

**FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE
IN SOMALIA**

BY
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
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than University of Nairobi for an award of a degree.


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DEDICATION

This project report is dedicated to Mr Mohamed Kheire a colleague and a friend who was killed in 2008, in the wave of eliminating humanitarian aid workers in Mogadishu and to all innocent Somalis and humanitarian aid workers who have suffered the fate of indiscriminate shelling and killing in Somalia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my gratitude to my supervisors, Prof David Macharia and Dr. Christopher Gakuu, who consistently and patiently dedicated their intellectual contributions which greatly shaped this study. I would also like to thank Professor Kangethe Iraki of USIU for his unwavering encouragement and positive motivation. My deep thanks also goes to Sandra Macharia of UNDP (New York) for her direction, comments and providing me with relevant materials where required. I also thank Daryeel Bulsho Guud and Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe for giving me a chance to study. I am also grateful to Hosea Litiku of Bangor University (UK) for his support. Finally, I would also thank the individuals from local and International organizations who took their valuable time to respond to the questionnaires without which this study would have never been completed.

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ABSTRACT

This project report has identified the factors influencing achievement of sustainable peace in former Italian Somaliland (currently known as Somalia) since 1960. The study was conducted with the objective of establishing the internal and external factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia. The factors studied are Clanism, Religion, politics, economy, piracy, and peace agreements, United Nations, United States, Italy, African Union, Al-Qaeda and the Arab League. It also explored possible solutions that can be employed to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia. From the literature reviewed, Somalia has not been able to achieve sustainable peace since the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, despite many peace agreements and therefore the need to investigate the factors that could be causing this deadlock. To achieve the objectives of this study primary data was collected by use of open-ended questionnaires and direct observation. The questionnaires were addressed to the Head of Somalia Programs in the respective agencies. The data collected was analyzed using content analysis and descriptive statistics where frequency distribution tables and percentage were used. The study found that the internal factors of clanism and religion can be positively influenced to bring back peace in Somalia while piracy, politics and the economy were seen to be hindering efforts for sustainable peace. On the external factors the study confirmed that the United Nations has not given enough assistance to Somalis to enable them end the continuous conflict and bring sustainable peace. The study also explored solutions that could lead to sustainable peace, some of the suggested solutions include disarming the outlawed groups and the civilians, unified international support on peace initiatives and strengthening local institutions that could be used as vehicles to peace. In the efforts to achieve sustainable peace the report of this study has recommended that Somalia army should be strengthened to be able to protect its people instead of having foreign armies such as Ethiopian troops and AMISOM. The locals should own the peace processes and the agreements should be made in Somalia instead of holding them in other countries. Finally a further research should be carried out on the involvement of Al-Qaeida and United States in destabilizing Somalia.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD	- African Center for Constructive Resolution of Dispute
ARS	- Alliance for Re- Liberation of Somalia
AMISOM	- African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	- African Union
CRD	- Center for Research and Development
EU	- European Union
ICU	- Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	- Inter Governmental Authority on Development
INGO	- International Non-Governmental Organization
NGO	- Non- Governmental Organization
OAU	- Organization of African Unity
SDM	- Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	- Somali National Alliance
SNF	- Somali National Front
SNM	- Somali National Movement
SPM	- Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	- Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	- Transitional Federal Government
UN	- United Nations
UNITAF	- United Task Force
UNOSOM	- United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPOS	- United Nations Political office for Somalia
USA	- United States of America
USC	- United Somali Congress

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Somalia has an area of 637,657 km² and is located on the East Coast of Africa and North of the Equator with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya as its neighbours. This region is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. According to the 2004 African Development Report Somalia had a population of 9,890,000 in 2003 where 99.9 % of the population were Muslims. The languages spoken in Somalia include Italian, Arabic, English and Somali, Somali is the official language (Bureau of African Affairs US, 2009). Somalia gained independence in 1960 and unlike most African States it had a strong sense of national identity. Somalis possess a common language, culture and they also share a profound attachment to Islam (Meredith, 2006). The immediate cause of conflict in Somalia was related to crises in governance. While democratic principles were being enacted at the top level, nepotism, corruption and clan competition were rapidly eroding the underpinnings of Somalia's nascent democratic system. The Political misrule, combined with pervasive corruption, hampered the maturity of administrative institutions and undermined development of the country's embryonic social services network, thereby engendering general disillusionment with the entire system (Abdulle & Ali, 2004). The exploitation of clan identity by political opportunists swiftly gave rise to an unwieldy number of clan based political parties (Mukhtar, 2003).

Somalia's civil war began long before the state collapsed in 1991. The root cause of the problem can be traced to the rapid marriage of the two Somali territories (North formerly British Somaliland and South formerly under Italian rule) to form the first 'united' state in 1960 (Adam, 1994). After the union, Southerners held all major posts in the government. The government programmes failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socio-economic stratification in the North inherited from the colonial administration (Adedeji, 1999). The Rehanwein of the Riverine region, who enjoyed an equal number of seats with the two other major clans the Hawiye and Darod prior to unification, were comparatively marginalized, and faced discrimination both in the education and government sectors.

Table 1.1 The following are the major actions that took place in Somalia from 1960 to 1991 when the president Siad Barre government was overthrown.

Table 1.1 The genesis of Conflict in Somalia from 1960 to 1991

Year	Action
1960	Independence of Somalia and unification of the two regions as the Somalia republic (British Somaliland & Italian Somaliland
1961	Referendum for the first Somalia constitution First Presidential election, Adam Abdulle Osman defeated opponent by one vote. Osman to rule for 6 years.
1964	First general election after independence and unity
1967	2nd presidential election, Abdirashid Shermake won against Osman
1969	2nd general election and the polarization of clan parties, 21st October Shermake assassinated by one of his body guards. On 21 October A military coup led by Siad Barre establishes the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) to govern the republic.
1972	Somali- Soviet agreement
1974	Somalia joins the League of Arab States
1976	Formation of Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)
1977	Somali National Army defeated in hands of Ethiopians
1979	Referendum for the 2nd Somali constitution
1980	Somalia agrees to give United States access to military port and airfield at Berbera
1981	Formation of Somalia National Movement an Issaq clan based opposition group.
1988	Somali signs a peace treaty with Ethiopia, renouncing its claim to the Ogaden. The army and air force bombard Hargeisa and Burao, centers of opposition to Barre driving an estimated 300,000 Issaqs into Ethiopia as refugees
1989	United Somali Congress, a Hawiye based opposition is formed and Somali Democratic Movement and Raween opposition group
1990	114 religious leaders, business men and political leaders known as manifestos call for Barre's resignation and a national reconciliation conference to create an interim government.
1991	Downfall of Mohamed Siad Barre's Regime The Issaq dominated SNM announces its secession and declares its independence as the Somaliland Republic

Sources: (Adam & Ford, 1997; Mukhtar, 2003)

In January 1991, Somalis everywhere received with jubilation the news of President Siad Barre's flight from Mogadishu on January 26, 1991 because they thought that was the end of dictatorial leadership. But a new chapter in Somalia's tragic history was beginning to unfold as the unbridled political opportunism of the 1960 re-emerged with a vengeance, nourished by years of oppression. Even as the United Somali Congress (USC) which was dominated by Hawiye clan succeeded in capturing the City, it was unable to contain the ensuing chaos and anarchy (Adedeji, 1999).

Since then Somalis have never been able to contain the situation and conflict continues to flare claiming many innocent civilians. Somalia records the largest number of unsuccessful peace agreements anywhere in Africa since 1991 to 2009. There have been twelve such attempts including: Djibouti National Reconciliation in 1991, Addis Ababa Agreement in Ethiopia in 1993, Somali National Reconciliation Conference held in Kenya in 2004, Khartoum Reconciliation in Sudan in 2006, National Reconciliation Congress in Somalia in 2007 and Djibouti Agreement in 2008 that resulted to President Sharif Sheikh Sharif being elected as the Transitional Federal Government president in January 2009 after the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf in December 2008 (Abdullahi & Handerson, 2007).

In African societies, the political ruling elite has shown no restraint in manipulating the people through prejudice and stereotypes about other ethnic groups in order to win their support for achieving their own self-centered objectives (Adedeji, 1999). The current crisis in Somalia is the product of multifarious interlinked causes, as diverse as the lingering effects of colonization, the dislocation of forced urbanization and the stresses of globalization. For close to two decades Somalis continue to suffer the brunt of a relentless war.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Since the collapse of the government in 1991, Somalia has been in search of sustainable peace as demonstrated through the various peace agreements negotiated, however, that search for peace has, for all practical purposes, been elusive. This is an indicator that besides the persistent conflict there is an attempt to make peace from within. The researcher intended to

investigate the internal and external factors influencing the achievement of sustainable peace and further explore possible solutions that could lead to peace.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to investigate the factors that influence the achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia and to explore possible solutions that can lead to achievement of sustainable peace.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The following are the objectives that guided the study

1. To establish the role played by internal factors in efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia
2. To examine the role-played by external factors in the achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia
3. To explore possible solutions that can lead to achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia

1.5 Research Questions

The research was guided by the following questions:

1. What is the role of internal factors in the effort to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia?
2. What is the role of external factors in the effort to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia?
3. Which are the possible solutions that can lead to achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia?

1.6 Significance of the study

This research could benefit Somalis directly by suggesting possible solutions to the current conflict. It may also assist African governments, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to resolve their long-running conflicts and bring about African unity. Organizations such as the United Nations, African Union and International community at-large could also see possibility of peace in war torn countries. Furthermore, it could also shed light on possible ways to solve conflicts and propose strategies for the avoidance of similar anarchy situations in Africa and other parts of the world.

Within the context of regional stability, Somali's instability weighs negatively to Somalia and its neighbours. The instability can easily spill over, not to mention the effects of fleeing refugees and bandits from Somalia. Finding lasting peace will be welcome to all parties. It therefore follows that sustainable peace in Somalia is critical not only within the country but also in the Region. Despite all the peace efforts, sustainable peace has escaped Somalia for close to two decades resulting in death and maiming of both soldiers and innocent civilians, especially women and children.

1.7 Limitations of the study

The limitations of the study arose from methodology used. The methodology employed as indicated in chapter three is purposive sampling and was conducted in Nairobi. The persons surveyed may not have been the best representation of diverse players involved in Somalia conflict. Also due to the constant changing environments, the faction perceived strong today may be disempowered tomorrow and therefore the conclusions made can be challenged or affirmed by another study in future.

1.8 Delimitations of the study

This study examined the internal and external factors that influence sustainable peace in Somalia since the establishment of the nation-state in 1960. The research concentrated on the former Italian Somaliland, currently Republic of Somalia. This country has been in civil war for close to two decades. As far as was possible, the sample selected was representative of the general context in Somalia. Furthermore, the researcher also used secondary data and carried out direct observation in Somalia to increase reliability and validity of data gathered from open-ended questionnaires. Due to the ever changing dynamics the researcher concentrated on the past developments up to the year 2009, this ensured that what was recorded by the researcher would remain as is.

1.9 Basic assumptions of the study

It was assumed that the respondents would be cooperative and would not obstruct the research by holding back important information. It was also assumed that the Somalia organizations in Kenya would remain operational during the period of research and that the informants would

provide facts about the factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia and give genuine solutions that if implemented could lead to peace.

1.10 Definition of significant terms

1.10.1 Sustainable Peace

Peace is the absence of violence or war or ending of military hostility between fighting units as in a civil war. In most cases, peace is violated by military aggression, coup d'état, civil wars, blood baths and mass slaughters.

Sustainability in a broad sense is the capacity to maintain a certain process or state. Sustainable peace therefore is peace that can be able to last and pass the test of time and is measured based upon absence of shelling, violence, killings, insecurity, sporadic fights and presence of justice, good administration and equitable distribution of resources and rule of law.

1.10.2 Internal factors

These are the factors that are within the boundaries of Somalia, which include political structure, clanism, economic, peace agreements, pirates and religion. They can be measured by the role played by the various political factions, distribution of public resources, Islamic law, the power of clans in peace dialogue and the role of pirates in peace.

1.10.3 External factors

These are actors outside Somalia geographical space who are directly or indirectly influencing achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia. These can be measured by their visible presence in Somalia, and their individual activities (Financial assistance, peacekeepers, humanitarian assistance, military support, and facilitators in peace agreements).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter has succinctly explained the situation in Somalia since 1960 to 2009 and has elaborated on the factors influencing peace. The factors in this chapter include; Clanism, religion, politics, economy, piracy, peace agreements, United Nations, United States, Italy, Arab League, Al-Qaeda and African Union. It has further looked into the effectiveness of mediation in solving conflicts in Africa.

2.2 The effectiveness of mediation in solving conflict in Africa

Between 1991 and 2005 60% of the African States experienced some form of conflict (Abdullahi & Henderson, 2007). These countries include Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and Cote d'Ivoire. Sierra Leone had a decade long war from 1991 to 2002 which had a devastating effect on the Sierra Leonean citizens (Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2009). In 2010 there are still ongoing wars in Somalia, DRC, and Sudan.

Somalia gained independence in 1960, even after celebrating 50 years of independence in July 2010, it is still struggling to get sustainable peace. These conflicts have created a need to have mediator's interventions some have succeeded while others have not. The mediators have been persistent to bring the warring parties on a round table for peace negotiations, timing is key to a successful long term outcome to negotiations (Griffiths, 2009). The mediator should keep on trying and triggering the right conditions rather than waiting for a propitious time to engage. The crux is securing a genuine sustainable peace for instance the one in Mozambique in 1992, verses the one for Somalia that barely makes it past the conference table. However all the years that go by in the groundwork are not wasted. How to make a deal stick is a headache to the mediators and the conflict analysts. Two models of negotiations have been mentioned 'deadline diplomacy' or 'confidence building mediation'. In deadline diplomacy one uses politically appointed representatives to pressure the parties into an agreement with a mix of incentive and muscle. The confidence building mediation is a much slower process of facilitated talks, in which a neutral and trusted mediator seeks to win a compromise (Nathan,

2009). The parties must be confident that their opponents will honour their promises and stable governance in the long term depends on the ongoing cooperation of the parties. Along with ownership and inclusion the root causes of conflict must be addressed otherwise a peace agreement may only postpone a return to violence (Nathan, 2009).

A good example is the case of Mozambique where Mozambique held 4 successful peace agreements. The agreement for Mozambique was implemented successfully and since then the country has held multiparty elections. The Acordo Geral de Paz AGP (General peace agreement) 1992- was signed in Rome, Italy. A cease-fire came into place after its ratification by the assembly followed by the phased cessations of hostilities and integration of the combatants into the new armed units. The others were disarmed and demobilized under UN supervision and then the IDPs and refugees were resettled.

Unlike Mozambique, Liberia after 4 failed agreements in 1990, 1991, 1995 and 1996 in 2003, the comprehensive peace agreement stipulated ceasefire, a transitional government, power sharing in the transitional government, resettlement of IDPs and refugees, general amnesty and a transitional justice mechanism and it has since held (Abdullahi & Henderson, 2007). Other countries where agreements have worked or have been able to resolve the conflict include Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, Lesotho in 1998, Mali in 1991, Comoros in 2001. This indicates that despite the prolonged conflict in Somalia, the situation can also be contained if the appropriate actions are taken (Abdullahi & Henderson, 2007).

2.3 Somalia Situation from 1960 to 2009

Historically, the current Somalia conflict can be traced back to the 19th century, when Great Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia divided the Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn into five distinct political jurisdictions (Abdulle & Ali, 2004). The territories were The British Somaliland Protectorate (current Somaliland), The Italian Somaliland (Somali Republic), French Somaliland (the present day Republic of Djibouti upon achieving independence in 1977), and The Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and The Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Various attempts were made to reunite the Somalis under a single flag. Despite these efforts only 2 Somali territories actually managed to merge. British Somaliland became independent in June 26 1960 and Italian Somaliland that achieved independence 4 days later on July 1st 1960. However in 1991, British Somaliland broke from wider Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre's regime. It has undertaken democracy without official recognition or support from the international community (Large, 2006). The failure to incorporate the remaining Somalia-inhabited territories into the new Somali Republic has and continues to have enduring consequences for the peace and security in the Horn of Africa region.

