

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
**FACULTY OF ARTS**  
**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK**

**EFFECTS OF 2007 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE IN  
KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF KISUMU CITY.**

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
**DECLARATION**

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

  
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Date

This research project has been submitted for examination with my own approval and that of my university supervisor.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Priston Chitere

26/11/08  
Date

## **DEDICATION**

This project is dedicated to my wife Hellen A. Aluoch and our children Nicholas, Sheila, Alex, Berine and Lameck all of whom not only understand the long hours I spend at my study but also share it as well.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am humbled to take this opportunity to sincerely thank those people who offered invaluable help towards the successful completion of this work.

I am grateful to my research assistants who sacrificed their time to gather information for this study, and all those who generously volunteered information towards its completion.

To my supervisor, Prof. Priston Chitere, whose patience, understanding, guidance, constructive criticism and encouragement navigated me through to come up with this refined work.

## **ABSTRACT**

The focus of this study was the effects of the 2007 post-election violence, a case study of the City of Kisumu. The study was conducted by interviewing people living in Kisumu and had experienced the post-election violence. The survey covered key areas which bore the brunt of the 2007 post election violence like Nyalenda, Kondele estates, Obunga slums and town center

The overall objective of the study was to investigate the effects of the 2007 post election violence. The suitability of the City of Kisumu was that it was one of the most adversely affected urban centers by the 2007 post election violence.

The study was guided by two theories: conflict theory as espoused by Karl Marx and Neo-Marxists like Dahrendorf, and George Homans' Rational Choice theory. The rationale for using these theories is explained by their relevance to the subject of study.

The conflict theory explains the division of society into classes with unequal resources power included. Since such marked inequalities exist, there are divisions of interest which are "built into" the social system (Giddens, 2004). These conflicts of interest at some point break out into active change and precipitate, for example, violence as was witnessed in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 general election.

The Rational Choice theory on its part serves to explain that Kenyans need to come up with rational decision which will be oriented towards facilitating national integration and ethnic affinity.

The study used both qualitative and quantitative data that were both primary and secondary. The primary data was collected using questionnaires and key informants interviews while secondary data was obtained through desk research and review of documents related to post election violence.

Findings from the study revealed that the alleged rigged 2007 presidential poll results were responsible for the violence that rocked the City of Kisumu. Other grievances like marginalization of the region added fuel to an already volatile situation.

The city experienced a wide range of violence which ended up in massive destruction of properties, injury to and death of people. There was a total disruption to social order as the town was taken over by gangs. Skilled entrepreneurs among them the Kikuyu and the Kisii were displaced from the City of Kisumu.

Recommendation arising out of this study is that Kenyans should always espouse the value of transparency and accountability in handling issues of national importance. Any acts of impunity may only serve to divide the country along ethnic lines and put national security and stability at risk. Finally Kenyan politicians should desist from exploiting negative ethnicity to realize their political ambitions.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKO	Alliance des Bakongo
NAKAT	Confederation des Association Tribales
C	Movement National Congolaise
A	Parti Solidaire Africain
A	Nigeria National Alliance
C	Northern People's Congress
NC	National Council of Nigerian Citizens
PA	United Grand Progressive Alliance
PP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
	African Union
C	Southern African Development Community
M-T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
MEHUTU	Part du Mouvement de l' Emancipation Hutu
R	Union Nationale Rwandaise
	Zanzibar Nationalist Party.
	Afro Shirazi Party
	Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party
J	Kenya African Democratic Union
J	Kenya African National Union
	Kenya Peoples' Union
	Central Intelligence Agency
	Orange Democratic Movement
K	Orange Democratic Movement Kenya
	Party of National Unity
	United States Aid for International Development
	Electoral Commission of Kenya
	Non-Governmental Organization

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

The study focused on the effects of the 2007 post-election violence on the City of Kisumu, Nyanza Province, Kenya. Pre or post election violence is a global phenomenon and has been on the rise in developing countries ever since the advent of popular political participation brought through election process. Election process provides the legitimate means via which competing parties or rivals may access political power. Orum quotes Hanna Arendt that fundamental assumption underlying popular political participation “was that no one could be called free without his experience in public happiness; that no one could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called either happy or free without participating and having a share in public power” (1989).

The medium of elections provides the means of access to public power so that the aforesaid happiness may be realized. Public power confers the legitimacy to govern men, to decide who gets what, when and how and the authoritative allocation of values (Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1985). In modern democracies political parties and party systems constitute another mechanism used by the ruling class to consolidate its hold on power. According to Nnoli their nature and functions tend to conform to the interests of the ruling class in the survival of its system of domination. But their fundamental function as a vehicle of retaining or sustaining political power interest of the incumbent group runs counter to the purpose of political parties and party systems which, in theory, is to provide a stable pattern of expectations, activities and behaviour for the peaceful change of governance from one faction of the ruling class to another or from one set of individuals within the ruling class to another (1985).

The experience with the modern democracies is that the competition for public power through political party elections had never been played safe and has often turned turbulent, occasioning destruction of property and loss of human life in its wake. In the Indian sub-continent, the post election suspicion and violence between Muslims and

Hindus that ensued after the 1937 elections eventually ended up tragically nine years later, with the partition of India, (Lowe; 2005). In Eastern Europe the free elections held in 1990 in the states of Yugoslavia triggered a series of crises that ended up in civil wars and disintegration of the latter. In the year 1999 it was the turn of East Timor to have its share of election related violence under the very eyes of the United Nations which had the mandate to supervise the process. The violence left 2,000 people dead and 350,000 others displaced.

As for many countries in Africa, election times have always posed trying moments with high possibilities of ending up in crises. Congo now renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was probably one of the first countries in the continent to experience a post-election violence. The results of the hastily organized independence elections held in May 1960 sparked off violence which ended up in such resource endowed provinces like Katanga resorting to separatist wars. The excess of violence and crises that ensued from the federal elections held in Nigeria in 1964 lowered disastrous experience in Congo to a second grade. The announcement of the results of the regional elections held in west of Nigeria in 1965 set in motion vicious cycles of ethnic violence that sparked off a civil war (Hallet; 1975).

In West Africa, post-election violence had been experienced in Cameroon, Togo and Nigeria. Other countries which have experienced violence but were of different breeds, not emanating from elections were Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They have had their share of violence but not out of elections though the undercurrent causes of the crises could broadly be similar.

Zimbabwe joins the orbit of the countries rocked by post-elections violence. In Zimbabwe the 2008 elections, ended in violence that caused ripples in neighbouring countries like South Africa. The influx of Zimbabweans, fleeing post-election violence in their country, to South Africa, set in motion xenophobic crisis in the latter arising from competition over scarce resources like jobs.

The East African region had not been spared the turbulence born out of elections. The island of Zanzibar was an early casualty in the constellation of crises to hit the region. The results of the 1963 election held in Zanzibar failed its litmus test to neutralize the

small Arab oligarchy and to entrench the rule by majority. The crisis that followed culminated in the revolution of January 12, 1964 (Lofchie, 1965). Uganda has had its turns and twists in political violence and is currently contending with rebel group to the north of the country. As for Rwanda and Burundi it has been a life of chronic violence deep rooted in the socio-political structures of the two countries. Periods of peace in the two countries are always cherished.

In Kenya the advent of multi-party democracy in 1991 posed challenges to the existing social and political orders. The Report of the Judicial Commission (1999) puts in perspective the political development in Kenya that created and reinforced social and political status quo whose disturbance later caused strain to national stability. Kenya attained independence in 1963 with a complicated federal constitution, locally known as *majimbo* constitution, which conceded a great deal of autonomy to the regions. Within a year, at first anniversary of independence in 1964, the *majimbo* constitution was replaced by a unitary system that converted Kenya into a Republic with a central government.

In the ensuing circumstances the independent opposition party KADU dissolved itself to join KANU thereby making Kenya a *de facto* one party state. The country eventually became *a de jure* one party state in 1982 by a constitutional amendment introducing Section 2A. As long as this structure was in place the order of things was tolerable.

The repeal of section 2A of the Constitution and the advent of multi-party politics caused a paradigm shift in the order of things. There was a sudden upsurge in negative ethnicity.

This was apparent in the emergence of opposition political parties based on tribal allegiances. This was exemplified by the tribal pattern of the results of parliamentary and presidential election results in 1992 and 1997. The issue of land which had been silent and tolerated prior to 1991 emerged as a sensitive issue with the advent of multi-party politics (Report of Judicial Commission, 1999).

The ruling party KANU was quick to manipulate the situation by exploiting the issue of land. Over the years since independence there had been shifts in population trends in the face of dwindling land resources. To many Kenyans multi-party democracy of one man



one vote meant that the “foreigners” or as they were derogatorily referred to as “madoadoa” in the Rift Valley Province and as “Watu wa Bara” (up country people) in the Coast Province had to go. These regional chauvinist tendencies were encouraged by an amendment in the Constitution that required a candidate for president in addition to other requirements to get a minimum of twenty-five percent of the of the valid votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces to be declared the president. The ethnic cleansing that was witnessed in the Rift Valley and parts of Coast provinces between 1991 to 1998 can be attributed to such political development. Certain presidential candidates had to be pre-empted from gaining 25% of the votes in certain provinces by eliminating their supporters. Some regions were clearly demarcated as KANU zones (Report of Judicial Commission, 1999).

But the violence that broke out after announcing the 2007 presidential poll results was complex and shocking in its spontaneity and turbulence. The announcements of the presidential poll results started a wave of violence all over the country.

Rift Valley Province was hit by a wave of killings and massive destruction of property. Hundreds of thousands of people regarded as outsiders who had settled in the province, and employees of government and private sector regarded as non-locals were displaced. In the city of Nairobi the post election violence was concentrated in slum areas and estates dominated by low income groups like Kibera, Korogocho, Dandora and Mathare. The middle class estates were not affected by the violence but everyone else lived in a state of fear. Coast, Central, Western provinces had their own share of post-election violence but not in the grand scale witnessed in Nyanza Province with its epicenter in the City of Kisumu.

Within less than twenty four hours of the announcement of the presidential poll results the City of Kisumu was virtually a ghost town. What remained for an observer were skeletons of destroyed and burnt buildings in the residential estates of Kondele, Manyata, Obunga and town center. The looting and destruction of property and displacement of people from certain ethnic communities was wide spread. The police intervention later worsened the situation. The violence escalated resulting in further destruction of property and leaving behind in its wake over 100 people dead.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Post election violence or similar crises are likely to occur in a country located in some parts of Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin America, West Indies or Africa. Such violence or crises leave in their wake suffering and loss of human life.

In the Indian sub-continent the crisis that started after the elections of 1937 reached its peak in 1946 when the Congress Leader Jawaharlal Nehru, was invited to form an interim government. The Muslim leadership called for 'direct action'. The violence that ensued left 5,000 people dead in Calcutta alone. Elsewhere it was human slaughter and displacement. In Eastern Europe the aftermath of free elections held in the former Yugoslavian federal states witnessed a break out of civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people were either killed or displaced (Lowe, 2005).

In Africa the sufferings emanating from post-election crisis started in the Congo in which thousands of people were killed including top political leaders (Hallet, 1975). Similar crisis occurred in Nigeria where it ended up in one of the bloodiest civil wars in Africa. The crisis in Rwanda has been punctuated by a period of peace.

The worst post election violence was experienced in Kenya after the announcement of the 2007 presidential poll results. The country went under difficult time in the aftermath of announcing the results. There could be many factors or combination of factors that contributed to the crisis ranging from social to economic. Kenya being a Third World country could have failed in the area of equitable distribution of the benefits arising from economic growth since independence. Such failure could have been compounded by such factors as corruption, tribalism and nepotism. By the time of intervention of international community, casualty stood at about 1,200 people dead and 350,000 displaced (Red Cross, Kenya 2008).

The aim of this study was to find out the possible causes and effects of the 2007 post-election violence and suggest appropriate corrective measures for implementation by the country's policy makers.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The study was guided by the following key questions

- What caused the 2007 post election violence?
- What were the types of violence experienced after the announcement of the 2007 presidential poll results?
- What key steps could be taken to avoid the recurrence of such a phenomenon?

### **1.4 General Objective**

The general objective of the study was to investigate the effects of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, a case study of the City of Kisumu.

### **Specific Objectives**

- 1) To find out the cause(s) of the 2007 post election violence.
- 2) To identify the types of violence experienced by different category of people during the 2007 post election violence.
- 3) To find out the extent of loss of property and life experienced during the 2007 post-election violence.
- 4) To suggest the mechanisms which need to be put in place to prevent recurrence of election violence.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

Kenyans fought for independence and co-existed as a people for 44 years thereby the country becoming an example of one of the most peaceful countries not only in the Great Lakes Region but also in Africa. The country had been a team player in the regional peace negotiation deals. The peace deals for Southern Sudan and the current government structure in Somalia are products of enduring diplomatic intervention of people of Kenya. It was therefore, unusual that such a people would be caught in spontaneous bestial outburst killing each other and engaging in wanton destruction of property. The country was only saved from further deterioration and eventual collapse as a nation-state by the intervention of the international community acting under United Nations mandate.

That such violence should have occurred in Kenya called for a research to assess and establish the factors that contributed to its occurrence and suggest appropriate pre-emptive measures.

It will be a source of knowledge to the academicians as well as the policy makers.

## **1.6 Definition of key terms**

**Violence:** Behaviour that is intended to hurt or kill somebody or cause damage or destruction to property.

**Developing countries:** These are countries which are still engaged in the process of improving the quality of human lives. They are characterized by endeavours to raising people's living levels, creating of conditions conducive to growth of people's self-esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions which promote dignity and broadening of choices (Todaro, 1977). Such countries are in Africa excepting South Africa, Latin America and some few countries in South East Asia.

**Majimbo:** It is a Kiswahili word meaning development in a federal or regional line as envisaged in Kenya's independence constitution.

**Youth:** They are young people who are in between the age of 14 to 35.

**Xenophobia:** Strong feelings of dislike or fear of people from other countries.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter was to review literature on post election violence or similar conflicts with special focus on their local causes and effects in the countries studied, to explore in details and put in perspective the effects of 2007 post-election violence on the City of Kisumu, Kenya.

