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Soviet Collectivization and Tanzanian Villagization: A Comparative Historiographic Study of Implementational Strategies

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Simon Kenyanchui

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Simon Kenyanchui

We approve the thesis of Simon Kenyanchui

Date of Signature:

Sept 21 1982 — George M. Enteen, Associate Professor of History, Chairman of Committee, Thesis Co-Adviser

October 6, 1982 — Cyril E. Griffith, Associate Professor of History, Thesis Co-Adviser

Oct 11 1982 — S. V. Utechin, Professor of History

September 23, 1982 — Dan P. Silverman, Associate Professor of History

September 30, 1982 — Henry C. Johnson, Professor of Education

October 7, 1982 — Gerald G. Eggert, Professor of American History, Chairman, Department of History

ABSTRACT

This study compares the interpretations of the implementation of Soviet collectivization (1929-1933) and Tanzanian villagization (1967-1976). The descriptions in sixteen characteristic and especiall revealing studies are compared in order to ascertain the influence of politics on historical scholarship. On the one hand, the sample seems to indicate that whereas Soviet historians were directly influenced by politics and ideology, the Western counterparts were influenced by Stalinism. The Cold War seems to have had no discernibl effect on the conclusions made by Western scholars on the implementati of collectivization. On the other hand, students of villagization were indirectly influenced by Tanzanian politics and the ideology of African socialism (Ujamaa).

The similarities and differences of the discussions on collectivization and villagization can make historians understand the interaction between politics and historical scholarship. The justific tion for this dissertation is described in Chapter I. The reader is t given the historical background and the political environment under which Soviet scholars and the students of villagization works in Chapter II and III. The conclusions which the scholars made and the analytical methods which they used indicated that the literature on collectivization could be grouped into neo-Stalinist and anti-Stalinist tendencies whereas the historiography of villagization coul be categorized as Marxist and non-Marxist. Soviet scholars, except Medvedev, belonged to the neo-Stalinist group, to which, of the Weste historians, R. W. Davies belonged. The other Western scholars belong to the anti-Stalinist category. The students of villagization were

all socialists, and this tended to make their interpretations similar despite different methodological approaches. The conclusions which the scholars made are described in Chapters IV and V and are compared in Chapter VI. The main conclusions and guidelines for future investigations are discussed in Chapter VII.

There are conflicting interpretations of the implementation of collectivization and villagization because the respective writers used different sources and studies and their political values and the political environments under which they worked were different. The conclusions summarized evidence that historiography is a mirror of society because historical interpretations tell as about the writers themselves as well as about the past. The descriptions obliquely reflect the relationship between politics and historical scholarship.

The Soviet neo-Stalinist historians and R. W. Davies claimed that although there were undemocratic tendencies in the implementation of collectivization, the economic and ideological objectives were achieved and that the USSR henceforth became the first socialist country and an industrial power. Medvedev and the Western scholars argued that collectivization was undemocratically implemented because the objectives were political and ideological. It was their view that Stalin successfully used collectivization to extend political power and communism to the rural areas.

Marxist socialists also argued that villagization was undemocratically impelemtned. Non-Marxist socialists either described the weaknesses of the politicians or the peasantry and hinted that it was these weaknesses which perverted the intended democratic strategies. The Marxist socialists criticized the classes such as the bureaucratic

bourgeoisie (the Party and government officials); the "kulaks" (rich farmers) and the international bourgeoisie (owners of multinational corporations). Their counterparts did not see them as classes; they did not even think that they constituted a danger in the implementatio of villagization.

The interpretations by neo-Stalinist scholars were compared with those by non-Marxist socialists and the conclusions by anti-Stalinist historians were compared with those by Marxist socialists because of their apparent similarities and differences.

The conflicting interpretations of collectivization and villaization were compared based on the works written in the post-Khrushc era and after 1970 respectively. Genuine scholarship in the USSR started after Khrushchev's denunciation of the cult of Stalin in the X Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1956. Serious works on villagization were written after 1970 when scholars felt that it had become a historical subject since its adoption in late 1967. The study demonstrates that politics had direct influence on Soviet scholars but indirect influence on the students of villagization. Western scholars were influenced by Stalinism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I am interested in the transformation of peasant economies because they have attracted the attention of both politicians and scholars. The relationship between politics and historical scholarship is a continuing concern. I have read widely on the influence of politics on historical scholarship in the USSR and Tanzania; rural development in the USSR and Tanzania; and the reasons for, and the implementation of collectivization and villagization. I then selected a few characteristic but especially revealing works for detailed analysis; compared and contrasted the interpretations and concluded that Soviet scholars were directly influenced by politics and ideology while the students of villagization were indirectly affected by Tanzania politics and ideology. The Western students of collectivization, my sample seems to indicate, were not influenced by the Cold War but probably were by Stalinism. Their conclusions reflected the influence of politics on historical scholarship in the USSR and not in their own countries.

The studies by Soviet scholars which are subjected for analysis are "A New Look at Stalin's Role in Farm Collectivization" by M. L. Bogdenko;[1] "Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside" written by D. A. Kovalenko;[2] "Soviet Historiography on the Problems of the Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class" by V. I. Pogudin;[3] Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism by Roy A. Medvedev;[4] and "Building Socialism: The Further Strengthening and Development of Socialist Society (1926-1941)," by V. A. Ivnitsky.[5] The studies by Western

historians which are assessed are Merle Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule; Irwin Peter Halpern's "Stalin's Revolution: The Struggle to Collectivize Rural Russia, 1927-1933";[6] Moshe Lewin's Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization[7] and R. W. Davies' The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930.[8] On villagization, the following studies are discussed: H. U. E. van Velzen essay "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants: A Study of a Political Field";[9] Issa G. Shivji's "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" and Class Struggles in Tanzania;[10] Philip Raikes "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development;[11] Michaela von Freyhold's "The Problem of Rural Development and the Politics of Ujamaa Vijijini in Handeni" and Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment;[12] C. K. Omari's Strategy in Rural Development: Tanzania Experience;[13] Tanzania; From Ujamaa to Villagization by Jannik Boesen;[14] Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy by Dean E. McHenry[15] and Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry by Goran Hyden.[16]

The above studies were selected because of five reasons. First, I wanted to see how the interpretations of collectivization and villagization reflected the control of scholarship in the USSR by the politicians and the influence of politics on the students of villagization. Western historians differed in explaining the fortunes and fate of the scholars during the four regimes of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. While people like Bertram D. Wolfe and K. F. Shteppa suggested that totalitarianism made scholarship serve the propaganda of the CPSU, Merle Fainsod, S. V. Utechin and George M. Enteen, although not refuting the claim, argued that there were serious scholars who

wrote or could have written scholarly studies.[17] Ali A. Mazrui, Cranfor Pratt, Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper claimed that the students of Tanzanian history were academically and ideologically committed because they sympathized with socialism or nationalism.[18]

Second, the scholars who explained the reasons for collectivization and villagization stressed either the political-ideological motives or the economic motives. On the one hand, Rudolf Schlesinger, E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies thought that collectivization was part of the building of socialism.[19] On the other hand, Alexander Erlich, Moshe Lewin, Herbert J. Ellison, Alec Nove, James R. Millar, Jerzy F. Karcz and O. A. Narkiewicz argued that collectivization was designed to extend Soviet power to the countryside after Stalin had defeated his rivals.[20] The commentators on villagization stressed three reasons: the role of President Julius K. Nyerere; the traditional economy; and the alienating impact of policy of positive non-alignment had over the coup in Zanzibar, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia by Ian Smith, aparthied in South Africa and the Congo (now Zaire) crisis.[2] The studies were selected to see whether any of these interpretations o the reasons to collectivize and villagize could be identified in the descriptions of the implementational strategies.

Third, collectivization and villagization were interpreted as part of economic development. I wanted to see how the view might have influenced the personal biases on the explanation of the implementational processes.[22]

Fourth, the literature on collectivization and villagization w outdated and there was no comparative historiographic study of the implementation of the two policies. Bogdenko and Pogudin discussed th

writings on collectivization after 1958 and by so doing updated the historiography. In "Historiography and Change," Merle Fainsod referred to V. K. Medvedev's article "The Liquidation of Kulaks in t Lower Volga Krai" to show that there were professional historians wh had not written serious work during the era of Stalin and that "the Thaw" was the beginning of "liberalization." He described how Medve used archival material hitherto unavailable to describe in detail th phases, participants and results of dekulakization.[23] His former st Nancy Whittier Heer, in chapter three of her study Politics and Hist in the Soviet Union, published in 1971, described the content of som of the Soviet studies published since 1958. She updated her former mentor's work and thesis. But she cited the arguments which did not support the official views of collectivization. She was demonstrati that the Khrushchev era and the first five years of the Brezhnev per witnessed the appearance of serious but controlled scholarship. In their discussions of Tanzanian socialism, Cranford Pratt, John S. Sa and Jonathan Barker, all Canadians, identified the historiographic schools but not some of the studies on villagization.[24]

Finally, the studies selected for this dissertation were con sidered to be genuine scholarship. There were conflicting interpret tions of what I considered to be some of the main themes of collecti zation and villagization: on collectivization they are dekulakizati the role of Stalin, the role of the Party and the government and the role of the local Party organizations and officials; on villagizatio they are the role of the Party and the government, and the response the civil servants and the peasantry. I selected studies on collect zation written after the XXth Party Congress of 1956. The historian

during the regime of Stalin (1929-1953) did not write genuinely scholar works. It was after Khrushchev's denunciation of the cult of Stalin in a closed session of the XXth Party Congress of 1956 that some "liberalization" occurred and encouraged serious research and writing on collectivization. Subsequently, Western scholars used the archives that were opened for research in the USSR or Soviet scholars' findings. Bogdenko and Pogudin's studies were selected because they updated the historiography of collectivization by providing new interpretations. Medvedev's interpretations were anti-Stalinist unlike Kovalenko and Ivintsky's. I have grouped Bogdenko and Pogudin between Medvedev, Kovalenko and Ivintsky. Medvedev provides a good example of genuinely serious scholarship and because his approach is Marxian, he contrasts with Western historians. Medvedev, not being a professional historian, was not subject to the control of the politicians. He is therefore similar to Western scholars whose writings are not politically controlled.

I also selected the studies on villagization because they were published after 1967 when socialism started to receive a more serious appraisal by historians. It was from 1970 that many scholars followed Shivji's scholarly critique of Tanzanian socialism. Marxist scholars took Shivji's leftist tendency while non-Marxists had a conservative approach.

The incompleteness of Fainsod and Heer's historiographical works, the fact that Soviet historiographical works on collectivization are narrow in scope and fail to include Western studies provide a justification for this dissertation. The lack of historiographical works on villagization makes it more necessary to justify this study, and

being a comparative one, it provides an alternative to interpretati studies.

There are at least two ways of writing a historiographic study. The first approach is to trace the evoluation of the schola ship on a historical topic such as Soviet collectivization from 192 to 1933; the implementation of Tanzanian villagization from 1967 to 1976; dekulakization during the period of mass collectivization, 19 1933. The second is to take note of the history of the scholarly c munity itself, at least the historical profession, in order to asce the political, socio-economic and cultural forces that shape the research and writing of studies. The historian wants to be aware o the selection of topics and themes, their descriptions and emphasis attached to them as well as the stated conclusions. What biases we at work in the selection of the themes, sources and studies? Did t writer use convincing evidence for the explanations? What question were asked or neglected?

The two approaches are used in this study. After introduci the reader to the historical background of collectivization and vil zation in the second chapter, the environment for historical schola ship in the USSR and Tanzania is described. It becomes clear that the Soviet Union and Tanzania are different in three major ways. C they are separated in time and space. Two, the people in the respe countries have different social, cultural, economic and political e iences. And three, the leadership in the Soviet Union claimed that the movement of collectivization was based on the principles of Mar Leninism; the Tanzanian leadership on the other hand, argued that villagization was a revival of traditional socialism, Ujamaa.

The second approach is used in chapters four and five where respectively, the scholarships of collectivization and villagizatio are discussed thematically.

The interpretations of collectivization and villagization a thematically compared in the sixth chapter. Reading the presentati of collectivization and villagization is like listening to a debate between Soviet and Western historians and Western and Tanzanian schc respectively. In this study, Western and Tanzanian scholars are sut divided into Marxist and non-Marxist.

The purpose of comparing and contrasting the interpretations of collectivization and villagization is to find out the direct and indirect influence of politics on historical scholarship. This is a pioneering study in which such an exercise is attempted. The de-Stalinization speech gave a measure of freedom to Soviet scholars. They began to do research and to write on the subjects that had been forbidden during the era of Stalin. Topics such as the role of Stal in collectivization, dekulakization, and the errors made by the Part and government officials, the local Party organizations, and the civ servants attracted attention. The Western scholars were interested in how the Soviet historians had used the evidence available to them in describing the above topics.

Some Soviet and Western historians made similar descriptions of the implementational processes and strategies of collectivization For instance, the interpretations of the role of Stalin by Medvedev were similar to those made by Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin. There wer some differences, however, in the descriptions of dekulakization. While Soviet historians conceded that the elimination of kulaks was

necessary, Medvedev questioned the use of compulsion and by so doing rejected dekulakization. The Western scholars were sympathetic to the kulaks. This reflected the preference for personal freedom.

There were also some similarities and differences in the interpretation of the implementation of villagization. Most of the historians made similar explanations regarding the role of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and central government officials. They differed on the obstacles of villagization. While Western scholars claimed that the peasantry was one of the major obstacles, Shivji blamed the international bourgeoisie that own multinational corporations. In his view, the international bourgeoisie allied with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (Party and government officials) in controlling the economy and consequently frustrated the objectives of villagization because the officials pursued their material interests.

Historiography is an oblique reflection of the historical reality. By comparing the interpretations of collectivization and villagization, we can learn about the conflicting conclusions that were based on the sources and studies used as well as about personal preferences. The similarities and differences of the interpretations can make historians understand the interaction between politics and historical scholarship. Further work is needed to solve this problem.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"K istorii nachalnogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizati selskogo khoziastva SSSR" ["On the History of the Initial Stage in All-Out Collectivization on Agriculture in the USSR,"] Voprosy istorri, no. 5 (1963):19-35. It was translated as a complete text in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XV, 36: (October 2, 1963):3-10; 14. Hereafter shortened as "Stalin's Role."

[2]A Samsonov et. al. Kratkaiia istoriia SSR, Chast II. trans. David Skvirsky & Vic Schneerson (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 159-173. Short History is hereafter used.

[3]"Problema likvidatsii kulachestva klassa v sovetskoi istoriografii," Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1965):142-149. It was translated in full in Soviet Studies in History, IV, 3 (Winter 1965-66):21-29.

[4]Trans. Colleen Taylor & ed. David Joravsky & Georges Haupt, 1st. pub. 1967 (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), Shortened to Let Histo Judge.

[5]D. A. Kovalenko et. al. Istoriia SSSR v 3-kh Tomakh, Chast II, trans. Kristine Bushnell (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 198-217. Hereafter briefed as the History.

[6]Unpublished dissertation: University Microfilm, Inc. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Microfilm 66-6937; Pennsylvania State University Library, B1802. Quoted hereafter as "Stalin's Revolution."

[7]La Paysannerie el le Pouvoir Sovietique, 1st. pub. 1966. trans Irene Nove & John Biggart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Hereafter shortened as Russian Peasants and Soviet Power.

[8]Referred to as The Socialist Offensive hereafter.

[9]In Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. I, ed. Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 118-126. Hereafter cited as "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants."

[10]In Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. II, ed. Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), pp. 304-330; hereafter abbr. "The Silent Class Struggle."

[11]Paper read at the Annual Social Conference of East African Universities, Dec. 18-20, 1973.

[12]The essay is hereafter cited as "Ujamaa Vijijini in Handeni" whereas the book is cited as Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania.

[13]Hereafter referred to as Strategy in Rural Development.

[14]Cited hereafter as Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages.

[15]In Towards Ujamaa in Tanzania ed. Bismarck U. Mwansasu Cranfor Pratt (Toronto: University of Toronot Press, 1979), pp. 125-144.

[16]Hereafter cited as Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania.

[17]Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation Rewrite: The Agony of Soviet Historians," Foreign Affairs, XXXI, I (October 1952):39-57. Konstantin F. Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State (New Brunswick, N.J. Rutgers University Press, 1963); Merle Fainsod, "Historiography and Change," Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror ed. John Keep & Liliana Brisby (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 19-42; S. V. Utechin, "Soviet Historiography after Stalin," Ibid., pp. 117-129; George M. Enteen, "The Writing of History in the USSR," Thought, 49, 194 (September 1974):299-310.

[18]Ali A. Mazrui, "Tanzaphilia," in his Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 255-267; C. Pratt, "Foreign Scholarship in Tanzania," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 8, 1 (1974):166-169; Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam," African Affairs, 69, 277 (October 1970):329-349.

[19]Rudolf Schlesinger, "The Turning Point," Soviet Studies, XI, 4 (April 1960):393-414, "Note on the Context of Early Soviet Planning," Soviet Studies, XVI, 1 (July 1964):22-44; E. H. Carr, "The Russian Revolution and the Peasant," The Listener, LXIX, 1783 (Thursday, May 30, 1963):898f, 913f, also in Proceedings of the British Academy, XLIX, (1963):69-93; "Revolution from Above: The Road to Collectivization," in his The October Revolution: Before and After (New York: Alfred A. Kropf, 1969), pp. 95-109 or "Revolution from Above: Some Notes on the Decision to Collectivize Soviet Agriculture," The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse ed. Kurt H. Wolfe & Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 313-327; and R. W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive, op. cit.

[20]Alec Nove, "Was Collectivization Inevitable?" Problems of Communism, VII, 4 (July-Aug. 1959):56-59 or "The Peasant, Collectivization and Mr. Carr", Soviet Studies, X, 4 (April 1959):384-389, "Was Stalin Really Necessary?" Encounter, XVIII, 4 (April 1962):86-92 and in his Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics or Was Stalin Really Necessary? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964), pp. 17-

39 and O. A. Narkiewicz, "Stalin, War Communism and Collectivization," Soviet Studies, XVII, 1 (July 1966):2-19. Alexander Erlich, "Preobrazhen ski and the Economics of Soviet Industrialization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVIV, 1 (February 1950):57-88, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) and "Stalin's Views in Soviet Economic Development," in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought ed. E. Simmons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 81-99, in Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin ed. William L. Blackwell (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 217-238) and in Readings on the Soviet Economy ed. Franklin D. Holzman (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1962), pp. 81-99; Moshe Lewin, "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization," Soviet Studies, 17, 2 (October 1965):162-197 and Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization trans. Irene Nove and John Biggart, 1st. pub. 1967 (Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1968) and Herbert J. Ellison, "Ideology and Agriculture," Soviet Studies, XVII, 4 (April 1966):397-407, "The Agricultural Hypothesis: A Comment on James R. Millar's Article," Soviet Studies XXII, 3 (January 1971): 394-401, and "The Decision to Collectivize," Agarian Policies in Communist and Non-Communist Countries ed. W. A. Douglas Jackson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 69-97; James R. Millar, "A Reformulation of A. V. Chayanov's Theory of the Peasant Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18, 2 (January 1970):219-229, "Soviet Rapid Development and the Agricultural Surplus Hypothesis" Soviet Studies, 22, 1 (July 1970):72-93, with Corine A. Guntzell, "The Economics and Politics of Mass Collectivization Reconsidered: A Review Article," Explorations in Economic History, 8, 12 (Fall 1970):193-116, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the first Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," Slavic Review, 33 (December 1974):750-766 and "A Note on Primitive Accumulation in Marx and Preobrezhensky," Soviet Studies, XXX, 3 (July 1978):384-393; Jerzy F. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," Soviet Studies, XVIII, 4 (April 1967):399-434, "Back on the Grain Front," Soviet Studies, XXII, 2 (Octobe 1970):262-294 "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture" American Slavic & East European Review, XX, 2 (April 1961):189-202 and "Comment on 'The Context of Early Soviet Planning,'" Soviet Studies, XVI, 3 (January 1965) 326-329.

[21]See Samuel Stephen Mushi, "Revolution by Evolution: The Tanzanian Road to Socialism," Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1974, Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976) and James N. Karioki, Tanzania's Human Revolusion (Universit Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979).

[22]Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917 1st, pub. 1948 (New York: International Publishers, 1966), Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System 1st pub. 1948 (Cambridge, 1980), E. H. Carr & R. W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, History of Russia, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969) and Nicolas Spulber, Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964): on villagization see footnotes 11-16 above.

[23]"Historiography and Change," p. 30. See V. K. Medvedev's "Likividatsiia kulachestva v Nizhnie-Volzhskom Vrae." ("The Liquidation of the Kulaks in the Lower Bolga Krei"), Istoriia SSSR, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec. 1958).

[24]C. Pratt, "Democracy and Socialism in Tanzania: A Reply to John S. Saul. Canadian Journal of African Studies, XII, III (1978):407-428, and "Tanzania's Transition to Socialism: Reflections of a Democratic Socialist," Towards Socialism in Tanzania, pp. 193-236; John S. Saul, "Tanzania's Transition to Socialism?" Canadian Journal of African Studies, XI, 2 (1977):313-339 and "Democracy and Socialism," Canadian Journal of African Studies, XII, III (1978):407-428; Jonathan Barker, "The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania," Towards Socialism in Tanzania, pp. 95-124.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVIZATION AND VILLAGIZATION

It is demonstrated in this chapter that co-operative farming was attempted in the USSR and Tanzania before the decisions to collectivize at the end of 1929 and to villagize at the end of 1967 were made.

In the background of collectivization, we shall first describe how Imperial governments treated the peasant or agrarian questions. Second, the co-operative movements from 1919 to 1929 are discussed. Finally, the immediate reasons for mass collectivization are assessed.

The background of villagization is explained by analyzing the existence of "Ujamaa" (communal living in villages and working) in pre-colonial times. Second, how German and British colonial governments tried to "modernize" traditional farming is analyzed. And finally, the reasons for villagization which President Nyerere gave and how it was to be implemented are discussed.

Background of Soviet Collectivization

The Peasant Question in the Imperial Period

The peasant question was linked to the institution of serfdom. Serfdom was a medieval institution in its origins. It was becoming firmly established in Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe when it was being abolished in Western Europe. Serfdom was legalized in 1649. During the reign of Peter the Great, serfs and peasants were recruited to serve in the army, factories and the building of St. Petersburg. The landowners left their farms to serve as army officers. The Crown rewarded them with serfs who worked on the farms. There were two types

of serfs: "barshchina" serfs were those who paid the landowners with their labor whereas "obrok" serfs paid quitrent.

Although there was a legal and social distinction between serfs and state peasants, they all belonged to the peasant estate; most worked on land; some served in the army and factories; and finally, they belonged to a peasant commune. The peasants and serfs joined together in rebellions to resist government policies or their treatment. The most notable rebellion was led by Pugachev during the reign of Catherine the Great.[1] The "specter of Pugachev" was perjoratively known as "Pugachevshchina."

The "specter of Pugachev" impeded and speeded the emancipation of serfs. Emperor Nicholas I feared liberating the serfs. He told the State Council in 1842:

> There is no doubt that serfdom, as it exists at present in our land, is an evil palpable and obvious to all. But to touch it <u>now</u> would be a still more disastrous evil . . . . The Pugachev rebellion proved how far mob violence can go.[2]

His Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov wrote:

> The question of serfdom is closely linked to the question of autocracy and even monarchy.
>
> These are two parallel forces which have developed together. Serfdom, whatever one may think of it, does exist. Abolition of it will lead to the dissatisfaction of the gentry class, which will start looking for compensations for itself somewhere, and there is nowhere to look except in the domain of autocracy . . . . Peter I's edifice will be shaken . . .
>
> Serfdom is a tree which has spread its roots afar: it shelters both the Church and the Throne.[3]

In actuality, Emperor Nicholas I wanted "the gradual transfer of peasants from the status of serfs, to that of obligated peasants--if need be, on various conditions, according to the locality. For I am

convinced that such a transfer should forestall a drastic change."[4]

After the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, when faced with peasant unrest and liberals' criticism of serfdom, Emperor Alexander II decided to abolish it. He told the nobles of Moscow assembly on March 30, 1856:

> It is better to begin abolishing serfdom from above than to wait for it to begin to abolish itself from below. I ask you, gentlemen, to think of ways of doing this. Pass on my words to the nobles for consideration.[5]

The emperor's message was carried out. Liberal intellectuals and enlightened nobles prepared an emancipation edict between 1856-1861. It was announced on February 19, 1861 (New calendar March 3, 1961),* the anniversary of Alexander II's coronation.[6] The law liberated about 23,000,000 serfs from the bondage of about 104,000 landowners.[7]

There has been a heated controversy on the significance of the emancipation of the serfs. Liberal scholars interpreted it as a humanitarian achievement in which no civil war as in the USA was fought. Soviet scholars called it a bourgeois law which did not give all the land to the peasant; and which "bound" the peasant to the commune. It must be remembered that it was a one-man's personal initiative which the predecessors had refused to take. For the first time in the Imperial period, serfs became citizens. The emancipation edict opened the door for other reforms.

The Agrarian Question in Imperial Russia

The agrarian question was closely linked to the problem of the peasant commune. The peasant commune posed a problem to the "modernization" of agriculture. The Russian rural countryside was divided

*Unless otherwise stated dates are according to the old style.

into narrow personal strips of land for subsistence production.

The existence of communes is now thought by historians to have been extremely widespread. For example, they existed in Europe, and as we shall also see in this chapter, in Africa. The communes in Russia are thought by historians to have replaced tribal organizations before the Kievan era in the 11th century.[8] Konstantin Aksakov defined and celebrated a commune as follows:

> A commune is a union of people who have renounced their egoism, their individuality, and who express their common accord; this is an act of love, a noble Christian act, which expressed itself more or less clearly also in its various other manifestations. A commune thus represents a moral choir, and just as in a choir a voice is not lost, but follows the general pattern and is heard in the harmony of all voices, so in the commune the individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusiveness in favor of the general accord--and there arises the noble phenomenon of harmonious, joint existence of rational beings (consciousness), there arises a brotherhood, a commune, a triumph of human spirit.*[9]

The Russian commune had four main characteristics.[10] The first characteristic was that all land, including the pasture, meadows and forests, belonged to the commune. The second feature was that the members lived in villages and worked together. The commune had several households (dvor) which were independent social and economic units. A family owned and cultivated individual strips of land. The father divided the land among his sons after they married. The periodic repartitioning of land was the third common feature of communes. A Soviet specialist on agriculture, Danilov, wrote on the repartitioning system:

> Each of the fields (polei) of the rotation was divided into yarusy, according to the distance of this piece of land from the settlement. Yarusy in their turn were

*Cf. President Nyerere's definition of Ujamaa in this chapter.

