

**EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION  
MECHANISMS: A CASE STUDY OF WAJIR COUNTY**

**COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY**


**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

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**Project Paper Report submitted by;**

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**To the Department of Sociology and Social Work of the requirements for the award of  
Master of Arts Degree in Rural Sociology and Community Development**



**Presented to;**

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**2012**

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## DECLARATION

I declare that this research project paper is my original work and has not been submitted for award of a degree or credit in any other institution or university.

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
15<sup>th</sup> Nov. 2012

## RECOMMENDATION

This research project paper report has been submitted for examination at the department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Nairobi with my approval as the supervisor.

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20/11/2012

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As everyone knows, a project paper is not written in one day and as such, a lot of energy and time are spent on it. However, this is not only the energy and time of the researcher; it also takes the same of so many other people who either directly or indirectly support the researcher. That is how it was in my case, and therefore I would like to direct a special word of thanks to them all.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project to the late Madam Dekha Ibrahim Abdi who personally encouraged and motivated me during the initial stage of concept note to study the subject of conflict in the region of Wajir.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>ADR:</b>	<b>Alternative Dispute Resolution</b>
<b>AED</b>	<b>Academy for Educational Development</b>
<b>ALDEF:</b>	<b>Arid Lands Development Focus</b>
<b>ALRMP:</b>	<b>Arid Lands Resource Management Project</b>
<b>AMREF</b>	<b>African Medical Research Foundation</b>
<b>ASAL</b>	<b>Arid and Semi Arid Lands</b>
<b>CBOs:</b>	<b>Community Based Organizations</b>
<b>CEPAR</b>	<b>Centre for Peace and Research</b>
<b>CEWERN:</b>	<b>Conflict Early Warning Early Response Network</b>
<b>CPMRP:</b>	<b>Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response Program</b>
<b>CPCC</b>	<b>Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee</b>
<b>DAI:</b>	<b>Development Alternatives Inc.</b>
<b>DEVCON:</b>	<b>Development Concerns</b>
<b>DOs</b>	<b>District Officers</b>
<b>DPCs:</b>	<b>District Peace Committees</b>
<b>ECCP:</b>	<b>European Centre for Conflict Prevention</b>
<b>ENNDA</b>	<b>Ewaso Ngiro North Development Authority</b>
<b>EPCPT:</b>	<b>European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation</b>
<b>IDEA</b>	<b>Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance</b>
<b>IEC</b>	<b>Information, Education, Communication</b>
<b>MSI</b>	<b>Management Systems International</b>
<b>NE</b>	<b>North Eastern</b>
<b>NGOs:</b>	<b>Non- Governmental Organizations</b>
<b>NFD:</b>	<b>Northern Frontier Districts</b>
<b>OECD</b>	<b>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</b>
<b>OOP</b>	<b>Office of the President</b>
<b>PCs:</b>	<b>Peace Committees</b>
<b>PEACE II:</b>	<b>Peace in East and Central Africa (Phase II)</b>
<b>REDSO</b>	<b>Regional Economic Development Services Office</b>
<b>SPSS</b>	<b>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</b>
<b>SUPKEM:</b>	<b>Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>USAID:</b>	<b>United States Agencies for International Development</b>
<b>WASDA:</b>	<b>Wajir South Development Agency</b>
<b>WPDA</b>	<b>Wajir Peace and Development Agency</b>
<b>WPDC</b>	<b>Wajir Peace and Development Committee</b>
<b>WFP:</b>	<b>Women for Peace</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

Over the years, conflict has been singled out as the main bottleneck to the development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALS) that accounts for over 80% of the total Kenyan land mass. Peace activists have been quick to blame the government for failing to protect its citizens and their property. Various external and internal interventions have been attempted with mixed levels of successes.

This study therefore sought to assess effectiveness of the peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms among the Somali clans in Wajir County. The methodology used in this study was a combination of survey and qualitative field study. This study adopted a survey design. The reason for opting for this design was because it allowed quick collection and analysis of data. It also made it easier to standardize in terms of relating with the cross-section of respondents. This design was also the most ideal as the researcher could not move with respondents who are by nature nomads with no permanent settlements. It was also the most ideal since the researcher was an outsider and was not able to conduct intensive field investigation due to cultural, religious and language differences.

The study identified the organizations and strategies employed for conflict resolution and peace-building. The study also analyzed the major constraints to peacebuilding and assessed the conditions which sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The study also assessed effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms and concluded that the mechanisms for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in the County are not effective.

From the objectives of the study, the findings were that there is low utilization of peacebuilding mechanisms, most members of the community are not familiar with major peace agencies such as NGOs and State and that the community had low confidence with the peace agencies. The study also found out that there were external influences which negatively impact on the peacebuilding processes in the region. It was also found that there was poor coordination among various peacebuilding organizations in the region. The study also found that the conflict is still frequent in the county and concluded that the mechanisms are not effective. The study recommended among others decentralization of peacebuilding resources for easy accessibility and suggested the need for further research in this subject of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background

Wajir County is inhabited by a number of Somali speaking clans (Cassanelli, 1982). Nearly the entire population of Wajir county is composed of the Somali ethnic groups and the small population of non-Somalis consists almost entirely of civil servants, security forces and businesspersons (Adan & Pkalya, 2005; Ibrahim & Jenner, 1996; Walker & Omar, 2002). The largest Somali clans in the district are the Ajuran, Degodia Ogaden and Garre, but also several smaller clans are present. Clans such as the Murule, Gabra, and Rendille (who are also found in the county) possess highly ambiguous and fluid ethnic identities, making it difficult to categorize them as “Somali,” “Oromo” or other (Cassanelli, 1982). The Ajuran predominantly occupy the north-west of the county, the Degodia occupy mainly the area south of Wajir town and the Ogaden are the main occupants of the north-east spreading over the west. The Ajuraan consider themselves to be the “original” inhabitants of much of the land (though in fact they displaced the Borana, who once inhabited the entire zone) Cassanelli, 1982). The Ajuraan enjoyed protected access to Wajir-West under the British colonial system and since independence have faced long-term migratory pressure and changing demographics from westward-expanding neighbors, especially the Degodia (Goldsmith in Menkhaus, 2005).

The county which is in an Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL) covers an area of 56,501km<sup>2</sup> with a population of approximately 630,000 people. It is approximately 10% of Kenya’s land mass. As an ASAL, farming is severely limited, making pastoralism the most viable form of productive land use. The main source of income in the county is livestock keeping which contributes to approximately 63% of the income (ALRMP, 2011). The County is therefore characterized by perennial drought spells creating serious scarcity of pasture and water. This in turn results into high competition over these scarce resources and opening avenue for conflicts over the resources especially during prolonged drought when the communities are forced to move from one region to another within the county or outside the county in search of pasture and water. Besides livestock, the people in Wajir County depend on government relief food for survival (Oxfam, 2006). Such high dependence on relief food that in most instances is not

reliable or adequate therefore means that there will always be conflict especially when the supply delays due to transportation or other constraints. Conflict also occurs during distribution of the same food at the distribution centres. Creation of these relief food distribution centres often generates a lot of conflicts due to divergent interests even for people who belong to the same administrative location. Most of the time there are conflicts among the relief food committees in terms of clan composition (OOP 2011).

Northeastern Kenya, where Wajir County lies has been embroiled in perennial conflict, both between resident communities and the post-independence government, and among different clans and sub-clans living in the region. Indeed, throughout the independence period up until the 1997 Inter- Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) reforms that lifted emergency regulations, North Eastern region was administered as an active security zone. Especially endemic has been the conflict among communities, usually along clan lines and escalating to cyclical violence (Ndegwa, 2001).

Conflict in Wajir County, as in other Northeastern Province counties, is centered on competition for water and pasture. This competition is exacerbated not only by the recurrent drought, but also by the state's behavior, which is perceived as general neglect or weak presence of Kenyan government, and at times intense security crackdowns (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996). In addition to the above conflict drivers, the region was closed out from the rest of the country after the decline of the secessionist war famously known as 'Shifta war', which lasted from 1963 to 1969 (Lier, 2010). During the same period, free movement was restricted in the region with Somali travelers required to carry a separate pink identity card, in addition to the national identity card carried by all Kenyans (Menkhaus, 2005). This state action of quarantine is believed by Somalis to have contributed to low economic and infrastructural growth and lower outcomes than the rest of the county in the fields of education and health (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

These combined issues aggravated the resentment among the Somalis in Kenya towards the Kenyan government. The community felt alienated and marginalized, and lost confidence in the government institutions. A state of lawlessness set the stage for perpetual conflicts in the region which have been described by some stakeholders as "Kenya's killing fields" (The Nation, July 14, 2005). According to the observation by

Agence France Presse (July 14, 2005), the government had very little or no authority in the region and some state sponsored peace mechanisms were seen by researchers both from within and outside as sources of conflict rather than of prevention and mediation. There was also limited government control other than use of force and imposition of curfews as conflict resolution mechanism by the Kenyan state. These resulted into extremely serious conflicts and insecurity incidences which led to deaths including massacres in Garissa in 1980, Mandera 1982 and Wajir in 1984. The Wagalla massacre (1984) in Wajir was an operation that the Degodia clan believes was intended to wipe them out in favour of other Somali clans (Abdi, 2004).

Between 1990 and 1992, two other factors contributed to a worsening of the situation: the collapse of the Somalia government in 1990, which led to a proliferation of arms through the already porous borders; and the fluidity of the Kenyan transition from authoritarian rule to competitive electoral politics in 1991-1992 (Ndegwa, 2001). Although in the first two multi party general elections (1992 and 1997), the region seemed to overwhelmingly supported KANU (the ruling party then), observers argued that it was coerced support because there was no independent media awareness and therefore there were still internal conflicts. Even moments perceived to be peaceful have not been of real peace but what can be described as fragile peace or deceptive calm which any small trigger would explode to a prolonged and deadly violence as was witnessed in Isiolo, Marsabit and Garissa in 2011 and Moyale in January 2012 and Banisa between Garre and Degodia in July 2012.

Considering the strategic importance of North Eastern region in terms of stability in the Horn of Africa, it is crucial to various stakeholders to ensure peace and stability in the region by, among other things, putting in place conflict resolution mechanisms. In recent times, the government has tried to transform its peace mechanism and started Wajir District Peace Committee to resolve conflicts through peaceful means rather than the use of force. The aim has been to integrate state lead peace mechanisms and local peace mechanism with the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and to consolidate them with civil society and CBO led peacebuilding efforts.

However, these efforts seem not to have yielded significant reduction in frequency and intensity of conflict in the region. Consequently, this attracted international community who came in to facilitate peace processes in the county either by funding researches on conflict resolutions or supporting local peacebuilding agencies. Such organizations include USAID, Mercy Corps, PEACE II, PACT Inc, European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, (EPCPT), Development Concern (DEVCON), European Centre for Conflict Prevention, (ECCP), and Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) among others. But again these efforts have been seen as ‘rushing to douse the flames’ which are not reliable for sustainable peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts (Gordon, 2009).

The observable reality on the ground is that Local Peace mechanisms have not been able so far, to address the root causes of conflict, namely the larger political, social and economic challenges because they lack the capacity to do so (International Alert 1993; Adan and Pkalya 2006). State mechanisms lack continuity for sustainable peacebuilding mechanisms on the side of Provincial Administration due to the fact that the DCs are frequently transferred. Law enforcement agencies also have difficulties operating in the arid land’s vast and harsh terrain a situation that is complicated by the little support from the local people. The state mechanisms are therefore seen as weak and inadequate to prevent, respond to or pacify conflicts in the region. Sometimes the approaches used by the state such as disarmament have been seen to be discriminatory. The judiciary is incapacitated by the great distances which prevent many people from physically accessing the courts and the discrepancy between official laws/legal processes and the customs and the value systems of the local population in relation to the crime definition and punishment. On the other hand, the strategies and mechanisms employed by NGOs are inadequate in effectively preventing and managing conflict because they fully rely on donor funds which are by nature unreliable.

Based on the foregoing observations, the purpose of this study therefore was to assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolutions mechanisms in North Eastern region.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

It is argued that during British colonial rule, and extending into Kenyan independence, the pastoral lifestyle of the people of Wajir -and the traditional systems underpinning it- were undermined by setting of administrative boundaries leading to perennial conflict over access to natural and political resources (Ibrahim, 2006). In the two world wars, Somalis were pitted against Somalis, fighting on the sides of warring European powers. More bitterness and rivalries were evoked. After independence, there was an attempt to secede from Kenya which led to the Shifta War (1963-1969). When the shifta war ended, clan boundary disputes, inter-clan conflicts, and violence based on electoral politics emerged as new forms of conflict in the County. These issues provoked the Kenya government to invoke a state of emergency which remained until 1992 (Ibrahim, 2006).

The determination both by the local community, the government, and non-state actors to bring peace in the region over time since independence has been noted through the various approaches and strategies. CBOs such as ALDEF and WASDA, NGOs such as Red Cross, AMREF and government departments, ALRMP and ENNDA have tried to solve the problem by addressing resource based conflicts through digging of boreholes and dams to provide water. Yet this approach has become a source of conflict rather than prevention and solution in terms of either influx of pastoralists to the water points or contentions over the sites of the dams.

According to the report by Wajir Peace and Development Agency (WPDA) on the conflict trends in the region, there were 150 conflicts which were recorded between the months of April and December 2010. Some of these conflicts were of very high magnitude which involved use of firearms and loss of lives and serious destruction of property. Out of these cases 75% were over water and pasture, 20% involved boundary disputes while the remaining 5% were as a result of livestock theft and power contests among clans (WPDA Conflict Diary -2011). These conflicts ranged from minor incidences of threats, obstructions/blockades, and standoffs which were locally resolved to high intensity conflicts which resulted into displacements, violence and injuries, and use of lethal weapons which required external interventions.

