

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**“ THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKERS IN
KENYA ”**

By

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**A Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the award of the
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DECLARATION


I Kirigo Mburu, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of a degree in any other university.

Signed 

Date 17/11/2011

Kirigo Mburu

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

Signed: 

Date 17th NOV. 2011

Dr. Anita Ndoti Kiamba

DEDICATION

This research study is dedicated to my parents, who taught me the value of education and provided all the necessary support for my education. To my dad, who enrolled in a law program, but could not accomplish his dreams because of many responsibilities, struggling till you achieved your degree in education in your 40's. For you, I will go the extra mile, and achieve what you wanted to achieve. You are my inspiration. To mum, for your care and encouragement, I will be forever grateful.

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy decision making has been the prerogative of heads of state, the decision makers in most states. Many decision makers have admitted that the media has forced them to respond to issues that were not even in their agenda, have been forced to take decisions and policies that were not even deliberated upon, especially after the media framing the issues in a way that affected public opinion, and also that the modern media has changed the whole environment of policy making because of the fast flow of news and modern technology. Involving the media, consulting and at times responding to the media, has been the order of the day.

Notably, a lot of work documented on this new role of the media has been in relation to developed countries. Few documented materials can attest to this influence in developing countries, as much as the impact is witnessed and confessed by the players of foreign policy decision making.

Kenya is considered to have a media industry that is vibrant as compared to most African countries, and the rest of the developing countries. Since independence, there have been three presidents, Kenyatta, Moi and, currently, Kibaki. During Kenyatta's and Moi's tenure, the media had somehow been suppressed and had less chance, even though some did, to influence the policy makers. Kibaki's tenure has seen the advent of a vibrant media with more freedom, even though some media players have misused the new freedoms. It is during Kibaki's tenure that this study wishes to study on the instances when media has set the agenda, been the public watchdog, influenced public opinion and promoted democracy. The study has established that the media has influenced policy makers in Kenya. It is time that foreign policy decision makers realized the power that media has and used it to their own advantage.

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
ACP/EU	Atlantic Caribbean Pacific/European Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
RSF	Reporters San Frontières
KTN	Kenya Television Network
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
EAC	East Africa Community
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G77	Group of 77
KICC	Kenya International Conference Centre
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGOs	International Governmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NSAC	National Security Advisory Committee

NSC	National Security Council
OAU	Organization of African Union
EAS	East African Standard
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
SA	South Africa
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TV	Television
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNSS-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Secretariat
US	United States
WB	World Bank
NMG	Nation Media Group
DN	Daily Nation

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Foreign policy is a set of objectives used by states and non-state actors to interact with other actors.¹ It is often connected to national interest. Since Stone Age to Iron Age, industrial age to information revolution age, information and knowledge has been said to be power. Media provides the information required to make informed foreign policy decisions. Robinson Piers, as quoted by Eytan Gilboa, postulates that, “there is either media influence or none at all in foreign policy.”² The influence is normally felt when there is policy uncertainty, when foreign policy is wavering or when it is inconsistent. News coverage has created political and professional dilemmas in policymaking to politicians, foreign policy and officials. Furthermore, these groups have not yet sufficiently adjusted to the new television saturated environment of policymaking.³

The expansion of global news television networks, such as CNN (Cable News Network) International and BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) World Service, and particularly their ability to influence policy, has caught politicians, government officials, journalists, and scholars unawares. This results from the perception of the media in general, and television in particular, as being the most important power broker in

¹Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. Politics and Public Policy. 2002. p. 5.

² Ibid.. p 5.

³ Ibid.. pp. 7-9.

politics.⁴ Foreign policy makers have been forced by these circumstances to respond to issues as they are reported. A decade ago, a policymaker had the time to consult or bargain with other policy makers, but media has changed this because of its nature of reporting, like live coverage.

Media was not perceived to have had powerful and immediate effects on its audiences. At the same time, some observers of the media and its audiences continued to feel that people were influenced in their beliefs and actions because of repeated exposure to the contents of mass communication. It was entirely possible, it was felt, that the influences were long term, subtle and difficult to pin down by the experiments, survey studies and other research efforts that had been in vogue.⁵ News media has the capacity to act as an influence on the international relations system itself, influencing decision making in particular cases and on the system more generally as media reports influence the decision making of participants in the system.⁶

In his study of public opinion and foreign policy, Bernard Cohen postulates that 'foreign policy officials considered the media to be a source of public opinion.'⁷ He continues to assert, that the linkages operate in two ways, namely, reporters may be well informed

⁴ Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. Politics and Public Policy. op cit. p 5

⁵ Shearon A. Lowery & Melvin L. DeFleur. *Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects*. Longman. USA. 1995. p. 265.

⁶ Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, 'News Media Reporting on Civil Litigation and Its Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making.' *Law and Human Behavior*. Vol. 27, No. 1, Psychology in Civil Litigation (Feb., 2003). p.5.

⁷ Philip J. Powlick. 'The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials.' *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 39. No. 4 (Dec., 1995). p. 427.

members of the public with views worthy of attention, and that the news stories they report transmit the opinions of others in the political system and the nation at large.⁸ The media's priming and framing roles are of importance here as well. Media coverage might raise attentiveness to previously obscure issues, or frame the terms by which the public will evaluate specific policies.⁹

This research attempts to overcome the obstacle of excluding the mass media from the foreign policy formulation process and suggests an analytical framework which focuses on the role of the media in this process. This study perceives the mass communication networks as parts of the environment in which the international actors (mainly nation-states) exists and acts. The media has a twofold role in such environment. First, it provides input into the process as an independent variable. Here the leaders react to the perceived reality as constructed by the press. Second, it is part of the environment which foreign policy makers try to affect or influence by making their decisions. This means that leaders who perform in an environment which includes the media take political decisions to solve problems, but at the same time try to make such decisions that will improve their image or develop a campaign that will affect the media dealing with the relevant international events and interactions. This is the output environment component of the environment. This incorporates the media into the framework as an environment

⁸Philip J. Powlick. *The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials*. op cit. p.427

9. Ibid

which encircles the decision-making process while serving as an input for decisions as well as a sounding board for the output – the policy.¹⁰

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem.

While there is no sufficient evidence yet to support the claim that media is becoming a controlling actor in the formulation of policy, it certainly affects many important dimensions of foreign policy and diplomacy.¹¹ Media constrains the policy process, primarily through the high speed of broadcasting and transmitting information. In addition to the increased diversity of issues on the foreign policy agenda, there is also an increasing variety in the actors who engage in foreign policy making. Traditionally, investigations of foreign policy looked primarily at states and leaders. There should be recognition of, and interest in, the foreign policy roles of decision makers who were not traditionally associated with international diplomacy like the fourth estate, the media. The researcher recognizes that most policy makers disregard the media as a major component in policy formulation, both in the policymaking environment and as a policy maker, through agenda setting, and as such, this research tries to bridge this gap by giving examples of media's influence in the modern day environment. These changes require reconsidering the decision making mechanisms in states. The simplification of the head of state as decision maker, though it has residual validity, needs to be broadened to take account of the media influence.

¹⁰ Shubham Srivastava, 'The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy: A Decision-Making,' Gujarat National Law University. *Proceedings and E-Journal of the 7th AMSAR Conference on Roles of Media during Political Crisis*. Bangkok, Thailand. 20th May 2009. pp. 3-4.

¹¹ This is the researcher's assertion based on the dearth of literature on media and foreign policy in Kenya.

1.3 Objectives of the Research.

In order for the purpose of this research to be achieved, the research will be guided by the following objectives, that is,

1. To examine the level of media influence on foreign policy makers in foreign policy decision- making.
2. To highlight the need for foreign policymakers to acknowledge the role of the media in foreign policy decision making

1.4 Scope of the Study

The study will not go into elaborate details on individual media houses and how they have shaped decision making process in Kenya. However, the important role the media can play or has played will be considered in this study.

1.5 Hypotheses

This study is guided by the following hypothesis, i.e.,

- (i) An analysis of the media's influence on foreign policy makers brings out the gap in the studies of foreign policy decision making models.
- (ii) Without an in-depth study of the relationship between the media and foreign policy makers, there will be an existing gap to explain their relationship.
- (iii) The existing gap regarding foreign policymaker's decision making models can be understood once there is a decision making model to explain the relationship between the media and foreign policy makers.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1. Introduction

There is a glaring relationship between the media and foreign policy. In order for the objectives of this research to be achieved, the following sections of literature will be reviewed. These include: Foreign Policy, Media and Foreign Policy Decision Makers.

1.6.2 Literature Review on Foreign Policy

At the heart of the study of foreign policy is the desire to understand countries' actions and behaviors towards other countries and the international environment generally. Foreign policy is defined as the totality of a country's policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders.¹² This definition is quite broad and encompasses a variety of issue domains or issue areas, which are defined as a set of interrelated concerns in policy making that are, however, more loosely tied to other sets of interrelated concerns. Traditionally, the study of foreign policy has focused primarily on the quest to maintain and enhance a country's power and security. It centered on questions of averting war, when possible, deciding to fight, if necessary, and first, and foremost, ensuring the integrity of the country's borders. Increasingly, economic relations between countries have gained attention.

Since the end of Cold War, globalization has become an important process that highlights the interconnectedness of the world's economies. This has had a greater impact on countries with economies that, in earlier eras, were less connected to the international

¹² Marijke Breuning. 'Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. pp. 5-6.

economy. For those countries that traditionally have depended greatly on international trade, economic issues have had a higher priority on the foreign policy agenda much longer.¹³ The foreign policy agenda does not stop with security and economic issues. In recent decades, environmental issues have increasingly gained attention; so have issues such as human rights, population growth and migration, food and energy policies, as well as foreign aid, development, and the relations between richer and poorer countries.¹⁴

Analysts have been concerned with the policies that states declare, the decisions made within governmental circles, the processes by which governments arrive at policies and decisions, the actions actually taken by governments, and the consequences of the behavior of governments and their official representatives. Foreign policy is the output of the state into the global system, the outcome of whatever foreign policy process exists within that state.¹⁵ Besides the actors who have a formal role in the formulation of foreign policy, informal factors, such as the media, think tanks, academics, scholars, pressure groups especially the business community, NGOs and political parties, play an important role in influencing the country's foreign policy by debating important foreign policy issues and projecting their views on them. The airing of their views influences the thinking of the players directly involved in the foreign policy formulation process. It also

¹³ Marijke Breuning. 'Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction. op cit. pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Bruce Russett & Harvey Starr. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice.* W. H. Freeman and Company. New York. 1989. pp. 186-187.

has an impact by shaping and reshaping the thinking of the people at large on foreign policy issues.¹⁶

As with many important ideas in the study of world politics, there are almost as many definitions of foreign policy as there are political scientists writing on the subject. One way to approach the concept of foreign policy is to break it down into its component parts, that is, foreign and policy. Policy is a decision or a set of decisions or programs that act as a guide to behavior. Policy is a guide to an action or a set of actions intended to realize the goals an organization has set for itself. Policy itself then is rooted in the concept of choice, namely, choosing actions (or making decisions) to achieve one's goals. These choices should be reasoned, in the minimal sense of comparing choices to see how well they achieve desired goals.¹⁷

The ideas of sovereignty and territoriality help us understand what foreign means. Sovereignty means control of the territory that exists inside the legal boundaries of the state. Foreignness applies to anything beyond those legal boundaries, to areas where the state has no legal authority over people or territory. Foreign policy is thus a set of guides to choices being made about people, places, and things beyond the boundaries of the state. Although there are different perspectives on the nature of foreign policy, it is

¹⁶ 'The process of foreign policy Formulation in Pakistan.' *Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians no. 12, April, 2004*. Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance. p. 8.

¹⁷ Bruce Russett & Harvey Starr. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. op cit. pp. 186-187.

possible to uncover several common features that are important in understanding the nature of foreign policy.¹⁸

Foreign policy, whether it is about the process of creating decisions, making decisions, or implementing decisions, is relational. The intention of foreign policy is to affect the behavior of another actor, from how it trades to how it votes in the United Nations to how it uses its weapons. Because nothing is distributed equally in the global system, every state requires resources, economic goods, military capabilities, political and strategic support, and cooperation and coordination with all other actors. Foreign policy, thus, concerns behavior toward some other actor for some reason.¹⁹ Foreign policy decisions are made by people, either as individuals or as part of a group. The individual foreign policy decision-maker is surrounded by several layers of environment, external and domestic, which constrain and limit in a number of ways what the decision maker is able or is likely to do. Each blends into others that sandwich it. There are connections between the systemic and societal factors, between societal and governmental factors, and between governmental and role factors. Role and individual influences impinge directly on the individual who plays a part in the development and execution of foreign policy.²⁰

In addition to the increased diversity of issues on the foreign policy agenda, there is also an increasing variety in the actors who engage in foreign policy making. Traditionally, investigations of foreign policy looked primarily at states and leaders. There has been

¹⁸ Bruce Russett & Harvey Starr. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. op cit. pp. 186-187.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 187.

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 259-260.

increased recognition of, and interest in, the foreign policy roles of decision makers who were not traditionally associated with international diplomacy.²¹ The foreign policies of countries, whether large and powerful, small and weak, or somewhat in between, drive the course of world history. At times, countries and their leaders have pursued wise policies that have yielded peace and prosperity. Yet at other times, they have made choices that have been destructive of both. What drives the study of foreign policy is the quest to understand not just why leaders make the choices they do, but also how and why domestic and international constraints and opportunities affect their choices. After all, leaders do not exist in a vacuum; they are surrounded by advisors and a bureaucracy, influenced by domestic constituents, and dependent on the power their state can project in the international arena. Untangling the relative impact of these various factors on foreign policy is no easy matter. The best explanations of the foreign policy choices of countries are frequently found in the complex interplay of multiple factors.²²

1.6.3 Literature Review on the Media

Media scholars, Maxwell McCombs and Don Shaw, cast media effects when they said the media does not tell people what to think, but rather what to think about. This has come to be called agenda-setting.²³ There is a great debate about the relationship between the news media and the foreign policy decision-making process, and the impact the former may have on the latter. Two theories have risen to explain this matter, the so-

²¹ Bruce Russett & Harvey Starr. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. op cit. pp. 259-260.

²² Marijke Breuning. *Foreign Policy Analysis : A Comparative Introduction*. op cit. pp. 5-6.

²³ John Vivian. *The Media of Mass Communication*. 9th eds. 1991. Pearson Education, p. 466.

called CNN effect, and the manufacturing consent thesis. But these theories are in conflict, thus, agreement about the direct impact of the media on foreign policy is yet to be achieved. Even though, for many journalists, policy-makers and scholars, there really is little doubt that the media profoundly affects the foreign policy process.²⁴

The media is involved in all stages of foreign policy formulation processes and political leaders take the media into consideration in its national and international aspects. The involvement of the media in this decision-making process is complex. Past studies of foreign policy decision-making neglected to deal with this complex role of the media. Actual reality demonstrates that this perspective minimizes the place of the media and therefore it should be dealt with theoretically, as well as in applied research case studies using a more complex approach emphasizing the crucial role of the media in foreign policy.

News media and foreign policy making process influence one another, sometimes directly, and other times indirectly. The degrees of their mutual influence are proportional to other circumstances, such as newsworthiness from the media point of view, and policy uncertainty from the foreign policy making perspective. This complex process is described in the following framework: When an external international event occurs, leaders learn about it from the media (the input process), information is processed via the various image components, and the policy or decision formulating process is set in motion. Media advisors and public relations professionals participate in the process, and officials consult with them and consider their advice. When a decision is made, or a

²⁴ Shubham Srivastava. *The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy: A Decision-Making*. op cit. p.1.

policy is formulated (the output phase), leaders take into consideration the media environment (national and international) in the decision itself, and mainly in the publication process. Moreover, it should be noted that in the background national and international public opinions influence the processes, and are involved in them.²⁵

An illustration would suffice on how the news media has revolutionized the foreign policy making process. The image of the Soviet missile crisis in Bay of Pigs, during John F. Kennedy's government is often mentioned. Srivastava observes, 'During the first six days of the crisis, Kennedy and his advisers had the chance to deliberate in secrecy about which course of action they were to take. The capability of keeping the situation in secret kept foreign policy makers from dealing with public hysteria or media pressures. Nonetheless, the context has changed considerably since 1962. Firstly, due to technological developments; real time news coverage allows information to be broadcasted 24 hours a day from anywhere in the world, with no regards for diplomatic secrecy. These contextual changes have re-defined the relationship between the news media and the foreign policy decision-making process. On the one hand is the so-called CNN effect, which is understood in a variety of ways. It comes from being understood as the capability of the news media (television in particular) to shape the policy agenda; the power of news journalism to move government, the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events; elite decision makers' loss of policy control to news media.'²⁶

On the other hand, the manufacturing consent theory argues that the media does not create policy, but rather that the news media is mobilized (manipulated even) into

²⁵ Shubham Srivastava. *The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy: A Decision-Making*. op cit. p. 14

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 2-3.

supporting government policy. It is universally accepted that the mass media holds great power, as it transmits information to the public and is free to highlight certain news items and ignore others. The great consensus that seems to hold today, however, is that the media does exert a subtle, yet direct influence, which is neither as significant as it was first thought to be, nor as minimal as was subsequently assumed.²⁷

Srivastava quotes Livingston, who suggests a three-way typology of likely media effects. These are conditional on the kind of intervention that is being conducted, of which he recognizes. First effect is media as accelerants, in this modality, media are presumed to shorten the time of decision-making response. Second effect is media as impediment; this takes two forms, as an emotional inhibitor, and as a threat to operational security. The third effect of the media on foreign policy making that Livingston mentions is that of the media as an agenda setting agent. In short, what researchers have found the CNN effect to be is the ability of the media to function as accelerants, impediments or agenda-setters. Just as well, the ability of the media to impact foreign policy is inextricably related to coverage, thus, the greater the coverage, the more direct the impact.²⁸

1.6.4 Literature Review on Foreign Policy Decision Makers

The foreign policies of African states are today being shaped by rapidly changing international and domestic environments to the extent that it is difficult to isolate purely foreign policies. The main factors that shaped African foreign policies before 1980s were given as the impact of colonialism, the role of resources, membership of international

²⁷ Ascensión Andina. 'Reinforcement vs. Change: The Political Influence of the Media.' *Public Choice*, Vol. 131, No. 1/2 (Apr., 2007). p. 66.

²⁸ Shubham Srivastava. *The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy: A Decision-Making*. op cit. pp. 9-12.

governmental organizations (IGOs), nonalignment, security and sovereignty, unity against apartheid, economic development and centralized decision making.²⁹ Significant emphasis was rightly placed upon the influence of the outgoing colonial powers on shaping the foreign policy orientations of the newly emergent African states. These influences were all embracing in the sense of being political, economic, military and cultural.

Traditional approaches to the study of foreign policy focused upon a small, elite group of foreign policy decision makers. Many times, a President or military head of state was considered the only decision maker, with one or no-party state systems reinforcing the centralization of policy decision making.³⁰ Most recent approaches, though recognizing that individual leaders still hold considerable sway over policy decisions, have also considered bureaucratic influences on policy, drawing on the role of diplomatic service personnel and various ministries. It is difficult to point to one single event that has transformed the characteristics of African foreign policies, but there are four critical changes within the domestic and international environments that offer distinct reference points for African states today. These are the end of the Cold War, the pressures of liberalization and democratization, the changing character of the global economy, and the debate over an African agenda.³¹ Leaders rarely make foreign policy alone. Advisory systems and government bureaucracies may be organized differently in different countries, but they always play some role in foreign policy decision making and

²⁹ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*. Northern Arizona University. WestView Press 1999, p 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 6-7.

³¹ *Ibid.*

implementation. There are factors internal to the states that compel states to engage in specific foreign policy behaviors. These include the institutional framework of the state, such as the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government, the organization of the government bureaucracy, whether the state is a democracy, domestic constituencies, such as interest groups, media, ethnic groups, or public opinion.³²

The relationship between decision makers and domestic constituencies is shaped, in part, by the political institutions of the society. Authoritarian governments provide very few, if any, avenues for citizens to explicitly influence foreign policy. They present foreign policy problems and decisions in terms of verbal imagery that they believe will resonate with their domestic audience, and they, too, try to convince their domestic audience that their policies are in the national interest, as defined by the leader.³³ In democratic societies, the public has more avenues formally available to express dissent. The degree, to which such opinion is expressed, as well as the degree to which it constrains decision makers, depends on both institutional and societal factors. The structure of the political institutions is more open to societal influence in some societies than others. Open institutional structures provide greater access and more contact points for interest groups and other societal actors and, hence, more opportunity to influence decision making.³⁴

³² Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, op cit, pp. 12-13.

³³ Ibid .pp 120-121.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 122.

Kenya's foreign policy is guided by a strong belief that its own future is inextricably tied to the stability and security of its environment and heritage as the basic source of its nationhood, livelihood and prosperity. It is also linked to the stability and prosperity of its neighbors in East Africa, and the rest of Africa.³⁵ To attain Kenya's foreign policy objectives and priorities, there are various institutions that are fundamental. These are the Presidency, the Cabinet, Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further, instruments, such as offices of Retired Heads of State/ Government and other Statesmen, National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Foreign Relations, The Kenya Fund for Technical Cooperation, Former Ambassadors and Senior Diplomats, Ambassadors at Large and Goodwill Ambassadors, Immigration Policies and Instruments and Special diplomatic zones are important to the realization of these objectives and priorities.³⁶

Kenya continues to be a relatively stable and important country in Africa despite the challenges facing it as a result of the collapse of the state system in many neighboring countries and the difficulties of the democratization process. It has continuously maintained civilian government since attaining independence in 1963. It accomplished two presidential transitions from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel Arap Moi in 1978, and from Daniel Arap Moi to Mwai Kibaki in 2002, and it transformed itself, albeit with difficulties, from a one party to a multiparty state in the 1990s.³⁷

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Republic of Kenya: Foreign Policy Framework. Nairobi. 2009. pp. 6- 7.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

Taking an example of a non-African but developing country, for instance Pakistan, its foreign policy has been shaped by national, regional and international factors which have influenced both the process of its formulation and the final outcome. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point for the initiation of all proposals relating to the conduct of Pakistan's foreign affairs with the exception of any matters that may be assigned to other Divisions/Ministries of the Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is consulted on all matters which affect the foreign policy of Pakistan or the conduct of its foreign relations. The Ministries play a role in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the focal point in the foreign policy making field.³⁸

The Parliament influences the foreign policy formulation and implementation process. The Security/Intelligence Agencies play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. These Security/Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan, especially those connected with the military, have acquired a predominant role in the foreign policy formulation process because of the fragility and weaknesses of the civilian institutions and the frequent military take over's. Besides the actors who have a formal role in the formulation of foreign policy in Pakistan, informal factors such as the media, think tanks, academics, scholars, pressure groups especially the business community, NGOs, political parties, play an important role in influencing the country's foreign policy by debating important foreign policy issues and projecting their views on them. The airing of their views

³⁸·*The process of foreign policy Formulation in Pakistan,* Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians. op cit. pp. 6-7.

influences the thinking of the players directly involved in the foreign policy formulation process.³⁹

1.7 Justification

The research endeavors to contribute to the understanding about the role and influence of the media in foreign policy decision making process. This view, it is hoped, will help in bridging the gap between the media and foreign policy decision makers. This understanding will be utilized in both academic and policy formulation. News coverage has demonstrable effects on audiences and policymakers, for instance, by compressing the time frame within which policymakers must react to events. Again, effects are variable, depending on the political system, the foreign policy problem, the characteristics of media coverage of the problem, and the degree of public awareness, interest and mobilization. The research will contribute to the debate on the influence that media has on foreign policy makers with a view to adding to the written literature on the perceived influence, in a Kenyan perspective.

