study that spreads to the early and mid 1990's is important particularly because political events in both Kenya and Uganda during this period have had a strong bearing upon their bilateral relations. We have in mind political refugees within both states whose presence and activities had by 1995 resulted to a dramatic deterioration of relations.

Another scholar who has studied interstate conflict among Eastern African states is Cathryn Hoskins.<sup>12</sup> Hoskin's study is limited in terms of time-frame. It covers only a small portion of the independence period of Eastern Africa States, and is confined to only three out of the more than seven states within the sub-region. More importantly, the study, whose main contention is that Somalia's irredentism occasioned conflict between the three neighbours, fails to appreciate other significant factors at play during the period covered by the study. Among

these factors include ideology and external, indeed Western interference which fuelled the conflict. Somali refugees in Ethiopia and vice versa, and the activities of "shiftas" in North Eastern Kenya certainly cannot be ignored if we are to have an adequate understanding of the causes of conflict between the three states not only during the 1960s but also throughout the 1970s and beyond.

Closely related to Hoskin's work is the study done by Korwa-Adar <sup>13</sup> in the mid 1980s. Adar focused on Kenya-Somali hostilities of late 1960s and 1970s and his central argument is that Somalia's threats to annex Kenya's North-Eastern province and Ethiopia's Ogaden region was the root cause of conflict between Somalia and Kenya on the one hand and Somalia and Ethiopia on the other. This finding echoes that of Hoskins. But while Adar's finding is correct, we wish again to point out that territorial disputes and self-determination considerations are not the only factors that explain ups and downs in Kenya's relations with Somalia. Infact, a study that shades light to the post 1980 period and the nature of relations between the two states is highly desirable particularly because this is the period when self-determination concerns and Somali irredentism are no longer significant factors.

Another scholar who has studied inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa is Samuel Makinda.<sup>14</sup> His study covers Sudan, Somalia Ethiopia and even Kenya. He has argued that outside actors who have tried to exert influence in the sub-region for strategic purposes have adversely affected relations between the states in the sub-region. He identifies Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Iran, Israel etc.<sup>15</sup> Other major actors according to him include the former Soviet Union which had a military presence in Somalia between 1963 and 1977, and the USA which has maintained access to military facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan since 1980. Makinda also addresses the issue of Somali irredentism. But his main argument is that the presence of super powers in the Horn of Africa led to escalation of tensions and conflicts

among states in the region as each super power supported one party to the conflict in line with its strategic considerations. The role of socio-economic factors in the conflictive relations among Horn of Africa states is however not addressed by Makinda in his work. Indeed, Makinda seems not to have considered the fact that super power involvement may only have fuelled an already volatile situation whose roots lay elsewhere. Besides, Makinda's study stretches upto mid 1980s and as we have noted, focuses on an entirely different aspect of inter-state conflicts in the Horn. Makinda has also pointed out that civil war in the Sudan has been a key determinant of tensions between Sudan and her neighbours Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. He says, "by 1983, Ethiopia relations with Sudan were again strained and Sudanese President Gaafar Numeiry was openly accusing Ethiopia (and Libya) of involvement in Southern Sudan.<sup>16</sup> Thus Makinda acknowledges quite accurately the role of rebels as formentors of trouble between states. However, he fails to isolate and carefully study the problem of refugees (who also constitute rebels) and its relevance in the conflicts characteristic of inter-state relations in many parts of Africa.

Other scholars such as Kiondo,<sup>17</sup> Okoth<sup>18</sup> and again Orwa<sup>19</sup> who have written on inter-state relations in East Africa have failed to give refugees the prominent place they deserve as main causes of strain upon the peaceful cooperation and interaction of East Africa States namely Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. While each of these writers has concerned himself with foreign policy issues (Orwa on Kenya, Okoth on Uganda and Kiondo on Tanzania), it seems to us that their respective works are incomplete without adequately highlighting the role Ugandan refugees in Tanzania and Kenya, Kenyan refugees in Uganda and Tanzania etc have played in the recurring conflicts and tensions between and among these states since independence. Even in his other works, Okoth<sup>20</sup> has not seen it fit to give his full attention to the issue of political refugees and their impact upon Kenya-Uganda relations. His study

also fails to address conflict with regard to other Eastern African states which interact with Kenya and Uganda economically, politically and socially.

An examination of the literature on refugees reveals that no meaningful study has been carried out to analyse the influence of refugees specifically on inter-state relations in Eastern Africa. Writers such as Holborn,<sup>21</sup> Hamrell,<sup>22</sup> Hatch<sup>23</sup> and Amate<sup>24</sup> have examined the causes of refugee movements in Africa in their respective works. Holborn and Hamrell argue that internal civil war in a number of African states, power struggles among opposing groups in specific states, religious persecution as has been the case in Sudan between Northern Arabs and Southern Christians and animists, inter-ethnic rivalry as exemplified by Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi among other causes, are all contributing factors to mass exodus of refugees in Eastern Africa. Political instability as indicated by coups, plots, political violence and other forms of public disorder,<sup>25</sup> they argue, have given way to huge movements of refugees in parts of the African continent. Amate, while also conceding that these factors are key causes of refugee movements in Africa, has made a general overview of the refugee situation in the continent during the 1980s. He has also identified leading refugee problems and suggested possible solutions to such problems.<sup>26</sup> But like his colleagues, Amate has failed to appreciate the fact that refugees do not always strengthen relations between their home countries and the host states. More often than not refugees are a recipe for hostilities, tensions and conflicts between their states. This is one key element which these scholars have failed to address.

Other scholars such as Nobel,<sup>27</sup> Kibreab,<sup>28</sup> Bulch<sup>29</sup> and Goldschmidt and Boech<sup>30</sup> have produced works on refugees and development examining how refugees have contributed to the development efforts of a number of African countries and exploring various ways by which refugees can be assisted so as to better their lives. These studies have also variously

recommended ways and means of integrating refugees into the ways of life of the local communities in the countries of Asylum. Like the first group of writers discussed above, this group fails to highlight the consequences of the activities of refugees (whose number rose to over 700,000 in some Eastern African states at one point in time) <sup>31</sup> on inter-state relations in the sub-region.

Yet other scholars such as Atle Grahl Madsen, <sup>32</sup> Nobel <sup>33</sup> and Goodwin-Gill <sup>34</sup> among others have looked at legal issues concerning refugee protection, refugee rights and refugee problems. Again this group of scholars has not studied refugees and inter-state conflict.

Overall, this brief literature review reveals that, although literature on interstate relations in Eastern Africa is abundant and so is literature on refugees in the sub-region, wide gaps exist in such literature. Gaps which have to do with the fact that the impact of refugees in Eastern Africa, as many as they have been, has lacked any meaningful attention among scholars. This study therefore attempts to fill this academic gap by providing an incisive, in-depth and systematic analysis of the role refugees have played in the social political and economic relations of Eastern African states namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Of particular concern is the place of refugees in conflicts that have continuously characterised interstate relations amongst these neighbouring states.

## **1.5 Theoretical Framework**

A theory has generally been defined as a body of internally consistent empirical generalisations of descriptive predictive and explanatory power.<sup>35</sup> The main uses of a theory is to explain, describe and predict phenomena. Stanley Hoffman has defined contemporary theory of international relations as a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to

discover the principal variables to explain behaviour and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national units.<sup>36</sup>

Whereas there are many appropriate theories that can be used to explain the problem of conflict in inter-state relations, it is our considered opinion that care must be exercised so as to choose a theory that would fully address the various dimensions of the problem being studied while at the same time emphasising the focus of the study. It is with these considerations in mind that we adopt the national interest approach of the power theory as propounded by realist scholars for this study. Foremost among prominent and well-known proponents of the power theory are scholars such as Hans Morgenthau,<sup>37</sup> Nicholas Spykman,<sup>38</sup> George Kennan<sup>39</sup> and Richard Niebuhr<sup>40</sup>. Realist scholars like these we have named argue that all nation-states within the international system seek to achieve, retain and maximise power. They contend that international relations is basically about the pursuit of power by nation-states. The central argument of realist scholars is that the world is a competitive place where nation states compete with one another for survival. Their contention is that competition arises when nation-states pursue what individual statesmen (read political leaders) regard as the core national interests of their respective states. But what is pursued and regarded as being in the national interests of one state may as well not be in the interest of the other. This is what results into a conflict situation. Often, conflict ensues when states seek to maximise their power at the expense of other states through pursuing national interests that have negative consequences on the national goals and objectives of other states.

In his definition of the national interest, Hans Morgenthau has noted that national interest is a compromise of conflicting interests. It is not an ideal arrived at scientifically but is rather a product of constant internal political competition.<sup>41</sup> In his view, international politics is a process in which national interests are adjusted. According to him, " The concept of the

national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world for the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary it assumes continuous conflict and threat of war to be minimised through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action." <sup>42</sup>

Realist scholars contend that domestic politics and policies are reflected in the external behaviour of states. This external behaviour is defined by the pursuit of what statesmen consider as being in the national interest of their state. Within the international system, states consider security as one of the most important aspects of their national interests. As such, the pursuance, promotion and maintenance of national security is a major pre-occupation of nation-states especially in their interaction with one another. According to Beaton, all governments seek security for their country and people.<sup>43</sup> It is no doubt a key element of what is seen by many states as constituting an important national interest. Among Eastern African states, the importance attached to national security as the central convergence of all the major national interests is reflected in the pronouncements of national leaders and policies pursued by the respective states. It is this single aspect and its importance as pursued by states in this sub-region that we find explains most adequately, the problem under study.

As a concept, security lacks a precise definition. This partly explains why various scholars have offered a plethora of definitions of the concept often depending on the ends they seek to achieve. For our purposes, national security is taken to mean the pursuit (by states), promotion and protection of what is considered to be core national values. National security is here understood to encompass general stability, peace and tranquillity within a state or even amongst a group of states. It has to do with the absence of threats to the physical well being of the citizens and the safety of their property. It is also seen as the protection of the privileges and positions of those in power. In this context, statesmen assume that as leaders

they have a duty not only to safeguard the well being of their people and that of their state from any internal or external threat or even actual attack from within or without, but also to protect their positions of power and privilege in society. Indeed, some scholars such as David Singer and other critics of the power theory have argued that more often than not, what is regarded as the national interest is infact the interest of those few people who have the control of a state's power. They seek to propagate their own personal interests under the guise of the national good.<sup>44</sup> Our concern, however, is not with investigating the basis of this criticism. It is evident that states seek to maximise their security through a multiplicity of ways. These include through the safeguarding of their independence, their territorial integrity, the safety and general well-being of their citizens, the protection of the political, social and economic way of life of the people among others. This is actually seen in the light of the broader objective of survival in a competitive, conflictive world. From the foregoing we can argue that states will act promptly and forcefully to any threat or perceived potential threat to their national security or to any other specific national interest(s).

Arnold Wolfers has correctly observed that nations are called upon to give priority to national security and thus to consent to any sacrifice of value which will provide an additional increment of security.<sup>45</sup> Regardless of the power and resources of an adversary, a nation state, it is assumed, will resist in some way, any action that would be prejudicial to her vital national values. Luard has noted that interaction between states will be affected not only by the values and objectives which they hold or perceive, but by the means they adopt to secure these.<sup>46</sup> This he says, means that between nations there may often emerge a conflict of expectations.<sup>47</sup>

The national interest approach allows us to assume that if refugees exert a negative impact upon certain national interests of states in Eastern Africa or are perceived as posing a threat



to such interests, then the threatened state will take appropriate measures to defend and or enhance those interests that are threatened. A situation of conflict will then ensue between the state(s) whose interests are being threatened and the state (s) which is home to the refugees. More specifically, the theory permits us to hold the view that if refugees in Eastern Africa are seen to perpetuate acts that are detrimental to or threatening national security interests of a state(s) in the sub-region either through their mere presence or their activities, then we can safely predict that the threatened state(s) will move swiftly to contain such a threat(s) and by so doing, is likely to enter into a conflict with the refugees' home state. Based on the assumptions of the national interest approach, it can be argued that if Eastern African states guided by their national security interests pursue uniform and therefore inevitable policies with regard to their security, then they are unlikely to conflict. On the other hand, if such national security interests pursued differ and run parallel to each other, then conflict ensues.

Luard has further remarked that the most important of the basic ends that serve governments as general and long term goals of their states are survival and security.<sup>48</sup> He notes that their weight can be measured somewhat by the dominant and consistent place that policies designed to secure them have assumed in the foreign policies of states. Those policies, we must stress, if in consistent with and perceived as running counter to the national values and objectives of their neighbouring states, a condition of conflict is inevitable.

Beaton has rightly noted that states do not seek some absolute level of security. They seek what they calculate will be reasonable likelihood that they can design and operate their own institutions in their territory.<sup>49</sup> It is when the pursuit of this reasonable level of national security is threatened either by forces within the state or external to it that hostilities arise. In our case, refugees resident in some Eastern African states and others that have fled from

those same states have been a main source of conflict between and among states in the sub-region.

We have noted that the attainment of an adequate level of national security is the objective of every state. We must add that because the means of attaining national security pursued by one state may not always be compatible with those of other states, conflicts often arise. We must also emphasise that, the national security of a state may be influenced by a number of factors. Some of the most critical factors influencing national security include a state's armed forces,<sup>50</sup> its leadership, its neighbours, the foreign nationals resident within it, its own citizens residing outside its borders, natural disasters such as famine, earthquakes etc. These factors may have a profound effect upon a state's security in a specific period of time whether singly or collectively. The result is either to weaken or strengthen that security. In Eastern Africa, all these factors have been at play, and have each influenced the national security of states in the sub-region. Such influence does not necessarily have to be uniform.

A highly disciplined and well equipped armed forces capable of striking back forcefully in case of an attack enables a state to defend her territory and guarantee the physical safety of her citizens.<sup>51</sup> A strong armed force may also act as a threat to the security interest of a neighbouring state(s) and may be used to intimidate a militarily weaker state. In this way, it becomes a source of conflict. Such a situation is compounded if the stronger state pursues expansionist policies.<sup>52</sup> The political leadership of a state acts mainly to safeguard national security. At the same time it acts to safeguard and maximise the power of those in control. The means by which these objectives are achieved range from the formation of alliances with neighbouring leaders to the manipulation of local citizens and foreigners through propaganda, intimidation and even force.

Foreign citizens are more often than not a threat to the national security concerns of both their hosts and their home states. The role and importance of refugees with respect to the national security of both the host and the country of origin of the refugees cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, the presence and activities of refugees, rebels, guerrillas, bandits, smugglers and other categories of foreigners may have serious repercussions on the security of the leaders of a state and that of their subjects. Refugees, rebels and other foreign citizens are seen as undermining the national security of their home states when they are suspected to or actually engage in armed attacks, subversive activities, hostile utterances and propaganda and other activities that are considered to have a negative impact on the national security interests of their home states. This is one reason why nation states maintain permanent armed forces to defend themselves if and when attacked. But Harbeson argues correctly that there are also occasions in which armed forces have been prompted to act largely by their own interest group demands and not necessarily for the protection of national interests.<sup>53</sup> Examples in Africa include Togo in 1963, Central Africa Republic in 1966, several times in Nigeria, among others. On the other hand, they are seen to undermine the national security of their host states through the pressure they put upon the environment and other meagre resources, their activities that may be in direct contrast with the legal procedure of their host state, their influence on the culture of the local population which may be regarded as alien, among others.

Whereas threats to a state's national security interests may be numerous, our concern lays with refugees and how their presence and their activities impinge upon inter-state relations among Eastern Africa states. Based on the national interest approach, our assumptions are that the mere presence of refugees within Eastern African states is a major cause of alarm to other states in the sub-region, and hence a source of conflict between host and home state. Another assumption is that some of the activities refugees engage in while in the host country

are perceived as threatening national security interests of both their home state and the host state. We also assume that states are particularly sensitive to threats directed at their leadership positions and will therefore mobilise national resources to defend their own interests at the pretext that whatever is under threat is actually the national interest. Such resources may include strengthening of the armed forces through beefing up recruitment and purchase of arms. Other ways may involve alliance formation, peddling of hostile propaganda to shape public opinion on matters perceived as being of national importance even if, in fact they are not. Sometimes propaganda may be used to divert public attention from national and international issues considered "sensitive and dangerous" to the public. This has happened in most countries in Eastern Africa. We further assume that refugees particularly in Eastern Africa, antagonise relations between their home countries and the countries of their asylum. This they do in various ways, including through subversive activities, armed attacks and other related activities that are seen as promoting general insecurity amongst the citizens and their leaders. Finally, we assume that national security considerations as aspects of national interests pursued by Eastern African states explain most adequately the tensions, suspicions, hostilities and conflicts that have continued to be a major characteristic of their inter-state relations particularly when viewed against the background of the refugee problem. In other words, the assumption is that refugees have threatened or interfered with certain specific national security interests of these states, and by so doing, have stirred conflicts among them.

As is the case with every theoretical framework, the national interest approach of the power theory we have adopted in this study has its weaknesses. Critics of the approach have pointed out that realist scholars have failed to offer sufficient definition of the concept of national interest. They further argue that realists have failed to offer a convincing explanation of who is actually charged with the responsibility of formulating the national interest.<sup>54</sup> Most

behavioralist scholars notably David Easton, who comprise some of the most ardent critics of the power theory argue that most concepts advanced by realist scholars are vaguely defined and lack precision. They also posit that the theory is rather outdated and must be discarded in favour of other "modern" theories such as behavioralism, post-behavioralism, functionalism etc. Their position is rather understandable given that they are themselves key proponents of these approaches they are terming "modern".

We believe however, that its weaknesses notwithstanding, the national interest approach of the power theory is still a very important practical and useful theoretical tool. It therefore remains, in our view, the most appropriate for purposes of explaining the problem this study seeks to address. This then is the primary reason for our choice of this theory among the numerous theoretical approaches we initially considered for this study.

## **1.6 Hypotheses**

This study collected data to test the following hypotheses:-

- 1.6.1 That relations between Eastern African states have been marked by conflict.
- 1.6.2 That refugee population in Eastern Africa increased during the period covered by this study, viz 1960 - 1995.
- 1.6.3 That refugees have impacted negatively upon the relations of Eastern African states.
- 1.6.4 That refugees in Kenya have had a negative impact upon Kenya's national security interests.

## **1.7 Methodology**

This study utilised both secondary and primary sources of data.

### **1.7.1 Secondary Sources**

The findings contained in the first four chapters of this study relied exclusively on data obtained through secondary sources. Library research formed the main method through which published and unpublished works were obtained. These included books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, seminar papers, public documents, United Nations reports and documents, theses, encyclopaedias, and other relevant documents considered useful to this study. These were read and carefully analysed. Most of these were obtained in various libraries within Nairobi, in United Nations establishments in and out of Nairobi and institutions of higher learning also situated within and out of Nairobi. The Kenya National Archives, and newspaper publishers such as the Nation Group of Companies among others, were other important sources of the newspapers and magazines used to extract data for this study.

### **1.7.2 Primary Sources**

This study also made use of primary sources of data. Data collected using primary techniques was used particularly to test hypothesis four and is presented in chapter five of this study. To collect this data, an empirical investigation was carried out in two locations in Kenya. To suit the purposes of the study, the areas had to have significant numbers of refugees. We therefore decided to choose Turkana district and Nairobi area. The reason for this choice was that Turkana district is home to several thousand refugees housed at Kakuma refugee camp, which is situated in Kakuma division, 120 Kilometres North-west of Lodwar town. Another reason for choosing Kakuma refugee camp as opposed to other refugee camps in the country was that, Kakuma housed refugees from many nationalities such as Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi e.t.c. On the other hand, Nairobi, being the

capital city of Kenya is also home to thousands of unregistered refugees from various nationalities. Overall, it was felt that Kakuma refugee camp and its environs as well as Nairobi area were suitable sites for this study because they both housed a sizeable number of refugees from different nationalities in the sub-region and were relatively cheaper to access compared to other areas with refugees in the sub-region and which had similar characteristics.

Our study population comprised of three categories namely:-

- refugees,
- local people living close to refugees, and
- opinion leaders (mainly GOK officials and NGO officials working in Turkana and Nairobi areas).

A sample of 120 refugees was drawn, 80 from Kakuma refugee camp and 40 from within Nairobi. Another sample of 150 local people was obtained. Of these, 80 were from in and around Kakuma refugee camp and the other 70 were drawn from various residential estates in Nairobi. 15 opinion leaders were selected, 8 from Turkana and 7 from Nairobi. It was felt that, this sample size was representative enough when viewed against the total study population. Explained below is how the actual sampling was carried out.

#### 1.7.2.1 Sampling

According to Bailey <sup>55</sup> the main advantages of sampling is that it can be highly accurate and saves time and money. Another main advantage is that by using a sample, the researcher can keep a low profile for he or she does not offend as many people as he would by interviewing the whole population.<sup>56</sup> It must also be borne in mind that the sample must be truly representative of the population being studied. Otherwise, the sample is of no use.<sup>57</sup>

It is with this in mind that we applied the following sampling techniques so as to arrive at the actual respondents we interviewed for this study.

#### 1.7.2.2 Refugees

The total refugee population at Kakuma refugee camp at the time of this study was approximately 35,000. These had been registered by the UNHCR. Out of these, we needed a sample of 80 refugees. For purposes of adequate representation, the sample of 80 refugees had to contain refugees from each of the nationalities of concern to us. These were Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Burundi. In addition, the sample had to reflect the population of each of these nationalities such that, the actual respondents had to be proportional to the total population of each nationality.

This researcher had intended to use the stratified sampling technic to group the various refugees into stratas according to their nationalities. On arrival at the camp however, he found out that this had already been done by the camp authorities for administrative purposes. Thus, refugees from Sudan lived separately in the camp from those from Ethiopia, Somalis lived in different quotas from Rwandese etc. The researcher also learnt that the camp authorities maintained a register of all refugees housed in the refugee camp. There were a total of 35,000 refugees. Of these, about 30,000 were Sudanese (due to proximity of the refugee camp to Kenya-Sudanese border), 1500 were Ugandans, 1200 Ethiopians, 1000 Somalis, 600 Rwandese and 400 Burundians. There were another 300 refugees of mixed nationalities including Zaireans, Mozambicans etc. We had decided to take a sample of 30 Sudanese, 18 Ugandans, 12 Ethiopians, 10 Somalis, 6 Rwandese and 4 Burundians. It was felt that this number was representative enough, given that the population of each group of nationalities varied considerably from one another.



Another important finding which helped us when it came to the actual sampling procedure was that, in each strata comprising a particular nationality of refugees, the camp authorities had divided each strata into what they termed as "sectors". In total among the Sudanese strata, there were 6 sectors each having about 5000 refugees. The camp also maintained a list of names of every strata. Among the Ugandan strata were two sectors, each comprising about 750 Ugandan refugees. Again there were lists of names of refugees in each sector. Ethiopians were divided into two sectors also, each with 600 inhabitants, while Somalis lived in three sectors each with about 300 inhabitants, within the Somali strata. A list of names of refugees in each sector was also maintained as in all other cases. The Rwandese strata was divided into two sectors as well, each with 300 Rwandese. Burundi's strata, like the rest of them was also demarcated into sectors. They were two in all and each had about 200 inhabitants. Lists for them were also kept.

To obtain the specific respondents that we interviewed from each strata, use was made of the systematic sampling technique. For the Sudanese, a sampling interval of 1000 was obtained by taking the total number of refugees i.e 30000 and dividing it by the actual sample size of 30 refugees (i.e  $30000/30 = 1000$ ). As is required by the systematic sampling technique, we proceeded to select every 1000th name in the register of 5000 in each sector. This way, 5 names were obtained from each of the six sectors in the Sudanese strata and a total number of 30 respondents was obtained. With the help of the community leaders in charge of the various sectors, this researcher identified the houses where the particular individuals chosen lived and proceeded to interview them.

Among the Ugandan refugees, the same sampling technique was utilised. The sampling interval was found to be 83 (i.e  $1500/18$ ) and every 83rd name on the list of each sector was picked. This way, a total of 18 respondents were chosen.

The same systematic sampling technique was employed to choose actual respondents from Ethiopian, Somali, Rwandese and Burundi refugees. For the Ethiopians, the sampling interval was found to be 100 (i.e 1200/12) hence, every 100th name on the list was picked and a total of 12 names obtained. Among the Somali, the sampling interval was also 100 (i.e 1000/10) and therefore, every 100th name on the lists representing the three sectors was picked, a total of which were 10. The sampling interval in the case of Rwandese refugees was 100 (i.e 600/6) as was that for Burundians (i.e. 400/4). Every 100th name on each of the Rwandese and Burundian register for each sector was picked. This way 6 Rwandese and 4 Burundian respondents were included in the sample. At the end of the exercise, a total of 80 respondents were selected. This was our sample size. Where the respondent chosen was found to be a minor, or could not be traced, a replacement was found, preferably from the same household. Maximum care was taken to ensure that nobody appeared in the sample twice. Again community leaders helped in locating the actual respondents included in the sample.

Unlike in Kakuma refugee camp, the main problem this researcher encountered in sampling refugees in Nairobi was that refugees in the city are neither registered with the UNHCR, the Kenya government or any other body, nor do they live together in a particular area of the city. They are scattered in different parts of the city, in estates, markets, slums etc. For this reason to identify a single refugee is indeed a very hectic endeavour. However, this problem had been anticipated. The total population of refugees in Nairobi is unknown. The Kenya government estimated it to be around 100,000 in 1993 while the UNHCR maintains that the figure is no more than 20,000.<sup>58</sup> What is not in dispute is the fact that a large number of refugees from various Eastern, Central and Southern Africa states resides in Nairobi city. The majority of them are however, from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, and Rwanda.

This researcher had the advantage of having a long time Sudanese friend, who by the time of doing this research was a refugee and lived in Nairobi's Hurlingham area. He was one of the Sudanese respondents. Through him, this researcher was introduced to no less than 10 other Sudanese refugees living in various parts of the city. We required to interview 8 Sudanese. With regard to Somali refugees we wished to interview 13. Our first task was to visit Garissa Lodge in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi, which has a large population of Somali and Ethiopian refugees. Frequent visits eventually enabled this researcher to get acquainted to a Somali businessman who agreed to be interviewed. He also made it possible for this researcher to get to meet more than 20 other Somali refugees. Thus, it became possible for us to obtain the 13 respondents we required for our purposes. Because Somalis live together with Ethiopians and do business together in Eastleigh, some of the Somali refugees we spoke to had close business links with their Ethiopian neighbours. As such, we were also able to meet and engage in lengthy discussions with many of them. This way, within a period of two weeks, we had managed to interview no less than 12 Ethiopian refugees.

The Ugandan refugees proved the most difficult to identify and interview. Some of them who had been pin-pointed to us, refused to admit that they are refugees. Eventually, this researcher decided to visit a large quarry near Embakasi. After explaining his case and the purposes of his study to the personnel manager, he learned that the company actually had three Ugandan employees who, following a request by their boss, accepted to give an interview to this researcher. One of them was not available, but the two who were, not only filled in the questionnaires provided, but also gave a lot of other relevant information. The two other Ugandan refugees interviewed were found in Busaa drinking places in Soweto village.

Contrary to our expectations, it proved much easier to locate Rwandese refugees. A relative of this researcher who lives in Komorock estate offered to help because his next door neighbour was a Rwandese refugee who had escaped from Rwanda following the civil war of 1994. Through her, this researcher managed to meet four other Rwandese refugees living in the same estate and one whose home is in South C estate. A total of four were chosen and interviewed. The one Burundian refugee interviewed also lived in Komorock estate. This way, we managed to obtain our sample of 40 refugee respondents residing in Nairobi.

#### 1.7.2.3 Local People

With regard to local people living close to refugees in Kakuma refugee camp, we chose to gather information from those people working for NGOs operating in the camp, and living either within the camp or outside it in the nearby market, business people in Kakuma market, employees of nearby institutions such as the hospital and schools and finally indigenous Turkanas living in "manyattas" near the camp. We had a sample size of 80 local people. Ten of these were chosen among the employees of NGOs; 5 living within the refugee camp and 5 living in the market. Simple random sampling technique was used whereby the names of all NGO employees operating in Kakuma, who reside within the premises of the camp were written down on pieces of paper. These were folded and were put into a small basket and thoroughly shuffled. Five pieces of paper were picked one after another. The people whose names were contained in the pieces of paper picked constituted the actual respondents. The same procedure was followed with regard to employees residing outside the refugee camp. This way a total of 10 respondents were identified and interviewed. The other 10 respondents were chosen from among employees of the local hospital and the high school nearby, all of

whom reside within Kakuma market or within the compounds of these institutions. Systematic sampling technique again was found to be the most appropriate because those institutions maintained lists of their employees. We needed 5 respondents from each of the two institutions. The hospital had about 60 employees. Therefore the sampling interval was calculated to be 12 (i.e.  $60/5$ ) and thus every 12th name on the list of hospital employees was picked and 5 respondents identified. The school had 38 employees including teachers and subordinate staff. The sampling interval was found to be 7 and every 7th name on the list was picked. In this manner, our 5 respondents were again chosen. At the end of the exercise, we chose 10 respondents.

In sampling our shopkeepers and businessmen respondents, we divided Kakuma town into five clusters each consisting about 10 business premises including shops, kioks, butcheries etc. From each, we picked any two of them and proceeded to interview the business owner. Purposive sampling technique <sup>59</sup> was used to obtain 50 respondents from among the indigenous Turkanas. This technique was favoured because the researcher could easily use his judgement about which respondents to choose <sup>60</sup> and also helped him save time and resources. The indigenous people (Turkanas) live in "Manyattas". There were about seven such manyattas situated near the camp. The researcher hired the services of two assistants (locals) who acted as interpreters between him and the respondents and who knew the area well. Permission was obtained from the chief and the headmen in charge of each manyatta. For purposes of representation, respondents were drawn from all the seven manyattas. A total of 50 were interviewed.

With regard to sampling local people living close to refugees in Nairobi, use was also made of the purposive sampling technique where the researcher used his own judgement about which respondents to choose. The researcher picked respondents from areas with high

concentration of refugees, such as Eastleigh, Komorock, Kayole, Hurlingham, Soweto etc. To ward off suspicion from the respondents, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the University of Nairobi and a permit from the office of the President and where necessary informed the chief of the area he intended to visit about his objectives.

#### **1.7.2.4 Opinion Leaders**

The opinion leaders interviewed for this study were persons considered to have very useful information for the purposes of this study by virtue of their various positions or standing in society. More importantly, they had to be people with a sound knowledge of the security situation in the country, as well as the position of refugees with regard to such security, or insecurity. A total of 15 opinion leaders were interviewed and were drawn from both Turkana district and Nairobi area. They included high ranking government officials in charge of provincial administration, senior police officers, senior officials of UNHCR and a number of other NGOs operating in Kakuma refugee camp. Of the 15, 8 were picked from Turkana district and 7 from Nairobi. Most of them did not wish their identities to be revealed and for this reason, they shall remain anonymous. Suffice it to say that they provided very useful information for this study.

### **1.8 Data Analysis**

Data obtained from secondary sources was carefully read and critically analysed and the patterns of relationship between the dependent and independent variables were established and recorded. The data collected from the field using primary sources was analysed using qualitative data analysis techniques. The aim was to obtain descriptive statistics such as

percentages, frequencies, cumulative frequencies etc which were used to present the findings of the field research.

## **1.9 Definition of Concepts**

A number of concepts have been used in this study which require operational definition.

These include:-

### **1.9.1 Conflict**

The term conflict has different meanings to many people. There is no one single definition of the concept which is acceptable to all people. To scholars such as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,<sup>61</sup> the term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals. Michael Nicholson notes that a conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually, inconsistent.<sup>62</sup> According to Nyaduwa Odhiambo<sup>63</sup> "people" and "group of human beings" also include their collective institutions, organisations and nation-states. In this thesis, we adopt these two definitions of the term conflict. Emphasis is however, placed on nation-states and their leaders.

### **1.9.2 Refugee**

This thesis shall adopt two definitions of the term refugee:-

- (a) The term refugee shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular

social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.<sup>64</sup>

- (b) The term shall also apply to any person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.<sup>65</sup>

### **1.9.3 National Security**

Scholars are generally divided as to what the concept security entails. There is no single, universally agreed definition of the concept. Some scholars see security as concerned mainly with the ability to mobilise a military attack, deter or defeat.<sup>66</sup>

For our purposes, security is given a broad meaning. It is seen in economic, social, military and political dimensions. National security is understood in this thesis to mean the protection, pursuit and promotion of core national values. These values include independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and a political and economic way of life. National security also entails the absence of adverse factors that threaten these core values, including the physical well-being of the people, their leaders and their property and also encompasses the general stability and peace of the people.



#### **1.9.4 Eastern Africa**

By this we mean countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi.

#### **1.10 Research Problems**

This researcher encountered a number of problems during the time of this research. First there was the problem of lack of co-operation by some Government officials particularly in-charge of security. The senior police officers interviewed were unwilling to avail to this researcher, certain police records. The alternative solution to this problem was to use national crime statistics instead of district statistics which we could not obtain. There was also the problem of identifying refugees in Nairobi. However, this was solved through establishing links with some refugee businessmen and using some friends who introduced us to some refugees in the city. Inturn these refugees introduced other refugees whom we interviewed.

## 1.11 Endnotes

1. R.J. Rummel, The Dimensions of Nations (Beverly Hills, California: Sage publications inc, 1972). p. 377
2. R.L. Pfaltzgraff and J.E. Dougherty, Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1990), p. 183.
3. Ibid. p. 187.
4. See chapter four of this thesis for more details of this conflict.
5. N. Odhiambo, Summitry System as a Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Eastern Africa (Nairobi: Unpublished M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1990), p.5.
6. R. Lieber, Theory and world politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), p.89.
7. For a definition of "International system" see Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty op. cit., pp. 136  
159.
8. I. W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated edition) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1 -15.

9. D.K. Orwa, "The causes of conflicts in the Relations of African States" in J.C. Ojo, et al, African International Relations (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 129 - 130.
10. Ibid. p. 130.
11. H.M. Tirimba, "Conflict and Cooperation. Antecedents of Kenya - Uganda Relations; 1964 - 1990" (Nairobi: Unpublished M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1991), entire work.
12. C. Hoskins, Case studies of African Diplomacy 2: The Ethiopain - Kenyan-Somali Dispute 1960 - 1967 (Dar-es-salaam: Oxford University press, 1969).
13. K.G. Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principles of Territorial Integrity as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963-1983" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universty of Southern Carolina, 1987), entire.
14. S. Makinda, Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. (London: CroomHelm, 1987), pp. 18 - 27.
15. Ibid. p.1
16. Ibid. p.42

17. A. Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy; The socio-economic context" in W. Oyugi, (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992), pp. 331 - 358.
18. G.P. Okoth, "The Foreign policy of Uganda Toward Kenya and Tanzania" in Oyugi, (ed), op.cit., p.300.
19. Ibid. pp. 297 - 330.
20. G.P. Okoth, Intermittent Tensions in Kenyan-Uganda Relations Historical perspective. seminar paper No.6 Presented at the Department of History , University of Nairobi, March 8th 1990.
21. L.W. Holborn, Refugees: A problem in our time. The work of the U.N High Commissioner for refugees 1951 -1972 (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press Inc, 1975), pp. 825 - 855.
22. S. Hamrel, (ed), Refugee Problems in Africa (Upsalla: The Scandinavian Institute of Africa Studies, 1967), p.9.
23. J. Hatch, "Historical Background of the African Refugee Problem' in Refugees South of the Sahara, H.C. Brooks and Y. El ayouty, (ed) (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities press, 1970), pp. 1 -17.

24. C.O.C. Amate, Inside the O.A.U: Pan-Africanism in practice (London: Macmillan publishers, 1986), pp. 459 - 475.
25. R.H. Jackson and C.R. Roseberg, "Why Africa's weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Judicial in Statehood" in World Politics, Vol XXIV, Oct 1981 July 1982, p.1.
26. Amate, op.cit p. 475
27. P. Nobel, (ed) Refugees and Development in Africa, Seminar proceedings No. 19 (Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), pp. 1 -30
28. G. Kibreab, "Rural Refugee Land Settlements in Eastern Sudan: On the Road to Self Sufficiency" in Refugees and Development in Africa P. Nobel, op.cit., pp 63 - 72.
29. M. Bulch, "Sociological and Economic Factors in Refugee Integration: The case of Ethiopian Exiles in the Sudan" in Nobel, op.cit., pp. 73 - 88.
30. E. Boeche and A.M.F. Goldschmidt (eds), Refugees and Development (Baden-Baden, Berlin: Vertagsge - sallschaft, 1983), pp. 15 - 50.
31. For details on refugee numbers in Eastern Africa, see chapter III.

32. Atle Grahl-Madsen, "Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition",  
in Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees, Michigan Year Book of International Legal Studies (New York: Clack Boardman Company Ltd, 1982),  
pp. 65 - 85.
33. P. Nobel, "Refugees, Law and Development in Africa" in Michigan Year book of international legal studies (New York: Clark Boardman Company Ltd, 1982), pp. 255- 281.
34. G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1983), pp. 127 - 140.
35. T. Couloumbis and J. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1986), p. 29.
36. S. Hoffman, "Theory and International Relations", in International Politics and Foreign Policy. 2nd edition R.N. Rosenau (ed) (New York: Free press, 1969), p.30.
37. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New Delhi: Kalyani publishers, 1991), p. 1 - 25.
38. N. Spykman and A. Robbins, "Geographical objectives in foreign policy" in American Political Science Review XXXIII. June 1939 p. 392.

39. G.F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 48.
40. H.K. Davis and R. Good, Reihold Niebuhr on Politics; His Policital Philisophy and its application to our age as expressed in his writings pp.60.
41. Morgenthau, op.cit p.68.
42. H. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States", American Political Science Review LXVI, Dec 1952, p. 961.
43. L. Beaton, The reform of power (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), p.9.
44. This practice of leaders pursuing personal interests in the name of the wider national interests finds alot of examples in many African States. Take the case of former Ugandan and Central African Republic dictators, Idi Amin and Jean-Baptiste Bokasa. What these men and many others of their ilk in Africa did was to use all in their power to intimidate, kill and keep at bay anyone be it a national or an outsider from interfering with or threatening their leadership.
45. A. Wolfers, "National security as an ambiguous symbol", in R.J. Art and R. Jervis, International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision Making (2nd ed) (Toronto: Little Brown and company, 1985), pp. 82.