> divided into kony--pieces of land equal in fertility. In each kon the member received his share--the strip. In very large communes with many households the fields were first divided between tens, or hundreds, of households, then by separate households.[11]

Repartitioning was a major cause of the agrarian problem throughout the Imperial period. Another cause of the agrarian problem was that members of a household walked between nine and eleven kilometers to the strips of land.[12] The fourth feature was that the size, distribution and economic organization of the communes depended on the habitat.

A solution to the agrarian problem was attempted by Prime Minister Peter Stolypin after the Revolution of 1905. He encouraged individual ownership of land where the redistribution was periodic and the break-up of the commune where periodic repartitioning was not chronic. His policy was known as "wager on the strong." Some "strong" peasants borrowed money from the Peasant Land Bank and bought land from "weak" ones and poor landowners. The Stolypin agrarian reforms were designed to strengthen and preserve the monarchy by minimizing the chances of peasant revolts whose causes were partly attributed by the government to the commune and traditional farming. The policy was partially successful before the Bolsheviks discontinued it after 1917.

The Road to Collectivization

The Russian peasant commune was romanticized by the Slavophiles (intellectuals who criticized Peter I's "Westernization"). Aksakov, who was quoted above, was a Slavophile. The Populists (Narodniks) argued that the communes would be the foundation for building a socialist society after the revolution. The Russian Marxists regarded the commune

as feudal and unprogressive. Vera Zasulich wrote to Karl Marx asking his views on the commune question. In the introduction to the Russian edition of The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Frederick Engels gave their answer. They wrote on January 21, 1882:

> The Communist Manifesto had as its object the proclamation of the inevitably impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face to face with the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and bourgeois landed property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian obshchina, though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it pass through the same process of dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?
>
> The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.[13]

Lenin wrote in his Development of Capitalism in Russia that capitalism had decomposed the communes. He became a populist in the revolutionary year 1917. As a means of getting political power he used the slogans "All Land to the Peasants" and "All Power to the Soviets."* The peasants were by then expropriating the landowners' farms among themselves. The workers and the soldiers joined the peasants. The commune was restored between 1917-1930.

The restoration of the commune worried the Bolsheviks. How were they going to solve the agrarian problem and maintain Soviet power in the countryside? In 1918 the land was socialized by the government. Lenin explained to poor peasant delegates why the law was promulgated:

> We Bolsheviks were against the law on socialization of the land. All the same, we signed it because we did not

*Soviet = a council.

> want to oppose the majority of the peasantry. . . . We did not want to bind the peasant to the idea which is strange to him that equalizing redistribution of land is useless. Better for peasants to find it out for themselves.[14]

The Communist (Bolshevik) government encouraged the gradual and voluntary establishment of three types of agricultural cooperatives: the "toz," "artel" and "kommuna":* (1) "In the kommuna, not only the land and the means of work were collectivized, but also the housing and consumption. The kommuna worked on egalitarian principles of distribution; families left their cottages and lived in rooms allocated to them in communal living quarters; everyone ate in a communal refractory; in principle, the children were brought up and educated by the kommuna, and lived in schools or nurseries under the care of persons appointed by the kommuna. There were individual variations in the details of organization as between one kommuna and another, and the above principles were implemented according to the means of the abilities of the kommuna in question."[15]

(2) "In the artel, collectivization did not extend to housing or consumption. Family life retained its private character, as it had before. Land was held in common, except for a small strip attached to the house, and the size of this strip varied according to the decisions taken by the local authorities. In principle, all important implements, and draught animals, and occasionally either all or some of the cows, were communally owned."[16]

(3) "In the toz either all or part of the land was held in common ownership, and communally divided. In the majority of cases, income was distributed in accordance with the size of each peasant's

*They were called "Kollektivnoe khozyaistvo" (Kolkhoz).

holding. It was rare for livestock and the majority of the farm implemer to be collectivized, but the heaviest and most expensive machines, such as tractors or steam thrashers, which the individual farmer could not afford, were owned communally. In this type of association there was considerable variation in the degree of collectivization and the amount of the property held in common."[17]

The number of the kolkhozniki (kolkhoz members) rose between 1920-1924; it fell between 1925-1927.[18] During those periods, the Soviet government was absorbed in other issues. Between 1921-1924 it was absorbed in the "scissor crisis" and the death of Lenin. Between 1925-1927 it was dealing with the problem of making a transition to socialism using or without using the NEP methods.

In the years 1923-24 agricultural prices fell and the prices of manufactured consumers' goods rose. The economists feared that peasants would refuse to sell their grain to the government or the cities. The "scissors crisis" was solved but it revealed that NEP posed economic problems.

The death of Lenin on January 21, 1924 deprived the Soviet peopl of the founder of the Soviet Union. Lenin had dominated the political scene as the teacher of the Bolsheviks. He formulated and explained the implementation of government policies. To some Bolsheviks the NEP methods, e.g., the cooperative movement, encouragement of trade, individual farming and trade (i.e. "State Capitalism") were contradictor with socialist objectives. But Lenin was not opposed. Now that he was dead, how could he be replaced? Who could formulate policies? This was the dilemma.

In the search for the ways and means of industrializing the country as a means of building a socialist society, two main factions emerged in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). Alexander Erlich designated the views they exchanged as "the Great Industralization Debate."[19]

Trotsky and Preobrazhensky were the "leftist oppositionists." They argued that the peasant must be squeezed to finance rapid heavy industrialization. They also argued that foreign investors would also be encouraged to finance heavy industrialization. The main theoretician of the Right Opposition was Bukharin. He wanted gradual industrailization and the encouragement of peasant prosperity. Stalin claimed to take the Leninist position. That is, he had no original ideas of his own; he swayed from the ideas of the "Leftists" and the "Rightists." He stressed that socialism should be built in the USSR first before thinking of revolutions in Western Europe. This was known as the theory of "Socialism in One Country," as opposed to trotsky's theory of "the Permanent Revolution." During the First Five-Year Plan (FFY), 1928-1932, Stalin embarked on rapid industrialization by squeezing the peasants through collectivization.[20]

Agricultural prices lagged behind those of manufactured goods at the end of 1927 and early 1928. The government found it difficult to purchase grain. The Bolsheviks later blamed the "kulaks" (rich peasants) for the grain crisis. M. P. Kim wrote:

> The basic causes of grain procurement difficulties were the splintering (razdroblennost') and the low level of commercialization of agriculture. But the grain difficulties also possessed a class basis, and it was specifically because of this that they were transformed into the grain procurement crisis of 1928.[21]

The delegates in the XV Party Congress at the end of 1927 resolved that collectivization would be encouraged. At the XVI Party Conference of April 1929 it was decided that "kulaks" would be restricted in joining the kolkhozes. Stalin argued later that "kulaks" should not join the kolkhozes. At the end of 1929 he prevailed over the Politburo on the issue of establishing collective farms throughout the USSR. He called it "the Great Turning Point" in the collectivization movement.

Background of Tanzanian Villagization

Tanzanian is the official name for the Union of Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar. The Union was formed on April 24, 1964. To make a distinction between the member-states of the Union, Mainland Tanzania is used for Tanganyika and Tanzania "kisiwani" (literally Tanzania island) refers to Zanzibar. Sometimes Zanzibar is retained. In fact Tanzania is sometimes synonymous with Tanganyika. This is the approach used in this study.

Tanzania mainland lies astride the Indian Ocean. Zanzibar lies about twenty-two miles off Dar es Salaam, the present capital city and main port of mainland Tanzania. Kenya and Uganda are the northern neighbors of mainland Tanzania. To the north-west are the tiny states of Burundi and Urundi and the giant state of Zaire. The southern neighbors, except Malawi, are its reliable friends. These are Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. President Julius K. Nyerere is the chairman of the "frontline states" of which those southern neighbors are some of the members.

Mainland Tanzania was colonized by the Germans from 1885 to 1919. It was called German East Africa. The British were given the colony

as a Mandated Territory by the League of Nations in 1919. The British called the territory Tanganyika. They ruled it as a Trust Territory for the United Nations from 1945 to 1961. Tanganyikans regained political independence on December 9, 1962. Zanzibar attained its political freedom a year later after being colonized by the British since 1890.

Tanganyika maintained the capitalist system until February 1967 when the government resolved to experiment on a socialist alternative. The policy was announced in the Arusha Declaration. The Declaration stated that Tanzania would develop without relying on foreign capital. It would rely on the people, land, good leadership and socialist policies (e.g. absence of exploitation; control of the major means of production and exchange by peasants and workers; democracy and equality). It also stated that agricultural development rather than industrial development would receive priority.[22]

It was not until September 1967 that a policy on agricultural development was formulated in the paper "Socialism and Rural Development." The policy stated that Tanzanians should go back to the traditional way of "ujamaa" (socialist/communal) system and "become a nation of ujamaa villages where people cooperate directly in small groups and where those small groups of people cooperate together for joint enterprises."[23]

The existence of villages is now thought by historians to have been widespread in Africa--the members of a village conducted social, political, and economic activities as one group. The activities vari because of the social customs and the environment. Tanzania is a large country. It is generally dry in the middle and fertile in the

valleys and at the edges. There are over 120 ethnic groups. Archaeologists and migrationist historians have suggested that Cushites (e.g. Mbugu) were the earliest settlers in Tanzania. The Nilotes (e.g. Maasai and Tatoga) and the Khoisan (e.g. Sandawe and Hadza) migrated into the region before the Bantu. The Bantu are three-quarters of the 120 ethnic groups. The early Bantu migrants copied Cushitic village-life. The pastoral Maasai did not live in vaillages.

A recent archaeologist has written about the Cushitic settlement of Engaruka:

> It was an important and concentrated agricultural settlement, dependent, in this area of low rainfall, on the irrigation potentialities of the river that rushes down the rift valley. Ancient field-systems stretch away from the river on each side. . . . Homesteads were mostly on the hillside, partly no doubt with a view to defense. . . . Engaruka remains an important archaeological site with much more to tell us.[24]

Similar settlements were described in Bantu societies by 19th century European travellers and missionaries. The settlements were large or small depending on the number of inhabitants. They were fortified with wooden stockade, or stone, or a hedge, or a deep ditch.

Travelling through the western region of pre-colonial Tanzania, Richard Burton described the Sukuma (the largest Bantu ethnic group in Tanzania) as living in numerous villages "which rise at short intervals above their impervious walls of the lustrous green milk-bush, with its coral-shaped arms, variegating the well-hoed plains."[25] Richard Burton also described the Nyamwezi (the second largest Bantu group and cousins of the Sukuma) to the south of the Sukuma as living in villages. About their capital at Unyanyembe

and its environs he wrote:

> This 'Bandari-district' contains villages and hamlets, but nothing that can properly be termed a town. The Mtemi or Sultan Fundikira, the most powerful of the Nyamwezi chiefs, inhabits a temple, or square settlement, called 'Ititenya' on the western slope of the southern hills. . . . In the centre of the plain lies 'Kazeh,' another scattered collection of six large oblongs, with central courts, garden plots. . . . Around this nuclei cluster native villages--masses of Wanyamwezi hovels, which bear the names of their founders . . . .[26]

A similar description was made by Southon of the London Missionary Society when he saw Urambo, then the rival town of Unyanyembe. Urambo was

> A large enclosure the sides of which are composed of a substantially built wall against which houses are built all around. It is nearly half a mile square and encloses nearly two square miles of ground. In the space thus enclosed about two hundred round huts--well built and some of them fifty feet in diameter--give habitation to about 10,000 inhabitants; quite another 5,000 live in houses built against the wall. . . the industrious agriculturalists and enterprising wapagazi [domestic servants] live at a distance from the capital. [the suburbs for the rich].[27]

This description gives an indication of the break-up of villagers from a "parent" village-settlement to found new ones. The example of the Nyakyusa (the third largest Bantu group) of southern Tanzania is illustrative of this phenomenon. The Nyakyusa lived in "age-villages" "whereby male age-groups, together with their wives and children, formed villages until the children became herd-boys and in turn hived off to form settlements of their own."[28] "Among the Nyakyusa the age-village. . . remained stronger than among the Ngonde (another Bantu group) where a centralized kingdom had emerged."[29]

Joseph Thompson was so impressed with the Nyakyusa village-life that he called their society an "Arcadia." He wrote:

> It seemed a perfect Arcadia, about which idyllic poets have sung, though few have seen it realized. Imagine a magnificent grove of bananas, laden with bunches of fruit, each of which would form a man's load, growing on a perfectly level plain, from which all weeds, garbage, and things unsightly are carefully cleared away. Dotted here and there are a large number of immense shady sycamores, with branches each almost as large as a separate tree. At every few spaces are charmingly neat circular huts, with conical roofs, and walls hanging out all round with the clay worked prettily into rounded bricks, and daubed symmetrically with spots. The grass thatching is also very neat. The tout ensemble renders these huts worthy of a place in any nobleman's garden.[30]

The preceding descriptions of Bantu villages give a hint of how people lived and worked together. The village had several homesteads. The village was ruled by a council of elders from each of the homesteads. The environs of the village belonged to all the villagers. The members of a household, however, owned their own garden. The elders organized the members to work in the gardens rotatively The principle of division of labor was practiced and it was based on sex, age, social status and kinship ties. For example, in most of the Bantu societies men cleared and burnt the bush while women cultivated and harvested maize or millet. The youth organized their cooperative work according to the age-sets. The sexes mixed in some economic activities.

A. A. Kazimoto discussed three types of cooperative farming among the Makonde. The youth practiced "Majaha." They weeded and cultivated in each others family-farm. The same system of rotation was practiced by grown-ups in what was known as "Vyalalo" and "Chikukul

He thought that other Bantu societies practiced the same system. He wrote:

> What is true to the Makonde is probably also true of other ethnic groups like the Wasukuma whose youth the Wagobogobo and the like who form powerful societies with effective social and economic programmes for the individual members and the societies as a whole. The Wapare have Msaragambo, a social practice that is being utilized more in nation building in the area.[32]

The Impact of Colonialism on Ujamaa (1885-1961)

The German Period, 1885-1919. German East Africa was first administered by the agents of the German East Africa Company from 1885 to 1891. It was a period of chaos and instability. The Company faced resistance from the local people. The causes of the resistances were the imposition of taxes and local rulers; and forceful recruitment of laborers for settlers' plantations. When the people were defeated, many left their original villages and settled elsewhere to avoid government control. Since taxes were per house, people reduced the number of houses to avoid paying more taxes. This means that the villages became fewer and scattered.

The German government took over the administration in 1891 to ameliorate the situation. But not much was achieved; things became worse than before. The government became more assertative in the implementation of the economic policies. For example, in 1901, Governor Götzen introduced the policy of "koloniale Lebensaufgabe" ("colonial life-work") in the southern coastal strip of the colony. The local administrators were forced to recruit labor and use it for the cultivation of cotton-farms designated as "Dorfschamba" or communal

plots. The landless Nyamwezi from up-country were resettled in the area. The policy was unpopular to the peasants.[33] The local administrators, the medicine-men and the peasants rose against the colonial government from 1905 to 1907. The uprising is known as the "Maji Maji" after the people's belief that their bodies would be bullet-proof once they were smeared with traditional medicine. It marked a turning point in German colonial policy. The period 1905-1945 is known as "the age of improvement and differentiation" in Tanzanian historiography. Africans adapted to colonial rule and the capitalist mode of production so that they could "face European rulers on more equal terms."[34] The reader is reminded that after the Revolution of 1905 in Russia the government felt that it was time to encourage individual farming. In German East Africa, and subsequently Tanganyika, the people felt that it was time they improved their life in stead of fighting the colonialists.

The British Period, 1919-1961. The designation of the period 1905-1945 as "the age of improvement" is exaggerated. German administration was terminated by the League of Nations in 1919. The British did not offer conducive conditions in which the people could "improve" themselves. Tanganyika had been the theatre of the First World War in East Africa. The buildings and the infrastructure were destroyed. 1919-1939 was a period of reconstruction. The British encouraged the local people to practice irrigation; to build cattle-dips and to accept Western medicine and education. There were outbreaks of sleeping sickness between the years 1922-1954. People were "concentrated" in planned settlements to avoid the disease. Colonial theorists suggested from this experience that if peasants lived in one area and

practiced production together, development would be accelerated.[35] The suggestion was not considered during the inter-war period.

After the Second World War, investment was encouraged in Tanganyika. In 1953 the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (T.A.C.) was set up to administer a Groundnut Scheme in the dry areas of Nachingwea, Urambo and Kongwa. The T.A.C. started "cooperative farming settlements." In 1954 the British American Tobacco Company began its settlement schemes. Peasants were encouraged to resettle in the settlement schemes and grow their own crops. But the policy did not attract them. They regarded tenancy as a form of squatterism in settlers' farms. The World Bank visited Tanganyika in 1959 to study and make recommendations on the schemes. It published a report in 1960. It recommended that planned settlement schemes should be established in empty and thinly populated areas so that landless peasants could be resettled in them. An Israeli expert, Benjamin Kaplan, endorsed the recommendation in 1961. The two suggestions combined the ideas advanced by colonial theorists during the interwar period and the ideas about cooperative schemes advanced in the fifties. The schemes were to promote "a healthy, prosperous yeoman farmer class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of its fruits, jealous of its inherent wealth, and dedicated to maintaining the family unit on it." The capitalist class would maintain the status quo by "stabilis ing influences in the African community."[36] The schemes and what the World Bank recommended was like the Stolypin Land Reforms after the Revolution of 1905 in Imperial Russia.*

*See page 17.

The Road to Villagization

There were two paths of development in independent Tanganyika during the pre-Arusha period, 1962-1967. The first one was the settlement scheme approach as recommended by the World Bank in 1960. The TANU government established a Village Settlement Agency (VSA) to resettle the peasants, supervise and finance the settlement schemes. The VSA was controlled by the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development. The government replaced the Tanganyika Agricultural Development with the National Development Corporation. The VSA resettled peasants in about thirty settlement schemes. The schemes were financed and managed by foreigners. They failed because of two reasons. First, the peasants did not like being resettled in the settlement schemes. And second, they were poorly managed. For example, the managers put many tractors in them, but had no trained drivers or mechanics.[37]

The second approach was a socialist as opposed to a capitalist one. The youth members of the TANU Youth League (TYL) and the peasants in Ruvuma Region started cooperative farms in 1960. They did this voluntarily.

TYL started National Service Farms in Songea and Tanga Districts. The members recruited unemployed young men in towns. Their mottoes were hard work, self-reliance and socialist cooperation. Like the VSA settlement schemes, the National Service Farms were not well-managed. The only successful farm was the Mbambara Sisal Project.

The peasants' socialist experiment was more successful than that of the youth. The peasants belonging to the "Social and Economic

Revolutionary Army" and those who were in fifteen VSA settlement schemes in the Ruvuma Region formed the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). The most successful cooperative settlement the RDA had was at Litowa. The settlers elected managers and finance-controllers. They also started a primary school. The school's board of governors was also elected by the peasants. The board designed its own curriculum which stressed practical rather than theoretical education. The Member of Parliament for the area, Mr. Ntimbanjayo Milinga, settled at Litowa. He even contributed part of his salary to the community. The top leadership was so impressed that some officials, e.g. the President, visited the area and encouraged other peasants to establish communal farms.

The TANU government encouraged the dual approach of development. But the socialist approach was favored more than the capitalist one. In his Inaugural Address as President of Tanganyika in 1962, Julius K. Nyerere said that "If we do not start living in proper village communities then all our attempts to develop the country will be just so much wasted effort."[38] In his Opening Address in April 1966 at the then University College, Dar es Salaam, the Second Vice-President Mr. Rashid Kawawa stated:

> In the future, it has been decided that, instead of establishing highly capitalized schemes and moving people to them emphasis shall be on modernizing existing traditional villages by injecting capital in order to raise the standard of living of the villagers. It is envisaged that such improvement might take the form of provision of water supply, better layout of villages, improved farming and production methods, and reorganization of land holdings.[39]

The settlement schemes were phased out in 1966. In February 1967 the policy of socialism and self-reliance was announced in the Arusha Declaration. In September 1967 the policy of villagization was stated in the government paper "Socialism and Rural Development."

The President gave two reasons in "Socialism and Rural Development." The first reason was the failure of the capitalist development through VSA settlement schemes.[40] The second reason for villagization was the success of RDA Ujamaa Villages.[41] President Nyerere described three differences between the proposed Ujamaa Villages and traditional villages. First, the Ujamaa villagers would not be discriminated because of sex or customary practices as it used to be among traditional villagers. Second, Ujamaa Villages would not be family communities but national communities so that "the barriers which previously existed between different groups must be broken down."[42] And third, Ujamaa Villagers would produce more than traditional villagers because of the use of modern knowledge and technology.

President Nyerere explained that the Ujamaa Villages would be established gradually. He wrote:

> The man who creeps forward inch by inch may well arrive at his destination when the man who jumps without being able to see the other side may well fall and cripple himself. Where necessary, then, progress can be made in three stages. The first may be to persuade people to move their houses into a single village, if possible near water, and to plant their next years' food crops within easy reach of the area where the houses will be. For some peoples in Tanzania this will be quite a change in living habits, so that in certain areas this may be the second rather than the first stage in the progress. For another step is to persuade a group of people--perhaps the members of a ten-house cell--to start a small communal plot (or some other communal activity) on which they work cooperatively, sharing the proceeds at harvest time according to the work they each have

> done. Alternatively, it might be that the parents of children at a primary school could start a community farm, working together with the children, and jointly deciding what to grow and how to share the proceeds. In either of these cases, and whether or not the people are living together in a village at this stage, the people would keep their individual plots; the community farm would be an extra effort instead of each family trying to expand its own acreage. Once these two steps have been effected, the final stage would come when the people have confidence in a community farm, so that they are willing to invest all their effort in it, simply keeping gardens around their own houses for special vegetables, etc. Then the socialist village will really be established and other productive community activities can get underway.[43]

The President warned that this strategy was not to be used everywhere. The processes of implementing the policy of villagization would differ from region to region because of the differences in people's social customs; soils and economic practices. To the strategy of gradualism, he added those of inducement and voluntarism. In areas such as Kilimanjaro District and the West Lake Region where traditional villages did not exist because of the success of the colonialist cash crop economy, he suggested the following process:

> The first should be during the beginning of the dry season when active men and women are taken to the new areas and loaned tents for a few weeks while they build temporary houses for themselves and their families who will move in later and begin land clearing ready for the rains. When accommodation is ready the second "moving day" should be instituted, with the families brought to begin their new life in the village. For those people whose relatives cannot help them, the Government should provide food until the first harvest, it should also provide a grace period of three years before repayment begins. In such settlements, too, it should be essential that agricultural advice be available, because the farmers would be unfamiliar with the crops and the soil requirements of the new area.[43]

The unresettled farmers would either amalgamate their individual plots and work on them communally or they would start a communal

poultry unit; or tannery; or shop; or cottage industry.[44]

He made the same suggestions for animal husbandry areas, e.g. Maasailand. He observed that because pastoralists did not live in communal villages due to their economic system, they would be persuaded to practice communal herding. The next stage would be for the herders to "make up a community herd, which is then cared for by modern methods and which perhaps has a reserved grazing area."[45]

The use of compulsion to establish Ujamaa Villages was revolting to President Nyerere but what he wrote or said left many interpretations. In July 1967 he was quoted by a friend as having said:

> I am a democrat and I could not be a Stalin. I would not regiment my people. Democracy in the African context is not the sophisticated and many faced thing which it is in places where democracy works at every level such as Britain and the United States. We need less sophisticated models in our present phase.[46]

In 1968 he wrote:

> A violent revolution may make the introduction of socialist institutions easier; it makes more difficult the development of socialist attitudes which give rise to these institutions. . . . The necessity for a violent revolution brings its own problems to the building of socialism; they may be different problems from those experienced by the states which are fortunate enough to be able to move peacefully from one kind of socialist system to another, but they are nonetheless real.[47]

But he qualified the use of compulsion by arguing that violence "should be accepted as a necessity when every other road forward is completely blocked and cannot be cleared by persistence, by public determination, or by other expressions of the majority will."[48]

FOOTNOTES

[1]On peasant revolts see Maurice Hindus, The Cossacks: The Story of a Warrior People (New York: Doubleday, Dovan & Co., Inc., 1945); Philip Langworth, Cossacks (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970) and Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels, 1600-1800 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976). For Pugachev in Literature see Alexander Pushkin, The Captain's Daughter and Other Great Stories (New York: Random House, Inc., 1936).

[2]George Vernadsky, et. al. A Source Book for Russian History From Early Times to 1917, Vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 552.

[3]Quoted in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. "Afterward: The Problem of the Peasant." The Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 275.

[4]Speaking to a delegation of noblemen, June 4, 1847. See A Source Book for Russian History, p. 560.

[5]George Vernadsky, et. al. A Source Book for Russian History From Early Time to 1917, Vol. III (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 589.

[6]Terence Emmons. The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861 (Cambridge, 1968).

[7]Terence Emmons. "The Peasant Emancipation," The Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia, p. 41.

[8]Jerome Blum. Lord and Peasant in Russia: From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century, 1st ed. 1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 24.

[9]"Afterward: The Problem of the Peasant," p. 272.

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[40]"Socialism and Rural Development," Freedom and Socialism, 1969, p. 364.

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[43]Ibid., p. 356f.

[44]Ibid., p. 360f.

[45]Ibid., pp. 361, 362.

[46]Ibid., p. 362.

[47]Quoted in William Redman Duggan and John R. Civille, Tanzania and Nyerere (New York: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 93f.

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CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND OF THE HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP OF COLLECTIVIZATION AND VILLAGIZATION

This chapter conveys basic information and delineates the broad contours of the evolution of historical scholarship in the USSR and Tanzania. Its purpose is to orient the reader by providing a context for the presentation of specialized writings on mass collectivization in the period 1929-1933 and villagization from 1967 to 1976.

Historical Scholarship in the USSR

Some Western scholars have suggested that Soviet scholars work under totalitarian conditions. The theory of totalitarianism states that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) control historical scholarship by deciding what topics should be researched into and how they should be interpreted.[1] There are some scholars who see Soviet historical scholarship as exclusively a form of propaganda. All, however, while agreeing that Soviet scholarship is controlled, argue that professional scholars had greater freedom during the periods of War Communism and the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1921-1928); less freedom during Stalin's era (1929-1953); considerable freedom during the "Thaw" period (1953-1955); some freedom during the Khrushchev years (1956-1964) and little during the Breshnev period (1964 to the present).[2]

The Soviet scholar E. N. Burdzhalov, the deputy editor of Voprosy istorii, commented on the environment of historical scholarship when he said that during the 1920's historians "worked more truthfully

than the historians of the 1930's, and the latter more truthfully than the historians of the 1950's."[3] There is some truth in this statement.

The CPSU showed some interest in historical scholarship after 1917. It supported and founded research institutes. Marxist and non-Marxist historians cooperated in historical scholarship. Non-Marxist scholars dominated in the State Academy of Material Culture (GAIMK), founded in 1919, and the Academy of Sciences of Leningrad. Marxist scholars' institutes were the Communist Academy, founded in 1918; Istpart (Party History), founded in 1920; the Institute of Red Professors, founded in 1921; the Lenin Institute, founded in 1923; and the Society of Marxist Historians, founded in 1925. Members of lesser organizations such as the Society of Old Bolsheviks and the Society of Ex-Political Prisoners and Penal Exiles were Marxist scholars.

