

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN CONFLICT: THE CASE OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC AND THE ANGLICAN CHURCHES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN,
1950s – 2005**

BY

L MBOJE R.M. MOVU

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
**A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ARMED
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DECLARATION


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
∟ Mboje, R. M. Movu

This study has been submitted for examination with our approval as University Supervisors.



Signed

Dr. George M. Gona



Signed

Dr. Mary C. Mwiandi

DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this work to my family: the Mjomba Movu Mlungule family, with special reference to Mary Samba Movu, Samuel Mjomba and Savia Mjomba and their families for the very special roles they played throughout the process of this study. Also a special mention of Lucas Nade Mjomba and Michael Adili Mjomba; thank you for your prayers.

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ABSTRACT

This project focuses on the Conflict in Southern Sudan, 1950s – 2005. The study argues that the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), their leaders, followers and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were directly involved in the conflict both in fighting as well as in the efforts that led to ceasefires and the peace agreements in 1971 and 2005. The study is set in a background where most information available was that which projected religious leaders and institutions, especially churches, as being peace-makers only. The study concludes that religious institutions have a great potential both in conflict sustainance and in its resolution.

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List of Acronyms

AACC- All Africa Council of Churches

AC- Anglican Church¹

ATR – African Traditional Religion- Different communities in Southern Sudan practice different religions. However, for purposes of this study, ATR will refer to any religion that is indigenously African.

AU – African Union

CMS-Church Missionary Society

CPA-Comprehensive Peace Agreement

ECS-Episcopal Church of Sudan

EU- European Union

FECCLAHA - Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa

GoS- Government of Sudan

HEC – High Executive Council

IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. It is comprised of the regional governments in Eastern Africa, namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea. It has its headquarters in Djibouti.²

IPF – IGAD Partners Forum

MCF - Movement for Colonial Freedom

NDA – National Democratic Alliance

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

¹ In this paper, "Anglican Church" (AC) will be used to denote "Church Missionary Society" (CMS) as well as the "Episcopal Church of the Sudan" (ECS). The AC in Sudan was founded by the CMS in the 1920s. It became an independent Diocese of the Anglican Communion in 1945. The communion is a federation of Episcopal churches. "Anglican" strictly means "English". Because of the "English" connotation of the word "Anglican" many churches of the Anglican Communion call themselves "Episcopal" as in Sudan. Roland Werner, William Anderson and Andrew Wheeler, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2001), p456.

² John, Ashworth., *Five Years of Sudan Focal Point* (Pretoria: Sudan Focal Point-Africa, 2004), p.24

NIF – National Islamic Front

NSCC - New Sudan Council of Churches

RCC – Roman Catholic Church

SANU - Sudan African National Union

SCC- Sudan Council of Churches

SEF – Sudan Ecumenical Forum

SCBRC - Sudanese Catholic Bishops Regional Council

SPLM/A – Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement/ Army

SSLM/Anyanya- Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. Sometimes SSLM will be used interchangeably with ‘*Anyanya*’ which was the fighting wing of the SSLM.

UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees

WCC-World Council of Churches

Definition of Terms

Church (es)- The Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) at three levels: Leaders, specifically bishops, priests, pastors and bishops’ councils, believers or their followers and their Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and/or institutions.

Conflict – A serious disagreement, a struggle or a serious difference of opinions and wishes.³

Conflict Transformation - The process of redefining a conflict and channeling the ‘incompatible’ ideas, attitudes and actions towards seeing the other with goodwill, commitment to mutual respect and inventing options for mutual gain.⁴ “Conflict can be unifying because most of our weaknesses and fears are common to us all... conflict

³ Jonathan. Crowther. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary. Fifth edition, (New York, Oxford University Press 1995), p. 241.

⁴ Ibid. p.70.

can be transformed; attitudes can be altered to seek mutual outcomes and behavior can be focused toward reconciliation and cooperation”⁵

Southern Sudan –The region in Sudan with minimum Islamic influence and majority of its population practices Christianity and African traditional religion. It is geographically placed in the South of the country.

Northern Sudan – The region in Sudan bordering Egypt and majority of its population is Islamic and is influenced by Arabic culture. It is geographically placed in the North of the country.

⁵ David W. Augsburger, *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures*, (Kentucky: John Knox Press 1992). p.72.

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The conflict in Southern Sudan has been long and complex. It began on the eve of Sudan's independence in 1955 when Southerners felt they had been short-changed in the sharing of positions in the new government. There were many Northerners in the top government positions even in the South, as compared to Southerners. The conflict was essentially between the central government in the North, consisting of a majority of Northerners, and members of the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) also commonly referred to as *Anya-nya* which was the main faction in the South. The international community did not take much interest in the Sudanese conflict since it was considered an internal issue. However, the conflict started gaining international interest when in 1964 the Government of Sudan (GoS) expelled all foreign missionaries from the Southern Region.⁶

In the mid 1960s, the conflict started attracting international attention. This was through the Missionaries, who were mainly from Europe and had been expelled. They publicised the situation in Sudan through their churches at home. In 1971 when the GoS embarked on an image-mending activity in Europe, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and its African constituent, the All African Council of Churches (AACC), took the opportunity to bring the SSLM and the GoS in face-to-face consultations to end the conflict.

The activities of WCC and AACC yielded some results. In 1972, the GoS and the SSLM signed the Addis Ababa Accord or Agreement in Ethiopia. As a result of the Accord, there was a ceasefire for about 10 years until 1983 when the Accord was

⁶ Anne Mosley Lesch. *Making War and Waging Peace*, (Washington: United Institute of Peace, 1993), p.83

dishonoured or abrogated by the GoS. The North-South conflict resumed and dragged on until 2005 when the GoS and the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the then main faction in the South, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya. This time round, it was the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which played the leading role in bringing the GoS and the SPLM/A together to discuss and finally sign the CPA.

Religion was one of the main features of the conflict. This is because the North was classified as being influenced by Islamic and Arabic cultures while the South leaned towards Christianity and African traditional religion.⁷ Given that most of the victims were Southerners where Christianity was more popular as compared to Islam, this study endeavoured to find out the role the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and the Anglican Church (AC) - their leaders, believers or followers and their NGOs- played throughout the conflict. Some church institutions, namely the WCC and AACC, played a crucial role in 1972 when they organized the Addis Ababa Conference which led to the Addis Ababa Accord resulted in a decade of cease-fire. However, how successful was the Accord since it was dishonoured barely 10 years later? Secondly, since the resumption of the conflict in 1983, what did the church do since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2005, was a product of the IGAD peace-process? This study explored the role of Churches in the Southern Sudan conflict, with specific reference to the RCC and the AC from 1950s to 2005.

⁷ Harir Sharif, "Recycling the Past in the Sudan" in Harir Sharif and Terje Tvedt, eds., *Short-Cut to Decay, The Case of the Sudan*, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), p.19.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The position of religion in a multi-centered society is not always clear. This is mainly because religious convictions can easily, through human frailty, be manipulated to legitimize injustices and even what to outside observers, sometimes seems to be evil.⁸

A country's majority subscription to a peace-preaching religion does not always mean absence of conflicts. Some of the African countries that have been faced with conflict in the past 20 years reveal that a big percentage of their populations subscribe to some of the world's major religions. For instance, populations in Somalia, Sierra-Leone, and Sudan are 99%, 50% and 61% Muslim, respectively, while the Christian populations in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi were 83%, 66% and 69%, respectively, to mention a few examples.⁹ Yet, all these countries have experienced conflict where many of their people became internally displaced or refugees.

Leaders of some religions have in the past been accused of fuelling conflicts. A case in point is Rwanda where some RCC clergy were implicated in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 as some of the key perpetrators.¹⁰ At the same time, the same church played an active role in brokering the peace agreement of 1992 in the Mozambique conflict, by sponsoring negotiation talks between the fighting factions and working behind the scenes for their success.¹¹ Therefore, there are many factors that influence a religion's role in conflict. Depending on the situation on the ground, a

⁸ Hasan Fadl Yusuf and Gray Richard, *Religion and Conflict in Sudan: Papers from an International Conference in Yale*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002), p.10.

⁹ Giuseppe Caramaza, "African Countries Profiles" *New People Magazine*, July – August 2004 edition, (Nairobi: New People Media Centre), p.8-28.

¹⁰ Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama, "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda" ed. Adelman Howard and Astri Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), Pp.85-87.

¹¹ David R. Smock, "Catholic Contributions to International Peace." < <http://www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3/rome2.shtml> > as accessed on 10th April 2006.

peace-preaching religion can fuel a conflict in one situation and in another situation, lead processes to a ceasefire.

Religion has been blamed for the conflict in Southern Sudan. Some scholars have argued that the conflict arose out of the fact that Islam was trying to dominate the South.¹² The expulsion of Christian missionaries from the South in 1964 and the introduction of *Shari'a* law in 1983 have been seen as specific acts of Islam's aggression against Christianity.¹³ In addition, a leader of the National Islamic Front, a party in Northern Sudan, said that the vision of Islam was to dominate Africa: He went on to say, "We will only stop when the forces of Islam have raised the Islamic flag over Cape Town and the whole continent of Africa has been Islamified."¹⁴

Christians blame Islam for the Sudanese conflict. Some church leaders in Sudan out rightly criticized this Islamic stance and the role of Islam in the conflict by saying, "The challenge of Islamism is much worse than communism. Something the next pope will have to fully face."¹⁵

There is little available information analyzing how churches participated in the conflict or in its transformation, especially from 1983 - 2005. However, Christians can be as aggressive as non-Christians. The Sudanese conflict pitted two "peace-preaching" religions, Christianity and Islam against each other. On the other hand, the role of both religions in advocating for peace cannot be ignored, as noted both in the Bible and the Quran, the books of instruction for Christians and Muslims.

¹² Johnson H. Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), p.37.

¹³ Anne Mosley Lesch, *Making War and Waging Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.83.

¹⁴ John Moi Venus, "Muskilat Junub: Southern Sudan Troubles." in *Point of View*, September 2004 edition. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2004), p15.

¹⁵ Sandro Magister., "Enemy Islam. An Interview with the Bishop of Rumbek, Sudan." in <http://www.hvk.org/articles/0604/77.html> as accessed on 12th May, 2006.

respectively.¹⁶ Despite these religions preaching peace, conflicts still persist. Why is this the case?

Early history of Christianity is associated with conflicts and violence. In 1096 Christians started organizing Crusades in which they waged war against non-Christians.¹⁷ Some of the countries that have experienced civil conflict in Africa namely Rwanda- Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo had a majority of their populations being Christian, yet the countries were faced with armed conflicts.¹⁸ This raises the question; what role did the Churches play in those conflicts? In the same breath, what role did churches play in the Sudanese conflict?

The available literature painted the clergy and church- based NGOs as the main agents who worked for a cease-fire. In addition, the literature left out the participation of the followers or the believers or non-clergy, yet they were also members of the Church. This study contends that there is a vacuum on information on churches' participation in the Southern Sudanese conflict since 1950s up to the signing of the CPA in 2005. There was an assumption that the non-clergy were passive in that conflict and only their leaders played the role of brokering a cease-fire in 1972. As noted before, it was notably the WCC and the AACC that played a key role in organising the Addis Ababa Conference that resulted in the Accord of 1972.¹⁹ Some key questions at this juncture are: did the WCC and the AACC have a hand in the collapse of the Addis Ababa Accord in 1983? Secondly, after the collapse of the

¹⁶ John 14: 7 *Good News Bible*, Collins Bible Society 1979; Holy Qur'an II:205 in Habibur R.C. 1988, "The contribution of Islam to Peace and Non-violence," in *Reconciliation International*, Vol.3, No. 1, 1988, p.8.

¹⁷ Peter Castiella, *2000 Years of Church History*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002), p.99.

¹⁸ Giuseppe Caramaza., "African Countries Profiles" *New People Magazine*, July – August 2004 edition, (Nairobi: New People Media Centre), Pp.8-28.

¹⁹ Francis M. Deng "Abyei: A bridge or a gulf? The Ngok Dinka on Sudan's North-South Border" in Jay Spaulding and Stephanie Beswick, eds. *White Nile Black Blood*, (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2000), p.150.

Accord, were the churches just passive observers of events in Sudan? If they played a role, what role was it and what were its results?

It is imperative that a study of this nature is carried out to explore the actual role that churches played in the Sudanese conflict, with specific reference to the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC). This study endeavours to outline the role of the AC and the RCC between 1950s and 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The findings of the research, it is hoped, will augment past researches on the role of religion in conflict and in conflict resolution, with specific reference to the AC and the RCC in Southern Sudan.

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The aim of the study was to explore the participation of the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholic Church in the Sudanese conflict in the period 1950s to 2005. The specific objectives were:

- a) To explore the participation of the church leadership in the Conflict.
- b) To explore the participation of the AC and RCC followers or believers in the conflict.
- c) To explore the participation of some of the AC and RCC institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the conflict.

1.4 Justification of the study

The role of religion in any situation can be subjective. This is because of the 'Mega' nature of society which has several centres of control.²⁰ Therefore, sometimes religion is a cause of conflict. There has been increasing interest in studies of religion as a

²⁰ Saberwal Sathish, *Roots of Crisis: Interpreting Contemporary Indian Society*. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996), Pp.56-58.

centre of conflict.²¹ Christianity and Islam have taken the major part of the focus because they purport to envisage non-violence as their main agenda.²² Yet, in the case of the Sudan conflict, two regions North and South dominated by these religions, Islam and Christianity respectively, were pitted against each other in a violent conflict that spurned for almost four decades. Whether the AC and the RCC took sides or not in the conflict is the question that interested this study.

Historically, church institutions and their leaders have tried to intervene in conflict situations. A case in point was how in the first phase of the Sudan conflict (1955-1971), the WCC/AACC were deeply involved in the process that led to the Addis Ababa Accord. However, the Accord was dishonoured barely 10 years after its signing, so what was the role of the churches in the collapse of the Accord? At the same time, in the second phase of the conflict (1983-2005), literature explaining their concrete participation is lacking. Why was this the case yet the majority of the victims were in the South, where Christianity was more popular as compared to Islam? Did the Islamic government see churches as part of the conflict?

The Southern Sudanese conflict was one of the longest civil conflicts ever in Africa. It began in 1955. There was a lull in the period 1972-1983 before it resumed till the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. About 250,000 people, mainly civilians were estimated to have been killed, while over 3.5 million became refugees or internally displaced.²³ Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and the DRC played host to hundreds of thousands of Southern Sudanese refugees.²⁴ Given that most of the victims were Southerners where Christianity was more patronised than Islam, it was

²¹ Yusuf *et al.* *Religion and Conflict in Sudan; Papers from an International Conference in Yale*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ A.M. Lesch, "Negotiations in the Sudan," in David R. Smock ed., *op. cit.*, p. 84.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

likely that they were involved in the conflict not only as agents seeking a ceasefire but also as fighters. This made the study of churches participation in the Sudan conflict a subject of interest to pursue.

1.5 Scope and Limitations

There are three main religions in Sudan: Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion (ATR). Whereas Islam was dominant in the North, Christianity and ATR were dominant in the south. Since the conflict involved the North and the South, the study recognised that all the major religions were involved in the conflict in some way. However, the study limited itself only to Christians, the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC). It endeavoured to explore their policies, activities, achievements and failures from 1950s to 2005.

The study limited itself to the activities of the AC and the RCC in the years 1950s, when there was the first mutiny, and 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The focus on the two denominations arose out of the fact that Christianity is one of the world's major religions and the AC and the RCC were the first Christian denominations to be introduced in Southern Sudan.²⁵ And due to financial constraints, the study was conducted in Kenya.

1.6 Literature Review

Several scholars have written on the Sudan Conflict covering different aspects and periods, depending on their interests. The following literature review shows that, although the Sudan Conflict was a common area of interest for many scholars, there is still a vacuum on the question of the churches' actual participation, their failures and

²⁵ Robert O. Collins, "Religion in Perspective in Sudan" <<http://eweb2.gov/cgi-bin/quer>>, June 1991 (accessed 12th December 2005).

success throughout the conflict up to the signing of the CPA in 2005. This work covers both published and unpublished materials.

Christopher Mitchell wrote “The process and stages of mediation, two Sudanese Cases.”²⁶ He examines the dissent ways in which to maximize the chances of success in resolving a conflict. One of the key questions he posed was what was the best mix of people and institutions to produce the results in a conflict resolution process. He further argued that there were cases when a single entity could become the sole intermediary, carrying through the procedure of contacting the parties in question, while there were complex cases where it would be more fruitful for a number of intermediary parties to carry out such a process. However, he did not explain a case where the mediators in question were faith-based groups and some of their followers could have been directly involved in the conflict either as victims or as fighters.

The idea of religious conflict has been explored by some writers. One such writer is Ann Mosley Lesch who wrote the paper *Negotiations in Sudan*.²⁷ She quoted one of the reasons for the formation of Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement as fighting against a “minority clique” in whatever form, including a religious sect. In addition, she pointed out that western churches were using SPLM to thwart the spread of Islam southward in Africa. She noted that it was the WCC and AACC which facilitated the negotiations. However, she did not explore the impact of the participation of the Christian organisations after the Accord. She also did not indicate if the religious groups played any role in the conflict or contributed towards the signing of the CPA, during the period 1983 to 2005.

²⁶ Christopher Mitchell., “The Process and Stages of Mediation, two Sudanese Cases” in David R. Smock ed., *Making War and Waging Peace*, (Washington D.C: United Institute of Peace, 1993), Pp.139 –159.

²⁷ A. M. Lesch, “Making War and Waging Peace.” in David R. Smock. *Making War and Waging Peace*, p.107 -138.

Other writers have argued that the Southern Sudan Conflict was prolonged because the political elite in the North was unwilling to bring it to an end. Harir Sharif argues this in his paper *Recycling the Past in the Sudan*.²⁸ In addition, he argued that it was external factors and influence that led to the war dragging on for over three decades. Sharif recognized the contribution of NGOs, especially the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), in helping to raise the living standards of the Southern Sudanese, through humanitarian assistance while trying to stay out of local and regional politics.²⁹ In noting the importance of the Addis Ababa Accord, Sharif termed it as one of the rare cases in which African internal conflicts were resolved by peaceful negotiation. It was an achievement not only by Sudanese standards but it was propagated as a model for solving similar conflicts in Africa and the Third World.³⁰ He accounted for the activities of NCA for only 2 years, 1986 to 1987. However, he only focused on NCA and left out other denominations. In addition, he accounted for a period of two years only, yet the conflict raged on for over two decades from 1983.

Some writers solely blame General Nimeiri's leadership for the Conflict. Bona Malwal explores this idea extensively in his book *The Sudan, a Second Challenge to Nationhood*.³¹ Malwal, who was also a member of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, attributed the conflict of 1983 to Nimeiri's leadership style and especially his dictatorial style. He argued that one tenet of Nimeiri's dictatorship was the introduction of Islamic *Shari'a* law for the whole of Sudan in September 1983. Malwal criticized Nimeiri for consistently ignoring the South and thereby leaving

²⁸ Harir Sharif., "Recycling the Past in the Sudan" in Harir Sharif and Terje Tvedt *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*. (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), p. 11-20.

²⁹ Terje Tvedt., "The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement" in Harir Sharif and Terje Tvedt. *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*. (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), p. 92.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Bona Malwal. *The Sudan, A Second Challenge to Nationhood*, (New York: Thornton Books, 1985), p 7.

them with no option but to revolt. Malwal also noted the importance of the Addis Ababa Agreement, pointing out that its preparations were through the World Council of Churches (WCC), which played an important role behind the scenes. WCC mediated over a period of time trying to bring the two (government and the southerners) sides together.³² Apart from specifying that the WCC chaired the negotiations, through Canon Burgess, and that they provided material and logistical support especially for those from the South. Malwal did not explain whether the Christian churches and/or institutions were involved in any way in the period 1983 to 2005.

Hizkias Assefa has written extensively on the Addis Ababa Conference of 1972. He has explored the mediation process of the Sudanese Conflict from 1955 to 1972 in his book *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*.³³ He pointed out that the identity of conflicting parties in any mediation process must be clearly defined in order to make it possible for a third party to intervene. Assefa further outlined the qualities of a mediator and thereby explained that the WCC and the AACC were accepted as mediators in the Sudanese conflict, on the failure of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) to be trusted by the Southern Sudanese representatives in 1970.³⁴ Assefa pointed out that the involvement of the two bodies began in 1965.³⁵ The intervention was mainly in the form of negotiations with the government, as well as material aid to Southern Sudan. According to him, some of the major successes of WCC and AACC in the intervention process were the replacement of expelled White Missionaries with expatriate African Missionaries as well as the ability to have audience with the government and leaders of the

³² Ibid. p.18.

³³ Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*, (Washington: Westview Press Inc., 1987), p.13.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 94.

³⁵ H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*, p.96.

Southerners³⁶. The book is a very detailed account of the WCC and AACC interventions in the form of negotiations and mediations in Southern Sudan led by the clergy. However, the work was limited to a detailed account of the Addis Ababa Conference only. In addition, it covers the period 1965 to 1972 only. It leaves out the 1983-2005 period.

Another writer within the Church leadership is Bishop Caesar Mazorali, the bishop of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) diocese of Rumbek. He has compiled the letters of the RCC bishops of Sudan to the GoS and to their followers during the period 1983 to 2001 in the book *The Church in Sudan, Journeying towards Justice and Peace*.³⁷ The book gives extensive details of the varying moods of the interaction between the RCC leadership, their followers and the GoS leadership in the period 1983 to 2001. However, it left out any information about other Christian denominations, activities of both the RCC and other denominations as well as the results of those activities, if any.

Other writers have pegged the Southern Sudan Conflict to the radical introduction of *Shari'a* law. Kjell HØdnebØ, Sharif Harrir and Terje Tvedt have argued this in their paper. *A Chronology of the Sudan 1972-1992*.³⁸ They argued that Christian - based institutions were radically opposed to the law. To explain the seriousness of the introduction of *Shari'a* they wrote that in 1983, the penal code of Sudan was revised and linked "organically and spiritually" to Islamic law.³⁹ The paper further explains that the National Council of Churches in Kenya in 1991 was one of the organisers for

³⁶ Ibid, P.97.

³⁷ Caesar Mazzolari, *The Church in Sudan, Journeying towards Justice and Peace*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2000), p.10-11.

³⁸ Kjell HØdnebØ, Sharif Harrir and Terje Tvedt., "A Chronology of the Sudan 1972-1992" in Sharif Harrir and Terje Tvedt, *Shortcut to Decay: The case of the Sudan*, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), p.259 – 274.

³⁹ Ibid, p.266.

a reconciliation meeting between two southern warring factions.⁴⁰ The meeting came up with a 12-point peace plan. However, they did not give the details of the peace plan and neither did they explain if the plan was of any significance to subsequent events up to the signing of the CPA in 2005. Similarly, the writers did not explain whether NCKK and other church groups subsequently worked together towards attaining a ceasefire.

Other writers posited that the Sudan Government used Islam as a tool of control in the South. Venus Moi John proposed this in his paper *Muskilat Junub: Southern Sudan Troubles*.⁴¹ He further noted that some sections of the population were forced by circumstances to adopt the Islamic faith so as to benefit from the central government. He summed it as religious discrimination, an “ideology that is unacceptable to people of today who are more aware of their civil rights and freedoms.”⁴² However, he did not indicate how churches reacted throughout the period of the conflict.

