

**THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES: A CASE STUDY
OF SOMALIA,**

By

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor

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DEDICATION

This research project is warmly dedicated to my family who nurtured the drive and the discipline to tackle my academic tasks with great determination.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to my family for the support they extended to me during the time of carrying out this research. I also appreciate the valuable guidance I received from my supervisor MARTIN NGURU in conducting this research. Thanks and glory to Almighty God who gave me the strength and resources to finish this project.

ABSTRACT

Military intervention in failed states remains a contentious issue in Africa just like elsewhere. Chronic insecurity in Somalia caused by inter-clan conflicts diverts the attention of international and regional bodies from nation building to conflict management has been the main headache. The main issue of concern therefore is whether it was appropriate and needful for the Kenyan government to take such an action against Somalia, so as to protect those at risk within and in other surrounding sovereign states. In this regard, this study focused on the impact of military intervention in failed states focusing on Somalia. The study sought to achieve the objectives like: to analyze the causes, examine the consequences and identify the challenges faced in the military intervention in Somalia. Secondary data was collected from various books on humanitarian intervention, treaties, declarations besides different instruments on policy, journals, past papers of research, newspapers besides different articles on military intervention. The collection and analysis of this data was done under the guidelines of the objectives of the study. Information that was collected was first verified and then subjected to the theoretical analysis. The military intervention in Somalia by Kenya can be attributed to political causes, economic causes and social causes. Specifically, the causes identified include security threat, the need to safeguard territorial integrity, interests in oil exploration and the need to secure oil blocks (the oil question) of deepsea offshore between Kenya and Somalia, internal and domestic political dynamics as well as the economic interest of realization and securing the LAPSSET project. In regard to the consequences, findings indicated that there has been material and human damage in its very nature with civilian casualties of the intervention both in Somalia and in Kenya. The intervention has heightened Al Shabaab's attacks in Kenya in form of retaliatory attacks in addition to strengthening of AMISOM. It has also had negative implication on Kenya's financial stability and has furthered militancy in Kenya. However, Al Shabaab has lost major strongholds as a result of the intervention. Pertaining to the challenges, the success of AMISOM is partially dependent on whether centralized structures of government can demonstrate legitimacy among the Somali citizenry. The contingents in the military force are also yearly rotated and this has had implications on performance. There is also shortage of skilled and specialized police trainers in AMISOM and reckless police action in Kenya as far as the fight is concerned. In a nutshell, the study concluded that causes, consequences and challenges in the military intervention in failed states are complex and have long termed ramifications. Nonetheless, the impact will definitely cut across the political, social and economic aspects in any context. The study recommends that the Kenyan government should establish all inclusive national development policies and consider greater inclusion of the Somali government as well as regional and international stakeholders in efforts to stabilize Somalia. It should also develop effective security policies to secure border region. In addition, both Kenya and Somalia should deal with the oil interest within the international law legal framework.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIAI	al-Itihad al-Islami
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CVDF	Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
MYC	Muslim Youth Center
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NEP	North Eastern Province
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the Study

The world changed substantially after the fall of communism following which the dimension of national and international security took on more complex forms. In a broad sense, the literature to date has characterized a failed state as one that is ruled by political, social and economic chaos and citizens are denied basic public goods. ¹The “failed state” approach was well known in the early 1990s, in academic and policy discourses. ² The failed-state concept has been gaining popularity because it signifies a condition where the infrastructure of the state completely crumples to an alarming level.³ Though, there is no definite and clear meaning of this concept, the existing literature points out a certain consensus among existing definitions. The nations seen as to be in that group are either suffering from, or in the verge of severe instability.

Majority of the failed state are characterized by incapacity to do their daily responsibilities which include: guaranteeing peace and security to its citizens, good governance, efficient border control and a sustainable economy. In the view of Zartman, revolt, coup or protest is just a part of what a failed state is. Instead, it is a scenario whereby there is disregard of authority, law and there is political disorder and thus there is a need to reconstitute. ⁴ Non-actors take advantage of the political vacuum which is due to an aftermath of state failure. ⁵ The concept comprises of both the total collapse and the process by which the state completely fails to fulfill its obligations which is preceded by a piecemeal decline in its capacity. Rotberg emphasized that the falling and the incapacitation are primarily due to coherent preferences formulated by political leaders in duration of time. ⁶

¹ Krasner, S.D., & Pascual, C. (2005). The Danger of Failed States. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(4)

² Helman, G., & Ratner, S. (1992). Saving Failed States. *Foreign Policy*, 89, 3–20.

⁴ Zartman, I.W. (1995). *Introduction: Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

⁵ Lyons, T., & Samatar, A. (1995). *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*.

⁶ Rotberg, R.I. (2002). “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”. *Washington Quarterly*, 25(3), 85–96.

The present time introduction of “humanitarian intervention” feature has had a great impact on the international relations theory. Even the steadfast peace lovers who do not support foreign incursion rally behind said undertakings with the intimation of caution that the forces deployed are entirely interested with offering altruistic help.

Obviously, in this post-Cold War period, the superpowers of the world flex their militant strength to re-establish good governance, extirpate famine and guard vulnerability of communities. The ground of the intervention in ‘failed state’ is in the excuse that their political instability is also a threat to global security. As explained by Akpinarli, this tag has been taken up and built up by foreign forces, in a reasonable example to tackle the difficulties faced those countries. Thence, military intervention is justified and advocated for by these actors in order to protect against the supposed security lapse. Several studies identify the main threats which are seen to jeopardize the international security: spill-over wars, massive migrations, transnational organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resource curses, diseases, terrorism. Failed states have often been seen to act as a breeding place for international terrorist syndicates, such as Al Qaeda. The glaring absence of a stable governing authority leaves them in a vulnerable state where they may become transference points for illicit drugs and human trafficking.

Many believe that many use term ‘failed state’ as a basis for authorizing invasions including the military ones of authorize probable military and other invasions, that are often perceived as benefitting those who are doing the intervention. The realist paradigm is based on an anarchic international system, where states are the main actors and rational calculations are the tools which frame their vital interests. In addition, any state interactions will be a zero-sum game and the use of force will always be an option. Realism is also characterized by the respect of a state. As a result of numerous cases of interventions, this idea has been at loggerheads with the of idea of sovereign immunity in the name of protecting civilians from detriment. Hence the need to understand the impact of the military intervention in failed states. This study will contribute to this understanding by using a case study of Somalia.

1.1.1 American intervention in Somalia

After the Black Hawk Down episode the American security experts and policy makers tried in great lengths to avoid any direct involvement in Somalia attacks. In this altercation, it was

believed that the dead Somali militiamen exceeded 700 and more than 1000 were wounded. In the aftermath of the episode the American troops bore the blunt as 18 American servicemen were killed prompting President Bill Clinton to recall all the American forces from Somalia. American troops revenged the attack after killing Zachariah al-Tunisi in 2001 in Afghanistan who was accredited with being a leader of the Al Qaeda and actively participated in the shooting down of two helicopters. The attack had major impact in the American army and the country at large. American army has been cautious in Somali operations.

The State Department believes that the effervescent security status in Somalia and the approaching humanitarian crisis are the most detracting obstacles that America is undergoing. By facilitating the training of Somali troops in Djibouti on top of providing them with cash for weapons, the Obama administration has been strengthened the TFG. Starting from the year 2007 through 2013, the US assigned roughly \$512 million to support AMISOM, notwithstanding the assessed contributions for the UN logistics support package for AMISOM. It also assigned more than \$170 million to ensure that the Somali National Army combated the Somali militant group, Al-Shabab, more effectively. The United States has been supporting Somalia's constitutional efforts and processes in and Puntland and Somalia. The State Department promised efforts to actively involve the government and the local leaders in South Central Somalia.

The United States has been committed in stabilizing Somalia. Lately, the U.S. Department of State has placed bounties on the heads known leaders of the militia. It has offered of \$7 million for information leading to the locating of Al-Shabab founder Ahmed Abdi awMohamed; \$5 million each for his associates Fuad Mohamed Khalaf Ibrahim Haji Jama, Bashir Mohamoud Mohamed, and Robow Mukhtar; and \$3 million each for the additional Al-Shabab leaders Ismail Zakariya, Abdullahi Yare and Hersi Ahmed.⁷

⁷ US Department of State (2012). "Rewards for Justice – Al-Shabab Leaders Reward Offer." June 7. Office of the Spokesperson.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Military intervention in failed state is a bone of contention and Africa is not exempted in this case. The conflict arises from the following questions: In the matters of a sovereign state, who should interfere? What is the basis for these interventions? Has the applicability of the principle of non-interference in the new age of globalization where sovereignty has been disregarded and instead replaced by human rights? As Africa is still in the middle of post-Cold war military intervention, the continent yet is of dire need of military intervention. Military intervention is precipitated by the dire need for peace and stability in our continent. Conflicts in Africa can only be solved by states and regional bodies such as the United Nations and African Union. The military interventions raise the question of sovereignty of African states.

Chronic insecurity in Somalia caused by inter-clan conflicts diverts the attention of international and regional bodies from nation building to conflict problem solving has been the main headache. Conflicts that have taken place in Somalia contain elements of legal justification based on the massive violations of human rights before and after Operation *Linda Nchi* (protect the nation) by the Kenya Defence Forces. The main issue of concern therefore is whether it was appropriate and needful for the Kenyan government to take coercive action in particular militant action against Somalia, to safeguard the people at risk within and in other surrounding sovereign states. Further there are a number of arguments and criticisms that have emerged touching on international humanitarian intervention and the right to protect. One of the main concerns is the application of force by KDF through the famous Operation *Linda Nchi* strategy and questions have been raised as to whether humanitarian intervention legitimizes one state to use force on the other in the name of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, the argument touching on humanitarian intervention and the right to protect is whether it amounts to a right to save or to punish. In view of the aforesaid, this study focused on the impact of military intervention in failed states by focusing on Somalia.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 Broad Objectives

The broad objective for this study was to investigate the impact of military intervention in failed states.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study will specifically;

- (i) Analyze the causes of military intervention in Somalia
- (ii) Examine the ramifications of military intervention in Somalia
- (iii) Identify the challenges faced by the military in the intervention in Somalia

1.4 Justification of the Study

This study will address both policy and academic issues.