The Marxist scholars were supported by the CPSU; non-Marxists were temporary allies. M. N. Pokrovsky was the most powerful Marxist; he was the founder, organizer and administrator of the Society of Marxist Historians (SMH). Another prominent Marxist who rivaled Pokrovsky and whose fame rose in the 1930's was E. M. Iaroslavskii.

Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovsky was born on August 17, 1868. His father was a bureaucrat in Moscow. Pokrovsky was trained as a historian under the famous Russian historians V. O. Klyuchevsky and P. G. Vinagradov. He became a member of the Bolshevik faction after the Revolution of 1905.

Pokrovsky incalculated the practice of "partiinost" (Party-mindedness) on all historians. The term partiinost implied that ideology was not only an important tool in research and writing of

history but also that historical scholarship was to be used for the propaganda purposes of the CPSU. The historical profession was a weapon in the "historical front." The term was popularized by some non-Marxists after Pokrovsky refers to their work as "nothing other than politics retrojected into the past."[4] Since he never rejected the term "partiinost," historians use it to describe some of his historical views.

Pokrovsky was the Deputy Chairman of the Peoples Commissariat of Education (Narkompros); he was the Chairman of the State Council of Scholars and the Presidium of the Communist Academy; he was the rector of the Institute of Red Professors. He was a member of the Institute of History, founded in 1921 and affiliated to the Social Science Faculty (FON) of Moscow University in 1922 and in 1923 to the Russian Association of Social Science Institutes (RANION). Pokrovsky was so powerful as a scholar and leader of the historical profession that Professor R. V. Daniels called him a "dictator"--and "commander."[5] Professor George M. Enteen called him a "scholar-bureaucrat."[6] Pokrovsky is thought to have writeen "600 works of one kind or another."[7]

Emelian Minei Iaroslavskii was born on February 19, 1878. It is thought by historians who have used secondary sources that Laroslavsk became acquainted with Marxism in 1898; he was active in workers' movement and he was probably a Menshevik before becoming a Bolshevik during the Revolution of 1905.

Iaroslavskii was the Secretary of the Party Collegium of the Central Control Commission since 1923; the Chairman of the Society of

Former Political Prisoners and Penal Exiles; the Society of Old Bolsheviks and the League of the Godless. He was a member of the Communist Academy. He was the editor of Pravda, Izvestiia and Bolshevik. He was on the editorial board of SMH's Istorik-Markist and Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, a journal of the Lenin Institute. Iaroslavskii wrote about 2,000 works "that include 140 books and brochures."[8]

There were struggles between Marxist and non-Marxist historians and among Marxist scholars because of national, political, and academic backgrounds; personality and professional differences. Most of the non-Marxists were national-minded and resisted Marxist interpretation of the past. Intellectuals from the Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan wanted nationalist interpretations of the country's past.

The source of personal and scholarly conflict was the explanation of the history of the CPSU (Bolshevik). The theme had implications of interpreting the "ripeness" of the conditions for the October Revolution of 1917 and the building of socialism. The theme was "dangerous" because the role of revolutionaries dead and living (e.g., Lenin and Stalin, etc.) was to be explained. The controversy that emerged in late 1929 was on the connections between "Narodnaia Volia" (People's Will) and Bolshevism.

I. A. Terodorovich stressed the similarities more than the differences. Teodorovich was a member of the People's Will before becoming a Bolshevik. In the first Soviet government, he was first appointed Commissar for Food, then Commissar of Agriculture of the RFSFR. He was the Chairman of the Peasant International. He was later the Chairman of the International Agrarian Institute. At the time of

the Narodnaia Volia controversy he was the chief editor of Kartoga i ssylka, a journal of the Society of Ex-Political Prisoners and Penal Exiles.

Pokrovsky argued that there were neither similarities nor differences between the People's Will and Bolshevism. The debate became one between Pokrovsky and those who supported him, e.g., Iaroslavskii, and Teodorovich, whom Iaroslavskii gave moral support. Teodorovich's views were discussed in the newspapers and scholarly journals. Pokrovsky and his group triumphed when Teodorovich was censured by the Central Committee.

The debate between Teodorovich and Pokrovsky shows the freedom in scholarship regarding self-criticism on the inadequacies of Marxist interpretation of some historical themes. The debate also shows the control exercised by the CC of the CPSU on historical scholarship. We also see a rift in the SMH. Iaroslavskii wrote in Bolshevik in 1930:

> The discussion showed how dangerous the situation is for Bolshevik research into the facts of our past when one or another group of comrades declares revisionist anything that does not fit its scheme. Among other things, one of the conclusions of this discussion, with which, it seems, all comrades agree, is the necessity in our historical journals to guarantee more balanced illumination of numerous controversial problems in the history of our party, the history of the class struggle. We hope that in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia and Istorik-markist there will be possible more enlivening and more objective discussion of a number of unclear and controversial problems in the history of our party and in the history of the revolutionary movement, without attaching to each other unsuitable labels.[9]

Iaroslavskii was claiming that Pokrovsky's views were as wrong and Teodorovich's, and that Pokrovsky's group were a minority. The implication was that Pokrovsky's views were wrong. The irony of his

call for "objective" scholarship was that it signalled the total imposition of partiinost by Stalin.

Stalin intervened in historical scholarship on October 31, 1931. The immediate background was A. Slutsky's article in the journa of Ispart, Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, entitled "The Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period of its Pre-War Crisis." Slutsky a former Menshevik, was a candidate member of the CPSU. He discussed the relationship between Lenin and the Centrists in the German Social-Democratic Party before 1914. Stalin wrote a letter to the editor, "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism." He protested that Slutsky underestimated the dangers of Centrism and opportunism which Lenin unmasked. He argued that Slutsky took a "rotten liberal" road in slandering Lenin and the Bolsheviks. He noted that Trotskyist tendencies were developing in the journal in particular and in the historical profession in general. He criticized the explanations of the history of the CPSU in the books written by E. M. Iaroslavskii and V. Volosevich.[10]

Stalin's letter was widely discussed by historians. "Many historians were slandered, then repressed. Many were compelled to admit 'errors'"[11] Slutsky was expelled from the History Department of Sverdlov University; Volosevich was dismissed from the History Institute of the Communist Academy; Iaroslavskii admitted his errors. The publication of Proletarskaia Revolutsiia was suspended until 1933.

The CC issued a decree on August 25, 1932 stipulating how the curricula and administration of elementary schools would be organized On February 12, 1933 the CC decreed that "a single obligatory textboo

approved by the People's Commissariat of the R.S.F.S.R. and published by Uchpedgiz" was to be used in schools. These decrees were an indirect criticism of Pokrovsky's historical interpretations. He fortunately escaped open official criticism that was posthumously launched in 1934 and in 1936.[12]

As Pokrovsky's influence diminished after his death, that of his rival Iaroslavskii grew. Iaroslavskii was one of the editors of a new textbook recommended by the CC in 1934. The new textbook was called Istoriia Vseseoiunznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii: (bolshevikov); Kratkii Kurs (History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik); Short Course), popularly known as the Short Course. It was published in 1938. The publication of the Short Course marked the subjection of historians to the CPSU which Stalin had been seeking between 1931-1937. One of the main objectives of the Short Course was "to give the party a uniform guide to the history of the party, a guide representing the official interpretation, authenticated by the Central Committee."[13]

Historical interpretations in the Short Course were based on Stalin's slogan "Socialism in One Country." The slogan had socialist and nationalist implications. Stalin was given the leading role in taking the initiative and guidance in the building of socialism. He was depicted as the pupil and right successor of Lenin.

The scholarship during the Stalin era was characterized by Trotsky as the "Stalin school of falsification" because in his view historians replaced Marxism with Russian patriotism.[14] This is part of what Western scholars call the "Stalinist historiography." By this they mean that the CC told historians not only what to write

but also how to write to serve to propaganda of the CPSU.

The two interpretations of Soviet historiography during the years 1938-1953 have some truth. It was during these years that non-Marxist scholars whom Pokrovsky had purged in 1928-1930 became prominent. They used the new environment to stress nationalist themes that they had been striving for but in Stalinist terms. E. V. Tarle became the symbol of the "nationalist (Stalinist) school."

Eugene Viktorovich Tarle was born on November 8, 1875. He got a bachelor's degree in 1896 and a master's degree in 1901 from the University of Kiev. He was professor of European history in the University of Leningrad. In 1927 his Europa epokha imperialisma (Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism) was published. Pokrovsky claimed that the explanations were "ententeophilist" and "pseudo-Marxist." The criticism became political. Tarle was arrested early in 1930 and imprisoned for about a year in Leningrad. He was later exiled to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan Central Asia, but he never finished the five-year term. He was reinstated in the University of Leningrad after the death of Pokrovsky.

Tarle stressed the role of the individual in history and Russian patriotism. He put Suvarov and Kutuzov to a high pedestal. In his Nashestviye Napoleon na Rossiyu, 1812 goda (Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812), published in 1936, Tarle changed the interpretations to satisfy political needs. He was forced to call the War of 1812 a People's War even more nationalist than the Spanish War. He had not called the war this way in the first edition. He was also forced to compare Hitler's invasion to the War of 1812.

Other nationalist historians glorified the role of personalities such as Ivan IV and Peter I. The expansion of Russia was described as progressive. It was suggested that Ukraine chose the right alternative to Poland; and Georgia to Persia (Iran) and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey).

After the Second World War everything German was criticized. Some historians criticized those scholars who even referred to Schlozer and Bayer. When the Cold Water started in 1947, scholars were instructed to interpret the foreign policy of the USSR as more progressive than that of the West.

Stalin's death in March 1953 led to the re-emergence of Marxist historians. Anna M. Pankratova (1897-1957), a former student of Pokrovsky, specialist in Russian labor movement, professor at the University of Moscow since 1934 and editor-in-chief of Voprovy istorii (Problems of History), the successor of Istorik-Marxist, tried to downgrade Stalin and create conditions conducive to independent research and writing of history. Scholarly articles about the Revolution of 190! were published in the journal in 1955. Then in the XXth Party Congress of 1956 Khrushchev criticized the cult of Stalin in the Short Course. The "de-Stalinization" speech, as it became known in the West, was interpreted as a harbinger of freedom in scholarship. There were a number of changes which occurred thereafter. M. A. Viltsan, N. A. Ivnitsky and Iu. A. Poliakov wrote:

> After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, favorable conditions were created for the study of the history of the collectivization of agriculture in the U.S.S.R., as also for the development of other areas of historical science. Many documents became available. Researchers received permission to study unpublished materials of the plenums of the Central Committee (November 1929, December 1930, January 19-3, June

> 1934, and others). The materials of various commissions of the Central Committee, VKP(B), on questions of collectivization are valuable sources on the history of the development of concrete acts, methods, and forms of collectivization. Interesting letters of workers, kolkhozniks, party and soviet workers to the Central Committee, VKP(B), the People's Commissariat on Agriculture, U.S.S.R., directly to J. V. Stalin, declaring warm wishes to help in the socialist transformation of the countryside. Materials of the funds of central agricultural institutions have been researched . . . Remarkable changes have occurred in the study of statistical data. Documents of local party and soviet organizations have been broadly introduced into the scientific purview.
>
> All this produced positive results. Monographs and scientific articles of wide circulation have appeared dealing with the history of kolkhoz construction. Qualitative changes in the treatment of this theme have taken place--reflecting the profound and many-sided researches have become more complete and have changed in many ways.[15]

The freedom created by the XXth Party Congress of 1956 was shortlived. Pankratova and her deputy editor E. N. Burdzhalov were criticized in 1957 by the CC of the CPSU. The journal was criticized of having "theoretical and methodological mistakes which show a tendency toward departure from the Leninist principles of party-mindedne (partionst) in scholarship."[16] Burdzhalov was singled out as violating the principles of collective leadership.[17] The CC of the CPSU used the disturbances in Poland and Hungary to curtail the de-Stalinization campaign and this led to the reprimand of Pankratova and the dismissal of Burdzhalov from co-editorship. Pankratova escaped disgrace because of her death in 1957. 1957 also saw the criticism of Tarle's writings by his biographers. They called them idealistic.

Khrushchev ordered the re-writing of Party history. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was written by a

team of scholars under the chairmanship of B. N. Ponomaryov, the Head of the Foreign Department of the Central Secretariat, and a Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The book was published in 1959. It was expanded in the second edition of 1962.[18]

The conditions under which scholars worked during the Khrushchev period were far better than those during Stalin's period and a little better than those during the Brezhnev era. These differences can be explained from the scholarly debates, censures and decrees during the three periods. There were no scholarly debates during the era of Stalin. For a short period, during the "thaw," debates, like those of the 1920's were reviewed. When the CC of CPSU clamped on them, it did not use a fist. During the Brezhnev period, the leadership revived Stalinist tendencies of censorship in order to disassociate itself from Khrushchev's "mistakes" in de-Stalinization. Instead of the CC of the CPSU directly censuring what should be written, research institutes in the Academy of Sciences did. This is what is called the practice of collective leadership which the Brezhnev team claims to espouse. For instance, the Bureau of the Historical Division of the Academy of Sciences censured Istoricheskaia nauka i nekotorye problemy sovremennosti, published in 1969; Rossiskii proletariat: oblik, borba, gegemoniia and Sverzhenie samoderzhariia, all published in 1970. The writers of the essays were criticized but they were not purged.[19]

An idea of the conditions for scholarship today can be explained from the writings of dissidents, the historography of dissidence, and to some extent, the stories about dissidents in the mass media in the West. The historians who do not criticize the Soviet system carry

on their work as usual. The case of Roy A. Medvedev and his brother Zhores A. Medvedev illustrates this observation. Through the collective principle, the Party exercises cunning control of scholarship. The scholars adhere to the directives of the Party for their own security as much as the nation's.

Historical Scholarship in Tanzania

Most African nationalists used the historical experience before and during the colonial period as a justification for the struggle for political independence. They argued that colonialist historiography was the colonialists' tool of emphasizing their activities at the expense of the colonized. They criticized the educational practice. For instance, Africans were not taught African history because it was claimed that there was none to teach.

After the attainment of political independence, most educated Africans in the government and higher institutions embarked on the decolonization of colonialist historiography. African historiography with nationalist themes became a tool for nation-building. Western trained historians and social scientists who were in government posts, or teaching in higher institutions, or doing research, supported the rewriting of African history.

Tanganyika became independent in 1962. It had few professional historians and many expatriates. A number of reasons made Western expatriates to be attracted to Tanganyika. The country achieved independence peacefully under Julius K. Nyerere. Western observers interpreted it as a democratic achievement. Western liberals thought

that President Nyerere was democratic and pragmatic. Consequently, trained scholars went to do research or teach in Tanganyika. On the other hand, Western Marxists thought of him as potentially progressive, i.e., Marxist-oriented. They based these interpretations from Nyerere's political behavior and actions in his speeches and writings.

Tanzanian and Western scholars collaborated or individually wrote nationalist studies and sometimes criticized the government's efforts in economic development. Examples of these studies (respectively) are A History of Tanzania, edited by Isariah Kimambo and Arnold Temu and published in 1969 by the East African Publishing House and Henry Bienen's Tanzania: Pary Transformation and Economic Development, published by Princeton University Press at the end of 1967.

Henry Bienen's Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development was based on government sources, studies and field work. Henry Bienen, an American expert on the Soviet Union then doing research in East Africa, claimed that the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) that was in power lacked organization and ideology to mobilize people in economic development as the Communist Party in the Soviet Union did. The book was outpaced by developments in Tanzania: while it was being researched, TANU was tightening its organizational capability; when it came from the press, the policy of villagization, part of the ideology of African socialism which Bienen implied in his criticism, was being implemented. These events had nothing to do with Bienen's call for a Leninist party to transform the economy of Tanzania.

A History of Tanzania was written by four Tanzanians and six expatriates teaching or doing research in Tanzania. The writers focused

on the initiatives of Tanzanians before and during the colonial period rather than on the activities of the outsiders. It was a comprehensive history of the Tanzanian nation based mainly on oral tradition, colonial sources and studies.

John S. Saul, a Canadian teaching in the Department of Political Science in the University of Dar es Salaam, reviewed Bienen's book. He pointed to the changes that had taken place in TANU, the Parliament and government and the commitment to socialism and self-reliance (proclaimed in the Arusha Dclaration) as evidence of Bienen's mistaken views about the lack of an ideology and a Leninist Party. He also pointed out that the Party controlled the state in the USSR whereas in Tanzania the state controlled the economic machinery with the approval of the people.

John S. Saul criticized the nationalist interpretation of Tanzanian history. He claimed that a Marxist interpretation of Tanzania's past and present could help readers to understand the socialist objectives.[20] Lionel Cliffe, a British also teaching in the Department of Political Science, made similar comments.[21]

The interpretations in A History of Tanzania and Party Transformation and Economic Development, and the comments on them by John S. Saul and Lionel Cliffe, later emerged in the historiography of villagization. The writers of A History of Tanzania were liberals; Bienen was also a liberal. Saul and Cliffe were Marxists. In the period 1962-1966 liberals dominated in writing about Tanzanian economic, political, social and cultural developments. The few Western Marxists that existed in Tanzania were joined by Tanzanian Marxists after the

Arusha Declaration on socialism and self-reliance in February 1967. By 1970, the number of Marxist and non-Marxist scholars had grown considerably. Western scholars outnumbered Tanzanian scholars.

In their study of villagization, Marxist and non-Marxist scholars do their research in the University of Dar es Salaam and Kivukoni College. The library in the University of Dar es Salaam has a sizeable number of published studies and some government documents and reports. The University of Dar es Salaam (and its research institutes) is the main place where research is conducted. Government sources are also found in the ministerial offices and their affiliates as well as the district and regional headquarters.

The problems foreign scholars face in getting government sources was commented on by Professor R. C. Pratt. Professor Pratt is a Canadian now teaching in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. He was the principal of the then University College, Dar es Salaam, from 1960 to 1965. He was a friend of President Nyerere. His book, published in 1976, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, in Nyererecentric. Pratt wrote when reviewing Clyde R. Ingle's From Village to State in Tanzania that the writer concentrated on the colonial period more than the contemporary that was central to the book. He suspected that the colonial archives "are more accessible than are party archives." He pointed out that a foreign scholar had five alternatives:

1. he can change his focus to the colonial period;
2. he can try to make his colonial material illustrate themes which he had initially conceived with reference to the post-independence period;

3. he can increase the theoretical component of his thesis and cut the empirical [portion];
4. he can change his topic to a contemporary study that will be more useful and of interest at the country he is working; or
5. he can go home.[22]

Perhaps a local scholar faces the same problem of having access to government sources.

Foreign scholars have done more field research than local scholars. The reliability of their findings can be questioned. The foreign scholars use local assistants for their field work. The assistants are mostly university and college students. The researcher prepares a questionnaire in English. The assistants translate it into Kiswahili. During the field work, the foreign scholar is an observer rather than a participant because first and foremost, he/she is a foreigner; but also because he/she does not know Kiswahili. The assistants themselves have ethnic differences which cause bias. All these problems indicate that the researcher may be getting interpreted evidence.

There are problems in the presentation and interpretation of the evidence. The first one relates to the dilemma between academic and political commitment. President Nyerere and the entire top leadership group insist that the reasons for the decision to villagize were internal rather than external. This has limited the ability of foreign scholars and Tanzanian non-Marxist socialists: they did not criticize the bureaucrats, the civil servants, the better-off farmers (or "kulaks") and the peasants. Tanzanian Marxist socialists criticized the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the kulaks and the international bourgeoisie.

The problem of the conflict between academic and political dilemma was commented on by professors Ali A. Mazrui and R. C. Pratt. Mazrui is a Kenyan who left the University of Makerere before the overthrow of Idi Amini. He is now teaching at the University of Michigan in the Department of Political Science, as well as directing the Center for Afroamerican and African Studies and the African sector of the World Order Models Project. Professor Mazrui is known in Africa, Britain and USA for writing provocatively on political and intellectual developments in Africa. "Tanzaphilia" is one such article. He argued in this article that Western intellectuals were "Tanzaphilist." They were impressed with President Nyerere's democratic politics and populism ("the romance of "Back to Nature" and the discipline of the countryside"). This made them to have ideological commitment and moral responses "to the goals of self-reliance and egalitarianism."[23] Pratt also claimed that both Marxist socialists and non-Marxist socialists' writings had ideological implications.[24] He wrote that they were sympathetic to the socialist experiment in Tanzania. The non-Marxist "ideological orientations bring them closer to Nyerere and to the Tanzanian position."[25] Mazrui suggested that the solution to the conflict between scholarship and the government's view was either conformity or "a combination of faith and scepticism, sympathy and criticism, loyalty, and nationalism."[26]

Foreign scholars face a separate problem called "the Prospero syndrome." This is a psychological problem which American commentators have pointed out. Prospero was Shakespeare's fictional forerunner of colonialism in The Tempest. He colonized Caliban, the only inhabitant

on an island. After learning Prospero's language, Caliban used it to regain independence. The ex-colonial states went through Caliban's experience. There is guilt on the part of Western scholars who identify themselves with Africans and their development efforts. They sympathize with the efforts in development because colonialists did not develop their countries.[27] The syndrome can also explain the problems a foreign scholar in Tanzania faces when conducting field research.

The second problem in the interpretation of villagization concerns whether to concentrate on the aspect of living together in Ujamaa Villages or working together in Ujamaa farms. These are the definitions of villagization. The establishment of Ujamaa Villages preceeded the aspect of living and working together. The leadership stressed the establishment of Ujamaa Villages from 1968 to 1973. There was drought at the end of 1973 and from the beginning of 1974 a food crisis situation developed which ended in 1976. President Nyerere ordered in 1973 that by 1976 most Tanzanians should be living in Ujamaa Villages. The students of villagization have commented on the aspects of establishing and living in Ujamaa Villages and practicing cooperative production. Professor Jonathan Barker designated both the Marxists and non-Marxists as "productionist."[28] In his view, these scholars emphasized production as an important criteria for rural development. Barker is a Canadian political scientist by training. He taught from 1970 to 1972 at the University of Dar es Salaam. He is currently teaching at the University of Toronto.

The government's periodic emphasizes on establishing Ujamaa Villages, living in Ujamaa Villages and communal production forced the scholars to comment briefly on the aspects that were peripherial to the major themes. Barker was characterizing the literature on communal production, but the leadership used the words "development" and "production" interchangeably. This is another reason why commentators wrote on more than one aspect of villagization. Since the word "development" is a general one, it is appropriate to characterize the literature on villagization as developmentalist rather than "productionist."

FOOTNOTES

[1]Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation Rewrite: The Agony of Soviet Historians," Foreign Affairs, XXXI, 1 (October 1952):39-57. See same article in his Communist Estalitarianism: Key to the Soviet System, 1st ed. 1956 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 56-60. See also his "party Histories from Lenin to Khrushchev," Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror, ed. John Keep and Liliana Brisby (New York: Frederick A. Preeger, 1964), pp. 43-60; Konstantin F. Shteppa, "The 'Lesser Evil' Formula," Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past, ed. Cyril E. Black, 1st ed. 1956 (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 107-122 and his Russian Historians and the Soviet State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962).

[2]Merle Fainsod. "Historiography and Change," Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror, pp. 19-42 and his former student Nancy Whittier Heer's Politics and History in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971); S. V. Utechin, "Soviet Historiography after Stalin," Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror, pp. 117-129 and George M. Enteen, "The Writing of History in the U.S.S.R.," Thought, 49, 194 (September 1974):299-310.

[3]See in History in the USSR: Selected Readings, ed. Marin Pundeff (San Francisco, Cal.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), p. 232. More on Burdzhalov see Merle Fainsod, "Soviet Russian Historians, or: The Lesson of Burdzhalov," Encounter, No. 102 (March 1962):82-89.

[4]Quoted and discussed in George M. Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), p. 33. Hereafter cited as Scholar-Bureaucrat.

[5]R. V. Daniels, "Soviet Thought in the Nineteen Thirties: An Interpretative Sketch," Indiana Slavic Studies ed. Michael Ginzurg and Joseph T. Shaw, Vol. I (Bloomington, 1956):97-136.

[6]Scholar-Bureaucrat.

[7]John Barber, Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928-1932 (New York: Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 22. Some of Pokrovsky's major works include: Russkaia istoriia s drevneishikh vremen (Russian History from the Earliest Times), 1st ed. 5 Vols., 1910-13, 8 ed. 4 Vols., 1933-34; Chs. to 1725 trans. 4 ed. J. D. Clarkson and M. R. M. Griffiths based on 7 ed. 1924-25, History of Russia From the Earliest Times to the Commercial Capitalism (New York, 1931); Russkaia istoriia v samom szhatom ocherke (Russian History in Briefest Outline), 1st ed. 3 Vols. 1920-23; trans. D. S. Mirsky

based on 10 ed. 1931 as Brief History of Russia, 2 Vols. (New York, 1933); Diplomatiia i voiny tsarskai Rossi v XIX stoletii (Diplomacy and Wars of Tsarist Russia in the 19th Century) 1923; Ocherki russkogo revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia XIX-XX vv (Essays on the Russian Revolutionary Movement of the 19-20th Centuies) 1924; Ocherki istorii russkoi kul twn (A Study of the History of Russian Culture), 2 Vols. 1923 and Istoricheskaia nuka i borba klassov (Historical Science and Class Struggle), 2 Vols., 1933.

[8]George M. Enteen, E. M. Iaroslavskii as an Historian." Unpublished paper made available to the author, p. 1. His works, amon others, include: eds., Istoriia VKP (b) (History of the Communist Par [Bolsheviks]), 4 Vols. (Moscow, 1926-39); he participated in writing Istoriia Vseseoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov); Kratkii Kurs (History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik): Short Course), 1st ed. 1938 and Bible for Believers and Non-Believers, published as late as 1977.

[9]Quoted in Scholar-Bureaucrat, pp. 126f.

[10]E. M. Iaroslavskii, Istoriia VKP (b), and V. Volosevich, Kurs istorii VKP (b) (History Course of the Communist Party, [Bolshevi Party III and IV (Moscow, 1930-31). The letter, "O nekotorykh voporsa istorii bolshevisma," is in Sochineniia (Works) (Moscow, 1940-1951), XIII, pp. 84-102; trans. in Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1953), pp. 483-97 and incomplete in History in the USSR, pp. 91-95.

[11]I. I. Mints cited in George M. Enteen, "Marxist Historians during the Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Professional Infighting," Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1929-1933 ed. Shelia Fitzpat (Bloominton: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 165.

[12]See the decrees in History in the USSR, pp. 95-99.

[13]Ibid., p. 130.

[14]See item 22, ibid., pp. 107-112.

[15]Quoted in Politics and History in the Soviet Union, p. 220.