Although these incidences may have been recorded and documented, there are several instances of conflicts and violence which go undocumented due to the geographical distances between the regions and inadequate communication networks among other factors. Both recorded and unrecorded incidences do have adverse impacts such as closure of schools that hinder learning and cause displacement of children. There are also closures of business activities and also influx of casualties to the few and not well-equipped health facilities found in the county.

Sometimes these incidents breed a cycle of conflict when revenge is used as compensation measure especially when there is no trust in legal institutions. This leads to indiscriminate attacks on entire villages or clans as was witnessed in Mandera and Wajir in August 2012 between the Gare and Degodia, which resulted into deaths and displacement of families. (Kenya Red Cross Society Report – August 2012).

The foregoing facts indicate that peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in the region have not yielded the desired results and the issue of perennial conflicts in the region was identified as a gap that needs to be addressed by looking at the effectiveness of the peacebuilding mechanisms in the region. It is also evident that peace efforts in the county have gone beyond just a Wajir issue to attract both national and international attention considering the fact that this phenomenon has manifestations that are similar and connected to the problems in the horn of Africa which to some extent seems insurmountable. For this reason this study sought to address the following questions;

### **1.3 Research questions**

- i) Who are the actors in peacebuilding and what are their involvements in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir?
- ii) Why is conflict persistent in Wajir despite the availability of peacebuilding actors and mechanisms?
- iii) How can peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir be made sustainable?
- iv) Are peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir effective?

#### **1.4 General objective of the study**

The general objective of this study was to assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir.

The specific objectives were;

- i) To assess the use and relevance of the mechanisms employed in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir.
- ii) To analyze the constraints to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir.
- iii) To assess the conditions which sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir.
- iv) To assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir.

#### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

The subject of conflict and peace in NE Kenya has received considerable attention in literature. Among such researchers are, Ndegwa who examined the sources of conflict in the region with a focus on Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) (Ndegwa, 2001). Chopra (2008) on the other hand focused on conflict resolution mechanisms among pastoralists in northern Kenya but paid little attention to the effectiveness of the same mechanisms. Adan and Pkalya (2006) studied the role of peace committees in peacebuilding. Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (2003) also focused only on the internally displaced conflict victims in Northern Kenya. Ibrahim and Jenner, (2006) examined factors which have triggered conflicts in the region since colonial times.

Looking at the above studies, it appears that they have not considered the relevance and effectiveness of the mechanisms for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region. It is also evident that some of these previous studies were conducted by insiders who are natives of the region. This may have undermined their objectivity in addressing conflict issues. Besides, some of the previous researches on the conflict in the region were funded by NGOs. This means therefore that the goals of the research could have been largely donor driven. Chances that the findings could have been fashioned to suit the donor interests rather than those of the researchers are therefore highly probable. This study is

significant in the sense that it was conducted by an outsider and therefore the findings and conclusions were less likely to have been influenced by emotive local interests. This research is unique in that it focused purely on academic concerns and considered facts as revealed and was not influenced by the underlying political, ethnic or ideological interests.

## **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

### **Scope**

The study focused on Somali clans within Wajir County which include Degodia, Ogaden Ajuran and Garre which are the most dominant Somali speaking clans in the county. Other clans such as Murule, Gabra, and Borana who also live in Wajir County are generally insignificant in Wajir inter- clan conflicts. For this reason, they were not the focus of the study. However, for the purpose of diversification, the study also interviewed key informants who included officials from NGOs, CBOs, LPCs, security personnel, political leaders, Human Rights Watch, Al Fatah and the Judiciary. These were people who were believed to have had special knowledge about the topic. Religious leaders, peace elders, youths, CBOs, Women for Peace, medical personnel, teachers and business persons formed the focus group discussions. The study only operated within the framework of the study objectives. The scope of this study was based on assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms used for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir where conflict is perennial despite the existence of various peacebuilding actors. Levels of community familiarity and confidence with the peacebuilding actors were used as part of the variables and parameters to measure the effectiveness of the mechanisms. Other variables included, utilization of mechanisms, accessibility to peacebuilding resources, level of external influences, coordination and trainings.

### **Limitations**

It was expected that the study would be constrained by geographical distance between one study site and another. Bearing in mind that the population of the study are nomadic pastoralists, reaching nomadic group in the vast territory would be a limitation. This was resolved by hiring a vehicle to ease mobility. Another limitation anticipated was the high prevalence of insecurity which would hinder movements. This was overcome by working

closely with the local administration and security personnel. There was also the issue of suspicion due to cultural and religious differences between the researcher and the community members which would have limited free discussions on sensitive clan relation topics. To counter this, the respondents were clearly informed that the study findings were to be utilized purely for the academic purposes and the responses given would be treated with utmost confidentiality. To further ensure trust between the researcher and the respondents, permission and blessings from critical community elders and leaders was sought. Also of notable limitation was language barrier between the researcher and the community. However, this was overcome by the use of interpreters.

## **1.7 Definition of Key Terms**

**Effectiveness:** The ability of the systems to successfully mitigate, manage and resolve conflicts.

**Peacebuilding mechanisms:** The strategies/methods or approaches used by peace organizations to help in conflict resolution, management and peacebuilding

**Peacebuilding organizations:** The structures/systems/agencies/actors/institutions involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution e.g. State, NGO or Local Peace Committees.

**Conflict Resolution** This is a more comprehensive term than conflict management, which implies that the deeper-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved. This implies that the behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed.

**Peacebuilding:** This is the implementation of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment which deters the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict.

**Rapprochement:** ("to bring together"), is a re-establishment of cordial relations, as between two communities/groups.

**Deference** (also called **submission** or **passivity**) is the condition of submitting to the espoused, legitimate influence of one's superior or superiors. Deference implies a yielding or submitting to the judgment of a recognized superior out of respect or reverence.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of relevant literature and information on peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir. It also presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that guide this study.

Nasong'o (2002) argues that conventional explanations of political conflicts in Africa in terms of inter-ethnic hatred are fallacious and unwholesome and, therefore fail to furnish a comprehensive appreciation of the basic causes of political conflicts in Africa.

His argument is that the conflicts are not caused by existence of myriad ethnic groups in one nation-state *per se*, but that they are explicable within the context of competition over resource allocation in a situation that is devoid of political institutionalization.

Gilman (1983) argues that no matter how cleverly we may try to arrange social systems, or provide protection for ourselves, life is always full of surprises. As long as there is not a firm foundation of inner peace, the mind remains remarkably capable of generating fears and insecurities which results into external conflicts (Gilman, 1983).

Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions designed to prevent armed conflict (Barnett, 2007). According to Miall (1999) and Bush (2004) it refers to two main tasks: preventing a relapse into war or violence; and creating a self-sustaining peace.

Galtung (1975, quoted in Miall et al (1999) defined peacebuilding as encompassing the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development. According to Galtung, peacebuilding is re-defined as part of 'third generation' of peace approaches evident after the Cold War, when a reaction against simplistic approaches to building peace finally recognized the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its links to development. Galtung argues that issues of culture, human needs, and 'fault-lines of the human condition such as gender' have now entered the peace debate and are recognized as crucial (Galtung, 2002).

In recent approach, peacebuilding has come to be seen as the collective, strategic framework under which security, humanitarian, governance, development, social

cohesion and social capital, and reconciliation dimensions can be brought together to address the causes and impact of conflict and build mechanisms for non-violent conflict management (United Nations, 2009). It involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. This understanding of peacebuilding reflects the growing consensus that peace requires more than just the absence of direct or physical violence. Instead, it is a long-term process that should aim to achieve the absence of indirect or structural violence (Galtung, 1975).

The United Nations Secretary-General's report (2009) described post-conflict peacebuilding as seeking "to prevent the resurgence of conflict and create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies". As such, peacebuilding is a holistic process involving various activities including provision of security, humanitarian aid, development and governance assistance, and (re)building of infrastructure. All these activities attempt to ensure that conflict-prone societies do not relapse back into cycles of conflict (Madoka and Notaras, 2011). UN defines 'post-conflict peacebuilding as the "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). In summary therefore, the above strategies could be analyzed according to the following models.

### **2.1.0 Peacebuilding models**

The researcher reviewed International Peacebuilding models such as Pacification, Rapprochement, Deference, Power sharing agreements and Third Party intervention were discussed to see and understand their relevance and possible application in the context of Wajir conflict. Lederach, (1997) proposes an intervention structure as a pyramid with an

apex representing the top, military, political and/or religious leadership; the middle level representing a mid- range leadership including sector, professional, ethnic, or International NGO leaders; and the grassroots leadership placed at the pyramid base. Each of the three 'spaces' contains activities to further the peacebuilding process. For instance at the top, high level negotiations, ceasefire agreements, and highly visible mediation would be used. At the middle level are problem solving workshops, conflict resolution trainings, and peace commissions. At the base which is the grassroots intervention would suit peace commissions, grassroots trainings, prejudice reduction activities and psycho-social work in trauma recovery (ibid, p.39).

Lund (2001), model offers a peacebuilding 'toolbox' with seven lists of activities. The model consists of both official and non-official conflict management methods. These include socio-economic and political measures, judicial and legal measures and use of Information Education Communication (IEC) in conflict management.

Another model designed by Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) identified community based initiatives, diplomacy, mediation and negotiation as peacebuilding measures. It also recommends Early Warning mechanisms, environmental security, capacity building and policy development among other strategies (CPCC, 2003).

### **2.1.1 Pacification**

Ryan (1992, in Large, 1998) refers to peace without justice as "pacification" a situation where an unjust society is perpetuated through the suppression of violence. Rigby (2001) approaches the issue more flexibly admitting that in the initial phase of a peace settlement the prime commitment should be to broaden and deepen the peace, before justice can be pursued.

This does bring the peace process into tension with the very foundations of long-term reconciliation, namely truth, justice and ultimately forgiveness. However, the threat of recurring violence may force peace-builders to pursue these values in sequential phases during a longer period of time that may be desirable (ibid, p.185).

### **2.1.2 Rapprochement**

In his writing, Rozeff sees rapprochement as an effective peace model in peacebuilding which created positive impacts between Western- Islamic conflicts. He stated thus; "Harmonious relations between the West (led by the U.S.) and Islamic countries and

states are achievable. Some rapprochement already exists. It can be extended. Where peace exists, and much peace does exist, it can be deepened and widened. That is one of the effects of rapprochement” (Rozeff, 2011).

### **2.1.3 Deference**

Smolenski (2005) examines deference in colonial Pennsylvania, to see how claims to political authority were made, justified, and accepted or rejected. He focuses on the "colonial speech economy," that is, the implicit rules that determined who was allowed to address whom and under what conditions, and describes how the qualities that inspired deference changed in the province from 1691 to 1764. Goffman explored the relationship between deference and demeanor in conflict resolution. He argued that a person with a poor demeanor will be held in lower esteem in the eyes of society. The same is true for people who behave in a good demeanor, the society will hold them in a higher esteem (Goffman, 1967). Deference is criticized that it can lead to frustration, resentment, and bad decisions (Ashkenas, 2011).

### **2.1.4 Negative and Positive Peace model**

Galtung (2007) designed ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace model. She sees negative peace as absence of violence while positive peace is a case of having social stability in which the new disputes do not escalate into violence. Social conflicts are expected in any community and as long as a conflict does not take violent forms, it may turn the society into a dynamic and inventive one (Galtung, 2007). She looked at the relationship between the conditions/consequences (Q) vis aviv peace (P). In this theory, Galtung described a functional relationship between Q and P and theorized that the more the condition Q is realized, the more peace P is attained.

### **2.1.5 Power-sharing agreements**

Baker (2001) identifies two ‘peacemaker profiles’ and attributes distinct approaches to both. For instance, whereas ‘conflict managers’ promote an inclusive approach, aim at reconciliation, employ a pragmatic focus, emphasize the process, engage local cultures and norms, presume the moral equivalence of the parties and assume a neutral role;

'democratizes' adhere to universal norms and values, employ an exclusive approach, aim for justice, emphasize the outcome, insist on moral accountability, believe justice to be non-negotiable, and relinquish their neutrality in favour of a principled stance. Baker places a current post-war intervention such as Kosovo firmly within the former (ibid, p.762), while Clapham blames the same approach as having precipitated the genocide in post-settlement (Rwanda, 1998). Clapham further criticizes this increasingly conflict resolution influenced approach being employed by international peace-building interveners, as they bring conflict parties into precarious power-sharing agreements that ignore the power imbalances and thus become hard to sustain (ibid, p.195). Baker (2001) agrees that such power-sharing arrangements fail to reflect the power leverage brought by each of the conflict parties. Furthermore, it also fails to reflect responsibility for human right abuses and war crimes committed by the very leaders that sign up to the precarious peace that often follows civil wars.

#### **2.1.6 Third party intervention**

This model is advocated by Featherston (1998); Lederach (1995); Nordstrom (1992) The model operates on the framework of facilitating 'peacebuilding from below' effort to chart more sustainable and locally owned paths to peace and justice.

From the literature on the models, it is evident that the proponents of the models have differences in emphasis attached to the values of truth, justice, reconciliation and their overall contribution to peace. However, despite of the noted differences, all authors conclude that there is no prescriptive solution for all conflict situations; rather a balanced process must be undertaken that will in time allow the conflicting societies to heal. The researcher seeks to use these models as a basis of studying the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir.

