

// **THE ROLE OF ACTORS AND PROCESSES IN THE
CONDUCT OF DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION: 2002-2003** //

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
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
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
DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a Masters degree to any other University.


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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.


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PROF. J.D. OLEWE- NYUNYA


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DATE:

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God converts mysteries into realities. This document is one such mystery. Pieces of ideas, drafts, and brains all put together. Thank you God.

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ABSTRACT

The interests in the “conduct and practices of diplomacy” are the roots on which this study has developed. The interests in this area of study were necessitated by the unique and protracted conflicts in Somalia. The fact that several peace initiatives could not manage to resolve the decade plus old fighting in the region despite international community invested efforts and resources in the conflict without achieving success, made it necessary for me to develop an investigative idea leading to an establishment as to why fighting could not be contained.

The study attempts to examine the role of actors as they pursue their interests through mediation and negotiation while applying diplomacy as the art of achieving their interests within conflict environment.

This study took off with reading conflict and diplomacy materials from relevant institutions like Institute of Diplomacy Library, Nairobi Peace Initiative, Life and Peace Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institute of French Research in Africa, among others. Primary data was collected through personally conducted interviews and observation at the Somali National Reconciliation Process at Mbagathi-Kenya. Participants at this workshop comprised representatives from states, Inter-governmental Organizations, Peace Research Institutions, and diplomatic consultants and advisers among others.

Findings of the study were that unabated conflict can escalate affecting international community. Conditions for protracted conflicts were clanism, availability of arms, high level of illiteracy and a tradition of suspicion rooted in history of imperialism and colonialism. Power struggle in Somalia by use of the gun is basis of livelihood and style.

It was also found that previous peace initiative approaches were wrong. The current all inclusive, with the workshop approach, recognizing the equality of all participants, and analyzing key issues as causes and remedies to conflict while taking into consideration diplomacy which applies tact and patience and managed to sustain the peace talks for one

year without major explosions that characterized the previous peace initiatives that led to stale-mate and fierce fighting.

The conclusion drawn from the study was that as much as the conflicts in Somalia remain unsolved, guns unsilenced, illiteracy level alleviated and backdoor funding of faction groups by external beneficiaries of the war like drug and arms dealers and other nations playing double standards to achieve their altruistic ends; the international community will remain challenged through refugees, unabated firearms and drugs trafficking among other social mis-conducts and lagging behind in economic, technological and social-political development.

In the globalization era, when the world defines itself as a global village a destabilization in the system renders the system dysfunctional. Hence dialogue, tact, understanding, patience are applicable to achieve world peace for development. In the academic circles I recommend for further research to ascertain a possible theory blending the analytical problem- solving approach with realism and idealism as a synthesis of diplomacy in maintenance of communications and successful negotiations for achievement of successful outcomes of protracted conflicts.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACC	All African Conference of Churches.
AL	Arab League
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
DOP	Declaration Of Principles.
EC	European Commission
IFRA	French Institute of African Research
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development.
IPF	Igad Partners Forum
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NFP	North Frontier Province
NGO	Non Governmental organization
NIF	National Islamic Front
RRA	Rahen Resistance Army.
SAMO	Somali African Muki Organization
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement.
SNF	Somali National Front.
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SNRP	Somalia National Reconciliation Process
SPM	Somalia Patriotic Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/ Army.
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council.
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front.
TNA	Transitional National Assembly.
TNG	Transitional National Government.
UNITAF	Unified Task Force.
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia.
USC	United Somalia Congress.
USF	United Somalia Front.
USSR	United Socialist Republic.
WWC	World Council of Churches.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study acknowledges and recognizes the fact that since the fall and collapse of Somalia as a nation, there have been efforts by several volunteers to try and restore a state of order in that country. Initiatives for that matter since 1991 have been designed variously; from mediations, negotiations, interception, humanitarian demonstration to military imposition, to try forcefully and keep each of the warring groups distant from each other through combined forces and has been helpless effort since peace has not been achieved

Twelve years without a central government since the fall of Siad Barre and his socialist government in 1991, and the wanton fighting that followed in pursuance of power to fill the leadership vacuum drew in the world communities, individually and as collaborative partners pulling in resources and manpower to establish peace in Somalia has almost become a disappointment that has sought to employ diplomacy that is the current approach to strive and achieve peace.

In an attempt to accomplish the Somalia complex conflict issues; mediations, negotiations, struggle for power and prestige, this study attempted to critically examine the role of actors and processes in conflict resolution as a diplomatic conduct.

The bulk of actors is made up of leaders of warring parties, mediators, financiers and supporters of both the war and peace. The principle actors are the states followed by the international organizations. Other actors comprise individuals; war lords, self-styled and commissioned advisors and consultants. While the processes are basically mediations and negotiations which are the powerful tools of diplomacy.

Problem-solving workshop theory perfects this study due to its analytical approach involving the role of the scholars least interested in conflicts but assisting in solving the problem in a workshop. The problem solving approach gets the parties from their usual environment to a neutral and conducive one, favourable enough to assist them to come to their understanding.

The fact that thirteen peace initiatives have so far been undertaken and yielded no success prompts this study to critically examine the role of diplomacy in protracted conflicts as a remedy for achieving peace. It takes into consideration the previous approaches used and comes to the conclusion that diplomacy through the application of tact, intellect, persuasion and patience is the ideal approach to be applied in an attempt to blocker for peace during the Somalia National Reconciliation Process peace negotiations.

Joshua Goldstein (2001) asserts that, “The international stage is crowded with actors, large and small, who are intimately interwoven with the decisions of governments. These actors are individual leaders and citizens, bureaucratic agencies in foreign ministries, multinational corporations and terrorist groups”.¹ He goes further to explain that among the above actors the main contours of the drama are defined by the interactions of the large conglomerate characters i.e. nation states.

Russet and Starr (1989) while taking the same position as Goldstein, note that states are the central actors on the world stage notwithstanding a variety of other non-state actors increasingly involved in the crucial issues of world politics.²

¹ Goldstein Joshua.; International Relations 4th edition ; Priscilla MC Geehan Pub-Library – Washington DC Chapter 1 page 11.

² Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr World Politics The Menu for Choice 3rd edition 1989; Library of Congress –in- Publication Data.Chapter 3 pages 54-70

In international relations, to be considered an international actor requires the following qualities: that the entity performs significant and continuing functions impacting on the interstate relations; the entity is considered significant by the policy makers of nation states and has significance for states in the formation of their foreign policies; and lastly, the entity has some degree of autonomy or freedom in its own decision making.³

From the international law point of view, international actors are referred to as subjects of international law, legal entities or international legal personality. To be a subject of a system of law or to be a legal person within a system implies three essential elements: a subject has duties thereby incurring responsibility for any conduct that is at variance with that prescribed by the system; a subject is capable of claiming benefits and rights enforced by that system of law; and thirdly, a subject possesses the capacity to enter into contractual and other legal relations with other legal persons recognized by that system of law.⁴

In international law as in international relations, there is a general consensus that states are the principal legal persons or subjects of law. In fact, before the nineteenth century states were the only actors or subjects recognized to operate in international matters. The position however, changed in the last century because non-state actors such as international organizations, individual and companies have now acquired some degree of international legal personality.⁵

The objective criteria of recognition of the state as the primary actor/subject in international law are due to the fact that the state has a defined territory with regard to uncertainty about the state frontiers since many states have long-standing frontier

³ Ibid

⁴ Akehurst Micheal; Modern Introduction to international; Law 1987 Published by the Academic Division Unwin Hyman Ltd 15/17Broadwick street London.

