



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

**\\ SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA: IGAD IN SOMALI 1990-2004 //**

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(R50/69233/2011)

**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of
Master of Arts in International Conflict Management.**

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DECLARATION

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I, Paul Habwe Kilioba hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my lovely wife Elizabeth Wangui and my two lovely children Favor Osomo and Taisha Nasumba. May God raise you up to become catalysts of change in a world filled with conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe my gratitude to so many people without who this sojourn would not have been a success. I am grateful first and foremost to God the almighty for aiding me attain this great milestone in my life. All the glory goes back to you. To my dearest wife, Elizabeth Wangui and my two lovely children Favour Osomo and Taisha Nasumba who bore the brunt of an absent husband and dad. You are the joy of my life. You encouraged me not to give up when I felt my strength was giving way. Thank you for your unfailing love and endless support.

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ABSTRACT

African regional and sub-regional organizations have taken up the role of conflict prevention and management owing to the fact that conflict in the horn of Africa usually forms a conflict system hence the need for a comprehensive management strategy. The issue of internationalization of conflict has brought many nations together to attempt and manage these conflicts. The African Union charter recognizes the efforts of sub-regional organizations in conflict management meaning that they have a big role to manage conflicts peaceful within their locality. IGAD sub-regional organization has contributed significantly to the management of conflicts in the horn of Africa. The region has been met with serious and enduring conflicts mainly the Sudan conflict and the Somalia conflict which is the focus of our study. IGAD has sought to resolve the Somali conflict through various conflict management strategies with mediation being the most preferred. IGAD has also faced serious challenges when dealing with the various actors and their interests both internally and especially externally that seem to manipulate the conflict management process for their own well-being at the expense of the Somali nationals hence complicating the whole process. The study also explores and critics the dynamics of IGAD's conflict management strategies within the horn of Africa with much focus on the two peace processes in Somalia the Arta peace process as endorsed by IGAD and the Mbagathi peace process as initiated by IGAD and concludes with recommendations that can help Somali attain the needed peace it deserves devoid of external manipulation.

ABBREVIATIONS

- ADFL-** Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo-Zaire.
- AFRC-** Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
- AMU-** Arab Maghreb Union.
- AU-** African Union.
- ASF-** African Standby Force.
- AMISOM-** African Union Mission in Somalia.
- COMESA-** Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.
- CEWARN-** Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism.
- CEWS-** Continental Early Warning System.
- CPMR-** Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.
- CC-** Country Coordinators.
- DRC-** Democratic Republic of Congo.
- ECOMOG-** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.
- ECOWAS-** Economic Community of West African States.
- EU-** European Union.
- EW-** Early Warning.
- ER-** Early Response.
- EASBRIG-** East Africa Standby Brigade.
- EASBRIGCOM-** East Africa Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism.
- EAC-** East African Community.
- FMs-** Field Monitors.
- FRODEBU-** Front for Democracy in Burundi.
- IGAD-** Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
- IGADD-** Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development.
- LAS-** League of Arab States.
- MLC-** Movement for the Liberation of Congo.

MDC-T- Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai.
NRIs- National Research Institution.
NPFL- National Patriotic Front of Liberia.
OAU- Organization of African Unity.
OIS- Organization of Islamic Conference.
RDC-ML- Rally for the Democratic- Movement of Liberations.
RPF- Rwanda Patriotic Front.
RUF- Revolutionary United Front.
SACB- Somali Aid Coordinating Body.
SADC- Southern African Development Community.
SADCC- Southern African Development Coordinating Conference.
SRRC- Somalia Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council.
TFI- Transitional Federal Institutions.
TFG- Transitional Federal Government.
TFC- Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic.
TCEW-Technical Committee for Early Warning.
TNA- Transitional National Assembly.
TNG-Transitional National Government.
UEMOA- West African Economic and Monetary Union.
UN- United Nations.
UNAMIR-United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.
UNEP- United Nations Environmental Programme.
UNSC- United Nations Security Council.
UNOSOM- United Nations Operation in Somalia.
UNPOS- United Nations Political Office for Somalia. C
WANEP- West Africa Network for Peace-building.
ZANU-PF- Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front.

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CHAPTER ONE

SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: IGAD IN SOMALI 1990-2004

1.0 Introduction

Recent conflict and conflict management trends in Africa depicts that regional and sub-regional organizations are an integral part of the design and implementation of conflict management norms and strategies. Furthermore conflict management practices in Africa have shown that mediation is the most dominant mode of conflict management. During the post-cold war era, the former French president Francois Mitterrand repeatedly called for the developing nations of African to solve their domestic conflicts and organize their own countries.¹ In 1991 the Somali state collapsed as civil war engulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military regime of Mohammed Siad Barre was forced out of power. It is generally agreed that the root causes of the Somalia conflict can be traced back to the scarcity and mismanagement of resources, political and administrative inefficiencies, corruption and nepotism practiced by the former governments and the colonialists before.² This conflict produced not only insecurity for its own citizens but also destabilizing security threats to neighboring states. Consequently many reconciliation conferences were organized in the fourteen years of Somali's statelessness. Menkhaus was perhaps right in stating that, "collectively this cacophony of conflict management yielded from 1991 to the early 1995 no fewer than seventeen national level and twenty local level

¹ Franke, B.F., *In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa*. www.sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf
Retrieved 20th Aug, 2013.

² Bradbury, M., *Somaliland: Country Report* (Totton: Hobbs the printer Ltd,1997) p.1

reconciliation initiatives.”³ The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference under the auspice of IGAD was the fourteenth attempt to restore law and order in Somalia with thirteen other efforts having failed leading to the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) igniting some level of confidence on the effectiveness of sub-regional organizations in handling regional conflicts.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Developmental Community (SADC) among others are some of African sub regional organizations that have attempted and actually manage conflict in sub Saharan Africa. ECOWAS and the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have made great strides towards establishing regional peace and security mechanisms over the last decade or so and have engaged in regional peacekeeping and mediation activities. The three ECOWAS peace keeping operations in West Africa include Liberia 1990; Sierra Leone 1997-1998 and Liberia 2003 are certainly the most well-known of such initiatives.⁴ In addition, however the mediation of IGAD in Sudanese and Somali peace processes are equally insightful signs of the growing potential and willingness of Africa’s regional organizations to deal with the continent’s manifold security problems. Thus African regional and sub-regional organizations have been called upon to lead international efforts alone or jointly in providing security and conflict management within the African context.⁵ These regional groupings were initially meant to provide opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth however contemporary regionalism in Africa has seen these organizations change their mandates to cover

³ Menkhaus, K., *International Peace Building and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia* in Clarke Walter and Herbst Jeffery(eds) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Bolder Co.: West view Press, 1997)

⁴ Farah, I., *African Regional Security Arrangements: ECOWAS and Lessons for IGAD in M, Mwangiru., Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* (Peace Forum, 2008) p.239

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.239-240

security issues including conflict management.⁶ The reality is that unless the conflicts that have pervaded different sub-regions of the continent are solved there would be no hope for the condescending goals of economic integration, development and prosperity.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The Horn of Africa comprises of the following countries, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Somali and Djibouti and borders two crucial sea lanes of communication, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are currently regaining importance in international maritime trade now that a number of Middle Eastern and Asian countries and the Russian Federation are trying to open new markets in Africa. It should be noted that the inhabitants of the Horn of Africa region have agonized from conflicts whose dynamics originate at both the local and global levels and have manifested in many different forms: civil wars, the violation of human rights, the suppression of civil liberties, abject poverty, famine, epidemics, debt problems, population displacement, ecological disaster and disenfranchisement. Marginalized social groups, including women, children, the elderly, the economically destitute and ethnic minorities, have borne the brunt. No end is in site to the conflict in the Horn. Attempts by groups both inside and outside the region to manipulate and control their states has generated intense armed conflict among different social groups. These conflicts have resulted in further depletion of resources already distributed unequally, engendering more violence, disruption of economic production and increased demographic displacement. Eventually, the perennial disorder will destroy the social fabric by promoting militarization, tyranny and mutual animosity; over time it will produce a culture of warfare. The Horn of Africa is also viewed as a conflict system where in order to resolve the conflicts within the system, the system should be held in

⁶ Jabane, A.M., *Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Management: IGAD's Mediation of the Somali Conflict, 2002-2006* (A Master's Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2008) p.2

contemplation during the management of one because settling or even resolving of one conflict in the system may be short lived because of the system interconnection between the settled conflict and the other within the system. Conflict managers view the conflicts in the Horn of Africa as a system which is related in one way or another and is characterized by environmental concerns that affect the relationship between members, ethnic conflict and border conflict between states. The conflict system in the Horn of Africa has been seen to have its epicenter in the Somali conflict making the region unstable. This has led to the production of thousands of refugees hosted in the region and more specifically in neighboring Kenya. The region has also seen individuals and groups responsible for the perpetuation of the conflict creating security alerts in neighboring capitals from which they operate, subsequently creating suspicion about the intention of states in the region and their efficacy in stabilizing the region. Therefore the managers of conflicts system within the Horn of Africa should be centered on settling or resolving the Somali conflict if other conflicts within the region are to be resolved.

The conflict has been internationalized owing to promoted insecurity in the neighboring countries: Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, due to proliferation of small arms, massive influx of refugees, many of whom were ex-soldiers with criminal intents. Infarct these ex- soldiers have joined banditry or Shifta movements transforming banditry from low intensity to high intensity conflict and its impact has compounded security within the region with far and wide reaching effects, affecting people and regional governments alike making large areas of the Horn ungovernable. A case in time is North Eastern Kenya where banditry has increased tremendously reducing economic activities and the free movement of the people. It is with this in mind that conflict managers in Africa affirm that regional and sub-regional organizations are key in the

implementation of conflict management practices and strategies with the process of mediation being the most preferred.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The general objective in this study is to analyze the effectiveness and impact of IGAD in resolving the Somalia conflict. In view of this, the following are the specific objectives:

1. Assess the efforts and the challenges of IGAD in the management of the Somali Conflict.
2. Identify the strategies or systems employed in the management of the Somali Conflict.
3. Suggest appropriate alternative mechanisms that IGAD can employ in the management of the Somali Conflict.

1.3 Literature Review

Sub-regional organizations as interveners in regional conflicts have been discussed at length and their weaknesses and stronghold established in particular several scholars have studied the cause of the conflict in Somali and how IGAD intervened to manage it. The literature review to this study is classified into two categories mainly those that deal with sub-regional organizations and that which deals with conflict management.

1.3.1 Literature Review on Sub-Regional Organizations

Regional organizations emerged more prominently after the end of the 2nd world war. These are organization that link together geographically and ideologically related states.⁷ These organizations have emerged across the continents and subcontinents with different objectives but they basically look forward to foster the aspirations of member states. Regional organizations aim to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity among member states with the purpose of raising the living standards of their people, fostering close relations

⁷ Shaw, M.N., *International law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 893

among them and ultimately contributing to the progress and development of the continent. Over a period of time and due to the increasing number of distressing events in several countries and in various regions, regional organizations realized that economic development and progress could only be pursued in a relatively peaceful and stable environment.⁸ While the literature on sub-regional organizations is vast, for the purposes of this study it shall be narrowed down to demonstrate the emerging role of international organizations in the contemporary international society. Sub-regional organizations are entities created by sovereign states to serve certain interests among them and operate within the framework of international law.⁹ It is significant to note from this definition that sub-regional organizations are a composition of states and are supported by the same states to operate. This framework gives them an official status among its member countries.

Frankel observes that international organizations can be differentiated into various categories. The first distinction he makes is between universal and regional organizations. The former refer to those whose membership encompasses the whole international community. The membership of regional organizations, on the other hand, is restricted to part, or the entirety of a continent. He further acknowledges that some regional organizations may be composed of member states that are not contiguous: what matters is that they have a common goal. A second distinction among international organizations can be made between multipurpose or political organizations and functional or specialized ones.¹⁰ Goldstein observes that the specialized organizations, which have specific functions, work better than those with broad purposes. In addition, functional organizations tend to be more cohesive as they promote the national interest

⁸ Farah, I., *African Regional Security Arrangements: ECOWAS and Lessons for IGAD in M, Mwangiru.*, *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* (Peace, Forum, 2008) p.238

⁹ Taylor, P and A.J.R Groom(Eds.) *International Institutions at Work* (London,Printer,1988) pp.4-5

¹⁰ Frankel, J., *International Relations in a Changing World* (Oxford University Press,1987) pp.85

of their member state and increase leverage for bargaining in the region where they are founded.¹¹ It is clear that potential goals or functions of both functional and specialized organizations can be political, social or economic in nature.

Klepacki, divides international organizations into those having interstate organs made of heads of state and those having intergovernmental organs with government representatives. This means that some international organizations are linked in functions either through summit diplomacy or through state agents.¹² In either case, states are able to pursue their own interest through these organizations.

At another level, Jenks claims that a fundamental distinction between international organizations resides in the type of treaty on which they are founded. This can be either one between states or one between governments. An interstate treaty is reflected across all the institutions of the state: administrative, executive, legislative and judicial.¹³ The administrative branch of the government is therefore mandated with the key responsible for establishing an intergovernmental organization.

Padelford views and expresses that regional organizations can be defined on the basis of intermix of geographical and political elements. Therefore regions are spatial areas, which came to be spoken of as a result of the practices of groups of states, utterances of statesmen, or the terms of treaties or agreements between groups of states. In definition the emphasis placed on the behavior of state representatives and whether an area becomes defined as a region as a result of

¹¹ Goldstein, J.S., *International Relations* (Pearson Publishers, 2011)

¹² Klepacki, Z.L., *The Organs of International organizations* (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff Noordhoff, 1973) p.5

¹³ Jenks, C.W., *Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations* (Year Book of International Law, Vol.22,1945) pp.11-72

states' activities.¹⁴ These activities may give rise to an international organization, with a capacity to institutionalize the relation of its member states within a regional context.

Russett perceives regionalism to encompass five aspects: social and cultural homogeneity; similar attitudes or external behavior; political interdependence; economic interdependence; and geographic proximity.¹⁵ Russett sees these factors as responsible for defining the strength of regional organizations. If a regional organization scores only in one of these factors then it is weak and cannot sufficiently promote the interest of its member states. On the other hand, if it scores in all these categories then it is strong and it will exhibit a strong ability to solve problems within the region that states would not deal with at national level. Therefore, it produces desirable results in terms of common security and states will not be expected to resort to use of force in their interactions with one another.

Wallace and Singer views sub-regional organizations in light of three basic criteria. First the organization must consist of at least two qualified members of the international system and must have been created by a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of national states. Secondly the organization must hold more or less regular plenary sessions at intervals not greater than once a decade. Thirdly the organization must have a permanent secretariat with permanent headquarters which performs ongoing tasks.¹⁶ This definition undoubtedly defines the modern-day African sub-regional organizations.

¹⁴ Padelford, N., *Recent Development in Regional Organizations* (Proceeding of the American Society of International Law, 1955) p.25

¹⁵ Russett, B., *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967) p.25

¹⁶ Wallace, M. and D. Singer., *Inter Governmental Organizations in the Global System 1815-1964 in International Organization* (Vol. 24 no. 2 1970) pp.239-287

Langivanio and Reyes see four factors that necessitate regional or sub-regional organizations. First is their approach to conflict management which is said to be the actors' familiarity with the problems and their cultural, social and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict. This coupled with its geographical proximity could facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent conflict than is possible through a global body such as UN and their cultural proximity which provides them with a better understanding of the conflict's dynamics, its key players, the context, specific management and resolution options.¹⁷ Furthermore conflicts have become increasingly regionalized in the Post-Cold war thus the need to be managed at their roots of origin.¹⁸ Secondly there is often the possibility that warring parties are more willing to or feel more comfortable at managing conflicts at regional level as opposed to the international level through the UN. This is because both state and private actors in a conflict may favor the participation of less intrusive third-parties.¹⁹ Similarly some countries may resist assistance from outside states and international organizations out of concern for protecting state sovereignty and to shield themselves against outside actors seeking to gain political influence over internal affairs. A case in time is when the president of Sudan refused to allow the UN troops to replace the African Union (AU) force in the war-torn country.²⁰ Thirdly regional organizations gain compared to the UN have the possibility of being more flexible in their treatment of evolving or ongoing wars as they have limited agenda and are not subject to the use of veto powers from the part of regional hegemonies as is the case in the UN Security

¹⁷ Langivanio, M. and J.D Reyes., *Building Peace and Security Capabilities in Africa: The Role of the Africa Union and its Partnership with African Regional Economic Communities and European Union* (CMI Background Paper, 2006)

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Oloo, A., *Regional Institutions and the Quest for Security in the Horn of Africa* in M, Mwangi, *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* Op cit., p.206 also see Carment, D & A. Schnabel, *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?*(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003)

²⁰ Ibid also see Bergenas, J.A., *Preliminary Assessment of the African Continent* (UNIDR,2007)

Council. There is also reason to believe that peer pressure from other states within regional and sub-regional organizations will be more effective than efforts from outside. Lastly a combination of proximity and flexibility should in principle imply the ability to act faster and if needed rapidly deploy peacekeeping forces.²¹ National governments need to be stirred up into action if they are to set an example for other nations of other regions. This can only be done through regional and sub-regional organizations.

Manuel asserts that, NATO began its transformation when the alliance expanded its mission to include conflict prevention and conflict management, in Europe including areas outside the boundaries of the NATO treaty area.²² NATO emerged to counter possible threats from the Soviet Union.²³ NATO member states include the US and Canada plus fourteen members from Europe. They sought to consult where territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them had been threatened.²⁴ These states accepted an armed attack on one of them should be considered as an attack against all. This approach was aimed at enhancing the security of the member state and deters any external security threats. NATO has in effect managed to fulfill its mandate and in cooperation with the Western European countries managed to help implement UN sanction in trouble areas like former Yugoslavia and Bosnia.²⁵ This shows that management is more guaranteed at regional level through inter-state cooperation and by collaboration with the United Nations.

Shaw also observes that apart from NATO, the European Union was founded among the European nations to further economic integrations and in the longer run a political federation.²⁶

²¹ Ibid., pp.206-207

²² Manuel. P., *A New Role for NATO* (World Security Network, 2004)

²³ Rourke, T.J., *International Relations in the World State* (2002) p. 200

²⁴ Myers, K., *NATO, The next Thirty Years* (London: Boulder, 1980) p.14

²⁵ Shaw, M.N., *International law Op cit.*, p.896

²⁶ Ibid., p.898.

The EU has endeavored organs of governance like the EU parliament to develop common external policies, political or economic policies on social, economic, and political development. The EU has also recognized the need to address conflict management in order to achieve development beyond its region of membership. Conflicts perpetuate poverty and eventually lead to social exclusion increases the risk of violent conflict. The EU has undertaken the effort to ensure that specific conflict management activities are supported.²⁷ The non- state actors have been allocated resources to run programmes that will bring an end to an existing conflict like that of Sudan and Somalia through IGAD mediation. Direct peace processes and peace build initiatives have benefited from the EU. Peace that is realized through non-sates engagement is a pointer towards the role international organizations can play in promoting conflict management.

1.3.2 The Role of African Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Management

Sub-regional organizations in Africa have also been involved in conflict management mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation at various levels and regions. Mwangi argues that there is a difference between conflict resolution, settlement and management. He observes that settlement is anchored on the notion of power, while resolution rejects power as the dominant approach for managing a conflict. He adds that settlement does not address the causes of the conflict but readjusts and regulates conflict relationships. The outcome of conflict settlement is determined by the power relationships of the parties. Conflict resolution stresses the importance of addressing needs, which are neither negotiable nor in short supply. The parties can therefore redefine their needs.²⁸ He concludes by defining conflict management as a process by

²⁷ The Revised Cotonou Agreement., *Towards a more flexible and effective EU support!* Article 72

²⁸ Mwangi, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publication, 2000) pp.38-40.

which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and do something about their conflict.²⁹ Conflicting parties can therefore negotiate about the issues.

Bercovitch on the other hand argues that the negotiation process can only be conducted when parties to the conflict agree to manage their conflict jointly. The structure of negotiation is dyadic if only two parties are involved and triadic when a third party is involved.³⁰ The third parties always have interests in the conflict situations and also its outcome.

Regional organizations aim to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity among member states with the purpose of raising the living standards of their people, fostering close relations among them and ultimately contributing to the progress and development of the continent.³¹ Regional organizations have realized that if there is going to be any economic development and progress in their various countries and regions then a comparatively peaceful and stable environment must be pursued.

Malan argues that traditionally, regionalism implies co-operation among states in geographically proximate and delimited areas to pursue a mutual gain in one or more issues of concern. Here the focus is on politically and economically organized entities which can speak with one voice regarding issues in their region or sub-region. He further argues that such regional organizations involve treaties of co-operation, which are entered into by geographically proximate states.³² Malan is of the opinion that while nothing is mentioned of sub-regions in the charter of the United Nations, it is best to regard regionalism and sub-regionalism as

²⁹ Ibid., pp.41-42.

³⁰ Bercovitch, J., *Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1984) pp.10-11.

³¹ Farah, I., *African Regional Security Arrangements: ECOWAS and Lessons for IGAD in M, Mwangiru., Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* Op cit., p.238

³² Malan, M., *Debunking Some Myths About Peace keeping in Africa*, In Cilliers, J and Mills, G. (eds) from *Peacekeeping to complex Emergencies: Peace Support in Africa* (Pretoria SAIIA and ISS, 1999) p.9

synonymous particularly in Africa where the relationship of the OAU and various African sub-regional organizations needs to be clarified.