Abel Alier is a Southern Sudanese and was also the leader of the Government of Sudan Delegation to the Addis Ababa Conference. He detailed the activities and processes that led to the Addis Ababa Accord in his book *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured-Southern Sudan*.⁴³ He acknowledged that the churches through the WCC and the AACC, made it possible for the Addis Ababa Conference to take place, thus resulting in almost a decade when there was no conflict. He also gave an account of Southern Sudan up to the abrogation of the Accord in 1983. However, he did not analyse the role of the churches since the Accord up to 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.273.

⁴¹ John V. M., *Point of View*, September 2004, p15.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Abel Alier. *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured-Southern Sudan*, (London: Ithaca Press, 2003), p.69-91.

Other writers such as Arop Madut-Arop, have credited the prolonged Southern Sudan Conflict to the existence of too many factions in the South, according to his book, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*.⁴⁴ Outlining the politics in Southern Sudan from 1960s to 2005 he explained that the formation of factions in the South and intra-factions within the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) made it difficult for the South to stand as one entity. He also gave a detailed information of the roles of the SPLM/A's leaders, especially the late John Garang and Riek Machar, explaining how their different ideologies also played a role in prolonging the conflict. While Garang wanted the South to remain part of the greater Sudan, Machar wanted it to be an independent state. Arop also briefly mentioned that the churches organised the Addis Ababa Conference. However, he did not explain if they played any role from 1983 to 2005.

Other scholars have explored the Addis Ababa Conference and its failure. Njoroge Peter Chege has compared the Peace Agreement of Sudan in 1972 with that of Mozambique in 1992 in his thesis, *Historical Analysis of the Implementation of Peace Agreements; A Comparative Case Study of Sudan (1972) and Mozambique (1992)*.⁴⁵

He analysed the Addis Ababa Conference and the Accord in detail but not the role of the churches, only mentioning that it was facilitated by the WCC and the AACC. By so doing, he did not look in detail, the specific contribution and shortcomings of the church organizations. In addition, his analysis was only limited to the year 1972, whereas the churches' role began before 1972. He also did not look at the period after

⁴⁴ Arop Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, (New York: Booksurge, 2006), p.13-15.

⁴⁵ Peter, Chege Njoroge *Historical Analysis of the Implementation of Peace Agreements; A Comparative Case Study of Sudan (1972) and Mozambique (1992)*, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2006), p. 48-54.

1972, yet the conflict resumed in 1983 and continued till 2005, a period of interest to this study.

All the writers on Sudan quoted above alluded to the fact that religion and religious institutions were involved in the conflict as fighters or in resolving it. These religions were both Christian and Islam. This study was interested in the specific role of the AC and the RCC in the period 1950s - 2005 that either contributed to the conflict or ceasefire, which is a gap that had been left out by the writers above.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework guides a research within a particular discipline. This study utilized the "Conflict transformation theory" as expounded by John Paul Lederach.⁴⁶ According to Lederach, conflict transformation is the process of understanding the nature of conflict and working with its "dialectic nature."⁴⁷ He pointed out that conflict transformation was different from "conflict resolution" because the latter implied that conflict was bad, hence something that was short-term and should be ended permanently. On the other hand, he noted that "conflict management" suggested that people could be directed or controlled "as though they were physical objects"⁴⁸ Since people are not objects, he preferred the 'conflict transformation' instead.

One of the main tenets of the theory includes the belief that human beings, who are involved in relationships naturally create social conflict, but once it begins, it transforms the events, people and relationships that created the initial conflict. He

⁴⁶ John Paul Lederach, "Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures." <<http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/contms.htm> >as accessed on 20th April 2006, p.3-23.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 15.

⁴⁸ J.P Lederach, "Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures." P.10-15.

explains that the changes could be predictable in some aspects, especially in communication patterns, social organization as well as in altering images of self and the other. The other tenets of the theory are that the transformation process should include "peace", "justice" "truth" and "mercy". According to him, the starting point of conflict transformation is truth which is the identification and acknowledgment of what happened. Justice involves the pursuit of the restoration, of rectifying wrongs and creating right relationships based on equity and fairness. Mercy involves compassion, forgiveness and a new start. It is oriented towards supporting persons who have committed injustices, encouraging them to change and move on.⁴⁹ The final result is peace, which is in the form of reconciliation and may be experienced as a ceasefire. "Conflict transformation" also suggests that left alone, conflict can have destructive consequences. However, if the consequences are modified, social structures, self-images and relationships may improve as a result of the conflict instead of being harmed by it. This would involve re-defining issues to change perceptions of issues and actions of other people or groups.

In conflict transformation theory, 'transformation' also touches the way the conflict was being expressed. Ideally, its expression should change from being competitive, aggressive and violent to being non-violent, advocated and mediated. Lederach sees advocacy and mediation as being stages of the conflict transformation process. Advocacy, in his opinion, was important to raise people's awareness of the issue being contested. It prepared a way for mediation, which is the process of steering the conflict from mutually destructive modes towards dialogue and interdependence.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ J.P Lederach, "Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures," p.21.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.10-15.

In Lederach's view, 'transformation' is holistic, from the personal to the systems' level. Whereas at the personal level conflict transformation involves the pursuit of awareness and commitment to change, at the systems' level it involves increasing opportunities for equity and non-violence. Finally, since conflict usually accentuates the differences between people and their opinions, effective conflict transformation is aimed at improving mutual understanding. Even when people's needs, interests and values are non-reconcilable and different, progress can be attained if each group strives for some relative accurate understanding of the other.⁵¹

Lederach's theory has been criticized by some scholars, among them Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan Funk.⁵² They pointed out that the theory was one-sided: it put too much faith on institutional formulae and too little emphasis on communal cooperation in pursuit of values, as well as celebrating human self-determination, while Islamic approaches put more emphasis on divine purpose. They also noted that the theory viewed the process of resolving or transforming conflict as drawing a lot from expediency and technique. By doing so, the theory neglected human relationships while focusing on isolated facets of the whole.

The theory of Human Basic Needs by Abraham Maslow could also have been applicable.⁵³ The theory stipulates that there are different categories of needs in order of hierarchy: physiological, safety, belonging and esteem needs. When all these are satisfied, an individual realises self-actualisation. However, if at any point a person was frustrated in their bid to achieve these needs, they become violent and this may

⁵¹Ibid. p.21.

⁵²Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan Funk "Islamic views of peace making."

<http://www.2.norwich.edu/hkearsle/video/said_lecture.pdtf> as accessed on 23rd April 2006.

⁵³ George Boeree, " Abraham Maslow - 1908-1970 " <<http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/maslow.html> > as accessed on 17th May 2006.

result in a conflict.⁵⁴ However, it was not applied in this study because it does not include the third party factor; it is only limited to the conflicting parties and does not include mediators.

Lederach's theory is applicable to this study mainly because of the participation of third parties. As pointed out in the Addis Ababa Accord, churches participated in the conflict as mediators, and mediation is one of the stages of conflict transformation, according to Lederach. Part of the theory, the "mediation process" has been used by Assefa in explaining the work of the WCC and the AACC in coming up with the Addis Ababa Accord.⁵⁵ He pointed out that the WCC and the AACC were mediators in the process. In exploring the involvement of the RCC and the AC some questions arose on the conflict transformation theory; to what extent was advocacy or mediation successful? The theory did not explain to what extent the involvement of the RCC and the AC modified the conflict resulting in the ceasefire. Finally, there could be several factors that lead to a ceasefire and not as presented by Lederach as being "advocacy" and "mediation" only.

1.8 Hypothesis

This study tested two hypotheses. These were:

- i. The AC and the RCC played a role in fuelling the Sudan Conflict from 1950s to 2005.
- ii. The AC and the RCC played a role in resolving the Sudan Conflict from 1950s to 2005.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ H.Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars. Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*, p.13.

1.9 Methodology

The methodology for this study was a historical analysis of both secondary and primary sources of data. The gathering of data began immediately the researcher obtained permission from the University to commence the study. Among the secondary sources, the study drew information from books, journals and internet-based sources. Among primary sources, information was obtained from oral interviews and unpublished works of scholars. Both the primary and secondary sources served the purpose of presenting a detailed picture of the study.

All the secondary data was obtained in Kenya. This was through extensive reading of published documents in the form of books and journals as well as soft copies from internet-based sources. This was from University of Nairobi Library; Sudanese Catholic Bishops Regional Council (SCBRC) Resource Centre; All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) Resource Centre; Nairobi Peace Initiatives (NPI) Resource Centre; New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) Secretariat as well as from the Centre for Conflict Resolution Resource Centre.

This study's supervisors and other scholars at the University of Nairobi (UoN) advised on previous studies on 'Sudan' carried out by other students. They consisted of students' projects at Master's level at the University as well as assignments on the 'Sudan Conflict.' Internet-based articles on 'Sudan' also formed part of the primary sources.

Several conferences and seminars on the Southern Sudan Conflict have been held at different times during the period of the conflict. Reports of conferences and meetings were obtained to fill any gaps left by information obtained from books. Most of the

reports were from the Resource Centre of the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the New Sudan Council of Churches, Nairobi.

The study obtained primary data from archives and from interviews. The archives of the AACC provided information on activities prior to the Addis Ababa Conference and after, in the period 1970 to 1973. The information from the archives consisted of documents and position papers exchanged by the people who were involved during the process.

Oral information through interviews was obtained during field work. The first step was sampling the population through 'Snow Ball' method of data collection. This was where the initial subjects with the desired characteristics were identified using purposeful sampling technique.⁵⁶ The initial respondents were key personalities in the churches. These included the Secretary of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Sudanese Catholic Bishops Regional Council(SCBRC) and his Deputy, the Acting Secretary General of Sudan Council of Churches in Khartoum (via email);the Pontifical Council on Inter-religious dialogue. Peace Program Manager of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church diocese of Rumbek. Program officers at the NSCC, some officials of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) who were based in Nairobi and staff of United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). It was from the key respondents that contacts of subsequent people to interview were obtained. The size of the sample was influenced by availability of subjects and their willingness to provide information.

⁵⁶ Olive Mugenda and Abel Mugenda, *Research Methods*. (Nairobi: Acts Press 1999), p.51.

The research involved conducting interviews using a guiding questionnaire with unstructured questions. The interviews were recorded through note-taking. Majority of those interviewed were Southern Sudanese or people who had been in Sudan during the conflict: Officers of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the clergy and former clergy who had participated in the Addis Ababa Conference preparations in the 1970s.

The researcher faced several problems during the time of the field work and data collection. One of the limitations was that some interviewees had limited information. This was countered by interviewing diverse people so as to achieve objectivity. Secondary sources of data may also be limited, since the period of study was recent. The study, therefore, made use of Internet-based sources, which tended to be more recent to complement both the secondary and interviews. The two methods were used complementarily so as to gather as much information on the subject as possible. Another problem was securing the contacts of the would-be respondents. This called for accessing their personal telephone contacts which required a lot of persuasion by the researcher. Secondly, some of the respondents cancelled appointments several times before agreeing to meet the researcher. This called for a lot of patience and endurance to the end.

Data analysis was qualitative. This was because the research did not require a lot of numerical data which would have necessitated the use of quantitative analysis instead. The qualitative analysis involved describing the events as narrated by the interviewees and synthesizing the information according to the arguments presented.

This study is divided into the following chapters:

1. **Background To The Study.**
2. **History of Sudan Up To The 1955 Conflict.**
3. **The Addis Ababa Accord and Its Aftermath.**
4. **The Renewed Conflict and The Comprehensive Peace Agreement.**
5. **Conclusion.**
6. **Bibliography.**

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF THE SUDAN FROM 1899 UPTO 1971

2.1 Introduction

There are four key phases in the history of Sudan and the North-South divide. The first is the early history up to 1820 AD. This time was marked with many local kingdoms throughout Sudan rising and falling due to infighting for domination and for resources. The next phase was the Turco-Egyptian rule from 1821 to 1899 under which the present day North and South Sudan were brought under one ruler. A major consequence of the Turco-Egyptian rule was that the North, specifically Khartoum, was established as the seat of power for the rulers while the South was left out and seen as a reserve for slaves.⁵⁷ The third phase was the Anglo-Egyptian rule which began in 1899. Under this rule, Britain and Egypt co-administered Sudan in a Condominium arrangement. The Condominium reinforced what was begun by the Turco-Egyptians by dividing Sudan administratively into the present day 'North' and 'South'.⁵⁸ The fourth phase began in 1955 when just before Sudan was liberated from the colonial rule, the first North-South conflict began. This Chapter traces the history of the Sudan from the time of the Condominium in 1899 up to 1971, just before the Addis Ababa Conference.

2.2 Sudan during the Condominium

The Condominium rule began in Sudan in 1899. The condominium was an Agreement between Egypt and Britain to co-administer Sudan.⁵⁹ It was of significant importance to the history of Sudan because it reinforced the 'North' 'South' divide of the modern day Sudan.⁶⁰ Under the Condominium, the British and the Egyptians co-

⁵⁷ H. Sharif, "Recycling the Past in the Sudan" in Harir Sharif and Terje Tvedt, *Short-Cut to Decay, The Case of the Sudan*, p.30.

⁵⁸ David Ruay, *The Politics of two Sudans*, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: Uppsala, 1994), p.35.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Werner Roland, William Anderson and Andrew Wheeler, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2001), p.219.

administered Sudan. The British divided the country administratively into the North, which was 'middle-eastern and Arab' and the South which was 'African and Negroid'.⁶¹

The Condominium rule had three main purposes. The British, who possessed superior military prowess as compared to the Egyptians, wanted to achieve the following: to curb the spread of Islam into the South and in effect into the rest of Africa; to protect the South from further slavery and thus near extinction of Southerners and finally to separate the two regions through divide and rule system.⁶² This was manifested through restriction of movement from the North to the South and vice versa, thus severing economic and other relations between the two regions. The restrictive rules of the system had major consequences in the attitudes of the people towards one another: it effectively sowed the seeds of 'differentness' between those in the North and those in the South. This historical development set the stage for later conflicts.

2.3 Early Anglican Church (AC) and Roman Catholic Church (RCC) Missionaries in Sudan

Missionaries from the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) arrived in Sudan during the Condominium rule. One of the greatest impacts of their work was that they introduced the two denominations which grew to have the largest number of followers among Christian denominations in Southern Sudan.⁶³ Since the CMS and the RCC had different origins, there was a danger of infighting among them over areas of influence. To avoid a conflict, Governor Reginald Wingate introduced the system of spheres of control, separating areas of

⁶¹ D.Ruay, *The Politics of two Sudans*, p.35.

⁶² Basil A. Omusotsi., *The Impact of the Cold War on the Sudanese Civil War, 1956-1989*. (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2004), p.25.

⁶³ John Yoh. *Christianity in the Sudan*. (Amman: Royal Institute for Inter-faith Studies, 1996), p.3.

control of the RCC and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) which later on came to be known as the Anglican Church (AC).⁶⁴ With time, the RCC and AC missionaries adopted the principle of 'comity,' by which the missions agreed not to compete against each other in the same area.⁶⁵ At the same time, animosity was considerably reduced as the missionaries united against slavery and slave-trade.

The missionaries arrived in Sudan at different times. The first to arrive were the Roman Catholic missionaries. They arrived in Gondokoro Southern Sudan, in 1846 to set up a mission post, the Vicariate Apostolic of Central Africa which was aimed at serving most of Central Africa, including Sudan.⁶⁶ They faced many challenges. One of their first challenges was dealing with slavery and slave trade in which both Arab and European traders were involved. In addition, the missionaries faced stiff opposition from the Muslim administration in the North under Governor Suleiman Pasha.⁶⁷ This rivalry marked the general relationship between the North and the South.

Church Missionary Society (CMS) arrived in Sudan later. They entered Sudan through Ethiopia in 1853 where they had gone to revive the Coptic Church. One of the earliest documented CMS activities are those of Dr. Kenneth Grant Fraser and his wife, Mrs. Eileen Fraser.⁶⁸ They began their work in Moru, the Southern part of Western Equatoria, in 1920 immediately after the First World War (WWI) which had ended in 1918. Their story reflects the general growth of Christianity in Southern Sudan as Sharland states;

⁶⁴ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.456.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.229.

⁶⁶ J.Yoh, *Christianity in the Sudan*, p.3.

⁶⁷ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p. 139.

⁶⁸ Peter Obadayo Tingwa, *The History of the Moru Church in Sudan*, (Nairobi: Sudan Literature Centre 1992), p.5.

...when talking about the mission and evangelization among the Moru, we are talking almost exclusively about the work of the Anglican Church and the daughter Church of the EC of the Sudan. The foundation of this work was laid very firmly by one couple Dr. Kenneth and Mrs. Eileen Fraser...⁶⁹

The local people approached them out of necessity. They needed medical care. With time, the people began attending their schools and finally some adopted their religion. They were a surgeon and a nurse, respectively. They arrived when slave-trade was at its peak. As a result, out of fear of foreigners, the local people did not warm up to them and to Christianity immediately. However, their medical knowledge endeared them to the people. A year after arrival, they began a boys' school in Moru and two years later, a school for girls.

During this period, the political scene across Africa and Sudan, in particular, was gradually changing. Since some Africans had participated in the WWI, they witnessed the vulnerability of the colonialists. The experience planted anti-imperialism feelings and nationalism on their return.⁷⁰ These emotions spread among the people and soon there was widespread resistance among the colonised across Africa after WWI. Since Egypt and Britain were administering Sudan together through the Condominium, the anti-imperialism feelings reached Egypt and this led to a souring of relations between Egypt and Britain. These new developments spread and finally reached Sudan, when in 1924, Ali Abd al Latif started a revolution called the White Flag Movement in Egypt.⁷¹ The Movement was championing a call for an independent Sudan united with Egypt. The colonial administration managed to suppress the Movement. However, in the same year, Sir Lee Stack, the Governor

⁶⁹ Roger W. Sharland., "Mission, Evangelism and Development among the Moru, " in David Sahatini ed. *The Christian Church in Zandeland*, (Nairobi: AACC, 1996), p.1.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Peter A. Nyaba. *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997), p.14.

General of Sudan, was assassinated in Cairo.⁷² Clearly, Egypt had drawn its sword against Britain. As a result of the pressure, the colonial administration ordered the removal of all Egyptian troops from Sudan. Subsequently, for the next 11 years, Britain administered Sudan virtually alone.

The year 1924 marked a turning point in the administration of the South. There was an uprising against the British Administration in Sudan as part of the anti-imperialism expressions that characterized the period immediately after the First World War. The uprising was of great significance to future events of Sudan because it was the first time that the 'Northerners' and the 'Southerners' were publicly united against the British.⁷³ The leader of the uprising, Ali Abd al-Latif was a descendant of a freed slave who had benefited from military and education opportunities that had been proffered to Southerners before.⁷⁴ His leadership in the struggle had a major implication in the colonial administration; they critically analysed the policy of offering educational and military opportunities which were at first a reserve of Northerners to former slaves. The British, therefore, reversed that policy and by so doing, they reinforced the Northerners' view that Africans were inferior to Arabs. This racial distinction was carried into official policy by the British at this point and for some time to come. They distinguished two types of Sudanese; racial Africans or non-Arabs and the Arabs, a category which included those who identified themselves as Arab, notwithstanding their African-Arab mixture.⁷⁵

The aftermath of the WWI had several consequences on South Sudan. First, missionary work suffered a setback. This was because resources from Christians in

⁷² Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.267.

⁷³ Francis Deng, *War of Vision*, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Publications 1995), p.106.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.107.

⁷⁵ Francis Deng, *War of Vision*, p.106.

Europe were diverted to reconstructing countries in Europe.⁷⁶ Secondly, the colonial administration in Sudan had to rely more on missionaries for administrative work, since the colonial administration's human and financial resources were stretched to their limit. Thirdly, the War marked a turning point in British Policy: Whereas before, neutrality towards religion was the colonial government's policy, after the War and in the subsequent years, the government now came out publicly to support Southern Sudan arguing that the region must be saved from Arabism, Northern Sudanese and Islam.⁷⁷

2.4 The Southern Policy

The British wanted to completely sever any links between the North and the South. In 1930, they introduced the Southern Policy by which there was change from Arabic to English as the official language in the South.⁷⁸ In the education system, the language of instruction in the South became English. This was met with resistance by missionaries. At the same time, even though on paper the education by missionaries was for all people, in practice the colonial government advocated for more education of children of merchants and notables, who were their allies.⁷⁹ This was because the government's policy for the South was to get only a few educated black Africans to fill minor clerical posts. The bulk of the administration work was left in the hands of the missionaries, who were more interested in spreading Christianity than building the capacity of the people above basic literacy level. This is the policy that saw the planting of seeds of underdevelopment in Southern Sudan because the region was left at the mercy of missionaries, who were facing both financial and personnel constraints. The Northerners in administrative positions in the South were relieved of

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.268.

⁷⁹ Johnson H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers 2003), p. 15.

their duties and replaced by Southerners. Finally, the colonial government literally separated the North and the South by clearing a space to act as a border between the North and the South at Bahr al Ghazal.⁸⁰

Through the Southern Policy, several other rules which separated the North and the South were introduced. One of these was the Indirect Rule.⁸¹ The principle of Indirect Rule was to, as much as possible, use indigenous structures to administer the people. This was possible in the North because of elaborate administrative structures that were in place through the Islamic religion. To strengthen indigenous structures in the North, the British enacted the "Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance."⁸² The legislation gave the Sheikhs judicial authority in *Shari'a* and customary law. Administration and religion were separated in the Indirect Rule. Governing laws were based on the Indian Constitution Model, while *Shari'a* was applied as family law. It dealt with marriage, inheritance and property rights.⁸³ The British controlled the Muslim administration through the Grand Kadhi.

The situation was different in the South. The South was characterized by numerous autonomous communities each with its own administrative structures.⁸⁴ The British thus established the Chief's courts in the South. The Courts borrowed heavily from the British judicial system and partly from the indigenous customs. In order to minimise the strength of the communities, the colonial government discouraged the natives from imitating the customs of other communities, since the pastoral communities had different customs from their agricultural counterparts. In addition,

⁸⁰Ibid. p.268.

⁸¹ Wal Duany and Julia Duany, "Genesis of the Crisis in Sudan." in Spaulding Jay and Stephanie Beswick eds. *White Nile Black Blood*, (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2000), p. 171.

⁸² J.H. Douglas. *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.12.

⁸³ Ibid. p. 13.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 12.

they also discouraged Southerners from imitating Islamic customs and laws. Whereas in the North uniformity of religion was encouraged through Islam, in the South, uniformity was discouraged. By so doing, the British managed to maintain the Southern communities as different entities and thus easily ruling them.

Ironically, the work of the Frasers, the first CMS missionaries as noted earlier, and others in Sudan was favoured by the Southern Policy. This is because there was no interference in their activities by the Northern administration. The pupils from the Fraser's school, after four years of instruction went to Nugent Intermediate School in Juba, another missionary school. Other missionaries, such as Dr. Manwell, Dr. A.H Carson and Mrs. Phillips, joined them.⁸⁵ They put up more health facilities and classes. Bishop Gwyne College was opened at the same place and most of the students from missionary schools were sent there to study Theology. A majority became pastors and lay readers.⁸⁶ This training of the locals in leadership and church doctrine played a major role in the spread of Christianity years later after foreign missionaries had been expelled. Almost a decade since the arrival of the Frasers, in 1927 seven of the first pupils from their educational activities became teachers. Two of them, Anderea Apaya and Danielle Parongwa, were sent to start a new school 45 miles away from Moru.⁸⁷ These two played a critical role in the changing political scene as will be seen later in this study.

