

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

**“THE GREAT LAKES REGION CONFLICT CASE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO”**

OLIVER WAFULA MAMILI

(R50/80855/2012)

0712853758

Supervisor: Dr. Anita Kiamba

**A Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arts in
International Studies**

University of NAIROBI Library



0378760 3

August 2015

AFR

JZ

5584

CGM3

C.2

DECLARATION

“This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other institution or University.”

Sign..........


Date..........

Oliver Wafula Mamili

Reg No: R50/80855/2012

This Research project has been submitted with my approval as the project supervisor.

Sign..........

Date..........

Dr. Anita Kiamba

Lecturer/Supervisor

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

University of Nairobi

DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my mother, Mary Nangila for the encouragement to pursue academics up to this level and also for her prayers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Anita Kiamba for her guidance and support throughout the period I was undertaking this research project. May the Almighty bless her work.

ABSTRACT

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to causes countless death and destruction of property thus posing greater insecurity in the entire Great lakes region, with DRC security forces and non-state armed groups responsible for serious abuses against civilians. The Rwandan-backed M23 armed group continues to perpetrate widespread war crimes, including summary executions, rapes, and forced recruitment of children into their forces. Numerous other armed groups have carried out horrific attacks on civilians in eastern Congo, including in North and South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale provinces. Fighters from the Nduma Defense of Congo militia group, led by Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, killed, raped, and mutilated scores of civilians in North Kivu. They include the Raia Mutomboki, the Nyatura, the Mai Mai Kifuafula, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a largely Rwandan Hutu armed group, some of whose members participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The conflict revolve around minerals and poor governance. This research paper looks objectively on the causes of conflict, conflict management approaches and the social economic impact of conflict in DRC and the entire Great Lakes region. Greed grievance theory is employed to guide in data collection and analysis. The research paper uses qualitative research design and collection of data done through secondary data from already published material on DRC conflict. The research concludes and recommends measures to be put in place to bring about peace.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEC-	Africa Economic Community
AU -	African Union
CEMAC -	Economic and Monetary Community
DRC -	Democratic Republic Congo
EAC -	East African Commission
ECCSA-	Economic Community of Central African States
FDLR -	<i>(Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FOMAC-	Multinational Force of Central Africa
ICGLR-	International Conference of Great Lakes Region
IDPS –	Internally Displaced Persons
MoU-	Memorandum of Understanding
OAU –	Organization of Africa Union
PTC-	Permanent Tripartite Commission
UNDP-	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF-	United Nations Children Fund

CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Background to the research problem.....	1
1.2 Statement of the research problem	5
1.3 Objectives.....	6
1.4 Literature review	6
1.4.1 Causes of Conflict in DRC.....	6
1.4.1.1 <i>External actors in DRC conflict</i>	10
1.4.2 Social Economic impact of DRC conflict.	15
1.4.3 Conflict management approaches	18
1.5 Justification of research.....	25
1.6 Theoretical Analysis.....	25
1.7 Hypotheses	26
1.8 Research Methodology.....	26
1.9 Scope and Limitations.	28
1.10 Chapter outline.	28
CHAPTER TWO	30
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.....	30
GREED GRIEVANCE THEORY AND CONFLICT	30
2.1 Introduction.	30
2.2 Greed Grievance theory.....	31
2.3 Greed and conflict.....	33
2.4 Greed & Grievance in DRC conflict	34
2.4.1 Armed groups and mineral exploitation.....	39
CHAPTER THREE	42
CASE STUDY: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONFLICT	42

3.1 Introduction	42
3.2 Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo.....	42
3.3 Main causes of conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo.....	47
3.3.1 Bad governance	47
3.3.2 Natural mineral resources.....	48
3.4 Initiatives to address conflict in the DRC	49
3.4.1 Goma conference.....	51
3.4.2 Develop political space as alternative to military operations.....	52
CHAPTER FOUR.....	53
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AN OVERVIEW DRC CONFLICT	53
4.1 Introduction	53
4.2 Poor Governance in DRC.....	53
4.2.1 Dawn of Independence.....	55
4.2.2 The Mobutu Era and First Congo Conflict.....	56
4.2.3 Kabila Regime and the Second DR. Congo Conflict.....	58
4.2.4 Peace and Democratic Attempts.....	59
4.2.5 The Consequences.....	60
4.2.6 Economic Implications.....	63
4.2.7 Attempts for Reforms.....	65
4.2.8 External Efforts	67
4.2.9 Continuing Challenges	68
CHAPTER FIVE.....	71
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	71
5.1 Democracy & Good Governance	72
5.2 Military approaches.....	74
5.3. Democracy and Good Governance.....	74
5.4 Recommendations	75
5.4.1 Economic Integration	75
5.4.2 Good Governance.....	76
5.4.3 Promoting Legitimate Trade	76
5.4.4 Civic awareness on natural resources.....	77
Bibliography.....	78

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the research problem

The ongoing conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where up to 6 million excess deaths have been recorded since 1998 and government neither controls nor governs its territory in a meaningful sense, is cause for concern to the international community and the United States government. The Democratic Republic of (DRC) Congo is home to more than 60 million people who have suffered profoundly as a result of their state's collapse and a series of local, national, and international conflicts that began in the early 1990's and some of which continue until today. In the aftermath of the contentious and contested November 2011 elections, DRC's future stability and ability to develop are both in question. In the United States, the issue of conflict minerals has become one of the dominant narratives about the conflict. As Autesserre notes, however, the overwhelming focus on conflict minerals as a cause of conflict in the D.R. Congo has perverse consequences that actually prevent international and local actors from developing a comprehensive solution to the country's conflicts¹

Moreover, Western advocacy efforts on conflict minerals have thus far made life more difficult for many Congolese while failing to stop the violence they purport to address. Instead, these efforts have thus far increased smuggling,² led armed groups to seek other sources of revenue, and left up to 2 million Congolese artisanal miners out of work. As is the case with the

¹ Séverine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences." *African Affairs* (Forthcoming 2012).

² Jonny Hogg and Graham Holliday, "Conflict minerals crackdown backfiring in Congo." Reuters (30 December 2011). Available: <http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL6E7NU25720111230?sp=true>

Kimberley Process, good intentions and the belief that attacking the perceived economic roots of conflict was a path to peace have largely proved ineffective.

In the context of the geo-strategic importance of the DRC and the abundance of highly sought after natural and mineral resources within its borders, national interest considerations have contributed to continued conflict. Neighboring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have been accused of Aiding Militia Groups such as M23 to destabilize the DRC Government with the main interest being illegal exploitation of natural resources.

The conflict, in Democratic Republic of Congo is fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and power struggles, is characterized as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises and the most deadly war ever documented in Africa. Over the past five years, the forces of at least six African countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in the conflict in DRC. Both foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including widespread abuses against Congolese children and adolescents. The situation in DRC is also a result of decades of poor governance and broader regional insecurity³.

The war has taken an enormous toll on children and other civilians. Over 12 percent of children do not reach their first birthday. Approximately one quarter of all children under age five in Basankusu, Orientale Province, an area that was close to the front line at that time, had died over a 12-month period, while the normal mortality rate over the same time period for the same age

³ International Rescue Committee (IRC) report, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey, Conducted September to November 2002, reported April 2003.

group is 3.6 percent. Attributes to the increased death rate in Basankusu and other parts of DRC mainly due to an increase in infectious diseases and malnutrition due to loss of food, assets, basic services and medicine because of war-related violence.⁴

Many of the armed forces operating in DRC have splintered into various movements and shifted alliances over the years. Rights abuses committed against children by combatants associated with all armed groups in DRC are egregious and well documented. Moreover, the occupation of large portions of DRC by the armies of neighbouring states has caused considerable suffering among children and other vulnerable groups. In 2002, most foreign armed forces withdrew from positions in DRC

When conflict erupted in 1998, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government by deploying elements of their national armed forces to positions in DRC. At the same time, Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought alongside the Congolese opposition groups, many of which they helped to create, including Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCDK), now known as Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML).⁵

In July 1999, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the DRC government, Congolese armed opposition groups and foreign states signed the Lusaka Ceasefire

⁴ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In 2001, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)

⁵ The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) split into two factions in 1999, the RCD-Goma (RCD-G) and the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which later became RCD-K/ML. The armed forces of Uganda have traditionally supported the RCD-K/ML and the MLC, while the armed forces of Rwanda have traditionally supported RCD-Goma

Agreement.⁶ To monitor this agreement as requested, the UN deployed a peace keeping operation, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Also, in accordance with the agreement, several foreign countries involved in the conflict began to disengage. Most foreign troops, including those of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, withdrew during 2002.

The Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawals were arranged through two separate bilateral peace agreements with the government of DRC. Most signatories have not upheld peace agreements, and fighting has continued in eastern DRC, particularly in Ituri District and the Kivus. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was first convened in 2001, in an effort to address the internal aspects of the DRC conflict. In December 2002, the parties to the ICD signed the Global and Inclusive Accord for the Transition in DRC, paving the way for the establishment of a transitional government to be installed in June 2003. It included all the main Congolese belligerents.⁷

ICD participants adopted 36 resolutions relating to the establishment of sustainable peace, including a resolution on the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and vulnerable persons and a resolution relating to the emergency programs in different social sectors that outlines specific policies for emergency social aid for children and youth. More than 90 percent of the battalions of Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) withdrew from positions in DRC in

⁶ Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC signed the cease-fire. The RCD and Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan opposition armed groups that operate in DRC were not signatories to the Lusaka Agreement

⁷ According to the agreement, Joseph Kabila will remain as the President of DRC for two years, leading to a general election. Four vice presidents will represent key groups: the government, the MLC, the RCD and the non-armed opposition. In reality, the DRC government and the MLC will likely share control over approximately 70 percent of the country. For further details on the structure of the transitional government, see UN Affected Populations or other political analyses

October 2002,⁸ but retained a presence in Bunia, in accordance with the bilateral agreement signed between Uganda and DRC.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

The Democratic republic of Cong conflict, fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and power struggles, is characterized as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises and the most deadly war ever documented in Africa. Over the past five years, the forces of at least six African countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in the conflict in DRC. Both foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including widespread abuses against Congolese children and adolescents. The situation in DRC is also a result of decades of poor governance and broader regional insecurity.

The DRC conflict has contributed to the insecurity in the wider Great Lakes region through proliferation of arms and also increase in the number refugees who in turn result in breeding space for rebel and terrorist groups formation. An urgent approach is needed to end the conflict in DRC in order to bring faster economic and political development in the region.

⁸ *New Vision*, the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, reported that over 2,000 children fathered by UPDF soldiers are left behind in DRC following the UPDF withdrawal

1.3 Objectives

The research seeks to outline the underlying objectives in order to address issues in the entire study.

1. To evaluate the causes of conflict in the Democratic Republic Congo.
2. To evaluate conflict management approaches put in place to bring lasting peace in Democratic Republic Congo.
3. To assess social economic impact of the conflict to the Democratic Republic Congo and neighboring countries in the Great Lakes Region.

1.4 Literature review

The literature review will focus on following themes: The causes of conflict in DRC which include: mineral resources in fueling and financing conflict, poor governance and external interest. Secondly the conflict management approaches put in place to solve the conflict with special emphasis on local mechanisms and international interventions and lastly the impact of the conflict to social economic development in DRC and the entire Great Lakes Region.

1.4.1 Causes of Conflict in DRC

The role of mineral resources in fuelling the long running conflict in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic the Congo (DRC) has attracted considerable international attention. Spurred in part by media reports about ' conflict minerals' and the success of the Kimberley Process in stemming the flow of so-called blood diamonds, the Congolese Government, mineral importers, international donors and the United Nations have all started to take concrete steps to

break mineral–conflict links. These are aimed ultimately at allowing the trade in certain key minerals originating in eastern DRC to continue while excluding armed actors for economic benefits, allowing the restoration of security and space for post-conflict peace building.⁹

Minerals have played an important role in more than a decade of armed conflict in eastern DRC. By tapping into and controlling the informal trade in precious metals and gemstones, rebel leader Laurent Kabila was able to build an opposition army and overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. Later, newly formed armed groups opposing the governments of Laurent (1997–2001) and then Joseph Kabila (2001–present) followed the same strategy, often openly supported by either Rwanda or Uganda, in their efforts to gain territorial control.

Foreign incursions into eastern DRC, and Rwandan Hutu rebels who had spilled over into eastern DRC in the wake of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, progressively engaged in illicit resource trade as a source of finance and means of survival. Besides non-state armed groups, regular armed forces of the *Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo* (FARDC, Armed Forces of the DRC) are also involved in exploiting mineral commodity chains to enrich themselves or, in some cases, to make up for low and unpaid wages. The FARDC's ranks include large numbers of former rebels; many of them, particularly a substantial new influx in eastern DRC since 2009, are only superficially integrated into the FARDC command structure and retain their former composition. Elements of the regular army, up to and including high-ranking officers, are involved in the various forms of exploitation, which range from ad hoc looting attacks to investment in mineral trading enterprises.

⁹ Eastern DRC refers to the provinces of Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu and Maniema; Ituri district in Orientale province; and Tanganika district (North Katanga) in Katanga province. See the map on p. viii.

