

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ROLE OF THE YOUTH IN THE 2007 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA

A Case Study of Kibera in Nairobi

C .T. MUCHIRI

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**A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY
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DECLARATION


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PROF MAKUMI MWAGIRU

Signature..........Date.....23.11.10.....

MR. OCHIENG KAMUDHAYI

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to Mr J. K. Mwanja, CBS, Director, National Youth Service of Kenya.

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Many people have contributed positively towards the successful completion of this project. It is, however, not possible to quantify or innumerate the valued contributions of each one of them. I express my profound gratitude to all of them.

I am deeply indebted to the management of National Youth Service for having paid my tuition fees for the course. Special thanks go to the Director of National Youth Service, Mr. J. K Mwanja CBS, for nominating me to attend the course and for encouragement every time we had a chance to meet or communicate during my study period. My gratitude also goes to the Commandant National Defence College Lt. Gen. Jones M. Mutwii and my sponsor Senior Directing Staff Maj. Gen J. Kasaon for their guidance, continuous and logistical support during my stay at National Defence College, Karen.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the role played by the youth in 2007 post-election violence. While in all past politically instigated and electoral induced ethnic clashes, the youth were condemned for perpetrating violence as ethnic warriors, what is less acknowledged is the fact that the youth were condemned, and still are the biggest victims and casualties. The majority of those who died, for instance, have been young people. While many reports concede that electoral violence is rampant in Kenya, there is little knowledge on the nature and extent of youth involvement in electoral violence beyond the fact that, invariably, the youth are the one social group that is most visibly engaged and used to penetrate and spread violence. It is for the purpose of unravelling this apparent dilemma that the researcher undertook to study the patterns, extent, character and form of youth involvement in electoral violence.

The study was guided by two questions; what was the role played by the youth in the post election violence in Kenya? What measures can society undertake in order to curtail this vice?

The study contends that the youth participation in the violence that erupted following the disputed December 2007 General Elections had its foundation in the role of the youth and especially the unemployed ones. The involvement of the youth in Kenyan politics can be categorized into legitimate and illegitimate roles. The legitimate role includes their participation as candidates, voters, poll agents, campaigners for various candidates and political parties. The illegitimate participation involves bribery, intimidation, obstruction and violence.

Both primary and secondary data was widely used, including text books, academic journals and newspapers, supplemented with Kenya Government documents. For theoretical underpinnings and actual appreciation of reality, academic materials and interviews with actors were conducted.

The study recommends, among other measures that the Ministry of Education should broaden the curriculum to encourage excellence in non-conventional fields of learning such as dance and gymnastics. Such a curriculum should provide training and policy guidelines on inter-ethnic issues to teachers (who are among the first to interact with the youth) and other actors who have an important role in molding the youth. This is in order to avoid recurrence of political violence in future.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | | |
|--------------|----------|---|
| AP | : | Administration Police |
| ECK | : | Electoral Commission of Kenya |
| KNCHR | : | Kenya National Commission on Human Rights |
| KP | : | Kenya Police |
| UNDP | : | United Nations Development Programme |
| USAID | : | United States Agency for International Development |
| PNU | : | Party of National Unity |
| ODM | : | Orange Democratic Movement |
| KANU | : | Kenya African National Union |
| KADU | : | Kenya African Democratic Union |
| SLDF | : | Sabaot Land Defense Force |
| KCA | : | Kikuyu Central Association |
| UMA | : | Ukambani Members Association |
| LU | : | Luhya Union |
| YKA | : | Young Kavirondo Association |
| KAP | : | Kalenjin Political Alliance |
| MUF | : | Mwambao Union Front |
| THA | : | Taita Hills Association |
| GEMA | : | Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association |
| ICDC | : | Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation |
| KPU | : | Kenya's People Union |
| GSU | : | General Service Unit |

| | | |
|-------------|----------|---------------------------------------|
| KBC | : | Kenya Broadcasting Corporation |
| FM | : | Frequent Modulation |
| MoU | : | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGOs | : | Non Governmental Organizations |
| IDP | : | Internally Displaced Person |
| IMF | : | International Monetary Fund |
| SLDF | : | Sabaot Land Defense Forces |
| TV | : | Television |

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Kenya began as a multiparty state at independence in 1963 but it was a de facto single party state. It became a de jure single party state in 1982 during the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi when the Constitution of Kenya was amended to insert Section 2(A) to make KANU (Kenya African National Union – the independence party) the only political party. In 1991, the government yielded to national and international pressure and amended the Constitution again to remove Section 2(A). This was during a wave of democratization that swept the globe following the end of the Cold War in 1989. The country held the first multi party elections in 1992, and since then, cross-ethnic violence has characterized every national electoral exercise.¹

The single most important explanatory factor for the electoral violence appears to be ethnic-based² competition for the presidency because of the perceived socio-economic benefits expected to accrue to the president's ethnic community. Although Kenya held presidential elections from 1963 to 1992, the incumbent always ran unopposed, which undermined the intentions of effective leadership transformation. Indeed, the governments of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963 – 1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (1978 – 2002) detained opposition leaders without trial demonstrating that state functionaries considered competition for the presidency treasonable.

¹Murunga, Godwin R., & Nasong'o Shadrack W., (2007) Kenya, The Struggle For Democracy (CODESRIA: New York), p 131

² Ibid, p 143

During the election violence witnessed in 1992 and 1997, the conflict's epicentres were mainly the Rift Valley and Coast provinces. The indigenous communities targeted the "migrant" ethnic communities ostensibly to drive them back to their original homelands. Although much of the past waves of violence were driven by competition over resources (e.g., land, employment and business opportunities), such violence still had political overtones. Practically, just before the General Elections, indigenous communities would organize to drive out migrant ethnic communities to deny them an opportunity to vote. Consequently, this reduced the chances of the presidential candidate supported by the migrant communities from garnering the minimum of 25per cent of the vote from at least five (5) out of the eight (8) provinces as required by law.³

On December 27th 2007, Kenyans went into a general election that was to place the country on the brink of making history of sorts. Firstly, the elections witnessed the highest voter turnout ever, a vindication of the democratic credentials or lack thereof that Kenya had built over time⁴. Secondly, the 2007 elections attracted by far, the highest number of candidates vying at all levels. Further, the election attracted the highest number of political parties sponsoring such candidates⁵. This buttressed the notion that competitive politics had at last taken firm root in the country's polity. Thirdly, the level of organization within electoral institutions that went on prior to the elections was lauded by many as exceeding continental standards. Indeed, opinion polls at the time showed that there was an overwhelming confidence in which the public held that the

³ The Kenya constitution requires that for a presidential candidate to be a winner, she/he should obtain a minimum of 25% of casted votes from at least five (5) of the eight (8) administrative provinces.

⁴ See IREC, Report on data Analysis of the 2007 General Elections Annex 6A, in IREC lists voter turnout as 70.71%, out of a total 14,296,180 registered voters.

⁵ Ibid. Nine candidates competed in presidential polls, 2548 in parliamentary and 15,334 in civic elections. The number of candidates roughly doubled and parties sponsoring candidate trebled the 2002 elections figures.

elections would be conducted in a free and fair manner⁶. Fourthly, the elections came soon after the government had lost a crucial referendum vote to the opposition over the issue of the proposed new constitution of Kenya. To many, the referendum was seen as a dress rehearsal for the epic election battle to come. In the ensuing race, opinion polls gave the opposition a slim edge over the incumbent⁷ and therefore, many saw a possibility that Kenya would be the first country where a President was democratically unseated after his first term.

However, the outcome of the elections thrust Kenya into the wrong trajectory in history-making. The astonishing scale of violence that greeted the announcement of the “winner”⁸ Honourable Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity brought out the ugly face of African politics, where democratic contests invariably ended in bloodshed amidst claims of electoral fraud and flaws. These events triggered the worst violent times witnessed hitherto in the country. There was wanton destruction of property and massive looting of private property, staggering cases of loss of life (approximately 1,150) and limb, anarchy and displacement of more than 300,000 persons⁹. The economic loss was estimated at several billions of shillings as the economic growth rate severely declined in the first quarter of the year. The international community sharpened its focus on the situation in Kenya, calling peace and urging both Kibaki and Raila to enter into dialogue. For this reason, His Excellency Kofi Annan was appointed by the African Union to spearhead dialogue efforts between the two warring sides, culminating into the signing of the National Peace Accord on 28th February 2008.

⁶ Ben Agina et al, Steadman Polls puts Raila Ahead in East African Standard, 08/12/2007; 48% of respondents had complete confidence in ECK, 41% had some confidence and 9% had no confidence.

⁷ Ibid. Raila polled 48% and Kibaki 44% with general elections barely 3 weeks away.

⁸ IREC, Report Of The Independent Review Commission (IREC) On The General Elections Held in Kenya On 27th December, 2007/2008, Government printer: Nairobi

⁹ IREC supra Pg 3

The post-election crisis has attracted significant academic interest locally and internationally. The researcher joins the cue in endeavour to unearth the role played by the youth in the 2007 post-election violence.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

Young people are the major participants in most of electoral violence. Violence is the physical manifestation of a conflict. Conflict is in turn a situation where two or more identifiable groups called protagonists, are in conscious opposition to each other as they pursue different goals. The groups may be tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic or political. Every conflict involves a struggle over values or/and claims to scarce resources such as land power, or/and status. The aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. They also fail to make a distinction between civilians and combatants and disregard the rules of war. The overall effect of violence is that it impinges on the standard of free and fair elections and violates fundamental freedoms.¹⁰

Internationally, election violence has taken place in United States, Asia , Latin America, and Africa where the “disappearance” of government critics, informal repression styled along ethnic or land clashes is one of the newest threats to human rights in the multiparty era. Elections over the years have been characterised by violence, bribery and intimidation. Such violence has often resulted in loss of life, destruction of livelihoods and denying people their rights to vote as

¹⁰ A report by The Kenya Election Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF), (2008) P.87

polling stations cannot be accessed. It is well known that much of this violence is usually perpetrated by the youth. However, the real masterminds- be it the politicians themselves or their organizers – are usually older people who are angels by the day and devils by night. These are people who in public are peace-makers but in private are war-merchants.

In the African electoral violence of the last twenty years, combatants have become increasingly youthful. Some of the forces are made up largely of young teenagers. Combatants may sometimes be as young as 8 or 10 years old. Girl fighters are increasingly common. This is partly demographic. Africa is not only the world's poorest continent, it is also its youngest. Half or more of the population of African countries are under the age of 18. Militia life offers training and a livelihood in countries where poverty and number overwhelm education and jobs. But the trend to more youthful combatants also reflects the discovery that children – their social support disrupted by war—make brave and loyal fighters. The company of comrades – in – arms becomes a family substitute. Notable examples of electoral violence have been witnessed in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Togo, Ivory Coast and Kenya.

The intermittent election violence raises serious concerns about the future of Kenya. The violence has resulted in significant loss of lives and property, disruption of business and uncalled for internal displacements of people. For instance, the 2007 post-election violence is associated with 1,300 deaths, displacement of more than 350,000 persons, disruption of economic (e.g., agriculture, tourism, international trade) and social (e.g., local and international travel) activities, loss and destruction of public and private property and high inflation. This poses great

fundamental questions. First, is whether the attainment of developmental goals as envisioned in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¹¹ and Kenya's Vision 2030¹² will be realized. Second, is that many youths are wounded and even killed in some of these violent acts. Third, the future of our youths is negatively affected. Instead of being engaged in productive ventures that would prepare them for future leadership and productive adult lives they are rather engaged in destructive violent activities that could destroy them. Fourth, electoral violence erodes credibility in the rule of law and impact negatively in democratic activities. By engaging in electoral violence Kenyan youths are helping to erode confidence in the system, and thus working against the current campaign to make Kenya a truly democratic country for the benefit of all.

It is, therefore, important to study the violence, and establish the nature, form and extent of the use and misuse of the youth. The nature of violence is either planned or spontaneous while form seeks to find the kind of violence perpetrated. Extent on the other hand, sought to establish the levels of youth participation in the chain of electoral violence.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are;

- i. To determine the role played by the youth in the post election violence in Kenya.

¹¹ The United Nations promulgates the MDGs; each country is to pursue them to enhance its human development. The goals include poverty and hunger eradication, universal primary education, gender equity, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, Combating HIV & AIDS and other diseases, environment conservation and enhanced global partnership (UN, 2004)

¹² Vision 2030 is Kenya's current long-term developmental plan whose main goal is to transform the country to an industrialized country by year 2030

- ii. To determine the key risk factors that exacerbated the involvement of the youth in the post election violence.

1.3 Literature Review

1.3.1 Introduction to Literature Review

The research is on the role of the youth in 2007 post-election violence. At this initial stages, the researcher attempts to examine the concept of the youth, electoral violence, and the role of the youth in 2007 electoral violence in Kenya. The contribution of various scholars on youth, electoral and political violence plus the role of the youth in post 2007 electoral violence in Kenya is highlighted.

According to Murunga et al, the term youth is a concept whose use is heavily dependent on context¹³. Many people understand this term in relation to age, which is generally accepted as the most important characteristic in formal delineation of this category¹⁴. The confusion that the emphasis on age creates in discourses of youth in Kenya is evident in discrepancies in statistical information testifying to the inability of those with vested interest in youth issues to set universally acceptable age boundaries. Estimates of the number of Kenyan youth, depending on the age boundaries under consideration, range from as high as 50 per cent of the Kenyan population to somewhere around the 25 per cent mark. Some consider 13-year-olds as ‘youth’, especially when all those who should be in secondary school or have graduated through rites of initiation from childhood are included in this constituency. Others base their classification on purely pragmatic grounds. Youth Agenda, for example, a leading NGO on making ‘youth issues

¹³ Murunga, Godwin R., & Nasong'o Shadrack W., (2007) Kenya, The Struggle For Democracy (CODESRIA: New York), p 136

¹⁴ Barkan, J.D., (2003) ‘New Forces Shaping Kenyan Politics’, *African Notes*, No. 18, p 19

part of the national agenda', considers all those falling between 15 and 40 years of age as youth¹⁵. As adolescents, youth are often considered as being too immature to have anything significant to contribute to present discourses of national importance. On this basis, they are therefore marginalized in significant decision-making forums. It is important to seek out alternative ways of conceptualising youth that displace the emphasis on physical immaturity, making it possible for those in this social category to be recognised as partners in and active contributors to, national development¹⁶.

The term 'youth' in this project is used to denote the transitional stage of life between childhood and adulthood characterised by transfer of societal responsibilities affirming the change of status from the former to the latter. The commemoration of the commencement and cessation of youth as a stage of life differs in timing and orientation from one community to another. Specific rites of passage may mark the entry into and out of this period. Some of these rites of passage of initiation are celebrated accordingly as public occasions emphasising the individual's membership of a community.

The youth are the greatest resource, the wealth par excellence and the future of the nation. The character and quality of the youth are the embodiment of national vision for the future. They must therefore, receive the best preparation for the life ahead. Above all, they must be educated to accept their responsibility for national and domestic life. They represent best efforts in preparing the society for the future. For these reasons, nations spend huge amounts of their national budget on the education of the youth. According to Daniel Arap Moi, in his book *Kenya*

¹⁵ Murunga, Godwin R., & Nasong'o Shadrack W., (2007) *Kenya, The Struggle For Democracy*, p 136

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p 136

African Nationalism, youthful energy is like flood waters which can either be conserved and managed in a reservoir, for systematic perennial irrigation, or be let loose to wreck havoc on the unsuspecting settlements in landscape below.¹⁷

Studies on politics tend to ignore or downplay the contribution of youth who are seen either as purveyors of violence or as victims of poverty¹⁸. According to Diouf, the construction of African youth as a threat or as a problem is symptomatic of a changing society where the status quo is being challenged in important arenas. He identifies in particular the changing relationship between identity and relationship, the emergence of new forms of inequality, and the transformation of the nature of chronological and psychological passage from youth to adulthood as important phenomena worthy of academic attention¹⁹.

Kenya's population is predominantly young with the age group 15-35 years accounting for approximately 35 per cent of the total population²⁰. It is at this age that much of the human capital is formed. Consequently, human development strategies implemented during this transitional period have long-term impacts on the structure and quality of human capital. Kenya has instituted a system of youth preparation beyond the normal school system and professional training colleges. The most significant of post-independence youth organizations is the National youth Service (NYS). In the NYS, the youth absorb a large dose of varied practical education and training. All this is designed to improve the quality of the youth and to prepare them for

¹⁷Moi, Daniel Arap, (1996) *Kenyan African Nationalism* (Macmillan Publishers) pp. 129-130

¹⁸ O'Brien, C., (1996) 'A Lost Generation: Youth Identity and State Decay in West Africa', in Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (eds), *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, (London: Zed Books) pp78- 103

¹⁹ Diouf, M., (2003), 'Engaging Colonial Cultures: African Youth and Public Space', *African Studies Review*, Vol. 6 , no. 2, pp 1-12

²⁰ GOK, Kenya Vision 2030, p 116

leadership. Furthermore, in 1984, the Government decided that a pre-university National Youth Service programme should be given before the selected first-year students join the university²¹. Though it was discontinued in 1989, the group of youth who underwent this special programme of education and practical training. The programme offered a large number of talks and lectures from May to September each year. The common purpose of all these was to introduce a programme of intellectual upgrading of insight and outlook for the attendants; a sharing of national viewpoints on joint responsibilities; a definition of national goals toward which the nation, including the youth, must purposefully direct their energies and hopes. The programme aimed at giving the youth a sense of national belonging, and at demonstrating the essence and constructive values of peace for all, unity of purpose and the effectiveness of love as a constructive force. The programme aimed at producing an appreciation (by the youth) of committed and responsible citizenship. Loyalty to the state and constructively responsible custodianship of the national heritage, nation-building, security and peaceful progress were all emphasised²². The programme, however, was well intentioned, but due to poor implementation, coupled with limitation of resources, could not survive.

Kenyan youth face many challenges. These include limited opportunities for educational advancement and technical training, limited opportunities for employment, high levels of poverty, lack of finance or access to credit, disproportionate exposure to high health and social risk such as HIV/AIDS drug and substance abuse, and crime, and lack of opportunities and mechanisms to participate in decisions that affect their lives. They therefore feel deprived what they believe is rightfully theirs. They also have a higher dependency rate compared to

²¹ Moi, Daniel Arap, (1996) *Kenyan African Nationalism* (Macmillan Publishers) p 120

²² *Ibid*, pp 120-122

comparable countries, which is attributed to unemployment, limited skills, and lack of resources and opportunities. As a consequence, many youth are tempted to engage in crime, drug abuse and prostitution, among other vices, and are also likely to enter into early marriage. Lack of resources and opportunities also increase the vulnerability of youth such that they become easy prey for political manipulation²³ including and not limited to violence.

1.3.2 Electoral Violence

Electoral violence is a political violence which is defined as an episodic interaction between social identity groups engaged in an ongoing, interactive relationship in which instrumental force is used and result in deaths and/or injury of humans²⁴. Political violence is intrinsically political, in that it involves concerted, affective actions by individuals in a social context. Mwagiru defines electoral violence as political violence that is geared towards winning political competition or power through violence, subverting the ends of electoral and democratic processes. Its tool of trade is the intimidation and disempowerment of political opponents. Electoral violence takes place not only just at electoral times, but in periods leading to elections, during the elections themselves and in the period immediately following elections such as counting of ballots²⁵.

Violence has abnormal aspects. Becker argues that violence itself involves the threat or realization of physical or psychological harm with an attending sense of violation of the harmed person's integrity²⁶. He presents six points on violence for discussion. These are first, that

²³ GOK, Kenya Vision 2030, p 117

²⁴ Marshall, Monty G., (1999) *Third World War, System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc: New York) p27.

²⁵ Mwagiru, Makumi, (2001) *Political and Electoral Violence in East Africa* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict research, Nairobi Kenya)

²⁶ Becker, Earnest, (1975) *Escape from Evil*, (New York: Free Press) p 383

violence is an extreme behaviour that is very dramatic, strongly emotive, and so, highly visible; it tends to distort general perceptions by “flooding” the senses and sensibilities of observers. Secondly, the decision to use violence directly involves only a subset of the mobilized population; even in the most extreme situations, only a minority of any population is actively engaged in violent action. Thirdly, violent action is extremely consumptive and, so, requires a relatively large support; the majority of the mobilized population is indirectly involved in the violence through such acceptance and support activities. Fourthly, the most insidious aspect of protracted violence is the increasing scope and the range of violent effect; victims of violence (the survivors) and others who are directly affected by violence are very strongly imprinted by experience and such imprint will often stimulate a will to revenge the violence and will remain as lifelong physical and psychological impairments. Fifth, the non-violent (normal) infrastructure of the mobilized group is retained throughout the conflict process, is supported by the majority of the population, and remains the preferred alternative to violence. Sixth, a group that has repeated experiences with violence will tend to institutionalize and glorify its capacity to engage in violence; in such situations, the conflict process becomes “overgrown” with stylized ornamentation and ritual (the culture of violence) and, so, becomes increasingly less transparent²⁷.