Most of the documented work on this topic is on developed countries and, thus, the need to study developing countries. The academic justification is derived from rational actor model and models of foreign policy decision making which will attempt to fill the gaps necessitated by the absence of a common understanding of the 'impact of the influence.' In addition, mutual misperceptions of intentions that arise from lack of a defined working relationship of the two actors raise concerns for the urgent need for proper working

³⁹ *The process of foreign policy Formulation in Pakistan,* Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians. op cit. p 8

strategy. In light of the foregoing debate, this study seeks to add to an existing body of knowledge by giving a conceptual insight through its analysis.

In modern day society, the media is taking a role in shaping the agenda and influencing activities that a policy maker may end up doing. This study seeks to show that the media should be recognized as a major player and influence in foreign affairs matters and change the old notion held by many practitioners and scholars that media effect in foreign affairs matters is minimal. This study will be important in the sense that it will bring into perspective the truth of the modern day politics where media has become a major player, seen by guiding or directing foreign policy makers in the decisions they take or what they do. Foreign policy makers have been left almost with no space for thinking rationally or following the standard operating procedures. Most of the times, the media has been guiding them on the actions to take, since they are forced to respond to events even without consultations.

Kenya, being a key player in both regional and international political arena, ought to have a strong articulation of her foreign policy through the media. The fact that she is endeavoring to be a middle income state by the year 2030 necessitates a foreign policy that will make her reach that goal. This calls for a strong relationship between the media and foreign policy decision makers and decision making organs.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

The study will explore one of Graham Allison's three models, the bureaucratic model. Foreign policy dictates how a country will respond to other countries politically, socially, economically and militarily and, to a somewhat lesser extent, how it behaves towards

non-state actors.⁴⁰ The bureaucratic decision making model holds that there is no single rational actor making decisions. Central governments are complex bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are formal, hierarchical organizations. Decisions here result from negotiations among government agencies with each having different, and at times conflicting, interests. Bureaucratic politics model views foreign policy as based on bargaining and compromises among governmental agencies. Policy networks here are temporary alliances of leaders, interest groups, and agencies to- influence policy.⁴¹

With the advanced technology, the media has distorted this planned system and in most times, a policy maker may never have the time for even bargaining in the case of bureaucratic model. There needs to be a model addressing the current situation where policy makers are forced to respond to issues almost instantly soon after they are reported. This study, therefore, examines whether there have been instances where foreign policy makers did not use this model as stated above and determine if media was the cause of the instant response.

1.9 Methodology of the Research.

Research as noted by Kothari,⁴² is defined as a scientific and systematic method consisting of enunciating the problem, formulating a hypothesis, collecting the facts or data, analyzing the facts and reaching certain conclusions, either in the form of solutions

⁴⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf. *World Politics: Foreign Policy Decision Making*. 8th ed. 2001. p. 56.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Kothari. C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods&Techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited Publishers. (2004).

towards the concerned problem or in certain generalization for some theoretical formulation. Research methodology, on the other hand, is a way to systematically solve the research problem. It indicates the various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying her research problem along with the logic behind them.⁴³

The project employed secondary data. This study has relied heavily on secondary data because of time constraints. The secondary information was from authoritative sources, such as books, papers on experts' opinion, print and electronic media materials, media reports and internet. The data was qualitatively analyzed and put in academic perspective, in tandem with the proposed research topic.

The research topic is limited to only one purposefully selected and unique case study, thus only resource institutions acquainted with the research problem have been selected. Nation Media House archives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were selected to be the source of materials herein. The information gathered was then subjected to qualitative analysis and interpretation. This allowed the researcher to draw inferences that would meaningfully contribute to the body of knowledge in the field of media influence in foreign policy decision making. The researcher hopes to validate the study's objectives not only from the theoretical basis, but also from practitioners' experiences, through statements made by policy makers.

1.10 Research Design

Research design refers to the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in

⁴³ Kothari. C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods&Techniques*. op cit.

the procedure.⁴⁴ In addition, Kothari, observes that research design is a blue print which facilitates the smooth sailing of the various research operations, thereby making research as efficient as possible, hence yielding maximum information with minimal expenditure of effort, time and money.⁴⁵ The researcher noted that research design deals with the decision regarding what techniques were used to gather data, what kind of sampling strategies and tools were used, and how time and cost constraints were dealt with. The function of research design, therefore, is to provide for the collection of relevant evidence with minimal expenditure of effort, time and money.

The research design that was used in answering the research objectives was a descriptive survey. A descriptive study determines the frequency with which something occurs and investigates the relationship between two or more variables.⁴⁶ The study framework was chosen because it was in line with the objectives of the study. The research utilized secondary data due to time constraints. The fact that the research was done during the sensitive time of post-election related events (The Hague wave), meant that the researcher could not interview some key people who would have been useful in giving information that would have enhanced field data collection relevant for this research. The research was qualitative. Text books, scholarly journals, newspaper articles, and monographs were used. They were used to analyze the themes emerging from the research. The libraries of the University of Nairobi and the Kenya National Archives

⁴⁴ Babbie Earl. *Survey Research Methods*. 2nd Edition). Belmont Wodsworth. 1990

⁴⁵ Kothari, C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods and techniques*. op cit.

⁴⁶ D. Cooper and Schindler, P.S. *Business Research Methods*. 8th eds. Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. India. (2003).

were used. The internet was also used, while locating important documents which helped on the research.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter One is the introduction and contains the background to the research, the problem statement, objectives, justification of the study, hypotheses, the literature review, theoretical framework and methodology of how the research was done.

Chapter Two focuses on the role of the media in society, and concentrates more on the role it plays in the running of diplomatic relations between states.

Chapter Three is on foreign policy decision making. The chapter discusses who the decision makers are in the field of foreign policy, the institutions involved and the models used in foreign policy decision making.

Chapter Four deals with foreign policy decision making in Kenya. The chapter analyzes how foreign policy decisions have been made since Kenya attained independence, by three different presidents, and the relationship between each president and the media.

Chapter Five is an analysis of the media and foreign policy. The chapter focuses on the analysis of the study, including the stated influence and suggestions of frameworks, explaining the relationship between media and foreign policy makers. It discusses the relationship that exists between the role of media and foreign policy.

Chapter Six carries the conclusion and recommendations of the study. Findings, recommendations and areas of further research are included in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN DIPLOMACY

2.1 Introduction

An understanding of the role of media in diplomacy will be of utmost importance in this research. The media, christened as the fourth estate, plays an important role, both locally and internationally, as the research will demonstrate. Foreign policy decision makers cannot ignore the role the media plays. The media cannot be ignored since it is the one which highlights the occurrences of both local and international events. An understanding of the geopolitical ramifications of the media is fundamental to the conceptualization of the objectives of this research. In this case, the CNN will be vividly captured since from its inception, it has continued to shape the perceptions of many concerning the foreign policies of the Western countries, especially the United States.

2.2 Media Influence and its Global Ramifications

When Ted Turner launched the Cable News Network (CNN) in 1980, he foresaw the potential of a worldwide audience with an interest in around-the-clock-news from practically every corner of the globe. He might not have envisioned his new venture as a media phenomenon that would come to have a significant impact on foreign policy making. Since its first mention during the Persian Gulf War, the CNN effect has been the subject of considerable commentary and scholarly analysis, linking it to everything from governments' loss of control over foreign policy decisions to a very public backchannel

for heads of state who seek alternatives to communicate their intentions to current and potential adversaries.¹

The causal mechanism of the CNN effect is usually conceived in the following way: Media coverage (printed and televised), journalists and opinion leaders demand that governments do something, the (public) pressure becomes unbearable and governments do something. According to Piers Robinson, media influence on policy occurs where there exists policy uncertainty or critically framed media coverage. In this situation, policy-makers, uncertain of what to do and without a clearly defined policy line with which to counter critical media coverage, can be forced to intervene due to media-driven public pressure or the fear of potential negative public reaction to government inaction.² When real time global communication became possible, a new media space for diplomacy came into existence. CNN led the way, and the CNN effect on foreign policy was born. CNN has retreated somewhat from this early mission, but other news broadcasters have stepped in to broadcast news on both television and the internet. The websites of Aljazeera in English, BBC World Service and CNN World, aspire to bring world politics to a global audience, and politicians have been quick to take advantage of this new domain for action.³

¹ Warren P. Strobel. *Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. United States Institute of Peace. 1997. USA, p.4.

² Piers Robinson, 'The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power during Humanitarian Crisis of Peace Research. Vol. 37, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), pp. 613-614.

³ Francis Beer & G. R Boynton. 'Global Media Diplomacy and Iranian Nuclear Weapon's: The New Space of Global Media Diplomacy. p.1.

Two completely different concepts of the CNN effect exist. The first is used, for instance, by Mermin, Livingston and Eachus. For them, the CNN effect consists of the media's ability to influence the policy agenda, by reporting issues and thereby pushing these issues in priority. They are convinced that the media can, indeed, influence policy decision making. Livingston and Eachus claim that, at some level, the media has this capacity though the question at heart of the CNN effect is who controls this capacity.⁴ For Mermin, this is of central importance in understanding the scope and character of television's influence on foreign policy formulation.⁵ The point made is that whoever sets the media agenda and draws the attention to certain problems or crises, also determines, in course, how decisions in government about these issues are eventually made. To the degree that foreign policy is reactive to news content, the key decisions made are those by reporters, producers, and editors.⁶

2.3 Media Influence in Foreign Policy and Perception

The second possible conceptualization of the CNN effect is employed by Gowing and Robinson. This approach is what is commonly understood as CNN effect. Here the point is not who sets the agenda in the first place. It can be politicians, government officials or the media. It is about how media coverage of a crisis affects policy decision making. This can be either during or before a crisis, thereby triggering an intervention. Critical television coverage of government action or inaction would, in this concept, drive

⁴ Livingston, Steven and Eachus, Todd. 'Humanitarian Crisis and Foreign Policy' in *Political Communication* 12, 1995. pp. 415.

⁵ Mermin, Jonathan. 'Television News and American Intervention in Somalia' in *Political Science Quarterly* 112(3). 1997. pp. 386.

⁶ Livingston, Steven and Eachus, Todd. 'Humanitarian Crisis and Foreign Policy' in *Political Communication*. op cit. p. 415.

officials either to pursue one of various policy options or change policy completely. The assumption is that real-time television coverage not only creates a demand that something must be done, but also drives the making of foreign policy.⁷

Some posit that the media plays an insignificant role in policy making processes, while others suggest it has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes. A more likely scenario is that its degree of influence varies considerably, being issue based in nature. One of the fundamental roles of the media in a liberal democracy is to critically scrutinise governmental affairs, that is, to act as the 'Fourth Estate' of government to ensure that the government can be held accountable by the public. In the same way that Habermas described the colonisation of the public sphere by large corporations, the political sphere is now being colonised by the media, and politics has begun re-orientating itself to satisfy the logic of media organisations. Therefore, the media is an active participant in the policymaking process and the ability to stimulate change or maintain the status quo depends on its choice of subject (or policy issue) and how it frames it.

The media may also influence policy outcomes through its ability to exclude certain policy options, which set the boundaries for legitimate public debate. Such analyses have led some researchers to posit that the media has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes, while others posit that it plays an insignificant role in policy making

⁷ Gowing. Nik. 'Real-Time TV' Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?' in Gowing. J., Paterson, R., Preston. A. (eds.): *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute.1996. p. 81

processes.⁸ Journalists and editors shape policy agendas by actively filtering issues, so that reporting conforms to their dominant news values, that is, selecting what issues are covered and which sources are used. This tends to confine policy debate to the strict boundaries of current accepted wisdoms set by the major political parties or institutional policymakers. The conservative nature of these perceptual screens is strengthened by the media's need for concision, which is especially dominant on television, with its appetite for sound bite politics.⁹ Past studies of foreign policy decision-making described the media mainly as a channel for delivering messages during the process of policy-making, but the reality of the last decades reveals that this point-of-view minimizes the actual role of the media, which is much more complex.¹⁰ The media is not only channel, but also plays a far more important role in the process. The media is a crucial part of the foreign policy decision-making environment, an environment which should not be regarded only as the input stage of the process, but much more as a general context, and as an output environment in which leaders make policies. Perceiving the media as an input variable means understanding its role in influencing society and politics, in agenda-setting and in constructing reality.¹¹

⁸Mr Michael Barker 'Manufacturing policies: the media's role in the policy making process.' Australian School of Environmental Studies, (Refereed paper presented to the Journalism Education Conference), Griffith University, 29th November-2nd December, 2005, p. 2.

⁹ Mr Michael Barker 'Manufacturing policies: the media's role in the policy making process, op cit. p. 3.

¹⁰ Chanan Naveh, 'The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework, conflict & communication online. Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002, p 2.

¹¹ Ibid

Brecher, together with other scholars of foreign policy, see the media in a narrower way, as a channel through which the operational environment can have an impact on the foreign policy process. Information may be communicated in a variety of ways, namely, the mass media – press, books, radio, and TV.¹² The broader perspective, which does not exist in the international relations literature, suggests that the media is part of the external-international environment which influences policy, and perceives the press and TV as external components or sources, as an input variable which drives decision processes as the other external input variables of the environment. In a more subtle way, the media may be seen not only as part of the international environment, but also as part of the internal environment of the state.

In a state, the media is not just an information channel. It forms a communication network influencing policy from within the state, as well as the party system, interest groups or the socio-economic stratification of society. The media has a twofold role. First, it provides input into the process as an independent variable. Here the leaders react to the perceived reality as constructed by the press and take it into consideration of what might be known as the “CNN effect”. Second, it is part of the environment which foreign policy makers try to affect or influence by making their decisions.¹³

Many studies have concluded that the media has a pivotal role in shaping government’s foreign policymaking processes through a phenomenon referred to as the CNN effect. This effect does not refer to the sole influence of CNN on policymaking, but rather on the power of global media networks to determine political processes through selective

¹² Chanan Naveh, ‘The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework. op cit. pp 2-3

¹³ Ibid. pp 3-4

coverage of certain issues. Gilboa notes that the CNN concept was initially suggested by politicians and officials haunted by the Vietnam media myth, the confusion of the post-Cold War era, and the communications revolution.¹⁴ A basic triangular relationship among the media, government, and public opinion anchors most studies of the effect global television is having on policymaking. In this context, the media does not have its own power, but power resides in the public, and to the extent the media has power, it is derived from its perceived ability to stimulate or even shape public opinion. The CNN effect theory is based on this context of media effects. In the late 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton described one of the social roles of the mass media as agenda setting, which is associated with Maxwell McCombs. Bernard Cohen introduced this perspective to the field of foreign policy in his classic book on the role of the media in the foreign policy decision-making process. This map-making function of the press is so central to the real impact of the press in the foreign policy field that it is said that the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.¹⁵

The foreign policy decision-making process takes place within an environment partly created by the media. Media performance in this environment is dictated by the state's political communication regime, government communication policy, the political-economy structure and by the specific communication channels which perform the relevant media functions. This media-created atmosphere reflects foreign-policy events

¹⁴ Mr Michael Barker, *Manufacturing Policies: The Media's role in the Policy making process*, op cit. pp 7-8

¹⁵ Chanan Naveh, *The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, op cit. p 8

through the agenda-setting perspective, influencing decision-makers and compelling them to respond through the media, with their specific characteristics. It is necessary to mention that the concept of media environment includes the feedback process which, in this context, means media-oriented foreign-policy decisions on the press.¹⁶

During the last decade, the expansion of global news television networks, such as CNN International and BBC World Service, and particularly their ability to influence policy in foreign affairs, has fascinated politicians, government officials, journalists, and scholars. This fascination resulted from a perception of the media in general, and television in particular, as being the most important power broker in politics. The foreign affairs bureaucracy is facing another dilemma, namely, how to compete effectively with real-time information provided on the screen without compromising professional standards of analysis and recommendations.

If foreign policy experts, military and intelligence officers, and diplomats make a fast analysis based on incomplete information and severe time pressure, they might make bad policy recommendations. Conversely, if they take the necessary time to carefully verify and integrate information and ideas from a variety of sources, and produce in-depth reliable reports and recommendations, these may be irrelevant, if policymakers have to make immediate decisions in response to challenges and pressure emanating from coverage on global television.¹⁷ Global television affects the nuts and bolts of policymaking, and has created challenges for all the participants in the policy process.

¹⁶ Chanan Naveh. *The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. op cit. p 10

¹⁷ Eytan Gilboa. 'The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking In Defense and Foreign Affairs.

The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press. *Politics and Public Policy*. Spring June 2002, No. 6. p21

Political leaders face several challenges and dilemmas. How do they avoid an immediate policy response to an unfolding event without being exposed as a weak leader who is confused and does not know how to handle a situation? When responding, how do they refrain from making a commitment to policy that might have to be reversed or changed? How do they include different appeals to domestic and foreign audiences in a single message? How do they flow with video clip pace without creating too high expectations for too rapid results? Finally, how do they maintain policy that is at odds with prevailing television tone, without alienating reporters and audiences?¹⁸

All participants in the foreign policy process have not yet sufficiently adapted to the new realities of global television coverage. Foreign policy experts, intelligence officers, and diplomats have lost several of their traditional functions to the journalists who are assuming some of these roles, and to spokespersons and communication experts, increasingly influential in inner governmental circles. Successful coping with the challenges of global communication and efficient utilization of new and innovative media technologies requires two sets of reforms in policymaking, that is, first, in the training of leaders, high level policymakers, and diplomats, and second, in the planning and implementation of policies. Leaders must be prepared to handle the rapid pace of global television's demands for fast and effective responses, particularly in crisis situations.

In addition to traditional and conventional strategic and diplomatic considerations, sophisticated policymaking in defense and foreign affairs today requires both sensitive understanding of the global media challenges and an efficient communication strategy for

¹⁸ Eytan Gilboa. 'The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking In Defense and Foreign Affairs, op cit. p. 25

dealing with them. One of the most important principles of successful leadership and governance is the talent and ability to adjust to changing circumstances. Leaders and organizations are now more aware of the challenges of global television, but need to address them more effectively.¹⁹

Like Shaw, Livingstone and Eachus offer a systematic in depth case study, not by analyzing the Iraqi case, but by looking at US intervention in Somalia during 1992. They base their discussion on a survey of official statements, the policy process in question and media coverage. As such, it is the most methodologically exacting research considered so far. What drives their discussion is not so much whether the media can influence policy, but rather who determines the content of the news and therefore controls its capacity to influence. As such, the authors actually assumed that media influence on policy can and do occur. Importantly, for Livingston and Eachus, if it turns out to be journalists themselves setting the news agenda, then it might be concluded that the CNN effect was indeed in operation. If, on the other hand, the news agenda was set by politicians, then something else would be going on; one could hardly talk of a CNN effect.²⁰ Notably, the media is a crucial element in policymaking by virtue of the fact that it shapes public opinion and, therefore, when political statements are presented as policy, it becomes very difficult for reporters, writers and the public to draw a line between the two.

¹⁹ Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. op cit. . p. 26.

²⁰ Piers Robinson. 'The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy?' *Review of International Studies* (1999). 25. p. 307.

2.4 Global Examples of Media Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making

The testimony of principal policymakers on the factors that had the greatest impact on their decisions provides evidence of the effects of global television. Several major policymakers have spoken and written about these effects on foreign policymaking. In the early 1980s, Lloyd Cutler, President Jimmy Carter's Legal Counsel, was surprised by how much television news had intruded into both the timing and the substance of the policy decisions that an America president was required to make.

