ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA:

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 2006 – 2009

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby do declare that, this project is my original work and has not been presented for award of any Degree or Diploma in any University.

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DEDICATION

The research project is dedicated to my wife and children for bearing with my busy schedule of

work, class and family related issues.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	Al Ittihad al Islamiyya
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah
AU	African Union
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Forces
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IEDs	Improvised explosive devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia
InSTEP	Increased access and Skills for Tertiary Education Program
ONF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RRA	Rahanwein Resistance Army
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council

TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNHCR	United Nations Humanitarian Commission on refugees
UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

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ABSTRACT

This research is an assessment of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, with the specific objectives to examine the effectiveness of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia and investigate whether military intervention can lead to stability in Somalia. Statement of the problem is about Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in December 2006 which was as a result of Ethiopia's national security threat related to its protracted conflict with Eritrea that tempted the country to invade Somalia. The Islamic court, which controlled most of Somalia at the time declared jihad against Ethiopia, and the court had considerable support from Eritrea. Somalia became a front in the proxy war between the two countries- Eritrea supporting the Islamic Court Union and Ethiopia supporting the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in Bidwoa. The region became destabilized as a result of the protracted conflict between the two countries. Peace and stability in the Horn depended on the resolution of the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict and triumph of sustainable peace. Statement of the problem is to answer the question; Does the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia a genuine quest for peace or a sign of military might to Eritrea? Or is it in fulfilment of the US war on terror ? Methodology is through descriptive and explorative research designs; and data collection through questionnaires. Key findings; Ethiopia's military intervention has been regarded as the most daring and strategic decision any African government has made to fight terrorism crossing a border towards its neighbour. Its successful operation motivated other countries for military intervention through the African Union. The exemplary exhibition of the military strategic intervention, created an impression that it was possible for a military operation to take place in Somalia; the Ethiopian troops proved their military capability in defeating ICU with determination to ensure a free Somali society of militia as well as extremist groups. The transitional government had challenges, just like any new regime in a post conflict society; its viability was majorly as a direct contribution of Ethiopian military as a governing power on itself. Ethiopian and the African Union's military greatly weaked the Al-Shaabab. Conclusion; There is no doubt that the Ethiopian military achieved what no international community and African countries thought to be possible. Its daring response to the lawlessness in Somalia laid the foundation of the current elected Somali Government and AMISOM. Recommendations include; With the successul outcome of both Ethiopian military and the African Union forces, there is need for Ethiopian Government to capacity build the Somalia National Army and encourage the Somalia Federal Government to pursue an inclusive governance approach without discrimination based on groups or clan system. All countries in the region will need to commit to not supporting disruptive insurgencies such as the al-Shabaab or warlords. The immediate security concerns must be to form the Fedral units. This is the best approach to this very complex political problem.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Background to the study

Somalia, like other African countries was under the colony of European powers in the eighteenth century, in this case by Great Britain and Italy. Like other countries, Somalia struggled for independence until it attained it on 01 July 1960, the date when it was proclaimed independent. However, the independence of Somalia had the seeds for both future intrastate and interstate conflicts within the Horn of Africa. The seed for interstate conflict was as a result of the desire to include all Somali clan inhabited areas that included the Somali clan territiries in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.[1] The outcome of the scattered Somali clans found its way in the scramble for Africa within the 18th century when the Western powers and the Ethiopian empire by then agreed and shared the Somali territories.[2] This was the case with the Somalis population in Ethiopia's Ogaden province.[3]

It is based on the need of uniting the Somali clans that its first leadership put it as the first priority.[4] Thus, this was the beginning of Somalia's confrontation with its African neighbours in the Horn of Africa. The large Somali population in Ogaden made it a target of the Somali Nationalistic leaders. The intrastate conflict was characterized within the Somali clan structure. The Somalis are divided in five clans, which are again sub-divided into other sub-clans, which

[1] Lewis, IM 1981, *Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions*, HAAN Associates, London.
[2] Egal, MHI 1968, 'Somalia: Nomadic Individualism and the Rule of Law.' African Affairs, vol. 67, no. 268, pp.219-226.
[3] Connors, W 2007 'Why we don't hear about the conflict in the Ogaden.' *Slate Magazine*, September 5, 2007.
[4] Egal, MHI 1968, 'Somalia: Nomadic Individualism and the Rule of Law.' African Affairs, vol. 67, no. 268, pp. 219-226. viewed 20 May 2008: p.222.

are then sub divided into families. The loyalty of individual Somalis lies with the family, sub-clan and then the clan at large, this then transforms into overall loyalty to the people in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in December 2006 was as a result of Ethiopia's national security threat which is still very much related to its protracted conflict with Eritrea. The crisis in Somalia has been explained by authors such as Terence Lyons (2006) in connection with the protracted conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Islamic courts with its irredntist agenda, controlled most of Somalia at the time declared jihad against Ethiopia, and the court had considerable support from Eritrea. Somalia became a front in the proxy war between the two countries-Eritrea supporting the Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopia supporting the Transitional Government of Somalia in Bidwoa.[5] The region became destabilized as a result of the protracted conflict between the two countries. Peace and stability in the Horn depended on the resolution of the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict and triumph of sustainable peace.

The intervention in Somalia has been an extension of the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict after the Algiers peace agreement was signed 2000. This study intends to answer the following question:

Does the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia a genuine quest for peace or a sign of military might to Eritrea?

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[5] Lawrence. Paul (2005), *Nationalism: History and Theory*. Harlow: Pearson Educated Ltd.

1.3 Objectives of the study

Overall Objective

To critically assess the contribution of Ethiopia's military intervention in peace to Somalia.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives
- To examine the effectiveness of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia.

- To investigate if military intervention can lead to stability and peace in Somalia.

1.4 Literature review:

This chapter examines the existing literature in relationship to the study topic. A few studies have been written on the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia. This study will be divided into the following themes.

1.4.1 Historical background

Establishing a Central Government was a challenge for more than two decades since Somalia had not been governed under such structure. The clan system presented itself as a big challenge for the new Somalia Government. Another challenge was the need to navigate in bringing together the two colonial systems of British and Italy left legacy. Yet the two systems were not the same. Ahmed and Green, notes that Somalis in the north had different needs and ideas on the union than those in the south. [6] This difference in needs further complicated the governance of Somalia from the onset of the Somali state. This proved difficult for the Mogadishu government in managing the affairs of its citizens. It was a democratic government, yet the Somalis had not experienced democratic governance in their history. The determination of the government to take

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[6] Ahmed, II & Green, RH 1999 'The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,' *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20. p. 1.

power from the clan structures got resistance.[7] More so, the new leaders involved in corruption and failed to honour the promises.[8]

The loss of credibility and trust led to violent elections and the assassination of President Sharmarke in 1969.[9] It's during this chaotic scenario that Siad Barre staged a successful coup while being the army commander. The coup brought down all the democratic institutions like the parliament and Ziad Barre became the new ruler of Somalia. Barre became popular as a result of his demand for greater Somalia, including its territories within the Horn of Africa. His nationalistic desire and the obsession with power for a greater Somalia, led him into war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden province in 1977.[10] He attacked Ethiopia while it had experienced domestic challenges in leadership. The Ethiopian emperor had been overthrown and replaced by the Communist regime of Mengistu that was yet to settle. At the same time, Ethiopia was fighting rebels agitating for the independence of Eritrea.[11] Barre was a military strategist who knew that the Ethiopian challenges had weakened the regime. The Ethiopian army got support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.[12] The defeat of Somalia marked the beginning of resentment to Barre's regime and the unitary state.

[7] Doombos. M and Markakis, J 1994, 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?' *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 21, no. 59. pp.82-88.
[8] Samatar, Al (ed.) 1994, *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, Boulder, Co. pp. 67.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Makinda, SM 1993, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder. Co.
[11] Brind, H 1983-1984 'Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa,' *International Affairs*. vol. 60, no. 1. pp.75-95.
[12] Ibid.

The defeat in Ogaden war increased tension against Barre's regime, which culminated in the formation of rebel groups to fight the regime.[13] The central government under Barre lost control to the guerilla groups in the north in mid 1980s and the fighting led to an estimate of 100,000 deaths.[14] After intense fighting against groups coming from the north as well as from the south, Barre was driven out from Mogadishu on January 26, 1991.

1.4.2 Somalia 1991-2006

Siad Barre was ousted from power in 1991 by several Somali rebel armed groups. The various rival armed groups involved in struggle for individual power after the collapse of the Mogadishu authority of General Mohamed Siad Barre.[15] These groups hindered the supply of humanitarian assistance during famine and drought, it has been estimated that over 400,000 Somalis died from starvation, disease and violence. The then US President-George bush authorized Operation Restore Hope on 9 November 1992 using the US military in protecting the humanitarian agencies in the provision of humanitarian assistance.[16] The United Nations Task Force (UNITAF)-led by US conquered the militia groups and allowed the humanitarian support to the civilians. UNITAF handed over its operation to the United Nations in May 1993. The U.N. effort was the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. Within the same month they took over from UNITAF and UNOSOM II coalition forces were attacked by one of the militia factions in Mogadishu. The US troops lost 18 soldiers during the 17 hour fight with the factions in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993. Because of these deaths, President Bill Clinton ordered the

[13] Ahmed, II & Green, RH 1999 'The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,' *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, p. 1.
[14] Hirsch, JL and Oakley, RB 1995, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.
[15] Menkhaus, K 2003 'State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 97.
[16] Makinda, SM 1993. *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co.

withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. However, the US completely pulled out of Somalia in March 1994 while the United Nations pulled out the remaining peacekeepers in March 1995.[17] Since then, Somalia existed without a central government, but split into several regions administered by clan based structures.

1.4.3 Ethiopia-Somalia Relations

For over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have been poor. Somalia invaded Ethiopia in the 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie and in 1976 during the Mengistu Haile Mariam military rule. In the first war, the Ethiopian military commander General Aman Andom defeated Somali forces, but his request to go inside Somalia was rejected by the Emperor, and he was ordered to remain behind the border. The 1976 invasion of Ethiopia by Somali forces and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) initially succeeded, leading to the capture of many Ethiopian towns by Somali forces. Somali forces briefly captured the surroundings of its third-largest city, Dire Dawa, in Ethiopia. However, Ethiopian forces, with the support of Cuban and South Yemeni forces, were able to defeat the Somali forces, although elements of the Somali rebel forces remained in control of remote areas in the largely Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia.[18]

Both Ethiopian and Somali governments intervened in the internal affairs of the two countries, and successive governments on both sides supported each others' armed opposition groups. The former president of the Transitional Federal Government, President Abdullahi Yusuf, was one of the first to receive Ethiopia's assistance after he fled Somalia in the late 1970s. He was one of

[17] Mearsheimer, J 1994-1995, 'The False Promise of International Institutions'. *International Security*. vol. 19. no. 3. pp.5-49.
[18] Ibid.

the first senior officials to challenge the Siad Barre government. Ethiopia was also the principal backer of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the group that liberated the northwest region of Somalia, currently known as Somaliland. The change of government in Ethiopia did not end Ethiopia's intervention in Somali affairs. The late Zanawi's government of Ethiopia became a key backer of a number of Somali factions and leaders, including Abdullahi Yusuf. Hussein Aideed, and other Somali factions.[19]

Sederberg (1995), further notes that, the Barre government was also a major sponsor of Ethiopian armed rebel groups. The current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly carried Somali-issued passports. Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia. The ouster of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central government in Somalia ended support for Ethiopian armed groups, although some Somali factions continue to support the OLF andONLF. For most of the 1990s, Ethiopia's primary concern was Al-Ittihad in Somalia and its activities in support of the ONLF. Al-Ittihad and ONLF carried out a number of attacks against Ethiopian targets, and Ethiopian security forces have violently retaliated against these groups and their supporters. The fighting with Al-Ittihad was triggered in the early 1990s when Ethiopian security forces brutally cracked down on the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a member of the first transitional government of Ethiopia. The ONLF joined the transitional government of Ethiopia in part because the Ethiopian

[19] Sederberg, Peter C., Conciliation as counter-terrorism strategy, *Journal of peace research.* volume 32, No 3. sage Selassie. 1995.

Transitional Charter provided nations and nationalities the right to self determination; however, the ONLF push for self determination created tension between the ruling EPRDF and the ONLF.

1.4.4 Ethiopian plan on Somalia

The Ethiopian -Eritrean war of 1998-2000, led both countries in competing for support all over the Horn of Africa and beyond. At that time, Eritrea started actively supporting any rebel group that opposed the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia engaged in a similar strategy and has been trying to establish a good relationship with all the other countries in the region.[20] As such, the political power vacuum that existed in Somalia represented a clear threat for Ethiopia mainly because it had become a safe heaven for Ethiopian rebel groups (including the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front) and created a risk of opening another front.

It was with the aim of having a friendly government and stabilizing its south-eastern neighbour that Ethiopia decided to spearhead the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based on the Transitional Federal Charter. Abdullahi Yusuf, a long time opponent to the Siad Barre regime and previously president of Puntland was elected President of the TFG at the Nairobi Conference in October 2004. It is interesting to note that the Ethiopian influence is quite visible in the way the TFG has been organised. The "4.5 formula" which implicates that seats in the Somali parliament shall be shared by the four major clans and the remaining 0.5 being allocated to an alliance of smaller clans, is more or less similar to the ethnic division found in the Ethiopian Parliament.[21]

[20] Menkhaus, K with Ortmayer, L 1995, *Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Case 464.
[21] Bloomfield. S 2008 'Somalia: The World's forgotten catastrophe.' The Independent.

Another example of the Ethiopian footprint on the TFG is President Abdullahi Yusuf. He had been a long time exiled opponent in Ethiopia and as President of Puntland had maintained close ties with Addis Ababa. Moreover, one of the first international moves made by the newly elected TFG president was to join the Sanaa'a Forum, a regional group comprising Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, which have all opposed Eritrea. The TFG also had the full support of Kenya whose tourist industry had already been affected by terrorist attacks in 2002 and has since been trying to limit the infiltration of Islamist groups from Somalia.[22]

Once it had secured the support of a friendly and internationally recognised Somali government, Ethiopia had to strengthen Abdullahi Yusuf's government to reduce the threat posed by an uncontrolled Somalia. The relocation of the TFG from its exile base in Nairobi to Somalia was the next step to take and it was not until February 2006 that the Parliament was able to organise a session in Baidoa, a city 250 Km northwest from Mogadishu. Part of the plan was to enforce the TFG through the deployment of African troops under the auspices of the AU Peace and Security Council. The deployed troops were expected to be drawn from IGAD member countries as part of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (known as IGASOM) despite some outcry against the presence of Ethiopian troops on its soil. On 6 December 2006, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1725(2006) allowing the deployment of IGAD troops by lifting the sanctions. However, the difficulty of the TFG to establish its authority in Somalia was obvious after the assassination attempts on President Abdullahi Yusuf and on his Prime Minister Mohammed Ghedi. In fact, at the same time, another force was getting stronger and stronger in Southern Somalia. Dating back to the time when Siad Barre government had been ousted,

[22]Bryden, A & Hänggi H (eds) 2005. *Security Governance and Post-conflict Peacebuilding*. Lit Verlag, Berlin, pp. 1-10.

various informal courts based on the Sharia had been functioning around Mogadishu and some of its surrounding areas.[23]

The courts became a credible armed force capable of fighting against any other warlords and in fact taking control of most part of the Somali capital. At that time, the success of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was not only due to its military power but also to its ideological appeal mainly focusd on the Hawiye clan, one of the most important clans living in South and Central Somalia.

International attention was only drawn to the UIC in mid-2006 once it started fighting against a coalition of warlords supported by the United States known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).[24] After managing to defeat the ARPCT the UIC appeared as a force that had to be taken into account. UIC leaders, including Sheik Sharif Ahmed and Sheik Hassan Dahir Awey, decided to expand the territory upon which the courts exercised their authority and their *Shahab* troops gained control of large territory. The UIC was also encouraged by the tacit support it received from various international actors such as the Arab League and, of major importance to Ethiopia, Eritrea. However, UIC leadership, unhappy with the Ethiopian support in favour of the TFG, historical relations and Ethiopia's military cross-border incursions, started pointing fingers at the Addis Ababa government threatening its existence. At that time, the UIC had become a real threat to all the efforts made by the Ethiopian Government to establish the TFG as the only credible governing body in Somalia.

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[23] Ken Menkhaus, Somalia, a country inperil, a policy nightmare. Enough strategy paper. 2008. pp.28-30.
[24] Ibid.

1.4.5 Peace processes in Somalia

Since early 1990s after the collapse of the Barre regime, there have been 14 Somali peace conferences aimed at bringing an end to the fighting in Somalia. These peace conferences were facilitated by the United Nations, the Horn of Africa Governments and Egypt. However, such efforts failed to bring about lasting peace due to competing interests of the international community and the governments in the Horn of Africa.[25] Regionally, Ethiopia facilitated a peace process in 1996 at Sodere. The participants were drawn from armed factions and political actors, the Sodere peace process collapsed when the Government of Egypt convened another meeting in 1997 in Cairo. But just like the Sodere peace process, the Cairo process also failed and follwed by another Bosaso peace conference in 1998.Other peace conferences followed like the IGAD peace plan in February 2000, the reconciliation conference in Arta-Djibouti in May 2000 at which participants agreed to the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Participants nominated Abdulqassim Salad Hassan as president of the TNG on August 26, 2002. Another one was the October 2002 Peace talks in Eldoret-Kenya-where a first temporary cease fire agreement was signed. The parties further agreed to establish a federal system of government and committed themselves to fight terrorism. In September 2003, the parties agreed on a Transitional National Charter, leading to a National Unity Government. The 275 Transitional Somali Parliament which comprised of major political factions and clans was inaugurated in Nairobi in August 2004.

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[25] Menkhaus, K with Ortmayer. L 1995. *Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. School of Foreign Service. Georgetown University, Washington. D.C., Case 464.