Scholars such as Olzak, Tarrow and Beissinger have contributed a lot in this field of political violence. Assembling data on ethnic and racial confrontations and protests in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Olzak uses every history analysis and ecological theories of competition and niche overlap to show that the breakdown of ethnic and racial segregation, by increasing economic and political competition, triggers exclusively collective

²⁷ Ibid, pp 384-390

action, including ethnic and racial violence.²⁸ Beissinger, constructing a database on violent collective events in the disintegrating Soviet Union and its incipient successor states, analyzes the highly clustered incidence of nationalist violence in the context of a larger cycle of nationalist contention. He shows that nationalist struggles turned increasingly violent (and increasingly assumed the form of sustained armed conflict) late in the mobilizational cycle, in connection with the contestation of republican (and incipient state) borders at a moment when effective authority was passing from the collapsing centre to the incipient successor states.²⁹ In part, Beissinger echoes the findings of Tarrow et al concerning the tendency for violence in Italy to occur towards the end of a mobilization cycle. Although not directly concerned with ethnicity, Tarrow's work - notably his finding that violence does not map directly onto protest- has implications for the study of ethnic violence. In Italy, violence appears to increase when organized protest weakens. As mobilization wanes, violence is practiced by splinter groups as the only way to cause disruption.³⁰ Although the dynamics of the two cases differ, both Beissinger and Tarrow analyze violence as a phase in a mobilization cycle rather than as a natural expression of social conflict or social protest.

As mentioned earlier, Africa is not left behind in electoral violence. A classic example is Zimbabwe. In this country, youth has been an important instrument of ruling party violence. The perpetrators of election violence have enjoyed have enjoyed impunity, often buttressed by presidential pardons and amnesties. Beside coercion, ZANU (PF) has also engaged in political discourse that demonizes its key opponents as reactionary, subversive, and often stooges of

²⁸ Olzak, S., (1992) *The dynamic of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press) pp. 27-55

²⁹ Beissinger, M.R., (1998) *Nationalist Violence and the State: Political Authority and Contentious repertoires in the former USSR* (Comp. Polit. In Press) pp133-155

³⁰ Tarrow, S., (1994) *Power in Movement* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press) pp237-375

whites and foreigners. Organized violence and intimidation of the opposition, albeit of varying intensity, has been a recurrent strategy of the ruling party before, during and after elections to punish constituencies that dared oppose it.³¹ Opponents were abducted and then disappeared, and scores of homes of suspected ZAPU supporters were looted and destroyed. ZANU (PF)'s Youth Brigade was actively involved in forcibly busing villagers to party rallies and ordering them to vote for the ruling party.³² Masipula Sithole argues that the four general elections held in Zimbabwe since 1980 exposes startling similarities in the ruling party's discourse and coercive mechanisms. Opponents were cast as reactionary enemies of the state and as mere puppets of the whites. The leaders mobilized unemployed youth, mostly males and sometimes women, to attack opposition supporters and their property, and threatened voters with loss of jobs, houses and houses and food relief and a return to war if they supported the opposition. The perpetrators of violence were the benefactors of police inaction or party protection, either through presidential pardons and amnesties for political crimes. The police themselves actively participated in violence on behalf of the ruling party. Despite pleas for reconciliation after three of the four elections, the party leadership sanctioned local vendettas against constituencies that had voted for the opposition.³³

Kenya's electoral violence is not a new phenomenon. Every one of the nine elections held in the country since independence- in 1963, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1997, and 2002- and most of the by elections in between, have been characterised by varying degrees of electoral

³¹ Rich, Tony, (1982) 'Legacies of the Past? The Results of 1980 Election in Midlands Province, Zimbabwe', *Africa* 52, pp 42-55

³² Arnold, Millard, et al, 'Law group summary of findings and conclusion', in *Zimbabwe: Report on the 1985 General Elections*, p. viii.

³³ Sithole, Masipula, 'Fighting authoritarianism in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Democracy* 12, 1 (2001), pp. 167-8

violence³⁴. The youth have been at the centre of it all. While the 2002 election was arguably the least violent and most democratic, the 1992 was the most violent. In the 1992 elections, the first after country's return to multiparty politics in 1991, the country witnessed unprecedented election-related bloodbath as a result of the politically instigated ethnic clashes. The clashes instigated by the then Moi-KANU regime claimed the lives of over 700 Kenyans³⁵. This was repeated again in 1997. observers have noted thus; "The country has therefore seen forms of violence each election year, in many instances, resulting in deaths of the innocent. The level of electoral violence has varied across elections. The elections were a stark contrast with the 1997 and 1992 elections which were undoubtedly violent"³⁶

According to Mutahi, the 1992 elections saw the open use of violence in killing, intimidation, and displacing of communities perceived as opposition supporters³⁷. The violence which began in 1991, came after KANU, the then ruling party, then reluctantly agreed to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution, which prohibited the establishment of other political parties except KANU, hence allowing the formation of other parties in the country. Most KANU politicians predicted that the country would disintegrate along tribal lines, leading to anarchy and chaos. Consequently, KANU Members of Parliament and other politicians allied to the party mostly from the Rift Valley Province, began to call for the forceful removal of other ethnic groups from the province as they were viewed as opposition adherents. In addition, they called for the

³⁴ The Youth Agenda, Who is Guilty, Youth Perspectives on the 2007 Pre-Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya, p 16

³⁵ Ibid, p 16

³⁶ Kenya Domestic Observation Programme (KDOP) in its Report *When Kenyans Spoke*

³⁷ Mutahi, P., 'Political Violence in the Elections' in *The Moi Succession Elections 2002* by Maupeu, H., Katumanga, M., & Mitullah, W., (eds), (Tranafrica Press: Nairobi), p 69

Majimbo system of governance to be enacted in order to protect their regional interests from outsiders. (Majimbo is a Kenyan style of federal government)³⁸.

As mentioned earlier, the 1997 elections was full of vigilante violence. Kagwanja asserts that this was a continuation of the orgy of ethnic cleansing that engulfed parts of rural Kenya from late 1991 and which was partly responsible for the flawed elections of December 1992³⁹. The violence shattered the euphoric celebrations of Kenya's return to pluralism. He further argues that vigilante violence, that went under the epithets of 'ethnic', 'land clashes', 'cattle rustling', 'border dispute', or simply 'gangsterism' was state sponsored. The government was accused of sponsoring vigilantism as a tool of informal repression in its desperate bid to derail multi-partyism and to hold on to power⁴⁰. Vigilantism in Africa is not as developed as in the West. Kelly Hine notes that vigilantism in western society, especially in United States, rose in response to the failure of law enforcement system to provide full protection to citizens and their property. As such, such vigilantes laid a legitimate claim to a moral high ground for their work in the preservation and betterment of the existing system. They had no connection to the state or its functionaries.⁴¹ On the contrary, the vigilantes of multi-party Kenya were sponsored by the state to stem the tide of the multiparty challenge and to help sustain the hegemonic elite of one party era in power.

³⁸ Kagwanja, P., (1998) *Killing the Vote. State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya* (Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission)

³⁹ Kagwanja, P., 'Politics of Marionettes: Extra-legal Violence and the 1997 Elections in Kenya' in *Out for the Count, the 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya* by Rutten, M., Mazrui, A., & Grignon, F., (2001) (eds) (Fountain Publishers: Kampala) p 72

⁴⁰ Ibid, p 72

⁴¹ Hine, K.D., (1998), 'Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Cant Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck,' *The American University Law Review*, Vol.47, No 5 June 1998, pp 1221-53

Vigilantism, according to Kagwanja, assumed several characteristics. First, it was portrayed as a product of ancient animosities or long-standing communal hatreds. Second, it relied on ethnic warriors, often identified with traditional ethnic symbols and attire, and wielding traditional weapons such as spears, swords, bows and arrows. In some cases, warriors wielded modern firearms. Thirdly, sometimes, security forces provided training, protection and worked hand in hand with ethnic vigilantes during attacks. Without exception, attacks were made against groups associated with the opposition or pro-democracy movement.⁴²

Mutahi further argues that the 2002 general elections were, relatively violence-free. They were widely hailed as the most democratic to be held in the country. Kenya was cited as the role model for other countries in the continent and the world to emulate for undergoing a peaceful transition⁴³. This clean report card was given by the local and international observers who were accredited by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to observe the elections. In addition, election observers generally agreed that there was reduced electoral violence, which had experienced large-scale electoral violence. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) has documented that over 4000 people have died due to political violence, which has at the same time displaced almost 600,000 people between 1991 and 2001⁴⁴

⁴² Kagwanja, P., 'Politics of Marionettes: Extra-legal Violence and the 1997 Elections in Kenya' in *Out for the Count, the 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya* by Rutten, M., Mazrui, A., & Grignon, F., (2001) (eds) (Fountain Publishers: Kampala) p 73

⁴³ Mutahi, P., 'Political Violence in the Elections' in *The Moi Succession Elections 2002* by Maupeu, H., Katumanga, M., & Mitullah, W., (eds), (Tranafrica Press: Nairobi), p 69

⁴⁴ 'Kayas of deprivation, Kayas of blood: violence, ethnicity and the state in coastal Kenya' (1997); 'Killing the Vote: State-sponsored violence and flawed elections in Kenya' (1998); 'Kayas revisited: a post-election balance sheet' (1998)

Indeed the history of post-independent Kenya, clearly shows that the successive three post-independence regimes have used violence as a means of entrenching their dominance and hold on to power. However, even in 2002 election, there were a significant number of incidences of violence, bribery and intimidation in what was otherwise regarded as a historical and peaceful election process. Other observers showed that a large a large percentage of political thuggery committed were incidences of assault⁴⁵. Other incidences involved threats, intimidation, hate speech, inter ethnic violence and forcible disruption of public meetings⁴⁶- in most cases perpetrated by political parties either singly or jointly, the police and terror groups like the Mungiki, Jeshi la Embakasi and Kamjesh. The government to be blamed for perpetrating violence⁴⁷. Similarly, the 2005 referendum elections were relatively non-violent but still saw instances of political violence in the nature of incitement to violence, hate speech and misuse of state resources, and abuse of public office⁴⁸. Worryingly, electoral violence in the country in the recent past has taken a gender dimension where female aspirants have been harassed and assaulted with a view of intimidating them from contesting. Electoral violence continues to be a major governance problem in the region.

1.3.3. The role of the Youth in the 2007 Electoral Violence in Kenya

It has been observed that living in a democracy means that youth has the right to have a say in how things are run – locally, nationally and globally. Doing that in practice means two things:

⁴⁵ *The central depository Unit on Electoral Violence in Kenya January-December 2002*

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp 3-4

⁴⁷ *Central Depository Unit (CDU) report on Electoral violence January, February, March, April 2002*

⁴⁸ *Behaving Badly: Deception, chauvinism and Waste during the Referendum Campaign: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2006*

participating in their community and being active citizens⁴⁹. By active citizenship is meant: Understanding rights and responsibilities as citizens in a democracy and having the skills and confidence to put them into practice. By participation is meant: Playing an active part in the decisions and, most of all, taking action to change things for a better community⁵⁰.

One may ask: To what extent did the Kenyan Youth play a responsible role in the 2007 elections and in the post election violence? In the attempt to answer this question, one looks at the Kenya youth in terms of their motivation (what drives them) and their instrumentality (what gives them the ability to carry out that which they are motivated to do). Contextually, one considers reported youth activities in terms of “the real world of African democracy”. In particular, needs to take cognizance of Sandbrook’s idea that most African democracies (in my regime(s) that (occupy) the hazy terrain between genuine representative or multiparty democracy, on the one hand, and authoritarianism, on the other”. In other words, they have not made the “second transition”, i.e “the phases of consolidation in which all major actors accept the rules of the democratic game...”⁵¹. The youth of Kenya participated in that game in various capacities, particularly as voters, agents, protesters and also as candidates for both civic and parliamentary seats.

The role of the Kenyan youth in power politics is generally defined by Dikshit as follows: A fundamental problem for the rulers in any state is related to converting power into Authority, that

⁴⁹ Cangia, Caterina Sr., (2004), ‘Youth: A Gift and a Challenge. A Global Perspective’, in Sr Elena Rostello (ed), *Youth Challenge*, Tangaza Occasional Papers/ No 16 Pauline Publications Africa.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p 17

⁵¹ Sandbrook, R., (2000), *Closing the Circles: Democratization Development in Africa*, (London: Zed Books Ltd) pp23-47

is, the right to rule, which comes into existence only when the citizens recognize the right of the political masters to govern; and to make laws; and the citizens' duty to obey those laws.⁵²

Having defined the quest for authority by those who wield political power, Dikshit draws a useful distinction between "legality of authority" and "legitimacy of authority". saying that: Legitimacy implies voluntary acceptance by the ruled of the ruler's authority to govern. In modern societies such an authority is derived from popular support obtained through free and fair multiparty election contests.⁵³

The Kenya events that are being examined here (the 2007 elections and the post-election violence) had to do with the politicians' scramble for authority and the citizens' struggle to ensure that none of the competing politicians grabbed it only through legality without legitimacy. In both events the participation of the youth was deemed significant. Their attractiveness to the contending parties depended on their instrumentality: their capacity for carrying out both constructive and destructive assignments.

The instrumentality of the youth depended on two of their attributes: their energy and their numbers. The energy or vitality is universally acknowledged.⁵⁴ The numbers depended on the demographic facts of the Kenyan voter registration. According to information obtained from the Youth Agenda (quoting ECK sources), the youth constituted approximately 60% of voters

⁵² Dikshit, R.D.. (2000), *Political Geography: The Spatiality of Politics* (Third Edition), (USA: TataMcGraw-Hill) p 5

⁵³ Ibid, p 7

⁵⁴ Cangia, Caterina Sr., (2004), 'Youth: A Gift and a Challenge. A Global Perspective', in Sr Elena Rostello (ed). *Youth Challenge*, Tangaza Occasional Papers/ No 16 Pauline Publications Africa. P16

registered for the 2007 elections. Thus the youth vote was a much sought-after vote by the contending political parties and individual candidates.

The instrumentality of the youth, based on their energy and their numbers, was reflected in the wide range of youth groups that were formed to campaign especially for the presidential candidates, featuring such groups as: Vijana na Kibaki (A pro-Kibaki youth group) and Youth Patriots 4 change (A pro-Raila youth group). Such groups, and various less prominent ones, gave their numbers, beauty and vitality to their favourite candidates in the 2007 elections. They played both positive (responsible) roles, e.g. singing and dancing to popularize their candidates, and negative (irresponsible) roles, e.g. beating up those campaigning for the rivals of their candidates.⁵⁵

While their capacity for constructive or destructive (responsible or irresponsible) participation depended on their instrumentality, what they actually did and whom they did it for depended on their motivational attributes, including their idealism: their belief in and commitment to the idea of “democratic citizenship” – based on the desire and ability of young people to be part of the process that determines what happens to one’s life and the lives of others in the community.”⁵⁶

The Kenyan youth did believe that they could make a difference in shaping the future of Kenya. In the pre-election period, they had organized and participated in a wide range of “youth leadership forums, community forums, meetings and public education activities”, whose

⁵⁵ *Who is Guilty? Youth Perspectives on the 2007 Pre-Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya*, The Youth Agenda, pp 65-66

⁵⁶ Cutler, David, (1996), ‘Introduction’ in Steve Mokwena (ed) *Taking the Initiative: International Perspectives on Young peoples Involvement in Decision Making*, (Cernagie young People initiative: UK) p 2

outcome, among other things, “was to have increase consciousness among youth and their leader....”.⁵⁷

In terms of explanatory parameters, this idealism can be seen as a strong sense of responsibility. In the expression of Mokwena, it is about the youth “taking the initiative.”⁵⁸ In this perspective, the youth participate in public affairs (especially decision-making) because it is their right, since the future belongs to them and the decisions made today will affect them more than they will affect the older citizens.

The idealism of the Kenyan youth accounts for the positive aspects of their participation in both the 2007 elections and the post-election violence that erupted upon the declaration of the presidential election results. Apart from idealism, their poverty arising, from the joblessness was a definite factor in the negative (irresponsible) aspects of their participation in the 2007 elections and as re-stated below, the post-election violence. In informal interviews based on convenience sampling, Kenyan youth repeatedly mentioned their poverty as their reason for having among other misdeeds sold their voting cards, asked candidates for money, harassed the rivals of their candidates, formed hired crowds for candidates they did into support and joined bands of youths for hire by candidates who needed them for defence or offence.⁵⁹

When interrogated on the irresponsibility of such actions, a number of Kenyan youth express elements of cynicism, disillusionment and even bitterness about the Kenyan society, which they

⁵⁷ Cit op, p 66

⁵⁸ Cutler, David, (1996), ‘Introduction’ in Steve Mokwena (ed) *Taking the Initiative: International Perspectives on Young peoples Involvement in Decision Making*, p 3

⁵⁹ *Who is Guilty? Youth Perspectives on the 2007 Pre-Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya*, The Youth Agenda, p 67

believe has been immensely unfair to their (the youth's) generation. Their excitability was another factor that cannot be ignored. The youth are prone to getting excited whenever there are events which are a bit out of the ordinary, such as election campaigns. The noise, the dancing, the public exchanges, and even the occasional insults and scuffles brought a measure of excitement to which the youth by their nature would be more attracted than would their older counterparts. Moreover, they would not just be attracted as onlookers but as active participants. Thus, if there were ugly but exiting incidents in the 2007 elections, nature would dictate that the youth would be more likely to get involved in such incidents.⁶⁰

The logic of the instrumentality and motivation of the youth as explained above extends rather effortlessly to their participation, in the post-election violence. Post-election violence scenes portrayed in the Kenyan mass media (print and electronic) suggested that the youth were the most prominent participants in the violence. Considering their energy and numbers (the basis of their instrumentality) one would expect them to form the vanguard of the expression the anger that characterized the suspicions about the genuineness of the declared presidential results. One would also expect that if anyone wanted to use any group of citizens to fight their battle for defensive or offensive purposes they would target the youth.⁶¹

Looking at the types of motivation for youth participation in political activities, as outlined above, it is clear that the youth would have been involved in the post-election violence with or without instigation by individuals or groups of individuals with personal or collective interests in the results. If one takes the view that the violence erupted out of the citizens' disappointment

⁶⁰ Ibid, p 67

⁶¹ *Root Causes and Implications of The Post election Violence of 2007*, A Report of the Research Undertaken by Kenya thabiti Task-Force 2008 (KTTF 2008), pp36-39

with the result, we can see the idealism of the youth making them the most likely group of citizens to come out and demonstrate their anger especially in a violent manner. Everywhere in the world the youth are more likely to fight for their rights in situations where older citizens would show some restraint.

The tendency of the Kenyan youth to engage in destructive activities in such circumstances may also be explained by their poverty and the cynicism, anger and disillusionment that emanate from it (the poverty). The poverty of the Kenyan youth would also explain their readiness to be hired by interested persons who might want someone to do some dirty jobs for them. In general, their idealism, poverty and excitability would explain their participation in the post-election violence whether we see the violence as spontaneous or instigated⁶². In terms of responsible citizenship, it is arguable that if the youth acted irresponsibly in the post election protests, the negativity of their behaviour is not in the mere fact that they protested, but in the violent nature of the protest, especially the fact that it targeted people whose only crime was that they were ethnically identified with a given presidential candidate in a particular neighbourhood.

The violence may have something to do with conflict culture but the asymmetric nature of the conflict (involving a government side and a non government side) required that the government side find it expensive to take an oppressive option in resolving the conflict.⁶³ In line with this perspective, it is arguable that it was the unruly behaviour of the Kenyan youth that brought the government side to the negotiating table and not the mediation skills of the Annan team. In this

⁶² Ibid, pp 36-39

⁶³ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H., (2005), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. (UK: Polity Press), pp 21-22

regard, there is a sense in which the post-election behaviour of the youth had elements of responsible citizenship. It is their violence on fellow citizens that remains questionable.

In conclusion, while many reports concede that electoral violence is rampant in all over the world and in particular Kenya, there is little knowledge on the nature and extent of youth involvement in electoral violence beyond the fact that, invariably, the youth are the one social group that is most visibly engaged and used to penetrate and spread violence. It is for the purpose of unravelling this apparent dilemma that the researcher undertook to study the patterns, extent, character and form of youth involvement in electoral violence.

1.4 Justification of the Study

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that violence is one of the greatest threats to sustainable development with the recent post election violence having imposed heavy social and economic costs on the country. With the hypothesis that the violence was sustained by the youth, it's important that the extent of youth involvement, the socio-demographic and economic profiles of the youth involved are determined in order to design appropriate policy instruments to address the inherent challenges. With population of the youth escalating against a backdrop of mounting social and economic challenges, the country may be sitting on a time bomb waiting to explode in the next general election if the youth issues are not addressed. Unless appropriate policies are in place and adequate resources are allocated, the reinforcement and perpetuation of increasing youth, poverty and exclusion will be amplified by the size of the youth cohort.

While in all past politically instigated and electoral induced ethnic clashes, the youth were condemned for perpetrating violence as ethnic warriors, what is less acknowledged is the fact that the youth were also the biggest victims and casualties. The majority of the dead, for instance, in all instances have been young people. While many reports concede that electoral violence is rampant in Kenya, there is little knowledge on nature and extent of youth involvement in electoral violence beyond the fact that, invariably, the youth are the one social group that is most visibly engaged and used to penetrate and spread violence. It is for the purpose of unravelling this apparent dilemma that the researcher undertakes to study the patterns, extent, character and form of youth involvement in electoral violence. Since violence is generally perceived to be perpetrated by the youth, the question of this research is whether this is only a perception or the truth.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The researcher employs Relative Deprivation Theory to explain the prevalence of political violence in Kenya. Relative deprivation is a situation in which a person or group is deprived of something which they think they are entitled to, while another person or group possesses it. The deprivation is relative between the two parties as a person or group possesses the item while the other does not. The term can be used in social science to describe feelings or measures of economic, political, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. The concept of relative deprivation has important consequences for both behaviour and attitudes in a society, including feelings of stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action.