#### 2.2 Historical Perspective

##### 2.2.1 Indian sub-continent

Many countries in various parts of the world have at one time or the other experienced conflict or crisis which had its origins in the politics and internal relations within the affected country itself. As already been mentioned under Chapter 1, political party elections in modern democracies have not always been played safe. A combination of internal social factors, politics and internal relations within a given country would seem to work in conspiracy to provide sources of conflict during election times or sow seeds of suspicion which results into conflicts in the aftermath leading to possible social phenomena such as genocides.

According to Lowe (2005), it was a sad journey towards the independence of India, far more difficult than had been expected. The electoral results of 1937 which witnessed the Hindu National Congress Party victorious, planted a seed for bloodbath and eventual disintegration of the state. The election results brought to the fore religious hostilities between Hindus and Muslims. Hindus made up two thirds of the 400 million people then, and the rest were Muslims. Shah, A.B in a forward to Hassnain, (1968, 5 – 13) acknowledges the inability of Muslims to co-exist with non Muslim society as a historical fact. Till then Muslims had lived as rulers, a persecuted or protected minority or in unstable co-existence in a non-Muslim society. According to Shah, never before had the Muslims shared power with others in a spirit of equality that transcended religious divisions. It is argued that history had not prepared them for freedom and the obligations that go with it in a multi-religious society. It is acknowledged that unlike Bible, Koran makes no distinction between temporal and the spiritual sphere of life (Hassnain, 1968).

In the elections, the Hindus won eight out of the eleven contested states thereby inviting the Muslim League to merge with the Congress. The Muslims were alarmed and out of fear of domination by the Hindus demanded a separate Muslim state of Pakistan. The Muslim leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah stirred Muslim passion by his slogan "Pakistan or Perish". Years down the line when the Hindu dominated Congress Party was invited to form the government, the Muslim leadership out of mistrust of the Hindus called for a day of 'direct action' in support of a separate state. What followed the call was fierce rioting where Muslims set about slaughtering Hindus. As the Hindus retaliated, the country seemed on the verge of civil war (Lowe, 2005: 514).

According to Chandra (1983: 206 – 207) the limited democracy granted by the 1935 Act, sparked off trends of regionalism as well as communalism, both of which were nurtured by the 'divide and rule' policy of the government, the semi-feudal and the rise of religious fanaticism. The religious division and suspicions manifested itself in the election results conducted in the years running to the self-determination of the Indian-sub continent. The Hindu based congress only won minority seats in the Muslim dominated regions as was the case with the Muslim League electoral performance in the Hindu dominated regions. The Congress Party's endeavour to consolidate its position and organize a mass-contact programme only irked the Muslim leadership which saw a hidden agenda by the former to deprive the Muslim minority of its separate identity and integrity. The league began to expound the theory that the Hindus and Muslims were in fact two different nations (Chandra, 1983).

Gokhale (1960:201) sees causes of election violence or such similar crises in India as linked to the Muslim League leadership suspicions and fear of the Hindus, the roots of which would be traced to a sense of inferiority felt by the Muslims themselves ever since the disappearance of the Mughal empire and the defeat of the Great Revolt of 1857. The bad politics of the Muslims fanned these already existing differences and fears into a bitter hatred, more so when they declared that nothing short of a separate state would satisfy the Muslims. Gokhale (1960: 202) also points a finger at the election results of 1935 in which the Muslim League fared dismally in Muslim majority areas. The call for a separate state for Muslims gathered momentum and the consequences were communal riots, the worst of which came in 1946.

From the foregoing, it would be noticed that the violence that characterized the period leading to independence of India were caused by communal factors deeply ingrained in historical religious differences and outright fear of possible domination of one group by another. The Muslims were a minority group in India ever since the decay and eventual disappearance of the Mughal Empire. The British administration in India also appeared to have exploited the communal differences in the subcontinent in the game of divide and rule. These differences came to manifest themselves in the series of elections conducted between 1935 and 1939 to prepare India for self-rule.

The communal riots and bloodbath appeared to reach peak in 1946 and resolution of the impasse was found in the partition of the country in 1947, with the birth of the new nation of Pakistan (Gokhale, 1960). According to Chandra (1983) the pride and joy in the achievement of freedom was limited by the pain and sadness of partition and the consequences of partition courtesy of election results well intended to prepare the sub-continent for self-determination.

### **2.2.2 The Federal State of Yugoslavia**

One of the regions in the world where election related violence had been experienced is Yugoslavia. The country was formed after the First World War and consisted of Serbia. It included people of several nationalities and the state was organized on federal lines to cater for six republics; namely Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia – Herzegovina and Macedonia. There were also two provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo which were associated with Serbia (Lowe, 2005). Sinha and Khumri (2007), recognize that ethnic diversity was the region's most characteristic social and political feature.

Yugoslavia was a state founded on quicksand and only remained intact and grudgingly stable as long as Broz Tito was in charge and only for a short while after his demise. The elections of 1988 in Serbia and the subsequent elections of 1990 and 1991 in other republics in the federation brought into power at least two uncompromising ethnic chauvinists namely, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia (Lowe, 2005).

In 1991 Milosevic refused to accept a Croat as president of the federation as was envisaged in the constitution, but continued to use federal cash to help his own Serb

economy. The refusal by Milosevic to accept the change of the presidency precipitated problems which reached a crisis point in June, 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent against the wishes of Serbia. What followed were confusion and civil wars which witnessed slaughter of each republic's minorities in every other region. By February, 1992 the international community intervened, the federal state of Yugoslavia disintegrated and independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia – Herzegovina were recognized (Lowe, 2005: 221).

According to Calvocoressi (1995) the rhetoric and election victory in 1990 of Slobodan Milosevic, an ambitious Serb nationalist, accentuated Croat and Slovene tendencies to secede from the federation. They saw the urge and intent of Milosevic to create Serb hegemony over the rest of the federation. The Serbs were the dominant ethnic group in the federation – constituting 40 percent of the entire population (Calvocoressi, 1995). The same year witnessed the sweeping to victory in elections by Franjo Tudjman, seen as a communist turned chauvinist, in the Croatian parliament. According to the constitution the federal presidency had to transfer to Croatia in 1991.

Calvocoressi (1995), attributes the conflict that ensued from the free elections held in Yugoslavian states in 1990 to several historical factors. He argues that the feelings of nationalism among various nationalities or ethnic groups and differences within Christianity, and Muslims were not mitigated by any economic fruits of federation. Endemic tensions between the several republics of the federation persisted and were accentuated. While, in 1991 Milosevic resisted the transfer of the federal presidency to the Croats, he continued to use the resources of the federation to develop Serb areas, and at the same time made open his intention to annex the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and restructuring the entire federation under Serb domination.

The ethnic structures in the federal republics were complex. Each republic had a minority ethnic group. For example, in Kosovo the Albanians were the ethnic majority yet the autonomous province was, ironically, the heartland of Serb nationalism who were a minority (Calvocoressi, 1995). Years later the nationalist ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs turned tragic.



Negative ethnicity and the accompanying nationalist ambitions, and the emergence of two rival ethnic chauvinists Milosevic and Tudjman on the political scene were broadly responsible for the tragedies which occurred in the federation. (Lowe, 1995) also recognizes the role of economic factors as a source of disaffection in the federation. He argues that the Yugoslav economy was in trouble, with inflation running at 90 per cent in the late 1980s and unemployment standing at over a million, 13 percent of the working population. The regional economic diversity was also another source of challenge in the federation. For example, Slovenia was reasonably prosperous while parts of Serbia were poverty stricken, hence attempt by Milosevic to use federal resources to aid Serbian economy. All these had a share in the built up mechanism that posed challenge to the federal cohesion.

### **2.2.3 East Timor**

As for the East Timor's election violence, it was all a game of double standards by Indonesia. Indonesia reluctantly bowed to international pressure to allow a referendum on independence for East Timor to take place in August, 1999. The pro-Indonesia minority militia backed up by the Indonesian troops visited violence on the people on the voting day – throwing the whole country into chaos. The announcement of the election results made the pro-Indonesia Militia run wild in furious outburst of revenge leaving a trail of death and destroyed property (Lowe, 2005).

The situation was resolved by the intervention of the Australian peace keeping force. Here again it was the fear of domination of a minority by a majority.

### **2.3.0 Africa's Experience**

The continent of Africa would easily pass as a permanent host to post-election violence. The first pre-and post-election violence in Africa occurred in the 1960s at the outset of the introduction of democratic politics to decolonize the continent. But the phenomenon has since refused to pass on and remains a stubborn dark cloud hanging over the continent and its onslaught appears to be in the upsurge instead.

#### **2.3.1 The Congo Violence**

According to Hallet (1980), the independence election held in Congo Leopoldville in May 1960, was mired in violence. He points out to several sources of problems which gave rise to the violence. First, the country was pushed to elections unprepared, voters

were not educated on the simple procedures of election issues, and therefore it took place in an atmosphere of mounting confusion, intense excitement, deep anxiety and spreading violence. Second, the Congolese went to the polls an ethnically polarized lot. The political organizations or parties that emerged in the pre-independence Congo had the riding objective of preserving local ethnic interests. For example, Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) of Joseph Kasavubu concern was to preserve ethnic interest of the Bakongo people, who dominated the politics of Leopoldville. In Katanga province the “authentic Katangans” founded the Confederation des Associations Tribales (CONAKAT) under the leadership of Moise Tshombe to take care of their interest in Elizabethville against the encroaching Luba immigrants from Kasai province. There were also several political parties based on ethnic orientations. Patrice Lumumba’s Movement National Congolaise (MNC) had some semblance of national image but the tide of ethnic consciousness was already too high and Congolese “tribalism” could not permit united front political participation in the elections.

Social factors have also been attributed to the Congo violence. The violence that nearly ruined the Congo’s independence has been seen as something deeper than political excitement. The Leopoldville (Kinshasa) of the late 1950s and up to 1960 had a great deal of unemployment and there existed a bitter resentment by African immigrants to the city against the favoured conditions enjoyed by Europeans, some of whom became the target of violence (Hallet, 1980). The Belgian authority’s attempts to repatriate unemployed African immigrants to rural areas were hardly a success and were counter productive.

The independence election results when announced even caused more confusion. The 137 seats of the National Assembly were shared among more than twenty different parties mainly tribally based. MNC emerged the largest party with 33 seats, ABAKO, 12; CONAKAT, 7; and others Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), 13. Lumumba did not win any seat in Katanga province. The coalition government formed with Lumumba as the Prime Minister and Kasavubu as its president soon found itself in trouble and the wave of violence that gripped the country thereafter witnessed tragic events that redefined the future of the country (Hallet, 1980).

(Lowe, 2005), blames Belgians for the election violence witnessed in Congo in the 1960 and thereafter. The decision by the Belgians to grant independence within six months was

inviting disaster. People were not prepared and the education levels of the populace were low with only about 17 graduates in the entire country who could take to the task of professional challenges. The ethnic diversity of the country and sheer geographical size were bound to pose challenges without adequate preparation for independence. A combination of these factors, set in motion vicious circles of violence that plunged the country into a disastrous civil disorder that was not restored until 1964.

Young (2003), in a well researched article blames the chaos attending to the Congo power transfer to an abdication of sort by Belgium. The colonial power hastily transferred power to fragmented nationalists. He further adds that all this happened when the colonial army in the country was still in the command of an entirely European officer corps and only three Africans among the 4,600 persons occupying the top three ranks in the civil service. The domination of the colonial officers in the army and civil service became a source of conflict leading to the mutiny in the army. The violence escalated leading to the secession of Katanga. The civil war was already taking shape.

Reader (1998) traces the local sources of the conflict in the post independence Congo elections to include inadequate preparation, Lumumba's narrow victory for the 137 seats in the National Assembly which compelled him to forming a cumbersome coalition of twelve different parties – including some bitter rivals. He also points out to Lumumba's tragic personality. At thirty five years old and volatile to the extent of irrationality, ill prepared and uncontrolled resentment against the Belgian's attempts to keep him from power lacked the cool and maturity demanded of a crisis manager. There were also external factors that escalated the crisis in the Congo. Congo became a confluence of the cold war tensions pitting Americans and Soviet Union. Faced with the spiraling violence and confusion in the first days of independence, American diplomacy moved aggressively to include a stabilization of the political situation by some formula which would minimize soviet influence. The United States' CIA became an active participant in the game of building access points to the Congolese political arena. Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of independence Congo had demonstrated his leanings to the Soviet Union. These maneuvers by the cold war rivals only succeeded in exacerbating violence with tragic consequences (Bender, Coleman and Sklar, 1985).The sources that triggered the post-election and independence violence could have been local but the intervening foreign factors made the situation worse.

### 2.3.2 Post – election violence in Nigeria

Nigeria went to the 1964 federal general election a divided nation. The election campaign was conducted in an atmosphere “reeking” in President Azikiwe’s words, “of mutual antagonisms, bitter recriminations and discriminations” (Hallet, 1980:385). The election was comfortably won by the National Nigerian Alliance (NNA) Northern political party, courtesy of United Grand Progressive Alliance (UGPA) a Southern political party that boycotted elections alleging their candidates were denied nominations in the Northern Constituencies.

But despite all these the country appear to survive the “reeking” atmosphere and the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa formed a cabinet with a national face and things appear to be working till the crucial elections held in the Western Region ten months later set in motion violent centrifugal forces. Events in the political balance of the western part of Nigeria had seen an increasing tension between the North and South. The NNDP of Akintola had become unpopular and was hardly expected carry the day in the regional elections. However, when election results were announced, Akintola’s Party NNDP was in massive victory, winning seventy one of the available eighty seats. With the announcement of election results amidst claims of riggings, violence increased alarmingly. Violence had also been observed during election campaigns as each opposing side had used gangs of thugs to facilitate their cause (Hallet, 1980).