1.4.1 Policy Justification

This study will benefit the Kenyan government and other African governments by supplying useful observations in order to comprehend the impact of military interventions in failed states of extremism. The Kenyan government will understand the consequences of the KDF incursion into Somalia and compare the expectations at the taking off of the mission with the envisioned goals. The outcome should prompt the relevant stakeholders into developing a better policy framework in regards to military interventions in future. The results will also aid other interested parties like civil societies and activists in getting a better understanding of military action in failed states. Therefore, they will have more information in presenting their stand in the debates for military intervention consideration in a given situation

1.4.2 Academic Justification

This study will also benefit researchers and scholars who may desire to examine of the issue of military intervention in failed states further. To them, the study will serve as a reference work that can be useful in expanding the conclusions on the discussion.

1.5 Literature Review

This section addresses the empirical literature on the interventions by the military in failed states; the nature of military intervention as well as positive and negative impact of the military intervention

1.5.1 The conceptual and Empirical Literature on Military Intervention

Political science is the only literature that puts more emphasis on the institutional effects of interventions. Lately, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs gave an outstanding study on the literature and a summary of some of the highlights are presented in this study. A study with an interest on military interventions by the countries that have a democratic system contribute positively to democratic reform but that is only a short-term measure; in the long-term measure it spawns political insecurity.

A different group of the political scientists did a study with more focus specifically on the main reason of US interventions. Several studies link US interventions to their interests in military and economy but not in the democratization. Another group concurs and says although there are a few limitations to the US interventions, they have beneficial effect on democracy. Smith's work regarding Military intervention, studied the main aspects of the ever changing world to establish the validity of armed intervention. In Smith's argument, he has challenged armed intervention in the near past on account of various reasons: for example, the very real danger of intensification, which was agreeable in the nuclear age, the respect for sovereignty and international law as, put forward by the United Nations and Unfavorable domestic and world opinions in the steps of intervention. Chakrabati's study sought the investigation of the setback that intervention causes the framework of a present-day need for international control. In Chakrabati prior survey of the changing public perception towards intervention as an instrument of state policy and examined the forces already working in the changing traditional laissez-faire regime.

Schwarz examined involvement and conflict as both doctrine and practice in the past view but in the modern-day focus. He further sees this showdown as a means to exercise mutual prevention and a way of using less force and pursuing objectives peacefully. Intervention can be a tactic to lessen the armed coercion and also as a strategy to keep events in check of an actor working towards national goals. Duner stated that the constant element of the state system has been

military interventions despite the alterations in its foundation. He further argues that since the end of the Second World War, the increase in military intrusion has been on the rise and a number of analysts challenge the move of intervention frequently.

Talientino decide to investigate the importance of the change and views post-Cold War era in order to legalize the military action mainly as a means of maintaining the international security and what defines international system. Though intervention is frequently flaunted as a means of to re-establish failed states their success has not be seen. Every country is as sovereign, and also its borders recognized as sacred. However, the surfacing of the world problems and the non-stop interdependence of nations is now clear that a country's problem can adversely affect the other country. Connaughton took the opportunity put forth by the new international order to present an argument the possibility for military intervention, besides the collective security regime in the 1990s, to succeed.

Jackson came up with vital normative difficulties which come up when human beings worldwide organized their political relations and lives in regards to societal-independent states. The study scrutinizes the present day by recognizing the norms of sovereignty of a state and ethical in statecraft, in reference to the post-1945 and post-1989 periods. It is a presentation of an all-inclusive study of well-known international issues which are inclusive of peace, war, human rights intervention, security, boundaries, failed states and democracy. The relationship between interventionist debate and the humanitarian- failed state debate is important because of its significance to Africa. The best example can be Jackson's work of previous realist perspectives are added-on by the "normative turn" in the current writings on intervention.

A study by Krain, (2009) examined the efficiency of military intervention in further stopping or slowing killing throughout the period of genocide and politicized. This study will provide six hypotheses in regards to the possible effects on the harshness of genocide or politicide, by conducting a cross national longitudinal analysis of the genocides spurning from 1995-1997. The findings of the study reveal that the interventions that help the objective of the cruel policy or challenge cited the sole effective response was military action. The study revealed that impartial interventions are possibly inefficient in reducing the impact and interventions with the aim of challenging perpetrators are better for the victims of genocide or politicide.

Matlary investigated the position of a UN consent for military interventions which was precipitated by non-mandated interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. In this article it will scrutinize the realist and positivist approaches to the issue and suggests a third approach called the 'human rights model', whereby public legality mainly contributes. The article revealed both the political and legal evaluation are on the contrary in this question as by the basis built upon. Further the article will analyze how the interaction between military strength and the present global public discourse and it in conclusion it said that the legality is built on a case- by-case basis. Thereby, the being of the UN power no longer provides automatic legality. In reality, Kosovo decoct a partial effort to threaten a group further from killing one another.

Concerning military intervention, Smith examines the main points of the changing world dynamic to determine the suitability of armed intervention. The author argues about the usefulness of wide application of armed intervention in the past by pointing out some of the shortcomings of military intervention; for example, the ever present danger of escalation, which was acceptable during the nuclear age; respecting the international law and sovereignty of a nation, the lack of situations where the use of said tactics could enable a nation to realize its vital interests; as well as the unfavorable domestic and world opinions in the steps of intervention.⁸ Meanwhile, a study by Chakrabarti sought to explore the problem of intervention in the context of a contemporary demand for international control. In Chakrabati prior survey he investigated the changing public perception towards intervention as an instrument of state policy and examined the forces already working in the changing traditional laissez-faire regime.

Schwarz⁹ examined involvement and conflict as both doctrine and practice in the past view but in the modern-day focus. He further sees this showdown as a means to exercise mutual prevention and a way of using less force and pursuing objectives peacefully without resorting to war. Intervention can be a tactic to lessen the armed coercion and also as a strategy to keep events in check of an actor working towards national goals. Duner stated that the constant element of the state system has been military intervention despite the system being altered and restructured to its foundation. He further argues that since the end of the Second World War, the

⁸ Smith, R.W. (1974). *Military Intervention in a Changing World*. The National War College: Strategic Research Group.

⁹Schwarz, U. (1970). *Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World*. New York: Ocean Publications.

increase in military intrusion has been on the rise and a number of analysts challenge the move of intervention frequently.

Talentino¹⁰ decide to investigate the importance of the change and views post-Cold War era in order to legalize the military action mainly as a means of maintaining the international security and what defines international system. Though intervention is frequently flaunted as a means to re-establish failed states their success has not be seen. Lyons and Mastanduno¹¹viewed every country is as sovereign, and also its borders recognized as sacred. However, the surfacing of the world problems and the non-stop interdependence of nations is now clear that a country's problem can adversely affect the other country by creating a ripple effect. A distinguished group of scholars agree with this article as they seek to explore if and how political changes have affected the balance between sovereign states and the authority of the larger international community.

Jackson¹² came up with vital normative difficulties which come up when human beings worldwide organized their political relations and lives in regards to societal-independent states. The study scrutinizes the present day through recognizing the norms of state sovereignty and ethical in statecraft, in reference to the post-1945 and post-1989 periods. It is a presentation of an all-inclusive study of well-known international issues which are inclusive of peace, war, human rights intervention, security, boundaries, failed states and democracy. The relationship between humanitarian-failed state debate and the interventionist debate is important because of its significance to Africa. The best example can be Jackson's work of previous realist perspectives are added-on, if not overruled, by the "normative turn" in the current writings on intervention.

A study by Krain¹³ examined the efficiency of military intervention in further stopping or slowing killing throughout the period of genocide and politicide. This study will provide six

¹⁰Talentino, A.K. (2005). *Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

¹¹Lyons, G.M., & Mastanduno, M. (1995). State Sovereignty and International Intervention. In Lyons G.M and Mastanduno, M. (eds) *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*(250-265). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

¹² Jackson, R. (2000). *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹³Krain, M. (2005). International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides, *International Studies Quarterly*, 49, 2005.

hypotheses in regards to the possible effects on the harshness of genocide or politicide, by conducting a cross national longitudinal analysis of the genocides spurning from 1995-1997. The findings of the study reveal that the interventions that help the objective of the cruel policy or challenge cited the sole effective response was military action. The study revealed that impartial interventions are possibly inefficient in reducing the impact and interventions with the aim of challenging perpetrators are better for the victims of genocide or politicide.

After military action in both Iraq and Kosovo, Matlary¹⁴ investigated the position of a UN consent for military interventions which was precipitated by non-mandated interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. In this article it scrutinized the realist and positivist approaches to the issue and suggests a third approach called the 'human rights model', whereby public legality is the main contributor. The article revealed both the political and legal evaluation are on the contrary in this question as by the basis built upon. Further the article will analyze how the interaction between military strength and the present global public discourse and it in conclusion it said that the legality is built on a case- by-case basis. Thereby, the being of the UN power no longer provides automatic legitimacy. In reality, Kosovo decoct a partial effort to threaten a group further from killing one another by killing or threatening to kill the supporters of said group.

1.5.2 Nature of Military Intervention in Somalia

The turmoil present in Somalia since 1991 has attracted attention both regional and international over the years; with many actors intervening with an objective of restoring peace in the country. One of the actors is the United Nations (UN) operations which were started seasonally from 1992-1995. This approach has been successful but not of late, because Kenya played an important part in the Somali peace keeping mission. The first peace-keeping journey started in (2002-2004) whereby Somali peace talks started and laid a ground from which the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) operated till 2005, whereby it re-located to Somalia. One cannot conclude that the relations between two states have been cordial. In 1963 & 1967 there was a cross- border dispute which was the "shifita wars" where ethnic Somalis in North Eastern Kenya tried to split.

¹⁴Matlary, J.H. (2004). The Legitimacy of Military Intervention: How Important is A UN Mandate? *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3 (2).

In 1993, UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF which became non-existing till 1995 as it was withdrawn from Somalia. Ethiopia intervened in 2006 to fight the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Despite the edgy links with Somalia this was an aftermath of Ethiopia's intervention in 2006, Kenya's good bilateral relations with Somalia are guided by its main foreign policy principles including the urge of a good neighbor. This approach has been successful but not of late, because Kenya played an important part in the Somali peace keeping mission. The first peace-keeping journey started in (2002-2004) whereby Somali peace talks started and laid a ground from which the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) operated till 2005, whereby it re-located to Somalia.