Education policy in the South changed about 10 years before independence. Whereas in the old system Southerners were not forced to take their children to school, in the new policy the Chiefs were required to avail a quota of boys for education in the

⁸⁵ P.T.Obadayo, *The History of the Moru Church in Sudan*, p.9.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.12.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

hastily established schools.⁸⁸ However, there were already a lot of differences between the education standards, establishments and attitudes towards education in the North and those in the South. One of the biggest negative impacts the different education systems had was that very few Southerners were educated by the time of independence: This late awakening had some impact on the training of the first generation of post-independence Southern leaders, but the decades of earlier neglect meant that there were few Southerners experienced in modern forms of administration and commerce when independence came in 1956.⁸⁹

2.5 The Sudan Council of Churches

The 1930s were years of rapid expansion of missionary activities in Sudan. One of the key landmarks was the founding of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). The SCC consisted of representatives of all Christian Churches operating in Sudan at that time, namely the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Presbyterian Church, Africa Inland Mission, the Greek and the Ethiopian Orthodox Churches. The aim of the SCC was to function as the channel for donor development funds, expertise, humanitarian assistance and social services, especially health and education.⁹⁰ However, due to the small number of Africans in its leadership, it was rather restricted to spiritual matters. The SCC largely remained a church organization that did not participate openly in political issues.

Elite African converts in CMS put the church squarely in the changing political scene in Sudan. In 1941, Anderea Apaya, one of the earliest converts, became one of the

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 394.

⁸⁹ J.H.Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.15.

⁹⁰ Raphael K. Badal, *Local Traditional Structures in Sudan*, (Nairobi: Life and Peace Institute, 2006), p.123.

first Africans to be ordained Deacon.⁹¹ Other Africans, such as Rev. Ezra Baya and Rev. Elinana Ngalamu who much later became the first Sudanese Bishop, were ordained shortly after him. These leaders embraced Christianity and were still deep rooted in their traditions to the extent of becoming role models to others. Some of them, such as Rev. Ezra and Rev. Ngalamu, were approached by their people to become chiefs.⁹² Although they turned down the requests, Bishop Ngalamu is reported to have assisted the *Anyanya* with food, clothing and accommodation and allegedly introduced them to his friends from abroad who assisted them with training and contacts.⁹³ With such people in the local church leadership, the church was not going to take a back seat in the liberation struggles that were about to begin.

2.6 Sudan towards Independence

Nationalism struggles across Africa led to a wave of liberation of many former colonies. The WWII had claimed considerable economic resources of Britain, leaving it weak to further fight colonial wars.⁹⁴ This meant there was pressure on Britain and other countries to grant independence to their colonies as well as the countries they were administering as Condominiums, including Sudan.

In preparation for independence, the colonial administration in Sudan organised a conference in Juba in May 1947. The aim of the Juba Conference was to chart the way forward for an independent Sudan and the future of Southern Sudan.⁹⁵ However, the British Administration had already decided to unite the North and the South into one country even before assessing the views of Southerners. According to Mary Wood, an administrator of colonial Sudan:

⁹¹ Ibid, p.11.

⁹² R.K. Badal, *Local Traditional Structures in Sudan*, p.123.23.

⁹³ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.394.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.364.

⁹⁵ J. H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.25.

...the main consideration is that the Sudan, though a vast country in area is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units. Those who prepared the report believe that the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together, the sooner they will begin to coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country. This belief is sincerely and genuinely held by many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including Southern Sudanese in the future Assembly, the process of unification will be hastened. I am confident that their recommendations are based on the highest motives, and think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the South.⁹⁶

Participants for the Juba Conference were drawn from the elite classes of both regions. It was during the Juba Conference that Britain finally decided to unite the North and the South at independence. The Juba Conference served to highlight the differences between the Northerners and the Southerners. While the Northerners wanted unity, the Southerners wanted an independent state. Because of the different policies that had been applied for the past two decades, whereas the Northern representatives were seasoned political elites, those from the South had been handpicked by the provincial administration.⁹⁷

The representatives of the South were not highly educated or experienced as compared to their Northern counterparts. Having been chosen from the three diverse provinces of the South-Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile-they did not have a common view. Only on being reassured that civil service pay scale (then much lower in the south) would be regularized throughout the country did they agree to attend the Legislative Assembly.⁹⁸ Clearly, the South was ill prepared for Sudan's Self-Government as compared to the North.

⁹⁶Mary Wood. "Juba Conference,"

www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/Documents/articles/juba_conference_1947.pdf
as accessed on 20th June 2007.

⁹⁷ F.Deng, *War of Visions*, p.129.

⁹⁸ J.H. Douglas. *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.25.

Therefore, it can be said that Southerners were not consulted in the decision to form a united Sudan at independence. The future of Southern Sudan was thereby determined without Southern representation.⁹⁹

The decision to unite North and South set the stage for conflict. The colonial policy of separate administration meant that few elites from the North had any practical experience or shared the vision of the South and vice versa.¹⁰⁰ In 1948, the Legislative Assembly passed a motion expressing the readiness of Sudan for self-government. At the same time, the British tried to accelerate development activities in the South by constructing Rumbek Secondary School, the first secondary school in the South, and later Juba Commercial Secondary School.¹⁰¹ Since only Missionaries only had primary and intermediate schools, the separate administrative policy of about 20 years had already created a seemingly irreversible gap in terms of both infrastructural and human development.

There was acceleration of activities towards independence in early 1950s. In March 1951, the Governor-General appointed a Constitutional Amendment Commission.¹⁰² It was chaired by Justice Stanley-Baker. There were a few Southerners in that Commission whose lobby for a Federal Constitution failed as the majority Northerners in the Committee ruled out federalism. The Southerners thus resigned from the Committee in protest. Consequently, the South was not represented in the subsequent negotiations which opened the way for self-government as Werner *et al* noted:

⁹⁹ F.Deng, *War of Visions*, p.129.

¹⁰⁰ J. H.Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.25.

¹⁰¹ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.365.

¹⁰² F.Deng, *War of Visions*, p.129.

No Southerner was present. Yet still the future looked hopeful. Politicians claimed that freedom would bring in a bright new day for the South. The NUP (National Unionist Party), which won the election, promised in its platform that "priority always will be given to the Southerners in the South. They would be Governors and District Commissioners." When the Sudanization was completed, out of 800 posts, the Southerners received 4 Assistant District Commissioners and 2 Mamurs. The British in a few months were swept out, and replaced by Northerners.¹⁰³

Political developments in Egypt affected the situation in Sudan. In 1952, there was a military coup against the Egyptian monarchy. The coup abolished the monarchy and replaced it with a military government instead.¹⁰⁴ The military leadership renounced sovereignty claims over Sudan. This led to the formation of close ties between the Egyptian government and some Northern parties of Sudan, especially the Umma Party. They held discussions concerning the Sudan's political future. Southern leaders were excluded in these discussions. In the same year, the Legislative Assembly passed a self-government law.¹⁰⁵ The statute stipulated the conditions for self determination of Sudan. The majority Northerners rejected the creation of a post of Minister for the South, as well as the South getting any preferential treatment. The Northern elites led the onslaught against any safe-nets for Southerners, as noted by Douglas:

...At the insistence of the Umma Party delegates, Egypt proposed to remove the Governor-General's reserved administrative powers for the South and in fact any special reference to the Southern Provinces, from the self-government Act. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman himself informed the Governor-General that the 'Southerners would have to accept [this agreement] in their best interests.' In effect the Umma Party specifically repudiated the Self-government statute it had helped to pass in the Legislative Assembly where the South had been represented. Thus the issues which concerned Southerners were once again decided without their participation.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.367.

¹⁰⁴ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p26.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*.

Gradually, Southerners felt overwhelmed by the Northerners. In October 1954, the Southern Sudanese politicians and tribal chiefs convened a conference in Juba.¹⁰⁷ Their aim was to discuss the future of Sudan, especially the place of the South in the larger Sudan. The Conference unanimously agreed on federalism for Sudan and an autonomous Southern state. Northern parties on the other hand, appeared to consider the idea of federation only to secure Southern votes and speed up the process of gaining independence. However, there was no consensus for a permanent Constitution for Sudan. As explained by some of the Northern representatives:

We encountered some difficulty in convincing the Southerners so we inserted a special resolution to please them, pledging that the Constituent Assembly would give consideration to the claims of Southern Sudanese Members of Parliament for a Federal government for the three Southern Provinces.¹⁰⁸

The relationship between Northern and Southern politicians worsened. Many Northerners were appointed to senior positions in the South after the constitutional amendment commission. Influx of Northerners as government officers and as merchants in the South increased fear among Southerners of Northern domination and colonization.¹⁰⁹

The fears heightened when some projects that had been hurriedly started by the British were wound up, mainly because of poor planning. Main economic activities in the South were concentrated in Equatoria County, in the Equatoria Region. This was where organized opposition to the government began. Incidentally, Equatoria was also the place where most recruits for the army and police were drawn.¹¹⁰ This created tension in the army and the police as the Equatorians were in solidarity with the civilians. Clearly, Southerners felt cheated. As a result, the first few years of

¹⁰⁷ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.27.

¹⁰⁸ F. Deng, *War of Visions*, p.133.

¹⁰⁹ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.367.

¹¹⁰ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.28.

independence were characterized by internal turmoil. The general trend was a tug-of-war between the Northern and Southern elite for decades.

2.7 The 1955 Conflict and Role of the AC and the RCC

The mid -1950s were marked by a lot of tension in the South. The tension reached a crescendo in 1955 when conflict started, sparked off by rioting textile workers at Nzara in Equatoria.¹¹¹ The police and the army opened fire at the rioters. However, Southern soldiers were reluctant to disperse the rioters. At the same time, Northern Army officers were aware of a growing anxiety among Southern Equatorial Corps.¹¹² They decided to disband the unit and dispatch the soldiers unarmed to the North. However, at Torit, the Headquarters of Equatorial Corps, the order was rejected. The mutiny spread to other garrisons of Southern soldiers and Police.¹¹³ On 18th August, they broke into the armoury, taking guns and ammunition. The mutineers killed all Northern soldiers and Arabs in the garrison as well as in prisons.¹¹⁴ They also moved from house to house killing Northerners. Other units of the Equatorial Corps in other places such as Rumbek and Yei followed suit. About 350 people were killed the majority of them being Northerners.¹¹⁵ The mutiny marked the beginning of the North-South active confrontation.

There was little intervention by the government in the mutiny. The British government was reluctant to send its troops into Sudan so as not to provoke Egypt to do the same. Some mutineers migrated to Uganda while others were caught and executed.¹¹⁶ However, the mutiny failed mainly because it lacked civilian support. It served to show the unwillingness of Southerners to be in the same government as

¹¹¹ Werner *et al.* *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p. 367.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Johnson H. D, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.28.

¹¹⁴ Werner *et al.*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.367.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.268.

¹¹⁶ Werner *et a.* *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.28.

Northerners at that time. The mutiny served to hasten British exit from Sudan. The British were in a hurry to grant liberation to Sudan mainly because they were not in full control of the situation. Therefore, even without a permanent constitution in place. Sudan gained its independence from the British in January 1956.¹¹⁷ A coalition government was formed with Ismail Al-Azhari as the premier. A Constitution Committee was formed in December. Out of 46 members, only three were Southerners. Any hope for a Federal Government was completely dashed out. O'balance states:

In December 1957, it was announced that the Constitutional Committee 'had given the Southern claim for a Federation very serious consideration and found that it would not work in this country.' The three dissenting Southern members had long since withdrawn from the committee.¹¹⁸

There were signs of division in independent Sudan. These were indicated by rejection of federalism by Northerners and withdrawal of Southerners from the Constitutional Committee which discussed the new constitution for an independent Sudan. Southerners formed the Federal Party to contest elections in 1957 and they won the majority of South's parliamentary seats.¹¹⁹ Generally, the parliament was a clear picture of the division that existed in reality. No Southerners were elected in the North and very few Northerners were elected in the South. The Southern leaders' immediate activity was to lobby for federalism. They were still lobbying when the military took over the government in November 1958 under Brigadier Aboud, the commander of the Sudanese Army.¹²⁰

The coming of the new government was marked with a lot of tension in the South. They were still nursing the injuries suffered during the aborted mutiny. The soldiers

¹¹⁷ Edgar O'balance. *The Secret War in the Sudan*, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd 1977), p.44.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p.46.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 49.

¹²⁰ E.O'Balance. *The Secret War in the Sudan*, , p.44.

who sought refuge in neighbouring countries were attempting a come-back in schools, Christian students were under pressure to discard 'the religion of imperialists' and embrace the 'national religion.'¹²¹

The situation seemed to move from bad to worse. In May 1962, the government issued the 'Missionary Societies Act'.¹²² This was a law that subjected all missionary activities to the control and express authorization of the government and sought to deter the baptism of children. The law practically marked the end of any possible missionary activity in the Sudan because it required a written permission from the Council of Ministers for all new initiatives. The law increased the tension already being experienced in the South. Christians reacted by making the issue an international concern by condemning the act in radio interviews abroad. Barsella *et al* quote one of the bishops:

Anyone who considers the Act [Missionary Societies Act of 1962] and the facts has to admit that, unfortunately, no freedom of Religion is allowed in Sudan and a de-facto persecution is making the churches and the Christians' life very, very difficult...¹²³

The government reacted by pointing out that the law aimed at making the church more local and in agreement with the government activities and plans. Generally, all efforts by Southerners did not bear fruit. An armed struggle led by *Anya-nya* in the South ensued shortly afterwards. The term *Anya-nya* means 'snake poison'.¹²⁴ The name explained the guerrilla tactics that the group, composed of Southerners and mainly former soldiers, were using.

¹²¹ Mark R. Nikkel, *Dinka Christianity*. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2001), p.221.

¹²² Gino Barsella and Miguel A. Ayuso Guixot, *Struggling to be heard*. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications 1998), p.31.

¹²³ *Ibid*, p.32.

¹²⁴ Wakoson Nyamlel Elias, "The Southern Sudan; the political leadership of the Anya-nya Movement," *Post-independence Sudan*, proceedings of a seminar held in University of Edinburgh. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1980), p.87.

The first attacks by the *Anya-nya* were in September 1963 at Panchallah in Southern Sudan.¹²⁵ They embraced guerilla tactics of hit and run because of lack of arms to defend an entrenched position. However, with time, they acquired more arms from their successful raids of army garrisons and police stations. The main weakness of the *Anya-nya* was lack of centralized command and organization, thus reducing the impact of their activities.¹²⁶

Popularity of Aboud's government waned fast in the country as a result of the conflict. However, the government was least concerned because in February 1964, the GoS issued a decree ordering the expulsion of all foreign Christian missionaries left in Southern Sudan. They were 617 in number; 503 Roman Catholics and 114 Protestants.¹²⁷ The government accused them of being part of the colonial Southern Policy, which it was now replacing with a 'Sudanization Program'.¹²⁸ The missionaries were also accused of having played a role in the failure of the education system in the south, as well as having been part of the 1955 mutiny.

The expelled missionaries responded to the accusation by publishing 'The Black Book of Sudan'.¹²⁹ In the book, the missionaries outlined their activities pointing out that 'Christian religion had tried to inculcate a spirit of brotherhood and universal love, the line separating the Southerners from the Northerners even before the missionaries arrived.'¹³⁰ They also noted that most of the education and health facilities in the South had been started by missionaries and they were not in any way sabotaging the efforts of the government. The missionaries also criticized the

¹²⁵ Mom Kou Nhial Arou, "Devolution and the Southern Problem" *Post-independence Sudan* (proceedings of a seminar held in University of Edinburgh) (United Kingdom, 1980), p.122.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.24.

¹²⁷ Gino *et al. Struggling to be heard*, p.35.

¹²⁸ Ibid, p.35.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Gino *et al. Struggling to be heard*, p.36.

government's use of force to convert Southerners to Islam. Despite the criticism, the government did not change its approach in the South. However, the tension was so high that in October 1964, Aboud stepped down to pave way for a caretaker civilian government.¹³¹ The new government tried to reconcile with the Southerners by declaring a general amnesty to all Sudanese who had fled the country since independence. However, not all Southern Sudanese returned. Those who remained in Europe later on played an advisory role to the Southern factions fighting the government.

Activities of the both the AC and the RCC were affected by the conflict. Most of the hospitals which had been established in the South, including those began in Moru by the Frasers, were closed down. Educational activities were also interrupted because of unrest among students. The intention of the GoS was to have full control of the Southern Sudan, including the health and education programmes of the churches.¹³²

The Government started to systematically take over missionary institutions in the South. It appointed people sympathetic to the government to replace the missionaries and Christian southerners in heading the institutions. At the health programme in Li in Moru, a newly appointed Dr. Abu Samra, took it upon himself to intimidate and compel some of the Christian dressers and cleaners to convert to Islam.¹³³ Those who refused were transferred to distant places from their families.

There was forced restructuring of the educational programmes in the South. Christian religious classes in the institutions were abolished. The AC met this challenge by

¹³¹ H. D. Johnson, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.32.

¹³² P.T. Obadayo, *The History of the Moru Church in Sudan*, p.14.

¹³³ Ibid.

coming up with an accelerated programme of training church leaders in all their stations. Immediately after the government took over institutions in the South, the District Commissioner in Moru banned the singing and dancing of Christian groups. At the same time, some church leaders, such as Canon Anderea was arrested and detained. Hospital staff and chiefs were forced to convert to Islam, refusal to which led to intimidation through transfers to rural areas. Khalwas or buildings for classes in Islam were built in Moru and the people were forced to take their children there as a precondition for enrolling them in regular schools.¹³⁴ Mosques and more Islamic schools were constructed and Christian leaders were under constant surveillance by the government.

When the *Anya-nya* activities intensified, some of those who had converted into Christianity joined too. In the 1960s, most of the Southern young professionals, such as teachers and clerks became both *Anya-nya* officers and still practised their Christianity as pastors or lay readers.¹³⁵ Further direct involvement of the church in the conflict came up naturally when the GoS soldiers attacked them and they sought refuge in the bush. In the mid-1960s, the GoS soldiers would descend on villagers, shooting indiscriminately. The people, including church leaders, took refuge in the bush. While there, they continued preaching and encouraging those fighting back. A notable figure was Rev. Solomo Miako who is said to have travelled “far and wide” preaching and encouraging the Christians.¹³⁶

The RCC was also affected like the AC. Since Aboud’s government followed a policy of ‘Arabization’ and ‘Islamization’ in the South, all Missionary-run schools were

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Werner *et al.*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.394.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

taken by the government and Arabic was introduced as the medium of instruction.¹³⁷ Generally, all missionary activities were restricted and they had to seek the GoS's permission to do anything. The government dealt ruthlessly with any suspected former mutineers who were still at large; they burnt villages and targeted educated Southern Sudanese.

Both the church leadership and the followers were fully committed in the conflict in the South. The early years of the conflict were marked with dramatic change of the role of the African church leaders, who also adopted the role of political leaders. Some RCC priests decided to join the conflict as combatants. Earlier, in 1958 Fr. Archangelo and Fr. Saturino Lohure sought papal permission to be elected into the Constituent Assembly of a federal government. Fr. Saturino, as quoted below, questioned the need of preaching:

What is the use of baptizing babies if in future it would become impossible to instruct them or if to get a job or employment they must become Muslims?¹³⁸

In 1960-2 a number of senior political figures, including Fr. Saturnino Lohure, Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho and William Deng, as well as a number of students, left for the bush and neighbouring countries, where they joined with the remaining mutineers to form both the exile political movement and the core of a guerrilla army. The exile movement eventually called itself the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), which later on worked closely with the *Anya-nya*.¹³⁹ Both Fr. Saturino and Fr. Archangelo died in the hands of GoS Army during a conflict in the Sudan-Uganda border.

¹³⁷ J. H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.30.

¹³⁸ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.405.

¹³⁹ J. H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.30.

The relationship between the Church and Government became very strained. In 1964, the Southerners' opposition to the government intensified when the government expelled missionaries from South Sudan allegedly for assisting the Southerners in the conflict.¹⁴⁰ In the same year, most schools in the South were burnt down in the escalating violence. In opposing the GoS aggression, the Christians who did not take arms supported their armed colleagues through other ways. They composed uplifting vernacular spiritual hymns which encouraged those who were in active combat.¹⁴¹ Undoubtedly, the songs were adopted by those in the bush and as such, they were all united in the conflict. At this time, it was a conflict between the GoS and the Church in the South, as noted by Werner *et al*:

...the story of the church..., both protestant and Catholic, in the period 1965-72 is a story of close identification with the Anya-nya movement ...it was the period in which a close identification emerged between Christian faith and the aspirations of Southern people for freedom from oppression and for control over their destiny...senior church leadership was often ambivalent about the armed struggle but among lay Christians and the rapidly growing numbers of evangelists and catechists, there was no such inhibition. The Christian faith was for them the source and inspiration of the struggle for liberation.¹⁴²

The AC leadership was directly involved in the conflict. A notable figure was Bishop Elinana Ngalamu of Yambio Diocese of Southern Sudan. It is reported that throughout the late 1960s, from his home, he assisted the *Anya-nya* with food, clothing and accommodation.¹⁴³ He was also alleged to have introduced the *Anya-nya* to his friends from abroad who had military training and contacts.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, it would appear that throughout the late 1960s and up to the Addis Ababa Accord, the RCC did not make a secret of its support of Southerners who were against GoS. Joseph Lagu, the leader of the *Anya-nya*, stated that it was the support of Bishop

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.16.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.17.

¹⁴² Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.443.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p. 422.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Mazoldi, former Catholic Bishop of Juba, that enabled the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) to make international contacts that resulted in its much strengthened military position.¹⁴⁵ This shows that the Church was fully involved in the conflict.

The expulsion of missionaries from Sudan called for international solidarity of Christians world wide with their Sudanese counterparts. This was also the time when the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) came to focus on the Sudanese issue. The WCC is a fellowship of protestant churches in which the Anglican Church (AC) is a key member. The AACC is the African arm of the WCC. In response to the expulsion, in 1965 the WCC in consultation with AACC sent a representative to Sudan to find out what the WCC could do to assist.¹⁴⁶ The representative came up with recommendations for increased aid to refugees for scholarships and for intercessions by all Christians. The scholarship and relief program started in 1966. In the same year, the AACC managed to send a 'goodwill delegation' to Sudan at the invitation of GoS.¹⁴⁷ The purpose of the visit was to observe the situation and if possible offer AACC's services to Sudan. They met both GoS officials and leaders of the Sudanese churches. After the visit, the GoS agreed to replace the expelled missionaries with expatriate African missionaries. The delegates were convinced of the desire of Southerners for a greater share in governing the Sudan; the need for a constitution guaranteeing religious freedom; the need for reconciliation rather than military operations and the need for a revision of the Missionary Act of 1962 to permit outside help to strengthen the Sudanese churches."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p.423.

¹⁴⁶ H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*, p.96.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.97.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.96.

The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) which had been formed about three decades before became a uniting factor for Southerners. The SCC worked hand in hand with the WCC and AACC and advocated for fair treatment of all Southerners. As a result, the SCC succeeded in uniting the major Christian denominations in an unprecedented way in the history of Sudan thus far.¹⁴⁹

The expulsion of the missionaries witnessed rapid changes among the leadership of churches in Sudan. Indigenous Africans took the leadership of the Church. It was a very challenging period for most of the denominations that were faced with a real threat of dying. With the exception of the Anglican Church which was already essentially self-governing, the other churches of the Sudan were ill-prepared for the sudden transition to full responsibility. Ironically, this was the period when the Sudanese Church grew powerfully into selfhood.¹⁵⁰ The Church came up with accelerated programmes to train lay readers, catechists and deacons to take up leadership.¹⁵¹ All the Christian denominations saw a common enemy in the form of the GoS. They thus united for the common purpose of resisting the GoS activities. At the same time, the expulsion of the missionaries and the taking over of church leadership by Africans meant that the Church was fully immersed in the conflict. This is because the new church leadership was indigenously Southern Sudanese and well versed in the politics of the Sudan.

