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THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1997-2007)

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International Studies.

October 2008

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DECLARATION

This Dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for examination at any other University.

Sign: _~~Ogech~~_   _27/11/08_

MR OGECHI, DENNIS MOGARE   **DATE**

This Dissertation has been submitted for Examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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MR ROBERT MUDIDA   **DATE**

Dedication

I dedicate this research to my family – Phyllis, Martin and Michelle Mogare.

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Abstract

The study set out to find out the role of external actors in conflict management in the DRC. It also set to find out the nature and type of actors involved in the DRC conflict and its management. The research had as its final object to inquire into the factors that motivate external actors to participate in DRC conflict.

The research based its findings on both from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources of information included face to face interviews and online interactions. The interviews were conducted using a structured questionnaire and interviewees were from DRC based in Nairobi and others were based their home country. The interviewees corroborated the ideas advanced by scholarly information gathered from secondary data in form of articles, journals, and published works.

The research relied on the theory of conflict research to hypothesize the findings. The theory defines the approach of conflict management by attributing issues to different parties' interests and encourages the process of creating an understanding between each other to resolve the conflict. The theory further considers peace to be attainable through legitimised post-conflict relationships.

The study finds out that the DRC conflict is as a result of evolution of a war economy that has attracted foreign actors to either mitigate or fight in the territory in order to access scarce resources. What emerged as the dominant trend is that the external actors have intervened in the DRC conflict in order to stabilize the region whose conflict epicenter is the DRC. The stability of the region is important to these actors who seek to pursue economic and trade interests.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

DRC   **Democratic Republic of Congo**

UN   **United Nations**

MONUC   **Mission d'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo**

ACCORD   African Centre for Conflict Research Development

ADF   Allied Democratic Forces

AFDL   Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire

AU   African Union

EC   European Commission

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West Africa

FDD   Forces for the Defence of Democracy

FNL   Forces Nationales de Liberation

IGAD   Inter-Governmental Authority for Development

LA   Lusaka Agreement

LRA   Lords Resistance Army

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations

OAU   Organisation of Africa Unity

SADC   South Africa Development Cooperation

SPLA   Sudanese People's Liberation Army

CHAPTER ONE

**1.0   BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ON THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL
ACTORS IN MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: A CASE
STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1997-2007)**

1.1   Introduction

Conflicts in Africa can be classified as internal, internationalised or international. These conflicts are classified as internal if they are limited within territorial boundaries of a state.[1]   The internal conflicts become internationalised if they are connected to the neighbouring states, or when they involve actors from the region or from the international levels.   These actors include nation states, intergovernmental regional institutions, and supranational institutions.

International conflicts refer to those conflicts that arise between individual states over issues that affect their national interests.[2]   International conflicts in Africa have reduced in the post Cold War period in Africa.   In contrast the internal conflicts have increased in the same period.   There is a significant reason for scholars to find out the reason that have led to the rising trend of internal conflicts in African states.   The internal conflicts if not understood on the basis of the actors at domestic, national, regional and international levels, it is difficult to get a breakthrough in the peace process.   The conflict mapping must consider harmonising the actors' interests to avoid stalemate in negotiations.

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[1]   M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Watermark, 2000, p. 36
[2]   Ibid

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The object of conflict management is to end suffering and protracted conflict.[3] Interest in peace making in the Great Lakes region emerge from the fact that countries in the region are unstable and conflict in one states provokes other conflicts in the neighbouring states. The countries have continually accused each other as initiator or supporters of the conflicts that continue to plague the territories.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict presents a confluence of sub-regional, regional and international interests.[4] At sub-regional and regional levels, there is a concern over the security of the nation states as a result of instability in the DRC. The countries that surround the DRC are recipients of large populations of refugees in their territories. Refugees become a source of security concern due to their activities in the host state. Refugees could be engaged in rebel training and recruitment while in the host state. This is observed in the Eastern DRC where the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) have continually recruited and trained its regiment.[5] Meanwhile as they settle they could be competing fro resources with the local communities. The outcomes of refugee influx demands that states seek for ways to address the plight of the refugees to maintain national security.

[3] Bercovitch, J.(Ed), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, London, Macmillan Press, 1992, P. 11
[4] Mekenkamp, M., P. Tongeren, & H. Veen, *Searching for Peace in Africa: An overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, http://www.euconflict.org. Accessed 24th March, 2007.
[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 17 March 2008.

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[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 17 March 2008.

At international level the DRC conflict attracts the attention of the international actors due to the strategic resource of coltan and diamonds that are abundant in the territory.[6] Those states that depend on the natural resources from the DRC find it difficult to seek alternative sources of the strategic resources that are uniquely present in the DRC sub-terrain. Therefore instability in the DRC distorts the industrial processes in the developed states that depend on it for some industrial inputs. The powerful states get concerned over the DRC conflict due to the gains or the losses that would be present.

This study will therefore seek to establish the link between the external actors and the intensification of the conflicts.

1.2   Statement of the Research Problem

Conflict management is the process that entails seeking solution to differences between two or more parties.[7] Internal conflicts are managed more easily when the parties are known to be limited to national levels and their interests are not subject to external influence or manipulation. A conflict will be prolonged if the parties' perceived interests continue to change from time to time. The parties' interests are likely to change if when some of the intervening variables originate

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[6]   Ibid
[7]   Touval, Saadia and I. William Zartman. "Mediation in Theory," In Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1985. Pp. 7-17

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beyond the traditional territory of the state. At the sub-systemic level,[8] a region has its own dynamic which is semi-autonomous but not independent from the global great power system and domestic politics. Competition occurs among the major regional players for leadership or hegemony over the locale. This characteristic often results in foreign meddling and subversion in domestic politics rather than foreign military intervention or invasion.

The DRC has witnessed several peace initiatives but they have not brought about conclusive peace.[9] The Inter-Congolese Dialogue ended inconclusively in Sun City, South Africa, and in July 2002 an agreement was struck between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. Despite these agreements and the engagement of the United Nations through a monitoring mission (*Mission de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo*, or MONUC), peace is not yet secured in this vast country.

The DRC conflict has developed an international character, which brought into picture many regional actors, defying regional and international mediation. This development leads the research to inquire into the role played by external actors in internal conflicts. The basic question for this study is: What is the role of external actors in management of resource based conflicts?

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[8]   R, Vayrynem "Regionalism: Old and New,". *International Studies Review, Vol. 5*, (2003), pp. 25-51

[9]   M., Mekenkamp, P. Tongeren, & H. Veen, *Searching for Peace in Africa: An overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, op cit.

1.3   Objectives of the Research

The research will be informed by the following objectives:

1. To find out the role of external actors in conflict management in the DRC.

2. To investigate the nature and type of actors involved in the DRC conflict and its management.

3. To inquire into the factors which motivate external actors to participate in DRC conflict.

4. To make recommendations on the way forward for addressing issues of external actors in DRC.

1.4   Literature Review

The literature review encompasses the literature on conflict and that on conflict management processes. The literature on conflict would present the theoretical, social and economic basis for examining natural resource based conflicts. The aim here is to establish any link between the conflict occurrence and the motivation for intervention. Literature on conflict management would present a background to examine the methods that have been adopted in the DRC peace process and their effectiveness. The literature review therefore presents a critique and a general overview gathered on causes, issues actors and peace initiatives.

Literature on Conflict

Literature on conflict is divided into two sub-categories. The first category is that on causes of conflict and the second deals with management of conflict. The first set of literature will outline the causes of conflict in the society. This will bring about some understanding on the various causes of conflict and the second set of literature will outline some forms of interventions in conflict. The researcher will use this basis to develop hypotheses for the study.

Role of Third Parties in Conflict

Zartman[10] asserts that Mediation, the most common form of third party intervention, is not a single discrete activity. Rather, it is a continuous process that falls on a spectrum of behaviour ranging from highly passive to highly active. The form and character of mediation in a particular international dispute are determined by many factors, including the nature of the dispute, the nature of the mediator, and a number of other cultural and contextual variables. A process of conflict management involves third parties when disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their basic differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.

In the international arena challenges of escalating conflicts, anarchical society, and the absence of generally accepted rules of the game, third party mediation is about

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[10] Zartman, I., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York: Oxford, 1989, p. 15

as common as conflict itself. As a form of multilateral conflict management, third party mediation is particularly likely to take place when disputes are long, drawn out and complex; the disputants' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute; and when the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some contact and communication.[11] All these conditions apply to the new breed of conflicts we have been experiencing since 1989.

Zartman[12] continues to aver that regional conflicts can be thought of in three different ways, each suggesting a different approach to their resolution. One is as a clash of conflicting unilateral solutions, which then require a formula for a joint or multilateral outcome satisfactory to both parties. A second is as a succession of opposing policies based on cost-benefit calculations, which then require a ripe moment—comprising specific components of mutually hurting stalemate, impending catastrophe, and a formula for a way out—for resolution. A third is an event in a process of change, requiring the negotiation of a new regime to replace an old one that previously embodied certain expectations and behaviours. These different notions are illustrated with many examples of regional conflicts and their attempted—and sometimes successful—resolution.

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[11] Bercovitch, J., International Mediation and Dispute Settlement, *Negotiation Journal, 7 (1)* , 1991, pp. 17-30

[12] Zartman, I., Op cit

Literature on Causes of Conflict

Causes of conflicts and especially violent conflicts would be attributed to various reasons. This depends on the levels of levels of analysis used. This is espoused by Waltz[13] in his analysis of man, state and war. He observes that an appropriate way to discuss and critically evaluate the multitude of approaches and theories on the causes of war is to divide them in terms of where along the social spectrum they locate the fundamental nexus of war causality. Upon this basis, he identified three main orientations on the cause of war. These are individual image, nation-state image and the state system image. This means that conflict can draw actors from groups of individuals, and states, both locally and internationally..

Sandole[14] agrees with Waltz when he asserts that conflict is multidimensional. He identifies these dimensions as connected to decision making, societal and trans-societal aspects. He concurs with Waltz's individual, state and international levels. Sandole investigated the role of variables located in different levels throughout the life-cycle of conflicts, which he divided into three successive periods, early, intermediate and late stages of a conflict systems' development. These features must be understood when carrying out conflict mapping for appropriate intervention like the DRC because of its protracted nature.

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[13]   Waltz, K., *Man, State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York & London, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 453.

[14]   Sandole, D. J. D., *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era*, London & New York, Pinter, 1999, p. 18.

Sandole[15] further found that it is critical to distinguish between conflict-as-start up conditions and conflict-as-process. The trend established that across the three stages of conflict systems' development of self-stimulating or self-perpetuating conflict processes, is important in evaluating relationship between different variables located at different levels through time. Conflict-as-start up conditions is seen to engender conflict-as-process and once process comes to characterize conflict, it does not matter how or when the conflict started. Therefore different start-up conditions can lead to the same process-initiation, escalation and controlled maintenance.[16] This means at some point in the DRC conflict cycle itself has become the main source of its protractedness.