**2.1.7 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** – This model is also known as External Dispute Resolution or Delegalization In Kenya particularly, conflicts among the pastoralist communities is not new; it has become their way of life due to some culturally acceptable practices that foster violent conflicts. Government efforts at resolving these endemic conflicts have often been viewed as foreign, ill-advised and dictatorial. Until the communities came together to devise their 'own' indigenous and negotiated solutions

which the government recognized, peace-building in these areas had largely been a failure.

Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR, is fast becoming the preferred method of resolving disputes and conflicts worldwide to a universality of situations hitherto governed by court processes and warfare among nations. This paradigm shift has been necessitated by the realization of the need to avoid the costly, lengthy and public exhibition of differences that characterize the litigation process. The law system of jurisprudence carries within it the seeds of continued conflict due to its adversarial nature and zero-sum effect of winner and loser in any contested issue. This model is seen as a win-win model.

### **2.1.8 Arbitration**

Arbitration is a proceeding in which a dispute is resolved by an impartial adjudicator whose decision the parties to the dispute have agreed, or legislation has decreed, will be final and binding. There are limited rights of review and appeal of arbitration awards. It is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which is a technique for the resolution of disputes outside the courts, where the parties to a dispute refer it to one or more persons (the "arbitrators", "arbiters" or "arbitral tribunal"), by whose decision (the "award") they agree to be bound. It is a resolution technique in which a third party reviews the evidence in the case and imposes a decision that is legally binding for both sides and enforceable.

The Arbitration Act, 1995 defines arbitration to mean —any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution. This is not very elaborate and regard has to be had on other sources. According to Khan, arbitration is a private consensual process where parties in dispute agree to present their grievances to a third party for resolution. Being a practical mechanism of conflict resolution that has been tested over the years, arbitration has a number of advantages. It is confidential; Parties select an arbitrator privately and proceedings are held privately. The process also has flexibility of time, procedure, venue and is not expensive compared to litigation. Further, there is minimum emphasis on formality, which fact encourages expeditious disposal of matters. Arbitration also limits appeals against awards, a fact which impacts policy on expediency of the arbitral process

### **2.1.9 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission**

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established in Kenya by an Act of Parliament (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act no. 6

of 2008) to investigate the gross human rights violations and other historical injustices in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008. The TJRC was part of the accountability component of Agenda Four (4) of the National Accord signed in 2008. It was established to address the cause and effects of historical injustices and gross violations of human rights which was aimed to contribute towards national unity, reconciliation, and healing.

#### **2.1.10 National Cohesion and Reintegration Commission**

This commission was formed following the signing of the Kenya National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2008. This commission was part of the Agenda Four which created commissions that would address longer term issues (Policy Brief, 2012).

**2.1.11 Mediation**, as used in law, is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a way of resolving disputes between two or more parties with concrete effects. Typically, a third party, the mediator, assists the parties to negotiate a settlement. Disputants may mediate disputes in a variety of domains, such as commercial, legal, diplomatic, workplace, community and family matters.

The term "mediation" broadly refers to any instance in which a third party helps others reach agreement. More specifically, mediation has a structure, timetable and dynamics that "ordinary" negotiation lacks. The process is private and confidential, possibly enforced by law. Participation is typically voluntary. The mediator acts as a neutral third party and facilitates rather than directs the process (*Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*). This approach was successfully used by Dekha Ibrahim in Wajir in 1998 and Mandera Peace Process in 2005. In 2008, during the post- election crisis in Kenya, she again used the same approach to convene "Concerned Citizens for Peace" (CCP), a peace movement that tried to mobilize Kenya's citizens for a non-violent peace-process at a time when the public space was highly critical.

#### **2.1.12 Peace Events and Activities**

These are sports gala events held to bring warring communities together. In Kenya, one such event was held in Amakuriat on the 27<sup>th</sup> July 2012 as a culmination of the initiatives and objectives of the Peace II Programme, and served as a climax of events and activities

in the Karamoja Cluster. The sports event brought together eight (8) teams (4 for females and 4 for males) representing the Karamoja, Turkana and Pokot communities.

### **2.1.13 Disarmament**

Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.). It involves the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population. Normally disarmament is not done in isolation but its operation is conducted concurrently with *demobilization* and *reintegration*.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants. It entails the disbanding of armed groups. Reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict. It is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.

This model is termed as *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*. It is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and is generally the strategy employed by all UN Peacekeeping Operations (*Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*)

### **2.1.14 Negotiation**

This approach was proposed by Roger Fisher and William Ury: who talked of Principled Negotiation. They put forward four principles for effective negotiation which includes; separating people from their problem, focus on interest rather than position, generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement and insisting that the agreement be based on objective criteria. At each stage of the negotiation process, the above principles should be observed. Developing a method for reaching good agreements is central to this model.

### 2.1.15 Conciliation


The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) defines a conciliation hearing as a process where a commissioner (or a panelist, in the case of a bargaining council or agency) meets with the parties in a dispute explores ways to settle the dispute by agreement.

The advantage of conciliation is that it extends the negotiation process and allows for settlement between the parties: for example, where a procedure requires that conciliation be attempted before industrial action can be undertaken, time is allowed for both parties to cool off, for approach each other in a friendlier manner whilst seriously attempting to settle before engaging in industrial action which might eventually destroy the relationship.

If the dispute is settled, the commissioner will draw-up a settlement agreement which both parties sign and then issue a certificate recording that the dispute is settled. A conciliation agreement is final and binding on both parties. If either party fails to uphold the agreement, it can be made an award and thereafter certified as an order of court.

M. Azfalur Rahim designed a conflict management model for solving conflicts as illustrated in Fig.1.

*Fig 1 Conflict Management theory. Model by M.A Rahmin*



Source; The International Journal of Conflict Management.

### **2.2.0 Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Actors in Wajir County**

The peacemaking efforts of the community and government groups in Wajir grew out of desperation at a situation that was causing hardships to the Wajir people. Before 1990, there were no formalized systems to deal with conflict in the region (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

However, some values with which the peace groups were adopted could still be identified. The Peace Groups have operated with assumptions that the conflict in Wajir County is multi-faceted. The conflict stemmed from historical contexts, including the colonial legacy, previous inter-clan conflicts, the conflict between traditions and the modern state, conflicts in neighbouring countries, chronic underdevelopment and marginalization, national and local leadership crises, and environmental factors as discussed in the background to this study. The operating peace groups have been operating on the basis that, although there are significant national and international components to the violence in Wajir, the primary cause of the conflicts was locally-generated as inter-clan problems within the County.

Another observation has been that there were many players/interest groups within the County who were responsible for starting, escalating, and generating the violence for their own ends. Traditional Somali systems of justice, although considered under the circumstances to control and regulate disputes, could also be used to escalate individual disputes to clan levels very quickly. A final thought made by the peace groups was that the access to modern weapons greatly exacerbates problems of violence within a traditional society like north eastern Kenya.

Similarly, there has never been a clear articulation of the peacemaking process. Most of what has been accomplished could be attributed to people with "a heart for peace," rather than training in conflict resolution (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

Based on the above assumptions, a number of strategies and mechanisms have been employed to deal with conflicts in Wajir. These strategies are discussed in details in this chapter under the sub topics below.

### **2.2.1 Local Peace Committees (LPC)**

The use of Local Peace Committees (LPC) is one of the mechanisms which have been employed to manage the perennial conflict in the county. A working definition of a LPC is that it is a committee formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim to encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding processes (Nepal, 2008).

A LPC is by its nature inclusive of the different sections of the community that are in conflict and has the task to promote peace within its own context. Its strategy is characterized by its emphasis on dialogue, promotion of mutual understanding, trust-building, constructive and inclusive solutions to conflict and joint action that is inclusive of all sides of the conflict and that is aimed at reconciliation. Peace Committees (PC) are largely a hybrid structure, borrowing heavily from traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and the modern formal dispute arbitration processes (Pkalya and Adan, 2006).

The increasing frequency, severity and cumulative consequences of conflicts in ASAL areas in Kenya particularly in the late 1980s and better part of the 1990s embraced a number of community based concerted initiatives to reduce the impacts of the then raging conflicts (Pkalya and Adan, 2006). Of particular interest was the emergence of local level peace building processes amongst the pastoralists' and agro-pastoralists' communities in Northern Kenya in mid to late 1990s which initiated peace dialogues, reconciliation meetings and sharing of grazing resources. This in turn took a more convincing shape, resulting to prolonged periods of ceasefire and adherence to inter-community agreed measures (declarations/ agreements) to end hostilities (Pkalya and Adan, 2006). The formation of LPC in Wajir started in 1993 with an initiative by a group of women of the Wajir district of Kenya, bordering Somalia and Ethiopia. At the time a highly destructive cycle of violent conflict raged in the district between different clans of Kenyan Somalis, leading to 1 213 deaths over a period of 4 years (Odendaal, 2007).

In Wajir County, the LPCs include, Wajir Peace and Development Committee, (WPDC), District Peace Committee (DPC), Peace elders (Al Fatah), Religious leaders, Cross Border Peace Committees (CBPC), Livestock Marketing Mediation Council (LMMC), Women for Peace (WFP), Water Users Association (WUA), and Pastoralists Association

(PA). These LPCs were seen to be effective due to the fact that they use conflict resolution methodologies that are indigenous to the particular community involved in conflicts. Traditional approaches emphasize local values and customs, and are more accessible to local communities because they cost less than the formal methods such as using the courts. They are also more flexible in terms of their scheduling and procedures; and they are more accessible because they use local languages and symbols (Pkalya et al, 2004).

Religious leadership, including Islamic leadership, has played a prominent role in pressuring local parties to reach accords through mediation by the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) (Menkhaus, 2005). Ndegwa, (2001) cited WPDC in particular, to have reached some notable milestones towards peace building in the region despite the fact that conflict in the region is still common.

WPDC has also helped in facilitation of the enforcement of Al Fatah declaration and use of Somali practices, including formal traditional apologies (*sabeen*), compensation, and blood money payments as conflict resolution mechanisms (Ibrahim and Jenner 1996). However, WPDC lacks the capacity to prevent large-scale communal clashes, or address the underlying causes of armed conflict in the region (Menkhaus, 2005).

### **2.2.2 Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

NGOs bring some notable advantages in conflict situations. They have a long history of engagement in countries experiencing violent conflict and because of their long-term commitment and extensive in-country networks, they have considerable knowledge of local conditions and tend to have greater acceptability with indigenous populations than many national and international institutions. Their strengths, particularly in conflict situations, lie in the fact that they are relatively independent, they are non-bureaucratic, are well informed and well connected. They have an inbuilt flexibility that allows them to be innovative with responses and, perhaps most important, they have a long-term perspective to their programmes.

In conflict resolution work, NGOs can function in areas where diplomats and politicians cannot operate because of political constraints and in areas where official actors often cannot gain access. They can have contact with different parties to the conflict without losing their own credibility. Because of their contact with grassroots communities, they

can build peace constituencies at a local level and mobilize public opinion to increase political will to actively work for peace.

Many local agencies have acquired conflict resolution skills because of training interventions by NGOs (Mackinlay, 1996). NGOs have emphasized on, and facilitate transferring knowledge between organizations involved in peacebuilding through field evaluation and consultation. These have produced influential policy documents such as the OECD 1997 Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation; UN 1992/1995 Agenda for Peace, and the 2000 UN Brahimi Report which are used by peace actors.

In Wajir, the role of NGOs and CBOs in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution has therefore been mainly a facilitative factor. Their collaboration with LPCs brings in several essential resources such as vehicles, fuel, food, and development follow-up. Ndegwa (2001) noted that to respond to conflict in the vast arid area it is necessary to have access to all-terrain vehicles and fuel which, alternatively, NGOs such as PACT (K) have been providing (Ndegwa, 2001). NGOs such as Oxfam (UK and Ireland), has been involved in the work of the peace groups. In addition to providing funding for various activities, Oxfam provided their vehicles, personnel, and logistics (fax, photocopying, etc.) for the work of the peace groups in the county. UNICEF provided assistance before its pull-out from the District in mid-1994 (Ibrahim and Janice, 1996). Other funding has been provided by Quaker Peace and Service and Mennonite Central Committee. Donors have provided approximately 50% of the funds used by the peace groups, with the other 50% coming from local sources.

USAID has funded several research and evaluation programmes on conflict situation one of which was in 2005 under the title Conflict Management in East Africa (Blue, 2005). DAI in conjunction with USAID also sponsored an assessment project on conflict mitigation and initiatives within Wajir which aimed at engaging the communities and governments in cross-border problem-solving inter-clan dialogue processes. This brought on board a consortium of NGOs such as, Regional Economic Development Services Office (REDSO) in Nairobi, Kenya, the Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE II) Program which is managed by the USAID/REDSO Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office.

Other NGOs who have conducted conflict research programmes in the county through funds from USAID include MSI, AED, PACT Inc. NGOs have also facilitated rapid response in the event of an outbreak of violent conflicts although it is noted that the capacity for that rapid response is weak (DAI, 2005).

Based on the peace diaries of WPDA, in which they note every intervention, the rapid response team has to intervene 10-20 times a month on average. During periods of drought, the figures are manifestly higher than during periods with enough water and pasture. This indicates some sort of relationship between conflict and resource availability. The team was not always able to avoid escalation of the conflicts into violence, as was the case in 1998 and 2000 (Pkalya et al., 2003).

PACT- Kenya and PEACE II initiated projects called *Peace Dividend Projects* in these areas as a way of creating inter-dependency among the conflicting communities in form of dispensaries and schools (PACT Kenya Report, 2011). In January 2011, CEPAR in conjunction with PACT- Kenya and USAID organized a two weeks International Training in Garissa towards sustainable peace in the region. The program called *Action Research in Peacebuilding* was launched in Garissa where 55 participants working for peace from different agencies (both civil society and government) were invited. The purpose of the program was to produce practical knowledge that is useful to community based peacebuilding practitioners.