One cannot conclude that the relations between two states have been cordial. In 1963 & 1967 there was a cross- border dispute which was the "shifta wars" where ethnic Somalis in North Eastern Kenya tried to split. October 16, 2011 was a day that held significance for the Kenyan army because compared to its neighbors, its invasion of Somalia was the first war the first war it engaged that was without its borders since independence.¹⁵ Whether there was full understanding of the impact this was likely to have is not clear.

1.5.3 Positive Impact of Military Intervention

Military intervention in a country brings about positive implications to the country in turmoil. After the deployment of the Kenya Defense Forces in Somali in October 2011, sanity started prevailing as the country started to regain its ashes. Many Somali fled the country due to civil war.that started in 1993. At the summit of a dire humanitarian crisis in 2011, the population of refugees was 519,411. The figure decreased by 98,700 which was an indication that a big number had voluntarily returned to Somalia.¹⁶ The voluntary return of refugees is as a result of a Kenya defense forces operation with other forces. Refugees are returning to their land after many years of a country marred by civil war and anarchy.

¹⁵Menkhaus, K. (2012). *The Enough Project: After the Kenyan Intervention in Somalia*. www.enoughproject.org

¹⁶UNHCR Kenya Operation August 2015 Statistics

¹⁷This was one of the positive implication and benefits accrued to the Somali community in Kenya- Somali border. The conflict in Somalia had continued for over two decades and thus the Kenya defense forces have facilitated the creation of a platform for peace in Somalia. Strategies that Brown (1996: 622), suggested become the most relevant corridor for durable peace in Somalia. The Kenyan Defense Forces soldiers with the support of the government has pushed for the Creation of a local authority initiative is also part of a federal Somalia goal. This is a step in ensuring that Somalia retains to its former self.

The first one is “co-optation” this strategy navigates measures in dealing with the militant group (Al Shabaab) and neutralizing their power.¹⁸This was the strategy that reduced the effect of the terrorist on Kenya employed by the Kenyan defense forces and also helped in destroying their economic activity to discontinue their funding sources. It aimed to discover the failings of the Somali people and the exogeneous actors in building a state. It also aimed at solving some of the hardships facing the Somali people ma infested in issues such as personal insecurity showed by the large number of IDP (Internally Displaced Person) and cases of poverty in the extreme reflected with high number of people having to survive on an income of less than a dollar in a day.¹⁹. The UN forces have significantly reduced the poverty levels as there is peace for the people to continue with their daily activities.

1.5.4 Negative implication of Military Intervention

However, presence of military in a country can bring more negative implications as in the case of Somalia. Even after the military intervention by Kenyan troops in Somalia to combat the Al shabaab, the terrorist organization remains an active and crucial threat to Kenya’s internal security. The “AlShabaab” a terrorist group based in Somalia has continued to attack Kenya even after the Kenya Defence forces went to Somalia. this has been a great blow to the country.

¹⁷Uhuru, Kenyatta. (2013) Kenya will not pull out its troops from Somalia. KTN NEWS Nairobi. October.01-2013 Nairobi. October.01-2013. Availableat <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TfdLwkM3wg>

¹⁸Brown, Michael E. 1996. *The International Dimensions of InternalConflict*. Center for Science and International Affairs.John F. Canady School of Government, Havard University, Cambridge. Massachusetts

¹⁹.¹⁹ IDMC, “Somalia: Displacement and worsening humanitarian situation as a result of ongoing violence and conflict,” July 30, 2010, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Africa/Somalia/pdf/Somalia-July-2010.pdf>

In 2013, they targeted Mombasa, the coastal tourist and the port city of Kenya .Many attacks have been experienced as a result of the revenge by the “Al Shabaab”. In september 2013, a similar attack was carried out by the terrorist group. The group carried out an attack in Westgate, a large and very popular shopping mall in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, killing at least 72 innocents Kenyan and tourists in September 2013.²⁰

The involvement of Kenya troops in Somalia was precipitated by Al-Shabaab attacks. Thus, by integrating its forces already in Somali with the AMISOM peacekeeping forces #operating under the mandate of the UNSC and AU, Kenya increased its involvement in Somalia.

The war between the insurgents and ENDF that took place in Somalia in 2006-2009 created a mass of internal displacement (IDPs) and refugees that fled to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya. Restoring peace in a country sometimes can lead to more havoc unexpectedly.²¹

In an effort to reconcile the clans in Somalia, Kenyan Soldiers have been accused t of aiding specific communities in Somalia.²² This has been the case of The Ogaden clan who predominantly occupies Jubba land and also has also a strong influence in Kenya. This in turns create animosity among the clans as one is being favored at the expense of the other. Such occurrences are sometimes unavoidable by peace keeping personnel but have negative implications on the Somali’s communities.

Kenya stood by its decision of military intervention in Somalia by stating that it was a defensive action. Brown defines defensive intervention as the intervention of states in another’s conflicted motivated by self-preservation and aim to bring cross border difficulties such as military assaults and influx of refugees to an end. Also, to keep wars from permeating or more ambitiously bring wars to a close.

Restoring Peace in a war-torn country in the case of Somalia is an uphill task that all parties including her neighbors and the international bodies need to put their resources together.

²⁰Lauren P Blanchard *The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya*

²¹Lauren P Blanchard *The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya*

²² Eriksson, Mikael. (2013). *Somalia’s Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest*. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Ministry of defense

However, there are implications that directly affect the Somali people and also her neighbors. In Somali the involvement of the defense forces in restoring has been more of success.

Gros (1996) in his investigations of failed states and what is associated with their failure, he concluded that there are five types of failed states: anaemic, mirage, aborted, anarchic and captured states. This is evident in Somalia where there was lawlessness but peace is prevailing as a result of military interventions.

Locally Kenya risked inviting home grown and international attacks and alienating the native Somali population. Taking it a step further, days into the intervention Kenya commenced an operation aimed at rooting out Al Shabaab sympathizers claiming that the head of the big animal known as Al Shabaab was located in Eastleigh. This operation was plagued with reports of serious violation of the human rights and racial profiling of the Somali people due to their ethnicity. Some reported inhumane torture and beatings while others were detained and deported if they could not prove that they were Kenyan citizens legally and also fail to bribe the local security forces.

²³ This form of racial profiling of the Somalis can prove to be a threat to Kenya's security as this will alienate them even further presenting the Al Shabaab with a ripe ground for recruitment thus concentrating their efforts here.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

1.6.1 Constructivism Approach

Constructivism as a perspective was developed by Bruner in 1966. It places emphasis on environmental structures which form government policies, identities and shape state norms therefore linking identities to the cultural structures. Under study, one has to look for the environmental and norms relations that may have caused a country to intervene. This approach agrees that there may exist similarities among states.²⁴ Norms change with every sociological interaction hence it addresses issues that other approaches neglect since they treat the interests

²³ISS, (2014). *The Controversial Repatriation of Somali Refugees from Kenya*. [http:// www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-controversial-repatriation-of-somali-refugees-from-kenya](http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-controversial-repatriation-of-somali-refugees-from-kenya) accessed 29/1/2014.

²⁴Thomas, U.B. (1996). Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan. In Peter J Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press

exogenously. Understanding this normative process becomes paramount for this theory. According to this approach, security cannot be solely defined without reference to inter-subjective perceptions but other factors must be considered as well. Perceptions of security and insecurity are connected to beliefs, values and identities.

1.6.2 Idealism Approach

This approach was developed by E.H. Carr in 1939 and disagrees with the traditional approach because it views security in terms of military. Idealists start their arguments from the point that natural harmony exists between human beings as they are fundamentally cooperative. This statement brings us to why war breaks out and steps the society must take to curtail it. War should not be attributed to their nature but rather from imperfect political practices and institutions. These flawed situations in both international and local levels are what destabilizes the perfect harmony between human beings. In order to prevent war from recurring, these imperfect arrangements must be readily identified and dealt with. President Woodrow Wilson provides the foundation for idealism from his international reform agenda. He believed that for democracy to exist the world must be made safe to begin with (Wilson, 1994).

Beginning in the early 1900s to the late 1930s this approach was geared by the desire to ensure peace. According to Wilson, democracy is the system that is best suited to alleviate intra and interstate disputes. He argues that it is only through the establishment of an international body can peace be secured. Such bodies like the League of Nations can mitigate international anarchy between states by employing diplomacy and also protect them from exogenous force.

Idealists argue that for force to be used, it must be legalized and authorized.²⁵ The realism approach replaced the idealist paradigm after the Second War. Scholars and researchers agreed that in rationally explaining the ubiquitous and never-ending power struggle this approach bettered its counterparts. Under study, this approach still fails to explain intervention.

²⁵Hedley, B. (1996). The Grotian Conception of International Society. In M. Wright ed. *Diplomatic Investigations*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

1.6.3 Pluralism Approach

The pluralism approach has exerted a major influence in both the sub-field of international relations and the discipline that is political science. The pluralists disapprove of the realist conception in the security studies approach saying that there are diverse forms of development and one should not focus on security and development. If one thinks that a certain entity is secure the other could see it as a threat. Therefore, one should not seek to force one's unique understanding on others with a different view. This may cause disagreements promoting destabilization rather than security. They also recognize that providing security for the environment and people can be done through the mutual effort between states. This means that states should cooperate and find peaceful ways of solving their disputes that would be an incubator for insecurity instead of being doubtful of each other. Without states cooperating with each other and finding peaceful ways of addressing the failings of traditional concepts, this approach will fail.²⁶

Pluralists disapprove of the viewing of the state as the principal in international politics. They believe that there is a huge correlation between life inside the state and life outside the state. Whatever affects the state internally also determines what happens outside the state and vice versa. This approach shines a light on the weaknesses of realism in international relations. They agree that the state plays a major role in setting up rules of technology, communications, economic and other games that occur simultaneously but in itself cannot set the international agenda nor make decisions as if they are not affected by values, interests and aspirations of banks, business firms, shipping companies, citizen groups, shipping companies and the likes. A state can only be defined as a player in the pluralistic world hence this approach can be viewed to be against the traditional doctrine of sovereignty.²⁷

1.6.4 Realism Approach

This approach (realism) remains the most convincing in the security studies approach compared to the other dominant tradition international relation theories. Hence the realist approach has

²⁶Anton, P. (2001). International relations theory and the discourse on terrorism: Preliminary reflections on context and limits. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 23(2), 134-52.