Nhara postulates that for the purpose of conflict management partnership of the UN and the AU together with sub regional organizations should be akin to a pyramid with the UN at the apex and sub-regional organizations at the bottom, while the AU serves as a link between the two organizations.³³ What Nhara does not bear in mind is the fact that this pyramid relation fetches more actors into the conflict and its management thus complicating issues further. Regional security arrangements should therefore emphasize on simple but reliable structures for security co-operation that can stabilize relations, prevent the spillover of conflicts, secure emerging common values and lay foundation for nascent regimes.

Within Africa there are several sub-regional organizations whose main purpose at the formation did not center on conflict management. Among these sub-regional organizations are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union(AMU) and *L' accord de non-aggression et d' assistance de defense*(L'ANAD). Apart from L'ANAD which was created specifically for purposes of security management, the others have evolved into security and conflict management institutions. In the case of ECOWAS it was founded primarily for purposes of economic integration; while SADC evolved from a political alliance against apartheid to an organization alter aspiring to economic cooperation. AMU was founded to promote Arab unity while IGAD's focus was on development in North-East Africa where it gradually took on the role of promoting conflict management in Sudan and Somalia. Africa's regional institutions have thus made substantial strides over the past

³³ Venture, D., 'Regional Security in Sub-Sahara Africa: What Role for South Africa' *Africa Journal on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* Op cit., pp.23-40

decade by assuming the primary responsibility for peace and security.³⁴ The nature of conflict in Africa necessitates an increasingly sub-regional response. This has led to many of the continents sub-regional organizations to add security and conflict management initiatives in their initial mostly economic purposes.

Franke on the other hand views the African Union's architecture for peace and security as premised on the intensive cooperation between the AU and sub-regional institutions which are considered as the essential building blocks and implementation agencies for its many programs.³⁵ By basing its security architecture on sub-regional pillars and incorporating existing initiatives into its continental policy, the AU not only profits from the sub-regions' comparative advantage in military and security matters, but also in conflict management due to AU's experience in peace operations in the case of Western, Eastern and Southern Africa.³⁶ Under this approach the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with sub-regional economic communities (RECs), while the AU serves as an authoritative clearing house and framework for all initiatives. African regional and sub-regional economic institutions initially did not deal with political and security concerns at their inception. However African governments began framing security issues in terms of impacts on trade, economic growth and development upon the realization that a secure environment is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the mandates of sub-regional institutions. The negative impact on economic development could not be ignored anymore.³⁷ The high intensity of conflict in many cases and the protracted nature of conflicts in others resulted in massive loss of human life, displacement of people, high numbers of refugees,

³⁴ Eric, B., and Katie, S., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000).

³⁵ Franke, B., "Competing Regionalism in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture," *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, Issue 3(2007). <http://web.africa.ujl.edu/asq/v9/v9i3a2.htm> Retrieved 15th May 2013.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Powers, K and Goertz G., "The evolution of Regional Economic Institutions into Security Institutions or the Demise of Realist Military Alliances?" *Geo Journal* (Fourth coming, 2006)

child soldiers, high incidence of vulnerability and social exclusion, destruction of socio-economic infrastructure, and erosion of institutional capacity. The conflict situation in Africa has exacerbated poverty across the continent, made it difficult to accelerate sustainable economic growth and development and destroyed physical infrastructure and human capital. This state of affairs forced sub-regional organizations to begin engaging in conflict management measures as priority for developing the necessary atmosphere within which socio-economic development can be pursued and actualized.

1.3.3 Literature Review on Conflict Management

The Horn of Africa is one of the conflict prone parts of Africa.³⁸ Mwangiru argues that these conflicts are characterized by among other things their protracted nature. The dichotomy between internal and international conflict is fallacious given that the process of internationalization of internal conflict has annulled the classic dichotomy in this and other conflict areas.³⁹ Mwangiru further observes that conflict may be violent or non-violent. Violent conflict is visible in terms of use of force while non-violent conflict is structural in nature and is usually not easily observable. Relations among people in societies characterized by structural violence are organized in such a way that the potential development of a significant segment of a population is impeded by economic, social or psychological factors.⁴⁰ On the other hand the African Centre for the Constructive Reconciliation of Disputes (ACCORD) Early Warning Systems notes that conflict is as a result of five sources of insecurity which it defines in terms of

³⁸Sabala, K., *Towards a Regional Security Architect for the Horn of Africa: A Framework Analysis in M. Mwangiru, Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* Op cit., p.15

³⁹Mwangiru, M., *Conflict & Peace Management in the Horn of Africa in IRG Conference Report on Regional Security in the Horn of Africa* (Series 8 Special Reports Vol. I 1996)

⁴⁰Mwangiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Process & Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publication , 2000) p.26

political, economic, military, environmental and social cultural variables.⁴¹ Often in our analysis we are prone to emphasize the political dimension of a conflict at the detriment of other variables which are equally important and drive conflict more directly.

Zartman also defines conflict as the underlying issues that cause incompatible objectives between parties.⁴² Reuck defines it on the other hand as a situation arising between parties who perceive that they possess mutually incompatible objectives.⁴³ Wallestain and Sollenberg view conflict as a battle between incompatible interests over government and territory where armed force is being used and where at least one of the parties involved represents the national government.⁴⁴ While Coser notes that conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. Conflicts are therefore an interaction amid human beings. This implies that people compete for something that is in short supply without being fully aware of their competitors' existence or without seeking to prevent the competitors from achieving their objectives.⁴⁵ In the case of the Somalia conflict shifting alliances were formed between clans and sub-clan members with the sole objective of gaining leverage in the conflict and therefore acquiring stronger claims to particular land resources. In particular the control of the Jubbaland region is necessitated by its favorable natural climatic conditions in contrast to the harsh conditions prevailing in other regions of the federal republic of Somalia. Jubbaland region also provides a major source of income and sustenance among the Somalis in terms of agriculture and

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Zartman, W.I., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*(New York, Oxford University Press, 1989) p.8

⁴³ Reuck, A., *The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution* pp. 97-111

⁴⁴ Wallestain, P and S. Margareta., *Armed Conflict: Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37(5) pp.635-649

⁴⁵ Lewis. A. Coser., *The functions of social conflict* (New York, Free Press, 1956) p. 3

pastoral activity hence the control of this region means control of its resources thus a major source of conflict looms in this specific region.

Zartman has defined conflict management as the elimination, neutralization or control of the means of pursuing conflict. It is important to identify conflict in the society its causes and early warnings to ease its management.⁴⁶ Mwangi notes that to do this one needs to look at the real issues in the conflict. He further concurs with Gurr and Davies in that conflict always displays early warnings which people should be on the lookout for.⁴⁷ Unfortunately these scholars do not specify what these real issues or signs of early warnings are.

Rourke posits that the role played by Inter Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in conflict management should mainly be limited to mediation, conciliation and not coercion.⁴⁸ Dougherty warns on emphasis on improvement of indigenous factors while giving scanty attention to the impact of conflict and influences from outside the area of conflict.⁴⁹ Any outside power trying to reduce conflict and help the parties channel their energies into more useful activities must not only look at its own interests but must also act in accord with the dynamics of the parties.⁵⁰ It is important to note that when dealing with conflict both parties look for a consensual solution.⁵¹ In order to achieve this favorable outcome both parties should never be forced to comply but the change must be based on mutual agreement and consent.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.8

⁴⁷ Mwangi, M., *Conflict: Theory, Process and Institutions of Management* Op cit., p.9

⁴⁸ Rourke, J., *International Politics on the World Stage 4th ed.* (Sluice Dock, Guilford, Connecticut, the Dushkin Publishing Group Inc, 1993) p.317

⁴⁹ Dougherty, J.E and R.LP Farltzgraft., *Contending Theory of International Relations: A Comparative Survey 3rd ed.* (New York Harperand Row Publishers, 1990) p.333

⁵⁰ Zartman W.I., *Ripe for Resolution in Africa* Op cit., p.255

⁵¹ Heinz-Jurgen, A. et al., *Conflict : A Literature Review* (University of Duisburg-Essen:Institute of Political Science, 2006) p.15

While these literature shows consistency with respect to the foundational and role of sub-regional organizations in promoting regional peace, there have been some notable restraints on the part of IGAD. The restraints have arisen partly due to the competing interests from both within and without the region. It should be noted that these regional interests may either add momentum to conflict management or impede the whole peace process. This literature review indicates that there is a gap between regional interests and conflict management approaches. Regional interests and their management approaches have therefore led to the internationalization of the conflict in the quest for peace in the horn of Africa. This research shall seek to fill the gap by looking at various world views that forms the basis of studying sub-regional organizations, the study will also look at the varied interests of regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict management, the study will also look at IGAD's intervention strategies in conflict management whether coercive or non-coercive and lastly evaluate the success or failure of sub-regional organizations in conflict management in our case IGAD sub-region.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The study has both academic and policy justification. This research shall contribute knowledge in the field of conflict management by sub-regional organizations. It is accurate to note that there has been a steady upsurge in internal conflicts which has resulted to innovative initiatives by conflict managers both regionally and sub-regionally. Contemporary studies have also endeavor to scrutinize the root causes of conflict with an analysis to understand the future challenges and strategies employed for conflict management. For example just like any other conflict in the Horn of Africa region, the Somali conflict is a protracted one. It has had and continues to have negative consequences not only for Somalia but also for the stability and

development of the Horn of Africa sub-region. It has a lot to do with the country's structures since the civil war was part of a structural conflict process which turned violent. Although various regional organizations like the United Nations and the African Union have been involved in the management initiatives of the Somali conflict there is very little to show for it. Sub-regional organizations have become the best alternative in the management of protracted conflicts because of their cultural proximity which provides a better understanding of the conflict dynamics, its players, its context and the specific management and resolution options. It is important to note that conflict can never be eradicated since conflict is about values which constitute the human society hence the importance of its management.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

The study uses the concept of internationalization of conflict. The concept implies that internal conflict turns into an international one and vice versa because of matters of territory, economic, natural resources, political, social and security disputes.⁵² The categorization of conflict as either internal or international was influenced by the realist school of thinking which later legitimized the dichotomy between domestic and international politics. Article 2(7) of the United Nations which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of states was a reflection of the dominance of the realist paradigm at the time of the UN formation.⁵³ The non-interference principle was later adopted subsequently by the emerging regional organizations such as the OAU and the League of Arab states whose charters immunize the states from external interferences when dealing with domestic problems.⁵⁴ The Cold War vision which saw that only

⁵² Ringmar, E., *Book Review Essay: On the Causes of War, Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.32, No.2(June1997) pp.223-230 see also Brown, Seyom., *The Causes and Prevention of War 2nd ed.*(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); J.Vasquez., *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993).

⁵³ Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I: Purpose and Principles.

⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2131(XX). Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty.

conflicts that arise from international dispute constitute threat to international peace reinforced the interpretation of sovereignty in favor of the notion that internal conflicts should be left unattended and treated as matter of domestic affairs not meriting outside intervention.⁵⁵ As time went on, the categorization of conflicts as either internal or international got eroded and was later abandoned thanks to agents like interdependence, humanitarianism, media, refugees, proliferation of arms, and ethnicity. The interdependence of international society makes it impossible to draw a hard and fast line between internal and international conflicts. The human rights violation in the course of the conflicts has given internal conflict an international dimension as derogation of human rights has international standards.⁵⁶ Indeed the availability of a third party enables it to define the conflict as either internal or international therefore dictating the approaches to its management.⁵⁷ Internationalization of conflict means that the previous internal conflicts become endowed with many international characteristics which render it no longer purely internal.⁵⁸ Indeed no analysis of internal conflict can ignore its external elements as

Duner notes:

“A complete analysis of internal war must...take into account the relations of several kinds: first...there is purely internal constellation (the split within the country), then the relations of the internal parties to the actors in their surroundings and finally the relations between the external actors.”⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Shirwa, H.F., *The Sub-regional Management of the Internal Conflicts in Africa: An analysis of the Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict* (May-August, 2000) (M.A Dissertation submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2001)

⁵⁶ Donnelly, J., *International Human Rights* (Boulder, Co.: West view Press, 1993) cited in M. Mwagiru., *The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation, 1985* (A Doctorate Dissertation in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, October, 1984) p.27

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Mwagiru, M., *Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives* (Presented at the IRG Conference Mombasa, Kenya 6-9 November 1996).

⁵⁹ Mwagiru, M., *The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation, 1985* Op cit., p.27

The very idea of internationalization of conflict invokes the rationale for regional action in the management of the conflicts. The creation of sub-regional groupings including IGAD is itself a response to the consequences of conflicts and is inspired by the purpose of promoting peace, security, stability and resolving conflicts in sub-regions.⁶⁰ The intermeshing of the economies and shared interests in regional stability means that security has become a concerted effort.⁶¹ States can no longer provide the well-being of its citizens alone nor can they insulate themselves from outside influence because of the globalization of both domestic and international politics hence states seek collaboration with each other to work towards realizing the aspirations of its citizens. Intractable internal conflicts cannot be contained within the borders of the state. They have the habit of crossing to the neighboring countries entangling and bringing together adversaries thereby assuming a complex international character. As a result it gives both the national, regional and global level participants a broad opportunity either to pursue their own interests in the conduct of conflict or to see their interests in conflict management.⁶² The concept of internationalization of conflict is useful for this study because it explains why external actors intervened in the Somali conflict and its management. It brings to light those interests which motivate both mediators and spoilers to play their influence in the peace process. More importantly the concept is useful in explaining the diversity of the players, the competing interests in the peace process and parallel initiatives which so far militated against a lasting settlement in the conflict. The peace making initiatives and concerted efforts currently being made by regional and extra-regional actors to bring about a sustainable solution can be

⁶⁰ See the Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD), Nairobi, 21 March 1996

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Zartman, I.W., *Changing forms of Conflict Mitigation* in R.O., Schutz, B.M and Dorr, S.R (eds). *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) pp.325-338

explained by this theory. The theory highlights the interplay between the internal and external actors and captures those issues and concerns which turn an originally internal conflict into an international one.

1.6 Hypotheses

1. Sub-Regional Organizations are tools towards achieving and maintaining peace among member states and the world at large.
2. Vested interests by third parties in conflict always pose a constraint on sub-regional organizations ability to carry out their mandate.
3. Sub-regional organizations adequately promote interests of its member states.

1.7 Methodology of the Research

This section explains the methodology that will be used in the study. The methodology will include a mix of methods to gather data within the scope of the research study. The proposed research will be a content analysis design. Content analysis is the systematic categorization of the symbolic meaning of messages in order to make inferences about phenomena of interest that are not directly observed. It also portrays an accurate profile of persons, organizations, events or situations by involving certain predictions and narrations of facts and characteristics.⁶³ This will involve surveying various organizations that are linked to IGAD sub-regional organization in conflict management in the Horn of Africa and the challenges they have faced in the management of conflict with specific emphasis in the Somali conflict. This design is appropriate to enable the researcher obtain information and some insight on the current status of the conflict management process in Somalia by IGAD sub-regional organization in the Horn of Africa and

⁶³ Krippendorff, K., *Content Analysis: An introduction to its Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 1980) p 8.

the challenges that it has had to endure. The researcher will have no control on the research variables.

1.7.1 Data collection

The researcher will focus mainly on qualitative analysis. The qualitative data will be collected from the Ethiopian and Somalia embassies and the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Horn of Africa Division. This will be achieved through interviews from the deputy ambassador of the republic of Ethiopia who was also the chairman heading the Ethiopian delegation in the IGAD National Peace Talks and also the deputy ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia who was also a delegate in the IGAD National Peace Talks. The use of questionnaires will also be administered at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs division of the Horn of Africa.

The secondary data on the other hand will be sourced from academic journals, and reference books, unpublished and published government policy documents and papers, dissertations in the area of conflict management, IGAD summit reports, communiqués and resolutions on Somali Peace process, reports from the United Nations the Secretary General, reports from the United Nations Security Council Resolutions OAU reports.

1.7.2 Data analysis

Given the nature of the method, content analyses tend to be more descriptive, summarizing apparent facts, by attempting to clarify a given interpretation. Moreover, content analysts tend to look at the surface content of text because these elements are less subject to interpretive variation that might undermine reliability and generalization. Thus, this research method is appropriate for assessing the information value of sub-regional organizations and conflict management in the Horn of Africa: IGAD in Somali 1990-2004.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Research

This paper seeks to investigate Sub-Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa: IGAD in Somali between 1990-2004. The study is wide even though it is not easy to find extensive materials on the subject. The University has limited books on IGAD and the few that are available are either borrowed by other people and therefore making it unfeasibility in accessing the required materials when needed.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Consists of the background to the problem, shows the conceptual lens that the study will utilize and illuminates on the knowledge gap that this study seeks to fill traceable through the literature review. This chapter looks at the introduction, the statement of problem, the objectives of the study, the literature review, the justification of the study, the theoretical framework, the hypothesis it seeks to validate or invalidate, the methodology, the scope and limitation of the study and finally the chapter outline.

Chapter Two: Overview of Sub-regional organizations and the management of conflict. This chapter is a theoretical discussion of the issues presented in chapter one. It exposes sub-regional organizations, regional and international organizations with regard to their interrelations and approaches to the management within and between states. The survey focuses on the traditional approaches to security management and the modern viewpoints about conflict. The study also looks at the traditional interstate conflicts, and also identifies new discourse on the management of intrastate conflicts of international organization, their development, objectives and current status in conflict management. The study concludes with the linkages that will provide a basis for involvement of the international organizations in the management of intrastate conflicts.

Chapter Three: The study discusses the roles and varied interests of both internal and external actors in conflict management. The study focuses on the Somali neighboring states, Africa Union regional organization, United Nations International Organization, Major Somali clans, Warlords, Regional Administrations, Businessmen, Somali Civil Society and the Islamist Groups.

Chapter four: The study analyzes IGAD in conflict management in the Horn of Africa by looking into the Arta and the Mbagathi peace process initiatives as participated and initiated by IGAD respectively in the Somali conflict.

Chapter Five: This chapter is the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT

2.0 Introduction

This chapter will present and expose of sub-regional, regional and international organizations with regard to their interrelations and approaches to the management within and between states. The survey shall focus on the traditional approaches to security management and the modern viewpoints about conflict. The conflict management strategy is a relatively modern idea. A part from the traditional interstate conflicts, there is a need to find out the views that are coming up on the management of intrastate conflicts of international organization, their development, objectives and current status in conflict management. The linkages will provide a basis for involving international organizations in the management of intrastate conflicts.

2.1 The Emergence of Sub-Regional Organizations

Sub-regional organizations were borne out of the realization that states cannot achieve their interest through limited membership to international organizations. Indeed, many region-specific issues demand localized approaches. International organizations, for their part, have evolved in the Post-Westphalia Treaty era that saw the creation of interdependent sovereign territorial units.⁶⁴ The rise of such units created a need for international cooperation and, as the system expanded, states began to seek to fulfill more interests through cooperative approaches. This resulted in the creation of formal treaties, which aimed at solving international problems.⁶⁵ The first major instance of this occurred with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which concluded

⁶⁴ Amerasinghe, E.F., *Principles of the International Law of International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.59

⁶⁵ Shawn, M.N., *International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p.887

the thirty year old religious conflict of Central Europe and formally established the contemporary nation-state agreement in Europe.⁶⁶ The rules that govern interactions in international relations are rooted in moral norms.⁶⁷ International norms are therefore guided by the expectations held by state leaders about normal international relations. They shape expectations about state behavior and set standards that make deviations stand out, helping states pursue their interests without hurting others. Hence, sovereign states agree to work together through structures and organizations that respect each member's autonomy and do not create a world government over them.⁶⁸ Therefore, states create practical organizations where they participate to manage specific issues that they would not be to address and manage on their own.

Until 1914 when the First World War broke out, world affairs were influenced by periodic conferences held in Europe.⁶⁹ These were exemplified in the Paris Conference of 1856 as well as the Berlin gathering of 1879 that dealt with the problems of the Balkans, among others. The 1884-5 Berlin Conferences, for their part, imposed some order upon the scramble for Africa. These conferences formed a background to resolve crises but they were inadequate in two ways. First, there was no formal procedure to determine who should convene the conference and who should be in attendance. Secondly, the states invited and in attendance would only make decisions through unanimous agreement, a factor that restricted a utility of a consultative approach in resolving inter-state problems.

The 19th Century witnessed an upsurge of international non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross founded in 1863 and the international law

⁶⁶ Gross, L., *The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948* (42 AJIL Publishing House, 1948) p.20.

⁶⁷ Falk, R., *Exploration at the Edge of Time: The Prospect for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) pp.68-69

⁶⁸ Goldstein, J.S., *International Relations* (New York, Pricilla McGehan, 2002) pp.295-296

⁶⁹ Shawn, M.N., *International Law Op cit.*, p.888

in 1873.⁷⁰ These private international unions demonstrated a wide ranging-community of interests on specific topics and awareness that, to be effective, cooperation should be international in scope. These institutions established machinery for regular meeting and created Secretariats to permanently engage it the core values of the organization. To this day, the work performed by these organizations remains of considerable value in influencing governmental activities and stimulating world action.

The second half of 19th Century also witnessed the development of public international unions, which linked together governmental agencies for specific purposes.⁷¹ These were functional associations that were set up through multilateral treaties and fulfilled the need for a more efficient method of international cooperation and regulation in an independent world. The first instances of such intergovernmental associations were provided by the international commissions established for the functioning of communication networks in the Rhine and Danube Rivers and later for other rivers in Central and Western Europe.

The first international unions in the 19th Century restricted themselves in dealing with specific areas and were therefore not comprehensive. However, their existence did provide a basis for the emergence and development of new ideas that paved way for the birth of international organizations of the 20th Century.⁷² These unions provided for the development of permanent secretaries, periodic conferences, majority voting, weighted voting, and proportionate financial contributions. All these were vital in the inception of contemporary international organizations.