The aim of securing control of lucrative mining areas and positions in mineral trading chains has resulted in sometimes violent rivalry between FARDC units and has undermined effective command and control within the FARDC. Some former rebels, even those who have embarked on integration or demobilization, have defected from the FARDC and rejoined non-state forces, dissatisfied with slow progress and poor and often delayed payments. In addition, competition between non-military actors such as local state and customary authorities, mining enterprises, and miners' cooperatives, has frequently turned violent. Responses aimed at breaking resource–conflict links in eastern DRC have sometimes been constrained by a narrow understanding of what constitute conflict resources, seeing them as resources ‘that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments’.¹⁰

On 10 March 2011 the mining ban was lifted. It is not yet clear how successful it was in starving out military actors from mining and trading areas, or at what cost. It appears, however, that cassiterite production has fallen—and continued to do so even after the ban was lifted—because the main international buyer decided not to accept any minerals that could not be traced back to the mine of origin. This seems to have reduced military presence in some cassiterite mines. For example, according to UN experts, the mining sites of Bisie and Omate in Walikale territory, Nord-Kivu, have been progressively demilitarized since the lifting of the ban¹¹

¹⁰ See e.g. United Nations, General Assembly, ‘The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts’, A/RES/55/56, 29 Jan. 2001.

¹¹ United Nations, Security Council, Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/345, 7 June 2011, p. 12.

Organized looting is the most direct and coercive form of military involvement in the mineral commodity chain. In looting operations, sites are attacked, populations scattered and their minerals and other goods taken. Armed groups usually loot sites over which they do not exercise control. FARDC elements and purely criminal groups are also known to carry out looting attacks, often pretending to be rebels or militia in order to disguise their identity.¹² In turn, FARDC units can start or use rumors of impending looting attacks by illegal armed groups to justify their deployment in mining areas.¹³ For these reasons, attribution of looting attack to a particular group, in media or other reports, should be treated with caution

.Looting attacks on mines, trading hubs and other communities are most frequently reported in Walikale territory, North Kivu. Such attacks are part of armed groups' wider strategy of targeting commercial competitors, disrupting FARDC deployments and creating disorder to prevent the return of refugees. One group apparently behind many of the attacks is Mai-Mai Sheka (also known as Nduma Defence for Congo), which often cooperates with elements of the FDLR's Montana Battalion.¹⁴ Mai-Mai Sheka is named after its leader, Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a man who apparently had no military experience prior to founding the group in mid-2009 but had worked with several mining companies and cooperatives prospecting for and trading minerals in Bisie. As he had relied on the 85th FARDC brigade for protection, his activities were effectively curtailed when the 85th brigade was driven out of the mine of Bisie at the beginning of 2009. According to the UN Group of Experts, the Mai-Mai mainly comprises deserters from the 85th

¹² Sematumba, O., 'The FDLR in North and South Kivu: a state within a state', Pole Institute, *Guerillas in the Mist: The Congolese Experience of the FDLR War in Eastern Congo and the Role of the International Community* (Pole Institute: Goma, Feb. 2010), p. 16.

¹³ Bilonda, K., Director, Progrès des peuples indigènes [Progress of Indigenous Peoples], Interview with the author, Kalemie, 7 June 2009.

¹⁴ United Nations, S/2010/596 (note 11), p. 40

brigade. It is also claimed to rely on military support from the deputy commander of the FARDC 8th military region, Colonel Etienne Bindu. While Sheka claims that his primary aim is to resist the return to Walikale of Congolese refugees currently in Rwanda, his true aim seems to be to re-establish a foothold in the local mining sector.¹⁵

1.4.1.1 *External actors in DRC conflict*

Many of the armed forces operating in DRC have splintered into various movements and shifted alliances over the years. Rights abuses committed against children by combatants associated with all armed groups in DRC are really and well documented. Moreover, the occupation of large portions of DRC by the armies of neighbouring states has caused considerable suffering among children and other vulnerable groups. In 2002, most foreign armed forces withdrew from positions in DRC.

When conflict erupted in 1998, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government by deploying elements of their national armed forces to positions in DRC. At the same time, Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought alongside the Congolese opposition groups, many of which they helped to create, including Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCDK), now known as Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML)¹⁶

¹⁵ United Nations, S/2010/596 (note 11), pp. 15–17.

¹⁶ The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) split into two factions in 1999, the RCD-Goma (RCD-G) and the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which later became RCD-K/ML. The armed forces of Uganda have traditionally supported the RCD-K/ML and the MLC, while the armed forces of Rwanda have traditionally supported RCD-Goma.

DRC receives considerable financial and technical assistance from its traditional partners such as the US, France and Belgium, which is directed towards building state capacity and strengthening the country's institutions of governance. New partners like South Africa, China and Angola have also been very important contributors to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC. However, as Theodore Trefon argues in his analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and political reform in the DRC, there has been little political energy or commitment from the capitals of these countries to align support for post-conflict reconstruction with the democratic aspirations of the Congolese people.¹⁷

This tendency remains detrimental to democratization efforts in the DRC on at least two fronts. Firstly, by staying indifferent to the lack of progress in democratic reform in the DRC, as exemplified in the timid international response to the controversial 2011 elections, while at the same time providing financial and technical support to the government in Kinshasa, the DRC's external partners are tacitly endorsing and emboldening the Congolese political leadership in its anti-democratic disposition. Secondly, some forms of technical and economic cooperation with the DRC tend to have the unintended effect of perpetuating the corrupt and repressive culture inherent in the system. Such is the case with the security assistance provided by South Africa and Angola as elements of the DRC's police force trained by them are believed to form part of Kabila's security apparatus used to violently suppress opposition protests. The same could be said of some of the investment decisions of other partners such as China and the European

¹⁷ Trefon Theodore 2011 *Congo Masquerade the political culture of Aid inefficiency and reform failure*. London. Zed books

Union, which have been criticized for reinforcing the web of corrupt links between foreign business and political patronage in the DRC.¹⁸

Generating and sustaining sufficient momentum for political reform in the DRC therefore requires a commitment from regional and global powers to rethink the nature of their engagement in the DRC. In particular, there should be a conscious effort to reconfigure the delivery of development assistance, trade relations and investment decisions so that they become instruments for supporting rather than obstructing the process of democratization in the country. This should be backed by a bold diplomatic drive, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, to put pressure on Congolese politicians to work as a collective towards greater political reform in the country.

1.4.1.2 *Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources*

Since July 2001, the UN Security Council has received reports from a panel of independent experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC. A 2002 report (S/2002/565) states that armed combatants are driven by a desire to control resources and finance their operations by riches gained from the exploitation of key mineral resources: cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds and gold. The use of children as forced labourers is a key component in the illicit exploitation of natural resources, Forced displacement, killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for economic gain are directly linked to military forces' control of resource extraction sites or their presence in the vicinity. Almost no revenues are allocated to public services, such as utilities, health services and schools.

¹⁸ See Michael diebert .”EU involvement in DRC mining draws protests”. Inter press service 28 October 2008 available on <http://ipsnews.net>(Accessed on 15th June 2015)

Local and foreign actors, including foreign armies, foreign armed opposition groups, Congolese armed opposition groups and Mai Mai militias, are implicated in the exploitation of natural resources in DRC. For example, Rwanda is alleged to export millions of dollars of coltan annually; Uganda is alleged to export huge quantities of gold and diamonds; Zimbabwe has rights to export Congolese tropical timber; and Angola has control of a large segment of the Congolese petrol industry. The panel of independent experts has also named 85 international business enterprises based in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East and North America that are considered to be in violation of the guidelines for multinational enterprises of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).¹⁹

Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe are named as key transit routes for commodities from DRC. The panel of independent experts also reports that links to individuals, companies, governments and criminal networks in the trafficking of natural resources are well established. The Lusaka Agreement does not address the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other economic interests, which, according to Oxfam, are a stronger driving force than political power for the continuation of conflict in DRC.

Analysts argue that action must be taken to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources in DRC if sustainable peace is to be achieved. In this context, the government of DRC officially

¹⁹ For complete list of businesses, see Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), Annex III. For more information on the OECD guidelines, see www.oecd.org.

launched its national diamond certification program on January 7, 2003, as part of its participation in the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, which is intended to limit the illicit exploitation of diamonds.²⁰

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is the UN's peacekeeping operation in DRC, established in 1999. In December 2002, the Security Council authorized a size increase of up to 8,700 military personnel, principally comprised of two task forces to be deployed in succession, when the caseload of the first task force can no longer be met by its capacity (UN Security Council Resolution 1445, paragraph. 10). According to MONUC representatives, as of early June 2003 the force size is approximately 6,000 military personnel.

Deployment of the second task force has not yet been authorized. MONUC also includes up to 700 military observers supported by specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, political affairs, child protection and medical and administrative support. In addition to other duties, MONUC is mandated to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with attention to vulnerable groups including women and children. This includes special attention to demobilized child soldiers. However, MONUC's mandate to protect civilians is limited to civilians in imminent danger in the presence of MONUC armed units.²¹

²⁰ The Kimberly Process is a negotiating procedure to establish minimum, acceptable international standards for national certification schemes of import and export of rough diamonds in an effort to stem the flow of rough diamonds from conflict areas, thereby contributing to the sustainability of peace and protecting the legitimate diamond industry. For more information on the Kimberly Process, see www.kimberlyprocess.com.

²¹ Critics of MONUC have argued that the force is weak and unable to improve the human rights situation for three primary reasons: 1) the small size of the force operating in a vast area; 2) the limited civilian protection mandate; and 3) the general atmosphere of insecurity. According to the International Crisis Group, the addition of at least 3,000 troops in Phase III of the operation, to total 8,700, will not be enough to make a difference

MONUC also strictly prohibits any act of sexual abuse and/or exploitation by members of the military and civilian components of MONUC and considers such behaviour as a serious act of misconduct. In December 2002, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General circulated a memorandum clarifying MONUC's policy on prohibition of sexual abuse and/or exploitation by all civilian and military components of MONUC. Among the prohibited activities are any exchange of money, goods or services for sex and sexual activity with persons under age

MONUC's Child Protection Section is the largest of any UN peacekeeping operation and is the first to include Child Protection Advisers (CPAs) deployed in the field. The high level of attention paid to the protection of children in DRC by the UN is, in part, a result of the work of this Section. In 2003, the Watch list published research on the abysmal record of attention to child protection issues in all UN Security Council resolutions and reports of the UN Secretary General on conflict situations. However, resolutions and reports on the DRC have addressed child protection more than those relating to any other conflict area in the world. This is a direct testament to the efforts of the Child Protection Section of MONUC. The mandate for the Section derives from Security Council resolutions related to DRC and to children and armed conflict (CAC). CPAs have been deployed as part of MONUC since February 2000.

1.4.2 Social Economic impact of DRC conflict

The term 'Great Lakes Region', although used literally, does not have a common, shared interpretation. In the context of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)²² the term denotes eleven African states, seven of whom, namely Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, are

²²For details and an overview of the ICGLR visit <http://www.icglr.org>.

perched on the shores of Africa's largest lakes: Victoria, Tanganyika, Albert and Kivu. The remaining four ICGLR member states: Angola, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo – Brazzaville and Sudan, do not enjoy such proximity to the lakes. In this paper the term 'Great Lakes Region' has a restrictive interpretation and is confined to the 'core' Great Lakes states of Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.²³

While refugees continue to dominate the discourse on forced displacement, a number of other forms of human mobility demand attention. First and foremost of these are internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁴ Displacement has become a coping strategy in respect of yet another stimulus – marked disruption in the ecosystem which renders it temporarily or permanently unsuitable to support human life.²⁵ The likely impact of climate change on population movements has been described by one source as follows: 'Estimates have suggested that between 25 million to one billion people could be displaced by climate change over the next 40 years.' The third, final category is no less contentious. Often described as 'undocumented migrants', 'irregular migrants' or 'migrants in an irregular situation', these displaced persons represent another manifestation of contemporary human mobility.²⁶ Given the range of sub-categories of forced displacement in the Great Lakes Region, the present study is confined to the two most lasting and visible manifestations – refugees and internally displaced persons.

²³ Henri Médard and Shane Doyle (eds), in *Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa*, Oxford: James Currey, 2007, give a persuasive explanation of the term 'Great Lakes Region'.

²⁴ Details can be found on the website of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) at <http://www.internaldisplacement.org> (accessed 2 December 2011)

²⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council, *Future floods of refugees: a comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration*, 2008, citing E El-Hinnawi, *Environmental refugees*, New York: United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 1995, http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf (accessed 17 May 2012)..

²⁶ According to the IOM, the term 'illegal migrant', which is widely used by drafters of national legislation governing immigration and residence, carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity: see *Glossary on migration*, 2nd ed, Geneva: IOM, 2011, 54, <http://joomla.corteidh.or.cr:8080/joomla/images/stories/Observaciones/11/Anexo%205.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2012).

Statistics on refugees and IDPs in the region are presented both as a way of contextualizing the ensuing discussion and providing a backdrop to the search for appropriate and sustainable responses. Besides revealing the trends of displacement in the region, the data enable us to determine the magnitude of the problem relative to other geographical locations on the continent and beyond. Of all documented cases of forced displacements, ‘protracted refugee situations’ (PRS) are the most serious.