⁵ Ibid page 65.

disputes with their neighbours. The state must also have a permanent population connoting a stable community, an independent and effective government with centralized administrative organs. However, the collapse of a government does not necessarily deprive an existing state of its rights since states have survived long periods with different governments, civil wars, anarchy and hostile occupations. The state has the capacity to enter into relations with other states, which is determined by the country's independence, which is the most decisive criterion of statehood.⁶

The recognition of individuals as subjects/actors internationally gained prominence after World War I and formally after World War II when major efforts were made to hold individuals directly responsible for acts of the states. Thus during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the leaders of the Nazi and Imperial Japanese governments, respectively, were tried for committing crimes against humanity, and acting on their own and not agents of another actor in committing⁷ crimes against peace.⁸

In their basic diplomatic interactions, the actors in diplomacy employ negotiation and mediation processes in order to achieve their objectives and functions. Diplomatic processes according to Mwangi, Kappeler and Odera, begin with the gathering and processing of information regarding the target entity.⁹ Negotiations, mediations and regional arrangements are the recommended methods of what is stipulated in the United Nations Charter as part of the peaceful settlements of disputes¹⁰. The term peaceful could mean diplomatic or simply peaceful means of solving conflicts,

⁶ Starke J G. Introduction to International Law. 10th Edition. Butterworths and CO. Publisher Ltd- 88 Kingsway London Ecb 6AB1989. Chapter 4 pages 95-114.

⁷ Kappeller, Mwangi, Odera. Diplomacy Part I, Concepts Actors, Organs, Rules and Processes Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies Library (UON), Unpublished. Chapters 2 pages 15-17.

⁸ Theodore A Coulombis, University of Athens & Wolfe James; University of Mississippi Introduction to International Relations 4th Edition Prentice Hall Inc. Chapter 2 pages 15-27.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ United Nation Charter For Human Development

the opposite of which is non-pacific which means use of combat war to arrive at resolutions. In short pacific is non-violent and non-pacific is violent means of achieving peace.

Diplomacy has existed as long as man has lived but the role of diplomatic agents to carry out diplomatic functions for states, and organizations were recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the sovereignty of States, maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations. The turn of the 20th century in general marked the realization and increased awareness on the part of most statesmen that certain moral limitations restrict the use of war as an instrument of foreign policy. Since the beginning of history war has been justified for statesmen's participation in terms of self-defense or religious duty, the avoidance of it has only become an aim of statecraft in the turn of the century. The two Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907, the League of Nations of 1919, the Briand-Kellogg pact of 1928 outlawing aggressive war and United Nations have the avoidance of war itself as their ultimate objective. At the foundation of these and other legal instruments and organizations is the conviction that modern war is not only a terrible thing to be avoided for reasons of expediency but also an evil thing to be shunned on moral grounds.¹¹

The Research Problem

The involvement of numerous actors in solving the conflicts in Somalia has led to loss of focus in ultimate settlement. The parties to the conflict ranging from the helpless Somali civilians, the warring factions, the external sympathizers and supporters in

form of governments and organizations like the United Nations and individuals have all have been thrown into the array of confusion, exhaustion and despair.

The purpose and principles of the United Nations concerning the sovereignty of states, maintenance of international peace and security and promotion of friendly relations among states has not been achieved in the case of Somalia due to the nature of the conflict which is based on clannism and the recognition of many entities as actors with rights to carry out and meddle with the war in Somalia. This has drawn in different types of actors some with good and others with ill intentions.

The processes, methods and approaches applied are also questionable. They are of uncompromising nature and hence the stalemates and explosions that terminate the negotiations and war resume.

How to achieve a peaceful settlement of disputes between states was a familiar theme in international relations and strategic studies literature had always been the part of the stock-in-trade of international diplomacy and as stipulated in the United Nations charter. Less familiar was the challenge to international organizations of managing non-state conflicts¹² such as the ten plus years old in Somalia. Contrary, the developing tradition of thinking about conflict and conflict resolution is all the more relevant as the fixed structures of sovereignty and governance break down. All over the world, societies are facing stresses from population growth, structural change in the world economy, and migration into cities, environmental degradation and rapid social change. Societies with institutions, rules or norms for managing conflict and

¹¹ Ibid Theodore Coulombis Chapter 13 page 261.

¹² Hugh Miall, Ramsbotham Oliver, and Woodhouse Tom : Contemporary Conflict Resolution; The Prevention, Management and Transformation of deadly Conflicts, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999 Chapter 1 pages 1-40.

well established traditions of governance are generally better able to accommodate change, than those with weaker governance, fragile social bonds and little consensus on values or traditions are more likely to buckle.

Then wouldn't diplomacy have a major role to play if conflicts must be contained? It is generally agreed that conflict must always exist in the society as long as there are groups or parties with incompatible goals. According to Mwagiru,¹³ conflict is normal in society since conflict is endemic. He argues that conflict is part of the society and cannot be eradicated but only to learn how to manage it properly.

Intrastate conflicts are not obviously the responsibility of any international institution such as IGAD, European Union and African Union and Governments of major states are reluctant to get involved in internal conflicts when they do not concern them. And when they do get involved, governments and international agencies frequently act at cross-purposes on account of differences in their interests and mandates. At the same time governments which are the receiving end of the international interventions, have considerable misgivings about what they perceive as unwarranted meddling from outside. And where the authority of the state has broken down altogether, the whole range of difficult questions arise:

- With whom should the international community negotiate, when the state has collapsed and the use of force is in the hands of local leaders commanding paramilitary militias?
- Should the international community negotiate with those in power, even if they have no legitimacy, and are in power only because of their ruthlessness and legacy?

¹³ Makumi Mwagiru; Conflict, Theory, processes and Institutions of Management: Water Mark Publishers –Nairobi, 2000 chapter 1 page 5.

- Does the international community legitimize and even persevere with such power-holders by negotiating with them?
- Should the community negotiate with representatives of civil society even if these representatives hold no such power?

Apart from states, three main types of agents now play an enhanced role in the resolution of contemporary conflicts: the UN, regional organizations and NGOs. The UN and its agencies remain central to the international community's response to conflicts.

Regional organizations make up the second tier of external agents in contemporary conflict resolution. In an effort to shed some of the UN's load, Boutros Boutros Ghali proposed that regional organizations should take on the primary responsibility for local conflict management before they escalate to the point of threatening international peace and security leaving the UN to pick up cases only if they have failed.¹⁴

Regional organizations have the advantage of proximity to the source of the conflict and familiarity with the main actors, cultural values and local conditions. Although the interests of local actors and, in particular, those of regional hegemony make regional organizations unsuitable for conflict resolution, and in most parts of the world they are chronically short of financial and other resources. To a large extent the involvement of the regional organizations in the conflict depends on the type and scope of the conflict such that they can manage if it is simple and small.

The gaps in the coverage of internal conflicts by the official organs of the international community have left space for humanitarian agencies and non-governmental agencies to play a larger role. Agencies such as the International

¹⁴ Boutros Ghali in Miall, Ramsboth, woodhouse; Contemporary Conflict Resolution -Ibid

Committee of the Red Cross, have taken on an enhanced profile in internal conflicts. NGOs have also become important. The number of NGOs involved in conflict resolution increased rapidly in the 1980s as development agencies, aid donors and governments became willing to fund their activities. Given their multiplicity and variety, NGOs have the advantage of flexibility and adaptability. Essentially they are able to work with local protagonists without the worry of thereby conferring official recognition, and can operate at the middle and grass- roots in peace building.

A conclusion can be drawn on the obstacles to conflict resolution since Nations and political groups are willing to fight to the end to protect their interests and achieve their ends. Such obstacles can however be kept at a balanced proportion given the fact that most violent conflicts impose massive costs on the society concerned, such that there is a large segment of the population which will benefit from the conflict coming to an end. The obstacles include shared interest across the conflicting communities, affecting security and economic welfare. Moderate politicians and constituencies who may have been silenced or displaced by the climate of violence will be keen to re-establish acceptable form of politics. Ordinary people will welcome a return to peace and wish to put the distress of war behind them. There is therefore a large reservoir of potential support that peacemakers should be able to foster.

A number of cases have been cited where conflicts have been settled by negotiation; examples include the ending of apartheid in South Africa, the ending of internal conflict in Nicaragua, El-Salvador and Guatemala, the political settlements in Mozambique, Namibia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In conclusion the whole scenario has led to the question of who are the genuine actors to broker and end the conflicts, what are their roles and what right methods would they apply? Diplomatic approaches of non-violent, non-forceful, patient, tactful are

consequently the ultimate solutions. The task is how to reconcile all the parties to the conflict and forge a diplomatic approach to bring the conflicts in Somalia to a negotiated end.

Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study is to establish the extent to which diplomacy can be applicable to the establishment of peace, order and stability among the various actors in the Somalia conflict.

Specific objectives include;

1. To establish the root causes of the unique and persistent conflicts among the Somalia clans.
2. To explore and examine the extent to which external and regional actors utilized diplomacy in the Somali conflict.
3. To establish the extent of negative impacts of various actors in the Somalia Peace Process.

Justification of the Study

This study has a policy or social justification and a scientific justification.

First, policy justification: Disintegration and total destruction of socio-economic and political institutions and facilities in most warring countries has created a need to focus on alternative means to secure peace among the various factions at odds. Due to displacement of people, total suffering in form of deaths, hunger and diseases that is as a result of war in Somalia, and the fact that many attempts by various parties comprised of sympathetic governments, international organizations and civic societies have failed to reconcile the factions at odds, makes it necessary to assess the methods, conducts and intentions of the parties involved in the effort to establish peace in

Somalia. Formulation of foreign policies and diplomatic agents depend on the right information as to qualities and conducts of the agents e.g. mediators, ambassadors. International relations issues, policies and literature need to be developed to guide the many actors in the war on their capacities and limitations to solve problems. Most of the existing literature and researches conducted on Somalia explain the causes, damages and efforts as applied by various actors without critically examining the fact that these efforts had not been applied well and with the right means that is being diplomacy.

Little has been researched on the performance and success on the application of diplomacy to conflicts in Somalia. For instance, Mohamed Osman Omar talks of leadership failure¹⁵ as being the reason why there is lack of peace in Somalia, while Hussein Adam in his book *Mending Rips in the Sky* sees options for Somalia as being the return of the Somalia intellectuals and compromise between those who seek total clan autonomy¹⁶. Lind and Sturman (2002), have explored land issues as being in the center of conflicts in Somalia like most parts of Africa¹⁷. Hassan Farah Shirwa (2001) gives an explanation of the strengths and weaknesses of IGAD in its effort to find a solution to conflicts in the Horn of Africa¹⁸.

Our study differs from most of these studies because for one it acknowledges that conflict must exist wherever there are human groupings. And since groups of people and individuals will always have incompatible goals and interests, conflicts and

¹⁵ Omar M.O, *A Nation Driven to Despair. Case of Leadership Failure*. Somali publication Ltd; New Dheli 1996.

¹⁶ Hussein M.Adam ,and Ford Richard (editors) 1977; *Mending Rips in the Sky; Options for Somalia Communities in the 21st century*. Red Sea Press inc Distributors of third World Books.

¹⁷ Lind . J. & Sturman .K.(Editors) *Scarcity and Surfeit*, Institute for Security Studies.

¹⁸ Shirwa F. *Subregional Management of an internal conflict in Africa; Case study of Somalia*. A dissertation to Idis (UON). 2001. Unpublished.

collisions are bound to occur. Extreme conflicts leading to deaths and destruction of property becomes questionable and its settlement calls for conduct of diplomacy.

A systematic investigatory research such as this is necessary to establish the extent to which diplomacy is applicable in achieving settlement of conflicts.

LITERATURE REVIEW:

The literature review is categorized into two; one that focuses on origins, development and performance of states, diplomacy, mediation and negotiations and two specifically addresses and follows the conflict issues in Somalia

Origins and Development of Diplomacy

According to Agum I.A Languages and Diplomacy, origins and development of diplomacy are traced back to the origins of humankind and the relationship between God and man.¹⁹The most important factor here is that of representation. In the Holy testament therefore which is pre-occupied with creations, population growth as Adam and Eve embarked on reproduction and therefore conflicts ensued due to partly disagreements beginning with eating of the sacred fruit by Eve against Adam's wish. God ultimately sought to communication using third parties and representatives. The angels became the diplomatic agents.

Traditional diplomacy argues that the practice for diplomacy was the fundamental responsibility of sovereigns, which later changed to be a responsibility of states. The Greek city-states followed by the Italian city-states that practically practiced diplomacy as a means of restoring relations already severed by wars. The concern for representation has led the history of diplomacy into two categories. The

first, a period of non permanent embassies covering antiquity and the middle ages culminating to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The second phase that of permanent missions originated in Italy in the fifteenth century.

Diplomacy in its true nature has been defined variously to suit its functions and its intentions. Kappeler, Mwagiru and Odera²⁰ have defined diplomacy as the conduct of international relations by non-violent means. They have further defined diplomacy, as the conduct of international relations by official agents of states, international organizations and other international actors. More restrictively members of their respective foreign services have defined diplomacy as the conduct of relations between sovereign states.

Magalhaes in Agum I. A; Language and Diplomacy has defined diplomacy as that basic instrument for the conduct or implementation of foreign policy between two or more states in contact with each other. Satow²¹ defined as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states.

Diplomacy is only functional when it applies its most powerful tools. Majorly these are Negotiations and Mediation. While negotiation takes an informal approach and mostly bilateral; mediation is broader since it invites a third party one or two and make negotiation more complex. Mediation comes in to reconcile conflicting parties who have failed to arrive at a resolution between themselves. Mediation adopts the conference format and follows the rules of procedure.

¹⁹ Agum I.A: Languages and Diplomacy . Dissertation;Submitted to IDIS Nairobi University 2001 Chapter 2 pages 31-34.

²⁰ Kapeller,Mwagiru, Odera; Concept; University of Nairobi IDIS Library Material. Unpublished page 5

²¹ Satow in Agum I.A. Language & Diplomacy Ibid page 32.

In terms of third party intervention it is helpful to distinguish between powerful mediators or mediators with muscle” that bring their power resources to bear and powerless mediators whose role is confined to communication and facilitation. Track one diplomacy involves official government or inter-governmental representatives, who may use good offices, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome, typically along the win-lose or bargaining line. While track two diplomacy in contrast involves unofficial mediators who do not have carrots or sticks. They work with the parties or their constituencies to facilitate agreements, encouraging the parties to see their predicament as lying along the lose-lose to win-win line and to find mutually satisfactory outcomes. The main difference between the two approaches lie in the fact that track one is more realistic, applies power and it is quick fix approach while track two is idealistic and accommodative. Track one signifies states while track two represents international organizations, Non-governmental Organizations and civic societies.

Negotiation and Mediation

In the art and science of negotiation it is generally understood that parties might be engaged in an escalating fracas and refuses to negotiate, but an offer by one side to negotiate may be interpreted as a sign of weakness. In such cases, a discerning, well meaning, non-involved party may identify the disputants that have a stake in a negotiated agreement and invite them to the conference.²²

The intervener might ensure that all legitimate disputants are represented in the ensuing negotiations. Sometimes in multi-party disputes, the intervener may select

²² Raifa Harvard. The Art and Science of Negotiation 1st edition 1982. Harvard College .USA.

which parties should negotiate since it would be embarrassing for a given disputant to make such selection²³

Raifa goes ahead to say that a mediator is an instrumental character in negotiations since he plays an important role in convening the meetings or a non-substantive neutral discussion. The mediator would control the emotions of disputants by explaining to them that the conflict is not a contest where there must be a loser or winner but it involves a conflict that must be solved. The qualities of a mediator as cited by Raifa are; he must be patient, sincere, enduring, firm, genuine, tactical, confident, secretive, wise, have integrity and impartiality, knowledge and skills of collective bargaining process, not a dictator, fundamental in human values and ability to assess personal weaknesses and strengths, analytical, personal drive and ego. Indeed what Raifa has described are the qualities that befit a diplomat well enough to march the diplomatic functions.