Former Secretary of State of United States of America, James Baker III, wrote that the terrible tragedy of Tiananmen Square was a classic example of a powerful new phenomenon: the ability of the global communications revolution to drive policy. For example, former U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, complained that CNN was the sixteenth member of the Security Council. Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, confirmed this observation by commenting that officials asking for his advice used to ask him what to do, but now ask him what to say.²¹

Global television constrains the policy process, primarily through the high speed of broadcasting and transmitting information. As noted by Van Dinh, the speed of diplomatic messages, has in the 20th century, gone from weeks to minutes. This difference is clearly demonstrated by the time American presidents had to officially respond to the construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall. In 1961, President Kennedy had the luxury of waiting eight days before making the first American official statement on the construction of the Wall. In 1989, President George Bush had less than eight hours to

²¹ Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. No. 6

make a statement on the destruction of the Wall. In less than 30 years, the time for policy response has dramatically shrunk.²²

In addition, in many recent crises, global television coverage has replaced ambassadors and experts as the source of critical information and evaluation on what is happening in the world. An American official acknowledged that diplomatic communications just can't keep up with CNN. Richard Haass, also complained that he could see an event or speech live on CNN at 2:00 pm, but he had to wait three hours or more before the CIA could deliver its own updated news and commentary to the NSC office.²³

Leaders have always used the press, particularly the elite newspapers, to obtain information and insights on other countries and world affairs. But global television has become a much more immediate, dramatic and powerful source. The faster pace of diplomatic exchanges conducted on global television has altered decision-making processes, particularly in acute situations. Valuable information, observations and suggestions from overseas diplomatic and intelligence sources may no longer arrive in time to have the desired influence on decisions, and when information does arrive in time, it has to compete with dramatic televised images and ongoing reportage of crises and foreign policy issues. Policymakers have also to take into consideration the tone of coverage, and deal with attempts of foreign leaders to undermine their policies and plans

²² Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*.op cit. p. 14

²³ Ibid. p. 15

through messages delivered on global television, primarily via the breaking news format which even increases the pressure for an immediate response.²⁴

The faster speed of diplomatic exchanges on global television presents major dilemmas to all the main participating actors in the foreign policy process, that is, political leaders, experts, diplomats, editors, and journalists. Beschloss argues that this speed may force hurried responses based on intuition rather than on careful extensive policy deliberation, and this may lead to dangerous policy mistakes. He asks whether, under the pressure of global television, Kennedy would have had the time to carefully consider options to resolve the highly inflammable Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy had 13 days to make decisions and to negotiate an acceptable agreement with the Soviets to end the crisis.²⁵

The observations made by Beschloss and Schorr point to a difficult dilemma political leaders often face. If they respond immediately without taking the time to carefully consider policy options, they may make a mistake; but if they insist they need more time to think, or have no comment for the time being, they create the impression, both at home and abroad, of confusion or of losing control over events. Leaders often tend to resolve this dilemma by providing some response, rather than asking for additional time to deliberate a decision.²⁶

²⁴ Eytan Gilboa, *The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. op cit. p. 18

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid. p. 19

Real-time television coverage puts leaders on the spot before they are ready to respond. Policymakers are forced to react instantaneously. If they do not respond, it appears that they are ducking responsibilities. The problem is that a statement on television becomes a commitment to a policy that might be very difficult to reverse or even change should a leader decide, after careful consideration, that this is what needs to be done. Moreover, any policy statement on global networks must take into consideration audience multiplicity. Before the global communication revolution, a leader could have used local media to send one message to his people and foreign media to send a different message to other peoples. Today this distinction has disappeared and a policy statement is reaching, at the same time, both local and foreign audiences, including enemies and allies. Sometimes, this requires a balancing act that in turn may take considerable time to articulate.²⁷

The pressure global television applies on policymakers to do something, particularly in severe humanitarian crises, may challenge policymakers beyond the specific case in question. Morris argues that it is on the foreign policy stage that we see most clearly the strengths and shortcomings of our presidents and other elected officials. Occasionally, failing to act in the face of horrific television pictures quickly gives a president a reputation for weakness, ineffectuality, and dithering. Clinton faced this threat when confronted by television coverage of the war in Bosnia, but was willing to take the risk, at least for several years, mainly because he felt that the American public would not support

²⁷ Eytan Gilboa, *The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. op cit. p. 20

intervention in this crisis. However, Bush's perceived weakness in 1989 was a major factor in his decision to invade Panama.²⁸

The new technologies appeared to reduce the scope for calm deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focused on. This perception was in turn reinforced by the end of the bipolar order and what many viewed as the collapse of the old anti-communist consensus which, it was argued, had led to the creation of an ideological bond uniting policy makers and journalists. Released from the prism of the Cold War, journalists were, it was presumed, freer not just to cover the stories they wanted, but to criticize US foreign policy as well. The phrase 'CNN effect' encapsulated the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events.²⁹

If the Gulf War reminded observers of the enormous power that governments had when it came to shaping the media, events after the 1991 conflict appeared to confirm the opposite. In fact, according to Martin Shaw, emotive, and often highly critical, coverage of Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam Hussein's forces, quite literally caused the virtually unprecedented proposal for Kurdish safe havens. 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia quickly followed and, once again, it was believed that the ill-fated sortie into the Horn of Africa in 1992 had effectively been forced upon the United States by media

²⁸ Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. op cit. p. 21

²⁹ Piers Robinson. 'The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy?' op cit. p 301

pressure. The two interventions, in Northern Iraq and Somalia, triggered a major debate within academic and government circles.³⁰

Foreign policy experts, in particular, were dismayed by what they saw as unwarranted intrusion by the Fourth Estate into the policy process. George Kennan, typically, argued that media coverage of suffering people in Somalia had usurped traditional policy making channels, triggering an ill thought out intervention. Other commentators followed Kennan in expressing concern at the dangers of media dictated foreign policy. James Hodge, for example, observes that today's pervasive media increases the pressure to respond promptly to news accounts that, by their very immediacy, are incomplete, without context and sometimes wrong. Working from a realist perspective, critics generally decried the CNN effect and stressed the need for elite control of the foreign policy making process.³¹

The media habits of diplomats make it clear that there is a close relationship between their work and the news of the day. A deputy foreign minister or an ambassador may personally scan more than half a dozen daily newspapers and weekly news magazines, listen to broadcast news and view the major television news program if he can. Meanwhile, his subordinates are reading even more newspapers, monitoring the broadcast media, and referring relevant information to him.

Nearly every government has one or more offices that monitor both the domestic and foreign press, make recordings of radio and television broadcasts, and distribute summaries of media content to foreign office officials and others. At embassies throughout the world, diplomatic personnel spend a great deal of time keeping up with

³⁰ Piers Robinson. 'The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy? op cit. p. 302

³¹ Ibid.

the press of the host country as well as with the domestic press of their own country. In addition, they may rely on third country media to keep themselves generally informed.³²

The press, pressure groups and different interest groups have been able to persuade governments and the direction of their foreign policies. The Nigeria government, for instance, has displayed this sensitivity both in its perception and conduct of its foreign policy. Due to the Israel-South African ties in the 1970s, Nigerian press was very critical of this relationship, and its denouncement frosted the ties between Nigeria and Israel. According to the *New Nigerian*, there was to be total disregard of restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel. In August 1991, following General Ike Nwachukwu's visit to Israel, the same *New Nigerian*, in its editorial column advised the Babangida regime not to consider the restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel. The *New Nigerian's* view was supported by the Northern elites, who even sponsored the distribution of pamphlets creating a negative impression about Israel and the evils done by Israel in the past to destabilize the Nigerian state.³³

Through the years and with each advance in technology, from high-speed presses and the telegraph to radio, television, and computers, these arguments echo and re-echo. Each innovation, it seems, poses the same challenge to the power elite. New and untrained voices join discussions best left to the elites, time and space collapse, and considered

³² W. Phillips Davison. 'News Media and International Negotiation.' *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer, 1974), p.175

³³ Terhemba N. Ambe-Uva and Kasali M. Adegboyega. 'The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations,' *Turkish Journal of international relations*. Vol. 6.No.3&4(2007).pp. 54-55.

thought is no longer possible.³⁴ Montague Kern, in his work, 'The Press, the Presidency, and International Conflict,' noted that Richard Beal, director of the White House Office of Planning and Evaluation, had charged that changes in the electronic media, like high transmission speed, had brought into question the power to govern.³⁵

Gerald Ford hinted that the execution of his decisive Mayaguez action off Cambodia might have been hampered had the national media been on the scene. Former President Carter was reported to have commented, perhaps not entirely in jest, that he had two major foreign policy problems: Sam Donaldson and Menachem Begin, reporters. Henry Kissinger confirmed this observation by commenting that officials asking for his advice used to ask him what to do, but now ask him what to say, since journalists report events as they happen. Breaking news and the continuing crisis coverage characterized by a special logo, such as America at War or the Middle East Crisis create more pressure on all groups involved in policymaking. Editors push reporters to broadcast new pictures, reporters push leaders to respond fast to unfolding events, and leaders push experts and diplomats to produce instant policy analyses and recommendations.³⁶

Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, members of Congress from both parties, and the Bush administration, complained that biased media coverage was turning public opinion against the war. Congressman James Marshall opined that reporters were painting a falsely bleak picture that weakened national resolve. President Bush struck a

³⁴ Bill Kovach Review: Do the News Media Make Foreign Policy? *Foreign Policy*. No. 102 (Spring, 1996). p. 173.

³⁵ Montague Kern. 'The Press, the Presidency, and International Conflict: Lessons from Two Administrations.' *Political Psychology*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 1984). p. 53.

³⁶ Eytan Gilboa. *The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. op cit. p.6

similar chord, claiming that they were making good progress in Iraq, but was sometimes hard to tell after listening to the filter media. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, added that the news media seemed to want to carry the negative. These statements reflect two assumptions widely shared by decision makers of all political perspectives, namely, first, that the mass media often fails to deliver the messages policy makers think it should convey, and second, that the media shapes opinion about foreign policy.³⁷

The pressures of accelerating deadlines and rapid communications have made thoughtful analysis a relatively scarce commodity in the high-speed information market place. If real-time television has diminished the broadcast journalist's already precious few moments to sift through the blur of details and conflicting accounts of a foreign crisis, the same pressures have serious consequences for foreign policy officials, who often must respond to the pressures of the crisis with little time for considered judgment. In his analysis of the role of the foreign press in shaping policy, Bernard Cohen said that the media may not be successful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling them what to think about. That is, the media has the ability to influence the public's perception of the important topics and issue of the day although it may not dictate what people think about those issues. There is correspondence between the order of importance given in the media to issues and the order of significance attached to the same issues by politicians and the public. The agenda setting hypothesis

³⁷ Matthew A. Baum. & Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis.' *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008. p.40.

holds that the fact of paying attention to some issues and neglecting others has an effect on public opinion and policymakers.³⁸

One fact about the media in modern society is the constant flow of news. Another fact is that large numbers of people read newspapers and listen to news on radio. Some citizens rely more on television for their news. Nevertheless, the mass media still has a significant source of detailed information about what is going on for very large numbers of people. The idea that the news media powerfully controls people's attitudes, beliefs and behavior might not hold water, but the press obviously brings to their attention a selected agenda on topics and issues to respond to and think about.³⁹

According to Kees Aarts and Holli, television news in the United States has been singled out for diminishing what politicians have to say to an ever shrinking sound bite, for providing only episodic coverage of political issues without making sense of them in their larger thematic or historical context, for reporting complex political issues in simplistic strategic terms, and, ultimately, for causing civic disengagement and declining social capital.⁴⁰ While both Light and Kingdon downplay the media's role in setting the president's agenda, other studies show that the media plays an important informational

³⁸ Angela N. Baiya, *The Role of Sudan Media Conflict Resolution: A case study of the Sudan mirror newspaper and the Darfur crisis.* p.16.

³⁹ Shearon A. Lowery & Melvin L. DeFleur, *Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects,* Longman, U.S.A, 1995. pp. 265-266.

⁴⁰ Kees Aarts and Holli A. Semetko. 'The Divided Electorate: Media Use and Political Involvement.' *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 65. No. 3 (Aug., 2003). pp. 759-760.

and framing role and that media policy attention may trigger shifts in the president's policy agenda on both foreign and domestic issues.⁴¹

According to Yoel Cohen, the fact that the citizen is able to draw information from many diverse sources, including television, radio, newspapers, computers and books, makes it more difficult for the foreign policymakers to control information about foreign affairs from the government. In contrast to the pre-television age when newspaper readers could turn their attention away from foreign news, the viewer of television news is forced to accept the information, and form attitudes on international questions.⁴² David Lewis and Roger Rose, in an analysis of media coverage prior to the Persian Gulf War, said that although the news stories presented in a half-hour broadcast are necessarily briefer and more superficial than print sources, they have the potential to influence opinion profoundly.⁴³

Cohen noted that apart from the media having an effect on foreign policy in terms of its image of the world and in terms of it being a source of information, its influence is also to be found in relation to its audiences, politicians, interest groups, and the wider public, and the extent to which ministers are receptive to pressure from these. Parliament, public opinion, interest groups and the media form an interdependent system, sometimes called

⁴¹ Jeff Yates & Andrew Whitford, 'Institutional Foundations of the President's Issue Agenda,' *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), p. 580.

⁴² Yoel Cohen. *Media Diplomacy: The foreign office in the Mass Communication Age*, Franc Cass. 2005. p. 163.

⁴³ David A. Lewis & Roger P. Rose, 'The President, the Press, and the War-Making Power: An Analysis of Media Coverage Prior to the Persian Gulf War.' *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 2002). p. 563.

in the literature on foreign policy making, the domestic environment. The media is dependent on these other elements in the domestic environment, notably parliament and public opinion, in changing foreign policy. If parliament and public opinion were to cease to exist, the influence of the media would also cease because the media is dependent on its audiences for any pressure on government to succeed.⁴⁴

Donald Jordan and Benjamin say that the process of shaping opinion on foreign policy does not appear substantially different from that affecting domestic policy preference. The media, for example, plays a central role; the old notion of minimal effects is dead. The contents of the mass media affect not only agenda setting, but also attributions of responsibility and policy preferences.⁴⁵ When collective opinion moves, the news that is broadcast on network television accounts for a large part of the magnitude and direction of change. But the source of news makes a great deal of difference. A single story from a news commentator or an expert is estimated to have a very large positive effect. For a majority of officials, the news media is thought to represent public opinion. Public attitudes are often thought to be represented in the tone and intensity of news coverage. The media is also seen by some as informed members of the public because reporters both know the issues and have an outside perspective on them. While many officials saw mass opinion as being either ill-informed or unable to voice a clear message on specific issues, to many, the press represents both an informed and articulate segment of public

⁴⁴ Yoel Cohen. *Media Diplomacy: The foreign office in the Mass Communication Age.* op cit. p. 52.

⁴⁵ Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I. 'Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News.' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36. No. 2 (Jun., 1992). pp. 227-228.

opinion.⁴⁶ In Bill Kovach's view, powerful and new communications technologies make it possible for everyone in the world to know a government decision or action the instant it occurs. The effects of these two circumstances are tightly interwoven and difficult to tease apart in the press/policy discussions of today. The media takes foreign policy out of the hands of the elite and opens the process to an ill-informed public or it is an indentured servant of the foreign policy elite. These are familiar poles in foreign policy debates.⁴⁷

Cohen postulates that the use of news media as a channel of communication occurs also when ministers and diplomats are planning policy.⁴⁸ Differences among them, resulting from different perceptions of the national interest or from opposing interests of different government departments, are not always resolved within the formal governmental structure. Information is disclosed in the media with the desired aim of maneuvering a minister, or the cabinet as a whole, towards or away from a particular course of action. Given that ministers and officials are unable to express in public their disagreement with government policy, this is usually expressed in the form of off-the-record leaks. Ben Loughlin argues that there is need to map and evaluate the political and diplomatic significance of the media on shifting relations between governments, media and publics through integrated and, if possible, comparative investigation of news producers, news content, and news audiences.⁴⁹ Illuminating these shifting relations, and how media

⁴⁶ Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I. 'Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News. Op cit. p. 227.

⁴⁷ Bill Kovach Review, 'Do the News Media Make Foreign Policy? Op cit. pp. 169-171

⁴⁸ Ben O.Loughlin, 'Media Diplomacy: Measuring Impact in the Global Influence Business,' *Royal Holloway*. 2007. p. 14

⁴⁹ Ibid

practitioners and policymakers measure the impact of such media, is a task lying at the intersection of concerns of academic, policy and media communities. It raises long-standing questions of media accountability, of regulating global information flows, and of demonstrating effects with social scientific validity. Nevertheless, it should be possible, for instance, to identify the potential network effect of the media. In a media ecology characterized by (ostensibly) distributed forms of influence in which users/ viewers can produce and contribute to media content, researchers could establish the extent to which the media, or contributors to the media become nodal in audiences' understanding of particular events and processes.⁵⁰

Peter Viggo Jakobsen observed that too often, correspondents, editors, pundits, and publishers who work for major media outlets, tend to see themselves as members of opinion-making elite. They consider themselves on an intellectual and social par with high-level policymakers, an attitude that increases the prospect of their being co-opted by ambitious and determined policymakers. A factor perceived to have enhanced the impact of the media is the increased importance of real time television, defined as the transmission of pictures less than two hours old. Using mobile satellite dishes, journalists are now able to bring real time coverage all over the globe.⁵¹

The German scholar-diplomat, Berndt von Staden, observed that as a consequence of the ever-increasing role played by the media in open societies, next to nothing is left of the traditional rule of secrecy in formulating foreign policy and in conducting diplomacy.

⁵⁰ Ben O.Loughlin, ' Media Diplomacy: Measuring Impact in the Global Influence Business. op cit. p. 14

⁵¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen. 'Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management Is Invisible and Indirect.' *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 37. No. 2 (Mar., 2000), p. 131.

Officials and negotiators have been exposed to new sources of media and public constraints as a result of interrelated revolutionary changes in politics, international relations and mass communication. The revolution in communication technologies, that is, the capability to broadcast, often live, almost every significant development in world events to almost every place on the globe, has led to the globalization of electronic journalism and to substantial growth in networks, stations, and communication consumers world-wide.⁵²

Viewed by Altschull as the centre-piece of the democratic assumption, the media is increasingly seen as an important influence shaping the political trajectories of countries, especially in the course of the current democratic wave.⁵³ In post-authoritarian societies, such as those of Africa and communist Europe, where the media was in the vanguard of the struggle for democratization, it continues to play important roles in shaping the course of events in the emerging democracies. The transition of the media in immature democracies, from a vigorous advocacy role to that of a facilitator of an emerging democracy, is often not an easy one. In this context, debates have often surfaced as to whether the media is using its newly found freedom under democracy properly, or whether safeguards need to be built in, to check what state officials like to see as media terrorism.⁵⁴ Rogers and Dearing stated that the media agenda seemed to have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda of elite decision makers. About

⁵² Eytan Gilboa, 'Media Coverage of International Negotiation: A Taxonomy of Levels and Effects. pp. 544-545

⁵³ Ayo Olukoyun. 'Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 47. No. 3 (Dec., 2004). p.72

⁵⁴ Ibid

impact, which the media is supposed to have upon foreign policy, various authors struggle for intellectual clarity. Gowing, for example, admits that media coverage can change overall government strategy. Gowing approvingly quotes Kofi Annan who observed that when governments had a clear policy, then television had little impact; however, when there was a problem, and the policy had not been thought through, they had to do something or face a public relations disaster.⁵⁵ Strobel is even more certain. He notes that the effect of real time television is directly related to the coherence of existing policy.⁵⁶

2.5 Conclusion

Scholars have lagged behind politicians in understanding the significance of political communication in domestic and international affairs. Academics and practitioners are now coming to appreciate what successful politicians have known for decades, namely, that the press is a key player in the process of governance and policy making. Whereas this awareness is now becoming more widespread, the highly complex interdisciplinary nature of research on media and diplomacy and the lack of analytical tools and models have inhibited progress in the field.

Scholars have lumped together very different media-diplomacy interactions under fashionable, but tautological terms, such as media diplomacy, television diplomacy, or

⁵⁵ George C. Edwards and B. Dan Wood, 'Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media.' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 2 (Jun., 1999). p. 328.

⁵⁶Piers Robinson. 'The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?' op cit. pp. 304-305.

the CNN effect, and this has resulted in conceptual confusion. There are no theories and models needed to explain this relationship between policy makers and media. Some years ago, when media was not as advanced as it is now, policy makers followed the traditional models when formulating policies. With this media saturated environment, a different approach should explain this relationship, an approach that will explain the relationship and the influence the media has on foreign policy decision makers. Foreign policy decision makers cannot ignore the role the media plays. When Ted Turner launched the Cable News Network (CNN) in 1980, he foresaw the potential of a worldwide audience with an interest in round-the-clock-news from practically every corner of the globe. He may not have envisioned his new venture as a media phenomenon that would come to have a significant impact on foreign policy making. Media influences policy agenda by reporting issues and thereby pushing these issues in priority. Livingston and Eachus claim that at some level media has the capacity to influence, and are convinced that the media can indeed influence policy decision making. The point made is, that whoever sets the media agenda and draws the attention to certain problems or crises, also determines in course how decisions in government about these issues are eventually made, that is, to the degree that foreign policy is reactive to news content. Some posit that the media plays an insignificant role in policy making processes, while others suggest it has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes; a more likely scenario is that its degree of influence varies considerably, being issue based in nature. One of the fundamental roles of the media in a liberal democracy is to critically scrutinise governmental affairs: that is to act as the 'Fourth Estate' of government to ensure that the government can be held accountable by the public. The media may also

influence policy outcomes through their ability to exclude certain policy options from the media, which sets the boundaries for legitimate public debate.

The media is a crucial part of the foreign policy decision-making environment, an environment which should not be regarded only as the input stage of the process, but much more as a general context, and as an output environment in which leaders make policies. Perceiving the media as an input variable means understanding its role in influencing society and politics, in agenda-setting and in constructing reality. In a more subtle way, the media may be seen not only as part of the international environment, but also as part of the internal environment of the state.

In the state, the media is not just an information channel; it forms a communication network influencing policy from within the state, as well as the party system, interest groups or the socio-economic stratification of society. The foreign policy decision-making process takes place within an environment partly created by the media. Media performance in this environment is dictated by the state's political communication regime, government communication policy, the political-economy structure and by the specific communication channels which perform the relevant media functions. This media-created atmosphere reflects foreign-policy events through the agenda-setting perspective, influencing decision-makers and compelling them to respond through the media, with their specific characteristics.

Such analyses have led some researchers to posit that the media has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes, while others suggest it plays an insignificant role in policy making processes.

CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

3.1 Introduction

Foreign policy is an important key to the rational explanation of international behaviour. It is not possible to understand inter-state relations without understanding their foreign policies. The study of foreign policy, therefore, is one of the most important aspects of the study of international politics. Apart from this, foreign policy is one of the most important instruments that nations employ to promote their interests.

Foreign policies are the strategies governments use to guide their actions in the international arena. Foreign policies spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation. But in general, international relations (IR) scholars are less interested in specific policies than in the foreign policy process, that is, how policies are arrived at and implemented.¹

This chapter deals with foreign policy decision making process. It discusses the nature of foreign policy; foreign policy goals and objectives; determinants of foreign policy; making of foreign policy; decision making; models of decision making; and Kenya's foreign policy

3.2 Nature of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy consists of the external behaviour of a state. Hartman describes foreign policy as a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests. To Norman Hill, it is the content or substance of a nation's effort to promote its interests vis-a-vis

¹ Neack Laura. *The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Rowman&Littlefield,2003.Snow,Donald M. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*.Longman,2003, p. 122

other nations. Ruthnaswamy defines it as the bundle of principles and practices that regulate the intercourse of a state with other states. George Modelski states that foreign policy is the systematic activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the environment.² According to C.C. Rodee, foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state, while negotiating with other states to protect or further its own interests.³ Padelford and Lincoln are of the opinion that foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve its interests. Thus, foreign policy is a series of inputs and actions that a nation makes use of in influencing the behaviour of other nations in the pursuit of its prescribed goals.⁴

3.3 Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

The foreign policy objectives main focus is National Interest. National interest, as already mentioned, is the key element in the foreign policy of a country. But since the term 'national interest' is open to a variety of meanings, Paul Seabury states that the national interest is what foreign policy makers say it is. The essential components of national interest of any state are the same, namely, security, national development, and world order. It embraces such matters as security, development of higher standards of living, and the maintenance of conditions of national and international stability. Foreign policy objectives, therefore, can be derived from national interest

² Modelski George, *The Theory of Foreign Policy*, London, 1962, p.3

³ Rodee, CC, Anderson and Christol, *Introduction to Political Science*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957 p.501

⁴ Chandra Prakash, *Theories of International Relations*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House., 2004 pp 94-96

only. They are, in fact, interests spelled out and made more precise. Objectives, therefore, are of a more specific nature than interests. An objective comes into existence when a particular type of national interest becomes sufficiently compelling for a state to seek.⁵ George Modelski, however, considers both interest and objectives under the category of aims and purposes. Further, every state acts according to certain norms and principles which represent more or less clearly formulated patterns of behaviour⁶. These principles together constitute the ideology of foreign policy. Again, every action and policy involves the application of certain means. A foreign policy is, therefore, a thought out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interest.⁷

Foreign policy objectives can be classified into various pairs of contrasting objectives. For instance, Arnold Wolfers has distinguished between possession goals and milieu goals.⁸ By the former he means those goals which a foreign policy seeks to achieve in order to achieve territory or a membership of some world organization, whereas by the latter he means those goals which nations pursue in order to shape favourable conditions beyond their national boundaries.