Unlike their European counterparts who could return home in the face of adversities, the African church leaders had to stand firm and lead their followers in defending

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p.98.

¹⁴⁹ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.452.

¹⁵⁰ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.443.

¹⁵¹ P.T.Obadayo, *The History of the Moru Church in Sudan*, p.14.

their home. Therefore, the fighting was very intense when the conflict began. At the same time, the church which was vocal against the GoS and thus offering leadership to Southerners got many followers during this time. The AC and the RCC had to restructure in order to withstand the pressure or fizzle out. On its part, the RCC leadership in Sudan initiated the process of undertaking missionary activity on behalf of the Vatican by replacing 'vicariates' and 'prefectures' with dioceses and Sudanese bishops.¹⁵² The 'vicariates' and 'prefectures' had to be administered directly from the Vatican, unlike the dioceses and parishes that were administered locally by resident bishops and priests respectively. By so doing, the RCC was bracing itself to fully deal with the challenge of the conflict by as much as possible, making decisions on the ground as the situation dictated. Through the restructuring, the RCC was receiving full backing of the international Roman Catholic Church. This restructuring served to put the church in a position to fully face the GoS through its local Sudanese bishops and priests.

Catechists or people who teach new converts about the RCC faith played a major role in facilitating behind the scenes resistance. Since they were many in number as compared to priests and bishops and in constant touch with the masses, they acted as the mouth piece of the priests and the bishops. In between teaching them Christian doctrine, they would encourage the people to continue resisting the GoS.¹⁵³ It was easy for the people to trust and obey catechists and lay readers, whom being lay people themselves, lived among them and shared all aspects of their lives. Additionally, when the European missionaries were expelled, the catechists were empowered to baptize and conduct Christian marriages, so this added to their authority. At the same time, there was already a strong African presence in the Sudan

¹⁵² Werner *et al.*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.455.

¹⁵³ Werner *et al.*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.393.

Council of Churches (SCC). The decisions informally acted as the policy of the church during the early years of the struggle.

While the South was uniting under churches, Aboud's government made frantic efforts to reconcile with the South. It organised a round table Conference of SSLM/*Anyā-nyā* leaders and GoS in 1965.¹⁵⁴ The *Anyā-nyā* leaders made the same demands that had all along characterized the struggle of the Southerners: federalism. Other demands included the reinstatement of English as the official language in the South, Rumbek Secondary School to be raised to a University, all restrictions to missionary activities should be removed and finally, two assistant directors of education be appointed in the South and at least one of them should be a Southerner.¹⁵⁵ However, no agreement was reached in the Conference because of divided views, as noted by Mom:

The Southern delegations did not have a common platform. One group called for outright secession while another wanted a vague self-determination. None of them modified its stand during the discussions....no Northern Political party was willing to grant to the South anything more than Local Government.¹⁵⁶

Failure of the Conference resulted in numerous problems. Intensity of the war increased between 1965 and 1969. In May 1969, Colonel Jaa'far Mohamed Nimeiri staged a successful coup and seized power from Aboud.¹⁵⁷ In June, he made an undertaking to solve the problem in the South. He declared regional self-government for the South within a united 'Socialist' Sudan.¹⁵⁸ Unlike the previous governments, he appointed a minister for Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang.¹⁵⁹ However, there was intensified fighting in the South and a failed coup in 1971. Joseph Garang was

¹⁵⁴ K.N.A Mom, *Devolution and the Southern Problem*, p.122.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p.125.

¹⁵⁶ K.N. A Mom, *Devolution and the Southern Problem*, p.125.

¹⁵⁷ Peter K. Bechtold., *Politics in the Sudan*, (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc. 1976), p. 259.

¹⁵⁸ K.N.A Mom, *Devolution and the Southern Problem*, p.127.

¹⁵⁹ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.36.

implicated and executed alongside some Northerners. Abel Alier was appointed to take his place.¹⁶⁰

Support for Nimeiri by Northerners waned after the attempted coup. He allied with the South so as to remain in power. Abel Alier who had been involved in the political arena for decades proved instrumental in reaching out to the Southerners.¹⁶¹ Therefore, Nimeiri befriended him. At the same time, regional events were contributing to the political developments in Sudan. Ethiopia was fighting a secessionist war against Eritrea. In the war, the Government of Sudan (GoS) supported Eritrea. In retaliation, the government of Ethiopia decided to offer military training and arms to the *Anya-nya*.¹⁶² In addition, the *Anya-nya* benefited a lot in military training by Uganda's Iddi Amin after helping him to overthrow Obote. The Southerners also benefited immensely from military training and aid from Israel which was against an Arabic and Islamic GoS.

The *Anya-nya* became more organised. In 1970, Joseph Lagu emerged as the their leader.¹⁶³ The South was now a force to reckon with. Joseph Lagu put effort in uniting the Southern factions, especially the *Anya-nya* and Sudan African National Union (SANU), which were the major factions then.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, Nimeiri's only option then was to seek the South as an ally, as noted by O'Balance:

Nimeiri changed tactics in the early 1970s and decided to befriend the South. Nimeiri was eager to mend fences with the South while at the same time the Southern guerillas were becoming more united. As a result, of the change of tactics, Nimeiri accepted for the GoS and the SSLM to meet and negotiate as equal partners in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.36.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid, p.37.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ E. O'Balance, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p. 49.

The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) made a follow up visit to Sudan in 1970. By that time, General Nimeiri was in power. Although the reception and the visit were reportedly better than the first, a member of the delegation, Kodwo Ankrah, wrote a memorandum to the WCC's Commission on International Affairs warning that "a new Biafra" was building up in the Sudan.¹⁶⁶ He, therefore, advised the WCC and AACC to call for a round table conference between the Southerners and GoS. This set the stage for behind-the-scenes meetings and negotiations that culminated in the Addis Ababa Conference between the GoS and Southern leaders which took place in February 1972.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ H. Assefa. *Mediation of Civil Wars, Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*, p.96.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p.95-131.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ADDIS ABABA ACCORD AND ITS AFTERMATH

3.1 Introduction

On 27th February 1972, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) signed the Addis Ababa Accord in Ethiopia, the headquarters of the then Organization of African Union (OAU). The Accord was arrived at after a 12 day conference by senior leaders of both the GoS and the SSLM, also commonly known as the *Anya-nya*. The conference was moderated by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) after they had successfully lobbied behind the scenes for about two years for both parties to agree to attend the conference.

The agenda of the conference was to end the conflict in Southern Sudan which involved the GoS and the *Anya-nya* as the main faction in the south. The Accord and its ratification into law on 27th March 1972 marked a period of ceasefire for the next decade. However, due to loopholes in the Accord and external factors especially the discovery of oil in one of the disputed regions in the South, the Accord was dishonoured or abrogated in early 1983, when president Nimeiri subdivided the South thus going against the Accord. The abrogation of the Accord by the president gave an opportunity for the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLA) under the leadership of Colonel John Garang de Mabior to strike back and begin a new struggle between the GoS and the South. The Sudanese People Liberation Movement/ Army was the main rebel group in the South. This chapter explores the Addis Ababa Conference, the role of the WCC and the AACC in the Addis Ababa negotiations, the components of the Accord as well as the challenges in its implementation that finally led to its abrogation.

3.2 Preparations for the Addis Ababa Conference

Prior to the Addis Ababa Conference, there was a lot of behind-the-scenes lobbying by both the WCC/AACC and Abel Alier, a Southerner and also Vice President of GoS. The lobbying by Abel Alier dated as far back as 1971, when he, in his official capacity as the Vice President of the Sudan was assigned to go to Europe on a fundraising mission for the government.¹⁶⁸

Abel Alier's visit was a strategic public relations exercise. He was to project the view that the GoS did not support the conflict in the South and that if the Southern factions were ready to negotiate, the GoS was ready to meet with them. While in Europe, he visited many countries including Norway, Britain, Switzerland, France, Sweden and Denmark, meeting with Government ministers as well as members of the public through public rallies. He also visited the WCC secretariat in Geneva and the Vatican in Rome. A visit to these institutions was strategic since they had the inside information of Sudan through their missionaries who had been expelled about seven years before. The church institutions, whose main interest was to be allowed to go back to Sudan, had considerable amount of power to influence both their governments' decisions as well as public opinion on the Sudan question. After the meetings, both of these institutions expressed their wish for a ceasefire between the GoS and the Southern factions. This was generally the view that was adopted by most of the governments and institutions that he visited. Indirectly, this put pressure on the GoS to hold talks with the Southern factions to end the conflict.

Sudan was conducting a public relations activity through Alier. Alier's Europe tour also resulted in face-to-face meetings with some of the leaders of the Southern factions based in Europe. These were important because they were the elite wing of

¹⁶⁸ A.Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.71.

the Southern factions as well as being in touch with the western governments and church institutions. They were also the mouth-piece of the South in Europe. Among the leaders Abel Alier met were Mading de Garang in the United Kingdom, the spokesman and representative of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)/*Anyanya*. Mading de Garang was cautious about meeting officials of the GoS. However, he met Abel Alier because he was a Southerner and secondly, they had both been schooled by the Anglican Church in Bor, Southern Sudan.¹⁶⁹ These early feelers helped break the ice. Since they were both former students of the Church Missionary Society's educational activities in the Sudan, their meeting had the backing of the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom. Abel Alier also met with Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, the SSLM representative in France.¹⁷⁰ Dr. Wol Wol was a Roman Catholic and had been educated by Verona Fathers who were Roman Catholic missionaries in Bahr al Ghazal Province, Southern Sudan. Meeting with him was strategic because he could be used to influence the Roman Catholic community in France and in Italy, where the Verona Fathers had their headquarters. Both these key individuals were convinced by Alier of the willingness of the GoS to hold talks with the Southern factions.

The visit by Abel Alier to the World Council of Churches (WCC) headquarters opened doors for their further involvement in Sudan henceforth. The WCC formed networks with their regional organization, the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). In June and August 1971, they sent a delegation headed by Dr. Nilius Leopoldo and Dr. Kwado Ankara of WCC, Canon Burgess Carr of the AACC and Samuel Athi Bwogo of the SCC.¹⁷¹ They were

¹⁶⁹ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.12.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.92.

on a fact finding mission to verify Abel Alier's assertions as well as to find out how they could assist.

The delegation was received by the GoS and allowed to tour anywhere they pleased. They visited the Southern towns of Wau, Juba and Malakal and interacted with the Christians in those places.¹⁷² By the end of the tour, they had been convinced of the Government's seriousness about holding talks with the Southern factions. The delegation also acted as a go-between for the GoS and the Southern factions, especially the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). By the time of their second visit, they had already met with the leaders of the SSLM both in exile as well as those in the bush. The GoS then impressed on them a number of issues: that GoS was willing to hold talks with the SSLM; the government would conduct talks on the basis of "one state", therefore any ideas of federalism should be abandoned; the SSLM would be seen by the government as a representative of all Southern factions, so it was upon them (SSLM) to consolidate the views of other disgruntled Southern groups and finally, the Southerners inside Sudan would abide by the outcome of the talks between the GoS and the SSLM.¹⁷³ The church delegation later on relayed the feedback that the SSLM leadership agreed to all the points except they were non-committal on the issue of compulsorily forming one state. The SSLM leadership also introduced the question of a ceasefire during the duration of the talks.

The government was keen to hold the talks. It prepared a document advocating for the talks and spread it to all its diplomatic missions abroad with the instructions to disseminate it broadly.¹⁷⁴ The document gained wide acceptance by the west. This indirectly put pressure on the SSLM to accept the GoS demand for talks or risk being

¹⁷² A. M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.12.

¹⁷³ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.93.

¹⁷⁴ A.M. Arop. *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.13.

seen as the bad ones. Therefore, whether the SSLM was in favour of the talks or not, they had to go ahead with the arrangements. The WCC/AACC had unwittingly been used by the GoS to be its goodwill ambassador internationally while at the same time putting pressure on SSLM to accept its gesture for the talks.

There was need for preliminary talks between the GoS and the SSLM prior to the conference. The aim of the talks was to cement the trust built so far and to agree on the agenda in advance. However, the preliminary talks were held secretly so as not to threaten the trust built so far.¹⁷⁵ On 9th -10th November 1971, General Baghir, a Minister in GoS, and Abel Alier met secretly with the SSLM leadership in Addis Ababa. The SSLM leadership included Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol and Mading de Garang, whom Alier had met in his trip. They had the backing of the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church of France and UK, respectively. The WCC/AACC/SCC delegation played a crucial role in facilitating the organization of meeting by acting as a go-between. The secret meeting took place in Addis Ababa under the guise of OAU Headquarters. Reverend Burgess Carr, the Secretary General of the AACC, was in attendance and led in prayers before every session.¹⁷⁶ Although the mood of the meeting was tense, the presence of Rev. Carr assisted because he would from time to time remind the participants of their role as leaders and that the lives of many people depended on them. The meeting served to build trust between the GoS and the SSLM, seeking clarifications as well making informal contacts among the leaders. All these were deemed to be important for the planned talks, because in the end, Abel Alier was able to write a personal letter to General Joseph

¹⁷⁵ A.Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. South Sudan*, p.93.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

Lagu of the SSLM and the leader of the SSLM. In addition, the GoS secretly gave in to the SSLM's demand for a ceasefire, which was effected in December 1971.¹⁷⁷

After the secret meeting and secret ceasefire demand having been met, the next thorny issue was the choice of venue. The SSLM delegation asked the GoS representatives to pick the venue so long as it was not in Sudan, because they feared for their security. Abel Alier chose Addis Ababa because, apart from being the headquarters of the OAU, Haille Selasie was generally then perceived as an elderly African statesman. Furthermore Ethiopia, also fighting its own insurgency war against Eritrea, was bound to be more understanding of Sudan's problem. Haille Selasie was asked to chair the talks and he reportedly agreed.¹⁷⁸

The choice of Abel Alier to conduct the image-mending activity for GoS disguised as 'fundraising' was successful. Not only was he able to meet with leaders of the missionary groups which had been expelled from Sudan a few years before, but he was able to convince them to visit Sudan and act as a go-between for the GoS and the SSLM. Alier, being a Southerner and a Christian, managed to kill two birds with one stone :he initiated involvement of the WCC/AACC as well as made contacts with the SSLM leadership. Furthermore, the WCC/AACC became immersed in efforts to bring the GoS and the SSLM in face-to-face talks to end the conflict. Since the WCC had international membership, it means the proposed talks had the backing of the international community. The WCC embarked on a fundraising activity for the conference as well as availing any technical support, such as applying for visas for the members of the SSLM.

¹⁷⁷ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.101.

¹⁷⁸ H.Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.131.

3.3 The Addis Ababa Conference

The Addis Ababa Conference was the first attempt by the GoS and the Southern factions to meet publicly face-to-face to negotiate a ceasefire to the 17 year old war. The conference was held from 15th to 27th February 1972 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It brought GoS and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement SSLM or the *Anya- nya* to negotiate as equals. Both sides were represented by high-powered delegations consisting of Abel Alier, the Vice President of the GoS; Dr. Mansour Khalid, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Gaafar Ali Bakheit, Ministry of Interior; Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman and Colonel Kamal Abasher for the GoS.¹⁷⁹ The SSLM were represented by Ezbione Mondir Gwonza as the head of the delegation; Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary; Mading de Garang, spokesman; Colonel F.B Maggot, Special Military representative; Oliver Albino, Angelo Voga, Rev. Paul Puot and Job Adier. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was represented by Dr. Leopoldo Niilus and Kodwo Ankra, while the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) were represented by Canon Burgess Carr and Samuel Bwogo respectively. Therefore, local Sudan Christian community was represented by one person only. This was a major oversight on the part of the church delegation. This is because the gesture meant that the international bodies, namely the WCC and the AACC, were shouldering the weight of the activities fully. It also meant and that was no need for a deep involvement of the local community. Yet, had the local church been deeply involved, it would have been critical in monitoring the implementation of the agreement later on.

The talks began on a wrong footing. Firstly, Emperor Haille Selasie declined an initial offer of chairing the talks. He reportedly was advised not to chair the talks because in the event that the Southerners succeeded in getting their autonomy, Eritrea

¹⁷⁹ H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.131.

which was waging an insurgency war against Ethiopia. would demand the same.¹⁸⁰ This created an impasse between the GoS and the SSLM. Burgess Carr and Kwodo Ankrah had to informally plead with the Emperor not to let the talks fail. Finally, the emperor agreed to send his Foreign Minister to deliver the opening speech as well as his personal representative to attend all the sessions and act as his liaison.¹⁸¹ After lengthy discussions, Burgess Carr was chosen by both parties to moderate the meeting instead of the Emperor. This gesture showed the amount of trust that both parties had on the church-led delegation.

It is clear that the informal meetings prior to the conference that the WCC/AACC held with both parties played a big role in placing the church-based institutions squarely in the centre-stage of the negotiations. Secondly, the SSLM delegation took issue with Abel Alier heading the Northern delegation yet he was a Southerner himself.¹⁸² They doubted the seriousness of GoS when it appointed a Southerner to head its delegation yet the discussions would revolve around North-South relations. However Carr, the Moderator, managed to convince them that they should start serious negotiations instead of dwelling on such a petty issue. Thirdly, the agenda proved to be a thorny issue because after each of the parties presented their opening speech justifying their position in the conflict, neither party agreed with the other's point of view. As a result, a special committee consisting of three people from each delegation was formed to formulate the agenda. They isolated the contentious issues and grouped them under the titles: political and economic rights and military/security issues.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ H.Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.132.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid, p.134.

¹⁸³ H.Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.135.

There were several contentious issues. One of them was the idea of forming a single state as had been suggested by the government. That idea was opposed by the Southern delegation which pushed for federalism.¹⁸⁴ The talks reportedly broke down several times on this question. The WCC/AACC intervened and started presenting to each of the parties a series of drafts for their approval until they arrived at a version agreeable to both. Although the SSLM pushed for “federalism,” the agreement finally settled on “regional autonomy”¹⁸⁵ By this, the Southern Provinces were to be granted some level of autonomy but within the Central Government.

Leadership and governance also formed part of the agenda. Governance was especially a critical issue because the SSLM delegation wanted as much autonomy as possible for the South. They argued that the central government would in practice be a Northern government, rather than a national one. They pressed for a clear outline of the government they were going to have.¹⁸⁶ The Northern delegation was opposed to the idea of autonomy because it closely bordered on federalism, which they opposed on the grounds that the Northern people had not asked for a federation; therefore they did not want to impose the concept on them.¹⁸⁷ Secondly, they argued that the SSLM did not represent all the Southern people, so there was a possibility not all of them would be in favour of federalism. They further suggested that if the SSLM delegation wanted to pursue federalism, then the GoS would subdivide the Southern region into smaller regions so that the SSLM could pursue their own course without interfering with those who did not favour them.¹⁸⁸ Therefore, they agreed on an autonomous Southern Region.

¹⁸⁴ J. H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.36.

¹⁸⁵ F. Deng, *War of Visions*, p.156.

¹⁸⁶ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.39-40.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p.40.

¹⁸⁸ H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.135.

There was need to define the autonomy as agreed on by the delegates. The conference agreed on the creation of a Southern Regional Assembly which was essentially like a parliament but for the Southern region only. In addition, the South would also have a High Executive Council (HEC) which was like a cabinet. The HEC could elect their president who had to be confirmed by the President of the Republic. The fact that the president of the HEC had to be confirmed by the GoS president was a loophole in the Agreement. It meant that the GoS could pick a weak person for the HEC. However, the Southern delegates did not protest such an arrangement then. This was one of the loopholes that was exploited by the GoS later before dishonouring the Accord.

Financial and economic arrangements between the Central government and the Southern Region were also an agenda. It was agreed that the GoS would release almost all of its revenues from the Southern Region to the Southern Regional treasury.¹⁸⁹ However, this turned out to be a major oversight on the part of the Southern delegation because they did not have the actual figures of what the government collected from the South for them to know whether it would be sufficient for them or not. Secondly, since it was the duty of the GoS to collect the revenue and then later on release it to the South, this would mean a continuous dependence of the Southern Region on the GoS, the very thing that they were trying to avoid.

The issue of security in the South was one of the toughest agendas yet. It was two pronged: the fate of armed *Anya-nya* members and the general maintenance of security in the South henceforth. The SSLM delegation wanted to know what would be the fate of their armed wing, the *Anya-nya*. Whereas the only viable option seemed their absorption into then National army, both delegations did not readily agree to this. Possibly, the Northerners were still scared by the previous mutiny while the

¹⁸⁹ A.Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan, p.118.*

Southerners were still doubtful of their safety 'in the enemy's camp'. After lengthy discussions, it was agreed that the *Anya-nya* would be absorbed into the national army.¹⁹⁰ However, the issue of maintenance of security in the South, after four days of discussion and having reached no viable agreement, the conference came close to being aborted.¹⁹¹ The Northern delegation insisted that there should be Northern troops in the South and that they would have free access to all places. This was vehemently opposed by the Southern delegation which said that Southerners would not feel safe with a heavy presence of Northern troops in their midst and that the Northern troops in the South should be restricted to their barracks. They argued that the Southerners would feel very vulnerable because the troops would be armed while they (Southerners) would not. When the conference threatened to collapse on this issue, Carr, the moderator approached the Emperor Haille Selasie and asked him to use his position as an African statesman to persuade the delegates to come up with a compromise. This, the emperor agreed by meeting the delegates separately and proposing to them a compromise position: that 50% of the troops in the South should be Northerners while 50% to be retrained *Anya-nya* troops.¹⁹² He further suggested that the Northern troops should as much as possible be restricted in the barracks since the government could easily deploy additional troops from the North in case there was need. This arrangement was accepted by both delegations. Clearly, Carr's insight and the Emperor's agreement to be directly involved assisted in carrying on the negotiations to completion.

Generally the Addis Ababa conference was a tense and emotional moment for the participants. The issue of conflict was ideally a Sudanese internal problem according to OAU's policies but Ethiopia through the Emperor Haille Selasie had to intervene

¹⁹⁰ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.39.

¹⁹¹ H. Alier, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.138.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

to break the impasse. It is reported that very often, the Moderator would ask the delegates to stand and pray silently before proceedings. However, at a certain point, he started praying and crying loudly as some delegates joined him, thankful for crossing a milestone.¹⁹³ It is also reported that whenever the discussions threatened to break on a difficult issue, the moderator would approach some of the OAU's diplomats informally and seek for professional advice.¹⁹⁴ However, such advice was sought informally and did not have official sanction in the discussions. Finally, the agreements reached in the discussions were referred to as the Addis Ababa Accord.

3.4 The Addis Ababa Accord

The Addis Ababa Accord had three main tenets. These were the Cultural Identity of the South, Equality between the North and the South and the recognition of the Southern Regional Legislative and Executive Bodies of the South.¹⁹⁵

It was agreed that cultural identity of the South was to be recognized by the government. The Southern Executive institutions were therefore to draw most of their legislation from customary law. The Central government was under obligation to respect such law. It was also agreed that there would not be any segregation on the basis of race or religion. To safeguard this principle, a secular constitution was to be adopted.

