

**"POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AS DETERMINANTS ON INTER
STATE- RELATIONS : A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND TANZANIA,
1964-1988."**

**HIS THESIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR
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University Of Nairobi

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
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
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ELIZABETH JEW OMONDI




This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.

Prof. OLEWE NYUNYA



Dr. A.F. ANANGWE



(ii)

DEDICATION

**Dedicated to my children: Dorothy, Yvonne, Marvin, Worrick and Rene for their
patience during the difficult moments of working and writing this thesis.**

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I am deeply grateful to all those who contributed to the success of this Thesis. It is not possible due to some limitations to mention you all individually. But I owe you special tribute to the following:

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ABSTRACT

It was the changing relations between Kenya and Tanzania over the years that stimulated this research. The former members of the East African Community had formed ideal partners, having shared colonial background, common languages, trade systems, borders and ethnic groups. But instead of harmonious coexistence there were several conflicts between the two countries to the point that the economic community in which both belonged collapsed.

The purpose of this study was to examine the factors which brought these changing relations between 1964 and 1988. The analysis starts with the idea that the different national interests both in the theoretical point of view and in the context of the two countries' relations brought the conflictual relations experienced by the two countries. The friendly relations which occurred during the early years of independence attributed to more or less similar interests pursued by these two countries during that period. There was also the political goodwill on the part of the states as they believed they had common destiny, that is, they were emerging from colonialism.

The next part of the study deals with the members relations in the economic community known as the East African Community. It examines the difficulties that were faced by the two countries as members of the community and implication of these difficulties on their relations. The last part of the thesis deals with achievements of the thesis and recommendations.

As such the scope of this study was determined by its control objectives, namely, the examination of the factors which throughout the period 1964-1988 affected the relations between Tanzania and Kenya, and the impact that these factors had on the two countries' relations.

The research was based mainly on secondary data. For example, the economic and political policies of the two countries over the twenty year period were examined. The economic and political policies, were not limited to the two countries but also included the policies of certain developed countries whose economic and political policies affected their relations with the East African countries. An examination was also carried out to reveal if the above relations had any influence on the Kenya -Tanzania relations. Trade statistics were correlated

to determine whether close trade links between one developed country and either of the East African countries had a long bearing on the relations between the two East African Countries

The study maintains that despite some agreements and conflicting interests between the two states, Kenya and Tanzania need each other in order to pursue some of their interests on a collective basis. It is noted that some of the goals might not be easily achieved if a country pursued them individually. A good example is the development of the tourism industry. The study also maintains that in any type of cooperation there is always an aspect of parity and each state should expect to benefit according to the input it had invested in the cooperation.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 KENYA - TANZANIA RELATIONS

1.1 INTRODUCTION:

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were great plans and hopes for unity, progress and stability on the African continent. Some African leaders, among them Kwame Nkrumah advocated for the establishment of a continental political and economic organization to help African states attain their developmental goals. Nkrumah asserted that "As Africans, our interests can only be served by uniting within an African community. Neither the commonwealth nor a Franco-African community can be a substitute." ¹ Legum has also observed that,

Africa imagined itself to be strong because it thought of itself as being strong. It enjoyed being courted by the west and by the east. But it confused the extent to which its international affairs could be converted in actual power at the points where its desires and interests conflicted with those of the major powers ². It is important to keep in mind Legum's concerns when examining the foreign relations of Kenya and Tanzania.

The leaders noted that it was in the interest of Africa's enemies to divide and paralyze the continent. This search for unity led to the establishment in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It also led to the establishment of regional organizations such as the now defunct East African Community (EAC), (1967-77), the West African Economic Community (CEAO) 1972 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 1975.

At the beginning of the 1960s however, problems began to crop up in some of these organizations. First, there was the division of States into the Casablanca and Monrovia groups within the Organization of African Unity. The Casablanca group was mainly comprised of the English speaking African countries led by Ghana. Their main interest was to have a united Africa both politically and economically. On the other hand, the Monrovia group comprised of mainly French speaking African countries who advocated for a federal state with the United States being their example. There was also a steady rise in internal political instability in many African States. There were border conflicts among African States and other forms of inter-state conflicts.

In Kenya-Tanzania relations for example, trade imbalances led to the disintegration of the monetary union within the East African Common Services Organization³. Each country established its own Central Bank and currency. Separate income tax departments were established and by 1977 each country had her own airways, railways and postal departments. The unity which the East African Community stood for could be seen only as an illusion.

National interest of a given state determines the way any given state behaves in international politics. This study therefore attempts to focus our attention on the concept of national interest as the most important determinant of Kenya-Tanzania relations.

The concept of national interest is based on the assumption that each state pursues different interests and because of this, increased contacts are likely to cause conflicts as much as they promote cooperation.

Whereas advocates of functionalist integration such as Mitrany⁴ suggest that due to the complexity of the governmental systems governments should work together in tasks that demand highly trained specialists, since technical problems can only be solved through collaboration of technicians at international level. Mitrany contends that collaboration in one field will automatically lead to collaboration in another field. However, this theory has been criticized since nationalism cannot be diffused and other political factors ignored, and since competition between states is inevitable. The realists for example contend that states depend for their existence upon the power they wield and they achieve their objectives through the use of power, this in turn brings an atmosphere of competition and therefore the more capable a state is the more likely that it will achieve its national objectives.

It must be made clear that conflicts and cooperation must be seen as dynamics of international politics. Thus, in using the national interest theory, we want to determine how the demands of particular interests in both, Kenya and Tanzania influence their relations. Morgenthau⁵ argues that mutuality between nations are normally formed when there is a community of interest among them. This may explain why at a given time, for example between 1964 and 1966 there was mutual understanding between Kenya and Tanzania.

Both the two countries saw the importance of belonging to the East African Community. In order to create a clear understanding of Kenya-Tanzania relations, some hypotheses were formulated to guide our analysis.

The major units of analysis are factors which have had significant impact on the two countries' relations. The factors include ideology, trade, the East African Community, North South relations and leadership.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

The bilateral Economic and political relations between Kenya and Tanzania has been erratic over the years. Although in 1963 the three East African countries issued a joint statement showing their desire for a closer union, the idea was abandoned for fear of Kenya's economic predominance ⁶.

However, it was agreed that a commission be set up to suggest and review ways and means of strengthening cooperation. The East African countries continued to work together in the long established Customs Union. There were also a range of public services operating on a collectively - managed basis. These included the East African Railways and Harbors, the East African Airways, the East African Posts and Telecommunications, the East African Income, Customs and Excise departments. It may be argued that during this period there seemed to have been cordial relations and a spirit of cooperation between Kenya and Tanzania.

These cordial relations were to change later to rather hostile ones between 1967 and 1978. Traits of the strained relations were seen in trade imbalances which were often accentuated by ideological rift between the two countries. There were constant arguments between Kenya and Tanzania which arose, in part, due to Kenya's positive trade balance with Tanzania. The uneven distribution of economic benefits was a major source of conflict between the two states. This was sometimes worsened by political acrimony. The political acrimony may be traced back to the different development strategies that the two countries pursued. Makinda ⁷ states that Kenya sought to develop its political economy and continued strong ties with the west. Tanzania on the other hand, pursued the goal of one party socialism and leaned mainly towards the Eastern Bloc. These different developmental strategies were bound to bring conflict because in the later years, Tanzania viewed Kenya as a power center within the East African region draining economic resources of Tanzania for its own development. This was a major source of conflict which even led to the collapse of the East African Community in 1977⁸.

Tanzania closed its borders with Kenya in February 1977 partly because of disputes over the ownership of the property belonging to East African Community and partly because of her desire to strengthen her economy and to break her dependence on Kenya. It can be observed from Table One that Kenya benefited from the East African trade far much more than other trading partners. Throughout the fifteen years between 1964 and 1978, Kenya had a positive trade balance of over eight million pounds with the exception of 1971 and 1978. An explanation can be given here that in 1971, a coup d'etat took place in Uganda and this might have

brought instability in trade among the East African Countries. In 1978, the explanation can be given that it was just a year after the break up of the East African Community and as such trade between the two countries was low.

Table One: Kenya's Trade With EAC Partners 1964-1978
(Value in '000 Pounds)

| Country | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Tanzania | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports | 13,771 | 14,589 | 13,608 | 11,663 | 13,069 | 12,848 | 14,752 | 14,743 | 16,286 | 22,277 | 25,949 | 28,540 | 33,442 | 9,822 |
| Imports | 4,207 | 4,624 | 3,898 | 3,350 | 3,692 | 4,018 | 5,938 | 7,933 | 5,887 | 8,528 | 10,686 | 9,166 | 12,406 | 1,622 |
| Balance | 9,564 | 9,965 | 9,710 | 8,313 | 9,377 | 8,830 | 8,814 | 6,810 | 10,399 | 13,749 | 15,263 | 19,374 | 21,036 | 8,200 |
| Uganda | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports | 12,581 | 15,339 | 15,619 | 14,796 | 13,265 | 15,949 | 16,698 | 19,150 | 16,507 | 29,557 | 39,676 | 32,910 | 33,162 | 51,992 |
| Imports | 7,244 | 7,135 | 7,317 | 10,165 | 8,650 | 7,803 | 10,048 | 8,026 | 7,583 | 4,860 | 3,843 | 1,486 | 818 | 581 |
| Balance | 5,337 | 8,204 | 8,302 | 4,631 | 4,615 | 8,146 | 6,650 | 11,124 | 8,924 | 24,697 | 35,833 | 31,424 | 32,344 | 51,411 |

Sources:

Govt Of Kenya, Economic Survey (Nairobi: Govt Printers 1974, p.27)

Govt Of Kenya, Economic Survey (Nairobi: Govt Printers 1979, p.38)

Govt Of Kenya, Statistical Abstract (Nairobi: Govt Printers 1974, p.27)

Table One also shows a drastic fall in Kenya's exports to Tanzania from £33,442 million in 1976 to £9,822 million in 1977. This was due in part to the break-up of the EAC and the subsequent closure of the Kenya-Tanzania border. The three heads of state met in Arusha, Tanzania in November 1983 and signed agreements on co-operation⁹. The changes in the leadership of the two countries may also partly explain the changed cordiality. President Moi became the president of Kenya following the death of Kenyatta while Mwinyi succeeded Nyerere who retired in Tanzania.¹⁰

The new rapprochement between Kenya and Tanzania in 1983 brought some important changes in the relations between the two countries. The border was reopened after six years of closure as a result of the agreement signed by the three presidents to normalize relations. Legum¹¹ states that the Tanzanian foreign minister stressed the desire to end the rift between the two countries. The minister emphasized the necessity to solve the outstanding problems of the East African Community. Tanzania tour operators were also called upon to relax the bureaucracy which kept them apart from their colleagues in Kenya. Legum¹² also states that the Tanzanian Prime Minister Edward Sokoine, appealed for a new spirit of unity among the East African neighbours. He did not, however, call for the revival of the East African Community but appealed for other forms of co-operation. Following this appeal, there were a series of agreements signed between the two countries covering cooperation in trade, tourism, transport and communication¹³.

The meeting between the Tanzanian President and Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, a special emissary of President Moi, in 1983, at Dar-Es-Salaam, was closely followed by an announcement that diplomatic relations between Kenya and Tanzania were to be established at a high commission level¹⁴. In 1984, Tanzania and Kenya also agreed to use their local currency in bilateral relations.

This study undertakes to determine why between 1964 and 1988 Kenya and Tanzania exhibited erratic bilateral relations. In examining this problem the variables which may have given rise to these inconsistent relations such as ideology, trade, the existence of the East African Community and the relations of these two countries to some industrialized countries were examined. Three main questions therefore were generated from the analysis.

To what extent were Kenya - Tanzania relations influenced by seemingly different levels of economic development as compared to ideological divergences? Was the common membership to the East African Community of any influence to Kenya - Tanzania relations? Finally, in what respects did Kenya - Tanzania relations with industrialized states affect the relations between these two States?

It was hoped that by answering the above questions some explanations would emerge as to what political and economic factors influenced the relations of these two neighbouring States.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.

The main objectives of the study were to investigate and understand the political and economic factors affecting Kenya - Tanzania relations from 1964 to 1988, and to further provide a broader examination and understanding of political factors that influence inter-state relations. It was hoped that this would provide policy recommendation that would hopefully lead to strengthening of relations between the two countries. Finally, the Study was taken with a view that it would generate academic interest in this field which may lead to more research.

1.3.1. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

- 1.3.1.1. To establish the role played by ideological orientation in inter- state relations, that is if differences in ideologies between two countries are associated with levels of conflict.
- 1.3.1.2. To examine the correlation between trade relations and levels of intensity of conflict.
- 1.3.1.3. To determine the extent to which external powers influenced the two countries relations.
- 1.3.1.4. To determine the extent to which Membership of the East African Community influenced Kenya-Tanzania relations.

- 1.3.1.5. To ascertain the extent to which differences in levels of economic development affected trade between the two countries.

4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

An examination of the existing data reveals that there is dearth of academic literature regarding the aspects proposed for the Study. In the past, research has dealt with descriptive and comparative analyses of the two countries foreign policies. Examples are those of Howell ¹⁵, and Stephens ¹⁶. Firstly, some studies have examined only the relations between these two countries with industrialized countries. Examples are those of Nzomo ¹⁷ and Makinda ¹⁸ (Vertical relationship). Although Nzomo has done studies on Kenya and Tanzania, the study was mainly based on the foreign policies of the two states and not how they related to each other.

There is a need therefore to shift emphasis from North-South relations to South-South relations. Secondly, Studies on the relations between Kenya and Tanzania have not been carried out probably because of their newness in the International scene. This Study is therefore taken with a view that it will help policy makers identify sources of cooperation and conflict between the two countries. This will in turn advance close working relations and therefore greater economic cooperation. Finally, because of the geographical and historical fact economic relations make both Kenya and Tanzania, potential trade partners. They need to depend on each other in areas such as communication, research and tourism to

enhance economic development. The above can only be realized if the two countries agree to work together in harmony. Other studies done have mainly focused their objectives on the effects of aid on the donor-receiver relationship only. Not much has been done on the effects of this aid on the relations of two equally underdeveloped countries, in our case Kenya and Tanzania. This study intends therefore to examine this factor.

The years 1964 to 1988 were chosen because we are interested in the two countries relations after independence. Further, there have been changes of leadership in both countries and this might have led to some changes in the two countries' relations. The researcher assumes that the change of leadership may be one of the factors bringing these cordial relations. The study hopefully will determine this.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW:

After the first World War of 1914-1918 in which the Germans lost, their East African territory was handed to the Britain as a mandated territory. Britain was to govern the territory on behalf of the newly formed body known as the League of Nations. Under these arrangements, Britain was instructed by the body to administer and develop the territory on behalf of the interests of the inhabitants. Britain thus took over the responsibility of German East Africa in 1920 and renamed it Tanganyika. Although both Tanganyika and Kenya were now being governed by the British, the colonial presence was much more established in Kenya.

Mazzeo has argued that,

It was believed that a common historical experience, cultural affinity, similarity of institutions and the long and close association of these two countries could have generated a search for common solutions to common problems¹⁹.

However, the development orientation of these two countries became increasingly different after independence. Mazzeo argues that this was partly owing to the historical conditions and partly because of personal ideological inclinations of the two countries' presidents²⁰.

It may be observed that during colonial days Kenya acted as the headquarters of the British East Africa Protectorate while Tanganyika and Uganda acted as satellite States. This phenomenon did not change after independence and Tanzania still lagged behind economically as a result of this historical fact. There was therefore a feeling by Tanzania that Kenya was draining her resources. Green has argued that because of this feeling, Tanzania felt that if she had to become economically viable she had to rely on her own resources and break away from the dependence on Kenya. The Arusha Declaration proclaimed in 1967, could be seen in this context²¹. It affirmed the Tanzania African National Union's creed of building a democratic socialist State. It also outlined the party's policies of socialism and self-reliance emphasizing how difficult it would be for a government to pay for development out of increased tax revenues. The Declaration also made it clear that Tanzania could not rely on foreign aid from overseas for her development. From then on Tanzania was to rely more on her own resources.

It was at this time too that Tanzania broke her relations with two of her most powerful western friends, Britain and United States ²². Nyerere's most serious dispute with the West occurred in December 1965 when the British government failed to take effective action to end the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority government in Rhodesia. Tanzania also threatened to leave the Commonwealth should Britain negotiate independence with the Rhodesian government headed by Ian Smith. ²³

It may be argued that although Tanzania's relations with the west have gradually improved somewhat, they have never returned to their pre-1964 warmth. This is due to the west participation in the Rhodesian affair and other related factors, for example, the British cancellation of £7.5 million loan agreement and other existing British aid during the year 1965²⁴.

In Kenya, contrary to Tanzania, the transitional process to independence was marked by bitter political struggle between the colonial rulers and the Africans. But after independence as Howell argued, there was need for Kenya not to embark on a foreign policy course that would severely damage her relations with important aid giving countries and those that received imports from Kenya. Unlike Tanzania, Kenya therefore strengthened her ties with Britain and other developed western countries ²⁵. It is against this background that relations between Kenya and Tanzania could be viewed. The assumption here is that Kenya's continued ties with western developed countries affected her relations with Tanzania. And Tanzania's ties with the East especially China affected her relations with Kenya. ²⁶

Howell has noted the belief by the Kenyan ruling elite that any identification with communist states would jeopardize Kenya's capitalist development²⁷. For Kenya, any communist country was an enemy, while Tanzania sought friendship with communist countries. For example Tanzania invited the Chinese to build the Tanzam railway and accepted loans for development from China. This position therefore makes it possible to analyze ideological positions of the two countries.

As already mentioned, Tanzania adopted the Arusha Declaration in 1967 as a strategy for development. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 proclaimed that Tanzania was going to follow the principle of Socialism and Self-Reliance.²⁸ The state was going to have effective control over the principal means of production and intervene actively in the economic life of the nation. The most surprising aspect of the Declaration was the framework established and the extent to which it was implemented. Stephens has stated that "It was without doubt, the most dramatic development in the course of young Tanzania's history"²⁹. Tanzania nationalized all major industries, banks and sisal plantations. She co-opted labour unions, co-operative and village schemes into the central government apparatus. Good observed that because of these actions by Tanzania, most Kenyan leaders who were advocating capitalist development were profoundly disturbed³⁰. However, Good (1980) does not explain how these events influenced the foreign relations of these two countries over this period. This is part of what this study attempts to do.

In Kenya, African socialism was adopted as the official aim of Kenya's development strategy ³¹. President Kenyatta stated that the country would develop on the basis of concepts and philosophy of Democratic African Socialism. He went further to explain that Kenya rejects both Western capitalism and Eastern Communism and that the country chose a policy of positive non- alignment ³². The paper also stated that political equality, social justice and human dignity will be the main objectives of the government. These objectives, it further explained, would not be sacrificed for the achievement of more material ends nor would they be compromised.

The main features of African Socialism outlined in this paper were that the government's aims were to achieve political democracy and mutual social responsibility, to encourage various forms of ownership, to ensure equitable distribution of wealth and income and to diffuse ownership to avoid concentration of economic power in the hands of a few individuals ³³. However, this policy was not put into practice and on the economic front, Kenya has continued to pursue a policy of mixed economy which is mainly pro-western capitalism. Kenya therefore promotes State and private ownership in economic matters. The assumption is that the individual can be relied on to promote the interests of the community without external control. Kenya has therefore paid lip-service to socialism.

This ideological strategy has given some scholars an impression that the strained relations between Tanzania and Kenya was mainly ideological and nothing beyond.

This argument has also been based on the fact that the two countries have had cordial relations with ideologically different industrial countries. From the foregoing analysis, it can be argued that ideology cannot be viewed in the abstract. The leadership of the two countries therefore, may be examined to give us a clear picture of seemingly ideological differences. Leadership behaviour can be defined as the particular behaviour in which a leader engages in the course of directing and coordinating the work of his members. It may be emphasized that leadership entails inter-personal influence towards the attainment of specific goals and situations.

The interpersonal influence is exercised through communication and more generally through behaviour. Leadership style will vary from one regime to another. Boyce stated that, "one does not need to pursue the more sensational examples of a charismatic leadership function. A recent study of foreign policy making in Tanzania shows that the president is the mastermind behind Tanzania's diplomacy and his is the lucid pen which frames the basic lines of policy".³⁴

It may be argued that while Nyerere shares with the Marxists the views that man's highest form of social organization is a socialist system, he rejects the scientific revolution as inappropriate in the African situation.³⁵ Stephens states that concentration of authority in the person of Nyerere created some problems in foreign policy formulation in Tanzania. He asserts that for security reasons, for example after the army mutiny in January 1964, there was a tendency to insulate Nyerere from information, opinions and opposing views.³⁶

Such isolation, Stephens further states. "forced Nyerere to rely on his own internal resources which might have been affected by his emotions. These emotions intruded in the decision making process and in that case national goals of Tanzania overtly reflected the preferences or personal ideology of Nyerere".³⁷

In Kenya the leadership was quite different from that of Tanzania. Stephens has observed that because of a number of vocally cohesive groups, a pluralistic situation was created composed of groups as the white settlers, the Indian merchants and the Africans.³⁸ This situation meant that there was constant interaction, compromise, accommodation and development of independent sources of information. As there were many interests to be considered, the channeling of the interests were to be essentially diverse. For example, foreign affairs process was accomplished through the mechanism of cabinet with ministers presenting various points of views from their ministries. This meant that decisions were arrived at in parliament or presented to the president as an alternative action.