Importantly, data show that the gravity of the situation in the Great Lakes Region is particularly acute on account of population size and duration, both of which far outstrip the thresholds of a PRS. A key hypothesis of this paper is that there is an intimate link between forced displacement, on the one hand, and governance and armed conflict on the other. A second hypothesis is on the role (adequacy or otherwise) of policy, institutional and legal frameworks in the displacement–conflict nexus. It is concluded that there does exist causal link (even if not direct and linear) between the high incidence of displacement in the region and governance challenges, as well as the seemingly endless armed conflicts raging in the region. Inadequacies at policy, institutional or legal level are an aggravating factor. In view of this, the study recommends first and foremost that rather than approaching displacement as a transitional phenomenon, policymakers should begin formulating mid- and long-term strategies in appreciation of the lasting nature of the phenomenon.

In broad terms, the ‘migration and development’ paradigm should be adapted. More specifically, mitigation and possible disruption of the displacement–a conflict link seem to call for greater focus and resources in the following areas: entrenchment of an evidence-based culture in

formulating policy interventions; fostering a culture of broad, purposeful consultations with stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation; and ensuring a more robust implementation and enforcement of treaty obligations pertinent to forced displacement.

1.4.3 Conflict management approaches

Several conflict management initiatives have been put in place to try and bring about sustainable peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo both local and international approaches under the African Union and United Nations mandate.

1.4.3.1 Peace agreement Initiatives

In July 1999, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the DRC government, Congolese armed opposition groups and foreign states signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.²⁷ To monitor this agreement as requested, the UN deployed peacekeeping operation, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

Also, in accordance with the agreement, several foreign countries involved in the conflict began to disengage. Most foreign troops, including those of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, withdrew during 2002. The Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawals were arranged through two separate bilateral peace agreements with the government of DRC. Most signatories have not upheld peace agreements, and fighting has continued in eastern DRC, particularly in Ituri District and the Kivu.

²⁷ Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC signed the cease-fire. The RCD and Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan opposition armed groups that operate in DRC were not signatories to the Lusaka Agreement

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was first convened in 2001, in an effort to address the internal aspects of the DRC conflict. In December 2002, the parties to the ICD signed the Global and Inclusive Accord for the Transition in DRC, paving the way for the establishment of a transitional government to be installed in June 2003. It included all the main Congolese belligerents.²⁸

ICD participants adopted 36 resolutions relating to the establishment of sustainable peace, including a resolution on the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and vulnerable persons and a resolution relating to the emergency programs in different social sectors that outlines specific policies for emergency social aid for children and youth. More than 90 percent of the battalions of Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) withdrew from positions in DRC in October 2002,²⁹ but retained a presence in Bunia, in accordance with the bilateral agreement signed between Uganda and DRC. Amnesty International (AI) and other human rights groups have raised concerns about the lack of impartiality by the UPDF in violence in Ituri District. In accordance with agreements, UPDF forces officially withdrew from Ituri District in April 2003, leading to an outbreak of extreme violence and insecurity.

As evidenced by the crisis in Ituri District, the withdrawal of foreign troops from positions in DRC has not brought peace, ended economic exploitation or stopped human rights abuses. While troop withdrawals have been strongly endorsed by the international community and have

²⁸ According to the agreement, Joseph Kabila will remain as the President of DRC for two years, leading to a general election. Four vice presidents will represent key groups: the government, the MLC, the RCD and the non-armed opposition. In reality, the DRC government and the MLC will likely share control over approximately 70 percent of the country. For further details on the structure of the transitional government, see UN Affected Populations or other political analyses

²⁹ *New Vision*, the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, reported that over 2,000 children fathered by UPDF soldiers are left behind in DRC following the UPDF withdrawal

undoubtedly fuelled initiatives towards peace, the lack of security and ongoing violence have cast a dark shadow on the overall progress of the Lusaka Agreement and also jeopardized the sustainability of positive results achieved thus far. In addition to the situation in Ituri District, the International Crisis Group and other analysts point to ongoing conflict in the Kivu as a fundamental obstacle to the achievement of sustainable peace. This situation has not been adequately addressed in recruitment of children and targeting of social infrastructure in the Kivus, particularly by RCD-G. Humanitarian organizations report an increase in the number of victims of sexual abuse, including rape of young girls by RCD-G in South Kivu

1.4.3.2 *Joint Military Operations*

1.4.3.2.1 *Umoja Wetu (Our unity)*

In late 2008, the governments of Rwanda and Congo agreed on a wide range of issues and agreed to launch a joint military offensive against the CNDP and the FDLR. They also agreed to restore full diplomatic relations and to activate economic cooperation. In January 2009, Rwanda and Congo launched a joint military operation in eastern Congo. The military operation dislodged and seriously weakened the CNDP forces. In January, the leader of the CNDP, General Laurent Nkunda, was arrested inside Rwanda, after he fled eastern Congo. The FDLR forces were also dislodged from their stronghold in North Kivu and forced to retreat. More than 2,000 Rwandan refugees returned home in January and February, as well as some FDLR militia members.

In late February 2009, Rwandan troops pulled out of Congo as part of the agreement with the Kabila government. The government of Congo has requested the extradition of General Nkunda. Nkunda still remains under arrest in Rwanda. Congolese forces continued to go after the

remaining CNDP and FDLR forces. As part of an earlier agreement, those CNDP forces willing to join the Congolese army were integrated. Rwanda also welcomed FDLR forces willing to return home. Meanwhile, remnants of the FDLR continue to target Congolese civilians. In late April 2009, United Nations officials accused the FDLR of committing serious atrocities against civilians in Luofu, a town north of Goma.³⁰

1.4.3.2.2 *Operation Kimia II (silent operation)*

After the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the completion of Operation *Umoja Wetu*, the government of Congo, with the support of MONUC forces, launched Operation Kimia II. In Eastern Congo, government forces targeted FDLR militia, especially in mining areas. According to a December 2009 report by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “the role played by MONUC in Kimia II continued to be focused on assisting FARDC with planning and on providing logistical support, including tactical helicopter lift, medical evacuation, fuel and rations.”³¹

The report also stated that MONUC provided military support to government forces.

Kimia II operations involved an estimated 16,000 government forces in North and South Kivu, according to U.N. officials.

1.4.3.2.3 *Amani Leo (Peace Today)*

On December 31, 2009, the government of Congo ended Operation Kimia II and in February 2010 launched Operation Amani Leo. According to United Nations officials, the objectives of

³⁰ <http://allafrica.com/stories/200904271233.html>.

³¹ Report of the U.N. Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, December 4, 2009.

Amani Leo are to protect civilians, remove negative forces from population centers, re-establish authority in liberated areas, and restore state authority. According to a directive signed by Congolese military Chief of Staff General Didier Etumba and MONUC Force Commander Lieutenant General Babacar Gayer, Congolese and MONUC forces “will concentrate on controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably FDLR elements, will not be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals.”³² The Congolese government and MONUC also agreed “the deployment of Military Police at the battalion level in order to prevent and sanction violations of human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law by their own forces. A zero tolerance policy for human rights violations will be strictly enforced.”

1.4.3.3 MONUSCO (*United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC*)

On May 28, 2010, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1925. The Congolese government had asked for the gradual withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force. The resolution converted the name and mission of the current peacekeeping force from the U.N. Organization Mission in DRC (MONUC) to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) effective July 1, 2010. The resolution also authorized MONUSCO’s mandate until June 30, 2011, and ordered the withdrawal of up to 2,000 peacekeeping troops by June 30, 2010. The resolution also called for the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers; support for the DRC government on a wide range of issues; and support for international efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. In June 2010, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed former U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Roger Meece as the special representative and head of the U.N. mission in DRC.

³² MONUC News. *After Operation Kimia II*, January 2010

1.4.3.4 MONUC (*United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC*)

In August 1999, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of 90 United Nations military liaison personnel to the DRC. In November 1999, Security Council Resolution 1279 affirmed that the previously authorized United Nations personnel would constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The operation is authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows peacekeepers to use force, if necessary, to carry out their mandate. Over the past decade, the Security Council passed a number of resolutions to strengthen MONUC's force and its mandate. Resolution 1291, passed in 2000, authorized MONUC to carry out a number of important tasks, including implementation of the cease-fire agreement, verification of disengagement and redeployment of forces, and support for humanitarian work and human rights monitoring. The resolution provided MONUC the mandate, under Chapter VII, to protect its personnel, facilities, and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Resolution 1565, adopted in 2004, increased MONUC personnel, with a primary objective of MONUC deployment to eastern Congo to ensure civilian protection and seize or collect arms, as called for in U.N. resolution 1493. The resolution also authorized MONUC too temporarily provide protection to the National Unity Government institutions and government officials. Resolution 1493 authorized MONUC to assist the DRC government to disarm foreign combatants and repatriate them to their home countries. The resolution, under Chapter VII, authorized MONUC to use "all means necessary" to carry out its mandate.³³

³³ <http://www.monuc.org>. (Accessed on 20th June 2015)

In December 2009, Security Council resolution 1906 authorized MONUC's mandate until the end of May 2010. The Kabila government has asked for the withdrawal of MONUC forces by 2011. A U.N. Security Council delegation was scheduled to visit Congo in late April 2010 but was postponed to May due to travel complications. In mid-May, a Security Council delegation visited the DRC and met with senior Congolese officials. The delegation was led by Ambassador Gerard Araud of France. According to Ambassador Araud, "The mission of the Security Council was to begin a dialogue with the authorities, population and civil society of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the future of the United Nations presence."³⁴

As of February 2010, MONUC had 20,573 total uniformed personnel, including 18,645 troops, 760 military observers, 1,216 police, 1,001 international civilian personnel, 2,690 local civilian staff and 629 United Nations Volunteers.³⁵ MONUC is currently the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world.

1.4.2 Findings

From the literature review the research has been able to address the objectives of the study that is the causes of the DRC conflict management mechanisms put in place and the social economic impact on the country and the Great Lakes Region. The conflict revolves around minerals resources management and the interference by external actors mainly neighboring countries who want to exploit valuable minerals by supporting rebel groups such as M23. This is well captured by the greed grievance theory in the subsequent chapters.

³⁴ <http://allafrica.com/stories/201005171804.html>. accessed May 2015

³⁵ MONUC Mission website available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/>.

1.5 Justification of research

The research will contribute to the existing knowledge in research on the possible ways of solving the long running conflict in the DRC and bring faster economic prosperity in the country and the greater Great Lakes Region. The research seeks to maximize on the gap of lack of civic awareness among the people as many people in the region lack education and information on the need of peace to utilize the immense resources at their disposal. Most researchers have focused on equitable distribution of resources to bring about peace and also deploying of more security personnel to bring about peace. The research will bridge this gap.

Lastly, the DRC Congo conflict is a reality in the modern day times and a lot of research needs to be conducted to ascertain the exact causes and devise remedies to bring about everlasting peace in the country and Africa as a whole. The conflict has negative ramifications to the overall peace of continent. This research will contribute towards realizing this noble goal.

1.6 Theoretical Analysis

The research will adopt greed grievance theory to investigate the causes of conflicts in the Great Lakes region with main focus on DRC. Grievance here include bad governance, unequal distribution of benefits emanating from Natural resources as in the case of DRC Congo, marginalization of communities as in the case of pastoralist communities in East Africa, corruption, ethnicity among others.

Greed on other hands in this research includes: illegal mining of mineral resources in the DRC by the army, militia groups and rebels. It also manifested in poor governance where certain

communities refuse to involve others in governance as in the case of Hutu and Tutsi which led to genocide in Rwanda. Rebel groups in the Great Lakes region are driven by greed to control mineral resources thus accelerating conflicts in the region.

The research will use the theory to underscore the relevance of grievances and greed in causing conflicts. When grievances are not addressed in time people will always resort to other means to address their problems. In most cases these means are characterized by greed and selfishness.

1.7 Hypotheses

1. The causes of Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo and how they have brought about stagnated development in the country.
2. Impact of DRC conflict in relation to both Social and Economic underdevelopment in the country and spillover effects on neighboring states in the region.
3. Conflict management Strategies which have been put in place in trying to end the conflict in DRC both at country level and regional level.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research design used is a descriptive analysis. The method used for the study was content analysis. This is a natural way of finding out the natural world and understands the way people interpret it. This was the most appropriate method for the researcher to gain more detailed information on the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. The data collection method is primarily secondary data mainly from already published research which include journals, websites and books on the subject of DRC conflict.

This is a method of collecting information by reviewing past research and literature within the view of subjectivist approach which applies qualitative methods using a humanistic and phenomenological approach. This approach relies on data collection from past research in light of the human perspective and therefore involves collecting feelings, emotions and perceptions when interpreting phenomenon under study regarding the DRC conflict thus the choice of qualitative research method.

For this study, the sampling method used was non-probability purposive sampling. Owing to the nature of the study, past research and case study analysis was used to collect data. Purposive heterogeneity sampling is a method that aims at getting a sample research and case studies with similar characteristics or traits. The data collected is very relevant to the conflict of DRC.

The research project will adopt discourse analysis, this is very appropriate to the analysis of the data collected in the study. This system helps to establish objectives in data. These included causes of causes of conflict, conflict management systems employed both local and international mechanisms, social economic impact of the conflict in DRC. The data for this study will be obtained from secondary sources. The data will be descriptive. Guided by the objectives and Greed grievance theory, the data will be arranged according to the major themes.