However, the challenges that NGOs face in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution make their initiatives for peacebuilding unsustainable, inequitable, unaccountable and illegitimatized (Wallace, 1999).

### **2.2.3 The role of state in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir County**

Whether responding to humanitarian needs or root causes of conflict, a fundamental problem in Kenya has been lack of an institutional framework and co-ordinated approach to conflict management. Interventions by government and non-governmental actors in various conflicts in the country are as old as the conflicts themselves, yet conflicts continue unabated. This is largely because responses have been uncoordinated and lack a strong institutional framework. As a result, most actors engage on ad hoc basis that are reactionary in nature. Lack of norms, values and principles to guide interventions, has in

certain situations exacerbated conflicts. In addition, sufficient resources have not been mobilized to prevent latent conflicts and enable rapid response when conflicts occur (OOP, 2009). The state has therefore formulated a National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management which was developed in September 2009.

The Kenyan government and Kenyan political dynamics have, on a number of levels, been viewed by the Somali community as a major conflict driver in the border area. But it is equally true that the impressive improvement in regional peace and security has been the result of positive Kenyan government intervention and policies. This has been due in part to a greater level of commitment to regional security and conflict prevention on the part of some branches of the Kenyan government. District Commissioners have been active in promoting peace and security; being the Chair of District Security Committee. In Wajir, there is also a District Peace Committee which is established by the government. The Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP), in the Office of the President, has expanded its work beyond rangeland and water issues to include conflict issues, the same with Ewaso Ngiro North Development Authority (ENNDA). The Kenyan military and police possess a greater commitment to border security as part of counter-terrorism policies. The government has also demonstrated its openness to partnership with civic groups to promote peace and security, including accepting “internally regulated group relations to bypass state legal institutions” (Menkhaus, 2005).

The state has tried to adopt a state-civic partnership strategy as a conflict resolution and management approach in northeastern Kenya. The result has been a “mediated state” arrangement, in which the Kenyan government partners with local non-state, civic, and traditional actors to fulfill core functions including conflict mediation, cross-border diplomacy, and the dispensation of justice, normally associated with the state,. However, researchers have also struggled to explain exactly what this partnership is in peacebuilding. Some have described it as an “ad hoc” arrangement by local officials overwhelmed by borderland lawlessness. Those coming from a peace-building and NGO perspective have tended to explain it as local or grassroots movement to which government has acquiesced on limited matters of conflict management (Menkhaus, 2005).

In some cases the state has used the security organs to enforce law and order and manage conflict especially when it involves use of lethal firearms in inter-clan wars and violence by imposing of curfews and administer state security operations like the Wagalla operation of 1984.

### **2.3.0 Constraints to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir County**

All acutely or latently violent conflicts involve highly complex and rapidly changing constellations which usually can only be influenced from outside to a limited extent. Although such situations have many common denominators, each conflict requires a combination of measures tailored to its specific features. Experience demonstrates that a number of challenges and dilemmas arise, each of which requires a specific solution (Ropers, 2002).

Richmond and Newman, (2006) argue that many ceasefires and peace agreements in civil conflict are initially unsuccessful. Some give way to renewed, and often escalating, violence. In other cases, peace processes have become lengthy and circular negotiations in which concessions are rare. They identified what they call ‘spoilers’ groups and tactics that attempt to obstruct or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means, including terrorism and violence. These spoilers must be managed during conflict resolution (Richmond and Newman, 2006).

Most conflicts are also rooted in an inequitable distribution of power and resources. This may be a cause of conflict, for instance where individual groups are the victims of massive economic, cultural or political discrimination. For conflict management, the question then arises of how they can be empowered without the risk of violent escalation being created.

All peace-making activities in situations of acute conflict face pressures from different directions. On the one hand they face the question of whether they should incorporate or support a physical separation of the parties, in order to reduce the risk of violent conflicts. On the other hand they face the task of seeking rapprochement involving encounters, dialogue and cooperation that is more viable in the long term. In the long term, only the

path of encounter and dialogue is likely to safeguard peace. In the short and medium term, however, it may be necessary to select a combination of measures appropriate to the particular case in hand, involving physical separation for a limited period (Ropers, 2002)

Lack of coordination and cooperation in the field among peace builders is another constraint to peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes. The consensus about peacebuilding is described by Barakat and Chard (ibid) as representing only agreement about what agencies ought to be doing, but not a transformation of approaches in the field. Stiefel (in Barakat and Chard, 2002) adds that despite a growing consensus about peacebuilding, inappropriate strategies identified by critical literature in the 1980s and 1990s are still evident due to the resistance to change within the very same organizations advocating it.

Hippel (2002) argues that there may be a consensus amongst the different peace builders on general aims, such as a general preference of peace, democracy and economic development, but beyond that, crucial differences emerge in terms of different missions, organizational cultures, sources of support, and dominant constituencies (ibid).

#### **2.4.1 Constraints faced by Local Peace Committees**

Wajir LPCs have been constrained in several ways in their endeavor to achieve peace in the region. Using Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), among the most important is shortage of resources to facilitate rapid response to conflict and to allow for institutionalization of peace infrastructure. The fact that WPDC has always had to cobble together resources from several sympathetic partners including individuals to respond to conflicts indicates its very weak capacity. WPDC has operated on its own local fund-raising efforts so far without much input from supportive or admiring partners. The extent of local support has included the elders and women giving freely of their time for peace activities and thus taking them away from their own livelihood duties. The government officials and NGO employees usually have to take off work or work on their own time for the efforts;

Apart from resource scarcity, WPDC also suffers from organizational and structural weaknesses. It is a nebulous structure, whose strength is that it is a hub of collaboration but which then undermines its institutionalization. As such many of its internal workings are reliant on personal and professional ties developed from close physical proximity.

Moreover, the WPDC's close relationship with the government is difficult to characterize precisely and thus to project its implications. Is it a client, an independent peace organ, a component of the security infrastructure, or a useful but ultimately dependent ally? Indeed, close relations with the government may taint an organization's reactions to social issues (Ndegwa 1996). This is so especially in a case where the organization is dependent on the government at several levels and is dealing in an area that is clearly at the core of the imperatives of the state (i.e. security). It is clear that while the activities of the Wajir PDC indicate wide latitude, it is one that may ultimately be circumscribed by state interests.

It is also crucial to note that the very nature of the conflict in Wajir, and Northeastern Province as a whole, poses the ultimate challenge to the LPCs. The conflict is driven, as noted earlier, by poverty, environmental challenges, and clanisms, complicated by state action and inaction. The environmental regimes of cyclical droughts often accompanied by famine and herd depletion, the intense competition for pasture and water all fuel a vicious cycle of despair, conflict, and violence.

More importantly, LPCs cannot coerce compliance. They have – and should have - no 'teeth'. They are only successful in so far as the softer approaches to peacebuilding are appropriate. LPCs will not be successful when there is a lack of political will towards peace at national level (Ball 1998).

It cannot be expected of LPCs to address the root causes of conflict, namely the larger political, social or economic systems (International Alert 1993; Adan and Pkalya 2006).

At most, LPCs enable local communities to minimize damage to their communities and maximize cooperation in matters over which they have control. Lastly, LPCs are no substitute for local government bodies such as Chiefs, DOs, DCs or the justice system. They may facilitate consensus on decisions to be made, but they cannot and should not make or enforce those decisions. The moment LPCs are invested with power, they will become an arena for contesting power and thereby lose the critical element of their success – being a non-threatening space where communities search for inclusive, mutually beneficial options to their problems (Odendaal and Olivier, 2006).

These are issues that pose challenges and constraints to Wajir LPCs.

#### **2.4.2 Constraints faced by Non Governmental Organizations**

Consistent donor support is therefore lacking with the effect of reducing the capacity of the group to respond effectively and efficiently to conflict situations, to support early warning and rapid response systems, and to implement peace resolutions. Donor support has at best been sporadic. For instance, Oxfam has provided emergency funds, vehicles, or food but not programmatic support.

#### **2.4.3 Constraints faced by State mechanisms**

According to the Constitution and other laws of Kenya, it is the role of the judiciary to solve conflicts between individuals, amongst communities and between citizens and the state. However, in the arid lands, (Wajir included) the judicial institutions play only a marginalized role in addressing local conflicts. Peace process through state mechanism is largely in the office of the District Commissioner who is the head of Security in the district.

According to Ibrahim and Jenner (2002), the District government has shown that it is capable of maintaining peace and enforcing security within the District. However, the capacity to continue this depends, in very large part, on a strong, committed District Commissioner. A change of District Administration could potentially harm peace efforts (Ibrahim and Jenner, 2006). This therefore means that there is lack of continuity for sustainable peacebuilding mechanisms due to the fact that the DCs are and will always be frequently transferred as per the nature of their work.

Law enforcement agencies also have difficulties to physically operate in the arid land's vast and harsh terrain and mostly they receive little support from the locals. The state mechanisms are therefore seen as weak and by large unable to prevent, respond to or pacify conflicts in the region.

As for the judiciary, one of the reasons for the limited impact is the great distances which prevent many people from physically accessing the courts. Most magistrate courts, which constitute the lowest level of the judiciary, are located in district capitals. To reach them from a more remote area usually requires a long and arduous journey. There are no incentives for witnesses to take on the burden of such travel just to attend a trial. In addition to the costs of travelling, the costs of filing a case at court are high in

comparison to the income levels of the population, making it nearly impossible for many to seek redress before a court for their grievances. Another obstacle is posed by the long duration of trials, in which the parties may be called back to the court for hearings. If an incident is not concluded immediately, acts of revenge are likely to be undertaken. For that reason, not many parties to a conflict find themselves in a position where they can go to the court and wait for the outcome of a case. Judiciary also faces a challenge of discrepancy between official laws/legal processes and the ideas and the value systems of the local population in relation to the crime definition and prosecution prescription. This discrepancy has serious impact on stability of the region and is seen as a driver for retaliatory conflicts. With the above constraints the researcher seeks to assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms as discussed below.

#### **2.4.0 Conditions that sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir**

In their book, *The Never Ending War*, Dobson and Payne stated that “In business of combating terrorists, the lesson is always the same. Success against the killer leads to less vigilance among the defenders. As soon as things appear to be under control, the enemy strikes again.” They therefore recommended consistent monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work as a necessary condition (Dobson and Payne 1987).

In his study of eight peace settlements, Hampson (1996) assessed the factors that made them succeed or fail and found that third party intervention contributed greatly to successful post settlement peacebuilding (ibid, pp.9, 210). Large (1998) believes that the unique resources that local actors bring to the process makes it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. This school of thought place more emphasis in the ownership of the process by local constituencies to ensure sustainability where peacebuilding intervention enable indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either expectations or packaged solutions” (ibid, p.157). Diamond (1999) also believes that peace must be built “from the inside out” and that interventions may only hope to catalyze change that must be brought about by local peace builders.

Stiefel in Barakat and Chard, (2002) argues that local ownership should not only be viewed as participation but should entail transfer of control from donors to recipients as local solutions tend to be “more effective, cheaper and more sustainable” (ibid, p.827).

This 'peacebuilding from below' has been criticized as being blind to social justice, when local 'unjust' power structures are strengthened through the engagement of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. The gender dimension must also be mainstreamed if a positive peace is to be built Reimann, (2001). A gender analysis of peacebuilding policy implementation can help avoid what Pankhurst and Pearce (1997) refer to as a 'gendered peace', where gender-blind interventions fail to adequately address women's needs.

The structures set up to implement peace-building processes are often top-heavy, namely they concentrate both efforts and resources at the top level. Moreover, as has been identified by Uvin (2002), the trend towards greater coherence and coordination amongst international peacebuilding agencies further challenges the ownership of the process by local actors. Although this fact gives more prominence to outside interveners, the need for locally owned processes is generally accepted.

Havermans (1999) praises the ability of official diplomacy to mobilize huge resources to entice or coerce, with 'carrots' or 'sticks', the warring parties to negotiation.

Bercovitch (1991) in his study of mediation in international conflict found that "[...] the leader of a government, possessing rank and prestige and having some 'leverage', has a better chance of mediating successfully than any other actor".

However, Jacobsen and Brand-Jacobsen (2002) criticize the focus on leaders as assuming that the appropriate representatives can be found, and that they will articulate and advocate the interests of their constituencies. This emphasis at the top may leave populations feeling isolated from the process, and thus top-level mediation must not be conducted in a 'void'. Manning (2003) also highlights the challenges to implementation at the local level of a centrally agreed peace process. The lack of connectedness between the top and lower levels of the intervention must be overcome to make peacebuilding sustainable. Lederach (1997) proposes a multi-level approach to peacebuilding that increases inter-connectedness between levels of intervention and co-operation between actors involved. The involvement of all sectors of society in peace-building is also highlighted by Tongeren (1999) as a key aspect but often overlooked by interveners. Grassroots approaches include Alger (1991) who acknowledges the potential role of the population as 'peace-builders', without whose "knowledge, participation and support", institutions "[...] cannot attain a strong and lasting peace". Walker (1998) highlights the

potential for transformation by 'critical social movements' that challenge authority and power from marginalized standpoints, including gender.

Lewer and Ramsbotham (1993) suggest 'multi-track' diplomacy as an effective way to tackle 'ethnic and regional conflict' whose complexity requires a 'systems approach' and the premise that change at the grassroots cannot be imposed from above. Similarly, Fisher and Keashly, (1991) in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, (2000) suggest a 'multi-modal, multi-level approach' in which different but complimentary activities are employed to tackle the multiple causation of 'inter-communal conflict' at every level of the intervention.