Although Kenyatta emerges from this examination as a strong leadership type in a pluralistic situation, his long detention isolated him from the then Kenyan politics. Like Nyerere, he was affected by his own emotions in foreign policy formulation. But unlike Nyerere, Good argues, Kenyatta was often content to leave foreign policy to his foreign affairs ministers.³⁹ Although he was no stranger to pan-Africanism.⁴⁰ He realized that there was much to care for in Kenya. After long years in detention, he may have had great need to achieve material progress which explains his respect for private property and his belief in individual initiative.

This may also explain why Kenya's economy was mainly bent on pro-western capitalism.

The examination of these two cases suggests that the differences between these two leaders' ideological orientation may have resulted from the broad political and economic environment in which they operated. This environment and leadership differences may be said to have had a major influence and impact on the East African Community. These in turn affected the relations of these two countries. It may also be argued that political climate determines the commitment to regional goals. Given that Tanzania and Kenya had already differed as regards ideology, commitment to the East African Community by both Kenya and Tanzania was low. This was shown particularly by Tanzania who felt that she was not benefiting much as Kenya did. The East African Community was established by a treaty of economic cooperation signed by the three East African countries in 1967. Its headquarters was to be at Arusha. The Community took the place of the East African Common Services Organization but continued with the functions of the East African High Commission. The new organization was intended to encourage the development of inter-territorial trade on a common market basis.

It was to remove all tariffs gradually and other official restrictions and attract foreign trade and investment on a much larger scale that could not have been achieved by individual states. It was also hoped that other neighbouring states like Ethiopia, Zambia and Somalia would join. But historically as Mazzeo observes, "The survival of regional cooperations in East Africa was constantly threatened by

the perceived uneven distribution of benefits among member states".⁴¹ It may be argued that Kenya's dependence on western capital reinforced her domination of markets of neighbouring states. Tanzania therefore saw her market as being exploited not only by Kenya but also by the western capitalist countries that had investments in Kenya.

Because of Kenya's dominant position in the regional trade, she seemed to have developed a vested interest in the maintenance of the community. It may be emphasized here that this argument was only valid to the extent that Kenya continued to dominate markets of other partner states. Kenya therefore consistently opposed any arrangements that would reduce her international trade surplus. The irreconcilability of these basic national economic interests among others led to the break-up of the community and the resultant dispute over who owned what. This was later in 1978 followed by the closing of borders of the two countries. These events suggest that this period was marked by conflicts and therefore hostile relations. The root cause of success or failure of East African Community must therefore be sought in a combination of political and economic factors of the prevalent situation.

It would be interesting to note the patterns of trade that went on between Kenya and Tanzania. This would go a long way to explain the changing relations. The assumption here is that the volume of trade is high between the two countries when they experience cordial relations. It may be noted that between 1972 and 1977 Kenya was not among the principle trading partners of Tanzania ⁴².

But as Table Two shows, trade between the two countries has increased steadily from 1982 onwards partly due to the agreement between the two countries to settle the dispute over the East African Community assets and partly due to the opening of the borders. This increase does not, however, compare to the period before 1977 (see, Table One).

TABLE TWO.

TRADE BETWEEN TANZANIA AND KENYA 1980 -1984
(Value in £'000)

| Year | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Kenya's imports from Tanzania | 309 | 273 | 859 | 1,015 | 3,019 |
| Kenya's export to Tanzania | 5,216 | 6,307 | 6,836 | 6,288 | 9,727 |

Source: Government of Kenya, Statistical Abstracts (Nairobi: Govt. Printers, 1985, p. 53).

Kenya - Tanzania relations may also be examined from the point of view of their relations with the developed countries normally termed as the North-South relations. Many third World leaders have seen and continue to see discussions of increasing differentiation within the South as a thinly disguised attempt to 'divide and conquer' differentiation. This differentiation is increasingly used by north to undermine the solidarity of the third world. Rothstein has observed that heterogeneity of interests among developing countries is normally over-emphasized and inflated by the north for their own national interests ⁴³ Rothstein further argues that, the emphasis on trade negotiations and on concepts such as 'selectivity' has

compelled the advanced countries to reaffirm their solidarity with their friendly developing countries escalating suspicion generated by discussions of differentiation.⁴⁴

This differentiation may be observed in the Kenya-Tanzania relations. Makinda has argued that because of Kenya's commercial links with western capitalist countries, Tanzania saw Kenya as an imperialist country within the East African region.⁴⁵ This factor has had some impact on the two countries' relations. The close links between Tanzania and China in the Sixties also generated suspicion and caused concern within Kenya. An assumption made here is that the complexities of interaction between interests of both the north and the south forces both to choose their friends and enemies. Thus, North - South relations, as has been explained, may affect the relations within the South.

The task of this study was therefore to determine the extent to which the above underlying factors have over the years influenced relations between Kenya and Tanzania.

6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

The essence of a theory is to describe, explain and predict relationships between variables. The suitability of a theoretical model in the study of inter-state relations will depend on the extent to which it guides us in analysing conflicts and cooperation between states.

Specifically, the theory should guide us in explaining, describing and predicting political behaviour of Kenya and Tanzania over political conflicts.

This study proposes to develop a theoretical framework based on the concept of "national interest". The framework is derived from the realist theory approach as expounded by Morgenthau⁴⁶. It is assumed that the national interests of these two countries have bred the erratic relations which existed between them. The realists argue that there is no harmony of interests among nations, instead there are often conflicting national objectives some of which may often lead to war.

Different scholars have given different definitions of national interest. For the purpose of this study, we shall adopt Morgenthau's definition of national interest. He defines national interest as a compromise of conflicting political interests; it is not an ideal that is arrived abstractly and scientifically but a product of constant internal political competition... the government through its various agencies is therefore in determining the national interests of a given country.⁴⁷ According to Coulumbis and Wolfe "all agree that the primary justification of states action is the national interest"⁴⁸ Kennan contends that national interests of nations stand above and absorbs the united and parochial claims of sub- regional groups⁴⁹ even though such groups seek to interpret the national interest in their own terms

It may therefore be argued that conflict of interests becomes a basic factor in inter-state relations. A good example is the conflict between Kenya and Tanzania over gains from trade in the defunct East African Community. However, he has advised that conflicts of interests should not be burdened by moral principles. This he states is the error of moralists-legalists approach.

"The moralists and the legalists carry into affairs of state concept of 'right' and 'wrong' and make the assumption that state behaviour is a fit subject for moral judgements"⁵⁰.

^e
Morgenthau supports the above argument even more strongly. He asserts that a government can only be judged by its interests. "Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation and the ends of policy are determined by available power"⁵¹. A realistic political analysis, states Morgenthau, "turns upon the concept of interests defined in terms of power"⁵². However, it would be naive to say that the basic national interest of survival is at play in the two countries' relations. It must be stressed that conflicts and cooperation must be seen as dynamics of international politics. Conflicts of interests therefore become a basic factor of inter-state relations. Thus, in using the national interest theory. We shall attempt to show how demands of particular interests in both Kenya and Tanzania influence their relations. It may be argued that conflicts arise because the national interests of the two countries are incompatible or that cooperation succeeds, because of the convergence of the national interest. As Morgenthau states, mutuality between nations are normally formed when there is a community of interests among them. Mutual relationship can, therefore, be seen between ideology and national interest⁵³.


It may be argued that, while Tanzania's national interest between 1967 and 1979 was to constrict private sector economy, Kenya's national interest was to promote the idea. This may have brought conflicts between the two countries.

Judging from the seemingly friendly relations that existed between the two countries in the 1980's, it was not clear whether a community of interests existed. It was hoped that this study would help in determining this fact.

Kenya - Tanzania relations can therefore be illustrated as indicated in Figure One. The assumption is that ideological factors, in this case Tanzania's socialism and Kenya's capitalism have influence on their relations. It is also assumed that leadership factors such as personality and beliefs of the leaders influence Kenya - Tanzania relations. Another assumption is that economic factors such as trade imbalances, membership in the East African Community has some influence on the two countries' relations.

FIGURE ONE

A Conceptual Model of Bilateral International Relations



It is suggested that the two countries' relations' with some of the industrialized countries also have influence on their relations. It is also suggested that these Independent variables interact (as shown by arrows joining the boxes) and these interactions also have bearings on Kenya - Tanzania relations. For example, the leadership of the two countries during the period of the study may have influenced the ideological stand which the two countries opted for. It is assumed that leadership also affected the economic strategy which can also be traced back to the ideology adopted by the two countries. Finally, it is suggested that economic situation in both countries may have influenced the choice of industrial countries that the two countries related with. The same explanation can also be given for the choice of ideologies that the two countries opted for.

The studies reviewed here, have mainly dealt with the different foreign policies of the two countries and their relations with either the Eastern or the Western industrialized countries. There has been very little research if any done on the Kenya - Tanzania relations. This study, it is hoped would close this gap.

7. HYPOTHESES:

From the conceptual model, a number of explanations emerge regarding the factors that may affect Kenya Tanzania relations. These assumptions are specified below in the form of four hypotheses.

7.1 Hypothesis one:

Real or perceived divergence in ideologies of national leaders bring about bilateral conflicts. The greater the differences in ideological orientation of the national leaders, the higher the conflicts in interstate relations.

Ideology here refers to the system of economic and political values from which the government derives objectives. For example, socialism as an ideology refers to the institutional orientation which permits the control of the means of production by the central authority. This is measurable in terms of numbers of state-owned industries in contrast to individual or private investments. Ideology is measurable in terms of beliefs, educational and social background of the leadership.

7.2 Hypothesis Two:

Divergence in levels of economic development generates conflictual bilateral relations. The wider the differences in levels of economic development, the higher the level of conflict. For the purposes of this study, economic development was used to refer to economic growth measured in terms of gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP). It was assumed that the higher the GNP and GDP, the greater the economic development.

7.3 Hypothesis Three:

The greater the benefits realized from the membership of a community, the lower the conflict between the member states. Community is defined here as any inter-state activity that is designed to meet some commonly experienced need. The need can be political or economic. This is measured in terms of flows of factors of production namely labour and capital between states. The term conflict refers to the struggle over values and claims of scarce status, power and resources. Conflict may therefore be violent or non-violent (that is in terms of physical force). Causes of conflict in inter-state relations include factors such as ideology, economic and territorial disputes and personality of leaders among others. Conflict is measured in terms of actual war, warning and strong public statements by the leadership.

7.4 Hypothesis Four:

The stronger the bilateral relations between an East African country and industrial countries of a given ideological bloc the higher the conflicts in her relations with another East African country supported by industrial countries of a different ideological bloc. The safety or insecurity of the states depends on the behaviour of its peoples particularly those who are involved in international transactions. For the purposes of the study bilateral relations is measured in terms

of trade, state visits and state messages. Economic co-operation is measured in terms of ratio of trade, volume of trade and the existence of an economic community (integration).

8. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

8.1 Sources of data.

In this study research was based largely on secondary data. It included extensive utilization of relevant documents. The sources included the East African Community Publications; United Nations Trade Publications; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Publications; Africa Diary; Africa contemporary Records and Africa Research Bulletin. Other sources included books, newspapers, magazines and abstracts of speeches made by relevant leaders.

8.2 Treatment of the Data

Descriptive statistics were used in analysing relations, policies, leadership behaviour and the two countries relations with external powers. Correlational statistics were also used in analysing trade data. Appropriate tables were compiled for the results of the analyses.

8.3 Limitation of the Study

It has been observed by other scholars that decision-makers are seldom willing to be interviewed and that international conduct is seldom open to direct observation, hence the only apparent alternative for students of foreign policy is to rely on existing public documents.

This source, it must be admitted has its own problems. It was noted that most of the information was either classified or unavailable for public inspection (for example, some of the East African Community Assets). Some information were not even recorded. We therefore had no alternative but to base our knowledge of contemporary world affairs mostly on day to day reporting.

In chapter one the historical background of Kenya-Tanzania relations was examined. It was illustrated that there had been erratic relations in the course of the twenty year study period. It has been shown that there have been periods of cooperation and at times period of conflict over certain political and economic factors. In order to examine these erratic relations we formulated some hypotheses to examine the variables which give rise to Conflict and cooperation as far as Kenya-Tanzania relations are concerned. These include trade, ideology leadership, the East African Community and relations with certain developed Countries. We therefore generated some questions to help us in our analysis.

1. Is Kenya - Tanzania relation affected by the different ideology they pursued as assumed in hypothesis one?
2. Is Kenya - Tanzania relation affected by the different development levels as assumed in hypothesis Two?
3. Is Kenya - Tanzania relation affected by the unequal benefits realized in the economic community as assumed in hypothesis Three?
4. Is Kenya - Tanzania relation affected by the relations these two countries have with certain developed countries as assumed in hypothesis Four?

As mentioned earlier, we shall answer these questions while relying, mainly on secondary data such as, Kenya -Tanzania Government documents, East African Community publications, United Nations Trade publications, Newspapers, Magazines and abstract of Speeches made by relevant authorities.

Chapter two examines the concept of national interest and leadership factor in general. The chapter also examines the interests these two countries pursued. In case these interests are influenced by different ideologies, then we shall argue that the different ideologies pursued, by Kenya and Tanzania, brought about conflicting interests. This will also clarify our understanding of the two countries' insistence on the use of ideologies. We shall also examine what role leadership plays in the formulation of ideologies.

Chapter Three gives a detailed historical background of the East African Community. It also examines the kind of trade which was being carried on within the Community. If this examination brings out the fact that there was unequal benefit from the community as hypothesis three assumes, then we shall demonstrate that this was a source of conflict between Kenya and Tanzania.

Chapter Four attempts to analyze the comparative relations between Kenya - Tanzania and the eastern bloc countries. This includes former Soviet Union, now known as Commonwealth of Independent of Russia (CIS), China and East Germany viz a viz the Western bloc countries which includes USA, Britain, France and West Germany.

It is assumed that Kenya identified and traded mainly with the western bloc countries while Tanzania identified and traded with the Eastern bloc countries. If this assumption is true, then we shall be able to determine whether these identifications had any bearings on the relations of the East African countries.

The determinants for the comparative analysis are based largely on economic assistance and to some extent military assistance Kenya and Tanzania got from these industrial countries. The explanations in this chapter analyze the assumption made in hypothesis four that external factors influence Kenya - Tanzania relations.

Chapter Five analyzes the findings of the study. It also covers the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

9. SUMMARY:

The aim of this study was to find out the factors that have led to the erratic relations between Kenya and Tanzania between 1964 and 1988. The Study has therefore been defined to include only the political and economic factors which have given rise to this type of relations during the period 1964 - 1988. Four hypotheses are generated to guide the study.

First, it is assumed that divergence in ideologies of national leaders bring about bilateral conflicts. Second, that divergence in levels of economic development generates conflictual bilateral relations. Third, that External factors influence Kenya-Tanzania relations.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Legum, Colin. The Growth of Africa's Foreign Policy: From illusion to reality. Undated Manuscript. New York: Fredrich Praeger Publishers, 1965. p. 1.
3. The organization was later renamed The East African Community. Uganda was also a member. In 1978 it was rendered defunct.
4. Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System. Chicago Quadrangle Publishers, 1948, p. 56.
5. Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. (5th Edition) New York: Knoff Publishers, 1967, p.116.
6. The three leaders even considered to form a Political Federation. "East A. Treaty on Cooperation" Daily Nation, June 1964, p.24.
7. Makinda, Samuel "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy" Third World Quarterly. Vol (5) (2) April 1983, p. 306.

8. Legum, Colin. Dyck. Jacqueline. (eds) "Common Border Closed" African Contemporary Records. Vol (8) 1978/79. p.B278.
9. "Tanzania Hails New Relationships" Kenya Times. Nov. 19th 1988. p.7.
10. President Munyi came to Kenya on official visit to Kenya in 1984 and 1988.
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12. Ibid., p. B176.
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16. Stephens, Robert. An Analysis of Foreign Relations of Tanzania and Kenya: A Comparative Study. Ph.D. Thesis University of Michigan, 1980, p.187-190.

17. Nzomo, Maria. African Socialism As A Determinant of Tanzania's Foreign Policy. BA Dissertation University Of Nairobi, 1974, p.81.
18. Makinda, Samuel. Op. Cit 1983, pp. 306 - 309.
19. Mazzeo, Domenico. (ed) African Regional Organization London: Cambridge University Press, 1984 p.150
20. Ibid., p.151
21. Nyerere, Julius. The Arusha Declaration and Tanu's Policy On Socialism And Self-Reliance Dar-Es-Salaam: Govt. printer 1967 p.17.
22. Diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Britain have since been restored and so has her diplomatic relations with United States of America.
23. The paper is now known as The Standard.
24. Smith, William. Nyerere Of Tanzania Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1964,p. 146.
25. Howell, John. Op. Cit. p.36.

26. There has been change in relations between Kenya and China from that of hostility to cooperation. This was marked by Kenya's official presidential visit to China in 1983 and 1988.
27. Howell, John. Op. Cit., p. 42.
28. It should be noted here that what was at issue was not scientific socialism or Marxism-Leninism but an evolutionary socialism. Revolution is rejected for Evolution.
29. Stephens, Robert. Op. Cit., p. 75.
30. Good, Kenneth. Kenya's Foreign Policy: Pressures, Images And Decisions. Ph.D. Thesis McGill University 1980, p.76.
31. African socialism was a term describing African political system that was mainly African but capable of incorporating useful compatible techniques from whatever source be it Capitalism or Socialism.
32. Kenya Government. African Socialism And Its Application to Planning in Kenya. Nairobi: Govt. Printer, 1965 pp. 5 - 7 The Paper is also referred to as Sessional Paper No. 10.
33. Ibid., pp. 3 - 4.

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35. Nyerere, Julius. Freedom And Socialism. Dar-Es-Salaam Govt. Printer, 1964, p. 4.
36. Stephens, Robert. Op. Cit., p. 314.
37. Stephens, Robert. Ibid., p. 315.
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39. Good, Kenneth. Op. Cit., p. 316.
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50. Kennan, George. Ibid. p. 81.
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CHAPTER TWO

2.0 NATIONAL INTEREST IN INTER - STATE RELATIONS.

2.1 INTRODUCTION:

In the literature review, it was assumed that national interest influence Kenya-Tanzania relations. The concept national interest as was explained in Chapter One refers to the objectives that a state pursues in order to maintain and preserve its territorial integrity as a nation-state. National interest is not an ideal that is arrived at abstractly and scientifically but it is a product of constant internal political competition among various government agencies. Schematically we could present the relations as follows:

Figure Two


National-Interest And Its Influence On Kenya-Tanzania Relations.



It was also assumed that the concept ideology has influence on Kenya - Tanzania relations. The concept ideology refers to the political and economic values from which governments derive their objectives. This can also be presented schematically as follows.

Figure Three**Ideology And Its Influence On Kenya - Tanzania Relations.**

Finally, it was assumed in Hypothesis One that leadership influence Kenya - Tanzania relations. Leadership here refers to those charged with the responsibility of formulating policies governing the nation. The above can also be presented schematically as follows:

Figure Four**Leadership And Its Influence On Kenya - Tanzania.**

The purpose of this chapter is to determine the major interests these two countries pursued. Specifically, its purpose is to examine the impact of these interests within the context of Kenya -Tanzania relations. This chapter also seeks to establish whether the ideologies the two countries pursued between 1964 and 1988 had any effects in their relations.

By linking the concepts of leadership, ideology and national interest to the two countries' relations, we wish to determine whether these factors have influence in Kenya - Tanzania relations.

It is also assumed in Hypothesis One that real or perceived divergence in ideologies of national leaders bring about bilateral conflicts. Conflict here refers to the struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources. Conflict may be violent or nonviolent depending on the use or non-use of physical force. Causes of Conflict in inter-state relations include ideological differences, territorial disputes, trade imbalances and personality differences. Personality is used here to refer to the qualities of character of the leadership both in Kenya and Tanzania. It is assumed that the greater the differences in ideological orientation of national leaders the higher the conflict in inter-state relations.


For a better understanding of the casual factors that lead to conflict, the chapter examines the national interests pursued by the two countries between 1964 and 1988. The Chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes national interest and its impact on ideology while the second part of the chapter deals with leadership and its impact on national interest.

2.2. National Interest and Ideology: Their impact on Kenya Tanzania Relations.

Despite its ambiguity, the concept national interest remains of central importance in any attempt to explain, predict or prescribe international behaviour. The realists agree that the primary justification of state action is the national interest. Before we proceed further it will be of great importance to determine the relationship between ideology and national interest. Kennan argues that national interest of nations is the most primary factor which determines the behaviour of nations.¹ He observes that ideologies and values are merely rationalizations of the actions, and above all ideology is only used for purposes of propaganda.² Perhaps, it is even safer to take Coulombis Stand.³ He argues that there is always mutual and feedback relationship between ideology and national interest in which each affects and even shapes the formulation of the other. Schematically this can be presented as follows.