Use of secondary will cut on the cost of research work in relation to designing questionnaires, conducting interviews and administration of the same. Use of secondary data is both time saving and effective in this research project

1.9 Scope and Limitations.

Time limitations because of the large geographical area of the Great Lakes Region I might not be able to travel to each individual state to collect data. But this will be solved through using secondary data from Publications, Internet sources, and journals which have written about the subject matter.

Secondly, since the study relies on secondary data to analyze the conflict in the DRC some materials may not be exactly and precise than if it were through use of primary data collection tools such as Interviews and Questionnaires.+-

1.10 Chapter outline.

Chapter one: Introduction

This chapter starts by introducing conflict in the Great Lakes Region focusing mainly on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by first setting the broad context of the research study, the statement of the problem, objectives, justification, literature review, theoretical framework hypotheses, the methodology of the study and finally the scope and Limitations.

Chapter Two: Conceptual analysis

This chapter adopts the Greed Grievance theory in analyzing the main motivation behind the DRC in relation to causes of the conflict and some of the issues that are not addresses during conflict management. This section examines the Greed and Grievance starting with global, continental and more specifically to DRC conflict.

Chapter Three: Case Study Democratic Republic of Congo conflict

This chapter mainly focuses on the descriptive nature of the DRC conflict. This chapter gives the genesis of the conflict in relation to causes, impacts and some of the conflict management mechanisms which have been employed to end the conflict itself.

Chapter Four: Critical Analysis: Overview Democratic Republic of Congo conflict

This chapter critically analyses the role of continued bad governance since independence characterized by totalitarian rule in times of Mobutu to Kabila. Bad governance is what enhances other causes of conflict in DRC the country has been marred by election malpractices resulting in post elections violence thus making the already war torn country worse in the recent years.

The chapter also draws the relationship between poor governance and mismanagement of resources, corruption and weak state security institutions. In summary bad governance enhances other causes of conflict in DRC since the Government itself is illegitimate.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation

This chapter provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas for further study.

CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
GREED GRIEVANCE THEORY AND CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction.

This chapter examines how greed grievance theory manifests in many conflicts all over the world and more so in Africa and specifically in DRC conflict. The theory which was propounded by Paul and Collier in study of Civil war is equally relevant to the DRC conflict. According to this theory war is always motivated by some factors. In DRC conflict the main motivation are vast natural resources including copper, timber Cobalt among other valuables resources. Resources are illegally exploited by Militia groups such as MAI MAI,M23 and foreign armies from neighboring countries to finance and sustain conflict as evident in the preceding Literature in Chapter one.

Another motivation for conflict in DRC conflict is bad governance coupled with corruption in Governmental institutions such as the security and the Judiciary. Rebel groups explore this weakness to offer alternative government to the people thus fueling the conflict through fighting government troops. These constitute Greed in the DRC conflict.

A grievance on the other hand includes failure of DRC government to share equitably the benefits emanating from mineral exploitation. Many people in the country feel marginalized and excluded from government. The second aspect of grievance is manifested is the government failure to uphold democratic values as characterized by election malpractices and totalitarian

regimes. This chapter seeks to underscore the relevance of the theory to DRC conflict and give more insights on the causes of the conflict.

2.2 Greed Grievance theory

Two phenomena have been recently utilized to explain conflict onset among rational choice analysts: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance produces and fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of inter-ethnic or horizontal inequality and identity formation is also crucial to intra-state conflict, as it overcomes the collective action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone, yet, the greed versus grievance hypotheses may be complementary explanations for conflict.

The greed explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works best in cross-country studies, but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in quantitative country-case studies. Grievances and horizontal inequalities may be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist³⁶.

Civil war is a multi-faceted problem. Not only does it produce human tragedies on a large scale, but it creates humanitarian crises that are of concern to the international community, as well as

³⁶Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner (2007). 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War'

contributing to global and regional insecurity in the Great Lakes region conflict more lives have been lost during 1994 genocide in Rwanda thousands of people were killed.

Civil war is also a major cause of underdevelopment, and perpetuates poverty³⁷. The number of countries embroiled in civil war in the African continent has continued to increase due to poor governance, corruption and marginalization of communities these grievances are rarely addressed by the state thus leading to conflict. In Southern Sudan the conflict revolves around mineral resources (oil) and sharing of leadership position between the two competing tribes.

Civil wars are not a homogenous phenomenon. Their origins, motivations and objectives vary. A useful guide to the typology of conflict can be found in Besancon³⁸. The discussion on the typology of civil war points to four broad types: genocides, revolutions or rebellions against the state, secessionist wars and internationalized wars (where adjoining states or the great powers get involved).

In recent years, two phenomena have been utilized to explain conflict onset among academic economists: greed and grievance. The former is due to the influential work of Paul Collier³⁹ and is more popular amongst economists. According to this view, conflict reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents, concealed with the fig leaf of collective grievance. Additionally, rebellions need to be financially viable: civil wars supported by natural resource

³⁸ Marie Besancon *Relative resource: inequalities in ethnic wars revolutions and genocide* journal of peace article volume 4.

³⁹ Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner (2007). 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War'

based rents like blood diamonds or oil, or when sympathetic Diasporas provide a ready source of finance, are more likely to occur. Above all, there was the assertion that inequality played no part in adding to the risk of civil war. In Congo the financing of M23 rebels mainly comes from illegal exploitation of mineral such as copper coltan and timber.

2.3 Greed and conflict

The greed motivation behind civil war has been popularized by empirical work on the causes of civil war where a cross-section of conflicts in different nations is analyzed together econometrically, and greed is influenced by the availability or abundance of natural resource rents civil wars stem from the greedy behavior of a rebel group in organizing an insurgency against the government. The war in South Sudan is mainly motivated by greed by two competing tribes mainly Dinkas led by Salva Kiir and Nuer led by RiekMachar in which extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention, targeted attacks against civilians not taking part in the fighting, violence aimed at spreading terror among civilians, and attacks on hospitals and U.N. peacekeepers⁴⁰

Greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group. The opportunities can be categorized into three components: financing, recruitment and geography. The most common sources of rebel finance are the appropriation of natural resources, donations from sympathetic diasporas residing abroad, contributions from foreign states (hostile to the government) or multinational companies interested in the region. Natural resource wealth is the chief among the three in terms of its relative importance. For instance Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran,

⁴⁰ United states press (Reuters 08/05/2014)

but the relationship suffered after Hamas refused to follow Iran's lead in supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The group also raises funds in the Gulf countries and receives donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world through its charities, such as the umbrella fundraising organization, the Union of Good. Some fundraising and propaganda activity takes place in Western Europe and North America. After the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government, efforts by the Egyptian military to destroy tunnels connecting Gaza with the Sinai severely limited Hamas's access to weapons, smuggled goods, and construction materials⁴¹

Civil wars motivated by the desire to control natural resource rents could also mirror "warlord competition", a term that owes its origins to the violent competition between leaders attempting to control economic resources in the context of African Great lakes region.

2.4 Greed & Grievance in DRC conflict

Poverty or slow economic growth is an important risk factor for civil conflict. Collier found that the odds a civil war will occur in a low-income country were 15 times higher than in a high-income country, while a doubling of per-capita income could halve the risk of civil war. The risk of conflict may be higher in low-income countries as the poorest people may feel they have little to lose from joining a rebel group, making rebel recruitment relatively cheap and easy. Laurent Kabila, former president and rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of Congo, claimed that organizing and leading a rebellion in what was Zaire was easy – 'all you needed was \$10,000 and a satellite phone'⁴²

⁴¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-fund.htm>

⁴² Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom (2004). 'On the Duration of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253–73

Uganda has benefited from the DRC's gold and diamonds. According to the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, Uganda has no diamonds but became a diamond exporter after it had occupied diamond-rich areas in the DRC. Similarly, the panel reported that Uganda's gold exports dramatically increased after its involvement in the conflict. Uganda also backed insurgents in the eastern Ituri region and played a direct role in combat there. Ituri is rich in gold reserves, and the dispute in part involved control of that resources.

The greed perspective. Rather than resulting from the greed of rebels, as emphasized by recent literatures, the existence of natural resources may be an incentive for third parties—states and corporations—to engage in or indeed foster civil conflicts. Hence, for example, the escalation of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has resulted in part from the involvement of neighboring states seeking raw materials.⁴³ The secessionist bid in Katanga in Congo was supported if not instigated by the Belgian firm Union Minière du Haut Katanga. And evidence suggests that the French oil corporation Elf took actions that led to an escalation of the conflict in the Republic of Congo⁴⁴

Natural resource dependence could in fact be associated with grievances rather than greed.⁴⁵ There are at least four variants of this mechanism. First, countries with middling levels of

⁴³ Dashwood, Hevina S., 2000. *Zimbabwe, the political economy of transformation*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press

⁴⁴ Verschave, François-Xavier. 2000. *Noir Silence*. Paris: Éditions des Arènes.

⁴⁵ The introduction of the terms greed and grievance is unfortunate, not least because the distinction between them appears to be a moral rather than a positive one.

dependence on natural resources may be experiencing transitory inequality as part of the development process.⁴⁶

Second, economies that are dependent on natural resources may be more vulnerable to terms of trade shocks. These could cause instability and dissatisfaction within groups that suffer from the shocks (in this case, the problem is not with dependence on natural resources per se but that natural-resource-dependent economies are likely to be dependent on a small number of commodities for their export earnings).⁴⁷ DRC economy is dependent on natural resources and any fluctuations in the international market causes tension among the population thus escalating the conflict.

Third, the process of extraction may produce grievances, for example, through forced migration. Ross, for The Ugandan economy significantly benefited from the re-exportation of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, and coffee, and commodity sales significantly improved the country's balance of payments and all the minerals were from DRC. Uganda is often cited as an economic success story in Africa, a model of economic growth and a country committed to poverty reduction, but there has been little scrutiny by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the role of its illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC in bolstering its economy.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ This may follow for example from the Kuznets curve hypothesis that predicts transitory inequality resulting simply from the fact that different parts of an economy may develop at different rates

⁴⁷ Vulnerability will also be more likely if the risks associated with the commodities are highly correlated—either in terms of price fluctuations or in terms of production conditions, such as the weather. There is no reason to expect that an economy exporting a diversified portfolio of natural resources will be particularly susceptible to income shocks

⁴⁸ The U.N. Panel report 2001 on DRC Conflict

The U.N. panel mentioned above also found that Rwanda, which has no diamond reserves of its own, began to export diamonds after it became involved in the war. It found that the Rwandan military financed its involvement in the DRC through commercial exploitation of resources, shareholding in businesses operating in the DRC, payments from the rebel group RCD-Goma, and taxation and protection payments from businesses operating in Rwandan-controlled areas in the DRC. Most of the revenues generated from these activities are opaque and off-budget. Uganda has been more brazen and has kept this revenue on-budget, even though the source of that revenue is considered to be illegal exploitation of another country's resources; funds are brought in through formal channels and openly included as a source of government revenue. The panel of experts further concluded that the nature of combat in the DRC was intertwined with control over resources.⁴⁹

Current big battles have been fought in areas of major economic importance, towards the cobalt- and copper-rich area of Katanga and the diamond area of Mbuji Mayi. Military specialists argue that the Rwandan objective is to capture these mineral-rich areas to deprive the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the financial sources of its war effort. Without the control of this area, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot sustain the war. This rationale confirms that the availability of natural resources permits the continuation of the war. In view of the current experience of the illegal exploitation of the resources of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda, it could also be thought that the capturing of this mineral-rich area would lead to the exploitation of those resources. In that case, control of those areas by Rwanda could be seen primarily as an economic and financial objective rather than a security objective for the Rwandan borders.

⁴⁹ Ibid

The feasibility mechanism. Natural resources could provide a way to finance rebellions that have been started for other reasons, thereby increasing the prospects of success.⁵⁰ This can occur either through control of production during conflict, or, in principle, through the sales of illegally mined minerals. Insofar as natural resource dependence matters through feasibility effects, it is a “permissive cause” rather than a “root cause” of conflict. Some scholars argue that because motivations for conflict are only permissive causes of this form matter, nevertheless insofar as there is variation in motivation, the feasibility explanation implies that there is a need to take account of root causes when responding to conflicts. In principle, there should also be observable differences in the conduct of wars, and of negotiations, between those that are conducted to access resources and those that are financed by resources but conducted to achieve other goals.

The different contexts that have intensified illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources are weak governance, unregulated mining, and illegal activities of armed groups. While the mitigating efforts have been directed at the latter two aspects, the issue of governance is a core concern that should be kept in perspective while developing initiatives that would sustainably address the link between natural resources said conflict .Countries in the region have divergent challenges in governance and this impacts their capacity to develop common approaches to managing natural resources and conflict in the region. Taking the DRC as an example, the challenges in governance are illustrated by a weak state presence in the east, insufficient infrastructural networks, lack of adequate socio-economic development, and a failure to administratively manage national resource and enforce natural resource management regulations.

⁵⁰ As noted above, this interpretation of resources providing “opportunity” (as opposed to motivation) is indeed a “softer” interpretation of the result that is sometimes suggested by Collier and Hoeffler

These challenges in governance create gaps that have been occupied by illegal armed groups, both local and foreign, who now thrive on these bountiful reserves. The unique situation of the DRC then spills over to its neighbors who are subsequently affected by conflict actors operating from the DRC to destabilize the Great Lakes region.