⁷⁰ Bowett, D.W., *The Law of International Institutions*, 4th Ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp.64-65

⁷¹ Ibid., pp.6-9

⁷² Shaw, M.N., *International Law Op cit.*, p.889

The most significant achievement of the 20th Century in terms of international organizations is the foundation of a universal and comprehensive organization: the UN.⁷³ The UN has played a prominent role in conflict management. Its foundation is empowered by sovereign state and the UN action is necessitated by their consent.⁷⁴ Although the UN strengthens world order, international anarchy still abounds due to unwillingness of states to surrender their sovereignty. Within this limit, the UN continues to provide a global institutional structure through which states can settle conflicts with less reliance on the use of force. From this view international organizations portray a trend where states seek to pool their efforts to solve common problems. The states find the cooperative approach inevitable due to the inability of unitary action to resolve global problems.

2.2 Approaches to the Study of Sub-Regional Organizations

To study and elucidate the role of sub-regional organization, one has to outline the various world-views that form the backbone of the discipline. This section will present the approaches that form the basis of studying sub-regional organizations. The rationalist approach links the notion of world order to the order found within the states.⁷⁵ This conceptualization believes in the transformation of a society of states into a true world community based upon the application of universally valid moral and legal principles. This can be achieved through gradual increase in the influence and responsibility of sub-regional organizations in all fields of peace and security.⁷⁶ This view presupposes that sub-regional organizations have a significant role to play on the world stage both substantive and procedural if conflict is going to be managed. Sub-

⁷³ Goldstein, J.S., *International Relations 4th Ed.* (Washington D.C: Priscilla McGeehan, 2001) p.298

⁷⁴ Luard, E and D. Heater., *The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does, 2nd Ed.* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994) p.24

⁷⁵ Goodwin, G., *World Institutions and World Order* in C. Cosgrove and K. Twitchett, *The New International Actors* (New York, 1970) pp.55-57

⁷⁶ Bowett, D.W., *The Law of International Institutions, 4th Ed.* Op cit., p.73

regional organizations rather than being mechanisms for greater efficiency should therefore focus above all simple administrative conveniences.

The second approach that helps to evaluate the role of sub-regional organizations in the international system is the revolutionary one.⁷⁷ It regards sub-regional institutions as instruments for specific policy formulation. The primary aim of sub-regional institution is viewed as a means of attaining a final objective as envisioned by the states that created them. This view does not consider international institutions as primary means of achieving a world community of states based on global association. Instead, this approach sees states as units that will benefit from sub-regional institutional structures.

The third approach is underpinned by realist thoughts. According to the realist perspective, international organizations are viewed as a forum for states seeking dominance,⁷⁸ as states are seen as being in a constant search for power and supremacy. For realists, eventuality of the first and Second World Wars demonstrated that the foundation of the League of Nations and the UN reinforced the status quo of the new balance of power.⁷⁹ Thus what is described as the world order is a reflection of the operation of the principle of the balance of power. Realists perceive the role of world organizations as reinforcing that balance and enabling it to be safely and gradually altered in the light of changing patterns of power. This has led to some weakness on the part of international organizations in their efforts to effectively tackle issues without causing intrigues among member states.

International institutions can be studied more adequately by combing the above approaches and establishing an inter-linkage between these various world-views. The success of

⁷⁷ Goodwin, G., *World Institutions and World Order* in C. Cosgrove and K. Twitchett, *The New International Actors* Op cit., pp.57-91

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.62

⁷⁹ Shaw, M.N., *International Law* Op cit., p.890

collective security can therefore be seen as depending on two points. First, the members must maintain their commitments to the organization, especially with regards to alliances. Secondly, a significant number of members must agree on what constitutes aggression. Despite these claims international are still contending with powerful states whose actions cannot be suppressed to deter aggression. Each regional or supranational organization is structured to contain aggression, but does not work against aggression by a great power.⁸⁰ The inter-dependence of states has indeed compelled states to create viable organs for cooperation. Through international agreements, cooperation can be sustained to improve the basic political areas of peace. Examining some of the regional organizations and the UN would demonstrate this reality.

2.3 Scope of Sub-Regional Organizations and Management of Conflicts

This section will look at various sub-regional organizations and the UN as a supranational organization. This approach is essential in highlighting the activities of these organizations to find out their capacity to engage parties in a conflict through peaceful methods or military intervention. The analysis will then be useful to deduce the extent to which sub-regional organizations can be effective when solving internal conflicts.

2.3.1 Organizations with Universal Character

Organizations of universal character encompass membership from across the globe. This type of organization seeks to promote international cooperation, peace and security.⁸¹ In order to address a wide range of new and unprecedented threats and challenges that states in the international system face they need cooperative efforts that transcend their regional territories. Indeed, many of these problems cannot be addressed by individual states. They include environmental threats, security, economy and international crime. Developments in international

⁸⁰ Goldstein, J.S 4th Ed. ., *International Relations* Op cit., p.120

⁸¹ Rourke, T.J., *International Relations in the World State*, 2002, p.197

cooperation have engendered supranational organizations like the UN and international regimes that seek to establish norms, rules, processes and organizations that help govern the behavior of states in an area of international concern.⁸² These regimes, for example have been noted in the protection of international bodies of water like the regime for oceans and seas. The trade regime under the WTO has established regulations for international trade practices.

The UN encompasses specialized agencies whose influence on governmental policies has gradually improved the nature of international relations.⁸³ The UN ensures peaceful settlements of disputes among states and also promotes economic and social cooperation in a wide range of issues to achieve collective security. To achieve the objective of promoting peace and security, the UN has created norms against violence. To accomplish this task, the UN has worked in areas like promoting nuclear non- proliferation through the International Atomic Energy Agency. This ideally is meant to limit the production and use of chemical and biological weapons, and fostering rules for the restrained conduct of war.⁸⁴ Countries that sign the Charter pledge to accept that armed force shall not be used in the international relations, except when it is in the common interest. Today, however, the UN has often been unable to prevail upon powerful countries that invaded others in their own interest. A recent example of this occurrence is when USA invaded Iraq unilaterally despite the objection by the UN. There was no proof of threat to support the argument that the US and the Great Britain were acting in self-defense. The difficulties faced by the two countries in Iraq demonstrate the need to observe the norm of non-violence in international relations.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Shawn, M.N., *International Law* Op cit., p.892.

⁸⁴ Goldstein, J.S., *International Relations 4th Ed.* Op cit., pp.319-320

Another peace-enhancing role for the UN is to serve as a passive forum in which members publicly air their points of view and privately negotiate their differences.⁸⁵ The UN acts therefore as a safety valve where drama can be played out without dire consequences. The grand debate approach to peace involves denouncing opponents, defending your actions, trying to influence world opinion and winning symbolic victories.

Diplomatic intervention has been another major role in the UN in promoting peace and conflict management around the globe. This can be inferred as evidenced during the Cold War period, where the divisions of labor between the roles of the sub-regional, regional and international organizations were clear. While the traditional role of UN was to mount peacekeeping operations, and to deploy political missions, regional and sub-regional organizations concentrated largely on preventive diplomacy. However, such operations were few and far apart. Since the early 1990s, UN has engaged a number of simultaneous, larger and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia.⁸⁶ As such, the UN encourages states to settle their disputes peacefully,⁸⁷ either before hostilities occur or after the fighting has started. The UN carries out inquiries, provides good offices, mediation, arbitration or adjudication to parties in a dispute. All these measures are meant to bring about a peace settlement to disputes in the international system. Under some circumstances, the UN uses sanctions as a measure to make countries comply with norms of non-violence.⁸⁸ To date, sanctions have not always been entirely successful, although in some cases they have influenced countries to comply with UN demands.

⁸⁵ Rourke, T.J., *International Relations in the World State* Op cit., p.219

⁸⁶ Disarmament and Conflict Resolution project., *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training* (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, New York and Geneva, 1998) p.14

⁸⁷ Rourke, T.J., *International Relations in the World State* Op cit., p.219.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

For example, in 2003 the sanctions that had been in place against Libya for 15 years finally persuaded the country to pay US \$ 2.7 billion in reparations to the families of the 280 people killed when a bomb planted in Libyan agents destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. By any standards however, this eventual compliance by Libya took place after a lengthy interval.

Peacekeeping has been another major activity within the UN, even though the organization has limited ability to intervene militarily in a dispute.⁸⁹ UN operations in these case range from lightly armed observer missions through police forces to fully-fledge military forces. In 2004 for example the UN mounted two peace keeping operations in Cote d'Ivoire and Burundi. In Cote d'Ivoire it utilized 6240 military troops, 200 military observers, 120 staff officers and 350 and police personnel. As of 31st may 2013 they had 8539 troops, 185 military observers and 1502 police officers.⁹⁰ In Burundi 5650 military personnel, 200 military observers, 120 police personnel, 34 international civilian personnel.⁹¹ The UN peace-keeping operation missions normally come between warring parties as a neutral force that creates space and is intended to help defuse an explosive situation as seen above.

2.4 Regional Organizations in Conflict Management

Article 52 of the UN Charter authorizes regional and sub-regional arrangements to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring such disputes to the UN Security Council. Clause (1) of the Article reads:

Nothing in the present Charter UN (Charter) precludes the exercise of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international Peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.220

⁹⁰ United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire. www.un.org/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/facts. Retrieved 29.07.2013

⁹¹ United Nations Operation in Burundi. www.un.org/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub. Retrieved 29.07.2013

arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN.⁹²

The UN usually becomes involved when all other apparent options have failed.⁹³ This was well captured by former UN secretary General U Thant when he stated:

Great problems usually come to the UN because governments have been unable to think of anything else to do about them. The UN is a last-ditch, last resort Affair and it is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failure to solve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by governments.⁹⁴

Regional and sub-regional organizations therefore act on behalf of the UN every time they intervene in conflicts in their member states. Their roles include mediating between conflicting parties and deploying peace troops to the conflict zone when necessary.⁹⁵ Despite the UN's involvement in a majority of the peace keeping missions, regional and sub-regional organizations are better placed to deal with the conflicts as they have a better understanding of inter-state affairs, due to shared cultural and religious backgrounds, and the effects of the conflict are likely to affect them directly, thus they are more likely to reach a consensus with the conflicting parties.

Africa has several regional groupings. However, continentally there is only one organization, AU, formerly known as the OAU. Its objective are social, economic, educational, security and scientific in nature.⁹⁶ In the organization, there is a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to deal with peace and conflict resolution in member states. The former OAU faced considerable problems in mediating and managing conflicts within member states. For example, in 1976, when the OAU advocated for the independence of Western Sahara, Morocco withdrew its membership. In 1993, OAU was also unsuccessful in mediating the

⁹² United Nations Charter., Article 52 Clause (1)

⁹³ Touval, S., 'Why the UN Fails,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 5(Sept-Oct 1994) pp.44-57:46

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Adeleke, A., 'The Politics and Diplomacy of Peace Keeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia,' *The Journal of African Modern Studies*, Vol.33 No.4 (Dec1995) p.571

⁹⁶ Organization of African Unity Charter., Article II Clause (2) (1963)

Chadian Civil War.⁹⁷ In the same year, OAU established its mechanism on conflict prevention, management and resolution. At that time, OAU began to recognize the potential of civil society in conflict management.⁹⁸ This was new ground for this intergovernmental organization and, in 1996, consultations with civil society helped define an agenda for possibilities of Collaboration in the management of internal conflicts. Recommendations included, inter alia, the elaboration of a specific programme for collaboration with, and promotion of civil society initiatives in conflict management.⁹⁹ The result was a partnership between OAU and civil societies and the establishment of the African committee on peace development.

2.4.1 Organization of African Unity Management of the Rwanda Conflict

The OAU has been involved in the conflict management of the Great lakes conflict where one third of the fifteen African conflicts have occurred leading to the post-Cold War decade where pervasive violence, insecurity, and outside involvement has been evident. In the case of Rwanda the Tutsi -led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from neighboring Uganda in October of 1990, the violence also enveloped neighboring Burundi and the former Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰⁰ Assisted by the deployment of French, Belgian, and Zairean troops in Rwanda, the RPF offensive to oust the Hutu -dominated Habyarimana regime was repelled a month after it began. While Belgium withdrew its troops shortly after the invasion, both France and Zaire continued to support the government with military and economic assistance. Under the leadership of Paul Kagame, the rebels regrouped in northwest Rwanda, and

⁹⁷ Shawn, M.N., 'Dispute Settlement in Africa' in *37 Year Book of World Affairs*, 1983 pp.156-160

⁹⁸ Muyanga, M. and M. Vogot., *An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; 1993-2000* (New York, International Peace Academy, Nov.2000)

⁹⁹ Report of the IPA/OAU Consultation on Civil Society and Conflict Management in Africa, Cape Town South Africa (New York: International Peace Academy, 1996)

¹⁰⁰ Adebajo, A. and C. Landsberg., *The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Investments*. Pugwash Occasional Papers 2 (1) (2001):pp.1 -12. Also see Ali, Taisier M., and Robert O. Matthews, eds. *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (Montreal, Canada: McGill -Queen's University Press, 1999).

began to employ guerilla tactics against the country's military forces. The original RPF membership was from Uganda working under the patron ship of the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni which had overthrown the Obote regime in Uganda in the early 1986. The Tutsi NRA members enjoyed military assistance from their Ugandan counterparts. In July 1992, OAU intervened and began negotiations between the Rwandan government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which led to the deployment of an OAU military observation mission to monitor a ceasefire. The new military group replaced a team that had been in Rwanda since April 1991. There has been a significant decline in violence levels after the first two years after the opposing parties received military assistance from four outside states.

In August of 1993, almost three years after the insurgency began; a comprehensive peace agreement was reached in Arusha, Tanzania, which called for the creation of a coalition government, the integration of the RPF into the national army, and the prospect of multi-party elections in 1995. The United Nations deployed UNAMIR, a peacekeeping force of 2500 troops, to monitor the peace process and facilitate the implementation of the agreement. However, this did not deter opposition from Hutu extremist, in fact there were more resistant. In early April 1994, the Rwandan President Habyarimana and the Burundian President died in a plane crash, which offset the genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This continued over the next three months, between 800,000 and 1 million lives were lost¹⁰¹ or as much as 20% of the country's total population. This was the culmination of longstanding ethnic competition and tensions between the minority Tutsi, who had controlled power for centuries, and the

¹⁰¹ Rwanda: *How the genocide happened* (BBC, April 2004) also see 'OAU sets Inquiry into Rwanda Genocide', *Africa Recovery* Vol.12 1#1(1998) p.4

majority Hutu people, who had come to power in the rebellion of 1959-1962.¹⁰² The genocide was halted by the victory of the RPF in July 1994, which was followed by the cross-border spillover in one of the largest population movements. There were approximately two million Rwandan Hutus refugees fleeing into neighboring countries of Burundi, Tanzania, and the former Zaire. Among the Hutu refugees were members of the former Rwandan government, including the armed forces (ex-FAR), along with elements of the Interahamwe, a civilian Hutu militia group which meant "those who stand (fight, kill) together", and Impuzamugambi, which meant "those who have the same (or a single) goal". These groups, particularly their youth wings, were responsible for much of the violence.¹⁰³ The Rwandan government together with the Rwandan Armed forces manipulated family ties and relationships to create killing groups also known as Interahamwe in Kigali and other rural areas.¹⁰⁴ In her article on citizen participation in the genocide, Lee Ann Fujii argues that the Interhamwe was not formed from the hatred of both the Tutsi and the RPF, but from "social dynamics that sometimes took precedence over ethnic considerations."¹⁰⁵ It is clear that in the absence of the two dominant groups discussed the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi the Rwanda's genocide would not have been as effective and fatal.

By January of 1995, these various Hutu forces, which were primarily residing in refugee camps in Zaire, began their cross-border attacks in an attempt to oust the RPF government in Rwanda. Their efforts were supported through the provision of military assistance from France, China, South Africa, and the Kinshasa government. The rebels also maintained cross-border

¹⁰² Lemarchand, R., 'Disconnecting the Threats: Rwanda and the Holocaust Reconsidered,' *Ideal Journal* Vol.7 No.1 (2002)

¹⁰³ Melvern, L., *Conspiracy For Murder* (New York: Versco, 2006) pp.25-28

¹⁰⁴ Fujii, L. A., 'The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwanda Genocide,' *Security Studies* Vol. 17, Issue 3(2008) pp.568-597:1

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3

sanctuaries in Burundi and Tanzania. Hutu attempts to recapture power which were bolstered by six outside state interveners led to increased levels of violence both one and two years after the campaign began. Within the former Zaire, Tutsis who had resided in the northeast of the country for generations became the targets of violent attacks by both Zaire and Rwandan Hutus along with the country's armed forces.¹⁰⁶ The nature of ethnic relations among the residing Rwandan and Zaire groups in mid-1994 was altered by the enormous migration of Rwandan Hutus into Eastern Zaire. The activities of the Hutu rebels both within Zaire and Rwanda contributed significantly to what the Great Lakes region considers as the third ethno-political conflict.

2.4.2 Organization of African Unity and the Congo-Zaire Conflict

In October of 1996, there was a coalition between the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire coalition (ADFL) and the Zairean Tutsis, also referred to as the Banyamulenge, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila which began a movement to overthrow the Mobutu SeseSeko regime. The rebels received widespread support from other states within the region. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi sent their own armed forces to fight alongside the ADFL coalition while Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Ethiopia provided various forms of military assistance. However, France and the United States, Cold War allies of Mobutu, chose not to actively prop up the host state government.¹⁰⁷ The Americans and the South Africans negotiated Mobutu's departure after eight months of high-level hostilities that led to the victory of the ADFL which led to the appointment of Kabila as the president.

However, peace was to reign for less than a year before the eruption of the second Tutsi revolt in the newly renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) due to Kabila's expulsion

¹⁰⁶ Kholsa, D., *Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: A Force for Peace or Spiraling Violence* (A Doctoral Dissertation Department of Government and Politics, University of Arizona, 2004) p.82

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.82-83

of the Rwandan and Ugandan advisors from the DRC coupled with a resurgence of violent attacks against the Banyamulenge.¹⁰⁸ Kabila owed the survival of his staggering regime to the intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Congo at this time was divided into four entities ruled respectively by the government and its allies, the pro-Rwandan Congolese Rally for Democracy (RDC-Goma), two pro-Ugandan regions administered by the Congolese Rally for the Democracy-Movement of Liberation (RDC-ML), and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). This episode of war was the longest (1998-2003), and proved to be the deadliest. It involved seven African states. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe foiled the attempt to overthrow the Kabila regime by Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda with their Congolese allies; this is the reason why it was referred to as the seven nation war or the African World War.¹⁰⁹ The armies of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad lined up in support of the government forces while Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops fought on behalf of the Banyamulenge. Zambia and South Africa, under the auspices of the South African Development Community (SADC), led the efforts to mediate a settlement. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations assisted these peacemaking overtures. Interim agreements such as the July 1999 Lusaka accords were repeatedly violated. With the interventions by the armed forces of seven regional countries and despite mediation efforts by both external states and regional organizations, rebellion levels in this conflict reached the highest possible level on the Minorities scale at the onset and the same degree of violence was coded at the end of the first and second years.¹¹⁰ In mid-2004, successive efforts to reach a

¹⁰⁸ The two Tutsi rebellions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) are considered as separate ethno-political conflicts which are the practices adopted in most compilations of episodes of armed conflict.

¹⁰⁹ Turner, T., *The Congo Wars: Myth and Reality* (Zed Books London: New York, 2007) pp.5-8

¹¹⁰ Kholsa, D., *Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: A Force for Peace or Spiraling Violence* Op cit., pp.83-84

comprehensive peace agreement between the various rebel forces along with their external state patrons and the Kinshasa regime which was being led by Joseph Kabila's is appearing to take a hold as the interim power-sharing arrangements is being successfully negotiated. It is estimated that more than three million people died as a result of either direct combat or battle-related fatalities due to famine or disease.

2.4.3 Organization of African Unity and the Burundi Conflict

The other conflict in the Great Lakes involved the Hutus in Burundi who sought to overthrow the Tutsi dominated military governments that had ruled the country since independence in 1962. The two groups have a history of violence and ethnic outbursts, often from attempts made against the Tutsi military authorities. In 1972 and 1988 more the 150,000 people died after the military engaged in severe reprisals against both Hutu rebels and civilians.¹¹¹ In June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye leader of the Hutu dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) won the election and became the first Hutu head of state leading a pro Hutu government. However, president Ndadaye was assassinated in October 1993 by a Tutsi led military coup that led to more violence between the Hutus and Tutsis. In the first two years after president Ndadaye assassination, approximately 300,000 people mostly civilians died in violent attacks by the Tutsi dominated military against Hutu civilians, the Hutu rebel groups, and the civilian Hutu and Tutsi.¹¹² Hundreds of thousands of Hutus also sought refuge in neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire. Burundian Hutu rebel groups, assisted by Rwandan Hutus based in Zairean and Tanzanian refugee camps, engaged in hit and run tactics in order to oust the Tutsi military government. The Rwandan Hutu government gave the rebels military assistance until it was overthrown by the Tutsi led RPF. Both Tanzania and Zaire sheltered the rebels while Kenya

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.84

¹¹² BBC., *Country Profile Burundi*.www.bbc.co.uk Last updated 5th June 2013

hosted organizations that represented group interests. France, which has been a longtime supporter of the host state government, continued to provide it with various types of military aid while also seeking to mediate a settlement. Violence levels escalated at both one and two years after the onset as the international interveners largely supported the rebel groups through mixed types of assistance. The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) launched various initiatives to reach a peaceful resolution and an OAU military observer group was deployed in 1994. In 2000, Nelson Mandela led the conflicting groups to a peaceful agreement.¹¹³ As of mid-2004, attempts to implement a comprehensive power-sharing arrangement continued along with rebel attacks against state authorities.