Figure Five.

The Interaction Between Ideology And National Interest And Their Influence On Kenya - Tanzania Relations.



It must be emphasized that national interest is mostly implied through actions of states. It does not have to be formulated in a specific document. We can therefore judge a country's national interest through the policies that a country pursues. Thus national interest can be operationalized through specific interests that these countries pursued at any given time of their history. Examples can be cited as the declaration by the East African leaders of their intention to move towards a process of federation which triggered debates within the individual countries. Each country therefore considered the pros and cons of a federation. Another example is the adoption of socialism as the official ideology in Tanzania. Kenya felt threatened especially because of her economic dominance in the East African region. This issue became a national interest in Kenya in which the leadership came up with its brand of socialism. Finally the third example that became a national interest to both countries was the formation and disintegration of the East African community in which the two countries counted their gains and loses. Such examples are many and we cannot mention all of them here.

Morganthau argues that the national interest can only be a compromise of conflicting political interests. He contends that national interest is a product of constant political competition among governmental agencies and its leaders. The kind of political interests that emerge are therefore determined by the personalities of government representatives and the capabilities of states ⁴ Morganthau further argues that whereas an individual can sacrifice his self interest, a nation cannot since its first duty is preservation.

Also, since international politics is characterized by a perpetual struggle for power, and therefore survival, statesmen cannot base their foreign policies on international moral norms or principles.

Central to the study of international relations, is the analysis of forces that contribute to cooperation between states. Cooperation refers to any inter-state activity designed to meet commonly experienced need. This need can be political, economic or military. In Kenya - Tanzania's case the East African Community for example was mainly economic. It ensured the free flow of trade, labour and capital within East Africa. It must be emphasized here that there cannot be relations between states in which conflicts are non-existent. This is because states do not pursue similar interests and even if they do, there is always competition of gains. Boulding for example argues that conflict dominates all kinds of relations, be it human or international.⁵ It can therefore be observed that conflict is the most visible aspect in any asymmetrical relationship between two states. We shall determine if the above was the case in Kenya - Tanzania relations.

What then were the major interests of these two countries after their independence? By answering this question we shall determine whether the interests of these two countries increasingly converged or diverged to the point that they impinged on one another. For Kenya, the main interest after independence was to continue with mixed economy as a strategy for development⁶. Mixed economy refers to the maximization of private enterprises. In Kenya the economy was greatly dominated by foreign capital. This strategy is clearly demonstrated

through all its developmental plans⁷. As had been observed in the literature review, Kenya had a dominant position economically over the other two East African countries. It was therefore in the interest of Kenya to maintain this position. The leadership thought that the most efficient way to do this was to continue with the mixed economy approach.

Kenya was also bent on this approach because the colonialists in Kenya had created a Kenyan bourgeoisie whose interest was tied to those of the international capitalism. The land settlement scheme and the policies pursued in industrial sector clearly demonstrate this⁸. It was therefore the interest of the Kenyan leadership and that of the international capitalist states who had invested in Kenya that forced her to adopt this strategy for development. The concept of leadership here refers to the president and his close associates who influenced the decision making process. It is no wonder then, that the rhetoric against inequality and exploitation which Tanzanian government persisted on were bound to bring conflicts between the two countries. Indeed, the adoption of the Arusha Declaration confirmed to the Kenyan ruling elite their fears that Tanzania was in fact hostile towards free enterprise. It was observed that what had happened in Tanzania was a Nasser-inspired takeover by decree with Chinese encouragement.⁹

It can be argued that, because Kenya enjoyed a higher level of industrialization, it constituted a semi-peripheral power in East Africa. For example, Kenya was supplying mostly manufactured goods to both Tanzania and Uganda while it imported raw materials in turn. The Arusha Declaration meant that Kenya

was not going to have a large free trade area as before. This limitation was detrimental to the Kenyan economy as its prosperity lay on the East African Market. When Tanzania insisted on a planned common market which implied, coordination in the production of goods, Kenya found it unacceptable. This conflict can hardly be explained in terms of ideology. It clearly shows that it was a clash of different interests. Tanzania's national interest, particularly after the Arusha Declaration was to remove the exploitation within the society. According to the Tanzanian authorities it did not matter whether it was exploitation of an individual over others or a nation over others.

Perhaps, Tanzania would not have changed to the socialist path of development were it not for the enormous difficulties the country underwent in its first two years of independence¹⁰, and the personality of Nyerere. This strategy, it was believed would help the state to generate capital internally and in the long run remove Tanzania from the dependence situation. The limitation of private investment meant that Kenyan goods which were manufactured by private companies would now not be accepted in Tanzania. Kenya saw Tanzania's decision as a move that was limiting their market.

Having dealt with national interest as a dominating factor in the two countries' relations, let us now examine how ideology helped the leadership to pursue the national interest. Ideology as a concept has had several meanings. For the purpose of this study we shall define ideology as a system of political, economic

and social values from which objectives are derived. It can be argued that it is these objectives that form the nucleus of a political programme.¹¹

What immediately strikes the students of international relations of the Kenya-Tanzanian politics is the countries' claim of being Socialist States. To begin with, it must be noted that it was not the Scientific Socialism of Marxism-Leninism but what was increasingly known as African Socialism. In general, African socialism became both a reaction against Europe and a search for an African unifying doctrine. Around the 1960s African socialism became so popular that most newly independent states regarded it as an ideology for nation-building.¹² In Tanzania for example, the move to Socialism as an ideology was therefore used to foster the national interest. It was undertaken to mobilize mass support and legitimize a regime under threat of economic collapse. The Arusha Declaration created a new sense of purpose as it was a way of rejecting exploitation and inequality. Socialism as an Ideology refers to institutional orientation which would only permit the control of means of production to the central authority, in this case the economic affairs of the society would be seen to belong to the public and not the private sphere.

In Kenya, on the other hand, colonial dependence was seen to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling class which came to power in the struggle against colonialism. It was therefore assumed by the ruling class that the approval from the masses would be won by emphasizing the fact that the policy of the government was based on African socialism. The contention here is that it was not the ideology of socialism which was important but its use by the ruling classes of both countries

to consolidate their positions. This was their main interest. It is in the above light that Pan-Africanism can be looked at. Legum argued, that many of the contradictions in this ideology had not been worked out. It follows that this diffused ideology expressed the interests of the political elites in the two countries which were not necessarily similar.¹³

The leaders therefore used Pan-Africanism to interpret their own interests in one way or the other. Those who argued that Pan-Africanism was an ideology which would have helped in the integration process could not be more wrong.¹⁴ When the Internal economic problems forced the leaders to redefine their national interests further the ideology of Pan-Africanism had to be abandoned. In his address to the Legislative Assembly in Dar-Es-Salaam, Nyerere commented that "We are not East African leaders but leaders of states in East Africa and regional unity has sometimes to come second to our national responsibility".¹⁵

Socialism was therefore a term with very positive connotation especially in the former colonies which had experienced the hegemony of one of the leading capitalist powers. It is clear from the above that two countries interpreted and used the ideology of socialism quite differently. It is hardly surprising then that some African governments who showed scant sympathy for socialists principles referred to themselves as African socialist. Kenya possessed such a government which publicly was committed to socialism but pursued capitalist strategy of development. There was considerable reliance on foreign capital. There was an official encouragement of indigenous entrepreneurship in both urban and rural areas.¹⁶

This situation increased the output of Kenyan production, yet what developed was only a dependent capitalism whose continuation for growth was limited.¹⁷

With independence, the African states adopted socialism, as a reaction against Europe and a search for a unifying doctrine. It is no wonder that it was given the name "African Socialism" to distinguish it from any other socialism. But as we have seen above even this African socialism was interpreted differently in different countries to suit the interests of the ruling class. Kenya and Tanzania were no exception. We are led to agree with Sandbrook when he claimed that in Kenya, "the attitude and aspirations were moulded more than was realized by the style and ethos of a divided economy".¹⁸ Hence the aim of the ruling elite to take over the economy became merged almost with individual aspirations to take jobs, positions and life style which this economy made possible.

The above was the historical context within which the Kenyan government had to choose an appropriate development strategy. That it transformed the colonial economy theoretically was evident in the key policies of Sessional Paper No. 10¹⁹ The paper refers to socialism but actually outlines capitalist development. For example, it showed that the ruling class hoped to rely on private ownership but with considerable government regulation and participation.²⁰ Throughout the paper, emphasis was based on economic growth from whatever sources of investment that could earn the greatest increment of national wealth.²¹

In African socialism one might have expected a communal approach to commercial and agricultural activities, yet this African socialism rejected the

communal ownership of land by clan or lineage. Instead, it opted for individual ownership and enterprise. It reserved cooperative elements for marketing of the produce only.²² In this regard therefore, African socialism here only encouraged personal accumulation and consumption which, carried to its logical conclusion thwarted the communal spirit by encouraging individualism and acquisitiveness as a means of personal success. In sum, there were firm evidences that the Kenyan government pursued a capitalist mode of production and not socialism as she claimed. It only emphasized the Africanization of the economy rather than its transformation. Transformation as a process would have required exemplary behaviour on the leaders' part which unfortunately they did not possess as we shall demonstrate later in this chapter.

Start!
Tanzania on the other hand actually tried to put its brand of socialism into practice. It must be pointed out here that the Kenyan African socialism and the Tanzanian African socialism did not contain identical principles as the two papers Arusha Declaration and Sessional Paper No. 10 evidently showed. The Papers did not even concur in the manner in which African socialism was to be implemented.

The Arusha Declaration had many aims but we shall only discuss those that are relevant to this study. First and foremost, Tanzania wanted to generate finances from within to help in running the government machinery having failed to get loans from the foreign countries.²³ The other aim was to mobilize all resources of the country towards the alleviation of poverty, ignorance and disease. The government aimed at exercising effective control over the principle means of

production, eradicating all types of exploitation intimidation and corruption. It aimed at policies which could facilitate the collective ownership of resources.²⁴

Tanzania also nationalized all major banks, insurance companies and sisal plantations. Private enterprises in the financial sector were eliminated to give the government full control of monetary and credit policies. Parastatals were to be run by the government and rural development was undertaken by introducing "Ujamaa" villages and farms.²⁵ Our concern here is not whether socialism failed or worked in Tanzania but that unlike Kenya the ruling elite at least tried to transform the economy in the way they thought, would eliminate evils brought about by capitalism.

The policies of Tanzania clearly demonstrated that they desired to see a transition to socialism. Many of the measures already identified above had as a part of their rationale, the creation of a social environment in which a greater sense of communal responsibility would emerge. This is true of "Ujamaa" villages, the actions taken to limit income inequalities, the measures to increase citizen participation and the introduction of the leadership code. Underlying all these was the desire to create an overall environment in which individual aggressive acquisitiveness would be checked and cooperative activities and socialist values encouraged.

However, many commentators including Nyerere, acknowledged that the economic difficulties encountered by the Tanzanians even after the Arusha Declaration were not only as a result of outside factors.

Nyerere suggested that policy errors, deep-rooted cultural attitudes that was widespread amongst both the masses and the bureaucracy, grave shortages of skills and capital, and the authoritarian inclination of many TANU officials made Socialism even more difficult. It can be clearly observed from the foregoing analysis that what the Kenyan government interpreted as African Socialism was not viewed in the same context as in Tanzania. The Kenyan leaders, proud of Kenya's economic growth rate and personally realizing economic benefits from the capitalist mode of production, used Tanzania's experience as a sort of foil against internal criticism. At the slightest differences in opinion with the Tanzanian government, the Kenyan politicians accused Tanzania of wanting to sabotage the Kenyan economy and to destabilize the government.²⁶

According to the Kenyan politicians, the Kenya's success was a living proof of Tanzania's failure. In such a climate each incident between the two countries however small, became a state affair. For example, Kenya complained about armed banditry against tourists at the border and implicated Tanzania's militiamen²⁷ while Tanzania complained about smuggling which was directly linked to her economic situation.²⁸ The most serious incident which brought the two countries into conflict were more directly political in nature than ideological. Kenya accused Tanzania of serving as a refuge for all Kenyans fleeing justice. The tension between Kenya and Tanzania was heightened in 1982 when Tanzania refused to extradite the leaders of the attempted coup of August that year. The Kenyan government interpreted this as a deliberate act of hostility. Conversely, Kenya also served as a refuge for Tanzanian politicians.

Thus, at the time of the wave of arrests linked to a coup attempt in Tanzania in January 1983, some opponents took refuge in Kenya.

After the mysterious escape of certain organizers of the coup plot from prison in Tanzania, it was established that the escaped men were in Kenya. Tanzania subsequently suspected Kenya to be involved and to have supported the coup. As can be seen here, the above conflict can hardly be seen to be ideological. What both governments feared was that the opposition groups could use the neighbouring countries to destabilize their mother countries. It was therefore in the interest of the governments to see that this did not happen. According to the authorities, it was in the interest of the nation to curb this opposition. Anybody giving support to opposition group was viewed as an enemy. However, we must stress here that these conflicts never degenerated into open conflict. Ironically, it must be noted, the meetings on liquidation of the Community assets were also being held regularly during this period. The heads of state met or exchanged messages through the intervening ministers. The importance that leaders attached to the liquidation of these assets showed how important the meetings and the decisions were nationally. Hence, the national interest here was to gain as much as possible from the defunct community.

As demonstrated earlier in this Chapter, it was up to the leaders to decide what they thought was the national interest and the best way to achieve this national interest. The personalities of the leadership would greatly determine what they considered to be important for the country.

In Kenya and Tanzania we shall determine if the contrasting personalities produced contrasting interests which finally led to the personality conflicts between the Kenyan and Tanzanian leaders.

2.3. National Interest and Its impact On Leadership Role In Kenya-Tanzania Relations:

2.3.1 Personality And Leadership.

Conceptually it is difficult to disassociate Nyerere's and Kenyatta's leadership belief system and personalities with the two countries' national interest. It can be assumed therefore, that national interests of a given country are the interests and objectives that are deemed crucial by the leadership for the survival of the state at any given time. Thus, the two countries' national interests were not separable from the leaders' belief system. Their beliefs and interests will therefore form part of the national interest in the respective countries.

It must be emphasized here that the personality of the president and the decision-making elites play a very important role in the formation of any country's foreign policies. It forces us therefore to put particular emphasis on the personalities of Kenyatta and Nyerere, Mwinyi and Moi, along with the impact of colonialism in moulding the post independence leadership through colonial education and civil service training. It must be realized that leaders have different

temperaments, dispositions and countenance that may greatly affect their line of thoughts and belief system which in turn have bearings on the policies they advocate.

It is said of Nyerere that without him, Tanzania's foreign policy would have been different from what it has been during his presidency. Nyerere has been known to cling to his belief in human dignity and equality.²⁹ This can be explained by the fact that he had no room for compromise in any issue which he believed to be a matter of principle.³⁰ This statement may appear as if Nyerere the president forced his personal interest on to the people and hence to the Tanzanian foreign policy making process. On the contrary, it may be observed that he would often argue and convince others about his view point.³¹ Nyerere was often preoccupied with the problems of developing a backward country. He was known for his simple style of living and his abhorrence of luxury. Smith commented about Nyerere that, "the great thing about Julius was, he didn't want the spoils of leadership; he just didn't care about possessions."³² The conclusion here is that his fascination with the ideology of socialism was probably inevitable given the above characteristics.

Nzomo asserted that, Nyerere's wit, and intelligence also made him convince the Tanzanian ruling class to opt for a socialist ideology as a strategy for development.³³ His role in the decision making process need not be over-emphasized. He was the head of practically every important government agency of change in the country. Wherever he was not involved himself, he appointed the heads of such agencies. This made it impossible for Nyerere not to have had some

say in major decisions that were made in the country. One of his ex-ministers and great opponent could not help remarking that Nyerere was very simple and very understanding. He would always give chances to others to express their point of view. He did not believe in a one-man government.³⁴ A western diplomat (formerly assigned to an embassy in Tanzania) said, "There are many bridge players in this world who can take a good hand and get good results.

There are few hands as poor as his".³⁵ The above examples are given to emphasize the fact that Nyerere persuaded the other leaders to accept socialism because he had this confidence in the innate goodness of people. This factor can be made more clearer by analysing how beliefs of an individual may affect his decision making especially as concerns leaders. (This factor shall be dealt with later in this chapter.)

Tanzanian problems at independence only pushed Nyerere further to the socialist countries and more so because the western countries had turned him down. During his state visit to China in 1965, he commented that if it were possible for him to lift all the ten million Tanzanians to see what the Chinese had done since the liberation, he would greatly have done so.³⁶ It is important to note that this friendship was not brought because of similarity in ideology but because of the common problems which directly affected the national interest of Tanzania at this time.

Mushi has noted that people in Tanzania have learnt about foreign affairs and Tanzania's position on any international issue from the president himself and

to a less extent from the Minister of Foreign affairs than from their representatives. Because of this, foreign policy has been associated with the president himself. The president has therefore been the main source of foreign policy for constitutional, historical and personal reasons.³⁷ Mushi further argues that under Tanzania's constitutional arrangements, the president is potentially able to exercise his will freely than under the parliamentary system.³⁸ Mushi however, points out that this advantage may diminish under the wrong leader who might become dictatorial. It has so far worked with Nyerere because of his charisma and brilliance which ensured adequate policy support through institutions. Thus although in performing the task of foreign policy he acted or appeared to act in his capacity as head of state he consciously ensured that his chairmanship of the party guided his presidential role and made the point of discussing all major policy decisions with the central committee of the party before proceeding to take action.

Unlike Nyerere, it can be argued that, Kenyatta's temperament and disposition made him to believe in material benefits and individual accumulation of wealth. It so happened that the team members that he worked with for example Charles Njonjo a one time Kenya's Attorney General and Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Mbiyu Koinange a one time Minister of State shared similar interest. The colonial structure offered him a way of doing it.³⁹ This also explains why he preserved the most needed aspects of the colonial structure, for example, the law and order structure, the judiciary, the civil service and parliament continued to function according to the British models. Brown has emphasized this fact further by adding that Kenyatta always took an active part in anything that might suit his

purpose. As such he kept himself free from ideological commitments so long as they did not jeopardize his personal interests.⁴⁰ As far as socialism was concerned it remained a vague concept to him as can be seen in his address to it in Sessional Paper No. 10. But Kenyatta played down any signs of communist information in Kenya. He claimed that he had learnt enough of their techniques. This was not surprising given Kenyatta's socio-cultural background. If capitalism would offer him personal wealth and self-confidence, this was what he would have advocated for. The highly personal style of government which he created could be justified because it gave him this confidence. Kenya's dominant position in regional, trade and Industrialization was therefore seen as an asset for accumulating personal wealth. When Tanzania limited the amount of manufactured goods from Kenya which were being sold in Tanzania by introducing import tax, the Kenyan ruling class accused Tanzania of economic sabotage.

Tanzanian political leaders on the other hand suspected Kenyan leaders of the same and Njonjo, one time Attorney General and Minister for Constitutional Affairs was commonly given as example. These personality clashes often brought tension between the two countries.⁴¹ Kenyatta and his associates became bitter critics of Tanzanian socialism because the implementation of those socialist principles in Tanzania were going to interfere with the Kenyan economy and more still they were going to give the opposition group in Kenya courage to continue opposing capitalism.

With the death of Kenyatta and the resignation of Nyerere from the presidency, gradual change in the relations between the two countries could be noticed. Moi the new president of Kenya was more concerned with the internal affairs of the country.⁴² On the relations with neighbours president Moi urged African leaders to work for unity. He believed that unity would create enlarged internal markets for locally produced goods and services while internationally it would increase the powers of African Nations.⁴³

President Moi therefore stressed that African nations should strive for political cooperation. It is in this context that Moi called for greater peace and lasting unity among African nations, Tanzania included. He further stressed that Kenya recognized any government in control of a country irrespective of its ideological standing.⁴⁴ Thus when Moi took over power from the late president he took the initiative to replace several political figures who were bitter critics of Tanzania government. These factors helped in clearing the scene for future co-operation. For example in 1983, an accord on tourism was once again signed and a series of presidential visits were undertaken.

The succession of president Mwinyi in November 1985, must be admitted, signalled noticeable changes. Unlike Nyerere's Tanzania, Mwinyi allowed some steady intensification of liberalization of policies. For example, the government revised the import export policy hitherto wholly controlled by the government. These measures once again created room for private investors.⁴⁵ Kenya viewed this move with relief.

2.3.2 Belief System And the leadership Role in Kenya - Tanzania Relations

Nearly everyone would agree that people have a large reservoir of beliefs about what is true or not and what is good or bad about the physical and social world in which we live. Rokeach has observed that these beliefs become organized into systems describable or measurable properties which in turn affect the behavioral consequences of an individual.⁴⁶ Like motives, beliefs cannot be directly observed but must be inferred as best as one can with whatever psychological devices available from all things the believer says, or does.