46. E. Luard, Conflict and peace in the Modern International System, (London: University of London Press, 1970), p.34.
47. Ibid. p. 4.
48. Ibid. p. 31.
49. Beaton, op.cit, p.10
50. Morgenthau, op.cit, p. 742
51. For more details regarding this contention, please refer to Good Robert, "The National interest and political realism, Neibuhrs Debate with Morgenthau and Kennan", in Journal of politics vol 22 (4), 1960, pp. 305 - 307.
52. See William Zartman's argument on Somali irredentism, in Zartman, op.cit, chapter II and III.
53. J.H. Harbeson, (ed), The Military in African politics, (New York: Praeger publishers, 1987), p. 49.
54. These criticisms are attributed to foremost critics of the realist school of thought such as David Singer, Melvin Small and David Easton among others.



55. K.D. Bailey, Methods of Social Research (3rd ed) (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p.83.
56. Ibid., p.84.
57. A. Kaplan, The conduct of inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science (San Francisco: Chandler publishing company, 1964), p. 239.
58. See UNHCR Annual Refugee reports for 1992, 1993 and 1994. See also U.S Committee for refugees Report, December 1993.
59. Bailey, op.cit., p.94.
60. Ibid.
61. M. Nicholson, Conflict Analysis (London: The English Universities Press, 1973), p. 15.
62. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op.cit., p. 182.
63. Odhiambo, op. cit., p. 23
64. See U.N Convention on the status of refugees, Geneva, July 1951.

65. See O.A.U Convention Governing the specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, 1967.
  
66. Odhiambo, op.cit, p. 23

## **CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS IN THE RELATIONS OF EASTERN AFRICAN STATES**

### **2.0 Introduction**

In the previous Chapter, we noted that inter-state relations in Eastern Africa have been characterised by conflict. This chapter seeks to demonstrate this conflict and to show how inter-state conflict has indeed been a major facet of the relations between and among states in the Eastern Africa sub-region. We want to observe from the outset that relations of states are neither simple nor static. <sup>1</sup> This is so because states interact with each other on a variety of issues which may be of a social, political, economic or technological nature. In their interaction with each other, states seek to pursue, protect, or maximise their national interests vis-a-vis other states. They seek to do this through their foreign policies which reflect a set of goals and objectives and the means by which they are to be achieved. <sup>2</sup>

It must be emphasised that the state pursues its goals and objectives in the light of certain interests that it seeks to promote and carefully protect while relating with other states. This is a cardinal principle which applies to not only Eastern Africa states but also to other states elsewhere in the world. Accordingly, what two or more states may seek to achieve as stipulated by their foreign policies will either prove compatible or antagonistic. <sup>3</sup> Incompatibility in the foreign policies and national interests <sup>4</sup> of states is what often results in a conflict situation between and among them. This is particularly explained by the fact that the wishes and interests of states determine the nature of external behaviour towards each other.

James Rosenau has correctly pointed out that domestic happenings often have an important bearing upon the external behaviour of a state. And the main explanation for this

has to do with the fact that states do not exist in isolation. They are interdependent and therefore the greater the interdependence, the higher the probability that an event in one state will have repercussions on other states. A political scandal, civil disorders, a crippling strike, a surge in the cost of living, an unexpected result in a local election e.t.c are some examples of internal situational factors that can have an impact on external behaviour of a state.<sup>5</sup> This impact may take the form of tensions, hostilities or even war in the relations of a state and her neighbours.

It is against this background that we seek in this chapter to show the extent to which relations between Eastern Africa States have been conflictual since independence in the 1960s upto early 1990s and to highlight some of the consequences of the conflicts.

## **2.1 Conflicts in Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania Relations since Independence.**

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania together make up what is commonly referred to as East Africa. At one point in their colonial history, they were all colonised by the British. After independence, they became separate sovereign states, but this did not in any way mean that the three neighbours ceased to interact economically and politically. Infact the period immediately after independence in the early 1960s saw an increase in their forms of interaction symbolised by a higher level of interdependence among them.<sup>6</sup> But this interdependence did not only result in co-operation, it also led to conflicts among and between the three neighbours. It is these conflicts that we want to discuss. During the colonial period, Kenya generally gained more economically as compared to her neighbours Uganda and Tanzania. This gain was a result of the British colonial economic policies in East Africa. In Kenya, the British introduced the so called settler economy boosting agricultural output and enhancing industrial development in many parts of the country. The

result was that by 1963 when Kenya became independent, the country had a good number of industries and hence a higher level of economic development. In both Uganda and Tanzania, the situation was entirely different with the two states each having an economy that was inferior to that of Kenya. Early in the period immediately after independence, Tanzania made it clear through public pronouncements by some of her senior most leaders that she felt uncomfortable with Kenya's higher development status. President Nyerere is on record as having vehemently opposed Kenya's capitalist mode of production which Kenya had inherited from the British on attaining independence.<sup>7</sup> Nyerere's socialist views which he was to propagate throughout his presidency ran counter to Kenya's economic and social orientation. This therefore provided the early opportunities for conflict in the relations of the two neighbours.

The 1967 Arusha declaration<sup>8</sup> which laid bare Tanzania's ideological path, emphasised the Kenya - Tanzania differences with regard to economic policies. Throughout the 1960s therefore misunderstandings, misgivings and differences marked relations between Tanzania and Kenya. These, accentuated by traits of strain in trade imbalances favouring Kenya and worsened by political acrimony arising from the imbalances, led to serious tensions between the two countries. Accusations and counter accusations as well as constant arguments became the hall mark of their relations.<sup>9</sup>

Even as talks aimed at establishing an East African Community were being held by the three East African neighbours, relations among them were not exactly warm. Tanzania and Uganda appeared to have established some sort of alliance aimed at countering Kenya's economic development which seemed to be at their expense. Tensions became a characteristic feature and appeared to put Kenya on one side and both Tanzania and Uganda on the other. These tensions were evidenced by the influence President Nyerere was

increasingly having an influence on Ugandan affairs during President Obote's rule in the 1960s. Given the "bad-blood" between Tanzania and Kenya, Nyerere appeared to successfully persuade Obote to follow in his socialist footsteps. Kenya was not very amused by this development given that several other neighbouring states were increasingly leaning to the left.<sup>10</sup> Besides, Kenya did not want to lose the massive economic benefits she continued to enjoy arising from Uganda's economic dependency on her.

Relations between Tanzania and Kenya worsened following the overthrow of President Obote's government by Idi Amin Dada in January 1971. Obote had become a close friend of President Nyerere and it came as no surprise that his reaction to the ouster of his friend and ally was indeed very strong, for he called on all African states to isolate the new Amin regime and not to recognise it. But Kenya immediately saw an opportunity in line with her national interests to gain maximum political mileage. Knowing that Tanzania would not welcome the new rulers in Uganda, Kenya immediately implied her recognition for the Amin regime though not publicly, by declaring that she did not recognise governments but states.<sup>11</sup> Kenya's stand only fuelled the already existing antagonism between her and Tanzania and made it even more difficult for meaningful conduct of relations between the two. President Nyerere, who termed Amin's presidency as barbaric, in-human and autocratic, called upon the Ugandan people to rise up against Amin's oppressive tendencies and bring down his government. Throughout Amin's rule, therefore, relations between Kenya and Tanzania remained conflictual. At one point President Nyerere described Kenya as a man-eat-man society. Kenyatta hit back, terming Tanzania a man-eat-nothing society. This was yet another indicator of the hostility with which both leaders viewed each other.

Yet, Tanzania's hatred towards Kenya was ameliorated further by the fact that Kenya did not seem to extend any meaningful support to Ugandan refugees in Kenya who were opposed

to Amin's regime. Indeed, Kenya was not actively involved in training or equipping Ugandan refugees as did Tanzania. This therefore acted to deepen the rift between the two neighbours and seems to have been clearly reflected in their continuing ideological war. In August 1979, for instance, Kenya's Daily Nation newspaper reported sentiments by a senior Tanzanian government official which perhaps underlined the seriousness of the continuing conflict. He was quoted as saying that "our posture must be to diversify our exports and imports to other countries and to find alternative routes so that economic blackmail should not succeed especially given irreconcilable ideological differences between us and our neighbours." <sup>12</sup> This statement seemed to indicate that the conflict between the two neighbours was bound to continue.

Amin's ouster from power in April 1979 by a combination of Tanzanian forces and Tanzania-based Ugandan refugees further caused strains in the relations between Kenya and Tanzania particularly as regards Kenya's suspicion on Tanzania's motives in overthrowing Amin. <sup>13</sup> Kenya believed that Tanzania had engineered Amin's ouster with the sole aim of restoring Obote to his former position as Ugandan Head of state and by so doing resurrect her hitherto strong influence (particularly her socialist leanings and hence the "alliance" against Kenya) over Ugandan affairs. Suffice it to say that Kenya was very concerned at the kind of government that would succeed Amin's and hence remained particularly weary of any attempts to bring back Obote to power. Tensions therefore continued to manifest themselves in the relations between the two states during the period immediately after Amin's departure. After the coup, Prof. Lule was installed President but his presidency lasted only three months from April to June 1979. Prof. Lule was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who, during his first few months in office, won Kenyan support primarily because Kenya preferred him to Obote whom Nyerere had continued to support all along. The strain in the relations between Kenya

and Tanzania took yet another leap for the worst when in May 1980, President Binaisa was overthrown in an "internal" coup which of course had been engineered by Tanzania. He was accused of corruption among other serious charges. Kenya swiftly condemned the take-over because this time it was Milton Obote who had regained power. Kenyan leaders declared that "there can be no peace if leaders are arbitrarily put in prison." <sup>14</sup> The conflict further deepened as Kenya saw Tanzania as trying to cut-off any dealings she might have with Uganda. On her part, Kenya was not about to encourage a strong Tanzania-Uganda relationship for this would severely jeopardize her national interests. Saying that the people of Kenya and Uganda had "always been together," <sup>15</sup> the Kenya government accused Tanzania of scheming to isolate and hurt her economically and cited the continued closure of their common border as yet another good example.

Although relations seemed to show signs of improvement towards the end of 1980 and during 1981 following President Obote's efforts towards a more unified East Africa, Tanzania's decision to grant asylum to Miss Chelegat Mutai, a Kenyan Member of Parliament who had been charged in Kenya with 48 counts of allegedly making false claims to obtain money illegally, produced a sour reaction from Nairobi leading to further deterioration in the relations between the two neighbours. Kenya's request to have her extradited back to Nairobi fell on deaf ears.

The lowest point in the tense relations between Kenya and Tanzania was reached in the aftermath of the abortive coup in Kenya in August 1982 when Tanzania gave temporary asylum to two self confessed plotters of the mutiny and continued to harbour a number of other Kenyan dissidents and fugitives. <sup>16</sup> The <sup>KENYAN</sup> Tanzanian authorities showed similar sense of outrage when severally soldiers and civilians who had been found guilty of plotting to overthrow President Nyerere in 1983, escaped to Kenya and were given asylum. Press



comments in Kenya became particularly little short of hysterical in attacks upon Nyerere and his government and in exposures of conditions in Tanzania itself.

Following the reopening of their common border in November 1983, the following years witnessed a gradual normalisation of relations between the two neighbours, a condition which has generally continued to manifest itself into the many summits, bilateral meetings, trade and other areas of co-operation.

It must be noted that the immediate consequence of the conflicts and tensions that have characterised Kenya-Tanzania relations was the stagnation in their trade interactions. A look at Kenya-Tanzania trade statistics during the years since independence reveals that the conflict between them did hurt very badly not only trade between them but also between them and other neighbouring states. The common border between the two states was closed by Tanzania in 1977 following the collapse of the East African Community and at a time when relations between them had been worsening. Besides hurting trade activities between the two states, the border closure meant that Kenyan exports and imports to Southern African states such as Zambia and Zimbabwe could not be transported. Air transport became too expensive and the longer the border remained closed, the harder Kenyan economy was being hurt. Movement of citizens across the border was no longer possible and those living close to the border or with relatives across it continued to suffer both economically and emotionally.

Secondly, Kenya's exports to Tanzania fell from U.S \$80 million in 1976 to a mere U.S \$6.7 million in 1981. Imports from Tanzania declined from U.S \$30.2 million to a lowly U.S.\$ 0.1 million. In other words, trade was badly affected, an indication of hostile relations between and among the two sister states.

Thirdly, the conflicts between Kenya and Tanzania significantly contributed to the break-up of the East African Community more so because the two states were essentially divided

in matters of ideology and with regard to the profits accruing from intra- regional trade. Tanzania accused Kenya of reaping all the benefits arguing further that foreign investors operating in Kenya and who were benefiting from the scheme were effectively converting her economy and that of Uganda into captive markets.

Fourthly, there was little official conduct of relations due to the hostilities between the two leaders which at times bordered on insults. The Tanzanian President shown no willingness to be drawn into discussions aimed at reopening the closed border or resolving the differences and problems bedevilling the community. Equally, bilateral meetings, summits and other forms of official interaction became even more infrequent, an indication that the two neighbours were not exactly happy with each other. Indeed President Moi refused to attend a summit in the Tanzanian town of Arusha in June 1980 unless both Binaisa and Lule, both of whom had been overthrown as Ugandan Presidents, were in attendance. This incident further heightened suspicion in the dealings between both states.

Relations between Kenya and her other East African neighbour Uganda remained conflictual too. Besides the conflicts over trade benefits in the East African Community, tensions and bitter conflicts manifested themselves in Kenya-Uganda relations since mid 1970s until mid 1990s. After Amin had ousted Obote in 1971 and the subsequent support the Kenyatta regime extended to him, relations had remained relatively warm until April 1975 when a top Ugandan military spokesman indicated that Kenya was being controlled by Britain.<sup>17</sup> Around this period, Uganda-British relations were in serious difficulties caused by Amin's threat to execute a British citizen, Denis Hills. Kenyatta's attempts to mediate in the conflict was interpreted by Uganda as having sinister motives. The conflict was further fuelled by an allegation by Uganda that Kenya was one of a number of countries involved in a "plot" with the British to invade Uganda. This controversy was sharpened by

Kenya's decision to halt a convoy of Russian weapons passing through the country from Mombasa and destined for Kampala. <sup>18</sup>

Relations reached a critical stage when on February 23rd 1979, it was reported that President Amin had laid claim on Kenya's territory which he said had been wrongly transferred from Uganda by the British colonial authorities.<sup>19</sup> This territory, which made up three-quarters of Kenya's arable land and covered up to about only thirty miles outside Nairobi was, according to Amin, part and parcel of Ugandan territory, belonged to the Ugandan people and he would therefore, seek to return it back to Uganda. <sup>20</sup> This was in line with her foreign policy objectives. <sup>21</sup> Amin is said to have declared that he would have launched war to recover this territory but for the fact that he was a "peace-loving citizen and leader". The conflict that this announcement generated was so intense that it drew condemnation from a large cross-section of the Kenyan public. This was seen as a direct threat to Kenya's security interests and Kenyan leaders made it clear that Kenyans were ready to defend themselves and their sovereignty, values and territory. Kenyatta declared with reference to Amin's claims, "Dreaming about taking our land is madness". Massive rallies were mobilised by Kenyan politicians during which Amin's effigy was burned, unofficial offers were made to kill him and the entire Kenyan community stood firm in a feeling of solidarity against the threat Uganda was posing to their stability. Although later on Amin withdrew his claims saying that he was only giving a lesson in geography, <sup>22</sup> relations remained tense.

In June the same year, an Air France airbus was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists claiming to represent the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The plane, carrying 246 passengers including 80 Israelis landed at Entebbe airport, Uganda. <sup>23</sup> President Amin, who claimed neutrality took personal charge of the negotiations for the release of the

hostages but the Israelis staged a daring raid on the Airport and rescued all but only three passengers. On their way back the Israelis stopped at Nairobi to refuel their aircraft. Amin immediately accused Kenya of conniving with the Israelis, fuming that Kenya had offered support to Israel even during the planning of the operation which had destroyed much of his airforce. This incident impacted very negatively on the already strained relations between the two neighbours more so because Amin had lost yet another opportunity to appear on the headlines of the world's press, and had the prestige of his country badly dented. This deterioration of relations at this point in time was underlined by killing of Kenyans living in Uganda and the disappearance without trace of others as Uganda vented her frustration on Kenya. Kenya also immediately imposed an economic blockade on Uganda in July 1976 and there was a heated exchange of condemnation from both sides. There were also reports of massing of troops by each state on the common border and Kenya allowed several hundred Ugandans into the country escaping from Amin's brutal rule. Indeed there had been widespread condemnation of the Amin dictatorship in many international circles<sup>24</sup> as Amin's security forces continued to butcher, torture and even rape people. Kenya was one of the countries which expressed concern. This appeared to have been triggered by recent anti-Kenya events which the Amin regime had so relentlessly perpetuated. Relations remained strained throughout 1977 though not nearly as critical as in the previous two years. In March, Kenyan senior clergymen expressed concern at the absence of international action to investigate atrocities in Uganda calling on the United Nations Organisation (U.N.O) to intervene.

In July, Kenya allowed the registration of more than 2,000 Ugandans seeking sanctuary in Kenya but many more remained unregistered. A Kenyan minister warned those Ugandan refugees acting as spies to stop their activities as Kenyan parliamentarians loudly deplored

Uganda's treatment of Kenyans living in Uganda and the latter's hostility towards Kenya. One Kenyan member of parliament wondered why the country was keeping quiet when provoked.

Relations continued to darken in October when Uganda banned all foreign commercial vehicles in the country and Kenya retaliated immediately by banning all heavy commercial Ugandan vehicles on her soil. Amin however, realised that he was going to be the loser, hence he requested for a meeting to discuss the ban. Relations improved in 1978. Though suspicions remained high on both sides and Kenya remained particularly concerned about earlier outbursts by the Ugandan leader <sup>25</sup> which indicated that Amin remained an enemy of Kenya.

After Amin's ouster in 1979 relations again worsened following Kenya's decision to allow supporters of ex-president Lule who had been removed from office after only three months in power to operate openly in Nairobi, from where they kept up their opposition to Binaisa's regime and sent arms across the border. Relations became seriously strained in July 1979 following a decision by Kenya to expel some 4,000 Ugandan refugees whom she blamed for a number of criminal activities. This action did not augur well with Uganda which immediately termed the act inhuman.

Another conflict developed two months later in September, over the detention in Uganda of 30 Kenyan lorry drivers and 26 vehicles with goods. Explaining that the vehicles were carrying relief food from UN agencies for the Southern Sudan, Kampala added that the vehicles had been held up because it could not assure proper security throughout Uganda.<sup>26</sup> The convoy was however released within a few days.

Conflict continued to plague Moi-Binasisa governments with Binasisa bitterly attacking Kenyan newspapers, the Daily Nation and the Standard on 21st September for reporting

which he described as 'gutter journalism peddling garbage' "who does not know that even people very-highly placed in government quarters in Kenya prospered on the smuggling of coffee from Uganda when Amin was in power?". Uganda's decision to temporarily close her border with Kenya in October 1974 ignited yet another row between the two states. The action produced an almost hysterical rage in Kenya. But after Dr. Obote regained power in May 1980, relations continued to improve as they had done in the beginning of the year. We must note that this period of conflicts prompted Kenya to initiate substantial military expenditures (see table 2.1 below) in preparation for any possible military strike by Uganda.

**TABLE 2.1: LEVEL OF KENYA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE (ME), ARMS IMPORTS (AI) AND SIZE OF HER ARMED FORCES (AF). 1975 - 83.**

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ME1</u>	<u>AI2</u>	<u>AF3</u>
1975	70	16	9
1976	64	0	9
1977	113	14	13
1978	204	68	13
1979	256	114	13
1980	248	69	13
1981	181	191	17
1982	235	70	19
1983	133	40	18

**KEY**

1. Military expenditure in million dollars
2. Value of arms imports in million dollars
3. Armed forces in thousands

Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1973 - 83.

The above figures show that Kenya's military expenditure rose by more than three hundred and fifty percent from 70 million dollars in 1975 to 256 million dollars in 1979. Arms imports rose from only 14 million dollars in 1977 to a staggering 114 million dollars in 1979, an increase of more than eight hundred percent. Equally the size of her armed forces increased from 9000 in 1975 to 19,000 in 1982. We want to argue that this substantial increase in Kenya's level of military expenditure, imports of arms and size of her armed forces was a clear response to the threat to her security posed by Uganda and reflected glaringly to the conflicts that had become the hall-mark of the two neighbours interactions. It underlined the suspicions with which Kenya held her neighbour. Indeed, the figures show a drop in all three categories beginning 1982 when military expenditure dropped from 235 million to 133 million in 1983, arms imports from 70 million to 40 million and size of armed forces from 19,000 to 18,000 over the same period. This drop reflected the beginning of a new era of warm relations following Amin's overthrow.

Relations between the two neighbours seemed headed for yet another dark period following Dr. Obote's overthrow in 1985. Obote fled to Kenya but only for a short period of time. This was seen to be a wise decision on the part of both the Kenyan leadership and Obote himself for it acted to check against another escalation of hostilities. This warm period was however short-lived as relations nose-dived again in late 1986. President Moi seemed to be increasingly distrustful of the new government in Uganda headed by President Yoweri Museveni. This mistrust was enhanced by internal political developments in Kenya<sup>27</sup> and the suspicion that the Museveni regime was encouraging elements opposed to the Kenyan government. Relations deteriorated in early 1987 following arrests by Kenyan authorities of Uganda refugees in Kenya suspected to have been posing a security threat. One Ugandan taken into custody died, prompting a wave of protests from Ugandan

authorities. As the year progressed, relations deteriorated particularly following the welcoming into the country by Kenyan authorities of Alice Lakwena, a refugee who had led a spirited armed struggle against the Museveni government. Uganda saw this as a serious provocation by Kenya and as the year neared to a close, charges and counter-charges rang out from both neighbours. As more refugees fled from Uganda into Kenya following the instability there, Museveni became convinced that Kenya was abetting anti-Uganda activities hence, tensions remained high.

In December the same year, a serious conflict erupted over Uganda's violation of the common border between her and Kenya. More than one hundred Ugandan soldiers were reported to have made an attempt to cross into Kenyan territory. Uganda was also said to have massed several thousand soldiers near the border. This resulted to an immediate response from Kenya police who countered the Ugandan attack and armed conflict ensued lasting for four days. There were denials as to who had been the first to attack but the Kenyan president made it clear that Kenya was ready to defend her territory and her people from any external aggression. Calling Uganda to stop interfering with Kenya, Moi added that Kenya had never violated the common border although Uganda had done so. <sup>28</sup>

Kenya's feelings were further underlined by a statement from Kenya's then minister in-charge of internal security Justus Ole Tipis in which he asserted that "Despite Kenya's respect for territorial integrity of other states and her active co-operation with many sister-states, it was surprising, and Kenyans were shocked at the vigilance, audacity and virulent belligerence with which Uganda treated Kenya <sup>29</sup>.

It must be observed that Kenya-Libyan relations had soured throughout 1987 with Kenya having evidence that Libya had actually been recruiting Kenyan university students to spy for her. Given the friendship existing between Libya and Uganda, Kenya had reason to suspect



that Libya was using Uganda to propagate her communist doctrine and to spread it into Kenya. The result was an escalation of hostilities between Kenya and Uganda on the one hand and Kenya and Libya on the other.

Another source of conflict during 1988 was the influx of more than 2,000 Ugandan refugees into Kenya whom Uganda accused Kenya of aiding. In July 1988 and for the next two years, relations remained conflictual mainly as a result of suspicions on both sides arising from refugee activities across the border. The refugee issue also remained the main explanation for Kenya-Uganda conflicts during the first half of the 1990s, reaching a climax in early 1995 as a result of what came to be generally known as the "Odongo affair" (see next chapter for details).

We have mentioned above that Kenya embarked on a massive militarization programme as the conflicts between her and Uganda raged. There were other consequences too, some of which underlined the seriousness of the hostilities. In December 1987 for instance during the height of hostilities, Kenya ordered Uganda's High Commissioner to Nairobi and another diplomat out of the country within 24 hours accusing the Ugandan envoy of insulting the Kenyan Head of State. Kenya also recalled her High Commissioner to Kampala and his First Secretary in protest. This single action was a strong demonstration of the unwillingness on the part of Kenya to compromise any of her national interests. But Uganda also came up with reactions of her own. She held hostage some officials of Kenya's embassy in Kampala and expelled some Kenyans living in Uganda. There were also protests in Uganda and demonstrations by Kampala residents against what they termed Kenya's moves to isolate Uganda.<sup>30</sup>

Although statistics show that trade was not affected by the conflicts between Kenya and Uganda especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, there were reports in 1994 that the Ugandan

government had called upon its citizens to boycott Kenyan products particularly milk and milk products. The numerous border incidents and temporary closures also affected the free movement of people and goods across the border.

The conflicts of 1970/80s helped break-up the East African Community. Disagreements about the distribution of benefits accruing from the community, political differences and other problems all combined to bring down the scheme. Had there been no conflicts between Kenya and Uganda, and also Tanzania, perhaps the community would not have tumbled as unceremoniously as it did. Each member believed perhaps wrongly that it was no longer in her interest to remain in the community. Problem was that the leaders failed to agree on a mechanism to work-out their differences. It was not surprising therefore that the scheme collapsed.

Since independence, Tanzania-Uganda relations were very cosy. Both Nyerere, Tanzania's President and Obote, Uganda's leader were very close personal friends, hence the warm relations between their states. But it was widely known that Nyerere seemed to exercise massive influence over Uganda's affairs. One reason for this was that Nyerere's desire was to align his country with Uganda so as to check against Kenya's continued economic dominance. As such, relations between Tanzania and Uganda remained correct with co-operation in many areas.

But all this changed suddenly following the overthrow of Milton Obote's government by Gen. Idi Amin in 1971. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration in all aspects of bilateral relations between the two states. The immediate cause of the strain in relations was that President Nyerere refused adamantly to recognise the new government in Uganda. Tanzania, pained at having lost a loyal ally in the region, immediately made clear to the new rulers in Uganda that Tanzania would have no dealings whatsoever with them and that they

were in office illegally. Hostilities therefore began to manifest themselves soon after the coup. The period of Idi Amin's presidency was therefore one characterised by conflict between Uganda and Tanzania. Nyerere even made it clear that he would never sit down with Amin on one table to discuss any issues whatsoever. Calling Amin a despot and an oppressor, Nyerere called upon other African countries within the O.A.U to impose sanctions on the Ugandan military regime. Severally, he publicly lashed out at what he saw as Amin's human rights abuses. This helped to distant the two neighbours even further and official interaction between them in all fields was reduced to a very small proportion.

Another issue that continued to guarantee conflict between Tanzania and Uganda remained that Tanzania had given sanctuary to most leading opponents of Amin's government including Obote and his senior officers. Worse, Tanzania was not attempting to hide the fact that it's government was sympathetic to Ugandan exiles in the country. Given the security threat this stand presented to Ugandan authorities, suspicion and tensions remained very much high. Throughout 1972, relations worsened as Tanzania continued to receive reports that Amin was planning to capture Tanga and had discussed the possibility with some Israeli soldiers <sup>31</sup>. In 1975, the Tanzania government published several condemnations of Amin's rule during the year, likening him to Hitler and on 25th July, Tanzanian government published an official statement explaining why it was boycotting the O.A.U summit in Kampala that year. Said the statement: "By accepting the hospitality of the present Ugandan government (the O.A.U) was thus acquiescing in its crimes".<sup>32</sup> On 27th July, a Tanzanian newspaper published pictures of atrocities in Uganda under the headline "Terror, Blood and Deaths Uphold Amin's Regime yet Africa Refuses to Protest".<sup>33</sup> Uganda on its part alerted its people to the threat of invasion from Tanzania and threatened to invade her "to teach her a lesson she would never forget because she was supporting rebellious activities against

Uganda". Accusations, counter-accusations, threats and counter-threats continued to overshadow relations between the two neighbours throughout the remaining part of the year.

Tanzania's decision in early 1978 to give asylum to over 100 Ugandan employees of the E.A.C who elected not to return home, drew the anger of the Ugandan authorities, and a week later tensions along the border increased following claims that Uganda's airspace had been violated and warning that if this happened again, Uganda should not be held responsible for any eventuality in the air, on ground or on water. Uganda also staged an air exercise along the border later in the year.

The final months of 1978 and early 1979 can yet be said to have marked the darkest period in Tanzania-Uganda relations. We have no intention to go into the details of the conflict characterising Uganda-Tanzania relations at this point in time for this will not serve our purposes. The conflict was triggered off by Amin's decision in October 1977 to invade Tanzanian territory and occupy the Kagera salient claiming that it belonged to Uganda. During the occupation of the 710 square mile area, inhabitants were killed, hundreds of women were raped, thousands others were displaced, while 10,000 other people were unaccounted for, and several thousands of livestock were stolen.

Tanzania, which was infuriated by Uganda's belligerence carefully planned an attack of her own comprising her soldiers and those of Ugandan rebels in the country. Beginning November 1978, an armed conflict ensued between the two neighbours culminating in a total invasion of Uganda by Tanzania forces in January 1979. On 12th April, Amin was forced to run away and Yusuf Lule was named president with Tanzania immediately recognising the new government of Uganda.

The first half of the 1980s witnessed a period of normal relations especially after Obote had regained the presidency. But relations appeared to deteriorate in 1985 when Obote was

once again overthrown. We wish to observe that since the coming into power of President Museveni in Uganda in 1986, Tanzania-Uganda relations have generally been correct, and have been devoid of squabbles that characterised their interaction in the 1970s.

It is crucial to note at this juncture that trade patterns between Tanzania and Uganda clearly reflect periods of strained- relations as shown by table 2.2.

**TABLE 2.2: UGANDA'S TRADE WITH TANZANIA. 1969-1982 (VALUE IN U.S \$M)**

YEAR	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
1969	4.8	3.3
1970	5.6	4.03
1971	2.3	5.31
1972	0.8	2.15
1973	0.3	2.5
1974	0.03	3.67
1975	0.003	0.76
1976	-	0.86
1977	0.1	0.21
1978	-	-
1979	0.09	14.7
1980	0.09	16.5
1981	0.08	11.1
1982	0.06	8.5

Source: Compiled from Direction of Trade Statistics Year Books (Washington DC,IMF,1974, 1977 and 1983).

From table 2.2 we observe that while Uganda's exports to Tanzania stood at U.S\$ 5.6 million in 1970, there was a significant drop in 1971 when Uganda's exports to Tanzania totalled only US\$ 2.3 million. Indeed Uganda's exports to Tanzania continued to drop dramatically, so much that by 1976, there was virtually no export trade between them. Ugandan imports from Tanzania also decreased significantly. In 1971 Uganda imported goods from Tanzania worth U.S \$5.31 million but this had dropped to only U.S \$ 0.21 million by 1978. This decline in bilateral trade illustrates a period of strain in Uganda-Tanzania relations.

**TABLE 2.3: TANZANIA'S TRADE WITH UGANDA, 1969 - 1982**  
**(VALUE IN U.S \$ M)**

YEAR	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
1969	3.3	4.8
1970	4.03	5.6
1971	5.3	2.3
1972	2.15	0.816
1973	2.25	0.3
1974	3.67	0.03
1975	0.76	-
1976	0.9	-
1977	0.2	-
1978	0.2	-
1979	13.3	0.1
1980	15.1	0.1
1981	10.1	0.1
1982	7.1	0.1

**SOURCE:** Direction of Trade Statistics Year Books (Washington DC IMF, 1974, 1977 and 1983).

Table 2.3 shows that Tanzania's exports to and imports from Uganda started dropping soon after 1971. This was the time when Obote was overthrown as Uganda's president. Throughout the 1970's when relations between the two neighbours remained strained, there was general decline in trade activities as evidenced by the figures in table 2.3. In 1971 for instance, Tanzania's exports to Uganda totalled U.S\$5.3 million. By 1975 however, this had dropped to only U.S\$0.76 million. Imports from Uganda fell drastically from U.S\$5.6 million in 1970 to nil in 1977. At the height of the conflict in 1978, Tanzania's exports to Uganda only amounted to U.S \$ 0.2 million while imports remained nil! Trade between the two states only started to pick up in 1980 following the overthrow of Amin and normalisation of relations. Tanzania's exports to Uganda stood at a huge U.S \$15.1 million in 1980 while Ugandan exports to Tanzania amounted to U.S \$ 16.5 million the same year. This is another

indication that strained relations between Uganda and Tanzania badly affected trade between the two neighbours.

Another strong indicator of the conflict was the armed attack first by Ugandan forces on Tanzania and later by Tanzania on Uganda, culminating in the defeat of Ugandan armed forces and the overthrow of Amin. Besides loss of life and property and social injustices committed by soldiers from both sides, normal interaction of the people of both states was greatly hampered during the conflict.

There were protests, demonstrations and condemnations from both sides. Nyerere severally boycotted O.A.U meetings citing his differences with the Ugandan regime. East African Community meetings could not take place as the two leaders, Nyerere and Amin could not sit around the same table. It is said that these differences had their toll on the operations of the community and partly contributed to its collapse. Mention must also be made of Tanzania's decision to openly arm, train and support Ugandan rebels. These showed the enmity with which Tanzania regarded her neighbour.

## **2.2 Conflicts in Uganda-Sudan Relations**

Relations between Uganda and Sudan have been marked by tensions and hostilities ever since independence. A major indicator of these hostilities in the 1960s was mainly border incidents involving armed forces units from both sides of the border. But these can also be seen in the light of domestic politics in both states. It is noteworthy that for a long time since her independence from the British, Uganda was plagued by civil wars, military coups and many other forms of civil disorder. On the other hand, the Sudanese government has had to deal with a very costly civil war occasioned by the demand by her southern inhabitants to have their own autonomous government.<sup>34</sup> The result and effect of this civil strife has,

for many years been huge flows of refugees from both sides of the border seeking safe areas away from the chaos. Over the years, suspicions tensions and hostilities between Uganda and Sudan have been heightened not so much by the presence of the refugees but by their activities and the attitudes of the respective states towards the refugees within their territory and those who have escaped to seek refuge in neighbouring states.

Uganda-Sudan relations remained conflictual in the 1960s and part of 1970s mainly as a result of charges and counter-charges of border incursions by troops from both sides of the common border. In June 1969 for instance, relations worsened following strong charges by Uganda that Sudanese troops had crossed into Uganda and shot people at random. This charge was immediately denied by Sudan. Throughout that year there was mutual suspicions of the danger each neighbour was posing to the other's security.

Following the military coup that brought Amin to power in 1971, relations worsened as the new rulers in Uganda accused Sudan of making several incursions into her territory and carrying out bombing raids. Specific incidents were cited. By this time it had been established that Uganda was indeed giving sanctuary to members of Sudanese groups fighting for secession in the south. There were more protests by Uganda in 1971 when she claimed that there was evidence that Sudanese authorities were training enemies of the Ugandan regime at a camp in southern Sudan. It was alleged that the sole aim of the mission was to overthrow the government of Uganda. Relations thus remained strained.

To underline the seriousness of the hostilities, Uganda expelled several Sudanese diplomats including the charge d'affaires, emphasising that she could no longer conduct any official dealing with a neighbour who was seriously undermining her national security. As the year came to an end, Uganda issued statements indicating that Sudanese troops had actually crossed into Uganda and were engaging southern rebels in battles on Ugandan soil.



The border between the two states, which had been closed during the height of differences in 1969, remained closed, as tensions persisted.

In 1976, relations soured further following president Amin's announcement of his country's intention to transfer certain parts of Sudanese territory to Uganda. He argued that former colonialists had erred while drawing the common border. Relations remained strained and were worsened again following Amin's overthrow in 1979 as the new rulers in Uganda suspected the Sudanese regime of President Numeiry of militarily aiding Amin's supporters. Events in July 1979 show that relations were quickly going from bad to worse as reports indicated that there had been an attack on Sudan's embassy in Kampala. Though ambassadors were exchanged between both states in March 1980, relations remained tense mainly due to the perceived danger Sudanese refugees in Ugandan territory continued to pose to Sudan's security.

Relations deteriorated again in mid 1980s following strong indications that Ugandan authorities were having a soft-spot for Colonel Garang, the leader of the newly formed rebel group, Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). It must be noted that, Colonel Garang's organisation was at this time proving to be the most serious challenge yet to the Sudanese government in its war with her southern inhabitants. Naturally therefore, Sudan was bound to react with a lot of hostility to any neighbour who showed any willingness to associate with Colonel Garang or his S.P.L.A/S.P.L.M. Uganda proved to be such a neighbour. From 1986 onwards, conflicts remained the most distinguishable characteristic of the interactions between Sudan and Uganda. These conflicts had to do with endless accusations (sometimes correctly) that Sudan was aiding Ugandan rebels and vice-versa.

As 1990s got underway, there was no let up in the conflicts. Increased opposition to the Ugandan government centred mainly to the north near the border with Sudan, led Uganda

to believe that Sudan had a hand in the activities of rebel groups pushing down south. As such, the early years of 1990s witnessed even colder relations between the two states as evidenced by very minimum official interactions such as bilateral meetings, summits, visits by leaders etc.

There was a big diplomatic row in 1995 following accusations by Uganda that a senior Sudanese diplomat in Kampala had been found being in possession of dangerous weapons. At this time, Uganda suspected that Sudan was extending massive military support to rebels of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) fighting to overthrow President Museveni and whose base is in northern Ugandan. This new round of heightened hostilities was exacerbated by a demand by the Ugandan government that Sudan should reduce the number of its diplomats in Kampala. Soon afterwards diplomatic relations were severed. Indeed, towards the end of 1995, both leaders Museveni and El-Bashir were loudly declaring war on each other with reports indicating that massive troop movements had been cited near the common border. While Uganda maintained that Sudan was the aggressor, Sudan on the other hand reiterated her earlier claims that Uganda continued to arm, train and support elements aiming to overthrow its government. <sup>35</sup>

Although Uganda and Sudan have never traditionally been close trading partners, it can be concluded that trade interactions between the two states has continued to remain minimal on account of the bitter conflicts that have been the hallmark of their relations. With the situation at the common border so volatile, insecurity has necessitated only limited cross-border movement of citizens and hence trade has remained only at a minimum level. This persistent nature of poor trade interactions is in our view, a reflection of the consistent nature of conflictive relations between the two neighbours. For instance, inter-state trade was only worth around £2 million in 1970. We have observed that the conflicts have impacted

negatively on official conduct of relations as evidenced by the numerous times that the states have severed diplomatic relations. There were reports that some Sudanese diplomats in Uganda were at one time harassed, contravening standard international norms of diplomacy. Accusations, denials, protests, and even actual attacks are other effects of the conflict characterising Uganda-Sudan relations and served as a clear indicator of the same.