2.5 Sub-Regional Organization in Conflict Management

Besides the regional organizations, there exist a number of sub-regional organizations which are involved in conflict management. For the purpose of this study we shall look at ECOWAS in West Africa, COMESA in Eastern and Southern Africa, SADC in the South African region, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and lastly IGAD in the Horn of Africa region. These sub-regional groupings have similar aims; they all seek to promote trade and economic security of member states.

2.5.1 Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS was created on May 28, 1975 in Lagos Nigeria. It was established to promote cooperation and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union for promoting economic growth and development in West Africa.¹¹⁴ Since its inception, ECOWAS has encountered many problems in the process of achieving such integration. These include political instability and lack of good governance that has plagued many member countries; the

¹¹³ Kholsa, D., *Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: A Force for Peace or Spiraling Violence* Op cit., 84-85

¹¹⁴ Economic Community of West African States. www.ecowas.org Accessed on 17.07.2013.

insufficient diversification of national economies; the absence of reliable infrastructure; and the multiplicity of organizations for regional integration with the same objectives.¹¹⁵ ECOWAS was created on May 28, 1975 in Lagos Nigeria to promote cooperation and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union for promoting economic growth and development in West Africa.¹¹⁶ Since its inception, ECOWAS has encountered many problems in the process of achieving such integration. These include political instability and lack of good governance that has plagued many member countries; the insufficient diversification of national economies; the absence of reliable infrastructure; and the multiplicity of organizations for regional integration with the same objectives.¹¹⁷ However, the organization has gradually participated in conflict management with success in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.¹¹⁸ One explanation may be that it unites nations facing common challenges and problems spilling over from one country to its neighbors, and thus crying out for multilateral solutions, such as organized crime and small arms proliferation.¹¹⁹ Additionally, the presence of an obvious hegemony, Nigeria, which surpasses its other members in terms of geographical size, population, GDP, military expenditure and its vast troops, plays a role in the success of ECOWAS.

ECOWAS also seeks to strengthen its military arm, ECOMOG.¹²⁰ Currently, the organization is seeking international support to enable it to train and equip 15 standby battalion

¹¹⁵ Adebajo, A., 'ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey', in Adekeye, Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges. Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004)

¹¹⁶ Economic Community of West African States. www.ecowas.org Accessed on 17.07.2013.

¹¹⁷ Adebajo, A., 'ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey', in Adekeye, Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges. Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004)

¹¹⁸ Adebajo, A., *Building Peace in West Africa. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002) also see Adibe, Clement E. 2000. 'Muddling Through: An Analysis of the ECOWAS Experience in Conflict Management in West Africa', in Liisa Laakso (ed.), *Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa. Europe, SADC and ECOWAS.* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki).

¹¹⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 451-452. Also see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *World Fact book* (Washington DC: CIA, 2008).

¹²⁰ Economic Community of West African States. www.ecowas.org Accessed on 17.07.2013.

of troops that could be deployed.¹²¹ To date, ECOMOG forces have been deployed in civil conflicts in Sierra Leone Guinea-Bissau. Liberia provided the first litmus test to Africa's commitment in conflict management with ECOWAS being the first sub-regional organization to manage conflict. The Charles Taylor led rebel movement the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) waged war against president Samuel Doe's government hence the Nigerian led ECOWAS worked hard to restore peace, law and order. ECOWAS further engaged in a number of civilian-military humanitarian activities aimed at reducing the suffering of the Liberian people but also winning their hearts leading to a favorable condition for their presidential and parliamentary elections that were held on 19th July 1997.¹²² ECOMOG mission in Liberia involved the active participation of eleven member states including Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Uganda and Tanzania also participated although not member states of ECOWAS.

In 1998, ECOMOG troops composed of military forces from Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria intervened in Sierra Leone following the ousting of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah's government and restored Kabbah's government as the official ruling power. This led to the signing of an agreement in Lome in September 1999 to settle the conflict in Sierra Leone between all actors namely the government, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels and members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military Junta.¹²³ Finally, in June 1998 some units of Guinea Bissau's armed forces led by the former chief of defense staff went into mutiny. President Joao Bernardo Vieira asked for military assistance from Guinea and Senegal based on

¹²¹ Berman, Eric G. and Sams, Katie E., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva and Pretoria: UNIDIR and ISS, 2000) pp. 138-145 Also see Adebajo, A., *Building Peace in West Africa. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- Bissau* Op cit., pp.137-163

¹²² Oloo, A., *Regional Institutions and the Quest for Security in the Horn of Africa* in M, Mwagiru., *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* (Africa Peace Forum Publishers, 2008) p. 243

¹²³ Ibid.

their close bilateral defense and security agreements. At the request of president Vieira, the ECOWAS authority of Heads of State and Government decided to help and intervene in order to restore peace and reinstate him as the legitimate president of Guinea Bissau.¹²⁴ Following the decision of the Head of States and government to mediate in the Guinea Bissau conflict ECOWAS set up a mechanism for supervision and control of the cease-fire with the help of Benin, Niger, and Togolese contingents.

In November 2002, ECOWAS received a boost from Senegal after it announced it was going to up its contribution and offer a force commander. This was followed by additional support from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo, which contributed 1264 troops to support the first phase of the mission. The force took over from the French troops who were monitoring the October 17th, 2002 agreement for the cessation of hostilities under an agreement involving ECOWAS, France and the government of Cote d'Ivoire. Nigeria also participated in the mission by providing medical and signal teams.¹²⁵ The involvement of ECOMOG mitigating internal conflicts is an example of managing conflicts through interstate relations at regional levels. Francophone ECOWAS member countries namely Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, with Guinea Bissau (Lusophone) are part of the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA), a regional economic and monetary union that shares a common currency (the CFA Franc).

2.5.2 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COMESA is a regional body established in 1994 with member states drawn from the eastern and Southern African regions. It succeeded the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) with an objective to create an internationally competitive economic community that would foster high

¹²⁴Oloo, A., *Regional Institutions and the Quest for Security in the Horn of Africa* in M, Mwangiru., *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* Op cit., p.244

¹²⁵ Economic Community of West African States. www.globalsecurity.org Accessed 17.07.2013

living standards amongst its people.¹²⁶ COMESA has 20 member states namely, Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. COMESA's aim is to establish a single market for goods and services and a common investment area through regional integration in trade and investment. COMESA thus focuses on the creation of a conducive environment for regional trade and investment, which includes an enabling infrastructure. COMESA prides itself by positioning the region in combating some of the basic causes of conflict such as resources, poverty and marginalization.¹²⁷ COMESA is credited with being one of the building blocks for African Unity and has played an integral role in the establishment of a free trade area. COMESA does not involve itself directly in conflict management; rather it works together with other regional bodies such as AU, IGAD and the EAC to compliment peace efforts in the region.

2.5.3 South African Development Community

The concept of a regional economic co-operation in Southern Africa was first discussed at a meeting of the Frontline States foreign ministers in May 1979 in Gaborone. The meeting led to an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania two months later which brought together all independent countries, with the exception of the then Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa, and international donor agencies. The Arusha conference in turn led to the Lusaka Summit held in the Zambian capital in April 1980. After adopting the declaration, it became known as 'Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation', and Sir Seretse Khama was elected the first chairman of the SADCC.¹²⁸ The Declaration committed the signatory governments to

¹²⁶ Economic Community of West African States. www.comesa.org Accessed on 26.7.2013

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Profile of Southern African Development Community(SADC) pp.1-2 www.sadc.int Retrieved 23.07.2013

pursue policies aimed at economic liberation (i.e. to reduce economic dependence on South Africa) and the integrated and equitable development of the economies of the region. The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was subsequently formalized by means of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference dated 20th July 1981.

In 1989 the Summit of Heads of State or Government, meeting in Harare, decided that SADCC should be formalized to “give it an appropriate legal status ... to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, Charter or Treaty.” In 1992 the SADCC transformed itself into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The SADC Treaty was signed in Windhoek dated 17th August 1992. In Blantyre on 14 August 2001, Head of State and Government signed an Agreement Amending the SADC Treaty. SADC consists of the following member states Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Seychelles, DRC, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Tanzania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It’s main objectives are to achieve development, peace and security, and economic growth, to alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. built on democratic principles and equitable and sustainable development.¹²⁹

Mozambique's President Armando Guebuza inaugurated the center of conflict management at its headquarters in Gaborone the capital city of Botswana as the head of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense and Security co-operation established by SADC heads of state and government on 28th June 1996. "Today, we can congratulate ourselves for having a system that will enable us to detect signs of different

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp.1-2

kinds of threats before they become a reality."¹³⁰ The formation of the SADC organs for politics, defense and security was done with the aim of filling the gap that was left by the front line states that constituted of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe whose main agenda was to coordinate responses to apartheid and formulate a union policy towards apartheid government and the liberation movement in South Africa. The organ of political, defense and security cooperation was the first institution to be added to SADC after it restructured from SADCC in 1992.¹³¹ After 1992 SADC's main emphasis was on economic development leading to the establishment of the SADC organ with the express aim of creating a special forum for political, defense and security cooperation with a focus on conflict management.

In the case of the Zimbabwean civil conflict SADC's position for many years was to agree with President Mugabe that the civil conflict was primarily a land question. SADC issued regular statements from its summits congratulating the Zimbabwe government on the successes in its land redistribution. However, SADC remained visibly silent on issues of human rights, and although it did encourage the promotion of free and fair elections, it failed to exercise any criticism of the electoral processes even though the process was evidently faulted. SADC ignored the Zimbabwe conflict and took a backstage role until the AU referred it to the matter as a mediator during the June 2008 Sharm- el-Sheik summit. SADC's mandate thus came directly from the AU. In turn, at its 2008 Dar es Salaam conference, SADC appointed then South African president Thabo Mbeki as chief mediator. This however was controversial as the MDC-T argued that Mbeki was pro- ZANU-PF. Since then, the SADC has been on the ground handling the

¹³⁰ Sapa., *SADC Launches Conflict Management Centre*. www.polity.org.za Last updated July 14th 2010

¹³¹ Masemola, H., *An Analysis and Appraisal of Restructuring in SADCC/SADC Since 1990* (A Master's Thesis, University of South Africa, 2006) p.124

mediation process while the AU's role has been to oversee the SADC and rubber stamp its decisions. However, the AU is much more clearly divided over the conflict, with many countries openly supporting the MDC-T and condemning the ZANU-PF regime as undemocratic and as violating human rights.¹³² These divisions are part of the reasons that the AU has been unable or unwilling to take the lead role on the Zimbabwean conflict; the other being the principle of 'subsidiarity' in which it has delegated sub-regional conflict management to SADC.

SADC publicly acknowledged the ZANU-PF and ignored the suffering of the Zimbabwean people as a result of human rights violation, breaches of the rule of law and political repression. The SADC allowed the Mugabe regime to act with impunity, blaming external actors and in particular sanctions on the government, despite it taking a more stand firm against the Mugabe regime in theory. When it eventually took on a mediation role, it is notable that it was devolved to South Africa and not on a multinational level despite being endorsed by the AU. The SADC ignored any interventionist action despite being able to construct a regional electoral code of conduct and to some extent playing a role in improving Zimbabwe's electoral processes on a technical level.¹³³ The SADC acted with considerable speed in the management of the Madagascar, which was contrary to the time and effort it put to the Zimbabwean conflict. The SADC, with support from AU was swift in suspending the island state from its membership in the organization but did not impose any sanctions. SADC further discussed various conflict management options including military intervention, although it was practically unlikely. Its diplomacy took place in a multilateral framework, involving a range of international organizations, although this was probably more a result of the nature of the circumstances than a

¹³² Cawthra, G., *The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe* (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Publishing, 2010) pp.29-30

¹³³ Ibid., p.34

conscious decision.¹³⁴ SADC remained engaged with mediation throughout the conflict, and repeatedly issued strong statements calling on all parties to resolve their differences, and even went as far as preventing Andry Rajoelina president of Madagascar from addressing the UN General Assembly.

An analysis of SADC's response to the two conflicts is in itself conflicting. For the sake of consistency and effectiveness, it is advisable that SADC establishes a firmer and more explicit normative regime around issues of human rights and the rule of law, and put in place a dedicated capacity for mediation support. This may necessitate the creation of a new arm or division within SADC comprising of professional and experienced individuals vast in conflict mediation and management. These individuals will interact with diplomats and act on behalf of SADC in liaising with international stakeholders, record keeping, relating with the media and the public and in supporting various peace processes. There is also a wide scope for improving relations with the AU and other international actors. SADC has not always acted in harmony with the AU and as both organizations lack institutional depth, liaison and cooperation is often superficial or crisis driven.¹³⁵ It is easy to be critical of SADC as is with the UN and other international organizations. However, one must consider how things might have been had SADC not existed, even if the role it has played in both conflicts has been partial and problematic. Regionally SADC has emerged with a much bruised reputation, and is seen as being partial to the now largely discredited former president of Madagascar Marc Ravalomanana. Internationally, SADC's reputation has also taken a beating over its position on Zimbabwe, with donor countries in particular losing confidence in the organization's ability to deliver.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

2.5.4 Arab Maghreb Union

The weakest of all the designated sub-regional organizations is surely the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), dominated as it is by the two sub-regional powers of approximately equal strength, Algeria and Morocco. These two countries are each other's arch-enemies, it is no wonder that AMU is extremely weak, bordering on complete insignificance. The only hypothetical development that might change this would be an accession to the organization by Egypt, which would appear a natural hegemon, but there are no indications that this will ever happen. The government in Cairo did apply for, but was refused, membership in 1994.¹³⁶ The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was founded in 1989 and comprises Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.¹³⁷ Even though its founding treaty mentions the objective of 'contributing to the preservation of the peace based on justice and equity,'¹³⁸ it has never made any contribution to this, and does not exhibit any institutional signs of any such ambition.

2.5.5 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

The genesis of IGAD is not like that of most African sub-regional organizations, particularly if one looks at the aims of IGADD the predecessor of IGAD. Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), was established in January 1986 with its headquarters in Djibouti with direct urging from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).¹³⁹ The formation of IGADD was a result of pressure from aid donors and the international community as opposed to being a product of a home-grown spirit to attend to

¹³⁶ Coshy, Ninan., 'Egypt's Troubles at Home and Signals Abroad', *Economic and Political Weekly* 30 (31-32) 1995 pp. 1960-1961.

¹³⁷ Berman, Eric G. and Sams, Katie E., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* Op cit., pp. 193-197 also see Aghrout, Ahmed and Sutton, Keith., 'Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(1) (1990) pp. 115-139.

¹³⁸ Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). 1989. 'Traité instituant l'Union Magreb Arabe', at <http://www.issafrica.org>

¹³⁹ Lyons, T., *Can Neighbours Help? Regional Actors and African Conflict Management* in F.M Deng, and T. Lyons (eds.), *African Reckoning A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998) p.

existing challenges. Following the success of Comité Permanent Inter-États de la Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans Le Sahel (CILSS) the states of the region were urged to form an intergovernmental authority to coordinate the fight against drought and famine.

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The UN General Assembly passed several resolutions to this effect, for instance Resolution 35/90 of December 1980. The formation of the organization took ten years; five years of negotiation for the body to come into existence and another five to attain a modicum of functionality.¹⁴¹ The initial founding members comprised of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. After its independence in 1993, Eritrea became the seventh member.¹⁴² IGADD mandate was to deal with the ecological and humanitarian problems in the Horn of Africa as witnessed between 1974-1984 that led to widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Horn of Africa.¹⁴³ Despite the organization's narrow initial focus,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Bekoe, D., and P. Omach., *Building Peace in Eastern Africa* (International Peace Academy, Makerere University, Uganda and Africa Peace Forum, Kenya, 2002) p.22

¹⁴² History of IGAD. <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/RECs/igad.htm> Retrieved 25.07.2013

¹⁴³ Mulegeta, K., *The Role of Regional and International organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD* Op cit., p.22

IGADD summits gave its member states a platform to address other issues of mutual concern and by 1994, the member states had come to the realization that the regional developmental problems extended beyond their initial mandate of environmental dilapidation. IGADD then began its intervention in Sudan's civil conflict and also facilitated the peace process between Ethiopia and Somalia. Consequently, the member states convened in a summit in Addis Ababa in April 1995 to discuss ways to revitalize the organization and expand its activities into related spheres.¹⁴⁴ On 21st March 1996, IGADD member states decided to reconstitute and transform the organization into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in a summit held in Nairobi. The new IGAD was launched in Djibouti on the 25th-26th of November 1996.¹⁴⁵ IGAD revised and expanded its mandate to effectively respond to reality of conflicts and insecurity in the region, which were an obstacle to development in the sub-region. The realization of the need for a regional approach in conflict management gave way for the formal restructuring of the organization to address the issues multi-nationally. The objectives of the new organization were broadened to include the promotion of peace and stability, and the creation of mechanisms for the management of intra and inter-state conflicts within the sub-region.¹⁴⁶ The inauguration of IGAD stressed on the importance of peaceful management of conflict within the region to facilitate sustainable development. IGAD member states agreed to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability, establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes and to deal with disputes between member states within the sub region before they are

¹⁴⁴ Appendix A IGAD'S Role in Regional Processes for Promoting and Sustaining Peace: Background and Introduction www.iss.co.za/AppendixA.pdf Retrieved 11.07.2013

¹⁴⁵ Fact Sheet Bureau of Military-Affairs: *Intergovernmental Authority on Development* (Washington, DC: July 16th 1993) <http://2001-2009.state.gov>

¹⁴⁶ Bekoe, D., and P. Omach., *Building Peace in Eastern Africa* Op cit., p.22

referred to other regional or international organizations.¹⁴⁷ The summit also recognized the need for regional peace as an essential prerequisite for development. Three priority areas were identified: Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs; Infrastructure (Transport and Communications) and Development; and finally Food Security and Environment. They also made particular reference on the need to reinstate peace processes Southern Sudan and Somalia.¹⁴⁸ The founding fathers of IGAD had envisioned IGAD as the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the Horn of Africa region and to assist and complement the efforts of the member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: food security and environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and management of humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation and integration, respectively.¹⁴⁹ IGAD continues to fulfill its mandate by maintaining acceptable levels of governance through encouraging its member states to live according to its set rules and procedures.

IGAD has four hierarchical policy organs namely¹⁵⁰ the Assembly of Heads of States and Government, which is the supreme policy making organ and determines the objectives, guidelines and programs for authority. Its chairmanship is rotational among its members and meets once a year. The council of ministers is composed of ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other focal minister designated by each state. It formulates policy, approves the work programs and annual budgets of the secretariat. The committee of ambassadors is comprised of IGAD members states ambassadors or plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD

¹⁴⁷ Fact Sheet Bureau of Military-Affairs: *Intergovernmental Authority on Development* Op cit.

¹⁴⁸ *Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstructions: IGAD's Role in Regional Processes for Promoting and Sustaining Peace* (Grand Regency Hotel, Nairobi 1-3 December 2003) p.18

¹⁴⁹ Intergovernmental Authority on Development., *Profile Document* p. 2 www.africa-union.org

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4

headquarters. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary heads the secretariat and is appointed by the assembly for a four-year term renewable once. The secretariat roles include formulation, coordination and harmonization of regional projects and development policies and programs for approval by the council. The Executive secretary has four directors working under him each heading a division. The four divisions include economic cooperation and social development, agriculture and environment, peace and security and administration and finance.

Since its formation in 1963, the role of IGAD in conflict management has propelled it to the center of activity in the Horn of Africa. This role is significant in that it is a deviation from its original mandate of addressing recurrent issues of drought and desertification in the sub-region. IGAD is also an interesting case study as it has just successfully concluded two important conflict management initiatives in Sudan and Somalia using two completely different approaches. The peace process for Sudan was exclusive and involved only the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A).¹⁵¹ On the contrary, IGAD's intervention in Somalia involved several actors among them factional leaders, civil society leaders and observers. The varied approaches may be attributed to the nature of the conflicts and the initial factors that led to the processes. Upon close examination, it is evident that IGAD did not deliberately or accidentally select the processes; rather it was upon the principal parties to do so. IGAD simply confirmed the preferred approach; through a consultative process, in the case of Sudan that led to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 9th January 2005 and through continuing and expanding upon the Arta process in the

¹⁵¹ Nyariki, D.M, *Strategic Resources and Management of Internal Conflicts: Case Study of Sudan* (MA Dissertation University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2005) p.143

case of Somalia that eventually led to the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG).¹⁵² IGAD faces a challenge in translating the concrete policies and action at state, regional and international levels from paper to reality.

Conclusion

The above analysis portrays, conflict management by sub-regional actors in the African continent is a recent phenomenon which African sub-regional organizations have been experimenting with in the last two or so decades. Therefore, this is a practice which is yet to take root and is still at the evolution stage. Considerable progress has been achieved in building African sub-regional capacity for managing violent conflict and addressing security threats on the continents. From the literature three things are certain: sub-regional organizations serve as instruments for meeting the goals of the respective member states, sub-regional organizations provide meeting places for members to interact socio-economically, discussing issues that affect them both positively and negatively and also diplomatically reinforcing their values and policies and lastly sub-regional organizations play the role of independent actors in the international system where they can act on the world scene without being affected significantly by any external interference.

