

**DRIVERS OF TERRORISM IN NE KENYA: MARGINALIZATION OR  
RADICALIZATION? ||**

other

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**R50/67609/2013**

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**“Masters Proposal Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Masters of Arts in  
International Studies of the University of Nairobi”**


  
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
## DECLARATION

This research study is my original work and has not been presented for any award to any other institution.



**Muhumed Ahmed Sheikh**

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University supervisor.



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## **DEDICATION**

**This thesis is dedicated to my fallen comrade Senior Private Jasper Onguso and all the soldiers we lost in Somalia. May your souls continue to fight for our freedom and safety.**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

First of all, I thank the Almighty God for his favour and blessings over my life that enabled me complete this study. This study reflects the support and input from many people, most important I am infinitely grateful to my supervisor Dr Kizito Sabala for his consistent guidance and support. He was patient with my endless twists and turns providing encouragement, reading materials and ideas for continuous improvement. I learnt a lot from his experience and expertise. Forever grateful and indebted.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ACSRT</b>	Algiers Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism
<b>AQAP</b>	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
<b>ARF</b>	ASEAN Regional Forum
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of South East Asian Nations
<b>ATA</b>	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
<b>ATPU</b>	Ant-Terror Police Unit
<b>AU</b>	The African Union
<b>BBC</b>	British Broadcasting Corporation
<b>CBRN</b>	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
<b>CDA</b>	Critical Discourse Analysis
<b>CNN</b>	Cable News Network
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>EACTI</b>	East African Counter-terrorism Initiative
<b>EAPCCO</b>	East African Police Chiefs Organization
<b>EARSI</b>	East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GoK</b>	Government of Kenya



<b>ICPAT</b>	<b>IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism</b>
<b>IEDs</b>	<b>Improvised Explosive Devices</b>
<b>IGAD</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</b>
<b>KDF</b>	<b>Kenya Defence Forces</b>
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>Non-Governmental Organizations</b>
<b>NIS</b>	<b>National Intelligence Service</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organization of African Unity</b>
<b>Ops</b>	<b>Operations</b>
<b>OTC</b>	<b>Overseas Trading Company</b>
<b>PFLP</b>	<b>Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine</b>
<b>PKO</b>	<b>Peace Keeping Operations</b>
<b>PREACT</b>	<b>Partnership for Regional East African Counter-terrorism</b>
<b>TFG</b>	<b>Transitional Federal Government</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>VIP</b>	<b>Very Important Persons</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

Acts of terrorism have had grave economic, political, and social implications in Kenya. Human lives, tourism, agriculture, and the transportation sectors have been severely affected. As most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are engulfed in perennial civil conflicts, Kenya has remained relatively peaceful for decades and played host to millions of refugees fleeing neighboring countries. However, since 1998, terrorism-related activities have been on the rise in the country posing a major threat to national cohesion, security and development. The impact of terrorism cuts across social, cultural, economic and political spectrums of the society. The nature of terrorist activities in Kenya has been changing and escalating in magnitude, leaving many innocent citizens as victims, while in some incidences, the country held at ransom by the terror groups. Kenya is becoming more vulnerable and strategic target for terror groups.

This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the experiences, challenges and lessons learnt from the recurrent incidences of terrorism. To this end, this study scrutinized the linkage between terrorism and radicalization. It also assessed the relationship between marginalization and radicalization of certain ethnic, religious and age groups within the country. Based on the nature of the study, a large part of the research findings was derived from secondary literature review of relevant publications and reports such as international crisis group reports, scholarly contributions on terrorism, radicalization, counter-radicalization and other literal works published on the subject matter. The study has also made various recommendations that could assist in the development of counter radicalizations and counter-terrorism policies.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 General Introduction

Terrorism is one of the oldest tools in the world that has been used by parties with grievances (real or perceived) and has been cited as the cause of approximately 30,000 deaths every year. Every continent on earth has witnessed episodes of terror, and this weapon has now attained immense geopolitical importance in the world.

For instance, it has had immense impact on economic growth of countries such as Kenya, which has since 2011 seen the largest slump ever witnessed by the country's second largest foreign exchange earner; tourism. Tourists numbers have been dwindling over the last four years, ever since Kenyan forces crossed into Somalia in pursuit of, Al-Shabaab, the Islamist terrorist group. The definition of terrorism varies from one state to another and from different unions resulting in many definitions of the same concept. Simon<sup>1</sup> indicates that there are more than 212 different definitions of terrorism. The UN Security Council Resolution,<sup>2</sup> for instance, in 2004, defined terrorism as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".

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<sup>1</sup> Simon, Jeffrey D. (1994). *The Terrorist Trap*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

<sup>2</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004). "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism".

<sup>3</sup> Article 1 (a)(1) The AU convention on prevention and combating of terrorism

However in 2005, the same UN panel in a congregation held in March adopted the definition of terrorism as “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” The African Union (AU) defines terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage”. Recently, Kenya has been experiencing increased insecurity due to the growing international and domestic terrorism. International terrorism involves perpetrators from across the borders while domestic terrorism is carried out by citizens of Kenya. Terrorism in Kenya dates way back to the late 70s. According to Mogire (2009), the first terrorism attack in Kenya occurred in the year 1976, where the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof group tried, unsuccessfully, to shoot down an El Al passenger plane during a scheduled stopover in Nairobi”. In the same year, terrorists from one of the Palestinian liberation movements successfully detonated bombs at a mass transit bus terminal in Nairobi known as OTC killing 14 people.

In 1998, Kenya’s single worst terrorist attack occurred when the Al-Qaeda extremist group carried out simultaneous suicide attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in neighbouring Tanzania, killing close to 300 people in Nairobi and at least 11 in Da es salaam. While the whole country is at fear, the attacks tend to be skewed towards densely populated areas like Nairobi and Mombasa. However, the North-Eastern region and recently Lamu have also been targeted possibly because of their proximity to

Somalia- the ascribed Al-shabab territory. There has been Incidences of hand grenades being hulled into churches and buses especially in Eastleigh area; an area known to hub most of the Somali immigrants. One of the deadliest terrorist's attack in Nairobi happened in September 2013 at the West Gate Shopping Mall. Over 60 people died, property worth hundreds of millions was destroyed and the country was left at a loss. In 2014, Al-shabab militants attacked Mandera town isolating the non-Muslims from the Muslims and killing non-Muslim workers<sup>3</sup> working in the region. The increase in terrorism in Kenya can be attributed to various factors. Adan<sup>4</sup> lists the factors as "...geography, ethnic composition, political stability, unstable neighbors, poverty, Islamic fundamentalism, and lax law enforcement" (p.8). Since 2014, terrorism in Kenya has greatly been dominant in the North Eastern region. From 2012 to date, over 500 Kenyans have been killed by terrorist groups and approximately 1000 wounded. Consequently, there has been a dire need to establish the underlying fundamental factors contributing to this.

North Eastern Kenya is inhabited by the predominantly Muslim Somali community. The area is semi-arid and no much farming is done. Instead pastoralism is the core occupation of the residents; a situation that has contributed to conflicts in the region. As of 2009, the North Eastern Province had a population of 2,310,757 residents.<sup>5</sup> It is almost entirely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The main Somali clans in the area are the Ogaden, Gurreh, Murule, Ajuran, Degodia and other Hawiye.<sup>6</sup> North Eastern houses the Dadaab Refugee Camp which gives refuge to thousands of Somali nationals who escaped

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<sup>3</sup> "Kenya bus attack: Al-Shabaab militants slaughter 28 non-Muslims who failed to recite Koran". The Independent. 2 December 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Adan, H.H. Maj. (2005). *Combating transnational terrorism in Kenya*. Retrieved from Defense Technical Information Center. Retrieved from: <http://www.dtic.mil/>.

<sup>5</sup> "Kenya Census 2009". Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

<sup>6</sup> John O. Oucho, *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya*, Volume 3 of African Social Studies Series, (BRILL: 2002), p.51.

the instability in Somali. The camps are run by the United Nations. For many years, the region has been known to be marginalized as compared to many parts of Kenya with developments being mostly theoretical and not practical.

A marginalized community is one which “out of a need or desire to preserve its unique culture and identity from assimilation, has remained outside the integrated social economic life of Kenya as a whole, or an indigenous community that has retained and maintained a traditional lifestyle and livelihood based on hunter or gatherer economy; or pastoral persons and communities whether they are nomadic or a settled community that because of its relative geographic isolation has experienced only marginal participation in the integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a whole”.<sup>7</sup> In other words, marginalization is the tendency of some region or communities being excluded from the mainstream of government developments. This problem has been prominent in the North Eastern region since post-independence. Marginalization of some groups or people in society has been known to be a precursor of violence and social unrest. It has also been noted to promote terrorism in Kenya.

Radicalization is another major cause of terrorism. Brian defines radicalization as “the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of [radical] beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society”.<sup>8</sup> Security bodies, organizations and intelligence bodies all over the world have greatly labeled terrorists as a product of a dynamic process called radicalization. In Kenya radicalization has been a major problem promoting terrorism. Youths are the main targets for radicalization by

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<sup>7</sup> Constituion of Kenya. Retrieved from <http://www.ngeckkenya.org/>

<sup>8</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, "Outside Experts View," preface to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*. Washington, DC: FDD's Center for Terrorism Research, 2009.

terrorist groups as they are vulnerable and more likely to adopt an ideology instilled on them.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Terrorism has become a major security issue in international systems and particularly after September 11 and Kenya is no exception. The country has been prone to terror attacks in the recent past and each time the economy is to some extent affected. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, after the 1998 US embassy bombing and after the 2007/2008 post-election violence, tourism fell by 7% and 30% respectively. The West Gate Attack, the bombings in churches in Mombasa and in buses in Eastleigh area of Nairobi have further aggravated the suffering of the economy. Terrorism continues to be a major puzzle all over the world with researchers disagreeing over its main causes and what really drives people to engage in acts of terror. It seems radicalization is the major contributor to rise in both domestic and international terrorism. Others however have attributed marginalization to be the major cause while others suggest both radicalization and marginalization play part in setting conditions for terrorism.

North Eastern faces both radicalization and marginalization problems and with the recent terrorism rise in the area, the thoughts of the two having been involved have only escalated. With the region experiencing poverty, lack of education and unemployment; which are facets of marginalization, individuals tend to be easily recruited into terrorist groups. Groups and individuals join terrorist organizations as a way of resisting prolonged and severe marginalization within their political communities. After the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for



increased investments in education and poverty reduction in order to thwart recruitment efforts by terrorist groups and organizations. Despite this, researchers and scholars have failed to reliably demonstrate marginalized individuals and communities are more likely to join a terrorist group. According to Martha Crenshaw<sup>9</sup>, concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup lead to the development of a social movement aimed at redressing grievances real or perceived. These feelings of discrimination or deprivation must be viewed as unjust and underserved. Similarly, the region has faced radicalization especially in youths. Presences of refugee camps provide a growing base for recruitment of youths. There are different types and factors that contribute to radicalization. Religious radicalization has largely been known to be the main type of radicalization contributing to terrorism. Internationally, major factors contributing to terrorism are spiritual mentorship and the internet. There are different aspects of radicalization which include perceived injustice or humiliation, need for identity and need for belonging. In North Eastern region there remains need to establish types of radicalization and whether they have any contribution to the rise in terrorism.

Researchers have developed a number of different theories and conceptual models that seek to explain the process by which an individual becomes radicalized, but these theories have not been empirically tested. Most see three to five stages from beginning to end of the process, from initial exposure through indoctrination, training, and then violent action. However, the question on whether radicalization, marginalization or both contribute to terrorism still remains unanswered. Most People are marginalized but not all are involved in terrorism. In Kenya, many regions are marginalized but no incidents of terrorism are experienced in all. Similarly, some regions have more radicalized groups and individuals

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<sup>9</sup> [https://www.academia.edu/5585121/Why\\_Do\\_People\\_Join\\_Terrorist\\_Groups](https://www.academia.edu/5585121/Why_Do_People_Join_Terrorist_Groups)

yet terrorism is minimal. There is need to establish the correlation between marginalization, radicalization and terrorism and to pinpoint the major contributor of terrorism activities in North Eastern Kenya. Generally, is marginalization the problem or is radicalization the problem? This study seeks to answer this vital question.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

1.3.1 To critically analyse various discourses on terrorism.

1.3.2 To examine the extent to which marginalization and radicalization contributes to terrorism in NE Kenya.

1.3.3 To investigate whether there are other drivers of terrorism in NE Kenya other than marginalization and radicalization.

1.3.4 To suggest appropriate counter radicalization strategies that can be used to tackle terrorism in Kenya.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

1.4.1 What are the various discourses on terrorism?

1.4.2 What is the extent to which marginalization and radicalization contributes to terrorism in NE Kenya? .

1.4.3 Are there other drivers of terrorism in NE Kenya?

1.4.4 What is the most suitable counter terrorism strategy Kenya can employ to reign in home grown terrorism?

## **1.5 Study Hypotheses**

- 1.5.1 The study is for the assumption that there is a positive correlation between marginalization, radicalization and terrorism in NE Kenya.
- 1.5.3 The study is also for the assumption that there terrorism in NE Kenya can be tackled with proper and inclusive multi-dimensional counter-terror strategy.

## **1.6 Study Justification and Significance**

### **1.6.1 Academic Justification**

This study will promote a better understanding of the drivers of terrorism in NE Kenya, a largely unexplored area in the academic field evidenced by limited academic work on the subject matter. The project intends to give an assessment of the factors influencing home grown terrorism and violent Islamist extremism in NE Kenya. The purpose is to identify the specific drivers of terrorism and catalysts of the radicalization process as well as suggesting relevant counter radicalization measures. The threat of Islamist radicalization and home grown terrorism has been on the increase with targets becoming purely local. This is an evident deviation from terrorist's targets 5 years ago which have been largely western or foreign interests. The knowledge on whether marginalization or radicalization is the determinant of terrorism is vital. With this knowledge, it is possible and easier to implement counter terrorism strategies specifically directed to either of these. The Kenyan government can therefore isolate the cases of marginalization and radicalization, provide counseling for the most affected and eventually prevent terror attacks. The study will suggest areas of improvement and provide a doorway for further research on the drivers of terrorism.

## **1.6.2 Policy Justification**

Research has traditionally played a significant role in helping governments formulate appropriate and sustainable policies. It affords this primarily through understanding and creating effective means of conflict management and resolution. Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on longstanding grievances against the central state.<sup>10</sup> This problem has grown more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia and the consequent capture of Kismayu seaport in September 2012. Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late must be a priority. It would be a profound mistake, however, to view the challenge solely through a counterterrorism lens.

Therefore in practical terms, this study is relevant and timely for the policy makers to develop effective, long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies. A link exists between radicalization and terrorism, but counter-terrorism tactics aimed only at stopping Al-Shabaab and other militant groups should not become the only official response. Counter-radicalization – reducing the appeal of radicalism – and de-radicalization – persuading people who are already in radical organizations to leave them – are long-term processes that require tact and patience.