[16]History in the USSR, p. 233.

[17]Ibid., p. 233.

[18]On comparisons with the Short Course see A. Leonard Schapiro, "A New History--A New Mythology," Problems on Communism, IX, 1 (January 1960):58-61 and "Continuity and Change in the New History of the CPSU," Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror, pp. 69-91.

[19]For details see George M. Enteen, "A Recent Trend on the Historical Front," Survey, 20, 4 (Autumn 1974):122-131.

[20]See John S. Saul, "Nationalism, Socialism and Tanzania History' in Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. I, pp. 65-75. For comments on other nationalist studies see Isaria N. Kimambo, "Historical Research in Mainland Tanzania," in Expanding Horizons in African Studies ed. Gwendolen M. Carter and Ann Paden (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969):75-90; Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam," African Affairs, 69, 277 (October 1970):329-349 and their reply "The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam: A Rejoinder," African Affairs, 70, 280 (July 1971):287-288 to Terence Ranger "The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam: An Answer," African Affairs, 70, 278 (January 1971):50-61.

[21]See John S. Saul, "TANU and Economic Development," Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. I ed. John S. Saul and Lionel Cliffe (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 265-266 and Lionel Cliffe, "Tanzania-Socialist Transformation and Party Development," ibid., pp. 266-276.

[22]R. C. Pratt, "Foreign Scholarship in Tanzania," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 8, I (1974):168. He reviewed Ingle's book in this essay.

[23]Ali A. Mazrui, "Tanzaphilia," Transition (Kampala), 6, 31 (June/July 1967):26.

[24]"Foreign Scholarship in Tanzania," pp. 166f.

[25]R. C. Pratt, "Tanzania's Trasition to Socialism: Reflections of a Democratic Socialist," Towards Socialism in Tanzania ed. Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 194.

[26]Ali A. Mazrui, "What is an Intellectual? What is his role in the African Revolution?" East African Journal, VI, 4 (April 1969), p. 14f.

[27]Father Hubert Horan, "Training Expatriates for Service in Developing Countries," East African Journal, VI, 4 (April 1969):19-22; Adam Kuper, "The Troubles of Prospero: The Expatriates Academic," East African Journal, VI, 12 (December 1969):28-34 and Jennifer C. Ward, "The Expatriate and the African University," East African Journal, VII, 10 (October 1970):12-16.

[28]Jonathan Barker, "The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania," Towards Socialism in Tanzania, pp. 96, 119.

CHAPTER IV

PROCESSES OF IMPLEMENTING COLLECTIVIZATION

The history of mass collectivization in the period 1929-33 became a topic of genuine scholarly research after the XXth Party Congress of 1956. The themes that received serious study were mainly four: dekulakization; the role of Stalin; the role of the Party and the government; and the role of local Party organizations and officials. There are conflicting interpretations of these themes by Soviet and Western historians. This chapter provides specific examples of the interpretations. The sample of studies by Soviet scholars are M. L. Bogdenko's essay "A New Look at Stalin's Role in Farm Collectivization"; "Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside" by D. A. Kovalenko in A Short History of the USSR, Part II; V. I. Pogudin's article "Soviet Historiography on the Problems of the Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class"; Roy A. Medvedev's magnum opus Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism; and N. A. Ivnitsky's section "Building Socialism: The Further Strengthening and Development of Socialist (1926-1941)" in part two of History of the USSR. Western historians' studies are Merle Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, Irwin Peter Halpern's "Stalin's Revolution: The Struggle to Collectivize Rural Russia, 1927-1933"; Moshe Lewin's Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization and R. W. Davies' The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930.

The conclusions which Bogdenko and Pogudin made slightly differed from the economic and ideological explanations of collectiviza

by the Party officials which Kovalenko and Ivnitsky supported. Kovalenko and Ivnitsky can be said to have neo-Stalinist interpretations whereas Bogdenko and Pogudin's are semi-neo-Stalinist. Bogdenko, Pogudin, Kovalenko and Ivnitsky are professional historians. They are members of the Academy of Sciences. Their conclusions are in sharp contrast to Medvedev's anti-Stalinist interpretations. Medvedev claimed that Stalin had political reasons for collectivization. The analyses by Davies can be placed between neo-Stalinist and semi-neo-Stalinist tendencies. In contrast, the views of Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin are anti-Stalinist.

The articles by Bogdenko and Pogudin were discussions of studies published in the Soviet Union. Bogdenko analyzed studies published between 1958 and 1962; Pogudin assessed those published between 1958 and 1964.

The Short History of the USSR in which Kovalenko's section was written by a team of specialists on economic, social, cultural and foreign affairs. The team was headed by A. Samsonov. The Short History of the USSR was meant for general readers. M. A. Naidenov criticized volume two in Kommunist. He charged that the authors carelessly used the sources and "distorted" the facts.[1] The Short History of the USSR was revised and re-entitled the History of the USSR in Three Volumes by a team headed by Kovalenko. The section on collectivization in the History was not written by Kovalenko; Ivnitsky did. The descriptions of collectivization were almost similar in the two books. Kovalenko and Ivnitsky referred to the resolutions and decrees of the Party and the government without verification of the sources. In fact, the two

specialists did not use any studies. The books are barren of historiographical and fontological assessment.

The first drafts of Let History Judge were called Before the Court of History (Pered sudom istorii). Medvedev changed to Let History Judge, or Toward the Court of History (K sudu istorii) because critics accused him of being subjective of Stalin's personality cult.[2] Like any translated work, Let History Judge suffers from stylistic changes but one of the editors, David Joravsky, claimed that "the translation is substantially full and faithful,"[3] because the book was written by "a contemporary scholar whose work deserves the best English we could give it."[4]

Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev is a critic of Stalinism and Maoism.[5] He ironically wrote that the "crimes" and "faults" of Stalin's cult should not be criticized in "dark colors" because Stalin's era "was a time of great accomplishments both at home and abroad."[6] He found it difficult to study the cult of Stalin because little was known of his "lawlessness";[7] his legacy is still strong and many Party sources dealing with Stalin's activities were destroyed.[8]

Medvedev is not a professional historian. He called his work a one-sided private research into "the darker pages" of Soviet history.[9] He used studies published since 1956; unpublished documents, memoirs and reminiscences of survivors of the 1930's and 1940's. He did not encounter any difficulties in obtaining the sources.[10] He claimed that he tried to restore communism's unity, moral purity and strength because only communists "should be the strictest judges of their own history."[11]

Medvedev began writing Let History Judge in 1961 when the de-Stalinization campaign started by Khruschev at the XXth Party Congress of 1956 was reaffirmed by the XXIInd Party Congress. He finished it six years later when the Brezhnev regime was restoring neo-Stalinist interpretations. This made him authorize its publication in the West.[12]

Medvedev was one of twin sons born in 1925 to a Marxist philosopher and teacher, Alexander Ramonovich Medvedev. He inherited his father's intellectual inclinations. He was trained in philosophy at Leningrad University. After receiving an advanced degree in education, Medvedev taught history in a secondary school which he later headed as the principal. He was a research associate in the academy of Pedagogical Sciences.[13]

Smolensk Under Soviet Rule was based on official Party and government reports, decrees and orders from Moscow to Smolensk and back to Moscow in the period 1917-1938. The archives were seized by German soldiers in mid-July 1941. Americans took them from the Germans at the end of the Second World War. The late Professor Merle Fainsod used support from Ford Foundation to conduct research in the Smolensk Archives. He concentrated on decision-making processes at the local level. The Rand Corporation initiated, funded and arranged for Fainsod and his assistants to gain access to the Smolensk Archives which the Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, US Army, provided. The team sifted, analyzed and organized the collection under the headings in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, published in 1958.

Fainsod noted that there was inadequate "documentation on the decision-making processes of the central authorities in Moscow," and

that there were no records from Smolensk to Moscow in the years 1930-1935. He felt, however, that the sources were of "unimpeachable authenticity" on the political processes in the Western oblast.*[14] He claimed that the sources gave a good indication of how the local government worked in particular, and in general, the suppressed freedom during the Stalinist period.[15]

Fainsod was born in May 1907 at McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania. He got his doctoral degree in 1931 in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He later taught in the department from 1933 to 1946 when he became the Chairman. He served in government posts before being appointed the Director of Political Studies at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. The other book on the Soviet Union he wrote is How Russia is Ruled, published first in 1953.

Halpern's "Stalin's Revolution" was a doctoral dissertation accepted by the Department of History, Columbia University, in 1965. His other study on implementation of collectivization is "The Role of the Regional and Local Organizations in the Collectivization of the North Caucasus during the years 1928-1932."[16]

Halpern used Soviet historical studies; Smolensk Archives; Trotsky Archives; Soviet national and provincial newspapers of the period 1928-1932; Stalin's collected works; Party and government records at Congresses; reports by Western observers and Russian emigres; and studies by Western scholars, e.g., Fainsod. He wrote that Soviet newspapers were informative on "the living drama of that period" but

*The term oblast replaced guberniia in 1929. It is comparable to a province.

they reported the propaganda of the Party. The Soviet studies were "prolix and largely sterile as political analysis of the collectivization movement--the high cost of making historical writing serve politics."[17]

His thesis was that collectivization was "a revolution engineer from above by a fanatic but calculating and opportunistic leadership" with the purpose of modernizing rural Russia from a "backward, totterin state into a highly industrialized, thoroughly politicized world power. Collectivization was essentially the conflict between the leadership which wanted to possess power in the countryside on the one hand, and on the other, the peasants who wanted to preserve "their modest possessions and their traditional way of life."[19]

Halpern worked for the CIA but he left it to pursue advanced studies. He was a Senior Research Associate of the National Goals on Urban Population Growth during the Carter Administration.

The main theme in Lewin's Russian Peasants and Soviet Power was that the grain crisis of the winter of 1927-28 was the immediate background for the decision to embark on mass collectivization.[20] The thesis was discussed in the essay "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization."[21] Russian Peasants and Soviet Power was expanded from this essay and "Who Was the Soviet Kulak?"[22]

Lewin claimed that mass collectivization was a "trial of strength" between the authorities and the peasantry. "This was a veritable civil war," he wrote, "fought by both sides with unyielding obduracy. The peasants met the government's actions with what was mainly passive resistance, in the form of economic sabotage. The

authorities retaliated with mass reprisals, which turned this period of Soviet history (1929-1933) into a sombre drama in which an enormous number of people perished."[23] Lewin based the analysis on Soviet documents; sources from the BDIC in Paris as well as Soviet publications from 1958 to 1965. He also used Western studies, e.g., Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule and Halpern's "Stalin's Revolution." Fainsod's interpretation of dekulakization influenced Lewin.

Lewin is an emigre from the Soviet Union. He taught in Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris; Columbia University, New York; and at the University of Birmingham, England. He is currently teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. He is the author of a number of studies on the Soviet period.[24]

The last study by a Western scholar is The Socialist Offensive by R. W. Davies from Britain. It is the first installment to a projected five or six volumes. He used Soviet documents, newspapers, studies by Soviet and Western economists, political scientists and historians. He used the studies by Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin. He wrote that Lewin's study "was a constant source of ideas and information on the first half of the period covered by the present volume."[25] He also used Western travellers' accounts during the period of mass collectivization, 1929-1933.

Davies felt that mass collectivization was an effort in the building of socialism. He wrote:

> The Soviet Communists saw industrialization as a prerequisite for achieving their central objective--the establishment, in a largely peasant country, isolated in a hostile capitalist world, of a socialist economy and society; and by 1936, with the

> collectivization of agriculture, and the elimination of the private hire of labour for profit, a kind of socialist economy had been created.[26]

He also wrote that "Between 1929 and 1936, the Soviet Union was transformed into a great industrial power; in its speed and scale, the Soviet industrial revolution has neither precedent nor successor anywhere in the world."[27] Davies argued that his study would help the general reader, first to comprehend the triumphs and failures of Soviet planned industrialization "on which all developing countries have to a greater or lesser degree embarked"; and second, to understand the formative period of the Soviet system whose features are discrenible today.[28]

Davies' arguments were closer to the Soviet historians who support and mildly criticize the Party officials' economic and ideological reasons of collectivization. E. H. Carr, a British specialist on the Soviet Union, was also sympathetic to the Soviet efforts at building socialism. Davies collaborated with Professor Carr in the first volume of the Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929. Davies' conclusions were influenced by Carr. He wrote that he was proud to continue the story in the Foundations because Carr "provided much intellectu stimulation and information" to him.[29] Davies is the author of other books on the Soviet period.[30]

Interpretations by Soviet Scholars

Dekulakization

The discussion on dekulakization concerned the reasons for the campaign; whether the means used should be considered "excesses"

and "distortions" and whether the kulaks were a separate class or not.

Kovalenko claimed that successful collectivization before 1929 and the opposition of the kulaks to mass collectivization in the winter of 1929-1930 necessitated dekulakization.[31] He argued that the kulaks were supported by members of the Industrial Party; the Labor Peasant Party headed by Kondratyev and Chayanov; the USSR Bureau headed by Sukhanov and Russian emigres belonging to trade and Industrial Committees.[32] He claimed that some kulaks supported the collective-farm movement and "conscientiously received all the rights of citizens."[33] In two years (1930-1932), 240,757 kulak families "were moved out [of] the areas which had been collectivized."[34]

Ivnitsky gave the same interpretations as Kovalenko. He suggeste that "1,440 acts of kulak terrorism were recorded in 1928, and in 1929 the number of kulak terrorist acts exceeded two thousand in four regions of the USSR alone (the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga area, the Urals and Central Asia)."[35] He claimed that the kulaks had connections with foreign agents and that their counter-revolutionary centers were in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Central Asia, the North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far East.[36]

Ivnitsky did not identify or write on the counter-revolutionary activities of the kulaks in the winter of 1929-30. He felt that dekulakization "was carried out in an organized manner."[37] Forcible expropriation and taxation were the means used for "liquidating the kulaks as a class."[38] In two years, 1930-32, "around 600 thousand kulak farms were expropriated and more than 240 thousand kulak families [were] deported."[39] He wrote:

> At the end of 1932, there remained approximately 60 thousand kulak farms (mostly in the non-Russian and grain-importing areas), much weakened economically and deprived of the ability to exploit the peasant poor. Thus, during the first five-year plan period the kulaks were routed, the roots of capitalism in agriculture destroyed and the victory of socialism in the village thereby assured.[40]

Bogdenko argued from new sources in state archives published after 1958 that the kulaks started to resist the establishment of collective farms from the mid-1929 to the beginning of 1930. The poor peasants in turn refused to accept the registration of kulaks in collective farms. He observed that serious regional studies were needed to explain the extent of the development of the collective farm movement in the second half of 1929.[41]

Bogdenko argued from the studies he analyzed with new sources that the specific methods of dekulakization and the reasons for the "errors" during the anti-kulak movement in the period 1929-30 had not "yet been studied sufficiently."[42] He claimed that poor and middle peasants guided by Party organizations and 25,000 workers, carried out the dekulakization campaign. The confiscated property was used for collectivization. He noted that the brigades committed "serious mistakes," e.g., dekulakization before collectivization.[43] It was the "excesses" which made the kulaks organize campaigns against collective farms and anti-Soviet activities. He did not elaborate on the excesses and kulak resistance.

Pogudin wrote that dekulakization was necessary for the building of socialism.[44] The kulaks resisted collectivization. "In a number of places," he wrote, "the kulaks initially were accepted into the collectiv farms, but they employed their presence there to subvert the collectives

from within."[45] He claimed that dekulakization was not Stalin's initiative or a "directive from above": "It was a partial systhesis of experience already at hand, and answered the growing needs of the development of collective farms."[46] He did not agree to the view expressed in the studies he assessed that the kulaks had economic and political power in the countryside. He suggested that further research was needed on the numerical percentage of kulaks; their economic and political power in the village; and the international position of the USSR. The findings would enlighten readers on the nature of kulak anti-collective farm movement.

Pogudin was critical of the explanations of the implementation of dekulakization in the articles he examined after reading new sources the writers did not use. He argued that the use of force against the kulaks was not inevitable. Lenin advocated economic methods that were later used in the "Peoples' Democracies" and not in the USSR.[47] Pogudin thought that the fixation of forcible expropriation was based on Stalin's utterances during and after the period of mass collectivization and on the claims in the Short Course. The recently published regional studies of dekulakization demonstrated that expropriation had differed from one region to the next. For instance, poor and middle peasants were not expropriated everywhere.[48] He called for a reinvestigation of the periods of expropriation because the USSR was a large country where the implementation cannot be generalized. The fate of expropriated kulaks also needed serious study.[49]

Medvedev felt that the means that were used in dekulakization during the winter of 1929-30 were "excesses" and "perversions"; e.g. the use of force; "complete expropriation," "physical annihilation."

banishment and "ruthless suppression" of "the entire kulak population."[50] He wrote:

> Because of the intensification of class struggle in the countryside, many more kulaks than the number planned [by a commission appointed by the Politburo] at the beginning of 1930 were banished to remote, usually northern raiony,* sent to corrective labor campus, or shot .[51]

He argued that the number of banished kulaks in 1933 (240,757)** as presented to the Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1933 was "greatly understated."[52] He argued that the "excesses" were not a violation of Lenin's cooperative plan because the officials of the Party did not study "the actual experience of socialist construction."[53] He felt that the Politburo recommended the expropriation of counter-revolutionary and "politically active richest kulaks" instead of isolating and persuading them.[54]

Medvedev discussed two reasons for the excesses. The first reason was that the policy of "dekulakization" was hastily made by Stalin without studying the cooperative movement. The Party organizations were "confused" on how to implement it.[55] The second reason was that the instructions and decrees of the Politburo were unclear. For example, there was no word in the instructions and decrees about "subkulaks" or about prosperous middle peasants."[56] As the implementers used force, the kulaks "tried" counter-revolutionary terror, anti-Soviet uprisings and banditry. Medvedev wrote that as a result of the mistakes,

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*Subdivision of an oblast or city.

**The figure was cited by D. A. Kovalenko. See p. 70 in this chapter.

> a significant portion of the middle peasants began to oppose the creation of collective farms, and the peasant masses became receptive to the kulaks' anti-Soviet propaganda. Sensing their strength, the kulaks intensified their opposition to collectivization. This led in turn to an intensification of repressive measures, not only against all kulaks without exception but also against the considerable number of middle peasants who were temporarily influenced by kulak agitation or simply hesitated to join the collective farms. The many well-to-do middle peasants, those who had occasionally hired labor, were hit especially hard.[57]

He speculated that, had the kulaks been "isolated and neutralized, "their resistance to collectivization would have been greatly weakened and they would have been obliged to submit to the measures of the Soviet regime."[58]

Medvedev cited from numerous sources and studies by Soviet scholars to back up his claims. He discussed what he called "abuses" (some kind of speial "excesses") during the years 1930-31. The first abuse was that dekulakization preceded collectivization in many raiony.[59] The second abuse was that the apparat carried out dekulakization suddenly with negative results. It was reported in Bol'shevik that a special tax was illegally levied on poor peasants as a preliminary to deprivating the franchize from them. In some regions the poor peasants decreed the dekulakization of the middle peasants if they "had once sold a dozen scythes, some grain, a cow, shoe soles, or hay."[60] The third abuse was the declaration of marital law in some raiony. The fourth abuse was that the kulaks who were banished to Siberia and the East "were deprived of most rights and privileges for a long time, including freedom of movement."[61] The last "abuse" Medvedev mentioned was the arrest and deportation of entire kulak or "subkulak" families to the Urals, Kazakhstan and Siberia. The transported were overcrowded in unheated cars during the winter.[62]

The interpretations of Kovalenko and Ivnitsky are difficult to assess because they did not cite the sources from which the data on the terrorist activities of the kulaks were. Kovalenko noted that 240,757 kulaks were banished by 1933. Medvedev cited the same figure but he did not also indicate the source. It is possible that this figure is found in the same source or study and the officials of the CPSU approve. If so, Kovalenko referred to it to support the official data. Medvedev used it to blame the members of the Central Committee for underestimating the "excesses."

There is also a methodological problem in the studies by Bogdenko and Pogudin. They did not discuss the acceptability of their predecessors' studies. How do we accept the suggestion that further work is needed on the processes and results of dekulakization when we do not know the sources or studies that had been used by their predecessors? It seems convincing to suggest that the observation that further research was needed was made to hide in the revived neo-Stalinist tendencies by the Brezhnev regime. The conclusions Bogdenko and Pogudin made were semi-neo Stalinist.

Medvedev's arguments on dekulakization are the most detailed. He used new sources and studies that were unavailable to Kovalenko, Bogdenko and Pogudin. He described dekulakization in details in order to expose Stalin's "errors," the focus of his study. It was possible to do so because the cult of Stalin was being criticized by Party officials. Medvedev wrote that he did not face difficulties from the officials in having access to the sources of the Party. The officials might have been aware that he was a critic of Stalinism.[63]

Some of Medvedev's conclusions are not convincing. First, he stated that mistakes were inevitable in the building of socialism.[64] It seems from this statement that Stalin should not be blamed. Second, he tended to generalize the processes of dekulakization. When was dekulakization carried out with and without collectivization objectives? Was the process of dekulakization the same everywhere, or were there variations? If there were, how can they be explained?

The Role of Stalin

The "mistakes" and "excesses" committed during collectivization were attributed to Stalin. Bogdenko and Kovalenko gave a mild criticism of Stalin's role; Medvedev gave an extreme one. Ivnitsky depersonalized the causes of the "mistakes" committed during the collectivization campaign rather than attributing them to Stalin.

Bogdenko argued from the resolutions and directives of the Politburo and newspapers that Stalin and Molotov prodded the low level workers to achieve higher rates of collectivization.[65] He felt that it was administrative "pressure from above."[66] He charged that "A great part of the blame for excesses in matters of the collectivization of the means of production in the countryside belongs to Stalin" because he supported the measures.[67]

Kovalenko wrote that Stalin disregarded Lenin's advice that neither haste nor pressure were to be used in collectivization. Stalin "acted hastily and brought pressure to bear on local Party organizations in the question of collectivization."[68] Stalin, Molotov "and other members of the Political Bureau" were told at the Plenary Meeting of the CC in November 1929 that "violations" of the Party line were being

committed, but no proper steps were taken. Instead, after the meeting, articles were printed in the press, e.g. Pravda, "urging a faster rate of collectivization."[69] The violation of the Party line led to the creation of communes rather than artels. The "distortions of the Party line caused discontent among peasants, who in some places resisted collectivization."[70] The Party rectified the "errors and distortions." At the request of the CC of the Political Bureau, Stalin's article "Dizzy with Sources" was published in Pravada on March 2, 1930. Kovalenko commented that "stalin gave a one-sided explanation of the reasons for the errors and distortions of the Party's policy. He blamed local Party workers for those errors, groundlessly accusing them of being 'dizzy with success.'"[71] Stalin and Molotov were also "carried away by the success of collectivization."[72]

Medvedev assessed evidence from Party resolutions and directives, newspapers, artistic literature and scholarly historical and political studies published after 1958 to indict Stalin. Stalin made "serious mistakes" beginning from the decision to collectivize to the implementational period. He claimed that "Mistakes were inevitable" because the USSR pioneered in building a socialist society.[73] It was Stalin's qualities which made the mistakes "serious" and which in turn deserved "serious study."[74] He wrote:

> And Stalin, who had greatly increased his power toward the end of the twenties [by destroying opposition groups in the Party], did not help to avoid or correct these mistakes. On the contrary, his inclination toward administrative fiat, toward coercion instead of convincing, his oversimplification and mechanistic approach to complex political problems, his crude pragmatism and inability to foresee the consequences of alternative actions, his vicious nature and unparalleled ambition--all these qualities seriously complicated the solutions

of problems that were overwhelming to begin with.[75]

Medvedev discussed four mistakes that Stalin committed. The first mistake was that Stalin exaggerated the success of cooperatives to justify the policy of mass collectivization. In reality, most of the collective farms "were small cooperatives consisting of 76 percent of the agricultural organizations." The overwhelming majority of collective farmers were poor peasants; only in a few villages and raiony had sizable numbers of middle peasants joined the collective farms."[76] The second mistake was that Stalin "severely criticized" the Commission's draft decree on the rate of collectivization. The final version of January 5, 1930 called for total collectivization to be finished by the spring of 1930 instead of 1932. But there were no material and financial resources for the organization of the implementation of the policy.[77] Consequently, "an emergency situation was created in the countryside, and with it an increase in the role of the GPU."[78] The third mistake was that Stalin made unilaterally the decision on kulak liquidation. He violated the collective principle of Party leadership. The policy of dekulakization made "so many mistakes" which would have been avoided as in the People's Democracies to be made.[79]

The last mistake was that Stalin blamed the local officials for using force, threats of dekulakization, promises of material inducement and the creation of kommuny rather than the artel. He was dishonest in blaming the local agencies in the article "Dizzy with Success," "which he wrote at the demand of the Central Committee."[80] The local officials were accused of deviationism "in many" oblasti and raiony respectively. But "most of the bigger officials" who gave the instructions were not tried.[81]

Medvedev argued that Stalin was too powerful by the end of 1929 to be criticized in the Politburo. He wrote that "The tragedy of the Party was not only that a man like Stalin led the Central Committee in the twenties, but also that the opposition was led by men such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, who could not offer an acceptable alternative to Stalin's leadership."[82] Medvedev argued that Stalin was responsible for the "perversions" in the collectivization movement because he issued directives to the local officials either orally or in writing since he was the head of the Party.[83]

Pogudin and Ivnitsky did not describe the mistakes of Stalin. Pogudin wrote at a time (i.e., 1965) when the Brezhnev leadership was cracking down on de-Stalinization. By 1977 when the History (in which Ivnitsky's section is) was published, neo-Stalinist controls of the historical profession were being revived. The criticisms of the other members of the Politburo which Bogdenko and Kovalenko made reflect the political rhetoric or collective leadership and the revival of neo-Stalinist interpretations. The presentations of Stalin's errors are enlightening. There are three related questions which need answers: Were Molotov and Kaganovich the only zealots who supported Stalin as Bogdenko and Kovalenko would make us believe? Does it mean that the head of state bears blame for what went on during the jurisdiction; are not the idolizers to be blamed as well? How can Medvedev criticize Stalin when he knows that there was no alternative to his leadership?

