

**THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL FACTORS ON UGANDA'S
FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE //**

BY
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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work. It has not been, and is not currently being submitted for a degree in any other university.


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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my knowledge as a university supervisor.

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Date:.....7-11-2003.....

DEDICATION.

**Johnston Shimanyi Miima.
Grandfather. Mentor.**

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My road to intellectual development has been so rough and with lots of bends that I needed a great many people to cheer me on. However, it is not possible due to some limitations to mention all of them individually. But now at the end of this particular pass, I wish in humble mind, to record my meagre thanks to the following:

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Jeffrey Shimanyi Miima

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ABSTRACT.

This dissertation has concerned itself with describing, explaining, examining and predicting the influence of internal factors in the foreign policy of Uganda. It proceeds from the premise that studies in the past have emphasized external factors rather than internal factors in explaining Uganda's foreign policy. There has also been a tendency by scholars studying internal factors that shape foreign policy to use examples of countries with high levels of economic growth. Besides, such studies that emphasized external factors in explaining the foreign policy of Uganda have inadequately addressed certain aspects of foreign policy. These aspects of foreign policy include leadership, personality of leaders, geography, attributes of a nation such as levels of economic growth and the military. This is partly because these studies have used theories such as realism, rational actor model, decision-making and dependency. This study therefore adopted the world systems theory to explain how domestic factors influence foreign policy of Uganda. It was hoped that this study would achieve two key objectives. Firstly to establish that in countries with low levels of economic growth foreign policy is best explained using internal factors. And to generate data and indicators that could be used to predict the future foreign policy behavior of Uganda.

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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

1.0 DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION OF CONCEPTS:

This study examines and explains the influence of domestic factors in Uganda's foreign policy since independence. However, in this introductory remarks it is important to briefly discuss the evolution of foreign policy as a field of study, define the concept 'foreign policy' and distinguish it from other related concepts such as international politics, diplomacy and international relations. We shall also define the term 'economic growth'.

1.1 A REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY:

Pfaltzgraff¹ observes that political science is the springboard of international relation, foreign policy and diplomacy. However, the overall mother is philosophy. According to Harvey Starr² political science was initially a descriptive and formalistic discipline of study that entailed studying memoirs of diplomats and formal institutions within states. However the 1948 Treaty of Westphalia and the two World Wars marked a turning point in the study of international relations. It was after the First World War that the first departments of international relations in political science evolved in Europe. This came as a response to calls by scholars to study how to prevent another war. The architects were among others, E.H. Carr³. Traditional theories of international relations trying to explain war and how to combat it emerged at

¹ See Pfaltzgraff, Politics And the International System, (New York: J.B. Lppincott Company, 1972), p. 2

² See Harvey Starr, "The Kissinger Years, Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No.4, December 1980, p.465-496.

the end of the Second World War. At this time, Pfaltzgraff⁴ observes, periodical journals like Foreign Affairs became available. Behaviouralists' School emerged on the eve of the Second World War and this was a landmark in the study of international relations. Behaviouralists believed in concepts, generalizing and theorising. This was the beginning of the scientific study of international relations. Foreign policy took root in the writings of Carr⁵ and Spykman⁶. In the 1960's there emerged the comparative foreign policy school that introduced statistics in the study of foreign policy. In 1966 Rosenau⁷ started publishing on the scientific study of foreign policy and brought forth what he called a pre-theory of foreign policy.

1.2 DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT 'FOREIGN POLICY':

It is in an effort to achieve certain goals in international relations that a state formulates and executes foreign policy and any attempt to define what constitutes or what foreign policy is raises a complexity of definitional problems³. This being the case, there are almost as many definitions of foreign policy as there are scholars who have attempted to define the concept. The wide range of definitions is a reflection of the fact that every scholar makes an effort to construct a definition to suit his own particular

³ See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1918-1939, An Introduction to the study of International Relations, (.....: Paper Mack, 1980), p.7.

⁴ See Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the International System, Op. Cit. P.1.

⁵ See again E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, Op. Cit.p.21.

⁶ See N.J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy", in Pfaltzgraff, J. (ed), Politics and the International system, (J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972.), p. 372-377.

⁷ See J.N.Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies, Why, What, How", in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, (New York: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 3-22.

⁸ M.W. Nzomo, African Socialism as a determinant of Tanzania's foreign policy, Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 1974), p.1

analytical field. Reynolds⁹, for example, defines foreign policy as the "range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relation with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, with the intention of advancing and continuing purposes of the individuals represented by it".

Ronald Barston¹⁰ defines a government's foreign policy as "a range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals of which may or may not have internal approval". William Wallace¹¹ maintains that foreign policy is to be seen as a state's policy towards its external environment. He further observes that the characteristics which distinguishes foreign policy from domestic policy is that the latter is intended to affect, and it is limited by the national political system. Joseph Frankel¹² takes the view that 'national interest' is the key concept in foreign policy and it amounts to the sum total of all national values. Burton¹³ holds that "if foreign policy is regarded as the pursuit of national interests then, by promoting or resisting change and adjusting to change, then the presence or absence of certain conditions will determine policy". Farrel¹⁴ consistently argues that foreign policy decisions are products of internal responses to both external and domestic political considerations.

⁹ P.A Reynolds, An introduction to international relations, (A Longman Paperback: 1971), p.48.

¹⁰ R.P. Barston, "External Relations of Small States", in A. Shaw, A.O. Brundt.(eds.) Small States in International Relations,.....

¹¹ See R.P. Barston, "External Relations of Small States" Ibid.p.17

¹² J. Frankel, International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press:1971),p.36

¹³ J.W. Burton. International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1967), p.1

Seabury¹⁵ contends that foreign policy comprises the totality of purpose and commitments, by which a state, through its constitutionally designated authorities, seeks by means of influence, power, and sometimes violence to deal with foreign states and problems in the international system. Modelski¹⁶ maintains that foreign policy refers to the system of activities evolved by states for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment. According to Rosenau¹⁷ foreign policy consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a nation's government, or their agents, which are intended to influence the behaviour of international actors external to their own polity. This presupposes that foreign policy result from the decision-makers' perceptions of present or expected problems in the relationships between a nation and its international environment. To this end therefore, foreign policy actions concern the intended influence and not the actual effect¹⁸ Utete¹⁹ holds that foreign policy choices are those actions of a state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond the state's own boundaries. Levin²⁰ maintains that foreign policy is a combination of aims and

¹⁴ See R.B., Farrel (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and international Politics, (Evanston: Northwestern Press, 1966), p.235.

¹⁵ P. Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States, (New York: Random House Vintage, 1965), p.7.

¹⁶ G. Modelski, A theory of Foreign Policy, (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 6-7.

¹⁷ J.N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systemic Analysis and Scientific consciousness in Foreign Policy Research" in, A. Ramney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago:Markham, 1968), p.222.

¹⁸ M. East and C.F , Herman, "Do Nation Type Account for Foreign Policy Behaviour" in J.N, Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Methods and Findings, (Sage Publications: 1974), p.72.

¹⁹ C.M B. Utete, "Foreign Policy and the Developing State" in Ojo, Orwa and Utete, African International Relations, (Lagos: Longman Group, 1985), p.43-51.

²⁰ I.D Levin in Farrel (ed) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1966) p. 213.

interests²¹ pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defense of these purposes and interests. Other scholars who have attempted to define the concept 'foreign policy' include, among others, Okoth²² Rourke²³ and McGowan.²⁴

From the foregoing attempt to define the concept 'foreign policy' it is evident that most scholars concur that the concept refers to a state's objectives and goals towards other states and other actors in the international system and how to achieve such goals and objectives. It is therefore a decision-making exercise and it is this meaning that this study shall adopt.

1.3 DISTINCTION OF CONCEPTS:

The concept foreign policy should not be confused with other related concepts such as international politics, diplomacy and international relations. According to McClelland (1972,18.) international politics is concerned with the allocation of resources and values in the international system in the absence of a leviathan. International politics considers actions of a state toward external environment as one aspect of a pattern of actions by one state and reactions or responses by others. Singer²⁵ is of the view that international relations is

²¹ See chapter two for a detailed account of what constitutes national interests.

²² G. Okoth, "The Foreign policy of Uganda, Change or Continuity", in W.O.Oyugi, Politics and Administration in East Africa, (Nairobi: East Africa Education Publishers, 1984.), p360.

²³Rourke,..... 1989,p.13.

²⁴ For example see P.J.McGowan, "Problems in the Construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory" in Roesnau, Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Findings and Methods. (New York: Sage Publications, 1974), p.29.

the network of interactions at global level. It is basically about conflict and cooperation in the international system. Platig (1969,12) maintains that diplomacy is the interaction between official governments and it explains international reactions and it is based on the paradigms of international law and international relations. Diplomacy helps us to understand the perspective of foreign policy behaviour. By doing so we look at the behaviour of governments that act on behalf of the entire world. It also forms a link between international politics and international relations. Brian White (1997,1) maintains that if world politics is characterised by the tension between cooperation and conflict, then diplomacy is said to provide the defining mechanism of international politics. Okoth²⁶, Rosenau,²⁷ McGowan²⁸, Reynolds et al²⁹ put up a sustained argument that foreign policy focuses on the official actions, roles and organisation of the conduct of foreign behaviour and it is therefore about state objectives towards other states and other actors in the international system and how to achieve such goals and objectives. Diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy. Diplomacy and foreign policy are therefore subsets of international relations³⁰.

²⁵ See D. Singer, "The Capacity to Influence", in F.A. Sonderman (ed.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations, (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall Inc., 1970), p.1.

²⁶ See P.G. Okoth, "The Foreign Policy of Uganda, Change or Continuity", in W.O. Oyugi, Politics and Administration in East Africa, op. cit, p.360.

²⁷ See J.N. Rosenau, (Comparing Foreign Policies, Why, What, How", in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policies, Theories, Findings and Methods, op. cit, p.3-22.

²⁸ See P.J. McGowan, "Problems in the Construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Findings and Methods, op. cit. p29.

²⁹ See P.A. Reynolds An introduction to international relations, 1971), op.cit.p.54.

1.4 DEFINING ECONOMIC GROWTH:

Todaro³¹ identifies low levels of standards of living, per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP) and unemployment as the major characteristics of developing countries. GNP is often used as a summary index of the relative economic well being of people in different nations. Per capita income of developing countries averages less than one eleventh of the per capita income of rich countries. For example the United Nations classified this as 3.4 per cent in 1960 to 1970 period compared to 4.9 per cent for the developed countries³². He further argues, on the one hand, that low capital accumulation, Low rates of structural transformation and technological progress are the key features of African economies. On the other hand, he maintains that countries with high levels of economic growth have high rates of growth per capita output and population, high labour productivity, high rates of structural transformation of the economy, high rates of social and ideological transformation and unlimited international economic outreach³³.

The view of this study is from the standpoint of the individual state outward to the external environment. Consequently the process of foreign policy is treated as a dependent variable and the internal factors influencing it as the independent variables.

³⁰ See B. Russett and H. Starr, World Politics the Menu for choice, op, cit, p.86.

³¹ See M.P. Todaro, Economics for a Developing World, an Introduction to Principles, Problems and Policies, (Bumt Mill: Longman Group, 1982). p. 65.

³² Ibid, p. 66.

1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT:

Although it is generally accepted that foreign policy is shaped by both external and internal factors, most of the research in Africa has tended to emphasize external factors rather than internal factors in explaining foreign policy behaviour. Utete³⁴ in discussing the foreign policy of a developing state takes a dependency approach and argues that the external environment influences its foreign policy. Others who share similar views include Vital³⁵ Nkrumah,³⁶ Leys³⁷ and Shaw³⁸.

Kiondo³⁹ and Macharia⁴⁰ writing on Tanzania and Kenya's foreign policy respectively hold that foreign policy in these states is influenced by external variables and is best explained using dependency and underdevelopment theories. These theories hold that economic surplus of a developing country is exploited and appropriated by another or others, especially the developed countries. This suppresses any attempt by such a developing country to evolve its own autonomous technological capacity and economic system and

³³ Ibid, p.105-115.

³⁴ T.W. Robinson, "The National interest", in Sonderman F. A (ed.), The Theory and practice of international relations, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, 1970.), p.112.

³⁵ D. Vital, The inequality of States: a study of the small powers in international relations, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967.) p.10-14.

³⁶ See G.A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 66.

³⁷ See C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, the politics of neo-colonialism, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1974.), p.1

³⁸ Shaw, Timothy, and Kenneth (eds.) The Politics of Africa.....

³⁹ See A.S. Kiondo, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The Socio-economic Context" in W.O. Oyugi (ed.) Politics and Administration in East Africa, (Nairobi: East Africa Education Publishers, 1984) p.331-358

⁴⁰ For example see M. Macharia, "Conflict and Collaboration in US-Kenya Relations 1985-1996", in P.G. Okoth, Africa at the beginning of the 21st century, (Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, 2000) p.157-192.

deprives it of the capacity to realize its own foreign policies. Writers on the foreign policy of Uganda have taken the same view.

Yash Tandon⁴¹ argues that the domestic political environment in Uganda has been marked with formlessness and internal violence and has not been able to influence its foreign policy. According to him, the seventy years of British imperial rule that created a dependency relationship with the west has been the dominant factor influencing its foreign policy. Writing in 1984 and in 2000. Okoth⁴² maintains that Uganda's foreign policy is mainly influenced by external factors and Mukwaya⁴³ concurs.

However, as great as their contribution may be, these studies have been inadequate as far as the need to explain the foreign policy of Uganda is concerned. In particular we seek to answer the following questions: Firstly, does the type of leadership shape the foreign policy of Uganda? Here leadership includes the state's ideological dispensation, policy-making institutions as well as the type of diplomacy it engages in. Secondly, to what extent does personality of leaders shape foreign policy? In this respect, the study shall examine idiosyncrasies and the type of training the leader has had in foreign policy. Thirdly, do individuals count in foreign policy decision-making? Answering this question entails inquiring into these individuals'

⁴¹ See Y. Tandon, "An Analysis of the Foreign Policy of Africa States, A Case Study of Uganda" in K. Ingham (ed.) Foreign Relations of African States (London: Butterworths, 1974) p.191.

⁴² See P. G. Okoth, "Uganda's Foreign Economic Relations", in Okoth P.G, Africa at the beginning of the 21st century, (Nairobi: The University of Nairobi Press, 2000), Op. Cit. P.360.

academic backgrounds and the office they occupy. Fourthly, do aspects and characteristics of a country such as its natural resources, industrial capacity and military power influence its foreign policy? Fifthly, what role does the domestic structure play in foreign policy? In this regard we shall examine bureaucratic organs. Lastly, this study will seek to establish whether or not geography⁴⁴ influences Uganda's foreign policy. Therefore, considering that foreign policy is a decision-making exercise that requires inputs from these internal factors, this study seeks to examine, explain and predict Uganda's foreign policy behaviour.

1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

This study focuses on the influence of internal factors in Uganda's foreign policy. It will concentrate on the internal factors and assess the extent to which they shape Uganda's foreign policy. The key objectives of this study are as follows:

1. to examine whether or not in countries with low levels of economic growth, foreign policy is best explained by domestic variables.
2. to generate data and indicators that could serve to predict future foreign policy behaviour.

⁴³ See A.K.K. Mukwaya, The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region: An Analytical Overview, (Kampala: The Nile International Conference Centre, 8th –10th April 2002.)

⁴⁴ See chapter two

1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY:

This time period (from independence to the present) delineates colonial legacies, allows us to examine post-independence foreign policies and brings us to the most recent dyadic interaction of Uganda with the outside world. The study is comprehensive to the extent that it includes not only certain aspects of foreign policy events that have characterised the nature of Uganda's foreign behaviour but also the periods of regime changes in Uganda thus enabling us to determine continuity and/ or change in its foreign policy. Secondly, while most of the research in this field in East Africa has concentrated on Kenya and Tanzania for instance by Nzomo⁴⁵, Stephens⁴⁶, Omondi⁴⁷, Mogire⁴⁸, Musambayi⁴⁹ among others, little research has been done on foreign policy of Uganda. Consequently there is scarcity of literature, which directly examines the role of internal factors in foreign policy of Uganda.

Thirdly scholars such as Rosenau⁵⁰, Russet⁵¹, Herman⁵², Morgenthau⁵³ to mention just a few have done studies in foreign policy without employing

⁴⁵ See M. Nzomo, African Socialism as a determinant of Tanzania's Foreign policy. Op.cit. p.2

⁴⁶ F. Stephens, An Analysis of the foreign Relations of Tanzania and Kenya: A Comparative Study, (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1973), op. Cit. p.1.

⁴⁷ See E. Omondi, Political and Economic Factors as Determinants of Inter-state Relations: A Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania (1964-1988), (Nairobi: Nairobi University, 1997).

⁴⁸ E.O. Mogire, From Conflictive to Cooperative Interaction: A Case Study in Kenya-China Relations, 1963-1991, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 1993.)

⁴⁹ For example see C.I.K. Musambayi, The Politics of Foreign Policy execution: Consistency and Inconsistency in Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards South Africa, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 1995). P.16.

⁵⁰ See J.N Rosenau, (ed), Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Findings and Methods, Op.cit, p. 3-22.

⁵¹ See B. Russet and H.Starr, World Politics, The Menu for Choice, (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1989).

⁵² See M. East and C.F. Herman, "Do Nation Type Account for Foreign Policy Behaviour?", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies, Theories, Findings and Methods, (New York: Sge Publications, 1974), p.72.

examples of countries to explain their findings. Those who have attempted to do so have used examples of countries with high levels of economic growth. Fourthly, Uganda is one of the countries in Africa that has had a lot of leadership changes, mainly through the gun, and this study seeks to examine the performance of these leaderships⁵⁴

Studies explaining the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy have employed examples of countries with high levels of economic growth and there is need to shift focus to those countries with low level of economic growth. Besides, most studies generally in international relations and in foreign policy have tended to focus on North –South or South –South relations⁵⁵. Consequently there is a tendency to assume that single country case study cannot be used to explain phenomena in international relations and in foreign policy.

Furthermore, reading through the literature on factors shaping foreign policy behaviour of Uganda there is paucity of evidence that role of leadership, attributes of a nation, the domestic structure, individuals and public opinion have comprehensively been addressed.

⁵³ H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. Op.ct. chapter 9.

⁵⁴ See J.N. Rosenau, "Comparing foreign policies: When What, How", in J. N Rosenau (ed.), Comparing foreign policy, Theories, Findings and Methods, op, cit, p. 3-22.