After independence there was a more immediate cause of the Somalia conflict, related to various crises in governance in the postcolonial period 1960 to 1969. During the 1964 and 1967, elections the government engaged in widespread fraud aimed at guaranteeing electoral victory for candidates fielded by the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL). Public outrage after the 1967 elections translated into angry demonstrations, clashes between government security forces and members of the public and incidents of interclan violence. Following the elections, sporadic incidents of violence continued and public confidence in the government fell to a new low (Abdulle & Ali, 2004).

The government's 'scorched-earth' policy and its growing intolerance of suspected opponents created a backlash, providing the insurgents with an ever-widening base of support. In 1982 the conflict spread to the Northwest where the Somali National Movement (SNM), an Issaq dominated political organization in Northwestern Somalia, took up arms to overthrow Siad Barre's regime (Mukhtar, 2003). The SNM waged continuous guerilla war until the government collapsed in 1991. The following underscores the situation:

The Somalis are so angry with the government that the country is literally sitting on a bomb waiting to explode. Barre belongs to the Marehaan clan. He has been persecuting the three other main clans the Isaaq, the Majeerteen and the Hawiye. His own clan is in the grip of an internecine power struggle, and rebels are advancing in Mogadishu, it looks bad (as cited in Kamoche, 1988 para. 23.)

In 1988 when Western aid dried up, Somali began to disintegrate, fragmenting into a patchwork of rival fiefdoms controlled by heavily armed clan chiefs. The Darod (Ogaden clan) formed Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); the Hawiye formed United Somali Congress (USC) in the Central region; and the army splintered into rival factions causing banditry, extortions and lawlessness to become commonplace. According to one of Siad's close friends, Siad repeatedly vowed

“When I leave Somalia, I will leave behind buildings but no people” (as cited in Dualeh, 2002, p.37)

Meanwhile as fighting escalated through out the country, a number of influential individuals led by a prominent human rights lawyer, the late Ismaciil Jimail Ossoble, released a manifesto calling on the government to hand over power peacefully. The move was immediately denounced by the armed opposition factions, who suspected the ‘Manifesto group’ of seeking to cut a deal with Barre and pre-empting a military overthrow of the regime. An open letter signed by more than 100 influential politicians from the old regime, businessmen and religious leaders was sent to Siad Barre on May 15th, 1990 (Abdulle & Ali, 2004).

The intention of the ‘Manifesto group’, a coalition of Somali clans, was to peacefully transform the Somalia government, avoid military confrontation and overcome the underlying interclan conflicts through dialogue. The military government arrested more than 36 of the signatories of the ‘manifesto group’. Although the manifesto group became popular in Mogadishu they did not enjoy the universal support of the armed opposition to the Siad Barre.

Uncontrolled armed militia ransacked the capital, and the subsequent interclan conflict between the Darod and Hawiye led to the suffering and death of defenseless civilians of both clans and the other unarmed clans. Almost all non-Hawiye clans, but especially the Darod and other minorities fled Mogadishu from fear of persecution or otherwise. One wing of the United Somali Congress (USC) leadership, in cooperation with the Somali National

Reconciliation Committee established by president Barre, abandoned its commitment to armed allies elsewhere in the country and unilaterally appointed a new president. The split within the USC triggered the outbreak of civil war across much of South and Central Somalia (Abdulle & Ali 2004). From this time onward Somalia continued to suffer many human atrocities, power struggles among various factions and a raging war that continues to this day. The table 2.1 shows the developments from 1991 to 2009.

The following shows how Somalia has been progressing since ousting of president Barre in 1991 to the current developments in 2009.

Table 2.1 Developments in Somalia from 1991 to 2009

Year	Action
1991	National reconciliation conference hosted by Djibouti in July
1992	No major action
1993	Addis Ababa agreement hosted in Ethiopia
1994	No major action
1995	No major action
1996	The Sodere agreement
1997	The Cairo agreement hosted in Egypt
1998	No major action
1999	No major action
2000	The Arta agreement hosted in Djibouti
2001	No major action
2002	Kenyan effort to bring together the Transitional National Government and opposition failed Signing of Declaration on cessation of hostilities held in Eldoret, Kenya
2003	Amendment of Transitional Federal Charter held in Kenya
2004	Inauguration of Federal Transitional Parliament hosted by Kenya
2005	June 2005 Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed Elected as president of TFG
2006	Alliance of Islamic courts took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 Signing of Khartoum I agreement to recognize TFG and ICU, this was never implemented and fighting broke out in December 2006 in which the Somalis, backed by Ethiopian troops defeated the ICU.
2007	National Reconciliation Congress held in Mogadishu with participation of 2,600 delegates representing clans, women and Diaspora. ARS (Re-liberation of Somalia) was established by former parliamentarians and Islamic courts Union in Asmara, September
2008	TFG and ARS signed Djibouti agreement in August 2008 witnessed by international community including AU, IGAD, US, UK, EU, France, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. December 29th 2008 President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned
2009	Withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia On 31st January 2009 chairman of ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected as Somalia's new president, he ran against former Somalia president Siad Barre, Maslah Mohamed Siyad, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake appointed as the Prime Minister by president Sheikh Sharif on February 13th 2009.

Source: United Nations Political Office for Somalia December 2009 (Modified by the researcher)

2.4 Internal Factors

The internal factors to be investigated in this study included: Clanism, politics, economics, piracy, peace agreements and religion.

2.4.1 Clanism

Unlike most African states, Somalia embarked on independence with a strong sense of national identity. The Somalis possessed a common language and a common culture based on pastoral customs and traditions; they also shared a profound attachment to Islam (Meredith, 2006). Beneath this passionate nationalism, however, lay a complex society based on clan families. Somalis asked each other not whence they came but to whom they were related. Every child of eight years was expected to be able to recite their family's genealogy through the male line stretching some ten to twenty generations or more to a common patriarch (Meredith, 2006).

Somalis gave political allegiance first to their immediate family, then to their immediate lineage, then to the clan of their lineage, then to a clan family. All the various clans ultimately belong to one of the 5 clan-families – the Darod, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, the Dir and Digil-Mirifleh – that comprise the nation. Clan-centered politics at the national level was increasingly becoming an unworkable proposition in the 90s. The clan factor, though less pronounced, was present during the reign of the civilian administration (1960-69). Clanism was similarly ubiquitous during the 21-year military dictatorship of 1969-1990 (Ali Fatar, 2007). The civil wars since 1991 were predicated entirely on perceived clan grievances erupting into the open. The opposition groups were all clan-based factions, fighting for their own, particular interests (Mukhtar, 2003).

Clanism, ethnicity, tribalism are often put forward as the main factors of intra-state conflict. It is important to note that clanism, ethnicity and religion is not simply a question of objective data such as language, culture and religion but a question of perception and an identity can be perceived by a group or can be attributed by an outsider. The elites in Africa societies, particularly members of political class manipulate people through feeding them with prejudice

against and stereotypes about other ethnic groups or clans to win their support for achieving their own self centered objectives (Adedeji, 1999).

The following shows how political parties were formed along clan lines.

Table 2.2 Political parties formed by different clans in different regions

Political Party	Region	Clan
SSDF	Mudug	Majerteen
SNM	North Western Somalia	Isaaq
USC	Central	Hawiye
SDM	Interriverine	Digil & Mirifle
SPM	Middle & Lower Juba	Darod (Ogaden)
SNF	Gedo	Marehan
SNA	Banadir, Middle & Lower Shabelle	Habargedir a splinter faction of USC.

(Mukhtar, 2003)

2.4.2 Political Factors

The air of promise of a bright future that is said to have swept the country at the advent of independence soon gave way in stages to the sort of creeping misery that unfailingly accompanied substandard governance. Thus began a long era of scandalous misrule, public disorder, calamitous civil war, secessionist cabals and man-made famine. The collective damage wrought by the cascade of unmitigated, disastrous events of the past several decades is all too real and equally painful to recount. Given that wretched record, one can be forgiven for taking a dim view of Somalia political discourse altogether as an exercise in futility (Fatar, 2007). Failure of governments to render justice, equal services or timely remedy leads to citizens taking issues into their own hands. They resort to committing violence on others and hold the view that discriminatory beliefs and practices are the order of the day and hence participate in perpetuating them. It is in such situations that unscrupulous leaders exploit to incite or perpetuate violence that serves their political or personal gain (Omar, 2004).

The governance situation in conflict countries at the time of conflict is characterized by failure to establish a foundation of law and order, failure to maintain a non discriminatory policy, gross inadequacy of investment in infrastructure and social services and marginalization of

majority of the population including children, women, aged and disabled (Adedeji, 1999). In the 1990s President Siad's control scarcely reached outside Mogadishu yet Mogadishu itself was increasingly threatened. His main adversary was General Mohamed Farah 'Aideed', military leader of the USC. The General was a ferociously touchy character whose nickname meant 'one who does not take insults lying down' and those who displeased him ran the risk of summary execution. Aideed's militia drove remnants of the Siad army out of Mogadishu in 1991 (Mukhtar, 2003).

As soon as Siad left Mogadishu and went to exile, a struggle for power broke out within USC between two Hawiye leaders. Their rivalry split the capital into two armed camps, engulfing it in months of conflict that left an estimated 14,000 people dead and another 40,000 wounded. The Mahdi controlled the north and the Aideed militia the south. The SNM established its own government in May 1991 and declared Somaliland independent from the rest of Somalia, returning it to its 1960 status (Large, 2006).

2.4.3 Economic Factors

Competition for resources typically lie at the heart of conflict, this accounts for the intensity of the struggle for political power in many African countries. In these countries political power is sought in order, *inter alia*, to acquire control over means of production. Those who win in the intense and brutal political power competition no longer need to exert themselves in furthering their economic wellbeing. Political victory ensures this automatically. Those who lose are immiserated, pauperized and are at risk of losing their lives (Adedeji, 1999).

Somali's economy has continued to suffer due to civil war, insecurity, harsh climate conditions and an import ban on the country's livestock. Consumer prices in Mogadishu have skyrocketed; there is fuel shortage and a devalued currency among other economic problems. Somalia continues to exhibit all the symptoms of a divided state with diminishing economic prospects (Meredith, 2006).

President Siad ensured his cronies and clan allies were rewarded and enriched making a fortune from food aid and then selling it on the market. A World Bank study estimated that the

growth of food aid was fourteen times higher than the growth of food consumption; Somalia became dependent on imported food, all to the advantage of the ruling elite (World Bank, 1988).

After receiving US\$1 billion from Italy and US\$800million from the United States in the 1980s the value of foreign aid to Somali soared to US\$80 per person, which was equivalent to half the GDP. Foreign aid became the prop of the Siad regime and was used to ensure that his economic exploitation led to political oppression. The police power was used to enforce property rights and guarantee unfair contracts between capitalists and workers (Meredith, 2006).

2.4.4 The Piracy

The pirates off the Somali coast who come from Puntland, the North Eastern region of Somalia, have been a threat to international shipping since the beginning of civil war in the early 1990s. International organizations including the World Food Programme have expressed their concern over the rise in acts of piracy as it impeded delivery of food aid shipments to Somalia (Wadhams, 2008). The pirate gangs are organized fishermen who got very annoyed with the way international boats poached Somalis tuna fishing grounds and dumped toxic waste along its ungoverned shores. In the early days they demanded poachers to pay a fine, but later they realized there was more money to be made from straight forward abduction (Aidan, 2008). Acts of piracy subsided following the rise of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. However, in December 2006 they began to rise after Ethiopia invaded Somalia. After seeing the profitability of piracy the warlords began to facilitate piracy-splitting profits with the pirates. General William Ward, Head of the U.S African Command, testified that in 2008 ransoms paid to pirates may have exceeded US\$30 million (Aidan, 2008). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) tried to combat piracy without success.

The lucrative success of many hijackings has drawn many young men to join the gangs of pirates whose wealth and strength often make them part of the local social and economic elite. The acts of piracy bring with them multiple threats to freedom of navigation, political and

economic stability in the region, delivery of humanitarian assistance and risk of environmental dimensions (United Nations, 2009).

2.4.5 The Islamic Religion

According to Bureau of African Affairs US (2009), 99.9% of the Somalia populations are Muslims. There have always been intermittent upsurges of religious extremism in the African Countries with Muslim Majority during the colonial period. Somalis share a profound attachment to the Islam Religion. According to Marx (1818) religion serves capitalists by pacifying the population. It is always abused and this is a serious matter by some of its adherents to an extent that they are prepared to kill in the name of Jihad.

At present Muslims constitute the overwhelming part of the population in such states as Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Somalia. Muslims concept of justice plays an important role in the internal national struggle for political and social power. All African-Muslim populations are organized as communal groups seeking state protection and patronage for their economic, educational and foreign policy interests (Lapidus, 1997). The resurgence and proliferation of Islamic organization in the former Somali Republic in the early 70s came about as a direct reaction to the Siad Barre regime that professed Scientific Socialism as the official ideology of the country. Islamic organizations were formed to save people from being converted to communism (Dualeh, 2002).

The latent suspicion and animosity between the Siad Barre regime and religious organizations came into the open when Barre decreed that on the question of inheritance, males and females would get equal share. He further decreed that no husband could divorce his wife without her consent. Both decrees were in contravention with teachings of Islamic and the Holy Quran (Mukhtar, 2003). The religious leaders came out in the open to confront Siad Barre and accused him of tampering with the Holy Quran. They sent preachers to denounce him as a communist and a devil. Siad felt threatened for the first time. Those leaders were executed in January 25th 1975.

After this execution the other religious leaders sought political asylum in Saudi Arabia, where they forged strong links with their future funders, the Saudi Islamic organizations and the wealthy Saudi philanthropists, who heavily donate to worthy Islamic causes. That link has put them in good stead and the religious organizations in the Somali Republic who have never ran short of funds (Dualeh, 2002).

2.4.6 Peace Agreements

Despite the seemingly long conflict, Somalia has attempted approximately 12 recorded peace agreements since 1991 that have failed (Abdullahi & Henderson, 2007). On the announcement of Djibouti intention to hold a Somalia peace conference, three things were clear to any political analyst who understood Somalia. The questions of inclusion, the credibility of the delegates and how the future Somali state will look like were to be discussed. These issues were flawed by the Djibouti Government during the Arta peace process. Majority of Somalis were unrepresented, the delegates were handpicked; some from Djibouti and others from the Diaspora, and they knew nothing about the issues on the ground (Abdulle & Ali, 2004).

The Arta Peace Process in 2000 also failed and another conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya following two years discussion between 2002 and 2004 which was organized by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This conference held in Nairobi resulted in Abdullahi Yusuf being elected as President of TFG in 2005. Between June and September 2006, the League of Arab States hosted a reconciliation meeting in Khartoum where the ICU and TFG signed Khartoum One Agreement agreeing to recognize the legality of the TFG. The TFG and the ICU were to work towards the reintegration of the forces and to continue the dialogue, but this was never implemented. In July to August 2007, the National Reconciliation Congress was held in Mogadishu, where 2,600 delegates attended including clan representatives, women groups and the Diaspora.

In September 2007 the congress for the liberation and reconstitution of Somalia made up of ICU and former parliamentarians met in Asmara, and established the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia and also adopted an action plan. In November 2008 Nur Ade was

elected as the Prime minister and in June 2008 the TFG and ARS initiated an Agreement in Djibouti. (UN, 2008). As a result of Djibouti agreement in December the TFG had a new leadership in January 2009 with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the President elected by Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) following resignation of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in December 2008 (Mbugua, 2009).

