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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND STABILITY OF SOMALIA: CASE OF AMISOM

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DECLARATION

I do hereby declare to the best of my knowledge that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted in any other University.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my family and friends.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament. Demobilization and Reintegration
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	internally Displaced Person
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MONUSCO	UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSSP	National Security and Stabilization Plan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PoC	Protection of civilian
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country team
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Program

ABSTRACT

There have been numerous attempts to bring peace to Somalia by the international community over the past 20 years. However, the international community efforts led by the United States and the United Nations in early 1990s did not succeed to bring stability in the county. African Union did not play direct significant role in those early attempts to restore peace and stability in Somalia. Nevertheless, African Union took the leadership in the stabilisation of Somalia by the deployment of AMISOM mission to Somalia in 2007. The project study is about the role of International Community in Stabilising Somalia; particularly the work of AMISOM peacekeeping mission. The objective of the study is to understand the role of the African Union in stabilisation of the African Conflict with the particular emphasis to the AMSIOM peacekeeping contribution to the peace and stability in the country.

The study provides theories and concepts that have laid foundations and understandings to the stabilisation operations. It also looks into the into the stabilisation measures that have been carried out in the world with special emphasis in the Africa Continent. The study also provides understanding of the developments behind the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia with critical analysis to the mission's challenges and achievements by looking the mission's mandates, objectives and activities that AMISOM carried out.

The study finds that, stabilisation is a process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer term development which involves coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of tasks ranging from security, governance, rule of law, political and economic development. Stabilisation has emerged as one of the most critically important aspects of international involvement in conflict and post conflict situations in Africa. The achievements that the study attributed to AMISOM is that it has helped in improving the security situation in Somalia and in the protection of the government officials and infrastructures. However, AMISOM mission has not been without challenges which need to be addressed in order to meet its mandates successfully as well as provide lessons for future peacekeeping missions by the African Union. To deploy a large peacekeeping operation African Union have always required extensive western support in terms of funding and logistics and continues today with the AMISOM in Somalia. Without Western political backing, funding and logistical support the deployment of African peacekeeping operations will remain hampered. The main policy recommendations of the study include AU institutional capacity needs to improve so that future Peacekeeping operations undertaken by the Union improves, the study also finds that military alone is inadequate and sometimes counterproductive to stabilise the country and it should not be the primary goal. Therefore there is need to enhance AMISOM participation in national reconciliation, in the provision of basic services and building effective national institutions.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction To the Study

1.0 Introduction

Conventional wars were fought by using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation and using weapons that primarily target the opposing army. There were clearly identifiable parties to the conflicts. Over the years the nature of conflicts has changed especially after the end of the cold war. There has been shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict, where the parties to conflicts are not easily identifiable and the civilians are the primary targets. Civil wars of this nature after the collapse of governments are the most principal threats to international peace and stability.

The UN has been on the forefront in responding to such threats, this approach remained prominent till the early 1990s when the UN increasingly faced difficulty in responding to the dramatic increase in intrastate conflicts and maintenance of international peace and security in Africa. Against this background increased call for regional organisations to shoulder and share the burden of Conflict prevention, management, stabilisation and transformation came.

The desire for an increased role of African Union in stabilisation of conflicts can be traced back to the failed UN mission in Somalia in 1993, followed by the failure to intervene in Rwanda and prevent genocide. The call for African solution for African Problems became common among African States. This provided a spring board which led to the development of African Peace and Security Council (PSC) to deal with peace and security issues within the continent. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) came under the jurisdiction of the Africa standby force, directed and supervised by the African Peace and Security Council (PSC)

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1.1 Problem Statement

Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991, when the armed opposition groups' overthrew the government of Siad Barre, resulting in turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. The combination of the civil war and the humanitarian crises led to the first international community intervention in Somalia through the United Nations .This took place in 1992 and 1993.

The two UN missions in Somalia were mandated to oversee the ceasefire in Mogadishu, provide security for UN Personnel, and deliver humanitarian assistance. Later an expanded mandate included the establishment of a transitional government consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions.

However, in May 1993, after attacks on UNOSOM forces which killed 18 American soldiers, UNOSOM pulled out of Somalia, although this is widely acknowledged as the first effort by the international community to restore stability to Somalia, however, it should not be forgotten that IGAD a sub-regional body, has also contributed to these efforts. IGAD first attempted to stabilise Somalia in 1991 when it organised a conference in Djibouti with the support of international community. The aim of the effort was to facilitate a peace process in Somalia. This has been followed by a myriad of other conferences.

Despite the peace processes, Somalia remains murky, even though the TFG has been in place since 2004. It has not exercised authority in the country due to the challenge of Islamic courts Union and Al-Shabbab. This situation has increased security problems in the country. However, with the intensification of the insurgency by the Al-shabab against TFG and the delay in deployment of IGASOM, IGAD pushed for the deployment of the African Peacekeeping

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was deployed in March 2007 following a resolution passed by AU and the UN Security Council authorization through UN Resolution 1744(2007).

Thus it can be acknowledged that the AU had not played direct significant role in Somalia prior to 2007. However, with the deployment of AMISOM troops in Somalia, after 2007 the situation has changed with the AU now seen to be directly involved in the Somalia's Stabilisation efforts. The AU main mission is to provide support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in its understanding to stabilise the situation in Somalia and also to create conditions necessary and sufficient for stabilisation, but five years down the line questions are being asked if AMISOM is able to fulfil its mandate, hence the need to try and provide some answers on the question, what is the AMISOM's contribution to the stabilisation in Somalia.

1.2 Objectives of the Research Project

The overall objective of this research study is to assess the role of African Union in the stabilisation of post conflict African Countries. However the specific objectives are;

- To assess the contribution of AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia
- To find out the challenges facing AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia

1.3 Justification of the Study

African countries have been faced with various conflicts. This has led to the development of various mechanisms to address and stabilise countries in conflicts. Though various ways have been proposed to address the stabilisation of African conflicts, this study will aspire to offer more knowledge on the stabilisation of African Conflicts, with special emphasis on the contribution of the African Peacekeeping missions in Africa, as well as the challenges. It will do this by providing substantial assessment of the contribution of AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia. This will in extent stimulate further research in this area of African Peacekeeping in the

continent. The findings of the study are expected to be useful to diplomats. military personnel. and policy makers in Africa among others. In addition the results of the research will be used to make some recommendations that can be of help in making of African peacekeeping Forces more effective in carrying out its peace keeping missions. The study will also contribute in increasing the available knowledge on Stabilisation efforts in the academic circles.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Introduction

The literature of the study is divided into sections each focusing on a given area as follows: The first section covers international community with focus on the concept of international community and why international community intervenes during conflicts. The second section delves on literature on stabilisation by giving an understanding of the concept as applicable to the study.

The third section focuses on the literature on African Union with emphasis on understanding of the African Union and the development concerning peace and security in Africa. The forth section of the literature review gives a historical analysis of the cause of conflict in Somalia and attempts made in trying to restore stability in the country. The fifth section covers on literature on the development of AMISOM and its mandate in Somalia while also trying to analyse its challenges, achievements and success.

1.4.2 Literature on International Community

The term international community has been used in international politics with variety of meanings. For Chomsky the International Community is the United States and Europe or the United States and its allies and clients[1]. Berit and Kühn while supporting this view argue that, the

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[1] Chomsky, Noam. The Crimes of Intcom: *Foreign Policy*, No 132, (September –October, 2002). pp 34-35.

international community comprises an unclear global majority and organised ruling elites[2]. In

contrast Hehir views the International Community as a body of globalised moral ideas that shape

institutions and inform policy choices as enshrined in international law[3]. To him institutions,

civil society and states only bear responsibility for upholding these values. The United Nations is

the most universal international organisation with 193 member states and is the closest

embodiment of the international community in his view.[4]

According to Hedley two schools of thought inform the framework for the understanding

of International Community, Realist and world Society.[5] Realist defines the international

community as all sovereign States, each State independent from other states. The realist view is

state centric and considers states as the only actors in the international system with legal

personalities. This notion reflects power politics and points to corresponding functions of the

international community while neglecting universalistic goals[6]. On the other hand proponents of

the World Society argue that, the international community should include other entities such as

international organisations, nongovernmental organisations and transnational corporations[7].

The realist understanding arises from the assertion that the study of international relations

is primarily concerned with inter-state relations. States in their view are the dominant actors,

conceived to be well integrated internally and act externally as a clearly defined unit. Non-state

actors are of little consequence since; ultimately, they are controlled by state. Non-state actors

and transnational organisations are largely ignored for the same reason that the state can, if it

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[2] Berit B & Florian P. The International Community Needs to Act: Loose use and empty signalling of a Hackneyed Concept: *International peace keeping journal Vol. 18 No 2* (Washington DC. polity press, 2011) pp. 135-151

[3] Hehir, J. Bryan. The Limits of Loyalty: *Foreign Policy*, 132 (September –October, 2002), pp 38-39.

[4] Annan, Kofi A. Problems without Passports: *Foreign Policy*, 132, (September –October, 2002), pp. 30-31.

[5] Bruno S and Andreas L. *The 'International Community: Facing the Challenge of Globalization*, research paper, Department of Political science University of Alberta. (Canada, University of Alberta publication, 1996).pp 2-4

[6] David C. On the Possibility of International Community International. *Studies Review. Vol. 11, No. 1*. (London: sage publishers. 2009). pp.1-26

[7] Jonathan I. Charney, 'The Use of Force against Terrorism and International Law', *American Journal of International Law, Vo 12 No. 95*, (New York: Routledge publishers. October 2001), pp. 835-839.

wishes, act as a gate keeper controlling their direction. War and violent coercive activity are the sharp end of power politics and the domain of strategic studies[8]. This view highlights the importance of power and interest in intervention by the international community[9]. From the world society arguments, international community comprises not only state actors and international organisations as argued by the realist, but a wide range of transnational societal actors, including international NGOs, social movements, multinational organisations and religious authorities. These views share the institutionalism idea that states and societies are increasingly interdependent and that today's problems need concerted action.[10]

International community represents some form of moral collectively of humankind which exists as an ethical reference.[11] It bears the idea of universal values that should be shared by a majority of actors, and of an importance to solidarity among states or even among all human beings. The universal jurisdiction, based on values that exceed single political communities and claim validity for all human beings is thought to help form the basis for an international community.[12]

In the post-cold war period the absolute sovereignty has been challenged and the debate is between state sovereignty and individual human rights. The modern understanding of the meaning of sovereignty is that sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question

[8] A.J.R Groom, "Paradigms in conflict: the Strategists, the conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher," in J Burton and F Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Reading in management and Resolution* (London Macmillan, 1990).
[9] David C. On the Possibility of International Community. *International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 1* (London: sage publishers, 2009). pp.1-26
[10] Barry B. and Ana G. International Community after Iraq. *International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1.* (Berlin: Hofien Publishers, 2005) pp. 31-52
[11] Ralph Jason G., *Defending the Society of states of States: why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and its vision of world society* (Oxford University Press, 2007) pp 23
[12] Burton J. *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules,* Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect[13]. Whereas the states by virtue of their sovereignty enjoy the rights to territorial integrity, political independence and non-intervention, the states also have a responsibility to protect the dignity and basic human rights of their own populations. Therefore the modern meaning of sovereignty is responsibility[14]. The UN member states in the 2005 World Summit adopted the concept of responsibility to protect with the declaration that international community is prepared to take collective actions in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations.[15]

1.4.3 Literature on Stabilisation

Stabilisation is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer term development. Stabilisation is also refers to the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer term development and Conflict Transformation. The process of stabilisations also diminishes the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict while developing local institutions to take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits an evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustainable

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[13] ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. VIII.
[14] Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 2009, p. 8;
[15] Bellamy, Alex J. & Reike, Ruben, "The Responsibility to Protect and International Law", Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, pp. 267-286

by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost.[16]

Stabilisation aims at three pillars social, economic and political development. The concept of stabilisations is predominantly a western government construct and that is shaped by their strategic interests and priorities: it has also progressively taken root in the UN and regional organisations, currently it is also being adopted by different countries. The broad parameters of stabilisation include a combination of humanitarian and development interventions, direct military operations, investment in governance capacity, rule of law, security sector reform, counter insurgency, peace building and state building activities pursued in contexts where state authority and legitimacy is contested. The practical manifestation of stabilisation activities nevertheless continue to vary from case to case.[17]

Though various stabilisation interventions exist, the international community so far has preferred military operation foremost. The fundamental goal of a stabilisation and reconstruction mission is to prevent a relapse of large scale armed conflict. For this to be achieved it becomes important to establish safe and secure environment in a post conflict country. This will entail various security priorities such as promoting a political settlement, neutralizing hostile groups, providing basic protection for vulnerable populations through military peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, regional or sub-regional organisations.[18]

Peacekeeping involves the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance, policing, human rights and

[16] Rana, S, "*Small Arms and Intra-state Conflicts*" Conference paper 7-11 November 1994 (Geneva: UNIDIR) p.2.
[17] Sarah Co. Samir E. and Robert M. States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for Humanitarian action. *Disasters Vol.34, Issue Supplement s3* (London: sage publishers, 2010) pp 275-296
[18] Assefaw B .United Nations peace missions in Africa. Transformation and determinants.*Journal of Black studies Vol.38 No 6.* (Saga publishers, London, 2008). pp. 830-849

electoral monitoring, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction[19]. Country's recovery from violent conflict depends first and foremost on the establishment of security and that can be achieved through military stabilisation. Without security, parties to the conflict will not lay down their arms, and a country will never progress and other forms of stabilisations will not take place.[20]

Bryden & Brickhill, argue that for any effective stabilisation, conventional international approaches to state building, including the restoration of a centralised security sector must be reassessed. Security arrangements must be subject to careful and detailed negotiation at the local, national and international levels, they also stress the importance of the external support to any coercive stabilisation efforts[21]. On the other hand Collinson argues that the stabilisation concept is defined by the agenda of the international community. The Agenda will determine the specific operations that are to be carried out in the post-conflict country. The agenda may change over time and hence the operations changes.[22]

In the short term stability operation tends to be focused on restoration of law and order and security while the long term usually tends to focus on addressing the long-term causes of the conflict with an aim of minimising the chances of reverting to conflict.[23] Robert Muggah while agrees with Collinson further argues that stabilisation agenda is one of the most important mission statements in any intervention by the international community and the development and

[19] Stephen J. and Donald Rothchild. Peace Operations: From Short Term to Long Term Commitment. *International Peacekeeping Vol. 3, No. 2*(Pretoria: Preston publishers, 1996),pp. 17 35.
[20] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25
[21] Matt B. Disarming Somalia: Lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state. *Conflict Security and Development journal Vol 10 No 3*. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2010) pp 438-460
[22] Ibid
[23] Sarah Co. Samir E. and Robert M. States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for Humanitarian action. *Disasters Vol.34, Issue Supplement s3* (London: sage publishers, 2010) pp 275-296

the planning for stabilisation agenda determine the success or failure in any stabilisation processes.[24]

1.4.4 Literature on African Union

African Union (AU) was formed in 2002 following Sirte declaration. One of the AU's objectives was to enhance the security and readiness of Africa to respond to armed conflicts in Africa. On establishment of AU it was mandated as continental guardian, to develop a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU was created to avoid over reliance on UN PKOs by seeking African solutions to African problems.[25]

The AU significantly departed from the OAU's reluctance to intervene in states' affairs. The organisation also departed from the position of the OAU, since the OAU intervened only in conflicts if they were invited by the parties to the conflict. In contrast, the general belief of the AU is that the protection of civilians should not be sacrificed at the expense of sovereignty. The peace and Security Council (PSC) has the power to undertake interventions and peace keeping missions in the continent in case of grave human rights violations. It recognises democracy, human rights, promotion of peace, security and stability as the cornerstone of its new identity and the possibility of sanctioning states that do not respect these.[26]

Furthermore, to solidify its role as continental leader in PKOs, the AU adopted the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) to demonstrate its commitment to develop a common position on matters relating to defence and security in Africa. The CADSP seeks to identify the common security threats in Africa and attempts to approach security

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[24] Robert Muggah: Stabilising Fragile States and the Humanitarian Space, in Mats B. and Achim W. (eds) *Ending wars, consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives.* (Routledge. London 2010). pp 33-52
[25] Helen S and Elizabeth M. *Africa's Responsibility to protect.* Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report (Centre of Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town. South Africa, 2007) pp.13-15
[26] Constitutive Act of African Union. Lome, Togo. 11 July 2000. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm

holistically. justifying this approach on the concept of human security. Moreover. the CADSP has been established to guide the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). and provide a framework for establishment of African Standby force.[27]

According to Vanesa and Malan, African Union recognises that civilian protection overrides sovereignty of a state and created Africa Standby force for African peace keeping missions and to stabilise conflicts in Africa, the initial concept of the ASF was that of a quick reaction capacity that would enable Africans to respond swiftly to a crisis in the continent.[28] Murithi on the other hand is of the opinion that AU is not yet fully politically. institutionally. and conceptually ready to confront African peacekeeping requirements on its own. He explains that AU experiences in Burundi and Sudan confirmed the requirement for the institutionalisation of legitimate and collaborative global peacekeeping partnerships underpinned by positive political support with strengthened, harmonised capacity building initiatives between Africa and other international actors.[29]

The African Standby Force (ASF) was to be based on standby arrangements with the continent's five sub regions, each providing a brigade sized contribution[30]. AU peace missions are facing difficulties in protecting civilian populations. Amnesty International reported that AMISON military offensives in the densely populated areas of Mogadishu endangered the lives of many civilians and violated international humanitarian law. Mechanisms to investigate and prosecute such acts have not been created, nor the means to oblige troop contributing countries to

[27] Ibid
[28] Vanessa K and Mark M. The African Standby Force, Progress and Prospects *African Security Review Vol 12 No 3. (Addis Ababa. Open publishers, 2003) pp* 71-81
[29] Murithi T. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Studies Vol. 17 No. 1.* (Addis Ababa. Open publishers, 2010) pp 70-82
[30] Theo N. Realising the African Standby Force as a Pan African ideal: progress, prospects and Challenges. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1*(Centre for military and strategic studies. University of Calgary press. Calgary. 2005) pp. 1-25

prosecute alleged offences. The absence of accountability could undermine the legitimacy of the

AU peace keeping missions.[31]

1.4.5 Literature on Somalia Conflict

Somalia government collapsed in 1991 after long period of clan based divide. conflicts

and resistance movements. The conflict is essentially one for control over power and resources,

notably land, where clan identity has been manipulated for political and economic ends. Over

time the conflict has become increasingly influenced by both regional and international

politics.[32]

The Somali crisis is not only an internal affair. it concerns other states in the Horn of

Africa and further abroad. Since the collapse of the government in 1991, there were considerable

external efforts made by the international community to stabilise Somalia and to establish

government. The various and often incoherent or openly conflicting external policies of various

actors have prolonged the crisis in Somalia.[33]

In 1992 the UN imposed an arms embargo with the purpose of establishing peace and

stability in Somalia[34]. Later on that same year, after mediating a ceasefire agreement. the UN

deployed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) which was in Somalia till

September 1993 when UNOSOM withdrew from Somali following the killing of American

soldiers in Mogadishu.[35]

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[31] Amnesty International (2010), *"No end in Sight: The ongoing suffering of Somalia's Civilians. "* AI Index: AFR 52/003/2010.
[32] Menkhaus K. Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping: *International security* Vol.31, No. 3(Cambridge, MA USA: MIT press, 2007) pp 81-82
[33] Harper M .*Getting Somalia wrong again, faith, war and hope in a shattered state.* (London: Zed books, 2012) pp. 23
[34] Ibid 23-24
[35] Security Council Resolution S/RES 733(1992), '*Imposition of Arms Embargo'.* 23 January 1992.   http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement

The UNOSOM intervention succeeded in the short term, getting food moving and reaching to the starving population. However, the international intervention failed to disarm the clan militia and to initiate appropriate peace dialogue and political reconciliation among the conflicting parties[36]. The failure of UNOSOM in Somalia has been attributed to the lack of clear strategy, lack of unity among its different components of its mission and the American military approach which was not consistent with the UN mission.[37]

According to Brons, the UN resolution 794 narrowly defined the Somali crisis as a purely humanitarian problem. Hence the mandate did not address in other complimentary objectives for a successful intervention[38]. Initially, there was a complete absence of discussion on the issues of disarmament and rehabilitation programmes, the integration of Somali civilians into humanitarian operations as well as military control, confidence building between the UN and Somali factions. In her opinion, the limitation of the UN mandate to the goal of providing humanitarian relief was key to the difficulties that the UN experienced in its approach to the Somali problem. The political dilemma was that, without tackling the problem of insecurity deriving from the military and political instability, there could be no long lasting humanitarian stability. Disarmament and demobilization were particularly important. The underlying problem of violence and the insecurity of food deliveries, the presence of armed fighters and bandits who were only partially controlled by factional leaders were fundamentally neglected.[39]

Mohamoud on the other hand argues that UN troops did not intervene as tradition peace keeping force. This is because that would have required two preconditions, to keep peace and an

[36] Ibid
[37] Mohamoud, A. *State Collapse and Post Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia, 1960 -2001.* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006). P. 140
[38] Brons, Maria H. *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?* (Utrecht: International Books, Netherlands. 2001). pp. 96
[39] Brons, Maria H. *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?* (Utrecht: International Books, Netherlands. 2001). pp. 223

invitation from a host government.[40] In Somalia, at the time of the intervention, both preconditions were missing. There was no government nor was there any peace to keep.