1.4.6 The Ethiopian military intervention

At the beginning of December 2006 the situation in Somalia had reached a stand-off, the major part of southern Somalia was under the control of the UIC while the TFG only controlled small areas around Baidoa but had international recognition. The deployment of IGASOM troops looked unlikely, Uganda the only country that had officially offered to send troops in Somalia, was even reconsidering its deployment. At the same time, the UIC leadership was becoming more and more vocal against the Ethiopian government. The UIC and Ethiopian armed elements had already clashed on numerous occasions between July and November 2006, but no full-scale clash had occurred.[26] However, a combination of factors was to favour the Ethiopian military intervention alongside the TFG. One of them was the Ethiopian Parliament approval of a bill authorising the government to take any necessary measure to counter threats posed by the UIC in Somalia. Another important legal step was the adoption on 6 December of Resolution 1725 by the UN authorising the entry of armed personnel on the Somali territory. Soon thereafter Ethiopia started sending troops, then only officially recognised as "military advisors", to be stationed in and around Baidoa,TFG's capital at that time, as well as in the Mudug area.

Once Ethiopia had stationed sufficient troops to protect the TFG but most importantly repel any offensive launched by the UIC, the Addis Ababa government let the UIC have the initiative. Major fighting broke out on 20 December when the Islamic forces attacked the TFG troops in the towns surrounding Baidoa. TFG troops with the help of the Ethiopian "military advisors" where able to resist the offensive and inflict casualties on the UIC side. On 21 December 2006, Sheik

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[26] Ghebremeskel, A. (2002). Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience. *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution.* Vol. 4, No.2.

Hassen Dahir Aweys, one of the UIC leaders declared from Mogadishu that Somalia was in a state of war against Ethiopia, and that all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia. This was just what the Ethiopian leadership had been waiting for as it provided them with a legitimate reason to officially confront the UIC in Somalia. Thus on 24 December 2006 the Ethiopian government could recognize the implication of its troops by declaring that "The Ethiopian government has taken self-defense measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts.[27]

Ethiopian forces concentrated their forces on two different fronts. Coming from the North-East assisted by troops coming from Puntland, a first front was opened near Gaalkayo in the Mudug region, proceeding towards Bandiradley and later on marching on to Beledweyne by following the Mugadishu-Garoowe road. In Beledweyne, the eastern front would be able to join the central and main front. This central front was opened in the Bakool, Hiraan and the northern part of the Bay region that surrounds Baidoa mainly aimed at securing the area, protecting the TFG as well as ensuring another route towards Mugadishu. Advancing rapidly, troops from the eastern front followed the road down from Beledweyne towards Mogadishu, while their counterparts did the same on the road from Baidoa to the Somali capital. Just three days after having launched their offensive Ethiopian troops alongside their TFG counterparts had reached the outskirts of Mogadishu. Meanwhile, another front was open, with the Ethiopian troops marching South-West from Baidoa towards Bu'uale in order to take control of the Juba River Valley and thus cornering the UIC troops in the South-Western part of the country between the sea and the Kenyan border. The UIC thus retreated towards Kismayo in the Southern tip of the country where they would

[27] Markakis, J. (ed), (1987). *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa*: Cambridge; Cambridge University press. pp.43-45.

tage a last attempt to resist the Ethiopian military force without much success.[28]

n the early 1990s, Ethiopian security forces chased out a number of ONLF leaders, cracked lown on the organization, and moved the Ethiopian Somali region capital from Gode to Jijiga, a :entral government stronghold. Members of the ONLF fled to Somalia and were embraced by Al- Ittihad, a fairly strong group at that time. Hence, some observers view Al-Ittihad as a group argely concerned with domestic issues. Ethiopia's principal interest at that time was to ensure :hat a united Somalia did not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia remains stable. Ethiopian forces crossed their border into Somalia a number of times >ver the past two decades and maintained presence inside Somali territory. Ethiopia's 'elationship with the first president of the TFG was strengthened when Yusuf backed Ethiopia's ?fforts against Al-Ittihad in the 1990s. The Ethiopian government's animosity towards the ousted Shura leader of the Islamic Courts, Sheik Aweys, is linked to Aweys' role as one of the leaders >f Al-Ittihad fighting against Ethiopia and that of Abdullahi Yusuf.

In 2004, the government of Ethiopia released a report, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy. The 158-page report covers a wide range of issues, including Ethiopia's assessment of its relations with Somalia. The report states that Somalia attacked Ethiopia twice in pursuit of its Greater Somalia ambition. The report notes that "at this time the Greater Somalia agenda has failed." Moreover, the Greater Somalia agenda no longer poses a serious threat to Ethiopia. The report contends that the factionalization of Somalia has allowed anti-peace and extremist elements to become strong, posing a threat to

[28] Ghebremeskel, A. Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience. *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No.2 (2002). pp.9-29.

Ethiopia. In order to reduce the threat from some parts of Somalia, the Ethiopian government must pursue a policy of engagement and support to Puntland and Somaliland, according to the report. The report also recommends a policy of targeting those armed elements that threaten Ethiopian security. This report was released two years before the Islamic Courts emerged, although the report gave the same labels of extremist, terrorist, and anti-peace to groups that were dominant at that time (Ahmed & Green, 1999).

1.4.7 Justification of the study

The study will strengthen the understanding of the use of military intervention as a coercive peace settlement mechanism in conflict management. In this essence the study will be useful to governments in the region such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya to assess the level and extent of military intervention. The study will also contributes to the literature review on conflict resolution and management mechanisms for both state and non-state actors in the Horn of Africa conflict system.

The study will provide the insights required when a military intervention is necessary in the region and the tenets that will make it successful. Moreover to highlight the aspects that need constant review to avert human rights violation, resentment and enhance regional co-operation among the states affected.

It will also seek to explicate that military intervention is not necessarily a negative resolution to prolonged civil wars and it can be a foundation to peace and stability of any affected state. Therefore the study will share insights on how military intervention can be used as a new tool in resolving prolonged conflicts in the region.

1.4.8 Hypotheses of the study

The study seeks to test the following hypotheses:

1. That military intervention would be an effective tool to Somalia conflict management strategy during the peace process.

2. That the Somalia peace process prolonged due to the limited use of military intervention.

3. That the Ethiopian military intervention was the foundation to Somalia's peace attainement.

1.4.9 Theoretical Framework

Military intervention in conflict can be viewed through a number of different theories, most of which focus on attempts to comprehend the causes and justification of the intervention. For this study topic, the researcher will use realism and rational choice theory. The rational choice theory contributes to the debate on conflict intervention. The rational actor theory posits that whatever their other state interests for attaining, those resorting to military intervention or peaceful settlement of the conflict possess adequate rationality to calculate costs and benefits. If the regime, therefore, can raise the costs to a sufficient level of severity and certainty, they will deter any external threat.[29] A second argument of rational choice theory suggests that if regimes act in any way, those using, or contemplating conflict escalation will calculate the benefits of such tactics as rising, and this calculation will increase their likelihood of military intervention for the sake of national interests.

Other scholars argue that military intervention in conflict is seen as a final rational choice expressed in the desperation while under threat, where there is an impending threat to the

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[29] Sederberg, Peter C., (1995). Conciliation as counter-terrorism strategy, Journal of peace research, volume 32, No 3, sage publications, p.8.

national sovereignty and its interest by the external forces. This would be seen as the case in point for Ethiopia's military intervention justification. This is after the rebellious groups, like Eritrea's struggle for self determination , after becoming an independent state, it continued to support the rebellious groups in Somalia opposed to Ethiopian's active role to the resolution of the Somali conflict.

1.5 Research methodology: Introduction

This section presents the methodology that was used. It comprises of the research design, methods of data collection, data analysis and presentation.

1.5.1 Research design

The research is relatively qualitative, whereby a small portion is quantitative. Qualitative research design emphasizes the description of data collected. Data collection was through oral interviews to the respondents. It is advantegeous in the sense that it gives the researcher opportunity to judge the response given and triangulate such responses with the observation while in the field collecting data. The sample population in this research is a set of list that the sample was chosen from. According to Babbie and Mouton,[30] a well articulate sample gives information that describes key elements that compose the sampling frame. For this study the overall population was 100, stratified through the various populations as a target.

Data collected by interview and questionnaires was coded by giving all statements numeric codes based on meaning for ease of data capturing. This was followed by data entry and analysis. The data was then analyzed using content analysis. Tables and pie charts were used and results presented in narration. The limitation in scope was the representation of all the respondents and also the interpretation of the context

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[30] Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2006. *The Practice of Social Research*: South African Edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press p184.

thereby to overcome the limitation, the use of purposive sampling was recommended as opposed to random sampling criteria.

1.5.7 Chapter outline

Chapter first: Introduction to the study.

Chapter two: Militarisation of Somalia and the Ethiopian military intervention-an overview.

Chapter three: Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia: a critical assessment, 2006-2009

Chapter four: Ethiopia's military intervention: a critical analysis

Chapter five: Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

MILITARISATION OF SOMALIA AND THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION-AN OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction

Somalia has been synonymous for statelessness and extreme insecurity. The eight years of transitional rule came to an end in August 2012; expectations are on high now that continued military-led stabilization, changing regional security dynamics and efforts to rebuild Somalia might enable the country to declare an end to two decades of civil war.

2.1 Somalia and its people

Somalia is a semi-desert state, in north-eastern of the Horn of Africa, with an area of about 640, 000 square kilometers[31] . The core agricultural production areas are between Juba Rivers and Shebelle because of the fertile arable land and the higher rainfall that is good for agriculture. Besides agriculture, the Somalis are nomadic pastoralists as a result of the harsh climate in the sub- continent. They were dispersed in the Horn of Africa via the Valley of Awash, Ogaden region in Ethiopia, also found in Djibouti and northern parts of Kenya[32] . The Somalis have a common origin of one language and Sunni Islamic faith, but they are highly divided society based on clan patronage and lineage. They have five major clans of Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Digil Mirifle and the Minorities; but are further sub-divided into 38 sub clans. This clan structure is a key political base, that is vital for the existence of individuals and groups at times of conflicts[33].

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[31]Bradbury M. 1994.*The Somali Conflict, prospects for peace*, An Oxfam working paper. Oxford: Oxfam, p.9
[32]Ibid.
[33]Ibid.

Brudbury further argues that until the colonial period, the Somalis were based on the clan lineage as a political identity.

Historically, the beginning of the conflict in Somalia can be traced to the colonial partitioning of the Somali nation in 1897; the current conflict is a catalyst of a number of issues that are intra-Somalis in nature. Though at some point the conflict acquired a regional perspective with her neighbours because of the fear of the Somali irredentism that did not recognize international boundaries. The rise of General Siad Barre led to a turning point in the Somali civil war through militaristic tendencies.

2.2 Origin of militarization of Somalia

General Said Barre used the cold war and the superpowers interests to acquire military hardware[34] . This was the genesis of militarization in Somalia. A number of countries contributed to the military hardware supply; these include Soviet Union, United States of America, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, Iraq, apartheid South Africa, Libya, Italy, and Egypt. To some extent, the weapons used in the conflict are an extension of the cold war. The proliferation of small arms is a livelihood for survival and defense in difficult economic situations[35] . During this time, Siad Barre availed weapons to his Darod clan, hence leading to intra-clan conflict on high scale that had not been witnessed before. Foreign interests fueled the conflict further, leading to elusive peace making process. The US made a contribution of $40 million in military hardware after the expulsion of Soviet Union in 1977; this led to constant military support until Barre was ousted

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[34]Ibid.
[35]Osman, A. 2007.Cultural Diversity and Somali Conflict, Myth or Reality?*Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution*. p.99.

from power.[36] Before its expulsion in 1977, Soviet Union provided 250 medium tanks, arsenal of guided missiles, boats and helped in the establishment of the navy and a well-equipped army of 370,000 troops.

Somalia has been in state of armed conflict of one form or another since 1988, a condition that is largely responsible for the destruction of much of the capital, the flight of over 1.5 million Somali refugees, and the displacement of over 1 million other Somalis.[37] The patterns and severity of this state of armed conflict have varied over time, ranging from intense civil war to intermittent communal clashes to chronic, low level insecurity described locally as "not war not peace". Armed conflict has affected almost every corner of the country at some point over the past twenty years, but most of the fighting has been concentrated in a few chronically contested locations, especially the greater Mogadishu area. Most of the fighting has been domestic, but external actors have frequently been central protagonists in Somalia's armed violence in the form of international peace enforcement or protection forces, occupying armies,proxy wars, covert operations, or as the source of policies or development resources that have inadvertently fuelled conflict locally.[38]

Somalia's experienced armed conflict in one form or another since 1988, a scenario that is to great extent directly responsible for the breakdown of infrastructure in the capital Mogadishu, leading to the displacement of over a million Somalis and 1.5 million as refugees in Kenya and other neighboring countries within the Horn of Africa.[39] The nature of the conflict has been

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[6]Adam, H. 2008. From Tyranny to Anarchy. Asmara: The Red Sea Press pp.54-83.
[7]Ken Menkhaus, The crisis in Somalia; Tragedy in five acts, *African Affairs*. 2007.
[8]Milliken, J & Krause, K. 2003.Concepts, Lessons and Strategies in State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. pp.20-46.
[9] Ibid.

ranging from severity, violence and full-fledged intra-state war, but they have varied over time, ranging from intense civil war to intermittent communal clashes to chronic, low-level insecurity.

Armed conflict has affected almost every corner of the country at some point over the past twenty years, but most of the fighting has been concentrated in a few chronically contested locations, especially the greater Mogadishu area. Most of the fighting has been domestic, but external actors have frequently been central protagonists in Somalia's armed violence – in the form of international peace enforcement or protection forces, occupying armies, proxy wars, covert operations, or as the source of policies or development resources that have inadvertently fuelled conflict locally.[40] The main clashes today occures between Somali forces, AMISOM forces from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Seira Leone against Al- Shabaab under the growing influence and perhaps direction of non-Somali jihadists.

The central government of Somalia has for decades been in a state of complete collapse due to the series of protracted armed conflicts. The absence of a working central government that is responsible for rule of law and public order has been the major factor in the uprising of various militia groups. Irrespective of the chronic vulnerability of militia groups and the competing armed conflict in South Central, other parts have experienced relative peace even in the absence of a central government. In some instances efforts to revive the central state have actually triggered armed clashes in some regions. There has been complex relationship between state failure, state-building, and armed conflict in Somalia.[41]

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[40]Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia, a country in peril, a policy nightmare*, Enough strategy paper, 2008.
[41]*International Crisis Group, Somalia*: To move beyond the failed state, Africa report 147, ICG, 23rd December 2008.

2.3 Range of armed conflict in Somalia since 1988

A number of ways are used to classify the conflict in Somalia based on the degree of fighting and actors that are involved, but some fall in more than one category. They include the following:

Civil war – large scale fighting involving significant armed militia groups, over issues of national politics – has taken place three times in Somalia since 1988, and counts as one of the most destructive forms of conflict. [42] The government of Barre against the multiple liberation fronts in 1988-90 led to the destruction of various infrastructure in Shabelle and Hargeisa. It led to over 50,000 deaths within Shabelle and Hargeisa. The civil war of 1991-92, pitting numerous clan-based militias over control of Mogadishu and the government, led to the destruction and looting of Mogadishu, many were displaced. The 2005-2012 war against Al-Shaabab has been the most complex armed conflict, involving foreign as well as multiple Somali armed groups; it has produced heavy property damage, the flight of over 600,000 IDPs from Mogadishu, and tens of thousands causalities. [43]

Foreign forces at war, involves either direct or indirect roles of external actors. [44] Somalia has seen both;there have been a surprising number of cases of foreign forces engaged in direct armed combat inside Somalia. [45] Foreign forces have been injected into Somalia's twenty year crisis as peacekeepers-UNOSOM I, 1992, peace enforcement operations; UNITAF and UNOSOM II, 1993-94, protection missions-AMISOM, 2007-, cross-border incursions against local threats-

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[42] Ken Menkhaus, Understanding state failure in Somalia; internal and external dimensions, appeared in the publication by the He Osman, A. 2007. Cultural Diversity and Somali Conflict, Myth or Reality? Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution; pp.84-130.
[43] Oinrich Böll Foundation, Somalia: current conflict and chances for state building, Volume 5, 2008.
[44] J. Dollard et al, Frustration and aggression (London and Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1980.
[45] Roland Marchal, Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war, in Alex de Wal (ed) Islamists and its enemies in the Horn of Africa, London, Hurst, 2004.

Ethiopia, periodically since 1995 and in 2006-09, military advisors-Eritrea, 2006, transnational jihad fighters and advisors from Al Qa'ida, 1992-94, 2003-, counter-terrorism operations-US.[46] While some of these interventions have contributed to short-term stabilization, UNITAF, for instance, halted the civil war and famine of 1992. Almost all of the interventions have been drawn into often very heavy armed conflict with Somali armed groups. Some of the most destructive wars in Somalia have involved foreign troops, including the period of fighting since 2007.[47] Foreign forces employ much heavier weaponry and, because they are usually fighting asymmetrical urban guerilla wars against Somali insurgents, produce higher levels of civilian casualties. When foreigners are the insurgents (Al Qa'ida/shabaab), their extensive use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and assassinations also result in high civilian casualties.[48]

Proxy wars- foreign interests have at times played out rivalries through Somali proxies, for instance, Eritrea and Ethiopia; the US and Al Qa'ida are another. Because funds for weaponry and ammunition are scarce in Somalia, injections of funding, supplies, and advisors to Somali armed groups dramatically increases the damage and duration of battles. These armed conflicts have proven exceptionally difficult to mediate because the external actors can constitute silent and unaccountable spoilers.[49] Because local proxies have also often been armed non-state actors or more or less autonomous security forces within national or local governments, this form of war has also reinforced local spoilers opposed to state-building, as they benefit from serving as an ally of an external force in the absence of a functional state.