The concept of “Relative Deprivation” was first introduced in the sociological literature by Stouffer et al in 1949, and one of the most influential formulations of the concept and the related idea of the reference group can be attributed to the British Sociologist W.G. Runciman and his book *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* from 1966. He employed the concept of relative deprivation in an attempt to understand the formation of popular beliefs and attitudes about social stratification in the United Kingdom. In particular, Runciman sought to explain why the level of class-political discontent voiced among members of various social groups did not seem to correlate strongly with objective indicators of economic and social deprivation. He suggested that the level of social discontent is determined by the difference between one’s own social and economic conditions and perceived conditions enjoyed by specific reference group. If groups that are fairly well off tend to compare themselves with even more privileged strata, this could explain why they are sometimes more discontented than genuinely poor people.⁶⁴

Ted Gurr is another renowned scholar who also made some contribution in the theory of relative deprivation. He asserts that relative deprivation is the anger or distress that results from a discrepancy between “should” and “is”. More formally, his central proposition is that relative deprivation is equal to “value expectations” minus “value capabilities” divided by value expectations. Value expectations are the goods and opportunities which people want and to which they feel entitled; value capabilities are the goods and opportunities which they have or think it feasible to attain. Gurr identifies three patterns of deprivation; aspirational, decremental, and progressive. Aspirational deprivation occurs when value capabilities remain constant over time while value expectations increase. Decremental deprivation occurs when value capabilities decrease over time while value expectations remain constant. In progressive deprivation, value

⁶⁴ <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4195006>, Accessed: 20/01/10 03:43

capabilities decrease over time while value expectations increase.⁶⁵ Gurr's notion of relative deprivation links subjective wants and perceived justice on the one hand with perceived capabilities on the other. Frustration then results from inability to gratify just wants. And this frustration creates the potential for collective violence (aggression).

According to Mwangi, relative deprivation theory was developed to try and bridge the gap between the individual and the social level. He further argues that relative deprivation is the discrepancy between value expectation and value achievement, that is, between what people believe they are rightly entitled to, and what they are capable of getting and retaining⁶⁶. Relative deprivation is activated by the reference group which a person compares oneself, and fortunes, with. It is the reference group that changes and conditions ones perceptions of what to expect and what to believe they are entitled to⁶⁷.

In the theory of relative deprivation, Mogire asserts that the political regime's inability to provide economic and political goods is seen as a source of relative deprivation within a population. By relative deprivation is meant a discrepancy between deserved and actual enjoyment of goods or conditions of life and more generally discontent with government performance and alienation from the political system⁶⁸.

⁶⁵ <http://www.istor.org/stable/1954733>, Accessed: 20/01/10 03:57

⁶⁶ Mwangi, Makumi, (2000) *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Watermark Publications: Nairobi) p.21

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.21

⁶⁸ Mogire, Edward O., The State And International Political Conflict In Africa: The Case Of Kenya, in *Conflict in Contemporary Africa* by Okoth, P. Godfrey, and Ogot, Bethwell A. (eds), (2002), (Jomo Kenyatta Foundation), p.

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon puts it that relative deprivation conflict may arise as developing societies produce less wealth because of environmental problems; their citizen will probably become increasingly discontented by the widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and the level they feel they deserve. The rate of change is key: the faster the economic deterioration, it is hypothesised, the greater the discontent. Lower-status groups will be more frustrated than others because elites will use their power to maintain, as they can, access to a constant standard of living despite a shrinking economic pie. At some point, the discontent and frustration of some groups may cross a critical threshold, and they will act violently against other groups perceived to be the agents of their economic misery or thought to be benefiting from a grossly unfair distribution of economic goods in the society⁶⁹

During the last two decades, relative deprivation has been used in two general senses in sociological, psychological and political science literature. First, the term “relative deprivation” is used to refer to the emotion of deprivation, and emotion generally conceived of as one type of anger roughly synonymous with a feeling of resentment or dissatisfaction or with a sense of grievance. Second, the theory of relative deprivation is not simply a function of an individual's objective status. The theory of relative deprivation attempts to specify the conditions under which objective (absolute) deprivation eventuates in subjective (relative) deprivation and to describe the ways in which felt deprivation results in various behaviours such as violence and apathy.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., 'Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict' in Richard K. Betts (ed), (2005) *Conflict After the Cold War* (London Longman: New York) p 579

⁷⁰ <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4195006>, Accessed: 20/01/10 03:43

Relative deprivation theory has its own weaknesses as an explanatory theory for conflict in that it is highly subjective, and cannot therefore be measured by any objective criteria. It also remains an unsatisfactory basis on which to explain social conflict, unless it is elevated to the group level⁷¹. However, it remains a concrete theory in understanding sources of political violence in Africa.

1.6 Hypothesis

The researcher will be testing the following broad hypothesis:

H₀: Cultural factors, political governance, income inequality resulting in economic and social exclusion and marginalization of the youth and triggered by electoral fraud were the main factors that exacerbated youth involvement in the post election violence.

1.7 Research Methodology

1.7.1 Research Design

Survey research design incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used. The quantitative method is favoured as it provides testable and empirical data and making statistical generalization to broader populations while qualitative method elicits open-ended responses as well as numerical data.

1.7.2 Target Population

This will be all youths who participated in planning and execution of the post election violence in Kibera slums. The researcher estimates it to be 10,000 youths.

⁷¹ Cit. op, p.21

1.7.3 Sample Design

A sample is a representative subset of a population. In this study, a sample size of 1000 cases from the youth will be drawn through snowballing technique. Another sample of 200 from non-youth mainly administrators, elders, church leaders, businessmen and residents will also be drawn.

1.7.4 Questionnaire Design

Questionnaires will provide information on the objectives of the study being undertaken and assures confidentiality concerning the submitted information. As an incentive to increase the response rate, respondents will be assured that the information they provide will be used solely for the research and no information shall be leaked to any authority other than summarized and generalized results for the study report. The first section will request the respondents to provide their demographic information. The second section of the questionnaire will with the extent of their participation in poll violence and the roles played while the last section will be on the risk factors that exacerbated their involvement in the post election violence.

1.7.5 Data Collection

The questionnaire will be piloted before distribution to gauge whether the study's purpose is understood and relevant questions asked, as well as obtain any recommendations. Using face to face interviews, 1000 youths who were involved in the post election violence and 200 non-youth will be approached for input. After the resultant refinement of the piloted questionnaires, the research questionnaires will be administered to the target population using interviews.

1.7.6 Data Analysis

Data analysis and interpretation forms a crucial part of the research process. In the analysis of the qualitative data, inductive reasoning will be used. The data will be analyzed as follows:

- i. The responses will be organized in a logical manner according to the propositions that they corresponded to.
- ii. The responses will then be clustered into categories using content analysis.
- iii. Content analysis will further be applied to distinguish constraints that related to the propositions to identify themes.

1.7.7 Validity and Reliability

All data relating to respondents' comments will be recorded in a separate Appendix. The pre-testing of the final survey questionnaire will result in suggested changes in order to improve understanding and enhance construct validity. External validity will also be confirmed since the research will be conducted in a "real world" setting. External validity is about generalizability or transferability of the findings to other contexts and how useful they are in the bigger scheme of things.

The standard survey questionnaire will be piloted before use in order to improve reliability. This will be conducted through establishing congruence between research problems, the study objectives, the literature reviewed and the formulated propositions.

1.8 Research Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction to the study: This chapter comprises the introduction, statement of the research problem, the objectives of the study, literature review, theoretical framework, the hypothesis, the research methodology and chapter outline.

Chapter 2: Election violence in Kenya: This chapter demonstrates conceptual understanding of election violence. It covers the three levels of election violence. These are pre-election violence, election violence, and post-election violence.

Chapter 3: Causes of election violence: This chapter analyses, conceptually, the causes of election violence. There are three types of causes of election violence. These are underlying causes, proximate causes, and trigger causes.

Chapter 4: Case Study of Kibera in Nairobi: This chapter surveys the role of the young people in election violence in Kibera. It considers the factors that led to the youth engage in election violence in 2008.

Chapter 5: Critical analysis: This chapter comprises the analyses the role of the youth in post election violence. It also analyses social demographic, economic and political profiles of the youth involved in post election violence, and quantitative data analyses. This is from both secondary and primary data.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: This chapter comprises of the reflection of Kenya's situation. This is from the point of view of the past, present and the future.

CHAPTER TWO

ELECTION VIOLENCE

2.0 Introduction

The chapter gives an overview of theoretical background of elections. It also highlights the salient issues inherent in election violence. Election violence is normally in three stages; these are pre-election violence, election violence, and post-election violence. All these are elaborated in details and how they manifest. The chapter is however purely conceptual.

2.1 Theoretical Background of Elections.

The justification for elections can be traced to the idea of the social contract found in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau though these are by no means the first account of the concept. The substance of the social contract theory is that the state is created through the medium of a contract. Hobbes idea of a social contract consists in individuals handing over their rights of self government to a single authority thereafter authorised to act on their behalf on the condition that every individual does the same.¹ The result is a relationship of sovereign and subject which leaned towards absolutism.

Departing from the absolutism of Hobbes. Locke postulates that political power is constituted by the consent of the people. The power must be exercised as it is given for the good of the people. The people in turn obey so far as the government acts within the trust reposed in it; but when it acts contrary to that trust, the people have a right to replace that government.²

¹ Held, David,(1989) *Political Theory and The Modern State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy* (Polity Press), p. 16

² Appadorai, A.(1975) *The Substance of Politics* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 23 – 25

By contrast Rousseau postulated that government is a result of an agreement among the citizenry. The legitimacy of a government was only to the extent to which it fulfils the instructions of the general will. When the government fails so to act it can be revoked and changed.³ The account of Rousseau represents the rudimentary basis of democracy. It is a condition of legitimate government that there are periodic elections.

The electoral process facilitates regime transition and provides a choice option as an alternative to violent change. But elections can also be used by the ruling elite to confirm the regime. Therefore the two strands of theoretical approach to elections emphasise the “voter choice” and “legitimation of state authority” respectively. The first focuses on the uncertainty of outcomes presented by the electoral process. The second is concerned with the functionality of the electoral process and focuses on some intent that outcomes should be predictable.⁴

In this study democracy is defined as a system of government that meets three essential conditions. These are competition for political power amongst individuals and organised groups; inclusive participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through free and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.⁵ In this context the electoral process is a multi-candidate game contested not just by candidates and parties, but their supporters as well in which different strategies of cooperation or antagonism between the players can increase or decrease their prospects for success.

³Held David, (1989) *Political Theory and The Modern State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy*. (Polity Press.), p. 31

⁴ Cowen, Michael & Laakso, Liisa *Election And Election Studies* in Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso (eds.) *Multiparty Elections In Africa*, (2002) (New York: Palgrave), p. 1

2.2 Elections and Violence

Election violence has attracted various scholars among them being Fisher. He defines election violence as “any random or organised act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or to otherwise influence an electoral process.”⁶ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines electoral violence to mean any act that ‘seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through the issuance of a threat’, through language such as ‘hate speech or verbal intimidation’, or through ‘physical assault, or destruction of property or assassination’.⁷ This definition, due to its limitation, is further broadened to include a culturalist perspective.

The concept of electoral violence encompasses violence in terms of the processes by which individuals are culturally socialized by the practices of the community and locality in which they are embedded. Here the resort to violence to influence electoral outcomes is not regarded as a major transgression of some important rule but as a matter of fact an event that is normatively not unacceptable. The culturalist lens also urges that a distinction be made between the violence of the state, the violence of dominant groups and the violence of oppressed and subaltern groups. It also draws attention to the spatial and temporal aspects of violence. What was considered as an act of violence, and hence a vitiation of the electoral process, at a certain period of time, at a certain place, may later not be regarded otherwise.

⁶ Fischer, Jeff ‘*Electoral Conflict and Violence*’, (IFES White Paper 2002-01), p 3

⁷ UNDP Concept Note: *Electoral Violence And Election Dispute Resolution* (Regional Centre in Bangkok, 2005), pp 2-3

Violence emanates from conflict behaviour with destructive effects on the relationship between groups and individuals. This is because election processes are vehicles, through which political power is retained or pursued, and social differences are highlighted by candidates and parties in campaigns for popular support, they tap deep vulnerabilities for violent interactions.⁸

Fischer argues that election violence can occur at five intervals in an election chronology: identity conflict during the registration process, campaign conflict, ballot conflict, results conflict and representation conflict related to the electoral system. The victims of electoral violence can be people, places, or things. Such violence could be local, regional or national, sporadic or continuing, superficial or deep-rooted. Targets of violence could be individuals or communities that have particular demographic features. Violence could be at one or more stages in the electoral process.⁹

In some instances election violence is considered to be a particular type of political violence occurring within the context of the overall process of democracy and democratization.¹⁰

Mwagiru, in a paper titled 'Political and Election Violence in Kenya', defines political violence as, violence over political competition at its heart. Political violence is concerned with the issue of the legitimacy of government. Above all, it removes or fractures political competition, and is aimed at removing or covering political dissent.¹¹ It encompasses overt state sponsored or

⁸ Sisk Timothy (2008) *Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence* (Discussion Paper, The International Studies Association), p 2

⁹ Fischer Jeff, '*Electoral Conflict and Violence*', (IFES White Paper 2002-01), p 8

¹⁰ Sisk Timothy (2008) *Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence* (Discussion Paper, The International Studies Association), p 4

¹¹ Mwagiru Makumi *Political and Election Violence in Kenya* paper presented to the Regional Conference on Political and Electoral Violence in East Africa, May, 2001 (Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict Research)

tolerated violence but may also include actions taken or not by the state or its agents with the express intention of realising certain goals in the affairs of the state.¹²

A scholar named Hoglund, identifies two approaches in conceptualising the term electoral violence. Almost similar to the view advanced by Sisk the first approach sees electoral violence as a sub-set of activities in a larger political conflict. In this aspect studies focus on electoral violence as part of the trajectory of ethnic or communal violence in divided societies. Instances of this characterisation of electoral violence are countries like Kenya, Sri Lanka and India in which violence is clustered around elections.

In the second approach, electoral violence is seen as the ultimate kind of electoral fraud by which he means clandestine efforts to shape election results through activities like ballot rigging, vote buying, and disruptions of the registration process. The nexus in these two approaches is the focus on the goal oriented and instrumental character of violence. A third approach is based on Galtung's defining concept of structural violence which distinguishes between structural violence from personal violence.¹³ Structural violence refers to a situation where damage is done to a person because of the structure of the social system thus preventing that person from fulfilling their aspirations. Structures are therefore blamed for the emergence of violence.

Electoral violence activities include the harassing, assault and intimidation of candidates, election workers, and voters; rioting; destruction of property; and kidnapping. The targets can be

¹² Nagengast, Carole (1994). *Violence, And the Crisis of the State* (Annual Review of Anthropology Vol.23) pp. 109-136

¹³ Hoglund, Kristine *Electoral Violence in War-Ravaged Societies: The Case of Sri Lanka*

separated into four categories: electoral stakeholders (voters, candidates, election workers, media, and monitors), electoral information (registration data, vote results, ballots, campaign material), electoral facilities (polling and counting stations), and electoral events (campaign rallies, travelling to polling station).¹⁴ Electoral violence is separated from other forms of political violence by a combination of timing and motive. The time aspect relates to violence carried out during the election period. The objective of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process and in extension its outcome.

Electoral violence seriously undermines the electoral process by dislocating voters from places of residence, scaring voters away from polling stations and intimidating them to vote for particular candidates or parties. Types of electoral violence include assassination, attempted assassination, confinement, battery, threats of violence, torture, arson, rape, sexual harassment, abduction, obstruction, looting, threats and intimidation, hate-speeches, defamation and insult, political thuggery, hijacking, destruction of property, property damage, economic repression, sabotage, eviction or displacement, closure of party or campaign premises, and violent or physical disrupting of public meetings and campaign rallies¹⁵. Electoral violence can occur before, during or after an election.

¹⁴ Fischer, Jeff. (2002), p 9

¹⁵ Mutahi, Patrick,(2005) "Political Violence in the Election", in *The Moi Succession Elections 2002* Herve Maupeu et al (eds) (Transafrica Press: Nairobi) p 74.

2.3 Pre-election violence

Pre-election violence takes place before election. Political competitors are known to use all types of tricks in order to realize their goals. Kiunjuri Irungu asserts that one tactic used by politicians is diversion. He asserts that, violence, wars and quarrels may serve the purpose of distracting the people's attention from a given issue a strategy most used by leaders. He gave as an example, a situation where Socrates dies which creates heated animosities in Athens. Suppose Athenians demanded the resignation of the democratic leaders. Other than resigning, democrats decide to divert people's attention by instigating war between Sparta and Sicily. The effect would be to obscure the issue of Socrates and relegated to the periphery. War would become the prime issue of the day. The threat of insecurity that accompanies wars and quarrels would constitute new food for thought for the people. When their minds are diverted, they would forget the issue of Socrates. Nor would the issue of Socrates regain its sharpness again after the distraction¹⁶. Election violence is at times used to divert people's attention from certain sensitive issues.

The relational dimension of conflict is necessary to constitute election conflict and violence. People or groups with little or no contact either directly or indirectly are unlikely to have either conflicting or harmonious relations. These individuals or groups are not static thereby requiring a dynamic analysis to conflict. The sources of election conflict include individuals, groups, and the state. Therefore locating the actors is a key component in tracing the causes and enabling factors of a conflict.¹⁷

¹⁶ Irungu, Kiunjuri,(2000), *The Machiavellian Art of Political Manipulation, The Kenyan Experience*,(The House of Hedges: Thika) p205

¹⁷ Ibid, p 75

Actors are necessary in explaining the motivational dimension (why parties opt for conflictive or cooperative strategies) of the conflict and violence. The actors should be located through the entire cycle of a conflict. As the conflict is transformed so are the actors. Actor transformation involves either the internal changes in the major parties or admission of new parties in the conflict. There is a wide spectrum of actors in election conflict and election violence. The participation of the state as an actor can be obscured where the distinction between the government and the political party is blurred. Similarly, the privatisation of state violence can be used to camouflage state perpetrated violence during elections. The use of hired militia by the opposition is not uncommon.¹⁸ Political parties hire thugs and youths to unleash violence or intimidate opponents.

The issues and interests in election conflict are complex and not easy to isolate. They vary from one actor to another actor and through time. Furthermore they are not static. They can shift dramatically within the life cycle of the conflict. As it is elaborated further in this section the 'instrumentalization logic' the 'we' and 'they' authority relationships have permeated societies to marginalise some groups while benefiting others. These groups could be social classes, ethnic or tribal communities, minorities and other stratifications. Thus elections have become a contest between groups seeking to acquire power and those after the maintenance of the status quo.

It can also be contended that whatever their other purposes, the tribal clashes in most parts of the world also constitute a very effective red herring. Undeniably, these clashes keep the opposition politicians and other lobby groups very busy. The clashes are particularly effective since by their sheer sadism and absurdity, they are naturally disgusting. In annoying the opposition politicians

¹⁸The Report Of The Judicial Commission Appointed To Inquire Into Tribal Clashes In Kenya (Nairobi: Government Of Kenya, 1999), p.167

and other members of the public, those in power are able to impede clear thinking. An annoyed person is not able to think clearly. Besides annoying the opposition, tribal clashes also motivates the opposition expend resources both intellectual and material in an effort to stop them¹⁹.

The pre-election violence is subject to many meetings and press conferences. In this way, the ruling party shifts the attention and energies of the opposition from the critical issues. Some of the strategies used by the ruling elites is leaving the country so often and embarking on vigorous foreign policies when the situation back at home is tense with burning issues. It is argued in certain quarters that in so doing, the elite want to show the local and international public how stable he is. The most probable reason, however, is that he wanted to downplay the burning issues or crisis at home. The foreign policies he purports to pursue outside the country are mere red herrings. They are intended to shift the attention of the people from issues at home. The people are then drawn to other issues as they follow their leader in their minds outside the country²⁰.

Pre-election violence normally results to deaths, burning of houses, displacement of voters, among others. Other instances of campaign violence involve the shooting of candidates and clashes between armed supporters of political rivals²¹. Pre-election deaths were also attributed to communist rebels who impose “permit to campaign fees” in countryside area they control.

¹⁹ Ibid, p 206

²⁰ Ibid, p 206

²¹ *Sun*, “Bloody election in Philippines, “ iafrica.com/news, May 13, 2001.

Muslim rebels and armed groups employed by politicians were also security threats during elections.²²

One can conclude that identity violence can occur during the registration process when refugees or other conflict-forced migrants cannot establish their officially recognized identities. The result is that these populations can remain disfranchised and outside of political process and potentially provoking violence in the process. Campaign violence can also occur as rivals seek to disrupt the opponents' campaigns, intimidate voters and candidates, and use threats and violence to influence participation in voting.