Rokeach has defined belief system as having represented within it some organized psychological but not necessarily logical form, of countless beliefs about the physical and social reality.⁴⁷ Each belief is therefore conceived to have three components. First, is the cognitive component which represents a person's knowledge held in varying degrees of attitude about what is true or false and what is desirable or undesirable.

Secondly, is the affective component, which under suitable conditions makes the belief capable of arousing effect of varying degrees centering around the object of belief and taking a positive or a negative position, and finally, there is the behavioral component which leads to some action when it is suitably activated. It must be emphasized that these components are so closely related that it makes no difference which one is used to rank the individual with respect to their attitude towards an object.

The concept attitude is indispensable not only to social psychology but also to the psychology of personality. Attitude will in the long run determine the social behaviour of an individual. These attitudes, observes Rokeach, can be recognized as psychological representation of Societal and cultural influence.⁴⁸ Attitude can be defined as interrelated set of opinions organized around a point of reference. It can be concluded that attitude is an enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner. We can therefore distinguish belief from attitude by saying that all attitudes incorporate beliefs but not all beliefs are necessarily a part of attitude. It may then be argued that not all beliefs are important to the individual and the more central the belief the more it will resist change and if for some reasons it is changed there can be widespread repercussions in the rest of the belief system.

Freud⁴⁹ and Maslow⁵⁰ both agree with the proposition that attitudes serve mainly the ego defensive functions of an individual. They also advance the proposition that value is a determination of attitude and as a concept it (value) provides us with an analytical tool for describing and explaining the similarities and differences between persons, groups, cultures and even nations.

Belief system as a concept in international relations may help us determine the behaviour of leaders such as Nyerere, and Kenyatta. George has noted that some individuals develop unusually strong need or striving for power and other personal values.⁵¹ As noted above, these personal values can be regarded as ego-motives since they are part of the ego-sub system of the personality and hence the

motivational structure which drives the individual to strive for these values. The ego is therefore capable of employing various constructive strategies in efforts to secure satisfaction for ones personal values. These personal values are useful focus for studying the interaction of a personality and his political behaviour. He has further noted that these types of leaders often emerge as reformers and innovators if successful in obtaining political office. They often re-interpret and even expand the functions of existing political roles or create new ones which fit their own needs, political styles and aspirations.⁵² These kind of leaders may often become role determining as opposed to role determined political leaders. Undoubtedly Nyerere and Kenyatta fit into this kind of leadership. For example, the statement can easily explain why Nyerere had no room for compromise in any issue which he believed to be a matter of principle.

2.3.4. Summary and Conclusion:

This chapter started by examining the sources of conflict among states in general. In the case of Kenya and Tanzania, it was illustrated that national interest and leadership factors were the major sources of conflict. Ideology was therefore shown to have played a minor role in the two countries' conflictual relations. It was further shown that ideology was only used as guideline for achieving what the leadership deemed to be consistent with the national interest.

The Chapter also illustrated that although the two countries claimed to be pursuing socialist oriented policies, their interpretation of socialism as an ideology

was completely different as was evidenced the two countries' developmental blue prints namely:- Kenya's 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 and Tanzania's 1967 Arusha Declaration. However, these differences in interpretation were found not to have played a major role in the two countries relations.

The Chapter further illustrated that the two countries approached cooperation or conflict as an exercise in balancing gain or sacrifice according to the national interest which was being pursued at a given time. The chapter also demonstrated that personalities of the ruling elite played a major role in the relations between Kenya and Tanzania. However, it must be stressed that the chapter was not intended to be a biography of the leaders, but it concerned itself with careers that influenced policy decisions and therefore relations of the two countries.

It can therefore be concluded that, although there was a mutual feedback relationship between ideology and national interest, in which one affected the other and even shaped the formulation of the other, national interest overrode ideological considerations. The fact that both countries have experienced cordial relations since 1982 can only prove further that ideology was not a major source of conflict between the two countries.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION ON INTER-STATE RELATIONS

3.1 INTRODUCTION:

This chapter examines the impact of regional organization on inter-state relations. ¹ In Hypothesis two it was assumed that divergence in levels of economic development generates conflictual bilateral relations. In hypothesis three, however, it was stated that the greater the benefits realized from the membership of a community the less the conflict between two states.

The purpose of this chapter is specifically to determine which of the two countries benefitted more from the regional organization, that is, the East African Community (EAC). The chapter further intends to determine whether benefits accrued from the community by either of the states led to any political or economic conflict. For the purposes of this thesis the operational problems are examined within the context of Kenya-Tanzania relations. The first part deals with the origins of the EAC and the problems inherent in its operations. The second part deals with the effects of these problems in the relations of the two states.

Pan-Africanism in East Africa in the late 1950's showed a general weakness. It was discovered that the struggle for political independence without real economic independence only meant neo-colonialism ². There was a general weakness on the part of the national bourgeoisie to assert themselves and advance their economic

interest. Having realized that Pan-Africanism in which a United Africa would become an economic giant with a large market to stand competition of other continents was impossible, the nationalists settled for regional cooperation. Nabudere has argued that the making of a continental market was an illusion because the national bourgeoisie did not have control over their own national resources. This was particularly so, because the struggle was only national and not continental³. Thus, when the ideal of an East African federation could not be realized⁴, the East African States settled for the regional cooperation to cater for their economic co-ordination. It was the economic realities which compelled the three East African countries to accept a limited amount of regional cooperation. These regional objectives were summarized in the Kampala Agreement of 1964 and 1965. The treaty aimed at establishing a new order in which the benefits of integration could be shared equitably⁵.

Trade in the EAC was confined to basically two bilateral flows. These flows were between Kenya and Uganda on one hand, and Tanzania and Kenya on the other. Trade between Kenya and Uganda in the period 1969 to 1978 totalled to US \$ 83.4 million, while trade between Kenya and Tanzania on the other hand totalled to US 60.8 million. In the same period, it may be observed that trade between Tanzania and Uganda was very minimal. It totalled to US \$ 3.7 million only.⁶ This implies that a substantial part of Inter-EAC imports went to both Tanzania and Uganda. These imports came from Kenya. The implication is that Kenya dominated the Intra-EAC trade.

Unfortunately it was the practical implications of the above aim to distribute benefits equitably that led to the collapse of the community. Our argument here is that there cannot be harmony in an integration where some members of a community reap far more benefits than the others. These conflicts did not only affect the economic relations but they also affected the political relations between the two countries.

This trade relations can be presented schematically as shown in Figure Six shows.

Figure Six

A Conceptual Model of Bilateral Trade Relations.



Figure six suggests that trade and membership in the community has influence on Kenya-Tanzania relations. These relations between Kenya and Tanzania are affected in turn by the trade and the membership of the community between the two countries. The Figure illustrates that this relation is an on-going process.

It can be argued that an unequal distribution of benefits in an integration is not inevitable. However, it is particularly likely to occur when the union is between countries of substantially different levels of development.

This could be seen in the three East African countries. The attraction of the established center, in this case Kenya, brought greater influence towards the polarization of development in some parts of the community. These tendencies were increased where Tanzania and Uganda could not produce goods which were demanded by Kenya.

Hazzlewood argued that in this kind of situation there was little spill-over of development from the more to the less developed members of the integration. The losses, imposed on the less-developed members may be relative or absolute. He argues further that, It is even possible that the less developed members may grow more rapidly outside than inside the integration.⁷ The fact that there was less spill over may have created tension among the members of the Community.

It is in fact possible to interpret the establishment of the Community not as a stride forward in cooperation but as stage in a process of disintegration. From the beginning, the East African community and the common market inherited the administrative foundations laid down by Britain during the early 1960s. The economic structures of the three partner states were also transferred intact from the former colonial powers. These structures had a built-in capitalist mode of production and development. The community and the common market were therefore functioning within a broad framework of capitalism. Hazzlewood observed that in such a laissez faire union in which the benefits were unequally distributed, the union was unlikely to survive long. Integration was made even more difficult as each country was committed to its own policies of development.⁸

The weaker countries may have come to believe that (even if wrongly) it would have been better to go it alone ⁹

Hazzlewood argued further that in an integration where there is some kind of laissez faire union, there is a need to have some regulations. But it is not easy for the benefitting country to accept the restrictions which would result from any regulation of the Union. For example, Kenya did not ratify the Kampala agreement ¹⁰ because it was to her disadvantage. It is likely therefore that the benefitting country would exert its competitive power to attract new industries than to accept the constraints imposed on it. The failure of the Kampala agreement led to the commissioning of the Philip commission which was given the task of reviewing the entire package of the East Africa Cooperation. It was also supposed to lay down a new legal base.¹¹

As for the common market, the main problem with it had always been the inequitable distribution of its benefits to member countries. Because one member, Kenya due to the advanced nature of her administration and economic structures, would take advantage of the common market arrangements more easily than the others. What had become obvious by 1966 when the Philip commission was set up was that Kenya was industrializing faster than the other members of the common market.

The gap of uneven distribution was becoming unbearable to the other member states as Kenya dominated the export market while remaining the least importer. Kenya's intra-regional imports steadily fell from \$26,000 to \$21,000 in 1974, while Tanzania's imports ranged from \$37,000 in 1965 to \$30,000 in 1974.¹² The disparity is more obvious when one considers the balance of trade between the three East African countries shown in Table Three. Kenya enjoyed a big surplus (positive balance) in trade ranging from 350 million shillings in 1965 to 104 million shillings in 1975 to an all time high of 750 million shillings in 1976. Tanzania (and Uganda) on the other hand had suffered trade deficits both before and after the formation of the EAC. This ranged to an all time high deficit of 236 million shillings in 1966 to 154 million shillings in 1974 and 219 million shillings in 1976 in the case of Tanzania. Uganda suffered trade deficits ranging from 58 million shillings in 1967 to a deficit of 870 million shillings in 1975.

Thus attempts to redress the industrial imbalance was not successful. What is obvious was Kenya's dominating position of the common market as an exporter and her smallest share as an importer both before and after the formation of the East African Community.

Table Three : Trade Balance In Intra-Regional Trade (Mill. Shs)

| | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Tanzania | -216 | -236 | -196 | -154 | -234 | -219 |
| Kenya | +354 | +380 | +254 | +691 | +104 | +750 |
| Uganda | -138 | -144 | - 58 | -537 | -870 | -531 |

Source: Annual Trade reports Statistical Abstracts (Nairobi: Govt. Printer, 1965, 1968, 1977).

This shows that attempts to redress the industrial imbalance had not been successful for reasons which have already been stated. Kenya for example refused to implement provision passed in the agreement to reduce the imbalance. She was also capable of moving on to productive activities in lines beyond the economic ability of Tanzania and Uganda.

As concerns the corporations, prior to 1967 all the corporations had their headquarters in Kenya¹³. However, the treaty for the corporation re-allocated the headquarters to the three East African countries. Thus E.A. Posts and Telecommunications (EAPT) was moved to Kampala, Uganda; the E.A. Harbours Corporation (EAHC) was moved to Dar-Es-salaam; Tanzania, and the E. A. Railways Corporation (EARC) and the E.A. Airways Corporation (EAAC) headquarters remained in Kenya. Most of the economic activities relating to the common services continued to be in Kenya. The Treaty also provided for an authority comprising of the three heads of state.

The effectiveness and control of the community was bestowed on this authority. The system, therefore relied too much on the harmonious relations between the presidents. This structure in a way also limited the capacity of the lower levels of the administrators to initiate certain functions of the community. National interests were therefore preserved within the framework of the authority. It can be argued that centralization of power within the authority indicated that the East African countries were not ready to relinquish their sovereignties to the community.

Ironically, it was the attempts initiated by Tanzania to decentralize the activities of the corporation which started the arguments that Tanzania intended to break-up the E. A. Railways Corporation. Decentralization of this E. A. Corporation would have redirected inflow of revenues from the headquarters to the regions. Decisions on how to utilize the accrued revenue would have been made by the regions. The regions would also be left with the responsibility of providing major and specialized repair services for which they (regions) would be paying. But through delaying tactics, revenue and accounting services were not established. Mbogoro ¹⁴ is of the opinion that Kenya was responsible for the delays.

Tanzania therefore unilaterally decided in 1974 to establish her own revenue and accounting services. The treaty provided that more money should be allocated to Tanzania for capital development of her harbour. This was undermined by Kenya and as a result more capital development was being taken in Mombasa harbour. This was achieved through the refusal of the harbours authority in Mombasa to transfer all the headquarters facilities to Dar-Es-Salaam.

Instead, a post of Deputy Director General who was an authority unto himself was established in Mombasa and finally. Kenya refused to send money to the headquarters in retaliation for Tanzania's refusal to send money to the EARC headquarters in Nairobi.

Concerning the E.A. Posts and Telecommunication Corporation the treaty provided that strong and functionally comparable regional headquarters including revenue and accounting services were to be established in the capitals of the countries. But up to the collapse of the EAC, the Corporation was still more or less in the same form as it was in 1967, the time of writing the Treaty. Most of the accounting services were still being done in Nairobi and not in Kampala which was supposed to be the headquarters of the Corporation.

It can be argued that the process of the implementation of the provisions of the treaty were not completed as soon as it was anticipated. This delay was caused by the states which were benefiting from the former arrangements especially Kenya. As concerns the corporations' assets, Tanzania and Uganda felt that Kenya had benefitted more than them. This feeling was exacerbated by not being able to know for sure how much EAC assets connected with the corporations were in each of the three countries. Many studies that have attempted to determine the distribution of assets in each of the countries have come up with different figures. These different figure raised disagreements when brought before the partner states as they refused to accept them as correct.

Cooper and Lybrand who carried out the study on behalf of the World Bank were of the opinion that assets were distributed by percentage as shown in table four.

**Table Four: DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS 1975 DECEMBER
GROSS FIXED ASSETS AT CURRENCY VALUE (PERCENTAGE)**

| | Tanzania | Kenya | Uganda |
|--------|----------|-------|--------|
| EARC | 37 | 48 | 15 |
| EAP&TC | 30 | 44 | 26 |
| EAHC | 49 | 51 | - |

Source: Cooper and Lybrand Study Nairobi, 1977. Quoted From Mbogoro Inter-state Trade and Development & effective common market MA Thesis p.78

Caution must be taken in interpreting these figures as assets which could not be allocated among partner states (system wide assets) were not included. However, the figures shows generally that Kenya had the greatest share.

The problem of transfer of funds for the corporation was aggravated by the balance of payments crisis which started in 1972 and grew worse every year. This resulted in a search for genuine transfers from the regions to headquarters by regional managers. These often were met with delays which were met with retaliatory delays and finally verbal exchanges. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the problem of transfer of funds occurred between Kenya and Tanzania and Kenya and Uganda but hardly between Tanzania and Uganda. It may be argued that out of resentment against the already privileged status of Kenya, the less developed partners refused to send more than absolutely necessary amounts to Kenya.¹⁵

Prior to 1967, most of the institutions which fell under the General Fund Services (G.F.S.) were based in Kenya. When the Treaty of 1967 came into force, most of the institutions which used to provide ancillary services to the common market moved to Arusha.¹⁶ However, not much was achieved by the transfer of headquarters. Estimates of the GFS expenditure for 1973/74 show that at most only half of the total budget for the year was spent in Tanzania, 35% was spent in Kenya. Uganda on the other hand retained only 12% of the total fund which were supposed to be transferred to Tanzania.¹⁷ Thus, it may be argued that the integration arrangements that had existed prior to 1967 contained many shortcomings, which the treaty of 1967 attempted to rectify but failed. Statistical evidence above indicate that on the whole Kenya dominated the intra-EAC trade.

As had been argued before, the arrangements of the treaty may not have been wrong in themselves but the foot-dragging and grudging on the part of those who stood to lose their benefits by the new arrangement led to the conflictual relations that we observe among the three countries during this period. The most probable explanation of the conflicts may be found in the conflictual national interests of the three partner states.

Nsibambi has noted that the decision to establish EAC and the framework within which its activities were performed were consequently of political bargaining.¹⁸ The collapse of the E.A.C. was as a result of actions taken by partner states themselves over a period of years.

Mugomba argued that since 1975, a three dimensional verbal 'guerrilla' warfare was waged by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda against one another ¹⁹

These bitter exchanges had led directly to the disintegration of the community and the dismemberment of most of the jointly operated services. Today each country has assumed direct control over regional activities within its own territory thus railways, ports, harbours, postal services and airlines are run separately. The question then arises what went wrong? Part of the explanation lies in the fact that national interest was given priority over regional interests as we shall demonstrate below.

Although the community had full time East African ministers who had status commensurate with that of the ministers of their governments, they found it politically expedient to propagate national rather than regional views. A Ugandan member of the East African legislative assembly was heard arguing that conditions within East African community had deteriorated into a "cut-throat competition because Tanganyikan ministers placed their territorial interest above those of the East African common market".²⁰ It may be argued that the ministers were, first and foremost responsible to their national legislatures rather than to the central legislative assembly. They therefore acted more as delegates of their of their territories than as ministers of regional administration. As Abu Mayanja once said in the Uganda National Assembly,

I was once informed that in some cases, such was the pressure on the people (Ministers) called upon to do this work that a minister scheduled to attend a meeting in Nairobi had time to study his papers only in the plane, on his way to Nairobi ²¹

Thus, the ministers, no matter how capable they were, were invariably ill-prepared to handle delicate issues which required great thought and firm grasp of details. In what way was the creation of an East African regional ministers likely to assist the growth of political commitment to an East African (regional) rather than national loyalty? Of course this was impracticable as the appointment of the ministers rested with their states. It was almost impossible for them to defy national directives. President Nyerere of Tanzania pointed out that there would be conflict of interests between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, as national interest would come before regional interest in any consideration be it political or economic ²²

The East African Authority which was made up of three national presidents assumed the central position of power. However, it must be mentioned that the presidents represented states whose interests after independence, could not necessarily be seen to coincide. As the treaty for 1967 provided, a single president could wreck the community if he refused to cooperate with other presidents. In fact according to article 3(a) of Annex X1, any member of the authority could record his objection to a proposal submitted for decision of the authority. If any such objection was recorded the authority could not proceed with the proposal unless the objection was withdrawn. An example which had been cited earlier was Kenya's refusal to ratify the Kampala agreement. Tanzania was of the opinion that the regional unity could not in any sense, be seen as making a positive contribution to the country,

whose choice was socialist path of development. Indeed according to Nsekela such approach would only be acceptable.

If it held the promise of a market improvement in the material welfare of the masses of Tanzanians implying not only a more rapidly growing level of income but also in line with our socialist policies and more equitably distributed incomes.²³

In turn, this implied that the community should have contributed in some significant way, to the eradication of those forces, economic, social and political which were responsible for the absolute level of poverty of most Tanzanians. In other words in the late 1970s the community was seen to be out of line with Tanzania's national interest.

As has been argued earlier in this study, Kenya felt that her national interest of faster level of economic growth was at stake. This was shown through deep resentment by Kenya who felt that Uganda and Tanzania were draining her economy as their inputs into the community were less than the benefits they got.

In the long run, Kenya simply could not accept this and she resorted to the unilateral actions that were taken. The formation of the Kenya Airways was one such example.

The point is that all the three countries during the years 1964 - 78 simply drifted apart in the domestic policies and national interests. Instead of substantial economic co-operation drawing the members politically and economically, each had a growing doubt about the actual relevance of the community. To many, the community was simply seen to have long out-lived its usefulness and no longer served the divergent national interests of its members.

Despite extensive agreement about advantages of economic cooperation, the EAC realities indicated that there were significant obstacles. Because of divergent national interests, each group of national planners concentrated on only the domestic development and not regional development. The plans of the three countries were drawn up separately with little or no consultation from the others.²⁴ These were bound to bring conflicts as they were sometimes contrary to those realizable and broader co-operation. Many critical investment decisions which could have been essential to attain the goal of regional economic integration were left to domestic interests and sometimes foreign interests who were primarily concerned with maximizing gains within a short time. An example can be cited here in which Uganda has generating their own electricity.²⁵ These factors would seem to indicate that full-fledged regional integration was not being contemplated.

There was lack of substantial agreement all because the three countries put their national interests first rather than regional interests. The Kampala agreement for example, failed because Kenya felt that her national interests were being undermined. The same argument could be advanced for the Treaty for East African cooperation. The joint activities carried out were not sufficient to set in train the kind of planned regional reconstruction essential for increased productivity and higher levels of cooperation in the region.

A number of reasons give credence to Hazzlewood's observation that the transfer tax would have done little directly to increase the attractiveness of Tanzania and Uganda for such large scale industries because of the following reasons. First, Nairobi was a more suitable location for serving the whole of East

African market than any location in Tanzania or Uganda²⁶ second, there is a far greater development of infrastructure in Kenya than in either Uganda or Tanzania.²⁷ Third, Kenya acquired the advantage of being more highly industrialized than Uganda and Tanzania which in turn attracted more investors. Lastly, as far as big industries were concerned, locational advantages, political stability and predictability, economies of scale, effective markets the policies of a country and its past performance are some of the crucial factors which induce them to invest in a country.