Achievement of peace, promotion of international law, and growth of international organizations can be examples of a milieu goal. In practice, milieu goals may only be the means for the pursuit of possession goals.⁹ Similarly, some objectives may be direct national goals, such as preservation of national independence and security and some are indirect goals which are of primary benefit to the people. Another

⁵ Kumar, Mahendra, *op.cit.*, 1978, p.234

⁶ Modelski George, *The Theory of Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.* p 4

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ Wolfers, Arnold, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore, 1962, pp 56-65

⁹ Holsi, K.J., *International Politics*, Prentice-Hall, 1978, New Delhi pp 145-146

contrasting set of goals may be ideological or revolutionary goals and traditional goals. Moreover, the objectives of foreign policy can be classified into three categories, that is, core value (interest) objectives, middle range objectives, and universal long range objectives.

The core values and interests are those kinds of goals for which people are willing to make ultimate sacrifices: they are related with the existence of a state. They are self-preservation, defence of strategically vital areas, ethnic, religious or linguistic unity and protection of cultural and political institutions, beliefs and values, economic development and prosperity. No government can dare adopt a course of policy that ignores the core values and interests and yet survive.¹⁰

Middle range objectives include trade, foreign aid, access to communication facilities, sources of supplies and foreign markets. These are for most states, necessary for increasing social welfare as well as increase of state prestige by expansion of military capacity, distribution of foreign aid and investment and diplomatic ceremonies, including exhibitions of status symbols as nuclear weapons, or space explorations¹¹. It also includes creating colonies, launching of satellites and acquiring spheres of influence. Ideological self-extension is also prevalent in many forms to promote a state's socioeconomic and political values abroad.

Universal long range objectives are those plans, dreams, visions, and grand designs concerning the ultimate political or ideological organization of the international system. These objectives aim at restructuring the world order. Hitler's concept of 'Thousand-Year Reich', Japan's dream of 'Greater East Asia', the Soviet Union's idea of 'World Soviet Federation,' De Gaulle's image of 'Federation Of fatherland,'

¹⁰ Rosenau, James, *The Study of Foreign Policy* in Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd,(eds), The Free Press New York, 1976, p 46

¹¹ Ibid

the American dream of 'making the world 'Safe For Democracy.' and more recently, George Bush's slogan of 'A New World Order: are some of the illustrations of long range objectives. It should be noted that the first and second categories of objectives require immediate pursuit, but the third category goals are meant for distant future.

3.4 Determinants of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is the result of a large number of factors. These factors affect the formulation of policy in different ways under different circumstances. Some of these factors are permanent, some temporary; some are obvious while others are obscure. However, all interact with each other. In devising its foreign policy a nation must consider certain basic facts of existence. This frame of reference includes its geographic-strategic situation, population potential, economic endowments, and ideological environment.¹² According to Rosenau, foreign policy inputs are geography, culture and history, technological and economic development, social structure, moods of public opinion, political accountability, governmental structure, and situational factors-both external and internal.¹³ To quote Padelford and Lincoln, "Fundamentally, foreign policy has its roots in the unique historical background, political institutions, traditions, economic needs, power factors, aspirations, peculiar geographical circumstances and basic sets of values held by a nation."¹⁴ Among basic determinants, J. Bandyopadhyaya includes geography, economic development, political tradition, domestic milieu and international milieu, military strength and national character. The determinants of foreign policy can be broadly divided into three categories, namely, internal factors, external factors, and policy making factors.

¹² Rodee, CC, Anderson and Christol, *Introduction to Political Science*, op cit. pp.506-511

¹³ Rosenau, James, *The Study of Foreign Policy* in Rosenau. op cit. pp 34-39

¹⁴ Padelford and Lincoln, *International Politics*, Macmillan New York, 1954, p307

Internal factors can be further subdivided into geography, historical traditions, national capacity, public opinion, and ideology, as distinct sub-categories..

3.4.1 Geography

Geography has been one of the most potent factors influencing the formulation of foreign policy. It is said that pacts may be broken, treaties unilaterally denounced, but geography holds its victim fast. That is, a state can escape anything, but the constraints of geography. Geography includes location, size, topography, state boundaries, population, climate, hydrography and soil.¹⁵ An analysis of the foreign policy goals of any country reveals the strong influence of geography. For instance, the foreign policy of Britain was centred on the principles of balance of power, supremacy on the seas and expansion of the Empire. These aspects of foreign policy were the natural off-shoots of its geography.¹⁶ The strategic location of Britain (an island) helped her to rule over the waves in terms of both trade and naval supremacy for centuries. Similarly, America, being separated from the continents of Europe and Asia by wide expanse of water, could follow an isolationist policy for a long time in the name of Monroe Doctrine. Likewise, Russia's location with no easy access to warm water impelled her to seek access, first to the Baltic, and then to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. However, the effect of geography is rather of an intricate nature. It has lost much of its importance in our time. The recent advancement in science and technology has relegated the geographical factor to background. No doubt, the phenomenal progress of aerial navigation and technological sophistication of warfare have led to serious depreciation of geopolitics.¹⁷

¹⁵ Chandra Prakash, *Theories of International Relations. Op cit.* pp 94-95

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Chandra Prakash, *Theories of International Relations, op cit.* P. 95

3.4.2 Historical Deductions and Foreign Policy

The foreign policy is also conditioned by the history of a nation. It is from history that a nation adopts a style and culture, which in turn, influence the course of action that a nation follows in its external relations. To illustrate, the element of isolationism in the US foreign policy is the legacy which took a long time to outlive its utility. Similarly, India's policy of non-alignment was a logical culmination of its freedom movement and the principles of Panch Sheel are rooted in its Buddhist past.¹⁸

3.4.3 National Capacity

National capacity implies military strength, technological advancement and economic development. A foreign policy must compromise with national capacity if it is to succeed. To illustrate, the British foreign policy had to reconcile with its medium power status after the Second World War¹⁹. Similarly, the revolution in the US foreign policy in the post-1945 period can be explained only in terms of superpower status resulting from the War. Likewise, the abandonment of superpower role by the Soviet Union since 1985 was the result of recognition by Mikhail Gorbachev of the declining capacity of the Soviet Union.²⁰

3.5 External Factors and their Ramifications towards Foreign Policy

Three elements together form what is known as external milieu. They are: World Organization, which includes International Law; the United Nations Organization and other International Institutions, aimed at maintaining the existing world order; and the World public opinion. No country can go on ever challenging world public opinion.

¹⁸ Chandra Prakash, *Theories of International Relations*, op cit. P. 95

¹⁹ Ibid. p 98

²⁰ Ibid

Even as a superpower, the United States had to bend before the world public opinion on the question of withdrawal from Vietnam and had to stop bombing after 1968. Another example would be what France had to take note of in the sense of outrage internationally demonstrated by its nuclear tests in the Pacific and had to reduce its original programme of tests from eight to six; and reaction of other states, particularly friendly states. The policy makers have to take due note of the interests of other states while formulating their policies.

The growth of International Law and organization, the mutational impact of technological advance on international relations, and the political evolution of the nation-states are some of the major factors that impart an essentially dynamic character to the international milieu within which a state has to formulate its external policies. The foreign policy makers are bound to treat the international milieu as a given datum for all practical purposes.²¹ Since the end of the Second World War, some major developments, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the development of highly sophisticated and devastatingly destructive nuclear projectiles, the growth, relative stability and partial effectiveness of the United Nations, the disappearance of classical imperialism and the emergence of a large number of militarily, states have profoundly altered the character of external environment.

3.6 Domestic Politics as determinant of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is shaped not only by the internal dynamics of individual and group decision making, but also by the states and societies within which decision makers operate.²² The sub-state actors closest to the foreign policy process are the state's

²¹ Chandra Prakash, *Theories of International Relations*, op cit, p 98

²² Goldstein Joshua S, Jon C.Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Pearson Longman, San Fransisco,2006. pp134-139

bureaucratic agencies maintained for developing and carrying out foreign policy. Different states maintain different foreign policy bureaucracies but share some common elements.

3.7 The Role of Diplomats

Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or foreign service, of diplomats working in embassies in foreign capitals (and in consulates located in noncapital foreign cities), as well as diplomats who remain at home to help coordinate foreign policy.²³ States appoint ambassadors as their official representatives to other states and to international organizations. Diplomatic activities are organized through a foreign ministry. In many democracies, some diplomats are political appointees who come and go with changes in government leaders (often as patronage for past political support).²⁴ Others are career diplomats who come up through the ranks of the Foreign Service and tend to outlast changes in administration. Skilled diplomats are assets that increase a state's power.²⁵ Diplomats provide much of the information that goes into making foreign policies, but their main role is to carry out rather than create policies. Nonetheless, foreign ministry bureaucrats often make foreign relations so routine that top leaders and political appointees can come and go without altering the country's relations. The national interest is served, the bureaucrats believe, by the stability of overall national goals and positions in international affairs.

Sometimes, state leaders appoint close friends or key advisors to manage the foreign policy bureaucracy. President George H. W. Bush did this with his closest friend,

²³Goldstein Joshua S, Jon C.Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Pearson Longman, San Fransisco,2006. p 134

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid

James Baker, as did President George W. Bush in his second term with his former NSC chief and confidante Condoleezza Rice. Chinese leader Mao Zedong put his loyal ally Zhou Enlai in charge of foreign policy.²⁶ At times, frustration with the bureaucracy leads politicians to bypass normal channels of diplomacy. For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy demanded to be put in direct contact with military personnel in the Caribbean overseeing the blockade of Cuba, bypassing the Secretary of Defence and high-ranking officers²⁷.

3.8 Making of Foreign Policy

The actions of a state in the international arena result from individual human choices by its citizenry, its political leaders, its diplomats and bureaucrats, aggregated through the state's internal structures.²⁸ States establish various organizational structures and functional relationships to create and carry out foreign policies. Officials and agencies collect information about a situation through various channels. They write memoranda outlining possible options for action, they hold meetings to discuss the matter, and some of them meet privately outside these meetings to decide how to steer the meetings.²⁹

3.9 Decision Making

The foreign policy process is a process of decision making. States take actions because people in government choose those actions.³⁰ Decision making is a steering process in which adjustments are made as a result of feedback from the outside world.

²⁶ Goldstein Joshua S, Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*. Op cit. p135

²⁷ Ibid. p. 123

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Goldstein Joshua S, Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*. Op cit. p. 123

³⁰ The rational model along with organizational process and bureaucratic politics derives from Graham Allison

Decisions are carried out by actions taken to change the world, and then information from the world is monitored to evaluate the effects of actions. These evaluations, along with information about other, independent changes in the environment, go into the next round of decisions.

3.10 Models of Decision Making

3.10.1 Rational Actor Model

A common starting point for studying the decision-making process is the rational model. In this model, decision makers set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, and then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs. The choice may be complicated by uncertainty about costs and benefits of various actions. In such cases, decision makers must attach probabilities to each possible outcome of an action. The goals of different individuals involved in making a decision may diverge, as may the goals of different state agencies. The rational model of decision making is thus somewhat complicated by uncertainty and the multiple goals of decision makers. The rational model may imply that decision making is simpler than actually is the case. It also assumes that each state's decision making process can be viewed as if there were a single unitary actor making decisions and that each unitary actor makes rational choices.³¹ It also involves an ability to recognize the circumstances under which a government must operate in carrying out its foreign policy. It as well involves the exercise of judgment

³¹ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics: Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 8th eds, 2001, p. 56

and common sense in assessing the best practical means and courses of action available for carrying out foreign policies.³²

The rational actor model has been subject to criticism. The model tends to neglect a range of political variables, like political decisions, non-political decisions, bureaucratic procedures, continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident.³³ Although the rational actor perspective on foreign policy has been around for several decades, misunderstandings and misplaced critiques of the approach persist, hindering thoughtful and informed discussion. In an otherwise superb study by the historian H.A. Drake, he states concisely common misconceptions of the rational actor model. In its purest form, the rational actor approach presumes that such a figure as (Constantine) has complete freedom of action to achieve goals that he or she has articulated through a careful process of rational analysis, involving full and objective study of all pertinent information and alternatives. At the same time, it presumes that this central actor is so fully in control of the apparatus of government that a decision once made is as good as implemented. There is no staff on which to rely, no constituencies to placate, no generals or governors to cajole. By attributing all decision making to one central figure who is always fully in control and who acts only after carefully weighing all options, the rational actor method allows scholars to filter out extraneous details and focus attention on central issues. From the perspective of rational choice theorists, any rational actor model assumes that actors, such as decision makers, make choices that the actors believe will lead to the best feasible

³² Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 'Introduction to International Relations', Oxford Journal, 3rd eds, p. 224.

³³ M. Clarke, 'The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis', in M. Clarke and B. White (eds) *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1989), p. 33.

outcomes for them as defined by their personal values or preferences. The interests of the decision makers may or may not include enhancing something called the national interest.³⁴

3.10.2 Bureaucratic Actor Model

The bureaucratic decision making model holds that there is no single rational actor making decisions. Central governments are complex bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are formal, hierarchical organizations. Decisions here result from negotiations among government agencies, with each having different and, at times, conflicting interests. Bureaucratic politics model views foreign policy as based on bargaining and compromises among governmental agencies. Policy networks here are temporary alliances of leaders, interest groups, and agencies to influence policy.³⁵ This approach focuses on the organizational context of decision making, which is seen to be conditioned by the dictates and demands of the bureaucratic settings in which decisions are made. Analyzing processes and channels whereby organizations arrive at their policies is seen to be a superior way to acquire empirical knowledge of foreign policy. The strength of this approach is its empiricism, its detailed attention to the concrete way policies are carried out in the bureaucratic milieus within which policymakers work. The approach seeks to find out not only what happened, but why it happened the way it did. The best known study of this kind is Graham Allison's book on the Cuban missile crisis, *Essence of Decision*. In these model, individual decision makers at different levels, each with their own particular goals in mind,

³⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models*, New York University/Stanford University, p.2.

³⁵ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics: Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 8th eds, 2001, p. 56.

bargain and compete for influence.³⁶ Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, went a good deal further in moving the focus of interest away from the individual decision-maker and toward the political system itself. As a consequence, the decisions of individuals became much less important as predictors of the outcome of the policy process. First of all, in the bureaucratic politics model, the policy positions of individuals derived primarily from their roles. Second, political decisions are seen as the result of a process driven by the interaction of bureaucratic interests, not by the decisions of individuals. To be sure, individuals were present as pieces on the chess board, but their importance came solely from the fact that they represented organizational interests. Indeed, the final policy outcomes need not even have been willed by any of those concerned, being instead the unintended resultant of bargaining, pulling, and hauling among the principal participants.³⁷ The publication of Graham Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in 1969 and *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* in 1971 revolutionized foreign policy analysis. In those seminal works, Allison introduced two new decision making approaches- the governmental politics model (most commonly referred to as the bureaucratic politics model) and the organizational process model – to explain the October 1962 confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The bureaucratic politics model embraced the perspective that foreign policy decisions are the product of political resultants or bargaining between individual leaders in government positions, whereas the organizational process model

³⁶ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 'Introduction to International Relations,' *Oxford Journal*, 3rd eds, p.226.

³⁷ Barbara Farnham, 'Political Cognition and Decision-Making,' *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1990),p. 88.

maintained that foreign policy actions are generated by organizational output, namely the behavior of large bureaucracies with parochial priorities and perceptions following standard operating procedure.³⁸ The bureaucratic decision making model holds that there is no single rational actor making decisions. Central governments are complex bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are formal, hierarchical organizations. Decisions here result from negotiations among government agencies with each having different interest, at times conflicting interests. Bureaucratic politics model views foreign policy as based on bargaining and compromises among governmental agencies. Policy networks here are temporary alliances of leaders, interest groups, and agencies to influence policy.³⁹

3.10.3 Organizational Actor Model

In this model, the process of decision making matters. It is an organizational actor model, according to which a concrete foreign policy emerges from clusters of government organizations that look after their own best interests and follow standard operating procedures. Decision-making in foreign policy involves the analysis and assessment of past and current data, in the light of past experience and that of others, who had dealt with similar situations, in order to identify the need and available options for action in the future and the likely implications of each of those options for the protection and promotion of national interests. Foreign policy has four aspects, namely, political, internal and external security-related, economic, including commercial, and societal, which has a bearing on society as well as those of others. A successful conduct of foreign policy protects and advances national interests and contributes to the preservation and enhancement of status and power, without being

³⁵Christopher M. Jones Edited by: Robert A., ' *Denmark Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models.* '

³⁶ Kegley and Wittkopf. 'World Politics: Foreign Policy Decision Making,' 8th eds, 2001, p 56

unduly detrimental to the national interests, power and status of others. It seeks to avoid conflicts and, where this is not possible, to minimize the likely damage to national interests, power and status.

The process of decision-making in foreign policy has become more complex than in the past due to a number of reasons, that is, the emergence of ethical issues such as human rights, democracy and disarmament as important components of the political aspect of foreign policy; the greater focus on non-political aspects such as economic, environmental; the new complexities of the security aspect due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the never-diminishing threats from trans-national religious and other terrorist groups and narcotics smuggling gangs to national and regional security; the trend towards greater trans-nationalisation of the decision-making process due to the impact on the process of a country's membership of international and regional organizations; the increasingly assertive role of national and trans-national non-state actors, such as the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and media in seeking to influence the process; the networking of such non-state actors, at the national and trans-national levels, in order to strengthen their ability to influence policy making and implementation; the insatiable demand from the non-state actors and other sections of the public for transparency and accountability; and the role of the printed and electronic media and the Internet in spreading greater awareness of the database of the process and in providing yardsticks by which the success of the policy-formulation and implementation could be judged. The availability of knowledge at the mouse-tip has contributed to a greater non-state participation in policy-making and implementation and to an instant and ever-continuing scrutiny of policy-making. Owing to the modernization of the media and the advent of the Internet, there has been a phenomenal increase in the availability of

current open data at reasonable cost to the state as well as the non-state actors. Even the best of facts can lead to wrong decisions in the absence of high-quality expertise in analyzing the facts and assessing the implications. The quality of in-house expertise has definitely improved in recent years, but more spectacular has been the growth of a reservoir of non-state expertise which governmental policy-makers can tap with benefit. The growth of the non-state expertise has been facilitated by the rapid growth in technology. The readiness of the state policy-makers to make use of the expertise of non-state actors has contributed to many innovations in policy-making. There is an urgent need for an examination of the positive and negative aspects of policy and decision-making process in respect of foreign policy in the light of the experience of countries in order to improve the quality of the decision-making.⁴⁰

Policy makers are inundated with information from multiple sources, but at the end of the day, they have to make a decision. That decision may be influenced by the wishes of their constituents, the demands of special interest groups, pressures from party members or by countless other factors. This is one of the many reasons why determining the direct influence of the media on policy-making is inherently problematic.⁴¹ Organizational process model maintains that foreign policy actions are generated by organizational output, namely, the behavior of large bureaucracies with parochial priorities and perceptions following standard operating procedures.⁴² In the organisational process model, foreign policy decision makers generally skip the

⁴⁰ B. Raman, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.(30/04/2000).

⁴¹ Donald Abelson, *'A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy'*, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.

⁴²Christopher M. Jones Edited by: Robert A. *'Denemark Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models.'*

labour intensive process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying, instead, for most decisions on standardized responses.

3.11 Policy Makers' Role

Another variable in the formulation of foreign policy is the attitude of the policy makers. A policy or decision making process consists of an interaction between those making the decision and their environment. In the opinion of Michael Brecher, policy choices flow inexorably from the composite images of the decision making elite, modified only by the counter images of competing elite within the political system. Certainly, in the formulation of foreign policy the ruling elite plays a major role. Decision makers act in accordance with their perception of reality. Having perceived in one's mind the relevant value and the image of the relevant sector of the environment, the decision makers determine the objectives. However, image and reality may either coincide or diverge. But all decision makers possess a set of images and are governed by them in their response to foreign policy problems. In the view of Brecher, elite images are no less real than the reality of their environment and are much more relevant to an analysis of the foreign policy flow. Since the final shape of the foreign policy is the handiwork of these elites, the impact of their views and personality is quite natural. Endorsing this view, Prof. Galbraith observes: Foreign policy to an extent, is a reflection of the fundamental instincts of those who make it. Therefore, we should identify those individuals who are decision makers and try to understand their idiosyncrasies and their subconscious compulsions while analyzing the foreign policy of a country.

Undoubtedly, the way decision makers interpret national interests and perceive the external scenario has much to do with the formulation of foreign policy. For instance,

we cannot fully explain the foreign policies of the former Soviet Union, Germany and Italy without taking into account the personal influences of men like Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini while they were in power. However, it must be noted that decision making in foreign policy does not mean the formulation of a grand design by a few leaders in terms of their personal wisdom or whims. It is essentially an incremental process involving the interplay of a wide variety of basic determinants, political institutions and organizational pulls and pressures of a bureaucratic-political nature and personalities of the decision makers.

To conclude, the basic determinants (geography, political traditions, economic development, domestic and international milieu) constitute the boundary conditions of decision making which no national policy maker can ignore. Political institutions, such as public opinion, party organizations, pressure groups, legislature, executive and foreign office, must be regarded as major parameters of the decisional system. Finally, the personalities of the ultimate decision makers, their ideological predilections, psychological propensities, and above all, their need for personal political survival, inevitably condition the final choice of ends and means. Foreign policy is, thus, a product of a complex interplay of history, geography, past circumstances, perception of the ruling elite, national interests and ideological consciousness, besides domestic, regional and international affairs.

