

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**FACULTY OF ARTS**

**THE 1998 TERRORIST BOMBING AND ITS  
IMPLICATION ON SECURITY PREPAREDNESS: A CASE  
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS WITHIN  
NAIROBI CBD.**

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**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Award of Master of Arts Degree in the  
Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi.**

**SEPTEMBER, 2013**

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
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## DECLARATION

This research study is my original work and has not been presented in any other Institution for examination.

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## DEDICATION

*To My Beloved;*

- Spouse Selly, Son Dylan, and Daughters Daisy and Diana: *It was your support and constant encouragement, patience and cheering me up when I was almost giving up on finalizing the study. To my children, attaining academic excellence is not a bed of roses, grow up and flourish academic garden.*
- Parents – Johana Kitur and Elizabeth Chepkemoi: *You nurtured and initiated me to face challenges in life with humility and courage.*

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

AP	Administration Police
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CBD	Central Business District
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DARPA	Defense Research Project Agency
DSI	Directorate of Security Intelligence
DPRIP	Drought Preparedness, Intervention and Recovery Project
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EWS	Early Warning System
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GO	Gazetted Officer
GOK	Government of Kenya
GSA	General Service Administration
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
ICS	Incident Command System
IO	Information Operations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISD	Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
IRA	Irish Republican Army
KICC	Kenyatta International Conference Centre
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
LoK	Laws of Kenya
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCBD	Nairobi Central Business District
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NOC	National Operation Center
NRC	National Research Council

<b>NSA</b>	<b>National Security Agency</b>
<b>NSIS</b>	<b>National Security Intelligence Service</b>
<b>OLF</b>	<b>Oromo Liberation Front</b>
<b>PI</b>	<b>Protective Intelligence</b>
<b>RC</b>	<b>Risk Communication</b>
<b>RSRSBCM</b>	<b>Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs</b>
<b>SLDF</b>	<b>Sabaot Land Defense Force</b>
<b>SEAL</b>	<b>Sea Air Land Forces</b>
<b>SGB</b>	<b>Security of Government Buildings</b>
<b>SPLM/A</b>	<b>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /Army</b>
<b>SWOT</b>	<b>Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats</b>
<b>TEDD</b>	<b>Time Environments Distance Demeanor</b>
<b>UNDMT</b>	<b>United Nation Disaster Mitigation Team</b>
<b>USA/US</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>USAID</b>	<b>United States Agency for International Development</b>
<b>WMD</b>	<b>Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>
<b>WB</b>	<b>World Bank</b>
<b>WTC</b>	<b>World Trade Center</b>
<b>9/11</b>	<b>September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 Terrorist Attack in US Soil</b>
<b>8/7</b>	<b>August 7<sup>th</sup> 1998 Terrorist Attack at US Embassy Building in Kenya</b>



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## ABSTRACT

Security preparedness in response to emerging terrorism threat in Kenya has over time been treated casually prior to the 1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi. It is this specific terrorist incident that terrorism threat in the country became more real with buildings increasingly being predisposed to it as an appealing target. The study therefore seeks to examine security preparedness measures in 15 Government buildings within the Nairobi Central Business District (NCBD) after the bombing, with more emphasis on their effectiveness while demonstrating the need for enhancement. These measures attempts to fill critical gaps based on 70 responses and focused group discussions.

Through an exploratory study, the threat of terrorism is appraised and steps to curtail subsequent plans of attack are explored, based on risk management and threat assessment conceptual framework. Additionally, security preparedness levels evaluated to determine if they adequately addressed the research findings were analyzed for any lessons learned that could be incorporated into the national strategy.

The findings uncovered glaring security preparedness and procedural flaws which terrorists can exploit, with evidence to suggest that security preparedness several years after the bombing is still at naught, and therefore require enhancement. Similarly, it has been found that building structural and non-structural strategies may not effectively ameliorate buildings' protection without other policy frameworks on risk and or disaster management. holistic security preparedness, city building by-laws and legislations.

This study argues that enhancement, through a concerted pro-active approach, would be of great importance in addressing such short-comings in Government buildings and the country at large. In this way, existing challenges are critically examined for change as necessary to enhance preparedness, which in no uncertain terms will not only mitigate against future terrorist attacks, but also help identify and neutralize terrorist intents early enough in the attack cycle. The analysis concludes with the recommendations that a comprehensive protective security approach is a crucial national effort towards tackling any terrorist threat. This recommendation, among others, complements existing strategies, namely, physical (structural) and non-physical (human).

# CHAPTER ONE

## BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This chapter provides the background to the study and states the problem under investigation. It outlines the research objectives, hypotheses and justification for the study. The study seeks to review protective security management aspect, alongside effectiveness of the same in Government buildings within the Nairobi City CBD in the period after the 1998 bombing. Pertinent terms and concepts used in the study are defined.

### 1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Just as the 1998 terrorist incident in Nairobi is a disaster <sup>1</sup> caused by human actions, notwithstanding other forms of risk hazards caused either by man-made or natural events, hitherto present vulnerability challenges to buildings necessitate certain measure of preparedness. The bombing incident cannot therefore be assumed to be the main reason for general security preparedness in all Government buildings <sup>2</sup> owing to a single terrorism-related event. Although buildings remain predisposed to other risks such as fire outbreak, electric faults, gas leak and organized violent robberies, as well as natural disasters like earthquakes, safety and security measures as a yardstick for preparedness within the city contribute to overall security preparedness in the country. Similarly, a bombing disaster in any of the Government buildings within the Nairobi Central Business District (NCBD) portends far-reaching ramifications to both human live and property, given that various ministries and departments offer vital public services therein. For example such service delivery aspects, including passports, birth/death/marriage/good conduct certificates issuance, motor vehicle registration, tax payment lobbies and judicial services, may suffer greatly in the event of a bombing. Consequently, it is the study's intention therefore to look at security management as a remedial step against terrorism threat with regard to Government buildings within the NCBD, which has overtime been treated casually prior to the 1998 terrorist bombing in the country.

Thus, the question is; 'are protective security management measures in Government buildings in the period after the 1998 terrorist bombing adequate or there is need for

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<sup>1</sup> A disaster is seen in the light of an unexpected event that may drastically threaten the lives of people in a building or damage buildings altogether thus disrupting services (Eden and Matthews 1996).

<sup>2</sup> This refers to in this study to government building whose construction, setting up and or usage involve public finances and only covering those within Nairobi's CBD.

enhancement'. Ironically, these buildings cannot be said to have been without any security or risk management strategy to cushion against any eventuality, more so fire and/or unauthorized access by 'homegrown' criminal minded individual or group <sup>3</sup> during the period before the 1998 bombing. A comparative study, for example, indicates that there were more than 250 bombing attacks in the United States of America (USA) against buildings from fellow Americans reported in 1997 (*GSA Public Building Service, 2000*). In the same light, one might tend to argue that although the 1998 bombing attack seems so distant, the threat may or may not be as visible in Kenya due to unpublicized level of the Government's preparedness, which could invariably thwart such threats. Furthermore, even though the terrorism threat may be dealt with early enough and disrupted prior to execution by proactive Government security management systems, other salient features of security preparedness cannot be over-emphasized.

While pondering about this preparedness component, the study acknowledged a new dimension in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century taken by terrorism in Africa and that emphasizes the use of unconventional means practiced in the Middle and Far East, Latin America and the Western world, both in rural and urban areas. It is on the basis of this notion that terrorism throughout history associated with violence against people or property targeting a given population has shifted to public buildings frequented by a large number of people. As a consequence, buildings in cities worldwide are slowly becoming the most compelling targets for contemporary terrorists, despite their predisposition to other forms of threats, a high-consequence event making it difficult to guarantee protective counter-measures in buildings (Department of State, April 1998). It is worth noting that these unforeseen or clandestinely planned perilous actions targeted at buildings cannot be entirely prevented, but there is always an incontrovertible need for security and/or disaster preparedness strategy so that their negative effects may be minimized.

To contextualize the terrorism threat and overall security management practices geared towards pre-empting such heinous acts targeted on Government buildings, as posited in the study, is equally critical. First, before pondering the how of this question, it is important to determine the nature of the threat and partially who is/are likely to be involved in executing it. This is necessary because terrorist attacks are normally a product

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<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, there is a general view that threats and or attempts made by local criminal gangs and or 'homegrown' violent individual or group to attack banks or police stations since the 1998 bombing have been thwarted severally.

of fastidious planning and ingenuity, which require concerted efforts to prevent prior to the actual attack, while taking into consideration other proactive actions. To avert possible consequences of terror attack in buildings, security preparedness<sup>4</sup> plans and/or management may be one sure way to effectively respond to such emergencies (Kahn 2003). Consequently, such preparedness management is vital because the detection aspect as a measure has grown more than fifty percent since 1999 for federal buildings, since terrorism remains a greater threat to US interests both in and outside the country (Nyatepe, 2004). In contrast, Kenya's security preparedness strategy to generally deal with the terrorism threat is still quite unexplored in various aspects, leave alone physical security protection, since very few buildings, as in most countries, are constructed with designs based on a specific security criterion (Nadel, 1998).

Overall, buildings' vulnerability to the terrorism threat therefore requires a certain level of preparedness, which seems to be inadequate, given the disastrous impact, for example, on buildings adjacent to the former US Embassy building. Indeed, the collateral damages from the bomb blasts –attributed to a relatively low-key security arrangement at the facility and poor structural designs in adjacent buildings, like the former Ufundi Cooperative House, –are indicators that specific aspects of the preparedness component were lacking. In the study by a US study group, the former US Embassy building had no active preparations for attacks from persons, vehicles or explosives, thus falling short of the “standard requirements” accepted by the State Department years earlier (*Ibid* pg. 15). That is why Susan Rice (then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) asserted that; *‘had the terrorists gained access, particularly into the underground garage of the US Embassy, akin to other typical modus operandi elsewhere, the damage to the facility and loss of life could have been greater’* (World Socialist Website, 8<sup>th</sup> August 1998).

To underscore the importance of preparedness, the then Israel Ambassador to the US emphasized after the blast that; *‘The way an embassy is constructed, the way people can get to the building, what construction materials are used ought to be taken into account just as vigilance counts’* (Zalman Shova, 1998). This line of thought is posited by a number of security scholars in regard to both structural and non-structural management

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<sup>4</sup> This denotes security practices that include traditional security strategies encompassing physical and human measures in government buildings. It covers structural designs and proactive law enforcement and or intelligence actions. This term ‘security preparedness’ is the key parameter considering the aim of the study which is viewed in the same light with ‘disaster preparedness’ components captured in the literature review.

strategies by way of hardening of buildings and threat assessment component. In this case therefore, ensuring that the security preparedness aspect serves its intended purpose in a terrorist threat situation depends on diverse factors: First, understanding terrorist attack cycle which is a culmination of six-stages ( target selection, planning, deployment, the attack, escape and exploitation )<sup>5</sup> remains critical in the overall inquiry. It is this particular threat and how it is dealt with well in advance, irrespective of inherent detection difficulties that the study focuses on. According to STRATFOR, 'the threat posed by terrorist operatives, and the difficulty of identifying them, highlight the need for counter-programs that adopt a proactive, protective intelligence approach focusing on "the how"/mode of attacks instead of just "the who"<sup>6</sup>.

This approach encapsulates threat assessment as the foremost ingredient to the study because any terrorist attack may be averted substantially if there is a foolproof security preparedness management plan. Based on the ever emerging terrorism threat therefore, security preparedness, touching on both structural/physical protection (metal detectors and gates systems) and non-structural/human (intelligence/policing aspects), have been identified in the study as salient features. These protective security management aspects entail policies or actions and/or structural designs instituted to minimize the extent of damage before the threat occurs. It also entails a review of some of the building's preparedness factors based on national or municipal strategies immediately after the 1998 terrorist bombing. The goal to enhance these security preparedness arrangements in Government buildings, though not a conclusive panacea to the complex nature of ensuring total security in the country, is supported by Nadel Laugh's assertion that '*...there is no cookbook to solving all potential threats since every building is different...just as the security criteria attempt to define how a solution should perform in any given situation, rather than establishing hard-and-fast rules that cannot be tailored to specific needs*'<sup>7</sup>.

The findings of the study are expected to aid in better management of security preparedness and policy measures, including development of appropriate security

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<sup>5</sup> The threat phase has been mainly articulated by American security arrangement. (ICS Study, 2005)

<sup>6</sup> STRATFOR Intelligence report, 2005. 'STRATFOR in Vulnerabilities in the Terrorist Attack Cycle dated September 29, 2005 2324 GMT'.

<sup>7</sup> Nadel, 1998 : 22

strategies in the City and/or countrywide. Additional terms related to the study are defined in section 1.6 of this chapter.

## 1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

If the terrorist threat as an aftermath of the 1998 bombing is anything to go by, one could expect capacity to protect critical infrastructure within the City and countrywide to be the Government's Herculean task. This is attributable to the fact that terrorist bombing targeting buildings for attacks remain a major security threat in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as terrorists seek to inflict maximum intimidation through destruction of property and loss of life, putting to test general security preparedness now more than ever before the turn of the century. The main task for the study therefore implies that security preparedness in the 15 Government buildings within Nairobi were significantly enhanced structurally or non-structurally following the bombing. Conversely, lack of preparedness could lead to huge sums of money being used for repair, provision of material and other equipment in the affected buildings in the post-attack period. This goes without saying that service delivery in buildings is bound to be critically disrupted for indefinite days, besides other far-reaching repercussions in terms business loss, death and damage to property. In fact, the 53 buildings, especially the Ufundi Cooperative House, severely damaged during the 1998 bombings also affected telephone, power lines as well as shattered windows thrown as far as 10 building blocks, an indicator of possible inadequate security preparedness.

The explanations in several literature of terrorists targeting critical infrastructure, particularly hard targets, is to maximize the psychological effects through disrupting the normal flow of business and creating an atmosphere of anxiety and panic, injuring people and damaging property to obtain publicity for their cause <sup>8</sup>, hence the study's attempt to look at the nexus between security preparedness in Government buildings and terrorism attack risk. It is on the strength of Laugh's assertion that terrorists "*want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead*" <sup>9</sup> that the most logical thing to do is to beef up the security preparedness level in Government buildings. However, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) <sup>10</sup> emphasizes that the level of security preparedness, both at critical Government buildings and general preparedness, cannot be said to be foolproof in view of the ever growing terrorism threat. Given that terrorists do not discriminate when they do

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<sup>8</sup> Coule, 2000: 63

<sup>9</sup> Laugh, 2000: 45

<sup>10</sup> ISD in '*The 1998 Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania*', 2005

execute attacks, ideal security preparedness therefore minimizes re-building or repairs of damaged buildings. In fact, funds that could have been used after the disaster for restoration purposes could as well be utilized in other pressing socio-economic issues.

Consequently, the degree of preparedness varies from building to building, depending on the location, access and security strategy in place. According to Buchanan, an effective security preparedness strategy has more often than not been overlooked even if it is a fundamental safety issue <sup>11</sup>, hence the study's attempt to find out probable rationale for security preparedness in Government buildings in the ensuing period after the 1998 bombing. That is why in one of his post-disaster situations overview, brings forth such questions with regard to status of structural and non-structural arrangements aimed at mitigating disasters and risks in buildings. The answers to this question possibly lie on whether there are indicators of these arrangements, as well as adequacy of other practices in terms of legislation and/or policy to harmonize pre-attack efforts in a more proactive approach irrespective of terrorists' threats from within and without by way of physical protection, intelligence and other appropriate measures. It is also imperative to look at directional, operational, tactical planning and operational intelligence synergy, as well as adequacy of resources that affect their overall standard performance of Government security preparedness.

Similarly, the belated reaction to such terrorist attack, threat or even ordinary crime as a means to unearth and possibly arrest those responsible for such heinous acts implies that security preparedness approach, largely seen as a law-enforcement aspect, may or may not need to focus on apprehending the criminals but rather disrupting in advance mainly at the planning stage or during the execution period. This proactive approach of catching and prosecuting criminals of all kinds, including terrorists, may assist in preventing such acts in future, with the *how* being a key ingredient in addressing the study's question.

In a bid to address issues depicted in the preceding paragraphs in light of the level of preparedness in Government buildings within Nairobi's Central Business District (CBD) for recommendation of best possible practice, the study was therefore guided by the following research questions:-

- a) What were the existing security preparedness measures in Government buildings?

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<sup>11</sup> Buchanan 2000



- b) How have security preparedness measures been enhanced to minimize the effects of potential terrorism threat future disasters after the 1998 Nairobi terrorist bombing?
- c) How effective are these security management practices adopted in buildings housing Government departments and institutions within the CBD?
- d) What recommendations can be made for better management of security preparedness in Government buildings and the country at large?

### **1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

#### **1.3.1 Broad Objectives**

The study evaluated the impact of the 1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi on security practices and/or protective measures adopted in Government buildings within the CBD.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

The following specific objectives were formulated based on the broad objectives. Based on the specific objectives, the study sought to:

- a) Establish preparedness measures the Government has adopted to forestall future terrorist incidents in Government buildings within the Nairobi CBD.
- b) Define existing gaps or failures of measures adopted.

### **1.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY**

The study, justified at the academic and policy level, serves to fill a gap in research regarding security preparedness in public buildings, as very little is presently published on the subject. Additionally, as the literature review in Chapter 2 will show, security preparedness in Government buildings seems to be lopsided. It is also on the basis of literature that exists elsewhere on security, risk management and counter terrorism efforts that a Kenyan view of these emerging phenomena has not been overly dealt with. Distinctively, there is no proof that preparedness efforts in the country, alongside internationally accepted approach in the period before and after the 1998 bombing, has been documented. For instance, there is no direct correlation between security controls in Government buildings and the country at large and the threat of ongoing terrorism threat, except may be a semblance of a symbiotic approach in addressing the threat that seem far from being seen as a war being fought by foreign entities inside Kenyan territory.

While the study will be keen to establish the relationship between the existing security measures at the time of the 1998 terrorist bombing and those put in place after, appropriate strategies and suitable guidelines that will ensure that resultant processes or development of new ones altogether will assist in enhancing their efficacy, since the norm has been that security and disaster preparedness approaches have been more reactive than proactive. Based on such a scenario, one could best contend that enhancing security preparedness as a minimum measure could go a long way in addressing long term homegrown and international terrorism threat. In this way, the study will be able to prove that security preparedness measures in place and those to be modified based on the recommendations may assist in reducing negative effects of future risks.

The academic rationale on the other hand seeks to augment and further provoke other academicians to look afresh at diverse insight into the 1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi and implications on targeting of diverse buildings alongside their preparedness in the country. The import of this to future research efforts is that it provides the basics of; what security preparedness premised on protective security is all about, whether it is useful, and whether the Kenyan national security aspirations are at a point where the development of security systems, policies and frameworks is sufficient. Future research could also focus on other facets of security risk management in other aspects, with the overall aim of safeguarding national security and safety of the Kenyan people.

Similarly, the basis of this study is also founded on literature review indicating inadequate research on protective and/or national security policy framework adopted by the Government after the bombing. Indeed, it is quite some time since the bombing occurred and key components of security led-policing and preparedness efforts being adequately appreciated in Government circles, yet they are pertinent in cushioning against any future disasters, including potential terrorism threat. This study will therefore enable researchers to have a better understanding of security preparedness approaches, which will inform future studies as useful institutional memory and reference material.

On policy, this study is significant because it shows the importance of security preparedness with reasonable and suitable protective activity addressing plausible threats in Government buildings and the country at large. The anticipated recommendations seek to achieve two specific objectives. The first goal is to fill the gap in identifying and

analyzing the requisite measures, beginning with security preparedness and cascading down to preparedness policy. The second is to recommend a more proactive security assessment and risk management by adding operational and strategic level security analyses in the envisaged national security policy and related counter-terrorism mechanisms, like legislations as well as disaster management policy.

### **1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION**

The study deals with a statistically rare field relating to security preparedness in 15 Government buildings located within the CBD in Nairobi City, Kenya. It delves into an area few scholars in Kenya have exhaustively given due diligence it deserved, so that in keeping with the greater safeguarding of such sensitive facility, this study is not about burglars and/or those whose deeds may pose minor threats, but rather a terrorist threat that falls within the purview of this study, whose ramifications remain far and wide. As a result, the focus remains on proactive means against potential terrorists by way of actionable strategies, both for buildings and at the national level.

An investigation of all buildings was not practical due to limited resources and time, hence the study's consideration of controlled respondents from selected fifteen (15) Government buildings within the CBD and purposively-selected security experts. Given that these buildings vary in use, size and structural designs, of paramount importance to the study are the traditional security strategies revolving around structural and non-structural measures, together with viable deterrence and/or security agencies' ability to contain risks or threats during the period after the 1998 bombing. Examination of structural and non-structural security measures put in place after the Nairobi bombing cover physical aspects like perimeter fences, gates, types of window glass, electronic monitoring devices and actual security personnel operating in these facilities, besides the Governments' protective intelligence system. All these are expected to shade more light on overall preparedness in the city and the country at large. Actionable strategies, including contingency plans, cannot be overemphasized due to the fact that sustained enhancement of these strategies is essential for integrated security and disaster since non-compliance yields temporary results at a very high cost.

Government documents, legislative books, journals and research articles have been helpful to the study despite limited literature on the subject matter and difficulties encountered

during the research period, particularly on inquiries touching on such sensitive security matter. Since the literature review does not posit known terrorists having been interviewed in a scholarly study, quantitative methods will not suffice in addressing the research objectives of proactive security measures to uncover practical surveillance, planning, attack and escape innovations of potential terrorists. Hence, the views from security, law enforcers and authoritative security experts offer credible judgments in the study, besides application of both qualitative and tria-polation methods<sup>12</sup>.

Similarly, available literature contains such analysis on terrorism and internationally accepted counter measures, yet analysis appears more limited on pragmatic lessons and inferential guidance that seem applicable to Kenyan security preparedness/protective countermeasures. The study also relied on observation, thus constrained because much of the information providing a comprehensive analysis on security measures in Government buildings were classified, just as difficulties getting hold of real time terrorists and the Government's anti-terrorism operational plan. However, limited research on terrorist targeting Government buildings in Kenya suggests that there is still room to chart a course to guard against related risks in future.