2.4 Election Violence

This may be referred to as balloting violence which occurs on Election Day when political rivalries are played out at the polling station. At times electoral violence may come from coercive organs of the state to support candidates of a ruling regime. In this case, representatives of the state at the local level in the administration and security organs may participate in influencing voters towards electing pro-government candidates. The polling day may also attract violence including kidnapping of opponents. But electoral violence may also be promoted by candidates and their agents. This may degenerate into mass riots and violent demonstrations.²³

Elections to be meaningful, presuppose a certain level of political organisation. Huntington's notes that the principal institutional means for organising the expansion of political participation

²² AFP, "Election violence toll: 50 killed, 69 injured," www.inq7.net, May 10, 2001.

²³ Katorobo, James, (1994) "Electoral choices in the Constituent Assembly elections of March 1994" in *From Chaos to Order*, Hansen, Holger Bernt, et al (eds) (Fountain Publishers: Kampala) p 127

are political parties and the party system.²⁴ The stability and the strength of a party and of a party system depend upon both the level of institutionalisation and its level of participation. A high level of participation combined with low levels of political party institutionalisation produces anomic politics and violence. Participation without organisation degenerates into mass movements; organisation lacking participation degenerates into personalistic cliques.²⁵ Electoral competition between parties tends to expand political participation and at the same time to strengthen party organisation.

Electoral manipulation assails the very essence of democratic governance. No electoral jurisdiction is immune from manipulation or accusations that some form or other of manipulation takes place. Indeed, even the older mature democracies like the United States of America have witnessed accusations of election fraud and manipulation. It would be a misconceived notion to assume that elections at least in democracies are beyond reproach. However beyond passing such a judgement there seems to be a broad acceptance of the requirement that elections must be free and fair. There also seems to be a broad consensus of what constitutes a free and fair election. Therefore holding governments to account on their obligations to international and regional agreements is one way of managing election conflict and violence.

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 states that the will of the people “shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting

²⁴ Huntington, Samuel, (1968) *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p 399

²⁵ Huntington, Samuel, (1968) *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press) p 402

procedures". Elections have a human rights dimension which must be emphasised especially in emerging democracies.

Elections have become a high-stakes game perceived as opportunities for marginalised groups to be represented in decision making processes. For the political elite elections is merely the tool to access the instruments of state. The overall objective of electoral conflict and specially election violence is to influence the electoral process. If disaggregated further we find that there are different motives behind the violence. Some actors might object to elections of any sort and find elections an illegitimate method for the transfer of political power. Other perpetrators might not object to elections as such, but are opposed to the system under which the elections are held, and might try to prevent or postpone elections. Yet other actors behind violence might want to influence the outcome of election. Finally, if elections do not yield the expected results, groups or parties might use violence to overthrow or alter the election outcome. The polarisation of the electorate in an election may induce political stalemate, regime instability or even widespread political violence.

The proportional representation (PR) systems appoint seats in the legislature based on the percentage of the vote received, rather than who got the most votes. Each electoral district, therefore, sends multiple representatives to the legislature. There is often a minimum percentage of the vote needed in order to gain a seat, but this allows smaller parties to gain a voice in the legislature. As a result, groups are more likely to form their own party and compete, rather than engage in negotiation within a party as would be more likely in a plurality system. The rationale

of all PR systems is to reduce the disparity between a party's share of the national votes and its share of the parliamentary seats.²⁶

Whether it is the majoritarian or proportional representation systems the scope of electoral systems in the management of conflict depends on two institutional dimensions. According to Reynolds and Reilly "electoral systems translates the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are the electoral formula used (i.e. whether the system is majoritarian or proportional, what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation) and the district magnitude (not how many voters live in a district, but how many members of parliament that district elects".²⁷ These influence the political outcomes and determine the political consequences of electoral systems for conflict management.

The choice of electoral system presents a peculiar challenge for divided societies or societies emerging from conflict. For example, particular electoral systems can reward candidates and parties who act in co-operative, accommodative manner to rival groups; or they can instead reward those who appeal only to their own ethnic group.²⁸ Thus in an ethnically diverse society lacking shared values elections might prove deeply divisive, generate artificial ideological rigidities release powerful aggressive impulses and channel them into dangerous and unaccustomed directions.²⁹ This has led critics of democracy to argue that elections are

²⁶ Reynolds Andrew and Sisk Timothy *Elections And Electoral Systems: Implications For Conflict Management* in Sisk Timothy and Reynolds Andrew (eds.) (1998) *Elections And Conflict Management In Africa* (Washington, D.C. :United States Institute Of Peace Press), p. 20

²⁷ Reynolds, A. and Reilly, B. (2002) *International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, IDEA Handbook Series,(Stockholm Sweden), p. 7

²⁸ Harris, P. and Reilly, B. (eds.), (1998) *Democracy in Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, IDEA Handbook Series,(Stockholm, Sweden), p. 192

²⁹ Beetham David *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization* in David Held (ed.) (1993) *Prospects for Democracy* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press), p. 171

unAfrican in that traditional African societies formulated decisions by consensus unlike in democracies.

According to Ake the argument, “premised on the misconception that democracy (including elections) is solely a Western creation, stems from confusion between the principles of democracy and their institutional manifestations. The principles of democracy include widespread participation, consent of the governed and public accountability of those in power. These principles may prevail in a wide variety of political arrangements and practices which naturally vary according to historical conditions.”³⁰ Furthermore elections exert an effect well beyond the time when it is not being exercised. Thus popular control underpins elections. To concentrate on the act of voting is to ignore the shadow that the vote casts in front of it.³¹

Scholars have proposed some theoretical perspectives on democracy and elections with an emphasis on electoral system design for divided societies. The consensus democracy theories advocate for institutions that facilitate cooperation and compromise among political leaders. The theorists of this system have proposed it for use in deeply divided societies arguing that it maximises the number of winners in the system, so that separate communities can co-exist.³² But the preference for proportionality and criticism of the majoritarian systems advocated by these theorists has been challenged by advocates for majoritarian systems. A second approach is centripetalism which envisages democracy as a continual process of conflict management, a

³⁰ Claude Ake 'Rethinking African Democracy' *Journal of Democracy* 1991 Vol. 2 Number 1, 32, 34
³¹ Beetham David *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratisation* In David Held (ed.) (1993) *Prospects for Democracy* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press), pp 63-64
³² Norris Pippa *Ballot Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories Of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, And Democratisation* in Reynolds Andrew (ed.) (2002) *The Architecture Of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, And Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 206

recurring cycle of dispute resolution in which contentious issues must ultimately be solved via negotiation and reciprocal cooperation, rather than simple majority rule. According to Reilly, “the heart of the case for centripetalism as a form of conflict management is thus the need to create incentives for accommodation”.³³ The argument here is that electoral systems that encourage reciprocal vote transfer deals between rival candidates representing antagonistic social groups can have a major impact upon the nature of electoral politics, vastly increasing the prospects for the consolidation of moderate, centrist political competition.

Election violence is mostly concentrated in urban areas. This is due to the great number of voters who are concentrated in those areas as opposed to scattered populations in the rural areas.³⁴ Voters accuse candidates of distributing bribes for votes.³⁵ This type of violence is meant to deny voters their right to vote. At times, inhuman tactics such as chopping off of fingers, hands, noses, or lips with the machetes in the name of democracy is employed.³⁶

In conclusion, voter intimidation is intended to produce a self-imposed loss of freedom on the victim. If intimidated, the victim will vote or behave in a certain fashion. However, in some instances, electoral intimidation takes on a real property dimension, with hired thugs enforcing electoral behaviour in recognizable physical districts.³⁷

2.5 Post-Election Violence

³³ Reynolds Andrew (ed.) (2002) *The Architecture Of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, And Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 206

³⁴ Misanet.com/IPS, “Beninese mobilize against election violence”, www.afro.com, March 3, 2001.

³⁵ Muwanga, David, *The monitor* (Kampala), “Cardinal Warns on Election Violence”, January 24, 2001.

³⁶ Shawcross, William, *Deliver Us From evil*, Simon & Schuster, 2000, p193

³⁷ Carter, Jimmy, *The Carter Centre*, “Trip Report. Jamaica Election”, December 18, 1997

Post-election violence is that violence that results from the outcome of the elections. They can occur in disputes over election results and the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve these disputes in a timely, fair, and transparent manner. The manner in which results are reported can also be a conflict issue.

Elections are indispensable to any democratic political system. But, as with any other mode of succession, in many countries, election also involve explicit or implicit use of force either by the political parties contesting the election themselves or outside agents like the military, labour unions or private militias. This use of force undermines the very premise of the democratic ideal that rest on freedom of expression and choice. As research in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, England and America and journalistic accounts of elections today in most parts of the world shows, electoral politics is and has been marred by substantial use of force. In the United States, the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 almost led to a national crisis. The election results were dubious in four states and violence was a factor in three.³⁸

Contestability is a defining element of democracy. It is the point where competition and democracy overlap. There can be democracy without competition but not competition without democracy. For this reason, political competition needs constraining and sustaining conditions as it is unlikely to be effective in a world of rational, maximising, selfish, and independent actors. Neither too tight to suppress competition nor too weak as to be detrimental to the benefit of competition.³⁹ These are the boundaries that limit and constrain competition and at the same time

³⁸ Rapoport, D., and Weinberg, L.,(2001), *Elections and Violence*. In *The Democratic Experience and political Violence*,(Frank Cass Publishers: London) p 30

³⁹ Bartolini Stefano *Electoral and Party Competition Analytical Dimensions and Empirical Problems* in

sustain it and make it viable. In all sustainable democracies the party system must be deeply and durably entrenched in specific substructures of the specific society. The problem is that this is not always the case particularly in developing world. This no doubt leads to violence once slightest irregularity is noted.

Elections in the world even today are marred with post-electoral conflict and intrigue. As Churchill once said 'democracy may be the casualty of elections'⁴⁰ The European Union's election Observation Mission in its report on elections in many countries "remains concerned by politically motivated violent incidents and their effects on overall atmospheres of the electoral campaign. It notices that political parties also bear a significant responsibility in the spreading of election related violence".⁴⁰

There is a growing relationship between democracy and political unrest in general and elections and the use of force to affect electoral outcomes in particular. Hibbs was the first one to study this link in a systematic way. In a cross country empirical study that analyzed the incidence of mass political violence in post-World war II period, he shows how democratic nations experienced about as much mass violent conflict as do non-democratic nations. Hence a democratized world would not necessarily be a non-violent one. His definition of unrest is broader than the one we use in this paper in the sense that we focus on political unrest just after elections whereas for him the timing of elections is not of significance.⁴¹

Richard Gunther et al (eds.) (2002) *Political Parties Old Concepts And New Challenges* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 89,108-109

⁴⁰ <http://www.cnn/2002/WORLD/Africa/03/08zimbabwe.mugabe/>.

⁴¹ Hibbs, D.,(1973), *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-national Casual Analysis*, (Wiley: New York) p 130

In two related papers, Wantchekon and Ellman show how the threat of political unrest (possibly initiated by the political parties themselves) after the election influences voting behaviour and equilibrium policy outcomes. Strategic forward-looking voters, who take into account the possibility of post-election unrest, can in some cases vote in a manner that avoids the incidence of violence. A counterintuitive result from their model is that a weak party (defined as one which does not initiate violence) will moderate its policy sufficiently to placate the strong party that is more likely to initiate political violence. Also, in their model there is no effort to win elections. This seems particularly unrealistic in the case of developing countries where parties spend substantial amount of resources before elections to influence the campaigning process. Moreover the parties are purely ideological in their model and do not care about office for office sake. Parties just want to win elections-the reason for seeking electoral victory could be either purely ideological or opportunistic or a combination of the two. Finally, in their model only one party is likely to initiate political violence, while in the model below both parties initiate violence in equilibrium.⁴²

What form has post-election been taking? Like pre-election and election violence, post-election violence has its own way of manifestation. One of them is disruption of vote counting by violent protests in several constituencies. The violence is motivated by voters believing that local election officials are biased in their counting procedures.⁴³ Deaths, burning of houses,⁴⁴ among others are some common incidences reported during post-election skirmishes. It is also common to witness youth brandishing machetes, bows and poisonous arrows and occasionally firearms,

⁴² Wantchekon, L., & Ellman, M., (2000), Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pp 499-531

⁴³ Ingram, Simon, *BBC News*. "Violence disrupts Thai count", January 9, 2001.

⁴⁴ *Afro News*, "Violent crackdown on peaceful protesters in Chad" June 12, 2001

matches and projectiles filled with petrol. This menacing gangs man blockades. blocking numerous roads with tree trunks and huge rocks-some of which been transported there by tractors from other areas. They also burn vehicles and tyres, refusing to allow anyone to pass. while their comrades engage in killing, insurgence, and marauding.⁴⁵

Post-election violence is also associated with emergence of Internally Displaced People's Camps. Hundreds of camps spring up in several parts of the country, signifying the magnitude of displacement. Some citizens sought asylum in neighbouring countries. Besides the destruction of infrastructure and roads, economic losses due to looting, and forced closure due to insecurity, social disturbances and ethnic tensions that undermined the will to build cosmopolitan communities, humanitarian needs (hunger, shelter, and medicine) insecurity and loss of lives, numerous cases of physical assault and rape- especially of women and children- are reported. Many women, who allow the police in to their homes in the hope of ensuring their own security, are raped and threatened. With the need for protection and food it is reported that women and young girls are forced to provide sexual favours in return for these essential commodities. Men who ostensibly provide security in these camps are also linked to cases of rape. Many victims could not get to hospital for treatment, nor could they take legal action against their aggressors, due to the chaotic situation in the country. After the violence had ebbed, doctors do indicate that they are not only treating the physical injuries of the rape victims, but also sexually transmitted infections. This leads to high rate of HIV/AIDS.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ The Waki Commission Report,p 53

⁴⁶ Ibid, p 53

In conclusion, post-election violence is as disastrous as pre-election and election violence. They have led to untold suffering particularly to the weak states which have very weak institutions. This scenario is very common in developing countries and more so in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

CAUSES OF ELECTION VIOLENCE

3.0 Introduction

The causes of election are numerous. They may be divided into three. These are, underlying causes, proximate causes, and trigger causes. At times, they overlap such that it becomes difficult to draw a line between them particularly the first two.

3.1 Underlying Causes of Election Violence

3.1.1 Ethnic Balkanisation

The colonialists divided Africa along administrative lines forgetting ethnic groupings. This was meant to ease their exploitation of resources. This left many ethnic groupings subdivided along administrative boundaries. The effect of this action is still felt today for the post colonial period electoral boundaries have favoured continuity. Where boundaries have been reviewed it has been beyond the limits of permissible departure.¹ Political association has fortified the structure with parliaments and the election managing bodies failing to adhere to the requirements of the constitutions.² The associational relationship has dividends in the form of resource allocation to certain areas to the exclusion of others.³

The party formations as from 1990s were established along ethnic lines. It was a form of conspiracy where the national multi-ethnic outlook was a camouflage for the separate ethnic representation that identified with a leader as opposed to the party. This phenomenon of

¹ Kriegler p 76

² The Constitution of Kenya Section 43(3)

³ David Throup, (1993) "Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 63, no. 3: p 372.

patronage politics, characterised by political manipulation of ethnicity and sharp horizontal inequalities have exacerbated ethnic tension in many parts of the world, particularly developing countries. It is this tension that develops to conflict. When conflict is not managed it develops into violent conflict and political instability.

3.1.2 Unresolved Land Expropriation

Land has remained an emotive issue and an underlying factor behind much of the violence in developing world. Many reports noted that throughout the 1990's, public land was irregularly and illegally allocated in total disregard of the public interest and the law. The recommendations of these reports were not implemented. Indeed, since the 1990s certain leaders have exploited grievances over perceived 'historical injustices' and poorly handled settlement schemes for electoral advantage. These grievances are related to perceived favouritism and corruption by successive governments in allocation of fertile land, including a refusal to prevent and reverse settlement of outsiders in land originally appropriated from the local residents by the colonial authorities. This of course has occurred in a context of rapid population growth in what remains a largely agricultural society.

In retrospect, the land situation in the developing world had been, according to Anderson and Lochery, a 'time bomb waiting to explode'.⁴ However prior to the elections, the extent of the grievances and the ease with which they could be mobilised appear less obvious to many observers.

⁴ Anderson and Lochery, *op. cit.*

3.1.3 Lack of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law

Most states in developing world has failed to integrate constitutionalism in their institutions and affairs of governance. Constitutionalism is more than just the instrument. It embodies all the various dimensions of statecraft and governance. It addresses the question how should the state structures be arranged and governed. The post colonial state inherited a constitution in the case of former British colonies, modelled around the Westminster parliamentary system. But instead of developing the idea of constitutional supremacy most of the constitutions paid homage to the executive.⁵ In other cases, the independence constitution was a strongly contested document. Many Constitutions underwent various amendments all geared towards strengthening the executives.⁶ This process of dismantling the constitution resulted in ethnicisation of resource allocation favouring the ethnic coalitions in power, and the emergence of political monolithism and the Big Man Rule or King Leader phenomenon. Ngunyi argues that at the normative level, this led to the entrenchment of presidentialism at the expense of constitutionalism.⁷

Successive regimes have made constitutional amendments that focus mainly on the equation of power. For example, Constitutional Amendments made some countries a *de jure* one party state while further amendments removed the security of tenure for holders of constitutional offices including the Attorney Generals and High Court Judges. The single party regime exacerbated the crisis of political legitimacy. Increasingly the regimes acquired a distinctly ethnic political foundation, monopolising power at the centre and personalising the state. The larger populace

⁵ Prempeh H. Kwasi, "A New Jurisprudence For Africa", *Journal Of Democracy*, vol.10, no. 3

⁶ Ochieng William "Structural And Political Changes", in Ogot B. A. and W. R. Ochieng, (1995) *Decolonisation And Independence In Kenya 1940 – 93* (Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers Ltd) p.107

⁷ Ngunyi, Mutahi, Sunday Nation on Constitutionalism in Africa, P 26 (26th May 2006)

was marginalised and excluded from the mainstream of political power. The offending provisions of the Constitutions were repealed to introduce multiparty democracy.⁸ However, the repeal of the constitution did not alter the fundamental flaws which facilitate the infamous electoral malpractices and fraud.

3.1.4 Economic and Political Exclusion

The patron client politics have engendered grievances relating to economic and rising political inequality. Regimes came up with political and economic ideologies that had no foundation such that they were un-implementable. However with more than forty years of the independence, these countries are still highly unequal societies with marked regional economic disparities. The economies of dependency have perpetuated primitive accumulation by the political elite increasing the stakes of election competition. Political institutions were perverted to serve the self aggrandising interests of ethnically based political elite.⁹ This has often been sustained by the interests of external actors who shift positions to either support the status quo or support political change, depending on the interest.¹⁰ With the flaws in the 1990s elections, donors were reluctant to reject the outcome once they were held.¹¹

3.1.5 Political and Electoral Systems

A political system is the generic term for all those institutions which contribute to the formation and execution of policy within and without government. A political system needs to be

⁸ Ochieng William *Structural And Political Changes* in Ogot B. A. and W. R. Ochieng (1995) *Decolonisation And Independence In Kenya 1940 – 93* (Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers Ltd), p. 245

⁹ Nasong'o shadrack in murunga p 30

¹⁰ Murunga 2004, p.198

¹¹ Waki Report, p. 32

impartial.¹² As Huntington states, 'democracy has come as much from top down as from bottom up.'¹³

The idea that consent legitimates government and the state system generally has been central to the discourse on liberal democracy. The ballot box has been viewed as the mechanism whereby the individual citizen expresses political preferences and the citizens as a whole periodically confer authority on government to enact laws and regulate economic and social life. The perception of impropriety, regardless of actual foul play undermines the integrity of an election process.

Harbeson John in a study of multiparty elections in Africa found that countries where multiparty elections were preceded by multiparty agreements defining the fundamental rules were likely to make more democratic movement than those which did not. Whereas elections have generally been acceptably free and fair on the election day, the campaigns were largely marred by serious abuses. Constitutions were amended to accommodate multiparty politics.¹⁴ However, to discredit the very notion of political competition, key government officials are alleged to have fomented ethnic clashes in many parts of developing world.

The multiparty reforms betrayed the aspirations of the populace. For example in many instances, the multiparty elections were held before the opposition could mount an effective challenge; in

¹² Hyden Goran (1999) "Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order", in Joseph Richard (ed) *State, Conflict And Democracy In Africa* (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp 192, 193

¹³ Samuel Huntington 'Will More Countries Become Democratic', *Political Science Quarterly*, 99 (1984), p.212

¹⁴ The Constitution of Kenya, Section 2A as amended reads "Kenya is a Multi Party Democracy" (Nairobi: Government Printer) Revised Edition 2001 (1998)

others elections were literally stolen by the government. The ruling elites resolutely resisted calls for constitutional reforms, while calls for independent electoral commissions were ignored by the ruling parties.¹⁵ The few examples of successful transitions were soon overshadowed by leadership resorting to the flawed structures.

In both the single party and multi-party system ethnicity continued to provide an instrument for mobilisation of party support. Olukoshi and Laakso aptly observe that “many African one-party and military regimes, in spite of their supposed aversion to ethnicity...rested on distinctly ethnic political foundations and reproduced themselves on the basis of definable, and in most cases narrow ethnic alliances”.¹⁶ More generally Ottaway argues that ethnicity is not a problem until it is made a problem. Competitive party politics invites divisive tactics by aspirants as well as by incumbent regimes.