Geoffrey Moorhouse in the book *The Foreign Office Today* concurs that the UN did keep peace in the Middle East, the Kashmir, in Cyprus and it continues to do so again in other 'hot' spots. The peace approaches by the UN peace keeping according to Moorhouse is through pressing the Nations and by use of the Negotiation Committee that negotiates for treaties.²⁴

In the book *Diplomatic problems of our time*, Craig, Gordon assert that despite the changes in communication and transportation which have altered the nature of Diplomacy, its chief instrument is negotiation which has remained the same. He further suggests that for negotiation to take place there must be two elements, common interests and issues of conflict²⁵

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Moorhouse Geoffrey. *The Foreign Office Today* (1977) 1st edition.

²⁵ Craig, A Gordon, Alexander L. George; *Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (1983) Oxford University Press USA.

In modern Diplomacy, Barston, Ronald, and Peter have a common agreement that negotiation attempts to explore and reconcile positions in order to reach an acceptable outcome. It can be formal or informal.²⁶

Origins of Diplomatic Peace Making Treaties

Coulombis and Wolf in Introduction to International Relations Power and Justice have outlined chronological development of peace settlements through peace treaties.

Randle R.F in the Origins of Peace (1973) has analyzed total strategies in the study of peace making and settlements.

For example researchers like Alex Vines²⁷ has outlined the efforts by churches and other organizations in the 1980's attempting to set modalities for setting a stage for peace negotiations culminating to long processes of conferences in Nairobi aiming to end the Renamo war with the Mozambiqan government.

Hezkias Assefa has written voluminously on approaches and strategies to mediation of civil wars with particular focus to Sudan conflicts in the early 1970s.

1990 researchers like Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse²⁸ have in contemporary conflict resolution outlined various issues including post-settlement peace building, its challenges and role of non political organizations.

Peter Woodward²⁹ in the book the horn of Africa has also outlined recovery issues, relations between the states of the horn and the changed international environment with the end of the cold war.

²⁶ Barston, Ronald, Peter. Modern Diplomacy. (1988) Long Pub. Group UK Ltd. chapter 4 pages 256-270

²⁷ Alex Vines; Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique Center for S. African. Ibid pages 120-114.

²⁸ Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Ibid Chapter 7 pages 185-211.

Mohammed Osman Omar³⁰ in his research outlined the events of 1991 Djibouti conferences one and two. The deliberations and outcome of these considered as first regional conference on the plight of Somalia outside the Somali soil.

Hussein M. Adam³¹ in the book “Mending Rips in the sky” talks of the fifth congress on behalf of the Somali studies international association at the Westin Hotel, Boston 4th-7th1993.

Robert F. Randle³² in the *Origins of Peace* 1973 has looked at and analyzed total strategies on the study of peace making and the structure of peace settlements. For this research the particular focus will be on his outline of the failure of peace settlements.

Coulombs Theodore³³ has given an elaborate development on origins and development of conference diplomacy starting with the Westphalia in 1648, congress of Vienna among others.

Satow’s handbook on diplomatic practices³⁴ has defined what conference diplomacy is and the procedures and processes followed when conducting conferences.

Khartoum University Press 1973 and ministry of foreign affairs³⁵ looks at the “peace and unity in the Sudan” as an achievement of Africa.

Current Literature Focusing on Peace Initiatives

Sub-Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa by Hassan Farrah Shirwa (dissertation) observed that the wrong approaches had been employed in managing the

²⁹ Peter Woodward: *Horn of Africa Politics and International Relations* 1996; Publisher, Tauris Academic Studies London Part 11 pages 115-218.

³⁰ Omar M.O; *A Nation Driven to Despair ; Case of Leadership Failure*. Somali Publication Ltd; New Dheli 1996 Chapter 1 page 1-9.

³¹ Hussein M.Adam, and Ford Richard,(Editors1997); *Mending Rips in the Sky; Options for Somalia Communities in the 21st Century*. Red Sea Press Inc Distributors of 3rd world Books.

³² Randle F. R. *Origins of Peace* 1973. The Free Press ,New York

³³ Theodore; *International Relations; Power & Justice*; Ibid Chapter 12 page 481.

³⁴ Satows; *Diplomatic Practices*

international conflicts of Somalia. That despite considerable efforts, the international community had failed to find peace for Somalia because organizations like the UN (1992-1995) tried to solve the matter in vain due to wrong approaches. These approaches were undiplomatic, did not involve the right expertise, was not an all inclusive, the ingredients that formed the cradle at the Mbagathi peace negotiation.

Amina Mohamoud Warsame (2002) while examining the changing roles of Somalia women and peace building blames the eruption of 1988 civil war in Somalia as the turning point in history of the Somalia people. She explains on how the aftermath of the war and the changes there of, the internationally unrecognized country of the Republic of Somaliland is rebuilding itself and making slow but remarkable social and economic recovery through the efforts and remarkable role of the women³⁶. In a post war nation building it takes the effort of committed individuals and groups to restore the lost status. When the world communities finally pull out of Somalia, which is always the case due to exhaustion and depletion of allocated donor funds and resources, the people of Somalia will have to undertake their development agendas. The women of Somaliland, a self-styled breakaway territory of the former federal republic of Somalia have taken the challenge and demonstrated that they can be entrusted with establishment of peace. Men are mostly at war frontlines causing explosions and controlling artilleries in Somalia and everywhere in the world. This therefore prompts the women to take center stage in establishment of peace. Unfortunately women and children are the most hit victims of violence due to vulnerability to rape and malnourishment.

³⁵ Khartoum University press 1973 "Peace and Unity in Sudan"

³⁶ Warsame. A. M. Queens without crowns; Somaliland women's changing roles and peace building. 2002. pub. Kijabe printing press- Kenya.

Journals from Life & Peace Institute

Quarterly publications from Life and Peace Institute focusing their attention to issues and conflicts in the horn have also addressed serious issues, events and trends emanating from the Somalia conflicts. For instance in their Oct 1995 edition, they precisely featured UN as learning from the past: *The Somalia experience*. Here among other issues the UN is said to have been faced by the overgrowing complexities of 50 years since inception. Faced with an ever growing number of complex emerges caused by internal conflicts and civil wars, the UN is advised to come up with creative new ways of dealing with these conflicts. Originally, in the light of interstate conflicts of WWII, the UN intervention was to be depended on the invitation from a government. However given most of today's conflicts are civil wars where the government is a party to the conflict such an invitation is unlikely to be extended. Somalia carried this problem to the extremes, as there has not been a central government in place since 1991³⁷. It therefore suffices to justify an argument that in absence of central and legitimate government Somalia issues have dominated the world scene and collectively been handled by the world community due to diplomatic interests.

April 2000 Last call for Somlia? This Horn Of Africa Bulletin Magazine tried to emphasize the diplomatic efforts of the newly elect Mr. Ismail Omar Gulleh, president of the Republic of Djibouti³⁸ as he made his first appearance into the international scene as a president, the typical style of selling foreign policy of a nation through diplomatic negotiations of this nature.

The crawl to profitable peace in Somalia. The author outlined here the African nations and Gulf states with perceived interests in Somalia crisis as being Egypt, Ethiopia,

³⁷ Horn Of Africa Bulletin.Vol 11 NO2 March-April 1999.Pub by Life & peace Institute

³⁸ Ibid

Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen, Kuwait and United Emirates whose involvement tended to complicate the matter, and posed obstacles for the progress and realization of profitable peace in Somalia³⁹. Contrary to this remark that is to some extent true, the international community Kenya included had been in the mainstream of the Somalia peace negotiation and indeed performs the role of host for the IGAD led initiative peace process in 2002/3.

Numerous local and external dailies with keen interest followed the progress and deliberations on the Somali wars.

Views From Various Local Newspapers with Specific Focus on the SNRP.

In the dailies various views describing all sorts of Somalia actions, behaviour and utterance featured prominently connoting both positive and negative images for the region and its inhabitants. For instance the rest of the world had been cautioned by the US and other organizations while addressing issues of terrorism with focus to Somali as the source operating in East Africa. In this category an element of media diplomacy plays the major role to influence the readers way of thinking while changing and controlling the world view through persuasions, unnecessary details and reminders.