### **2.50 Assessing the Effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in Wajir County**

The researcher identified and described the peace models used by the mechanisms, constraints to peacebuilding and conditions that sustain peacebuilding in order to assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms. However, based on the preliminary findings from the literature review, the mechanisms have many limitations which could have been the reason why conflict in the region is perennial and even moments perceived to be peaceful are just because there is absence of violence which does not necessarily mean presence of peace.

### **2.6.0 Theoretical Framework**

This research was guided by two theories namely Peacebuilding theory and Conflict Resolution theory

#### **2.6.1 Peacebuilding Theory**

Under peacebuilding theory, the research adopted *Democratization theory*. This theory is based on multidimensional approach to peacebuilding. The proponent of this theory suggests that for peace to become viable, it is not only the conditions that generate conflict that needs to be addressed. In addition, peacebuilding should be designed in such a way that the dysfunctions can be avoided. The theory further suggests that peacebuilding need to focus on security and designing self sustaining institutions.

Otherwise, there is risk that peacebuilding gives rise to new conflicts or that it undermines democratization.

The theory of democratization has become integral part of the conflict prevention agenda and since 1990s multidimensional peace organizations have become the model of contemporary peace promotions not only to prevent violence but also to address the root causes of conflicts.

In *An Agenda for Peace (1992)* former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali applied this theory by suggesting that post-war peacebuilding was a form of conflict prevention via social and political reconstruction. In 1996 the *Agenda for Peace* was supplemented by the *Agenda for Democratization* and the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan further developed the notion that democratization is part of peacebuilding (United Nations, 2001).

This theory proposes economic reconstruction for sustainable peace and further argues that for sustainable peace, mechanisms such as disarmament and demobilization of previously warring groups, destruction of weapons, reformation of security sectors and issues related to democratization such as transformation of rebel groups into political parties must be applied (Jarstad and Sisk). This theory was relevant to this study because it addresses the structural transformation which addresses the individual needs in the community and this is one way of addressing the resource based conflicts. By transforming the structures, equity is also addressed.


### **2.6.2 Conflict Resolution Theory**

Under conflict resolution theory, the research considered Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) approaches to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This approach includes dispute resolution processes and techniques that act as a means for disagreeing parties to come to an agreement short of litigation. It is a collective term for the ways that parties can settle disputes, with (or without) the help of a third party. This theory was more applicable because ADR has gained widespread acceptance among both the general public and the legal profession in recent years as it uses conflict resolution mechanisms that are acceptable by the community such as mediation, arbitration, conciliation and negotiation, Kariuki (2001), and there is also a perception that ADR imposes fewer costs than litigation, a preference for confidentiality, and the desire of some parties to have

greater control over the selection of the individual or individuals who will decide their dispute. This model is seen to yield a win-win result.

In Kenya particularly, Government efforts at resolving the endemic conflicts in the pastoralist communities like in Wajir have often been viewed as foreign, ill-advised and dictatorial. Until the communities came together to devise their 'own' indigenous and negotiated solutions which the government recognized, peace-building in these areas had largely been a failure.

**2.71 Conceptual framework**



**Research plan**

<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Sources of Data</b>	<b>Measurable Variable</b>	<b>Tools and Equipments</b>
To assess the use and relevance of the mechanisms employed in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir.	Key Informants, NGOs, Religious leaders, State officials, FGD Secondary data	Familiarity with peacebuilding processes Representation of various interest groups in institutions/organizations Financial and institutional resources and capacity Nature of strategies, channels and resources for peacebuilding and conflict resolution	Questionnaire pen, note book Interpreter
To analyze the constraints to peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms	Key Informants, NGOs, Religious leaders Secondary data FGD State officials	Resource availability and distribution and power sharing among local populations Confidence/ trust in peacebuilding and security institutions Proximity to peacebuilding institutions and timeline for rulings and justice Construction of physical infrastructure Stability and continuity in peacebuilding agencies	Questionnaire, Camera, pen, note book Interpreter
To assess the conditions which sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution	Key Informants, NGOs, Religious leaders Secondary data State officials FGD	Community involvement and support towards peacebuilding processes Regularity and locations of peace meetings and dialogues Resource distribution and power sharing among local populations Coordination among peace and security agencies Regularity of trainings	Questionnaire, Camera, pen, note book Interpreter

<p>To assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms.</p>	<p>Key Informants, NGOs, Religious leaders  Secondary data  State officials  FGD</p>	<p>Prevalence of conflicts  Stability and continuity of socio- economic life  Availability of functional conflict early warning and rapid response networks and resources  Competence of staffs in peacebuilding operations and missions  Resources and capacity for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms response  Number of participatory groups/ agencies in peace  Support for disarmament activities  Regularity and consistency in delivery of peace messages  Community involvement and support towards peacebuilding processes  Relations with external groups</p>	<p>Questionnaire, Camera, pen, note book  Interpreter</p>
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## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter presented a description of the study site and the study design. It also presented the techniques used in sampling, data collection and analysis.

#### 3.1 Site Description

Wajir County is an Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL). The county covers an area of 56,501km<sup>2</sup> and approximately 10 percent of Kenya country land mass (*See map in appendix 7.6*). The population is approximately 630,000 people. As an ASAL, farming is severely limited, making pastoralism the most viable form of productive land use. Rainfall is very minimal with an annual average of between 250mm and 300mm and an annual evaporation of about 300mm. The County is therefore characterized with perennial drought spell creating serious scarcity of pasture and water. This creates high competition over these scarce resources and opening avenue for conflicts over the resources. The main source of income in the county is livestock keeping which contributes to approximately 63 percent of the income (ALRMP, 2011).

The county is divided into four main regions namely Wajir East which is mostly occupied by the Degodia clan, Wajir South which is occupied by the Ogaden Clan, Wajir West which is occupied by the Ajuaan. It is Wajir West where Wagalla is situated. Wagalla is famous in the Kenyan history because of the famous Wagalla massacre of 1984 which left over 500 men from Degodia clan dead. The massacre was as a result of inter-clan conflict between Degodia who had guns and other Somali clans. Wajir North is mostly the Garre community (Cassanelli, 1982). The study also focused on Wajir central which is the headquarters of Wajir county due to its being cosmopolitan and accommodates all these four clans and whenever conflict occurs in the peripheral divisions, it spills over to Wajir town.

Due to nomadic pastoralism nature of the communities, conflicts normally occur when members of one community cross to the other in search for pasture and water. It is during such migration times when issues like livestock theft or rape occur and the affected

community retaliates which in turn escalates into inter clan violence as was witnessed in Wajir in August 2012.

Sometimes one clan blocks the others from accessing pasture in their region especially when it rains in one region of the county and not the others. Competition for business and political supremacy in Wajir town is also a conflict factor making it an epicenter for conflict which would in turn spread to the other periphery locations. Wajir East and Wajir South were also very critical in terms of their proximity to Kenya- Somalia border thus provide easy proliferation of small arms and contraband goods to Wajir town. These are also areas which are prone to cross- border conflicts especially at Konton in Wajir East, Gherille in Wajir South which was attacked by Al shabaab in January 2012 and two government officials, a District Officer and Registrar of persons kidnapped. There is also Diiff in Wajir South which is also right at the border.

### **3.2 Research Design**

According to Mugenda (2008), research design refers to overall conception of the study. It refers to the process that the researcher will follow from conception to completion of the study. It is a blue print that enables the investigator to come up with solutions to the problems and helps structure the collection, analysis and interpretation of data. It is also a logical model of prove that allows a researcher to draw inferences concerning casual relations between variables under investigation.

This study adopted a survey design. The research design referred to the nature and outlook of the research applied which involved qualitative and quantitative data. The reason for opting for this design was because it allowed quick collection and analysis of data. It also made it easier to standardize in terms of relating with the cross-section of respondents. This design was also the most ideal as the researcher could not move with respondents who are by nature nomads with no permanent settlements. It was also the most ideal since the researcher was an outsider and was not able to conduct intensive field investigation due to cultural, religious and language differences. It was therefore the best design which could bring deeper insight and better understanding of the mechanisms in order to assess their effectiveness in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

### **3.3 Units of Analysis**

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), define unit of analysis as the entity around which the researcher seek to make generalization. This is the major entity that was being studied. It is 'what' or 'whom' was being studied. In this study it constituted the peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms among the clans of Wajir.

### **3.4 Units of Observation**

According to Mugenda and Nugenda (2003), this is the subject, object, item or entity from which we measure the characteristic or obtain the data required in the research study. These were the definite sites of the study. They included water points, market places, school curricula, health centres and peace meeting sites where events, activities, behaviours and moods were observed. These helped in gathering qualitative data.

### **3.5 Sources of data**

Sources of data for this study included religious leaders, elders, women, youths, teachers, business persons, CBO representatives and medical personnel. There were also members and officials of NGOs, LPCs, District Peace Committee, Security Personnel, political leaders, Human Rights Watch, Al fatah elders, and the Judiciary who have special/extensive knowledge about the topic and were able to contribute.

Secondary data were obtained from print and electronic sources.

### **3.6 Study Population**

The study population was Wajir County consisting of the clans of Degodia, Ajuran, Ogaden and Garre which are spread into five regions of the county. The study focused on the five regions namely; Wajir East (Khorof Harar), Wajir West (Griftu), Wajir South (Diif), Wajir North (Buna) and Wajir Central (Wajir). *(See map of Wajir County on appendix 7.6)*. In Wajir Central two households were selected each from Degodia and Ogaden because they are the majority clans in Wajir town. The others were one each.

There were also respondents identified for interview from organizations and individuals which instituted Key Informants and Focus Group Discussions.


**Table 1. Distribution of Clans According to Regions**

Regions	Clans
Wajir East	Degodia
Wajir West	Ogaden
Wajir North	Ajuraan
Wajir South	Garre
Wajir Central	Degodia/ Ogaden/Ajuran/Garre

**Table 2. Household Sampling according to Clans**

Clans	Households
Degodia	32
Ogaden	32
Ajuraan	28
Garre	28
Total	120

**Fig 2. Household Sampling According to Clans**



### 3.7 Sample size and Sampling method

Sampling was carried out among the four clans which are Degodia, Ajuraan, Garre and Ogaden. Simple random sampling was used since the population is homogeneous. Twenty four households were selected from each of the four study sites ie Khorof Harar, Griftu, Diif and Buna. In Wajir Central Systematic Random Sampling was used for selection of households. Sixteen households were selected from the Degodia and Ogaden clans with each clan eight households while four household each from Ajuraan and Garre. A sample of 120 was drawn from the target population.

*Table 3. Household Sampling According to Geographical Area/Locality*

	Distribution	Number
Households	Diif	24
	Khorof Harar	24
	Griftu	24
	Buna	24
	Wajir Central	24
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>120</b>

For Focus Group Discussions, 40 participants were drawn using purposive method to select participants who were believed to discuss the issues related to the objective of the study. These were drawn from organizations and special groups in each of the five study sites. Five focus Group Discussions were held at different study sites at different times. The distribution was summarized in table 4.

**Table 4 Sampling According to Organizations and Special Interest Groups for FGD**

<b>Organizations</b>	Religious (Sheikh)	5
	Peace elders	5
	Women For Peace	5
	Youth Groups	5
	CBO	5
	Medical personnel	5
	Teachers	5
	Business persons	5
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>40</b>

For Key Informants, non-probability sampling or purposive method was again used to interview key informants who were selected due to their special knowledge and their ability to give relevant information about the topic. The study sampled 10 key informants for interview as distributed in table 5 below.

**Table 5 Sampling of Key Informants**

<b>Key Informants</b>	Police	1
	NGO	1
	Judiciary	1
	CBO	1
	LPC	1
	DPC	1
	Councilor	1
	District Commissioner	1
	Human Rights Watch	1
	Al Fatah elder	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>10</b>

### **3.8. Methods and Tools of Data Collection.**

Data collection refers to the gathering of information to serve or prove some facts (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). The study entailed a collection of both primary and secondary data.

#### **3.8.0 Data collection Methods and Techniques**

These included Focus Group Discussions, Oral Interviews, Observation and Key Informant Interviews which were used to collect primary data. For secondary data, Documentary review method was used.

##### **3.8.0a Focus Group Discussions**

The researcher established 5 focus groups in total. However these five focus groups were spread in each of the five study sites as follows, Khorof Harar (1) group, Diif (1) group, Buna (1) group, Griftu (1) group and Wajir Central (1) group..

##### **3.8.0b Individual Respondents**

These were individuals who were interviewed from 120 randomly selected households (*Bullas*) in the five study sites (24 households from each study site) which were Khorof Harar, Griftu, Buna, Diif and Wajir Central. They were interviewed to give their views in this study for comparative analysis besides those of the respondents within FGD and KII. They were mainly household heads. Individual respondents helped in answering the research question 1 of the research and helped during the analysis for objective 4 which is about assessing the effectiveness of the mechanisms.

##### **3.8.0c Observation**

This is a qualitative data collection method which was used simultaneously with the other methods. The researcher observed attitudes during the interviews. The researcher also went to various sites such as water points, markets, hospitals and schools to observe the trends.

##### **3.8.0d Key Informant Interviews (KII)**

The study interviewed 10 key informants. These were people who are officials in the NGOs, CBOs, LPCs, District Peace Committee, Security Personnel, Political leader, Human Rights Watch, Al fatah elder, and the Judiciary who may have special/extensive knowledge about the topic and are able to contribute towards the questions in the KII schedule. This method was instrumental in gathering data related to all the research

questions and helping the researcher to achieve objectives of the research. The method enabled the researcher to identify and describe the mechanisms, understand constraints and conditions to peacebuilding.