Kenya seemed so far to have more of these factors than the others.²⁸ It may be argued here that the EAC's interference with domestic objectives may have been an irreducible latent contradiction. In retrospect, it seems clear that Kenya's decision-makers had decided that the EAC was a net loser for them and they were strong enough to secure radical changes in their favour.

The stress is on Kenya because Uganda had no real bargaining power coupled by the domestic and leadership difficulties that it was undergoing. Tanzania on the other hand saw itself as being cheated out of the gains which would have been achieved by the 1967 treaty that is, the negotiations towards coordinated industrial planning and location of headquarters. Therefore, it sought to halt that process of deterioration.

The three partners felt that the viability of their national interests were endangered by the EAC so that the other disputes, ideological, services and funds were only superficial manifestations.

This was not seen in the early years of independence. Green contended that it seems most unlikely that either Tanzania or Kenya seriously saw its state ideology threatened by the EAC in a way leading to real destabilization.²⁹ It can be argued that the conflictual national interest between these two countries brought about the hostilities observed here. For example, Kenya saw barriers to private ventures which would have undercut E. A. Corporations. Tanzania on the other hand saw special salaries and tax rates out of line with the general Tanzanian practice. The treaty of 1967 could do nothing about the divergent national interests. The different ideologies certainly made cooperation increasingly more difficult considering the fact that they were used from time to time as pegs on which to hand mutual political abuse. Ideology, however was not the main cause of dissension and the inevitable collapse of the community.

3.1.2 The changing perception in the Relations of Kenya and Tanzania:

It is perhaps not surprising that the death of the EAC has not killed the apparent interest in regional interaction schemes among the East African countries. Both Tanzania and Kenya have come forward to work together in the Eastern African Economic Community for Africa (ECA)³⁰ This has been established with a view to expand economic development in the area. Although ECA was formed before the fall of EAC, neither Kenya or Tanzania opted to leave it. This shows a sense of cooperation between the two countries. More interesting for us are the bilateral meetings organized between Kenya and Tanzania in order to normalize relations.

Following the re-opening of the border, a series of meetings have been organized on border relations, tourism, trade and transport.³¹

Tanzania's initiative to normalize relations Gordon argues, may have stemmed from her very severe economic crisis and government's decision to encourage tourism as a foreign exchange earner.³² As concerns Kenya, the decision to normalize relations with Tanzania may have been out of the realization by the Kenya government that it was suffering an immense economic loss, for example with the closing of the borders. Kenya's entire trade with Zambia which hitherto was approximately five million shillings worth almost came to halt. It was also seen that to re-route traffic was too difficult and would have caused many problems.³³ Judging from the organized meetings and frequent presidential visits between the two countries, Kenya and Tanzania are likely to expand their ties. However, Gordon observed that regional cooperation will be less formal and may be less in the East African community.³⁴ Many projects have been initiated between the two countries since the Arusha accord.³⁵ In January 1984, Kenya and Tanzania signed an agreement to facilitate free flow of tourists across the border.³⁶ In February the same year, Kenya and Tanzania signed agreements to engage in cattle trade by establishing cattle markets in border regions. The two countries also agreed to use local currency to conduct trade between them.³⁷

Finally, supranational planning is the best answer for the problem of regulating a common market and bringing cooperation among states. Unfortunately, it is not an entirely helpful answer because the difficulties in the way of

supranational planning are at least as great as the problems of the common market to which it is offered as a solution. The fundamental difficulty, of course is the surrender of the autonomy which it involves. At the minimum of supranational planning is the confrontation of national plans in the expectation that inconsistencies will be revealed and action taken to eliminate them in the interest of all concerned. But when national plans are supreme, supranational plans can not be achieved.

This was the case with the East African community. Added to these problems was the fact that Kenya encouraged the role of foreign investments in her development process in 1965 while Tanzania to the contrary de-emphasized this in 1967. The result was that foreign capital influx especially in the manufacturing industry grew asymmetrically in the EAC member states. Since this trade was basically in manufactured goods and semi-manufactured products, foreign firms operating in Kenya ended up controlling a substantial part of Intra-EAC trade.³⁸ This development was in bad taste especially to Tanzania which saw Intra EAC trade as basically a flow of foreign goods.

3.2 Conclusion

To sum up, the chapter has attempted to show the origins of the East African community and how it made cooperation difficult by the constant inequitable distribution of benefits. It has also demonstrated the institutional weaknesses of the community.

These difficulties accounted for the inter-state political and economic rifts between member countries in general, and conflictual relations between Kenya and Tanzania in particular.

The chapter has also shown that the breaking up of the EAC was not necessarily a negative development. indeed it can be said to have been positive in that it brought about the reality of the situation. The consolidation of national independence could not have been achieved under those conditions but on the other hand the failure of the EAC paved ways for new forms of cooperation to be forged . The chapter also attempted to show that because of economic difficulties that the two countries faced, they may have agreed to normalize relations, paving way for economic cooperation.

It must be emphasized however ,that Kenya being able to export much more than Tanzania, the factors of structural imbalance in trade still persist and may still be a sensitive issue in future.

FOOTNOTES

1. The factor on external influence on Kenya - Tanzania relations is discussed in more details in Chapter four of this study.
2. Nkrumah, Kwame. Africa Must Unite. London: Longman, 1963. pp. 53 - 55.
3. Nabudere, D. "Tanzania and Regional integration: Old and new Patterns." Journal of African Politics and International Affairs. Vol. (18) (1 & 2) 1978, p.124.
4. Of the Three pillars of the EHC, the common market was the first to come into existence. The common market was further strengthened with the formation of a customs Union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917 and joined by Tanganyika in 1927. The headquarters was placed in Mombasa, Kenya. Early problems with the East African customs Union were connected with protective aspects of external tariffs which were meant to encourage local production in East Africa as a whole, but in actual fact, this encouraged local production and industrial development in Kenya only. Mazzeo, D. (ed) African Regional Organization. London: Cambridge University press, 1984, pp. 168-217. Hazzlewood, A. Economic Integration: The East African Experience. London: Longman, 1975, pp. 65-71. Mbogoro, A. Inter-State Trade and Development An Effective Market in East Africa. M.A Dissertation University Of Dar-Es-salaam: 1975.
5. Korwa, Adar. " An investigation and Analysis of the causes of the Disintegration of east African community" M.Sc. Scholarly Paper Indiana State University, 1981, p.65.
6. Korwa, Adar., Ngunyi, Mutahi. The Politics of integration East Africa since Independence. Paper delivered at the workshop on Leading issues in East Africa Politics and Administration Nakuru-Kenya 1st - 3rd Oct. 1990.
7. Hazzlewood, A. Op. Cit., p. 14.
8. Hazzlewood, A. Ibid., p.14.
9. Meis, G.M. Inter-Economic. A monthly Review of International Trade and Development February 1970.

10. In 1964 Tanzania threatened to pursue an economic policy which would eventually pull her out of common market. his threat led to negotiations which resulted in the Kampala Agreement whose major objective was to deliberately distribute industrial activities of lagging partners (Uganda and Tanzania) This agreement was never ratified by Kenya.
11. Rothchild, D. "The political Implications of the Treaty" East African Economic Review. Vol. (3) New series (1) Dec. 1967, p 52 The Philips commission failed to rectify the situation and as a result of which another treaty was signed. The treaty for East African cooperation was signed by the three governments
12. Government Of Kenya. Annual Trade Reports, Statistical Abstracts. Govt. Printer. Nairobi 1965 - 1975.
13. All the institutions Under the general Fund services were also based in Nairobi (Kenya) This included the office of the Secretary General and the Counsel of the community the common Market secretariat the Finance and Administration Secretariat
14. Mbogoro. A. Op. Cit., p 65.
15. Mbogoro, A. "The East African community: An Economic Analysis of the integration scheme." Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 16 (2) 1978 p.67.

16. For lack of Office accommodation, some of the departments like the East African Literature Bureau and the auditor Generals office remained in Nairobi.
17. Government Of Kenya. East Africa Economic and Statistical Review: Estimate of Expenditure for 1974/75. Nairobi: Initiative Publishers, 1974/75.
18. Rothchild, D. Op. Cit., p. 40
19. Mugomba, A. "Regional Organization and Underdevelopment" Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. (16) (2) 1978, p.260.
20. Mazrui, A.(ed) World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years. New York: third World Press 1978, p.230.
21. Government Of Uganda. Uganda Parliamentary Debates Second Series 1967-68. vol. 71 p.223. Mayanja's point was refuted but he successfully stuck to it.
22. E.African Standard. August 9 th 1967 p. 7.
23. Mugomba, A. Op. Cit., pp. 264-5.

24. Govt. Of Kenya " Plan implementation in Kenya" U.S.S.U. Conference Nairobi. January 1969.
25. Nsibambi, A.R. "Political commitment and Economic integration in Mazrui, A. (ed) Op. Cit., p. 215.
26. Nsibambi, A.R. Ibid. p 210
27. Nsibambi, A.R. Ibid. p 211.
28. While Tanzania might be the most predictable country, her brand of Socialism alienated some important western investors.
29. Green, Regionald. Towards Development and Self-Reliance New York : Longman 1975, p. 20.
30. Nabudere, D. Op. Cit., p. 150.
31. "East African Ministers Meet in City." Daily Nation. January 1984, p.15.
32. Gordon, D. "Foreign relations: Dilemmas of Independence and Development in Barkan, J (ed) Politics and Policies in Kenya and Tanzania. New York: Harper and Row, 1979, p. 320.

33. "Transport Dispute continues" African Research Bulletin. London: Africa Publishers Limited. December 14th - January 15th, 1984, p. 3349.
34. Gordon, D. Op. Cit. p 320
35. African Research Bulletin. Op. cit., p 3348.
36. Ibid., p. 3349.
37. "UK Kenyan's Biggest Trading Partner." Daily Nation, January 28th 1985.
38. Ngunyi, M. Regional Economic Co-operation As a Strategy for Development: The African Experience. Paper presented at the Institute for Development Studies, University Of Nairobi, 1992, p. 12.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 THE EXTERNAL FACTORS AS DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S RELATIONS WITH TANZANIA

4.1 Introduction

It has been Proposed in hypothesis four that the strong bilateral relations between an East African country and an industrial nation hostile to another East African Country leads to interstate competition between the two East African countries.¹ This chapter sets out to examine the relations between the two East African Countries and the Eastern Bloc countries. It further examines the two countries relations with the Western Bloc countries.

The chapter has been necessitated by the fact that we cannot attribute the divergences in relations between the two countries to leadership, national interest and economy alone. A reasonable study of relations of African countries in general and Kenya and Tanzania in particular must include external influences. For the purposes of continuity and understanding, each state's foreign relations will be separately examined. We shall attempt to determine if the above relations has any influence on the Kenya - Tanzania relations. The objective of this chapter therefore, is to determine whether the interests of these industrial countries affect Kenya-Tanzania relations. To enhance our examination of many intricate relations that existed between the countries certain issues need to be identified These will include the liberation movement in Southern Africa, Smith's unilateral declaration

of Rhodesia's Independence, and the middle East conflict. The Somalia-Ethiopian war of 1977/78 and various actors of interests in the Indian Ocean zone will also be identified and a comparative analysis made. The behaviour of the various countries of East Africa Vis-à-vis the superpowers will also be determined. The stand taken by both Kenya and Tanzania, it is argued, affect negatively or positively their relations with each other.

The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one deals with Kenya -Tanzania Economic and military relations with the east from 1964-1988, while the second part deals with Kenya -Tanzania economic and military relations with the west. It has been proposed that the more economic and military assistance an East African country gets from either of the superpowers the closer the two countries relations. It has also been proposed in hypothesis four of this study that the national interest of a given country will determine who her friends and enemies are. That is, close relations between countries are forged only when their interests converge and conflicts emerge when interests diverge. This chapter, it is hoped will help in determining this.

4.2 Kenya-Tanzania Economic, Political and Military Relations with the East

The relations between Kenya and the Soviet Union was that of suspicion occasioned by the power struggle between the "conservatives" who were identified with President Kenyatta and his American admired powerful minister for economic planning and KANU Secretary General, Tom Mboya. They preferred to be identified with the west making them be accused by the radicals of being western agents.

The radicals on the other hand, were identified with Kenya's first vice-president Oginga Odinga who symbolized the pro-East group. Kenyatta opposed Odinga's semi-official close contacts with the Soviet Union. Incidences can be cited when Kenya rejected Soviet Union gift projects. Consisting of a 200 bed hospital which was to be built in Kisumu and a 1,000 student college.³ The reason given for this rejection was that the terms were not acceptable. By February 1966, this aid programme had collapsed. However, the hospital project, which was located in Odinga's hometown - Kisumu, was however salvaged.

Kenya's reluctance to establish close relations with the Soviet Union was also displayed in 1965 when it was announced that air traffic rights had been granted to the US government to be exercised by Pan-American Airways.⁴ This announcement was significant in that, earlier the three East African countries had agreed to the effect that to emphasize their adherence to non-alignment, they would next grant air traffic rights to a Socialist state. The Soviet Union's Aeroflot was chosen to be the ideal one. Kenya changed her mind claiming that she could not see any economic advantage in having Aeroflot in Nairobi. Instead it was reasoned, that Pan-American Airways had offered to build an international - standard hotel in Nairobi. This brought disagreement between Kenya and Tanzania. Tanzania claimed that Kenya had violated the agreement.⁵

It may be argued that Kenya considered her national interest gain in accepting the American proposal and therefore discarded the agreement between

her and the other two East African countries. It may be argued further that economic capitalist state rather than socialist state seemed logical to deal with for the Kenyan government. During the ensuing power struggle between the radicals and the conservatives, the radicals lost the contest. They found themselves being ousted from Kenya African National Union (KANU) party and their party Kenya Peoples Party (KPU) was banned. Most of its leaders were detained.

Opondo ⁶ argued that Kenya's relations with the Soviet Union therefore started on the wrong note right from the immediate post - independence period. The relations came to acquire ideological undertones. Since then communism, the ideology of the East became an unwanted ideology in Kenya. Indeed, Kenya associated any criticism of the government policies with communism.⁷ In spite of Kenyatta's pro-western inclination, he praised the Soviet Union as having been at the head of the struggle against colonialism. He described the Soviet Union as a fighter of the people's of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. However, whether Kenya was genuine or not in this rather rare praise of Soviet Union is debatable.

As the incidences illustrated below show, the praise of the Soviet Union was far from being genuine⁸. It may be argued that it was used as a cover-up to show that Kenya was non-aligned and would give praise to whoever deserved it. Given the "ideological" conflict within the different camps in the government, this was necessary.

It is hardly surprising that the then foreign minister Joseph Murumbi articulated foreign policy in a manner that did not reflect the conservatives position. In a number of incidence, Murumbi was forced to retract his statements or a position he had taken at International Meetings. In December 1965 for example, Murumbi without consulting with Kenyatta voted with other African Ministers in favour of severing diplomatic relations with Britain over Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia. This was clearly seen as an anti-western stand. The president forced Murumbi to retract his position and acknowledge the fact that he (the president) was right in not rejecting diplomatic relations with United States.⁹ Tanzania on the other hand did the exact opposite. Nyerere was later to comment that some countries had to run and check their bank account in order to make a decision. He was clearly referring to Kenya and others.¹⁰

The Soviet - Kenya relations was made worse due to the fact that the Soviet Union was arming Somalia with military equipment. The unification of the Somalia in the Horn of Africa has for many years been the aim of Somalia leaders. The Kenyan Northern Frontier District (NFD) now known as the North Eastern Kenya was part of the scheme for Pan-Somalia move. The Somalia cause for self-determination received endorsement from the first conference of the Afro-Asian people's solidarity organization held in Cairo in 1957. It stated that "the conference supported the struggle of the Somalia people for their independence and recognizes their right to self determination."¹¹ As independence approached in Kenya, both Somalia and NFD pro-secessionists intensified their campaign for unification.¹²

Following the British decision to create the Northeastern Region there was widespread violent demonstration in Somalia against Britain.¹³ Somalia became even more determined to get this area and its Somalia people's back into Somalia. The greatest setback for pan-Somalia cause, however, began with the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The newly independent African states supported principle of *uti possidentis* which called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.

In his speech at the Non-Aligned Conference, October 1964, President Osman restated the Somalia's position on the issue of self-determination. He emphasized that "until the Somalia people, a nation bound by the strongest links of race, tradition, culture, language and religion are allowed to achieve their unity in the exercise of their right of self determination, the border problem would not be solved"¹⁴ Thus, the Somalia-Kenyan and Somalia-Ethiopia disputes resulted from Somalia's refusal to recognize the European-drawn boundaries. This issue to the Somalia Government was of paramount national interest. President Barre on one occasion remarked about the claim about the NFD that:

I have stated before and I am saying again that the territorial dispute between Somalia and its neighbours should be settled realistically, sincerely and in an atmosphere of brotherhood without outside interference so that every body can get what is rightfully his. After the differences have been ironed out, the real African unity can be forged.¹⁵

President Barre viewed the NFD as part of Somalia.¹⁶ Between 1977 and 1983, there was conflict between Kenya and Somalia caused by two new factors. First, was the Somalia-Ethiopia War of 1977/1978. It may be observed here that

Kenya and Ethiopia had common interest. They were safeguarding their territories which were being claimed by Somalia. Second, after Kenya's president Moi visited Ethiopia in 1979 the two leaders signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation. The Ethiopian leader also reciprocated by visiting Kenya in 1980. The Somalia government construed the co-operation to mean that there was a coalition between the two governments against Somalia. These actions were strongly attacked by Somalia.¹⁷ As tension grew the two countries Kenya and Somalia increased their military expenditure. It can be observed that between 1971 and 1978 alone, Somalia's expenditure in military was worth \$750 million, most of the assistance came from eastern bloc countries with the Soviet Union transferring military goods worth \$150 million¹⁸ to Somalia. During the same period Tanzania received military assistance worth \$320 Million while Kenya received no aid from the Soviet Union. On the contrary it received military assistance from western bloc countries which was worth \$120 Million.¹⁹

It may also be observed that the military transfer from Soviet Union to Somalia and Tanzania was far much more than the transfer which went on between Kenya and the western countries. These easily created tension between the Soviet Union and Kenya. As had been observed before, both Tanzania's and Somalia's relation with Kenya were not close. In the case of Tanzania it was because of its communist claim while for Somalia, it was because of border conflict. Kenyan leaders feared that these weapons would be used to attack her. The leaders viewed Somalia's claim on the NFD as a violation of Kenya territorial integrity.

Kenya's initiative to maintain her sovereign rights over the NFD dates back to pre-independence years.²⁰

President Kenyatta for his part viewed this issue as Kenya's internal responsibility and stated that:

We and especially KANU, feel, and we have put it clearly before the Somalia Government that we regard the NFD as part of Kenya This is a question which we can discuss with the Somalia in NFD, this being a domestic affair of Kenya.²¹

Claims to this territory by the republic of Somalia were seen as a direct threat to Kenya's territorial integrity. Kenya was therefore, ready to do everything possible to preserve her territorial integrity. On the issue of negotiations between Kenya and Somalia to resolve the issue the minister for internal security and defence expressed the following opinion,

The Kenya Government is not about to sit down with Somalia Government to talk about the North-Eastern Region. The North-Eastern Region is part of Kenya and there is no time today or tomorrow when our government is going to approach Somalia to talk on the North-Eastern disputes.²²

The Soviet Union military aid to Somalia was viewed by Kenya as a clear indication of Soviet's support of Somalia claims. This military aid programme dated back to the 1960s and continued until 1978. It would help here to identify the Soviet's interest in the horn of Africa. The Soviet Union interest in the area was mainly due to the Horn of Africa proximity to the strategic shipping lanes of the Red Sea, and its strategic position on the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.²³ The Soviet presence in Somalia could be viewed in these terms but also there were no

other motives. For example, it can be argued that there was need to curb influences from other countries such as the west and China whose presence would curtail her influence in this region.²⁴ It may also be argued that the Soviet's presence in as many individual countries as possible served to reinforce her claims to global power status. It confirmed Moscow's reach. It is for this last reason that the Soviet's presence in the Middle East can be explained.²⁵

In Africa this influence was fostered through economic and military aid, Somalia for example. between 1964 and 1974 received aid from the Soviet Union worth \$300 million and \$1 billion respectively.²⁶ In 1976 the Soviet Union and Somalia signed a military aid agreement of roughly \$100 Million. It may be argued therefore, that the Soviets looked at the military aid as a means to help advance their ends.²⁷ Somalia provided her with this opportunity.

Kenya strongly opposed the Soviet Union's influence in this area because it was claimed by the Kenyan government that the arms used by the shiftas in NFD came from the Soviet Union and that these items had been provided to the shifta by Somalia. Makinda argues that Kenya and Ethiopia became close because of the anti-Soviet feelings which were linked to Somalia's claim on Kenya's territory.²⁸

Throughout the 1960s, Tanzania's relations with the Soviet Union was not strong. As we had observed before, although Tanzania acknowledged the Soviet's support for liberation movement in Southern Africa, and accepted some military aid from the Soviet Union, she was blamed for supplying aims to Nigeria's Federal

Government during the Biafran War. Tanzania also blamed the Soviet Union for her intervention in Czechoslovakia. The President even cancelled his visit to the Soviet Union because of this. As for Kenya, she did not view Tanzania-Soviet relations in the above light. Kenya felt that because the Soviets were supplying Somalia with military and economic aid, they were a party to Somalia's claims of NFD and this was not welcome. Soviets presence in Tanzania was therefore, seen in above light. Kenya felt insecure as she was surrounded by pro-Soviet nations. Given that the conservative government in Kenya viewed communism as a threat to its position, and given that the Kenyan ruling class had interpreted Tanzania's link with the Soviet Union to mean communists penetration in Tanzania. The relations between the two countries became hostile particularly when Tanzania proclaimed the Arusha Declaration in 1967 as noted earlier.