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<sup>10</sup> International Crisis Group, Kenya Somali Islamist Radicalization. Africa Briefing No.85. 25<sup>th</sup> January 2012

## **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

Based on the fluidity and complexity character of contemporary fundamental terrorism, there is no overarching theory that can explain with precision the drivers or causes of extremism in Kenya of such unprecedented savagery as evidenced in the recent Garissa University carnage. The study will however, rely on the constructivism theory and borrow some tenets on structural functionalism to explain the correlations between terrorism and marginalization and the extent to which radicalization contributes to terrorism. Constructivism's foundational assertion is that social norms shape interests and interests determine state behaviour. Constructivism argues that society creates the norms of each state; norms then define identities and identities are the synthesis of common views and values that form a group conscience that thereafter sets behaviour.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

The study explores the research methodology that aims at addressing the research objectives and questions. The study sample and instruments for the study will draw data from both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data will be derived from interactive interviews and administration of questionnaires from staff in public and private sector in NE Kenya, government agencies, non-governmental agencies, religious leaders, unemployed youth, women (miraa sellers) and civil society heads. Secondary data will be sourced from a collection and review of published and unpublished material, journals, academic papers and periodicals. These will be taken through intensive and critical analysis.

### **1.8.1 Case Study**

The case study method is a very popular form of qualitative method and involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit be a person, a family, an institution, a cultural group or even the entire community.<sup>11</sup> It places more emphasis on the full analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their interrelations. In this study, the case study is North Eastern region of Kenya which comprises of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties.

### **1.8.2 Data Collection**

Primary data was collected through structured interviews and non-structured interviews from government security officials, religious leaders, youth and local population. Further this study depended on primary data acquired through secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis is a method that involves analysis of data that has been collected by other researchers and also through official statistics. The advantages of the secondary data analysis are the cost and time involved is less than what could have been incurred if student was to collect the data<sup>12</sup>. Sources of secondary data will be newspapers, government publications, website sources and other scholarly work done on terrorism and Islamic radicalization in Kenya.

### **1.8.3 Data Analysis**

Data analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics to analyze the findings from the raw data.

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<sup>11</sup> C R Kothari, *Research Methodology, Second Revised Edition*, page 113

<sup>12</sup> Bryman A, *Social Research Methods 3rd Edition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 183 - 190

#### **1.8.4 Data Presentation**

The research findings are presented through charts and diagrams to demonstrate relationships and figures emanated from quantitative data. For qualitative data a narrative description which connects findings to hypothesis and research questions is employed.

Quotes from interviewees will be used to inform and support findings.

#### **1.9 Chapter Outline**

The study is composed of five chapters as outlined below:

##### **1.9.1 Chapter One: Background and Introduction**

This chapter discusses the background and brief introduction of the study. The section discusses the statement of the problem, the research objectives and questions, research hypotheses as well as the academic and policy justification of the study.

##### **1.9.2 Chapter Two: Discourse on Terrorism**

This chapter reviews literature on terrorism including definitions and norms of relevant institutions. The chapter tackles all the pertinent issues on contemporary terrorism and serve to ground the question of terrorism in the existing academic discourse.

##### **1.9.3 Chapter Three: Terrorism in NE Kenya: Marginalization or Radicalization?**

This chapter is the thrust of the study and covers discussions on possible causes and effects of terrorism in NE Kenya. Norms and practices of institutions that deal with terror in the region are also be analysed.

#### **1.9.4 Chapter Four: Opportunities and Challenges of Curbing Terrorism in NE Kenya**

From the data analysis chapter four discusses the main findings of the study and highlights opportunities and challenges encountered in the national efforts in the fight against terror.

#### **1.9.5 Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations**

This chapter is the culmination of the study and therefore aims to suggest tangible policy recommendations based on the findings discussed. The discussion indicates whether the results confirm, totally or in part, to the study hypotheses. The section demonstrates whether the hypotheses are supported and gives thorough explanations for that.



## CHAPTER TWO

### DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to analyze some of the most important linguistic constructions around terrorism and some of the major sociopolitical implications of terrorism and counterterrorism discourses and practices. The labeling of the September 2001 events as acts of terrorism has allowed the (re)framing of a discourse that has been uncritically accepted and widely reproduced across different genres up to the point of it becoming one of the principal security discourses at the global level. The starting point of this work is that the framing of the September 11, 2001 events as “terrorism” results from a deliberate choice, and it is not an explication of “the Truth.” Indeed, framing these events as terrorism was not a natural act, nor it was neutral and alternative framings could have been possible (e.g., “acts of international crime”) but were not even taken into consideration. Larsen argues that when something is considered rational, it is because it is “only the expression of the temporary hegemony of a particular political discourse.”<sup>13</sup> This insight is important as it indicates that understandings of terrorism are shaped by a temporary and constructed hegemony of understanding of “what terrorism is” in interaction with other discourses on security, threat, religion, and identity. Furthermore, and crucially, different constructions bring with them different kinds of actions.

In the last 6 years, analyses on the communicative aspect of terrorism and counterterrorism have rapidly grown. Still, the limited quantity of analyses devoted to the

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<sup>13</sup> H. Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* (London: Routledge, 1997), 22.

discourse on terrorism and its sociopolitical effects illustrates that much more work remains to be done. The present analysis is carried out through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA), a mode of research traditionally associated with the academic field of applied linguistics. According to CDA, there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social structures; language is viewed as a social practice, and discourse is seen as contributing to the construction of the social world. At the same time, discourses are seen as constituted by other social practices.<sup>14</sup> This chapter first analyzes some of the main features of the political discourse on terrorism interlinked with the counterterrorism discourse as first instantiated under the Bush administration. It then focuses on the appropriation of the US-led discourse by the Kenyan government as well as on some of its major implications going beyond the formulation and acceptance of the counterterrorism strategy known as the War on Terror. Its main aim is to contribute to further opening a critical space of reflection in seeing “terrorism” primarily as a discourse and to underline some of the effects deriving from the appropriation of the discourse.

## 2.2 Norms and Institutions

There are no universally accepted definitions of norms and institutions. Peter Katzenstein has defined norms as ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity’.<sup>15</sup> Although norms are shared understandings, it is the interests and preferences of hegemonic states that determine their shape. In this sense, African and

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<sup>14</sup> N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, ed. T. van Dijk (London: Sage, 1997), 258–284.

<sup>15</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.

Asian states and peoples are consumers rather than shapers of global norms.<sup>16</sup> However, once established, norms are expected to constrain the behaviour of the strong and the weak alike. As international actors interact, they generate new norms, but the actors and their practices are products of older norms.

Robert Keohane suggests that institutions 'can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time'. He argues that institutions must possess certain characteristics, namely 'persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles'.<sup>17</sup> Hedley Bull defines institutions as 'a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals'.<sup>18</sup> He sees institutions as 'an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions – and at the same a means of sustaining this collaboration'. These institutions include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and 'the managerial system of the great powers'.

The above definitions use the term institution in two senses. In the first, an institution is a stable set of rules, principles and norms. In this case, state sovereignty, diplomacy, international law and multilateralism are institutions. These are *primary* institutions. In a second sense,<sup>19</sup> an institution is a formal organization or a regime. Multilateral organizations that meet this definition include the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). There is a

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<sup>16</sup> Samuel m Makinda "Global terrorism versus Norms and institutions in Africa and Asia", *Identity, Culture and Politics, Volume 3, Number 1, July 2002*

<sup>17</sup> Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), 1988, p. 383.

<sup>18</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London, Macmillan, 1995 [1977]), 2nd edn., p. 71.

<sup>19</sup> For one of the best collections on the laws of war, see A. Roberts and R. Guelff, *Documents on the Laws of War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), 4th edn.

relationship between primary and secondary institutions: primary institutions underpin secondary institutions. For example, the UN, a secondary institution, is intelligible because it is based on multilateralism, a primary institution.

The important point about the relationship between primary and secondary institutions is that international actors attach meaning and significance to international organizations only because they are familiar with the primary institutions on which these organizations are constructed. The most relevant regional and sub-regional institutions that deal with terrorism in East Africa are the African Union (AU) and its Algiers Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT), IGAD's ICPAT, the Eastern African Police Chiefs Organization (EAPCCO), and the East African Community (EAC). The AU has adopted a broad-based continental normative framework to combat terrorism, with its 2002 plan of action calling for member states to promote policies aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism identified in the UN Strategy (e.g., poverty and social and economic marginalization).<sup>20</sup> These instruments stress that counterterrorism measures should not infringe on human rights or undermine the rule of law. The continent's robust regional normative framework, however, has yet to be implemented by many AU members. Competing priorities within the AU Peace and Security Commission and differing perceptions of the threat among its members, as well as lack of resources, have so far limited its contributions in this area. Only 37 AU member states have ratified the 1999 OAU convention, and the 2004 AU Plan of Action is not yet in force due to a lack of ratifications.<sup>21</sup> There are significant challenges to effective cooperative action to counter terrorism in East Africa, including severe intra- and interstate conflict, increasing

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<sup>20</sup> See paragraph 10(e) of the 2002 Plan of Action.

<sup>21</sup> Eric Rossand, Alistair Millar and Jason Ipe, *Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa. Ceter on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.*

radicalization, lack of state capacity, competing priorities, and political sensitivity surrounding the very notion of counterterrorism itself. To date, most counterterrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law enforcement measures to the near exclusion, even at times to the detriment, of longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

### **2.3 Critical Analysis of the concept of Terrorism**

More than ten years have passed since the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, but still today terrorism and counterterrorism shape public discussions and governmental agendas. Over the last years, terrorism has been a ubiquitous topic of discussion on television programs, newspapers, academic publications, children books, university's seminars, Facebook pages, and blogs.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the terrorism threat remains very alive in public perceptions. "Terrorism" is a pervasive discourse with diffuse effects on many aspects of the public and private lives of individuals, and it conditions many dimensions of contemporary life. The presumed objectivity of the discourse, facilitated by the live media representation of the collapse of the Twin Towers, facilitates an impression of impartial truth toward which there is no room for discussion. Although loaded with assumptions, cultural biases, and moral charges, "terrorism" is often used uncritically and unreflectively with far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, the domestic repercussions of counterterrorism—including massive restrictions on freedoms, a general erosion of public morality, and a growing "Islamophobia"—are still central points of contention in public discussions.

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<sup>22</sup> Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*. Cambridge University Press, 2006

What is striking when approaching terrorism is its extraordinary level of consistency among different genres, spaces, and times. The same set of words and linguistic constructions is used, reproduced, and finally naturalized to the point of becoming common sense. Indeed, to understand the events of September 11, 2001 as “terrorism” has become so evident, clear, and true that the fact of putting it under discussion is unthinkable. In the words of Zulaika and Douglass, “terrorism is so ‘real’ that it requires no frame, so ‘true’ that no interpretation is necessary, so ‘concrete’ that no meaning need to be inferred.”<sup>23</sup>

In this study, terrorism is not approached as an ontologically stable and objective phenomenon that can be uncritically examined. Rather, the same notion of terrorism is put under critical scrutiny, and the consequences of its use are analyzed. To this purpose, critical discourse analysis (CDA) seems to be an ideal framework to address the importance of analyzing the terrorism discourse and its implications. CDA is a research agenda aimed both at providing an analysis of discourses and discerning connections between language and other elements in social life that are often opaque.<sup>24</sup> In CDA, discourses are seen not as neutral ways of describing the world, but as ways of reproducing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society. Discourse is intended as “a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.”<sup>25</sup> Indeed, particular attention is devoted to the relation between language and power. The analytical part of this article is based on a textual analysis of data collected from policy documents and statements and various media

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<sup>23</sup> J. Zulaika and W. E. Douglass, *Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 5

<sup>24</sup> N. Fairclough, “Analysing Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Research” (London: Routledge, 2003).

<sup>25</sup> N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 64.

extracts, as well as academics and religious leaders. However, Access to official documents and information on government practices and data on incidents is not easy—a difficulty that reflects and reproduces the securitization of “Islamism,” “radicalism,” and “terrorism”. Given the sensitive nature of such phenomena, many institutions have no interest in releasing documents or information on terrorism and related issues.

#### **2.4 American Political Discourse on Terrorism**

The terrorism discourse (re)framed in the aftermath of the 2001 events can be approached as an “Othering discourse” in which Americans’ positive attributes are contrasted with the negativity of the Muslims’ negative culture . Through an analysis of the naming practices and lexical choices used in the representation of events, it emerges that the September 11, 2001 events are represented primarily in terms of violent encounters between “evils, enemies of freedom” (“terrorists”) and an innocent civilized country (“America”). Van Dijk’s notions of “positive self-presentation” and “negative other-presentation” are particularly useful here. In the discourse under analysis, there is a clear polarization between us (Americans, Westerners) and them (terrorists, Arabs, Muslim fundamentalists)<sup>26</sup>. The following statements by Bush are illustrative:

“Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.<sup>27</sup> These terrorists kill not merely to end lives,

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<sup>26</sup> Valentina Bartoluci. *Security vs Liberty : The Discourses on terrorism in the united states and Morocco and its societal effects*, 2014

<sup>27</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 2001).

but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.”

Opposite to the “enemy” “barbarism,” “cruelty,” “cowardice,” and “evilness,” stand the American “fabulous values.” In many fragments of the discourse, the enemy is characterized by its only desire of spreading violence and hate:

“I think terrorists will kill innocent life in order to try to get the world to cower. I think—these are coldblooded killers. I mean, they’ll kill innocent people to try to shake our will. . . . They have not only killed in Spain; they have killed in the United States; they have killed in Turkey; they have killed in Saudi Arabia. They kill wherever they can.<sup>28</sup> The terrorists’ only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death. This terrorist enemy will never be appeased, because death is their banner and their cause. Their barbarism cannot be appeased, and their hatred cannot be satisfied.”

The “us versus them” polarization reached the highest point in Bush’s “you’re either with us or against us” speech.<sup>29</sup> Such polarization dividing the moral “us” versus the immoral “them” oversimplifies a very complex topic, reducing it to a broad binary opposition using condensational symbols. No middle ground is possible—indeed, organizations become either “not terrorist” or “terrorist,” and people are either on the side of terrorism or against it. This dichotomous form is expressed through language such as “extremist,” “coward,” or “vicious,” which pejoratively places “terrorists” in the category

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<sup>28</sup> Remarks following discussions with Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende of the 695 Netherlands and an exchange with reporters, 16/3/04.