²⁷Francis, W.C.(1994). Pluralistic Theories and the Attack upon State Sovereignty. In Charles Merriam and Harry Elmer eds. *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*. New York: Macmillan.

been seen as the chief theory of international relations. As pointed out by the realists state survival, power and national interests are crucial when analyzing inter-state relations. The realists also identify the capacity of the military as being key for any state that wants to meet its interest in this anarchic world. The conceptualization of the world in this manner stems from the realists' strong view that in order for states to realize objectives in international politics is the use of military force. Territorial issues such as defense of geographical borders, waterbodies, mountain ranges industrial resources such as gas and oil not forgetting fertile land to be used to feed one's public. could be a direct motivator for military intervention as put forth by Hans Morgenthau. Those who prefer this approach see the above factors as a means for a state to increase hence it can be debated that the reason for military invasion into Somalia was to safeguard its economic, political and social interests.

1.7 Hypotheses

- (i) There were diverse goals in the intervention by the military in Somalia
- (ii) Military action in Somalia has had a myriad of consequences
- (iii) There are several challenges faced in the military intervention in Somalia

1.8 Study Methodology

This cogitation sought to investigate the consequences of military intervention in a failed state with focus on Somalia. The study sought to source secondary data for analysis from humanitarian organization websites working in Somalia, government documents and journals, periodicals, newspaper article, books and internet sources. Humanitarian organizations working in Somalia and government documents consisting mainly of public documents including declarations, decisions and statements and official publications will form the platform for data analysis. The study therefore, will employ a qualitative approach to explore the impact of military intervention in Somalia.

Secondary data was collected from various books on humanitarian intervention, treaties, declarations and policy instruments, Journals, previous research papers, magazines, newspapers and articles on the subject matter. Underlying this is the fact that the policy makers were deemed to be the core actors in the region's security issues and can therefore, provide up-to-date

information. The objectives of this research facilitated the collection and analysis of data. Before subjecting the information collected to the theoretical frame work, it needs to be validated through logical and analytical arguments using the qualitative approaches. After its examination, the conclusions were drawn from the results of the data in line with the study objectives.

1.9 Scope and limitations

The scope of this research is geographically restricted to Somalia, Northern Eastern region of Kenya and parts of the coastal area bordering Somalia. The time frame of the study covers from 2006 to the present day. The limitations encountered in the study include lack of access to the war tom region owing to insecurity. Information from the relevant stakeholders is different to access owing to security restriction imposed on such information. There is also very little up to date literature on the current situation in Somalia.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter one comprises the prologue of the study that presents the following; the grounding of the study, declaration of the problem, objectives of the study and the methodology. Not forgetting the theory of the framework, literature review and the justification of the study.

Chapter two consists of analysis of the causes of military intervention in Kenya.

Chapter three consists of examining the outcome of intervention by the military in Somalia.

Chapter four consists of identifying the challenges faced as a result of military intervention in Somalia.

Chapter five consists of the summary, conclusions from the findings giving recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

CHAPTER TWO

CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

2.1 Introduction

State and non-state actors worldwide share ideas and beliefs that not only allows military intervention but also calls for it in certain situations. Other literature have largely disregarded this. Scholars, by paying more attention to questions such as why when and where, have failed to develop theoretical explanations for the significant irregularities noted in the world as a result of military action. Prevention of human rights violation does not give leeway to other States to intervene. It is only by examining the where and when military intervention is necessitated and examining its interaction with the self-centeredness of state can there be an understanding of why States choose to respond to a few of the grave human rights violations. This chapter seeks to analyze the causes of the military intervention in Somalia.

2.2 Political Causes

2.2.1 Security Threat

In its back past Kenya has experienced periodic attacks with the worst being the attack on the US embassy in 1998 which claimed 213 lives. The attack was highly planned and well strategized as it occurred simultaneous with the Dar-es-salam in Tanzania where 12 People perished. It was in the year 2002, whereby the terrorist attacked an Israeli Hotel and 15 people lost their lives. Militants attacked an aircraft belonging to the Israeli in the same municipal but the set target was not realized. Attacks have been on the rise recently due to the Kenya Army success in Somalia. The Kenya Forces was a result of Al-Shabaab attacks in 2011 that necessitated the intervention.

On 11 July 2007 two people met their demise near the premises City Gate Restaurant near the Hotel Ambassadeur, as the contraption they were carrying suffered a suspected premature detonation. In late September 2009 guests found a grenade of Russian origin under seats at the Simmers restaurant on Kenyatta Avenue in Nairobi and on 13 June 2010 six people died and many more were injured after three explosive devices went off at a political gathering at Uhuru Park.

On 4 December 2010 separate grenade attacks in Nairobi murdered three police officers and on 20 December 2010 the Kampala Coach bus terminus on River Road suffered a grenade attack

claiming the life of one person and injuring 26 others. On October 1, 2011, suspected Al Shabaab gunmen kidnapped a 66-year-old French woman named Marie Dedieu who was disabled from her abode in Manda Island which is in Kenya. She passed away while in the aggressors' clutches in that same month. On October 13, two female *Spanish Médecins sans Frontières* aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya were kidnapped by suspected Al Shabaab militants and ferried to Somalia. This series of kidnappings and cross border attacks motivated the militant incursion into Somalia by Kenyan forces in October 2011. Claire states that Kenya was confronted by a serious terrorist threat. She also noted that the radical Islamists provided the government of Kenya with a serious threat beginning from 1998, when twin explosions destroyed the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam Tanzania and Nairobi. Fredrick described that Kenya's power to prevent terrorist attacks within their borders was challenged by the advances the Al Shaabab made in Somalia in the last few years. The sheer size of Kenya's border with Somalia cannot be patrolled adequately hence weapons or men are smuggled across the border with relative ease. Moreover, Al Shabaab's presence in Kenya stems from the radicalized Muslims who support its fight in Somalia. Their attacks on Kenyan civilians applied pressure on the Kenyan government. In lieu of the above points, Kenya's intervention can be related to the defense of its national security.

2.2.2 Defending Territorial integrity

European colonialism can be viewed as the originator of most conflicts plaguing Africa. The Somali were distributed to five different regions by colonial boundaries namely: - Kenya, Djibouti, Italian Somalia, British Somaliland and Ethiopia. At independence, The Republic of Somalia's core pillar was irredentism. This was rejecting the boundaries instituted by the colonialists and calling for the political unity of the Somali residing in the Horn of Africa. In Kenya, some regions were sentient to this philosophy. From the instance Kenya attained independence in 1963, it has encountered a number of secession challenges. Beginning the year 1963 to 1968, an attempt by the Somalis in the North Eastern to become part of a "Greater Somalia" was what is referred to as the *Shifto War*. This war and further violence like the Wagalla Massacre in 1984 created resentment among the Somali in Kenya because of the brutality with which Kenya suppressed it. After the *Shifto War*, the government of Kenya affirmed a state of emergency in North Eastern Province that spanned for almost three decades, causing further alienation of the Somalis residing in Kenya.

Somalia participated in the Ogaden with Ethiopia war between the years 1977–1978. The war was instigated by Somalia in the hopes of realizing its dream of a Greater Somalia by assimilating the Ogaden into the Somali Republic. This assimilation of Ogaden was intended to cause the unification into a one state country by boosting Somali nationalism. Nonetheless, this dream would remain a dream as Ethiopia managed to defeat Somalia in 1978 with help from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Because of this separatist idea (irredentism) Kenya is on the lookout should Somalia seek the reuniting of the greater Pan Somalia (Somalia). Kenya is wary that predominantly ethnic Somali population in the Northern Frontier District may be enticed to secede from Kenya.

In the year 2006 to 2009 during the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia, Al shaabab made a name for itself as a weapon against the Ethiopian invasion. They then occupied the void left after the Islamic Courts Union collapsed and Ethiopia withdrew rapidly expanding to become the dominating governing body. By August 2010, the larger part of the central and south Somalia was under the control of Al Shaabab. They then made their first international terrorist attack on Uganda by targeting Kampala, its capital, with suicide bombings (11th July 2010). By creating an Islamic State, Al shabaab aim to establish political unity for all the Somali across the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the entity plans to overwhelm Somalia and eventually propagate this philosophy throughout the Horn of Africa. Kenya's interior minister, the late George Saitoti connected the move of Al Shabaab with the issue of Kenya's territorial integrity when they tried to form an Islamic Emirate in Somali. This included Djibouti, north eastern Kenyan region and The Ogaden region of Ethiopia. "This is a serious provocation on Kenya's territorial integrity by the Al Shabaab with negative effects on the tourism industry and generally also on our own investment". Kenya's military intervention in Somalia was to protect its territorial integrity from the detrimental consequences Al Shabaab would bring Kenya. Also, it argues that it has legal right to ward off any danger that threatens its integrity and sovereignty.

2.2.3 Domestic Military Dynamics

Washington believed that Kenya was on the forefront in the counterterrorism struggle. This was because of the rate of increase of Islamism in the Horn of Africa. Kenya's counterterrorism funding was increased by The State Department from \$4.5 million in 2006 to an estimated \$8 million in 2011. The United States also offered regular counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

training to the senior officer in Kenya; Kenya Military Academy has tweaked its curriculum to cover such training and the United States' increased the amount of military spending to Kenya. This influx of funding that Kenya received from Washington's treasury in the name of counterterrorism may therefore have driven Kenya's military incursion into Somalia.