Talbott argues that, once a country utterly loses its ability to govern itself, it also loses its claim to sovereignty and should be a ward of the United Nations to authorise interventions[41]. However, this justification was contested by Rukiya Omaar an Alex de Waal who argued that the intervention was not properly handled because there was no prior consultation with Somali people. To them, Somalia is an independent and sovereign country and the Somali people are a nation whether they have a government or not. The two observers were strongly opposed to the nature and need of the military intervention in Somalia.[42]

IGAD has been constantly engaged in contributing to the stabilisation of Somalia since the collapse of the Somalia government in 1991[43]. IGAD played a leading role during the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process, which gave birth to the TFG in 2004. However, though IGAD played an important role in trying to bring stability to Somalia. Its initiatives have been faced with challenges and rivalry between member states.[44]

According to Mulugeta IGAD Member states' contradictory approaches to dealing with the Somali issue has also hampered IGAD from taking a common position[45]. The issue of neutrality often caused antagonism among the members, affecting IGAD's capacity to deal with the Somalia issue. While Bjørn argues that the IGAD challenge is either limited institutional

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[40] Mohamoud, A. *State Collapse and Post Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia, 1960 -2001.*(West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006). P. 140
[41] Time Magazine, December 14th 1992. P. 31 in Mohamoud, A. *State Collapse and Post Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia, 1960 -2001.*(West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006). P. 140.
[42] Ibid P. 140
[43] Sabala, K,izito, Aisha Ahmad, and Edwin Ruto. 'The Somali peace process from Arta to Eldoret to Mbagathi: opportunities and challenges'. In Alfred Nhema and Paul T. Zeleza (eds) *The resolution of African Conflicts* UNISA Press, Pretoria 2008, pp 134-158
[44] Ibid
[45] K Mulugeta(2010) The role of regional organization and International organization in conflict resolution, case of IGAD. *Journal of contemporary studies.* Vol 23 No 4 pp 10-12

capacity or the authority to deal effectively with the problem. These institutional capacities have been affected by unpaid financial arrears by member states.[46]

1.4.6 Literature on African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)

The AU role in the Somalia peace keeping can be traced to the request of the IGAD technical Committee to send military observer mission to Somalia in early 2003. However, prevailing insecurity in Somalia delayed the deployment of such a mission. By the time the security situation had improved the TFG president Yusuf stated the need for a strong Peace Support Operation (PSO) to deploy to Somalia. Yusuf argued that the situation had made an observer mission redundant and no longer warranted in the Somalia situations and Somalia rather needed a peace making force.[47]

In May 2005, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorised deployment of PSO (IGADSOM) to Somalia with the purpose of supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), training Somali security forces, supporting disarmament, monitoring the security situation, protecting its own forces and facilitating humanitarian operations. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda offered to participate.[48]

Some of the Somali function groups rejected deployment of IGASOM to Somalia and the participation of the frontline countries, arguing that those countries could not be seen as neutral in the conflict[49]. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which was gaining control over Mogadishu at the time, stated its willingness to dialogue with the TFG but only as long as IGASOM would

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[46] Møller, Bjørn: *The Somalia Conflict, The role of external actors*: (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) report, January 2009) pp 14-15

[47] AU Peace and Security Council, '*Report of the Chairperson*', PSC/PR/2 *(XXII)*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 5 January 2005

[48] IGAD, '*Communiqué on Somalia*'. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 31 January 2005

[49] AU Peace and Security Council, '*Report of the Chairperson*'. PSC/PR/2 *(XXIX)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 12 May 2005

not be deployed[50]. The frontline states were excluded from participating in IGASOM. By excluding frontline countries, Sudan and Uganda were the only remaining countries to supply troops. Since Sudan was struggling with its own internal conflicts and had peacekeepers present within its own territory, Uganda was the only viable troop contributor. IGAD had to rethink its troop contribution plan and hence IGASOM forces were never deployed.

The reasons for turning IGASOM into an AU mission were the possibility of drawing troops from a wider range of AU members[51]. The AU PSC decided to authorise the deployment of AMISOM on 19 January 2007. On 21 February 2007 the UNSC[52] authorised AMISOM with an initial six months to carry out the following mandate.[53]

To support the dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and TFIs in their efforts for stabilising the country, to provide protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions, to facilitate humanitarian assistance including the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs and to assist in the implementation of the national security and stabilisation plan of Somalia.[54]

The mission continues to be renewed approximately every six months and is on-going, while making some important gains on the ground AMISOM still unable to control any territory outside of the capital city. Despite years of backing from regional powers and the West, the TFG remains troubled, politically dysfunctional and incapable doing anything resembling governing

[50] AU Peace and Security Council, *Information Note on the Situation in Somalia, PSC/PR/2(LV),* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 17 June 2006
[51] A. Mulugeta.. Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa" *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 15 No. 2., 2008, pp. 171-184
[52] UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/245/31/PDF/N0724531.pdf?OpenElement
[53] Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa.* Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief, Washington DC. August 2007, p.8
[54] AU Peace and Security Council, *'Communique', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX),* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 19 January 2007

and largely ineffectual. and Al Shabbab. though weakened. still maintains considerable resources.[55]

In light of AMISOM mission mandate. Menkhaus argues that AMISOM has relatively succeeded in facilitating humanitarian operation in Mogadishu and its environs. This he argues has been made possible by the securing of the sea port and airport by the AMISOM troops in Mogadishu[56]. This has allowed the international organizations to bring relief food and other basic commodities hence helping in alleviating the suffering of the people. Erastus agrees with Menkhaus and further argues that AMISOM mission in Somalia has been of help in providing support to the TFG in Mogadishu, as a result of AMISOM support in Mogadishu. The TFG government has been able to carry out some of its operation under relative peace, most of these support have been in the form of security provided to the government and training and support given to military and civilian police.

According to Human Rights Watch report in August 2011, AMISOM is able to defend the TFG from being overwhelmed by Al-Shabab's forces. But it is not effective in helping the TFG stand on its own. AMISOM's ability to perform the tasks outlined in its mandate has been also hampered due to lack of resources and the failure to deploy sufficient troops. Despite being mandated as a peace keeping mission, AMISOM offers little protection to the civilian population, and worse, it is even widely accused of indiscriminate fire that may have killed hundreds if not thousands of Mogadishu's citizens.[57]

[55] Tim Murithi. *The African Union's evolving role in peace operations*: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia: *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) African Security Review Vol 17 No.1 Pretoria. South Africa* 2008. pp 70-83

[56] Ken Menkhaus, *A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine: Enough Policy Briefing*. September . 2011. pp.1-2

[57] Human Rights Watch: *You don't know who to blame "War crimes in Somalia"* Human Rights watch Report, August, 2011, Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0811webwcover.pdf

According to Murithi, AMISOM's greatest challenge is the lack of enough military strength to hold ground in captured areas. This is because most African countries have been reluctant to send their troops and the insurgents have been able to recruit and mobilise people to recapture these areas.[58] Because of this there has been withdrawal by AMISOM in some of the captured areas due to lack of military personnel to defend such areas. However Hull and Svensson argue that, while the lack of enough military personnel is one of the challenges of the AMISOM, the major challenge is the lack of political solution in the country which has not complimented any gains that have been made by AMISOM in capturing new territory. The consequence of this has been lack of progress in its stabilisation mission and greatly affected restoring stability in Somalia.

In light of this they argue that it is important for external support to be sought to create such qualified and modern units which are required but otherwise lacking, they argue that with such assistance from external states, the AU may be able to maintain the concept of 'African solutions to African problems' whilst at the same time successfully undertake PSOs.[59]

However, as it stands the Al-shabab situation in Somalia is different from what it was before, hence it is necessary to find out the contribution of AMISOM in the stabilisation process, in light of the new developments, and the expanded role of AMISOM in Somalia with increased peacekeeping troops from various countries including Kenya.[60]

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[58] Tim Murithi. *The African Union's evolving role in peace operations*: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia: *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) African Security Review Vol 17 No.1 Pretoria, South Africa* 2008. pp 70-83

[59] Hull, C. and Svensson, E. *African Union Mission in Somalia – Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI--R-2596--SE, Stockholm, 2008

[60] Solomon A .Dersso (2010) Somalia dilemmas: *Changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. Institute for Security Studies* (ISS Research Paper No.218, Pretoria , South Africa) October 2010

1.4.7 Summary and the Gap of the Literature Review

The literature review above gives a summary on the various ways international community have contributed to the stabilisation efforts in Somalia, with particular emphasis on the role played by the African Union. Review of the available literature revealed that most of the work carried out has focused on the level of preparedness of African Union peacekeeping missions, with emphasis on financial and technical support available for African standby force.

Secondly most of the available literature mainly on the challenges and success that Africa peacekeeping missions have faced with specific focus on African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Finally some studies have been carried out on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) but with focus on mainly on the issues of the funding of the mission and protections of the Transitional Federal Government. There was no greater look of the role of AMISOM in the overall stabilisation of the country. In order to determine the contribution of AMISOM in the stabilisation of the country it has become necessary to carry out this study and to analyse the contribution of AMSIOM in the stabilisation of Somalia.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study will make use of two theories to provide understanding of the role of the AMISOM in stabilisation efforts in Somalia. These are systems theory and peace building theory. System theory is a theory that attempts to explain how the international system adapts to disturbances caused in the international system. Such disturbance can be due to conflicts. Any conflict in a state may result in disturbing the equilibrium state of the international system. These disturbances to the international system hence necessitating a regulator to restore stability in the

international system. The regulator in this case can be international organisation. regional organisation or sub regional organisation such as UN. AU. NATO, IGAD and EAC.

On the other hand peace building theory is a theory that entails actions taken to support and promote peace. It will help to understand the actions and steps that the international organisation, regional or sub regional organisation undertake to create an environment for peace building and stability in the international system, actions that they take to prevent relapsing to conflict and sustainability of peace building through establishing institutions.

However peace building theory follows a concrete plans, steps and processes which have been laid beforehand while system theory focuses on international system adaptation to the restoration of stability in the international system at any given time. Therefore peace building theory will complement the systems theory in a way that. peace building theory will give actions plans and steps that the international community undertakes to eliminate international disturbances and to restore stability and equilibrium in the international system.

1.5.1 System Theory

The research is situated within the frame work of the systems theory. A system is a framework theoretically or conceptually defined for the analysis of phenomena in political, economic, and bio social spheres of life. It normally consists of a set of variables in interaction among independent or dependent variables. which changes in one or more variables.[61]

The analysis of the systems approach best begin with an examination of the concept of system as understood generally. Kaplan's definition is that a system of action is a set of variables so related. in contradiction to its environment. The theory is based on the concept of a whole. Anatol Rapoport defines a system as "a whole, which functions as a whole by virtue of the

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[61] Kaplan M. *System and Process in International Politics.*(New York: Harper Collins publishing Inc ,1957), pp 23-25

interdependence of its parts J.W. Burtons defines the concept of a system as "relationship between units".[62]

The system theory can therefore be defined as "a series of statements about relationship among independent and dependent variables, in which changes in one or more variables are accompanied or followed by changes in other variables or combination of variables.[63]

The system is expected to be at equilibrium for it to be stable[64]. Any equilibrium indicates the instability of the system; with the ordered pattern of interaction previously defining it no longer operative, the system can no longer be distinguished from its environment. The operations of the system cannot be explained solely through consideration of the interrelation of its elements but also through the environment.[65]

The system theory holds that within the international systems, states are held together by a complex network of interactions which make them inter dependent in facilitating their basic functions. These functions include investments, tourism, communication network, technology transfer, information flow, trade transactions, and diplomatic activities.[66]

Richard Rosecrance begins his application of the system theory by classifying various actions of states in terms of their effects on the international stability of the system which can be any international, regional or sub regional organisation such as UN, AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC etc. He argues that any conflict in a state may result in disturbing the equilibrium state of the international system. This causes disturbances to the international system hence necessitating

[62] J W Burton(1998) *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.6-8
[63] ibid
[64] Dougherty J. andPfaltzgraffR. *Contending Theories in International Relations, a comprehensive Survey.* (New York: Harper Collins publishing Inc, 2000). pp.136-140
[65] Burton J. *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules*, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 6-12
[66] Ibid

a regulator to restore stability in the international system. The regulator in this case can be any superpower or international organisation such as UN, AU, and NATO etc.[67]

Rosecrance concludes that every system seeks to maintain its equilibrium and therefore any disturbance tends to offset the balance. Against this background, all states in the system must cooperate to eliminate disturbances throughout the system.[68] The conflict management mechanism of African Union and the sub regional organisations indicate the willingness of states to reduce disturbances. It is within this framework that African Union stand by forces were established with an aim to minimise the disturbances that conflicts in states causes to neighbouring countries and international system through restoring stability in the war torn countries.

System theory therefore will help in understanding the role that African Union is playing by providing peacekeeping mission to stabilise Somalia which is part of the international system and functions within African conflict system.

1.5.2 Peace building Theory

The genesis of peace building theory can be traced to the work of two scholars, John Burton and John Lederach. Burton's work evolved by looking at peace due to meet human needs, this latter led him to develop a model for peace building.[69] On the other side John lederach work was more concerned studying peace building as an important aspect of reconciliation.[70] These two scholars provided a foundation for the development and understanding of peace building theory. However, over time developments have continued to be

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[67] R. N. Rosecrance.,"Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* Vol. 10. No. 3 (saga publishers, London. September, 996) pp. 314-327
[68] Ibid
[69] Burton J.W. *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention,* Vol.1. (London, Macmillan publishers, 1990) pp 12
[70] Lederach J.P.*Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Society.* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) pp. 5-8.

made to the peace building theory, chief of them being by the UN who has contributed significantly to the evolving of peace building theory.[71]

Peace building theory can be conceptualised as a process of concrete actions taken to support and promote peace. The process involves a modification of social structures through measures undertaken as part of the evolved peace building theory. Peace building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms. Any effort for peace building should include short and long term actions tailored to the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it and that these actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.[72]

Peace building is also regarded as a multifaceted task that implies a commitment to establishing the military, legal, political, economic, structural, cultural and psychosocial conditions necessary to promote a culture of peace in place of a culture of violence. The ending of armed conflict and mechanisms for reducing the threats of further violence are an essential basis for building peace and human security, but are insufficient to create confidence in the new regime and to overcome the psychological barriers among people created by the experiences of war. Due to the challenges involved to restore stability, peace building process has been

[71] Boutros G .*An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping.* (New York: United Nations publications, 1992).pp 14-22
[72] Elizabeth M and Chetan K. *Peace building as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies.* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado USA . 2001) pp 23-25.

envisaged to be important through the participation of actors who can be either local or international community such as UN, AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, and EU etc.[73]

The work of peace building has been predominantly being carried out by the UN over the past few decades but based on the new approach that UN adopted to carry out peace building based on the operational reality and on the regional nature of conflicts across continent; a broad consensus emerged in the peace building community on the need for regional approaches. Such approaches would address linkages in regional conflict, prevent conflict from spreading across borders, and promote sustainable regional economic and social development.[74]

Following the move to build peace through regional organisation it was necessary to create regional approaches, measure and practices that can be able to build peace on the various regions. To this end AU came up with Africa Stand by Force (ASF) whose major mandate is to keep and build peace in the continent. To date such missions have been carried out by African Union through African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Peace building theory will be a valuable yardstick by which to assess the extent to which AMISOM stabilisation in Somalia has been effective. This is because AMISOM mission in Somalia concerns stabilisation of the country, which also forms a major component of peace building theory. Some of the major components of peace building theory include peace operations, and post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. AU has launched various peace building missions in Africa, including AMISOM with the mandate of stabilisation of the country

[73] Stephen J. and Donald Rothchild. Peace Operations: From Short Term to Long Term Commitment. *International Peacekeeping Vol. 3, No. 2*(Pretoria; Preston publishers, 1996),pp17 35.
[74] Wendy, Lambourne, and Herro Annie. 2008. "Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peace building Commission: implications for non-UN interventions". *Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 20. No. 3*(Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Sydney Australia, 2008) PP. 275-289

and the peace building theory will be useful in understanding the AMISOM stabilisation efforts in Somalia.

1.6 Hypothesis

- **Null Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia has no relationship with stabilisation of the country

- **Positive Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia will lead to stabilisation of the country.

- **Negative Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia will not lead to stabilisation of the country.

1.7 Research Methodology

This section presents the research methodology, which primarily relates to the way in which a researcher structures or conducts the research project on the basis of objectives of the study. The research will be focused on trying to understand the issue of stabilisation efforts in Somalia with specific emphasis to AMISOM mission to Somalia. The methodology includes such aspects as sampling technique, data collection procedures, data collection instruments, and data analysis. Accordingly, for the purpose of this study. research methodology begins with research design.

1.7.1 Research Design

The methodology of the study is both quantitative and qualitative approach and both analyses were used to trace the process and establish a causal relationship between the variables. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data helped to identify developing trends and assists in understanding the role of AMISOM in stabilising Somalia.

This was done with an aim of gaining a holistic view in the context of the study to capture data on perceptions of study population and to collect in depth information. This allowed the study to make use of records and documents that are not necessarily meant for historical analysis and other useful information from the informants from diverse backgrounds.[75]

1.7.2 Population

According to Stuart and Wayne, a population is any group that is the subject of research interest[76]. For the current study the population comprised officials from the United Nations, African Union/AMISOM, IGAD, academicians, researchers, media groups and Humanitarian aid workers in Somalia.

1.7.3 Sampling

In research, the information that is collected from the sample should represent and reflect the characteristics of the population to be researched. In this study a manageable sample of 22 respondents was drawn by means of non-probability sampling for the collection of the primary data. The study made use of purposive or judgmental non probability sampling to choose the sample. Purposive sampling is where a researcher makes judgment about which subjects should be selected to the sample to provide the best information to address the purpose of the research. This will form the identifying the subject of interest in the study.[77] This will allow the researcher to choose and pick the sample for his research. This technique is important when specific group of the study population posses the information required for the research.

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[75] David L. *Qualitative Methodology and Grounded Theory*.(NewDelhi: Press Net Publishers, 2006)
[76] Chava F. Nachmias and David Nachmias. *Research methods in the Social Sciences*(St Martin's Press, Inc 1996, London) pp.179-83
[77] Ibid pp. 183-85

1.7.4 Data Sources

The study used both primary and secondary sources on the subject matter under discussion. The primary data was obtained through interviews and questionnaires. Diplomats and officials from United Nations, African Union/AMISOM, IGAD. academicians/researchers. media and humanitarian workers were interviewed. An instrument in a research study is a device used to measure the concept of interest in a research project. An ideal measuring instrument is one which results in measures that are relevant, accurate. objective, and efficient. To select appropriate method for addressing, the needs for the research questions, the researcher used schedule interview in the primary data collection.

Both closed and open ended interview guide questions were used to allow respondents to include more information and their understanding of the subject. This will allow the researcher to better access the respondents' true feelings and understandings about the AMISOM peace keeping mission. The secondary data was obtained from scholarly works published or unpublished as captured in the internet, Jstor and from books, journals and articles drawn from private libraries, the university library, UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia and AMISOM, UN reports on Somalia, African Union Communiqués and Resolutions and reports.

1.7.5 Data Collection

Primary and secondary data collection was started by consulting the archives of the above listed data sources. This was followed by conducting interview from respondents from United Nations, African Union/AMISOM, IGAD, humanitarian workers, media groups and academicians. The researcher used judgemental or purposive non probability sampling technique to choose the sample. The interviews were carried out only with the key informants. Researcher

was not able to meet all the respondents for interviews for logistical difficulties. and in a few cases interviewed respondents through telephone interviews.

1.7.6 Data Analysis

Data analysis was done using contextual and content analysis. The analysis of the data included data organisation, creation of categories in data that is distinct from each other, establishes their relations and generating themes. Once the categories and themes have been identified, the data was evaluated to determine the adequacy of information. credibility, usefulness. consistency and validation of the hypothesis. At the same time the researcher put together data and gave analytical view of the situation under study. The report shows how the findings of research are different or similar compared to the researcher's expectations which have been derived from the literature review. Data is presented through arguments, descriptions and narratives.

1.7.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study that was carried out was limited to locality; with the study being limited to literature material on African Union role in peacekeeping and stabilisation. The study was carried out and the primary data was collected through interviews with key informants from the UN country team AMISOM, IGAD, media groups and humanitarian works to corroborate some of the secondary evidence that was reviewed. The major limitation of the study was that due to time, financial constraints and Security constraints to Somalia the study was mainly limited to secondary source of information. Limitations of this study also relate to unavailability of some reference materials on the AMISOM peacekeeping mission to Somalia. Attempts was made to get alternative materials to offset the falls through relying on progress reports developed by United Nations, African Union/AMISON and International Humanitarian organisations.

1.8 Chapter Summary

The research study will comprise for five chapters, with its main substantive issues and arguments presented in Chapter Three and Four.

Chapter One: Introduction to the study:

This chapter constitutes the research proposal. It introduces the study and gives an overview of the entire study. The chapter also shows the gap that the study hopes to fill. This was done by giving a background of the study, scope and limitation of the study in order to situate the study, after which it given the problem statement that the study will address. The chapter also includes theoretical frameworks that give direction to the study and methodology that was used to provide a roadmap for the research.

Chapter Two: Stabilisation: A Conceptual Analysis:

This chapter illustrates some of the theories and concepts that have laid foundations to the stabilisation operations, understanding elements of stabilisations processes. This will be done by looking at some of the stabilisation measures that have been carried out in the world with special emphasis in the Africa Continent. The chapter will discuss elements of stabilisation processes and will draw a conclusion about the stabilisations process based on their frameworks, objectives, mandates goals and activities that has been carried out in the achievements of the stabilisation in post conflict counties.

Chapter Three: Case Study of AMISOM:

This chapter looks at the development of AMISOM mission in Somalia, with emphasis on understanding the historical developments behind the mission. This will be done though discussions of some of the stabilisation efforts that have been tried in Somalia by the international community particularly in the AMISOM case. To find out the AMISOM role in the

contribution of the stabilisation of the country, the chapter also discusses activities that AMISOM has carried out to stabilise the country, challenges and the achievements.

Chapter Four: Critical Analysis of AMISOM Peacekeeping Mission:

In this Chapter, the researcher provides an in depth critical analysis of the AMISOM Peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In the view of the AMISOM mission mandates objectives and activities, the chapter critically discusses about the findings from the literature review, conceptual analysis as well as the findings from the field data in comparison with the research objectives and hypothesis. Based on the findings the chapter also discusses two emerging issues in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission namely Civilian Protection of the mission and the long term exit strategy.

Chapter Five: Summary, Findings and Conclusions:

This chapter summarises the main findings form the study. The chapter also provides policy recommendations based on the findings of the study; besides the chapter makes recommendation for further study on the key emerging issues in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission. The chapter ends with conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

Stabilisation: A Conceptual Analysis

2.0 Introduction

The chapter will illustrate some of the theories and concepts that have laid foundations to the stabilisation operations, by looking into some of the stabilisation measures that have been carried out in Africa with an aim to understand the frameworks, objectives, and goals. The chapter will also discuss about the main areas of stabilisations in post conflict societies.

Stabilisation has emerged as one of the most critically important aspects of international involvement in conflict and post conflict situations in Africa. The persistence of conflicts in many places where peace building has been tried is an illustration both of the overwhelming need for and significant difficulties in establishing conditions for sustainable peace.[78] As Africa emerges out of its post-Cold War period, characterised by intra state conflicts and political instability, the continent has also become a prime theatre for various stabilisation interventions. A number of actors have been involved in such interventions ranging from United Nations to regional and sub-regional organizations. The goal of these institutions is not only to stem the upsurge in civil conflicts but also to prevent relapse when those conflicts are over.[79]

Stabilisation consists of four distinct yet interrelated categories of tasks or pillars. The first pillar of any stabilisation efforts is the security, which addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions. Security encompasses collective as well as individual security and is a

[78] Hussien M Adam. Somalia, a terribe beauty being born. In Zartman, W.I. (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority.* (Lynne Reinner publishers, Inc. London. 1995) pp 69-90
[79] Robert Hoekstra & Charles E Tucker. *Stabilisation and reconstruction Operations.* Prism 1 no 2. (National Defense University Press, Washington DC. 2010) pp 14

precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars.[80] In the most pressing sense, providing security involves securing the lives of civilians in the aftermath of immediate and large-scale violence as well as restoring the territorial integrity of the post conflict state. This in most cases form the short term goal of stabilisation.[81]

One of the key issues of the security stabilisation includes information sharing about threats and potential threats to the peace process and population. Information sharing helps to prevent the potential threats to the population and to the government officials. It is also important to manage spoilers and individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests and will therefore work to undermine it. Spoilers should be encouraged to change their behavior over time, depending on their motives and capacity at state and local levels, spoilers may need to be dealt with militarily or through political or economic negotiations.