<sup>29</sup> G. W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point” 705 (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 2002). <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html> Retrieved on 28 may 2015



of “evildoers.” “Their” actions are invariably denoted as brutal and destructive, and the perpetrators dehumanized (“cowards,” “hiding in caves,” “without hearth and conscience”)

The representation of the other as “evil” brings with it the consequence that solutions based on negotiations are not even taken into consideration. In all public speeches covering the issue of terrorism, the attention is exclusively devoted to so-called Islamic terrorism, completely neglecting other “terrorisms” and failing to acknowledge such problematic notions. As it will be further clarified in the next section, this has sociopolitical effects. For instance, as pointed out also by Ahmed, “the fact that all 19 of the hijackers were Muslims appeared to condemn by association every Muslim on the planet. Any expression of Muslim identity risked the fear of being suspected as ‘terrorist’ activity.”<sup>30</sup> The governmental discourse on terrorism is deeply characterized by the terminological linkages between “terrorism,” “radicalism,” and “Islam/ism.” The imprecise use of “Islam,” “Islamism,” “(Islamist/ic) terrorism,” and “clash of civilization” is not a recent feature of the political discourse, but the 2001 events have surely exacerbated them, and, as a consequence, suspicion toward the Muslim world has also increased. Although suspicion toward the Muslim world by Christian Europe can be found from the time Islam appeared, it is after the 2001 events that the link between “Islam” and “terrorism” emerged as the central concern of states all around the world.

Political discussions around “Islam” and “terrorism,” initially associated with Samuel Huntington’s widely cited but increasingly discredited *The Clash of Civilizations*,<sup>31</sup> demonized Islam and linked it to catastrophic images of ongoing terrorist attacks. Later,

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<sup>30</sup> A. Ahmed, *Islam Under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

that general argument came to be modified by a more precise line of thought that asserted that terrorism was not generically derived from Islam, but from a particular interpretation of it—that of *Wahhabi Islam*, a strict Sunni interpretation prevalent in Saudi Arabia. A deluge of stereotypes, such as the vision of the West as secular, advanced, and civilized in contraposition to a Muslim and Arab world seen as barbaric, permeated discussions around terrorism. This pervasiveness of stereotypes could be found in all domains. While Mamdani has analyzed the link between Islam and terrorism in the media coverage, this construction has been widely echoed beyond media circles.<sup>32</sup>

The prevalent distinction in the discourse is not located between terrorist and national population but between “bad Muslims” and the “good ones”. In the discourse, “false” Islam is represented as a dictatorial faith demanding and receiving absolute submission from all adherents and set in contrast to Judaism and Christianity, perceived as allowing free and individual experiences of faith for their adherents.<sup>33</sup> (“False”) Muslims are violent just in function of their faith—a faith that is constantly associated with violence and understood as antithetical to modern secular democratic systems. Woods has reported that “in the first days after the 9/11 attacks, many commentators and public officials framed the conflict in religious terms.” In a very different context, such as the Moroccan one, King Mohammed often reiterates the distinction between “good” Islam, identified in the *Maliki* School, and the “bad” one, of Saudi influence, that needs to be ostracized.<sup>34</sup> As further analyzed below, such semantic mixes and assumptions not only hamper a detached

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<sup>32</sup> M. Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 766–775.

<sup>33</sup> T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

<sup>34</sup> Valentina Bartoluci. *Security vs Liberty : The Discourses on terrorism in the united states and Morocco and its societal effects*, 2014

understanding of these phenomena but also have important political implications. One of the consequences of the discourse has been that Islamists, “radical” or not, have ended up being considered as potential terrorists because perceived as vulnerable to the appeal of violent propaganda.

## **2.5 Kenyan Discourse on Terrorism**

In the Kenyan context, “terrorism” is solely understood as “Islamist terrorism,” and “radicalism” is seen as one of the primary causes of terrorism. The assumption that, radicalization leads to terrorism is common in public governmental debates. A direct link is made between terrorism as perpetuated by “radicalized Islamists” and the necessity of strengthening security and control measures against them. The same can be noted with regard to the association between fundamentalism and Islam. This can be considered another clear case of public narrative influencing the policy formulation process. It is commonly acknowledged by governmental officials that “terrorist violence” attracted poor people with very little who can easily get entangled in the mysticism around Islam, which makes them willing to do anything in order to get to paradise.<sup>35</sup> The discourses on poverty, religion, and violence are clearly mixed. In such a statement, the assumption that poverty is a factor causally linked to the radicalization of individuals and to terrorism is reiterated.

Kenya’s geography and geographic location contribute to making Kenya an attractive terrorist target. Kenya’s strategic location makes it a significant gateway from the Middle East and South Asia to East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Because it is a

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<sup>35</sup> Daily Nation, October 1, 2013. <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Terrorists-target-unemployed-youth-says-William-Ruto/-/1056/2014568/-/6bunyrz/-/index.html>. Retrieved on 28 May 2015

geographical gateway, Kenya has developed a major seaport at Mombasa, international airports in Mombasa and Nairobi, and extensive rail, road, and communications infrastructure throughout the country.<sup>36</sup> In addition, Kenya is relatively easy to enter and travel within undetected, because of its porous borders shared with its five neighbors, and its long, largely unmonitored coastline. This combination of infrastructure and porous borders makes Kenya an attractive target and an easy conduit for terrorist-related materiel, activities, and transit points. The Kenyan coastal region is widely inhabited by Arabs who have strong historical and cultural ties with the Arabs in the Middle East. Because of the common religion and language, terrorists can easily blend into the coastal community. For example, Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed operated from Siyu Island in the Lamu district on the Kenyan coast for a long time without the authorities detecting him<sup>37</sup>. Kenya's political stability since independence, combined with its geostrategic importance, has led it to be recognized by Western countries as a major hub for economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities for the East African and Horn of Africa region. The United States has maintained military access agreements with the government of Kenya that permits the US military use of Kenyan sea and air bases for the past several decades. These facilities helped provide humanitarian assistance in the early 1990s to Somalia and Sudan and to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide and served as a power-projection platform to the Persian Gulf region.

In contrast, political instability in the neighboring country of Somalia enables expansion of terrorist interest into Somalia and, thus, into Kenya. For example, Somalia's collapse in 1991 tremendously affected Kenya's security. The lack of an effective

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<sup>36</sup> Hared H Adan, *Combating transnational terrorism in Kenya*, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2005.

<sup>37</sup> Mutinga, Murithi. 2004. How Terrorist Attack was Planned and Executed. *The East Africa Sunday Standard*, Nairobi, 27 November.

government in Somalia for the last 25 years has allowed unimpeded movement of terrorists across the common border. Somalia's collapse brought an influx of Somali refugees into Kenya, allowing terrorists to blend in with the refugees, move freely across the border, and easily import terrorism into Kenya. Poverty and widespread unemployment have made Kenyan youths vulnerable to indoctrination and recruitment for terrorist activities. Violent extremists demonstrated on Westgate attack and in subsequent plots that they seek to kill large numbers of Kenyan citizens domestically. Al-shabab leadership has sanctioned the use of violence against innocent people and pursued the strategy of segregating Kenyan citizens based on religion to stoke conflict. Moreover, the attacks showed violent extremists' willingness to commit suicide while attacking thus makes them difficult to deter. These characteristics make violent extremism the most dangerous terrorist threat to Kenya and the region.

Kenya's North Eastern region emerged as a distinct administrative entity dominated by ethnic Somalis after independence. It is, by most accounts, the worst victim of unequal development. A history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services, have combined to produce some of the country's bleakest socio-economic and political conditions.<sup>38</sup> Homegrown terrorism is a major national security threat to countries in Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century because of the combination of violent extremist ideology—especially violent extremism and its suicidal terrorism—with the Internet accelerating an individual's radicalization and the proliferation of technology enabling an individual to cause mass casualties or widespread disruption. In other words, the scope of

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<sup>38</sup> International Crisis Group, Kenya Somali Islamist Radicalization. Africa Briefing No.85. 25<sup>th</sup> January 2012

the insider threat to the region in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is virtually unprecedented. An individual, segregated within his or her own community of sympathizers, can potentially radicalize to violent extremism and then utilize modern technology to kill millions of people or hobble critical infrastructure. This insider threat requires a greater emphasis on preventing potentially catastrophic attacks before they occur. Violent extremists demonstrated on Westgate attack and in subsequent plots that they seek to kill large numbers of Kenyan citizens domestically, and Al-shabab leadership has sanctioned the use and pursued the strategy of segregating Kenyan citizens based on religion to stoke conflict. Moreover, the attacks showed violent extremists' willingness to commit suicide while attacking thus makes them difficult to deter. These characteristics make violent extremism the most dangerous terrorist threat to Kenya and the region.

In the 1998 American embassy bombing of Kenya and Tanzania, the attackers came from outside each of the country. Later on home grown terrorists have taken an active role in subsequent attacks. A case in point is the latest Garissa University attack where Kenyans were the lead planners and executioners of the attack. The attacks on Westgate Mall on 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2013 and Garissa university attack on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015 heightened Kenya's consciousness to the threat posed by home grown violent extremism groups. Most youth have joined radical groups or movements in order to voice what they perceive as grievances ranging from: the prevalence of poverty, perception by the local population that they were being marginalised by successive governments, low level of education, weak legal system, religious intolerance, and lack of inclusivity. The state being the main target of the grievances they hold, the group's main agenda therefore is to bring political, social and economic change; radicalization therefore provides a platform and a vehicle to pursue

this agenda. Islamic radical groups have managed to package themselves as an alternative to mainstream democracy/democratic governments. While religious Islamic ideological arguments are advanced to challenge government on their failures to provide a utopian perfect system, the underlying theme of all groups have been political in nature more so in Kenya.

The causes of terrorism in Africa are located in the contradictions of domestic political economy and the asymmetrical nature of the international system. For the former, these include poor governance epitomized by systemic corruption, rising poverty, unemployment, inequality and the near-total collapse of social services and infrastructural facilities.<sup>39</sup>The UN Resolution 1373 requires all member states to enact counter-terrorism legislation. The Islamic radicalization that is observable in many Muslim societies has its roots in revivalist movements that emerged in the 1950s.<sup>40</sup> Kenyan Muslims are no exception; they have become more observant, and a small portion has become radicalized. The Kenyan Muslim community— 4.3 million of the country's 38.6 million population according to the 2009 census – has been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the best supported of which has been Wahhabism.

Al-Shabaab's swift rise to relative dominance in southern Somalia since early 2009 has added to concerns about radicalization in Kenya and beyond. Despite recent military setbacks, growing internal schisms and public backlash, it remains a major threat to Somalia's and the region's security and stability. Since 2010, it has built a formidable and secretive support infrastructure in Kenya. A tiny, but highly radicalized, close-knit and

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<sup>39</sup> J Shola Omotola, *Assessing counter-terrorism measures in Africa: Implications for human rights and national security*

<sup>40</sup> Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°37, *Understanding Islamism*, 2 March 2005.

secretive Salafi Jihadi fringe looks up to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation (*marja'iyah*), supports its “jihad”, funnels money and recruits<sup>41</sup> and is the primary agent of radicalization. Even without the physical threat posed by Al-Shabaab, Kenya would have to contend with this small but dangerous, homegrown threat. Al-Shabaab radicalizers and recruiters have for some time been actively looking beyond the Somali community for potential jihadists and in line with its regional agenda, Kenya’s (and Tanzania’s) coastal Muslims are an increasingly important target. There is growing evidence to suggest that attacks in North Eastern Province are joint operations of Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadists. Swahili members are easily able to evade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by Kenyan security officers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali looking.

Kenya is now officially home to over 500,000 refugees from Somalia. This will increase as more victims of the famine and conflict there cross the border. The Dadaab refugee camps in the north east are severely overcrowded. Set up some twenty years ago to host 90,000, they are today one of the world’s biggest refugee settlements, with a population of over 462,970.<sup>42</sup> This influx has imposed tremendous security concerns for the Kenyan government and there are no easy solutions. The country has acceded to the 1951 refugees convention, so is obliged to offer refuge and protection to those fleeing conflict. Documentation is a big problem and a large but unknown number have obtained Kenyan documentation illegally, largely due to corruption, but also because it is often difficult to distinguish between Kenyan ethnics and other Somalis. The more the

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<sup>41</sup> “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)”, S/2011/ 433, 18 July 2011, pp. 140-179; “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)”, S/2010/91, 10 March 2010, pp. 25-35

<sup>42</sup> [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)



authorities tighten procedures for passports and national identity cards – often by adding new vetting layers – the more difficult it becomes for bona fide citizens to acquire these important documents.

The bureaucratic hurdles many young Kenyan Somalis face is a source of anger often exploited by radical Islamist groups. Another concern is the movement of Somali refugees into Nairobi and Mombasa. The Somali population of Eastleigh, originally an Asian neighbourhood, is now estimated at over 100,000. While most Kenyan Somalis no longer identify more with Somalia and even see some progress in their inclusion into society, Nairobi's counter-terrorism policies are alienating some of them as well as other Muslims.<sup>43</sup> The government has greatly increased its capabilities, with substantial foreign help. Since 11 September 2001, Kenya has actively assisted Western efforts to identify, arrest and detain suspected terrorists. This became very significant with the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) in Somalia in December 2006, when Kenyan officials arrested and detained more than 150 individuals fleeing that country, a number of whom were ultimately handed over to Ethiopian military forces. This policy was extremely unpopular among Kenyan Somalis and Muslims in general. In part due to lack of resources, government's counter-terrorism efforts continue to focus on policing and border security, rather than programs designed for counter-radicalization or de-radicalization of those who have joined radical groups.

The war against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular and Muslims in general. Kenyans have historically been suspicious of the Somali community. Police harassment and

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<sup>43</sup> International Crisis Group, Kenya Somali Islamist Radicalization. Africa Briefing No.85. 25<sup>th</sup> January 2012

discrimination in the name of “Global War on Terror” continues among other prejudicial deep-rooted trends dating back to the Shifita War. Somalis are often without distinction labeled “Al-Shabaab”.<sup>44</sup> Hostility toward them is exacerbated by their commercial success in Nairobi and other major urban areas, as well as their assumed but unproven association with piracy, extremism and terrorism. Though the governments has repeatedly urged Kenyans not to stereotype or discriminate against Somalis, politicians’ statements and media rhetoric risk further demonizing them. The government must develop effective, long-term strategies for both counter-radicalization and de-radicalization, because extremism will continue to be a problem long after the physical threat of terrorism subsides. Radicalization presents a threat to Kenya’s security and stability. Formulating sound policies and then tackling it head on before it is too late needs to be a priority.