### **3.8.1 Data collection Tools and Instruments**

The tools and instruments used to collect primary data for this study included Interview guides, focus group discussion guides and questionnaires.

#### **3.8.1a Questionnaire**

Face-to-face structured and unstructured questionnaires and interview schedule were used in this study. The questionnaires had both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The questionnaires were subjected to key peace actors/agencies and institutions with past and current interventions to determine the nature and approaches of interventions towards conflict mitigation.

#### **3.8.1b Focus Group Discussion Guide**

A structured and unstructured discussion guide was used for organized focus groups discussions.

#### **3.8.1c Key Informant Interview Guide**

Key informant guides were used to collect data from the key informants during data collection for this study.

### **3.9 Data analysis**

The data generated from this study was both quantitative and qualitative. Descriptive statistics was used to present the data. The data was organized into frequencies and percentages for analysis.

The data were prepared and processed with the aid of a computer spread sheet program and subsequently presented in charts, tables and graphs to allow easy interpretation.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter deals with the presentation and discussions of the findings. The data are organized into themes emerging from the responses given in relation to the study objectives.

#### Gender Distribution of the Respondents


*Table 6. Gender of the respondents*

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	109	91
Female	11	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

In this study, more males (91.25%) than females (8.75%) were interviewed. This was attributed to the patriarchal nature of the society and cultural stereotype where women are not allowed to interact freely with foreigners, more particularly when they are men. The religious beliefs also played part in that Muslim women are submissive and should not be seen to be out going. The few women who participated were women who have some status in the community, one of them being a nominated councilor.

This therefore showed that the peacebuilding process in the region lacked inclusivity as women were marginalized and were not given opportunity to participate.

*Fig 3. Gender distribution of the respondents*




## Age Distribution of the respondents

**Table 7. Age Distribution of Respondents**

Age	Frequency
Above 50 years	78
Below 50 years	42
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

The majority of the interviewees were over 50 years of age (65%). However the ages of the interviewees ranged between 24 years and 72 years. This was attributed to the fact that elders are regarded as the key decision makers in the community. The sensitivity of serious inter-clan issues such as conflicts is entrusted to be handled by elders and therefore youth and children are viewed to have no experience to contribute. Again this was consistent with the cultural expectation of the community where elders are seen as the spokesmen of the community.

**Fig.4. Age Distribution of Respondents**




**Table 8. Witnessing of conflict in the region**

<b>Witnessing of conflict</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
YES	98
NO	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

From the study, 82 percent of the respondents confirmed that they had witnessed or had been involved in inter clan conflict in the region. 67 percent reported to have been participated in conflicts in the last two years. This explains why conflict is considered frequent in the region. If 82 percent had witnessed conflict in the last two years, it confirms that conflict prevalence is very high in the region and this would be interpreted to mean that the mechanisms in place for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region are not effective.

**Fig.5. Witnessing of conflict**



#### 4.1 Assessing the use and relevance of the Mechanisms for peacebuilding.

The study assessed the mechanisms employed by the peace actors in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. To assess this, the study identified the peacebuilding actors and who are involved in peacebuilding within those actors, and the mechanisms they employ. The study also examined how these mechanisms are utilized by the 12 actors to understand which ones are commonly used in order to assess their effectiveness. Also examined was the level of community familiarity and confidence with those peacebuilding actors within the county.

##### 4.1.1 Mechanisms and strategies


This study revealed that even though there were twenty one organizations involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the county, the respondents were only familiar with only twelve of those organizations which were categorized under three classes- Local Peace Committees, State Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations. The study revealed that the Local Peace Committee as peacebuilding actor had the highest number of groups involved in peacebuilding. They included Al Fatah, Peace elders, Women for Peace, Youth for Peace, Pastoralist Associations and Religious Leaders. The State as an actor included Provincial Administration, The Police and the Judiciary. Within the NGO were Wajir Peace and Development Agency, Wajir South Development agency (WASDA) and Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF) as illustrated in the table below.

**Table 9 Peacebuilding actors**

Local Peace Committees	State Agencies	NGOs
Al Fatah*	Provincial Administration	Wajir Peace and Development Agency (WPDA)
Peace elders	Judiciary	WASDA
Women For Peace (WFP)	Kenya Police	ALDEF
Pastoralist Association/		
Youth For Peace		
Religious leaders		

\*Al Fatah- Council of Elders comprising of Imams, Sheikhs and highly respected community elders entrusted for handling cases involving Somali inter-clans

**Fig 6 Distribution of peacebuilding organizations**



#### **4.1.2 Level at which the Peacebuilding mechanisms are commonly used.**

The study identified 12 mechanisms used by the peacebuilding actors in the region. These mechanisms included.

**Informal Peace Agreements/Accords (IPAA)** These were found to be peace accords signed between different warring clans as a means of resolving the conflicts and building peace among the communities. The research found such agreements which included Degodia- Marehan Accord in Wair, Garissa Declaration (2002), Modogashe Declaration (2001) and Mandera Accord. These Informal Peace Agreements were found to be used only by the Local Peace Committees and more particularly Al Fatah and Peace Elders. This means that only 17 percent of the peacebuilding actors use this mechanism for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This finding was an evident that this mechanism is not commonly utilized yet it is one of the models that is appropriate in peacebuilding as it is a homegrown approach to peacebuilding.

**Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (TCRM)** This referred to the traditional way of conflict resolution. These were found to be based on culture and norms of the Somali community which they called *Heer*. The research revealed that only three peacebuilding actors out of the 12 in the region were using this mechanism. These were Al Fatah, Peace elders and Religious leaders. This was 25 percent of the actors. This was attributed to the fact that this mechanism is based on the community culture and practices such as *Maslah* which was only well understood by the locals and specifically male

elders who were found to command community respect and understood well the community culture and practices.

***Policy Formulation and Enforcement (PFE)*** This mechanism was found to be common only with the state actors. The study reviewed the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and found that it contains policies that were very relevant to the Wajir situation. However, the other actors failed to utilize this mechanism with the Local Peace Committees arguing that some of its contents are not applicable in Wajir conflict. The mechanism was found to be only 17 percent utilized. This finding could explain why conflict was still perennial in Wajir despite the availability of peacebuilding actors and mechanisms in place.

***Arbitration (ARB)*** The Arbitration Act, 1995 defines arbitration to mean —any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution. This is not very elaborate and regard has to be had on other sources. According to Khan, arbitration is a private consensual process where parties in dispute agree to present their grievances to a third party for resolution. Being a practical mechanism of conflict resolution that has been tested over the years, arbitration has a number of advantages. It is confidential; Parties select an arbitrator privately and proceedings are held privately. The process also has flexibility of time, procedure, venue and is not expensive compared to litigation. Further, there is minimum emphasis on formality, which fact encourages expeditious disposal of matters. Arbitration also limits appeals against awards, a fact which impacts policy on expediency of the arbitral process. The research found out that it was the most commonly used mechanism with 58 percent.

#### ***Conveyance of Peace Messages (CPM)***

The study found out that this mechanism was being used by six of the 12 peacebuilding groups. This constituted 50 percent of how it was utilized as peacebuilding mechanism. FGD also revealed that conveyance of peace messages is not effective in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They argued that some messages depict some clans as ‘outsiders’ or ‘bad ones’ while some messages relayed through mass media do not reach people due to high level of illiteracy and vast geographical distances.

***Resource Sharing (RS)*** In analyzing resource sharing as a mechanism for peacebuilding and conflict resolution, the study realized that only four out of the 12 peacebuilding

groups apply this strategy. This was 33 percent utilized. The study revealed that this strategy was mainly left to the Local Peace Committees. The State and NGOs did not apply the mechanisms at all.

#### ***Bridging of Trade Barriers (BTB)***

This approach refers to building bridges and creating free atmosphere for trade among and between different clans. It is one mechanism for easing tension that may build among different clans with the aim of building peace. The study revealed that this mechanism is employed by only 3 out of the 12 peace actors. That constituted only 25 percent utilization. This therefore meant that this important mechanism was not commonly used but was left for only peace elders, women and pastoralist association groups. Key Informants also confirmed that bridging of trade barriers is an important peacebuilding strategy which should be commonly used by all actors although it was found that it was underutilized in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Wajir.

#### ***Infrastructural Development (ID)***

This peacebuilding mechanism involves finance and logistical support for peacebuilding processes. The research found out that this strategy was not commonly used. It was applied only by NGOs and State. This was attributed to the fact that Local Peace Committees were found not to have their own finances and other resources but depend on support from NGOs and the Government whenever they wanted to respond to a peacebuilding mission.

#### ***Peace Events and Activities (PEA)***

This is one of the mechanisms that have been tested in Kenya for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. An NGO called PACT Kenya through USAID funded the event on the 27<sup>th</sup> July 2012 which involved in a cross-border peace building programme involving the Tepeth, Matheniko, Dodoth, Jie, Bokora, Pian, Sebei and Upe (Pokot) communities mostly referred to as the Karamoja on the Ugandan side and Turkana and Pokot on the Kenyan side as was discussed in the literature review. However, this study found out that in peacebuilding in Wajir, this approach is not commonly applied as only 3 out of 12 (25%) of the peacebuilding groups apply the mechanism. This was because other actors such as Peace elders and Al Fatah lacked resources to organize such events.

### ***Trainings (TRN)***

The research also revealed that only 2 out of 12 (17%) of the peacebuilding organizations organize peace trainings. This meant that training as a peacebuilding mechanism is not commonly applied in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir. This finding also explained why only 37 percent of the respondents were found to have attended training or seminar on peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the region yet conflict in the region was found to be frequent.

### ***Disarmament (DA)***

As discussed in the literature review, disarmament is one of the universally recognized peacebuilding models for executing successful peacekeeping operations. This is so because it involves demilitarizing the armed groups and reintegrating former combats into civil society for sustainable peacebuilding. However, the study found out that in Wajir, this strategy was not commonly used as it was supported by only 2 out 12 (17%) of the peacebuilding groups.

### ***Curfews (CF)***

Like disarmament, the study also found out that curfew was also not commonly used and was supported by only 17 percent of the peacebuilding actors in Wajir.


***Table 10 Number of peacebuilding mechanisms commonly used***

<b>Peacebuilding Organizations</b>	<b>Mechanisms commonly used by the actors</b>						<b>Total</b>
	ARB	TCRM	CPM	IPAA	RS	BTB	
<b>LPC</b>	ARB	TCRM	CPM	IPAA	RS	BTB	<b>6</b>
<b>State</b>	ARB	ID	DA	CF			<b>4</b>
<b>NGOs</b>	PFE	ID					<b>2</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>

**KEY:** ARB Arbitration, TCRM Traditional Conflict Resolution Method, IPAA Informal Peace Agreement/Accord, RS Resource Sharing, BTB Bridging Trade Barriers, ID Infrastructure Development, CF Curfew PFE Policy Formulation and Enforcement

From the above analysis, it was evident that none of the mechanisms are commonly used for peace building. Local Peace Committees commonly use 6 mechanisms which was 50 percent. The state commonly used 4 mechanisms while NGOs commonly used 2 mechanisms out of the 12 mechanisms identified.

**Fig 7 Percentage of mechanisms commonly used by each of the peacebuilding actors**



**4.1.2 Community familiarity with peacebuilding institutions.**

The study interviewed 120 respondents in this area to give their opinion on the level of familiarity and confidence they have with the peace institutions in the county. These were individual respondents from the households drawn from the five study sites where 24 households were selected from each study site. The study assessed how the community members were familiar with the peacebuilding actors in Wajir and whether they recognized their involvement in peacebuilding activities. The study also determined whether they acknowledged the peacebuilding work they were doing and how committed the actors were.

Table 11 below summarizes the findings.

**Table 11. Familiarity with peacebuilding organizations/actors**


Name of peace Agency	Recognition/Familiarity
LPCs	80
State	24
NGOs	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

From the study, it was found out that 67 percent of the interviewees were familiar with LPCS while 20 percent familiar with the State organizations. Only 13 percent were familiar with NGOs.

Focus group discussions revealed that LPCs were the most known because they were found in every locality since they are locals and would move with the community even during times of droughts.

NGOs were least known since most of them operate from Wajir town because of amenities that they required for them to function such as electricity, hotels, offices and good communication networks which were not found at the periphery settlements. The NGOs were also challenged by the poor road networks, the heightened insecurity and vastness of the area which made their operations outside Wajir town to be very limited and therefore they are only known within Wajir town and the nearby small towns. Within the focus group discussions, it was clear that NGOs are seen not to be committed to their peacebuilding mission and were seen as fundraising organizations. That was why they only have offices in Wajir where they can get donors and rarely go to villages to operate there so that they could be known.

***Fig.8 Familiarity with peacebuilding organizations***



**4.1.3 Community Confidence with Peacebuilding Actors**

To assess the involvement of peacebuilding actors, the study looked at the level at which the community members had confidence with the peace actors. The summary of the findings are illustrated in table 12 below.

*Table 12 Community confidence with peacebuilding actors*


<b>Name of peace agency</b>	<b>Community confidence (F)</b>
LPC	92
State	20
NGOs	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

From the findings in the table, only 7 percent had confidence with NGOs, 17 percent had confidence in the state agencies while the majority of respondents (76%) said that they have confidence in the Local Peace Committees. NGOs were seen to be money minded in their operations and are only approached to finance logistics like vehicles and fuel to respond to conflict resolution and peacebuilding missions but they are not seen as peace-builders. The community claimed that they take advantage of conflicts to raise funds from donors.