⁵⁵ For example see A. Ogunsanwo, "The Foreign Policy of Algeria", in Aluko, O., Foreign Policies of African States. (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1977) and generally see the works of Boutrous Ghali and John Okumu in the same book.

This study, by inquiring into the above-mentioned aspects of foreign policy, will attempt to generate new insights and perspectives for understanding foreign policy of Uganda. This will be useful to policy makers since for any policy to be successful, adequate, appropriate and realistic information is needed. Besides, this study will generate literature that directly examines how internal factors shape Uganda's foreign policy and this will be useful for future research.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW:

There is scarcity of literature, which directly examines the role of internal factors in foreign policy process in Uganda. This section is therefore a preliminary review of some of the available literature pertinent to internal factors of foreign policy in general. Although foreign policy issues have been debated at least since the Second World War, much of the literature now extant has built on the writings after the 1960s. This is the period when the scientific study of foreign policy began and found its enduring identity. It is therefore from this period that we spotlight our attention and this section is divided into two parts. The first part consists of theoretical writings on the internal factors of foreign policy while the second part examines studies done in Africa and East Africa.

1.8.1 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES:

One of the most important works to the initiation of this study was James Rosenau's⁵⁶ essay "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy". By examining previous works Rosenau came to the conclusion that analysts of foreign policy sought to explain external behaviour of states by reference to more than five sets of variables. First is the idiosyncratic variable, which captures all the aspects of the decision-maker of foreign policy in a state. The second factor is what he calls 'the role' and this he argues refers to the influences that official position role bring to the external behaviour of states. Third is government, which he identifies as the internal structural limitations, or enhancements of a state's external behaviour. Four he identifies the variable he calls society which he takes to mean the non-governmental aspects of a state which influence external behaviour, such as the degree of integration of the society and industrial base. Lastly Rosenau examines the international system as variable determining a state's external behaviour. All these factors, he adds, do not affect the foreign policy of a state in similar or equal ways.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin⁵⁷ early works on decision-making is also important to this study since it examines foreign policy making in small and developing states. In their writings they argue that in small state such as those in Africa, a small elite tends to possess an almost exclusive control over the foreign affairs of the state, so that the behaviour of the state in foreign policy is often

⁵⁶ See D. Singer, "The Capacity to Influence" in Sonderman, F.A. (ed.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations, (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall Inc. 1970.)

⁵⁷ See Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (ed.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).entire text.

a mirror of their behaviour. In such cases an analysis of the decision-making process is important. In analysing state behaviour, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin suggest that there must be reference to the decision and the implementation process, which results, into actions or lack thereof, which thus comprise state behaviour. The three scholars also employ three of Rosenau's factors- idiosyncratic, role and government. But in addition to this and because these scholars sought to explain decision-making in a complex society, they included what they saw as important concepts such as setting, goals, means, organisational and decisional units to mention just a few. Therefore, despite the fact that the Snyder and friends research and approach has proven useful to this study, total reliance on their framework would not yield the best results. This is because decision-making of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin is a sophisticated tool originally applied to complex circumstances, whereas decision-making analysis in our case here is a much simpler process. However the approach is useful in showing the inner workings and relationships of two very authoritative agents of action within the state: leadership and organization.

Another scholar who sought to examine the role of leadership in foreign policy, and who has greatly inspired this study is Herman⁵⁸. He argues that decision-making environment of a leader depends on a number of factors. First is nationalism in which he holds that when a leader is too nationalistic he tends to make conflictual foreign policy choices for his nation. This is because he gets caught in the dilemma of whether or not to put national interests or

⁵⁸ See M. East and C.F. Herman, "Do Nation Type Account". op, cit,p.7-46

personal interests first. Second is the leader's belief in internal control over events and Herman argues that the more internal control over events the leader believes he has, the more foreign policy decisions he will initiate. Third is the element of dogmatism and she believes that a more dogmatic leader is less likely to show change in his position on international affairs. Such a leader will prefer to pursue a conservative path in his conduct of domestic and foreign policy and will always want to maintain the status quo as it were. The leader will also be guided by the operational code he confesses for it is the operational code that opens the door for him. What Harvey and Russett⁵⁹ call willingness enhances this operational code. Thus the conceptual scheme she employed revolved around three types of personal characteristics namely beliefs, decision style and interpersonal style and she further argued that the leader must be willing to execute the foreign policies as the opportunity dictates. The foregoing discussion of the approach of Herman give us insights on how decision-makers in different types of leadership initiate and execute foreign policies. Herman's husband, Charles⁶⁰ also influenced the inception of this study.

Herman employed Rosenau's, idiosyncratic aspect of decision-makers, as he sought to explain that the personal characteristics of a leader influences a nation's foreign policy process. According to him, the head of state's worldview influences what information he receives and how he perceives that

⁵⁹ See G.A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1950), p.1.

⁶⁰ See M. East and C. Herman, "Do Nation Type Account", in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Findings and Methods, op, cit, p.203.

information in various ways. First is how much control the head of state feels his nation and government has over events. Second is how the head of state views his nation as powerful relative to others and lastly is whether or not the head of state favours cooperation or conflict in his conduct of foreign affairs. Charles identifies confidence, openness to information, risk-taking and the size of the state as key determinants of how a nation makes her foreign policy choices and these insights greatly inspired this study.

Elsewhere Herman⁶¹ sought to explain the kind of decision units that shape a country's foreign process and he considered individuals, groups and the bureaucracy. He explains that decision-making take place through the bureaucracy and depends on characteristics of individuals, their operational code and on modes of conducting interpersonal relations. Herman takes the view that decision-making could also involve 'groupthink' which involves a set of individuals interacting frequently. He further identifies three stages in decision making which include identification of the problem, enumeration and evaluation of alternatives and implementation. At the problem identification stage there is the identification of how power is distributed among the participants and whether or not there is a common denominator. In the next stage the participants meet in groups but as representatives of bureaucratic organizations and consequently bureaucratic politics prevail. Once a decision is made energy is redirected to its implementation⁶² and this may need

⁶¹ See Herman, 1975,p.119-124.

⁶² Ibid. p. 122

physical and human resources as well as coordination, communication and control.

Kissinger's⁶³ writings on the 'domestic structure and foreign policy' were also a great inspiration to this study and he sought to explain the influence of the domestic structure on the foreign policy process. In doing so, however, he did not delve into the specific internal factors that informs a nation foreign behaviour. Nevertheless he consistently argues that the domestic structure determines the amount of total social efforts which can be devoted to foreign policy of a nation. According to him it is the domestic structures that allocate resources and determine the interpretation of the actions of a state and that in the contemporary time the type of ideology the state follows guides such interpretations.

This study would not have began without the persuasions of Hans Morgenthau⁶⁴ as well as Nicolas Spykman⁶⁵ in their sustained study on the role of state national attributes and the role of geography in foreign policy respectively. According to Morgenthau the domestic environment of foreign policy is characterised by both unstable and stable and he interprets geography as the most stable factor that determines the power of a nation. For example the location of a state in the international system determines her power and how that state conducts her foreign behaviour. We shall employ

⁶³ H.A Kissinger,.: "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy" in Pfaltzgraff, J (ed.), Politics and the International System, (New York:J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972.), p. 285.

⁶⁴ See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op.cit, chapter 9 and also J.N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, (New York: Random House Press, 1961.)

this argument in explaining that Uganda's landlockedness and her location at the source of the Nile influences her foreign policy process.

Availability or unavailability of natural resources influences the power and consequently the type of a nation's foreign policy behaviour. Such resources include food and raw materials like oil. Morgenthau cites the Indian example in which increases in population led to food scarcity and this constrained her foreign policy process. According to him, raw materials lead to industrialisation and mechanisation of warfare, which translates into national power for Britain was a great power in the nineteenth century because she was self-sufficient in coal and iron. Since the Second World War oil as a source of energy has become important for industry and war and it has made the Middle East attract overwhelming attention in international affairs. Another factor that Morgenthau identifies as affecting the power of a nation is the military and he maintains that the more prepared the military of a state is, the more power that state has for such a military can support the foreign policies of the state. Quality of the population of a nation is a source of power for such population translates into national morale. National morale is said to be the degree with which a nation supports for foreign policies of its government.

Of all the factors that make for the power of a nation however unstable is the quality of diplomacy and this is because diplomacy is for national power in peace while military strategy is for power in war. He concludes by concurring with Rosenau's argument that the type of government of a state determines

⁶⁵ . See N. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy", in J. Pfaltzgraff (ed.), Politics

her power and he identifies three basic characteristics that a good government should possess. First is that such a government should maintain a balance between the material and human resources. Second is that it should keep a balance between such material resources and national power. Lastly the government the foreign policy so chosen is pursued. In a nutshell therefore Morgenthau sought to explain what he thought to be the national attribute of a state informing and shaping its power and foreign policy.

The contribution of Almond and Lippmann⁶⁶ to this study as they sought to explain whether or not public opinion affects a nations foreign policy discourse cannot be overemphasized. And they did this in what they called 'the Almond-Lippmann consensus' and we were only able to access this through what Holsti⁶⁷ calls 'the challenges to the Almond- Lippmann consensus'. The works of Lippmann and Almond was based on a research carried out on the United States of America in the 1950s and arguments therein are based on three basic assumptions. First is the view that the public is volatile and cannot effectively participate in the process of foreign policy, second is that the public lacks coherence and lastly it has no role to play in the conduct and formulation of foreign policy.

The Holstian work propounds the "democratic peace proposition" of Emmanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. However, realists argue that public opinion is a barrier to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy. In the words of

and the International System, op. cit, p.372-377.

⁶⁶ Ole Holsti; The Almond-Lippman Consensus, 1992, p.

⁶⁷ See O. Holsti, The Amond Lippmann Consensus, ibid.

Morgenthau "...rational requirements of a good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational".⁶⁸

On the view that public opinion is volatile, Lippmann established that the public is not qualified to perform the role assigned to it by the democratic theory. Almond held that indeed the public was volatile and panicky. On the view that public lack coherence, Philip Converse found out that the public lacked coherence and it was also shown that the public was moody.

William Caspary⁶⁹ challenged the view that the public opinion is volatile arguing that the American public is characterised by a strong permissive mood. Holsti maintains that the volatility thesis can be tested most directly by individual-level rather than aggregate analysis of opinion data. Achen, Peffley, Hurwitz⁷⁰ supported this view and argued that at the individual level, mass foreign policy attitudes are every bit as stable as foreign policy attitudes. However, most of the evidence in the 1960s pointed towards the conclusion that public opinion is impotence in the foreign policy making process.

⁶⁸ J.H. Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of A Theory of International Relations" in Horace, The role of theory in International Relations (Princeton: D. Van Company. Inc., 1964), p.117. Also see S.A. Gitelson, "Major Shifts in Recent Uganda Foreign Policy", African Affairs vol.76. No.304, July 1977. p.359.

⁶⁹ Caspary..... (1970), p. 546.)

⁷⁰ Achen..... 192a.

Nevertheless, the desire for re-election and the fear of electoral defeat may force a government or a president to succumb to public opinion. Rosenau⁷¹ argues that there are two types of publics: the attentive public and the mass public and that the mass public has no quality. This being the case, he advises governments not to entirely rely on the public when conducting foreign policy adding that the public should only be used to gauge the suitability of foreign policy decisions already made. This literature on public opinion therefore provided us with a framework through which to explain the role the Ugandan public played in the foreign policy process during the period under study.

1.8.2 FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES IN AFRICA AND EAST AFRICA:

The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of an era of many changes in nation-state arrangements and interrelationships. Most importantly was the emergence of new states on the international stage most of which were carved out of former colonial empires⁷². Scholars the world over have therefore attempted to explain the foreign policies of these new states especially in Africa and East Africa with most of the studies taking a comparative approach rather than a single case approach. However both comparative and single case studies demonstrate certain hypotheses derived therefrom and both studies enhance generalization and theory development

⁷¹ See J.N. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies, What, When, How" in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policy, Theories, Findings and Methods, op. cit, p.3-22.

⁷² See R.F Stephens, An analysis of the foreign relations of Kenya and Tanzania. Op.cit. p.1.

as Mwagiru⁷³ maintains. Both types of case studies can be useful since their findings may be suggestive, and give useful pointers to future directions in practice and research. Whichever method is used develops further insights into the field of foreign policy.

Andrew Kiondo⁷⁴, writing on the foreign policy of Tanzania, tries to examine the socio-economic variables. He consistently argues that Tanzania's foreign policy is best explained by external factors. Yash Tandon⁷⁵ while agreeing with him maintains that the formlessness and internal violence that has marked most African countries negates any purposeful influence the domestic environment could have on foreign policy choices. Tandon⁷⁶ therefore takes the view that most foreign policies of African states are best explained using external variables with the colonial legacy being the most important. Citing the case of Uganda, he holds that the seventy years of colonial rule heavily influenced and continues to influence its foreign policy. He laments that the colonial legacy created a dependency relationship between Africa and the West, which continues to determine our foreign policies.

Mukwaya⁷⁷, writing in 2002, shares similar views with Tandon and Okoth. He observes that during the reign of Museveni Uganda's foreign policy, which he

⁷³ M.Mwagiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa, The Uganda Mediation, 1985, (Canterbury: University of Kent, 1994.)

⁷⁴ See Kiondo, "Tanzania's foreign policy: The socio-economic context" in W.O. Oyugi (ed). Politics and Administration in East Africa. Op.cit. p.331-358.

⁷⁵ See Y.Tandon, "An analysis of the Foreign Policy of African States, A case study of Uganda", in K. Ingham (ed), Foreign Relations of African States.. Op.cit.p.191.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ See A.K.K. Mukwaya, The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region.op.cit.

calls "Movementocracy", is mainly influenced by events happening in the Great Lakes Region. Okoth⁷⁸ seeking to explain the foreign policy of Uganda towards the US and argued that apparent formlessness and internal violence marked the domestic environment in Uganda since she attained flag independence in 1962. However Okoth⁷⁹ does not explain the kind of 'formlessness' he alludes to and how it was brought about. In the final analysis he seems to suggest that the main determinant of Uganda's foreign policy has been the external environment. Elsewhere he has sought to explain Uganda's foreign policy towards Kenya and although he argues that Uganda's foreign policy towards Kenya has been interplay of external factors. Most recently Okoth⁸⁰ has sought to explain Uganda's economic relations in the 21st century and he has done so by examining her political leadership since independence. He identifies economic interests as the main factor for which a nation formulates foreign policies and yet there are other variables that constitute national interests such as sovereignty, political and social cultural interests to mention just a few.

⁷⁸ See P.G. "Uganda's Foreign Economic Relations", in P.G. Okoth (ed.), Africa at the beginning of the 21st century, op. cit, p. 287-330.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ P.G. Okoth, "Uganda's Foreign Economic Relations" in P.G. Okoth (ed.), Africa at the beginning of the 21st Century. (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2000), p.287-330

Stephens⁸¹ while writing on the foreign of Kenya and Tanzania consistently argues that personality, style and ideology of the leadership mainly influence the foreign policy decision-making in this region. He also sought to justify his study on two assumptions. First was that interests of countries of East Africa have not been fully formed and secondly that their circumstances are less complex and interest groups fewer. These are just but some of the studies that have been conducted on this region of the world and they greatly inspired this study.

1.8.3 A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE:

There is clearly, therefore, an expansive literature on the general subject of the influence of internal factors in foreign policy decision-making behaviour. However, there is scarcity of literature that directly discusses the influence of internal factors on Uganda's foreign policy and there are many gaps that one discerns. Firstly is internal factors of foreign policy have been discussed without reference to any particular country. Most of these studies have not used examples of countries to generate data and indicators, which could be used to predict foreign policy behaviour. The few studies that have attempted to do so have employed examples of countries with high levels of economic growth and liberal democratic regimes. This study seeks to fill in this gap firstly by employing an example of a country with low levels of economic growth and this is Uganda. Secondly since these studies were done in the periods between 1960s and early 1980s, it would be worth examining them up to the current period to determine whether or not they are applicable.

⁸¹ See R.F. Stephens, An analysis of the foreign relations of Kenya and Tanzania, a

Researchers on the influence of external factors of foreign policy of Uganda do not adequately capture internal circumstances of foreign policy such as leadership, geography, the characteristics of Uganda as a state as well as public opinion. In this regard they fall short of explaining leadership aspects such as ideological dispensation and nationalism. They also do not exhaustively explain idiosyncratic values of those who take decisions on behalf of the state. Closely linked to this is their failure to adequately inquire into how the national attributes of Uganda, which include natural resources, the military and the level of economic development influences its foreign policy choices. This study is therefore an attempt to inquire into the influence of such internal factors in the foreign policy of Uganda.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

Hoffman⁸² defines theory as a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principle variables, to explain behaviour and to reveal the characteristics types of relations among national behaviour units. Singer⁸³ defines it as “a body of internally consistent empirical generalizations of descriptive, predictive and explanatory power”. Thus, a theory is an analytical tool that facilitates study, analysis and understanding of certain phenomena.

Various scholars have adopted different approaches in studying foreign policy. This is due to the fact that foreign policy studies continue to be of academic and national importance. In this study we shall adopt the world

comparative study, op.cit

⁸² See S. Hoffman, “Theory and International Relations” in J.N. Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York: Free Prss, 1969.),p. 46.

systems theory approach to describe, explain, analyse and predict the influence of internal factors in Uganda's foreign policy. It is however necessary to examine other approaches in the study of foreign policy in order to justify why this particular approach has been adopted.

The first is the dependency theory, which emphasise the role of external factors in foreign policy of a state. Mukwaya⁸⁴ has used what he calls "Alternative Development Theory" which is a view within the dependency theory to explain Uganda's foreign policy. He argues that issues such as globalisation, the potential for a state actor to influence, and the need to consider relationships between power positions and serious exclusion as major causes of insecurity locally, nationally, regionally and globally. He falls back to the assertion that marginalisation of a state contributes to insecurity in the international system. This theory therefore explains external factors and not internal factors. Consequently it cannot adequately address our research problem.

The second is the power theory approach. This is based on realism. The realist school of thought sees the state as the main actor in the international system. It starts from the premise that universal conformity is not possible, hence internal conflicts will always arise and persist⁸⁵. This arises from the fact that few nation-states are willing to surrender their sovereignty to

⁸³ See D. Singer, The Theory and Practice of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970.)

⁸⁴ Mukwaya, Ugandan Movementocracracy foreign policy and the Great Lakes region, Op.cit. p. 4.

⁸⁵ See J.H. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations, op.cit, chapter 9.

international institutions, which are bound to fail since they lack power to sustain nation-states. Furthermore, the realists contend that the responsibility of each state is to promote the interests of its people against the opposition of other groups in the international system. To the realists therefore the behaviour of the international system can best be understood in terms of international politics defined as a "struggle for power".