Control of the security apparatus is the basic source of state power and its use will likely have been one of the major drivers of conflict. Its reform therefore is a priority. Security sector reform is important for the actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violence such as police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies, institutions that govern these actors and manage their funding, like ministries of interior, defense, and justice. Reform aims to create a professional security sector that is legitimate, impartial, and accountable to the population.

Second pillar for stabilisation is the justice and reconciliation, which addresses the need to deal with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms. The task includes exacting

[80] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25
[81] Anten, Louise. *Strengthening Governance in Post-Conflict Fragile States. Issues Paper*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael Institute), The Hague, the Netherlands, 2009. pp. 6

appropriate penalties for previous acts and building the state's capacity to promulgate and enforce the rule of law. Incorporating the concept of restorative justice, justice and reconciliation efforts include attempts to reconcile ex-combatants, victims, and perpetrators.[82] Resolving grievances arising from conflict and to create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws, and a humane corrections system.

For the population to access justice, they must understand their rights and the means for claiming them. For most people in a war-torn state, the laws and the formal justice system are alien institutions they fear or do not understand. Legal awareness helps counter this misunderstanding and promote access to justice. Legal awareness campaigns can be conducted by the state but they are most effective when conducted by civil society at a grassroots level or through the media. Because providing information to huge populations is a significant challenge, trusted and familiar social networks can be used to enhance legal awareness efforts. Legal awareness of suspects and the accused should also be promoted.[83]

Access to justice involves the use of both informal and non-formal justice mechanisms based on strict compliance with human rights standards. This will likely require harmonizing informal practices with international human rights law. Informal justice systems derive legitimacy from traditional, customary, or religious sources. In these environments, they often help resolve disputes because the formal, state-based system does not reach the entire population, the population views informal mechanisms as more legitimate and effective, and the volume of cases may be too large for the formal system to process. Informal practices may also continue

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[82] Ibid
[83] Robert Hoekstra & Charles E Tucker. *Stabilisation and reconstruction Operations*. Prism 1 no 2. (National Defence University Press, Washington DC. 2010) pp 18

functioning at the local level in the absence of a formal and codified legal system. Where these systems are ignored or overridden, the result can be the exclusion of large sectors of society from accessible justice.

Third pillar for stabilisation is concerned with the social and economic wellbeing. This addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program, often accompanying the establishment of security and social wellbeing. It will entail protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the disease causing elements. As the situation stabilises, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long term social and economic development.[84]

Violent conflict creates humanitarian crises and inflicts tremendous harm on civilian populations. These crises involve large scale population displacement and the absence of the basic needs. As families struggle to survive during and after violent conflict, social fabric may be torn apart within and among communities. Disputes about land, water, harvests, pasture rights, marriage, inheritance, and other inter and intra community issues typically arise and may threaten a fragile peace. Children may have missed years of education, and many may have been denied the chance to start primary school. Essential services infrastructure may be ruined, including ports, roads, and basic utilities.

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[84] Raymond Gilpin. Toward Conflict-Sensitive Macroeconomic Growth: Unraveling Challenges for Practitioners. Presented at Building Capacity in Stability Operations: Security Sector Reform, Governance and Economics. *United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Center for Naval Analysis,* Alexandria, VA. 2009.

Rebuilding physical infrastructure is necessary for the provision of services over the long term. Restoring access to these services is necessary to ensure the survival of conflict-affected populations, sustain livelihoods over the long-term, and to boost the legitimacy of the state.

Peace cannot be sustained over the long term without addressing the social needs of a population. Without basic necessities such as food or shelter, large-scale social instability will persist because people will be unable to resume the functions of normal life sustaining a livelihood, traveling safely, engaging in community activities, or attending school. Without helping people return to their homes or new communities of their choice or providing a means for peacefully resolving.

In conflict affected countries, assistance activities can never be completely neutral. Resources inevitably represent the distribution of power and wealth. Managing these resources can create tensions if careful attention is not given to how they are distributed and delivered. Do no harm principle is important so that potentially negative impacts of aid is minimized and to prevent aid activity from harming the populations it is trying to help.[85]

Facilitating a smooth transition from relief activities to sustainable development is a major challenge in post conflict societies. This transition refers to the shift from primarily life saving measures to restoring livelihoods that contribute to long-term growth Activities in both areas of relief and development are often funded and managed as distinct programs. This may create gaps both financial and institutional in provision of basic needs when relief activities end and the development activities largely take over. Coordination of the assistance strategies and

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[85] T. Bouta. Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, building blocks for Dutch policy research paper. *Netherlands Institute of international relations (Clingendael Institute), Conflict resolution Unit*. The Hague 2005

development strategies are important to ensure that relief activities are nested in and coherent with the longer term objective of sustainability.

Finally, governance and participation addresses the need to create legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring the active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of the country's government and its policies. Governance involves setting rules and procedures for political decision making and for delivering public services in an efficient and transparent manner. Participation encompasses the process for giving the population a voice in government by developing a civil society structure that generates and exchanges ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media. The last three pillars of stabilisation have formed in most cases the long-term goals of stabilisation.[86]

Societies emerging from conflict often have debilitated or corrupted governance institutions, lack professional capacity for governance, and require new or reformed legal frameworks for political engagement. Providing essential services is the primary function of administrative governance in societies emerging from conflict. These societies are in immediate need of security, the rule of law, economic governance, and basic human needs services such as health and education. In providing these services, the focus must be on the development of host nation capacity, equal access, and non-discrimination in service delivery, and adequate and timely payment of civil service salaries to make peace pay.

With the limited resources available to war-torn societies, it's not possible to deliver all services at once. The priorities should be security, the rule of law, economic governance, and

[86] Camile Conaway. Charting Progress: The role of women in reconstruction and stabilisation operations. Companion Article to the special report. *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)* Washington DC. 2005 pp 3-8

basic human needs services if not already provided. Capacities building of the host government institutions are important. The Managerial capacity for governance involves recruitment, appointment, training, and mentoring of ministers, deputy ministers, and other senior public administration personnel. Merit based criteria for selection may be ideal, but the host nation's ability to provide this level of talent may be degraded. Warlords and other faction leaders may need to be included in a new administration, and the diaspora may be brought into positions of leadership, whether for political reasons or because they are most qualified for service like the case in the current Somalia parliament. If political considerations dictate the need for inclusion of power brokers and potential spoilers, it's important to be considered time restricted appointments and strict oversight of these positions.

For any stabilisation efforts to succeed, work in these four areas must be carefully integrated. As United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has noted in his address entitled analysis of UN stabilisation efforts in Africa.

> *"All these tasks humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic are interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together. We cannot expect lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy. If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may turn out to have been pursued in vain."* [87]

In looking at some of the stabilisation efforts that have been carried out in Africa by the International Community, Denis argues that best practices for any stabilisation efforts in Africa should be based on the following principles. First, stabilisation can only be achieved if the international community acts coherently and in close consultation with the host government. Second, any stabilisation operation must be grounded in a deep understanding of the local context to identify the weaknesses of potential spoilers and determine the appropriate sequencing

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[87] United Nations, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations.* Department of Peacekeeping Operations New York, 2003.pp 8-12

of activities. Third, resources and ambition must be consistent with one another if the military presence is insufficient to dominate; the international community will have to reach an accommodation with some of the spoilers rather than confront them all at once.[88] Fourth, stabilisation can lead to a different set of priorities to long term development but must be informed by an assessment of longer term impacts to avoid exacerbating conflict or strengthening insurgents. Fifth, care needs to be taken to avoid a focus on winning consent for international peacekeepers undermining the primary objective of securing legitimacy of the host government. And lastly, in the absence of a fully inclusive political settlement quick impact projects alone cannot bring about successful stabilisation but can be an important way to provide the time and space for such a political settlement to be nurtured.

2.1 Thinking about Stabilisation

Stabilisation efforts have been carried out by United Nations and other organisations such as international NGO's and regional organizations. However, the question which has increasingly come out of the stabilisation process is which theoretical frameworks have underlined these operations. This necessitates looking at some of the theoretical framework that has informed stabilisation operations in Africa.[89]

Peace building theory is of importance in giving a comprehension of the stabilisation initiatives that are designed to rebuild war torn societies and institutions after hostilities have ended, as well as measures that are intended to prevent conflict before it erupts. Such practices

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[88] Pierre Englebert, Denis M. Tull. Post conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States. *International Security, Vol. 32 no 4.2008.* pp 106-139
[89] A.B. Fetherston . Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace building: A reconsideration of theoretical frameworks. *International peacekeeping. Vol.7. No. 1.* 2000. pp. 190-218

may also be seen as features of the stabilisation measures, which have emerged in the post-cold war period as an alternative to traditional peace keeping operations.[90]

Given the critical role of poor governance and state failure or collapse in many African conflicts, peace building theory can provide an assessment of the role of these rebel movements in peace building and sustainable post-conflict stability. In looking at these he stresses that Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda can provide these assessments. He asserts that Peace building is one of the key missions for Unite Nations peace operations, with its broader conceptual definition including the need to reinforce preventive diplomacy and to bolster peace-making efforts, and includes such diverse tasks as demilitarisation, restructuring, security sector reform and economic development which are key elements of stabilisation.[91]

The peace building theory in his study is associated with the role of international actors through the internationally sponsored peace agreements or the international United Nations military peace-making operation. Stability and state reconstruction, while a central goal of these actors, has resulted in the development of institutions which are founded on peace building concepts in these countries.

While looking at the stabilisation efforts in these countries he argues that, successful stabilisation efforts in these countries not only requires such important utilitarian efforts as disarmament, infrastructure development and security sector reform, but also the institutionalization of new norms and rules that prescribe nonviolent means of conflict resolution by formerly armed parties and good governance by the state, especially in the distribution of political power, group identity and socioeconomic benefits that directly contribute to conflict

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[90]Edward Banka Gariba. Post-conflict development in Liberia: Governance, security, capacity building and a developmental approach. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). *African Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJCR) Volume 11* No. 2, 2011, pp. 105-132
[91]Ibid

management.[92] This he states is only possible if the stabilisation efforts are based on the following principles. Safe and secure environment, Rule of Law, Stable governance, Economic stabilisation and social wellbeing of the population.

While acknowledging that development assistances have been channelled to these countries by international community such as UN, IMF, World Bank, EU among others, efforts should be specifically tailored to mitigate the conditions for conflict and prevent the re-emergence of civil strife for these forms the basis of peace building theory and stabilisation measures, preventing the re-emergence of conflict.

Numerous contemporary authors and scholars have used various theories to understand stability operations in Africa. Charles Bailey has applied Abraham H. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as an outline from which to understand stability operations in Africa. As one of the most researched human psychology theories, Maslow's basic premise is that human beings are motivated to satisfy needs and lower or more basic needs must be satisfied before higher ones can be fulfilled.[93]

Violence and other atrocities are rooted in unfulfilled human needs and believed Maslow's physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs can be used to frame and prioritize future strategy and stability operations in Africa. He uses the theory to understand the stabilisation missions in DRC which he argues necessitated that the needs and interests of the conflicting parties be met.[94]

However he states that while useful, Maslow's theory is based on individual motivations versus societal provisions, providing only a partial framework. William Zartman has advanced a

[92] Ibid
[93] Charles Bailey. *Winning the Hearts and Minds: Providing the Basic Needs First*, Strategy Research paper. U.S. Army War College, Pennsylvania USA. 2005 pp. 6-14
[94] Ibid pp.15

theory of state collapse based on the misplaced governmental and political character of present day African nations. [95]He believes conflicts and instability in Africa are warning symptoms of state failure and states collapse when they can no longer perform the functions required for them to perform as a state. Similarly, Robert Rotberg argues that nation states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering goods and services. When a nation state cannot provide the necessary components of a successful society and state, which also correlate on an individual basis to Maslow's safety needs, the result is state failure.[96] An obvious relationship exists among Zartman's and Rotberg's state collapse theories and Bailey's insights in regard to Maslow's theory of human motivation. In this regard Rotberg argues that as much as stabilisation efforts in Africa have predominantly being military based, it is important for stabilisation efforts to focus son improving the capacity of states to provide services to its citizens in order to avert future re-occurrence of conflicts in states.

Human security theory explains the role of international community in stabilisation of Liberia and Sierra Leone. He argues that security is a prerequisite for development. He stresses that the governments in Africa do not possess the capabilities to secure the framework of safe development hence the necessity of international organization such as UN, AU, EU among others to help in effecting these frameworks through the principles that are enshrined in Human security theory. To him the principles of human security are the same principle that forms the principle and guidelines of stabilisation and reconstruction operations. [97]

[95] Hussien M Adam. Somalia, a terribe beauty being born. In Zartman, W.I. (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. (Lynne Reinner publishers, Inc. London. 1995) pp 69-90
[96] Robert J. Rotberg. Failed states, collapsed states and weak sates, causes and indicators in Robert J.Rotberg (ed) *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2003
[97] United Nation Report. *Human security and Peace building in Africa: the need for an inclusive approach*. New York, 2009. http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/human_security_peacebuilding_africa.pdf

Peace building theory is an important theory in understanding of United Nation peacekeeping missing in Africa .She argues that this is because of the conceptual definition of peace building theory which has over the years moved from short-term measures to long-term measures. The effects of these changes have been felt in all United Nations stabilisation measures. which are predominantly in Africa.[98] Because of the shift in stabilisation operations from United Nations to Regional led operation, peace building theory still provides an important framework in understanding such operations.

2.2 Elements of Stabilisations

The most common elements of stabilisation measures that have been used are Security stabilisations, economic stabilisations, governance stabilisations and social stabilisation among others. The earliest forms of stabilisation were channelled towards the creation of safe and secure environment and these in most cases were done by the international community through peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, regional or sub-regional organisations.[99]

The most important in each component of the stabilisations is the institutional building and reforms. In addition to reform of the governance framework, particular care must be paid to the creation or strengthening of the associated institutions. These institutions cannot be imposed from outside but must be bodies that are able and committed to performing their core function. This has proved to be a difficult challenge and one that requires a multi-faceted long-term strategy. In many of the cases where institutions have been built according to external models and based on international assistance, the institutions are weak or even mere facades. The challenge is how to encourage and assist the growth of institutions that are able to perform the

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[98] Sandra J. Maclean. Peace building and the New Regionalism in southern Africa. *Third world quarterly Vol 20, No 4.* 1999. pp 943-956

[99] Williams, Garland H. *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Post-conflict Reconstruction.* United States Institute of Peace press (USIP) Washington DC. 2005

functions that are considered critical to ensuring legitimate and peaceful states, are appropriate to the prevailing conditions, and are not unrealistically ambitious.[100]

Institutions that are sustainable and sufficiently robust to deal with the vicissitudes of human nature and political activity-be it struggles for power, criminal behaviour, corruption, violence, or merely lack of experience-cannot be built rapidly. The institutions themselves require staffs that are competent.

2.2.1 Stabilisation and Security

A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, or large scale violence. The most immediate concern is personal physical safety from violence.[101] Even after fighting is over, insecurity is often spread throughout society from politically motivated violence, rampant gunfire and retaliation by former enemies, gender based violence, landmines, and emerging armed criminal elements among others. Because of these security threats in transitional environments there is a call for a dual capability to control large scale threats to the peace process while also maintaining public order. This brings to the fore the quest for Safe and secure environment in a post-conflict country.[102]

A country's recovery from violent conflict depends mainly on the establishment of security. Without security, parties to the conflict will not lay down their arms, and a country will never progress beyond a state of siege and will remain stagnant in its economic, political, and

[100] Sultan Barakat. *Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan,*" Third World Quarterly series (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004)

[101] Beth cole. *Guiding principles for stabilisation and Reconstruction,* United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 2009. pp 36-37

[102] Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson. *Transforming for stabilisation and reconstruction operations,* National defence University press, Washing DC, 2004

social development.[103] People will refrain from resuming normal activities that are fundamental to a healthy and vibrant society, like sending their children to school and opening shops for business. Civilian agencies will be unable to begin laying the critical foundation for promoting the rule of law, good governance, economic growth, and healthy social development.

The fundamental goal of a stabilisation is to prevent a relapse of large scale armed conflict. For this to be achieved it is important to establish safe and secure environment in a post conflict country. This will entail various security priorities such as promoting a political settlement, neutralising hostile groups, providing basic protection for vulnerable populations among others.[104] The first step for safe and secure environment is to separate warring parties which involves establishing distinct areas of control that keeps factions apart from one another and allows peacekeeping forces to monitor their actions. This limits further suffering among civilians, asserts control over fighting forces, and builds confidence nationwide in the prospects for peace. The separation of combatants is usually followed up with observation and monitoring of a cease fire. The role of international forces in ensuring stability is vital until local forces have become effective and accountable enough to provide security. Of which military stabilisation has been central to securing safe and secure environment in post-conflict countries in Africa.[105]

At the inception stages, the stabilisation interventions should encourage warring factions to buy into peace agreements that form the basis for the disarmament and demobilisation of their fighters. This is usually followed by the long-term process of reintegration that includes the

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[103] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25
[104] Assefaw B .United Nations peace missions in Africa. Transformation and determinants.*Journal of Black studies* Vol.38 No 6. (Saga publishers, London, 2008). pp. 830-849
[105] Adebajo, Adekeye and Chris Landsberg. Back to the future UN peacekeeping in Africa. *International Peacekeeping Vol.7, No. 4.* 2000. pp. 161-188

reform of the security sector to meet post-war security challenges and to create an enabling environment for sustainable peace and development.[106]

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) have become common words in stabilisation activities. Disarmament is a process of collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament processes usually include the development of responsible arms and management programmes.[107]

Demobilisation is a process by which conflicting armed groups are induced to disband their military organization and structure and shift from combatant to civilian status.[108] The DDR process involves, the registration and processing of individual ex-combatants in temporary centres, the massing of troops, rebel forces in camps, barracks or other assembly areas, for the above purpose, inducements for ex combatants to give up their weapons, the provision of transitional assistance packages to help them and their families meet their immediate basic needs, such as food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term remedial education, training, employment and tools, discharge, and, transportation for ex-combatants to get to their home community.

Reintegration is a longer term social and economic in the DDR process, with an open time frame designed to facilitate the assimilation of ex-combatants in a way that allows them and their families to adapt to civilian life in communities that may not necessarily be ready to accept them. In most cases, this phase of the DDR process involves, provision of cash or some form of

[106] K Theidon . Transitional Subjects: The Disarmaments, Demobilization and reintegration, *International Journal of Transitional Justice. Vol.1 No.1,* 2007. pp. 66-90

[107] Nicole Ball. Disarmament ,Demobilisation and Reintegration, *Netherlands Institute of international relations (Clingendael Institute), Conflict resolution Unit,* The Hague 2006, research report for the Netherlands Ministry of foreign Affairs, pp 1-7

[108] Ibid

compensation package in exchange for the commitment of ex-combatant not to return to conflict, providing ex combatants with longer term job or career training, initiating sustainable income-generation projects, repatriating refugees and displaced persons and establishing a forum and process for truth and reconciliation.[109] This stage of the DDR process is usually accompanied by efforts at rehabilitation of war affected individuals, including children, and reconstruction of national infrastructure damaged as a result of the violence.[110]

The challenges for the stabilisation intervention measures is to find a way to dismantle conflict nurturing institutions and replace them with institutions that are capable of sustaining peace. Some conflict nurturing elements have been eliminated with the cessation of hostilities and the demobilisation of fighters. But others have persisted, requiring sustained military and diplomatic engagement.[111] For instance, the remains of wartime military and security arms in some countries in Africa continue to pose great risks to internal security.

Some of these challenges in Africa are inflated armies, with little or no civilian control, irregular and paramilitary forces, an overabundance of arms and ammunition in private and government hands, weak internal security forces and lack of trust in and legitimacy of governments' control over police and military forces. Interventions need go beyond the initial peace processes to restore physical security and stability to include long term stability initiatives that aim to usher in socioeconomic progress and reform of political institutions in post-conflict societies.[112]

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[109] T. Bouta. Gender and Disarmament ,Demobilization and Reintegration, building blocks for Dutch policy research paper, *Netherlands Institute of international relations (Clingendael Institute), Conflict resolution Unit*, The Hague 2005 pp 9-13

[110] Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World.* Oxford University Press. Oxford, 2008. pp1-4

[111] Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull. Post conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States. *International Security, Vol. 32 no 4.2008.* pp 106-139

[112] Ibid

Conflicts in Africa, particularly civil wars, usually result in the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers and irregular rebel militia. Many of these recruits include women and children. Once a conflict comes to an end, either through a peace agreement or as a result of military victory, the war-torn country needs to address the issue of surplus troops who may be discharged from military and rebel forces, which for purposes, are being disbanded.[113]

The nature of the conflicts in Africa has also included the proliferation of lethal weapons, mostly small arms and light weapons (SALW). Most of these weapons have found their way into the various conflict zones in Africa. The aftermath of conflicts in Africa has also meant tackling the difficulty task of dismantling persistent old loyalties and command structures of fighting forces.

Having a large number of ex combatants who are still in possession of weapons can pose a threat to the security of a state and its civilian population.[114] The situation may also be considered threatening for countries bordering on the state in question. Therefore DDR programmes should be put in place by the international community to dissipate threats to the security of a post conflict African society by helping ex-combatants disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate into communities of their choice.[115] These programmes should provide ex combatants with the kind of skills necessary for them to become productive members in a peaceful society. DDR programmes, combined with security sector reform (SSR) are designed. ideally, to forestall any return to violence, and to this end they consist of three three-stage processes that involve weapon surrender of active combatants, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into their society.

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[113] Herbst, E. John. *Addressing the problem of failed states: A New instrument.* Prism 1, no.1 (National Defence University Press, Washington DC. 2009) pp. 5
[114] Ibid pp.8
[115] Hamre John J. Sullivan, Gordon R. Toward Post conflict Reconstruction. *Washington quarterly. Vol. 25 No 4.* 2002. pp 85-96

The objective of the DDR process, according to UN's DDR Resource Centre, is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. This entire process, linked to broader national recovery, is a complex one, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.[116] There is a growing awareness that the problem of insecurity in transitional states in Africa has been compounded by some of the very institutions meant to mitigate them.