Lund[17] avers with Sandole on observing that once some level of significant violence has begun, it is prone to escalate because an interactive process of attack and retaliation leads to a self-perpetuating cycle. Thus conflicts begin and continue escalating because intervening variables facilitate the process. These variables are present on the behaviour of actors and their interests.

Mitchell[18] concurs with the above view when he observes that conflict behaviour itself can be an important influence in affecting conflict intensity if it involves high levels of violence, damage or loss of participants. Such behaviour would

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[15]   Ibid
[16]   Ibid, Pp. 129.
[17]   Lund, M. S., *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington, US Institute of Peace Press, 1996, Pp. 133 – 134.
[18]   Mitchell, C., *The Structure of International Conflict*, London, Macmillan Press, 1981, Pp. 52.

involve an increase in the levels of anger, hatred, restraint, fear, or desire for revenge on the part of those suffering damage. Over time, behaviour of the opposing party may appear sufficient reason for continuing and intensifying one's own conflict behaviour often producing an analogous impact on the attitudes and subsequent behaviour of the adversary. This means conflict behaviour may become the source of future conflict attitudes and behaviour irrespective of any future development of mutually incompatible goals.

Jabri supports Mitchell's view and he observes that 'war mood' takes hold when conflicts escalate.[19] For her it is expected that once violent destruction of the enemy and his valued resources comes to define a relationship, then rules of the game change and behaviour that is unacceptable during peacetime becomes legitimate during wartime. These acts include killing, torture, rape, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing and creation of concentration camps. This position points out that conflict is not only destructive but it also leads to some form of gains to warring groups.

Ampleford et al[20] however contend that over time conflict-as-process may be more important than conflict start-up conditions. Therefore it will not be sufficient to statically identify operating variable worth looking but also to identify the dynamic processes that may overtake these static start up conditions. Identification of a conflict's start-up conditions is necessary as demonstrated by

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[19]   Jabri, V., *Discourses on Violence*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, Pp. 6.
[20]   Ampleford et al; *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: RIJK Assessment Template*, FEWER, the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, August 2001, Pp. 4.

the gradual incorporation into mainstream conflict analysis of underlying causes or structural dimensions or sources of latent or open conflict. This analysis points out that conflicts tend to develop in environments characterized by structural factors, which form the pre-conditions of crisis situations, such as systematic political exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, entrenched economic inequities, economic decline and ecological deterioration.

Azar[21] further argues in support of Ampleford et al that the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity group - racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural. In intra-state conflicts, actors range from conventional armies to para-military units, local warlords, mercenary groups and even criminal gangs. This requires state level analysis to comprehend the groups in conflict and their claims. The understanding gained from the analysis of actors would help identify issues to negotiate in the peace process.

In synthesis of the views expressed above, Azar[22] hypothesises that the source of protracted conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and society, and whose pursuit is a compelling need. These are security, distinctive identity and effective participation in the process that determine conditions of security and identity and other such developmental requirements. To him the real source of conflict is the denial of those human needs that are common to all and whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all.

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[21] Azar, E. E., Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions, in J. Burton & F. Dukes (Eds.), *Conflict; Readings in Management and Resolution*, London, Macmillan Press, 1990, Pp. 147 – 148.
[22] Ibid. pp 156

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In support of Azar's views, Porto[23] observes that resource based conflicts in Africa including the DRC, can be studied along the geographical boundaries of these conflicts. These would be categorized under different conflict systems. The most volatile conflict systems are the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. A number of linkages bind different conflicts in the Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn to national, regional and international contexts. It is evident that conflicts emanate from environmental resources that communities share. For example conflict between herders and farmers in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia and in the Nile flood plain in the Equatoria province of Sudan have linkages to wider regional conflicts involving Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt.[24] Despite these conflicts involving the sharing of the Nile waters, they also include other important sources of conflict as well. A similar observation can be made in Eastern Congo where communities are fighting over the access to and control of natural resources. The conflict here is linked to the national conflict involving the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well the rebel movements and militia groups such as the Mai Mai. At the level of regional conflict, the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have established a number of alliances with local Congolese communities, rebel movements and local militias for political expediency. A key strategy of these alliances is to gain

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[23] João Gomes Porto, Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective, in Lind, J. and Kathryn Sturman (Eds) Op Cit, Pp. 28.
[24] Ibid.

leverage in the struggle to control the extraction, marketing and export of the country's abundant natural resources.

Bigagaza, Abong and Mekarubaga[25] confirm the above the above observations through an extensive analysis on the issue of land and conflict in Rwanda. In their analysis they reveal how ethnic mobilization by elite groups served as underlying competition for scarce resources. The authors have dwelled on land scarcity and unequal land distribution as the basis of competition between Rwanda's elite groups. They argue that Rwandan elites are responsible for characterizing as an ethnic conflict, the struggle for the control of the state. This study concludes that an ethnic conflict needs to be deconstructed and focus on the underlying motivations of groups in conflict.

The response towards the land problem in Rwanda has been government intervention through land reform programme.[26] The government proposed Rural Development Centres to mitigate land scarcity was essentially a failure. This was partly due to resistance to this programme by rural populations. The next move by the government was to initiate the villagisation programme in order to settle the Tutsi and Hutu refugees. This was aimed at mitigating conflict emerging over property and land by the returned refugees. But the government still faces a problem in its implementation due to huge population. It is evident therefore that the government requires sufficient financial support to realize this programme.

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[25] J. Bigagaza., C. Abong and C. Mukarubaga, "Land Scarcity, Unequal Land Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda," in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (Eds.), Op Cit, Pp. 51 – 84.
[26] Ibid

Oketch and Polzer[27] concur with Biagagazaa, Abong and Mekerubaga when they focus on coffee production, which accounts for 80% of Burundi's foreign exchange receipts. Over-reliance on a single crop leaves the country vulnerable to global markets and scarcity. A predatory state-dominated system links the production and marketing of coffee to the country's long running civil war. Northern consumers pay in excess of US $10 per kilo of Premium Arabica blend Burundian Coffee. However peasants who produce Arabica coffee beans are paid a small fraction of this.[28] The Tutsi Dominated *Office des Cultures Industrielles du Burundi* (OCIBU) regulates the Coffee sector. The OCIBU consistently fixes low producer prices paid to coffee farmers. This hierarchy of intermediaries greatly disadvantages the primary producers and it is a potent linkage coupling the production and marketing of coffee to civil war to control of the state.

Oketch[29] concurs with the above observation when she asserts that the peace processes in Burundi have involved official and unofficial initiatives. Regional and international peace interventions included OAU military observer mission from 1993, and the military intervention of UN, EU and US sent special representatives. These initiatives had little effect. The international and regional initiatives, sanctions and the Arusha peace process did have significant, but very ambivalent effects. These initiatives dwelled more on the political and military

[27] J. S. Oketch & T. Polzer, Conflict and Coffee in Burundi, in Lind J. & Kathryn Sturman (eds.), Ibid, Pp. 85 – 156.
[28] Ibid, Pp. 30.
[29] Oketch, S. J., *A Critical Evaluation of Sanctions as Third Party Leverage in the Management of Internal Conflict: The Burundi Peace Process, 1993 – 2000*, M. A. Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

interventions but they did not take into account the core issues of natural resources. This means that external actor in conflict management are not a sure means to bring peace. This also shows that actors will seek to have representation in peace processes to safeguard their interests.

Moyroud and Katunga[30] synthesises the views of Oketch, Bigaagaza, Abong and Mekerubaga when they observe that external actors are a feature of exploitation and conflict escalation the DRC. Coltan mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo in North and South Kivu provinces involves an intricate network of individual extractors and their superiors, rebel authorities, regional governments, regional and international air transporters and trans-national corporations. They argue that the extraction of coltan in the Kivu is linked to the conflict through a particularly illicit and profiteering set-up involving regional and international trans-national corporations and governments. This attribute of interlinked actors has in the end caused damage to the environment.

Moyroud and Katunga[31] continue to debate that DRC has only had *ad hoc* and informal diplomatic mediation initiatives. Most have been African-led efforts launched by groups of nearby states, influential heads of state, or operational sub-regional organization outside Central Africa. The UN, Western governments and international non-government organizations attempted to bring the influence and capabilities to bear. These peace initiatives focused on establishment of a

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[30]   C. Moyroud & J. Katunga, Coltan Exploitation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in Lind, J. and Kathryn Sturman (eds.), Ibid, Pp. 159 – 186.
[31]   Ibid

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ceasefire, freezing of the territorial control of all conflict parties, deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, establishment of a joint military commission made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement and initiation and setting up of the inter Congolese National Dialogue, aimed to bring about a new political order in Congo. The initiatives including the Lusaka accord have not focused on the environmental variables as inputs in the peace process. This is unlikely to bring a lasting peace process.

Land and natural resource use systems are a powerful linkage between overall natural resource scarcity and low intensity conflict in the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The structure of natural resources in the region is uneven. Pockets of comparatively abundant natural resources along watercourses and in higher elevation are embedded in highly stressed overall ecological region where natural resource scarcity is common.

Flintan and Tamrat,[32] support Moyroud and Katunga on reflecting that in Ethiopia identify cycles of drought and famine as the cause of recurrent humanitarian crises. They predict that food security will worsen as the population expands. This concern underlies the government of Ethiopia's claim to make better use of their relatively abundant access to Nile waters. This policy will create conflict of interests with other riparian countries that is Sudan and Egypt.[33] This will arise as

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[32] Fiona, F. & Imeru Tumrat, 'Spilling Blood Over Water? The Case of Ethiopia,' in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (eds.), Op Cit, Pp. 243 – 320.
[33] Rahmato, D., *Water Resource Development in Ethiopia: Issues of Sustainability and Participation*, 2001, Pp. 2.

a result of competing national interests over the use of Nile waters. Thus strategic resources are base for conflict start up.

Flintan and Tamrat[34] further contend that in Ethiopia, social and political issues have rarely been factored into water development and utilization programmes in the past. The distribution and use of water is a highly contentious issue from the water point all the way up to the regional basin level in North-East Africa. National level water resources are currently managed by the Ministry of Water Resources, which is mandated to develop policy and undertake implementation. The ministry is expected to work closely with regional water research and authorities. Though in reality the flow of information, skills and capacity between the different levels of government is severely hampered by internal politics and the lack of resources. Community participation is virtually non-existent. There is little evidence to suggest that either the ministry or the regional governments have incorporated conflict analysis and resolution in their capacities. These issues need to be addressed in the future as pressure increases to improve the effectiveness of water development and utilization.

Farah, Hussein and Lind[35] agree with observation made by Flintan and Tamrat when they show that *deegan* or a land base and its resources play a central role to Somalia conflict. The Somali conflict involves many clans and sub-clans. Shifting alliances were formed between different clans and sub-clans to gain

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[34]   Ibid, Pp. 307.
[35]   I. Farah, A. Hussein and J. Lind, "Deegan, Politics and War in Somalia,' in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (eds.), Ibid, p. 321 – 356.

