

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PUNISHMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

By

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
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ABSTRACT

Even beyond the intellectual level, the idea and feeling of freedom is inherent in the life of normal human beings. Man feels that he is in command of his choices and their realizations. But although the same person feels and is able to talk about free choices, more often than not, the content and limits of these choices are too vague almost to a point of being incomprehensible, hence the need of a clarification. But a clarification of the term free will or freedom of choice cannot be done sufficiently without at the same time considering the doctrine of determinism.

Accepting the premise that human beings are the result of their biological and environmental influences, we could still intelligently claim that they have (human beings) freedom of choice or as it were psychological freedom. Freedom of choice should not be construed to mean that 'free choices' are those actions that have no reasons as causes behind them (uncaused events). Thus, while free actions and unfree actions have to be seen within the general law of causation, still free actions are felt to be emanating within man's bio-psychical structure. And that man is aware of these free actions as his actions.

It is then within this freedom of choice that we tend to capture the concept of moral responsibility. The concept of moral responsibility in man forms our basis for judging human actions either as morally right or morally wrong. Consequently, morally right actions are praised while morally wrong actions are blamed. Praises are supposed to encourage morally right actions while blames are supposed to deter morally wrong actions. But in the process of judging human actions the society is faced with two basic problems. First, the distinction

between free actions (where man was aware of actions as his deliberations) and unfree actions is not always clear-cut. Second, even when it is known that the actions were free in the way defined, it would still be difficult to identify what type of blame is the most effective as a means of behaviour modification for the man whose actions we have disapproved. Thus, faced with the above uncertainties, punishment as a form of blame could only be justified if and only if it is the best means of behaviour modification in a particular occasion. On the same vein the aim of moral education in schools has to do with the enhancement of freedom of choice that is subsumed under the students' biological and environmental determinants. Equally important, moral education has to provide some form and socio-ethical directions to the students. These objectives could be accomplished, I hope, through understanding and discipline of the teachers and the students respectively.

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Members of my family have stoically tolerated my absence at the time of the preparation of this work. This unique quality they have shown is here noted with appreciation.

While the errors and what is claimed in the thesis is my sole responsibility, I cannot fail but to mention Joyce Mwangi (Nairobi) for her ability to discharge the dreary task of deciphering and typing my not too legible hand-written first draft. Barbara Shokal (Edmonton) has displayed an enviable mastery of her job as is evidenced by the workmanship that is part of the thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of the thesis whose title is 'Educational Implications of the Metaphysical Controversy between Free Will and Determinism: With a Special Reference to Punishment and Moral Education in Schools' is realized when in our experiences in decision-making we discover two opposing features. The first of the two features is the awareness of freedom: our ability to decide for ourselves and to deliberate about what to do. On the other hand, we discover that in many cases what we believed to be a free decision had been influenced by various types of determinism.

Thus, it is claimed that the two seemingly opposing positions form the basis of our morality and, to a large extent, our metaphysics. It is further claimed that if, on one hand, we are persuaded to taking the first position (our awareness of free will), then the concept of moral responsibility as is ordinarily understood, retains its meaning, hence the restoration of the concepts of discipline in general and punishment in particular. This is said to be true for discipline and punishment would only be meaningful if human beings were morally responsible for their actions. Alternatively, it is argued that if we took the second position (that human actions are determined), then the concept of moral responsibility would be radically affected, necessarily requiring that we consider the theory and practice of punishment anew.

In the light of the above claims and arguments, the thesis examines the premises that:

- (i) Man's behaviour is metaphysically determined;

- (ii) Man is a product of diverse influences: biological and social determinants;
- (iii) Whatever man chooses to do or not to do is still in the realm of social ideals he has internalized, even when the process seems to be personal;
- (iv) It is at the psychological level that man seems to be exercising free will, that is, free will in the sense that he has an awareness of his behaviour. In other words, the thesis examines the contention that metaphysical determinism (physical and psychological determinism) and the concept of moral responsibility are not incompatible. That metaphysical determinism rather than opposing free will, is in fact its basis.

Although the main content of the thesis is about free will and determinism, there are many types of the two concepts. The doctrine of free will includes among others, social freedom, metaphysical freedom, psychological freedom and theological freedom. Metaphysical determinism would include physical determinism, psychological determinism, ethical determinism, theological determinism and logical determinism. All these various types of free will and determinism are to be discussed for clarification purposes though the main emphasis is to be placed on social freedom, metaphysical freedom, psychological freedom, metaphysical determinism and ethical determinism with respect to the concept of moral responsibility. That done, the implications of the conclusion arrived at from the discussion of the above premises will be shown to be operative in social contexts when the practice of punishment and moral education is treated.

Therefore, the thesis is divided into five main chapters.

Chapter I, 'The Definition of the Free Will versus Determinism Debate'

is composed of two major sections. In the first section (1.10), different shades of meaning associated with free will are analyzed with the intention of clearing the air as regards what we are precisely going to treat. The second section, 'The problem in Perspective' (1.20), reviews some of the major arguments for and against free will and determinism respectively. Here, representative scholars such as C.A. Campbell, C.D. Broad, P. Edwards, J. Hospers, R.E. Hobart, R.L. Franklin and J.P. Sartre are individually discussed and their contribution to the effort of resolving the problem at hand is noted. In the light of the definition of terms and the brief review, the scope of the thesis is properly defined.

Chapter II, 'What is Man?: Some Theories on the Nature of Man', is composed of four major sections. The first section (2.10), is a brief scientific historical background which deals with the advancement of science as a discipline during the 17th Century. It stresses the major contributions of Galileo, Newton and Darwin in the improvement of scientific method with regard to a clearer understanding of the nature of man. In this same section, the theory of quantum mechanics and its contribution to our debate of free will and determinism is noted through the eyes of E. Nagel and I.G. Barbour. Section two (2.20) discusses the empirical dimensions of man, that is, what is known about man through the method of science. Thus, the biological and environmental determinants of man are discussed. Section three (2.30) discusses the presupposed basis of free will in man. Here, the discussion revolves on what is said to be the subjective dimension of man; what is commonly known as the self. Section four (2.40) attempts to reconcile the two dimensions of man: the objective and the subjective modes of man.

Chapter III, 'Moral Responsibility, Discipline and Punishment' is made up of four major sections. The first section (3.10) analyses the concept of responsibility with a special interest in moral responsibility. The second section (3.20) analyses the concept of discipline as a general method of conforming to rules. The third section (3.30) discusses the concept and the justifications of the practice of punishment as a particular method under discipline, of making one conform to rules. The fourth section (3.40) is the conclusion of the whole chapter.

Chapter IV, 'Moral Education and Discipline in School' is composed of three major sections. The first section (4.10) is a brief discussion of the concept of 'morality'. The second section is a discussion of the content and procedure of moral education in schools as presented by various contemporary educators. The third section is a conclusion of the major findings in the chapter.

Chapter IV: the last chapter, is both a recapitulation of the major findings of the thesis and the recommendations which deem useful in our educational system with regard to moral education and discipline.

Methodology

The thesis is basically a conceptual analysis of the problem of free will and determinism. This is prompted by the author's conviction that before we can successfully tackle the major problems pertaining to morality, legal rules and moral education, the inherent philosophical assumptions have to be understood, particularly at the policy-making level in our educational system.

CHAPTER I

1.00 The Definition of the Free Will Versus Determinism Debate

The problem of the thesis hinges on the classical doctrines 'free will' and 'determinism'. The problem has engaged many great minds but up to now, no conclusive answer seems to have been arrived at. Nevertheless, it is my contention that what has been said about human nature has a message for the educators. Before we define precisely the problem we wish to investigate, it is important to elucidate the two doctrines: 'free will' and 'determinism'. 'Free will' is a compound term of 'free' and 'will'. To have a better understanding of the compound term, we have to define what is meant by the terms 'free' and 'will'.

Freedom, a noun from the word 'free' is in a class of complex multi-functional terms. When the context of use is not indicated, the term becomes most ambiguous. Originally, freedom and liberty designated the status of a citizen, that is, one who was not a slave.¹ In a state, a citizen had among other things, political freedom whereas a slave had none.

It is observed that even with its different uses, the term 'freedom' usually entails a negative connotation, in other words, the main notion inherent in the term is an 'absence' of something. When someone says that 'he is free' it will ordinarily occur to our mind that he is missing a certain thing either formally or in actuality. However, we shall have very limited information if the person concerned does not tell us what

¹B. Gibbs, Freedom and Liberation. (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), pp. 10-11.

he is 'free from'. It is only when he has specified what he is free from that we can understand what he is missing, which he could attain when the 'absence' is absent.

A few scholars have noted that the term freedom is neutral as regards value.² On the other hand, in most of its uses, freedom is loaded with value so much that when someone claims that he is free from a certain disease, it will be taken to mean that he is free from a certain thing which he does not like, e.g., a disease. Again, if one says that he is free from 'want', we would understand that, 'want' to him is a constraint and what he might attain when the want is absent is something valuable. From the above examples, we gather that whenever we are using the phrase 'free from' we always have particular constraints in mind and also particular things we desire to achieve now that the constraint in question is absent. M. Cranston underscores the point well when he asserts that constraints in life are as various as the things that we would like to acquire. Hence, there are many types of freedom rather than just one.³ I. Berlin, when discussing liberty identified two senses of freedom: positive and negative freedom. Negative freedom is directed towards the absence of the constraint in question while positive freedom is directed towards what one wants to achieve when the constraint is not there.⁴ Berlin's dichotomization was probably prompted by the common uses of the phrases 'free from' and 'free to'. It can be

²L.A. Reid, Philosophy and Education. (London: Heinemann Educational Book Ltd., 1962).

³M. Cranston, Freedom: A New Analysis. (London: Longman's Green & Co. Ltd., 1967).

⁴I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 122-134.

easily realized that his dichotomy does not defy what we have already said about freedom as an absence. This is because the phrase 'free from' stresses the constraint present while 'free to' stresses the thing we want to achieve. In other words, the two phrases reveal the two elements in 'freedom' and could be viewed as two sides of the same coin.

In the above paragraphs, we have concentrated our efforts on the attributes inherent in the concept of freedom. It is imperative now to distinguish a few types of freedom which I concede have been referred to by both the proponents and the opponents of free will and determinism, respectively, in their attempts to resolve the traditional problem. The freedoms to be discussed here are: Social freedom, psychological freedom, theological freedom and metaphysical freedom.

(i) Social Freedom

This involves being free from certain constraints in order to achieve some of our desires. Most of these constraints and desires are social and vary from one society to another. It is, for example, common to hear people or governments talking of political freedom, economic freedom, freedom of worship and many others. By political freedom we usually refer to the freedom of citizens or associations with respect to governments. An association could claim to have political freedom if certain of its activities are not interfered with by the government. A citizen in a state could say he has political freedom meaning that he can exercise his influence on the government by the act of voting.

Again, a country could claim to have acquired political freedom if another country which used to govern it ceases to have any political control. It is a historical fact that most of the so-called third world countries have been politically and economically controlled by foreign

governments. Today, most of the third world countries are politically free though it would take them time to be economically free from the foreign domination. However, some of these social freedoms may mean different things to different people even when the same terms are used. To exemplify the point, economic freedom may have different meanings when used in an actual social context. Quite often we hear pronouncements to the effect that the new independent states (politically independent) take a long time before they achieve economic freedom. What it really means is that even after gaining political freedom, new states have their economies dominated by foreign companies mostly from the so-called developed countries.

Furthermore, trading companies might claim to have economic freedom when they want to indicate that they are free to operate without the interference from the government. This is perhaps the meaning conveyed by the economic freedom in countries that are said to be run by governments based on capitalistic ideologies. But in the so-labelled socialistic countries, the phrase "economic freedom" is likely to be interpreted as the absence of economic needs of an individual, one of them being poverty. Freedom of worship and freedom of expression, (included in social freedom) are among the human rights stipulated by the United Nations Organization. The two rights are supposed to enable an individual to express himself and worship without the interference of the government.

Thus, in all these different types of social freedom (both discussed and those not discussed above), we realise that, like any other freedom, the constraints and the desires in any particular case are quite explicit. Therefore, since man's needs are many and the constraints of varied types,

it is intelligible to say that one is politically free but not economically free. Related to the above freedom is what R.S. Peters likes to call formal and actual freedom.⁵ The idea Peters wants to bring to light is that sometimes one is considered free although he has no ability to utilize the particular freedom. One, for example, might be considered free to join any of the religious groups in a state but still joins none of them. In this example, the man is free but decides not to join any of the religious groups. A case to illustrate an instance where one has freedom which he may not have the ability to realise is in constitutions. In the United States of America, for example, any mature citizen is free to become the country's President, but only a few actually manage it. Actual freedom is achieved when one utilizes formal freedom. In our earlier example, one actualizes freedom of worship when he joins one of the religious groups of his choice.

(ii) Psychological Freedom:

This is centered in our consciousness. It may be understood as a feeling an individual has of acting freely when his achievements seem to correspond to his intentions or purposes. D. Bidney asserts that psychological freedom could be viewed both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, it involves a feeling of harmony with one's environment and an awareness of self-expression and self-determination in the achievement of one's goals. Objectively, it involves overt actions in the carrying out of a purpose and in the enjoyment of the product or consequences of one's activities. Psychological freedom could be exemplified by the feeling of a man waking up on a Sunday morning, he decides to go to

⁵R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), pp. 188-192.

church and he goes. We notice that all along, the man seems to experience no constraints in his decisions and the execution of his intentions.

(iii) Theological Freedom:

This type of freedom is what is mostly presupposed by the Christian theology when it tries to reconcile two beliefs that seem to be opposed to each other. The first belief is that men freely choose how to act; while the second is that God is Omniscient, and therefore knows in advance what every man will choose. To some theologians, theological freedom "...seems to involve the denial of God's omniscience and omnipotence or his justice. For, if men are truly free, then God cannot be justified in punishing or rewarding them for their deeds".⁶

(iv) Metaphysical Freedom:

It is due to lack of a better term that 'metaphysical freedom' is used here. This is the sort of freedom that is opposed to the principle of causality, that is, that every event has a cause. The proponents of this freedom claim that there are at least some events or actions which are uncaused. The claim is not that some events have causes which we are ignorant of, but that they have no causes at all. In most arguments for the metaphysical freedom, moral decisions are cited as the most important cases of uncaused or undetermined events in human beings. Outside human actions, metaphysical freedom is referred to as 'chance'. However, the term 'chance' has many uses. In his analysis of the term 'chance' in physics, Nagel identified five senses. For the first four

⁶Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. 9 (Chicago: William Benton Publisher, 1971).

senses of the term 'chance', Nagel asserts that they are not incompatible with the principle of Causality. This is because most of the time we use 'chance occurrence' to denote that we are ignorant of the determinant conditions of events. The last sense of change discussed by Nagel is what he refers to as 'absolute chance' or an uncaused event. This sense of 'chance' is incompatible with the principle of causality.⁷ So, metaphysical freedom is used here to portray total freedom or absolute chance events, both in the physical world or in man. But the question of whether there are uncaused events in the physical world or in man, is another issue.

Having analysed various types of freedom, it is important that the term 'will', which is the other component of the expression 'free will' be analysed. We are told that, in its widest sense, 'will' is synonymous with conation and conation is a voluntary activity. In a restricted sense, 'will' designates the sequences of mental acts eventuating in decision or choice between conflicting conative tendencies. In the scholastic sense 'will' is supposed to be one of the two rational faculties of a human soul. Only man as a rational animal, is said to possess 'will'. This human will is said to be free insofar as it determines itself towards the line of action it chooses. Though it is claimed that the objects of the will are presented by the intellect, the faculty (the intellect) does not determine 'will' which may still act against the intellect's judgment.⁸

⁷E. Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961), pp. 324-334.

⁸D.R. Dagobert (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy. (Ottawa, New Jersey, Little Field, Adams & Co., 1962).

From the above description of the term 'will', it is evident that different people use the term differently in order to suit their purpose. It is my contention that the proponents of the free will doctrine would be inclined to support the scholastic notion of 'will' which portrays an inner-most entity in a rational being, which is undetermined or uncaused. Finally, the description has indicated that 'will' is always used where human actions are being referred to. This is consonant with the problem of free will versus determinism in which, though 'chance' events in the physical world are involved, man's actions are central.

The doctrine of free will is always seen as opposed to the doctrine of determinism. As in freedom, there are many types of determinism. For our purpose, we shall identify the following: ethical determinism, logical determinism, theological determinism, physical determinism and psychological determinism.

(i) Ethical Determinism:

Here, it is claimed that man always will choose what he believes to be the best for himself. The supporters of this determinism, argue that even when man seems to be doing what appears to be contrary to his wishes, the end is always expected to be for the good. Unlike many types of determinism, which seem to debase man's freedom, ethical determinism appears to enhance it. In this sense, freedom, is seen as the determination of the will of man's actions or choices by what is assumed to be good. To have one's choices determined by what is bad is considered as being enslaved. Ethical determinism has many supporters. Thus, if correctly interpreted, Plato seems to be applying ethical determinism in his epistemological theory which is based on a metaphysical

good. For Plato, our knowing is determined by the good and at the same time, knowing is considered as a process which liberates us from our ignorance which prevents us from reaching the good.⁹ Again, discussing some types of freedom, L.A. Reid identifies a particular freedom which I think is compatible with ethical determinism as defined here. He asserts thus:

Freedom in this ... sense is not simply some measure of freedom from internal or external restraints, nor just the freedom of thinking and choosing and acting. It is a 'freedom' which is attained, when, being in some measure released from restraint, and having exercised one's freedom of thinking and choosing, one attains, or 'wins' or enters 'into' a state of 'freedom' which is achieved through voluntary acceptance of some kind of 'order' or 'law'.¹⁰

Speaking in the same vein as Reid, B. Gibbs says the following:-

The principle linking the various extensions of the original concept of freedom is the idea of power (not necessarily legal power) of circumventing obstacles (not necessarily legal obstacles) to the achievement of good. The highest, completest freedom is the power of avoiding the greatest evils and achieving the greatest goods.¹¹

From the above quotations, it is evident that the two authors consider ethical determinism as the highest freedom. Today, when educators are considering education as a liberating process, charged with the function of getting rid of our ignorance of what is good and what is bad, I think they have ethical determinism in the background as one of their bases. Man is educated, they would claim, so that he acquires a power

⁹F.M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato: Translations and Introduction Notes. (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 222.

¹⁰Reid, op cit., p. 125.

¹¹Gibbs, op cit., p. 7.

to choose what is right from what is wrong. Unfortunately, these same educators have not been able to overcome the problem about what is right and what is wrong.

(ii) Logical Determinism

This type of determinism is involved with logical arguments that are used in Logic. In the early development of Logic as a discipline, it occurred to certain thinkers that logical laws could reveal that the world is already ordered and cannot be changed, and subsequently, even man's will is determined. This kind of thinking was based on the supposition that every proposition whatsoever is either about the past, the present or the future concerning human actions. Even propositions that have never been asserted are necessarily true, according to this claim.

Aristotle is said to have dealt with logical determinism or what is sometimes known as fatalism when he considered the question whether every proposition asserting that a certain event occurred at a certain time was true, even before the event took place, and whether every false proposition asserting that a certain event occurred at a certain time, was false even before it failed to take place. Again, Diodorus Cronus is considered to have been the most polemical advocate of logical determinism. His fundamental principle was that, it always follows from the fact that something has happened, that it was going to happen before it happened. From this premise he argued that it is never within man's power to do anything except what he actually does.¹²

L. Wittgenstein's logical atomism in his Tractatus is a good

²³P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (New York: Collier MacMillan Publishers, Vol. 1 - 8, 1968).

representative of logical determinism in the contemporary western philosophy. In his 'picture - theory' idea, Wittgenstein claimed that a factual proposition gets its sense only because its words either themselves represent existing objects or are analysable into other words representing what exists. Thus, for him, propositions are pictures constructed by man according to and therefore reflecting the necessities which govern the structure of reality. This is to say that, even before a language exists, the reality is already there and cannot be changed by the propositions of a language. However, Wittgenstein changed this position in his Philosophical Investigations.¹³ F. Hegel and G.W.

Leibniz are among other contemporary Western philosophers whose metaphysical outlook places a lot of emphasis on logic. For instance, Hegel considers truth to be something that cannot be contradicted and he identifies this with unity. For all those who advocate logical determinism, there is a common belief that reality is necessarily unchangeable and all the rules of logic do is to reveal that reality. Hence, man's actions cannot change reality for they are themselves accommodated in that reality.

(iii) Theological Determinism:

This is the doctrine opposed to the theological freedom that we have already discussed. The theological determinism claims that if God determines what a man is going to do or choose, then God should not hold man responsible for the actions or choices he makes.

¹³ D. Pears, Wittgenstein. (London: Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1971).

(iv) Physical and Psychological Determinism:

These determinisms are both based on the principle of causality. Although the principle is an old one, it has been enhanced by the advancement of science, especially around the 17th Century. The principle of causality or the universal law of determinism as said earlier, stipulates that every event has a cause. Unlike what we called metaphysical freedom or chance occurrence in the physical world, physical and psychological determinism (which are normally subsumed under the general term 'Metaphysical determinism') opposes any uncaused or undetermined events, be they physical or human. It should be clear that psychological determinism is the principle that no human action is undetermined. Metaphysical determinism in general claims that we may be ignorant of the causes of some of the happenings we observe but that should not lead us to conclude that these happenings are uncaused.

We have clarified the doctrines of free will and determinism by way of an analysis of what they may both entail. To have a grasp of what the controversy between them is all about, we have to look into the concrete arguments for and against free will and determinism. We can only succeed in doing that, I hope, by citing works by scholars who have devoted some of their time in order to contribute to the debate. However, we can only cite a few scholars whose works are to be viewed as representative of many others who have attempted to resolve the problem.

1.10 The Problem in Perspective

C.A. Campbell and R.L. Franklin are among the staunch contemporary supporters of the doctrine of free will. While Campbell is an earlier philosopher, Franklin is a fairly recent one. It shall be realised

through their works that they attempt to resolve the problem of free will and determinism from the point of view of psychological freedom. Campbell has written three essays (1938, 1940 and 1951) which are directly connected with the problem of free will and determinism.¹⁴ In his first essay (1938) which we are going to treat more thoroughly, Campbell's aim is to establish that the doctrine of free will is a reality while that of determinism is false as far as human choices are concerned. The second and the third essays are attacks that Campbell levels against both the psychologists and the philosophers whose arguments tend towards the doctrine of determinism in human actions. Unlike Campbell, Broad attacks the problem from the point of view of the notion of obligability.¹⁵ Using the conceptual analysis of terms involved in obligability, C.D. Broad discounts the contention that we can ever have uncaused events either in the physical world or in human actions. It is my view that while Campbell and Broad are engaged in the same problem, each is taking a different aspect of it. Thus, while Broad is arguing against what we earlier defined as metaphysical freedom, P. Edwards¹⁶, unlike Broad, argues that all human actions are caused. He adds that his position does not invalidate the contention that human beings feel responsible for certain actions. More than being determinists like Broad, J. Hospers and R.E. Hobart represent a group of scholars who argue that the doctrine of free will is based on the doctrine of determinism. These groups of scholars, sometimes referred to as soft

¹⁴C.A. Campbell, In Defence of Free Will: With Other Philosophical Essays. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967).