A number of factors account for this. National militaries and other security sector actors have been implicated in many cases in the support of autocratic rule and in the perpetuation of civil wars. In periods of autocratic rule, the military establishment in some African countries has not only been accused of propping up unpopular civilian regimes but also of illegally taking centre stage in the political processes.[117] This has led, characteristically, to a legacy of entrenched politicization and professional erosion of security sector institutions, to the loss of confidence and trust in their capacity and very existence, and to appalling civil military relations. States emerging from autocratic rule and civil conflicts must necessarily restructure and transform the security sector not only to bolster its capacity to address post war security challenges, but also to support the tenets of democratic governance so necessary for building sustained peace.[118]

Security Sector Reforms (SSR) involves a process of improving the governance over service delivery in the security sector. This sector comprises organisations authorised to use force in the protection of the state and its population.[119] The EU has broadly accepted SSR to

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[116] Haughton, Jonathan . The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies and Peace-Building Operations. *Development Assistance Strategies in the 21st Century: Global and Regional Issues*, Vol. 1. Tokyo, July 2002. pp. 213-281
[117] Ibid
[118] D Bendix and Ruth Stanley. Security Sector Reform in Africa: The promise and the practice of new donor approach. *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Occasional Paper Series, Volume 3. No 2*. Durban, South African 2008. pp 18
[119] Ibid pp 19-20

mean the reform processes applied in those countries whose development is hampered by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors and are often exacerbated by lack of democratic oversight. Security governance issues including the reform of the security sector and reinforcing the rule of law are now increasingly recognised as priority for stabilisation.[120]

The UN for instance now considers effective SSR as part of a comprehensive and sustainable stabilisation strategy in post conflict state. Within the context of UN post conflict stabilisation interventions, SSR has been deemed essential not only for avoiding a situation of security vacuum after the withdrawal of peacekeepers but also for removing immediate threats to the process of democratic good governance in Africa.[121] SSR thus seeks to restructure demoralised security apparatuses of the state as well as their management and oversight mechanisms to meet post-war security challenges. It has focused on strengthening the peacetime capacity of security forces to meet immediate security.[122]

The UN has assumed a broad peace support mandate that goes beyond peacekeeping. Peace support operations (PSOs) are established to foster and reinforce conditions for sustainable peace. They are intended to facilitate peace negotiations and agreements, the monitoring of ceasefires, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and particularly the peace building elements of DDR. PSOs provide a more holistic approach for addressing conflicts on the African continent and this has made the UN an indispensable partner in the search for durable peace in Africa.[123]

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[120] United Nations. *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations.* Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UN publications. New York, 2003 pp.44

[121] W Kilroy. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: The co-evolution of concepts, practices, and understanding. Research paper. *Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies,* University of New York. 2009.

[122] Collier, P. Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Policies be Distinctive? *Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics,* University of Oxford, 2007

[123] D Bendix and Ruth Stanley. Security Sector Reform in Africa: The promise and the practice of new donor approach. *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Occasional Paper Series, Volume 3. No 2.* Durban, South African 2008. pp. 11

The UN, including its specialized agencies, departments, programmes and funds, intervenes at various points in the DDR process. It provides humanitarian assistance particularly during the disarmament and demobilisation phases of that process. It offers financial assistance to help with the transitional support packages.[124]

2.2.2 Governance and Stabilisation

Governance refers to the processes and rules through which state and non-state actors in a society wield power and authority and how they influence and enact governmental policies and decisions. Governance is a broader concept than government, the principal elements of which include the constitution and the three branches of government legislature, executive, and judiciary. Governance extends beyond the role and actions of public sector institutions, structures, and processes. It concerns how societies organize to pursue collective goals and interests.[125] Because of the key role of governance it is important to for any stabilisation effort to address question of how to build stable governance.

Conflicts in any society have effects not only upon the citizens of country but also on the social institution of a country. Key among these institutions is the governance institution since conflict results in breakdown of governance structures. In certain cases these institutions are usually degraded or non-existent. The absence of proper governance usually has an impact on key institutions in a country such as rule of law, social wellbeing of the country, development, security among others.[126] Societies emerging from conflict often have debilitated or corrupted

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[124] E.Onumajuru . United nation's peacekeeping operation and Conflict resolution in Africa. Unpublished Thesis, *Peace Operations Training Institute*, Virginia, USA.2005 pp 24-26
[125] Muggah Robert: Stabilising Fragile States and the Humanitarian Space, in Mats B. and Achim W. (eds) *Ending wars, consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives.* (Routlledge, London 2010). pp 33-52
[126] Ibid

governance institutions, lack professional capacity for governance, and require new or reformed legal frameworks for political engagement.[127]

Usually after a peace settlement or military stabilisation, it becomes important to restore governance structure all with an aim to avoid reverting back to the conflict. It is in trying to achieve this attempts that the international community has played a crucial role in promoting stable governance in Africa in various ways. One of the ways through which the international community has played in establishing stable governance is through leading the formation of transitional federal governments like it happened in DRC and Somalia. The transitional federal governments have been put in place to facilitate a return to democratic governance. The TFG have been tasked with mandate such as coming up with new constitutions, reforming social and economic institutions and preparing for democratic elections among others.[128] The international community has also been of help in trying to promote stable governance in post conflict Africa countries by promoting an inclusive government even after the formation of democratic government through facilitating talks with the rebels group who may not signed agreements before and hence including them in the government. The UN and AU have played important role in Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Rwanda among others.[129]

Political transformation without the reform of the governance framework will not suffice. While an appropriate governance framework not always result in stable, peaceful states, a poor governance frame work generally undermines the sustainability of the peace. It can exacerbate the social fault lines, divisions, and tensions, entrench conflict generating electoral or governance

[127] David S McDonough. From Guerrillas to Government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda, *Third world quarterly Vol 29, No 2.* 2008. pp 357-374
[128] Timothy Donais. Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. Research paper: *Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).* Geneva, Switzerland. 2008. pp 1-17
[129] Ibid

models, or provide a basis to contest the government, as seen in Haiti in relation to the dissolution of the army.[130]

Democracy is the most appropriate governance model to resolve civil conflict and prevent its recurrence. Despite the increased instability and vulnerability to conflict during transition to democracy remains the best option for ending conflict over the longer term. Democracies are ultimately more stable than autocracies and democratic institutions provide greater opportunity for the non-violent resolution of conflict. Democratic institutions are considered to promote open and fair competition for power on the basis of popular vote, promote the government's accountability, and provide a forum for rational discussion of political problems and settlement of conflicting social interests.

Thus, reform of the governance framework must ensure that as far as possible a negotiated governance arrangement between parties addresses or overcomes the grievances that led to war in the first place in order both to minimise the chances of a return to conflict and to entrench basic democratic governance. Governance institutions and political rules that are consistent with a democratic state, and minimise the potential for conflict, must therefore be developed.

The electoral and governance framework of the state should be reviewed and amended to address deep-seated divisions and unequal access to resources or other reasons for conflict.

The new framework must encourage a more cooperative power-sharing model of government, with genuine checks and balances on the abuse of power. Particular care should be paid to the incentives to follow these arrangements as strategies to encourage compliance and enforcement.

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[130]Sultan Barakat. *Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan. "* Third World Quarterly series (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004)

The process adopted in undertaking such reform will in turn affect both the sustainability and the legitimacy of the governance framework and institutions created. The aim must be to encourage national dialogue and public participation in seeking solutions to the underlying divisions, and shaping the mandate and policy framework for the future governance of the state. This can help to ensure that the choices made benefit the public more widely and are a part of an overall transformation of the root causes of the conflict.

Finally, it is important to avoid a climate of unregulated executive power, which will ultimately undermine the stability and legitimacy of the new state. The role of the international community after a domestic government is elected is a delicate matter. It is clear that the new government is the legitimate representative of the people and must have the freedom to make political and policy decisions. However, at the same time, the dominance of the executive during the early years of such a transition over any of the checks and balances and accountability mechanisms is a cause for concern. Without stable governance, the government institutions are usually under different faction with each faction pursuing its own interest and not the interest of the population.

In terms of state society linkages, it highlights the importance of positive relationships between a government and its citizens for stability. In failed and fragile states, these relationships are largely negative, citizens' distrust and fear the state and hold low expectations that government has the ability, or the desire, to meet their needs. Hence any attempts to restore stability in any post conflict state must be channelled towards meeting citizens' expectation, improving state capacity to meet citizens' expectations and holding the government accountable towards meeting the citizens' expectations.[131]

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[131] Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson and Richard Hill. Guide to Rebuilding Stability operations: A role for the military. *Strategic studies institute, United States Army War College.* Pennsylvania USA. 2009 pp. 3-5

2.2.3 Rule of Law and Stabilisation

Rule of law refers to the accountability of individuals, state, institutions public and private to be accountable to the law and the ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights, and ensures their safety and security. The laws must be consistent with international human rights norms and standards.[132] Besides the laws having been put in place there should be mechanism to ensure enforcement and adherence to the laws. This requires equal enforcement and equality before the law, independent adjudication of the law, fairness in the application of the law, and avoidance of arbitrariness. The enforcement and adherence to the principles of law requires access to justice systems. This becomes possible if citizens are willing to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice because they have trust upon such institutions. The rule of law requires the separation of powers and participation in decision making organs in the government. Rule of law is the ideal that states strive for; stabilisation requires urgent focus toward establishment of the rule of law.[133]

In all post conflict African countries the restoration and establishment of rule of law is important in the stability of a country in the long run. The reason for this is that after wars and conflict the authority of states are usually weaken, this breeds insecurity and weaken institutions of governance. Due to weak institutions that have been created by the conflicts it has been acknowledged that only the restoration of rule of law and strengthening of the institution can enhance governance, accountability, conflict management etc.[134]

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[132] Jan Stromsem. Africa regional Rule of Law Status Review report. *United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*. Washington, DC. 2008 pp. 6-20

[133] Beth cole. *Guiding principles for stabilisation and Reconstruction*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 2009. pp. 67-69

[134] Ibid

According to Samuel immediately after the cessation of violent conflict, opportunity exists to improve the rule of law. The provision of such opportunity does not mean an entire creation and establishment of law. In order for this to be done effectively it requires that the establishment be done in stages, with preferences given to the creation of laws to tackle major crimes such as human rights violations, and politically motivated violence. Even as the laws are been established, it must be emphasized that the laying of institutional foundations for the rule of law is of importance.[135]

In line with establishing the rule of law, the international community has been champions of transitional justice in Africa where possible with aim to end impunity for past crimes associated with the conflict, including genocide, crimes against humanity, mass atrocities, and other war crimes. Transitional Justice is defined as the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt to come to terms with the legacy of past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. In order to make perpetrators accountable for conflict related crimes, transitional justice mechanisms may be employed, such as tribunals, truth commissions, or traditional approaches. It has been argued by the UN that each transitional justice process must spring from the particular needs of the country and its religious, moral or cultural norms. The imposition of pre-packaged solutions by the international community is not advised. The following are some of the judicial or non-judicial processes that have been used in Transitional justice in Africa.[136]

Special courts or tribunals, these have been used to try war crimes, genocide, serious human rights violations, and crimes against humanity. A special court may be purely host nation,

[135] Samuels, K. Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt. *Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 37*. Social Development Department. The World Bank, Washington DC. October 2006. pp. 1-12
[136] Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley. *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict*. Santa Monica. Rand Corporation, 2005. pp. 22-24

like the Gacaca court in Rwanda. It can also be purely international, like the The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute those responsible for atrocities during times of war and genocide or a hybrid of the two like the The Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law, committed in Sierra Leone during the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). In establishing special courts and tribunals, international legal professionals such as judges, prosecutors, and lawyers often work with host nation counterparts to co administer justice. However, it is important to note that successful courts and tribunals depend on political will of regional and international actors and significant international funding.[137]

Truth and reconciliation commissions are also important in post conflict societies. Truth and reconciliation commissions are official, non-permanent, non-judicial and investigative bodies that can be used to address conflict related crimes and their impact on society. Their primary purpose is to allow a society emerging from conflict as a whole to understand what happened during the conflict as well as why it happened and to pursue communal resolution.

Customary or traditional approaches. It has been proposed that when incorporating customary or traditional approaches into a rule of law framework consultation with knowledgeable host nation actors are important. It should also focus the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating each customary method. The customary approaches be valid culturally and socially and should not be an attempt by leaders to create new mechanisms of

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[137] Ibid pp 36

control. Consideration of international human rights standards and fair play are paramount. Long standing customary mechanisms may be used as a form of transitional justice.[138]

According to Sannerholm the example of Gacaca system of justice illustrates the importance of traditional approaches in stabilisation efforts. He argues that though the international community had reservations about the system along the way some international organisations such as the UN and ICC have been able to provide both technical and financial support to the process hence illustrating the contribution of international community in restoring the rule of law in Rwanda.[139]

International community has been of help in promoting the rule of law in post conflict countries in Africa during stabilisation, with the underlying agreement that international participation in this area is essential. It is usually beyond the capacity of African countries emerging from conflicts to rebuild the rule of law on their own, and it is such an important item on the post conflict agenda to be ignored. International assistance by the UN in promoting the rule of law has had positive effects in many African countries. The case of Rwanda illustrates the point. International assistance to the justice system responded directly to these needs and included not only legal advice to the Justice Ministry, training and other substantive elements, but also assistance in rebuilding Court houses and providing the Justice Ministry with basic supplies and legal texts.[140]

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[138] United Nations Office on Drug and Crime Report. *Promoting Rule of law and Human Security in East Africa,* 2009. pp. 6-7. http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/regional-ministerial-meeting/Eastern_Africa_Regional_Programme_Final_Draft.pdf

[139] Richard Sannerholm. Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law Vol.12. No.1.)* Oxford University Press. Oxford 2007). pp. 65-94

[140] Ibid pp 21

2.2.4 Social Wellbeing and Stabilisation

Social wellbeing is the ability of the people to meet their basic human needs and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. To meet the basic needs of the society, priority must be given to the following areas, equal access to and the delivery of basic needs services, the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of social fabric and community life.[141] The conflict and violence in Africa have led to a destruction and breakdown of institutions that provide these services to the citizens. The result of these has been that after the end of a conflict it becomes necessary to provide services to the population, but also to establish institutions that can provide the same.[142] These kinds of services usually come in form of humanitarian assistance which is targeted to save lives and alleviate suffering caused by conflict. Conflict creates poverty and limits people's access to food, water, shelter, medical care and other basic services.

It is important for priority to be given to humanitarian assistance in post-conflict societies. This is because failure to do so is likely to have negative repercussions for long term stabilisation and development by dividing the country and perpetuating sufferings. The reason for such necessity is attributed to the fact that conflicts in Africa have led to displacements of populations. These displacements which occur when conflict forces people to leave their homes have created large communities of those needing humanitarian assistance. The displaced include refugees who flee to other states, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who seek refuge elsewhere within the country. As the situation stabilises, provisions must be made for the return

[141] Beth cole. *Guiding principles for stabilisation and Reconstruction.* United States Institute *of Peace Press.* Washington, D.C. 2009. pp. 85
[142] Pierre Englebert, Denis M. Tull. Post conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States. *International Security, Vol. 32 no 4.2008.* pp 106-139

or resettlement of these displaced persons according to their preferences and what conditions allow. Rapid returns of the displaced may be destabilising because returnees may overwhelm fragile social services that are still being rebuilt. Returnees can become involved in property disputes with squatters or others who have moved into their homes.[143]

If the situation does not stabilise or if return is impossible for substantial numbers of people, longer term solutions have to be found to ensure that displaced populations do not suffer more than necessary and that their displacement does not contribute to broader security problems. For instance, if large numbers of the displaced are not properly resettled and remain in camps rather dangers can arise. Large refugee populations can spread the conflict to neighbouring nations, particularly if the needs of refugees are not effectively met.[144]

International organisations have been at the forefront in providing humanitarian assistance in Africa in conflict prone countries through the establishment of camps to accommodate the refugees or IDPs in Africa. Beside they have been at the lead in providing basic services to the displaced persons such as food, water, clothing shelter and education among others. Such Efforts have been led by organization such as UNICEF, UNHCR, Red Cross, and WFP among others.[145]

2.2.5 Economic Stabilisation

Addressing of the economic concerns of the parties are very crucial process for the stabilisation and peace building efforts to the conflict, because the scarcity of basic needs such as food and clothing as well as limited access to the means of production and opportunity to use

[143] Beth cole. *Guiding principles for stabilisation and Reconstruction*, United States Institute *of Peace Press*, Washington, D.C. 2009. ,pp 86-92
[144] Ibid 965
[145] Kyrili K. and Martin M. *The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Budgets of Low-Income Countries. A research report for Oxfam*. Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International in July 2010.
http://relooncy.falcow.com/0_NS4053_869.pdf

them are some of the best known causes of violent conflict.[146] Most conflicts in Africa are typically over resources rather than identity but are usually triggered off by competitive politics associated with the electoral system and take on ethnic and cultural dimensions.

Economic stabilisation involves immediate tasks to help the economy start functioning again. Economic stabilisation involves stabilisation of the currency and country socio-economic institution with an aim of spurring economic growth. One of the most important tasks are establishing stable currency, improving Capacity for Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations. Economic stabilisation and reconstructions in post conflict African countries has been predominantly carried out by international financial institution such as World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, regional banks such as South African Development Bank. East Africa Development Bank among others.[147]

Economic stabilisations and reconstruction involves much more than the building of physical infrastructure, but also the development of structures and policies. These efforts by international financial institutions have also focused on the adoption of stabilisation and structural reform policies and the design of an appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory framework so as to create market friendly economies and reactivate broad based economic growth.[148] Economic restructuring and stabilisation activities should therefore target both the individual level and the communal level to ensure that there is sustainable development of the economy and equal opportunity for all.

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[146]Raymond Gilpin. Toward Conflict-Sensitive Macroeconomic Growth: Unraveling Challenges for Practitioners. Presented at Building Capacity in Stability Operations: Security Sector Reform, Governance and Economics. *United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Center for Naval Analysis*, Alexandria, VA. 2009.
[147] International Monetary Fund (IMF). *Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries*. Occasion paper 247. IMF publication services Washing DC. 2005 pp 5-8 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/247/op247.pdf
[148] Ibid pp 12

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The World Bank and the IMF have come a long way since they supported countries emerging from war in the same way and with the same mechanisms applied to other countries, a practice that often endangered peace and stabilisation process in Africa. The contribution of World Bank and IMF in stabilisation of post conflict countries has been felt across countries in Africa. For instances the World Bank plays an important role in supporting truth and reconciliation commission in Sierra Leone and Gacaca courts in Rwanda. The World Bank, IMF and ADB also provided soft loans to countries such as DRC, Liberia, and Angola to help in building destroyed infrastructure.[149]

2.3 Conclusions

In conclusions the chapter has provided highlights on the various stabilisation attempts that have been carried out in Africa, with emphasis on the theories that have underlined some of the operations and concepts that have informed the application of the stabilisation attempts in Africa. From literature studied it has been realised that various scholars have used different theories to try and understand the stabilisation operations that have been practiced in Africa. However, when it comes to principles most scholars are in agreement of the elements and principles that should guide the stabilisation operations.

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[149] Howard Stein. The World Bank and the IMF in Africa: Strategy and Routine in the Generation of a Failed Agenda. Research paper. *Center for Afro-American and African Studies (CAAS)*, University of Michigan. 2004. pp 21-24

CHAPTER THREE

Case Study of AMISOM

3.0 Introduction

This chapter looks into the development of AMISOM mission in Somalia, with emphasis on understanding the historical developments behind the current AMISOM mission in Somalia. This will be done though discussions as case study of the AMISOM. The chapter will also discuss about the stabilisation efforts that AMISOM have tried to restore peace and stability in the country by analysing both secondary and primary data that have been collected.

3.1 Background of AMISOM Deployment

AMISOM's origin can be traced to January 2007 when the AU's Peace and Security Council voted to assume the mandate and responsibility from IGAD for a peacekeeping mission in Africa.[150] Transferring the mandate from IGAD to the AU was a result of the need of greater African military involvement in the operation. This was done when the UN did present its authorization in for non-IGAD African states to contribute forces to IGASOM in recognition of the few IGAD members willing to deploy contingents.[151] As a result of this statement, the AU took responsibility for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia on 19 January 2007 and officially mandated the operation.[152]

After the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union in December 2006 by Ethiopian troops, the international community began a process of facilitating the deployment of troops to Somalia which could replace Ethiopian troops. This took the form of financial commitments which were

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[150] AMISOM. Amison bulletin issue 2, March 2007,Nairobi pp 5
[151] Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006)
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,SOM,,45c30c570,0.html
[152] Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa.* Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief, Washington DC. August 2007, p.8

made by EU and USA who were leading in their commitments. Besides these commitments there was push for a quick deployment of troops to the AMISOM mission.

African Union's communiqué of January 19 2007[153] states that, troops were initially supposed to be deployed by AMISOM, for a period of 6 months, starting from the date of the communique, with the following mandates. To support the Transitional Federal Government structures, implement a national security plan, and train the Somali security forces and to assist in creating a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.[154] As part of its duties, AMISOM was to support the transitional federal government's forces in their battle against the Somalia based militant Islamist group Al-Shabab.

Various countries pledged to send troops with the first country to give commitment being Malawi which on January 22, 2007 agreed to send a battalion of between 400 to 1200 troops. This was followed by Nigeria who pledged a force of between 770 to 1100 troops on January 24, 2007. Thereafter countries such as Burundi, Uganda and Ghana followed and pledged troops for the AMISOM mission. However, despite the commitments the first deployment did not begin until March 2007 when Uganda deployed the first force of 1600. This was followed by Burundi which deployed an advance force of 100 on December 23, 2007and latter added 1800 in

[153] African Union's communiqué: Peace and Security Council 69th Meeting, 19th January 2009, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX)
[154] Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 19, 2007/African Press Organization at its 300th meeting held on 19 January 2007

December 23. 2007.[155] This maximum troop's deployment was later to be expanded by a UN resolution to 17731 troops in February 2012[156].

The UN was expected to provide required logistical and financial support services. AMISOM deployments were in sectors, from sector 1 to four. Sector 1 covers Mogadishu Middle and Lower Shabelle regions with a uniformed personnel strength of 9.500 troops from Burundi and Uganda. Sector 2 covers areas of Middle and Lower Juba regions (Kismaayo). the troops in this sector consist mainly of the re-hatted Kenyan Defence Force with uniformed personnel strength of 4,700. Sector 3 covers Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Baidoa) and western part of Hiraan regions, Burundi and Uganda also cover this sector with uniformed personnel strength of 2,500. Sector 4, covers Galgudud, Mudug and part of the Hiraan regions (Beledweyne), the Djiboutian contingent covers in this sector with uniformed personnel strength of 1,000.