### **2.3 Suspicions, Tensions and War in Somali-Ethiopia Relations, 1960-1980**

Throughout the first two decades after independence in 1960, relations between Somalia and her neighbour to the west, Ethiopia remained conflictual. Bilateral ties were in all respects exceedingly suspicious and tension packed, traits that were best reflected in the war that brokeout between the two neighbours in mid 1970s. It is worth noting that, the root-causes of the conflicts were historical and that we do not intend to detail them here. We may only mention that at the time of Somali's independence in 1960, Somali leaders vowed to get back the Ogaden region, a territory situated to the western part of Somalia and which Somalis claimed had been hived from her by the former colonialists, the Italians and British and illegally handed over to Ethiopia. <sup>36</sup>

Soon after independence, Somali leaders called upon Ethiopia to relinquish the Ogaden region which Somalia refered to as her western province. Somalia maintained that Ethiopia was a colonial power adding that the people of Somalia's "western province" needed their independence. She invoked the principal of self-determination and vowed to unite all Somalis citing Article III (b) of the OAU charter which supports the total emancipation of the African territories which were then still dependent. On her part Ethiopia maintained that there had never been any Somali nation before 1960 and that the Ogaden had been historically part and parcel of Ethiopian territory, arguing that Somalis living there were nomads who had driven

their cattle there in search of pasture and water. They had then displaced the original Ethiopian inhabitants. It appeared therefore that both Somalia and Ethiopia were out to protect what each saw as vital national interests.

Citing Article III (3) of the OAU charter which called for states to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, Ethiopia charged that Somali government's claims on her territory was in furtherance of her annexationist and expansionist ambition and should not be countenanced if other OAU member states were able to retain their territorial integrity.<sup>37</sup> Under such circumstances therefore, conflicts persisted. These early conflicts manifested themselves in border clashes between the two, which persisted throughout 1960s rising to a peak in 1964 when an undeclared war was actually going on between the two states.<sup>38</sup> As tensions and suspicions continued, the two sides engaged in occasional but bitter exchange of hostile propaganda and armed clashes along the common border.

Hostilities were particularly high in 1973. There existed ethnic Somali dissidents within Ogaden region who Ethiopia charged were financed by Somali authorities. But Somalia replied that these were members of the Western Somali Liberation Front (W.S.L.F) fighting for the independence of their territory. Despite spirited efforts by the O.A.U to end the conflict through diplomacy, relations remained tense and low throughout 1974.

During 1976, guerrilla attacks against Ethiopian installations became numerous while transport systems in the Ogaden were rendered useless by W.S.L.F soldiers.<sup>39</sup> Ethiopia accused Somali of sending regular troops under the guise of W.S.L.F fighters across the common border in early 1977 saying that these soldiers had attacked Ethiopian government buildings, people and military installations. All these accusations were denied by Somalia.

By June 1977, full scale war had broken out between Somalia and Ethiopia. The same month, Ethiopia indeed admitted that a state of war existed between her and Somalia in the

Ogaden region although Somalia continued to deny direct involvement. But it became clear as the conflict raged that Somalia was gaining and had indeed captured a series of towns, villages and waterholes in Haraghe, Bale and to a much lesser extent Sindamo and Arrusi Provinces.

On 25th July 1977, heavy fighting was reported around Jijiga and nearby areas and claims were made on both sides of the loss of tanks and aircraft. The seriousness and importance of the war to Ethiopia was not lost in the words of president Mengistu Haile Mariam who called for a "total peoples" war against aggressors and interventionists. Ethiopia, he said "was engaged in a life and death struggle in the Ogaden War. Fronts are being opened against us from every corner".<sup>40</sup>

Within Ethiopia, chaos had erupted due to differing ideological standpoints held by various antagonistic groups in the country. There were also secessionist moves by regions such as Eritrea where a rebellion was in progress. These chaos added to the armed conflict in the Ogaden, gave way to the massive movement of refugees into Somalia and Sudan creating more problems and hence worsening relations between the two neighbours. It increasingly appeared that Somali forces had overrun Ogaden but the Soviet Union came in just in time to save the day. The Soviets, impressed by the earlier Marxist revolution of Mengistu in Ethiopia, came in to support what appeared ideologically in her interests. As such, Ethiopia was able to recapture several vital towns and Somalia later announced her willingness to stop hostilities and to enter a peaceful settlement. Consequently, her troops withdrew from Ogaden. Despite the end of the war, relations did not improve and tensions remained still high. OAU mediation efforts later helped to somehow ease the tension but only after Somalia agreed to drop her claims on Ethiopian territory.

One of the most important impacts of the Somali-Ethiopian conflicts was the spill-over effect it had upon Kenya-Somalia relations. Since Somalia had made similar territorial claims on Kenya (see section on Kenya-Somalia relations), Kenya had immediately thrown her weight behind Ethiopia the moment she was invaded by Somalia. This friendship was signified by a treaty of friendship and co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia in January 1979 which partly aimed at containing and countering Somali expansionism.<sup>41</sup> Somalia reacted angrily to this move and did not hide the fact that she detested the idea of a Kenya-Ethiopian alliance against her. As such, relations between her and Kenya nose-dived.

The continuous flow of refugees from Ogaden as the conflict raged stood out prominently as a mark of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. For instance 279,000 refugees were in UNHCR camps while a similar number had sought refuge with friends in Somalia <sup>42</sup>. Bilateral trade between the two states registered a marked decline given the hostile nature of the interaction prevailing between the two states for a period of over two decades. Particularly, Ethiopia's export and import trade suffered following escalation of war mainly near her eastern sea ports such as Massawa. Yet another serious mark of the conflict was Ethiopia's dramatic decision on September 6th, 1977 to sever diplomatic links with Somalia saying that "they served no useful purpose in view of the continuing war of invasion which the Mogadishu regime is waging against Ethiopia". Somalia, in response broke off ties the next day.

Another immediate impact of the conflicts was the decision by Ethiopia to arm herself in response to the endless threats emanating from Somalia. Ethiopia's army, which was estimated at only around 10,000 soldiers in 1970 had increased to about 20,000 in 1977 and was still expanding at a past pace. Besides, one billion U.S Dollars worth of arms and equipment was brought in 1977 mainly from the Soviet Union including Mig fighter planes,

heavy and light tanks, multi-barrelled rocket launchers, artillery and small arms, vehicles and ammunition. Efforts were also made to increase the military training of quite a number of the Ethiopian soldiers. In this regard, use was made of Soviet top Generals and other high ranking officers brought in specifically for that purpose. We argue that all these efforts to improve Ethiopia's military stature were made necessary by the conflict that had ensued between her and Somalia.

The conflicts also generated a lot of concern from the O.A.U which made several spirited efforts though largely futile, to contain the crisis. There were debates and entire O.A.U special sessions for instance in June 1974 devoted to working out a solution to the hostilities. Though most of them did not help persuade Somalia to stop her belligerence against Ethiopia, the moves helped show the concern of the continental body towards the achievement of peace in the region through the de-escalation of conflicts.

#### **2.4 Conflicts in Kenya-Somalia Relations: 1963 - 1980**

In his extensive study of Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia, K.G Adar has correctly observed that the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination have played central roles in the conduct of inter-state relations.<sup>43</sup> It is these principles that were responsible for conflicts in Kenya-Somali relations since independence upto 1980. Briefly stated, Somalia argued that the British had, during the time of defining the common border between Somalia and Kenya, failed to take into consideration the interests of the Somali ethnic community and had divided the Somali people into two with a large number of them remaining in Kenyan territory.<sup>44</sup> Somalia maintained that the northern frontier district (N.F.D) which the British created in the North Eastern part of Kenya just before Kenya's independence rightfully belonged to Somalia and that the frontiers as set out by the colonial administration were not

binding.<sup>45</sup> In short, Somalia sought to return back the Northern Frontier District to her "rightful" ownership. Indeed the Somali Prime Minister was quoted on August 25 1963 as having stated that Northern Frontier District is and always has been historically geographically, economically, ethnically and culturally a separate entity from Kenya proper.<sup>46</sup> Kenya, on her part was determined to preserve her territorial integrity. This meant that any claims to her territory after she had attained sovereignty were seen as a direct threat to her territorial integrity and an interference in her internal affairs and was therefore totally unacceptable.<sup>47</sup> Immediately after independence in 1963, Kenyan leaders led by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta made it clear through their public utterances that Kenya was not going to entertain any attempts by any of her neighbours to claim any of her territory. Kenyatta stated clearly that every inch of the Northern Frontier District was part of Kenya and not part of Somalia and that Kenya would not discuss NFD with Somalia.<sup>48</sup>

These opposing views gave rise to a conflict that was to dominate relations between Somalia and Kenya for two decades. Relations deteriorated in 1964 and 1966 following a spate of attacks on the Kenyan side of the common border by Somali bandits (otherwise known as "shiftas") some of whom were Kenyan-Somalis who were in favour of the NFD seceding to Somalia. These shifta attacks were responsible for several deaths of Kenyan administration officials and helped maintain a strong sense of hostility by Kenyan government officials towards Somali authorities, for it was believed that the Somali government was working in cahoots with the shiftas.<sup>49</sup> June 1965 saw fierce fighting between the Kenyan government and the shiftas, and Somali government officials reiterated their earlier position that they would never rest until they returned back NFD to Somalia. 1965 to 1967 was a period of bitter conflict between Kenya and Somalia. Calm returned following the signing in 1967 of a memorandum of understanding in Arusha under the chairmanship of president



Julius Nyerere. There was therefore, a thawing period in bilateral relations between the two states and diplomatic relations were fully resumed the following year.

The 1970s witnessed another peak period with regard to strained relations between Kenya and Somalia. The period 1977 - 1978 witnessed a steep deterioration of relations specifically because Kenya had publicly supported Ethiopia during her war with Somalia.<sup>50</sup> Particularly disturbing to Somalia was the signing of a co-operation treaty between Ethiopia and Kenya in which they vowed to cooperate against Somali's territorial claims on their respective countries.

After Moi took over Kenya's leadership following the death of president Kenyatta in 1978, he restated Kenya's position emphasising that Kenya would continue to be vigilant with regard to the defence of her territorial integrity and her vital national interests. 1980 also witnessed a rise in hostilities. Indeed, shifta attacks which had eased for a while resumed again following an exchange of visits by the Heads of States of Kenya and Ethiopia. During this meeting, Kenya and Ethiopia renewed their 1964 defence treaty much to the chargin of Somalia. Relations between Kenya and Somalia only began to show signs of improvement in June 1981 when Kenya's president Moi and Somalia's president Siad Barre signed a co-operation accord. We have to note that a careful look at trade activities between Kenya and Somalia for a period of twenty years between 1965 and 1985 reflects the effects of strained relations. This shows that economic variables do infact impact upon inter-state relations. Table 2.4 illustrates this.

**TABLE 2.4: KENYA'S EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM SOMALIA. 1965 - 70 AND 1976 - 85 (K£'000)**

YEAR	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	BALANCE
1965	658	9	649
1966	324	10	314
1967	7	--	7
1968	639	57	582
1969	881	18	863
1970	735	22	713
1976	2373	103	2270
1977	2397	105	2292
1978	3574	20	3554
1979	2678	71	2607
1980	4738	44	4694
1981	1916	30	1886
1982	4116	33	4083
1983	2734	40	2694
1984	2881	36	2945
1985	5526	71	5455

SOURCE: Kenya, Economic Survey, 1967, 1971, 1978 and 1988 issues.

The above table shows that Kenya's exports to and imports from Somalia fell between 1965 and 1967. This was a reflection of tensions and hostilities between Kenya and Somalia. Indeed while Kenya's exports to Somalia stood at K£ 9,000, she imported nothing from Somalia in 1967. But Kenya's exports to Somalia rose to K£639,000 in 1968 and K£881,000 in 1969. This can be attributed to the resumption of normal relations after the 1967 meetings in Arusha. It can be seen that the period between 1970 and 1980 witnessed an increase especially in Kenyan exports to Somalia despite the fact that relations between the two states remained strained. Two possible explanations can be advanced for this. The first is that during the Ogaden war, the demand for Kenyan exports in Somalia remained high. The second is that this was the period when Kenya sought alternative markets for her goods after Tanzania closed her common border with Kenya in 1977. It is also noteworthy from the

table that Kenya's imports from Somalia dropped drastically from K£105,000 in 1977 to only K£20,000 in 1978. This was during the height of the Somali-Ethiopia war and was also the time Kenya was showing support for Ethiopia.

It is noteworthy that the hostilities of 1980 were reflected in trade interactions between Kenya and Somalia. While Kenya's exports to Somalia stood at K£4,738,000 in 1980, these dropped to K£1,916,000 in 1981. Kenya's imports from Somalia fell from K£44,000 to K£30,000 during the same period. But it should also be borne in mind that from 1982 to 1985 trade between the two countries generally picked up, with a general increase in the volume of both Kenya's exports and imports to Somalia. This was a reflection of the normalisation of relations during the same period.<sup>51</sup>

The break-off of diplomatic relations in mid 1960s was also another measure of the worsening relations between Kenya and Somalia as were the numerous public pronouncements and hostile propaganda broadcasted by both the print and electronic media of the respective countries throughout 1960s and 1970s as the conflicts persisted. It is also worth noting that the people of Kenya's North Eastern Province suffered from the insecurity that persisted throughout the conflict. Hundreds lost their lives and animals during clashes between shiftas and Kenyan government forces.

## **2.5 Tensions and Conflicts in Kenya-Sudan Relations in Mid 1980s and 1990s.**

For almost two decades since the attainment of independence, Kenya and Sudan maintained a cordial relationship based on their mutual desire for good neighbourliness for their economic and social benefits. Until 1985, relations between the two states exhibited no sign of hostilities and events within the two neighbours did not seem to have a marked bearing upon their cross border interactions. But starting 1985, events in Sudan began to

dictate the course relations between her and Kenya would take for well over the next decade. In other words Kenya-Sudan relations began to deteriorate in mid 1980s courtesy of political and social developments in the Sudan. The War of Liberation in Southern Sudan (discussed elsewhere in this chapter) began to gather momentum, producing thousands of refugees who fled into Kenya. Besides, Kenya started to show strong signs of sympathy for the leaders of the newly formed Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). This was the immediate cause of frictions between her and the government of Sudan.

Sudan was understandably nervous at Kenya's open-handedness and generosity towards Sudanese refugees fleeing into her territory, and began to suspect Kenya's intentions. Kenya, on the other hand acted in a manner to suggest that she was only fulfilling her international obligations by offering refuge to defenceless human beings according to the provisions of international law.

The strain in the relations of the two neighbours became more pronounced in 1988 as Sudan publicly accused Kenya of allowing SPLM to open offices in Nairobi. This was a very serious charge indeed as it implied that Kenya was supporting a rebel movement aiming to overthrow the Sudanese government and was, therefore, threatening her neighbours security. Nairobi immediately denied this accusation. As the year progressed, relations worsened. Sudan made it clear that she would retaliate by giving refuge, arming and training supporters of the clandestine 'Mwakenya' group operating in Kenya.<sup>52</sup> Relations were at their lowest point in June when Sudan demanded the immediate closure of a relief office in Nairobi, claiming that it served S.P.L.A and wondering why the office should operate in Nairobi while there was official government representatives at the Khartoum embassy in Nairobi.

There seemed to be no let-up in the conflict as the year came to a close. The severity of the hostilities came to a head in March 1989. Tensions soured as charges and denials characterised official statements emanating from Nairobi and Khartoum. During the same month, Sudan expelled two Kenyan diplomats under unexplained circumstances. It was however, not lost to observers that the expulsion was directly linked to the simmering controversy over alleged support of Sudanese rebels by Kenyan authorities. Relations remained strained.

In 1991, a decision by Kenyan authorities to open a refugee camp for Sudanese refugees in Kakuma, Turkana district did not do any good to the worsening mood existing between Nairobi and Khartoum at the time. Kakuma, which lies only about 100km from the Kenya-Sudanese border, was seen by Sudanese authorities as too close a site for the concentration of hostile refugees. She charged correctly that Kenyan authorities should have established the camp deeper into the Kenyan interior adding that, the decision to open the camp at Kakuma could only be explained by the Kenyan government's sympathy for Sudanese refugees fighting for autonomy in the South of Sudan

Tensions continued to mar relations between Kenya and Sudan as mutual suspicion remained, with Sudan making it plainly clear that she would never allow Kenya to be used as a base by her Sudanese refugees planning to cause trouble in Sudan. There were reports in early 1995 that Khartoum had recruited Kenyan muslim youths and was training them in preparation for rebel attacks on Kenyan positions. These claims were never substantiated but they nevertheless served to fuel the already simmering row between Nairobi and Khartoum. The conflict has persisted and seems likely to linger on as long as Kenya continues to harbour Sudanese refugees and as long as the Southern question in the Sudan remains unresolved.

Although several bilateral and multi-lateral summits have been held involving both states and pledges have been made for normalisation of ties , it is obvious that suspicions and tensions have continued to be a major characteristic of the relations between Sudan and Kenya. A strong sense of mutual mistrust has remained as reflected in the threats and counter threats several high ranking officials of each state have issued in the past. Trade interactions have also remained minimal though this may be explained by other factors apart from the tensions that have been so much part of the official interactions between Kenya and Sudan for the last one decade.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

We have demonstrated in this chapter that inter-state relations in Eastern Africa has been conflictual. Though we could not examine exhaustively the conflictive relations of all the Eastern Africa states during the period under study, it is our feeling that the chapter has achieved its purpose namely, to show that relations between Eastern Africa states have been marked by conflicts. We have demonstrated that the pursuit and protection of vital national interests is an important feature of inter-state relations and plays a central role with regard to tensions and hostilities that hamper cordial relations between and among states. The chapter has also outlined some of the major consequences of these conflicts. It has also been shown that refugees have been central players in most of the conflicts discussed though this has not been isolated as a factor and discussed at length. The next chapter takes a critical look at the refugee problem in the sub-region.

## 2.7 Endnotes

1. F. Hartman, The Relations of states (5th ed) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company Inc. 1967), p.11.
2. P.G. Okoth, "The foreign policy of Uganda since independence towards Kenya and Tanzania" in W. Oyugi (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa, (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992), p. 359.
3. Hartman op.cit., p. XXV
4. See a definition of the concept in chapter one.
5. J.N. Rosenau, World Politics (London: The Free Press, 1976), p. 28.
6. R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Borton: Little, Brown & Company, 1977), chapter 1.
7. Nyerere's views are contained in most of his works on African socialism in which he opposes capitalism saying its basic aim is to exploit the poor masses and that it benefits only a few people in society particularly those controlling the means of production.
8. See Arusha Declaration, Dar-es-Salaam, 1967.

9. Africa Today, p. 691.
10. A. Chemonges, "Uganda and the Disintegration of the East African Community Between 1971 and 1977", (Unpublished M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1984), chapter II.
11. M. Ngunyi and G. Adar, "The politics of integration in E.Africa since independence" in Oyugi, op.cit., pp. 410 - 412.
12. Daily Nation, Nairobi, August 8th, 1976 p. 6.
13. Weekly Review. Nairobi, January 4th, 1980 p. 5.
14. Africa South of the Sahara. 1988 (London: Europa Publications Ltd, 1987), p. 549.
15. Africa Research Bullentin (Political) Vol. 16, No.10, November 15th 1979, p.5430C.
16. Africa Contemporary Record. 1981 - 82, Annual Survey and documents, (New York: African Publishing Company, 1983), p.B201.
17. Daily Nation. April 12th 1975.



18. Africa Contemporary Record. 1975/76, p. B362
19. Weekly Review. Nairobi, February 23rd 1976, p. 3.
20. Ibid.
21. S.A. Gitelson, "Major shifts in recent Ugandan Foreign Policy" in African Affairs Vol 76, No 304. July 1977, pp. 354 - 380.
22. Weekly Review. Nairobi, March 1st 1976, p. 3.
23. Africa South of the Sahara. 1978 - 79, p. 1029.
24. Ibid.
25. Africa Contemporary Record. 1978/79, p. B452.
26. Weekly Review. Nairobi, Sept. 14th 1979.
27. Africa South of the Sahara. 1988, pp. 547 - 549.
28. Daily Nation. Nairobi, Dec 16th 1987, p. 1 and 6.
29. Ibid. p. 6.

30. Daily Nation, Nairobi, Dec. 24th 1987, p. 1.
31. Africa Contemporary Record, 1972/73, p. 288.
32. Ibid. p. B361.
33. Sunday News, Dar-es-Salaam, Dec. 27th, 1975, p. 1.
34. See Zartman I.W, Ripe for Resolution, conflict and intervention in Africa,  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 91.
35. The East African, Nairobi, Dec. 13th to Dec. 20th 1995.
36. Amate C.O.C, Inside O.A.U: Pan Africanism in Practice (London: Macmillan  
Publishers, 1986), p.409.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Zartman op.cit., p. 105.
40. Africa Contemporary Record, 1977/78 p. B227.

41. Africa South of the Sahara. 1980/81, p. 888.
  
42. Ibid.
  
43. K.G. Adar, "The significance of the legal principles of territorial integrity as the modal determinant of Relations: A case study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963 - 1983" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1986), chapter 2.
  
44. East African Standard, Nairobi, Oct. 1st 1964, p. 1.
  
45. I.M. Lewis, "Pan Africanism and Pan-Somalism" in Journal of Modern African Studies 1 (2), August 1963, p. 150.
  
46. J. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute. (London: Pallmall, 1964), p. 156.
  
47. J.J. Okumu, "Appraisal by a Kenyan" In Resolving conflict in Africa, L.W Doob (ed), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 60.
  
48. African Research Bulletin, (Political, Social and Cultural), 1 (9) Sept, 1964, pp. 146 - 147.
  
49. See Kenya National Assembly Senate official report, vol - July 1963 p.9

50. Adar, op.cit., p. 250.
51. N. Odhiambo, "Summitry System as a Mechanism for Resolving Conflicts in Eastern Africa (Unpublished M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1990), p. 176.
52. Weekly Review. June 10th 1988, p. 52.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN EASTERN AFRICA.**

### **3.0 Introduction.**

In the preceding Chapter, we noted that inter-state relations in Eastern Africa have been conflictual. We went on to demonstrate how conflicts between and among states in the sub-region have remained a major characteristic feature of the relations among Eastern African member states. Mention was made of the fact that the causes of these inter-state conflicts are not only varied but also multi-dimensional. Among these causes is the refugee problem. Our contention is that with regard to relations between Eastern African states the refugee phenomenon has taken a centre stage. Over the years since early 1960s when most Eastern African states attained independence from their former colonial masters, refugee flows have been an enduring reality in the sub region. Indeed, the problem of refugees has generated a lot of debate in the past among scholars and has been a subject of concern in many inter-governmental forums not so much for the problems and needs of the refugees themselves, but also for the impact refugee flows have had upon the people and governments of the host states <sup>1</sup>. This Chapter examines the refugee problem in Eastern Africa. It looks at the background to the refugee problem, the causes of the refugee problem and its magnitude in terms of refugee populations during various times over the period covered by this study. One of the main objectives of the Chapter is to examine the flow of refugees in the sub-region over the given period with a view to establishing whether or not refugee numbers have increased. It is in Chapter four that we have detailed the role refugees have played with regard to inter - state conflicts in Eastern Africa.

### **3.1 Background to the Refugee Problem in Eastern Africa.**

The phenomena of migration and refugee movements have existed throughout the history of human settlement<sup>2</sup>. Since the beginning of written history, refugee movements have been witnessed mainly as a result of war and tyranny in many parts of the world<sup>3</sup>. For example before the start of world war II , there were 1,151,625 refugees mainly from Germany and Spain and other parts of Europe scattered all over Europe, the Americas and parts of Africa. The second world war alone produced refugee movements of 60 million resulting directly from policies adopted by Germany and the former Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

In Africa, anti - colonial warfare in the 1950s and 1960s stood out as the major cause of refugee movements, commencing with the exodus of Algerian refugees to Tunisia and Morocco in 1957 as the Algerians fought for independence from the French. The flow of the refugees became an acute problem in the 1960s coinciding generally with the struggle for and attainment of independence by most African states including those in Eastern Africa.<sup>5</sup> In other words the point we are making is that colonialism was responsible for the early flight of people from their areas of birth to other countries in search of peace and security as states fought for independence.

The colonial legacy also created circumstances that were to give rise to social conflicts among other problems, the result of which was an exodus of refugees to safer areas, often across borders. For instance in Eastern Africa, the colonial powers were responsible for the creation of frontiers according to the European balance of power. The frontiers they created did not take into account African interests particularly ethnic minorities and tribal interrelations. This became an inseparable barrier to the development of any form of healthy social growth within the African continent.<sup>6</sup> Armed conflicts have erupted in a number of Eastern African states namely in Somalia (the Ogaden conflict), Kenya (conflict over

Northern Frontier district), Ethiopia (Eritrean demands for autonomy) among others. The consequence has been large refugee movements throughout Eastern Africa, as people fled for their lives.

The refugee problem in Eastern Africa is also explained by the types of governments that were put in place immediately after independence. Opposition to military rule, tyranny and single - party systems and various other low levels of tolerance characterising such ruling groups or individuals together with their inclination to equate national welfare with personal welfare have in the past aroused opposition. This opposition in turn provoked counter active policies compelling people to become refugees as violence, fragmentation and instability reigned. In such cases, refugee numbers have ranged from a few opposition politicians and intellectuals to thousands of persecuted individuals. Relevant examples in Eastern Africa where this has happened are Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>7</sup>

The emergence of national states and the repression of domestic tribal conflicts by one dominant group are other important issues of concern with regard to the refugee problem in this sub-region.<sup>8</sup> This is best seen in the persisting Southern Sudanese conflict which has raged for over two decades. The Southern Sudanese seeing themselves as a nation autonomous of the northerners who are mostly Arabs, and who have for a long time dominated Sudanese politics, decided to fight for an end to this domination and oppression. They sought to establish their own state independent of the north. But the Islamic government in Sudan has adamantly refused to accept the demands for self determination by the Southerners who comprise of mainly black Africans or Christians and traditionalists. The conflict has therefore widened, producing a big proportion of the sub - region's refugees who have found safety in neighbouring states such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda.

It should be pointed out also that the refugee problem in Eastern Africa can be seen in the light of political domination of one ethnic group by another. In a number of Eastern African states, it has happened that having attained political power, particular ethnic groups have gone ahead and abused it in order to retain their superiority over rivalling groups. The abuses have included enforced assimilation, the murder of elites, land confiscation, denial of employment and other opportunities among others.<sup>9</sup> Notable examples of Eastern African states where this has happened include Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Again the resulting phenomenon has been that of refugees. This has gone on throughout most of the independent history of these states and is still happening upto the present day.

Other causes of the refugee problem in Eastern Africa include foreign interests which in some instances have acted as an agravator of the situation. A good example is the role of the French in the Rwandese internal conflict. Other causes, but which have contributed to lesser numbers of refugee flows are socio - economic interms of marked social disparities in equatable distribution of privileges and economic exploitation . These have in certain cases caused silent migratory movements and have occurred in most of the Eastern African states. Of crucial importance also has been border clashes over territory the most prominent in Eastern Africa being the Kenya - Somali conflicts over the former Northern Frontier District and the Ethiopia - Somali clashes over the Ogaden region. Both conflicts were responsible for thousands of refugees in the sub - region. Drought and famine are other factors that triggered huge refugee flows especially from Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985. But these famine refugees who fled to Kenya, Sudan and Somalia, however had returned home by the end of 1986 following spirited efforts by the international community to provide them with food and other necessities. The return of rains that year also helped to normalise the hitherto dangerous situation. Taking all these aspects into account we thus find that the



refugee problem in Eastern Africa has originated in a great multiplicity of factors which are at times interconnected and overlapping. A look at the numbers of refugees in the sub - region reveals just how volatile the problem is.

### **3.2 Refugee Population in Eastern Africa : Origin and Destination**

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), the collection of accurate statistical data on refugees and asylum seekers is one of the most problematic issues confronting the organization whose primary concern is the protection of refugees worldwide <sup>10</sup>. Figures collected by UNHCR frequently diverge from those reported by journalists, voluntary agencies, host governments and donor states. A number of different factors are responsible for this problem. The most notable is that the world refugee itself is subject to quite different interpretations hence, individuals and organizations alike may give figures depending on their definition of who actually a refugee is.

Secondly , the collection of accurate refugee statistics is often hampered by the movements of large numbers of people over extremely large areas and in some of the most remote, weakly administered and hostile territories on earth."

Thirdly, since the settlement of refugees is often spontaneous amongst local people with the same ethnic and linguistic background, it is often difficult to prevent the local population from registering as refugees and to establish how many refugees are actually living in the area.

The fourth factor is seen in a report by the US Government Bureau of Refugee Programmes which states that: "given the fluidity of most refugee situations, counting refugees is at best an approximate science".<sup>12</sup> Refugees often come and go across international borders as well as within their countries of asylum according to changing levels

of assistance and security. They move in and out of camps, or migrate between rural and urban areas. Some refugees register more than once in order to gain higher levels of assistance and deliberately undermine subsequent efforts to undertake a more accurate census. This makes it extremely difficult for aid agencies and local authorities particularly, to keep track of such movements

Fifthly, like any other population, refugee population is a dynamic rather than a static entity. Refugees die, get married and give birth. Refugee families may split up, regroup or change their place of residence. However accurate they may have been at the time of their collection, statistical data about the size and composition of a refugee population can quickly become outdated. In all, refugee numbers are often fraught with inconsistencies and lack of precision, even in industrialised countries where individual screening procedures and data collection presents fewer practical problems. It has been argued that much of the confusion surrounding refugee statistics undoubtedly stems from their sensitive and controversial nature. No government likes to admit that its citizens have felt obliged to leave their own country. In Eastern Africa, Kenya presents a good example of such a country.

A sixth factor contributing to the problem of refugee statistics has to do with economic and political considerations. Governments of some host countries have made inflated claims concerning the number of refugees or returnees living on their territory in the hope that, this will attract higher levels of international sympathy and material support. In other situations in Eastern Africa and elsewhere, host governments have strenuously denied the arrival of refugees from a friendly neighbouring state<sup>13</sup> while others have a tendency to disseminate very selective information about refugee numbers for purpose of policy making. For instance a country seeking to justify the introduction of a more restrictive asylum policy may issue statistics which demonstrate a sharp increase in the number of people submitting requests for

refugee status. Kenya for example, maintained in 1992 that Somali urban refugees mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa numbered between 100,000 and 150,000 while UNHCR gave its figures as 20,000. <sup>14</sup> Kenya has been vocal about her desire to see Somali refugees leave her territory.

Echoing the above sentiments, the U.S committee for refugees observes that politics and nations' administrative procedures affect counts of refugees. Some sources report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees while others term them as economic migrants. It may be in the political interests of a government to understate its refugee population or in other instances, to report inflated numbers.<sup>15</sup>

While the barriers to the collection of accurate refugee statistics are formidable, they are not insurmountable. In many refugee situations, reasonably precise enumeration is possible given adequate resources, a degree of stability, efficient staff members and most important of all, support from the host government authorities. Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement. This means that the many deficiencies in the available data cannot be taken to mean that the available statistics cannot be quoted or used as a basis for providing assistance to refugees and for planning programmes to support refugee populations.<sup>16</sup> With these problems about refugee statistics in mind and bearing in mind too that serious statistical problems will almost certainly continue to arise in large, complex and rapidly changing emergencies in Eastern Africa and in other parts of the continent, we now examine the distribution of refugees in the Eastern African sub - region since independence.

Statistics show that the number of refugees in Eastern Africa has generally increased throughout the period covered by this study. It is noteworthy however that this increase has not been evenly distributed in all the countries in the sub - region. As a result, some

countries such as Somalia hosted a large number of refugees during a certain period while a close scrutiny of refugee numbers in Kenya during the same period has shown that Kenya was home to only several thousand refugees. We wish to note that some states in Eastern Africa have acted as hosts to significant numbers of refugees while at the same time these states have been sources of large numbers of refugees themselves. A perfect case in point is the Sudan in mid 1980s.

Throughout the last three decades, the majority of Africa's refugees have originated from and migrated to Eastern and central African countries.<sup>17</sup> Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and even Ethiopia have borne the brunt of these displacements while being at the same time major sources of migrants. Over the last thirty years, refugee population in each one of the Eastern African states has evidently soured.

Available statistics of refugees in the sub-region date 1967. By the end of that year, there were 730,000 in Africa mainly South of the Sahara of which it is estimated that around 200,000 were in Eastern Africa.<sup>18</sup> UNHCR, which was and still is the leading world organization whose concern is refugees, did not however, issue figures for individual countries during much of the 1960s. It was therefore, difficult for us to obtain refugee figures for individual states in the sub-region until 1972.

In 1972, refugee population in Eastern Africa was 386,000 and was distributed as shown in Table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN EASTERN AFRICA BY  
DECEMBER 1972.**

Host Country	Number	Origin of main groups.
Ethiopia	16,000	Mainly Sudanese.
Burundi	42,100	Rwandese.
Kenya	1,500	Various origins
Rwanda	5,000	Burundians.
Sudan	59,000	55,000 Ethiopians, 4,000 Zaireans.
Uganda	166,000	72,000 Rwandese, 60,000 Sudanese, 34,000 Zaireans.
Tanzania	96,400	58,000 Mozambicans, 14,000 Rwandese, 23,000 Burundians, 1,400 Zaireans.
<b>Total</b>	<b>386,000</b>	

Source : UNHCR, December, 1972.

This number represents more than one-third of the total population of refugees in Africa at the end of 1972 which stood at 1,005,700.<sup>19</sup> Figures available for the rest of 1970s show a sharp rise of refugee numbers in the sub-region, a situation which is attributable to the increasingly volatile political situations in countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda. In 1979, the population of refugees in Eastern Africa had surpassed the one million mark. It increased by over 300% from 386,000 in 1972 to a staggering 1,097,900 in 1979. Table 3.2 provides more details.

**Table 3.2 NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN EASTERN AFRICA: 1979.**

Host country	Number	Origin	of main groups
Sudan	330,000	297,000 30,000 3,000	Ethiopians, Ugandans, Zaireans.
Rwanda	8,500	7,600 900	Burundians, Ugandans.
Uganda	112,000	78,000 34,000	Rwandese, Zaireans.
Ethiopia	10,000		Sudanese.
Kenya	6,500	4,600 950 900	Ugandans, Ethiopians, Rwandese.
Somalia	500,000		Ethiopians
Burundi	50,000	49,000 1,000	Rwandese, Zaireans.
Tanzania	160,000	129,500 4,100	Rwandese, Ugandans, rest Namibians and South Africans.
Djibouti	20,000		Ethiopians.
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,097,900</b>		

Source : UNHCR, August, 1979.

These figures reveal that the number of refugees in Eastern Africa was roughly half of all the refugees in Africa whose number at the end of 1979 stood at a staggering 2,260,000.<sup>20</sup>

According to J.R Rogge, since the flow of refugees commenced in earnest in the early 1960s in Eastern Africa, it has been characterised by almost continuous growth. The figures so far have proved this. Indeed, statistics show that refugee flows in this sub - region have been

continuous over the years as they have been in other parts of the continent. Periodically, refugee flows have been punctuated by sudden surges.<sup>21</sup> For instance, movement of refugees into Somalia soured from 500,000 within a period of four years between 1979 and 1983, to a whopping 700,000. In Sudan, the number of refugees almost doubled during the same period while in both Ethiopia and Tanzania, the refugee population remained largely unchanged. Rwanda recorded a large influx of Ugandan refugees as well as others from neighbouring Burundi, pushing the number to slightly over 60,000. In Burundi, a thirty percent increase of refugee numbers saw the population there rise to 58,000 during the same four year spell. Djibouti too recorded a marked increase in her refugee numbers from 20,000 in 1979 to 35,000 in 1983. In Uganda, the number increased from a lowly 4,000 to a staggering 116,000. Kenya is the only state in the sub-region which witnessed a slight drop in her refugee numbers from 6,500 in 1979 to 5,200 in 1983. This drop can be attributed to relative stability that prevailed in Uganda in the early 1980s, allowing some of the Ugandan refugees who had fled to Kenya to return home. Ethiopian refugees fleeing to Kenya rose by 1,600 between 1979 and 1983 as the number of those from Uganda dropped almost by half to 2,200.

Shown below is a table depicting the state of refugee population in Eastern Africa by August, 1983.

**Table 3.3 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN EASTERN AFRICA: AUGUST 1983.**

Host country	Number	Origin of main groups	
Somalia	700,000	Ethiopians	
Sudan	637,000	460,000	Ethiopians,
		170,000	Rwandase,
		5,000	Zaireans,
		2,000	Chadians.
Tanzania	159,000	148,000	Rwandese,
		9,500	Zaireans,
		1,500	From S. Africa & Namibia.
Uganda	116,000	35,000	Zaireans,
		79,000	Rwandese,
		2,000	Sudanese.
Rwanda	62,000	44,000	Ugandans,
		18,000	Burundians.
Burundi	58,000	55,000	Rwandese,
		3,000	Zaireans.
Djibouti	35,000	Ethiopians.	
Ethiopia	11,000	Sudanese.	
Kenya	5,200	2,200	Ugandans,
		1,600	Ethiopian.
		1,400	Rwandese.
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,783,200</b>		

Source : UNHCR, August 1983.



The above table shows that, like the preceding period, refugee population in Eastern Africa had showed a significant increase by August 1983. The total population increase was 685,300, and this pushed the 1979 figure of 1,097,900 to 1,783,200, representing an increase of slightly over seventy percent (70%). The total refugee population in the entire African continent was 2,506,600 over the same period. Again the figures reveal that Eastern Africa alone was host to more than three-quarters of the total number of refugees in Africa! We must also note that although the increase in the numbers of refugees in the continent was only about 250,000, refugee numbers in Eastern Africa alone went up by almost three times as much, confirming our earlier observation that the population of refugees in the sub-region has consistently increased over the years.