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[46] Moller, B. 2009. The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors, DIIS Report Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; pp.24-49.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Marchal, Roland, A Tentative Assessment of Harakat Al-Shabaab in Somalia, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, June 2009; pp.34-89.
[49] Ibid.

Sub-national polities at war-Somalia's regional administrations, most notably Puntland, secessionist Somaliland, and more recently Galmudug – are viewed as zones of relative peace, where disputes are settled through politics, not armed conflict.[50] Whether this relative peace is a function of having an effective government or not is a matter of debate – some residents of these administrations argue their peace is the result of a strong social compact, and that the government is the result of, not the cause of, peace. In any event, these sub-national polities have engaged their security forces in armed conflict, against local rivals and rejectionists (Somaliland in 1994-95 and Puntland intermittently since 2000) and against one another (Somaliland vs. Puntland, intermittently since 2004).[51] Modest resources and a local desire to contain the fighting have kept these clashes relatively limited in scope and duration. The unilateral creation of sub-national administrations raises conflict-producing issues such as rights and citizenship, borders, and control over seaport customs and energy resources.

Communal clashes-hundreds of communal (clan) clashes have occurred across Somalia over the past twenty years. No region has been immune, though some have suffered much more than others. Some constitute spiraling violence originating in cycles of revenge killings for a crime. Many of these clashes are triggered by struggles over valued resources – pasture, wells, markets, airstrips, seaports, and international humanitarian or development aid and contracts.[52] Others have been fueled by disputes over political control of towns and districts. Still others have been manipulated and manufactured by Somali political elites in Mogadishu or Nairobi – what Somalis call "remote control" wars. The pervasiveness of inexpensive weaponry has sometimes

[0]Menkhaus, K.2004. Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism, London: Routledge, .pp.39-76.
[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.

resulted in these clashes produced shocking casualty levels more akin to those from a civil war. While communal clashes have many different triggers, communities with relatively robust civic, religious, and traditional (clan) leadership are better inoculated against spiraling clan clashes, and can more effectively negotiate to end to them.

Standing clan militias at war- whereas communal clashes involve clans mobilizing temporarily to protect their corporate interest, some clan-based militias in Somalia are standing units, paid (irregularly) by militia leaders. Most of the fighting in 1991-92 involved clan-based factions. Since 1995 the number and political prominence of these militias have declined, but they remain a powerful player in Somali armed conflict, and have enjoyed resurgence as partners and proxies of foreign actors since 2004.[53] Their forces are typically poorly-disciplined. Clan leaders, who are often responsible for recruiting fighters into these militias, can and do exhibit some influence with these groups, even as they themselves are manipulated by the militia leaders.

Paramilitaries at war-security forces with formal standing in national or regional governments – police, army, presidential forces, and others – have tended to operate as autonomous units based largely on clan and answering to their commander, not to the government. They pursue their own interests, which sometimes results in their use of lethal force against other armed groups, including other security forces nominally working for the same government.[54] This was a major problem in the TFG in 2007-08, and remains a source of periodic armed clashes in Puntland and in the TFG.

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[3] Regan, Patrick M. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000; pp. 31-109.
[4] Ibid.

War economies-as in other countries beset by protracted war, Somalia has suffered from the rise of armed conflict driven primarily by parochial economic interests – to loot, extort, and secure and protect valuable sources of "rent" such as checkpoints, ports, and airstrips.[55] Many armed groups, including clan militia and government security sector units, are paid irregularly or not at all, and so approach armed conflict as an opportunity to secure war booty. This motive can animate the behavior of foot soldiers as well as top financial backers of wars. These clashes tend to involve risk-aversion, opportunism, and the targeting of civilians rather than combatants.

Extremists at war-various Islamist militias and movements – most notably Al Ittihad al Islamiyya (AIAI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hisbul Islamiyya, and Shabaab – have clashed with clan militias, regional governments, transitional governments, rival Islamist groups, and foreign forces over the past twenty years.[56] Armed conflict involving Islamists, inject a level of ideology and a "war of ideas" into the Somali civil war that had largely been absent since 1988.[57] They have also been able to attract a cadre of fighters transcending clan lines who are much more committed, disciplined, and willing to die than fighters in Somali clan militias and government forces. The Islamists have also demonstrated a superior ability to build networks of Somali financial backers across clan lines and in the diaspora. Al-shabaab, as Islamist militia group has introduced new tactics of war – improvised explosive devices, suicide bombing and extensive use of political assassination.[58]

[55]Theory of greed and grievances in war economy as explained in Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Scarcity and surfeit: *the ecology of Africa's conflicts*. ACTS and Institute of Security studies,2002, p. 7.
[56] Andre Le Sage, Somali Council of Islamic Courts, (3 August 2006) (unpublished paper) p. 8.
[57]*International Crisis Group*, Somalia Islamists, Africa report No 100, ICG, 12th December 2005, p. 6.
[58]Marchal, Roland, A Tentative Assessment of Harakat Al-Shabaab in Somalia, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*. June 2009.

Private militias at war- a certain amount of armed conflict in Somalia has been waged with private militias. These are mainly business security forces, and accountable to the business community who pays their salaries. Some of the MPs recruited their own private protection forces which engaged in armed clashes.[59] Foreign security firms are also expanding their presence in Somalia and could become a new player in armed conflicts as well.

Armed criminality- gangs of armed youth called freelance militia are often nominally affiliated with a larger security force in Somalia but act as autonomous violence entrepreneurs engaging in extortion and criminal violence against civilians. This includes elements in government security forces in the TFG and Puntland, where both clan militias and in some cases the Islamist militias are involved.[60]

2.4 Ethiopian Military intervention in Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia have a long and bitter history, with the ethnically Somali Ogaden region a constant source of tension. Part of the Ogaden is in Somalia, part in Ethiopia. Historically, Somalia has wanted to claim the entire Ogaden, and Ethiopia continues to face resistance from rebel movements within the disputed territory.[61]

In 2006, the Ethiopian troops made another military intervention into Somalia; they crossed their eastern border into Somalia;where they sent their troops over the border, about 30000 of

[59]Ken Menkhaus, Somalia, a country in peril, a policy nightmare, *Enough strategy paper*, 2008.
[60]Menkhaus, K.2004. Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism, London: Routledge. Pp.39-76.
[61]Moller. B. 2009. The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors. DIIS Report Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; pp. 24-49.

them,who were not opposed officially by the United States.[62] The well-trained and well-armed Ethiopian troops smashed the feeble resistance of the Islamic Courts, and installed a transitional government in Mogadishu. This transitional government remained the recognized government of Somalia until August 2012 when its term came to an end, ushering in the current democratically elected government.[63]

Somalia troops fractured the Islamic Courts. Some of the leadership were co-opted into the transitional government; The second Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President, Shiekh Sherif, was by then a leading figure in the Islamic Courts. But some Islamic Courts' members decided to remain militant fundamentalists. This was the genesis of Al Shabaab, the group which went on to forge links with Al Qaeda and controlled most of Southern Somalia.

A broader perspective shows many incidents of Ethiopian–Somali conflict. Boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the scramble for Africa of the 19th century when Menelik II took over the Ogaden region, a move that directly contributed to the birth of a major Somali anti-colonial campaign by the Dervish, which collapsed a quarter of a century later in 1920 under heavy British arial bombardment. Tensions resurfaced when Britain in the 1948 settlement granted to Ethiopia the Ogaden region. Somali disgruntlement with this decision led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the intention of taking control of the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia. This plan would have reunited the Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the Republic of Somalia. Shy of that, ethnic and political tensions have

Davis, Michael C., Wolfgang, Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter, Sepp. International Intervention in the Post–Cold War World. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004;pp.24-49.
Ibid.

caused cross-border clashes over the years. For example the border dispute in 1960-1964, Ogaden war-1977-1978, August boarder clash-1982 and 1998-2000 cross border war.[64]

Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are of course not limited to the 20th-21st Centuries. Wars between historical Somali states and Ethiopia stretch back to the 16th century. Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a 16th century Islamic leader and General of Adal, popular in Somali culture for his jihad against Ethiopia during the rise of the Adal Sultanate, an historic multi-ethnic state in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, painful living history, oral and cultural traditions, long-standing ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay between the two nations and fuelled the conflict.[65]

2.5 History of Ethiopian Intervention

One of the first incursions by Ethiopian troops after the fall of the Somali government took place in August 1996. Later, in March 1999, Ethiopian troops raided the Somali border town of Balanballe in pursuit of members of the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya group which has been fighting to unite Ethiopia's eastern Ogaden region with Somalia. In 1999 two Somali leaders, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, protested to the United Nations Security Council on the heavily-armed Ethiopian troops in Beledhawo and Dollow towns. They further alleged that the Ethiopian troops had taken over the local administration and detained officials in the towns. In May 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, with the help of a pro-Ethiopian Somali faction occupied the town of Luuq in southwestern Somalia, close to the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. In late June 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, supported by armoured vehicles launched an attack from Luuq that resulted in the capture of GarbaHarre in the Gedo region, which was previously controlled by the Somali

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[64]Moller, B. 2009. The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors, DIIS Report Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; pp. 24-49.
[65] Ibid.

National Alliance led by Hussein Aideed. The attack was apparently aimed at flushing out Ethiopian rebels based in Somalia.[66]

An attempt was made to improve relations between Ethiopia and the TNG in June 2001, but relations only practically improved in 2004 when Abdullahi Yusuf became the TFG President. Then Ethiopia reversed its position and began to support the government, especially against various Islamist militias in Somalia, like the Islamic Courts Union. Though initially, Ethiopia did not recognize the Transitional government and reportedly continued its raids against Al-Ittihad and supporting various warlord factions, which led to strained relations between the Ethiopian government and the interim Somali government, characterized by accusations, denials and counter-accusations on both sides.

Ethiopia, based on its interest has suppord a number of different Somali factions at one time or another.[67] Among these are the Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC), Muse Sudi Yalahow, General Said Hirsi Morgan (allied to the Somali Patriotic Movement or SPM), Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud and his Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (former President of Puntland and later TFG President). A number of Somali warlords have also held meetings and form alliances in Ethiopia.

In January 2002, around 300 Ethiopian soldiers were deployed in Garowe (capital of Puntland) with other Ethiopian troops reportedly moving into the neighbouring Bay region and around Baidoa. Ethiopian soldiers attacked and temporarily re-captured the border town of Beledhawo

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[66] Davis, Michael C., Wolfgang, Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter, Sepp. International Intervention in the Post–Cold War World. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004;pp.24-49.
[67] Ibid.

on May 15, 2002 with the help of the SRRC after the town had been captured by a rival militia. During the raid, the commander of the rival militia, Colonel Abdirizak Issak Bihi, was captured by the Ethiopian forces and taken across the border to Ethiopia. After the raid, control of the town was turned over to the SRRC. Earlier in May, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had retaken control of Puntland by ousting his rival Jama Ali Jama with the aid of the Ethiopian army.

In February 2003, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, MelesZenawi, admitted that Ethiopian troops were occasionally sent into Somalia to battle the militant Islamist group Al-Ittihad and stated that the group was linked to Al-Qaeda. He also claimed that Ethiopia's government had lists of Al-Ittihad members who were, at the time, in the Transitional National Government and parliament of Somalia; a claim that TNG President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan has consistently denied. President Hassan has in turn, accused Ethiopia of destabilizing Somalia, interfering daily in Somali affairs and violating the arms embargo on Somalia by supplying weapons to warlords opposed to the Transitional Government at the time.

2.6 The 2006-2009 Somalia war

The War in Somalia was an armed conflict involving largely Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and Somali troops from Puntland versus the Somali Islamist umbrella group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and other affiliated militias for control of the country.[68] There is a clear connection between War in Somalia since 2009 and the War of 2006. The war officially began in December 2006 when Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to prop up the TFG in Baidoa. The TFG in Somalia invited Ethiopians to intervene, which became an unpopular decision that failed to strengthen the government. Subsequently the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan DahirAweys, declared that Somalia was in a state of war, and all Somalis should

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[68] Andre Le Sage, Somali Council of Islamic Courts, (3 August 2006) (unpublished paper) p.8-33.

take part in the struggle against Ethiopia. On December 24, Ethiopia decided to actively combat the ICU.[69]

The late Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, justified Ethiopian invasion; it entered hostilities because it faced a direct threat to its own borders. He claimed that the Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of their nation. The ICU, which controlled the coastal areas of southern Somalia, engaged in fighting with the forces of the Somali TFG, and the autonomous regional government of Puntland were backed by Ethiopian troops. The outbreak of heavy fighting began on December 20 with the Battle of Baidoa, after the lapse of a one-week deadline the ICU imposed on Ethiopia (on December 12) to withdraw from Somalia. Ethiopia, however, refused to abandon its positions around the TFG interim capital at Baidoa. On December 29, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu relatively unopposed. Later, a small number of U.S. Special Forces accompanied Ethiopian and TFG troops after the collapse and withdrawal of the ICU to give military advice and to track suspected al-Qaida fighters. Both American support for the TFG and various Arab Nations' support for the ICU were isolated cases from the central motive of the war between the allied Ethiopian and Somali government forces and the allied ICU and Eritrean forces.[70]

As of January 2009, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia following a two-year insurgency, which led to loss of territory and effectiveness of the TFG and a power-sharing deal between Islamists splinter group led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's Alliance for the Re-liberation of

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[69] Ibid.
[70] Matt Bryden, Union of Islamic Courts; In-depth profile, unpublished paper, 2006. pp.1-10.

Somalia (ARS) and TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan in Djibouti. The al Shabaab who has separated from the ICU rejected the peace deal and continued to take territories including Baidoa. Another Islamist group, Ahlu SunnahWal jama'a, which was allied to the transitional government and supported by Ethiopia, continued to attack al Shabab, and taking over towns as well.

2.7 Theoretical aspects of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia

Intervention is commonly defined as interference in the territory or domestic affairs of another state with military force, typically in a way that compromises a sovereign government's control over its own territory and population.[71] The meaning and importance of sovereignty as the key concept defining the global political order has made intervention a controversial and debated subject for the past several years. The Ethiopian intervention can well be explained by the International Relations theory, where the concept of sovereignty is typically traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648 and established a political order of territorially defined states that had exclusive control over their own political affairs and populations.[72] Despite the importance of sovereignty and non-interference in international theory and law, Bass point out that these principles have never been given absolute respect in practice. Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of scholars, political leaders, and activists have argued that sovereignty should not stand in the way of international intervention meant to protect victims of gross human-rights violations.[73] The Ethiopian and US military intervention in Somalia illustrate this case of new normative claim and the controversy this position has generated.

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[71] Davis, Michael C., Wolfgang, Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter, Sepp. International Intervention in the Post–Cold War World. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004; pp. 101-133.
[72] Walzer, M. (2006) Just and Unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations. London, UK: Basic Books
[73] Bass, Gary J. Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Knopf, 2008. pp. 19-59.

Another theory is the just war theory, which can be viewed as an explanation with an intent of justifying why some military intervention in conflict is justified. This means not all wars can be justified.[74] The theory therefore examines the justification of how and why wars are fought.[75] This theory is based on principles which have to be fulfilled for the war to be considered a just war, such that a military intervention can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success.

2.8 Conclusion

The Ethiopian military had success chances for the intervention. At the start of the intervention the airport and seaport were captured easily without any much incidence. This ensured that supplies could flow into the region without much obstruction at the points of entry.[76] In ultimate goal of principle of peace re-establishment; this is very evident of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. Hundreds of people were dying on a daily basis and the intervention brought a stop to this. The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. There was no excessive use of force in or of sophisticated weapons or weapons of mass destruction. This was to ensure the innocent people were not caught in the cross fire (Reagan, 1996). In addition, as Orend claimed, just wars save the lives of many innocent people. The case of Somali intervention by the western forces led by U.S. was a case of just war aimed at saving the lives of thousands of people facing starvation and sharp violence.[77]

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[74]Reagan, R. (1996). Just War: principles and Cases. New York, NY: CUA Publishers; pp. 49-69.
[75]Walzer, M. (2006) Just and Unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations. London, UK: Basic Books; pp.78-109.
[76] Regan, Patrick M. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000; pp. 43-99.
[77]Orend, B. (2000). War and International Justice: A Kantian perspective. Wilfred Laurier Univ; pp.11-39.

CHAPTER THREE

ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 2006-2009

3.0 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter two, Ethiopia's military capability has been on the rise in the Horn of Africa. The 2006 intervention may go down in history as one of the most daring and strategic decision any African government has made to fight terrorism crossing a border towards its neighbour. Ethiopia's action to invade Somalia looks perplexing, considering it seemed unprovoked, but its long term impact was appreciated both in Somalia and the international community. Ethiopia's daring action on the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) at the time when no state in the Horn of Africa and even the international community could dare to make such military intervention was impressive and laudable.

Irrespective of whether the goal for invasion was for its national security or the nearly two decades of instability there and the history of irredentism, the end result of a relatively peaceful Somalia justified Ethiopia's daring action that installed hope and future to the young Somali population. Although not without precedent, it was still unusual for one African country to invade another on the scale Ethiopia did and fight a war that was feared to be bloody.

In this chapter, the study presents the effectiveness of Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia to ensure a free Somali society of militia groups as is illustrated from the data collected from the field.