The realists are therefore convinced that the key to international relations is the history of power politics. Herein one finds the flaw of the power theory. Power theory with its faith in the balance of power system is one directional. Power is presented as an end in itself which states must pursue at all times. This theory is therefore static and does not take cognition of the changing environment in international system. Moreover the power theory sees power as an independent variable, whereas power can also be a dependent variable. Likewise the theory contains a near dogmatic belief in its presentation of power as the vital national interest that states pursue and defend above all else. A further complication arises when one considers the problem of identifying the national interest. This is because the term 'national interest' means different things to different people. Foreign policy decision-making is not necessarily a clear cut and rational process. Policies are often generated through great internal political and bureaucratic debates. We therefore find that this approach would be inappropriate in our study.

The third approach often used in the study of foreign policy is the rational actor model. Scholars who use this model see governmental behaviour as

"more less purposive acts of unified governments based on logical means of achieving given objectives as Graham Allison⁸⁶, Burton, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin⁸⁷ maintain. The model represents an effort to relate an action to a plausible coalition. This approach views decision-makers as solitary actors searching to maximize their goals in global politics. The rational actor model assumes that the statesman will make decisions, which are in the best interest of the country. This is based on the assumption that he receives all the necessary information before making a decision. The advantage of this model is largely derived from the simplicity of the model as it is an inexpensive approximate of reality. This approach has been particularly useful in analyzing war periods since it allows one to understand the revolving issues with a maximum of complexity.

But the approach's drawbacks are enormous, since it is obvious that both internal and external factors shape foreign policy. A more serious weakness to this approach is that it assumes a rational calculation on the part of the decision-maker, which is an ideal situation, but one that is seldom realized. Although the rational actor model has proved useful for many purposes, there is need for it to be supplemented by models that focus on internal factors of foreign policy such as governmental machinery, leadership, the characteristics of the state, geography, the domestic structure of the country and personality of the leaders. The world systems approach, which we have

⁸⁶ See G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", American Political Science Review Vol. 63 (1969), p.689-718.

⁸⁷ See Sapin et al (eds.). Foreign Policy Decision-making. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.), p. 1.

adopted in this study, strives to capture the internal factors that influence the foreign policy decision-making behaviour.

Emmanuel Wallerstein⁸⁸ propounded this theory and according to him a system is a set of patterned interactions, in which behaviour has a certain reason and where at some level of abstractions can make generalizations⁸⁹. According to the world system theorists, a pattern means time while interaction implies some structure. Systems have boundaries that are marked by discontinuities in terms of quantity and quality of interactions. This view therefore affirms that international relations is a system involving different transactions.

The world systems theory examines the international system from the perspective of the developing world, core versus the periphery⁹⁰. It maintains that the state is the tool of the dominant economic class in the society. According to the world systems theorists the real actors in the international system are classes. They further hold that the location of a state in the global network of capitalism facilitates this. They take the view that the process characterizing international relations is that of exploitation, imperialism and underdevelopment.

⁸⁸ See E. Wallerstein, 'The Range of Choice: Constraints of governments of Contemporary African Independent States' in Michael Lofchie (ed.), The State of The Nations. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.), p.19-33.

⁸⁹ See McClelland, 1972, p.111

⁹⁰ See Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations,(1987), 275.

According to this theory, exploitation of the poor by the rich is done through the class struggle⁹¹. They see classes as the fundamental social units, each generated and defined by economic conditions. They argue that the state arose from the need to hold class antagonism in check. These theorists further argue that classes clash in their interest to take political power and it is in the light of this theory that we examine how internal factors shape Uganda's foreign policy.

1.10 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION:

Library research constituted the main source of information. Consequently, this study is essentially documentary based mainly on secondary sources of data. These sources include published and unpublished materials such as books, newspapers, journals, reports, public documents, seminar papers, bulletins, magazines and encyclopedias. In using these sources, informal interviews with relevant officials were conducted to fill the gaps that occurred from the secondary sources. In this regard we interviewed relevant scholars, officials at the Ugandan Embassy and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1.11 HYPOTHESES:

From the literature review and the theoretical framework, we generate the following hypotheses:

1. In states with low levels of economic growth internal factors are more likely to influence foreign policy than in countries with high levels of economic growth.

⁹¹ See Roberts. 1983. 241.

2. In states with low levels of economic growth external factors tend to influence foreign policy.
3. There is no relationship between levels of economic growth and factors shaping foreign policy.

1.12 GENERAL OUTLINE OF STUDY:

Thus, the following chapter (chapter two) provides an overview of the domestic factors that influence or shape foreign policy and demonstrates the interrelatedness of these factors. Chapter three is an assessment of the domestic political environment in Uganda since independence. Chapter four is an overview of the foreign policy process in Britain (a country with high levels of economic growth). Chapter five consists of a critical analysis in which we have attempted to examine the extent to which the internal factors influenced Uganda's foreign policy. Our summary, conclusions and recommendations are carried out in chapter six.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT FOREIGN POLICY.

2.0. INTRODUCTION:

We all know that foreign policy of any country is shaped by both internal and external factors. External factors are those that are outside the political boundaries of the state in question such as international organizations and other states. Internal factors that affect foreign policy are those found within the political boundaries of such a state. These include state national attributes, geography, the role of the domestic structure, public opinion, leadership and individuals. This chapter provides an overview of these internal factors that shape foreign policy.

Foreign policy of every state, it is argued, deals first with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its national interests⁹². Countries spend labor, resources and efforts in pursuit of what their governments, elite and peoples consider their national interest. A state engages in the conduct and formulation of foreign policies to achieve specific goals aimed at preserving her national interests such as to defend her territory, to enhance her economic well being and prestige and to ensure stability in the international system.

⁹²See S.S Mushi, Foreign Policy of Tanzania. (Dar es Salaam: Publishing House, 1981), p.4.

2.1 THE CONCEPT 'NATIONAL INTEREST' IN FOREIGN POLICY:

There is no consensus as to what constitutes a nation's national interest.' However, a number of scholars have attempted to define it and one of them is Hartman⁹³. Writing in 1978 he defines national interest as those things that states could or seek to do in their relations with other states. He maintains that states define their national interests very differently depending on the prevailing circumstances and as such national interests should not be thought as graven in a stone or as inevitable parts of a nation's foreign policy once identified. A state's concept of national interest arise out of a complex and not entirely rational interaction between the lessons its people absorb from the exterior environment and the nature of its own society. In any event national interests perceived by the nation fall into two categories, vital and secondary. Vital interests are those for which the state is normally willing to fight for/to protect immediately or ultimately. States do not usually give such vital interests serious alternative thoughts and they include the protection of the existing territory and the preservation of their prestige. By contrast, secondary interests cover all the myriad desires of individual states that they would like to attain but for which they will not fight.

Because any state can decide to pursue an extravagant list of vital interests whose achievement is only possible at some other state's expense, war and violence are always potential in the international system. There is no magic formula that ensures that the interests and, therefore, the foreign policies of states will prove compatible. If opposed policies are pursued and prove

⁹³ Hartman (1978), op.cit. p8.

irreconcilable, short of war and if the state furthering these policies persists in them, force is the final resort.

Secondary interests are the stuff of diplomatic compromise and one interest can be obtained by giving up another in negotiation. Closely related to concept of national interest is the issue of security. Security is a relative condition for any one state as long as others continue to exist. However a state will seek to make itself secure from loses of its territory and population. Security is more desired by states than peace per se and as such although war has its horrors, dangers and uncertainties, state s will prefer to endure it than compromise its national territory. However, given that security is the sum total of the vital interests of a state and because a vital interest is one for which a nation is willing to resort to war or force either immediately or ultimately the concept of national security will vary from state to state.

National interests change as the world situation changes, for they are not only relative to the interests and power of other states and, as these are perceived by the state formulating its policy. The dynamic nature of national interests in the foreign policy planning process is what necessitates the continual re-evaluation of foreign policy that is characteristic of the modern nation-state. Having distinguished the concept foreign policy from other related concepts – diplomacy, international politics and international relations; and having defined what constitutes national interests, it is to the domestic sources of foreign policy that this chapter now turns to.

According to Mushi⁹⁴ and Robinson⁹⁵ domestic refers to that which is not external. This means that besides the external environment there are certain factors within the state boundaries that influence her conduct of foreign behaviour. These factors include the states national attributes and capabilities, geography, the domestic structure, public opinion, leadership and idiosyncratic values of the statesman. We now examine how each of these factors influences foreign policy decision-making process.

2.2. NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES / CAPABILITIES IN FOREIGN POLICY:

According to Akehurst⁹⁶, a state must satisfy three conditions to qualify as one of the basic political units in the international political system. It must have a well-defined territory, population and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and conducting transactions with other actors in the international system. Northedge while concurring with Akehurst⁹⁷, takes the view that although a state may be able to control its territory, and even to achieve the loyalty of its population, it needs recognition as a territorial association of people for purposes of international law and diplomacy and as an equal member of the system of states. This recognition enables the state to effectively participate in everyday international transactions, which constitute a significant aspect of statehood.

⁹⁴ See S.S. Mushi, The Foreign Policy of Tanzania. Op.cit. p.5.

⁹⁵ See T.W. Robinson, "The National Interest", in Sondeman F.A., The Theory and Practice of International Relations. (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall Inc., 1970), p.13.

⁹⁶ See M. Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention", in Bull, H. Intervention in World Politics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p95-115.

Morgenthau⁹⁸ and Smythe⁹⁹ share the argument that foreign policies are made by states. Morgenthau argues that until the time of Napoleon Wars, only small groups of the population identified themselves with the foreign policy of their nations giving the impression that foreign policies were truly not national but dynastic policies. According to Morgenthau¹⁰⁰ there are stable and unstable factors that influencing the foreign policy of a nation.

Morgenthau¹⁰¹ identifies geography as the most stable factor that shapes the power of a nation. The location of the United States of America, he maintains, for instance, is a permanent and important factor that guides the foreign policies of other states towards her. Other geographical factors that guide foreign policy are the Alps that separates Italy from the rest of Europe; possibility of nuclear war has enhanced the importance of the size of territory as a source of national power. This is because in order to make nuclear threat credible, a nation requires a territory large enough to dispense its industrial and population centers as well as its nuclear installations.

Natural resources such as food, raw materials and oil influence the power of a nation. A nation that is not self-sufficient in food must import. Britain for example, between the two world wars, had her power threatened due to insufficiency in food. Self-sufficiency in food is a source of strength while

⁹⁷ See M. Arkehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention" ,in Bull, H. Intervention in World Politics. Ibid, p.100.

⁹⁸ See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Op. Cit, p. 1-56.

⁹⁹ See Smythe (1980), op. Cit. p 122.

¹⁰⁰ Please see H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Peace and Justice. Op. Cit. Chapter 9.

¹⁰¹ See H. Morgenthau, ibid

scarcity of food is a source of weakness in international politics. Morgenthau gives an example of India in which an increase in population led to a decrease in food productivity and this handicapped her foreign policy process.

Raw materials are needed for industrial production and for waging of war. A nation's level of technological advancement and level of self-sufficiency in raw materials determine the kind of war she can engage in. The United States is closest to self-sufficiency in raw materials and it also controls sources of raw materials, which it does not produce. Uranium, which is used to make nuclear weapons, is seen as the most important raw material.

Oil has become a very important source of energy for industry and war since the Second World War. Oil drives most mechanized weapons and vehicles. Regions and countries that have this resource greatly influence interactions in the international system. Examples include the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. Technological development enhances this power of oil.

Morgenthau and Herman¹⁰² share the view that the industrial capacity of a nation is a source of power. Industrialisation therefore defines the power of a nation. Congo, for example, has uranium but she is not powerful because she is not industrialized. Because of the technology of modern warfare, transportation and communications, industrialisation has become an

¹⁰² See M. Herman, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders", in Internal Studies Quarterly, Vol.24, No. 1, 1980, p. 7-46.

indispensable aspect of the power of a nation. The leading industrialized nations are the great powers.

The power of a nation can also be assessed in terms of its military preparedness. This implies that a powerful state is one whose military is capable of supporting the foreign policies it pursues. There are certain factors that help us determine the military preparedness of a state. Such factors include technological innovations, leadership, quality and quantity of the armed forces.

In terms of technology, suffice is to mention that nations with sophisticated and advanced technology have won wars and remained powerful in the international system. This is best illustrated by the four major innovations in the technique of warfare that the twentieth century has witnessed. These innovations include the use of sub-marines, the tanker, use of air and use of nuclear weapons. However, it is the use of nuclear weapons that poses the greatest threat to international peace and security. Therefore in order to use nuclear weapons to achieve state objectives it is required that the state using such weapons must reduce their yield to approximate that of conventional weapons.

Quality of military leadership determines national power. For instance, the power of Prussia in the eighteenth century was a reflection of the military genius of Fredrick the Great and of the strategic and tactical innovations he introduced. Quality and quantity of armed forces influences national power

and so the military should not be too small or too large to perform the required functions. Because population is one of the factors upon which the power of a nation rests it is a qualitative element that influences national power.

National character and national moral influences a nation's strength in international politics. National character is composed of virtually all the citizens of a nation. These include those who act for the nation in peace and in war, those who make decisions, those who execute the policies so made and those who elect and are elected, producers and consumers.

National moral refers to the degree of determination with which a nation supports the policies of its government in peace or in war. This degree of determination is exhibited through public opinion, industrial production, military establishment and diplomatic service. Public opinion to a great extent guides the United States' influence in international affairs. This public opinion is expressed through votes of congress, election results, polls and the media.

The quality of government influences the power of a nation¹⁰³. A society that feels it is deprived of human rights and freedom will have a low national moral. The converse is true. Autocratic governments, for example, hardly rely on popular support for their foreign policies¹⁰⁴. A state with unbridgeable class

¹⁰³ See P.A. Reynold, An Introduction to International relations. Op. Cit p.53.

¹⁰⁴ See H. Kissinger, "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy", in Pfaltzgraff, J. (ed), Politics and the International System. (New York: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1972), p.385.

divisions will find its national moral in a precarious state. While force and decrees drive totalitarian regimes, a democracy is driven by popular support.

The power of a nation is also influenced by the quality of diplomacy it engages in. Diplomacy is an instrument for seeking national power not only in peace but also during war by the states themselves or through third parties. This is opposed to military strategy, which is an instrument through which a nation seeks national power in war. Nations must rely on their diplomacy to act as a catalyst for the different factors that constitute their power.

The quality of government determines the nature of a country's foreign policy. Good governance is key to effective foreign policy. Such a government guarantees the security of its citizens, effective use of its resources and relies on public support for the foreign policies it pursues. A good government must choose the objectives and methods of its foreign policy in view of the power available to support them with maximum chance of success.

A government must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its domestic and foreign policies. In the contemporary world, foreign policy is pursued through the military, diplomacy and propaganda. This is because the struggle for power in the world today is not only for military supremacy and political domination, but also in a specific sense, a struggle for the minds of men. Therefore the power of a nation depends on the skill of diplomacy, and the support of the other nations. Both domestic and foreign policy discourses

are therefore intertwined. Attributes of nations are extremely useful in explaining foreign policy behaviour¹⁰⁵.

2.3. GEOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN POLICY:

According to Spykman¹⁰⁶ and Reynolds¹⁰⁷ geography is an important aspect of foreign policy decision-making. Spykman further observes that although widely separated regions in the international system can function as relatively autonomous power zones, no area in the world can be completely independent of the others¹⁰⁸. He maintains that Europe was the original centre of military power and it was the European balance that was reflected in other sections of the world. Spykman¹⁰⁹ and the Sprouts¹¹⁰ are of the view that isolationist and interventionist foreign policy of America is shaped by geography.

2.4. THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE:

Henry Kissinger¹¹¹ maintains that the domestic structure is taken as given and that foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. He further holds that if the domestic structure is based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develop. Stable domestic structure therefore facilitates foreign policy decision-making.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p.389.

¹⁰⁶ See N. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy", in J. Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the international system, Op. Cit p.373.

¹⁰⁷ See P.Reynolds, An introduction to international relations. Op. Cit. P.1

¹⁰⁸ See for example, Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy", in J. Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the International System. Op. Cit.p.379.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p.380.

¹¹⁰ See Margaret and Harold Sprout , (1972), op.cit. p378

¹¹¹ See H. Kissinger, "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy", in J. Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the Internal System, Op. Cit.p.285.

Unstable domestic structure inhibits the conduct of international affairs. Kissinger¹¹² identifies the crucial role played by bureaucracy in the foreign policy process. He however cautions that the bureaucracy can be counter-productive if it is irrelevant to the problem.

2.5. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY:

The major works discussing public opinion and foreign policy is that of Almond and Lippmann otherwise known as the 'Almond- Lippmann Consensus,' as expounded by Ole Holsti¹¹³. The 'Almond-Lippmann Consensus' was a result of extensive research after the Second World War. This consensus was premised on three basic assumptions. Firstly was the proposition that the public is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies. Secondly is the assumption that the public lacks coherence and lastly is the view that in the final analysis, the public has little if any role to play in the conduct of foreign policy.

The question as to whether or not the public has a role to play in the process of foreign policy has triggered a debate between the liberal democrats and realists in foreign policy. Liberal democrats maintain that democracies do not go to war with each other. They therefore propose the democratic peace proposition and that democracies are always at peace with each other. Realists such as Morgenthau¹¹⁴ argue that public opinion is a barrier to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy since it is moody. The public, according to

¹¹² See H. Kissinger, *ibid*.

¹¹³ See O. R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", in International Studies Quarterly, (1992), p. 439-466.

¹¹⁴ See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op.cit, chapter 9.

realists, can only deal with local issues affecting their lives. The public would therefore jeopardise the process of foreign policy. It is these three basic assumptions that guided the Almond-Lippmann Consensus that we should now examine.

(a) Public opinion is volatile:

Lippman¹¹⁵ propounded this argument. He maintains that the public is not informed to play the role assigned to it by the classical democratic theory. The public is uninterested and uninformed about foreign affairs. Almond maintains that public opinion is volatile and mood driven. He further argues that the public is apathetic when it should be concerned and panicky when it should be calm. Morgenthau, Bailey¹¹⁶ and George Kennan supported this view.

While Lippmann called for stronger executive prerogatives in foreign affairs, Bailey wondered whether or not the requirements of an effective foreign policy make it necessary for the executive to mislead the public.