2.4.1 Armed groups and mineral exploitation

Armed groups sustaining themselves through profits from illegal exploited natural resources have created regional insecurity complex. For instance, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group from Uganda operating in the DRC, has been linked to illegal taxation of gold and timber and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*, FDLR) has been implicated in trade in minerals, timber, and charcoal, as well as cannabis production. Criminal elements within the Congolese Army (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*, FARDC) have also been implicated in illegal taxation and exploitation, notably during the six-month eastern DRC mining suspension from March to September 2010.

The demand in global markets is also a perpetuating factor. The minerals tin ore and coltan are important components of cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices, and the DRC is a primary global source.⁵¹ This demand encourages regional smuggling as a means for individuals and collectives to illegally profit from natural resources. Illegally armed groups are reported to control access to mines in remote areas where they subject civilians to gross human rights abuses

⁵¹Chip Pitts, Human exploitation fuels mining trade in DRC: Apple, Dell look away, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amnesty-international/human-exploitation-fuels_b_243939.html (accessed 30 August 2011).

and displacement.⁵² Apart from the regional aspect of illegal trafficking of these minerals to finance armed group activities and the criminal profit motive, minerals are also used in lieu of hard currency for trading to fund conflict. This includes the supply of arms.⁵³

In the final report of the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC,⁵⁴ it was concluded that the involvement of the military and armed groups in illegal mineral trade was by way of taxation, protection, commercial control and coercive control. Taxation involves levying illegal taxes on mining activities and unrelated commercial activities in the area. Protection is requested of military and armed groups to provide security forming activities and to prevent looting. For commercial reasons, the military use illegal revenue to engage in mineral trade. Military and armed groups gain control through seizing productive pits and periodically pillaging minerals. The involvement of the military in the illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources has compromised their mandate to provide civilian protection.

In reference to these criminal elements in the army, it was observed that deployment of these criminal networks is increasingly driven by the desire to control natural resources.⁵⁵ Illegally armed groups form a vital component of the natural resources/conflict nexus. Their role in regionalizing insecurity is partly financed by illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources. This underlines the importance of adopting a regional perspective with regard to natural resources and conflict in the Great Lakes Region.

⁵² De Kock, *The DRC* at 50, 2.

⁵³ United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo*, S/2003/1027, 15.

⁵⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2010/596, 2010, 48-49, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?Symbol=S/2010/596 (accessed 19 May 2012).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

The interconnectedness of countries in the region is seen in regional illegally armed groups and crime networks, interdependent economies, trans-boundary nationalities, and shared natural resources. 'While most conflicts in the Great Lakes begin within the borders of countries, the actors within a particular conflict are rarely confined within state. Indeed conflicts tend to link diverse actors, interests and issues and these linkages broaden local, regional and international economies and political contexts.'⁵⁶ The regional impact of illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources, and its link to conflict financing, indicates that only a dedicated and concerted regional approach will effectively deal with the link between natural resources and conflicts. As stated earlier, natural resources are not the only source of conflict financing for illegally armed groups. 'The challenge for policy is to deal with organized armed groups.

⁵⁶Patricia Kameri-Mbote, *Environment and conflict linkages in the Great Lakes Region*, IELRC Working Paper, 2005-6, 4.

CHAPTER THREE

CASE STUDY: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly focuses on the descriptive nature of the Great Lakes conflict but with main focus on (DRC) which happens to be the epicenter of conflict in the entire region. This chapter will give the genesis of the conflict in relation to causes, impacts and some of the conflict management approaches which have been employed to end the conflict itself.

3.2 Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo

Landmark peace agreements signed in 2002 by 11 African governments and various non-state armed groups were meant to end 7 years of war in DRC that had ravaged Africa's Great Lakes region. A decade later, instability, tightly intertwined with regional geopolitics still persists. Recurring conflict has killed tens of thousands, mostly civilians, and displaced millions others. The extended instability has also led to a collapse of basic social services and economic activity in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), resulting in manifold more deaths due to malnutrition, lack of access to basic healthcare, and scarce livelihood opportunities.⁵⁷

Amid this breakdown, barbaric forms of violence have emerged. During one 4-day period in the summer of 2011, nearly 400 women, men, and children were raped by militia fighters. Since

⁵⁷Benjamin Coghlan et al., "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis," The International Rescue Committee and the Burnet Institute, 2007

1996, there have reportedly been more than 200,000 rape cases, which are mostly attributed to armed militias.⁵⁸

Sponsored militias in the eastern DRC have continued to dominate the conflict. Nearly all of the illicit traffic in Congolese minerals that funds armed groups' transits Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Despite numerous initiatives and agreements, no comprehensive framework to end this complex conflict has been forged. International engagement has continued to be fragmented with an emphasis on symptoms. Costs to the international community in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance alone total more than \$2 billion annually. The persistent state of crisis, similarly, constrains economic investment in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Instability in the Great Lakes, moreover, hinders other security challenges in the region, including state building efforts in South Sudan and defeating the Lord's Resistance Army militia in Uganda since the militia groups are interlinked in different countries thus making conflict resolution more complex and complicated.

As part of its effort to consolidate control over post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an operation into the eastern DRC in 1996. The RPF aimed to neutralize the remnants of the former Rwandan regime's military, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), and the Rwandan *Interahamwe* militia who were key players in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 in which thousands of people lost lives and property destroyed. These fighters, who numbered in the tens of thousands, had fled to the Congo where they enjoyed free maneuver and launched raids into Rwanda. Soon after the initial operations the RPF broadened its goals to remove the

⁵⁸ *Report of the Panel on Remedies and Reparations for Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Geneva: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2011)

regime of Mobutu SeseSeko, president of then Zaire, whom they saw as protecting their enemies. Several other countries, including Burundi and Uganda, eventually provided frontline troops and support to build a Congolese rebellion, ostensibly led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, known as 'Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libérationdu Congo-Zaire (AFDL).⁵⁹

Kabila assumed power in Kinshasa in May 1997 after Mobutu's disorganized forces were quickly defeated during a 7-month war of "liberation." However, lacking legitimacy, geopolitical vision, and governance experience, his regime was characterized by brutality and violation of human rights. Most foreign armies subsequently withdrew in 2003. Rwanda's 1996 invasion of the eastern DRC set a pattern of conflict that has since repeated itself and, in effect, wholly shifted Rwanda's previous civil war onto DRC soil. Its reliance on proxy militia's in the DRC and periodic military operations to resolve complex political challenges prompted other governments to follow suit. This has led to the proliferation of armed non-state groups and instigated a never-ending series of crises in the region.⁶⁰

In recent years, the key actors have been the *Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), a militia supported by Rwanda, and the *Forces Démocratiques de Libérationdu Rwanda* (FDLR), which is composed of ex-FAR leaders and poses a security risk to Rwanda. A lasting solution to the fighting in the Great Lakes will take more than the end of the FDLR and CNDP, however. Years of fighting have spawned other conflict drivers and peace spoilers. Among them

⁵⁹Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (Geneva: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2010), 70.

⁶⁰Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN Security Council: S/2008/773, December 2008).

is the eastern DRC's easily accessible natural resources, particularly gold, tin, colombite-tantalite (coltan), and tungsten. Armed groups depend on revenues from the illicit trade in these resources. For some, it has become a primary objective. The same holds true for elements of the, *Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC), the DRC's national army, which have been implicated in mineral trafficking.⁶¹

The minerals trade also features prominently in decision-making in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Most of the eastern DRC's minerals must move through these and other East African countries, where they are levied with fees and re-exported, often by local businesses. This has become a significant source of economic activity and growth. For example, Rwanda's domestic minerals production is small, but the mining sector was a "key growth engine" for Rwanda in 2011 during a year of otherwise subdued regional economic activity, including a slump in Rwanda's agricultural sector.⁶²

The RPF's tactic of arming various Tutsi-dominated militias has likewise fostered mistrust of the DRC Tutsi community. In response to the heightened polarization and militarization of the region, communities including the Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Hunde, Shi, Rega, Bembe, and others—created armed militias, known locally as *Mai-Mai*, to defend themselves. Decades of cross-border migration combined with ongoing conflict-related displacement of 1.4 million people in the Kivu have also turned the already thorny issue of land ownership into a major

⁶¹Ruben de Koning, *Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Interventions*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 27 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2011), 17-18.

⁶²*Resilience in the Face of Economic Adversity: Policies for Growth with a Focus on Household Enterprises*, Rwanda Economic Update 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 2011), 3.

challenge. With each crisis, property belonging to locals was occupied by new arrivals. Any attempt to recover or return to this land became an inter-communal conflict.

The Kivu's have among the highest population densities in the DRC, with nearly 70 inhabitants per Square kilometre compared with a national average of 29 inhabitants Per square kilometre. The resulting weakening of traditional authorities coupled with the government's inability to enforce property laws has produced a state of permanent conflict over land ownership. Conditions in the DRC's neighbors also feed the proliferation of armed groups. In Burundi, the government has been accused of human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions by the army. In response, the previously demobilized Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) rebel militia has regrouped and rearmed in South Kivu. A new rebellion, *FronatuTabara*, has also based itself in South Kivu. This has stoked fears that violence may return to Burundi in full force and engulf the eastern DRC. In Rwanda, minority elite is consolidating a monopoly of political and financial power and is intolerant of opposition voices. Arrests of activists and independent journalists are common. The post-genocide legal system has also been tainted by corruption and procedural irregularities hindering the disarmament of the FDLR and the return of tens of thousands of refugees from the DRC. Meanwhile, hamstrung by weak legitimacy and capacity, the DRC government has had little success in extending its authority in the Kivu.⁶³

⁶³ *Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda's Community-Based Gacaca Courts* (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2011).

3.3 Main causes of conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo

This section looks at some of the main causes conflict DRC and how they have prolonged the conflict.

3.3.1 Bad governance

Following years of extreme instability, Lieutenant General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, ousted both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 coup. The Congolese state and economy still bear the deep impact of Mobutu's 'predatory' rule of thirty-two years. Executive power in Zaire, a name given to the DRC by Mobutu, was an absolute ruler. The 1974 constitution granted him authority over the executive, legislature and Judiciary. Mobutu, the head of the state, also had the right to change the constitution at his discretion. He banned political parties while making membership in his party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement, compulsory.

In the name of democracy a one-party system was established wherein elections were held periodically, with the incumbent head of the state as the only candidate. Mobutu was also guilty of severe human rights violations and political repression. Corruption was integral to the system, and politicians became entirely dependent on his good will. He consolidated power by co-opting potential rivals and exploited the country's vast natural resources. By the 1990s, the country's economy was near collapse due to mismanagement, corruption and authoritarianism. This overall dismal scenario and the later happenings in the DRC gave credibility to the stance that conflicts in Africa, including the one in the DRC, are due to bad governance.⁶⁴

⁶⁴J. Stremlav, "Ending Africa's Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 4, 2000, p. 118.

3.3.2 Natural mineral resources

At present, cassiterite ore (which is refined to produce tin) is the leading mineral in terms of dollar value contributing to armed groups in the DRC. The country is the world's sixth leading producer of tin, although estimates of total production vary. The Enough Project calculates that the eastern DRC produces over 24,000 metric tons of tin, or 6-8% of global production.⁶⁵

This likely contributed about \$115 million to armed groups in 2008.⁶⁶ Over half of this material comes from the Bisie mine in North Kivu, which has changed hands among armed groups several times and is currently controlled by a unit of former CNDP rebels now integrated into the Congolese army. Although coltan ore (refined to produce tantalum) is not as significant as cassiterite in its financial contributions to the conflict in the DRC, it was the first conflict metal from the DRC to be the subject of global concern in the early 2000s, as the price for the mineral spiked in conjunction with growing demand from the electronics industry. The DRC is one of the leading producers of this material, estimated by one source at 155 metric tons (tantalum equivalent) annually, or 15-20% of global production⁶⁷ (in contrast, nominal U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) figures estimate 100 metric tons of production in 2009 and 8.6% of the global total indicating some of the variability in statistics related to these minerals)⁶⁸. This may have provided armed groups with about \$12 million in 2008.

⁶⁵ Enough Project. "A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals." April 24, 2009

⁶⁶ Enough Project. "Armed Group Profits—3Ts and Gold 2008" Excel file,

<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Armed>

⁶⁷ Enough Project. "A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals."

<http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-minerals-strategy-paper>

⁶⁸ USGS. "Tantalum 2010 Commodity

Summary." Accessed on 08/08/21 <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/niobium/mcs-2010-tanta.pdf>

The mineral resources endowment in DRC has not benefited the local but rather divided them thus becoming the hot pot for civil wars. Weak government institutions coupled with corruption have led to insurgency of armed groups such as the Mai Mai and M23 to illegally exploit the minerals and use the revenue to purchase weapons thus sustaining the conflict in the country over a longer period of time.