The state agencies were handled with suspicion based on historical state crackdowns like Wagalla Massacre. The mechanisms used by the state such as Curfew and Disarmament were seen to be forceful and unpopular and therefore not much supported by the community. They also felt that the state agencies were discriminatory in conflict resolution especially during disarmament exercises. Most of the state agents such as Police, Magistrates, District Officers and District Commissioners in the region were non locals. This created cultural and religious differences which made the community to perceive these agents as outsiders who could not be entrusted to resolve the internal sensitive matters such as inter-clan conflicts. In fact the state was only used to create orderly environment when there was conflict but once there was order, the local peace elders would take over the peacebuilding process. There was high confidence in Local

Peace Committees because they use local language and mechanisms that the community could easily understand and identify with. The community believed mostly in 'heer'<sup>1</sup>

**Fig 9**



**4.1.3 Peace resources used for peacebuilding and conflict resolution by the peace agencies.**

From the study, 5 resources were identified as essential for peacebuilding. These were human resource, finance, vehicles, offices and communication. LPCs were found to be limited with resources with only human resources. This is because LPC comprised only of community elders who were not financially stable. LPCs were also found not be fully structured and depend on external support. NGOs were found to have all these resources because they were funded by donors and were fully structured. They were found to be run by professionals. The state was also found to have all the resources sampled because they are supported by the government and they have a formal structure and competency.

**Table 13 Peacebuilding Resources**

Agency	Peacebuilding Resources				
	Human Resource	Finance	Vehicles	Offices	Communication
LPCs	✓	X	X	X	X
STATE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NGOs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**KEY**

- ✓ Resources available for the organization
- X Resources not available for the organization.

<sup>1</sup> Heer- Traditional conflict resolution methods

The study found that the Local Peace Committee had only 20 percent of the sampled peacebuilding resources. The State and NGOs were found to possess all the 5 sampled peacebuilding resources.

#### 4.2.0 Analyzing the Constraints to peacebuilding and conflict resolution

In relation to objective 2 of the study, the study analyzed the factors which constraints peacebuilding efforts in Wajir so that the mechanisms could not be effective.

The study found out four major sources of external influence which were identified as constraints to peacebuilding namely, Political, Business persons, Ideology and NGOs. The study also discovered activities carried out by these external forces to influence peacebuilding processes. The following were identified as main activities which included Incitement, Financing, Competition Exclusion and Inclusion.

#### 4.2.1 Level of External influence

The study found out that the conflicts in the county were more as a result of external agendas and influence by powerful outsiders who were revealed to be politicians and business people. Ideology and NGOs were also found to influence conflict in the county.


*Table 14 Level of external influence*

Source of Influence	Frequency	Percentage
Politicians	69	57%
Ideology	33	28%
Business persons	12	10%
NGOs	6	5%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100%</b>

The research revealed that 57 percent of external influence came from politicians. This is the highest source of influence. The least influence was from NGOs which was 5 percent. Politicians were found to influence conflict in order to create demographic imbalances for political reasons by instigating conflict leading to eviction of members perceived to be from a different clan who live among them. They therefore have interest in conflict. Business people were also found to have interest in conflict. They were found to benefit

from lawlessness and chaos by getting opportunity to smuggle in contraband goods and illegal weapons. It was also revealed that they influence conflict as a way of eliminating business rivalry and competition especially when the competitors are from a clan perceived to be non-indigenous. There was strong evidence that in almost every case of armed conflicts in the region, 'non-local' interests (displaced Somalis from Mogadishu, Mogadishu-based merchants and Nairobi-based interests) have had decisive roles in provoking such armed violence.

*Fig 10. External Influence to conflict resolution and peacebuilding*



#### 4.2. Access to institutions and resources


During the study, 120 respondents were interviewed to determine the distance to accessing the resources related to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The study found out that 47% access resources within a very long distance of over 50 kilometers away. The interview with the Key informants revealed that this was a major constraint to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir. Majority of them said that this was the major contributor to escalation of conflict in Wajir because it was almost impossible for rapid response. They stated that for the mechanisms to be effective in peacebuilding and conflict resolution there must be timely accessibility and application of these mechanisms. The research found out that these were lacking due to long distances which therefore rendered the mechanisms not to be effective in peacebuilding in Wajir.

**Table 15 Access to peacebuilding organizations and resources**

Resources	Distance to Resources						TOTAL
	0-10kms	10-20kms	20-30kms	30-40kms	40-50kms	Over 50kms	
Water	96	24				0	120
Pasture	0	0				120	120
Hospital	72	24				24	120
School	120	0				0	120
NGOs office	48	0				72	120
LPCs office	24					24	120
DCs office	48	0				72	120
Police Station	72	48				0	120
Law Court	24	0				96	120
<b>Average</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>8</b>				<b>56</b>	<b>120</b>

In the analysis, the study found that 53 percent of the respondents were able to access resources within a distance of below 50 kilometers. 47 percent had resources over 50 kilometers away.

**Fig 11 Access to peacebuilding organizations and resources**



### **4.3.0 Assessing the Conditions that sustain Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution**

#### **4.3.1 Utilization of peacebuilding strategies.**

The research found out that only 25 percent of the mechanisms are frequently utilized in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the county as discussed in 4.1.1 above. This is a very low percentage and therefore presented a condition that cannot sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

#### **4.3.2 Coordination among all Peacebuilding actors.**

During Focus Group Discussions the research found out that there was poor coordination between the peacebuilding actors. 40 participants were involved in the discussion. Most of the participants believed that there was no networking among the organizations operating in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. They also believed that the mechanisms are used in an uncoordinated manner without proper community participation and involvement. Smaller number agreed that there was coordination and networking among the peacebuilding organizations. The conditions that make peacebuilding sustainable are good coherence, coordination, and connectedness between all peacebuilding agencies. The findings in this research revealed that these conditions are lacking.


***Table 16 Coordination and cooperation among peacebuilding organizations***

<b>Coordination</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
YES	36
NO	84
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>

When assessing the conditions that make peacebuilding sustainable, literature review proposes good coordination and cooperation among peacebuilding actors as necessary condition in making peacebuilding mechanisms effective. However, from the findings of the study, 70 percent of the participants believed that there was no coordination and cooperation while only 30 percent believed there was coordination.

It was also revealed that the coordination among peacebuilding actors was poor because peace actors which are within a particular region could not be used in another region within the county.

**Fig12. Coordination among peacebuilding actors**




**4.3.3 Training**

When assessing how much the local community members have attended the trainings on peacebuilding and conflict resolution, the research interviewed 120 participants. The study found out that only 37 percent of the respondents had attended training while 63 percent had not. With such a low percentage trained in peacebuilding, it can be interpreted that the mechanisms are not effective because the more the capacity of people are build, the more effective they should be in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

**Table 17 Peace Training experience among clan members**

Training	Frequency
YES	44
NO	76
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>

**Fig 13 Peace Training experience among clan members**



#### **4.4.0 Assessing the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms**

The study assessed the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms in the county. From the findings of the objectives 2 and 3 as discussed, it was evident that there were more constraints to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the county which made the mechanisms not to be effective. There were external influences which could not be managed by the mechanisms. There research also revealed that accessing peacebuilding institutions and resources was a major constraint as 47 percent of the community members access them beyond a distance of 50 kilometers.

The findings from objective 2 and 3 also revealed that the conditions that sustain peacebuilding and conflict resolution were not met and this made the mechanisms not to be effective. Such conditions included coordination and training of community members on peace where only 37 percent of the community members have attended peace training.

#### 4.4.1 Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response Mechanisms

The study looked at the availability of functional early warning and rapid response mechanisms and found that the most used ones were the traditional signs such as rumours, change of mood towards people from different clans in social places, discriminatory buying and selling at markets and shops, isolation and suspicion, provocative speech and behaviors such as rape and hostility, blocking of water points or livestock paths, and livestock theft.

The community members were found not to believe so much in the government intelligence as conflict early warning mechanisms. The reason was that most of these conflict drivers take place in the pasture fields where government intelligent agents are not frequently present. This finding confirmed that the mechanisms for peacebuilding and conflict resolution could not be effective because there are no mechanisms to respond rapidly when the warnings are seen because the LPCs who are in the field lack capacity to respond rapidly due to vastness of the area and poor transport and communication network. The state intelligence towards conflict early warning entails incidences such as smuggling of guns and other crude weapons and mass migration of one clan.

The research also found out that the state also considered cases such as increased cases of livestock theft and tensions arising from establishment of new settlements as conflict early warning signs.


#### 4.4.2 Prevalence of conflicts

Based on the above findings, the study asked all the 80 participants on their views regarding frequency of conflicts in the region. During the response, 76 percent said that conflict was frequent, while 22 percent said conflict was rare. The remaining 2 percent considered conflict to be very frequent. It would be analyzed that 78 percent confirmed that conflict was frequent in the county.

*Table 18 Prevalence of conflicts*

Prevalence of Conflict	Frequency
Very frequent	3
Frequent	90
Rare	27
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

**Fig 14 Prevalence of conflict**



During focus group discussions, the majority of the participants agreed that conflict in the region was still frequent. This they attributed to the fact that peacebuilding actors in the region do not network and collaborate as each work on their own. The group discussions revealed that the mechanisms used was not effective because the community only have confidence in the local mechanisms some of which are not universally applicable. This made the mechanisms not to be effective.

Majority of the participants also stated that the mechanisms employed by NGOs and State were not trusted by the community and this made these mechanisms not to be effective. This was because they were seen as foreign approaches. The majority also observed that although the State and NGOs were not trusted, yet it was found that they were the peace actors who command almost all the necessary peacebuilding resources while the Local Peace Committees were found not to own sufficient resources. These made the LPCs mechanisms not to be effective because they could not operate without resources. The study therefore found out that the mechanisms were not effective.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents summary of the key findings relating to the effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms among Somali clans in Wajir County. It also presents conclusion and recommendations of this research and for further study.

#### **5.1 Summary**

Male constituted 91 percent of the respondents while female constituted only 10 percent. This was attributed to patriarchal set up of the community where culture and religion put male to be more dominant than female. The age pattern also revealed that majority of participants was over the age of 50 years (65%). This was attributed to the fact that sensitive clan issues such as inter- conflicts are handled by elderly men in the society. The implication of this finding is that the peacebuilding processes in Wajir is not participatory and all inclusive. This in turn made the mechanisms employed not to be effective.

The research also found out that there are 3 main peacebuilding/agencies which are Local Peace Committees, The State (Government) and NGOs. The research also revealed that there are twelve (12) mechanisms/strategies which are employed by these peacebuilding organizations. They include, Informal Peace Agreements and Accords, Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms, Policy on Peacebuilding, Conveyance of Peace messages, Arbitration, Resource Sharing, Bridging Trade barriers, Infrastructure Development, Peace Events and Activities, Trainings, Disarmament and Curfew. These mechanisms are used at different levels by different organizations for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

However it was noted that only 25 percent of the strategies are utilized. It was also revealed that Local Peace Committees are the most familiar organization in peacebuilding with 67 percent familiarity while state had 20 percent of the respondents familiar with it and NGOs 13 percent.

In terms of confidence the study found out that 76 percent had confidence with LPCs, 17 percent had confidence with the State and 7 percent had confidence with NGOs.

As for the availability of conflict resolution resources, the research found out that LPCs had only 20 percent of the necessary resources. The State and NGOs had 100 percent of the resources.

Further, the research identified two issues which were major constraints to peacebuilding. These were; External influence where peacebuilding processes were influenced by politicians, ideological principles of the community, business people and NGOs. 57 percent of external influence was found to come from politicians.

Another constraint found was access to peacebuilding institutions and resources. The research revealed that 47 percent of the community accessed these resources within a distance of over 50 kilometers.

This study also identified 2 conditions which were not met by the organizations.

One of them was coordination and cooperation among all peacebuilding institutions. 70 percent of the respondents believed that there was no coordination while only 30 percent acknowledged that there was coordination and cooperation.

The other one was lack of trainings and capacity building. 63 percent of the respondents had not attended any training on peacebuilding and conflict resolution while only 37 percent had attended training.

Although the study found that there were conflict early warning mechanisms, it was evident that they were not effective because there were no mechanisms for rapid response. The finding therefore revealed that the mechanisms were not effective as 78 percent of the respondents admitted that conflict was still frequent.

## **5.2 Conclusions**

The overall objective of this study was to assess effectiveness of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir County. The study assessed the mechanisms used in Wajir in relation to the universal peacebuilding models such as ADR and others discussed in the literature review.

The effectiveness of the mechanisms were measured using different levels which included, level of use of the mechanisms by various peacebuilding actors in Wajir, level of community familiarity with the mechanisms, level of community confidence with the mechanisms, level of external influence towards the application of the mechanisms, coordination of application of the mechanisms, availability and access to peacebuilding resources and prevalence of conflict in the region.

Local Peace Committees play a major role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir. However, they lack contemporary and universally acknowledged peacebuilding and conflict resolution approaches. They rely solely on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. There is need for LPCs to adopt contemporary peacebuilding models since they large community confidence and recognition.

Community support is crucial for sustainable peacebuilding process. However, it is apparent that the relationship between the community and state mechanisms is not mutual. The state actors such as the police is only required when there is armed violence to stop the fight. After which, the peacebuilding process is left to the Local Peace Committees for the state is not trusted by the community. They therefore take the role of fire-fighters when there is violent conflict.

NGOs are major actors in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Wajir. However, like the state actors, their role in peacebuilding is not fully recognized by the community. They play peripheral role and the LPCs only incorporate them when there is need for finance and logistic support, because like the state, they have adequate peacebuilding resources whereas LPCs do have very little.