The media whose main objective is known to be that of attracting readership and make higher sales, has in the past been instrumental in positively convincing the world to take the plight of the Somali and the rest of the troubled spots in the rest of the world as global problems that needed attention. The media propaganda also plays the role of slowing down the fighting groups through panic waves sent to them as exaggerated media sanctions while playing agency roles for sources of particular

³⁹ Ibid

sanctions and threats. For instance, the East African Standard of February 14, 2002 the Kenyan security was cautioned against posting the officers of the Somali origin due to fear of compromise in the North Eastern Province of Kenya.⁴⁰

Somalia Weighs Islam's Alternative to Anarchy: The search for an alternative to dictatorship and destructive warlordship led to mosques and Islamic schools.⁴¹ This is a communication that the rest of the Somali population has sought to religion for social guidance. A divided loyalty between the religious and political among the masses poses a future problem such that it may render political contenders powerless.

Peace in Somalia? As the Kenyan Rift Valley town of Eldoret prepared to hold the 14th Somali Reconciliation Talks, ABDULKADIR KHALIF weighed the prospects for a genuine peace emerging and found them surprisingly bright- with, of course, the usual proviso: goodwill.⁴² Here the media changed its view to positively highlight the process as being genuine and with hopes of eminent peace. This would form the basis of motivation to all the constituencies of the conflict capable of driving the process to any direction. If the supporters of the conflict were mostly motivated the result would be supply of more fire arms and other war equipments and resources. It could also speed the talk to a an ultimate achievable concluded end since the peace participants would have been brainwashed to thinking that make peace is the only task facing them and it is their responsibility.

Somali Talks In Vital Phase- The Somalia National Peace and Reconciliation Conference enters a crucial second phase that could result in the creation of an all-inclusive legitimate government in the country. President Moi's special envoy for Somalia, Mr Elijah Mwangale, said six committees had been formed to address core

⁴⁰ East African Standard February 14, 2002 headed *Policy Sending wrong signals in the N.E Province*

⁴¹ East African Standard Wednesday April 24, 2002.

⁹²The East African, Magazine Section, October 14-20, 2002

issues, including federation and a provisional charter for the war-ravaged country. The charter once established and endorsed was significant enough a assign of the expected order. , The rule of law is established with it, the implementation stage would the more complex as it opens the Pandora's box of who actually will lead and implement the charter, dominate, dictate, acquire wealth and command respect; true of politics. Struggle for power and control of the resources that originally led to the fall of a nation and destruction of is resources.

Other committees formed then were; demobilization, disarmament and re-integration, land and property rights, economic recovery, institution building and resource mobilization, regional and international affairs and conflict resolution and reconciliation.⁴³

Somali Parties Agree to Stop Fighting In City: Peace efforts in the war-torn Somalia yesterday received a major boost following a declaration that hostilities in the country's capital should end.

The seven Somali faction leaders whose militia have been fighting in the capital Mogadishu, signed a joint declaration in a landmark resolution committing themselves:

- To cease all kinds of hostilities now and in the future;
- To fight jointly the bandits and armed militia who have been killing and abducting innocent people, hijacking public transport in the city, and committing other crimes and;
- To solve political differences through dialogue and goodwill in a brotherly atmosphere.⁴⁴

⁴³Daily Nation; Monday December 2, 2002.

⁴⁴ Daily Nation; Thursday December 5, 2002.

Mogadishu has continued to perform the duties of the capital city even after the fall of Somalia as a nation and destruction of the infrastructure of the city. Mogadishu has been characterized with fierce fighting than anywhere else in the whole of Somalia. This is due to the concentrated national wealth associated with most cities and expected power base. The newly formed transitional government was based in Mogadishu, within which its powers are confined since the same government has been resisted anywhere else while Mogadishu has been a target to attacks by the forces opposed to it.

Somalia City Talks Rejected: Somali delegates in the on-going peace talks yesterday opposed the transfer of the conference from Eldoret to the outskirts of Nairobi.

They said they preferred the talks to continue in Eldoret since they had made adequate progress in the peace process. Moving out would mean re-adjusting to a new situation, they said.

Sources told the East African Standard the talks are expected to move from Eldoret to Mbagathi in Nairobi to allow the Kenya Government and the international community to closely monitor progress in the talks. But the delegate said there is a likelihood of meddling by Kenyan Somalis living in Eastleigh who are likely to gatecrash the conference.⁴⁵

The movement and relocation of the peace talks was a result of high expenditure in addition to the supervision and coordination as alleged above. In the workshop theory, the ideal venue should have been the college institution which only became possible after the accommodation bills had escalated given the commercial and profit oriented restaurants had to maximize their profits. The Somalis in Eastleigh

⁴⁵ East African standard Wednesday, January 29,2002.

have always a problem to all the peace talks. They are said to be the chief financiers to their respective factions. Citizenship of most of the Somalis have never been certain. Those of the Kenyan origin has also been controversial given the boundary friction at the Northern part of Kenya their urge to be part of the republic of Somalia, their ancestral land before the colonial administrative boundaries dislocated them, has been source of divided loyalty. It has been the style of most Somalis in the Diaspora to make money a broad and finance wars at home hoping for victory through their warring agents. This type of conduit operation has however derailed peace talks in the past and threatens to disrupt the SNRP in Kenya.

Somali Talks Continue Despite Rows: Ceasefire signed in October last year boosted hopes that a solution from the Eldoret negotiations would be in sight in spite of wrangling over procedures and attendance. Observers said there had been a few small signs of progress. The cease-fire boosted hopes that a solution would be in sight even though skirmishes had continued on the ground along with some heavier fighting in the Puntland region.

Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka could meet with IGAD frontline states foreign ministers to discuss the troubled Somalia peace talks.

According to a ministry statement, Mr. Musyoka reiterated the Kenyan government's commitment to the Somali and Sudan peace talks, arguing that the people of the two countries had suffered long enough.

He assured the world that Somalia talks were still on course, contrary to reports that they were on the verge of collapse due to corruption.

Kenya's special envoy to the talks Mr. Elijah Mwangale said those allegations were untrue. The process would not collapse since it was in the second of a three-phase program.⁴⁶

Somali Peace Talks: Transporters Block Move to Nairobi – The planned relocation of the Somalia National Peace and Reconciliation Conference to Nairobi marred by protests by transporters who complained of non-payment for their services. They blocked buses hired by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Technical Committee to transport the delegates to Nairobi and threatened to burn them unless they were paid all their dues.

Transporters had been ferrying the delegates from the 10 hotels, which hosted the talks.

Efforts by Kenya's special envoy to Somalia, Bethwel Kiplagat to plead with the transporters to allow the delegates to relocate were futile.

It took the intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary, Mr Peter Ole Nkuraiyia, to save the situation when he faxed a statement promising that the transporters would be paid the soonest possible.

The conference, which started on October 15 2002, was the first to bring together a majority of the country's military and political leaders.

Puntland State Minister for Justice and Religion Ahmed Ashareh said Somali leaders were confident that the conference would result in the formation of a legal, all-inclusive government of Somalia.

“Our people should know that this is the only chance for us to agree on peace. They should know that the future of our nation, our existence and our well being lies in this conference,” said Mr Ashareh.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Daily Nation Tuesday, January 14, 2003.

Peace Talks: Aiming for a Win-Win situation in Somalia – Retired

Ambassador Bethwel Kiplagat took over from Elijah Mwangale as Kenya's Special Envoy to Somalia on January/18/ 2003. He came in just as Phase II of the Somali Reconciliation Conference was winding up. He spoke to special Correspondent Cathy Majtenyi on the challenges and progress of the talks:

You are quoted as saying that you wouldn't allow Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, or even IGAD to take the peace process hostage. What role does the technical committee play in the talks and to what extent do the individual players influence the outcome of the talks?

Kiplagat reiterated by saying that the technical committee that headed acted as a facilitator for the process, and their work was to make sure all the various groups were there. The committee decided, in consultation with the Somalis and the other partners, to establish the six committees to examine the aspects of building a stable Somalia. The technical committee would receive reports from these groups and then would see how to take the process forward. In his experience of dealing with conflicts in Africa, one of the fundamental things was to ensure exclusivity of all the interested parties because if any were left out, they would jeopardize the process.