3.1.6 The Problematic State

States are hierarchical organisations; systems of power that are legitimised for specific functions that they are supposed to carry out. The basis of state in Africa is the colonial state. The colonial state condoned authoritarianism and viewed political activity as a disguised form of self-interest, subversive of public welfare. The post colonial state did not deconstruct the colonial state. Mboya once remarked that “there is no point in change for its own sake.... look at the political

¹⁵ Olukoshi Adebayo and Laakaso Lissa “The Crisis Of The Post Colonial Nation State Project In Africa” in Olukoshi Adebayo and Laakaso Lissa (eds.) (1996) *Challenges of the Nation State in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), p. 27

¹⁶ Olukoshi Adebayo and Laakaso Lissa “The Crisis Of The Post Colonial Nation State Project In Africa” in Olukoshi Adebayo and Laakaso Lissa (eds.) (1996) *Challenges of the Nation State in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), p. 15

institutions..... this is the system we have been used to working with. We may introduce certain superficial innovations but the principles and so much of the machinery remain the same".¹⁷

The most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes the most institutionless arena in which conflict and disorder as its most prominent features. Elections have remained for the purpose of regime legitimation. Rather than reflect aspirations of electorate to choose who governs they reproduce a political elite. The state is essentially a lootable resource. In the thinned political space those who get in control the resource for self-aggrandisement and will use every available means including electoral manipulation to keep others out while those who are out will do everything to create space including rejecting election outcomes.

The failure to deconstruct the colonial state and construct a new state which reflects the aspirations of the citizens has ramifications on social and political conflicts. This creates 'push' and 'pull' factors which exert pressure on elections as an instrument of managing political conflicts. Unequal resource distribution and the gaping disparity between the elite and the poor create a volatile environment susceptible to violence, especially among those in absolute poverty. Elections become a high stakes game in a highly politicised environment which if not managed develops into conflict. In analysing the African State, Chazan et al note that "... political competition was curtailed, dominant political parties were fortified, administrative structures were expanded, and decision making was heavily centralized around the head of state and his cohorts."¹⁸Przeworski has remarked that "without an effective state, there can be no democracy or

¹⁷ Mboya, Tom,(1970) *The Challenge of Nationhood* (London: Andre Deutsch), p. 312

¹⁸ Chazan Naomi et al (1999) *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, 3rd ed. (Boulder Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 46

market”.¹⁹ In a nutshell the state is subordinated to small elite heavily dependent on rent-seeking, laden with illegitimacy and surrounded by poverty and inequality.

As a result politics has become a struggle between individual and group identity. Olukoshi and Laakso argue that the conflicts afflicting the state in Africa are as a result of the crisis of individual and group identity.²⁰ According to Ake as the phenomenon of mutual fear pulled apart, the groups placed more value on capturing political power for themselves and grew increasingly fearful about what seemed to them to be the grave consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for control of state power. Thus the premium on political power raised higher and higher and with it the intensity of political competition and its domination by efficiency norms”.²¹ There was a systematic subordination of the peripheral state institutions (including the electoral authority, judiciary and parliament) to the executive.

3.1.7 Failure of State Policing Apparatus

The state exists to provide amongst other things guarantee of security to the citizenry. In the Hobbesian state the subject surrenders the instruments of violence to the state on the terms that every other citizen will do the same. The security apparatus have been failing to take proactive actions to stop the violence despite forewarning by their counterparts in the intelligence agencies. This calls to question the preparedness of the forces no doubt in the provision of security but also in providing security for special functions such as the election.²²

¹⁹ Przeworski Adam (1995) *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 11

²⁰ Olukoshi Adebayo Laakso L. "The Crisis of the National State Project in Africa" in Olukoshi A. Laakso L. (eds) (1995) *Challenges To The Nation State In Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African) Studies, pp. 8-9

²¹ Ake (2001:5)

²² The Report of The Waki Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2008), pp. 371 - 378

3.1.8 The Use of Political Violence

Violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure control. The post-independent regimes used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the hands of the State, rather than outside of it. Opposition parties were subjected to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial. Rallies, by students and others, were dispersed by the paramilitary forces.

3.2 Proximate Causes of Election Conflict

3.2.1 Weak Administrative Mechanism

The independence of the electoral bodies is protected by the Constitution and statutory provisions. The Constitution insulates them from the direction or supervision of any authority in the execution of their functions. They are expected to serve impartially and independently and perform the functions in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice, and without influence from the Government, any public officer, any political party, any candidate participating in an election, or any other person or authority. The commissioners have security of tenure. The limitation to this independence relates to the nomination and appointment of commissioners. The nominations are party based and the appointment by the executives.

The nomination and appointments represent partisan and vested interests rather than competence and integrity. The unilateral appointment of Commissioners by the executives prior to the election damages confidence in the hitherto respected electoral authorities. The mistrust that permeates the political actors further erodes the capacity of the electoral bodies to act impartially

and mediate election conflict. The weakness of these bodies is manifested in the failure to manage the heightened tensions during the tally of the votes in order to discourage electoral violence.

3.2.2 Institutionalization of Impunity Culture

Centralisation and personalisation of power in the executive produces an autocracy. The executive could write and rewrite the law at pleasure. There has been institutionalization of impunity culture mostly in developing countries. For those who have been involved in political violence in the past, no legal action has been taken against them. As such, this has motivated other actors to follow suit since government is seen to be inertia.

3.2.3 The Personalization of Presidential Power and the Deliberate Weakening of Public Institutions

Power has been personalized around the presidency and this has been increased by changes in the Constitution under each President since independence. Laws are routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as being in the way are often changed or even ignored. By 1990s. Constitutions had been changed for many times purely to weaken other institutions at the expense of the executives. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the Civil Service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power.

The above syndrome has had various consequences. The first is a sense of lawlessness that has led to Government institutions and officials being seen as lacking in integrity and autonomy. One result of this in the 2007 election was the perception by sections of the public that Government institutions,

and officials, including the judiciary, were not independent of the presidency, were not impartial and lacked integrity. Hence, they were perceived as not able to conduct the election fairly. That public sector institutions were seen as biased and unlikely to follow the rules increased the tendency to violence among members of the public. Furthermore, members of the provincial administration and the police also understood that it was sometimes in the interest of their personal survival to follow what they understood to be the directives or inclinations of either the President or Members of Parliament in their areas rather than to uphold the law. This led to some officials not following the law themselves, and sections of the provincial administration and security forces even engaging in acts of violence themselves.

The second is the perception on the part of the public that given the power of the President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from the President's power and personal decisions. This also has led the public to believe a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over power, from taking jobs, land and entitlements. All of this has led to acquisition of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero sum game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not accepted. Hence, there is tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power, leading to what one specialist has called a race to the bottom because of a fear of being dominated by other ethnic groups and being subjected to the associated consequences of that. This has created a climate of fear and suspicions which politicians easily exploit and use to mobilize violence.

3.3 The Trigger Causes of Election Conflict

3.3.1 Unemployed Youth

Although developing countries' population growth rate has been reduced and is now reportedly gone down to 3 per cent, it still has many youth who are unemployed. Furthermore, in 1990s, the number of street children increased 300 per cent in just four years. Many of these initially rootless children who are now adults are the product of displacement by ethnic violence. They have grown up on the streets and are inured to violence, something that is clearly very dangerous. In addition, although many youth speak English, something that has raised their expectations, they have no hope of formal sector employment. The combination of being rootless, having survived amidst violence, plus their need for an identity and a livelihood makes them ready recruits for violent gangs, which exist in many developing countries and are tapped by politicians, particularly but not exclusively during elections. Additionally, there is also a growing problem of unemployment among youth who are university educated.²³

3.3.2 Use of Militia.

The existence of the state is justified on the ability to mediate conflicts and facilitate social, political and economic progress. This involves monopoly over the instruments of violence for the public good. The consolidation of autocracy in the constitutional amendments of the 1960's, the political killings and anti-pluralism heralded the birth of gangs and militia. The state receded to the centre with limited infrastructure for penetration to the peripheral spaces in the rural and urban informal settlements. Militia groups grew out of this ungoverned space.²⁴ Political leaders

²³ Kagwanja, Peter M who is Guilty: Youth perspectives on the 2007 proposed Elections Violence in Kenya (Nairobi: the Youth Agenda) p. 105.

²⁴ Mogire Edward, *The State And Internal Political Conflicts In Africa: The Case Of Kenya* in Okoth Godfrey and Ogot Bethwell (eds.) (2002)*Conflict In Contemporary Africa* (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation), p.131

both in and outside governments mobilise the ever increasing number of economically deprived youth for political gain.

Violent gangs, consisting mainly of unemployed youth have been mobilized into gangs along ethnic lines. Their power, to the point of having become shadow governments in many areas, stems from two sources. First as the main aim of Governments in the 1990s was to mobilize political support to gain and maintain political power, a good deal of revenue was spent on patronage rather than on maintaining infrastructure and providing social services. This meant that countries started to crumble, visually evident in the decay of roads and the proliferation of uncollected garbage, even in the capital cities. This crumbling as well as a decline in social services and security also paved the way for violent gangs which provided them. This gave unemployed youth work, albeit within gangs, and made the latter extremely powerful. Over time these gangs operated as Mafioso shakedown gangs, with violence and impunity, as they continue to do. Increasingly, citizens began to ask who was in charge of states, gangs or the Governments.

While one might have expected that the police could have dealt with the increase in violent gangs operating as virtual shadow states in so many parts of the country, Governments have been ineffective in dealing with them for several reasons. First, many politicians themselves have used these violent gangs to decimate their opponents, to protect themselves from a dictatorial state in the 1990s, and to gain power then and now. Second, by the time governments were serious about banning the groups, they were large, controlled a number of areas, and continued to operate in spite of the bans. Third, security forces including police often were victims of these gangs themselves and used draconian but ineffective force against them.

Militia have organised structures that facilitate a symbiotic relationship with politicians to expand their economic interests and spheres of influence.²⁵ The activities of gangs and militia resuscitate around elections either to intimidate or influence the voting process.

The use of traditional rivalries and militia to settle political differences is a phenomenon that became evident in Africa as governments came under intense scrutiny for their human rights performance²⁶. This practice is called 'informal repression'. It entails the instigation of violence between the ethnic groups that may have long-standing and latent rivalries or inciting new conflict between communities that had previously lived together in harmony. Sometimes communities of the same background have been set against each other on political grounds. In other situations, governments have fomented religious rivalries²⁷.

Children have been incorporated into the militia. Right from the time they are born, they encounter the violence and the community trains them that there is nothing more honourable than defending one's community when called to do so. When the raiders strike, the children leave school and join the ranks of combatants. During the weekends, they are said to join the raiders to plan and execute the violence. Teachers are also combatants and when violence breaks out, they take up arms, which they hide in the school compounds and go to fight²⁸.

²⁵ The Report of The Waki Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2008).

²⁶ Introduction to Monitoring State-Sponsored Violence in Africa, January 2000. Article 19. Civil Liberties Organization, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Network of Independent Monitors, p27

²⁷ Ibid, p30

²⁸ Ibid, p31

3.3.3 Use of Vigilantes

These are groups linked to militias only that they are not, mostly, outlawed. They do the policing work with the help of the State, even though this has led to conflicts between 'public' policing and the agents of 'private' policing²⁹. Private policing has come to encapsulate a variety of agencies, ranging from commercial security firms who are hired by the wealthy to protect their property, to rag-bag vigilante gangs who patrol the slums and shanties. Vigilantes are dangerous to public order precisely because they are prepared to break the law to achieve their goals of protection and investigation often using violent methods of control³⁰. As such, vigilantes turn to be criminal gangs. Worst of all, their activities are controlled or occasionally mobilised for political interests.

3.3.4 Effects of End of Cold War

The end of the Cold War in 1989-90 was followed by what Huntington describes as the third wave of democratisation in most parts of Africa. In 1992 multiparty elections were held throughout Africa and the number is on the increase. A prevailing assumption both within theory and practice has been that peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing. While more democracy is probably the answer to political violence in the long run, an expanding body of scholarly work has contended that democratization processes in particular in post-conflict societies are highly conflictual.

Elections and democracy are often seen as a form of conflict management, with theorists arguing for the benefits of democratic competition as a means of managing the tensions inherent in all

²⁹ Bruce Baker, 'Living with non-state policing in South Africa: the issues and dilemmas', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40, 1(2002) pp. 29-53.

³⁰ Ibid, p 63

societies.³¹ Ideally elections organise political competition and facilitate peaceful transfer of power. They establish a legitimate and representative democratic government.

However in reality elections are increasingly generating conflicts. In particular the period of multiparty elections in Africa has witnessed more of the conflict generating and divisive aspects of elections. Elections not conducted freely and fairly will spur further conflict. Inherent in all democratic systems is the constant threat that the group conflicts which are democracy's life blood may solidify to the point where they threaten to disintegrate the society. Hence the conditions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan battle are among the key requisites of democratic government.

3.3.5 Mismanagement of the Electoral Process

The election outcome is the most visible trigger. The institutional arrangements surrounding the polling are also important to uncover the driving forces behind electoral violence. In particular, the electoral mechanisms electoral administration and electoral system design are central to understanding the conditions which are prone to election conflict. The nature of and the rules determining political competition have been regarded as important to stimulate or prevent conflict, electoral fraud and violence. As Sisk aptly observes "while elections provide for opportunities of voice and participation in governance and they ostensibly manage political competition through non-violent rule-bound procedures and institutions, the campaign, voting,

³¹ Przeworski, Adam. (1991) *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

and proclamation phases of such contests are frequently accompanied by degenerating election related violence.³²

The Election Day proceeds peacefully but the events that follow in the proclamation phase triggers mixed reactions. There are jublations for some and despair for others. Whereas this is expected of any election, the delay and charade at the tallying centre prior to the announcement of the final result serves to rouse suspicions of fraud and rigging. The finality of the process and the lack of trust in the judicial system seem to block any avenue for diffusing the tension. There is, therefore, rapid transition from tension to violence.

In conclusion, the causes of violence cannot be traced to only one factor. This is because, like war, violence is mono-causal. It is normally a combination of related circumstances which requires a trigger for violence to take place.

³² Sisk Timothy (2008) *Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence* (Discussion Paper, The International Studies Association.)

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY OF KIBERA IN NAIROBI

4.0 Introduction

Kibera is situated in Nairobi's South-western Peri-urban zone approximately seven kilometres from the Nairobi City Centre. Kibera as a whole is an informal settlement comprising of ten villages covering approximately 250 hectares of land with an estimated population of about 500,000 people. That gives an average population density of 2000 people per hectare although some villages are more crowded than others. The villages are Lindi, Kisumu Ndogo, Soweto, Makina, Kianda, Mashimoni, Siranga, Gatuikira, Laini Saba and the newly founded Raila village.

The village is densely populated with 95 per cent of the residents living below poverty line. Most of them are working in the industrial area of the city as casual labourers with an average income of Kshs.45.00 per day. The average family of 7 occupies a small room of 10 by 10 feet. There are no street lights. Most of the houses are made of mud and roofed with either corrugated iron sheets or covered with polythene paper.

4.1 Political and Policy Aspects

Politically, Kibera is a volatile area because of its history. Residents here are Nubian squatters who were settled on this land after the World War II by the British Colonial government. On the other hand there are the "illegal" local squatters who have been squatting on the land as a means of survival. The official Kenya government position is that this is government land. Till recently, the land tenure policy regarding "illegal" settlements was that the government could not develop

or invest on such land. The government has therefore not developed any infrastructure according to its policy on investment which states that this can only be done on legally owned land. This scenario pits the tenants of Kibera against land lords who in most cases do not put up proper water and sanitation facilities in the area to match the rental housing units. Urban interventions that address the issues of slums have been triggered only by external factors such as land development and speculation, health and safety threats to the wealth owned by external landlords, etc. This has therefore been mainly reactive rather than proactive to emerging problems in the area. Regardless of the case, there is an absence or failure of coordinating mechanisms that set the roles and jurisdiction in the area effectively.

Compounded by lack of a clear policy framework, there aren't effective government programs for meeting the needs of the residents of Kibera informal settlement. Poor water supply and sanitation are among the most serious infrastructure problem. Notable interventions have only been received from other agencies i.e. donors, development partners, NGOs. However these efforts are still to a large extent uncoordinated.

4.2 Social Aspects

Kibera residents consist of different ethnic communities as alluded to earlier on. Most of them have come to the city to look for sustainable livelihoods. In the event of social conflicts in the area, ethnic reactions tend to flare up especially between the original Nubian community on one hand and other local ethnic groups. Kenya's water resources crisis carries significant social risks. Growing demand over limited endowment of water generates competition and causes conflicts over water use within the village, posing considerable social risks to the poor and the communities without adequate representation in the location in decision making.

In terms of family pattern, households consist of either single person with an average family size of 7. Most households are female-headed households as the village is a big source of day domestic workers who work in the middle and high class estates around Nairobi.

The researcher carried out survey in the above mentioned area due to the fact that it is always very volatile in terms of violence. It also has a lot of youth who are idle. Above all, it is this area which was one of the epic centre of 2007 post-election violence where youth even uprooted the railway line affecting the economy of not only Kenya, but also for East African countries.

4.3 Quantitative Data Analysis

This section entails attempts to analyze the recorded data from the interviews and literature review plus the observed data in relation to the set objectives of the study. It analyses specifically, role of the youth in post-election violence, Socio-demographic, economic and political profiles of the youths involved in post- election violence, and key risk factors that exacerbated involvement of youths in post- election violence. It also analyses other factors that contributed to youth participation in violence.

4.4 Risk factors for Youth Violence

4.4.1 Response on Peer Influence

Peer influences among the youth are generally considered positive and important in shaping interpersonal relationships, but they can also have negative effects. Having delinquent friends, for instance, is associated with violence in young people.

According to the survey carried out, the researcher found out that the respondents value their peers to the fact that during the post-election violence majority of the respondents got involve in groups. The respondents who participated in post-election violence in groups accounted for 75 per cent of all the responses while those who participated individually accounted for only 25 per cent. It was also found that most of the respondents spend their free time visiting their peers and this constituted of 820 responses which is clear the peers are of great importance to the respondents and hence the high rate of working in groups during the post-election violence.

Cross tabulation Table 4.1 Response on the form in which respondents involved themselves in post-election violence against how they spend their free time

| | | Activities engaged in during free time | | | Percentage |
|---|--------------|--|-------------------------------|--|--------------|
| | | Indoors Frequency | Playing games Frequency | Visiting friends/Peers Frequency | |
| Form of Groups involvement in the post-election violence | Groups | 80 | 100 | 520 | 70.0 |
| | Individually | 0 | 0 | 300 | 30.0 |
| Total | | 80 | 100 | 820 | 100.0 |

4.4.2 Response on Community Factors

The communities in which young people live are an important influence on their families, the nature of their peer groups, and the way they may be exposed to situations that lead to violence. The findings of the survey revealed that majority of the peer groups are formed on the basis of ethnic background and political grounds. The peer groups formed on ethnic backgrounds

accounted for 75.8 per cent of all the responses while those formed on political grounds accounted for 23 per cent of all the responses.

Table 4.2 Response on basis of peer groups formation

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| School/alumni | 5 | 0.5 |
| Age | 7 | 0.7 |
| Ethnic background | 758 | 75.8 |
| Political grounds | 230 | 23.0 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

The survey findings also revealed that the respondents are patriotic to their community as well as to their political party and politician. This was evident by the fact that majority of the respondents were prompted to post-election violence because of self defence and that of their community and accounted for 46 per cent of all the responses followed by loyalty to political party and politician which accounted for 30.7 per cent.

Table 4.3 Response on what prompted respondents to post-election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Self defence and that of the community | 460 | 46.0 |
| Loyalty to political party and politician | 307 | 30.7 |
| Forced into | 19 | 19.0 |
| Social and political frustration | 214 | 21.4 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

4.4.3 Response on Demographic and Social changes

Rapid demographic growth and accelerating urbanization together created conditions, including unemployment and grossly inadequate housing, which in turn led to extreme frustration, anger and pent-up tensions among youths. Young people, as a result, were more likely to turn to petty crime and violence, particularly under the influence of peers.

The survey findings revealed that majority of the respondents were born in Kibera which is a slum and this accounted for 70.1 per cent of all the responses but it was also revealed that there were emigrates from other different places and this accounted for 29.9 per cent of the total responses.

Table 4.4 Response on place of birth

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Kibera | 701 | 70.1 |
| Elsewhere | 299 | 29.9 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

It was also revealed that majority of the youths in the area of survey are unemployed and this mostly leads to frustration, anger and pent-up tensions among themselves and as a result most of them are likely to turn to petty crime and violence particularly under the influence of peers. From the findings of the survey, 76.2 per cent of the respondents were unemployed and 84 per cent of their friends were also unemployed.