The statistics during the remaining years of the 1980's further confirm this observation. Sudan for instance continued to shoulder a heavy burden of Ethiopian refugees whose number increased tremendously particularly during the late 1980s. In late 1990, Ethiopian refugees in Sudan had increased to 726,000, an increase of about 100,000 in comparison to the 1983 figures. By the end of 1990, refugee population in Uganda rose to 156,000. This figure, however differs significantly with other sources'.<sup>22</sup> Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burundi and Kenya too recorded huge increases in the number of refugees coming into their territory at this point in time. In Rwanda however, numbers dropped to around 21,000 at the end of 1990 largely on account of prevailing peace within neighbouring Uganda. Tanzania at the same time recorded a dramatic increase of its refugee population, from 159,000 in 1983 to more than 250,000 by December 1990. The source of her refugees was Burundi, where ethnic tensions had sky-rocketed towards the end of 1980s. The fleeing Burundians preferred to cross over to Tanzania, which has continued to enjoy enviable stability in the region, arguably more than any other Eastern African state. Indeed, Tanzania was also home to refugees from as far away as South Africa and Mozambique.

The situation in Kenya mirrored that in other states in the sub-region. Indeed, her refugee population had risen to 14,000 by the end of 1990, thanks to skirmishes in Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and Rwanda. Summarised below is the refugee situation in the sub region as of December 1990.

Table 3.4 ESTIMATED REFUGEE NUMBERS IN EASTERN AFRICA AS OF DEC. 31st 1990

Host country	Number	Origin
Ethiopia	783,000	398,000 Sudanese, 385,000 Somali.
Sudan	726,000	700,000 Ethiopians, 20,000 Chadians, 4,500 Zaireans, 2,000 Ugandans.
Tanzania	256,200	154,700 Burundians, 72,000 Mozambicans, 22,000 Rwandese, 16,000 Zaireans, 1,000 S.Africans, 200 Others.
Somalia	358,500	355,000 Ethiopians, 3,500 Kenyans.
Uganda	156,000	87,000 Rwandese, 64,000 Sudanese, 2,000 S.Africans, 1,500 Somali, 1,300 Zaireans, 200 Others.
Rwanda	21,500	Burundians
Burundi	90,700	80,600 Rwandese, 10,000 Zaireans, 100 Somalis.
Kenya	14,400	5,100 Ugandans, 3,000 Ethiopians, 2,000 Rwandese, 1,000 Somalis, 3,300 Others.
Djibouti	67,400	61,000 Somali, 6,400 Ethiopians.
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,484,200</b>	

Source : Compiled from U.S Committee for Refugees, 1991.

As demonstrated in the table above, the period between mid-1980s to early 1990's witnessed yet again a general surge in the total population of refugees in the sub-region. Indeed, the increase during the seven year period beginning 1983 and ending in 1990 was 72%. This again was reflected in a variety of factors including internal social disorder in a number of Eastern African states notably Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia.

Figures for the entire refugee population in Africa stood at 5,443,450<sup>23</sup> as of December 1990 indicating that the refugee population in the continent actually doubled within seven years. What is most telling is that almost half of the refugees were concentrated in the Eastern African sub-region alone. It is worth noting that the number of refugees in Kenya by December 1992 had jumped to more than 400,000. Majority of these refugees came in from Somalia and Sudan where civil war had been raging for several years. But in Ethiopia statistics showed that, there was a marked drop in refugee numbers to about 432,000 by the same time. While this was not by any standards a small number of escapees, it nevertheless showed that certain developments within the sub-region must either have favoured a voluntary return of the refugees to their home countries or that certain circumstances within and without Ethiopia forced the refugees out. In our opinion, the most plausible explanation for this marked drop in refugee numbers can be explained mainly by internal developments within Ethiopia. Most notable was the government's spirited efforts to silence dissenting groups in the country as well as regions within it seeking to secede such as Eritrea. These occasionally produced bitter armed clashes between the government and opposition rebels, and could have been a deciding influence over many Somali and Sudanese refugees to either return home or find refuge in other more peaceful states, such as Kenya.

In the neighbouring Somalia, escalating clan warfare and power wrangles drove thousands of Ethiopian refugees who had sought refuge there back to their volatile homeland and elsewhere.

By June 1, 1991, Ethiopian refugees still in Sudan were only 35,000 and the number was steadily dropping. At this time, Somali refugees in Ethiopia numbered approximately 600,000, and as noted above, this figure had dropped to around 432,000 by the close of 1992.

Another notable feature in the figures above was the drop in refugee numbers in Djibouti by more than half. It is probable that the Somali and Ethiopian refugees who had settled in Djibouti may have felt increasingly unsafe in the face of increasing insecurity in Djibouti where power wrangles had been gathering momentum throughout 1991.

In Burundi, Rwandese refugees registered a dramatic rise, sky-rocketing three times over within a period of two years beginning 1990. The number stood at a massive 271,000 and was steadily rising. The contributing factor to this huge rise in Rwandese refugee seekers was the ethnic massacres within Rwanda as the long standing feud between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups erupted yet again. Indeed, in 1994, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled from Rwanda to neighbouring states particularly to Zaire and Tanzania as blood-thirsty Hutus went on an orgy of violence and murder of fellow Tutsi countrymen after Rwanda's Hutu president was killed in a plane accident believed by Hutus to have been masterminded by Tutsi rebels of the RPF. Tutsi tribesmen who escaped death also fled to Uganda, Kenya and other neighbouring states. More refugees, this time Hutus, fled the country in the wake of RPF's victory and control of the country. By 1995, Rwandese refugees in the sub-region were in excess of one million and in other states such as Sudan and Kenya, refugee numbers remained exceedingly high. In Kenya, the renewed conflict in Somalia drove huge numbers of refugees into the country. At one time in 1992, Somali refugees in Kenya were estimated at more than 400,000.<sup>24</sup>

### **3.3 Conclusion**

We have demonstrated in this chapter that refugee population in Eastern Africa registered a steep rise during the period covered by this study. By so doing, we confirmed our second hypothesis which states that refugee numbers in Eastern Africa generally increased between 1960 and 1995. Factors responsible for refugee movements in the sub-region were also clearly enumerated. As we stated in chapter one, the huge numbers of refugees in this sub-region has had an important impact on inter-state relations in Eastern Africa particularly with regard to inter-state conflicts. It is this impact of refugees on inter-state relations in the sub-region that we turn our attention to in the next chapter with our central argument being that refugees have played a central role as significant sources of interstate conflicts in Eastern Africa.

### 3.4 End Notes

1. Minutes of various O.A.U sessions indicate that the issue of refugee problems and their impact on the host states has been discussed many times.
2. E. Boesch and A. Goldschmidt (eds), (Baden-Baden, Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983), p. 15.
3. M.J. Proudfoot, European Refugees:1939-52. (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p.21.
4. Ibid.
5. L.W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of our time. (vol. II). (Metuchen, New Jersey, The Scarecrow Press Inc, 1975), p. 827.
6. J. Hatch, "Historical background of the African Refugee Problem", in Refugees South of the Sahara. H.C. Brooks and El-Ayouty Yassin (eds), (West Port, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970). pp 1-17.
7. E. Boesch and A. Goldmischmidt, op.cit., p.17
8. Ibid. p.16.
9. Ibid.

10. United Nations Commissioner For Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees (1993): The challenge of protection, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p.145
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. p. 147.
14. UNHCR, Refugee Bulletin, December 1993 Geneva, The UN, P.2.
15. United States Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1991. (Washington: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1991), p.32
16. Ibid.
17. J.R. Rogge, Too many, Too long, (New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld Publishers,1985) p.14.
18. S. Hamrell, Refugee problems in Africa. (Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967), p.9.
19. UNHCR, Report on Refugees, December 1992, (United Nations, Geneva, 1972), p.3.

20. J.R. Rogge, op. cit., p.1211.
21. Ibid. p.15.
22. U.S Committee for Refugees, Op. cit., p.32.
23. Ibid.
24. These were estimates reported mainly by the Kenyan Press and were, therefore difficult to authenticate.



## **CHAPTER FOUR: REFUGEES AND INTER-STATE CONFLICTS IN EASTERN AFRICA**

### **4.0 Introduction**

The foregoing Chapter examined the scope of the refugee problem in Eastern Africa. It was noted that refugee numbers in the sub-region have generally increased over the period under study. We emphasised that the collection of accurate statistical data on refugees and asylum seekers remained a very problematic issue. We also pointed out that the huge numbers of refugees in Eastern Africa continued to be of great concern to the sub-region's leaders principally because of the impact they continued to have upon cross-border interactions of member states. This chapter focuses on this impact. The central argument is that refugees have been a very important cause of inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa. It starts from the premise that the presence of refugees, their activities, their problems and the way they are perceived by the people and leaders of both their countries of origin and those of the states into which they seek refuge, singly or collectively, contribute to tensions, suspicions, hostilities and conflicts between and among Eastern African states.

A casual examination of the conflicts that have been experienced by states in this sub-region reveals that refugees have been major players with regard to the origins of these conflicts. It is this role of refugees as significant contributors of inter-state conflicts that we turn our attention to. Our thesis is that although there may be other contributing factors to inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa, to us these are only but parameters. Refugees, we argue, supersede all other key causes of inter-state conflicts in this sub-region.

#### **4.1 Refugees as the Cause of Conflicts in Uganda-Tanzania Relations: 1971-79**

During the period immediately after independence from the British, Tanzania and Uganda maintained cordial relations. President Nyerere of Tanzania and his Ugandan counterpart Milton Obote had a warm personal relationship. This relationship meant that the two leaders agreed on many issues, both personal and state matters and as such, their two countries cherished friendly interactions. One such issue the two states were in agreement over was that they both viewed Kenya with suspicion as negotiations to form an East African economic community were in progress. Indeed Uganda, influenced by Tanzania, began to pursue a socialist policy. This brought her even closer to Tanzania but only helped to distance her from her Eastern neighbour Kenya. This warm friendship between the two neighbours prospered throughout the 1960s.

But the honeymoon between Uganda and Tanzania came to an abrupt end on January 25th 1971 when President Obote was ousted in a military coup by his own soldiers as he attended a Commonwealth conference in Singapore.<sup>1</sup> The new military junta that took over power was led by General Idi Amin Dada who had been Dr. Obote's armed forces chief. Events following the coup in Uganda immediately altered relations between Uganda and Tanzania.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Obote sought asylum in Tanzania where he was welcomed by President Nyerere's administration along with many of his top government officials who were lucky not to have been arrested or killed by General Amin.

The Tanzanian government received the new Ugandan regime with open hostility and President Nyerere publicly denounced Amin's government. Many more refugees escaped from Uganda where General Amin had started a reign of terror. Thousands of Ugandans were reportedly butchered by Amin's soldiers in the months following the coup. Hundreds more "disappeared" without trace particularly those who were viewed as posing a threat to Amin's authority. The Tanzanian government gave sanctuary to these refugees from Uganda, an act which

was received with anger and contempt by Amin and his top military brass. Thus, the two neighbours now viewed each other with contempt and hatred. They had suddenly become enemies. Tanzania mainly because Amin had overthrown an ally, indeed one over whom she had, and intended to continue to have a lot of influence on. Secondly, Tanzania was concerned about the role Amin's regime would have on the newly formed East African Community in which Obote had co-operated with Tanzania over certain issues of mutual concern.

On her part Uganda, immediately after the coup, regarded Tanzania as an enemy because Tanzania had given refuge to Dr. Obote and many of his supporters numbering about 2000,<sup>3</sup> an act which Uganda saw as a real threat to her security. Amin therefore became not only defensive but also bellicose toward Tanzania.<sup>4</sup> Amin was particularly worried about the fact that given President Nyerere's past relationship with Dr. Obote, both men would most certainly plan to topple his new government. This state of affairs therefore had the immediate effect of straining relations between Tanzania and Uganda.

It is important to note that Tanzania never officially recognised the new Ugandan regime. For this reason, Uganda regarded the instability that came in the wake of the coup as having something to do with Tanzania which had clearly demonstrated her stand through the support she had given Ugandan exiles. We hasten to note that it was not in the national interest of Tanzania for the Amin regime to continue being in power in Uganda. Given this fact, Tanzania immediately set out to put in place plans aimed at overthrowing Amin and restoring Dr Obote back as Uganda's President. By March 1971, Tanzania had already started training and arming Obote's supporters.<sup>5</sup> From this time onwards the policy of the military government in Uganda was one of viewing Tanzania as the immediate enemy and a real danger to its survival.

In February 1973, Amin accused Tanzania of plotting against his regime. This charge followed an invasion by supporters of Obote from Tanzania in September 1976<sup>6</sup> which had easily

been repulsed by Amin's troops. But President Nyerere continued to criticise Amin and his government charging that Amin was not only dictatorial but also racist and inhuman.<sup>7</sup> He accused Amin of flagrant violation of the human rights of Ugandans and called on Ugandans to raise up against this barbarism. Meanwhile, Ugandan refugees in Tanzania had started reorganising themselves with the aim of returning to Uganda to remove General Amin from power. As insecurity intensified in Uganda, more refugees fled into Tanzania and Amin became increasingly uncomfortable. In July 1974, he accused President Nyerere of planning to invade Uganda with the aid of Zambia so that Nyerere can return Obote to power. Amin's anxiety was further confirmed when later the same year he threatened to invade Tanzania. He repeated this threat the following month, when he amassed more than 4000 Ugandan troops along the Tanzanian border.<sup>8</sup> His contention once again was that Tanzania was increasingly aiding Ugandan refugees, arming them and encouraging them to threaten Uganda's government. For this reason according to Amin, his government could not sit idle and watch while its security was being jeopardised. His army began to stage exercises at the frontier and Amin was reported to have boasted that his new Mig-21 fighter aircraft would take only 20 minutes to reach Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>9</sup> During this period, large deliveries of arms to Uganda from the Soviet Union including tanks and Mig-fighters were reported. It is not difficult to decipher the wisdom behind these imports of sophisticated weapons. The Ugandan regime was preparing to protect itself against any attack, whether from the refugee units in Tanzania or Tanzania itself.

Amin's fears were genuine. This was mainly due to the fact that ever since the attempt by Obote's men to overthrow Amin in 1972, Obote's supporters and most of the Ugandan refugees had formed a guerilla organisation. Continuous campaigns had been staged by the guerillas, with the knowledge and help of Tanzanian authorities. Although Tanzania had granted refuge to Obote on the understanding that he does not carry out subversive activities against Uganda while on

Tanzanian soil, this condition was never observed because Obote's supporters frequently crossed into Uganda<sup>10</sup> and again in April 1977 Amin accused Tanzania of plotting to invade Uganda. Relations between the two states remained strained as Uganda once again called upon Tanzania to immediately abandon her policy of supporting, training and arming Ugandan refugees.

But Tanzania did not shift her policy on Uganda and Nyerere continued to offer every possible support to Ugandan exiles. Tanzania particularly encouraged these Ugandan refugees to reorganise themselves and invade Uganda. It is noteworthy that the various Ugandan refugee groups in Tanzania were by this time bitterly divided and that attempts to unify them had not achieved much success. Though divided, their one primary goal was to return to Uganda and remove Amin from power.

The period of tension and conflict between the two neighbouring states climaxed when Uganda invaded Tanzania in October 1978, marking the beginning of a full-scale war. Amin knew that he faced a threat from Tanzania since Obote and other senior refugees were based there. Indeed, he perpetually claimed that Tanzania, with an assortment of Western Countries and Israel was about to invade his country. This is the excuse he had used in many of his threats. On October 30th 1978, in a swift move, Ugandan troops crossed the Uganda-Tanzania common boarder and occupied 710 miles of Tanzanian territory,<sup>11</sup> a region called Kagera Salient. Amin's action seemed aimed at pre-emptying any attack that Ugandan exiles in Tanzania may have been planning at the time. On another level, his invasion of the Kagera Salient can primarily be explained by the fact that the Kagera Salient was the main staging ground for Ugandan exiles. Amin's administration however justified the invasion by claiming that the Kagera river was Uganda's natural frontier, and that the area belonged to Uganda!

The Ugandan invasion was a failure and Amin ordered his troops to withdraw from Kagera in mid-November.<sup>12</sup> He had particularly aimed to make it more difficult for anti-Amin refugees

to attack Uganda. Some scholars like Smith however saw the invasion as aimed at diverting attention from the internal problems confronting Uganda at the time. Our argument however is that though Smith's view may be correct, the overwhelming motive was to contain the threat posed by Ugandan refugees in Tanzania for it was not a secret that they were openly opposed to Amin and that they were planning an attack. After the Ugandan attack, Tanzania saw a perfect opportunity to counter-attack and claim that she was liberating Uganda from the jaws of her tyrannical ruler Amin, whose brutal reputation had by now spread the world over. The main reasons however for Tanzania's new policy appeared to be that she had seen a chance to catapult Obote, his supporters and other Ugandan refugees back to power through an attack of her own.

In December 1978, Tanzania increased pressure on the various Ugandan refugee groups in Tanzania and Kenya. Meetings were held in Nairobi to work out modalities of unity among the warring factions. A further preliminary meeting followed in Tanzania around the same time. Meanwhile in 1979, Ugandan rebels with the help of Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda. A full scale war broke out between the two neighbours. Amin's army was itself not very united with serious internal wrangles posing a grave danger to its efficiency more so in the face of an armed attack. Reports indicated that there were massacres and slaughter amongst Amin's troops and Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan troops seized upon this weakness to press their attack, pushing back Amin's troops from their stations near the common frontier. Not even help from Libya seemed to make any difference on the side of Uganda and although there were conflicting reports, it appeared that Tanzanian troops and Ugandan refugee rebels encountered feeble resistance.

In March 1979, a meeting was held between several groups of the Ugandan exiles at Moshi, Tanzania, specifically to bring together the various leaders. Obote's camp faced hostility from within the ranks of some of the groups. Of particular concern was Professor Lule who did not seem keen to work under Obote. During this meeting, the Uganda National Liberation Front

(UNLF) was formed and Prof. Lule, a former principal of Makerere University was elected leader. Since the exiles still remained bitterly split by regional, tribal and political divisions, Tanzania decided to favour a compromise candidate, withdrawing its support for Obote when it became obvious that the UNLF would have been further divided had Obote been chosen to lead it.<sup>13</sup>

At the beginning of April 1979, Tanzanian troops and the Ugandan rebels entered Kampala, the Ugandan capital.<sup>14</sup> The Ugandan army, disheartened and facing mutinies and sabotage by Liberation Movements inside Uganda, could no longer stand the Tanzanian onslaught. Gaddafi's troops, having failed to rescue Amin, left Uganda the same month and Amin himself fled the country. The Tanzanian army remained in Uganda where it enjoyed popular support continuing to advance into the rest of Uganda and at the end of May, it captured Amin's native West Nile Province. Prof. Lule was installed President and although many of the refugees returned to Uganda, Obote himself remained in Tanzania. Lule however did not remain President for long. His regime lasted only 68 days.<sup>15</sup> He was replaced by Obote's former Attorney General Godfrey Binaisa on June 19th 1979 following internal disagreements among the top officials of the UNLF. Obote became President of Uganda the following year.

One important point that the war between Uganda and Tanzania proved was that states can go far once they have reason to believe that a real threat to their national security interest looms. And we said as much in Chapter One. An important aspect to the Uganda-Tanzania conflict was the implications the conflicts had upon Tanzania's relations with her northern neighbour - Kenya. Kenya and Tanzania had continued to enjoy a warm friendship despite their ideologically incompatible paths until Amin seized power in Uganda. Tanzania had expected Kenyan authorities to condemn, in the strongest terms possible, the military coup in Uganda, denounce Amin's leadership and offer limitless support to Ugandan dissidents. In the ensuing conflict between Uganda and Tanzania, the latter expected Kenya to side with her. But Kenya decided to remain

aloof to the goings on between her two neighbours to the extent that she continued dealing normally with Uganda. Consequently, relations between Kenya and Tanzania cooled despite President Kenyatta's refusal of overtures for open friendship with Amin.<sup>16</sup> Although Kenya did offer refuge to Ugandan refugees during Amin's rule, she obviously did not show any meaningful or significant support to them in a manner which would have suggested that, like Tanzania, she wished to see the former Ugandan regime back in power. It was evidently not in Kenya's interests to see Obote back in power mainly because Obote's policies had ran counter to Kenya's. Secondly, as long as the security of Kenyan citizens in Uganda was guaranteed,<sup>17</sup> Kenya decided to deal with Uganda normally, for then her economic interests would be fully achieved since Uganda remained one of Kenya's main trading partners in the sub-region. On another level, Kenya may have acquired an opportunity to slap Tanzania on the face, given the latter's overwhelming desire to continue having an influence over Uganda's affairs.

Since Tanzania clearly indicated that she wished to have nothing to do with Uganda as long as Amin remained president and as long as Ugandan refugees continued being in Tanzania where they were being supported in various ways, it was clear that policy differences stood tall as far as Tanzania-Kenya relations were concerned. These differences were responsible for heightened tensions between the two neighbours in the early 1970s particularly following Obote's exit. Indeed, it was the same differences coupled with other factors that were later responsible for the closure of the Kenya-Tanzania common border in 1977.<sup>18</sup> After Amin's overthrow, Kenya seemed to have welcomed the new government of President Y.K. Lule. But Lule was soon ousted, paving the way for Godfrey Binaisa whose government lasted until May 1980. Binaisa's government, which had a strong pro-Obote faction soon became the darling of Tanzania. Indeed Tanzania announced plans to construct a new link from Lake Victoria to the Indian Ocean to reduce Uganda's dependence on Kenya's port of Mombasa.<sup>19</sup> Kenya reacted angrily to this announcement



for it represented a serious threat to the economic benefits she had always enjoyed from Uganda's continued use of the port of Mombasa. Again, this development helped increase tension between the two states.

Following the ouster of Binaisa on May 11 1980 by a distinctly pro-Obote group led by Paulo Muwanga in connivance with Tanzanians, Kenya launched a vicious verbal attack on Tanzania. Binaisa had attempted to prevent Obote from rejoining Uganda and had seemed not to favour other Ugandan exiles closely associated with Obote and who had remained in Tanzania. Secondly, Binaisa had visited Nairobi to discuss with President Moi terms for improving bilateral relations following reports circulating to the effect that he and Moi had discussed the possibility of Kenyan troops replacing Tanzanian troops in Uganda.<sup>20</sup> It is these two factors that contributed to Binaisa's downfall.

It must be emphasised that Kenya-Tanzania relations became immediately highly strained after Binaisa's ouster mainly due to the role Tanzania played in it. The support Tanzania extended to Obote and his group on the one hand, and the position of Kenya in respect to the leadership of Obote and the favourable political situation that existed in Uganda at the time, widened the already existing gap between Kenya-Tanzania relations. The result was that the border between the two states remained closed and Moi refused to attend an East African summit in Arusha in early June 1980 in protest against events in Uganda and the continued presence of Tanzanian troops there. It is also worth noting that although other factors may have been responsible for the border closure and the subsequent economic impact it had, tensions and hostilities that manifested themselves in Kenya-Tanzania relations during this period had much to do with the policy of Tanzania towards Ugandan refugees in that country and Kenya's attitude and actions towards the same.

Another factor that worsened the already not too friendly relations between Kenya and Tanzania was the attempted coup in Kenya in August 1982. Following the coup attempt, Tanzania

gave refuge to a number of the coup leaders including its leading architect, Captain Ochuka, and two of his closest associates. Although these officers were later brought back to Kenya to face trial, the very fact that Tanzanian authorities had welcomed these officers did not go down well with Kenyan authorities. The implications therefore on the relations between the two states although not extremely serious cannot go unmentioned.

#### **4.2 Refugees as a Key Contributing Factor to Conflicts in Kenya-Uganda Relations: 1980-1995**

Relations between Kenya and Uganda have been marked by conflicts.<sup>21</sup> These conflicts have mainly been of a low level nature. The two neighbours have however continued to co-operate especially with regard to bilateral trade. Unlike the Uganda-Tanzania conflictive relations, the conflicts that have characterised Kenya-Uganda relations have remained at a low level and have never escalated to open war involving the armies of both states.

In 1987 though, a border clash between the two neighbours threatened to blow up into a full-scale military offensive. We want to argue from the outset that the tensions, suspicions and conflicts that have continued to mark the interactions between the two countries are largely a function of refugees from both sides. Although Kenya has never had a significant number of refugees outside her territory, there have been cases where a number of Kenyans have fled the country over the years for political reasons. These have often sought refuge in neighbouring states such as Uganda. Naturally, the Kenyan government has never acknowledged or recognised these as refugees but "criminals" who have fled the country after committing crimes. In our view however, such people are refugees as long as they have fled their country for fear of political persecution as a result of their political inclinations.

On the other hand, refugees from Uganda have fled to Kenya on many occasions on account of the instability that has prevailed in that country for much of the period she has been independent. At present, Ugandan refugees are in Kenyan refugee camps and in major urban centres in Kenya particularly in Nairobi. As we saw in our account of refugee populations in the sub-region, the numbers of Ugandan refugees in Kenya increased throughout the 1980s.<sup>22</sup>

The presence of these increasing numbers of refugees is the single most important factor that is responsible for the strain in the relations between Uganda and Kenya. While a sudden influx of a huge number of refugees would be a cause of concern to the host state especially due to the strain they bring upon her resources and hence national security, we contend that the sheer numbers of refugees flowing into a country does not in itself necessarily worsen relations between the concerned states. What often determines the course of relations between the host state and the country of origin of the refugees has much to do with the attitude of the host state towards the refugees themselves and the specific activities of the refugees. This is to say that even a single refugee can be responsible for a sudden, very dangerous shift in the hitherto friendly relations of two or more neighbours. Of equal relevance is the similar effect domestic happenings have in shaping a state's attitude towards refugees within its borders as well as her own refugees resident in neighbouring states. It is against this background that we examine how refugees have contributed to conflicts in Kenya-Uganda relations.

During Field Marshall Idi Amin's rule, Kenya gave sanctuary to hundreds of Ugandan refugees who fled the chaos and genocide in Uganda. Some of these refugees were ardent supporters of the deposed Ugandan leader, Dr. Milton Obote. But as we noted elsewhere, Kenya did not offer much support to Ugandan refugees who were bent on ousting the Amin dictatorship. The explanation for this was simply that such an action was not in the immediate national interest of Kenya. This also explains why the Kenya government continued to co-operate with Uganda

under Amin's administration. This state of affairs is in line with our theoretical framework whose assumption is that the national interest comes first. In this regard, Kenya remained acutely aware that Amin's regime would guarantee Kenya's continued economic gains from the two states' bilateral trade and that as long as Dr. Obote remained outside Ugandan politics, Tanzania's influence over Uganda would remain effectively checked.

After Amin's overthrow, relations deteriorated between the two states following Kenya's decision to peremptorily expel 4000 Ugandan refugees claiming that they were involved in the country's violent crime wave. Uganda immediately issued an official complaint, terming Kenya's action as inhuman. Later, Kenya issued an ultimatum to a further 5000 registered Ugandan refugees to leave by March 1980. This action, which did not do any better in rectifying the already strained relations between the two neighbours, seemed to follow the ouster of Prof. Lule whose successor, Godfrey Binaisa, Kenya didn't seem to be comfortable with. Not surprisingly therefore, Kenya allowed supporters of ex-president Lule to operate openly in Nairobi from where they kept up their opposition to Binaisa's regime and sent arms across the border. Uganda-Kenya relations were therefore to remain strained. Despite a foreign ministry announcement that Kenya would not allow dissidents to use its soil as a battleground against their own countries, there was enough practical evidence to prove otherwise. Relations however improved during the first half of the 1980s.

But since 1986, relations between the two states have exhibited marked strains. Charges and counter charges have reflected the suspicion and hostility with which both states have regarded each other. After Museveni took over power in Uganda in January 1986, Kenya's President Moi became increasingly distrustful of his regime due to its radical nature. This distrust was enhanced in the ensuing months during which events within Kenya became increasingly alarming to the Moi regime. At this time, a wave of discontent within Kenya directed at Moi's leadership gathered

momentum, culminating in the formation of the "Mwakenya" conspiracy (a Swahili acronym for the Union of Nationalists to Liberate Kenya). This movement, comprising a significant Kikuyu (the Kikuyu are Kenya's largest ethnic group) element, and having representatives from other Kenyan ethnic groups, became the focal point of Kenyan politics.<sup>23</sup> What became apparent is that by mid-1987, "Mwakenya" embraced a wide spectrum of opposition to the Moi presidency.

Moi was therefore concerned that President Museveni's government and the continued unrest in Uganda could provide a source of arms and other forms of support to "Mwakenya" supporters in Kenya. This would present a very serious threat to Moi's regime. There had indeed been reports to the effect that some "Mwakenya" members had fled into Uganda and this heightened Moi's suspicions about Uganda's role. Thus, relations between the two neighbours remained sour. Indeed, tensions grew in early 1987 following Kenya's treatment of Ugandan refugees residing in Kenya particularly those in urban areas. In a statement delivered soon after his arrival in the country from an overseas trip, President Moi declared that "all illegal aliens must go back to their countries".<sup>24</sup> He directed police to arrest all aliens blaming them for insecurity and adding that they were undermining the peace. Police swoops arrested and detained at least 500 Ugandan refugees living in various estates in Nairobi. Kenyan authorities claimed that a number of Ugandans in Kenya were spying for the Ugandan government, an allegation that was never really proved. It is difficult to establish whether indeed Ugandan refugees in Kenya were posing a serious threat to Kenyan security or it was just another attempt by Kenyan authorities to divert attention from the intensifying "Mwakenya" issue. What is for sure is that the rounding up of Ugandans in Kenya was seen by Ugandan authorities as an unwanted provocation and Uganda complained bitterly. Relations between the two states further worsened following the death of a Ugandan who had been taken into custody in early 1987, prompting further protests by Uganda. Uganda denied having interfered in the internal affairs of Kenya in anyway and assured her

neighbour that she had no intention of doing so. Some of the Ugandan refugees who had been arrested and detained were released in July without any charges being preferred against them, ostensibly for what Kenyan authorities called their commitment to ensure that good neighbourliness prevailed between her and all her neighbours.

As the conflict raged, Uganda complained that Kenyans had interfered in freight deliveries to Uganda that were routed through Mombasa, allegations that Kenyan officials denied. In May, Uganda also complained that Kenya had imposed severe border restrictions on her. It was also reported the following month that Ugandan dissidents based in Kenya had increasingly attacked villages in Eastern Uganda. For these reasons relations between the two neighbours remained deeply antagonistic. The atmosphere of tension was exacerbated by the flight into Kenya the same year of Alice Lakwena, who led the "Holy Spirit" Movement (HSM) which had been fighting for the overthrow of Museveni's government but which Museveni's forces ruthlessly crushed.<sup>25</sup> Museveni was infuriated by Kenya's decision to grant asylum to Alice Lakwena, whom Uganda saw as a dangerous threat to her security. In September that year Uganda claimed that Kenya was harbouring and training Ugandan rebels. Kenya swiftly denied these charges, warning Uganda that any attempt to infiltrate Kenya would be met with swift and forceful retaliation.

Relations between the two neighbours were further strained by the influx of more than 2,000 Ugandan refugees into Kenya following another wave of unrest in Uganda. Once more, Uganda accused Kenya of supporting elements bent on ensuring Uganda's downfall.<sup>26</sup> To underscore the feeling among Ugandan authorities, Ugandan troops were reported to have entered Kenyan territory in pursuit of rebels. Kenyan police at the common border near Busia engaged them in a fierce battle for several days during which at least fifteen people lost their lives. The border between the two states was temporarily closed, Kenya expelled Uganda's High Commissioner to Nairobi, while Uganda retaliated by ordering out Kenya's High Commissioner

to Kampala. This period marked the darkest point ever in the relations of the two sister states. Later that month however, both Moi and Museveni met and agreed to withdraw their troops from the common border. The border was reopened, and relations normalised.

But this was not for long. In July 1988, relations worsened again following an attack on Kenyan fishermen at Sumba Island on lake Victoria by Ugandan soldiers. Though it was never explained officially why this attack and others which continued that year and part of 1989 were perpetuated, we can argue that Ugandan authorities remained uneasy about the activities of the Ugandan refugees who had fled to Kenya.

In October 1990, following an armed invasion of Rwanda by Rwandese exiles living in Uganda, Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi directed that all Rwandese refugees must leave Kenya immediately and that Ugandan refugees engaged in "illegal activities" would also have to leave. Moi was a close friend and business associate of then Rwandese president the late Juvenal Habyarimana. It would seem that this announcement was, therefore, meant to show solidarity with him and publicly disapprove of Uganda's obvious involvement in the attack. During the following days, Kenyan police carried out swoops in most major towns seizing refugees from their homes. Some legitimately registered refugees had their documents destroyed by the police and security forces. More than 1000 refugees mostly Ugandans were expelled to Uganda and many others were arrested<sup>27</sup>. The Ugandan government's anger mounted at this action particularly due to the fact that none of the arrested refugees was a senior rebel leader, or those closely associated with rebel groups fighting the Ugandan government at home. She therefore considered this as purely an act by Kenya to show solidarity with the Rwandese regime. Given this state of affairs, relations between the two neighbours remained tense until the following year.

A major conflict between the two states erupted again in early 1995 following what later became generally known as the "Odongo affair". On February 3rd 1995, the Kenyan government-

run Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) reported that a guerrilla group based in Uganda was preparing for the violent overthrow of the Kenya government. The report added that the group's leader, identified as "Brigadier" John Odongo also known by various other names, was born in Seme, Kisumu district and had been living in self-exile abroad since the 1960s. What prompted the government announcement were reports appearing in a Ugandan bi-weekly newspaper, "The Monitor" published for the week ending January 30th 1995 in which the said "Brigadier Odongo" had actually acknowledged the fact that he was preparing to attack Kenya. Odongo is said to have named his organisation as the February Eighteen Movement (FEM) which he said had a military wing, the February Eighteen Resistance Army (FERA)

In the following weeks after the announcement, the Kenya government categorically alleged through stories broadcast by KBC and published in the ruling party-owned "Kenya-Times" newspaper that, the military wing of "Brigadier" John Odongo's FERA was founded with the support of president Museveni's National Resistance Movement(NRM). Claims were also made that Odongo had strong links with the NRM and that he had moved up in rank in the movement's military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), after being promoted in 1986 in recognition of his contribution to the NRM. <sup>28</sup>

The significance of these and many other allegations by the Kenya government on the Odongo issue are reflected in the deep suspicion with which Kenya regarded Uganda, seeing her as an increasingly dangerous threat to her national security. But Uganda responded to these accusations immediately and firmly. Vice President Dr. Wandira Speciosa Kazibwe, speaking a day after the Kenya government announcement, said that her country had been taken aback by the allegations implicating Uganda in a plot to destabilise Kenya. "There is no plot whatsoever of Uganda harbouring guerrillas,"<sup>29</sup> she said. Uganda's foreign minister Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda also



vehemently denied the allegations saying: "There are no rebels whatsoever fighting to overthrow any neighbouring country on our soil".<sup>30</sup>

The Ugandan government and the UNHCR confirmed that Odongo was indeed a registered Kenyan refugee resident in Uganda. The Ugandan government also stated that it was duty-bound, just like any other state to give refuge to any one seeking asylum regardless of their country of origin. But Kenyan authorities led by none other than President Moi declared that Odongo was not a refugee but a criminal. The Kenya government, already angered by the fact that Uganda was housing "Brigadier" Odongo, demanded for the immediate extradition of Odongo and his associate, Mr. Wangamati. Moi also said that other Kenyan "refugees" in Uganda who had contravened refugee rules that prohibit them to engage in criminal or political activities be repatriated. President Moi further accused the UNHCR of having had a hand in abetting the activities of Odongo and challenged the UN body to explain the circumstances under which Odongo fled Kenya and was registered as a refugee in Uganda. It is noteworthy that Kenya has always maintained that it has no refugees anywhere in the world and that those who claim to be refugees were self exiled criminals who have run away to evade justice in the country. Perhaps this explains the firmness with which Kenyan government officials and senior KANU officers were demanding the extradition of Brig. Odongo. President Moi himself threatened to have all refugees thrown out of Kenya if Uganda and the UNHCR did not turn Odongo and his accomplices over to Kenyan authorities to face the "full force of the law".

As relations between the two states further deteriorated, KANU politicians all over the country held demonstrations condemning Brig. Odongo and the Ugandan government. Earlier sentiments about Uganda's intended destabilisation of Kenya using the latter's "self-proclaimed refugees" were repeated. KANU's Mombasa supremo Shariff Nassir declared on March 4th thus, "from tomorrow, every Ugandan living in Kenya must pack and go".<sup>31</sup> The response by Uganda

remained largely cool during the first four weeks following the first news about Odongo's Movement. It however, became increasingly clear that the Ugandan government was not about to hand over Brig. Odongo to Kenyan authorities as demanded by President Moi and other senior KANU politicians. Indeed, there were assertions that Uganda was planning to relocate Odongo to a European country. Demonstrations organised mainly by pro-Government politicians spread throughout Kenya condemning Odongo and castigating Uganda for allowing herself to be used as a guerrilla training ground for Kenyan dissidents. It was also claimed that Museveni had always wished to destabilise Kenya since he took power nine years earlier.

The Odongo affair took on an interesting turn on March 20th 1995 when President Museveni spoke for the first time on the Odongo issue. Acknowledging that he had indeed always known Odongo since 1972, Museveni said that he and Odongo had fought together alongside Tanzanian forces to overthrow Idi Amin in 1979. Museveni further added that Odongo was a Marxist guerrilla who had actually fought in some of the "Liberation" wars in Uganda. These statements fuelled Kenyans' speculation that Museveni and indeed Ugandan authorities were deeply entrenched in a plot to destabilise Kenya. But president Museveni on the same breath categorically denied that he had at any one time offered military assistance to Odongo nor encouraged him in anyway to launch attacks on the Kenyan government. He sought to exonerate himself and his government in the whole saga. Interestingly, he also acknowledged that Odongo had indeed set up guerilla bases in Uganda and undertaken armed raids in Kenya. What Museveni did not say is exactly what his government had done about these activities by Odongo which are clearly a violation of international law. This only confirmed what Kenyan politicians had gone round the country saying that Odongo's guerrilla movement existed, that it was based in Uganda and that Uganda was actively abetting activities aimed at destabilising Kenya.