In order for the objectives of the research to be achieved an analysis of Kenya foreign policy is of great importance. The Kenya's foreign policy will be analyzed albeit not in elaborate details.

3.12 Kenya's Foreign Policy

The conduct of foreign policy in Kenya is a prerogative of the Head of State, the Chief Executive (President). Consequently, the Chief Executive is the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. This applies universally and is not unique to Kenya.

The Foreign Ministry's responsibility is that of advice and execution in consultation with the President. Several individuals, institutions and organizations participate in the foreign policy formulation and decision-making. From this perspective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only a facilitator, co-ordinator and a steward of the country's foreign policy; the various government agencies are complementary actors in the conduct of foreign policy.⁴³

3.13 Kenya's Foreign Policy Orientation

Kenya's foreign policy has, since independence been designed and guided by the following basic and universally recognized norms, that is, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and preservation of national security, good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, non-alignment and national self-interest, and adherence to the Charters of the UN and OAU/AU.⁴⁴

3.14 Factors Influencing Kenya's Foreign Policy

Kenya's foreign policy has since independence been guided and shaped by its own

⁴³ www.mfa.go.ke

⁴⁴ The information is from Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework document (2009). pp.7-16

national interest. This self-interest could be grouped into three main categories, namely, security/political, economic advancement/development, and geo-politics.

3.14.1 Security/Political

Peace and stability are a pre-requisite to social and economic development. The government's commitment to guarantee the security of its people, and the preservation of national integrity and sovereignty within secure borders, underlies the desire to advance national interests by guaranteeing a secure political environment for development.⁴⁵

3.14.2 Economic Advancement or Development

Economic development has played a dominant role in shaping Kenya's foreign policy. The need to pursue an open economic policy and the demand for foreign capital and investment flows, inter-alia Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and ODA, has influenced Kenya's approach to foreign policy.⁴⁶

3.14.3 Geo-Political Factors

Kenya's foreign policy in the region has been shaped by factors, such as the presence of overlapping ethnic community across borders and the fact that Kenya is a littoral state of the Indian Ocean, which influences relations with landlocked neighbors.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ www.mfa.go.ke retrieved on August 29 2011

⁴⁶ www.statehouse.go.ke retrieved on August 30 2011

⁴⁷ www.mfa.go.ke retrieved on August 30 2011

3.15 Kenya and Regional Integration.

International and regional co-operation form a major component of the foreign policy of any country. Kenya participates actively in several regional initiatives. She is a member of East African Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), ACP-EU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, amongst others. This co-operation is borne out of the realization that the development and prosperity of Kenya are intimately tied with her neighbors in the region.⁴⁸

With the advent of globalization and liberalization, the country's external relations are being governed more and more by the need to promote a favorable environment for trade and investment. The Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1997 on "Industrial Transformation to the year 2020 clearly defines Kenya's approach to regional integration arrangements. It identifies institutional and legal framework as prerequisites to fostering international and regional trade which could benefit Kenya. This pro-active and participatory role in the economic and trade dynamics in the region is geared towards fighting poverty and improving the welfare of the citizens of Kenya.⁴⁹

3.16 Media and Foreign Policy

According to Piers Robinson, media influence on policy occurs where there exists policy uncertainty or critically framed media coverage. In this situation, policy-makers, uncertain of what to do and without a clearly defined policy line with which

⁴⁸ www.mfa.go.ke retrieved on August 30 2011

⁴⁹ Ibid.

to counter critical media coverage. can be forced to intervene due to media-driven public pressure or the fear of potential negative public reaction to government inaction.⁵⁰ When real time global communication became possible, a new media space for diplomacy came into existence. CNN led the way, and the CNN effect on foreign policy was born. CNN has retreated somewhat from this early mission, but other news broadcasters have stepped in to broadcast news on both television and the internet.⁵¹ Critical television coverage of government action or inaction would drive officials either to pursue one specific of various policy options or change policy completely. The assumption is that real-time television coverage not only creates a demand that something must be done, but also drives the making of foreign policy.⁵²

Some posit that the media plays an insignificant role in policy making processes, while others suggest it has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes; a more likely scenario is that its degree of influence varies considerably, being issue based in nature. One of the fundamental roles of the media in a liberal democracy is to critically scrutinise governmental affairs: that is to act as the 'Fourth Estate' of government to ensure that the government can be held accountable by the public. In the same way that Habermas described the colonisation of the public sphere by large corporations, the political sphere is now being colonised by the media, and politics

⁵⁰ Piers Robinson, *The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power during Humanitarian Crisis* Journal

of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), pp. 613-614.

⁵¹ Francis Beer & G. R Boynton, *Global Media Diplomacy and Iranian Nuclear Weapon's: The New Space of Global Media Diplomacy*. p.1.

⁵² Gowing, Nik. *'Real-Time TV' Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?* in Gowing, J., Paterson, R., Preston, A. (eds.): *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute, 1996. p. 81

has begun re-orientating itself to satisfy the logic of media organisations. Therefore, the media are active participants in the policymaking process and the ability to stimulate change or maintain the status quo depends on their choice of subject (or policy issue) and how they frame it. The media may influence policy outcomes through their ability to exclude certain policy options from the media, which sets the boundaries for legitimate public debate. Such analyses have led some researchers to posit that the media has a powerful monolithic influence on all policy processes, while others suggest it plays an insignificant role in policy making processes.⁵³

3.17 Conclusion

The chapter dealt with definition of foreign policy, factors determining foreign policy, decision making process and models. With them dealt as thus in this chapter is important to the researcher whose objective is to investigate the media influences on foreign policy decision making process. Kenya's foreign policy has been highlighted for two reasons the researcher deemed important. The researcher is from Kenya and Kenya's foreign policy forms a very good basis for analysis. In conclusion, the relationship between media and foreign policy was discussed. Chapter four is important because it brings examples of how the media has influenced foreign policy decision making process in Kenya.

⁵³Mr Michael Barker '*Manufacturing policies: the media's role in the policy making process,*' Australian School of Environmental Studies, (Refereed paper presented to the Journalism Education Conference). Griffith University, 29th November-2nd December, 2005, p. 2

CHAPTER FOUR

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

In the early post independence period, there was considerable optimism that the resource base of Africa- particularly in minerals-would provide a foundation for continental pride and status and would give individual countries the economic capability to project a strong foreign policy within the continent and overseas. This optimism was based on an assumption that these resources would facilitate diversification into other key economic areas and so strengthen policy options further. Ali Mazrui went so far as to predict that by the mid 1990s, Nigeria would probably be more influential internationally than either Britain or France. Although there are some examples to suggest resources can influence policy options- as with oil diplomacy (for a limited period) in Nigeria, gold diplomacy in South Africa, or diamond diplomacy in Botswana, the resource base of Africa has not brought it significant leverage within the global economy.¹

Studies of African foreign policy seek to shed light on actors, contexts, and outcomes. Foreign policy makers attempt to reconcile domestic interests with external circumstances, taking account of the available means, resources and institutions for doing so. Important to understanding foreign policy are specific domestic and external contexts and the interactions between these two environments. As major players in foreign policy, elites operate within institutions that continually constrain them but oftentimes, these

¹ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. Northern Arizona University, 1999, Westview press, p 3

policymakers can work around such limits and manage the tensions between domestic and international society. Outcomes are interesting because they answer far reaching questions about how elites achieve their foreign policy goals, specifically how they balance means and objectives. Despite the postcolonial conundrum of multiple motives and meager means, African elites have treated foreign policy as a way for nation-states to become effective participants and claimants in the international arena.²

4.2 History of Africa in Foreign Policy Orientation.

African states placed an emphasis on the active membership of IGOs, such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Union (OAU), and the Group of 77 (G77). By pooling energies within such organizations, states were able to project a presence quite beyond what one would expect from their individual capabilities. Within almost one-third of the voting bloc within the UN General Assembly (more when allied to others in the G77), African States had some success in pushing their policy agendas. For most African states, the NAM was of marginal utility, and it tended to become a focus of policy attention only at times of summit meetings. The OAU proved more significant in tackling intra- African tensions and helping to formulate regional policies, but even here the organization has struggled to materially impact the policies of individual states.³

² Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, 'I William Zartman,' General Editor, 2001, Lynne Rienner Publishers. p 1

³ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit, p 4

Opposition of apartheid policies carried out in the Republic of South Africa (SA) provided something akin to a reflex unity in African foreign policy, especially within the Front-Line States like Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This consensus on SA helped to maintain African cohesion in organizations such as the UN, the OAU, and the Commonwealth, and it was effectively used to lobby for economic assistance, particularly on Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).⁴

In part in response to the demonstrated inability of the state to respond in part to international pressures, a number of African states held elections in a bid to construct new domestic and international sources of legitimacy. In some cases (Kenya, Cameroon, Gabon, Togo) these elections were manipulated to keep incumbents in power, but in others (Benin, Mali, Namibia, Malawi and most notably South Africa) leadership changed as a result of popular participation. These experiments with democracy created a new set of institutions such as political parties, legislatures, and increasingly independent press and advocacy groups that have the potential to alter the ways by which African foreign policies were made and implemented. African foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century is still dominated by overarching constraints on the survival of weak states. The imperatives of state survival, Clapham notes, force elites to use foreign policy to garner political and economic resources from the external environment.

Whether made singly or collectively, foreign policy reflects the continental attempts by elites to manage threats to domestic security and insulate their decision making from untoward external manipulation. Contemporary African elites, like their predecessors, are

⁴ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p 5

preoccupied with political stability, legitimacy, and economic security, issues whose importance seems to increase rather than diminish. Continuities in structural weaknesses, however, compete in importance with marked changes in actors, issues, institutions, and strategies for African foreign policy.⁵ The focus on actors and contexts, on the sources and sites of policy formulation and implementation, reveals the institutional bases of actors and their links to each other and society as a whole. In studies of decision making in Africa, most scholars have concentrated on the cultural and organizational contexts of conception and execution of policy in light of domestic and international resources. These studies have highlighted that decisions are outcomes of a wide array of variables ranging from the nature of leadership, ideology, modes of domestic mobilization, organizational resources, and the impediments and opportunities that emanate from the external environment.

African foreign policy has been essentially a matter of deliberate actions by elites. Limited by a dearth of resources and competing domestic concerns of nation state and building, African elites, for the most part, have chosen to participate in external realms. After independence, foreign policymakers sought to resolve the choice (and oftentimes trade-offs) between national and continental identity, sovereignty and supranationalism, and differentiation and integration. Continental identity, supranationalism and integration in various forms proceeded from the desire to unite disparate geographic units to pool resources in concerted action, and to increase the leverage of the continent as a whole in the global and regional affairs of new African states. In contrast, through sovereignty,

⁵ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op cit. pp 5-7

national identity and differentiation, African states sought to maximize individual political autonomy, strengthen territorial borders and guarantee unilateral advantages from privileged relations with external actors. Thus the competing choices and practices of nationalism and Pan Africanism have coexisted, though uneasily, in African foreign policy, a testimony to the success of elites in straddling these broad concerns.⁶

Traditional approaches to the study of foreign policy focused upon a small, elite group of foreign policy decision makers. Many times, a President or military head of state was considered the only decision maker, with one-or no-party state systems reinforcing the centralization of policy decision making. Most recent approaches, though recognizing that individual leaders still hold considerable sway over policy decisions, have also considered bureaucratic influences on policy, drawing in the role of diplomatic service personnel and various ministries. It is difficult to point to one single event that has transformed the characteristics of African foreign policies, but there are four critical changes within the domestic and international environments that offer distinct reference points for African states today. These are the end of the Cold War, the pressures of liberalization and democratization, the changing character of the global economy and the debate over an African agenda. Such a change presents new opportunities for African states to pursue more autonomous foreign policies, especially within their own sub regions.⁷

⁶ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op cit. pp 1-2

⁷ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. pp 6-8

The Cold War never explained the sources of foreign policy on the continent, but the willingness of the two superpowers to provide assistance to states regarded as important to their global strategies allowed a number of African leaders to hold on to power. International financial institutions similarly bolstered the prospects of many neo-patrimonial regimes on the continent. In some cases, client regimes fell soon after Cold War patronage stopped. It is notable, for example, that among the six top recipients of U.S aid during the Cold War, five (Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire) suffered from severe conflict during the 1990s: the sixth (Kenya) faced increasing domestic pressures for political liberalization. The loss of patronage and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union altered the prospects for governments in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique and the strategies of liberation forces in Namibia and South Africa. At the same time the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) imposed structural adjustment policies on African states weakened by debt, economic decay and corruption.⁸

The bulk of the postcolonial independence leaders have exited the scene, and new actors have emerged promising to handle old constraints differently, innovating where their predecessors stumbled, and learning to appreciate the limits of their capabilities. They are reshaping institutions and alliance patterns to meet new challenges in the face of remarkable changes in domestic and external contexts. In style and substance, new actors

⁸ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit. p 6

are trying to lend a different flavor to policymaking by mobilizing diverse constituencies and remaking rules.⁹

African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers dovetailed with the postcolonial patterns of domestic power consolidation. In environments where the structures of participation and contestation, particularly political parties and legislatures, declined appreciably, the charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign policy. Weak and manipulatable bureaucratic structures compounded the lack of effective representative institutions, affording ample opportunities for individual leaders to dabble in their countries external affairs. Power centralization coincided with the pervasive belief that controlling the complexities of the external arena entailed unanimity of purpose, which could be guaranteed only by strong executives. From this exalted vantage point, foreign policy making emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their domestic opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic policies. The behavioral patterns in inter-African relations and organizations reinforced the predominance of presidents as foreign policy makers. Through summits and other high—level meetings, continental and regional organizations nurtured the perception of foreign policy as a conclave of the mighty. The tendency of leaders to dominate decisions on momentous issues such as economic cooperation and mediation of conflicts limited the roles of opposing institutions. Africa underwent a far-reaching transformation in the 1990s. The Cold War and apartheid ended, and with their departure two issues that shaped much of African foreign policy were removed. Domestically, continued economic

⁹ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit. p. 8

crisis and the collapse of the neo-patrimonial postcolonial state- and, in response, a surge in pressures for reform- shifted political calculations. These international and domestic transformations altered the topography of power and institutional arrangements across the continent and, hence the context in which foreign policy decisions was made. In some cases, African leaders responded with strained and fragile efforts to reform their economies and political systems; in others, the pressures led to state collapse.¹⁰

The global sweep of liberalization, instigating economic reform across Central and Eastern Europe and into China and the pressures for democratization have had uneven impacts on African states. Many, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, have struggled to implement reforms, whereas others, such as Nigeria, appear to have failed, possibly temporarily. Parliaments, pressure groups, civil society groups, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become factors in the foreign policy equation, attempting to shift decision making away from a purely centralized command post (an office of the president). In countries where political elites have resisted change, political conditionalities- democracy and human rights-become important levers used by IFIs and Western powers to shape domestic and foreign policies. Though somewhat simplified, it is possible to argue that African states foreign policies were pursued with some commonality of objectives in the early post independence period. Admittedly, there were different levels of commitment, but there was basic agreement over such formal policies

¹⁰ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op cit. pp 5-6

as nonalignment, opposition to apartheid, anti colonialism, and the goal of modernization/ economic development.¹¹

A diverse body of work has over the years analyzed the consequences of the post Cold War global order on African domestic political and economic structures. For a majority of weak African states, regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies. They are also the closest and generally most salient threat to regime survival thereby warranting particular attention. In the 1960s, analysts emphasized that African decision makers were constrained by the need to consolidate power and meet socioeconomic demands at home. In addition to the fact that African elites had only tenuous control over the postcolonial states, external actors, particularly the former colonial powers, retained considerable influence over most facets of African life. This influence was partly why anti-colonialism and the opposition to external intrusion formed significant aspects of Africa's foreign policy behavior. As discussed by P B Harris, African foreign policy in the formative decade was a product of distinct fears of exploitation from both the West and East and the need to reduce the penetration of the Cold War into emergent Africa. In subsequent decades, African elites continued to labor under what Clapham aptly described as the constraints of poverty, disunity, domestic expectations and external penetration. Political economy analyses in the 1970s and 1980s proposed a structural perspective on African elite constraints that concentrated on the pervasive influence of global economic and

¹¹ Stephen Wright (eds). *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p 9

military asymmetries. These analyses identified structures of dependence, penetration, and subordination that influenced African foreign policy making.¹²

African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers dovetailed with the postcolonial patterns of domestic power consolidation. In environments where the structures of participation and contestation, particularly political parties and legislatures, declined appreciably, the charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign policy. Weak and manipulatable bureaucratic structures compounded the lack of effective representative institutions, affording ample opportunities for individual leaders to dabble in their countries external affairs. Power centralization coincided with the pervasive belief that controlling the complexities of the external arena entailed unanimity of purpose, which could be guaranteed only by strong executives. From this exalted vantage point, foreign policy making emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their domestic opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic policies. The behavioral patterns in inter-African relations and organizations reinforced the predominance of presidents as foreign policy makers. Through summits and other high—level meetings, continental and regional organizations nurtured the perception of foreign policy as a conclave of the mighty. The tendency of leaders to dominate decisions on momentous issues such as economic cooperation and mediation of conflicts limited the roles of opposing institutions.¹³

¹² Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op cit. pp 2-3

¹³ Ibid. p. 5

Posing the question of African foreign policy making in the conceptually comfortable ways of thinking about change and continuity scarcely illuminates the confusing processes characterizing the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Change needs to be understood on various levels. First, it denotes progress and capacity building as actors acquire new models of confronting old (and new) battles. Second, it is preemptive, that is, we learn from previous institutional and behavioral flaws. More significant, for African states long encumbered by diverse challenges, change in the foreign policy environment ideally accompanies some marked improvement in organizational freedom at home and in opportunities abroad. The interest is in whether changes in actors, issues, and roles constitute significant procedural and substantive shifts in foreign policies. There is a consistent web of constraints on state action with ever diminishing domestic and international opportunities. Globalization has circumscribed Africa's role in the international system while engendering new actors that are making additional demands on already vulnerable actors. In the face of a less benign and charitable international environment, African decision makers are nevertheless forced to pay attention to multiple external constituencies- NGOs, IFIs, and MNCs (Multinational Corporations) as well as Cable News Network (CNN) - invariably raising the costs of foreign policy.¹⁴

As in the 1960s and 1970s, some African states and leaders have been successful in seizing opportunities and avoiding some of the most restrictive constraints, others have made the worst of a bad environment. Forces of media are not alone in reducing the

¹⁴Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, op cit. pp 207-208

leverage of state actors tasked with formulating and articulating foreign policy.¹⁵ There is institutional and leadership incoherence as one of the continuing obstacles to effective decision making in African foreign policies, which reflect the endurance of state-and nation-building imperatives. In recent years, internal fragmentation of sovereignty and authority has stymied predictable patterns in foreign policy roles, a phenomenon that has assumed two extreme trajectories (with considerable variations in between). At the first level are states such as the DRC and Liberia where civil wars spawn multiple power centers that stake competing claims and positions in international and regional arenas. Second are states such as Kenya, Togo and Zambia, where fragmented pluralism puts ruling groups and their domestic challengers at opposite ends of the foreign policy actors inviting assorted outsiders to be on their side and lending a remarkable degree of confusion to decision making. This is the broader context in which Clark treats democratization as a source of regime vulnerability. As Adibe, Clark, and Reno put it, the process of the deinstitutionalization of the state and the related privatization of diplomacy has placed African foreign policies in a profound crisis of consistency and direction. Realist assumptions of state-centeredness are shamed by the specter of the African state weighed down by various internal actors and increasingly unable to compete with internal challengers in the foreign policy arena. It is no longer a question of whether foreign policy is the preserve of the president or the foreign minister but of whether any organized body is in charge. Analysts will not cease to prescribe liberalization and democratization as the solution to Africa's problems, but their impact on foreign policy

¹⁵ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit.p. 209

decision making is not certain, particularly when the state has virtually been hollowed out and IFIs and NGOs are at the forefront of determining the parameters of African external and internal policies.¹⁶

A more enduring legacy of democratization on foreign policy processes in Africa's is, perhaps, the increase in the density of cross-regional functional and professional organizations seeking a voice on a variety of issues. The much-touted role of civil society in contemporary Africa is often exaggerated, but the fact that more groups with diverse interests are able to forge common positions along salient issues such as human rights, gender equity, regional security and the environment demonstrates the potential for collaborative coalescence. Although these groups alone might not have that much influence on foreign policies in their individual countries, the flourishing alliances across issues bolster their collective latitude. Of note is how the multitude of domestic actors and opposition groups fosters strategic links with international networks to subvert the policy roles of formal state actors. In the past, the actors, targets and outcomes of African foreign policy were less ambiguous. Even the more elusive national interests could be gleaned from policy proclamations at the annual OAU summits. As few African leaders have bothered to attend these summits, it has become more difficult to discern interests and gauge positions. There was also precision in the previous models of African foreign policy as scholars sought explanations that best tied domestic contexts to the external realm. With the multiplicity of actors, amorphous targets, and uncertain outcomes, African foreign policy has entered uncharted territory. When there were coherent states

¹⁶ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit. pp 213-214

and when Africa exuded the ability and faith to make a difference in an asymmetrical world, there was a pattern to foreign policy, but in the absence of these variables, foreign policy has become an untidy process of improvisation.¹⁷

The growing significance of civil society in many states is leading to new influences on foreign policy machineries. The decline (or more accurately in some cases, the repackaging of authoritarian leaders like Moi has given nongovernmental organizations, women's groups, religious groups, trade unions and media a greater opportunity to have input into decision making processes, in what Christopher Clapham has called the privatization of diplomacy. The occasionally watchful eye of Western governments and their political conditionalities may also have a constraining influence on some leaders.¹⁸

These changes require scholars to reconsider decision making mechanisms in African states. The simplification of the head of state as decision maker approach, though it has residual validity, needs to be broadened to take account of these other groups. Religious influences, media and public opinion are becoming something to note in policy formulation in various states, though it is often difficult to pinpoint because it involves many diverse groups: prodemocracy groups, liberation fighters and newspaper editors.