The Garissa University College attack on April 2<sup>nd</sup> 2015 that resulted in the massacre of 147 innocent students remains the gravest Al-shabab attack on Kenyans. In its statement following the attack, Al-Shabaab claimed it acted to avenge atrocities it alleges have been committed by the Kenyan military deployed in Somalia. “When our men arrived, they released the Muslims. We are holding others hostage,”<sup>45</sup> said Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage. Furthermore, trying to sow domestic divisions in Kenya, Al-Shabaab claimed it was taking revenge for historic injustices against Muslims in the country. It hopes in this way to prompt the usual draconian responses from the government that would further embed the narrative of an anti-Islamic Christian government and gain more recruits. It also claimed that it spared Muslims in the Garissa

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<sup>44</sup> Guled Mohammed, “Hounding Somalis hurts terror fight”, *The Star*, 2 November 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Daily nation, Thursday April 2 2015, “Alshabaab militant claim responsibility for Garissa University attack” <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/-Garissa-University-attack-Shabaab/-/1107872/2673832/-/dwvrhdz/-/index.html> retrieved on 29 may 2015

attack, echoing directives on minimizing Muslim deaths most recently heard from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab still killed Muslims at the university. In Somalia, almost all of its victims are Muslims. President Kenyatta's immediate statement that extremists are deeply embedded in Kenya is significant. The statement, as well as the fact that the government offered a ten-day amnesty to all youth who have joined Al-Shabaab, is a new acknowledgement of the home-grown threat. Since the 1998 al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, and a second al-Qaeda attack that hit Mombasa in 2002, the government has consistently downplayed the home-grown threat and blamed extremism on outsiders. Extremism in the country thrives on a groundswell of Muslims grievances radicalized by wider global trends and writings

The political response to this latest attack has been mixed. National and county governments acknowledge their shared duty to combat the threat and preserve national unity. However, the financial freeze of 86 bank accounts of named individuals, companies, and NGOs looks more like political score-settling than thorough counter-terrorist action. Much more radically, senior Kenyan Somali politicians and county leadership have called for the closure of Dadaab, one of the world's biggest refugee camps, between Garissa and the Somali border

## **2.6 Conclusion.**

The exceptional measures adopted throughout the world to fight against terrorism have contributed to a climate that has certainly caused more violence than enabled its reduction. Indeed, the elite political representation of terrorism has led to a logic that encourages

hostility and to a generalized suspicion resulting in a generalized violence preventively adopted to fight against terrorism. Al-Shabaab has kept its promise to bring the war to Kenya, whether by its own hand or local affiliates and by sowing divisions in a nation still not at ease with itself. The deeply politicized response of Kenya's ruling elites has been most alarming and publicly applauded by Al-Shabaab. Kenya's leadership has been unable to produce a convincing national strategy, content to score short-term political points over their opponents with complete disregard for allaying fears and tensions between Kenyans of different ethnicities and faiths. Corrupt government officers and citizens remains Kenyas biggest hindrances to registering any much needed substantial gains on the war on terror.

## CHAPTER THREE

### TERRORISM IN NE KENYA: MARGINALIZATION OR RADICALIZATION

#### 3.1 Introduction

Since attaining political independence in 1963, Kenya has been grappling with the persistent problem of unbalanced regional development. Through various policies and interventions, the government has tried to reverse the discriminative effects of colonial policies that had created wide disparities and imbalances between regions. However, after decades of experimenting with different economic and social policies, regional disparities and imbalances in economic, social and political development still persist. Wide disparities also exist between urban and rural areas, with 85 per cent of all poor people living in rural areas while the majority of the urban poor live in slums and peri-urban settlements.<sup>46</sup>

While 93 per cent of adult women in North Eastern Province had no education at all, only 3 per cent of adult women in Central Province had never been to school. These disparities, while narrowing, continue today: only 19 per cent of eligible girls in North Eastern Province were enrolled in primary school in 2005/06, against 87 per cent in Central Province. Differences between urban and rural conditions are similarly striking, with urban households much more likely to have access to health care, schools and piped water than those in rural areas.<sup>47</sup> About 74 per cent of people living in North Eastern Province are poor, against only 30 per cent of those in Central Province.<sup>48</sup> The high

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<sup>46</sup> Society for International Development (SID) (2006), *Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives*.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

poverty rate of people of North Eastern Province makes them exceptionally vulnerable to weather and price shocks.

The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on longstanding grievances against the central state. This problem has grown more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late must be a priority.<sup>49</sup> It would be a profound mistake, however, to view the challenge solely through a counterterrorism lens. Kenya's North Eastern Province emerged as a distinct administrative entity dominated by ethnic Somalis after independence. It is, by most accounts, the worst victim of unequal development.<sup>50</sup> A history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services, have combined to produce some of the country's bleakest socio-economic and political conditions.

### **3.2 Historical Perspective of Marginalization in NE Kenya**

The dilemma concerning regional disparities, economic inequalities and marginalization in Kenya are more complex and paradoxical than common discussions have been able to capture and that the "so-called" causes and the suggested policy

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<sup>49</sup> Crisis Group Africa Report N°45, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, 23 May 2002; Andre Le Sage, "Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 27, no. 89 (September 2001).

<sup>50</sup> Hamsa Omar and Sarah McGregor, "Somali rebels threaten to carry out attacks against Kenya", 28 February 2011.

remedies leave a lot to be desired. The current literature assumes a commonality of interests on a regional and/or ethnic basis. The literature also assumes that inequalities, marginalization and other disparities only occur across ethnic groups and regions, and hence intra-regional or intra-ethnic disparities, inequalities and marginalization are not studied. Another assumption is that when one is elected or appointed to a key position in government, such an appointment is a benefit to the entire community or region to which the appointee belongs. The formation of a Somali nation state from the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia raised the issue of the status of Somali inhabited areas in neighbouring states, including the Northern Frontier District of British Kenya. Although the majority opinion in the Northern Frontier District favoured secession, the Regional Boundaries Commission, set up in 1962, recommended that the predominantly Somali inhabited areas remain in Kenya as the North Eastern Province.<sup>51</sup> Kenya's Somalis saw this as betrayal. They boycotted the 1963 elections to select the government that would take over from the British after independence on 12 December and began a rebellion.

An acute sense of injustice and anger at the colonial fiat nourished a Somali perception that they had no stake in independent, multicultural and "Christian" Kenya. This triggered a series of armed irredentist insurrections in the early 1960s that came to be known as the Shifita War. Newly independent Kenya sent in its security forces, which brutally suppressed the rebellion, and declared a state of emergency in the province that lasted for almost 30 years.<sup>52</sup> The Shifita War was Kenya's invisible conflict, waged in a remote corner when human rights reporting were in its infancy and mass media was state controlled. The rest of the country was unaware of much of its horrors or did not care at all.

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<sup>51</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.

<sup>52</sup> Responsibility was transferred from the foreign to the colonial office in 1902, Ian M. Lewis, *A Modern History*, *op. cit.*

A highly sanitized official account cast the conflict as one between a treacherous community of *shifia* (bandits), backed by Somalia, and a new nation striving to create a democratic, just and multi-ethnic society.<sup>53</sup> Mogadishu portrayed it as a struggle by an oppressed people to regain freedom and rejoin *Somaliweyn* (Greater Somalia). The war left a powerful legacy that continues to disfigure politics, perception and discourse. Its history and aftermath have given rise to instrumentalised narratives – by one side to radicalize, by the other to justify policies of exclusion and repression.<sup>54</sup>

The insurgency was ended through military means, with no formal peace agreement or closure to the grievances. Many underlying political issues were left to fester, with neither dialogue nor reconciliation. Consequently, no meaningful disarmament took place. Hostilities simply assumed a different character and turned internecine. Remnants of the rebellion regrouped into armed gangs engaged in highway banditry, livestock theft and poaching. The criminality served as Nairobi's justification to maintain emergency laws and continue brutal security operations. The Somalis considered the latter to be motivated by a desire to “deal with unfinished business”; the period is symbolized for them by the 1984 Wagalla Massacre, in which hundreds if not thousands were killed during an operation to seize weapons.<sup>55</sup> To many, the sense of anger, helplessness and alienation generated by the post-war security operations was worse than during the conflict itself.

While much of Kenya suffered varying degrees of misrule, especially under Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi, few regions have been as badly governed

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.

<sup>55</sup> Crisis Group interview, civic leader, Wajir, North Eastern Province, September 2011. The current Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya is investigating gross human rights abuses it calls the North Eastern Massacres (including the Wagalla Massacre) committed in the 1970s and 1980s.



as North Eastern Province.<sup>56</sup> The process to extend the central government's writ over the troubled region was gradual and complicated by history, its huge size, arid geography, dispersed population, insecurity and lack of infrastructure. The first rudimentary civilian administration took shape in 1965 and then only after hefty allowances were promised to the first wave of officials, soon to be absorbed into a new department called the Provincial Administration. Most in the top tier – the Provincial Commissioner, district commissioners and district officers – were not natives of the province, and central Kenyans were overrepresented. The thinking was that posting civil servants and other administrators outside their home regions would foster national cohesion and patriotism.<sup>57</sup> This ideal was undermined by growing nepotism and an unofficial policy of sending troublesome administrators to the region as punishment. In those early days, many officials lacked education and training.

In North Eastern Province, state neglect continued, living standards deteriorated and repression and insecurity worsened. The security services continued to perpetrate abuses, including the Wagalla Massacre, but a subtle change began in 1982.<sup>58</sup> A coup by junior Luo and Kikuyu military officers, most from the air force, was foiled by loyalist soldiers under the command of an ethnic Somali army major, Mohamoud Mohamed Barrow.<sup>59</sup> He was promoted, put in charge of a revamped air force and soon appointed chief of general staff, becoming in a short time one of Moi's most trusted allies and a key beneficiary of his vast patronage system. Moi had other aims beyond rewarding a loyal officer and his

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<sup>56</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

<sup>58</sup> Crisis Group interview, civic leader, Wajir, North Eastern Province, September 2011. The current Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya is investigating gross human rights abuses it calls the North Eastern Massacres (including the Wagalla Massacre) committed in the 1970s and 1980s.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid

family. He was feeling increasingly insecure. An underground political movement, Mwakenya, was fomenting unrest in the universities. Domestic and international pressure for political reforms, especially an end to the one-party model, was mounting. To shore up his position and maximize support, he reached out to previously marginalized communities, including by appointing some of their leaders to key posts.<sup>60</sup> Subsequent political developments, notably the decision to adopt the multiparty system in 1991, made Moi even keener to court Somalis. Leaders of the newly-emergent political parties had the same idea.

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 diminished Nairobi's fears of a cross-border conflict or a foreign-sponsored rebellion, allowing Moi greater ambition and flexibility in his Somali outreach within the province and beyond. Keen to project himself as a regional statesman, he used North Eastern Province connections to convince Somali leaders to accept Kenya as a venue for their 2002-2004 peace negotiation (first in Eldoret, then Mbagathi). He also forged close business links with Somali tycoons. His outreach strategy collapsed around 2002, when he began actively campaigning for Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president, to succeed him. The province voted overwhelmingly for the opposition, led by Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki, and Kibaki became the next president.

The Kibaki administration has been more sensitive to the province's needs. The modest steps taken have been well received by the public. Much of the change in popular attitudes is due to the "soft" style adopted, even though it has not delivered on almost all campaign promises, most notably restitution for past injustices and addressing underdevelopment. An affirmative action education policy has increased the number of students from the region at public universities, and a northern Kenya development ministry

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid

has been created, but not well funded. Controversy still simmers over the 2009 census, which allegedly undercounted the Somali population. There are also hard to substantiate claims that Kenya continues to support the U.S.'s extraordinary-rendition policy. Finding a credible solution to past abuses, such as the Wagalla Massacre, and addressing concerns about the census and counterterrorism policies would help advance healing and normalization in the province, but the intervention in Somalia complicates this process.<sup>61</sup>

### **3.3 Economic growth and development- Marginalization?**

Marginalization has persisted in some regions of Kenya thanks to aspects of colonial legacy, historical injustices and the uneven allocation of resources since independence. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 was anchored on a strategy of investing resources in high potential areas with high economic returns to attain rapid economic growth. Though the sessional paper also called for people-centred expenditure regimes that would uplift the provision of health care and education in marginalized areas of Kenya, marginalization has remained malignant in some regions of the country; despite the 1965 policy declarations of intent.<sup>62</sup> In spite of aridity and all the poor characteristics of this region, the North is a significant contributor to Kenya's fiscal strength. The ASAL area accounts for 50-70 percent of the country's livestock production and is home to 90 percent of the wild game that sustains the tourism industry (GoK 2006). The following estimates from the

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<sup>61</sup> Crisis Group interview, civic leader, Wajir, North Eastern Province, September 2011. The current Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya is investigating gross human rights abuses it calls the North Eastern Massacres (including the Wagalla Massacre) committed in the 1970s and 1980s.

<sup>62</sup> Sifuna, D.N (2007). The challenge of increasing access and improving quality: An analysis of universal primary education interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since 1970s. In *International Review of Education* (2007) 53: 687-699.

International Institute for Environment and Development (2004) provide an indication of the contribution of pastoralism to the national economy:

**Table 1: Contribution of Pastoralism to National Economy**

Table 3: Estimates of contribution from pastoralism to the Kenyan national economy (2004) Contribution of agriculture sector to GDP	16%
Contribution of livestock to agriculture GDP	50%
Significance of indigenous cattle in national herds	75%
Significance of milk production - % of total national milk production	24%

*Source: IIED Issue paper No. 142*

Despite this, individual returns seem very low. The economic activities are incapable of sustaining livelihoods, as 13.3 percent of all adults in NE Kenya live on help from local and international NGOs. Attempts to settle pastoralists have made them less efficient in using the semi-desert terrains and more dependent on emergency relief food. While populations from other districts have diverse sources of income, NE region is largely dependent on livestock and do not exploit existent credit facilities. For example, only 4.5 percent of the poor and 1.1 percent of the non-poor sought credit in 2005, against a national average of 35 percent (KNBS, 2007).<sup>63</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Background paper prepared for Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010 by Sarah Jerop Ruto, Zipporah Nyamauncho Ongwenyi and John Kabutha Mugo: Educational Marginalization In Northern Kenya, 2009

The policies and politics in Kenya up to the 1990s largely perpetrated regional inequalities. The extent of alienation is such that populations in the North distance themselves from the rest of “*down Kenya*”. It has been analysed that the north was easy to ignore due to political expediency. Pastoralist populations lack in numbers for significant political capital. They cannot exert influence to swing votes in any election. As such, arid districts have been pitted on the losing end in terms of political power relations. A combination of both positive as well as self-serving reasons can be attributed to the warming up to the North. On the one hand increasing understanding and appreciation of the pastoral production system has resulted in efforts to meaningfully integrate the North in national development.<sup>64</sup> There is genuine concern to redress to socio-economic inequities still prevalent. But on the other hand the “minority groups” are now coming in handy when trying to inject diversity to the political arena. Parties that are primarily composed of singular ethnic groups woo Northern groups. There also seems to be preference to entrust key political positions to persons outside the dominant ethnicities that have shaped Kenyan politics.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, there is a growing view that recognises the untapped potential in the North. The north is advocated as the “new development frontier”, the gateway to Northern Africa that can expand the Kenyan economy that currently focuses on its Eastern and Southerly neighbours.

There are three main reasons why a nation should be concerned with marginalization within its borders. First, marginalization entrenches inequality in society thus dampening

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<sup>64</sup> Sifuna, D.N (2007). The challenge of increasing access and improving quality: An analysis of universal primary education interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since 1970s. In *International Review of Education* (2007) 53: 687-699.