Cross tabulation table 4.5 Response on employment status of the respondents against their friends

| | | Employment status of friends | | | Percentage |
|--------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|------------|
| | | Unemployed | Permanently employed | Casual labourer | |
| | | Frequency | Frequency | Frequency | |
| Employment status of the respondents | Yes | 238 | 0 | 0 | 23.8 |
| | No | 602 | 5 | 155 | 76.2 |
| Total | | 840 | 5 | 155 | 100.0 |

4.4.4 Response on Cultural Influences

Culture, which is reflected in the inherited norms and values of society, helps determine how people respond to a changing environment. Cultural factors can affect the amount of violence in a society – for instance, by endorsing violence as a normal method to resolve conflicts and by teaching young people to adopt norms and values that support violent behaviour.

According to the survey carried out, the researcher found all the respondents had common communal grievances against other communities which were either economical or political. The economical grievances were based on the fact that economical resources are unfairly distributed among the different communities and this accounted for 87 per cent of all the responses. The political grievances concern the belief the only people from certain communities can rule over the country and this accounted for 13 per cent of all the responses.

Table 4.6 Response on common communal grievances

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Economical | 870 | 87.0 |
| Political | 130 | 13.0 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

The survey also revealed that other factors that prompted majority of the respondents to engage in the post-election violence was tribal grudges and this accounted for 90 per cent of all the responses which is likely to be as a result of the common communal grievances. The other factor that was also revealed was the delay of the electoral process and this accounted for only 10 per cent of all the responses.

Table 4.7 Responses on other factors that prompted respondent to engage in the post-election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Tribal grudges | 900 | 90.0 |
| Delay of the electoral process | 100 | 10.0 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

4.5 Role of the Youth in Post-election Violence

During the research, analysis of the role played by the youths in post- election violence was carried out in the broad Kibera slum on an individual unit level. At this level, interviewed individuals exhibited a very high participation of youths in the violence. All the respondents

strongly believed youths were the main vehicles of destruction, insecurity and instability experienced.

Majority of the youths were organized in groups. each having its well coordinated mode of operation and governance and this accounted for 60 per cent of all the responses. These groupings were formed in the early 1990's, while some came to existence after the infamous referendum of 2005. There are those that previously existed as mere football clubs in this urban setting. The survey carried out also revealed that the groups were formed mostly on the basis of ethnic background and political grounds. Those groups of peers formed on ethnic background accounted for 75.8 per cent while those formed on political grounds accounted for 23 per cent of all the responses.

Table 4.8 Response on the form in which the respondents involved themselves in the post-election violence against the grounds of peer groups formation

| | | Grounds of peer groups formation | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|
| | | School/Alumni | Age | Ethnic background | Political grounds | |
| | | Frequency | Frequency | Frequency | Frequency | Percentage |
| Form of Groups | | 5 | 7 | 588 | 0 | 60.0 |
| involvement | Individually | 0 | 0 | 170 | 230 | 40.0 |
| Total | | 5 | 7 | 758 | 230 | 100.0 |

It was interesting to realize that all the groups self-governed themselves and had strict rules to which members had to adhere, with disobedience of the same attracting punishment. These sects

were composed mainly of men, all of whom fell in the youth's age bracket. However, another distinct factor was that membership was subject to ethnic background. Here is a broader analysis of these groups, and how they have been carrying out their activities.

4.5.1 Mungiki

A secretive, outlawed and quasi-religious group dating back to the 1980s, whose exclusively Kikuyu male membership is drawn mainly from Central Province. Mungiki ("multitude" in Kikuyu) claims ideological links with the anti-colonial Mau-Mau movement. While rooted in the Central Province, Mungiki has a strong presence in the slums of Nairobi, where it controls and charges for access to basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation. It is alleged to have close links to senior Kikuyu politicians.

Before the recent political violence, tenants moving in or out of some slums had to pay Mungiki Ksh150 (just over US\$2), which soared to Ksh.2,000 (\$28.50) once violence broke out. The group also operates protection rackets, including in the public transport sector, confiscating the property of small businesses that refuse to pay a daily "fee".

Mungiki also holds "trials" for people who violate its strict rules of dress or behaviour, detaining, maiming and even killing those it finds guilty. After the 30 December 2007 announcement that the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, had won the presidential election, the group made it plain it was existent, killing and mutilating members of pro-opposition ethnic groups. Weapons used by Mungiki include machetes, knives and clubs.

4.5.2 Taliban

After Mungiki, the best-known urban armed group is the Taliban, mainly Luo. Members communicate and identify themselves via a system of secret hand signals. Like Mungiki, the group runs extortion rackets, notably on public transport operators. Taliban has no membership oath or cells throughout the country, but it does have squads in various slum locations. Its leader was jailed in 2002, after skirmishes with Mungiki over control of these illegal activities, especially levies on matatus (minibus taxis) using Juja Road. The weapons of the Taliban include slingshots and machetes.

4.5.3 Baghdad Boys

The vigilantes are active in Kibera, Kenya's largest slum, whose members are drawn mostly from the Luo community, and use slingshots and knives.

4.5.4 Kosovo

It is another vigilante group based in Kibera, including members from the Luo and Luhya communities, using slingshots and knives

4.5.5 Jeshi la Mzee aka Kamjesh

This is another slum-based gang specializing in extortion and protection rackets, targeting operators of public minibuses. Membership is mixed, comprising Kikuyu, Luo, Maasai, Kisii and the Luhya. These are the main vigilante gangs that exist in Kibera. They target mainly the unemployed youths with a promise of providing employment, protecting their ethnic

communities or even providing alternative systems of government where the central government has failed.

When violence initially erupted in Kibera, youths initially rioted in the streets in what appeared as an ordinary protest that would be short-lived. What followed were all forms of criminal activities, and the situation seemed to go out of hand every other day.

These groups, in a short span begun recruiting youths from their ethnic belonging and training them on tactics they would use to counter- attack rival ethnic communities. Initial groups to do this were those from pro-opposition side, who strongly believed victory had been stolen from them. Their main target was the kikuyu ethnic community. They shouted anti-Kikuyu slogans, and burnt banners that carried Party of National Unity (PNU) messages. What resulted were running battles between these youths and police officers who were attempting to disperse the angry youths.

In reaction and demonstration of unity with the incumbent president and the government, pro-government youths are grouped and launched their demonstrations as well. During the day, these two rival groups would exchange bitter words and even throw stones at each other. When darkness came, tension got higher as each side armed its members with all forms of crude weapons in readiness of any eventualities.

Looting of businesses and torching of houses believed to belong to individuals of the rival communities became a common scene. What followed were incidents of harassment, especially

on innocent women and children. This went on and immediately transformed to a more dangerous state. the worst that could ever happen. This would best be explained as a man-eat-man society, where people started hacking rivals to death in broad daylight. Women and children were intimidated and raped by people they so well knew in what was appearing as a new twist of the violence. The situation was evidently out of control. as even policemen from rival communities fell victims. People were burnt to death in their sleep, as others were forcefully evicted from their genuine residences. This is evident from the research findings as shown on table 5.2 below.

When one group appeared to be losing control from the other, it would seek backing from other parts of the country. Youths of their ethnic belonging would be ferried to Kibera using all means. ranging from simple public means to the relatively cheap rail transport. They came armed, in large numbers and ready to fight. Transport was paralyzed as youths barricaded roads, property belonging to individuals and the government were destroyed and the criminals vowed to stay put.

Table 4.9 Response on the activities carried out during the post-election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Looting stores | 50 | 5.0 |
| Fighting and harassing rival communities | 49 | 4.9 |
| Destruction of property | 91 | 9.1 |
| All of the above | 810 | 81.0 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

4.6 Socio-demographic, economic and political profiles of the youths involved in post-election violence

From the study, it was evident that there has been a drastic change in population, modernization, urbanization and social policies, which has in turn transformed the youth generation. Kibera is characterized by a high population size that keeps swelling by day. Majority of those interviewed live in informal settlements and went only for primary education as shown in table 5.3 below. There are those who have been born and brought up in the setting, while others are immigrants from the rural areas as was earlier discussed in the previous chapter. They either live on their own or with their peers with basically no one to look up to.

Initially, they moved to the urban areas in search of employment and in belief that goodies are only found there. This, for majority has not turned to be the case. It therefore resulted to frustration. In fact, majority blamed their lifestyles on the government, which they believed, if well run would change their lives. The then opposition had promised major transformations, majority of who would be a beneficiary of the youths. They believed that the then system of government had neglected them and that's why they so much sought the then promising common man-friendly regime.

Table 4.10 Response on education level of the respondents

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| Primary | 868 | 86.8 |
| Secondary | 120 | 12.0 |
| Tertiary | 12 | 1.2 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

Out of the youths interviewed in Kibera, none of them was in the formal employment sector as shown on table 5.4 below. They claimed to rely on inconsistent manual contracts that were either casual or monthly. On a good day, one can raise slightly over 2\$ US, which is only adequate to cater for one decent meal. On condition of anonymity, there are a number of male youths who admitted to have been involved in petty crimes such as pick-pocketing, just to raise a little coin for a meal.

Table 4.11 Response on respondents' status of employment

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Employed | 238 | 23.8 |
| Unemployed | 762 | 76.2 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

Kibera borders what the researcher can well describe as financially stable Jamhuri Estate. Walking past the slum through Jamhuri, one can clearly realize distinct difference in the structures and lifestyles of the two urban settings. It is this income inequality, according to interviewees that greatly contributed to the violence that was experienced after the announcement of the disputed election results.

Youths believed that a large share of the national cake had been a reserve of the few elderly at the expense of the majority young. They claimed that the then ruling regime cringed onto power for their own good and that of their close friends at the expense of the majority many. They therefore resulted into using violence as a tool to demonstrate and drive their message home.

Furthermore, the then opposition, as the youths claim had promised heaven on earth for the youths, and they couldn't sit and watch as the golden opportunity flew from them. This was clearly brought out in the finding of the survey in the fact that the respondents mention that the common communal grievances that are thought to have prompted the post-election violence were either political or economical as shown on table 5.5 below.

Table 4.12 Response on common communal grievances thought to have prompted the post-election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Economic | 870 | 87.0 |
| Political | 130 | 13.0 |
| Total | 1000 | 100.0 |

It is this economic status of the youths that easily tempted them into accepting small financial packages that were on offer by financiers of the violence. Killing a person of the rival community attracted a whopping Ksh.1000, while torching a house earned a criminal Ksh.250.

The 2007 General Elections attracted the largest number of young contenders in various political positions. In fact, even those who were past the youths bracket often associated themselves with this large group, just to woo their support. There were many youths contending for parliamentary and local authorities posts than had been experienced before. All the politicians relied heavily on support from youths, especially from Kibera during their campaigns. They were hired and ferried around at a cheap price that even at times included a simple campaign cap.

Pro and post campaign period provided very exciting moments for the majority unemployed youths in Kibera. One time or another would find supporters of rival politicians clashing in public and even engaging in physical confrontation. Asked whether they are comfortable with the presence of youth gangs in their areas of residence, residents claimed that they had decided to back the groups for some reasons. They felt neglected by the government and they needed attention. These groups played the role of alternative systems of government by providing security, regulating water supply and even at an advanced stage selling electricity to the slum dwellers. All these they didn't receive before these groups intervened. Since takeover of security by these youth groups, incidences of petty crimes had drastically reduced as claimed by the residents. More to this, these groups had provided employment to other member youths who carry out activities of extorting illegal taxes from the public. Leaders of these groups promised to bring a new wave of liberation to their members and the common Kenyan in the not so far distant future.

4.7 Key Risk Factors that Exacerbated Involvement of Youths in Post- election Violence

There are a number of risk factors that greatly contributed to youth engagement in violence. Kibera, being the largest slum in the country and indeed in East and Central Africa has a rapid growth of youth population. A significant number of youths have also moved in from rural areas and this has greatly contributed to uncontrolled mushrooming of unplanned settlements.

Majority of the youths are unemployed and this is coupled by an ongoing world economic downturn, which has resulted in a significant increase in prices of basic commodities. In addition to this, this residential area is faced by a security challenge, where there are few numbers of police officers to cater for large numbers of citizens. This is what has seen youths turn to play the

role of alternative systems of government. They, among other activities engage in provision of security to the residents, at a fee. This is because they realized there existed a gap.

Above all, majority of the youths are at their transition age to adulthood. In their cultural and customary practices, it is compulsory that they are taught war-like defensive mechanisms before they can fully be accepted and recognized as men. It is in such periods that they acquire all kinds of training related to physical tackling of conflicts, especially one involving different communities. As a matter of fact, some communities believe in violent approach to solving conflicts as the only viable way and have since time immemorial upheld that.

For a long period of time, police use brutal methods to calm street demonstrations or even when on a security operation in the area. In the post election violence, youths were therefore seen to be maximizing on the opportunity they had to humiliate police or even weigh physical ability of these disciplined forces.

Today, guns are easily accessed by youths across the country. If you can't buy one, there is an equally wide variety of rifles and pistols for hire from established sources. The Kenyan gangster's arsenal varies according to the task and how much the user is ready to pay. The cost of a pistol or AK-47 rifle ranges from KSh.3000 to KSh.15000 an hour.

4.8 Other Factors

According to the survey carried out, the research was only able to find out on the above risk factors for youth violence but there are other factors, namely: family influences which involve

the parental behaviour and family environment; income inequality which involves economic growth; and political governance which involves the legal framework and the policies offering social protection to the citizens.

4.9 Analysis from data collected from non-youth

In order to strengthen the information given by the youth, the research also carried out a survey on a sample of 200 administrators, elders, church leaders, businessmen and residents who gave their own opinion or observations on the youth involvement in the post election violence.

Risk factors for youth violence

Response on peer influence

According to the survey carried out, it was evident that the youth value their peers to the fact that during the post election violence it was observed that majority of them were involved in groups. It was observed by 60 per cent of the non-youths' respondents that majority of the youth involved in post election violence were in groups and only 40 per cent of the respondents observed the youth participate in the post election violence individually.

Table: Response on how the youth were organized during the post election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
| In groups | 120 | 60 |
| Individually | 80 | 40 |
| Total | 200 | 100 |

Response on community factors

The findings from the non-youth revealed that majority of the peers are formed on the basis of ethnic backgrounds and this accounted for 76.0 per cent of all the responses while those formed on political grounds accounted for only 22.5 per cent all the responses.

Table: Response on the basis of peer groups formation among the youth

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| School / Alumni | 1 | 0.5 |
| Age | 2 | 1.0 |
| Ethnic background | 152 | 76.0 |
| Political grounds | 45 | 22.5 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

The survey findings also revealed that the youth are patriotic to their community as well as to their political party and politician. This was evident by the fact that majority of the respondents observed that the youth were prompted to post-election violence because of self defence and that of their community and accounted for 46 per cent of all the responses followed by loyalty to political party and politician which accounted for 30 per cent.

Table: Response on the reasons for the youth engagement in the post election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Self-defence and that of the community | 92 | 46.0 |
| Loyalty to political party and the politician | 60 | 30.0 |
| Forced into it | 4 | 2.0 |
| Social and political frustration | 44 | 22.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

Response on activities carried out during the post election violence

The non-youth also revealed that majority of the youth who participated in post election violence engaged in looting of stores, fighting and harassing of the rivals and destruction of property and this accounted for 81 per cent of all the responses.

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|-------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Looting of stores | 10 | 5.0 |
| Fighting and harassing rivals | 10 | 5.0 |
| Destruction of property | 18 | 9.0 |
| All of the above | 162 | 81.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

Reasons for youth involvement in politics during the pre-election

The non-youth also revealed that majority of the youths are not employed and on reasons why majority of them involved themselves in politics during the pre-election period was to earn a living. This accounted for 173 responses of all the responses from the administrators.

Table: Response on occupation of majority of the youth against the reasons for their engagement in politics during the pre-election period

| | | Occupation of majority of the youth | |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|----------|
| | | Unemployed | Employed |
| Reasons for youth engagement in politics during the pre-election period | Bring change to the society | 7 | 0 |
| | Earn a living | 173 | 0 |
| | Politics is a way of life | 8 | 0 |
| | Politics was the thing of the day / everyone else did so | 12 | 0 |
| Total | | 200 | 0 |

Response on the factors that lead to post election violence

The responses from the non-youth revealed that the first major factor that lead to post election violence was financial frustration by the then political regime which accounted for 55 per cent

of all the responses. The second major factor was the financial provision to do so and this accounted for 39 per cent of all the responses.

Table: Response on the major factors that lead to the post election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|------------|--------------|
| Financial frustration by the then political regime | 110 | 55.0 |
| Financially motivated to participate in the violence | 78 | 48.0 |
| Peer pressure | 6 | 3.0 |
| Electoral fraud | 6 | 3.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

Other factors that were identified by the non-youth were tribal grudges which accounted for 90 per cent of all the responses and the delay in announcing the election results which accounted for only 10 per cent of all the responses from the administrators.

Table: Response on other factors that led to the post election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|------------|--------------|
| Tribal grudges | 180 | 90.0 |
| Delay in announcing the election results | 20 | 10.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

Response on the type of compensation made to the youth for participating in the post election violence

The non-youth were able to reveal some form of compensation that were made to the youth for engaging in the post election violence. Majority of the administrators revealed that most of the youth were compensated with money ranging from Shs. 50 to Shs. 100 and this accounted for 83 per cent of all the responses.

Table: Response on the form of compensation made to the youth for engaging in the post election violence

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Money ranging from Shs. 50 to Shs.100 | 166 | 83.0 |
| Bought illicit brew (Chang'aa) | 20 | 10.0 |
| Bought bang | 14 | 7.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 |

From the above analysis, it is evident that youth were involved in post-election violence of 2007. This is due to the fact that this is corroborated by the responses from non-youth.

CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter critically analyses the role of the youth in post-2007 election violence. It further examines the risk factors that contributed to youth's involvement in violence. These risk factors are family influence, peer influence, community factors, demographic and social changes, income inequality, political governance, and cultural influence. However, it is important to consider political and electoral violence in Kenya.

5.1 Political and Electoral Violence in Kenya

Kenya is a country undergoing a political transition reflected in its constitutional reform process. Consequently, violence and the issues it impacts on have not remained static, and therefore it is necessary to assess how manifestations of violence relate to existing and emerging factors, such as the political, social and economic environment, the legal and regulatory infrastructure and capacity, and other issues of institutional transformation.

The term "political and electoral violence in Kenya" relates to a myriad of conflicts, distinct in their manifestations, yet woven together by common themes and violations. The situation is compounded by difficult socio-economic conditions, which have continued to worsen over the last seven years resulting in increased unemployment. Increases in the cost of living have left many desperate and insecure. Youth and other marginalized groups have been particularly affected. Violence has characterized other social and economic disputes, including evictions, cattle-rustling, and border-conflicts. Although interpretations of causes and responsibilities for

this violence remain contested, the nature of much of this violence is directly attributed to political and electoral violence, which, for the most part, is deeply interrelated.

Although not unique to the multi-party context, violence has become a common feature in the conduct of elections in Kenya. Both the 1992 and 1997 general elections were held against a backdrop of acute violence and intimidation in many parts of the country. The parliamentary by-elections in 2001 for the constituencies of Kilome and Taita-Taveta were also extremely violent. It has been estimated that between 1992 and 2002, at least 2,000 people have been killed and 400,000 displaced in politically motivated violence targeting ethnic groups perceived to support the opposition¹.

Political violence occurs in various contexts, both between and within political party formations. In a number of areas the conflict is fuelled by ethnic and clan rivalries, and other forms of internal conflict. The general security situation has also worsened as a result of instability and insurgencies in several neighbouring countries, and Kenya's porous borders, which have resulted in an increase in the availability of small firearms. The situation is further compounded by the involvement of vigilante and militia groups that are implicated in a range of criminal actions, from intimidation and murder to organized stock theft. Many of these groups are little more than "guns for hire", and have been utilized by politicians from various political groups for offensive as well as defensive purposes.

¹ Playing with Fire-Weapons Proliferation, Political violence and Human Rights in Kenya, Human rights Watch, May 2002, P.1

As the primary agency responsible for crime prevention, and criminal investigations, the role of the police in relation to political and electoral violence is pivotal. The Kenya Police, which has primary responsibility for internal security, has a force of only 30,000, is clearly ill-equipped, and struggles to deal with its constitutional and other legal obligations to maintain security conditions for a free and fair election. Its image is further weakened by allegations of incompetence and complicity, and concerns regarding political partiality and alleged bias in favour of those in power.

5.2 Role of the Youth in the 2007 Post-Election Violence in Kenya.

The study has long-established the strong relationship between environment conditions and youth and adolescent behaviour. Among the environmental conditions that affect youth and adolescent behaviour are unemployment and poverty, family structures such as membership in single-parent families and levels of integration into family and other social support groups. Thus the relationship between youth unemployment and security in the context of the Kenya politics is deep and intricate².

This is evident from the fact that even prior to the outbreak of violence following the announcement of the disputed results of the 2007 presidential elections, the youth in various parts of Kenya were involved in different ways in politics. They actively campaigned for various political parties and candidates and received from candidates, either freely or by extortion, campaign funds and gifts that they also participated in distributing among potential voters. In addition, some presented themselves as candidates for elective offices while others were

²Knoester, C. & Hayne, D.L., (2005), Community Context, Social Integration into Family, and Youth Violence. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67 (August): pp 767-780

involved in intimidating and even assaulting supporters and rivals of their preferred political parties and candidates. The youth also served as organized groups providing security services to different candidates and political parties that also deployed them either as polling or tallying agents during the elections.