2.5 External Actors

The external factors in this study include United Nations, United States, Arab League, Al-Qaeda, African Union and Italy.

2.5.1 United Nations

The United Nations has organized over 12 highly publicized and expensive reconciliation conferences. The faction leaders that have taken part have signed agreements at every meeting, but each settlement collapsed soon after it was agreed, sometimes within hours (Adedeji, 1999). The United Nations is the first partner in conflict management; The UN Charter Article 1(1) states the purpose of the UN as follows

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

This is evident in peacekeeping, peace-making, electoral supervision and in humanitarian assistance. The role of UN in Africa can be regarded as dismal because of the UN charter Article 2, paragraph 7. This article discourages the UN from '*intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state*' In Africa there is also uncompromising assertion of state sovereignty which makes it difficult for neighbours to

intervene in internal affairs. It is the principle of sovereignty that legitimizes governments' reluctance to allow UN mediators into 'internal conflicts' (Meredith, 2006).

After the fall of Somalia President Siad Barre the humanitarian exercise of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was US\$ 3 billion and it was the most expensive peace keeping exercise in the world. It was the first time UN invoked powers of peace enforcement, under chapter 7 of UN charter (Dualeh, 2002).

With its issues becoming full-blown towards the end of cold war, Somalia became a testing ground for the international community's response to violence, conflict and humanitarian crises in the new world order. In particular, it became a trial for the UN envisaged role as an International Arbiter of conflicts. UNOSOM policies were not seen to reflect the interests of the Somali people and this impeded the ability to respond adequately to the overall crises in Somalia.

The history of the UN's involvement in Somalia is extremely complex and has left a legacy of mistrust amongst Somalis and International Partners, as well as donors. There are globally both positive and negative perceptions about the UN in Somalia depending on the specific audiences but the overall perception is generally negative. The UN's humanitarian, political and development activities contribute to these perceptions. How the UN in Somalia is perceived is clearly critical in managing expectations. A lot of good work is being ignored at the expense of the more visible and 'controversial' roles of the UN in Somalia. The negative perceptions affect the means and the capacity of UN's operations through increased security constraints. In some instances in the South Central region, the perception on the ground is that the UN is part of the Government and therefore not neutral. In other instances and locations in the same region, the UN is perceived positively as it is seen to be addressing humanitarian and early recovery needs (UN, 2010).

2.5.2 United States

The President of CARE US declared in September 1992 ‘The international community backed by UN troops should move in and rule Somalia, because it has no government at all’, (As cited in Meredith 2006). It was total anarchy, wanton destruction and collapse of social, economic and political structures

Fresh from its victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military was keen to prove that it could undertake operations other than war. The opportunity to sort out a few rag tag militias in Somalia, while in pursuit of humanitarian objectives, seemed an ideal test (Meredith, 2006). On 3rd December 1992 UN authorized United Task Force (UNITAF) to do all necessary to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. UNITAF was to be led by the US military and included France, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Nigeria and other nations. The US contributed 28,000 men, between 1992-1995 a number of soldiers were killed, among them included 18 Americans (Omar, 2004)

President Bush, savouring the prospect of a further triumph with which to end his presidency, called the mission “Operation Restore Hope”. There was a disagreement on whether the troops should disarm the militia because this was not their mission and they did not want casualties. The US troops landed in Mogadishu in December 1992 and left in May 1993 they saved hundreds of thousand of lives that could have perished without their timely intervention (Mukhtar, 2003). Although disarming the militia was not their mission, when they arrived most Somalis expected them to disarm the militia. Aideed and Mahdi accepted American presence.

On their arrival they allowed Aideed and Mahdi and other warlords to keep their arsenal intact in designated compounds. No attempt was made to round up heavy weapons let alone disarm the militia. Few days later the army patrol arrested a group of Aideed gunmen loading up arsenals of weapons in a building near the US Embassy. The army commander instructed the patrol leader to let them go. From then on the militia leaders knew they were untouchable. After this incident the Somalis concluded that “Operation Restore Hope” was little more than a cynical deal between USA and the warlords.

UNITAF lasted for 5 months and made little impact in southern Somalia. Its presence provided opportunity for negotiations at Addis Ababa in 1993. After UNITAF left UNOSOM II was formed. At the southern port of Kismayu in Feb. 1993, UNITAF allowed a rival Darod militia led by Siad Barre's son-in-law to occupy the town, ousting a pro-Aideed militia; Aideed interpreted this as an accretion of war. US continued to kill wrong persons and Somalis called it a camp of murderers. When UN planned to attack the place where Aideed lived, the UN planes were shot down and a one-hour affair turned to 14 hours (Meredith, 2006).

2.5.3 Italy

The Italian presence in Somalia dates back to 1885 (Mukhtar, 2003). Italians gave aid to Somali between 1981-1990 to the tune of more than a billion dollars (Dualeh, 2002) where they sponsored over 114 development projects such as road, hospitals and Mogadishu University. The Northern part, which was a British Colony, was totally ignored. This reduced Italy's credibility in Somaliland. In the late 80s Italy tried on several occasions to save Somalia from the impending disaster. They contacted SNM (Somali National Movement), the only movement at the time fighting the Siad Barre regime to initiate talks between them and Siad. SNM rejected Italy's initiative, citing Italy's past mistakes; The SNM being Northern did not trust the Italian overtures, they saw Italy as partisan to the conflict (Dualeh, 2002).

Although Italy had great influence on Siad Barre they were not able to salvage Somalia the way US had saved Ethiopia in 1991 from a similar disaster. The US convinced Mengistu Haile Mariam to go into exile. He did and as a result of the U.S move, Ethiopia today has relative peace and stability compared to Somalia. Italy could have done the same with Barre but they never did. Had Italy forced Siad to go to exile he would have done so, because Italian government had great influence on President Siad Barre. That oversight by Italy had proven a great disservice to the Somali people. In the late 80s, the Italian government had lost touch with reality in Somalia. The tragedy for the Somali Republic was that Italy was in a position during the 80s to exert enormous pressure on Barre to change his oppressive ways. Italy lost its final chance to win back the Somalia friendship when Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991. Italy's support of Siad Barre was seen as cynical in the light of International

community's uproar. For Italy to play a significant role once again in the Somalia situation it must also seek to mend fences with the Somaliland. Without that, Italy's future role in Somalia and Somaliland would surely fall short of its goal (Abdullahi, 2007).

What has lately been most encouraging is that the present Italy government has shown absolute neutrality in the Somalia crisis. This position of strict neutrality by the Italian government would earn great credibility from the Somali people thus positioning Italy into an effective mediator (Dualeh, 2002).

2.5.4 African Union

The African Union was launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 by the leaders of the 53 African States. In the intervening years it has established a range of bodies, mechanisms, protocols and institutions. A sufficient amount of effort has been focused on creating a peace and security architecture to combat the multitude of challenges that the AU has been facing. Current efforts by the AU invite comparisons with its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Murithi, 2008). The African Union was given the right to intervene without consent, in a member state in order to "restore peace and stability", to prevent war crimes, genocide, and crime against humanity and in response to "a serious threat to legitimate order" (Meredith, 2006; AU 2002).

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. AMISOM is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 (UN, 2008).

2.5.5 Arab League

Somalia's cultural and economic ties with the Arabs go back to the pre-Islamic era. Somalia was always close to Arab world, but with conversion to Islam its connection to other Arabic, Islamic nations became very powerful (Mukhtar, 2003). Somalis have been members of the

Arab League since 1974. Over the centuries, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates financed several development projects in Somalia. Siad also benefited from these countries for military assistance (Adam & Ford, 1997). After the collapse of the state in 1991, Arab nations turned their back on Somalia. Their efforts for relief and reconciliation were insignificant. The Arab League passed resolution after resolution calling for Somalia's unity, but provided no relief assistance (Mukhtar, 2003).

2.5.6 The Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a transitional umbrella group that has evolved from a loose association of Islamic militants who had flocked to Afghanistan during the 1980s to join the Jihad (Holy war) against the Soviet occupation. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, many of these 25,000 "Arab Afghans" returned home, where they fostered radical Islamic movements in many Muslim countries, including Somalia (Phillips, 2002). Al-Qaeda has increased its influence across Northern and Eastern Africa according to the US Head of African Command General William Ward (2002). He said that Somalia and Sudan in particular provide sanctuary for violent insurgents. According to the former US Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet, after being expelled from Afghanistan Al-Qaeda may seek to regroup in another country where it could count on some degree of local support, and Somali is strategically the ideal country since it is a failed state whose lawless anarchy would permit terrorists to operate relatively freely (George, 2002).

The Al-Qaeda network has operated there in the past and has long standing ties to a small minority of Somali Islamists and Al-Shabab, with which it has worked since early 1990s. Somalia which has the longest coast in Africa, could also provide easy entry for Al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan via Pakistan or Iran by sea. A little money goes a long way in Somalia, where jobs are scarce and militia members get paid as little as US\$ 4 per day. All these factors make Somalia vulnerable to Al-Qaeda operations (Phillips, 2002).

2.6 Theoretical Framework

This study is based on Karl Marx (1818-1883) Conflict Theory and Johan Galtung theory of violence. This is because Somalia has been in a state of civil unrest and the conflict theory will disclose reasons for the persistent conflict in a country which is a true nation.

Conflict arises from human relations in two principle ways; first, individuals or groups have different values, needs and interests and second, conflict arises because resources are not available or are scarce. These two factors intrinsically cause conflict (Adedeji, 1999).

Conflict can originate from past rivalries and personality differences. Ingredients of conflict include: Power, values, needs, perceptions, feelings and emotions. Society is made up of many competing groups, each with different interest. According to Martin Luther King peace is nothing but a successful management of conflicts or negative incompatibilities and true peace is not merely absence of tensions but also the presence of justice. If a peace settlement is to succeed, both in ending armed violence and promoting reconciliation, the terms of a new, just and mutually beneficial post war order must be established through collaboration and dialogue (Large, 2006).

2.6.1 Marxist Conflict Theory and Analysis

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was the founder of conflict theory, which argues that the competition of individuals and groups for wealth and power is the fundamental process shaping social structure. For conflict theory the basic question about a social structure is “who gets what and why?” Marx believed that in the long run, the conflict of groups produces a progressive development of greater equality, democracy, autonomy, and individuality as different forms of privilege are abolished. He believed that this progress only occurs when the rule of privileged groups (slave holders, aristocrats) is overthrown, leading to a more inclusive society. In 1960s, the rise of conflict theories, stressing the importance of stratification, class, conflict and material interests led to increased interest in Marx. “The political and economic philosophy of the dominant class influences all the aspects of life” (Marx, 1971).

The conflict theory involves a critical investigation in the following elements: The structures and dynamics in conflict situations, the background and context of conflict, which consists of three related dimensions. The distant past- may span decades or centuries; immediate past context-that show deterioration of relationships within parties, including trigger that sparked violence and Current events.

Conflict is formed by personalities and personal perspective on the social, cultural, political, economical and religious within which the conflict is set. This context will be affected by interests, positions, power, rights, feeling of outside pressure and the parties in conflict. There are 3 categories of parties to a conflict, Primary parties which are visible for example warlords, Alshababs, Islamists, insurgents and militia. Secondary parties are those directly affected by conflict and Peripheral parties are those on outside but still have interest in the outcome of the proceedings they are commonly known as shadows and are not visible for example, Al-Qaeida and other external players.

2.6.2 Johan Galtung's Theory of Violence

The analysis of cultural violence dimensions in Somalia is informed by Johan Galtung's theory of violence. The theory identifies three forms of violence: Direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence is the physical violence, it is visible as it causes injury, death and destruction. Structural violence is related to the existence of policies, institutional frameworks and structures that do not allow people to satisfy their basic needs. Such structures include poverty, economic inequality and political marginalization. Galtung defines cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence exemplified by region and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science" that legitimize or justify warfare or structures of exploitation and marginalization (Mbugua, 2009). In other words, cultural violence refers to the social, cultural and political values that are used to legitimize physical and structural violence. Unlike physical violence, both structural and cultural are not visible. Figure 1 is a demonstration of Galtungs Violence Triangle.




Figure 1 Johan Galtung Violence Triangle

Source: Polygon: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy (2004)

Galtung contends that both direct and structural violence are not possible without cultural violence. Therefore, cultural violence reinforces structural and direct violence (Galtung, 1996).

2.7 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework has been presented by use of a figure showing inter-relation of variables. It has demonstrated the relationship between the Internal and external players in achieving sustainable peace. Somalia and the International community are both working together to bring about sustainable peace. Due to the continuous instability Somalia has attracted many external players who directly or indirectly contribute to the current situation of anarchy. There is strong relationship within the national factors, which are manifested by clan wars, religious movements, economic inequality, political differences and interests. Sustainable peace is the ultimate goal for Somalis and external players.

The study represents variables. These are things that occur, change or are still changing and need to be explained or controlled. It is our inability to explain and control them that constitute the problem. Internal and External factors are independent variables, they cause other

variables to change, and they are also referred to as causal factors. The different types of variables in this study are explained below.

2.7.1 The Independent variables

The independent variables constitute of internal and external variables, the internal variables include: clanism, political factors, religion, economic factors, peace agreements and pirates. The external factors include United Nations, United States of America, Italy, the African Union, the Arab League and the Al-Qaeda. These variables directly affect the dependent variable.

2.7.2 The Dependent variable

Sustainable peace is the dependent variable that cannot stand on its own, it depends on other variables in order to succeed and it can also be referred to as the resultant factor. The expected result depends with the behaviour, activities and events of these variables.

2.7.3 The extraneous variable

In this research the extraneous variables constitute of Internal and external variables, the internal constitutes of Former Somalia politicians, Somali businessmen and the Somali Diaspora, while the external include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. These are variables that influence independent and dependent variables yet do not constitute a major part of the research. However, if not measured they can affect the validity of the study.

- Extreneous variables**
- Afghanistan
 - Pakistan
 - Eritrea
 - Ethiopia
 - Yemen
 - Djibouti
 - EU
 - Kenya
 - Former Somalia politicians
 - Somali Business men
 - The Somalia Diaspora

Independent Variables

- Internal factors**
- Clanism
 - Politics
 - Religion
 - Peace agreements
 - Piracy
 - Economy
- External factors**
- UN
 - US
 - Italy
 - AU
 - Arab League
 - The Al-Qaeida

- Dependent Variable**
- Sustainable Peace in Somalia**
- Absence of violence and civil war
 - Presence of Justice and rule of law
 - Positive Development
 - Equitable distribution of resources
 - Internal functioning government trusted by the people

Figure 2 Conceptual Framework

2.8 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, this chapter gives details of the situation in Somalia that caused conflict since independence and ousting of President Siad Barre regime in 1991. It has explained the deteriorating situation from bad to worse under his rule. It has also mentioned how the UN and US among others tried to rescue the situation in vain. It has explained the national and international factors contributing to achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia, and various peace agreements that have failed. Finally the researcher has given a theoretical and conceptual framework. The conceptual framework has been expressed in figure 1 and 2 to clearly show how the various variables directly or indirectly affect the achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia. Not only the independent and dependent variables but also extraneous variables have been put into consideration to ensure all factors are captured.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines Research Design and Methodology. It explains how the researcher selected the population and target group, the type of research design, the suitable sampling design, the method of data collection, data analysis and the techniques that were used to ensure validity and reliability of the instruments used. It also mentions the ethical behavior used by the researcher.

3.2 Research Design

Research design is a 'blue print' that enables the investigator to come up with solutions to the problems and guides the researcher in the various stages of the research (Nachmias, 1996). It is also referred to as a definite plan determined before any data is collected, for obtaining a study sample from any given population. Very large samples are feasible making the results statistically significant even when analyzing multiple variables. In this study the researcher used descriptive survey method. As a research design, a descriptive survey concerns itself with describing practices that prevail; beliefs, views, attitudes or perceptions that are held. This involved questioning people and recording their responses for analysis. The survey method was the most appropriate in carrying out this study as its aim was to gather extensive information from the respondents. The information was obtained from secondary data, open ended questionnaires and direct observation was also used to triangulate and augment the data collected.