(b) Public opinion lacks structure and coherence:

In a classic study based on data from the late 1950's and early 1960's, Phillip Converse concluded that the political realm of the mass public lack coherence. However, his analysis of congressional candidates revealed substantially higher correlation among responses to various issues. His findings made him to conclude that mass political beliefs are best described as non-attitudes. These findings became the centre of active debate.

¹¹⁵ See the Lippmann (1980), p.239.

Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1964) as well as Rosenau (1961) supported him.

(c) Public opinion has limited impact on foreign policy:

Ole Holsti¹¹⁷ reports that immediately after the Second World War, some political leaders saw public opinion as playing a role in foreign policy. Such political leaders included Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson and Stephen Douglas. This could not withstand serious empirical scrutiny. Bernard Cohen demonstrated in a critical survey of literature, however, that the view that public opinion constrains the process of foreign policy was often asserted but rarely demonstrated. Cohen's research on foreign policy bureaucracy indicated that state department officials had a rather modest interest in public opinion (Cohen: 1973,1). However, other researchers such as Lipset and Paterson maintain that the president has almost a free hand in the conduct of foreign affairs.

However the war in Vietnam brought about renaissance of interest in public opinion. Those who had believed in the 'almost single hand' of the president in the conduct of foreign affairs came to re-examine their stand. As a result, analysts began to challenge the important aspects of the Almond- Lippmann Consensus. We now examine these challenges.

¹¹⁶ Bailey (1978).....

¹¹⁷ See O. R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", in International Studies Quarterly (1992), p. 439-466.

The first challenge is on whether or not the public is volatile. This challenge first came from Caspary (1980). He argued that Almond had relied on a single question in which he asked respondents to identify 'the most important issue' in America at that time. Caspary (1980), after his research concluded that the American public was characterised by a strong permissive mood.

Ole Holsti¹¹⁸ argues that individual level rather than aggregate analysis of opinion data can test the volatility thesis most directly. However it is important to emphasise that none of these challenges to the Lippmann- Almond thesis is based on some newly found evidence and that the public is in fact well informed about foreign affairs.

Challenge number two is on whether or not public attitudes lack structure and coherence. Almond and Lippmann arrived at various conclusions. Firstly they found out that even though the general public may be rather poorly informed, attitudes about foreign affairs are in fact structured in at least moderately coherent ways. They further maintain that a single isolationist-to-internationalist dimension inadequately describes the main dimensions of public opinion on international affairs. On the last challenge on whether or not public opinion was really impotent, most of the research conducted in the 1960's pointed toward the conclusion that public opinion is impotence in the foreign policy making process.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

From the foregoing discussion it emerges that public opinion's role in foreign policy process depends on the nature of the government. In open political systems where elections are free and fair, the desire for re-election and the fear of electoral defeat may force a government or the president to succumb to public opinion. A good example is the case of the United States during its war with Vietnam¹¹⁹. The then US president, Johnson, was not able to seek re-election because of the kind of decisions he made regarding the war. President Johnson had maintained that neither the general public nor their representatives wanted to 'lose South Vietnam to communism'. The decision was made based on how he perceived the threat of communism in South East to American power. However it took long to win the war and the American people were completely dissatisfied. They vehemently criticized President Johnson who decided not to seek re-election. Furthermore the way the government of Nixon handled the issue led to the electoral defeat of the Republicans paving way for Jimmy Carter to take power.

Idealists and liberal democrats argue that the public should play a role in the foreign policy process. For them war is caused by statesmen. They maintain that the public hates war. Kant while concurring with Allison takes the view that to prevent war, public opinion has to be made truly influential to public matters. Liberals justify the contention that republican governments are less likely to declare war. The general public will make sure that they do not engage in war. This is because they pay taxes and elect leaders. The idea of

¹¹⁹ See G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", in American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (1969), op. Cit. p. 689-718.

democratic peace proposition has been guiding the policy of the US especially after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

The public control liberal democratic governments. It supervises actions of statesmen who, according to liberal democrats, are responsible for mayhem. Public opinion gets to the foreign policy process through the media. Foreign policy practitioners and the media are both involved in the gathering of information about foreign policy. The media has therefore been able to influence foreign policy. This relationship between the media and foreign policy need to be looked at carefully. In considering these we identify three competing interests. Firstly is the public's right to know. To know what and when should they know. Secondly is whether or not the government should suppress issues or policies that would hurt national interest. Lastly is whether or not it is the right of the media to report fully to the public the interests of the governments; when should the media report and on whose authority.

Interests of foreign policy and those of the media intersect most sharply. However, usually, it is the government that sets the foreign policy agenda. The media shapes the outcome of the agenda. How events are reported affects policy-makers directly or indirectly. The decision-maker takes a decision and the media reports it. The policy maker reads it and as a result of the reading, he may modify the policy. Events including actions of governments are reported. The public reads and reacts to them. Those reactions are feed to policy makers and the makers may modify, adjust or

scrap the policy choice. The media is therefore a mediator in the policy - making process.

The media synthesizes opinion polls, for example. This means that for the public to play an important role in the foreign policy process, it must be a well-informed public. Whether or not the public has a role to play in the foreign policy process therefore depends on the level of literacy and how best the society can filter issues relevant to it. It also depends on the nature of government and whether or not that government guarantees freedom of press.

Rosenau argues that we have two types of publics; the mass public and the attentive public¹²⁰. The mass public includes a preponderant majority of the population. Its members pay little, if any, attention to international affairs. Being uninformed about foreign policy issues they lack structured opinions. The attentive public is always a very small group of the population. Members may have high incomes and more formal education than that of the mass public. This type of public plays a significant role in the foreign policy process but it does not include participation in the opinion making process itself. The mass public does not play a significant role. This is because it is emotional, irrational, spontaneous and volatile. The mass public can therefore be a destabilizing factor. Morgenthau advises governments not be slaves to the public.

Since foreign policy process contain decision-making and implementation, public opinion comes in at both stages. At information stage it brings in input while at the execution level, it can constrain the foreign policy process.

In the final analysis does public opinion really matter? This question can be answered using the case of the US. One important observation is that a democratic government has got an ideological need for public support. Leaders in such governments therefore do not want to spoil their chances of re-election. However, the public is used in most cases to support decisions already made. It is therefore mostly used to gauge the suitability of foreign policy choices already made. Closely related to public opinion in foreign policy is the role of leadership to which we now turn our attention.

2.6. LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY:

Margaret Herman¹²¹ recognizes four aspects determining how leadership affects the foreign policy process. These are nationalism, belief in internal control over events, cognitive complexity and dogmatism. Nationalism refers to one's loyalty to his nation. How nationalistic the head of state is, influences the way he makes his foreign policy choices. According to Herman, the more nationalistic the leader is the more conflictual his nation's foreign policy will be. This is because such a leader will be less dependent on other nations. He will therefore engage in foreign policy choices that are mainly informed by the domestic environment. Such a leader will put emphasis on skillful diplomacy.

¹²⁰ See J.N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. (New York: Random House Press, 1961), p.35.

¹²¹ C.Herman, "Do Nation Type Account for Foreign Policy Behaviour", in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing Foreign Policy: Theories, Findings and Methods, Op. Cit.p.7.

Belief in internal control over events refers to the belief to exercise control over the situations in which the leader is involved. A leader who believes he has such control over events will initiate more foreign policy actions. He will be alert and well informed about the future of his nation.

Cognitive complexity defines the degree of differentiation a leader shows when observing or contemplating his environment. Such a leader will not only rely on diplomatic skills, but also on economic and cultural skills in her nation's behaviour towards other nations in the international system. The international system, according to Holsti¹²², is a set of attributes, established power relations and patterns of interaction. Such a leader will want his nation to cooperate with as many other nations as possible. He will therefore tend to support cooperation rather than conflict in the international system.

Dogmatism refers to beliefs and disbelief about reality. A nation led by a very dogmatic leader is usually resistant to change¹²³. It will, however, put a lot of emphasis on procedural matters. Such a leader is also described as being conservative and will only want to respect established ideas.

Studies have also been conducted on whether or not the idiosyncratic values and perceptions of leaders affect their foreign policy choices¹²⁴. The data suggest that aggressive leaders are high in need for power, low in conceptual

¹²² See K.J. Holsti, The International System, a Framework for Analysis, op. Cit. Also see K.J. Holsti, "Retreat from Utopia, International Relations Theory 1945-1970", in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol.4. June 1971 p165-177.

¹²³ See C. Herman. "Do nation type account for foreign policy behaviour" Op. Cit.p. 7.

¹²⁴ See C.Herman, ibid. Also see C. Herman, Leadership and Foreign Policy, op, cit, p.467.

complexity, distrustful of others, nationalistic and likely to believe that they have control over events in which they are involved. In contrast the data suggests that conciliatory leaders are high in need for affiliation, high in conceptual complexity, trust others, less nationalistic and have the ability to control the events in which they are involved.

Herman identifies four types of personal characteristics, which include beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style. Belief refers to fundamental assumptions about the world. It defines what the leader sees as the most important belief for his nation. Nationalism is often used as reason for a specific political leader's actions particularly in discussions of Third World countries. Decision style means the preferred methods of making decisions and it comprises openness to new information and risk taking. Decision style constitutes a leader's operational code⁶¹. Lastly interpersonal style refers to the characteristic ways in which a policy maker deals with other policy-makers. There are two types of personal styles-paranoia and Machiavellianism. Whereas paranoia constitutes excessive suspicion, Machiavellianism denotes manipulative behaviour.

For foreign policy to be effective the leader must see the process as a passion and must be trained in foreign affairs. Closely linked to leadership and foreign policy is the question of whether or not individuals count in the process of foreign policy.

2.7. INDIVIDUALS AND FOREIGN POLICY:

Harvey Starr¹²⁵ conducted a study on Kissinger and reports that individuals do play a role in foreign policy process. Kissinger is one of the major foreign policy phenomena of our time. His background, style of behaviour, foreign policy positions, relationships with presidents Nixon and Ford and his preeminence in American foreign policy has fascinated scholars

As the national Security Adviser, Kissinger controlled the apparatus of the national council. He chaired the five major interagency committees that supervised foreign policy: the Washington Special Action Group dealing with crises, the Defense Programs Review Committee, the Vietnam Special Studies Group, the Forty Committee dealing with covert intelligence operations, and the Verification Panel¹²⁶.

It seems that in the case of Kissinger, individuals did count. Kissinger⁶⁵ had the official position, the unofficial 'clout' and the opportunity to shape and execute foreign policy of America. In his Harvard College senior thesis, *The Meaning of History*, Kissinger observed that every body is a product of an age, a nation and environment, and he constitutes what is essentially unapproachable by analysis, the form of the form, the creative essence of history, the moral personality⁶⁶.

¹²⁵ See H. Starr, "The Kissinger Years, Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1980, op. cit, p. 465-496.

¹²⁶ See H. Starr, *ibid*.

In studying the role of individuals in foreign policy Kissinger's recollection and reconstruction of his time in office is an important source of data about his beliefs, values, attitudes and the reasons behind his decisions and behaviour⁶⁷. Psychological studies were also done on Kissinger by drawing his portrait through history, chronology and descriptive detail. This was done through examining his biographies. These biographies set forth the public record of policy while he was in office and the facts about his life before he became a high level decision-maker. These biographical and psychological studies revealed Kissinger's operational code. Operational code analysis has been done on Kissinger's pre-office academic writings with the objective of delineating his belief system upon taking office.

A study on Kissinger was also done through examining his memoirs. These academic writings revealed Kissinger as an honest man with a consistent belief system and operational code⁶⁸. Kissinger's writings reflected 'continuity' in that his philosophy and political style appear to be essentially the same for the decision-maker and the academic. Kissinger therefore turned scholarship into projective biography. He developed, articulated and outlined his operational code and provided a guide to his future behaviour. In fact he kept on referring to his Ph.D. thesis, *A World Restored*, in his statements as a decision-maker.

One aspect of White House Years and Kissinger's career has been the issue of Kissinger's relationship with Richard Nixon. It is argued that Kissinger disliked Nixon as a person and loved Nixon as president for his foreign policy

performance. He held Nixon as the best negotiator he ever knew. He also praised Nixon's belief on the creation of peace and world order. Kissinger also praises Nixon for understanding geopolitics and the capabilities of competing states.

Kissinger, it is argued, sought out men who would equal his intellectual capabilities. His relationship with Nixon was formal and intellectual and that the two men never became friends. They both hated bureaucracy especially in instances where it would drug their feet in decision-making. It is argued that Kissinger's antipathy to bureaucratic constraints on the statesman and diplomacy goes back to his discussion of the statesman in a *World Restored*. Kissinger's experiences with both Kennedy and Johnson administrations only served to reinforce his views of bureaucratic constraints.

Kissinger's instrumental beliefs revolved around the central theme of negotiations as the tool of the statesman and how the statesman uses force and diplomacy. According to Kissinger, a legitimate state uses diplomacy to achieve limited objectives. His memoirs, *White House Years* provide us with one source of data on an important era in America's foreign policy process. Just as Kissinger searched the clues to the personality and worldview of the leaders with whom he would be dealing, he had a clear and consistent worldview or belief system of his own and he acted on it. He was concerned with certain values and not with others; concerned with order, limits and restraint and a psychological perspective on how one forged agreement with opponents.

2.8 CONCLUSION:

Despite the fact that both external environment and internal factors affect foreign policy, we concentrated on the internal factors. We examined the following factors: state national attributes, leadership, public opinion, individuals and personal characteristic of leaders. The attributes of a nation such as natural and human resources, the military and food security affect a nation's foreign policy. The type of leadership affect foreign policy and in this regard we considered aspects such as liberal democratic principles as opposed to dictatorial ones. We further noted that although leaders formulate policies and in most cases only turn to the public for approval, public opinion plays a key role in shaping foreign policy. Individuals and the offices they occupy as well as their idiosyncrasies go along way in influencing foreign policy. From the discussion we discerned that these factors are interrelated and none can dispense with the other.

CHAPTER THREE

UGANDA'S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

3.0 INTRODUCTION:

This chapter is an examination of the domestic political environment in Uganda since independence. It analyses the regimes of Obote, Amin, and Museveni. However in this introductory remarks we find it imperative to provide some background information about Uganda. Uganda is one of the countries in East Africa and was colonized by the British and got her independence in 1962 and became a republic in 1963. Just like many states in Africa, Ugandan State is a product of colonial rule¹²⁷. It was created basically to serve the interests of foreigners who needed an administrative apparatus that they would use for the purpose of control. Consequently the state has been an oppressive one and one of its major roles is to manipulate the economy for the purpose of those who control the state. The state in Africa is an inherited state with various characteristics such as patron-clientilism and ethnic mobilization structures of dominance. These give the impression of a strong state. Otherwise in reality the state in Africa and particularly in East Africa is very weak and is unable to enforce its own laws and regulations as it fails to provide for the needs of its citizens. The state is characterised by extreme centralization of power, which is attributed to various factors. First is the colonial legacy¹²⁸ in which power was centralized in the office of the governor and freedom fighters studied this and found it to be good for they discovered that it ensured that one stayed in power. Second

¹²⁷ See R.F. Stephens, An Analysis of the Foreign Relations of Kenya and Tanzania, A Comparative Study, (Michigan:Michigan University Press, 1973.) Op. Cit. p1.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

is the loss of political legitimacy and it is argued that the three East African countries forgot about their differences to fight the colonialists. At independence the differences started to re-emerge and as a result those who held state power felt threatened and opted for political engineering¹²⁹ so as to stay in power. As states lose legitimacy they become more and more oppressive. The third factor is that states in East Africa have experimented with a number of ideologies. While Kenya was sympathetic to the capitalist ideology, Tanzania and Uganda¹³⁰ experimented with socialism. For example Tanzania in 1967 adopted the Arusha declaration which installed "ujamaa" and in 1969, Obote's Uganda argued for the "move to the left" However all the three states in East Africa wanted socialism so as to divert attention from their colonial masters' ideologies and joined the non-aligned movement. As the states lost legitimacy and adopted one party rule¹³¹ they became undemocratic and they could not call for elections regularly, ignored the rule of law and began to infringe on the rights and freedoms of individuals. Lastly is that most states in Africa have failed to achieve what they set out to achieve at independence and have been unable to effectively regulate behaviour among citizens. Leaders flout laws and have failed to implement plans towards development but have succeeded in making their presence felt throughout the society. This has particularly been the case in Uganda under the reigns of Milton Apollo Obote, Idi Amin Dada and Yoweri Museveni and it is these regimes that we now discuss.

¹²⁹ See A. Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation Building in East Africa, (Northwestern Press, 1972), p12.

¹³⁰ See H. Bienen, Armies and Parties in Africa, (New York: African Publishing Company, 1978), p12.

¹³¹ See P.G. Okoth, "The Foreign Policy of Uganda, Change or Continuity", in W.O. Oyugi, Politics and Administration in East Africa, op. Cit. P.69.

3.1 THE FIRST OBOTE REGIME 1962-1971:

In Uganda, at the end of the Second World War, both immigrant communities were small and limited in political influence¹³². The most striking economic and political contrasts were, however, between the kingdoms of Buganda and the rest of the country. Buganda, rich in history and past achievements continued to stand out distinctively from all the other districts of the Protectorate. Buganda was the center for industrial and commercial development and she enjoyed considerable advantage in education. Politically the Uganda Agreement of 1900 assured Buganda a much greater measure of internal autonomy than other districts.

In 1962, Obote's party, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) won the elections¹³³ by defeating the Democratic Party (DP) and with support of the *Kabaka* of Buganda, Obote secured an absolute majority in parliament and thereby led his country into independence¹³⁴. A coalition government was therefore formed by Obote's predominantly protestant Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda traditionalist political party, *Kabaka Yeka* (YK), which translates as the only king. Milton Obote, a northerner, became Prime Minister and chose Buganda's *Kabaka* (king) as his largely ceremonial president when Uganda became a republic in 1963. The ruling coalition soon broke up over disagreements about the lost 'countries' issue. Bunyoro territory was transferred to the Baganda by the British in reward for their loyalty, which

¹³² See A. Mazrui, Political Engineering and Nation building in East Africa, Op. Cit. P.

12.

¹³³ See C. Gertzel, "Kingdoms, Districts and the Unitary State in Uganda 1945-1962" in D.A. Low and A. Smith (eds.), History of East Africa Vol. 3, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.), p. 66.