Table 1.2 Respondents' view on Ethiopia's military intervention

Response	AU[78]	IGAD[79]	SCS[80]	DC[81]	SFG[82]	PLA[83]	SLA[84]	EG[85]	KG[86]	Total
Effective	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	24
Ineffective	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Neither effective nor ineffective	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	4

Source: Field data

In the table above, 24 respondents were of the view that Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia conflict was effective. It represents 80 percent of the total sampled population of 30 respondents. This response can be attributed to the fact that Ethiopia was the first country, not only in Africa, but the entire world, to have made the decision of military intervention early 2000s, at a time when the regional and the international community was undecided on the Somalia conflict intervention mechanism. Two of the respondents were of the view that it was ineffective on its intervention. This is 3.3 percent of the total sampled population. The response was mainly from the Somalia civil society representative and the Somaliland Administration official. This can be associated with the humanitarian need that in most cases was identified by the members of the civil society. While the Somaliland administration, with relative peace, viewed Ethiopia's response as an opportunity for creating more internal displaced people (IDPs)

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[78] African Union.
[79] Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
[80] Somalia Civil Society.
[81] Diplomatic Community.
[82] Somalia Federal Government.
[83] Puntland Administration.
[84] Somaliland Administration.
[85] Ethiopian Government.
[86] Kenyan Government.

in Somaliland, leading to increased pressure on the available resources. According to the Somaliland official, the military intervention did not create a long lasting peace, but instead, it created humanitarian suffering of the local Somalis. Finally, 4 respondents did not confirm whether the military intervention was either effective or ineffective. It represents 13.3 percent of the sampled population. The reason for such response can be associated with the increased suspicion and the conflict of interest among the stakeholders over the stabilisation of Somalia. The response was mainly from civil society, Somalia Federal Government and the Puntland authority interviewed.

Figure 1.1 Pie chart representation of the responses

Response on effectiveness of Ethiopia's military intervention

Source; **Field data**

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3.1 The 2006 Ethiopian intervention

In response to whether Ethiopia invaded Somalia to guarantee its own security or effectiveness for stability of Somalia, it is fair to examine its impact in Somalia, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa[87]. The Ethiopian forces seemed to have planned and laid down their strategy of intervention in Somalia before the actual intervention. The physical presence of the Ethiopian troops was an outcome of serious planning and options developed by the Ethiopian government[88].

In early 2005, Somalia was mostly – but not completely – under the loose control of the Union of Islamic Courts[89], a relatively moderate Islamic group which was slowly bringing some semblance of stability and security to a country that had not known peace for decades. But the Islamic Courts soon earned the wrath of Ethiopia and the West, which saw in its emphasis on Islamic law a strong link with terrorism and irridentism. This was near the beginning of the War on Terror, and the United States still had not made the distinction between the moderate if conservative Islam of groups like the Islamic Courts and, to an extent, Hamas in Palestine, and the militant, almost anarchic fundamentalism of Al Qaeda.

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[87]Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

In 2006, Ethiopia sent its troops over the border, about 30000 of them[90]. The relatively well-trained and well-armed Ethiopian troops smashed the Islamic Courts, and moved the transitional government to Mogadishu[91]. This transitional government remained the recognised government of Somalia until August 2012 with the election of the new democratically elected regime, even though they did not even control all of Mogadishu. An Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in December 2006 succeeded in ousting an increasingly radical Islamist army Al Shaabab and its movement, the Islamic Courts Union, but provoked a cycle of insurgency and counterinsurgency that plunged the country into new depths of misery[92].The Islamic Courts fractured, some of the leadership were co-opted into the transitional government[93]. This was the genesis of Al Shabab in 2006, the group which went on to forge links with Al Qaeda and still controls parts of central and southern Somalia. Ultimately, some western diplomats have argued that the Ethiopian invasion of 2006 reduced the instability that Somalia was experiencing after the 1991 revolt against Barre regime.[94]At the same time it created the condition for deployment of AMISOM in 2007 without which there would not be a semblance of government in Somalia today. Ethiopia might not have been too fussed[95]; the invasion laid the ground for today's relative stability and election of current democratically elected government, which greatly minimised potential threat to Ethiopia.

Several major developments presented both new opportunities and new risks for Somalia and the Horn of Africa in 2009[96].The Ethiopian withdrawal and replacement by AMISOM transformed

[90] Interview with Ethiopian Intelligence representative at the Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya, 10 June 2013.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Interview with Colonel Gebre Alemseged, Head of Somalia Peace Process facilitation office of IGAD, 12 June, 2013.
[94] Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Interview with Colonel Gebre Alemseged, Head of Somalia Peace Process facilitation office of IGAD, 12 June, 2013.

the political landscape in Somalia[97]. The worst fears that the Al Shabaab would consolidate control over the capital Mogadishu—a fear the Bush administration sought to exploit at the eleventh hour with a failed push for authorization of a U.N. peacekeeping force through the U.N. Security Council did not materialize. On the contrary, the Ethiopian withdrawal in negotiation with the so-called Asmara ARS group dramatically reduced violence and defused radicalism by removing the presence of a "foreign occupier" which many Somalis for obvious reasons of sovereignty resented[98]. It also strengthened the coalition of moderates from the Transitional Federal Government and opposition groups including many Islamists who signed the Djibouti Peace Agreement in the summer of 2008[99]. That coalition enjoyed greater legitimacy for having delivered the Ethiopian withdrawal, while the Al Shabaab lost its main adversary and rallying point.

Ethiopia's successful operation motivated other countries for military intervention[100]. The weight of the military forces that has been stacked against Al Shabaab is too much for them to handle. This becomes clear when one start looking at the number of countries involved: Burundi and Uganda alongside Djibouti, Sierra Leone troops and Kenyan troops under the AMISOM and Ethiopia with its own military force; and various international actors remaining very quiet for now, although there's plenty of speculation that the United States was contributing drones to go after specific targets. The Ethiopian forces are credited for the creation of the current optimism of the military solution to the Somali conflict. The exemplary exhibition of the military strategic intervention, created an impression that it was possible for a military operation to take place in

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[97] Ibid.
[98] Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.
[99] Interview with Colonel Gebre Alemseged, Head of Somalia Peace Process facilitation office of IGAD, 12 June, 2013.
[100] Interview with General Gebre Dilla, Head of military intelligence of Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.

Somalia, despite the feeling among the international community that the social and geographical terrain was not favourable for such an operation.[101]

However, the Ethiopian National Defense Force's (ENDF's) involvement in Somalia had the immediate effect of creating a power vacuum in which Islamist militants assumed control and the more moderate elements of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) became "marginalized, splintered, and weakened".[102] According to views of the local Somalis, the ICU was cultivating an environment of stability and security unprecedented in Somalia since 1991. As the Ethiopian government and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) eventually entered into productive diplomatic dialogue with the more moderate ICU elements, it seems plausible that Ethiopia would not have intervened had its government, the TFG and the ICU found a way to neutralize the influence of the more radical ICU elements in 2006.[103] This approach was never attempted, as Ethiopia, the TFG and the US labeled the ICU an extremist organization and made few diplomatic overtures to the new regime in Mogadishu.

The events that transpired between late 2006 and early 2009 offer poignant lessons regarding: (1) the effects of military intervention in nations already plagued by humanitarian crises; (2) the role of the international community in either mitigating or exacerbating those conditions; and (3) the type of leadership and diplomacy necessary to most effectively improve humanitarian conditions. Ethiopia's most critical strategic mistake during the conflict was its unilateral support of the TFG led by AbdullahiYusuf to supplant the ICU with an ineffectual regime.[104] Corrupt and unpopular

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[101] Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.
[102] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.

with the local populace, the TFG, ushered into power by force with the aid of a nation considered by many Somalis to be the enemy, had no long-term viability as a governing power.[105] Ethiopia and its allies made the mistake of misunderstanding the full range of players in the ICU and painting a distorted picture of it to the international community.[106] In 2006, "US, TFG, and Ethiopian officials labelled the entire leadership of the ICU as extremist and terrorist," yet invited some of the very same ICU officials to take part in a UN-led peace process a year and a half later.[107] Ethiopian military intervention both directly contributed to and exacerbated the humanitarian situation in terms of civilian casualties, displacement, migration and access to humanitarian aid.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

3.2 Justification of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia

To understand how this strategy was launched foremostly, one should remember that since the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, both countries were competing for support all over the Horn of Africa and beyond. As argued in Chapter one, at that time, Eritrea started actively supporting any rebel group that opposed the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia engaged in a similar strategy. As argued in Chapter one, the genesis of the 2006 military confrontation between Ethiopia and the Union of Islamic Courts traces its roots to colonial boundaries.[108]

Table 1:3 Respondents' response on Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia

	Total interviewed	Yes	%	No	%
Justification for military strategy	40	38	95	2	5
Military strategy is the answer	40	30	75	10	25
Effectiveness of Ethiopian Military	40	35	88	5	12

Source: Data from the field

A total of 95 percent were of the view that Ethiopia's military intervention was justified; this is in relation to the Ethiopian historical relations with Eritrea and Somalia. This view of respondents is in agreement with the arguments of Ahmed as captured in literature review; he argued that, since independence, various Somali governments have seen the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the North-Eastern Kenya and the State of Djibouti as integral parts of what they often

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[108] Connors, W (2007) 'Why we don't hear about the conflict in the Ogaden,' *Slate Magazine*.September 5.

refer to as the 'Greater Somali Republic.'[109] Although Somalia has not had an effective government since the overthrow of the Barre government in 1991, the hostility between the two States remained as suspicious as ever. However, the absence of government and the existence of various competing factions within Somalia itself, created a state of relative peace one that can be best described as cold peace. According to 95 percent of respondents, this setting descended into a complete quagmire when Islamist forces under the name of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) stepped into Somalia's political spotlight.

In mid-2006, the UIC and Ethiopia started accusations and counteraccusations. As noted in Chapter three, the UIC blamed Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs while Ethiopia in turn accused the UIC of promoting a hidden agenda aimed at destabilizing the unity of the Ethiopian State.[110] Ethiopia also contended that the leadership of the UIC was controlled by forces that were by then actively pursuing the vision of a Greater Somalia, a vision that aspired to integrate Ethiopia's Somali speaking region of Ogaden into mainland Somalia and hence threatened Ethiopia's political independence and territorial integrity.[111] The military confrontation between Ethiopia and the United Islamic Courts (UIC) might have been averted had it not been for the entrenched history of hostility that exacerbated the longstanding mistrust, leading to the creation of what Ethiopia deemed a state of "clear and present danger" to its sovereignty.[112]

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[109] Ahmed, II & Green, RH (1999) 'The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,' *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20,p. 1.
[110] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[111] Dawit G. (2006) A Critical and Timely Resolution to Defend our Sovereignty, The Ethiopian Herald. Vol. LXIII. No.072, 3 December. p.3.
[112] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.

The legality of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia presents into light the complex predicaments resulting from the realities of a 'failed State' and the current threat of "violent extremism".[113] According to Ethiopia, the invitation by the legitimate and recognized Somali government and Ethiopia's lawful right to collective and individual self-defence justified its military intervention.[114] It is based on this that 95 percent of respondents argued that Ethiopian military intervention was the answer to the Somali interst. Majority of them confirmed that it was based on the 2006 Ethiopia's military intervention that later in 2009 African countries, including Uganda and Burundi were willing to contribute their troops under African Union to fight the extremist groups in Somalia. One respondent argued that it was for the same reason that the Kenyan Defence Forces entered Somalia with the optimism of defeating Al-Shaabab. Contemporary international law permits intervention in matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of other States with the consent of that State.

Although invitation to intervene in the internal affairs of States by the legitimate governments of that State is seen as an expression of the sovereign authority of that State, the nature of the inviting government, the precarious and limited nature of its authority, its lack of both internal and/or external legitimacy, are among the factors that render the legality of interventions uncertain. Though any form of interference in the internal or external affairs of any State is contrary to the stipulation of the Charter and customary norms of international law, the existence of consent precludes the wrongfulness of the act.[115]

In order for a government to extend an invitation to another State on matters of internal affairs, international law requires government to be a legitimate representative of the State, in effective

[13] Interview with Undisclosed respondent, United States of American Embassy, Nairobi, 02 July 2013.
[14] Interview with Bradshaw John, Senior Officer, European Union Political Affairs, 10 June 2013.
[15] Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (1992), Oppenheim's International Law, (9th ed.), Longman. pp.150, 435-438.

control of the people and territory of the State and capable of speaking on behalf of that State. [116]

Even if there is no one party that is unequivocally better placed to speak and decide on behalf of that State, a party in a relatively better position can represent the State in question. In the context of Somalia, none of the two factions satisfy the triple requirements of legitimacy, effectiveness and recognition. None of these parties claimed legitimacy over the other as none of them was product of a freely and fairly contested election. Whereas the UIC was in a better position as far as control of the larger proportion of the Somali territory is concerned, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) commanded substantial level of recognition among the international community. From the point of view of international law, one needs to be invited by an entity that meets not only the test of international recognition but also the tests of legitimacy (whether internal or external) and of effectiveness. Although the TFG had sufficient level of international recognition, it lacked the legal authority to speak for the Somali State.[117] Even if it was a government that met the test of both legitimacy and recognition, the lack of effective control of the Somali territory strips it of the right to request assistance and denies third States the right to intervention.

However, this does not exclude the right of such a government to request assistance to quell a low level strife within the State.[118] The TFG does not meet this requirement and its invitation could not be lawful. When one of the parties is not in a clearly better position to act on behalf of the State, intervention by invitation is illegal since external forces will have the opportunity to decide the outcome of a purely internal struggle. Although the invitation argument lacks the essential requirements of the law, Ethiopia seems to have a valid right to counter-intervention in response to prior illegal interventions by Al Qaida , Eritrea and other States with the view to

[116] Ibid.
[117] Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Counter-Measures in International Law, 102 AJIL,p.715-720.
[118] Ibid.

defend the political independence of Somalia. The principle of counter intervention assumes the existence of a prior illegal intervention in violation of the political independence and territorial integrity of States protected under the UN Charter. If an illegal intervention in the internal affairs of the State had already occurred in violation of international law, other States earn the right to intervene to counter-balance that illegal intervention.[119] So the latter intervention is interference in the affairs of the State for the sole purpose of defending and restoring the independence and sovereignty of the State offended by a prior illegal intervention. On the same vein, the intervention of several States in the internal affairs of Somalia accorded Ethiopia the right to intervene to offset an   intervention that was already underway. Counter-intervention subject to conditions justifies Ethiopia's action.[120] Yet, it is also noteworthy to take account of the silence of the Security Council, the General Assembly or the African Union in the face of a mounting conflict between the two States that was grave enough as to trigger the jurisdiction of these institutions.[121] Ethiopia's action was not officially condemned by these organs. This could be attributed to the realization by the international community of the unfathomable truth relating to the breading of militancy in Somalia and the consequent threat posed against Ethiopia.[122]

Aside from the issue of self-defence, Ethiopia's conduct predating the full-scale military confrontation with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) can be seen from two angles, i.e., invitation and counter-intervention.[123] Since the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacked the legal authority to invite, Ethiopia's claim for invitation does not seem to be consistent with norms of international law governing intervention. However, assuming that the intervention in

[19] Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Counter-Measures in International Law, 102 AJIL, pp.715-720.
[20] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Doornbos, M and Markakis, J (1994), 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?' *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 21, no. 59. pp.82-88.

Somalia of Eritrea and other states preceded Ethiopia's sending of 'military trainers and advisors', Ethiopia had the legal right to counter-intervention to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of the Somali State and of its people.

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) also had the full support of Kenya whose tourist industry had already been affected by terrorist attacks in 2002 and was since then trying to limit the infiltration of Islamist groups from Somalia. The Ethiopian government had Kenya as an ally to support her interest in Somalia because of the 2002 terrorists attack in Nairobi[124]. Once it had secured the support of a friendly and internationally recognized Somali government, Ethiopia had to strengthen Abdullahi Yusuf's government to reduce the threat posed by an uncontrolled Somalia. The relocation of TFG from its exile in Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi to Sc February 2006 in Baidoa, was a milestone towards Ethiopia's support of TFG.

The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was encouraged by the support it received from various international actors such as the Arab League and, of major importance to Ethiopia, Eritrea. The ease with which UIC troops captured territory formerly held by warlords over-shadowed the fact that the Islamic courts still did not have sufficient military power to sustain an armed confrontation with a properly trained military force[125]. However, UIC leadership, unhappy with Ethiopian support in favor of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia's un-admitted military cross-border incursions, started pointing fingers at the Addis Ababa government. At that time, the UIC had become a real threat to all the efforts made by the Ethiopian Government to establish the TFG as the only credible governing body in Somalia.

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[24] Interview with Senior Intelligence Officer, Kenya, 13 July 2013.
[25] Ibid.

Moreover, UIC leaders were openly opposing the deployment of foreign troops as part of an African peacekeeping force.[126]

3.3 The Ethiopian military capability

As argued in chapter one and three, at the beginning of December 2006 the situation in Somalia had reached a stand-off, the major part of southern Somalia was under the control of the UIC while the TFG only controlled small areas around Baidoa but had international recognition. The deployment of IGASOM troops looked unlikely, Ethiopia as the only country that had officially offered to send troops in Somalia, was determined to ensure its success. At the same time, the UIC leadership was becoming more and more vocal against the Ethiopian government. The UIC and Ethiopian armed elements had already clashed on numerous occasions between July and November 2006, but no full-scale clash had occurred.

However, a combination of factors was to favour the Ethiopian military intervention alongside the TFG, as argued in chapter one, this include the Ethiopian Parliament approval to counter threats posed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia. Another one was United Nation's adoption of resolution 1725 of 06 December 2006.

Once Ethiopia had stationed sufficient troops to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) but most importantly repel any offensive launched by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the Addis Ababa government left the UIC to initiate the war. Major fighting broke out on 20 December when the Islamic forces attacked the TFG troops in the towns surrounding Baidoa.

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[126] Interview with Ziad, Deputy Head of Mission-Somali Embassy-Nairobi, 23 June 2013.

TFG troops with the help of the Ethiopian military advisors were able to resist the offensive and inflict casualties on the UIC side. This represented the first time in months where the UIC faced a staunch opposition.[127]

On 21 December 2006, Sheik Hassen Dahir Aweys, one of the UIC leaders declared from Mogadishu that Somalia was in a state of war against Ethiopia, and that all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia.[128] This was just what the Ethiopian leadership had been waiting for as it provided it with a legitimate reason to officially confront the UIC in Somalia.[129] Thus on the 24 December 2006, the Ethiopian government could recognize the implication of its troops by declaring that "the Ethiopian government has taken self-defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and the foreign terrorist groups.[130]

Ethiopian forces concentrated their forces on two different fronts. Coming from the North-East and assisted by troops coming from Puntland, a first front was opened near Gaalkayo in the Mudug region, proceeding towards Bandiradley and later on marching on to Beledweyne by following the Mugadishu-Garoowe road. In Beledweyne, the Eastern front would be able to join the Central and main front. This Central front was opened in the Bakool, Hiran and the Northern part of the Bay region that suurounds Baidoa, mainly aimed at securing the area, protecting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as ensuring another route towards Mogadishu.