3.3 Target Population

A population is any group, institution, people or objectives that have at least one characteristic in common. The target population for this study comprised of 68 employees of seventeen United Nations working inside Somalia, 160 employees of sixteen Local NGOs and 84 employees of twenty one International agencies registered with Somalia NGO Consortium in Nairobi and working inside Somalia. The total population was 312 employees. They were selected because they are conversant with the Somalia context and understand the past and current Somalia situation.

3.4 Sampling Procedure

Purposeful sampling was used to obtain respondents for this study. This technique is the most popular in qualitative research and subjects are selected because of their characteristics (Patton 1990). Sampling is the process of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the population so that a study of the sample and an understanding of its properties or characteristics would make it possible for us to generalize such properties or characteristics to the population elements (Sekaran, 2003). The sample selection for this study was based on common characteristics such as understanding Somalia conflict and knowledge of Somalia through day today interactions. Two respondents from each agency were purposively selected: The head of Somalia program and the assistants. This yielded a sample of 108 respondents. A non-probability sampling was used because the focus is in-depth information.

3.6 Methods of Data collection

Data collection is an integral part of research design as it is from the collected data that the researcher can do an analysis, draw conclusions and make recommendations. Triangulation was used to gather information open ended questionnaires and direct observation. The information was integrated to complement each method used for valid and reliable findings. During observation the researcher had to rely on memory as writing could raise concern by those being observed. To minimize subjectivity the researcher avoided interpreting what such gesture actually meant and therefore only described only what was observed. The researcher explained clearly that the research being conducted was only to be used for study purpose, this gave respondents confidence to respond to the questionnaires. The observation was important because of those respondents who were not able to respond to the questionnaires. And it was also necessary to confirm the validity of the responses by those respondents who answered the questionnaires in a way the researcher used this as a control measure to reduce subjectivity and increase validity and reliability. It also helped the researcher to understand the phenomena. The information was treated completely confidential.

3.6.1 Survey Techniques

This study involved qualitative data collection approach and therefore content analysis was used. The data was collected from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used included open ended questionnaires and direct observation. A questionnaire is a pre formulated written set of questions to which respondents record their answers, usually within rather closely defined alternatives. Each item in the questionnaire was developed to address a specific research question or objective. The open-ended questionnaires were used to encourage the respondents to give in-depth information without feeling held back in revealing any information.

3.6.2 Data collection procedures

The study involved collecting primary data through open ended questionnaires. Before carrying out the survey, permission was obtained from the University of Nairobi. The questionnaires were addressed to heads of Somalia programs and Program assistants, a letter of introduction from the university was sent together with the questionnaires. It was important that participants were assured of confidentiality and therefore the questionnaires were put in envelopes and sealed. Telephone contact was made to establish contact with the targeted sample. This allowed the physical location of the agencies to be known for ease of access when administering the questionnaires. The respondents were free to fill the questionnaires in the presence of the researcher or fill them to be collected later. The questionnaires were picked after completion, the exercise took 60 days to be completed.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

A major aspect of research design is obtaining valid and reliable information. This is to enable the correct conclusions to be drawn based on the data obtained. The purpose of research is not merely to collect data but to use such data to draw warranted conclusions about the existing situation in Somalia. Validity and reliability depends on the way the instruments are used and on the inferences researcher wish to make from them.

3.7.1 Validity

Validity is the appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the specific inferences based on data collected. To enhance the validity of the research instrument a pilot study was conducted on seven respondents that were randomly sampled from target population, using the questionnaire to make sure it is comprehensive, adequate, and logical and format is friendly to the respondents. This was used to determine soundness, accuracy, clarity and suitability of research instrument.

3.7.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to consistency of these inferences overtime. Initial responses were used to reword the items and missing items were included and misplaced ones discarded. Only those items which were correctly worded and free from misrepresentation were retained.

Other techniques that were used to ensure the respondents were not being misinformed, by misinterpreting the question includes: Triangulation, checking informants descriptions, writing down questions asked, recording personal thoughts, documentation of sources of remarks and inferences and describing the context in which questions are asked.

3.8 Methods of Data Analysis

Data analysis refers to the computation of certain measures along with searching for patterns of relationship that exists among data groups. It involves: editing, coding, classification and tabulation of collected data so that they are amenable to analysis. The qualitative/textual data collected from the open-ended questionnaires was classified question by question, themes were identified based on ideas, concepts, behaviours and interactions. These were then organized into coherent categories that were summarized and brought meaning to the text.

The nature of this research was qualitative. Analyzing data in qualitative study essentially involved synthesizing the information obtained from various sources. In the social world it is rare that only one variable is relevant to what is to be explained. Often numerous variables are directly associated with the dependent variable which was the case of this particular study.

3.8.1 Data analysis

This study was analyzed using content analysis which helps to establish themes, categories, patterns and relationship among variables and draw conclusion there from. The information from the questionnaires was summarized question by question to illustrate key themes in each question. Content analysis was best suited for this study. Nachmias & Nachmias (1996) define content analysis as a technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages and using the same to relate trends. The content analysis has been used previously in a qualitative research by Koigi (2002). Strauss & Corbin (1990) do back use of qualitative data, they argue that the method is scientific as the data collected can be developed and be verified through systematic analysis. The qualitative method can be used to uncover and understand what lies behind a phenomenon under study.

Descriptive analysis was used to analyse the data received from the respondents. This involved descriptive tools such as frequency distribution and percentages this method was used by (Muturi, 2000). Cooper & Emery (1995) asserts that descriptive study is used to learn the who, what, when, where and how of the topic under study. Descriptive statistics were used for analyzing the negative and positive roles played by the internal and external factors to achieve sustainable peace

3.8.2 Measurement and analysis of variables

The research is qualitative and therefore content analysis was used. Figure 4 shows the variables and measurement scales.

Table 3.1 Operationalization of variables

Variable	Indicator	Measurement	Measurement Scale	Tool of analysis	Decision making
Independent Variables (course changes in Dependent variable also known as predictor variable)					
Internal factors level of positive or negative support received from inside the country					
• Clanism	The existence of minority and majority clans Clan interconflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of clans, power to influence a positive peace deal 	Ordinal	Content analysis	The largest clans command power & resources
• Politics	Different factions Hizbul Islam, Al-Shababs, TFG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of political interest groups, within Somalia. Their power of influence on peace Ability to govern & bring peace 	Ordinal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Lack of trust in TFG & within various factions
• Economy	Unequal distribution of resources, Humanitarian assistance, poor infrastructure, health centers, lack of basic needs	Ownership of public property. Its positive or negative effect on peace negotiations	Nominal	Content analysis	Wealth concentrated in few powerful hands
• Religion	Islamists	How religious groups influence the community on peace decisions & positive leadership	Ordinal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Group with majority members dominates the others
• Pirates	Hijacking ships, hostages of crew, ransom paid, threat to freedom of navigation, political and economic instability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Factions funded by pirates Friendliness to factions Interest in power 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	The factions they fund are strong and fuel violence inside Somalia
• Peace agreements	Various peace agreements held in different countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of peace agreements held Time frame Pressure to perform Competence 	Nominal	Content analysis	Failed because they are not accepted by all factions
External factors Level of positive or negative support received from outside the country					
• UN	Humanitarian aid/ support peace deals, financial support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of peace deals they have facilitated, food aid in MT Relationship with Somalis Pressure for the peace agreement 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Misuse of support, not trusted by Somalis, peace deals not inclusive, aid not neutral and impartial, negative relation
• USA	Humanitarian assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military Financial aid/ HA 	Nominal	In-depth	Most financial aid is for war, food aid not

	Financial and military aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relationship with Somalis 		descriptive analysis	impartial, US not trusted by Somalis, negative relation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ITALY 	Financial support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial aid Relationship 	Nominal	Content Analysis	Misuse of funds meant for development in war. Italy is seen as neutral and thus can be an effective mediator.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AU 	Military support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AMISOM Troops Favourism of groups to take power 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Having troops on the ground to bring peace, they have lost trust in the Somalis, not seen as neutral and impartial
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arab League 	Financial/ military support	Finance & arms	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Funds misused in war instead of development positive relation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Al-Qaeda 	Financial / military support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finance & arms Technical support Interest in power 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Fueling war in Somalia thru funding various factions, alshababs and islamists. Not clear whether positive or negative relation.
Dependent variable (its outcome depends on the manipulation of Independent variable)					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainable peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absence of violence and civil war Presence of justice / rule of law Positive development Acceptable administration / government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of peace agreements held Support for Somalis, peacekeepers 	Nominal	Content analysis	If all the variables put efforts sustainable peace can be achieved.
Extraneous variable (Have the capacity to affect both Dependent & Independent variables)					
External factors					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan 	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	They could be present in Somali and funding war and doing all the terrorism & suicide bombing relation not clear
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pakistan 	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	They could be present in Somali and funding war and doing all the terrorism & suicide bombing, relation not clear
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eritrea 	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support Interest to support certain group 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	They have been sighted to be giving weapons, they could also be present in Somalia in low profile negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethiopia 	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support Interest to support certain group 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	It was announced they left but could still be there at low profile negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yemen 	Military / Financial Assistance	Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Likely to be present and funding the war positive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Djibouti 	Peace facilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of effects of peace Technical support 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive	Likely to be funding war positive

Internal factors					analysis
Former Somalia politicians	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of effects of peace • Power of influence 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Fueling clanism and enmity, claims of dictatorship by TFG positive
Somali Business men	Military / Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of effects of peace • Power of influence 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Fueling war to continue enjoying the lack of rule positive
The Somalia Diaspora	Peace facilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of effects of peace • Power influence 	Nominal	In-depth descriptive analysis	Likely to be fueling war and clanism positive

3.9 Ethics

Due to the sensitivity nature of the study topic, due consideration had to be taken while carrying out the study. The purpose of the research was clearly stated to the respondents; privacy and anonymity was maintained during the study.

3.10 Summary

In conclusion, the chapter clearly gives details of how the research was carried out. The research design used was survey design, the target population has been described, the sampling procedures have been explained. Purposive sampling which is non probabilistic, survey method of data collection was used. Validity and reliability has been elaborated, the ethical considerations have been outlined and, finally, the methods that were used to analyze data collected have been described.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results, findings and analysis of the study. The data was analysed by use of content analysis and presented using the three objectives of the study. Incorporated is also the data gathered through direct observation. The main thrust of the study was to establish factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia and exploring possible solutions that can lead to sustainable peace.

4.2 Respondents Response Rate

Out of 108 respondents who received the questionnaires only 76 returned giving a response rate of 70.4 %. This response rate was a result of personal efforts and persistence in following up the questionnaires sent. At the time of data collection some of the Somalia heads of programs were out of the country, this resulted in a delay in responding to the questionnaires taking close to 60 days before the questionnaire could be filled. Others found the subject of study suspicious and declined to respond. It is however necessary to mention that the topic was sensitive and required revealing in-depth information, it was also long and required ample time and concentration.

Table 4.1 Respondents Response rate

Questionnaires	Frequency	Percentage
Questionnaires returned	76	70.4
Questionnaires not returned	32	29.6
Total	108	100

4.3 The role of internal factors in the efforts to achieve sustainable peace

To answer this question the researcher looked at how Clanism, Economy, Politics, Piracy, Religion and Peace agreements have been contributing either positively or negatively in efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia. The data pertaining to this objective was

analysed using frequencies of responses per respondents and content analysis. For ease of analysis the respondents coded the responses into positive and negative roles.

4.3.1 Clanism

Table 4.2 shows the summary of diverse roles played by clans in the efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia.

Table 4.2 The role of Clanism on efforts to achieve peace

Role	Responses to the question on clanism	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative role	Clan hostility, domination of majority clans making other feel inferior, oppression of minority clans, competition over resources, power struggle among clans	24	31.5
Positive role	Help unite community, Hold reconciliations, bonds the people together, clan elders solve disputes and mediate, clan has acted as a tool to bring people together making it easy to share information on peace.	32	42.1
No effect	No meaningful role, no impact major role in peace making	8	10.5
	No response	6	7.9
	Total	76	100

Out of the 76 respondents, 32 mentioned that clan plays a positive role in peace issues while 24 respondents felt that clan actually fuels conflict due to competition, domination and struggle for power. Twelve of the respondents felt that clans have not played any role and have not had any impact on peace, while six of the respondents did not respond to the question. From this table we can say that if clans are strengthened they can help overcome conflict by uniting Somalia as a true nation.

According to the respondents clanism plays a positive role in bringing together the Somalis for peace as it is seen as a uniting factor. The study established that clans still holds the community and individuals together, give help and support to its members and everyone is loyal to their clan.

“Even now when most of our people are displaced in the camps, we are helping them with the little food we get from Aid agencies, we do not hate each other, all Somalis are brothers and sisters but politicians divide us” Study respondent

The study shows that some clans have taken a major role in peace initiative in that they unite the entire clan with a common interest; it has helped to consolidate the community as one. It was found out that clan elders are also used by the community to resolve disputes and to mediate on behalf of a member of a certain clan in cases of inter-clan disputes. Clans have been an avenue to mobilize members to participate in the peace process; they have had a series of peace reconciliation within the country with various clans.

The respondents also revealed that although clanism could be used as a positive tool to bring peace it has also been mentioned that it also plays a negative role in efforts to achieve peace. This is because of high imbalance in terms of power and lack of enough resources for each clan. Somalis are culturally and traditionally influenced by the clan where they belong. This has been largely accused of fuelling the war in Somalia. There is power struggle among the clans and each wants to dominate; supremacy amongst clans has accelerated conflict in the country. There is disrespect among clans, they are all looking down upon each other and no one is willing to sit and discuss with other party. The strong clans want to dominate the weaker one and also want a bigger share in the countries leadership and benefit more; hence this has sparked conflicts, which have undermined the achievement of peace in Somalia. As Adedeji (1999) asserts, to label a conflict simply as ethnic or clan war can lead to misguided policy choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, clan, religion or cultural differences inevitably result in violent conflict and that differences therefore must be suppressed.

Table 4.3 shows how the clans' numbers vary with Hawiye, Isaak, Darod, and Rahanwein having the highest in numbers while Dir and digil have the lowest numbers.

Table 4.3 How clans are distributed in Somalia

The figure shows the size in terms of population of the various clans in Somalia

Name of Clan	Percentage
Hawiye	25%
Isaak	22%
Darod	20%
Rahanwein	17%
Dir	7%
Ethnic minorities	6%
Digil	3%
Total	100%

(Source relief web, 2002 modified by the researcher)

4.3.2 The role played by politics in achieving peace in Somalia

Somalia has several factions that are involved in the inter leadership of the country. Table 4.4 has summarized the roles played by politics in efforts for peace.

Table 4.4 Role of politics on peace

	Responses to the question on politics	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative role	Politics is highly desegregated and there are many interest groups (Al Shabab, Ahlusunna waljama, TFG and Hizbul Islam) seeking own interest, not committed to peace, All groups are weak and have no capacity to rule, local and international actors have aspirations that have nothing to do with peace, political rivalry for supremacy, Presence of many outlawed groups, politicizing peace	39	51.3
Positive role	TFG supported by AMISOM is fighting for peace and democracy, Attempts to unite various groups for peace, The Al Shababs are attempting to have peace in the areas they control	21	27.6
No effect	TFG have done nothing in efforts to bring peace, has not played any major role	12	15.8
	No response	4	5.3
	Total	76	100

The table has further been categorized into positive and negative roles. Majority said politics plays a negative role in efforts to attain peace. According to the respondents politics is a major contributing factor to lack of peace in Somalia out of 76 respondents 39 pointed out the thirst and competition for power while 21 respondents mentioned that TFG is fighting for peace and democracy. While 12 respondents felt that the Alshabab, TFG, Ahlusunna and Hizbul were not doing anything about peace.