The Role of the Party and the Government

Bogdenko, Kovalenko, Ivnitsky and Medvedev emphasized the leading role of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Pogudin

did not describe what part the CC played in the implementation of collectivization. Bogdenko wrote that the Party and the Central government created the material-technical base and the "organizational-political" prerequisites for collectivization of agriculture.[84] The Party acquired experience in dekulakization during the procurement of grain in the years 1928-29. The Central Committee and the Central government organized the anti-kulak campaign during mass collectivization. The use of economic methods such as the imposition of taxes and fines, and "firm assignments to kulak farmstead"; and confiscation of property and coercion (whenever resistance was organized) were the strategies which the Central government urged the local Party organizations and government officials to use.[85] When "gross exaggerations" were made, e.g., "paper collective farms" such as the kommuny and high percentage rates, in Khoper okrug, Atkarsk and Pugachev districts in the lower Volga krai, the Party intervened and corrected them.[86]

Kovalenko and Ivnitzky started from the claim that the Central Committee prepared the conditions for mass collectivization and directed its implementation and went on to describe in detail the resolutions and decress that were passed. Kovalenko wrote that the hostility of the kulaks to collectivization made the CC issue the resolution on dekulakization on January 5, 1930. He did not mention its title;[87] Ivnitsky did: "The Rate of Collectivization and State Measures to Assist Collective Farm Development." Ivnitsky wrote that the resolution was proposed by the Politburo Commission of December 5, 1930 after reviewing the progress of collectivization in the second half of 1929.[88] Thus, Bogdenko, Kovalenko and Ivnitzky claimed that the CC and the Central government played a positive role in the implementation of collectivizati

Medvedev also stressed the guiding role of the CC in collectivization but he felt it was a negative one. Stalin and the CC imposed orders on the local Party organizations and government officials. He also criticized Molotov, Kaganovich "and other leaders of the Central Committee who had pushed and prodded local agencies in collectivization."[89] He criticized the historians who did not blame the Party for the "grave excesses and perversions" during collectivization. Medvedev argued that since it was obvious that the kulaks would oppose collectivization, "the main job of Party and Soviet agencies was to win the middle peasants over to their side and to isolate the kulaks."[90] That was not done. Nevertheless, with "unbelievable exertions" the Party managed to save agriculture from catastrophe.[91]

The conclusions which Bogdenko, Lovalenko, Medvedev and Ivnitsky made pose some questions. When and how did the CC and the Central government play a negative and a positive role? If the leaders of the CC made mistakes, is not Medvedev's suggestion that the Party saved agriculture from disaster contradictory? It seems to me that the commentators on this theme personalized the Party to displace its leaders and this causes the problem of what/when to criticize: the Party or the officials?

The Role of Party Organizations and Officials

The part played by the local Party organizations and their affiliates were discussed in details without any criticism by Kovalenko and Ivnitsky. Pogudin did not assess this theme.

Kovalenko described the contribution which the 25,000 industrial workers, the rural intelligentsia (teachers), the Red Army, poor peasants and farm laborers' gave in the collectivization movement.

The 25,000 workers came from major industrial cities. "Of those 25,000 workers 89 percent were veteran workers, and about 70 percent were Communists."[92] They played a "leading role" as chairmen of collective farm boards.

Kovakenko claimed that the teachers made a "large contribution" in collectivization of agriculture. "In the eyes of the peasants the village teacher was the most authoritative representative of the intelligentisia and everybody heeded his voice."[93] The Red Army demobilized 100,000 officers and soldiers who assisted as tractor-operators, drivers, accountants and team-leaders.[94] The poor peasants and farm laborers were active in collective-farm boards, rural soviets and cooperatives. They played an an "important role" in the collectivization of agriculture.

Ivnitsky wrote that workers, Soviets and rural Party cells played in that order, "an especially important role;" a "significant" role; and a "principal" role. He wrote that "Tens of thousands of workers" helped the peasantry "in their struggle against kulaks" and in organizing the collectives in the winter of 1929-30.[95] The November Plenum sent 25,000 workers to the countryside at the beginning of 1930. "Of the 25 thousand workers sent by the November, 1929 plenum, more than 70 percent were Communists." The Party and trade union organizations sent 180,000 workers to the villages in 1930 alone. Between November-December 1929 and June-July 1930 "more than a quarter million workers were sent to the village."[96]

Ivnitsky wrote that "Groups of poor peasants and agricultural laborers organized under Soviets, collective farms and cooperatives were of significant importance in rallying the poor and middle masses."[97] He claimed that the number of Communists had considerably increased in

the Party cells by the winter of 1929-30. They organized the mass movement of collectivization.

Ivnitsky attributed the serious mistakes and distortions during collectivization to the local officials. According to him,

> These mistakes stemmed primarily from the difficulties involved in transforming agriculture along socialist lines--the most difficult task after the conquest of power by the proletariat. The novelty of the matter, the lack of experience in carrying out mass collectivization, the extreme acuity of class struggle in the village, the provocations of the kulaks, which drove local personnel into taking incorrect action, excessive enthusiasm after the first success in the collective farm movement, the pursuit of higher percentage of collectivization--all these could not but be affected in the course of collectivization in the first few months of 1930.[98]

Medvedev argued that the local Party organizations and top government officials committed errors because they "were not prepared for total collectivization in such a short time." They were simply carrying out orders from above.[99] He wrote that "In order to carry out orders that came from above, not only in written but often in oral form, almost all Party and Soviet organs were forced to put administrative pressure on the peasants and also on the lower officials."[100]

Medvedev argued that "much of the blame must be placed on the Party and Soviet organizations that fell into grave excesses and perversions in setting up collective farms."[101]

Thus, Kovalenko and Ivnitsky presented the local Party organizations and government officials as having played a heroic role in the collectivization drive. Medvedev thought that the Party organizations and the officials implemented collectivization dictatorially because they were forced to do so from above. They should have revised the orders to suit the local conditions under which they worked. Medvedev

seems to view the Party headed by Stalin as committing mistakes all the time. Was there no time when the people on the spot committed mistakes because of local conditions? It would have been correct to criticize the local Party organizations and the government officials because they carried out the campaign on the spot while the top officials carried it from the offices in Moscow. Medvedev blamed the people in Moscow more than those on the spot because bad directives lead to poor implementation.

Interpretations by Western Scholars

Dekulakization

The Smolensk Archive provided Merle Fainsod with the evidence on the preparations for dekulakization in Velikiye Luki okrug in the Western oblast.[102] The Party committee of the Luki Okrug decided to "dekulakize" on January 28, 1930. The members authorized two OGPU* officials, Kolosov and Dabolin, to plan the operation. The members of the committee met again on January 30, 1930. They decided to enlarge the OGPU component of the committee by fifteen people and to arm the militia during the dekulakization campaign. On February 6, 1930 "troikas" consisting of the secretary of the Party committee, the chairman of the Soviet executive committee and the head of OGPU were designated to direct the operation with the aid of twenty-six local officials.

The raitroikas received a top secret letter on February 12, 1930 containing the instructions for dekulakization. The kulaks were divided into three groups. The first group was "the counter-revolutionary kulak aktiv." The group was to be arrested by the OGPU and deported

*The State Political Administration from 1922 to 1934. It was renamed the NKVD until the outbreak of the Second World War. The name changed to NKGB, the MGB and now it is the KGB.

after the approval of the okrug troika. The property was to be confiscated and given to the existing kolkhozes. The second group was to be "certain (separate) elements of the kulak aktiv who were 'quasi-landowner were not to be deported; they would be resettled in areas needing improvement, e.g. swamps. The kulaks in the last group were to be collectivized with some of their farm implements.

The letter warned the raitroikas not to dekulakize families with sons in the Red Army and poor peasants for ideological reasons. The Party organizations and trade unions were instructed to stop the flight of kulaks to the cities and industries. The implementers were told to consult on unclear directives.

Fainsod learned from the archival sources that okrug troikas claimed that the instructions were not clear. He did not describe whether they consulted the Centre or not. He described how OGPU reports indicated that excesses were made by the implementers, e.g. arrests of "village intelligentsia," poor peasants, peasants with sons in the Red Army and middle peasants. "Banditry" was also reported.[103] The OGPU also reported that the "perpetrators" shared confiscated property, food and money among themselves.[104] The excesses made well-to-do peasants dekulakize themselves by committing suicide; making fictitious divorces; fleeing to Moscow, the Urals and Siberia; "selling out all they owned, or leaving their property with relatives and friends, or simpy abandoning their fields and homes."[105] Humanitarian chairmen of village soviets, some Party members, many poor and middle peasants refused to approve deportation and expropriation measures.[106]

Fainsod wrote that "the Party leadership decided to call a halt to the excesses it had set in motion."[107] Ivan Petrovich Rumyantsev,

the first secretary of the Western obkom* and a member of the CC, sent a letter to all okrug Party secretaries on February 20, 1930. He criticized the "dekulakizers." A top secret obkom circular was sent to all the okrug Party committees on March 2, 1930 in which the members were reprimanded for not stopping raion and village officials' "abuses." On the same day, March 2, 1930, Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success" was published in Pravda. The okrug troikas were instructed to review dekulakization. Fainsod noted that "like other posthumous efforts to render justice, the instructions proved easier to issue than to execute."[108]

Halpern, Lewin and Davies used the Smolensk Archive and Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Lewin based the description of the dekulakization process on Fainsod's in Velikiye Luki okrug.[109] Despite the use of other sources and studies, these scholars presented dekulakization almost in the same way.

Halpern, basing his account on Soviet documents, Party officials' speeches and newspapers, found that there was no clear definition of a kulak,[110] and this made dekulakization chaotic; and the justification of the use of threats and coercion by local Party officials.[111] He disagreed with Soviet scholars who wrote that dekulakization was legally carried out.[112] He also did not agree to the view that raion committees and higher organs of Soviet power implemented dekulakization. Using newspapers, Halpern claimed that decisions for expropriation were made in rump meetings of poor and landless peasants "under Party and urban-worker tutelage."[113]

*The Party Committee in an oblast.

Basing his analysis on Soviet documents, Lewin also wrote that the definition of a kulak was vague, and this made the dekulakization operation arbitrary and indiscriminate "against whole sectors of the broad mass of the peasantry."[114] For example, early in 1930 the term "podkulachnik" or "henchman of the kulak" was introduced.[115] In 1933 Stalin introduced the term "zazhitochny" (prosperous peasant) "when this stratum had already ceased to exist."[116]

Lewin argued that kulaks "never constituted a serious political force within the Soviet context, in the sense that they were not capable of organizing themselves on a wider scale than that of the village "[117] and that "their political thinking and their organization did not extend beyond the context of the raion."[118] He wrote that while Soviet historians had claimed that "Dekulakization was the key-weapon in the strategy of collectivization," they underestimated the unpreparedness and unwillingness of the peasants for rapid collectivization.[119] Lewin wrote that dekulakization took "priority over collectivization" in the winter of 1929-30.[120] It was during this time that dekulakization was "chaotic, brutal and cruel."[121] The local activists committed excesses such as "naked" (goloe) dekulakization, i.e., expropriation for its own sake; "ideological dekulakization" ("the persecution of anyone who refused to obey instructions"),[122] "universal dekulakization" (Dekulakization in "non-sploshnaya" regions: non-grain areas which were "less ripe" for collectivization)[123] and "'shared-out' (delezhka) dekulakization," i.e. the looting and sharing of confiscated property. Lewin identified these excesses from Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, Soviet sources, newspapers and studies. He wrote that "'shared out' dekulakization" "went on throughout the entire country" arousing the indignation of the peasants

and the embarrassment, anxiety and criticism of the Party officials at the Centre.[124]

Lewin did not accept the reliability of the data on acts of terrorism by the kulaks. He argued that kulak resistance can "be interpreted as a sign of weakness."[125] The resistance was "dangerous" in spring 1930 when excesses were highest.[126] He felt that scattered groups of the kulaks and village priests carried out oral propaganda against the kolkhozes. They did not do this as a strong group but because of "the weakness of official propaganda, and above all to the distrust which the peasants felt."[127]

Lewin accepted the Politburo's claim that the confiscated property from the kulaks was given to the bednyaks.[128] He abhorred the cost of collectivization. He thought that about ten million people "must have been deported, of whom a great many must have perished."[129] The cost in human lives and the "terrible events" which the peasantry faced led him to reject the official and some Soviet historians' view that dekulakization was a class struggle that was supported from below.[130] He wrote:

> Primarily, the broad mass of the peasantry were victims of the policy of dekulakization, and it was in this light that they saw themselves. The alledgedly 'revolutionary process carried out by the masses' was in fact a purely administrative operation, conceived and executed on a vast scale by the leadership, and appallingly mismanaged at that. Dekulakization was a major strategic manoeuvre in the leadership's campaign to collectivize the peasants.[131]

Davies suggested that the data was "confused and contradictory"[132] from which the decision on the "elimination of the kulaks as a class" was

adopted. He used Soviet and Western studies (such as Smolensk Under Soviet Rule and Russian Peasants and Soviet Power) to describe the confiscation of the property and dwellings of the kulaks in the Western region. He wrote that local Party organizations and officials and the OGPU carried out dekulakization. They justified their actions against poor and middle peasants as the "henchmen" of the kulaks. On the expropriations which took place he wrote:

> The expropriation of the kulaks which took place in January 1930 was at first supported by no legislation. It was unplanned, unsystematic, at times even chaotic. It was inspired by the pronouncement of Stalin and the relentless press campaign, but its scope and spread were determined by the local authorities or even by the plenipotentiaries and brigades themselves.[133]

He demonstrated that in Kazakh, "both the expropriations of 1928 and those of 1930 had in common the use of political as well as economic criteria to select the victims, the establishment of special commissions in which the OGPU was directly involved, the despatch of plenipotentiaries to the villages and the summoning of peasant meetings to provide some popular authorization for the measures. Above all, the Kazakh expropriations, like those of 1930, were intimately connected with the collectivization of agriculture."[134] The people who implemented collectivization gave 60 percent of the confiscated animals to batraks* and poor peasants and 20 percent to existing collective farms.[135] He concluded that "there is no doubt that collectivization was facilitated by dekulakization" as intended by the authorities.[136]

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*Poor peasants.

There are fontological problems in the Smolensk sources which Fainsod did not solve. Fainsod wrote that the sources were authentic.[137] He did not establish the authorship and changes, if any, which Germans or Americans might have made. He did not even discuss the credibility of the reports of the OGPU. Did the OGPU officials want to impress Moscow on the difficulties or achievements they were encountering or making (respectively) in the dekulakization campaign? Halpern and Lewin saw dekulakization as a political manoeuvre by Stalin in particular and the Communist leadership in general. Davies thought that dekulakization had political, ideological and economic reasons. They all claimed, however, that expropriation of the property of the kulaks was unjustifiable. They based their claims on the statements by the Communists who opposed dekulakization and collectivization in grain-growing areas. It is clear that they preferred personal freedom to authoritarian tendencies. Lewin's argument that kulak resistance was not a threat to the Soviet system would have been convincing if any statistics had been cited.

The Role of Stalin

Of the Western historians whose writings are assessed in this study Fainsod did not describe the role of Stalin. He was interested in the relationship between Moscow and Smolensk. Halpern interpreted the role of Stalin in the collectivization campaign as a political struggle for personal power. He wrote:

> Collectivization was Stalin's most important achievement. With it he brought the Bolshevik Revolution to the countryside; with it he achieved the power he needed to carry through his other programs; with it, he was able

> to take firm hold of the grain sack of a nation and to dispense the fruit of the nation's labors to his own best advantage.[138]

He wrote that Stalin started pressing for rapid total collectivization a month after the XV Party Congress. He cited Stalin's speeches during the visit to Siberia from January 15 to February 6, 1928 and to the Moscow Party Organization and concluded that Stalin had decided on mass collectivization by the end of 1928. He claimed from the Party resolutions and directives and the press that the policy of "eliminating the kulaks as a class" was Stalin's idea which was unopposed in the Politburo because he had "debilitated, bruised and humiliated" the moderates and the Right-wing group.[139] He felt that Stalin used the dekulakization campaign to "whip the peasantry into submission to the will of the state and its ruling Party"; he also used it as "an expeditious means of completing the revolution, a means of bringing the peasant and his production under the control of the central authorities, and of simultaneously crushing both obdurate individuals and traditional institutions of peasant economic and political autonomy in one great wench."[140] He concluded:

> Unless and until there is a basic overhauling or even scrapping of the kolkhoz system, brutally imposed on the peasantry under Stalin's aegis, agriculture in the Soviet Union will remain Communism's Child of Sorrow.[141]

Lewin also interpreted Stalin's role as a pursuit for personal power. He wrote that Stalin initiated the policies of mass collectivization and the liquidation of the kulaks. He did so because of "the successes and failures in the domain of industrial construction, the recession in agricultural production and the upward movement in

collectivization, the dynamic of the industrialization drive and enthusiasm for the socialist offensive."[142] He argued, however, that these reasons were exaggerated.[143] Lewin claimed that the serednyaks (middle peasants) were not massively joining the kolkhozes as Stalin claimed.[144] Stalin was unopposed in the Politburo because "the Stalinist faction were already entrenched, since the Right had for all practical purposes, been eliminated and formally denounced."[145]

Davies wrote that Stalin's remarks and Molotov's speeches at the Party Plenum of November 1929 encouraged the local Party organizations and officials to reach for higher rates of collectivization.[146] Stalin inspired dekulakization by his pronouncements.[147] Commenting on Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success," Davies wrote that it was written "after protracted disputes in the party."[148] Stalin also wrote the article because of the success in the collection of grain; the sowing season was approaching and there had been peasant resistance. He wrote that "Stalin's exemption of himself and the Central Committee from criticism [of the excesses and distortions] was a crude evasion of responsibility."[150]

Halpern and Lewin made the same interpretations of Stalin's role in mass collectivization of agriculture. Stalin not only initiated it but also pressed for its completion. Collectivization was a means of amasssing personal power. The comment was like Medvedev's. Davies' conclusions were semi-neo-Stalinist. The image of Stalin as a dictator was responsible for these interpretations. The use of the same sources and the assumption that these sources were unreliable is another

explanation of the same conclusions. They did not take into account Soviet scholars' publications based on archival materials in which the writers did not criticize Stalin's mistakes.

The Role of the Party and the Government

Fainsod assessed the role of the ~~Patry~~ party and the Central government when he described how the preparations for the implementation of collectivization were made. Halpern, Lewin and Davies indicated how the CPSU appointed commissions that recommended how collectivization was to be implemented. The CC and the Politburo approved the findings. The Party also worked out the corrective measures of the excesses committed by the implementers.

Halpern and Lewin claimed that the Party and government officials accepted Stalin's policy on the "elimination of the kulaks as a class."[151] Halpern thought that the directives on implementation were unclear, and this led to chaos and the use of force by the local Party organizations and officials.[152] Lewin argued that the Politburo was aware that hasty collectivization would create problems for the "men on the spot."[153] He claimed that the CC "did everything in its power to turn dekulakization into a series of acts of pillage."[154] The Party passed a decree that authorized the local officials to confiscate the property of the kulaks who tried to change their residence or sell their property. But the decree was not published.[155] In essence, the decree "authorized universal dekulakization."[156] He used Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule to demonstrate that the Center ordered local officials through the press when and how to dekulakize.[157]

Davies claimed that the top officials guided the process of collectivization, and that they were concerned with excesses and peasant resistance. They corrected them through the press by reasserting the voluntary principle.[158] It was from the autumn of 1930 that the Party and government officials "refrained from exercising sufficient pressure" in the collectivization movement. He speculated that "the time was not yet ripe for an all-out drive, or [it was] simply due to preoccupation with the troubles of industry and planning, and with the climax of the campaign against the bourgeois specialists."[159]

Halpern and Lewin saw the Party and government officials as concerned with maintaining power through the collectivization of agriculture. There are three explanations for this interpretation. First, they used the same Party resolutions and decrees on collectivization. Second, they criticized Stalin's political motives, and since he was the head of the Party and the government, they merged the motives together. And third, they criticized the way the kulaks were expropriated. Since they claimed that it was a political campaign, they naturally gave the responsibility to the Party and the government. As already stated above, personal preferences in freedom also explain the interpretations.

Davies' interpretation was like that of some Soviet scholars. Davies was interested in the achievements of Soviet industrialization rather than the political system like Halpern and Lewin.

The Role of Party Organizations and Officials

The Western historians who analyzed this theme were Halpern, Lewin and Davies. Fainsod did not discuss it for the reason that was stated above. The origin of the policy of total collectivization in the raiony; the relationship between Moscow, the local Party organizations and officials;* the means which the local Party organizations and officials used during dekulakization were described.

Halpern and Lewin pointed out that the Khoper okrug in the Lower Volga was the pilot region for mass collectivization before the decision was made at the end of 1929. From the sources in the Smolensk Archive and Western studies Halpern made some reservations. He argued that the local Party officials "secured the approval of the central Party command before undertaking an all-out drive to collectivize all the villages of the okrug in one full sweep."[160] According to the archival sources published in 1958 the OGPU had filed allegations about subversive organizations in the okrug between 1928 and 1929. He thought that "some zealots" who were "more Stalinist than Stalin" "tried to clear themselves of suspicion and to restore respectability in Moscow's eyes."[161]

Halpern disagreed with Soviet scholars who claimed that the idea of total collectivization started spontaneously in raiony and spread to okrugi and krais.** He claimed that it was the "dazzling" results which the Soviet scholars mentioned rather than spontaneity which made the idea of total collectivization spread from raiony to okrugi to krais.[163]

*This problem has already been described in this chapter.
**The territorial subdivision of a Soviet republic.

Lewin described how the Party committee of the Khoper okrug decided to pilot mass collectivization, and how the idea was picked up in thirty-five to forty okrugi.[164] He pointed out that the top officials urged rural communists to pioneer in forming collective farms. The rural communists were reluctant until the Party used "bureaucratic" techniques, e.g. expulsion from the Party.[165] The process of collectivization was "speeded up at the behest of the Politburo."[166] Stalin used the example set by the Khoper okrug to claim that "the Five-year plan for collectivization" was possible.[167]

Davies did not point out whether Khoper was the pilot okrug or not. But he thought that some top and local Party officials used the okrug as the model for spontaneous collectivization.[168]

Halpern, Lewin and Davies argued that the Party organizations and officials proposed higher rates than those suggested by the Central Committee. Halpern charged that the Party okrugi plans for mass collectivization "did not appeal to the leaders in the Kremlin." The Kremlin was "anxious to have a centrally coordinated, systematic mass collectivization movement and needed a single plan for its execution."[169]

There were conflicting interpretations of the part played by the village soviets. Halpern argued from press reports that the village soviets were not as active in the collectivization movement as Soviet historians claimed. The peasant members in the village soviets were more attached to the mir (commune) than to communism.[170] He wrote:

> The fact of the matter is that there were not many Communists in the first place, and many villages were altogether free of Party cells. Moreover, where peasant Communists could be found in the villages they were usually peasants first and Communists second.[171]

Lewin wrote that the bednyaks who were members of rural soviets or the Party joined the dekulakization campaign.[172] Davies found from Soviet sources and studies that the participation of the village soviets in the collectivization movement was ineffective.[173]

The third sub-theme was the use of different strategies by the local Party organizations and officials, and the brigades--the soldiers, OGPU, Komsomols, the MTS, the "25,000-ers" and the poor peasants in kolkhozes. Halpern disagreed with Soviet historians who argued that the Red Army and the MTS were active in the collectivization movement. The Red Army units "were used mainly as repair brigades to put the debilitated farm machinery in order."[174] It was the Party officials and the "25,000-ers" (factory workers) who were the "workhorses" of collectivization: "they reportedly filled out the ranks of the collectivization brigades, the agitation-propaganda columns, and the machine repair brigades."[175] They used intimidation, administrative pressure, persuasion and coercion.

Davies described how the collectivization process was carried out in the North Caucasus, one of the most successful regions where collective farms were formed. The brigades used the "towline" method:

> The 'towline' operated in the following manner: Near the end of January [1931] each of the ten [raions] most advanced in collectivization 'took into tow' one of the more backward raions in the region. Some seven hundred fifty 'shock' kolkhoz members were selected from the more successful collectives to work in ten 'towline' brigades. In addition, ten 'shock' workers from various factories in Rostov were attached to each brigade, which then consisted of between eighty and eighty-five men.[176]

Lewin's account was heavily drawn from Fainsod's Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. He wrote that the OGPU was armed and the local

Party officials directed the dekulakization process.[177]

Davies used Soviet studies based on archival material. He claimed that over 70,000 industrial workers volunteered after November 1929. Of these, 27,000 were selected: 70 percent were Party members; about half had worked in industries for ten years and four-fifths were from industrial regions.[178] The industrial workers "were accompanied by an equally large number of local party and government officials."[179] They worked in the okrug and district "headquarters" (shtab) under the the chairmanship of the soviet executive committee that was directed by the regional and Central Party officials.[180] Propaganda and persuasion; promises of material inducements; fines, intimidations and coercion were the implementational strategies that were used in the collectivization movement.[181]

It can again be seen that Halpern and Lewin made similar presentations which were related to the political interpretation of mass collectivization. Davies did not think that collectivization can be explained in political terms only.

The commentators did not discuss where and when the local Party organizations and government officials used different strategies in the collectivization campaign. Who were the zealots and who were not? What were the reasons? Is there any statistical evidence which supports or fails to support the number of peasants who joined the kolkhozes to prove or disapprove the claim by some Soviet historians that collectivization was carried from below?

FOOTNOTES

[1]See "Kommunist Criticizes New History of the USSR," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVII, 52 (January 19, 1966): 15-16.

[2]"Forward," Let History Judge, pp. xxxiiif

[3]David Joravsky, "Editors Introduction," Ibid., p. xviii.

[4]Ibid., p. xix.

[5]"Forward," Let History Judge, pp. xxviii; xxx

[6]Ibid., p. xxvi.

[7]Ibid., p. xxviii.

[8]Ibid., p. xxxii.

[9]Ibid., p. xxxi.

[10]Ibid., p. xxxiii.

[11]Ibid., p. xxxiv.

[12]His other publications are the West. See Professional'noe obuchebie shkol'nikov na promyshlennom predpriiatii nekotorye vyvody iz opyta raboty eksperimental'kykh shkol v RSFSR (Moscow, 1960), trans. into German (Berlin , 1962) and Bulgarian (Sofia 1962); Voprosy organizatsii professional'nogo obucheniia shkol'nikov (Moscow 1963); The October Revolution (Columbia University Press, 1979); On Stalin and Stalinism (Oxford 1979); On Soviet Dissent (Cambridge 1980).

[13]This writer failed to get detailed background information on Bogdenko, Kovalenko, Pogudin and Ivnitsky.

[14]Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, 1st. pub. 1958, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 13.

[15]Ibid., pp. 14; 454.

[16]Unpublished paper prepared for the Committee on the History of the CPSU: New York, 1956. He included it in the miscellaneous readings in the bibliography. It is in Bakhmateff Archive, Columbia University Library, New York. This writer failed to get it.

[17]"Stalin's Revolution," pp. vi-viii.

[18]Ibid., p. 1.

[19]Ibid., pp. iv-v.

[20]Russian Peasantry and Soviet Power, pp. 11; 19f; 516.

[21]See Soviet Studies, xvii, 2 (October 1956):162-197.

[22]See Soviet Studies, xviii, 2 (October 1966):189-212. Also see R. Beermann, "Comment on 'Who Was the Soviet Kulak?'" Soviet Studies, xviii, 3 (January 1967):370-371.