¹⁵D R. Cheney (ed.), Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971).

¹⁶P. Edwards, Hard and soft determinism, in S. Hool (Ed.), Determinism and Freedom: In the age of Modern Science. (New York: New York University Press, 1958).

determinists, support metaphysical determinism although they do not oppose psychological freedom.¹⁷ Lastly, we shall look at Sartre and his notion of freedom.¹⁸ As shall be realised, the way he uses the term 'freedom' is radically different from the other scholars we have mentioned. Freedom, for Sartre, is the potential human possibilities that are present in every individual, that is, a human being has more than one alternative from which to choose from. Consequently, the world we know or have created is not the only possible world. For him, the world we have created is the world we desired to create.

In their discussion of the problem of free will and determinism as it affects human behavior, scholars often refer to the notion of 'self'. There is almost a common agreement that 'self' is the central element in human beings, which is supposed to control the decisions and choices; nevertheless, the scholars differ as to the origin of 'self'. There are those who argue that 'self' is an entity which is the essence of an individual and that this self is determined by neither heredity nor environment in a situation of decision-making. Reid¹⁹ is a representative of those who talk of self as undetermined by either heredity or environment. Reid identifies three personal selves. The first and the second selves are composed of the heredity and environment of an individual. These selves, he claims, could be subjected to empirical studies. The third personal self is regarded as the base of the other two selves mentioned. Concerning this third self, Reid goes on to say:

¹⁷Their support of metaphysical determinism does not envisage that they have conclusively proved its truth.

¹⁸J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1958).

¹⁹Reid, op cit.

This ... aspect [personal self] is in fact the pre-supposition of there being a structure and a history of personality at all even of there being anything properly called experience or knowledge. Knowledge, experience and their development have a temporal or 'process' aspect, but the process aspect pre-supposes an activity of something which is not itself activity and which may be called the 'self'. There must be a self which is distinguishable from its passing states and which can possess, own, apprehend, know these states, both as passing and in relationship.²⁰

Those who argue like Reid in the above passage, are essentially supporters of the doctrine of free will. Traditionally these supporters of free will are commonly known as libertarians. There are, on the other hand, those who consider self as the formed character of an individual. They insist that self is part and parcel of the past influences of an individual and is composed of hereditary and environmental influences. This group, as will be evident, supports determinism. Throughout the thesis, we shall adopt the term 'libertarianism' when referring to the doctrine of free will while its proponents are to be known as libertarians. 'Determinists' is the term to be used for those who support the doctrine of determinism as defined earlier. Thus, we are now ready to review individually, what each of the introduced scholars have to say on the problem.

1.11 C.A. Campbell

Professor Campbell's first essay entitled 'In Defence of Free Will' was an inaugural lecture delivered in 1938. According to him, the problem of free will appears urgent due to its connection with the concept of moral responsibility. He thus remarks:

²⁰ Reid, op.cit., p. 98.

Evidently, free will in some sense therefore is a pre-condition of moral responsibility. Without doubt, it is the realisation that any threat to freedom is thus a threat to moral responsibility - with all that that implies - combined with the knowledge that there are a variety of considerations, philosophic, scientific and theological, tending to place freedom in jeopardy, that gives to the problem of free will its perennial and universal appeal.²¹

Campbell discusses free will from the point of view of the experience of moral responsibility that is apparent in a situation of decision-making. He identifies two conditions which he considers crucial if we have to talk of moral responsibility for a certain act. The first condition is that the agent is the sole cause of the act while the second condition is that, there exists an option for the agent to exert his causality in any alternative way. In this case then, Campbell asserts that some human actions do fulfil the above two conditions. But how does Campbell confronts the counter-argument propounded by the determinists to the effect that human actions and decisions are determined by the past: heredity and environment?

Campbell readily admits that the agent is determined by heredity and environment but only up to a certain extent. He contents that, besides what is determined by the externalities, our practical judgments on persons presuppose throughout that there is something in conduct which is genuinely self-determined, that is, something which the agent causes unaffected. This feeling of freedom in decision-making situations is not something that could be proved empirically, but is only felt by the agent concerned. He further notes that the experience of this freedom is most evident in what he calls a situation of 'Moral temptation'. A

²¹Campbell, op.cit., p. 36.

situation of moral temptation, if we understand Campbell correctly is where the agent has two or more alternatives from which he has to take only one of them. The determinists would not disagree that we do experience a kind of freedom at the time of making a moral decision, but they would like to question whether this feeling of freedom is real or an illusion. To answer the determinists, Campbell asserts that:

...formed character prescribes the nature of the situation 'within' which the act of moral decision takes place. It does not in the least follow that it has any influence whatsoever in determining the act of the decision itself. The decision as to whether we shall exert effort or take the easy course of following the bent of our determining nature: take, that is to say the course which in virtue of the determining influence of our formed character as so far as formed, we feel to be in line of least resistance In other words the agent distinguishes sharply between the self which makes the decision, and the self which as formed character, determines not the decision but the situation within which the decision takes place.²²

From the above passage, the programme of decision-making in a situation of moral temptation is experienced by the agent as a genuine creative act by the self 'ad hoc' and this alone. If that kind of freedom we experience at the time of decision-making is not real, then the concept of moral responsibility is an illusion, Campbell argues. But we know that the concept of moral responsibility is not an illusion, therefore our experience is about real freedom. Campbell's argument seems to be that: the concept of moral responsibility is real. Moral responsibility entails metaphysical freedom. Therefore, metaphysical freedom (what we experience) is real. As it is, the argument is faulty for its truth would depend on the truth of the minor premise; that

²²Ibid., p. 43.

moral responsibility entails a metaphysical freedom. Campbell summarizes his essay by answering the objection put forward by determinists against the doctrine of free will. The objections are in form of the argument on predictability and the argument on unintelligibility.

On the argument on predictability, the determinists argue that if our behaviour is not influenced by our self as formed character, then it would be difficult to even roughly predict how an agent is likely to behave in a certain occasion. Campbell counter-argues that the agent does not have to will anything out of the blue. The self as formed character presents the range of possible limited choices from which the self in a situation of moral decision will act upon. Using the range of choices presented by the self as formed character, we are able to predict roughly how the agent is likely to behave, but we cannot succeed in determining the exact choice that he is going to take. Personally, I think it is safe to hold the doctrine of determinism without necessarily advocating complete predictability of events or actions.

On the argument of unintelligibility, determinists argue that libertarians are wrong when they say that a moral decision is a self's act and yet insist at the same time, that it is not influenced by any of the determinate features of the self's nature which constitutes its character. Campbell discounts the accusations by arguing that the determinists are confused in their analysis of the situation. Looking at the situation from the point of view of an outsider, Campbell contends, one would realise some determining influences but when the agent is engaged in a real situation of moral decision, he experiences freedom.

In his second essay (1940) entitled 'The Psychology of Effort of Will'²³ Campbell attacks those psychologists who oppose the doctrine of free will with their use of the motivational theory of behaviour. The psychologists criticised argued that we are always inclined towards what we desire most, and that the consciousness of effort of will is part and parcel of the character of the agent. This consciousness of will, they argue, comes about when the agent is confronted by competing desires. But Campbell wants to argue that we only experience, or are conscious of making an effort of will only when we choose a course that is contrary to the course towards which we feel that our desiring nature most strongly inclines us. In other words, we are conscious of effort of will when the self as formed character opposed the self, present at a moral decision-making situation. Although he does not disagree very much on what the psychologists are contending, he says that what they propose is just one of the methods of overcoming a moral temptation and his method (Campbell) is another.

Campbell's third essay reads, 'Is Free Will a Pseudo Problem?' (1951).²⁴ As already indicated in the title, this is an attack directed towards Professor Schlick and others who argue that the problem of free will and determinism is a pseudo one. Campbell insists that the problem is indeed real while he goes on to hold that determinism is a false doctrine as far as some human actions are concerned. He points out that the usual reason why it is held that moral freedom implies some breach of causal continuity is not a belief that causal laws 'impel' us as normative laws do according to Schlick, but simply the belief that the

²³ Ibid., pp. 56-76.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 17-34.

admission of unbroken causal continuity entails a further belief which is incompatible with the concept of moral responsibility. This is the admission that no man could have done otherwise than he did. Essentially, Shlick is arguing that the concept of moral responsibility does not entail natural but the prescriptive or normative laws. Unless an agent is affected by the natural Causal Laws when acting, then he is answerable to his acts. Campbell, on the other hand, concedes that over and above Schlick's condition for one to be held morally responsible, one should have been able to do otherwise than he did. He would like the phrase 'Could have done otherwise than he did' to be taken in its categorical sense, that is, an agent being what he was and being placed in the same circumstances could have done something other than he did.

In general, Campbell's three essays reviewed give the following message: First, the formed character of an agent is not involved in decision-making in a situation of moral temptation. Secondly, the effort of will, which is presented as a mysterious power can only be experienced by the agent but is not analysable objectively by an observer. Thirdly, to be held morally responsible for an action, the agent should have been able to do otherwise than he did and this should be taken unconditionally. Lastly, the exerting of the effort of will is not found in all human actions but only in a situation of 'moral temptation' (when one is making a moral decision). All in all, Campbell's remarks that the self as formed character is not involved in decision-making puts us in a very absurd position, for it is normally expected that, to be held responsible for an action, the act should have emanated within the agent. If we detected that the agent was not the cause of the act in question, then we would have held him responsible. Campbell,

as we noted, has tried to 'prove' the existence of a metaphysical freedom by using what we earlier defined as psychological freedom. I think even by trying to split the self into two: the self as formed character and the 'self as a mysterious power', Campbell does not so far succeed in resolving the problem of free will and determinism.

1.12 C.D. Broad

In his early essay 'Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism' (1934),²⁵ Broad starts with the analysis of the concept of obligability. When one has done action X instead of Y and it is said that he ought to have done Y instead of X, then we infer that 'ought' means that the action X could be substituted for action Y. But if, on the other hand, the person said that he could not help doing action X instead of action Y, then it would mean that the term 'ought' could not be applied. In a word, 'ought' and 'ought not' are only applicable to obligable actions. This then would lead us to suggest that obligable actions are those which either were done but could have been left undone or were left undone but could have been done. But if obligable actions are substitutable actions, then what is involved in the term 'substitutability?' Broad asks.

Broad notes that an action could either be voluntarily substitutable or involuntarily substitutable. A voluntary substitutable action is that which the agent either could have done what he did not do or could have left undone what was done. If the agent could not have helped what he did or what he left undone, then the action is not voluntarily

²⁵ Cheney, op. cit., p. 82-105.

substitutable. Broad concludes that for an action to be obligable it has to be voluntarily substitutable. He adds that human volitions are included in obligable actions. But are volitions substitutable? To show what it would mean for a volition to be substitutable, Broad cites the following example:

Suppose that, on certain occasion and in a certain situation, a certain agent willed a certain alternative with a certain degree of force and persistence. We may say that the volition was substitutable if the same agent on the same occasion and in the same circumstance could instead have willed a different alternative or could have willed the same alternative with a different degree of force and persistence.²⁶

Broad finds it difficult to admit that we could get volitions that were substitutable in the sense stipulated in the above quoted example. This he goes on to explain, is because we are aware that a man's, "... present ~~conative~~-emotional dispositions, and what we may call his power of intense and persistent willing are in part dependent on his earlier volitions."²⁷

What Broad is trying to put across, I suggest, is that man does not act haphazardly. Man's overt actions are caused from within. That specific actions entail specific causes. In other words, man is not an uncaused cause. Broad then concludes that there is only one sense of 'could' in which we could say that volitions are substitutable, in the sense that I could have willed otherwise than I did if on the previous occasions I had willed otherwise than I did. This sense of substitutability is itself analytic in that what is contained in the

²⁶ Ibid., p. 88.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 90.

predicate is already in the subject. Correctly understood, the statement does not give us any information as to how and why we make choices when confronted with alternatives. However, Broad wants to conclude that volitions cannot satisfy the condition of categorical substitutability.

In one sense he notes that 'ought' and 'ought not' are used for comparative purposes. In this sense, the use of the two terms could be extended to animals or even to inanimate objects, so that we could intelligibly say that a car ought to be able to get from Nairobi to Nakuru in less than three hours. What we would mean by this is that any car that took the journey in more than three hours would be a poor specimen of a car or that it would be in a bad state of repair. We are not to be understood to mean that this car, in its present state of repair, unconditionally would perform faster. In this case, we are comparing the performance of a certain car with the average achievement of cars in general. The 'ought' we are using here is what Broad terms as a 'comparative ought'. The second sense of 'ought' and 'ought not' is usually applied to human actions. The difference it makes with the first one is that a human being has the power of cognition in general and of reflective cognition in particular. This means that he can have an idea of an average or ideal man. He is able to compare his achievements with those of the average of ideal man, as conceived by him. Consequently, this man will persistently try to approximate himself with the ideal man he believes in. Broad observed that:

When we say a man ought not to cheat at car's we often mean to assert two things: (a) that the average decent man does not do this and that anyone who does this falls, in this respect below the average. And (b) that a man who does this either has a very low ideal of human nature

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or a very weak and unstable desire to approximate to the ideal which he has so that in this further respect, he falls below the average.²⁸

Broad concedes that neither of the judgments in the above imply that a particular person who cheated on a certain occasion could have avoided the action categorically or that the person could have willed more strongly and persistently to live up to the high ideal categorically. Hence, if the libertarians have in mind 'categorical substitutability' when they are saying that actions are obligable if only they are substitutable, then Broad finds their assertion an impossible one to retain. In other words, our volitions are always determined by various factors, contrary to the libertarian's contention. According to Broad, this is in line with the doctrine of determinism which requires that every event has a cause. He goes on to argue that during a volition, the putting forth of effort of a certain intensity in a certain direction, at a certain moment, is itself an event or a process however unique and peculiar it might be; hence, it is subject to all the conditions that apply to an event. Broad notes that libertarians would like to say that the putting forth of effort is an uncaused phenomenon. To labour the point even further, Broad asserts that when we say, for example, that Smith's action was guided by the Moral Law, what we really mean is that Smith's 'belief' that a certain alternative (choice) would be in accordance with the Moral Law and his 'desire' to do what is right, that is, follow the Moral Law were the causal factors which determined his 'putting forth of effort' on the side of the alternative.

Broad's arguments and the analysis of the concept of obligability are quite articulate. In my view, he has in his own way shown

beyond doubt that the doctrine of libertarianism is an impossible one. However, it should be realised at this juncture that Broad is opposing libertarianism using the principle of causality. In other words, he is saying that the dictum that 'every event has a cause' is equally applicable to volitions. From the above then, it is not difficult to observe that Broad is dealing with freedom and determinism at a metaphysical level (as metaphysical freedom and determinism defined earlier). Hard as he has tried, Broad does not seem to have resolved the classical problem by advocating determinism as the true doctrine. As shall be observed later, the principle of Causality, that every event is caused, is a difficult one to prove empirically. Finally, I feel that Broad is rather high-handed in his readiness to reduce a human being into a conglomeration of events. I contend that we would still require more knowledge especially on the working of our minds before we can be so sure that man is nothing but events.

1.13 P. Edwards²⁹

P. Edwards' essay is concerned with the quarrel between what are commonly referred to as 'soft' and 'hard' determinism. As can be inferred from the terms given, the two camps (soft and hard determinism) are under the wings of the doctrine of determinism in the metaphysical level. That is, both camps hold that all events including human actions have causes. In fact, the two camps only differ in their regard to the concept of moral responsibility. Edwards treats these two camps in their relation to moral responsibility. This is because it would be difficult to consider the concept of punishment without talking

²⁹ Hook, op.cit., pp. 117-125.

about moral responsibility, he argues.

Edwards' first task is to identify precisely the quarrel between 'soft' and 'hard' determinists which he thinks is not well spelt out. To do that, he uses what he calls 'Hume-Mill-Schlick Theory' to represent the views of the soft determinists in general. What is the contention of the 'soft' determinists? They argue that there is no contradiction between the doctrine of determinism and the assertion that human actions are sometimes free. This is due to the fact that when we call an action 'free' we do not necessarily mean that it was not caused. For them, a 'free' action entails the condition that we could make a moral judgment upon it. It means that the agent involved in the action was not compelled or constrained to perform it. But Edwards notes that sometimes people act in certain ways due to threats, drugs, hypnotic suggestions or even over-powering urges of kleptomaniacs. In such cases, the agent would not be said to be free. It is only when the agent is able to exercise his rational desires, with an unimpeded effort, choosing to act the way he wants, that a human being could be said to be free, though his acts are caused as much as acts that are not deemed free. How then do we distinguish between free and unfree actions when we hold that both are caused? The soft determinists are likely to answer that we do not distinguish the two types of actions by the absence or the presence of causes in them but by the 'kind' of causes that are present in the actions. The second premise endorsed by the soft determinists, Edwards contends, is that there is no anti-thesis between moral responsibility and determinism. When we say that a person is morally responsible, we presuppose that he was a free agent at the time of the

action (free in the sense just defined by the soft determinists). This does not in any way presuppose that the agent has a contra-casual freedom as the libertarians would have us believe. As indicated earlier, both soft and hard determinists admit that our choices and desires spring from our inherited tendencies and the environmental influences which we are subjected to at the beginning of our lives and which we had no hand in shaping. The bone of contention, between the two camps comes about when the soft determinists are willing to hold human beings responsible for some of their actions and choices while the hard determinists are urging that the concept of moral responsibility is non-functional.

Edwards goes on to discuss the problem-area between the two camps by citing the work of Professor Campbell; 'Is free will a Pseudo Problem?' (the essay was discussed earlier; 24). In that essay, Campbell states that there are two groups of people; the unreflective people and the reflective people. Each of the two groups required different criteria for judging one as either morally responsible or not as regards an action. The unreflective group of people (people who are not acquainted with theories of science, philosophy or religion) would hold a person morally responsible only if they were sure that he was not impeded when acting. For the unreflective group, the fact that the person acting did not cause his character, does not arise when they are making a moral judgment. On the other hand, the reflective people (those that are acquainted with theories of science, philosophy and religion) have another additional criterion besides that used by the unreflective people. This reflective group subjects an agent to a moral judgment only if he was able to do otherwise than

he did.

Campbell then concluded that the doctrine of determinism is compatible with judgments of moral responsibility in the unreflective group's sense but incompatible with judgments of moral responsibility in the reflective group's sense. Edwards agrees with the two senses of moral judgments but differs with him(Campbell) when he assigns the two senses to different people: the reflective and the unreflective. Edwards contends that it is when the agent is dominated by violent emotions, anger, indignation or hate, especially when the moral judgment to be made is *injurious* to him, that an agent is likely to employ the unreflective sense of moral responsibility. The same agent is likely to use the reflective sense of moral responsibility or moral judgments when judging the same situation calmly, and when the fact that the person to be subjected to the moral judgment did not shape his character is brought to attention. Edwards then gives two conditions for the proper use of moral responsibility. He points out that for any judgment to be considered moral it should be 'impersonal' and secondly, it should be a judgment which can be supported in a calm and reflective state of mind. Consequently, what Campbell calls the reflective sense of moral responsibility is the only one that qualifies as the proper use of the concept, Edwards claims.

Edwards' analysis of the difference between soft and hard determinists is good but not free from problems. The idea of holding an agent morally responsible only for actions which he did in a calm and reflective state of mind is helpful but difficult to apply to in borderline cases such as an action in post-hypnotic session or the behaviour of a kleptomaniac. With such cases one would always face

the dilemma of identifying what action is responsible and what is not.

1.14 J. Hospers

Hospers's essay entitled 'What Means this Freedom?'³⁰ draws its forceful argument from the Freudian psychology of unconscious motivation of our actions. Following this line of thought, Hospers contends that there are many actions for which human beings in general and law courts in particular, are inclined to hold the doer responsible, but which he (Hospers) thinks he (the doer) should not be held responsible. The agent may 'think' that he acted as he wanted, he may 'think' that he had control over his actions; or he may 'think' that he could have acted otherwise than he did but the fact remains that he is not free. Hospers is, however quick to point out that what he is saying should not be construed to mean that people should cease to be punished nor that blame and praise should cease to be operational. All that he wishes to do is to point out that frequently, persons we think responsible are not properly to be taken so; for we mistakenly think them so because we assume they are like those in whom no unconscious drive is present, and that their behaviour can be changed by reasoning, exhorting or threatening.

Hospers then wants to identify what criteria are commonly used to distinguish between those to be held morally responsible and those who are not. The next task is to analyse these criteria and see if they hold any water. The first criterion commonly given for one to be held morally responsible is the absence or the presence of pre-meditation in an action. Hospers cites an example of an agent present

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 126-144.

at the scene of an accident. Normally, the agent will act swiftly but his action would be considered moral though it is 'unthinking' as a knee-jerk. This, Hospers explains away by saying that it is as a result of past conviction and training which has become a habit. On the other hand, we could have premeditated processes which are not ready to subscribe to moral responsibility. Hospers gives an example of a thief who takes a long time reflecting on how to realise his plans successfully. Though the thief seems responsible at the time of planning what to do, it might as well be that the overwhelming impulse towards the thieving plans stems from an unusually humiliating ego-defeat in his early childhood. Essentially, Hospers is discounting the condition of premeditation as sufficient for holding an agent responsible for an action.

Can we then say that one should not be held morally responsible for his actions unless he could defend them rationally? Hospers gives two reasons why he thinks that the cited criterion is not good enough. First, those whom we consider to be good in giving reasons are to be favoured against those who are not good. Secondly, the giving of reasons could as well be a rationalization camouflaging unconscious motives of which the agent knows nothing about, for one's intelligence and reasoning power cannot escape unconscious motives.

Should we say that one is morally responsible for one's actions unless they are as a result of unconscious forces of which the agent knows nothing about, Hospers asks. This is a difficult criterion to sustain. If applied, many of the actions that we hold people responsible for would be falsified forthwith. We could also add that it is possible for human actions not to escape unconscious forces as part of

the conscious motives. This position would then force us to drop completely the concept and practice of moral responsibility. This would subsequently lead to subjectivism in morality.

Can we say then that an agent is morally responsible only if his actions are not compelled? Here we are faced with serious problems, Hospers argues. To start with, we are not sure what we mean by actions being compelled. We are aware of both psychological and physical compulsion. But while the physical compulsion is easier to explicate, the psychological one is rather difficult even to identify. This is because, when one talks of experiencing psychological compulsion, we can hardly ascertain what he is really feeling. Secondly, it would also be difficult to determine whether the agent is being compelled by conscious or unconscious psychological forces.