<sup>65</sup> The Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba are some of the dominant ethnic groups and generally, each views the other with suspicion especially in key positions. The consensus is to reach out to others. The selection Chair of the Interim Independent Electoral commission is from a “minority tribe”.

poverty alleviation efforts. Second, the phenomenon pulls apart communities within society, thus creating tension and lowering growth and investment potential.<sup>66</sup> Finally, it is much harder to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth in communities with excessive social disparities and wide economic gaps. Unchecked marginalization tends to entrench inequalities when sharing resources and opportunities. This leads to social tensions, which if unchecked, will endanger national cohesion, possibly leading to violence and insecurity, and will threaten economic development in the long term.

The national expenditure on major roads in Kenya between 1990 and 2000 illustrates the inequity in resource allocation that can lead to marginalization. Nyanza and Western regions were minor beneficiaries in road infrastructure development for the above decade, while North Eastern, Eastern, Coast and Rift Valley have even less road densities. Marginalization arises from historical factors, natural resource endowments, cultural effects and policy choices. The national expenditure on the provision of piped water (2004) in Kenya further illustrates the skewed pattern of resource allocation in favour of some regions in Kenya, as shown in the same table.

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<sup>66</sup> Kiringai J. (2006). Public Spending in Kenya: An Inequality Perspective. In Readings on Inequality in Kenya, pp11-55, Society for International Development.

**Table 2: National Expenditure on major roads (1990/2000)**

Region	10 <sup>6</sup> Ksh	%	Road Density (Km/Km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>a</sup>	People using piped water(%) <sup>b</sup>
R/valley	3,148	27	0.34	24
Coast	2,747	23	0.26	53
Central	2,090	18	2.01	30
Eastern	1,970	17	0.25	27
Nyanza	1,067	09	1.82	09
Western	697	06	1.43	10
N/Eastern	17	0.1	0.10	07

*Source: Republic of Kenya (1999), Kenya Population Census, Republic of Kenya (2004), Statistical Abstracts.*

Multiple factors of poor infrastructure, low population density and limited institutional capacity cement low service delivery evident in the North. 95% of children in NEP are born at home, against a national average of 69.5%. Only 11.8% of infants in this province have an immunization card, against a national average of 63.7%. Nearly a third of all infants are underweight. In terms of sanitation, 55.1% of households in the arid districts have no access to toilet facilities, against a national average of 14.8%.<sup>67</sup> More than 50% of the population either draws water from unprotected wells (25.4%) (with notable exposure to contamination), or from rivers (25.6%). Only 5.7 percent of the households in the arid districts have access to piped water, and most of these are concentrated in the urban areas

<sup>67</sup> Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. (2009). Kenya population and Housing Census, 2009.

(KNBS, 2007). Low nutrition and poor access to medical and related services poses life-threatening challenges to the population.

The classification of disadvantaged districts shown in table 2 below (1999) correlates with current literacy and poverty indices. The current poverty levels (2009) for Garissa, Narok, Lamu and Kajiado are disproportionately low compared to the statistically computed education opportunity indices, while current literacy indices still remain below the national average (0.66).<sup>68</sup> The policy on marginalization in Kenya is patterned on the quality of life approach used to derive Human Development Index (HDIs). The most developed counties rank close to 1.0, while the least developed counties will have a County Development (CDI) of much lower than 1.0.

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<sup>68</sup> CRA Working Paper No.2012/01: Creating a county Development Index to identify marginalized counties,



**Table 3: Education opportunity indices for disadvantaged districts**

	<b>District</b>	<b>Opportunity index(1999)</b>	<b>Literacy index(2009)</b>	<b>Poverty Index(2009)</b>
1	Marsabit	0.019	0.26	79.3
2	Turkana	0.024	0.18	92.9
3	Wajir	0.024	0.26	84.4
4	Mandera	0.053	0.10	85.7
5	Garissa	0.056	0.52	54.5
6	Tana River	0.119	0.50	75.4
7	Samburu	0.599	0.29	77.7
8	Narok	0.893	0.41	33.7
9	West Pokot	1.111	0.47	68.7
10	Isiolo	1.155	0.60	63.1
11	Lamu	5.014	0.73	30.6
12	Kajiado	6.720	0.55	12.1
13	Kitui	8.426	0.64	62.5
14	Kilifi	8.889	0.68	66.9
15	Kwale	10.322	0.67	72.9

*Source: Report of the sub-committee of the admission board of the University of Nairobi On disadvantaged districts (1989).*

The human development index (HDI) has been criticized for the fact that its indicators do not take into account inequalities within countries. This has necessitated that the HDI be modified to suit local needs. The HDI is extensively used to determine the level of development both nationally and at regional level. The human development approach reinforces the importance of multidimensional assessment and analysis leading to policy formulation and revision, and fund allocation for human needs.<sup>69</sup> The use of HDI in assessing levels of development has brought to light disparities and broadened policy discussions by bringing in traditionally excluded perspectives (such as those of women, the poor, ethnic minorities, and people living with HIV/AIDS or with disabilities).

Human development reporting (HDRs) have brought life and additional credibility to the human development approach by adapting analytical and methodological tools to local circumstances. Many prominent national scholars and thinkers have been engaged in the application of the human development paradigm to local development challenges, especially in developing countries, with the support of UNDP. HDR innovations have contributed to the formulation of national human development policies.

### **3.4 Radicalization**

The radicalisation that is observable in many Muslim societies has its roots in revivalist movements that emerged in the 1950s. Kenyan Muslims are no exception. They have become more observant and a small portion has become radicalised.<sup>70</sup> The Kenyan Muslim community – 4.3 million of the country's 38.6 million population according to the 2009 census – has been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades,

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<sup>69</sup> Pagllani P. (2010). *Human Development Report Reports: Influence of regional, National and subnational HDRs*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*

much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the best supported of which has been Wahhabism.<sup>71</sup> Salafi radicalisation was gradual and unfolded in three distinct phases, each complementing the one before.<sup>72</sup> The first wave occurred in the late 1970s and coincided with Saudi Arabia's emergence as an oil power keen to export its brand of Islam. It was essentially theological and driven by an unstated proselytising agenda.<sup>73</sup> The aim was to subvert the traditional *Shaf'i mazhab* (sect) and related Sufi orders and convert their adherents to Wahhabism. The proselytising drive was initially reliant on organisations run by Indian and Pakistani expatriates, most of them adherents of conservative sects popular in the Indian subcontinent, such as Deobandism and *Tabligh Jemaat*.

The second phase started in earnest in the early 1980s. It was overtly political, rested on the Salafi creed and unfolded against the backdrop of Iran's Islamic Revolution. The political message of the new generation of Salafi radicalisers was simple, but compelling: "pure" and "authentic" life was impossible under a secular state, not least because it did not allow Muslims to live in conformity with Sharia (Islamic law). Muslim minorities had no business seeking accommodation with the state. Short of overthrowing the state, the only options were to emigrate – as the Prophet Muhammad did – or struggle for separatism. The third stage unfolded in the 1990s, entirely driven by a new generation of Salafi Jihadi militants and groups. This added a deeply militant layer on top of small but influential radicalised institutions, based on a distinct puritanical theology and a potent

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<sup>71</sup> According to the assistant livestock and development minister, Aden Duale, the ministry was only allocated Ksh 400 million (about \$5.3 million) for development in the 2008/2009 budget. "Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard)"

<sup>72</sup> Crisis Group Africa Report N°45, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, 23 May 2002; Andre Le Sage, "Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 27, no. 89 (September 2001).

<sup>73</sup> August 2009. The official government figures state that the ministry was provided in total Ksh 2,395 million in 2008/2009; 2,975 million in 2009/2010; and 3,155 million in 2010/2011. See [www.northernkenya.go.ke](http://www.northernkenya.go.ke).

political narrative. The *jihadis* neither invented a new language nor a new theology but simply built on the solid foundation established by their predecessors.<sup>74</sup> The novelty of their world view and discourse lay in the elevation of jihad to a supreme act of faith, promotion of the cult of martyrdom and justification of terrorism.<sup>75</sup> The *umma* (Islamic community) had failed because it had been co-opted by *kuffar* (unbelievers), was fragmented and sought to achieve its aim by secular methods. The Muslim condition was the same everywhere, their grievances and rage commonly shared. Jihad was an apocalyptic imperative: to emancipate the *umma* in preparation for the day of reckoning. It had to be waged simultaneously locally and globally.

### 3.4.1 Drivers of Radicalization

A key development that emerged from the violent attacks on civilians is that local Kenyan nationals were involved and it was not exclusively Somali-Kenyans or Somali nationals, as is nationally assumed. Understandably, concerns about violent extremists in the Horn of Africa have been aggravated by the political instability in Somalia, which gave rise to al-Shabaab in 2007. Unemployment has been cited by many authors as the key driver of radicalization. Youth join Al-shabab as a form of employment. Joining Al-shabab pays well, from \$50-\$150 monthly, depending on the work, yet requires little effort.<sup>76</sup> All one has to do is carry around a gun and patrol the streets. Therefore, for some of these youth, a significant reason for joining Al-shabab was because it enabled them to provide

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<sup>74</sup> Crisis Group Africa Report N°45, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, 23 May 2002; Andre Le Sage, "Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 27, no. 89 (September 2001).

<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> "Funding jihad: Al-shabab cash lures in young Kenyans". BBC. 11 December 2014. Retrieved 18 June 2015

for themselves and their families. Although personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored. The fact that many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, dampens their self-worth such that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take advantage.

Lack of education is also a key driver of radicalization; this entails a lack of education in general and not religious education.<sup>77</sup> Youth are not able to pursue different avenues in life and do not see a bright future ahead. As a result, it's easier to join Al-shabab rather than languish in poverty with no chance to "pursue something greater." Fear of victimization for not joining Al-shabab is also a problem. The fear of being seen as weak by family and society at large and thus had to "man up" and join. This is especially the case for those youth who lived in Al-shabab controlled areas. If an able-bodied youth did not join, one could be suspected of supporting the Government of Kenya and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) or both. Since some of them would move between Al-shabab and TFG controlled areas regularly, they had to pick a side.<sup>78</sup>

Kenya Defence Force (KDF) bombings of Somali towns have also built intense hatred toward Kenya. The destruction of property and life was a great cause of distress. Youth join Al-shabab to seek revenge as well as to protect themselves and their families. Revenge against Kenya Defence Force (KDF) soldiers.<sup>79</sup> This can be due to harassment, particularly

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<sup>77</sup> Seth J. Schwartz et al., "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

<sup>78</sup> Roland Marchal, "The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia*," Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>79</sup> Seth J. Schwartz et al., "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

of female relatives at checkpoints. The youth sometimes describe Kenya Defence Force (KDF) soldiers as “animals” who would touch our women inappropriately at the checkpoints.

### 3.4.2 Al-Shabaab Radicalization

Al-Shabaab’s swift rise to relative dominance in southern Somalia since early 2009 has added to concerns about radicalisation in Kenya and beyond. Despite recent military setbacks, growing internal schisms and public backlash, it remains a major threat to Somalia’s and the region’s security and stability. In the last four years, it has built a formidable and secretive support infrastructure in Kenya.<sup>80</sup> A tiny, but highly radicalised, close-knit and secretive Salafi Jihadi fringe looks up to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation (*marja'iyah*), supports its jihad, funnels money and recruits and is the primary agent of radicalisation. Even without the physical threat posed by AlShabaab, Kenya would have to contend with this small but dangerous, home-grown threat.<sup>81</sup> Many Somali sources suggest Al-Shabaab-inspired radicalisation (though not more theological Salafi radicalisation) is on the decline in North Eastern Province and Eastleigh, but counter-terrorism experts caution against hasty conclusions. Anecdotal evidence does suggest a drop in traditional jihadi propaganda activities in and around the major Salafi mosques. Friday sermons – often important in gauging clerical establishment views – appear less inflammatory and devoted more to spiritual matters.<sup>82</sup> With exceptions, the jihadi pamphlets given to congregations during prayers have either disappeared or cover issues

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<sup>80</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.

<sup>81</sup> *BBC News*, 18 April 2011. Al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage has played to Kenyan Somalis’ sensitivities by reminding them of the Wagalla Massacre.

<sup>82</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.

beyond the region. The “toning down” of sermons, however, may simply be a result of the routine surveillance most major mosques reportedly now receive.

Another plausible explanation is that jihadi radicalisation may have gone underground. Most mosques in Eastleigh now look deserted during the “off-peak” times between the five mandatory prayers.<sup>83</sup> The special *muhazara* (lecture) and *halaqa* (study group) sessions conducted by clerics for select students appear few and far between. According to some sources, these “master classes” are being conducted away from mosques, usually in homes or in the dozens of madrasas that have sprung up. No place has as many madrasas per square kilometre in Kenya as Eastleigh.<sup>84</sup>

A mosque in Pumwani, a district adjacent to Eastleigh, until recently handed out jihadi pamphlets with articles and speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki, an extremist Yemeni American cleric killed in a U.S. drone attack in Yemen in September 2011. It was said to have been an important Al-Shabaab recruitment centre throughout 2010.<sup>85</sup> Youths with potential were reportedly often sent to Kiunga, Lamu for further vetting at an Al-Shabaab “holding” facility, their IDs, birth certificates and other documents confiscated and burned. The founder of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), based at the Pumwani mosque, Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, was recently named Al-Shabaab’s leader and coordinator in Kenya. He allegedly commands a force of some 200-500 fighters, most of them Kenyans.

Al-Shabaab radicalisers and recruiters have for some time been actively looking beyond the Somali community for potential jihadis, and in line with its regional agenda,

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid

<sup>84</sup> Hamsa Omar and Sarah McGregor, “*Somali rebels threaten to carry out attacks against Kenya*”, 28 February 2011.

<sup>85</sup> August 2009. The official government figures state that the ministry was provided in total Ksh 2,395 million in 2008/2009; 2,975 million in 2009/2010; and 3,155 million in 2010/2011. See [www.northernkenya.go.ke](http://www.northernkenya.go.ke).

Kenya's (and Tanzania's) coastal Muslims are an increasingly important target.<sup>86</sup> There is growing evidence to suggest that attacks in North Eastern Province are joint operations of Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadis. Swahili members are easily able to evade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by Kenyan security officers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali looking. There also is growing speculation some may have returned to Coast Province and that recent killings in Lamu may be part of an elaborate Al-Shabaab plot to destabilise the region. Even if not, the prospect of Somalia jihad veterans returning should be a cause of concern.<sup>87</sup>

### 3.5 Counter-Terrorism Operations and its Counterproductive Effects

While most Kenyan Somalis no longer identify more with Somalia and even see some progress in their inclusion into society, Nairobi's counter-terrorism policies are alienating some of them as well as other Muslims.<sup>88</sup> An observer noted, "It is painful for Somalis living and working in Kenya to have their loyalty to the country being constantly questioned and doubted". If these policies continue, they will increase communal tensions and the risk of "home-grown" terrorism.<sup>89</sup>

The decision in October to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia's Juba Valley to fight Al-Shabaab is the biggest security gamble the country has taken since independence. *Operation Linda Nchi* (Protect the Country) is risky, because the potential for getting bogged down in Somalia is very high; the likelihood of an Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror

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<sup>86</sup> Jay Bahadur and M.H.D., "Al-Shabaab names Kenyan leader: Appointment of Sheikh Ahmed Iman could signal coming terror attack", *Somalia Report*, 10 January 2012.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

<sup>88</sup> Hamsa Omar and Sarah McGregor, "Somali rebels threaten to carry out attacks against Kenya", 28 February 2011.