Obote submitted to a referendum in November 1964. The referendum led a return of some of the disputed territory to Bunyoro and led to increased discontent with the Obote administration in Uganda. In the same year here occurred army mutinies in all the three East African countries. Early on 20th January 1964, Woronoff¹³⁵ argues, the troops of Tanganyika Rifles stationed just outside of Dar es Salaam rose against their officers, mostly British, and arrested them. They then left their barracks and entered the capital where they surrounded the state house and by dawn controlled all the strategic points in the city. From this position of strength, they presented their demands for the removal of all expatriate officers and an Africanisation of the army as well as an increase in pay. When the ministers with whom they parleyed promised favourable treatment of the demands most of the soldiers agreed to return to their barracks. The next day, the units in the provinces repeated this operation on a smaller scale, and also returned to their barracks. Within days there were sit-down strikes in the armies of neighbouring Kenya and Uganda. Nyerere called on former colonial power to disarm the soldiers and on 25th January, British troops were moved in by helicopter and rounded up and disarmed the mutineers and rioters. Kenya on its part decided to maintain the original principle of military service inherited from the colonial power, Britain. Kenya entered into a military alliance with Britain so that the British would kill all the military men who would be engaged in a coup. This created fear in the armed forces and they decided to remain in the barracks¹³⁶ Uganda decided to cut off links with the British but did not transform the army from its colonial

¹³⁴ See K.Ingham (ed.), *Foreign Relations of African States*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p.5.

heritage. This colonial army was mainly composed of illiterate, was pro-imperialism in terms of ideology such that they were just interested in conquering and lastly the colonial army was anti-people. There was no harmony between the citizens and the military and any slight provocation would result to a coup. It is also worth noting that the army mutinies in East Africa coincided with Uganda's support of Zanzibar Revolution and the West, led by the United States of America viewed these events as manifestations of communism in East Africa. This was a gross misunderstanding on the part of the US the revolution and the army mutinies did not have anything to do with communism¹³⁷.

Another remarkable event that happened in 1964 was that anti-Obote elements led by UPC Secretary-General, Grace Ibingira attempted to push Obote out of power by accusing him and his Deputy Army commander Idi Amin of involvement in a gold and ivory scandal¹³⁸. In another related incidence Obote's visits to Peking, Belgrade and Tokyo underlined the West's assertion that his regime was socialist oriented and thereby anti-capitalist and it is no wonder, therefore, that when minister Grace Ibingira visited Europe and the US she was granted one million dollars to be used for dislodging Obote from power. Obote responded by arresting the main plotters, suspending the 1962 constitution¹³⁹, promoting Amin to army chief of staff and

¹³⁶ See Mazrui, Soldiers and Kingsmen in Uganda. The Making of Military Ethnocracy, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 1.

¹³⁷ See Okoth, "The Foreign Policy of Uganda, Continuity or Change", in O.Oyugi (ed.), Politics and Administration in East Africa, Op. Cit. P.116.

¹³⁸ See Karugire. 1980, Mazrui, op. Cit. and N. Chazan, et al (eds.), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.)

¹³⁹ See Jorgensen;... 1981. P.229.

disposing *Kabaka* from the presidency. In 1966, Obote convened the national assembly to write a new republican constitution entrenching a strong executive presidency and substantially reducing the powers of traditional rulers. Through this constitution, Obote monopolised power to direct who gets what, when and how in various respects. Besides destroying Buganda's autonomy which was a cornerstone of resistance to central authority, the constitution gave Obote power to appoint and dismiss senior and junior officials both in the national and district services. It also gave him important legislative powers, together with detention and emergency regulations, which enhanced his control over people's lives. The new constitution led to increased tensions with the traditional Buganda legislature, the *Lukkiko*, which rejected the new constitution and the limitations it imposed Buganda federal powers. The Buganda declared Obote's actions null and void, passing a resolution demanding the withdrawal of the central government from Buganda soil by March 30th 1966. Obote then declared a state of emergency and on May 24th 1966, government troops stormed the *Kabaka's* palace in Mengo, seizing it after a day's fighting. *Kabaka* Mutesa the Second consequently fled to Britain where he died three years later. To consolidate his power, Obote introduced a republican constitution in 1967¹⁴⁰ and made Uganda a unitary state. This constitution also marked the blue print for Obote's centralisation of power. Through this constitution Obote monopolised power to direct who gets what when and how. In 1968 Obote was at the height of his power and this was fortified by two new constitutions drafted by Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda, and paved the way for an absolutist Presidency which surrounded itself with

preventive detention laws and a vicious secret police. By the end of 1968 Obote felt insecure and postponed national as well as party elections for he was not only scared of the national ballot, but also of his own party. Obote's rise that set in after crushing Buganda bore within itself seeds of decline and by 1969 the rise had reached a plateau and thereafter Obote's fortunes began to decline. The causes of this decline can be traced to the following: his determination to crush the Baganda and to keep them in perpetual terror from 1966 onwards betrayed an exaggerated fear as well as intense hatred. It is widely believed that by crushing the *kabaka*, and by expelling him, by filling jails with Baganda detainees and by seeking to humiliate them, Obote sealed his own downfall. The reasons given are that Baganda are too numerous and too centrally located to be ignored or to be permanent enemies.

Following an assassination attempt on Obote in 1969,¹⁴¹ the UPC banned all opposition groups, threw the whole of the DP leadership in jail and effectively created a one party state¹⁴². Obote then introduced the common man's charter that was designed to transform Uganda into a socialist state maintaining that socialism was the only ideology that could bring about development in Africa. But by and large the political environment in which Obote operated was an environment that was extremely hostile to any left wing ideology and hence Obote's years have been described as years of ideological void. The legacy of British imperial presence in Uganda, general conservatism of the country and the Roman Catholic anti-communism stance

¹⁴⁰ See G. Pinywa, Political Development and Ideological void, Uganda Under Obote..... 1980.p.8.

¹⁴¹ See G.Pinywa, ibid.. p.1.

¹⁴² See A. Mazrui, Political Engineering and Nation building in East Africa, Op. cit.p. 1

all made it hard for socialism to take root in Uganda. In Obote's non-aligned Uganda, the regime was impelled to adhere to the status quo, bequeathed by the British and for six years after independence, Uganda followed precisely the direction of development the British had selected for it during the protectorate era. Some¹⁴³ argue, however, that this non-alignment stand strained relations between Uganda and the West for it was interpreted to mean communism and whoever supported communism became an enemy of the West. Another of Obote's policies that the West did not like was supporting nationalist movements and this was evident in Uganda's support to Congo. By supporting nationalist movements, Uganda was seen to threaten US interests in the Congo where she was exploiting uranium. In retaliation the US supplied Congo with planes which bombed two Ugandan villages in allegation of supporting Lumumbists and this pre-empted an angry demonstration in Kampala in February 1965 that ended at the US Embassy with demonstrators pulling down and tearing up the American flag. The defeat and dismemberment of Buganda kingdom marked the end of the conflict between traditional rulers and modern elite in Ugandan politics. Traditional rulers were abolished. The abolition of traditional rulers was preceded and followed by a continual state of emergency over Buganda, which lasted until the coup of 1971.

3.2 AMIN'S REIGN OF TERROR 1971-1979:

While Obote was preoccupied with consolidating his political grip in Uganda, Amin was simultaneously establishing effective control over a significant part

¹⁴³See A. Mazrui. Ibid. p.1.

of Ugandan armed forces. Ethnic tensions between different northern groups in the army soon developed¹⁴⁴. From the beginning of 1969, Obote had divided the army into two factions along ethnic lines. As president and the chairman of the Defense Council, he relied on the nilotic soldiers, largely from Acholi and Lango, while for his part, Amin built his support from his fellow nilers, especially those who happened to be Sudanese by origin like himself. Tensions between Obote and Amin grew as Obote tried to limit Amin's power base within the army and Amin grew increasingly convinced that Obote was attempting to neutralize him. Just prior to leaving for Singapore to attend a summit conference of commonwealth leaders, Obote had asked Amin to account for 2.5 million pounds sterling spent by the army. With Obote away in Singapore, Amin responded by seizing power on January 25th, 1971 with considerable internal and external support¹⁴⁵. Many Ugandans especially Buganda dissatisfied with Obote's increasingly oppressive government, initially welcomed Amin's military coup. The release of many detainees and Amin's decision to allow Kabaka Mutesa 2's body to be returned from England for burial were popular measures but the Buganda kingdom's role was completely diminished. The West saw Obote's removal from power as the end of socialist policies, which threatened their interests in Uganda, and hence, on his part Amin quickly moved to portray his regime as capable of guaranteeing those interests through various ways. First was a rapprochement of South Africa, a long-term ally of the West in Africa, in which he announced that a ten-man delegation was to be dispatched to evaluate problems confronting

¹⁴⁴ See P.G. Okoth, "The Foreign Policy of Uganda, Change or Continuity", in W.O. Oyugi, Politics and Administration in East Africa, op. cit.p.116.

¹⁴⁵ See The Uganda Times February 14 1965

the blacks in South Africa. Second, he stated that a British –Israeli presence was to be maintained. Third, he openly criticised Obote's 'Common Man's Charter'. Fourth, he announced that Uganda would not leave the Commonwealth even though the world community protested against the sale of arms by the West to South Africa. All these instances ensured that warm relations ensured between Uganda and the West at least up to late 1972.

The initial euphoria soon turned to horror, as the true nature of Amin's government became clear. He soon ordered the army's Acholi and Langi whom he considered rivals for power, to return to the barracks and had hundreds of officers and enlisted men killed. He also created new security organizations,¹⁴⁶ which reported directly to him including the Public Safety Unit and the State Research Bureau. Along with the military police, these two organizations wrecked havoc on Ugandans and within two years Amin had imposed one of the severest dictatorships in Africa. By the end of his first year in office his security forces had killed approximately 10,000 Ugandans (Stremlau: 1980; 16). Over the next few years, many were killed; others escaped to neighboring countries or went into hiding in Uganda. After several years of terror and killings the death toll had risen to as high as 300,000; according to Amnesty International estimates. In 1972, in an attempt to shore up domestic support, Amin ordered expulsion of Ugandan citizens of Asian origin and the expropriation of their property holdings, firms, farms and factories. In the same year relations with the West began to deteriorate. America closed its embassy in Kampala in protest against the death of two

¹⁴⁶ See Vijay Gupta, Obote Second Liberation. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House), p.167

Americans at the hands of Amin's soldiers. He also nationalized British companies, expelled Israelis from Uganda and then turned to the Soviet Union and Arab States for military and financial support. Amin's entire style of diplomacy lacked middle-class refinements and made diplomatic visits without being invited for to Israel, Britain, France and the then West Germany. Amin's regime tolerated what Goran Hyden and Ali Mazrui call "economy of affection"¹⁴⁷ and he helped those connected to him by blood, kin community and religion.

Amin overreached himself when he ordered the annexation of 1,800 square miles of Tanzanian territory known as the Kagera salient. President Nyerere of Tanzania, already a vocal critic of Amin's government responded by ordering his troops, joined by several anti-Amin Ugandan militias under the rubric of Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) to invade Uganda and oust Amin. On April 10th, 1979, Amin's government fell and he fled to Libya¹⁴⁸ and later to Saudi Arabia.

Shortly after his successful coup in 1971, Amin embarked on a vicious reign of terror and executions against individuals and groups within the society¹⁴⁹. Violence and murder became institutionalized and individuals and communities found themselves without protection against humiliation, molestation and dispossession. Liberty, life and property were at a discount and in such a state of chaos many lives were lost including those of leading

¹⁴⁷ Mukwaya; Uganda's Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region, 2002, p.284

¹⁴⁸ G. Hyden, No Short Cuts To Progress (Nairobi: Heinmann Publishers, 1983),p.8

personalities in the land. One occurrence that sent a wave of horror throughout and beyond the Christian world was the murder of the Anglican Archbishop Luwum, in company with ministers Erunayo Oryema and Charles Ofumbi¹⁵⁰. This also made President Carter of the US to lam an embargo on Ugandan coffee thereby ending her monopoly of the purchase of Uganda's main cash crop. At the United Nations Washington and London used their influential positions to denounce and isolate the Amin regime. Some seventy five thousand Ugandan Asians, a third of who were Ugandan citizens, were expelled in 1972, at ninety days notice.

During Amin's reign, soldiers and civilians belonging to ethnic groups other than his such as the Acholi and Lango were arbitrary massacred, political opponents liquidated, elite and regional leaders annihilated, whole villages destroyed. The slaughter became wanton and random, largely perpetrated by army and security forces drawn from the presidents own tribal group, the Kakwa, from Nubian Ugandans and from Southern Sudanese Mercenaries¹⁵¹.

Any account of Amin's means of state terror would be incomplete without mention of his notorious police institutions which all had their headquarters in Kampala area: the State Research Bureau at Nakasero; the Public Safety Unit at Naguru; and the Military Police at Makindye. These institutions recruited agents, who were highly educated, from every ethnic and religious

¹⁴⁹ See sub-topic on 'Tanzania and Uganda war and the fall of Amin' later in this chapter.

¹⁵⁰ See P. Mutibwa, Uganda since independence, the story of unfulfilled hopes, (London: Hurst and Company, 1992), p.112.

¹⁵¹ See Woodhouse.... 1996,p.5.

groups in Uganda to be spies, informers and torturers against fellow citizens.¹⁵²

The regime witnessed peaks of violence: the first was the initial six months during which as many as one thousand five hundred soldiers were killed together with unknown number of civilians in revenge for supporting the former Obote regime. The most important reason why Amin approved these killings by his soldiers as well as his Security Research bureau was that they were part and parcel of his overall objectives of holding the country under perpetual terror¹⁵³. The second peak was 1972-1973 during and following the first invasion from Tanzania, which provided an excuse for eliminating opponents of the regime as well as captured invaders¹⁵⁴. The Israeli raid to free hostages at Entebbe in 1976 sparked a new wave of violence and the success of the raid revealed that the Ugandan armed forces were vulnerable. This inspired fresh coup attempts, while the regime counter-measures culminated in a brutal repression from February to September 1977.

The outbreak of mutinies during the 1978 Uganda invasion of the Kagera Salient and the counter invasion by Tanzania led to a new wave of repression, culminating in indiscriminate killing of civilians in eastern and northern Uganda by fleeing soldiers following the Ugandan National Liberation Front's capture of Kampala. In addition to these peaks, there was the background violence

¹⁵² See S. S. Mushi and K. Matthew (ed.), Foreign Policy of Tanzania: A Reader. (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981), p.305.

¹⁵³ See again P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, The Story of Unfulfilled Hopes. Op. Cit. P.284.

¹⁵⁴ See Kiwanuka..... Op. Cit.p.14

perpetrated by the state security apparatus; the State Research Bureau, the Public Safety Unit and the Military Police. The Amin regime appeared to relish illegal and covert actions, much like the Nazi regime¹⁵⁵. The focus on personal violence however masked the underlying escalation of structural violence; the rise in kwashiorkor; the absence of medicine; the shortage of doctors; the disrepair of rural borehole wells. More people may have died from structural violence than from personal violence.

Idi Amin institutionalized a ruthless and vindictive personalist dictatorship as he relished and thrived on the utilization of brutal force. His colossal brutalities defy cataloguing, but certainly amount to several hundreds of thousands of people- some estimates are as high as half a million. Documentary evidence about the deliberate organization of the torture and killing and about the personal involvement of Idi Amin, has only become available since the fall of the tyrant; but the actions of his various "security" forces were attested by refugees who flooded into neighboring countries.¹⁵⁶ A United Nation's report on refugee estimated that by the time Amin was overthrown, there were a million widows and orphans of murdered civilians of Uganda, an "infinitely tragic proof of atrocities perpetrated against the defenseless population by the armed forces and the State Research Bureau which showed little sensitivity to human life..."¹⁵⁷. Central precepts of international law were flagrantly and persistently violated on a massive scale.

¹⁵⁵ See The East African Standard, Nairobi July 9, 1976.

¹⁵⁶ See P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, The Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, op.cit, p. 286.

¹⁵⁷ See the United Nations Report; 1988, p.132.

Under Amin, the law of the gun and the law of the jungle replaced the rule of law and the functioning of the judicial system was so undermined that justice itself became a word, which had no particular meaning. Like all dictators, Amin used the framework of the existing legal system to establish his law of the gun. It began with a series of decrees in March 1971 which gave the armed forces power of "search and arrest". Soldiers could search homes, houses, buildings and even vehicles. There was also the decree to "suspend politics" which gave the minister of internal affairs power to detain any person announced by Attorney General.

Amin as a leader was preoccupied with petty issues such as reprimanding governmental officials openly and by name for seducing each other's wives instead of more important issues of nation building. He was so earthy that this earthiness was known to even enter into his conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs. He once told Nyerere through a telegram how he was a coward but he aroused in Amin affectionate feelings of the kind that a real man sometimes senses when confronted with a woman. Amin did not base his policies on rational principles and very often he declared that his decisions were the result of divine revelations.

From the beginning of Amin's reign of terror, tribal and religious divisions created an atmosphere where a spirit of collective outrage and oppositions against the atrocities could not prevail. Instead an indifferent attitude and a spirit of "it is they not us" prevailed in Uganda to the very end of Amin's regime. "They" meant those of another tribe or those who worshiped God,

"differently" and this was a strong factor in the survival of Amin. To this extent, therefore, Amin was a product of Uganda's history of religious and tribal strife.

3.3 TANZANIA-UGANDA WAR AND THE FALL OF AMIN:

During the 1970s, Nyerere stood almost alone in his condemnation of the Amin regime and his motivation was two-fold: a humanitarian impulse, which found the brutality of the regime repugnant and self-interest in weakening the cause of a troublesome and threatening neighboring state. Therefore relations between the two states remained strained and tense for as long as President Nyerere refused to recognize Amin¹⁵⁸. On his part, Amin accused the Tanzanian government of allowing ex-president Obote who had taken refuge in Tanzania, to use it as a base for subversion against the Ugandan government.

From February 1972 onward, militant anti-Zionism in foreign policy and strengthening of Islam in Uganda cherished Amin's growing links with the Arab world. In return his regime obtained, especially, military assistance from the Arab states lead by Libya and Saudi Arabia. During the 1972 September invasion of Uganda by Tanzania and during their border war in 1978, Libya sent military aid to Amin. Libyan troops numbering about three thousand were involved. Besides receiving military aid from the Arab world, Amin also received military assistance from the United States of America. American companies supplied Amin's regime with security equipment, and in turn,

¹⁵⁸ See S. Decalo, "African Personal Dictators", The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 23 No. 2 (1985), p.215

bought most of the Uganda's coffee until the October 1978 embargo imposed by the US congress. The relations between the Soviet Union and Uganda were very formal, despite Soviet's military aid to the regime. Most importantly, however, the Soviet Union refused to supply Amin with military equipment during the 1978-1979 war with Tanzania¹⁵⁹.