The last criterion discussed by Hospers is whether we should hold one responsible for an action by the measure or the degree to which that action could be modified by the use of reason. To illustrate what he means, Hospers gives an example of an agent who washes his hands from time to time, not on account of the hands being dirty. To make him stop the irrational behaviour of washing hands, the agent is presented with the up-to-date medical reasons as to why he should discontinue this habit of washing unless the hands are dirty. If the agent refuses to change this habit when we believe that we have presented him with the best reasons, then we should think the agent as not responsible for his behaviour, Hospers claims. From the above example, Hospers concludes that the last criterion is the best to apply when judging whether one is morally responsible or not. However, he is of the opinion that the criterion, good as it is, has to be

supplemented, probably with the other criteria discussed earlier on. It should nevertheless be mentioned that Hospers supports the criterion of the degree of modifiability of actions, basing his argument on neurotic cases. Normally, most of the neurotics seem to be immune of modifiability, that is, reason does not affect neurotic actions.

From the above discussion, Hospers tries to show why we are not to be held responsible for most of our actions. He argues that, the more thorough and detailed knowledge we have about the causal factors that leads an agent to behave the way he does, the more we tend to exempt him from moral responsibility. For example, it is common to hear that "She is nervous and jumpy, but do excuse her: she has a severe glandular disturbance."³¹

Hospers concludes his essay by asserting that we operate on two planes or levels. There is what he calls the upper level which is the level of action of behaviour. In this level, terms related to the concept of moral responsibility are properly applicable. It is at this level that we apply moral judgments to human actions. At this level, Hospers continues, all the distinctions made about compulsive and noncompulsive actions are valid. This is the more important level for practical reasons, since it is the one that deals with the behaviour-change phenomenon. The lower level, on the other hand, is the domain of desires and choices. At this level there is no urgency of action. It is at this level that we realise that we are not the characters that we have chosen to be. Consequently, it is at this level where moral discourse does not apply, Hospers argues. We are then warned not to confuse the two levels that we operate on at the time of judging

³¹ Ibid., p. 133.

other agents. But though the lower level is not directly affected when we are making moral judgments it is still important for the simple reason that we would avoid many unnecessary human miseries commonly afflicted to human beings when we are ignorant of the fact that they did not choose what they are.

Hospers' message in this essay, I would say, is that though our actions are determined by our past influences, we would still justify the concept of moral responsibility and even the institution of punishment (if punishment is an efficient method for changing behaviour), with some modifications here and there. Punishment should be a device for the changing of the behaviour of an agent so that he could elicit what the society considers to be right. Therefore, we can easily say that Hospers' concept of moral responsibility hinges on the notion of behaviour-change. This, I think is the best idea that Hospers has contributed in the essay so far. However, it should be noted that the notion 'responsible for' is bound to be interpreted differently. A more detailed analysis of the notion will be given in Chapter III.

1.15 R.E. Hobart

Hobart's essay, 'Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable Without It'³² supports those scholars who argue that the doctrine of free will and determinism are not incompatible. He goes on to say that in fact, free will is based on determinism. For him, the incompatibility between free will and determinism is based on a misapprehension. But Hobart is aware of some other scholars who

³²R.E. Hobart, 'Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable Without It', in B. Berofsky (ed.), Free Will and Determinism. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), pp. 63-95.

seem to be hammering the same point but who, however, would like some transformation to be effected on the two doctrines (free will and determinism) if they are to be seen as compatible. He has in mind scholars such as T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley who demand that a different metaphysics of ego (ego to be viewed as timeless) is to be instituted if the controversy is to be resolved. For Hobart, the terms 'free will' and 'determinism' should be understood as they are ordinarily used.

In our daily lives, Hobart notes, we experience some freedom especially when making decisions. This experience seems to be surer in us than any philosophical analysis of freedom when we consider ourselves as whole beings. It is only when we try to analyse what freedom that we experience entails that we realise that one of its important features is determinism. We are forced to examine the notion of free will, by what Hobart calls 'our analytical imagination'. This he explains as our hunger to conceive the 'ultimate', or that the 'inner most' liberty persuades us to carry out the analysis. What is needed to understand the compatibility of free will and determinism is not a reconciliation but a comprehension of the two seemingly opposing doctrines. To illustrate the point that free will involves determinism, Hobart cites many examples: If we think that an event was not caused or that we did not know its causal-factors, we normally do not make moral judgments upon it. In rational beings, it is only when we realise that an act emanated from the agent that we would hold him responsible for the particular act. But for events or actions where we do not conceive of determination, we also do not conceive of free will. Therefore, free will conceived as involving indeterminism

as the libertarians argue, is impossible, Hobart concludes.

The misapprehension of the doctrine of free will and the doctrine of determinism is brought about by the misuse of such terms as 'self' and 'character' Hobart claims. He goes on to argue that our stress on morality arises upon the realisation that we are different selves, thus, likely to elicit different behaviour-patterns. This is possible because we differ in our moral traits or character. But what is this character? He says that by character we mean "... the sum of man's tendencies to action, considered in their relative strength; that sum insofar as it bears upon morals."³³ But the libertarians argue that a free act is that act of the 'self' unaffected. Here, the self is construed as being the author of the physical acts while it is not in itself affected by physical situations (the libertarians go on to argue that the causing self is distinct from the character of the agent, that is, the agent as temperaments, wishes, habits and impulses). Hobart rightly argues that even if we had two selves in an agent, the self as our formed character and the self at the time of making a decision, it would be pointless to praise or blame an agent for acts which do not emanate from the 'self' as his character. When praising or blaming someone, Hobart avers, we are normally characterizing him in our mind with the appropriate feelings. We are assessing his actions (which spring from within him, from the self as his character) with the character that we would approve (Hobart seems to be an ethical relativist). From the above contention, Hobart asserts that the libertarians are wrong when they claim that an agent is composed of two selves, the 'self as character' and the 'self that

³³Ibid., p. 66.

wills'. If we detach the self that wills from the self as formed character (our tendencies and motives), what is left in an action would be neither praiseworthy nor blamable. According to Hobart then, the libertarians are confusing metaphysical freedom with what we defined as psychological freedom. While psychological freedom is possible with human actions, metaphysical freedom seems to be impossible, he says. So, the point of difference between Hobart and the libertarians is that while he accepts the possibility of psychological freedom in human actions, he is not prepared to equate it with contra-causal (metaphysical) freedom, a thing that the libertarians are persuading us to believe.

Consequently, while the libertarians consider contra-causal freedom as the basis of the concept of moral responsibility, Hobart does not see the necessity of it (contra-causal freedom). In fact, even if contra-causal freedom was possible Hobart contends, this in itself would not help the practice of moral judgments, rather, it would destroy it. Thus, free will should be understood to mean the consciousness an agent possesses in an acting situation. In that case, we should only be held morally responsible for an act if we were conscious of it. This is in a situation where we are able to say that we did it intentionally. My impression is that if Hobart is correctly interpreted, no agent should be blamed or praised for an action in the sense that he categorically could or could not have done otherwise than he did. Blame and praise should be viewed as educative devices. This is the conclusion that Schlick had arrived at. Hospers, whom we discussed earlier, seems to be towing the same line.

1.16 R.L. Franklin

Franklin views the problem of free will and determinism as involving two concepts of man. The problem concerns man and his relationship to the universe, he contends. For him, the doctrine of free will is real while that of determinism is a false one. Franklin first of all, observes that the many arguments advanced to show or prove that the doctrine of free will is a possibility are inadequate. This does not however, mean that the doctrine of free will is an illusion, he warns. To the best of his knowledge, the so-called common sense argument, is the most forceful if one were to hold the free will doctrine. The common sense argument is based on what we experience in our everyday life. But what is the position of the libertarian if it is precisely put? He suggests that:

The libertarian is convinced of what we may call a certain radical discontinuity between man and the world he lives in, such that the whole universe and even the man's character and brain do not determine that the choice shall be so rather than otherwise. He uses 'freedom' in an extended but intelligible sense to mark his conviction of the existence of the discontinuity which to him is central in his belief about man.³⁴

Franklin on his part, would like to assert that not in all situations that man experiences freedom of action. The situations in which he thinks man experiences genuine freedom are as follows:

- (i) At the point of a moral choice; that is, when a final decision has been reached, one feels that he was responsible of his choice.
- (ii) During a moral struggle that ensues at the moment of deliberation prior to a moral choice.

³⁴ R.L. Franklin, Freedom & Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), p. 36.

(iii) In cases of intense moral perplexity, when all the established guides or laws to conduct fails.

(iv) Finally, in cases in which Franklin refers to as novel or original.

From the cited examples, Franklin is convinced that indeterminism is manifest. Whenever such situations as above occur he adds, the agent is always attentive, for the mind must be active if we have to talk of one having choices.

The next task that Franklin wants to engage in is that of defining his notion of 'attention' and to have a phenomenological analysis of exactly where indeterminism is located in a human action.

Franklin identifies two realms or modes of existence in the human mind; the active and the passive modes. To illustrate this assertion, he gives an example of a person who is engaged in a process of decision-making on a certain thing (he terms this as the active realm). This person finds himself day-dreaming over something else (this he terms the passive realm of mind). The man realises that he is day-dreaming instead of being engaged in the process of the decision-making, and he turns his attention or he directs his attention back to what is happening to the man actively. Franklin argues that day-dreaming is what is happening to the man passively.

In directing attention back to the decision-making process, the man is engaged in a mental activity which is not itself a 'choice'. But from this mental activity of directing attention, which is a sub-class of the changes in our attention, there is yet another smaller sub-sub-class which seems to correspond strictly to the notion of choice. This arises from the moment the man consciously decides between pursuing or dwelling on this or that consideration. It is in

such situations that we are aware of trains of thought from which we choose just one. It is this 'selective directing of attention' that Franklin refers to as a 'choice' in the true sense' a choice which is undetermined by the self as formed character.

Franklin seems to be following Campbell's foot-steps in that he starts by analysing our psychological freedom but ends by affirming metaphysical freedom. Again, his categorisation of 'active' and 'passive' realms of mind is rather confusing if we fail to understand him clearly. I would personally be inclined to suggest that even when one is day-dreaming, the mind is still active although the agent's experience might be quite different from what he usually experiences when his mind is said to be 'active'. But of course, my position would be criticised as attempting to interpret Franklin out of context. This is because we can with justification, accept what he terms as 'active' and 'passive' realms of mind as long as we stick to the definitions he offers of them, which are psychological in context. Thus, in the end, Franklin fails to resolve the free will and determinism problem, though his contribution is commendable.

1.17 J.P. Sartre

As it has been indicated at the beginning, Sartre presents a definition of freedom which even the ordinary libertarians are not willing to endorse. While the libertarians concede that only some of the human actions, particularly those concerned with moral decision, are uncaused by our past influences, Sartre is advocating that all human actions are free, and that man cannot help being responsible for his actions. Perhaps it should be intimated at once that the ideas of freedom to be explored here are contained in a

book which was first published in French in 1943 and first translated into English language in 1957, under the title "Being and Nothingness."³⁵ That was some time ago and Sartre radically changed his position concerning some of the ideas before he died. It is now known that, probably unable to sustain his version of the existentialism philosophy, Sartre opted for marxism. Nevertheless, the way he has extended the notion of freedom is quite illuminating and reveals a new perspective from which we could view the problem of free will and determinism.

To understand Sartre's notion of freedom, it is imperative that we understand his ontology. In his ontology, Sartre avails himself of the phenomenological method invented by Edmund Husserl. He has identified three modes of being: the Being for itself, the Being-in-itself and the Being-for-others. The Being-for-itself, and the Being-in-itself are the most important modes of Being. We can even say that the whole book (Being and Nothingness) is about the connection between the two modes of being. The Being-for-itself is the becoming, it is the consciousness of something while the Being-in-itself is the nonconscious mode of being. This Being-for-itself which we could always refer to as consciousness is not a permanent entity but a project towards the non-conscious being or world. Sartre wants to imply that our consciousness is always a consciousness of something. This 'something' is always the object of the consciousness, but this object is other than consciousness which is the subject. Consciousness or the subject, knows the object but does not create it. This then means that the object transcends what the subject is

³⁵ Sartre, Being and Nothingness.

conscious of. According to Sartre then, the objects of consciousness are phenomenal in the sense that they appear to, or for consciousness. Consequently, we cannot properly inquire what lies 'behind' appearance of phenomenon. We can only investigate the being in appearance or phenomenon. But if we could strip away all the determinate characteristics and all those meanings which are due to human interpretations in the function of human purposes, we will be left with the Being-in-itself or the non-conscious being which is permanent and can only be said that it is.

The next task is for Sartre to explicate what he takes to be an action. He accuses some earlier scholars who he says started engaging themselves with the problem of free will without even trying to be explicit about what is pre-supposed in the notion 'action'. To act according to Sartre is to:

... modify the 'shape' of the world, it is to arrange means in view of an end. It is to produce an organized instrumental complex such that a series of concatenations and connection of the modifications affected on one of the links causes modifications throughout the whole series and finally produces an anticipated result.³⁶

But Sartre quickly warns that the above are not the most important notions of an 'action'. The most important notion is the notion of 'intention'. He goes on to argue that if one caused an event to occur without being aware of it, then that could not qualify to be an action. To call something an action would require that we connect the result to the intention, Sartre argues. But if intention is the fundamental notion in an action, what is the genesis of an action?

³⁶ Ibid., p. 433.

The genesis of an action is the recognition of the lack of a desideratum or something desirable not yet realised by the subject. From the moment of the conception of a need, the consciousness withdraws from itself in order to approach the non-being which is the object of desire. This withdrawal of the consciousness and the striving for the desired object is what is referred to as freedom of action. Hence, Sartre states that the above notion of an action displays the following consequences:

- (i) That no factual state whatever it may be (political and economic structure of society, or the psychological state, etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever; for an act is a projection of the Being-for-itself towards what is not.
- (ii) That no factual state can determine consciousness, to apprehend it as a negation or as a lack. According to Sartre, consciousness is to be seen as a permanent possibility wrenching itself away from its past in order to consider what it lacks.

After saying the above, how does Sartre approach the problem of free will and determinism?

Sartre agrees with the determinists when they say that every event has a cause but he challenges them to look beyond the causes; that is, look for the motives. For him the ultimate cause of an action is the end. As pointed earlier, the cause of an action is its intention. The consciousness is always trying to strive towards the values which it has already posited. These values Sartre contends, are symbols of what modes the consciousness or the conscious being would like to be. The wrenching of consciousness away from itself and the striving for the non-conscious being or the unrealised goals is (as said before) what Sartre would like to equate with 'freedom'.

Sartre is not unaware of the powerful arguments usually propounded by the determinists which claim that we are not able to modify ourselves for the simple reason that the past has already taken its toll, and that nothing else could rub that away; our hereditary and environmental influences. In reply to the determinists' arguments, Sartre counter-argues that our past influences do not even come into consideration when we are thinking of freedom (as advocated by Sartre). He supports himself by saying that the objects or things that appear to be a hindrance to our freedom have meaning only when they are viewed in their relation to the ends and means that we have as conscious beings. It is our freedom that first constitutes the framework or order, so that, before the illumination of these objects or facts in our consciousness, they remain neutral. They are neither helpful nor are they a hindrance to the process of making ourselves what we have chosen to be. Sartre is trying to point out that the universe as non-conscious of something, this consciousness of something ceases to be useful to consciousness or the conscious being unless, we see it in its relation to what we want to achieve. In a word, our consciousness is not interested in what we have already become but in what it is striving to be. To put it in another way, what the conscious being was and is (essence) is not in itself important. What is important is the process of becoming which Sartre identifies with 'Existence'.

Sartre is not yet through with the many problems that beset his notion of freedom. He recognizes that man as a conscious being is living among other conscious beings. The conscious being discovers that he is engaged in a complex of instruments which acquired their

meanings not from himself but from the other conscious beings. The problem is to explain how this conscious being is going to avoid taking these meanings which he himself has not provided. Sartre attempts an answer to the above question by summoning us to study some layers of reality which come into play so as to constitute a man's concrete situation. The layers suggested are as follows:

- (i) Instruments which are already meaningful (works of art, cinema, theatres, hospitals, roads, etc.).
- (ii) The meaning, which the conscious being discovers as already his (his nationality, his physical appearance, etc.).
- (iii) The other as a centre of reference to which the above meanings (i and ii) refer. Sartre then gives a long explanation of the way to overcome the problem of a conscious being having to be influenced by the choices of other conscious beings. His explanation boils down to the assertion that all the above layers of reality would have meaning only when they are 'known' by an individual conscious being, that is, when an individual conscious being is conscious of them (the suggested layers) in relation to its becoming. How then does Sartre relate his notion of freedom to the concept of moral responsibility?

As expected perhaps, Sartre argues that the conscious being is condemned to be free. Man is responsible for all his actions. He is responsible for the world he has created. He is responsible for what he is because that is what he wanted to become. Sartre warns that he is using the term responsibility in its ordinary sense of that incontestable author of an action or an event. He goes on to concede that it is pointless to complain of what one was becoming since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, what we live or even what we are. There are no 'accidents' in life, everything goes according to what we

have decided that it should go. To elucidate this point, Sartre cites an example of an event taking place in a certain community which suddenly involves a particular person to take part in it. Sartre argues that this particular person is free to take or not to take part in the event even when there appears to be threats (Sartre is thinking of war). How could this particular person refuse to take part in the event even under threats? He could do that by either absenting himself or by killing himself. These ultimate possibilities are always present in any situation. If the particular person takes part in the event, this could be because of inertia or cowardice in the face of public opinion or because he prefers certain other values more than the values related to the refusal of taking part in the event. Accordingly, any side the man takes is itself a choice. For a man to take the position that he cannot make up his mind over a certain issue, because he is determined, is what Sartre terms as "Bad Faith" which should not be encouraged by conscious beings. Hence, nothing else except death can terminate a conscious being's possibilities.

At the end of his philosophical statement, Sartre does not answer the problem of free will and determinism, although he has given a very good description of the subjective view of a conscious being. As Copleston³⁷ has said, one of the problems that Sartre confronts is that of explaining the origin of either consciousness or the non-conscious being after having declared that consciousness is a negation of being. Again Sartre's use of the terms 'free' or

³⁷ J.D. Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism. (London: Search Press Ltd., 1972).

'freedom' is so wide that their meaning tends to be evacuated. For if all human actions are to be called free without exception, it would be difficult to know what the term, 'free' adds to form what we ordinarily call 'free action'.

But perhaps the most unfortunate thing about Sartre's work is his unrestrained use of language. This fact alone makes it difficult for us to unearth what message he intends to deliver without at the same time misunderstanding him. For example, when he uses the term 'freedom' he tries to stress the notions of negation and lack. As pointed out earlier, Sartre asserts that a conscious being is always conscious of himself as being separate from other objects around him, including other conscious beings. At the same time, a conscious being is always lacking, that is, a conscious being is never complete. There is always room for a conscious being to be what he is not. These two notions that Sartre identifies with 'freedom' should not be equated with freedom as referred to by the libertarians. Sartre should be interpreted as always discussing 'freedom' at the level of psychological freedom, which I think even the determinists are bound to affirm. Thus, the most important difference to be noted between Sartre and the libertarians is that while the libertarians are deliberately trying to apply psychological freedom to 'prove' the reality of metaphysical or contracausal freedom, Sartre does not try to resolve the problem, not because it is difficult but simply because it is not there. Subsequently, our treatment of Sartre must be seen as an attempt to disentangle some of the various uses that the 'language of freedom' is involved in, but not as a treatment of a philosopher who seriously discusses the metaphysical problem of free

will and determinism. Finally, Sartre's effort in portraying values as the final end of conscious beings' actions is commendable and leads him to acknowledge what we have referred to as ethical determinism. But rather than strengthening Sartre's concept of freedom, this position weakens it for it means that man is determined by values. Of course Sartre would counter-argue that the values themselves originate in man. To break the apparent vicious circle, Sartre would have to show how these values come about.

1.20 Conclusion

In our short survey, we have gathered among other things, that (i) libertarians believe in contra-causal freedom if the concept of moral responsibility is to be sustained, (ii) the determinists believe that every event is caused, and (iii) the 'soft' determinists hold that the concept of moral responsibility could be redefined in a way that praise and blame would be used as educative devices, acting as instruments of behaviour change.

Having given the conceptual analysis of the two crucial terms (free will and determinism) in the thesis, and having also presented some arguments for and against the two doctrines as presented by our representative scholars, it is now fitting that we elucidate the core problem of the thesis. As pointed earlier, the object of the thesis is not to resolve the classical problem between free will and determinism; rather, it is to analyse the arguments brought forward and see if they have anything to contribute in the field of education, especially when it comes to punishment and moral education. It is my contention that each of the approaches towards the problem of free will and determinism reveals an important aspect of man in particular

and reality in general. Consequently, the more we understand man and his surroundings, the better the education that we could provide. The educational implications we have in mind are metaphysical in that they are so general that they could not be subjected to scientific tests, although they might be exercising a lot of influence in both theory and practice in education.

It has also been noted that the doctrines of free will and determinism are composed of a variety of freedom and determinism respectively. For our purpose here, we shall only deal with a few of these varieties which we think are more relevant in the field of education. From the doctrine of free will we are going to emphasize the educational implications according to what was defined earlier as metaphysical freedom, psychological freedom and social freedom, while from the doctrine of determinism the emphasis is going to be on the implications derived from metaphysical and ethical determinism. We take these varieties of free will and determinism as more relevant for their direct involvement in the concept of moral responsibility which is going to feature prominently when we come to discussing discipline and punishment. Although theological determinism is equally involved in the concept of moral responsibility, its treatment would bring another dimension to the problem of free will and determinism which we are not well equipped to tackle here.

Finally, before we can come into grips with the educational implications of the free will and determinism, we have to study in more detail, the basis of the arguments given for and against both the doctrine of free will and determinism. Thus, the next chapter is going to deal with the different studies done on man and his

environment. These studies, we concede, would help us not only to understand the many aspects of human nature but also how each of these aspects could precisely be utilized in the field of education.

CHAPTER II

2.00 What is Man?: Some Theories on the Nature of Man

In the first chapter we have defined the problem of free will and determinism, and mentioned some of the arguments for and against each doctrine as propounded by different scholars. In the present chapter these arguments will be probed even further by looking at their basis as revealed by various theories about man. However, there are many theories about man's nature but all of them could conveniently be classified into deterministic and libertarian theories. So, for the deterministic theories, we shall point out and analyse some of the contentions put forward by scientists in their study on man. This will be in form of biological and environmental determinants of man. But before treating the scientific arguments, a short review of the scientific method will be in order. For theories that advocate the autonomous nature of man, we shall seek their basis; their strong and weak points.

The aim of the chapter is to find out whether the two general theories stipulated are contradictory or whether the two could be reconciled in any way. Consequently, this will I hope, lead us to discover which of the types of freedom and determinism, e.g., metaphysical freedom, social freedom, psychological freedom, ethical determinism and metaphysical determinism, are applicable to man and which are not. In this way, the concept of moral responsibility will be seen in the light of the results of this chapter.