Politics was one of the independent variables that are contributing to sustainable peace in Somalia. As earlier mentioned in this study *"failure of governments to render justice, equal services or timely remedy leads to citizens taking issues into their own hands"* (Fatar, 2007). The respondents revealed that in Somalia there are different factions competing for the country's leadership. Some of the factions mentioned are Al Shabab, TFG, Ahlusunna waljama and Hizbul Islam. According to the Respondents the strongest faction is the Al Shabab followed by TFG, Ahlusunna Waljama and Hizbul Islam respectively. This factions control different areas in Somalia targeting to finally capture the whole country and become the ultimate leader. Other players who were also mentioned include the AU, UN, US, EU, Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda who are said to be supporting the factions and the TFG.

According to the respondents the TFG is a political tool for the external players. Although it is being supported by AMISOM and is fighting for peace and democracy, the majority of the respondents felt that it has not had an impact or any major role in achieving peace since its formation. It has not even succeeded in governing their area. The TFG has also been accused of killing civilians, retarding economic progress and pursuing self-motivated interests and not the interests of the majority of the Somalis. The TFG, led by President Sheikh Sharif, is currently ruling in Somalia but it has faced a lot of challenges especially in trying to achieve and maintain peace in the country. The challenges notwithstanding, the study shows that the government can be strengthened if they keep calling the opposing groups to the negotiation table and be open to everyone. The government can also be strengthened by forming a unitary government which is operational and one that incorporates all parties, communities and with full representation. It was also revealed that the government could be strengthened by getting financial assistance from IGAD and other regional and international communities for

strengthening the army to keep peace instead of calling foreign troops to protect them. The existence of foreign troops in Somalia has been a source of grievance for those against the TFG and has continually fuelled more conflicts. Apart from TFG that has international recognition, there is a group known as Al-shabab which is one of the strongest factions currently controlling most of South and Central Somalia. This group has been fighting the TFG together with other two factions mentioned by the respondents: the Ahlusunna waljama and Hizbul Islam.

Another hindrance to achievement of peace in Somalia is interest by other governments and the international community. They play a major role in influencing politics, they have vested interests in the government, and they seem to strongly support TFG. On the other hand Al-shabab and other militia groups receive support from Afghanistan and the Al-Qaeda. Each group wants to be the strongest and hence achievement of sustainable peace is undermined.

Although there are many statements of negative roles on political issues, it is important to note that the respondents also mentioned that the Transitional Federal Government, backed up by AMISOM, is putting efforts to contain the situation despite the multitude challenges.

4.3.3 The role of economic activities in achievement of sustainable peace

This study was investigating how the economic activities have contributed positively or negatively in efforts to achieve sustainable peace. With a non functioning government there are many conflict entrepreneurs taking advantage of the situation for their own selfish gains. For this reason they could be taking part in funding the fighters inside Somalia or even working closely with them. Thirty nine of the respondents said economic activities plays a negative role in efforts to achieve peace.

Table 4.5 The role of economy on peace

	Responses to the question on economy	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative role	Property ownership has contributed to chaos, those with big businesses have no interest in peace as they do not pay tax, Piracy on Somalia waters has caused fluctuation of oil and made it impossible to transport goods, Majority clans command most resources, poverty has cause even young boys to be fighters	39	51.4
Positive role	Private companies are flourishing and are also creating employment, Piracy money has also been used to develop Somalia, some of the business people have been assisting in bringing peace in Somalia.	28	36.8
	No Response	9	11.8
	Total	76	100

Table 4.5 shows how the economy has contributed to the continuous conflict in Somalia. This is because businessmen, politicians and major clans are enjoying the benefits of failed state where they are doing business tax free. From the Galtung's theory of violence, *"Economy falls on the structural violence because most Somalis cannot access even basic needs"*. Further Adedeji (1999) admits *"competition for resources typically lie at the heart of conflict"*

The conflict entrepreneurs, those entrepreneurs who are running businesses in a tax free environment, have been mentioned to be fuelling internal conflict. Land disputes, business-related income sources like sea, airport and pastoral lands are the major economic factors contributing to conflict. Owners of large property and big pieces of land such as those who own the coastline where fishing is done do not want peace; they do not want a strong government in place that would control their illegal businesses and or even put any legal restrictions on them. Conflict entrepreneurs benefit from conflict in Somalia, for example pirates in the Indian Ocean and arms dealers are great beneficiaries of conflict. Most of those who own this wealth are from the majority clans.

Somalia has good natural resources, approximately 3,300 KM long coastline, big rivers namely Juba and Shabelle and good soil. It has access to rich fishing grounds in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden (Adam & Ford 1997). However, these resources are being exploited with the primary interest of enriching a few individuals without consideration for the people or the environment. These individuals are taking advantage of the lack of a strong government in Somalia and do not have an interest in peace as this would curtail their activities. Natural

resources in Somalia have not been fully utilized and the economy has retarded. Business has gone down due to constant civil wars hence creating high level of poverty and dependency. Poverty has seriously affected the people especially young men who are being recruited by the fighting groups to fight for their respective interests and also engaging in piracy to get income; while on the other hand majority of Somalis are languishing in poverty; unable to meet basic needs, the hungry becomes violent hence rise in conflicts.

Political leaders who own large properties as well as businessmen and private companies operating in Somalia are fueling violence, as they are the most beneficiaries of the current war. Due to lack of government, there are no stable existing public companies hence the private ones are the strongest and they command the economy.

Being an arid and semi-arid region, Somalia draws its main economic activities from livestock keeping, farming, business and international trade. However, due to political instability and piracy along the coastal line, the international community is no longer interested to trade with Somalia. Somalis in the Diaspora also plays a role in the economic development of Somalia. It was revealed that if there could be no political instability, Somalia economy could have been much better with reduced poverty, and could have attracted foreign, domestic and private investments at large, which could have contributed to rapid economic growth because of the availability of resources. Even with rich natural resources Somalia continuous conflict has made Somalia to continue depending on Humanitarian Aid.

On the other hand the economy plays a positive role because the private company and piracy has created employment for the youth. Some of the money earned from these businesses filters down to local communities through economic activity and helps bring about minimal development.

4.3.4 The role of religion in achieving peace in Somalia

Islam religion is a religion of peace and is seen as one of the factors contributing to sustainable peace in Somalia.

Table 4.6 The role played by Religion on peace

	Responses on Islamic religion	Frequencies	Percentages
Positive	Islam is a religion of peace, Religion is used by sheikhs to foster peace, can unite Muslims for peace, used to resolve even clan conflicts, has been used to unite Somalis,	35	46.1
Negative	Self understanding and interpretation is a major clash between Islamists and other people, different groups use Islam to justify their ideology and terrorize others	21	27.6
No role	Religion has not done much on peace, Has not played any role on peace	16	21.0
	No Response	4	5.3
	Total	76	100

Table 4.6 has presented the role played by religion in peace. According to the respondents religion is good and can be used as an avenue for peace. However others are misusing it for their own interests and therefore 21 respondents said religion plays a negative role on peace. Religion is seen as a uniting factor with 35 respondents saying it is good for reaching the ultimate goal of peace. It plays a positive role in peace in Somalia and is generally considered a good thing unless misused by extremists. Majority of the respondents like their religion and they view it as a religion of peace, however fundamentalists continue to misinterpret and confuse the followers. Religion is seen to have the potential to bring peace in Somalia. Somalia is an Islamic country whose citizens profess Islamic faith. Islam acts as an umbrella body to Muslims to become one and voice their issues as one. As one of the respondents stated:

“There are some extremists in some parts of Somalia, but religion is used by elders and Sheikhs to foster peace”.

Majority stated that religion had significantly united the faithful; it is a tool used by the leaders for example sheikhs to foster peace. It was established that the Islamic religion has helped to maintain peace, such as when the ICU managed to control Mogadishu and Somalia peacefully and temporarily establish law and order. The respondents agreed that religion is the best initiative in achieving stable peace in Somalia. If respected, it has the power of uniting and

solving the differences amongst people giving them a common platform. It has already brought peace and united people for a common interest in some regions where war and chaos have been apparent though it has not been successful in achieving sustainable peace in the whole of Somalia.

Different interest groups use it for their own advantage. Self-understanding and interpretation of Islamic scriptures is the major factor of clashes between Islamists and other Muslim faithful. Different interest group use religion to justify their ideology, which has a bearing on peace. For example Al-Shabab uses Islam to terrorize and justify their actions. Additionally, radical Muslims impose laws and rules that prohibit use of certain things and this has also been one of the major sources of conflict since even the people are divided. Some respondents feel that Islamic religion has not been used to bring back peace.

4.3.5 The role of piracy in ending conflict and bring peace in Somalia

Piracy has played a major role in fuelling conflict in Somalia. It has not only affected the Somalis, its effect has been felt also in the region and the rest of the world.

Table 4.7 The role of Piracy on peace

	Responses to the question on Piracy	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative	Pirates are suspected to support fighters inside Somalia, Not in support of peace as it will end their business, contribute to insecurity in the region as even young children are recruited, has tarnished the name of Somalia as they hijack ships and crews.	43	56.6
Positive	Plays role in safe guiding Somalia waters, and illegal fishing from neighbouring countries, Piracy money has been used to develop Somalia,	18	23.7
	Not responded to the question	15	19.7
	Total	76	100

Piracy is one of the factors that is extremely visible to non-Somalis in the region and internationally. Aidan (2008) asserts, *“The first obvious truth is that pirates are making millions and shipping companies are beginning to avoid the Suez route in favor of the longer,*

more expensive route cape of good hope, because nothing seems to deter the pirates” Its effect on Somalia is felt all as it causes price fluctuations of oil and other goods in the region. Table 4.7 Shows that 43 of the respondents said piracy plays a negative role on peace as the money is also used to fund fighters in Somalia.

From the responses the piracy negatively influences peace in Somalia. As it hinders accessibility, funds war and cause high currency fluctuations thus affecting the economy. The study further established that pirates have become very popular, business-oriented and have got significant power. However they pose a security threat also to the locals. “Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed men makes them feel insecure, and their free spending ways cause wild fluctuations in the local exchange rates” (Phillip, 2002).

Majority of the respondents described pirates as criminals who are also fuelling war since presence of peace and functioning government will end their business and this has a negative impact on achievement of sustainable peace. It has also encouraged young Somalia men to take up arms and involve themselves in the criminal activity. Besides, piracy has interfered with the accessibility of Somalia hence denying Somalia the necessary goods and machinery needed in the country and even the humanitarian aid. As (Abdallah, 2009) asserts:

“These acts of piracy with them multiple threats of freedom of navigation, political and economic stability in the region, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and risk of environmental dimensions. Their proliferation is an insult to international legality but also an invitation to the international community to bring an appropriate and new support to the Somalia authorities to help them address effectively the root causes of piracy.”

This has negatively contributed to the Somalia economy since it affects businesses by making the cost of goods high. Piracy has also created fear in the international community due to kidnapping, abduction and holding foreigners hostage in hijacked ships.

However some respondents felt that piracy has played an important role in safeguarding the Somalia waters from Western fisherman hence guarding against its exploitation. It was revealed that the activity has helped to develop Somalia since money obtained from piracy is used for development and reconstruction of the country. Since the state of the economy has failed, piracy is the only means out of economic hardship for many young people.

It was established that if a powerful government is formed, the criminals could be arrested and disarmed. That there would be organized fishing activities through the provision of appropriate fishing gear and boats hence improving the economy to some extent.

4.3.6 The peace agreements that have not succeeded to bring peace in Somalia

Several peace agreements have been made since the ousting of the Siad Barre regime. Although the peace agreements have been good initiatives, there exist numerous challenges that have made it impossible to get peace after 19 calendar years. Although these sittings involved Somalia, only one has been held in Somalia in 2007. According to the respondents some of the peace initiatives have been completely useless in terms of results, such as the Sodere Agreement

“Am sorry to say this about peace agreements, but it has been a waste of time and resources” study respondent.

However some have come close to striking a deal such as National reconciliation held in Kenya. The Table 4.7 gives a summary of the shortcomings and outcome of the agreements as mentioned by the respondents and confirmed by UNPOS report.

Table 4.8 The Outcome and short comings of past peace agreements

	Peace agreement	Negative outcome	Positive outcome
1	2008 Djibouti agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hizbul and Al-shababs refused to support President Sharif 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TFG and ARS initiated an agreement • led to the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia • President Sharif Sheikh Sharif was elected after the resignation of Abdullahi Yusuf
2	2007 Asmara Meeting- Eritrea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Later ARS split; it subdivided into pro-government (TFG) led by the current president Sheikh Sharif and Anti-government (Hizbul) led by Hassan Aweys. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing the Alliance of Re-liberation of Somalia
3	2007 National reconciliation congress- Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • it was discriminative against some Somali elders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • initiate reconciliation process among the locals but did not succeed.
4	2006 Khartoum Reconciliation-Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamists (ICU) refused to support TFG and continued fighting however they were defeated by Somali backed by Ethiopian Troops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • with the help of league of Arab state, the Transitional Federal Government legality was recognized by both parties (TFG and Militia)
5	2002-2004 National reconciliation , Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • parliamentarians who always run after their own interests were elected in this conference • Did not represent all 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formation of TFG • Abdullahi Yusuf elected as President
6	2000 Arta Agreement- Djibouti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • it was underrepresented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional national government (TNG) led by president Dr Abdikassim Salad was established
7	1997 Cairo Agreement- Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • only worsened the situation by creating new warlords 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This resulted to short-term Banidir administration, which was supported by Egypt and Libya but did not

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The meeting was also perceived as a small conference that lacked good strategy hence it did not have a major effect in achieving peace 	succeed.
8	1996 Sodere Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conference was participated by the warlords who were allied with Ethiopia and they only criticized each other 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Salvation Counsel was established co-chaired by several function leaders including Ali Mahdi but Hussein Aiden denounced the NSC and accused Mahdi of receiving arms from Ethiopia
9	1993 Addis Ababa Agreement-Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • some warlords retreated from the agreement thus no positive effect 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the UN supported the establishment of District and regional administration together with reconstituted police forces in some parts of south-central Somalia
10	1991 Djibouti National Reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was established that the leader elected was weak and thus no good result came out of it. • It is also perceived as a lost opportunity because at that time the country had a chance to get the world to assist in reconciling Somalia and eventually achieve sustainable peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ali Mahdi was chosen as an interim president; General Mohammed Farah Aided rejected that appointment

4.4 The role of external factors in the efforts to achieve sustainable peace

It was necessary to determine whether there are external forces involved in the Somalia peace efforts. From the responses the highlighted roles were acting as peace mediators, humanitarian assistance, financial assistance and support.

4.4.1 The role played by United Nations in efforts to bring peace in Somalia

The United Nations has been visible in Somalia since the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991. However they are yet to fulfill their agenda of peace. This section explains the negative and positive roles they have been playing on peace in Somalia. According to 38 respondents United Nations is playing a negative role in efforts to bring peace. The UN is not doing enough to enable Somalia get peace and also their long time presence in Somalia has not resulted in positive outcomes.