¹⁵² Oloo, A., *Regional Institutions and the Quest for Security in the Horn of Africa* in M, Mwagiru., *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* Op cit., pp.228-230

CHAPTER THREE

ROLES AND INTERESTS OF BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTORS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

3.0 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the roles and interests of both internal and external actors in the Somali peace process. They include Somalia Neighboring States, African Union Regional Organizations, the United Nations International Organization, Major Somali Clans, Warlords, Regional Administrations, Businessmen, Somali Civic Society and the Islamist Groups.

3.1 Actors in Somali Conflict Management

The term “actors” refers to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties. Mediators are all those groups who help the conflicting parties by bringing them together, gaining trust, setting the agenda, clarifying issues and formulating agreements.¹⁵³ All the actors have a certain interest in the process which is what makes them become involved in the first place.¹⁵⁴ The interests of the various external stakeholders in internal conflict vary from security to humanitarian. They also stem from ambitions for leadership and statesmanship which inevitably alters the structure of conflict management and also makes the conflict map more complex than it was before.¹⁵⁵ Many conflicts are extremely complex and are characterized by multiple parties and issues. This chapter will examine the actors and their interests in the Somali conflict.

¹⁵³ Ramsbotham, H.O et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) pp. 158-159 quoted in Ochieng Kamudhayi, *Somali Peace Process* in Makumi, Mwagiru (ed.) *African Regional Security in the age of Globalization* (Henrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p.116

¹⁵⁴ Mwagiru, M., *Community Based Approches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management* (Nairobi: GIZ, 2001)

¹⁵⁵ Mwagiru, M., *Theory, Processess and Institutions of Management* (Watermark Publication, 2000) p.68

3.1.1 Constituents

All actors in a conflict have constituents. These are usually the people they are answerable to and whose interests they profess to be fighting for. The constituents may include citizens, institutions that have supported and continue to support a conflicting party and those to whom the individual parties owe a duty of explanation. The latter group may include opposition parties who may one day take over the leadership and be faced with the very consequences of the conflict. The constituents are a very important component in conflict management.¹⁵⁶ In the case where the warring parties settle a conflict through mutual agreement, the constituents must have approved the agreement prior to its signing hence preventing the likelihood of re-entry. Negotiating parties experience re-entry problems in cases where they are unable to sell their terms to their constituent's hence leading to the annulment of the treaty.

3.1.2 Interested parties

Apart from the constituents, there are also the interested parties to the conflict. The Interested parties usually have an interest in the conflict and its outcome because it affects them. Interested parties in a conflict includes neighboring states which because of their close proximity to the conflict can disrupt functions within the state such as trade with the conflicting parties and security especially along the border. In our case the Horn of African states.¹⁵⁷ The interested parties may also include actors such as international organizations, for example the United Nations, or Regional organizations such as the Africa Union or even Sub- regional organizations like IGAD, SADC and ECOWAS who are bound by their charters and that of the UN to maintain peace and order internationally, regionally and sub-regionally.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.50

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

3.1.3 Allies and patrons

Allies and patrons are those who for ideological, cultural, legal and other reasons support one side or the other in the conflict. They do so by providing material and other support. They complicate the conflict because a conflict can eventually ensue between the different allies and patrons during the duration of the main conflict.¹⁵⁸ The Somali conflict attracted external players from the international community who were ‘friends of IGAD’, for example Britain, Sweden, Norway, Italy, the USA and China just to mention a few. These states agreed to support IGAD with logistics and resources. The external actors offer support in terms of logistics and resources, which is crucial in the peace process but there is need to examine who among them is an ally or an enemy of the process in the context of mediation.¹⁵⁹ Some of these states interest themselves in the process because of previous history shared with Somalia. For example, former colonies participate in mediation efforts due to emotional tie that exist even after the end of the colonial regime. Britain for instance plays an important role in different mediation efforts in Anglophone countries that are members of the British Commonwealth, while France takes an active role in Francophone nations. In the Somalia case, Britain and Italy came to support IGAD’s effort as former colonial masters, in addition to their international interests.¹⁶⁰ Economic interests especially in the banana plantations drove Italy’s involvement.¹⁶¹ In Somalia, Britain was interested in protecting Somaliland, which was pursuing international recognition Within Somalia; Britain’s interest was the protection of Somaliland, which was seeking international recognition after repudiating the 1960 union agreement with Italian Somalia. The US

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Chester. A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall., *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases*(Washington Dc: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2004) pp.107-109

¹⁶⁰ Kamudhayi, O., *Negotiating in Civil Wars: A Case study of Somalia National Reconciliation Process 2002-2005*(A PHD Thesis University of Nairobi, 2011) p.60-61

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

involvement was necessitated by the 1998 bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (by cells of Al Qaeda who operated Somalia). Their point of engagement was security and war against terrorism. While Sweden viewed this as an opportunity to offload the huge Somali refugee population within its territory; Norway came because of its policy as a peacemaker. England observes that the engagement of external groups is a delicate matter as it brought about multiplication of issues in the mediation process, which increased and complicated the issues to address.¹⁶² The Somali conflict therefore became a complex matter intertwined with external interests that do not necessarily serve the agenda of the peace process.

3.1.4 Profiteers

Profiteers in the Somalia conflict are mainly warlords, businessmen or the new type of warlord-businessmen. On Jan 21st the Online Edition of the Herald Tribune ran an editorial on Somali's apolitical warlords:

“Warlords have neither an ideology nor a political agenda. Their actions are solely driven by their pursuit of illicit enrichment and war booty. The individual fiefdoms they have carved out are used as a base for the exploitation of confiscated properties, plantations, ports and airports as well as for drug trafficking, the issuance of fishing licenses for foreign concerns and arms trade.”¹⁶³

Warlordism can be defined as the senseless purposeless fighting in aggrandizement land to put real roadblocks and tax and do all kinds of businesses from drugs, selling of small and light weapons, contraband and charcoal with total disregard of their actions and their consequences to the next generation. Warlordism therefore exists where there is lack of national institutional framework and vision.¹⁶⁴ Adam also defines a warlord as a man who was a lord of a particular

¹⁶² See England, A.M (ed.) *International Mediation, 3rd edn* (Dordrecht: Nordin, Nijhoff, 1990)

¹⁶³ International Herald Tribune, (21.01.2004) quoted in Grosse-Kettler, S., *External Actors in Stateless Somali: A War Economy and its Promoters* (Bonn: BICC Publishers, 2004) p.5

¹⁶⁴ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Ethiopia Feseha Shawell and also the Chairman heading the Ethiopian delegation in the IGAD National Peace Talks, in Nairobi at the Ethiopian Embassy, 12th August 2013.

area by virtue of his capacity to wage war. A warlord therefore exercised effective governmental control over a fairly well defined region by means of a military organization that obeyed no higher authority.¹⁶⁵ In reality there is very little difference between warlords and businessmen; the former being ex-members of Barre's regime who are already engaged in trade. For example a former manager of a US-oil company Osman Atto partnered with Barre by allowing him to enjoy part of the profit from the international company in re-turn Barre's regime was to offer him immunity. Today Atto is a multi-millionaire in Mogadishu. He has a permanent militia group at his disposal and can easily mobilize additional recruits if he so wished.¹⁶⁶ Warlord businessmen on the other hand spread rapidly in the southern part of Somalia in 1999. These men controlled their own militias and operate on a strictly economic basis whereby the use of violence is simply construed as a way of conducting business.¹⁶⁷ For example these warlord businessmen charge 2-3000 Somali shillings for night patrols per house per day.

3.2 Interests of External Actors

Somali has quite a number of external actors those interested in a unitary Somalia while the others would rather divide the state into small manageable institutions like that of Somaliland and Puntland. The current state in Somalia can be attributed to external actors who have a strong opinion on the most suitable solution to the Somali conflict. The internal and external factors have been intertwined with external influences which have further affected the peace processes. External actors be they mediators or warring parties acquire their influence from their region, their neighboring states, and lastly from International Organizations.

¹⁶⁵ Grosse-Kettler, S., *External Actors in Stateless Somali: A War Economy and its Promoters* (Bonn: BICC Publishers, 2004) p.5

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

3.2.1 Somalia Neighboring States

The first Somali neighboring state is Ethiopia. Bitter relations between Somalia and Ethiopia exist even after the collapse of the Somali state. In 1991, almost one year after the collapse of the Somalia state, president Zenawi and president Moi met in Addis Ababa and expressed their determination to defend their territories against any external power chains without any specific reference to Somalia.¹⁶⁸ This has been done through continuous incursions into Somalia targeting suspect groups that have allegiances with internal opposition groups.¹⁶⁹ The 1999 conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea intensified the incursions as the two states worked with suspect groups in Somalia playing them against each other. The situation intensified after Eritrea worked with Hussein Aideed to offer bases for Oromo Liberation Front.

Ethiopia's policy direction toward Somalia has got three objective limitations: the first is to offer support to regions that do not accommodate or offer refuge to terrorists and extremists, which are Somaliland and Puntland. The administrations in these regions have been working hand in hand with Ethiopian authorities to extradite any individuals or groups wanted by the Ethiopian security apparatus. Secondly, they build capacity to defend and foil any intrusions by terrorists, extremists and anti-peace groupings rooted in Somalia. Their third objective is to work with the Somali people and the international communities to disarm and weaken anti-peace forces from Somali that threaten the Ethiopian territory.¹⁷⁰ Ethiopia aims at gaining regional control, thus it would rather Somalia is a weaker state so it can have more control over the Horn

¹⁶⁸ Onyango, O.C., *Territorial Claims as the Model of Determinant of Inter-State Conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, 1960-1991* in Okoth and Ogot(eds), *Conflict in Contemporary Africa* (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000) p.92

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ministry of Information, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy* (Addis Ababa, November 2002) pp.6-7

of Africa and curb threats from the Zone V borders.¹⁷¹ Ethiopia's interest in Somalia is ironical especially if you think security is their major concern.¹⁷² This is because collaboration between Ethiopia and select groups within Somali does not support peace efforts in Somali. On the contrary, arming factions within Somali in the false pretense of national security thwarts any efforts to build a stable Somalia and establish a functional national government. The reality is that Somali is prone to create more security problems in Ethiopia, while its internal opposition groups are more likely to enjoy more preserve in the unstable Somalia.

In 1996, the OAU and IGAD gave Ethiopia the mandate to intervene and mediate the conflict in Somalia. Ethiopia took advantage of this responsibility to play a blurred multiple role of mediator, regional power and spoiler. A keen look at Ethiopian sponsored conferences may indicate its interest in Somali's peace processes. Ethiopia's willingness to host UN-sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa could be attributed to its interest to promote its status as a diplomatic hegemony and the regions peace broker. In return, the United States prepared the new regime in Ethiopia as the regions mediator. Ethiopia worked with general Aideed, who was a major player in the Somali conflict. Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders worked with suspect groups and shared ideologies that helped advance guerilla war. General Aideed also harbored hostility towards Arabs, especially toward Egypt, which he accused of supporting Siyad Barre regime for a long time, which worked in favor of Ethiopia. Reports indicate that Meles Zenawi offered general Aideed support in his confrontations with UNOSOM.

In November 1996-97, Ethiopia hosted the Sodore conference to revive decentralized powers in the federal Somali state, which worked against factions that opposed Ethiopia. One of

¹⁷¹ Johnson, P., *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*(A Report for Oxfarm GB, April 1999) p.12

¹⁷²Omar, A., *The Impact of external Political Interventions on the Peace Process: The case of Somalia* (MA Dissertation University of York, 2003) p. 50

the main objectives of the Sodore conference was to forge a coalition between like-minded factions that would oppose Hussein Aideed's self-proclaimed Salballar 'broad-based' government. Hussein Aideed took over after the death of his father, General Mohamed Farah Aideed in 1966 and immediately became an enemy of Ethiopia, which accused him of working with Islamic groups that posed a threat to the Ethiopian national security.¹⁷³ In the same period, an opposing peace conference in Egypt, the 'Cairo Conference' downplayed the Sodore conference on the basis that it introduced the principle of fixed proportional representation by clan, the 4.5 formula used subsequently in the country.¹⁷⁴ Ethiopia used the Sodore conference to cover its attacks into Somalia from 1996 to 1997, which destroyed the quarters of Islamic groupings, Al-Itihad Al-Islami.¹⁷⁵ The Ethiopian government has accused these groupings of carrying attacks within the Ethiopian bases in Gedo. Reports by Ethiopia claim that the operations killed non-Somali foreign fighters and uncovered documents that provide evidence that Al-Itihad is linked to Al-Qaeda.

During the conference period, Somali established Islamic courts all over the country as the faction leaders failed to handle the growing civic movements that were a rising threat to financial politics. This made Ethiopia's role as spoiler more visible, in addition to its open hostility to the Transitional National Government since 2001 that struggled to restore stability in Somalia.¹⁷⁶ In March 2001, the SRRC was created after a conference in Awasa by forces opposing the TNG efforts in Somalia. Arta peace conferences worked to strengthen the TNG and subsequently weakened the SRRC, which sought to increase its influence in Somalia. Although

¹⁷³ Mohamed, J.G., *Who is a Terrorist* (Mogadishu: Mogadishu Printing, 2002) p.4

¹⁷⁴ Menkhaus, K., *Diplomacy in a Failed State: International Mediation in Somalia* (Accord Issue 21, 2010) p.17

¹⁷⁵ Mohamed, J.G., *Who is a Terrorist* Op cit., p. 4

¹⁷⁶ Terlinde, U and T. Danniel., *Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development* (Peace Conflict and Development-Issue Four, April 2004) p.16

the Ethiopian hegemonic role has not been embraced by member states in the horn of Africa Ethiopia maintains that the tiny republic of Djibouti could not be reputed with a landmark success in Somali reconciliation. Ethiopia separated its factional politics after its defeat by Arta and ordered new players, some part of previous factional groupings. Ethiopia used its influence over Somalia to lobby for 200 delegates at the Eldoret conference. More than half of the official delegates were Ethiopia's allies, working in the interest of Ethiopia. Most of the functions of the conference wield power of disrupting but do not have any legitimate consistency beyond scores of militias. Ethiopia need for total control over the peace process in Somalia since 1996 to favor its hegemonic interests has negatively affected parallel peace initiatives that do not work to favor its interests.¹⁷⁷ Ethiopia believes that no peace interventions can succeed in Somalia without its support. Ethiopia's Prime Minister, the late Mr. Meles Zenawi in an interview with Al-Hayat newspaper, stated that his country is more experienced in Somali affairs than any other country in the region, and that any intervention without Ethiopia risks being sabotaged. "No Somali government would be realized without Ethiopia's involvement in its foundation."¹⁷⁸ Ethiopia's collaboration with the warlords against any forces that threaten its influence over Somalia further indicates that its interests do not work towards a peaceful and stable Somalia. By maintain its prominence over Somalia; Ethiopia believes that it would eliminate a historic enemy.

The second state is Eritrea. The border conflict between Somalia and Eritrea from 1998-2000 sparked new interest in Somalia from Eritrea. Its interest is in ensuring that Ethiopia's interests in Somali favour Somali and regional stability, reducing Ethiopia's control in the

¹⁷⁷ Mohamed, J.G., *Who is a Terrorist* Op cit., p. 49

¹⁷⁸ Omar, A., *The Impact of External Intervention on the Peace Process: The Case of Somalia* Op cit., p.54

region.¹⁷⁹ Eritrea acknowledged TNG and provided arms to Somali factions that opposed Ethiopia during the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Eritrea's interest in Somalia stems from a common struggle against Ethiopia's need for regional control. Eritrea depended on Somalia for military support and training during its liberation struggle.¹⁸⁰ Eritrea is now an active player in the IGAD facilitation committee.¹⁸¹ Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti cooperation targets weakening Ethiopia's influence in the region by stabilising Somali. It is believed that Eritrea is in Somalia primarily to weaken the role of its archenemy, Somali hence bolstering its position with the aim of giving the problem a regional perspective.

The third state is Djibouti. Djibouti is both a member of the Arab league and IGAD. It is a founding member of IGAD and hosts IGAD's headquarter. Somali's makes up a majority of Djibouti's population thus the two states share historical and cultural ties. In fact, since independence, the country was ruled by leaders from the Isse clan of Somalia. Djibouti owes her independence to Somalia, which has supported its struggle for independence and feels it has reason to reciprocate Somalia's investment in its independence. Djibouti's role in the Somali conflict was not supported by resources or its diplomatic experience; rather it received support from Egypt and Italy. Djibouti hosted the first two reconciliation conferences in 1991, and hosted refugees from Somalia. Djibouti also steered reconciliation efforts with the backing of Egypt and Italy, who had attempted reconciliatory talks earlier on between the Siyad Barre regime and the opposition groups. Djibouti took a low profile after its attempts at reinstating peace in Somali were not successful. In September 1999, Djibouti's new president announced renewed interest in

¹⁷⁹ Mulegeta, K., *The Role of Regional and International organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD* (Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Publishing, 2009) p.26

¹⁸⁰ Chege, M., *Leader Shows His True Colours* (PNT The Gazette Edition, 2008) www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/opinion_20/Eritrea_Leader_Show_His_True_Colours_gazette.shtml Retrieved 15th August, 2013

¹⁸¹ Joint Communiqué, Issued by the IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee on the Somali Peace Process Nairobi, Kenya. Tuesday 28th October, 2003 No.5 www.un.int/wcm/.../1092400499.doc Retrieved 20th August, 2013

Somalia at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September.¹⁸² Djibouti has several interests in Somali. Afar populations in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea often threaten the ruling Isse clan. The Afar community has its interests in the presidency, which has been under the Isse clan since independence. The French troops in Djibouti are also a source of uncertainty. Djibouti is under a treaty with the French and any sudden changes or movement of troops from Djibouti could threaten its stability and national security. Ethiopia's hegemonic tendencies also threaten Djibouti's stability. The power imbalances in the regions do not favor Djibouti as its national security is under threat from external forces. Djibouti's interest in restoring stability in Somali is in its favor as they will work together against bullying tendencies from Ethiopia, which has tried to dictate the agreement on the use of the Djibouti port.

The Arta conference indicates that Djibouti's interest in the Somali peace process is due to financial ties between businessmen in the two states. Somali and Djibouti businessmen engage in businesses that work to benefit both states. The lack of a stable government in Somali leads Somali businessmen into Djibouti as they pursue international trade, which strengthens both countries economically. As a major player in the Arta Conference, Djibouti has little choice other than to support efforts by the TNG to restore Somalia. Djibouti's role in the Arta conference has diplomatically pitied it against Ethiopia in an effort to reduce Ethiopia's need for control over restoration efforts in Somali. Sentiments from its foreign minister accuse Ethiopia intrusion of derailing peace efforts in Somalia, which threatens the stability of the region.¹⁸³ It is now that Djibouti and Ethiopia have shown unprecedented cooperation since the 6th IGAD ministerial

¹⁸²Babafemi, A., *Somalia: The United Nation's Role in the Peace Process and Future Commitments* (A Report from United Nations Resident Coordinator, 14Nov. 2000)

¹⁸³ Integrated Regional Information Networks., *Djibouti: Ethiopia diplomat rebuked for Somali comments* (26 February, Nairobi, 2002) <http://irinnews.org/Report/30485/Djibouti-Ethiopia-diplomat-rebuked-for-Somali-comments>

meeting in Nairobi on 22nd May, 2004 after realizing that a stable Somalia is in the best interest of both countries.

The fourth state is Kenya. Kenya's involvement in the Somali conflict was both for personal and strategic reasons. Strategically, Kenya is one of the key players in the Horn of Africa due to its strong economy. From this perspective, Somalia welcomed Kenya as a potential partner. Unlike Ethiopia and Djibouti, Kenya sponsored no factions in Somalia and this gave it an added advantage. At a personal level in the year 2002 the former President Daniel Moi aimed at protecting his interest and to create a legacy in regional peacemaking and statesmanship¹⁸⁴ arranged the Nakuru meetings in 2000 as a way of watering down what he perceived as Ethiopia's growing influence in Somalia. As one of the eldest leaders in Africa, he took special interest in mediating conflicts in Africa. This did not go well with Uganda and Ethiopia who were also in competition for regional dominance. While Uganda sought regional hegemony originating from President Museveni's ambition and claims of being the longest sitting president after Moi retired end of 2008. Ethiopia pegged its claim to population size.¹⁸⁵ Obviously, all the three states had high stakes in the outcome of Somalia. Whereas the outcome would improve Meles' and Museveni's standing in regional politics, they also viewed it as a means to advance their relationship with the West especially the USA.¹⁸⁶ The latter wanted an indirect way of keeping tabs on Somalia after the decade of 1993. Although the two had good relations with the West, Moi did not. However Moi, still had regional supremacy because of his long years as president in the region and the strength of Kenya's economy. Compared to Ethiopia and Uganda which were just coming out of war, Kenya had many years of stability which gave it advantage.