Another part of the agreement was that there was going to be a Southern Regional Legislative Assembly and a High Executive Council (HEC). Membership to these bodies was through elections by Southerners. The legislative body was to elect the

¹⁹³ Ibid, p142

¹⁹⁴ Hizkias A., *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.137.

¹⁹⁵ Bona Malwal., *The Sudan. A second Challenge to Nationhood*, (New York: Thornton books, 1985), p.17.

president of the HEC who was to be confirmed by the President of the Central Government. Both these structures were to run the affairs of the Southern Region in consultation with the GoS. The Southern structures had no powers to collect revenue, rather they had to depend on the GoS to allocate them their share.

Security issues also featured in the agreement. It was agreed that a 50:50 ratio of Northern and Southern troops would be posted in the South.¹⁹⁶ At the same time, Southerners would also be recruited into the national army in proportion to Southerner's population. In addition, all *Anyanya* members who wished to be part of the national army had to be retrained and redeployed as need arose. The troops in the South, who were to be referred to as the Southern Command, were to be controlled by the President of the GoS on the advice of the President of the HEC.

In technical terms, the above three major tenets of the agreement were subdivided into four subheadings. These were; the constitutional arrangement under which the Southern Regional structures of the Assembly and the HEC were contained.¹⁹⁷ The other subheading was the ceasefire agreement, in which both the GoS and the SSLM agreed on a ceasefire during the talks and during the implementation of the Accord. The third subheading was 'security' and it had four main issues; the Protocol or agreement for Repatriation, Relief and Resettlement of Southerners; the Protocol for Administrative Arrangements; the Protocol for Temporary Military Arrangements and finally the Protocol for Judicial and Amnesty Arrangements. The final subheading was Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of Southerners. This encompassed issues of cultural identity of the Southerners being recognized by the Central government. It was also agreed that they would not be subjected to *Shari'a* Law indiscriminately.

¹⁹⁶ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.129.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.130.

The final step of the talks was signing of the Accord. It was a grand affair witnessed by the Emperor Haille Selasie, who congratulated the delegates on their discussions.¹⁹⁸ The Accord was signed by Dr. Mansour Khalid as the representative of the GoS and Colonel Gwonza on behalf of the SSLM. Although Abel Alier was the head of the GoS, Carr, the moderator advised that since Alier was a Southerner, then if he signed the document it faced the danger of it being seen as a Southerners' agreement. Additionally the whole delegation imprinted their initials in the document.¹⁹⁹ The Emperor's personal representative and two representatives of the World Council of Churches (WCC) also signed the document as witnesses.

The Agreement was a grand affair. Immediately after the signing, they issued a communiqué to the media stating that 'An Agreement has been reached between the Sudan government and the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement on all issues of the conflict in the Southern Sudan.'²⁰⁰ Barely a week later, on 3rd March 1972, President Nimeiri enacted the Agreement into law.²⁰¹ Since the Agreement had not yet been ratified or broken down and formulated into law, this step alarmed the SSLM and increased their suspicion of the intentions of the GoS. The ratification process had been scheduled for 12th March in Addis Ababa. However, the SSLM asked for a postponement to 27th so that they may sort out internal issues.²⁰² In any case, the ratification was only going to be a mere formality since the GoS had already accepted all the terms and conditions of the Accord when Nimeiri enacted it into law.

¹⁹⁸ J.H.Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.143.

¹⁹⁹ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.131.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.17.

²⁰² A.Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.134.

There was a change of dynamics within the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and their armed wing, *Anyanya*. A majority of the SSLM leaders, after studying the agreement and consulting with their elite members especially those in Europe, felt that the South should have its own independent army as well as an independent foreign trade and foreign assistance to ensure its independence. They also argued the South should not depend on the central government for its revenues.²⁰³ These were the demands that Joseph Lagu, the head of the SSLM/*Anyanya* made to the delegation of the GoS on 27th, on the day of the ratification. However, he was told it was not possible for such demands to be included in the Agreement since the GoS delegation which was headed by Minister Mansour Khalid, did not have the mandate to add anything to the Agreement. Secondly, he was informed that such a move would undermine the credibility of the SSLM leadership to the whole world which was aware of the Agreement.²⁰⁴ This was followed by tense discussion and informal consultations between Alier and Lagu amidst informal consultations among the SSLM delegation and Burgess Carr of the AACC and the mediator of the Addis Ababa Conference. Finally, Lagu abruptly agreed to ratify the Accord. It is said he reached this decision alone, since his delegation was just as surprised as the GoS when he announced he was going to ratify it.²⁰⁵

The ratification ceremony was a pompous affair. It was witnessed by the Emperor Haile Selassie and highly publicized through the secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. It was publicized as a good example of Africans solving their own problems independently. However, the fears of the SSLM were proven valid when issues of security and finance were some of the reasons that

²⁰³ Ibid, p.136.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

strained the relations between the Central government and the South so much so that the Accord was dishonoured about a decade later.

3.5 Implications of the Addis Ababa Accord

The Addis Ababa Accord was received with mixed reactions. The Council of Ministers of the Government of Sudan was divided. Whereas some generally welcomed the agreement, others had reservations on the *Anya-nya* being recruited to be part of the army.²⁰⁶ This is because they viewed them as mutineers who should not be trusted. However, army commanders on their part accepted the Accord without any reservations which was seen as a good sign because the Army was expected to work the hardest in ensuring security.²⁰⁷ A majority of the civilians in the North saw the Agreement as favouring Southerners and generally opposed it. As a result, political parties in the North united in their opposition of Nimeiri. Therefore, as Northerners saw him as a traitor, most Southerners saw him as their saviour.

Reactions to the Accord in the South varied too. While the civilians in the South saw the Agreement as an opportunity for a ceasefire and praised Nimeiri for it the *Anya-nya* were divided.²⁰⁸ A section of them totally rejected it as a sell-out by their leaders and thus crossed over to Ethiopia in protest.²⁰⁹ Most of those who remained were against the idea of being absorbed into the National Army and especially being redeployed to the North. Some *Anya-nya* commanders, such as Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, Alfred Deng Aluk and Stephen Madut Baak who were trying to organize the others to reject the Accord, were arrested through the assistance of Lagu, and later on

²⁰⁶ A. Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, South Sudan*, p.132.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.133.

²⁰⁹ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.19.

some were executed.²¹⁰ Lagu was made a Major General in the Sudanese National Army, while Abel Alier was appointed the interim president of the interim High Executive Council, before elections.²¹¹ These appointments sowed a seed of rivalry between Alier and Lagu who felt cheated out of the highest post in the South. This rivalry characterized the relationship between Alier and Lagu throughout the decade when the GoS tried to implement the Addis Ababa Accord.

A Southern Regional Government was set up with its headquarters in Juba. The Southern Administration had shortage of trained personnel, infrastructure and finances. The shortage of personnel posed many challenges because Alier's idea was to put in place an elaborate western-style type of government, which required a lot of personnel.²¹² The Executive Council of the South was unable to collect more than about 50% of their local revenues. This affected the administration system in two major ways: the administrative system became very vulnerable since their salaries could not always be guaranteed, and secondly, the fears of the SSLM leaders just before the signing of the Accord became real. At the same time, it was the Southern delegation to the Addis Ababa Conference which felt that they were too few to be subdivided to form an 'economic subcommittee', thus the economic component was left out in the agreement.²¹³ Therefore, throughout the 11 years of regional autonomy, the South did not exercise any autonomy in economic planning and education. As a result, the employees in the South were more faithful to the Central Government than to the local people. As a result, to the locals, there was no difference between the time before the Accord and after it.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid. p.22.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ J.H.Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.39.

²¹⁴ Khalid Mansour., *The Government they Deserve*, (London: Kegan Paul International Ltd. 1990), p. 243.

Southerners who had fled during the conflict started returning. Most had become refugees either in the North or in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and Uganda. Those who went to Northern Sudan became Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The resettlement of both the refugees and the IDPs posed another problem. More than a million IDPs were repatriated by UNHCR while about 550,700 IDPs were resettled between 1972 and 1973. This situation attracted international agencies, such as Unicef and UNDP. There were ecumenical agencies associated with WCC, which assisted in the resettlement; these included the Evangelical Agencies represented by Across and Catholic agencies such as Caritas and the Catholic Relief Service.²¹⁵ They, however, assisted through the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), which acted as the central organizing unit.

The SCC was critical at this time. By virtue of being the only member of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) on the ground, the SCC was well placed to monitor the implementation of the Addis Ababa Accord. However, this was not the case because the Accord did not have a monitoring clause. Secondly, the SCC lacked the necessary capacity to undertake the monitoring task. At the same time, it might have been an oversight on the part of the WCC/AACC that they did not involve the SCC deeply in all the Addis Ababa processes. Suffice it to say that the WCC/AACC missed a big opportunity to be the eyes on the ground during the implementation stage. On their part, they concentrated on constructing and refurbishing churches, schools and hospitals in the South.²¹⁶ Generally, the SCC formed various commissions to assist in humanitarian services, such as constructing reception and health centres and schools in designated areas to

²¹⁵ Werner R. *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.445.

²¹⁶ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.445.

assist resettling the returning refugees. The SCC received financial assistance from its partners abroad, through the WCC and AACC. By the end of 1972, it had received \$600,000, a considerably huge sum at that time. It was spent in emergency supplies such as maize, beans, blankets and agricultural tools.²¹⁷ In 1973, the SCC had three priorities; building of reception centres, repair and reconstruction of medical and educational facilities and finally the construction of new buildings, which later became schools and hospitals in areas of particular strategic importance especially in Juba, Malakal and Wau all in Southern Sudan.²¹⁸ Noticeably missing is any budget to put in place structures to monitor the political goodwill both in the North and in the implementation of the Accord.

During the early years of the Accord, the SCC started facing internal problems. There was the problem of protocol, whereby the member churches of the SCC felt that the Council was seemingly more powerful than the constituent churches.²¹⁹ They wanted to restrict it to spiritual issues only. However, the SCC's activities were dictated by the situation on the ground. There was also the problem of capacity as illustrated in a letter, quoted below, to the SCC members:

...I have been giving some thoughts to the future of the SCC/CRR (Commission on Relief and Rehabilitation), programme as it relates to the life of the Churches. A program of this nature could create serious problems and could become a great burden in the future given the present weakness of the Council itself...we should not in this present program create big institutions that could become a heavy burden to the Churches to administer.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Ibid, p.453.

²¹⁸ Ibid, p.453.

²¹⁹ Ibid, p.454.

²²⁰ Bethuel Kiplagat, (A member of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and who had been seconded by the NCCK to set up the SCC Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation), in Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.454

Even when such fears were openly expressed, still the WCC/AACC did not act in assisting the SCC to manage its growing responsibilities during the delicate period of the implementation of the Accord.

Meanwhile, Nimeiri took advantage of the Accord to make himself popular in the South. The popularity was especially important to Nimeiri because he was becoming very unpopular in the North. Most Northerners viewed the agreement as a betrayal of true Islamic values, terming it as an 'unholy alliance between the Church and the *junta*' and thus undermined it.²²¹ In 1976 there was an attempted coup on Nimeiri's government but it failed because Southerner's thwarted it.²²² At the same time, the failed coup made Nimeiri start mending fences with the Northerners. He reconciled with Sadiq al Mahdi, leader of the attempted coup and offered him a position in the ruling party. Nimeiri also introduced a radical national reconciliation programme by releasing political prisoners of the North. Hasan al-Turabi of the Muslim Brotherhood was one of those released. He rose from being a political prisoner in 1977 to an Attorney General in 1978.²²³ At the same time, the self-rule in the South enhanced a sense of national unity.²²⁴ However, the radical pro-Islamists who had been integrated into the government were radically opposed to the Addis Ababa Accord and thus undermined its implementation within the ranks of the Government.

There were problems in the Security Arrangements of the Accord. This is because even when it seemed that a majority of the *Anya-nya* had stayed behind to join the National Army, they were not convinced that the government meant what it said in the Agreement. Immediately after the disbandment of the *Anya-nya* and their

²²¹ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.446.

²²² F. Deng, *War of Visions*, p.164.

²²³ K. Mansour, *The Government they Deserve*, p.263.

²²⁴ F.Deng, *War of Visions*, p.158.

absorption into the National Army, the most senior former *Anya-nya* officers were ordered to report in Khartoum for training abroad in India, Pakistan and Britain.²²⁵ This rendered the remaining *Anya-nya* leaderless.

Tension among former *Anya-nya* members was rising. A junior officer, Captain John Garang de Mabior put a request to the committee in charge of the *Anya-nya* absorption to postpone the absorption in some places due to the tension that was rising.²²⁶ His request was granted but at the same time, he was marked by the GoS as the leader of rebellious *Anya-nya*. In 1973, there was general unrest among the *Anya-nya* in the army as they turned down every effort to transfer them to the North. General Lagu was asked to go to the South to address his former members but on arrival he was jeered by the Southern soldiers who called him a traitor and a sell-out to the government.²²⁷ Matters became worse when a short while later, a delegation was sent from the High Command from Khartoum to go and arrest Captain John Garang who was viewed as the ringleader of the underground resistance. However, the officers in the barracks threatened to revolt if Garang was arrested. so the commanders left without making any arrests. All the same, Garang was transferred a short while later and then offered a scholarship in military science in the United States where he was based until 1981.²²⁸ The same fate faced any former top-ranking *Anya-nya* officers most of whom were scattered in different places where it was assumed they would not pose any threat. Some of the remaining *Anya-nya* did not approve of being in the low ranks of the regular army. Despite the diplomatic and approachable attitude adopted by the GoS, the SSLM insisted that the Southern Soldiers should remain in the South. However, to allay fears of a potential mutiny by a troop

²²⁵ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.24.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.23.

²²⁷ A. M Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.26.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.27.

composed of former *Anyanya* only, an equal number of Northern soldiers were deployed among the Southern troops. All the same, some defiant *Anyanya* guerrillas went into exile in Ethiopia.²²⁹ These played a critical role in the revival of guerrilla activity in 1983 because they were readily available.

The Southern Regional Assembly had limited powers on national issues. It could only ask the President of the Republic to exempt the Southern Region from any legislation deemed unsuitable for Southerners, but the president had the final decision-making powers. The Conference resolved that the Central government should concede additional revenues to the South. Although the South could plan their economic activities, Southerners did not get the full autonomy they were asking for. They were only granted sufficient powers to manage their own affairs. The Addis Ababa Accord granted the South some regional autonomy in a united Sudan. The autonomy was in the form of a High Executive Council or cabinet responsible for all aspects of governance except defense, foreign affairs and finance, which would be handled by the central government in which Southerners would be represented.

There was a general dissatisfaction in the South at the speed at which the Accord was being implemented. Despite Nimeiri's efforts, the South was generally dissatisfied by the poor or lack of services mainly occasioned by poor funding. The Region received only 23.2 % of the Central government's allocated grant for the special development project.²³⁰ This caused more tension between the GoS and Southerners, a majority of whom started being suspicious of the willingness of Nimeiri to implement the Accord. Nimeiri's popularity in the South waned fast. He tried to maintain his popularity in the South by trying to please the leading Southern politicians. In 1978, in an effort to

²²⁹ K. Mansour, *The Government they Deserve*, p.142.

²³⁰ J.H.Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.42.

endear himself to Lagu's supporters, he asked Alier not to vie for re-election so that Lagu would be elected the president of the South.²³¹ At the same time, Northern members of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement led other radical Islamists in declaring the Accord and its results as 'unholy Alliance between the church and the Junta.'²³² The general political situation in Sudan was turbulent with both the Northerners and Southerners expressing dissatisfaction with Nimeiri's leadership.

The year 1980 marked a turning point in the restless political situation in Sudan. This was the year when many southerners who had been in exile in Uganda were migrating after the fall of Idi Amin. This posed resettlement challenges and tension in the South. In the same year, Nimeiri reappointed Alier as President of the High Executive Council of the South in place of Lagu. This disappointed Lagu and his supporters and increased tension in the South between Lagu and Alier's supporters. In the same year, oil was discovered in Southern areas, namely Kafia Kingi and Hafrat al-Nahas. These were areas adjacent to Northern provinces. Kafia Kingi and Hafrat al-Nahas had been parts of the South during the colonial administration. It had been agreed during the Addis Ababa Conference that they should be transferred back to the South.²³³ However, by the time the oil was being discovered in 1980, they had not been transferred yet. The delay was necessitated by a drought which meant that both Arab and Dinka pastoralists had to co-exist next to White Nile in Kordofan. By transferring the area to the South, it was feared the Arab pastoralists could be denied access to the river.

The discovery of oil brought new challenges to the already existing tension between Northern and Southern politicians. In November 1980, the National Assembly, under

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.446.

²³³ J.H.Douglas. *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.39.

the guidance of Hassan Al-Turabbi, considered a Bill to re-set the boundaries of the regions so that the oil fields and agriculturally rich areas of Bentiu could be in the North. This sparked off an opposition by Southerners in the National Assembly. The President settled the matter in favour of the South in accordance with the Accord. However, the Central Government entered into an agreement with Chevron and Total oil companies of the USA and France, respectively, about exploration of the oil deposits without consulting the Southern Members of Parliament.²³⁴ The Southern Regional Assembly was not happy about that move by the GoS. At the same time, the GoS, mainly consisting of Northerners, clashed with the Southern Regional Government on the siting of the oil refiner. Each of the parties wanted it to be constructed in their region. The political clash between the Northern and Southern politicians served to unite the Northern parties. The Umma and the Muslim Brotherhood Movement formed a strong block against the Southerners. They unanimously opted to exclude the Southerners from any discussions concerning oil.²³⁵ Nimeiri ordered the construction of the oil refinery in the North.

Other contentious issues gradually emerged. There were disagreements concerning the Jonglei Canal. The Jonglei Canal was to be constructed to tap Nile waters for an irrigation scheme. Egypt saw the possibility of making Sudan its "breadbasket."²³⁶ It, therefore, encouraged the Central Government to construct a canal that would transport water to Egypt. However, the Southern Regional Assembly did not favour the idea because they feared the project would not be implemented sustainably and thus the Southerners might lack water in future, despite promises of socio-economic development to the South by the GoS. Any demonstrations against the construction

²³⁴ Ibid, p.39.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid, p.47.

of the canal in the South were violently dispersed by police. The GoS went ahead and started constructing the canal despite the Southerners' protests.

Meanwhile, tension between Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier increased. Lagu, who was from the minor community of Nimule felt that the Dinkas were dominating the Southern politics. It therefore became a tug-of-war between him and Alier, who was a Dinka, in trying to win Nimeiri's favours. As a result, Lagu proposed to Nimeiri to subdivide the Southern region into 3 smaller regions.²³⁷ In response, Nimeiri dissolved both the National and Southern Regional Assemblies and called for new elections and a referendum to determine the subdivision of the South. He appointed a military-led interim government in the South and instructed it to carry out a referendum. However, before the referendum was held, Nimeiri unilaterally subdivided the region into Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile.²³⁸ This unilateral action is seen as one of the main reasons that led to the abrogation of the Accord, as noted by Morana:

The Accord was terminated by Nimeiri when contrary to the terms of the (Addis Ababa) agreement he divided the South into three regions with reduced constitutional powers. Subsequently, with the Muslim Brotherhood, he imposed the so called September (Islamic Law).²³⁹

The situation in the South became very tense owing to the sub-divisions. The former *Anya-nya* officers openly opposed the subdivisions and regrouped themselves. Captain John Garang de Mabior, who had returned from abroad, was thus sent by the government to observe the situation in Bor Garrison, where a mutiny had been reported and give feedback to the government. However, on arrival, he joined the mutineers in the mutiny instead and fled to Ethiopia. This marked the birth of the

²³⁷ J.H. Douglas. *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.46.

²³⁸ K. Mansour. *The Government they Deserve*, p.301.

²³⁹ Joseph Morana. (Chairman NSCC), *The Sudan at War in Search of Peace*, Report of a consultation Commissioned by churches and Christian Councils of the Great Lakes, (Nairobi: Karen, 7-8th April 1998), p.20.

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in July 1983.²⁴⁰ In September 1983, Nimeiri went ahead and instituted the application of *Shari'a* Islamic and doctrinal law in the whole of Sudan.²⁴¹ This move was strongly condemned by Southerners and some Northerners. Among Northerners, was Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, who was executed by Nimeiri in early 1985.²⁴² The execution made Nimeiri lose favour among Northerners while at the same time, the Southerners under SPLM/A were already against him. This marked the renewal of the North-South conflict. In effect, the Accord had been dishonoured. The masses started demonstrations in Khartoum but were violently dealt with by the military.²⁴³ However, the Trade Union Alliance organised strikes and called for civil disobedience. The low ranks of the army were reluctant to act against the strikers when they were called to action. The strikes gained momentum and popularity among the masses. In mid-1985, Nimeiri was on his way to Sudan from USA. He stopped over in Egypt and could not re-enter Sudan, given the tense situation. He had in effect been toppled; he stayed in Egypt in a self-imposed exile.

3.6 The AACC and the WCC in the Addis Ababa Conference

The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) played a major role in the Addis Ababa negotiations for Sudan. The two organizations were involved in intense lobbying to have the conference held, as well as partly giving technical support to part of the delegation to enable them attend the negotiations.²⁴⁴ At the same time, the visits the WCC/AACC had paid GoS

²⁴⁰ Francis Deng and Prosser Gifford, *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*, (Washington DC: The Wilson Centre Press 1987), p.18.

²⁴¹ K. Mansour, *The Government they Deserve*, p.302.

²⁴² *Ibid*, p.303.

²⁴³ *Ibid*.

²⁴⁴ H. Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, p.107.

immediately after the expulsion of missionaries and the behind-the-scenes meetings seemed to have created immense goodwill on the part of GoS as explained below:

In a conflict where religion was an important factor in the communal life of the warring parties, the intermediaries (in this case WCC and AACC) were more acceptable if they could be regarded as “people of religion” rather than politicians...they would raise moral and religious concepts...justice, forgiveness and reconciliation...²⁴⁵

At the same time, the personalities of the WCC/AACC representatives endeared them to the participants of the Addis Ababa Conference. The success of the Conference is especially attributed to the mediator’s style of leadership, as noted by Werner *et al*:

“Carr presented himself throughout as a man of faith, and appealed to both sides to negotiate with each other as men who shared in a common religious heritage. He began the formal negotiations with a sermon drawing on texts from both the Old Testament and the Qumran”²⁴⁶

However, despite their efforts, the WCC and the AACC failed in several ways. First, it was questionable whether the SSLM was ready for such negotiations. The GoS wanted to reinstate its relationship with Europe after the expulsion of the missionaries, so they used the WCC/AACC to put pressure on the SSLM to attend the talks. The church institutions were thus unwittingly used by the GoS to win favour with the West. Secondly, the technical capacity of the individuals representing the WCC/AACC to handle a conference of such a magnitude was questionable.²⁴⁷ It seems the overriding factor to them was that the conflict had to end at whatever cost. As a result, the final documents had loopholes which could have been avoided if legal experts had been tasked to draw up the document. One of the glaring loopholes was the lack of a custodian for the Accord; the GoS which was headed by Nimeiri and Lagu had signed the Addis Ababa Accord. However, in case of any problem, it was

²⁴⁵ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.441.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.14.

not possible for Joseph Lagu who had been appointed a Major General of the Sudan Army to question Nimeiri on any issue since Nimeiri was his Commander-in-Chief.²⁴⁸

Generally, the Agreement left no room for further negotiations even informally. Another oversight on the part of the church-led institutions was in not putting in place a monitoring system as part of the agreement. This meant that the local Christians who were the people on the ground and could send any danger signals to the WCC/AACC, were almost completely ignored in the process.²⁴⁹ Indeed, this was the view expressed by some members of the WCC/AACC who had participated in the preparations for the Addis Ababa Conference. Rev. Gatu said:

Looking at how the WCC/AACC handled the whole process, I think we should have prepared the Sudan Council of Churches to monitor the implementation of the Accord. This could only have been possible through capacity building of the local Christian community to be our eye on the ground. Sadly, I think we straight away trusted what the delegates at the Addis Ababa Conference said, without looking at the long-term implications and without wondering what would happen if one of them went against the Accord. When we tried to intervene again in the late 1980s, we discovered we had been overtaken by events; it was not possible to bring the warring parties to a negotiating table now. The oil reserves which had just been discovered made the situation very difficult.²⁵⁰

Generally, the loopholes in the Addis Ababa Accord, lack of a monitoring mechanism on its implementation and the discovery of oil played a huge role in the break down of the implementation and subsequent recurrence of conflict in Southern Sudan. The GoS was more interested in gaining maximum benefits from the oil rather than in implementing the Accord. In the late 1980s, AACC organised a conference in Addis

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p.17.