## 1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The definition of terms and concepts used extensively in the document are given below:

***Disaster Management:*** This refers to strategies developed to contain disruption before and after, for example a terrorist attack in a building and those affected. *Disaster* herein refers to a disruptive occurrence leading to losses in life and property. Disasters are typically divided into three (3) main categories: technological disasters, natural disasters, and complex emergencies<sup>13</sup>

***Domestic terrorism:*** There is no clear definition of domestic terrorism but for purposes of the study this refers to a kind of terrorist activities undertaken by an individual or group within Kenya. The subject could be a Kenyan returnee who could possibly have acquired illegal combat training by Somalia Al Shabaab type operatives outside the country or a violent individual or group targeting a given populace.

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<sup>12</sup> This is a term used to scientifically corroborate data obtained from various sources.

<sup>13</sup> Piper, 1999

***Emergency:*** This refers to any abrupt event that can cause death or injury to building occupants or that which threaten the facility's position as a public safety.

***Government building:*** This refers to any building exclusively owned or leased by the Government of Kenya for use in discharging its core responsibilities.

***Hazard:*** This refers to threats to humans and what they value. Its management entails measures to control or to mitigate undesired consequences.

***Internecine:*** Conflict that spills over into another country or fought on foreign soil.

***Mass Casualty Event:*** This refers to a situation aimed at reducing or avoiding, if possible, the potential losses from hazards and appropriate assistance to victims.

***Mitigation:*** This refers to policies and professional approaches that can be used to prevent and minimize the economic impact and social disruption of a terrorist attack.

***Non-military counter-terrorism:*** This refers to the use of surveillance or covert operation efforts.

***Non structural protection*** implies short term physical presence of human security in form of armed guards and long term intelligence-led approach.

***Risk Management Framework:*** A planning methodology that outlines the process for setting security goals; identifying assets, systems, networks, and functions; assessing risks; prioritizing and implementing protective programs; measuring performance; and taking corrective action for both public and private sector entities (DHS, 2005). In this light, *Risk* it is an assessment of possible damage that could lead to fear (threat) and loss (consequence) from plausible terrorist attack or any other disaster incident. Consequently, *Risk Communication* refers to a social process where an individual or group is informed about hazards, the resultant behavioral change and participation in decision-making on risks.

***Plans of Action:*** Emergency plans in the event of bombing or any other threat.

***Protective security intelligence:*** This is the process used to identify and assess threats by way of 3 crucial stages of counter surveillance, investigations and analysis.

***Protective Intelligence (PI):*** This is another term for threat assessment approach that entails a means of identifying suspicions or unfathomable terrorists and their activities.

***Terrorist group:*** A group that practices terrorism.

***Security designs:*** These are management models meant to mitigate and reduce impact or prevent unauthorized persons from entering a building.

***Security Preparedness measures*** are the structural and non-structural measures in buildings. ***Structural measures*** therefore entail physical aspects in building like perimeter fence, main gates, doors and electronic detectors, while ***Non-structural measures*** are mainly human aspects in terms of personnel or security officers assigned to security duties and/or contingency plans/action plans.

***Soft target building:*** This includes business premises like hotels, supermarkets, schools and those housing national heritage usually with limited security.

***Threat assessment*** or protective security intelligence (PSI) is the process of gathering and assessing information about persons who may have the interest, motive, intention, and capability of mounting attacks against public officials and/or workplace.

***Terrorist Target Areas or buildings:*** Those with such critical economic and symbolic importance, including police stations, energy and water installations, and other symbolic soft targets such as schools.

***Terrorist threat:*** This is a term consider in the study as the central issue that entails vulnerability to stability of state or safety of buildings. Threat referred therein is seen light of a natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property (DHS, 2009). It is also categorized as homegrown or international carried out by terrorists not limited to lone / deranged / mentally disturbed person who violently target a section of the population. For consistency sake, terrorism threat will be used in this study to refer to both cases.

***Time Environments Distance Demeanor (TEDD):*** The acronym TEDD in security cycles illustrates the principles used to identify criminal threats.

***Weapons of Mass Destruction:*** These refer to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives. ***State-sponsored:*** Those executed by a Government against its own people or other states.

***Vulnerability:*** A weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or technological failure<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> DHS, 2009

## CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

The chapter simulates literature review in relation to terrorism threat and security preparedness in Government buildings, alongside national strategies highlighting past experiences and subsequent actions in view of a bombing threat. Analytical synopsis of possible causes of terrorism, preparedness approaches and the role of the Government in the event of an attack targeted at buildings under the purview of protective security are also explored. In this way, scholarly work, Laws of Kenya (LoK) relating to security preparedness, including those of the security organs, were reviewed with the sole aim of addressing the research questions. The conceptual framework and research hypothesis are finally outlined.

### 2.1 TERRORISM THREAT AND SECURITY PREPAREDNESS

The starting point for the literature review focuses on threat identification with regard to tactics used by terrorists and appropriate protective measures to circumvent vulnerabilities in Government buildings. For example, the threat of a moving vehicle containing explosives may be neutralized by designing protective measures to mitigate the threat. Since terrorists' preference of buildings as choice of attack in the period preceding 1990, has been depicted by some scholars to have increased in frequency and severity. This trend also saw terrorists all over the world heightening those activities revolving around hijacking of airplanes, business leaders, sportsmen, world leaders, among other nationals, kidnapping and subsequent murders (*Macionis, 1991*). Consequently, the need for security preparedness, the domain of protective security, has over time become a subject of scrutiny. However, in a bid to address the research question, the risk vulnerability in view of preparedness in Government buildings remains the focal point, especially if there are no clear threat assessment criteria, unifying legislation, national plan and/or policy framework for inter-agency synergy in dealing with the terrorism threat.

In this perspective, the primary task of protecting Government buildings and/or the country at large against the terrorism threat rests squarely on structural and non-structural aspects of protection. For example, looking at the roles of the three internal security organs, namely Kenya Police, Administration Police, and NSIS, it can be discerned that securing Government buildings and preventing other forms of organized crime in the country, especially domestic and/or international terrorism, remain a cardinal goal. In



order to understand the broader context of security preparedness and how it suits the overall security strategy, it is imperative to comprehend how terrorism threat in Kenya has impacted on co-ordination efforts of these agencies as well as physical protective devices that may aid in answering the research question.

First, it is important to explore the possibility of domestic terrorism threat on the strength of Scott Stewart's assertion that 'grassroot jihadists need not to spend a lot of money to manufacture 10 grams of explosive material... as they may not need to "*waste a long time finding the materials, because you can find all these in your mother's kitchen or readily at hand in any city you are in*" (Scott Stewart, 2009). This means that a simple attack can easily pass the test of a terror attack given readily available weapons such as knives, clubs or small Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Kenya, given the rising number of resentful unemployed youth engrossed with enticement by such criminal groups like *Taliban, Mungiki* or Somalia's *Al-Shabaab* fighters.

Secondly, Kenya continues to face external threats being a soft target of international terrorism largely attributed to internecine effects and the vast western interests in the country as confessed by the 1993 World Trade Centre terrorist convict Ramzi Ahmed Yousef that: '*If you cannot attack your enemy, you should attack the friend of your enemy*' (Benjamin Weiser, 1998). Be that as it may, both hard and soft targets in the country, particularly the critical infrastructure, including Government buildings, rail system, ports, big shopping malls in the City or the rural tourist resorts frequented by foreign tourists and any symbol of western interests, could be targeted. These two illustrations enabled the study to appreciate the nexus between the meaning of terrorism threat and security preparedness.

According to the US Department of Army's Field Manual (FM) <sup>15</sup>, four major objectives describe a terrorist's behavior (the first three can be used to realize the fourth). These objectives strive to—

- i. Inflict injury or death on people.
- ii. Destroy or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
- iii. Steal equipment, materiel, or information.
- iv. Create adverse publicity.

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<sup>15</sup> (FM 3-19.30, 2001)

The following section explores terrorism and how it can be identified as well as security preparedness in Kenya.

### 2.1.1 Meaning of Terrorism

First it is important to understand what terrorism means because the term has been used liberally, while a number of scholars do not agree on a common definition. It is also worth noting that no country has had a wholly acceptable definition due to circumstantial interpretations of violence with international law –for instance recognizing only crimes such as mass murder, illegal fund-raising, being in possession of illicit explosives or arms, hijacking, hostage-taking and sabotage. In most instances, it is defined according to location (*domestic or international*) and/or issue-oriented (revolutionary, nationalist or environmental). A simple definition for the term terrorism can be derived from the word terror, which implies a well-organized use of macabre violence calling attention to a certain problem or emphasizing the desire for change (*Macionis, 1991*). This line of thinking informed the study's description of risks relating to terrorism for its repulsiveness and inculcation of widespread fear arising out of wide ranging causes and consequences with use of terror and assassinations, for instance, is documented in the Bible <sup>16</sup>.

Other inferences from different scholars posit at least 109 definitions of terrorism ranked in order of gravity from motives (publicity), goals (such as political), purposes (create fear), targets (victim's reaction), and methods (combat strategy or tactic) (*Schmid, 1988*). These definitions have received wide criticism by some scholars on grounds that most definitions are confused with fear, fright and alarm, and yet easily distinguishable from acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations, leafleting and rioting (*William Dyson, 2001*). In Kenya, the proposed Suppression of Terrorism Bill (2003) attempts to depict terrorism as acts advancing religious, political ideology or environmental activism (Sect. 1), like the Green Belt Movement. This presumably mirrored the US Patriot Act of 2001, describing terrorism in terms of such criminal activities like assault, damage to property, trespass (Sect.12 (1) and attire (Section 12).

Several definitions in the US have been documented with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) describing it as 'the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal law of the United States for purposes of intimidation.


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<sup>16</sup> Use of terror has been cited in several verses in the Old Testament books of Numbers and Joshua.

coercion or ransom' hence 'methods' (FBI, 1998), while the US State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) emphasize 'motives' and 'goals' respectively (Simonsen et al, 2000). However, political motivation is a common element in most definitions, and thus a distinction between the elements of *method* and *target* (Gus Martin, 2003).

In Table 1.1, terrorism is depicted as part of an evolving conflict in a sequential manner (Jonathan White, 2002).

**Figure 1: Evolution of Conflict**



Terrorism has also been explained as evolving into insurrection or civil war, when for instance 25% of the population is engaged in the violence can be best described as becoming revolutionary (Dyson, 2001). It is of essence to also note that modes of terrorist attack are *traditional* (ordinary weapons), *technological* (Weapons of Mass Destruction - WMD) and *cyber*, where viruses or destruction of information infrastructure occur with its force multipliers effect in form of technology, media and religion.

### Common Tactics used by Terrorism

There are several known offensive strategies used by terrorists in realizing their objectives and capabilities that have been over time been categorized into 13 tactics / specific method so far motivating their pursuit. According to the US Field Manual 3-19.30, these specific offensives include but not limited to;

- **Forced-entry** where the terrorist forcibly enters a facility using forced-entry tools (such as hand, power, and thermal tools) and or explosives. He uses the tools to create a man-passable opening or to operate a device in the facility's walls, doors, roof, windows, or utility openings. *He may also use small arms to over-power guards. His goal is usually to steal or destroy assets, compromise information, injure or kill facility occupants, or disrupt operations.*
- **Covert-entry** where terrorist attempts to enter a facility or a portion of a facility by using false credentials or stealth. He may try to carry weapons or explosives into the facility. His goals include those listed for forced-entry.

- **Moving vehicle bomb** or stationary vehicle bomb. A terrorist drives into a building and detonates (suicide attack) or covertly parks an explosive-laden car or truck near a facility /detonates the explosives by either time delay or remote control. The goal is to damage or destroy the facility or to kill people within the blast area.  
*(Both tactics have been cited as having been used in the 1998 Nairobi /Dares Salaam bombing).*
- **Insider-compromise.** A person authorized access to a facility (an insider) attempts to compromise assets by taking advantage of that accessibility. The terrorist may also try to carry weapons or explosives into the facility in this tactic. His goals are the same as those listed for forced-entry.
- **Exterior attack.** A terrorist attacks a facility's exterior at close range. He uses weapons such as improvised incendiary or explosive devices, and hand grenades.  
*(This has been a common phenomenon in most urban violence in Africa- recent Garissa Church attack)*  
*Stand off weapons.* A terrorist fires military weapons or improvised versions of military weapons at a facility from a significant distance. These weapons include direct (such as anti-tank [AT] weapons) or mortars). For example, those used by the 2001 Kikambala suspects who attempted to shot at a plane taking off at Moi International Airport, Mombasa.
- **Ballistics.** The terrorist fires various small arms (such as pistols, sub-machineguns, shotguns, and rifles) from a distance. The goal is to damage building as well as to injure or kill its occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
- **Electronic-emanations eavesdropping.** The terrorist uses it from outside a facility or its restricted area to monitor electronic-emanations from computers, communications, and related equipment. His goal is to compromise information.
- **Mail-bomb delivery.** The terrorist delivers bombs or incendiary devices to the target in letters or packages. The bomb sizes involved are relatively small. His goal is to kill or injure people.
- **Supplies-bomb delivery.** The terrorist conceals bombs in various containers and delivers them to supply-and material-handling points such as loading docks. The bomb sizes in this tactic can be significantly larger than those in mail-bombs. His goal is to damage the facility, kill or injure its occupants, or damage or destroy assets.

- **Air-borne contamination/chemical or biological.** A terrorist contaminates a facility's air supply by introducing chemical or biological agents in to it. His goal is to kill or injure people.
- **Water-borne contamination.** A terrorist contaminates a facility's water supply by introducing chemical, biological, or radiological agents in to it. These agents can be introduced into the system at any location with varying effects, depending on the quantity of water and the contaminant involved. His goal is to kill or injure people. (US Field Manual 3-19.30, 2001).

### **Forms of Terrorism**

There are several forms of terrorism, with a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones motivated primarily by religious concerns (*Hoffman, 1993*). Several scholars termed them as **religious terrorism**, with its institutional memory dating back to the history of humankind. It includes major religions and its offspring sects, cults and alternative religions that condone violence. The perilous groups are associated with apocalyptic thinking who belief in the end of the world and more so those engaging in a buildup of various weapons for defense (*Lewy, 1974 & White, 2002*). The apocalyptic logic is rooted in millenarianism depicted by self-destruction or Doomsday founded on indoctrination process, where one strips of the real identity in place of a false background history, thereafter using a cover story to mislead Government counter agencies toward the wrong target in case of capture or arrest (*Juergensmeyer, 2001*). Such "Doomsday" terrorists include Aum Shinrikyo (who released nerve gas called serene on a Tokyo subway, Japan, in 1995) and Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah with interesting obsession and megalomania (*Jessica Stern, 1999*).

Another branch of religious terrorism is based on the historical perception of Muslims being violent-like and anti-Western. Such phrases as '*Islam is the opposite of peace because it submits to the will of Allah...to fight and slay the non-believers wherever they find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war*' (*The Koran, Surah LX: 5*) highlight a new facet for scholars.

### ***Nationalistic Terrorism***

The idea of nationalism as a form of terrorism took a new dimension in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century with the emergence of Mao's victorious Cultural Revolution that brought down the imperial Manchu China in 1949, similar to the non-violent tactics of Mahatma Gandhi in India (*Juergensmeyer, 2001*). In Africa, pre-independence anti-colonialism activities between 1945 to 1975 in most of the 54 countries has been categorized by some scholars as a form of nationalistic 'Wars of Independence' owing to use of guerrilla tactics, like the Mau Mau freedom fighters in Kenya. Other arguable forms, include actor-sponsored terrorism of the 1994 Rwanda and Burundi ethnic cleansing and genocide perpetrated by armed militia groups against innocent civilians. Frank Fanon also contends that urban terrorism was practiced in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America <sup>17</sup>.

It is also in the context of modern day use of violence by a group that the Soviet Union in 1991 for example saw 14 states declaring independence with Russia retaining Chechnya, hence the Chechen war that began in 1999 persisting to date. As a result Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) remains a fighting force against the Russian domination. This fighting has manifested itself into terrorism due to the nuclear black market, smuggling of depleted plutonium, cesium, and other radioactive material that makes "dirty" bombs (*White, 2002*). Generally, this explains the reason why the US and other Western powers have characterized some countries as 'hot spots' and low intensity conflicts 'gray area phenomenon' in the world, with the Balkans, Kashmir, Somalia, and the Congo being depicted as 'powder kegs', while Syria, Iran, Afghanistan's Taliban regime, Sudan and Iraq continue to being key suspects secretly sponsoring global terrorism (*White, 2002*). Use of explosives/bombs by such groups cannot be overemphasized.

### ***Technological Terrorism***

Today, a number of countries are facing threats of attacks on their populations and critical infrastructural software. These threats include manipulation of electronic information or 'Cyber terror' by organized crime syndicates or anarchists-type groups. It entails elaborate intent to destroy databases, raise funds, securing communications with other terrorists' cells or causing disruption to infrastructure like power grids, police databases,

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<sup>17</sup> (*Frantz Fanon, 1985*) This is based on his assertion that 'as long as we have the wretched of the earth among us, we shall have terrorism'.

medical network transportations and financial transactions, easily executed via the Internet with complete anonymity, little risk and few resources (*Rathmell, 1998*). Shift in tactics by terrorists towards conclusive methods, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as a weapon of choice is also a worrying trend over time. The years after 1990s marked the age of super-terrorism with the use of WMD, despite suffering from overly obtuse and dry theoretical treatment (*Ehud Sprinzak, 1998, Rosenthal 2001*).

### **2.1.2 Sociological and Historical Perspective on Terrorism**

Using the Parsonian explanation<sup>18</sup>, O'Connor developed some sociological premise regarding terrorism to include relative deprivation hypothesis, frustration-aggression hypothesis, egotistic rage hypothesis, negative identity hypothesis and moral disengagement hypothesis (*O'Connor, 1994*). A number of scholars have also managed to come up with a fair description of terrorist personality that include those with low self-esteem attracted to groups with charismatic leaders because they enjoy risk-taking ventures. Other psychological considerations include ineffective parenting or rebellion against one's parents and/or a pathological need for absolutism. Known attributes about terrorists indicate that people who tend to join terrorist organizations; those between the ages of 22-25 years, 80% male with women in support roles, 75-80% single, 66% middle or upper class background, 66% in college or graduate work, 42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups, 17% unemployed and 18% with strong religious beliefs (*Ross, 1999*). Similarly, other studies indicate that most suicide terrorists are between the ages of 16 and 28, mainly men who come from poor backgrounds and with limited education, although some come from wealthy families and have university degrees<sup>19</sup>. These are some of the attributes associated with sub-cultural phenomena, which develop, support, and enhance a penchant for cold-blood and calculated violence, an indication that terrorism is a social activity where an individual joins it for diverse reasons.

Some scholars have attempted to distinguish between terrorists who desire to "destroy the nation, or world, of their fathers", and those who desire to "carry on the mission, or world, of their fathers" in a somewhat neo-Freudian of Oedipus Complex, which Post indicated

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<sup>18</sup> *The explanations for these behaviours have been further expounded by labeling tradition highlighting conjecture that the confinement of people and groups within state-administered categories of criminality, punishment and retribution promotes not rehabilitative humanity but rather a downward spiral of crime, criminalization, and inhumanity for the individuals and groups targeted by such a system (Ferrell, 1998)*

<sup>19</sup> (*Merari, 1990*).

entails hating or loving your father, or at least the "world" they represent<sup>20</sup>. The biological conjecture of "fight or flight", implying a state of arousal under stress has also been applied to crime, hence the behavioral requirements of such activities (fighting excitement before an event, and fleeing manipulation of audience after an event) producing a pattern of physiological need for stimulation at regular intervals.

Most psychology and criminology scholars maintained that anarchists upheld use of violence by embracing the principles of self-liberation from oppressive and coercive relationships as they use such phrases as '*terrorists target people; anarchists target things like institutions and structures*'<sup>21</sup>. As the highest form of revolutionary struggle, most anarchists engaged in murder-suicide in a rather logical notion about the rationale of confrontation. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, anarchists were involved in bombing, among other vices, until it was phased out owing to the rise of communism and fascism in 1917. Ferrell maintains that anarchists detest "state-protection racket", fines like for motor vehicle parking, plethora of licensing fees and state law relating to, among others, impoundment, seizure, imprisonment, and death penalties<sup>22</sup>

Currently, environmentalists and anti-globalization movements with intention to assail such institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) identify themselves with anarchists (*Kushner, 2005*). Anarchists also celebrate May Day (May 1<sup>st</sup>) where they engage in violent activities, just as ecological terrorists glorify 16<sup>th</sup> October every year corresponding with the United Nation's (UN) World Food Day. During the occasion, they disrupt big restaurants like the McDonald's in the US. Others have set aside April 19<sup>th</sup> as their "Militia Day" to mark such events as the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, the start of German Nazis persecution of Jews, Adolf Hitler's birthday and the start of the American Revolution in 1775<sup>23</sup>. This line of thought could perhaps inform fears that some terrorists could in future set aside the 9/11 or Nairobi US Embassy bombing memorial events as their most popular date for terrorism in the world and Kenya, respectively. Terrorist groups that have declared ancestry with anarchism include; the British Angry Brigade, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Weatherman in the US, the Japanese Red Army, and the Mexican Zapatista movement.

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<sup>20</sup> Post, 1990

<sup>21</sup> Ferrell, 1999: 93

<sup>22</sup> Ibid: (to them such a system exists to perpetuate itself and to protect the powerful using such common connotations as "in the interest of the community")

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



## Cases of Building Facilities that have been Targeted by Terrorists

The most active international terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, which was formed by Usama Bin Ladin in the late 1980s for purposes of bringing together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion, has come out as the foremost global terrorist organization<sup>24</sup> that has carried out systematic bombing targeted at buildings with hundreds of people therein. The group is believed to have masterminded the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, which killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. It also claimed responsibility to the plane crash of 9/11 event in 2001 (Dudley, 2002). The group has had links with Islamic militants namely; Egypt's al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, Somalia's Al-Itihad al-Islamiyya (currently associated with Al Shabaab), Sudan's Abu Nidal, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

To achieve its mission, Al Qaeda's objectives revolve around availing finances, recruiting and training Islamic extremists, mainly Sunni, to overthrow "non-Islamic" regimes and discard Western culture worldwide. In 1996, Usama issued a *fatweh*/religious decree, that:

*'It was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens - civilian or military - including women and children and their allies everywhere' (White, 2002).*

Another classic example of an attack on a building infrastructure (widely considered to be a case of domestic terrorism) is the bombing of Alfred Murray Federal building in Oklahoma City on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1995 by an American, Timothy McVeigh, who used a bomb made from ammonium nitrate fertilizers mixed with combustible fuel oil. The truck that ferried the bomb was parked in front of the fateful building before being detonated. Numerous bombing attacks within Russia fitting into the definition of domestic terrorism include; the bombing of an Apartment Building in 1999 that killed 64 residents, and another on a shopping market that culminated in a 57-hour seizure of a Moscow theater, where 120 hostages were killed in 2002. Similarly, Thomas Drabek, in *Disaster in Aisle 13*, recounted how a massive explosion rocked the Coliseum in Indianapolis, killing 54 people instantly and injuring about 400 others out of the 4,327 people who had gathered inside the Coliseum to watch the final 'Holiday on Ice' Show in 1963.