The strain in the two neighbour's relations was further aggravated by president Museveni's adamant refusal to handover Odongo to Kenyan authorities. In the same statement that Museveni issued on March 20th, he explained that his government would not hand over John Odongo to Kenya. By this time however, it had been revealed that Odongo had actually been relocated to Ghana, a fact that raised the temperatures even higher within the highest echelons of the Kenyan establishment. Museveni offered the explanation that his country had decided to relocate Odongo to a third country because "he did not want to make enemies with the Kenya establishment or the Kenyan opposition". Politically, he said, "it was a problem. We did not want to be enemies of president Moi or his political opponents but rather we wanted to deal with the matter under an international framework".<sup>32</sup>

Within Kenya, opposition politicians saw the "Odongo affair" as a creation of the KANU regime aimed at instilling fear in the people through "unfounded " claims of an impending attack. More seriously, the opposition charged that President Moi was using the Odongo issue to divert public attention from the more pressing issues in the country. One such issue was the pressure by the opposition for a constitutional change in line with a multi-party political system. Evidently, President Moi had shown that he was not keen on allowing a constitutional change which would probably have brought to an end the advantage KANU had continued to enjoy over the opposition political parties.

It must be emphasised that whether the Odongo affair was actually blown out of proportion by the Kenyan government or not, it was the source of yet another very dark period in the relations of Kenya and Uganda. A number of armed attacks that followed in some parts of western Kenya in March and April 1995 were all squarely blamed on FERA by Kenyan authorities. Worse still, Uganda was seen as the force behind FERA's strength and activities. One such attack was carried out in mid-march at Sirisia Divisional centre in Bungoma district in which two administration

policemen were killed. Uganda vehemently denied that the attackers had originated from Uganda or had retreated to that country after their attacks as charged by Kenyan officials. Kenyan opposition figures indicated that the attack had actually been planned and executed by Kenya government operatives, so as to give credence to the government's claims that Kenya faced a serious security threat from FERA guerrillas based in Uganda.

A large number of Ugandan refugees still remains in Kenya including Alice Lakwena, former leader of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), which fought Museveni's government in 1987. Kenya has severally stated that these Ugandan-refugees have been responsible for many criminal activities especially in Kenya's urban centres. We want to argue that suspicions, tensions and hostilities will most likely continue to mar relations between the two states particularly when viewed against the background of the refugees whose threat to the national security interest of both states has been evident. As it was, relations between Uganda and Kenya remained at their lowest level throughout 1995.

#### **4.3 Refugees and Conflicts in Uganda-Sudan Relations since Independence.**

Sudan neighbours Uganda to the north. The two states share a common border. Since independence, domestic happenings within both states have had much influence on the behaviours of each state towards the other. In Sudan, the long standing civil war between the Southern black christians and animists and the Sudanese government which is controlled by muslim Arabs had produced thousands of refugees who have, over the years fled into Uganda. The Southern Sudanese, who have strong ethnic links with the people of northern Uganda have been fighting for autonomy demanding for their own state separate and independent from the Arab north. Their argument has been that the Arabs, who are muslims, regard them as inferior, deny them most of their basic human rights, force them to adopt Islamic religion and culture and generally oppress

them <sup>33</sup>. The southern Sudanese further argue that since they are ethnically, culturally and religiously different from the northern Sudanese, it is only fair that the Sudanese government allow them to secede. But the government of Sudan has always maintained that secession for the Southerners is out of the question and that Sudan cannot be divided along ethnic lines.

It came as no surprise therefore when leaders of the Southerners decided to take up arms and fight for what they believe to be a just cause. Over the years, the conflict between the Sudanese government and the Southerners escalated into full-blown war, resulting in heavy casualties and an exodus of thousands of Sudanese refugees into Uganda, Ethiopia and other neighbouring states. The civil war, which began in 1950s had continued upto date with the Sudanese government determined not to allow the Southerners to breakaway while the Southerners themselves have had to flee and form armed wings such as Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), whose primary objective is to force the government to agree with their demands.

On the other hand, Uganda has on its part suffered from ravages of civil war following numerous military coups since 1970. Fighting continued after the coup that ousted Obote from power in early 1971 pitting Obote's supporters with Amin's and many Ugandans escaped into Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and other neighbouring countries. After Amin was overthrown in 1979, there followed other coups such as the overthrow of Prof. Lule in 1979, Binaisa in 1980, Obote again in 1985 and General Okello in 1986 by the current President Yoweri Museveni. Put shortly, Uganda has not been a stable country and a direct consequence of this instability has been massive refugee flows into Sudan as has been to other neighbours.

Having said that, we wish to point out that the problems that are occasioned by refugee flows from both states are largely responsible for the conflicts that have overshadowed bilateral relations between the two neighbours since independence. The underpinning factor is that each of the two states considers her national security under serious threat from refugees resident within

her neighbour's territory. Compounding this fear are suspicions that Uganda supports, trains and arms Sudanese refugees and vice-versa. It should be noted that as the flow of refugees into both states continued over the years, their relations worsened. This fact allows us to conclude that conflicts in Sudan-Uganda relations are significantly a result of refugee flows.

During Obote's first regime, Sudan correctly suspected that the Ugandan government was sympathetic to Southern Sudanese who as we have noted, have strong ethnic links with the people of northern Uganda. Indeed, there were over 50,000<sup>34</sup> Sudanese refugees in Uganda in 1970. Infact, a good number of them were armed rebels fighting the Sudanese government. Sudan's increasing concern was based on the fact that senior Ugandan leaders especially those from the Northwest including the commander of the Armed Forces Major-General Idi Amin, had shown strong sympathies with the Southern Sudanese cause. Uganda continued to allow relief supplies to pass across the frontier into Southern Sudan although not arms, further annoying Sudan. Sudan was also enraged by Obote's continued supply of aid and comfort to Sudanese rebels in Uganda. Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of Obote's close ties with Israelis who acted as trainers and advisors of his army, a fact which led Sudanese authorities to believe that Sudanese rebels in Uganda were jointly receiving military training along with Ugandan army officers at camps near the common border.<sup>35</sup> Though in late 1970 relations appeared to have started warming up following the capture of Rolf Steiger, a mercenary who was training the Sudanese rebels (The "Anyanya") by Ugandan forces and the subsequent handing over of the man to Sudan, this period of friendship was short lived as evidenced by events following Amin's ascension to power. Shortly after the coup, Idi Amin accused Sudan of having made several incursions into Uganda and carried out bombing raids in Acholi district. Specifically, Amin mentioned incidents which occurred on 22rd and 23rd December 1970 at Oraba, on 18th January 1971 at Akilok, on 26th and 28th January 1971 at

Mnamua and claimed that there were many other attacks. The response of the Sudanese government, delivered by a foreign ministry spokesman was that troop movements in the area were probably connected with action against "Anyanya" (Sudanese guerrillas) camps in line with government policy to suppress the rebels.<sup>36</sup>

Relations tumbled further, with Sudan making more attacks on rebels in northern Uganda and Uganda claiming that Sudan was attacking her citizens without any provocation, a claim Sudan didn't take seriously given that Uganda was giving support to Southern Sudanese refugees in her territory. On April 20th 1971, Uganda sent an official letter of protest to Sudan in which she strongly deplored Sudan's policy towards her. The letter also stated that more than 500 Langi refugees who were supporters of Milton Obote, were undergoing training at Owiny Ki-Bul in Southern Sudan for purposes of waging guerrilla warfare against Uganda and that they had made a number of incursions across the frontier, abducted people, raped women and destroyed property. Sudanese authorities again denied being responsible. On 22nd April however, a Sudanese diplomat was expelled from Uganda followed shortly afterwards by the charge d'affaires, Amin Abdul Latif. In December the same year, Uganda was once again claiming that fierce fighting was taking place three miles inside its borders between Sudanese troops and Southern refugees and that many refugees had been fleeing into Uganda following fierce fighting in Southern Sudan. Uganda stated that she would receive refugees as long as they surrendered their arms, adding that she wished to maintain good relations with all her neighbours and would, therefore, not allow its soil to be used as a base for fighting against them.<sup>37</sup> It appeared apparent that Uganda, despite her claims to the contrary, was actively supporting Southern Sudanese rebels fighting the government of Sudan. Reports indicated that Sudanese refugees had actually been spotted performing military "games" and other training activities alongside Ugandan soldiers. It also appeared clear that Sudan was not going to sit back and watch as Uganda deliberately jeopardised her national security interests.

Sudan therefore undertook immediate steps to counter Uganda's actions. One such step was to launch attacks on suspected rebel positions within Uganda itself and the other was to offer military support including arms and how to use them, to the Ugandan refugees she had granted refuge. This was seen as a perfect retaliatory move which obviously did no good to the already badly troubled relations between the two neighbours. No wonder, therefore, that relations were to remain perilously shaky as each neighbour regarded the other as a terribly dangerous threat to her own survival. Underlining this strain was the continued closure of the two states' common border which had been shut in 1969 as a direct result of accusations and counter-accusations at the time.

In early 1975, Amin appeared to express the wish that past difficulties between his country and Sudan be buried. He is reported to have stated that Uganda and Sudan must not hit each other any more. But his actions and statements contradicted him and only confirmed that he was actually not committed to maintaining friendly relations with Sudan. Just like his attitude towards his East African neighbours Kenya and Tanzania, Amin showed clearly that his government did not care much about good neighbourliness and peace. In mid 1975 for instance, he told a visiting Southern Sudanese minister to inform president Numeiry that he was determined to see Southern Sudan independent within his own life time. He even added that Libya and Iraq would support him in such a policy. Sudan viewed these comments with a lot of concern given that there were five hundred Southern Sudanese in Uganda's army, eleven of whom were officers. Amin's statements did not, therefore, do any good to the already strained relations between the two states. It showed that Uganda continued to support the Southern Sudanese guerrillas in her territory, while at the same time making statements calculated to show that her policy was that of non-interference in her neighbour's internal affairs. Relations deteriorated even further when Amin announced in February 1976 that Uganda aimed to transfer certain parts of Sudan, saying that nearly the whole



of Southern Sudan had been part of Ugandan territory until it was transferred to Sudan by British colonialists in 1914.<sup>38</sup>

Following Amin's overthrow in 1979, the new Ugandan leaders strongly suspected that General Numeiry's government would host and militarily support Amin and his henchmen should they decide to regroup and launch an armed attack on Uganda. Indeed, these suspicions were reinforced by the treatment Sudanese authorities extended to Ugandan refugees including Amin's deputy, General Mustafa Idrisi and Isaac Maliyamungu who had been accommodated at Yei. At first there were reports that the two men were reassembling Amin's scattered forces. But the Sudanese government adopted a different policy, insisting that all refugees totalling over 25,000 were disarmed and would not be allowed to attempt an invasion of Uganda from Sudanese soil<sup>39</sup>. General Joseph Lagu, President of the High Executive Council of South Sudan declared in early June 1979 that nobody would allow Amin to organize a guerrilla war against the new government of Uganda from South Sudan adding that Southern Sudanese people were mostly Christians and had fought to defend Christianity and other traditional values. He vowed that his people would never invade Uganda to fight a Muslim Holy war. Sudan's policy can be seen in the light of her vehement opposition to Tanzania's involvement in the Ugandan conflict.

Though Sudan had her own serious problems with the Ugandan regime, Numeiry, in his capacity as OAU chairman in 1979, voiced his concern that the war in Uganda in which Tanzania was heavily involved had a strong element of hostility against Muslims in Uganda and strongly castigated president Nyerere complaining that Tanzania had violated the OAU charter by invading Ugandan territory. Her failure to encourage Amin's supporters to fight may also have been due to Amin's very poor human rights record and the international condemnation it had elicited throughout his presidency and also a result of prof. Lule's early gesture of friendship towards Sudan soon after he took over power in Uganda. In July 1979 however, there was an attack on

Sudan's embassy in Kampala which was not clearly explained though indications pointed at southern Sudanese rebels having been the culprits. Sudan's government immediately severed diplomatic relations with Uganda in protest. The controversy over Ugandan refugees in the Sudan meanwhile persisted and relations remained bitterly strained.

Although diplomatic relations were restored in March 1980, Sudan remained concerned due to the danger Ugandan refugees continued to pose to her security in the southern region. Relations however, showed some signs of improvement following the reopening of her common border with Uganda in January and the restoration of diplomatic relations in March the same year. Later the same year, Uganda alleged that Sudan was keeping forces on its border which apart from causing fear amongst her citizens, were also representing a growing threat to Uganda's security interests. These allegations were once again dismissed by Sudan as mere lies with no shred of truth. It is worth noting that the first half of 1980s was marked by generally correct relations between the two neighbours despite the persistence of the refugee problem. In June 1986 however, relations nose-dived again following Colonel John Garang's visit to Kampala. Garang, who in 1985 had formed an armed movement named the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement SPLA/Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army SPLM to fight the Khartoum military government, was seen by Sudanese authorities as a very serious threat to its security. Col. Garang's movement had outlined its objective as primarily to replace the military regime of Gen. Numeiry with a unified Democratic Sudan. Garang also set out to portray his movement as national with national objectives, effectively ending the political cleavage between the Islamic north and the predominantly non-Islamic south.

Having already been welcomed by the Libyan and Ethiopian regimes where he was allowed to establish camps and with indications growing that Kenya was also being sympathetic to him (Garang), Sudan had reason to feel extremely disturbed by the fact that Uganda might offer

similar support to Colonel Garang's SPLM/SPLA. His visit to Uganda and the welcome the Ugandan authorities accorded him combined to revive hostilities between the two states. Sudan's immediate worry was that should Uganda too decide to offer military and other much needed support to the SPLM, then she would be confronted by an ever bigger security problem given the proximity of her southern troubled region to Uganda. Interestingly, the Ugandan Foreign Minister assured his Sudanese counterpart in a statement that Garang's visit had been purely personal due to an old friendship between him (Garang) and president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, a friendship dating back to their days as students in Dar-es-salaam university, Tanzania. Sudan quite understandably found it hard to accept this assurance in the light of the unfolding events in Southern Sudan. She strongly believed that Col. Garang's visit to Uganda had strong political motives.

The continuing conflict took yet another twist in April 1988 when Kampala strongly complained that the SPLA had made incursions into Uganda and parts of Arua and Moyo districts into battlegrounds. There were reports that SPLA troops killed, kidnapped, tortured and raped many Ugandan civilians and burned and looted several villages.<sup>40</sup> The Ugandan government's complaints made it clear that Sudanese problems were being transferred into Uganda's territory, particularly that Sudanese Army and SPLA were engaging in battles on Ugandan soil and that many Ugandan citizens had suffered from the effects of the Sudanese government/SPLA conflict.

Despite several attempts by Museveni to negotiate with SPLA leaders with a view to ending the fighting in southern Sudan, the fighting continued and although 11,000 Ugandan refugees were voluntarily repatriated in November 1988, more than 15,000 still remained in Sudan and 30,000 Sudanese refugees were still in camps in northern Uganda, with the number rapidly increasing as the fighting continued. Given this scenario, relations did not show any immediate signs of improvement during the following months particularly because refugee activities on both

sides of the border remained of a serious security concern. Underpinning this state of hostilities was a strong mutual sense of suspicion that each neighbour was actively extending military aid to rebels within her territory.

Accusations and counter-accusations marked the early years of the 1990s coupled by a deep sense of hostility by both neighbours towards one another. Relations deteriorated sharply in April 1995, when about fifty Ugandan troops sealed off the residence of the Sudanese military attache Mr. Hayder el Hadi Omer whom Kampala accused of refusing to hand over a cache of arms including mines, rifles and ammunition found in his possession. Ugandan authorities believed that the arms were meant for Ugandan rebels operating north of the country. This was yet another signal that Sudan, with her deeply ingrained suspicions that Uganda continued to offer all kinds of support to Sudanese refugees bent on fighting it, would continue retaliating by way of extending military support to Ugandan rebel groups particularly the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. The Ugandan government also demanded that Sudan scale down the number of diplomats in her mission in Kampala and ordered fourteen of them to leave the country within two weeks. Sudan complained strongly about Uganda's treatment of her diplomats in Kampala and vowed to take the case to the OAU and "brief all the member states of the organisation about Sudanese-Ugandan relations and how our diplomats were treated in Kampala by Ugandan security forces".<sup>41</sup>

It appeared that the Ugandan government was becoming increasingly apprehensive of the activities of the Lords Resistance Army rebel group with growing indications that the group was responsible for several kidnappings of prominent Ugandan politicians earlier in the year. Due to the large number of Sudanese refugees in the North where LRA activities are centred and strong indications that Sudan was actually supplying them with arms, it remained impossible for relations to normalise. Meanwhile, fighting in the south of the Sudan continued and once again Sudan

strongly believed that Sudanese refugees in Uganda, with ample assistance of the Ugandan government, were giving crucial support to SPLA. It is safe to predict that the conflict between the two states is bound to continue as long as each state has reason to believe that the other is sympathetic and supportive to refugees and other groups who are a threat to its national security interests. As it appears now, there is nothing to show otherwise.

#### **4.4 Refugees as the Significant Source of Tensions in Kenya-Sudan Relations: 1985 - 1995.**

The problem in southern Sudan as discussed elsewhere in this chapter has been an important source of refugees as has been other crises in the Eastern African sub-region. Refugees emanating from Southern Sudan have fled not only into Uganda and Ethiopia, but also into Kenya, Sudan's other Southern neighbour. The flight into Kenya of these refugees gained momentum as from 1985 onwards following the formation of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The actual numbers of the refugees fleeing into Kenya from Sudan have however, not been as many as those fleeing into Uganda and Ethiopia perhaps because the common border between Kenya and Sudan is not as extensive as it is when compared with the latter's other two neighbours. We wish to note that it is difficult to ascertain how many Kenyan refugees have fled into Sudan over the years. UNHCR records do not show. It can be deduced therefore that there are very few if any Kenyan refugees in Sudan. Our argument is that as a result of the presence of Sudanese refugees in Kenya, bilateral relations between Kenya and Sudan have been troubled. These troubles have manifested themselves in the manner in which the two neighbours have viewed each other. Increased armed attacks by the SPLA in Southern Sudan during the months after it was formed drove the Sudanese government into suspecting that Kenyan authorities too had become a source of inspiration to SPLA supporters amongst Sudanese refugees in the country.

It is not difficult to decipher that the suspicions by the Sudanese authorities had much to do with the fact that Sudan's other neighbours, Uganda & Ethiopia were actively arming, training and supplying Sudanese exiled rebels with other necessities. Sudan therefore believed that Kenya was doing exactly the same.

In mid 1988, the Khartoum regime became increasingly convinced that Kenya was giving secret support to the SPLA by offering it facilities for its military operations across the border. The Sudanese foreign minister Hussein Aby Salih was quoted in May 1988 as having stated that Kenya had allowed the SPLM to open offices in Nairobi and that Kenya was actually providing arms to the movement's soldiers. He added that arms shipments from Israel were being channelled to SPLA through Kenyan authorities. The Sudanese foreign minister also warned that if the Kenyan government did not close the alleged offices and stop the alleged supply of arms to Colonel Garang, Khartoum would give sanctuary to Kenyans supporting the clandestine "Mwakenya" movement.<sup>42</sup>

Alarmed by the threat that Sudan's implied action to host anti-Kenya elements would have upon her national security interests, Kenyan leader's reaction was immediate. President Moi, in his Madaraka Day address to the Kenyan public denied that Kenya was harbouring Sudanese rebels and that at no time had Kenya ever offered an office in Nairobi for the leader of the SPLA Col. Garang or any other rebel leader. The President affirmed that there existed no Sudanese rebels in Kenya and challenged the Sudanese ambassador to show the arms allegedly given to SPLA or to pinpoint the office. Said the President: "our only concern is for the plight of the famine stricken people of Southern Sudan".<sup>43</sup> Moi did also mention that self-exiled Kenyan novelist Prof. Ngugi Wa Thiongo had recently visited Khartoum. The Kenyan authorities had linked Wa Thiongo to the "December 12th Movement" (DTM), a "Mwakenya" precursor and had accused him of spreading adverse publicity about Kenya in the Western Media. Moi did not however say that Wa

Thiongo's visit to Sudan had any link with Sudan's threat to aid Mwakenya but it obviously did show that the Moi government was in no way taking the Sudanese threat lightly.

The conflicts intensified as Kenya's Foreign Minister Dr. John Robert Ouko issued a statement saying that "Kenya takes great exception to statements attributed to the Sudanese Foreign Minister falsely accusing Kenya of supporting SPLA". Reiterating Kenya's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any nation which he said was the cornerstone of Kenya's Foreign policy, Dr. Ouko warned that Kenya would not take kindly to provocations from any country.<sup>44</sup> The Kenyan Foreign Minister also summoned the Sudanese Ambassador to Kenya Omer el Sheikh and strongly protested against the reported intention by Sudan to give sanctuary to Kenyan dissidents. He said that Kenya was "bitterly angered" by Khartoum's allegations that Nairobi was shipping arms to the SPLA. On June 5th, Sudanese Foreign Minister Abu Salih summoned Kenya's charge d'affaires in Khartoum Mr. Mwitia Muburi and handed him an official request for the closure of the relief office in Nairobi which the foreign minister claimed served a logistical and military role.

Relations further soured when on June 6th the Sudanese Prime Minister Sadek-el Mahdi demanded that Kenya end alleged contacts with refugees fighting for the Southern Sudanese cause. In a policy statement, El Mahdi said that his government had asked Kenya to close down relief supply offices which he alleged were actually serving the SPLA. EL Mahdi added that while Sudan is keen on monitoring friendly relations with Kenya, this could not be at the expense of Sudan's own security. But in reaction to this, a senior official at Kenya's Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the office referred to was being used for humanitarian purposes only and coordinated the supply of relief food and medicine to needy people in Southern Sudan. As the war of words continued, the Sudanese Prime Minister declared: "I cannot understand why the SPLA should have an office in Kenya when there is a Sudanese embassy there". He also added that his

government had turned down a "Mwakenya" request for permission to launch anti-Kenya activities from Sudan. But Kenyan authorities probably did not believe this as no indication was made of closing the said office.

Sudan brought a new dimension to the conflict when she later laid claim on the Elemi triangle, a piece of land near the common border between the two states. But as expected, Kenyan authorities bluntly refused to enter into any negotiations over the claims. In October 1988, Kenya indicated it was considering closing its embassy in Khartoum as accusations and counter accusations deepened. Kenyan authorities began to get concerned about reports that Sudan had embarked upon a plan geared towards inciting Kenyan Muslims against the Moi regime. Added to these were strong indications that the Sudanese government was increasingly becoming isolated in the region as it was seen as encouraging Muslim fundamentalism. Its Muslim leaders had vowed to extend Islamic influence in other countries as both Uganda and Ethiopia had already voiced concern over this. As such, Kenya became naturally concerned with Sudan's Islamic policy as Sudan continued to accuse Kenya of continuous support for the SPLA.

In March 1989, Sudan expelled two Kenyan diplomats and although diplomatic relations between the two states were not severed, tensions flared as Kenya did not show any signs of disassociating herself with Sudanese refugees and indeed kept housing more of them including top officials of SPLA led by its boss Col. John Garang. Sudan was also angry because Col. Garang continued to own and occupy a posh mansion in Nairobi's upper class Hurlingham residential area from where he directed the rebel group's operations. Kenya again denied that she had any links with nor had aided Garang in any way but this nevertheless could not sway Sudan into believing that Kenya was telling the truth. Relations therefore remained sour and couldn't be helped by Garang himself who implicated the Sudanese government in a number of clandestine schemes in alliance with Libya aimed at training Kenyan political refugees who would return to Kenya to



topple Moi's government. Given Col. Gaddafi's (Libyan leader) international reputation as a staunch supporter of terrorism, Kenya increasingly viewed Sudan as a dangerous enemy. In April 1995 for instance, Col. Garang told the press in Nairobi that Khartoum was training muslim youths to destabilise the region. He disclosed that 300 Kenyan youths were being trained in the Sudan for rebel activity in Kenya. As expected, Sudan issued a vehement denial as had happened in the past.<sup>45</sup> On another level Moi's frequent meetings with SPLA leader Col. Garang in Nairobi has done little to help the troubled ties between Sudan and Kenya. Indeed Moi has held private talks with Garang more than once, talks that have only added salt to the raw wound that has been the Kenya-Sudan interactions for several years.

When Kenya, in collaboration with the UNHCR opened a new refugee camp in Kakuma, Turkana district to absorb fleeing Sudanese refugees, the Sudanese government viewed this development with a lot of skepticism particularly because the Kakuma camp is only about 100 kilometres from the Kenya-Sudan common border. She feared that it would be easy for these refugees to launch attacks in Southern Sudan and just as easily retreat back to their camps in Kakuma.

Kenya-Sudanese relations however, began to show signs of improvement in mid 1995 with increased meetings between the presidents of both states. It can however, be argued that as long as hundreds of Southern Sudanese refugees and top SPLA leaders remain in Kenya, relations can again tumble any time given the uncertainties of domestic as well as external events that may occur in both states and the direction that refugee activities especially in Kenya may take.

#### **4.5 Endless Tensions in Sudan-Ethiopia-Somali Relations since Independence: A Function of Refugees.**

Since independence, both governments of Ethiopia and Sudan have had to deal with secessionist movements fighting for autonomy. As seen elsewhere in this chapter, Sudan has had to deal with fierce civil war raging for many years between secessionist groups such as the SPLA. Ethiopia on the other hand has had to grapple with the thorny problem in Eritrea, one of her provinces which for many years until 1992 fought to secede from Ethiopian federation. There have been other wars following military coups and border hostilities with neighbouring Somalia. The result of these instabilities within the two states which border each other has been a massive influx of refugees into both states.

Somalia, on her part has not been stable either. The war pitting her against Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, and civil strife in that country also sent thousands of refugees fleeing into Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, the war between Eritrean secessionists and Ethiopian forces drove thousands of refugees into Sudan during the over thirty years the conflict persisted until the province won independence from Ethiopia in 1992. In Sudan, the conflict between the government and Southern Sudanese rebels has seen torrents of refuge seekers cross over into neighbouring Ethiopia. By 1969, both countries had about an equal number of refugees, some 30,000 from both sides of their common border. By the time Eritrea achieved independence, the actual refugee numbers had increased many times over. The Southern Sudanese problem persists and refugee flows have continued.

We must hasten to observe that Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan constitute the single most important cause of conflicts in the bilateral relations between and among the two neighbours since independence. The mere presence of the refugees, their activities and the policies undertaken by the respective states towards the refugees are the most

prominent sources of the conflicts. We noted in earlier chapters that refugees have largely been viewed as a threat to the national security interests of many states. Earlier sections have demonstrated the significance of specific government policies with regard to refugees from neighbouring states and how this has led to strain in bilateral relations. It has been no different in the case of Sudano-Ethiopian relations.

Muslim refugees from Ethiopia naturally sympathised with the Eritrean Liberation movement and sought assylum in the Sudan. Conversely, non-muslim Southern Sudanese mainly Nuer pastoralists and Anok agriculturalists sought refuge in Ethiopia's Gambella Province. A border dispute between the two neighbours over the Settit-Humera region remained unresolved throughout the 1960s, with Sudan strongly claiming that the region belonged to her. In the late 1960s, Ethiopia began to believe that the Sudanese authorities were allowing the Eritrean rebels to operate from across the border in the Kasala area. In their turn, the Sudanese accused the Ethiopian government of sheltering Southern Sudanese political refugees.<sup>46</sup> Initially, these accusations and counter accusations remained unsubstantiated and did not erupt into serious conflicts but as the civil wars in both states magnified, and refugee numbers rose, relations between the two neighbours began to deteriorate.

By 1975, large numbers of refugees had entered the Sudan and popular sympathy was felt by northern Muslims and radicals for the Eritrea Liberation Movement. Tensions rose as Ethiopian authorities publicly complained that arms were reaching the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF) and other rebel movements through the Eritrea refugee border camps in the Sudan. Sudan immediately denied these allegations. Ethiopian opposition groups and other refugees easily escaped across the border into Sudan during 1975 and reports indicated that Ethiopian airplanes had on several occasions flown into Sudanese airspace and bombed refugee camps suspected to hold ELF rebels and arms and other supplies.

Early in March 1976, the Sudanese Foreign Minister made it clear that Sudan had been acting with considerable restraint with regard to the violation of Sudanese airspace by Ethiopian airplanes throughout the previous year. The statement added that the Ethiopians had conducted several bombing attacks on Sudanese territory in which Sudanese citizens had been wounded and Sudanese property destroyed. It warned that such provocations in future would not meet with such restraint.<sup>47</sup> Over the next two years, Ethiopia and Sudan increasingly became enemies. Hostilities grew to the extent that the two neighbours almost declared war on each other. President Numeiry of Sudan evidently sympathised with and supported Eritrean nationalist refugees and guerrillas in Sudan and extended similar aid to other Ethiopian exiles in his country. Given the dangerous threat that such support posed to Ethiopian security particularly because she was having problems with other neighbours like Somalia, she regarded Sudan's actions as extremely provocative.

As the Eritrean problem continued, there were indications of an imminent invasion of Ethiopia by Somalia following the latter's claim for the Ogaden region. This drove Ethiopian authorities to seek assistance from the Soviet Union, a request which the Soviets could not resist for it would provide a perfect opportunity for them to extend their influence to the Horn of Africa as the rivalry between the USA and her allies and the Soviet Union intensified as the cold war persisted. By 1979, the involvement of the Russians in the Ethiopian internal conflict had deepened. We want to point out that, this Soviet involvement became a principal source of concern for Sudanese authorities. Sudan viewed it as part of a wider strategy by the former Soviet power to target her and Kenya. This development therefore did not help to improve relations between the two neighbours. An indicator of this was the tendency by the two neighbours to spread hostile propaganda against each other through their respective print and electronic media. Commercial air travel between the two states was suspended in the summer of 1977 and although the suspension was lifted in January 1978, relations remained strained as in July, Numeiry strongly

opposed the Soviet interventions in Ethiopia. Ethiopia launched an official complain to the OAU about Sudan's open policy to support Eritrean refugees and despite negotiations between officials from both states to solve the problems between them, nothing conclusive was achieved. Ethiopia's military leader Col. Mengistu Haile Marriam refused to attend an OAU summit the same month ostensibly because Numeiry had declined to meet him on neutral ground before it opened.<sup>48</sup>

Talks between Numeiry and Mengistu in February 1979 proved to be inconclusive. Ethiopia later blamed Numeiry for the breakdown, accusing him of "betraying Africa by acting as the servant of imperialists" (presumably a reference to the United States of America). We want to argue that despite the Soviet, Cuban and Libyan intervention appearing as the main source of conflict between the two neighbours at this time, the Eritrean refugees in Sudan and the latter's subsequent support for them had infact triggered off the conflict. The other factors were but parameters to the conflict.

In early 1980, a new era of "warm" relations between the two neighbours seemed to have emerged. President Numeiry appeared to be seeking away out from under the enormous human and economic burden imposed by over 360,000 Ethiopian refugees in his country. Relations between the two neighbours showed dramatic improvement throughout 1980 and 1981. President Numeiry himself conceded in 1982 that "may be the relationship between Ethiopia and the Sudan is not as before".<sup>49</sup> Three reasons may explain Numeiry's rapprochement with Addis Ababa. Firstly, Numeiry was particulary worried that Libya might be able to infiltrate agents into Sudan from Ethiopia to help incite the Sudanese people especially in the south against his regime. Secondly, Numeiry wished to stop more Southern Sudanese dissidents being given sanctuary in Ethiopia. Lastly, the Ethiopian refugees in Sudan who at this time (1982) stood at a staggering 450,000,<sup>50</sup> had become a major burden to Sudanese national security concerns and as such she hoped that an Eritrean settlement would relieve her of this burden.

This period of improved ties was however, short-lived. Tensions flared in late 1982 when Ethiopia protested about Sudan's participation in the US Bright Star - 3 Military manouvres. As relations again began to worsen, Ethiopia cancelled a long scheduled visit of its scholars and University officials to mark the Jubilee of the University of Khartoum. In November 1983, Numeiry accused Ethiopia along with the USSR, Libya and Cuba of supporting the armed resistance movement in Southern Sudan. Ethiopia through one of her foreign ministry officials immediately termed the accusations baseless and unfounded and Ethiopia's official media organs accused the Numeiry regime of making Ethiopia a scape-goat to conceal its own internal strife. In a speech on 22 January 1984, President Mengistu stated that it was criminal of the Sudanese government to accuse his regime of instigating the simmering crisis in the Sudan. Mengistu added that Sudan itself was harbouring anti-unity and anti-revolutionary bandit groups opposed to the Ethiopian revolution in its territory.<sup>51</sup>

Relations remained sour even after Numeiry was overthrown in 1985. Infact, Ethiopia appeared to be openly supporting refugees allied to the newly formed armed movement of Col. John Garang (SPLM). Sudan once again strongly condemned Ethiopia's action. In retaliation, she too increased her military training and arms support to Eritrean refugee groups based in Sudan. This meant that relations between the two countries appeared to have gone back to the same state as they were in 1975 - 76. Indeed, the Ethiopian government made no secret of the fact that Garang's SPLA freely used Ethiopian territory as bases for their operations. Besides Ethiopia also accusing Sudan of assisting Eritrean dissidents, she complained that Sudan was allowing imperialist forces to send arms into Tigray and Eritrea as part of the relief aid sent across their joint borders. But it also appeared clear that President Mengistu, like Haile Sellasie before him seemed ready to negotiate a deal involving suspension of support by both governments of their opposition forces who comprised mainly of refugees.<sup>52</sup> Sudan however, doubted the sincerity of Mengistu's gesture

mainly due to the fact that SPLA headquarters remained at Nazareth near the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Another cause of skepticism was that the SPLA also maintained a military camp near Gambela, close to the borders of Southern Sudan. There was also evidence to show that Ethiopia had been transporting food, medicine and other supplies to the SPLA. Finally and perhaps more damaging was the fact that Ethiopia had allowed Col. Garang's SPLA to operate a radio station in Addis Ababa, which Garang made sure to put in maximum use to broadcast propaganda against the Sudanese government.

The military coup in Sudan in 1989 which ushered in a new government in that country did little to normalise ties. And civil war in Ethiopia around the same time gave rise to more than half a million refugees fleeing into the Sudan, increasing the total number of Ethiopian refugees to almost 800,000 by Dec. 1990. In Sudan, the situation was no different and the country hosted about the same number of refugees at the same period in time. Hostilities therefore persisted throughout early 1990s. Even after Eritrea won autonomy in 1992, it soon became clear that relations between her and Sudan were not any better for both states correctly accused each other of harbouring unfriendly groups of refugees.

In early 1995, the SPLA boss Colonel Garang stated publicly that he had reliable information that Sudan was training several hundred Ethiopian refugees with a view to arming them and sending them into Ethiopia to destabilise that country. Although Garang did not actually verify his claims, these allegations only added to the growing concern in the sub-region that Sudan had adopted a new policy of extending her Islamic influence far and wide. Rumours emanating from the West had also indicated that Sudan together with Iran were actually supporting terrorism in various parts of Africa and the Middle East.<sup>53</sup> Even after Ethiopia got a new president (Meles Zenawi), conflicts have persisted between her and Sudan as large numbers of refugees remain in the two states.

Ethiopia and Somalia have also not been friendly neighbours for much of their post-independence existence. Though their problems largely revolved around Somali irredentism as discussed in the previous chapter, civil disorder in both states led to the influx of refugees across the common border. On the other hand, the Ogaden war of 1977 - 78 also had a similar effect of producing huge numbers of refugees from both sides. During the following three years, Ogaden Somalis escaping the fighting and Ethiopian repression flooded into Somalia, joined by people from other ethnic groups escaping the conflicts within Ethiopia. With the country hosting over 1 million refugees in 1980, UNHCR officials termed this as the most serious refugee problem in the world. This huge number of refugees brought with it a number of security related problems which manifested themselves in the hostilities and tensions that worsened the already difficult bilateral relations between the two neighbours.

By 1982 - 3, Somali refugees in Ethiopia opposed to the Mogadishu regime had formed themselves into two main groups: the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). The two formed a working alliance in 1982 with a base in Ethiopia where they received comfortable reception from Mengistu's government. On its part, the Somali government had spoken out previously in favour of the Eritrean struggle and was closely allied to Sudan. As an enemy of Ethiopia, Sudan had successfully extended friendship to Somalia, a fellow muslim state. Ethiopia's interpretation seemed to be that the Somali regime was pursuing a similar policy to that of Sudan with regard to Ethiopian refugees both within Somalia and in Sudan.

Indeed, Sudan had publicly declared her sympathy for Somalia in her conflict with Ethiopia, but there was no proof of military or arms support. Given such a scenario, Ethiopia found it in her interest to support Somali opposition elements in Ethiopia with the hope that a new government in that country would probably bring the dawn of a new era in their relations. Somalia accused Ethiopia of perpetrating several border attacks in June 1982 for which Somali



opposition groups claimed responsibility but which had actually been carried out by Ethiopian forces. This was yet another display of evidence that the Ethiopian army was actively assisting dissident Somali groups in Ethiopia to launch attacks on their country.

In early January 1986, the "Times of London" newspaper reported that raids by Somali dissidents assisted if not instigated by the Ethiopian authorities, and frequent violations of Somali air space accompanied on occasion by bombing and strafing had also continued.<sup>54</sup> A year earlier on Feb 18th 1985, an Ethiopian foreign ministry statement had typified the strained relations between Ethiopia and Somalia by characterising Somali's policy as one of "provocation and aggression". The statement had strongly accused Somalia of supporting armed dissident movements particularly the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front. Here again, policies that both neighbours pursued reflected their quest for survival by eliminating or minimising the security threats posed by their respective refugee groups operating outside their respective borders and who were being actively assisted by their opposing governments. The signing of a joint communique on April 4th 1988 ostensibly to create a "lasting peace" seemed to bring some warmth in the relations of the two states. But Ethiopia's determination to continue allowing the Somali National Movement (SNM) to maintain offices in Addis Ababa and at Dire Dawa guaranteed that the two states would remain deeply suspicious of one another. More importantly, the Mengistu regime provided logistical support to the rebel refugees and in fact allowed the SNM to operate five camps at Dire Dawa region. It was also strongly believed by some Western powers that Ethiopia still supplied military assistance to the rebels after the joint communique had been signed.<sup>55</sup>

Indications showed that a few months after the signing of the joint communique, relations appeared headed for the better as reflected in the public pronouncements by the respective leaders. There were also discussions about the possible repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia and

the conclusion of a communications and air transportation deal between the two states. This remained the position until civil strife set in Somalia beginning 1989, leading to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing into Ethiopia as clans jostled for the control of the country's leadership. The culmination of the civil war was the toppling of dictator Siad Barre and the country has not had an official government upto date (1995). In the absence of an internationally recognised government in Somalia since late 1989, we do not wish to examine her relations with Ethiopia in as far as refugees are concerned because technically the country cannot enter into official relations with other legal international entities such as states since she lacks recognition.