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leverage in the conflict and to stake stronger claims to particular *deegan*. In particular the ecological conditions of Jubbaland region in Southern Somalia is better compared with the rest of the former democratic republic and they provide a major source of income and sustenance to Somalis. Control of these resources is a major source of the conflict in Jubbaland.

Verney[36] agrees with Farah, Hussein and Lind when he observes that the Sudan conflict reveals demographic and environmental forces operating underneath the political and social chaos. Decreasing rainfall in pastoral areas, environmental degradation in agricultural islands, and technological economic stagnation, have combined to intensify ethnic conflicts over subsistence resources in both South and the North. The Nile River has funnelled external influence in Sudan for a long time and it serves as a connection to Egypt, which has successfully expanded large-scale agriculture while capturing resources from the South to empower the traditional modern elite in the North.

Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer[37] complement Verney's views when they show how oil exploration in Sudan gave an impetus to the government of Sudan's determination to forestall a lasting rapprochement with Southern demands for autonomy. Their case study indicates how oil exploration displaced the Dinka, Nuer and other Southern communities from their homes. At the same time there

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[36]   P. Verney, P., *Sudan: Conflict and Minorities,*. Minority Rights Group International, London, 1995, p. 123

[37]   P. Goldsmith, L. A. Abura, & Jason Switzer, 'Oil and Water in Sudan,' in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (Eds.), Op Cit, Pp. 187 – 241.

is pollution on the ecological base upon which their subsistence livelihoods are based. Oil production in Sudan generates revenue that was used to sustain an armed conflict that lasted for about twenty years.

Mwagiru[38] takes the above debate to another dimension when he observes that in practice an internationalised conflict has domestic sources. The domestic actors develop linkages with external actors while pursuing different goals. This creates interdependence between them. This tends to influence the negotiations and the outcome thereof. It is also possible to observe that domestic linkages with the external actors bring up the problem of impartiality in mediation. It is impossible to have a mediator whose interests will not interfere with the outcome of mediation. This is due to the motives of third party involvement.

Zartman[39] agree along with Mwagiru's view when he argues that the perceptions of the parties about the conflict and the mediation can have an effect on the outcome. This problem in DRC peace initiatives has become manifest with the exploitation and exportation of various minerals that exist in its subterranean land. The various actors that have an interest in the strategic minerals are competing for the resources and supporting various rebel groups to protect their mining interests.

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[38] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management,* Nairobi, Watermark, 2000, p. 62

[39] Zartman, I.W., Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost and Change' in I. W. Zartman (Ed), *Resolving Regional Conflict: International Perspectives*, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1991, Pp. 11 – 22.

From the literature review it is observed that the authors have highlighted majorly on domestic sources of conflict and how the interests of domestic actors are intermeshed with those external actors. At that level the interests of external actors affect the progress of peace initiatives in a territory. However the authors have not explored the role of external actors in the process of mediation. The study therefore seeks to fill the gap left out on analysing the role of external actors in the process of mediation. The research will focus therefore on investigating the role of external actors in the DRC conflict in the context of searching for peace.

1.5   Justification of the Study

This study can be justified both at academic and policy levels. At academic level the study will contribute towards the existing literature on the study of resource based conflicts and the management processes. It would also contribute to theory on the role of external actors and management of internal conflicts. This study presents an inquiry on the role of external actors in the process of conflict management. It seeks to entrench the view advanced by the conflict systems theory on the interconnectedness of a single conflict to other actors in the external environment. It will also put to test the third party intervention and the management of conflict.

At policy level, this study will contribute to policy decisions by conflict management organs of states and institutions to strategically determine the way

forward in ending conflicts through study of external actors and their interests. For example the UN has had the largest Military mission in the DRC yet the problem is protracted and the peace has not been restored in the territory. It is important to find out the impediments and address them effectively at institutional level.

1.6   Theoretical Framework

This study will rely on the conflict research in its investigations. This paradigm views international relationships as being based on a complex pattern of transactions and interrelationships.[40] These interactions engender conflict in the process. The conflict management arm of world society paradigm is conflict research.

Conflict research approaches conflict management by defining the issues that underlie the conflict. It identifies the parties' interests in a conflict and encourages them to understand the basis of their contending views. This is aimed at helping the parties to ultimately solve their conflict.[41]

The preoccupation of the institutions and states is to engage themselves in peace processes to settle conflicts peacefully. This is espoused in the UN Charter.[42]

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[40]   Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi, Watermark Publications, 2000, Pp. 39.

[41]   M. Light, Problem – Solving Workshops: The Role of Scholarship in Conflict Resolution in M. Banks (Ed.), *Conflict in World Society, A New Perspective on International Relations*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1984, Pp. 146 – 160.

[42]   UN, *UN Charter*, Article 2(4)

The DRC peace initiatives have tried to limit their scope of conflict management to this specification. Since the process of settlement of conflict would be long, it makes the conflict to be protracted and change in dimension. This brings us to the problem of conflict transformation. New issues arise, actors increase and the management process gets more complex. This significantly has to rely on the problem-solving workshop to gather consensus.

The conflict research paradigm also considers conflict resolution to be attainable only where post conflict relationships are legitimised and self-sustaining.[43] Conflict resolution must be achieved without the imposition of certain values on the conflicting parties. There must be situations where post conflict behaviour is based on criteria and understanding, which are acceptable to the conflicting parties. In searching for a resolution of the conflict, all interested parties must be involved in the process and the position of all parties should be taken into account. Conflict research is relevant here because it helps to expose the circumstances that fuel internal conflicts.[44] This is quite applicable to the DRC case study because the external actors seek to protect their exploitative operations in the DRC by using rebels or the government. This involvement intensifies the conflict while peace initiatives stall. The ruling class has established structures in the government that enable them to continue dominating the marginalized groups. By extension the government dominates all the decision-making mechanisms in

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[43]   Ibid
[44]   Groom, A. J., "Paradigms in Conflict; The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher;" In J. Burton & Dukes F. (Eds.) *Conflict: Readings in Management Resolution*, London: Macmillan, 1990, Pp. 71 – 198.

the state and this is in tune with the various national interests of external actors. The poor cannot fight back nor protect themselves because they are relegated to the periphery of their country's economy.[45] This makes it easier to organise the poor masses to join a rebellion. The world society paradigm will therefore cater for the analysis of the DRC conflict, the actors and the peace initiatives.

1.7   Hypotheses

This research makes the following hypotheses in its study:

1. Some external actors have contributed to conflict management in DRC through mediation.

2. Some external actors' interests in the DRC have contributed to conflict protraction through fighting for exploitation of natural resources.

3. Peace initiatives in the DRC conflict have failed because of the competing interests from some of the external actors

1.8   Definition of Concepts

Conflict: The term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.[46]

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[45]   Hollis, M. & Steve Smith: *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1990, Pp. 39.
[46]   Dougherty, J. E., & R. L., Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1971, p. 182.

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Conflict Management:

It is the process of introducing external actors or exogenous managers and introducing external factors such as mediation into a conflict. Conflict management can also be carried out by endogenous, exogenous or heterogeneous conflict managers. Endogenous refer to conflict managers who hail from within the conflict, exogenous are external to the conflict and heterogeneous exhibit both characteristics.[47]

Actors

The concept of actors refers to those parties that are directly or indirectly involved in an ongoing conflict.[48] They would be domestic i.e. those emanating from the territory, or external if the originate beyond the territorial boundaries of the state in conflict.

1.9   Research Methodology

This research relied on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered from the DRC embassy in Nairobi through interviews with the embassy staff. The interview also extended to the citizens of DRC working in the international organisations in Nairobi. The interviews used were structured in form. Structured interviews have pre-planned schedule of questions that aim to elicit specific responses from the respondents. The interviews follow a logical

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[47]   M. Mwagiru, *International Management of International Conflict in Africa; The Uganda Mediation 1985*, PhD Thesis, University of Kent 1994, p. 24
[48]   Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op cit, p 49

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sequence that keeps the interviewee interested to give responses that meet the objectives of a study.

The structured interviews enabled the researcher to make observations on the responses regarding the views that were sought from various interviewees. The variety of respondents provided room for comparisons on the strengths of responses and or biases. The structured interviews further restricted respondents to only respond to questions designed to elicit relevant information to the research.

The limitation of the structured interviews was observed to prejudice among respondents. Another limitation was observed in the bias that respondents had on being prompted with answer a question in a restrictive manner. However it was possible to counter this problem by increasing the sample size that targeted the DRC citizens in Nairobi and they held positions either at the Embassy or at various international organisations. This would have also been attended to through unstructured interviews but the time constraint contributed to not using this option.

Secondary data will be sourced from published texts, journals, newspapers, magazines and Internet. The secondary data will be qualitatively analysed and put in academic perspective in tandem with the proposed research topic. The limitation of these data emerge when need arises to probe or inquire more about

the postulations already published. The strength of this data is that it is credible and reliable having been subjected to academic theorisation. The secondary data also has an advantage that it has previously been critiqued to see the weaknesses and gaps in its corroboration.

The combination of primary and secondary forms of data will therefore form a compact basis for academic arguments and policy formulation. The researcher intends to validate the objectives not only from the theoretical basis but also from experiences founded in the society.

2.0 DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MANAGEMENTOF NATURAL RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS

2.1 Introduction

An overview on the role of external actors in the management of natural resource based conflicts takes a theoretical analysis of similar conflicts in the globe and the intervention strategies that have been used to bring about peace. The overview limits itself to natural resources based conflicts witnessed especially in the post-Cold War period. The majority of these conflicts have occurred in Africa. The relationship of the conflicts in nature type and causes shall be reviewed to determine whether conflicts are unique or they are the same. This approach will generate a view on whether a case study will be used to generalise the conflict management approaches.

The Chapter shall also make a summary on the contending views in regard to the role of external actors in the management of natural resource based conflicts. The challenges would also be reflected from the other case studies. The case studies shall provide a comparative framework to carry out the study on the role of external actors in the DRC conflicts. DRC conflict has been intensified as a result of both domestic and external factors. These factors will be analysed and synthesised to come up with an informed position on the contribution of external actors in the management of conflicts.

2.2 Overview on External Actors and Management of Natural Resource Based Conflicts (RBC) in Africa

The overview on external actors and the management of natural resource based conflicts takes a look of scholarly studies and debates on internal conflicts issuing from competition for resources. The literature under review is categorised on the basis of: debates on natural resources and emergence of internal conflicts, internationalisation of natural resource based conflicts, the role of external actors and intervention strategies in RBC.