Merdard has argued, that Kenya's ruling elite saw Tanzania as likely to offer launching pads for sabotage by the Kenyan dissidents most of whom were "socialists". This fact was proven true in 1970s when most of the Kenyan political dissidents sought asylum in Tanzania²⁹ Kenya did not take this very kindly. When Tanzania chose socialism as the working ideology of the country and implemented the Arusha Declaration, this action did not only alarm the Kenyan elites, it also encouraged them to brand Tanzania as an enemy. The enmity at this time became so real that the Tanzanian government thought of replacing Kenyan imports with the Chinese.³⁰

Evidence show that the Soviet influence in Tanzania was only an illusion from the Kenyan government. Tanzania's relations with China could not allow for close relations with the Soviet Union as well as the United States. There was not much change in Tanzania's relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. Even though Nyerere visited Moscow in 1970, it may be argued that Tanzania had always held the Soviet Union at bay because it had always been suspicious of Russia's intentions in Africa as it was of America's. The Russians on the other hand were upset by the fact that the Chinese had secured an important position in Tanzania. This attitude did not differ significantly in the 1970s and 1980s because of the continued China-Soviet conflicts.

Furthermore, Tanzania criticized the Soviet Union for supporting Idi Amin of Uganda by offering him military assistance. Uganda and Tanzania had conflicts owing to the fact that Nyerere offered asylum to the former Ugandan President Milton Obote. There was also the conflict of personality between Nyerere and Amin.³¹ It may be argued that arms aid to Tanzania were helpful in forging a relationship with the front-line states in the fight against South Africa. Tanzania acknowledged and praised the Soviet Union as a supporter of African freedom and liberation. Moscow also sought to build ties with African countries to diminish the role of the West and China through ideological means. The Soviet Union tried to convince African countries that they were engaged in a common struggle against Western imperialism. The Soviets argued that the only way African countries could achieve genuine independence lay in freeing themselves from the economic fetters that still bound them to the imperialist world.

She claimed that this embrace of the soviet model of development and acceptance of the "disinterested" aid of the Soviet bloc offered this so viable method.³² It may be argued therefore, that because of Tanzania's claims of being a socialist state, the Soviet Union felt that they had a friend in this territory

However, as the following incidence show the above assumption which was clearly embraced by the Kenyan Government were far from the truth. Tanzania saw the rise of super-power involvement as providing an even greater need for strict non-alignment. From this springboard Tanzania criticized both the Soviet Union and the United States for viewing all events in the World through the lenses of East-West conflict. Kenya's concern for her security therefore, became of paramount national interest. This security factor was influenced by external factors, it is indeed in this context that Tanzania's involvement with the Soviet Union created tension between the two countries. It would be of interest at this stage to identify other factors that prompted Soviet presence in Tanzania.

It may be realized that, the Soviet Union's presence in Tanzania was not to obtain access to any military facilities as Tanzania had none. It was more so, the desire to obtain a voice in Tanzania's local affairs. The Soviet Union tended to furnish arms to countries that did not obtain arms from the United States and its Western allies. Tanzania happened to be one of these states. Albright argues that perhaps the personality of Nyerere also influenced the Soviet to supply Tanzania with arms.³³ As table 5 shows, although Tanzania received more military aid from

the Soviet Union than it did from any of the Western Countries, this did not influence foreign relations towards the Soviet Union.

Table Five

Value Of Arms To Kenya And Tanzania By Major Suppliers (in million Dollars)

| Recipient | Total | Soviet Union | France | Fed Rep Of Germany | United States | United Kingdom | China |
|-----------|-------|--------------|--------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|-------|
| Kenya | 100 | - | - | 5 | 50 | 40 | |
| Tanzania | 180 | 110 | | - | - | - | 30 |

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1969 - 1978 US Government printing Office 1981, p.101.

We may argue that penetration of communism in Tanzania was only the west interpretation. Kenya was therefore, a victim of western propaganda and press when she believed that there was a communist take over in Tanzania. As evidenced appendix 6 and Appendix 7, there was less trade going on between Tanzania and the Soviet Union than trade between Tanzania and the western bloc countries. This factor can also be emphasized further through (Appendix 2 and Appendix 3)

Throughout the period between 1964 and 1981 Tanzania's import from the Soviet Union was very low, ranging from 0.18% to 8.9% in 1979 which was the highest percentage. The average import being only 1.6%. This is in great contrast

to Tanzania's trade with Britain, a western country. Her average import from Britain, during the same period was 25.2%. The same trend can be observed of her imports from United States and West Germany with average of 6.2% and 17.3% respectively.

Tanzania's export to western bloc countries was far much more than her export to the Soviet Union. As can be observed from Appendix 3. Tanzania average export to Soviet Union was only 7.2% while export to Britain and United States were 24.5% and 13.2% respectively. It may therefore be concluded that Tanzania traded more with the western bloc countries than it traded with the Soviet Union. Nyerere argued that the relations between the two countries was not determined by ideology but by special interests. True, Tanzania was a socialist state but this had to be understood in terms of Tanzania's objective of nation building.³⁴ This factor may explain the fact that most of her military trade was with the eastern bloc countries while most of her economic trade was with the western bloc countries. The national interest dictated this trend.

Having examined Tanzania - Kenya - Soviet relations it would be of interest to examine Tanzania - Kenya relations with another eastern bloc country, China. Kenya's relations with China had been estranged due to the fact that China provided arms to Somalia. Between 1978 and 1982 China provided Somalia with military aid worth \$ 70 million. During the same period it provided Tanzania with military aid worth \$ 30 million.³⁵ It may be emphasized that this was the period that war between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden had just ended. As noted earlier

Somalia had also claimed the NFD in Kenya. Kenya was greatly alarmed by the this war. President Kenyatta stated that, Somalia should renounce her claims on the territory in north eastern Kenya. President Kenyatta also added that it had been hoped that the Arusha agreement of 1967 would have paved way for mutual cooperation. But Somalia maps still lay claim on the Kenyan territory.³⁶ As a result of this alarm Kenya went ahead to support Ethiopia both diplomatically and materially.³⁷ It can be argued that since China gave arms to Somalia, Kenya linked the Chinese with Somalia claims in the Kenya territory.

Incidentally the Chinese premier, Chou - En - Lai's statement in Mogadishu in February 1964 that revolutionary prospects were excellent throughout Africa³⁸ was not taken kindly by the conservatives government in Kenya. Nzomo argues that quite apart from the Kenya's differences with Somalia, they (Kenya) considered the 'revolution' to have been accomplished in Kenya and did not want to hear anyone suggest otherwise. Consequently, Chou - En - Lais intended visit to Kenya was quietly postponed. Furthermore when Chou-En-Lai was on a state visit to Tanzania, he made a similar statement to the one he had earlier made in Somalia that: "An exceedingly favourable situation for revolution prevails in Africa."³⁹ This time the Kenyan government responded to make its position clear by saying that:

"The Kenyan government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside"⁴⁰

It may further be emphasized that the dislike for the Chinese revolutionary calls coupled with suspicion that the Chinese along with the Russians were assisting the radical group in Kenya in its attempts to overthrow the government contributed to strained relations between Kenya and China during much of the sixties. It was argued that the relation with the Chinese like the Russians was not going to benefit Kenya. This was because China was not one of the principle sources of economic aid (Appendix 8 and Appendix 9). Appendix 4 also shows that Kenyans imports from china were generally low compared to imports from USA, Britain, France, and even West Germany. The percentage ranges from 0.22% in most cases to 2.64 in 1970. In 1982 there was an isolated all time high percentage import of 16.6% a result of the improved relations between Kenya and China. This followed a high level delegation to China led by Kenya's President Moi. A similar trend existed for Kenya's exports to China as shown in Appendix 5. The percentage of exports to USA ranged from 0.42% in 1970 to 87.3% in 1971, the exports to Britain ranged from 5.1% in 1971 to 46.1% in 1980 and to West Germany the exports ranged from 5.1% in 1971 to 44.9% in 1977. These figures as observed were much higher than Kenya's export to China which ranged from nil in 1969 to 1.8 in 1966.

As observed earlier, 1969 marked the end of the struggle between the so called radicals and the conservatives in Kenya it was noted that the radicals lost in the struggle. From then onwards the Kenya government discouraged close relations, economic, political or cultural links with the eastern bloc countries in general and with China and the Soviet Union in particular.

As the Kenyan economy was dominated by western capitalist states, it is hardly surprising that relations between Kenya and the eastern bloc countries were mainly characterized by conflicts rather than by cooperation. The cold war politics during this period was a determining factor on each country's move and Kenya was no exception.

Under such circumstances Kenya -China relations deteriorated very rapidly. A number of incidences that followed go along way to prove this. For example, some Chinese nationals in Kenya were expelled on the grounds that they were interfering in Kenya's internal affairs. Chinese reaction to Kenya's accusations and expulsion of its nationals was not conciliatory either. Their first reaction came, when Kenya decided to expel the Chinese Charge d' Affairs in June 1966. It was alleged that the Chinese Embassy had made unwanted attacks on the Kenyan government and other foreign countries which had diplomatic relations with Kenya.⁴¹

Radio Peking, referring to the expulsion of the Charge d' Affairs said that it was a dangerous step taken by the Kenyan government. It accused Kenya of wilfully sabotaging relations between China and Kenya by distorting the truth. The Chinese subsequently expelled the Kenyan Charge d' Affairs while the Kenyan embassy was attacked by a mob. Kenya reacted by making protests to the Chinese Embassy by asserting that:

The Kenyan government wishes to tell the Chinese Embassy that it is not in part of its functions to indulge in blatant lies and trickery in order to provoke a breach of relations between the two countries... If this state of affairs continues the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China will be held accountable for the serious consequences that may follow.⁴²

However no serious consequences followed as diplomatic relations were not broken until 1967 when Kenya felt she could not stand the Chinese activities any more. It may be argued that this was not necessary given the fact that Kenya had achieved her objective which was to control the activities of the Chinese where she felt her interest was at stake. Furthermore, it may be noticed that Kenya - Chinese relations remained in "Limbo" and were not revived until Mao's death in 1976. For these eleven years, Kenya and China had no diplomatic relations and both embassies remained closed. As observed earlier, the two countries relations were made worse due to the fact that China was equipping Somalia with arms during the Somalia - Ethiopian war of 1977/78. Speaking in the Kenyan National Assembly, One member of parliament stated that:

We have been told in various reports of ships that lie out of the port of Mogadishu. We have been told of assistance to armies of this neighbouring territory. We have read that there is even the suggestion of substantial financial assistance. How much of this is all directed at Kenya? I believe that this may well be the root of trouble.⁴³

It can be further observed that when Mao-Tse Tung died in 1976, Kenya, unlike other countries did not observe any mourning, instead, the press took the opportunity to criticize the Chinese model of development.⁴⁴ The strained relationship that had been created by the two countries lasted until 1978 when the Embassies were re-opened. A number of factors led to this change, first, the death of Mao brought into power a leadership that was more pragmatic and less inclined to preach world revolution. Second, the United States and the Soviet Union had greatly increased contact and there was much cooperation between them as a result of the detente. This was particularly demonstrated by the admission of China to the United Nations. Finally, the significant re-opening of the Kenyan Embassy coincided with American's establishment of full diplomatic relations with China.⁴⁵

It may be argued that because of Kenya's pro-western stance and close links with United States, Kenya was most likely waiting for United States lead in forging friendly relations with the Chinese.⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that the official ideology of both China and Kenya did not change, yet their relations changed. This point proves that ideology was not the main issue bringing strained relations between the two countries. On the Contrary, it may be argued that different interests examined above were the main causes of conflict.

It may be argued that although China condemned the super-powers' involvement in the Middle East⁴⁷ and the Indian Ocean zone⁴⁸, she had done so only to further her own interests that is, to woo support from the third world countries. On the Arab-Israeli war for example, China regarded the Superpowers as manipulating the Middle east countries with a view to control them. This point can be supported by the fact that when the Soviet Union was expelled from Egypt and Ethiopia the Chinese government commented that the third world countries were beginning to realize that they were masters of their own fate.⁴⁹

Owing to the fact that Kenya had always been suspicious of Somalia moves, she had granted United States to build naval facilities in Mombasa on the Kenyan coastal regions. This was deemed appropriate especially with the Chinese presence in Somalia and later on, the Russian presence in both Somalia and Ethiopia. Kenya believed that aid got from these countries greatly enhanced Somalia's claim of the N F D. But as it had been noted earlier, pragmatism seems

to explain the changed relations between China and Kenya in the late 1970s. Furthermore, during this period a new President, Daniel Moi emerged in Kenya. The Kenyan government must have noticed the increasing reapproachment in Sino-American relations and continued Sino-Soviet Conflict. Considering the fact that Kenya's alignment tends to a pattern similar to that of United States and its dependence on external economic assistance, Cooperation with China was seen to be economically viable at this stage.

Following the reopening of the Embassies there has been two Presidential visits to China. Chinese vice-president Premier Ji-Pergfeu also visited Kenya in 1980. Thereafter China cancelled \$58.6 million debt that Kenya had owed since 1964. China also gave Kenya \$11 million to enable her to build a sports complex in Nairobi. Part of the money was also used to improve cotton and rice production within the country.⁵⁰ In conclusion, we can say that there has been a remarkable improvement in the two countries relations.

As for Tanzania her relations with China developed from 1964 onwards. In that year, China signed a military assistance agreement which was later followed by other forms of aid. The most Significant form of aid was the TANZAM railway loan the Chinese gave the Tanzanians. In 1965 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. This agreement between Tanzania and China had been interpreted to mean that a partial informal alliance⁵¹ existed between the two countries. However, Nyerere made it clear that Tanzania's relations with China was solely for economic and social betterment of the peoples. He stressed that if

Tanzania had to practice a policy of non-alignment, she had to make friends with the eastern bloc countries too.⁵² Although Tanzania seemed genuine in committing herself to the principles of non-alignment and therefore restricting Chinese influence in Tanzania's foreign policy, it is doubtful whether in practice this was the case. But up to the end of 1960s, there was no evidence that the Chinese aid had influenced Tanzania foreign policy.

It may be argued that the coincidence of interest shrouded any influence that may have occurred. Sensing that this relationship might bring this danger, Tanzania publicly announced that no more economic aid would be received from China until the completion of TANZAM Railway. During the 1970s however, there was clear evidence that Tanzania was close to China. By 1970s for example, China had replaced Britain as a major source of imports (Appendix 2) it may be observed that in 1971 her import from Britain was only 0.31% while her imports from China was worth 2.57%. In 1972 for example her imports from Britain was worth 4.24% while her imports from China was worth 45.69%. This went on until 1974 when imports from China began to decrease. This as we noted earlier was as a result of Tanzania's announcement that no more aid would be received from China until the completion of the TANZAM railway. China had also replaced other western countries as a major source of military assistance.⁵³ China had become second only to the World bank as a major source of economic aid.⁵⁴

Politically there were regular visits of high ranking officials to both countries. In 1978 for example, the then Tanzanian Prime Minister Edward Sokoine visited

Peking. In return the Chinese Vice-Premier Li-Hsien-Nieu also visited Tanzania in 1979. In April 1980, Chinese foreign minister called on Tanzania's President on his way to Zimbabwe's independence celebration. The close relations between Tanzania and China, were clearly demonstrated between the former response to Mao-Tse-Tung's death. Besides Nyerere's message of condolence, students and staff of Dar-Es-Salaam University cancelled all examinations and classes. They also marched to the home of the Chinese ambassador to mark respect for Mao.⁵⁵ Kenya's response was very different as we had shown earlier.

It may be concluded that Tanzania friendship with China continued because the Tanzanian leadership felt that Chinese development policies' (model) suited Tanzania's situation.⁵⁶ Nyerere clearly demonstrated that in areas where they disagreed with China, Tanzania would always take a position deemed to be in step with Tanzania foreign policy. An example which can be cited here is on the liberation of Angola. In the Angolan war of independence, China had supported the National Liberation Front FNLA while Tanzania supported the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A). But overall, Tanzania's leadership viewed China as a developing nation that shared some of Tanzania's goals and aspirations as are evidenced in other examples that follow.

Tanzania like China always viewed the USA and the USSR intentions in the Indian Ocean zone with Suspicion. Both have denounced imperialism and other forms of domination. The USA and Soviet's presence in this region was viewed as interference in the affairs of these coastal countries. In any case China unlike the

superpowers was viewed by Tanzania as a country which maintained her reputation for non-interference in domestic affairs of Africa. Its presence in the Indian ocean zone was therefore viewed as a counter balancing power between that of the USA and the Soviet Union.⁵⁷

On the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, Tanzania, expressed great concern over the move when it became obvious that Britain was not going to do much to subdue the white independence. As observed earlier, Tanzania was one of the African countries who broke diplomatic relations with Britain to express her disappointment.⁵⁸ China on the hand expressed shock and outrage on the above.

China had always stressed her support of liberation movements. Smith's Unilateral declaration of Independence was viewed contrary to China's principles. Chau-En-Lai speaking in 1964 Commented that:

China is a Country which has been liberated from colonial shackles of imperialism. We naturally sympathize with and support the peoples of Asia, Africa with and Latin America since we share the same experience. Furthermore since we China, has already won its own victory, it has the obligation to support those states which have not yet achieved victory.⁵⁹

It is in the above light that china looked at the liberation movements and the struggle for independence of southern Africa. The unilateral declaration of independence by Smith was therefore unacceptable.

4.3 Soviet And Chinese Influence On Kenya-Tanzania Relations

From the foregoing analysis, we have attempted to analyze how Kenya and Tanzania viewed both the Soviet Union and China. It has been observed that Kenya's relations with the Soviet Union since independence can hardly be described as close. It has been further demonstrated that Kenya's relations with China up to 1978 could only be described as hostile. It can be observed that after Mao's death there was an improvement of relations between Kenya and China. Although Tanzania was viewed to be close to the Soviet Union, from the analysis it had been shown that this was not the case. It may be argued that the belief that communism had penetrated Tanzania was only an interpretation of the west. Kenya unfortunately fell victim to this propaganda. This view greatly influenced her relations with Tanzania. Although close relation had existed between Tanzania and China, it may be argued that the relations were based on the principle of sovereign equality. This factor can be proved by the fact there was no evidence to show that China had influenced Tanzania's foreign policy in any way.

Given that the conservative government in Kenya viewed communism as a threat to their position, and given that the Kenyan ruling class interpreted Tanzania's close links with China to mean communist penetration, the relations between the two countries became hostile particularly when Tanzania proclaimed the Arusha Declaration. It has been shown that the Soviet communist penetration into Tanzania was only a western propaganda.

However, to the Kenyan government this penetration was real. The government saw this penetration as a threat to their national interest particularly her capitalist oriented economy.

4.4 Kenya - Tanzania Economic, Political and Military Relations with the West.

Generally, Kenya has had cordial economic relations with the western bloc countries than the east as the following illustrations show. It would seem that the capitalist-mode of development and the leadership's colonial mentality influenced Kenya's economic policies which were mainly pro-capitalist and anti-socialist in their orientation.

Between 1964 and 1979 Kenya was the second largest British aid recipient after India. It received \$180 million, much of which was used to finance land transfer for buying out British owned firms in the country.⁶⁰ It can be argued that the close ties between Kenya and Britain do not only lie on historical, social and cultural relations but are firmly rooted in the educational fields, investments and commercial enterprises. These relations were never broken by the Kenyatta regime. Moi's regime continued in the same line. Indeed, by 1970s Britain continued to be Kenya's leading trading partner and a source of foreign and capital investment both in public and private sectors. From 1982 to 1988 Britain provided £200 million to Kenya at an average of £35 million annually in capital aid and technical assistance.⁶¹ In 1986 Britain provided £33.8 million to Kenya under the aid programme.⁶²

When president Moi visited Britain in the same year, he signed a £50 million grant. This was Britain's largest ever support to an African country. Kenya was also one of the major beneficiaries of Britain's 1978 waiver of debts of the twenty-two underdeveloped countries. Kenya's official debt to Britain was only rivalled by India's £600 million and Pakistan's-£110 million. This was reduced by £75 million.⁶³

Tanzania's relations with Britain on the other hand was not as close as Kenya was to Britain. The relations between the two countries had been strained in the mid 1960's over two issues. First, was the conflict over the unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I) and then Tanzania's refusal to pay pension to British workers in Tanzania whom most of them had left Tanzania for Britain after Tanzania's independence. While Tanzania and many African countries protested against the declaration of Rhodesia's independence by Smith, Kenya only reacted mildly by urging Britain to solve the problem amicably. It can be argued that Kenya did not show a clear stand on this issue. This is because of her close relations with Britain which she did not want to spoil.