3.4 Initiatives to address conflict in the DRC

A dozen major peace agreements, negotiations, and reconciliation initiatives, often brokered with help from the international community, have been the primary vehicles employed to resolve conflict in DRC in the Great Lakes region. Most of these accords, however, have addressed only some of the causes and consequences of the conflict and, at times, neglected its principal drivers which are equivalent in medical fields of curing the symptoms and not causes of the diseases. The measures in most cases are employed only when the conflict is full blown and this has led to partial conflict resolution in the DRC.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has to date been the largest peace initiative. Convened by UN Resolution 1291 in 2000 and held under the auspices of the African Union and UN with support from international donors, it brought 18 countries to the negotiating table of which were directly involved in the conflict. After 6 years of political negotiations, the conference gave rise to the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region, signed in December 2006 by heads of state from Angola, Burundi, the

Central African Republic, the DRC, Kenya, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.⁶⁹

The pact entered into force in June 2008 after it was ratified by eight signatories. An ICGLR Secretariat was established in Bujumbura to implement the pact's 10 protocols, including regional non-aggression and mutual defense, good governance, and reconstruction and development. Only limited progress toward these objectives has been realized to date, however. A key contribution of the ICGLR has been that it took into account the economic dimensions and motivations of the conflict in the eastern DRC. Specifically, it launched a Regional Initiative on Natural Resources to certify, formalize, and track the minerals trade so as to eliminate trafficking and the role of armed groups. Pilot schemes in Rwanda and South Kivu have shown some progress.

The ICGLR's main shortcoming has been that it did not address the massive human rights violations committed by various state actors that intervened in the DRC—abuses that have now been well documented through UN reports. As a consequence, these actors have had little incentive to end their reliance on short-term military responses and proxy militias to meet their immediate security and economic interests.

The Tripartite Plus Commission was a U.S. initiative launched in 2004 dealing mainly with the FDLR presence in the DRC. This initiative culminated in a joint *communiqué* on November 9, 2007, committing the DRC and Rwandan governments to “a common approach to address the

⁶⁹Jean Migabo Kalere, *Textes fondamentaux sur le processus de paix en RDC* (Leuven: CPRS, 2008). Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, S.J., *Du pacte de stabilité de Nairobi à l'Acte d'engagement de Goma : Enjeux et défis des processus de paix en RDC* (Kinshasa :Cepas/Rodhecic, 2008).

threat posed to their common security and stability by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.” The Nairobi communiqué fulfilled a fundamental aim of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to more aggressively target the ex-FAR remnants that comprise the FDLR. The FARDC-RDF collaboration has been very unpopular in the eastern DRC, even though many in the region dread the FDLR. The joint operations

3.4.1 Goma conference.

The Goma peace conference has been the only one initiated by the DRC government. From January 6–24, 2008, the conference brought together 1,500 delegates from all communities and social strata in North and South Kivu. Its general objective was to rally stakeholders and involve them in the restoration of peace in the area. Delegates ultimately signed an *Acted'engagement* to cease hostilities.

By giving all communities and most armed groups a voice, the Goma conference represented a significant step forward in understanding the conflict from local perspectives. And a high priority for these communities was to prevent those guilty of committing massacres, sexual violence, or inciting ethnic hatred from holding positions of responsibility, particularly in the security services.⁷⁰ After the conference, the involvement of traditional village chiefs and other community leaders facilitated the disarmament or integration of 22 armed groups into the national army indicating a strong desire at the local level to end the fighting.

⁷⁰Laura Davis, *Justice-Sensitive Security Sector System Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Brussels: Initiative for Peace building, 2009), 11.

3.4.2 Develop political space as alternative to military operations.

Ever since the 2007 Nairobi *communiqué*, military responses to the conflict have been prioritized at the expense of other approaches. The results have been very mixed. Groups targeted in sweeps often relocate until operations end, then return and attack civilians whom they accuse of helping state authorities. Military operations against non-state armed groups may be necessary, but they should be combined with initiatives that offer an alternative and a future to certain members of these groups, especially those not guilty of war crimes.

There is reason to believe that combatants can be persuaded to step down. The Goma conference rekindled some confidence among militia groups on a way forward. Likewise, during previous negotiations, the FDLR agreed to denounce the use of force, condemn genocide ideology, cooperate with the international tribunal on the genocide, and transform itself into a political party in Rwanda. Offering members of militias reasonable and secure opportunities in their home countries should be a key aspect in peace efforts. Fostering protection of political rights and civil liberties, moreover, will undermine the claims of exclusion and persecution that militias such as the FDLR use to recruit among exile communities.⁷¹

In conclusion the prospects for peace in the DRC will fundamentally depend on the development of an inclusive approach that combines the security and economic interests of the various local and regional actors in the region. If communities in DRC are given equal chances in accessing benefits emanating from mineral resources and also given opportunities in the national government ultimately peace will return to the country and the Great Lakes region as a whole.

⁷¹FDLR Declaration (Sant'Edigio peace talks between the FDLR and the Government of the DRC, Rome, Italy, March 31,2005).

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AN OVERVIEW DRC CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have been focusing on the causes of conflict, conflict management and social economic impact on the DRC. This chapter looks critically at poor governance as the primary cause of prolonged conflict and how it enhances other causes of conflict n DRC. Poor governance include weak state institutions such as the uniform force, corruption in government, unfair distribution of vast resources, authoritarian rule and weak legal and justice system in the country. It is through democracy and good governance that the country can be able to manage its security apparatus, resources and social welfare of its citizen's .This component is lacking in the leadership of DRC since independence.

4.2 Poor Governance in DRC

Since independence DRC has been characterized by dictatorship and violation of basic human rights by successive regimes from Mobutu era all the way to Kabila regime. Election rigging and weak judicial institutions have led to never ending conflict. The country has enormous mineral wealth – copper, diamond, gold, cobalt, etc., and potentially large reserves of oil and natural gas. Paradoxically, this resource rich country is also the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian conflict. The conflicts of 1996 and 1998 have resulted in massive disruption of the social, political and economic fabric of the country.⁷² For over a decade the country has been embroiled

⁷² "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis," *International Rescue Committee*, New York, 2008.

in conflict with devastating effects on its civilian population. The conflict in the DRC is one of the longest conflicts in international politics.

Numerous treaties and negotiations notwithstanding, the conflict continues with varied intensity. Though the parties involved in the conflict have their own perspective regarding the cause and course of conflict, none can deny that the region is in dire need of peace as well as sustainable development to break the 'conflict trap' that has brought miseries for all the conflict-ridden countries of the world including the ones in African continent.

The costs of the conflict are self-evident. Besides death and destruction, large-scale displacement is an integral part of the conflict. Other humanitarian costs include negative impact on women and other vulnerable groups, and there has been a noticeable increase in the post-trauma stress syndrome and the resultant psychiatric problems for the victims. The economic costs of the conflict cannot be confined to a particular sector of industry or investment prospects. It has affected the important sources of livelihood of the local people. Besides exacting extensive damage to the infrastructure of the region the violent conflict has discouraged private investment and pushed the economy towards stagnation. It is like a vicious circle in which violence has led to underdevelopment and vice versa.

The common people caught in this vicious circle have suffered the most. The country emerged from what has been called 'Africa's First World War', due to indulgence of many neighbouring countries in the conflict, in 2003 with the establishment of a transitional government. The war has come to a halt but has given way to several local conflicts. Amidst the conflict scenario, the

country reportedly held its first free and fair elections since independence in July 2006. The current situation continues to be dismal with the rising cost of the violent conflict; in terms of death and destruction, disease, malnutrition, mass displacement ever rising. Militia groups as well as government troops have treated the civilians caught in the conflict as easy victims for.

The humanitarian crisis in the DRC is among the most complex, deadly and prolonged as the numbers of displaced persons, sexual crimes, mutilations and summary executions have been of a staggering magnitude. This section argues that the conflict in the DRC can largely be attributed to poor governance and the consequent lack of democracy since its independence. The poor governance resulted in inequitable distribution of resources, corruption, human rights violations under authoritarian regimes and thus stoked discontent among the people.

4.2.1 Dawn of Independence

DRC was a colony of Belgium. King Leopold II of Belgium named it the Congo Free State after acquiring the territory formally in 1885. In 1908, the Belgian parliament took over the Free State from Leopold following international pressure. From then on, it became the Belgian Congo, under the rule of the elected Belgian government. The country became independent on 30 June 1960 but mutiny and secessionist movements marred the post-independence era. Earlier in May 1960, Patrice Lumumba led Movement National Congolais (MNC) won the parliamentary elections. Lumumba became the Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu, of the ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo) was elected President. To quote Mac Nulty: “Unlike Africa’s other major colonial powers Britain and France, Belgium had done little to promote a local elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, there was not the smooth transition to

Western-favoured regimes which largely characterized independence elsewhere; instead, the Congo began rapidly to implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions which foreign interests did much to foment.”⁷³

The problem got aggravated with the fact that the cold war era brought the fight between Soviet Union and US to the country. The Soviet Union supported Lumumba as the legitimate leader of the country and the US challenged it. The resource rich country also could not get economic freedom with powerful outsiders that continue to keep control on the economy of the country. To quote Mac Gaffey, “the colonial African elite thus lacked education, administrative and managerial experience, and wealth. At independence, the Belgians handed over political but not economic control, so that the new dominant class based its power on control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big foreign mining and plantation companies.”⁷⁴ The overall scenario culminated into a political crisis. Kasavubu and Lumumba got engaged in a power struggle and later Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba in September 1960.

4.2.2 The Mobutu Era and First Congo Conflict

Following years of extreme instability, Lieutenant General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, ousted both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 coup. The Congolese state and economy still bear the deep impact of Mobutu’s ‘predatory’ rule of thirty-two years. Executive power in Zaire, a name given to the DRC by Mobutu, was absolute. The 1974 constitution granted him authority over the executive, legislature and judiciary. Mobutu, the head of the state,

⁷³ M. MacNulty, “The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1, 1999, p. 57.

⁷⁴ . MacGaffey, *The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth* (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 27.

also had the right to change the constitution at his discretion. He banned political parties while making membership in his party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement, compulsory.

In the name of democracy a one-party system was established wherein elections were held periodically, with the incumbent head of the state as the only candidate. Mobutu was also guilty of severe human rights violations and political repression. Corruption was integral to the system, and politicians became entirely dependent on his good will. He consolidated power by co-opting potential rivals and exploited the country's vast natural resources. By the 1990s, the country's economy was near collapse due to mismanagement, corruption and authoritarianism. This overall dismal scenario and the later happenings in the DRC gave credibility to the stance those conflicts in Africa, including the one in the DRC, are due to 'bad governance.'⁷⁵

Bad governance within the state accompanied by the external dimension i.e. the Rwandan genocide of 1994 laid the foundation of conflict in the DRC. Some of the militias responsible for killing thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda fled across the border to the DRC. Rwanda wanted DRC to check these militias and sent its own troops twice to stop preparation of attacks on the country. The Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire, AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu in May 1997. The ascendancy of Kabila led to the end of first conflict.

⁷⁵ J. Strelav, "Ending Africa's Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 4, 2000, p. 118.

4.2.3 Kabila Regime and the Second DRC Conflict

The situation however could not remain stable for a long period with differences between Kabila and the neighboring allies, which continued their presence in the DRC, and led to a no compromise situation.⁷⁶ Internally, good governance remained an unfulfilled dream for the people despite all the euphoria regarding the change that was expected. There was disappointment at the popular level as the government behaved in an authoritarian manner and reneged on its promise and did not provide a genuine democracy and combating corruption.⁷⁷

The rule of Kabila was, thus, similar in many ways to his predecessor. He banned political activities, dissolved parliament and suppressed all local bodies. There was no state budget between 1998 and 2001. Laws were issued by presidential decree. Collaboration ended with international financial institutions since they were pressing him to investigate massacres that took place during the conflict. Kabila, just like his predecessor Mobutu, encouraged favoritism and nepotism. Poor monetary policy led to a near economic collapse. The internal and external factors colluded and pushed the country towards a Second Congo War, the world's deadliest conflict since World War II in August 1998. From 1998 to 2003 the country suffered hugely with fighting between the Congolese government supported by Angola, Chad, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and on the other side Congolese rebels backed by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Many other militia groups that claimed to be defender groups for their community also became active participants in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement in 1999 and deployment of the UN peacekeeping force in 2000 notwithstanding, the violent conflict continued.

⁷⁶ Thomas Turner, "War in the Congo," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, vol. 5, no. 10, April 2000, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Sagaren Naidoo, "The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the DRC Conflict," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2000, pp. 91-92.

4.2.4 Peace and Democratic Attempts

In January 2001, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, took over. In 2001, the Inter-Congolese dialogue was initiated to set the stage for peace and democracy. In April 2003, the Pretoria Peace agreement paved way for the installation of a transitional government with the aim of reunification, pacification, and reconstruction of the country, the restoration of territorial integrity and the reestablishment of the authority of the state throughout the national territory.⁷⁸

On 18 July 2003, the Transitional Government came into being. A new constitution was adopted on 13 May 2005. Elections were held in 2006. Joseph Kabila was elected the President, and in February 2007 a new government was formed. Despite all these laudable events the violent activities did not come to a complete halt. The Eastern provinces, specifically the Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga remained unstable while rebel groups continued to fight among them and with the government.⁷⁹

Optimism for a permanent peace came after the Goma agreement was signed on 23 January 2008. However, the non-inclusion of the FDLR ((Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) in the January 2008 talks and the government's pledge to disarm the rebels has cast doubt over the prospects of permanent peace. In Ituri, the risk of renewed violence is limited by the presence of the MONUC (United National Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), the dismantling of the majority of armed groups and the local population's war weariness. However,

⁷⁸ Shelly Whitman, "Women and Peace-building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006, p. 38.