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[127] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.

Advancing rapidly, troops from the Eastern front followed the road down from Beledweyne towards Mogadishu, while their counterparts did the same on the road from Baidoa to the Somali capital. Just three days after having launched their offensive Ethiopian troops alongside their TFG counterparts had reached the outskirts of Mogadishu. The Somali capital was to fall in their hands after the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) decided not to defend the town in order to avoid bloodshed.[131] It is based on this that 75 percent of respondents were of the view that military intervention was the most effective strategy for intervention in Somalia. Meanwhile, another front was open, with the Ethiopian troops marching South-West from Baidoa towards Buale in order to take control of the Juba River Valley and thus cornering the UIC troops in the South-Western part of the country between the sea and the Kenyan border. The UIC thus retreated towards Kismayo in the Southern tip of the country where they would stage a last attempt to resist the Ethiopian military force without much success.

Ethiopia made good on its decision to withdraw its military forces from Somalia, a move which transformed the political landscape in Somalia. The worst fears that the Al-shabaab would consolidate control over the capital Mogadishu, a fear the United States-Bush administration sought to exploit at the eleventh hour with a failed push for authorization of a U.N. peacekeeping force through the U.N. Security Council, which did not materialize. On the contrary, the Ethiopian withdrawal had the potential to dramatically reduce violence and defuse radicalism by removing the presence of a "foreign occupier" which Somalis of all stripes resented and which fueled the insurgency.[132] It also promised to strengthen the coalition of moderates from the

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[11] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[12] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 013.

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Transitional Federal Government and opposition groups, including many Islamists, who signed the Djibouti Peace Agreement in the summer of 2008. That coalition enjoyed greater legitimacy for having delivered the Ethiopian withdrawal, while the Al-shabaab lost its main adversary and rallying point. Periodic Ethiopian incursions into Somalia were inevitable, but were not sustainable with the intent to undermine the new transitional government.

The Somali crisis was deeply enmeshed in a broader regional dynamic, including Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions and Ethiopia's domestic politics, including the counterinsurgency campaign against the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia had and still has legitimate, vital security interests in Somalia and has the capacity to block developments that it views as threatening to its interests.[133] Moreover, Ethiopia's constructive response to the Djibouti Agreement and its support of the creation of a moderate coalition of opposition and TFG leaders suggests that, under the right conditions, ample political space exists to find solutions which are acceptable to both Somalis and the Ethiopian government.[134]

3.4 Effectiveness of Ethiopian national defence Force (ENDF) operation in Somalia

The Ethiopian government never publicly acknowledged the size of the forces deployed in Somalia during the intervention, but it is estimated that 30,000-40,000 Ethiopian soldiers took part in operations in 2007 and 2008.[135]By comparison, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers involved in offensive operations and the defence of Mogadishu numbered approximately

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[133] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia. 20 June 2013.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Interview with Undisclosed AMISOM Senior Political Adviser, 21 June 2013.

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5,000.[136] In late 2006 TFG forces, with ENDF ground and air support, engaged and effectively dispersed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had previously "gained control of 8 of the country's 18 administrative regions" by early January 2007.[137]At the peak of this brief period of fighting, an "estimated 65,000-70,000 people were displaced, some of them having already been displaced by the flooding," few cited conflict as the primary motivation for their flight.[138] The startlingly rapid retreat of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a Taliban-like group linked to Osama bin Laden, surprised TFG military intelligence officers who were threatened by ICU operations. The Ethiopian troops proved their military capability in defeating ICU with determination to ensure a free Somali society of extremist groups.

The intensity of air strikes by Ethiopia, which had long been allied with the transitional government, helped turn the tide. Ethiopia's ground forces, already based in Somalia, have played a critical role. American Military intelligence officer affirmed that, Ethiopia's success was not inevitable.[139] According to him, America had faith in the Ethiopian capability to bring long lasting peace in Somalia. The American intelligence report had earlier in 2000 indicated that the Somalia peace lied in military operation.[140] According to the Kenyan Intelligence Service Officer, the strategic approach of Ethiopian troops was a key symptom of the effective eradication of ICU, in his words, "the reality was just a matter of time". [141] Although the ENDF-TFG alliance had soundly defeated the ICU, establishing order by TFG forces proved a more

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[136] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Interview with undisclosed American Military Intelligence Officer, 29 June 2013.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Interview with undisclosed Kenyan Intelligence Officer, 20 June 2013.

complicated task, especially in Mogadishu.[142] The obvious reason was that: "after the fall of the ICU, the semblance and order and security that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), had created in Mogadishu began to deteriorate".[143] Banditry, violence and assassination of TFG-loyalists by insurgents became common place in the early months of 2007. One respondent in the Somalia military confirmed that, Ethiopia's military swift response to Islamic Courts Union (ICU) retaliatory attacks against Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) forces; they attacked the ICU's operation bases within Baidoa.[144] In less than a week, the ICU forces were no more in Somalia.[145] After achieving this success in Somalia, the Ethiopian troops partially came to an end in January 2009 as the TFG and the Djibouti-based wing of the ARS formed a government of national unity.

Table 1.4 the views of stability through military intervention

Response	AU[146]	IGAD[147]	SCS[148]	DC[149]	SFG[150]	PLA[151]	SLA[152]	EG[153]	KG[154]	Total
Lead to stabiiity	3	3	1	2	2	0	1	3	3	18
No stability	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Not sure	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	4
No answer	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	6

Source: **Field data**

From the table above, out of the 30 respondents, 18 were of the view that military intervention leads to stability; this was 60 percent of the total study population. The response can be

[142] Interview with undisclosed AMISOM Senior Political Adviser, 21 June 2013.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Interview with undisclosed Military Officer, Somalia Federal Government, 20 June 2013.
[145] Ibid.
[146] African Union.
[147] Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
[148] Somalia Civil Society.
[149] Diplomatic Community.
[150] Somalia Federal Government.
[151] Puntland Administration.
[152] Somaliland Administration.
[153] Ethiopian Government.
[154] Kenyan Government.

attributed to the concerted effort between Ethiopian government and the regional and the key diplomatic community stakeholders in the Somalia military operation.

For instance, most of the AU respondents and IGAD had supported military intervention as the best option for Somalia conflict, but because of financial limitations, they could not take that route. 2 of the respondents thought that it does not lead to stability in Somalia; it represents 7 percent of sampled population. The response was from the civil society and the Somaliland Administration. The reason can be linked to the relative stability in Somaliland that was not through military intervention. To the civil society, such intervention, leads to more in stability in the region, giving an example with the first intervention of Ethiopian forces that radicalised Islamic Courts Union (ICU), leading to the Al-shaabab militia group that increased instability in Somalia for over the past two decades. While 4 respondents, equivalent to 13 percent were not sure and 6 respondents, equivalent to 20 percent, could not answer on the contribution of military intervention to stability.

Figure 1.2 the pie chart representation of the above responses

Response on stability through military intervention

Source: Data from the field

Despite the historical enmity between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Ethiopian National Defence

Forces (ENDF) in Somalia, which numbered between30,000-40,000 throughout the duration of

the conflict, was praised by many Somali civilians for being "disciplined in their day-to-day

interactions with Somali civilians."[155]To the Somali civil society, the ENDF focus was on the

enemy operation areas of the ICU. Though there were concerns raised on the observance of

human rights during the operations, Amina Mohamed argued that supporters of ICU and a few

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[155] Ibid.

western International Non Governmental Organisations raised the concern as an avenue for getting humanitarian aid in the pretext of addressing human rights.[156]

ENDF relied on the use of Katyusha rockets launched from multiple-rocket-launchers in response to insurgent attacks.[157] Critics of ENDF tactics claimed the Katyusha was an inherently indiscriminate weapon incapable of offering the targeting precision necessary to minimize civilian casualties-assuming that targets were even located to begin with.[158] However, first-hand accounts detail several instances of civilian casualties that occurred as a result of Katyushas, not as being the target but some of the civilians had either voluntarily or forced in to offer themselves as human shields in the ICU hide outs. [159]

In one incident, ENDF responded to an insurgent attack launched from the town of Beletweyne by shelling the city for three days in July 2008.[160] Because of fear, many civilians in the neighboring communities escaped for safety. According to UNHCR report, it estimates "that at the end of July, 74,000 people had been displaced as a direct and indirect effect of related fighting." [161] The report notes that, such episodes were reportedly common place throughout 2008.

The ICU militias were accused of using small arms fire that resulted in further civilian casualties. In an August 2008 incident, ENDF soldiers responded to the detonation of a roadside bomb with wild gunfire that left approximately 40 ICU militia members dead[162]. The recorded instances of reckless use of force was largely linked to the TFG forces, which the human rights groups

[156] Interview with Amina Mohamed, an International Monitoring and Evaluation expert on Humanitarian aid in Somalia, 16 June 2013.
[157] Interview with Prof Abdi Gandi, Somalia Political Scientist. 21 June 2013.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Interview with Prof Abdi Gandi, Somalia Political Scientist. 21 June 2013.
[161] UNHCR, Somalia Humanitarian condition, 2008 report.
[162] Interview with Colonel Gebre Alemseged, Head of Somalia Peace Process facilitation office of IGAD. 12 June, 2013.

claimed that search and seizure operations conducted by the TFG, occasionally resulted in assault, rape, looting and killing of Somali civilians.[163] The ENDF's successful intervention in Somalia had the immediate effect of replacing the ICU with the TFG without a power vacuum in which Islamist militants assumed control and the more radical elements of the ICU became "marginalized, splintered, and weakened."[164]

As discussed earlier, evidence suggests that the ICU was cultivating an environment of stability and security unprecedented in Somalia since 1991. As the Ethiopian government and the TFG eventually entered into productive diplomatic dialogue with the more moderate ICU elements, it seems plausible that Ethiopia would not have intervened had its government, the TFG and the ICU found a way to neutralize the influence of the more radical ICU elements in 2006.[165] This approach was never attempted, as Ethiopia, the TFG and the US labeled the ICU an extremist organization and made few diplomatic overtures to the new regime in Mogadishu. Admittedly, the US and Ethiopia were largely justified in viewing the ICU as a potential threat to security interests in the region.

According to the UNHCR report, the events that transpired between late 2006 and early 2009 offer poignant lessons regarding: (1) the effects of military intervention in nations already plagued by humanitarian crises; (2) the role of the international community in either mitigating or exacerbating those conditions; and (3) the type of leadership and diplomacy necessary to most effectively improve humanitarian conditions.[166] Ethiopia's most critical strategic decision during the conflict was its unilateral military intervention in support of the TFG and its attempt to

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[163] Ibid.
[164] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia. 20 June 2013.
[165] Ibid.
[166] UNHCR. Somalia Humanitarian condition, 2008 report.

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supplant the ICU with a legitimate government though an ineffectual regime.[167] The effectiveness of the Ethiopian military intervention was at play once again when it emerged that its interest was in the establishment of good governance and management of the national resources by the Somalis themselves. Though fragmented, corrupt and unpopular with the local populace, the TFG, was ushered into power by the Ethiopian military force with the aid of other neighbouring nations of Burundi and Uganda.

The transitional government had challenges, just like any new regime in a post conflict society; its viability was majorly as a direct contribution of Ethiopian military as a governing power on itself.[168] Ethiopia and its allies tried to build its capacity and made no mistake of misunderstanding the full range of players in the ICU and painting a distorted picture of it to the international community.[169]

Ethiopia's air power was decisive, the jets attacked several airports used by the ICU, and struck recruiting centers and other strategic targets in ICU-run towns.[170] The ICU's shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons were unable to hit Ethiopia's aircraft at high altitudes. While the ICU had some surface-to-air missiles, these devices were quite old—and complex Soviet weaponry tends to degrade. But even more important than the fighter jets, the intelligence officer acknowledged Ethiopia's use of Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships that could target the ICU's ground forces. The military intelligence officer acknowledged that there was an underestimation of Ethiopia's willingness to commit to the fight against the ICU. "This campaign is far more far-sighted than

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[167] Interview with Undisclosed Senior European Union Diplomat, Political Affairs. 10 June 2013.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Interview with undisclosed American Military Intelligence Officer. 29 June 2013.

we expected," he said. "They did not just do this on the fly; they had to have been planning this for several months. This is a major commitment."[171]

In 2006, "US, TFG, and Ethiopian officials labelled the entire leadership of the ICU as extremist and terrorist," but technically, Ethiopia ensured neutralisation of the ICU by inviting some of the very same ICU officials to take part in an UN-led peace process a year and a half later.[172]While the Ethiopian military intervention both directly contributed to and exacerbated the humanitarian situation in terms of civilian casualties, displacement, migration and access to humanitarian aid, there was an early evidence of possibility that Ethiopia's actions would yield long-term benefits for the Somali population.[173]

The election of a new provisional government that enjoys a measure of support in both Ethiopia and Somalia was perhaps a turning point in addressing the humanitarian crisis.[174] The success of the new government hinges on its ability to assert control over central and southern Somalia, a formidable challenge considering the continued violence in those regions caused by inter-clan fighting and militant Islamists.[175] If the government proves capable of stabilizing Somalia and reintroducing the rule of law, Ethiopia's intervention, it was early argued, would have played a role in paving the way for long-term improvement in humanitarian conditions in Somalia.[176]

Ethiopia's intervention was the fight against terrorism that forced its military action in Somalia against the Islamic Courts and affiliated radical militia mainly Al shabaab that it was a unilateral

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[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Interview with Hussen Juma, Somali Embassy in Nairobi, 23 June 2013.
[174] Interview with Ziad, Deputy Head of Mission-Somali Embassy-Nairobi, 23 June 2013.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.

decision based on Ethiopia's security interests in securing a peaceful Somalia, to avoid terrorist activities by the militia groups.[177]

Ali Mohammed Gedi argue that Ethiopia did not request financial support from the U.S. or the international community for that endeavor, but noted that Ethiopia derived adequate satisfaction from the strong U.S.-Ethiopia cooperation since then as it was evident to Ethiopia that the U.S. "was in the same trench" as Ethiopia.[178] Ever since 2006, Ethiopia has been fighting terrorism with the intention of securing peace and development for Somalia, and to great extent the entire Horn of Africa.[179]

Yelbu, noted that U.S. did not provide a single bullet for Ethiopia, while the latter had to bear the cost of training Somali Transitional Federal Government troops. [180] He reiterated the $3 million expense for five U.S. civilian contract trainers and argued that $2.5 million in C-130 spare parts "is nothing" in comparison to the sacrifices made by Ethiopian troops in Somalia without U.S. financial support.[181]

Despite noting that the USG's political support is valued within the Government of Ethiopia , Yalbu ended the interview by emphasizing that Ethiopia had trained 6080 Somali Transitional Federal Government troops without U.S. financial support and had also took another 1,000 Somali troops for training.[182]

According to Wondimu, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister asked the Parliament to pass 'a proposed resolution, which declared Ethiopia's desire for peaceful relations with Somalia, but

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[177] Interview with Ali mohammed Gedi, 22 June 2013.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.

reiterated the hostile actions taken by the ICU. [183] It highlighted the "clear and present danger" the ICU represented to Ethiopian sovereignty and expressed Parliament's support for the GOE in taking "all measures deemed necessary" to deal with the threat'. Arguing that the government's first preference was negotiation, the Prime Minister stated that 'we can't avoid the problem.[184] According to him, the resolution strengthened the GOE's hand in negotiations because it did counter two major misperceptions among CIC leaders.[185] The first was that the GOE would not take military action against the CIC without international backing. The second misperception was that a GOE declaration of war on Somalia would provoke an internal political crisis in Ethiopia. This was also false, he asserted. Thus by authorizing the executive to act rapidly when and if the situation becomes intolerable, Parliament did strengthen the GOE's hand to make peace.

He further noted that his government had no problem with Somalia at the first time of intervention, even in future per se, nor even with the CIC (by then) as a whole.[186] He indicated that 'CIC was led by extremist elements who constituted a "clear and present danger" to Ethiopia' by then.[187]

3.5 The 2011-todate military intervention performance

According to AbdhiHakim , it was a tragedy to the militia groups that Ethiopia's army crossed over the border again and entered the regions of southern Somalia. [188] He argues that, Somali

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[183] Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, interview, 20 June 2013.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Interview with Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Interview with Abdihakim Aynte, the director of the Somali Forum for Progress, 27 June 2013.

militia groups had a double suffering from both Ethiopian and the Kenyan invasion, which were focused on shelling hide out towns in southern Somalia in their hunt for the Al-Shabaab militants.[189] Ethiopia's previous invasion in 2006 led to the death of over 15,000 Somalis-most of which were shot by the militia groups for failing to offer them human shield.[190] He further notes that Ethiopia's invasion directly led to the decrease of the militant Islamist group Al-shabaab, which was becoming a huge threat beyond Somalia before its invasion.