2.2.4 Internal Political Dynamics

Till the year 1991, Kenya was basically a one-party state. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which was the ruling party, asserted its dominance politically, mainly through repression and rigging of the electoral process until 2002. This is when long serving President Daniel arap Moi stepped down to bring his fifth term to a close under domestic and donor pressure. The elections held that year were hailed both at home and abroad as showing a primary in Kenya's democratic path. National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was created by the uniting of primarily ethnically based and fractitious parties, to defeat Daniel arap Moi's preferred candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. After the election, this unified front started unraveling slowly, showcasing patronage politics and underlying ethnic grievances that overshadowed the optimism of the 2002 polls. Raila Odinga, who was a leader of one of the factions in NARC, pointed an accusing finger at Mwai Kibaki for renegading on a deal struck prior to the polls. The deal would have seen to the creation of a prime ministerial position resulting in a power sharing arrangement. Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, also an ex member of NARC, contested against Kibaki for the presidency in the December 2007 general elections. The parliamentary polls, that were regarded as significantly credible, parties against Kibaki's coalition made rather large gains. Odinga's party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), fell seven seats short of an absolute majority in the National Assembly. The presidential election, however, was deemed by observers as flawed, with evidence of rigging evident on both participating sides.

Kibaki was declared the winner by the electoral commission despite significant irregularities in the vote tabulation process. For example, voter turnout in some areas was recorded as having exceeded 100%. This announcement was followed by riots in urban areas as Odinga's supporters rage turned violent in many parts of Kenya mainly along ethnic lines. Although the violent acts were spontaneous, investigators found that politicians of both parties had planned multiple attacks. The former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and several African former heads of

state, led the negotiations between both parties. A power sharing arrangement was formed as a result of combined pressure from aid donors and the United States.

In April 2008, a coalition government was formed with Kibaki as the president and Odinga in a new prime minister position. Both parties saw the need of drafting a new constitution and to tackle sensitive land rights issues.

Kenya's political vulnerability coincided with her military intervention in Somalia and the public's support behind it. Elections were scheduled to be run a year later, and opportunists were trying to utilise a vacuum. President Mwai Kibaki was retiring and Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, his most likely successors were awaiting on an announcement by the International Criminal Court that would determine if the cases against them were to be tried. They were charged with war crimes in the post-election violence that occurred after the 2007 elections. This intervention had been aimed at drumming up the voters' support in 2013 as the national election for the government and politicians who had shown their ability to defend the country and its citizens as well as reducing post-election violence drew nigh. Hence this intervention could be linked to the 2013 election. The election was relatively calm and brought the perceived risk of Kenya. The President was voted for on the pro- security, pro- progress and pro-business ticket

2.2.5 Strategic Interest of Creating a Buffer Zone

Kenya is on the lookout should Somalia seek the reuniting of the greater Pan Somalia (Somalia). Kenya is wary that predominantly ethnic Somali population in the Northern Frontier District may be enticed to secede from Kenya. This concern is what spurred President Jomo Kenyatta to sign a mutual defense agreement with Haile Selassie, Ethiopia's emperor in 1964. This agreement was renewed in 1979 and third time in 1989. Apart from the fear of the political unity of the greater Pan Somali movement, Kenya's interest is economic and strategic: If Juba was to be a semi-autonomous land, it would serve as a safeguard from the Al Shabaab attacks on its tourism industry and LAPSSET (The large port development project in Lamu), provide the needed influence over gas and oil deposits in the disputed zone and access to the Kismayo market. Its stability could also facilitate the repatriation of the 500,000 refugees in Kenya. The vast potential of Juba land region is also geopolitically and economically strategic. It is rich in industry, resources and fertility. If Kenya has any hopes of gaining a foothold in the area it would need to have better relations with Mogadishu. For them to realize this goal, Kenya has unsuccessfully

tried to create a buffer zone between herself and Somalia for many years. In October 14, 2011, as far as Fredrick is concerned, Kenya announced that its deployment of troops into Somalia was in pursuit of Al Qaida linked After a succession of cross-border raids driven by Al Shabaab, Kenya's internal security minister, George Saitoti, said that Kenya had been and would remain an island of peace and that we would not allow crooks from Somalia, that has been in perpetual unrest for over two decades, to undermine our peace. Al Shabaab's recent series of kidnappings in Kenya proved to be the final straw to fight against them Saitoti and others said.

However, others like Menkhaus view things differently. He argues that these kidnappings were a disguise by Kenya to go on the offensive against Al-shabaab but alleges that plans to march on the border area were already in place. With international backing, Kenya had already planned its operation before the kidnappings that made them move in October 2011. The aim was to create a buffer zone in the Juba area that borders Kenya which is now believed to have been its main objective to begin with. Daniel Branch states that the invasion of Somalia by Nairobi was in the interest of securing its eastern border and creation of a cushion against attacks inside Somalia. Therefore Kenya's military action can be associated with the need to create a buffer zone on Kenya's border.

2.3 Economic Causes

2.3.1 Oil

Nearly 60 years ago (in early 1950s) Agip (Italian) and Sinclair Oil Corporation (American) recognized Somalia's gas and oil potential and commenced the study of petroleum geology In Somalia. Siyad Barre's rule collapse coupled with the subsequent anarchy put a stop to oil and gas farming in Somalia. Recently, oil has emerged as a key resource of interest in East Africa. The discovery of oil in waters off countries including Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique have made East Africa the place for gas and oil exploration.

Somalia's semi-autonomous Somaliland and Puntland regions, that are found in the horn of Africa have also licensed exploration blocks. Kenya is among the number of countries in the region that have discovered oil deposits in their territory. Such explorations between Somalia and Kenya led to military intervention by latter. Luckystar argues that where some of the

explorations are taking place reside in Somalia waters insinuating that Kenya's militant action might've been aimed at claiming said sites to ensure her exploration is undisturbed.

Claire described Somalia and Kenya having an altercation over the maritime boundary. Kenya's stand is that the boundary should run due east from the point at which their border meets the coastline, while Somalia holds that the boundary should run perpendicular to their shared coastline. This is an issue of extreme importance as said area holds approximately eight oil blocks and Kenya has been granting exploration quests that Somalia holds should be granted only after a bilateral agreement is realized. Abdillahi Mohamud, director of the East African Energy Forum, has described Kenya's intervention as a tactic deigned to grant her claim offshore oil block concessions which rightfully belong to Somalia as stipulated in the 1982 U.N. law of the sea convention. Somalia has also shown interest in the oil in the area between the two countries. Abdullahi Haji, the minister of foreign affairs for Reuters in Mogadishu has said that this conflict is a territorial argument that stemmed from the interest of gas and oil companies. Also, if this is not solved it will escalate into a dispute that will sour the deep relations between the two countries to begin with and may even end in war.

All but one of the eight offshore blocks available for licensing that Kenya has identified lie in the disputed area. The French firm Total and Texas-based Anadarko companies holds the licenses from Kenya to the blocks in the disputed area but are disinclined to drill because of boundary line issue. Therefore, one could only assume that one of the motives that led Kenya to intervene in Somalia was to secure the oil blocks for exploration in the deep sea offshore between Kenya for its benefit.

2.3.2 Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) Project

Upon completion of this transport and infrastructure project in Kenya, the Lamu corridor will be second largest corridor in the country. The other transport corridors in the country are the Mombasa port and the Mombasa – Uganda corridor that snakes its way through Nairobi and much of the Northern rift. The Lamu corridor project never took off after its conception in 1975 due to numerous reasons (economic-political). Claire highlights the need to protect this project led to Kenya's military intervention which was broadly considered to have a strategic angle and was inevitable: the neighboring countries of Burundi Uganda and Ethiopia were in Somalia militarily because of the growing discernment of heightened insecurity caused by the increase

Somali piracy, the need to provide the LAPSSET project and ultimately Kenya had failed in its endeavor to form a buffer zone between itself and Somalia. The African Magazine outlined that the LAPSSET project as the largest investment in Africa that would greatly boost Kenya's prosperity but the inadequacy seen in policing the border posed a great threat as insecurity in the form of kidnappings of tourists and aid workers and killing was being brought to the surface as this was the daily news in the area.

Since LAPSSET extended to that area, stamping out the insecurity became the priority to the stakeholders of the project. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have secured their security and economic interests with the help of the EU and US by thwarting Al Shabbab's terror links and piracy. Therefore, the dream of uniting Somalia with a central government remains to be seen. Eugene tries to link Kenya's intervention to securing the profit from a major new port (Lamu Port) that would have been lost otherwise. The intimidation of Kenyan tourists' areas by the militant group dealt a major blow to one of the nation's largest growing economic sectors. Kenya's role as the hive of regional trade was threatened by the Somali militant group because of its ability to attack its ports and danger shipping way. For instance, Kenya has planned to open new major port 60 miles off the Somali border that it hopes the Al Shabaab cannot threaten its ability to lure the majority of the share of the growing regional volume as well export her goods. This can be realized if Kenya can succeed in creating a buffer zone in the Southern part of Somalia. Thus, one can argue that the need to protect this project and therefore its economic interests led to the Kenyan Military incursion into Somalia

2.4 Social Cause: The Refugees over influx and its burden

The UNCHR closed all the coastal camps in 1995 following the request by the Kenyan government. The resultant refugee population was transferred to Daadab or Kakuma. This was another UNCHR camp located near the Kenyan border with Sudan almost 2,000Km from Daadab. The Daadab camps had a population of 127,000 at the end of 2005 as opposed to its population which stood at 255,000 by February 2009. The UNHCR had to declare all the camps full and put an end to the registration in August 2008 after a costly transfer program to Kakuma. Large numbers of refugees that had fled Somalia decided to remain in Nairobi and declare themselves 'economically self-sufficient' rather than move to the UNCHR camps reported the Human Rights Watch investigation. Many refugees managed to move into cities and towns such

as Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Kisumu Eldoret despite the Kenyan government making various attempts to contain them in the camps making these attempts redundant. Although majority of refugees were eventually granted citizenship, their numbers are not made public due to political sensitivity.

The security threat as arising from this is that some of immigrants from Somalia and Kenyan-Somalis are sympathetic to the Al Shabaab. They actively support them in Nairobi by processing contraband, raising and transferring funds, recruiting other fighters and providing medical assistance to the wounded. Furthermore, Al Shabaab's has recently garnered more support among the wider Muslim community in Kenya. The primary source of support for the Al SHabaab in Kenya seems to be centered around the Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque, located near Eastleigh in Nairobi home to more than 100,000 Somali refugees.