3.2 Structure of AMISOM

The mission is headed by the Head of Mission (HOM). The military component is under the supervision of a force commander (FC) while the police component is under a police commissioner, both of whom are led by the HOM . Major General Levi Karuganga was appointed as AMISOM's first commander for the military from March 2007 to February, 2008.The force commanders of AMISOM military section serve for one year. So far all the force commanders have came from Uganda. To date AMISOM has had five military force commanders.[157]

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[155] Solomon, D. (2009). "*The Somali Conflict: Implications for Peace Making and Peace Keeping Efforts.* open publishers .Pretoria pp 12-24
[156] UNSC Resolution 2036 (2012) http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm
[157] Terry Mays (2009) *African Union ,African Union Mission in Somalia,* A thesis

AMISOM SENIOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

HoM

DHoM

CoS

Political Affairs

Legal Affairs

PIO

HIV/AIDS

Human Rights

DDR

SSR

Civil Affairs

Gender/ Child Protection

Humanitarian Affairs

CivPol Comm

FC

CAO

22.07.2008

Source: AMISOM: http://au.int/RO/AMISOM/about/mission-profile/mission-structure

The Mission is composed of the Office of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), who is the head of the mission (HoM), the military component headed by a Force Commander (FC), the Police, headed by a Police Commissioner (CivPol Comm) and the Civilian component headed by a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).[158]

Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) role is to bring all efforts for a safe, peaceful and democratic Somalia in a peaceful and reconciled region. The head of the mission, is t o provide leadership to AMISOM and contribute to an effective coordination of the international policies and activities for Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian sectors as well as the rehabilitation of Somali National Institutions.

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[158] AMISOM : http://au.int/RO/AMISOM/about/mission-profile/mission-structure

To successfully achieve his tasks, the head of mission is implementing the following Strategy. Consistently, interact and engage all Somali, Regional and International stakeholders as well as opinion makers. Contribute to the formulation of policies related to Somalia, Keep AU policy makers abreast of key developments and to mobilize resources and report back.

The Force Commander (FC) heads the AMISOM military component which is the biggest of the three components of the AMISOM Mission (the others being Police and Civilian components). The Military Component of AMISOM is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilise the situation in the country, creating the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate takeover by the United Nations.[159]

The military component provides protection to the country's Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) as they carry out their functions and guards key infrastructure including the Adden Adde International Airport, the Sea Port and State House (Villa Somalia). It also protects AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment. The component is also popular with the Somali population due to its provision of various free services, including an inpatient and outpatient medical service as well as a reliable supply of purified water.[160]

AMISOM has a police component which is headed by the police commissioner, who reports to the head of the mission. The police component comprises of senior leadership and support services personnel, police trainers and police advisors. The police commissioner is a member of the AMISOM senior leadership team and is assisted by six other officers of the senior police command namely, the Deputy police commissioner, the police training and development

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[159] International Crisis Group (2011) Somalia: *The Transitional government on life support*, African Report No 170.London.pp 6-29

[160] Mohammed Aden. *The AMISOM response to conflict and the implementation of peace and security in Somalia*, MA Thesis, New Generation University College, Addis Ababa, 2012 , pp 35-51

coordinator, the police reform restructuring and development coordinator. the operations coordinator and the police chief of staff and special assistance to the police commissioner. AMISOM has 200 Police Officers from Burundi, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya. Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda.[161] The AMISOM Police has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advice the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict international standards.

Chief Administrator Officer (CAO) heads AMISOM Political Affairs Unit. AMISOM political Affairs unit aids Somalia's Transitional Federal Government in the search for an inclusive political process, the re-establishment of functioning state institutions. and the implementation of a clear national vision and roadmap for the transition in accordance with the terms of the Djibouti Agreement.

In support of efforts to stabilise the situation in the country, the unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. The unit is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service.

3.3 AMISOM Funding

AMISOM is financed by a broad set of donors. Financially and in kind contributions are made directly to the African Union or to the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) of the operation on a bilateral basis. The UN established a trust fund to provide financial support to AMISOM and provide a UN logistical support package to AMISOM.[162] Both the trust fund and

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[161] International Crisis Group (2011) Somalia: *The Transitional government on life support*, African Report No 170.London.pp 6-29
[162] Augustine P. Mahiga: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG) Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, August 2012, New York

the support package are managed from Nairobi (Kenya) by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).[163]

In addition, a Joint Security Committee (JSC), set up under the Djibouti Agreement in June 2008, is tasked to harmonise work by the government and the international community to support Somalia's national security institutions, such as the army and police. The JSC consists of representatives from AMISOM, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), and other members of the international community, including the EU, Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the League of Arab States.

The Funding for AMISOM has majorly focused on three main areas of Pre-Deployment funding which includes all the funding that makes it necessary for countries to deploy troops, In theatre Funding which is concerned with funding for feeding, water, fuel, maintenance of equipment and accommodation stores and finally personnel reimbursement which covers personnel allowances for the troops and personnel in AMISOM mission[164]. The UN has provided a logistics support package to AMISOM via the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which is financed by assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget and from discretionary contributions to the UNSOA managed Trust Fund for AMISOM. The largest cash contributors to AMISOM are the US, EU institutions and the UK. The EU institutions provide support directly to the AU, mostly for the payment of personnel allowances.[165]

The US supports troop contributing countries directly as well as providing bilateral support directly to the AU and via their assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. The UK contributes to the AMISOM trust fund, provides some support directly to Uganda and

[163] UNSC resolution 1863 2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/211/65/PDF/N0921165.pdf?OpenElement
[164] UN Security Council resolution 1863 in 2009
[165] Victoria Meltcafe(2011) *UN integration and Humanitarian space in Somalia*, Stimson publishers, London pp 12-19

Burundi and to the AU Commission. This is in addition to financing routed via their assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget and to the EU. The contributions of the US and UK are therefore far greater when their contributions via the UN (and EU for the UK) are taken into consideration.[166] Other government donors contribute either indirectly through their assessed contributions to the UN and EU or in some cases with additional discretionary bilateral contributions to the Trust Fund for AMISOM. Contributions to the trust fund for AMISOM have been relatively modest in comparison with other funding sources.

The UK, moreover, had provided 48.2% of the total funds contributed to the trust fund up to the end of 2011. The EU support to AMISOM is funded under the African Peace Facility (APF), which provides substantial predictable funding for Africa led Peace Support operations and supports the African Peace and Security Architecture as well as the EU Africa dialogue on peace and security. Total APF funding for the period 2004 – 2013 amounts to over €1 billion. The APF is the major instrument of the Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa EU Strategy.[167]

Besides the international community has been engaged in mobilising support for AMISOM mission in Somalia. These supports have been facilitated by International Contact Group (ICG) to support peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The ICG is an informal grouping of ambassadors from western nation that promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and organises conferences on Somalia.[168] The ICG have no set time schedules for their meeting but they meet regularly ever since it was started in 2006. Despite the regular meetings and producing

[166] Menkhaus, K. (2010) 'Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: The Somali Case'. Disasters. Vol. 34 Special Issue, South Africa pp 3-9
[167] European Union (2012),E newsletter issue 58 ,march 2012 ,Brussels ,pp 4-6
[168] Eva Frisell(2012).The EU comprehensive approach towards Somalia, Executive summary pp 2-8

communiques and reports about Somalia peace process, ICG has been accused of being ineffective talk shows and not contributing meaningfully to the Somalia stabilisation process.[169]

3.4 AMISOM in the Somalia Stabilisation

AMISOM mission in Somalia was authorised by the UN with expectation that the Mission was to be transformed into a United Nation peace keeping mission. Reasons for this expectation were that hopes were not high of success in Somalia because of Africa's lack of enough trained and equipped troops for an effective force. Putting together the force in Somalia was also proving a problem, despite financial backing from the US and EU.[170]

This therefore called for reappraisal to ensure expeditious transformation of AMISOM to a full UN run PKO with active participation by forces of developed nations. Furthermore, the re-appraisal was to ensure the provision of a UN mandate for the international force to be deployed in Somalia, revision of the existing arms embargo to accommodate this force and the establishment of a timeline or set of benchmarks for its transition to the UN PKO. However, as this has not been the case due to two reasons. The hesitation of UN to allow its peacekeeping in Somalia to engage in Combat operations, this has never been popular among western nations and secondly the fact that AMISOM has made progress in achieving its mandates, with a number of African countries contributing troops who are making its mission a success.[171]

As it was discussed during the London conference, the focus of the international community should now not be on how to transform AMISOM mission to UN PKO's but on how to sustain the success of AMISOM and to strengthen it to finish its mandates. This is because it is turning out a success in achieving its mission. This serves to testify that the success of

[169] Lunn John and Gavin Thompson (2012) *Somalia: recent political, security and humanitarian developments* pp 11-15
[170] Ndulo M (2011) *United Nations peacekeeping operations, security and transformation*, occasional paper, Lusaka pp 4-10
[171] Naho Y(2012) *.peacekeeping operations*, university of peace .Geneva pp 13-16

AMISOM mission and the recent developments where Kenya defence forces joined in defeating Al-Shabab has embodied the international community decision not to transform AMISOM into a UN PKO.[172]

AMISOM is mandated to support the dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts for stabilising the country, to provide protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions, to facilitate humanitarian assistance including the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs and to assist in the implementation of the national security and stabilisation plan of Somalia.[173]

To be able to fulfil these objectives AMISOM was given the following tasks Support dialogue and reconciliation, working with all stakeholders, Provide, as appropriate, protection to TFIs and their key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions, assist in implementing NSSP, particularly the reestablishment and training of Somali security forces, Provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts, Monitor, in areas of deployment, the security situation, Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian, operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs; and Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right to self-defence[174].

The mission has three components namely, military, police and civilian components. The Military Component which is the biggest of the three components of the AMISOM Mission is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilise the situation in

[172] Lunn John and Gavin Thompson (2012) *Somalia: recent political, security and humanitarian developments* pp 12
[173] AU Peace and Security Council, '*Communiqué*'. PSC/PR/Comm. *(LXIX)*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 19 January 2007
[174] Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007

the country. The component provides protection to the country's Transitional Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and guards key government infrastructure including the Adden Adde International Airport, the Sea Port and State House (Villa Somalia). It also protects AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment.

AMISOM has since its deployment in March 2007 effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu.

In terms of coordination and cooperation with humanitarian agencies, AMISOM Humanitarian Affairs Unit works closely with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (UNOCHA), UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, WFP and other UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. AMISOM also collaborates with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health and other relevant authorities.[175]

AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the deployed troops. Given the depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM Medical facilities with three hospitals in Mogadishu have now become the medical centres where the civilian populations around Mogadishu depend upon.

The three hospital departments treat over twelve thousand (12000) patients per month on average[176]. Their treatments vary from chronic medical diseases to surgical cases both acute and

[175] Moller, B. *The Somali Conflict. The Role of External Actors*, Danish Institute For International Studies,Copenhagen 2009 pp 3-7
[176] Victoria Meltcafe. *UN integration and Humanitarian space in Somalia*, Stimson publishers, London, 2011, pp 12-19

chronic. Over 90 percent of these patients are from the local population including TFG troops and officials most of them requiring emergency surgical interventions.

AMISOM Political Affairs Unit aids Somalia's Transitional Federal Government in the search for an inclusive political process, the re-establishment of functioning state institutions, and the implementation of a clear national vision and roadmap for the transition in accordance with the terms of the Djibouti Agreement. In support of efforts to stabilise the situation in the country, the unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. The unit is also responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service.[177]

AMISOM Police has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advice the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict international standards. The police unit works with their Somali counterparts to develop training manuals in readiness for the commencement of refresher training for serving members of the SPF. The AMISOM Police Component works hand in hand with several partners. These include, but are not limited to, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), The Strategic Planning Management Unit (SPMU), the European Union (EU), the Somali Police Force and the African Union member states.

AMISOM mission in Somalia has been of help in providing support to the TFG, as a result of AMISOM support the TFG government has been able to carry out its operation under

[177] Assefaw B .United Nations peace missions in Africa. Transformation and determinants.*Journal of Black studies* *Vol.38 No 6.* (Saga publishers, London, 2008). pp. 830-849

relative peace, most of these support have been in the form of security provided to the government and providing training and support to the Somalia military and civilian police.

Stabilisation involves the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance for the vulnerable populations, policing, human rights, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction[178]. Country's recovery from violent conflict depends first and foremost on the establishment of security and neutralising hostile groups that can be achieved through military stabilisation.[179]

In light of AMISOM mission mandate, AMISOM has relatively succeeded in the stabilising the country. AMISOM facilitates humanitarian operation in Mogadishu and its environs. This has been made possible by the securing of the sea port and airport by the AMISOM troops in Mogadishu[180]. This has allowed the international organisations to bring relief food and other basic commodities hence helping in alleviating the suffering of the people. Al-Shabaab is no longer the only threat to stability, the resurgence of inter clan competition is a serious issue particular in the newly liberated areas in the Lower Jubba region.

AMISOM contribution in the stabilisation of the country continues, bringing large part of the south central Somalia under the government control. With the support of AMSIOM Somalia now have a new Constitution, a new Parliament and new government. The security situation in Somalia has greatly improved, because of the continuing efforts of AMISOM. With the support of AMSIOM Somalia now have a new Constitution, a new Parliament and government. The immediate challenges which the Government and the international community including

[178] Stephen J. and Donald Rothchild. Peace Operations: From Short Term to Long Term Commitment. *International Peacekeeping Vol. 3, No. 2*(Pretoria: Preston publishers, 1996),pp. 17-35.
[179] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25
[180] Ken Menkhaus, *A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine: Enough Policy Briefing*, September, 2011, pp 1-2

AMSIOM is to establish local and district administrations, justice and rule of law, as well as to provide basic services to the population, particularly areas which have been liberated.[181]

3.5 Background Information of the Field Data Respondents

For accuracy of information and in order that as broad and cross section of population would be covered as possible. Respondents from different background, work experiences were taken into account. The researcher tried to cover different group of people who may have the knowledge of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in the country. Following table shows the groups of the people and organisations they work with that the researcher interviewed for the study.

Table. 1

ORGANISATION	No of Respondents	% of respondents
AMISOM	3	14%
IGAD	3	14%
Media Group	2	9%
NGO	5	23%
Researchers	5	23%
UN	4	18%
TOTAL	22	100%

From above table1 the researcher interviewed 22 respondents from various organisations working in Somalia which are all part of the international community. NGO workers and the researches were 46% of the respondents combined, with 5 respondents from each organisations, followed by the UN workers which were 18% or 4 respondents, 6 respondents or 28% of the total respondents were from AMISOM and IGAD 3 respondents from each organisation. Lastly the media groups interviewed were 2 people making them 9% of the total respondents.

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[181]Gabriel Gatehouse: *Can Somalia's cheap peacekeeping defeat al-Shabab?*. BBC interview with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga. Mogadishu, June 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18392212

As was explained in table 1 here in figure 1, respondents' groups are presented in a pie chart. The researcher interviewed 22 respondents from various organisations working in Somalia which are all part of the international community. NGO workers and the researches were 46% of the respondents combined, with 5 respondents from each organisations, followed by the UN workers which were 18% or 4 respondents, 6 respondents or 28% of the total respondents were from AMISOM and IGAD 3 respondents from each organisation. Lastly the media groups interviewed were 2 people making them 9% of the total respondents.

3.5.1 Gender and Age Group of the Respondents

Table: 2

Age group and Gender of the respondents					
Sex	Age Group				
	20 - 30	31 - 40	41 - 50	Over 50	Total
Male	3	5	10	0	1
Female	2	2	0	0	
TOTAL	5	7	10	0	2

Figure 2

Over 50 yrs
0%

20-30 yrs
23%

41-50 yrs
45%

31-40 yrs
32%

- □ 20-30 yrs
- ▣ 31-40 yrs
- □ 41-50 yrs
- ▣ Over 50 yrs

As per the above table 2 and figure 2, age group of the respondents were as follows. 23% or 5 of the respondents were aged between 20 to 30 years old, while 32% or 7 of the respondents were between 31 to 40 years and 45% or 10 of the respondents were between the ages of 41 to 50 years. There was no respondent above the age of 50 in the study.

Figure. 3

Gender of Respondent

Female
18%

Male
82%

- ▣ Male
- ▣ Female

As evident from the above figure 2, 18% of the respondents or 4 of the respondents were female while the remaining 18 or 82% of the respondents were male.

3.6 AMISOM's Challenges

The AU has been characterized by big ambitions and deficient resources since its formation, the same observation can be applied to its peace support operations (PSOs). The AU has limited capacity to both plan and manage operations and its PSOs have been characterized not only by slow deployment but also by unclear mandates. Many of the challenges of the AMISOM have also been experienced by other AU peace keeping missions.[182] Although AMISOM mission in Somalia is expected to achieve its objectives, however, in attempting to fulfil its mandates the mission has faced some challenges and these can be summed up into two major challenges of Operational challenges and Political challenges.

3.6.1 Operational Challenges

AMISOM operation are supported by staff carrying out various roles, however the number of staff employed by the AU in AMISOM secretariat is comparatively small in relation to the organization's ambitions. The staff personnel who often carry multiple responsibilities and also the number of the inexperienced in the peace support operations are relatively high. Though it must be acknowledged that European Union and United Nations support operations in Somalia have played a key role improving the capacity of staff and personnel involved in AMISOM mission a lot more is still desired.[183]

The second major operational challenge which has hampered AMISOM mission has to do with funds availability, with AMISOM depending more on external funding. This dependency has hampered AMISOM mission since the deployment and operation of the mission is pegged on funds availability. The deployment of troops in Somalia has been heavily reliant on support from

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[182] Tim Murithi(2009).*The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia.* Africa Security review Vol 17 No 1, Addis Ababa pp 5-9

[183] Tariku Abreha Kahssay(2009).*ISS research paper on Somalia* ,Institute of social studies ,The Hague pp 38-45.

United States of America and other international community. However, this has resulted in failure of troops to be deployed according to timeline that was set forth with most countries waiting to deploy after receiving financial and technical support from the international community.

The limited support which has been aimed at strengthening direct operations has also left institutional capacity under developed. This can be attested by the study findings which showed that 86% (19) of the respondents mentioned funding as a chief obstacle to AMISOM fulfilling its mandates. This is in line with study carried out by Svensson in African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) challenges that established financial and logistical constraints as challenges that prevent AMIB from fully implementing its mandate' [184] In relation to funding AMISOM has also faced a challenge of management of such funds. This has been occasioned as a result of lack of institutional capacity to manage the received funds from donors.[185]

The third major operational challenge that AMISOM mission has faced has to do with lack of basic equipment for intelligence operations and communications though their vehicles often have VHF and HF radios. Remote bases lack aperture terminals (VSAT); essentially cutting those from headquarters and making coordinate commands and control nearly impossible.[186] Even sufficient military guidance maps of the region are lacking from AMISOM's package of mission essential resources. The maps they do have are generally from the United Nations Humanitarian information centre and are geared towards the need of humanitarian agencies instead of military force. This concurs with the findings of a thesis entitled challenges facing African military in peacekeeping mission where Mazimba argues that poor

[184] Svensson, Emma (2008) *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation.* Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency.
[185] Baker p (2010) *AU standby force and challenge in Somalia*, Africa security review Vol 16 number 2,Addis Ababa .pp 2-4
[186] Ibid

communication equipment and limited intelligence are a great hindrance to peacekeeping mission in Africa.[187]

Related to the above challenge is that AMISOM has been affected due to cultural and language barriers. This has been occasioned by lack of Arabic speakers, as well as Somali language to communicate with the Somalia public. This has affected AMISOM intelligence system hence affecting its operations. AMISOM limited monitoring and intelligence capabilities are not shared by their adversaries. Somalia rebels groups forces have an intelligence capability built on information's the belligerent are more aware of the location of AMISOM troops than AMISOM troops are aware of the belligerent location. The same challenge of culture has been noted by Adoyi who says that cultural barrier has faced peacekeeping mission in Africa, with particular emphasis on Darfur the centre of his study. However, from the study findings only 18% (4) of the respondents viewed this as a challenge in AMISOM mission.

The fifth factor that has affected AMISOM operations has to do with weak mandates. The mandate of AMISOM has been limited, with particular limitation placed on the use of force. This it is believed has affected AMISOM operations given the nature of conflict that transpires in Somalia, it has also affected AMISOM responsibility towards the protection of civilians. This can be attested by response from one of the AMISOM officials interviewed in the study who mentioned that part of the challenge of AMISOM mission is weak mandate. This is in agreement with what Appiah[188] findings in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) challenges. AMIS mission also encountered weak mandates as a challenge in its mission. The same could be confirmed from the study for according to one respondent weak mandate has been a challenge that has affected AMISOM in meeting its mandates.

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[187] James Mazimba(2012), Challenges facing African military in peacekeeping missions, A Thesis
[188] Seth Appiah-Mensah: The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur dilemmas. *African Security Review*, Number 15 Vol 1. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 2006 pp 12-14

The other factor that has affected AMISOM operation has to do with the model of troops generation which is based on a model called troops generation countries. This is because the countries generating the troops have to receive support for training, financing and logistics to help facilitate the deployment of their troops to AMISOM mission in Somalia. Though the study found out that the model of troops generation was a problem in AMISOM mission with 13.6 %(3) of the respondents saying this is a problem in AMISOM. However, this is contrary to what other Studies by Adoyi, Mazimba have found out to be peacekeeping challenges in Sudan and Burundi respectively.[189]

The other factor that has hampered the operation of AMISOM has to do with lack of adequate troops and weak TFG forces who are partnering AMISOM in its mission. The crisis in Somalia is largely a result of continuing insecurity and governance vacuum. This vacuum has been created as a result of AMISOM troops not being able to cover a wider geographical area in their peacekeeping operation and also the existence of weak TFG forces not only to maintain control over captured areas but also to champion AMISOM cause.[190]

Until the balance of power shifts fully in favour of the TFG, which requires strong leadership and the support of the Somali people, there is very little the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) can do with its limited resources, inadequate force size and limited mandate, to help restore full stability in Somalia. The TFG forces have also faced rivalry among its forces due to clan rivalry in its operation and command in of the TFG military efforts. This lack of cohesion has resulted in weakening the military strength of the TFG forces in its support to AMISOM mission in Somalia.[191]

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[189] *Ibid*
[190] Africa Union(2012) *AU newsletter February issue 2012*,Adddis Ababa .pp 7-9
[191] Ibid

This challenge can be summed up in the words of one respondents who mentioned that few troops has not only hampered AMISOM mission, this he argues has not been made any better by weak and poorly trained TFG forces who are working together with AMISOM forces. Generally the study findings indicated that 68% (15) of the respondents believed that this is a challenge to AMISOM mission. These findings are supported by Williams[192] where he states that lack of enough troops and slow pace of troops deployment have been a major barriers to peacekeeping mission.

3.6.2 Political Challenges

AMISOM mission in Somalia started against the background of Ethiopia intervention in Somalia. Because of this the Ethiopia intervention in Somalia has led to two major problems for AMISOM mission in Somalia. First it affected the public trust and co-operation with AMISOM forces. This is because many in Somalia were still sceptical of the AMISOM mission after the Ethiopian incursion which was supported by the USA. It was a challenge to AMISOM to change this perception among the people and win their trust, this took a while to happen and it affected AMISOM operations.[193]

Secondly the AMISOM peace keeping operation has faced the problem of fear of Ethiopia political interest in Somalia. Ethiopia has played a vital role in AMISOM success mission. However; the fear of their interest in Somalia has always given a dark shadow to AMISOM mission.