Accordingly, when the then Britain prime minister announced his intention to resume arms sale to South Africa, Nyerere made it quite clear as he had done in 1961 that Tanzania would withdraw from the commonwealth rather than compromise on matters of principle.⁶⁴ "The British government however, went ahead with the decision to sell arms to South Africa. Tanzania reaction was that of anger. The Tanzanian government declared that the British decision was "a provocation against Africa. It further referred to the British as arrogant".⁶⁵

However, Nyerere did not take his country out of the commonwealth as he had threatened repeatedly. It may be argued that Nyerere seemed to have learnt a lesson from the failure of a similar threat over Rhodesia's U.D.I. Even though Tanzania had broken diplomatic relations with Britain over the issue, this did not help her achieve any tangible measures in terms of influencing British policy towards Rhodesia. It may also be argued that Nyerere seemed to have recognized the ineffectiveness of acting out of threats as a diplomatic tactic for influencing major decisions of more a powerful nation. However, unlike Tanzania who protested against the British government's intended resumption of selling arms to south Africa, Kenya only called British traditional "respect for the rule of law, democracy and fair play".⁶⁶

It was believed that South Africa was helping the Rhodesian government in perpetuating their claims for Independence. The arms bought from Britain were therefore used to facilitate this claim. This attitude was considered verified by British refusal to use military force against Rhodesia and the support extended to Britain by U.S.A. Kenya's remarks to Britain can be argued, avoided any criticisms or issues that would bring reprisals from Britain. It has already been mentioned that Tanzania refused to pay pension to British nationals who had firms in Tanzania. This was considered harmful to Tanzania national interest which was to denounce capitalist development. Kenya on the other hand did the exact opposite by accepting loans from Britain to buy out British firms. This move of course was going to have a negative effect on Kenya's future economy.

The point here is that, Kenya's extreme dependence on Britain had greatly reduced its capacity to make her own decisions independently. However, it can be argued that there was a marked improvement in Tanzania's relations with Britain during the 1970s. Perhaps Britain recognized the fact that Tanzania was growing as an important informal leader of the Front-line States (F.L.S.). In addition to that, Tanzania had always been the headquarters of the O.A.U. liberation committees. Tanzania had become a country with which Britain had to reckon with when attempting to negotiate settlements to Southern African issues. There was also the need to neutralize the Chinese presence in Tanzania. Whichever the reason, Britain was eager to restore normal economic relations with Tanzania. The British foreign secretary, at that time, Sir Alec Douglas Home visited Tanzania in 1974 and initiated negotiations over the resumption of aid terminated in the 1960s. The visit was closely followed by that of the then labour minister for Overseas Development, Judith Hart. It was during this visit that £11 million aid agreement with Britain was signed. A second agreement was signed in 1975 which included £2.5 million aid to Tanzania.⁶⁷

Nyerere also paid his first state visit to Britain in November 1975 marking the end of tensions and hostile relations. Despite the normalization of relations, Nyerere never ruled out a future recurrence of Anglo-Tanzania quarrels. It was not surprising that even before the end of 1970s there were differences between Tanzania and the United Kingdom. One of the issues which brought tension was Tanzania's takeover of Lonrho's⁶⁸ assets in 1978. Tanzania was accused by the corporation for not having paid adequate compensation.

There was also the conflict over the negotiation of Zimbabwe's independence. The British newspapers generally accused Nyerere of being an imperialist and a dictator even worse than Idi Amin of Uganda.⁶⁹ Nyerere however managed to overlook those hostile comments because of the importance he attached to the Zimbabwean independence. The former Ian Smith's security forces then under the control of the British appointed governor to Zimbabwe, Lord Soames killed seven of Robert Mugabe's patriotic Front guerrillas who had surrendered as per Lancaster House cease-fire agreement, Nyerere did not hide Tanzania's anger. Referring to the inhuman killing, Nyerere observed:

"The British cannot just look at their watches and say time (for reaching assembly points) is up anyway and kill people. This is murder. It is not in any way in accordance with London agreement"⁷⁰

Nyerere also went ahead to accuse the British government of rigging the Zimbabwe's election. When Mugabe's patriotic Front was declared the winner of the election, all Nyerere could say was "This is not the first time I have been wrong and I am happy to be wrong".⁷¹

From the above analysis it can be argued that Kenya was more closer to Britain than Tanzania both economically and politically. Kenya exported goods worth much more to Britain than Tanzania did especially from 1967 onwards (Appendix 9). (See also Appendix 6) It can be deduced from the figure that from 1964 to 1967 Tanzania's export to Britain was substantial.

This can be explained by the fact that, during these years, Tanzania had not yet completely implemented her socialist principles and thus was not regarded by Britain as an enemy of capitalism. The high imports (Appendix 7 and 9) from Britain by both Tanzania and Kenya only goes along way to explain the fact that Kenya and Tanzania acted as peripheral states in capitalist development with Britain as the center.

Bilateral military co-operation between Kenya and Britain in the 1970s remained close as it was in the 1960s. This was illustrated at the height of confrontation between Kenya and Tanzania in 1976 - 77 when Britain speeded up its arms supply to Kenya. The Royal Airforce continued to train the Kenya Airforce ever since independence. Britain also retained the right to send military troops to the north of Kenya for military exercises. Britain was also accorded military facilities in Mombasa.⁷² These facts not only show that the bilateral relations between the two countries remained not only strong, but they were also cordial.

As for Tanzania, arms aid programmes were seen to be used in forging a relationship with the front-line states in the fight against Rhodesia and South Africa.⁷³ It may be argued that because of this, Britain was not keen in giving Tanzania military aid. Furthermore, the radical call from Tanzania to third world countries to support violent revolutionary change and promotion of armed struggle were not well received by some of the independent African states including Kenya and the western countries like Britain. It had been seen earlier that, Britain wanted a peaceful transition from minority rule to the majority rule in Southern Africa.

Another reason why Tanzania did not receive much military aid from Britain was that, Tanzania felt that exclusive dependence on Britain was no longer acceptable. The mutiny which took place barely two weeks after Tanzania's independence was led by British trained troops. The British military assistant it was argued were unable to fully meet Tanzania needs.⁷⁴ President Nyerere was later to argue that both recipients of arms and their neighbours recognize the significance of military assistance and the fact that it effectively ties supplier nations to them⁷⁵ thus, Tanzania wanted to avoid this dependence on Britain by turning to other countries for military imports. China was such example. (This aspect was dealt with earlier in this chapter).

While the British committed themselves to provide aid to Kenya, in an effort to promote peaceful transition from direct colonial rule to independence, other donors also joined in this endeavour. The United States is one such example. She provided bulk aid to Kenya at independence and many years later. By sheer volume of their aid, the extent of their influence on Kenya's economic and political life cannot be underestimated. From 1966 to 1971 Kenya received £3,826 Million aid in grants.⁷⁶ By mid 1970s the United States' presence in Kenya became increasingly important in several spheres. Major US corporations had set up operations in Kenya. For example, IBM, Firestone and General Motors. There were also major US banks which were also operating in Kenya. It is well known that United States has had a powerful say in the world bank over the years and as many projects in Kenya were funded by the World Bank this was US influence continued even at the agency level.

One example of such penetration was in the production of tea. The world bank gave technical assistance, grants and donor personnel to operate the loan projects. Another US involvement through the World Bank was the livestock development projects and agriculture where the World Bank provided \$247,100.⁷⁷ The US also gave aid to other projects like small scale African business promotion, small scale industrial business and property ownership. American aid were also used to promote capitalist agriculture, industry and large and small scale land ownership.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the transnational firms that operated in Kenya had further assured the continuity of the close relations between Kenya government and the US.

It may be observed that there was also a very close military co-operation between Kenya and US. By 1980s US had become the major arms supplier to Kenya. Kenya also entered a series of security agreements with the US. These agreements were necessitated by Kenya's fears of US expanded military support to Somalia.⁷⁹ Other critics of Kenya's Foreign Policy also argue that Moscow's open criticism of Kenya's policies and the inevitable outgrowth of dependence on US increasingly drove Kenya to closer ties with the US foreign policy interest.⁸⁰ During the 1977/78 Ethiopian Somalia war, Somalia turned to western countries to seek military assistance. This was necessitated by the fact that Somalia expelled the Soviets for having supported Ethiopia in the war, thus, the US began to aid both Kenya and Somalia in return for her (US) having access to naval facilities in Kenya and Somalia⁸¹. However, although both Kenya and Somalia received military aid from the US, Kenya expressed her unhappiness. One Kenyan official commented

that, "You supply us with planes and the Somalia with equipment to shoot them down".⁸²

It may be argued that because of Kenya's close relations with America, she received an assurance that aid given to Somalia would not be used against her. The US Deputy Secretary of State for Africa assured Kenya that the US arms to Somalia would not be used against her neighbours.⁸³ The US also made it clear that the military aid would depend on Somalia denouncing its traditional claims to territory in Kenya and Ethiopia.⁸⁴ Thus it can be seen that Kenya was being favoured by the Americans as regards the above issues.

It should also be stated that Kenya was also dissatisfied with some Arab countries who were supportive of Somalia in her desire for unification. Two major reasons for this support stem from the fact that Somalia is both a Muslim state and a member of the Arab league. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan offered support in the event of Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. In 1977 when Kenya learnt that Saudi Arabia was providing arms to Somalia, the Kenyan Vice President (Now President) Moi visited Arabia to discuss the issue. It may be argued that Kenya's security concerns were extended to external actors supplying economic and military aid to Somalia. Hence Kenya's behaviour towards external actors was directed by the external actors behaviour towards Somalia. As for Tanzania, her relations with the United States could hardly be described as close especially in the political sphere. Unlike Kenya who had close relations with the United States right from independence period, Tanzania's antagonisms with the US started in mid 1960s

when Tanzania expelled US diplomats and peace corps for an alleged coup plot. The bilateral relations grew even worse in the 1970s due to other factors that will be demonstrated below.

Tanzania accused the United States of interfering in the internal affairs of smaller states especially in Vietnam and Korea. Another factor was that Tanzania campaigned for China's admission to the United Nations Organization. The fact that there was ideological differences between China and the US, the US did not want China to be admitted in the United Nations Organization while Tanzanian delegates even danced on the UN floor following China's admission to the UN in 1971. United States reaction was predictable. The US president Nixon, immediately lowered the level of American delegation to Tanzania's tenth independence anniversary celebrations the same year.⁸⁵

Relations between the two countries was made worse following a vote in the UN committee of 24 on decolonization related to Puerto Rico and South Korea. The conflict arose when the US which did not want these issues discussed attempted to exert political pressure on Tanzania. Tanzania however, went ahead and voted for immediate debate whether Puerto Rico was really an American colony. The United States immediately labelled Tanzania a "Police state"⁸⁶ and declared an attack on Tanzania. This attack was in form of reduction of US aid to Tanzania. Besides the above, Tanzania was not happy with the US role in supporting apartheid in South Africa. Kenya, as we had seen earlier had always shown mild responses to these issues or openly supported the US. A good

example of this can be cited when Kenya was on the side of the United States in boycotting the Moscow Olympics in 1980 to protest against the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. Apparently, Kenya never protested against the United States invasion of Vietnam.

It may be argued that America's and Kenya's anti-Communist leaders were becoming more fearful of the Soviets capacity to intervene in African affairs like they did in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The Kenyans leaders sought protection under the US security umbrella by expanding economic and military ties with the United States.

The Kenyan stand was in great contrast to Tanzania's stand. As shown above, Nyerere never had faith in the Americans and only made exception of President Carter's leadership whom he believed had a genuine concern on the liberation of Southern Africa.⁶⁷ During his tenure in office, Tanzania came closer to the United States and the US became one of the major sources of aid to Tanzania. (Appendix 6 and 8). Even though the relations improved, Tanzania did not share the same policy with the United States in boycotting the Moscow Olympics as a protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nyerere even refused to meet Mohammed Ali who had been sent by President Carter to seek African support for the proposed boycott, Tanzanian officials were later to argue that it was an insult for Carter to send a boxer to confer with their President.⁶⁸ Tanzania also abstained from the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia's intervention of Afghanistan.

West Germany has continued to occupy the second most important position after the United Kingdom as a source of bilateral foreign aid to Kenya. It continued since the 1960s to be one of the major importers of Kenyan coffee, Kenya's Chief foreign exchange earner. Kenya also ranked second after Nigeria as major African importer of western goods.⁸⁹ West Germany also ranked third among western countries that had invested in Kenya. It should be added that Kenya had not had any significant relations with East Germany. This attitude is consistent with its pro-western stand on international issues (some of which we have discussed earlier in this chapter) which were normally dictated by economic links with West Germany. Indeed, neither Kenya nor East Germany have yet established diplomatic representation in each other's capital.

On the other hand, Tanzania's relations with West Germany had been strained in the mid 1960s when she recognized East Germany. West Germany had declared the Hallstein Doctrine which branded any country which recognized East Germany as an enemy of West Germany. West Germany went ahead further to close down her consulate in Tanzania. Diplomatic relations were not fully normalized until 1972. With the withdrawal of the Hallstein doctrine, relations with West Germany greatly improved and West Germany became one of the major trading partners as well as a significant source of aid. By 1979 Tanzania had become the second largest recipient of West Germany's assistance.⁹⁰ However, Tanzania did not hesitate to denounce West Germany's nuclear co-operation with South Africa. Instead East Germany was praised for its active support of the African countries.

4.5 SUMMARY

Tanzania's major confrontations in the 1970s were concentrated on the United Kingdom, primarily over the liberation of Southern Africa. But as had been observed earlier, the broken fences were generally mended and most threats of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain were never carried out. Although there were relatively less condemnation of the west as a bloc, Nyerere on different occasions, set his reasons for feeling less threatened by the Soviet bloc than the west.⁹¹ He argued that western governments for their part, tended to tie political strings, to their bilateral aid. He gave the US review of its policy according to each country's stand on Afghanistan or the Olympic boycott examples. In other words, the US considered her national interest first before giving aid to any country. It has been demonstrated that the western influence was mainly felt in Kenya as compared to Tanzania. Since the 1960s there has been no major conflict between Kenya and the major western bloc countries. Economically Kenya maintained close relations with the Western countries in comparison to Tanzania. It can therefore, be argued that Kenya has been closer to the western world than Tanzania. What effect then did these relations have on the Kenya-Tanzania relations?

Ideologically, the relations between the two East African countries and the external actors brought a rift between the two countries in the mid 1960s and especially in 1967 when Tanzania proclaimed the Arusha Declaration. Tanzania's perceived close relations with the Soviet Union made the relations worse, as the Kenyan authorities developed a feeling of mistrust on Tanzania's intentions.

As had been mentioned earlier China was providing arms to Somalia. It was therefore, believed that these arms were used to attack Kenya because of the border dispute. True, there was no border conflict between Kenya and Tanzania but ideologically the Kenyan authorities felt that socialism would infiltrate into Kenya and cause insecurity to those in authority. This may explain the war of words between the two countries especially after the Arusha Declaration. Kenyan authorities feared that Tanzanian authorities would support the radicals in Kenya. Kenya therefore, embarked on denouncing Tanzania's relations with China and criticized Tanzania's decision to adopt socialism as her working ideology. It should be emphasized however, that although this conflict seemed to be based on ideology the underlying factor was the conflict of national interest of both the two countries. The Kenyan ruling elite felt that their hold on political power was at stake.

Economically, the Kenyan ruling class derived their support mainly from the west. They were therefore opposed to the support (real or imagined) the eastern bloc countries extended to Tanzania. According to the Kenyan ruling elite, if Tanzania was successful in her economic development, the radicals would have a genuine reason for opposing the government.

It was believed that Tanzania's success would have been a living example of what socialism can do. It may be argued that it was with great relief that the Kenyan authorities viewed the Tanzanian unsuccessful attempt to improve her economy.⁹² The cold war politics during this period (1960s to 1970s) made things

worse. Kenya for example identified herself more with the western countries, she therefore looked at Tanzania through the same lens. As it was believed by the Kenyan government that Tanzania was close to eastern bloc countries, she could only be regarded as enemy. However, during the 1980s there was marked improvement between these two countries as a result of detente.

Furthermore, with Mao's death the Chinese leadership stressed world revolution less and less. It was earlier believed by the Kenyan government that through the Chinese and soviet union's encouragement, Tanzania was keen in spreading revolutions and influencing other African countries to adopt socialism. With this minimized, Kenya no longer viewed Tanzania as a threat. Another factor which may have influenced Tanzania -Kenya relations was the Kenyan recognition of changed circumstances in China. This factor can be supported by the fact that during the 1980s there has been marked improvement in the relations between these two countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the purpose of this study, we shall only consider Britain, United States, West and East Germany, Soviet Union and China as the main external influences of both Kenya and Tanzania. This is not to say that other developed countries which have relations with both Kenya and Tanzania are insignificant.

2. It may be stated here that early post independence period of the two countries coincided with the heights of cold war politics. The western bloc countries managed to persuade the Kenyan politicians that there was something inherently wrong about communism. This was conceived to be a threat by those who feared communism takeover of the incumbent government. It is in this context that Oginga Odinga who openly associated with the soviets and Chinese was viewed as an agent of "evil" and a threat to many politicians. See Atwood, William. The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965, pp. 237-270. Odinga, Oginga. Not Yet Uhuru. London: Heinemann Publishers, 1969, p.48-69.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The objective of this study was to investigate the political and economic factors which affected Kenya - Tanzania relations from 1964 to 1988. The study was therefore undertaken with a view to examining and understanding these political and economic factors that influence inter-state relations. It was hoped that these findings would provide recommendations that would lead to strengthening of relations between Kenya and Tanzania.

The problem we undertook to examine was to explain why the relations between these two countries had been erratic over the given years. It was observed that between 1964-1967 these countries showed interest in working together as a federation. After 1967, it was observed that these cordial relations changed to rather hostile ones which reached their climax in 1978. It was also observed that since 1982, the two countries again exhibited cordial relations and were ready to cooperate once again in specified fields.

In the hypotheses, we raised some assumptions which were likely to have brought these kind of relations. Hypothesis one stated that real or perceived divergence in ideologies of the national leaders lead to conflicts. In the study it was demonstrated that the ideologies the two countries chose to follow after 1967 were different. However, it was shown that this was not the cause of the conflict between the two countries.

On the contrary it was shown that it was the contrasting personalities of the leaders that brought the conflict. Having been bred under different socio-cultural background and having achieved different levels of education, the two leaders president Kenyatta and Nyerere impressed on their governments different interest. It was shown that these interests (national) were often conflicting as a gain for one country meant the loss for the other. These interests as we have demonstrated were often disguised in ideologies which were conflicting.

In the second and third hypotheses we stated that different levels of economic development and membership in the community where one country realized greater benefits than others was likely to bring conflicts. In Chapter three we demonstrated that Kenya was economically stronger than Tanzania. And because of her better position, she had a better chance than Tanzania to sell her manufactured goods to other countries including Tanzania. Kenya therefore accrued more economic benefits from trade and services from the East African Community. It has been shown that this brought conflict which later led to the break-up of the East African Community.

In the fourth and final hypothesis it was stated that identification with the developed and industrialized countries by the two states which were ideologically hostile to each other brought about conflicts. In the study however, it was demonstrated that the two countries especially Tanzania had never closely identified with the U.S.S.R. and China because of ideology but because of the interests the ruling elites shared. As for Kenya - western relations, it was

demonstrated that given the fact that the ruling class could only fulfill their interests by being close to the western camp, they were therefore forced by circumstances to identify with the west. It was also demonstrated here that ideology did not play a major role in choosing friendly countries. For example, it was shown that in recent times Kenya had greatly identified herself with the Chinese government in order to accrue some economic benefits from the relations.

It was also illustrated that although Tanzania differed with Britain and U S A, the differences were not ideological but rather political in nature. For example the two countries differed in the forms of independence in Zimbabwe and on the South African question. It was also clear from tables (6,7,8 and 9) that both countries, Kenya and Tanzania traded more with the western bloc countries that is, USA, France, Britain and West Germany than they did with the eastern bloc countries that is, USSR, E. Germany and China in general. The only striking difference was that Kenya imported more from the Western bloc countries than did Tanzania. This trend can be seen to have persisted even at the height of hostility between the two East African countries, e.g. in 1967 to 1969. The average Tanzania's import from western bloc countries was 32.21% compared with 29.22% from the eastern bloc countries during the same period. The same argument can be advanced for the years 1976 to 1978 at the height of hostility created by the imbalance of the trade in the East African Community. Tanzania's imports still averaged of 88.22% from the western bloc countries as compared to 9.14% from the eastern bloc countries. It may be emphasized here that the same trend can be seen on exports too.