¹⁸⁴ Kamudhayi, O., *Negotiating in Civil Wars: A Case study of Somalia National Reconciliation Process 2002-2005*

Op cit., p.85

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p.84

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

Similarly, Kenya boasted of many years' experience of involvement with conflicts both within and beyond the region.¹⁸⁷ From Burundi to Sudan, Angola to Mozambique, Somalia to Uganda, Moi personally intervened to bring solutions to the conflicts raging in those countries. Moi had also initiated the process of "IGAD Revitalization" which changed the mandate of IGADD profoundly. The strongest motivation of revitalization of IGAD was the need to find regional strategies for the resolution of numerous inter- and intra-state conflicts.¹⁸⁸ He also used the IGAD process to make his country and himself internationally presentable after the withdrawal of IMF and World Bank.¹⁸⁹ Moi's pursuit of greater regional integration was meant to work against the alienation of his regime by its Western friends in the early 1990s. In his speech at the conclusion of the Djibouti hosted conference for Somalis in 1991, Moi stressed that resolution of the sub-regional conflicts should be sought within the confines of the IGADD and said:

"we expressed concern that the continuation of the present conflicts in our sub-region would lead to further loss of life and property and increase misery among our people, thereby retarding development...for the leaders and the Somali groups and movements assembled in this hall, the choice is very clear and simple: it is either peace or perpetuation of misery, confusion and anarchy... you can lay a firm foundation for... peace and tranquility in the sub-region, the Horn Of Africa... We underscored the urgent need to resolve these conflicts peacefully through our own efforts and to strengthen peace and cooperation among the states of the sub-region and prevent foreign interferences and all their negative consequences."¹⁹⁰

Apart from Moi's statesmanship ambitions, other related interests concerning security matters were of serious concern. With a proportion of Kenya's population being of Somali descent, Kenya was uncomfortable with any unfriendly governments in Somalia. The fear was that such a government could revive the irredentist jingoism of a Greater Somalia. Historically, Kenyan

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p.85

¹⁸⁸ Terlinden, U., IGAD-Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks (Berlin, February, 2004)

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Speech by H.E Former Kenyan President Daniel Moi at the Occasion of Somali National Reconciliation talks, Djibouti on 15th July, 1991.

fears, were informed with the 1996 *Shifto* wars. Apart from irredentism, a second security concern directly emanated from the turmoil in Somalia. Due to the huge refugees' influx and the proliferation of small arms into the country, there was indeed enough cause for worry.¹⁹¹ Somalia has been viewed as an exceptional case when dealing with external security problems in Kenya. This is because Somali does not have the diplomatic apparatus to deal with the insecurity issues like Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda which have well established diplomatic avenues that can be explored. Infarct Kenya suspects that the two terrorist attacks in the last six years in its soil were organized inside of Somalia, leading to the closure of its borders with Somalia several times in the last couple of years. After the September 11 US terrorist attacks the security threats from Somalia were heightened. The entry of Somalis into Kenyan soil was restricted while their passports became invalidated. Somali-inhabited estates were also raided and several arrests made. Kenya has thus been credited in its fight against terrorism in East Africa and has received some assistance to this end from the US government.

Other national interests like trade and employment for Kenyan citizens also informed the situation. Kenya has become the second home for the Somali nationals. Infarct one million Somali's speak Swahili and have attended both our secondary schools and universities and approximately 2400 Kenyan teachers work as expatriates in Somalia teaching in both their secondary schools and universities. In Eastleigh Garisa lodge area the Somali's are engaged in big business where they have constructed huge malls which are a source of revenue to the Kenya government through taxation.¹⁹² Most of the international organizations and UN agencies

¹⁹¹Kamudhayi, O., *Negotiating in Civil Wars: A Case study of Somalia National Reconciliation Process 2002-2005* Op cit., pp.60-61

¹⁹² Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somali Siyad Mohamud Shire and also a delegate member in the IGAD National Peace Talks (Interview held in Nairobi at the Somali Embassy, 16th August 2013)

operating in Somalia have their operational and logistical bases in Kenya since UNOSOM pulled out from Somalia in early 1995. These organizations are staffed with many of Kenyan expatriates. They rent premises and employ local Kenyan staff. The Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) which brings together international organizations, UN agencies and donors is based in Nairobi where most expatriates working in Somalia spend their time and aid resources. A number of Kenya-based flight companies are operating lucrative business in Somalia including ECHO and UNCAS flights which are used by humanitarian organizations in Somalia, and a large fleet of Kenya-owned light planes which transport Miraa, passengers and other commodities to and from Somalia. There are almost 12 daily flights to Somalia transporting Miraa (the mild narcotic leave) which is grown in the Meru province of Kenya. The revenue from this trade is estimated worth of 120 million US dollars a year.¹⁹³ When peace is achieved and a functional stable government is established Somalia is a potential destination for Kenya's work force in the reconstruction efforts of rebuilding the Somali nation. This great window of opportunity at Kenya's door step led the Kenyan government to provide four luxurious brand new Mercedes Benz one for the elect-president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahamed, and the other three for his escort including other head of state facilities. This was part of Kenya's campaign in aiding Somalia to find a lasting peace and also cement a strong bond with the new Head of state who is counted as an Ethiopian close ally.¹⁹⁴ The war with Eritrea and the meddling with Somalia internal affairs resulted in Ethiopia's deteriorating image with the west making Kenya a potential for becoming a de facto regional diplomatic leader and mediator of conflicts in the sub-region. Kenya's improved relation with the west has been evidenced after conducting a successful democratic transition added to its advantage in playing a prominent role in the IGAD sub-region. What is yet

¹⁹³ Farah, K.H., *Miraa Export to Somalia* (A Paper Presented to IDIS: Nairobi University July 2003)

¹⁹⁴ Daily Nation, 14th October 2004

to be seen however is the extent Kenya wishes to exploit these prevailing opportunities for its own advantage.

Fifth and sixth states are Sudan and Uganda. Each IGAD state has been part of the Somali conflict, although the above states have played passive roles. Uganda and Sudan do not share a border with Somalia but are concerned about terrorist attacks from Somalia. Uganda supplies AMISOM with troops mainly to safeguard its territory against terrorism. Sudan involvement in Somali is limited mainly due to its internal problems. However, Sudan supported Aided as a hero who overcome American Imperialism in the region. Sudan has been accused by the United States and United Nations for offering military and financial support to Gen-Aided during the confrontations between SNA and US-led forces in Somalia, at the expense of the international community. This was necessitated by its isolation by the United States and its neighbours leading Sudan to seek a closer relationship with Somali groups during the early 1990's. Sudan is the only IGAD state, which has had an embassy in Somalia since 1993. This has been necessitated by its adoption of a hands-off model from the Somali politics which has helped Sudan avoid conflicting diplomatically with Ethiopia. It however, supported the TNG Diplomatically within IGAD.¹⁹⁵ This can be attributed to the fact that both countries share religious and cultural connections, which create a basis for their interaction within the region. Sudan's internal problem has also limited its involvement in Somali's conflict despite a large number of Somali students moving to Sudan for higher education. This is evidenced by the continuous absenteeism of its foreign minister during IGAD's ministerial meetings which have occurred monthly in Nairobi since October 2003.

¹⁹⁵Mulegeta, K., *The Role of Regional and International organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD* Op cit., p.26

Uganda as the chair of IGAD has interests in the Somali peace process. Infact Uganda and Burundi have the largest contingents in AMISOM with the force commander coming from Uganda.¹⁹⁶ Following the IGAD Summit in Kampala in October 2003 and the failure of the frontline states to build trust within the Somali groups, Uganda sought to take over the mediation of the conference, which was resisted by Ethiopia and Kenya. In January 2004, the Ugandan president launched the Safari Park Consultation of the Somali leaders, which was successful- albeit temporarily. His role was strengthened by the belief that his role as a regional statesman would be strengthened by the exit of Moi. Kenya is the largest financial contributor of the member states to the IGAD fund for the Somali peace process, second being Uganda.¹⁹⁷ It is clear that the different objectives made by the multiparty intervention are more complex than anticipated. It is my view that motivation based on humanitarian and altruistic reasons does not stand on the basis that mediation involves risks and expending resources as shown in the above cases. This indicates that mediation by IGAD member states was driven by personal interests as opposed to the need to stabilize Somali. This explains the chaos in the mediation process and the need for management in the peace process.

Seventh are the Arab Countries. Somalia has been a member of the Arab league since 1974 and was an important player in the Arab world before losing its position due to its geopolitical position. As the only country without an effective government, it holds a special position in the Arab region. The Arab countries share cultural, political, commercial and religious ties with Somali, especially as it is 99% Islamic, the official religion in most Arab states. During the cold war, different Arab countries played different roles in the Somali conflict.

¹⁹⁶ Ford, G., *Somalia Recolonized -With African Help* (Black Agenda Report, 05.08.2012) www.blackagendareport.com Retrieved 30th August 2013.

¹⁹⁷ Farah, K.H., *The Impact of External Factors and Interests in the Somali processes (2000-2004)* Op cit., pp.122-123

In 1977, Egypt and Saudi Arabia worked with Siyad Barre in 1977 to chase away soviets from Somalia and steered him to the Western comp. The relationship between Somalia and Egypt dates back to 1979, in a time when Somali was among the few countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Egypt after its agreement with Israel. Additionally, Egypt together with Saudi Arabia sponsored Somali into the Arab league. The Arabs view Somali's stability as strategic in countering Ethiopia's regional influence. Somali is strategically placed; it is at the horn of Africa and at the mouth of Babel-Manded, the petroleum export shipping lanes, which play an important factor in the economic dynamics of the Arab league. Somali enjoyed economic relationships with the United Arab Emirates; it was one of its biggest trade partners.¹⁹⁸ Saudi Arabia was also a great economic partner. Somalia supplied Saudi Arabia with up to 90% percent of its meat imports up until 1999 when Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on imports from Somalia due to the alleged Rift Valley fever.¹⁹⁹ Arab countries have greater influence on Somali especially since it has no interest from the west. Arab countries offer scholarships for higher education to Somali students since the fall of the government, which reinforces cultural, and diplomatic relations between Somali and the Arab world. The Arab official policy is in favor of unitary Somali state. The Arabs interest in Somali stems from the fear that Ethiopia and Israel can easily influence an unstable Somalia Ethiopia and Israel, which will work against their interests. However, apart from Egypt and Libya, Arab countries are not properly equipped to deal with the micro-politics and sub-conflicts of Somalia, thus their focus is on the formation of a unitary government.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 123

¹⁹⁹ Integrated Regional Information Networks., *SOMALIA: Somaliland youth risk death in search of better life* www.irinnews.org/report/83694 Retrieved 17th July, 2013

The role of Arab states is not negligible. It is said the Al-Shabaab receive financial support from Qatar and Saudi Arabia and are one of the biggest troops that resist peace efforts in Somali, which undermines reconciliatory efforts by IGAD states. Egypt and Libya also face similar accusations. The Al-Shabaab also acts as a terrorism threat to security among the IGAD member states. IGAD also accuses Egypt of spoiling peace initiatives it endorses. The Arab states are notorious for providing financial and arms support to radical groups in the name of charity.²⁰⁰ The Arab League therefore has an important role to play in the Somali peace process. The best thing it could do for Somalia is to expedite all the support it has directly to the TNG.²⁰¹ The Arab region should also support the efforts of IGAD and the AU to strengthen Somali's government institutions and help it stand on its own feet. As long as it is weak and not standing on its own feet, it cannot be effective.

3.2.2 International Organization

In late 1991, amid increasing media coverage of the Somali war and famine, the outgoing UN Secretary- General Javier Perez de Cuellar decided to re-engage with the crisis. In January 1992 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 733 to impose an arms embargo on Somalia a full twelve months after the government of Siyad Barre had fallen. The UN then launched its first diplomatic initiative. Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, James Jonah, visited Somalia and persuaded Ali Mahdi and General Aideed to hold talks in New York under the auspices of the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The talks, which signaled the reengagement of the international community in Somalia, produced an agreement on a

²⁰⁰Mulegeta, K., *The Role of Regional and International organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD* Op cit., pp.39-40

²⁰¹Healy, S., *Regional Engagement in Somali* (An interview with H.E Mahboub M. Maalim. The Executive Secretary of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Accord Issue 21, 2004) p. 26

cessation of hostilities and paved the way for further UN resolutions on March 17 and April 24 that authorized the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in April 1992.²⁰² The mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), led by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Mohamed Sahnoun, was to maintain a ceasefire throughout the country, promote reconciliation and a political settlement and provide urgent humanitarian assistance. The Resolution also called upon the international community to support the implementation of a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. UNOSOM began its mission in Somalia in April 1992. Initially consisting of fifty unarmed ceasefire monitors, the operation's mandate was revised in August to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers and reinforced with a lightly armed force to protect aid deliveries. Sahnoun sought to mediate the conflict but was replaced by the Secretary-General in October 1992 after criticizing the UN for being slow and bureaucratic.²⁰³ The loss of this experienced and knowledgeable external diplomat came at a pivotal moment in Somalia, and constituted another missed opportunity, as Sahnoun might have been better placed to avoid some of the mistakes subsequently made by UN diplomats.

The UN operation (1993-1995), proposed by the Bush administration, was driven by a desire to build up the UN capacity to manage the emergencies. The operation aimed to establish corridors for the safe passage of humanitarian supplies to a population that was in dire need of food, medicines, and other basic supplies and services. The intervention soon encountered difficulties, as "Operation Restore Hope" quickly became embroiled in an armed conflict against one of the most dominant warlords, General Aideed. However, the UN "humanitarian intervention" (UNOSOM) failed to promote reconciliation and to rebuild a central

²⁰² Johnson, P (ed.), *A History of Mediation in Somali Since 1988* (Centre for Research and Dialogue, 2009) p.11

²⁰³ Ibid.

government.²⁰⁴ The UN's efforts were also complicated by competing goals within the troop-contributing countries and some regional countries, especially Ethiopia and Egypt, which sought to exert their influence on the crisis. In the aftermath of the UNOSOM withdrawal from Somalia in March 1995, the Secretary-General established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to help him advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the States and organizations concerned.²⁰⁵ The UN continued to engage indirectly, monitoring the situation and providing periodic reports for the Secretary General from a base in Nairobi. For the next five years, however, the diplomatic initiative was left to regional countries and the European Union.

3.2.3 Regional Organization

OAU was established on 25th may 1963 in Addis Ababa on signature of the OAU charter by representatives of 32 governments. A further 21 states have joined over the years with the 53rd member being South Africa in 1994.²⁰⁶ The transformation of the OAU to AU was made possible by the unanimous will of the member states and adopted by the 5th extraordinary OAU/AEC summit held in Sirte Libya from 1st-2nd March 2001.²⁰⁷ AU's engagement in search of peace in the Somali conflict was limited to observation and issuance of statement calling for peace in the war torn country. It observed most of the peace conference since 1993. After failure by UN and US troops to restore peace in Somali, the U.S. shifted its focus to African leaders and sought their help by engaging them in regional negotiations that focused on Somali from a regional perspective. The US was of the opinion that previous success by African leaders in

²⁰⁴ Tavalato, U., *Somali, Djibouti to Mbagathi: Making or Breaking Peace* (2004) p.4

²⁰⁵ Johnson, P (ed.), *A History of Mediation in Somali Since 1988* Op cit., p.13

²⁰⁶ African Union., *Transition from OAU to the African Union* (2002) www.au2002.gov.za/docs/.../oau_au.h

Retrieved 29.08.2013

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

different states would be beneficial in steering Somali towards a stable democracy under the rule of law. They also believed that cultural ties between Somali and other African states would work to avert the conflict. The US saw the inclusion of neighbouring countries as a cost effective move and an alternative that had more chance at being successful, in comparison to intervention by overseas forces. It offered to support efforts to resolve the conflict by African states. As Warren Christopher noted, "We are going to try to use the African leaders' assistance to provide an African solution to what is really an African problem."²⁰⁸ AU has thus been very instrumental in the Somali peace process that eventually led to the formation of the TNG and currently the federal state of Somalia. It was the AU that appointed IGAD sub-region to take the lead role in the mediation of the Somali peace process on its behalf.²⁰⁹ The AU lobbied for support from African states and the international community urging them to provide any necessary assistance towards reconciliatory efforts in Somali by the TNG.²¹⁰ During the AU council of ministers and its subsequent summit meetings held in Lusaka Zambia 5th-8th July, 2001 the AU hindered Ethiopian attempts to invite some of its allied faction leaders to its 74th session and reiterated its support to the TNG by condemning warlords who persistently sought to muffle any endeavours aimed at restoring the peace in Somalia.

It is evident that when international organizations like the UN or the super power US empower both regional organizations like AU and sub-regional organizations in our case IGAD with the needed resources and man power with a concerted view of helping the sub-region achieve lasting peace devoid of personal interests then this noble endeavour can be realized. This

²⁰⁸ Mwangi, M., *Conflict and Peace Management in the horn of Africa* (A Paper Presented at IRG Conference, Mombasa, Kenya Nov 6-9th, 1996) p.11

²⁰⁹ Pinfari, M., *Interregionalism and Multiparty Mediation: The Case of Arab Africa* (A Paper Presented at the XXV Convegno SIP Palermo, 8-10 September, 2011) p.13

²¹⁰ See CM/DEC. 14(LXXIV) Para 7&8

is because sub-regional organizations like IGAD understand the internal dynamics of conflict within the region while the international organization on the other hand has the need resources to achieve the needed result.

3.4 Interests of Internal Actors

Somali has quite a number of internal actors whose influence and interests have affected the stability of the war torn nation. The study will however not analyze all the actors in the Somali conflict but some of the actors and their interests. The actors are as follows the clan based warring factions, warlords, regional administrations, Somali civil society, businessmen and the Islamist groups.

3.4.1 Major Somali Clans

Somalis as a people have been compacted into four plus point five major clans they are the Hawiye, Darood, Dir, Digre bifre, others who are the minority but not in number but a segregated view that has been upheld by the Somali people for centuries. Clan rivalry is almost finishing Somali of a very terrible disease. There difference should have been a mosaic that they should have taken advantage off but unfortunately due to economic and natural reasons the clans have become instruments of killing each other to access these resources. They have a saying, “if the sky falls on you your clan will save you, but if your clan falls on you nobody will save you.”²¹¹ The clan belief justified ones actions even if it means committing horrendous crimes in the world as long as it is done in the name of the clan, the clan would ultimately save this individual. Clan rivalry is therefore one of the key actors and factor in the Somali conflict.

²¹¹ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Ethiopia Feseha Shawell, Nairobi at the Ethiopian Embassy, 12th August 2013.

3.4.2 Warlords

Warlordism became famous after the demise of Barre's regime in 1991. After his ouster, opposing clans started fighting against each other in a struggle for dominance and survival. There was nationwide fighting and anarchy. The rise of warlords killed the national framework. The warlord employed guerilla tactics to take control of cities, harbors and airports, to expand their control over the people. They expanded personal fiefdoms, captured sections of the country for themselves and destroyed the infrastructure. Somali was in a dire state as it was in the midst of three years of drought, which had dried out the country and left the people with no food. This gave the warlords an advantage as their control over various regions in the country enabled them to frustrate the food aid programs by the UN. The warlords and their private militia continued to control the country frustrating any efforts to appease the country and build a national government until June 2006.²¹² Most warlords unfortunately have no political or national agenda. Their motives are usually material gain and dictatorial control of the country without any ideologies to benefit or grow the nation or the section under their control, unless it will elevate their power or financial status. Warlords use their fiefdoms to exploit resources and engage in unlawfulness such as drug trafficking, arms trading and in some cases terrorism. Clearly, warlordism is a successful business in Somalia and a source of income and employment. Warlords' armed militias are responsible for the death of thousands of innocent people, and warlords carry the primary responsibility for the agony of the people. Warlords are therefore important actors in the Somali conflict. You will find them from Somali to Ras-Kambodia north and south.

²¹² Emathe, F.E., *Somalia: IGAD's Attempt to Restore Somali's Transitional Federal Government* (MA Dissertation submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, California, 2006) pp.21-22

3.4.3 Regional Administrations

Regional administrations are in Somaliland and Puntland they include Awdal, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabele, Middle Shabele Banaadir, Hiiraan, Galguduud, Bari, Mudug, Sool, Nugaal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag administrations. These are key actors in the Somali conflict but overlapping with clans although none of these administrations would forthrightly admit it.²¹³ For example in Mogadishu the capital city of Somalia houses three regional administrations mainly the lower Jubba, middle Jubba and the Gedo region. The inhabitants of these regional institutions are the Hawiye clan. Economically kismayo located in the lower Jubba regional administration is the center of business activity of both local and export goods which has attracted a lot of numerous battles in the past in pursuit of its ultimate control because of the economic benefit that is derived from it. Other regional administrations however view the development of the capital city with contempt because one clan seems to benefit at the expense of other clans in other regional administrations.

3.4.4 Businessmen

There is also a small group of Isaaq businessmen in Somaliland. During 1990s they supported Somaliland President Egal, in exchange for their assistance; the President exempted them from having to pay seaport taxes. Now the alliance is completely shifted and the current government is raising seaport customs making Berbera a non-profitable area, creating tensions between the administration and the business elite.²¹⁴ At the moment the business community supports the Somali federal government simply because of the wish to have a secure business environment. A growing number of Somali entrepreneurs are concluding that their business

²¹³ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Ethiopia Feseha Shawell and also the Chairman heading the Ethiopian delegation in the IGAD National Peace Talks(Interview held in Nairobi at the Ethiopian Embassy, 12th August 2013).

²¹⁴ Little, P.D., *Somalia: economy without state* Op cit.

interests could benefit from the emergence of some recognized central authority, albeit one coexisting with rather than challenging the warlord based economy from which these merchants profit.²¹⁵ Another reason for their support is the fear of resurgence of warlordism in Somalia if the current government fails. The business community has been accused by critics for importing huge sums of fake bank notes that devalued the Somali shilling rate. This selfish move weakened greatly the purchasing power of the common man. It is a well-known fact that there is currently a strong business community in Somalia who will not submissively comply in any Somali policy now or even in the near future.