[23]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 19. W. S. Churchill recorded from a conservation with Stalin in 1942 that collectivization cost ten million peasants in four years. Of course Stalin had no figures and Churchill did not verify. See his The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p. 447. Lewin wrote that Churchill was probably told 100 million died. Ibid., p. 520. This is obviously too high a figure to be accepted even without verification.

[24]Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique (Paris, 1965), Le dernier combat de Lenine (Paris, 1967), Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economics Debates: From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers (Princeton, 1974) and "Society, State and Ideology during the First Five-Year Plan," in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 ed. Sheila Fitspatrick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 41-77.

[25]The Socialist Offensive, p. xvi.

[26]Ibid., p. xiii.

[27]Ibid., p. xiii.

[28]Ibid., p. xiv.

[29]Ibid., p. xvi.

[30]With others he edited Science Policy in the USSR, vol. I (London, 1969) and The Technological Level of Soviet Industry. Author of The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System and the editor of The Soviet Union.

[31]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," pp. 164f.

[32]Ibid., p. 168.

[33]Ibid., p. 166.

[34]Ibid., p. 166.

[35]Ibid., p. 207.

[36]Ibid., p. 207.

[37]Ibid., p. 213.

[38]Ibid., p. 214.

[39]Ibid., p. 215.

[40]Ibid., p. 215.

[41]"Stalin's Role," p. 3.

[42]Ibid., p. 3.

[43]Ibid., p. 10.

[44]"Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class," pp. 21; 27.

[45]Ibid., p. 24.

[46]Ibid., p. 26.

[47]Ibid., pp. 22f.

[48]Ibid., p. 26.

[49]Ibid., p. 27.

[50]Ibid., p. 96.

[51]Ibid., p. 98.

[52]Ibid., p. 98.

[53]Ibid., p. 100.

[54]Ibid., p. 98.

[55]Ibid., p. 101.

[56]Ibid., p. 98.

[57]Ibid., p. 99.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. 100.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid.

[63]See introduction in this chapter.

[64]Ibid.

[65]"Stalin's Role," p. 6.

[66]Ibid., p. 7.

[67]Ibid., p. 8.

[68]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 169.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., p. 170.

[71]Ibid., p. 170.

[72]Ibid., p. 170.

[73]Let History Judge, p. 71.

[74]Ibid., p. 71.

[75]Ibid., p. 72.

[76]Ibid., p. 83.

[77]Ibid., p. 85.

[78]Ibid., p. 86.

[79]Ibid., p. 101.

[80]Ibid., p. 87f.

[81]Ibid., p. 89.

[82]Ibid., p. 70.

[83]Ibid., p. 89.

[84]"Stalin's Role," p. 4.

[85]Ibid., pp. 8-10.

[86]Ibid., p. 5.

[87]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 165.

[88]Ibid., p. 205.

[89]Let History Judge, p. 88.

[90]Ibid., p. 99.

[91]Ibid., p. 90.

[92]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 167.

[93]Ibid., p. 167.

[94]Ibid., p. 167.

[95]"Building Socialism," p. 210.

[96]Ibid., p. 210.

[97]Ibid., p. 210.

[98]Ibid., p. 211.

[99]Let History Judge, p. 86.

[100]Ibid., p. 86.

[101]Ibid., p. 99.

[102]Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, pp. 242-244.

[103]Ibid., p. 244.

[104]Ibid., p. 245.

[105]Ibid., p. 246.

[106]Ibid., p. 246.

[107]Ibid., p. 246.

[108]Ibid., p. 247.

[109]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 497-499.

[110]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 126f.

[111]Ibid., p. 320f.

[112]Ibid., p. 231.

[113]Ibid., p. 228.

[114]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 490.

[115]Ibid., p. 494.

[116]Ibid., p. 491.

[117]Ibid., p. 471.

[118]Ibid., p. 472.

[119]Ibid., p. 483.

[120]Ibid., p. 488.

[121]Ibid., p. 487.

[122]Ibid., p. 498.

[123]Ibid., pp. 488; 499.

[124]Ibid., p. 502.

[125]Ibid., p. 486.

[126]Ibid., p. 486.

[127]Ibid., p. 487.

[128]Ibid., p. 495.

[129]Ibid., p. 508.

[130]Ibid., p. 508.

[131]Ibid., p. 509.

[132]The Soviet Offensive, p. 151.

[133]Ibid., p. 231.

[134]Ibid., pp. 140f.

[135]Ibid., p. 141.

[136]Ibid., p. 251.

[137]See introduction in this chapter.

[138]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 408.

[139]Ibid., p. 152.

[140]Ibid., p. 152.

[141]Ibid., p. 421.

[142]Ibid., p. 446.

[143]Ibid., p. 456f.

[144]Ibid., p. 457.

[145]Ibid., p. 469.

[146]The Socialist Offensive, p. 312.

[147]Ibid., p. 231.

[148]Ibid., p. 252.

[149]Ibid., pp. 252-261.

[150]Ibid., p. 312.

[151]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 173; Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 454; 460; 474.

[152]Ibid., p. 194; 211.

[153]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 461.

[154]Ibid., p. 488.

[155]Ibid., p. 495.

[156]Ibid., p. 496.

[157]Ibid., pp. 489; 497-499.

[158]The Socialist Offensive, Ch. 6.

[159]Ibid., p. 380.

[160]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 159.

[161]Ibid., p. 160.

[162]Ibid., p. 157.

[163]Ibid., p. 162.

[164]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 433.

[165]Ibid., p. 434.

[166]Ibid., p. 459.

[167]Ibid., p. 433.

[168]The Socialist Offensive, pp. 159; 161f.

[169]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 173.

[170]Ibid., p. 207.

[171]Ibid., p. 197.

[172]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 500.

[173]The Socialist Offensive, p. 224.

[174]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 205.

[175]Ibid., pp. 200;207.

[176]Ibid., pp. 326f.

[177] Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 500.

[178] The Socialist Offensive, p. 208.

[179] Ibid., p. 204.

[180] Ibid., p. 205.

[181] Ibid., p. 213.

CHAPTER V

PROCESSES OF IMPLEMENTING VILLAGIZATION

The main scholars who assessed the implementation of villagization were Marxist socialists and non-Marxist socialists. One of the non-Marxist socialist commented on their interpretations when he wrote:

> The Ujamaa village policy and its implementation are like the elephant described by the blind men. The image of the man who touched only the tail was quite different from that of the man who touched only the leg. The whole creature, or the whole implementation process, is the sum of diverse parts.[1]

This chapter provides specific writings in which the above interpretations were discussed relating to the role played by the Party and government officials* in villagization; the response of the civil servants,** and the peasantry*** to the policy of villagization.

The studies by Marxist socialists which are discussed in this chapter are H. U. E. Van Velzen's "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants"; Issa G. Shivji's two studies "The Silent Class Struggle" and Class Struggles in Tanzania; Philip Raikes' "Ujamaa Vijijini" and Michaela von Freyhold's

*Marxist socialists called them "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." Some non-Marxist socialists also used the same term.

**Local people call them "Wa-Staffu," i.e., all salaried Party and public servants. This was adopted by the Marxist socialists: they called them the government staff. Non-Marxist socialists called them civil servants.

***It was divided into "kulaks" ("progressive farmers") and "peasants." Most of the scholars used the term kulak Marxist socialists discussed the role of kulaks as contrasted with non-Marxist socialists who concentrated on the response of the peasants.

"Ujamaa Vijijini in Handeni" and Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania. Non-Marxist socialists' studies are four: C. K. Omari's Strategy in Rural Development; Tanzania From Ujamaa to Villagization by Jannik Boesen; Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages by Dean E. McHenry and Goran Hyden's Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania.

Issa G. Shivji and C. K. Omari are Tanzanians. Shivji got his undergraduate degree in law at the University of Dar es Salaam. He is currently a lecturer in the School of Law, University of Dar es Salaam. He was a member of the TANU Youth League College Branch; a radical group of students. The TANU Youth League College Branch (TYLCB) had its own journal called Cheche (the Spark) which published theoretical leftist views. Shivji's "The Class Struggle" was one of its last publications. It was in the September issue of 1970 after Shivji had graduated in the 1969/70 academic year.

Most of the students belonging to the TANU Youth League contributed views to the debate on Tanzanian socialism. President Julius K. Nyerere, while welcoming their views, did not like their militant way in which they were addressed. In one of his usual visitations to the campus in February 1970 President Nyerere disapproved the questions and answers the TYLCB asked. Shivji continued the debate which the President and the TYLCB had started.[2]

Shivji argued "that the fundamental contradictions in the Tanzanian society are not to be found in the rural peasantry (including the big farmers [kulaks] but in the content and nature of the relationship of Tanzania's economy with international capitalism."[3] He wrote that the paper was written "under pressure of time and not

altogether favourable circumstances."[4] He felt that it was time the class analysis was used rather than relying on empirical research in explaining how Tanzanian economy was controlled. He concluded that Tanzania must industrialize "in order to disengage from the imperialist economy and make a break with its underdevelopment."[5] Shivji's thesis and conclusion were challenged by three expatriate Marxist socialists--Thomas Szentes, Walter Rodney and John S. Saul.[6] Their views made Shivji to expand his essay into a monograph Class Struggles in Tanzania. He did not change his views but he used new published studies. The comments from Szentes, Rodney and Saul will be discussed in this chapter.

C. K. Omari was an associate professor of sociology in the University of Dar es Salaam. He was the Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science before being appointed the Chairman of Social Welfare Institute. He is currently doing research in Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Omari is the author of over five books and articles on Tanzanian socialism. Strategy for Rural Development was expanded from the essay "Tanzania's Emerging Rural Development Policy," published in Africa Today, Summer 1974. He described how Tanzanians were attempting to build a socialist society in these studies. In the book, he warned against dogmatism and perfectionism "in some rural workers' minds as well as in some policy makers' minds" because Tanzania was not in a hurry to build a socialist society.[7]

Dean E. McHenry and Goran Hyden are of USA nationality. They have had long experience of working and research in East Africa. McHenry did his research for the doctoral degree in Tanzania. The

dissertation "Tanzania: the Struggle for Development" was accepted by the Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, in 1971.

Out of the thesis he wrote papers and presented them in seminars in East Africa and the U.S.A. The papers were "Peasant Participation in Communal Farming: The Tanzanian Experience;" "Policy Implementation in Rural Africa: The Case of Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania;" "Gaining Peasant Compliance: The Colonial Government's Implementation of Policies Affecting Rural Tanzania;" and "Rural Policy Divergence: Communal Farming in Ujamaa Villages." These studies show that McHenry was interested in communal farming in particular and rural development in general. He was also interested in the dialectical relationship between peasant compliance to the colonial government and the Tanzanian government. Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages was based on these essays.

Hyden lived for twelve years in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as a social science researcher and adviser to the Ford Foundation for Eastern and Southern Africa. He taught political science in the three Universities of East Africa.

Hyden claimed that it was the traditional mode of production which made the peasants to be reluctant in resettling in Ujamaa villages. He suggested that it was only in Africa where peasants "have enjoyed a degree of independence from other social classes large enough to make them influence the course of events on the continent."[8] His claims were based on Tanzanian experience. He first expressed the claims in "The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania" in a colloquim at the University of California, Los Angeles,

spring 1978. The paper was expanded into a book, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania.

Hyden wrote in the preface and introduction of the book that he did not use "standard models" suggested by Western scholars for the study of peasants. The scholars offered pseudo-solutions because they were biased. He called his method the African "chapati," i.e., his long experience while working in East Africa had made him to understand the social realities. In other words, he was unbiased in his views on the response of Tanzanian peasants to the policy of villagization.

Philip Raikes and Jannik Boesen are Danish. They have written a number of articles on socialism in Tanzania for the Institute of Development, Copenhagen. Boesen was a research officer for the Institute in the late 1970's.

Raikes claimed that administrative methods rather than voluntary methods were used in villagization.[9] He proposed that Ujamaa Villagers should aim at higher productivity.[10] His study was an interpretative one. He used government sources and studies. His interpretation was influenced by preceeding Marxist socialists.[11]

The essay by Boesen was mainly based on field research in the West Lake Region between 1970-1975. He wrote that "technocratic and bureaucratic control measures" were mainly used in the implementation of villagization.[12] He made the same interpretations like the Marxist socialists. But it was not a class approach.

Professor Michaela von Freyhold got her training in the Frankfurt School of Sociology. She was a lecturer in Sociology in the University of Dar es Salaam from 1968 to 1970. She conducted field research in

Tanga Region from 1970 to 1972, 1973 and in 1977 with Tanzanians and expatriates who had written on Ujamaa. She read reports on Ujamaa and wrote some of the findings in the essay "The Problems of Rural Development and the Politics of Ujamaa Vijijini in Handeni," published in the African Review in 1976. She expanded the essay into Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, published in 1979.

She wrote that the government staff was expected by the Party and government officials to mobilize the peasants. That was the same way the colonial government carried out policies relating to rural production. The purpose of the study was to describe and analyze the successes and failures of cooperatives by explaining the response and the struggle between the peasantry and the government staff.[13]

Michaela von Frehold has been Professor for the analysis of Third World Development, University of Bremen, since 1978.

Let us turn to the themes mainly discussed on villagization: the bureaucratic bourgesisie or TANU/Central government officials; the government staff or civil servants; the kulaks and the peasants.

Interpretations by Marxist Socialists

The Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie

The term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" was popularized by Issa G. Shivji. It was a class composed of people who had provided the leadership to the African petty bourgeoisie in the struggle for independence (Uhuru). The class formed the "politico-administrative bureaucracy" after winning independence.[14] It became the bureaucratic bourgeoisie after announcing the Arusha Declaration on socialism and self-reliance in February 1967.

Shivji divided the bureaucratic bourgeoisie into three groups: (a) "politico-administrative, (b) economic and (c) military bureaucracies: (a) "political heads of government minitries and departments (central and local) and their top civil servants; heads and top functionaries in the judiciary, police and security; and the top leadership of the party"; (b) "heads and higher functionaries of parastatals, public corporations, and other quasi-economic, either state-run or state-supervised institutions (cooperatives, marketing boards, higher educational institutions included)" and (c) "top military officers (majors, colonels, captains, and lieutenants)."[15]

Shivji divided the petty bourgeoisie into three social groups at the time of independence:

upper layer	intellecturals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers.
middle layer	middle government salariat, junior clerks, soldiers, etc.
lower layer	shopkeepers, lower salariat in the services sector, and generally lowest grades of the salariat.[16]

These social groups were united by the desire to destroy the monopoly of the economy by the Asian commercial bourgeoisie. The upper and middle sub-classes of the petty bourgeoisie which "overwhelmingly came from urban-based occupations, and had some education and knowledge of the outside world," provided the national leadership in the struggle against the commercial bourgeoisie. He claimed that the main objective of the petty bourgeoisie in the struggle for independence was economic. He wrote:

> The objective economic interests of the petty bourgeoisie therefore called for a struggle against the colonial

> state. In this their interests coincided with those of the broad masses. Thus it was "destined" to become a ruling petty bourgeoisie, unlike its counterpart in Europe where the petty bourgeoisie could hardly play any historical role.[17]

Shivji also wrote:

> The petty bougeoisie was interested in political freedom as an end in itself or at most to facilitate its own struggle against the commercial bourgeoisie, not as a weapon in the fight for the total emancipation of the whole society.[18]

He argued that a "Bonapartist" struggle emerged within the petty bourgeoisie after the attainment of independence in 1962.[19] The first reason was that there was an internal class division caused by six factors: "(a) income; (b) eduation; (c) standard of living and life-style [the main milieu]; (d) control of or potentially effective participation in the decision-making bodies; (3) the role occupied in the production process; (f) control of or proximity to state apparatuses."[20] The second reason which led to the Bonapartist struggle was that the group that had provided the national leadership for the struggle for independence became conservative rather than revolutionary. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie became interested in its own material interests. Shivji argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie allied with the international bourgeoisie in the control of the economy.

Shivji was criticized by Thomas Szentes, Walter Rodney and John S. Saul. Szentes, a U.S.A. citizen teaching economics, pointed out that Shivji did not investigate "the dialectics of development as opposed to the status quo approach" in explaining how international capitalists and their allies maintained their interests and privileges. He raised three questions:

> Why does partnership with Government offer international companies the best hope of achieving guaranteed markets and the minimization of risks? What kind of risks can be minimized by doing so? Why is it through management contracts that they seek to gain or complement their income?[21]

Szentes did not provide answers to these questions. Instead he concentrated on Shivji's weaknesses in the analysis of socio-economic formations in Tanzania. He criticized Shivji for not discussing the struggles between and within the capitalist and socialist systems on the one hand, and on the other, the struggle between the "rich" and the "poor" countries.[22]

Walter Rodney, a Guyanese lecturer in History, basing his views on Amilcar Cabral's analysis of the retention of state power by the petty bourgeoisie in Revolution in Guinea (Shivji did not use the book), wrote that Shivji was indiscrimate in his discussion of the ruling class because "the African petty-bourgeoisie stratum includes Shivji, the other T.Y.L. [TANU Youth League] comrades at the University and most of the national leadership in Tanzania--irrespective of political connections."[23] Saul was also of the opinion that internal class contradictions and class struggles should have been analyzed as the role of the international bourgeoisie was.[24]

Shivji did not change his views in Class Struggles in Tanzania. He wrote it to answer the above critics. He elaborated and documented his views. He argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was torn between the political interests of retaining state power and the economic interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the international bourgeoisie. It opted for a status quo and dependency on international capitalists. Alone, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was "incapable of

restructuring the internal society and thereby disengaging from the world capitalist system."[25]

Shivji underestimated racial conflict as one of the major factors during the struggle for independence. The practice of educational, occupational, legal and economic policies was based on racial divisions between Tanzanyikans and the minority Europeans and Asians. A class explanation of the transition to nationhood failed to explain racial factor in the nationalist movement. Shivji made the Asian community, of which he is a member, the victim of independence.

In order to understand the material interests and ideology of the ruling group, the questions Szentes asked must be answered. Similarly, the ideology for non-alighment which the Tanzanian leadership claims it practices has to be assessed. Finally, the claim that the members of the ruling class are social democrats and populists has to be explained within the context of nation-building. It seems these days that people look at the government as the Giver rather than the Receiver. This puts an underdeveloped country like Tanzania into a dilemma of maintaining stability and developing the country through the so-called self-reliance approach.

The Role of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie in Villagization

The common claim among Marxist socialist was that bureaucratic and technocratic rather than democratic and political methods were used in the implementation of villagization. The formulation of policies was discussed to demonstrate the claim. "Guidelines" for future action were then suggested. The discussion that follows is

based on Issa G. Shivji!s two studies "The Silent Class Struggle" and Class Struggles in Tanzania.

Shivji did not examine the role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in "The Silent Class Struggle" because he was interested in answering the question, "Who controls Tanzania's economy?" After discussing the alliance between the international bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the control of the economy, Shivji gave "guidelines" which we shall discuss later. It was in the Class Struggles in Tanzania where he discussed the bureaucratic and technocratic methods of implementing villagization. In this study he wrote:

> Decision-making is typically a process of movement of files and orders through the hierarchy of officials. In the absence of a national bourgeoisie, even the notions of bourgeois democracy do not exist. The bureaucratic method of decision-making finds its counterpart in the technocratic method of implementing the decisions so made. Again the problems of implementation are seen as technical problems: in terms of correct 'expert advice,' 'efficient' organization and 'planning' of things and use of qualified manpower. People are just another statistic in the plan who should implement in instructions.[26]

Shivji concluded that Ujamaa was imposed on the peasants from above. He claimed from Angwazi and Ndulu's study of the process of villagization in Rufiji in 1968 that it was not a political struggle in which cadres were involved. These conclusions were made by him in "The Silent Class Struggle." In that essay he referred to Stalinist bureaucracy and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

Shivji wrote that Tanzania did not have a developed state apparatus as that during the era of Stalin. "The Stalinist bureaucracy could really be described as having no social base in so far as neither the capitalist nor the working class were controlling it."[27] He

claimed from these two differences that Tanzanian bureaucracy was "not so independent as to be able to accelerate development of productive forces as was the Stalinist bureaucracy." [28] The bureaucratic and technocratic methods of implementing villagization, he wrote in Class Struggles in Tanzania, led to two negative results: "The control of the state, on the one hand, and the state control of the economy, on the other."[29]

One of Shivji's main criticisms of Tanzanian bureaucracy in "The Silent Class Struggle" was that it was dependent on the international bourgeoisie. This hampered efforts at carrying out a revolution as in socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and Maoist China. In Maoist China, the Cultural Revolution occurred because of the "humanization of bureaucracy," i.e., workers control through a committed revolutionary vanguard party, which resolved non-antagonistic contradictions. He felt, however, that the Cultural Revolution was "not a revolution in so far as it did not radically change the property relations."[30] In other wrods, he favored the Stalinist bureaucracy to Maoist bureaucracy. This is also reflected in the recommendation of industrialization he made.

> Tanzania, in order to disengage from the imperialist economy and make a break with its underdevelopment, must industrialize. Even the success of "Ujamaa Villages" will decisively depend on whether the productivity and the standards of living of the peasants in Ujamaa Villages are higher than those of individual peasants. Mechanization and the provision of essential social infrastructure--medical facilities, education, running water, houses, etc.--are sine qua non if the Ujamaa policy is not to fall into discredit with the peasantry. Ujamaa villages cannot be built on the hoe-economy for they would hold out no advantage whatsoever to its members vis-a-vis individual peasants. Thus it can be seen that industrialization--for production of consumer necessities and producer goods--to complement the

> agricultural sector is very necessary to develop a balanced self-sustained economy.[31]

Shivji argued that heavy industrialization was possible because Tanzania had iron and coal deposits in the south where a railway passed through to Zambia; and a labor force. Industrialization would "galvanize the whole nation both for socialist reconstruction and defense" "and for realignment of forces to effect further revolutionary measures."[32]

We learn more from Shivji about the decision-making role than the implementational role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. There are two explanations. Shivji saw the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as better at office-work than at revolutionary work in the countryside. He based his findings on Marxists' studies in which the same view was expressed. The explanation was also based on the analogy between the Tanzanian and Stalinist bureaucracies. He was aware that the analogy was inappropriate. In a footnote he wrote:

> It is true that owing to historical and reasons of concrete material conditions, bureaucracy is capable of excesses and bureaucratic deformations which may not easily be resolved. This is especially true when bureaucracy has penetrated the Party rank. Cf. in this respect the socio-political scene in Soviet Union today. Russia's "revisionism" may have its roots in Stalinist bureaucratic deformations.[33]

The above statement was based on Trotskyist literature or Stalinist bureaucracy and Deutcher's Stalin and The Unfinished Revolution. The use of these studies explains why Shivji's explanations of Tanzanian bureaucracy were Trotskyist; and the implementation of villagization through industrialization were Stalinist.

Shivji did not come to grips with the question of the role of the international bourgeoisie in villagization. To what extent did the international bourgeoisie want villagization to fail? Furthermore, he did not take into account some of the conclusions in the studies he used which was relevant to his explanations. For example, in a study by Deutscher, he quoted this statement:

> In the development of post-capitalist society the tension between the worker and bureaucrat may yet prove to have some essentially creative elements. The worker and the bureaucrat are equally necessary for the transition towards socialism. As long as the working masses [peasants] are still in that stage of intellectual pauperism left over from the centuries of oppression and illiteracy, the management of the processes of production [read the implementation of villagization] must fall to the civil servant.[34]

Had this statement been used by Shivji he would not have blamed the bureaucrats and recommended a workers-peasant alliance in the implementation of villagization. In fact, the example of the half-way implementation of the Cultural Revolution which he cited as the workers and peasants' business contradicted his recommendation. This made him to favor the Stalinist bureaucracy, and by recommending industrailization, Stalinist workers.

The Government Staff

John S. Saul was the first Marxist socialist to give a theoretical "warning" on the "crisis of choice" Tanzanian leadership would face in development. He read his paper "Class and Penetration in Tanzania" in three seminars: Molo (Kenya) in late 1966; Nairobi (Kenya) in late 1967 and in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in late 1967. On the three occasions he argued that

> Tanzania may find itself caught between the demands of two social forces--an emergent 'kulak' class making itself felt at least at the local level and a 'new class' directive elite.[35]

Saul was criticized in the seminars because the views were theoretical. He later elaborated his findings by using President Nyerere's speeches and the policy papers on socialism, self-reliance, education and rural development. Saul wrote that elitist analysts in East Africa were mistaken to think that rural "penetrators" (i.e., local civil servants) were "progressive" and "virtuous."[36] On the contrary, the "leadership cadre" in Africa was "relatively privileged and increasingly conscious of itself as a group" because of its "educational qualifications and/or occupation of state and party bureaucratic positions."[37] It was education which created Western socio-cultural behavior; individualist and elitist attitude, self-aggrandizement and the mode of life.[38] He generalized from these observations that the same trends were developing in Tanzania with dangerous consequences on the implementation of rural socialism. As government agents, the local civil servants "often find themselves particularly well situated to effect their own will--as much by acts of omission as by acts of commission."[39]

Saul's views "greatly influenced" H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen's interpretations in the essay "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants."[40] He based his explanations on government documents, Marxist and non-Marxist studies on development and field research in Rungwe Districts, Mbeya Region, between August 1966 and December 1968. He confirmed Saul's claims that education, salaried occupations, individualism, elitism and a higher standard of living made the local civil servants a different

socio-cultural group. These factors isolated them from the peasants they were supposed to villagize. For example, the government staff met in recreational clubs where it exchanged views on work-experience. He also found the staff to be arrogant, assertive and paternalistic in behavior. He quoted one Community Development Officer (CDO) as having said:

> I am new in this area, so it will be useful if I tell you something about my character. I am not a kind and polite man: I am cruel. If I see that government orders are not obeyed I will know where to find you, and how to punish. I do not care if you hate me, for me it is only important that the orders of the government are fulfilled. I know you are truly blind otherwise you would have appreciated more the progress that staff have brought to Bulambia. Now we are going to make you rise from a long sleep. I have a strong medicine for this job; we will give it to all lazy people. It is better than the poison that you use when you want to kill somebody. The old people should lead the younger ones, but instead of giving guidance they are engaged in bewitching others and they only select good citizens for their heinous crimes.[41]

The CDO's speech raises serious fontological problems of credibility. As it was seen in chapter two, most field researchers use high schoolers and university students as assistants. Van Velzen did not acknowledge the field assistants. During the time of the field research, the students in the University College, Dar es Salaam, were critical of government policies. When the government passed the policy of Natonal Youth Service in October 1966, the students opposed it. They were temporarily sent home and in February 1967 the policy of socialism and self-reliance was adopted. One has therefore to establish which students participated in the field work, their political views and enthnic backgrounds. The author of course did not do this.

Thoden van Velzen was interested in the overall role of the government staff in the organization and administration of Ujamaa villages. The CDO's speech was a likely one in organizational and administrative matters rather than in forming Ujamaa Villages. Again the political views and ethnic backgrounds of the "penetrators" in the rural areas have to be discerned before any generalizations are made.