The Ethiopian army is currently in Somalia at the invitation of the African Union (AU), and the current strategy is to create a new front against the al-Qaeda-linked Al-shabaab along the Ethiopia-Somalia borders by working with local clans and proxy fighters such as the Sufi militants of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ). Abdihakim, further argued that the AU's invitation to dispatch Ethiopian troops to Somalia was another productive and effective move. "The African Union seems to value Ethiopia's experience in fighting ICU and other militia groups in Somalia."[191]

Ahmed, shares the same sentiments as Abdihakim who argues that the greatest fear of Somali intellectuals however is not how the Ethiopian army have conducted the operation, but rather how the local Somali administration could benefit from the Ethiopian led peace through its military intervention.[192] The concern was on the fact that some of Al-Shabaab retreated to the forests, thus to need for the local population to cooperate with Ethiopian forces in identifying the hide out areas.[193] Both Ahmed and Aynte believe that al-shabaab are in weak condition but were

[189] Ibid.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Interview with Abdihakim Aynte, the director of the Somali Forum for Progress, 27 June 2013.
[192] Interview with Ahmed Ismail, the Human Rights Adviser-Care Internatioanl-Somalia, 01 July 2013.
[193] Ibid.

afraid that the failure of local administration to identify the militia groups could strengthen them.[194]

Munene was of the view that, despite al-Shabaab's attempt to arouse nationalist rage against Ethiopia, this strategy will ultimately not be successful. [195] The Somali citizens to a larger degree were grateful for the intervention of the Ethiopian troops, at the time when the international community had a deaf ear on the Somali plight. "Somalia is currently a big mess. And the truth is that Somalis have learnt that al-Shabaab has nothing to offer them, so such sentiment could not succeed. The Somali people are wiser than al-Shabaab." [196] The Ethiopian invasion it was obvious initially helped to create a powerful Islamic insurgency but times have changed.[197] "When Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia, Al-Shabaab continued civil war rather than rebuild the country. He further notes that their hands are dripping with the blood of Somali civilians,for instance the suicide attacks directed at students, there is no way to think that suffering people will support their enemy. Somalis want peace, security and good governance," [198]

Munene further notes that, the reason behind the AU's invitation to Ethiopia to join the conflict in Somalia is that the African Union does not have enough resources and volunteers to resolve such a bad situation without Ethiopia, and there were no good reasons to refuse Ethiopia's help. "Ethiopia has volunteered to do the job by itself, so the AU had to be happy to use the Ethiopian

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[194] Ibid.
[195] Interview with Macharia Munene, Professor of international relations at the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi, 22 June 2013.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid.
[198]Interview with Macharia Munene, Professor of international relations at the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi, 22 June 2013.

army and its military equipment."[199] He explained that previously the AU was not interested in Ethiopia joining the Somali conflict because of the bad history between the two countries, but Al-Shabaab changed the dynamic by becoming a regional threat which could develop into a global threat. With this in mind, the AU now supports all efforts to eliminate Al-Shabaab from Somalia and the region.

Macharia, an international relations lecturer at USIU University argued that the Ethiopian invasion might yet complicate the conflict.[200] According to her, in 2006, Al-Shabaab existed mainly as a disorganized militia but the Ethiopian invasion radicalized them as they felt that their country was under occupation. However, she believes that capability of Ethiopian troops and strategy gives hope for counter attack on any of the al-Shabaab recruits. However, Professor Munene maintains that previously the aim of the AU was maintaining the position of Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) but now the common goal is to defeat al-Shabaab. Defeating al-Shabaab, he said requires the unified efforts of the region, with Ethiopia being in the command lead.

Today, though, there are no trench lines in Mogadishu. On 6 August 2011, to the astonishment of just about everyone, Al Shabaab pulled back overnight from all city centre positions. Their propagandists called it a tactical retreat, but it turned out not to be temporary. The insurgency was collapsing across central Somalia and falling back on its heartlands to the south.[201] In cognizant of the opportunity, Somalia's neighbours Ethiopia and Kenya quickly joined the

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[199] Ibid.
[200] Interview with Hannah Macharia, an international relations lecturer at USIU University-Nairobi 22 June 2013.
[201] Interview with Fred Ngoga, AMISOM Senior political adviser, 27 June 2013.

AMISOM effort and invaded from the west and south.[202] In September 2012 the Kenyans captured al Shabaab's last remaining stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo, effectively ending the insurgents' long ambition to take over Somalia.[203]

This is an astonishing moment for a country long dubbed the "world's most failed state": the first chance in a generation for genuine change, and what the UN Special Envoy Augustine Mahiga called "an unprecedented opportunity for peace."[204] As turning points go it is comparable, perhaps, to the US ejection of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. Fred argued that, Ethiopian intervention in 2006 created the opportunity for the US and later AMISOM military intervention after realising that it was possible based on Ethiopian achievements.

Somalia has, famously, had no properly functioning central government for over 20 years. Its leaders have long been riven by internal clan rivalries, and hamstrung by outrageous institutional graft. For the last six years, Somalia has consistently beaten Afghanistan to the bottom spot on Transparency International's annual 'Corruptions Perceptions index.' Yet in 2012, Somalis held their first democratic elections in decades, ousting their former Islamist president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and replacing him with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a little-known university professor who used to work as a consultant for the UN.

There are other reasons for cautious optimism. So many of Mogadishu's long-abandoned seafront villas are being rebuilt, in many cases by owners returning from twenty years of exile, that the city is experiencing a minor property boom.

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[202] Ibid.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.

On the face of it Somalia represents that rarest of things, a good news story from the Muslim world. There is, though, no room for complacency. The new government is still unproven, and Al Shabaab is far from defeated. Indeed, the militants had already begun a switch to a deadly, Taliban-style hit-and-run strategy before their withdrawal from Mogadishu. Terrorist attacks are also rising alarmingly in neighbouring Kenya, including in the once-safe Somali enclave of Eastleigh in Nairobi, and the Muslim-dominated tourist areas in and around Mombasa.

As the immediate out-going British ambassador Matt Baugh points out, fixing Somalia is not just in Somali interests but affects the security of us all. "Somalia represents a kind of threat we have not seen before, and the Ethiopian military determination is the way to move forward".[205]

3.6 The impact of Ethiopian military operation in Somalia

Al-Shabaab's military position has been greatly weakened due to both Ethiopia's military and the African Union forces.[206] A military operation by Kenya in Somalia's south-central region has added to pressure on the militant group. On October 16, 2011, Kenya initiated military action against Al Shabaab, declaring self-defense. It made initial successes against the rebel group chasing them out of Elwak, Dhobley and Bulla Hawo. This was reinforced by Ethiopia's re-entry in to the armed conflict in Somalia. According to Fred, the Kenyan government did have neither the financial clout nor the military knowhow to continue a protracted guerrilla war against an elusive and mobile enemy in an alien terrain, but Ethiopian support was and still has become critical.[207] The support given by the Ethiopian army has made the Kenyan intervention not only

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[205] Matt Baugh, out-going British ambassador, Speech at opening of the UK Hargeisa office, 2012.
[206] Interview with Fred Ngoga, AMISOM Senior political adviser, 27 June 2013.
[207] Interview with Fred Ngoga, AMISOM Senior political adviser, 27 June 2013.

possible but success. The support granted by strong Ethiopian move in Central Somalia, has given Kenyan army good reputation in guerrilla fighting.[208]

Events in Somalia are difficult to predict. But one thing is sure: the radical group Al-Shabaab is increasingly losing the momentum. It may try hard to adjust to the internal crisis in the Jubaland state, but the underlying causes of the problem will continue to grow, eating away at the cohesion and dynamism of the group. Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-Shabaab and cleared them from the capital city. Most importantly, it is refreshing to see some degree of resolve and cooperation among countries in the sub-region, with all the credit given to Ethiopian forces where none of the African countries could dare.

The Ethiopian forces have succeeded in defeating Al-shabaab terrorists in Somalia largely because of the ability of the Ethiopian troops to win the hearts of the majority of the Somali population, as from 2011. Ethiopia's military action, followed several failed regional and international efforts on Somalia, the latest, then, being the IGAD's Mission (IGASOM) that had been mooted in 2002 but collapsed in March 2006.

Against these odds Ethiopia's leaders believed that the intervention was doable, sensing an opportunity for "African solution to African problems". It seemed, then, a courageous endeavour, for Ethiopia to attempt to reassemble the wreckage of a country the world had written off as beyond repair. Six years down the road, the topical question is not "if but when" will total stability be realized? To journalists, he asserts that, it is surprising that Somalia can go for days without making alarming headlines.[209] To him, the most thrilling thing is to compare the

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[208] Ibid.
[209] Interview with undisclosed local Business man, Mogadishu, 04 July 2013.

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situation now to when the first Ethiopian troops arrived in a gloomy, deathly Mogadishu. There were lawless, gun-wielding militias looming all over, and rockets were landing everywhere as the Ethiopian troops were arriving.

The Somalis, who had seen several of such operations fail before, wore pessimistic, dismissive faces seeing Ethiopian troops as just another showbiz display by the outside world. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which controlled Mogadishu warned that the Ethiopian troops would be defeated.[210] To him, one of the breakthrough sign was the capture of the airport, Seaport, and Villa Somalia.[211] Unlike IGASOM, which had failed pointing at lack of political consensus, mandate, composition, funding and logistical issues, Ethiopia's tenacious capacity to provide leadership regardless was the main difference.[212]

The intervention has since transformed and many players have joined, it is now beyond reasonable doubt that stabilizing Somalia is not impossible. Perceptions have changed, there is light at the end of Somalia's dark tunnel, and for the first time in more than 40 years, Somalis have a legitimate and democratic government. The semblance of peace, organization, governance, democratic processes, and establishment of a security system all point to definitive departure from the chaos of the past decades.[213] In Mogadishu, business are cropping up stores, shops, and restaurants operating till late, structures coming up, Mogadishu port receiving more than 20 ships a week and more than 40 flights landing weekly at Mogadishu airport. All such developments are accredited to the daring input of Ethiopia.[214]

[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Interview with undisclosed local Business man, Mogadishu, 04 July 2013.

According to Ambassador Mahat, Ethiopia has contributed significantly to the current Somalia stability. [215] He further affirmed that, the resulting improvements in security in Somalia had enabled the people of Somalia "to successfully conclude their 8-year transition to a more representative and legitimate political order". He also noted that with the support of Ethiopian forces, AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces have driven Al-Shabaab out of its major strongholds including Mogadishu, adding that Ethiopia had the objective to help Somalia "get rid of all Al-Shabaab cells" and become "a stable and peaceful country with a professional army" . The courage of Ethiopian troops gave impetus to AMISOM in its pursuit. Currently, AMISOM is helping to train the core of a rejuvenated Somali National Army as well as a Somali Police Force to help secure these gains.

He argued that, last year, the African Union deployed two new Police Units to Mogadishu, the first ever deployed by the AU after Ethiopia's contribution to stabilization.[216] It is helping to build up governance capacity within the Federal Government of Somalia by training civil servants and working with local officials and civil society "to enhance linkages to the central government and strengthen connections between citizens and the state".[217] AMISOM is also involved in assisting the government to "implement Quick Impact Projects such as rebuilding schools, roads, bridges, and medical facilities, as well as provide clean, potable water and temporary shelter for IDPs".[218]

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[215] Interview with Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif,. Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, 05 July 2013.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Interview with Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif,. Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, 05 July 2013.

In 2012, the Somali National Army and its partners in AMISOM and Ethiopia retook major al-Shabaab strongholds–including the lucrative port of Kismayo–and essentially confined al-shabaab to the southern region's smaller towns and back roads.[219]

According to senior Kenyan Defense Force officer, Al-Shabaab's current territorial possession is to a great extent confined to the strategic port of Baraawe, which is important for taxing imported goods and the facilitation of fighters and resources. But it is a matter of time for them to be defeated by the combination of AMISOM, Ethiopian and the Somali National Army forces.[220]

Just like Ambassador Mahat, the senior Kenyan Defense Force officer affirmed that, the combined efforts as advanced by Ethiopia are key for a complete breakthrough against remaining Al-Shabaab. The efforts by Kenya, AMISOM, Ethiopia, and Somalia has proved that international coordination was a much more successful strategy compared to the individual action, which takes a bit of time for results to be achieved.[221] The operations to defeat al-Shabaab have yielded less humanitarian casualties and battlefield losses due to the coordinated measures as advanced by Ethiopia in its 2011 invasion. And because Al-Shabaab slowly became less popular, the group could not rally as much local and diaspora support as it did against the AMISOM intervention and it's unable to spread propaganda against the operations because of the coordination of the military operation.[222]

The Ethiopian military operations, alongside AMISOM, and the Somali National Army's aggressive operations, has granted Al-Shabaab a dwindling Popularity: Al-Shabaab's main

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[219] Ibid.
[220] Interview with undisclosed Senior Kenyan Defense Force officer, 10 July 2013.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.

response to the tactical success of Ethiopia's, and Somali government-allied forces has been to "tactically withdraw" from areas where it has come under pressure in order to preserve the lives of its forces. The group since has relied on ambushes and increasingly on firing mortars and deploying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against security targets. But the use of indiscriminate tactics has not always helped it retake territory and have contributed to a declining popularity due to civilian casualties incurred.[223]

3.7 Conclusion

n conclusion, security remains the biggest challenge for the new government. Just days after the 1ew president was sworn into office in September 2012, three suicide bombers struck outside a 1otel in Mogadishu where he was meeting with a delegation from Kenya. The situation has mproved as the African Union peacekeeping force, AMISOM, working with Ethiopia, has lriven Al-Shabab militants out of their strongholds in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. iomalia's own national army still remains a very weak institution, divided by internal ivalries.[224] "If today, the AMISOM left abruptly, Somalia would go back to clanism, clan ompetitions, warlordism. The current military personnel mainly came from the Hawiye clan, 1ose around the Mogadishu areas.[225]

\nother challenge for the new government is how to administer territory being reclaimed from .l-Shabab. The port city of Kismayo in southern Somalia is one of the most economically nportant claims in the last year and clans in the area are competing for control of the city, and ive established a new state in the area like the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland

Interview with undisclosed Senior Kenyan Defense Force officer, 10 July 2013.
Interview with Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamed, Somalia political analyst, British Embassy-Mogadishu in Nairobi. 10 July 13.
Ibid.

in the north, challenging the central government which is trying to establish a stronger presence outside the capital.

While Somalis may be to blame for some of the internal struggles, there is no doubt that its neighboring countries have also played a role in the sustained conflict in Somalia. With different countries hosting their adversary insurgencies, it is impossible to get rid of extremism, destructive rebel groups, anarchy and instability. All countries in the region will need to commit to not supporting disruptive insurgencies such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia. If Somalia is trying its best to promote peace and stability, its neighbours should do the same. If not, Somalia will continue to circle around instability. The international community can also play a role in enforcing this notion, as the support of terrorist groups is in violation of international law. The international community should hold countries accountable for hosting or supporting terrorist groups and insurgencies as they not only destroy prospects for regional security but also destroy prospects for international peace and security as well.

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the focus has been on the effectiveness of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia. Much of the information source was captured from the respondents in the field and the documented information in books, journals and reports from humanitarian organizations operating in Somalia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ethiopian military contributed a lot to the current stability experienced in Somalia. Its success in ousting the radical Islamist army- Al Shaabab and the various militia groups aligned with the Al-Shabaab encouraged the African Union and the United Nations Security Council to give military intervention as an option for Somalia's long term stability.

In this chapter, the focus is on the emerging issues. The emerging issues include the Jubaland initiative, increased British and western nation's interest in Somalia, refugee problem and the humanitarian catastrophe.

4.1 Emerging Issues

4.1.1 The Jubaland initiative

After more than two decades of civil war and inter-clan conflict, Somalia is undertaking an ambitious programme of national reconciliation and development, with federalism as a pillar of its plan. The national administration, in place since 2012, is called the Somali Federal Government (SFG), and the country's basic law is the Provisional Federal Constitution. Both embrace the principle of power-sharing between central and regional authorities. But the

"Jubaland Initiative" is exposing stark disagreements over how federalism should be implemented and over who should drive the process: the central government and parliament, or the regions themselves. Moves to bring three regions in the south of Somalia together into the state of Jubaland have turned into a tussle with the central government, with regional power-houses Kenya and Ethiopia playing important roles.[226] The regions involved are Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo, which are adjacent to Kenya and Ethiopia.

On 15 May 2013, 500 Jubaland delegates assembled in University of Kismayo for Jubaland state formation conference. They elected Sheikh Ahmed "Madobe" Mohamed Islam as the first president of Jubaland State of Somalia, even as Somali Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon appointed a task force for Jubaland.[227] Local communities allocated amongst themselves the 500 delegates to represent the various communities and districts of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Gedo regions that have united to form Jubaland. The Jubaland state formation process has been underway since late 2010, about two years before the SFG came into being. The state covers a combined area of 87,000sqkm and has a total population of around 1.3 million.[228] This includes numerous clans, such as the Ogaden-Darod, Maheran-Darod, Sheekhaal, Auormale, Biimaal, Gaaljecel, Rahanweyn, Murile, Bejuni and various Bantu groups.

Due to its natural resources and location, Jubaland has the potential to be one of Somalia's richest regions, but conflict had kept it chronically unstable for over two decades. The regions include some of the most remote and marginalized areas of the country, some of which are entirely cut off during the rainy season for months at a time. The most important city is the port

[226] Interview with Yelbu Ligalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia, 20 June 2013.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Interview with Undisclosed Senior Kenya Government official, 15 July 2013.

of Kismayo, a lucrative prize for various warlords who battled for control of it following the 1991 fall of president Mohamed Siad Barre. Al-Shabab insurgents held Kismayo from 2006 to September 2012, when they were ousted by Kenyan troops and forces of the Ras Kamboni militia. At that time, they earned tens of millions of dollars a year in tax revenue, mainly from charcoal exports.

Kenya, has been keen to create a buffer zone to protect its territory from Al-Shabab incursions, played an important role in hosting talks among stakeholders and backing former defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi) as the "president" of an entity then called "Azania". Since the establishment of the SFG, these conversations continued in the form of the Jubaland Initiative.[229] Ethiopia has also been keen to see a buffer zone in Southern Somalia - so long as its leadership is not sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front, an Ethiopian rebel group. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which comprises seven states in the region has also supported the Jubaland Initiative.[230]

After Al-Shabab was pushed out of Kismayo in September 2012, discussions moved to the port city itself. [231] In late February 2013, hundreds of delegates gathered for a formal Jubaland conference to push the process forward. A flag and three-year constitution were adopted. This row over who should be in control of setting up new federal states threatens Somalia's internal stability and its external relations. It places the government in Mogadishu at odds with the new leaders in Kismayo and established ones in Puntland, and potentially with Kenya and IGAD.