Table 4.9 The role played by UN in Somalia

	Responses to question on United Nations	No of Respondents	Percentages
Negative role	Many trials to restore Peace, has been giving empty promises, not doing enough to support TFG, Seen to represent the West which agitates the anti-TFG factions, Not honest about peace in Somali	38	50
Positive role	Financing TFG, Humanitarian assistance, supporting peace negotiations, spearheading diplomatic peace initiatives, has attempted to bring factions on round table for peace	26	34.2
No effect	Has done little on peace, they do not want to solve the problem, has not done any impressive role in ending Somalia conflict	8	10.5
	No response	4	5.3
	Total	76	100

It has been accused of not being neutral in the peace negotiations and has taken sides with those destabilizing Somalia. In a statement by the Puntland state after the agreement reached

on November 26th, 2008 *“The UN did not act in good faith in the mediation of the various Somali stakeholders. They deliberately sided with those destabilizing the country”* The study found out that although UN has been in Somalia since the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, no tangible progress on peace has happened. As Nhema (2004) argues *“As an organization of sovereign states the United Nations is dependent upon its membership for approval of its actions as well as for financial and military backing”*

On the issue of perception, UN is perceived by the Somalis as a negative force that represents the West. Islamists use this western ideology perception to influence people against UN.; The UN have also been accused of financing and supporting the TFG and of having their own agenda in Somalia therefore, any step taken in trying to bring peace is faced with a lot of resistance especially by the anti-TFG groups. The other weakness of the UN is that they only focus on the top and forgets the people on the ground yet they are getting peace for them. This perceptions lead to respondents saying that UN is not interested in ending the conflict in Somalia.

The United Nations has been playing a positive role in trying to bring peace in Somalia although it has not achieved much. It has contributed significantly through spearheading diplomatic peace initiative processes and providing basic needs for Somalis. It has always put pressure on the Somalia government to end conflict. The UN acts as a mediator during peace negotiations and provides security operations and materials to end conflict. It has helped to organize various conferences in order to promote peace and end conflict. It has also been an observer in various peace processes. Besides dealing with peace the UN also provides Humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict in Somalia.

4.4.2 The role played by the United States in efforts to achieve peace

The United States are also seen to be playing a role in efforts to achieve peace in Somalia. The table has categorized the roles of US into positive and negative.

Table 4.10 The role played by United State on Peace

	Responses on United States question	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative	They send fighters to Somalia indirectly, they fight Somalis in the name of fighting terrorist, they are seen as obstacles to peace efforts, has been concentrating on attacks, is against Islamic law	36	47.4
Positive	Giving Humanitarian Assistance, facilitating for peace, curbing insecurity, emphasizing on signing of peace treaties	30	39.4
No effect	Not doing enough, are not helpful	4	5.3
	Not responded to the question	6	7.9
	Total	76	100

Out of 76 respondents 36 said they play a negative role while 30 of them said they play a positive role.

The respondents perceived the US to be negatively involved on peace efforts as they have embarked on a series of attacks on the militia that are derailing the establishment of peace process in Somalia. According to omar (2004) *“After September 11, 2001 attack on New York town towers and the pentagon the President of the U.S expressed his determination to extend what he called “war against terrorism” to include Somalia”*. The respondents mentioned that the US is not very friendly to many Somalis it is believed that US is responsible for conflict even in other parts of the world such as Iraq as well as in Somalia, by interfering with these country’s internal affairs. They are seen as the greatest problem and obstacle in peace achievement, they have been accused of fighting Somalia in the name of fighting criminals such as pirates and terrorists like Al Qaeda. Indeed as pointed out by (Phillips, 2002)

“Largely expelled from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda may seek to regroup in another country where it could count on some degree of local support, Somalia is such a place. It is a failed state whose lawless anarchy would permit terrorists to operate relatively freely. The Al-Qaeda network has operated there in the past and has long standing ties to a small minority of Somali Islamists, with which it has worked since 1990s”

Furthermore US have been accused of having their own interests together with UN and EU. Besides, it has also been alleged that they indirectly send fighters in Somalia whom they finance and further interfere with the internal affairs of the country for their own selfish gain. During the research one of the respondent asserted:

“U.S is a contributing factor to the Somalis conflict, they fight Somalis in the name of finding the Al-Qaeda in order to bring peace, but they have own interest”

United States have always emphasized on peace putting pressure on the government to end conflict and they have even financially supported peace conferences. According to the respondents, US supported the 14th peace process and provided support to some factional leaders. It is also alleged that they are supporting the TFG government financially and keenly checking on the work of government in sustaining peace in Somalia. United States has helped Somalia also on humanitarian assistance, by providing food and medical assistance to affected families in war torn areas. They also facilitate humanitarian assistance to the Somalis.

4.4.3 The Role of Italy on efforts to achieve peace in Somalia.

Italy was the former colony of Somalia. It is also playing a role in Somalia as its past influence can still help bring Somalia to peace.

Table 4.11 The role played by the Italy on peace in Somalia

	Responses to the question on Italy	Frequencies	
Positive	Italy colonized Somalia and Knows Somalia well, they can take part in solving the problem, As a former colonial state it has provided heal through friends of IGAD,	20	26.3
Negative	Colonized Somalia and were not good as government formed after was corrupt, they are meddling with Somalia affairs; It is the original influencer of current conflict.	18	23.6
No effect	Not very visible, have limited intervention, no significant role, have done nothing	22	28.9
	Not responded to the question	16	21.2
	Total	76	100

Table 4.11 shows the role played by Italy on peace in Somalia. The negative and positive roles are very close while most respondents said Italy was not very helpful although they colonized Somalia and also their visibility on Somalia issues is also low.

Italy colonized southern part of Somalia. It has constantly participated in dialogue with the concerned parties aiming in resolving the issues affecting Somalia. As former colonial state Italy provided support to Somalia through the 'TROIKA' and friends of IGAD initiative. Further, it has helped by organizing different workshops to try to bring the warring parties together and also provision of medical assistance to the affected. However, they have not been successful in solving the problems to end conflict; Italy has not been directly involved in the Somalia peace initiatives.

On the other hand, just like UN and US, Italy is also seen as a representative of the West hence their support is not well received. It has been seen as the original cause of Somalia's problems due to its influence during colonial times as a result of activities like bribery, robbery and political assassinations. It has also been accused of having self-interests and meddling in Somalia affairs in the name of negotiating for peace. They have made limited interventions in peace initiatives hence there has been no any visible role in achieving sustainable peace. One of the respondents said:

"I do not know the role of Italy on peace process, but whatever it is, it is not helping Somalia".

However, some respondents believe that if committed, Italy can play a role in restoring peace in stability since it knows Somalia well being the colonizer.

4.4.4 The African Union factor

African Union has been in the forefront in supporting the TFG through AMISOM. While some countries such as Uganda and Burundi have given troops others are reluctant to do so and this has remained a big challenge to the AU.

Table 4.12 The role of the African Union on Peace in Somalia.

	Responses on the question on African Union	Frequencies	Percentages
Positive	Although they control a small area there is relative peace in the area they control, been trying to combat militia, provide security to TFG, Have provided military assistance	38	50
Negative	They have been accused of killing civilians in the name of fighting for peace, they are seen as security for TFG and not citizens, and they have also provided assistance in terms of infrastructure and providing medicine.	29	38.2
No effect	They are not helping they have done very little on peace.	5	6.6
	Not responded to the question	4	5.2
	Total	76	100

According to table 4.12 out of 76 respondents 38 said AMISOM the regional peace keeping mission operated by African Union is playing a positive role on peace in Somalia. At the moment the areas controlled by AMISOM is relatively safe and movement of goods and people is free. AMISOM is also protecting the TFG from being overpowered by Al- Shababs and other factions in Somalia; the AU military are not only maintaining peace and order but they are also helping to build Somalia infrastructures and providing health care services.

On the other hand AMISOM is perceived to symbolize brotherhood while for others it is perceived as a puppet of the West propagating western ideology. It was also established that the peace keeping military are poorly armed and uncoordinated. AMISOM has greatly been accused of killing civilians in the name of bringing peace creating more IDPs in the country. They are accused of only protecting the TFG and the seaport but not the civilians. However, majority of the respondents felt that if more personnel who are better equipped are deployed, AMISOM could carry out its mandate more effectively.

4.4.5 The Role played by the Arab League on peace issues in Somalia

The Arab league has played roles in efforts to bring back peace in Somalia including bringing the factions on around table to negotiate for peace. Table 4.13 has presented the positive and negative roles played by the Arab League.

Table 4.13 The role played by the Arab League on Peace

	Responses on the question on Arab League	Frequencies	Percentages
Positive	Have religious ties with Somalia and advocates for Islamic nation, Has facilitated peace processes, and called the factions on around table to negotiate for peace.	21	27.6
Negative	They indirectly fuel the war by supporting some groups involved in war	25	32.9
No effect	They are not helping and have done nothing of efforts to bring peace.	12	15.8
	Not responded to questionnaires	18	23.7
	Total	76	100

According to the respondents the Arab League is seen to have a negative role on Somalia peace issues the respondents indicated that Arab league has not done anything in achieving peace. Somalia is a member of the Arab league but there are no tangible or formal relations between the Somalia Government and the Arab league. They have been accused of having some interests but they only provide limited financial support to the hands of selfish leaders.

They are also alleged to be giving support to Al-Shabab. It is believed that they have links with Islamists in Somalia and support some factions hence exacerbating the already existing conflicts directly and indirectly. It was also revealed that they don't give enough support since even refugees who go to Saudi Arabia for security reasons are deported. The Arab league has helped in forecasting peace initiatives in Somalia by championing for the interests of the Muslims at large since Somalia is a Muslim state. It supports a peaceful co-existence with the Arab countries including Somalia.

4.4.6 The Al-Qaeda factor

The Al-Qaeda have been said to be supporting some factions in Somalia and spreading their terrorism ideology. This has accelerated the conflict in Somalia.

Table 4.14 The role of Al-Qaeda on peace in Somalia

	Responses on the question on Al-Qaeda	Frequencies	Percentages
Negative	They are supporting some Islamists in Somalia, they are causing the US to attack Somalia in search of terrorists, They are increasingly occupying Somalia and this worsens the efforts for achieving peace.	33	43.4
Positive	They are helping the Somalis by protecting their waters and safeguarding the Muslim religion against the western ideology	27	35.5
	Not responded to question	16	21.1
	Total	76	100

Table 4.14 shows the role played by the Al-Qaeda in Somalia that is frustrating the efforts to achieve peace in Somalia. The Al-Qaeda is increasingly occupying Somalia and this has accelerated the war and worsened the situation. Some of the fighters in Somalia have links to Al-Qaeda and most Somalis are against them with the exception of some hardliners who are spreading Al-Qaeda ideologies. The respondents revealed that the Al-Qaeda are a catalyst they thrive in such situations and won't hesitate to make things bad and tarnish the image of the country like they have done in Somalia. They are funding the Islamic extremists in Somalia and creating tension between Muslim states and non-Muslim states hence causing mistrust. It was established that some of the fighters from Afghanistan are in Somalia and they are taking advantage of the war to spread Al-Qaeda ideology through the country.

According to the respondents Al-Qaeda has played a major role in safeguarding the country's affairs and territory especially against the US who are there to exploit Somalia. They also help to fight external aggression of countries against the Muslims and have been praised for having provided security to Somalia Nationalists. Al-Qaeda claims to have been trying to defend the Islamic nations against external exploitations by the Western countries as mentioned by one of the respondents:

"The Al-Qaeda wants Somalia to be an Islamic state, the Islamists want that too and therefore they give in to the demands of the Al-Qaeda"

but they have become a threat. They have also guarded the sea territory of Somalia against the illegal fishing in Somalia waters.

4.5 Other factors that are playing a role in efforts to achieve peace in Somalia

Due to the complexity of the Somalia conflict it was necessary to look into other factors that could be indirectly involved in the Somalia situation. The factors include: Diaspora, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and European Union.

a) The Diaspora

The study shows that the Somalia Diaspora sometimes attends peace conferences though major results have not been witnessed. The Diaspora is important for Somalia since their interest is to have peace and development in their own country. Though they have not achieved much, they have helped as mediators on Somalia conflicts and involved in the various agreements but they have been blamed for not coming out strongly to condemn the violence. It was revealed that some have good intentions and contribute in peace conferences and are even in the TFG government. Others, however, fund war and undermine peace efforts.

The respondents indicated that the Diaspora are the lifeline that supports Somalia and therefore involved in trying to bring peace through dialogue. Majority of the Diaspora desire to support but do not have the capacity; they even hold meetings but funding is a problem. Though they have not achieved peace, majority of the respondents indicated that they should all participate in dialogue, peace initiatives and signing of various peace treaties as a way to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia.

b) Ethiopia There has been a long-standing hostility between the Somalia people and Ethiopia; they are not welcomed in Somalia. Somalis do not see them as friends as they have had long conflict. However, Ethiopia was supporting the current government (TFG) until December 2009. They have helped in initiating peace process and hosting Somalia refugees as well as putting pressure on the warring communities to end conflict and foster in developing the country. They have tried to mediate between the various groups and even sent troops to keep peace. The invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops however caused more people to rebel against Ethiopia. Generally, the long hatred between the two countries and existence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia created a lot of tension between the two countries hence any peace initiative undertaken by Ethiopia is undermined. There is also suspicion that Ethiopia

has its own interests in Somalia and not necessarily to achieve peace hence they have not been successful in their peace processes.

c) Eritrea

Eritrea has been accused of supporting and funding some Islamists so that Ethiopia does not get a chance to occupy Somalia. Majority of the respondents indicated that it plays a big role in destabilizing Somalia. Eritrea has been used as passage of arms to Somalia. However some respondents indicated that Eritrea has tried to end the Somalia conflict by jointly involving itself in Somalia peace negotiations and has further fully pledged its support to the Somalia materially aiming to establish peaceful Somalia. Besides all this roles, Eritrea has not achieved to maintain peace in Somalia.

d) Djibouti

Djibouti has been having a positive relationship with Somalia and has been encouraging the warring factions to put aside their differences and support peace. Most of the agreements reached have been held in Djibouti and in spite of having hosted peace processes; it has remained supportive of the IGAD initiatives and always stood on the side of the TFG.

e) Kenya

Similar to Ethiopia and Djibouti, Kenya neighbours Somalia and it has had a positive relationship with Somalia and its leaders. However, Kenya's Northern part has been claimed by Somalis thus there is some mistrust. According to the respondents Kenya has greatly helped Somalia in trying to achieve peace and stability; it has played a key role in peace initiative to an extent of even setting up a secretariat to spear head and guide the peace process. It has also hosted the Somali 2002-2004 National Reconciliation Conference that led to the establishment of the current TFG. This was a major achievement in trying to achieve peace. Moreover, most of the parties involved in conflict resolution have a base in Kenya for example, IGAD, AMISOM and UN.

Kenya has held a series of dialogue with Somalia government and militia to bring them together, sign treaties and promote peace, however, it has been hesitant in providing military

for peace keeping in Somalia. Just like Yemen, the Kenyan government has hosted the Somalia refugees and helping them assisting them in getting basic needs from humanitarian organizations. Somalis also have large businesses in Kenya, which they are operating without any interference. Though Kenya has not been fully successful in achieving peace in Somalia, it has put efforts to end decades of war between the warring groups diplomatically through spearheading peace processes for Somalia.

f) The Pakistan factor

According to the respondents the Pakistan has been funding the Al-Qaeda and they have links with the Islamists. They have also tried to give humanitarian assistance as well as financial and educational support though very limited. However, they have also been accused of having links with extremists, training Al-Shabab fighters and supporting them financially. However they are not very visible in the whole conflict in Somalia.

g) The Afghanistan factor

According to the respondents Afghanistan has greatly been blamed for fuelling war in Somalia and is a root problem to world terrorism activities. This country is believed to be the home of Al-Qaeda and it has ties with Somalia Islamists who always spread its ideology. They have been blamed for training Al-Shabab fighters; they also give financial assistance to the groups fighting. Afghanistan has been sponsoring Al-Qaeda who have occupied Somalia, causing more deaths as US targets them and ends up killing innocent Somalis. The study established that there is no role played by Afghanistan to promote peace but they are causing more conflicts indirectly since they are assisting the fighting groups through Taliban. Generally, Afghanistan is a threat in achieving peace in Somalia hence they have not had any positive impact.

h) The Yemen factor

Yemen has played a role in trying to bring peace in Somalia. They are championing for the interests of Muslims since Somalia is a Muslim state. The study found out that Yemen government has unsuccessfully tried to facilitate peace however, there is suspicion of a link between Islamists in Somalia and Yemen, which could be accelerating conflict. The

respondents further established that, it has been used as safe grounds for the militia groups whom are fighting with TFG. Though Yemen has been in the forefront in bringing the warring communities to end their conflict by hosting peace process, it has not achieved peace in Somalia.

i) The European Union factor

The EU has constantly been giving humanitarian assistance to Somalia; it offers basic needs such as food, shelter as well as health care through NGOs in areas where there are conflicts and wars. On peace initiatives, EU has positive influence and funds peace initiatives and has constantly put pressure on Somalia government to end the long conflict; however they have not achieved peace. In some cases, it has been seen as meddling with Somalia Internal affairs and as if they have their own interest in Somalia though very limited. Although they support Somalia in their effort to facilitate peace initiatives, they have not done much in achieving sustainable peace but they have done a lot in giving humanitarian assistance.