²⁴⁹ Raphael K. Badal. *Local Traditional Structures in Sudan*. (Nairobi: Life and Peace Institute, 2006), p.122.

²⁵⁰ Rev. John Gatu, (Former Moderator of St. Andrews PCEA Church and member of WCC/AACC delegation to Sudan in 1971). Nairobi, Oral Interview 24th July 2007.

Ababa to discuss the role of the church in the new situation in Sudan.²⁵¹ However, the situation was already too volatile for any concrete intervention as the one that led to the Addis Ababa Accord.

²⁵¹ Daudi Waithaka, *Sudan at war in Search of Peace*. Report of Consultation commissioned by Churches and Christian Councils of the Great Lakes-Horn of Africa Region, (Nairobi: April 7-8, 1998), p.34.

CHAPTER FOUR: RENEWED CONFLICT IN THE PERIOD 1983 - 2005

4.1 Introduction

In 1983, the Sudanese conflict started again. This was after a about a decade of ceasefire. This time round, the conflict dragged on for over two decades. Apart from the original demand of federalism by the South, other factors came up and complicated the issues further. These were the discovery of oil in Kafia Kingi and Hafrat al-Nahas, provinces lying between the border of the North and the South. Both the North and the South wanted the oil-rich province, which had originally been assigned to the South by the Addis Ababa Accord but had not officially been transferred to the South by the time the oil was discovered. Another bone of contention was the construction of the Jonglei Canal which was to drain water from the Nile into Egypt. Southerners argued that it was not going to be managed in a sustainable manner such that they feared water scarcity at some point.

The third major bone of contention was among the Southern factions; while some still wanted federalism, others opposed it, preferring 'total liberation of the whole of Sudan from oppressive laws'²⁵² This difference in ideologies resulted in fierce fighting among the Southern factions. The Government of Sudan (GoS) exploited the infighting and weakened the Southern factions considerably. The church tried to mediate both between the government and the South, as well as among Southern factions. The Church succeeded in resolving the conflict involving Southerners, however, it was the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process that finally resulted in a ceasefire between the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Although the clergy and church-based NGOs did not participate officially in the CPA discussions, their views and opinions as

²⁵² J.H.Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.62.

expressed in previous conferences and detailed in their documents, featured largely in the CPA, meaning they were in consultation with the participants. This chapter explores the role of the AC and the RCC in the second phase of the Sudanese conflict, 1983-2005, and the IGAD process that led to the signing of the CPA.

4.2 The 1983 Mutiny and the Role of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)

The beginning of the renewed conflict was a mutiny in August 1983 at Bor Garrison, Southern Sudan. The immediate cause of the mutiny was a transfer order from the General Army Headquarters to transfer Battalion 110 made up of Southern soldiers in Aweil, Southern Sudan, to Darfur in the Western region. They were disarmed before being transferred, and their place immediately taken by Northern soldiers.²⁵³ This move made Southern army personnel to be on high alert and increased underground planning for their attack. They decided to resist any more such transfers. In August, before the Order was repeated in other battalions, the soldiers revolted, thus sparking off the mutiny. The mutineers, all former *Anya-nya* members and younger recruits, chose August to symbolize the continuation of the Torit Mutiny (1955) which was also in August. Most of the battalions in the South, namely 116 in Juba, 117 Torit and Kapoeta, 110 in Aweil, 111 in Rumbek and 105 in Bor, Pibor and Pochalla, 104 in Ayod, Waat and Akobo agreed to start the mutiny at the same time.²⁵⁴ Among its organisers were Salva Kiir, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and Francis Ngor Makiec who were all in the field.

The mutiny targeted Northerners. Mutineers attacked their Northern counterparts, killing them indiscriminately. As already observed, the Commanding Headquarters

²⁵³ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p.44.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

sent John Garang to go assess the situation and report back. However, on arrival, he joined the mutineers, since all along he had been in touch with them.

The mutiny marked a new phase in the Sudanese conflict. Garang emerged as a formidable leader of the mutineers most of whom, after the initial attacks, had sought refuge in Ethiopia. The mutineers crossed the border into Ethiopia, where they joined hands with former *Anyanya* members who had refused to join the regular army. Within a short time, a new organization, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) emerged with an elite leader, John Garang who unlike the SSLM elites, was part of the combatants. Unlike the SSLM, the SPLM/A had its political and military wings united under one commander, John Garang.

The SPLM/A emerged as a major force in the South. It drew most of its members from former *Anyanya* members and Southern civilians. Despite being well structured and with a unity of command, SPLM/A faced a challenge of ideology. There were ideological differences among its members. The *Anyanya* veterans who were opposed to the Addis Abba Agreement saw the second conflict as an opportunity for the South to finally achieve its objective of federalism. However, some of the new leaders, especially Garang, advocated for a revolution for the whole of Sudan 'thus liberating it from oppressive laws and Nimeiri's influence'.²⁵⁵

The idea of liberation of the whole of Sudan, rather than the Southern only, was strategic for the SPLM/A leadership for two major objectives. One was to appeal to non-southerners who had their own grievances against Nimeiri. In their pursuit of this objective, they got the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) party in the North as their allies. The party was anti-Nimeri mainly because they did not like his stand on

²⁵⁵ J. H. Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.62.

the Addis Ababa Accord.²⁵⁶ The second objective was so that SPLM/A continues attracting military and financial support from the government of Ethiopia which was also fighting its war with Eritrea which wanted to secede. It was strategic that Southern Sudan did not seem poised for secession so that Ethiopia would support them. This was because Eritrea was also fighting its secession war with Ethiopia at this time. Therefore, in its manifesto of July 1983, SPLM/A explained its actions as being driven by underdevelopment, nationality and policies influenced by religion.²⁵⁷ However, the SPLM/A had humble beginnings, as noted by Fr. Atit:

The SPLM/A began in the Upper Nile Region, and did not have much impact to the rest of the South. In fact, all the way until 1985, which I would call the first phase of SPLM/A, many people in the South did not take it seriously. People in the South started seeing the seriousness of SPLM/A only when the government started enticing them (Southerners) with money to join the military and fight against SPLM/A. By then, SPLM/A was in control of many towns in the South.²⁵⁸

The SPLM/A also faced the problem of tribalism. There was rivalry between two of the major Southern communities; the Dinka and the Nuers. Nuers felt they were being threatened by Dinka dominance.²⁵⁹ As a result, they were suspicious of the majority Dinka leadership thus creating tension in the Movement. Another problem was that the older *Anya-nya* members leaned towards reconstructing *Anya-nya* into a powerful guerrilla group and being guided by its major principle of federalism rather than fitting within the new SPLM/A. These differences finally led to the formation of factions within SPLM/A. While one faction was led by John Garang, the other was led by *Anya-nya* veterans Gai Tut, William Abdalla and Akuot Atem.²⁶⁰ The

²⁵⁶ Peter A. Nyaba., *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003), p.61.

²⁵⁷ Ibid. p.38.

²⁵⁸ Oral Interview, Fr. Justine Atit, Nairobi, 10th June 2007

²⁵⁹ P.A.Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, p.34.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p.27.

subdivision into factions led to a considerable weakening of the Southern forces fighting the GoS because each faction had its own chain of command.

4.3 The Renewed Conflict and the Role of the AC and the RCC

There were new dimensions in the conflict. In 1985 Nimeiri was overthrown. His overthrow brought dramatic changes in the North; the parties that were opposed to him came together and joined the rest of the Northern parties forming one strong united Northern block. This left Southerners on their own, not as a united block but several factions fighting one another.

The GoS took advantage of the factions within the SPLM/A to weaken the Southern resistance even further. The GoS would sign a ceasefire agreement with one faction but continue fighting with another. As a result, the Southern resistance became very weak. The first of such agreements was the Koka Dam Declaration which was signed by the GoS and the SPLM/A leaders in March 1986 at Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan. The Koka Dam Agreement was important in the history of the SPLM because it was the first occasion in which the SPLM/A was officially recognised by the GoS.²⁶¹ It was also the first time that a practical programme for the ceasing of hostilities and guidelines for the political restructuring of Sudan were discussed since the resumption of hostilities in 1983. The main outcome of the declaration was a call for the repeal of the *Shari'a* law and the holding of a constitutional conference.²⁶² However, the Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi reneged on the agreement and he continued implementing the *Shari'a* law. Therefore, the SPLM/A resumed fighting.

²⁶¹ John Garang., *The Call for Democracy*, (London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1992), p.142-144.

²⁶² Ibid.

In 1988, the GoS and the SPLM/A signed the Mirghani Agreement. It included provisions for a ceasefire, the freezing of the *Shari'a*, the lifting of the state of emergency and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts.²⁶³ The signatories proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's political future. However, the National Islamic Front (NIF) party in the North led the opposition against this agreement because of its stand on *Shari'a* which the SPLM/A was against. The GoS reneged on its commitment and the fighting continued.

In 1997, the GoS and South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) and other smaller factions signed a series of Agreements. These were the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains and the Fashoda Agreements.²⁶⁴ The main component of the Agreements was on ceasing of hostilities. The factions then formed the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). However, the SPLM/A downplayed the Agreements terming them a tactical effort by the government to win the support of Southerners.²⁶⁵ They thus disregarded them and continued the conflict. At the same time, the UDSF started fighting the SPLM/A. Generally, mid to late 1990s saw the height of the Southern Sudanese conflict both within the Southern factions and between the North and the South.

The Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) were involved in the renewed conflict both directly and indirectly. Through taking arms and fighting the GoS Army, their members were directly involved in the conflict. At the same time, their indirect involvement was through advocacy activities some of their leaders organised to bring about a ceasefire. It was difficult for any intervention activities to

²⁶³ J. Garang, *The Call for Democracy*, p.150.

²⁶⁴ Barnabas L. Wama and John R. Reese., <www.fas.org/irp/world/para/spla.htm> as accessed on 20th Aug. 2006.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

easily bear fruit because of the new dimension of oil in the Sudan which brought with it new entrants who were interested in the oil, especially American Oil companies. Whereas at first there was pressure from Europe and America on both the GoS and the Southern factions to end the conflict. on the discovery of oil, the pressure especially from the American government eased. At the same time, America supported the GoS because it was opposed to communist ideologies adopted by John Garang and Ethiopia. Therefore, therefore, the GoS benefited from USA's military support. Some church leadership and their followers were directly involved in the conflict in their individual capacities. Although there were many Christian denominations in the South, the AC and the RCC played a leading role, such that the others organised themselves alongside these two.²⁶⁶

The involvement of the Church in the conflict came naturally because Christianity still had a majority following in the South as compared to the North. The first Anglican Church in Moru had grown considerably by the time the conflict resumed. Moru had become Mundri Diocese and its two earliest parishes of Lui and Mundri had become Archdeaconries. the next step to becoming Dioceses.²⁶⁷ However, because of the intense fighting, the church projects of health, education and development stalled. In 1986, the Assistant Bishop in Lui had to seek refuge in Juba, since this was the town still heavily guarded by the government forces and fighting there was minimal. This was the trend for most of the other projects. Since 1987, the church was divided into two; the church in the bush and the church in Khartoum or areas under government control.²⁶⁸ This brought about a shift in the way the Church was involved in the renewed conflict as compared to the first one. This time round,

²⁶⁶ Werner *et al.*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.234.

²⁶⁷ P.T.Obadayo, *The History of the Moru Church in Sudan*, p.20.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

both the RCC and the AC were almost fully indigenous. They had already overcome the teething problems of being abandoned abruptly when missionaries had been expelled. The AC reacted by developing an indigenous ministry throughout the South. The AC's policy was to train a large number of pastors, evangelists, lay readers and women workers. These were the same people who took up arms and went to fight in the bush when the conflict resumed. Those who did not were supporting the fighters indirectly, especially with food, information and safe passage.

Tension in Southern Sudan was consistently rising. Throughout the 1990s, the followers of the Roman Catholic Church became very vocal in their resistance to GoS. The Young Christian Students (YCS) (a movement of the RCC for youth at all levels in learning institutions) spearheaded public demonstrations and boycotts of classes, protesting the introduction of Arabic language as the official language in learning institutions.²⁶⁹

The church leadership supported the YCS though not publicly. However, some priests, who were very close to the students namely Fr. Nicholas Kiri who was the Secretary General of Juba Dioceses and Fr. Constantino Pitya who was the vicar general, were arrested at gun point and flown to Khartoum.²⁷⁰ According to the government, the Church was an enemy: priests were arrested because of their speaking against the Arabization of the education system. Students, led by YCS protested against that action and in support of their priests. As a result, there was a lot of chaos. There was, for example, systematic targeting and killing of students, including Francis Abraham, who was the YCS leader.²⁷¹ The movement was viewed

²⁶⁹ Oral Interview, Fr. Peter Loro, Secretary General of the Sudanese Catholic Bishops Council, Nairobi, 20th May 2006.

²⁷⁰ Oral Interview, Fr. Peter Loro, Nairobi, 20th May 2006.

²⁷¹ Oral Interview, Fr. Peter Loro, Nairobi, 20th May 2006.

by GoS as a recruiting ground for SPLA. As a result, the Bishop of Juba (His Lordship Rt. Rev Paulino Lokodo) officially abolished YCS to safeguard the lives of YCS members and students in general. All the same, the government hostility against Christians drove many of them to become members of SPLA.²⁷²

There was serious animosity between the government and the church. Some of the RCC church leaders argued that the GoS wanted to eliminate Christianity but was only afraid of the international attention that such an action would draw. There was almost no difference between how the government treated the militant rebels (SPLM/A) and how it treated Christian groups and movements. It seemed to them (government) that the church was the political wing of the SPLM/A, which was its enemy. Therefore, exterminating the church, especially its leadership, would have been one step closer to finishing the enemy.²⁷³

The RCC leadership in the form of priests and bishops played a key role in the conflict. This time not as an intermediary but as an ally to the Southerners struggle, as explained by Fr. Loro:

The church was the voice of the people mainly because the Southern politicians were silent about the situation in the south and all senior positions in the army were occupied by Northerners. The church spoke to GoS which was a military Government. The Roman Catholic Church bishops were like the leaders of all the other churches, and they were very vocal.²⁷⁴

The GoS was pushed to the limit and lost trust in the RCC. In 1992 Fr. David Tombe was arrested for allegedly assisting the SPLA to capture Juba. He was only released when the Pope John Paul II visited Sudan and appealed to the president for his release in 1993.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Oral Interview, Bishop Caesar Mazollari, Bishop of Roman Catholic Church Diocese of Rumbek, Nairobi, 6th June 2006.

²⁷⁴ Oral Interview, Fr. Peter Loro, Nairobi, 20th May 2006.

Meanwhile, all along the Church was positioning itself to face the conflict more squarely. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), which had played a passive role in the activities that led to the Addis Ababa Accord, was now very vocal. It was a fully fledged institution consisting of the Roman Catholic Church, Episcopal Church of Sudan (AC), Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Africa Inland Church, Sudan Interior and the Pentecostal Church.²⁷⁵ As the conflict intensified, there were clear boundaries in the South of areas controlled by GoS and those by the SPLM/A. At the same time, the government restricted people's North-South movement. As a result, the SCC based in Khartoum could not serve Southerners because of logistical problems.²⁷⁶

The SCC searched for a way of circumventing the logistical problems. After consultations and agreements with the SPLM/A leadership, a new organization, the New Sudanese Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed in late 1989 and its secretariat located in Nairobi, Kenya.²⁷⁷

The NSCC was established to perform the functions of the SCC in the inaccessible areas in Southern Sudan.²⁷⁸ By this time, the line between the Church and the SPLM/A was very thin. The NSCC openly established good relations with the SPLM/A, as evidenced by the adoption of the word 'New' to conform to the areas under SPLM/A control which were known as 'New Sudan.'²⁷⁹ By having the SCC and the NSCC, the Churches maintained pressure on the GoS for a ceasefire. At the same time, the close links between the NSCC and the SPLM/A made it difficult to distinguish between the Church and the SPLM/A. Generally, the SCC and NSCC

²⁷⁵ New Sudan Council of Churches, *Come let us Reason Together*. Report of Dialogue between SPLM and the NSCC (Nairobi: NSCC), p.25.

²⁷⁶ Kettering Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, (Nairobi: NSCC 2002), p.13.

²⁷⁷ H.Ruun, *Come let us Reason Together*, p25.

²⁷⁸ Christopher M. Kenyi., *Educational needs and Services for War-affected-South- Sudanese*. Report of a survey, (Nairobi: AACC and Swedish Save the Children 1996), p.122.

²⁷⁹ K. Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, p.6.

rarely criticised the SPLM/A. The links were so strong that the SPLM/A was alleged to have decided who would be the leaders of the NSCC when they announced over SPLA Radio on 17th January 1990 that the leaders of the NSCC would be Bishop Paride Taban and Nathaniel Garang.²⁸⁰ Likewise, bishops representing the NSCC were accused of refusing to comment on the human rights abuses by SPLM/A to the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Sudan, Gerhardt Baum, in 1990.²⁸¹ However, in rare situations, the NSCC came out reprimanding the SPLM/A for human rights abuses. One such instance was in 1998 when the organisation wrote a letter to the SPLM/A leadership noting their disappointment. Werner *et al* wrote:

We are filled with pain for the suffering of our people. We have longed for a true liberation from the oppressors in Khartoum. We have tasted liberation but now ... some of our liberators have become oppressors of our people. SPLA soldiers kill each other. Civilians are oppressed. Properties are destroyed...Church leaders will not stay quiet or accept the present conditions. Change must come soon in the SPLM...we are willing to risk all, even our very lives to make this change happen.²⁸²

Generally though, it seems the Church decided not to criticise the SPLM/A on any issues. The NSCC leadership might have feared the consequences as those suffered by the RCC when in 1998, the RCC publicly criticised the SPLM/A for stealing 65% of the food aid going into those parts of Southern Sudan controlled by the SPLM/A.²⁸³ In another case, Bishop Caesar Mazzolari of the Roman Catholic Church diocese of Rumbek had criticised the SPLM/A for their abuse of human rights. His parish which was in an area controlled by the SPLM/A was attacked several times by the SPLM/A.²⁸⁴ Therefore, it is likely that the suffering the RCC underwent in the hands

²⁸⁰ "The European-Sudanese Public Affairs council," <www.nccusa.org/publicwitness/sudan.html> as accessed on 14th Oct. 2006.

²⁸¹ Macram Mas Gassis (Bishop), "Open Letter to Catholic Bishops," <www.petersvoice.com/openletter.htm>. as accessed on 14th Oct. 2006.

²⁸² Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.649.

²⁸³ Oral Interview, Bishop Caesar Mazollari ., Nairobi, 6th June 2006

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

of the SPLM/A, especially through abduction of her personnel, was a warning to them to stop the criticism.²⁸⁵

4.4 The Role of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and the World Council of Churches (WCC) in the Southern Sudan Conflict

The entrance of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) into the scene ushered in new dimensions in the conflict. The church increased its visibility both in the North and in the South where the SCC and the NSCC were based respectively, thus putting a lot of pressure on the GoS. The aim of NSCC was 'to achieve strength in unity as a viable means of expression of the churches and to promote justice, peace, reconciliation and human rights in the New Sudan.'²⁸⁶ Being a religious institution, it was curious that the NSCC had openly allied itself to the SPLM/A. However, the activities of the organization were fully recognised by the member denominations, whose leaders worked closely together.

The AC and the RCC worked very closely. This was through Bishops Paride Taban (RCC) and Nathaniel Garang (AC), the leaders of the NSCC. In 1989, they both visited the Vatican and the headquarters of the WCC to popularise the NSCC to their leaders. They represented the unity which was lacking among the fighting factions and thus people both in Southern Sudan and elsewhere believed them: for them, NSCC was first of all the united voice of the churches of Southern Sudan 'on behalf of the suffering people. The formation of NSCC gave expression to a widening sense of common identity and purpose among Christian communities in Southern Sudan.'²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ "Operation Lifeline Sudan Weekly update 9th March 2003," <www.Reliefweb.org> as accessed on 3rd January 2007

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Werner *et al.* *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.640.

Christian religion became a tool that was used by the AC and the RCC to unite Southerners during their conflict with the GoS. In the principle of working for human rights, the AC and RCC denominations both individually as well as under the umbrella of NSCC did not recognise the religious divide. Bishop Dau said:

For us, we were working for all people (in the South) as children of God, no distinction between faiths.²⁸⁸

The same sentiments were expressed by members of the AC who said distinctions between denominations were only in theory; in reality they worked as one- the voice of all Southerners whether in the North or in the South.²⁸⁹

The NSCC emerged from the shadows of the SCC to operate differently. It steered away from being an aid or humanitarian organization into an advocacy organization, creating awareness of the Southern situation internationally. By so doing, the situation in Sudan achieved international publicity. To the NSCC leaders, relief work which was what the SCC concentrated on mostly after the Addis Ababa Accord, was not dealing with the root-cause of the conflict, as expressed by Bishop Paride:

...spending on relief alone is like fattening a cow for slaughter, so how long can one be doing this work without dealing with the root causes of the war and poverty?.. for until our cries for peace are heard and answered, our cries for food will never end...²⁹⁰

The NSCC gained mileage in advocacy work through its international networks. It made use of its international connections especially through the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and World Council of Churches (WCC), which had already established themselves as successful negotiators. Through WCC, there was intense lobbying and behind –the- scenes consultations too at the international level. In August 1991, the Secretary General of the WCC, Rev. Emilio Castro, wrote a letter to

²⁸⁸ Oral Interview, Bishop Daniel Dau, New Episcopal Church of Sudan, Nairobi, 6th June 2006.

²⁸⁹ Oral Interview, Bishop Caesar Mazollari., Nairobi, 12th May 2006.

²⁹⁰ Bishop Taban Paride, in K.Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, (Nairobi: NSCC 2002), p.13.

President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria thanking him for his initiative in organizing the Abuja talks on Sudan later that year.²⁹¹ Both the GoS and the SPLM/A had been invited to attend and negotiate on the way forward for a ceasefire. In the letter, the Secretary General of the WCC expressed the WCC's willingness to intervene as it had in the Addis Ababa talks. He wrote:

... and would like to assure you that we are prepared to undertake any facilitating role that you may deem appropriate in the course of your endeavors...²⁹²

However, the meeting never took place as a result of intensified fighting. WCC's gesture served to show Nigeria's president that he had the support of WCC and by extension of the international Christian community. By so doing, the WCC was opening itself up for consultations with any persons who were somehow taking an active role in the Sudan conflict.