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<sup>24</sup> A Qaeda organization uses terror against the US to justify hatred to the Americans blamed for among other things persecution of Muslims, the Palestinian question, the Gulf War and invasion of the Afghan Taliban regime.

### 2.1.3 Targeting of Buildings and the Means

Buildings often considered as durable and sustainable commodities are largely susceptible to unforeseen natural and man-made calamities that require foolproof design and protective security to suit human needs as a place to live and work. Building planners in the United Kingdom and Japan, for instance, operate under a national building code designed for safety and security. This has been traced to a major collapse of 22-storey block of flats caused by an internal gas explosion in East London in 1968, which prompted an ad-hoc introduction of new design rules and building legislations to ensure future risk reduction of tall buildings. To this end, three sources of internal blast in a building have been identified, namely; the detonation of high explosives, which may enter the building as a result of aerial shelling or implanting by saboteurs, the accidental ignition of flammable gases, or leakages of gas (*Mainstone, 1978*).

It is widely acknowledged that terrorists with intent to bomb targeted buildings take into considerations various ways of achieving their objectives. The commonest form of terrorist attack on a building is simply by way of an individual sneaking explosives into vulnerable areas like luggage bays, visitors lobbies and parking areas. This is quite possible, given that bomb explosives are easy to make and convenient to transport in a concealed manner, with a 500 Kg bomb requiring as little as 10 cubic feet of cargo space. Other modes of execution include shelling, cyber and vehicle mounted attacks.

On the other hand, building vulnerabilities<sup>25</sup> are mainly identifiable by way of tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are associated with those tactics. For example, the general design strategy for forced entry is to provide a way to detect attempted intrusion and to provide barriers to delay the terrorist until a response force arrives. Vulnerabilities may involve inadequacies in intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) and barriers. Similarly, the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as far from the facility as possible and to harden the facility to resist the explosive at that distance. Vulnerabilities may involve limited standoff<sup>26</sup>.

It is against this background that although criminals, including terrorists, all over have a common means of executing their operations, which has been widely described by a


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<sup>25</sup> (*F.M. 3-19.30, 2001*) This entail gaps in the buildings' protection.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

number of scholars as having a definite attack plan cycle, which has been summarized as indicated in figure 2.

**Figure 2: Terrorist Attack Plan of Action**



In Figure 2, critical points in this attack cycle posit terrorists' intentions, whether by a single person or group within a definite planning stage, beginning at target identification by way of discreet surveillance widely known as 'pre-operational surveillance'<sup>27</sup>. This action is the most challenging as pointed out by the former US Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, that 'intelligence reports during her tenure in Kenya positing staggering rates of crime in Nairobi, and more so the discovery that the embassy was under surveillance prior to the bombing, fell on deaf ears'<sup>28</sup>. In fact, Bushnell maintained that even the Under Secretary of State for Management, Bonnie Cohen, declined her request for a higher level of protection for the embassy saying '*the core premise what many call intelligence failures is almost without exception intricately associated with failures of the policy process*'<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> (STRATFOR, 2010: 7

<sup>28</sup> This is contained in '*The 1998 Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.*' a study by Institute of Diplomacy containing a verbatim report of US Accountability Review Board (ARB) established in 1999 to investigate the Nairobi attacks.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

During the planning stage of a terrorists attack, the process entails extensive surveillance, target identification (information gathering), deployment (knowing who does what) and consequently the attack (detonation and flight or suicidal). Although nearly all types of criminal acts, like a chicken thief or hardcore criminal, do have a semblance of planning, just like a terrorist requiring some form of pre-operational surveillance aimed at defeating detection. In the 1998 Nairobi bombing for instance, planners<sup>30</sup>, upon satisfactory pre-operational surveillance, embarked on acquisition and assembling of the bombing explosives used during the attack.

## 2.2 Securing Government Buildings against Threats of Terrorist Attack

As noted in the problem statement, key challenges in ensuring security in Government buildings and the country at large against the threat of terrorism remains a reality. With the aforementioned typical tactics to buildings particularly Government, some far way beyond the protection that facility designers can provide (for example kidnappings, hijackings, and assassinations) that take place away from building especially as they traverse these targeted building). However, protection against these threats in Government buildings is courtesy of operational security and personal measures.

For all intent and purposes, the threat of attack requires specific approaches aimed at cushioning against such unforeseen terrorist plans, as depicted by Campbell that '*We must always frame security issues properly, study and understand what risks and threats really constitute*'<sup>31</sup>. The lack of empirical guidance on security preparedness gives the study room to explore on whether there are adequate security and other professionals' need to regularly and increasingly protect Government buildings and the country at large through assessment of all the raft of relevant strategies/practices. This is not to say the wide range of structural and non-structural aspects ranging from level of training for security

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<sup>30</sup> Planner/s in this respect may be part of a larger conspiracy (more often likely to be discovered) or a single planner and executor widely known in intelligence circle as 'lone-wolf', usually difficult to detect. Example of such an attack is the Theodore Kaczynski (*aka* the "Unabomber"), the epitome archetypal lone-wolf operative who used violent attacks to publicize a social and or political messages; ISD website: <http://isd.georgetown>.

<sup>31</sup> (Campbell. 2002:134)

personnel to circumvent such threats and/or their capacity to investigate, locate, plan and/or design such public facilities are inadequate.

Based on risk factors therefore, it is important to acknowledge the possible impact of an attack in terms of death, workplace interruption and property destruction, besides costs associated with repairs and/or symbolic importance of such visible landmark vital to national interests. In such a case, it is of importance to underscore the security preparedness without which terrorist operational attacks portend far-reaching repercussions to both life and property. This is based on the fact that terrorist attacks follow a discernible attack cycle, which best security practices or preparedness pre-empt through acting before an attack by way of adopting a proactive, security and protective intelligence approach focusing on “the how” of such militant attacks instead of just “the who”<sup>32</sup>. It includes a sustained programme or a long term protective strategy, alongside intelligence gathering and analysis, incident and consequence management plan that utilizes existing resources at every level and addresses a higher threat if and when one is identified. Alternatively, cities or towns in India, for example, have a comprehensive plan enshrined in building bye-laws, or land use zoning regulations that accommodate structural mitigation measures in any disaster-prone areas (*Yokohama Strategy, 1994*).

Some of the counter measures against terrorism in general have been proposed by several scholars, including adoption of such legislation like the US Patriot Act of 2001 that came into force following the World Trade Center (WTC) terrorist attack and that hitherto specifies the role of various anti-terrorism efforts, domestic preparedness and creation of the Office of Homeland Security. The Act expanded surveillance and intelligence gathering mandates to assessing threats and evaluating the country's critical infrastructure depending on origin, kind and level of threat. This is not to say such other devices developed over time, like metal detection systems and/or use of ‘sniffing’ equipment (used in Britain), are inconsequential since non-metallic forms like plastics, fertilizer or petrol are quite difficult to identify using a metal detector (*Dewar, 1994*). Under normal circumstances therefore, the nature of protecting buildings implies that security measures should be flexible in such a way that they are increased in time of threat (*Ehud Spinzak, 1996*).

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<sup>32</sup> STRATFOR, 2007:14.

In Kenya, enhanced collaboration efforts by the Administration Police, Kenya Police, National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and other quasi-military anti-terrorist units has over time provided a framework for the country's anti-terrorist activities, which the study delved into. Based on the research question, understanding the best case scenario of tackling the terrorism threat complexities in a rather workable plan of action covering both non-structural protection<sup>33</sup> and structural measures in the long run assist in securing targeted Government buildings, which the next section endeavours to address.

### **2.2.1: Non-Structural Security Preparedness Aspect in Kenya**

The non-structural aspect of dealing with terrorist threat targeting buildings emphasizes routine security checks performed by uniformed security officers on a daily basis in all Government buildings. This is more often than not aimed at safeguarding the building against attempted terrorists attacks and/or directed commission/omission of crime therein.

First, in answering the research question on preparedness measures in Government buildings within the NCBD, 'visible protectors' are mainly in the form of the Administration Police (AP) officers under the ambit of Security of Government Buildings (SGB) unit as the first line of security presence. The unit is under the overall command of a Gazetted Officer (GO) based at Harambee House, assisted by members of Inspectorate (Chief Inspector or Inspector) in discharge of duty. Other rank and file members include sergeants, corporals and constables (referred to in Police Standing Orders as 'subordinate officers'). This goes without saying that since these security officers are tasked with the responsibilities of monitoring check-in-procedures at security desks and scrutinizing all persons, parcels/luggage or vehicles entering Government buildings, curtailing instances where potential terrorist elements may capitalize on security lapses to plant explosives remains a challenge. That is why security personnel do not always take chances in securing buildings under their guard through such actions like being ever alert and/or even supervising or accompanying hired contractors during repair work or installation of any new equipment within Government buildings.

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<sup>33</sup> Non structural protection is a key theme in the study.

In order to perform these round- the-clock protection of Government buildings to the best of their ability, the AP Strategic Plan of action emphasizes two core functions: aimed at pre-empting terrorism threat: The first entails a review with regard to the competencies of SGB staff in its Protective Security to include security of VIPs and protection of Government strategic installations. The performance indicators are ascertained by the number of existing personnel trained and equipped to competent standards and/or the number of prevented incidents<sup>34</sup>. The second most important role is Terrorism Interdiction, which mainly deals with;

- Identifying, isolating, monitoring and disrupting any activity bearing terrorism manifestation,
- Developing a policy framework to facilitate information exchange and analysis with relevant organizations,
- Improving surveillance, human and technical capacity,
- Mainstreaming terrorist interdiction skills in the AP. Its performance indicators are number of patrols and surveillance, informers recruited, reports made to relevant departments, arrests made, range of weaponry recovered and number of officers trained on counter terrorism<sup>35</sup>.

Secondly, as terrorism tactics increasingly become advanced world over, new roles for security personnel have been developed along security operation line so much so that terrorists planning on hard targets like Government buildings are thwarted at an early stage. This presents another a shift of security practice towards intelligence led-disruption of criminal-minded individuals or groups targeting a segment of the society or terrorist attacks. This action, which the study sought to ascertain, could entail in general disrupting of terrorist plans early enough, in a clandestine action under the purview of the security intelligence capabilities world over. In this case, *security intelligence*<sup>36</sup> has taken protective security to a higher level through assessment of threats emanating from within and without in a bid to curtail disastrous effects (Loch K., 2004). Given the imminence of the terrorism threat in the country in the aftermath of the 1998 US Embassy incident, the Government, in a bid to thwart chances of another terrorist attack in the country, started (in 1999) to restructure the Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI) into the National

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<sup>34</sup> AP Strategic Plan, 2002 : 8

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Loch equate security intelligence to “Knowledge of the enemy”

Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), as well as the establishment of an operational Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 2003<sup>37</sup>. This also explains the reasoning behind the inauguration of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2004, heralding a new chapter in the country's history of preparedness efforts, enhancement of security and immigration controls. In assessing successes or failures accounting for security preparedness, examining cases of intelligence and policy-making that produced adverse outcomes is of paramount importance.

In the fight against terrorism threat therefore, the main task for the NSIS in this respect entails the aspect of *protective security intelligence*<sup>38</sup>, a process practiced world over. The main aim in this process is to identify a threat in order for counter action to pre-empt the potential of an attack during the planning phase. The process of 'identifying' persons involved in terrorist attack planning covers a thorough examination of Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor (TEDD) principle<sup>39</sup>. It usually entails thorough examination of such behaviors that though are not by themselves criminal in nature, like; visiting a public building, photographing or curious inquiries by strangers and observing security measures that are not in any way illegal but can be indicators that an attack is being plotted<sup>40</sup>. As indicated in the terrorist threat cycle in section 2.2, a terrorist carrying out such non-criminal activity or pre-operational surveillance is normally detected by a suave intelligence outfit under a 'counter surveillance', which is a valuable proactive tool.

It is worth to note that the intelligence approach to counter terrorism has been cited by many scholars as a key non-military use of surveillance (covert operations). Overall, surveillance has a long history of covert operations known as "shadow wars" of assassinating or eliminating key terrorist supporters. This has however been done away with in some countries like the US, where the operation against adversaries was banned after the Vietnam War through a Presidential Executive Order signed in 1981. Other Internationally accepted means of dealing with terrorism include but not limited to,

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<sup>37</sup> IGAD report, 2004

<sup>38</sup> This is instrumental to the study.

<sup>39</sup> The acronym TEDD is widely used in such instances like, if a person sees someone repeatedly over *time*, in different *environments* and over *distance*, or one who displays poor *demeanor* (acting unnaturally), then that person can assume he or she is under surveillance.

<sup>40</sup> STRATFOR, 2007



military counter measures, which are hitherto being used, for example by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to coordinate protection strategies and maintenance of the five level color codes (Threat Level Warning). For instance, the threats to US Embassies revealed more than 400 cases of suspicious surveillance of embassy buildings in 1998<sup>41</sup>. Similarly, the deterrence doctrine as part of counter-terrorism measures has over time been considered by a cross-section of scholars as shrouded in difficulties containing terrorists and their sponsors because terrorists seek destruction and threatening them with war and destruction in retaliation for some violent act produces no effect (White, 2002).

Since Kenya is a signatory to over 12 International conventions relating to the fight against terrorism, which include the International Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (1999) and UN Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), counter-terrorism measures are tied to foreign policy in the context of international relations, emphasizing the doctrine of deterrence as a means of curbing the use of weapons presumably in terrorists' arsenal. The Kenyan situation is a classic example of soft and hard approaches, depending on their symbolic nature as supported by the catharsis effect (Rathmell, 1998). Although security preparedness approaches worldwide are not new in view of the terrorism threat, their explicit connotation in the Kenyan security context remains a challenge. The point of departure for the literature review is Government documents related to the provision of national security by those entrusted to safeguard against terrorism threats from within and without.

### **2.2.2 Structural Security Preparedness Aspect**

In any security plan, physical security measures in buildings are an important part of security preparedness. After mapping out the building layout of a target building by a potential with intent to defeat or bypass physical security means, an effective proactive security program could minimize chances of such terrorist executing his/her plans. However, these physical security aspects are never foolproof, since they can be defeated/immobilized by suave attackers, who thoroughly plan the attack in advance. In such a scenario, a way is needed to deny attackers the advantage of striking when and

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<sup>41</sup> (Department of State, 1998)

where they choose, besides making it difficult for them to be able to reach the target building by just a simple walk-in or routine vehicular movement. In this way, physical protection measures, like badge readers, closed-circuit TV (CCTV) coverage, metal detectors and cipher locks, may keep persons with weapons away from a protected target or deter would-be attackers from trying to approach any building with a weapon (*Fred Burton et al., 2007*).

In the US blast mitigation for structures programme some considerations to the development of a performance-based design process that integrates security and hazard mitigation objectives with new technologies and risk management principles have been synchronized. That is why the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for example, developed federal standards on 'hardening' of buildings in view of explosives and other risks<sup>42</sup>. A perfect case in point is the aftermath of Alfred Murray Federal building bombing in Oklahoma City on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1995 that made the General Service Administration (GSA) to design security criteria for classification of federal buildings into three categories based on facility size in square feet, number of employees and volume of public access<sup>43</sup>. As a result, the FBI's offices in Washington DC were retrofitted to meet these security requirements after receiving façade and structural improvement fund to provide additional blast protection in view of design perimeter, entries, interior and the security planning of the overall facility (Nadel, 1998).

Using Henri Poincare's tendency for a highly sensitive issue to initial conditions as opposed to rules, such physical structural improvement has been justified by a number of scholars in a case where devastating flood in the City of Chicago in 1992 (due to a failure in the City's tunnel wall) that was reported earlier by a private contractor was not heeded by City authorities. In the long run, a crack that could have cost \$ 10,000 eventually cost taxpayers, the City and the business fraternity an estimated \$1.7 billion (Roeser, 1992). Preventable risk therefore implies that the outcome of errors, oversights and even the best intentions may only result in real and unexpected surprises much later.

However, security preparedness against potential terrorist threats particularly targeted on Government buildings would benefit from lessons from internationally accepted anti-

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<sup>42</sup> *FEMA Strategic Plan, 1997*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

terrorism strategies before any potential targeted attack/explosion in the workplace. In this context, strategies initiated by the Government of Kenya (GOK) in conjunction with international partners may equip the Nairobi City Council, National Operation Centre and relevant security organs with the overall aim of enhancing security preparedness.

## **2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

This section analyses two applicable concepts and one model which assisted the study achieve its intended objective. The study will therefore utilize Fein & Vossekuil's Threat Assessment concept, Roger Kasperson's Risk Hazard model, alongside Joanne Nigg's Risk Disaster Management concept. Whereas the Threat Assessment concept more or less seeks to evaluate risk for the various forms of targeted violent threats and appropriate remedy, the Risk Hazard model emphasizes prior preventing events, preventing consequences and mitigating consequences (after they have occurred). Similarly, key elements of the disaster management concept that take into consideration elements of *prevention, preparedness, mitigation and reconstruction* was also important in providing guiding principles for any Governments with the capacity to dealing with disaster eventualities at these various stages.

### **2.3.2 Threat Assessment Conceptual Approach**

The threat assessment conceptual framework in the study is based on a systematic approach used originally by the U.S. Secret Service in its protective intelligence activities to protect the US President, top Government officials/key personalities and foreign leaders. The approach has been developed and relevant modifications made to evaluate risk for other forms of targeted violence in buildings. A number of security scholars (*Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, Wiley John, 1999 and Fred Burton et al, 2007*) have further improved on the concept taking into cognizance dynamics of violence related to modern threats including terrorism.

First, the study underscored three fundamental principles of the threat assessment approach<sup>44</sup>, which asserts that 'targeted violence is the result of understandable and often discernible processes of thinking and behavior'<sup>45</sup>. This is where acts of targeted violence are not necessarily spontaneous but rather a deliberate process spanning a considerable period of time where the planning aspect takes into account a series of decisive factors. The factors entail; which target(s) to select, the proper time and approach, and the means for violence derived from sufficient information about the target, the setting of the attack, or about similar attacks<sup>46</sup>.

The second principle is that 'violence stems from an interaction among the potential attacker, past stressful events, a current situation, and the target'<sup>47</sup>. This covers situational/contextual understanding of risk focusing on examination of the history of attackers at a given situation/period involving violent behavior which (usually recur), and reaction from other people over his/her potential threat. Indicators include appraisal of related factors about the intended target susceptibility, extent of potential attacker's acquaintance with the target, and the target's state of preparedness.

The third principle is an appraisal of risk due to ease in identification of any terrorists' distinct attack-related behaviors that usually precede their attacks. This include a continuum of thinking, planning and logistical preparations, which start with the development of an idea about attack, communication of the idea and visiting the target or scene of the attack<sup>48</sup>. This perhaps underscores the rationale behind the Chairman of the ARB, Admiral William Crowe's admission, in a detailed briefing about the intelligence gathered by various elements of the intelligence community over several years prior to the August 1998 embassy bombings, of intelligence and policy disconnect. Crowe emphasizes in the brief that although there was extensive intelligence about the presence and operations of al Qaeda cells established in several African countries, including Kenya, with one cell in Nairobi, the principle of action<sup>49</sup>, the last phase of a terrorist plan (which

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<sup>44</sup> Wiley J. 1999 in Behavioural Science Law 17, 323-337.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Fein & Vossekuil, 1998

<sup>47</sup> Ibid : 55.


<sup>48</sup> Ibid: 57

<sup>49</sup> The principle assumes that terrorists want to have an advantage over the security officers especially those manning targeted buildings...ISD website: <http://isd.georgetown>

is the 'attack' phase) have equal chance of succeeding because a determined group or an individual chart a way to reach the target by whatever means capitalizing on a sheer element of 'tactical surprise' after careful surveillance and planning process.

Based on these principles, the threat assessment likely to be taken by any security agency in dealing with the threat undergoes at least 5 areas of conducting investigations as indicated in figure 3.

**Figure 3: Types of Information for Threat Assessment**



At the initial stage, information from multiple sources, just like in a comprehensive risk appraisal, focuses on personal interviews/interrogation with the subject, material used/weapons of the subject, interviews with persons who know or have known the subject, and records and history. Three types of information about the subject are typically collected as follows; name, physical description, date of birth, residence, education, employment history, history of violence and criminal behavior, mental health/substance abuse history, expertise and use of weapons and history of harassing others, as well as current life information like employment situations, desperation, and any "downward" progression in social, occupation, or psychological functioning<sup>50</sup>.

The second area is **attack-related behaviors**. As previously noted, attacks of targeted violence may be preceded by a series of preparatory behaviors, including selection and location of the target, securing a weapon, subverting security measures, among others.

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<sup>50</sup> ibid

Behaviors of concern include: (1) an unusual interest in instances of targeted violence, (2) evidence of plans to attack a specific target (e.g., diary notes, recent acquisition of a weapon), (3) communications of inappropriate interest or plans to attack a target (although direct threats to the target may be rare, subjects may communicate information about intentions to family, friends, co-workers and/or other communication channels), (4) following a target or visiting a possible location of an attack, and (5) approaching a target or protected setting<sup>51</sup>.

The third area of inquiry relates to the subject's motives. Motives may vary considerably depending on the nature and type of targeted violence like Government building, but they are almost always directly related to target selection.