4.6 Possible solutions that can lead to achieving sustainable peace in Somalia

For this objective in order to understand the possibilities for peace in Somalia, it was important that the respondents reflected on President Siad Barre era when there was peace in Somalia. This could help the peace experts to see what they can borrow, improve; change in order to reverse the conflict situation that has been existing for years.

The tactics used by President Siad Barre to maintain peace during his regime (1969 to 1991)

- a) During his regime there was a well-structured government and the military and the police were powerful and had the capacity and authority to command and give direction in matters of conflict.
- b) Clan elders were respected and were used when there was conflict.
- c) To some respondents, Barre was an authoritarian and ruled his people by force this worked for him although it also contributed to him being unpopular among his allies.
- d) He is said to have been surrounded by his close allies and clan members on top government positions, this was to ensure his safety against his perceived enemies.

Reasons why it has been difficult to achieve peace in Somalia after ousting of President Siad Barre 1991-2009

- a) Emergence of warlords and other interest groups who are thirsty for power
- b) Destruction of major institutions like courts of justice and thus people take law in their own hands.
- c) Social disconnection, after war broke out many Somalis went to seek refuge abroad or in neighbouring countries leaving vulnerable people behind who have not been able to solve the problem
- d) Inability to agree on the center for power and desire for all to be leaders which is not practical
- e) Failure by the citizens to trust their own government probably because of the atrocities done by the former regime.
- f) Political Rivalry and divisive politics.
- g) Formation of weak governments that are threatened by outlawed militia groups.
- h) International community and neighbouring governments meddling with the internal affairs of the Somalis.
- i) Prolonged war in Somalia is causing fatigue

Possible solutions that can lead to Sustainable peace

The respondents in this study gave various suggestions on how Somalia can bring back sustainable peace

a) Forming a functioning and strong Government in Somalia

A functioning government in Somalia that is fully inclusive and respected by the Somalis should be formed. The Government's military should have the mechanisms to protect its people from the chronic insecurity and they should create confidence in their citizens. A well-structured government with police, military, law and order is an asset in ending the conflict. The government should be assisted with manpower and finances to create functioning institutions ready to steer development in various sectors and ultimately improving the economy and creating employment for its citizens. Elect a diplomatic, nationalist and

visionary leader. When civilians view a leader as diplomatic, nationalist and visionary they appreciate him. The internal and external players should invest towards ensuring the leader elected has good qualities and will be respected and accepted by Somalis. The international community should provide means for power sharing after forming a new government and this will give a sense of full representation by all clans.

b) Disarm the Militia and other outlawed groups to reduce their power

In the current years different groups have emerged including the Al-Shabab community warlords, Hizbul Islam and Ahlusunna waljama. These groups are interested in power and ruling Somalia. They are fully armed and pose a threat to civilians; in addition they have recruited innocent children and youth into their groups. In Somalia even civilians have arms. The necessary efforts should be put to disarm these groups and also the armed civilians to minimize levels of killings. If these groups are disarmed the government can strengthen its army to protect the people without posing a high threat on themselves. The Somalis should be ready to do away with outlawed groups so that it is easier to implement justice and order. If negotiations fail then they should engage in war and disarm them by force and take over the country. Sanctions should be put in place to control weapons getting into Somalia.

c) Use clanism as a tool of unity instead of dividing the Somalis

Somalia being a true nation with same language, culture and religion should have people who appreciate each other without segregating them along clan lines. The Players should invest in discouraging clanism. The new government should regard all clans whether being or small as it is a human right to treat all humans as equal. Having close friends, relatives and clan members will certainly not solve the chronic conflict in Somalia. The Somalis should be willing to forgive and forget clan atrocities in order to move ahead. Clan domination in politics, ownership of resources should be controlled by the government. Competing for scarce resources has been another reason of conflict for years. A good government should ensure equitable distribution of resources of the country without discrimination. The external factors should assist the country in dealing with difficult businessmen and pirates who are fueling the war in Somalia for their own interest. Lack of trust among the players is another problem that

has made it difficult to strike a peace deal. When people agree and speak in one voice then it will be difficult to respect what they say and implement it.

d) Unified International support

It is clear from the respondents that the International Community's support is not consolidated; they must come together and support same initiatives in order to succeed. Common strategies will be necessary if the international community is to fight the outlawed groups in Somalia. The international community should be committed to supporting peace initiatives from locals at any time. It must be ready to avail fund and human power to support these initiatives and ensure that it fully involves Somalis in decision-making.

e) Strengthen local institutions and initiatives on peace

In Somalia there has been degeneration of traditional institutions, which were responsible for settling disputes such as courts and clan elders. These institutions became powerless and are no longer respected hence people break rules with impunity. These traditional institutions should be revived and strengthened. For peace to be achieved, Somalis should appreciate their own support and leadership and include the clan elders, religious leaders and other charismatic leaders in peace efforts. In addition, peace conference should be organized inside Somalia so that they can be owned locally. Furthermore, the peace process should be able to look at the underlying cause of conflict.

f) Fighting Terrorism in Somalia

The International Community has been combating terror inside Somalia. This has created a lot of suspicion on their peace mission as during the attacks many civilians are killed. The international community should join forces and work closely with the locals when fighting terrorists; if possible they should not attack inside Somalia.

g) Peace negotiations be done at home

The peace Conferences have been held in each of the neighbouring countries: Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, Yemen, and Sudan among others (Adedeji, 1999). This already gives an impression to the outlawed groups that they are feared indirectly giving them more strength. The peace

negotiations should be done at home. The Somalis should initiate the peace process instead of waiting for the international community to do it for them.

h) The International community and Somalia must invest in peace education

Most Somalis may be lacking the capacity to have good negotiations for peace and thus revert to conflict. A capacity building should be availed for them in order to make sensible judgment on their country.

i) Encourage Somalis to invest at home

The Somalis should start investing at home instead of investing all their resources elsewhere in order to improve their economy, they should be willing to develop their own country instead of running away leaving others in charge to destroy. They must know whether bad or good home is home and they will have to go back one day. Finally the external and internal community must be engaged peacefully to solve the conflict in Somalia. Otherwise a million dollar invested in unwilling heart will be a waste of resources. According to the respondents external support is critical for Somalia to have sustainable peace.

4.7 Direct observation

An observation guide was developed to ensure the correct and relevant information was observed. The observation was done in a natural environment in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Physical Environment: It was confirmed that indeed AMISOM was in Somalia for peace keeping. There were buildings where they were said to be living and when combating the Al-Shabab. The soldiers were also visible on the streets and along the road especially, on Al-Mukarama road that was used by the observer. On top of their buildings there were sacks full of sand, their purpose was to prevent bullets targeting them from the militia to penetrate to their buildings. In the same area there was the parliament and the presidential palace confirming that indeed AMISOM are a back up for TFG. There were too many armed men on the streets including children less than fifteen years, this created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust among the residents. According to one resident:

“Here (referring to Mogadishu) you must have a gun, if you don't have others will keep on threatening you, when they know you also have a gun they respect you, for me one time I put a banana on my right side of the trouser waste line, to threaten people I have a pistol.”

Social environment: During the observation the following were observed: the appearance of the locals, verbal behavior and interactions, physical behavior and gestures... It was observed that there was fear and mistrust of persons which was confirmed by the way the guards on the checkpoints interrogated the drivers in order to be allowed to pass. In some instances the person on the checkpoint had to consult with the other guides, this shown there were those who gave orders on what was to be done. The people seemed to be easily agitated and quick to react, this was shown by persons who requested something and were not granted; they raised their voice, frowned and threw their hands up. They seemed to be ready for attack as they carried bullets hanging across their chests. It was also noted that those people from areas controlled by different militia groups such as Al-Shabab dressed and looked different, they had beards and their trousers were not touching the ankle. On the other hand those from AMISOM controlled areas did not mind having a clean shave. To ensure the reliability of the information observed the researcher engaged in informal unstructured spontaneous interviews with locals to understand some of the observations.

4.8 Summary

In summary this chapter has presented findings and analysis of the research. The Internal and External factors are both involved in efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia and they are interdependent. The direct observation done in Mogadishu has also complimented the literature review and confirmed the responses from the questionnaires. The chapter has also given possible ways of harnessing the internal and external factors to bring sustainable peace in Somalia.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the study and has given the major findings of the study following the objectives as follows: The internal and external factors influencing sustainable peace and the possible solutions to the problem. Further the discussions, conclusion, recommendations and suggestion for further research has been given.

5.2 Summary of Findings

This study examined the internal and external factors influencing achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia and also explored possible solutions that can lead to achievement of sustainable peace. Secondary and primary data was used to gather information through open ended questionnaires, observation and UN reports. The study was planned and conducted in an accurate, ethical and professional manner to ensure its validity, reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness. It is assumed that the findings that emerged from this study may contribute to a better understanding of the role played by internal and external factors in addition the suggested solutions resulting from the study can be implemented to enable Somalia achieve sustainable peace.

5.2.1 Internal Factors influencing achievement of sustainable peace

The concept of clans in Somalia have been popular in terms of helping the community solve disputes, mediate on behalf of a member of a certain community where there is an inter clan dispute and mobilize their members to participate in peace process, they have been largely accused of fuelling the war in Somalia as a result of supremacy wars and disrespect among other clans.

TFG and Al-Shabab are the major political groups in Somalia. Although TFG is supported by AU, UN, US it has not had an impact or any major role in achieving peace, it has not even been good in governing their area. Another hindrance to achievement of peace in Somalia is

the international community, that is, UN, US, EU and AU because they are perceived to have vested interests in the Somalia government.

Land disputes, business-related income sources like sea and airport and pastoral lands are the major economic factors leading to chaos. Being an arid and semi-arid region, Somalia draws its main economic activities from livestock keeping, farming, business and international trade.

The study established that self-understanding and interpretation of Islamic scriptures was the major factor of clashes between Islamists and other groups. Different interest groups use religion to justify their ideology, which has a bearing on peace. However, religion is good and is one of the factors that can be influenced in achieving stable peace in Somalia. If respected, it has the power of uniting and solving the differences amongst people giving them a common platform.

From the study, piracy has become very popular; business oriented and has got significant power. However it has contributed to insecurity in the whole of the coastal region. It is believed that piracy is playing an important role in safeguarding the Somalia waters from Western fishermen.

5.2.2 External factors influencing achievement of sustained peace in Somalia

From the study, the UN is seen as a negative force that represents the west according to Somalis. Islamists use this ideology to influence people against UN support; they have also been accused of financing and supporting TFG and that they have own interest in Somalia.

The United States has been supporting peace process and has provided support to some faction leaders. They have also supported the TFG government financially and have been opposed to Islamic law being introduced in the whole of Somalia. They have also participated in humanitarian assistance and fighting off militias. Majority of Somalis however, believe that the US is not very friendly to many Somalis. Actually they have been accused of being the greatest problem and obstacle in peace achievement.

It was also established that Italy has constantly participated in dialogue with the concerned parties aiming to resolving the issues affecting Somalia. Further, they have helped by

organizing different workshops to try to bring the warring parties together and also provision of medical assistance to the affected. However, it has been accused of having self-interests and meddling with Somalia affairs in the name of negotiating for peace. Italy is not very visible and its role on peace in Somalia is minimal.

The AMISOM are also based in Mogadishu with a mandate to defend the TFG president if they are attacked. They are also helping to build Somalia infrastructures and providing health care services. Somalis feel that if more well –equipped personnel are deployed, AMISOM will be more effective in achieving its objectives.

The Arab League has helped in peace initiatives in Somalia by championing for the interests of the Muslims at large and since Somalia is a Muslim state. However, Arab league has not done anything in achieving peace.

The study established that Al-Qaeda thrive in conflict situations and never hesitate to make things bad and tarnish the image of the country like they have done in Somalia. They were funding the Islamic extremists in Somalia and created tension between Muslim states and non-Muslim states hence causing mistrust. Interestingly, they are praised for safeguarding the country's affairs and territory especially against the US who are there to take advantage of Somalia to exploit. They have also helped to fight external aggression of countries against the Muslims and have been praised for having provided security to Somali nationalists.

From the study, the Somali Diaspora has been instrumental in searching for peace in their country through supporting leaders in Somalia. Sometimes they attend peace conferences though no major results have been witnessed.

Ethiopia has helped in initiating peace process and hosting Somalia refugees as well as putting pressure on the warring communities to end their conflict and foster in developing the country.

Eritrea has also been accused of supporting the Al-Shabab and militia groups in general who support Islamic laws through sponsoring its army to fight alongside the militia; it's used as passage of arms to Somalia as well. Being a Muslim state, Pakistan has held several talks with Somalia to try and resolve the conflicts; it has been hosting the warring factions to urge them

to resolve conflicts. They have also tried to give humanitarian assistance as well as financial and educational support though this has been very limited.

Yemen has contributed to the Somalia peace process by hosting peace processes to try and end conflicts. They have also been championing for the interests of Muslims since Somalia is a Muslim state. Djibouti has good relations with Somalia and is seen as loyal to Somalis and that is why they have constantly been involved in peace negotiation because they want peace in Somalia. They support the government (TFG) and have also witnessed the signing of peace agreements.

Kenya has greatly helped Somalia in trying to achieve peace and stability; it has played a key role in peace initiative to an extent of even setting up a secretariat to spearhead and guide the peace process and further hosted the Somali national reconciliation conference and was mediator in the peace process. The European Union has constantly been giving humanitarian assistance to the Somalis; it offers basic needs such as food, shelter as well as health care through NGOs in areas where there are conflicts and wars. On peace initiatives, EU has positive influence and funds peace initiatives and has constantly put pressure on Somalia government to end the long conflict. Afghanistan is a threat in achieving peace in Somalia hence they have not had any positive impact.

5.2.3 Possible Solutions that can lead to achieving sustainable peace

For peace to prevail, the study found out that Somalia should first involve all the conflicting parties, both internal and external, in their negotiations for formulation of a unity government that represents all. The unity government formed should have a good system of administration and good governance, and should ensure that the national resources are shared equally. The leaders should also agree to do away with outlawed groups and choose to maintain peace and political stability since this is the key pillar to any country's stability. The Somali Government should further improve on the security matters by disarming the outlawed groups. For the Somalis citizens, they should join together for peace and speak in one voice; start investing in Somali rather than investing all the resources elsewhere since investments bring confidence. The international community should as well stop funding individual clans, militia and other interest groups involved directly in conflict since this has been worsening the conflict.

The international community should be engaged in dialogue among the warring parties without taking sides and support an outcome that would lead to sustainable peace; they should also provide good infrastructure and initiate development to gear up the economy. Both international community and Somalia should be fully dedicated to implementation of peace initiative, furthermore the international community should avail more resources to facilitate the process. By assisting build Somalia poverty can be alleviated hence reducing crime for example, piracy which has a negative effect on the international trade and also undermining peace. Other than financial and material support, the international community should educate the Somalia people and create peace programs and have full commitment to help Somali achieve sustainable peace.