<sup>89</sup> David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977), p. 75.



campaign is real; and the prospects for a viable, extremist-free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim, at least in the short term. If it costs many Kenyan lives or triggers a mass terrorist attack, it will precipitate a backlash against Kenyan Somalis and further radicalise the community. It has already triggered a number of attacks, on both civilian and government targets, in North Eastern Province.<sup>90</sup>

The war against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular and Muslims in general. Kenyans have historically been suspicious of the Somali community, and police harassment and discrimination in the name of “Global War on Terror” continue deep-rooted trends dating back to the Shifta War. Somalis are often without distinction labelled “Al-Shabaab”.<sup>91</sup> Hostility toward them is exacerbated by their commercial success in Nairobi and other major urban areas, as well as their assumed but unproven association with piracy, extremism and terrorism.<sup>92</sup> Though the government has repeatedly urged Kenyans not to stereotype or discriminate against Somalis, politicians’ statements and media rhetoric risk further demonising them. Deputy Defence Minister Joshua Orwa Ojode, for example, likened Al-Shabaab to a snake with its tail in Somalia and head in Eastleigh.

### 3.5.1 Policy framework and way forward

Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) had advantage when it launched a preemptive and preventive war against AL-Shabaab. It chose the timing for the incursion, and it had the

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<sup>90</sup> Crisis Group Africa Report N°45, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, 23 May 2002; Andre Le Sage, “Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia”, *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 27, no. 89 (September 2001).

<sup>91</sup> Hamsa Omar and Sarah McGregor, “Somali rebels threaten to carry out attacks against Kenya”, 28 February 2011.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

initiative. However, those advantages will diminish should the war be more than a single campaign. The incursion will lose momentum over time, and Al-Shabaab may be able to rally, regroup, and counterattack in various ways similar to what happened against Ethiopian military. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have achieved rapid victory, it has been fairly common in history for that victory to be marred by *"the war after the war"*. Hence the need for a proper exit strategy.

Though judging from its past reactions which advocated for diplomacy, Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) pre-emptive and preventive action was rare and it was a justified case. In future, Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) cross boarder incursion must be the last resort, not temporally, but with respect to the evidence-based conviction that the non-military instruments of policy cannot succeed. There should be convincing intelligence facts to the effect that the conditions to be forcibly preempted and prevented would result to catastrophic consequences. The benefits of preventive military action must be expected to be far greater than the costs. There should be international support for Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) pre-emptive and preventive action. Demobilization and reintegration of Kenyan unemployed youths who had joined the terrorist group Al-Shabaab by providing amnesty, education, vocational opportunities and employment for former combatants may prevent them from rejoining Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

Islamist radicalism in Somalia is reaching into Kenya. The cross-border network Al-Shabaab has built is attempting to radicalise youth to fight in Somalia and conduct terrorist attacks in their own country. This problem has become more severe with the Kenyan

government's decision to intervene directly in Somalia. It is important that Nairobi not conflate radicalisation and terrorism. Counterterrorism tactics should not be the only official response to radicalisation. The government must develop effective, long-term strategies for both counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation, because extremism will continue to be a problem long after the physical threat of terrorism subsides. Radicalisation presents a threat to Kenya's security and stability. Formulating sound policies and then tackling it head on before it is too late needs to be a priority.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF CURBING TERRORISM IN KENYA

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the opportunities Kenya had to counter the menace of terrorism and also look at the challenges faced in such endeavours. The first part will look into Kenya's counter-terrorism responses in form of strategies or legislations. The second part will address the peculiar challenges faced in executing counter-terror policies and ideologies.

#### 4.2 Kenyan Security and Counterterrorism Activities

Kenya faces genuine security threats from Al-shabab and Somalia's continued instability, but government crackdowns have only worsened the climate of fear. In early 2014 the government launched Operation Usalama Watch to detect illegal immigrants, arrest and prosecute people suspected of engaging in terrorist activities, identify places harboring criminals and prevent lawlessness in general.<sup>93</sup> Thousands of Somalis were rounded up and held at a football stadium in dehumanizing conditions. More than 300 people were deported to Somalia in the first two weeks of the operation alone, despite concerns by a number of rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, about the security situation in Somalia for the deportees. The campaign ultimately yielded little in terms of bolstering Kenya's security, but it touched off a raw nerve in already fraught relations

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<sup>93</sup> Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2014). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

between the Somali community and Kenya. For Al-shabab, the ethnic profiling of Kenyan Somalis served as yet another opportunity for recruitment.

The government created an anti-terrorism police unit in 2003, but rights groups have criticized it heavily for “enforced disappearances” and the “mistreatment or harassment of terrorism suspects” - all factors which could perpetuate terrorism. Kenya is a central partner in the East African Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI) which has made it a major beneficiary of training, including joint military exercise, and funds for police training and to improve the National Counter-terrorism Centre. What clearly lacks are the tight institutions and oversight that could be adopted from countries such as Turkey.

Since Kenya Defense forces incursion into Somalia, Al-shabab has carried out a number of sophisticated attacks in Kenya, Al-shabab is testing its ability to carry out attacks in far-flung vulnerable areas. For example, in the high casualty attacks, a number of gunmen attacked the mostly Christian village of Mpeketoni on the Kenyan coast near the Somali border, killing at least 60 people. Al-shabab claimed responsibility for one of the attacks, saying they were revenge for Kenya’s continued presence in Somalia. On 21 September 2013, unidentified gunmen attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>94</sup> The attack, which lasted until 24 September, resulted in at least 67 deaths, including four attackers. Over 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting, with all of the gunmen reported killed. In April 2015, gunmen stormed the Garissa University College, killing almost 150 people and wounding several others.<sup>95</sup> The attackers claimed to be from the Al-Shabaab militant group, and indicated that they

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<sup>94</sup> Jason Straziuso (December 13, 2013). "NYPD report on Kenya attack isn't US gov't view". Associated Press, *Yahoo News*. Retrieved March 18, 2015

<sup>95</sup> "Nearly 150 dead in Al-Shabaab school attack, Kenyan officials say". *FoxNews*. Retrieved 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2015

were retaliating over non-Muslims occupying Muslim territory. The militants took several students hostage, freeing Muslims but withholding Christians.

In response to high value targets like the Westgate attack and the Garissa University attacks, the Kenya government instituted a series of measures to shore up its domestic security. This includes the know-thy-neighbor (*Nyumba Kumi Initiative*), which divided the households into groups of 10 and requires people in those households to hold one another accountable and share information on any suspicious activities.<sup>96</sup> This singled out Kenyan Somalis and anyone who looked like Somali for surveillance, escalating the mistrust that characterizes Kenyan-Somali interactions.

The Kenyan government appears to be taking a stance based on “hard” military action. President Kenyatta reinforcing this with statements urging Kenyans to unite in the “war against a common enemy”.<sup>97</sup> Excursions using heavy military action can be counterproductive. In Iraq, heavy handed military action, such as the assault on Falluja in the wake of the lynching of four American security contractors in April 2004, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, including many women and children, and served to fuel further insurgency. This could have the same impact in Kenya’s case since this conflict is driven in part by moral objections to policies and actions which are considered unjust or unlawful by Al-Shabaab and, according to Attree<sup>98</sup>, part of the strategy for achieving sustainable peace in a circumstance such as this should be to reconsider those policies and actions. This could mean a re-evaluation of Kenya’s policies in their invasion of Somalia.

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<sup>96</sup> Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2014). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

<sup>97</sup> Jason Straziuso (December 13, 2013). "NYPD report on Kenya attack isn't US gov't view". Associated Press, *Yahoo News*. Retrieved March 18, 2015

<sup>98</sup> Larry Attree, Head of Policy, Saferworld & David Keen, Political Economist and Professor of Complex Emergencies, London School of Economics

In 2014, President Uhuru Kenyatta has signed into law a contested security bill (The Security Laws Amendment Bill), saying it would help fight armed groups operating in Kenya. These included giving Kenya's intelligence agencies the power to carry out covert operations to prevent attacks and allowing police to detain terror suspects beyond 24 hours, provided they were first brought to court. The Kenya High Court has thrown out key aspects of a tough new anti-terrorism law after a legal challenge, where eight clauses were annulled, including those which curbed media freedom and capped the number of refugees and asylum-seekers to 150,000.

Kenya received \$2.7 million in training and equipment for a counterterrorism unit from the United States and United Kingdom.<sup>99</sup> East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII) was renamed again to the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT). According to the State Department, which requested \$10 million for PRACT for fiscal year 2013, this program is designed “to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats and address longer-term vulnerabilities.”<sup>100</sup> United States support, which is often opaque and complex funding streams costing hundreds of millions of dollars, is aimed at developing the capacities and capabilities of local and regional security forces, including AMISOM. United Kingdom counterterrorism assistance is even more opaque than U.S. assistance, making it difficult to determine even rough estimates of how much, and what kind of, assistance it gives to Kenya.<sup>101</sup> PRACT, as its predecessors were, is paid for through the Peacekeeping,

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<sup>99</sup> U.S. Department of State, FY 2012 *Congressional Budget Justification* Volume 2 - Foreign Operations, at [transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158267.pdf](http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158267.pdf), accessed August 21, 2012, p. 155.

<sup>100</sup> U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Africa Overview*.

<sup>101</sup> *Samwel Mukira Mohochi v Attorney-General of Kenya and Secretary General of the East African Community*, East African Court of Justice at Arusha. App. No. 5 of 2011.

Operations (PKO) fund (\$249.1 million requested for fiscal year 2013).<sup>102</sup> PKO funding is comparatively less transparent than military funding streams.

Kenya has also been one of the largest global recipients of Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), with the State Department requesting \$5 million for fiscal year 2013 and having allocated approximately \$49.5 million during fiscal years 2003-2011.<sup>103</sup> The ATA program, according to a Department of State website, “trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism. [Diplomatic Security] officers work with the host country’s government and a team from that country’s U.S. mission to develop the most effective means of training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protections, and VIP protection.”

Kenyans continue to decry the escalating insecurity that affects their socio-economic fabric. They fault the government for lacking forensic laboratories that can record data with profiles of those involved in terrorists’ activities such as sponsoring and sympathizers. Captain Werunga maintains that “it would be difficult for Kenya to win the war against terrorism in the absence of a proper mechanism that will profile suspects and create reserve of information that can easily be referred to by security organs.”<sup>104</sup> The NIS is also in question for not justifying its huge annual allocations of over Ksh10 billion in fighting insecurity. During the fiscal year 2013/14, a total of Ksh1.2 billion has been set

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<sup>102</sup> U.S. Department of State, FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification Volume 2 - Foreign Operations, at [transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158267.pdf](http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158267.pdf), accessed August 21, 2012, p. 144.

<sup>103</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response*, Congressional Research Services, November 3, 2010, p. 51-52.

<sup>104</sup> Retired Captain Werunga S., who is a security expert and the director of African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies



aside to erect a National Forensic Laboratory to facilitate criminal investigations in order to get justice for victims of crime.

Another security expert, Dr. Ochieng Kamudhayi, asserts that the Kenyan government must have a new approach in fighting terrorism by advancing its intelligence gathering and applying new technologies by infiltrating terrorist cells and by being ahead of them every time. Kenya being a key ally of the West in their fight against terrorism, should seek more assistance in terms of cash, equipment and training. In October 2012, president Kibaki assented to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which is lawfully expected to disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers used by terrorists to conduct their crimes.<sup>105</sup>

According to Werunga, some factors affecting the security sector in Kenya include: lack of modernization of the security system and serious lapses of coordination between NIS, KDF, the police department and the Executive. There is no centralized coordination in the security sector. The top security apparatus are engage in shifting blame and giving excuses such as “I was not aware; this caught us unawares, I was not informed, we were not given the intelligence briefing.” The former minister of Internal Security had last year admitted that the National Police Service lacks sufficient personnel and equipment to combat crimes in the country. There are around a total of 80,000 regular and Administration Police for over 40 million Kenyans. Various state security organs are reactionary and not proactive and to a good extent they do not apply early warning systems. Bad governance and the use of security forces by politicians to divide the electorate are also part of the problems ailing the sector.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Personal interview with Emoy Lelo from National intelligent service, *Perspectives on international terrorism: an analysis of Kenya's response*, June 20, (2014).

<sup>106</sup> Simon T, reporter in the guardian.com (September 22nd 2013)

### **4.3 Emerging Issues**

Kenya's citizens is plagued with attacks from the Al-Shabaab militants, the question being asked is what the government are doing or can about it. As the death tolls continue to soar, the national government appears to be losing the "war" against the militant groups, along with the confidence of their people, as the leadership grapples to organize their security forces and adopt effective counter-terrorism strategies needed to battle the extremist groups. Kenya is not alone, according to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2013 terrorist activity increased substantially with the total number of deaths rising from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013, a 61% increase. Over the same period, the number of countries that experienced more than 50 deaths rose from 15 to 24 - though more than 80% of lives lost occurred in only five countries; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria.

#### **4.3.1 Al-Shabaab's Motives and Interest**

The terrorists who took over Nairobi's ostentatious Westgate shopping mall and Garissa University planned their attack meticulously to maximize global impact. It is one of the few assumptions that can be drawn from the confusion that still remains about what happened at Westgate and why it was a high value target for Alshabaab. Designed to generate an unstoppable wave of emotional and political pressure, and probably a change of approach towards Somalis and Somalia, they are hoping to unleash a spiral of violence in east Africa. The horror of the act challenges us to respond with our head, rather than with our heart, if we want to outwit the terrorists.

### 4.3.2 AMISOM's Military Gains as an opportunity for Kenya

Some observers argue that Al-shabab has been greatly weakened by AMISOM gains in the past two years. However, U.N. experts suggest that avoiding direct military confrontation has allowed Al-shabab to preserve the core of its fighting force and resources with its forces remaining intact in terms of chain of command, operational readiness, discipline and communication capabilities.<sup>107</sup> Since what it termed a “strategic withdrawal” from Mogadishu in August 2011, the group has conducted almost-daily guerilla-style attacks on government, civilian, AMISOM and other foreign targets, in both urban and rural areas.<sup>108</sup> Notable attacks against foreign targets in 2013 include a June attack against the U.N. compound in Mogadisho in which<sup>109</sup> people were killed and a July attack on the Turkish diplomatic residence. Al-shabab conducted assassinations and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types such as mortars, grenades and automatic weapons causing hundreds of civilian casualties.