But it is important to note that although the chapter is about the two general theories on man, the deterministic theory seems to take

precedence over the theory on the autonomy of man. The first reason for this is that many people today are more inclined towards the deterministic theories due perhaps to the success of science, hence, there is more literature in that vein. The second reason is that the basis for the arguments for the autonomy of man are difficult to put forward for they hinge mostly on what we feel as agents, especially when taking moral decisions.

2.10 The Historical Background of the Scientific Method

Although the free will versus determinism debate has been present in theology for a long time, it is only during the 17th Century that it took a serious scientific outlook in the Western World. The historical background of the scientific method and its results presented here does not attempt to give all the complex factors involved in the debate. So, we are going to trace some important breakthroughs that took place as a result of the application of the scientific method in the hands of Galileo, Newton and Darwin. We shall also briefly discuss the theory of quantum mechanics and see whether or not it could contribute to our effort of resolving the free will versus determinism problem.

During the era of philosophers such as Aristotle up to the middle ages, objects in the Universe were explained in terms of their purpose.¹ The goal of study at this time was not primarily in order to describe, predict and control limited phenomena as is the case with modern science. The object was to understand the meaning or the relation of the parts to the whole and the relation of the whole to the supreme

¹I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion. (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966).

power. This meant that within the over-all pattern of the universe, every entity from the greatest to the smallest was seen as having a status and purpose in the gradual hierarchy of reality. Though the universe was viewed as law abiding, the laws were moral rather than mechanistic. From the above, it can be inferred that the universe was assumed to be static with all its species created in their present form. It was a complete universe with no fundamental novelty except what was considered as God's act. In this type of universe, man was seen as the centre, so that all the other species were to be explained mainly in terms of the role they played in human purposes.

In 17th Century, Galileo almost overturned tables concerning the view of the universe that was common there before. Galileo's contribution to the method of scientific study was his combination of mathematical reasoning and experimental observation. While the metaphysical and religious questions were directed towards remote causes of things, Galileo's scientific method concentrated on the proximate causes. This was an important landmark in the growth of the scientific method, for it meant that teleological explanations that were characteristic of the earlier era were to be replaced by the scientific descriptions and explanations. Consequently, this meant that a particular phenomenon could be investigated as an isolated case of the whole universe.²

We can then say that Galileo's two important ideas in modern science were; first, his advocating that the universe be viewed as one, composed of particles of matter that were always in motion. This idea was enriched by Galileo's exploration of space using the then

²Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion.

invented telescope. As we have already stated, before Galileo, man was considered the centre of the universe, but with the discovery of other planets and the fact that the earth goes round the sun instead of the vice versa, and that there was a possibility of other living beings outside the planet earth, man's esteem was in danger of weakening.

The second contribution of Galileo (which could only be inferred from his work) was the allocation of different duties to both God and man. For him (Galileo) God created the universe, he being the 'first cause', but it was the duty of man to explain the 'efficient causes' of phenomena by the use of science.

Newton seemed to have come to clarify what Galileo had pioneered. He was more insistent than Galileo that the scientists' work was to describe and that any speculations when dealing with scientific study were to be avoided at all costs. Newton was so interested in knowing how things worked so much that he was willing to investigate the influence of gravity upon objects while leaving unanswered, the question of the nature of gravity. For him (Newton) the laws of gravity seemed to be applicable to all objects in the universe, from the smallest particle to the largest planet. It should however be noted that Newton saw the universe as a harmonious entity that was being controlled by forces. This was an important contention for it suggested a universe that was as intricate as a machine, which followed immutable laws that were predictable to the smallest detail. This was perhaps the basis of determinism in scientific study which later generations were to adopt and develop further.

The impact of the new scientific method became very popular

during the 18th Century, so much that it was a common belief that the universe could be explained by the use of science alone. At this time, Laplace, a French mathematician had become one of the most articulate spokesmen of the view that the universe was self-sufficient as an impersonal mechanism. This view is evident from the following quotation by Barbour when discussing the issue. It says:

The world was no longer seen as the purposeful divine drama of the middle ages or even as continuing object of providential supervision as for Newton, but as a set of interacting natural forces. If events were governed by natural causes, any remaining gap in the scientific account should be filled not by introducing a deus ex machina, but by further search for physical explanations.³

From the above, we figure that the universe was assumed to be a complete mechanical system of inflexible cause and effect laws, so that all the future events would be inexorably determined. Thus, if we are unable to determine a happening, it is not that it cannot be determined but it should be taken as a question of our ignorance, for given enough time, every happening could be predicted.

It was during the 19th Century that another scientist made himself a name in the world of Science. Darwin came up with what is today commonly known as the 'evolutionary theory'. The evolutionary theory is composed of the following ideas: (i) the idea of random variation. In this, Darwin had ample evidence (supported with data) of the occurrence and inheritability of minute and apparently spontaneous variations among the individual members of the same species. Though Darwin could not explain how this came about, the important things for him was to know that it happens; (ii) Darwin had also

³Barbour, Ibid., pp. 58-59.

observed that in general, more young organisms are born than could survive up to parenthood. And that some variations conferred slight advantages in the intense competition for existence that occurs between members of the same species or between members of different species in an environment. This is what he termed the 'Struggle for Survival'. (iii) Lastly, Darwin had observed that an individual member of a species that had a slight advantage over the other members lived longer on the average. Over a long duration, this phenomenon of competition would bring about a corresponding reduction, and finally the elimination of the other less advantaged members of a species, hence, the gradual transformation of the species. This is what Darwin called the 'natural selection'.⁴ But it is important to observe that some of the ideas inherent in the Darwinian evolutionary theory were known even before his famous work - "Origins of Species" (1859). Thus, perhaps his greatest contribution was his ambition to fit these ideas together into a unified theory and his effort in trying to support the theory with a lot of collected data.

Darwin's work also exhibited one of the important characteristics of the method of science. That is, with a lot of observational data, coupled with an imaginative mind and intuition, one was able to come up with a coherent theory. Thus, he was able to demonstrate the dictum that 'no amount of data constitutes a scientific theory unless it is unified with an imaginative hypothesis'.

In his later work, "The Descent of Man" (1871), Darwin tried to demonstrate that his theory of evolution was applicable even to man. He indicated that man's characteristics could be explained in terms

⁴Barbour, Ibid., p. 85.

of the modification of the anthropoid ancestors through the process of 'natural selection'. To prove his case, he cited the anatomical resemblances between man and a gorilla. In the end, he asserted an idea which was more repugnant to theology than what Newton had earlier advocated: that human beings differ from animals rather in degrees than in any other radical way. The consequence of the above assertion was that man's own existence would thus be brought under the umbrella of the natural laws, and could be analysed in categories applicable to other forms of organisms. This was an important supplement to the scientific method in the light of the emergence of diverse disciplines (in studying the nature of man) popularly known as the social sciences. Darwin's universe unlike that of Newton was always being transformed from a lower hierarchy to a higher one. Furthermore, instead of this universe being governed by mechanistic laws, Darwin's universe was governed by the natural laws of selection (statistical in nature). It should be realised that even with this idea of natural selection, science in its insatiable interest to discover more about man still retained its deterministic rigour in the sense that complete predictability was thought to be a possibility.

It was not until the end of 19th Century that the scientific method was forced to adopt a notion of determinism which did not have a strong bias towards complete predictability. This was prompted by the discovery of the quantum mechanics in physics. In 1905, Einstein had shown that light does act like waves as well as like particles, and that the wave and particle aspects of light complemented each other like two sides of a coin.⁵ This discovery by Einstein was

⁵ Newsweek, 12/3/79.

nursed by other on-coming scientists such as Heisenberg who came up with the theory of quantum mechanics. Hence, according to Heisenberg:

... the standard interpretation of the experimental evidence for the theory of quantum mechanics yields the conclusion that in certain situations some of the stipulated subatomic elements (such as electrons) have properties characteristic of particles, while in other situations they exhibit properties characteristic of waves. This 'dual nature' of its fundamental elements is a distinctive mark of the theory and has been a source of much puzzlement.⁶

In this regard then, quantum mechanics was cited as being one of the indeterministic theories. The supposed explanation for this position was assisted by a set of formulas derived from what is known as the 'Heisenberg uncertainty relations'. Although these formulas are complicated for the uninitiated, the most important message for our case is that if a measurement enables us to ascertain with great accuracy the position of an electron at a given time, no measurement can assign a precise value to the momentum (and hence the velocity) of the particle at that time. The advocates of the above theory as being indeterministic in character, went on to argue that due to this inherent uncertainty relations, then:

... the equation of quantum mechanics cannot therefore establish a unique correspondence between precise positions and momenta at one time and precise positions and momenta at other times.

But is the case for quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory as forceful as its advocates put it? According to Nagel,

⁶E. Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanations. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961), p. 294.

⁷Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 295.

classical mechanics as illustrated by the Newtonian physics is not the only deterministic theory in modern physics. In this light, he suggests a general definition of a deterministic theory and asserts that this would include more than there is in classical mechanics. His definition states that " ... a theory is deterministic if and only if, given the values of its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of variables for any other period".⁸ Thus, we learn that, while the advocates of quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory (quotation 7) call for precise prediction of what is to come if a theory was to be taken as deterministic, Nagel (quotation 8) maintains that a deterministic theory does not necessarily call for precise prediction of what is to come. So, Nagel concludes that, if we adopt his definition of a deterministic theory, then the quantum mechanics theory is deterministic just like any classical mechanics theory.

In that case, I would be inclined to say that the difference between Nagel's and Heisenberg's definitions of deterministic and indeterministic theories is rather on language than on content. Heisenberg is correct if by calling quantum mechanics theories indeterministic, he only means that complete predictability is not applicable to them. Of course, his argument is based on the assumption that in classical mechanics, complete predictability of events was a possibility (this is an assertion that has not been proved true). However, to me, Nagel's definition of a deterministic theory seems reasonable and concurs with common sense. This is because there are many occurrences for which we are not able or we are not bothered to

⁸Nagel, *Ibid.*, p. 292.

trace a one-to-one correspondence as cause and effect and yet we are ready to affirm that they are determined. In a way, whenever we think of occurrences, there is a tendency to assume that they are caused. Therefore, I would say that the doctrine of determinism is composed of two ideas, the idea of 'cause' and the idea of 'predictability', and that the former is the more central. This is because, it would be illogical to affirm the idea of 'predictability' while at the same time denying the idea of 'cause' in an occurrence. On the other hand, it would be logical to affirm the idea of 'cause' without at the same time, affirming the idea of 'predictability'.

So, while we can only think of predictability if we assumed that an occurrence is caused, we most of the time think of the idea of cause in an occurrence without bothering ourselves with the idea of predictability. Furthermore, an occurrence may be unpredictable for two reasons: it may be unpredictable because at the material time, we do not know all the causal-conditions involved in the occurrence. Here the occurrence in question is caused but we cannot precisely predict it for we have a limited knowledge about it. On the other hand, an occurrence may be unpredictable because it is uncaused. In this case we have no way of predicting. Either those who, like Heisenberg, equate indeterminism with unpredictability and determinism with precise predictability are interested in the idea of predictability in the doctrine of determinism or they assume that the idea of 'cause' is self-evidence and therefore calls for no proof. Nagel seems to be interested in the idea of 'cause' which leads him to the problem of whether or not metaphysical determinism or metaphysical freedom would be demonstrable through the method of science. In the

end, Nagel *does* not only disagree with those who cite quantum mechanics theories as being indeterministic in nature (his idea of indeterministic occurrences would entail 'uncaused occurrences') but he also criticises those who use quantum mechanics as the basis to prove the possibility of human freedom. He puts it nicely when he says that:

It ... follows that conclusions concerning human freedom and moral responsibility, when based on the alleged 'acausal' and 'indeterministic' behavior of subatomic processes, are built on the sand. Neither the analysis of physical theory, nor the study of the subject matter of physics, yields the conclusion that there is no strict causal behavior anywhere.

Later in the Chapter, we shall discuss Nagel's scepticism over whether or not the idea of causality has been conclusively proved to be true in the physical world.

Barbour, trying to assess the contribution of quantum mechanics theories in the attempt to resolve the free will versus determinism debate, asserts that Laplace's bold claim that complete predictability is possible has been abandoned. The reason given for its abandonment is that we cannot predict the exact position and the exact velocity of a subatomic particle at the same time; that we can only calculate the probabilities for the future occurrences. But Barbour poses the question whether the said uncertainty is to be taken as being the result of indeterminacy in nature or it is due to human ignorance. He cites three answers that could be given to the above question.¹⁰

The first answer is that the uncertainty of prediction is a

⁹ Nagel, *Ibid.*, p. 316.

¹⁰ Barbour, *Op. cit.*, pp. 298-9.

result of temporary human ignorance. Following the same argument, many scientists assert that nature followed precise laws which our future theories were going to explain. So, what the present theories in science express is real and given time, the scientists would discover all the remaining natural laws that govern the world. Einstein is among the group of scientists who took the above line of thought.

The second answer is that uncertainty of prediction in science results from the inherent experimental and conceptual limitations in the observer, especially when that predictions involves minute objects such as electrons. Those who support this argument claim that theories are only useful tools for co-ordinating our observations in science but not the representations of the real world. That is, we can never formulate theories which are mistake-free to the extent that they represented the real world. The observer is always interfering with theories by injecting his subjective view, it is claimed. The third answer which is championed by Heisenberg suggests that the uncertainty of prediction expresses the indeterminacy as an objective feature of nature. This means that nature is indetermined and that the uncertainty expresses the reality.

Looking at the above three answers critically, we note that each has its merits and demerits. The first argument that there are natural laws which we could discover using more advanced knowledge has the merit of explaining away some instances where we discover a certain theory was wrongly formulated due to our inaccuracies. This is especially true where scientific laws that dealt with a large number of objects were found to be inaccurate when applied in a particular object such as an atom. But even granting the utility of this

position in science, we still find that there is not any clear experimental evidence to prove its truth or falsity. In this age, when we are still discovering new theories and discarding the old ones, it is difficult to say whether a time will come when we shall have discovered all the theories representing the nature of things as they are. I guess, that would be the end of science!

The second answer like the first one, stresses the ignorance or rather the inaccuracy of the observer to an extent that he can never reach that degree of perfectability in order to produce a theory that would represent the reality of things. But unlike the first answer, the second answer sounds a defeatist note to the on-coming scientists. Taking this position, the scientists are assured of a never complete accuracy in whatever field they are working in. Again, the claim that we can only achieve the reality when the scientific concepts are independent of our subjective view is rather weak. This is because we have cases where human subjectivity is not involved and yet there is unpredictability which we cannot explain. For example, the unpredictability at the time of which a radioactive atom disintegrates.¹¹ To add to that, this answer is silent as to whether nature is determined or indetermined.

The third answer which Barbour defends has the advantage of combining the merits of the other two answers while discarding their weaknesses. Those scientists who support the view claim that the apparent unpredictability in quantum mechanics expresses the indeterminacy in nature. As one scholar asserted, the uncertainty in quantum mechanics does not reside in the imperfection in our

¹¹Ibid., p. 302.

measurements nor in man's ability to know; it has its cause in nature herself.¹² That is, there is no exact causal connection between observable events, since measurement consists in extracting from the existing distribution, one of the possibilities it contains.

Although Barbour supports the view of the world as indetermined, it is important at this juncture to understand how he is using the terms 'determinacy' and 'indeterminacy'. Earlier we found out that Heisenberg and other scholars who wanted to use the theories of quantum mechanics to illustrate the possibility of human freedom defined 'indeterminacy' as unpredictability and 'determinacy' as precise predictability. For Barbour's case, he contends:

Some authors speak of individual atomic events as uncaused since they are not strictly determined. But uncaused seems to imply that the future springs up de novo unrelated to its antecedents. This is not the case, for the probabilities of the one instant are previously and unambiguously determined by the wave - functions at earlier instances. On the other hand, we cannot speak here of absolute causation or necessary causation, for the past passes on the future a set of possibilities. One alone out of these many potentialities can be realised.¹³

Barbour concludes that such relations between events in which the range of possibilities, but not the particular occurrence, is determined would be referred to as a weak form of causality in order to distinguish it from a strong form of causality or absolute causation.

Making our inference from the above quotation, we realise that Barbour is using 'indeterminacy' in quantum mechanics as Heisenberg and others

¹²H. Margenau, 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Interpretations of Quantum Theory', Ibid., pp. 301-2.

¹³Ibid., p. 304.

used it, to mean unpredictability. Consequently, 'determinacy' would for him, mean predictability. But he is keen enough to note that indeterminacy of this nature does not oppose the idea of cause which we said was important in the doctrine of metaphysical determinism. So, he would speak of a strong form of causality in cases where we are able to precisely predict an event while the weak form of causality is applied where we are only able to calculate the probabilities of an event; therefore, whether we are able to precisely predict an event or not the idea of causality is not denied. Thus put, Barbour's contention like that of Nagel indicate that quantum mechanics theory cannot contradict the idea of causality for it is itself based on it.

However, Barbour's terms 'weak' and 'strong' forms of causality are rather misleading or inappropriate. For instance, a weak form of causality could be interpreted to mean that when an occurrence was unpredictable, it was because its causal factors were weak. I do not think that this is how Barbour would have liked to be understood. Again, even granted that the causal factors of an occurrence are weak, logically, we would still be affirming the idea of cause and only denying the idea of predictability. All we are saying is that our inability to precisely predict an occurrence does not necessarily entail that its causal factors are weak in themselves. Essentially, there might be no difference between what we are able to precisely predict and what we are not. The truth would be that in one occurrence we know the necessary causal factors while in the other we do not know. And that that does not in anyway change the nature of the causal factors of the occurrence in question.

Thus, in the foregoing historical background of scientific method we have observed that neither the Newtonian mechanistic theories nor the quantum mechanics theories defy the doctrine of determinism with its stress on the idea of 'cause'. Perhaps the important question to ask at this stage is whether science as a discipline has convincingly demonstrated the truth of the principle of causality before using it as its bedrock. If the principle of causality, that every event has a cause turns out to be a false one, then it would mean that we could witness some chance occurrences or uncaused events in the universe.¹⁴

In his discussion on whether or not there was ever a 'chance occurrence' which we would use to falsify the principle of causality, Nagel argues that:

... there appears to be no unquestionably authentic cases of such events (chance occurrences). Indeed it is impossible in the nature of the case to establish beyond question that any event is absolutely chance occurrence. For to show beyond all possible doubt that a given happening (e.g., the decomposition of an atom) is spontaneous and without determining circumstances, it would be necessary to show that there is nothing whatever upon which its occurrence depends. But this would be tantamount to showing that no satisfactory theory could ever be devised to explain what the present theories already explain, and in addition account for the allegedly spontaneous event.¹⁵

The above quotation intimates that we could not discount the possibility of a chance happening although when called to demonstrate the truth empirically we seem to be in trouble. The problem that arises when called to demonstrate an instant of a chance happening is that we do

¹⁴ Nagel's 'Chance Occurrences' here would be equated to what the libertarians usually call contra-causal events where metaphysical freedom is involved.

¹⁵ Nagel, Op. cit., pp. 332-333.

no. know whether it is lack of the necessary knowledge about chance occurrences or whether they do not exist. But does this position lead us to conclude that the principle of causality is a true one since we are unable to demonstrate a single chance occurrence? I think it would be a hasty conclusion to say that the principle is true because there is still a chance that chance occurrences exist and that it is through our ignorance that we have failed to expose the truth. Hence, it becomes the onus of science to prove that chance occurrences do not exist by conclusively showing that the principle of causality is involved in every occurrence.

But it seems as if the scientist is not in a better position to demonstrate the principle of causality. For example, in his attempt (if ever it was made) to demonstrate the principle of causality, a scientist would perhaps cite many cases where the event is shown to be the effect of another. However, this exercise would not exhaust all the events that there are. In most cases, scientists formulate theories by studying a correlation sample of events. Say, when it is observed that after the formation of black clouds in the sky rain falls, then when this phenomenon is repeated many times, it is deduced that black clouds cause rainfall. This in itself, does not mean that all the instances of rainfall have been considered. Again, if we argued like Hume, it would be difficult to show the necessary connection between cause and its effect. Thus, we would be forced to conclude that science can neither demonstrate the truth nor the falsity of the principle of causality, though it is always applying it.

How then can we prove the truth, or the falsity of the principle of causality, if scientific method cannot be of any help? The

principle of causality has been discussed by many and able scholars. Although their works will not be discussed here it seems to me that no method has proved very fruitful. Most of these scholars have come to the conclusion that neither empirical nor rationalistic methods would be able to demonstrate the truth nor the falsity of the principle of causality. However, the same scholars contend that it is a useful postulate not only in science but also in our daily life.¹⁶

Taking stock of the importance of this section, it is reasonable to assert that neither metaphysical determinism nor metaphysical freedom (chance occurrences) as defined in the first chapter are conclusively demonstrable either through the method of science or the rational method alone. Thus, both the determinists and the libertarians are forced to seek better arguments elsewhere for their support of metaphysical determinism and metaphysical freedom respectively, in man. Again, since the method of science is based on physical determinism (subsumed under metaphysical determinism) and that metaphysical determinism is based on the principle of causality; and since we have not been able to demonstrate the truth of the principle of causality, then, it is only fair that we caution those who tend to overestimate what science is able to accomplish in the physical world. Those words of caution should even be taken more seriously when the method of science is being applied in the study of man.

2.10 The Basis of Determinism in Man

We have seen that the advancement of science in knowing more about the physical world has given man more confidence in the use of

¹⁶Some of the philosophers who have discussed the principle of causality include F.H. Bardley, R.G. Collingwood, I. Kant, A.E. Taylor and D. Fume.

the same weapon (the scientific method) to understand more about himself. This is because man has come to consider himself as a part of the world just like any other organism, as Darwin puts it. Here, our main concern is to observe some of the contributions that have been made through the application of scientific methods in the study of man. Since these studies are basically deterministic, they seem to support the doctrine of determinism in man.

The scientific study on man and his environment however, is based on two fundamental theories: the biological basis of man and the environmental basis of man. While the biological bases are studied under the natural sciences, the environmental basis are treated under what are known, as the social sciences.