#### **4.6 Refugees and Conflicts in Rwanda-Burundi Relations and their Neighbours.**

Both Rwanda and Burundi were administered jointly by Belgium under United Nations trusteeship, but the two neighbouring states elected to separate on becoming independent in 1960. Both states are populated by mainly two ethnic groups namely the Hutu who are the majority ethnic group in both states and the Tutsi who comprise the minority. During the days before independence and after, the two ethnic groups in both states remained bitterly divided as each sought to dominate the other. It is not within our objectives to go into the details of this internal conflict. What we must point out is that, this bitter ethnic division has intermittently since 1960, resulted in serious internal strife and civil war and the shedding of the blood of thousands of Rwandese and Burundian peoples. As a consequence of the enduring civil disorder, torrents of refugees from both Rwanda and Burundi have flooded the neighbouring states most notably Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and Kenya. The most recent such outbreak of fierce civil war erupted in Rwanda in 1994 after the deaths in suspicious circumstances of the two Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a plane crash in Kigali, Rwanda's capital. During this latest civil war alone, over one million Tutsi were massacred and thousands of refugees fled for dear life.

We contend that refugees from Rwanda and Burundi have been the sole contributor of tensions and hostilities not only between and among the two landlocked sister states, but also between them and their neighbours who have had to shoulder the heavy burden of sheltering the refugees. It is this contention that we here-under wish to prove. Ties between the two neighbours began to show signs of strain in 1961, when the Hutu ethnic group seized power in Rwanda. Fearing persecution, several thousand Tutsi (some heavily armed) crossed into Burundi where upon the Burundi authorities welcomed them. The Tutsi, who had ruled Rwanda in the past, and had a royal background, made no secret of the fact that they intended to recapture the leadership of the country through every means. Having been welcomed in Burundi, their presence there became the basis of the strained relations that were to characterise both states until 1966 when Zaire's President Mobutu intervened and brought leaders from both states to the negotiation table. Internal political developments in Burundi also seemed to favour a stop to hostilities between her and Rwanda. But it should also be noted that Hutu refugees had also escaped from Burundi into Rwanda and were also seeking a triumphant return to their country and take over political leadership from the minority Tutsi who for a long time had dominated the country's politics. The situation in both states therefore was one of concern and suspicion over the intentions of the refugees and their backers, in this case, authorities of both states.

An attempt in 1972 to overthrow Burundi's Tutsi President Micombero by Hutus drove relations to a new low as Burundi accused Rwanda of having played a role in the failed coup attempt. Burundi's precise charge was that Rwanda had not only given refuge to Hutu refugees, but had continued to extend all manner of support to them including tacit encouragement to launch attacks across the border. The uprising resulting from the coup attempt left more than 80,000 people dead and created in excess of 50,000 refugees who fled into neighbouring states. Relations deteriorated further as Rwanda's radio severally called on Burundi's Hutu tribesmen to "avenge"

and liberate themselves from Tutsi domination. Alerted by this open hostility from her neighbour, Burundi forces struck Hutu refugee camps inside Tanzania on a number of occasions eventually provoking a three weeks Tanzanian blockade on Burundi foreign trade and a strong wave of protests from the Tanzanian government.

In May 1973, Burundi's foreign minister launched a complaint with the OAU council of Ministers in which he accused Rwanda of unwarranted provocation, saying that Rwanda had not only armed Burundi enemies but had also massed troops along their common border. At around the same time, a series of attacks on Burundi positions by Hutu refugees based just inside Rwanda drew the ire of Burundi authorities throwing even more cold water on the already "ice-cold" relations between the two sister states.

When Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, seized power in a military coup in July 1973, relations appeared to normalise as Burundi leaders quickly welcomed the new regime with the hope that relations would remain correct and warm. They did, for almost half a decade. In 1979 however, relations faltered again between Burundi and Rwanda. The cause of trouble this time was allegations by Rwanda to the effect that Burundi authorities were arbitrarily arresting and killing Hutu refugees. This proved to be a particularly serious and perturbing allegation as reflected by the reaction of Burundi's President Jean-Baptist Bagaza who stormed out of a Franco-African summit the same year fuming not only over the accusations but also over what he construed as official Rwandan complicity in the distribution of tracts at the summit accusing his government of responsibility in the killing of Hutus, accusations that the Burundi leader strongly denied.<sup>56</sup>

Relations between the two neighbours nose-dived during 1985 and early 1986. Burundi expelled 38 Rwandese nationals in October 1985 bringing to 300 the total number of expelled Rwandese refugees without "correct documents". Relations worsened further in late 1985 when Burundi refused to allow Rwandese trucks transporting goods to Rwanda to pass through her

territory. This action seemed to be a retaliation to a similar action by Rwandan authorities who had earlier on refused passage to a Burundian convoy of transit goods apparently intended for Museveni's NRA forces in Uganda. Burundi had taken a decision the previous year to openly support Museveni, who was fighting to oust the Ugandan government more so because of Museveni's Tutsi ethnic background. With increasing sense of hostility on both sides compounded by evidence of official involvement in refugee rebel activities targeting either state, relations remained cold. Indeed, in mid January 1986, Burundi forces occupied the Rwandese ambassador's residence in Bujumbura, the Burundian capital and soon after the ambassador had to return to Kigali.

Ethnic violence erupted again in Burundi in 1988 driving tensions between both states to new heights. More than 10,000 refugees who had already fled into Rwanda from the strife-torn Burundi narrated horrible stories about indiscriminate killings of Hutus by the Burundian military. Burundi seemed somehow convinced that Rwanda was in some way implicated in Burundi's ethnic strife. But Rwanda stood her ground, maintaining that she was committed to a sincere and dynamic policy of good neighbourliness as reflected in official pronouncements by Kigali radio. But relations remained tense during 1990s.

Regarding relations between Rwanda and her other neighbours, we wish to point out that Rwanda relies on Uganda for the passage of both her exports and imports to and from the port of Mombasa. For this reason, it has always been in her interest to maintain cordial relations between her and Uganda. This inturn would guarantee safe and efficient transit of her goods and hence the growth of her economy. However, this desire to maintain correct relations has not always borne the desired results. Because they share a common border, refugees fleeing Rwanda as a result of ethnic warfare have repeatedly found refuge in Uganda. Initially, Rwanda's source of complaint

was that Ugandan authorities were always mistreating Rwandese refugees through random evictions, harrassment and generally subjecting them to insecurity.

Uganda's internal problems also gave rise to refugees who fled to Rwanda. At one time, Amin warned Rwandese authorities to desist from housing any Ugandan refugees opposed to his government. He threatened to invade Rwanda with massive force should the latter fail to heed this warning. In 1982 and 1983, Uganda evicted more than 10,000 Banyarwanda mainly due to the reality of enduring resentment between the Banyarwanda and other Southern Ugandans. These were reported to have moved to Tanzania. This action by Uganda did little to improve the already tense ties between her and Rwanda.

During 1988, relations worsened due to difficulties in controlling populations along the Rwanda-Uganda common frontier. Coupled to this was fear by Rwandan authorities over Uganda's indifference to Tutsis in Uganda who had severely threatened Rwanda's security. Rwanda was mainly concerned about the 60,000 mainly Tutsi refugees in Uganda at the time, some of whom actually served in the NRA. In early 1990, a rebel group, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), comprising of mainly Tutsi refugees in Uganda and whose key leaders served in Museveni's NRA emerged. Rwanda immediately accused Uganda of being the force behind this movement and even launched complaints to the OAU. But Uganda denied all the accusations. The truth however, was that Museveni had never endered himself to the Hutu government of Rwanda led by Habyarimana. And so allegations that he had an hand in attacks by Tutsi rebels on Rwanda were actually correct. It was an open secret that Paul Kagame, the RPF leader was a close associate and friend of Museveni's. Indeed Uganda is seen by many country's in the sub-region particularly Kenya as having been instrumental in the downing of the plane that killed the Rwandese leader on April 6th 1994 sparking off a civil war that led to over one million deaths. Uganda was also believed to have offered massive support to the RPF, which is predominantly

Tutsi and helped it defeat the Hutu military and take control of Kigali. This brought to an end Hutu domination of Rwandese politics that had lasted decades.

The Kigali-Kampala conflict also spilled over to Nairobi. Juvenal Habyarimana had been a close ally of Moi's for many years, underlining the long friendship that Kenya and Rwanda had enjoyed since Moi ascended to Kenya's presidency in 1978. Understandably therefore, President Moi was not amused by Museveni's policy of meddling in Rwanda's internal affairs by abetting the activities of the RPF. The gap in the relationship between Moi and Museveni widened further after the death of Habyarimana and seemed to prolong the already simmering differences between the two (see elsewhere in this chapter).

After a new Government took power in Rwanda in which the RPF leader, General Kagame was made Vice-president, Kenya remained bitterly opposed to it. It has been alleged that the Moi government granted asylum to several hundred Rwandese Hutus including senior former government officials who fled after the RPF take over. Kenya's action did not please the new power wielders in Rwanda particularly because many of the Hutus Kenya hosted were key suspects in the massacres of millions of Tutsi's during the ethnic flare up.

Relations remained troubled when in 1995, Kenya refused to hand these suspected perpetrators of genocide to a special UN tribunal constituted to probe the causes of the genocide and bring the perpetrators to book. Kenya's decision to refuse to cooperate in this internationally sensitive matter immediately prompted an international out-cry with many leaders in the world wondering what Moi was really upto. Moi insisted that those who killed the two Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda must first be identified saying that his government will arrest anyone who comes to Kenya trying to arrest Rwandese.<sup>57</sup> Relations between Rwanda and Kenya were at their lowest level by October 1995. So were those between Kenya and Uganda due largely to Kenya's

position with regard to Rwandese refugees whom Ugandan authorities said must be arrested and charged with crimes against humanity.

Other than negatively affecting both states, the conflicts between Kenya and Rwanda reflected badly on the helplessness of the UN and its agencies to compel states to act in accordance with its conventions to which they are signatory.

#### **4.7 Refugees and Conflicts in Kenya-Somali Relations since Independence**

As we stated in chapter two, relations between Kenya and Somalia have always been uneasy since independence. The onus of this uneasiness is mainly Somali claims on Kenya's North Eastern Province. These claims, which Somalia formally renounced in 1980 centred around Somalia's foreign policy of self-determination through which she sought to bring under her rule, all lands occupied by Somali speaking peoples. These included Kenya's North Eastern Province (formerly Northern Frontier District) as well as Ethiopia's Ogaden region.

Somalia's policy to "recapture" the North Eastern Province which she actively pursued since independence upto 1980 more often than not, resulted to armed attacks on positions in Kenya by "shifas" (bandits from Somalia). Somalia also encouraged Kenyan Somalis who supported secession of the NFD to flee to Somalia from where they repeatedly attacked Kenya.

Relations between Kenya and Somalia thus worsened in 1964 and 1966 following attacks within and across the border by the "shifas". These attacks which were directed at both the Kenyan government officials and other people increased. It was estimated that about 2000 "shifas" were based in Somalia while 700 were based in Kenya. Amongst the first victims of "shifas" attacks was Kenya's Isiolo District Commissioner Mr. Wabera and a local chief who were murdered in late 1963. Kenya believed that the increased offensive by "shifas" would not have had such a big toll on the stability of NFD had the Somali government not supported them. And



she was right. Somalia was indeed behind the shifta menace in North-Eastern Kenya. Somali officials made it publicly clear that they were never going to tire until NFD was returned to its rightful owners, Somalia. Partly for this reason, Somalia encouraged the Kenyan escapees (mainly of Somali origin) to form a rebel movement to fight for the "Liberation" of the Somali peoples. The Somali government supplied them with weapons and many of the "shifta" attacks that occurred within Kenya during much of the 1960s and 1970s were mainly engineered by the Somali government. Relations therefore remained difficult to normalise. Indeed, Kenya severed diplomatic ties with Somalia and vowed to crush the "shifta" menace. A Kenyan minister was reported to have threatened that the Kenyan government would not allow any Somali minister to land at or pass through Nairobi.

It must be noted at this juncture that while the main issue of contention between Kenya and Somalia remained that of the control of the NFD, Kenyan refugees in Somalia (shiftas) in conjunction with Somali troops appeared to be a strong undercurrent of the conflicts. Vowing to wipe out the "shiftas", the government of Kenya killed 396 "shiftas", captured 33,260 and 200 were still suspected to be at large between June 1963 and June 1965.<sup>58</sup> But this did little to end the problem. Security in the NFD deteriorated throughout 1970s and the Kenya government blamed President Siad Barre's regime for the instability in the province. Kenya insisted that she was duty bound to protect her territory while Somalia vowed to continue to pursue a policy of unifying all her peoples. It was therefore difficult for relations to be corrected.

President Moi, just like Kenyatta before him, restated Kenya's position soon after he came to power that Kenya would never give away the NFD and would defend it vigorously should she be attacked. Relations had somewhat warmed in the mid 1970s following the decision by NFD leaders to support the Kenyan government and Kenya's political process in which they now participated. Internal problems in Somalia may also explain this since Somali leaders were now

pre-occupied with their own internal political divisions. But relations deteriorated again in 1980 when "shifita" activities resumed. This was a direct result of the visit to Kenya by Ethiopia's president during which the two leaders pledged to assist one another should Somalia attack any of them. Relations however, improved significantly towards the end of that year as Somali's policy shifted. She announced that she was no longer going to claim Kenya's territory and that she had now abandoned her policy of self-determination.<sup>59</sup> Somalia must have realised that it was to her best interest to pursue a policy of cooperation with her neighbours. This was among other reasons due to her multiplying internal problems and the increasing tendency to isolate her by the international community <sup>60</sup>.

We wish to also point out that following civil war in Somalia in late 1989 and 1990, hundreds of Somali refugees fled into Kenya where Kenyan authorities in collaboration with UNHCR gave them refuge. But the burden these refugees placed upon Kenya's internal security in particular and continue to do so, have made the Kenyan government to loudly raise concern. Unfortunately, there is no recognised government in Somalia which Kenya can complain to.

There have been complaints from the UNHCR over Kenya's treatment of Somali refugees particularly following reports of forced repatriations by Kenyan authorities. But this has much to do with the strain the refugees have placed on the country's resources and people, and more importantly the government's concern over its national security interests. It is this issue of refugees and Kenya's security that we turn our attention to in the next chapter.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has graphically shown that refugees have indeed been a very significant source of inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa. By so doing, we confirmed our hypothesis three as stated in chapter one. An attempt was made to show that although a surge in the numbers of refugees

in a given country at a given time tended to heighten tensions between the host and the home governments of the refugees, it was nevertheless evident that even small numbers of refugees, indeed even a single refugee can and does contribute to tensions among and between states. This has happened in Eastern Africa. The final sub-section of this chapter also emphasised that despite Somali irredentism appearing as the main cause of conflict between Somalia and Kenya, Kenyan refugees mainly of Somali descent were indeed partly responsible for many "shifita" attacks and the consequent strain in relations between Kenya and Somalia. Our next chapter looks at the impact of refugees on the host country's security with the focus being on how refugees in Kenya have impacted upon Kenya's national security interests.

#### 4.9 Endnotes

1. Africa South of The Sahara, 1979 - 80 (9th edition) (London: Europa Publications Ltd, 1979), p. 1049.
2. G.P. Okoth, "The foreign policy of Uganda since independence towards Kenya and Tanzania. "In W. Oyugi (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992), pp. 368 -369.
3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Annual Refugee Reports, (Geneva: December 1972).
4. G.P. Okoth op.cit, p. 367.
5. Ibid p. 368.
6. Africa South of the Sahara, op. cit p. 999.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Weekly Review, (Nairobi, February 1975).

10. K. Mathews and R. Omari, "Uganda - Tanzania Relations, 1971 - 1980", in Journal of International Relations Vol. 3. No.2 (Dar-es-Salaam: June 1985), pp. 41 - 68.
11. G.I. Smith, Ghosts of Kampala (London: Weinlenfield and Nicolson, 1980), p.179.
12. Africa South of the Sahara, op .cit p. 1050.
13. Ibid, p. 1051.
14. Weekly Review, (Nairobi: April 12 1979), p. 52.
15. Africa Contemporary Record. 1980/81 Annual survey and documents (New York: Africana publishing company, 1982), p. B353.
16. Africa Contemporary Record. 1972 - 73, p.B161.
17. D.K. Orwa, "Continuity and change: Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi" in Oyugi (ed), op.cit, p.312.
18. A.S. Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign policy: The socio-Economic context", in Oyugi (ed), op-  
cit, p. 347.

19. K.J. Nsubuga, "Uganda - Kenya Relations 1970 - 85: The interplay of History, Economics and Geopolitics", Seminar paper on issues in contemporary African international relations, Department of Political Science, Makerere University, February 1988, pp. 16 - 17.
20. African Research Bulletin (political), vol. 16 No. 10, November 1979, Africa Research Ltd, Enter, 1979, p.5430c.
21. H.M. Tirimba, Conflict and cooperation: Antecedents of Kenya-Uganda relations. 1963-1990 unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi 1991, entire.
22. United States Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1991 (Washington: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1991), p. 32.
23. Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, p. 543.
24. Daily Nation, March 18th, 1987 p.1.
25. Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, p. 1035.
26. Ibid.
27. U.S Committee for Refugees, op.cit., p.44

28. Weekly Review, Nairobi, March 10th, 1995, p.6.
29. Ibid p.12
30. Ibid.
31. Daily Nation, Sunday, 5th March, 1995 p.1
32. Weekly Review, March, 24th 1995. p.14.
33. The causes of the Sudanese civil war have been documented by several authors such as I. Zartman among others.
34. See UNHCR Report on Refugees, December 1972.
35. Africa Contemporary Record, 1970 - 71 pp. 1996 - 197.
36. Africa Contemporary Record, 1971 - 72 p.B84.
37. Ibid, p. B243.
38. Idi Amin also made similar claims around the same time regarding Kenya's Western and Rift Valley Provinces, claims that Kenya did not take too kindly.

39. The Guardian. 4th June 1979 p.8 and 5th June 1979 p.9, London, 1979
40. These and other reports appeared in the Ugandan government owned 'The guide' published for the last week of June 1988.
41. Weekly Review. April 28th, 1995. p.30.
42. Weekly Review, June 10th, 1988. p. 52.
43. Daily Nation, June 2nd, 1988 p. 24.
44. Daily Nation, June 3rd 1988. p. 24.
45. Weekly Review, April 7th, 1995 p. 28.
46. Africa Contemporary Record, 1969 - 70, p. B114.
47. Ibid, p. B127.
48. Africa Contemporary Record, 1978/79 p.B123.
49. New York Times (New York: 12th February 1982), p.16.
50. UNHCR Refugee Reports 1982 p. 16



51. Africa Contemporary Record, 1983 - 84 p. B147.
52. "Ethiopia and Libyan involvement", Horn of Africa special issue on the Sudan, vol. 8 No.1, New Jersey, 1985 p. 46.
53. The rumours were mainly orchestrated by the Western press particularly the British and American print and electronic media.
54. The Times, London, 15th February 1986, p.9.
55. African Contemporary Record, 1988 - 89 p.403.
56. African Contemporary Record, 1984 - 85 p.189.
57. Weekly Review, October 13th 1995, see also the East African, October 8th - 15th 1995.
58. Kenya National Assembly Senate Official Report vol. July 1965 col. 610 - 611.
59. W.I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: University press, 1989), pp. 91 - 94.
60. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, social and cultural) 18(6), June 1981 p. 6074.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: REFUGEES AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF A HOST COUNTRY: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

### **5.1.0 Introduction.**

Our main task in this Chapter is to explore the impact of refugees on the host country's security. Refugees do pose danger not only to their countries of origin but also to their host countries. As discussed earlier, they engender conflicts between states by engaging in hostile activities against their countries of origin. In doing so, they poison the relations between the receiving state on the one hand, and the country of origin on the other. This aspect can have serious security implications particularly when it provokes armed conflicts between nations. There is another dimension to national security from the point of view of the host country and which also exacerbates inter-state relations to the extent that the host country tends to attribute its security problems to the refugees' country of origin. It is argued in this study that refugees do pose direct danger to the security of the host country by, among other things, undermining the domestic laws and harmony. This reality seems to characterize the refugee phenomenon in Eastern Africa.

An attempt is made to demonstrate the immediate dangers refugees pose to Kenya's national security interests as a case study. This is done through an empirical investigation. It is hoped that Kenya's experience typifies the situation in Eastern Africa.

### **5.1.1 Kenya's National Security Interests.**

In chapter one we offered a definition of the concept national security interest. Kenya's national security interests are reflected in her foreign policy goals and objectives as well as in her domestic policies. Briefly stated, they include the safeguarding of her territorial integrity and sovereignty against any external or internal attack, the maintenance of good neighbourliness

with other states in the sub-region and the promotion of basic freedoms and rights of her citizens as stipulated in Kenya's constitution.<sup>2</sup> It is also the interest of the Kenyan government to protect the property of the government and that of her citizens. Section 75 (I) of the Kenyan constitution stipulates that: "No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired".<sup>3</sup>

Other important security interests include maintenance of law and order and the protection of the lives of every citizen of the republic of Kenya. The Kenya government has made it perfectly clear that citizens are obligated to do whatever is required of them to protect the nation against other nations and against people within its borders intent on weakening it by undermining the existing social order.<sup>4</sup> Like many other states, Kenya has also spoken loudly on the importance of conserving and protecting the environment, particularly the need to avoid wanton destruction of forests and water catchment areas. This would ensure protection of water and forest resources and would, in turn, nurture favourable climatic conditions for higher agricultural output.

Generally speaking therefore, Kenya's national security interests entail what the Kenya government regards as the best for itself and its people. It refers to the people's well - being, safety of self and property and the protection of all that guarantees this safety. It points at the steadfast defence of the country's national values against any threat whether internal or external.

#### **5.1.2 Study Area and Population.**

This study was carried out in two different areas in Kenya with significant refugee numbers. These are Turkana district and Nairobi area. Turkana district comprises of 7 divisions namely: Katilu, Kakuma, Lokitaung, Lokori, Central (Kalokol), Turkwel and Kibish. The study was carried out in Kakuma refugee camp and its surrounding. The camp is situated about half a kilometre from Kakuma shopping centre in Kakuma division, around 120 km north - west of

Lodwar town. Being the Headquarters of Turkana district, Lodwar town is the base of most senior government security officers besides being the district's business centre. As such, it constituted the other area in Turkana district where data for this study was collected.

According to the Kenya population census of 1989, Turkana district had a population of 184,060', at the time of the 1989 census. It covers 69,146 sq km. 94.5 % of the population belong to the Turkana tribe while the rest are a mixture of other tribes some working in various government and NGO departments while others conduct various business activities. According to the census figures, Kakuma division had a population of 35,356. It covers a total area of 17,510 km. Kakuma refugee camp, which was opened by the Kenya government in collaboration with the UNHCR in 1991, had a population of 36,804 refugees by December 31st 1993. \* The number increased to 37,094 the following year.<sup>7</sup> This implied that the influx of refugees in the division during early 1990s led to a sharp increase in the total population of the division. Kakuma refugee camp houses refugees mainly from seven sources namely; Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Burundi. However Sudanese refugees are the majority. Local people living close to the camp are mainly Turkanas who live in traditional huts called "Manyattas". Other people from outside Turkana district are also found living within and outside the refugee camp. Most of these people are mainly employees of the various agencies operating in the camp and business people most of whom will be found at the nearby Kakuma market. Due to the harsh climatic conditions, no farming activities are carried out in this area of Turkana district. This also applies to most of the other divisions. The main pre-occupation of the Turkana people is nomadic pastoralism.

This researcher gathered information from three categories of respondents which included refugees themselves within the camp and outside, local people living close to the refugee camp (both Turkanas and other "expatriate" communities) and government officials and leaders especially

those in charge of security issues such as District Officers and senior police officers (refer to chapter one for details of the number interviewed and how they were sampled).

Nairobi area, which constituted the second area of the study, is the capital of Kenya. It has an area of 693 sq. km and a total population presently estimated at almost 3 million. In 1989, the city's population stood at 1,324,570 according to the census figures released by the Kenya government.<sup>8</sup> This population is multi-ethnic. But the Kikuyu tribe, who are the majority make up about 32 percent of the city's total population. The remaining 68% is made up of the other Kenyan tribes as well as foreigners from other countries. According to the Kenya government, there are around 100,000 urban refugees in Nairobi. The UNHCR however estimates the number of urban refugees in Nairobi to be around 20,000.<sup>9</sup> These refugees are of mixed nationalities. These are from Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire.

It was difficult to establish the actual number of refugees from the specific countries mainly due to the fact that most of them are not registered with the UNHCR. Indeed, the Kenya government does not recognize them as refugees but "freelivers". Like in the case of Turkana district, this researcher gathered information from the urban refugees, Kenyans living in the city and government officials who oversee security and other opinion leaders.

## **5.2. The Pre-Refugee Security Situation in Kenya.**

For purposes of this study, we consider the pre-refugee period to encompass the period before 1990. We must hasten however to emphasise that we in no way imply that there were no refugees in Kenya until 1990. As we saw in chapter three, there were refugees in Kenya throughout 1970s and 1980s. However, it was after 1990 that refugee numbers in Kenya skyrocketed following chaos and civil war in neighboring states such as Somalia and Rwanda. It was also during the early 1990s that the Government of Kenya (GOK), in conjunction with the

UNHCR, established refugee camps in various parts of the country with a view to minimising their movements and by so doing, containing their effects on the local people. Our argument therefore is that during this period (i.e 1991 - 1995), the massive influx of refugees into the country had a negative impact upon the security interests of Kenya. To appreciate this, the security situation before 1990 when the refugee numbers in the country were markedly fewer, needs to be adequately examined.

One of the most important things that this researcher established from the field during the early stages of this research was that the security situation in the country in general and in the area inhabited by refugees in particular had deteriorated significantly since the coming of the refugees into the country. This, by implication meant that the national security situation in the country was much better during the pre-refugee period compared to the post - refugee period. A casual look at national crime statistics confirms this point.<sup>10</sup> Reported cases of major crimes such as murder, rape, assault, cattle theft, robbery etc, remained generally fewer before 1990 than they did after that year as refugee numbers increased. Table 5.1 below shows the figures of some major crimes known to the police over a period of ten years , five of which fall under the pre - refugee period and five under the post - refugee period.

**Table 5.1 MAJOR CRIMES KNOWN TO THE POLICE IN KENYA, 1985 - 1993.**

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
1. Murder (including attempt)	832	942	1001	981	902	999	1071	1536	1517
2. Manslaughter	278	397	435	453	487	461	461	498	434
3. Rape (including attempt)	370	496	420	465	500	515	543	590	589
4. Assault	14101	14753	15552	14299	13598	13757	13059	12994	12324
5. Other offences against the person	1409	1426	1502	1407	1493	1468	400	274	308
6. Robbery & allied offences	5968	5998	5751	5833	5697	6842	7406	10197	9242
7. Cattle theft	1263	1160	1115	1283	1207	1458	1754	2844	3139
8. Theft of other stock	496	413	354	394	359	343	388	537	600
9. Theft of produce	-	783	769	956	1215	1027	1150	1897	2495
10. Theft of vehicles	-	-	2015	1778	1626	1809	1893	2115	2142
11. Theft by servants	-	4301	4350	4407	4631	4826	5045	5515	5697
12. All other penal code offences	8101	8817	10051	9230	14632	16909	20855	20400	8417
<b>Total</b>	<b>32818</b>	<b>39486</b>	<b>43315</b>	<b>41486</b>	<b>46347</b>	<b>50408</b>	<b>54113</b>	<b>59398</b>	<b>46904</b>

Source : Compiled from Statistical Abstract, various years between 1988 and 1994.

According to the figures depicted in the table above, reported cases of major crimes during the period between 1985 - 1989 were much lower than those known to the police after the large influx of refugees into the country beginning 1991 - 1995. Indeed, there was a sustained increase of rape and attempted rape cases reported to the police throughout the ten years beginning 1985 to 1995. For instance for the five year period beginning 1985 and ending in 1989, there were 2221 cases of rape and attempted rape reported to the police as compared to 2237 cases reported during the four year period from 1990 to 1993. Except for assault, all other major crimes reported showed a general increasing trend magnified in all cases during the "post - refugee" period. This, therefore would give truth to our contention that, the security situation in Kenya before 1990 was indeed not as bad as after that year.

Apart from crime, other security issues of concern to the Kenya government include environmental issues, health issues particularly general health and well - being of the citizens etc. The pre - refugee period in the country in general and in the areas where this research was carried

out in particular was marked by far much fewer incidents of environmental destruction such as destruction of forests without any meaningful afforestation programmes being initiated. With particular reference to the area surrounding Kakuma refugee camp, it must be emphasised that before the camp was opened, the approximately 6 km by 3 km area covered by the camp was itself dotted by numerous drought resisting semi - desert vegetation which is no longer there. It is easy to establish this fact judging by the other nearby areas where although heavily destroyed, some trees still remain. Indeed, trees were cut to give space to the many houses and huts, offices and other facilities that make up the camp. There is little or no sign of any serious afforestation programmes going on, perhaps due to the harsh climatic conditions. Local inhabitants questioned also attested to the fact that, before the refugees came, there were no business activities involving the sell of wood fuel in Kakuma market. This however changed as local people saw an opportunity to make some money from the desperate refugees through the sale of wood fuel. The effect has been widespread destruction of the environment around Kakuma.<sup>11</sup>

Another aspect of environmental destruction is that of pollution. Before the refugee camp was established in Kakuma, the seasonal river Tarach which borders the camp, was far less polluted. Evidence of this can be found in cases of water related diseases such as bilharzia and typhoid which, during the pre - refugee period, were much fewer than cases reported during the post - refugee period. Evidence during the research also showed that, because of lack of toilets in the refugee camp, most of the refugees used the bushes on the banks of the river. During seasonal rains, the human waste is washed into the river, which becomes the main source of water for the local people. The polluted water therefore affects the health of the people, leading to many cases of typhoid, diarrhoea among other water borne diseases.

With regard to other types of diseases, we found out that reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhoea and other infections of the urinary tract remained largely



minimal upto 1990. Granted that other factors may also have come into play, the sharp increase in such cases reported after the refugee camp was set up in Kakuma, as well as similar diseases in Nairobi, suggested that indeed refugees remained a leading factor with regard to the escalation of such diseases among the Kenyan public. Despite the fact that available figures only represented the period from 1989 to 1993, it is not difficult to discern the fact that, cases of sexually transmitted diseases increased as the number of refugees in the country also went up. Below is table 5.2 which shows reported cases of some selected diseases to illustrate this point.

Table 5.2 ANNUAL OUT-PATIENT MORBIDITY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED YEARS AND AREAS

	Turkana District			Nairobi Area	
	1989	1990		1989	1990
1. Diarrhoea	9,401	10,092		26,502	27,737
2. Urinary infections	1,006	1,655		13,873	15,551
3. Gonorrhoea	770	989		12,990	14,399
4. Abortion	126	155		1,068	1,438
5. Bilharzia	111	149		161	199
6. Intestinal worms	1,599	1,750		9,974	10,698
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,013</b>	<b>14,790</b>	<b> </b>	<b>64,568</b>	<b>70,022</b>

Source : Compiled from Health Information Reports, (GOK), various years between 1989 and 1993.

Table 5.3 ANNUAL OUT - PATIENT MORBIDITY STATISTICS, 1992 -1993 FOR TURKANA DISTRICT AND NAIROBI AREA.

	Turkana District			Nairobi Area	
	1992	1993		1992	1993
1. Diarrhoea	12,650	13,429		28,838	29,052
2. Urinary tract infections	2,816	3,530		29,741	32,987
3. Gonorrhoea	1,462	1,994		16,771	17,909
4. Abortion	212	287		2,996	3,479
5. Bilharzia	209	230		988	1,162
6. Intestinal worms	2,099	2,474		14,454	15,742
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,448</b>	<b>21,944</b>	<b> </b>	<b>93,788</b>	<b>100,331</b>

Source : See Health Information Reports, GOK, Ministry of Health , 1992 , 1993 and 1994.

The rising figures for sexually transmitted diseases confirm another finding, that the level of prostitution was much lower before refugees moved into the country. Evidence of this was most pronounced in Kakuma and Lodwar where despite strict traditional checks on sex, it was found that many young Turkana girls had gone into prostitution lured by the easy money that many refugee men were willing to spend on sex. Before they moved into Kakuma, prostitution was almost alien among local people. As the figures above show, reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhoea were around 770 in 1989 in Turkana district. This was

two years before the Kakuma refugee camp was opened. Four years later in 1993, the number had shot up to almost 2000. It should also be noted that it is not only local women and men who engage in this prostitution, but also refugee women as well as men.

Yet another serious security issue remained that of HIV/AIDS. AIDS has become one of the leading killers in the world today. The worst thing is that, unlike other STDs, it is incurable. Worst affected are the youth who are more sexually active. As such, the Kenyan government, like other third world countries has spent lots of money on AIDS awareness campaigns with emphasis being on prevention. Statistics show that the pre-refugee situation was characterised by very few AIDS cases. In Turkana for instance no AIDS case had been reported until 1991 when the camp was opened at Kakuma. The argument in this thesis is that refugees who flocked into the country from some countries with one of the highest reported cases of the disease such as Uganda were much more responsible for the spread of this disease among Kenyans. Even figures in Nairobi have continued to show a drastic increase over the years. Being a metropolitan centre, the AIDS figures for Nairobi cannot be strictly associated with refugees alone. Though it is quite possible that they are responsible because many refugee women are known to be among the city prostitutes, we must point out that many other Kenyans and foreigners were also responsible. Table 5.4 shows reported cases of AIDS in some selected districts in the country during both the pre - refugee and post - refugee periods to allow for easy comparison.

Table 5.4 AIDS CASES BY DISTRICT OF REPORTING SITE

Year	<u>District</u>				
	Nairobi	Mombasa	Turkana	Garissa	Busia
1987	295	804	0	1	0
1988	403	1416	0	0	0
1989	728	2363	0	3	25
1990	759	2812	0	12	582
1991	1684	2756	34	0	130
1992	1497	2423	53	48	56
1993	1232	2327	53	26	388
1994	1551	547	89	76	398
<b>Total</b>	<b>8551</b>	<b>15448</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>1579</b>

Source : Kenya National AIDS Control Programme.

The figures show that there has been a general increasing trend of AIDS cases reported within Kenya since the refugees began to flow in earnest into the country in 1990. In Turkana district for example, no AIDS cases, even a single one had been reported until 1991, when 34 cases were reported. It should be noted that Kakuma refugee camp was opened early that year. By the end of 1994, a total of 229 cases had been reported. In Nairobi, the figures show an

alarming increasing rate from 295 reported cases in 1987, 403 in 1988 and 759 the following year. The figure had shot to 1953 in 1994. This coincided with a period of tremendous increase in the refugee population in the city. In Mombasa which also held significant numbers of refugees, the AIDS cases reported during the pre - refugee period were much lower than those for the post refugee period. Again, a general increasing trend is clearly visible. But being a tourist town with thousands of tourists from foreign countries each year, the increase in AIDS cases reported for Mombasa district should not be seen principally as resulting from refugees alone. It is contended that these tourists were possibly much more responsible for the increased numbers. We have also shown figures for Busia district which is situated at the border between Kenya and Uganda which is also home to a number of refugees from that country. The figures show a similar rising trend over both periods. Our conclusion was therefore that refugees had greatly contributed to increased cases of STDs in the country and worse to the alarming spread of the killer scourge that is the HIV virus that causes AIDS.

Other issues of national security importance which were largely unheard of before the refugees came into the country particularly in Turkana district included riots, cases of arson and malicious destruction of property (we have given statistics of some of these elsewhere in this section), cattle theft etc. Although incidents of cattle theft are really not new to a nomadic community like Turkana where local neighbours like the Pokot are also semi - nomadic herders, evidence hereabove suggests that, such cases tended to increase with the establishment of the refugee camp in Kakuma. Local people interviewed as shown later in this chapter attested to this fact. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain specific figures for Turkana district regarding cattle and livestock theft. Figures for Rift Valley province (see table 5.1 above) showed a general increasing trend particularly after 1990.

We also found out that the traditional way of life of Kenyans, their values and customs had been negatively affected by the presence of refugees in the country. This applied more with regard to the Turkana. It was found that before the refugees came, Turkanas largely maintained some of their key, positive traditions such as the sanctity of sex. Cases of prostitution amongst the community were unheard of. Immorality was also limited. The coming in of refugees in the area had drastically changed the people's perception of these customs. What follows in subsequent sections is a detailed report of the findings of specific national security concerns and the extent to which refugees are responsible for insecurity in the country.

### **5.3.1 General Information about the Respondents.**

As noted in chapter one, this researcher gathered information from three categories of respondents namely refugees, local people living close to the refugees and opinion leaders who included Government of Kenya officials particularly those in charge of security issues, NGO officials and other key informants believed to have adequate information relevant to the study.

A majority of the refugees interviewed (90%) reported that they were registered with the UNHCR as refugees. A small proportion (6.7%) indicated that they were not registered refugees while the remaining (3.3%) did not respond to the question. Although the majority reported that they were registered refugees, this researcher felt that there was a strong possibility that some of them particularly the urban refugees in Nairobi may have been lying. This feeling was strengthened by UNHCR officials who said that majority of urban refugees were not registered with the organization. A possible explanation for their decision to say that they were registered when they were actually not could have been the fear of being repatriated or their businesses being closed up should the government learn of their continued illegal stay in the country.

It had been anticipated that most of the refugees had fled into Kenya during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. This was confirmed by the researcher who in fact established that only a tiny percentage (3.3%) of the refugees had been in Kenya for only one year (at the time of carrying out the study). A large proportion of the respondents said that they had arrived in Kenya as refugees during the past five years while a smaller proportion (16.7 %) said that they had come to Kenya more than five years earlier. This information tallied with the fact that the early 1990s saw the outbreak of civil war in Somalia and later in Rwanda and the intensification of fighting in Southern Sudan with the resultant fleeing of thousands of people from these countries into Kenya.