The interest and voice of the regional partners were important because they had also been involved in Somalia over the years. But Kiplagat and his team had to make sure that their concerns and suggestions could not hold the process hostage. The technical committee hoped for a win-win situation for all those involved, mainly Somalia itself and the region. There were also other partners like the African Union, Arab League, Egypt, and US whose interests mattered.

⁴¹ The East African; February 17-23, 2002.

As far as the technical committee was concerned, they hoped to carry on with the conference and come to some arrangement, have a government, hopefully, in Mogadishu, and then that government together with the international community would take up governance issue.⁴⁸

Good governance the only hope for war-torn Somalia: Since the on going Somali National Reconciliation conference began on October 2002, a lot had been achieved. Although the main objective of the conference, that was to achieve durable and sustainable peace for Somalia had not yet been realized, preliminary success had been achieved.

This conference, unlike others in the past, had managed to have all the delegates including the key players in the Somali quandary incorporated, mainly being the faction leaders and the Transitional National Government.

Speaking of the peace process, Mahad Ali Yusuf, a Canadian Somali, said that, "...it was commendable that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Bethwel Kiplagat, special envoy for the peace talks, there had been lesser problems as far as the issue of delegates was concerned. He had managed to solve that. Kiplagat had also been able to steer the plenary successfully in the first six stages of discussing committee reports". The remaining plenary discussions on the charter would be done once the leaders agreed on the number of parliamentary delegates, which was then the contentious issue at the conference.⁴⁹

HYPOTHESES

1. Diplomacy has a positive impact on Conflict Resolution
2. Track one and two diplomacy compliment conflict resolution.

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ The People; Sunday July 6, 2003.

3. Diplomacy has a negative impact on Conflict Resolution.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Problem Solving Workshop Theory

Problem solving approach involves a set of theoretical assumptions about society in general and conflict in particular, together with a set of procedures for intervening in a conflict situation. It is the only one type of third- party intervention seeking some end to a conflict which makes it distinct from; adjudication and arbitration which suggests application of legal norms; from conciliation which suggests an attempt focused on reducing hostility; from mediation which suggests merely the reconciling of positions or interests and finally from settlement which suggests elements of imposition or coercion.

The approach has many things in common with other informal and non-directive procedures for bringing a bout the resolution of a conflict, this include facilitated dialogues, third-party consultation, interactive conflict resolution, process promoting workshops and track two methods.⁵⁰ According to Mitchell and Banks, the approach aims at a resolution of the conflict, as an outcome freely acceptable to all the parties involved in it. It is the best way of dealing with deep-rooted and protracted conflict that is defined as recurring conflict arising from parties' holding salient and non- negotiable values.

The theory supports and recognizes the equality of all the parties to the conflict. Since it takes the workshop format in its deliberations, it actually allows time and occasion for study of root causes and remedies of conflicts. John Burton in the book *World Society* looks at the role of the scholar who may be disinterested in the

⁵⁰ Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks 1996- *The Analytical Problem Solving Approach*; page xvii.

conflict but may assist in solving the problem in the workshop. The approach according to this theory is by getting the parties from their environment let them cool down their temperaments and assist them to come to an understanding.⁵¹ In view of this interaction the parties may be able to reach a settlement.

Qualifications to admission to the workshop is to anyone who has a veto, those with power and so are those with strong views. The whole idea is to put together the disputants and assist in solving the problem.⁵²

The workshop approach has however been applicable in many international, regional and national negotiations and mediations with intent to achieve peace.

In February 1970 in what was popularly referred to as the Addis Ababa Negotiations for the Sudan conflicts was in a form of workshop that brought together the delegation from the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, as well as the representatives of the World Council of Churches and the All African Conference of Churches⁵³

Similarly the talks to end the Mozambican conflict between RENAMO a rebel group and the FRELIMO government in the 1989 August Nairobi talks among whose other participants were heads of states like Daniel Moi of Kenya, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe plus the leaders and representatives of the warring groups⁵⁴

Most recent and similar arrangements have witnessed the talks on the Somalia peace processes such as the Djibouti 1&11of 1991 United Nations sponsored, 1993

⁵¹ Burton John; World Society, London. Cambridge University Press 1972 in Makumi Mwangiri: Theory, Processes and institutions of Management (Ibid) Chapter 2 page22.

⁵² Mitchell Christopher and Banks Micheal 1995 ; Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical-Problem Solving Approach. Library of Congress Cataloging –in- Publication Data.Pages vii-xii.(Introductory Chapter).

⁵³ Asefa Heskias; Mediation Of Civil Wars 1987.Approaches and Strategies the Sudan Conflict.Pub. West view Press,Chapter 87-100

Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation, The Ethiopian sponsored Sodere Peace Process of 1996, the Egyptian sponsored Cairo Peace Process of 1997, the Djibouti peace initiative in May – August 2000⁵⁵ and the on going Mbagathi (formerly based at Eldoret) Somalia National Reconciliation Process in which this study undertook to explore the role of actors (workshop participants), processes and the diplomatic implication.

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The methods employed in data collection comprised both primary and secondary methods. The reason for engaging both methods was to minimize the existing bias. Primary data alone would have been too narrow and subjective since the individual respondents would be limited in their knowledge. Likewise concentration on old scholarly records would lead to inadequacy due to previous researchers' subjectivity and change of events since the research was conducted as an element of social sciences' variability.

Secondary data was collected through library researches and reading published books, periodicals, journals, Newsletters in various research institutions like Institute of French Research in Africa, peace institutions such as Africa Peace Forum, universities and government departments responsible for conflict issues. Primary data specifically focused on diplomatic professionals with functions of mediation and negotiations, Warlords, civilians, International Organizations representatives and governments agents at the peace process. Specific questionnaires for all these

⁵⁴ Vines Alex; *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique 1996*; Pub Eduardo Mondalane Foundation- Amsterdam. Chapter 5 page 120-146.

⁵⁵ Shirwa H.F.; *The Sub-Regional Management Of an Internal Conflict in Africa. 2001 Dissertation*

categories were structured targeting relevant information and experience from each of them. It also involved visits and attendance of the peace negotiation forum at Mbagathi for purposes of following the proceedings.

Random sampling technique was employed for purposes of accessibility and due to uncertainties and volatility and the venue such that there were frequent changes, commotion and limited time by respondents to attend to one and fill questionnaires. Oral interviews took prominence due to lack of writing and reading skills from the respondents especially the Somalis. This was being conducted by a research assistant of Somalia origin and participant of the reconciliation process in order for me to obtain information on the official issues that were being deliberated; I sought the assistance of Igad secretariat staff as a researcher assistant which enabled me to obtain both written information and planned agendas and clarifications from personalities not easily accessible.

There were a couple of problems encountered in the collection of data where accessibility to information was difficult. For secondary data it was mostly difficult to be allowed to carry materials if one is not a registered member, so I was forced to do registrations or photocopy which became financially strenuous. Oral interviews were equally difficult due to language barrier especially to the Somali Nationals. Other respondents could not give information due to suspicion or lack of clearance; this was protocol and therefore one needed authority to carry out a research if suspected as journalist since the press was not allowed at the process.

The information collected was processed systematically in descriptive and analytically manner in order to connect linkages and create meaning, shape and form.

CHAPTER TWO

DIPLOMATIC ELEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Chapter Outline

Chapters:

1. Introduction

2. Diplomatic Elements in the Management of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

3. Somalia: 1960-1991; A Diplomacy of Conflict in the Pursuance of Foreign Policy

4. Previous Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives in Somali, 1991-2001.

5. Somalia National Reconciliation Process in Kenya: 2002-2003.

6. A critical Analysis of the Role of Actors and Process in the Conduct of Diplomacy in SNRP Kenya

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

DIPLOMATIC ELEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Introduction:

The Horn of Africa is not an indigenous term but one that springs from a glance at a map rather than any perception of inhabitants of that area of Northeast Africa. There is no agreement on what exactly the Horn is.⁵⁶ The concept has grown from an early concern about Somalia's relations with Ethiopia, and then increasingly to include Sudan as well in their frontier expansionist. The reason for this expansion lies primarily in the perception that there seems to be a history of common problems in the region: disputes over borders both between states and within them, widespread and prolonged civil wars threatening not only governments but the survival of states themselves, economic regression that appears to owe something at least to domestic policy failure, as well as the vagaries of the world economy and environmental decay, in addition to the famines that seemed to grow in scale and regularity.