2.11 The Biological Determinants of Man

Biologists and Bio-chemists have come to realise that the life of man begins when the male sperm joins the female ovum to form a zygote. At an early stage of development, the foetus (a more advanced stage of a zygote) of a human being is not very different from any other animal; that is, the growth is through the method of cell-division and specialisation. Each of the sperm-cell or the ovum is composed of genes. These genes are in the form of Deoxyribonucleic Acid, commonly referred to as DNA. Genes are then formed into Chromosomes which are more complicated than the genes. The Chromosomes are found in pairs in all the body cells. The human body is known to be composed of 46 Chromosomes, arranged into 23 pairs, one of each pair derived from the father and the other from the mother. But genes are the actual carriers of the hereditary traits such as eye-colour, brain characteristics, baldness and many other characteristics that we inherit and which are

crucial to our personality. It is also a fact that a zygote brings together various combinations of chromosomes and hence, different genes are inherited by each child of the same parents. Only identical twins (mono-zygotic twins) have identical chromosomes, therefore identical gene-combinations. On the other hand, even fraternal twins (dizygotic twins) have developed from different zygotes, therefore, they are bound to have different gene-combinations.¹⁷

Again, other than just being carriers of hereditary traits, genes do have the functions of explicating and controlling the developmental processes in living things in general. Thus, although the structure of the genes seems to be relatively simple, the ways in which their codes are translated into life-processes are rather complicated. Geneticists appear too confident that life processes could be explicable in physico-chemical terms without seeking answers from a distinctive vital substance or life-force. This is to say that life-processes could be explicable, for example, without referring to a super-natural power. But the problem that faces man today is that although he seems to understand the components that make up life, he has yet to succeed in creating life artificially. However, the important inference that we might draw from these facts is that biological components of man are considered basic in the formation of individual personalities, and that although hereditary influences could be monitored in almost every stage of development, it is impossible to give their exact proportion as regards our personalities.

2.12 The Environmental Determinants of Man

Having simply outlined the biological components of personality,

¹⁷B. Von Haller Gilmer, Psychology. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970).

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the next major area that influences man is the environment he is situated in. However, the area is so wide that we can only cite a few examples to illustrate what this entails. Environment could be subdivided into physical and social dimensions. The physical dimensions of environment includes the physical surroundings such as forests, rivers, mountains, and the climatical conditions. On the other hand, the social dimensions of environment would include the family organizations, the leadership hierarchy, educational and legal institutions, and the value systems.

For a long time, scholars have been discussing the relative contribution of heredity and environment in the formation of an individual personality (nature and nurture problem). Recently, most social scientists have come to learn that the problem has been wrongly posed, for what is evident is that both heredity and environment contribute to what we become. But the problem becomes an impossible one when we try to trace how much each type of determinants contribute in a particular personality which in itself is a complicated affair. To illustrate this point, many studies of various kinds over the heredity-environment problem conclude that man will not develop properly if he does not interact with the environment he is situated in. So far, the studies carried out indicate that the individual reflects his genetic structure which has been tampered with by an array of environmental factors throughout his life-span. If a person with a high ability potential is placed in a poor environment, his measured ability (overt behaviour) will probably be low. On the other hand, if his heredity ability-potential is low, then, even the best environment has its limits on how much that person can do or can be.

The theory of socialization is the most readily cited to illustrate how an individual is influenced by the environment. However, the theory is formulated differently by different scholars. This I think, is due to the fact that different scholars put more emphasis on particular items that fall under their special interests. Thus, for Baldwin, the theory of socialization should be subsumed under the general theory of behaviour and learning. He goes on to concede that:

The task of the theory [socialization] ... is to explain how a child becomes an individual who fits into his society, who shares its values, who has acquired and uses skills that are important for the maintenance of the society.¹⁸

On the same theory, Inkeles says that:

... Socialization refers to the process whereby individuals acquire the personal system properties - the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values needs and motivations, affective and conative patterns which shape their adaptation to the physical and socio-cultural setting in which they live.¹⁹

Though the above quotations are expressed in different words, we can infer that both Baldwin and Inkeles are essentially saying the same thing: that socialization is the process of selectively integrating an individual in his surroundings.

Further, most of the social scientists have identified formal and informal socialization. Formal or deliberate socialization refers to the intentions and the actions of all those who are concerned with the training of the child or the young especially the parents, the guardians and the teachers. Informal socialization could refer to all

¹⁸ A.L. Baldwin, "A Cognitive Theory of Socialization" in D.A. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company), p. 325.

¹⁹ A. Inkeles, "Social Structure and Socialization" in Goslin (ed.), Socialization Theory of Research, pp. 615-616.

that goes on between an individual and his environment without neither the individual nor his conscious agents of socialization being deliberately aware of what is going on. Although the process of socialization starts from birth and goes on until the time of death, it is my view that perhaps it is only at the stage the psychologists term as late childhood and adolescence states, that some of the social values such as sportsmanship, bravery, and leadership are likely to be actualized meaningfully in an individual. The reason for this is that socialization must adapt itself to the maturational factors of the individual. For example, there might be a potential footballer but until his legs and muscles are well developed, his skills for the game will remain at the stage of potentiality.

The Cognitive theory which is under the general theory of socialization does help to explicate even further how an individual is influenced by various factors within particular surroundings. A cognitive theory is understood as:

... a theory of human behavior which stipulates a general cognitive mechanism as the initial step in the chain of events leading from the stimulus to response. The assumption behind cognitive theory is that stimuli are received and processed to extract the information they contain. This information is in a way integrated into a cognitive representation of which the individual himself is represented. The cognitive representation might alternatively be called a belief about the content of the environment.²⁰

The cognitive representation of an individual is known to expand as he is exposed to different raw materials which the cognitive picture or representation is constituted. Of course, the cognitive representation of an individual is never static or complete, for it is always

²⁰Baldwin, op. cit., p. 328.

being modified by new values.

Again, though the direct impact of ecological patterns on an individual's cognitive representation has not been very popular with the social scientists for a long time, the little that has been studied in that direction show that the ecology of a society does considerably effect the individuals within it. A controversial argument that is usually supported by research postulates that ecological demands placed on a particular society plus their cultural adaptations to this ecology do lead to the development of some skills that are useful while ignoring those that deem useless. To illustrate the argument, P.R. Dasen carried out research among the Australian Aborigines. In the study, it was shown that the Aborigines had a very lowly developed concept of number. This was attributed to the influence of their ecological background - hunting and gathering of food, activities that required little counting.²¹

Another area where we easily derive some evidence of social determinants of man is in language. Thus, some scholars have come to recognize that a language represents a wealth of experiences of a people, that is, their culture with all its ramifications, which is a representative of their world-view. B.L. Whorf illustrates the point nicely when he asserts that:

My own Whorf studies suggest to me that language for all its kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon deeper processes of consciousness, which are necessary before communication signaling or symbolism whatsoever can occur.²²

²¹P.R. Dasen, "The Influence of Ecology, Culture and European Contact on Cognition Development in Australian Aborigines", in J.W. Berry and P.R. Dasen, Culture and Cognition: Readings in Cross-Cultural Psychology. (London: Methuen Co. Ltd., 1974), pp.

²²J.B. Corroll, (ed.), Language Thought and Reality. (Cambridge: Massachusetts the MIT Press, 1958), pp. 239.

In a study which she carried out in Burundi, E.M. Albert observed that the major intra-cultural variations in the uses of speech was systematically related to the constituents of cultural patterns including aspects of the social structure, the cultural definitions of situations of action, the cultural philosophy, the value system and the patterned interactions.²³ From the above study, Albert concluded that in Burundi, aesthetical and emotional values take precedence over logical criteria in all but a small classes of communicational situations. In other words, emotion is more valued than truth in Burundi. Developing the same argument further, she concluded that falsehood is regarded as a positive value rather than a negative value, contrary to the Western traditions. It is my view that L. Senghor would like the above conclusions to be generalized for all the African people rather than only for the Burundi people.

As stated earlier on, cross-cultural studies are very controversial. The reason perhaps is that most of those who are engaged in such researches are biased even before the research is off the ground. If we take for example, the research on the concept of number among the Australian Aborigines, we would easily deduce that the study was somehow biased. This is because the research conclusions seem to equate a low development of the concept of number with a low potentiality of the use of numerical concepts. If the Aborigines ecological and cultural background do not call for an expansive concept of number, then I do not think it is of any importance to develop it. And that this should not be taken to mean that the

²³ E.M. Albert, "Culture Patterning of Speech Behavior in Burundi", in J.J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (ed.), Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication. (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1972).

Aborigines have a low potentiality for number concepts, hence, their being categorized as 'uncivilized' when compared with the Europeans whose concepts of number is said to be highly developed. Again, I think it is wrong to compare the Aborigines' values with the Europeans' values while one has already assumed the European's values to be the standard of comparison. In the same way, if we consider Albert's study on cultural influences of speech in Burundi, we would question her conclusion that the Burundi people value emotions more than truth. I think a better interpretation of the findings would be that logic or discursive reasoning is not emphasized by the Burundi people, not that given truth and emotions, the Burundi people would go for emotions. Here again, we witness a case where a peoples' values are compared with the European standard values even when the cultural background is known to be different in the two societies. Even if the Burundi people do not emphasize discursive reasoning in their daily life, that in itself should not be construed to mean that they do not have the potential for discursive reasoning.

On the other hand, those critics who disagree with such researches which seem to be geared to discredit some societies as 'uncivilized' usually over-react and as a result, give the wrong reasons why the researches are biased. It would be a weak argument, I think, to try to show for example, that Africans valued discursive reasoning by citing a few examples of discursive reasoning by Africans, for this would still present an undeveloped concept of reasoning that would be inferior to the European standard. A strong argument would, among other things indicate that both the Africans and the Europeans have, as human beings, potentiality for diverse abilities that include

discursive reasoning and emotional traits. That given the same cultural background as the Europeans, the Africans would be able to practise discursive reasoning as their European counterparts. I think, the important point to remember when dealing with cross-cultural studies is that we possess potentiality for diversified abilities, and that different cultural background calls for the development of different potential abilities. To express the same point under the cognitive theory, we would say that we inherit the cognitive mechanism or frame but the way this mechanism is developed depends on our environmental and cultural background.

Criminologists have not been slow in studying and trying to find out what factors influencing the criminal behaviour in people. The criminologists seem to be guided by the premise that if we understand why criminals behave the way they do, then we will be in a better position to use the corrective measures for the benefit of both the criminals and the society at large. Nevertheless, many theories have been put forward by different scholars at different periods all purporting to explain the cause of criminal behaviour.

Sometimes it was believed that criminal behaviour is inherited. Recently, it has been found that no research has conclusively shown this contention to be true for all cases of criminal behaviour. Contrary to that, there are other scholars who have argued that criminality is a learned behaviour. Essentially, the later group of scholars is saying that nobody is born a criminal; it is the environmental background that make some people criminals and others not. To me, none of the two general theories (criminality either as an inherited or a learned behaviour) exposes the whole truth about the

causes of crimes. While each of the theories contains some truth, I think we could agree with T.M. Mushanga when he asserts that no single theory has been able to explain all the causes of criminal behaviour for all types of crimes.²⁴ Perhaps we could add that the causal factors of behaviour (normal as well as criminal) are many, and varies from one person to another and from one type of crime to another. This is facilitated by the complicity of the interaction between biological and environmental determinants of man. Thus, both the natural and the social sciences avail us examples which strongly ascribe to the view that man's behaviour is determined in one way or other.'

2.20 The Basis of Free Will in Man

The basis of free will in man is rather a difficult one to discuss. It is difficult to discuss it for the simple reason that only one basic 'proof' seems to be offered for the truth of the proposition that man's actions are free. This basic 'proof' is our personal experience. So, it is often said that our most immediate evidence that man is not just an object is the fact that he has passions, emotions and feelings (we are not sure whether organisms do not have similar experiences). The idea of experience as used here should be understood as encompassing among other things, sensing, thinking, feeling and remembering; that is, all forms of awareness within the flow of our consciousness.

But we do realise that any type of experience presupposes an experiencing agent or subject. To explain this presupposition, the

²⁴ T.M. Mushanga, Crime and Deviance. (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1976).

proponents of free will of the agent jump to the concept of 'self'. Nevertheless, the problem remains unsolved due to the fact that different scholars define the concept of 'self' differently, each according to his special training. Thus, a philosopher's definition of 'self' is likely to differ from that of a psychologist.

Again, it is common for two philosophers to give different definitions of the concept 'self'. For if we consider a scholar such as E. Husserl, we find that he defines 'self' as a transcendental ego which he considers as an ultimate subjective source of all of man's diverse manifestations. Husserl's definition is perhaps prompted by his insistence in trying to base all knowledge upon a bedrock of absolute certainty. For M. Buber, the 'self' should be thought of as the attainment of what we were created to be, that is, one's possibilities. The other problem of defining 'self' is attributed to the fact that it has to be seen as somewhat static but changing all the time. An illustration of the dilemma is the fact that what one was last year is rather different from what he will be five years to come and yet he is to be considered as the same 'self'. However, the dilemma is attenuated though not eradicated, when most scholars agree that 'self' should be seen not as something given but as something to be developed, indeed created through responsible choices. Sartre and his students would certainly endorse this definition of 'self'.

In his discussion of 'self', Reid (as mentioned earlier) identifies three aspects of what he terms as 'personal self'. The first two aspects of personal self he asserts could be known objectively, through the method of science. These two aspects correspond to the biological and the environmental basis of man

(section 2.10). The third aspect of the personal self is not only different because it could only be known through any other means but not through the method of science, but also because it is presupposed by the other two aspects of personal self. Reid puts it well when he states that:

... there is another aspect ... of the personal self which does not belong to its objective history or at least to its history in the same sense, and which is not in the same way accessible to objective scientific study as in the structure of the character or the causal sequence of personal experiences.²⁵

Reid goes on to cite concrete examples which he thinks demonstrate very well the fact that human actions are free. He particularly points at the act of reflection. He contends that, reflection is a free act for if it was not, then it would not be a reflection. He adds that what we decide to do after our reflection should be seen as an expression of that free reflection. I think this argument is analytic and does not help to prove that human actions are free since ordinarily, the term reflection seems to be equated to a free action. I think Reid would have done better than that if he first of all distinguished what type of freedom he identified with the act of reflection.

On the same line of argument, Campbell supports the doctrine of free will in man by citing examples which are not very different from those given by Reid though not identical. One of the examples he discusses is the act of cognition. He begins the discussion by stating that all cognition presupposes a subject that is conscious of itself as cognizing. This subject is then a being which is identical with itself throughout and inspite of the diversity of its

²⁵Reid, op. cit., p. 98.

cognition. Thus, a person could or does experience pain, desires to go home or thinks of his dead mother, all at different times, but he will have these experiences as the same experiencing self; although it is a fact that this self is not completely the same any more. But why the self-contradiction, Campbell asks. He attempts an answer by conceding that the apparent:

... Self contradiction rests on the assumption that sameness totally excludes difference; and this is an assumption to which all self-conscious experience give a direct lie. I as a self-conscious subject cannot doubt that I who now hears the clock strike a second time am the same being who a moment ago also heard the clock strike even though I must have become different in some respect in the interval.²⁶

To express the same answer simply, Campbell would argue that the self-contradiction seems to occur when we look at reality from two different perspectives. Thus, when we look at reality subjectively, we see ourselves as the same subjects having different experiences, while when we view ourselves objectively or externally, we are unable to connect the experiences, hence, our treating them as experiences coming from different subjects or selves.

From the above two quotations (25 and 26) it is evident that Reid and Campbell are availing themselves of the personal experiences as the strongest justification for affirming the doctrine of free will as regards man, and that in doing that they are holding the contention that the objective method of science would be inapplicable in understanding these type of experiences. I wholly agree with them in that point. Perhaps we may also add that it is in principle difficult to understand the type of freedom that is illustrated by personal

²⁶C.A. Campbell, Selfhood and Godhood. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), p. 83.

experiences through the method of science since the method of science is tailored basically for different modes of knowledge, or rather, the method of science is aimed at approaching reality from a different perspective; the objective mode of reality.

However, we are faced with a problem when we come to discuss subjective and objective modes of reality in that we are forced to use the same language for both. For example, when Reid talks of three aspects of the personal self, he creates an impression that there are three ontologically existing entities of personal self. And that the third aspect of personal self is seen as quite different from the other two. That is to say that, the third aspect of personal self is viewed as excluding both the biological and the environmental bases of man. I would rather that we see the synthesis of the biological and the environmental bases as constituting the subjective aspect of self. This is so because when reflecting or when engaged in any personal experiential act, it is obvious that we feel free, but this does not mean that our reflecting or experiencing does not reflect both our biological and environmental influences. In other words, what we are experiencing in such situations is what we referred to as psychological freedom in the first chapter. Therefore, we would have no quarrel with the libertarians if they realised and indicated clearly that both our biological and environmental influences are present in our present self.

As we argued in the earlier chapter, the libertarians go wrong when they try to 'prove' the existence of free will in general without having to distinguish what type of freedom they referred to. At the same time, we would oppose those determinists who claim that all human

actions are determined if what they mean to say is that human actions are metaphysically determined, and hence, the psychological freedom is an illusion. That is, the determinists go wrong I suppose, when they try to 'prove' that man's actions are metaphysically determined by using other types of determinism (such as what we defined as ethical or logical determinism).

2.30 The Whole Man Model

From what we have discussed in the preceding sections (2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.20), it is quite clear that we have ended up with two modes of man; man as determined and man as a free agent. While the determined mode of man is knowable through the objective methods such as the method of science, man as a free agent is only knowable through personal experiences of an individual. And since an individual is both determined and a free agent, he is liable to know himself through both the objective and the subjective methods.

The problem however, arises when we try to understand other people who seem to be like ourselves. The question is, do we know other people through the objective or through the subjective methods? It is obvious that we can and we do use the objective methods to know the determined mode of people other than ourselves but when we come to their other modes; - men as free agents, - the exercise is not an easy one to explain. For that matter, there are some scholars who argue that we can never know others through experience (subjectively) in the same way that we know ourselves as individuals. Thus, all what we know when we claim to know other human beings is what we have inferred from what we experienced about ourselves as individuals.

This is an important question to settle in that if it is true that we cannot know the experiences of other human beings, it would be difficult for us to evaluate other peoples' actions as either being free or determined and therefore warranting praise and blame or none of the two. But it is interesting to note that even before we know how we come to understand other peoples' experiences as free agents, we find ourselves already engaged in the process. We are always judging people either as responsible or not responsible of their actions, using various types of justification.

Making his contribution on the concept of a person and subsequently how we come to know other people's experiences as free agents, P.F. Strawson criticises what he refers to as the two common views of man. The first view is the Cartesian dualism.

According to Strawson, the Cartesian dualism sees man as two substances: one of the substances could be properly be ascribed physical characteristics and the other non-physical or corporeal characteristics; the former is the body while the later is the ego.²⁷ According to the Cartesian theory then, Strawson contends, we should ascribe physical or corporeal characteristics to the body and the states of consciousness to the ego. However, Strawson rejects the Cartesian dualism theory by asserting that the concept of the pure individual consciousness; the pure ego, is a concept that cannot exist, or at least cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analysed. We may also add that if the Cartesian dualism theory is upheld, then it would mean that since one's own experiences are within the pure ego, which the

²⁷ P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. (London: Methuen & Co, Ltd., 1959), pp. 94-95.

physical or the corporeal aspect cannot help us to reach, then it would be difficult or impossible to know the experiences of others in the same way that we know our own experiences. And this would naturally lead to solipsism.

The other common view of man is what Strawson labels the 'no-ownership' doctrine of self which he associates with M. Schlick and L. Wittgenstein. This is the theory that the only sense in which experiences can significantly be said to have an owner is that they are causally dependent upon the states of some particular body. In other words, experiences could only properly be called mine when they are causally connected with my body as a particular body, in a particular location and at a particular time.²⁸

Strawson rejects the non-ownership doctrine of self in that it is incoherent as a satisfactory concept of a person. He goes on to argue that, if in a given person, all experiences are dependent upon the state of his body and that this is contingent, then how are these experiences going to be identified as his? Or, in accordance with what principle are these experiences going to be classified as his experiences? Furthermore, this position would bring about the problem of personal identity.

Commenting on Strawson's 'no-ownership' doctrine of self, A.J. Ayer agrees that the theory has a problem in that:

Not only is it not clear how the individual experiences are to be identified but there appears to be no principle according to which they can be grouped together; there is no answer to the question what makes two experiences which are separated in time, the experiences of the same self,²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 95-97.

²⁹ A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person: And Other Essays. (London:

At the end of his discussion of the above two theories, Strawson concludes that the concept of a person is a primitive one in the sense that it cannot be analysed further into smaller units without incurring some distortions.³⁰ So, Ayer, concluding in favour of Strawson asserts that:

Not everything we want to say about persons can be construed as a statement about physical objects which are their bodies; still less, when we refer to persons, are we referring to mental substances or to collections of experiences. Neither in Strawson's view can it be maintained that persons are compounds; that they are the product of the two separate entities or sets of entities, one the subject of physical characteristics and the other the subject of consciousness. He holds on the contrary, that the subject to which we attribute the properties which imply the presence of consciousness is literally identical with that which we attribute physical properties.³¹

I would agree with Strawson's adoption of the middle-of-the road position between the two theories discussed in that whenever we are talking of a person, the term should of necessity include both the physical and the non-physical characteristics. This contention could, I hope, be supported by the common fact that when one is dead, we do not usually address the corpse as a person nor do we call the departed characteristics (the spirit) the person.

Secondly, there are many theories which try to understand the concept of a person through what is considered to be the origin of human actions. Looking at these theories in general, it is evident that some of them are reductionistic while others are dualistic in Macmillan Press Ltd., 1963), pp. 113-114.

³⁰ Perhaps Strawson's sense of unanalysability of the concept of a person is close to G.E. Moore's unanalysability of the notion of 'Good' in his Principia Ethica.

³¹ Op. cit., pp. 85-86.

nature. On one hand, most of the reductionistic theories of the origin of human action view a person either as a corporeal or an incorporeal being but not both. For example, physicalism is a theory that considers a person as a corporeal being and that the non-physical characteristics are just an aspect of a person. Hence, all actions originate in a person who is physical. The opposite of the above theory is the one which reduces a person into an incorporeal being so that all actions are considered to be originating from the self which is non-physical.

On the other hand, all the dualistic theories about the origins of human actions usually admit the existence of a person as a body and a mind (non-physical being). However, the dualists do differ as to the origin of actions. For instance, the interactionists claim that the connection between the corporeal and the incorporeal aspects of a person is that of cause and effect, so that the corporeal aspect acts upon the incorporeal aspect and the vice versa. And that just this causality is what connects and unites the two aspects into a person.³² Like Strawson's two theories of a person, each of the above theories fail to give us a comprehensive explanation of the concept of a person. Thus, they further strengthen the assertion that the concept of a person has to include both the corporeal and the incorporeal attributes. But, I must admit that the way the two aspects are related as regards human actions seems difficult to explain.

Thus said about the concept of a person, we could say with some justification I hope, that we are unable to know other persons as free agents in the same way that we know ourselves (through our

³²R. Taylor, Metaphysics. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

personal experiences). This, I think, is because, although we can observe their physical behaviour, there is that non-physical aspect (free will) which only a person as a free agent could directly experience. Nonetheless, we do know about other persons as free agents through actions that we assume to have emanated from them as free agents. That is to say, through associating our behaviour with what we experience, we have in the same way, learnt to associate other peoples' experiences with their physical behaviour. For example, when we see someone smiling, we are likely to understand him as being in a jovial mood, not through ourselves experiencing his happiness, but through associating what we usually feel when we are in a position to smile. In the same way, I think Hirst and Peters are expressing the same idea when they assert that our awareness and understanding of other peoples' minds is different from our experiences about the physical world. Thus:

Concepts like those of 'believing', 'deciding', 'intending', 'wanting', 'acting', 'hoping', and 'enjoying', which are essential to inter-personal experience and knowledge, do not pick out in any straightforward way, what is observable by the senses.³³

So, when we come to pass judgment on a person's action through his observed behaviour, we are usually using a public standard arrived at through what we ourselves, experience as free agents.