The other factor that has affected AMISOM is lack of political will from the regional and sub-regional organization in Africa. This is because countries were expected to contribute troops voluntarily but this has not been forthcoming as was expected hence affecting To find, deploy

[192] Paul Williams(2010)Peace Operations in Africa: seven challenges, any solutions, conflict trends pp 3-8
[193] Cornwell, R. (2009). "Hope for Settlement in Somalia Fade." Analytical paper, Johannesburg pp 12-15

and manage troops in AMISOM mission has been difficult ever since African Union authorized the deployment in Somalia. This can be attested by the AU struggle to secure promises of just over 60 percent of the authorized troops during the initial stages. In practice, approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops were the sum total of AMISOM until December 2007 when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived. By April 2009 AMISOM had around 4,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi. Nor could the AU pay for its own peacekeeping mission. Instead, it relied on funds from the U.S., UN, the European Union and several other states.[194]

Political will as a challenge has been attested by Feldman[195] as a challenge to peacekeeping mission, where he argues that all this is because of the various political interests that exist among the various nations, He further argues that most of the political interests trace their roots to colonialism. From the study findings political will is a major challenge as attested by a respondent who said that political will have had an impact on AMISOM timeline since troops have not been forthcoming as planned.[196]

Exist strategy is another challenge to the AMISOM peacekeeping. Exit strategies always entail elements of prediction. The wisdom of any given exit related choice may only be demonstrable several years after the choice, as the exited country either remains stable or returns into disorder again. This has been a challenge considering that AMISOM mandate is short term and hence there has been need for a good exit strategy. The Government and Somali forces need to become less dependent on AMISOM. Responsibilities need to be handed over to national forces and administrations especially in regions where al Shabaab has been driven out. However, the challenge has been on when and how best to exit Somalia.

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[194] Ibid
[195] Major Robert L. Feldman : Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces. *Defence & Security Analysis* Vol. 24, No. 3, Fort Leavenworth, USA, 2008 pp. 267-279
[196] Interview held by a respondent on 18/09/2012

Any transition or exit plan thus embodies projections about what is likely to happen after exit. Milestones met relate to past and present action and do not necessarily indicate future performance, especially independent host state performance. A positive trend may have been due to the presence of an operation or the interaction of that presence with local parties. Trends and projections from other operations may or may not be valid locally owing to just such strong interactions between international engagement and the specifics of the engagement environment.

Various arguments have been given considering AMISOM exit but AMISOM is yet to have a definite strategy in place for exit. The furthest it got was the UNSC Resolution.[197] which expressed the Security Council's intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation as a follow on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council.

From the findings of the study as mentioned by number of interviewees, it was realized that exit strategy is a challenge as AMISOM nears the complete defeat of Al-shabab. The findings of the study indicated that 18% (4) of the respondents believed that exit strategy and handing over security to the Somali government is a challenge to AMISOM. This is in harmony with the study done by William Durch[198] about the UNOSOM peacekeeping in Somalia, which he found that one of the biggest challenges that faced UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993-1994 was the exit strategy. He further argues that Exit strategy has been a challenge to many peacekeeping missions around the world from Kosovo to the current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan where it is still a major issue to the US and NATO forces.

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[197] UN Security Council Resolution 1863 (January 2009)
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,SOM,,497839f92,0.html
[198] William J. Durch. Supporting peace, the end. Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation," in *Exit Strategies and State Building*, (Ed). Richard Caplan (Oxford University Press, 2011).

3.7 AMISOM's Achievements

Despite AMISOM mission in Somalia having faced a number of challenges, there is grudging appreciation for AMISOM's success at fending off repeated insurgent attempts to overthrow the TFG, a prospect many in the international community deem a red line issue that must be avoided at all costs. This has been of help since it has help in sustaining the peace process in Somalia by enhancing continuity of the TFG government which is turning out to a central pillar to restoration of stability in Somalia.[199] This is attested by the findings of the study for all the respondents agreed that AMISOM mission in Somalia has improved the security situation in Somalia, the same is backed by Cuevas[200] who affirms that AMISOM mission in Somalia has generally improved the security situation in Somalia hence the study findings affirm the important role that international community has played in stabilisation of Somalia.

With regard to AMISOM mandate on Facilitating humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) AMISOM has helped by setting up provisions and services like hospital for attending to injured and sick civilians and also injured AMISOM fighters.[201]

AMISOM has been able to facilitate the provision of humanitarian services to Somalia people, particularly in the recent liberated areas of the Afgoye corridor which holds one of the biggest concentrations of internally displaced people in the world. AMISOM is helping the locals by building security so that they can share in the economic revival of the capital. Hence the

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[199] International Crisis Group (2011)Somalia: *The Transitional government on life support*, African Report No 170.London.pp 17-21

[200] Cuevas Elroy (2012) Is Somalia Safe Now, Naval publishers, Newport. pp 2-3

[201] Ibid

locals will now be able to access humanitarian services and eventually return to their original homes in Mogadishu.[202]

In relation to the objective on Assisting in the implementation of the National Security Stabilisation Programme (NSSP). AMISOM implemented security by crushing and pushing the Al-shabab insurgents away from certain territories and ensuring to keep a strong hold on captured areas, hence provision of peace and tranquillity for some Somali people to have space for recovery and development. AMISOM has been key for improvements of the security situation in Somalia. Apart from its military achievements, the mission has contributed to the establishment of Somali security forces and the TFG finally looks it will manage to establish a functioning command and control structure because of AMISOM.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces has made significant progress in the previous period towards various towns such as Afgooye town among others. Afgooye has been for a long time a stronghold of the Al-Qaeda backed Al-Shabaab insurgents and is a strategic junction for routes to the north, west and south of Somalia. Operation Free Shabelle started recently with the objective of bringing security to the 400,000 people of the Afgooye corridor, and area North West of Mogadishu with the largest concentration of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the world.[203]

AMISOM was able to defeat and drive the Alshabab out of Mogadishu and the surrounding cities. Alshabab militants in Afgooye have been defeated and the area now liberated. AMISOM has also done a great job by driving Al-Shabab out of Afgooye, Kismaayo and Baidoa among other towns. AMISOM has also liberated other towns such as Afmadow. International

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[202] frican U union Peace and Security Council report. *Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, October 2012. Pp 2-7*
[203] African Union(2012),*AMISOM press release 15th May, 2012*, Mogadishu Somalia Nairobi pp 2 http://amisom-au.org/2012/05/amisom-press-release/

Aid offering organizations like UN programs have been finding it difficult to reach people who needed aid but now the situation has been calmed down with thanks to AMISOM and Somali National forces for defeating Alshabab in the areas previously under the control of Al-shabaab.[204]

Ethiopian forces and Somali troops AMISOM has been able to defeat and drive Al-Shabaab out of Baidoa. This has allowed AMISOM to start using the southern route as access points to Somalia for transportation of their equipment and resources and also the north through Djibouti and Ethiopia in the western border area. In regard to the mandate on monitoring the security situation on areas of operation, AMISOM has had relative successes in their monitoring. AMISOM has been carrying out joint patrols with the TFG forces or local forces in liberated areas.

In view of the mandate of AMISOM on Providing protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) & key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions, AMISOM has been at the forefront in providing security to TFG senior government official including the president and the prime minister. Besides AMISOM has not only secured key government facilities such as government buildings and airport but it has maintained security in these facilities.[205] Central to AMISOM's mandate is the provision of protection and support to the Transitional Federal Institutions, comprising the President, his Ministers and the Parliament, and key installations and locations in Mogadishu. Accordingly, AMISOM is stationed in a number of strategic locations divided into two sectors in the capital city of Mogadishu, where Ugandan troops cover the harbour, airport, Villa Somalia (the presidential palace) and Kilometre 4 (K4).

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[204] AMISOM . AMISOM News Bulletin ,December Issue 2011
[205] J. Peter Pham. The Somaliland Exception. Lessons on Post conflict State Building from the Part of the Former Somalia that Works. *Marine Corps University Journal Vol. 3 . No. 1. Spring 2012*

Burundi sector covers other locations such as the Mogadishu University and the Military Academy.[206] This is in agreement with findings of the study where 18.18%(4) of the respondents believed that AMISOM mission in protecting TFG and infrastructure was fair while the rest 81.82%(18) believed that their efforts in protecting TFG government was good.

In regard to mandate of AMISOM on providing technical assistance to TFG, AMISOM has considered capacity building as one of the key components to their goal considering that two decades of fighting has destroyed most if not all of the public institutions. AMISOM through its Political Affairs Unit has been conducting various capacity building workshops, as attested by a Needs Assessment Workshop held in Kampala, Uganda which identified priority areas for the Somalia TFG.[207] The workshop was attended by twenty five officers from various ministries of the TFG who were led by the then Minister of Labour, representatives from the AMISOM TCC's, and AMISOM. The Needs Assessment Workshop was followed by training of TFG officers held in Uganda by the Uganda Management Institute (UMI) and the University of South Africa (UNISA) School of Business Studies. The officers were later attached to a two week attachment programme in countries that have emerged from conflicts such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Uganda.

Through its military and police components, AMISOM is also helping to build capacity for Somalia Armed Forces and the Somali Police Forces through training, mentorship and coordinating the payment of stipends. AMISOM has been training Somali soldiers at the Al-Jazeera Camp in Mogadishu. AMISOM has successfully conducted training of different categories of the Somali Police Officers in Kenya and Somalia. The AMISOM Police has also successfully helped the Somali Police Force (SPF) to build its data base and has also helped in

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[206] Ibid
[207] AMISOM(2011) ,AMISOM News bulletin ,December issue ,2011

vetting of new recruits. Currently mentorship for both the military and the police is still on-going.

It is worth stating here that, bilateral training and support to the SPF has also supplemented by AMISOM's efforts in the capacity building effort of the SPF. AMISOM police has conducted an assessment of all such bilateral trainings provided to the SPF in order to ensure standardization in the trainings. This exercise resulted in AMISOM police conducting refresher training for over 2,000 SPF officers. In collaboration with the Italian Carabinieri (Police), plans are underway to provide training for a specialized police support unit whose major responsibility will be public order management and crowd control.

Though the success of AMISOM on improving the capacity of the study can be supported by study finding which showed that 45.5 % (10) of the respondents rated the work of AMISOM in building capacities of TFG government as good while 40.9%(9) and 13.6%(3) rated their work as fair and poor respectively. Nevertheless from study findings it can be seen that majority believed that much has not been done to improve the capacity of TFG.

Finally on AMISOM mandate on promoting national reconciliation and dialogue, through its office of political affairs has helped in facilitating constant dialogue with all stakeholders at all levels of Somali society. This has been done through facilitating political outreach both in Mogadishu and in Nairobi where there is a large Somali community. AMISOM has not been carrying this alone but it has done this in conjunction with IGAD, UNPOS and other regional organizations.[208] From the interviews carried 36.4% (8) of the respondents believed that the contribution of AMISOM in encouraging reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia was good while 31.8%(7) and 31.8%(7) believed that AMISOM contribution to reconciliation and dialogue was fair and poor respectively. Despite the mixed answers from the respondents about the

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[208] Mary Harper. *Getting Somalia Wrong?: Faith and War in a Shattered State* London: Zed Books. 2012 ,pp 25-36

AMISOM's facilitation in dialogue and reconciliation, AMISOM continues to play a critical role in the stabilisation of Somalia and facilitating improved dialogue between Somalis and assisting them to find political common ground. However, this study acknowledges that though AMISOM has contributed to reconciliation and dialogue there is still need for further improvement on the role of AMISOM on reconciliation and dialogue in Somali.

3.8 Conclusions

In conclusion AMISOM mission in Somalia is currently considered a success story in light of recent developments against Al-Shabaab where Al-Shabab have been defeated and driven out of their stronghold and the strategic port city of Kismaayo. AMISOM operation is also seen as a good example of successful cooperation between a regional organization and the United Nations. In the view of the study and data collected, the research confirms the hypothesis that "AMISOM mission in Somalia will lead to stabilisation of the country".

Despite the fact that recent developments have spurred optimism concerning AMISOM mission in Somalia questions have been raised on how AMISOM has been able to deal with the security and protection of the general Somalia population. AMISOM's ability in the intuitional capacity building of the Somalia government and the exit strategies given that the mission has almost succeeded in defeating Al-Shabab and driving them out of captured towns. In order to understand this question next chapter will offer a discussion and analysis on these issues further.

The conclusion from the field data shows that AMISOM has contributed to the stability of the country and also will succeed to stabilise the country, but requires internal support from the Somalia government and the general public as well as external support from international community for resources and funding for the mission to be successful. In this regard all the

respondents want the mission to be extended so that AMISOM completes to stabilise the country.

Despite the achievements, AMSIOM faces a number of challenges. Limited resources in terms funding and manpower. Cultural challenges, language barriers, ineffective Somalia government, conflict within Somali government lack of political leadership and working relations within Somalia leaders as well as long term exist strategy for the mission.

AMISOM to be successful in the stabilisations of the country, respondents suggest that. Internally AMISOM should earn and increase the confidence from the Somali people, conduct peacekeeping in a professional manner and respect of the local culture and religion, stay away from clan politics within Somali clans. To build military, police and other Somalia national institutions and provide the necessary capacity building to allow Somalia to take over the process successfully after it ends. Externally AMSIOM needs more regional collaboration and support, less international meddling and influence seeking in Somalia. AMISOM also needs resources and financing form international community to complete the peacekeeping mission successfully

CHAPTER FOUR

Critical Analysis of AMISOM Stabilisation

4.0 Introduction

The Chapter provides in depth analysis of the current AMISOM Peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This will be done by giving understanding of the AMSIOM stabilisation activities in the country followed by a critical discussion two important issue for the AMSIOM stabilisation, namely role of AMSIOM in civilian protection and the long term exit strategy from mission.

4.1 Understanding of the AMSION Stabilisations

Stabilisation involves coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of tasks ranging from security, governance, rule of law, political and economic development. In the post conflict societies, the restoration and establishment of legitimate and effective institutions which deals with the security and public safety are important in the stability of a country.[209]

The aim of stabilisation is to prevent a relapse of armed conflict. For this to be achieved it becomes important to establish security in the country. This will entail various security priorities such as promoting a political settlement, neutralising hostile groups, providing basic humanitarian assistance and protection for the vulnerable populations through military peacekeeping missions by.[210]

It has been observed both in the literature review and the conceptual analysis in chapter two, although various stabilisation interventions exist, the international community prefers

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[209] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25

[210] Assefaw B .United Nations peace missions in Africa. Transformation and determinants.*Journal of Black studies* Vol.38 No 6. (Saga publishers, London, 2008). pp. 830-849

military stabilisation foremost.[211] Military might is an important tool for reducing bloodshed around the world, because the use of military force in situations of active conflicts will make a difference and peacekeeping initiatives remain a reliable and effective way to provide stability to fragile nations and reduce the suffering of the world's most vulnerable people[212]. However in the stabilisation process it's important that any military advances must go hand in hand with a viable political process.

4.1.1 Objectives Revisited

The overall objective of this research study was to assess the role of African Union in the stabilisation of African Conflicts. While the specific objectives were;

- To assess the contribution of AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia

- To find out the challenges facing AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia

In regard to the assessment of the role of the African Union in the stabilisation of African conflicts. The findings from the literature review, conceptual analysis and field data is that, the African Union significantly departed from the OAU's reluctance to intervene in states' affairs. This can be seen the African peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Burundi and Somalia. AU also ' believes that the protection of civilians should not be sacrificed at the expense of sovereignty. The African union Peace and Security Council (PSC) has the power to undertake interventions and peace keeping missions in the continent in case of grave human rights violations.[213]

To respond African Crisis in African AU established African Standby Force which was intended to be continental African peacekeeping force, with Military Police and Civilian

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[211] Stephen J. and Donald Rothchild. Peace Operations: From Short Term to Long Term Commitment. *International Peacekeeping Vol. 3, No. 2*(Pretoria; Preston publishers, 1996),pp. 17-35.
[212] Paul Collier and Bjørn Lomborg. *Does Military Intervention work?* Project syndicate, Prague, Czech Republic, April 2008
[213] Constitutive Act of African Union. Lome, Togo. 11 July 2000. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm

components, under the direction of the African Union and to be deployed in times of crisis in Africa. The ASF was to be based on standby arrangements with the continent's five sub regions, each providing a brigade sized contribution[214].

Study also finds that African Union is not yet ready politically, institutionally, and conceptually to take African peacekeeping requirements on its own. AU experiences in African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) confirmed the requirement for the institutionalisation of legitimate and collaborative global peacekeeping partnerships, political and financial support from the western countries.[215]

AMISOM was mandated to support the dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts for stabilising the country, to provide protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions, to facilitate humanitarian assistance including the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs and to assist in the implementation of the national security and stabilisation plan of Somalia.[216]

In view to the AMISOM's contribution to the stabilisation of Somalia, the study finds that AMISOM mission has three components, military, Police and Civilian components. Through its military and police components, AMISOM is helping capacity building of Somalia forces and

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[214] Theo N. Realising the African Standby Force as a Pan African ideal: progress, prospects and Challenges. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1*(Centre for military and strategic studies, University of Calgary press, Calgary, 2005) pp. 1-25

[215] Murithi T. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Studies Vol. 17 No. 1.* (Addis Ababa. Open publishers, 2010) pp 70-82

[216] AU Peace and Security Council, '*Communiqué*', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 19 January 2007

the police forces through training and mentorship. AMISOM conducts and arranges regular trainings of different categories of the Somali Police Officers in Kenya and Somalia.[217]

AMISOM forces had made gains against Al-shabaab and captured most cities in the southern Somalia, latest being Kismaayo, the last stronghold of Al-Shabaab insurgents. Security situation in Somalia has improved as the result of the AMISOM mission. AMISOM also secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu in coordination with humanitarian agencies, with the United Nations country team and with the Somalia line ministries and other relevant authorities to establish coordination mechanisms and sharing of information.[218]

The AMISOM Police has successfully helped the Somali Police Force (SPF) to build its data base and has also helped in vetting of new recruits. Currently mentorship for both the military and the police is still on-going. With the support of AMSIOM Somalia implemented successfully the roadmap from the transition and now have a new Constitution, a new Parliament and new elected Speaker, President and a new Prime Minister.

In regard to the AMISOM mandates and the activities, the study from the literature review as well as the field data shows that, AMSIOM has contributed towards the stability of Somalia particularly in the security sector. Security of the country has improved since the deployment of AMISOM particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu.[219] All the respondents interviewed believe that security of the country has improved since AMSIOM deployment and

[217] Ibid
[218] Ken Menkhaus, *A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine: Enough Policy Briefing*, September , 2011, pp.1-
[219] Sarah Co. Samir E. and Robert M. States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for Humanitarian action. *Disasters Vol.34, Issue Supplement s3* (London: sage publishers, 2010) pp 275-296

also there is a great confidence from the respondents that AMISOM will succeed in the stabilisation of the Somalia provided that AMISOM gets the required local Somali support and external funding and political support from the international community.

The study also finds that, despite the improvement in the security of the country, there are gaps in the AMSISOM peacekeeping mission. AMSISOM has made great achievements militarily. However the Somalia government is too weak to take advantage of the military gains and to create political structures. In the stabilisation process it's important that any military advances must go hand in hand with a viable political process. The military front alone will not bring sustainable peace in Somalia.

In regard to the last objective of the challenges facing AMISOM in the stabilisation of Somalia. The study finds that, there quite number of challenges that the mission is facing, which was discussed in chapter three. Although Al-Shabaab is weakened, they are still very active and transformed into hit and run guerilla warfare tactics and the challenge is to secure peace thereafter. To respond this challenge AMISOM and the Somali forces must be equipped to deal with the new tactics and provided enhanced training and also to be strengthening of the Somali Security Forces.[220]

The other immediate challenges to the Government and the international community is that, as large parts of south and central Somalia come under the control of the Government, there is need to provide urgent and substantive support for stabilisation and the development of effective regional, district and local administrations through democratic and popular participation to prevent a power vacuum and resurgence of inter clan competition and to provide basic

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[220] Augustine P. Mahiga: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG) Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, August 2012, New York
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/643

services to the population, particularly areas which have been under Al-Shabab and recently liberated.[221]

The other challenge was that, AMISOM wasn't able to generate enough troops in time and weak TFG forces who are partnering AMISOM in its mission. The crisis in Somalia is largely a result of continuing insecurity and governance vacuum. This vacuum has been created as a result of AMISOM troops not being able to cover a wider geographical area in their peacekeeping operation and also the existence of weak TFG forces not only to maintain control over captured.[222]

The study also finds that it has been a challenge for the AMISOM civilian component staff to implement their tasks fully, they are unable to interact freely and regularly with the respective stakeholders in Somalia, including the TFG officials and ordinary Somalis. This has impacts negatively on the implementation of their tasks. Whenever a civilian AMISOM staff member has to travel out of the secure zone, they require full military escorts in the armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and this puts a strain on the military component, as the Force Commander has to divert his limited resources.

4.1.2 Hypothesis Revisited

Following are the hypothesis of the research study;

- **Null Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia has no relationship with the stabilisation of the country

- **Positive Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia will lead to stabilisation of the country.

- **Negative Hypothesis:** AMISOM mission in Somalia will not lead to stabilisation of the country.

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[221] Ibid
[222] Africa Union(2012) *AU newsletter February issue 2012*,Adddis Ababa .pp 7-9

Literature review as well as the conceptual analysis in the chapter two, stabilisation involves presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of tasks ranging from security, governance, rule of law and political development. In the post conflict societies, the restoration and establishment of legitimate and effective institutions which deals with the security and public safety are important in the stability of a country.[223]

In the view of the literature review, conceptual analysis and the data collected from the field, the study finds that AMISOM mandate as well as the activities has been a great help in restoring peace and stability in Somalia. The security situation in Somalia has improved as the result of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). With the support of AMSIOM Somalia implemented successfully the roadmap from the transition and now have a new Constitution, a new Parliament and new elected Speaker, President and a new Prime Minister.

Therefore the study confirms the positive hypothesis that "AMISOM mission in Somalia will lead to stabilisation of the country" while at the same time rejects other two hypotheses, null hypothesis "AMISOM mission in Somalia will not lead to stabilisation of the country" and the negative hypothesis "AMISOM mission in Somalia will lead to destabilise of the country".