### 2.3.3 Hazard Management Concept

The used of hazard management aspect in the study is derived from the hazard management concept of event occasioning consequences so that in the event of bombing, a number of actions prior and after may yield positive results. This has been attributed to a number of studies by scholars (*Quarantelli 1994, Kasperson 1998 and Hays 1998*) who envisioned the old model hazard as comprising events and consequences with three broad classes of hazard management, which have since been developed into a more complex 'chain' or model based on hazard dynamics. This evolution of events and consequences chain into a multi-stage structure with 'upstream' and 'downstream' components provides a standardized means for structuring hazards and for identifying systematic opportunities for hazard control. Each of these stages is connected by links representing an opportunity for blocking the hazard. In the 'upstream' ,for instance, security being a basic human need is converted into human wants bearing in mind its usefulness and minimization of risks, while the 'downwards' portion consists of human exposure to these releases (bomb attack), leading to adverse consequences<sup>52</sup>. The hazard concept revolves around two essential functions, mainly intelligence and control.<sup>53</sup>

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
<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Kasperson, 1994

<sup>53</sup> *Intelligence in this case provides the information needed to determine whether a problem exists. while at the same time defining choices and predicting whether success is achievable while Control consists of design and implementation of measures aimed at preventing or reducing its consequences.*

**Table 1: Hazard Management Process**

<i>Assessment</i>	<i>Control analysis</i>	<i>Control Strategy</i>	<i>Implementation/Evaluation</i>
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


The graphic representation of hazard management in Table 1 depicts the management process as a sphere of activity showing the hazard chain through which the deployment of technology, which could have resulted in harmful consequences for human beings and the community at large depending on four managerial activities; hazard assessment, control analysis, control strategy and implementation and evaluation surrounding the chain. This process goes hand in hand with communication component in the next section.

**Hazard Management Communication**

The hazard management may not succeed without Risk Communication (RC) covering risk assessment and management decisions on the disaster prevention and preparedness concept. This is attributed to the fact that RC identifies barriers to risk awareness and attitude change using a two-way communication pathway resulting from a societal discourse that determines the manner of distributing the messages (the conveying authority) and the receiving audiences. The genesis of the RC framework rests on a theoretical rule on socio-psychological processes underlying risk information and communication (Rohrmann, 2000). In this study, three vital processes that are intertwined emphasize: how hazards are dealt with, procedure and assessment of risk information, and finally how risk perception, evaluation and behavior is affected by accepted information as indicated in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Risk Communication Types**



The concept envisages a complex of 'actors' like risk-exposed people, especially employees in workplaces, public authorities, police agencies and the media. This is ideal as illustrated in Table 2, where relevant variables and propositions about the causal links between these fundamentals are identified.

**Table 2: Components of Risk Communication Process**

<b>RISK PROCESS</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>
<b>Hazard</b>	The hazard (event), which the people are or might be exposed to.
<b>Appraisal of risk</b>	Awareness of hazard/admitting of exposure; risk perception.
<b>Preventive action decision</b>	Choice between: risk-reducing behavior and new information
<b>Risk-Reducing Act</b>	Avoiding exposure/preparedness (individual and/or group).
<b>Context of RC</b>	RC Source: (brochures, TV/radio, print media), type of institution
<b>Utility of suggested action</b>	Assumed effectiveness of the proposed measure to mitigate the risk (based on perceived feasibility).
<b>Prior risk perception</b>	Existing hazard perception and risk appraisal (cf.) <i>before</i> current RC process.
<b>Institutions for risk management</b>	Public authorities and/or agencies responsible for safety of people (employees, etc) and dealing with risk management.

The RC conceptual distinctions put emphasis on: an individual risk evaluation and safety management in response to a hazard, the content of risk and evaluating risk information and appreciating risk features.


In any interactive process, any Government can initiate an RC process by alerting the citizenry about impending hazards in their environment and request information or risk mitigation measures. The security preparedness campaigns and disaster mitigation procedures involving groups and counseling of employees at risk remain key to the two-way interactive RC situations. Actions on interactive processes are usually through simulation exercises against risk at the workplace like JKIA and/or KICC.



### 2.3.4 Disaster Management Concept

Another area which the study utilized relates to the Disaster Risk Management cycle<sup>54</sup> illustrated in Figure 5, which is more or less intertwined with the Hazard Management Process described in the preceding section, given that both strive to give a semblance of coordinated effort aimed at minimizing effects of disasters.

Figure 5: Disaster Management Cycle<sup>55</sup>



The emphasis on disaster preparedness<sup>56</sup>, which underlies the study's objectives, entails comprehensive plans and continuous assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. As a plan, it has been made a tradition that this activity has to be in a written document which provides details of preventative and preparatory measures as Lyall asserts that this would in the long run reduce the impact of disasters and help an organization to continue carrying out

<sup>54</sup> This is a key theme of disaster management that underpins the study.

<sup>55</sup> www.drmc (2004)

<sup>56</sup> Disaster preparedness and security preparedness procedures in the study are intertwined.

its normal business activities<sup>57</sup>. In this way, anticipated disasters are cushioned through public awareness, predictions of occurrences and consequences, training and mock exercises and pre-planning rescues<sup>58</sup>. There is a general perception that preparedness has not been given the much attention in Kenya, particularly with regard to public buildings, as reinforced by the fact many studies /few literature in Kenya have not exhaustively covered it.

In Figure 4, the *response* component is usually activated once a disaster strikes. It entails the provision of services immediately after a disaster, such as emergency relief and management, rehabilitation and general recovery. In *reconstruction*, helping the affected to resume normalcy is the focus. It entails rebuilding during the period preceding a disaster, incorporating mitigation measures in the processes as a means to cut future losses and prevent recurrence of a disaster through strategic planning<sup>59</sup>

## 2.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses were therefore postulated to guide the study:

- H<sub>1</sub>: The Government has enhanced security preparedness measures and/or practices of its buildings within Nairobi CBD following the 1998 bombing.
- H<sub>2</sub>: The security practices adopted have been effective in deterring incidences of terrorists' attack risks.

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<sup>57</sup> Lyall, 1995

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Hays, 1998

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter gives a descriptive overview of research procedures used in carrying out the study, focusing on Government buildings within the Nairobi Central Business District (NCBD). It outlines the study variables, sampling, investigation and collection methods. The data processing and analysis method are also provided.

#### **3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN**

The researcher examined at security measures put in place in Government building within NCBD in addition to other long-term strategies in the aftermath of the 1998 US Embassy terrorist bombing. Given that buildings are the main unit of analysis, security measures in buildings were assessed dependent on the sample and measurement methods to try and address the research questions alluded to in Chapter One.

The researcher employed survey design that entailed cross-sectional collection of data based on distinctive features of relevant variables representing a set of people and/or cases in relation to security measures in Government buildings within Nairobi CBD. The explanatory survey design using quantitative and qualitative research methods entailed a self-completed questionnaire, focused group question guide and observation checklist as the primary data collection instruments. This was deemed appropriate as successfully used by (Eden and Ngulube, 2003) to assess various library buildings related vulnerabilities. The questionnaire used enabled an exploratory viewpoint, descriptive and evaluative approach, which allowed the researcher to infer respondents' perceptions of building vulnerabilities and preparedness measures in a terrorism threat phenomenon. This correlation study used independent variables that may or may not contribute to measures in government buildings that guard against any terrorism related attack.

## **3.2 SAMPLING METHODS**

### **3.2.1 Site Selection**

The study was conducted within the Central Business District (CBD) in Nairobi, the Capital City of Kenya. The CBD, which acts as an administrative and socio-political and commercial centre, has diverse buildings, roads and other infrastructural facilities. The City, estimated to have a population of three 3 million people, has at least five land use zonings meant for diverse activities developed into sectors. The center zone is referred to in the study as the CBD, while other outlying sectors include industrial, residential, neighbourhood business/retail and commuter zones.

The site selected was considered due to its geographical location and placement of critical Government buildings therein. The former US Embassy, which was also in the vicinity and the point of reference in the study, is also a positive attribute to the choice of the area. Due to financial considerations, the study was limited to Government buildings within the Nairobi CBD.

### **3.2.2 Site Characteristics**

The CBD is located right in the heart of the City. on the south-eastern side of the University of Nairobi, north-western side of Kenya Polytechnic and between Uhuru Highway and Moi Avenue. It has a high concentration of commercial and businesses activities.. The CBD is well known for its modern high-rise buildings with dense structure glass and stone/steel walls.

Many buildings are built in a courtyard pattern, with ample streets. The buildings have been expanded considerably after the construction of administrative buildings in the pre-independence period. Some have hitherto been modified or retrofitted on security considerations. Generally, the types of buildings considered for the study were mainly high-rise medium size office and large complex buildings housing Government departments, like the KRA-Times Towers, Central Bank, Jogoo House, Nyayo House, Anniversary Towers, Kenya National Achieves and KICC, among others.

The sample buildings enabled an evaluation of effectiveness of security measures put in place following the 1998 bombing. This is important because effective security practices,

which entail deterrent measures under the banner of preparedness, minimize deaths, damage to property and disruption of daily activities in the event of a disaster.

### **3.2.3 Sampling Methods**

The researcher employed cross-sectional sampling technique in selecting Government buildings for the study. This was achieved using a target population comprising 34 Government buildings within the NCBD. A map showing the Government buildings obtained from the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife aided in identifying the sample. The sample frame had roads/streets dividing them providing a basis for the strata. Proportional stratified random sampling was used in order to achieve greater representativeness in the sampled buildings. The sample size that was studied was 15 Government Buildings.

The rationale for choosing Government buildings was based on an assumption that terrorists tend to target those buildings with symbolic representation of the Government in a bid to intimidate and point out their concern.

Security section in Government buildings were also selected using purposive sampling techniques due to the nature of security inquiry as per the study objectives. This was made possible from the list of departmental functions in each building, with that charged with maintaining security/safety of Government buildings being focused on.

To facilitate comparison and authentication of additional information, the developed case schedule targeting hand-selected experts engaged on a focused group discussion was used to enhance the study. These security respondents/focused group experts, all interested in participating in the study, were considered to be well versed with issues regarding the management of security in critical installations, related vulnerabilities in view of terrorism threats, and other risks. The study was limited to a span of 10 years ranging from 1998 to 2008, with desk analysis highly explored specifically on the subject matter.

## **3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

### **3.3.1 Sources of Data**

The data collected to aid the study pertaining to security measures in buildings were obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected using observations, focus group discussion and in-depth-interviews. Secondary data was obtained from Government documents like the Kenya Armed Forces, Kenya Police &

Administration Police and NSIS Acts, besides the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2002, Disaster Management Bill, 2009, and Counter Organized Crime Bill, 2009. Reference to Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife maps, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Local Government/Nairobi City Council by-laws, and manuals relating to the Fire Brigade operations, alongside the Administration Police Strategic Plan, 2004-9, Vision 2030 and the Draft National Security Policy were also made. Other secondary sources for comparative purposes included review of published books, journals, websites and other Internet materials.

### **3.3.2 Data Collection Techniques**

The instrument for the study was in-depth-interviews, focused group discussion and observations checklists. In-depth interviews were administered to a total of 70 security personnel in the sampled buildings, while the remaining 5 were participants in the focus group discussion mainly nominated security experts comprising a private consultant, a student and public servants. The interview and focused group protocol entailed probing for specific information using closed questions and open-ended spelt out in the interview guide/focused group questions respectively. Respondents were given an opportunity to use their knowledge and skills to highlight various aspects pertaining to disaster preparedness and risks exposed to Government building in view of the terrorism threat.

The interviews for security personnel took place in the respondents' convenient venues, including places of work and during daytime hours. This was arranged on different days for each building at the convenience of the respondents. On each visit, the researcher and assistant researcher introduced themselves during the interview that lasted around 40 minutes. For the most part, the respondents were given time to fill spaces provided in the interview sheet and were free to ask questions/ seek clarifications. The focused group discussion involving the researcher, research assistant and the 5 experts were conducted at Hotel Intercontinental whose duration lasted for about one hour. Respondents' and experts perceptions, experience and suggestions on the sampled building vulnerabilities, threat assessment and risk/disaster preparedness in view of terrorism threat were key areas of assessment. There were 12 invitations for the focused group discussion but only 5 experts managed to honour the date. Part of data gathering data entailed asking the participants to complete a structured questionnaire about their understanding on building security

preparedness vis a vis terrorism threat. A summary of the data collection techniques is given in Table 3.

**Table 3: Summary of the Data Collection Techniques**

Type Of Data	Respondents/ Observation	Unit	Of	Technique Of Data Collection	Of Data Collection Instrument	No. Of Respondents
Quantitative	Security officer buildings	officer	manning	In-depth interview	Interview guide	70
Qualitative	Security Experts			Focused Group Discussion	Questionnaire guide	5
	Buildings			Observation	Checklist	15

Overall, semi-structured interview guides and focused group questions guide were categorized based on study objectives, which in essence allowed for quantitative and qualitative analysis based on descriptive statistics. For direct observation, the researchers visited the sampled buildings within the CBD and logically observed the security features. Field notes constituted the main tool of observation. To validate the data collected, triangulation was carried out using the literature review, in-depth interview guides and observation. The advantage of employing triangulation is that the method allowed an elaborate assessment of building vulnerability and terrorism threat themes under scrutiny.

### 3.3.3 Distribution of Key Informants

A summary distribution of Government buildings and key informants is as follows:

**Table 4: Distribution of Respondents**

<i>Building</i>	<i>Department or Expert</i>	<i>Respondents</i>
<b>Treasury Building</b>	Ministry of Finance and Planning	5
<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	5
<b>Nyayo House</b>	Provincial HQ, Immigration & Other depts.	5
<b>Sheria House</b>	Registration & State Law offices	5
<b>Jogoo House</b>	Ministry of Education & Home Affairs	5
<b>City Hall</b>	Nairobi City Council	5
<b>TSC HQs</b>	Teacher Service Commission (TSC)	5
<b>Times Tower</b>	Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)	5
<b>KICC Building</b>	Tourism conference & key landmark	5
<b>Parliament</b>	Parliament	5
<b>Harambee</b>	Office of the President	4
<b>The High Court</b>	Judiciary Head Offices and Courts	4
<b>Central Police St</b>	Divisional Police Headquarters/Station	4
<b>National Archives</b>	National Heritage	4
<b>Herufi House</b>	Central Bureau of Statistics	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>Expert 1</b>	Security Analyst – NSIS	1
<b>Expert 2</b>	Legal Officer– NCTC	1
<b>Expert 3</b>	Assistant Director-NDOC, Nyayo House.	1
<b>Expert 4</b>	Counter Terrorism Officer – NCTC	1
<b>Expert 5</b>	Private Security consultant	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>75</b>

As indicated in table 4, five security experts involved in the focused group discussion had diverse knowledge security threats in the country and very much familiar with the topic especially premeditated violence, given their academic and professional specialty. Their consideration was based on the fact that they have long and direct experience in identifying, investigating or countering the adverse effects of threats against any of the critical infrastructure in the country. They also possess insights that are useful in advancing a deep understanding of the terrorism threat in general. This study, therefore, adopts the qualitative approach to derive insights and judgments from diverse experts.



### 3.3.4 Data Processing, Organization and Analysis

After the interviews, focused group discussion and observations, the researcher transcribed the findings in full, hand-inputted the data from answers in the interview guide/focused group tape into a computer using the SPSS software before analyzing emergent themes generated from the research questions. Having inputted data into the SPSS database, the process of data analysis underwent three consecutive stages of data reduction, display and conclusion. Data were statistically analyzed based on corresponding questions and answers set criteria. From generated themes, a working conceptual framework was devised and then subjected to appropriate continual appreciation. Thereafter, data were saved in the computer to allow revision of the content based on data collected and concept analysis.

Secondly, data display encompassed visual illustrations for ease of reference, such as pie charts of variables measured using nominal data aided in determining whether or not a relationship exist among independent variables and dependent variable. For ordinal data, the mode, median cumulative frequency distributions, percentages and bar graphs were computed. Illustrations in form of nominal data involving bivariate analysis were ascertained using chi-square to determine significance of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Qualitative data analysis involved the identification of themes using content analysis, while inferential statistics became useful in confirming hypotheses using the Chi-square test, cross-tabulation and measuring of relationships between variables.

To determine significance of the relationship between independent and dependent variables, Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis was carried out alongside Cronbach's alpha as measure of internal consistency ("reliability"). The correlation scale model<sup>60</sup> used to describe the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable that assisted in the study is.

*0.7 and above – very strong relationship,  
0.50 to 0.69 – strong relationship,  
0.30 to 0.49 – moderate relationship,  
0.10 to 0.29 – low relationships and  
0.01 to 0.09 – very low relationship.<sup>61</sup>*

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<sup>60</sup> Davies, 1971.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

Finally, data presentation and analysis in form of frequency distribution enabled the researcher to give a descriptive history of respondents' demographic features and their perceptions in view of buildings' vulnerabilities and terrorism. At least five alternative responses associated with different values of one variable were in some instances used to express these counts in percentages thus answering questions arising out of terrorism threat, building vulnerability and security preparedness rating as presented in Table 5, which formed the basis of identifying threats, *vis a vis* or perceptions/opinions.

**Table 5: Vulnerability Rating and Opinion Response Coding**

Very High	<i>'Strongly Agree'</i>	5
High	<i>'Agree'</i>	4
Medium	<i>'Unsure'</i>	3
Low	<i>'Disagree'</i>	2
Very low	<i>'Strongly Disagree'</i>	1

In the final analysis, these became the basis upon which conclusions were drawn and recommendations made, especially from facts emanating from hypothesis testing. Answers provided to the study's main questions determined if the underlying hypotheses were to be accepted or rejected.

### **3.3.5 Challenges Encountered During Data Collection**

There were peculiar experiences noted by the researcher in the field notes, which impeded the study in one way or the other. Notably, restriction in accessing information from Government officials with citations of security officers' oath of secrecy, while fear of security breach reprisals by most respondents hampered speedy progress of the research. The research specifically raised suspicion, with some security officers fearing citation in final report. Some of the respondents were generally not co-operative, while others could not observe time, citing tight work schedule. This made some of the meetings short-lived when some of these demands were not fully met.

### 3. 4 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

The relationship between independent and dependent variables were identified to answer the research question touching on preparedness measures adopted to forestall disastrous effects of future terrorist incidents targeted at buildings housing Government departments after the 1998 terrorist bombing, as well as existing gaps or failures of these measures. The association of these variables represented factors or themes that conceptually affect preparedness or vulnerability of buildings to terrorist attacks.

In the study, the hypotheses explore whether there has been  $H_1$ , 'enhanced protective security measures and practices for Government buildings within Nairobi CBD following the 1998 bombing. On the same breath,  $H_2$ , measured effectiveness of these security measures and practices adopted in Government buildings. Each of these assumptions were either accepted or rejected based on assessment criteria ( $H_0$ ). These hypothesis testing were used in respect to nominal, ordinal and interval data collected.

### 3. 5 VARIABLES OF THE STUDY

The main dependent variable in the study consisted of security officers' knowledge of actual security preparedness measures against potential terrorist attack in Government buildings in the aftermath of the 1998 bombing. The dependent variable term in the hypothesis '*protective security preparedness measures*' is used to describe the structural and non-structural measures in buildings whose ultimate goal is to act as a bulwark against unauthorized access, pre-emptive acts, besides lessening damage to the building, and loss of life in the event of unforeseen attacks.

The independent variables tested for significance of their correlation with dependent variables identified were also categorized into two, namely; respondent's profile and scales of respondents' perceptions of security preparedness features and their efficacy. In the respondent's profile category, the following variables were measured:

- Academic qualifications ( by stating specifically i.e *Masters degree*)
- Gender orientation (specifying if male or female) and current age (in years)
- Total number of years engaged in employment as security officer/expert in the stated field.
- Religion and ethnicity (specifying).

The independent variables measuring respondent's perception of security preparedness against terrorism threat covered all aspects of security measures in Government buildings and overall security strategies. Several items measured preparedness level and their effectiveness using the respondent's perception and familiarity with varied aspects of threat assessment, routine security guard roles, and risk vulnerability in view of the terrorism threat.

The various independent variables were measured at *nominal*, *ordinal* and *interval* scales, particularly respondent's knowledge of preparedness aspect of security measures in Government buildings. A large section of data captured in summated rating mainly referred to by a number of scholars as the 'Likert Scale' was used to collate ordinal data on a range of independent variables representing three categories of respondents' views on level of preparedness in Government buildings, themes or concepts related to terrorist mode of attack and appropriate measures that could mitigate the threat in future. The variables measured at interval level included collection of data by calculation of time (in years), and respondent's work experience or age (in years). According to some scholars, this type of scaling as a method of index construction, often used to measure individuals' opinion or attitudes, allows the characteristics of perception to be measured and given a numerical value, thus permitting for a more extensive statistical analysis of data (O'sullivan, 1999).

A summary of the main variables measured is as follows:

**Table 6: Variable Measurement Levels**

Measurement Level	Classification of variable measurement	Availability of scale
Nominal	Working experience	Employment in practice i.e security officer in any of the Government buildings.
		Employment in private consultant or student majoring in security field.
	Academic/professional Achievement	Exact specialty or discipline  Academic qualifications in this case include Bachelors degree, KACE, 'O'-Level or KCPE.  Level of training i.e Investigation, Intelligence or security operation/technical courses
	Activity involvement	Security officers, security expert or student knowledge in guard/sentry duties, investigations and potential planning attacks

Measurement level	Jurisdiction of measurement	Item measured
<i>Ordinal</i>	Demographic data	Diverse ethnicity, gender and religion
	Level of security preparedness mainly structural and non-structural security preparedness measures	<p>Knowledge of security preparedness.</p> <p>Knowledge of building structural and non-structural security features.</p> <p>Knowledge on facility access, security awareness signboards, emergency plan of action and administrative capabilities and employee identification badges.</p> <p>Knowledge of public safety issues like utility distribution, minimum standoff distance. Others include presence of perimeter fence and technological security devices.</p> <p>Knowledge of threat assessment and risk management and ability of its practice.</p> <p>Familiarity with the 1998 bombing.</p>
	Terrorist modes of attack	<p>Understanding of terrorist mode of attack targeting buildings and circumventing measures.</p> <p>Knowledge of contemporary issues on terrorism.</p>
	Level of building vulnerability	Knowledge of risk management practice and facilities in use i.e access water points, telephone, backups.
	Category of group likely to get involved in terrorism	Understanding of societal tendencies i.e Religion, race and gender
<i>Interval</i>	Level of counter terrorism measures/policy measures	<p>Familiarity with security related legislations both local and international including the Organized Crime Act in Kenya.</p> <p>Knowledge of counter terrorist strategies by Government and globally</p> <p>Overall level of preparedness and management</p>
	Experience	Total number of years in the profession
	Hastening of measures in the period after 1998	Each year
	Demographic data	Current age in years

### 3.5. 1 Particulars of those Responsible for Security in Government Buildings

The characteristics of security officers manning Government buildings were appraised and the following summarizes their responses:

*Gender orientation:* A bigger number of respondents were male involved in day-to-day security in Government buildings, primarily evident in gate-keeping, investigations and

operational jobs dealing with all forms of threats. The male officers were assigned work during odd hours perhaps explaining why they can endure the kind of risks associated with their tasks, unlike their female counterparts, who are mostly assigned duties at security reception-desks during the day.