International Crisis Group Kenya has revealed that there are officially almost 500,000 refugees from Somalia in Kenya putting an enormous strain on locals and the government. The crisis is not only in the camps. The government has been edgy about the rate at which the ethnic Somali populace is growing and their influence on the economy. As at the last census, they numbered 2.4 million. It has also been noted that there seems to be a growing resentment for the Somalis among the natives in the urban centres. Another headache for it is documentation. A large but unclear number have acquired Kenyan papers mainly through corruption but it almost impossible to distinguish between a Somali and a Kenyan. Another issue would be the relocation of said refugees into Mombasa and Nairobi. The Somali population of Eastleigh, is now estimated at over 100,000. These Demographic changes are keenly observed as they are known to have a political effect. Case and point, Yusuf Hassan who is an ethnic Somali was elected to a parliamentary seat in Eastleigh.

Refugees bring different dynamics into their host communities bearing the need for humanitarian development and action. Since Kenya has hosted refugees for over two decades, their large number has been perceived as a great burden in regards to environment degradation resource depletion. The fivefold increase in the number of refugees in the Daadab camps that were meant to host 90,000 since 1991, has seen their resources over stretched. This has compromised the quality of services rendered and has also given rise to environmental concerns such as deforestations. Due to their large numbers, tension has erupted between host and refugee

communities as they compete for scarce resources like construction materials and water. This unsolved problem remains a social burden for the government of Kenya for decades. Because of the demographic changes which has political social and economic ramifications on the host state, one could associate this with Kenya`s need to intervene in Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

3.1 Introduction

Neighborhood has been known to promote or hinder democratic transition whereas involvement of the military eases a shift in the internal democracy of a state. These interventions can initiate such a process by putting an end to the rule of dictatorship and disintegrating the past leader's structures. Moreover, the assurance of democracy put together to the modern terrible memoirs can be a starter to calm a new government set up by an outer player. Militaries also provide the avenues necessary for the safe conduction of an election in a fledgling democracy.

In summary, military interference can assist in a democratization of a particular state by ushering in a new regime. However, this allegation should not controversy. The introduction of a democratic system together with its principles at the domestic level is not necessarily inconsistent with foreign imposed regime change. One should however note that not all interventions have the same purpose hence not all hold the promise that is democratization. In cases where the regime is supported by the military it causes autocratic regression. Democratic transitions may also be caused by hostile interventions where said action challenges and ends the existing regime. It is therefore apparent that military interventions can have different consequences depending on the nature of the intervention. This chapter examines the ramifications of military intervention in Somalia.

3.2 Casualties

As in every war, damage is incurred by both materials and humans. By October 19th 2011, 70 Al Shabaab militia met their demise at the hands of the Kenyan army at the beginning of Operation *Linda Inchi* as they forced their way towards the militia's base at Afadawa. This weakened the Al Shabaab while encouraging The Kenyan troops. As the Operation Linda Nchi ran its course, Kenya intensified its aerial bombardment of Gedo and Juba, it caused a small damage but to a great extent increased security injure. In one of the cases, five children were killed which raised an upheaval that necessitated the Prime minister of Kenya at that time to offer an official apology and later an inquiry team sent. Luckystar found that civilian casualties were reported by both countries as a result of this intervention.

3.3 Retaliatory attacks on Kenya

The operation Linda inchi that was launched in October 2011 resulted in retaliatory attacks in the coastal regions and the capital city. The armies' intervention into Somalia led to the vulnerability of Kenya and provided a good validation for Al shabaab to attack the country. It was clear that Kenya intervening in Somalia angered the Al shabaab and they made their threat clear that they will be going to attack the country. The attacks have been seen in the capital city, coastal regions and the north-eastern regions where grenade attacks are common. These attacks were there before the Kenya forces intervention but were had a small impact but the magnitude increased since the invasion of the Kenya Forces. The Al shabaab use channels to attack as they do not directly attack.

When Kenya Armies intervened in October Kenya has been attacked many times. It started with the attacks on entertainment areas like the bars but grew to the churches. The major areas targeted are the capital city and the North-eastern parts. The attacks have also been made to the security personnel as in January 2012 there was a raid on a police post and six were killed and two other taken hostages. Between 18th November and 19th December there have been attacks in Eastleigh claiming more than 16 lives and injuring many among them were the Kenyan-Somali. The attacks led to violence with the People of Somali origin being on the receiving side. This report was compiled by HIPS.

Though many attacks are not brought to the public awareness many attacks have occurred. In 2011, the country suffered more than 15 deaths while more than 50 people were injured in separate attacks in the country mainly occurring in the capital city and the North eastern parts of Kenya. In 2012, 6 lives were claimed by similar attacks in the coastal region and Nairobi and more than 46 injured.

3.4 The Repatriation of Refugee

The total number of refugees registered by December 2013 was 587,223. The majority, 477,424 people are from Somalia, South Sudan came in second with (46,176), Ethiopia had (31,209), and Democratic Republic of Congo (14510). Majority of the refugees (466,424) live in Dadaab camps and (53,816) in kakuma and the rest live in the Capital city. The Kenya Republic agreed to the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. (1969 OAU) and the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Since operation “Linda Nchi” was started, Kenya has experienced many attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and the North-eastern parts of Kenya. The attacks are carried out by the Al shabaab and this has led to an enmity and mistrust with the Somali-Origin people being the victims. The country has initiated the process of restoring the refugees numbering 500,000 to their native land despite the mayhem still in Somalia. This is done despite the objection from Somali government and the international community. The repatriation was necessitated by the many attacks Kenya experienced. The move has brought about mixed reactions and discrimination against the Somali refugees and the Kenyan-Somalis since 2012. Kenyan security forces and the Somali community have been at logger heads mainly in the Eastleigh estate for being suspected of harboring terrorists. Thus, the Somalis feared to give any crucial information to the police. The repatriation has started well with 20,000 Somali refugees voluntarily leaving Kenya.

In 10 November 2013 both the Kenyan government and the Somali government governments and the UNCHR signed the Tripartite Agreement which would foresee the repatriation process. This Agreement outlined the roles and responsibilities of signatories and it includes internationally accepted standards that ensured voluntary character of refugees’ repatriation. Although HIPS argued that the Somali links are little in the Country and many of the attackers instead are Kenyan citizens. Somali had been the talk of the day by the Politicians as the 2013 elections approached.

When the tripartite agreement was signed by Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary concerned with the security of the country, Joseph Ole Lenku, gave the green light for the repatriation and that the government will be relentless in their repatriation efforts and nothing would stop the process. Kenya’s part argument is that the repatriation will provide a conducive environment for the Somali to re-build their country. Despite, the objection by the UNCHR Kenya still insists on repatriation and was beneficial to the Kenyan community and the Somali people. The UNCHR representative in Kenya, RaoufMazou said that the process was only voluntary and will take a period of 10 years.

3.5 Strengthening of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

In 2007 the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council green lighted The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the betterment of the Somali people. AMISOM has indeed been successful in flushing out the Al shabaab from the Capital,

Mogadishu and other major towns.²⁸ The talks between the UN and the AU started in 2011 with the main interest being amplifying AMISOM human personnel for it to gain more towns. A better Strategic concept was adopted with its aim being to better coordination effort to get rid off of Al shabaab. At last, 17,731 numbers was agreed upon which would provide logistical support which was supported by the AU in 2012.

At a later date in the month the UN Security Council approved the new number but did not take place till a London Conference Resolution 2036. The Resolution gave a go – ahead for AMISOM to plan appropriately and take every measure with the aim of reducing Al shabaab threat.²⁹ The realization of setting up a stable Juba land is difficult due to the vastness of the region and can only be realized by the joining of the Kenya forces and the AMISOM.³⁰

In December 2011, Kenyan forces were interested to be a part of the AMISOM which was later accepted by the UN Security Council. The allocation of the roles is a contentious matter and may take some time. The set Kenyan army is 4,700.³¹ In July 2012, the Kenyan Forces in Southern Somalia were placed under the command of AMISOM. Kenyan forces were 4664 in the AMISOM increasing the number to 17000 of the 17731 set numbers. The AMISOM force picked today Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Since when KDF was slipped in the AMISOM, the Kenyan government needs to encourage its forces to work harmoniously with other forces. This will be of great help in situations where there will be a harmonious and better coordination in restoring peace in Somalia and destabilizing AL shabaab.

3.6 Kenya's Financial Instability

The cost of war is always high thus no exception to Kenya as the country used roughly (US\$ 2.8 million) as monthly personal costs. Kenya recorded a 236 billion budget deficit. The total cost is high to be borne by the Kenyan Government. This forced the country to ask for help from regional organizations and International community like the UNSC and IGAD to alleviate the

²⁸ AMISOM, (2012). *AMISOM Assumes Formal Command of Kenyan Forces in Somalia*. <http://amisom-au.org/2012/07/amisom-assumes-formal-command-of-kenyan-forces-in-Somalia/>

²⁹ Jon, L., & Gavin, T. (2012). *Somalia: Recent Political, Security and Humanitarian Developments*. SN06115, International Affairs and Defence Section and Economic and Policy Section.

³⁰ African Magazine, (2013). *Why Kenya is fighting In Somalia*. Report on expert Mission by a member of the unparmanent forum on indigenous issues. *LAPSSET report 059912*.

<http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/features/politics/why-kenya-is-fighting-in-Somalia>

³¹ Eriksson, Mikael. (2013). *Somalia's Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest*. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Ministry of defense

huge burden from Kenya. The reaction was encouraging as in 2012; the UNSC increased the AMISOM force to 17,731 troops.³² Also the funding was increased to US\$ 500. The 4,000 KDF troop in Southern Somalia was officially slipped in the AU mission making it a bigger force. However, the Kenyan government increased the allocation in 2012-2013 financial year to 70 billion this huge expenditure pressurized allocation of funds to other sectors such as education, health and security.