During post election violence, UGPA demonstrators were shot by police, and NNDP supporters murdered by their opponents. “Anarchy” and “civil war” were not inappropriate terms to apply to the situation in the west of Nigeria in the last months of 1965 after announcing poll results (Hallet, 1980).

The post-election violence in west of Nigeria caused anxiety in the rest of the country. By early 1966 the country was moving towards a revolution. The circle of violence that started in the aftermath of 1965 election in west of the country had reached fever pitch but was suddenly interrupted by surprising and shocking events that occurred in the night of January 14-15 1966. Groups of middle ranking army officers, Ibo in origin operating simultaneously in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna murdered four leading politicians, Tafawa Balewa – the federal Prime Minister; the premiers of the West and North and Sardauna of

Sokoto and Chief Akintota (Hallet, 1980). The murder list extended to cover finance minister Chief Festus Okotie – Ebo and top army officers from the Northern and Western regions. This was the anti-climax of the post-election violence that started in the western part of the country. It clearly put the country on a tragic path to a bloody civil war that was to last years.

The causes of election violence that led to the civil war in Nigeria could be traced to wide ranging factors, all with local roots. According to Hallet (1980) the Nigerian political turbulence was envisioned and when it occurred it was hardly surprising. The factors that gave a clear warning of troubles ahead were the sheer size and heterogeneity of the country's population and the deep and often bitter divisions that emerged between rival political parties in the decade before independence. Unlike the Congo, there was adequate preparation for independence, the constitution had been hammered out after years of discussion among Nigerian politicians and was provided with an elaborate range of safeguards designed against illiberal practices. The independence federal government was controlled by NPC (Northern political party) and NCNC (Southern party) and action group forming parliamentary opposition.

Hallet (1980), points out to the ever increasing suspicion and tension between the North and the South as one of the contributing factors to the country's post-election violence. In the 1950s the North had been fearful of South's domination. A decade later the situation was reversed; with the NPC clearly the dominant partner in the federal government in Lagos, as the southerners began to feel the pressure of "Northern domination". Southern attitudes to the North were made of mixture of fear, ignorance and contempt. In Awolowo's phrase the North was "a dead weight on the country as a whole, a gradual but sure break in the fast moving South" (Hallet, 1980). The national census that was conducted in 1962 and finally published in 1964 gave the North a superior numerical figure of 30 million people to 26 million for the South. It became a political issue and led to such a bitter feeling between NPC and NCNC that the coalition disintegrated just as the country was preparing for the federal general election to be held at the end of 1964.

Other sources of the Nigerian violence include widespread corruption of which almost all Nigerian politicians seemed guilty. The Nigerian politicians, their supporters and close relatives were emerging in a class of their own when the ordinary Nigerians remained

poor. The large cash cars, the lavish expenses accounts, grandiose official residences of politicians provided the man in the street with clear evidence of rewards which his rulers were gaining from their tenure in office. The rigged elections of the west in Nigeria provided an opportunity for the poor Nigerians to express their anger against their exploiters (Hallet, 1980)

Lowe (2005), blames the Nigerian pre- and post-election violence of the 1960s on series of local factors that include tribal differences. He argues that the different tribes in the country were brought together to fight a common enemy, colonialists. But after Europeans withdrew the nationalists' loyalties reverted to the tribes and not the nation. Secondly, he points out to the underdevelopment in the country and the economic recession that faced Nigeria in the year 1964 when the country was faced with federal general elections. In 1964 the prices of basic commodity had risen by 15 percent and unemployment was rising. All these were happening against a background of emerging wealthy politicians and other public service elites.

According to Reader (1998), the Nigerian violence was a product of ethnic and regional chauvinism. In the post independence Nigeria the regions bitterly competed for the largest share of revenue, for the location of industries and for appointments to public office and ethnic affiliations were constantly exploited. The scramble among politicians went on for six years, frittering away the wealth and the potential of the country, leaving a vast majority of the population impoverished and demeaned by the avaricious behaviour of their elected leaders. The ordinary Nigerian electorate in the street was disgusted and spoiling for a fight. The federal general elections of late 1964 and the alleged rigged elections in the west of the country only provided a window for the marginalized people to pass their message. The 1965 post election violence that started in western part of the country triggered vicious circles of violence that ended up in tragic events that plunged the country into a civil war.

According to studies conducted by Meredith (1984), the Nigerian post-election violence that led finally to the downfall of the civilian rule was due to the country's politicians' over-engagement in scramble for power and profit conducted with such reckless abandon. The advantages of political office were used at every opportunity by Nigeria's leaders to accumulate empires of wealth and patronage with which to improve both their personal

and their party's fortunes. He points to the power struggle between the North and South and the divisive role played by the census results released in 1964 when the country was preparing for federal general elections. The irregularly conducted elections in Western Region which was fought by both sides, of the opposing political parties, with ruthless and brutal tenacity, bribes, threats, assaults, arson, hired thugs and murder triggered political violence in its aftermath eventually bringing the entire country to its knee.

After the civil war, the country, for years, remained under successive military dictatorships. But after return to civilian administration, the country later faced challenges of the modern multi-party democracy taking root in Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries. In April, 2007 Nigerian experienced a post-election violence. The Nigerian opposition parties, most of them drawing their support from ethnic bases, rejected the result of the presidential election as having been rigged in favour of the ruling party's candidate. The violence took the form of riots and destruction of property and it is estimated that over 200 Nigerians died in both pre-and post-election violence (New Africa, May-2008).

### **2.3.3 Post-election violence in Zimbabwe**

As this paper is being written the post-election violence in Zimbabwe is still posing a challenge to the African Union (AU) and SADC). The results of contested presidential polls have been closely rejected by the main opposition party MDC T which later declined to participate in the second-round presidential run-off polls. In the ensuing violence since March, 2008 unknown number of people had been killed, thousands displaced and property destroyed (New Africa, May, 2008).

Majority of Zimbabweans displaced during post election violence found their way to the neighbouring South Africa where their presence caused tension as they competed with the locals for jobs and other opportunities. The South Africans reacted by attacking immigrants from other African countries which resulted in loss of life, displacement of people and destruction of property. This was an echo of Zimbabwean post-election violence.

The local sources of post-election violence in Zimbabwe can be attributed to the challenges associated with multi-party democracy. Most independent African leaders had

been reluctant to leave power. Robert Mugabe has been the leader of the country ever since the attainment of independence in 1980 and twenty eight years later he would still not let go.

The economic factors could also have contributed to the much of the post election violence witnessed in Zimbabwe. The country is virtually facing economic collapse after years of facing economic sanctions imposed by Britain and its allies and alleged sabotage by multi-nationals operating within the country. Inflation is running at 150,000% and unemployment at 80%. For many Zimbabweans who had been disaffected by the opposition politics the 2008 elections had provided an opportunity to bring change by voting the incumbent regime out which had been blamed at least by the international mass media for the malaise affecting the country (New African, May 2008).

#### **2.3.4 Post election violence in Rwanda**

The violence in Rwanda and the subsequent genocide that followed is an unique and stands in its own class. But what stands out clearly is that what man resents most is perpetual domination and marginalization of man by another (Barbet, 1998). The genesis of the violent internal turmoil in which Rwanda found itself lies in the overthrow of the dominant ethnic group the Tutsi from the position of dominance enjoyed over the centuries. Historically, the Tutsi of Rwanda were local elites culturally and distinct from the mass of the population and occupying a position which had been greatly strengthened by the support received from the colonial overlords. With time in the 1950s the Belgians tended to favour the oppressed Hutu majority and openly encouraged the emergent Hutu political movement. In 1957 a group of Hutu intellectuals, all former seminarians, published a manifesto denouncing the political monopoly of the Tutsi (Hallet, 1980).

The communal elections of 1960 were organized by the Belgians amidst violence and revolts involving killings, counter killings and destruction of property. In the communal elections the Hutu virtually replaced the Tutsi chiefs by popularly elected Hutu burgomasters. The Hutu burgomasters in exercise of their powers removed Tutsi in their areas from all positions of responsibility. In 1961, with the blessings and organization of the colonial overlords a meeting of burgomasters and local councilors all Hutu, abolished the monarchy and a republic was established by a popular acclamation, a revolution to witness the entrenchment of the Hutu and an end to the Tutsi hegemony. In July, 1962



Rwanda achieved independence – under the presidency of a Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda (Hallet, 1980).

A series of communal and legislative elections conducted in Rwanda in the period 1960 to 1962 witnessed the end of ancient Tutsi monarchy and power shifted to the previously subservient Hutu. The Tutsi refused to accept the change in and opted for armed resistance. The turmoil that engulfed the country since 1959 after Hutu revolt and the violence that followed the communal and legislature elections witnessed the Tutsi fleeing to the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Tanganyika and Congo for safety. The Tutsi in exile staged incursions to overthrow the Hutu domination in the country. In the period 1962 – 1966, there were about at least nine incursions by Tutsi exiles. This led to revenge attacks on Tutsi still in living in the country. About 10,000 Tutsi men, women and children were hacked to death in a series of massacre a terrible reprisal wrought by the Hutu populace (Hallet 1980: 609). This led to further displacement of the Tutsi – who found refuge in neighbouring countries.

Reader (1998), blames the violence in Rwanda on the following factors:- first, Rwanda people did not have a shared identity at independence, secondly, the preparations for handover of power by the Belgians were done hastily without adequate preparations, third, the Hutu were favoured in the last years of Belgian rule and hurried independence appear to be in their favour. The Tutsi had preferred a stage-by-stage process to self rule. He also points out to the anxiety of the Tutsi in the light of their population size. The Tutsi only constitute nine per cent of the country's population. Belgian chose to take side with the majority Hutu. The communal elections held in July, 1960 which gave Parti du Mouvement de l' Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) control of 210 of 229 communes, witnessed changes in power structure prompted a deteriorating situation. Violence was in the increase. Tutsi were killed, their property destroyed. On 28 January, 1961, Rwanda elected councilors and burgomasters were called to a meeting at which the country was declared a sovereign democratic Republic of Rwanda. Legislative elections held under United Nations supervisions in September, 1961 confirmed Hutu supremacy (Reader, 1998).

Rwanda resorted to bad policies in period immediately after independence aimed at hurting the Tutsi instead of pursuing reconciliatory politics. The thrust of Rwanda

Nationalism had not targeted the colonial regime but it had been inspired by ambitions to take over an oppressive indigenous hegemony which the colonial authorities had installed and supported before the 1950s. Policies pursued by the Kayibanda regime include encouragement of the Tutsi by any means to leave Rwanda, introduction of quota system in various institutions including workforce that no more than nine per cent of the Tutsi be granted opportunities in schools and universities. This was in proportion to their population size. In the meantime the killings of Tutsi and destruction of their property was encouraged. The “purification” campaign to enforce the quota system in the country was carried out very vigorously by the educated Hutu elites who were destined to be the beneficiaries for the vacated public and private sector jobs. This was itself a form of violence and extreme alienation of a people. The economic and psychological effects of the hatred generated by the “purification” campaign throughout the country set off another massive wave of Tutsi emigration (Reader, 1998).

The declaration of Rwanda by acclamation by the Hutu dominated burgomasters and municipal councilors heightened ethical tensions and caused more attacks and killings of Tutsi and destruction of their property. For example, in the period September to October 1960, about 150 Tutsi were killed and 3,000 houses burnt down and 22,000 people displaced. New waves of Tutsi emigrants went on foot to the refugee camps in Uganda (Prunier, 2005).

Then came the legislative elections of 25 September, 1961 in which the PARMEHUTU got 78% of the vote and the Tutsi outfit – UNAR only managed 17% - which out of the forty four seats gave them thirty five and seven respectively (Prunier, 2005). What followed the legislative elections were raids by Tutsi exiles which elicited violent reprisals against the Tutsi living in the country. The vicious circle of violence continued plunging the country into bloody crisis.

Wole Soyinka, a novel prize winning novelist, in an article written in 1994 had made reference to Rwanda as “The blood soaked Quilt of Africa” (Reader, 1998: 672). In an endeavour to get to the bottom of the causes of the genocide in Rwanda, a Catholic theologian Laurien Nzesimanaa confessed to having been shocked by the genocide in his country, but not astonished. According to him people live behind a mask, which the winds of history occasionally blow aside. The genocide was shocking, but only those who were naïve about human nature could be astonished. The theologian told an inquiry

reporter:- "I have the impression that you have not yet discovered man, either in his grandeur or in his misery; he can always surprise us" (Reader, 1998: 677).

### 2.3.5 Post-election violence in Zanzibar

According to (Meredith, 1984), the most violent eruption occurred in East Africa that is the revolution in Zanzibar. The resented Arab oligarchy's political party the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) won the independence elections held in July 1963. The Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) an indigenous political party obtained majority of the total votes cast taking some fifty-four percent, but it won only minority seats. The ZNP and a third group, Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) a rival of ASP formed a coalition government. 1963 was overshadowed by a mood of intense racial animosity.

The Independence Day 10 December was dismissed as *Uhuru wa Waarabu* (independence for Arabs). There were no celebrations to mark the day, several plots were soon underway but the initiative taken and launched by John Okello, on 12 January 1964 surprised many. Okello staged a bloody coup which witnessed the flight of the Sultan and well over 5,000 Arabs killed, thousands more had been interned, their houses, property and possessions seized. Later many Arab families were forcibly deported and the community virtually disappeared. A revolution had been accomplished (Meredith, 1984).

Local factors were caused post-election violence in Zanzibar. First, the domination of indigenous people by immigrant Arabs had been resented. The British had treated Zanzibar as an Arab State under the control of an Arab dynasty ever since a protectorate was established in 1890. Despite the small number, sixth of the population, the Arabs controlled major resources on the island, dominated government affairs and filled the higher ranks of the civil service. Asian immigrants were encouraged by the Sultan to settle in Zanzibar and soon established a stronghold over commerce and trade. The indigenous people were virtually marginalized; they occupied the lowest rungs in Zanzibar society, working as manual labourers, farmhands, fishermen and craftsmen. These were conditions which could not be withstood forever. The independence elections of 1963 and declaration of independence which appear to confirm and perpetuate the Arab oligarchy and its forces of exploitation provided excellent opportunity for indigenous people to fight for the restoration of their dignity and resources (Meredith, 1984).