*Education:* Most respondents had a minimum secondary school (Ordinary-Level) education. This is an expression that the security realm attracts persons who have attained secondary school education and above, hence better placed to understand emerging security threats and best practices in dealing with them in the country.

*Age:* The ages of majority respondents manning Government buildings ranged from 21 to 40 years. This shows that the officers were youthful and energetic to muster the strenuous demands associated with their job.

*Religion:* It was also deduced that majority of respondents were Christians, perhaps reflective of the proportion of Christians as compared to Muslims and traditional religion/cult members in the country.

*Experience/Number of Years worked:* Majority of the respondents have worked in the security sector for a term ranging between 11 and 20 years (*SEE APPENDIX*).

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **4.0 SECURITY PREPAREDNESS IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS**

This chapter outlines the results of data analysis obtained from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observations. Given that the central drive of this study is to study the relationships of the independent and dependent variables, the overall aim to address the research objectives and answer the research as well as verify the hypotheses made in chapter two were assessed. The statistical method of Pearson Correlation is used to determine the existence of any relationships between the independent variable and dependent variable based on a set of opinion questions given to respondents and or focused group expert through the use of five-point Likert scale. It essentially delved into the relationship between security preparedness measures in Government buildings and terrorism threat. At the same time regression analysis and reliability is conducted to examine which among the independent variables is most important to explaining preparedness in Government Buildings and the country at large.

First, a descriptive analysis of terrorism aspect with its underlying causalities and attack cycle *vis a vis* fragility of Government buildings to future risks in the aftermath of the 1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi possibly as a way of embedding the various protective strategies. A look at changes in the structural and non-structural security features of 15 sampled Government buildings within Nairobi's Central Business District (NCBD) is also examined as a mirror to general security preparedness countrywide, and as a way forward into providing the basis for the identification of critical factors for designing effective plans of action in view of future risks or threats.

##### **4.1.1 Terrorism Threat and Assessment of Preparedness in Government Buildings**

The study considered diverse viewpoints about terrorism, vulnerability of Government buildings to this threat and relevant security preparedness measures in the Kenyan context. In an attempt to understand implications of terrorism action on security preparedness of

Government buildings, the basic 'terrorist mindset' (of premeditated violent acts or systemic violence by members of an organized group or individual acting with utmost secrecy threatens a specific target) became the reference point. Whereas it is important to understand terrorists mind, several factors are deemed to aid actual terrorist action. A general motivation for a lone ranger attacker or organized criminal group working in cohort for a prolonged period of time has been commonly cited by a number of scholars particularly Fein & Vossekuil, as examples whose ultimate goal is to exert undue influence on the Government and/or the general public.

To achieve such intended motive, a higher risk propensity for Government buildings to be targeted by potential terrorists indicates the need for security preparedness plans. This is in view of the fact that terrorists targeting Government buildings are more likely to be on the strength of reaping maximum publicity and abundant justification for their cause. In fact, the study's examination of diverse motivations, especially those relating to 'symbolic' value buildings, reckoned such name-recognition aspects of KICC, Parliament, Central Bank and City Hall buildings. It is this 'symbolic' value touching on national sovereignty and name-recognition that play into the media and public mind.

In view of the globalization effect posited in the preceding sections, the threats and dynamism of terrorism in Kenya became a reality in 1998 after the bombing, begging the question as to how Government buildings' security preparedness had shifted focus from traditional security details to proactive protective management approaches geared towards hardening potential target buildings, as well as identifying and defusing terrorists' plans. These new ways of ensuring enhanced protective security of Government buildings in the City and the country at large indicated identifiable protective security activities covering both structural and non-structural measures which could in one way or the other assist in dealing with the terrorism threat well in advance.

#### **4.1.2 Socio-cultural Considerations about Terrorism Threat in Kenya**

The sociological perspective about global terrorism threat has in one way or the other presented various scholars an opportunity to synthesize because the threat poses a great danger to those working and living in major towns and cities, as far as socio-cultural and economic implications are concerned. The socio-economic ramifications arising out of heightened fear of probable disruption of routine activities, destruction of property and loss of lives sends chilling shivers amongst the Kenyan populace, who hitherto abhor




fundamentalist, violent ideals and directed violence in any form and standard, if the 1998 bombing and other subsequent bombing are anything to go by .

It is against that background that the study enquired about factors that may encourage terrorism in Kenya and responses indicated as follows:

**Table 7: Factors Likely to Promote Terrorism in Kenya**

Variables	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Media Sensation	15 (20%)	30 (40%)	1	25 (33%)	4 (5%)	75
Railway	42 (56%)	25 (33%)	5	1 (1%)	2 (3%)	75
Youth Unemployment	16 (21%)	33(44%)	3	14 (19%)	9 (4%)	75
Globalization	8 (11%)	12(16%)	6	25 (33%)	24 (33%)	75
Overpopulation	2 (3%)	7(9%)	8	14 (19%)	44 (59%)	75
Total	83	107	23	79	83	375
Cell Rep %	20.7%	27.8%	6.4%	22.4%	22.7%	100%



In table 7, the distribution of the opinion of respondents concerning the factors promoting terrorism is derived from cell representation showing the cell performance of 20.7% and

27.8 % with strongly agree and agree cells respectively. This spread of cell representation touched on marginalization, radicalism, youth apathy, globalization, and ordinary crime as likely to promote terrorism in Kenya. It also depicted cell performance of 22.4%, 22.7% and 6.4% with regard to (disagree), (strongly disagree) and (neutral) cells respectively. The argument on *marginalization* as the main contributory factor to terrorism delved on skewed resource allocation/distribution as likely to compel affected members of the society to seek attention for such imbalance to be ameliorated as shown by 20% of respondents who strongly agree, 40% that (agree), 33% (disagree) and 5% (strongly disagree). The explanation given is that issue-driven disenchanting group usually expresses dissatisfaction using any form of tactic to compel the Government to address unmet grievances or policies touching on socio-economic and political difficulties like unfair land or resource allocation. Some respondents cited marginalized societies or groups as having transformed themselves into a quasi-terrorist outfits, for example the latent Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in Coast, annihilated Sabao Land Defense Force (SLDF) in Mt Elgon, and Mungiki (in parts of Central, Rift Valley and Nairobi), due to a common expression of their grievances through crude and clandestine activities.

*Radicalism:* The radical elements, mainly influenced by religious ideals, was seen as another factor revolving around extremism of any kind that may promote terrorism in Kenya. As such, 56% (strongly agree), 25% (agree), 1% (disagree) and 3% (strongly disagree) to the statement that radicalism is likely to promote terrorism in Kenya. It is particularly seen in light of ideologically “home grown” and externally inspired extremists with the potential to propagate their ideas that such presence of local and foreign inspired Jihadist groups like Al Qaeda or the Somalia-based Al Itihad Al Islamiyya, which has over times mutated into Al Shabaab are indicators of terrorism threat with asimilarity of indoctrination, recruitment and operational capabilities.

*Youth apathy tendency:* 21% (strongly agree), 44% (agree), 9% (disagree) and 4% (strongly disagree) that youth associated attendant psychological impact compel an individual or group of youth to engage in terrorism as a result of external forces, whose motives are to attract attention and publicity irrespective of whether the attack succeeds or not. Expert respondents particularly averred that the youth is usually influenced by culture change, curiosity/adventure and constant exposure to internet world culture depicting modern lifestyles that glorify violence and terrorism success. As a result, the youth capitalize on their energetic valve to imitate with the hope of becoming heroes, while

others seek to acquire quick wealth by any means. Similarly, certain actions, including air flight cancellation, cordoning/evacuation in suspected areas/buildings, and arrests of suspects, were cited by respondents as serving to psyche this group. Resultant broad psychological impacts, especially when Governments issue alerts, indirectly boost their intended aim of causing public fear.


*Globalization:* In a globalized environment, 11% (strongly agree), 16% (agree), 33% (disagree) and 33% (strongly disagree) to globalization as contributing to terrorism in Kenya as exemplified by an individual or group seeking to express solidarity with happenings in parts of the globe. One of the responses cited a local group or community who feels part and parcel of a wider society elsewhere in the world especially the Somalia instability, the Israel/Palestine conflict and archaists with specific global issues/policies as more likely to compel a section of Kenyan society to identify with their cause. Passive supporters of Al Qaeda, for example, may also consider using the exact date of the 1998 Nairobi bombing or the 2002 Kikambala terrorist event as part of their future global rallying point.

*Ordinary crime:* It also affirmed that 3% (strongly agree), 9% (agree), 19% (disagree) and 59% (strongly disagree) to ordinary crime as likely to promote terrorism in Kenya. The reasoning behind the low rating is that ordinary criminals are usually uncoordinated due to the nature of motive, which is short-term (like stealing for the sake of it before escaping after committing) may not produce terrorists, who execute their acts in a rather complex and/or well planned attacks.

The study's enquiry also explored on other probable targets for terrorist in Kenya during the period after the 1998 terrorist bombing based on vulnerability of targets of either preferred 'soft' and 'hard' targets for diverse reasons. As observed in the literature review, buildings deemed to be the most compelling target more often than not have to be one with high concentration of people at a given time. Based on that consideration, inquiries about category of buildings preferred for attack by terrorists yielded the following responses;

**Table 8: Category of Buildings Likely to be the most appealing target for a terrorist attack**

Variables	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total
Rural Dwellings	2 (3%)	12(16%)	7	18(24%)	36(48%)	75
Government offices	47 (63%)	17(23%)	2	6(8%)	3(4%)	75
Soft target like school in any town	27 (36%)	15(20%)	6	12(16%)	15(20%)	75
Foreigners workplace/property	22 (29%)	34(45%)	5	12(16%)	2(3%)	75
TOTAL	98	78	20	48	56	300
Cell Rep - %	32.7%	26%	6.6%	16%	18.7%	100%



In table 8, the cell representation indicated cell performance of 32.7%, 26%, 16% and 18.7% spread to correspond to strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree while 6.7% is neutral. The cell representation spread across rural dwellings, Government buildings, soft target like school in any town and foreigners workplace/property as the most appealing target for terrorism in Kenya.

*Rural Dwellings/buildings* -: A paltry 3% (strongly agree) and 16% (agree) that a rural dwelling/building is most likely to be an appealing target for terrorists in Kenya as compared to 24% (disagree) and 48% (strongly disagree) in view of other types of buildings. Most respondents opined that chances and repercussions for an attack, targeting people in a rural residential home, *Manyatta*, or homestead remain minimal.

*Government Buildings*: It became apparent that 63% strongly agree, 23% agree that Government buildings, wherever they are, as being the most preferred terrorist targets, as compared to 8% disagree and 4% strongly disagree. Respondents acknowledged the possibility and impact of targeting such 'hard' targets housing Ministries or Departments, Government security installations and government-owned learning institutions due to their symbolic value and as a means to challenge the authority remains all time high.

*Soft Target Building/Resort*: It also became clear that 36% strongly agree, 20% agree to such soft target buildings like a University, School, supermarket, any star hotel and shopping mall complex as most exposed target owing to ease of access with less stringent security measures to potential terrorists when compared with 16% that disagree and 20% strongly disagree. The respondents maintained that these buildings are likely to yield far reaching repercussions as they attract a large number of unsuspecting persons.


*Foreigners' workplace/Investment Zones*: The inquiry revealed that 29% strongly agree, 45% agree, 16% disagree and 3% strongly disagree to foreign embassies or high commission buildings, including diplomats' houses and foreign investments, as the most likely target for terrorists. The respondents affirm that terrorists' selection of the target is usually to pass a message to associated countries or investors.

#### **4.1.3 Preferred Mode of terrorist attacks for Hard Target Buildings**

In the literature review, targeted violence irrespective of building category, underscores security scholars' depiction of targeting as resulting from a deliberate process of thinking and behavior alongside the planning aspect. The planning, in this case encompass a series of decisive factors such as which target(s), the proper time and approach, and the means for violence derived from sufficient information about the target, the setting of the attack,

or about similar attacks<sup>62</sup>. The inquiry about chances with regard to means with which terrorists may use in attacking hard target Government buildings yielded the following:

**Figure 6: Risk Perception on Mode of Terrorist Attack**



The risk perception presented in Figure 6 indicated close to 40% chance for vehicle borne or *rolling* means of attack against hard target Government buildings when compared to other modes of attack. The respondents reiterated that a possibility of this method as the most preferred mode of attack is higher given that most terrorist finds it convenient to use a vehicle loaded with explosives or bomb, with the sole aim of causing collateral damage to the facility and mass casualty event. The rationale is that terrorists' operational option at the point of entry range from booby-traps or timing devices used to explode bombs once inside a building to suicide bombing components.

<sup>62</sup> Opcit (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998)

The walk-in / individual placement and shelling or aerial categorization account for 20% chance each as preferred means of attack that may be used against a target building in Kenya. Walk-in device is easily carried in small quantities using a parcel or back-pack. Similarly, it indicated 15% chances of unauthorized access by a third person, hacking and manipulation of information or disabling of data not necessarily in the form of physical but technological transfer from a distant locality. This technological aspect of threat usually manifests itself in its formative stages, with a high possibility of vital information or data kept in computers pertaining to, among other things, official Government documents (including policies, finances/payrolls, tenders, or personnel records) being lost in the event of a terrorist attack or disabling/ crushing of computers.

Finally, 5% chance is in the form of Chemical or Biological explosive threat that may find its way into a Government building through unusual incoming packages/parcels, persons or vehicles that are casually inspected.

#### 4.1.4 Vulnerability of Government Buildings

There is always a danger of ignoring risk factors, as documented in the preceding chapter, an omission that usually results in far reaching ramifications. Vulnerability of Government Buildings by terrorists implies that a number of factors may need to be considered for its mitigation's success or failure. In an empirical study by the ISD Summary of Second Working Group, the 1998 bombing could have been averted if the US State Department had not dismissed intelligence advice on the need to relocate their embassy outside Nairobi's city center prior to the bombing. The report further described the State Department's remarks on the then Nairobi Embassy as a "medium-risk" post barely qualified for selected security improvements, let alone constructing a new building, given the number of embassies deemed "high risk," hence falling below standards because of financial constraints<sup>63</sup>. Although the move to shelve the relocation was seen neither as a solution to imminent security threats nor as a matter of safety precaution, the policy-makers also failed to act on available intelligence which pointed to Osama Bin Laden's meticulous planning and especially the growing terrorist networks in East Africa, which culminated into the 1998 Nairobi bombing<sup>64</sup>.

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
<sup>63</sup> ISD Summary of Second Working Group report of 14th March 2005,

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

In the unfortunate event of a terrorist attack therefore, a considerable adverse effects on Government buildings indicated as follows;

**Table 9: Adverse Effect of Terrorism Attack in a public Building**

Variables	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total
Mass Casualty	40(53%)	20(27%)	4	9(12%)	2(3%)	75
Disruption of Public Services	37(49%)	19(25%)	2	12(16%)	5(7%)	75
Disruption of Property	9(12%)	17(23%)	3	18(24%)	28(37%)	75
Loss of Wages	2(3%)	15(20%)	4	26(35%)	28(37%)	75
TOTAL	88	71	13	65	63	300
Cell Rep. = %	29.3%	23.7%	4.3%	21.7%	21%	100%



In table 9, the cell representation for ramification arising out of any terrorist attack indicated cell performance of 29.3%, 23.7%, 21.7% and 21% spread across strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree cells respectively with regard to mass casualty event,



paralyzing of public services, destruction of property and loss of wages as the most likely effect of a terrorist attack in a public building while 4.3% is neutral. *Mass casualties*: In effect, 53% strongly agree, 27% agree, 12% disagree and 3% strongly disagree to a possibility of a mass casualty event, leading to deaths as a result of a terrorist attack targeted at Government buildings as compared to other resultant effects. The argument is based on the fact that a majority of the public does seek services on a day-to-day basis in these buildings. Respondents specifically cited passersby, contractors, civil servants and security personnel as part of the larger public equally predisposed to a terrorist attack by virtue of working in these buildings.

*Paralysis of Public Service*: It also emerged that 49% strongly agree, 25% agree, 16% disagree and 7% strongly disagree that various public delivery services are bound to suffer most in a terrorist attack targeting Government buildings as compared to other effects.

*Destruction of Property*: There is a very high likelihood of destruction of a part or whole of the building targeted by a terrorist as indicated by 12 % that strongly agree, 23% agree, 24% disagree and 37% strongly disagree to structural damage as a foremost possibility.

*Loss of Wages*: A paltry 3 % strongly agree, 20% agree, 35% disagree and 37% strongly disagree to possible resultant loss of wages and livelihoods in the event of a terrorist attack on a Government building as compared to other repercussions.


Given the adverse effects of such an attack, Government, first-hand security preparedness defenses assessed in the study indicated the following;

#### **4.2.1 Security Preparedness in Government Buildings**

Whereas security preparedness in Government buildings are tied to actions that anticipate and seek to circumvent threats over time, the study's evaluation of the sampled buildings' security preparedness against vulnerabilities and risks related to terrorism posit a number of measures, both for the specific building designs and other salient management postures. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the level of security preparedness in Government buildings (*both human and non-human physical protection*) largely depends on certain factors, which in the long term go requires planning, resources and policies.

Given the importance of guaranteeing security and safety in all Government buildings, a general security preparedness level trend in the period after the 1998 bombing indicated as follows;

**Figure 7: Security Preparedness Alert level after the 1998 bombing**



As indicated in Figure 7, it is a clear that beefing up of security and general alertness in the country were noted in all Government buildings in the immediate years after the 1998 bombing and 2001 Kikambala bombings. The explanation is that security measures are more often than not hastened whenever threat intensity goes up, with a tendency to nose-dive after some time before an elongated lull, perhaps until emergence of another threat. Respondents cited non-structural measures as prone to lax attitude after a period of time.

However, such a depiction may not assist much in addressing the research objective, given that elasticity of security preparedness measures and their effectiveness levels in Government buildings and the country at large depended on several factors. In evaluating structural hardening and enhancing of non-structural measures against the varied mode of terrorist attacks, there are pertinent indicators that affirm their efficacy. To discern the various security preparedness strategies, the sampled Government buildings were clustered on a scale of I to VI with 6 staggered equally-weighted security factors based on the US Facility Security Level<sup>65</sup>. This technique, which is universally accepted, provided a means to ascertain appropriate security preparedness measures for such terrorist-related


<sup>65</sup> Ibid: (ISC, 2008)

emerging threats to buildings. The numerical categorization for each building based on the 6 equally weighted security preparedness factors indicated as follows;

**Table 10: Factors Affecting Government Buildings' Security Preparedness**

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Not sure</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	
<i>Associated Symbolism</i>	35(46%)	14(18.7%)	1	16(22%)	9(12.5%)	75
<i>Nature of Services</i>	18(23.5%)	14(19%)	3(4)	29(39%)	11(14.5%)	75
<i>Threat Level</i>	21(28.5%)	14(18%)	3(4.5)	31(41%)	6(8%)	75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>225</b>
<b>Cell Rep. - %</b>	<b>32.9%</b>	<b>18.7%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>33.8%</b>	<b>11.6%</b>	

**Level I-III Criteria**




In table 10, the cell performance indicate a spread of 32.9%, 18.7%, 33.8% and 11.6% to strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree cells respectively with a convergence towards associated symbolism, type of services provided and Government buildings threat level. With regard to *associated symbolism*, 46% strongly agree, 18.7% agree, 22% disagree and 12.5% strongly disagree to Government buildings as having commensurate security arrangement owing to their "symbolic" value. Most respondents cited Harambee House, KICC, Sheria House, The High Court, and Police Headquarters as symbolizing the presidency, state law, judiciary and law enforcement respectively. Conversely, risks of attack on such high name-recognition buildings which in most cases explains the rationale

behind potential terrorist's sudden interest in targeting them. That is why, effective security programs acting as a bulwark against any eventuality are usually considered from the 'outside in' based on 'action' rather than 'reaction', to make it extremely hard for any potential terrorists intending to carry out any attack. Secondly, 23.5 % strongly agree, 19% agree, 39% disagree and 14% strongly disagree to the nature of services offered in a Government building as determining its security preparedness level. Some of the respondents cited services such as immigration controls (Sheria House), resolution of disputes/crime deterrence measures (High Court), policing duties (Vigilance), money regulation (CBK) and revenue collection (KRA) as likely to suffer in the event of a terrorist attack. Similarly, the threat level of a given target building was also considered as equally pertinent in ascertaining level of security preparedness as indicated by 28.5 % that strongly agree, 18% agree, 41% disagree and 8% strongly disagree, which posit the third categorization factor both in the city and countrywide.


Level IV-V factors also indicated as follows;

**Figure 8: Building Size Evaluation Criteria**




In figure 8, buildings size Government buildings as criteria for security preparedness indicated that categorization of 4 buildings out of the 15 sampled have over 16 storeys/floors. The building size is an important factor that determines security preparedness for each building, an aspect that goes hand in hand with the number of people entering each building.

**Figure 9: Building Population Evaluation Criteria**



In figure 9, the number of people entering for example, only 2 buildings have a total population of over 4,501 per day while 4 buildings range between 1500-3000 people. These factors assisted the study to ascertain the status of security levels using an evaluation criteria affecting both structural and non-structural protection with regards to cost and level of protection as indicated in Figure 10.

**Figure 10: Cost Implications against Level of Protection in Government Buildings**



In combining the downward and upward curve in Figure 10, the overall rate of security measures have a direct bearing on expenditure on safety devices or counter/defense strategies. The input or cost dependent on resources is such that a rise in cost implies greater protection/safety. Cost covers a wide range of security preparedness factors, which ultimately are not limited to staff remunerations and cost of equipment but other overheads.