Coser[49] observes that conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals. Conflict is therefore an interaction involving humans. It implies people compete with each other for something that is in shortage without being fully aware of their competitors' existence or without seeking to prevent the competitors from achieving their objectives. This is illustrated in the Somali conflict that involves many clans and sub-clans. Shifting alliances were formed between different clans and sub-clans to gain leverage in the conflict and to stake stronger claims to particular land resources.[50] In particular the ecological conditions of Jubbaland region in Southern Somalia are better compared with the rest of the former democratic republic and they provide a major source of income

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[49] L. A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York, Free Press, 1956, p. 3
[50] J. Lind, & K. Sturman (eds.), *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2002, p. 134

and sustenance to Somalis. Control of these resources is a major source of the conflict in Jubbaland.

Mwagiru[51] observes further that social conflicts emerge as a result of relations among people in the society and how the resources within the society are shared for the development of individuals. The potential for development is impeded by factors, which may be economic, social and essentially it is about the power struggle for the resources. He contends that the Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict prone parts of Africa as a result of inequitable distribution of resources. Mwagiru also observes that these conflicts are characterized by their protracted nature and spillover effects. The RBC eventually acquires an international dimension once actors from beyond the national borders begin taking part in the conflict. The process of internationalisation of resource based conflicts has created new challenges in the effort to make peace within a territory. The conflict resolution process therefore has to contend with the interests of eternal actors in the internationalised conflict areas.[52]

Markakis[53] contends that ethnicity certainly is a factor in the RBC since in nearly all cases, the opposing parties being to groups with different ethnic and clan identities. Further, he argues that whether such differences in themselves are

[51]   Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes & Institution of Management*, Nairobi, Watermark Publications, 2000, p. 26.
[52]   M. Mwagiru "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" in *IRG Conference Report on Regional Security in the Horn of Africa* (Series 8 Special Reports) Vol. I 1996.
[53]   J. Makakis in K. Fukui *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Ohio: Ohio University Press 1994, p. 217

sufficient cause for conflict is questionable. It is only when they analyse situations and realize that there has been an element of marginalisation by the incumbent's government that competition for resources emerge as a factor in the conflict.

In this context Enloe[54] concurs with the above view and highlights two factors considered as catalysts; competition for resources in conditions of great scarcity and secondly, the role the state plays on controlling the allocation of such resources. State controls the production and distribution of material and social resources and hence has become the focus of the conflicts. Access to power of the subjects is of vital importance for the welfare of its subjects. Enloe cites an example from the Horn of Africa and he observes that power access has not been available to many social groups in the Horn of Africa. This has consequently resulted to the state being both the object of the conflict and principle means by which it is waged.

Solomon[55] similarly observes that emergence of violent conflict is between the results of complex processes often with deep historical roots. ACCORD's Early Warning Systems[56] views conflict as the result of five sources of insecurity, which it defines in terms of political, economic, military environmental and social cultural variables. Often in conflict analysis it is possible to emphasize the political and military dimensions of a conflict at the expense of other variables,

[54] Enloe, H., *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, Boston Little Brown, 1973 pp. 22-23
[55] Solomon, H., "Analyzing Conflicts" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit p.35
[56] Ibid

which are often important and drive conflicts more directly. Samarasinghe[57] agrees that there is a functiona correlation existing between poverty and conflict. Most conflicts in the Horn of Africa actually all can be analyzed based on insecurities as well as poverty. In context the former conflict in the South Sudan has been excessively driven by the exclusion of the region from development.

Resource based conflicts are observed to afflict states domestically. According to Brown[58] internal conflicts are violent or potentially violent due to political disputes. Although the conflicts in Africa have a genesis in bad governance, mainly it is the people who are deprived of the rights to economic and political empowerment that lead to frustration and cumulative grievances eventually lead to violent conflict.

The line between internal and external conflict is rendered very thin especially in this era of globalisation. Even within states, the control of central authority as the custodian of sovereignty may also be limited by either conflict or structural and institutional weaknesses so as to generate crisis of state responsibility. This is espoused by Rupesinghe[59] in his discussion about disappearing boundaries.

[57]   S. Samarasinghe (ed) 'Conflict Management Throughout the Crisis Life Cycle' in H.Solomon, *Analysing Conflicts* op.cit.p. 35
[58]   M. Brown, *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,* Centre for Science and International Affairs Harvard University, Mit Press, 1996, p. 3
[59]   K. Rupensighe. "The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts" in E. Boulding, *Peace Research, Conflict and Security Re-examined,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp 43-64.

Holding a similar view is Koech[60] who contends that the notion of internationalisation of conflict raises the issue of the relationship between borders and states. He observes that the Somali conflict is rooted in inter-clan competition for state control and has gradually extended beyond its traditional boundaries. Neighbouring states are viewing the conflict with a concern over the insecurity it has caused in their common frontiers with Somalia.

Various views hold about security concerns in the Horn of Africa. Hiteng[61] observes that the proliferation of conflicts in the region has generated the problem of proliferation of light weapons. In addition he argues that the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of people within the region has made the trafficking of illegal arms much easier resulting into security vulnerability within and between communities in the Horn. Kiplagat[62] on political and security implications of conflict in the Horn argues that there have been millions of internally displaced persons and refugees, a crumbling infrastructure due to the unresolved conflicts ranging like bush fire across the region a torrent of small arms that may be a source of insecurity for years to come.

There have been various developments that render a conflict not to be considered as internal. These include the problem of ethnicity and borders inherited at

[60] Koech, J., "Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD in M. Mwagiru", *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*, Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation 2000, p.128
[61] C. Hiteng, "Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa in Mwagiru", *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* op cit p. 12
[62] B.A Kiplagat, " Politics and Security Implications" *in International Resource Group Conference Report* op cit p. 15

independence given the increase in number of internal conflicts in Africa this is an important consideration. This is espoused by Mwagiru[63] in his attempt to conceptualise internationalisation of conflict. The former OAU itself had a problem in its efforts to manage conflicts since it had dichotomized conflict as either internal or international conflict.[64]

However as noted by Mwagiru[65] the defunct OAU realized the reality and the strict dichotomy no longer exists. The context in which a conflict belongs should determine the type of conflict management. Conflict system approach gives useful pointers to the wide causes of conflict and eventually to the suitable management approaches that should be adopted. This approach advises that when managing a particular conflict all other conflicts should be held in contemplation. In case of Ethiopia Eritrea, it might have been seen like a conflict between only the two states but as the conflict progressed, it had regional linkages with Sudan Somalia and Djibouti and therefore its resolution meant taking into consideration other actors.

With the end of Cold War, the United Nations and regional organizations were called upon to assume greater responsibility for conflict resolution and prevention than ever before. But due to the changing nature of conflicts which was mostly

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[63] M. Mwagiru "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives". in *IRG Conference* Report, op. cit p. 30

[64] M. Mwagiru, *The Internal Management of Internal Conflict in Africa; The Uganda Mediation* 1985 (PhD Dissertation. University of Kent 1994) p. 145

[65] M. Mwagiru. "Conflict and Peace management in the Horn of Africa" *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation,* op cit p.70

within states a significant problem was posed for inter-governmental organizations which were designed to manage disputes between states and whose characters specifically prohibited them from interfering in the internal affairs of its members.[66] The AU fro example despite amending its constitutive act, it has faced an enormous tasks to resolve internal conflict in Africa due to weak political commitment on the part of the leaders. This is coupled with feeble structures in the African Union Commission to implement the decisions that are reached upon by the African leaders.

Peck[67] further argues that the UN and regional organizations had to reconsider how to meet this new challenge. This led to the ongoing debate about which kind of organization is best fit to carry out conflict prevention and resolution – the UN regional or sub-regional organization. She carried out a comparative study and concluded that strategic co-operation between the UN regional and sub regional organization and NGOs could also be expected to have a synergetic effect. Further she argues that increasing resources for conflict prevention and shifting the focus for preventive assistance approach could go along way to helping member states of the UN and regional organization work move effectively to ameliorate the many existing and potential conflict.

[66] Ibid
[67] C. Peck, "A More Strategic Partnership for Preventing and Resolving Conflict" *in* M. Mekenkamp, *Searching for Peace in Africa* op cit p.39

The preoccupation of the institutions that engage themselves in peace processes is to settle the conflict peacefully. This is espoused in the UN Charter.[68] The Somali peace processes have tried to limit their scope of conflict management to this specification. Since the process of settlement of conflict would be long, it makes the conflict to be protracted and change in dimension. This brings about the problem of conflict transformation. New issues arise, actors increase and the management process gets more complex. This significantly has to rely on the problem-solving workshop to gather consensus.

Peace and reconciliation initiatives in Somalia have involved the UN, the EC and the Djibouti government.[69] All of them have facilitated peace and reconciliation efforts. Although they have failed to take root, some of them have had positive impacts. The UN tried official diplomacy by targeting the direct warring groups, mainly the warlords, while the EC and the Djibouti government tried unofficial diplomacy by targeting members of the civil society. IGAD stands out as an effective institution with structures that have engaged an effective peace process where the UN and the US have failed.

A number of linkages bind different conflicts in the Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn to national, regional and international contexts.[70] It is evident that conflicts emanate from environmental resources that communities share. For

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[68] UN, *UN Charter*, Article 2(4)
[69] M. Mekenkamp, *Searching for Peace in Africa* op cit p.43
[70] João Gomes Porto, "Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective," in Lind, J. and Kathryn Sturman (Eds) Op Cit, Pp. 28.

example conflict between herders and farmers in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia and in the Nile flood plain in the Equatoria province of Sudan have linkages to wider regional conflicts involving Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt.[71] Despite these conflicts involving the sharing of the Nile waters, they also include other important sources of conflict as well.

A similar observation can be made in Eastern Congo where communities are fighting over the access to and control of natural resources. The conflict here is linked to the national conflict involving the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well the rebel movements and militia groups such as the Mai Mai. At the level of regional conflict, the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have established a number of alliances with local Congolese communities, rebel movements and local militias for political expediency. A key strategy of these alliances is to gain leverage in the struggle to control the extraction, marketing and export of the country's abundant natural resources.

Bigagaza, Abong and Mekarubaga, have done an extensive analysis on the issue of land and conflict in Rwanda.[72] In their analysis they reveal how ethnic mobilization by elite groups served as underlying competition for scarce resources. The response towards the land problem in Rwanda has been government intervention through land reform programme. The government

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[71] Ibid.

[72] J. Bigagaza, C. Abong and C. Mukarubaga, "Land Scarcity, Unequal Land Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda," in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (Eds.), Op Cit, Pp. 51 – 84.

proposed Rural Development Centres to mitigate land scarcity was essentially a failure. This was partly due to resistance to this programme by rural populations. The next move by the government was to initiate the villagisation programme in order to settle the Tutsi and Hutu refugees. This was aimed at mitigating conflict emerging over property and land by the returned refugees. But the government still faces a problem in its implementation due to huge population. It is evident therefore that the government requires sufficient financial support to realize this programme.