Various authors and publishers have included in the Horn states like Djibouti and Eritrea . Which is largely due to the fact that these particular states attained their independence much later in the 1980 and 90s especially for Eritrea and Djibouti both as breakaway states from Ethiopia and Somalia respectively with whom they share history.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Woodward Peter: The Horn of Africa politics and International Relations, 1996.;ibid pages 90-106

⁵⁷ Life and Peace Institute in its quarterly publication "Horn of Africa Bulletin."Front page of the Publications.

The Horn of Africa therefore comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.

History of the Horn

The history of the Horn has thus long involved the rise and fall of states, with the Ethiopian state sustaining the greatest longevity overall.⁵⁸ The Ethiopian state moved its centre southwards while in Sudan successive states rose and fell in different latitudes of the Nile. The Somalia people at the tip of the Horn have been the most mobile in terms of lifestyle; moving from one place to another in search of pasture of the three regions of the horn which is home of the arid lowlands of the Cushitic-speaking Muslim people who, away from the few small coastal trading cities, lived a pastoral life. While sharing in the perception of a common ancestor, as well as religion, culture and language, the Somali were also highly divided by clan, sub-clan and family in the harsh environment.

Imperialism and Colonial Influence in the Horn

The existing borders and demarcations within the Horn were drawn by the colonial powers and largely reflected European rivalries rather than the ethnographic character of Africa.

In a sense, before imperialism and partition of Africa there was the co-existence, which overlooked boundaries, constituted an immense sense of tolerance among the indigenous clans within the region. As much as rivalry existed for grazing grounds, water sources and trading routes, there existed the African traditional form of peace making and sustenance through exchange of livestock.

⁵⁸ Ibid Woodward Peter page 11.

In the pre-colonial Somalia regulation of social structures and enhancement of social, economic and political relations in a loosely allied configuration of clans, sub-clans, extended families and families was largely through the practice of *Dia*. *Dia* is the compensation paid to the clan of a murdered person which is often paid in camels, thus hundred for men and fifty for women. According to Shirwa, all Somalis were and are members of the *dia*-paying group, which is analogous to modern day social security system. The clan leaders who consist of all men beyond middle age, possessing proven bravery and oratory to defend clan rights were assumed the sole clan leaders. The choice of this category of people for leadership and protection is what traditionally constituted the qualities and characteristics of what a diplomat ought to be. Marghales for instance outlines the qualities as being somebody who is fluent, one whose memories can be trusted, physically energetic, with good health and must have qualities of an orator

The Somali legal system of *heer* which is a written contractual agreement between clans, which regulates matters that need decisions such as paying and receiving compensation for injury, death and other non-violent faults incurred by the parties. This is a demonstration of diplomacy of good conduct and goodwill for each other such that even without writing a reminder, the observance and adherence to rules that govern relations and respect rights of others is all what diplomacy is about.

The above practices can be exercised among the people of the Horn without changing the current situation which is largely an outcome of colonialist with its characteristic features of boundary divisions, loss of freedom of movement,

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undermining of the traditional social relationships replaced with European notion of nationalism,⁵⁹ which constantly plays the game of divide and rule.

Diplomacy during the Imperial Era in The Horn:

The Roles Of Mahdi-(Sudan), Menelik-(Ethiopia) And Sayed Mohamed Abdille Hassan – (Somalia).

Introduction

The above three contributed greatly to the protection and unification of their people that finally led to nationalistic movements and total attainment of their independence. The main diplomatic characteristics among the above that distinguished them from their predecessors and successors was the fact that they possessed a charisma, bravery, and military skills that challenged the European penetration, settlement and dominion in their respective territories in the wake of the mid 1800. The most significant issue of this time was the total and armed conflicts between the colonialists and the indigenous people waging up resistance against foreign intrusion. The central factor in this period was land. Land for grab by colonialists and land for protection by the natives. Skills and tacts to deal with these conflicts were the main characteristics among Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi [Sudan], Emperor Menelik [Ethiopia] and Sayed Mohamed Abdille Hassan (Somali).

Mahdi and Sudan

Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi sometimes referred to as Ahmed el-Mahdi⁶⁰ was the saviour of the Sudanese in 1881-85 when he led the revolt that saw the end of the

⁵⁹ Roland Oliver & Fage J.D: A Short History of Africa. Penguin African Library AP2 Second Edition 1966.

Khedive dynasty of Egyptian rulers. In this scenario Egypt's drive to the south thus petered out, some four years before the revolution of the Mahdi put an end to Egyptian administration in the Sudan as a whole.⁶¹ The influence and history of the Mahdi created a sensitive situation that kept the British imperialistic expansionist ambitions in check and even led to good relations characterized by cooperation that led to economic, political and educational developments. In Woodward's own view he observed the Sudan's British rulers who governed a vast country with history of revolt against imperialist, and still sensitive to the dangers of another Mahdist uprising, administratively they built on both the Turco-Egyptian state and its Mahdist successor both which had mixed coercion and repression with elements of political management to sustain themselves.⁶² The Turco-Egyptians had converted indigenous ethnic communities into tribal administration, while a commodity-seeking economic drive had encouraged indigenous traders (*jabala*), especially from the riverain north of the country, notably Nubia, to spread south and west as an emerging trading class (including for many years taking slaves from the Nuba mountains and the south). Meanwhile, there was a relaxed acceptance of the Muslim *Sufi tariqas* (religious orders) that had grown since the eighteenth century thus the Mahdist state altered rather than destroyed its predecessor some allegiance promotion and loyalist to the Mahdi dynasty. A clear demonstration of loyalty that was well founded was the British recognition and promotion of Mahdi's posthumous son, Abed el-Rahman el-Mahdi whose neomahdist movement continued to grow in the inter-war years funded by the agricultural and commercial activities.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Woodward Peter- Ibid

According to the above analysis, the politics and economy characterized by the construction of Gezira dam as the backbone of the Sudan economy in 19920s while oil, which built the state further is the source of current animosities. Education and the nationalistic movements of the Sudan led to the independence in 1956 which was also as a result of the foundations, operations and anxiety created by the Mahdi movements as a result of the total cooperation between the Anglo-Egyptian condominium a combined political and imperialistic strategy to dominate Sudan.

The Mahdist period in reality reflects the only time Sudan had unity in the North and South as a block; there has not been any since then.

Menelik and Ethiopia

Throughout the 1880s, while he waited for his inheritance, Menelik was tactfully, skillfully and diplomatically building up his stock of European weapons from every available source not least from Italians whom he ultimately had to defeat with them at the battle of Adowain in 1895. Meanwhile and more successfully, he was doing what all successful African leaders of the time did.⁶³ Menelik used ivory to acquire firearms and firearms to get more ivory. In the process he was year by year expanding his kingdom eastwards, southwards, and westwards of the Afar and Somalia of Harrar and the Ogaden. This expansionist skill has made most scholars to regard him as an exceptional case, as a scrambler for Africa who happened to be an African ruler.⁶⁴

In addition to the expansion of the empire, Menelik and later his successors Tafari and Menelik's daughter Zawditu were keen to create a more modern state to which the new capital of Addis Ababa was an indication which was followed by the

⁶³ A Short History of Africa- Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid

railway from Djibouti and postal and currency arrangements. A small number of students were sent abroad for education; later in 1930 a ministry of education was established. A few hospitals were started. Politically, a bi-cameral parliament was established.

Menelik and Tafari (later Haile Sellassie) were responsive to the outside influences but were also resistant as a means to maintain the African Empire's unique independence in the continent, which was to play off one power against the other especially those holding adjacent territories. Apparently the influence and legacy left by Menelik lived until the Marxist revolt that led to deposition and murder in detention of Haile Sellassie in September 1974. Just like Sudan Ethiopia has not witnessed unified peace to date.