### 2.3.6 Post-election violence in Kenya

Kenya has had a series of post-election violence ever since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1991 thereby providing example of post-election violence as an increasingly widespread phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa. The country experienced both pre-and post election violence in the period 1991 to 1998. The political development in Kenya which brought into play multiparty politics provided fertile ground for violence. The changes in the political order made an ordinary Kenyan (*mwananchi*) to regard himself, firstly as a member of his tribe and only secondly, as a national of the country (Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 1999).

KANU, which was the ruling party, took advantage of the new development to perpetuate its hegemony. In order to control certain provinces the ruling party claimed certain regions to be its zones. The battle for twenty five per cent of the presidential votes in the five provinces in Kenya was already taking shape. The people supporting opposition parties had to be displaced from certain regions. The attacks took ethnic dimension with the local people attacking opposition supporters in their midst regarded as foreigners. The Kikuyu, Luo and some sections of Luhya groups of tribe were in opposition parties. The pattern of violence pitting tribes in Rift and coast provinces was as per Table 1 here below:

**Table 1: Pattern of tribal clashes in Kenya  
Rift Valley**

<b>DISTRICT</b>	<b>AREA</b>	<b>TRIBES</b>
NAKURU	Molo Njoro Olenguruone	Kipsigis, Ogiek-vs-Kikuyu and Kisii Kipsigis, Ogiek -vs-Kikuyu Kipsigis, Ogiek -vs- Kikuyu and Kisii.
KERICHO	Londiani Fort Tenan Kipelion Thessalia Kunyak Sondu	Kipsigis -vs-Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Kamba & Luhya. Kipsigis - vs- Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Kamba & Luhya Kipsigis -vs - Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo Kamba & Luhya Kipsigis - vs- Luo Kipsigis -vs-Luo Kipsigis -vs-Luo
NAROK	Ennossupika	Maasai-vs- Kikuyu
LAIKIPIA	Oi Moran	Samburu, Turkana & Pokot -vs Kikuyu.
NANDI	Miteitei Kamasai Owiro Songhor	Nandi - vs- Kikuyu, Luhya & Kisii Nandi -vs- Luhya Nandi -vs- Luo Nandi - vs- Luo
UASIN GISHU	Burnt Forest Turbo	Nandi - vs- Kikuyu Nandi vs.- Luhya
TRANS NZOIA	Saboti	Sabaot - vs.- Bukusu Pokot- vs.- Luhya
TRANS MARA	Nyangusu	Kisii - vs.- Maasai

**Nyanza Province**

<b>District</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Tribes</b>
KISUMU	Sondu	Kipsigis -vs- Luo
KISII	Ochodororo Nyangusu	Kisii -vs- Luo Kisii - vs- Maasai

### Coast Province

District	Area	Tribes/clans
MOMBASA	Likoni Matuga	Digo – vs – Luo, kikuyu & other upcountry people Digo –vs – Luo, kikuyu, & other upcountry people

**Source: Report of Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, (1999)**

The types of violence involved include killings, looting and burning of properties. Many people were displaced in the rift valley and parts of coast province in the pre and post election violence in the period 1991 to 1998. The perpetrators of the violence were well organized militia. For example in the coast province the Mijikenda youth included ex-servicemen who had taken oath to violently evict from their midst the upcountry people. The Likoni incidence i claimed more than seventy lives including ten policemen.

In the conflict of that period so called non locals were attacked and hounded out of the Rift Valley Province. The attacks on certain ethnic communities left hundreds of people dead, displaced and property destroyed. The politicians were culpable of the election violence. There was strong evidence that the tensions had been fanned by various parliamentary candidates through potentially inflammatory campaign speeches during the run up to the elections. The mass media also played a role in promoting post-election violence. In the run up to elections of 1997 there were pamphlets like Dispatches, Kenya Confidential, and Exposure, which were polemical in tone and made serious allegations against individuals and institutions. The contents of these pamphlets caused divisions and antagonism among the people (Article 19 of 1998).

Whereas the 1992 and 1997 post-election violence was limited to the two provinces in Kenya namely Rift Valley and Coast, the 2007 post election violence has been distinguished by its spontaneity, the turbulence and the rage with which it occurred. Within seconds of announcement of presidential poll results on December 30, the whole country was engulfed in violence. Many parts of Rift Valley Province had erupted into widespread inter-ethnic violence before presidential poll results were announced. The delays in the tallying of votes and rumors about the imminent rigging of the election by the incumbent sparked attacks primarily directed at the members of the incumbent's

ethnic group settled or working in that province. Of course other members from other ethnic communities who had acquired land in the province or working there were not spared. Inter-ethnic violence that swept across many communities in the aftermath of the December polls began in the Rift Valley. The epicenter of the first wave of Rift Valley violence was in and around the town of Eldoret. Within days of presidential poll results announcement, the target ethnic communities settled or working in the province had been virtually wiped out – through either displacement or killings. Their homes were burnt down and other properties destroyed (Human Right Watch, 2008).

According to Kenya Housing Rights Update (January, 2008), the violence protests and the ensuing violence following the disputed results of the December 2007 presidential elections resulted in hundreds of thousands of people displaced and rendered homeless. Rift Valley led in the number of people displaced.

Before quitting the post-election violence in Rift Valley it is fitting to examine further the unrest in this province. The issue of "*Majimboism*" was promised by certain politicians within the volatile context of the politics of land. The question of "*Majimboism*" was peddled by certain politicians during their campaigns in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces, the two provinces with the most sensitive outstanding land issues. These politicians interpreted the concept of *majimboism* narrowly to mean ethnic federalism. The tensions over ownership of land and other issues have long been a source of mistrust and violence between the majority Kalenjin population and the area's occupied by Kikuyu minority. Those tensions were made worse by the sharp lines drawn between opposing camps during the 2007 electoral campaign. The opposition championed by ODM engaged in ethnic rhetoric promising equitable land redistribution. The mass media was also used for the escalation of the post-election violence. For example, KASS Fm Eldoret's popular Kalenjin language radio station was used as a platform for inflammatory ethnic rhetoric (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

The province also witnessed other types of violence occasioned by the presidential poll dispute. The police and the military deployed in the province more so in Eldoret area were accused of killing innocent people. At one point the military deployed in Eldoret area accused the police of using excessive force in attempts to restore order.

In the same province a near vicious cycle of violence was initiated by killer gangs from Central Kenya ethnic communities to avenge the killings of their kin and destruction of property. The reprisal attacks against people mainly from Luo Nyanza, Kalenjins and Luhyas and minority groups associated with ODM occurred in the Rift Valley towns of Nakuru, Molo and Naivasha. The vicious attacks were executed by well organized militia from Central Province and left many people dead or displaced and property of unknown value destroyed. What followed after the last two weeks of January and February 2008 was exodus of members of a certain ethnic community back to their ancestral land in Western Kenya. The violence in Nakuru, Molo, and Naivasha in the Rift Valley were reprisal in nature and had been reinforced by the long standing ethnic mistrust among Kenyan communities.

- Nairobi province appear to have escaped the mayhem and orgy of post election violence witnessed in the Rift Valley and elsewhere courtesy of massive security deployed to protect Central Business District of the city. According to the (Kenya Housing Rights update, January-2008) the post election violence engulf primarily the formal settlements of Kibera, Korogocho, Mathare where inter-ethnic violence, killings, displacements and destruction of property were witnessed. Post-election violence also occurred in the formal settlements of Dandora, Kariobangi which tended to have pockets of slum dwellers.

The Kibera slums became a show case of post election violence in the City of Nairobi. Members of one ethnic community from Western Kenya with support of minority groups, formed militia gangs and displaced certain ethnic groups from the giant Kibera informal settlements. Several people were killed and property destroyed. The Rift Valley Railway services were paralyzed as sections of the railroad passing through Kibera were uprooted (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The security forces fighting the gangs trying to reach city centre from East land areas of Mathare, Jogoo Road and also from Kibera also contributed to the escalation of violence in the city. ✦

In the Central Province of Kenya, which is alleged to have been the origin of killer gangs that were responsible for fatal reprisal attacks on people from Luo Nyanza and Kalenjins in some parts of Rift Valley already mentioned, hardly experienced physical combats. The people of central province especially in Thika, Juja, Nyeri and other urban centers, engaged their perceived antagonists in psychological warfare through verbal warnings



and leaflets to leave the province within stipulated time failure to which their heads would be severed. The warnings forced members of the affected ethnic communities to move to police stations for safety. The orgy of killings was not witnessed in the province, but non-kikuyu were displaced. Coast Province of Kenya had its worst experience in pre- and post election violence of 1992 and 1997. The election related clashes in the Rift Valley and the Coast combined left over 1,500 people dead and 300,000 displaced over this period. The violence in the Coast included well organized attacks against people from up-country.

But the 2007 post election violence took a different dimension. The ODM supporters in Mombasa launched attacks on supporters of other political parties PNU and ODM - K. On a number of occasions the protests turned more violent with the youth resorting to looting of business premises and destroying property.

But again the ODM politicians' promises of "*majimboism*" during their pre-poll campaigns cannot be ruled out as a source of violence in the Coast. There was a lost opportunity to introduce "*majimboism*" to address the long standing land question. The other source of local violence were the security forces that engaged the local protestors in running battles on daily basis in the name of restoring law and order (Human Rights Watch- 2008).

Western province had its own share of the 2007 post election violence which to some extent had ethnicity overtones but all was overshadowed by the 2007 post-election violence in the neighbouring province of Nyanza where waves of violence appear to start from rural areas and reach peak in the City of Kisumu. The announcement of the presidential poll results set parts of Nyanza ablaze. Major roads in the province were barricaded with bon fires.

For months life in the province came to a stand still with learning institutions including Maseno University closed. Kisumu is one of the towns which bore the brunt of post-election violence which left in its wake about 100 of its residents dead and property worth millions of shillings destroyed (Daily Nation Thursday June 12, 2008).

## **2.4.0 Theoretical Literature**

Societies are characterized by conflict and change. Broad social and political trends, for example, shifts in population trends, urbanization, governance, bureaucratization and resource constraints can cause major paradigm shifts resulting in strain in the political and social orders. In all that the societies need to be accountable for their deeds. It is of paramount importance to make a rational decision before they engage in any human action. Conflict and rational theories have been used in the study.

### **2.4.1 Conflict Theory**

According to Marx, societies are divided into classes with unequal resources. Since such marked inequalities exist, there are divisions of interest which are “built into” the social system (Giddens, 2004). These conflicts of interest at some point break out into active change. Conflict theorists see society as essentially full of tension; even the most stable social system represents an uneasy balance of antagonistic groupings (Giddens, 2004: 669).

There is also the Marxist perspective of social stratification. It regards stratification as a divisive rather than an integrative structure. The theorists who espouse the perspective see it as a mechanism by which some exploit others rather than a means of furthering collective goals (Haralambos and Holborn, 1992: 36-37). According to Haralambos and Holborn (1992), Marx believed that the class struggle was the driving force for social change.

Conflict theorists are oriented toward the study of social structures and institutions (Ritzer, 1996). Ritzer cites Dahrendorf (1958; 1959) who sees society at every point as subject to process of change. Conflict theorists see dissension and conflict at every point in the social system. As a social institution, political activity consists in contests for the power to make laws, or, more generally, contests to deal with issues of who governs, who wields ultimate power, for how long, in what fields (Wells, 1970). Political institution is an area of conflict stratagems, bargaining and influence, alliances, agreements and disagreement, and the grounds for them all in relation to the exercise of legitimate force in a society (Wells, 1970).

And lastly, there are the visions of Karl Marx and Max Weber of the social and political orders. Broadly, the two conflict theorists agree first that social and political orders penetrate one another and that events and phenomena in the one influence events and phenomena in the other (Orum, 1989). This is an essential element in the study of political sociology.

### **Relevance to the study**

Conflict theory helps us to understand in this study the causes of conflict in the society. Though the class stratification exists in the society, the political elites should not use the circumstance to achieve their end. People need to understand their source of conflict and find solution without rising against themselves. It also helps to understand that an occurrence of events and phenomena within the confines of the political order will influence events and phenomena in the social order and vice versa.

### **2.4.2 Rational choice theory**

Rational choice theory was proposed by Homan (1961) and states that human beings are purposive and goal oriented in their preferences or utilities that are set hierarchically in the society. It begins with assumption that men have different wants, goals and values and as such men live within the world of scarcity and therefore must select between alternative courses of action that leads towards the most preferred goal (Heath, 1976:3 Carling 1992:27, Coleman, 1973). Ritzer (1992) asserts that rational choice theory assumes that in choosing between alternative actions, a person will choose that one which is perceived by him at the time, the value of the result is great. People examine and make calculation involving various alternative action open to them and compare amount of rewards associated with each course of actions and likelihood of receiving it. In rational choice theory the highly valued rewards will be devalued if the actor thinks that it will be impossible to attain while enhancing the lesser valued reward in case the actor sees it being attainable.

In choosing lines of behaviour people make rational calculations with respect to the utility of alternative lines of conduct, preference hierarchy, intellectualization and the cost of each alternative in terms of utilities foregone and the best way to maximize utility. The theory asserts that such phenomena that arise from rational choices constitute a set of parameters for subsequent rational choices of individuals. This is because they determine

the distribution of resources among individuals, opportunities for the lines of behaviour and the nature of norms and obligations in a situation.

### Relevance to the study


The rational choice theory enables us to realize that all the decisions which a person makes are vital for the welfare of all. Each person has to make a rational decision which will enhance peace in the society. The common philosophical ideology of John Mbiti that “I am because we are”, has to be rationalized by each individual as it eventually forms a basis for human group.

### 2.5 Conceptual Framework

The aftermath of 2007 General Elections was faced with violence which rocked the whole country. Post election violence is a sad phenomenon which occurred in Kenya. It led to different types of violence like rape, fighting, displacement and loss of income.