But what is the upshot of this concept of a person that entails both corporeal and incorporeal characteristics? I would argue that it is calling our attention to the fact that man is not just his biological and environmental determinants. Rather, he is these factors organized

³³P.H. Hirst & R.S. Peters, The Logic of Education. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 63.

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³³ P.H. Hirst & R.S. Peters, The Logic of Education. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 63.

into a being that is conscious. A being that experiences some psychological freedom nurtured from these biological and environmental influences. This being has a purpose in life that is guided by the ideals (ethical determinism) and commitments to these ideals that have been acquired from the society.

Attempting to acquire these ideals however, different means or alternatives are required. Thus, we find man reflecting over the possible alternatives, taking the one that deem more suitable in each particular situation. It is in this sense I hope, that man is said to be exercising his free will. If so, human freedom or free will should not be seen as only involving the absence of coercion but also as involving his inner ability to pursue what he considers to be good among many possible alternatives.

Of course, we have to admit that a man's potentiality is finite, so that there is a maximum of what one could do or could become. In practice, this potentiality is difficult to exhaust for every individual since it again involves a complex of influences. At the moment however, we could only note that more often than not, we pass away before we have actualized all our potentialities. Furthermore, some of the alternatives that an individual opts for excludes others which he would have taken. This, I suggest, is due to the fact that we are temporally and spatially restricted.

2.40 Conclusion

We have observed that the scientific study which is not necessarily based on the truth of metaphysical determinism, does help us to understand the basic determinants of man (his biological and environmental

make-up). On the other hand, we have also realised that metaphysical freedom or the phenomenon of uncaused events has not been conclusively demonstrated either in the physical world or in man. Furthermore, even if it were conclusively demonstrated, I do not think that it would help us to understand this human freedom that we associate with human actions.

To understand human freedom I suggest, it is essential that we see man not as disconnected elements. We should see him as basically determined by these factors but at a higher level where the factors constitute an organism that experiences a type of freedom which he utilizes in choosing some alternatives from a variety of possible alternatives. In other words, when we talk of human freedom or free will, we should be understood to mean psychological freedom which includes among other things, ethical determinism and social freedom as defined, which are within the framework of man's basic determinants.

But however clear and thorough we would have liked to be over this problem of free will and determinism as regards human actions, there still remains other problems which are of utmost importance. We have not only argued that human freedom entails that one is able to choose from a limited variety of possible alternatives, but also that man's actions to a certain extent reflect his past influences, some of which he could not control. But the problem is, when we hold one responsible for certain actions, what degree of his present influences or circumstances do we take into consideration and what degree of his past influences do we allow? To put the same question differently, what criteria do we use to hold one responsible or not

for a particular action? Subsequently, why and when do we have to forgive, praise or blame an individual for certain actions? These problems form the content for our next chapter.

CHAPTER III

3.00 Moral Responsibility, Discipline and Punishment

We have attempted to argue in the previous chapter that some types or degrees of both determinism and freedom are operational within man. Connected with this proposition is the concept of moral responsibility which seems to be the basis of the practice or moral judgments which we make, not only upon others but also upon ourselves. These moral judgments have their external manifestations through praises, blames, rewards and punishments. Therefore, the main objective here is to attempt to give among other things, answers to questions that were posed at the end of Chapter II. That is, within what types of determinism and freedom does the concept of moral responsibility function? And finally, why and under what circumstances do we usually forgive, praise or blame (punish) someone or a group for certain actions?

Thus, the first section of the chapter discusses the concept of responsibility, the second section, the concept of discipline, the third section, the concept of punishment and the justification of the institution of punishment, in the light of free will and determinism.

3.10 The Concept of Responsibility

The concept of responsibility like many other social terms is rather elusive. The term becomes even more so when used under different disciplines of study. A good illustration of this fact is provided in cases where the philosophers and the social scientists attach different meanings to the concept of responsibility in its relationship

to the problem of free will and determinism.

Philosophical discussions over the concept of responsibility normally show some inadequacies which I think are due to the tendency by the philosophers to ignore what the scientists have contributed about causes, especially in medical and legal fields. On the other hand, the lawyers, the probation officers, the psychiatrists and the social scientists in general more often than not hold views or decisions whose philosophical assumptions they may not be aware of.

There is also a practical problem of defining the term responsibility in that in most of its various senses, it is tied up with morality. This usually has the implications that different societies are likely to have different definitions of morality and subsequently different definitions of the concept of responsibility even when the facts are the same (the 'is-ought' problem in Ethics). This is probably why it is difficult, if not impossible to have a universal procedure that could be used to govern all our moral judgments at particular situational levels.

In his very commendable work, Hart¹ distinguishes four different senses of the term responsibility as follows:

- (a) Role - Responsibility
- (b) Causal - Responsibility
- (c) Liability - Responsibility
- (d) Capacity - Responsibility

However, it should be pointed out that Hart's classification is just one of the many that have been provided by different scholars. The

¹H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 211-212.

appropriateness of adopting the above classification is that it seems to include most of all the major classifications given by many other scholars without at the same time confusing the readers.

Role-responsibility is for example, applicable when we maintain that a teacher is responsible for the good conduct of his students, or the parents are responsible for the education of their children. In such cases, we find that a general procedure has been drawn which indicates that whoever occupies a certain distinctive position or office in a social organization, be it formal or informal, is responsible for the duties pertaining to that position or office. Role-responsibility is also a very common sociological term, where every member of a society is bestowed with specific duties by virtue of age and sex.

Causal-responsibility emphasizes the causal-connection between an event and its causes. In this sense, the term is applicable to both animate and inanimate beings. Ordinarily, we usually say that the drought last year was responsible for the poor yield which consequently was responsible for the famine in the country. Again, we would normally say that the principal's 'no compromise position' was responsible for the students' three days strike. This sense of the term responsibility would be better understood perhaps if we contrasted it with a sense of moral responsibility in general. When we hold someone morally responsible for a certain action, it is considered justifiable either to praise or blame him for the action, since it is assumed that he was free when he acted. When we praise or blame someone for a state of affairs, for example, when we blame the principal as being responsible for the students' strike, we are

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disapproving the state of affairs in question (the students' strike) and at the same time disapproving the principal who freely caused the state of affairs.

In the case of the drought being responsible for the poor yield and hence, the famine in the country, we usually disapprove the state of affairs (the poor yield and the famine) but we cannot blame the drought in the same way that we blame the principal for causing the strike. However, we do have instances where a person is held causally responsible for an action without being morally responsible for the same action. Thus, if someone killed a man, we may say that the killer was causally responsible but not morally responsible for the death if we realised that this killer was insane at the time of the killing. If on the other hand, the killer was sane (no reason found to justify that the killer was not free during the killing) then we would hold him both causally and morally responsible for the killing. So, while causal-responsibility is applicable to both inanimate and animate beings, moral responsibility is applicable to human beings, not in all cases but only when we think that the concerned people possessed the power of acting as free agents.

Liability-responsibility, sometimes known as strict liability has a technical touch in law. Although liability-responsibility is subsumed under the general notion of moral responsibility in the sense that it concerns human beings as free agents, its causal-connection between cause and its affects need not be direct. This fact is exemplified in a case where a shopkeeper is fined for over-charging even when the offence is committed by his employee. Again, in most cases of liability-responsibility, the consequences of the

action are more emphasized than its intentions. Hence, I think we would not be wrong if we asserted that the differences between liability responsibility and causal-responsibility is that, while in liability-responsibility we tend to ignore the intentions of an action, in causal-responsibility, the intentions are simply not there.

Capacity-responsibility, I think, is the most important sense of the term responsibility in a general moral sense. It is important both because it is connected with the general assumption that man has the ability to choose what to do and not to do, and in the sense that it forms the basis for all the other particular senses of responsibility within the framework of moral responsibility. Thus, taking the four senses of responsibility stipulated by Hart, we could make two valuable dichotomies of the concept 'responsibility': causal and moral responsibility.

Causal responsibility as said before would be applicable to both inanimate and animate beings while moral responsibility is exclusively applicable to human beings who we assume to possess psychological freedom. As is likely to be realised, causal-responsibility is more general and would be seen as including the notion of moral responsibility. On the other hand, the general notion of moral responsibility would be understood as including legal or liability responsibility, moral responsibility in a narrower sense and role-responsibility. Of course, there is no strict exclusivity between these senses of responsibility under the notion of moral responsibility in general. To illustrate this proposition, I have in mind a case where one has been found guilty of murder. In such a situation, it is common for the murderer to be held responsible both morally (in a narrower sense) and

legally. What this means is that the murderer has contravened a moral sanction as well as the law of the land. The difference between sanctions or moral norms and laws is usually that in most societies, sanctions are informal rules without any definite methods of maintenance, while laws are usually formal with well spelt out procedures as regards their maintenance. Of course it should be noted that more often than not, laws are formulated where there occurs a high frequency of individuals' contravention of sanctions that are considered very important in society. This proposition could drive us to the logical conclusion that legal institutions are based on the moral structures in a society. This would mean that laws are expected to safeguard and to minimize what a society considers as right and wrong actions respectively.

Of the two major senses I have identified (causal responsibility and moral responsibility in general) therefore, I contend that what connects them is the idea of "causal connection" between cause and its effects either directly or indirectly. On the other hand, the other senses of responsibility subsumed under moral responsibility in general are connected by the notion of 'accountability' or what Hart refers to as 'capacity-responsibility'. Thus, from now on, our interest is going to tend towards one of the two classes of responsibility: namely, moral responsibility which is more closely connected with human actions.

But we have been trying to analyse what the notion of moral responsibility means without at the same time trying to precisely indicate what conditions are necessary for the application of the concept beyond indicating that it involved man as a free agent. However,

many moralists have been wrestling with this problem for a long time and their contributions would be of value to us. For example, in his treatment of some ethical issues, Aristotle conceded that, one would be morally responsible for an action or state of affairs only if the action was voluntary. That is to say, voluntary actions were the only ones for which a person could either be praised or be blamed. But what precisely did Aristotle mean by a voluntary action? It is that action which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances involving the action. To clarify the meaning of a voluntary action even further, Aristotle contrasts it with an involuntary action which is supposed to have taken place either under compulsion or owing to ignorance. A compulsive action he adds, is that whose cause is external to the agent so that he contributes nothing to it.²

Aristotle gives two examples of acts which he considers to be compulsive: first, when at sea, a captain is carried off course by a strong wind; second, a captain who is forced to take another course by his crew members. Further, Aristotle cites what he considers as borderline cases (neither completely voluntary nor

²The discussion is paraphrased in J. Glover, Responsibility. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1970), pp. 4-12, from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book 2.

³The contentions are quoted in J. Glover, ibid., p. 13 from Bradley's Ethical Studies.

involuntary actions) such as when a captain of a ship is forced to throw his cargo overboard during a storm to avoid being drowned or a case where a man obeys a tyrant who threatens to kill the man's family if the man does not obey the orders.

The weakness of Aristotle's argument that voluntary actions should not be compulsive is its vagueness, especially if we attempt to understand his definition of the term 'compulsion' from the examples cited above. In these examples, when the ship is blown off course by the wind, it is true that in such circumstances the captain could do nothing to stop the state of affairs. But it is also noted that the example of the captain being forced to take a different course by his crew members and the other one of a man being forced to obey a tyrant or else his family is killed are in a way similar, although Aristotle would like to see them differently. The two examples are similar in that both the captain and the man still had alternatives that they could have taken. Both could have decided to defy their assailants' orders and be ready to take the consequences. Yet the example of the captain being forced to take a different course by his crew members is cited to illustrate an involuntary action while the case of the man who is forced to obey the tyrant's orders is taken as being illustrative of a voluntary action. However, Aristotle could have been right to claim that the captain who is forced to take a different course by his crew members was not free if we interpret the proposition that 'the captain was forced to take a different course by his crew members' to mean that actually the captain was physically forced to steer the ship to a different direction, for by then the

captain would have no alternative from which to choose from. The next condition, ignorance, that Aristotle considered as a good candidate for absolving one from moral responsibility for an action is not very important for our purpose. Its triviality obtains because it seems confusing for Aristotle asserts that an action done through ignorance is involuntary only when it causes the agent some subsequent pain or regret. Other actions done through ignorance (but causing no pain) while not voluntary are not involuntary either.

At a later date, F.H. Bradley argued that, three conditions must be fulfilled if one was justly to be held morally responsible (moral in a narrower sense). The three conditions are that:

- (a) One must be throughout one identical person;
- (b) The deed must have belonged to him - it must have been his;
- (c) Responsibility implies a moral agent. No one is accountable who is not capable of knowing (not who does not know) the moral quality of his acts.³

Bradley's first condition that one must be the same person if he was to be held responsible for an action, could only be applied in cases where a man is directly involved in an action. If we interpret the condition thus, then we are likely to realise that this rules out what Hart identified as role-responsibility and liability-responsibility. But it is obvious that these senses of moral responsibility in general are very much recognized and practised in our society. An example of this is as mentioned earlier, the commonly held view that parents are responsible for the good conduct

³The contentions are quoted in J. Glover, ibid, p. 13 from Bradley's Ethical Studies.

of their children. Here the parents are not directly involved with their children's actions and yet we are ready to hold them morally responsible. Thus, good as it might be, this condition for one to be held morally responsible for one's action is too restrictive to be of any use.

Discussing his second condition for one to be held responsible; that the deed must have belonged to me, Bradley distinguishes what he calls 'absolute' and 'relative' compulsion. Absolute compulsion is the production, in the body or mind of an animate being, of a result not related as a consequence to its will. Relative compulsion is a mere threat of absolute compulsion and according to Bradley it does not qualify as a condition for absolving one from moral responsibility for his actions. Actions done under absolute compulsion include those performed in a state of terror or great bodily weakness, where there was no conscious exercise of the agent's will. In that light, I think Bradley would be right to hold morally responsible for his action, the man who was forced to obey the tyrant's orders in Aristotle's example cited earlier. This is so because Bradley would claim that the man is still responsible for making a choice between two evils: doing something he detests or losing his beloved family. As Glover has correctly argued, this condition is inadequate in that it leaves out of account the possibility of an act which results from the agent's choice but where we would normally say that the choice itself was made under compulsion.⁴ Thus, it seems obvious to me that the man who acted under the tyrant's orders would be absolved from moral

⁴ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

responsibility for his action. This is so for we would consider that he acted under compulsion. This is the sense of 'compel' that Bradley seems to be ignoring, which is the one that is usually referred to, when, judging actions as moral. This sense of 'compel' is the more reasonable in that for most of our actions, we are always making choices between various alternatives. For example, the man in Aristotle's cited case chose the well being of his family in doing what he did not approve. However, even having said that, we still have a problem of putting down precisely the conditions that would justify every action as compulsive, so that one is absolved from moral responsibility. This I suppose is partly because these conditions are not unanimously agreed upon by everybody and partly because each case has some of its unique elements. For instance, we might ask how much torture should be inflicted to a person to do something he does not approve so much that we would be justified to absolve him from moral responsibility for the action.

When we come to Bradley's third condition for moral responsibility to apply; that only those who are capable of knowing the moral quality of their action are responsible, we realise that this is a direct denial of Aristotle's view that general ignorance of what one ought to do is no excuse. Hence, the disagreement between the two scholars is moral rather than factual. Therefore, while Bradley is ready to absolve a psychopath from moral responsibility for his actions, Aristotle is ready to hold him responsible. While Bradley's position is more consonant with our ordinary use of the term moral responsibility in the narrower sense I think, Aristotle's position is more favourable in the sense of Hart's liability-responsibility or the sociological

role responsibility, which tend to down-play the intentions in making moral judgments over actions.

We have attempted at a definition of the term 'moral responsibility' and we have also roughly outlined the general conditions that are usually used to absolve one from responsibility (the factors that contribute to these general conditions includes immature minds, mental illness and bodily weaknesses). But we still ask the question: What is the utility of the concept of moral responsibility in a social context?

One of the justifications cited as regards the social benefits of the concept of moral responsibility is illustrated through the practices of blame and praise. It is claimed that blame is supposed to be a registration of our disapproval so that, whoever is disapproved could stop from doing the disapproved action, and change for the better (what we approve). At the same time, our disapproval of the man might act as a warning to others who may be inclined to perform similar actions. All this is done in the name of enhancing the well being of both the individual and the society at large. Glover points out that, even if we do not know whether it is possible to have a world where blame never existed, we still make moral judgments upon others and upon ourselves (self-reproach). Following the same line of argument, many moralists claim that, without the concept of moral responsibility in the background, it would be difficult to blame or praise.

If blame and praise as social practices are useful as is suggested from what we have just said, it seems to be equally correct to assert that the concept of moral responsibility is useful in the social sphere.

Hence, blame and praise provide an appropriate link between the concept of moral responsibility and morality. Of course, there are other moralists (those who take a deterministic approach) who have argued that blame, as a method of deterrence and behaviour-change is inefficient, hence, the uselessness of the concept of moral responsibility. However, arguments for and against the concept of moral responsibility as regards behaviour modification will be treated in more detail when we discuss the concept of punishment and its practices.

3.20 Discipline

We have attempted to clarify the confusion that is inherent in the concept of moral responsibility in general and its connection with human actions. In this section and the next, we shall try to argue that the concept of moral responsibility is usually presumed as the basis of punishment and praise. Again we hope to establish that punishment and praise are among the social devices of behaviour modification subsumed under the term discipline. Here, punishment will include both formal and informal blames. Similarly, praise will mean both formal and informal commendations. So, whatever is their nature, punishment is meant to be unpleasant while praise is meant to be pleasant to the receiving end. Finally, our discussion is biased towards punishment.

The term 'discipline' is etymologically rooted in a learning situation. Its core meaning is related to the idea of conforming to rules, norms or orders.⁵ Thus, it is argued that in the process of

⁵ R.S. Peters, Ethics & Education. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 267.

acquiring knowledge, it is essential that we learn the basic rules that govern each discipline or form of knowledge and adhere to them. In language-learning, we have to be disciplined in the rules of grammar of the particular language. In logic, we have to command the fundamental rules that usually govern our thinking procedure. Again, in a rather different way, we observe that the individual members of a society are most of the time trying to conform to some normative rules, or the laws of the land. This is a rather more social idea of the term discipline, which is connected with our moral systems. It is in this idea of discipline that we are particularly interested in our discussion.

However, in both senses of discipline, we recognize what we refer to as external and internal discipline. External discipline would be illustrated in a case where one is forced to conform to certain external rules by an authority. This is what we normally mean when we say that the soldiers are well 'disciplined'. Again, we do talk of a disciplined class in a school environment. On the other hand, internal discipline is sometimes referred to as self-discipline or self-control. In a learning situation, we may find a teacher imposing conformity to rules that are inherent in various subjects. In mathematics, for example, a teacher could provide the students with a lot of exercises on the multiplication of fractions. The teacher expects that the students command the rules and may be comprehend their usefulness. Later the students are expected to be able to use the rules without the teacher's assistance.

Further, in the process of rearing, normally the children are taught to conform to some norms, although they are not mature enough

to understand why the parents or even the teachers require that they conform to them. The parents or the teachers cannot let the children free to do whatever they want simply because they (the children) do not understand why they have to conform. For example, the children have to be taught to obey their superiors even with their immature understanding. The parents and the teachers force the children to conform to certain norms in the expectation that when they grow up, they will come to understand and even appreciate the importance of some of the norms they were forced to conform to externally. This, it is argued, would be the appropriate stage when we could say that they (the children who are now mature) have gained self discipline or internal discipline. On the same vein, Reid⁶ and Nash⁷ contend that external discipline should be justified only if it is a means to self-discipline. So far, I do agree with them by adding that whether it is in learning situations or in moral situations, externally imposed discipline should always presuppose self-discipline.

But are all the methods applied in externally imposed discipline justifiable? We shall here only treat the institution of punishment which is regarded as one of the popular methods for keeping externally imposed discipline. However, it is important in this connection to mention that sometimes people try to equate discipline with punishment. For example, a teacher may be heard to say 'I am going to discipline you', when he is in the process of meting out corporal punishment to a student. I would say that this is a loose way of using language.

⁶Reid, op. cit., p. 132.

⁷P. Nash, Authority and freedom: An introduction to the philosophy of Education. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 110-114.

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Perhaps the assumption behind the statement is that the punishment is going to make the student conform to the rules he has contravened. So, the term discipline is wide and includes blame, punishment, praise and reward, among the methods of making people submit to rules.

3.30 Punishment

There are many definitions that have been proposed as to the meaning of the concept 'punishment'. Two examples will be cited to illustrate some of the important notions inherent in the concept of punishment. Benn and Peters have identified the following criteria for the use of the term punishment; that:

- (i) it must involve an 'evil, an unpleasantness to the victim';
- (ii) it must be of an offence (actual or supposed);
- (iii) It must be of an offender (actual or supposed);
- (iv) it must be the work of personal agencies (i.e. not merely the natural consequences of an action);
- (v) it must be imposed by authority (real or supposed), conferred by the system of rules against which the offence has been committed.⁸

The two authors add to the above five criteria (which were quoted from Professor Flew's work 'The Justification of Punishment') another one; that the unpleasantness should be an essential part of what is intended and not merely incidental to some other aims.

In the same way, Hart argues that the central elements in the concept of punishment are that:

- (i) it must involve pain or other consequences considered unpleasant;

⁸S.I. Benn & R.S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 174.

- (ii) it must be of an offence against legal rules;
- (iii) it must be of an actual or supposed offender, for his offence;
- (iv) it must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender;
- (v) it must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by legal system against which the offence is committed.⁹

From the above two quotations, it is manifest that the most important or rather the core element inherent in the concept of punishment is an intentional infliction of pain or unpleasantness to an individual or a group by an authority (actual or supposed) for a breach of a rule or rules. The infliction of pain or unpleasantness I suggest, is supposed to be for the well being of the offender in particular and the whole society in general, in that a greater evil or pain is prevented to occur in future. Of course, we note that Hart's criteria are strongly biased towards legal punishment.

However, rather than the above strict definition of punishment used in law and in morality in general, there are other scholars who would like to define it in another way. This somewhat loose definition of the term punishment is exemplified by the following two quotations:

Punishment is very common in nature and we learn a great deal from it. A child runs awkwardly, falls, and is hurt; he touches a bee and is stung; he takes a bone from a dog and is bitten; and as a result he learns not to do these things again.¹⁰

Also;

A punishment is a noxious stimulus, one which will support, by its termination or

⁹ Hart. op.cit., p. 5.