Despite the fact that recent developments have spurred optimism concerning AMISOM mission in Somalia, questions have raise on how AMISOM has been able to deal with civilian protection and in light of the military achievements of AMISOM and what are the exit strategies given that the mission has nearly succeeded in defeating Al-Shabab and driving them out of the major cities in Southern Somalia. These will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

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[223] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25

4.2 AMISOM and Civilian Protection

AMISOM currently finds itself in a context that is very different from previous years. In the past, AMISOM was a relatively small fighting force with limited control over a few districts in Mogadishu. During those years, protection of civilian (PoC) issues, while important were constrained by the every size and limited breadth of AMISOM. Concerns have revolved around indiscriminate shelling and poor discipline of AMISOM and Government of Somalia troops, resulting in civilians being caught in crossfire as well as a number of allegations of sexual exploitation by AMISOM troops. Interaction with the civilian population did exist, but limited presence coupled with the fact that an armed conflict was raging, constrained wide-ranging engagement with the public.[224]

Since August 2011, much has changed. Al Shabaab has withdrawn or has been pushed back from large areas of South and central Somalia, which is now in the hands of AMISOM, Ethiopian troops (not under the AMISOM umbrella), Somali Government soldiers, and anti Al Shabaab militia. As a result, many part of those regions that, hitherto were untouched by the armed conflict, became part of this conflict, albeit briefly. Al Shabaab having lost its urban stronghold, Kismaayo, which means that it has lost its income generator.

The impact on the civilian population in areas not accustomed to armed conflict has been dramatic but limited. Dramatic, because the conflict came to their towns and villages and caused panic and displacement, but limited in that combat tended to be brief and civilian casualties limited. The latter has as much to do with AMISOM being far more cognizant than in the past about its international legal obligations towards civilians, as Al Shabaab not engaging in a traditional warfare against AMISOM.

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[224] Nikolaus Grubeck. Civilian Harm in Somalia. Creating an appropriate response. *Civilian in Armed Conflict Series*. Washington DC. USA 2011

Protection of civilians is defined differently by humanitarian, political and military actors, but any effort to mainstream into the operations of a mission must begin with defining the type of threat one is meant to protect civilians from. Previous studies have found that the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) view protection of civilians fundamentally differently and that this is reflected in how they implement it on the ground.[225] The UN views protection of civilians more like an end in itself as something intrinsic to its existence as an organisation meant to save civilians from the scourge of war. As such, the UN has adopted a broad definition of protection in its peacekeeping operations, as reducing all kinds of threats to civilians, based on three pillars.

Protection through political process, protection from physical violence, and by establishing a protective environment[226] By contrast, NATO's mission in Afghanistan sees protection as a means of defeating the insurgency based on insurgent math, which holds that every civilian casualty creates an additional 20 insurgents, and because it erodes the credibility of the mission. Thus, NATO defines protection of civilians as reducing the threat from their own operations and focused on how not to kill civilians themselves by restricting their escalation of force, use of air support and establishing a Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Tracking Cell.

In recent years, the AU too has developed its own approach to protection of civilians for its peace support operations.[227] In 2010, the AU Commission developed Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians whose purpose is to provide strategic guidance for specific missions tasked with implementing protection at the operational and tactical levels. Like the UN, the AU

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[225] The UN DPKO/DFS *Civil Affairs Handbook*, New York, USA March 2012. pp 10-15
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Civil_Affairs_Handbook.pdf
[226] Harvey J. Langholtz. Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations: *Peace Operations Training Institute*. Jamestown USA, October 2010 pp. 15-17

[227] Stensland, Andreas and Sending, Ole Jacob. *Unpacking the 'Culture of Protection' - A Political Economy Analysis of OCHA and the Protection of Civilians*. Security in practice. Oslo: Nupler press.2011pp 12

defines protection broadly as reducing all kinds of threat to civilians through a political process, protection from physical violence, by establishing a protective environment, and even add an extra tier on top of that of the UN, which is protection through respect for human rights.

On the ground, however, AMISOM is nothing like a UN peacekeeping operation, as it has been deployed without the consent of al-Shabaab and in support of the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and it employs force beyond merely in self-defence. Following criticism regarding indiscriminate use of force by AMISOM, violent abuses by the TFG forces it is there to support, and in light of how civilian casualty helps al-Shabaab's spread propaganda, AMISOM has taken a number of steps that have effectively reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by its operations.[228]

These are notably the implementation of an Indirect Fire Policy (IDF) and consideration for the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). Its main challenge, however, has been that AMISOM finds itself caught between two fundamentally different ideas of what kind of protection it is meant to provide the UN like guidelines whose broad definition it has been decided should be mainstreamed into its operations and its current measures on the ground that resembles NATO's how not to kill civilians ourselves approach. This naturally begs the question which of the two approaches will be the most useful in Somalia?[229]

Since July 2010, the AU Commission has led in developing a framework of action and creating guidelines on the protection of civilians.[230] The consequence of this has been felt in the

[228] Bergholm, Linnea. the African union, the United Nations and Civilian protection Challenges in Darfur, Working paper Series, No. 63. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford Department of International Development, Oxford. 2010 pp 10-17
[229] ibid
[230] African Union. Proposed Guidelines for the protection of Civilians for AU peace Support Operations for consideration by the African Union. Addis Ababa, 2009. pp. 3
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENTTEXTE/8763.pdf

peace and Security Council which encouraged the AU Commission to mainstream the draft AU Guidelines into the activities of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Currently, there is no clear definition of the protection of civilians that is shared across institutions and sector in the AU or elsewhere. This is a central obstacle to rendering the protection of civilians operationally effective. The formulation of the AU's four tiered approach to the protection of civilians through political process, physical protection, rights based protection and through a secure environment has contributed to clarifying the understanding and enhancing the operationalisation of the protection of civilians in the AU context. However, the four tier approach still requires further clarification in order to have practical significance in the AU operations. This will be particularly important in the current process of mainstreaming the protection of civilians within the AU's current operations, particularly in AMISOM.[231]

While the authorisation for civilian protection in the UN is clear, in the AU the APSC Council's has left the decision to protect civilians up to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the force commander or another actor further down the chain as they deem it fit.[232] And it is not clear if the capabilities, from the beginning, are deemed sufficient to protect civilians or are planning to do so.

There is need for increased conceptual clarity that will improve the ability of the strategic, operational and tactical personnel to gauge whether capabilities do correspond with the mandate to protect civilians. The issue of conceptual clarity is particularly salient in the light of the AU's multidimensional approach to the protection of civilians. While the protection of civilians has a clear role for military actors, it equally involves the police and civilian components of the AU's peace Support Operations. This brings to the fore operational challenges

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[231] Ibid pp 6
[232] The UN DPKO/DFS *Civil Affairs Handbook*, New York, USA March 2012. pp 17
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Civil_Affairs_Handbook.pdf

such as ensuring coordination across sectors and actors, increasing understanding of roles and responsibilities and creating a shared approach towards implementing and mainstreaming protection within the AU's work.

However, with AMISOM achieving significant military successes against Al-Shabaab over the past one year have come at considerable cost to the Somali civilian population. AMISOM was more focused on reinforcing the fledgling TFG, diminishing the military capabilities of Al-Shabaab and hunting down terrorists than with the protection of civilians. However, with the civilians bearing some brunt of the ongoing conflict in Somalia, attention has focused on civilian protection.[233]

A notable shift in focus and approach concerning civilian protection occurred in late 2010. This was when first the AU and the United Nations began to take increasing notice of civilian protection concerns. From 2011 onwards this increased attention to civilian protection concerns has significantly impacted the manner in which AMISOM operations have been planned and conducted.[234] Both the AU and AMISOM leadership have taken considerable steps to incorporate protection of civilian considerations into the work of the mission. But despite this progress significant gaps remain. These must be addressed by the AU if AMISOM is to successfully attain to stabilise the country and be viewed as legitimate and credible in the eyes of the Somali people.

When AMISOM was established in January 2007, it was mandated to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, facilitate the implementation of peace agreements in Somalia, protect the transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), support the implementation of the National

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[233] Nikolaus Grubeck. Civilian Harm in Somalia. Creating an appropriate response. *Civilian in Armed Conflict Series*. Washington DC. USA 2011 pp 18
[234] Ibid 21

Security and Stabilisation plan (NSSP), provide technical and other support to disarmament and stabilisation efforts, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

AMISOM mandates has not provided an explicit protection for civilians this is unlike the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which has been operating concurrently. This is because the mission was viewed as a short term operation tasked with providing technical support and ensuring the physical safety of the TFIs before paving way for a larger and more robust UN peacekeeping mission for Somalia.[235] However, as soon as the initial deployment of 1600 Ugandan forces arrived in Mogadishu in March 2007, they swiftly became entangled in the fighting between the TFG forces and insurgents. By 2008 Mogadishu had become engulfed in conflict.

To facilitate the expansion of AMISOM operations into the remainder of southern Somalia, the force strength was elevated to an authorised 17,731 uniformed personnel in 2012. The mission was then authorised to take all appropriate necessary measures to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.[236] This was in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia. Despite increasing the force strength of AMISOM, neither the AU peace and Security Council (PSC) nor the UN Security Council has given much consideration to providing the mission with a clear mandate for protection of civilians. This was based on the recognition that AMISOM essentially did not constitute a peace support operation. Rather, it was acting as a peace enforcement operation engaged in military operations against an armed insurgency.

[235] African Union. Communiqué of the 245th Meeting of the peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa 15th October 2010 (PSC/MIN/1/[CCXXXXV) pp 3 http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/101015%20AUPSC%20Communique%20%28 Addis%20Ababa%29.pdf
[236] Ibid 4-5

In this context, since AMISOM was a direct actor in the conflict the mission could not be provided with a mandate for protection of civilians.[237] AMISOM could not be expected to provide protection to the civilian population at risk while simultaneously engaging in ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, despite the increase in troop numbers in 2012, AMISOM has remained critically under resourced in its operation. It therefore becomes clear that even if AMISOM were to be provided with a civilian protection mandate it would not have the necessary resources to implement such a mandate. The mission was therefore not given a protection of civilian's mandate.[238] The AU PSC's communiqués and the UN Security Council's Resolutions initially only went as far as calling on AMISOM to uphold and ensure respect for International humanitarian Law (IHL) in the conduct of its operation.

Yet civilian protection concerns grew rapidly as the conflict escalated. Accurate figures are difficult to ascertain largely due to continued insecurity and a lack of political will to prioritise tracking. As a result of the conflict and outbreaks of fierce fighting which engulfed both Mogadishu and towns across southern Somalia, hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands more displaced. In Mogadishu, where the heaviest fighting took place until 2011, civilian casualties were perhaps the highest.

Human Rights Watch estimated that between late 2010 and mid 2011 the fighting in Mogadishu had resulted in 1,000 civilian fatalities and 4,000 civilian injuries[239]. The World health, Organisation reported that in the first six months of 2011, 6,543 individuals had been admitted to hospitals in Mogadishu with weapons related injuries. Despite the difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics it is clear that the civilian population in Somalia, and particularly in

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[237] United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 2036(2012). New York USA. February 2012 pp 1 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm
[238] Ibid pp 2
[239] Human Rights Watch: *You don't know who to blame "War crimes in Somalia"* Human Rights watch Report, New York USA. August, 2011. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0811webwcover.pdf

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Mogadishu, have borne the brunt of the conflict and those measures needed to be taken to better protect civilians at risk.[240]

In addition, during the heaviest bouts of fighting particularly in the Somali capital civilians have faced an increasing range of risks. Contrary to the tactics often witnessed in other conflicts characterised by insurgency, much of the fighting in Mogadishu has being conducted along traditional frontlines. Al-Shabaab, TFG and AMISOM forces have relied to a significant extent on artillery fire. The use of such indirect fire by all sides inherently has been placing civilians at a high risk of death, injury and property damage.[241]

Al-Shabaab have been exploiting this tactic, firing mortars at AMISOM positions from densely populated areas. They then used civilians as human shields when AMISOM used retaliatory fire. Civilians have also often been caught in the cross fire between Al-Shabaab, AMISOM and TFG forces. This has been particularly the case in Mogadishu. In certain cases civilians cooperating with AMISOM have also been directly targeted and being assassinated. Such incidents have been on the rise as Al-Shabaab has being pushed out of major towns such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismaayo and other towns.[242]

A relatively new risk has emerged with the increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks which has rose dramatically since 2011. Noting these concerns, in his report to the PSC on the situation in Somalia in October 2010, the Chairperson of the AU Commission reported that humanitarian organisations have increasingly raised

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[240] Ibid pp 18

[241] African Union. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 18, 2010 http://annablou.wordpress.com/2010/10/18/report-of-the-chairperson-of-the-african-commission-on-the-situation-in-somalia/

[242] Nikolaus Grubeck. Civilian Harm in Somalia. Creating an appropriate response. *Civilian in Armed Conflict Series*. Washington DC. USA 2011 pp 22

concerns about the high number of civilian casualties arising from fighting taking place in Mogadishu between insurgents and TFG forces supported by AMISOM.

The chairperson further reported that certain humanitarian organisations and human rights groups had accused AMISOM of indiscriminately shelling civilian populated regions of Mogadishu. This was in response to attacks from Al-Shabaab. The Chairperson noted that such accusations, further fuelled by Al-Shabaab propaganda, had the potential to affect the credibility of AMISOM in the eyes of the Somali people.[243] In this regard, the Chairperson reported that AMISOM had commenced with the development of a proactive and comprehensive communication and outreach strategy.

AMISOM and the United Nations Country team (UNCT) in Somalia had initiated the establishment of a working group intended to share information on the civilian casualties and devise practical means of addressing civilian protection concerns. It was the intention of the Commission to incorporate the Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in AU Peace Support Operations developed by the AU in 2009 into the activities of AMISOM. In its Communiqué on Somalia, the PSC reiterated the AU's commitment to respect the sanctity of human life as articulated in the AU Constitutive Act.

With particular reference to the AU's efforts in Somalia, it reaffirmed the AU's commitment to fully adhere to and respect IHL in AMISOM's operations. In this regard, and as part of the overall effort to better protect civilians, the council has been encouraging the Commission to integrate the draft guidelines on the protection of civilians into the activities of AMISOM while the mission does its utmost to avoid collateral civilian casualties.

In its first open meeting on the protection of civilians held in May 2011, the PSC again requested that the Commission continue with its efforts to incorporate the draft guidelines into

the activities of AMISOM. It urged the development of an AMISOM approach towards the protection of civilians.

Following the decision of the PSC to prioritise the protection considerations into AMISOM operations, an indirect fire policy has been put place for AMISOM mission. The policy formalised a stricter chain of command for the use of mortar and artillery fire and the establishment of no-fire zones where civilians were known to be present.

This policy is asserted through an interview held with an AMISOM official who acknowledged that their policy on protection of Civilian is usually determined by the field commander who makes such decisions.[244] Furthermore, pursuant to the requests of the PSC, AMISOM organised a roundtable in Kigali in July 2011 on enhancing respect for IHL in the conduct of its operations. While these efforts were on-going the UN Secretary General continued to express concerns related to the protection of the civilian population in Somalia.

In his report to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia in April 2011, the Secretary General expressed such concerns, particularly over the recruitment of child soldiers by parties to the conflict. The Secretary General noted that the United Nation Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is always working with AMISOM in this regard. The aim being to recruit civilian personnel for the mission, to strengthen its public information capability and to improve the mission's protection of civilian strategy

Reporting to the Council again in August 2011, the Secretary General noted that the protection of civilians in Somalia remained a major concern.[245] Taking note of the Secretary General's concerns and the efforts undertaken by the AU and AMISOM to prioritise protection

[244] AU Peace and Security Council report. *Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, October 2012. Pp 2-7*
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/RAPPORTCPS/18_en-v-Rapport_sur_le_CPS_-_No_39.pdf
[245]United Nations. UN Security Council resolution 2010 (2011) New York USA. September 30, 2011 pp 3
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10399.doc.htm

of civilians' considerations in the operations of the mission the Security Council, through Resolution 2010 in September 2011, welcomed the progress made by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties during its operations. It further urged the mission to continue in its efforts to prevent civilian casualties and to develop an effective approach to the protection of civilians.

By the end of 2011 these measures were beginning to take effect. Both the UN and non-governmental organisations reported that the Indirect Fire Policy was showing results with instances of indiscriminate shelling in Mogadishu diminishing. Building on this progress, since late 2011 calls have been made for the establishment of a more centralised civilian casualty tracking mechanism.

This was endorsed when the UN called for the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC).[246] In essence, the CCTARC was to be established to track incidences of civilian harm, to investigate such incidents and to provide compensation when required. In addition to the establishment of the CCTARC, in early 2012 the AU Commission was providing support to AMISOM for the development of a mission wide strategy to incorporate protection of civilian considerations into AMISOM operations. The lack of clear strategy by African Union in protecting civilian is best amplified by Williams who argues that the institutions that authorize peace operations in Africa have also been loath to specify when exactly peacekeepers are responsible for protecting civilians. Clearly, peacekeepers are not supposed to harm civilians, nor are they supposed to stand by while civilians within their areas of deployment are massacred.[247]

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[246] United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 2036(2012). New York USA. February 2012 pp 1 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm
[247] Paul D Williams. Peace operations in Africa: seven challenges, any solutions. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington DC USA 2010 pp 1-4

AMISOM's commitment to minimising the impact of its operations on the civilian population in Somalia and urged all forces active in the country to follow its example can exemplified by the statement of SRCC who stated that AMISOM takes its responsibility for the safety of the people of Somalia very seriously and fully understands its obligations to conduct operations without causing undue risk to the local population.[248]

Despite the progress which has been attained in the last two years in reducing civilian casualties and emphasizing the importance of civilian protection considerations in AMISOM operations, significant gaps still persist and there is need for AU and the mission leadership to address further the issue of harm to civilians if harm to the civilian population is to be minimised and AMISOM is to ultimately be successful in Somalia.[249]

The adoption of the Indirect Fire Policy by AMISOM represents a positive development which has certainly contributed to the reduction of civilian casualties.[250] However, the policy to date has not really incorporated AU decision making into AMISOM's resource needs. It has not resulted in additional resources for training, mentoring and equipment such as weapons tracking mechanisms or aerial drones which would greatly assist in tracking fire and determining response options. Thus while the expectations of the mission have been raised it has not been provided with the necessary means to live up to these expectations. The indirect fire policy was only introduced into the revised AMISOM rules of engagement in mid 2012 which was a full year after their adoption by the mission.

Expectations for compensation in situations where AMISOM is found to have caused harm to civilians have increased. These have been heightened by calls by the UN Security

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[248] AMISOM(2012) AMISOM New Bulletin, September 2012 Issue. http://amisom-au.org/topics/amisom-bulletin/
[249] Walter Lotze and Yvonne Kasumba. AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. Protection of civilian in peacekeeping in Africa. *Conflict Trends Issue 2*, 2012. Durban, South Africa. pp 18
[250] Ibid pp 21

Council for AMISOM to establish a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). However, at present the AMISOM mission has neither the necessary mechanisms nor personnel in place to operate a civilian casualty tracking and response cell, nor does it have the financial resources to pay compensation claims on a sustainable basis. Thus while the notion of compensation payments is morally appealing, unless AMISOM is able to establish and operate such a mechanism on a sustainable and equitable basis, the mission may be raising expectations well above what it is actually capable of delivering.[251]

Much progress has been made in reducing the risks faced by the civilian population in the conduct of AMISOM military operations, a view still persists among the Somali people that AMISOM troops are immune from disciplinary action or other forms of accountability when the mission is responsible for causing civilian harm. To date, numerous AMISOM military personnel have been repatriated from the mission area. They have faced disciplinary action in their home countries for violations which have resulted in civilian injury. But hitherto neither AMISOM nor the AU have developed a clear conduct and discipline policy.[252]

This effectively means that disciplinary cases are left up to the discretion of the Force Commander or head of the Mission. There are no established mechanisms and/or processes for facilitating follow up with concerned member States on the outcomes of any disciplinary proceedings that have been instituted. To address perceptions that AMISOM personnel are immune from accountability where civilian harm has been caused, the mission will need to establish and implement both a conduct and discipline policy and a more proactive public information strategy. Protection of civilians in Somalia need for policy for guidance and practice.

[251] Nikolaus Grubeck. Civilian Harm in Somalia. Creating an appropriate response. *Civilian in Armed Conflict Series*. Washington DC. USA 2011 pp 21
[252] Walter Lotze and Yvonne Kasumba. AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. Protection of civilian in peacekeeping in Africa. *Conflict Trends Issue 2*, 2012. Durban, South Africa. pp 19-21

This corresponds to the findings of the study which showed that only 9% of the respondents believe that AMISOM has done a good job in protecting civilians.

As long as AMISOM continues to operate alongside and provide support for TFG forces it will in some measure be held accountable for the actions of these forces.[253] Numerous challenges have been noted with regard to TFG forces to date in relating to civilian protection. These include reports of the recruitment of child soldiers, the absence of rules of engagement, the ongoing use of indirect fire and the conduct of operations Al-Shabaab in civilian areas.

AMISOM and Somali Government forces are no longer the only fighting force vying for control in south and central Somalia.[254] In addition, there are also various militias with unpredictable alliances towards the Government and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah who are fighting against Al Shabaab, more for their desire to oust Al Shabaab rather than a serious alignment with the Government. A number of militia are effectively being sponsored by Kenya or Ethiopia through training and receipt of equipment and consequently, might also affect their allegiance to the Government.

AMISOM through the AU and the UN is the provider of equipment, funds, training and leadership to the Somali national army and some of its proxy forces. Consequently, AMISOM has a duty to ensure that all forces fighting either directly or on behalf of the Somali Government adhere to IHL.

There is need for a policy practice to govern AMISOM activities in the field. AMISOM will need to establish clear procedures for the provision of support to TFG forces. AMISOM should consider incorporating elements of conditionality for its support. These would need to be similar to those the UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

[253] Somalia protection cluster (SPC). *Protection of Civilians in Somalia Emerging issues in 2013.* Nairobi October 2012 . pp 1-4 http://www.somaliangoconsortium.org/docs/key/8/2012/1349109747.pdf
[254] Ibid pp 3

established for the provision of support to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).[255]

Finally, as AMISOM expands its operations beyond the confines of Mogadishu, it will face a range of new civilian protection challenges. Al-Shabaab is likely to continue with its tactics of asymmetrical warfare. However, AMISOM is likely to continue to be under resourced. Rising expectations will be placed on the Mission by the international community but more importantly, by the Somali people themselves. The management of the expectations of those worst affected by the conflict in Somalia will most certainly be a crucial success criterion for AMISOM. The mission will thus be better served if it assesses and effectively communicates its abilities and limitations to the host population.

4.3 AMISOM Exit Strategy

In any peacekeeping mission, one thing is common that the peacekeeping mission must be faced with exit strategy in their mission. Exit strategy is an issue that has been a grapple to UN peacekeeping mission since UN participated in peacekeeping operations around the world. The exit of peacekeeping can be failure, successes and partial failure.[256]

Exit strategy in African peacekeeping mission has been an issue to deal with ever since African Union started to participate in peacekeeping operations in the continent. Most peacekeeping missions in Africa have never been guided by clear exit strategy but they have been basically hinged on mandates that are guiding them.[257] AMISOM mission in Somalia is one such mission where there is no clear exit strategy in place ever since the mission started.