The above occurrence had led to depression (hopelessness) and deprivation. When people reach a state of fear and deprivation they need to understand what caused the conflict which led to post election violence. After becoming aware of the conflict people are expected to make an effective rational decision to avoid recurrence of the phenomenon in the future. See Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



## 2.6 Operationalization of variables

For a researcher, the independent variable is the presumed cause and the dependent variable is the presumed effect (Singleton, *et al*, 1998).

**Table 2: Variables**

### Operationalization of variable

Independent variable	Indicators
General election	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preparation of voting</li> <li>- Registration of voters</li> <li>- Casting of votes</li> <li>- Accounting of votes</li> <li>- Announcement of results</li> </ul>
Dependent variable	Indicators
Post election violence	<p>Causes of violence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Delay in announcement of Presidential results</li> <li>- Inequitable distribution of national resources</li> </ul> <p>Types of violence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mugging</li> <li>- Rape</li> <li>- Displacements</li> <li>- Sexual harassments</li> <li>- Robberies</li> <li>- Destruction of transport systems</li> <li>- Blocking of roads</li> </ul> <p>Injury and loss of property</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Destruction of property</li> <li>- Killing</li> </ul> <p>Mechanism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compensation</li> <li>- Enacting of a new constitution</li> </ul>

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## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design that was used in the study. It includes: research site and description, unit of analysis and observation, sample selection and size, data sources, collection methods and tools, and data analysis. Others are challenges to the study and ethical considerations.

#### 3.2 Research design

According to Kothari (2004:31) the main purpose of the research design is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose. A research design is the program that guides the investigator as he or she collects, analyzes, and interprets observations (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 99). According to Kombo and Tromp (2006) research design is the “glue” that holds all of the elements in a research project together.

#### 3.3 Site selection and description

The study was conducted in the City of Kisumu (Charter yet to be granted). Kisumu city consists of two constituencies of Kisumu Town West and Kisumu Town East which are accessible. It has been selected globally as one of the millennium cities. It is located on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria, western Kenya. It is one of the three big urban centers in Kenya after the City of Nairobi and is the provincial headquarters for Nyanza Province where principal economic activity includes; sugar, fishery, subsistence agriculture and some low level tourism. The city has a large informal economy (Earth Institute, 2007). It is the main urban centre in Nyanza Province which is rated to have low human performance index compared to other regions of Kenya. The low human development is due to among others: lack of income earning opportunities, years of political marginalization because of the region’s long association with opposition politics in the country. One of the characteristics of Kenya’s bad governance in the past is that regions that were deemed to be opposition zones were ignored (Third Kenya Human Development Report, 2003).

The city is metropolitan but the Luo remain majority and are mainly involved in informal business activities. Other ethnic groups especially the Kisii are found in large numbers

dominating transport business and real estate development. Minority groups, Indians and Kikuyu dominate major businesses in the town. According to Earth Institute (2007), the city's population is 375, 600 (estimates). The City had always been the hot bed of opposition politics in Kenya ever since the formation of KPU in the 1960s resulting into its marginalization in the first forty years of independence.

The area was purposively selected because it bore the brunt of post election violence. It was the only city in the country that was left in ruins only hours after announcement of the 2007 presidential poll results.

### **3.4 Unit of analysis and observation**

Mugenda and Mugenda (1999:14) define units of analysis as those units we initially describe for the purpose of aggregating their characteristics in order to describe some larger group or abstract phenomenon. Nachmias and Nachmias (1996:53) conceptualize the unit of analysis as the most elementary part of the phenomenon to be studied, the ultimate subject matter of inquiry in behavioural sciences.

Based on these definitions, therefore, the units of analysis of the study were the effects of 2007 post-election violence and its origins. The authors mentioned further outline unit of observation as subject, object, item or entity or events from which we measure the characteristics or obtain the data required for the purpose of the study. This unit can be a natural person, business entity or any property or event however described. In the circumstances, the units of observation were youth, businesses, men, women, and the region's institutions and officials.

### **3.5 Sample selection and size**

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999:10) sampling is the process of selecting a number of individuals for a study in such a way that the individual selected represent the large group from which they were selected. Sampling refers to a process of selecting a number of items from the universe to constitute a sample for study (Kothari, 2004:56). In this study, due to time, budgetary, and human resource constraints, all the elements in the population were not interviewed. only a selected sample to represent the target population were interviewed.

Probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed to select units of observation that formed the sample population. The study applied cluster sampling in the selection of respondents interviewed. The (Earth Institute, 2007) population estimate of 375,600 provided a basis to draw a proportionate representative sample. Kisumu City was divided into three clusters as follows:

Cluster one was Kisumu town centre (Oginga Odinga Street). Cluster two was Kisumu town west constituency (industrial area and middle class estates of USAID and Moscow). Cluster three was Kisumu town East constituency (Kondele- Darfur area and Nyalenda). In every cluster the researcher selected 80 respondents using simple random sampling. According to Kothari (2004) simple random sampling, gives each possible sample combination on equal probability being picked and each item in the entire population to have an equal chance of being included in the sample. Therefore the researcher had 80 respondents from each cluster which had the same numbers within the three clusters totaling to 240 respondents.

Each cluster had 80 selected respondents. Therefore, respondents in three clusters equaled  $80 \times 3$  say 240. The proposed size of the respondents was 240. But few respondents as shown in the table below declined to be interviewed claiming that the information they had was so sensitive to be shared. Out of 14 key informants who were supposed to be interviewed one business lady was so emotional. She said that she could not talk anything regarding post election violence because the loss the family incurred was unbearable. Also an Asian businessman whose premises were burned refused to give any information fearing that the information could be used against him. Therefore only 12 key informants were interviewed.

**Table 3: Number of respondents interviewed**

Gender	The number of respondent supposed to be interviewed	Respondents who refused to be interviewed	Respondents who were not interviewed	Respondents interviewed
Male	148	9	9	139
Female	92	10	10	82
Total	240	19	19	221



The study also used purposive sampling method while carrying out key interviewing to get key informants. Key informants were 12 who included 1 district officer, 2 principals of secondary schools, head teacher of Agah Khan primary school, 1 chief, 1 manager of a hotel in the city and 6 businessmen.

### **3.6 Data Sources, Collection Methods and Tools**

The study used multiple sources of information both primary and secondary to ensure validity and reliability of the data collected.

#### **3.6.1 Data sources**

##### **3.6.1.1 Primary data**

Primary data is information gathered directly from respondents (Kombo and Tromph, 2006:100). It was collected from men, women, youth, businesspersons who experienced the 2007 post election violence. The questionnaires were administered to collect quantitative data.

More detailed information was collected through key informant interviews and also visit to several business and residential properties destroyed during the post election violence so as to enhance the validity of gathered information.

##### **3.6.1.2 Questionnaires**

These are tools which are commonly used to obtain important information about the population. Questionnaires were used to collect quantitative and qualitative responses. Each item in the questionnaire was developed to address a specific objective. This study used both structured with closed ended questions and unstructured questionnaires with open ended questions. Primary data was collected by both instruments and was used to sample population of youth, women, and men and specified key informants. Unstructured questionnaires with open-ended question were also be used to capture in-depth responses since the area of study was new and also to capture the advantage of allowing respondents to express themselves freely.

##### **3.6.1.3 Key informant interviewing**

A key informant is anyone who has special knowledge regarding the research problem. They were selected purposively by virtue of their knowledge and understanding of the target group. This helped synthesize different views on the subject and facilitated the

researcher to draw balanced conclusion. They included two principals of secondary schools, the head of Agah Khan Primary School, a district officer, a chief and six business persons. The researcher used key interview guide to enhance the collection of information.

#### **3.6.2.4 Secondary data**

The secondary data was collected through desk review by analyzing documents related to post election violence. The researcher consulted the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics Library, Kenya National Library, Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, Department of Sociology and Social Work Library and the Institute of Development Studies Library at the University of Nairobi.

### **3.7 Data Analysis**

Once the questionnaires or the measuring instruments had been administered and returned, the mass of raw data collected were systematically organized in a manner that facilitated analysis. The data from closed ended questions were entered in a code sheet from which they were entered into the computer using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). It was from this that descriptive and inferential statistics were used to interpret and present the data. Further, descriptive statistics had been used to summarize information for accurate description and comparisons. Descriptive statistics also enabled the researcher to meaningfully describe the distribution of scores of measurements using a few indices or statistics. These included mean, mode, tables, and percentages. Inferential statistics had been used in cross tabulation and formed the basis of correlation statistics. This method was, therefore, used to establish relationships between variables by moving beyond the data in order to give conclusions.

Quantitative data were summarized to identify themes on the basis of questionnaires received from the field. The analysis reduced data from many cases into concepts and sets of relational statements that could be used to explain what was going on. This involved opening up the text and expose the thoughts, ideas, and meanings contained therein through the use of a process called open coding. This process entails breaking down of data into discrete parts. Closely examine them, and compare for similarities and differences. The similarities and differences enabled the researcher to form explanations about the nature of the phenomena. The resultant summaries or conclusions that arose out

of this process were subjected to social theories to establish their conformity to social realities.

### **3.8 Challenges of the study**

Due to the volatility of the topic at the time the study was being conducted, it was not easy to persuade respondents to consent to the interviews. Victims of the study were not readily available and the few who were there were reluctant to part with information fearing it would be used against them. Further more people who bore the brunt of post election violence were displaced and were yet to return to the City of Kisumu.

The researcher minimized the population under study within the context of the study topic due time, budgetary and human resource constraints.

### **3.9 Ethical considerations**

Prior to the study, an introductory letter was obtained from the university a copy of which was made available to each of the nine research assistants.

Prospective respondents were informed of the study objectives and their consent sought. They were asked to freely give the information. Confidentiality of any information given was guaranteed.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 4.0 Introduction

This was a descriptive study on the effects of the 2007 post election violence in Kenya, a case study of the City of Kisumu.

This chapter is sub-divided into five sections: These are socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, the cause(s) of the 2007 post election violence, the types of violence experienced by people in the 2007 post election crisis, injury and loss of life and mechanisms of dealing with post election violence.


#### 4.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

The social demographic characteristics presented included province of origin of respondents, respondent's tribe, gender, age, marital status, education and occupation. Data collected on each of these indicators are presented below.

##### 4.1.1 Distribution of respondents according to province.

Respondents from Nyanza were (95.9%), Rift Valley (0.5%) and Western (8%) as shown in Figure 2 below. It shows how less metropolitan the town had become in the aftermath of post election violence.

**Figure 2: Province distribution**



**4.1.2 Distribution of respondents according to districts and divisions.**

The majority of respondents were from the two neighbouring districts of Kisumu (74.2%) and Siaya (26%). It shows the people in the town were mainly from neighbouring districts. Majority (52.3%) were from Winam division followed by Kisumu West division with (19.1%). This shows that the town was experiencing most human influx from its own immediate backyard.

**4.1.3 Distribution of respondents according to Estates**

The majority of interviewees were drawn from Obunga (34%), Kondele (33%), Nyawita (30%), Migosi (30%) and Manyatta (28%). These were estates which witnessed the worst incidences of post election violence with widespread destruction of properties and businesses and loss of life.

**4.1.4 Distribution of respondents according to tribe**

The majority of the interviewees were Luo (73.8%), Luhya (14.9%), and Kisii (4.5%) as shown in table below. It shows the town had become less metropolitan in terms of

ethnicity in the aftermath of the post election violence, a manifestation of pattern of ethnic displacement.

All key informants interviewed said that businesspersons from Central and Eastern provinces of Kenya who were displaced during post election violence were yet to return to Kisumu.


**Table 4: Distribution according to tribe**

		Tribe		
		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Luo	163	73.8	73.8
	Luhya	33	14.9	88.7
	Kisii	10	4.5	93.2
	Kalenjin	5	2.3	95.5
	Teso	2	.9	96.4
	Kamba	1	.5	96.8
	Meru	1	.5	97.3
	Indian	1	.5	97.7
	Swahili	3	1.4	99.1
	Somali	1	.5	99.5
	Nubian	1	.5	100.0
	Total	221	100.0	

#### 4.1.5 Distribution of respondents according to gender.

Male respondents were (63%) while female were (37%) as shown by figure below. It indicates that men were more open to discuss their experience of the 2007 post election violence than women.

**Figure 3: Gender distribution**




**4.1.6 Distribution of respondents according to age and marital status**

The majority of people available for interview were in the age bracket 18-27 years (48%); 28-37 years (31.7%) and 38-47 years (13.1%). It indicates that the youth dominated other age groups in the town. This sentiment was expressed by (66.7%) of key informants, who described the city of Kisumu as a swarm of idle youth and that was its undoing.

Overall, (62.9%) of the respondents were married, (34.4%) were single, separated, (0.5%), divorced (1.4%) and widowed (0.9%). Figure 4 illustrates the distribution.

**Figure 4: Distribution by marital status**



#### **4.1.7 Distribution of respondents by level of education and occupation**

The respondents were distributed according to the level of education to determine which level was more available for interview which could affect the quality of information. Most of respondents interviewed (41.3%) of all males, and (41.3%) of all females had attained secondary and primary education respectively. Others are shown on the table below. This shows that majority of interviewees were people with broad world view and good grasp of what transpired during post election violence.

Most of the respondents (53.3%) were business persons, (6.6%) were housewives while the least were Social workers (0.5%) and the rest had other occupations. The researcher targeted the affected areas where majority were faced by post election violence.



**Table 5: Distribution of respondents on the basis of level of education**

**Sex \* Level of Education Crosstabulation**

			Level of Education					Total
			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary/Diploma	University	No formal education	
Sex	Male	Count	32	57	40	8	1	138
		% within Sex	23.2%	41.3%	29.0%	5.8%	7%	100.0%
	Female	Count	33	29	14	3	1	80
		% within Sex	41.3%	36.3%	17.5%	3.8%	1.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	65	86	54	11	2	218
		% within Sex	29.8%	39.4%	24.8%	5.0%	.9%	100.0%

The study revealed that most of respondents were Luo from Nyanza Province. The respondents were within an age bracket of 18-37 years old (79.9%) and those who had attained primary and secondary education were (69.2%). This meant that members of other ethnic communities were displaced after 2007 post election violence and were yet to return to the city.