It was also confirmed that the massive influx of refugees into Kenya was a result of two main factors. These included civil unrest within the refugees' home states and deep fear on the part of the refugees of political persecution. A moderate number of respondents (56 of them or 46.8%) cited civil unrest as the reason that necessitated their escape from home, while the same number of respondents said that they fled to Kenya for fear of political persecution. A relatively small proportion of respondents ( 6.4% ) did not offer any response with regard to why they escaped from their home countries. Not surprisingly, a significant number of the respondents who gave the reason for escaping as fear of being persecuted for their political beliefs were Ugandan and Sudanese. Most Ugandan refugees interviewed expressed their opposition to the Ugandan leadership of President Museveni. Indeed most of them were supporters of earlier regimes like that of Obote and General Tito Okello. Similarly, members of Sudan's main opposition rebel groups who comprise the majority of refugees from that country, held totally divergent views from those of the Islamic government of El Bashir, itself a military dictatorship. An overwhelming majority of the respondents (73.3 %) said that they were first welcomed into the country by Kenyan government officials while about 23.3 % reported that they were first welcomed by

officials of the UNHCR. This implied that the Kenya government approved and willingly welcomed refugees to settle within Kenyan territory. The import of this is that with the increase of insecurity particularly in areas inhabited by refugees, the government seemed to get alarmed, as evidenced by the utterances of its senior officials yet it was the same government which had welcomed these refugees.

For various reasons, it was deemed necessary to find out whether or not the basic needs of the refugees such as food, shelter, maintenance, clothing etc, were adequately met. This question applied mainly to refugees in the camp. The responses were particularly telling. A huge proportion (86.7 %) said that their basic needs were not sufficiently provided for. Infact most of them bitterly complained that there was an acute shortage of food as food rations had been drastically reduced for unexplained reasons. They also complained about the shortage of building materials and firewood among other things. It was however found out that a fraction of the refugees (10 %) felt that all their basic needs were fully met. But this finding could be explained by the fact that, not all refugees in the camp came from poor backgrounds. Besides, some of them had relatives who were relocated to western countries such as the US and Britain and were frequently receiving financial assistance from them. A very small proportion of the respondents (3.3 %) acknowledged that while some of their needs were adequately met, others were not. This seemed to indicate that they felt partly satisfied and comfortable and partly not.

With regard to category two of our respondents which involved local people living close to refugees, the sample of 150 respondents taken included people of diverse occupations and backgrounds ranging from professionals like doctors and teachers to peasants and students. The idea was to gather information from a wide cross - section of people with a view to knowing in which way(s) they have been affected by the presence of refugees. Their ages ranged between 17 - 65 years with the majority of them falling under the 20 - 45 years old bracket. A large



proportion of them (70%) had lived in their present area of residence (close to refugees) for more than five years at the time of the research while a smaller proportion (20%) said that they had resided in the area for a period between two and three years. The remaining 10 % indicated that they had lived in their present area of residence for less than two years at the time of the research.

The last category comprised of opinion leaders. These included GOK officials in charge of security issues particularly in areas with a high concentration of refugees. Notable ones included the chairman of the district security committee, Turkana who is also the area DC, District Officers of various divisions visited both in Turkana district and Nairobi area, senior police officers, UN and NGO personnel as well as other leaders. Of the total respondents in this category, forty percent (40%) had at the time of the research served in their respective areas of jurisdiction for a period of between one and three years, meaning that they had a considerable knowledge of the security situation in the area. Another 40 per cent (40 %) indicated that they had worked in the area for more than three years while only 10 per cent indicated that they had served in the area for less than one year. The remaining ten percent (10 %) did not respond to the question.

All of the opinion leaders, particularly the government officials admitted that there were thousands of refugees in the country with those serving in Nairobi stressing that although the exact figures of urban refugees remained unknown, the number was very significant when seen in the light of the effects those refugees had upon the Kenyan government's policies and its citizens.

### **5.3.2 Relationship between Refugees and Local people.**

Generally speaking, the influx of refugees in Kenya has affected in more ways than one, the lives and the life of the local population. Particularly, this effect has been greatly felt by people who have had to interact with the refugees by virtue of their living close to one another

either in the camps or even in urban areas. The refugees often flock into a country in huge numbers, unannounced and they have very many needs themselves. For these and other reasons, the arrival of these refugees in Kenya as elsewhere has had consequences upon local peoples' attitudes towards them.<sup>12</sup> For instance ninety seven percent (97 %) of the local respondents agreed that the influx of refugees into the country had affected their lives in various ways while only three percent (3%) reported that they had not been affected in anyway by this influx despite the fact that they had continued to live and interact with the refugees for a long period of time. It was deemed necessary therefore, to find out the attitude of both the local people and leaders towards the refugees and vice - versa with a view to getting to understand fully the relationship between the two. An understanding of the relationship between the refugees themselves was also sought.

Although local people and refugees continued to interact in various ways including trade and business activities among other forms of interaction, this researcher found out that a deep mutual sense of mistrust and suspicion existed between them. Indeed, thirty four percent (34 %) of the local people questioned indicated that the attitude of the refugees towards them was outrightly hostile and unfriendly. A similar percentage (34 %) of the same category of respondents said that they considered the attitude of the refugees towards them as suspicious although not exactly hostile while twenty eight percent (28 %) replied that refugees were generally friendly to them. This, they said was reflected not only in their business dealings with each other, but also in presents and other items that they exchanged from time to time.

The refugees themselves held almost similar views. Thirty seven per cent (37 %) said that local people neighbouring them were friendly and welcoming to them. But then almost an equal proportion (36%) reported that the local people viewed them with open hostility and suspicion for no reason. Another 27 per cent indicated that they were not sure which answer to give. The response from the opinion leaders was not very much different. Although a larger proportion of

them (58 percent) reported that the relationship between refugees and local people was generally satisfactory, a significant proportion (42%) felt that the relationship between the two was in fact not a good one.

It was thus concluded from the above findings that although the Kenyan authorities had allowed refugees to settle in Kenyan territory and enjoy the country's hospitality, the relationship that had continued to exist between the refugees and the local people was not very healthy. Even senior officials of the government admitted that indeed, there existed serious problems of attitude between the locals and the refugees. The study found out that the explanation for this unhealthy relationship lay particularly in the presence and activities of refugees in the country, which continued to be a serious threat to the social, economic, environmental and physical security interests of the Kenyan people.

### **5.3.3 Physical Safety of the People and their Property.**

One of the central responsibilities of any government is to safeguard the security of its citizens and their property. The security significance of citizen's physical safety lies in the fact that when people are secure and harbour no feelings of fear from within or without, they go about their business much more zealously and they are therefore more productive. Similarly, when the peoples' property is secure and is under no threat of being taken away from them, again they tend to work harder with the aim of increasing what they already have so that they can have even more. This increased output from the lowest level translates into higher national output with the net result being that the country is able to realise stable growth in all sectors of its economy: It is the inalienable duty of the Government to ensure (for its own interest) that everyone of its citizens is physically safe and protected and that his or her property is guarded against any actual or potential harm be it theft or destruction. This principle forms one of the key national security interests of

Kenya. It is reflected in the protests that often accompany incidents that adversely affect the peoples physical well-being as well as their property.<sup>13</sup>

This study found out that a majority of the people living in areas inhabited by refugees harboured a deep sense of fear for their physical safety and that most of them had suffered loss of property which they had reason to attribute to the refugees. Ninety five percent (95%) of those interviewed said that they had lost property such as cattle, clothes and other items which they strongly suspected had been stolen by the refugees. Only a mere 5 percent (5%) of the respondents indicated that they had not incurred any loss although they maintained clearly that they did not feel very secure. It was noted that among the Turkana respondents, many spoke with bitterness about how they had lost goats to the refugees particularly those goats that strayed into the camp which is not fenced off. Others reported that their huts had been broken into and their food rations (issued to them under the feeding programme coordinated by the Government of Kenya (GOK) and the World Food Programme (WFP) stolen. But in the case of Nairobi, we were unable to confidently accuse the refugees as being the culprits given that many other people (local) lived in the area as the refugees and could have been just as responsible for thefts as the refugees. It was however clear that feelings of insecurity ran high amongst local people especially in estates such as Kayole, Soweto and some parts of Eastleigh.

Apart from theft, it was also established that there had been several cases of physical assault of local people by the refugees. Fighting between locals and refugees was found to be a common phenomenon especially in areas close to the refugee camp. Sixty percent (60%) of the respondents among local people said that they had heard of or witnessed cases of physical assault and fighting involving refugees and local people while about seven percent (7%) of the respondents reported that they had been victims of assault by refugees especially at night near Kakuma market on the stretch of road between the market and the refugee camp. This was

confirmed by local government officials and police officers, eighty percent (80%) of whom emphasised that cases of theft and physical assault against local people by refugees had sharply increased raising the concern of the Kenya government. One reason explaining these security problems occasioned by refugees was that local people were opposed from the beginning to the establishment of the Kakuma refugee camp.

It was discovered that rape of local women and girls by refugee men was another major problem facing the local population. People interviewed complained that several women and girls had been way laid and raped by refugees from Kakuma camp. This researcher found this a rather surprising revelation given that newspaper reports had seemed to highlight an increasing number of rape cases of refugee women by local men in and around the refugee camp. But this notwithstanding, our findings underlined the fact that rape was not only directed at refugee women but that it was a growing problem among the locals. This researcher in fact saw with his own eyes a young Turkana woman about twenty five years of age who had been brutally raped and seriously beaten up by a group of young refugee men. The lady, whom this researcher found lying outside Kakuma police station with a swollen, blood soaked face and bruised legs, had gone there to report the crime.

But a big number of the refugees interviewed ( 44% ) indicated that they were not aware of any of the above mentioned incidents. A moderate proportion (36 %) completely refused to accept that refugees were responsible for any incidents of theft of property of local people or rape of local women. Some observed that local women who may have been raped provoked their attackers, or had loitered into the refugee camp to engage in prostitution !. Others further hinted that refugees were being blamed unfairly for wrongs they did not commit because of their defencelessness. About three respondents however admitted that some refugees were responsible

for theft of local people's property while only one refugee respondent acknowledged that some refugees had actually been responsible for incidents of rape of local women.

On their part, Government of Kenya officials interviewed maintained very strongly that there had been a steady increase of actual rape of local women and attempted rape cases in the area. They attributed this to the refugees. Indeed, ninety percent (90%) of the opinion leaders including all GOK officers questioned agreed that refugees were responsible for incidents of theft of local peoples' property, prostitution and rape among other ills. The remaining ten percent (10%) comprising mainly of NGO officials were either non-committal or refused to respond to the question.

Given the candid testimony by the local people who were the real sufferers, and the local GOK security officials who are in charge in these areas, it was difficult to believe the refugee respondents who either denied or said they were not sure. Indeed, seventy percent (70%) of the government officials particularly police officers acknowledged that they had handled many cases of rape of local women by refugees adding that it had become very risky for unaccompanied women to move freely within the area next to the Kakuma refugee camp especially at night. This researcher could only therefore conclude that refugees had occasioned great fear and suffering amongst local people who felt that they were no longer safe and so was their properties and cattle. And this fear is justified when viewed against the background of the psychological trauma that rape causes on the victim and the ever increasing dangers of contracting AIDS and other venereal diseases.

#### **5.3.4 Illegal Weapons, Drugs and Illicit Brew.**

One of the greatest risks to national security has to do with the illegal introduction into a country, of illegal arms. The danger is usually that guns, pistols, grenades, bullets and other forms

of military hardware can always land into the hands of criminals bent on unleashing terror on the people through murder, robbery and other forms of criminal activities. It then becomes difficult for government security machinery to protect the citizens when heavily armed gangsters roam around. It is crucial, therefore, for a state to have in place rules and procedures to strictly prevent any visitors coming into the country for any purposes while armed including those who illegally find their way into the country while carrying firearms. But given the nature in which refugees flock into a country, it is always difficult to ensure a thorough screening in order to rid them of any illegal weapons that they may be carrying.

In Kenya, this has been a great issue of security concern to Kenyan authorities. Given that many armed conflicts within several of Kenya's neighbours have produced thousands of refugees into Kenya most of whom have flocked into the country suddenly and in large numbers, it was never always possible for GOK and UNHCR officials to thoroughly screen the refugees and to take away any weapons they may have had. The result was that many refugees managed to flee into the country with assortment of fire arms. As a matter of fact, Eastleigh section of Nairobi is well - known as a market for all sorts of fire arms ranging from small .22 caliber pistols to machine guns and AK 47 rifles.<sup>14</sup> These have found their way into the country courtesy of Somali, Sudanese, Ugandan and other refugees.

This study found out that refugees easily found their way into the country with weapons despite the screening procedures at most border post screening centres. Fifty eight percent (58%) of the local people interviewed said that some refugees possessed fire arms. Another thirty percent (30%) reported that they did not know whether refugees possessed or sold firearms while only ten percent (10%) said that they did not think that refugees possessed or illegally sold firearms. Only two percent (2%) did not respond to the question.

GOK officials and most other opinion leaders were unanimous ( 100% ) in declaring that many refugees had come into the country with guns and other weapons. Police officers added that these guns had found their way into the hands of hardened criminals who had committed many armed robberies in Nairobi and other towns and had shot to death a number of people in the process. Asked whether he thought that recent bank robberies in Nairobi and Mombasa had been committed using firearms brought into the country by refugees, one senior policeman in Nairobi answered: "Yes, I am one hundred per cent sure that gangsters who have been terrorising Nairobi residents and those who have staged daring bank robberies brandishing guns have acquired these guns from the many refugees who fled into Kenya with all sorts of arms !". This policeman echoed similar sentiments expressed by Turkana OCPD earlier on during the research.

As expected, many of the refugees interviewed ( 43.4 % ) denied that refugees smuggled fire - arms into the country while only a few of them (6.7%) admitted that indeed refugees smuggled arms into the country. A big proportion ( 50 % ) reported that they were not sure whether refugees brought in fire arms or not. These responses were not in the least surprising given that it would have been the height of naivety for anyone to expect the refugees to admit that they had smuggled dangerous illegal weapons into the country. However, the impact these weapons had on the security situation in the country remained critical. In Turkana for instance, local people reported that three local people had been shot to death by refugees following quarrels over undisclosed matters. Police confirmed this although it was difficult to obtain and have a look at the official police records due to the fact that police officials insisted that it was against their rules and procedures to avail crime records to civilians, including this researcher.

This researcher therefore concluded that, the coming into the country of refugees had led to an escalation in the number of illegal firearms and the dangers associated with these arms. The most immediate and critical was the increased insecurity of the people manifested in bank



robberies, armed robberies, car theft, murder of unsuspecting citizens who tried to protect their property from being stolen etc. Most of these criminal activities involved the use of fire arms such as pistols and guns.

Besides smuggling of fire arms into the country, it was found out that refugees were freely and illegally smoking marijuana ( bhang). Local people voiced their concern with some parents saying that they feared that their young sons would be influenced by the refugees into starting to smoke or even peddle the drug. In Nairobi, fifty two percent ( 52 % ) of the respondents among local people revealed that hard drugs like cocaine and hashish were being sold in estates like Eastleigh, Kayole, Kariobangi, Komarock among others. Some of these areas have huge numbers of refugees. Indeed, it was noted by most respondents that some street children were being used by several refugee drug dealers to push the drugs in exchange of a small fee. About forty percent ( 40 % ) of local people agreed that consumption of drugs especially among the youth had increased. They were however unwilling to point a finger at the refugees, only insisting that other Kenyans were also in the business. But twenty eight percent (28%) of the refugees questioned said that indeed they smoked bhang and went on to say that it was the only way through which to escape from constant thoughts about the many problems they faced, such as hunger. Forty percent ( 40% ) said that they had no idea about drug pushing or use by refugees, while twenty five percent (25%) denied any link between drug abuse and refugees. On their part, opinion leaders agreed that drug use had increased and added that, most of the hashish in the Kenyan market had come from Somalia. About thirty percent (30%) agreed that refugees had alot to do with drug peddling in the country while a similar proportion ( 30 % ) were not sure. Half of the remaining forty percent (40%) said that the problem had as much to do with refugees as with the local Kenyans. The other half offered no response. This researcher concluded in view of the above responses that, indeed, refugees had to a certain extent contributed to the increasing incidents of

drugabuse among Kenyan public. Some of the refugees were part of networks smuggling hashish from Somalia, sometimes in collusion with some corrupt GOK officials. It should however be noted that, some local people have also remained key players in the illegal trade in dangerous drugs and should, therefore, share blame for the increasing rate of drug - abuse among the Kenyan public, not the refugees alone.

There was also found to be a widespread brewing and selling of illegal traditional liquor not only within the refugee camp, but also in some estates such as Kayole and Soweto in Nairobi which house significant refugee numbers. We are in no way suggesting that local people were not brewing traditional liquor before the coming in of refugees. They did. What we are saying is that refugees had obviously increased the level of manufacturing traditional liquor. In a place like Kakuma for instance, it was established that, in almost every one in three households, traditional liquor (changaa) was brewed. Indeed, some of the refugee respondents in Nairobi were found and interviewed in changaa and busaa drinking places in Soweto and other areas. In Kakuma, some local people interviewed expressed concern over the cheap illegal liquor sold in the refugee camp saying that many of their young sons and husbands spend most of their time drinking. Others were bold enough to declare that the refugee camp was a big blessing to them as they now could easily afford to buy themselves a drink.

The refugees who were interviewed overwhelmingly (about ninety percent) agreed that illicit liquor was being brewed in the camp and in estates in Nairobi. Local people and opinion leaders were also in unanimous agreement about this. The refugees however offered several explanations for their decisions to so wantonly brew and sell illicit liquor. One such explanation was that they used it as a source of income to supplement the little food they received from UNHCR. Others loudly declared that it was the only leisure activity that they could indulge in. Whichever reasons they had, one thing remained clear, that this illicit liquor had a very negative

effect upon the local people. Granted that Turkana and other Kenyans drink alcohol, drinking must not be excessive lest other more productive activities particularly in rural areas are ignored. One Turkana man had this to say; "since the coming of the refugees into Kakuma refugee camp, my friends and I can afford to buy a drink because it is sold much cheaply in the camp. We can drink as much as we want". This attitude is indeed very self destructive when viewed against the background of the many negative effects attributed to too much alcohol intake.

Surprisingly, little effort was being made by the camp authorities or GOK officials to stamp out the brewing of illicit liquor. Not even when very young people both boys and girls freely engaged in drinking, some in the company of both their parents. As a consequence, prostitution had thrived and given that most Turkana are polygamous, this researcher felt that with increasing prostitution within the camp and at Kakuma market and given that some refugees were from countries that have a remarkably high rate of HIV/AIDS cases, this situation posed a great threat to the government's declared efforts to curb the spread of AIDS and other related diseases. It does not need stressing that AIDS has become one of the deadliest killers in the world today particularly in developing states. The security significance of AIDS lies in the fact that the disease is a major killer, with the people in the 16 - 30 years bracket being the hardest hit by the disease. This means that if it is not checked, many countries including Kenya will lose most of the able population, the skilled, young people who are most productive. (AIDS figures are given elsewhere in this chapter).

In Nairobi, it remained difficult again to blame the refugees for illegal activities such as brewing of illicit liquor. It was however found that a number of the changaa making houses in Kayole and Soweto were patronised by or in some cases owned by Ugandans. AIDS continued to be a major threat to the lives of the people and while local people acknowledged that it was their lot who were mainly responsible for the spread of the disease due to prostitution and careless

sexual behaviour. Some thirty one percent (31%) felt that refugees especially those from Uganda and Zaire had rather accelerated the spread of the disease.

#### 5.3.5 Subversion.

It has been detailed elsewhere in this thesis that nation states are particularly concerned with any external threat to their national security. One of the important issues this study sought to confirm or disconfirm was whether refugees in Kenya were indeed engaging in subversive activities against their home governments as it had frequently been claimed by some neighbouring states. As pointed out, it is the interest of the Kenya government to maintain good relations with her neighbours as espoused in her foreign policy. As such, this policy seemed to be tainted by reports and statements issued by Uganda and Sudanese government officials to the effect that Kenya was encouraging refugees in her territory who were bent to overthrow their respective governments. This is essentially what we set out to investigate. We first of all confirmed the fact that some of the refugees residing in Kenya were senior members and officials of notable refugee groups fighting the governments of Sudan and Uganda. Included in this category were SPLA top leaders such as chairman Col. John Garang, former Uganda guerrilla leader Alice Lakwena among others. It was felt that, the fact that the Kenya government continued to host these senior rebel leaders in the country whose armed opposition towards their home governments remained unwavering was itself enough reason to breed hostility between her, Uganda and Sudan.

It however proved difficult to establish whether the GOK was extending any tangible support whether military or otherwise to the refugees. Indeed, sixty percent (60 %) of GOK officials vehemently denied that the Kenyan government had at any one time encouraged refugees to fight their home governments leave alone being aware of any refugees subverting their home governments. Another twenty percent (20%) said they were not aware or did not know while

twenty percent (20%) failed to respond to the question. This response from GOK officials was hardly surprising given the fact that no one would have expected the GOK officials to admit the government's involvement as an abettor of hostile activities by refugees directed at their home governments. Indeed, the government of Kenya had been accused correctly by the Sudanese government for having allowed SPLA to open an office in Nairobi sometime in late 1980s.

Majority of the local people interviewed (80%) said that they did not know whether refugees in Kenya were actively fighting for the downfall of their home governments. Twelve percent (12%) said that indeed refugees were actively subverting their home governments, while only 8 percent did not offer a response. Among the refugees interviewed, a moderate fifty percent (50%) answered in the negative while forty percent (40%) indicated that they had no idea. Only ten percent (10%) agreed that some of their colleagues were bitterly opposed to their home governments but added that they did not know who was extending what kind of help if any, to these refugees.

Interestingly, we also found out that indeed, most refugees harbored ill feelings against their home governments. Others even told us that spying amongst some refugee groups like Sudanese was common adding that some refugees had a duty to report on goings on in the camp and outside. Our conclusion therefore was that despite the lack of conclusive evidence, some refugees engaged in subversive activities against their home governments through acts such as spying particularly those escaping from their country who brought information to refugee leaders within the camp who in turn passed this information to their supervisors in Nairobi or elsewhere. This researcher may not have witnessed any secret military training camp anywhere used to train refugees. But it was strongly felt that the GOK may as well have been doing this secretly. What with the government's openly cosy relationship with senior SPLA officials?. What with there being no indication of the government's condemnation of rebel activities within her neighbours'

territory such as Joseph Kony's LRA in Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan?. These were some of the indications that led us to conclude that indeed, it was very possible that the GOK despite denials by its officials, had done little to cut its links with rebel refugees in the country hence the accusations directed to her by neighbours may actually have some truth. And infact most GOK officials questioned (80%) said that Kenya was likely to continue being suspected by neighbours of complicity as long as she continued to harbour refugees regarded as a threat to the security of their home states. On our part, we could not agree more.

### **5.3.6 Environmental Destruction.**

The relevance of a stable environment to national security lies mainly in the contribution of the environment to development. A well protected environment is a panacea for healthy forests, clean unpolluted air and water, fertile soils and a more harmonious co-existence between man and other animals. In other words, a healthy, well protected environment leads to a higher level of economic development. This is because food and nutritional situations influence health. A degraded environment through forest destruction and deterioration of pasture land and erosion of fertile soils inturn results in low output and insufficient food levels and the subsequent reduction in the level of resistance to diseases.<sup>15</sup> Indeed environmental degradation is the main source of poverty and famine.<sup>16</sup> A hungry, disease prone population is a costly burden to any government and can hardly engage in any productive activities. For these reasons, destructive encroachment on the environment whether caused by bad government policies, rural peasants, refugees or corporate interests must be discouraged or eliminated altogether. Unfortunately in Kenya and other countries in the Eastern African sub-region, environmental destruction has reached an alarming stage, becoming a major threat to national security. Responsible for this environmental destruction has been various factors including government ineptitude, corruption of the very people charged

with protecting the environment, the ever increasing pressure on land due to soaring population, pollution and other forms of industrial destruction, refugee activities among others. This destruction has taken the form of massive clearing of areas under forests, dumping of waste into water sources such as rivers, careless dumping of garbage which remains uncollected, air pollution among others.

Our concern in this thesis is on the role of refugees in this environmental destruction. In previous sections of this chapter, we noted that before the coming in of refugees particularly in Turkana district, the environment around Kakuma was very much safe and largely intact. We found out that before the refugee camp was established, the area on which the camp stands which borders a seasonal river, was an important grazing ground for nomadic Turkana herdsmen, and was dotted by semi arid type of vegetation as was other areas surrounding it. Not so after the refugees came in. The area was cleared and the offices and huts sprang up. What we found out during our inquiry was that refugees have been responsible for wide spread environmental degradation around Kakuma division. Various forms of environmental destruction were witnessed. The worst hit were forests (trees to be specific) and the seasonal river Tarach bordering the camp. Before the refugees came, there was very limited cutting of trees around Kakuma mainly for two reasons. First the population was much less and was largely nomadic. Secondly, demand for wood fuel and building materials was extremely low, because Turkana traditional huts require limited wood.

It was established by this researcher that the refugee camp's management authorities provided very little firewood or any other source of fuel to the refugees. As a result, refugees were faced with the dilemma of looking for and acquiring fuel for cooking, and other uses. It was found out that, refugees acquired firewood or charcoal from the few trees that are drought resistant and are scattered around Kakuma area particularly along the banks of river Tarach. Consequently, most of the trees have been felled and the area will soon degenerate into a huge desert if the

practice is not urgently stopped. It was also established that local people were exacerbating the problem by cutting down trees and either selling the firewood to the refugees directly or making charcoal which fetches more money. Indeed, this idea of local people selling wood fuel to refugees in Kakuma has taken root and has become a booming business. While it lasts, a desert is surely and steadily developing around the once relatively green plains of Kakuma.

Another issue of security concern was found to be the blatant pollution of river Tarach. As mentioned before, River Tarach, which is seasonal becomes an important source of water for the local people particularly the Turkanas and their cattle when the rains come. The problem however is that the water from the river is heavily polluted by human waste. It was discovered by this researcher that most refugees had no toilets in the camp so they helped themselves in the bushes along the banks of the river. Some of them even helped themselves on the riverbed during the dry season. Among the local people interviewed, majority of the respondents (85%) reported that refugees were responsible for various forms of environmental degradation. They gave various accounts of the problem, emphasising that refugees were polluting the river with human waste and other forms of garbage. A walk around the camp confirmed that indeed, most refugees had no pit-latrines and walking along the river close to the camp, one is overwhelmed by the stench of human waste. As a consequence, waterborne diseases such as typhoid, bilharzia etc are very common in Kakuma because the people draw water for all purposes (including drinking) from the heavily polluted river.

Although we also found out that most Turkanas did not in fact have toilets themselves and were using nearby bushes as toilets, their contribution to river Tarach's pollution was minimal compared to that of the refugees because for one, their manyattas are situated some distance away from the river. This is because many of them do not feel secure being too close to the refugee



camp. Another reason is that while the refugees' shit was left too close to the river uncovered or at times even directly into the river, the locals used bushes situated some distance away.

Opinion leaders questioned overwhelmingly (100%) admitted that refugees were responsible for environmental destruction in Kakuma. Little efforts were being made to change the situation for the better. Afforestation programs started by the government in the area have failed partly due to lack of commitment and partly due to harsh climatic conditions. Refugees interviewed said that they had to somehow cook and help themselves!. Asked whether they had destroyed the environment around Kakuma, some respondents had this to answer. "How are we expected to cook our food. We are provided with no firewood, charcoal, paraffin or stoves or anything ... we have nothing with which to dig pit-latrines. What do we do"? said one respondent. Another one retorted: "we have suffered alot! yes we have cut trees for firewood. Are we going to starve?. why can't we be provided with fuel?" Yet, another respondent said: "We have not destroyed the environment. What we are doing is try and survive"!

It was evident to this researcher that environmental degradation by refugees particularly in the harsh climatic areas of Turkana district posed a serious danger to the present and future economic development of the district in particular and the country in general. But this researcher was extremely sympathetic to the refugees whose condition was truly pathetic. His heart went out to a particular Sudanese woman seen trying to prepare a meal of beans using pieces of carton paper collected at the camp's administration garbage pit!. But the danger this environmental degradation was posing to the country's national security interests was underlined by the increasing reported cases of water-borne diseases (detailed earlier on in this chapter) as stressed by medical personnel and other public health officers at the nearby Kakuma mission hospital. The local District Officer, while admitting that environmental degradation around the refugee camp had

escalated, said that the government was working out modalities to minimise or eradicate the problem. Little or no evidence of such efforts or modalities was however visible.

In Nairobi, we could only confirm that garbage heaps in refugee dominated residential areas like Eastleigh were ever growing bigger. But again, while it is acknowledged that local people also live in the estate, our argument is that refugees are to blame for the growing state of uncleanliness in Eastleigh particularly in areas surrounding "Garissa lodge", that famous seat of refugee business activities in Kenya. This finding was also supported by the local people and opinion leaders. In slum areas such as Soweto and other densely populated estates like Kayole both of which have refugees, the environment in these areas has also been violated greatly but we can not lay blame squarely on the refugees because local people in these areas are also responsible.

#### **5.3.7 Business Activities.**

It is generally known that a rise in business and commercial activities results in a corresponding growth of the economy of a state. Moreover, a free, liberalised economy where everyone has the freedom to conduct business activities, set his /her prices according to the market forces and conduct business activities without any interference are all strong recipes for a healthy economy.

The coming of refugees into Kenya, particularly in Turkana and Nairobi was accompanied by an influx into the Kenyan market of cheap items that the refugees came into the country with. Some of these goods had been looted from their home countries during the chaos and confusion that had occasioned their flight. Upon arrival, many refugees particularly those from Somalia and Ethiopia set up business activities and began to trade, specialising mainly in cheap items. This was immediately welcomed by local people who saw it as a boon to their weak purchasing power.

People could now afford to buy all sorts of goods including food stuffs, clothes, electronics etc. The problem was that these cheap refugee businesses quickly drove many local people out of business because the refugees offered too cheap prices. Looked at against the country's overall national security goals, this phenomenon proves detrimental. First of all because the country has been trying to deal with an ever increasing unemployment rate. It has infact been encouraging school leavers to go into "jua kali" business to support themselves precisely because there are no jobs for them. Refugees therefore began to drive out most of these local struggling businessmen who now had nowhere else to turn to. Before the refugees came, many of the business people were comfortable, conducting their businesses without any unfair competition. We argue therefore, that, the refugee influx was hurting Kenya's noble goal of encouraging "Jua - Kali" business activities to local people with a view to combating unemployment.

A large proportion of respondents interviewed among local people particularly those in business blamed the refugees for virtually taking over and controlling most business activities. These represented about fifty percent ( 50% ) of the respondents. Another forty percent (40%) of the respondents said they had no problem whatsoever with refugees running businesses in their markets, while the remaining ten percent ( 10 % ) elicited no response. It was however largely felt that despite the items sold by refugees being cheap, most were of very low quality. Another critical concern was that, refugees had tended to monopolize the business, leaving out the local people. This was the case in Kakuma market before the provincial administration ordered police to prevent refugees from venturing out of the refugee camps into major towns, and for the refugees to confine their business activities in the camp. <sup>17</sup> One reason local administration officials gave was that some refugees misused the relative freedom of travel to migrate from the camps to towns where no agency cared for them, hence, they risked falling into crime and prostitution. The other reason was that of business rivalries between refugee business people and the locals.

On the restriction of refugees in the camp, a number of refugees bitterly complained to this researcher. A local daily reported one refugee as quipping: "Kenyan business persons in centres close to the camps have colluded with the provincial administration to frustrate refugee entrepreneurs out of business by denying them travel".<sup>18</sup> Other respondents noted that they saw no reason as to why government should restrict them in camps where they cannot operate profit-making business ventures. Some UN camp management officials, asked to comment about this trade rivalry between refugees and locals chose to reserve their comments.

In Nairobi, businessmen in Eastleigh also strongly lamented about the strong monopoly of business activities by Somali and Ethiopian traders at "Garissa lodge". Local business people also complained that they were slowly being forced out of the market by cheap-selling goods sold outside pavements in the city centre. These goods were said to belong to prominent refugee business tycoons in Eastleigh. Although some local people, it was established, had welcomed the opportunity offered to them by this cheap, low quality goods trade, the trade was badly hurting our local entrepreneurs hence, was impacting negatively to our country's national security interests. As at the time we concluded this research the rivalry between the refugees and local business people both in Kakuma and in Nairobi continued.

### **5.3.8 Rivalry between Refugees themselves.**

As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter not all refugees who have flocked into this country see eye to eye!. We noted earlier that tension among different groups of refugees from the Sudan particularly the Dinka and the Nuer has often erupted into fighting. This study established that this is not a characteristic unique only to refugees from the Sudan. Among Somali refugees for instance, deep feelings of mistrust and hostility exist as exemplified by the minimum interaction of Somalis from different clans. Indeed cases of serious fighting pitting refugees from certain

Somali clans in various refugee camps in the country had been reported in the press.<sup>19</sup> Often, such differences had their roots in the political feuding at home. Majority of the opinion leaders interviewed ( 70% ) and a high number of local people (63%) reported that rivalry among refugees existed. More importantly, we found out that the intensity of fighting amongst the refugees both within Kakuma refugee camp and even in Nairobi's Eastleigh, often spilled - over into the residences of the local people creating fear and despondency among them . Sixty one percent (61 %) of the refugees interviewed agreed that there existed differences among some refugee groups but they also insisted that these differences were only minimal. Thirty percent ( 30% ) said that they were not aware of any serious wrangles among refugees while nine percent ( 9 % ) gave no response to the question. Refugee community leaders interviewed noted that there were mechanisms put in place for resolving any problems which may crop up from time to time in the camp and that any disagreements were often amicably resolved. But this researcher had difficult believing this particularly after attending one stormy meeting called by Dinka community leaders to resolve a bitter conflict involving three members of the community. No agreement was reached and tensions ran high throughout the meeting.

Fighting amongst rival Somali clans in Kenya has often escalated raising the concern of the Kenya government officials. These fights are a serious threat to public security because they expose local Kenyans living close to the warring refugee groups to grim danger of being hurt or killed. Again, people can hardly go about their normal daily activities when they know that they are in danger. Administration officials in Nairobi said that government security personnel had ensured that peace prevailed in areas with heavy refugee presence like Eastleigh. But hard evidence remained elusive more so if one had to consider the heavy presence of all sorts of firearms in this section of the city. Business rivalry was also cited by some respondents as a possible source of hostilities among the refugees. We therefore concluded that such rivalry was

likely to continue as long as instability persisted in the refugee's home countries and as long as new refugees continued to trickle into the country. Government too, seemed not to be doing enough to eradicate the problem as proved by the evidence on the ground.

### 5.3.9 Riots and Arson

Another serious security threatening issue that we confirmed was that of riots and mindless destruction of property by refugees. Many refugees felt that the UNHCR and the Kenyan government were not looking after them well enough. They cited insufficient food rations, clothing and beddings and a host of other necessities. For this reason, we established that refugees occasionally rioted in protest about alleged failure of authorities to treat them well. Local people questioned ( 73 %) said that they had heard or witnessed riots by refugees. Of the remaining twenty seven percent ( 27 % ) of the respondents among local people, twelve percent ( 12 % ) indicated that they were not aware that there had been any riots while the remaining fifteen percent ( 15 % ) offered no response. Of those who reported being aware of riots orchestrated by refugees, most were those living within a two kilometre radius from the refugee camp while those who said they were not aware of any riots by refugees lived about five kilometres away from the camp. It was possible therefore that due to the distance between them and the camp, they could not have heard or witnessed such riots. Those interviewed also noted that the riots were often accompanied by burning of houses within the camp as well as those outside nearest to the camp. The rioters also destroyed property. Goats, donkeys and camels belonging to the local people were always either stolen during the riots or maimed. The situation usually proved worse for the local people because the rioters sometimes expected the locals to join them in their protests. Those who refused, it was learned, were usually thoroughly beaten up. Government security forces sometimes took long to intervene and return the situation to normal according to a number of local people.

As a result, the damage incurred was usually extremely high. Many local people narrated to this researcher how they had lost their animals, had their homes burnt to the ground, were injured, or had their animals slashed. One woman narrated how her son had been beaten up thoroughly and critically injured during fierce riots at Kakuma refugee camp in 1994. Some shopkeepers had their shops broken into and looted during the same riots. Local people said they were forced to flee as pandemonium broke all over the place. These riots had followed an earlier announcement by the UNHCR that it was planning to conduct a head-count of all refugees so as to synchronise food distribution. This announcement proved very unpopular indeed.

Those interviewed in Nairobi reported that they had not witnessed or heard of riots involving refugees anywhere within the city. However, a moderate number ( 39 % ) noted that there had been isolated incidents of destruction of property and burning of houses in Soweto and Kariobangi. It was however, difficult to ascertain whether refugees were solely responsible for these callous acts or it was the local people or both. Our conclusion was that these acts of riots and arson were criminal activities which negated the government's vowed commitment to protect its people and their property. These activities were also in contrast to the provisions of the Kenyan constitution and were hence, a risk to the national security interest of Kenya.

#### 5.3.10 **Other Issues of Concern.**

Other important issues of concern to the Kenyan government according to government officials that were closely associated with refugees included the effects of their lifestyles and values to the local people particularly in Turkana district. It was found out that Turkanas were fast abandoning their traditional values some of which they have held for centuries. Example is sex. Before the refugees came into Turkana, we were informed that sex was highly respected among Turkanas. Only married people are allowed to engage in sex according to Turkana customs.

These customs were mostly respected before the establishment of the camp except a few isolated cases. But not since the coming in of refugees. Many local women had taken to prostitution, perpetuated by themselves and refugee men either within or outside the refugee camp. Young men were also abandoning their traditional economic roles, not to go to school but to hang around the refugee camp.

Another issue of concern was found to be that, some refugees who had come into the country illegally and had failed to register themselves as refugees were later corrupting government officials to obtain Kenyan identity cards, passports and other legal documents that they did not qualify to possess. Administration officials conceded that this had caused a lot of problems especially to the country's scarce resources. The same refugees, having illegally acquired Kenyan registration documents were tarnishing Kenya's image abroad by engaging in such ills as drug trafficking.

There were other serious problems local people were facing which they attributed to the presence of refugees in the country. Many of them ( 88%) both in Nairobi, Kakuma and even Lodwar town bitterly complained that the refugee influx had resulted in massive increase of house rent pushing some Kenyans from more decent dwellings to slums as they could no longer afford to raise money to pay house rent. The worst hit areas in Nairobi included Eastleigh, Komarock and Kayole. A middle aged man who lives in a single - roomed house ( bed - sitter ) in Kayole estate with his wife and two children told this researcher that he used to live in a two - bedroomed flat at Eastleigh section three in 1992 where he used to pay Ksh 2,500 monthly rent. He went on to say that he had been forced to move out to his present residence when the landlord suddenly hiked the house rent by around three hundred percent ( 300% ) to ksh 8,000 per month. This followed the arrival of many "high - spending" refugees especially from Somalia and Ethiopia in the area. Attempts to look for another house within Eastleigh, he said, proved futile as all other



land lords had also hiked the rent. In short, the issue of housing had become an extremely thorny one particularly in areas with significant refugee populations.