U.N. reporting on Al-shabab attacks indicates a surge in the group's use of grenades and IEDs and suggests evidence that the group has exported technical knowledge for the manufacture of suicide vests and IEDs to Kenya and Uganda. Complex attacks, in which explosives or suicide bombers are used to breach a perimeter and are then followed by gunmen to produce maximum casualties have become a hallmark of the group. The former head of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, Matt Bryden, suggests that the Westgate attack represents a dangerous new stage for Al-shabab:

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<sup>107</sup> Personal interview with junior officer from Kenya air force HQ, *Perspectives on international terrorism: an analysis of Kenya's response* June 17, 2014.

<sup>108</sup> Personal interview with Emoy Abdulahi Lelo from National intelligent service, *Perspectives on international terrorism: an analysis of Kenya's response* June 17, 2014.

<sup>109</sup> Personal interview with senior officer from Kenya prison, *The Impact of Alshabaab on Kenya State Security* March 13, (2014).

“My assessment has always been that the day Al-shabab lets go of the ‘Cult of the Suicide Bomber,’ we will be in a world of trouble. It’s far more complicated to procure the parts for an explosive vest and to find people willing to be martyrs. My worry is that if you just get guys riding in with AK-47s and grenades, they could do incredible damage<sup>110</sup>.

Foreign fighters who have trained and fought with Al-Shabaab have reportedly deserted the group in recent years either because of disillusion with its military losses or because of internal dissent. This desertion affords Kenya and other regional partners a rare window of opportunity. The benefits of such opportunity can only be realized through effective and rational counter-terror strategies. Reports suggest some may have travelled to Yemen to join AQAP,<sup>111</sup> while others, including those linked to regional Al-shabab affiliates like Al Hijra in Kenya seek to shift their focus from Somalia to fighting for Al Qaeda and killing U.S. citizens in Kenya and East African region. The U.S. counterterrorism operation in Barawe, Somalia, which reportedly targeted unsuccessfully, a Somali-Kenyan Mohamed Abdikadir Mohamed, aka “Ikrima,” may be indicative of the level of U.S. concern regarding Al-shabab’s targets in Kenyan. Through the formation of credible counter-terror institutions, Kenya could harness a great deal and exploit this ever-increasing American interests in fighting Al-shabaab. Ikrima has been identified as a senior Al-shabab operative responsible for recruiting foreign fighters and directing attacks in Kenya, including, possibly, the attack on the Westgate mall. An intelligence report by Kenyan government referenced by CNN suggests that Ikrima, who has also been linked to

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<sup>110</sup> Matt Bryden, former head of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, ‘Cult of the Suicide Bomber,’

<sup>111</sup> Personal interview with Lt. Colonel Hans Nyange from Kenya Army *Perspectives on international terrorism: an analysis of Kenya’s response*, June 15, (2014).

Al Hijra, may have been planning a complex attack against UN officials and Kenyan government in Nairobi.<sup>112</sup>

In summary, Al-shabab presents the international policymakers with a paradox; the group has demonstrated its intent and capacity to wage a violent war on Somalis and other targets in East Africa. It has also shown its ability to recruit Americans. It ties to groups that have conducted terrorist attacks against the United States such as Al Qaeda and AQAP and the reported presence of foreign fighters in Somalia with the intent to strike targets beyond the African continent raise the group's profile among foreign terrorist organizations watched by the U.S. intelligence community. The challenge for US policymakers is calibrating the appropriate response determining how the regional partners or the United States itself can most effectively prevent the group from growing stronger that focuses on attacking the United States without playing into their narrative and further fueling radicalization.

#### **4.3.3 Religious terrorism in Kenya**

Another factor, key to Kenya, is effectively dealing with the religious ideology as the motivation for the terrorism. In the cases of Al-Shabaab, their ambitions are both linked to religious and political motivations. In order to counter this, certain countries have used more moderate theologies, whether Islamic or not, and advocate for non-violent methods of addressing grievances. Morocco's national strategy in 2013 for example, promoted intra-religious and inter-religious dialogue. What this did was to allow the government to help build trust within societies and within public institutions. This approach in

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid

Morocco was considered to be effective in preventing radicalization and the abuse of religion for terrorist purposes.

Algeria took a similar approach, developing religious guidance programmes that aimed to promote tolerance and peace and respect for human rights. This sought to counter the ideologies that exploited disenchantment within society and addressing root causes. Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta is demonstrating signs of using this approach as in his address to the country on December 2<sup>nd</sup> 2014, he urged Muslims to stand together with the country, also stating that "Islam is a religion of peace - Allah is all gracious and merciful". Fortunately, as one of the countries in Africa with some of the most moderate Muslim factions, this approach could create a platform to sustain terrorist penetration. However, insensitive media and reckless national mindsets evidently targeting people of Somali ethnicity may limit the expected successes of such strategy.

#### **4.4 Challenges**

Most initial reactions to the Kenyan offensive have focused on the substantial problems and risks of the incursion from a military and security perspective. This would not be considered a thorough counter-terror strategy as it lacks multi-dimensionality.

Kenya's military has very limited experience in direct combat, and, with the exception of some peacekeeping deployments, has never waged war across the Kenyan border. Some analysts worry that Kenya's untested forces will fare poorly in clashes with Alshabaab forces on the unforgiving Somali terrain. Related to this concern are worries that Kenya initiated this attack in the early weeks of the rainy season, when track roads become impassable and heavy military equipment gets bogged down. This is one of the reasons

Kenyan forces moved so slowly in the first two months of the campaign. This gave many observers the impression that the Kenyan offensive was not adequately planned.<sup>113</sup>

The Ops Linda Nchi objectives were also not explicitly stated; Kenyan officials have expressed divergent goals. They have at different points claimed the aim is to prevent Shabaab from engaging in cross-border abductions of tourists, defeat Shabaab, capture the strategic seaport of Kismayo, and to secure the border area through the creation of a demilitarized zone (Jubaballand). Kenya is exceptionally vulnerable to Shabaab terrorist attacks. Shabaab moves freely in and out of Kenya, where the group does business, recruits, and engages in fundraising. A major Shabaab terrorist attack in Kenya would have devastating consequences for Kenyan tourism and business. Observers have expressed alarm that Shabaab could make good on threats to take the war to Kenya, and that Kenya would be less secure as a result of its offensive into Somalia. As evidence of this, foreign embassies have elevated security alerts for Kenya. Such alerts have heavily impacted negatively on the tourism industry.

Two grenade attacks in Nairobi, carried out by a professed Kenyan Shabaab member and recent convert to Islam, have amplified these fears. Shabaab leaders have implored their followers in Kenya to launch jihadi attacks in Kenya, a tactic that could produce “lone wolf” terrorism in addition to planned Shabaab attacks. The actual threat may be overstated, however, as Kenya’s value to Somali interests makes it risky for Shabaab to launch a major terrorist attack there. But the danger could grow larger the longer Kenyan forces stay inside Somalia.<sup>114</sup> Terror is designed to have psychological impacts outweighing the physical damage. The physical effort to inflict psychological pain is

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<sup>113</sup> from Kenya Army war diary *The Impact of Alshabaab on Kenya State Security* March 18, (2014).

<sup>114</sup> Kenya Army operations on *The Impact of Alshabaab on Kenya State Security* March 18, (2014).

amplified by magnifiers which include population hysterical and panic reactions to attacks, media reports on attacks, and government security services responses to attacks. This is what has made terrorism in Kenya to thrive.

Kenyan offensive in Somalia could also be used as a propaganda tool in the bid to recruit largely illiterate youths for Al-shabaab. Observers have raised concerns that Kenya's military operation into Somali territory could work to Shabaab's advantage, by rallying Somalis against a foreign occupation, in much the same way that Shabaab enjoyed significant popular support when Ethiopia occupied Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008. Though Somalis are exhausted from war and are devoting most of their resources to assisting relatives affected by the famine, a sustained Kenyan military presence, with inevitable reports of civilian casualties, runs the risk of generating a new wave of Somali jihadi recruits and fund-raisers for Shabaab. The ill-advised public announcement of Israeli counterterrorism support to Kenya was exactly the kind of misstep that Shabaab could parlay into propaganda to turn the Jubbaland intervention into a jihadi cause.<sup>115</sup> So far few Somalis and Somali Kenyans appear to have joined Shabaab in response to either the Kenyan or Ethiopian military offensives in southern Somalia; Shabaab appears instead to be relying more and more on forced conscription.

#### **4.4.1 Insufficient Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Policies as a major challenge**

The mission of fighting terrorists was not a new concept. To be sure, prior to Kenyan incursion to Somalia, there were certainly counterterrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The main problems, however, were based on lack

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<sup>115</sup> Kenya Army war diary *The Impact of Alshabaab on Kenya State Security* March 18, (2014).



of funding and support from more experienced Western counterparts. The National Security Intelligence Service was established following the embassy bombings and Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.<sup>116</sup> The addition to ATA was largely a formality and no significant funding was dispersed until several years later.<sup>117</sup> This was, nevertheless, a statement made by both America and Kenya to reiterate their joint fight against terrorism. Since 2002, The ATA Program has “trained more than five hundred Kenyan Security officials in the United States” and many more in U.S. designated training facilities throughout East Africa.<sup>118</sup> The Kenyan Government has also created an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee.

The lack of this comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform through questionable means and violate the human rights of many in the Muslim community. Intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence.<sup>119</sup> As the proper prosecutorial infrastructure is hardly in place, Kenyan authorities frequently hand-off terrorism suspects to neighboring countries or the United States. In one instance after the 2010 bombing in Kampala, Uganda – the Government of Kenya transferred 13 Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda. The Minister of Justice declared that the rendition was illegal, although there was no possibility of reversing the action that

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<sup>116</sup> Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2014). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

<sup>117</sup> Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126.

<sup>118</sup> Ploch, L. (2010). Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

<sup>119</sup> Prestholdt, J. (2014). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27.

had already occurred.<sup>120</sup> There are also several Kenyan nationals currently detained at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay. One such subject, Mohamed Abdulmalik, was informally suspected of participating in the 2002 Mombasa attacks.<sup>121</sup> He was never charged with a crime and no evidence was ever recovered after extensive interrogations and searches. Nevertheless, he was handed over to the American government because Kenya did not have the means to further investigate or prosecute the case. This is not to say that Mohamed Abdulmalik is innocent. Rather, the untrained law enforcement personnel and lack of proper legislation in Kenya make the amount of counterterrorism aid flowing into the country largely irrelevant.

In the aftermath of the Westgate attack in Nairobi, it is clear to academics and policy experts that Kenya is still heavily reliant on Western security resources. This is not surprising for a developing democracy still dealing with critical levels of poverty and corruption. Still, the counterterrorism units that were expanded and funded for the sole purpose of responding to acts of terrorism were quickly overwhelmed by an inability to work together. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta activated the military in direct contradiction to its usual role essentially creating more confusion than would have occurred otherwise. This led to allegations that the success of the militants was a direct result of ineffective law enforcement and counterterrorism strategies, ultimately calling into question the extensive training and funding of recent years. After neutralizing the alleged hostage situation, stories began circulating that the Westgate mall was looted by KDF forces, using an opportunity of chaos to profit financially. Additionally, Kenya detained and later released numerous Kenyan Muslims who were held under the country's

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<sup>120</sup> Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2014). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

<sup>121</sup> Abdullahi, Ahmednasir. 2010. Uganda is Kenya's Guantanamo Bay. Daily Nation. 25 September

existing anti-terrorism legislation and were subsequently released due to lack of evidence.<sup>122</sup> To the extent that post-9/11 counterterrorism laws around the world allow for varying degrees of detention with little oversight, one can all but expect Kenyan authorities to use its power indiscriminately, albeit legally, to search for perpetrators, often at the expense of innocent civilians.

#### **4.4.2 Devolution plan left out security**

Kenya is a vast land mass and, even under the best circumstances assuring its security is a difficult task. In 2010, the country underwent a series of political reforms including devolution of power. Many federal roles were delegated to regional governments and the elected governor. Other powers, including security, remained centralized. Currently, the security of each region is under the control of the district commissioner, a position that is appointed, not elected. The commissioner often comes from a different region and is accountable to superiors in Nairobi, not local people.

This system creates disconnect between needs on the ground and government policies. The key is more local awareness and empowerment. The discourse should be shifted to how to make the response more in tune with local security concerns. However, recently, there have been intense debates around the idea of devolving security, with some worried that this could make oversight more difficult and facilitate abuse of power.

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<sup>122</sup> Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/> Retrieved on 25 July 2015.

#### 4.4.3 Lack of funds and forces

There are also massive shortages of police and equipment, a problem frequently linked to corruption, graft and corresponding poor management. In Garissa, students told *BBC News* that there were only two guards on campus.<sup>123</sup> According to an Associated Press report from March 2014, the operating budget of an anti-terror police unit in Nairobi was \$735 per month.<sup>124</sup> In comparison, parliamentary representatives earn approximately \$15,000 per month.<sup>125</sup>

The addition of these entities has required substantial funding from the United States. The direct funding for counterterrorism, which nominally existed prior to 9/11, increased roughly 15 times its previous value in the immediate year following the attack (Aronson, 2012). Additionally, President Bush – in 2003 – authorized a \$100 million aid package titled the East African Counterterrorism Initiative. Of this funding that was directed towards the entire region, \$88 million went directly to Kenya. Further, an additional \$122 million was requested for the next fiscal year. After all of this money is dispersed through the various government entities, the problem still remains that the infrastructure has yet been seen to affect authorities' ability to identify terrorists, foil terrorist plots, and bring criminals to justice.<sup>126</sup>

#### 4.4.4 Future prospects

The flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years, success has been minimal. For one, the

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<sup>123</sup> "Kenya attack: Garissa University assault 'killed 147'". *BBC News*. 2 April 2015. Retrieved 2 April 2015.

<sup>124</sup> Mukinda, F. (2010, 21/5/2013). New Pay for Kenya Police on the Way. *The Daily Nation*.

<sup>125</sup> Wafula P, *The real cost of war against Al-Shabaab terrorists* Retrieved October 25, 2014

<sup>126</sup> Prestholdt, J. (2014). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27.

definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents. The Kenyan government defines terrorism as anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious goals.<sup>127</sup> This definition neglects terrorism based on political, ideological, and criminal rationales and thus, places an unfair target on the minority religion in Kenya. Second, actual legislation has been very difficult to pass and put into practice, therefore, the government has been operating without official and encompassing anti-terrorism laws and standards.

The challenges in addressing the looming threat of more attacks are huge, especially considering the current “mess,” as Owoko described it. Security in Kenya is like a huge elephant in the room,” she said. “You want to move it but you have no idea if you should start because everything is a big, heavy mess. Personnel? We don’t have enough. Our police equipment is out of date... we need to upgrade. We cannot deal with Al-shabab in our own country and we can’t deal with them abroad. We can’t improve lives of Kenyans and so they are looking to groups like Al-shabab [who are] willing to pay them. The politicians are all clamouring in different voices.”