The data also showed that trade balance favoured the developed countries rather than the two East African countries. This is the normal trend of capitalist development where the more industrialized countries benefit more than the less developed. In Kenya-Tanzania situation Kenya was the more developed as such Tanzania acted as a satellite state. For the above reasons Kenya saw it logical to do more business with the western countries than they did with the Eastern countries. When it was of great importance that benefits could be got from the eastern bloc Kenya had reason to turn to the east and her relations with China today is a good example. It was also demonstrated in this study that there has been closer cooperation between USSR, China and USA in recent times. As it was demonstrated that Kenya always waited for a lead from the USA. There was no longer any need to be mean to China or the USSR. Tanzania, the champion of revolutions in East Africa according to the Kenyan elites stressed this less and less. According to the elites there was no encouragement from China as a result of Mao's death. Kenya therefore saw no need of being hostile to China and Tanzania, the Chinese agent for revolutions.

On the basis of the theoretical approach used in this study, it was argued that it was difficult for the two countries to have good relations if either of them had cause to believe that the other was encroaching on some aspects, political and economic that the other considered to be of vital importance. National interest was therefore operationalized to be any aspect that the ruling class defined as important for the nation. We showed that interests sometimes conflicted, however what emerged from these conflicting interests became the national interests.

We identified some of these interests as trade benefits, benefits accruing from the East African Community, Opposition from other groups within the countries helped by either of the developed countries, and personal interests of the ruling class. All these formed part of the national interest. With the national interest serving as our framework it was possible to identify the sources of conflict which brought about the hostile relations between the two countries. The findings were as follows:

1. Between 1964 - 1966 Kenya and Tanzania had friendly relations because they believed that having been colonies of one master, Britain, their future was destined together. They would therefore solve their problems especially economic ones together. They were ready for example to continue with the East African Community which was started by the colonial government.
2. That from 1967 - 1978 the contrasting interests of the national leaders gave birth to contrasting national interests. Kenya opted to continue her development on the capitalist line while Tanzania followed her brand of African Socialism. In the East African Community for example Kenya increasingly opposed any attempt to 'carry' the poorer nations while Tanzania on the other hand claimed that Kenya was benefitting at the expense of the Tanzanian economy.
3. That from 1979 - 1988 the hostile relations changed to a rather friendly one because first, the big powers were emphasizing less and less the cold war politics. Their allies had to do the same. Secondly, the new leadership was

ready to forge friendly relations. It was realized that the two countries had common problems which could only be solved on a common basis. The border trade, rustling and Tourism for example, could only prosper if the two countries worked in a peaceful atmosphere.

4. That although Tanzania was believed to have aligned itself with eastern bloc countries this was not the case. On the other hand it was demonstrated that during the period 1964 to 1988 Kenya had closely identified itself with the western bloc countries. Kenya was only a victim of western propaganda when they treated Tanzania as an enemy.
5. That ideology per se was not the cause of the conflicts between the two countries. It was demonstrated that ideology was used only to camouflage the national interests of these countries. It was shown for example that neither the two East African countries nor the industrialized countries officially changed their official ideology but there was closer relations between them in the 1980s.

5.1 CONCLUSION

In the justification of this work, it was hoped that the study would make certain contribution with respect to the discipline of International relations. The study was expected to contribute to factors which affect relations between two countries of more or less equal levels of economic development, particularly so if they are neighbouring states.

Secondly and from a more specific perspective the study was also expected to contribute towards an understanding of Kenya - Tanzania relations. Since efforts had been made to develop a theory of International behaviour of states in pursuing what they consider as a vital national interest and analysing the methods used in pursuing it. We contended that it was the interests and methods employed by these two countries which brought about conflicts at certain times.

5.1.1 What can be done

In any type of cooperation that involves sovereign states, the question of parity, is bound to assume great importance. This was the case with EAC where the uneven distribution of benefits was a source of constant irritation to Tanzania. However, leaders and people must be made to realize that integration cannot benefit all participants equally. Benefits must be relative. Therefore, moderation and self-sacrifice on the part of the more developed country is essential. If Kenya for example, had agreed to some of the institutional changes that were suggested in the agreements and treaties, the EAC may not have collapsed.

Secondly, leaders and people must have political will and cooperative attitudes. They must, for example think East African and not Kenyan or Tanzanian as concerns regional institutions. They should constantly be taught and reminded that whenever they used corporation facilities, they used service which were cheaply and efficiently provided by the joint cooperative efforts of the states. With respect to the development of a method of analysing whether the pursuit of

country's national interest caused frictions with her neighbour, it was indicated in Chapter One that the method of analysis would be mainly descriptive mostly relying on public documents, a method which has been employed by many scholars of international relations. This method is justified in this study in view of the fact that decision makers are seldom willing to be interviewed and the international conduct is seldom open to direct observation. If the method is accepted then it can be claimed that our study has contributed towards the development of a method for analysing countries relations. Historical documents provide an unobtrusive measure of policy makers beliefs and perceptions when they are not being observed and therefore they have less reason to manipulate their language.

5.1.2 Recommendations to Kenya - Tanzania policy makers

The policy makers may note that according to the findings of this study, belief in different ideologies may not contribute to conflicts although it may sometimes be used to diverge attention to the real sources of conflict. As for Kenya - Tanzania relations the real sources of conflict emanated from personality difference of the leadership and their interests, the imbalance of trade and the identification with countries deemed enemies of either's interests. However, our findings were that some of these identifications were just a perception by either countries (Kenya and Tanzania). They were not necessarily true. The policy-makers may care to note that it is very easy for the leadership to turn their personal interests into national interests and this may often bring conflicts. It is therefore recommended that policy-makers see that what is considered as national interest must be objective and of

benefit to the whole nation. It is not possible that in a Community like East African Community all members gain equally, but policy-makers may care to note that each country should gain according to the input it has invested in the Community. Failure to appreciate this may bring conflicts.

In the case of Kenya, the policy-makers may be advised to alter some of the country's policies which may have made it possible for her to move away from the apparent alignment with the west. She has also to change some of the views held about the east. The pursuit of a more pro-East¹ policy as she has already started may be desirable so as to bring some balance in her relations with the two blocs. This in turn may wipe some ill-feelings that Kenya had about Tanzania. For example Tanzania was looked at as a revolutionary government helping dissidents to overthrow the government of Kenya.

As concerns development Kenya and Tanzania may have to re-examine their relations if they have to succeed in their developmental goals. As we had noted in Chapter One, geographical and historical factors make them both trade partners. They have to depend on each other in many areas of development. The above can only be realized if the two countries agree to co-operate.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Soviet Union no longer exists instead it is now called the Commonwealth of Independent States of Russia (CIS).

2. The percentages in Appendixes 6,7,8 and 9 were compiled From United Nations Year-book On Trade Statistics. United Nations Publications 1964-1986.

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APPENDIX 1

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES: CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA

| Foreign Department | | 1966 | |
|--------------------|---|------|--------|
| 1 US \$ | = | KShs | 7.894 |
| 1 Pound | = | KShs | 13.423 |
| 1 Jap. Yen | = | KShs | 2.702 |
| 1 Franc. | = | KShs | 3.400 |
| | | 1975 | |
| 1 US \$ | = | KShs | 16.332 |
| 1 Pound | = | KShs | 23.179 |
| 1 Jap. Yen | = | KShs | 9.950 |
| 1 Franc. | = | KShs | 9.653 |
| | | 1986 | |
| 1 US \$ | = | KShs | 16.332 |
| 1 Pound | = | KShs | 23.179 |
| 1 Jap. Yen | = | KShs | 9.950 |
| 1 Franc. | = | KShs | 9.653 |

APPENDIX 2

TANZANIA'S IMPORT FROM COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM
1964 - 1981 (IN MILLION POUNDS) BY PERCENTAGE(Totals may not add up due to rounding)

| YEAR | USA (%) | BRITAIN (%) | EAST | | WEST | | USSR (%) | KENYA (%) | TOTAL |
|------|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------|
| | | | GERMANY (%) | GERMANY (%) | FRANCE (%) | CHINA (%) | | | |
| 1964 | 7.73 | 41.19 | 0.25 | 7.99 | 3.17 | 0.47 | 0.21 | 38.98 | 100.00 |
| 1965 | 7.14 | 40.96 | 0.30 | 10.46 | 3.55 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 36.87 | 100.00 |
| 1966 | 8.54 | 43.81 | 0.61 | 12.05 | 4.30 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 29.82 | 100.00 |
| 1967 | 11.61 | 44.08 | 0.47 | 9.91 | 5.82 | 0.45 | 0.24 | 27.42 | 100.00 |
| 1968 | 1.78 | 3.59 | 0.00 | 2.87 | 12.64 | 1.91 | 0.51 | 76.70 | 100.00 |
| 1969 | 0.40 | 0.94 | 0.69 | 0.52 | 2.47 | 83.22 | 0.18 | 11.58 | 100.00 |
| 1970 | 0.39 | 36.17 | 0.02 | 51.57 | 8.70 | 2.55 | 0.19 | 0.41 | 100.00 |
| 1971 | 0.31 | 5.32 | 0.03 | 77.77 | 11.38 | 2.57 | 2.07 | 0.53 | 100.00 |
| 1972 | 0.00 | 21.09 | 0.15 | 9.42 | 4.22 | 55.71 | 0.36 | 9.06 | 100.00 |
| 1973 | 4.24 | 21.55 | 0.90 | 11.25 | 4.37 | 45.69 | 0.40 | 11.59 | 100.00 |
| 1974 | 13.38 | 20.59 | | 16.36 | 5.20 | 32.62 | 1.12 | 10.73 | 100.00 |
| 1975 | 31.63 | 3.55 | | 19.53 | 3.76 | 23.31 | 2.23 | 15.99 | 100.00 |
| 1976 | 15.16 | 31.99 | 0.02 | 24.27 | 3.38 | 10.31 | 0.79 | 14.08 | 100.00 |
| 1977 | 0.33 | 55.46 | | 6.84 | 28.55 | 0.14 | 8.52 | 0.15 | 100.00 |
| 1978 | 0.05 | 80.46 | 0.00 | 12.65 | 5.20 | 0.05 | 1.59 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| 1979 | 0.28 | 51.82 | 0.01 | 7.17 | 31.54 | 0.21 | 8.90 | 0.07 | 100.00 |
| 1980 | 4.72 | 58.79 | 0.05 | 0.86 | 34.55 | 0.04 | 0.93 | 0.06 | 100.00 |
| 1981 | 5.62 | 48.89 | 0.27 | 30.72 | 10.41 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 3.44 | 100.00 |

Source: Table Compiled from United Nation Yearbook On International Trade Statistics. United Nations Publications, 1964 - 1981.

APPENDIX 3

TANZANIA'S EXPORT TO COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM
1964 - 1981 (IN MILLION POUNDS) BY PERCENTAGE(Totals may not add up due to rounding)

| YEAR | EAST | | WEST | | FRANCE (%) | CHINA (%) | USSR (%) | KENYA (%) | TOTAL |
|------|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------|
| | USA (%) | BRITAIN (%) | GERMANY (%) | GERMANY (%) | | | | | |
| 1964 | 1.07 | 29.89 | 0.00 | 28.86 | 5.71 | 11.66 | 1.64 | 21.16 | 100.00 |
| 1965 | 0.49 | 20.23 | 0.02 | 25.64 | 4.59 | 22.95 | 1.47 | 24.61 | 100.00 |
| 1966 | 2.56 | 29.02 | 2.10 | 26.42 | 2.74 | 16.05 | 2.67 | 18.44 | 100.00 |
| 1967 | 1.06 | 25.14 | 2.12 | 26.22 | 5.12 | 17.77 | 0.97 | 21.59 | 100.00 |
| 1968 | 0.01 | 4.02 | | 8.77 | 32.21 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 54.98 | 100.00 |
| 1969 | 0.16 | 2.68 | 3.70 | 15.71 | 15.71 | 0.00 | 2.25 | 59.78 | 100.00 |
| 1970 | 0.36 | 27.36 | 0.02 | 40.73 | 26.52 | 4.82 | 0.02 | 0.16 | 100.00 |
| 1971 | 0.46 | 39.89 | 0.05 | 5.89 | 43.98 | 9.37 | 0.03 | 0.33 | 100.00 |
| 1972 | 14.57 | 34.55 | 0.51 | 13.15 | 2.29 | 24.53 | 1.77 | 7.62 | 100.00 |
| 1973 | 16.40 | 36.88 | 3.98 | 13.22 | 2.40 | 14.65 | 3.53 | 8.95 | 100.00 |
| 1974 | 17.44 | 34.48 | 0.95 | 13.43 | 1.87 | 12.89 | 7.86 | 11.08 | 100.00 |
| 1975 | 14.37 | 30.09 | 1.10 | 20.57 | 1.58 | 16.32 | 6.03 | 9.94 | 100.00 |
| 1976 | 17.04 | 24.12 | 0.49 | 25.02 | 1.18 | 4.98 | 22.59 | 4.58 | 100.00 |
| 1977 | 7.09 | 28.68 | | 30.19 | 19.66 | 0.10 | 14.27 | 0.02 | 100.00 |
| 1978 | 0.34 | 44.62 | | 4.32 | 26.89 | 0.09 | 23.75 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| 1979 | 0.09 | 29.99 | | 30.19 | 19.65 | 0.01 | 20.07 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| 1980 | 50.32 | 0.09 | | 32.61 | | 0.01 | 16.96 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| 1981 | 9.55 | 40.08 | | 42.94 | 1.88 | 0.54 | 4.13 | 0.89 | 100.00 |

Source: Table Compiled from United Nation Yearbook On International Trade Statistics. United Nations Publications, 1964 - 1981.

APPENDIX 4

KENYA'S IMPORT FROM COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM
1964 - 1986 (IN MILLION POUNDS) BY PERCENTAGE (Totals may not add up due to rounding)

| YEAR | USA (%) | BRITAIN (%) | EAST GERMAN (%) | WEST GERMAN (%) | FRANCE (%) | CHINA (%) | USSR (%) | KENYA (%) | TOTAL |
|------|------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------|
| 1964 | 11.26 | 54.84 | 1.41 | 16.27 | 4.72 | 1.61 | 0.09 | 9.80 | 100.00 |
| 1965 | 17.56 | 51.92 | 0.29 | 12.68 | 5.13 | 1.97 | 0.92 | 9.54 | 100.00 |
| 1966 | 18.73 | 52.74 | 0.29 | 13.38 | 5.91 | 0.89 | 1.58 | 6.47 | 100.00 |
| 1967 | 58.98 | 26.51 | 0.13 | 8.02 | 2.92 | 0.63 | 0.27 | 2.54 | 100.00 |
| 1968 | 12.87 | 58.19 | 0.22 | 14.80 | 5.67 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 6.00 | 100.00 |
| 1969 | 4.61 | 63.44 | 0.24 | 16.72 | 6.78 | 0.44 | 0.77 | 7.02 | 100.00 |
| 1970 | 16.12 | 56.12 | 0.25 | 15.16 | 6.95 | 1.94 | 0.59 | 2.87 | 100.00 |
| 1971 | 44.05 | 3.65 | 0.05 | 4.79 | 46.60 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.52 | 100.00 |
| 1972 | 76.30 | 8.71 | 0.07 | 7.89 | 5.63 | 0.54 | 0.16 | 0.69 | 100.00 |
| 1973 | 81.66 | 4.68 | 0.10 | 8.97 | 3.19 | 0.80 | 0.03 | 0.58 | 100.00 |
| 1974 | 85.16 | 4.56 | 0.05 | 7.08 | 1.79 | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.54 | 100.00 |
| 1975 | 89.32 | 9.94 | | | | | | 0.74 | 100.00 |
| 1976 | 10.69 | 58.95 | | 18.51 | 4.89 | 1.38 | 1.59 | 3.99 | 100.00 |
| 1977 | 13.82 | 43.15 | | 26.23 | 11.93 | 2.64 | 1.71 | 0.52 | 100.00 |
| 1978 | 0.59 | 52.56 | | 31.90 | 11.21 | 1.85 | 1.18 | 0.08 | 100.00 |
| 1979 | 2.26 | 91.51 | | 4.46 | 1.14 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.02 | 100.00 |
| 1980 | 17.32 | 46.13 | | 31.54 | 2.72 | 2.04 | 0.24 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| 1981 | | | | | | | | | |
| 1982 | 15.38 | 38.38 | | 21.38 | 7.95 | 16.62 | 0.04 | 0.24 | 100.00 |
| 1983 | 19.39 | 41.48 | | 24.23 | 13.50 | 1.05 | 0.01 | 0.34 | 100.00 |
| 1984 | 21.22 | 6.62 | | 42.64 | 24.35 | 3.71 | 0.14 | 1.31 | 100.00 |
| 1985 | 17.43 | 42.95 | | 25.19 | 11.07 | 2.86 | 0.05 | 0.45 | 100.00 |
| 1986 | 11.07 | 35.35 | | 24.79 | 26.09 | 2.15 | 0.01 | 0.47 | 100.00 |

Source: Table Compiled from United Nation Yearbook On International Trade Statistics. United Nations Publications, 1964 - 1986.

APPENDIX 5


KENYA'S EXPORT TO COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM
1964 - 1986 (IN MILLION POUNDS) BY PERCENTAGE (Totals may not add up due to rounding)









| YEAR | USA (%) | BRITAIN (%) | EAST GERMAN (%) | WEST GERMAN (%) | FRANCE (%) | CHINA (%) | USSR (%) | KENYA (%) | TOTAL |
|------|------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------|
| 1964 | 10.17 | 21.48 | 0.07 | 15.49 | 1.93 | 0.84 | 50.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1965 | 5.67 | 21.76 | 0.03 | 15.83 | 1.61 | 1.35 | 53.25 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1966 | 10.38 | 24.15 | 0.05 | 15.92 | 1.48 | 1.83 | 45.47 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1967 | 7.35 | 39.48 | 0.00 | 15.17 | 1.70 | 0.16 | 36.03 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1968 | 14.77 | 25.24 | 0.00 | 17.07 | 3.68 | 0.03 | 38.55 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1969 | 3.84 | 7.10 | 0.00 | 32.16 | 2.84 | 0.00 | 52.65 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1970 | 0.42 | 18.53 | 0.03 | 8.51 | 0.69 | 2.25 | 11.18 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1971 | 87.32 | 2.31 | 0.03 | 5.14 | 0.42 | 0.48 | 4.11 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1972 | 86.20 | 3.26 | 0.01 | 5.81 | 0.93 | 0.56 | 3.14 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1973 | 79.50 | 5.81 | 0.00 | 9.36 | 1.80 | 0.59 | 2.95 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1974 | 25.81 | 18.43 | 0.00 | 41.78 | 4.26 | 0.49 | 7.62 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1975 | 14.56 | 28.23 | 0.00 | 33.55 | 2.40 | 1.96 | 18.97 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1976 | 13.47 | 32.55 | 0.00 | 44.93 | 3.18 | 1.47 | 3.63 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1977 | 10.85 | 35.80 | 0.00 | 36.78 | 3.74 | 1.32 | 9.76 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1978 | 10.96 | 38.87 | 0.00 | 42.02 | 3.42 | 1.26 | 2.13 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1979 | 17.31 | 46.09 | 0.00 | 31.51 | 2.72 | 0.25 | 0.09 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1980 | 18.87 | 38.76 | 0.00 | 32.64 | 3.22 | 2.68 | 3.67 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1981 | 16.90 | 41.60 | 0.00 | 35.44 | 0.82 | 1.71 | 2.71 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1982 | 12.64 | 46.81 | 0.00 | 31.91 | 3.64 | 1.27 | 3.17 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1983 | 15.99 | 40.11 | 0.00 | 27.65 | 8.04 | 1.83 | 5.67 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1984 | 20.77 | 34.63 | 0.00 | 33.04 | 3.42 | 0.58 | 6.60 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| 1985 | | | | | | | | | |
| 1986 | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Table Compiled from United Nation Yearbook On International Trade Statistics. United Nations Publications, 1964 - 1986.

APPENDIX 6


THE VALUE OF TANZANIA'S EXPORT TO THE COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM '64 TO '81 (in Million Pounds) BY PERCENTAGE



| | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
|  UNITED STATE |  BRITAIN |  E.GERMANY |  W.GERMANY |
|  FRANCE |  CHINA |  USSR |  KENYA |

SOURCE: COMPILED FROM U.N. YEAR BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS. 1964 - 1981.

THE VALUE OF TANZANIA'S IMPORT FROM THE COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM '64 TO '81 (in Million Pounds) BY PERCENTAGE




UNITED STATE
 BRITAIN
 E.GERMANY
 W.GERMANY

FRANCE
 CHINA
 USSR
 KENYA

SOURCE: COMPILED FROM U.N. YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS U.N. PUBLICATIONS - 1964 - 1981

APPENDIX 8


THE VALUE OF KENYA'S IMPORT FROM THE COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM '64 TO '86 (in Million Pounds) BY PERCENTAGE



SOURCE: COMPILED FROM UN YEAR BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS UN PUBLICATIONS - 1964 - 1986

THE VALUE OF KENYA'S EXPORT TO THE COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY FROM '64 TO '86 (in Million Pounds) BY PERCENTAGE

185



SOURCE: COMPILED FROM U.N. YEAR BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS U.N. PUBLICATIONS - 1964 - 1986