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[229] Interview with Undisclosed Senior Kenya Government official, 15 July 2013.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid.

There has been fighting over the leadership of Jubaland State.[232] Elders and politicians in Kismayo blamed the fighting on the government of Somalia, after government backed, former warlord Col. Bare Aden Shire, (Barre Hiiraale). The Prime Minister Said Shirdon and Somalia interior Minister Abdi Karim Hussien Guled are alleged to have supported Barre Hiiraale and Hasan Basto. Where as Kenya fully supporting Ahmed Medobe. The Jubaland affair is an important test case for the fledgling SFG, whose credibility depends in part on its ability to stand up to other centres of power in the country through federalism. Unless these tensions are managed effectively, Jubaland could unravel and eventually break up into areas that are controlled by smaller rival factions.[233] This is an opportunity that a group like Al-Shabab would love to exploit.

4.1.2 Increased British and Western nations' interest on Somalia

In February 2012 and May 2013, the UK hosted major international conference on Somalia.[234] The events were designed to bring together key stakeholders, and most particularly donors and interested non-Somali governments, to discuss ways in which approaches to Somali issues could be better coordinated. Amongst other priorities, the February 2012 conference was timed to raise pressure on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in the lead-up to the August expiry of their self-extended mandate, reflecting serious concern that little progress was being made in establishing a procedure for replacing the transitional government with something more legitimate and permanent in time for August. The 07 May 2013-London conference was a follow up of the 2012 conference.[235]

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[232] Ibid.
[233] Interview with Senior Kenya Government official, 15 July 2013.
[234] Interview with Somalia Diaspora, Business man in London, June 19 2013.
[235] Ibid.

In many ways, the two London conferences marked an encouraging change in international rhetoric.[236] There seemed to be a deepening realization that the often repeated sentiment that development 'on the ground' would be needed if security issues such as piracy and al-Shabaab's commitment to al-Qaeda-linked terrorist acts, in the vein of the July 2010 bombings in Kampala, are to be addressed. However, action since these conferences has been much less encouraging; it is turning out as a scramble for Somalia by the United Kingdom and the Western Nations. The underlying interest is in the extractive industry where the Western Nations are in cold war fight with each other to take control.[237]

A follow-up event for February London conference was held in Istanbul, it was convened at the end of May with the inspirational title 'Preparing Somalia's future: Goals for 2015'. As with the London conference, though, the rhetoric does not seem to have been matched with results. The conference itself was inconclusive, even in many ways, and it remains unclear whether it achieved much.[238]

4.1.3 Refugee problem

Somalis lacked an effective central government since civil war broke out in 1991 after the ouster of President Siad Barre. Driven out of their homes by climatic factors and seemingly never-ending conflicts, tens of thousands of Somalis have been forced to flee across the borders to neighbouring countries. In response, Kenya adopted an informal camp policy for refugees, restricting their movement to the limited confines of refugee camps that in most cases are located

[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid
[238] Ibid

in the most remote, poor, hostile, and undesirable parts of the country.[239] The Dadaab refugee camp is one of the camps, located in one of the remotest parts of Kenya, which has the least fertile soil. The refugees live among the nomadic pastoralists, many of whom live in abject poverty. While the refugees receive international aid, the locals generally do not. This disparity causes an economic imbalance that has resulted in the host community being hostile and blaming its problems on the refugees. It also raises fundamental questions about human rights and equality, since the refugees, who receive free shelter, food, firewood, and health care, have better conditions than their hosts.[240]

The refugees lead to resource competition. Since the arrival of refugees to the Dadaab camp, the host community's already insufficient water supply has been severely affected. The locals argue that their women are forced to travel long distances to find water, resulting in health problems for them, such as back and chest pain. Lack of sufficient water, deforestation, and resultant soil erosion has threatened the food security of the locals, who depend on pasture and water for survival[241]. The huge demands on the scarce local water resources give rise to friction within the local communities. Moreover, refugees are often viewed as a security threat to the host community. For example, the Daadab tribesmen accuse the Somali refugees in the Daadab refugee camp of raping their women and cutting down trees. There have also been numerous cases of terrorism attempts and kidnappings. Some locals further argue that they have been attacked during the night and had their cattle stolen. This perceived threat forces the locals to

[239] 2012 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees country operations profile - Kenya, Working environment. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483a16&submit=GO#KENDA. Accessed 25 June2013.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid.

acquire illegal arms and thus sets conditions for terrorist groups to take advantage of the poor conditions at the camp to lure young men into their organizations.[242]

When refugees arrive at a camp, there is often a great demand for timber, wood, and poles for construction and cooking purposes, which puts a great strain on the timber resources of the local community. The Daadab community, who host the refugees, are alarmed at the rate at which refugees cause deforestation. This anxiety causes frequent confrontations and fights between the local population and the refugees, because the hosts argue that their livestock largely depend on foraging and the trees that the refugees have cut down.[243] The combined demand for firewood and building materials from the camps and the host communities is very significant. Collecting firewood and building materials is undertaken by members of the host communities and camp populations alike, and both groups are engaged in buying and selling it. However, firewood harvesters based in the camps are largely responsible for commercially providing firewood to the camps. Good quality firewood is difficult to find close to the camps and nearby settlements, leaving only low-quality firewood for collection by women and children in the host communities.[244]

As the distance to good firewood sources increases, the collection process is taken over by men using donkey carts; therefore, it has been commercialized. The demand for energy for household use is growing with the increasing population in the area as a whole. The local collection of firewood is becoming more laborious, and the potential for conflict is ever increasing. Windle Trust Kenya (WTK), one of the implementing partners of the Borderless Higher Education for

[242] 2012 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees country operations profile - Kenya, Working environment. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483a16&submit=GO#KENDA. Accessed 25 June2013.
[243] Ibid.
[244] 2012 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees country operations profile - Kenya. Working environment. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483a16&submit=GO#KENDA. Accessed 25 June2013.

Refugees (BHER) project has launched the application process for Increased access and Skills for Tertiary Education Program (InSTEP) notes that, there have been mixed reports on the impact of refugees on local education. [245] At the Dadaab refugee camp, refugees often have more opportunities for education than the locals.[246] According to Rosemary, the refugees attend one of the many schools in the refugee camp. [247] The host community suffers from poor quality education as compared to the refugees in refugee camps, since the refugees can access better teachers who, in most cases, come from urban areas or from foreign countries.[248]

Refugees influence the local economy in a variety of other ways. In general, the increase in population results in an increased demand for products and goods, which raises prices and the cost of living in and around the refugee camp. The influx of refugees also increases job competition. At the Daadab refugee camp, job competition is intense because NGOs tend to hire refugees, who work for less than the locals.

Additionally, the influx of a great number of refugees causes an increase in communicable infectious diseases in the surrounding areas.[249] When this occurs, there is often a push for improving health sanitation services in the area.[250] Locals are allowed to utilize the health services at some but not all refugee camps. Still, there are cases where refugees have better health services than the surrounding villages, which can lead to tension.[251] Pastoralists living along the borders neighboring the refugee camps lose their lives from increased cross-border,

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[245] Windle Trust Kenya, Borderless Higher Education for Refugees Project, available at http://www.windle.org/about%20us.html, accessed 29 July 2013.

[246] Interview with Rosemary Uppal, Program Officer, Windle Trust Kenya, Borderless Higher Education for Refugees Project, 29 July 2013.

[247] Ibid.

[248] Interview with Rosemary Uppal, Program Officer, Windle Trust Kenya, Borderless Higher Education for Refugees Project, 29 July 2013.

[249] Montclos, M., and Kagwanja P., "Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya." Journal of Refugees Studies. 13.2 (2000): 205-222. Accessed 25 June 2013 at http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/13/2/205?.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Ibid.

resource-based armed confrontations. Depleted livestock, limited pasture and water from the cumulative effect of cyclic drought, and the availability of small arms have resulted in an increase in pastoralists' cross-border movements that can trigger violent, armed cross-border conflict.[252]

There are significant impacts on grazing and wildlife. Livestock from the camps impact grazing up to about 20 kilometers away from the camps, although grazing pressure and competition are negligible beyond this distance. Meanwhile, wildlife populations around Dadaab have been reduced as animals have migrated due to disturbance, having been forced out by competition.[253]

Besides the above, according to the United Nations Humanitarian Commission on refugees (UNHCR), there has been an increasing deterioration in the treatment of uprooted Somali civilians both inside Somalia and in the surrounding region. Against the background of occasional terrorist attacks, there have been a growing numbers of incidents of xenophobia, round ups and deportations of displaced Somalis. Kenya mentioned as one of the countries with an increase in such xenophobia incidents, round ups and deportations of displaced Somalis. The increasingly negative perception of uprooted Somalis gives a cause for concern over the wider refugee protection environment in the region and the rest of Africa. According to undisclosed source, there are frequent reports of verbal and physical harassment in communities as well as arrests, arbitrary detention, extortion and even push-backs of Somali refugees.[254] This negativity is having a corroding effect on the traditionally positive relations between the host communities and Somali refugees, many of whom have spent decades in exile.

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[252] Ibid.
[253] Ibid
[254] Interview with Undisclosed source, Daadab Refugee Camp, 27 July 2013.

In a number of countries, more and more Somali refugees have been approaching UNHCR offices requesting registration or renewal of their refugee identity documents.[255] Of particular worry was the action by the local authorities of Somalia's Puntland region in pushing back more than 900 internally displaced people (IDPs) to conflict-stricken central Somalia in July 2010.[256] In Gaalkacyo where some of the deportees, mainly Somali men between the ages of 18 and 25, were held, UNHCR facilitated an inter-agency humanitarian response, providing food, water, medical assistance and blankets.[257] Somalis have been fleeing years of violence, and are themselves victims of terror and conflict which has taken thousands of lives and displaced millions. Indiscriminate fighting continues, with utter disregard for the safety and well being of the civilian population, for incidence the current Jubaland conflict. With nearly half of the population dependent on humanitarian aid, Somalia is one of the world's worst crises. More than 1.4 million people are internally displaced in Somalia and over 600,000 Somalis live as refugees in the neighbouring countries. After Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia is the third largest refugee-producing country in the world.

According to Jama, the Syria strife has send Somali refugees on the run. [258] Many are being forced to flee conflict again, years after having sought refuge in Syria from civil war back home. It is all too familiar image for Jama and the thousands of Somalis who fled to Syria in the 1990s to escape their own civil war. Jama and her five children left the capital Mogadishu in 2005.

As threats to their safety increase, the wait to be transferred to another host country for the second time is raising fear and uncertainty among the Somali community in Syria. "We were

[255] Interview with Simon Bling, Programme Officer, UNHCR, Nairobi, Interview, 27 July 2013.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid
[258] Interview with Jama Hussein, the Somali refugee in Syria, 19 July 2013.

welcomed in Syria. It was a great place for the Somali people," Jama said, recalling a time of peace and stability. "The kids were enrolled in school and there were no problems. Life was normal." That recollection stands in sharp contrast to the violence that has engulfed Syria over the past two-plus years. Her homeland, meanwhile, has been plagued by fighting for the past 20 years, though a relative calm has recently prevailed. Since the ousting of former dictator Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been viewed by the international community as a failed state. The armed conflict has put civilians in the middle of the clash between rival warlords, the interim government, and al-Shabaab fighters with ties to al-Qaeda. Jama said she and her family were relocated to Syria, where visas were not required for citizens from Arab League nations. However, one drawback was that the Syrian government did not grant work permits to the refugees

4.1.4 Humanitarian Catastrophe

According to United Nations Humanitarian Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), the humanitarian nightmare in Somalia is the result of a lethal cocktail of factors. [259] The large-scale displacement caused by the fighting in Mogadishu is the most important driver. The displaced have fled mainly into the interior of the country, where they lack access to food, clean water, basic health care, livelihoods and support networks. Internally displaced persons, or IDPs, are among the most vulnerable populations in any humanitarian emergency. With 700,000 people out of a population of perhaps 6 million in south-central Somalia forced to flee their homes, the enormity of the emergency is obvious. The UNHCR report (2012) notes other challenges as follows:

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[259] United Nations Humanitarian Commission for Refugee (UNHCR) report, 2012.

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Second, food prices have skyrocketed, eroding the ability of both IDPs and other households to feed themselves. Food prices have gone up due to a global spike in the cost of grains and fuel; chronic insecurity and crime, which has badly disrupted the flow of commercial food into the country; and an epidemic of counterfeiting of the Somali shilling by politicians and businesspeople, which has created hyperinflation and has robbed poorer Somalis of purchasing power. Mother Nature is not cooperating either: a severe drought is gripping much of central Somalia, increasing displacement, killing off much of the livestock, and reducing harvests in farming areas.[260]

Third, humanitarian agencies in Somalia are facing daunting obstacles to delivery of food aid. There is now very little 'humanitarian space' in which aid can safely be delivered to populations in need. Until recently, the TFG and its uncontrolled security forces were mainly responsible for most obstacles to delivery of food aid. TFG hardliners viewed the movement of food aid to IDPs as support to an enemy population – terrorists and terrorist sympathisers in their view – and sought to impede the flow of aid convoys through a combination of bureaucratic and security impediments. They also harassed and detained staff of local and international nongovernmental organisations, or NGOs and UN agencies, accusing them of supporting the insurgency. Uncontrolled and predatory TFG security forces, together with opportunistic criminal gangs, erected over 400 militia roadblocks (each of which demanded as much as US$500 per truck to pass) and kidnapped local aid workers for ransom.

Somali aid workers and other civic leaders have faced a terrifying combination of threats in their humanitarian work, especially from criminal gangs and Al-Shabaab cells. This has infused

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[260] Ibid.

political violence with a high level of unpredictability and randomness in Mogadishu that has

eroded the ability of astute Somali aid workers, businesspeople and civic figures to make

calculated risks in their movements and work. When threats and attacks occur, aid workers are

never sure whether they were targeted.

4.1.5 Piracy, kidnap and ransom payment

Acts of piracy off Somalia are organised crime. It is a symptom of the profound insecurity,

lawlessness, poverty and lack of sustainable economic opportunity for the Somali people. There

has been an intensification of piracy attacks between 2008 and 2011. The Somali Kidnap and

Ransom Model is professionally conducted and values hostage lives. Somali piracy is unique

because it functions under a model of kidnap and ransom in which hostages are taken and traded

for payments. The United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, in its report of August 2011, to

the UN Security Council, stated that the aim of the attacks on ships sailing off the coast of

Somalia is to secure ransom demands.[261]

Under the current model, ransoms are extracted by leveraging the lives of the hijacked crew.

Roger Middleton, an expert on Somali piracy at Chatham House notes, -The reality in Somalia is

that the pirates are not trying to steal the cargo or the ship itself-they're trying to take control of

crew so they can ransom them.[262] Somali pirates claim openly that the revenues generated from

acts of piracy are used for their own sustenance. After hijacking the Ukrainian freighter Faina

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[261] U.N. Sec. Council, Monitoring Group on Somalia, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Sec. Council Resolution 1587 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/2005/625 (Oct. 4, 2005).
[262] Nick Wadhams, Somali Pirates vs. Islamists: A Dispute Over Business, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1987855,00.html; see also Jerry Frank, Ransom for Seafarers Could Rocket to 50m, LLOYD'S LIST, July. 15, 2013.

loaded with a cargo of arms and tanks in September of 2008, Somali pirate spokesman Sugule Ali said that the pirates had no plans to offload the weapons: -We just want the money.[263]

Although the situation is admittedly distasteful, the Somali pirates have consistently upheld their promises, and after capturing vessels have conducted themselves with a modicum of respect for the crew and with professionalism in negotiations. After the release of the French yacht Le Ponant, Agence France Presse reported that a pirate Good Conduct Guide, outlining appropriate methods for hostage treatment, was found onboard.[264] If there is anything good about the Somali piracy it is that for right now it is a predictable business transaction.[265] The hijackers are more interested in the ransom money than trying to sell the cargo or ship.[266] When ransoms are paid, the pirates release the ship, crew, and cargo.[267]The highly publicized case of the Chandlers, a British yachting couple captured by Somali pirates on October 23, 2009, and still held today due to their inability to pay a ransom, illustrates the professionalism of the Somali model. Despite threats and the emotional toll, the pirates have provided the Chandlers with modest medical attention and some respite as the situation has progressed.[268]

According to undisclosed source, piracy has been important to the Somalia economy.[269] He notes that a considerable number of people appear to be directly employed in the piracy business. His arguments are in line with Kraska and Wilson (2009a), who estimated that as many as 5,000

[263] Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html.
[264] Pirates Used 'Good Conduct Guide' in French Yacht Siege: Source, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 17, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ic4lMhcdvj6BV5HsRB-uabBjyUmA.
[265] Interview with with Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President of Maritime Services, Maersk Line Limited 12 June, 2013.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Mail Foreign Service, British Yacht Couple Paul and Rachel Chandler Held by Somali Pirates 'Temporarily United,' DAILY MAIL, Mar. 8, 2010. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1256318/British-yacht-couple-Paul-Rachel-Chandler-held-Somali-pirates-temporarily-reunited.html.
[269] Interview with Undisclosed source in Puntland, 01 August 2013.

Somali men were working as pirates, divided into five large groups. Firstly there are those directly involved in the hijacking. [270] Pirates generally operate in teams consisting of a "mothership" and two to three small, open, high-powered wooden fishing boats (skiffs). Each skiff's crew generally consists of up to 8 people: One ex-fisherman who is responsible for navigating, one person to operate the technical apparatus and the rest ex-militia men with extensive experience of using firearms. Hijacked ships are steered into Somali territorial waters and anchored a few miles off the coast. The guarding of the ship then tends to be subcontracted to local militias, with up to 50 people on each ship and another 50 on the coast. The owner of the ship is contacted by experienced negotiators with reasonable English language skills (often former teachers). Some of the hostages (generally including the captain) are taken off the ship and are guarded in local households. This discourages the remaining crew and foreign troops from attempting to take control of a hijacked ship. As the Somali piracy business is based on ransoming the crew, hostages are treated reasonably well. In 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 1,016 hostages being taken by Somali pirates and in need of food - creating employment for local cooks, producers and traders.