**4.2 Causes of Post Election Violence**


The first objective was: To find out the cause(s) of the 2007 post election violence. The indicators under this objective were participation in general election, description of general election, reasons for 2007 post election violence, who were involved in the 2007 post election violence, if post election violence was justified and inequitable distribution of national resources. Data collected on each of these indicators are presented below.

**4.2.1 Participation in General Election**

Most of the respondents (84.6%) participated in the 2007 general elections, and only (15.4%) did not participate. It indicates that the turn-out by the people of the City of Kisumu to vote in the last general election was very high. The statistics are supported by the views of (41.6%) of key informants who talked of high turn-out of voters in Kisumu town after hopes were raised by opinion polls in which a candidate with fanatical support in the town had a head start.

town after hopes were raised by opinion polls in which a candidate with fanatical support in the town had a head start.

**Figure 5: Distribution of respondents' participation in 2007 general election**



Did you participate in the 2007 general election?

**4.2.2 How would you describe the 2007 general election?**

Most respondents (40%) adjudged the 2007 general election as not fair, (30%) adjudged it as not fair at all, (24.5%) of respondents saw it as fair, while (5.5%) saw it as very fair. It shows how there was confusion across the town's population about the outcome of the 2007 general election. All the twelve key informants said that there was intriguing handling of counting of presidential votes at last stages. There was the smooth counting of votes at initial stages in which one candidate was leading. This was followed suddenly by throwing people into darkness of what was going on. The key informants also said that there was delay in releasing the presidential poll results which made Kisumu residents cast doubt on the announced presidential poll results as a result people felt cheated. The respondents' description of the 2007 general election is depicted by Table 6.

**Table 6: Distribution of respondents' description of 2007 general election**

**How would you describe the 2007 general election?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Very fair	12	5.5	5.5
Fair	54	24.5	30.0
Not fair	88	40.0	70.0
Not fair at all	66	30.0	100.0
Total	220	100.0	

**4.2.3 Why was there violence after 2007 general election?**


Most respondents (93.7%) attributed the 2007 post election violence to delay in announcement of presidential poll results and the dispute over the results eventually announced, (3.9%) of respondents attributed the violence to the failure of election results to produce change in leadership while (2.4%) blamed the power hungry politicians as depicted by Figure 6.

These statistics were supported by the views given by various key informants. (66.7%) of key informants talked of the suspicions and anger raised among voters by the unexplained delay in announcing presidential poll results. About (16.7%) of key informants talked of immaturity among politicians which led to failure to stem the mayhem. They further blamed the 2007 post election violence on the lust for power on the side of certain politicians. One respondent said;

“The 2007 post election violence was a way of dealing with an ethnic community that had been trying to dominate other Kenyans and treating them like second class citizens not entitled to public power.”

50% of key informants attributed post election violence to negative ethnicity in the country which was exploited by power hungry politicians to realize their political ambitions. They added that these politicians were able to use the vulnerable unemployed youth who were never in short supply in the City of Kisumu.

**Figure 6: Distribution of respondents on why there was violence after 2007 general election.**




Why was there violence after 2007 general election?

**4.2.4 Who were involved in the post 2007 post election violence?**

Majority of respondents (62%) talked of youth involvement in the 2007 post election violence, (33%) of the respondents talked of all people involvement and (5%) of the respondents said police were involved as shown by Figure 7. The key informants shared the view that the youth were involved in the post election violence. (75%) of key informants said that the City of Kisumu was a host to several unemployed or underemployed youth who took advantage of the election dispute to cause mayhem.


**Figure 7: Who were involved in post election violence?**



#### **4.2.5 Do you think that post election violence was justified?**

The largest category of female respondents (56%) felt that post election violence was not justified, while (54%) of male respondents felt that it was justified. This was because most of the male were youth and they benefited from the violence. Others are shown by the Figure 8.

**Figure 8: Yes responses for justification of post election violence.**



Do you think that the post election violence was justified?

The explanation for justification responses (38.2%) said it was an expression of anger, (23.6%) of respondents talked of expectation of change by the people while (37.3%) were said that people wanted their rights to be addressed, while (0.9%) affirmed that election was not free and fair. (66.7%) of key informants explained that post election violence was overwhelmingly in response to perceived rigged presidential polls. According to them there was a general dissatisfaction with the delayed announcement of presidential poll results by the ECK.

The no responses advanced the following explanations, about (30.5%) of respondents explained that rational means should have been sought to resolve the dispute. About (40.0%) said the post election violence led to disruption of peace and caused chaos, (20%) talked of lack of accountability by E.C.K. which they saw as the culprit.

**Table 7: No responses for justification of post election violence**

**if No explain**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Lack of use of other logical means like dilogue	29	30.5	30.5
Led to disruption of peace and chaos	38	40.0	70.5
Lack of responsbility and accountability by E.C.K	19	20.0	90.5
Nothing substantial which took p.lace	9	9.5	100.0
Total	95	100.0	

(16%) of the key informants said that the 2007 post election violence was not justified and was only imposed on Kenyans by power hungry politicians.

**4.2.6 Did inequitable distribution of national resources (e.g. land, job opportunities, infrastructure development, and allocation of funds) cause the 2007 post election violence?**

Most of the respondents (61.6%) did not link the 2007 post election violence to the distribution of natinal resources with reference to the City of Kisumu, while (38.4%) linked the 2007 post election violence to inequitable distribution of national resources like land, job opportunities, and infrastructure development.

Of these respondents, (48.8%) attributed the 2007 post election violence to unemployment in Kisumu, (36.0%) called for change while (15.1%) blamed negative ethnicity for the post election violence.

(50%) of key informants said that Kisumu City was part of a region that had been marginalized for over forty years by successive governments of Kenya because of its opposition politics. They cited closure of industries in Kisumu town, poor roads all over Nyanza province. The election poll results dispute provided an opportunity for displaced aggression.

**Table 8: Inequitable distribution of resources**

**If Yes explain**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Unemployment	42	48.8	48.8
Wanted change to take place	31	36.0	84.9
Tribalism	13	15.1	100.0
Total	86	100.0	

The study revealed that 2007 post election violence was caused by various issues. Top most was the suspicious manner in which the presidential poll results were handled. The people of Kisumu felt cheated and decided to fight against what they saw as an act of impunity by an ethnic community to retain power. Other factors like years of marginalization of Luo Nyanza which were manifested in neglected infrastructure, lack of job opportunities combined to add fuel to an already volatile situation. The study also revealed that negative ethnicity exists in the country and was exploited by unscrupulous politicians to realize their political ambitions.

**4.3 Types of violence**

The second objective was: To identify the types of violence experienced by different category of people during the 2007 post election violence. The indicators to this objective were category of people most affected and type of violence experienced. Data collected on each of these indicators are presented below.

**4.3.1: Category of people most affected by 2007 post election violence in the City of Kisumu.**

Respondents affirmed that there was violence in Kisumu City. When they were asked who were affected by the violence, majority of respondents (36.4%) said that all categories of people were affected, (32.3%) indicated the youth as most affected category by the 2007 post election violence. Others are shown on the Table 9.



**Table 9: The most affected category of people by post election violence**

**Who were most affected category of people by post election violence?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Youth	71	32.3	32.3
Men	9	4.1	36.4
Women	17	7.7	44.1
Children	18	8.2	52.3
Women and Girls	25	11.4	63.6
All	80	36.4	100.0
Total	220	100.0	

When the respondents were asked if the local people were affected by post election violence, (91.4%) affirmed that they were affected by post election violence. Most respondents (50.5%) talked of looting and destruction of property as the most prevalent type of violence witnessed in the town. Other types of violence are depicted by Table 10.

**Table 10: Types of violence**

**If Yes what kind of violence?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Looting and destruction of property	100	50.5	50.5
Mugging	12	6.1	56.6
Sexual harassment	6	3.0	59.6
Loss of life	31	15.7	75.3
Fighting	6	3.0	78.3
Food shortage	12	6.1	84.3
Body injuries	7	3.5	87.9
Psychological trauma	3	1.5	89.4
Disruption of education	2	1.0	90.4
Police harassment	10	5.1	95.5
Displacement of people	9	4.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

These views were supported by the key informants. All the 12 key informants concurred that property sector bore the brunt of post election violence. The looting and destruction of property was at its peak in the residential estates of Kondele and Manyatta followed by targeted businesses and properties in the town centre.

### 4.3.2 Were women affected by the 2007 post election violence?

Majority of respondents (90.5%) indicated women were affected by post election violence while (9.5%) indicated they were not affected. When respondents were asked which type of violence the women experienced during post election violence, majority of the respondents (18.5%) indicated incidences of women being raped, (15.2%) of respondents indicated women were victims of insecurity while (12.1%) stated women were also killed during post election violence as shown by Table 11.

**Table 11: Type of violence experienced by women during post election violence**

If Yes explain

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Rape	98	49.5	49.5
Loss of employment	4	2.0	51.5
Food insecurity/Shortage	30	15.2	66.7
Loss of life	24	12.1	78.8
Body injuries	11	5.6	84.3
Sexual harassment	3	1.5	85.9
Mugging	9	4.5	90.4
Displacement	12	6.1	96.5
Destruction of their properties	7	3.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Women had a difficult time coping with a hostile environment especially due to their feminine nature. They had to flee the violent environment as soon as possible to avoid bad scenario like raping. The illustration below shows a fleeing woman from the scene of violence.




Illustration No. 1: A woman runs past a burning tire set a blaze by protesters in Kisumu.  
Source: Sunday Nation of 3rd February 2008.

#### **4.3.3 Were the youth affected by 2007 post election violence?**

Most of the respondents (94%) indicated the youth were affected, while (6%) said the youth were not affected. It supports the views given by one key informant who said; "Kisumu City was home to idle youth groups whose involvement in the 2007 post election violence threw the town into anarchy." When respondents were asked how youth were affected, (48%) of respondents explained that the youth were shot by police, (17%) explained the youth were arrested by police, (17%) indicated the youth lost jobs and (8%) stated the youth sustained body injuries as shown by Figure 9.

Figure 9: Effects of the 2007 post election violence on the youth




#### 4.3.4 Experience of business persons of post election violence

Most of respondents (95.5%) indicated that business persons experienced post election violence while (4.5%) indicated they did not. This position is supported by the sentiments of all the key informants that business persons were the hardest hit category of people. Their properties and business were looted, destroyed or burnt, they were displaced, and some killed. Businessmen from Central and Eastern provinces had not returned to town ten months after the crisis. Some business persons had returned to dispose of their properties and often at cost. Some Asian business families had since relocated to Uganda, Tanzania or Dubai.

**Figure10: Effects of 2007 post election violence on business persons**

**Business persons experience of violence**



**4.3.5 Types of violence experienced by business persons**

Majority of respondents (68.9%) explained that business persons experienced looting and destruction of properties, (8.1%) talked of burning, (8.6%) talked of disruption of businesses, 1.4% disruption of transport system and (0.5%) loss of life. Others are shown in Table 12 below. One key informant remarked: “deaths of some business persons were caused by shock after seeing all their life time savings lost.” Illustration No.2 depicts an experience of a business person.

**Table12: If yes what kind of violence?**

**If yes what kind of violence?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Robbery	25	12.0	12.0
Looting and destruction of properties	144	68.9	80.9
Burning of property	17	8.1	89.0
Disruption of businesses	18	8.6	97.6
Loss of life	1	.5	98.1
Disruption of transport	3	1.4	99.5
Loss of customers	1	.5	100.0
Total	209	100.0	




Illustration No. 2: Destruction of business premises

Source: Daily Nation of January 14, 2008.

#### **4.3.6 Did the post election violence affect your life?**

Most of the respondents (82.3%) were affected by the 2007 post election violence while (17.7%) indicated they were not affected. The ways the respondents were affected by the post election violence varied. Majority of respondents (31.7%) were affected by food insecurity while 13.3% had lost jobs. Others are shown in the Table 13 below.

**Table13: If yes how was your life affected?**

**If Yes how was your life affected?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Food insecurity	57	31.7	31.7
Loss of jobs	24	13.3	45.0
Disruption of transport	8	4.4	49.4
Disruption of business	15	8.3	57.8
Psychological torture	23	12.8	70.6
Inflation	15	8.3	78.9
Loss of property and goods	11	6.1	85.0
Disruption /Discontinued education	9	5.0	90.0
Insecurity	11	6.1	96.1
Loss of life	6	3.3	99.4
Displacement	1	.6	100.0
Total	180	100.0	

All key informants confirmed that people’s lives were deeply affected by the post election violence in the City of Kisumu. Food insecurity was one of the major threats at the height of the post election violence as the town was virtually inaccessible as the transport system was paralyzed hence food supplies cut off. Jobs were lost as several firms that were main employers like Ukwala Supermarket, Grand Kimwa and its associated companies, major petrol stations, Punjani Electrical and Industrial Hardware Limited (Illustration No. 2), Amalo Industries Limited among others were looted and destroyed



Illustration No.3 shows a businessman pointing at the property which was burnt down  
Source: Daily Nation of February 6, 2008.

The study revealed that women were more affected than men due to their body anatomy. Many were raped among other types of violence's they experienced ranging from sexual harassment to mugging. Though male youth experienced some violence like harassment by police many took the advantage and started mugging and looting people's businesses. The study also revealed that business persons and real estate owners mainly the Kikuyu and the Kisii were affected in terms of destruction of property and displacement.

It was also revealed that some Asian business families who felt they were targeted during post election violence had since relocated to other countries.

**4.4.0 Loss of personal property and life**

The third objective of the study was: To find out the extent of loss of property and life experienced during 2007 post-election violence. Indicators under this objective were property destroyed, injury and loss of life, the persons behind the destruction and loss of life. Data collected on each of these indicators are presented below.