Very important peacebuilding approaches such as peace events and activities, bridging of trade barriers, conveyance of peace messages, infrastructure development and

disarmament were not commonly used because they do not have support of the elders, yet the research found that they were necessary for sustainable peace.

Finally the research revealed that conflict is still frequent in Wajir despite the existence of peacebuilding organizations and strategies. This was confirmed by 62% of the respondents.

Based on the evidence from the findings described above, the study concluded that the mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Wajir County are not effective.

### 5.3 Recommendations

From the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made;

➤ ***Decentralization of peacebuilding resources.***

The study found out that most peacebuilding resources and institutions are centralized within Wajir town yet conflicts in the region starts at the peripheral settlements and pasture fields which are very far from Wajir. Some over 100 kilometers away from Wajir town.. The study recommended that peacebuilding resources should be decentralized.

➤ ***Sensitization on peace and peacebuilding processes.***

The study revealed that there was a gap on knowledge on peace by most community members. Only a small number had attended trainings on peace. The NGOs should embark on organizing and financing sensitization seminars and workshops on peace in the county. The government should mainstream peace agenda in *barazas* and education curriculum for schools to increase more awareness on peace processes. Local Peace Committees should use forums such mosques and churches to sensitize people on peace. Peace Events and Activities should be incorporated in the peace programmes in the region. This would improve community confidence.

➤ ***Participation.***

Community participation is essential for sustainable peace. However, the study revealed that peace process in the county is dominated by local elders, NGOs and the State. Women and youth who are also key stake holders are excluded in the process. This study recommended inclusion and active participation of these category community members in the peace process in the county.

➤ ***Coordination and Collaboration.***

Sustainable peace requires collaborative efforts. This study recommended that all agencies working towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the region should form a network for proper coordination and collaboration. This would enhance maximum utilization of peacebuilding resources and minimize duplication of peacebuilding activities. This would also increase the sharing of experience on good practices.

➤ ***Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response Networks.***

The study recommended that there should be reliable systems for conflict early warning and rapid response. The peace agencies should create a network for early warning and rapid response.

➤ ***Strengthening of Peace Systems.***

Peacebuilding systems should be empowered both with skills and resources. Local Peace Committees should be trained and facilitated to form Resource Sharing Committees. The police should be well equipped with vehicles and efficient communication gadgets for easy detecting and response. The judiciary should embrace the use of mobile courts since there is only one law court in the entire county with only two magistrates.

➤ ***Incorporating other approaches.***

There is need to incorporate modern peacebuilding models and approaches into peacebuilding efforts in Wajir. These should include ADR model which consist of conciliation, mediation, and negotiation. Other approaches such as disarmament, peace events and activities, infrastructure development, bridging of trade barriers, and conveyance of peace messages should be embraced and supported by all peacebuilding actors in the region.

#### **5.4 Suggestion for further research**

This study was not conclusive but it opened a room for future studies and further research in this particular subject of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. There is need to research on how changes and instability of peacebuilding agencies affect peacebuilding processes in the region and how the peacebuilding mechanisms in the region can be made effective. This study was not able to deal with those. These areas still require extensive research to come up with further recommendations and way forward towards developing effective mechanisms for peacebuilding and conflict resolution not only among the Somali clans but also among communities and societies with the same characteristics.

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## 7.0 APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1

#### 7.1 LETTER TO THE AUTHORITY

ONDIEGE, R. OGEDA,  
P.O BOX 5244-00200,  
NAIROBI.  
25<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 2012.

THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER,  
WAJIR COUNTY,  
PRIVATE BAG,  
WAJIR.

Dear Sir,

**RE: PERMIT FOR DATA COLLECTION- ACADEMIC RESEARCH**

I am a Sociology student at the University of Nairobi. I am undertaking a research on **peacebuilding and conflict resolution among clans in Wajir County**.

The aim of the study is to learn how the measures can be developed and improved to ensure peace and security in this region.

The purpose of this letter therefore is to request you to allow me conduct interviews within the County to obtain the necessary data. The sites will include Wajir East, Wajir South, Wajir North and Wajir West districts.

Attached here is a letter from the University authorizing me to undertake the research as part of my thesis writing.

Thank you,

Ondiege Reuben Ogeda

## **7.2 CONSENT NOTE**

My name is Reuben Ogeda. I am a Sociology student at The University of Nairobi. I am undertaking a research on peacebuilding and conflict resolution among clans in Wajir County. I would like to ask you a few questions on this subject.

The purpose is to learn how the measures can be developed and improved to ensure peace and security in this region.

I assure you that your participation in this study would not impose any direct cost or give monetary benefit to you. It will only take a little of your time. I also assure you that the results of this study will be shared with you as soon as the report is ready.

Thanks for your cooperation.

Ondiege Reuben Ogeda.

### 7.3 TOOL/INSTRUMENTS

#### 7.3.1 Interview guide for household heads: Individual

*(Please help me fill this questionnaire honestly and accurately.)*

1. Name (Optional) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Location \_\_\_\_\_

3. Age \_\_\_\_\_

4. Sex: Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_

5. Clan \_\_\_\_\_

6. What is your main occupation/Profession?

i) Livestock keeping \_\_\_\_\_

ii) Business \_\_\_\_\_

iii) Salaried \_\_\_\_\_

iv) Others, please specify \_\_\_\_\_

7. What conflicts have you experienced or witnessed in this community?

8. How frequent are conflicts in this locality? *(Tick appropriately)*

Very frequent	Somewhat frequent	Rare	Very less frequent	None at all

9. What peacebuilding/conflict resolution mechanisms are you familiar with in Wajir?  
*(List as many as you can)*

10. Which ones of these mechanisms are commonly used in peacebuilding and conflict resolution?

11. Which of the following peacebuilding actors are you familiar with?

i) Local Peace Committees (LPCs) ii) NGOs iii) State.

12. In your opinion, do you believe that these peacebuilding actors are coordinating well among themselves towards peacebuilding and conflict resolution?

12. Rate your level of confidence with the following peacebuilding actors

Actors	Level of confidence			
	Very high	High	Low	Very Low
LPCs				
State				
NGOs				

13. What is the approximate distance to these resources and services in your area?

		0-10 kms	10-20 kms	20-30 kms	30-50 kms	Over 50 kms
1	GK Court					
2	Police station					
3	DCs office					
4	LPCs office					
5	NGO office					
6	School					
7	Hospital					
8	Water					
9	Pasture fields					

14. (i) How have these services contributed to peace and security in your area?

(ii) How have these services contributed to conflicts in your area?

15. What training/ education on peace have you participated in?

i) If yes who organized it? What media (radio, mosque, churches)

ii) How frequently do you attend such trainings?

iii) What messages of peace and conflict resolution do you receive?

v) What messages do you receive that bring conflicts?

vi) How do you respond to those messages?

16. What factors hinder peacebuilding and conflict resolution in your locality?

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17. What suggestion would you give on making these measures more effectively?

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**THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS YOU.**

### 7.3.2 Interview guide for Focus Group Discussion

*(Please help me fill this questionnaire honestly and accurately.)*

1. Have you ever witnessed inter clan conflicts in this region?
2. What conflicts have you experienced or witnessed in this community?
3. How frequent are conflicts in this locality? *(Tick appropriately)*

Very frequent	Somewhat frequent	Rare	Very less frequent	None at all

4. What peacebuilding/actors in your locality are you familiar with?
5. Which ones do you have confidence with and why?
6. Do they have systems for conflict early warning and rapid response?
7. Which mechanisms/models are they using in peacebuilding and conflict resolution? *(Name them)*
8. Do you believe these mechanisms are effective in peacebuilding and conflict resolution?
9. In your opinion, do you believe that these measures effectively mitigate conflicts in the locality?
10. What is the approximate distance to these resources and services in your area?

		0-10 kms	10-20 kms	20-30 kms	30-50 kms	Over 50 kms
1	Law Court					
2	Police station					
3	DCs office					
4	LPCs office					
5	NGO office					
6	School					
7	Hospital					
8	Water					
9	Pasture fields					

11 (i) How have these services contributed to peace and security in your area?

(ii) How have these services contributed to conflicts in your area?

12. What training/ education on peace have you participated in?

i) If yes who organized it? What media (radio, mosque, churches)

ii) How frequently are these meetings held in your locality?

iii) What messages of peace and conflict resolution do you receive?

i) What messages do you receive that bring conflicts?

ii) How do you respond to those messages?

13. Are there any external influence to peacebuilding in this region?

i) If yes, where do they come from?

- Politicians
- Businessmen
- Culture
- NGOs
- Any other

14. What factors hinder peacebuilding and conflict resolution in your locality?

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15. What suggestion would you give on making these measures more effective?

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**THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS YOU.**

**1.3.3 Questionnaire for Key Informants**

*(Please help me fill this questionnaire honestly and accurately.)*

1. What is the name of your agency?
2. What is your designation in the organization?
3. How many staff do you have in your organization?
4. What is the gender composition (WPDA and LPCs)?
5. How long have you been working in the region?
6. How do you detect when conflict is eminent?
7. How frequently do people come to report to you cases of conflict?

Very rarely	Rarely	Somewhat frequent	Very frequent

8. What is your response/intervention strategy?

Direct

Indirect

Financial Support

Capacity building

Any other

9. What resources/capacity do you have to undertake peacebuilding and conflict resolution? *(Tick appropriately)*

Vehicles	
Finance	
Institutional	
Communication services	
Human resource	
Community peace champions (opinion leaders)	

10. Indicate the number of conflict incidences you have intervened in during the last

- i) 1 month
- ii) 6 months
- iii) 1 year
- iv) 3 years

11. What were the major causes of the conflicts?

- i)
- ii)
- iii)
- iv)
- v)

12. Which strategies do you use in peacebuilding and conflict resolution?  
*(Arbitration, Resource sharing, Peace Events etc)*

13. What forums on peacebuilding and conflict resolution do you organize?

- i) How often do you organize these forums?
- ii) What activities do you perform at these forums?

14. Which organizations do you collaborate with in peacebuilding

- i) How do you collaborate *(Information, training, finances, infrastructure sharing)*

15. What challenges/constraints/difficulties do you encounter in your endeavour to resolve conflicts and build peace?

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16. a) Who are the individuals from outside your community/agency whose actions encourage peace and security locally?

17. b) Who are the individuals outside your community/agency whose actions undermine peace and security?

- i) Politicians
- ii) Religious leaders
- iii) Cultural/ Clan based
- iv) Organization/agencies

18. How frequently do you evaluate your conflict management strategies and approaches?

19. What would you suggest should be done to strengthen conflict management mechanisms and maintaining peace in the region?

- i)
- ii)
- iii)
- iv)
- v)
- vi)

**THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS YOU**

## **Questionnaire for key Informants**

### **District Commissioners**

*(Please help me fill this questionnaire honestly and accurately)*

1. How long have you been working in this region?
2. Have you ever experienced inter- clan conflicts in this region?
3. How do you detect when conflict is eminent?
4. How frequently do people come to you to report cases of conflicts?
5. What are your intervention mechanisms? *(List them in terms of preference)*
6. What resources do you have for conflict resolution and peacebuilding?
7. Are there cases of inter clan conflicts you are aware of that are solved outside your intervention?
8. How are they solved?
9. Why do you think they would prefer solving them in the community other than involving the provincial administration?
10. Are there external factors that interfere with your attempts to independently solve inter clan conflicts eg politicians, religious leaders peace elders etc?
11. Do you receive good will from the community in your peacebuilding activities?

**12. Do you conduct trainings on peacebuilding?**

**13. Which other peacebuilding and conflict resolution organizations do you work with?**

**14. What challenges do you encounter in your peacebuilding process?**

**17 What recommendation(s) would you give that would strengthen peacebuilding in this region?**

#### 7.4 PLAN OF ACTIVITIES

The time schedule that will guide the study is as follows:

<b>PERIOD</b>	<b>ACTIVITY</b>
January 2012	Submission of proposal to the Department for examination
February – March 2012	Corrections and submission to the supervisor for examination
April 2012	Development validation and review of research instruments
May -June 2012	<b>DATA COLLECTION</b> Administration of Research Instruments
July 2012	Data Analysis
August 2012	<b>THESIS PREPARATION</b> Thesis write up
August- September 2012	Submission of thesis to the faculty for examination and defense
October 2012	Correction and final submission of Thesis to the faculty

## 7.5 TIME TABLE FOR DATA COLLECTION

Day/ Date	Activity
<b>WEEK ONE</b>	
Mon 25 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Get authority letter from the administration
Tue 26 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Travel to Khorof Harar from Wajir (126 kms)
Wed 27 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Conduct individual interviews at Khorof Harar with 5 households
Thu 28 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Conduct FGD at Khorof Harar
Fri 29 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Travel back to Wajir
Sat 30 <sup>th</sup> June 2012	Travel to Griftu and conduct both individual and FGD interviews
<b>WEEK TWO</b>	
Mon 2 <sup>nd</sup> July 2012	Conduct individual interviews in Diff
Tue 3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2012	Conduct FGD in Diff
Wed 4 <sup>th</sup> July 2012	Conduct FGD in Wajir
Thu 5 <sup>th</sup> July 2012	Conduct individual interviews in Buna
Fri 6 <sup>th</sup> July 2012	Conduct FGD in Buna
<b>WEEK THREE</b>	
Mon 9 <sup>th</sup> – Fri 13 <sup>th</sup> July 2012	Meeting with Key Informants for interview in Wajir
<b>WEEK FOUR &amp; FIVE</b>	
14 <sup>th</sup> – 31 <sup>st</sup> July	Data analysis