¹⁰ B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1972), p. 60.

omission, the growth of new escape or avoidance responses.¹¹

From the two quotations (10 & 11), it is evident that the term punishment defies all the criteria given by Hart (punishment as applicable in legal and moral situations), with the exception of the criterion that punishment entails some kind of pain or unpleasantness. In fact, only this unpleasantness criterion that is recognized as applicable to punishment in the second sense. This second definition of punishment is rather deterministic and is generally used by the social scientists who are inclined to denying the utility of the concept of moral responsibility and consequently their denial of the doctrine of free will in man. It is also noted that this deterministic definition of punishment would be justified as an efficient method of deterring an organism from behaving in certain ways.

Finally, there is another sense of punishment which is used in ordinary language by the layman where one for example would simply say that 'the weaker boxer is receiving a lot of punishment from his opponent'. Here, although punishment is equated with pain or suffering just as what we have referred to as a deterministic definition of punishment, it is different in the sense that it does not seem to be based on any principle; punishment is just another word for suffering. In the following pages, we are going to put more emphasis upon the concept of punishment as used in legal and moral situations.

But how are we going to justify the infliction of punishment (punishment as applied in legal and moral situations which are based

¹¹R.L. Solomon, 'Punishment' in R.H. Walters, J.A. Cheyne and R.K. Banks (Ed.), Punishment: Selected Readings. (Cox & Wyman Ltd., London, 1972), p.58.

on the concept of moral responsibility) to others, especially when we note that one of its important elements is unpleasantness? Traditionally, three answers have been proposed for the above question. There are some scholars who have argued that punishment is both a deterrent as well as a reformatory device subsumed under methods of discipline. This answer is related to the utilitarian view propounded by Mill and Bentham. Thus, the utilitarians hold punishment as a necessary evil; that it is used to prevent a more serious evil that might befall a man if it (punishment) was not inflicted. As a deterrent, the aim of punishment is said to discourage the wrong-doer and others from doing what is considered to be wrong. As a reformatory device, punishment is supposed to modify the behaviour-pattern of the individual punished and those who witnessed its infliction.

However, there are others who often argue that punishment is retributive. Punishment as retribution is sometimes described as an eye for an eye for it is conceded that, the idea is based on the principle of justice in that one gets what he is worth or he deserves; that is, if the authority failed to administer punishment to an offender, then that would be unfair to the offended.¹² To distinguish between the two views of punishment, it is argued that punishment as retribution is backward-oriented while the utilitarian view is forward-oriented. This is interpreted to mean that in retribution one considers the offence committed, with an aim of meting out the same or almost the equivalent of what the offender had done, so that justice is done to him and the offended person. On the other hand,

¹² J.P. Day, 'Retributive Punishment', in Mind, Vol. 87, No. 348, 1978.

in deterrence and reformation, one is always looking forward to what the given punishment is going to affect the offender and those witnessing the punishment.

Having outlined the traditional justification of the institution of punishment, one question that is sure to emerge is whether punishment could be justified solely on one of the above views. If that is possible, the other views may be rendered redundant.

Of the two views, punishment as retribution is the most attacked. But we may be forced to ask, is punishment as retribution as bad as it is described by its opponents? To answer this question, we would like first of all to consider some of the core elements inherent in punishment. This approach becomes even more useful when we note that a deliberate infliction of pain or unpleasantness to an 'offender' when believing him to be innocent of the alleged offence could not be termed as 'punishment'. So, since it is considered that what the offender is being punished for was painful or unpleasant to the offended, following the principal of justice, it would not be fair that the offender be repaid with something painful or unpleasant. Thus, logically, it seems that punishment is retributive by definition. Of course, the meaning of punishment does not hinder us from raising an ethical question as to whether it is right or wrong to inflict pain to an offender. I think that we would only be sure that punishment is right if we could succeed in showing beyond doubts that the principle of justice which punishment as retribution is based on is higher on the hierarchy of values than the related values such as happiness as regards the offender.

All the same, we could strengthen the argument for retaining

punishment as retribution by contending that its retributive element does not necessarily exhaust its (punishment) potential utility. So, rather than being retributive, punishment could at the same time serve both as a deterrent as well as a reformative device. I think Nash puts it aptly when he concedes that punishment is retributive in nature and that its justification could be seen in terms of its deterrent effects, meanwhile reform is taken as its ultimate aim.¹³ Thus, it seems to me more reasonable to argue that the above elements (retribution, deterrence and reformation) do enrich the institution of punishment. And that we cannot do without any of the elements without at the same time distorting this meaning of punishment. In the same way, we would see punishment as having more than one purpose. Thus, in any one particular punishment, one element is likely to be more pronounced than the others depending on the nature of the offence committed. I suspect that it is when we unproportionally elevate one of the elements at the expense of the others that we encounter problems on the justification of punishment. However, there are still more serious arguments against the institution of punishment of which we are going to treat in more details.

3.31 The Elimination of Punishment Campaign

Without further arguments, we have in the previous section tried to argue that the institution of punishment is important in social life. That the three traditional elements; retribution, deterrence and reformation are inherent in it. But today, there are those

¹³Nash, op.cit., pp. 115-116.

who, contrary to the above position argue that punishment defined in the moral and legal sense should be done away with. This group of abolitionists of punishment (as they are commonly referred to) is composed of the psychologists, the psychiatrists, the sociologists and other experts with a scientific outlook which is essentially deterministic. Although these abolitionists differ in many respects, they are brought together by this contention they hold that punishment as is commonly known traditionally is irrelevant as a social institution.

But before we can get down to discussing the above contentions, it is important to be clear as in our mind as to what the abolitionists mean when they concede that punishment be eliminated in the society. As one of the staunch supporters of the abolition of punishment campaign, Skinner as we saw earlier (footnote 10) defines punishment as any unpleasant stimulus which is likely to cause an animal to avoid or escape a particular behaviour pattern. This definition indicates that the term 'punishment' is not exclusively for human being alone but involves also other lower animals. So, if we take that punishment is a deliberate infliction of pain or unpleasantness for a disapproved intentional behaviour, we shall perhaps come to realise that the abolitionists are asking that the notion of blame, which is associated with intentional behaviour, be eliminated. Thus, I would agree with Ross when he states that punishment as disapproval and not punishment as suffering is the target of the abolitionists.¹⁴ Consequently, this would call for the abolition

¹⁴Ross, op.cit., p. 69.

of the concept of moral responsibility presupposed by the idea of disapproval or blame. But how do the abolitionists support their stand?

There are many arguments for the elimination of punishment, however, there are two basic ones. The first argument propounded by the abolitionists states that the concept of moral responsibility (which is taken as the basis of punishment in the moral sense) is redundant if we take that the purposes of punishment are to deter or/and possibly to reform the behaviour patterns of an individual concerned. This has the implications that the notion of capacity-responsibility, which we argued that it is inherent in the concept of moral responsibility is eliminated, so that the offenders' relation to an offence is on the level of what we defined as causal-responsibility. This relationship between an offender and his offence would then compare well with the relationship between drought as a cause and famine as an effect in our earlier example. Essentially the abolitionists usually seem to be denying the relevance of the seemingly autonomous nature of man with regard to his behaviour. In other words, they are arguing that the free will that man seems to be exercising is not relevant to warrant him to be blameable.

The above argument is supported by what is already discussed (in Chapter two) that man is determined by both his biological and environmental elements which he may not have control of. Therefore, the abolitionists advocate that punishment as a deliberate infliction of pain for an alleged intentional disapproved behaviour be replaced with a system designed as a means of preventive and reformative social

hygiene.¹⁵ This is because they argue, when we know that someone is sick normally we do not blame him for the sickness though we are ready to do everything possible (even inflicting some suffering as a means) to make sure he recovers from the disease. Thus, instead of categorising people as offenders and non-offenders, we are advised to see them as sick and healthy people respectively. The reason for this contends Oruka is that:

Both disease and crime have causes external to the 'will' and desire of their carriers or promoters. It would therefore follow that the right way to reduce crime is not to punish the criminal but rather to 'punish' (if this is possible) the factors (the criminal forces) that breed criminal behaviour.¹⁶

In my view, if the abolitionists are arguing for the elimination of moral responsibility (hence the elimination of the institution of punishment in the traditional sense) on the premise that the truth of the determinism thesis necessarily denies the truth of what we defined earlier as psychological freedom (free will), then the foundation of their argument is faulty. The reason for so saying is that it would seem that the abolitionists are equating the biological and the environmental influences of man with what we defined as metaphysical determinism whose core element is the principle of causality. I take the argument to be faulty in that however precisely the metaphysical determinism thesis is formulated, it defies a straight-forward empirical proposition. In other words, the thesis can neither be confirmed nor be refuted conclusively for the truth of it transcends

¹⁵ H. Odera Oruka, Punishment and Terrorism in Africa. (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1976), pp. 86-87.

¹⁶ Oruka, ibid., p. 87.

all finite bounds of experience. But at the same time, I think the abolitionists are articulate enough to realise that whether meta-physical determinism thesis is conclusive or not, it remains a fact that biological and environmental factors are the basis of human behaviour. In this light, I would say that the abolitionists are underscoring an important point (though they tend to overdramatize it) that to eradicate an individual's criminal behaviour, rather than punishing him, it would be only fair that we considered his basic constituents as the causes: his biological and the environmental factors. This is perhaps an aspect of man that most of the legal institutions tend to ignore when dealing with an offender. And I feel this is perhaps why traditional punishment has proved rather inefficient as a basic instrument of behaviour-control.

The second argument for the elimination of moral responsibility and therefore the elimination of punishment as disapproval is rather moderate as compared with the first one. In itself, it does not necessarily deny the institution of punishment in principle but finds its practice a difficult one to sustain with regards to its alleged aim. Thus, Barbara Wootton, another staunch abolitionist argues that we do not need to prove that the determinism thesis is true in order to maintain that the concept of moral responsibility is irrelevant as a basis of punishment. For her, if the main aim of punishment is prevention and not retribution, then, whether the concept of moral responsibility is meaningful or not, it is not a condition for punishment (punishment without the element of retribution). That is to say, she further argues, it is unnecessary to ask whether an offender is, or is not a free agent or a responsible person in the

sense that he could have done otherwise than he did, if he wished.¹⁷

Barbara Wootton's argument is faulty for it is based on the premise that the aim of punishment is always prevention and never retribution. However, the argument seems faulty only when viewed against the traditional sense of punishment. What we are saying is that although Barbara Wootton is entitled to her moral position with regard to the aim of punishment in moral and legal contexts, this does not square well with the ordinary usage. This is perhaps evident in most complex societies where two types of laws exist under one legal system: criminal and civil laws. Consequently, we have in such societies criminal and civil offences respectively. Thus, if a person is accused of having misappropriated money belonging to a certain firm or a co-operative society, he (the accused) might be convicted under criminal laws; an offence against the state. But the same offence could be treated under the civil laws so that, the culprit might be asked to pay back all the money he had misused. So, even if the two types of punishment the offender gets are fundamentally preventive, nevertheless, the civil laws do stress the notion of retribution or compensation. In the light of this consideration, I would still maintain that the notion of disapproval in punishment is important for it is in itself a form of behaviour-influencing reaction. Furthermore, in many cases, especially when disapproval is expressed by a respected authority, for example a father or a Churchman, its effect may be such that the judgment is accepted by the offender, taken up in his own moral consciousness, and perhaps in this

¹⁷ Ross, op.cit., p. 88, quoting Barbara Wootton's Social Science and Social Pathology, p. 247.

way become a determining factor in his own future behaviour not just because of fear or unpleasantness of punishment (disapproval) but from the respect for what is considered as right and just. In this way then, I would suggest we use punishment as disapproval when we have reasons to believe that the offender was morally responsible not in the sense that he had the ability to do other than what he did but rather in the sense that our disapproval-reaction would have a chance of influencing his future actions. But although we have argued for the retention of the concept of moral responsibility as the basis of punishment entailing moral disapproval for certain actions, we have still to make an effort towards the task of establishing the criteria we would use to make sure that such and such actions are punishable; that is, our disapproval is likely to positively influence the behaviour of the offender.

The second part of the above argument against the institution of punishment due to its impracticability, states that even if the concept of moral responsibility is meaningful as a basis of punishment as disapproval, we have no objective method of finding out whether a certain action was punishable; whether our type of disapproval would be likely to change the behaviour-pattern of the offender. What the abolitionists are saying is that we have no objective (scientific) way of penetrating the psyche, of the alleged offender in order that we judge him an offender. Furthermore, even if we are able to determine objectively whether one had the capacity to control his actions, it would still be difficult to award punishment proportionate to the offence.

I must say I find this argument rather intriguing for it seems

true that we do not have any objective method of the likes of science to determine whether one for example had his psychological freedom when he acted in a certain way and if so, what type of punishment would have deterred the offender from committing the same offence in future. However, I again note some weaknesses inherent in this argument especially when it suggests that since we cannot determine clearly punishable from unpunishable actions, then we have to treat all disagreeable actions as being a result of sickness. For me, I would suggest that we still could roughly identify through experience and modern breakthroughs in the study of man what are punishable and what are unpunishable actions. Our basis in so doing would be the applicability of disapproval. If we have evidence that certain actions are likely to be positively modifiable then we would term them punishable. On the other hand, if we have reasons to believe that certain actions could not be modified by the notion of disapproval assumed in punishment, then we would call them unpunishable. Thus, for those actions earmarked as punishable, we would try to use punishment as a modifier of behaviour. For the actions categorized as unpunishable we would have to apply other means of behaviour control. For instance, bedwetting was thought to be a punishable behaviour but of late, it has been realised that it cannot be modified by disapproval. To overcome it, we are advised to use psychological treatment.

When we come to actions which we ordinarily term as negligences such as a case where a driver drove a faulty car and caused the death of a person, I should think that some disapproval might help the driver to bring to focus the importance of being more careful not to

ever drive faulty cars. But here we still have a problem. One could rightly argue that the driver might be upholding the same principle as the punished; that it is morally wrong to deprive someone's life as a result of negligence. If so then, punishment is not going to teach the driver anything that he did not know before. I would agree with the argument but I think that perhaps an appropriate punishment could serve as a vivid reminder of the seriousness of the consequences of the driver's negligent action.

A more complicated problem arises when we attempt to analyse punishment in relation to what we usually categorize as deliberate actions. For instance when an offender does something wrong although he knows that it is disapproved by the society. In such a situation I do not think there is any type of punishment that would stop this kind of deliberate offender. Thus, although the offender might stop his action, probably because of the fear of the anticipated punishment, he is still a potential offender as far as he believes that he is right and the society is wrong. To succeed in modifying the behaviour of the above offender, perhaps it would require that we consider the reasons (the abolitionist would like to call them causes) behind his stand.

So far then, our argument has led us to identify two types of behaviour or actions: punishable behaviour where punishment as disapproval is likely to be an effective tool of behaviour-modification, and unpunishable behaviour where punishment as disapproval is not likely to work as a tool of behaviour-modification simply because the person concerned has no immediate control over his disapproved behaviour, and unpunishable behaviour where punishment as

disapproval is not likely to work as a tool of behaviour modification, because the person concerned is convinced that his behaviour is right.

Thus, for any behaviour-pattern that we may wish to modify, it seems always advisable to consider whether it is punishable or not. When we are sure the behaviour pattern is punishable, then we would need to assess the type of punishment that would be most appropriate. When the behaviour-pattern is unpunishable because the person involved has no immediate control, we would try to look for causes beyond him as a free agent. But when we discover that the behaviour pattern is unpunishable because the concerned person has reasons to think that he is right, then it would be advisable if we tried to find out whether he has a point. Perhaps it is important to point that even in situations where punishment as disapproval is likely to be effective as a tool of behaviour modification, its success is low. To be sure, it has to be reinforced with other methods of behaviour modification. Perhaps Hart is expressing the same point when he says:

But it is important to be realistic: to be aware of the social cost of making the social control of anti-social behaviour dependent on this principle punishment and to recognize cases where the benefits secured by it are minimal. We must be prepared both to consider exceptions to the principle on their merits and to be careful that unnecessary invasions of it are not made even in the guise of 'treatment' instead of frankly penal methods.¹⁸

To conclude, we have considered the philosophical problems surrounding the theory of punishment. We have also looked into t

¹⁸Hart, op.cit., p. 183.

practical problems involving punishment such as the problem of accurately identifying what human actions could be considered punishable and unpunishable, or if actions are considered punishable, what measure of punishment is to be meted out, or alternatively, if actions were to be considered unpunishable, what other methods of behaviour-control are effective. Even if we have to accept the above problems with regard to the practice of punishment, still I find no any forceful argument that would incline me to equate punishment (as disapproval) with 'treatment' as propounded by the abolitionists. In a word, it is better to make the best of a bad situation rather than giving up.

3.50 Conclusion

We have observed that the concept of moral responsibility is connected with psychological freedom which is presupposed when judging human actions. But our attempt to be precise about what human behaviour that the concept of moral responsibility could appropriately be applied to has just succeeded in citing some general criteria, noting that each particular action has to be judged on its own merits as regards whether the person involved was morally responsible or not. Further, it is only when we could judge a person as morally responsible for his actions, either directly or indirectly that we would go ahead and blame or praise him whichever is appropriate. Again, I think it would be wrong to hold man morally responsible for all his actions. This is perhaps why the abolitionists arguments for the removal of the concept of moral responsibility as a basis of punishment and replacing it with treatment cannot succeed in a social context. Thus, the distinction between morally responsible and morally non-responsible actions is always there, though it is sometimes

obscure.

All in all, in this chapter we have been trying to argue that blames and praises are based on the concept of moral responsibility and that the concept of moral responsibility is on the other hand based on what we have defined as psychological freedom. But psychological freedom does not necessarily defy social freedom, ethical determinism, social determinism, or even metaphysical determinism, for it is within them. Alternatively, there is no way that we could affirm the truth of metaphysical freedom (uncaused effects) and yet talk intelligently about praises and blames with respect to human behaviour.

Again, even if we could reasonably succeed in identifying punishable from unpunishable behaviour, still we have not answered the basic question why we have to punish (blame) someone for behaving in a manner that we consider to be wrong. I think our practice of blaming and praising is based on an assumption that there are right and wrong actions in society. It is only within such an assumption that perhaps we would be able to justify why we have to try and persuade (through blames and praises) others to behave in certain ways and not others. In that light, our next chapter will be an attempt to find out whether we have reasonable grounds in trying to persuade others to conform to what we consider to be right. Finally, we shall attempt to establish what this persuasion would mean in the school environment. This will be in the area of moral education.

CHAPTER IV

4.00 Moral Education and Discipline in School

Before we could even discuss moral education, it would save us a great deal of trouble if we first defined what morality is. Certainly, this is a term that has occupied moral philosophers for a long time. Thus, to get our functional definition of the term, it is important to examine some remarks made by those who have been using it in such phrases as 'moral behaviour', 'moral judgments' or 'moral rules'.

In one of his famous works on moral philosophy, Hare has maintained that in any moral judgment, there are two notions that are always presupposed. The first is the notion of 'universalizability'. By this he means to say that if I maintain that I ought to do X, then I am committed to maintaining that morally. Anyone else ought to do X unless there are relevant differences between the other person and myself. The next is the notion of 'prescriptivity'. Here, Hare wants to say that moral judgments are action-guiding. The action-guiding force is said to be derived from the fact that they entail imperatives: my acceptance of the principle that one ought to do X commits me to accepting the imperative: let me do X; and again my accepting the imperative commits me to doing X in the appropriate circumstances.¹

In the article "On Defining 'Morals'" Whiteley asserts:

I shall assume that any acceptable way of defining 'moral' and 'morality' must isolate something which plays a distinctive part in human life, and must enable us to distinguish matters of morality (right and wrong) from matters of taste or preferences, and matters of convenient or expediency, since it is with

¹R.M. Hare, Freedom & Reason. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962).

this matters that morality is usually contrasted.²

For him, the morality of a community consists of those ways of behaviour which each member of the community is taught, bidden and encouraged to adopt by the other members.³

Baier seems to be echoing Hare when he concedes that morality defies self-interest and that one is always acting on a principle not on any rule of thumb. Further, a moral point of view is characterized by greater universalizability in that it must be thought of as a standpoint from which principles are considered as being acted on by everyone.⁴

Finally, Gewirth indicates that though there are diverse meanings of 'morality' and 'moral', a certain core meaning may be or is detectable. Thus, for him:

... a morality is a set of categorically obligatory requirements for actions that are addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, and that are concerned with furthering the interests of persons or recipients other than or in addition to the agent or the speaker.⁵

From these few definitions, it is evident that whenever we would wish to talk about morality, we would have to remember that it presupposes certain rules or principles in a society that are supposed to guide members of that particular society as regards what is right

² C.H. Whiteley, "On Defining 'Moral'" in G. Wallace & A.D.M. Walker (ed.), The Definition of Morality. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 21-22.

³ C.H. Whiteley, "On Defining 'Moral'" in G. Wallace & A.D.M. Walker (ed.), Ibid., p. 22.

⁴ Kurt Baier, "The Moral Point of View", in G. Wallace & A.D.M. Walker, Ibid., p. 195.

⁵ A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 1.

and what is wrong. The principles should be binding both in the eyes of the individual and the society in general. Again, morality is supposed to aim for the common good of the society concerned. However, morality is not to be confused with customs, though no doubt the two are related. Unlike customs, moral principles seem to be grounded in a way that could be reasonably explained. On the other hand, moral principles are not like legal rules though they may be aiming at the same thing. While legal rules are more particular, moral principles are rather general. Moreover, in most cases, moral principles seem to form the basis of a particular legal system.⁶ Thus, morality is to be taken to mean an intelligent following of rules to the point of which is understood and upheld for the good of all in a society. That is to say, whoever follows moral rules should be ready to justify his action in connection with what is right and what is wrong, we assume. Although we realise the inadequacy of our definition of the term morality, nevertheless, we are now ready to discuss the topic of the chapter; moral education.

4.10 Moral Education

If there are controversies in the term 'education' (the technical and ordinary use of the term) then these become much more complex when we have to discuss moral education. First there is an analytical problem. That is, if we take Peters' definition in which 'education' entails something worthwhile, then the term 'moral'⁷ in the phrase

⁶H.L.A. Hart, in The Concept of Law, Chapter VI warns us not to make the mistake of thinking that a legal system must always conform to the morality of a society.

⁷The term 'moral' is prescriptive in this context. It is to be understood as being the opposite of the term 'immoral' and to be distinguished from the term moral in contexts such as 'moral responsibility'.

'moral education' becomes redundant. This is because, both the terms 'moral' and 'education' would mean something worthwhile or good. However, I think this objection could be overcome by saying that what is entailed by the term 'education' is much wider than what is entailed by the 'moral education'. Education in this sense of being worthwhile would include both moral and non-moral values as its content. On the other hand, 'moral education' would include values mostly concerned with interpersonal relationships such as honesty, freedom and justice.

But even after overcoming the apparent analytical problem we still have more substantial problems involving moral education. These problems are mostly related to the content, the procedures and the role that our school system is supposed to play in moral education. Perhaps this fact will come out illuminatively if we considered various approaches to what is referred to as moral education by some of our contemporary scholars.