#### 4.5 Conclusion

The global war on terrorism’s dividends for the government of Kenya may prove minimal or perhaps significant in the long run, but what has become clear is that ordinary Kenyans with no perceptible link to terrorists regularly bear the cost of counterterrorism. This is the case, at least in part, because the political and economic risks in targeting middle- and lower-class Kenyan Muslims have seemed negligible. Kenyan government

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<sup>127</sup> Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

wish to win the “hearts and minds” of Kenyan Muslims, but they contend with the fact that while American resources have helped Kenya build a more robust security infrastructure, such aid effectively rewards Kenyan authorities for abridging the rights of Muslim citizens. But the terror rampage at Garissa University College was a grim reminder of the logistical and security challenge for the Kenyan security apparatus, and of the growing diversity of the nature of threat posed by al-Shabaab

The overall observation is that despite efforts made by government and other agents to curb the menace, much is yet to be achieved. The local capacity to combat terrorism in Kenya is yet to be convincing and meet the threats posed. For Kenya to achieve its efforts in combating terrorism and terror-related activities, well-co-ordinated, multi-sectoral and pro-active measures should be espoused and implemented from the county to national government level. Besides, enhancement of national security to deal with terrorism and emergency handling capacity should be given priority and de-linked from politics.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents summary of finding according to objectives of the study, conclusions and recommendation of the study. This study sought to establish the drivers of terrorism in North Eastern Kenya. In order to achieve this broad objective the study aimed to scrutinize four main objectives. To start with the study explored the various discourses on terrorism with specific emphasis on the United States and Kenya. The second objective explored the extent to which marginalization and radicalization contribute to terrorism in NE Kenya. This objective was tied up to the first hypothesis which expressly specified that there is a positive correlation between marginalization, radicalization and terrorism in NE Kenya

The third objective sought to address the possibility of there being other drivers of terrorism in NE Kenya other than marginalization and radicalization. The fourth objective sought to suggest suitable counter-terrorism strategy for Kenya. This objective was linked to the second hypothesis which is for the assumption that terrorism in NE Kenya could be tackled if the government adopts appropriate multi-dimensional counter-terror strategy.

#### **5.2 Summary of Findings according to objectives**

This study used a descriptive research design. The target population consisted of the unemployed youth, preachers, women miraa sellers and government officials in the counties of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera . The study made use of primary data sources. Primary data was obtained by use of non-structured interviews schedules and key

informant interview guides. The key informants in this study were the key government officials involved in counter-terrorism mostly those working in Garissa County. On the other hand, the secondary information was obtained from a collection and assessment of published and unpublished sources, periodicals, journals and academic papers that was then taken through comprehensive and critical examination.

### **5.2.1 Discourses on Terrorism**

According to the research literature terrorism perpetrate mass distraction of properties as well mass killings of innocent lives. Terrorism has gradually and drastically changes from traditional terrorism to new terrorism. Most terrorists today have moved beyond these homemade improvised explosive devices. They use construction explosives that can be easily stolen from construction sites all over the world, or they use military explosives that can be purchased on the international market or stolen from military installations. New terrorism refers to the changing character of the phenomenon. According to the protagonists of the new terrorism, it involves different actors, aims, tactics, motivations and actions. In 1999, Laqueur described the impact of terrorism to be a mere historical nuisance. A major group in the class of new terrorism is chemical biological radiological nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. With this terrorism can reach an unprecedented level of destruction.

Al-Shabaab conducts assassinations and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types, mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons, causing hundreds of civilian casualties. U.N. reporting on Al-shabab attacks indicates a surge in the group's use of grenades and IEDs and suggests evidence that the group has exported technical



knowledge for the manufacture of suicide vests and IEDs to Kenya and Uganda. Complex attacks, in which explosives or suicide bombers are used to breach a perimeter and are then followed by gunmen to produce maximum casualties, have become a hallmark of the group.

### **5.2.2 The Relationship between Marginalization, Radicalization and Terrorism**

Acts of terrorism have had grave economic, political, and social implications in Kenya as well as any part of the world. Human lives, tourism, agriculture, and the transportation sectors have been severely affected. Tourism, which is the driving force of the economy, accounts for 25 percent of the GDP and has been paralyzed because of on-again/off-again travel bans imposed by the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries since 11 September 2001.

Lack of education is also a key driver of radicalization; this entails a lack of education in general and not religious education.<sup>128</sup> Youth are not able to pursue different avenues in life and do not see a bright future ahead. As a result, it's easier to join Al-Shabaab rather than languish in poverty with no chance to pursue something greater.

Fear of victimization for not joining Al-shabab is also a problem. The fear of being seen as weak by family and society at large and thus had to "man up" and join. This is especially the case for those youth who lived in Al-shabab controlled areas. If an able-bodied youth did not join, one could be suspected of supporting the Government of Kenya

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<sup>128</sup> Seth J. Schwartz et al., "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) or both. Since some of them would move between Al-shabab and TFG controlled areas regularly, they had to pick a side.<sup>129</sup>

Kenya Defence Force (KDF) bombing of Somali towns have also built intense hatred toward this group. The destruction of property and life was a great cause of distress. Youth join Al-shabab to seek revenge as well as to protect themselves and their families. Revenge against Kenya Defence Force (KDF) soldiers.<sup>130</sup> This can be due to harassment, particularly of female relatives at checkpoints. The youth sometimes describe Kenya Defence Force (KDF) soldiers as “animals” who would touch our women inappropriately at the checkpoints.

### 5.2.3 Other Drivers of Terrorism in NE Kenya

The role of Alshabaab in Kenya is to destabilize the Kenya state security in order for them to perpetrate their terrorist agenda. Other than marginalization and radicalization, illegal trades and cross border smuggling indirectly drives terrorism in NE Kenya. Unscrupulous Kenyan businessmen who engage in smuggling of sugar from Somalia earn Al-shabaab the much needed revenue to fund their acts of terror inside Kenya. These revenues afford them purchase of much needed weapons and also help them pay salaries to its members.

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<sup>129</sup> Roland Marchal, *The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia*, Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>130</sup> Seth J. Schwartz et al., “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

#### **5.2.4 Suitable Counter Terrorism Strategy**

The Kenya military incursion to al-Shabaab insurgents is the ultimate strategy that Kenya government is using to respond to al-Shabaab threats and attacks. One strategy to discourage terrorism is mitigating the psychological impact of the intent. Less media attention and downplaying terror significantly suppresses the value of an attack. In fact, governments should employ a public policy that entrenches the fact terrorism in Kenya like any other crime is part of human life and will not go away. Media hype that follows attacks and focus by social media glorifies terror further amplifying the psychological impact. Since what it termed a “strategic withdrawal” from Mogadishu in August 2011, the group has conducted almost-daily guerilla-style attacks on government, civilian, AMISOM, and other foreign targets, in both urban and rural areas shows achievement of Kenya government strategy.

#### **5.3 Conclusions**

In conclusion, Terrorism has gradually and drastically changes from traditional terrorism to new terrorism. As Kenya youth population grows in size and political importance, already representing the majority of the population in the region, participants highlighted the need to make strategic investments in youth-oriented services, foremost among them education. Education services that provide young people with the skills needed to enter an increasingly modern and globally connected marketplace are vital. In a similar vein, vocational training is important to providing the region’s youth with employable skills, and it should be extended equally to young men and women. Education presents young people with a variety of life options and is a critical first line of defense

against many of the socio-economic factors that may lead to youth radicalization. The aim of al-Shabaab in Kenya is to destabilize the Kenya state security in order for them to perpetrate their terrorist agenda and induce sectarian violence. Al-Shabaab once appeared to be one of the most formidable terrorist groups in Somalia proving capable of governing vast amounts of territory and executing well-orchestrated attacks both inside and outside of Somalia.

Acts of terrorism have had grave economic, political, and social implications in Kenya. Human lives, tourism, agriculture, and the transportation sectors have been severely affected. Tourism, which is the driving force of the economy, accounts for 25 percent of the GDP and has been paralyzed because of on-again/off-again travel bans imposed by the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries since 11 September 2001. Because of the travel bans, many Kenyans have lost their jobs, which directly affect the economy. The government also has lost a major source of revenue from its formal sector of the economy.

Finally, the challenges to curb al-Shabaab arises from the point that Kenya's military has very limited experience in direct combat, and, with the exception of some peacekeeping deployments, has never waged war across the Kenyan border; Kenyan officials have expressed divergent goals; Shabaab moves freely in and out of Kenya, where the group does business, recruits, and engages in fundraising; Shabaab leaders have implored their followers in Kenya to launch jihadi attacks in Kenya, a tactic that could produce "lone wolf" terrorism in addition to planned Shabaab attacks and Kenyan offensive as tool for Shabaab recruitment.

## **5.4 Recommendation**

Based on the findings of this study this section presents the following recommendations that will help Kenya tackle the increasing threat of terrorism:

**Addressing terrorism through development.** Evidently, all the marginalized regions of Turkana, Pokot, Samburu and Somalis-inhabited North Eastern parts of the country are the most insecure places in Kenya. All these parts share a history of persistent neglect and exclusion from national development endeavours. Equitable distribution of the national cake would rid out Kenya of conditions that are conducive for the spread of terrorism and other forms of insecurity. Development has the potential to reduce the chances of terrorism by eliminating the roots of discontent in Africa. As the World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, says: 'The international community has already acted strongly, by confronting terrorism directly and increasing security. But those actions by themselves are not enough. We will not create that better and safer world with bombs or brigades alone'.<sup>131</sup> He goes on: 'We must recognize that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both between states and within them; while the fight against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the world; while the link between progress in development and progress toward peace is not recognized - we may win a battle against terror but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace'.

Development includes capacity building in its broadest sense, thereby implying the promotion of new ideas, standards, institutions, norms and techniques of overcoming obstacles to human progress. It includes democratization, enlightened leadership, an independent judiciary, and responsible and accountable governments.

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<sup>131</sup> James D. Wolfensohn, 'A partnership for development and peace' at <http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/speeches/wolfensohn.htm>. Accessed on 10 July 2015.

The government should counter radicalization and extremism through education. A task force should be set up to review our curriculum and make adjustments that will introduce subjects on peaceful co-existence good citizenship. This is crucial given the pre-eminent role of schools and other educational establishments in the development of a resilient community that upholds values of non-violence, peaceful coexistence and tolerance. In the United Kingdom, for example, authorities work closely with providers of education at all levels to make schools and universities, better equipped to resist the influence and ideology of violent extremism. This has resulted in the teaching in schools of subjects that promote intercultural understanding and citizenship. The crucial role of education in creating a resilient society led the Yemeni authorities to unify the general educational system under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, ensuring that the national curriculum respects all religions, as well as setting in motion awareness activities that promote religious discourse and the ethics of tolerance and moderation

The government should also develop a better working relationship with reliable civil society and established community leaders. The State or the county government alone does not have all the resources necessary to counter radicalization and deal with violent extremism. Therefore, the national and county governments need partners to carry out this vital task. Involving civil society and local communities can bring to bear a range of tools and resources not available to governments. Working with communities and civil society enhances trust and transparency and strengthens social cohesion. Civil society organizations can reach segments of society that governments may have difficulty to engage. They can help counter extremist ideologies and promote peaceful dialogue.

Investing in contacts with local communities not only facilitates and accelerates the process of information gathering, but can also act as an early observation or recognition system of any violent extremist tendencies, hence permitting an early and effective counterstrategy.

Countering internet radicalization through community inclusive strategies and appropriate internet legislation. Kenya's counter terror efforts should include tackling internet radicalization as one of the priorities. Alshabaab has been way the better winner in the social media contest over the years. Whereas terrorists' indoctrination, recruitment, and training previously relied primarily on physical meetings between recruits and recruiters, the Internet can now provide these connections quickly, easily, remotely, and anonymously. Terrorist groups are using this to their advantage and are employing a wide array of online platforms to disseminate a variety of content. They tailor their online platforms specifically to attract young persons, by producing content that is appealing to their interests and using the same Internet platforms that are popular among youth to disseminate this content. Efforts to counter the online radicalization have thus far lagged behind terrorists' abilities to promote their messages. In countering radicalization messages to youth, many governments have sought out moderate Muslim officials and influential religious figures to address head-on the fallacies and distortions of Islamic teachings that terrorist groups often propagate.

Singapore, in particular, has partnered with moderate imams to great effect. For example, Singapore's Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) has developed websites for youth, to include a site that responds to religious queries and a site devoted to rebutting extremist ideologies. We need to increase our understanding of the tools, techniques, and

messages that terrorists are using. We need to gain a better understanding of the tools, techniques, and messages that youth respond to and address the underlying needs that may make young persons susceptible to terrorist appeals. Increase public support for counterterrorism activities is prudent. The lack of information currently being provided to the public has helped galvanize human rights advocates against many government's counter-terror programmes in the NE and Coast region. In addition, the limited public confidence enjoyed by security and law enforcement agencies in this region has often resulted in counterterrorism activities receiving little public support. Civil society, in particular, can play a significant role in building local support through education and raising awareness, lobbying government authorities to make the UN Strategy and AU drafts on counter-terrorism part of domestic legislation, monitoring implementation of the Strategy, investigating and publicizing abuses committed in the name of fighting terrorism, giving assistance and support to victims, and promoting the importance of peace and security.

The government should recognize that a blanket or draconian crackdown on Kenyan Somalis, or Kenyan Muslims in general, would radicalize more individuals and add to the threat of domestic terrorism. The security forces have increased ethnic profiling but otherwise appear relatively restrained (especially given past behavior). Counter-terrorism operations need to be carefully implemented and monitored, also by neutral observers such as civil societies and human rights bodies.

One strategy to discourage terrorism is mitigating the psychological-impact intent. Less media attention and downplaying terror significantly suppresses the value of an attack. In fact, governments should employ a public policy that entrenches the fact terrorism in



Kenya like any other crime is part of human life and will not go away. Media hype that follows attacks and focus by social media glorifies terror further amplifying the psychological impact.

Demobilization and reintegration of Kenyan unemployed youths who had joined the terrorist group Al-Shabaab by providing amnesty, education, vocational opportunities and employment for former combatants may prevent them from rejoining Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

Terrorism is no more implanted by some unknown alien foreigner clandestinely entering a foreign country. With the mounting number of home-grown terrorist attacks, radicalization is becoming an important security priority. With the sudden spurt in home-grown terrorism perpetrated by a new breed of terrorists born and radicalized in their country of residence, conceptions of terrorism have changed and so have conceptualizations of radicalization. The association of radicalisation with the internet helps it cause great anxiety. The notion of the internet as a double-edged-sword complicates the problem. To date, several prominent terrorism experts have come up with empirically validated models that point out the lack of direct proportionality between Islam and radicalization. The confusion between Islam and Islamism/radicalism often leads to faulty policies. Moreover, a counter-terrorist focus on Islamic ideology is dangerous.

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The Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba are some of the dominant ethnic groups and generally, each views the other with suspicion especially in key positions. The consensus is to reach out to others. The selection Chair of the Interim Independent Electoral commission is from a “minority tribe”.

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