Substantively, Van Velzen did not explain the behavior of the staff in terms of the risks and fears it faced; e.g., being fired by the government if commitment was not shown in rural development; the fear of being transferred to remote areas of the country; the fear of being assassinated. Marxist studies rarely contain these factors; their use by Van Velzen partly explain the above substantive weakness. Van Velzen generalized that the government staff behaved in the same way everywhere. Besides the bureaucratic method which Van Velzen described, the government staff also used the strategies of inducement and compulsion. These were explained by Philip Raikes and Michaela von Freyhold.

In the paper "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development" Raikes described the strategies that were used by the government staff in Handeni district, Tanga Region. He suggested that the use of the strategy of material incentives, e.g. social services, subsidies, grants and loans, was implied in the official policy of voluntarism in establishing Ujamaa villages.[42] The government staff instead used a selective approach in the use of incentives. For example, kulaks were given machinery or concentration was put in less developed and underpopulated areas where it was thought that nucleated villages could be formed quickly. The selective use of incentives led to the failure of villagization.

First, there was not enough manpower and expertise. Second, the peasants interpreted material incentives as government assistance rather than as an inducement for them to establish Ujamaa Villages. Third, political education was a necessary incentive which was not used. And finally, material incentives were used for manipulative purposes; i.e., as a bait to the peasants.

Raikes saw a connection between inducement and compulsion. He wrote that "All of the negative aspects of the manipulative use of material incentives are still more closely connected with the use of force."[43] He argued that the government staff used coercion in less developed and underpopulated areas because the peasant could not resist. Raikes pointed out that "Operations" were examples of coercion.

> One sometimes hears the frontal approach [which was used in the 'Operations'] compared to the forced collectivization of agriculture in Russia during the 1930's, but nothing could be more misleading.[44]

Michaela von Freyhold also described the implementational strategies that were used by the government staff in Tanga Region. She based her conclusions on interviews and discussions with the civil servants; participation in communal work in Ujamaa villages; and district reports in the headquarters. She also used Marxist and non-Marxist studies.

She wrote in Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania that "staff people were usually outsiders" to the peasants they administered because of "tribal" and social (e.g. "elitist mentality" and "prestige hierarchy") differences. For example, the "local staff were usually from tribes considering themselves superior to the people in the area where they worked."[4] She then made two conclusions. Firstly, she argued that the staff

despised the ordinary peasants and allied with the wealthier peasants as the colonialist staff did.[46] Secondly, the staff used compulsion, persuasion, inducement, threats and taxation[47] as colonialists had done "because they feared peasant resistance and political maneuvers by the peasants if they made themselves unpopular with influential sections in the village [the kulaks]."[48]

Von Freyhold wrote that the local staff used the inducement strategy (the promise of government aid such as tractors, water, roads, schools) in poor areas such as eastern Handeni. The villagers who pioneered in settling Stahabu Ujamaa Village were also promised "aid" to induce neighboring peasants to follow suit. Stahabu Ujamaa Village was the first to be established in Pangani district at the end of 1967. But the villagers were not given the aid.[49] She noted that force and intimidations were used whenever peasants resisted or showed signs of resistance.[50] She claimed that force was used against poor peasants. She cited the establishment of Segera Ujamaa Village at the end of 1970 as an example. She wrote:

> Segera was a model of what can be achieved by the use of coercion at the present juncture of Ujamaa development. . . . The socialist countries which successfully used coercion at certain stages of collectivization backed this up either by well-planned and massive subsidies from the industrial sector to agriculture or by political mobilization at village level. Countries which tried to force collectivization without either of these found themselves in agricultural chaos.[51]

Von Freyhold was critical of the local officials who dreamed of "the possibility of domesticating the peasants in the way Stalin had done" because the agricultural sector of Tanzania "was too unproductive to sustain either a Stalinist bureaucracy or the prolonged negative effect such a bureaucracy would have on production. In

Tanzania the problem was after all not to get the surplus out of the hands of the peasants but first of all to produce a surplus." She continued:

> Government staff may have been able to prove to the peasants their power by shifting them from one place to another--in fact, some villages have already been moved several times—and this may have taught the peasants more fear of the staff than most of them had had before independence, but they have not come closer to their official objective of increasing production and making life in the villages more comfortable.[52]

Raikes and Von Freyhold made the same explanations of the role of the government staff in villagization. This is not surprising because Raikes concentrated in one district (Handeni) of Tanga Region. Furthermore, Von Freyhold used more sources than Raikes. Their preferences for the politics of socialist development are part of the explanation of the similarities of the conclusion.

The condemnation and approval of the use of force was not based on what they had described. It was based on their biases. Raikes did not even explain in what ways the "Operations" were similar to the implementation of Soviet collectivization. If the Tanzanian bureaucracy did not want to squeeze surplus from the peasants as in the 1920's and early 1930's, how did it come that Von Freyhold approved the use of coercion in the successful establishment of Segera Ujamaa Village when compulsion had negative effects during dekulakization? These were some of the issues and questions which Raikes and Von Freyhold did not raise.

The Kulaks

The term "kulak" was introduced in agricultural research in Africa by Professor Rene Dumont in his book Types of Rural Economy,

published in 1937.[53] He recommended kulak farming when he visited Tanzania in 1967.[54]

There are four sources of kulak farming. First, Peter Stolypin of the last years of Imperial Russian wanted to create a non-revolutionary climate in the rural areas by encouraging "progressive" farmers. The policy was known as "betting on the strong." Second, the British wanted to create a yeoman class in Tanganyika to maintain the status quo. Third, the rich peasants in the early period of Soviet history were described as "kulaks." They were those whom the government claimed opposed socialism. The fourth source in A. A. Chayanov. He also recommended "progressive" farming. He was a member of the Organization of Production School of Russia.

A. A. Chayanov made a demographic study of peasant families in late 19th century Russian in order to ascertain rural differentiation based on resource allocation and income distribution.[55] Western scholars became interested in Chayanov's explanation of rural differentiation in the mid-60's. Marxists criticized Chayanov for not incorporating the peasant economy into the international economy. Africanist scholars have been split: some advocate the strategy of "betting on the strong" while others think that "betting on the many" is the best alternative in agrarian development.[56] The debate smacks of opinions expressed by the Narodniks (Populists) and Bolsheviks in Imperial Russia.[57]

The application of Chayanov's model of rural differentiation in Tanzania was rejected by Philip Raikes and accepted by Diana Hunt. Raikes based his rejection on the absence of a landlord class. He argued that land was not in short supply.[58] Diana Hunt found that

in Mbere society the size of the family determined the area sown and people were not paid for their work.[59]

Who are the "kulaks"? The answer to this question is vague. H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen answered it this way:

> The better-off peasants are called kulaks in this account but the concept of "kulaks" should be stripped of its emotional connotations of oppression, repression and exploitation which it has acquired in Soviet history. By "kulaks" I simply mean the "better-off" farmers whose position in rural areas has become controversial since Tanzania committed itself to socialism. As "better-off" is a relative concept it is to be operationally defined anew for every rural community. Arbitrarily, I chose to call the wealthiest twenty percent of the population kulaks.[60]

Moshe Lewin examined Soviet sources and studies and found that the terms "kulak" and "better-off" peasant were interchangeable categories. Kulak was neither "capitalist" nor a "semi-capitalist." The term was used for propaganda purposes to make kulaks the main obstacles of socialism.[61]

Shivji wrote that it was "a mistaken over-emphasis (especially on the part of those who come with fixed ideas about classes and appear to see classes everywhere so long as they can count a handful of farmers owning two landrovers or a tractor) to focus attention on rural stratification out of all proportion to its role in the context of Tanzania."[62]

> In fact, even the so-called 'rural capitalist' (the term is completely vulgarized--it simply refers to big farmers), that appear to give currency [sic] the idea of rural capitalism, would be found to be either related to or are the retired members of the economic bureaucracy--a much more important stratum in the Tanzanian economy as a whole.[63]

The Tanzanian kulak is therefore either a "better-off" farmer; a "progressive" farmer a "rural capitalist" or a "big" farmer.

The Role of Kulaks in Villagization

H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen wrote that the staff and the kulaks circumscribed the peasantry from privileges and power positions: the peasantry was the "suffering third" (in the triadic staff-kulak-peasants structure in his essay) in the implementation of villagization.[64] The staff used the policy of "betting on the strong." They gave preferential treatment to kulaks because they were "progressive."[65]

Shivji saw a dialectical relationship in the part played by kulaks during the struggle for independence and the building of socialism. The kulaks, being few in number, were a weak political force who did not press "the colonial state to act in their interests" or to "bid for power on their own or in alliance with other classes (especially the masses of peasants) was weak." "The kulak class was therefore 'destined' to be led by other sectors of the petty bourgeoisie who could command mass peasant support."[66]

The peasants allied with the intelligensia and traders in the struggle for independence. These groups stook for a nationalist ideology. On the other hand, the kulaks wherever they were dominant, e.g. Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, had a "tribalist" ideology.[67] Shivji thought that the "anti-nationalist" part played by kulaks in the struggle for independence explained why their interests were not recognized in national policies. "In practice therefore, the kulaks protect their interests by fraternizing with the bureaucracy and controlling the local level organizations."[68]

Von Freyhold questioned the assumption made by the government staff that progressive farmers were innovators. She found from her field research that the progressive farmers in Tanga region, and

probably elsewhere in Tanzania, hired labor instead of buying tractors.[69]

She felt that the alliance was possible and mutual because the two groups were elites. The staff provided the kulaks with government credits, technical advice and medicine to make them induce the poor peasants they hired not only to join Ujamaa villages but also to forestall resistance. She argued that the colonial staff used the same strategy for rural development.[70] She found, however, that the cooperation was a brittle one. For instance, the kulaks successfully resisted joining Ujamaa villages or persuading the poor peasants to join Ujamaa villages.[71]

The interpretations of the role played by the kulaks in the implementation of villagization raises serious questions. Can we generalize as Von Velzen and van Freyhold did that it was because of material interests that the civil servants and the kulaks established Ujamaa villages. Von Freyhold did not examine the similarities and differences between the civil servants during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Were the conditions and the kulaks of the colonial and post-colonial periods the same or different? Shivji did not explain whether the peasants did or did not join "tribalist" movements organized by the kulaks. How did the kulaks succeed in fraternizing the government staff when they had been "enemies" during the struggle for independence on the one hand, and on the other, the central government to disregard the material interests of the kulaks which the civil servants, who were the agents of the central government, defended? How did the peasants join Ujamaa villages when the civil servants and the kulaks alienated from them?

Interpretations by Non Marxist Socialists

Tanu and Government Officials

In Tanzanian's Ujamaa Villages Dean E. McHenry discussed the decision-making process by TANU and the conflict that arises between it (TANU) and the government officials. He wrote that "Party-government struggles for domination of the state have led to de jure supremacy of the party in policy formation but de facto domination of the government in policy implementation."[72] He argued that the top leadership of TANU proposed and formulated national policies while the members in the outer circle and government officials did not participate. At the same time, TANU relied on the government for expertise, money and implementation of its directives.

McHenry claimed that the struggle reached a climax in 1972. TANU took the first step by reshuffling the government. The government was enpowered to implement policies that TANU made. But that role was limited by "bureaucratization."

> The most salient characteristic of Tanzania as it has evolved in the first decade and half since independence is the growing predominance of government. Rival bodies have been reduced in power, absorbed, or suppressed. At the same time, this process has often resulted in eliminating links with the people.[73]

He thought that TANU did not solve the conflict when it reshuffled the government in 1972. Instead, it gave the government implementational powers of national policies. He claimed that the purpose of TANU was to "reassert its dominance" over the government.[74]

The conclusion McHenry made surprised this writer. The reader would expect from the foregoing discussion of party-government struggles that the conflict hindered the implementation of villagization. Instead,

he put the word bureaucratization in quotation marks, suggesting that it was not a serious problem. He discussed Marxist socialist literature on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and claimed that there was a tendency "in much of the literature to assume that the substitution of bureaucratic for democratic principles automatically leads to popular alienation, and that such alienation brings resistance to government efforts to gain popular compliance."[75]

There are three explanations for this conclusion. First, McHenry was interested in communal farming in particular and rural development in general. Second, he was interested in the dialectial relationship between peasant compliance to the colonial government and the Tanzanian government. He did not, however, explain the similarities and differences between the colonial and post-colonial governments. Third, he argued that villagization could succeed in rural Tanzania because there was no economic differentiation, and people practiced shifting cultivization which could make resettlement easy.[76] He suggested that one has to examine the impact of colonialism on traditional farming before describing the possibilities of villagization.[77] He did exactly that.

The Civil Servants

McHenry's interpretation of the role of the civil servants in the implementation of villagization was connected with that of TANU and the government. He wrote that the government reshuffles in 1972 were also done in the civil service. With the new power of implementing the policy of villagization that the government was given by TANU, it carried out administrative changes. It was hoped

that the changes would improve implementational capability of the civil servants.

Using studies on local government and rural development, McHenry described four main problems that continued, as of independence, to affect the efficiency of the civil service. The first was the lack of popular participation in decision-making at the local government level. The government created many committees, institutions and councils which "either broke down and failed to function or become forums for informing people of central government decisions."[78]

The second problem was frequent changes of administrative structures in the civil service. "All these changes," McHenry wrote, "seem to have been the result of the belief that structures determine behavior: if behavior of a particular sort was not as wanted, the way to correct it was to change the structure. The frequent changes, therefore, indicate that desired behavior was not being obtained."[79]

The third problem was that Regional and Area Commissioners, "politico-administrative officers," were given ministerial status when local government power was decentralized in 1972. In practice their functions did not differ from those of Provincial and District Commissioners during the colonial period. The civil servants who had power were the Divisional and Ward Secretaries. They exercised party and government functions and "there was no powerful administrative officer with countervailing power" in the local government.[80] McHenry argued that the civil servants "tended to adopt the style and function of government officers."[81] He accepted Michaela von Freyhold's view that ward secretaries exercised the power of "the native authorities during the colonial era.[82]

The fourth and last weakness in the local government was the lack of civil servants. This made the government officials interfere and dominate regional and district administration. This was the problem of bureaucratization we discussed earlier.

McHenry did not show how the four problems actually affected the process of settling peasants in Ujamaa Villages. The explanation of the problems makes the reader infer that they did. But did the problems start to affect the process of villagization before or after 1972? To put it in another way: What part did the civil service play in the establishment of Ujamaa Villages before and after 1972? These questions are important because McHenry blamed the civil servants' lack of participation in decision-making in local councils. He wrote:

> The difficulty does not seem to be traceable to the conscious intention to those who created the structures to subvert them or to mislead the people. Rather, it seems to be a function of control of resources of knowledge, wealth, and perceived status, which has been so overbalanced in favor of the central government that the population at large has possessed insufficient countervailing force necessary for a real 'say' in decision-making.[83]

McHenry did not cirticize the implementors and the decision-makers. How does resources of knowledge, wealth and perceived status explain the implementation of villagization?

Besides the decision-making process and how it affected the implementation of villagization, McHenry, Jannik Boesen and C. K. Omari discussed the strategies which the civil servants used. The strategy of persuasion was used in the period 1967-1969; inducement was used from 1969-1972 and 1972-1976 was the phase of compulsion. McHenry

thought that there was continuing ambiguity over what the most appropriate strategy for implementation was.[84]

The Strategy of Persuasion (1967-1969). Boesen wrote that TANU and civil servants in the West Lake Region were active in mobilizing peasants into Ujamaa Villages from 1968 to 1970. They used persuasion and voluntaristic methods. He observed, however, that bureaucratic methods were also used but they were not effective.[85]

McHenry divided the persuasion method into four techniques: the source of the message; the transmitters of the message; the medium of transmitting the message and the receiver of the message. The President was the source of the message. Most of TANU members and government officials "toured the regions exhorting people to move into Ujamaa Villages." The number of persuaders grew geometrically during the second phase of implementation, i.e., 1969-1972.[86] He disagreed with Henry Mapolu's view that the more the persuaders, the less was the response.[87] Mapolu is a Marxist socialist.

Those active in communicating the message to the people were the Prime Minister, Regional Commissioners, the two Vice Presidents, Area Commissioners and TANU chairmen. They held meetings in the countryside and told people that communal working would accelerate development.[88] Since it was difficult to address peasants in scattered homesteads, TANU, government officials and civil servants talked to those who had already settled in Ujamaa Villages; school children or townspeople--"none of whom were targets necessary for successful implementation."[89] During the meetings, the persuaders gave different interpretations of how peasants would be resettled

or how communal production could accelerate development.[90] He claimed that the persuaders gave the message to wrong targets of implementation and that the peasantry grew somewhat skeptical of the persuasion of functional officers because of "its inappropriateness in the past."[91] How do we reconcile these views? We saw how McHenry's criticism of the government officials could be inferred. We also saw how he did not identify his views with those of Marxist socialists. This is revealed in this instance too. He thought, however, that persuasion "did have some success" because about five percent of the peasantry was resettled into Ujamaa Villages.[92]

The Strategy of Inducement (1969-1972). McHenry called inducement the "sweetening" of the message.[93] He wrote that functional officers "grew impatient" of using the persuasion technique because it did not yield the results expected of it. Consequently they switched to the use of material and moral incentives.[94] The use of the strategy made about ten percent of the peasantry join Ujamaa Villages between 1970 and 1971.[95]

McHenry did not explain how the civil servants switched from the use of persuasion to that of inducement. He did not indicate the source of his data for the number of peasants who joined Ujamaa Villages. The reader is also interested in knowing whether the increment from five to ten percent indicates that inducement was more successful than persuasion. If so, why did not the civil servants continue to use inducement? His conclusion that inducement was abandoned because not many peasants were joining Ujamaa Villages was not convincing.[96]

The Strategy of Compulsion (1972-1976). Omari and McHenry explained how the civil servants dealt with the problem of floods in

1968, 1971 and 1972 in what were called "Operations." Omari did field research besides using TANU/government documents and studies. McHenry did not conduct a field research. Omari noted stages of the Operations.

First, the preparations were planned by the Regional TANU and government officials. They convened meetings in which executive committees were formed. Second, the members in the committee made timetables for the operations. Omari was critical of the preparations. He wrote that there were no discussions in the meetings. The people were presented the policy as a government mandate.[97]

McHenry argued that the implementational process differed from area to area. The civil servants concentrated on the poorest areas first. The wealthiest were the last.[98] The police and the army were used. McHenry witnessed destructions of buildings in the districts he worked in 1975. The ruins reminded him of the "ghost town in the Wild West."[99] The peasants put up ineffective resistance.

The Operations was the most successful strategy in resettling peasants. Omari criticized their sporadic implementation. McHenry claimed that the Operations were similar to concentrations established by the British when they were faced with the problem of sleeping sickness in the territory. He felt that the peasants were not brutalized as those in the Soviet Union during the period of mass collectivization.[100] He wrote:

> The Tanzanian experience with the Ujamaa Village differed in some important respects from the Soviet experience with the kolkhozy and the Chinese experience with the commune. The prominent role played by the "dekulakization" campaign in the Soviet effort had no equivalent in Tanzania. The level of compulsion involved in Soviet collectivization was much higher than that in Tanzania.

> The famine associated with collectivization in the Soviet Union led to starvation, whereas in Tanzania it resulted in massive food imports. . . Tanzania's rural population, moreover, was only a tiny fraction of that of the Soviet Union or China.[101]

These interpretations are divorced from the analysis of the operations. He described how peasants were loaded into trucks and resettled into Ujamaa Villages. The target was the peasant; not the so called kulaks. It is the process that is important, not the designation of the peasant. Why did he compare the ruins he saw to the Wilk West or colonial concentrations? McHenry was criticizing Western journalists who compared the use of force in the "operations" to "dekulakization" campaign in the U.S.S.R.[102] Despite the criticism, he favored compulsion. He wrote:

> For various reasons, the party and government leaders were able to carry out the operations without significant opposition: the policy had potential benefits which many peasants perceived; the kulaks were weak at the national level, and many concluded that they might actually benefit from the villages . . .[103]

The contradiction can be explained from the critical attitude to Marxist literature, like he did to the studies of Michaela von Freyhold and Philip Raikes, and personal preference for the use of coercion to make the peasants develop.

The Peasantry

Goran Hyden gave the most comprehensive analysis of the response of the peasantry to villagization. He claimed that the peasants were an obstacle in the implementation of villagization because they did not want to "modernize,"[104] and colonialists did not transform the peasant mode of production. He criticized Marxist socialists who blamed the civil servants' participation in villagiza-

tion. In his view, the civil servants were interested in villagization but the peasants were not.[105] He wrote:

> The peasant mode simply appeared too strong for the officials to conquer. Rather than endangering their careers, therefore, most officials accommodated themselves to action based on the premises of the peasant mode. Their principal failure does not lie in having pursued their class interest in a naked fashion but in having failed to mobilize the peasants for alternative institutional forms of action by yielding to the inherent demands of the peasant mode.[106]

He argued that the "political lieutenants," i.e., the politicians and government officials, knew the problems of peasant resilience to change. They therefore called for a class struggle between the peasants and the "petty-capitalist farmers." The peasants did not see "petty-capitalist farmers" as exploiters on whom to wage a class war. They chose them as their leaders.[107] The bureaucratic bourgeoisie was enthusiastic to implement Ujamaa. The interpretation of implementing villagization in class terms consequently foredoomed the movement.

> Mistakes were made and clumsiness characterized many of the efforts to get at the peasants. The bureaucracy lacked the sensitivity that would attract peasants to join in the effort.[108]

One would have expected Hyden to criticize the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's role in the implementation of villagization. Instead, he gave credit to the bureaucrats for trying their best. The peasants were the obstacle.

> Bureaucracy in Tanzania, therefore, fails to be developmental or progressive not because it lacks links with workers and peasants. . . . The problem is rather that where the peasant mode still prevails, there is little room for a revolutionary potential in the relationship of the state to the peasantry. When the petty-bourgeoisie interacts with the peasants through the state, the outcome is not a "bang," only a "poof"![109]

He concluded that

> Socialist transformation is as taxing on the peasants as capitalist development. Such was the lesson learned in Tanzania between 1967 and 1973. During these years the peasants were spared the heaviest burdens by virtue of the fact that the officials could not easily get at them. The peasants could continue to hide away from the officials[110]

Hyden left two questions unanswered: Were the poor and middle peasants as enthusiastic as the bureaucrats in the policy of villagization? How could the peasants welcome the policy and impede its implementation at the same time? He did not also explain whether the resilience of the peasants to change was more crucial in understanding their response to villagization than the failure of the colonialists to transform the mode of production. Hyden did not use field research. The findings would have made him to understand the realities (what he called African "chapati") more than he claimed he did.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Dean E. McHenry, Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy. (Berkeley, California,: Institute of International Studies, 1979), p. 222.

[2]For details see John S. Saul, "Radicalism on the Hill," in Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. II, pp. 289-292.

[3]"The Silent Class Struggles," p. 305.

[4]Ibid., p. 304.

[5]Ibid., p. 321.

[6]Thomas Szentes, "'Status Quo' and Socialism," in Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. II, pp. 331-349; Walter Rodney, "Some Implications of the Question of Disengagement from Imperialism," in Ibid., pp. 350-353 and John S. Saul, "Who is the Immediate Enemy?" in Ibid., pp. 354-358. The views in Shivji's essay and the comments were summarized by John S. Saul in the introduction to the postscript, Ibid., pp. 297-303.

[7]Strategy in Rural Development, p. 14.

[8]Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 9.

[9]"Ujamaa Vijijini," p. 9.

[10]Ibid., p. 6.

[11]See footnote 1, Ibid., p. 28.

[12]Jannik Boesen, "Tanzania: From Ujamaa to Villagization," in Towards Socialism in Tanzania. Ed. Bismarck U. Mwamsasu and Cranford Pratt. (Toronto: University of Toronot Press, 1979), p. 129.

[13]See introduction and acknowledgements in Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania.

[14]Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, 1st pub. 1975 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 85. K. Ngombale-Mwiru, who was the first to discuss the same question, used the term "politico-bureaucratic bourgeoisie." See his "The Arusha Declaration on Ujamaa in Kujitegemes and the Perspectives for Building Socialism in Tanzania,"

Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. II, p. 56. Shivji rejected it because it was a descriptive and cumbersome concept. See his Class Struggles in Tanzania, footnote 54, p. 85.

[15]Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 88.

[16]Ibid., p. 87.

[17]Ibid., p. 49.

[18]Ibid., p. 60.

[19]Ibid., p. 64.

[20]Ibid., p. 87.

[21]"Status Quo and Socialism," p. 333.

[22]Ibid., p. 346.

[23]"Some Implications of the Question of Disengagement from Imperialism," p. 352.

[24]"Who is the Immediate Enemy?" p. 85.

[25]Ibid., p. 96.

[26]"The Silent Class Struggle," footnote 31, p. 323.

[27]Ibid., p. 310.

[28]Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 97.

[29]"The Silent Class Struggle," p. 320.

[30]Ibid., p. 321.

[31]Ibid., p. 321.

[32]Ibid., footnote 94, p. 326.

[33]Quoted in Ibid., p. 320.

[34]John S. Saul, "Class and Penetration in Tanzania," in Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. I, p. 118.

[35]Ibid., p. 118.

[36]Ibid., p. 119.

[37]Ibid., p. 120.

[38]Ibid., p. 120.

[39]"Staff, Kulaks and Peasants," footnote 10, p. 177.

[40]Ibid., p. 157.

[41]Philip Raikes, "Ujamaa Vijiji and Rural Socialist Development," Copenhagen, Institute for Development Research, March 1974. Paper read at the Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 18-20, 1973, p. 14.

[42]Ibid., p. 18

[43]Ibid., p. 24.

[44]Michaela von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment. (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 41.

[45]Ibid., p. 41.

[46]Michaela von Freyhold, "The Problem of Rural Development and the Politics of Ujamaa Vijijini in Handeni," African Review, 6, 2 (1976), p. 137f.

[47]Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 39.

[48]Last case study in Ibid., pp. 170-184.

[49]Ibid., p. 46f.

[50]Ibid., p. 141.

[51]Ibid., p. 59.

[52]See "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants," footnote 10, p. 177.

[53]"Class and Penetration in Tanzania," p. 119.

[54]Daniel Thorner, et al. (eds.), The Theory of Peasant Economy. (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1966).

[55]See view in W. F. Wertheim, East-West Parallels. (Van Hoeve: The Hague, 1964).

[56]See the view that "Narodnik Capitalism" is being practiced in Tanzania in Susanne D. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania," Socialist Register ed. Ralph Milband of John Saville (London: The Merlin Press, 1980), pp. 203-226.

[57]Philip Raikes, "Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania," Journal of Peasant Studies, 5, 3, (April 1978), pp. 285-325.

[58]Diana Hunt, "Chayanov's Model of Peasant Household Resource Allocation," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6, 3, (April 1979), pp. 247-285.

[59]"Staff, Kulaks and Peasants," p. 154.