The sixties saw the birth of a new approach to moral education in the Western world (mostly North America). The method is simply termed as 'Value Clarification'. The main purpose of this approach is to clarify values that individual students are committed to without, at the same time, trying to advocate any particular values as overriding others in importance. According to the proponents of this method of teaching, no individual or institution's values are to be held as examples of what is to be adhered to by everybody. This position is exemplified by the justification given below by one of the supporters of the method when he says:

Since we see values as growing from a person's experience, we would expect that different experiences would give rise to different values

and that any one person's value would be modified as his experiences accumulate and change. A person in the Antarctic would not be expected to have the same values as a person in Chicago. And a person who has an important change of patterns of experience might be expected to modify his value. Values may not be static if one's relationships to his world are not static. As guides to behavior, values evolve and mature as experiences evolve and mature.

The above passage seems to emphasize some elements in moral education. First, that different experiences are likely to evolve different values, hence the inherent relativity of values. Second, since it is obvious that we are exposed to different environment in terms of geographical positions and time, then, the advocates of Value Clarification approach are ready to accept anything that an individual student has considered to be a value.

The next method of teaching moral education to be considered is the Cognitive developmental approach. This approach is associated with Kohlberg of Harvard University. As will be evident Kohlberg and his supporters view the theory of moral education as a progress taking specific stages. This they have borrowed from the late Jean Piaget who (through research on children) was convinced that moral development is always paralleled to cognitive development. And again, that moral development like cognitive development comes in stages. Thus, Piaget identified three stages of moral development. First, the pre-moral stage where a child had no moral obligation to rules. Second, the heteronomous stage where the concept of right was equated to rules. Third, the autonomous stage where the purpose and consequences of

⁸L. Raths, M. Harmin & S.B. Simon, Selection from, "Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom", in D. Purpel & E. Ryan (eds.), Moral Education: It Comes with the Territory. (California: A. Phi Delta Publication, 1976), p. 75.

rule-following are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange.⁹

What are the supporters of Cognitive developmental approach saying? The approach is called 'cognitive' we are told, for it recognizes that moral education, just like intellectual education, has its basis on the active thinking of a child about moral issues and decisions. Again, it is termed developmental for it conceives moral education as an upward movement through specific moral stages. Therefore, Kohlberg and his associates would like to argue that although it could not be correlated to a specific degree, cognitive development plays an important role in enhancing moral development in an individual. Specifically, cognitive development is said to be a necessary condition in every stage of moral development. The next task that Kohlberg undertakes in this approach is to distinguish moral judgments from moral actions. While moral judgment is merely the ability to reason about moral issues, moral actions are the commitments of oneself to particular moral principles. Kohlberg argues that although maturity of moral reasoning is a necessary requirement for maturity of a moral action, it is not a sufficient condition.¹⁰

If it is true that mature moral reasoning is a necessary condition for a mature moral action, and that moral reasoning like any reasoning comes in hierarchical stages, then what role does the school play in the process of moral education? Kohlberg is convinced that the school and its environment should help the students to develop moral reasoning at every stage. Again, he is convinced that at every level of moral

⁹ Purpel & Ryan, Ibid., p. 177.
¹⁰ Ibid., p. 181.

development, the ultimate issue dealt with is the concept of justice. Hence, at the initial stage of moral development, the concept is confusingly understood. But at stage six, which is the highest according to Kohlberg's moral paradigm, the concept of justice and its constituents such as liberty and equality is to be clearly grasped.¹¹ The school is seen as a vehicle of accomplishing the above task.

From the Cognitive developmental approach, we first gather that there are some values that are somewhat universal or absolute. These are values which seem reasonable for everyone to commit himself to. These values however, are implicit during the initial stages of moral development. Secondly, in this approach to moral education, reasoning seems to take a key position. Thus, it could be fairly said that moral education in the cognitive developmental approach's sense is assisting the students in understanding the basic moral principles related to the concept of justice. These points will be discussed later in the chapter.

The third contemporary method of moral education to be considered is what is commonly known as 'Cognitive Approach'. This method seems to have developed as a criticism of the other two approaches discussed above for their failure to tackle all the problems in teaching about moral issues in school. Scriven, one of the advocates of the cognitive approach asserts that the Value Clarification approach is inadequate for it fails to question the basis of our morality. This failure of Value Clarification approach to interest itself with the basis of morality brings about the confusion between moral and non-moral values.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

The consequence of this confusion is a sense of relativity with regards to values. Further, Scriven castigates the development approaches to moral education for their failure to answer the question whether someone on an 'intermediate' level of moral development is more wrong on moral issues than someone at a higher level.¹²

For Scriven, a viable curriculum of moral education would be covered in three stages. The first stage is concerned with knowledge. In this stage the students are encouraged to gather knowledge and have understanding of arguments involving moral issues. The more knowledge one has the better when it comes to moral decisions. This is because real understanding tends to bring about sympathy for others; that is, the modification of the affective dimension of man.¹³ The second stage is to deal with the development of reasoning skills in moral issues. The third stage is supposed to encourage students to question the basis of ethics in general.

To assess the contribution each of the discussed approaches make to moral education, I would agree with Scriven when he accuses Value Clarification approach for its failure to distinguish moral values from non-moral values. The reason for my support of this observation is that normally, a latitude of relativity is allowed at the realm of non-moral values even for people in the same community. For instance, it is acceptable for one to like dancing, playing soccer or reading books on particular subjects even when others do not like it. In such

¹²M. Scriven, "Cognitive Moral Education" in D. Purpel & K. Ryan, Moral Education: It Comes with the Territory. (California: A Phi Delta Publication, 1976), pp. 322-3.

¹³M. Scriven, Ibid., p. 323.

situations, one is still in the level of preferences or tastes. In fact if we have to go by our definition of 'morality', then it will be clear that tastes and preferences are not among moral values.

Thus, the approach (Value Clarification) is wrong in that it does not encourage individual students to transcend or go beyond personal preferences. For that matter, I think it would be an improvement if we encouraged the students to discuss issues that involved other students. This may help them in their investigations as to whether or not there are some moral views or values which are held in common by all. Consequently, such discussions or investigations might reveal to the students that perhaps there are some basic moral principles that make it possible for people to live communally. Again, the approach seems faulty in that when, for example, a teacher respects every individual students' personal preferences on the level of actions, then the concept of social freedom is dangerously dramatized. That is, when the freedom to do what one wishes irrespective of the wishes of others, the consequence might be what we refer to as 'permissiveness', which I take to be antithesis of morality. So, although the Value Clarification approach succeeds in making the students sensitive to some of the important factors to be considered in moral issues, it would be inadequate to stop at this level. It is inadequate in that students are likely to believe that morality depends solely on individual tastes. Such students would be inadequately prepared when confronted with a real moral problem.

Kohlberg and his associates, on the other hand, seem to be stressing an important point that has been ignored by the Value Clarification approach: that for one to grasp the higher moral principles,

reasoning ability is necessary. However, cognitive-developmental approach to moral education falls short in a number of ways. Firstly, while I support Kohlberg's argument that the development of moral judgment ability is necessary for a mature moral action, the claim seems to have been pushed beyond its limits. This is perhaps indicated by Kohlberg's inability to explain why one would be unable to make a mature moral decision even when we could still say he has a mature moral judgment ability. Kohlberg attributes the inability to make mature moral decisions to a weakness of will.

Secondly, another weakness that is revealed by cognitive-developmental approach is its over-emphasizing the importance of reason at the expense of making the students aware of the moral inconsistencies and contradictions at the level of an individual. Subsequently, moral education becomes just another intellectual exercise for the students to engage in. And finally, Kohlberg as a moral educator seems to have committed the fallacy of division by trying to reduce a complex concept into, perhaps one of its constituents.¹⁴ This is when he asserts that the concept of justice is the bedrock of morality. Although I would not deny that the concept of justice is important, I would be hesitant to consider it as the sole basis of morality.

For those who advocate the cognitive approach to moral education, I think the same criticisms levelled against the cognitive-developmental approach would be used. It is difficult to see how mere knowledge about moral problems is likely to change one's behaviour towards others. The Cognitivists seem to be ignoring what the moral philosophers have been calling the 'is-ought' problem. Thus, students

¹⁴ L.A. Reid, Philosophy and Education: An Introduction. (London: Heinemann, 1962), Chapter IV. Professor Reid seems to be saying that the basis of morality is inter-personal relationship.

could be having the same knowledge about a certain moral issue but fail to concur when it came to making decisions on that same issue.

4.20 Conclusion

Looking at the question of moral education as a whole through the three approaches discussed above, a few important points seem to stick out clearly. First, each of the approaches seem to be stressing the importance of either facts concerning morals, reasoning ability about moral issues or the commitment to a moral code or moral principles. It is true that the students have to acquire some knowledge relevant to moral issues. For example, they have to be able to see school rules as tools toward a moral point of view. The students have also to see the relationship between school rules and legal rules or any other code of regulation that governs a particular interest-group.

Secondly, although general knowledge about morality is necessary, it is not sufficient. The students have to be encouraged to develop an ability in reasoning about moral issues, using the facts they already have. At this juncture, the students may come to the realisation that factual knowledge and reasoning ability are perhaps not enough in a moral decision-making situation. Thus, one would be liable to taking different alternatives even when he has the same facts about the situation in question. This fact might again expose to the student the view that moral education involves more than factual knowledge and reasoning power. It involves one being committed to certain moral principles, a fact that makes every decision involving moral issues a painful one especially when the principles involved are almost at par in importance. I think the school environment would

help the students to commit themselves to well reasoned principles by engaging them in the decision-making process. In that way, the students are bound to see some of the practical problems involved in rule-following especially where personal values conflict with the societal values in some peculiar situations.

Thirdly, it has been shown, I hope, that for any approach to moral education to succeed, a measure of freedom or openness and a measure of guidance or control is essential. The reason behind is that for the students to acquire internal discipline, as a result of external discipline, they have to understand what is involved in rule-following. For the students to understand what is involved in rule-following, they have to understand their (rules) connection with the assumed moral principles. And lastly, for the students to be able to understand the connection between school rules and general moral principles, they have to be involved personally. In other words, they have to discuss moral issues without any inhibition or intimidation. But as indicated earlier, this does not mean that students could develop morally by just reasoning or understanding moral issues. It is here that the student would need some guidance. In this light, a moral view should be exposed to them. This point is aptly put as Kristol says: "'Permissiveness' and 'authoritarianism' are indeed two possible poles of moral discourse - they are, both of them, the poles that come into existence when the centre no longer holds. The centre is authority".¹⁵ For Kristol, authority should mean the exercise of power toward some morally affirmed end in such a reasonable way as to

¹⁵J. Kristol, "Moral and Ethical Development in a Democratic Society", in D. Purpel & K. Ryan, *Op. cit.*, p. 380.

secure proper acceptance and sanction. Of course, the students should have the freedom to challenge any position put forward by the teacher or any of their superiors.

Another interesting point that seems to emerge in our discussion is the importance of the environment and the part it has to play in moral education in school. By environment here we mean the society or what goes on outside the school gate. I would agree with those who take society as an important factor contributing to our success or failure in moral education in school. What many educators seem to be saying is that, it would be ironical to try to make students in the school environment understand or even be committed to moral principles that do not work in practical situations. For example, it would be difficult to have the students understanding and getting themselves committed to the principles of justice or equality while what is portrayed by the society is an unjustifiable injustice or inequality. Again, there are indications that even for those that are directly involved in moral education, there seems to be two moralities. One morality for the moral educators while the other is for moral education students. In other words, we seem to be prescribing one thing while committed to another, therefore, doing another thing. If we are to succeed in guiding our students or youths to committing themselves to a moral point of view that we think is viable, then we have to do away with the double standards. To do away with the inherent double standards, Hare's conditions of universalization and prescriptivism will be of great help to us.

Finally, we have found that, though the problem of relativism and absolutism has occupied moral philosophers for a long time, the

matter has not been settled yet. This indicates that more research into this problem would not be wasteful. The effort would not be wasteful in that it might be able to help the educator to distinguish moral values from non-moral values. Furthermore, the effort might be able to put some light into the question of whether or not morality is based on one or more absolute principles and if not so, what degree of relativity do we allow, both in moral and non-moral values, with regard to different societies? These efforts would be of great help to an educator in that he could take the task of moral education with a sense of direction and some confidence.

CHAPTER V

5.00 Recapitulation and Conclusion

The main objective of this Chapter is to briefly summarize the main issues discussed in the thesis, outlining some of the suggestions and tentative conclusions of the major issues with regard to educational implications.

Our conceptual analysis of the two basic terms; free will and determinism has revealed the fact that both have many shades of meaning. That most scholars have tried to discuss the two principles without first clarifying the shade of meaning each was subscribing to. The result of their efforts has often been confusion, attacks and counter-attacks between opponents and proponents of each of the two doctrines. For example, often times, determinists want to use other shades of determinism to prove the truth of metaphysical determinism (physical determinism and psychological determinism) which is based on the principle of causality. On the other hand, the libertarians seem to be elevating all shades of freedom to metaphysical freedom, a doctrine that is diametrically opposed to metaphysical determinism. The presupposed assumptions by both determinists and libertarians have been well illustrated in our discussion of Broad's and Campbell's contributions to the free will versus determinism controversy. In that light, our analysis has indicated that the proponents of determinism in general subscribe to the thesis that every event including human actions has a cause. The advocates of free will contend that though most of the events seem to have causes, nevertheless, there are events that are truly free in the sense that they are not caused from without.

These uncaused events include human actions for if not so, then the concept of moral responsibility would be an illusion.

Besides the two seemingly extreme positions above, there are those who take a rather moderate position. These group of scholars we have noted, contend that with regard to human beings, a measure of both freedom and determinism applies. And that it is in this context that the concept of moral responsibility derives its meaning.

But our interest in the problem of free will versus determinism has been its relationship to human actions. This realization has prompted us to study more critically the basis of the arguments for and against free will and determinism respectively. We have succeeded in this exercise I hope, by trying to understand the nature of man. Thus, in view of the fact that man is considered as both free and determined, we have attempted to penetrate him through two perspectives.

In the first place, claims that man is determined are based on the scientific studies on the nature of man. In the light of this view, we have tried to understand the nature of man by utilizing past and present scientific findings on his biological and environmental constituents. But our utilization of the scientific findings about the nature of man required that we first of all, understand the basis of the scientific method not only as it applies to human beings but also as it is used to explain nature in general. Our initiative towards this direction made it clear that although the method of science is based on the doctrine of metaphysical determinism, whose core notion is the principle of causality, its truth (scientific method) cannot be demonstrated scientifically.

Thus, although we do not seem to know exactly how and when a

life-process begins, nonetheless, we now understand that each individual is a unique composition of genes inherited from both the father and the mother. Those genes could be analysed further into some of the simple elements that compose our world which includes iron, water and salts. Further than that, an individual is continuously being influenced by his environment: the family background, the neighbours, the ecology, the value system and the entire concept of what is the good life. These two basic determinants of man are so complicated that the possibility of two or more people born of the same parents and in the same environment resembling each other completely is eliminated. Therefore, our scientific study of man has shown that he is a part of nature and this nature is perhaps, the very matrix from which his very being is contrived and the soil out of which he is nourished.

Secondly, even when some scholars are willing to endorse the truth of the above basic determinants of man, that admission does not necessarily exclude them from retaining the contention that some of the human actions are free. For such scholars, the strongest 'proof' of the truth of human freedom is what is regarded as personal experience. This is the claim that man seems to be free at the point of making decisions about what course of action to take in each occasion. Hence, moral decisions are cited as illuminating examples of free actions.

But of course the proposition admitting the nature of man as determined and free at the same time poses a problem of a contradiction. To explain away the apparent contradiction, scholars such as Campbell argued that no matter how efficient the method of science is, it would not help us to understand human freedom. Campbell then suggested that we treat man as he feels or experiences at the moment of making

moral decisions. In a word, Campbell is advocating that we see man subjectively, that is, in terms of his personal experiences. In view of the above contention, an impression is created to the effect that man is composed of two modes of reality: the objective mode which could be penetrated through the method of science and the subjective mode usually referred to as the 'self' which only a person himself could know. That is, to know the self would require a personal encounter.

One of the major metaphysical questions to arise out of this particular conception of man concerns individuality and self-identity of man as a person; the degree of his self-sufficiency and freedom from anything else. The question which could be asked is this: how far is man's identity submerged and over-whelmed within the totality of nature in general, having shared his basic determinants with other beings in nature? Or, how unique and how similar is man with regard to other human nature? The problem becomes even more problematic when we affirm that the self cannot be known through other means except through the subjective way: through personal experience. I think it is true that we cannot understand the self through the method of science (objective method). But this implies that we cannot understand other human beings' experiences; that we can only understand what we experience personally. If we cannot understand the experiences of others then it means we are not in a position to judge their actions, which are assumed to emanate from the self. This prompted us to reconsider the concept of man as both objective and subjective modes, and possibly to replace it with another model which accords well with our daily moral judgments about others and our own actions.

Our attempt to have a satisfactory concept of man has driven us to review what Strawson has discussed concerning the metaphysical concept of a person. To start with, Strawson has discussed what he termed as the Cartesian dualism theory of man (this could be equated to what we have called objective and subjective modes of man) which sees man as two substances: his physical and non-physical characteristics. He dismisses this theory by arguing that a notion of self as pure individual consciousness that is isolated from any physical characteristics of man is something that cannot exist as a primary concept of a person. Again, granted that an incorporeal phenomenon existed, it would be difficult if not impossible to know personal experiences of other human beings through their physical characteristics or behaviour. This position as we saw when discussing the objective-subjective modes of man implies that our moral judgments about other people's actions are based on a false premise: that there is a necessary connection between one's behaviour and his self. To put it in another way, there is a necessary connection between the objective and subjective modes of man.

Discarding the Cartesian dualism theory, Strawson discussed the no ownership doctrine of self. This is the theory that stipulates that experiences could only be identified with one of only they were causally connected with his physical characteristics or his body. In other words, only actions that are connected with my body could be called mine. This position, Strawson argued, seems to cut out the incorporeal mode of man and to create a concept of man as a series of actions. Consequently, this position raises the question as to how personal identity is achieved. That is, is it the physical characteristics

or the non-physical characteristics that characterize a person as a unique individual? Ayer agreed with Strawson's argument by adding that if we accepted this concept of a person, then we would have no answer to the question as to what makes two experiences which are separated in time to be identified with the same person. Strawson concluded that neither of the two theories of the concept of a person seem to be satisfactory. This is because the concept of person cannot be analysable into simpler elements and yet retain its meaning. He suggested that man is neither his physical nor his incorporeal characteristics but both. This conclusion reinforced our contention that man is both his external and internal characteristics merged into one. To parody Weiss, each being is something on the inside and from the outside, something on the outside and from the inside. He is an independent individual reality encountering and taking account of others. And he is all these at once.¹ Therefore, so regarded, man cannot be limited to what we discover through the natural and social sciences. We have to apply even the humanities and our personal experiences to understand man.

In terms of actions, we have noted that as human beings, we are hemmed in both by our possibilities and the contemporary actualities, and we deal with these from the vantage point of our rather stable character and transient dispositions. The possibilities and actualities dictate what items in those ranges we shall find most appealing and therefore what is the range of material with which we shall deal with; our character and dispositions dictate what items in those ranges we shall find most appealing and therefore what it is

¹p. Weiss, Nature and Man. (New York: H. Holt & Company, 1947), p. 39.

th : we shall in fact deal with.² The upshot of this concept of man is that human beings' actions are precisely unpredictable not because they are mysterious beyond our probing, but because they are more dynamic, more private and individual than any complete prediction would allow.

Therefore, granted that man is both determined and free in the sense we have already shown, we have still to deal with the question as to what degree of determinism and what degree of freedom we have to allow in judging one as either morally responsible or morally non-responsible for his actions. As we have noted, the first hurdles for any philosophical discussion to clear are the conceptual ones. In that respect, we have sought through analysis, the meanings that are usually attached to the term 'responsibility' and its various cognates in various contexts. The outcome of the analysis has indicated that there are many uses of the term responsibility and that the notion of moral responsibility in general presupposes the existence of free will which one exercises when performing acts which we categorize as free actions. We have clearly shown, I hope that this free will that a normal human being possesses is nothing more than what we termed as psychological freedom, which is not in any way diametrically opposed to the basic determinants of man, both biological and environmental. Thus, we generally judge one as morally responsible for his actions if we have good grounds to assume that a person was psychologically free. Subsequently, we generally blame or praise someone for actions which we believe he was morally responsible for in the sense that he exercised his free will at the time of his deliberation.

²Ibid., Man's Freedom. (Carbondale: South Illinois University Press, 1950), p. 63.

Nonetheless, we have no illusion about the existing problem of precisely stating the conditions for absolving an individual from moral responsibility for particular actions. The problem becomes even more acute when we have to deal with particular actions in particular situations. We have then argued that although we are confronted with this problem, we have to retain the institution of punishment as disapproval, based on psychological freedom. We have opted for this position due to the understanding that blame is usually taken a device for deterring individuals from engaging themselves with behaviours or actions which have the disapproval of the society. Of course, the contention that the utility of punishment as a social deterrent device outweighs the problems incurred in its use has been criticised by a number of scholars, among them the 'abolitionists'.

During our discussion on discipline and punishment it dawned on us that if we have to justify why we have to prescribe for others especially the students to conform to certain modes of behaviour, then it would mean that perhaps there are certain kinds of behaviour or actions that are considered worthwhile in the eyes of the society. We have argued that if it is true that the society has distinguished what is right or wrong, which seems to be actually the case, then punishment is perhaps not the best device. The students have to be made to understand what is involved in rule-following. This understanding of the basis of rule-following has to be acquired through moral education.

In a nutshell, the conclusion of the thesis is that man is basically determined by his biological and environmental influences. That within this framework of determinism, man does exercise his free will - psychological freedom. And that it is only when we assume that

one was exercising free will that we are ready to hold him morally responsible for particular actions. Thus, the concept of moral responsibility is based on man's psychological freedom and not on metaphysical freedom as defined in Chapter I. Subsequently, the institution of punishment if it has to be used at all as a device for behaviour modification, caution has to be exercised. That is to say, for any use of punishment, it has to be made sure (within the possible means) that it is the best behaviour modification device in each particular case. Further, even when it is considered the best candidate as a means of behaviour modification device, care should be taken that punishment remains a means that it is rather than an end in itself.

Finally, the concept of punishment and its usefulness would not be correctly understood by the receiving end (those subject to the practice of punishment) if the perennial conflicts between personal and social interests are not well grasped. This is where moral education comes in within an educational system. The students have to be gradually sensitized about the necessity of some fundamental moral principles such as justice, equality and freedom. In other words, the students have to be prepared to live in a society where moral conflicts are inevitable. However, there are various methods towards moral education depending on the environment, mental and emotional maturity of the students.

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