3.4.5 The Somali Civil Society

The Somali civic society is composed of NGOs, religious groups, and clan elders; according to Menkhaus “these disparate groups run the spectrum from progressive to traditional and as a result are not capable of much cooperation.”²¹⁶ The civil society is involved wherever there is a political gathering, political negotiation, hot issues or humanitarian issues that need to be addressed. They are also operating all over Somali and at one point when the government in Djibouti was formed the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) led by Addiqaasin Salad Hassan who was elected in Djibouti on 25th August 2000 was basically a government formed by the civil society. The civil society’s role therefore is not limited to political negotiation, or dealing with hot issue that may arise or even issues that are of humanitarian in nature but it goes as far as forming the government in the case of Somalia. Infarct every government attempt in Somalia since in 1997 beginning with H.E Husein Farrah Aidid, then H.E Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, then came H.E Adullahi Yusuf Ahmed, H.E Sharif Sheik Ahmed, and presently the current president

²¹⁵ Menkhaus, K and J. Prendergast., *Governance and Economic Survival in Post intervention Somali* (CSIS Africa Notes, No. 172 May 1995) pp.1-10

²¹⁶ Menkhaus, K., *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment* (Writenet Paper UNHCR August 2003)

H.E Hassan Sheik Mahmoud in all this regimes we see the high involvement of the civil society either as ministers, director generals or even in the formation the government in Arta between 1999-2000 as earlier mentioned.²¹⁷ You will also find the civil society's involvement in the political, economic and humanitarian sectors. The civil society has also been abused in Somali. Infarct anyone seeking a political role and cannot get it through the clan structure or otherwise uses the umbrella of the civil society for their personal political gains. A good example is the wife of the current prime minister and also the former foreign minister are members of the civil society or claiming to be so. It is therefore evident that the civil society plays a significant role in the politics of Somali.

3.4.6 Islamist Groups

Despite the fact that Somalia is the only country in the Horn of Africa in which the population is almost entirely Muslim, Somali has never been divided because of its religious division, like its neighbors, Ethiopia and Sudan, rather its conflict stems from clannism. Historically Somalia is based on clannism and not on religion, however currently various Islamist activisms (Sharia Courts, al-Ittihad cells) tend to be organized by clan and work within the parameters of clannism.²¹⁸ As a rule, radicalism Islam cover areas in which Somali's find themselves a minority in a non- Somali land: Kenya, Ethiopia, Europe, and North America as a consequence of Somali diaspora. For example it is not surprising that the Ogaden clan that lives in the border area of Kenya and Ethiopia is one of the most radical Islamic clan.²¹⁹ However,

²¹⁷ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Ethiopia Feseha Shawell and also the Chairman heading the Ethiopian delegation in the IGAD National Peace Talks(Interview held in Nairobi at the Ethiopian Embassy, 12th August 2013).

²¹⁸ Menkhaus, K., "Political Islam in Somalia," *Middle East Policy Journal*, Vol. 9 No 1(March 2002).

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Somali pastoral life infuses the culture with a strong preference for pragmatism over ideology, not so much as a matter of choice, but as a matter of survival.

Political Islam in Somalia began in the mid-1970 in an effort to overcome clannism. It was well accepted during the oppressive and violent Barre regime. The relations between Somalia and Saudi Arabia also saw more Somali youth moving to Saudi Arabia for higher education, which exposed them to radical Islamic cells that influenced their ideologies.²²⁰ The first strategy of Political Islam in Somalia was to control territories in order to start the development of a network throughout the country. They temporarily gained the seaports of Kismayo and Merka in 1991 and they administered the commercial crossroad town of Luuq in Gedo region. Wherever they went, they established Islamic law rather than customary clan law (xeer), the punishment included, amputation which was not allowed in the customary clan law, the women were forced to wear a veil, and the qaat was banned. Free education was provided in the Arabic language. On the contrary, Al-Ithad sought to work in the communities and establish links with key sectors such as businesses, local courts, and schools as opposed to embarking on a national political agenda, as they were of the opinion that the Somali people were not ready for Islamic rule, and they did not believe in the ideals of a national political system. However, most of the Sharia courts in the country are the result of a lack of government and the rule of law and are present even in areas where the Al-Ittihad (AIAI) has no control.²²¹ Al-Islah is another Islamist charity group that operates in the country with the dozens of other Islamic non-profit organizations. "The diverse strategies and dispositions of Al-Ittihad groups in Somalia mean that external observers must be extremely careful not to indulge in the simplifying but inaccurate

²²⁰ Tavolato, U., *Somali, Djibouti to Mbagathi: Making or Breaking Peace* Op cit., pp.8-9

²²¹ AMREF Annual Report of the Luuq District Health Programme, Nairobi, 1994

algorithm which runs something like this: Al-Islah = Al-Ittihad = Al-Qaeda.”²²² The current state of the country makes it hard to distinguish between groups driven by a political agenda that provide services needed by the people (Al-Islah) versus those who are interested in deeper Islamization in the interest of global and political agendas (Al-Ittihad).

Conclusion

IGAD is economically weak and does not possess the leverage to secure a settlement in any of the conflicts ranging in the sub-region. It lacks proper systems and means to reward or punish its member states. For example, in the Sudan civil war, IGAD lacks the ability to negotiate a peace deal over the warring parties and further lacks the means to monitor and enforce peace in case the two parties signed an agreement.²²³ It is also important to note that IGAD's independence and impartiality is limited as it is under the influence of international, regional and sub-regional organizations it is affiliated to or relies on, especially for financial and logistical support. For example, Kenya and Uganda are members of the East Africa Community (EAC) and the Commonwealth whereas Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are members of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).²²⁴ These sub-regions have their own policies that member states must observe, which in some cases may interfere with their peace efforts in Somalia. Often the policies of IGAD and these other organizations are incommensurable hence leading to external forces interference in matters of internal affairs in the Horn of Africa. A good example is Egypt's involvement in the Somali

²²² Menkhaus, K., "Political Islam in Somalia," *Middle East Policy Journal*, Vol. 9 No 1 (March 2002).

²²³ Lund, M. and W. Betts., "In Search of Sub-regionalism" in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P.V and De Veen, H.V. (eds), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, Op Cit., p.123 also quoted in Shirwa, H.F., *The Sub-Regional Management of An Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of the Djibouti Peace initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-Aug 2000)* (MA Dissertation Presented to University of Nairobi IDIS, 2001) p.96

²²⁴ Shirwa, H.F., *The Sub-Regional Management of An Internal Conflict in Africa: An Asnalysis of the Djibouti Peace initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-Aug 2000)* (MA Dissertation Presented to University of Nairobi IDIS, 2001) pp.96-97

conflict on the basis of Somalis membership of the League of Arab states and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is evident that IGAD member states prefer to dedicate their limited resources to undermine external interference in the conflict in self-interest as opposed to brokering a peace deal for the good of Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IGAD IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

4.0 Introduction

IGAD has enhanced its role by setting the agenda on peace support operations in Somalia. IGAD's institutional strength has often been sidelined in the light of the regions power politics. The role of IGAD's secretariat to develop an independent conflict management agenda will always be limited despite the obvious need for a better regional security framework. However, IGAD brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management that involves regional states and limits the involvement of external actors beyond the region. With regard to Somalia, the organization has played a pivotal role in directing African and wider International responses to conflict in the region.²²⁵ IGAD has made significant contribution to the peace process in the Horn of Africa. The organization has been faced with serious and enduring conflicts mainly the Sudan conflict and the Somalia conflict, which is the focus of our study. IGAD's role in conflict management stems from the fact that its member states are weak and often face similar challenges as the ones it is trying to resolve. This is a challenge it shares with other African inter-governmental bodies. The limitations in good governance, both by will and in practice further complicate IGAD's involvement. Sub-regional organizations such as IGAD face internal challenges in conflict management, resting their moral legitimacy for intervention on rather soft ground.²²⁶ In the case of Somalia, intervention by IGAD, which led to the successful establishment of a transitional government, has not quelled the Somali conflict. The conflict is

²²⁵ Healy, S., "Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: The Contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development," *International Affairs*, Volume 87, Issue 1, January 2011, pp.105-120

²²⁶ Shirwa, F.H., *The Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: Analysis of Djibouti Peace Initiative in Somali Conflict (May-Aug 2000)* (MA Dissertation Submitted to the University of Nairobi, 2001) p.42

continually fueled by personal interest of different actors in the Somali conflict. In the case of Sudan, the IGAD peace process lasted a decade. This is evidence on the numerous challenges sub-regional organizations face in conflict management. This chapter seeks to look at a critical analysis of IGAD's approach to Conflict management in the Horn of Africa. It will look at the two peace process initiatives participated and initiated by IGAD in the Somali conflict a tool of conflict management.

4.1 Peace Process Initiatives in the Somali Conflict

IGAD employs a Diplomatic approach in Conflict management, which involves mediation. IGAD's active role is seen in the mediation of both the Sudan and the Somali conflicts. In our case, IGAD mediation talks focused on the re-creation of a central government in Somalia, the lack of which has been perceived to impact negatively on regional as well as international security, through piracy, Jihadism and international migration. IGAD assumed that regional meditation would translate into overbearing force on the parties, which would help the peace process. Thus, it focused on ensuring that the warring parties remained at the mediation table, which is important for the peace process. Deng observes that IGAD possesses two elements of leverage in conflict management. First it has the potential to deliver on one side's possible agreement and secondly, the threat to end the mediation through withdrawal or by taking sides.²²⁷ The potential for coalition with the opposition can confer a certain degree of leverage, but its longevity is threatened by the changing intra-regional relations in IGAD, and is thus not reliable. This is one of the challenges to the ability of regional organizations to meet their objectives.

²²⁷ Deng, F., *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities*, Op cit.

4.1.1 Analysis of the 2000 Arta Peace Process

To fully appreciate the Mbagathi Peace Process, which was an IGAD led process we must first learn from previous peace processes which sought to resolve the Somali conflict. Moore argues that to deal effectively with conflicts, the intervener needs a conceptual road map or conflict map that details the conflict triggers, identify barriers to the peace process and outline methods to effectively manage or resolve the conflict. The mediator works with the disputants to test hypotheses about the sources of the conflict.²²⁸ The Somali conflict is all about political power and, thus there is need to employ a systematic approach to address the political power relations to ensure a positive outcome. To a certain extent, the Addis Ababa objectives, namely the quest to establish some form of a government system, influenced the Arta Peace Process.

The formation of a national government in Somali in the midst of the conflict does not guarantee that the government will survive or manage to resolve the conflict. It is important to note that the Arta peace process was an initiative of the President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelle. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that included Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda was the main underwriter of the process, though Ethiopia worked actively to undermine the outcome of the process due to the perception that Islamists dominated the outcomes.

The Arta Peace Process was later endorsed by the EU, the UN, the US, Egypt, Italy and Libya. The international actors intervened as they expected that the process would result in the establishment of a national government.²²⁹ IGAD took a hands free approach on the Arta Peace Process but gave its blessings to the Djiboutian initiative. Unfortunately, the initiatives success

²²⁸ Moore, C.W., *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (3rd edition)* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003) p. 61

²²⁹ Moller, B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors* Op cit.

was limited as it did not involve all the actors in Somali conflict, namely all IGAD states. The involvement of all the countries is easy as all the internal factors in the conflict are related to each country. For example, if you want to bring some warlords you will have to work with Ethiopia, if you want to bring some warlords and the business community you will have to work with both Kenya and Djibouti. If by whatever reason the three key IGAD state external actors mainly Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti who are on the forefront in the Somali conflict refuse to work together no positive result can be forthcoming.²³⁰ The lack of involvement of all IGAD states led to the non-inclusivity of internal actors making the process incomplete hence its downfall.

The top-down approach of the Arta Peace Process has not resonated well with the Somalis since its inception. The top-down approach was opposed by some international actors, and even led to the suspension of Mohamed Sahnoun as the UN special representative for Somali, after he criticized the UN for solely focusing on the top-down approach. Adam points out that Mohamed Sahnoun had begun to win Somali cooperation by advocating for a gradual approach that would have worked to integrate the Somali traditional conflict management mechanisms.²³¹ Somali's historical culture of a decentralized government based on power sharing among clans greatly challenged the top-down process adopted by the Arta process and was one of the reasons why the process was unsuccessful. To some extent, the clan system is an example of an autonomous and cohesive system of government worth revisiting when dealing with government building processes. A positive aspect of the Arta process however was the inclusion of about 2000 delegates representing a wide spectrum of interests, varying from

²³⁰ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Ethiopia Feseha Shawell and also the Chairman heading the Ethiopian delegation in the IGAD National Peace Talks (Interview held in Nairobi at the Ethiopian Embassy, 12th August 2013).

²³¹ Adam, H., *From Tyranny to Anarchy* (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 2003) p.24

warlords, to clan and religious leaders. The delegates were encouraged into creating the basic blocks of a system of government that would cater for the interest of all parties. Consequently, the delegates allocated 44 seats to the main clans (the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirifle and Dir Clans).²³² However, the Hawiye military faction and the Islamic leaders were against the creation of Transitional National Assembly with equal clan representation as they had superior military capability compared to other clans. The establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) with Abdulqasim Salat Hassan (Hawiye) as president was perhaps another compromise to manage and appease the Hawiye opposition to the process outcomes.

The Arta peace process was also challenged by the fact that a majority of the representatives were self-appointed, thus they did not represent national interests rather their presence was for selfish reasons.²³³ The delegates had a role to play in the management of the conflict, which does not necessarily mean that such a role can be transformed into the formation of a representative government. Unfortunately, the Arta Peace Process elevated the interests of individual groups as opposed to working on a nationalistic agenda to restore stability in the country.

The Arta Peace Process operated on the assumption that appointing Habr Gidir as President of the Transitional Government was a step in the right direction as he was someone who could lead and control his fractious clansmen in Mogadishu. This assumption however ignored the political background of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan; in addition, 60% of the 245 members came from Siad Barre's carefully selected parliament.²³⁴ Consequently, the TNG and TNA were opposed by both the Mogadishu citizens and the warlords. In reality, the TNG only

²³² Adar, K.G., 'Somalia: Reconstruction of a Collapsed State' *Conflict Trends*, No.2 (2001)12-21:13

²³³ Lewis, I.M., *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2008) p.81

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.82

had control of a few streets in Mogadishu, while the greater part of the country was divided among the dominant warlords, such as Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Hussein Aidid and Mohammed Dhere.²³⁵ The failure of the Arta peace process can be attributed to the fact that the process did not focus on conflict management and refused to create a mechanism to ensure that the underlying causes of the conflict were addressed in a systematic and coherent manner. Their primary focus was the creation of a national government, which refused to address the conflict directly and work on restoring peace. The conceptual framework for creating a government before making peace has since become a defining feature in the management of the Somali conflict despite its shortcomings.

Spoilers and external interests are also to blame for the collapse of the agreement. The Mogadishu warlords have been the most active military force involved in sabotaging the agreement as they stand to lose their economic stranglehold on the country, which is their source of revenue as they racketeered and diverted food aid, exported scrap metal, and sold guns, particularly small arms to illicit traders in the region. They illegally acquired wealth and unlawfully dominated the country's politics. Additionally, the Ethiopian government outright opposition for the TNG encouraged those opposed to Arta process and strengthened their resistance.²³⁶ Although Ethiopia has some legitimate concerns regarding irredentists previously sponsored by the Siad Barre regime, Ethiopia has consistently worked against the efforts to build peace. Keeping Somalia in a perpetual state of anarchy and lawlessness allows the Ethiopian government to intervene without regard to the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

²³⁵ Makhubela, L.M., *Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning From Failed Mediation Processes* (MA. Dissertation University of Pretoria, 2010) pp. 78-79

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.80

Ethiopia's preference for a weaker Somali can be justified if one considers that the Somalis' claim to the Ogaden have never been abandoned.²³⁷ However, Addis Ababa's preference of a weaker dependent Somali especially if one considers that a stable Somalia with the capacity to manage its internal affairs may be the most preferred benefit for both Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region as a whole in the long term.

Another issue is that the mediator of the Arta peace process and President of Djibouti were given more power than is necessary. For example the power to hand pick twenty members to the TNA without a clearly defined criterion agreed upon by all actors in the peace process. These powers compromised the objectivity of the mediation process. According to Moore, a mediator is a person who assists the principal parties to reach a mutual acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute voluntarily.²³⁸ The fact that the Arta peace process gave its mediators decision-making powers challenged their role in bringing the conflicting parties to agreeable conclusions towards resolving the conflict. The mediator became part of the problem by usurping some of the decision-making powers of the disputants. It is critically important that decision-making powers should rest with disputants because they are responsible for implementing the Arta Peace Agreement. The practice of handpicking some members of the TNA influenced the power structure of the assembly, particularly with regard to clan representation. The Arta Peace Process confirms that a solution imposed on the Somali conflict will not resolve the conflict. The Arta Peace Process assumed that the establishment of a national government would be a viable option in the management of the Somali conflict. However, this assumption is baseless and has since shifted the focus of the peace process from conflict management to state

²³⁷ Moller, B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors* (DIIS Report Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009) p.20

²³⁸ Moore, C.W., *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (3rd edition) Op cit., p.8

building.²³⁹ The Arta Peace Process and the Addis Ababa Peace Process made similar mistakes by equating the concept of state-building with peace-building. The Arta Peace Process, like the Addis Ababa Peace Process, was not successful in persuading disputants to develop concrete measures to manage the conflict, though it agreed on the ceasefire agreement, which cannot be successful without clearly defined implementation mechanisms involving major actors in the conflict.²⁴⁰ In fact, the state-building approach limited the Arta process from developing concrete conflict management structures that would work towards restoring peace. Ironically, the Mbagathi Peace Process was also based on the similar conjecture that building a Somali state institution would translate into peace-making.

4.1.2 Analysis of the 2004 Mbagathi Peace Process

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya was the fourteenth attempt at reviving the Somali state. The conference was initially conceived as complementary to Arta Peace Process but it later took its own shape as the new reconciliation conference. The duration of the conference was envisaged to be two weeks but eventually turned out to be two years.²⁴¹ In confirmation with the 9th IGAD summit in January 2002 which mandated three frontline states Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti to jointly coordinate their efforts in the mediation of the Somali groups, Kenya hosted the 14th conference which began on the 15th October 2002 under the auspices of IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), in Eldoret (Kenya)²⁴² with the “Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process.” Besides the cease fire it also entailed agreements on the basis

²³⁹ Moller, B., *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors* Op cit.

²⁴⁰ Moravcsik, A., *New Liberalism Chapter 13* by C. Reus-Smith and D. Snidal in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 249

²⁴¹ Report of the Technical Committee on the National Reconciliation Conference 3rd -5th April, 2002.

²⁴² Ibid.

of a new federal constitution entailing considerable devolution of power, inclusive and representative of both local and regional political structures and an invitation to the international community to monitor the process.²⁴³ One notable exception however in the Eldoret conference was “Somaliland,” which refused to participate in the peace process.²⁴⁴ It’s unfortunate that even after the signing on the 27th October 2002 of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and Structures and Principles of the Somali national reconciliation process inter and intra-clan fighting within Somalia continued to break out in a number of places.

The Declaration of Hostilities was accompanied with the arms embargo “which established an embargo on all delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.”²⁴⁵ Despite the promising start the Resolution adopted by the Security Council of United Nations at its 4737th meeting on 8 April 2003 claimed:

“Noting with regret that the arms has been continuously violated since 1992, including since the signing of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process (Eldoret Declaration) in October 2002, and expressing concern over the illegal activities linked to the financing of arms purchases and military activities by the violators of the arms embargo in Somalia.”

However, both the embargo and the ceasefire, have been violated by members thus the peace process has been marred by accusation and posturing as opposed to a genuine search for a resolution to the conflict.²⁴⁶ After the collapse of the TNG in the capital Mogadishu, the warlord took over threatening the national security of both Kenya and Ethiopia.²⁴⁷ Ethiopian sponsorship of the Somalia Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) has been matched by Djiboutian and Arab patronage of the TNG, both having violated the arms embargo.

²⁴³ Mover, B., *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiary: Role of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in ensuring Peace and Security in Africa* (DIIS Working Paper No.4)

²⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council., *Report of the Secretary –General on the situation in Somalia: Development inside Somalia S/2003/231*

²⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992.

²⁴⁶ Tavalato, U., *Somali, Djibouti to Mbagathi: Making or Breaking Peace* Op cit., p.11

²⁴⁷ Makhubela, L.M., *Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning From Failed Mediation Processes* Op cit., p.84

In mid-February 2003, as a cost saving measure, the peace process was relocated to Mbagathi, on the outskirts of Nairobi. By drafting papers on various aspects of reconciliation and state building, in order to present them to a final plenary session, the Mbagathi process completed the second phase of the peace process. The second phase produced the Declaration of Agreement on the 5th of July 2003 in which leaders agreed to a transitional parliament comprising 351 members apportioned by clan, as recommended during the Arta peace process (Djibouti 2000) formula. At the time Somali delegation agreed on the 4.5 formula in which the four major clan families (Dir, Darood, Hawiye, Digil-Rahanweyn) were to be represented in equal numbers, while the half were to represent the minority group.²⁴⁸ The Mbagathi process thus created a platform for the participation of the warlords in the negotiation process, which was a departure from the previous processes. The Mogadishu warlords, such as Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Hussein Aidid, Mohammed Dhere, Omar Finish and others, seized the opportunity to use the peace process as a vehicle for the promotion of their narrow political interests.²⁴⁹ Kenya and Ethiopia are key actors in all the peace processes in connection with the Somali conflict management as it is intertwined with their national interests especially security. However, their narrow-minded definition of national interests has become a hurdle to the management of the Somali conflict as it has often sidelined other national interests such as commercial and political issues. The key financial sponsors of the process include the European Union (EU) and the UN. Infact it is during this time that the UN appointed Winston Tubman as its very first special Envoy and head of the United Nations Political office for Somalia. The United States on the other hand was marginally involved in the peace process not as it is directly involved with issues of Al-Shabaab militant group on its top agenda.