3.7 Further Militancy in Kenyan

In Kenya the Muslim populace stands at 4.3 million which accounts for 9-10% of the total population. The majority are living the Coastal and North Eastern regions. A large number also live in Eastleigh in Nairobi which is mostly occupied by the Somalis who fled their country for Security reasons.³³

There is suspicion in some areas for the extremist ideology. Since independence there have been secessionist challenges. In the years 1963 till 1968 there were attempts by the indigenous Somalis in the North Eastern Region to join the “Greater Somalia” in the *Shifita War* and the Wagalla Massacre in 1984, was contained which resulted in a hostile environment amongst them in Kenya. The constant attacks had ripple effects especially in development projects as they lack schools, hospital and good infrastructural activities. The regions have got high poverty cases, many youths are unemployed and the Security is fragile. Bitterness especially towards the government is prevalent and extremists take advantage of the hatred and are able to recruit the Al shabaab. In the 1990s, a sizeable number of Kenyans were vulnerable to extremism from Al Qaida and a Somali militant group known AIAI (asal-Itihad al-Islami) resulting in the 1998 bombings of the Us embassy in Dar-es-salaam and Nairobi. Scores were killed in the twin attacks which were highly coordinated.

Radicalization was attributed mainly to the upcoming of Al shabaab in 2006. The group had been planning till 2011 when they started their attacks due to the activities in Somalia. The Muslim Youth Center (MYC) was formed and allegedly viewed the grievances for the Muslim youths but

³²Eriksson, Mikael. (2013). Somalia's Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Ministry of defense

³³ISS, (2014). *The Controversial Repatriation of Somali Refugees from Kenya*. [http:// www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-controversial-repatriation-of-somali-refugees-from-kenya](http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-controversial-repatriation-of-somali-refugees-from-kenya) accessed 29/1/2014.

instead recruited Al shabaab members. However, it made a promise to minimize attacks for the “AL Shabaab brothers” in condition that the troops are withdrawn from Somalia.³⁴

Ahmad Iman Ali was accorded great respect in Nairobi but this was before the realization that indeed he was an Al Shabaab sympathizer as he participated in financing the Al shabaab in Somalia. In 2009, Ahmad Iman Ali became the leader of Al shabaab Kenyan recruits in Somalia.³⁵ Ever since Kenya invaded Somalia, Security experts have the suspicions that militant MYC is the ones who carry out the attacks in Kenya. The year 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea found that MYC recruited and engaged in various activities favorable for the breeding of Al Shabaab. Since 2010, Ahmad Iman Ali advocated for Jihad and instructed his fighters to attack Kenya and Uganda. An Al shabaab attack in Uganda killed 74 people.

Speeches in support of Jihad and the MYC based in Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque have greatly led to the radicalization group growth in Nairobi, Coastal towns and the North –eastern parts. The Kenyan based group seems to be an affiliate of Al Shabaab as it finances the group and supports the group activities. Sentiments by then Police boss, Mathew Iteere confirmed that many reformed Al shabaab members returned to Kenya. Security Officers lament that Tanzania and Kenyan coasts Regions have become training grounds. The said Mosques have seized offering extremists’ teachings due to government intervention. The International crisis group in 2012 revealed that radicalization breeds in homes.

3.8 Al Shabaab’s Loss of Strongholds

Kenyan intrusion into Southern Somalia was a big challenge to the Al Shabaab as the group left the major cities in Somalia. Areas considered safe were fled which included Puntland, Yemen, South and Central Parts of Somalia were abandoned by the group. Al Shabaab changed their tact and resulted in guerilla warfare tactics. They frequently ambushed the military convoys on the road by planting landmines and throwing hand-propelled grenades. Guerrilla tactic was unsuccessful as the Kenyan Forces took Kismayu which was said to be their Source of income

³⁴Eriksson, Mikael. (2013). Somalia’s Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Ministry of defense

³⁵African Magazine, (2013). Why Kenya is fighting In Somalia. Report on expert Mission by a member of the unparmanent forum on indigenou issues. *LAPSET report 059912*.
<http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/features/politics/why-kenya-is-fighting-in-Somalia>

for survival and to meet their operational costs was captured.³⁶ This cut short their income and was a progress on the KDF. The loss of their income angered the Al Shabaab and intensified their attacks with the targets being government offices and personnel. The Al Shabaab still has the capability of more attacks despite their financial constraints.

³⁶Eriksson, Mikael. (2013). Somalia's Civil War, Security Promotion and National Interest. Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI-R--3718—SE. ISSN 1650-1942. Ministry of defense

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES FACED IN THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

4.1 Introduction

It has been noted that although KDF even as part of AMISOM has made considerable progress in realization of its mandate and its effort in restoring peace and stability in the war-torn Somalia despite the numerous challenges that have had an impact on the operation and needs to be addressed. This chapter will analyze these challenges.

4.2 Uncertainty of Political Situation in Somalia

Some elements of political power in Somalia are: disunited, local, very violent, heterogenic and it's built on a combination of the informal and formal structures under the management of the militia and clans, where various social and political orders combine.³⁷ This frame's volatility, with the accessibility to power and resources cited as the catalyst of conflict among the clans. Besides the clan, there is contention on the nature and desirability of the state. A large number of the Somalis are nomadic in nature hence dislike uncertainty brought about by the establishment of a central authority to govern their affairs. This is as a result of the military dictatorship they experienced. Majority of them prefer a federal governing system that allows for a larger portion of largely independent.

The determinant of success partly is dependable on the demonstration of legality of the centralized systems of government amongst the Somalis'. A way of proving legality is not only guaranteeing effective and just in time rendition of public services and goods but also ensuring peace and stability prevails to all areas that are liberated. The main hindrance is the acknowledgement of legality that prevails in the country whereby the local leaders who come in place of former militant leaders mostly hail from the minority clans in their localizations but act as a tool to the central authority. Till today, the central government keeps on struggling to have the much-awaited legitimacy.

³⁷Hjalte, T.(2013).*The Spaces of Civil War: From a Global Typology of Civil War to a Topography of Violence in South Africa*. University of Tromso

4.3 The Mandate of AMISOM

AMISOM authority is replenished yearly and is greatly affected to political changes, financial and various factors that AU and the federal government do not have a say. There have been negotiations between the African leaders, Somali government and the world at large. The end result of these negotiations has multifaceted drive and concerns that have effect on the independence of the task. In addition, when the contingents annually take turns, performance is undermined as the skilled personnel leave with the much knowledge and apply it in the Al-shabaab operations.

4.4 Troop Strength

The biggest challenge for the AMISOM is that there have few personnel in the troops for it to face the Al shabaab in order to get rid of them and restore peace in the Somalian country. An increase to 17,731 from 12,000 after a Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) boosted the military operations but the number is still small in regards to the complexity of the tactics of AL Shabaab. A letter to the president of the UN in 2013 raised the issue of few army personnel in the AMISOM army and the need to increase the number for better and effective performance.

4.5 The Police Component

The Police trainers are unskilled and need to be trained to improve their skills. Another blow is that the few police training officers are stationed on a rotational basis and immediately leave immediately at the completion of their rotation. It was cited as one of the challenges that are unfavorable to the training cells in the AMISOM. In-experience and linguistic problems are a major stumbling blocks for the AU Peace Support Operations. AMISOM lacks Somali Speakers further worsening the situation as they understand the local language.³⁸

4.6 The Civilian Component

The civilian constituent is undermanned making the meeting of their set goals a major challenge. The situation worsens when one has to organize a training while on mission because every crew requires training and the generic support operations know how which must be applied to every crew in this constituent. The purpose of training peace keeping mission is to boost the potential of the staff to effectively complete the specific task. Training is based on a functional

³⁸International Peace Institute,(2013). *Report on Training Needs Analysis (TNA) for the African Standby Force*. Nairobi/Accra: Author

requirement and the need to assess the performance of the civilian component. Instead of the training being mission oriented, it has been redirected to individual assessment because of their absence.

Priority has been assigned by the international community to strengthen the federal government in the opening phase of the mission. Also in minimizing threats posed by the AL Shabaab. The effect was the disregard of recruitment and training of an able civil constituent.³⁹

4.7 Management of Disengaged Fighters

A partnership of AMISOM and other partners is formulating strategies, policies and plans for the administration of the Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters (CVDF). These tools have been put forward to the FGS for implementation but that is likely to fail due to inadequate financial resources. The effect will be detachment from the fighting may only be for a season as angry and unsatisfied individual may engage in banditry and other criminal activities.⁴⁰

Two main categories of disengaged fighters are: the ones arrested during combat and the ones who voluntarily surrendered to AMISOM or the Somali National Forces. AMISOM continually faces members who disengage from the Army though the resources are limited for the mission. AMISOM's role is mainly to control the deserters at certain points and hand them over to the FGS. ⁴¹ By mid-January 2013, the federal government held 1,500 disunited fighters. Similar to AMISOM, the FGS is incapacitated in the transition of the dis-united fighters.

4.8 Large Numbers of IDPs and Refugees

Al Shabaab attacks and skirmishes between the government and anti-government groups in Mogadishu have caused the displacement of a populace greater than the 1.2 billion as reported by the UN agencies. UNCHR office based in Somali estimates that 1.46 billion IDP's live in terrible

³⁹International Peace Institute,(2013).*Peace and Security Council Report*.Nairobi/Accra: Author

⁴⁰Williams, P.D. (2013).*Dealing with Disengaged Fighters: The Case of Al Shabaab*. International Peace Institute

⁴¹The Commission on the Situation In Somalia, (2013). *Report of the Chairperson*. Author

environment in extended dislocation, and hope for permanent answer is still a dream. In 2011 estimation Refugees were 684,475⁴²

The new Federal Government of Somalia has strived to enhance peace, better governance and reconciling parts have been autonomous. Still the Federal structure is very weak and vulnerable for future volatility. The outlawed group Al Shabaab still remains a threat to peace and security despite its ouster from many areas it had ground.

The Dadaab refugee is characterized by kidnappings, grenade attacks and violence posing security threats and becoming a stumbling block in delivering aid. The targets are said to be the Somali refugees, UN officials and Humanitarian agencies. The Peace keeping forces have lately been accused of harassment.⁴³ Irresponsible police actions could radicalize Kenyan Somalis which could make the situation worse than it is. Kenya is in dire need of radical security reforms as it is currently weak and ineffective.