Some local people also said that refugees were using money to bribe their way into the few job opportunities both in the private and public sector having acquired false identification papers. This of course happened at the expense of academically superior and more deserving local people. Government officials did not of course agree with this assertion, although this researcher strongly felt that this was a serious possibility given the high level of corruption especially within the ranks of Kenya's civil service.

#### **5.4 Implication to Kenya's Relations with Her Neighbours.**

We have seen that evidence showed that refugees in Kenya had negatively impacted upon the country's national security interests. We want to argue that, as a result of this negative impact, Kenya's relations with her neighbours particularly Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda had greatly deteriorated. Kenya had also on numerous occasions loudly protested against fighting by Somali clans within Kenyan territory. Unfortunately, there is no recognized government in Somalia to which Kenya could officially complain. Nevertheless, her protestations indicated strong feelings about that country in the face of its refugees' activities in Kenya. Indeed, Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi is on record advising Somali refugees against fighting one another while in Kenya adding that the hospitality Kenya had accorded them must be reciprocated through peaceful co-existence among themselves and the local people.<sup>30</sup>

Kenya has also openly engaged in a war of words with both Uganda and Sudan as a result of refugee activities in Kenya perpetrated by Ugandan and Sudanese refugees. There have even been cases of diplomatic expulsion, official protests and counter protests and massive repatriation by Kenyan authorities of refugees from Uganda accused of engaging in criminal activities, for

example in 1990 and 1994. Ugandan authorities have at times seen these as mere political gimmicks on the part of Kenyan authorities. Relations have soured (refer to chapter four for details) not only between Kenya and Uganda but also between her and other neighbours on account of the national security threats posed by the refugees in her territory. We therefore again repeat that, the negative impact on Kenya's national security interests posed by refugees as detailed above has often translated into bitter hostilities and conflicts in the relations between Kenya and her neighbours.

## 5.5 Conclusion.

This chapter has shown that the presence of, and activities of refugees in Kenya has negatively impacted upon the national security interests of Kenya particularly where the safety and general well-being of the local people is concerned. It is contended that this situation is reflected in other countries within Eastern Africa. We have also tried to demonstrate that the national security situation before the massive influx of refugees into the country in early 1990s was much better when compared to the post - refugee period. The chapter has also noted that this negative impact by refugees on Kenya's national security interests had in turn, often led to strained relations between Kenya and the refugee's home countries. But it should also be observed that Kenya remained determined to protect her national interests especially where refugees appeared to threaten such interests. This was demonstrated by her decision to close down several refugee camps such as Utange in the coastal tourist town of Mombasa and Thika refugee camp near Nairobi. Clashes between the refugees in Utange and local Giriama tribesmen as well as perceived negative effects on the town's tourist image may be factors explaining the decision to close down Utange refugee camp. Thika's closeness to Nairobi, the Kenyan capital may have been the reason that prompted authorities to shut down the camp. Despite these actions we wish to conclude that the government

seemed not to be doing enough with regard to the security situation in Kakuma and Turkana district in general as evidence showed. As a result, refugees continued to hurt Kenya's security interests. It is hoped that the Kenyan experience is mirrored in other Eastern African countries with significant refugee numbers. This therefore, would give weight to our contention that, refugees do impact negatively upon the national security interests of the host country and confirms our hypothesis as stated in chapter one.

5.6 Endnotes.

1. J. Okumu, "Kenya's Foreign Policy" in O. Aluko (ed), The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), pp. 136 - 162.
2. The Constitution of Kenya (1969) (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969), chapter III
3. Ibid., p. 36.
4. G.W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 212 - 213.
5. Kenya Population Census, 1989, Government printer, 1990, pp. 1 - 149.
6. UNHCR, Annual Reports, 1993, p. 2.
7. UNHCR, Annual Reports, February 1994, p.3.
8. Kenya Population Census op.cit, pp. 1 - 21.
9. UNHCR End Year Situation Report, December 1994, (Nairobi, 1995), p.55.
10. See various issues of statistical abstracts, (GOK) during the period 1986-1990.
11. Despite there being a divisional forestry officer stationed in Kakuma, it was established that little has been done to discourage this unwarranted destruction of the ecosystem.

12. A. Goldschmidt and E. Boesch E, "The World Refugee Problem: Refugees and Development" in Refugees and Development, International conference organized by the development policy forum of the German foundation for international development (Baden-Baden, Berlin: Homos verlagsgesell - schaft, 1983), p.25.
13. The issue of physical harm to the person and the respect for private and public property are issues that are clearly articulated by the Kenyan constitution - GOK officials have often spoken against theft and harm to the person of any citizen of Kenya.
14. The Daily Nation, East African Standard and other Kenyan newspapers have widely reported on the availability of illegal weapons in Eastleigh, Nairobi. A walk in Eastleigh's "Garissa lodge" makes one believe that indeed "everything" is on sell, of course by refugees.
15. "Environment and Development in Africa: What prospects for the future ?" A paper presented for UNEP, Nairobi, 1988, p. 6.
16. East African Standard, Nairobi, 28th July 1995, p.7.
17. Daily Nation, Tuesday, 18th July 1995, p. 19.
18. Ibid.
19. Again these reports have frequently appeared in the Kenyan Print and Electronic media.
20. Daily Nation, Nairobi, 28th July 1995, p. 1.

## **CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6.0 Introduction**

This study began by pointing out that conflict is an important characteristic of interstate relations in Eastern Africa. We emphasized that conflicts constitute a strong barrier to cordial relations between states and hence, act to block bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation upon which relations on social, political and economic issues thrive. Conflicts also help to obliterate the benefits that often accrue from such cooperation. In other words, inter-state conflicts are associated with numerous consequences that are largely negative. In this chapter, the findings of the study are summarised and recommendations made. We then go on to conclude the thesis.

### **6.1 Summary of Findings**

Chapter one of this study is basically an introduction of the thesis. The chapter began by a statement of the problem under investigation which is basically an examination of the role of refugees as an important source of inter-state conflict in the Eastern African sub region. The broad objective of the study was to look at the impact of refugees upon the inter-state relations in Eastern Africa. Among other objectives as set out in the chapter include to investigate whether or not refugees have been responsible for the tensions and conflicts that have been characteristic features of inter-state relations in Eastern Africa. As a way of justifying the study, both the academic and policy significance of the study were outlined. It was noted that a study endeavouring to explain the critical causes of inter-state conflict (such as refugees) and to offer recommendations that can eradicate or minimise such conflicts is indeed a welcome undertaking. It was also observed that the lack of a detailed study showing the impact of refugees upon inter-state relations in the sub-

region calls for a study of the type we have undertaken so as to help fill the gap this dearth of information has created.

It is also in chapter one that we set out in details, our theoretical framework which has been used to guide this study. We adopted the national interest approach of the power theory and argued that national security interests form an integral part of the key interests of states not only in Eastern Africa but also elsewhere in the world. The arguments of key power theory proponents such as Morgenthau are analysed, particularly where national interest is concerned. It is noted that, national security interests dictate the actions of states and the kind of foreign (and even domestic) policies that they pursue. In this respect, we argue that, to the extent that refugees in Eastern Africa are perceived to, or actually do threaten these national security interests of states in the sub-region (particularly those of their hosts), inter-state conflict ensues. In short, the theory assumes that if the national security interests of Kenya for example are threatened by refugees within her territory or outside it, then a situation of conflict is likely to ensue between Kenya and the country of origin.

Other main issues addressed in Chapter one include literature review, hypothesis and methodology. As regards literature review, an attempt was made to critically review literature on inter-state conflict in the sub-region and also in Africa in general. It was noted that most writers on the subject had largely ignored the effects of refugees in inter-state relations. It was also observed that writers on the subject have concentrated on other conflict-causing factors such as economic issues and personality differences amongst political leaders. A review of literature on refugees was also done whereupon a similar finding was established; that scholars have mostly concentrated on the suffering of refugees within their new area of refuge and how refugees can be assisted. Little or no effort has been made to look at their impact upon the communities of

their host states. Four hypotheses were also formulated for the study. These were tested during the research and the findings are contained in chapters two to five.

In terms of methodology, it has been explained that this study utilised both primary and secondary sources of data. The latter sources were used to gather data for chapters one, two, three and four. The former sources were utilised to collect data mainly for chapter five. We explained that the secondary sources of data included books, journals, newspapers and magazines, reports, manuals, documents among others. With regard to primary sources, field data collection techniques were used such as observation and interviews, both verbal and written. Questionnaires were administered to three categories of respondents. Various sampling techniques were used including systematic sampling technique, purposive sampling technique and cluster sampling technique among others. Once collected, the data was coded and quantitatively analysed then presented in the thesis. We also defined key terms used in the study as a conclusion to chapter one.

In chapter two, we analysed inter-state relations in Eastern Africa and argued that conflicts have been a major facet underlining the interactions of states in the sub-region. It was noted that these conflicts were principally a function of the pursuit of conflicting national interests and the protection of the same. Underpinning this, we found out, is the fact that both domestic as well as external variables explain the persistence of conflictive relations between and among states in Eastern Africa. Among the ones we identified include refugees whom, we argued, had led to bitter hostilities between many states in the sub-region. Indeed, specific conflict situations were analysed for the period since independence upto 1995 for instance conflicts in the relations of Uganda-Sudan, Uganda- Tanzania, Kenya-Somalia etc. Our findings further emphasized that numerous consequences of these conflicts were easily discernible and that, they in fact acted to confirm the existence of such conflicts. These, it was emphasized remained mainly negative. Among the



consequences we highlighted include both official and unofficial protests by one or more states party to the conflict, ceasing of official conduct of relations through closure of diplomatic missions, economic blockade, closure of common borders, arbitrary arrests of foreign nationals especially those from a rival state, deliberate enlargement of armies and military hardware and most serious of all, outright war. The findings in Chapter two therefore confirmed our first hypothesis which stated that relations between Eastern African states have been marked by conflicts.

Chapter three of this thesis presented data generated to test hypothesis two which stated that the number of refugees in Eastern Africa increased during the period covered by this study. The hypothesis assumed that over the years, refugee numbers generally rose, on account of a myriad of reasons. The first important thing that we noted in the chapter was that the collection of accurate statistical data on refugees and asylum seekers is one of the most problematic issues confronting global non-governmental and national organisations dealing with refugee matters. Several factors responsible for this problem were outlined. In all, about six factors were outlined including the unreliability of the data due to various reasons such as double counts, logistical problems, the nature of refugee movements, etc.

It was also in chapter three that we presented statistics of refugee populations in Eastern Africa during specific periods from 1972 to 1990, and estimated figures for some countries such as Kenya in the early 1990s. We found out that indeed, the number of refugees in the sub-region increased seven-fold during the period under review. However, it was also established that there were marked fluctuations of refugee numbers at specific periods whereby for various reasons, a marked decrease in the numbers of refugees could be noted in a specific year in comparison with other years. Similarly, we found out that dramatic increase of refugee numbers during specific times was also common. One major reason for this was that the cooling of hostilities either internal or external, had the effect of bringing about calm, hence eliminating any immediate reason

for mass exodus of refugees. Several factors were advanced that helped to explain the reasons behind the mass exodus of refugees in the sub-region. It was noted that among the most serious ones include, civil unrest and public disorder, fear of political persecution, military confrontation between two or more states, military coups and to a lesser extent, natural disasters such as drought, famine etc. It was therefore confirmed in chapter three that, inspite of the fluctuation in numbers, a significant increase of refugee numbers in Eastern Africa was clearly evident.

The findings presented in chapter four related to the impact of refugees upon the relations of Eastern African states. The chapter's objective was also to test hypothesis three which implied that refugees have been responsible for conflicts between and among Eastern African states. Having seen in chapter three that the population of refugees in Eastern Africa had dramatically risen, we argued in chapter four that the impact of the refugees upon the relations between their home states and their host countries cannot be ignored. We went on to analyse the nature of this impact while emphasizing that indeed refugees were a major source of inter-state conflicts in the sub-region. We want to note that our findings fully confirmed hypothesis three as stated above. We found out that indeed refugees were, to a very large extent responsible for tensions, hostilities, and conflicts that had continued to mar peaceful relations between and among states in the Eastern African sub-region. It was noted in the same chapter that activities of refugees themselves while inside the borders of their host state on one hand, and perception of both the host and home governments of the presence of these refugees on the other remained the two underlying sources of the conflicts. A general survey of the Eastern African sub-region was undertaken with a methodic examination of the refugees' role in the relations of specific states in the sub-region. It was revealed that for instance Kenya-Uganda relations since independence were marked by tensions, conflicts, squabbles and hostilities and that these were mainly attributable to the presence and activities of refugees within both neighbouring states. The same case applied to relations

between other states in the sub-region. Ethiopia-Somali relations, Sudan-Kenya, Tanzania-Uganda, Ethiopia-Sudan and Kenya-Somalia were analysed. The common denominator in all of them was that refugees had continued to play a central role in the conflicts characterising these state's interactions with one another, not only bilaterally, but in some cases, multi-laterally as well.

Another finding was that suspicions remained high between the host nation and the source nation mainly because the latter always remained wary of motives of the refugees, accusing them of subversion and castigating the host nation (sometimes wrongly or rightly) while accusing it of aiding "elements" who were a threat to its national security. Specific cases in the sub-region were laid bare. For instance relations between Sudan and Kenya were badly strained in the late 1980's and early 1990's mainly because Sudan believed that Kenya was a key supporter and sympathiser of Sudanese refugees resident within Kenya's territory, who were fighting the Sudanese government. No matter how much Kenya denied these accusations, Sudan remained adamantly convinced and consequently, relations remained sour.

This chapter also detailed yet another interesting finding. We found out that conflicts between some two specific states in the subregion had often "spilled-over" to a third state. This happened in the case of Tanzania-Uganda hostilities in the 1970s. Tanzania had expected Kenya to join her in condemning the new Uganda leadership of Amin Dada following the bloody coup that overthrew Milton Obote in 1971. Kenya didn't. Instead she chose, for the sake of her economic interests, to support the new Ugandan regime despite its dictatorial tendencies. The result was that relations between Tanzania and Kenya too worsened. Another example was that of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in which both states accused one another of supporting rebel refugees most of whom were a result of the Ogaden war pitting both neighbours. Sudan, in light of her bitter conflict with Ethiopia over the latter's support of SPLA rebel movement, chose to support Somalia in the Ethiopia - Somali conflict. Numerous other examples

were highlighted. At the end of the chapter, it was clear that indeed, refugees played a significant role in conflictive relations characterising Eastern African States.

Chapter five presented the findings of our field survey in which we took Kenya as a case study and sought to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that refugees in Kenya had impacted negatively upon Kenya's national security interests. The assumption of this hypothesis was that Kenya's vital national values specifically what she perceived as key national security interests had been threatened and or harmed by the presence of refugees within her territory. The hypothesis also assumed that such a threat or harm occurred as a result of either deliberate effort by the refugees themselves through their activities or through their mere presence in the country depending on the manner in which the leaders of their home countries and those of their host states viewed them. As noted elsewhere, we hoped that the findings of our empirical investigation reflected the situation in other Eastern African states with refugees. The chapter began by outlining Kenya's national security interests. Key among them, it was noted, was the preservation of the country's territorial integrity and the protection of its sovereignty as stipulated in Kenya's foreign policy. Other important national security interests included the protection and safeguarding of the citizens' physical well-being and the safety of their property, protection of the environment among others.

A look at the pre-refugee security situation in the country showed that Kenya's national security interests remained largely safe and well maintained as opposed to the period after the coming into the country of the refugees. Indeed, a look at the security situation in areas settled by refugees before they came into the country revealed that there had been a negative change when viewed against the situation which had prevailed after the coming of the refugees. To arrive at this conclusion, a careful study was carried out empirically in both Turkana district and in Nairobi, using survey methods of data collection. Questions were asked to three categories of respondents

namely refugees themselves, local people living close to those refugees and finally opinion leaders who included government officials in charge of security, NGO officials working in the refugee camp and other people considered to have adequate information useful to this study. Our findings persuaded us to conclude that refugees were indeed harming the security of the local people through various ways. These included such acts as rape of local women, murder, theft of local people's livestock and other property, destruction of the environment, control of business activities to the detriment of the local people, corruption, disruption of peace through riots, arson etc during which some local people got hurt or could not go about their normal activities, negative effect on the local people's traditional values and customs among others. By so doing, the study confirmed our hypothesis four as stated above.

It was also found out that the Kenyan government seemed not to be doing enough to effectively contain the negative impact refugees were having upon the country's security interests. This was confirmed by the response we got from the local people, some opinion leaders and even some government officials. It was felt that this probably had to do with the government's stated commitment to continue offering humanitarian assistance to refugees regardless of their source and was, therefore, reluctant to carry out any action which would portray the image that the government was deviating from this commitment. But we also found out that the government had severally taken action against refugees who broke the law, through arresting and imprisoning them, or repatriating them. This had however resulted in tensions between Kenya and the refugees' home country with the latter accusing the former of mistreating innocent people and contravening international conventions governing refugees to which she was signatory. The Kenyan government had also closed several refugee camps in the past ostensibly to minimise the insecurity occasioned by the refugees. Examples were given of the government's rounding up of Ugandan refugees in

the country in 1990 and the furore this action created between the two neighbours. Kenya had also closed down refugee camps at the Coast and in Thika near Nairobi.

Another finding was that, majority of local people wanted to see the government of Kenya doing more to safeguard their security which they generally agreed had deteriorated since the arrival of the refugees. It was noted that a sizeable number of refugees from Uganda and Sudan had on several occasions engaged in subversive activities against their home countries. This had the effect of creating confrontations between these states and Kenya. The latter however maintained that she had neither information nor evidence of such actions. We emphasised strongly that an upsurge of crime, destruction of the environment and subversion were some of the leading ills associated with refugees in Kenya. Before the chapter closed, we offered a brief statement on the implications of this negative impact on Kenya's national security interests to her relations with her neighbours and argued as we had done throughout the study, that relations have deteriorated between Eastern African States mainly due to refugee activities. We also alluded to the fact that several senior Kenya government officials including the president had occasionally raised concern about the continued presence of refugees in the country. Indeed, at one time Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi threatened to expel all refugees from the country, perhaps due to the threat they posed to the country's national security interests.

## **6.2 Policy Recommendations**

This study has demonstrated that conflict has been a dominant characteristic of inter-state relations within the Eastern African sub-region. More importantly, it has demonstrated that refugees have been a very important source of such conflict. Underscoring this point is the fact that the pursuit of vital national interests and or the protection of the same explain more accurately

the frictions that have erupted between Eastern African states particularly when viewed against the background of the refugee problem in the sub-region.

Having noted that the consequences of these inter-state conflicts have been largely negative and having highlighted some of the most serious ones, we cannot hesitate to point out that nation-states must seek to cooperate under a peaceful environment, hence the urgent need for them to minimise or eradicate altogether the conditions that have so often led to the germination of seeds of hatred, suspicion and conflict. This is most desirable to states that neighbour one another. We here-under offer some recommendations that we suggest can help policy makers in the sub-region to deal with the problem of inter-state conflict in Eastern Africa in general and the issue of refugees as key sources of this conflict in particular. We wish to emphasise however that, our recommendations should not be seen as the only ones that can be implemented. Rather, we argue that our views should be seen in the light of other recommendations made by other researchers, academics and leaders whose desire is to bring about an enabling environment for peaceful conduct of inter-state relations.

Firstly, we recommend that Eastern African states should work towards eradicating conditions that give rise to massive influx of refugees into neighbouring states. Internal power struggles, military coups, tribal or ethnic confrontations and other factors that breed civil war and public disorder must be eliminated. This is the surest way of reducing or eliminating the problem of political refugees. We suggest that these can be eliminated through maintenance of strong democratic institutions where people can fairly and legally compete for power, establishment of a strong civil society, nurturing of ethnic harmony and peace and the desire to maintain a strong national identity instead of personality cults. This way, problems associated with refugees such as subversion will be minimised and the result will be minimal or absence of inter-state conflicts in the sub-region.

Secondly, the host states in Eastern Africa in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should come up with appropriate and timely measures aimed to monitor and bring under control, refugee movements once the refugees start flowing into the host country. In the past, the UNHCR came in too late while the host states, most of which lack resources to cope with sudden torrents of refugees, could do little to handle the refugees effectively. The result has been that thousands of refugees came into the host countries carrying dangerous weapons and other contraband goods which they later used to subvert their home states or sold to the local people who used them to perpetrate crime. We recommend that refugees should not be allowed to come deep into the interior of the host states particularly to urban centres. They should be monitored closely and brought together in habitable camps with enough facilities away from the host states' population. There should be a constant check on their activities. This way, the risks they pose to host state's national security interests will be minimised particularly if strict measures are adopted to restrict them in such designated areas. Currently, though refugee camps have been set up for instance in Kenya, there has been no strict control of refugee movements and this has, as we saw in this thesis, contributed to many security problems.

A third recommendation is that, host states in Eastern Africa that abate subversive activities by refugees within their territory must willingly stop. Conflicts will always persist as long as states encourage rebel groups in whatever way to subvert their home states. It is felt that in order to bring-about peaceful co-existence, Eastern African states should encourage utmost cooperation in matters relating to refugees who would want to overthrow their home governments. In this respect, Eastern African States should appreciate the wider benefits of such cooperation. Differences between individual leaders must not be allowed to come between the wider goal of peace. To this end, we propose that states within this sub-region should come up with a secretariat whose aim is to foster an Eastern African cooperation similar to other regional and sub-regional



bodies elsewhere in Africa and the world. Such a body should immediately set out punitive measures to any member state found guilty (by a constituted committee of the secretariat) of this or other identified mistake as set out in the organisation's statutes. It is hoped that this will significantly reduce incidents of friction between Eastern African States. Fourthly, it is recommended that a piece of legislation should urgently be put in place preferably by the United Nations Organisation (UN) outlining the activities that refugees within the host states should engage in and those that they shouldn't. A clause should be included empowering the host state and not the UNHCR to enforce this piece of legislation. We saw in our study that in the past, several states in Eastern Africa failed to take legal action against refugees who had committed crimes against their citizens for fear of being accused of contravening international law. A good example is Kenya. Despite the fact that crime is not admissible in International Law, senior GOK officials confirmed to this researcher that they had failed to take any legal action against some refugees who had committed serious crimes because they were forbidden by International Conventions to which Kenya has declared her commitment to uphold. The legislation so formulated, we argue, will most likely give more freedom to host states to act without fear of being accused of contravening international laws governing the treatment of refugees. More so, the actions taken by the host state against refugees who have broken the law may act as a deterrent to other refugees who may wish to commit similar offences.

Finally, it is recommended that, there should be regular meetings between officials of Eastern African States, preferably the respective Chief Executives to iron-out any differences that might arise among them, whether these are as a result of refugee activities or as a result of any other factor. This diplomatic initiative will ensure that potential conflict areas are addressed before they intensify into full blown conflicts.

In conclusion, scholars should devote more energy to the subject of inter-state conflicts and the specific factors that give rise to such conflicts. Attention should also be focused on the refugee problem, specifically the impact of refugees on the social, economic and political aspects of their host societies. In the past, a lot of attention has been directed at the problems encountered by the refugees in their new areas of refuge, the fact that most of their basic needs are not fully met, the suffering they undergo etc etc. Little concern has been laid upon the effects of these refugees on the host state.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adelman, K., African realities (New York: Crane Russak & co., 1980).
- Amate, C.O.C., Inside the O.A.U: Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1986).
- Arlighaus, B.E., African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).
- Art, R., & Jervis, R., International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision making (2nd ed) (Toronto: Little, Brown & co.1985).
- Atle, Grahl-Masden., Refugees and Refugee Law in a world in Transition, in Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees, Michigan Year Book of International Legal Studies (New York: Clack Boardman Co. Ltd, 1982).
- Bailey, K.D., Methods of Social Research (3rd ed) (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
- Beaton, L., The Reform of Power, (London; Chatto and Windus, 1972).
- Boech, E., and Goldschmidt, A.M., (eds), Refugees and Development (Berlin: Nomos Verlagsgeschaft, Baden Baden, 1983).

Bulch, M., "Sociological and Economic Factors in Refugee Integration: The case of Ethiopian Exiles in the Sudan" in Nobel, P., (ed), Refugees and Development in Africa, Seminar Proceedings No. 19 (Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987).

Coser, L., The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press 1950).

Couloumbis, T. and Wolfe, J., Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (New Dehli, Prentice-Hall of India, 1986).

Day, A.J., Border and Territorial Disputes (2nd ed.) (London: Longman, 1987).

Deutch, C., The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 1972).

Doob, L. (ed), Resolving Conflict in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

Dourgherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.H., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).

Drysdale, J., The Somali Dispute (London: Pall Mall, 1964).

Goodwin-Gill, G.S, The Refugee in Interanational Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

Harberson, J.H. (ed), The military in African Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987).

Hartman, F., The Relations of States (5th ed) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. 1978).

Hatch, J., "Historical Background of the African Refugee problem" in Brooks, H.C. and El-Ayouty, Y. (eds), Refugees South of the Sahara (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970).

Hamrell, S. (ed), Refugee Problems in Africa (Upsalla: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967).

Hoffman, S., "Theory and International Relations", in Rosenau, R.N, International Politics and Foreign Policy (2nd ed) (New York: Free Press, 1969).

Holborn, L.W, Refugees: A Problem in Our Time. The work of the U.N.H.C.R., 1951-72 (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1975).

Hoskins, C., Case Studies in African Diplomacy 2: The Ethiopian-Kenya-Somali Dispute, 1960-1967 (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969).

- Kaplan, A., The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964).
- Kennan, G.F., Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964).
- Keohane, R. and Nye, J., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977).
- Kibreab, G., "Rural Refugee Land Settlement in Eastern Sudan: On the Road to Self-sufficiency" in Nobel, P., Refugees and Development in Africa (Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987). pp. 63-72.
- Kiondo, A., "Tanzania's Foreign policy: The Socio-economic Context," in Oyugi, W. (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992).
- Knorr, K. (ed), Power, Strategy and Security (New Delhi: Asian Books, 1987).
- Legum, C. et al, Africa in the 1980s: A Continent in Crisis (New York: McGrall Hill, 1979).
- Lieber, R., Theory and World Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972).

- Light, M. and Groom, A.J, International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985).
- Little, R. and Smith, M., Perspectives on World Politics (2nd ed) (London: Routledge, 1991).
- Luard, E., Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System (London: University of London Press, 1970).
- Makinda, S., Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
- Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and Peace, (5th ed) (New Dehli: Kalyani Publishers, 1991).
- Ngunyi, M. and Adar, K., "The Politics of Integration in East Africa since Independence" in Oyugi, W. (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992).
- Nicholson, M., Conflict Analysis (London: The English Universities Press, 1973).
- Nobel, P. (ed), Refugees and Development in Africa. Seminar Proceedings No. 19 (Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987).

- Okoth, J.P., "The Foreign policy of Uganda since Independence towards Kenya and Tanzania" in Oyugi, W. (ed), Politics and Administration in E. Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992).
- Okumu, J.J., "Kenya's Foreign Policy, in Aluko, O. (ed), The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
- Orwa, D.K., "The Causes of Conflict in the Relations of African States" in Ojo, J.C. et al, African International Relations (London: Longman, 1985).
- \_\_\_\_\_ , "Change and Continuity in Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi, in Oyugi, W. (ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenaur Foundation, 1992).
- Papp, D., Contemporary International Relations: A Framework for Understanding (3rd ed) (New York: Macmillan Publishing co. 1991).
- Proudfoot, M.J., European Refugees, 1939-1952 (London: Faber and Faber, 1957).
- Rogge, J.R., Too many, Too Long (New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld Publishers, 1985).
- Smith, G.I., Ghosts of Kampala (London: Weinplfeld and Nicholson, 1980).



Russett, B. and Starr, T., World Politics: The Menu for Choice (New York: H.W. Freeman and co., 1985).

Rosecrance, R.N., Action & Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and co., 1963).

Rummel, R.J., The dimensions of Nations (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

Rosenau, J.N., World politics (London: The free press, 1976).

Tordoff, W., Government and politics in Africa (London: Macmillan, 1984).

Waltz, K., Man, the State and War (Columbia: Columbia University, 1969).

Wolfers, A., "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" in Art, R. and Jervis, R., International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision making (2rd ed) (Toronto: Little, Brown and co., 1985).

Wynia, G.W., The Politics of Latin American Development (Cambridge University press 1984).

Zartman, W.I., Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (updated edition) (New York: Oxford University press, 1989).

### Theses and Unpublished papers

- Adar, K.G., "The Significance of the Legal Principle of Territorial Integrity as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963-1983" (PhD Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1986).
- Anangwe, A.F.D., "The Politics of Decentralization in Kenya" (PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 1990).
- Chemonges, A., "Uganda and the Disintegration of the East African Community Between 1971 and 1977" (M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1984).
- Nyaduwa, O.J., "Summitry System as a Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Eastern Africa" (M.A Thesis University, of Nairobi, 1984).
- Tirimba, H.M., "Conflict and Cooperation: Antecedents of Kenya - Uganda Relations, 1964-1990" (M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1991).
- Makokha, J., "The politics of Nationalism and Irredentism in North Eastern Province, Kenya" (M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1979).
- Nsubuga, K.J., "Uganda-Kenya relations 1970-1985: The Interplay of History, Economics and Geo-politics," Seminar Paper on issues in Contemporary African International Relations (Department of Political Science, Makerere University, February, 1988).

Okoth, G.P., "Intermittent Tensions in Kenya - Uganda Relations: Historical Perspective" (Seminar Paper No.6 presented at the Department of History, University of Nairobi, March 8th 1990).

"Environment and Development in Africa: What prospects for the future?" (A paper presented for UNEP, Nairobi, 1988).

### Journal Articles

Jackson, R.H., and Roseberg, C.R., "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Judicial in Statehood" in World Politics, vol.XXIV Oct. 1981-July 1982).

Gitelson, S.A., "Major Shifts in Recent Uganda Foreign Policy" in African Affairs, vol.76, No.304 (July 1977).

Lewis, M.I., "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism" in Journal of Modern African studies1(2) (August 1963).

Mathews, K., and Omari, R., "Uganda - Tanzania Relations, 1971-1980" in Journal of International Relations, vol.3, No.2 (June 1985).

Morgenthau, H., "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States" in American Political Science Review, LXVI, (Dec. 1952)

Spykman, N., and Robbins, A., "Geographical Objectives in Foreign Policy" in American Political Science Review, XXXIII, (June 1939)

### Periodicals

Africa Contemporary Record.

Africa Research Bulletin

Africa South of the Sahara

Africa Today

Horn of Africa special issues.

### Newspapers

The Daily Nation (Nairobi)

The East African Standard (Nairobi)

The East African (Nairobi)

The Kenya Times (Nairobi)

The New Vision (Kampala)

Daily News (Dar-es-salaam)

The New York Times (New York).

The Times of London (London)

The Guardian (London)

**Magazines.**

The Weekly Review (Nairobi)

The Economic Review (Nairobi)

Newsweek ( New York)

**Other publications.**

GOK, The Constitution of Kenya.

\_\_\_\_\_, Statistical Abstracts

\_\_\_\_\_, Economic Survey

\_\_\_\_\_, Kenya Population census, 1989.

\_\_\_\_\_, National Assembly Senate Official Reports

UNHCR, Annual Reports (Geneva)

\_\_\_\_\_, The State of the World's Refugees (1993)

\_\_\_\_\_, Refugee Bulletins (Geneva)

United States Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey. (Washington D.C).

IMF, Direction of Trade Statistical Year Book, Various issues.

UN, Charter on the Status of Refugees, 1951.

OAU, Charter

\_\_\_\_\_, Various Resolutions.

## APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE

### CATEGORY A: OPINION LEADERS (i.e GOK security officials, NGO and UN officials e.t.c)

1. What is your name? \_\_\_\_\_
2. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_
3. What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What is the official title of your job? \_\_\_\_\_
5. For how long have you worked in your present station? \_\_\_\_\_
6. Are there any refugees in your District? If yes, how many ?  
\_\_\_\_\_
7. Which would you say are the major sources of refugees in your district? (Please indicate major countries of origin) \_\_\_\_\_
8. How would you describe the relationship between refugees in your district and
  - (i) The local people
    - Very good
    - somewhat good
    - Bad
    - I don't know
  - (ii) Themselves
    - Very good
    - Somewhat good
    - Bad
    - I don't know
  - (iii) Local leaders
    - Very good

- Good
- Not good
- I don't know

9. Would you consider some of the activities of the refugees as having had a negative impact upon the lives and the way of life of the local people?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

(ii) If your answer to the above question is yes, please specify these activities

\_\_\_\_\_

10(i) Are there instances where refugees have threatened or undermined the security of the local people?

- Yes
- No
- I am not sure.

(ii) If yes, how?

- theft of property of local people eg. Cattle
- Actual bodily harm
- smuggling of weapons
- hoarding of foodstuffs/business rivalries
- All of the above
- Others please specify \_\_\_\_\_

11. What kind of action if any, has the Government taken to such refugees whose activities threaten the security of the people? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Has the Government complained to the governments where the refugees come from?

- Yes

- No

- I am not sure

13. Owing to the presence and activities of refugees in this country and the government's response, how would you regard the relationship between Kenya and her neighbours where these refugees come from?

- Very friendly

- Friendly

- Not friendly

- Very hostile

14. Some neighbouring states such as Uganda and Sudan have in the past accused the Kenya government of encouraging, helping and being sympathetic to refugees in the country bent on overthrowing their governments. What is your comment? \_ \_

---

15(i). Would you attribute the general increase in incidents of crime in the country in the recent past to the activities of refugees?

- Yes

- No

- Don't know

(ii) If yes, how much?

- Very much

- Moderately so

- Least



16. In the recent past there has been a spate of bank robberies in various towns in Kenya. Guns and other weapons have been used in these crimes. Do you think that refugees have been suppliers of such guns and other weapons?

- Yes

- No

- I don't know

17. Please comment on the future of refugees in Kenya and the implications their presence will continue to have with regard to Kenya's relations with her neighbours.

---

**CATEGORY B: LOCAL PEOPLE LIVING CLOSE TO REFUGEES**

1. What is your name? \_\_\_\_\_

2. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_

3. What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

4. For how long have you lived in this area? \_\_\_\_\_

5. Recently, there has been an influx of refugees into the country particularly in this area.

Has this affected your life in any way?

- Yes

- No

- I do not know

6. Specifically, have you suffered any loss of property or cattle which you can attribute to the refugees?

- Yes

- No

7. Would you say that refugees have engaged in activities (other than theft if you said so above) that you consider to be harmful to the people of this country? ( For the answer you give to this question please explain it briefly)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. Has the district administration or the government in general done anything to discourage such activities? If yes, please specify.

\_\_\_\_\_

9i) Have you offered any material support to any refugee for any reason?

- Yes

- No

ii) If yes, what did you offer and for what reason? \_\_\_\_\_

10. What do you think is the attitude of refugees towards the local communities?

- Very friendly

- Suspicious

- Hostile

11. What specific problems that you have encountered in the past would you attribute to the influx of refugees in this country?

---

---

12. The government has in the past accused refugees of being in possession of illegal weapons, cattle rustling and other criminal activities. In your opinion, are these accusations true?

- Yes

- No

- Not sure

13. Do you think that the government should continue harbouring refugees in this country?

- Yes

- No

- I do not know

14. What do you suggest should be the Governments' policy towards refugees in the future? \_\_\_\_\_

15i) Are you aware of any refugees actively involved in activities aimed at overthrowing their home Governments?

- Yes

- No

- I am not sure

ii) If yes, who is supporting these refugees?

\_\_\_\_\_

16. What do you think the government should do to safeguard the security of its people, especially you who live near the refugees?

\_\_\_\_\_

—

\_\_\_\_\_

**CATEGORY C: REFUGEES.**

1. What is your name ? \_\_\_\_\_

2. How old are you ? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Which is your country ? \_\_\_\_\_

4. Are you a registered refugee ?

---- Yes

---- No

5. When did you first arrive in Kenya as a refugee ? \_\_\_\_\_

6. What made you escape from your home country ?

---- Civil unrest

---- Fear of political persecution.

---- Hunger and starvation

---- Other , please specify \_\_\_\_\_

7. Who first welcomed you on arrival in Kenya ?

---- Government officials

---- UNHCR officials

---- An NGO official

---- Other , please specify \_\_\_\_\_

8.(i) Are all or most of your needs such as food, shelter, maintenance etc  
fully catered for ?

--- Yes

--- No

(ii) If no, what do you do to supplement what you get from the camp  
authorities or wherever else ? \_\_\_\_\_

9. If you don't live in the refugee camp say you live in the urban centre , what do you do for a living ?

---

---

10 How would you describe the attitude of the local people (Kenyans) towards y  
refugees in general ?

--- Very good

--- Good

--- Not good

--- Don't know

11(i) Have Kenyan Government officials been very helpful to you?

---- Yes very much

---- Yes, alittle bit

---- No, not at all.

(ii) If no , why do you think that is the case ? Please explain briefly

---

12. Generally what in your opinion, is the relationship between refugees and the  
neighboring local people ?

--- Friendly/Good

--- Not friendly/Bad/Hostile

--- I am not sure.

13. Some refugees have been accused by the Government and some local people of cattle rustling, smuggling of illegal weapons such as guns, drug trafficking etc.

Are these accusations true ?

---- Yes

---- No

---- I don't know

14. Refugees have also been accused of destroying the environment through cutting of trees, polluting activities etc. What do you say to these accusations ?

---

15. What is your opinion about the Government currently in power in your country?

---

16(i) Do you think there should be a change of Government in your country ?

--- Yes

--- No

--- I do not know

(ii) If yes would you support any movement aiming to overthrow your home Government ?

--- Yes

--- No

--- I am not sure

17(i) Are you aware of any movement of refugees in Kenya aiming to overthrow their home Government ?

---- Yes

---- No

---- I do not know

(ii) If yes, does the Kenyan Government or the camp authorities help this movement(s) in anyway ?

--- Yes

--- No

--- I do not know.

18. How would you describe relations between your country and Kenya?

---- Excellent

---- Good

---- Hostile

---- I have no idea.