In Burundi, a similar theme of land scarcity and inequality form the basis of the conflict that has recurred frequently in the agricultural rich state. Oketch and Polzer focus on coffee production, which accounts for 80% of Burundi's foreign exchange receipts.[73] Over-reliance on a single crop leaves the country vulnerable to global markets and scarcity. A predatory state-dominated system links the production and marketing of coffee to the country's long running civil war. The peace processes in Burundi have involved official and unofficial initiatives. Regional and international peace interventions included OAU military observer mission from 1993, and the military intervention of UN, EU and US sent special representatives. These initiatives had little effect. The international and regional initiatives, sanctions and the Arusha peace process did have significant, but very

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[73] J. S. Oketch & T. Polzer, "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi," in Lind J. & Kathryn Sturman (eds.), Ibid. Pp. 85 – 156.

ambivalent effects.[74]   These external initiatives dwelled more on the political and

military interventions but they did not take into account the core issues of natural

resources. The conclusion one can make from here is that conflicts cannot be

brought to an end through external actors' efforts. Since 1998, the official peace

process has been framed in a series of meetings in Arusha. This process was seen

as the key to future peace in Burundi but may in practice legitimize a continuation

of the war. This is due to elite struggle to control the state and the fact that armed

Hutu rebel groups have not been included in the negotiations. This shows that

conflict resolution attempts are far from achieving the conditions for a positive

peace, which would allow for a transformation of the structural underlying causes

of the conflict.

The DRC conflict has been protracted since the overthrow of President Mobutu

Sese Seko in 1997.[75] Since then DRC has only had *ad hoc* and informal

diplomatic mediation initiatives. Most have been African-led efforts launched by

groups of nearby states, influential heads of state, or operational sub-regional

organization outside Central Africa.   The UN, Western governments and

international non-government organizations attempted to bring the influence and

capabilities to bear.   These peace initiatives focused on establishment of a

ceasefire, freezing of the territorial control of all conflict parties, deployment of a

UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, establishment of a joint military commission

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[74]   Oketch, S. J., *A Critical Evaluation of Sanctions as Third Party Leverage in the Management of Internal Conflict: The Burundi Peace Process, 1993 – 2000*, M. A. Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.
[75]   Fukui, K. *Ethnicity and Conflict in Africa*, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004, p. 124

made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement and initiation and setting up of the inter Congolese National Dialogue, aimed to bring about a new political order in Congo. The initiatives including the Lusaka accord have not focused on how to fully bring about a lasting peace process.

Fukui[76] further notes that the Somali conflict has also lasted for the last sixteen years as a result of conflict involving many clans and sub-clans. Shifting alliances were formed between different clans and sub-clans to gain leverage in the conflict and to stake stronger claims to particular stakes in the government. The just concluded IGAD-led Somali peace process is still fragile. Previous peace and reconciliation initiatives in Somalia had involved the UN, the EC and the Djibouti government. All of them facilitated peace and reconciliation efforts. Although they failed to take root, some of them had positive impacts. The UN tried official diplomacy by targeting the direct warring groups, mainly the warlords, while the EC and the Djibouti government tried unofficial diplomacy by targeting members of the civil society. The external influences are observed here to shape the internal conflict dynamics and peace processes.

Verney[77] concurs with the above debate when he looks into what is happening in Sudan. The Sudan conflict reveals demographic and environmental forces operating underneath the political and social chaos. Decreasing rainfall in pastoral areas, environmental degradation in agricultural islands, and technological economic stagnation, have combined to intensify ethnic conflicts

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[76] Ibid, p. 167

[77] P. Verney, P., *Sudan: Conflict and Minorities.* Minority Rights Group International, London, 1995.

over subsistence resources in both South and the North. The Nile River has funnelled external influence in Sudan for a long time and it serves as a connection to Egypt, which has successfully expanded large-scale agriculture while capturing resources from the South to empower the traditional modern elite in the North. The long-standing conflict in Sudan was complicated and protracted by the discovery of oil.[78] The peace initiatives in Sudan were frustrated more since the government started to expand oil production and hence realising higher government revenue. The government hardened its position during the IGAD-led pace process, 1998-2005, especially when it realized most oil rich fields are located in the South. However through external intervention, IGAD concluded the peace process with a comprehensive peace agreement. IGAD enabled the Sudan peace by aligning competing parties, their interests and approaches.[79]

The above observations indicate that an internationalised conflict has domestic sources. The domestic actors develop linkages with external actors while pursuing different goals. This creates interdependence between them. This tends to influence the negotiations and the outcome thereof. It is also possible to observe that domestic linkages with the external actors bring up the problem of impartiality in mediation. It is impossible to have a mediator whose interests will not interfere with the outcome of mediation. This is due to the motives of third party involvement.

[78] P. Goldsmith, L. A. Abura, & Jason Switzer, 'Oil and Water in Sudan,' in Lind, J. & Kathryn Sturman (Eds.), Op Cit, Pp. 187 – 241.
[79] ICG, *God, Oil and Country*, ICG Group, Brussels, 2002, Pp. 219.

External intervention of conflicts is motivated by the sub-regional organisations. In Africa these entities have been involved in conflict intervention in various regions. In West Africa, ECOWAS through its Monitoring Group has intervened in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.[80] It undertook military peace keeping to improve the security situation in these states as a result of internal conflicts. Over time ECOWAS's peace and security framework has developed the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security. This mechanism is charged with responding to sub-regional conflicts ranging from fact-finding and diplomatic efforts to military intervention. In addition ECOWAS has been active in other conflicts like that of Ivory Coast and the Mano River Union through mediation efforts, fact-finding missions and some peace-keeping deployments. These observations are indicative that international organisations at regional level are capable of responding to conflicts through various methodologies to enhance peace and security.

This trend is also reflected in the Southern African region by SADC.[81] Through its organ for Politics, Defence and Security it has managed to enhance peace and security among its member countries. This organ has the authority to specify the type of intervention that should be adopted in various crises. SADC has been involved in diplomatic and military interventions in DRC and Lesotho with fair success. Despite it regional dimension in membership, SADC has been faced with hindrances emerging from unilateralism and the procedures to be used in the

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[80] Saferworld International Alert, *EU Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa*, Rome, Saferworld International Alert, 2003, p 44
[81] Ibid

intervention of conflicts. The problem has been addressed through institutional revision of the legal framework for intervention. This will prevent future loopholes for unilateral action. This approach is essential to strengthen the institution's ability to promote regional peace and Security.

The above problem is not only confined to Africa. Goldstein observes that NATO has been an establishment that looks into the European and North American interests.[82] Initially it was founded in 1949, to deter Soviet power in Europe during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War period NATO has been key in the military intervention in Europe. In 1994, NATO through UN mandate took part in the military peace keeping in Bosnia. Its military strategy raised furore from the UN sand Russia when it used air strikes against the strong Serbian forces to protect the Bosnian civilians. NATO's credibility in intervening in future conflicts was put into question. On one hand the Soviet leaders protested over its intention to dominate in the Eastern Europe and on the other, tension started emerging between the American and European members over the new role of NATO in post-Cold War period.[83] Despite these impediments NATO has provide some stability among its member states.

Therefore many contemporary intergovernmental organisations are created by states through means of concluding an international treaty for a set purpose. A

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[82] Goldstein, J.S., *International Relations*, Washington DC, Priscilla McGeehan, New York, 2001. p. 99

[83] Yost, D. S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, Washington DC, US Peace Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p.67

constituent instrument and international organisation provides for certain rights and capabilities of the organisation, which lead to the conclusion that the organisation possesses a certain degree of international legal personality to intervene in conflict as an external actor. Sub-regional organisations derive their mandate to manage conflicts in a region from the member states. Member states recognise regional stability as a basic factor in social and economic development. The sub-regional organisations have become a permanent feature of external actors in the management of internal conflicts.

2.3   Summary

The overview of internal conflicts in Africa indicates that they cannot be resolved internally by the parties to conflict. The conflicts instead intensify as eternal actors take centre specific sides and polarise the conflict. The conflicts are gradually tilting to mediation by third parties. The third parties are central in the negotiations. The peace processes through mediation seek to align the competing interests within the state and their external allies.

There are various challenges that are confronting peace processes in Africa. Some internal conflicts are linked to the resources that are in demand in international markets. The various trans-national agents would support a party to conflict hoping to control the exploitation of the precious resource. The violence escalates as communities that are resident in the resource areas are displaced to give way for exploitation. This means conflicts will last as long as the

exploitation continues without an understanding between the parties to conflict on how to share the resource.

There external actors who are identified as individual leaders, states, sub-regional, regional or supranational organisations, have various limitations in spearheading peace process to a successful end. These limitations include acceptability to parties to conflict, the ability to mobilise resources and the intervention strategies. While every peace process should pacify a conflict, some processes took long to be concluded due to lack of common understanding and poor alignment of interests.

This Chapter has laid a foundation on the approaches to interventions in intrastate conflicts. The role of external actors has been captured and it will be used to conduct an analysis of external actors in the natural resource based conflict in DRC.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1997-2007)

3.1 Introduction

The DRC conflict has been protracted and the various interventions have not brought about comprehensive peace. The Chapter begins by providing a background about the DRC conflict. It gives historical, political and economic views about the conflict. The Chapter further contextualises the DRC conflict in the framework of external actors as factor in contributing to peace. However at another level the analysis considers the external actors as a source of polarisation of the parties to the conflict.

The Chapter also collates views from both primary and secondary sources and entrenches the theoretical and practical views about the management of conflicts. Finally this Chapter links the issue of natural resources and peace processes. The perspective of greedy and grievance in management of conflict would be linked to the various actors at sub-regional, regional and extra-regional levels.

3.2 Background to the DRC Conflict

In providing background to conflict, provides a basis for conflict analysis and management. The background also provides an anatomy for setting the conflict management process. In this context various tools of conflict analysis will be used.

The DRC conflict is attributed to historical and colonial legacies. The first colonial state to control DRC was Belgium in 1908. The DRC remained under the colonial supremacy till June 1960 when it acceded its independence with Patrice Lumumba as a prime minister and Joseph Kasa Vubu as the first president.[84] Internal struggle for regional control and exploitation of the resources in the Katanga region led to the assassination of Lumumba. The country then experienced a series of rebellions and secessionist movements sometimes with the direct encouragement of external actors.

The above observation was exemplified in the US support for the coup by Colonel Mobutu Seso Seko who successfully organised the 1965 coup and assumed power till 1997. In 1997 the regime of Mobutu was overthrown by an alliance under the leadership of Laurent Desiré Kabila and strongly backed by a number of African governments.[85] Laurent Kabila was subsequently assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, as president of the DRC. This phenomenon is congruent to the idea advanced by Mwagiru[86] in his view on internationalization of conflict. In his view the process of internationalization involves the interdependence of one actor on another to attain crucial resources of power. In DRC the actors in power sought external assistance to attain power.