In early October 1978, Amin announced that Tanzania had invaded Uganda with the help of Cuban troops in an attempt to cover up for the army mutiny. Over two hundred Ugandan troops that were not affected by the mutiny fled across the Tanzanian border into the Kagera salient. In late October the same year Amin bombed Bukoba and Kyaka towns. Amin ordered Loyal members of the Masaka suicide battalion and the Mbaraka Simba Battalion to pursue the Ugandan mutineers across the border and there a large number of Tanzanians were killed¹⁶⁰. Washington called on Uganda to withdraw from Tanzania but Kampala accused it of interfering in an African affair as Woodhouse reports.

The late president Nyerere was incensed by Amin's allegations that Tanzania had invaded Uganda and by the invasion and annexation of the Kagera Salient on the pretexts of self-defense and the restoration of Uganda's "rightful" boundary to the old colonial division between German and British spheres of influence. To divert attention from the erosion of his power base

¹⁵⁹ See C. Amate, Inside the OAU. Pan Africanism in practice, (London: Macmillan, 1986), p.428

¹⁶⁰ See P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, the Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, op.cit. p.316.

and troubles within the army, Amin ordered a full-scale invasion and occupation by these battalions. The next day he announced that the Kagera Salient had been annexed and would in future be administered as an integral part of Uganda. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not condemn the Ugandan action although Nyerere wanted an outright condemnation of the Ugandan invasion and preferably some positive action by African states. At the end of November 1978, an OAU envoy, Phillip Obangu reported that Ugandan troops had withdrawn from Tanzanian territory. Pressure from the Africa, Arab world and even the Soviet Union convinced Amin that the best policy was for Uganda to retreat from Tanzania.

When the border conflict between Uganda and Tanzania over the Kagera Salient erupted, Tanzania was ill prepared for war. It took weeks to master the necessary armed forces for counter attack. Secret meeting of exile groups was held in Nairobi in late December 1978, after Nyerere dropped hints that the Tanzanian counter-attack would not be limited to driving Ugandan troops from the Kagera Salient. The meeting, which included among others, representatives from the Uganda Peoples Party (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) agreed to support the Tanzania incursion into Uganda. The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) served as an umbrella organization for the different exile groups.

The opposition to Amin had been slow to unite. It ranged across the ideological spectrum of left-wing activists to right -wing conservative monarchs. The groups and peoples had one thing in common- their hatred of

Amin and their desire to rid Uganda of him. By January 1979, Amin made repeated assertions that Uganda was being invaded by Tanzanian troops. On 5th January, Nyerere made a speech on Dar es Salaam Radio admitting that Tanzanian troops had crossed the border and entered Uganda. Their mission, he declared, was to warn Amin that Tanzania would no longer ignore him. Nyerere reiterated emphatically that the job of these troops was not to topple Amin for that task belonged to Ugandans themselves.

By late 1979, it became evident that without massive help in the form of direct Tanzanian participation, Amin was not going to be toppled in the foreseeable future. Libyan support of Amin had vastly been increased in the early months of 1979¹⁶¹. On 27th March 1979, Libyan government sent a diplomatic ultimatum to the Tanzanian government, stating that Libya had a joint defense agreement with Uganda and that unless Tanzanian troops were pulled out of Uganda within twenty-four hours the war would spread to Tanzanian territory. The Ugandan exile groups were disorganised and they could not give more than spontaneous individual assistance to Amin forces. The exile groups for the most part, lacked armed strength. Even the combined force of the few groups with armed detachments was no more than a few thousand. The Amin regime could not be overthrown in an inter-state war¹⁶².

On 10th April 1979, Kampala fell before the onslaught of Tanzanian exile troops and forces. In the last resort Nyerere had allowed Tanzanian troops¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ See S.S. Mushi and K. Matthew (ed.), Foreign Policy of Tanzania, op.cit. p.308.

¹⁶² See African Contemporary Record, 1978, p.430.

¹⁶³ See P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence. The story of Unfulfilled Hopes, Op. Cit. P. 316

to take part in the battle for Kampala, something he had always maintained was a job for Ugandans alone. Amin fled and a new regime was installed under Yusuf Lule as Head of a government of national unity.

3.4 THE UNLF PERIOD, 1979-1980:

The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) government of Y.K. Lule that replaced the Amin regime was too short-lived to make much meaningful impact on Uganda's economy and foreign policy. Nevertheless, it suffices to observe that rule, an ex-academic who had in that been a minister under the British for seven years before political independence would be expected to turn to Britain for support. Relations with the west were therefore revived also with East African states Lule did not want socialism.

Within 68 days Lule was ousted because of political infighting and Binaisa replaced him. This posed a problem for Britain as it was not certain whether Binaisa was merely a "front man" to prepare the return of Milton Obote, still waiting in the wings in Tanzania and become very cautious about giving aid to Uganda. Binaisa's regime lasted 11 months and the military commission ousted him headed by Paul Muwanga. Within East Africa, Binaisa's government was well received in Tanzania for he had described his government as "left of centre" and this did not please the capitalist Kenyan government and he was ousted in May 1980.

Looking over the period of the UNLF, one cannot fail to feel a sense of lost opportunity. There was so much hope when Amin was swept out of power, yet

so much despair, despondency and in the end indifference after the farcical elections of 1980. After Amin, Ugandans genuinely believed that a new chapter had begun. With the coming of elections, enthusiasm among the young and the old with a feeling that the final victory of justice and good over injustice and evil was within their grasp. All, however, was to be spoilt, and the people's hope trampled on, by a few political gangsters. It was difficult, especially for those who stayed in the country through the Amin period, to tell genuine liberators from the swindlers. Even the government leaders themselves were not sure of the credentials of those with whom they were now working and shaping power.

3.5 THE SECOND OBOTE GOVERNMENT 1980-1985:

Several short-lived civilian administrations followed the overthrow of Amin's government, culminating in a return to power by Obote in disputed election in 1980. The sixty-eight-day Lule's government headed by former Makerere University vice-chancellor and chairman of the UNLA's political arm Yusef Lule perceived pro-Buganda slant and tensions between the UNLA's military and political wings. The UNLA ousted Lule and installed Godfrey Binaisa, the attorney general during the first Obote's government, as president. Infighting within UNLA prevented Binaisa from restoring stability in Uganda. In August 1979¹⁶⁴ Binaisa's government imposed a ban on all political parties, believing that with such a ban, Uganda would avoid the politics of region, sectarianism, rivalry and hatred, and be able to work for and even achieve the politics of consensus, an argument similar to that made by president Museveni today.

Pro-Obote forces within the military structures of the UNLA removed Binaisa from power on May 13th, 1980, placing him under house arrest and scheduling elections for December 10th 1980¹⁶⁵ while Binaisa went to exile in Britain¹⁶⁶. This election was a landmark in Ugandan history and it had been looked forward to as a means of redressing the wrongs of the past

By this time (1980) Obote had returned to Uganda to lead the UPC and this cast a chill over a large section of the Bantu who were not in the UPC camp. His party's main opposition came from the reborn DP, which was predominantly catholic, and from the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), led by Yoweri Museveni and the Buganda dominated Conservative Party (CP). The UPC won a majority of twenty seats in the new National Assembly and Obote, although he had not himself stood for election to parliament arguing that as an experienced politician, he was above what he called 'the politics of constituencies', resumed the presidency. This was the first election to be held in Uganda since April 1962, and though the DP and the UPM complained of electoral fraud, Obote had made an unprecedented political comeback to win the elections and the support of the army and he started his new regime with a promise of no revenge and of reconciliation with all his opponents. People listened; the words were sweet, but the tone remained that of the Obote of the 1960s. Such remarks were disarming, but they also contained chilling premonitions of the true Obote who was to emerge later as the dust of the general elections started to settle. All this, as it turned out, was no more than

¹⁶⁴ African Journal Programme, aired on Nation Television in Nairobi on 28th June, 2002 at 7.30pm.

¹⁶⁵ See The Washington Post, July 25, 1985.

empty rhetoric-no doubt intended for the foreign media and the financial institutions which chose to believe what they were told by Obote rather than what those inside Uganda were actually seeing and hearing.

The rigged elections may have stolen victory from the DP, but Museveni's UPM was only a minor player at the time of the elections and won only a single seat. Museveni himself was narrowly defeated in his Mbarara home district by a DP candidate. Claiming that Obote had rigged the elections, Museveni proclaimed a guerrilla war of resistance with the goal of overthrowing him by force. At this point, Obote made a last desperate appeal to his 'godfather' Julius Nyerere, to send troops to quell the guerrilla war, but Nyerere did not act. Perhaps he had had enough of Uganda's problems, and in any case, Nyerere and his *ujamaa* policies in tatters, was in the process of packing his own bags to make way for his successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Nyerere told Obote that as he was soon leaving office he could not commit his successor to policies, which would in effect, be open-ended¹⁶⁷. Many Ugandans sighed with relief to see that at last the great Tanzanian leader had realised the folly of endlessly propping up a man so unpopular in his own country. Tanzania quietly began to support the NRA. Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) gained support in Buganda. This army brought an end to the second Obote presidency in August 1985 and while his UPC parliamentarians were waiting in the National Assembly for the start of a meeting which he himself had summoned, Obote boarded his Mercedes and

¹⁶⁶ See K. Museveni, What is Africa's Problem? (Kampala: NRM Publication, 1992), p.280.

¹⁶⁷ At the time Museveni captured state power, it was still fashionable for the so-called progressive African leaders to identify themselves with the socialist camp. Museveni

drove towards the Kenyan border. This time he overflowed Tanzania on his way to Zambia. His regime was over. One ethnic leader, General Tito Okello, used his support of his fellow Acholi, the dominant ethnic group in the army, to force Obote into exile¹⁶⁸. In January 1986 the NRA defeated Okello's forces and drove him from Kampala. The NRA there-upon established a new government with Museveni as the president.

3.6 THE MUSEVENI ERA, 1986 TO THE PRESENT:

Museveni formed what he termed a 'broad-based' government. But what he did in reality was simply to reconstitute the different fractions of political and fighting groups originally opposed to Obote. As a guide to his leadership the regime launched a brief document called the 'Ten Points Program' in which foreign policy, political and economic priorities were outlined. The regime claimed to have declared a 'pragmatic' economic policy emphasizing an independent and self-sustaining economy.¹⁶⁹

During its days in power the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime embraced a Marxist rhetoric and openly condemned colonial economic relations in Uganda particularly and Africa in general. The regime blamed the West for failure of its foreign policies, particularly economic policies during the Obote's second regime and was unwilling to cooperate with it. In the light of the then existing international political climate characterised by the cold war

belonged to this camp, although he later denied this and instead claimed to be a revolutionary nationalist

¹⁶⁸ See K. Museveni, What is Africa's Problem, Op. Cit. p.19.

¹⁶⁹ See P.G. Okoth, "Uganda's Foreign Policy Towards the United States of America", in Munene, Nyunya and Adar (eds.), The United States and Africa. From

politics the NRM regime deceived Ugandans that it was determined to pursue an independent political and economic path. Museveni claimed that his regime was neither pro-West nor pro-East but rather pro-Uganda. In an effort to portray himself as a revolutionary, Museveni established friendly relations with states thought to be pro-East such as Ghana under Jerry Rawlings, Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara, Libya under Gaddafi and Ethiopia, which was ruled by Mengistu Haile Mariam. This was in addition to friendly relations, which existed with socialist Tanzania in the neighbourhood.¹⁷⁰

However, Museveni was soon faced with the reality of the situation on the ground. Within a year of wielding state power he realized that he still needed the same imperialists he had castigated to bring about development. He therefore abandoned the socialist rhetoric and re-established friendly relations with the West he also traveled far and wide to solicit support from as many countries as possible. The regime continued to maintain good relations with its neighbors so as to access the sea.

However, civil war continued into the Museveni regime except this time shifting its location and concentration in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country. The regime has soared expenditure on the military, it has witnessed a rise in inflation and external debt. The regime has then turned to embrace the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other Western Financial institutions.

Independence to the end of the Cold War. (Nairobi: The East African Publishers, 1985.), p. 105-125.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Although Museveni managed to broaden foreign relations that enabled Uganda to attract support from the West, this has, according to Okoth, served to keep him in power. Above all the regime is marked by rampant violations of human rights especially in the northern region. Despite this violation of human rights, the West still back Museveni and they have helped him host international conferences. For example in 1989, Uganda hosted the African Regional Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development and hosted several others in the 1990s. The West also facilitated the election of Museveni as the chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the 1990-91 period. The West partly succeeded in taming Museveni's radicalism but Museveni also tamed himself having been confronted by the daunting task of managing state affairs. When it came to power his regime initially followed an anti-imperialist line in its foreign policy, contending that Africa lacked ideological independence and that it was the neo-colonial relations that kept Africa backward. This granted, Museveni's regime soon became the darling of the West in Africa. Despite this state of affairs, the ordinary Ugandans are not better off in terms of prosperity and affluence. And although Museveni attempted to return what Amin had stolen from Asians, the regime still promotes ethnic discrimination, corruption and nepotism. The society remains undemocratic cannot be described as a liberal democratic regime, and Museveni continues to build a system that will perpetuate his hold on power for as long as he likes. Therefore the domestic situation in Uganda under Museveni has remained virtually the same as that in the preceding regimes.

3.7 CONCLUSION:

From the analysis above, we note that Uganda is divided along overlapping and complex ethnic, regional, religious and economic lines. These divisions have been sources of conflict over state power largely because of patterns of access to political and economic power associated with them since early colonial times. In the post colonial politics they have manifested in party politics in significant ways, as elite fractions both acted as representatives of major regional and religious groups, and also used the divisions to mobilize popular support in their own interests. Consequently the struggles for state power since independence have largely been between elite fractions.¹⁷¹ Also key to note is that the domestic environment has virtually been the same in all the regimes.

Foreign policy process in Uganda since independence has been highly personalised and dominated by the Heads of State and one cannot talk of any institution in Uganda as being responsible for foreign policy decision making. Foreign policy outcomes therefore reflect these leaders' personal attributes. Uganda's foreign policy has been determined by their desires for international recognition. From Amin to Museveni, they wanted to be treated as world and/or regional statesmen. To a large extent foreign policy has been influenced by their training in foreign affairs and /or lack of it as well as their beliefs.

¹⁷¹ See R.J. Anthony, 'Constitutional reforms and politics of constitutionalism in Uganda; a new path to constitutionalism', in Katorobo and Munene (ed.) Uganda. Landmarks in rebuilding a nation. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995), p.155-190

Uganda's geographical location has also been a key factor shaping its foreign policy.

Uncertainties, discontinuities, inconsistency and contradictions marked Uganda's foreign policy during this period. The main objectives of these policies were to achieve personal interests concealed under the auspices of national interest. Therefore Uganda's foreign policies have been influenced by internal factors.

CHAPTER FOUR.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL FACTORS IN UGANDA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

0 INTRODUCTION:

ates do not exist in isolation, but in one international system comprising of
her states. Uganda has therefore continued to engage in foreign behaviour
espite the circumstances it has been in such as change of regimes and
olitical instability. The main task of this chapter is to examine the extent to
hich such foreign policy decision-making behaviour has been, and continues
be shaped by internal factors based on the findings documented in the
revious chapters. We shall do this by examining the influence of each factor
Uganda's foreign policy and proving a comparative study with a country
with high levels of economic growth and in our case, England.

1. UGANDA'S NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND CAPABILITIES:

n view of this the factors that shaped and continues to shape Uganda's
oreign policy include geography, natural resources, raw materials, oil,
ndustrial capacity, technology, quality of the military, quality of government,
uality of diplomacy and national moral. We now turn to examine each of this
actors starting with geography.

Uganda is one of the countries in East Africa, located at the source of River
Nile and it is a landlocked state for it does not border any sea. Being a
landlocked state, it relied on the Kenyan and Tanzanian ports of Mombassa
and Dar es Salaam respectively as a link to the outside world. Particularly

these were the avenues through which it conducted its import and export trade. Uganda therefore had/has to foster friendly relationships with neighboring Kenya and Tanzania but this has not always been the case. During this period, however, Uganda's foreign policy toward the two countries has been inconsistent. At one time the relations are warm and cordial and at another time it deteriorates. For instance during the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania war, Uganda could not use the Dar es Salaam port to import or export. A similar case had been witnessed during the 1976 Uganda -Kenya tension when Amin wanted to annex a part of Kenyan territory. He however changed his mind so as to safeguard his country's economic interests¹⁷². Another feature that one notices is that refugees from Uganda flocked Kenya and Tanzania and from there they launched guerrilla warfare to their mother country to topple regimes they did not like.

As we argued in chapter three Amin's reign warmed Uganda up to the Arab world and this phenomenon can be explained in terms of her possession of the source of the Nile. River Nile flows from Uganda through Sudan and Egypt; which are predominantly Muslim, into the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt in particular has had a lot of interests in the Nile.

Uganda imports oil for it does not possess that natural resource just like most countries in Africa but for its case imported mainly from the Arab world. The country was also threatened with insufficiency in food and this is because most of the government expenditure was on military arms and therefore

¹⁷²P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, The Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, Op. Cit.

military expenditure rose at the expense of expenditure on foodstuffs and agriculture. This was exacerbated by the expulsion of Asians in the 1970s for it negatively impacted on the economic interests of Uganda. Besides, at the time of the coup Amin had promised heaven to everyone and certainly an impression was created that the new (or second) republic would make the economic situation of the population easier. The eighteen points given as the reasons for overthrowing Obote had stressed the economic hardships which the people had suffered under his regime, but after a year and more, Amin had nothing to show to justify his coup. Taxes had not been reduced and the people were called on to make sacrifices necessary to make development possible. The prices of basic foodstuffs and the general cost of living were rising; *kondoism* was still rampant, there were even fewer jobs, violence and murder rose and was institutionalized. Not only the civilians were complaining, even army personnel were looking to Amin for a solution. So it was not surprising that, unable to deliver goods, Amin should have turned upon the only community with money and property to give his people. This situation threatened Uganda's power for self-sufficiency in food is a source of strength in international politics.

Uganda like many countries in the developing world lack industrialisation and raw materials and this constrains its ability to wedge war against other states in the international system. This was evident during the Israeli's raid on Entebbe that just took a few hours to fall. Another incidence occurred in 1963 when Congo backed by the US bombed two villages in Uganda in allegation

of supporting Lumumbists¹⁷³. Uganda does not possess valuable minerals such as uranium, which is used to make nuclear weapons.