Today, the focus of foreign policy has shifted somewhat from an emphasis on country relationships to the all-pervasive influence of IMF and World Bank, with additional pressures brought to bear by the debt agencies. Economic policy has evolved from low

¹⁷ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit. pp 214-216

¹⁸ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*, op cit. pp 14-15

politics to high politics. Half of the continent is under World Bank (SAPs) Structural Adjustment Programmes, which significantly impact indigenous policy initiatives and add an element of realism that was not always present before; SAPs have serious implications for traditional notions of sovereignty, and they limit independent policy implementation.¹⁹ Traditional approaches to foreign policy, though still occasionally throwing useful light on issues, need to be reconfigured by new sets of research questions that address the continent in the changed global and regional environments. Overall, successful democratization appears to be the key to the continent's survival. From that should flow more measured foreign policies, more equitable domestic societies, more capable political leaderships and more productive and diversified economies.²⁰

In East and Central Africa, leadership changes have occasioned what is billed as a new generation of African leaders particularly Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Seeking to inject a new pragmatism in decision making, these leaders have had a major imprint on their domestic and regional environments. Ruth Lyob points out that contemporary leader in the Horn of Africa operate in a context where the past, particularly as it shapes myths and traditions of statehood, continues to shape foreign policy outlooks. No less important than individual policymakers is the reinvigoration of decision making institutions. The wave of transitions to democracy in the 1990s expanded the policy roles played by parliaments, interest groups, civic organizations, and the mass media. In most Africa, the leadership faces scrutiny from independent media, policy analysts, and advocacy groups in national

¹⁹ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies* p 17

²⁰ *Ibid.* p 19

and regional institutions. As it ceases to be the domain reserve of the head of state, the domestic context of African foreign policy making takes on an increasingly complex character, increasingly determined by the interaction of a broad range of actors, institutions and norms.²¹

4.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy Orientation

Kenya's foreign policy is guided by a strong belief that its own future is inextricably tied to the stability and security of our environment and heritage as the basic source of our nationhood, livelihood and prosperity. It is also linked to the stability and prosperity of our neighbors in East Africa, and the rest of Africa. As a result of this pragmatic approach, Kenya's foreign policy principles have stood the test of time: peaceful co-existence with neighbors; equality and sovereignty of all states; friendly relations with all nations; resolution of conflicts by peaceful means; adherence to the principle of non-alignment; and justice and equity in the conduct of international relations. Kenya successfully forged mutually beneficial alliances with the West while constructively engaging the East through its policy of positive non-alignment.²²

Forces of globalization have also altered the environment and the conduct of international relations, simultaneously expanding and constricting the space for the realization of Kenya's goals. While offering new economic opportunities, especially in the fields of Science, Technology and Communication, globalization has also led to reduced capital

²¹ Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. op cit. pp 8-9

²² Republic of Kenya: Foreign Policy Framework, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 2009, Nairobi. p 11

flows, shrinking market access and economic marginalization of poor economies. Kenya's foreign policy is guided and driven by a vision of a peaceful and prosperous Kenya effectively contributing to the realization of a stable continent and better international understanding. Its mission is to advance the interests of Kenya through innovative diplomacy. The policy is driven by national values and aspirations of the Kenyan people, which include: Unity in Diversity; Honor and Patriotism; Peace and Liberty; Justice and Equity; Quest for Prosperity; and the Harambee spirit (pulling together). The guiding principles of the policy are peaceful co-existence with neighbors and other nations; resolution of conflicts by peaceful means; promotion of regionalism; respect for the equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; respect for international norms, customs and law; adherence to the principle of non-alignment; and justice and equity in the conduct of international relations. The conduct of Kenya's foreign relations is guided by a diversity of sources, including official documents and pronouncements. These include: The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (1963); The Sessional Paper No. 10/1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya; The Sessional Paper No. 1/1986 on Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007); National Development Plans; Kenya Vision 2030; and Executive Pronouncements and Circulars.²³

Kenya's foreign policy is anchored on five interlinked pillars of diplomacy: economic; peace; environmental; cultural and Diaspora. The economic diplomacy pillar aims to achieve robust economic engagement in order to secure Kenya's social economic development and prosperity that will ensure our nation becomes a middle income and

²³ Republic of Kenya: Foreign Policy Framework, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 2009, Nairobi. p 8

industrialized economy by the year 2030. The peace pillar seeks to consolidate Kenya's legacy in cultivating peace and stability as necessary conditions for development and prosperity in countries within the region. Environmental diplomacy recognizes Kenya's enormous stake in the management of its own resources, those of the region and the world and is designed to provide the link between the management of shared resources and issues of security, sustainability and prosperity especially within the Eastern African region. The cultural pillar aims to use culture as a vital role in international relations especially through the use of Kiswahili language as the pedestal of our engagement with foreign cultures and the renowned Kenyan personalities including athletes in order to exert greater influence on domestic, regional and international exchanges. Diaspora diplomacy recognizes the importance of harnessing the diverse aspects, dynamics and potential of not only Kenyans living abroad but Africans in the Diaspora who now encompass the sixth region of the African Union. These pillars will be anchored on core priorities and strategies for bilateral and multilateral engagement.²⁴

4.4 Kenya's Political Background since Independence.

The country has had three Presidents since independence. Upon Jomo Kenyatta's death on 22nd August 1978, Daniel arap Moi took over the leadership. He retired on 30th December 2002 in line with a constitutional Provision which limits the Presidential term to a maximum 10 years of 5 years each. This provision took effect in 1991 following the re-introduction of multipartism. Previously Kenya was a single party state. Mwai Kibaki took over from Moi on 30th December 2002 to become Kenya's third President. Kibaki

²⁴ Republic of Kenya: Foreign Policy Framework, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 2009, Nairobi, pp 8-9

and his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won with a landslide in the December 27 2002 general elections, thus ending KANU's forty year stranglehold. Kenya has played a leading role in the quest for peace and stability in the turbulent East African region, because of her stability and general neutrality.²⁵

Kenya continues to be a relatively stable and important country in Africa despite the challenges facing it as a result of the collapse of the state system in many neighboring countries and the difficulties of the democratization process. It has continuously maintained civilian government since gaining independence in 1963; it accomplished two presidential transition from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel Arap Moi in 1978; and from Daniel Arap Moi to Mwai Kibaki in 2002; and it transformed itself, albeit with difficulties, from a one party to a multiparty state in the 90s. Kenya became independent on 12 December 1963 after a bitter struggle against British rule. The issue central to the independence struggle, and in particular Mau Mau, was land tenure. Kenyatta, its first president, pursued a foreign policy that emphasized cooperation with neighboring countries, support of continental liberation movements, and a mixed economy that strongly encouraged foreign investment and hence close ties with Western countries. After his death in 1978, there was a smooth transition despite a precarious political environment, allowing Vice President Moi to become President.²⁶

Although a detailed study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is beyond the scope of this study, it will suffice to state that the ministry is

²⁵ www.statehousekenya.go.ke Kenya in Brief: Independent Kenya, retrieved on 28th September, 2011.

²⁶ Stephen Wright (eds), African Foreign Policies. op cit. p 101

involved almost on a daily basis in shaping and formulating foreign policy. The missions abroad file reports that assist the permanent secretary and the ministry in advising the president on policy matters. The biannual conference of Kenyan ambassadors and high commissioners also serves as a useful forum for exchanging views on various foreign policy issues. Recommendations are then presented to the government for further action. The foreign missions and international organizations based in Nairobi also have some influence on the formulation of policy. The establishment of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) made Kenya in 1972 the first developing country to be chosen as the headquarters of a UN organization. In 1976, the UN Human Settlement Secretariat (UNSS-Habitat) was also established in Kenya. This has positively influenced various aspects of foreign policy. For example, Kenya is party to several conventions on biodiversity and is the only country that regularly disposes of illegally acquired but widely traded wildlife products such as ivory, rhino horn, and leopard skin by public burning.²⁷

Kenya had long followed the path of the capitalist market economy, but global changes had their impact in the 1973 and 1983 fuel crises and the coffee booms of 1977 and 1986. Economic and political systems survived the test induced by the major powers and the World Bank when aid was frozen between 1991 and 1993. Kenya depends on the West for machinery, chemicals and industrial inputs, and it relies on Middle East petroleum to drive the economy. Agricultural exports such as tea, coffee, soda ash, horticultural products, sisal, wattle bark, and pyrethrum depend on world market prices decided in the

²⁷ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p 113

West. Thus, foreign policy has to cater to these aspects in a world increasingly focused on economic power.

4.5 Institutions of Foreign Policy in Kenya

To attain Kenya's Foreign Policy objectives and priorities, the following institutions are fundamental: The Presidency; the Cabinet; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Parliament. In addition, there are eight instruments that are key to the realization of these objectives and priorities. These are: Offices of Retired Heads of State/ Government and other Statesmen; National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC); Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations; The proposed Kenya Kenya Fund for Technical Cooperation; Association of Former Ambassadors and Senior Diplomats; Ambassadors at Large and Goodwill Ambassadors; Immigration Policies and instruments; and establishment of Special diplomatic zones.²⁸

4.6 Kenyatta's Foreign Policy Orientation

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg decried the lack of institutions in Africa and hence the emergence of personal rule. In the context of foreign policy, the most important policy formulation institution is the Presidency, often supported by the respective ministries of foreign affairs. Kenyatta's style of leadership was reflected in his foreign policy. Kenyatta assumed the presidency at a time when he had achieved heroic status among Kenyans and condemnation as a leader by the colonial government. At independence, Kenyatta apparently had already made up his mind about Kenya's path in foreign affairs. Subsequent policy documents, such as the KANU Manifesto and the Sessional Paper No.

²⁸ Republic of Kenya: Foreign Policy Framework, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 2009. Nairobi, p 9

10 of 1965, clearly spelled out Kenyatta's wishes: that Kenya would be built along the lines of free enterprise, tied to the West, and that the accumulation of foreign capital would be necessary for economic growth, which led to the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964.²⁹

The comments put forward by John Okumu and Samuel Makinda outlining various factors influencing foreign policy are partially accurate. It is the contention here that the input by the head of state is paramount. Kenyatta at independence was the hero who brought freedom. The Kenya Weekly News, the mouthpiece of the British settler community, described Kenyatta as being stained with the mark of the beast, and in 1958, the chief secretary of the Kenya Colonial Administration, Walter Coutts, made perhaps the most representative of British commentaries: "All sensible people will know that these leaders of Mau Mau are not fit to return to civilized society, much less assume the mantle of political leadership. Anyone who supports the contrary view stamps himself as a supporter of bestiality, degradation and criminal activity." The British were quick to change their opinion of Kenyatta on realizing the extent of his domestic and international support, and perhaps above all, his willingness to cooperate with Britain, the settlers and foreign investors. Kenyatta was determined to be a good neighbor within the East African region and protect Kenya's territorial integrity. Being an elder statesman, he was consulted on continental matters. He became the chairman of the OAU Congo Conciliation Committee during the Congo crisis in 1964. He was also consulted by the warring Angolan factions, and he held conciliatory meetings in Nakuru and Mombasa in 1975. On territorial integrity, Kenyatta made it very clear that Kenya would not concede

²⁹ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p 101

any of its territory. In September 1963, he cautioned the British government against negotiating away the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which the Somali government was claiming. This problem was never solved before Kenyan independence, and Kenyatta had to engage forces against the Shifta, often translated as bandits' guerillas in 1967. In brief, Kenyatta's personality had a strong influence on foreign policy, and he maintained Kenya in a close relationship with Western states. Others perceived his stance as a wait and see policy because Kenyatta was cautious and conservative. This perhaps stemmed from Kenyatta's maturity, his experience abroad, and his detention for about a decade in remote areas of Kenya. Okumu best summed up foreign policy under Kenyatta: Kenya has effectively maintained a low profile on many of the burning issues in Africa and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as quiet diplomacy. It is a style which avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote. It is a diplomatic posture which recognizes that the uses and functions of foreign policy of a poor nation are to promote economic and social modernization, tasks which require the services of development diplomats.³⁰

Kenya's foreign policy has arguably stood the test of time. This was initially because of Kenyatta's pragmatic approach to issues, which meant that Kenya could cooperate with any country in the world- as long as it was in the best interest of Kenya. Kenya's priority at independence was economic development and security. The government elite recognized that the West was economically better placed to deal with these needs, hence the evolution of closer relations. These relations, though unbalanced in favor of the West,

³⁰ Stephen Wright (eds). *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. pp 102-103

were built on the foundation of seventy years or so of British colonial rule and the strong presence of Western multinational corporations.³¹

Politically, Kenya has a checkered history. Under its first president, Jomo Kenyatta, the country prospered. Although Kenya became a de facto one-party state as early as 1964, Kenyatta's brand of authoritarian rule was relatively benign. Kenya's fortunes declined sharply, however, once Daniel arap Moi took power in 1978.³²

4.7 Moi's Foreign Policy Orientation.

Foreign policy under the Moi administration was more of a presidential prerogative, more aggressive, and consequently, more controversial. Foreign policy under Kenyatta was characterized by a noncommittal, wait –and – see attitude. Kenyatta disliked air travel, and he often sent vice president Moi or the foreign minister to represent him. In contrast, Moi proved to be as active as any foreign minister. He visited many countries trying to establish links useful to Kenya. Positive nonalignment was to be the official maxim of the country's foreign policy. Moi emphasized what came to be known as Nyayo philosophy, following the footsteps of Kenyatta with the objective of achieving three espoused principles- love, peace and unity- as well as the more concrete objective of maintaining close links with the West. In regional foreign policy, Moi put the Nyayo philosophy into practice in the following areas: good neighborliness', peacemaking and peacekeeping.³³ The Department of Foreign Affairs was established in the Office of the Prime Minister

³¹ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. pp. 114-115

³² Joel D. Barkan, 'Kenya after Moi,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004). p. 88

³³ Stephen Wright (eds). *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p. 103

(now President) in 1964. Joseph Murumbi became the first minister of state in charge of foreign affairs, and Robert Ouko was the first permanent secretary. Murumbi was succeeded briefly by Argwings Kodhek in 1966, then by Njoroge Mungai. Munyua Waiyaki was the minister for foreign affairs between 1968 and 1983. Other notable and long serving ministers include Elijah Mwangale, Robert Ouko, Ndolo Ayah, and Stephen Kalonzo Musoyka. The Department of Foreign Affairs later attained its own identity and became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Josephat Karanja, later Kenya's vice president, went to London as Kenya's first high commissioner, Adala Otuku was posted to Moscow as ambassador, and Burudi Nabwera represented Kenya in Washington, D.C. These pioneer diplomats made their presence felt in international diplomatic circles. Waiyaki was the chief architect of Kenya's antiapartheid policy. Ouko made Kenya's presence felt at the EAC and in the late 1980s when he vigorously defended the Moi administration internationally.

At the level of permanent secretary, several illustrious Kenyans have made their mark. Bethwell Kiplagat, permanent secretary between 1983 and 1991, was an articulate diplomat whose oratory was admired by the Nairobi diplomatic corps. He was also the architect of Moi's peace diplomacy and an authority on Mozambique, Sudan and Somalia. His successor, Sally Kosgei, was articulate in defending Kenya, authoring such publications as *Nailing Lies*, which attempted to counteract publications by Africa Watch and Amnesty International that were critical of Kenya's human rights record. She was

also behind attempts to change the attitude in Western capitals regarding Kenya's political and economic reforms.³⁴

President Moi's major foreign policy preoccupation, like that of many African leaders, was the wooing of foreign investors. In May 1994, while on transit to China, the president took time to meet members of the Indian business community and urge them to invest in Kenya. Government incentives include investment allowances of up to 85 percent on plant and machinery in manufacturing and hotel sectors, liberal depreciation rates, and remission of the customs duty.³⁵ In mid 1980s, especially during the tenure of the late Robert Ouko as minister for foreign affairs, there were statements to the effect that Kenya's foreign policy, and its diplomacy should be based on economic considerations. However, that remained a statement of intent, to the extent that it was never effected in practice. What is new is that in current times, it is a perspective that has emerging themes and rationalizations that were not there before.³⁶

4.8 Kibaki's Foreign Policy Orientation

Kenya's turn to China, Japan, South Korea and India- the East- for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a result of President Kibaki administrations deliberate effort to pursue economic diplomacy. President Kibaki and majority of African states have deliberately worked economically with the East more intensively than the traditional

³⁴ Stephen Wright (eds). *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. pp 111-112

³⁵ Ibid. p 114

³⁶ Makumi Mwangi. *Foreign Policy, Economic Diplomacy and Multilateral Relations: Framing the Issues in Kenya's Emerging Asia-Pacific Policy*, in 'African Review of Foreign Policy,' A Publication of United States International University in Nairobi. Vol 4. no. 1. May 2006. p. 47

Western markets and this change in tack is attributed to the notion of looking east pegged on economic diplomacy. The notion of looking East is driven mainly by two factors. First is that states such as South Korea, China, India and Japan consider African states as having acceptable policies that they can identify with. Secondly, Asia Pacific countries are providing an alternative focus for diplomacy and foreign policy. The economic interface with the East gives Kenya and indeed Africa an opportunity to construct a worldview that is able to move the center of diplomacy of these states from traditional western capitals to eastern capitals such as Beijing.³⁷ Within the East African region, Kenya has put a great deal of effort into reviving three important economic institutions: the EAC; the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), now COMESA; and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Since independence, Kenya has done well in the development of tourism, which has grown in terms of arrivals and in earnings and today ranks among the highest foreign exchange earners for Kenya. Sport has also been used as a tool for economic diplomacy. Kenya has enjoyed unsolicited publicity as a tourist destination through its long distance athletes, especially during the Olympic and Commonwealth Games.³⁸

4.9 Media Influence since Independence

The roles and functions of the media in any society are determined by both the internal and external situations in different societies. But what is most crucial is the nature of the political system and the nature of government in power at a particular time. For example,

³⁷ Opiyo Ododa, 'Why African Countries are Turning to the East.' *Development*. Wednesday Sep 14, 2011, Business Daily.

³⁸ Stephen Wright (eds), *African Foreign Policies*. op cit. p 114

the media's roles and functions under liberal political systems like those of the West will substantially differ from those under authoritarian regimes like many of the African and other Third World countries. Secondly, it is clear that most of the media in Africa, Kenya included, fail to embrace in totality the libertarian norms of the press.³⁹

One party states, whether of the Soviet or the African variant is characterized by authoritarianism as its guiding ideology. According to this ideology, the state assumes the right to control the rest of society and to expect unchallenged obedience. It is an ideology which thrives on and encourages the suppression of criticism and any challenge to those in authority.⁴⁰

In the case of the media, the authoritarian ideology encourages a media system that champions the government's hegemonic agenda over the rest of society, while at the same time overlooking the government's shortcomings and excesses. It does or is expected to do this by articulating only those views that are in harmony with the dominant state ideology. The aim of the authoritarian approach to governance as it relates to the mass media is that it should lead to distortion of information and in some cases, the deliberate disinformation of the public. It also aims at keeping the public ignorant. While this does not mean that the media should automatically succumb to the designs of the state, the choices are not always easy, particularly in a one party-state.⁴¹ After independence in 1963, similar patterns of media ownership and development continued as they were under the colonial rule. For example, the independent African government entered the shoes of

³⁹ Polycarp J. Omolo Ochilo, 'Press Freedom and the Role of the Media in Kenya,' *Africa Media Review* Vol. 7 No. 3 1993. p 25

⁴⁰ Peter Wanyande. *Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Kenya*. Retrieved on 29th September. 2011, www.google scholar p. 58

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 59

the colonial rulers. These governments had full control of the electronic media run under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting headed by a Minister appointed by the President. Its other departments were The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and the Kenya News Agency.⁴²

4.9.1 Kenyatta's Era and the Media

The development of Kenya's news-media system is closely tied to the country's political history. The formative years of Jomo Kenyatta's presidency were briefly but broadly attended by national political goodwill, but this spirit waned following the regime's alienation of potential adversaries. The fallout between the president and his former deputy, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was particularly significant in marking the beginnings of a presidency that was soon to be defined by its penchant to resort to repressive state apparatuses rather than representative institutions as instruments of legitimizing its rule. Kenyatta routinely employed state machinery, including the police and the judiciary, to frustrate opponents; others were co-opted through threats or given access to state resources. Also, he invented a new political goal: the nation-building project, made possible through a set of political machinations, what Atieno-Odhiambo called the ideology of order. It was legitimized on the idea that competing interests—religious, ethnic, and regional—unless checked, would impede the country's development. Politicians, the media, and the public were expected to privilege a narrative of national unity, with support gathered through coercion and cooption. In the early post-

⁴² Polycarp J. Omolo Ochilo, *Press Freedom and the Role of the Media in Kenya*. Op cit. pp 24-25

independence period, therefore, the media were seen by the state as a partner in the nation-building political project.⁴³

4.9.2 Moi's Era and the Media

Daniel arap Moi became president in 1978 in a constitutional succession following Kenyatta's death. Moi promised to follow in his predecessor's *nyayo* ('footsteps')—which meant continuing with Kenyatta's policies.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the government continued to use state machinery to intimidate political opposition, detaining politicians, journalists, and university lecturers. Moi clamped down on other ethnic alliances and the alternative and local-language media seen to represent such groups and their interests. Intimidation and detention of newspaper editors was commonplace. Before 2009, Kenya did not have a press law, making both media workers and organizations particularly vulnerable to state intimidation. Media freedom was provided for in section 79a of the constitution, but it remained subject to the provisions of the penal code, which gave the government power to clamp down on the media in the interest of public morality, public order, and national security. The interpretation of these provisions was often notoriously ambiguous. Moi attributed power to the media, and thus tried to take control of *The Nation* and *The Standard*.⁴⁵

Intense lobbying and criticism of the government's position on media liberalization saw it reluctantly license new players. Still, these were politicians or their proxies. Curiously,

⁴³ George Ogola, '*The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta's Nation-Building Press to Kibaki's Local-Language FM Radio.*' *The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya, Africa Today*. 57, No 3. p.80

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 82

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

these new stations were allowed to broadcast only in specific geographical areas and mainly in English and Kiswahili. This tightly managed process of media liberalization had several implications. First, the geographical conditionalities imposed on the license holders meant that these stations did not have national appeal. Second, to avoid confrontation with the state, these new stations operated principally as entertainment stations—which alienated them from various publics. Third, most of these stations broadcast only in English and Kiswahili—which severely limited their listenership.⁴⁶ Kenya's media are implicated in political, social, and economic dynamics from which it cannot be disaggregated.⁴⁷

In 1997, President Moi made an impassioned appeal to the Western media to judge Kenya fairly and give it credit for its positive achievements. Describing Kenya's Press one of the freest in the world, he asked foreign journalists not to focus solely on the negative elements of the Kenyan society but to also consider the substantial gains in the political reform process, the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime and the regularity of the General election since independence in 1963. Moi asked why foreign journalists likened him to deposed Zairean leader (now Democratic Republic of Congo) Mobutu Seseko with Kenya. Moi said that the government would continue to pursue

⁴⁶ George Ogola. 'The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta's Nation-Building Press to Kibaki's Local-Language FM Radio. Op cit. p.86

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.91

policies that fostered the growth and development of a free and a vibrant press. He asked African Press to mount a campaign for debt relief on the continent.⁴⁸

In the Kenyan situation, the conflictual relation between the state and the media has not been confined to either the foreign-owned or the indigenously owned media. The relations between the state and the mass media in independent Kenya continues to be uneasy and conflictual. The state has continually accused the press of being unpatriotic and bent on serving the interests of the Western nations at the expense of the interests of Kenya. This line of argument has often been necessitated by the media's coverage of what the political establishment considers to be negative news about Kenya. According to this line of thought, the media should champion only the positive things about the nation and ignore the less acceptable ones. The media, on the other hand, accuses the state of undermining its freedom and right to inform and educate the public on matters of public importance, by articulating both the good and the bad. This conflict has intensified, particularly since the advent of multi-party politics in the early 1990s. While under one party rule, the state could, with relative ease, suppress attempts by the media to expose its shortcomings and thus conceal the conflict, this has not been easy under multi-party politics.