Getting financial assistance from IGAD and other regional and international organizations to strengthening the Somalia Transitional Federal Government army to keep peace instead of calling foreign troops to protect them. The country should therefore hold free and fair elections and form a coalition government having equal representation in all the government positions and with full commitment to run the government. For sustainable peace to be attained, the government formed should be acceptable by all and should eliminate all the outlawed groups. Moreover, Somalia should elect a national leader who is strong and committed to the peace agenda. On the other hand, the international community should avoid internal interference to give Somalia a chance to organize their country; however, they should offer financial support, necessary resources and support development issues to improve the state of the country.

5.3 Discussions

Research Objective	Findings of the Study
<p>1. To establish the role played by Internal factors in efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia</p>	<p>The study found out that the role of clan and religion recorded high positive response which shows these factors are friendly to peace negotiations and they can be strengthened to bring peace in Somalia. Just like other peaceful states Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea and Niger, Somalia constitutes of overwhelming Muslim majority. Religion is not a disadvantage that could lead to anarchy but according to Marx 1818 "Religion is always abused which is a serious matter by some of its adherents to an extent that they are prepared to kill in the name of Jihad" This is indeed what is happening in Somalia, the Islamists are abusing religion to their own advantage yet it is stated in the Qu'ran "<i>Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind</i>" (al-Ma'dah:32). Somalia embarked on independence with a strong sense of national identity, possessing common language, culture and Religion (Meredith 2006). Like many other societies Somalia has minority and majority clans this is the same as tribes in Kenya and Rwanda to sight as examples. Although this is not a new phenomenon it remains a big problem of identity and power. This is inline with the Marxist theory, which argues that the competition of individuals and groups for wealth and power is the fundamental process shaping social structure. The basic question remains "who gets what and why". In Johan Galtung's violence triangle Clanism falls under cultural violence which is invisible.</p> <p>Clan centered politics at national level was increasingly becoming unworkable in the 90s (Mukhtar, 2003). This same statement tends to be true by 2009 as mentioned by 24 respondents that clan can also play a negative role. But what is interesting to reveal from the study is with rising Islamist Clannism is fading away. For example members of the factions do not belong to the same clans. On the other hand the economy, Politics and Piracy recorded high negative responses showing that they are a critical issue when it comes to efforts to negotiate for peace. Respondents also confirmed that competition for resources is at the heart of conflict (Adedeji, 1999) as we referred to Economy and Piracy, 39 and 43 respondents respectively mentioned without government business is good. The study has also revealed that although Piracy is bad it also has a positive side: Protecting illegal fishing,</p>

	create employment for the youth and protecting Somalia coastline
2. To examine the role played by External factors in efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia	<p>The study found out that UN plays a negative role in efforts to make peace although they have been in for close to 19 years. This could also be attributed to the UN charter article 2 paragraph 7 <i>"Nothing contained in the UN charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"</i> This statement can further explain the reason why the UN has been persistent in supporting the TFG. Thirty eight respondents perceived UN to be playing a negative role in Somalia with some saying they are not helping at all. This confirms (UN, 2010) that mentioned that <i>"The negative perceptions affect the means and the capacity of UNs operations through increased security constraints"</i> Based on this confirmation it can be necessary to say the long service of UN is not bearing any fruits and it should be willing to step aside for other potential members. The United States also recorded a high rate of negative response, but it seems also to have maintained its initial mandate of Humanitarian aid as respondents said US provides food, shelter among other humanitarian aid items. The African Union recorded a high positive response on their AMISOM operations, this means unlike other players, it can be strengthened to improve performance probably through providing more troops from other AU members. However, the civilians perceive it as TFG security to fight the Al-Shabab.</p>
3. To explore possible solutions that can lead to achievement of sustainable peace	<p>The study revealed that Somalis indeed desire peace as fighting has caused fatigue and hopelessness. People should tolerate each other; forgive the past atrocities committed to their clans and forge ahead. On the other hand there must be will to actually end conflict which in initiated from within. A strong government with a strong leader should be formed. Institutions such as courts of justice should be put in place. There should be equal distribution of resources to the clans. If solving the problem through negotiations fail then the militia should be disarmed by force to secure the citizens. Resources both financial and capacities should be availed, the International Community should not interfere with the internal affairs of Somalia and educating Somalis on peace could be an asset in future peace negotiations</p>

5.4 Issues that emerged from the study on efforts to achieve peace in Somalia

This study report has discovered that indeed the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Al-Qaeda groups are indirectly involved in the war in Somalia. The United States is fighting the Al-Qaeda inside Somalia and this has been confirmed by Phillips (2002) who asserts that:

"Somalia has a long coastline with numerous unpatrolled ports that could provide easy entry for Al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran by sea. The U.S Navy intercepted at least one ship that reportedly transported fugitive Al-Qaeda operatives who escaped from Pakistan port inside shipping container. U.S Intelligence officials believe that bin Laden owns a number of ships, one of which is suspected of transporting some of the explosives used in August 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Shortly after September 11th, U.S Intelligence officials received reports that bin Laden himself planned to move from Afghanistan to Somalia".

Other governments including Eritrea are availing arms to Somalia, and training fighters these has been fuelling the conflicts. It has also made it easier for the civilians to have guns and be involved in conflict claiming they have them for personal security. In addition, the U.S has taken their war on Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to fighting Al-Qaeda inside Somalia where they suspect the Al-Qaeda to be hiding. This has resulted to worsening the internal conflict by increased killings of civilians and increased numbers of IDPs. This has made it impossible for the Transitional Federal Government to govern successfully as they also do not know how to control entry of arms to their country and how to deal with the Al-Qaeda and US.

Using this continuous conflict path, peace agreements are challenged as those who are really fuelling the war are not part of the negotiations and are seen not to exist yet they are critical in any peace decisions.




Figure 3 Somalia Continuous conflict path

Given the Somalia continuous conflict path, the following plan can be used to achieve peace in Somalia




Figure 4 Somalia Seven steps to peace plan

5.5 Conclusion

This study has carefully revealed the Internal and External factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia and has further provided suggestions on how peace can be achieved within the country. The first objective of the study was the identification of the Internal factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia; the study has found out that Clans should be enhanced to support peace initiatives and not be triggered to cause conflict. The study has also revealed that religion is good for peace; religion shapes most societies and the religion of

Islam is not an exception. Nonetheless, care must be taken to avoid the promotion of fundamentalists who are out to abuse religion. With respect to politics, the study established that no group is worth to be supported; the weak TFG has nothing to offer in achieving peace while other groups such as Al-Shababs, Ahlusunna waljama and Hizbul Islam are worse as they are not patriotic and lack the capacity to bring peace. All these political factions and groups are not committed to promoting peace; they are all fighting for the control of Somalia for their own interests. The country should therefore hold free and fair elections and form a coalition government having equal representation in all the government positions and with full commitment to run the government. Majority of the respondents revealed that the factions are more on the negative side when it comes to promoting peace this is due to competition, lack of interest and loyalty.

The second objective of the study was the identification of the External factors influencing sustainable peace. It was confirmed that United Nations role on peace in Somalia is perceived negatively and another avenue or mediator needs to be sought to resolve the problem.

The third Objective of the study was the proposal of possible solutions that can lead to the achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia. It was revealed that Somalis are tired with war and it is the right time to advocate for peace. One of the key solutions is to allow peace initiatives and agreements be locally driven rather than being created outside and therefore stirring a feeling among the Somalis of imposition of External initiatives.

5.6 Recommendations

In a country that has been in conflict for close two decades, the people are suffering and for the country to revive and come back to peace the following measures must be taken.

5.6.1 Strengthen Internal army

The neighbours or international community is always helping out Somalia. The Somalis need to use own armies and not armies of other countries. As Machiavelli asserts “unless Somalia commands its own arms no principality is secure rather it is dependent on future since there is no valour and loyalty to defend it when adversity come” Further he says “nothing is so weak or unstable as a reputation for power which is not based on ones own forces” borrowed armies will have difficulties maintaining peace as when they withdraw the government will always be defeated by the militia groups who have own army. The Somalis must have a homegrown Somalia Army that will be respected and is inclusive of all including the armed clans and militia groups.

5.6.2 Formation of new States

Somalia could also attempt to form new states with independent leadership such as Puntland that was founded in 2000. Other states that Somalia could form to minimize conflict are Banadir state where Mogadishu can be the capital and Juba state where Baidoa can be the capital.

5.6.3 Peace must be locally owned

It must be ensured that priorities are determined locally, it is therefore crucial that spaces and processes exist where consensus building and dialogue can take place. If local people and groups participate in defining the problem they can be engaged to take ownership also of solutions. Peace agreements/negotiations should be done at home because holding them in other countries shows that those engaging in negotiations are actually scared of the militia and this strengthens them indirectly. The civilians cannot identify governments formed in other countries and will always perceive them as being foreign. The peace negotiations should also be done in phases instead of one off meetings this will give others a chance to be involved in the next one if they miss one.

5.6.4 Clan Traditional Mythology

Somalis must have the will to end the traditional mythology of viewing ones clan as self righteous, largest, bravest, wisest and most deserving to rule the other clans. They must result to win-win elections. There has been continuous dissatisfaction and betrayal especially during peace negotiations. The question, from whom were you born is still a big issue that could be hidden under the carpet. The functioning government should encourage Somalis nationalism and no government positions or resources should be granted according to ones clan.

5.6.7 Reward by the International Community for peace milestones achieved

The UN and other nations should find ways of supporting Puntland, Somaliland and Transitional Federal Government also give military assistance. With a prosperous Somaliland, Puntland and functioning TFG trouble makers would attract fewer followers.

5.7 Suggestions for further research

This study has concentrated on the Internal and External factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia and possible solutions that could lead to achievement of sustainable peace. Political instability in Somalia directly affects its neighbours as it is the case in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti who are hosting Somalia refugees and peace is threatened at the borders. Therefore it would be necessary to carry out further research on effects of conflict in Somalia to its neighbours on the other hand it could also be important to investigate how attaining peace in Somalia could destabilize peace in Kenya Northern Frontier, Ogaden in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland.

Furthermore, research could be carried out on the involvement of Al-Qaeda in destabilizing Somalia and using it as a base for attack, as could have been the case when U.S embassy in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. The possibility of presence of Al-Qaeda being fought by U.S inside Somalia has been confirmed by this study; Phillips, 2002 & Omar, 2004. However a further research could be carried out on their specific mission in Somalia. Although this study has attempted to fill the many questions behind inability to achieve peace in Somalia, it would be necessary to look further into the policies in place by external players on a country

with armed conflict, to find out how the international law can be applied to save the citizens and bring the country back to sanity.

On Religion a further research should be carried out on countries ruled by Islamic law to clearly see whether it could be applied in Somalia. The issue of clanism should be looked into outside the political arena to see how it can be used positively to end conflict. Another important factor to influence positively could be African Union who appears to have a positive influence on sustainable peace.

5.8 Summary

In conclusion this Chapter has given a summary of the findings of the study. It has further elaborated on what has emerged from the study and two models have been used to explain the findings. The study has also outlined the recommendations of the study and has also given suggestions on the areas where further research can be done.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Somalia Ethnic groups as of 2002



Source: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

Appendix 2 Introduction letter from the University



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND EXTERNAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF CONTINUING AND DISTANCE EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTRA-MURAL STUDIES
NAIROBI EXTRA-MURAL CENTRE

Your Ref:

Main Campus
Gandhi Wing, Ground Floor
P.O. Box 50197
NAIROBI

Our Ref:

Telephone: 318262 Ext. 120

24th MAY, 2010

REF: UON/CEES/SCDE/DEMS/NEMC/DF VOL. 6/277


TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: CATHERINE WANJIKU - REG. NO L50/71007/2008

This is to confirm that the above named is a student at the University of Nairobi College of Education and External Studies, School of Continuing and Distance Education, Department of Extra-Mural Studies pursuing Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management.

She is proceeding for research entitled "factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia"

Any assistance given to her will be appreciated.


CAREN AWILLY
CENTRE ORGANIZER
NAIROBI EXTRA-MURAL CENTRE



Appendix 3 Questionnaire

Questionnaire Examining Factors

Influencing Achievement of Sustainable Peace in Somalia

Salaam Aleykum! This questionnaire has been prepared as part of a project by a student from the School of Continuing and Distant Education within the University of Nairobi. The name and contact details of the student are:

Miss Catherine Wanjiku
P.O. Box 61197-00200
Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254-722-888967
Email: ccwanjiku@yahoo.com

The purpose of the project is to critically examine the internal and external factors influencing achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia.

This research does not intend to advance the interests of any clan, religion, individual, governments, or aid donors. It is purely for academic research and it is hoped that its findings will clarify the factors influencing sustainable peace and suggest possible directions for the way forward. All responses will be treated confidentially and will only be used for the purpose of this study. The researcher will not disclose any personal information about the respondents however you may omit any questions that you prefer not to answer.

Any inquiries regarding the affiliation of the researcher can be made with the University of Nairobi (School of Continuing and Distant Education) whose contact details are:



University of Nairobi,
College of Education and External Studies,
Department of Extra Mural Studies
P. O. Box 92 - Kikuyu
Tel: +254-066-33135

Thank you for your assistance.

Date:

Age: (tick)	25-35		36-45		46-55		56 and above	
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Questions:

1. How was peace maintained before 1991 by the Siad Barre regime?

2. Why has it been difficult to have sustainable peace in Somalia since ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991?

3. What should be done by the Somalis in order to bring back peace in Somalia?

4. Comment on how the following factors affect peace:

Clanism:

Politics (Alshababs, TFG, other interest groups.....)

Economy (natural resources, poverty, businesses, private companies, lack of basic needs)

Islamic Religion (Islamic groups)

Peace agreements (Example: Arta agreement held in Djibouti, National reconciliation conference 2004 held in Kenya, Djibouti agreement.....)

Piracy: (Hijacking ships, hostage...)

5. Somalia has had several peace agreements over the years, what has been the key effects of these initiatives?

6. In your opinion which kind of external support does Somalia need to bring back peace?

7. In your opinion which external parties should be involved to facilitate achievement of sustainable peace in Somalia?

8. Comment on how the following factors affect peace in Somalia

United Nations: (Humanitarian assistance, Mediation in peace deals, financial support...)

United States: Military aid, Humanitarian assistance, financial assistance...)

Italy: (Financial assistance, relationship, Italy colonized Somalia and supported development projects in Somalia in the 90s)

African Union: (AMISOM on peacekeeping mission in Somalia)

Arab League: (Financial, military support)

Al-Qaeida: (Financial, military support)

9. What should be the role of the International Community in Somalia?

10. Give comments on the following on peace in Somalia
Afghanistan:
Pakistan:
Eritrea:
Ethiopia:
Yemen:
Djibouti:
Kenya:

European Union:

Somalia Diaspora:

11. In what ways should the Somalis and the International Community be harnessed to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia?

12. What approach (es) could you recommend to those involved in peace negotiations for Somalia in order to succeed?

13. What pitfalls must be avoided by all participants of Somalia peace negotiations in order to strike a lasting peace deal?

[Empty rectangular box for writing]

14. How does insecurity in Somalia threaten peace in the region?

[Empty rectangular box for writing]

15. In your opinion what do you think should be done to bring sustainable peace in Somalia?

[Empty rectangular box for writing]

Thank you for your time!

Appendix 4 Direct Observation guide

Factor influencing peace Research Study Observation data sheet

Date: July 25th to July 30th 2010

Location: Mogadishu, Somalia

Items to observe and note

1. How is the general environment?
2. What is visible on the streets?
3. How do people dress?
4. Who has a gun?
5. How easy is it to access a gun?
6. What can be heard?
7. What covers the buildings on top?
8. How is transport?