4.9 Clan Rivalry

In both the ethnic and religion, the Somali are said to be homogenous. What divide the Somali community are the clan and the family systems which are their base of socio-political life.. The Somali is composed of five major clans and many sub-clans. Most Islamic extremists are believed to come from the Hawiye Clan which is 25% of the total Somali community and is situated in northern part of Mogadishu. Isaaq clan occupies the North-west part of Somalia and the Eastern part of Ethiopia. The most extensively distributed clan is the Darod clan which covers a wide area from Puntland to the Kenya border.⁴⁴. Despite the unpopularity of Al shabaab, Inter-clan is common and has forced many to have arms especially in the rural set up. There is a reason for doubt especially for the Kenyan army in Puntland an area not experiencing fighting. Dislike of far-off job has been cited as a very effective rallying tool. The notion that the refugees are ruthlessly treated motivates the coming and rising up of nationalism of which President Sheikh Sharif of the TFG and the Al Shabaab are taking advantage of.

⁴²The Guardian, (2011). *Dadaab Refugee Camps: 20 Years of Living in Crisis*. March, 24. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-living-in-crisis>

⁴³Human Rights Watch, (2011). *Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border*. November, 28.

⁴⁴Ulf Dahre, J.(2007). *Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa*. A Report of the 6 Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa, Lund University, August 24-26

4.10 Counter- Insurgency

Though Al Shabaab has grown weaker, it is still a formidable enemy because it has a grasp of the terrain and the local vibrancy than the foreign army which is a benefit on their side. The plans have been altered from fighting in the open to the background, giving the Kenyan armed foot soldiers to get into the interior. Their fighters camouflage as civilian and distribute the weapons. This was what the Ethiopian Army learnt in December 2006 this was when the Union of Islamic Courts set up many soldiers in the South Western Somalia and they were destroyed by the armies on land and those in the air which almost wiped out the Al shabaab but the latter adjusted their ways and used the guerilla might. It was during the Ethiopian occupation whereby there was unanimous support from both the Somali as it had been more successful than previous forces. It saw the KDF want to change tactic to use guerrilla warfare due to the terrain and civilians would be participators as they will act as the human shields.

4.11 Protecting Supply Lines and Winning Hearts and Minds

The biggest test that Kenyan Forces have encountered has been proving its own forward-deployed forces, and is further challenged since its many kilometers from the border. Another challenge waiting is a threat to attack supply convoys.⁴⁵ Till today the Kenya forces have been unsuccessful in convincing the Somalis and the possibility of being seen as liberators instead of intruders are very slim. The militant has started seeking support to tarnish the forces image and seen as a force coming to occupy. If the Kenyan Forces captures all of the Southern Somalia there will be a heavy task ahead of providing a trustworthy political leadership where Al Shabaab has gained ground. The Allied Somali Militia is likely to be unsuccessful and it will be challenged to guarantee security. In a similar case in 2006, Ethiopian forces were forced into an unfamiliar “place” that received a cold welcome by the Locals and also the TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf

4.12 Guerrilla and Terrorist Threat in Kenya.

Since Kenya invaded Somali there have been many conflicts and attacks that Al-shabaab claims responsibility. Bars and Entertainment areas were targets not forgetting the churches as well. The attacks prompted the security apparatus to heighten and strengthen security in the capital city that resulted in Al shabaab altering their tactics to the North-Eastern Region. The Al shabaab became

⁴⁵ Many of the attacks reported by Al Shabaab (via twitter) are accounts of ambushes of KDF convoys.

more courageous and began attacking Police Post and having some as prisoners. The founder of the Muslim Youth Centre located in Pumwani was mentioned as a sympathizer of the Militants in Kenya.⁴⁶ Foreign Countries have been issuing travel advisories to their citizens of possible terror attacks this is the case of the United Kingdom.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Jay, B.(2012).Al Shabaab names Kenyan leader: Appointment of Sheikh Ahmed Iman could signal coming terror attack.*Somalia Report*, January, 10.

⁴⁷Chonghaile, C. (2012). Kenya: Warning of imminent terrorist attack.*The Guardian*, January, 7.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter strives to give recommendations for the drawn conclusions on the basis of the findings. The conclusion for the research questions were drawn from the discussions. The study objectives guided the discussions presented. Conclusions to the research questions are inferred from the discussions. Finally, the chapter gives recommendations and suggestions that may be used in further research.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.1 Causes of Military Intervention in Somalia

The Military incursion in by Kenya can be attributed to political causes, economic causes and social causes. One of the political causes was the security threat that resulted from escalation of militant attacks in Kenya caused by the Al Shabaab insurgency in neighboring Somalia. This proved detrimental to Kenya's security proving Kenya with the motive for the incursion. Kenya was also seeking to preserve its boundaries from the negative impacts of the Al Shabaab attacks on tourism and the investment in Kenya. Washington's increased spending on Kenya in order for them to fight terrorism may have motivated the incursion into Somalia. The intervention could be linked to the 2013 elections whereby the intention may have been to drum up support ahead of the polls by the politicians perceived to be capable of standing up for the country as well as mitigate the risk of violence after the polls. The incursion may also arise from Kenya's interest in creating a buffer zone at its border by creating a semi-autonomous Juba to act as a deterrent against from the Somali based militant group known as Al Qaeda.

As for the economic causes, the intervention may have been driven by the oil exploration and the need to secure the disputed oil blocks of deep sea offshore between the neighboring countries. This was to facilitate Kenya's continual exploration of said blocks for its benefit. Furthermore, Kenya needed to safeguard its potential in capturing the largest share of the regional trade volume as well exporting her goods by creating a buffering zone in the Southern part of Somalia where the AL Shabaab cannot put said ability in jeopardy. It would not be much of a stretch if one thought that the intervention of Kenyan military was to secure its economic

interest as well as offer protection to the LAPSET project. For the social causes, the sheer magnitude of the refugees that were hosted by Kenya for nearly two decades was seen as a huge burden by the host communities. Particularly in regard to competition for scarce resources, depletion of resources and environmental degradation. This caused sociological, political and economic impacts in Kenya thus it is credible to associate the military intervention with in Somalia with the social issues caused by the refugee crisis.

5.2.2 Consequences of Military Intervention in Somalia

Military interventions in failed states can have different consequences depending on the nature of the intervention. From the analysis of the findings on the Kenyan intervention in Somalia, there have been both human and material damage material with the victims and injuries coming from both Somalia and Kenya. It can also be inferred that the intervention heightened Al Shabaab's attacks in Kenya in form of retaliatory attacks. The intervention may have caused the small-scale attacks and violence which are in the form of grenade attacks with the victim being the capital city, the Coastal Regions and the areas near the Kenya- Somalia border. The Kenya Government began repatriation of the half million Somali seeking refuge in Kenya despite the instability in Somalia and objections from the International community. This has resulted into a worse environment for the refugees due to harassments.

The intervention by the Kenyan forces in Somalia also strengthened AMISOM. With the forces' request to be formally part of AMISOM, the AMISOM force is currently drawn from Djibouti, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. The intervention has caused negative implication on Kenya's financial stability. This is due to the demand for increased allocation towards the war in the budget. When a country engages in war, the huge expenditure puts a strain on its budget as there arises a need to divert funds from their set purpose. The intervention has also furthered militancy in Kenya. The radicalization and recruitment into the militant group has got members from Kenya and Tanzania. This encompasses both the Somali community in Kenya and the Muslims living in the Tanzanian and Coastal region. With the increased risks of alienating Kenyan Somalis, there is a potential that Al Shabaab may regard Kenya as a breeding ground for training new members. Although there has been increased government oversight on this, the radicalization and militancy may have subsided and gone to people's homestead. As a result of

the intervention, Al Shabaab has lost major strongholds including the loss of the strategic seaport of Kismayo.

5.2.3 Challenges Faced in the Military Intervention in Somalia

There are outstanding challenges that have influenced the impact of the operation. A considerable number of Somali societies are characterized by nomadic lifestyle and there is a suspicion of much meddling in their central authority, a statement supported by an exposure to a military brutality. The success of AMISOM largely depends upon the support of the central government and its citizens. The contingents in the military force are also yearly rotated and this has there are effects of performance. This is attributed by the know-how on the terrain and tactics employed by the Al shabaab. In addition, there are challenges including a small army force in the troop.

Another problem is inadequate skilled personnel and specialized police trainers in AMISOM. The situation further worsens as police trainers are employed seasonally and leave after the completion of their cycle. The government of Somalia also is incapacitated by the conversion of the large number of disunited members. Moreover, Police irresponsible actions contribute to the insecurity and there is a possibility of more radicalization. The notion that Somali refugees are treated badly in Kenya, may also stir up nationalism. Which both and the transitional federal government President Sheikh Sharif and the Al Shabaab are trying to capitalize. Despite its weakened state, the Al Shabaab militia remains a formidable foe since it has a better understanding of the dynamics that exist locally compared to its foreign opposers. Therefore, they can maximize n this advantage. There is also the challenge of subsequent attacks by the group.

In a nutshell, the causes, consequences and challenges in the military intervention in failed states are complex and vary with contexts. However, the impact will definitely cut across the political, social and economic aspects in any context.

5.3 Recommendations

In regard to findings, the following recommendations are made:

The government must establish all-inclusive national development policies. Marginalization maybe a conducive environment for radicalization hence undermines the efforts to combat the

terror group. IN order to combat the feeling of marginalization among the people living in areas bordering Somalia, the Kenyan government should put in place development strategies that will address their well-being. The Kenyan government should put into consideration the involvement of International and regional and stakeholders as well as the Somali government in its endeavor to restore peace in Somalia. A long-term measure needs to be in place and all parties enjoined in the efforts as they are also affected by the instability in Somalia.

Kenya Should establish security policies that are adequate in its bid to protect its borders. The challenge presented by poorly equipped security agencies manifests itself and the incapability of the Police to effectively control the borders. The current policies need to be restructured and alternative methods of reform explored in order to effectively and satisfactorily secure the penetrable borders. Comparing the cost of this solution to military combating of a foreign security threat, it is found to be cost effective

The international legal law framework provides an avenue for Somalia and Kenya to deal with their oil dispute. Given that both parties are interested in exploring and securing these oil blocks, they should reevaluate the meaning of international law for them to curb the unnecessary expenditures.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Studies

More research should be conducted on military intervention in failed states in different contexts to develop a more solid conclusion on the issue. In addition, it is important that studies be done to understand the grounds for the viability of military intervention in failed states. These would go a long way to holistically understand the issue of military intervention in failed states.

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