There are even reports that restaurants have sprung up to cater for the needs of the hostages.[271]Individual pirates' profits are estimated at about US$10-45,000. Compared to Somalia's annual *per capita* income of 273 US$, piracy is clearly a financially attractive career for unemployed young men.[272] The undisclosed source noted that single pirate hijack resulted in a ransom ranging from US$500,000 to a record US$9.0 million in 2010.[273] As ransom amounts

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[270] Kraska James and Brian Wilson. (2008) "Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword," *World Policy Journal.* Vol. 25. No. 4 p. 46.
[271] Lindiey. Anna (2010) *The Early Morning Phonecall: Somali Refugees Remittances*; Studies in Forced Migration Vol 28: Berghahn Books
[272] Interview with Undisclosed source in Puntland, interview, 01 August 2013.
[273] Ibid

are often kept as a commercial secret, estimates of total incomes from piracy in Somalia come in all sizes, mostly vastly inflated. About US$40 million were paid in ransoms in 2008.[274] A realistic figure for 2009 is in the region of US$70 million.[275] To put this into context, in 2008 and 2009 the official government budgets of Puntland province were US$11.7 million and US$17.6 million respectively.[276]The proceeds of total official cattle exports from Somalia in 2009 are in the region of US$ 43 million. Piracy therefore potentially generates a large amount of foreign exchange receipts and income relative to the size of the Somali (and especially the Puntland) economy.[277] The proceeds of piracy are shared between the pirates, the guards, the negotiation teams, the financiers of the piracy expeditions and bribes for local officials.

The UN estimates that 40 percent of the proceeds fund local employment directly, of which the pirate crews get 30 percent and those employed on the land-side operations 10 percent. Another 10 percent is paid in gifts and bribes to the local community, while 50 percent is paid to the financiers and "sponsors" of the business, which are often said to be based abroad.[278] If the money was invested or spent in local businesses so as to create multiplier effects, it could have a transforming effect on deprived coastal communities, impoverished by years of economic uncertainty and illegal and destructive overfishing. The testimony of locals interviewed on the effect of piracy on the economy is, however, conflicting. On the one hand, piracy is said to bring a lot of direct employment opportunities to the local community. In addition pirate financiers and ex-pirates are said to be investing in local businesses and contributing to the provision of local governance and public goods. Any form of conspicuous consumption requires employing private

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[274] Lindley, Anna (2009), "Between 'Dirty Money' and 'Development Capital': Somali Money Transfer Infrastructure Under Global Scrutiny," *African Affairs* (August, 2009), pp.519-539.
[275] Hulburt Kaija (2011): The Human Cost of Somali Piracy One Earth Future, Oceans Beyond Piracy Report, One Earth Future Foundation.
[276]Interview with Undisclosed source in Puntland, interview, 01 August 2013.
[277] Ibid.
[278] United Nations (2008): Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811, available at: http://daccess-ddsny. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement.

security guards around the person, car(s) and compound, generating further employment opportunities. On the other hand there are complaints that the participation of locals in the gains generated by piracy is negligible, because much of it is moved abroad funding property purchases in Nairobi or Mombasa. Money spent on imported status goods such as Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) does not create local economic development.[279] Critics of piracy also express concern that the local poor suffer because piracy is generating inflation and disrupting trade flows causing price increases in important commodity prices.[280] Residents in coastal communities often complain that they are not participating in the gains from piracy.

Garowe is at the heart of the pirates' tribal heartland[281]. Naval intelligence officers interviewing captured pirates established that the heavily armed boarding teams tend to come from the interior and specifically Garowe, with only a hired fisherman / navigator from the coast.[282] Bosasso has long been a pirate port.[283] Nowadays, however, officials in Bosasso make a show of cooperating with foreign naval forces and pursuing pirates. Ransom negotiations have not been conducted from the vicinity of Bosasso since the international naval mission started. Bosasso's prison is said to house a significant population of pirates.[284] Nonetheless, Bosasso is the main port for importing pirate equipment such as communications technology, motors and weapons. There is also unlikely to be a problem with successful (ex-) pirates investing their newly-found wealth in businesses and real estate in Bosasso.[285] According to the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) Officer, smaller coastal towns seem to gain little from the pirate business carried out in their local waters. Although piracy creates local employment, coastal communities are missing out on

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[279] Interview with undisclosed Somali Business man, 28 July 2013.
[280] Ibid.
[281] Hansen Stig Jarle (2009) Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies, NIBR report 2009:29.
[282] Ibid.
[283] Ibid.
[284] Interview with Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) Officer, 26 July 2013.
[285] Interview with Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) Officer, 26 July 2013.

investments as they are vulnerable to strikes from the Southern Somali militias (Islamists have taken over Gharadeere and Hobyo in the past) and foreign military aircraft patrolling the coast.

To date, Somali pirates have not made a practice of torturing or killing crews of hijacked vessels. This would seem to be a logically necessary component of the kidnap and ransom model. Because Somali pirates are in the business for money alone, it is in their interest to make sure hostages survive.[286] According to Sugule Ali, spokesman for the pirates who hijacked the Faina, -Killing is not in our plans.[287]

4.2 Conclusion

After years of political stagnation and little meaningful change in the security situation, Somalia has finally reached a point where its new government has the possibility of breaking out of an era of lawlessness and putting itself on track to achieve widespread national support. The challenges remain immense but improvements in the security situation, a weakening of al-Shabaab, and a relatively fresh slate of political leaders open the door for positive change. This progress will come to an abrupt end, however, if the new leaders fail to crack down hard on the culture of corruption that has permeated the Somali political system. It is also important for the international community to give the Somalis more leeway to determine their future while responding favorably to legitimate requests from the Somali government and reputable civil society organizations.

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[286] Chandler Pirates Increase Pressure for Ransom Money, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8492731.stm.
[287] Jeffrey Gettleman. Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html

Until there are significant improvements in the security situation, it is almost impossible for any government, even a talented one that eschews corruption, to govern the country and gain the respect of its people. The history of past security mistakes is legion which include Cold War military collaboration that contributed to regional conflict, the dictatorial approach of Siad Barre and his efforts to subjugate Somaliland, warlord fiefdoms based on clan support, a well-intentioned but mismanaged international intervention in the early and mid-1990s, more warlord politics followed by the rise of the Islamic Courts militia and intervention in Somalia by Ethiopian forces that contributed significantly to the rise of al-Shabaab. Politically, the problems remain enormous, but again there are reasons to be hopeful. But whatever optimism is appropriate, it must be balanced with a sense of caution. Perhaps progress lies in the mere fact that, where once the picture in the south was overwhelmingly negative, with signs of optimism confined largely to the peripheral (and effectively independent) state of Somaliland, and the largely autonomous territory of Puntland, there is now a much more mixed picture in and around Mogadishu as well. The Jubaland State is a thorny issue that the Somalia Federal Government, regional authorities and the international community need to be more cautious in its approach to avoid bloodshed.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary

The overall objective of this study is to assess the contribution of Ethiopia's military intervention in sustainable Somalia peace. Specific objectives are to examine the effectiveness of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia and to investigate whether military intervention strategy alone can lead to stability in Somalia. This study is arranged into four key sections. The first chapter introduces the research topic background, statement of the problem, justification, the overall aims of the study, literature review and the methodology. The second section examines the historical background of militarisation of Somalia and the Ethiopian military intervention. The third section looks into the field findings by examining effectiveness of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia. The fourth and final section discusses the emerging issues in the context of the research topic.

5.1 Key findings of the study

Objective one: The effectiveness of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia .

Ethiopia's military intervention has been regarded as the most daring and strategic decision any African government has made to fight terrorism crossing a border towards its neighbour. An Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in December 2006 succeeded in ousting an increasingly radical Islamist army Al Shaabab and its movement, the Islamic Courts Union. The invasion laid the ground for today's relative stability and election of current democratically elected government, which greatly minimised potential threat to Ethiopia. It's successful operation motivated other countries for military intervention through the African Union. The exemplary exhibition of the military strategic intervention, created an impression that it was possible for a military operation to take place in Somalia, despite the feeling among the

international community that the historical relationship and geographical terrain was not favourable for such an operation.

In late 2006 TFG forces, with ENDF ground and air support, engaged and effectively dispersed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had previously "gained control of 8 of the country's 18 administrative regions" by early January 2007.[288]

The Ethiopian troops proved their military capability in defeating ICU with determination to ensure a free Somali society of militia groups. The intensity of air strikes by Ethiopia, which had long been allied with the transitional government, helped turn the tide. Ethiopia's ground forces, already based in Somalia, have played a critical role. Ethiopia's military swift response to Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in retaliatory attacks against Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) forces; they attacked the ICU's operation bases within Baidoa. In less than a week, the ICU forces were no more.[289] The effectiveness of the Ethiopian military intervention was at play once again when it emerged that its interest was in the establishment of good governance and management of the national resources by the Somalis themselves. Though fragmented, corrupt and unpopular with the local populace, the TFG, was ushered into power by the Ethiopian military force with the aid of other neighbouring nations of Kenya, Uganda and Burundi.

The transitional government had challenges, just like any new regime in a post conflict society; its viability was majorly as a direct contribution of Ethiopian military as a governing power on itself. Ethiopia's invasion directly led to the decrease of the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab, which was becoming a huge threat beyond Somalia before its invasion. Ethiopia's military

[288] Interview with undisclosed AMISOM Senior Political Adviser, 21 June 2013.
[289] Ahmed, IJ & Green, RH (1999) 'The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects. External Interventions and Reconstruction,' *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20,p. 1.

action, followed several failed regional and international efforts on Somalia, the latest, then, being the IGAD's Mission (IGASOM) that had been mooted in 2002 but collapsed in March 2006. Ethiopia has contributed significantly to the current Somalia stability. The resulting improvements in security in Somalia had enabled the people of Somalia "to successfully conclude their 8-year transition to a more representative and legitimate political order". With the support of Ethiopian forces, AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces have driven Al-Shabaab out of its major strongholds including Mogadishu, adding that Ethiopia had the objective to help Somalia "get rid of all Al-Shabaab cells" and become "a stable and peaceful country with a professional army".[290]

Objective two: to investigate whether military intervention strategy alone can lead to stability in Somalia. Ethiopian and the African Union's military greatly weaked the Al-Shaabab. Events in Somalia are difficult to predict. But one thing is sure: the radical group Al-Shabaab is increasingly losing the momentum. It may try hard to adjust or mutate to the internal crisis in the Jubaland, Puntland or Cetral Somalia, but the underlying causes of the problem will continue to grow, eating away at the cohesion and dynamism of the group. Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) forces and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-Shabaab and cleared them from the capital city.[291]

Most importantly, it is refreshing to see some degree of resolve and cooperation among countries in the sub-region, with the credit mainly given to Ethiopian forces for daring where none of the African countries could dare. To a large extent, military intervention has managed to create

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[290] Interview with undisclosed AMISOM Senior Political Adviser, 21 June 2013.
[291] Ibid.

stability in Somalia. Besides Ethiopia, the current relative stability and the successful formation of Somalia Federal Government is a collective effort of the African Union's troop contributing countries in Somalia. To a less extent, humanitarian support and development aid has also contributed to the stability of Somalia.

There is no doubt that the Ethiopian military achieved what no international community and African countries thought to be possible. Its daring response to the lawlessness in Somalia laid the foundation of the current AMISOM. The United States of America and the United Nations had tried military intervention, but their strategy backfired at the initial stage with little progress. Ethiopian government never publicly acknowledged the size of the forces deployed in Somalia during the intervention, but it is estimated that 30,000-40,000 Ethiopian soldiers took part in operations in 2007 and 2008. In late 2006 Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, with Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) ground and air support, engaged and effectively dispersed the ICU, which had previously gained control of eight administrative regions by early January 2007.[292]

It has been argued that Ethiopia's intervention contributed to the displacement of the citizens, leading to a huge humanitarian crisis. Such a military intervention does cause massive destruction in human life and property.However, it should be looked at its totality and in another way had there not been military intervention and it is a fact that even in the absence of military intervention , displacement in Somalia is common. [293]It is driven by a variety of factors including civil war, natural disasters, economic conditions and threats to public health.It is problematic to make any hard assertions regarding the ENDF's causal role in the death and displacement that

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[292] Ibid.
[293] Doornbos, M and Markakis, J (1994), 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?' *Review of African Political Economy*. vol. 21, no. 59. pp.82-88.

plagued Somalis for two years. As discussed earlier, death and displacement is attributable to a combination of factors, it is not limited to Ethiopian troop intervention. Security remains the biggest challenge for the new government and the regional authorities of Somaliland, Puntland, Central Somalia and the current Juba regions administration.[294] The political struggle for control over Kismayo and the Juba regions highlights the tension between Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia, an issue that could undermine the political progress made in the past year.

Regarding the effects of ENDF security operations on humanitarian conditions in Somalia, beyond the documented instances of injuries and deaths caused as a result of the ENDF's intentional abuse of the civilian population and use of indiscriminate shelling and gunfire, it is problematic to make any hard assertions regarding the ENDF's role in the death and displacement that plagued Somalis for many years. However, statistical data and firsthand accounts offer a starkly contrasting picture of the humanitarian situation in Somalia before December 2006 and during the ENDF's two-year conflict with the insurgency. [295]

5.2 Recommendation

With the successul outcome of both Ethiopian military and the African Union forces, there is need for Ethiopian Government to capacity build the Somalia National Army and encourage the Somalia Federal Government to pursue an inclusive governance approach without discrimination based on groups or clan system. Besides , a collective solution pursued gradually through regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC) might have the advantage of consensus

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[294] Interview with Ziad, Deputy Head of Mission-Somali Embassy-Nairobi, 23 June 2013.
[295] Interview with AMISOM Senior Political Adviser, 21 June 2013.

in ensuring that the Somali political leaders are held accountable for the good governance and peace building of Somalia.[296]

All countries in the region will need to commit to not supporting disruptive insurgencies such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia. If Somalia is trying its best to promote peace and stability, its neighbours should offer support rather than escalate the conflict. Somalia's neighboring countries should play a role in the sustained stability in Somalia. Different countries should stop hosting their adversaries' insurgencies. It is possible to get rid of extremism, destructive rebel groups and anarchy.

The immediate security concerns are urgent and deserve full attention in Jubbaland. The importance is the best approach to this very complex political problem. It needs forging a post-Shabaab administration to disaggregate the Jubbaland political question into three separate objectives to pursue: the fostering of non-threatening Somali polities along Kenya's border as a temporary buffer zone; the establishment of a regional political unit; and the brokering of a sustainable and equitable deal to govern the seaport and air port of Kismayo. All three are important, for distinct reasons, but they require three different approaches. Breaking them up into three discrete tasks greatly improves the odds of the success of the Kenyan intervention.

Buffer zone on Kenya's border. This is the most achievable objective. The good news is that local communities along the Somali-Kenyan border already have extensive, routinized patterns of cooperation, thanks to years of efforts by Somali Kenyans backed by the Kenyan government.

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[296] Doornbos. M and Markakis. J (1994), 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?' *Review of African Political Economy*. vol. 21. no. 59. pp.82-88.

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INTERVIEWEE LIST

Ali Mohamed Ghedi, Former Prime Minister of Somalia.
Col.Gebre Alemseged, Head of Somalia Peace Process Facilitation office of IGAD.
Fred Ngoga, AMISOM Senior political adviser
General Gebre Dilla, Head of military intelligence of Ethiopia.
Hannah Macharia, an international relations lecturer at USIU University-Nairobi
Macharia Munene, professor of international relations at the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi
Prof Abdi Gandi.
Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) Officer.
Senior European Union Diplomat, Political Affairs.
Somali Business man.
Undisclosed respondent, United States of American Embassy, Nairobi.
Undisclosed Senior Intelligence Officer, Kenya, interview.
Senior Kenya Government official.
Source in Puntland.
Wondimu Asamenew, Director General of Africa Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Ethiopia.
Ziad, Deputy Head of Mission-Somalia Embassy-Nairobi.
Yelebu Lijalem, Head of Horn of Africa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia.

Appendix 1: Research Questions

Good morning/ afternoon, my name is Shawel Gebre, a Master's of Arts in International Conflict Management student at University of Nairobi.

The information you give in response to this questionnaire will be held in confidence and not used for any other purpose apart from the academic purpose.

General information

Name of the institution/work department ....

Geographical location of the institution/work station ....

Position at the institution ....

Number of years working ....

Personal characteristics

Gender .... (Male), (Female), (Trans-gender) -**Please tick the answer**

Education: .... (Primary), (Secondary), (University), (None of the above)

Age: .... (20-30), (31-40), (41-50) (51 and above)

Religion: .... (Christian), (Muslim), (Any other-Specify------------)

Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia

1. Ethiopia's military intervention to Somalia was dubbed curbing a national security threat.
How do you see the military intervention as a tool for enabling peace in Somalia?

2. Is Military intervention a solution to prolonged civil wars, share your views?

3. Do you think that the Ethiopia's military intervention could have resolved the prolonged
Somalia conflict?

A. No

B. Yes

C. If yes or no is your answer, would you please explain

how...

4. Is military intervention a new way to curb the effects of prolonged civil wars and how
effective is it?

5. Do you think that the military intervention as conflict management approach would end civil
wars in the region?

6. Do you think the multilateral co-operation have effect in undertaking a successful military
intervention process in the region?

7. How do you see the position of Ethiopia as regards the military intervention in Somalia?

8. What would you suggest to make military intervention more successful averting the issues of
human rights violation and humanitarian crisis?

THANK YOU FOR TAKING YOUR TIME!