In the same year, the WCC sent a fact-finding delegation to Sudan, at the invitation of President Omar El Bashir. The delegation met with members of the Revolutionary Council, who were military officers who had played a key role in the coup which brought the present government into power and cabinet ministers as well as Muslim religious leaders.²⁹³ The aim of the meeting was to gather information on the real situation on the ground as well as establish good relations between the organization and the GoS. Through such meetings, the WCC conducted intense lobbying behind-the-scenes, successful enough for them to dialogue with some of the top leaders of the factions. This was also illustrated in December 1991, when at the cancellation of the Abuja talks, the WCC once again wrote to both President Bashir and General Garang of SPLM/A, reprimanding them. The *Churches in international Affairs* quotes

²⁹¹ World Council of Churches, *The Churches in International Affairs*, Reports for 1991-1994, (Geneva: 150 rue de Ferney 1995), p.123.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid, p.124.

...we have been informed of a new escalation of the conflict between the Sudan Government armed forces and the forces of the SPLM, leading to loss of life and destruction of property. We have also been informed that the expected peace talks between the Sudan Government and the SPLM/A which should have taken place in Oct/Nov 1991 have been cancelled or postponed indefinitely...we urge you to immediately cease hostilities and proceed with the negotiations for lasting peace with justice in the Sudan.²⁹⁴

President Bashir responded to the letter, explaining that the media had blown the issue out of proportion but that his government was willing to implement a ceasefire. The dialogue goes a long way to show that the WCC was updated on the situation in Sudan. The organisation tried to intervene from the highest levels possible by dialoguing with the leaders of the fighting groups. Meanwhile, the WCC was also concerned about the Southern factions, especially the fighting which had degenerated into Dinka vs Nuer conflict, the clash of the two biggest communities in Southern Sudan. The churches worked through the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) to reconcile the communities.

4.5 The New Sudan Council of Churches in the Intra-South Conflict

The Dinka vs Nuer conflict seriously threatened the unity of the South and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The fighting became intense mainly because both groups had an easy access to arms. Whereas the Dinka group received the support of the Ethiopian government, the Nuer group received support from the Government of Sudan. The conflict within the SPLM/A factions reached a climax in 1991 when the Nassir (Ethiopian border) faction was formed. Its leaders were Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, all Nuers who announced that they had ousted the chairman, Garang, and taken over SPLM/A.²⁹⁵ The faction denounced SPLM/A's ideology of revolutionising Sudan and vowed to fight for an independent

²⁹⁴ World Council of Churches, *The Churches in International Affairs*, Reports for 1991-1994, (Geneva: 150 rue de Ferney 1995), p.124.

²⁹⁵ K. Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, p.24.

Southern Sudan and a democratic structure instead. The situation degenerated into a Dinka vs Nuer war and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the south under the hands of their own liberation fighters.²⁹⁶ At the same time, whereas the Nuers were suspicious of Dinka's domination, the smaller communities saw the Nuer and the Dinkas as major communities intending to dominate them too. Therefore, there were many conflicts in the South throughout the 1990s. The ease with which the Southerners accessed arms contributed to the fierceness of the fighting. This time, tradition was broken and the normal traditional constraints of previous generations failed. Modern weapons turned cattle raiding into deadly assaults targeting even women, children, the sick and elderly. Traditional codes of warriors were violated as anyone could become a victim; all property was liable to looting and every community was vulnerable.²⁹⁷

In the early 1990s, the NSCC recognised the need to intervene in the Dinka vs Nuer conflict. This was in their General Assembly in 1992 in Akobo, Southern Sudan.²⁹⁸ The Assembly decided to undertake an initiative for grassroots peacemaking and peace monitoring. Consequently, NSCC established a 'Peace Department' at its headquarters. The Department was mandated to 'find ways to promote the message of peace and put it into practice in the communities of Southern Sudan.'²⁹⁹ Deriving from the planned activities, according to NSCC, 'peace' meant 'no conflict or no fighting.'³⁰⁰ However, for the initial two years, nothing concrete happened apart from the spreading of the message to encourage people to stop fighting among themselves.

²⁹⁶ Peter Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, p.107-138.

²⁹⁷ K. Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, p.29.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.47.

²⁹⁹ K. Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, p.27.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.49.

NSCC intensified its activities to end the conflict in the 1990s. In February 1993, during the Presbyterian General Assembly in which also the NSCC participated, church leaders called on all pastors to travel through the area of the conflict and preach about reconciliation.³⁰¹ While it is reported that many of the pastors did that, the fighting continued. In 1994, Commander Riek Machar sent a letter to the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Africa (PCEA), a member of the NSCC, asking the church leaders to work for peace and to help in facilitating a 'peace' conference.³⁰² The church, through its network of pastors, elders and evangelists took the challenge and started talking about the possibility of such a conference to their followers, thus involving the ordinary Christians. At the same time, the NSCC put an international call to its international partners to raise funds towards the conference. Within a short period, \$28,000 was raised towards the conference, which was held in July of the same year at Akobo.

The NSCC employed both traditional and Christian reconciliation methods. Traditional Sudanese reconciliation rituals such as slaughtering a bull and Christian teachings from the Bible were used at the conference.³⁰³ The church leaders then decided to move throughout the conflict areas "parish to parish, village to village" inhabited by the Nuer, Lou and Jikany communities who were fighting, to explain what had happened.³⁰⁴ Although there is no evidence that this effort stopped or reduced the hostilities, it is clear that the leaders of the factions made use of the churches as an ally.

³⁰¹ William O. Lowrey, *The Role of Religion in an Indigenous Peace Process among the Nuer People of Sudan*, (Washington DC: AACC, 1996), p.171.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ W.O. Lowrey, *The Role of Religion in an Indigenous Peace Process among the Nuer People of Sudan*, p.171.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p.179.

The NSCC initiated a formal process to end the Southern factions' conflicts, especially the Dinka vs Nuer conflict, towards mid-1990s. The process later on came to be known as 'People – to- People Peace Process'. It was based on the theory that since 'peace' would be agreed on and determined by the people, the people would be more likely to keep and enforce it.³⁰⁵ The process drew its roots from Sudan traditional and Christian conflict resolution beliefs and practices.³⁰⁶ The People-to-People Peace Process was a series of meetings in different places in Southern Sudan that culminated in the Wunlit Peace Agreement which was signed by leaders of both communities witnessed by the NSCC at Wunlit in Southern Sudan.

The first in the series of the People-to-people Peace Process was in 1997. It took place in Yei in Southern Sudan from 21st-24th July.³⁰⁷ It was attended by SPLM/A and NSCC leaders. One of the most important outcomes was the agreement that NSCC would have a mandate for leading and facilitating reconciliation processes at grassroots levels in Southern Sudan. This acted as an official recognition of NSCC's activities by Southern factions in attaining a ceasefire among the Southerners. This recognition was important because it guaranteed security to NSCC's officers involved in the process, as explained by Ms. Okwaci:

The SPLM/A leadership would convey to us information on where they were going to attack. The radio would thus broadcast the information and ask people to take cover or move away from certain areas and therefore reduce the number of casualties considerably. The Radio would do the same if we got information on areas that the GoS was likely to attack. We tried to protect civilians as much as possible.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Michael Ouko, *Building Hope for Peace inside Sudan*, (Nairobi: New Sudan Council of Churches 2004), p.13.

³⁰⁶ K.Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*, p.49.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Oral Interview, Ms. Rebecca Joshua Okwaci (Ms), (Radio Sudan Journalist), Nairobi, 13th June 2007

The next meeting was in 1998. It was attended by 30 leaders of the Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal and the Nuer of Western Upper Nile, who were involved in conflicts in Southern Sudan.³⁰⁹ It was held in Lokichogio in Kenya because of logistics involved. This meeting took place during a time when there was intense fighting. Gimbiya explains:

..meeting took place at a time of increased insecurity on the West Bank. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol had aligned with the Government to fight SPLM/A and had dominated and devastated much of northern Bahr-El Ghazal. There was also intense fighting on the East Bank where inter-Nuer factions led by Dr. Riek Machar and Paulino Matiop were in intense conflict with Matip favoured by the GoS who intended to advance deep into Western Upper Nile to clear the way for oil exploitation.³¹⁰

The 1998 meeting played a role in bringing the leaders together to reflect on the effects of the conflict on their people. The leaders agreed that the new trends in the conflict were dangerous since modern weapons were employed and traditions violated. The meeting was very successful as explained by Ms. Awut Deng, who was working for NSCC as a mobilizer of the people as well as one of the leaders of SPLM/A women's wing. She said:

..It was in the interest of the government that the Southern factions should continue fighting. This was important so that it could easily access the oil in Nuer-land without much resistance. However, after the Dinka and Nuer leaders' meetings, when the government displaced Nuers from oil – rich areas, it was very emotional to see that it was Dinkas who housed the now land-less Nuers. This was totally unthinkable a few years before!³¹¹

There was concerted effort by NSCC to tackle the Southern Sudan conflict from all angles. As meetings for leaders took place, the NSCC introduced activities, such as games and music festivals that brought the different youth and women groups of the communities together. In total, there were about 30 conferences and meetings

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ K. Gimbiya, *Inside Sudan*.

³¹¹ Oral Interview, Ms. Awut Deng, (SPLM Women's Wing/NSCC Peace Mobiliser), Nairobi 18th May 2006.

organised by NSCC to end the Dinka vs Nuer conflict between 1997 and 2003.³¹² They ranged from small village meetings to big meetings attended by the top leadership of the groups, such as Garang and Machar. One of the big meetings was the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference. It was held at Wunlit in Bahr – el Ghazal in Southern Sudan in 1999. The meeting was a success as explained by Ms. Deng:

The Wunlit conference agreed on no more war and put structures to resolve the conflicts that may come up. The conference had tremendous results; 6 months after the workshop, children who had been abducted were returned; there were proper marriages; there was free movement and trade between the Nuers and Dinkas. The Wunlit agreement still holds today. But may be the biggest achievement was that in the following year, John Garang and Riek Machar reconciled, thus reconciling the Nuers and Dinkas.³¹³

The collaboration between the NSCC and SPLM/A was extended even to the everyday life activities of the SPLA officers. Isaac Mayen Maker, the SPLM/A Security officer for East Africa and who had taken part in combat activities during the conflict said:

...the church (NSCC) was not supporting the war but the SPLA fighters benefited from it with relief food through the villagers. The villagers would be given relief food by the Church and they would in turn give some of it to the fighters. I am not sure if the Church was aware of this, but even if they were, then they did very little to prevent that from happening.³¹⁴

4.7 Ecumenical and Advocacy Activities

Different denominations in Southern Sudan worked together to stop the conflict in Sudan. This was ecumenism in action. There were also a lot of ecumenical activities linking the Sudanese Christians with their counterparts worldwide. In 1994, the Sudanese Christian leaders including the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)

³¹² Michael Ouko, *Building Hope for Peace inside Sudan*, p.32.

³¹³ Oral Interview, Ms. Awut Deng, Nairobi, 18th May 2006.

³¹⁴ Oral Interview, Maker Isaac Mayen, (SPLM/A Security Officer for East Africa), Nairobi 7th June 2006.

and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), together with their funding partners, came together to form the Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF). It was formed under the auspices of the World Council of Churches (WCC) to provide dialogue opportunities between Sudanese church leaders and their external partners.³¹⁵ The SEF held annual meetings in Geneva, London and in South Africa. Such meetings assisted in putting Sudan in the limelight in those countries. On returning home, the participants would lobby their parliamentarians to urge their governments to put economic sanctions on GoS. In the process, members of SEF played a major role in creating an international network in advocating for the human rights of Southern Sudanese. By so doing, they maintained the Sudan issue in the international agenda. The international networks were used to influence the policies of some countries to favour ending the conflict in Sudan. In the USA, televangelists and Christian groups lobbied the government to put pressure on GoS to end the conflict.³¹⁶ In Europe, the WCC hosted photo exhibits that made the reality of the suffering of the victims of the conflict clearer.³¹⁷

The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) ecumenical efforts included involving its highest offices. In February 1993, the international leader of the RCC, Pope John Paul II visited Sudan. As an international figure, his visit drew international attention to Sudan. He met with the Head of State Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir and other members of the government in addition to addressing the leaders and followers of the RCC. He diplomatically condemned the government for the conflict in the south in the words:

The immense suffering of millions of innocent victims impels me to voice my solidarity with the weak and defenceless, who cry out to God

³¹⁵ John Ashworth, *Five Years of Sudan Focal Point by January 2007*, (Pretoria: Sudan Focal Point Africa, 2004), p.i.

³¹⁶ J.H. Douglas, *The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p.66.

³¹⁷ Nicholas Strand, "Photo Exhibit displays Sudan Struggle"

<<http://overcomingviolence.org/en/archive/past-annual-foci/2003-sudan.html>> as accessed on 6th January 2007.

for help, for justice, for respect for their God-given dignity as human beings, for their basic Human Rights, for the freedom to believe and practice their faith without any fear or discrimination.³¹⁸

At the same time, the Pope outlined the policy of the church as spreading Christianity through preaching as well as humanitarian activities.³¹⁹ It should be noted that the Pope's speech did not in any way condemn the activities of the SPLM/A. Bishop Mazollari conceded that the relationship between the church and the SPLM/A was smooth. He said:

SPLM/A's attitude towards the church (RCC) was friendly. The church considered the SPLM/A our own people since the war was happening in the South, among them. However, we (RCC bishops) did not hesitate to condemn their abuse of Human Rights, as a result of which some of them were aloof from the church.³²⁰

Just like the RCC, the Anglican Church also used its high offices to focus international attention on Sudan. In 1995, George Carey, Archbishop of Canterbury, visited Sudan and went to Juba where he encouraged the faithful to remain committed to their faith.³²¹ His visit generated wide media coverage of the conflict and thus put it in the international focus. At the same time, the NSCC used its close links with the SPLM/A to advocate for ceasing of hostilities among Southern factions.

Despite the concerted ecumenical advocacy efforts, the situation in Sudan worsened. In 1994, the government repealed the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 and replaced it with "The Miscellaneous Amendment (Organisation of Voluntary Work) Act 1994"³²² The repeal of the Missionary Societies Act came as a surprise to Christians who had been calling for its repeal for about two decades without any success.

³¹⁸ Pope John Paul II, *Pope John Paul II in the Sudan*, (Khartoum: Archdiocese of Khartoum, 1993), p.5.

³¹⁹ Ibid, p.21.

³²⁰ Oral Interview, Bishop Caesar Mazollari, Nairobi, 6th June 2006.

³²¹ Werner *et al*, *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment*, p.601.

³²² Roman Catholic Church, *Position of the Catholic Church on the Provisional Order of 4 October 1994*, (Khartoum: SCBC, 1994), p.1.

However, the 1994 law seemed worse: it referred to the Churches as "Non-governmental Organisations working in the South" which required government supervision and approval of all its activities.³²³ The churches viewed the law as government control and also took issue with being referred to as NGOs. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), on behalf of Protestant churches, criticized the government for coming up with the law without consulting the Christian groups. The Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference sent to the Minister of Social Planning, Ali Osman Muhammad Taha, their response, speaking against the Law and they distanced themselves from its implications. They said:

...The Act (1994), as it is formulated, interpreted and intended to be enforced, does not apply to the Catholic Church. Therefore, we consider ourselves not subject to this law.³²⁴

Generally, the church asked the government not to interfere in the churches' activities on education, medical and health care, relief and assistance to the poor and needy, development work, church personnel, media and church property.³²⁵ They applauded the government's step in asking the Churches' opinion and stated they, just like the government, were also concerned with the well being and total human development of all the Sudanese people.

The Church became very vocal. From 1996 onwards, the churches through SCC/NSCC, and also through AACC/WCC, articulated Southern Sudan issues at any opportunity in international meetings. This decision was arrived at during a consultation they held in 1996 in South Africa for church leaders in Africa, sponsored by AACC and WCC. It brought together church leaders who were neighbours, but

³²³ Gino Barsella and Miguel A. Ayuso Guixot, *Struggling to be heard*, (Nairobi, Paulines Publications 1998), p.88.

³²⁴ Roman Catholic Church, *Position of the Catholic Church on the Provisional Order of 4 October 1994*, p.2.

³²⁵ *Ibid*, p.7.

who to a large extent had never quite understood the conflicts across their borders.³²⁶

The participants were from Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Tanzania. The leaders resolved to be making contributions towards any efforts being made by governments in ending conflicts. They proposed the formation of a sub-regional ecumenical forum which would help strengthen the voice of the churches as they pursued a ceasefire in countries with conflicts. The forum, the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), was officially launched two years later.³²⁷ The aims of FECCLAHA were maintaining open communication with all parties in conflict, promoting dialogue between the conflicting parties, monitoring the status and implementations of all peace agreements, forming ecumenical structures for effective mobilization of regional peace initiatives and finally promoting effective sharing of information on peace initiatives.³²⁸

FECCLAHA continued being more focused as it also sought membership of other countries which were involved in conflicts. In their next consultation in 1997 in Uganda, Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) joined them. They organised activities to specifically discuss the Southern Sudan conflict, consulted with the fighting factions and generally pressed for a ceasefire. A key feature of their activities was coming up with resolutions in support of meetings or activities in support of ceasefires.

The Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Consultation in April 1998 in Nairobi was one such meeting. It took place on the eve of Inter-Governmental Authority on

³²⁶ Rev. Mutava Musyimi, *Sudan at war in Search of Peace*, Report of Consultation commissioned by Churches and Christian Councils of the Great Lakes-Horn of Africa Region, Report, (Nairobi: April 7-8, 1998), p.17.

³²⁷ Karimi Kinoti., *Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa [FECCLAHA]*, Report, (Nairobi: FECCLAHA 1999), p.iv.

³²⁸ D. Waithaka, *Sudan at war in Search of Peace*, p.36.

Development (IGAD) talks on the Sudanese conflict that had been scheduled for May 1998. The consultation was convened by Churches and Christian Councils of the Great Lakes-Horn of Africa Region. The participants included the patriarch of the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia, Orthodox Church of Eritrea, RCC of Ethiopia, Church Councils from DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, NSCC, SCC, the SPLM/A represented by Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, Secretary for Education and Religious Affairs and the GoS by Dr. David de Chand, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³²⁹

The aim was to bring the SPLM/A and the GoS in a face-to-face meeting, hear their views and advise them on the best way to achieve a ceasefire. In the meeting, the SPLM/A accused the GoS of religious bias favouring the Islamic North and under-developing the South, while the GoS accused the SPLM/A of pushing for a federal union of North and South Sudan, without consulting the people of Sudan. The meeting was characterized by trade of accusations between the conflicting parties, but at the end, it was a dialogue which the churches thought was useful in the journey towards a ceasefire. In addition, both the SPLM/A and the GoS expressed their willingness to implement a ceasefire if their demands were met.

FECCLAHA organised activities to complement the efforts of the regional organizations, especially those of IGAD in achieving a ceasefire. However, they did not take a front seat in the negotiations and participate directly as stakeholders. Rather, they brought the fighting parties in face-to-face meetings, as well as consulted them informally. The Church adopted the strategy of working behind-the-scenes. Fr. Atit said:

Although the church found itself entangled in the conflict because of Human

³²⁹ Ibid, p.2.

Rights violations by both the GoS and the SPLM/A, it (church) sees itself as an institution that should not be manipulated. But if we are in the background, we can see things objectively.³³⁰

Throughout mid and late 1990s, the AC and RCC maintained Sudan in their agenda of activities and discussions. FECCLAHA was officially launched in 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya. During the launch, discussion on Sudan was part of the main agenda. Both the NSCC and the SCC were invited and they gave an update of the situation in Sudan. They gave a report of how the government had promulgated a constitution based on Islamic *Shari'a* law. The participants agreed to support all people who were working towards a ceasefire in Sudan. They held their next forum in 2000, in Limuru Kenya.³³¹ Here too, Sudan was discussed at length. The participants were informed of the stalled IGAD-led talks and allegations of use of chemical weapons by GoS on the Southerners. The chairman, Rev Mutava Musyimi called for a 'holy impatience,' meaning gradually putting pressure on all those involved in the conflict for a ceasefire.³³² Through such meetings, the ecumenical body put the issue of the Sudan conflict in the international agenda by circulating their reports and findings to their counterparts worldwide.

Church leaders organised meetings, seminars and conferences concerning the conflict in Sudan. In August 2001, the Sudanese Anglican Church (AC) and Roman Catholic Church (RCC) bishops held a joint seminar in Nairobi and sent an appeal to both President El –Bashir of the GoS and to Dr. Garang of the SPLM/A.³³³ The appeal, signed by Bishop Paulino Lukudu Loro, president of the Sudan Catholic Bishops, Conference and Bishop Dr. Joseph B. Marona, Archbishop of the Episcopal Church

³³⁰ Oral interview, Fr. Justin Atit. (Priest of Wau Diocese), Nairobi 10th June 2006.

³³¹ K. Kinoti, *Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa*, p.14.

³³³ Akasha Alsayed, 'The Bishops of the Catholic and Episcopal Churches of the Sudan meeting in Nairobi,' *Sudan Echo*, Vol. III Issue No. 001, September 2001, (Nairobi: Centre for Strategic Peace Studies), p.1.

of the Sudan, the Bishops said they were concerned about the "human suffering in both the North and the South of the country."³³⁴ They further affirmed the principles of the IGAD peace process, namely the relationship between the state and religions, the principle of self-determination and the discussion on a comprehensive ceasefire. The church, was therefore, putting pressure on both leaders of the fighting parties, in this case El-Bashir and Garang, as well as their followers through the people-to-people Peace process of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) to end the conflict.

The NSCC organised meetings and conferences to inform other stakeholders and the common people alike on the progress of the Sudanese activities towards a ceasefire. In October 2002, it organised a forum jointly with SCC in Uganda for Sudanese Civil Societies.³³⁵ Representatives from Community Based Organisations (CBOs), NGOs, GoS, SPLM and IGAD members and partners attended. The aim of the forum was to bring GoS and SPLM in a face-to-face dialogue on achieving a ceasefire in the conflict. The GoS delegation was led by Rev. Ambrose Adi while the SPLM one was led by Dr. Cirino Hiteng. Both Dr. Hiteng and Rev. Adi reiterated that their parties were willing to resume the negotiations that had stalled.³³⁶ Through the forum, NSCC and SCC spread information about the IGAD activities and any other activities aimed at a ceasefire. It was also an opportunity for the common people, represented by Sudanese local NGOs, to share ideas on the way forward to a ceasefire.

The churches used advocacy as a strategy of arriving at a ceasefire in the Sudan conflict. The advocacy was directed both to the people in Sudan as well as people not

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Joy Eluzai Kwaje, "Women's Programme," *Arise*, Issue No. 9, December 2002 (Khartoum: SCC), p.1.

³³⁶ Ibid, p.2.

directly involved in the conflict. The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) bishops advocated for a ceasefire and reconciliation among the fighting groups through letters and periodicals published for their followers. The letters were public documents which were written after a period of discussions and deliberations by the bishops on certain themes. Normally the theme of discussion was dictated by the situation at hand.