⁷⁹ "Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu," *International Crisis Group*, Africa Report no. 133, 31 October 2007.

the success of DRC reconstruction would depend on effective ways to address the persisting root causes of the conflict –unequal access to land and unfair sharing of revenues from natural resource exploitation.⁸⁰

The conflict in DRC thus is essentially an outcome of authoritarianism, foreign interference, poor governance and lack of democracy. Since independence in 1960, continuous inter-ethnic and civil strife, authoritarian rule, etc have ravaged the country. To quote an ICG report, “The erosion and collapse of state institutions was a proximate cause of the Congo’s two wars between 1996-1997 and 1998-2003. By the time Rwanda invaded in 1996, President Mobutu Sese Seko’s abusive government had undermined the army, administration, parliament and court that the local population greeted the Rwandan-backed rebels with euphoria. However, the new government of President Laurent Kabila was similar in many ways, and state institutions remained weak and corrupt. In the east, rebel movements established ad hoc administrative structures bent on extracting natural resources and taxes. The country was essentially divided into large districts ruled by military movements.”⁸¹

4 .2.5 The Consequences

The people of the DRC have suffered immensely throughout the colonial times and in the post-independence era. The continuation of exploitative colonial legacy by the leaders of the independent DRC brought a trail of death, destruction and underdevelopment for the people. The ongoing conflicts have aggravated the situation. It has claimed numerous lives and plunged the

⁸⁰ “Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri,” *International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 140, 13 May 2008.*

⁸¹ “Escaping The Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo,” *International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 114, 20 July 2006.*

resource rich country into chaos and acute underdevelopment. A glimpse of the humane cost of the conflict can be gauged by the following facts: "On August 27, 1998, just a few days after the beginning of the civil war, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service reported that rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies killed 200 civilians in Kassika in South Kivu. This was one of the first mass killings, called 'the massacre of Kassika.' Later, 818 other civilians were killed in 'the massacre of Makobola' in the town of Makobola. Their houses were burnt and almost at the same time fifteen women were buried alive in Kamituga. As early as February 1999, thirty people were killed at Kilambo in North Kivu by the *Rassemblement des Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), backed by the Rwandan army.

RCD rebels and the Rwandan soldiers and militias tied up men, raped women in front of their sons and husbands, and killed them. In May the same year, the RCD with its Rwandan allies killed at least thirty villagers in Katogota, south Kivu (Human Rights Watch 2001). In late 1999, the RCD with their allies sexually tortured and buried many women alive in Mwenga (*Association Africaine de Défenses des Droits de l'Homme*, ASADHO 2000)."⁸²

United Nations in March 2005 described the conflict in Eastern Congo, as the 'world's worst humanitarian crisis.' Since 2000, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has documented the humanitarian impact of conflict through mortality surveys. The first four studies, conducted between 2000 and 2004, estimated that 3.9 million people had died since 1998. About 10 per cent of all the deaths were due to violence and 90 per cent were due to diseases like malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia and malnutrition. The fifth survey, covering the period from January 2006

⁸² Guillaume Iyenda, "Civil Wars and Lootings in the Congo: How the Poor Pay the Bill," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2005, pp. 13-14.

to April 2007, concluded that 5.4 million deaths have occurred between August 1998 and April 2007, with as many as 45,000 people dying every month. As with previous IRC studies in the DRC, the majority of deaths have been due to infectious diseases, malnutrition and maternity related problems. In June 2007, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs put the figures of internally displaced persons at 1.16 million. The UNHCR put the figures for Congolese refugees in the neighboring countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda at 310,000 in October 2007.

A Human Rights Watch report has accused DRC's neighboring countries, of committing abuses both economically as well as physically. To quote the report, "while Ugandan commanders were plundering gold, looting timber, exporting coffee, and controlling illicit trade monopolies in the Ituri district, their troops were killing and otherwise abusing the local population. Without international pressure, the situation can only get worse."⁸³ The security forces of the DRC as well as rebel groups too have been accused of committing crimes against humanity- killing, looting, torturing and raping women.

4.2.5.1 *Impact on Women*

The troubled situation has made the life of women more difficult. Besides getting killed and injured, hundreds of thousands of women and girls have been raped in the country. There are at least 40,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the DRC according to a report of the World Health Organization published in 2005. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence, Yakin Ertürk, who toured eastern Congo in July 2007, violence against

⁸³ *Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: DRC*, New York, April 2001.

women in North and South Kivu included ‘unimaginable brutality. ‘All armed forces involved in the conflict are guilty of sexual crimes.’⁸⁴

Cases of making women sexual slaves and thereafter the inhuman behavior of the captivators too were reported from the country. To quote, “Most victims, as ever, are women and girls, some no more than toddlers, though men and boys have sometimes been targeted too. Local aid workers and UN reports inform of gang rapes, leaving victims with appalling physical and psychological injuries; rapes committed in front of families or whole communities; male relatives forced at gunpoint to rape their own daughters, mothers or sisters; women used as sex slaves were forced to eat excrement or the flesh of murdered relatives. Some women victims have been murdered by bullets fired from a gun barrel shoved into their private part.”⁸⁵

4.2.6 Economic Implications

The conflicts have dramatically reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. Foreign business houses have curtailed operations due to an uncertain atmosphere, lack of infrastructure, and a non conducive and difficult work environment. There has been an increase in unemployment. A country rich in natural resources has become one of the least developed countries. The infrastructure in terms of road density, electrification and water supply remains poor.

⁸⁴ “The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo,” *Human Rights Watch*, June 2002

⁸⁵ “Atrocities Beyond Words,” *The Economist*, 1 May 2008.

The country is the world's largest producer of cobalt, and a major producer of copper and diamond but the resources of the country have been a curse and brought misfortunes for the natives and all the benefits have gone to the outsiders. Resources have been used to fuel conflict and not to get people out of poverty. In 2007, the Human Development Index ranked the country at 168 positions out of a total of 177 countries. The unstable situation has provided a fertile ground to the stakeholders to exploit the natural wealth of DRC with impunity. As Reyntjens wrote, "Entrepreneurs of insecurity are engaged in extractive activities that would be impossible in a stable state environment. The criminalization context in which these activities occur offers avenues for considerable factional and personal enrichment through the trafficking of arms, illegal drugs, toxic products, mineral resources and dirty money."⁸⁶

A United Nations report published in April 2001 clearly pointed that all the parties involved in the conflict profited by looting resources of DRC. The overall situation hence remains fragile and poverty is all pervasive. The words of Jan Egeland, the then United Nations Under-Secretary General for humanitarian affairs are worth quoting: "there are few places on earth where the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources is as large as in Democratic of Congo."⁸⁷

The DRC is emerging from a decade of political instability and violent conflict that has led to the near-collapse of the economy, and caused the annual per capita income to plummet to \$120 in 2005 (down from \$380 in 1985). Experts have described this as 'development in reverse.' The country has the second largest swath of rainforests in the world. With 86 million hectares of area covered by rainforests, the DRC accounts for over half of the total remaining rainforests in the

⁸⁶ F. Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila," *African Affairs*, vol. 100, no. 399, April 2001, p. 312.

⁸⁷ "Congo (DR) conflict." http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/ZR_CON.htm. (A. O. 2 May 2008).

Central Africa region. Congolese forests are a vital resource, both for the Congolese people and the global environment. About 40 million rural Congolese depend on the forests for their food, income, energy, shelter, medicines and cultural needs. Described as the 'second lung' of the planet for their ability to store carbon dioxide on a global scale, these Congolese forests too have been threatened by widespread poverty and instability in the region.

The United Nations peace-keeping forces too have been accused of adding to the woes of the people. An internal United Nations report - obtained by the BBC – reveals 'widespread and inherent corruption' pervading the procurement department in Kinshasa, the capital of DRC. According to a 2007 report of the Human Rights Watch from December 2004 to August 2006, around 140 allegations of sexual exploitation involving United Nations personnel were recorded in Congo. A BBC report accused United Nations troops have been involved in arming militia groups and smuggling gold and ivory. Earlier the peacekeepers in the DRC were also accused of perpetrating widespread abuse of refugees and indulging in sexual violence.

4.2.7 Attempts for Reforms

As discussed earlier the internal political and economic conditions in the DRC remained quite problematic. The external dimension wherein the neighboring countries continued interfering in the internal affairs too played a key determinant in keeping the situation violent. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) sponsored by the international financial institutions too was not good for the country. Thus, the problems of the DRC are also linked to the fall of the economic system aided by the international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Many aspects of the economic and social realities in the DRC were not taken into account in

implementing the SAP. The DRC received aid in the form of their first structural adjustment loan of \$27 million in 1976. The SAP was supposed to help push developing countries into industrialization by supplying short-term loans and technical support, but the opposite happened in the DRC. Long-term debt in the DRC was \$2,900 million in 1977 and it swelled to \$23.7 billion in 1987. Debt overhang became so huge that the IMF had to put a halt to financial aid to the DRC in 1990. The process of change has begun and it is hoped that the internal and external collective efforts would pave the way for democracy, sustainable development and peace in the DRC.

After taking over in 2001 Joseph Kabila launched an era of reforms and relative growth alongside the attempts for peace. Donors re-engaged and sponsored a stabilization plan that included new investment, mining and forestry codes and reformed fiscal and monetary policies to cut inflation and boost revenue. The GDP growth was 7 per cent in 2005, while national revenues tripled between 2000 and 2005. These reforms have been coupled with an increase in aid, which in 2006 amounted to 56 per cent of the national budget.

Though the promises are yet not fulfilled, there are concrete steps the elected government has undertaken. First, the government has announced a programme of political and administrative decentralization to bring the state authority closer to the people and for an equitable sharing of the nation's revenue between the centre and the provinces. Secondly, it also plans to hold local elections. Third, the government is taking steps to translate the cease-fire into lasting peace. All these steps need political will on the part of the leaders as well as all other parties involved in the conflict.

4.2.8 External Efforts

The country joined the World Bank in 1963. Since then, World Bank assistance on 82 projects has helped the country work towards achieving improved governance, economic growth and a reduction in poverty. However, as is evident from the political history of the country, the achievement of these valuable goals remained a distant reality. As of October 2007, there were nine active World Bank projects with a value of approximately US\$1.9 billion in the DRC. These include:⁸⁸

The Health Sector Rehabilitation Support Project to ensure that the target population of selected health zones has access to, and use a well-defined package of quality essential health services, the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project to support the efforts of the Government to demobilize an estimated 150,000 ex-combatants and help them return to civilian life, multi Sectoral HIV/AIDS Project to implement the national strategic plan for HIV/AIDS control activities and provide resources to improve service delivery mechanisms to better the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS, Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project to facilitate the implementation of urgent reforms in critical areas including initiating a civil service reform. This project will help the government deal with the country's debt situation.

Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project to increase the competitiveness of the economy, and thereby contribute to economic growth. It is hoped that these projects would pave the way for positive changes in the country. The International Monetary Fund is also trying to help the country's economic recovery. In 2006 the UK was the largest bilateral donor to DRC's

⁸⁸ Democratic Republic of Congo: Overview," <http://web.worldbank.org>

first democratic elections in 40 years and currently it is the second largest bilateral donor and contributes around £70 million per year. The UK Department for International Development is active in the revival of the DRC economy and has three main objectives:⁸⁹ Building a capable and accountable state-Delivering a peace dividend for poor people-Reducing remaining violent conflict and its impact Besides aid, the investments have again started pouring into the country by the developed countries and the developing countries like China and India.

4.2.9 Continuing Challenges

Around 25 million Congolese went to the polls in 2006 to cast their votes in the presidential run-off elections, the final step in the nation's first free and fair polls. President Joseph Kabila won with 58 per cent of the vote and a popular mandate to pull Congo out of its vicious circle of violence and economic recession. Voters wanted him to give a meaning to the national motto 'Justice, Paix, Travail' (Justice, Peace, and Work). Nevertheless, many people have not perceived positive change since the elections. 'Justice remains in short supply, as has been the case ever since the days when DRC was the private property of the Belgian King Leopold; and peace and work are as endangered as the country's rare mountain gorillas.'⁹⁰

To quote Hennemeyer, "The people of Congo want is nothing grandiose – no gleaming new international airports or nuclear reactors –but simply a government that meets some of the most elemental needs of a people who have been deprived of them for years. A few hours of electricity per day, a modest paycheck for school teachers, mail delivery, the ability to travel from one town

⁸⁹"Country Profiles, Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo," <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/congo.asp>. (A. O. 2 May 2008).

⁹⁰ Christian Hennemeyer, "Governance Not Guns in the Congo," <http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=85>. (A. O. 8 May 2008).

to the next without facing extortion or rape – these do not seem to be excessive demands on a popularly elected government.”⁹¹

The only solution to the problem is improved governance. Democracy cannot thrive solely on the conduct of elections. Good governance is an essential part wherein a system of checks and balances is necessary to keep the executive branch of the government in its defined sphere. A free media is important to bring out the truth, a vibrant civil society and opposition are essential to keep the government on its toes. While international attention has concentrated on elections in the DRC, the other elements of a stable democracy are weak or missing, including the necessary checks on executive power. The Parliament is not very powerful. The judiciary is also not independent and inadequately funded.