**4.4.1 Do you live in this town?**

Most of the respondents, (97.3%) were residents of the City of Kisumu while the rest (2.7%) were not living within the city. Majority of respondents (57.3%) said that they carried on businesses to sustain themselves while (25.5%) were not engaged in any way to earn a living. Others are shown by the Table 14.

**Table 14: What do you do to sustain your livelihood?**

**If Yes what do you do to sustain your livelihood?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Business	126	57.3	57.3
Employed in public sector	12	5.5	62.7
Employed in private sector	26	11.8	74.5
None	56	25.5	100.0
Total	220	100.0	

Those statistics are supported by the information advanced by the key informants that Kisumu had many unemployed youth. The main business, according to the (91.7%) key informants, was mainly boda boda which was under paying. One respondent said:




“The boda boda bicycles and motor bikes do not belong to the riders but few rich individuals living comfortably in the background.”

The key informants indicated that unemployment remains a debilitating social problem in the City of Kisumu.

#### 4.4.2 Was any of your property destroyed?

Majority of the respondents (61.5%) did not experience destruction of property while (38.55%) indicated their personal properties were destroyed. Among those who experienced destruction and loss of property, (39%) lost business goods while below (2%) lost all above. Others are shown by the Figure 11. When the respondents were asked to explain the manner in which the property was destroyed, majority (67.8%) said they lost property through looting and (32.2%) said they lost property through burning.

Figure 11: The kind of destruction experienced



If yes ,what kind of destruction did you experience?

#### 4.4.3 Mass destruction of property in Kisumu city during the 2007 post election violence

The majority of the respondents (71.0%) strongly agreed that there was mass destruction of property in Kisumu City in the aftermath of the announcement of the disputed

presidential poll results, (24%) agreed and only (2.3%) disagreed. Others are shown by the table 15.

(91.7%) of key informants confirmed that destruction of property in the town was massive. One respondent said;

“This city was very beautiful, one could admire and wish to spend more days here, not like today where every corner of the city street you are met with a destroyed building”.

**Table 15: Was there mass destruction of property in this town?**

**There was a mass destruction of property in this town. To what extent do you agree with this statement?**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly agree	154	71.0	71.0
Agree	53	24.4	95.4
Not sure	5	2.3	97.7
Disagree	5	2.3	100.0
Total	217	100.0	

**4.4.4 It is difficult for people whose businesses were affected by the 2007 post election violence to reorganize. To what extent do you agree with this statement?**

Most of the respondents (58.6%) strongly agreed that it would be difficult for people whose businesses were affected by the post election violence to reorganize, (29.1%) agreed and only (0.5%) strongly disagreed.

The above responses were supported by the position of all the key informants who affirmed that the reconstruction of destroyed businesses was yet to start in the town. Main businesses as demonstrated by Illustrations 4 and 5 here below were still in a state of disrepair and vandalized at the time of the study. Some businessmen actually relocated to either other provinces/districts or countries as already been mentioned elsewhere in this report.



**Illustration No. 4: Business premises in a state of disrepair in Kisumu City**  
Photo by Researcher: October 24, 2008



**Illustration No. 5: Grand Kimwa Hotel in a state of disrepair in Kisumu City**  
Photo by Researcher: October 24, 2008

#### **4.4.5 Were any of your family members/relatives injured during the 2007 post election violence?**

(38.2%) of the respondents talked of injuries to the family members/friends, while (61.8%) admitted members of their family relatives did not suffer any injury. Majority of respondents (70%) admitted 1-2 members of the family/relatives were injured, (18%) had 3-4 family members /relatives injured. The least (4%) had over 8 family members injured. Others are shown by the Figure 12.


When they were asked how they got injured, majority of the respondents (38.7%) were of the view that the youth demonstrators were responsible for the injuries of relatives, (20.0%) were beaten by anti-riot police, (18.7%) sustained injuries through gun shots, (13.3%) suffered accidental injuries, while other injuries were sustained through arson and (4.0%) who could not explain how the injury was sustained.

The statistics are supported by the view of the 100% key respondents who said that the youth were responsible for the suffering of many people during 2007 post election violence in the City of Kisumu. One key respondent was categorical that:

“The youth were involved in the Kisumu post election violence with vicious abandon and they appear to enjoy the whole mayhem by looting, destroying properties and touting the police. After the Naivasha and Nakuru incidences in which people from Luo Nyanza were either killed or displaced the youth resorted to attacking residents of posh estates, looting properties and beating people for not supporting their course.”

Figure 12: Number of family members/relatives injured

If Yes, how many were injured?



If Yes, how many were injured?

#### 4.4.6 Did any of your family members/relatives die during post election violence?

Majority of respondents (75.8%) did not lose relatives, while (24.2%) lost relatives through post election violence. From the survey it was noted that majority (89.6%) of respondents lost 1-2 relatives while (10.4%) lost 3-4 relatives through the post election violence. One respondent said;

“I lost my son through a bullet wound. I tried to call for help but there was no response. He bled until he died. If it were you what could you have done? She said this as she tried to control her tears.”


When respondents were asked what the cause of death was, majority (47.9%) explained that it was as a result of gunshots, (18.8%) to succumb to injuries, (9.4%) hacked to death, and (8.3%) died of burns while (4.2%) said the victims died of shock.

(8.3%) of key informant said that the youth could not let people move freely especially if you did not come from their tribe. They were either hacking or stoning their victims to death to retaliate what their tribesmen were done in other parts of the country especially in Naivasha and Nakuru.

#### 4.4.7 Who killed them?

Most of the respondents (54.0%) were of the view that the police were responsible for the deaths while (46.0%) blamed the youth demonstrators as depicted by the Figure 13.

Figure 13: Who killed them?



The study revealed that there was mass destruction of property in Kisumu City. The destruction was carried out by youth who looted the business premises especially those which were owned by members of other ethnic communities. The youth took the advantage of the situation to loot properties. Business had not improved in the town because displaced investors had not returned to town. Some few had returned only to sell their properties.

The study also revealed that some young people were either injured or killed by stray bullets. Others were accidental injuries sustained as victims fled away from police or demonstrators or fell from the buildings while looting.

Another revelation from the study is that it might be in the long term interest for a person to acquire property and invest only among his or her own people. One's own people are not Kenyans but members of one's tribe.


#### 4.5.0 Mechanism of dealing with post election violence

The fourth objective of this study was: To suggest the mechanisms which need to be put in place to prevent recurrence of election violence. The indicators under this objective were how to treat the perpetrators of 2007 post election violence, how to treat victims of 2007 post election violence and other suggested mechanisms. Data on each of these indicators are presented below.

#### 4.5.1 Are the perpetrators of the 2007 post election violence known in this community?

The majority of the respondents (54%) stated that the perpetrators of the 2007 post election violence were not known in the community, while (46%) stated that the perpetrators of the 2007 post election violence were known in the community as shown by Figure 14. The explanation for the responses is that some of the respondents were either the perpetrators of the violence or their sympathizers.

**Figure 14: Perpetrators of 2007 post election violence**



If the perpetrators of 2007 post election violence are known

#### 4.5.2: How should the perpetrators of 2007 post election violence be treated?

When respondents were asked whether or not the perpetrators of post election violence be forgiven (67%) said they should be forgiven, (26.2%) said they should be arrested and charged while (6.4%) said nothing should be done them.

The responses demonstrate that majority of respondents were not the victims of the post election violence. The real targets and victims of the 2007 post election violence in Kisumu City according to 12 key informants are yet to return to the town.

**4.5.3 Were you or any member of your family/relatives(s) displaced?**

Majority of respondents (55.8%) said none of the relatives was displaced while (44.2%) had members of the family or relative(s) displaced as shown by Figure 16.

**Table16: Family members/relatives displaced**

Were you or any member of your family/ relative(s) displaced?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	96	44.2	44.2
No	121	55.8	100.0
Total	217	100.0	

From the above statistics it is apparent that even some members of the Luo community living in Kisumu City were not spared. About (50%) of key informants talked of broken families caused by the 2007 post election. One respondent said;

“Members of the Luo community whose spouses were from certain communities were displaced and their properties destroyed. Children from such marriages were not spared”.

**4.5.4 Suggestion given on how to treat victims of post election violence**

Majority of respondents (41.4%) indicated they should be left alone to fend for themselves, (23.2%) indicated they were assisted to resettled elsewhere, (19.2%) said they were assisted to settle in the area (town) where (16.2%) got free transportation. When asked who assisted them (33.6%) of the respondents said they had to find their own way out, (27.1%) said they were assisted by the government and red cross, another (27.1%) were assisted by relatives and friends while (1.9%) were assisted by police.

**4.5.5 Compensation of people who lost property in Kisumu through post election violence**

Most of respondents (93%) talked of full compensation to the businessmen by the government at market rates of businesses and properties lost while, (4.2%) argued that



people who lost property should be left alone to fend for them. Others are depicted by Table 17.

**Table 17: Compensation for loss of property**

How should the people who lost property in this area through 2007 post election violence be treated?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Government to compensate them at market value	198	93.0	93.0
Perpetrators of violence to compensate them at market value	6	2.8	95.8
Be left alone to deal with their problem	9	4.2	100.0
Total	213	100.0	

The statistics are supported by the position taken by 83.3% of key informants who argued that the government had failed to discharge its statutory obligation to provide security to the people and their property in the hour of need. It, therefore, must pay for the losses. The Managing Director of Punjani Electrical and Industrial Hardware Limited (Illustration No. 2) one of the key informants in the study said;

"I am going to sue the government to be compensated for the value of my business and property worth Kshs. 60 million lost during the 2007 post election violence".

#### 4.5.6 Enactment of new constitution

Majority of respondents (73.3%) felt that enactment of new constitution could avoid the recurrence of post election violence, while 26.7% felt it is not a solution as depicted by the table 18.

**Table 18: Enactment of new constitution**

Do you think enacting of new constitution can prevent recurrence of post election violence?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	159	73.3	73.3
No	58	26.7	100.0
Total	217	100.0	

When respondents were asked to suggest other mechanisms which need to be put in place to avert post election violence, majority (21.9%) suggested enactment of a new

constitution as a solution to Kenya which was confirming to the previous question that this will be of paramount importance to restore peace and tranquility. Others suggested (19.5%) that transparency and accountability would guarantee Kenya's future, (17.1%) suggested reconstitution of ECK as the best way to avoid recurrence of post election violence while (4.8%) suggested that elimination of negative ethnicity would guarantee the country a future free of post election violence as depicted by Table 19.

One respondent said; "transparency, accountability, equitable distribution of national resources and creation of employment opportunities for the youth were the best way forward to avoid recurrence of post election violence. If the same had been put in place before 2007 General Election, there would have been a mitigated violence or non at all in the City of Kisumu."

**Table 19: Suggest the best way to avoid recurrence of post election violence in Kenya**

Suggest the best way to avoid recurrence of post election violence in Kenya?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Enacting of New Constitution	46	21.9	21.9
Disolving of ECK	35	16.7	38.6
Reconstitution of ECK by independent body through vetting	36	17.1	55.7
Good governance	19	9.0	64.8
Increase security personnel	5	2.4	67.1
I dont know	3	1.4	68.6
Transparency and accountability	41	19.5	88.1
Abolish tribalism	10	4.8	92.9
Implementation of commission reports	1	.5	93.3
Government to compensate victims of post election violence	1	.5	93.8
Creation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission	5	2.4	96.2
Respect the rule of law	5	2.4	98.6
Providing employment for youth	3	1.4	100.0
Total	210	100.0	

The study revealed that enacting of a new constitution would be one of the major mechanisms which need to be put in place. It would put the country on track.

The study established that espousing values like transparency and accountability when dealing with issues of national interest would save Kenya from future trouble.

The study has also revealed that people were aware of the existence of negative ethnicity in the country.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### INTERPRETATION OF THE KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter is divided into three sub headings interpretation of key findings, conclusion and recommendation. It is from this chapter where possible avenues for further research may ensue.

#### 5.1 Interpretation of key findings

The first objective of the study was to establish the cause(s) of the 2007 post election violence, a case study of the City of Kisumu. The study revealed that number factors, led by alleged rigged presidential poll results contributed to the post election violence. The majority of respondents (94%) attributed the 2007 post election violence in Kisumu to delayed announcement of presidential poll results and said people felt cheated when a candidate who was trailing in the initial stages of vote counting was declared the winner.

People resorted to fight for their right which they saw was being taken away with impunity. Other factors that added fuel to the 2007 post election violence in the City of Kisumu include the teeming unemployed youth. The study revealed that the City of Kisumu had many unemployed or underemployed youth.

Orum quotes Hanna Arendt that fundamental assumptions underlying popular political participation “was that no one could be called free without his experience in public happiness, that no one could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called either happy or free without participation and having share in public power”(1989). Here was the main thrust of the fundamentals underlying the vicious violence in the city of Kisumu, a giant without basic industries to provide employment for its teeming youth. The region had been denied a share of public power in Kenya’s first forty years of independence and also denied access to public happiness by successive political administrations because of its association with opposition politics. As one senior Kenyan politician once remarked “Siasa mbaya maisha mbaya.” The opposition politics had been regarded in Kenya as bad politics (siasa mbaya) hence maisha mbaya (bad life) and the shared political philosophy by past administrations was

to neglect such regions (Third Kenya Human Report. 2003, United Nations Development Programme Kenya).

The causes of the 2007 post election violence in Kenya, a case study of the City of Kisumu had parallel with what had occurred elsewhere in the world .According to Lowe (2005), India's pre independence electoral results of 1937 which witnessed the Hindu National Congress Party victorious caused suspicion among Muslims and planted a seed of bloodbath and eventual disintegration of the country. In the Federal State of Yugoslavia the dominant behaviour of ethnic Serbs and their denial of power to pass over to other ethnic groups in the federations like Croatia in the subsequent presidential elections led to inter ethnic violence.

Then there was the post election violence in Nigeria. Nigeria went to the 1964 general elections a divided nation. The election campaigns were conducted in an atmosphere "reeking" in president Azikiwe's words of "mutual antagonisms, bitter recrimination and discrimination" (Hallet 1980: 385).