[84] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, ICG Africa Report, Vol 26, no 20*, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2000, P. 5
[85] Vlassenroot, K., *Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo*, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen. 2004, P. 19
[86] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op cit, P. 61

The DRC has been engaged in many wars since its independence in 1960.[87] Most of the fighting is linked to the external exploitation of its immense natural resources initially dominated by the immense copper wealth to be found in the Katanga province in the south. The plundering of Congolese resources remains a constant parameter in the analysis of the various violent episodes that manifest the contemporary conflict.

The DRC conflict forms its own conflict system. Conflict system theory espouses the view that activities in one conflict environment influences activities in another territory of conflict. Mwagiru[88] observes that conflicts are indivisible and therefore cannot be separated from other in a given environment. The DRC conflict demonstrates this phenomenon since the conflict at one level is linked to the exodus of about 1.2 million Hutu refugees across the border from Rwanda, following the capture of Kigali by the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front in July 1994.[89] Among the refugees that fled into Zaire at the time were many members of the defeated Rwandan army (*Forces armees Rwandaises* or FAR) and Hutu militias (the *Interahamwe*) who had perpetrated the mass killing of some 800 000 Tutsi. The sudden influx of refugees into Zaire created a new security risk along the border between the DRC and Rwanda, as it altered the existing demographic dynamic and ethnic balance in the eastern part of the Congo. In this sense, it can be argued that the refugee crisis of 1994–95 exported the Rwandan ethnic and political conflict to Zaire and greatly contributed to the further escalation of the

[87] Ibid, P. 21
[88] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Concepts, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op Cit, Pp 73-74.
[89] Ibid, P. 24

conflict in the DRC. It would therefore be conclude that Rwanda contributes directly to the DRC conflict due to the internal instability and the fleeing refugees.

The DRC conflict is an epicenter to the conflict system in the Great Lakes. This conflict system region has drawn actors from the east and the central African region. The conflict intensified in 1996 between the then Zairian forces of Mobutu and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) as a result of internal and external factors.[90] However though this was the situation internally, the AFDL, a rebel movement led by the late Laurent Desiré Kabila was externally supported by Angola, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Eritrea. The Rwandan military forces provided aid and direction to the rebellion that included Tutsis and other discontented groups.

Rwanda's primary interest for its support to the rebellion was to press into eastern DRC in order to rid the area of all 'Interahamwe' and ex-FAR forces who had fled Rwanda after the genocide but continued to create instability in their home country. Rwanda also had objected to Mobutu's policy of tolerating the Hutu militant camps. The campaign of the AFDL culminated in May 1997 when its troops took over Kinshasa and it forced the then President the late Mobutu to flee the country. A victorious Laurent Kabila soon announced that Zaire would henceforth be known as the Democratic Republic of Congo. The establishment

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[90] G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, 'War, Peace and Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo' in *World Political Science Review, Volume 2, Issue 3*, 2006, Pp. 223-233

of the Kabila regime brought about a new order in the state and triggered new episode of violence.

3.3   Sub-regional Actors in DRC Conflict

The theoretical basis for explaining the entry of international organisations in management of conflict is embedded on third party in conflict management. Mwagiru[91] observes that internationalization of conflict gives third party a broader and more sophisticated view to manage the conflict. He further notes that third party responses to internal conflict are motivated by the interests of the member state interests in the sub-region. In this view management of conflict by sub-regional actors shall reflect a consideration of humanitarian and state-centric views.

These sections review the position of the states that are contiguous to the DRC and their particular role in the DRC conflict. In this analysis the direct involvement of the states actors in the DRC would be evaluated to determine the motives and the outcome of each state. The comparative and cumulative participation of the various actors indicate the complexity of the conflict in endeavour to make peace.

The external dimension to the DRC conflict in producing an inter-state battle with the direct involvement of eight African states increased the enormity and

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[91] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Concepts, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op Cit, P. 70

complexity of the crisis.[92] The DRC assumed an unprecedented magnitude for two inter-related reasons. Firstly, the DRC was a battleground for the internal disputes of six neighbouring countries. They were the conflicts between: the MPLA government of Angola and the UNITA rebel movement; the minority Tutsi government in Burundi and the pro-Hutu rebels of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL); the Sassou Nguesso government of Congo-Brazzaville and militias backing the ousted president Pascal Lissouba and his ally, the former prime minister, Bernard Kolelas; the Rwandese government of Paul Kagame and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe that were responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the Museveni government in Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); and the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

The DRC conflict is observed to be an epicenter of conflicts in the Great Lakes sub-region.[93] DRC conflict therefore forms a patterned interaction in the region with other actors in the sub-region. Secondly the conflict in the DRC provided an opportunity for inter-state hostilities, produced by the domestic disputes, to be played in DRC territory.[94] For example the conflict between Sudan and Uganda illustrates this argument clearly. The governments of Sudan and Uganda went to war because of each one's support for the rebel movements that were trying to

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[92] Interview of the researcher with Head of Political Affairs, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

[93] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Concepts, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op Cit, P. 73

[94] Interview of the Researcher with Head of Political Affairs, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

oust the other. Uganda supported the SPLA because Khartoum backed the LRA and ADF rebels. Sudan, therefore, rallied to the support of Kabila, because its enemy, Uganda, was at war with the DRC government.

External actors get involved in the process of conflict when pursuing certain strategic interests. The sources of interest in a conflict for these external actors are the economic benefits of the resources in the territory under conflict.[95] Actors with vested interests in resources control and exploitation came into play in the DRC conflict and they intervened in the conflict by offering military aid that escalated the conflict. Rwanda and Uganda assisted the UNITA rebels in transportation of military hardware and the sale of diamonds, because Angola was backing Kinshasa. In this regard the military the alliances and counter alliances of the rebel groups in various states within the region magnified the conflict into a seemingly irresolvable proportion. The two actors therefore would not contribute to peace making process in DRC.

The DRC conflict is linked to the activities and events of the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994.[96] It is noted that at that time the Mobutu regime was collapsing and the country was ungovernable. With a dysfunctional government, stripped of its legitimacy and facing popular resistance, the DRC was powerless to stop the genocide or deal effectively with its repercussions within the country. Both the Hutu and the Tutsi were to benefit significantly from the situation in the DRC.

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[95] Cilliers, J. & C. Dietrich. *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000, Pp 26-7

[96] Interview of the Researcher with the Political Affairs Director, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

The Hutu took advantage of the weakened defence force (Zaïre Armed Forces or ZAF) and established bases in the DRC, bringing with them as much military equipment as the French Army's Operation Turquoise would allow. Consequently soldiers from the former national army (Rwandan Armed Forces or RAF), as well as the extremist Hutu militia or *"interahamwe"* were able to infiltrate refugee camps in DRC without government interference from either DRC or Rwanda.

The above observation points out that the conflict of DRC was given an impetus to escalate as a result of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The Rwandan government's key input in the DRC was to support the fighting rebels and subsequently overthrow the Mobutu regime.

Angola took part in the escalation of the DRC conflict. Angola's experienced and better equipped army played a role in the actual military operations such as defeat of mercenaries in Kisangani, Lubumbashi and the Unita in Kenge.[97]   Angola desired to have a stable neighborhood tom contain the rebel activities of UNITA in its northern frontier. In this regard the Congo government sought to intervene in the DRC with an objective of stabilizing its own national security.

External actors do get into an internal conflict as a result of internationalization of the conflict. The process of internationalization in the DRC conflict and Rwanda

[97]   Interview of the Researcher with the Political Affairs Director, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

follow the conceptualization of refugees and internationalization.[98] Rwanda's

Hutu population transcends into DRC. Rwanda's offensive against the Hutu

refugee camps and ex-RAF and *interahamwe* bases was the turning point in the

victory of the Allied Democratic Forces. The tensions between DRC and

neighbouring Rwanda leads to a threat of interventions as was the case in 2004

when a Rwandan backed faction of 2-3000 soldiers headed by two renegade

commanders, took over the city of Bukavu in South Kivu from June 2-9 June,

2004.[99] The Rwanda government and leadership are holding in at least 10 mines

in DRC, and that the basic economy of the Rwandan capital Kigali is based on

Congo resources. A full scale intervention from Rwandan side is not intended for

a comprehensive peace but rather to protect their interests in the DRC territory. A

possible violent outcome of the tensions is further likely as a result of the post-

Rwandan genocide pursuit of reconciliation and justice. In August 2004 the key

argument from Rwandan government was that if DRC could not track down the

Interahamwe on Congolese territory, Rwanda must go in and take them out.

Rwanda and Ugandan combined efforts to support the Allied Democratic Forces

for the Liberation of Congo in order to hide their own expansionist agendas and to

improve national security in their national frontiers. Once they realised it would

be impossible to set up a responsive regime to their interests under Kabila, they

decided to have him deposed and coordinated an aggressive assault against his

[98] Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Concepts, Processes and Institutions of Management*, P. 68
[99] Interview of the Researcher with the Political Affairs Director, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

regime. The Uganda and Rwanda regimes initiated this input because of the proximity to the DRC and the threats the conflict had to the national security.

On 13 September 1998 at the annual SADC summit in Mauritius, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was mandated to lead the mediation efforts, assisted by Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano.[100] This initiative, which became known as the Lusaka peace process, drafted modalities for the implementation of a political settlement which culminated in the signing of a cease-fire agreement at the heads of state summit on 10 July 1999 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LA) made provisions for the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement of armed forces. It also provided for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops and the appointment of a facilitator for an all-inclusive inter-Congolese political negotiation. The initiative considered for the deployment of a United Nations (UN) Peace-keeping force, the disarmament of armed groups from neighbouring countries and the formation of a national army. The LA was thwarted by renewed hostilities and fraught with implementation difficulties, it remained the most articulate basis to resolve the crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Libya took an initiative to broker peace between the leader of DRC and that of Uganda, Chad and Eritrea.[101] The Libyan initiative was motivated more by the

[100]   Interview of the Researcher online with Media Personnel Attached to MONUC, 8th September, 2007
[101]   Interview of the Researcher with the Head of Political Affairs, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

pariah status it held prior to joining the African continental politics in the post-cold war period. The Libyan regime saw an opportunity to advance its power relations in African continent. The outcome of Libyan leader's effort to create a durable peace in DRC led to the conclusion of the Sirte agreement. On 18 April 1999, the Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi, brokered a peace agreement between Museveni and Kabila, which was also signed by the Presidents of Chad and Eritrea. Signed in the Libyan town of Sirte, the agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Chad, subsequently, withdrew its troops from the country and Libya sent some 40 military personnel to Uganda to prepare for the deployment of a proposed neutral African peacekeeping force provided for under the Sirte agreement.