The oil crises in Uganda during the period also indicated how natural resources can influence foreign policy of a state. Uganda lacks oil deposits and so depends on imports. The oil crisis got worse during the rule of Idi Amin especially in July and August 1976. Before this crisis Amin had depended on oil supplies from Kenya but his growing indebtedness prompted Kenya to stop the supplies. By July 1976 Uganda owed Kenya Ug.Shs.445, 000,000 for oil supplied alone¹⁷⁴. Amin therefore resorted to hijacking and seizing oil tankers destined for Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan to meet the oil shortages.

Low levels of industrialisation translate into low levels of power of a nation. Because of the technology of modern warfare, transportation and communication, industrialisation has become an indispensable aspect of the power of a nation. For this reason the leading industrialized nations are the great powers.

We argued in chapter two that one of the key determinants of the power of a state is its military preparedness. In Uganda the military played a very minimal role in this effect. This is because the military was politicized and unable to significantly help the country to pursue and achieve its national interests. The military was interested in capturing state power and once it did so, it

¹⁷³ See P.G. Okoth, "Uganda's Foreign Policy Towards the United States of America", in Nunya, Munene and Adar, The United States and Africa, From Independence to the end of the Cold War, op, cit, p. 105-125.

¹⁷⁴ See Rupensinghe (1985), p.268.

plundered both economic and political life of Uganda. This plundering was because of the illiteracy in the army for it comprised of illiterate and semi-illiterate men and women who were not trained in politics and decision-making. This plundering of the life of Ugandans was made worse by the killings in the army. We argued in the previous chapter that Amin while in power had a strong feeling of insecurity because the army was predominantly Acholi. At the time of the coup for instance one third of the army were Acholi and Amin was not sure of their loyalty to him. In Britain there has been relative separation of the military from politics.

Most of the killings in the army during the reign of Amin were conducted in the first twenty months of the rule¹⁷⁵. The first was when a coup was attempted in July 1971 and Acholi and Langi soldiers were massacred at Jinja and Mbarara barracks, the second was at Matukula on the Uganda -Tanzania border in February 1972, the third was during another attempted coup in June 1972 and the fourth occurred after the invasion in September 1972. The murders were conducted in remote places sealed to journalists and were never reported and Amin turned to expel Asians and Israelis to divert attention of the international and internal community. Obote nurtured the tensions in the army as he attempted to recruit his own men. Above all the leaders, threatened with lack of support from the populace, turned to the army to keep them in power. All this hampered the participation of the military in pursuant of foreign policies and the poor leadership in the army made it even worse. Leaders and the led alike in the army were illiterate. Their lack of

¹⁷⁵ See chapter three

technological innovation made Obote to rely most of the time on Nyerere to keep him in power and when Nyerere got tired of him, he was overthrown by forces led by Museveni in 1985. Ugandan military did not play a significant role in influencing foreign policy but played a major in enhancing power struggles and political bickering.

Uganda's national morale since independence has been quite low. National moral refers to the degree of determination with which a nation supports its government in peace or in war. One important factor to support this view is that the regimes were not civilian and therefore lacked the blessings of the populace. They suspended political parties and political participation and it all began with Obote in 1969 when, following an assassination attempt on him he banned all political opposition groups and threw the whole of DP leadership in jail¹⁷⁶. Amin's rule nurtured this for no political party existed and no elections were held. National morale was further thrown into limbo with killings of key decision-makers and the general public as well as suspension of the constitution.

The type of governments during the period was also quite wanting and the society was deprived of human rights and freedoms. Since the army supported them, the military regimes did not rely on popular support. Ugandan governments have experimented with different types of ideologies with different levels of success. Obote's move to the left which aimed at making Uganda a socialist state miserably failed and during the era of Amin one

¹⁷⁶ See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op, cit, chapter 9.

cannot identify a particular ideology although at the time of the coup he decried the socialist ideology. When Obote returned to power in the 1980s, he discarded the socialist ideology and attempted capitalism though not openly but he was in power for a while and was overthrown by forces led by Museveni.

While the power of a nation is influenced by the quality of diplomacy it engages in, personal characteristics and personal interests of its leaders guided Uganda's diplomacy during this period¹⁷⁷. Amin for instance would use shrewd diplomacy to obtain his foreign policy objectives and this was witnessed during the fuel crisis in Uganda after Kenya stopped her supplies to that country. Amin took this case to the UN and the OAU. In a desperate effort to win public sympathy he pretended to be the victim of international conspiracy and aggression. He used every diplomatic channel to induce Kenya to stop demanding cash for oil supplied. The stream of OAU representatives to Nairobi was unending so was the pressure from the oil companies and other foreign businesses which could no longer send goods to Rwanda, Sudan and Zaire. With such pressure from all directions, the Kenyan government agreed to Amin's plea. For Amin that was a great success and a profitable climb down from the brink of disaster. Furthermore, his diplomatic effort had brought about by the intervention by Liberia which sent its ambassador, Dr. Johnson, offers by president Numeiry of the Sudan to

¹⁷⁷ See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, ibid. chapter 9.

mediate among others. Due to this diplomatic success, Amin resorted to his usual ploy and promised that his army would never invade Kenya¹⁷⁸.

Apart from diplomatic efforts Amin, Obote and Museveni used propaganda as a way of foreign policy implementation¹⁷⁹. Amin's propaganda was meant to pit neighbouring states against each other. He was a keen listener to the radio and the moment he heard something he would broadcast it on his radio and television and make it look as if he alone had a superior intelligent source. Thus during the Shaba invasion of Zaire in 1977, Amin announced that he had reliable information that forces opposed to Mobutu were moving across Tanzania and Zaire governments. Also sensing the divisions within the East African Community, Amin would sometimes announce that he was to preserve the organization with Kenya alone. The next day he would announce his readiness to cooperate with Tanzania. Thus Uganda became the source of political differences between its neighbors. This was clearly demonstrated vicious attack of the Tanzanian press on Kenya after the July 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe.

The quality of government determines the nature of a country's foreign policy for good governance is key to effective foreign policy since such a government guarantees the security of citizens, effective use of its resources

¹⁷⁸ A.K.K. Mukwaya, The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region: An Analytical Overview, (Kampala: The Nile International Conference Centre, 8th-10th April, 2002.).

¹⁷⁹ See P. Mutibwa, Uganda since independence, the story of unfulfilled hopes, op. cit, p 85 A.K.K. Mukwaya, The Uganda Movementocracy Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region, *ibid*, and also P.G.Okoth, "Uganda's foreign economic relations", in P.G. Okoth, Africa at the beginning of the 21st century, (Nairobi: The University of Nairobi Press, 2000), p. 287-330.

and relies on public support for the foreign policies it pursues. While this has been the case in Britain it has not been the same in Uganda. During this period, Mutiibwa¹⁸⁰ argues, life was at a discount and there were massive violations of human rights and public support was severely suppressed at the expense of the military support. Such governments were not able to choose the objectives and methods of foreign policy in view of the power available to support them with maximum chances of success. A good example here is the choice by Obote's first regime to pursue socialist policies which failed and Amin's policies to annex Kagera Salient from Tanzanian territory which ultimately led to his downfall.

A government must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its domestic and foreign policies but this was not entirely the case in Uganda. For instance, while the communist world supported the policies Obote attempted in his first regime, the west condemned them. During Amin's rule while his initial promises and his overthrow of Obote was supported by the west, the same west later came to condemn his reign of terror and he chose to turn to the Arab world. Closer home Tanzania strongly opposed Amin's rule. Uganda was therefore isolated in the international system and was therefore unable to consistently execute and implement foreign policies. Its foreign policy process and national power was negatively affected. This is not the case in the developed world where public opinion and the occasional swelling of public pressure are as important as the external/international environment. They set limits to what policies are feasible by way of providing

¹⁸⁰ See P. Mutiibwa, Uganda since independence, the story of unfulfilled hopes, op,

or denying support for the government. In fact mass opinion in the developed world may be relatively uninterested and uninvolved in foreign policy issues, it is argued, but the government must bear and have borne in mind the importance of carrying opinion with them.

4.2. GEOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN POLICY:

Writing in 1972, Spykman¹⁸¹ consistently argues that geography is a key factor determining the foreign policy of a nation and although we have alluded to this in our previous discussion on state national attributes and its influence on foreign policy, we need to discuss it further. This is because Uganda's geographical location was one of the major foreign policy determinants. Uganda is a land locked country and over the years one of its foreign policy goals was to access the coast through maintaining friendly relations with Kenya and Tanzania but this was not always the case. For example, in 1973, Amin threatened to invade Tanzania warning that his army would capture Tanga in north east Tanzania to be an outlet of Uganda to the sea¹⁸². He visited Israel twice in July 1971 seeking for arms for his plans to invade Tanzania and requested phantom jet fighters, armed boats to carry his forces across Lake Victoria into Tanzania, helicopters and a US dollars 10,000,000 grants. Israel supplied Uganda with the executive jet he had asked for and a small quantity of arms and that was all. These arguments confirm the importance of geography in foreign policy formulation as advanced by Spykman. Above all Uganda's position as a landlocked country dictates that it

cit, p.85

¹⁸¹ See N. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy", in J. Pfaltzgraff (ed), Politics and the International System, (J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972), p. 372-377.

¹⁸² Mittleman (1975), p.238.

continues to foster friendly relationships with her neighbours particularly Kenya and Tanzania. In fact this explains why Museveni has played a key role in re-establishing the East African Community.

4.3 THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE:

Violence and political turmoil have marked Uganda's domestic structure throughout this period and it all began with the first reign of Obote in which he suspended the constitution, sidelined the Baganda and caused damages in the army¹⁸³. He did not even bother to address the grievances that led to the mutiny in 1964 although he depended on it to stay in power. He suspended all political parties and personalised power to decide who gets what, when and how. He championed socialist ideologies, which made Uganda fall out with the then western bloc, and Amin finally overthrew him in 1971. Amin institutionalised violence, suppressed all political participation throughout his reign and despised the rule of law. He put his national interests before those of the nation and finally overreached himself when he attacked Tanzania in 1978. This ushered in short-lived rules of Binaisa, Lule and Muwanga before the return of Obote to power through controversial elections in 1980. Claiming that Obote had rigged the elections, Museveni declared a guerrilla war and dethroned him in 1985. Uganda was therefore unstable and this being the case, its conduct and formulation of foreign policy was negatively affected. Another key factor that impacted on Uganda's foreign policy in this period was the strangling of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was not cherished as some bureaucrats were killed and others imprisoned. The role of the

¹⁸³ See Chapter Three

bureaucracy in foreign policy decision-making cannot be overemphasized. Allison's¹⁸⁴ argues that those who act in decision-making are representatives of bureaucratic departments and although they are individual decision-makers their perceptions of what the problem is, and of solutions to the problems is heavily shaped by their bureaucratic positions and roles. While Allison's work opens the black box in international relations and foreign policy, this was not the case in Uganda. This is because the individuals who were to be involved in pooling and pulling were not allowed to do so and the key creeds of the bureaucratic politics model were violated. Such persuasions include the view that the bureaucracy matters rather than the individual. In Uganda it is only the president who mattered in the conduct of international affairs and this being the case, the outcome of such foreign policy decisions were not outcomes of compromises but decrees of the presidents. This then meant that foreign policy decisions were arrived at mainly using the group think model of decision-making theory. This was supervised by the institution of the president. This institution fought for its own existence by heavily relying on the army for support throughout the period under study.

Sometimes the domestic weakness of a regime may force it to take an adventurous move against a suspect neighbour as a final desperate resort to attempting to acquire internal consolidation. A strong body of opinion in Uganda holds that this indeed was the reason why Amin chose to attack Tanzania in 1978. His army was in disarray over many domestic quarrels not least of, which was Amin's handling of the army. Through diverting the army

¹⁸⁴ See G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the The Cuban Missile Crisis", in

into a foreign war, he had hoped to remain his initiatives at home. Amin was therefore internationalizing his domestic conflicts and problems.

4.4. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY:

In his work, "challenges to Almond- Lippmann consensus" Holsti(1980) sought to examine the extent to which the foreign policy of a state is affected by public opinion. This consensus was buttressed in three basic assumptions. Firstly the proposition that the public is volatile and provides inadequate foundations for a nation's foreign policy. Secondly it rejoices in the assumption that the public is incoherent and lastly is the view that upon critical examination the public has little if any role to play in the conduct of a state's foreign policy. These assumptions shall guide us as we seek to examine the role the public opinion played during the period under study.

On the view that the public is volatile, we found out that indeed the Ugandan public was not informed to play the role assigned to it by the democratic peace proposition. The public is not interested in international affairs and it is mood driven. In Uganda during the period under study the public was preoccupied with the internal struggles in the country and lived in fear. This fear was exacerbated by Amin's reign of terror, Obote's reluctant to allow opposition political parties and Museveni's "zero-party" rule. The public was panicky because of the reign of terror. In Amin's regime several lives were lost and he created security organizations such as the public safety unit and the state research bureau which were run by elite and acted as spies, informers

and torturers of fellow citizens. Such organizations made the people even more panicky for they feared that they would be arrested and killed if they "engaged in careless talks" and their fear was extended to Obote's regimes. In the first regime by suspending the constitution and political parties and instituting detention without trial, he instilled a lot of fear and panic in the public

And although Bailey writing in 1978 conferred a lot of powers to the executive in foreign affairs, he wondered whether that same executive was to mislead the public this was the case in Uganda for leaders like Amin, Obote and Museveni did not involve the public in their foreign policy choices. What they did best was to put their personal interests and mislead the public from time to time. Amin misled the public on several occasions right from the outset of his regime when he chanted his reasons for overthrowing Obote and this initial euphoria soon turned horror as the true nature of Amin's government became clear. Obote did the same during the second regime. This political instability made Uganda's foreign policy incoherence. This is because without political association and interest articulation through political parties and interest groups one individual would not share his opinion with others. From the foregoing, the Ugandan public had little impact on its foreign policy.

It is suffice to mention that public opinions role in foreign policy process depends on nature of government. In open political systems where elections are free add fair the desire for the re-election and the fear for the electoral defeat may force a government to succumb to public opinion. A good example

is the case of the US war with Vietnam¹⁸⁵. When the then US president, Johnson, was not able to seek re-election because of the kind of decision he made regarding the war. President Johnson had maintained that neither the general public nor their representatives wanted to lose Vietnam to communism. The decision was made based on how he perceived the threat of communism in SE. Asia to American power. However it took long to win the war and the American people were completely dissatisfied and they strongly criticized Johnson making him not to seek re-election. Furthermore the way the government of Nixon handled the issue lead to the electoral defeat of the republicans allowing Jimmy Carter to take power.

Uganda was a closed political system since elections were suspended between 1962 and 1980 and even when they were finally held in 1980, they were marred with irregularities and rigging and this has extended into Museveni's regime. Therefore one cannot talk of the governments succumbing to public opinion. In fact what kept the leaders in power was the army and it only did so for as long as it wished. The public has been restricted to the periphery of politics.

However, we also concur with the liberal democrats¹⁸⁶ view that the public should play a role in foreign policy since they hate war, which in most cases is caused by statesmen. The refusal of Nyerere to help Obote's second regime to remain in power by allowing his troops to assist Obote fight Museveni's

¹⁸⁵ J.N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy-An Operational Formulation, (New York: Random House Press, 1961), p. 1-17.

forces can be explained in this way. This is because, as we have argued elsewhere the Ugandan public rejoiced when Nyerere refused to support Obote and they thought that at last he had realized that he was imposing on Ugandans someone who was not popular. Once disowned by his 'godfather' Obote was finally dethroned by forces led by Museveni. In this case Ugandans hated war not because they had not elected Obote but because they were tired of Nyerere's intrusion in their internal affairs and they anticipated that the overthrow of Obote would bring renewed hope in their country.

Uganda's situation went contrary to the democratic peace thinking that the public control democratic governments and supervise actions of statesmen who are responsible for mayhem. In Uganda the public did not supervise statesmen's actions. This is the opposite side of what has been happening in the developed world¹⁸⁷.

Public opinions gets to the foreign policy process through the media because foreign policy students and the media are both involved in gathering of information about foreign affairs. There are certain parameters that guide this relationship between the media and foreign behaviour. Firstly is whether or not the public has a right to know, and to know what and when. The second is whether or not the government should suppress policies and issues that would hurt national interests. Thirdly is whether or not it is the right of the

¹⁸⁶ See B. Russett and H. Starr, *World Politics, The Menu for Choice*, Op. Cit. P.17.
See also H. Starr, "The Kissinger Years, Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1980, p. 465-496.

¹⁸⁷ See W. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*, op. cit, p.85.

media to report fully to the public the interests of governments, when should it report and on whose authority.

Although interests of foreign policy and of the media intersect most sharply, it is the government that sets the foreign policy agenda. However, in Uganda the media was suppressed. For example foreign and local journalists were not allowed in the places where Amin killed people. As a result these killings would go unnoticed. Amin would temper with the media as he time and again interfered with information. He was a keen listener to the radio and the moment he heard something he would broadcast it on his own radio and television and make it look as if he alone had superior intelligent sources. For instance during the Shabba invasion of Zaire in 1977, he announced that he had reliable information that forces opposed to Mobutu were moving across Tanzania and Zaire governments. How events are reported affects policy-makers directly or indirectly and Amin's tampering with what was reported was interpreted differently from what the media had intended. It also interfered with the public's reactions and how those reactions are fed to policy-makers who are supposed to modify, adjust or scrape the policy choice. The interference of Amin with information received from the media incapacitated the role of the media as a mediator in the policy making process.

However, for the public to play an important role in the foreign policy process, it must be a well-informed public. Furthermore it should be literate and able to filter issues that are relevant to foreign policy. Unlike in Britain, the Ugandan regimes plundered the education system through their reigns of terror. Many

parents could not send their children to school for fear of being way-laid and killed and with the expulsion of Asians, costs of living went up and people were to make the hard choice between getting formal education or fending for themselves. Most of the time the regimes were involved in consolidation of power rather than development issues such as education. Even the educated in the society were lured to work as spies and informers to keep the illiterate in power. The regimes suppressed freedom of expression negatively impacting on the media. In the final analysis it has been argued that the public opinion in most cases is used to support decisions already made. It is mostly used to gauge the suitability of foreign policy choices already made by the government.

4.5 LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY:

Leadership, Herman¹⁸⁸ argues is one of the key determinants of the foreign policy of a state and she identifies four aspects that determine how it affects foreign policy. These aspects are nationalism, internal control over events, cognitive complexity and dogmatism.