The extent to which specific measures seek to reduce chances of devastating effects and/or thwart terrorist access to buildings proves that these security level evaluation factors answers the research objectives, as indicated in the next section;


#### 4.2.2 Structural Mitigation Criteria against Terrorism Threat

The new ways put in place in Government buildings to guard against potential terrorism threats as per the study objective with regard to level of structural security preparedness measures after the 1998 terrorist bombing indicated the following;

**Table 11: Adequacy of Structural Mitigation Indicators in Government buildings**

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Not sure</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	
<i>Gate/Door Maintenance</i>	43(57%)	21(28%)	1	4(5%)	6(8%)	75
<i>Building Designs</i>	24(32%)	15(20%)	1	22(29%)	13(17%)	75
<i>Technical Equipment</i>	32(43%)	17(23%)	2	18(24%)	6(8%)	75
<i>Secure escape access</i>	16(21%)	23(31%)	5	21(28%)	10(13%)	75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>300</b>
<b>Cell Rep. - %</b>	<b>38.3%</b>	<b>25.3%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>11.7%</b>	<b>100%</b>

#### Structural Measures



In Table 11, the cell performance of 38.3%, 25.3%, 21.7%, 11.7% and 3% spread across strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree and (not sure) cells in respect to gate system, building designs, technical equipment and secure emergency access suggested plausible indicators of structural mitigation measures in government buildings aimed at thwarting possible terrorist attack. As for the *gate system* (gates and doors), 57% strongly agree, 28% agree, 5% disagree and 8% strongly disagree that it is the foremost security preparedness indicator against intruders at points of entry in Government buildings that require enhancement after the 1998 bombing as compared to other physical preparedness measures. The respondents cited reinforced barriers, lockable doors and steel gates which are manned on a 24-hour basis.

*Building Designs:* 32% strongly agree, 20% agree, 29% disagree and 17% strongly disagree that the way Government buildings within the NCBD have been designed, have had a net effect of forestalling all manner of risks including potential terrorist attacks. Respondents cited perimeter walls, parking and laminated windows as having been enhanced after the 1998 bombing, by way of retro-fitting. However, most respondents disagreed that the structural design does meet the expected standard to wade off potential terrorists, citing those determined to use aerial bombing means of attack.

*Use of Modern equipment in the building:* 43% strongly agree, 23% agree, 24% disagree and 8% strongly disagree to indicators of adoption and usage of modern security equipment like CCTV security cameras in Government buildings that assist in monitoring suspicious/illegal intruders including potential terrorists as compared to physical security measures. In most buildings, respondents noted that adoption of technological equipment in the form of surveillance cameras, bomb or fire detectors, electronic security system, intrusion detection sensors / alarm, back up utility systems, installed electric barriers, hand band metal detectors, fire extinguishing, detection and suppression systems have been enhanced in most Government buildings, thus effective in curtailing all forms of illegal entry not necessarily to guard against terrorists.

On *access to building*, 21% strongly agree, 31% agree, 28% disagree and 13% strongly disagree that there is enhanced restricted access in terms of structural mitigation measures that ensure convenient level of access to designated entry points for persons and vehicles and emergency exits as compared to other measures. They cited various security checks,

including hand band detection, motor vehicle and luggage screening for all persons seeking services in these Government buildings.

#### 4.2.3 Non-Structural Criteria Mitigating against Terrorism Threat

Direct human involvement in securing Government buildings against unauthorized risk access and pertinent means of dealing with those out to carry out systematic violent attack on the buildings and/or its occupants was categorized into two, namely; security officers manning each building on a 24 hour basis, as well as protective intelligence. In answering the study's objective, these two areas presented marked transformation after the 1998 terrorist bombing.


As a means to prevent ease of access by any potential terrorists and/or movement of associated conventional weapons into these Government buildings, Table 12 depicts attendant security preparedness level indicators that could mitigate against terrorist-related incidences on Government buildings.

**Table 12: Adequacy of Non-Structural Strategies in Government Buildings**

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	
<i>Enhanced Capacity</i>	47(63%)	19(25%)	1	6(8%)	2(3%)	75
<i>Regular staff Briefing</i>	10(13%)	11(15%)	12	29(39%)	13(17%)	75
<i>Incorporated security and disaster plans</i>	15(20%)	12(16%)	1	35(47%)	12(16%)	75
<i>Public Participation</i>	3(4%)	20(27%)	3	27(36%)	22(29%)	75
<i>TOTAL</i>	75	62	17	97	49	300
<i>Cell Rep. = %</i>	25 %	20.7 %	5.7%	32.3%	16.3%	100%



## Non Structural Measures



In table 12, the cell performance indicated that 25%, 20.7%, 32.3%, 16.3% and 5.7% spread along strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree and not sure cells with regard to enhanced capacity of security personnel, regular briefing, adequate regulations/checks, incorporated security-disaster plans and public participations as key non-structural measures in government buildings.

In view of *enhanced capacity of security personnel*, 63% strongly agree, 25% agree, 8% disagree and 3% strongly disagree that security control tools in form of round-the-clock security provided by *sentries/guards* are the most credible form of security in sampled Government buildings. The respondents cited sentries' use of hand-band detectors and portable metal detectors for visitors or vehicles entering Government buildings on a daily basis, throughout the week and on a 24-hour shift basis to be the most effective means of thwarting potential terror attacks. They contended that these sentries have basic knowledge on security threat assessment and skills on how to handle risk situations that include emergency recovery procedures, and preparation of security and general disaster contingency measures in all Government buildings.

*On staff awareness programme*, there was a convergence of 13% strongly agree, 15% agree, 39% disagree and 17% that strongly disagree to presence of regular situational awareness briefings covering personal and building security and safety measures, including first aiding in case of emergencies in Government buildings as compare to 56% who disagree and strongly disagree to the statement. The security personnel in general had the ability to detect, prevent and rescue, largely due to the nature of their initial and on-

the-job training. Use of employee and visitors identification cards for all staff entering the building and presence of memos, security awareness posters or caution signboards were cited as key awareness features.

Respondents also cited a list of emergency telephone numbers of senior staff and those of emergency service providers, including Police 99, mobile telephone emergency lines or and ambulance services, posted in all the Government buildings. There were security awareness posters, including emergency caution signboards marked; *EXIT*, *ENTRANCE*, Fire Extinguisher, water hydrant points and evacuation route signs in most of the sampled Government buildings, and which were clearly labeled. Similarly, notices of restrictions in Government buildings and the use of employee and visitors identification cards for those entering Government buildings were being strictly adhered to.

Additionally, 20% strongly agree, 16% agree, 47% disagree and 16% strongly disagree that *security and disaster plans of action* have been partially incorporated after the 1998 bombing as a security preparedness measure against terrorist threats that could be targeted at Government buildings as compared to the statements for other non-structural measure. Respondents while acknowledging the importance of a plan of action aimed at reducing or forestalling injury to employees or visitors, disruption of Government services and damage to property, indicated that written memo threat assessment have been seldom reviewed, with each building emergency plan (via Manual and Standard Procedures) that more often than not lead to haphazard collaboration in most cases between the Police and Nairobi City Council Fire Brigade, thus negating the potentiality of the plans, if any. Some contended that such a plan of action on emergencies in Government buildings is casually administered and not given due attention as indicated by some respondents, who strongly disagree to it being effective since it is neither subjected to regular rehearsal nor owned by staff.


It also became apparent that *public participation* as a preparedness measure in the form of public announcement and media awareness against terrorism threat has been somewhat adequate, as 4% strongly agree, 27% agree, 36% disagree and 29% strongly disagree that this could mitigate against such risks in Government buildings after the 1998 bombing as compared to other non-structural measures. The respondents attributed poor public participation to widespread belief that the primary responsibility of dealing with terrorism threat rests on security organs. It is for this reason that both the public and security

agencies are characterized by poor working relations, suspicion and failure to co-operate in minimizing such instances of terrorism threat since perception of police failures outweigh their common good.

#### 4.2.4 Appropriate Security Organ dealing with Protective Security

A question put across to the respondents on the local security regime’s effectiveness in tackling terrorism threat or protective security responsibility, including operational detection and prevention of violence that may enhance better management of security preparedness in Government buildings, indicates as follows;

**Figure 11: Security Organ’s Preparedness Efforts**



In the Figure 11, a significant 32% strongly agree to Kenya Police officers contribute immensely in tackling terrorism risks through a combined role of physical guarding/provision of security with regard to Government buildings, besides carrying out actual investigations, arrests and prosecution of suspected terrorists.

Respondents were unanimous that the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has carried out its mandate since its formation in 2004. Similarly, another 24% indicated that the Administration Police are directly involved in the day-to-day protective duties, which entail terrorist interdiction, as spelt out in their 2009/2010 Work Plan. Although this has been clearly outlined in the Action Plan, the AP’s role in investigation and actual

interdiction is still at infancy. However, of keen interest was a strong convergence of 30% that the National Security Intelligence Service is the key local security agency that has contributed a great deal in tackling terrorism threat through protective security, operational detection and prevention of terrorism-related activities that may impact on security both in Government buildings and the country at large. Whereas 10% strongly agree that with the establishment of the *National Counter Terrorism Center* (NCTC) has contributed greatly in the fight against terrorism (owing to its mandated responsibility of ensuring synergy amongst the security organs involved in dealing with the vice) a small fraction ( 4%) that expressly give the Kenya Military as having overly performed better.

#### 4.2.5 General overview on security preparedness measures

The respondents further indicated that noticeable changes in the way Government buildings may not be sufficient by itself in dealing with terrorism threat. In essence, other salient remedial measures including a legislative framework<sup>66</sup>, which the study could not ignore is attributed to the fact that although the country still utilizes legislations in the Laws of Kenya (LoK) – which do not in any way recognize terrorism as a crime punishable by law, there have been a number of initiatives towards its realization. The legislative efforts, particularly the revised Anti-Terrorism Bill, that seek to provide means with which the detection and prevention of terrorist activities can be contained by amending relevant Acts like the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries Act) were cited by some respondents as pertinent. In the envisaged bill, terrorism is depicted as ‘the unlawful use of violence or threat of use of violence, with intent to advance a political, religious, ethnic, ideological or other such cause; and includes any unlawful use of violence or threat of use of violence with intent to put the public or a section of the public in fear’<sup>67</sup>. Replete throughout the data are signs that the terrorism threat and security preparedness nexus may provide direction for future reference. However, these findings beg a critical look at efficacy of security preparedness factors which is outlined in the next section.

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<sup>66</sup> Legislative Framework that entails legal means of dealing with the emerging threat of terrorism locally.  
<sup>67</sup> Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2007.

## **4.3 EFFICACY OF SECURITY PREPAREDNESS AGAINST TERRORISM THREATS**

### **4.3.1. Background**

This section contains data analysis addressing the study question on best security preparedness practices against potential terrorists targeting Government buildings and the country at large. As deduced in chapter 4. short term and long term security preparedness measures' positive indicators after the 1998 bombing are further examined to determine effectiveness of both structural and non-structural strategies and challenges as per respondents'/expert viewpoints. Accordingly, the strength of relationship between dependent and independent variables is critical in defining security preparedness in Government buildings in view of emerging terrorism threat. In the long run, ways of reversing the possible effects of anticipated risks through proactive security practices in buildings, awareness and re-evaluation of long-term strategies to contain such emerging threats were explored. In effect, the analysis suggests that most buildings in the City are not foolproof against any disaster, owing to overhead costs and absence of a clear cut legislative/policy framework.

In the study, whereas the significance of security preparedness against terrorism threat is being over emphasized by the Western world, other life-threatening events awash in the African continent, remains real. However, that does not mean managing security preparedness against terrorism threat on Government buildings, may not be a priority hence the need to put into consideration the right procedures for dealing with the indicators of terrorist planning in the first place. It is against this assertion that security preparedness in Government buildings goes beyond structural and non structural measures, as some scholars posit such security controls to be a key pillar in public buildings irrespective of its related heavy investment in them. This is notwithstanding the fact that these measures may not be a foolproof in dealing with emerging dynamism in threats by whatever means because terrorists would always want to try circumventing the same.

In ascertaining the extent of structural hardening and enhancing of non-structural measures against the varied modes of terrorist attacks, therefore, a Government building Security Level categorization in the preceding section was of great assistance. Indeed, the security

level categorization may be a suitable indicator for addressing the overall threats of terrorism attack on or before things gets out of hand. However, in evaluating them, as discerned in the next section, pertinent indicators affirm their efficacy, which are in one way or the other helpful in reducing chances of devastating effects.

#### **4.3.2 Importance of Security Preparedness Measures against Terrorism Threat**

Since terrorism is not limited to groups opposing established Government, such individuals, whose objectives include personal gratification and criminal tendency, pose a threat to any Government buildings. Although the threat may be ongoing, it cannot be wholly addressed using a prescribed security preparedness formula as Brian Senkas' asserts '*As we deal with certain tactics, certain weapons the terrorists do innovate is just enough to obviate our security measures. They either switch to softer targets (sic) or they may innovate tactically*' (in Patrick Marshal, 1990). Rather, a well thought out preparedness paradigm management shift in mitigating against disruption of normalcy, loss of life and property remain critical. As a consequence, it goes without say that effectiveness of both structural and non-structural measures may assist in addressing the risks on or before things get out of hand, as adduced in the next section.

#### **4.3.3 Physical Structural Criteria as a Key Security Preparedness Measure**

In securing Government buildings against any potential risk to them and/or occupants, certain structural precautions and designs have been cited in the study as going along way towards cushioning against detrimental consequences of unauthorized access and direct manifestation of terrorism threat. This is in view of the fact that the nature and functions of a Government department *vis a vis* a large number of people and vehicles moving in and out of these buildings on a daily basis requires a more balanced security system. Bearing in mind the study's objective, there is a strong convergence in the *structural gate system* as a key physical security mitigation feature against intruders and terrorists at the points of entry and parking, as indicated in the preceding chapter. These restrictions in Government buildings form part of designs that ensure protected access points, since they indicate how a building has been designed/laid-out, nature of fence and location of parking as well as type of glass windows (whether laminated or not). These mitigative maintenance standards designed to ensure convenient level of access, in terms of emergency exit or escape route

with notices kept unobstructed for both building users and first line responders in the event of bomb attack, are quite a permanent feature in Government buildings.

The limiting of access by way of well manned entry points in Government buildings that assist minimizes chances of a vehicle with explosives being left unattended, entering freely or forcefully into a building. Any attack therefore via vehicle, pedestrian, or even aerial form of attack, is best kept at bay. Apparently, the way the gate system has been designed has also been replicated in some buildings in the city. These measures in the long run have the potential of forestalling terrorist attacks that may in most cases lead to mass casualty events.

In the same breath, *adoption of modern intrusion*-detection devices that identify illegal movement of persons, weapons and explosives within the vicinity of Government buildings as the second most important form of physical structural defense may not be overemphasized. This strong concurrence is principally to guard against certain forms of terrorist attacks, including cyber, vehicle and pedestrian. It is therefore important that:

- Extent of inbuilt interior or exterior compactness of most Government buildings is likely to enable a building to withstand an explosion. This indeed could mitigate against the second category of possible attack by way of shelling or aerial bombing. Although a remarkable absence of laminated glass windows in most of the Government buildings could otherwise ensure that staff or passersby are protected from flying glass in event of bomb blast, the recently constructed Government buildings have taken into consideration the importance of laminated window glasses.
- Effective scrutiny of unusual packages, use of employee and visitors' identification and staff reporting anything curious or confronting idlers are major hallmarks in Government buildings against walk-in or individual placement carried in small quantities using a parcel or back-bag mode of transporting explosives into a building.
- Presence of security awareness posters or caution signboards labeled thus 'Emergency *EXIT, ENTRANCE, FIRE*' and evacuation route signs, fire extinguisher/water hydrant points in most of the sampled Government buildings. There are also notices of restrictions in Government buildings as a means of deterring unauthorized access.

- Enhanced cyber safety measures, through use of computer back-ups, securing of computer rooms when not in use, use of hard copies or diskettes and flash disks that are kept elsewhere from the building or electronically placed on remote server in another building. These actions are important because any damage to such data would impact negatively on the functioning of Government ministries.
- Finally, Chemical and Biological threats in Government buildings may be kept at bay as misuse of nuclear explosives or anthrax transmission, though considered in the study as the least form of threat, may precipitate some basic measures. Since this form of threat is usually sophisticated, vigilance by way of strict entry into Government facilities and ensuring scrutiny/augmenting inspection procedures for unusual, incoming packages, persons or vehicles have been enhanced to deter unauthorized persons with chemical explosives into these building.

#### 4.4.4 Non-Structural Criteria as a Security Preparedness Measure

This covered pertinent human security enhancements, namely;

- a) Trained security personnel able to detect, prevent and rescue in view of terrorist threats on Government buildings.

The study noted improvement of security and safety in Government buildings, based on the number of trained security officers on the subject matter. Although all security officers have a bias towards training in martial arts and weapon handling, as well in threat analysis, any form of terrorism threat remain a major challenge to various scholars. This is more evident in threat assessment for any form of terrorism threat as there is an over-reliance on training targeting all cadre of security officers basically on traditional criminal tackling and maintenance of law and order. In effect, a substantial number of officers seemed not to have adequate training to deal specifically with security situational analysis, a form of sharing vital information amongst enforcement officers.

Similarly, the officers' firsthand knowledge on general security indicates a great disparity in training of other auxiliary staff to deal with all manner of threats. This is based on the small percentage of respondents who strongly agree that level of training given to other non-security staff/personnel is still insufficient, hence security preparedness measures against terrorism portend a big challenge requiring an all-encompassing training for both



security personnel and other workforce in each building. This is attributed to the fact that awareness raised just as preventive steps to minimize chances of terrorist attacks taken are of paramount importance. As a result, there is need to ensure that all staff members are knowledgeable/trained on general security skills, law enforcement duties and threat assessment in order to ensure that lives are saved in the event of a life threatening situation or attack. For effective results, simulation exercises done periodically in these buildings can go a long way in filling that skills gap.

Emphasis on threat assessment, as well as use of modern technological equipment, in minimizing terrorism risks requires equal input in the form of training of personnel using them, besides new innovations. This is because adequacy of personnel to handle them is still insufficient. Essentially, trained staff ought to know how to use these equipment for greater preparedness.

b) Effectiveness of the local security regime in dealing with terrorism.

Most significantly, there seemed to be a norm amongst the local security regime to treat every threat, no matter how far-fetched, to be a serious threat. In discerning diverse roles of security organs, a look at the security level in all the 15 Government buildings indicates that they are equally secured by a contingent of security personnel whose functions are primarily guard/protection duties throughout the day and night in shifts.

In the first instance, the study underscored the important role played by Administration Police (AP) officers in providing security in Government buildings within the CBD, with visible presence at Harambee House, Nyayo House, Herufi House, and Sheria House, while Kenya Police officers' presence were noticeable at Central Police Station, Vigilance, Parliament Buildings and Treasury House. In buildings where the APs provide actual security at main gates, entrances, visitors' bay and parking, they are usually armed. Part of their responsibilities includes monitoring check-in procedures at security desks, as well as scrutinizing all persons, parcels/luggage or vehicles entering building during the day and night, throughout the week.

The APs officers carry out these roles with much ease given that they possess the requisite skills involving weapon identification, crime detection and general protection duties. This notwithstanding, other specific roles under the Administration Police Act (CAP 208, LoK)

include assisting the Provincial Administration in execution of their duties, preservation of peace and conflict resolution<sup>68</sup>. In the AP Strategic Plan, terrorism interdiction is categorized as its major tasks, apart from other roles more often than not seen as supplementary. Involvement of private security guards, mainly from the G4S, visibly deployed at Times Tower and KICC, also supplement police officers' day duties.

Similarly, the Kenya Police listed as another defense line against terrorists have multiplicity of roles, ranging from those executed by ATPU to those charged with the responsibility of ensuring security of Government buildings and the country at large. In occasions where there are emergencies, including bomb scare incidences, the regular police usually cordon, conduct searches and control movement of people and vehicles. They also have bomb experts and sniffer dogs.

On the country's intelligence agency, the foremost mandate entails tackling such transnational crimes, owing to the nature of work cutting across unraveling situations that breed terrorists. The importance of intelligence obtained by way of undercover operations ensures elimination of terrorist weapons' supply, suppression of recruitment and blocking or freezing their assets. It is in view of seeking to prevent persons threatening to attack public officials and/or building targets described by Fein as *threat assessment*<sup>69</sup>, that use of discrete intelligence in conjunction with the TEDD principle is seen as highly likely to prevent any terrorist attack or plans (Fein & Vossekui, 1998). This is because such appraisal is able to assist in identifying a person (or persons) threatening to commit violent acts or "targeted violence" as opposed to the normal security 'profiling'<sup>70</sup> through a sequence of actions. The problem with this approach is that since bombing threats in Kenya are rare and best isolated, profiles will not be sufficient when compared to, for instance, *Mungiki* stereotyping. In the literature on assassination, for example, the classic "profile" of the "American assassin" is of a male attacker<sup>71</sup>, which may not be the case as for a terrorist (Kirkham et al., 1969). This assessment assists in evaluating the threat by uncovering any facts or evidence that indicate the threat is real.

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<sup>68</sup> Administration Police Act CAP 208; pg 121

<sup>69</sup> This specific assessment developed by the US Secret Service has evolved into a standard approach to analyze a variety of dangerous situations, including threats of workplace violence

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. 'profiling' widely used in a typical police investigation where a criminal associated with proscribed *Mungiki* gang for instance is profile to be one who sniff tobacco stuff, wear *rasta* hairstyle and or deal ruthlessly with own defectors including beheading in a characteristic style

<sup>71</sup> Kirkham has expounded the concept of profiling in most of his scholarly work.

As a long-term strategy, therefore, good inter-agency cooperation and coordination, commonly referred by risk management scholars to cover Communication, Coordination and Intelligence (2C's and I) components, ensures that any credible intelligence flow is a product of information sharing and cooperation at the Government, public and even regional and international levels. In effect, it came to the fore that all security organs play complementary role in dealing with terrorism threat as per their functions, thus bringing into sharp focus the sheer element of coordinated effort. The coordination component is such crucial matter since APs play a passive role in the Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery (KSIM), as Provincial Administration officials (PCs and DCs) act on their behalf, this has in one way or the other contributed to their dismal show in dealing with the vice as core highlighted in their strategic plan. It was however discerned that the personnel so far trained on the subject matter have a clear understanding of their role pertaining to SGB and terrorism interdiction, though they in a position to disrupt any activity bearing terrorism manifestation as compared to other security organs. In the short term, the department could be able to improve on their surveillance, human and technical capacity within the buildings precincts, as opposed to long-term surveillance and disruption operations during terrorist planning stage, which is under the purview of sister security organs.

c). **Effectiveness of emergency plan of action for each building.** Given the overall strategy of preparing and training building occupants or other staff/personnel on how to go about during life threatening situations, the study underscored the fact that security and disaster plans of action have not been fully incorporated and reviewed regularly to cover all the risks and threats, including terrorism. Though emergency plans of action, kept under tight custody of each head of security in all buildings, explicitly pass as pro-active preparedness in each building, it can be safely argued that poor implementation of these plans may lead to poor coordination of rescue efforts since the overall threat framework is largely ignored.