All these suggest that the youth participation in the violence that erupted following the disputed December 2007 General Elections arising from the December 27, 2007 elections had its foundation in the already defined role of the youth and especially the unemployed youth in politics in Kenya. The involvement of the youth in Kenyan politics could be categorized into legitimate and illegitimate roles. The legitimate participation included their role as candidates, voters, and poll agents as well as campaigners for various candidates and political parties. The illegitimate roles included bribery, intimidation, obstruction and violence.

Some authors like Hogeveen observe that modern society generally considers violence unpalatable and dreams of armistice but in the same instant rises to cheer violence in sport and entertainment. Hogeveen further asserts that we are fascinated by violence so long as it is not done to us or anyone near to us³. It has been observed that in the Kenyan political milieu, marginalized communities and the youth in particular often see violence as a means of driving away the members of the 'non-indigenous' ethnic groups in order for the natives to gain access to jobs, educational opportunities and land.

³ Hogeveen, B.R., (2007), *Youth and Violence. Sociology Compass*, ½: pp463-484

5.2.1 Youth, Education and Training

Large numbers of the youth in Kenya are affected by a number of factors in the field of education and training. These include their inability to access post-secondary school education and training, the negative effects of poor educational conditions in their regions of origin and the quality and relevance of the education and training they receive. It is also evident that the values that are fundamental to achieving national cohesion and stability are not emphasized either in theory or practice in the national institutions including the education system. It is therefore not surprising that a large number of youth are the most affected by unemployment in most parts of Kenya.

Youth Unemployment as a Trigger of the Post-election Violence, argues that socio-economic factors have frequently been important causes of violent conflicts in developing countries. Many of these conflicts, Brinkman argues, are caused by the unequal distribution of economic opportunities. Other forms of socio-economic inequalities according to Brinkman (2001) are less explicit but also result from the unequal distribution of public jobs, licenses, contracts, taxation, subsidies, investments and services across different groups in a country⁴.

Since the early 1990s, Kenya has experienced broadening of democratic space and with this, participation of different groups including the youth in politics has increased. However, democratization does not always coincide with broadening of participation in economic arena. The patterns of political and economic changes affecting the people of Kenya since about 1991 are best understood in the context of economic reform policies supported by international

⁴ Brinkman, H., (2001) *Preventing Civil Strife: An important Role for Economic Policy*. Discussion Paper No. 20: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. p 14

funding and donor agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank since the 1980s. Liberalized and globalized markets not only create enormous opportunities but also sharpen the distinctions between winners and losers. The winners are increasingly those who are educated, skilled and know how to use new technology. Judging by this pattern, it is not surprising therefore, that the parts of Kenya with better social and economic infrastructure tend to have dominant representation in both political and economical institutions of the country. Developing countries like Kenya have therefore tended to struggle to balance issues of economic liberalization and efficiency with good governance and equity⁵.

Unemployment has been a major problem that cuts across all regions in Kenya. However, the youth, unlike any other social group tend to be more adversely affected by unemployment. Youth are the most affected by unemployment followed by women. The youth in Kenya constitute about 78.1 per cent of all the unemployed persons. The cited causes of unemployment especially among the youth included: inadequate job opportunities, poor educational background, lack of required skills, discrimination based on tribe, unrealistic expectations exemplified by youth's choosiness about jobs and poor national policy. A significant percentage of youth perceive discrimination on tribal basis as the cause of their unemployment. Such youth can easily be manipulated politically to engage in ethnic violence⁶.

The levels and impact of youth unemployment however, differ from region to region. The agriculturally and industrially' more prosperous regions of Kenya tend to experience lower levels of youth unemployment than the poorer regions of the country. The average levels of education

⁵ Ibid, p 10

⁶ Ibid, p 17

and skills attainment also explain the differences in patterns and impact of unemployment among the youth in different parts of Kenya.

The convergence of low levels of education achievement, poor skill attainment, high density of population and high levels of youth unemployment are observed in the Coast, Nyanza and some parts of Central and Western provinces. While North Eastern Province is hit by the problem of low education attainment and inadequacies in relevant skills, compared to other regions, its sparse population reduces the magnitude of youth unemployment. In particular, in some parts of the country (including Nairobi, Central, Nyanza, Western and Eastern Provinces), high population densities, most of which consist of the youth, coincide with relatively higher levels of educational attainment and high levels of youth unemployment and poverty.

Although in most instances the youth in Kenya are perceived to be disadvantaged by inadequate education and job opportunities, some of the youth are victims of their own unrealistic expectations. They pointed out that most educated young people in Kenya have been socialized to expect formal employment and tend to disregard opportunities in the non-formal sectors and especially agriculture.

It is also observed that whereas the local economies in many of the impoverished regions of the country contribute immensely to the national revenue pool, they contribute little directly to the local populations in terms of employment creation and poverty reduction. At the Coast and in the South Rift, for instance, the thriving tourism industry contributes a lot of foreign exchange to the national economy but the local communities and particularly the youth derive little or no

benefit from the industry. In Western and Nyanza the fishing and sugar industries generate a lot of revenue to the Central Government but their impact on poverty and unemployment among the local communities is minimal. It is this state of affairs that drives particularly the youth into desperation and hostility toward the long-term immigrants from other parts of the country that often are more prosperous than the indigenous populations⁷.

5.2.2 Post-Election Youth Violence

Zeldin in an analysis of facts and misconceptions about youth and violence in USA points out that the youths between the ages of 15 and 24 often are disproportionately' at risk of being both a victim and a perpetrator of violence. Zeldin identifies one of the misconceptions as the fact that adults exaggerate the rate of youth violence sometimes by a factor of four to one. Another misconception is that youth crime is often equated with race with African American and Hispanic young men being perceived as less law abiding and disciplined and more prone to violent behaviour⁸. In the Kenyan case, ethnicity would substitute for race; there is a perception that Luo and Luhya young men are violent. In the context of post-election violence, IDPs in the Mount Kenya region reported that this pattern of youth aggression appeared to be deeply entrenched among the Kalenjin and other nomadic communities especially in the Rift Valley. Such perceptions appeared to have influenced the police response to demonstrations and riots across the country with more brutal tactics used in the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya dominated areas of Rift Valley, Western Kenya and Nairobi slums.

⁷ Human Rights Watch (2002), *Playing With Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya*. New York, p 11

⁸ Zeldin, S., (2004) Preventing Youth Violence through the Promotion of Community Engagement and Membership. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 32 (5) , pp 623-641

Zeldin also points out that another prevalent misconception is that violence is a premeditated event that is randomly' directed toward innocent bystanders. Zeldin notes that the opposite is true and that the vast majority of violent encounters occur between friends, acquaintances and within families⁹. Many of the victims of post-election violence knew the people who killed their relatives, looted and destroyed their property or attacked, threatened and evicted them from their homes or property.

There is a fundamental link between ethnicity and political violence in Kenya. Since the restoration of multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s, there has been tremendous manipulation of ethnicity by the political class. A common thread between the Moi and Kibaki governments is that both have been accused of engaging in ethnic, political patronage that mainly favoured their own ethnic political constituencies. In such circumstances, competing political blocks tend to appeal to ethnic sentiments that fuel tensions that often degenerate into violence. The youth usually play an important role in such ethnically charged political processes as perpetrators of violence. They tend to enforce restrictions of access to implicitly demarcated political zones where 'outsiders' and opponents are not allowed to campaign. This suggests that some of the youth involved in the post election violence were not necessarily seeking or defending their personal interests but furthering the objectives of their inciters.

Freeman, however argues that the notion that ethnic diversity necessitates conflict is gross~ misguided. Freeman points to the example of Tanzania that has a great deal of ethnic diversion/ yet has remained strife free as a result of a government system that effectively, manages and distributes political and economic power. According to Freeman, ethnicity only becomes salient

⁹ Ibid, pp 623-641

when it overlaps with patterns of relative deprivation. Freeman therefore concludes that deprivation rather than poverty is meaningful indicator of the source of conflict. Citing Nafziger and Auvinen, Freeman defines relative deprivation as the conditions in which people deprived of something they had, but subsequent, lost, or when others have gained relative to them¹⁰. Most forms of deprivation that are likely, to lead into conflicts and violence are economic and political. For examples groups that perceive the risks of losing political power and related economic privileges are likely, to resort to aggression against competing groups. In the Kenyan case, the youth who had the perception that their future would be bleak with particular groups gaining or retaining power were seen to be more involved in violence.

Brinkman argues that from economic point of view, individuals and groups in society/ are usually, motivated to engage in violence or war if the benefits are larger than the costs. Thus, if members of the 'other' ethnic group can be attacked and evicted, and land, natural resources, or cattle can be seized with limited costs, it is likely, that violence will occur. Brinkman further observes that the most critical role of economic policy is to ameliorate socio-economic disparities among different groups that tend to fuel conflicts and violence¹¹.

It has been observed that there is an established pattern in Kenya in which members of the politically, dominant groups enjoy privileged access to opportunities in education, employment and basic services such as health. They pointed out that this trend is often reflected in the dominance of top civil service positions as well as business opportunities by members of the

¹⁰ Freeman, D., (2005). An Explanation of Conflict: Ethnicity, Deprivation, and Rationalization. *Conference Paper Read at Kentucky Political Science Association Conference, 4th March 2005*

¹¹ Brinkman (2001), *Preventing Civil Strife: An important Role for Economic Policy*. Discussion Paper No. 20: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p 15

same ethnic group or political party as those of the president and powerful cabinet ministers. Likewise the interests of the political and economic elite tend to override those of the disadvantaged groups such as the youth. The latter pattern is reflected in the apparent reluctance of the government to protect disadvantaged citizens against unfair job recruitment and labour compensation practices. In addition, the government has failed to ensure justice to individuals and groups that fall victim to illegal acquisition of property including land.

Since a majority of the youth are self-employed in the informal sector (commonly known in Kenya as Jua Kali), they are frequently victims of arbitrary licensing systems and confiscation of goods on account of allegations of conducting 'illegal' businesses. The sweeping changes introduced in the public transport sector in 2004 that occurred almost simultaneously with a general freeze on licensing of hawkers especially in Nairobi rendered many youth jobless and this has had repercussions in the levels of violence and crime involving the youth in Kenya. It is in this context that it has been observed that the post-2007 election violence in Kenya provided a camouflage for settling of property and employment disputes¹².

Knoester and Hayne have outlined three structural characteristics associated with social disorganization that predict crime and delinquency: economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility. All these factors exist in different degrees and combinations in the regions that were most affected by post-2007 General Elections violence in Kenya¹³. For example, considering the increasingly sharp distinctions between the winners and losers in the liberalized economy in Kenya and the relatively higher levels of economic deprivation among the youth

¹² Human Rights Watch (2002), p 13

¹³ Knoester and Hayne (2005) Community Context, Social Integration into Family, and Youth Violence. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67 (August): p. 768

there is usually a higher likelihood of the youth expressing their grievances violently. With regard to ethnic heterogeneity, it could be observed that individuals are more likely to resort to aggression based on perceptions that their neighbours from particular ethnic groups have better access to political and economic opportunities than themselves. Residential mobility mainly explains the pattern of violence in cities and particularly in slums. Impoverishment of slum dwellers often coincides with high levels of change of residence location and little commitment to neighbourhoods. Majority of residents in poor neighbourhoods are therefore often less likely than residents of middle class neighbourhoods to be adversely affected by the economic impacts of violence and destruction. It is the poor parts of the cities, therefore that have a reputation of being the most militant and it was to such parts of the cities that the police were deployed in late December 2007 to either prevent riots or quell protests that had erupted.

The patterns and trajectory of post-2007 election violence affirm the strong correlation between relative deprivation and intensity of violence. The areas most affected by post-election violence were the densely populated cosmopolitan rural areas and the urban slums. Examples of such rural areas that were most affected by violence were Kipkelion, Burnt Forest, Turbo, Molo and Mumias. Some of the slums that were most affected were Mathare, Kibera, Kariobangi and Dandora in Nairobi; Langas and Huruma in Eldoret; Rhonda in Nakuru; and; Manyatta, Kondele and Nyalenda in Kisumu. In slums and other socially' deprived neighbourhoods, the youth often have easy access to alcohol, drugs, and offensive illegal weapons all of which tend to reinforce violent behaviour and to signify a lack of community social control. Furthermore, in such neighbourhoods, the limited opportunities for education and employment and the resultant competition for the few available resources are bound not to only weaken community ties and

social bonds but also to aggravate the sense of hopelessness among the unemployed youth.

5.3 Risk Factors for Youth Violence

In some countries the rapid growth of youth populations, combined with high levels of unemployment and rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, are seen by many observers to be correlated with violence. The likelihood of a violent onset is believed to be particularly acute in contexts where a large population of young people is coming of age in the face of unstable governments, insecurity and development challenges. In such circumstances youth are more likely to band together in search of solutions and in some cases resort to violent means.

A myriad of elements interact determining the involvement of young people as either perpetrators or victims of armed violence. These include social and economic deprivation and marginalization, lack of educational opportunities and demographic factors such as age and gender. In addition, important societal factors at the macro-level can exacerbate the involvement of young people in violence. These include cultural norms that support violence as an acceptable means of resolving conflicts, as well as norms that entrench male dominance and well as those that support excessive use of force by police against citizens.

Age and gender are some of the most important biological risk factors in the perpetration of armed violence and being a victim of armed violence: young men between the age of 15 and 29 years are most at risk of being killed with a firearm or using a gun to kill someone. In other instances, research shows that firearms have increased the lethality of domestic violence¹⁴. Being witness to such violence or subjected to it or any other abuse or neglect, conditions young

¹⁴ Sunday Nation, June 21 2009 p.4

people for later involvement in acts of violence. These factors combined with poor social support structures, such as a lack of parental supervision increase the risk for other forms of violence.

Other factors that exacerbate the link between violence and youth include the continent's daunting post-independence history of socio-political change, severe unrest, and poverty. Young people are seen as particularly vulnerable during periods of socio-political unrest and struggle.

5.3.1 Family Influences

Parental behaviour and the family environment are central factors in the development of violent behaviour in young people. Poor monitoring and supervision of children by parents and the use of harsh, physical punishment to discipline children are strong predictors of violence during adolescence and adulthood. Parental aggression and harsh discipline at the age of 10 years strongly increased the risk of later convictions for violence up to 45 years of age.

Several researchers followed up almost 900 children in New York, United States and found that harsh, physical punishment by parents at the age of 8 years predicted not only arrests for violence up to the age of 30 years, but also – for boys- the severity of punishment of their own children and their own histories of spouse abuse. In a study of over 900 abused children and nearly 700 controls, showed that recorded physical abuse and neglect as a child predicted later arrests for violence – independently of other predictors such as sex, ethnicity and age. Other studies have recorded similar findings. Other factors include: a large number of children in the family; and a low level of family cohesion¹⁵.

¹⁵ Wilson, A.V.(2002).et al. *Homicide: The Victim Offender Connection*.(New York: Alfred Knoff) pp. 267-342

Family structure is also an important factor for later aggression and violence. Findings from studies conducted in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States show that children growing up in single-parent households are at greater risk for violence. In the study in Dunedin, New Zealand, living with a single parent at the age of 13 years predicted convictions for violence up to the age of 18 years¹⁶.

In general, low socio-economic status of the family is associated with future violence. For example, in a national survey of young people in the United States, the prevalence of self-reported assault and robbery among youths from low socio-economic classes was about twice that among middle-class youths. In Lima, Peru, low educational levels of the mother and high housing density were both found to be associated with youth violence¹⁷.

5.3.2 Peer Influences

Peer influences during adolescence are generally considered positive and important in shaping interpersonal relationships, but they can also have negative effects. Having delinquent friends, for instance, is associated with violence in young people. The results of studies in developed countries are consistent with a study in Lima, Peru which found a correlation between violent behaviour and having friends who used drugs. A number of researchers concluded that delinquency caused peer bonding and, at the same time, that bonding with delinquent peers caused delinquency¹⁸.

¹⁶ Ibid. p 349

¹⁷ Ibid. pp 267-342

¹⁸ Decker, S.H., and Van Winkle, B. (.1996). *Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence.* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).pp 72-107.

5.3.3 Community factors

The communities in which young people live are an important influence on their families, the nature of their peer groups, and the way they may be exposed to situations that lead to violence. Generally speaking, boys in urban areas are more likely to be involved in violent behaviour than those living in rural areas. Within urban areas, those living in neighbourhoods with high levels of crime are more likely to be involved in violent behaviour than those living in other neighbourhoods.

The degree of social integration within a community also affects rates of youth violence. Social capital is a concept that attempts to measure such community integration. It refers, roughly speaking, to the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust that exist in social relations and institutions. Some researchers studied five poor urban communities in Jamaica¹⁹. They found a cyclical relationship between violence and the destruction of social capital. When community violence occurred, physical mobility in the particular locality was restricted, employment and educational opportunities were reduced, businesses were reluctant to invest in the area and local people were less likely to build new houses or repair or improve existing property. This reduction in social capital –the increased mistrust resulting from the destruction of infrastructure, amenities and opportunities, increased the likelihood of violent behaviour, especially among young people. A study on the relation between social capital and crime rates in a wide range of

¹⁹ Horowitz, R.(1983) *Honour and the American Dream: Culture and Identity in a Chicano Community*. (Rutgers University.) pp48-97.

countries during the period 1980–1994, found that the level of trust among community members had a strong effect on the incidence of violent crimes²⁰.

It is evident that indices of social capital reflecting low social cohesion and high levels of interpersonal mistrust were linked with both higher homicide rates and greater economic inequality.

5.3.4 Demographic and Social Changes

Rapid demographic changes in the youth population, modernization, emigration, urbanization and changing social policies have all been linked with an increase in youth violence. In countries that have suffered economic crises and ensuing structural adjustment policies, real wages have often declined sharply, laws intended to protect labour have been weakened or discarded, and a substantial decline in basic infrastructure and social services has occurred. Poverty has become heavily concentrated in cities experiencing high population growth rates among young people²¹.

In their demographic analysis of young people in Africa, researchers suggest that the tension between a rapidly swelling population of young people and a deteriorating infrastructure has resulted in school-based and student revolts²². There was experienced a similar situation of student strikes and rebellions in Senegal, where the population under 20 years of age doubled between 1970 and 1988, during a period of economic recession and the implementation of structural adjustment policies. In a survey of youths in Algeria, likewise, it was found that rapid demographic growth and accelerating urbanization together created conditions, including unemployment and grossly inadequate housing, which in turn led to extreme frustration, anger

²⁰ Ibid, pp103-109

²¹ Ibid, p129

²² Klein, M.W., and Maxson, C.L., *Social Science Research* 69: pp.561–565

and pent-up tensions among youths. Young people, as a result, were more likely to turn to petty crime and violence, particularly under the influence of peers²³.

5.3.5 Income Inequality

Research has shown links between economic growth and violence, and between income inequality and violence. Gartner, in 1990, in a study of 18 industrialized countries during the period 1950–1980, found that income inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient, had a significant and positive effect on the homicide rate²⁴. More researchers obtained the same results in an investigation of 45 industrialized and developing countries between 1965 and 1995. The rate of growth of the GDP was also significantly negatively associated with the homicide rate, but this effect was in many cases offset by rising levels of income inequality²⁵.

5.3.6 Political Governance

The quality of governance in a country, both in terms of the legal framework and the policies offering social protection, is an important determinant of violence. In particular, the extent to which a society enforces its existing laws on violence, by arresting and prosecuting offenders, can act as a deterrent against violence. It has been found, through studies, that the arrest rate for homicides had a significant negative effect on the homicide rate²⁶.

In all those studies, objective measures of governance (such as arrest rates) were negatively correlated with crime rates, while subjective measures (such as confidence in the judiciary and

²³ Ibid, p 567

²⁴ Smith, D. and M. Zahn. Thousand Oaks, *Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research*, CA:Sage Publications. pp 35-65

²⁵ Ibid, p 89

²⁶ *National Institute of Justice Journal, U.S.A.* 230: pp.26–31.

the perceived quality of governance) were only weakly correlated with crime rates. Governance can therefore have an impact on violence, particularly as it affects young people. Studies on violence affecting various ethnic groups in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, concluded that dissatisfaction with the police, the justice system and prisons increased the use of unofficial modes of justice. In Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, the police were among the principal perpetrators of violence against young people. Police actions – particularly against young men from lower socio-economic classes – involved physical violence, sexual abuse, rape and bribery²⁷.

He suggested that a sense that justice depended on socioeconomic class was an important factor in the emergence of a culture of violence among marginalized youths in Caracas, Venezuela. Similarly, another researcher, Aitchinson, concluded that in post-apartheid South Africa, impunity for former perpetrators of human rights abuses and the inability of the police to change their methods significantly, have contributed to a generalized feeling of insecurity and increased the number of extra-judicial actions involving violence²⁸.

5.3.7 Cultural influences

Culture, which is reflected in the inherited norms and values of society, helps determine how people respond to a changing environment. Cultural factors can affect the amount of violence in a society – for instance, by endorsing violence as a normal method to resolve conflicts and by teaching young people to adopt norms and values that support violent behaviour. One important means through which violent images, norms and values are propagated is the media. Exposure of children and young people to the various forms of the media has increased dramatically in recent

²⁷ Ibid, p 37

²⁸ Aitchinson, W.B (1982). *Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, pp17-192.

years. New forms of media – such as video games, video tapes and the Internet – have multiplied opportunities for young people to be exposed to violence. Several studies have shown that the introduction of television into countries was associated with increases in the level of violence. The preponderance of evidence indicates that exposure to violence on television increases the likelihood of immediate aggressive behaviour and has an unknown effect in the longer term on serious violence²⁹.