Many newspapers, including *The Standard* and the *Daily Nation* which appeared to be pro-establishment during one party rule, have since become some of the harshest critics of the state. The state on its part has not let these criticisms go unchallenged. In many instances, the state has responded by either closing down some of the printing facilities or

⁴⁸ Daily Nation. Friday. November 14. 1997 p 44.

the newspapers and magazines. It has, in some cases, arrested proprietors of the print media that are considered critical of the state and charged them with sedition or other such serious offences.⁴⁹

Politically, the (Nation Media Group) NMG, has been at loggerheads with the political leadership. Kenyatta, like his successor Moi, had little patience for the Nation, and invariably accused it of serving foreign masters, in clear reference to its foreign ownership. But the newspaper never relented. In the clamor for multiparty politics in the 1990s, the Nation was a crusader for more democratic space and, therefore, it was perceived as anti-government. Similarly, the pressure the NMG exerted in the political arena contributed significantly in the change of regime following the 2002 General Elections. In this perspective, the hegemonic role of the NMG cannot be contested. By contrast, the East African Standard remained conservative and defended the outgoing regime, probably because it was owned by it. Mwai Kibaki has been in power since the General Election of December 2002 and this study attempts to analyze how he has been influenced by among others, foreign and local media, the two leading media houses, considering that both own television networks and circulate newspapers- in formulation of foreign policies.

4.9.3 Kibaki and the Media (2002-2011)

For the first time in 2002, Kenyan citizens effected a regime change in multiparty national elections, using a strong and vibrant civil society and a united opposition. The

⁴⁹ Peter Wanyande. *Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Kenya*. Retrieved on 29th September, 2011. www.google scholar p. 56

elections led Mwai Kibaki to victory as president. This was the first time in Kenya's postcolonial politics that the opposition defeated a candidate that was nominated by an outgoing president as his successor. A few courageous independent news media, such as the Daily Nation newspaper, took on the role of advocate for civil liberties from the mid 1990s into the 2002 elections, bringing the discussion of nepotism and authoritarianism in the public spotlight. The relative press freedom in the 1990s, during Kenya's great presidential authority, provided a considerable outlet for the voicing of political dissatisfaction, but this kind of press coverage was significantly quelled with the intimidation of the press, and journalists were never allowed to shake the regime with impunity.⁵⁰

The Kenyan news media commonly invites mixed opinion. Some consider it deeply compromised, but others point to its vibrancy. According to a BBC policy briefing, the media is described as one of the most respected, thriving, sophisticated and innovative in Africa. Others argue that the Kenyan news media enjoys much higher public trust than institutions, such as parliament and the law courts.⁵¹

Needless to say, and as all Kenyans are aware, President Kibaki has been a staunch believer in the freedom of the press. Under his watch, Kenya has had one of the most vibrant and free media in Africa. Since President Kibaki took over leadership, a deliberate commitment has been made to widen the democratic space and ensure total freedom of expression and freedom of media. As a result, the media in Kenya is vibrant

⁵⁰ Yusuf Kalyango Jr, *Media Performance and Democratic Rule in East Africa: Agenda Setting and Agenda Building influences on Public Attitudes*. www.google.com May 2008, p. 84

⁵¹ George Ogola. *The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta's Nation-Building Press to Kibaki's Local-Language FM Radio*. Op cit. p. 80

and has grown tremendously over the last few years. We now have a multiplicity of radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines that offer wide-ranging programs. These media houses operate freely and without any interference from the Government. It is clear that the government of President Kibaki has given media more space to operate freely. It must also be appreciated that the media wields a double-edged sword. Media reports can serve to build or to destroy; to unite or to divide people. Whereas the importance of the freedom of media cannot be questioned, it is also clear that freedom cannot be exercised without responsibility.

The media plays the role of informing society about the relationship existing between Kenya and the neighboring countries. The public spat between Kenya and Uganda over the Lake Victoria Migingo Island, for example, was replete with highly nationalistic language, with Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni being regularly described in Kenya's media as a blindly ambitious expansionist. This may have served to promote public perceptions of Uganda's leadership, and especially its relationship with Kenya. A loose moratorium in late 2009, based on efforts to determine the real owners of Migingo Island, seems to have temporarily quelled tensions between the two countries.⁵²

By offering disparate coverage of East Africa Community (EAC) issues, discussions and analyses, among other products, the media implicitly subscribes to ideas of agenda setting based on the way it places, primes, frames or presents stories and agenda building, by mobilizing various actors to make decisions on issues covered. Accordingly, issues of

⁵² George Nyabuga, 'East African Integration: Dynamics of Equity in Trade, Education, Media and Labour,' in 'Enhancing Equity in the East African Regional Integration Process: Role of the Media,' Society for International Development, Nairobi, 2011. pp 141-142

what informs content, and how the content is framed, primed and presented, may influence public thinking and reaction to EAC issues.⁵³

The media influences opinion. The DN, of 2nd January, 2003, described Kibaki as a consensus-builder and a moderate. Two days later, the same paper talked of Kibaki taking drastic measures to ensure that state organizations performed to the expectations. His moves were described as intelligent. The newspaper also quotes the President George Bush of the US looking forward to working with the new Kenyan president. Bush notes: the elections have opened a hopeful new chapter in Kenya's history. The election, he continues, was a testimony of Kenyan's confidence in him (Kibaki). The hope, Bush is talking about is at an all-time high in the history of the nation. Indeed, around this time, in a program in The Voice of America called Straight talk Africa, Kenya was voted the most hopeful nation in the World.⁵⁴

The media has advocated for good governance in Kibaki's tenure, thus encouraging external investors to consider investing in Kenya. On corruption, the East African Standard (EAS) of 18 June 2003, described Kibaki as having a light moment with the President of Transparency International, Dr. Peter Eigen. This could be construed as a cordial rapport with the anti-graft institution. It further described Kibaki's position on the

⁵³ George Nyabuga, 'East African Integration: Dynamics of Equity in Trade, Education, Media and Labour,' in 'Enhancing Equity in the East African Regional Integration Process: Role of the Media,' op cit. p 143

⁵⁴Frederick Kang'ethe Iraki. 'The Sinusoidal Representation of the Kibaki Presidency in the Kenyan Media: 2002-2006, Confucius. Retrieved on 29th September. 2011, www.google scholar p 182

matter of graft in Kenya. Kibaki warned those engaging in the practice in his government, swearing that he would deal with them ruthlessly.⁵⁵

In 2005, John Githongo, then Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance, fled the country and resigned. The EAS of 8th February, 2005, talked of the resignation as a devastating blow to the government's anti-corruption programme. It further noted that the departure created the worst political confidence crisis for Kibaki since he came to power in 2002. Kibaki was urged to act quickly to take control of events in the country. The phrase alluded to the leadership vacuum that Kibaki seemed to have created in the country. Wilfred Kiboro, the Nation Media Group (NMG) Chief Executive Officer, CEO, minced no words about the newspaper's commitment to blow the whistle on corrupt officers. The two newspapers undermined Kibaki's credibility to the core. The attacks by the bilateral donors, namely Britain and Germany, did not make things any better. The Kibaki government was seen as steeped in corruption. Pressure mounted on the President to dismiss the corrupt officials but he stayed put. The move was misconstrued to mean that Kibaki condoned high-level corruption. The political repercussions were deep and gravely hurt Kibaki's image during the referendum that ensued, on the draft Constitution.⁵⁶

The media sets the agenda when there is no clear policy. The Kibaki administration is far from being media savvy. Its reaction to criticism, both fair and unfair, was, and still remains, unimpressive. Worse still, at one time, Kenyans did not know the position of the

⁵⁵Frederick Kang'ethe Iraki, *The Sinusoidal Representation of the Kibaki Presidency in the Kenyan Media: 2002-2006*, Confucius. Retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google.com p. 183

⁵⁶ Ibid p 186

government on any matter. Individual ministers contradicted each other and the president. The government spokesman was contradicted in public.⁵⁷ The media has been a constant source of information for the public. The Artur brothers' saga is a case in point. A group of hooded men attacked the Standard media house, burnt newspapers, and left with some tapes. Apparently, they drove in vehicles with government number plates. The Security Minister, Mr. Michuki, was hard put to explain who the attackers were. To date, the government has been unable to explain the attack. Similarly, the Artur brothers' saga was another embarrassment to the Kibaki administration. Who were these two East European, flashy men? Were they mercenaries, as claimed by Raila, brought in to scare or harm the anti-Kibaki group? Once again, the government was unable to explain the presence of these scary men in the country. Instead of apprehending them, it conveniently deported them to Dubai. With mounting pressure from the media and the politicians, a few pro-Kibaki leaders were dropped from government. But this was too little too late. The government appeared to be under siege, at least politically.⁵⁸

To be true, Kibaki seems to be a great economic leader. But in the political arena, the finance wonder boy is in dire straits. With a hostile media, coupled with very poor media management skills, Kibaki's achievements have been drowned. Not even the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation has been able to sell the achievements of Kibaki. In contrast, the anti Kibaki forces have been better organized and more media savvy. Little wonder then, that they stole the referendum victory from Kibaki. The media campaigns

⁵⁷ Frederick Kang'ethe Iraki. *The Sinusoidal Representation of the Kibaki Presidency in the Kenyan Media: 2002-2006*, Confucius. Retrieved on 29th September. 2011, www.google scholar. p. 188

⁵⁸ Ibid. pp 188-189

against the Kibaki regime in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 succeeded in handing the government a resounding defeat at the referendum. The adversarial rapport between the presidency and the media is not unique to Kenya, but is a worldwide phenomenon. However, the poor management of the media by the Kenyan leadership is likely to further alienate the government from the people.⁵⁹ The government also needs a marketing mechanism to sell its work to the people. As Dr. Alfred Mutua, Government spokesman, put it, selling a product without publicity is as successful as winking in the dark. He said that the government needed to have a thinktank of intelligent, imaginative, high-integrity and highly-motivated Kenyans to advise it on how to market itself appropriately. As it stands, it looks very bad indeed. No government, according to him, should try to ignore the power of the media. It can only do so at its own risk and peril.⁶⁰

The media's role as a public watchdog came out clearly, for instance, after Sir Edward Clay's dossier on 'dodgy security contracts' raised questions concerning the Kibaki regime's governance performance, but also laid bare the hypocrisy of external forces ostensibly committed to fighting corruption. It is remarkable that since Kenya's independence in 1963, British firms have monopolised all lucrative tenders in the security docket, as well as in the printing of Kenyan currency. All these tenders have been awarded to British firms without subjecting them to international tendering for competitive sourcing. This has had nothing to do with the British offering the best

⁵⁹ Godwin R. Murunga & Shadrack W. Nasong'o (2006): Bent on self-destruction: The Kibaki regime in Kenya, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24:1, pp 22-23

⁶⁰ Frederick Kang'ethe Iraki. *The Sinusoidal Representation of the Kibaki Presidency in the Kenyan Media: 2002-2006*, Confucius. Retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google.com . pp 189-190

bargains in price and quality of services and equipment, including naval ships, vehicles, and military equipment. In addition, the United Kingdom has also dominated business in other sectors with, for instance, a British bank (Barclays) making 27 per cent of its global net profit from Kenya from artificially-driven high interest rates on treasury bills. This was the state of affairs when Clay assumed his posting in Nairobi in 2001, close to two years before National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) came to power in January 2003, yet he never raised a voice against dodgy security contracts under the Moi regime. In essence, they became dodgy and Sir Edward saw corruption only after the new power barons redirected the tenders elsewhere. Arguably therefore, if British firms had continued to monopolize the contracts, Sir Clay would have remained as quiet as his predecessors, preferring behind-the-scenes diplomacy to public confrontation on the excesses of the incumbent regime.⁶¹

The media has been a tool for propaganda, calling for drastic responses from policy makers. For instance, according to *Sunday Standard* of October 26, 2005, in Fred Mudhai's article 'Where Negotiations fail 'Public Diplomacy' Works,' The one country in Africa in which the master states and their missionaries appear to be on a mission to elevate propaganda to an insidious art form is Kenya where they tried to create rumours that Kenyans are fed up with the Kibaki regime. There was deliberate effort to portray Kenya as being responsible for international terrorism, and from Sunday Nations, June 29, 2003, an interview of Clay with Nation TV's Louis Otieno, being excessively corrupt, incapable of having civilized relations with master states, and that it is a

⁶¹ Godwin R. Murunga & Shadrack W. Nasong'o (2006): Bent on self-destruction: The Kibaki regime in Kenya. op cit. pp 22-23

collapsing state that might need international intervention. Objective studies followed, among them being the one produced by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, an American elite body that is good at engineering consensus that proceeded to announce that Kenya was a failed state; and the local media took its announcement as if it was gospel truth. The local media accepted what Moses Wetangula called balderdash as truth in part because they seem to be subservient to the missionaries.⁶²

On Saturday, February 10, 2007, the story that annoyed the government most concerned the now well known Anglo Leasing scandal. Though still convoluted and obscure, the scandal was sprawled across Kenya's both print and electronic media. Murungaru, a cabinet minister, was obviously rattled by the ferocity of the media onslaught and when he rolled out his gun, Ngotho, the journalist, was behind bars. It took the condemnation of international media institutions to make the government water down its fury and realize it was heading for a fight, not only with local journalists, but also with the entire journalistic fraternity in the free world. The international pressure was so great that on January 17th 2011, the Attorney General, Amos Wako, decided to drop charges against Ngotho. Media here acted as a public watchdog and opinion maker.

Soon after that, Reporters San Frontières (RSF) praised the Kenya as one of the few countries in Africa that were determined to ensure that press freedom was respected. Realizing that Kibaki's Government cared so much about what the Western world thinks about it, the RSF emphasized that Wako's move was supported by Western embassies

⁶².Macharia Munene. *The Media, Ethics and National Interest*.retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google scholar p. 159

and reiterated that this kind of initiative should be taken more often. According to RSF, the charge against Ngotho for implicating a government official and an associate of the President in alleged corruption, outraged many ambassadors, who noted that the prosecution would violate certain provisions of the constitution. The world was about to forget the rough times journalists in Kenya go through when, on May 2nd 2011, the First Lady ,Lucy Kibaki, reminded everyone that she was not so happy with the media in this country and was not intending to turn the other chick. In that feeling, she was joined by the First Lady in Nigeria, Stella Obasanjo , who also wanted journalists in that country to realize that she was not just another market woman they could play about with. The two ladies decided to take drastic steps against the media, and their actions made the RSF to express shock over what they saw as the abuse of authority. In Nairobi, Lucy went to the premises of Nation Media Group and spent five hours complaining about “unfair” reports. The nature of her complaints exploded beyond her control when she was televised assaulting a Kenya Television Network (KTN) cameraman ,Clifford Derrick Otieno, who was filming her as she was shouting to journalists in the newsroom. She was clearly shown slapping Clifford. Since first ladies influence the policy makers indirectly, her actions were perceived by Western nations as suppression of media freedom and misuse of public office.

Media disseminates information. On February 22, 2011, Government Spokesperson Dr. Alfred Mutua held a meeting with his counterpart from the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Ramin Mehmanparast. The Iranian Government Spokesperson said his country was keen on establishing working partnership with Kenya that would see the two countries have regular exchange of news and information. This move, he said, would ensure that Kenya

and Iran transmit accurate information. He further extended an invitation to Dr. Alfred Mutua and the Kenyan media to take a trip of The Islamic Republic of Iran to cover several aspects of Iran which can be disseminated through the Kenyan media outlets.⁶³

On Thursday, March 18, 2010, President Mwai Kibaki re-affirmed Government's commitment to upholding the freedom of media in order to create an open and information empowered society. In his address while officially opening the Pan Africa Media Conference at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC), President Kibaki asserted that the local media enjoyed greater freedom for the past seven years than in any other time in history of the country. The President affirmed that in appreciation of the crucial role of the media here in Kenya , the Government had in the last seven years remained committed to the creation of an open society anchored on a free media. The Head of State noted that media has a duty to disseminate reliable information that would shape the society positively and help the public to make informed decisions. During the occasion President Kibaki challenged the media to invent captivating ways of championing and promoting the tremendous achievements that the African continent has accomplished.⁶⁴

President Kibaki told media practitioners to resist the temptation of being Afro-pessimists who think nothing good can come out of Africa adding that the continent has managed to overcome its challenges in shorter periods than the developed when they were faced by similar challenges. The President urged the media to shift their focus now on the emerging relations between Africa and its external partners particularly the South-South

⁶³ www.communication.go.ke retrieved on 3rd September, 2011.

⁶⁴ www.statehouse.go.ke Responsible Freedom of Press Empowers Society- March 18, 2010. retrieved on 4th October, 2011

cooperation which will herald new global dynamics in the near future. The Head of State remarked that as leaders, they also looked up to the media to help in promoting the gains they had made as a continent. Citing the case of the East African Community, President Kibaki noted that media is best placed to promote awareness, discourse and lively debate on EAC and asked them to take deliberate interest in the region's integration agenda. President Kibaki acknowledged that The Pan Africa Media conference was taking place at a significant moment in the development of the East African Region. In East Africa, the process of regional integration has deepened with the signing of the Common Market protocol. Today, the East African Community comprises a large and robust market with a population of 125 million people and a combined G.D.P. of 70 billion U.S. Dollars. This endowment offers our region a unique opportunity to become a lucrative economic hub in Africa. Noting that EAC was the most advanced regional bloc in Africa, President Kibaki invited the media to engage stakeholders in the region and rally support from citizens in the region as other countries seek members in the body or try to replicate the model. He said that it was in this context that leaders appealed for closer engagement and partnership with the media. The Media is best positioned to promote awareness, discourse and a lively conversation with the broad range of stakeholders in our region. The media should, therefore, take deliberate interest in our region's integration agenda.⁶⁵

The Wikileaks diplomatic cables sparked great discomfort within Kenyan government saying it was surprised and shocked by reports in the international media indicating that the US government had low regard for the Kenyan leadership and saw the nation as a

⁶⁵ www.statehouse.go.ke Responsible Freedom of Press Empowers Society- March 18, 2010. retrieved on 4th October, 2011

swamp of corruption. On Thursday, March 18, 2010, Government spokesman Dr Alfred Mutua termed as totally malicious and a misrepresentation of the country and its leaders damaging information on Kenya by the US and released by WikiLeaks. Mutua said the reports which appeared in leaked documents published by Wikileaks, indicated that briefings by the US ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, painted a very gloomy picture for Kenya in as far as governance is concerned. According to the damaging Wikileaks cables touching on Kenya, almost every single sentence from the US embassy in Nairobi spoke with disdain of the coalition government. Mutua also accused foreign powers - apparently referring to the US - of attempting to undermine the government. US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger said he hoped the anticipated WikiLeaks secret cables on Kenya would not affect the relations between the two countries. From colonial days the various Executives in Kenya have had their quarrels with the independent Kenyan Press. The free Press, likewise, have not been particularly happy with the performance of those in political power. The fundamental misunderstandings have always been based on two divergent outlooks: The politicians in power have always wanted to manipulate the Fourth Estate to get their best image across to the wananchi and yet the journalists have always wondered how they could fulfill their obligation to publish the truth about information and news without proper accessibility to vital information without governmental hindrances.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKERS IN KENYA

5.1 Introduction

The analysis is done using Kibaki period in power, between 2002-2011, since that is the period that the Kenyan media is said to have gained some amount of freedom, practically. It is also the period when some laws in favor of the media were passed and freedom of speech was accorded its right meaning, at least according to the law. Chapter two highlighted the role of the media in diplomacy and this chapter analyzes these roles and their effect on the nature of foreign policy, foreign policy decision making, and the bureaucratic model of foreign policy analysis. The issues the chapter discusses are propaganda tool, media-technology and diplomacy, public watchdog –the fourth estate, public opinion and media, politics and media, Democracy Tool- The media, Media ownership and influence, Agenda setting versus the media and political environment and the media, and media and National Interest. Political environment is another issue that the media has had to deal with since any time there is a regime change; there is a corresponding change of operating environment since independence.

This research has demonstrated that the media has, in many instances, influenced foreign policy decision makers and has led to the actors, mainly presidents, acknowledging that there is a new force in place, the media, which has forced them to either make rush decisions without even consulting, and which influences their citizens' views in their preferred mode. It is only important to analyze the Kenyan media ownership and structure, since the foreign owned media has tended to influence Kenyan policy makers

in ways that their countries of origin would prefer, that is, public diplomacy. Third world leaders must find a way of working with the media if they envision a state with a peaceful working environment.

The media is an important tool in democracies. It can help sell policies to the population, thus influencing opinion to the advantage of the government, and at the same time can render a government weak through propaganda.

As documented in chapter two, the study identifies the main roles of the media in diplomacy, namely, agenda setting, acting as a public watchdog, propaganda tool, promotion of democracy, good governance and accountability, source of information and a tool for disseminating information.