Furthermore, in the event of an emergency requiring evacuation of staff, few Government buildings were noted to have updated plans of action, which even most staff could not access. Whereas rehearsing plans of action, in the form of occasional drills and evacuations simulation exercises, makes it easier to effectively respond to real bombing or any other threat situations, the measure is still naught in some Government buildings. This

is in spite of the fact that rehearsing of building plan of action in buildings reduces or forestalls injury to employees or visitors, disruption of services and damage to property.

d). Finally, since the country still utilizes archaic legislations in the Laws of Kenya (LoK) which does not in any way recognize terrorism as a punishable crime, the ongoing legislative efforts, particularly the revised Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2010, seek to provide measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities by amending relevant Acts, like the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries Act). If the Act passes, Terrorism defined may deal with 'unlawful use of violence or threat of use of violence, with intent to advance a political, religious, ethnic, ideological or other such cause; and includes any unlawful use of violence or threat of use of violence with intent to put the public or a section of the public in fear'.

#### 4.4.5 Strategic Security Preparedness Considerations

Other operational capabilities of such emergency services in most Government buildings included emergency telephone lines for Nairobi Hospital, Kenyatta National Hospital, MP Shah Hospital, St. John Ambulance, Africa Air Rescue (AAR), Nairobi Fire Brigade and Police 99 operations.

Similarly, involvement of regional or international actors in tackling trans-national crime, especially terrorism, by way of clandestine operations, collaboration between the relevant local security organs with external counterparts is a security strategy toward risk averse. The manner of coordination bolstered towards realization of pro-active mandates in the form of Early Warning Systems (EWS) and other policy or legislative pieces also underscores the importance of combating terrorism using more than one country to succeed.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this chapter, the entire research efforts are appraised alongside the study objective, hypothesis testing and the conceptual framework. It highlights discussion on themes derived from the study as per the study hypothesis for ease of interpretations and drawing of conclusions based on security preparedness strategies. Finally, recommendations alongside future work are also critically outlined.

#### 5.1 Universal Themes Derived From the Study

##### 5.1.1 Terrorists' 'Targeting' Phenomenon of Buildings

As this study put forward, aptness for potential terrorists choosing a *target*, in this case Government buildings, came out as a key theme due to ascribed motivations, particularly associated symbolism and net effect mainly attributed to its attendant media sensation. Similarly, with the emerging trend of terrorists' choice of targeting people normally in a building infrastructure, the study upheld an explanation relating to preference of motor vehicle means of carrying explosives into a targeted building owing to its potentiality to cause adverse maximum effect to the facility and human lives. Bearing in mind the diverse modes of attacks explored in the study therefore, a 'targeting concept' in the making presents future scholars with a hard fact reality, given that many terrorist attacks are a by-product of an individual or group *motive* in the strong sense of the word. In retrospect, determining motive can give an indication of which potential target(s) might be at risk. The understanding of the same might also be useful in determining the degree of risk where for example any public figure attackers and or potential-attackers<sup>72</sup> that are motivated more often than not by a quest to achieve notoriety or fame, bring attention to a personal or public problem, avenge a perceived wrong or retaliate for a perceived injury, and end personal pain/to be removed from society or killed<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> The threat of VIPs is more explicit in the US.

<sup>73</sup> Fein & Vossekuil. 1999.

The reason and choice of attack may be as diverse, given the prevailing conditions within and outside the country as indicated by a number of respondents' focused assumption that terrorists select targets with high "symbolic" value, a factor that is well espoused in the literature. That is why high name-recognition, "national" installations (whether state-owned or private) like KICC, Nyayo House, Harambee House, National Archives, Treasury and International hotels in the City are more of symbolic features that require adequate security measures due to their uniqueness and centrality value. Notwithstanding this school of thought (that terrorists do attack hard targets with symbolic value and instant name-recognition in the public and media's mind), the study left open the potentiality of terrorists opting for soft targets, like a village dwellings, nightclubs, shopping malls, schools, and small time hotels, for the sake of it. For this reason, one may be tempted to assume that Government buildings need not over emphasize on foolproof security preparedness aspects because it could result into fortification of an otherwise free environment even if terrorism continues to be a key security threat in the country and region.

In dealing with targeted violence regarding both hard and soft target buildings, particularly those housing Government ministries or departments, the 1998 bombing and subsequent terror threats in the country, which has not been sufficiently researched either by local or other African scholars, gives a clue on a rather non-conclusive approach in containing future potential terrorist planning and attacks well in advance. Indeed, one can argue that the inherent difficulty of a sure approach in dealing with the threat, let alone justifying what terrorism is all about in the African context, make security preparedness in the study a prescriptive and alien rather than a homegrown solution to the threat, unlike poverty, for instance. The difficulty in crafting foolproof security preparedness against terrorists is enhanced by an explanation given by the ISD Summary of Second Working Group report of 14<sup>th</sup> March 2005, over the way in which the 1998 Nairobi bombing was executed with precision and meticulous planning done over a period of time, which even the US intelligence and policy-makers were unable to act upon available intelligence pointing to Osama Bin Laden's growing terrorist networks' elaborate planning in East Africa<sup>74</sup>.

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<sup>74</sup> ISD website: <http://isd.georgetown>.

Secondly, the study results suggested that terrorist attackers targeting Government buildings would prefer motor vehicle mode of attack as the most calculated and cost effective method owing to the ease with which large volumes of explosives may be carried into a building for maximum results. However, a high possibility of bomb attack targeted on the building by way of vehicle bomb attack, walk-in, airborne attack or shelling, cyber and chemical or biological methods, in that order, remain the hallmark terrorist trend means that may need to be well taken care of in Kenya. Furthermore, in the age of the Internet and with critical infrastructure, targets that have traditionally operated openly without the security precautions of the national security sector are faced with other forms of threat emanating from within and without that continue to be a security challenge.

On the study's inquiry about security preparedness, both structural and non-structural means revealed varied enhancement, with the threat of terrorism on building infrastructure being a new phenomena in Africa – making it a complicated affair in dealing with attendant preparedness component due to, among others, cost implications and attitude. Additionally, the relationship between security preparedness measures after the 1998 bombing against selected variables in the face of unforeseen risks provided some criteria of tackling the threat. Overall, the threat assessment capabilities and nature of buildings' structural designs, determining factors and their effectiveness, assisted the study in proving the level of security preparedness of Government buildings in Nairobi's CBD and, by extension, the country at large as indicated the next section.

### **5.1.2 Enhancement of Security Preparedness Measures against Terrorism**

Although the Government has the authority, structure and legitimacy of security institutions and policies, the degree to which the state addresses the question of security preparedness of its installations, while taking cognizance of other societal factors, shapes the entire research process. It is the study's findings that the bombing partially influenced the positive change in structural and non-structural approaches with regard to security preparedness in Government buildings.

In the short and long terms, the manner in which Government buildings have been secured within the CBD does not fully address the entire terrorism threat save for some semblance of well protected gates manned on a 24-hour basis. However, inadequacies in terms of other structural and non-structural attributed to absence of a clear policy framework,

uncoordinated security approach alongside unpredictable resource allocation to the security sector and seeming general ill-prepared in view of large scale disasters, remain of concern.

In a bid to address future terrorism related and other risks facing Government buildings, enhancing these structural and non-structural security preparedness measures, alongside improving the response mechanism, may somehow reduce chances of potential terrorist attack planning or unfortunate disaster in the city. In fact, one does not need to be an expert in either security or disaster management to recognize the urgent need for alertness at any costs in an endeavour towards threat reduction. These strategies may invariably ensure efficient and prompt action plan against threats facing staff and damage to building facilities, whether from terrorists or other causes of disasters, as indicated in the next section.

### 5.1.3 Proactive Non-Structural Security Preparedness Approach

In the context of the 1998 bombing and diverse instances in the literature review, the first hurdle in tackling varied forms of the terrorism threat emphasizes on human provision of security through enhanced screening as a way of ensuring that unauthorized persons do not get through the standard screening procedures, alongside threat assessment. In this way, preparedness focus on non-structural security approach is a sure way of keeping terrorists at bay from accessing potential target buildings to an extent that chances of motor vehicle, pedestrian and chemical mode of attacks is minimized. From the foregoing, thorough screening against these forms of potential terrorist attacks revolve around guarding against such acts of *targeted violence*<sup>75</sup> described by Wiley *et al*, as a product of deliberate planning process spanning a considerable period of time<sup>76</sup>.

Overall, the non-structural deterrence value from the study deduced as follows:-

- Administration Police officers are the first line of defense providing round-the-clock security in all Government buildings. Their training and strategic plan outlined on the methods and techniques in dealing with terrorism interdiction are tailored toward securing most Government buildings against all forms of illegal entry on a daily basis.

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<sup>75</sup> Targeted violence best describes scrutiny about the study's broad objective..

<sup>76</sup> Wiley .J. 1999



As part of enhanced security in Government buildings, additional security personnel in each building deployed after the 1998 terrorist bombing were geared towards beefing up screening for persons and vehicles entering the buildings, a move that makes it hard for unauthorized access. Hitherto, this restriction continues in all Government buildings. Similarly, thorough scrutiny of persons and screening of luggage before being allowed into all Government buildings remains a permanent feature, just as public servants working in these building have access documents or badges which are verified on a daily basis.

- Whereas the NCTC and Kenya Police's ATPU deal with trans-national crimes at different latitudes, the agencies' daily brief covers joint inter-agency coordination at the local, regional and international levels given their specialized skilled manpower and resources.
- These traditional security strategies are augmented by threat assessment approach carried out by other organs, including the NSIS and the military, which constitute another level of the security regime. Indeed, these last two security organs deal with detection of all forms of threats emanating from within and without with regard to terrorism. The use of *threat assessment*, as posited by one of the expert respondents, emphasizes on intelligence-led protective security. The threat assessment and the gate keeping technique<sup>77</sup> over a time remain strong deterrents against diverse means of terrorist attacks. The idea behind protective intelligence has been expounded by a number of scholars as part of Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor (TEDD) principles used to identify threats with enough details accumulated to enable proactive approach against such organized criminals.
- In the study, the importance of transforming the intelligence agency in Kenya not only denoted the need to focus on the new threat but translation of collected information into law enforcement action in order to minimize chances of terrorist attacks in future. This has been achieved by defining and analyzing the threats and potential terrorist threats, which the NSIS over time has grown to fulfill in its intelligence endeavours. The core mandate of the NSIS specifically entails investigating, gathering, evaluating and disseminating information with a view to

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<sup>77</sup> Gate keeping technique, a euphemism in intelligence cycles equivalent to Protective Intelligence (PI) or threat assessment approach .

safeguarding the national interests of Kenya from threats or potential threats emanating from within or without<sup>78</sup>. In essence, this broad role is not limited to terrorism but security preparedness as a tool to guide security agencies and policy makers.

To achieve a level of success, staff training remains a critical area that needs urgent attention whose ultimate aim is to evaluate and eventually develop security preparedness plans. Overall, these security-related features, coming at the backdrop of a seeming focus on new methods of addressing emerging security challenges facing the populace in places of work, necessitate adoption of, among other measures, hardening of Government buildings as indicated in the next section.

#### **5.1.4 Structural Compliance in Government Buildings**

Since the study findings indicated that enhanced physical security structural indicators in Government buildings may not be the sole deterrent feature against all forms of terrorism threats, adoption of modern technological means of securing specific Government buildings against intrusion by way of surveillance cameras and other traditional structural designs are pertinent. A curious observation is that the sudden reliance of the CCTV surveillance systems and other modern detection equipment, which are operational in most Government buildings, as opposed to other proactive counter measures noted in the preceding section, offer inadequate tangible results to the emerging threat despite their higher ratings preference for such measures in the study. Notwithstanding inherent challenges, the positive attributes in Government buildings remain elastic with;

- i. Design improvements particularly at visitors lobbies, perimeter fences, barriers and security desks. The designs of emergency routes are also conveniently short with clearly labeled safety pictorials for escape purposes. Since most of the buildings were structurally designed way back before terrorism begun targeting such installations, retrofitting visible within the parking lot, visitors lobbies at Times Towers, Harambee House, Nyayo House, Treasury Building and the High Court go a long way in trying to address the issue in question,

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<sup>78</sup> The NSIS Act no. 11 of 1998

- ii. Enhanced use of metal detectors supplemented by hand band detectors on vehicles and visitors entering the building at the High Court, Herufi House, Treasury, Jogoo House, Sheria House and Vigilance among others,
- iii. Other long term strategies aimed at cushioning against unauthorized access, man-made disasters like fire in Government buildings and other forms of threat were noted to be part of other conglomeration of factors determining level of security/safety in the country at large.

## **5.2 Conclusion on Overall Security Preparedness in Government buildings**

The analysis in the preceding sections derived from scrutiny of the literature review, interviews and observation point to two main best practices areas of non-structural and structural security preparedness methods with which the Government should strive to prioritize. As the old adage goes '*prevention is better than cure*', enhancing these security preparedness features in the short and long term remains key options in the wake of the emerging threat of terrorism in the country. Indeed, emphasis on human security approach and building structural designs, respectively, are identifiable key security preparedness pillars in the study.

Although these two indicators of both human and structural security depict improved security preparedness that seemed to support the hypothesis, security preparedness in all Government buildings and the country at large brought to light issues related to necessity of constant *pro-active strategies* before things get out of hand. Whereas the structural technological component, namely CCTV cameras and alarm systems, as well as traditional human security approaches seemed to offer more in terms of thwarting the various forms of terrorist attacks targeted at buildings, both measures were not without deficiencies. That is why the responses somewhat presented contrarian views on both of these security preparedness concepts on the perspective of terrorism threat that seemed inconsistent with the existing literature, perhaps due to dynamics in security threats. Furthermore, scholars in some circles, particularly in Africa, are yet to appreciate the issue of terrorism threat in the African perspective and its envisaged threat assessment means as a security preparedness yardstick, let alone adopting western world TEDD approach, given the more often than not 'after-the risk event management' in Africa. It also became apparent that

statements of policy or passage of anti-terrorist legislation aimed at reducing chances of any terrorist group hell-bent on causing a mass casualty event, may not hold water in the Kenyan security preparedness context, based on the nexus of terrorism threat and the dilemma whether Government buildings could actually be a viable target.

It can be therefore concluded that the study was able to prove the two hypotheses since in the first instance, the outcome of hypothesis thus;  $H_1$  'The Government has enhanced security preparedness measures and practices of its buildings within Nairobi CBD following the 1998 bombing' is rejected because the value computed for testing is more extreme and unlikely to have been the main reason for enhanced security preparedness after the bombing incident than the critical value of routine security alertness. Thus, the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) 'enhanced security preparedness measures in Government buildings within the CBD are not directly as a result of the 1998 bombing' holds water. The underlying reason is that there is no tangible proof of the current security preparedness measures being a product of the 1998 bombing in Nairobi, so much so that the role of Government in designing and implementing a meaningful and effective security preparedness program in its buildings goes beyond such a singular bombing phenomenon. In fact, since most of the Government buildings in question do offer essential public services such as passports, registration of societies/parties, birth, motor vehicle and tax collection points, appropriate counter measure rules out the idea of forthright fortification.

By itself,  $H_1$  appeared to concern itself with the measures so far put in place in a bid to deter potential threat of terrorism in Government buildings, a threat which in the first place may not be foreseeable given other immediate socio-economic and political challenges in the country. It could also be the reason that most Government buildings constructed before the bombing threat became a reality in Kenya never saw the need for interior and external compactness as well as laminated window glasses. This is in spite of evident improvement in structural design in the form of security retrofitting, increased number of personnel manning buildings, enhanced emergency means of escape in buildings, extent of staff training on emergency evacuation and appropriate security equipment, all of which have the potential to impact positively on safeguarding buildings against risks including terrorism threat. Enhancing security preparedness in this regard is therefore the only insurance against such unforeseen terrorism risks since securing of Government building to the extent that the cardinal role of Government is to guarantee both freedom and

security at equal proportion remain paramount. In the long term, improved security preparedness geared towards mitigating potential risks in Government buildings arising out of fire outbreak, arson or electric fault, and poor construction workmanship, among other man-made or natural disasters.

On the second hypothesis *H2*: 'The security practices adopted have been effective in deterring incidences of terrorists' threats' when taken in isolation of security preparedness in Government buildings depicted contrasting views based on interviewees from security personnel and experts. Based on the findings, the second hypothesis is also rejected because the value worked out for testing *effectiveness* is unlikely to be the actual reason for improvement in security preparedness strategies so far adopted in Government buildings. In fact, the study ran short of depicting improvement in human security preparedness as a routine task in all Government buildings other than the terrorism threat, hence *H0* imputes 'there is no relationship between security preparedness adopted in Government buildings that may effectively deal with terrorist attacks' on the face value. In fact, effectiveness of security preparedness measures in Government buildings and the country at large in the wake of the terrorism threat are based on various risk factors.

In protecting Government buildings for example, strategic planning and resources like finances, trained personnel and technical equipment, alongside appropriate comprehensive policies, may not necessarily be sufficient factors for dealing with a terrorism threat. That is why the study dwelt on security preparedness in terms of police and intelligence, as well as structural components given that the Government usually derives authority from shared human values. Ironically, the focus on effectiveness of these national security apparatus does not mean terrorism threat has all over sudden overtaken other security challenges in the country given other equally threatening organized crime and governance challenges. This is rather because human security as a measurable or specific condition in itself may not be differentiated and solely acted upon by law enforcement agencies without sufficient risk factors, both locally and externally.

For the same reasons, the Null Hypothesis is therefore rejected because of the assertion based on statistical tests that effectiveness of security preparedness is unlikely to have been influenced by the 1998 bombing. Although the study underscored the fact that enhanced security in Government buildings is based on other considerations other than the 1998 bombing, improved security preparedness in the ensuing period could have been

influenced by that particular incident. In fact, these other considerations could include but not limited to the facts that:

- Government buildings are hard-targets with guaranteed level of protection due to the nature of their sensitivity as compared to soft-targets such as schools or supermarkets;
- Government buildings is a convenient place to work in due to serene surrounding environment unlikely to encounter security threats associated with street urchins, pickpockets, 'ngeta squads', office burglars, cyber hackers, extortionists and hardcore criminal robbers, hence;
- Security preparedness is the foremost safeguard in Government buildings against unauthorized access, theft of Government property, espionage activities and such other undesired breaches of strategic plans or policy secrets. It also acts as a safeguard against other man-made disasters like fire, burglary and unauthorized persons known to be a source of nuisance.

Finally, from the aforesaid, the H1, H2 would have perhaps overlooked concluding that the only way to circumvent potential terrorists capitalizing on security lapses inherent in Government buildings or the country at large is to deal with the threat during the requisite planning phase. Although study findings seem to point out gullible weaknesses on security preparedness in Government buildings generally, it may be necessary to emphasize on these observations as a means to deal with such risks:

- a) Appreciation of an annual security plan of action in all Government building on the basis of risk assessment, vulnerability, affordability and all-inclusive participation explicitly overlooked,
- b) Enhancing capacity of security organs in view of ongoing reforms, operational synergy and sharing of information,
- c) Although some respondents stressed on the need for legal mechanism to deal with the terrorism threat in the country, the idea remains superfluous owing to the absence of a law, national security policy or national disaster management policy specifically to tackle the threat. In fact, one respondent opined that such state of affairs makes it possible for a terrorist group or suspects going scot-free. However, efforts to legislate

are ongoing given the revised Suppression of Terrorism Bill and Disaster Management Bill, among other envisaged laws.

It is therefore apparent that long-term security strategies and practices, besides institutional frameworks and policies remain key to addressing the terrorism threat. Investing in watertight security preparedness, especially during times of 'high alert', produces tangible safety guarantees in the cities and countryside.

### **5.3 Importance of the Conceptual frameworks to the study**

Risk Hazard, communication model and disaster management cycle conceptual framework were very useful to the study. First, the risk management concept underscored the importance of pro-active mechanisms and procedures, personnel training, developing short / long-term strategies, rehearsals, public education and building early warning systems. It also recognizes the consequences of globalization and human rights issues in a liberal economy, where an ever increased vulnerability requires any Government to take hard decisions on what and how to protect the vulnerable targets, availing resources for the necessary measures, besides enhancing personnel resource capacity. The concept, theoretically when used interchangeably with the communication model, assisted the study in coming up with ways and means of protecting Government buildings and the country in the event of a terrorist attack. This action, which is depicted in the study's logistical readiness, will not only thwart terrorist attacks but mitigate all other effects of an attack.

It is also important that risk assessments helped in identifying areas and category of people that may be at risk of attack early enough so that in securing Government buildings and the county at large in the wake of the terrorism threat, the risk management concept could form a fundamental basis for preparedness. Conceptually, security risks posed by terrorism took into great consideration 3 factors as expounded Henry H. Willis, 2005;

- **Threat:** the probability that a specific type of attack or disaster will occur, as determined by intelligence and other indicators,
- **Vulnerability:** the probability that an attack or disaster will result in damage to property and probable loss of live and, finally,

- **Consequences:** the cost of an attack or disaster<sup>79</sup>

On the basis of a terrorist attack threat in an urban/ city setting for example, the higher concentration of people in such a symbolic target, as opposed to a rural/dwelling with less population, makes 'security preparedness' component an ideal theme in risk disaster management. This concept, which goes hand in hand with Hazard risk management and communication models, was basically useful in guiding the study's analysis in view of security preparedness benchmarks in buildings and the country. Although it is widely expected that all disaster management practitioners have to bear in mind that the appropriate response to a disaster is to protect life first (Robertson 2005:278), such awareness in Government buildings are far below standard due to a strong belief that Government buildings are always secure. Circumventing potential hazards helps in prioritizing the threats/risks, as well as reducing the vulnerability of such eventualities (Wellheiser and Scott 2002).