Uncertainty and discontinuities marked Uganda's foreign policy during the period under study. According to Herman this is because the leaders then were too nationalistic and therefore too loyal to maintain the status quo and they did not rely on other nations in their conduct of international affairs. They were rather engaged in foreign policy choices that were mainly influenced by

¹⁸⁸ See M.G. Herman, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1980, p. 7-46.

internal factors. There are numerous examples that attest to this. Firstly during the first rule of Obote, his socialist and non-alignment ideologies led Uganda to be isolated by the west whose presence in this region was most pronounced. But by and large the political environment in which Obote operated was extremely hostile to any left-wing ideology. The legacy of British imperial presence in Uganda, general conservatism of that country and the Roman Catholic anti-communism stance all made it hard for socialism to work in Uganda.

During Amin's era, the situation was the same though he initially received overwhelming support from all over the world. But as his regime out to be a horror many nations such as the US, Britain and Israel isolated it. This being the case the main objectives of foreign policies were personal interests concealed under the auspices of national interests. These leaders would easily change their decisions once they realized that their interests were not being met. For example when Amin disagreed with Israel he became the most vocal proponent of the Arab world. This was because Israel refused to give him military and financial assistance and he chose to lead Arabs to defeat Israel. Long forgotten was his comment in February 1972 that "the minister for defense of the United Arab Republic and the minister for defense of Israel is also my best friend". By June 1972, he changed his tune to Africa and Arab leaders and wanted the Arabs to sit down a plot how to fight Zionism in the region. Personal interests as being the overriding drive of foreign policy was also experienced in its relation with Britain. In early 1972 Amin invited the British to establish a training school in Uganda and they agreed but when they

refused to supply Uganda with military hardware they were ordered to leave Uganda. Amin accused them of interfering in its internal affairs.

Obote on his part relied heavily on Nyerere to keep him in power even after rigging elections in 1980. As we have argued elsewhere, in 1985 when Obote was facing overwhelming opposition from forces loyal to Museveni, he turned to Nyerere for help but Nyerere refused claiming that he was about to leave office and did not want to leave open-ended policies to his successor. Obote felt even more insecure by this move and decided to overfly Tanzania to exile in Zambia when he was finally overthrown. We therefore find that the domestic environment in their foreign policy choices mainly guided these leaders for they strongly believed they had a lot of control over events in their country. But this was not the case for while Obote was away in Singapore he was overthrown by Amin who was also overthrown later by Tanzanian forces. Amin had underestimated the Tanzanian military power and the kind of support it received from Ugandans both at home and abroad. Obote also underestimated the forces of Museveni and thought he attracted a lot of support at home and in the end he was sent packing. On his part Museveni has relied on the Western countries to hold on power.

According to Herman¹⁸⁹ cognitive complexity confers upon a leader the ability to weigh and rely on diplomatic, economic and cultural skills in his nation's behaviour towards other nations. It also requires such a leader to cooperate

¹⁸⁹ See C. Herman (ed.), International Crises, Insights from Behaviour and Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p.8. See also M. East and C.F. Herman, "Do nation type account for foreign policy behaviour?", in J.N. Rosenau, Comparing foreign policies: theories, methods and findings, op. cit, p. 222.

with as many other nations as possible. Uganda followed this view with mixed results. Obote's first regime's move to the left made Uganda cooperate with the East and be isolated by the West. On the other hand Amin's rule was ushered in with cooperation from the West. However this cooperation was short-lived because they refused to support Amin militarily. Amin then turned to the Arab world from where he received such help. Closer home in East Africa Amin's relations with Kenya and Tanzania were mixed- sometimes warm and other times unfriendly. For instance in 1976 Amin wanted to annex a part of Kenyan territory but he later shelved the idea. Amin would sense divisions within the EAC and claim that he would be happy to maintain the organisation with either of the two countries but he would quickly change his mind. It is worth noting that Amin's downfall was due, partly to the fact that he did not want to cooperate with immediate neighbors. For instance Ugandan refugees in Tanzania and Kenya were on the forefront in organizing the Tanzanian attack in 1978 and the subsequent fall of the tyrant.

The nature of Uganda's economy during the period was also one of the factors that influenced its foreign policy. Like many other developing nations Uganda's economy is very weak and this was worsened by the increases in military expenditure (the British economy is very strong)¹⁹⁰. During Amin's rule during the first month after the coup 160 million Ugandan shillings had been spent on the military alone up from 51million. Still this was not enough and Amin turned to the Arab world for help. In February 1972, he visited Tripoli and in a joint communiqué spelt out Israel's changing fortunes in Uganda as

he recognized the Palestinian cause in the Middle East. As a result the Libyan people donated funds "to help the Muslims in Uganda" and a Libyan Arab Uganda Bank for foreign trade and development was opened in Kampala. The mainstay of the Libya-Uganda relation was financial consideration; Libya had the funds to buy support south of the Sahara, and Uganda was desperate for assistance.

Nationalisation of foreign businesses can also be understood in economic terms. These measures introduced by Obote and Amin challenged the asymmetrical and dependency relations. They accused foreigners for being responsible for Ugandan woes through exploitation and thus they were driven by the urge to make Uganda and to control their own affairs. Nevertheless the regimes continued to rely on outside supplies for military hardware and willfully entered into transitory alliances.

Another creed that buttresses Herman's thinking is what she refers to as dogmatism and takes it to mean beliefs and disbelief about reality. Amin was out of touch with reality as most of his decisions were 'revelations'. He would take decisions and justify them on the grounds that they had been revealed to him by some supernatural powers. He pointed out for instance that his decision to expel Asians was prompted by a dream.

Ugandan leaders were resistant to change and did everything possible to remain in power and evidence abound. Obote, in an attempt to remain in

¹⁹⁰ See W.Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, op.cit,p.6, and D. Vital, The

power during his first reign chose to suppress the Baganda who posed the greatest opposition to his rule and he began by attacking the *kabaka* palace and breaking the ruling coalition with the Baganda. Besides suspending the 1962 constitution he suspended elections. Amin's regime was no exception for anybody who opposed it was killed and elections continued to be suspended. The leaders' resistance to change can also be understood by the fact that none of them relinquished power voluntarily. Each leader came to power by the gun and left it by the gun a part from a few short-lived civilian rules that came in between the fall of Amin and the second Obote government.

Foreign policy of Uganda was also influenced by the idiosyncratic values¹⁹¹ of the political leaders. All the leaders were aggressive and high in need for power, low in conceptual complexity and distrustful of one another. This distrust was the main reason the Ugandan leaders turned to the army to keep them in power. Indeed Amin and Obote heavily relied on the army to keep power and the killings in the army exhibited this. Sometimes however these leaders would pretend to be conciliatory particularly at the start of every new regime. Amin after the coup claimed that he would forgive those who supported Obote and Obote pleaded the same at the start of his second regime and so did Museveni.

Making of British Foreign Policy, op. cit, p.84.

¹⁹¹ J. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, op. cit, p. 3-22.

Another core assumption that we borrow from Herman is what she identifies as the personal characteristics including beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style. To her belief defines what the leader sees as the most important for his nation. Whereas writers such as identify the driving force of British foreign policy as economics and foreign trade, it is hard to discern what Amin considered as the most important for Uganda and perhaps this can be understood by examining his training as a military officer. His constant war mongering and military threats can be understood in this way. Amin's lack of formal education also played a role in foreign policy process. His policy to expel Asians and severe links with Israel without considering the economic repercussions was due to lack of formal education. He did not rationally evaluate the inability of his uneducated soldiers and trusted men to run effectively the seized businesses. This led to decline of foreign trade and plunged the country into an economic crisis. Obote though educated did not appreciate the importance of a constitution in the running of the affairs of a country. He even chose to pursue a socialist ideology that did not bring about development as he had expected.

Whereas decentralization and devolution plays a key role in decision-making in the developed world Lieber¹⁹² and Vital¹⁹³, in the case of Uganda during this period, decision-making was highly personalized with the centralization of power to decide who gets what, when and how vested in the president. As a

¹⁹² See R. Lieber, "British Foreign Policy: The Limits of Manoeuvre", in C. Roy Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, op. cit, p. 2.

¹⁹³ See D. Vital, *The Making of British Foreign Policy*, op. cit, p.25.

result, unlike in the developed world¹⁹⁴ the bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics did not play a significant role in foreign policy making. Foreign policy decisions were to a large extent not results of bureaucratic pooling and pulling amongst bureaucrats but were personal pronouncements of the presidents. Since they were presidential pronouncements, the makers believed that they were the most rational to make decisions and they stepped into the dangers of this model of decision-making. Furthermore these leaders exhibited what Russett calls paranoia and Machiavellianism styles of decision-making meaning that they were excessively suspicious about the environment in which they found themselves in and therefore resulted to manipulative behaviour so as to stay in power. Consequently they did not see the process of foreign policy as a passion.

4.6 INDIVIDUALS AND FOREIGN POLICY:

Harvey Starr writing in 1980 maintains a sustained argument that individuals do play a role in the foreign policy process. He takes the view that the role of individuals, his memoirs while in office, the persons he associates with while in office and his academic background all go a long way in shaping the influence he has on foreign policy.

Whereas in the developed world there has been profound influence of ministers and officials concerned with economic and financial affairs in the making its foreign policy¹⁹⁵, in Uganda during that time, the president mainly

¹⁹⁴ See Snyder, Sapin and Bruck (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, op. cit, p.26.

¹⁹⁵ D.Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy, op. cit, 26.

played leading roles in the conduct of foreign affairs. Amin ruled by decrees and he established security organizations such as the State Research Bureau and Safety Units that were run by the elite to help the country in perpetual terror. He was also a dishonest man and would divert the public's attention from internal troubles by attacking another country or creating another issue. For example to divert attention from the erosion of his power base and troubles within the army, Amin announced a full scale attack on Tanzania claiming that Tanzania had attacked it in 1978.

Be it as it may individuals do count in foreign policy process and in the case of Amin and Obote their impact on foreign policy was due to their role in society. They had an official role as presidents to execute foreign policy of Uganda. And in studying the role these leaders played we look at their time in office as a source of data about their beliefs, values, attitudes and the reasons behind their decisions and behaviour. Elsewhere in this chapter we mentioned the various foreign policy choices the both initiated. Amin for instance severed links with Israel, Britain and America and chose to cooperate with the Arab world so as to gain military and financial support. He also made visits to several countries while in office and we also consider his foreign policies towards its neighbors-Kenya and Tanzania. This need not belabor us again.

These leaders' pre-office behaviour and background shaped their way of foreign policy decision-making. Amin for example was not trained in politics but was trained as a soldier hence his militaristic attitude toward solving any international issue or problem. His constant war mongering and military

threats can be understood in this way. Since he was not trained in politics and in decision-making he could not appreciate the pivotal role the bureaucracy plays in foreign policy decision-making. Amin was therefore a sharp contrast of Kissinger¹⁹⁶ on whom Starr¹⁹⁷ conducted his study on the role of individuals in foreign policy. This is because Kissinger was trained in politics and foreign policy and on examining his memoirs, Starr argued that he was an honest man with a consistent operational code. His writings reflected continuity for his philosophy and political style appeared to be essentially the same for the decision-maker and the academic. Obote was also a contrast of Kissinger and this can be explained in terms of how he used to change his ideologies. In the 1960s for example, Obote rejoiced in the socialist ideology nurturing it to bring about development in that country but this did not work and prompted him, in his second regime, to change to capitalist ideology that was the dominant ideology in East Africa.

Another contrast between Kissinger¹⁹⁸ and Amin is that while Kissinger sought out men who would equal his intellectual capabilities, Amin sought out men who would equal his intellectual inability such as his vice president who could not read or write. While Kissinger appreciated the bureaucratic role of decision-making Ugandan leaders did not. Furthermore while Kissinger believed in negotiations as the tool of the statesman and how the statesman uses force and diplomacy, Amin cherished shrewd diplomacy to obtain his

¹⁹⁶ H.A. Kissinger, "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy", in J.Pfaltzgraff (ed.), Politics and the International System. Op. Cit, p. 285.

¹⁹⁷ See H.Starr, "The Kissinger Years, Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4 December 1980, p. 465-496.

¹⁹⁸ See H. A. Kissinger, "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy", in Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the International system, op, cit, p. 285.

foreign policy objectives and this was experienced during the fuel crisis in Uganda after Kenya stopped her supplies to that country. Amin took this case to the UN and the OAU. Furthermore while Kissinger urged states to use legitimate means to achieve their foreign policy objectives Ugandan leaders found themselves in illegitimate positions and used illegitimate means to achieve their foreign policy objectives. While Kissinger cherished cooperating with opponents, Ugandan leaders mastered the art of extinguishing opponents. Obote in the 1960s after surviving an attempted assassination arrested all the plotters and suspended the constitution and eliminated the *kabaka*. Amin on his part killed everyone who dared oppose him through his security organizations.

4.7 CONCLUSION:

In this chapter, based on the findings in chapters two and three, we have attempted to assess the extent to which internal factors of foreign policy influenced Uganda's foreign policy decision-making. We began with state national attributes and identified natural resources, geography, level of industrialisation, quality of military, national moral, oil, technological advancement as well as diplomacy as affecting foreign policy of Uganda. The second factor that we addressed is geography and we argued that geographical location on the international map, size and population density shapes a nation's foreign policy. To this end, Uganda's landlockedness has been a key foreign policy determinant. Thirdly we examined the extent to which public opinion informed foreign policy and argued that Uganda being a developing nation and suspending elections for a long time, had very little

input from the public into its foreign policy choices. Fourthly we assessed the role of leadership and argued that political turbulence impacted on Uganda's achievement of her foreign policy goals such as protection of her national interests. We also argued that whereas the developed world enjoys decentralization and devolution in the making of foreign policy, personal interests and centralization of power marked Uganda's foreign policy during the period. This was clearly demonstrated by the reign of Amin, Obote and Museveni. Amin's interest was to be seen as a regional leader or king in East Africa. This made him neglect the rule of law and public opinion. Obote and Museveni are no exception, Museveni's involvement in the wars in the Great Lakes region can also be explained in this way. Lastly we examined the role individuals play in foreign policy making. We found that Uganda's foreign policy has been shaped more by the idiosyncratic values of its leaders than their training or past experiences. In this chapter, therefore, we have confirmed that the foreign policy of Uganda is shaped by internal factors. Uganda has been unstable with frequent regime changes. The military dictatorship that replaced it drastically changed the cautious foreign policy of the first Obote regime. Its foreign policy during Amin's rule was confused and confusing. It was hard to figure out his policy trend. Amin used foreign policy to provide scapegoats for his domestic failures. Besides Obote found himself pre-occupied with Uganda's domestic problems in the 1990s. These problems have continued into the reign of Museveni.

CHAPTER FIVE.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1 SUMMARY:

This study has examined and explained the influence of internal factors on Uganda's foreign policy since independence. It was premised on the tendency by many scholars to emphasise external factors rather than internal factors in explaining Uganda's foreign policy. The study argued that such studies were inadequate in explaining certain aspects of foreign policy such as leadership, individuals, the characteristics of a nation and geography.

The study consisted of five chapters. The first chapter provided a working definition of the concept 'foreign policy' taking it to refer to the intentions of a state towards the external environment and how to achieve such intentions. It adopted the view that foreign policy is a decision-making exercise. We went ahead to state the research problem and we argued that over the years studies have explained foreign policies of developing states and particularly Africa by using the external factors. We felt that in countries with low levels of development foreign policy choices are best explained using the domestic factors and this was premised on a number of factors. Firstly was that a lot of research in this field had been done in the North, most writers on these factors had done so without applying their findings on state levels; secondly foreign policy research has been concentrated in the North and there was need to fill-in these gaps. A brief assessment of the works that inspired the study was done and this survey confirmed our research problem as well as its justification.

Chapter two was an overview of the internal factors of foreign policy and their interrelatedness. In chapter three we sought to examine the political environment in Uganda since independence. We examined each of the regimes beginning with the first Obote regime, Amin's reign of terror, and the UNLF regime and concluded with the reign of Museveni. We found that in all the regimes there was/is domestic turbulence and that the foreign policy goals have remained the same. However, whereas the reigns of Obote and Amin were characterised by crisis management, that of Museveni has been one of normalcy. Chapter four assessed the extent to which the internal factors influenced the foreign policy of Uganda. This is where we tested our hypotheses and confirmed that internal factors shape foreign policy of Uganda.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS:

This study inquired into the influence of internal factors rather than external factors in the foreign policy of Uganda. According to the limited hypotheses we posited in chapter one, we deduce the following conclusions. The country has been struggling to bring about economic growth and has therefore concentrated in construction and reconstruction of its economy. We found that wars marked its entire history and this led to a rise in military expenditure, inflation and external debts. The low level of economic growth has increased corruption, nepotism and tribalism. Consequently its postcolonial policies have reflected the turbulent domestic environment.

The regimes did not put in place foreign policy information gathering and assessment mechanisms and this is mainly attributed to the turbulent environment and personal rule. Furthermore the study confirmed that the foreign policy of Uganda since independence has shown continuity rather than change. Throughout the period, the nation's foreign policy goals and national interests have remained the same: to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, support liberation movements in Africa, to participate fully in international affairs and to foster East African cooperation.

Therefore, on the basis of the limited hypotheses we posited in chapter one, this study has achieved its aim, namely to show that the foreign policy of Uganda is influenced by internal factors rather than external factors.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS:

Based on the findings in this study, we recommend that policy makers and implementers consider the following before making any foreign policy decisions. Firstly that state national attributes such as natural resources, geography, level of industrialisation, quality of the military, national moral, oil, technological advancement and diplomacy go a long way in shaping a nation's foreign policy. Secondly, they need to consider the geographical location of the state in question on the international map, its size as well as its population density. Thirdly they ought to appreciate and weigh carefully the contributions of the public. Fourthly they should consider what role leadership plays and in this regard attend to issues such as decentralisation and devolution of power vis-a vis centralization of power. This will mean an

assessment of the idiosyncratic values of leaders and their training in foreign affairs. Therefore, foreign policy makers and implementers should pay close attention to internal factors of foreign policy.

We do not claim to have a monopoly of knowledge in this field of study and recommend that further research be done particularly in the following areas. Firstly one would be advised to conduct a study on the influence of each of the factors that shape foreign policy in one particular country. This is because such an inquiry would provide details of such a factor that our study has not provided. Secondly a research can be done to argue that no one particular factor of foreign policy can exhaustively explain any one country's foreign policy. Put differently, all the internal factors of foreign policy are interrelated and none can dispense with the other. Thirdly one would carry out a study arguing that although the current study has focussed on the internal factors shaping foreign policy in a developing nation, the same factors best explain foreign policies of developed nations. Fourthly the argument that irrespective of the level of economic growth, nations formulate and execute foreign policies in similar ways could be a foundation to support a study in foreign policy. This would entail such a researcher to employ a comparative study pitting a country with high levels of economic development to one with low.

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