²⁴⁸ Tavolato, U., *Somali, Djibouti to Mbagathi: Making or Breaking Peace* Op cit., p.11

²⁴⁹ Makhubela, L.M., *Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning From Failed Mediation Processes* Op cit., p.84

The Mbagathi process took place in a period of challenging international security threats, characterized by the post September 11th 2001 attacks in the US. The fact that Somalia is a Muslim state meant that the America government would have a strong interest in the direction of the peace process. This was attributed to the Bush Administration's fight over global terrorism. Like Afghanistan, the protracted failed state of Somali was viewed by the Bush Administration as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda inspired groups. The US policy exerted considerable pressure on the state-building approach to the Somali conflict management efforts.²⁵⁰ It is clear from the World Bank and UN strategy that a responsive and effective state is an essential prerequisite for development. In the case of Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enrichment and empowering those who control it; while exploiting and harassing the rest of the population.²⁵¹ As mentioned earlier, external mediation tends to focus on state-building and not on peace-building approaches, despite the fact that the average Somali needs would be met from a state of peace than a revived central government.

The 2004 IGAD sponsored Mbagathi Peace Process was founded on the basis that creating state institutions would transform the Somali conflict. Menkhaus asserts that the process that led to the formation of the TFG, had repeated earlier mistakes by unsuccessful processes that had devoted time and resources toward the Somali conflict. The most critical mistake was its focus on creating a government as opposed to insisting on reconciliation measures among the warring parties. The focus on state-building during the Mbagathi process was a strategic error in terms of mediation as the Somali conflict is not mainly about government formation as this

²⁵⁰Lewis, I.M., *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland* Op cit., p.91

²⁵¹ Menkhaus, K., *Warlord and Landlords: Non-State actors and humanitarian norms in Somalia* (Draft Paper Presented at the Curbing Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups Conference, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Canada 14th -15th November, 2003) p.19

mediation approach appeared to imply.²⁵² As mentioned earlier in this study, the process involved external stakeholder who were detached from the conflict to fully understand its undercurrents and the dire situation in Somalia. Therefore, no progress was made with regard to the renewed fighting inside Somalia that was exacerbated in fact, by the posturing during the Mbagathi peace process. Subsequently, the disputants resulted to violence in an attempt to settle their differences that became evident during the Mbagathi process. This state of affairs seems to have persisted for over a decade, as seen from the 1991 Djibouti Peace Accord (which is held responsible for sparking the highly destructive war in Mogadishu in the latter part of 1991 between the militias of General Aidid and Ali Mahdi) to the 2002 Kenya-mediated Peace Process sponsored by IGAD.

Importantly, the peace talks were strongly divided in terms of the pro-Ethiopia group led by Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed and the anti-Ethiopia Group of Eight led by Mohammed Qanyere Afrah (representing the Mogadishu warlords). The selected delegates at the Mbagathi Peace Process created the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the TFC, a legislative branch TFP and an executive branch, the TFG. The Ethiopians lobbied hard for Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed to become president of the TFG. However, it is important to note that IGAD acknowledged that Ethiopia's support was critical for the success of the Mbagathi process, thus IGAD paid attention to Ethiopia's interest with no regard for the interests of the disputing groups. When Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed was elected President of the TFG, his first act was to appoint a pro-Ethiopia Prime Minister, namely Mohammed Ali Ghedi (Abgal).²⁵³ Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was elected speaker of the transitional parliament in an attempt to strike a balance of power between the two factions in the TFG. The rationale for this was based on the perception that he was not

²⁵² Menkhaus, K., *Warlord and Landlords: Non-State actors and humanitarian norms in Somalia* Op cit., p.12

²⁵³ Adam, H., *From Tyranny to Anarchy* (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 2008) p.180

aligned to the pro-Ethiopia faction of the President and the Prime Minister. However, he did maintain some level of neutrality with regard to the two factions that emerged from the Mbagathi peace process.²⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the pro-Ethiopian group criticized him as being an Islamist on the basis of his proposal that the TFG start negotiations with the UIC. The Ethiopian government opposed vehemently the inclusion of the UIC, which led to the stigmatization of the speaker. The US and Ethiopian governments were of the opinion that the Somali Islamic Movement was under the rule of extremists who were harboring terrorists, which included the three suspects in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The Mbagathi constituted TFG was similar to the previous peace processes in that it focused on a government-building approach to the Somali conflict management process. Thus, the creation of the cabinet also ignored the peace-building process and took on a state-building approach, which ignored the importance of creating a climate conducive to free and fair political activities when the mandate of the transitional government ends. During the transitional phase, the cabinet was a bloated structure with ministries that were not relevant such as the creation of a ministry of tourism that defies all basic logic, bearing in mind that the country was at war with itself. The government-building approach could have been more effective had it concentrated on addressing the conflict by constituting a cabinet that would concentrate on conflict management strategies. The reality was that the Mbagathi process was a gathering of disputants who were still at war with each other for all practical purposes. However, the Mbagathi process failed to acknowledge that the conflict management process was not yet ripe to allow a fundamental shift

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

to initiate a successful government-building process.²⁵⁵ Since 1990 we are now moving into the twenty third year of the Somali conflict and by any international standard in any community or part of the world twenty three years in a conflict situation is not an easy thing yet the reality is that the situation is not ripe for resolution. There is without doubt a unique element in every conflict therefore it is important to identify the unique element in the Somali conflict. Everything in Somali as we have earlier discussed is tied within the framework of the clan and unless the entire clan leaders and a good majority of them say 99% agrees to any emerging issues and more so the issues tied to the Somalia conflict then nothing will go. Reality is that you cannot kill the whole clan structure with a population of not less than ten million people, while the resources available are unevenly distributed among the clans and the very fact that they have lacked visionary leadership since independence. A combination of all these factors could not bring a lasting solution in Somalia although the Somali conflict has survived now for twenty two years with the correct and right timing of intervention having passed a long time ago. Liberia and Burundi were failed states that rose from chaos to nationhood. Rwanda was the same but Somalia is very unique as it is probably the only country in the world, which has had a failed state for twenty two consecutive years. This is a unique scenario that baffles all logical and intellectual minds as to why twenty-two years later, even with a federal government in place Somalia is yet to achieve nationhood. These could be an area that intellectuals could consider researching on.

The evidence put forward by the study confirms this assumption that regional cooperation and coordination can bear positively on the Somali peace process. The Mbagathi peace process

²⁵⁵ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somali Siyad Mohamud Shire and also a delegate member in the IGAD National Peace Talks (Interview held in Nairobi at the Somali Embassy, 16th August 2013)

was successful because all key actors including all IGAD member states collectively managed the conflict. The consensus within the IGAD states resulted in the formation of the TNG and currently the federation of the republic of Somalia. Had there been no coordination and cooperation and especially among the frontline states mainly Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti this great achievement by IGAD sub-region would be but a piped dream.

The management of the Somali peace process has been marred with the lack of cohesion among the actors both internal and external. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken since 1991 most of which ended in failure. The failures are partly attributed to the lack of cohesion within the internal and external actors in the peace process. The Djiboutian initiative in 1991 had its backing from the United Nations, United States and Europe with an aim of reviving the collapsed Somali state as prompt as possible. Rifts between Italy, Djibouti and Egypt have become apparent due to their alignment with the moderate and civilian politicians with the intention of filling the power vacuum left in Somali while Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other hand support the armed movements with the aim of taking control of the country. The other issue of concern has been the attempt of Ethiopia and Egypt domineering over the Somali peace process. The most notable differences are concerning the Unitary State approach that eventually established the interim government and currently the federal Republic of Somalia versus the formation of two institutions mainly in Puntland and Somaliland championed by Ethiopia and the Arab countries respectively. Ethiopia's idea of coming up with polarized mini-administrations in Somali have been resisted by both Egypt and other Arab countries.

Another issue of concern has also been seen in the peace processes initiated and endorsed by IGAD sub-regional organization. The Arta peace process as earlier seen in the study was endorsed by IGAD although this peace initiative was singled handedly managed by Djibouti as

opposed to the Mbagathi peace process which was collectively managed by all IGAD member states. The failure of the Arta peace process is attributed to the sabotage by Ethiopia given the secessionary tendencies in Ethiopia, thus Ethiopia tended not to support a creation of a strong Somali state with greater influence in the Horn of Africa, and would rather opt for a weaker state, more potential for Ethiopian control and influence and with less threat from Zone V borders.²⁵⁶ The Mbagathi peace process in Kenya was also characterized by regional posturing for the first one and a half years hence affecting the IGAD mediation process by creating rifts within the Somali factionary leaders.²⁵⁷ It is thus clear that third parties always pose a constraint directly in the case of Ethiopia or indirectly in the case of the Arab countries on sub-regional organizations ability to carry out their mandate in conflict management.

Sub-regional organizations do not adequately promote the interests of its member states because each member state has its own selfish interest in mind but rather promotes the goals of the respective member states.²⁵⁸ Take for example in the case of Ethiopia that would rather have Somalia in a fallen weaker state than a strong and stable state with greater influence in the Horn of Africa because of the fear of secessionary tendencies it witnessed with Eritrea. Another example is Egypt who fears that any peaceful relationship between Ethiopia and the TFG will negatively affect its regional interests. Moreover, in the regional rivalry for influence, Egypt believes that Somalia is an integral part of the Arab world and should be inclined more to the broader Arab world than the larger African neighborhood. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Egypt will be careful not to let Ethiopia have an unchecked influence in Somalia because

²⁵⁶ Johnson, P., *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis* Op cit., p.12

²⁵⁷ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somali Siyad Mohamud Shire and also a delegate member in the IGAD National Peace Talks (Interview held in Nairobi at the Somali Embassy, 16th August 2013)

²⁵⁸ Archer, C., *International Organizations* (London: George Allen and Irvin, 1983) p.130

Egypt desires the greatest share of influence in Somalia's political evolution. This is precisely why Egypt has allied itself with anti-Ethiopian Somali forces.²⁵⁹ Thus sub-regional organizations serve the goals and not necessarily the interests of its member states. IGAD member states are independent, sovereign states and therefore limited in their ability to act across other state territories. It is therefore vital to put a system in place where member states can fulfill their desired goals through intergovernmental cooperative arrangements. Sub-regional organizations like IGAD can therefore fulfill this mandated by reflecting the values and goals of its member states and their aspirations and not necessarily their interests.

Conclusion

It is clear that with the establishment of the TNG and later the first permanent federal government in August 2013 Somali as a nation has experienced a period of intense reconstruction especially in the capital city of Mogadishu. This has not however altered the fact that some underlying key issues in conflict management like greed for political power, equitable distribution of land and natural resources, clan rivalry and poor governance and leadership styles are yet to be resolved.²⁶⁰ It is evident from the study that the creation of a government before resolving the conflict would not be enough in the restoration of peace and stability in the former war torn state. The logical approach to the Somali conflict management would be to deal with the reconciliation part of the process, with no particular regard to the truth as it could re-ignite the conflict. The Somali peace processes were not yet ripe for a reconciliation strategy; the most

²⁵⁹ Tadesse M., *Al-Itihadi; Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Meag Printing Press, 2002) p.174

²⁶⁰ Interview with the Deputy Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somali Siyad Mohamud Shire and also a delegate member in the IGAD National Peace Talks (Interview held in Nairobi at the Somali Embassy, 16th August 2013)

fundamental approach would have been to resolve the conflict first before embarking on any form of healing the scars of the past.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has shown that if lasting peace is to be assured in the new federal state of Somalia, then developing a local capacity free from clannist politics and basic institutions is fundamental. Strategic accessibility and the mobilization of both the localities and communities through the various sections of the Somali society like the elders, the youths and the women are crucial steps in attaining peace. Civic organizations, whose purpose would be to support the elected government, are also critical. Somalis should therefore insist on a government based upon democracy and accountability. Getting to this point will require Somalia to undergo a complete political evolution just like its neighbors.

The complexity of the Somalia conflict lies in the internal forces of clannism, wrong mediation strategies and other outside interferences. It has become clear that both IGAD and the international community in its entirety lacks concepts for state formation processes in states that have disintegrated for a long period of time. Unsettled key issues like self-determination, consolidation and integration of the existing local, regional entities as well as the shape and legitimacy of developing power and governmental structures are all too often thwarted with void concession overtones. Thus a proper functioning state is therefore a threat to those who are thriving under the prevailing conflict situation. Importantly, conflict managers have come to perceive Somalia through the lenses of counter-terrorism, counter-irredentism, state-building, and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them into almost any sequence or combination. You need to resolve the conflict in order to build a state as opposed to building a state in order to resolve the protracted conflict. The state-building approach to Iraq and Afghanistan provide lessons that can be applied to the Somali conflict

management processes. Learning from these two countries will ensure that conflict managers avoid the pitfalls of government-building as an instrument of conflict management in the protracted Somali conflict.

The complexity of the Somali conflict led to the involvement of more actors with divergent interests in their pursuit to resolve the conflict leading to the internationalization of the conflict as seen in the study. The challenge therefore is not just about the management of conflict, but also the management of peace which will have to take into account the interests of all the parties involved in the conflict.

Although Somalia still suffers, Somaliland illegitimate in the eyes of the world has emerged from the ashes with phoenix-like activity. Its rehabilitation efforts provide insights that the international aid community would do well to appreciate. Regional politics also need to be considered as a constraint and factor in peacekeeping effectiveness. Intra-state conflicts should not be just viewed as internal problem but be placed in regional context where politics, arms flow and collaborations undermine peace efforts. International players like UN should therefore input in sub-regional interventions in terms of logistics and training. Such a body will also legitimize operations, offer leverages and help to oversee or enforce peace agreements through local peace initiatives. Inputting in sub-regional interventions, ensuring equity and prudence in the distribution of resources while building on the traditional systems of conflict management in partnership with all the key stakeholders would limit the international community frustrating exercise that seem to thwart the whole peace process is the hope and challenge for the twenty first century.

The first recommendation is that lasting peace for Somalia can only come from the Somali people themselves, with the engagement of traditional and indigenous peace and reconciliation mechanisms that is devoid of international domination. The arms and weapons that Africans use to fight and kill themselves are manufactured outside Africa. Africa uses its scarce resources that should be channeled towards development to acquire arms that it uses to foster conflicts. Thus while it keeps getting underdeveloped and impoverished, it is creating wealth for the arms producing nations. Africa needs to find out whose interests the conflicts that it is embroiled in serves. The best approach towards a peaceful management of Somalia's conflict therefore remains a bottom -up approach with participation from the grassroots similar to the one adopted in the Boroma Peace Process where local clan elders were used to establish indigenous approaches to conflict management. Another good example of the bottom up approach is the traditional peace and reconciliation mechanism known as the 'Xeer' (customary law) which was used as a democratic tactic in Somalia to peacefully resolve disputes. With it, people were allowed to participate equally in the process of electing their leaders and establishing their administration. The Xeer is a precedent-based social code which is understood to apply to all Somalis and served as a necessary restraint and moderating guide in disagreements and feuds between individuals and groups. It emphasizes a decentralized political authority that is administered by political leaders. It is an institution to mediate political and social arrangements in contemporary Somalia in its anarchical state and situation of state collapse.²⁶¹ The Xeer system is dynamic as new xeer rules are developed to address unforeseen circumstances. So the system is constantly evolving. However, because of the anarchical state of affairs in Somalia it

²⁶¹Chinenye, P and Dave-Odigie., *Somalia Conflict: An African Indigenous Approach towards a Peaceful Resolution* (Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution Vol. 3(4), April 2011) p.65 also see Netabay N. *Bottom-Up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somalia Conflict* 2007
www.crinfor.beyondintractability.org/case__studies/bottom_up_approach.jsp Accessed on 25/7/2013

may be very difficult to use the Xeer mechanism. If warring parties can agree to a ceasefire first and foremost, then the Xeer can be resorted back to its original function. The Xeer system has been experimented on in Puntland and Somaliland breakaway regions of Somalia and has recorded tremendous success. The two regions succeeded in creating institutions led by a council of elders that have both mandates for and experience in conflict management and the continuous responsibilities of establishing peace. This will ensure physical security, development, restoration and protection of the environment, equitable distribution of resources and resolving both pastoral and other conflicts within the sub region.

Secondly the centrality of the clan structure as a critical political unit for conflict and stability is another area which requires further research in order to enable conflict managers to maximize such a structure to resolve the Somali conflict. IGAD used the clan structures to its benefit not for the benefit of the Somali people in the management of the Somali conflict. 44 seats were set up and allocated to the main clans (the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirifle and Dir Clans). Neither the Hawiye military faction nor the Islamic leaders were in favor of the equal balance of clan representation in the created Transitional National Assembly, mainly because they had superior military capability compared to other clans. The establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) with Abdulqasim Salat Hassan (Hawiye) as president was perhaps another compromise to manage and appease the Hawiye opposition to the process outcomes as seen in the study. The failure to utilize the clan structures in its totality with the aim of peace-building strategies, has led to partial success in the Somali conflict management process bearing in mind that the clan elders' decision-making role is a jealously guarded conferral aspect of the Somali society.

Thirdly more than ever, Somalia needs a president who is not inclined to use force but

one who is able to negotiate with other regions through fair play and mature politics. This time round, the leaders of the TFG would do well to avoid sticking to ethnic lines in terms of their elected leaders. There is no doubt that power and influence can be acquired and exercised for insidious purposes; this has been the norm in Somalia for several years. This norm has steeped Somalia in a morass of chaos and malfunction. The TFG leaders must therefore put their country first before thinking about their clans. Putting the country first will strengthen Somalia. This may not be achieved overnight, but it is an endeavor worth striving for and local politics would be paramount.

Fourthly the impact of the Somali conflict on the Horn of Africa is another area for further research. The research should focus on the proliferation of small arms in the region, the Pan-Somali irredentism ideology, and the influence of neighboring countries on the Somalia conflict. Furthermore, the research should seek to establish the gravity of the effect of the Somali conflict on the national security of neighboring countries, the Horn of Africa, and the East African region. In addition, the research may also establish if there is empirical evidence that the terrorist attacks in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia indeed have any links with the Somali conflict as is asserted by the US and Ethiopian governments.

Fifthly future mediation processes should also consider the neutrality of the mediator regarding the issues causing the conflict. The mediator should not impose a solution on the disputants, but should rather assist disputants to arrive at a solution acceptable to them and their constituencies. This approach will enable disputants to sell the deal to their constituencies and to implement it without any reservations. Unquestionably, a win-win approach will preserve the integrity of all negotiators.

Sixthly legal and institutional weakness, operational challenges and implementation

problems linked to insufficient human and financial support which IGAD relies fully from external actors has been a factor for consideration in the slow implementation of the Somali peace process. IGAD needs to come up with frameworks of raising support from its member states if it is going to be effective in conflict management in the Horn of Africa in the near future. A good example is the Boroma peace initiative which was sponsored financially and materially by the local population and the diaspora, thus ensuring local support for the conference outcome.

Seventhly as a phenomenon, warlordism bred not only mayhem and domestic terrorism, but international terrorist activities. Many experts believe that the plotters of the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were linked to an Al-Qaeda cell operating in Somalia. Moreover, the fact that an Al-Qaeda cell was able to perpetrate a major attack on an Israeli resort near Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002 illustrates the capacity of militants to freely operate within Somalia. It is also important to point out that this study did not conduct a detailed analysis of the sudden emergence of Al-Shabaab as a political force which should also be covered in future studies. Identifying the financial and political supporters of the Al-Shabaab can shed some light on the degree of sophistication of military capability of the organization, which is a matter of concern for conflict managers in the Somali conflict management processes.

Eighthly the IGAD states should stop competing amongst each other in terms of who should get the glory in the successful mediation process that ushers in a stable Somalia government. This regional competition prevents IGAD members from developing a coherent consolidated approach to conflict management issues. IGAD should always be ready to respond to conflict situations no matter how many conflicts there are since conflicts throughout the horn are shared by all states, similarly, peace and prosperity will be shared throughout the region.

Finally the study concludes that conflict is complex and appears to be impossible to resolve, yet recognizes that conflict may be resolved, provided external role-players do not impose a solution to disputants.

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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Date of Response:

This questionnaire is meant to help in collection of information on sub-regional organizations and conflict management in the Horn of Africa: IGAD in Somali 1990-2004. You are kindly requested to answer/fill the appropriate responses at the end of every question to the best of your knowledge and sincerity. Every information given will be handled with utmost confidentiality and will be used for academic purposed only. Please do NOT write your name.

1. Did you experience the Somali conflict in the year 1990-2004?

Yes []

No []

2. Were you a victim in anyway?

Yes []

No []

3. What would you consider to have been the main causes of the Somali conflict?

Greed for political power []

Land and distribution of natural resources []

Clan rivalry []

Poor governance and leadership styles []

Lack of conflict management strategies []

Any other Explain

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4. Name some of the key actors that were involved in the Somali conflict both internal and external?

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5. What interests did the above actors have in regard to the management of the Somali conflict?

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6. What position did you hold in the IGAD peace talks?

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7. How were agreements arrived at:

- a) Very easily. []
- b) Easily. []
- c) Fairly difficult. []

d) Very difficult. []

Give a brief explanation:

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8. What role has IGAD play to ensure the management of the Somali conflict since 1990-2004?

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9. What lessons can we learn from the following peace processes as led by IGAD sub-region?

A. Arta Peace Process

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B. Mbagathi Peace Process

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10. In your opinion did the peace processes above begin at the correct timing? Were the parties ready for mediation? Give a brief explanation.

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11. In your opinion has IGAD been successful in conflict management in the Horn of Africa?

- a) Not successful. []
- b) Less successful. []
- c) Satisfactorily successful. []
- d) Very successful. []

Briefly explain.

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