[60]M. Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization, trans. Irene Wove & John Boggart, 1st pub. 1967. Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 78.

[61]"The Silent Class Struggle," p. 305.

[62]Ibid., footnote on p. 305.

[63]"Staff, Kulaks and Peasants," p. 176.

[64]Ibid., p. 167f.

[65]Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 52.

[66]Ibid., p. 58.

[67]Ibid., p. 115.

[68]Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 42.

[69]Ibid., p. 45f.

[70]See Kitumbi-Chanika Ujamaa Village case study, Ibid., pp. 142-162.

[71]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, p. 68.

[72]Ibid., p. 85.

[73]Ibid., p. 88.

[74]Ibid., p. 85f.

[75]Ibid., p. 89.

[76]Ibid., p. 88f.

[77]Ibid., p. 74.

[78]Ibid., p. 74.

[79]Ibid., p. 77.

[80]Ibid., p. 77.

[81]Ibid., p. 77.

[82]Ibid., p. 74.

[83]Ibid., p. 111.

[84]Jannik Boesen, "Tanzania: From Ujamaa to Villagization," Towards Socialism in Tanzania, ed. Bismarck, U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 133.

[85]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, p. 119.

[86]Ibid., p. 123f. For his own ref. footnote 32.

[87]See speeches quoted, ibid., pp. 120-122.

[88]Ibid., p. 123.

[89]See Ibid., footnote 41.

[90]Ibid., p. 123.

[91]Ibid., p. 151.

[92]Ibid., p. 151.

[93]Ibid., p. 151.

[94]Ibid., pp. 133; 151.

[95]Ibid., p. 151.

[96]Strategy for Rural Development, p. 123.

[97]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, p. 134.

[98]Ibid., p. 139.

[99]Ibid., p. 133.

[100]Ibid., pp. 126f. See same views in his "The Ujamaa Village in Tanzania: A Comparison in the Chinese, Soviet and Mexican Experience in Collectivization," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18, 3 ( ):347-370.

[101]Ibid., p. 139.

[102]Ibid., p. 151f.

[103]Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 9.

[104]Foran Hyden, "The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania," in Agriculture Development in Africa: Issues of Public Policy ed. Robert H. Bates & Michael F. Lofchie (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 236.

[105]Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 108.

[106]Ibid., p. 113f.

[107]Ibid., p. 123.

[108]Ibid., p. 124.

[109]Ibid., p. 125.

CHAPTER VI

A COMPARISON OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF COLLECTIVIZATION AND VILLAGIZATION

There are four interpretational tendencies, two in each case, of collectivization and villagization. On the one hand, there are neo-Stalinist/semi-neo-Stalinist and anti-Stalinist tendencies in the interpretation of collectivization. On the other hand, there are those who accepted the views of the leadership regarding villagization and those who criticized them.

The Soviet scholars whose conclusions were neo-Stalinist are Kovalenko and Ivnitsky. They emphasized the ideological and economic objectives of collectivization. They, however, blamed Stalin when things went wrong but indirectly exonerated him by stating that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), its Central Committee and the Politburo guided the movement and corrected the problems which the agents (implementers) failed to overcome or created. They suggested that collectivization was a revolution from above which the workers and peasants (targets) carried out. Bogdenko and Pogudin shared the same assumptions but they argued that further research was needed in the patterns and in the participants of dekulakization. The implication is that they sympathized with the fate of the kulaks, and can be considered to be semi-neo-Stalinists representing the de-Stalinization trend.

Medvedev is anti-Stalinist. He vehemently rejected the official views on collectivization. He argued that the reasons for collectivization were political. Collectivization was imposed from above on the

local Party organizations and civil servants (agents) and they in turn imposed it on the peasants. Collectivization was Stalin's political weapon for acquiring and monopolizing power in the countryside.

Fainsod made the same claims as Medvedev and subsequently Halpern and Lewin reiterated them. Davies thought that there were economic, ideological and political justifications for collectivization. His conclusions were closer to those of the Bogdenko, Pogudin, Kovalenko and Ivnitsky.

Shivji's views on villagization were as leftist as Medvedev's on collectivization. He thought that villagization was launched for political reasons. He suggested that a Stalinist-type bureaucracy and industrialization would make villagization a success. He shared the other Marxist socialists' assumptions that villagization should be implemented by workers, cadres of a vanguard party. He also thought that bureaucratic methods were used by the local Party officials and the civil servants but he rejected the claim that kulaks impeded the movement. It was the international bourgeoisie, allied with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who frustrated the campaign of villagization. These conclusions on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the international bourgeoisie and the kulaks separated Shivji from Van Velzen, Raikes and Von Freyhold who emphasized the bureaucratic methods of the civil servants and the materialism of the kulaks. The views of these scholars were closer to those by non-Marxist socialists in the sense that they were about internal and not the external factors of villagization.

The non-Marxist socialists Omari, McHenry and Hyden suggested that the reasons for villagization were for economic development.

Van Velzen, Raikes and von Freyhold also felt that villagization was a strategy for rural development. Omari wanted villagization to be implemented gradually while non-Marxist socialists, though not stating it, implied it in their discussion of the weaknesses of the decision-makers, executive officers (e.g., McHenry) and the peasantry (Hyden).

The closeness of the interpretations by Western historians and Omari presents a problem of classifying them. Methodologically and politically they were different. The Marxist socialists criticized the official views of villagization while the non-Marxist socialists did not. The best classification, as the studies analyzed in this dissertation seem to indicate, is to talk of Shivjist and non-Shivjist tendencies.

This chapter compares some of the main discussions of the roles of the Party and government officials; the agents (local Party organizations and officials, civil servants) and the targets of the respective policies, the peasantry. The approach is thematic. The interpretations of the neo-Stalinists/semi-neo-Stalinists is compared with those by non-Marxists; the conclusions by anti-Stalinists is contrasted with those made by Shivji. The purpose of the comparisons is to understand the political environment under which the scholars worked.

The Party and Government Officials

Bogdenko and Kovalenko blamed Stalin more than the other members of the Politburo when things went wrong in the collectivization campaign because he supported the agents despite their "mistakes."[1] Kovalenko argued that the CPSU rectified the errors which resulted from Stalin's and the agents' dizziness.[2] The Party guided the agents because it

had organizational experience.[3] Bogdenko felt that the Central Committee supported the use of economic methods in collectivization, e.g., taxation and fines.[4]

McHenry argued that Taganyika African Union (TANU) and the government were, since independence, in constant struggle for the domination of decision-making.[5] TANU won the struggle by purging rival groups and decentralizing the government in the anticipation that national policies would be effectively and efficiently carried out.[6] He claimed that the struggles alienated TANU and the government from the people.[7]

The major difference between McHenry and Bogdenko and Kovalenko was that he did not discuss the role of an individual, groups of individuals and TANU. The difference is interesting. The CPSU and TANU are the only ruling parties. Since they shared the views of the Party, Bogdenko and Kovalenko emphasized its role. They personified the CPSU and used it to displace Stalin. Since they wrote at the height of de-Stalinization the conclusions reflected the influence of politics. As a foreigner, McHenry felt that it was politically safe to describe the weakness of the decision-makers. He avoided analyzing the roles of individuals or groups of individuals. The suggestion implied in the approach is that villagization was bureaucratically implemented--TANU imposed the policy on the government and in turn, the government imposed it on the agents.

Anti-Stalinists and Shivji criticized the Party and government officials. Medvedev argued that Stalin made the decision to collectivize after defeating the opposition. He claimed that Stalin exaggerated the

success of agricultural cooperatives.[8] Stalin also decided on dekulakization unilaterally. Medvedev claimed that Stalin violated the principle of collective leadership.[9] He felt that collectively the CC and the CPSU played negative roles because Stalin's high tempo and coercion were neither discouraged nor stopped.[10]

Halpern and Lewin also claimed that Stalin had political reasons.[11] They charged that the CPSU accepted Stalin's policy of dekulakization without question.[12] According to them, the directives on dekulakization were purposely unclear so that the Party officials could escape blame when things went wrong.[13]

Shivji was also critical of TANU and government officials; the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. He claimed that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was poor at decision-making because it believed in expertise, technicalities and paper victories. As the policies were poorly planned so was their implementation.[14] He made three suggestions. First, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie should disengage from the capitalist system as the Stalinist bureaucracy did.[15] Second, Tanzania should industrialize.[16] Finally, the bureaucrats should leave the implementation of socialism to the workers.[17]

The difference between anti-Stalinist conclusions and Shivji's was that the former emphasized Stalin's political goals and the latter emphasized the economic (egoistic materialism) reasons of the bureaucrats. The anti-Stalinists first and foremost blamed Stalin when things went wrong while Shivji claimed that the bureaucrats were inefficient. The reader is left to wonder whether being a leader as Stalin was means taking all the responsibility of the things that went

wrong or the idolizers should also be blamed. Were the bureaucrats, on the other hand, all inefficient, undedicated and dishonest?

Medvedev's criticisms of Stalin reflect the de-Stalinization period in which they were made. Being outside the political controls of the Party and being a free-lance historian accounts for Medvedev's interpretations. His independent approach explains the fact that if there were no controls of the Party, Soviet historians would write frankly about their country's past. That Medvedev's conclusions were similar to those made by Western scholars suggest a point of convergence in historical scholarship and human freedom in the USSR and the West. The interpretations by Western historians obliquely reflect the political environment under which Soviet historians like Medvedev work. Their views seem to have been influenced by democratic principles and Stalinism. It is difficult to identify the influence of the Cold War.

Shivji's conclusions also obliquely reflect the relationship between politics and historical scholarship in Tanzania. By lumping the Party and government officials together as the bureaucratic bourgeoisi Shivji avoided attacking an individual, groups of individual and the only ruling Party. For political reasons he blamed the international bourgeoisie as some critics of the government tend to. He avoided external examples for nationalist reasons. He was aware that Stalinist bureaucracy had "excesses" and "deformations" and yet he recommended a Stalinist-type bureaucracy in Tanzania.[18] He knew that an alliance between workers and bureaucrats was neither possible nor creative in a country like Tanzania where illiteracy was high.[19]

The Agents

Kovalenko and Ivnitsky described in details the role played by the 25,000ers, poor peasants, selsovets and the Red Army.[20] Ivnitsky suggested that these agents could not avoid making mistakes because of the difficulties of building socialism.[21] Davies showed how successful the agents in the North Caucasus used the "towline" method to implement collectivization.[22] He claimed that the agents used propaganda, persuasion, inducement, fines, intimidations and coercion.[23]

McHenry argued that the agents of villagization also used different strategies: persuasion, inducement and compulsion. He criticized the use of coercion during the "Operations" because peasants' houses were destroyed. He did not think that the "Operations" could be compared to dekulakization since they did not result in famine. In contrast, Raikes likened them to dekulakization.[25] McHenry stated that compulsion made many peasants to move to Ujamaa Villages. Von Freyhold thought that the use of coercion led to success, at least judging from the experience like the USSR.

The above differences were also reflected in the recommendations they gave. McHenry claimed that the civil servants were as unpopular, inefficient and alienated from the people as the colonial civil servants had been. He suggested that to understand villagization one has to study colonial rule and its impact.[26] Van Velzen and Von Freyhold also thought that the civil servants were unpopular, inefficient and were alienated from the people because they were an educated elite.[27] The implied suggestion was that a sociological study of past colonial Tanzania would explain the weaknesses and the problems of the civil servants.

Medvedev, Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin did not think that collectivization was a revolution supported from below as Kovalenko, Ivnitsky and Davies seemed to assume. They felt that collectivization was imposed on the agents who imposed it on the peasantry. Halpern thought that the okrugi officials originated and planned mass collectivization because they were Stalinists or were forced by the Party officials in the Kremlin.[28] Lewin also thought that the okrugi officials obeyed the orders from the Kremlin.[29] Halpern and Lewin felt that the workers were the only active agents of collectivization.[30]

The assumption by Kovalenko, Ivnitsky and Davies that collectivization was supported from below was the same as the official view. The conclusions of Kovalenko and Ivnitsky reveal that politics and historical scholarship are related. Davies' explanations show that even if Soviet historians are controlled by politicians, they may be describing what really went on.

McHenry, Van Velzen, Raikes and von Freyhold concurred that the agents used various strategies bureaucratically. They differed in the analogies of the "Operations" and dekulakization as well as the recommendations for the study of collectivization. McHenry contradicted himself in criticizing and at the same time admiring the use of coercion. If Raikes and von Freyhold claimed that the agents used bureaucratic rather than democratic methods, how do we account for the admiration of dekulakization? Raikes and von Freyhold's analogies between the "Operations" and dekulakization suggest that the bureaucrats were Stalinist-type. But Shivji suggested that the Tanzanian bureaucrats were not Stalinist. Finally, McHenry did not indicate

whether the destruction of houses in Tanzania led to famine. Did the destruction of houses also lead to famine in the USSR? McHenry contradicted himself in order to reflect the officials in Tanzania who loathe comparisons of external experiences to Ujamaa (see Chapter III). To be politically safe, McHenry, Raikes and von Freyhold made superficial conclusions. It is plausible to argue that the interpretations reflect the dilemma between academic and ideological commitment (the Prospero syndrome--see Chapter I).

The Targets

The main target of collectivization was the kulak; for villagization it was the peasantry, but progressive farmers, according to Van Velzen, Raikes and von Freyhold, became the agents to protect their material interests.

Kovalenko and Ivnitsky saw the kulaks as the enemies of collectivization because they resisted.[31] Bogdenko and Pogudin shared the same assumption but unlike Kovalenko and Ivnitsky,[32] they felt that force should not have been used, and that more research was needed to explain the problem. Davies also thought that dekulakization was illegally implemented, but it helped collectivization.[33]

Van Velzen, Raikes and Von Freyhold suggested that the civil servants favored progressive farmers, the kulaks. von Freyhold argued that the civil servants despised the poor peasants as the ex-colonial servants did. Like Raikes, she claimed that the civil servants promised aid which they never gave. Instead they used force in less developed and underpopulated areas because they expected least resistance. They recommended the emphasis to be on high productivity.

Hyden was bitter with the peasants because they refused to "modernize" since the colonial period.

Medvedev, Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin concluded that dekulakization had no economic and ideological justification. Medvedev wrote that dekulakization led to an intensification of the class struggle which resulted into physical annihilation and indiscriminate expropriation.[34]

Fainsod concluded from the Smolensk Archives that some of the okrugi Party and government officials supported the use of coercion against the kulaks while some members of the selsovets disapproved.[35] Lewin and Medvedev claimed that the kulaks protected themselves by resisting. Halpern was so bitter that he suggested the destruction of the kolkhozes because they were established through force.[36]

Shivji accused foreign researchers of inventing kulaks in the countryside.[37] It was the retired employees and their relatives who mattered economically in the countryside.

The impression which Kovalenko and Ivnitsky gave was that the poor peasants supported collectivization while the kulaks opposed it. This view is similar to the official one. On the one hand, Van Velzen, Raikes and Von Freyhold gave the impression that poor peasants were the victims of villagization. On the other hand, Hyden did not think so; the peasantry as a whole were a burden of development. The two conflicting interpretations reflect political rhetoric. First, Raikes and Von Freyhold repeated the politicians' emphases on production. Second, Hyden extenuated the weaknesses of the civil servants because he empathized with them. All these interpretations manifest the Prospero syndrome.

Medvedev, Fainsod, Halpern, Lewin and Shivji rejected the sociological significance of the term kulak. The economic justification for collectivization and villagization was therefore questioned. Shivji criticized the Western researchers who thought that internal obstacles were more important. By suggesting that the people who formed the upper layer of the rural stratum were economic bureaucrats, Shivji implied that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was still economically powerful after retiring. He was concerned with the politicians' flirtation with socialism. The open criticism of the politicians shows that there is freedom for historians in Tanzania. Medvedev, Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin were concerned with human rights which dekulakization eroded and which are absent today.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 169; "Stalin's Role," p. 8.

[2]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 170.

[3]Ibid., p. 165, "Stalin's Role," p. 4.

[4]Ibid., pp. 8-10.

[5]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, p. 68.

[6]Ibid., pp. 85; 88.

[7]Ibid., p. 85.

[8]Let History Judge, pp. 71f; 83.

[9]Ibid., p. 101.

[10]Ibid., pp. 88, 90, 99.

[11]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 152; 408; Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 456f, 469.

[12]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 173; Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, Ibid., pp. 454, 469, 474.

[13]"Stalin's Revolution," pp. 194, 211; Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 461, 496.

[14]Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 96.

[15]"The Silent Class Struggle," pp. 310, 323; Class Struggles in Tanzania, Ibid., p. 85.

[16]"The Silent Class Struggle," p. 320.

[17]Ibid., p. 211.

[18]Ibid., p. 326.

[19]Ibid., p. 320.

[20]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 167; "Building Socialism," p. 211.

[21]Ibid.

[22]The Socialist Offensive, pp. 326f see p. 102 in this study.

[23]Ibid., p. 213.

[24]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, pp. 139, 151f.

[25]"Ujamaa Vijijini," p. 24 Cf. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 41.

[26]Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, p. 89.

[27]"Staff, Kulaks and Peasants," p. 157; Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 41.

[28]"Stalin's Revolution," pp. 160, 173.

[29]Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 434.

[30]"Stalin's Revolution," pp. 173, 197; Ibid., pp. 224, 500.

[31]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," pp. 164f, 168; "Building Socialism," p. 206.

[32]"Revolutionary Changes in the Countryside," p. 166; Ibid., p. 213.

[33]The Socialist Offensive, pp. 231, 251.

[34]Let History Judge, p. 98.

[35]Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, p. 244.

[36]"Stalin's Revolution," p. 421.

[37]"The Silent Class Struggle," p. 305.

[38]*Class Struggles in Tanzania*, p. 115.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

There are conflicting interpretations of the implementation of collectivization and villagization partly because of the use of different sources and studies, political values and circumstances under which the historians worked. The different conclusions obliquely reflect the relationship between politics and historical scholarship. Soviet scholars are directly controlled by the orders of the CPSU while the students of villagization are indirectly influenced by politics. It is difficult to explain the influence of politics on the scholarship of collectivization with respect to Western historians. The descriptions of collectivization do not reveal the influence of the Cold War. The historians were sympathetic to the fate of the peasantry and this tendency reveals the respect for human rights as valued in the Western democratic societies. Further research is needed to explain the relationship between politics and historical scholarship.

The future historian will have to select more studies on collectivization and villagization than those analyzed in this dissertation. The historian should probably ask more questions than those raised in this study. Questions not relating to historiography will be useful. What were the special features of the writers' backgrounds that have a bearing on the explanations of the implementation of collectivization and villagization? How does one account for the academic and political commitment of the students of villagization? What features of Tanzaphilism (see Chapter III) explain this tendency? Did the Cold War in any way influence the interpretations of collectivization by Western

scholars; do the conclusions constitute a "historical front" of their own? The answers to these questions can come from a wide reading of works other than those on collectivization and villagization, e.g., international relations between the USSR and the West since the Second World War; foreign policy and practice of Tanzania; politics in the USSR and Tanzania; rural development, etc. It might be useful to interview the scholars in order to ascertain their personal views which might have influenced their conclusions.

This study has not only provided an example of how interpretations can be used to explain the influence (and lack of it) of politics on historical scholarship, but also how interpretations on two historical subjects can be compared for the purpose of analyzing the relationship between politics and scholarship in the USSR, the West and Tanzania. The main conclusions are summarized in this chapter.

Medvedev and Shivji occupy unique positions in the historiography of collectivization and villagization, respectively. They claimed that collectivization and villagization were undemocratically implemented. In suggesting that collectivization was dictatorially carried out, Medvedev implied that there has never been socialist democracy since the death of Lenin. He is a dissident scholar who writes as a free-lance historian.

Medvedev was encouraged to criticize the cult of Stalin after Khrushchev had denounced it at the XXth Party Congress of 1956. He joined the Communist Party and started to do research on Stalinism but when he finished writing in 1968, the Brezhnev regime was discouraging the criticism of Stalin and even reviving neo-Stalinist ideas.

He was expelled from the Party and he published Let History Judge in West Germany. The book can be seen as written by a former Party member who criticizes the existing situation. That Let History Judge was published in the West indicates the lack of freedom for historical scholarship in the USSR. Medvedev criticized the role of Stalin and the use of coercion by the local Party and government officials during the dekulakization campaign. He touched on the hot-spot themes of collectivization which the Party and government officials disapproved. The fact that Medvedev has not been expelled from the USSR despite his criticism of neo-Stalinist tendencies scores the observation made in chapter three regarding the toleration of dissidence by the present regime.

Shivji is also a free-lance historian. He wrote "The Silent Class Struggle" after he had graduated in the school of law and expanded the essay into a monograph The Class Struggles in Tanzania when he was teaching in the Department he graduated from. He was also critical of the role of the Party and government officials in villagization. Shivji felt that without industrialization villagization would not succeed. The recommendation that Tanzania should disengage from the capitalist system was a Marxist critique which is closer to the views of the critics of the government. In this sense Shivji's presentation of villagization gives an idea of the relationship between politics and the historical scholarship in Tanzania. His interpretations were Marxist and nationalist. There is therefore some truth in Professor Ali A. Mazrui and Professor Cranford Pratt's claims that scholars in Tanzania are both academically and ideologically committed (see Chapter III).

There is one major difference between the interpretations of collectivization by Medvedev and those of Shivji on villagization. Medvedev's conclusions were anti-Stalinist while Shivji's were Trotskyist because he criticized the Stalinist bureaucracy which carried out heavy industrialization he recommended for Tanzania. There is a special feature in their backgrounds which had a bearing in the interpretations. The dissidence of Medvedev has been described. Shivji's Indian background seems to have had a bearing on the interpretation of the role of the Party and government officials and the international bourgeoisie in Tanzanian economy. The Indians had controlled the economy during the colonial period. The decision by the government to experiment the socialist strategy in development terminated the monopoly of the economy by the Indians. This explains in part why he was critical of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who abandoned the capitalist road to development and the international bourgeoisie that replaced the Indians in the control of the economy. The knowledge of the background of the historians seems to clarify the interpretations. This was not discussed because this is not an interpretative study. It is left to future historians to carry out such a study.

The remaining students of collectivization and villagization can also be compared according to the conclusions they made. The discussion of collectivization by Fainsod, Halpern and Lewin and those by Marxist students of villagization-Van Velzen, Raikes and Von Freyhold-were similar regarding the claim that the respective campaigns were bureaucratically and undemocratically implemented. On the other hand, Davies, McHenry, Hyden and Omari acknowledged the bureaucratic

implementation of collectivization and villagization but they indirectly criticized the Party and government officials, the local Patry officials and the civil servants.

The interpretations of Kovalenko and Ivnitsky were neo-Stalinist. The interpretations of Bogdenko and Pogudin place them between Kovalenko and Ivnitsky on the one hand and Medvedev on the other. The conclusions they made were neither neo-Stalinist nor anti-Stalinist. Their views can be described as semi-neo-Stalinist (moderate). Bogdenko and Pogudin argued as Kovalenko and Ivnitsky did that the kulaks conducted anti-Soviet and anti-kolkhoz subversive activities with the support and expectation of Russian emigres and Western capitalists. They concluded that dekulakization made the building of socialism in the countryside possible. Bogdenko and Pogudin suggested that further research on dekulakization was needed. But they were all optimistic that collectivization was a socialist campaign. This conclusion makes them comparable to Davies and Omari. Davies shared the assumption that collectivization was a strategy which made industrialization possible; Omari argued that villagization was a socialist movement but it had to be implemented democratically and gradually.

Kovalenko, Bogdenko, Pogudin and Ivnitsky were professional historians and this probably explains their interpretations of collectivization. The writings of Kovalenko, Bogdenko and Pogudin were contemporaneous with Medvedev's Let History Judge. The interpretations would be expected to be as anti-Stalinist as Medvedev's. Ivnitsky wrote at a time (the book was published in 1977) when the Party directives according to the Brezhnev leadership warned against criticizing

the cult of Stalin. These observations suggest that professional historians work within the confines defined by the politicians and that neo-Stalinist tendencies started to be gradually revived by the Brezhnev leadership after the forced resignation of Khrushchev in 1964. By 1977 some of the control measures for historical scholarship during the era of Stalin had been restored. The trend paralleled the revival of pre-revolutionary dissidence. Therefore, the observation made in Chapter III, namely, that the literature of dissidence can explain the environment for scholarship during the era of Brezhnev, seems to be convincing.

We can state that Soviet scholars and the students of villagization are academically, and to some extent, ideologically committed. The Soviet scholars shared some of the claims made by the Party officials, viz, the struggle against the kulaks and collectivization as a socialist movement. The interpretations by Shivji and Omari were nationalist/socialist. The Western students of villagization were also academically and ideologically committed although not being officially told to do so. On the contrary, Western students of collectivization differed from the Soviet historians. It is not easy, however, to discern the influence of the Cold War on their interpretations. The influence of politics on historical scholarship needs further research.

It seems fruitful to study and compare the interpretations of collectivization and villagization. The fundamental differences between Soviet and Western scholars on the one hand and those between Tanzanian and Western historians on the other obliquely reveal the relationship between politics and scholarship. Were the differences between the

interpretations of collectivization and villagization a reflection of the scholar's perception of Marxian socialism (Communism) and traditional socialism (Ujamaa)? This question, and the ones mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, clearly suggests that this study has only opened the door for further work.

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Evidence of colonial hangover by the research student can as well be used as a toilet paper

VITA

Simon Kenyanchui

ADDRESS: Department of History, University of Nairobi, P.O. Box 30197, Nairobi, Kenya.

EDUCATION: East African Certificate of Education (E.A.C.E., Div. 1), Kakamega High School, November 1971.

East African Advanced Certificate of Education (E.A.A.E., 3Ps, 1 Sub), Kakamega High School, November 1973.

B.Ed (Hons.), University of Nairobi, September 1977.

M.A., European History, The Pennsylvania State University, November 1979.

Ph.D., Russian and Soviet History, The Pennsylvania State University, November 1982.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

Graduate: M.A., "Lenin and Zinoviev on the Self-Determination of Boers in the War of 1899-1902: A Fontological and Historiographic Study," Paper in Lieu of Thesis, The Pennsylvania State University, August 1979.

Ph.D., "Soviet Collectivization and Tanzanian Villagization: A Comparative Historiographic Study of Implementational Strategies," The Pennsylvania State University, November 1982.

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:

Russian and Soviet History; Education

AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

European History (1500-Today); East European History (1500-Today); African History.

PROFESSIONAL WORK EXPERIENCES:

Teacher, Senende Secondary School, January to April 1974.
Teacher, Usenge Secondary School, September 1977 to January 1978.
Instructor, Kiswahili, Liberal Arts Critical Languages Program, 1979-1980.
Instructor, Social Science 110: "Introduction to Contemporary Africa," General Education in the Humanities and Social Sciences, The Pennsylvania State University, Spring Term 1981.
Teaching Assistant, Spring 1978 to Winter 1981; Summer and Fall 1982, The Pennsylvania State University.