South Africa initiated a peace process to end the DRC conflict. The South Africa initiative was on 23 August 1998, at an urgent SADC summit in Pretoria. The former South African President Nelson Mandela, then chairman of the SADC, was mandated to organise a cease-fire in consultation with the OAU.[102] South Africa sought to stabilities DRC because it threatened South Africa's trade and commercial interests in the neighbouring SADC member states. South Africa enjoyed a wide market for its manusafactured goods in the SADC region where DRC is a member. However, Mandela's mediation efforts were said to have been constrained by disagreement with Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, on who should head the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security that was used to authorise the military intervention in support of Kabila.

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[102]   Ibid

South Africa took a position in DRC based on the authority that binds its historic events of 1994, the continuing economic influence of the white establishment, the country's robust institutions and a strong civil society; most leaders who fall within this category were formerly in the military and head autocratic regimes.[103] South Africa also identified its own strategic and economic interests. Even in this era of globalisation, star wars and anti-missile shields, whereby imperialist nations continue to focus on regional alliances to support their interests, particularly where access to resources is concerned. The natural resources found in the DRC are essential for state of the art technology, the space and aeronautical industries, for South Africa's industrial process.

3.4 Regional Actors

3.4.1 The African Union

On 10 September 1998, the OAU hosted a meeting of ministers in Addis Ababa during which a draft cease-fire agreement was formulated. That agreement, though agreed to in principle by the belligerents, was never signed. The African Union therefore is yet to play a significant role to end the DRC conflict due to lack of initiative from the African leaders.[104]

At its Fourth Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa on 15 and 16 March 2004, the Executive Council, a policy making organ of the Union was briefed on the

[103] Ibid
[104] Interview of the Researcher online with a Media Personnel with the MONUC, 8th Sept, 2007, Lubumbashi, DRC.

evolving situation in the DRC.[105] It was reported that Union should seek for the establishment of the transitional institutions provided for by the Comprehensive and All Inclusive Agreement adopted in Pretoria, South Africa, on 17 December 2002, and endorsed by the Parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa, on 2 April 2003. It was further noted that the pacification of the Ituri Region by the UN Forces had led to a thaw in the relations between the Parties to the peace process and abated the security and humanitarian situation in the country.

AU is member of the International Transition Support Committee and of the Technical Committee established by the International Community to backstop the electoral process.[106] The African Union actively supports the transition process, alongside the United Nations, the European Union, representatives of the Permanent Members of the Security Council based in Kinshasa and other African and foreign partners of the peace process. The AU also participates in many missions within the country, carried out by those two international transition support organs. For instance, the AU Office was part of a Joint Mission, comprising representatives of the UN, the Transitional Government, the Embassies of France, Belgium and Spain, the UNDP and the European Union, which visited Bunia, Ituri, at the end of February 2004. During the visit, the delegation had a working session with the leaders of the armed groups, who pledged to resume dialogue with the Government to find a solution to the

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[105] Interview of the Researcher online with a Media Personnel with the MONUC, 8th Sept, 2007, Lubumbashi, DRC.
[106] Ibid

instability in the Region. The delegation inaugurated the town's new Prison, Court and Police Station.

3.5   Extra-Regional Actors

3.5.1 United Nations

The United Nations has placed initially intended to have a military mission to a total number of 16,700. In July 2003 the Security Council agreed to strengthen the mandate of MONUC and increase the number of peace keepers to 10,800 UN soldiers instead of the 5,200 it already had in place in the DRC.[107] The mission was to protect civilians and aid workers. The Ituri region, which contains some of the world's largest gold reserves, had transformed into a bloodbath large magnitude.

UN also sent military troops to the DRC conflict to pacify the warring factions. The military interventions in form of peace monitoring missions or direct military interference were deployed to prevent the escalation of the conflict. UN interventions and peace keeping missions carried with them the capability to establish ethical standards that could be a leading example for future operations in DRC conflict. However examples from eastern DRC where UN troops took advantage of their power position to have sex with distressed women for simple vital necessity as bananas aggravated the conflict despite the presence of the peace keepers.

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[107] United Nations, *Report on Peace Keeping Operations*, New York: United Nations, 2004, P. 5

The DRC conflict has manifested mixed reactions form various external actors. There are those actors offering genuine to DRC to support peace. These are the AU, UN and the SADC. These organizations have made arrangements to pacify the country despite the myriad challenges that are witnessed. However the majority of individual state actors are sabotaging or supporting the government depending on the gains to be made. The individual states have been indicated to seek opportunities to exploit the resources in the DRC. The mixed policies towards the DRC by regional actors has interfered with the peace agreements or play part in dishonoring the agreements made between the government and the rebels. To date the DRC continues to contend with the problem of infighting as a result of external interests playing against each other in its mineral rich territory.

This Chapter has presented an expose of the external actors and their impact to the conflict dynamics and the management of an internal conflict. The external actors are not motivated by central values for pursuing peace in a region. The wars that are fought in DRC are not confined to the interests of the domestic actors. The external actors have a big role to help the parties to conflict to resolve the DRC conflict if they seek to harmonize their perception of the conflict.

4.0   CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter attempts to make a synthesis of the findings in other chapters. It evaluates the findings of the research on the basis of objectives set in the background to the study, and tests the hypotheses to validate the research outcomes. The chapter therefore makes an evaluation that brings to fore the role of external actors in the DRC conflict and peace processes.

The research set out in Chapter One to find out the role of external actors in the DRC conflict.[108] The chapter also laid a foundation for carrying out the study by defining the concepts of external and conflict management process. The concept of conflict identified three dimensions that are connected to decision making, societal and trans-societal aspects of gender was defined as the state of nature that aggregates human beings as being men or women. The concept of conflict was defined as a social phenomenon where two parties hold divergent views about a common goal and how to attain it.[109] This explanation provides for a perception that conflict may be about values, wants and interests which are negotiable and could be subject to settlement. But conflicts about human needs are non-negotiable and cannot be compromised, tended or repressed. At another level the concept of conflict management was defined as the process of introducing external actors in the mediation of a conflict. These definitions laid a basis for

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[108] For further details refer to Chapter 1 of this Study
[109] J. W. Burton, World Society, London, Cambridge University Press, 1971, Pp. 46 – 47.

operationalising the variables of study in the research that seeks to examine the role of external actors in the management of the DRC conflict.

Chapter One also made a foundational framework to guide the study.[110] First it defined the objectives of the study, and then it made assumptions or hypotheses on the proposed research. It further theorised the conflict system approach is appropriate for the study of the DRC conflict. The theory indicated that the study would consist of complex evaluation of the relationships and interactions between actors and issues within the Great Lakes region conflict system.

Chapter Two presented an overview of natural resource based conflicts.[111] The Chapter conceptualised that natural resources trigger internal conflicts as a result of greed or grievance. Greed or grievance emerges whenever there are disparities on how to share the resource available in a territory. The Chapter revealed that internal conflicts in Africa are difficult to resolve without intervention of external third parties. The natural resource based conflicts were observed to intensify each time external actors take specific sides in favour of one party to the conflict. Third party intervention in a peace process through seeks to align the competing interests within the state and their external allies.

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[110] For More Details Check in Chapter One of this Study
[111] Refer to Chapter Two of the Study

Chapter Two similarly identified the various challenges confronting peace processes in natural resource based conflicts.[112] It was observed that natural resource based conflicts are linked to the resources that are in high demand in international markets. Various trans-national agents would support a party to conflict hoping to control the exploitation of the precious resource that fetches high returns in the international market. The violence inevitably escalates as communities that are resident in the resource areas are displaced to give way for exploitation. This means natural resource conflicts are protracted in the set up where a contestation arises in regard to exploitation and sharing of the proceeds.

The second Chapter further traced the dynamics of natural resource based conflicts.[113] It emerged that the resource based conflicts and the management approaches differ according to the type of the resource and the ease at which it could be exploited and sold in the international markets. The Chapter demonstrated further that natural resource based conflicts lead to struggle for territorial control and secession. Conflicts are expected to arise from human relations when individuals or groups have different values, needs and interests and they are not met. Conflict emerges whenever resources are not available in unlimited quantities and access to them has to be controlled and fought for. Social disparity in the control and access of resources portends a strong source of conflict. It thus requires a comprehensive peace process to collectively address the interests of he various actors to avoid post-conflict insecurity.

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[112] More details Captured in Chapter Two of the Study, Section 2.1
[113] Ibid

Chapter Three tackled the case study of external actors and the management of the DRC conflict.[114] The Chapter made some findings in regard to the role of natural resources, the external actors and the management of the DRC conflict. It was established that the external actors have a determined position that would affect the sustainability of any peace agreement.[115] It was observed that the various peace initiatives engaged in the DRC have not realised a comprehensive peace agreement. The SADC initiative, the South African engagement, the Libyan peace process fro DRC failed to broker an ideal peace agreement. The interpretation here would be attributed to the improper redress of the various external actors interests such the Rwandan and Ugandan interests that support the rebels inside DRC to continue exploiting the resources. The peace agreements could not be enforced when on the ground there would be hostility towards the government and when the stakeholders are not bound to respect he peace truce.

The AU and the UN have been demonstrated as the actors with sufficient resources to intervene and dissuade the actors from engaging in natural resource based conflicts.[116] The AU and the UN have continental and universal support respectively to engage military action to avert humanitarian crises and foresee a transition to peace in territory. At continental level the Au has the mandate to pacify conflicts in the member states. The action by the AU to negotiate for generated a sufficient background for supranational intervention through the UN.

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[114] More details can be referred Chapter, Section 3.1

[115] Interview of the Researcher online with Media Personnel Attached to MONUC, 8th September, 2007

[116] Interview of the Researcher with the Political Affairs Director, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007

In Chapter Three, the research observed that the UN through MONUC has managed to work towards peace in the DRC.[117] First the military presence in DRC has averted the humanitarian crisis that existed prior to 2004. Secondly MONUC managed to foresee the election process in the year 2005 and the installation of a democratically elected government. And fourthly MONUC has been able to continuously monitor the ceasefire agreements and has prevented rebel from interfering with the government rule of law. The UN continues to find many challenges on the ground. As a result of the external interferences from Uganda and Rwanda, the UN has been unable to restore peace in the Eastern part of the DRC. Uganda and Rwanda continue supporting militias in the DRC territory to safeguard those areas rich in minerals for ease in exploitation and transportation.

Chapter three also identified some of the reasons for escalation of the DRC conflict. The first reason that was evident is the competing interests for the rich resources in the DRC by the external actors.[118] The neighbouring states such as Rwanda, Angola and Uganda are seeking to benefit in kind or through militia engagement, from the resources in the DRC territory. The support to rebels is to allow these states to exploit the resources.

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[117] Interviews of the Researcher with Media Personnel working in DRC
[118] Interview of the Researcher with the Political Affairs Director, Embassy of DRC, Nairobi, September 5, 2007.