The letters of the Sudan bishops during the period of the conflict outlined the policy of the RCC regarding the conflict. The RCC leadership addressed four items in their letters: they appealed for an end of the conflict; pointed out injustice as the root cause of the conflict; called for free access to humanitarian assistance; and finally warned their followers to respect, but not to convert to, Islam. This was evident starting from the first letter that the Bishops wrote since the conflict resumed. It was dated 1st October 1983 under the headline 'Blessed be the Peace makers...Appeal for peace to all the Christian Faithful and all the Peace-loving Sudanese of Goodwill.'³³⁷

The letter made an appeal to all Christians in general not to be involved in the conflict, since they were followers of Jesus, 'the Prince of Peace.' Quoting passages from the Bible and other teachings of the church, they appealed to the Christians to 'live in truth and love.'³³⁸ It also made an appeal to public authorities to "open the way to an honest dialogue for peace and reconciliation." In this, it pointed out the following as being the root causes of the conflict; institutionalized injustice, unchecked discrimination, uneven development, inequality and breakdown of public administration.³³⁹ The bishops made it clear that all they wanted was a ceasefire, at

³³⁷ Roman Catholic Church, *Letters to the Church of the Sudan*. Report. (Khartoum: Museo Nazionale, 2002), p.30.

³³⁸ Ibid, p.31.

³³⁹ Ibid, p.30-35.

least for a start. They thus appealed to all the factions to stop fighting, saying:

...We appeal to the various armed groups for understanding. Perhaps you have some grievances you want to vindicate, or even a just cause to struggle for-whatever your reasons for resorting to violence, we plead with you to give serious thought to our appeal for peace...³⁴⁰

Despite such appeals, the conflict still continued. The bishops did not stop writing. The next letter dated 30th June 1984 was generally an encouragement to their followers not to convert to Islam. It stated:

...Do not be confused in the face of the *Shari'a* and forced Islamization...in spite of the public declarations that the Islamic *Shari'a* is not meant for Christians, you know that several Christians have suffered from the application of these laws...where the *Shari'a* Law conflicts with Christian tradition ... you must stand for Christ ...At the same time, we assert that Islam has spiritual values we must respect...³⁴¹

All the letters of the Bishops, whether by an individual or several of them during the period of the conflict, addressed either all or at least one of the above themes. Some of the letters encouraged the Southerners to protest against forced imposition of the *Shari'a* Law and disapprove introduction of Islamic laws if it would mean suppression of Christian practices. However, the bishops still called for reason even in these circumstances, saying:

...the Christian's reason for protesting in these cases must never be opposition to Islam but the defence of his civil and Human Rights as a citizen of the country...the protest must moreover be expressed, not by disorderly conduct or by undermining lawful authority.³⁴²

Some of the letters addressed specific sections of the Christian population. One such letter was dated 28th November 1991 was addressed to the Christian faithful in Damazin in Bahr el-Ghazal. The District Commissioner went to the parish priest and ordered him to hand over to him all the keys to the parish houses as the first step

³⁴⁰ Ibid, p.31.

³⁴¹ Ibid, p.45.

³⁴² Roman Catholic Church, *Letters to the Church of the Sudan*, p.225.

towards taking over the parish³⁴³ However, a number of Christians went and surrounded the houses and camped there day and night, abandoning their homes. The letter was commending them for their bravery, saying:

...all your brothers and sisters in the faith have greatly appreciated the stand you took. The unity that brought you together and the determination you showed. It was not only the Church that you defended but also the honour of your country.³⁴⁴

The policy of the RCC as expressed in the bishops' letters and their activities were largely supportive of Southerners than GoS. At the same time, from time to time the bishops held meetings with the representatives of the GoS on different issues. One such meeting was in September 1995. Its aim was to explain to the government the activities of the Church and seek ways of collaboration where possible in reaction to the new law restricting Christian activities.³⁴⁵

The bishops wrote over 50 public letters and documents in the period 1983-2003. The documents played the role of informing the general public the stand of the churches on different issues. They also served to encourage their followers while at the same time criticizing the government. Finally, the letters created awareness worldwide on the situation in Southern Sudan as a result of which, Christians in other parts of the world joined in a call for a ceasefire.

4.7 The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process

The IGAD initiated some negotiations that led to a ceasefire and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. IGAD is an Inter-Governmental Agency on Development. It is composed of member states of Eastern Africa,

³⁴³ Ibid, p.180.

³⁴⁴ Roman Catholic Church, *Position of the Catholic Church on the Provisional Order of 4 October 1994*, p.2.

³⁴⁵ Roman Catholic Church, *Letters to the Church of the Sudan*, p.136-145.

including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. In the mid-1990s, IGAD initiated the 'IGAD Peace Process,' deciding to undertake the solving of the GoS vs. SPLM/A conflict as opposed to viewing it as an internal Sudanese problem. At the time of the establishment of the IGAD Peace Process, SPLM/A was the major faction in the South fighting against the GoS.³⁴⁶ That is why it was only SPLM/A which was targeted among the Southern factions. In the late 1990s, other countries - such as Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa as well as the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, Germany and several other European countries offered to support the IGAD Peace Process but indirectly especially through material and advisory support. They formed the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF).³⁴⁷ In 1999, the IGAD Peace Committee set up a secretariat in Nairobi, with Kenyan Ambassador Daniel Mboya as its Special Envoy. It was divided into two technical (sub) committees, namely the Political Committee and the Interim Arrangements Committee.³⁴⁸ These committees were to work towards bringing the GoS and the SPLM/A into talks to end the conflict. IGAD took the move of establishing a secretariat so as to make the idea of solving the conflict an on-going commitment as opposed to sporadic meetings from time to time.

The IGAD Peace process involved a series of meetings and discussions revolving around the Declaration of Principles (DOP) document. The DOP was a document prepared by the IGAD mediators explaining the mechanism through which the discussion to resolve the conflict would be evolved.³⁴⁹ The DOP document laid down the framework of the discussions by detailing some of the major areas which should be tackled. These were social and political system of the Sudan which was to be based

³⁴⁶ J. Ashworth, *Five Years of Sudan Focal Point*, p.24.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ A.M. Arop, *Sudan's painful Road to Peace*, p.378.

on a secular and democratic state that guaranteed equity for all peoples of the Sudan; extensive rights of self-administration to be given to the various peoples of the Sudan; there should be appropriate fair sharing of wealth among all Sudanese; the judiciary should be independent; and finally, if the GoS and the SPLM/A failed to reach an agreement through dialogue, then Sudanese should be allowed to determine their future through a referendum.³⁵⁰

The DOP drew sharp criticism from the GoS delegation, which termed it as being biased and favouring the SPLM/A. On the other hand, the SPLM/A delegation argued that their National Executive Council would fully endorse the document, terming it a step in the right direction.³⁵¹ Such sharply divided opinions characterised most of the IGAD meetings, explaining why it took the IGAD Peace process almost a decade to arrive at the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) document.

The IGAD discussions were going on concurrently with the conflict since none of the parties agreed to a ceasefire during the talks until the year 2000. This made it difficult for a meaningful agreement to be reached within a short time. Although the meetings targeted the top officials of GoS and the SPLM/A, it was difficult to get El-Bashir, the president of the GoS, and John Garang, the leader of the SPLM/A, to dialogue face to face. Most of the times, it was the GoS side that turned down invitations to attend such meetings.³⁵² In the long run, the delegates to the IGAD Peace Process were ministers of the GoS and senior leaders of the SPLM/A. It was under such a tense environment that the IGAD talks were carried out until 2002 when one of the most significant Agreements, the Machakos Protocol, was signed.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² A.M. Arop, *Sudan's painful Road to Peace*, p.376.

4.8 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

A series of talks between the GoS and the SPLM/A were held in Machakos, Kenya at the beginning of 2002. The talks culminated in the signing of 'The Machakos Protocol' on 20th July 2002.³⁵³ It was signed by the GoS and the SPLM/A. Following the reconciliation through the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the composition of the SPLM/A had then expanded to include Southern Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A and, Sudan National Alliance among other smaller factions that had earlier on defected from the SPLM/A. This meant that almost the whole of the South was represented in the signing of the Protocol. This was important to the church because it reduced the danger of the GoS being in agreement with one faction but continuing to fight with another.

The Machakos Protocol was historic because the signatories for the first time agreed on a road map towards ending hostilities. The Agreement was a broad framework setting forth the principles of governance; the transitional process; structures of government; the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan; and finally the state and religion.³⁵⁴ Additionally, a week after the signing, on 27th July 2002, President of GoS, Omar al-Bashir, met for the first time with John Garang, leader of the SPLM/A.³⁵⁵ The meeting was a gesture of commitment of the GoS towards implementing the Machakos Protocol.

The Agreement called for the rewriting of Sudan's constitution. It specifically noted that *Shari'a* would not apply to non-Muslims. The Agreement also called for a referendum to be held in six years-time to determine whether the South should remain

³⁵³ J. Ashworth, *Five Years of Sudan Focal Point*, p.105.

³⁵⁴ Mary Nthangu Mbatha, *Evaluation of Opportunities and Constraints of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Resolving the Sudanese Civil War*, (University of Nairobi: 2007), p.12.

³⁵⁵ John Reeves, "Sudan at the Crossroads," <
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/spla.htm>> as accessed on 12th August 2006.

part of the present Sudan or be independent and the sharing of common resources such as water and oil, between the North and the South. Generally, the Machakos Protocol provided a broad framework on principles of governance and procedures for a transitional process. Since those were the contentious issues that contributed to the conflict between the GoS and the SPLM/A, the signing of the Protocol led to the beginning of a ceasefire.

The Machakos negotiations were successful since they brought the top leadership of GoS and of SPLM/A in a face-to-face meeting for the first time ever. On their resumption on 16th October, 2002 after a break in July, the GoS and SPLM/A signed a Memorandum of Understanding which called for a complete cessation of hostilities for three months and an unimpeded access in the South for humanitarian assistance.³⁵⁶ This was a complete turn-around attitude on the part of GoS and a huge success for SPLM/A. It also meant more aid for the Southern civilians since humanitarian organisations were allowed free access to the South.

The talks resumed the following year, 2003 in Naivasha, Kenya. This time, discussions to end specific problems were held as stipulated in the Machakos Protocol. These were the Protocol on security arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003. This was an agreement to create a new National Armed Forces consisting of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) as separate, regular and non-partisan armed forces with a mission to defend the constitutional order. This was a departure from the Addis Ababa Agreement in which the *Anya-nya* had to be absorbed into the National Army.

³⁵⁶ John Reeves, "Sudan at the Crossroads," <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nara/spla.htm>> as accessed on 12th August 2006.

The next was the Protocol on wealth-sharing which was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7th January, 2004. This contains detailed arrangements for revenue transfers in the Wealth Sharing Protocol. Southern Sudan has been allocated 50% of net oil revenues generated from oil-fields in Southern Sudan. This arrangement was also not present in the Addis Ababa Accord, mainly because oil had not been discovered then. This Protocol allows some level of financial autonomy in the South, the absence of which was one of the reasons that led to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Accord.

The Protocol on Power-sharing was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May, 2004. This was of major significance because it gave for the first time, an opportunity to the people of Southern Sudan to exercise the right of self-determination through a referendum. The same Power-Sharing Protocol provided for A Bill of Rights, enshrined in the new Interim National Constitution, which obliged all levels of government to respect, uphold and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. This bound the signatories to international documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The next Naivasha protocol was the Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States and Abyei. It was signed in Naivasha Kenya, on 26 May, 2004. These were some of the areas where the conflict had been fought fiercely throughout the conflict period. They were areas which were highly contested by both the North and the South because they were richly endowed with natural resources. The Machakos and Naivasha Agreements were put together to form the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The CPA was a departure from former agreements. This was because it was arrived at after discussions that involved the international community and thus the Sudan conflict was not treated as an internal Sudanese issue. Secondly, it dealt with the contentious issues in detail. These were the issues which in former agreements, especially the Addis Ababa Agreement, had loopholes. Some of the new items that featured in the CPA and had not featured in the former agreements, included the devolution of government functions and the decentralization of powers and revenues.³⁵⁷ The CPA also provided for a detailed implementation modalities in the form of a matrix with measurable and scheduled mechanisms for effective monitoring.³⁵⁸ The monitoring aspect was also important and was totally absent in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Unlike the Addis Ababa Agreement, the CPA largely explained the mode of implementation of the right to self-determination agreement to the South and freedom of worship for Southerners. Equally important was the recognition that non-Muslims will not be subjected to *Shari'a* Law.

The signing of the CPA was a grand affair. Both the African Union and the international community were represented. The international community also featured in the CPA document in the Power-Sharing Protocol. Its key role was to carry out a mid-term evaluation of how the CPA was being implemented. The following were present and they appended their signatures to the document: Mwai Kibaki, President of the Republic of Kenya on behalf of the IGAD Sub-Committee on the Sudan, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni; President of the Republic of Uganda on behalf of IGAD Member states; Ahmed Aboud Gheit, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the government of the Republic of Egypt; Alfredo Mantica, Deputy Minister for

³⁵⁷ M. N. Mbatha. *Evaluation of Opportunities and Constraints of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Resolving the Sudanese Civil War*, p.14.

³⁵⁸ *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, (Nairobi: 9th Jan, 2005), p.136-228.

Foreign Affairs on behalf of the government of Italy and also the International Partners Forum (IPF); Fred Racked, Special Envoy of the Netherlands on behalf of the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands; Hilde F. Johnson, Minister of International Development on behalf of the Royal Norwegian government as well as on behalf of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF); Hillary Ben, Secretary of State for International Development on behalf of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland; Mr. Colin L. Powell, United States Secretary of State on behalf of the United States of America; Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the AU, on behalf of the AU; Charles Goerens, Minister of Development Co-operation of Netherlands on behalf of the EU; Mr. Amre Mousa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States on behalf of the League of the Arab States; and Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the Sudan on behalf of the United Nations.³⁵⁹

4.9 Role of the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The AC and the RCC did not feature directly in the major discussions that led to the CPA. As explained before, this was a major departure from the set up of the Addis Ababa Agreement where the churches took a front seat in the organisation and mediation process. Secondly, their absence in the Inter-Governmental Authority in Development (IGAD) Peace Process was curious especially because they played a crucial role in resolving the Dinka vs Nuer conflict. The conflict led to the unity of the South, making it possible for the GoS to sign the CPA with a largely united South. There were mixed reactions concerning the absence of Churches:

It is very bad that especially the leaders of the SPLM/A did not involve the church in their major negotiations. May be they felt that they had achieved what they wanted and so there was no need to continue involving the church. However, had they invited us, I am sure we would have participated in those negotiations. All the same, nobody

³⁵⁹ *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, (Nairobi: 9th Jan, 2005), p. xiv-xvi.

can deny that we played a role in the signing of the ceasefire agreement.³⁶⁰

At the same time, some people feel that it was good the church was not involved in the negotiations so that it was not compromised, since the church views itself as an institution that should not be manipulated. However, in the background, it can observe things more objectively and act more freely as observed below:

The church did not want to be in the frontline negotiations but rather remain in the background. Indeed, we cannot forget the case of Bishop Rorej of the AC who, in 1997 was appointed a minister in the Government of Sudan. However, he could not criticise the same government he was working for. As a result, he became compromised and this led to his expulsion from the Church. Sadly, he formed his own church and began activities that were being supported by the government! To avoid such a situation, it's always best for the church to be in the background.³⁶¹

On the other hand, some people felt the Church was all the same represented. To them, it did not matter that the churches were actually not part of the IGAD Peace Process. Ms. Deng said:

The priests and pastors did not have to appear in person during the negotiations. Definitely their sentiments and wishes were well known to all those involved.³⁶²

Meanwhile, there were groups who blamed the Church for not doing enough during the conflict. These sentiments explain the divided views of the Church and thus its dilemma throughout the conflict period; should it mediate between the North and the South or should it stand in solidarity with only the suffering Christians? Since the Church had a large constituency in the South, Southern intellectuals, especially those who were members of the rebel movement, expressed their disappointment that the

³⁶⁰ Oral Interview, Bishop Caesar Mazollari, Nairobi, 6th June 2006.

³⁶¹ Oral Interview, Fr. Sautino Morokomomo, (Priest of Wau Diocese), Nairobi, 6th June 2006.

³⁶² Oral interview, Ms. Awut Deng, Nairobi, 18th May 2006.

Church had not committed itself fully to the struggle against the North.³⁶³

Amidst the mixed reactions above, the Churches' proposals through the NSCC and SCC to GoS and SPLM/A on how to end the conflict featured prominently in the CPA document. These included the step-by-step plan for a conflict-free Sudan, which was almost replicated in the Machakos Protocol, the document which laid down the framework for the ceasefire.³⁶⁴ The other major idea of the churches that featured in the CPA document was the Right-of-self-determination for the South, which the bishops outlined during their meeting in Norway.³⁶⁵ The matrix of implementation of the CPA and involvement of the international community had also featured in the NSCC Bishops' meeting in Norway.³⁶⁶ Such approximate conclusions of the church, which were adopted by the International community through the IGAD Peace Process, serve to prove that in the South, churches and church-based institutions played the role of a surrogate state. To a large extent, church leaders were viewed as legitimate authorities and a mouthpiece of the community.³⁶⁷

³⁶³ Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, "Great expectations: The Civil Role of the Churches in Southern Sudan," Raphael K. Badal ed. *Local Traditional Structures in Sudan*, (Nairobi: Life and Peace Institute, 2006), p.127.

³⁶⁴ New Sudan Council of Churches, *Let Justice Prevail*, Position Papers of the Sudanese Churches on Peace and Self-determination, 2003, (Nairobi: New Sudan Council of Churches 200), p.6.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, p.12.

³⁶⁶ Ibid, p.6.

³⁶⁷ R.K. Badal, *Local Traditional Structures in Sudan*, p.122.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This study has shown that churches played both a divisive and a unifying role in the Southern Sudan conflict. Between 1950s and 2005, the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in Sudan directly and indirectly played these roles through their leaders, their followers and institutions associated with them.

The churches were formally involved in efforts to bring about a ceasefire in the Sudan conflict. This was through their institutions; namely, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), the All African Council of Churches (AACC), the World Council of Churches (WCC), Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), and the Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF.) The ceasefire efforts were carried out through the leaders' personal efforts, meetings, workshops and negotiations with both the GoS and factions in the South. These efforts bore fruit in the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, although it was dishonoured about a decade later.

Southern Sudanese, Christians and non-Christians saw the Church, as their ally. This was mainly because at the time of slave trade, the churches preached against it; during the time of colonization and the "Southern Policy," missionaries erected hospitals and schools for Southerners, and finally, during the North-South conflict, the church structures also suffered through the laws expelling them. More importantly, some bishops and priests were directly involved in supporting the Southern fighters with material needs or being part of the combatants themselves. As a result, their activities were viewed by GoS as being supportive of the Southern factions. The government treated church leaders harshly by imprisoning them. Generally, the churches were viewed as being part of the Southern factions. Although the churches seem to have cooperated with the Southerners more than with the government, to some extent it

was a natural phenomenon following the heavy Islamic presence in the North as well as expulsion of Christian NGOs from the North.

The direct role of the churches during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) discussions was blurred. Although the NSCC had worked hand-in-hand with the SPLM/A in the South and the AACC and the WCC had held dialogue with the GoS officials in prior negotiations, church leaders were not part of the signatories or even witnesses to the CPA. This is because, apart from the SPLM/A, the AU and the UN, all the other participants in the CPA discussions were government representatives. All the same, some of their key suggestions featured in the CPA. These were the right to self-determination of the South, a referendum to decide the future of the South, a matrix for the implementation of the CPA as well as a wealth-sharing formula between the North and the South.

The AC and the RCC employed advocacy as a strategy to put the conflict of Sudan in the international limelight. The RCC bishops released many public letters calling for a ceasefire. In such letters, they emphasised the importance of all people concerned to work for and promote a conflict-free coexistence in the country. Such letters were circulated especially in Europe, where the Christians put pressure on their governments to force the GoS to end the conflict. Through advocacy, the churches used their highest offices to intervene. When the RCC leader, Pope John Paul II and the AC the Bishop of Canterbury, visited Sudan and met with the Head of State, Omar El Bashir, they successfully lobbied for the release of some missionaries who had been detained by GoS. Likewise, such visits increased international pressure on the GoS to end the conflict. At the same time, the Southern Sudanese bishops invited church and political leaders from all over the world to visit Sudan and see the

situation. The following delegations visited Southern Sudan: South African bishops, USA Roman Catholic Church bishops, Australian RCC and AC bishops, French RCC bishops and a group of Kenyan MPs. Such visits played the role of putting Southern Sudan in the limelight internationally. The church's advocacy bore fruit when they advocated against bombardments through the South African bishops, who later lobbied their government to stop selling arms to GoS.

The churches performed a dual role. As they advocated for a ceasefire between the GoS and the South, they also advocated for a ceasefire among Southerners. The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) played a major role in the people-to-people peace-building programme. The programme resulted in the resolution of the Dinka vs Nuer conflict, thus ensuring a united South in readiness for the CPA. During the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process, Southerners spoke in one voice unlike in the past, such as the conference prior to Sudan's independence. To carry out such activities, the NSCC was heavily supported financially by the National Council of Churches of USA (NCC-USA). The funds were used to support especially the People-to-People Peace Process that culminated in the reconciliation of Dinkas and Nuers in 2000 and also in paying the organisations' personnel. However, it is curious to note that the same USA which supported the NSCC had a lot of interests in the oil deposits in Southern Sudan. Therefore, ecumenism or the working together of churches became a vital tool for advocating for a ceasefire. In 1996, the NSCC and SCC presented a joint paper entitled "*Here We Stand in Action for Peace*" in a consultation in Norway. In the paper, they gave a step-by-step plan for a peaceful Sudan, while drawing heavily from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is the document that largely featured in the CPA document.

The NGOs affiliated to the churches, especially the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA) and Sudan Episcopal Forum (SEF) contributed to the ceasefire activities in Southern Sudan. The activities of the faith-based organisations did not differ from those of secular NGOs or of the Inter-Governmental Authority in Development (IGAD). In most cases, they both advocated for a ceasefire and provided humanitarian Aid. However, their impact was greater because their Christian orientation, more often than not, opened doors with other Christians worldwide. A good example of this was the SCC based in the North and the NSCC in the South but both working for a common cause and both getting support from Europe and America. One of the key successes of faith-based NGOs in bringing about the ceasefire was their ability to be involved at all levels across the board: from training in non-violence among women, youth groups and community elders at grassroots levels to high-powered mediation involving heads of states. The presence of the churches at the grassroots or local communities and weaving their way to the international cycles had the impact of making their presence felt.

At the same time, the Church armed itself and fought the GoS forces. This was through some of its leaders and also followers in their individual capacities. Since most of the victims in the conflict were Southerners, where the AC and the RCC had majority followers, the Church was both an aggressor as it was a victim. In conclusion, the Anglican Church (AC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) at their three levels of leadership, followers and institutions and/or NGOs played both an indirect and direct role in fuelling the conflict as well as in ceasefire efforts.

Lederach's theory of Conflict Transformation holds true in examining the role that the AC and the RCC played in the Sudanese conflict. This was through advocacy as a strategy for transforming or resolving a conflict. As has been explained in Chapter Four, the AC and the RCC conducted concerted advocacy both at the national and international levels in their efforts to bring about a ceasefire in the conflict. They did this through their international connections and lobbying governments which gave material support to GoS. Lederach's theory also pointed out that Mediation and Advocacy were the two factors that lead to a ceasefire. Both of these were utilised by the Churches. In 1972 the AACCC/WCC mediated in the conflict to bring about the Addis Ababa Accord, which resulted in a decade of a ceasefire. In the second phase of the conflict, 1983-2005, the churches advocated intensively although they did not feature at the front line of the CPA. This means that depending on the factors on the ground, the use of both Mediation and Advocacy may both be applicable in transforming or resolving a conflict.

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
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
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