[255] Walter Lotze and Yvonne Kasumba, AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. Protection of civilian in peacekeeping in Africa. *Conflict Trends Issue 2*, 2012. Durban, South Africa. pp 19-21
[256] Jeffrey Record . Exit Strategy Delusions. *Parameters Vol 31*, no. 4. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA 2001 pp 21–27.
[257] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. pp 23-33

Nevertheless AMISOM exit strategy is based on the following four principles of Local Administration, National Security and Stabilisation Plan, Security System Structures and Transition to a UN peacekeeping mission. Though these principles govern the exit strategy in Somalia, National Security and Stabilisation plan with a draft to guide and operationalise is only in existence. The draft runs from (2011-2014). The National Security and Stabilisation Plan are based on a set of objectives which guides its use by AMISOM, TFG and the international community. These form the Subject of Continuing discussion.

AMISOM have made every effort militarily to increase the territory under the control of the TFG, yet the Government has failed to take advantage of these gains to create political structures and provide basic services to the population. They do not have the capacity to do it. Development agencies that would in normal circumstances step in to assist the government with reconstruction efforts are still working from Nairobi and not making any dent in the newly liberated areas.

The military front alone will not bring sustainable peace in Somalia. Political solution will lead to the complete defeat of the Al- Shabaab and the end of the military operations. International community must do more to engage all parties and stakeholders in the Somalia conflict and reinvigorate effectively the political solution of the country.

One of the principles that have been envisioned by AMISOM as important building block of its exit strategy is the establishment of democratic political systems. The establishment of a democratic political institution is one of the major ways in which AMISOM hopes will provide long-term stability to the people of Somalia.

AMSOM has been supporting the establishment of local administration in Somalia by encouraging local initiative through the Garowe peace process. Garowe process is lauded it as

the first Somali led attempt to pursue a peaceful political transition in Somalia.[258] AMISOM

argues that in order to be representative the process has to be widely consulted on. The first

national constitutional conference was held in Garowe from 21-23 December 2011, the meeting

was convened by the Transitional Federal government of Somalia and hosted by United Nations

and AMISOM.

The major objectives of Garowe peace process was to come up with a draft constitution

and how best all Somalis can be represented in a Federal government.[259] The Garowe peace

process took into consideration the following as its foundation the TFG charter, the Djibouti

agreement, Kampala accord and the Road Map of Somali peace process into account. The peace

process led to the establishment of Garowe principles. The principles were based on the

following tenets, the representation of the national constituent assembly, Procedure of choosing

the members of the national constituent assembly and term of the national constituent assembly.

AMISOM has contributed to the establishment of a recognized executive authority to

succeed the TFG government. AMISOM, as well as the international community has played a

big role in the just concluded election in Somalia where for the first time a president was elected

in Somalia. AMISOM as part of its exit strategy has always proposed that the establishment of a

democratic government acknowledged by the people of Somalia marks an important step toward

the exit of AMISOM forces.[260] AMISOM through the office of Special representative has been

emphasising the need for careful consideration of how populations in Al Shabaab controlled

areas could become involved in the political process without risk to their lives.

[258] Somali national constitutional consultative conference, 21-23 December 2011, Garowe, Puntland, Somalia.
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HGL2Wx5OstE%3D&tabid=9705&language=en-US
[259] Chatham house. *British Government Consultation with UK bases Somali Diaspora*, Chatman House publishers,
London, February 8, 2012 pp 3
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0212somali_summary.pdf
[260] United Nations. S/RES/1863 (2009) UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009. 16 January 2009, New York USA. pp 1-6
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/211/65/PDF/N0921165.pdf?OpenElement

In order to strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and coordination mechanisms. AMISOM in working with the TFG hopes to institutionalize a set of international norms, rules, principles, identities and organizational structures and processes to be adequately put in place to ensure democratic governance and accountability of the security sector in Somalia. This AMISOM proposes should be done through support provided at the political level for the development of strategic higher level security and justice policies and decision making processes. Such policies will enable relevant security and justice institutions and agencies to develop their own sector priorities, reform and implementation strategies.

Secondly to rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security and justice agencies and institutions. AMISOM and TFG have increased their operational tempo and now control Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismaayo among other towns. As they expand their area of control, so the airport, sea port and other critical infrastructure are no longer contested, but still remain attractive targets and the TFG lacks adequate resources to protect them adequately. Momentum need to be sustained. Relations between AMISOM, local forces and the TFG National Security Forces need to be strengthened, with TFG and local forces regularly fighting alongside AMISOM troops.

Thirdly to ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-state security and justice institutions. Dealing with transnational organised crime and terrorism will require an increased level of collaboration, cooperation and information exchange between state and non-state security actors. Partnerships between the TFG ministries, security and justice institutions, AMISOM, friendly militia groups, private security and military companies, the international community, local, regional and district authorities, NGOs and civil society organizations, and the diaspora can complement these interventions and support capacity in the

face of scare financial and human resource in Somalia. Such partnerships will also help foster shared threats and risks analysis, data management systems, support trust and confidence building regulations on joint operational planning.

Fourthly, to increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector development efforts. The parliament is generally considered to be weak, both in terms of process and effect, and the same applies to the sub committees which should be active in the field of defence and security, justices and human rights. Civil society is similarly lacking in capacity and voice in the security sector in Somalia.

AMISOM and the international community support the parliament in training of the parliamentary committees in matters of defence, security and justice, conducting an analysis of the gaps in the existing legal framework for security governance and provide model laws to support the drafting of legal frameworks for the Somalia Police Force, Army, NSA and Coast guards.

AMISOM also need to support the development of reporting and analytical processes, especially security sector budgeting analysis. AMISOM should also encourage the engagement of CSOs and NGOs in Somalia's security sector development issues to encourage more public participation in security issues given that AMISOM has been making progress in various towns. AMISOM and the international community should also be champion the establishment of democratic institutional arrangements to ensure easy and transparent access for citizens to express their concerns in any of these respects. This should be done through capacity building to various government officials from different line ministries in the government.

To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilisation of Somalia, the recent withdrawal of Al-shabaab form big cities demands an urgent need of review of the African

Union Mission to Somalia. With AMISOM currently expanding its mission beyond Mogadishu, there is need to carefully harmonize its operations with that of the Somali National Security Forces and its allied friendly forces, to ensure that neither becomes over stretched and vulnerable. Expanding AMISOM's role will require additional troops, helicopters and other operational enablers, including management of explosives. It will also require different structures and more robust communications and logistics.

The new Somalia government will request the AU to revise and re formulate its mandate to include a second phase concept of operations (CONOPS) in support of international stabilisation support in Somalia. With Assessments indicating that Al-Shabaab could change tactics and employ more use of explosives and suicide bombers to stretch the government and AMISOM manpower by conducting attacks in ostensibly secure areas, thus reducing their capacity to mount further offensive operations. AMISOM has been involved in facilitating initiatives that reach out to communities to encourage them to report suspicious activities and collaborate with the security sector.

Although the formation of National Security and Stabilisation Plan is a good step there for the long term exit strategy, there is need for concerted efforts to put the plan into practice and major emphasis should be given to the security in the short term in order to effectively restore security in Somalia.[261]

AMISOM has proposed to use an all-inclusive way of governing areas previously under Al-shabab. Though AMISOM has not proposed the methodology to be used in governing such areas, the choosing of such methodologies have been left to the discretion of AMISOM force commanders who work in partnership with the office of political Affairs.

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[261] Paul D. Williams. Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, August 2009, pp. 514–530.

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However, the clan is the most useful at the level of social reconciliation, rather than political reconciliation, and that representation should be regionally based involving civil society and organised Islamist movements rather than purely clan-based. In the current context in Somalia, traditional elders are the only truly representative authorities for Somalis. Involving clan elders in discussions could enable the inclusion of views of people from those areas without direct engagement with Al Shabaab.[262]

In conclusion, though AMISOM mandate does not include civilian protection, the issue of civilian protection has been able to come up in AMISOM mission, with question being raised on how AMISOM is carrying out civilian protection in its mission. AMISOM policy of fulfilling civilian protection has being field based and force commanders determine the boundaries that determine what constitutes civilian protection in its mission. Because of lack of Policy by the AU to guide their peace keeping mission there is need to develop policy that promote accountability and adherence to IHL.

AMISOM just like any other peace keeping mission must face the question of what constitute an exit strategy for AMISOM. However, AMISOM has no laid down strategy for its Somalia mission. If AMISOM troops begin to leave Somalia there are sets of various challenges that remain within the area. With a weak central government that is pleasing the various clans, there are little prospects that the government can survive without some form of external intervention mechanism or assistance for the next few years. This means that the international

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[262] Menkhaus K. Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali case. *Disasters Vol.34, Issue Supplement s3* (London: sage publishers, (2010) pp 320-341

community and the member states that are embroiled in the security operation within Somalia should remain there for the foreseeable future.

Little exit strategy plans have been put in place by AMSIOM and there seems to be no conclusive plan for troop withdrawals, there is need for long term careful plan of helping a transition to Somalia leadership. AMISOM seems to have achieved a great milestone in defeating Al-shabaab. The strategy now shifts to that of reconciliation. These shall not be achieved through the barrel of the gun but through political process and diplomacy. The responsibility of ensuring lasting peace falls squarely on the Somali government and its ability to address historical injustices. More action needs to be taken fast to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated and that violence seems the only way to solve problems.

4.4 Conclusion

In conclusion AMISOM mission has contributed to the stabilisation of Somalia by providing protection to the Somalia government, bringing large part of the country particularly in the south and central Somalia under the government and contributing to the intuitional building of the Somalia government. However, AMISOM mission has not been without challenges which need to be addressed to not only help it meets all its mandates successfully but also help provide a lesson for future peacekeeping missions by African Union.

The issue of the protection of civilians have not been explicitly mandated to AMISOM mission and it come out as an emerging issue and primary concern due to accusations of indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas by AMISOM and the potentially damaging effect casualties have on the mission's credibility. To find long term exist strategy is also another emerging issue in the AMISOM mission.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Findings and Conclusions

5.0 Introductions

The aim of this chapter is to summarise the main finding of the study. In chapter one the study set out the role of AMSIOM in stabilisation. Chapter two provided conceptual analysis about stabilisation. Chapter three discussed about the case study of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Chapter four gave critical analysis of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Lastly chapter five is structures as follows. The first section will discuss a number of the findings from the study and implications arising from the findings. The next sections will discuss some policy recommendations. The third section will discuss how this study contributed to the literature in African peacekeeping missions and finally chapter concludes with recommendations in the areas which need of further research.

5.1 Research Findings and Their Implications

The study finds that, Stabilisation is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic infrastructure and to create the foundation for longer term development, which involves coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of tasks ranging from security, governance, rule of law, political and economic development. In the post conflict societies, the restoration and establishment of legitimate and effective institutions which deals with the security and public safety are important in the stability of a country.[263]

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[263] Berger, M. From Nation-Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order' Third *World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1(Routledge, 2006). pp 5-25

In view of the AMISOM activities, the study also finds that, despites the challenges, AMSIOM has contributed towards the stability of Somalia particularly in the security sector. Security is one of the most important pillars of any stabilisations which address all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions and is a precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars of stabilisations.[264]

Security of the country has improved since the deployment of AMISOM particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu which is an indicator of the AMISOM contribution to the stability of the country as the field data shows that all the respondents believe that security of the country has improved since AMSIOM deployment.

Through its military and police components, AMISOM is also helping to build capacity for Somalia Armed Forces and the Somali Police Forces through training and mentorship. AMISOM has successfully conducted training of different categories of the Somali Police Officers in Kenya and Somalia.[265] The AMISOM Police has also successfully helped the Somali Police Force (SPF) to build its data base and has also helped in vetting of new recruits. Currently mentorship for both the military and the police is still on-going.

AMISOM also secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu in coordination with humanitarian agencies, with the United Nations country team

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[264] Sarah Co. Samir E. and Robert M. States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for Humanitarian action. *Disasters Vol.34, Issue Supplement s3* (London: sage publishers, 2010) pp 275-296

[265] Ibid

and with the Somalia line ministries and other relevant authorities to establish coordination mechanisms and sharing of information.[266]

AMISOM has considered capacity building as one of the key components to their goal considering that two decades of fighting has destroyed most if not all of the public institutions. AMISOM through its Political Affairs Unit has been conducting various capacity building to the Somalia national institutions and line ministries.

The study also finds that, despite the improvement in the security of the country, there are gaps in the AMSISOM peacekeeping mission. AMSISOM has made great achievements militarily. However Government has failed to take advantage of these gains to create political structures. In the stabilisation process it's important that any military advances must go hand in hand with a viable political process. The military front alone will not bring sustainable peace in Somalia.

AMISOM has been explicitly mandated to take all necessary measures to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.[267] During its operations, protection of civilians has arisen as a primary concern due to accusations of indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas by AMISOM and the potentially damaging effect casualties have on the mission's credibility. The study finds that AMISOM mandates has not provided an explicit protection for civilians, as a result hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands more displaced in Mogadishu, where the heaviest fighting took place until late 2011.[268]

The study also finds that funding availability and inadequate troops are another challenge to the mission. AMISOM relies on support from United States of America, European Union and

[266] Ken Menkhaus, *A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine: Enough Policy Briefing*, September, 2011, pp.1-
[267] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036 (22 February, 2012)
[268] Human Rights Watch: *You don't know who to blame "War crimes in Somalia"* Human Rights watch Report, August, 2011. Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0811webwcover.pdf

other international community. However, this has resulted in failure of troops to be deployed according to timeline that was set forth with most countries waiting to deploy after receiving financial and technical support from the international community.[269] Coordination of the military interventions is also problem for the mission, as Kenya and Ethiopia intervened unilaterally, although Kenya now is part of AMISOM, Ethiopian troops are still in the country fighting with Alshabab and they are not part of the AMISOM mission which can create coordination problems

The study also finds that there is no clear exit strategy in place for the AMISOM peacekeeping mission. Exit strategies always entail elements of prediction. The Government and Somali forces need to become less dependent on AMISOM. Responsibilities need to be handed over to national forces. However, the challenge is when and how best to exit Somalia.

5.2 Policy Recommendations

To make the most of the opportunity to end more than two decades of chronic conflict, the international community should. Increase AMISOM's force strength and provide more resources. To maintain momentum and consolidate gains, AMISOM should quickly assume full tactical and operational command of the AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan missions and coordinate closely with Somali allies. Any major offensive should be accompanied by a political strategy to win the support of local clans and social groups and stabilise those areas in which they are present.

AMISOM should encourage the Somali authorities to indicate continued willingness to negotiate a political accommodation and incorporate into a national regional security force Al-Shabaab commanders and fighters willing to renounce terrorism and work towards peace, since this would weaken the group further and could help stabilise newly recovered areas.

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[269] Africa Union(2012) *AU newsletter February issue 2012*, Addis Ababa .pp 7-9

As past experiences in Somalia repeatedly showed, a military approach on its own is inadequate and usually counterproductive. It cannot and should not be the primary approach. There is need to enhance AMISOM participation in national reconciliation, in the provision of basic services, in building effective institutions in dealing with the humanitarian responses, and in fully controlling liberated areas. This is because stabilisation, sustainability and improvements of the gains made only become possible when strong and effective institutions are in place.

Along with increasing the troop level of AMISOM, there is a need to enhance its outreach to local communities and public relations systems as well as its capability for reducing indiscriminate attacks that counter responses against Al-Shabaab have reportedly caused to civilians. In order to sustain the gain it has already made there is need for AMISOM to design and implement a communication strategy that will allow the Somali public to engage AMISOM more and understand their mission, know their services provision and even give them feedback.

Protecting civilians from the negative effects of Africa's armed conflicts raises huge challenges and AMISOM is not an exception. AMISOM needs to expand their definition of protection of civilians to include more than reducing the threats posed by their own actions. At the latest workshop on mainstreaming protection of civilians into AMISOM[270] the need for a mission specific strategy for protection of civilians in Somalia was highlighted in particular. As the mission now expands beyond Mogadishu, such a strategy will have to reconcile the need to protect civilians with the realities of fighting a war on the ground.

AMISOM must continue its efforts to reduce collateral damage, which particularly relates to increased discipline amongst own troops, reparations, implementing the civilian casualty tracking cell, and work to increase national accountability for the violations by the TFG forces.

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[270]Alexander William Beadle: Protecting Civilians While Fighting a War in Somalia. Drawing Lessons from Afghanistan: Policy brief. *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)*. Oslo Norway, October 2012

At the same time, protection of civilians from a broader definition of threats will be equally important because it carries the key to eventual success and possible exit for AMISOM. Doing so will require the mission to reduce all kinds of threats, as outlined in the AU civilian protection guidelines.

Any peacekeeping mission requires a good entry strategy which ensures that the mission's mandate have clear objectives, addresses the causes of the conflict, and provides enough resources to get the job done. Exits strategy must also be equally well planned from the start of the peacekeeping mission.[271]

Exit strategy in African peacekeeping operations has been an issue to deal with ever since African Union started to participate in peacekeeping operations in the continent. Most peacekeeping missions in Africa have never been guided by clear exit strategy but they have been basically hinged on mandates that are guiding them.[272] AMISOM mission in Somalia is one such mission where there is no clear exit strategy in place ever since the mission started. Therefore the mission needs to revisit its exit strategies and put clear targets for long term exit strategy.

5.2.1 Recommendations for Further Study

Based on the research findings there are some areas which the researcher recommends for further study. Firstly during the AMISOM operations, protection of civilians has arisen as a primary concern due to accusations of indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas by AMISOM and the potentially damaging effect casualties have on the mission's credibility. Protection of civilians is defined differently by humanitarian, political and military actors, but any effort to mainstream it into the operations of a mission must begin by understanding and defining the type

[271] Jeffrey Record. Exit Strategy Delusions, *Parameters Vol* 31, no. 4. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA 2001 pp 21–27.
[272] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. pp 23-33

of threat one is meant to protect from civilians and what account for a civilian protection in the context of African Union peacekeeping missions in an active conflict like the case AMISOM facing in Somalia.

Secondly, exit strategy in any peacekeeping missions is important and requires good planning at the start of the mission. Peacekeeping missions should not stay longer than necessary at the same time it needs to be very careful of withdrawing prematurely to avoid to return to conflict environments and renewed violence. Therefore it's also necessary to know further, what are the possible exit strategies in a situation of an active conflict, with a short term peacekeeping mission like the one of AMISOM and with weak government institutions to take over governance responsibility.

5.3 Conclusions

This chapter concluded this study by discussing findings of the study and its implications. The chapter also discusses number of policy recommendations based on the study findings. It also gives suggestion in the areas which require for further research and finally makes conclusions and lessons learnt.

In general AMISOM mission in Somalia has been of relative success in fulfilling its mandate. The major success that the study attributed to AMISOM is that it has helped in improving the security situation in Somalia and in the protection of government officials and infrastructures. However, AMISOM mission has not been without challenges which need to be addressed to not only help it meets all its mandates successfully but also help provide a lesson for future peacekeeping missions by African Union.

It was realised from the study that with AMISOM nearly succeeding in the defeating of Al Shabaab, there is need for the international community to engage more strengthening the

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socio-economic and political process of restoring peace, to engage more in long-term solutions in building and sustaining peace in Somalia as opposed to Short-term goals of emergency responses in Somalia.

To deploy a large peacekeeping operation African Union have always required extensive western support not only funding, logistics and transportation but also political and continues today with the AMISOM in Somalia. Without Western political backing, funding and logistical support the deployment of African peacekeeping operations will remain hampered despite military training programs.

The lesson learnt from AMISOM is that AU institutional capacity needs to improve so that future Peacekeeping operations undertaken by the Union improves. The second lesson learnt is that funding for peacekeeping is not easy to obtain, especially when the recipient institution is weak. To sustain and develop AU capacity to conduct Peace Keeping Operations two things need to be done. Firstly the organisations institutional capacity needs to be strengthened in the long term and secondly, AU member states need to be provided with the resources needed to enable their successful participation in AU Peacekeeping operations.

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APPENDIX I

Interview Guide Questions

Topic: International Community and Stability of Somalia: The case of AMISOM

Dear participant,

You are asked to participate in MA project study conducted by Nur Muse Abdi. MA student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University Of Nairobi. I am conducting a study about the role of International Community in Stabilising Somalia. I am particularly interested in the work of AMISOM. The study is being done under supervision of Dr. Ochieng Kamudhayi of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University Of Nairobi.

The participation of the study is entirely voluntary and you have the right to refuse to participate. However, your participation is greatly valued and appreciated. The answers provided will only be used for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidentiality. I request that you take approximately 30 minutes of your time to answer the following questions.

Thank you, for your time, participation and cooperation.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Nur Muse Abdi at nmusa2@yahoo.com or tell: **+254 722965642**

Section 1: Biography of the respondents

Name:...

....

Address/Email/Telephone:...

...

Age: 20-30 ( )   31-40 ( )   41-50 ( )   Over 50 ( )

Sex: male ( )   Female ( )   Marital status: married ( )   Not Married ( )

Educational Level: Primary school leaver ( ) Secondary school Leaver ( ) University graduate ( )

others ( )

Organization ....

Group: NGO ( ) Media ( ) UN ( ) IGAD ( ) AMISOM ( ) Academician/researcher ( )

Section 2: Closed Ended Questions

1. In your opinion, has the Somalia security situation improved or deteriorated since the AMISOM deployment in the Country? *Improved* ☐ *deteriorated* ☐

2. One of the AMISOM mandate is to support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia. How would you rate the work of AMISOM in supporting dialogue & reconciliation process in Somalia? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

3. How would you rate the work of AMISOM in facilitating humanitarian access and delivery to the Somali people? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

4. How would you rate the work of AMISOM in protecting the Transitional Federal Institutions? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

5. AMISOM mandates include Providing technical assistance & other support to the stabilisation efforts in Somalia. How would you rate the work of AMISOM in building capacities of the Transitional Federal Institutions? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

6. How would you rate the work of AMISOM in protecting the civilian population of Somalia? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

7. The current AMISOM mandate expires in October 2012. Do you think that UN Security Council should renew the AMISOM mandate to stabilise the country? *Yes* ☐ *No* ☐

8. How would you rate the professional conduct of AMISOM peacekeeping troops? *Very good* ☐ *Good* ☐ *Fair* ☐ *Poor* ☐

9. Do you think that AMISOM soldiers treated people in Somalia with dignity & respect? *Always* ☐ *Sometimes* ☐ *Rarely* ☐ *Never* ☐

Section 3: Open- Ended Questions

1. What do you think are the biggest challenges to peace and security in Somalia?

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2. According to the information you have, what are the tasks that AMISOM supposed to carry out in Somalia?

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3. In your opinion, what AMISOM has done to restore peace and stability in Somalia?_____

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4. What do you think are the biggest challenges to the AMISOM peacekeeping Mission?

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5. In your opinion, do you think that AMISOM will succeed in restoring peace and stability in Somalia?

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6. In your opinion, what needs to be done to ensure that AMISOM mission is successful?

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7. What do you think are the major achievements of the AMISOM peacekeeping mission?

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APPENDIX II

Map of Somalia

Map No 3600 Rev 10   UNITED NATIONS
December 2011