These underlying concepts therefore assisted in testing study hypothesis and deriving conclusions in the following ways;

- The preparedness component is deemed essential to the study in that risk to building in view of terrorist threats based on the assertion that terrorists have in the past targeted buildings, like the 1998 bombing, is quite important for policing and structural mitigation measures.
- The usefulness of disaster management concept/model is geared towards prompting appropriate action in the event of a disaster, which by and large could eventually reduce potential losses in terms of property and lives. This could be an efficient means to minimize attendant risk events depending on the effectiveness of a building's plan of action and staff evacuations.
- Individual or group behaviour based on the study's theoretical framework indicates that certain societal developments upset core values of one's or group's attainment, thus seeking solace on terrorism acts. For instance, some societies become susceptible after experiencing terrorism while others become stronger afterwards,

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<sup>79</sup> Henry H. Willis. in 'Estimating Terrorism Risk' (2005: 17. (The same logic is in assessing risk from natural disasters)



depending on interaction patterns in the societal economic, political or religious structural subsystems.

- It is the risk threat assessment that widens the spectrum of options in an ever non-equilibrium state, so that during times of high instability (such as terrorism threat violence) emergency services are at peak levels, so much so that stability or normalizing the situation can only be regained by developing strategies that are themselves unstable. This being the domain of NSIS implies that the rationale for acquiring intelligence forms the basis for immediate and long term actions. Ideally, intelligence, currently the domain of the NSIS, informs action to be taken by the law enforcers, military and policymakers with vital information , revolving around collection of human intelligence, analysis and sharing, even amongst intelligence fraternity in the region or globally. Essentially, the foundation of effective intelligence strategy means that knowledge of terrorist group leadership, ideology, source of finance and network are easily traced since information about underground terrorists' intentions and capabilities is rarely in the public domain. It is also worth to note that due to buildings susceptibility to terrorism and other risks in the city, some of the recommendations spelt in the next section are crucial.

## **5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS**

This last section proposes a set of recommendations mainly for policy improvement, application and further research that could mitigate against future terrorist threat related risks.

### **5.4.1 General Recommendations**

As the preceding section revealed, respondents' observations generally concurred that potential terrorist prefer 'hard targets', particularly Government buildings. Considering a higher chance of a terrorist using a motor vehicle to attack a Government building, the 1998 bombing serves as a catalyst for enhanced security preparedness standards that may need to be appropriately designed. With the emerging terrorism threat as an ongoing dilemma, a situation where strategies to thwart the threat based on the standard of imminence of the previous threats, like those of 1998 and 2002 bombings, require similar concerted efforts to counter it. To cushion against possible attacks therefore, the paradigm

shift in security approach in Government buildings should reflect both the threat and difficulties inherent in containing the vice. It is therefore recommended that security preparedness measures take cognizance with the emerging threat, emphasizing on the following as per the study objectives:

- a) Developing and implementing appropriate security preparedness measures as a long-term activity for all buildings at various areas, especially in urban settings, not only after a disaster strikes to contain losses but also before the event happens or re-occurs. These may include;
- Implementing such proactive protective measures on possible risks and use of the latest technology, based on safety guidelines and plans of action in Government departments. This would be more of collective protective measures where appropriate instructions are given to all building staff,
  - Building and maintaining the organizational capacity to conduct protective intelligence investigations at all levels while taking into consideration conceptualization, planning, and oversight by experienced law enforcement and security agencies. Once developed, such a protective program will serve as a key component of a comprehensive protection strategy to prevent targeted violence.
- b) Enhancement of existing policies and strategies taking cognizant of the policy framework on counter terrorism and disaster management. This should include;
- Expediting pending policy/legislative Bills relevant to dealing with terrorism threat, alongside other security challenges in the country to avert the same. This is expected to give a clear guideline on plans that could be reviewed and tested regularly in light of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2007 and draft the National Security/Disaster Management policy, which is still pending for discussion in Parliament.
  - Evaluating risks as a means of adopting technical progress and firm prevention policies for effective building security and safety, particularly with appropriate training of security staff and disaster managers,
  - Formalizing risk assessment actions and keeping constant review to ensure appropriate action via regular monitoring and evaluation.

- c) Creating awareness amongst building occupants and the general public. This will serve as a guide to the populace, who would benefit from the sensitization campaigns for future leverage in keeping with;
- Situational awareness for both the security personnel, staff and general public as a relatively simple security preparedness element to take care of terrorism threat because it reinforces Government buildings plans of action as well as national security strategy. This element is important since it is the foundation of first coming to the realization that a threat exists since denial, apathy and complacency of a threat can be the greatest undoing for any security action. It is considered by many scholars as an attitude as opposed to a hard skill where one is expected to be observant on the surroundings and identifying potential threats and dangerous situations. Because of this, situational awareness<sup>80</sup> is not just a process that can be practiced by highly trained Government agents or security organ — it can be adopted and employed by anyone. In the event of an attack therefore, a person with a complacent or apathetic mindset will be taken completely by surprise and could freeze up in shock and denial as their minds are forced to quickly adjust to a newly recognized and unforeseen situational reality. That person is in no condition to react, flee or resist.

#### 5.4.2 Recommendations for Enhanced Security Preparedness

Indications are that the security preparedness in the study, which covers both proactive security features in Government buildings and other general defense strategies, remains the best practice one could appreciate and highly recommend. It is suggested that first and foremost, the Government must assess its traditional security strategy through a dual disciplinary approach as follows;

- a) **Physical robustness of buildings;** Notwithstanding threat levels, the safety regime emphasizing structural component at the designing stage, as opposed to retrofitting at a later stage, cannot be gainsaid. Available records depict most of the sampled Government buildings as having been constructed in the immediate period after Kenya attained its independence in 1963, when safety measures and modern

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<sup>80</sup> Situational awareness is the process of recognizing a threat at an early stage and taking measures to avoid it ( STRATFOR August 22, 2007 | 1806 GMT, By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart)

technologies aimed at cushioning against potential risks were not quite apparent at the time. This therefore implies that guaranteeing sufficient level of security in Government buildings could entail putting in place innovative and new techniques which to a large extent entail the following measures:-

- Strict adherence to an available physical security, emergency/response plan and fire preparedness systems. The physical countermeasures to be reviewed periodically include clearly labeled emergency “Exit” signs, ample perimeter fence, foolproof lighting, clear/unobstructed escape route, functional alarm/fire system, availability of Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), and emergency evacuation plans as part of such a long term strategy, which offers value as ways and means to thwart any form of threat, particularly a terrorist attack.
  - The gate should preferably be manned by well trained officers or private security guards with ad hoc simulation drills in mind, alongside, monitoring of suspicious individuals, visitors and vehicles
  - It is recommended that Government buildings located within the NCBD may be considered for zoning to allow systematic protection against unauthorized access by way of placing checkpoints/barriers at the Jogoo House, Intercontinental Hotel for vehicular movement, besides efforts towards beefing up current physical robustness. Alternatively, relocating elsewhere outside the CBD in keeping with (the then former US Ambassador to Kenya) Prudence Bushnell’s repeated efforts to secure a safer location for the embassy, which had earlier been dismissed in Washington for well over a year on the excuse that there were lack of adequate funds in the State Department to replace sub-standard buildings or rather the usual ignoring of policy recommendations by those in authority,
  - Any structural design in buildings should be closely undertaken with express consultation from, among others, the Architectural Association of Kenya, city planners and public works, for long lasting safety standards,
  - Finally, it is highly recommended that a refurbished Administration Police plays a crucial role in protection of Government buildings now and in the future.
- b) Furthermore, the Government should consider putting in place an overall threat assessment program as part of efforts towards long term non-structural security preparedness.

Though these recommendations are just but the tip of the iceberg, it stands out from the study that they could be helpful in ensuring the preparedness in time of need. Overall, to meet and sustain security preparedness in the long run requires such strategic planning, resources and comprehensive policies for effective deterrence and preventing terrorist attacks.

#### **5.4.3 Further Research**

Since an exploratory study is a process that gives a researcher new leads, the recommendation for further research on areas the study failed to capture is prudent. This study may have left out equally important areas of disaster management concepts, criminal justice and homegrown security framework. Given that policy statements on all strategies are part of safety elements of a security plan backed by programmes and regulations, the existing empirical studies on terrorism propounded by Western scholars may not be conclusive. The Kenyan perspective tackling terrorism threat may also need to be revisited given the divergent views or controversy surrounding what actually the threat is all about and measures to counter the same. Implementation and evaluation of risk communication programs and disaster preparedness may also need to be looked at afresh.

From the foregoing, the populace in Nairobi or general public's risk perception after the bombing has not been exhaustively researched on. An all-inclusive conceptual framework that looks into situational needs of people *vis a vis* risk perception in an African viewpoint elucidates the need for upcoming researchers. Since the most compelling catchwords for terrorism remain those of publicity and causing public fear through the media, a scholarly understanding of terrorism, its manifestations in the Kenyan context is still lacking. This may give room for an authoritative literature for comparative purposes.

In enhancing a better understanding on the security preparedness approach, risk disaster management policy in the country needs to be geared towards a more proactive practice since the former supersedes provision of physical security and advance intelligence in order to assess threat implications and avail practical recommendations. That could give credence to the need for a review of the national security-cum-disaster management policy, given the manner in which circumstances behind the 1998 bombing were handled.

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**APPENDIX A: RESEARCH BUDGET**

<b>ITEM</b>	<b>Estimated cost in (Kshs)</b>
Administrative costs (Including Transport fare)	7,000/=
Focused Group Discussion Venue & Refreshment	14,000/=
Research Assistants Salaries	24,000/=
Data Analysis/In put for SPSS	5,000/=
Typing, proofreading and Binding	6000/=
Miscellaneous	4000/=
<b>Total</b>	<b>60,000/=</b>

**APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SECURITY OFFICERS & FOCUS GROUP  
INVITATION LETTER**

Introduction

Hello, my names are Anthony K. Biegon, I am currently a student at Nairobi University collecting information on mitigation measures and/or extent of security preparedness in view of terrorist threat that may be targeted at Government buildings within the Nairobi Central Business District. I will use the information obtained for my MA Disaster Management Programme. If you agree to be interviewed, I will ask questions about general security of the building but I promise that all information will be treated with total confidentiality. Kindly note that a space is hereby provided for comments if need diligence arises.

Sincerely,

Anthony k. Biegon

.....  
**FOCUS GROUP CONFIRMATION LETTER**

P.O BOX 50898-00100  
NAIROBI  
3<sup>rd</sup> March 2011

Dear Sir/Madam,

I hereby invite you to join me in a Focused Group Discussion for my Masters Degree Project survey which will be held at The Hotel Intercontinental, Nairobi (within the swing pool lounge) on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2011 between 1700 hours and 1800 hours. Your ideas and opinions concerning security preparedness in view of terrorist threat targeted at Government buildings within the Nairobi Central Business District will be highly appreciated. I have invited 12 participants whose responses to the questions I have prepared will only be used for purposes of the intended academic reasons.

If for any reason you might not be able to make please call me through my mobile 0720840629 or 0733805 179. Otherwise i look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

Anthony k. Biegon

Consent to Participate in Focus Group

You are kindly requested to confirm your attendance by tearing the dotted lines at the bottom of this letter and send the same to me via the above mentioned address. Note that the focus group discussion will be tape recorded/picture taken if need be but will not be quoted in the final report.

.....  
I understand this information and agree to participate fully under the conditions stated above:

Name : \_\_\_\_\_

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION I GENERAL INFORMATION**

**Table 13: Information Regarding Respondent's Particulars and Focused Group Participants**

Respondents/ Focus Group Participant Demographics			
Name:	Date:	Time:	Place:
<i>What is your area of Occupation /speciality?</i> <input type="radio"/> Security/Public officer <input type="radio"/> Private Consultant <input type="radio"/> Student <input type="radio"/> Others (specify)	<i>Age in Years:</i> <input type="radio"/> 20 to 30 <input type="radio"/> 31 to 40 <input type="radio"/> 41 to 50 <input type="radio"/> Over 51	<i>Gender:</i> <input type="radio"/> Male <input type="radio"/> Female	
<i>Level of Education</i> <input type="radio"/> Primary <input type="radio"/> O-Level <input type="radio"/> A-Level <input type="radio"/> University	<i>Experience in the job?</i> <input type="radio"/> Less than 5 Years <input type="radio"/> 5 to 10 <input type="radio"/> 11 to 15 <input type="radio"/> More than 16	<i>What religion do you belong or profess?</i> <input type="radio"/> Christianity <input type="radio"/> Islam <input type="radio"/> Traditionalist <input type="radio"/> Others	

**SECTION II: Respondent's Interview Guide**

**a. Information Regarding the Building**

1. Name of Building.....
2. State nature of surrounding/location .....
3. Type of service offered in the building. ....
4. Indicate the nature of building set up if detached or high-rise (if the later, how many floors).....
5. Who is responsible for security in the building (specify).....
6. Tick as appropriate (YES/NO)

a. Is access to building restricted to all persons?

YES	
NO	

b. Is the building provided with a protected sign in procedures?

YES	
NO	

c. Does it clearly indicated by pictorial or directional exit signs/escape route?

YES	
NO	

d. How often do you have mock exercise on bombing and training of staff on emergencies?

e. How often is it rehearsed i.e. bomb threat plan of action in your building dovetailed within the overall threat framework?

f. Are there sufficient structural measures to minimize chances of a terrorist attack in your building?

If yes, categorize identifiable measures using the scale:- I strongly agree, I agree, I disagree, I strongly disagree, I am not sure)

g. Do you think measures put in place after the 1998 bombing have been sustained?

h. Considering that the level of protection against potential attack on a targeted building with less effort or mitigation strategy is high, do you think resource input is important?

YES	
NO	

i. What kind of improvement would you recommend to cushion against future eventualities?

**b. Knowledge of Terrorism Threat and Routine Mitigation Measures in Building**

**(Tick where appropriate)**

1. In your opinion, do you agree that the following socio-cultural factors are more likely to promote terrorism in Kenya? Apportion as appropriate for each

Ω (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)

❖ Radicalization ( )

❖ Youth apathy ( )

❖ Globalization ( )

❖ Marginalization, ( )

❖ General crime( )

2. In your opinion, which building category do you think are most likely to be an ideal target for attack by potential Terrorist in Kenya? Apportion as appropriate for each

Ω ( I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)

- a) Rural dwelling(                    )
- b) Government Buildings (                    )
- c) Soft Target Buildings(                    )
- d) Business Premise(                    )
- e) Foreign own(                    )

3. All terrorists prefer certain mode of attacks. In your opinion, please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree, the assertion that the following mode of terrorist threats is likely to be used in carrying out attacks on targeted buildings including Government buildings?

- i. Vehicle bone Attack (                    )
- ii. Aerial Attack (                    )
- iii. Walk-In bombing (                    )
- iv. Biological/Chemical attack (                    )
- v. Cyber attack (                    )

4. In your opinion, please rate the following statement on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree . What key security criteria/ factors determine level of preparedness in a hard-target building?

(Apportion as appropriate)

Ω ( I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)

- Symbolism of the Building (                    )
- Services provided in the building (                    )
- Size of Building in storey (                    )
- Population (                    )
- Cost implication (                    )

5. What measures have been instituted to minimize the impact of terrorist attack in Government buildings? List /categorize them appropriately.

a). Do you think the measures have assisted/sufficient in dealing with terrorism risks?

If not what could be done? (Elaborate)

b). What best security practices/ strategies do you think Government should institute to deal with terrorism threat? (Elaborate)

6. Do you agree that Kenyan security regime has mutual understanding with other regional or international actors in combating the vice? Specify instances of diplomatic approach as a means to combat terrorism.

7. In your opinion, please rate the following security agencies on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree on whether they are best suited or recommended to deal on day to day security preparedness and/or management in Government buildings? Tick as appropriate

- NCTC (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)
- Administration Police (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)
- Military (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)
- NSIS (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)
- Kenya Police (I strongly agree, I agree, I am not sure, I disagree, I strongly disagree)

### **Efficacy of Security Measures in Government Buildings**

Answer each item provided by ticking or explaining

1. In your opinion, what are the most appropriate non-structural factors that determine effectiveness of preventive measures in Government buildings and contribute to tackling terrorism threat?

2. What additional the precautionary security measures were adopted with regard to personnel deployed in Government buildings after the 1998 bombing?

3. Give any other information helpful to this study.

Thank you for your contribution

Time Interview ended .....

Time taken .....



### **SECTION III**

#### **A guide for Participants during the Focus Group Discussion**

4. The general understand of the term terrorism.

5. The key socio-cultural factors are likely to promote terrorism in Kenya?

Ω **Guide;** Radicalism/ Globalization, youth apathy/modernity, marginalization, and general crime

3. Target building in the Kenyan context most preferred for attack by potential Terrorist in Kenya and why?

Ω **Guide:** Rural dwelling, Government Buildings, Business Premise, Foreigners' Investment/Embassy

4. The KEY methods used by terrorists in attacking a hard-target building in order of preference?

Ω **Guide;** Vehicle borne Courier, Aerial Bombing, Walk-In bombing, Biological/Chemical attack and Cyber attack ,

5. What best security criteria/ factors determine level of preparedness in a targeted building?

Ω **Guide :** Its Symbolic nature, Services provided in the building, Size of Building in storey, Population and Cost implication

6. What concrete measures are applicable for both hard and soft target buildings in view of terrorism future terrorism threats

Ω **Guide :** Structural and Non Structural

7. a) What other best security practices/ strategies do you think Government should institute to deal with terrorism threat?

b) Is Government's move to formulate legislation to deal with terrorism or provide measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities likely to assist in dealing with the vice in Kenya?

Ω **Open Discussion**

8. Which of the security organs in Kenya should be best suited to deal with terrorism threat facing the country with regard to Government infrastructure especially public buildings?

Ω Guide : NCTC, Administration Police, Military, NSIS and Kenya Police

9. What kind of improvement should be recommended to cushion against future eventualities?

Ω Open Discussion

10. Considering that the level of protection against potential attack on a targeted building with less effort or mitigation strategy is high, is the government-led resource input commensurate to measures put in place in government buildings?

Ω Open Discussion

11. Give any other information helpful to this study.

Ω Open Discussion

**APPENDIX D: RESPONDENTS' PROFILES (TABLE 14)**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>freq.(n)</i>	<i>Perc (%)</i>	<i>Cum. Freq</i>	<i>Cum. Perc(%)</i>
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	51	68	51	68
Female	24	32	75	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>Age</b>				
10-20	11	14.7	11	14.7
21-30	25	33.3	9	47.6
31-40	32	42.7	25	90.7
Above 41	7	9.3	75	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>Level of Education</b>				
Primary	8	10.7	8	10.7
O-Level	47	62.7	55	73.4
A-Level	14	18.7	69	92.1
University	6	8	75	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>Religion</b>				
Christianity	54	72	54	72
Islam	11	14.7	65	86.7
Traditional Sects	3	4	68	90.7
Atheists	7	9.3	75	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>Experience</b>				
Below 10	25	33.3	25	33.3
11 to 20	32	42.7	57	76
21 to 30	12	16	69	92
31 and above	6	8	75	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

**APPENDIX E: DATA ANALYSIS GUIDE**

**a. Results for Power calculation for correlation**

Probability of Type I Error (alpha) = 0.05  
 Sample size = 75  
 Correlation coefficient observed ( $\rho$ ) = 0.6

**Power of study = 1**

**b. Results for Single calculation : confident interval estimation**

Percent confidence interval (usually 95)	95
Sample size	75
Correlation coefficient( $\rho$ )	0.7283
Single calculation of confidence interval	

**c. Sample size table for correlation (quick table)<sup>81</sup>**

This is the truncated version of the table in the next page marked d), for a correlation coefficient ( $\rho$ ) where power=0.8 and alpha ( $\alpha$ )=0.05

- $r$  = correlation coefficient and  $ss$  = sample size

$r(\rho)$	$ss$	$r(\rho)$	$ss$	$r(\rho)$	$ss$	$r(\rho)$	$ss$	$r(\rho)$	$Ss$
0.02	15455	0.22	126	0.42	33	0.62	15	0.82	8
0.04	3862	0.24	106	0.44	30	0.64	14	0.84	7
0.06	1716	0.26	90	0.46	28	0.66	13	0.86	7
0.08	964	0.28	77	0.48	25	0.68	12	0.88	6
0.10	617	0.30	67	0.50	23	0.70	11	0.90	6
0.12	428	0.32	59	0.52	21	0.72	10	0.92	6
0.14	314	0.34	52	0.54	20	0.74	10	0.94	5
0.16	240	0.36	46	0.56	18	0.76	9	0.96	5
0.18	189	0.38	41	0.58	17	0.78	9	0.98	5
0.20	153	0.40	37	0.60	16	0.80	8		

**d. Sample size table for correlation**

<sup>81</sup> Siegel S and Castellan Jr. N J (1988: 235-244)

- A comprehensive table of sample size for correlation is presented here.
- The rows are correlation coefficients ( $\rho$ ).
- Cells in the table are sample size required for each combination of power,  $\alpha$  and  $\rho$

Power	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.95	0.95	0.95
Alpha	0.05	0.01	0.001	0.05	0.01	0.001	0.05	0.01	0.001
$r(\rho)$									
0.02	15455	25086	38640	21406	32536	47771	27051	39418	56040
0.10	617	999	1538	853	1296	1901	1078	1569	2230
0.20	153	247	379	211	319	468	266	386	548
0.30	67	107	164	92	138	202	116	167	237
0.40	37	59	89	50	75	109	63	90	127
0.50	23	36	54	31	46	66	39	55	77
0.60	16	24	35	21	30	42	25	36	49
0.70	11	16	23	14	20	28	17	24	33
0.72	10	15	22	13	19	26	16	22	30
0.74	10	14	20	12	17	24	15	20	28
0.76	9	13	18	12	16	22	14	19	25
0.78	9	12	17	11	15	20	13	17	23
0.80	8	11	16	10	14	19	12	16	21
0.90	6	8	10	7	9	12	8	10	13
0.94	5	6	8	6	7	9	7	8	10
0.96	5	6	7	6	7	8	6	7	9
0.98	5	5	6	5	6	7	5	6	7

*APPENDIX F: MAP OF NAIROBI CBD (SEE LAST PAGE)*