The regional elections in the western region of the country in 1965 were conducted in tense atmosphere of regional and ethnic rivalries. When the election results were announced to have been won by Akintola's party NNDP violence broke out in all parts of the region amid claims of rigged elections (Hallet, 1980). The violence in western Nigeria became vicious eventually plunging the entire country into anarchy and civil war.

The Nigerian post election violence was blamed on power hungry politicians, regional and ethnic chauvinists (Meredith, 1984). According to Meredith (1984) the country's politicians were over engaged in scramble for power and profit conducted with reckless abandon while neglecting the general population.

In Kenya the 2007 election campaigns were similarly conducted in an atmosphere "reeking" with tribal chauvinism. The opposition politicians promised people majimbo, and negative ethnicity was exploited to the extreme.

Lowe (2005) blames the Nigerian pre and post election violence of the 1960s on a series of local factors that include tribal differences. He argues that the different tribes in the

country were brought together to fight a common enemy, colonialists. But after Europeans withdrew the nationalists' loyalties reverted to tribes and not the nation.

In Kenya, the citizens' loyalties long reverted to tribes as would be seen in the country's political parties which were organized along ethnic lines thereby posing challenges to multiparty democracy in the country.

Conflict theory explains the cause(s) of the post election violence that had been experienced. The broad social and political trends for, example, shifts in population trend, urbanization, governance, bureaucratization and resource constraints cause major paradigm shifts resulting in strain in political and social orders.

According to Marx, societies are divided into classes with unequal resources. Since such marked inequalities exist, there are divisions of interest which are "built into" the social system (Giddens, 2004). These conflicts of interest at some point break out into active change. Conflict theorists, therefore, see society as essentially full of tension; even the most stable social system represents an easy balance of antagonistic groupings (Giddens 2004).

There is also the Marxist perspective of social stratification. It regards stratification as a divisive rather than an integrative structure. It is seen as a mechanism by which some exploit others rather than a means to further collective goals (Haralambos and Holborn, 1992: 36-37).

In the context of this study the situation has been made worse by the emergence of ethnicity as an element in social stratification. Political institution is an area of conflict stratagems, bargaining and influence, alliances, agreements and disagreements and the grounds for them all in relation to the exercise of legitimate force in a society (Wells, 1970). Struggle to control power so as to be able to exercise legitimate force in society has been at the centre of post-election violence.

The second objective of the study was to identify the type of violence experienced by different categories of people in the 2007 post-election violence. Respondents (50.5%) identified looting and destruction of property as the most prevalent form of violence

experienced by residents of Kisumu. Other types of violence include raping of women, paralyzed transport system, killing of people, food insecurity, injuries, trauma, disruption to education system, harassment by policemen, displacement of people and mugging which persisted long after hostilities had ended.

Respondents (95.5%) stated that business persons and property owners from other ethnic communities were displaced and their businesses and properties destroyed. The displaced individuals were yet to return to the city. Some affected Asian families, according to the study, had relocated to other countries.

In Yugoslavia, the types of violence experienced during post violence were similar to Kenyan situation. The minority ethnic groups in each federation were attacked, killed, or displaced and their properties destroyed (Calvoressi, 1995).

The types of violence experienced during post election violence in Nigeria include arson to properties belonging to certain ethnic communities in the Western and Northern parts of the countries. Members of the Ibo ethnic group in the City of Kano and other northern towns were killed in their thousands and survivors displaced (Meredith, 1984). The latest 2007 post election violence in Nigeria took the form of riots and destruction of property and it was estimated that over 200 Nigerians died (New Africa, May -2008).

In summary, post election violence always takes the form of destruction of property, killings and general disruption to social order. This is also the pattern in the post election violence in Zimbabwe and Rwanda. In the latter the killings deteriorated into a genocide.

And lastly the other key study was in the area of possible mechanism in dealing with post election violence. Respondents (73.3%) thought that enacting of a new constitution would provide a pre-emptive measure against post election violence in future. Other respondents thought transparency and accountability would save Kenyans a possibility of post election violence. Some respondents suggested that the government should work towards making Kenya a cohesive state by reducing negative ethnicity. Others suggested that creation of employment opportunities for the youth as one of the solution to future post election violence.

A social system always has its own way of surviving a crisis and re-establishing its order. People tend to understand the source of their conflict and find solution. Rational Choice theory assumes that in choosing between alternative actions a person will choose that one which is perceived by him at the time, the value of the result is great. It enables the parties to a conflict realize that all the decisions which a person makes are vital for the welfare of all.

It is apparent from the literature reviewed that a constitutional review has always been a prioritized to resolve political stalemates. To resolve the spiraling violence in India the country's laws had to be changed to provide for the creation of the state of Pakistan for Muslims (Gokhale, 1960). Similarly in Nigeria to manage the post election violence of the 1960s the country's constitution had to be changed to provide for creation of more federal states (Reader 1998). In Kenya and Zimbabwe temporary measures, principally negotiated power sharing deals between the political rivals to resolve the stalemates, were put in place pending constitutional changes.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The study has established that lack of transparency and accountability at the final stages of handling the counting of votes and delay in announcing presidential poll result caused anger and suspicion of election rigging. First the residents of the City of Kisumu had already staked their claim to the presidency after forty years of waiting any other dispensations was unacceptable.

The study also established that there was no cohesion among Kenyan ethnic communities and that negative ethnicity reigns high. This manifested itself when the local youth (Luo) took advantage of the alleged rigged presidential poll results and engaged in vicious destruction of properties, businesses and displacement of rival ethnic groups.

These displaced people were yet to return to the City of Kisumu eleven months after the crisis ended. There were also some Asians who were targeted to be taught lessons. Some of such families have simply relocated their businesses to neighbouring countries. This had negatively effected the economy of the town. The issue of class also resurfaced in the study. Most of unemployed youth attacked, looted homes and businesses belonging to the Luo.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

One of the most important lessons that have emerged from the study is that Kenyans must exercise great care in handling the issue of power. Issues of national interest should be handled transparently and culture of impunity is to be avoided. Unscrupulous ethnic chauvinists should not be given room to destroy national integrity of this country.

The other issue which must be observed keenly is the equitable distribution of national resources. The benefits of the economic growth should be harnessed in a manner to create jobs for the youth. Unemployed youth are vulnerable to exploitation by ethnic chauvinists to cause mayhem among peace loving Kenyans. The City of Kisumu would have been spared the disaster it underwent during post election violence had the youth been engaged in well paying jobs.

Lastly, there is a need for Kenyan politicians to show maturity and sense of restraint. The last political campaigns were conducted in atmosphere “reeking” with incitement. Politicians from all the divides had exploited negative ethnicity for selfish ends. This was a recipe for the blood letting witnessed in the aftermath of the last general election.

### **5.4 Suggestions for further research**

1. The role played by ethnicity in post election violence.
2. The role of socio- economic factors in post election violence.
3. The alternative methods that can be utilized to resolve critical political disputes in Kenya, like disputed presidential poll results.
4. The effective way of dealing with the victims of post election violence.
5. The challenges of multiparty democracy in Kenya.



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## APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE I

Date of interview \_\_\_\_\_

### Introduction

Dear respondent

My name is Charles Wambura Aluoch from University of Nairobi, Department of Sociology and Social Work. I am conducting a research on the **Effects of 2007 Post Election Violence, a Case Study of the City of Kisumu, Kenya**. I kindly request you to give your honest responses to the questions given here below to enable me collect authentic data. The information given will be treated with strict confidence.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

### Section I: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondent.

1. a) Province \_\_\_\_\_  
b) District \_\_\_\_\_  
c) Division \_\_\_\_\_  
d) Estate \_\_\_\_\_
2. Tribe \_\_\_\_\_
3. Sex 1. Male      2. Female
4. Age \_\_\_\_\_
5. Marital status  
1. Single      2. Married      3. Divorced      4. Widowed  
5. Other \_\_\_\_\_
6. Level of education \_\_\_\_\_
7. Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

**Section II: Causes of Post election violence**

8. Did you participate in the 2007 general elections?

1. Yes                      2. No

9. How would you describe the 2007 general elections?

1. Very fair              2. Fair              3. Not fair              4. Not fair at all

10. Why was there violence after the 2007 general elections?

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11. Who were involved in the violence? \_\_\_\_\_

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12. Do you think that the post election violence was justified?

1. Yes                      2. No

13. If yes, explain \_\_\_\_\_

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14. If No, explain \_\_\_\_\_

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15. Were local people in this area targeted in 2007 post election violence

1. Yes                      2. No

16. If yes why were they targeted \_\_\_\_\_

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17. Was it fair for post election violence to take place?

1. Yes                      2. No

18. If yes, explain \_\_\_\_\_

19. Did inequitable distribution of national resources (e.g land, job opportunities, infrastructure development etc) cause the 2007 post election violence?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

20. If Yes, explain \_\_\_\_\_

**Section III: Types of violence experienced by people in 2007 post election crisis**

21. Who were the most affected category of people by post election violence?

- 1. Youth
- 2. Men
- 3. Women
- 4. Children
- 5. Women and girls
- 6. All
- 7. None

22. Were the local people affected by the post election violence?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No (*If no go to question 23*)

23. If yes what kind of violence? \_\_\_\_\_

24. Were women affected by 2007 post election violence?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No (*If no go to question 25*)

25. If yes explain \_\_\_\_\_

26. Were youth affected by 2007 post election violence?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No (*If no go to question 27*)

27. If yes explain \_\_\_\_\_

28. Did the businessmen experience any kind of violence?

1. Yes                      2. No (*If no go to question 29*)

29. If yes what kind of violence? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

30. Did the 2007 post election violence affect your life?

1. Yes                      2. No (*If no go to question 31*)

31. If yes how was your life affected? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Section IV: Loss of personal property and life**

32. Do you live in this town?

1. Yes                      2. No

33. If yes, what do you do in this town to sustain your livelihood?

- 1. Business
- 2. Employed by public sector
- 3. Employed in private sector
- 4. Other \_\_\_\_\_

34. Was any of your property destroyed?

1. Yes                      2. No

35. If yes, what kind of destruction did you experience?

- 1. Residential building
- 2. Commercial building
- 3. Other specify) \_\_\_\_\_

36. In which way was the property destroyed?

- 1. Burning
- 2. Looting
- 3. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

37. What is the approximate value of your property that was destroyed in Kenya shillings? \_\_\_\_\_

38. There was a mass destruction of property in this town. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

- 1. Strongly agree                      2. Agree                      3. Not sure
- 4. Disagree                      5. Strongly disagree

39. It is difficult for people whose businesses were affected by 2007 post election violence to reorganize. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

- 1. Strongly agree                      2. Agree                      3. Not sure
- 4. Disagree                      5. Strongly disagree

40. Was your business destroyed by the local people?

- 1. Yes                      2. No

41. If Yes, Explain \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Section V: Injury and loss of life**

42. Were any of your family members/ relatives injured during the 2007 post election violence?

- 1. Yes                      2. No

43. If yes, how many were injured?

- 1. 1 – 2                      2. 3 – 4                      3. 5 – 7                      4. Over 8

44. Explain how they got injured.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

45. Who injured them?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

46. Did any of your family members/ relatives die during the post election violence?

- 1. Yes                      2. No

47. If yes, how many.

- 1. 1 – 2                      2. 3 – 4                      3. 5 – 7                      4. Over 8



48. Explain the cause of death.

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49. Who killed them?

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**Section V: Mechanism of dealing with post election violence**

50. Are the perpetrators of the 2007 post election violence known in this community?

1. Yes                      2. No

51. How should perpetrators of 2007 post election violence be treated? 1. Forgiven

2. Be arrested and charged                      3. Other  
(specify) \_\_\_\_\_

52. Were you or any member of your family/ relative(s) displaced?

1. Yes                      2. No

53. If yes, how have you/they been treated? (Tick only one)

1. Assisted to resettle in the area  
2. Assisted to resettle elsewhere  
3. left alone to settle at a place of my choice  
4. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

54. How should the people who lost property in this area through 2007 post election violence be treated? (tick only one)

1. Government to compensate them at market value  
2. Perpetrators of the violence be made to compensate them at market value  
3. Be left alone to deal with their problem  
4. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

55. Who assisted you/them? \_\_\_\_\_

56. Do you think enacting of new constitution can prevent recurrence of post election violence?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

57. Suggest the best way to avoid recurrence of post election violence in Kenya

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## APPENDIX 2 KEY INFORMATION STUDY GUIDE

### Dear respondent

My name is Charles Wambura Aluoch from the Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Nairobi. I am conducting a research on a study entitled: **The Effects of 2007 Post Election Violence in Kenya, a Case Study of the City of Kisumu**. I am interviewing professionals and leaders who experienced post election violence in Kisumu and trying to get detailed information about the subject. I kindly request you to participate in this study.

Thank you in advance.

### Section A: Demographic Characteristics

Name (optional) \_\_\_\_\_

Marital Status: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_\_\_

Age \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_

Estate \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Job title \_\_\_\_\_

### Section 2: 2007 Level of violence

1. What were the causes of post election violence in City of Kisumu?

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2. What is the people's perception of 2007 post election violence?

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3. Which were the most affected sectors in the city \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. Which category of people were the most affected by the 2007 post election violence

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5. Which category of people participated in the 2007 post election violence?

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6. Were the locals affected by post election violence and in which way?

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7. Who were targeted by perpetrators' violent acts? \_\_\_\_\_

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8. What type of violence did both local and outsiders face during 2007 post election violence? \_\_\_\_\_

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9. What was the extent of loss of property in the 2007 post election violence?

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10. Who were the owners of these properties and businesses? \_\_\_\_\_

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11. Have they resumed their businesses? \_\_\_\_\_

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12. What was extent of loss of life experienced during the 2007 post election violence?

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13. What was the extent of displacement in Kisumu City? \_\_\_\_\_

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14. In which way can the re-occurrence of the post election violence be prevented in future?

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15. Suggest the mechanism which the government need to put in place to prevent further election violence

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