The country is trying to overcome the authoritarian rule that was the main cause of chaos and conflict. But it still has to come out of the quagmire of the menace of corruption that is deep rooted. King Leopold epitomized the problem when he said, ‘my rights over the Congo are to be shared by none.’ The Congolese state has suffered from corruption since then. Corruption continues to undermine the economy and administration. The 2002 peace agreement, which established the current political transition, has brought problems of governance into the forefront. Senior positions in the administration and state-run enterprises were shared between signatories, and state resources were siphoned off to fund election campaigns and private accounts. Between 60 and 80 per cent of the customs revenues are estimated to be embezzled, a quarter of the national budget is not properly accounted for, and millions of dollars are misappropriated. The

⁹¹ Ibid.

abuse of public office for personal gains is omnipresent from clerical staff to the highest members of government.

Political actors regularly interfere in the administration, customs service, army and control of natural resources to embezzle funds. This, in turn, has perpetuated a system of governance that is largely predatory, with the state living off the citizenry and the country's resources without providing even the most rudimentary social services. Corruption and politicization within the administrative apparatus undercuts the state's capacity to collect revenues or use them. The DRC has one of Africa's weakest collection capacities, with revenues (excluding aid) amounting to just over 10 per cent of GDP.

Hundreds of millions of potential tax dollars are embezzled or lost. Hiring and promotions in the administration depend more on connections than competence. Corruption in the armed forces has been particularly detrimental. It has been relatively easy for higher authorities to embezzle their troops' salaries. The troops, who live in terrible conditions, in turn harass the local population.⁹²The army is itself a threat to civilians in the country, while the police seen as a menace in many areas. Some steps have been taken to address the disease of corruption, particularly by local civil society groups, but much more needs to be done.

⁹² For details see Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 46, no. 1, March 2008, pp.57-86.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The nature of conflicts in the DRC is multi-dimensional and compounded by diverse sources of conflict. While most conflicts in the Great Lakes begin within the borders of countries, the actors within a particular conflict are rarely confined within state. Indeed conflicts tend to link diverse actors, interests and issues and these linkages broaden local, regional and international economies and political contexts.

In the DRC where people's existence is closely intertwined with the environment and where the environment variable is always present, there is the tendency to exclude the environment-conflict interface in the analysis of the causes of the conflict. This is despite the high visibility of the environmental dynamic and the marked impacts that conflict has on the environment there is continuous depletion of environment such as cutting of tree in Congo forest and increased farming in the forest by the displaced people.

Indeed the root cause of the conflict in DRC has been characterized as being an amalgamation of structural violence, extreme and increasing poverty and the exclusion or marginalization of the majority from the economic, social, political, human rights and cultural rights and inequality.⁹³In the case of Rwanda one community feels marginalized by the other thus resulting to arm struggle to safe guard their interests. In Southern Sudan the scenario is the same where Nuer community feels secluded by Dinka ruling tribe in management of oil revenues thus resulting in civil war.

⁹³SIDA, 2004, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region*, Division for Eastern and Western Africa, Sweden pp.21

Borders are also a factor and feature in some of the conflicts in the region. Many border areas have marginal environments which encourage proliferation of armed groups and act as hideouts for such groups. Conflicts relating to borders in the Great lakes Region have a natural resource dimension typified by communal competition over these resources.⁹⁴ Rwanda and Ugandan forces have been accused of aiding M23 Rebel in Eastern Congo in exchange for cheap minerals and timber thus complicating the peace process in the region.

5.1 Democracy & Good Governance

Democracy and good governance are critical to sustainable management of natural resources. From the literature it is clearly evident that conflicts relating to political governance and election are many especially in East Africa. For instance Kenyan 2007-2008 post-election violence is as a result manipulation of polls by the ruling party.

The perception of most African countries' leadership is that they are only committed to the notion of democracy when bidding for leadership. They rarely establish a political environment devoid of distrust, extremism and violence.⁹⁵ In the Great Lakes region democracy and good governance are affected by the fragility of nation states arising from defective structures established during the colonial era and continued when the states became independent. Whilst the colonial rulers assumed that the ethnic divisions had been controlled through the use of force in the states they created, these continue to dog nation states in their quest to organize their affairs. African countries need to build nationhood as opposed to statehood which encourages

⁹⁴Mwagiru M. et al., *Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in Africa*, Working papers on Conflict Management No. 3(2001).

⁹⁵See Odunuga, S., 1999, "Achieving Good Governance in Post-Conflict Situations: The Dialectic between Conflict and good Governance", in Adedeji A. ed., 1998, *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, Zed Books, London, p. 48.

tribalism and negative ethnicity. Tanzania is best example of successful nation building country in Africa where all religion and communities have a sense of oneness and patriotism thus leading to peaceful coexistence as spear headed by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.

The majority of groups engaged in contemporary armed conflicts define themselves on the basis of identity, national, ethnic religious or cultural. Such identity is closely linked to environmental resources. With regard to states, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) underscores the centrality of natural resources to sovereignty and statehood. This centrality is replicated at lower levels within nation states where ethnic, religious and cultural entities perceive ownership and control of resources as integral to their identity as groups. Self-determination is thus linked to natural resource control.

The proliferation of conflicts weakens the state and can lead to disintegration. Laws and regulations for efficient and effective distribution of environmental goods and services among the citizenry are inoperative. Within such a context, governance structures are weakened including environmental governance structures. The breakdown of the rule of law, insufficient, deficient, destroyed infrastructure, breakdown of community institutions responsible for sustainable resource management and lack of favorable conditions for the implementation of environmental laws impacts on the efficacy of the state and its agencies to police sustainable management of environmental resources. There is consequently unchecked human encroachment into the protected areas such as forests and national parks with negative impacts on the ecosystem and the resources. Further the protected areas are used as sanctuaries by rebels with negative impacts on renewable and non-renewable resources

5.2 Military approaches

Sustainable peace is within the grasp of the residents of the eastern DRC. However, the actions of FARDC, particularly with respect to the integration of Congolese armed groups into its ranks, and behavior of its soldiers will be a central determining factor for this outcome. If the process of integration of armed groups into the government armed forces continue to contribute to desertions by former non-state fighters(who once again become a destabilizing force); and if the abusive actions of FARDC soldiers are not curtailed, then an escalation of violence is inevitable.

The military response to foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC, combined with international efforts to restrict the ability of such groups to generate and access income streams, has yielded positive results. Nonetheless, more concerted efforts are required to protect civilians from harm from both members of armed groups and FARDC soldiers. In addition, further demilitarization of mining areas in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and other areas, is essential. Despite the implementation challenges of the DDR process and severe limitations of the DRC economy, it appears that a significant number of former combatants in the eastern DRC have been able overcome a key hurdle to reintegration. That is, many demobilized combatants are pursuing stable, civilian livelihoods, relative to the majority of the DRC's economically active population.

5.3. Democracy and Good Governance

DRC should adhere to good democratic practices such as free and fair elections, functional judicial institutions; reduced bureaucracy in government institution. The leadership should manage natural resources in fair and equitable manner to eliminate marginalization of some communities which resort to armed struggle thus generating more conflict. Democracy forms the

basis of social, economic development of any society DR Congo must confirm to these in order realize lasting peace.

5.4 Recommendations

The DRC conflict requires multidimensional approach to end it and achieve everlasting peace in the region. This paper recommends the following in order to achieve peace and prosperity in the region:

5.4.1 Economic Integration

Economic integration forms the basis on peace building in any given society and it is high time that states in the Great Lakes region put aside their individual interest and participate fully in the their respective economic blocs. For instance East African countries must strengthen their corporation through East African community (EAC) while their counter parts in Central Africa do the same through Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).Integration will open up opportunities such as improved infrastructure and provision of social services thus fostering unity and peaceful coexistence of different communities in the region.

Reactivating the Economic Communication of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) Created in 1976 as an economic partnership including the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, the CEPGL was initially charged with fostering cooperation in political, economic and social aspects of society. Unfortunately, the CEPGL process was derailed before it could ever materialize. Revitalized CEPGL would integrate regional armed forces under one command, lay the foundation for police

and judicial cooperation and harmonize economic policies/regulation. This regional body will act as compliment to already weak DRC national security institutions thus enhancing peace and stability in the country and the entire region. This body will promote both social and economic development in the region thus eliminating the long running civil wars in the region.

5.4.2 Good Governance

Many conflicts in the region happen because of poor decision making and lack of transparence among the ruling class. In the DRC many civil wars are caused by election rigging. Politics of exclusion as evident in Eastern Kivu where people feel marginalized and excluded from the management of vast resources in DRC.

Civil societies should be allowed to grow in the region in order to check the excesses of the ruling class thus encouraging fairness and transparence in both allocation of resource and management of public funds. In Eastern DRC M23 came into existence due to unfairness by the ruling government to share mineral resources. People resort to violence in order to access mineral resources thus leading to conflict.

5.4.3 Promoting Legitimate Trade

There is need to legitimize the mineral trade in the sub-region to stop illegal exploitation of resources From DRC by armed group and foreign troops as witnessed in preceding chapters. There is need to engage armed groups such as M23 the importance of doing legitimate mineral trade thus eliminating conflict in management and trade of minerals. In December 2008, retired U.S. Ambassador Herman Cohen proposed an economic common market, encompassing the

DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.⁹⁶ In his view, the free movement of people, a fairer distribution of resources and free trade through legitimate channels would benefit the not only the DRC but the greater Great Lakes Region. This will greatly eliminate mineral fueling conflicts in terms of financing.

5.4.4 Civic awareness on natural resources

Natural resources are the major cause of conflicts in African Great Lakes region specifically DRC ranging from Natural minerals, water access and land. People in these regions lack sufficient knowledge on how resources can bring economic prosperity thus improved standard of living. Ignorance among people about this potential leads to other foreign companies coming to exploit the resources cheaply by creating division among the local thus promoting conflict. The best example is the conflict in DRC Congo is fueled by foreign economic interest to an extent where multinational support rebel groups in order to access mineral cheaply through smuggling.

⁹⁶ Herman Cohen, "Can Africa Trade its Way to Peace?" *The New York Times*, December 15, 2008. www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/opinion/16cohen.html.

Bibliography

- Akerlof, George and Rachel E. Kranton, 'Economics and Identity', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(3): 715-753. (2000).
- Amnesty international report, *The state of world human rights*, (2008)
- Besançon, Marie 'Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions And Genocides', *Journal of Peace Research* 42(4): 393-415. (2005).
- Brown, Graham ,'Horizontal Inequalities, Ethnic Separatism, and Violent Conflict: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia', Background paper for Human Development Report, (UNDP 2005)
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler A., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War: Working Paper WPS 2000-18*. (Washington D.C.:World Bank,2011)
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 13-28. (2002).
- Collier, Paul and AnkeHoeffler 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars', (Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563-595, 2004).
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War', *CSAE WPS/2006-10*,(Oxford: University Oxford, 2007
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom (2004). 'On the Duration of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253-73
- Comparative perspective. Working Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Explaining political order. (Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 563-97.
- Connie Mumma-Martinon, *The role of regional bodies in promoting sustainable peace in the Great Lakes Region*, (Nairobi, IGLRC), 2011
- Frank Muhereza, *Regional implications of conflicts on political, social and economic development in the Great Lakes Region*, (Nairobi, Centre for basic Research, 2011)
- Global Witness. "DR Congo: Ex-Rebels Take Over Mineral Trade Extortion Racket." (Conflict Minerals and the DRC: BSR ,An Overview 30 March 11, 2010.)
- Isabell Kempf, *Bridging the Great Lakes: implementing the human rights dimension* ,(Nairobi, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 2011)
- Jeremy. *Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment*. (Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 598-624.) .2005
- Khoti Kamanga, *Forced displacement and conflict in the Great Lakes Region*,

- Le Billon, P., *The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict/Political Geography* (UK, Oxford OX1 3TB, 2011),pp. 561–584
- Mansfield and Brian Pollins. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Meetings, Boston.
- Mwagiru M. et al., *Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in Africa*, Working papers on Conflict Management No. 3 (2001).
- Nairobi Protocol, *The Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*,(Nairobi, adopted on April 21, 2004)
- Nathan Byamukama, *Conflicts and sexual and gender-based violence* (Nairobi, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 2011)
- National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, Cambridge, MA. Weinstein, 9804
- Nyambura Githaiga, *Natural resources and conflict in the Great Lakes Region* (Nairobi, Institute for Security Studies, 2011)
- Olson, Mancur, *The Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Political Science34 (2): 229-49, 1965)
- Report of the U.N. Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, December 4, 2009.
- Ross, Michael L ‘A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds and Civil War’,(Annual Review of Political Science9: 265-300, 2006).
- Ross, Michael L, ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil Wars?’, (Journal of Peace Research41(3): 337-56.,2004)
- Russett, Bruce M. ‘Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics’, (World Politics16 (3): 442-54. 1964.
- Schelling, Thomas.*The strategy of conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1960
- Smith, Ben. *Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world*, (1960-1999). 2004
- Snyder Richard. *Does lootable wealth breed civil war? Resource extraction and political order*. 2002.
- Studies Association Convention, (March 22-27,) New Orleans, LA.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2010.