5.2 Media and Foreign Policy

Global television affects the nuts and bolts of policymaking, and has created challenges and dilemmas for all the participants in the policy making process. Political leaders face several challenges and dilemmas, namely, how to avoid an immediate policy response to an unfolding event without being exposed as a weak leader who is confused and does not know how to handle a situation; when responding, how to refrain from making a commitment to policy that might have to be reversed or changed; how to include different appeals to domestic and foreign audiences in a single message; how to flow with video clip pace without creating too high expectations for too rapid results; and, finally, how to maintain policy that is at odds with prevailing television tone, without alienating reporters and audiences.¹

¹ Eytan Gilboa. 'The Global News Networks and U.S. Policymaking In Defense and Foreign Affairs, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Spring June 2002, No. 6

5.3 Propaganda Tool

The one country in Africa in which the master states and their missionaries appear to be on a mission to elevate propaganda to an insidious art form is Kenya where they tried to create rumors that Kenyans were fed up with the Kibaki regime. There was a deliberate effort to portray Kenya as being responsible for international terrorism, being excessively corrupt; incapable of having civilized relations with master states, and that it was a collapsing state that might need international intervention. Objective studies followed, among them being the one produced by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, an American elite body that is good at engineering consensus that proceeded to announce that Kenya was a failed state. The local media took its announcement as if it was gospel truth. The local media accepted what Moses Wetangula called 'balderdash' as truth in part because they seem to be subservient to the missionaries.²

5.4 Media-Technology and Diplomacy

Global television constrains the policy process primarily through the high speed of broadcasting and transmitting information. The faster speed of diplomatic exchanges on global television presents major dilemmas to all the main participating actors in the foreign policy process, that is, political leaders, experts, diplomats, editors, and journalists. This speed may force hurried responses, based on intuition rather than on careful extensive policy deliberation, and this may lead to dangerous policy mistakes.³

Real-time television coverage puts leaders on the spot before they are ready to respond:

²Macharia Munene. *The Media, Ethics and National Interest*, .retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google scholar p. 159

³ Eytan Gilboa 'The Global News Networks and U.S Policymaking In Defense and Foreign Affairs, op cit, P 19

Policymakers are forced to react instantaneously. If they do not respond, it appears that one is ducking responsibilities. The problem is that a statement on television becomes a commitment to a policy that might be very difficult to reverse or even change, should a leader decide, after careful consideration, that this is what needs to be done. Moreover, any policy statement on global networks must take into consideration audience multiplicity. Before the global communication revolution, a leader could have used the local media to send one message to his people and the foreign media to send a different message to other peoples. Today this distinction has disappeared and a policy statement is reaching, at the same time, both local and foreign audiences, including enemies and allies. Sometimes, this requires a balancing act that in turn may take considerable time to articulate.⁴ The new technologies appear to reduce the scope for calm deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focus on. Changes in the electronic media, such as high transmission speed, have brought into question the power to govern.⁵ Powerful new communications technologies make it possible for everyone in the world to know a government decision or action the instant it occurs. The effects of these two circumstances are tightly interwoven and difficult to tease apart in the press/policy discussions of today. The media takes foreign policy out of the hands of the elite and opens the process to an ill-informed public or they are indentured servants of the foreign policy elite. These are familiar poles in foreign policy debates.⁶

⁴ Eytan Gilboa 'The Global News Networks and U.S Policymakin In Defense and Foreign Affairs, op cit. p 20

⁵ Montague Kern, 'The Press, the Presidency, and International Conflict: Lessons from Two Administrations,' *Political Psychology*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), p. 53.

⁶ Bill Kovach Review, 'Do the News Media Make Foreign Policy?' *Foreign Policy*, No. 102 (Spring, 1996). pp. 169-171

5.5 Public Opinion and the Media

A basic triangular relationship among the media, government, and public opinion, anchors most studies of the effect global television is having on policymaking. In this context, the media does not have power of its own. Power resides in the public, and to the extent the media has power, it is derived from its perceived ability to stimulate or even shape public opinion.⁷ The mass media often fails to deliver the messages policy makers think they should convey, and also the media shapes opinion about foreign policy.⁸ The media seeks to influence, shape and control public opinion on matters political. In this logic then, the media becomes hegemonic as it attempts to sway public opinion about the government of the day. In brief, the media implicitly or explicitly challenges an existing political order and paves way for regime change. In this perspective, the press and the presidency are entangled in a deadly game of control.

5.6 Democracy Tool- The Media

As the centrepiece of the democratic assumption, the media is increasingly seen as an important influence shaping the political trajectories of countries, especially in the course of democratic wave. In post-authoritarian societies, such as those of Africa and communist Europe, where the media was in the vanguard of the struggle for democratization, it continues to play important roles in shaping the course of events in the emerging democracies. The transition of the media in immature democracies from a vigorous advocacy role to that of a facilitator of an emerging democracy is often not an

⁷ Chanan Naveh, 'The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework conflict & communication online, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002, p 8

⁸ Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,' *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008, p.40.

easy one. In this context, debates have often surfaced as to whether the media is using its newly found freedom under democracy properly, or whether safeguards need to be built in to check- what state officials like to see as media terrorism.⁹

A common myth peddled in discourses on the media in Kenya is that it has championed freedom and democracy. Be that as it may, Kenya has continued to be regarded as a beacon of hope in Africa and an emerging democracy on the continent, not so much because of the quality of its elections, respect for individual liberties or its reputation for justice, but more because of its vibrant media.¹⁰

5.7 Media Ownership and Influence

The ownership press types that shape news coverage of politics and democratization are mainly classified as state- or privately-owned in a capitalist society, the private news media respond to the interests of the market place rather than the expectations of the public and government officials. On the other hand, state-owned news media in Africa has been susceptible to censorship and direct political control. Consequently, media performance in East Africa is related to the professional norms and editorial policies created, in part, by the type of ownership. The reliance on authoritative, often governmental sources in East Africa presents a daunting challenge on an unsophisticated audience, which is inadequately informed to critically evaluate political news. The independent media, however, has been questioning East African governments on policies

⁹Ayo Olukoyun, 'Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Dec., 2004), p.72

¹⁰ Karui Kanyinga and Duncan Okello, 'Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections,' Society for International Development and Institute for Development Studies, 2010, p277

and decisions, and holding the elites accountable. In Kenya, journalists have scrutinized the government since 1991, which roughly coincides with the timeframe of the constitutional amendment for multiparty democracy.¹¹

5.8 Agenda Setting versus the Media

The media has the ability to influence the perception of the important topics and issue of the day, although it may not dictate what people think about those issues. There is correspondence between the order of importance given in the media to issues and the order of significance attached to same issues by politicians and the public. The agenda setting hypothesis holds that the fact of paying attention to some issues and neglecting others has an effect on public opinion and policymakers.¹² The media plays an important informational and framing role and that media- policy attention may trigger shifts in the president's policy agenda on both foreign and domestic issues.¹³ Kofi Annan observed that when governments had a clear policy, then television had little impact; however, when there was a problem, and the policy had not been thought through, they had to do something or face a public relations disaster. The effect of real time television is directly related to the coherence of existing policy.¹⁴

¹¹ Yusuf Kalyango, Jr., 'Media Performance and Democratic Rule in East Africa: Agenda setting and Agenda Building influences on Public Attitudes,' May 2008, dissertation. p. 7

¹² Angela N. Baiya, 'The Role of Sudan Media Conflict Resolution: A case study of the Sudan mirror newspaper and the Darfur crisis. p.16.

¹³ Jeff Yates and Andrew Whitford, ' Institutional Foundations of the President's Issue Agenda,' *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), p. 580.

¹⁴Piers Robinson. 'The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 304-305.

Information and Communications Minister Samuel Poghiso urged the media to improve on its analytical reporting as it effectively plays the role of agenda setters in economic development.¹⁵

5.9 Political Environment and the Media

The relationship between the mass media and the state in Kenya is unlikely to improve unless two conditions are met. First, there must be commitment on the part of the state to democratic governance and recognition of the legitimate role of the media in the promotion and protection of democracy. Second, there must be a vibrant civil society that is capable of obstructing attempts by the state to encroach on the rights and freedoms of the public, including the freedom of the press. The political orientation in state society relations in Kenya since independence has been characterized by a determination by the state to control society. This approach, which is underpinned by an authoritarian ideology, resulted in a culture of fear rather than trust and respect for the state.¹⁶ There is the question of the prevailing political culture which is either conducive to honest governance or hostile to good governance. A democratic governing structure is conducive to effective protection of national interests and for this reason the media should guard against the erosion of democracy, without making the polity an adjunct of another country. It is not easy to expose the dangers to the national polity in a restrictive political climate. As happened in Kenya in the 1980s, only bold journalists would dare to expose malfeasance in a repressive regime. The end result was that Kenya plummeted deep into

¹⁵ www.communications.go.ke Speech by Information and Communication Minister Samuel Poghiso on Thursday, March 18, 2010, retrieved on 29th September, 2011.

¹⁶ Peter Wanyande. *Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Kenya*. Retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google scholar p 54

dependency on foreign interests and became a client state responding to the whims of the master states instead of national interests. However, with the prevailing sense of democracy in Kenya and media hyperactivity, the challenge to the media is to be ethical and to learn what Kenya's national interests are in order to minimize its perceived role as a sub-agent of post modern colonialism.¹⁷ The subservience of the Kenyan media in the 1980s when Kenya was under a repressive regime, is in big contrast to the flourishing freedom that it enjoys in the prevailing environment and some of them have been a discredit to journalism as a profession and occasionally seems to be subservient to foreign forces. The number of media outlets has increased and the robust ways in which they operate, sometimes being wild, is unprecedented. They are eager to glorify foreigners, particularly noise making diplomats that are anxious to capture publicity by vilifying the country. The practice of diplomatic noise making started in the 1990s as a pressure tactic that Western powers use to harass mainly African countries into submission, and it started in Kenya. In the process, the Kibaki regime appears to have become a victim of an externally and domestically well orchestrated and hostile, media enthusiasm to find fault and to ignore the positive. On its part, the Kibaki regime has blundered, the biggest blunder being its failure to have an effective public relations strategy or strategists. It is unable to respond at the level of the attacks and as a result, the regime has been the recipient of so much constant beating from the media that it seems to be under perpetual siege. This kind of journalism, however, has led to a perception that

¹⁷Macharia Munene. *The Media, Ethics and National Interest.*, retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google scholar p 160

the journalists are out to get someone or to discredit the country at the behest of external interests.¹⁸

5.10 Kenyan Media and National Interest

In part, the Kenyan media is unable to look after Kenya's national interests because it has what amounts to a master-client relationship with foreign media or missionaries. That relationship is one in which the Kenyan media tends to be the recipient and conveyor belt of foreign values and interests in the name of news and programs, but is not supposed to project Kenyan values and interests in the home countries of the missionaries. Subsequently, Kenyans are free to be inundated with propaganda from the master states through the missionaries. Citizens of the master states, however, are not free to receive broadcasts from Kenya and the Kenyan version of events. When in 2003 Raphael Tuju, the then Minister for Information, tried to open a Kenyan radio station in London, the British Government refused to permit him. By denying Tuju a license, Britain was simply protecting its national interests from the truth as perceived by Kenyans and still expected its version to be accepted.¹⁹

5.11 Media and Economy

The media has helped shape opinion in regard to trade by highlighting what is more beneficial to the country. Kenya's turn to China, Japan, South Korea and India (the East) for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a result of President Kibaki administration's deliberate effort to pursue economic diplomacy. President Kibaki, and a majority of African states, have deliberately worked economically with the East more intensively

¹⁸ Ibid. p 161-162

¹⁹ Macharia Munene. *The Media, Ethics and National Interest*.retrieved on 29th September, 2011, www.google scholar p 160

than the traditional Western markets and this change in tack is attributed to the notion of looking East, pegged on economic diplomacy. The notion of looking East is driven mainly by two factors. First, is that states, such as South Korea, China, India and Japan, consider African states as having acceptable policies that they can identify with. Second, Asia Pacific countries are providing an alternative focus for diplomacy and foreign policy. The economic interface with the East gives Kenya, and indeed Africa, an opportunity to construct a worldview that is able to move the center of diplomacy of these states from traditional Western capitalists to Eastern capitals, such as Beijing.²⁰

5.12 Media and Regional Integration

President Kibaki told media practitioners to resist the temptation of being Afro-pessimists who think nothing good can come out of Africa, adding that the continent has managed to overcome its challenges in shorter periods than the developed countries when they were faced by similar challenges. The President urged the media to shift their focus now on the emerging relations between Africa and its external partners, particularly the South-South cooperation which will herald new global dynamics in the near future. The Head of State remarked that, as leaders, they also looked up to the media to help in promoting the gains they had made as a continent. Citing the case of the East African Community (EAC), President Kibaki noted that media was best placed to promote awareness, discourse and lively debate on EAC and asked it to take deliberate interest in the region's integration agenda. President Kibaki acknowledged that The Pan Africa Media conference was taking place at a significant moment in the development of the East African Region. In

²⁰ Opiyo Ododa. 'Why African Countries are Turning to the East,' *Development*. Wednesday Sep 14, 2011, Business Daily.

East Africa, the process of regional integration has deepened with the signing of the Common Market protocol. Today, the East African Community comprises a large and robust market with a population of 125 million people and a combined Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P). of 70 billion U.S. dollars. This endowment offered the region a unique opportunity to become a lucrative economic hub in Africa. Noting that EAC was the most advanced regional bloc in Africa, President Kibaki invited the media to engage stakeholders in the region and rally support from citizens in the region as other countries seek membership in the body or try to replicate the model. He said that it was in this context that leaders appealed for closer engagement and partnership with the media. The media was best positioned to promote awareness, discourse and a lively conversation with the broad range of stakeholders in the region. The media should, therefore, take deliberate interest in the region's integration agenda.²¹

5.13 Bureaucratic Model and Foreign Policy

The bureaucratic decision making model holds that there is no single rational actor *making decisions*. Bureaucratic politics model views foreign policy as based on bargaining and compromises among governmental agencies. Policy networks here are temporary alliances of leaders, interest groups, and agencies to influence policy.²² In this approach, the belief is that foreign policy are neither simply choices made rationally by government, nor merely outputs from governmental decision making processes and procedures. Instead, the view of the approach is that foreign policy decisions are the

²¹ www.communications.go.ke retrieved on Thursday March 18, 2010

²² Kegley and Wittkopf. 'World Politics: Foreign Policy Decision Making.' 8th eds, 2001. p. 56

result of bargaining games that go on amongst the players in the foreign policy decision making arena,²³ the media being in the equation, as evidenced in Chapter Four from the Kenyan case. No government should try to ignore the power of the media. It can only do so at its own risk and peril.²⁴

5.14 Conclusion.

The central question about the media will remain what states can do to sustain the interest of external actors preoccupied with what they perceive as more worthwhile concerns. These themes constitute a promising avenue of future research. It would, for instance, be enlightening to examine the specific challenges that the media poses to Kenyan foreign policymakers. If the media is more influential in Kenyan foreign policy, how do we measure its influence? Is this actor transitional or permanent element on the foreign policy landscape? How does it alter the conception of national interest? In addition, since interminable wars seem to propel humanitarian organizations to the forefront of Kenyan foreign policy, from what institutions do the media derive its authority and how does it establish mechanisms of accountability and probity?

²³ Makumi Mwangi. *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and Practice*. IDIS. 2004. p 138

²⁴ Frederick Kang'ethe Iraki, *The Sinusoidal Representation of the Kibaki Presidency in the Kenyan Media: 2002-2006*, Confucius. Retrieved on 29th September, 2011. www.google.com . pp 189-190

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

6.1 Chapter Summaries

The background of the study, problem statement and the objectives were dealt with in Chapter one. It is from the problem statement that the fact that the media has influenced foreign policy decision making was highlighted. The relevant literature was reviewed, whereby the media influence on foreign policy decision making came out clearly. The methodology unto which this research rests was also documented. Another important segment of Chapter one was the conceptual framework; Graham Allison's model: the bureaucratic model.

Chapter two was an overview of the media's role in diplomacy. The chapter had two sections; one section dealt with CNN Effect, which explained the origin of the theory and what it has continued to mean to scholars of foreign policy. The role of the media as an agenda setter, public watchdog, public opinion and a tool of propaganda was discussed. Kenya has gone through a period of one party dictatorship to multiparty democracy. The media has had its take on each era, from suppression of their freedom to Kibaki's era where the media is left to exercise some notable freedom.

Chapter three analyzed Graham Allison's three models of decision making. Criticisms of the three models were also analyzed. The policy making field used to be the domain of political elites and presidents. The bureaucratic decision making model holds that there is no single rational actor making decisions. Central governments are complex bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are formal, hierarchical organizations. Decisions here result from negotiations among government agencies with each having different at times

conflicting, interests. Bureaucratic politics model views foreign policy as based on bargaining and compromises among governmental agencies. Foreign policy, the nature of foreign policy, foreign policy goals and objectives, determinants of foreign policy, making of foreign policy, decision making, models of decision making and Kenya's foreign policy were also discussed.

Chapter four dealt with foreign policy decision making in Kenya. The country has had three presidents since independence, Jomo Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki. Kenyatta, its first president, pursued a foreign policy that emphasized cooperation with neighboring countries, support of continental liberation movements, and a mixed economy that strongly encouraged foreign investment and, hence, close ties with Western countries. Kenyatta's personality had a strong influence on foreign policy. Foreign policy under the Moi administration was more of a presidential prerogative, more aggressive, and consequently, more controversial. President Kibaki has been a staunch believer in the freedom of the press. Under his watch, Kenya has had one of the most vibrant and free media in Africa. Since President Kibaki took over leadership, a deliberate commitment has been made to widen the democratic space and ensure total freedom of expression and freedom of the media. As a result, the media in Kenya is vibrant and has grown tremendously over the last few years.

Chapter five analyzed the relationship between the media and foreign policy decision making. The analysis was done within the framework that related the media and its characteristics in relation to the influence on foreign policy decision makers in Kibaki's era, a period that the media was seen to be vibrant and free. Themes emerging from other

chapters and could apply to the analysis were considered. A perfect example of such a theme is the political environment's ability to determine how the media will behave in the type of government, be it authoritarian or libertarian.

Influx of the media has seen policy makers left with no space for consulting, and their agenda being dictated by the media players. Both policy makers and the media need each other to survive. But policymakers took a long time to appreciate the media's new role in diplomacy and its impact on their decision making caught them almost unawares. Of late, most policymakers have embraced the new environment and are taking advantage of using the media to their own advantage. Those still reeling behind must realize that the media is here to stay and must encompass it in their activities.

6.2 Recommendation

It has emerged from the research that the media is influential to foreign policy decision makers in Kenya. The type of regime, leader's personality, and political environment are themes recurring in the research, albeit in different manifestations.

Kenya, being a key player in both regional and international political arena, ought to have a strong articulation of her foreign policy through the media. The fact that she is endeavoring to be a middle income state by the year 2030 necessitates a foreign policy that will make her reach that goal. This calls for a strong relationship between the media and foreign policy decision makers and decision making organs.

Time is ripe for governments to take advantage of media and use it to propel development in their regions. Kenyan leaders should learn to accommodate the media and use it to support its development initiatives, also through public opinion. There is a

proper working environment for policy makers when they work in collaboration with the media.

There is a tendency by some journalists to engage in what might be called irresponsible journalism. There are cases where some journalists fail to check their facts before they file stories. Sometimes, this behavior by journalists is due to sheer ignorance, carelessness, or lack of professionalism. This is why it is important to improve the standards of journalism through efficient and appropriate training. Such carelessness can also be reduced if strict standards and professional ethics were enforced in the profession. In this regard, it may be useful to emphasize training of journalists in specialized disciplines so that a journalist reports only on those areas and disciplines in which he or she has developed special competence. This would be of great help to both citizens and policy makers since the information they will be responding to will be true thus no worry of formulating a wrong policy.

The late G.K. Rukwaro argued that in so far as the Constitution of Kenya is concerned it does not guarantee freedom of the press. The law merely guarantees freedom of speech to all persons. In effect, the media in Kenya does not enjoy constitutional protection any more than a person in Kenya. Of critical concern, according to Rukwaro, is the major flaw in the constitution as this freedom can be derogated on so many grounds that at the end of the day one is left in doubt as to what freedom one has. In other words, Kenya, unlike the U.S., has not embodied the concepts of press freedom in her fundamental laws. The effect of this omission is that the role of the media under the current multiparty politics in Kenya is being seriously hampered through ambiguous laws relating to the

freedom of the media and the freedom with which they may be able to deal with the various political, economic, cultural and social issues.

Kenyans should allow the media to play the watchdog role on the press freedom and democracy. To this end, the media must continue to impress on the government that in a democratic society, the government is a trustee of the collective will of the people, and that the actions of the government are expected to be regulated by public opinion. The media is the most appropriate outlet in gauging public opinion. This can only take place when the press and the people are fully free from any forms of governmental interference.

Media house owners misuse freedom of the press and act as they wish. Some media house owners are not so patriotic and could be serving foreign interests. This could be hazardous where news is manipulated to suit other interests and ends up being harmful to Kenya. Propaganda could be propagated this way, and this would be detrimental to Kenya's progress.

As much as we want the media as a public watchdog, patriotism on the part of journalists is lacking. Rarely do foreign media report negative issues about their countries to foreigners. This seems to be the exact opposite here where news stream in, with great repercussions for our country, yet from the editors' perspective, this is what seems to sell. There is need to exercise some patriotism and try to market our country.

Media houses should pay their journalists well. The norm in which journalists depend on the news source for basic needs creates a dependency that forces the journalist to slant news in favor of the provider. Compromised journalists are likely to adjust facts or simply fabricate stories. Exploited journalists become unethical as they fall prey to external extortionists, pushing agenda that may be harmful to Kenya's national interests.

Trained journalists, the cadre being recommended here, will be wise enough to know a story's implication and, thus, get a way to frame it, or ignore it altogether, if, for instance, it could affect security and peace that a Kenyan enjoys. There is need to balance it with the likely benefits, in terms of the public good.

There is need for a public watchdog on the Fourth Estate as it watches the other three constitutional branches of government. Given that the media, as well as the political leaders, appear intent to manipulate the public by using their immense power, there is need for an independent, but effective, system that is independent of both the government and media houses, from which news can be trusted and acted upon.

6.3 Limitation of the study

The study did not utilize primary data to corroborate secondary data. The utilization of interviews and field data collection would have enriched the research, whereby the emerging trends of media's influence would have been gotten directly from stakeholders or policy makers.

6.4 Area of Further Study

Scholars have tended to concentrate on developed world only, and very few materials have been documented on media's influence on foreign policy decision makers in

developing world. Studies on Africa, and more so Kenya, are barely documented and there is need to research on this. There is need to come up with a model for policymakers to use, guiding them on how they can use the media to the benefit of the public and country, especially in development, peacekeeping, trade and environmental issues.

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