The second reason that was identified is lack of wide consultation among the regional actors before initiating the peace process.[119] This would be attributed to competing states' interests. On one hand it would be contended that the neighbouring states viewed different opportunities and threats in the DRC conflict. Uganda and Rwanda saw that the instability in DRC would threaten their national security as rebels found a humble environment to regroup and train for an offensive in the Rwanda and Uganda regimes. The inaction by DRC government on the rebels in the Eastern DRC led the two states to carry out their own military operations in DRC to secure a buffer Zone with their frontiers. The peace process in DRC would require Uganda and Rwanda to participate and contribute towards the building peace.

The peace initiatives in DRC demonstrated that the peace initiatives addressed singular agendum. For example the Lusaka initiative was addressing the concerns of SADC region. The Member countries such Angola, Mozambique and South Africa were seeing an opportunity for trade and investment in DRC if peace was attained.[120] The peace initiatives however ran into obstacles that emerged from lack of an agreement over which parties should be acknowledged as belligerents, lack of an agreement on cease-fire talks and the direct involvement of the rebels in these negotiations, the stalling of the peace process by a crumbling of strategic alliances, the choice of a mediator for an all-inclusive internal dialogue; the implementation problems experienced by the MONUC; and the sustainability of

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[119] Ibid
[120] Interview of the Researcher, online, with Media Personnel with the MONUC, 8th Sept, 2007, Lubumbashi, DRC.

the war from the exploitation of the DRC natural resources, in particular its minerals. A combination of these factors led to disjointed decisions that would not forge binding decisions that would produce sustainable peace.

The Third Chapter demonstrates the first objective of the study that set out to find out the role of external actors in conflict management in the DRC. It emerged that the external actors act as mediators in the DRC conflict. However the mediators in the DRC peace processes have emerged to hold diverse motives in the mediation. The motives of the mediators have led to unsustainable peace due inadequate consultations and harmonization of the actors' interests. The conflict research theory revealed here that the multiplicity of intervals makes a conflict more complex to resolve.[121]

The third Chapter also addressed the second objective of he t study that set to investigate the nature and type of external actors involved in the DRC conflict and its management. The Chapter depicted the actors in the DRC peace processes included states, sub-regional organisations, regional and supra-national organisations. State actors include the neighbouring states to DRC such as Angola and Mozambique. Others are African states such as Libya, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC sub-regional organisation was in the forefront to initiate peace to protect the interests of the member states in the Southern African region.

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[121] More details on Conflicts Research Theory are captured in Chapter one of the Study, Section 1.6

The third objective of the study was to inquire into the factors that motivate external actors to participate in DRC conflict. The external actors' motivations that were identified include threats to state security, greed for the natural resources in the DRC territory and the opportunities to invest in the presence of peace. In this regard the conceptualisation by the conflict research paradigm in regard to the parties' interests in conflict intervention is pertinent in examining possibility of sustainable post-conflict relationship in DRC.[122]

The final objective of this study was to make recommendations in regard to external actors and the management of natural resources based conflicts. This objective is covered in the next Chapter of the research.

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[122] For more details on Conflict Research refer to Chapter One, Section 1.6

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

The study on external and the management of natural resource based conflicts has made a few observations on the connection between natural resources and the peace processes in a state. In Chapter One of the study, the review of literature on natural resources and conflict indicated that the actors are drawn into a conflict based on the interest that they seek to pursue and attain.[123] The actors would be drawn into a conflict as a result of greed or threat to security. The greed and security aspects of the DRC conflict attract the attention of the international actors due to the strategic resources that are abundant in the territory. Those states that depend on the natural resources from the DRC find it difficult to seek alternative sources of the strategic resources that are uniquely present in the DRC sub-terrain. Therefore instability in the DRC attracts external actors whose interest to intervene through peace process is hinged on the resources.

Natural resource based conflicts acquire internationalisation in a conflict system as actors rush into the territory to support allies in the government or in the opposition.[124] The DRC conflict has been internationalised DRC which brought into picture many regional actors, defying regional and international mediation. This development has led to external actors contributing to the escalation of the

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[123] For Details refer to Chapter Two, Section 2.1
[124] K. Fukui, Op cit p 124

conflict. While the peace efforts would be in place the external actors have contributed to the sabotage of the peace processes.

It was further observed from the overview of the natural resource based conflicts that two factors act as catalysts.[125] First is competition for resources in conditions of great scarcity and secondly, the role the state plays on controlling the allocation of such resources. State controls the production and distribution of material and social resources and hence becomes the focus of the conflicts. Access to power of the subjects is vital for the welfare of the marginalised. This has been the precursor to the DRC conflict where the government regimes had over a long time exploited resources from the environment without sharing the revenues with the locals. The exploitation of the resources without realising any returns to the community has led to grievance from the society. The consequence to rebellion against the state and the initiative to control of the mineral rich areas to exploit and charge rent. Rebellions in Eastern DRC are evidence of the search for equitable distribution of the natural resource wealth in the country.

Natural resource based conflicts are open to various resolution processes. The peace initiative to end resources based conflicts depends on factors such as inclusivity at regional, continental and international levels.[126] The DRC peace initiatives have been detached from one another. The initiatives have been initiated by individual states and did not address the issues that surround the DRC

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[125] D. J. Sandole, Op Cit, 18
[126] Ibid, p 24

conflict. The military intervention by the UN was a culmination of dysfunctional conflict and its management initiatives. On this basis a few recommendations could be drawn on the management of natural resource based conflicts.

5.2   Recommendations

The DRC conflict is the evolution of a war economy and this has become a major obstacle in resolving the conflict. The DRC's immense natural resources, in particular its mineral wealth, had been an incentive for the continued occupation of Congolese soil by the foreign armies. The extraction of the resources of a country would provide rich pickings for those who, through the deployment of their armed forces could control and exploit mining ventures that they would otherwise not be able to access in the absence of conflict. The states that occupy the territory militarily derive economic benefits from the war. These states do not seek for political settlement since the longer the war the higher the economic benefits. These states should be engaged in dialogue to reach on a political settlement that would create an atmosphere to engage the parties to conflict in negotiations and come up with an enforceable peace agreement.

Another essential step to peace in the DRC is to have a complete foreign troop withdrawal. The presence of troops in the DRC raises hostility and dissent from the local communities. The resurgence of violence and militia groups to control mining areas for exploration and exploitation could reduce in the absence of foreign troops. The foreign states should be discouraged too from supporting the

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militia groups who are continually fragmenting and intensifying the conflict. The negotiations would proceed successfully when dealing with legitimate rebel groups from the DRC territory. The rebel group interests would be known by the government of the day and seek to reach an agreement. The fewer the rebel groups the easier it would be arrive at a comprehensive peace agreement. DRC peace would be tenable once the rebel groups are identified and then given an opportunity in the peace process to present their grievances. A solution is possible once the rebel groups are identified and grouped as an identifiable entity from within the DRC territory.

The conflict in DRC would realise peace if both the government and the rebels recourse to armed conflict financed out of the revenues earned by the exploitation of the country's natural resources. The natural resources would gradually be a means to source the necessary war matériel to sustain the war. The rebels would struggle to control more territory to acquire sufficient resources to fight the government. On the other hand the government that depends on foreign exchange to settle its foreign expenditures would intensify the fight to satisfy the domestic and external demand of the exploitable resource. The government and the rebels should be under international sanctions not to sell the war resource to finance the war. The inter-governmental organisations from Africa such the SADC, EAC and the AU should join efforts with the UN to place an embargo on the movement of minerals originating from the DRC into the international markets. Effective embargo would reduce the conflict intensity once outsourcing of military hardware is constrained into the DRC. The de-escalation of the conflict would

provide an environment for initiating a peace process and eventually peace building would be sustainable.

Finally natural resource based conflicts like the one in DRC should be treated by the international community as a threat to international peace and security. The international community under the platform of the UN has an obligation to support peace and stop suffering of mankind in any form. The UN and its membership should take initiative to pass a resolution on the non-movement of the arms and military hardware to conflict areas in the DRC. Unless mandated by the UN, no organisation or individual should be allowed to order or transport any weapons into the neighbourhood of DRC. The UN Security Council should also act on the reports on suspected states that violate the arms embargo. Both the states that produce the weapons and those that intend to be transit points for weapons destined for DRC. The UN initiative once enforced, it would place the DRC under progressive peace building and reconstruction. The resource wealth from the state would help rebuild the infrastructure and social institutions for the welfare of the society.

With the election of a recognised government of President Joseph Kabila in 2005, the international community has an opportunity to propel forward the peace process to a conclusion and make consistent follow up on the implementation. The new government has better chances than before to secure human rights through legitimate state structures. The international community would also step

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up pressure on the government to obligate itself to the peace process and the disarmament of small armies and violent factions in the country. There is reason to plan on more enhanced post-conflict reconstruction when the government in power has effective authority and recognition in its own territory. Therefore the government should always be challenged to explain its action or inaction to prevent violent and take measures to build peace.

The DRC conflict is multilayered and presents a hazardous subtlety in which the civilian population is held as victim. While the international community represented by governments and intergovernmental organizations supports the initiatives towards a sustainable economic and political construction, the micro-level dynamics has to be taken into consideration. The parallel economy and the informal political structures in the stateless societies in DR Congo contain the dynamics towards peace. It would be hazardous to criminalize all nongovernmental policy in the fragile regions in the process of nation building and peace building. The existing social and economic structures are a product of the state collapse and neglect by a corrupt regime, and the lack of formal employment. The social marginalization of youth is an underlying factor behind the proliferation of armed militias. In conflict ravaged areas, joining a local militia and receiving a gun is the only single opportunity for a marginalized youth for social identity, profit and survival. It is important therefore that the government is informed on how to integrate into its structures the former rebel fighters. It would be also useful to have the government reintegrate the society into a functional

socio-economic system where people could derive their livelihood without engaging in a struggle for subsistence.

Therefore a successful strategy for the resolution of conflict in the DRC would have to take into account the external and regional inter-linkages and seek to accommodate and harmonise these various forces, in order to bring about positive engagement. Any peace initiative focused on the resolution of conflict in the DRC should not be undertaken in isolation from the regional and international contexts. The various levels of conflict system and internationalisation should be carefully incorporated in the peace engagements.

APPENDIX

Questionnaire on the Role of External Actors in Conflict Management: A Case Study of Democratic Republic of Congo

My name is Dennis Ogechi. I am a student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a study into the role of external actors in conflict management. I am seeking for your input in form of opinions, observations and information in regard to this important topic. Your information shall be treated with confidence and can be cited for academic reference only.

1. Share with me some information about the external actors you are aware of in the DRC conflict.

2. How is the DRC conflict linked to any events occurring in the neighbouring states?

3. What are the activities these actors engage in the context of the DRC conflict?

4. What impact do each of these actors have on the DRC conflict dynamics?

5. What do you consider as the key interests of each of the actors identified above?

6. In you opinion what do you recommend to each of the actors if they would contribute to attaining a comprehensive peace in the DRC.

7. What comments do you have in regard to the DRC conflict and its management process?

Thank you for your time in responding to my questions in this session.

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