5.4 The Context of Youth Violence in Kenya

According to the Human Rights Watch, Kenya exhibits many of the factors that have been markers of civil strife elsewhere in Africa: strong ethnic divisions, polarized political issues, political manipulation, rampant violence, socio-economic disparities and a lack of economic opportunity and endemic corruption³⁰. All these factors contribute in different ways to moderate or aggravate conflicts that emerge from time to time in different parts of the country.

Given the large numbers of unemployed and disillusioned youth in many parts of the country, politicians and other social groups usually find it easy to whip up emotions among the youth and to recruit them mostly into vicious political gangs and private militia such as Mungiki, Baghdad Boys, Taliban, Chinkororo and Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF). The youth also serve political interests especially where there are disputes related to the electoral processes (they barricade roads, storm poll centres to attack officials or eject opponents, and also destroy documents and property). Depending on their sources of support, the youth also tend to differ in the levels of sophistication with which they organize and execute violence. The degree of

²⁹ Ibid, p 204

³⁰ Human Rights Watch (2002), p 16

sophistication including the types of weapons used also tends to blur the difference between conflict and crime.

Some of the youth interviewed in this study strongly believed that the government, corporate organizations, politicians and members of migrant communities all share responsibility for the plight of the unemployed youth in many part of Kenya. Politicians are only interested in their votes and services during campaigns but rarely are committed to fulfilling the many promises they make to the unemployed youth during election campaigns.

Rachlin argues that youth violence usually is a factor of contingencies of reward and punishment associated with the behaviour. The contingencies may be analyzed in terms of the balance between short-term and long-term costs and benefits of violent behaviour. For instance the short-term costs of violent behaviour are the physical effort of the act the possibility of immediate physical retaliation immediate social disapproval and the opportunity cost of other social acts that the violent behaviour takes the place of (being friendly and caring toward long-time neighbours, protecting one's employee or being loyal to an employer). The immediate benefits of violent behaviour are intrinsic satisfaction of the act itself (for example the satisfaction of successfully evicting a neighbour or destroying their property) and any extrinsic benefits (a chance of appropriating another person's land, livestock, TV, stereo or house) that reinforces the violence. Among the long-term costs of violent behaviour are delayed retaliation, possible social disapproval and loss of social support, rejection from a social group, job loss, and health risks associated with violent acts and lifestyle (e.g., exposure to HIV arising from rapes). Possible long-term benefits of violence are long-term intimidation of others (people would fear

to own property or live near neighbours that have a reputation for violence) and exciting lifestyles (membership in violence-reinforcing subgroups)³¹.

The patterns of post-election violence in Kenya could thus be classified according to the intensity and manifestations of violence across the different parts of the country. These could be categorized into regions and neighbourhoods that witnessed very intense violence, moderate violence and tension and fear not necessarily breaking out into violence. The intense violence was witnessed in parts of Nairobi, Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley provinces. Moderate violence was experienced in parts of Central, Eastern and Coast provinces. Tension and fear that did not necessarily transform into violence was experienced in parts of high and middle class residential areas in Nairobi, Eastern province, Central province and the Coast.

The effects of the violence could be examined according to categories of perpetrators and victims. Whereas women, children and the elderly, were the greatest victims, the perpetrators were mostly, the unemployed male youth. Research has often associated the youth in Kenya with political violence especially, in circumstances where tradition is used to organize political violence as witnessed in 1997 in Likoni where upon being recruited to perpetrate violence young men would be taken to local spiritual leaders to undergo ritual of oath taking in connection with planned raids³². Instigators of post-2007 election violence who included professionals like teachers, doctors and other civil servants, as well as local political activists. Some religious leaders and women therefore found ready accomplices among the unemployed male youth.

³¹ Rachlin, H., (2004). *The Behavioural Economics of Violence*. Annals of N.Y. Academy of Sciences. 1036: p. 325

³² Human Rights Watch (2002), p 18

From the above analysis and the primary data collected from Kibera, it is clear that the objectives of the study has been realised. It has been demonstrated that the youth played a key in the post-election violence in Kenya. It is evident that they were misused by politicians in order to serve their own personal interests. The youths' involvement was underpinned by the fact that they are energetic, agile, idle and therefore available and had nothing to lose during violence. The social-demographic, economic and political profile of youths that planned and perpetrated the post-election violence in Kenya has been documented in previous chapter. The key risk factors that exacerbated the involvement of the youth in the post-election violence have been well articulated theoretically and proved practically by the respondents.

The hypothesis, which states that, 'Cultural factors, political governance, income inequality resulting in economic and social exclusion and marginalization of the youth and triggered by electoral fraud were the main factors that exacerbated youth involvement in post-election violence' has been tested. The study has reinforced the theory of relative deprivation, which is the discrepancy between value expectation and value achievement, that is, between what people believe they are rightly entitled to, and what they are capable of getting and retaining. By relative deprivation is meant a discrepancy between deserved and actual enjoyment of goods or conditions of life and more generally discontent with government performance and alienation from political system. Political regimes' inability to provide economic and political goods is seen as a source of relative deprivation within a population, hence instability in form of violence.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.0 Introduction

This chapter is the conclusion of the thesis. It contains reflection of the Kenya's Government handling of youth in the past and in the present times. It also contains reflection of how the Government should handle youth in future in order to avert political violence not only during elections, but also in other periods.

6.1 Reflection on the Past

The Kenya's Government has been using punishment and extinction methods in dealing with the youth. However, punishment as an act adds to its costs, according to Rachlin, hence reducing its net value computed by subtracting the costs from benefits. Rachlin further observes that if violence were already occurring at a high rate, only extremely severe punishment would reduce its value sufficiently to achieve a reduction in the immediate value of non-violence below that of non-violence. For example, extremely cruel punishments for members of youth gangs and militia such as Mungiki and Chinkororo have not yielded the desired reduction in violence and crime by members of these groups. Punishment also tends to drive the violent person into another subculture (e.g., a gang or prison) where the violence may be more valuable than non-violence in the long run as well as the short run¹. Punishment has therefore been unproductive.

¹ Rachlin, H., (2004) The Behavioral Economics of Violence. *Annals of N.Y. Academy of Sciences*: 1036, p. 333

Extinction, on the other hand, would function by removing the incentives and reinforces of violence. Denial of financial support to the violent person or group, or denying them admission to schools, jobs, or business and residential premises to rent would be examples of extinction. Not selling petrol or machetes to the youth could delay or even frustrate the youth in their attempts to commit violence but could not provide adequate deterrence against it. Similarly the youth could be stopped from committing violence through immediate and severe retaliation as witnessed in police shootings and arrests or through restriction of movement of the youth witnessed in many parts of the country during the past-election violence. Rachlin, however, concludes that the problem with extinction is that the immediate benefits of violent behaviour are largely intrinsic and could not be measured by such extrinsic values as not being allowed to rent a business premise or residential house in a particular area. Likewise some costs of violent behaviour such as immediate retaliation by unidentified others may be difficult to control thereby rendering extinction inadequate in controlling youth violence in some instances. There are also other risks associated with extinction which include police misuse of firearms against peacefully demonstrating youth or that the youth themselves could device mechanisms against peacefully demonstrating youth or that the youth themselves could device mechanisms to counter extinction such as wrenching off the railway line or settling electricity transformers on fire to distract the police².

Miller supports the Rachlin's argument that imprisonment not only creates undue pain but also increases the likelihood of recidivism. Punishing the Kenya youth involved in

² Ibid, p 333

the post-election violence through incarceration would in some cases exacerbate their hopelessness that would subsequently be addressed by committing more crime upon their release. Miller therefore concurs with Rachlin that the limitation of punishment in the case of violence is that physical punishment tends to increase violent behaviour while incarceration drives the punished person into the very social subgroup (the prison culture) where violence is maximally reinforced³.

Zeldin, on the other hand argues against the use of punitive crime policy solutions in addressing the issues affecting the youth based merely on the assumption that youth is considered a developmental period of 'storm and stress'. He suggests that rather than adopt the policy of containment that emphasizes punishment, control and incapacitation, it would be more appropriate to use the strategy of involving young people in community. This would include helping the youth to acquire competencies, confidence, and sense of belonging necessary for a successful transition into young adulthood. The relevant policy actions would address the issues of youth economic empowerment and social and political inclusion⁴.

6.2 Reflection on the Present

The Kenyan Government has taken some measures all geared towards addressing issues of the youth. One of them is creation of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. This has come up with programmes meant to uplift standards of the youth in the country. Some of these are Youth Development Fund and Kazi Kwa Vijana (Jobs for Youth) Programmes.

³ Miller, H.A., (2006) Review of: Reforming Punishment: Psychological Limits to the Pains of Imprisonment. *Journal of Forensic Science*, 51(6) pp1440-1441.

⁴ Zeldin, S., (2004) Preventing Youth Violence through the Promotion of Community Engagement Membership. *Journal of Community Psychology*: 32(5) pp623-641

Youth Development Fund was meant to fast track creation of employment opportunities through enabling young people set up small businesses. The Government, therefore, through the fund set up mechanisms to have easier access to credit and collateral by the youth. In addition, youth are to be equipped with appropriate skills to creatively engage in economically viable activities. This initiative is still in its infancy and it is still too early to comment about its success or failure. But, the fund has a lot of bureaucratic processes which acts as a bottleneck towards quicker realization of its goals. Above all, the fund is currently faced with leadership wrangles, a situation that is yet to be sorted out.

Kazi Kwa Vijana Programme is an ambitious programme intended to create 300,000 jobs in six months. The programme is intended to have projects in all constituencies so as to youth and food insecurity. The fund is expected to enable the Government push development initiatives and address unemployment problem. The overall budget is set at Kshs.15 Billion. This is expected to be disbursed over the next six months with the Government of Kenya providing up to 2/3 and the rest coming from the Development partners and Non Governmental Organizations. The programme has its own challenges ranging from corruption to slow disbursement of funds.

The Government has youth training institutions. These are National Youth Service (NYS) and Youth Polytechnics which are spread all over the country. NYS has stations all over the Republic and has vocational training centres. The major challenge facing the organization includes poor funding by the Treasury and obsolete training equipments.

Youth Polytechnics, on the other hand, are spread all over the country. They face problems of funding, poor training equipments, negative attitudes by the youth on these institutions, among others.

6.3 Reflection on the Future

This study recommends three categories of durable measures focus on first, socio-economic policies that should reduce the levels of relative deprivation among the youth; second, ensuring transparency and accountability in public institutions including clear mechanisms for redress for aggrieved parties, and thirdly, imparting appropriate values to the youth to shape their character as responsible citizens.

6.4 Reducing Relative Deprivation

The Public Service Commission and other similar agencies should adopt the best practices already in place in other parts of the world such as Asia, Europe and USA in order to improve on transparency and accountability in recruitment processes. For example, public serve recruitment should be done through an independent and fair multistage examinations system to protect the process from political and other manipulations.

The Ministry Of Youth Affairs should liaise with experts in entrepreneurship to help transform the youth talents and energy into employment and business opportunities in line with the Vision 2030 objectives of national development. The Youth Enterprise Fund should allow flexibility in project funding and broaden its scope to harness youth talents in art, music, drama and sports.

The ministries of Provincial Administration, Local Government, Trade, and Industry should adopt more synchronized and friendly trade licensing and regulation mechanisms that are supportive to youth business initiatives. The youth, majority of whom work in the informal sector, often are victims of arbitrary laws and corruption perpetrated in some of these departments.

The ministries of Planning and Finances should take deliberate equity measures while allocating resources for development of educational and other infrastructure across the country. Such measures would support equitable skill development and also stimulate economic development that would absorb the youth into gainful employment.

Corporations and business associations should encourage voluntary contributions to support youth employment programmes in cities and municipalities throughout the country to dissuade them from joining militia and other extortion gangs. This would not only help to empower the youth economically but also contribute to crime and violence reduction.

6.4.1 Transparency and Accountability

Parliament should initiate and facilitate a wide range of legal reforms. For example, reforms that focus on diversity policies should allow integration across ethnic and social groups not only in schools but also in places of work and business. Similarly, it should initiate electoral reforms with aim of discouraging and severely penalizing political bribery, violence, hate speech, malicious propaganda and any form of intimidation and

manipulation. Such measures would drastically curtail the level of youth involvement in electoral misconduct and violence.

The media council should take measures to strengthen practice regulations that discourage among others broadcast or publication of political vulgarity, hate speech, and ethnic, class or gender slander. The media organizations should adopt a collective resolution that expressly discourages or blocks broadcast or publication of comments and views that undermine inter-group harmony in Kenya. The media organizations should take deliberate steps to give more prominence to political leaders that set good examples by their public conduct and utterances. These measures would help cut down on inciting media contents that could negatively influence the youth.

The police should adopt professional and friendly methods of dealing with the youth. The police often tend to victimize the youth for appearing to be idle and in some cases even prefer trumped up charges against them such as belonging to proscribed groups such as Mungiki. Currently in some parts of the country and particularly in urban areas the youth cannot gather in small groups without being rounded and locked up by the police.

The ministries of Land and Justice should introduce policies and laws that eliminate irregularities in land tenure governance especially in the rural areas since the youth are not immune to the problems that affect their families or communities and tend to be dragged into disputes and violence arising from such irregularities. They should collaborate

with the ministry of information to organize live forums for public deliberations on land governance and other relevant issues.

6.4.2 Value and Character Moulding

The religious organizations should encourage the integration of cultural youth initiation programs with their own programs. Such initiatives would help moderate values and practices that glorify youth violence and that encourage them to look down upon members of particular sex or groups and cultural practices that are not their own. In the same way, religious leaders at all levels should strive to moderate their utterances and to conduct themselves in ways that set good examples to the youth.

The Religious institutions in collaboration with the ministries of Education Information should establish school programs that encourage debate and dialogue on critical national issues. This would help cultivate a culture of dialogue and debate among the young people and discourage use of violence as a mechanism for resolving disputes.

The ministry of Education should broaden the curriculum to encourage excellence in non-conventional fields of learning such as dance and gymnastics so as not to tie students to examination success in narrowly defined curricula. Such a curriculum should provide training and policy guidelines on inter-ethnic issues to teachers and other actors that have an important role in moulding the youth.

The ministries of Information, Education and Justice should establish long-term civic education committees throughout the country that are de-linked from General Elections

to sensitized and educate all social groups and particularly the youth on responsible citizenship. These measures should help counteract the adverse effects of rumours, propaganda and misinformation especially during election campaigns.

The media should moderate their negative portrayal of the youth since such repeated negative portrayal far from informing and warning the public about youth deviance could have the opposite effect of 'negative socialization'.⁵

⁵ Negative socialization refers to a situation in which exposure to a behavior or practice encourages the exposed individual to adopt negative values associated with such behavior or practice.

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Appendix A

Te...
S...

Cour:

Ayany
Estate

Karanja
Road Estate

Satuikira
Estate

Olympic
Estate

Kibera

Kibera
slum

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Location of Kibera, in Nairobi

Appendix B

TITLE: Role of the Youth in the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya

A Case Study of Kibera in Nairobi

QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a degree in Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Studies. The questionnaire is scheduled to assess the role played by youth groups in post election violence. The information is specifically for study purpose and is highly confidential. Your positive response is highly appreciated.

A) Demographic information

1. Gender.

a) Female

b) Male

2. Age

a) 19

b) 20

c) 21

d) 22

3. Marital status

- a) Single
- b) Married

4. Education level.

- a) Primary
- b) Secondary
- c) Tertiary

B) Extent of participation and roles played

The following statements are intended to measure your participation in last year's post election violence.

5. Did you engage in the recent post-election violence (2007/08)?

- a) Yes
- b) No

6. If yes, what prompted you?

- a) In self defence and that of my community.
- b) As a show of loyalty to my political party and politician.
- c) I was forced into it.
- d) Social and political frustration

7. How did you do your activities?

- a) In groups
- b) Individually

8. What activities were you engaged in during the period that the violence lasted?

- a) Looting stores
- b) Fighting and harassing those who seemed as rivals
- c) Destruction of property

C) Economic status

9. Are you employed?

- a) Yes
- b) No

D) Socio status

10. . What activities do you engage in when not at work/school?

- a) I am indoors
- b) Play games
- c) Visit friends

11 . What do majority of your friends do for a living?

- a) Unemployed

b) Permanently employed

c) Casual labourers

12. . Do you engage in any traditional/ ritual practices in your area of residence?

a) Yes

b) No

13. . If yes in 14 above, which ones?

a) Circumcision

b) Marriage

c) Baptism

d) Promotion to adulthood

14. In what groupings do you relate with peers?

a) By school/alumni

b) By age

c) By ethnic background

d) On political grounds

15. Do you believe by any way your cultural/ social background contributed to your participation in the violence?

a) Yes

b) No

E) Political engagement.

16. Were you involved in politics?

- a) Yes
- b) No

17. If yes, what role did you play?

- a) I was a candidate for an elective position.
- b) I was an agent/ campaigner for a candidate
- c) I was an official for a political party.

18. Why were you engaged in politics?

- a) To bring change to the society
- b) To earn a living
- c) Politics is my way of life
- d) It was the thing of the day/ everyone else did so.

F) Risk factors that exacerbated involvement in post election violence.

19. What led you to engaging in violence?

- a) I was financially frustrated by the then political regime
- b) I was financially motivated to participate in violence
- c) Peer pressure
- d) There was an electoral fraud

20. What was your motivation in the violence?

- a) I was incited by friends
- b) As a show of solidarity for my party/ politician
- c) I was paid to do so.
- d) I wanted to express my frustration.

21. To which ethnic group do you belong?

22. As a community, did you have common grievances?

- a) Yes
- b) No

23. If the answer to Q25 is Yes, what were they?

- a)
- b)

24. What other factors caused violence?

- a)
- b)

25. What was your party?

- a) PNU
- b) ODM

- c) ODM-K
- d) Others

26. Did you attend any political party meeting?

- a) Yes
- b) No

27. What promises did these parties make that could have benefited you:

- a) Z
- b) Z
- c) z

28. Where were you born?

- a) Kibera
- b) Elsewhere

29. Which role did you play during?

a) Pre-election violence

.....

b) Election day violence

.....

c) Post-election violence

.....

30. Were you compensated?

- a) Yes
- b) No

31. If yes in question 30 above how were you compensated?

- a)
- b)
- c)

Thank you for your cooperation. Once again, the information remains confidential.

C.T. MUCHIRI

Appendix C

NON-YOUTHS' QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a degree in Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Studies. The questionnaire is scheduled to assess the role played by youth group in post election violence. The information is specifically for study purpose and is highly confidential. Your positive response is highly appreciated.

G) Demographic information

1. Gender.

- a) Male
- b) Female

2. Age

- a) 45 – 50
- b) 51 – 55
- c) 56 – 60
- d) 61 – 65
- e) 66 - 70

3. Education level.

- a) Primary
- b) Secondary
- c) Tertiary

4. Status in the community.

- a) Provincial administrator
- b) Church elder
- c) Village headmen
- d) Business person
- e) Resident

Personal observations

H) Extent of participation

5. In your own opinion, who were involved in the post-election violence?
- a) The youth
 - b) The old people
6. How were those involved organised?
- a) In groups
 - b) Individually
7. In your own opinion, what prompted them to the post-election violence?
10. In self defence and that of my community.
11. As a show of loyalty to my political party and politician.
12. I was forced into it.
13. Social and political frustration.
8. What activities were they engaged in?
- a) Looting stores
 - b) Fighting and harassing those who seemed as rivals
 - c) Destruction of property

I) Economic status

9. What do majority of the youth do?

- a) Employed
- b) Unemployed

J) Socio status

10. In what groupings do you relate with peers?

- a) By school/alumni
- b) By age
- c) By ethnic background
- d) On political grounds

11. Do you believe by any way your cultural/ social background contributed to the youth's participation in the violence?

- a) Yes
- b) No

K) Political engagement.

12. Were the youth involved in politics?

- a) Yes
- b) No

13. If yes, what role did they play?

- a) I was a candidate for an elective position.

- d) I was an agent/ campaigner for a candidate
- e) I was an official for a political party.

14. Why were the youth engaged in politics?

- e) To bring change to the society
- f) To earn a living
- g) Politics is my way of life
- h) It was the thing of the day/ everyone else did so.

L) Risk factors that exacerbated involvement of the youth in post election violence.

15. What led the youth to engaging in violence?

- e) I was financially frustrated by the then political regime
- f) I was financially motivated to participate in violence
- g) Peer pressure
- h) There was an electoral fraud

16. What other factors caused the violence?

- a)
- b)

17. Did the youth attend any political party meeting?

- c) Yes
- d) No

18. What promises did these political parties make that could have benefited the youth?

- d)
- e)
- f)

19. Which role did the youth play during:

d) Pre-election violence

.....

e) Election day violence

.....

f) Post-election violence

.....

20. Were the youth compensated?

c) Yes

d) No

21. If yes in question 20 above how were the youth compensated?

d)

e)

f)

Thank you for your cooperation. Once again, the information remains confidential.

C. T. MUCHIRI