Sayed Mohamed Abdille and Somali

Abdille was regarded as the central figure of the resistance against the Ethiopians and Europeans. His tactics and skills in the employment of resistance earned him a new name to which he was being referred to as the "mad mullah" by the British. An Islamic scholar of considerable charisma, he personified ethnic and national as well as religious resistance. He was said to have been inspired by the example of Ahmed el- Mahdi in Sudan, and the guerrilla tactics used by el-Mahdi lieutenant, Osman Digna, in the east of the country. Abdille Hassan led over two decades of resistance in the north; his threat was never fully extinguished until his death in 1920 whereas his vision of the unity of the Somalia people became a great symbol of later Somalia nationals, indicating the capacity of the Somalis to cooperate against the foreign invaders.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ibid

Post -Independence Interrelations in the Horn

European imperial system that had drawn the boundaries of the Horn and influenced internal political developments had collapsed with the independence of Sudan in 1956 and Somalia in 1960 to which as a result the major legacies lay in the newly independent states' frontiers; in their potential impact for the intensification of relations between the states of the region, especially between Somalia and Ethiopia. At the same time there were important internal implications with relatively isolated regions within the individual states being rapidly brought together in new relationships: the colonially separated Eritrea's incorporation into Ethiopia; the isolated south's hurried inclusion in a unitary Sudan; and the joining of the former British and Italian Somaliland.⁶⁶

More specific, in the post-Second World War period it was the decline of British as the major imperial power in northeast and East Africa that allowed a major change in the internal politics of the Horn. While the UN's role was only a part of a transitional process towards independence from European rule.

Just as the Horn's strategically significant position on the sea route to the east and on the periphery of the Middle East had drawn European intervention in the region, so the same factors encouraged others to step into the international vacuum being created by the imperial decline. The most obvious initial influence was that of the USA, through its contribution to Britain's decline in Egypt and Sudan, and more importantly through its growing involvement in Ethiopia. But the USA was to be challenged by the USSR, first in the Middle East, and later in their more radical phases, in all the three major states of the Horn. With the superpowers playing out their rivalry on this Middle East periphery, it was unsurprising that a variety of the

⁶⁶ Woodward Peter: *The Horn of Africa*

Middle East countries joined in as well. Egypt had been involved in the process of Sudan's independence and was to maintain the interest in the region from which the Nile waters flowed. Israel, as well as the USA, cultivated relations with Ethiopia, long perceived as an historic bastion against Islam and by implication Arabism; while radical Arab states such as Iraq, Syria and later Libya, supported Eritrians in their challenge to imperial incorporation.

European imperialism played a part, but only a part, in the shaping of politics within the Horn. Reasons of history and international politics ensured the deepening of the central involvement of Muslim sects in national politics in northern Sudan, an involvement that began long before the emergence of political parties. In Muslim Somalia, however, there were no comparable sects, and instead clan and sub clan units remained the most characteristic structures for the emergence of political activity at the state as well as the local level. Yet the international divisions of the Somali people also involved divisions of those basic units ensuring that the structure of Somalia politics would impinge on the post-colonial state's borders. In contrast to the largely localized politics of the pastoral Somalis, the traditions of state –building in Ethiopia had combined internal imperialism with enhanced centralization. The West had aided this latter development in the form of support to successive emperors (including the reinstatement of Haile Selassie) as well as acceptance of Ethiopia's case for expanded borders, including Eritrea and the Somalis of the Ogaden.

Those same indigenous and external experiences served to encourage reactions even within the imperial context. The manifestations were largely regional- the complaints of the southern Sudanese before independence and the revolt of the Eritrea's in the 1960s- but other factors were involved as well, including not only

social and cultural differences but also perceived socio-economic discrimination. Economic development of the northern Sudan under the British rule had not only led to neglect of the south, but a perception that ever since the slavery of the nineteenth century it had been partially at the expense of the southerners who were reduced to being hewers of wood and drawers of water. At the same time Britain had neglected British Somaliland, while Italy had encouraged Italian Somaliland's economic development, albeit still modest in extent. Italy had also presided over economic expansion in Eritrea (mainly in the period prior to 1935 and the invasion of Ethiopia) that had been shifted to an emphasis on central Ethiopia after the federation of 1952. Regionalism, shaped by the era of imperialism, was to become not only the domestic politics of the three states, but eventually a major challenge to the state system of the Horn.

The mounting of a successful challenge to the structures of imperialism, whether external, was to lead to a new political age in all the three states and, in turn, to a challenge to the survival of all the above three states. The end of the age of imperialism was not the end of the era of external involvement in the Horn. The balance between external and internal was to alter; but just as imperialism had influenced rather than wholly transformed indigenous societies, so after independence those societies would remain influenced from without, though driven more directly by internal dynamics.

Contemporary Conflict Resolution in the Horn

Sudan

In 1958, a military force, under General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power and began a campaign to suppress opposition and accelerate the 'Islamicisation' of the south. At the same time, the Anya Nya (Snake Poison) rebel force, which began to

form in the year before independence, emerged as a military threat to the state. The Anya Nya campaign for the southern self-determination ended in 1972 when the warring parties accepted the Addis Ababa Accord, a formula granting the south regional autonomy.⁶⁷

Efforts Towards Peace

The Addis Ababa Accord reached in February 1972 between the government of Sudan under President Numeiri and the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) or Anyanya II Movement established regional self-government in the southern provinces of Sudan including Bahr El Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile. It was during this peaceful phase in the Sudan that oil exploration and discovery occurred.

The agreement established a system of governance in Sudan that provided for extensive autonomy and self-rule in the south. The Addis Ababa Accord failed, however, to establish real autonomy. The executive powers of the regional assembly, including the government, ministers and commissioners were all to be appointed or approved by the president of the republic. The president also retained veto powers over the bill he deemed contrary to the national constitution. In effect, although the southern region was provided on paper with extensive autonomy in the management of its affairs, it was all subject to the direct approval by the presidency.

The current phase of the conflict involving the National Islamic Front [NIF] Government and the Sudan people's Liberation Movement/ Army under the command of Dr John Garang de Mabior started in 1983. The Koka Dam Agreement of March 1986 during the premiership of Sadiq Al Mahdi and his governing ally El-Mirghani is notable, as it was entered into by the SPLM/A of Dr. John Garang and El-Mirghani

⁶⁷ Goldsmith Paul, Abura Lydia, Switzer Jason: Oil and Water in Sudan Chapter Five in Scarcity and

heading the National Alliance for National Salvation. The Koka Dam Agreement called for the convening of a national conference to discuss the problems of Sudan and the repeal of the September 1983 Laws that introduced *Sharia* as the national law. As a prerequisite to the national constitutional conference, the Koka Dam Agreement called for the dissolution of the government of Sadiq Al Mahdi and its replacement by a new government of National Unity incorporating all political forces in the Sudan.

The constitutional conference was never held as Sadiq Al Mahdi rejected the agreement. His government was particularly opposed to the repeal of the *Sharia* as a national law and the dissolution of his government.

The Asmara Agreement reached in 1995 between the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)- opposition groups in the north-and the southern SPLM/A, was a significant attempt to address the fundamental north-south issues of Sudan. The Asmara Declaration called for the establishment of a decentralized government comprising of northern and southern entities or regions with extensive powers allocated to each region vis-à-vis the central governing unit.⁶⁸

Issues of environment and natural resource management were included in the distribution of powers between the central authority vis-à-vis the southern and northern entity. The Asmara Agreement places the management of natural resources and the environment prominently under the two entities or concurrently with the central entity. The exception remains the issue of mineral resources, which is placed under the central authority, however, recognizing the right of the host entity to fix a reasonable percentage of returns of the revenue accruing from the exploitation of mineral resources.

Surfeit Lind J and Sturman K-Editors, 2002, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

⁶⁸ Ibid

The Asmara Agreement was a major step forward in identifying the factors needed for peace in the Sudan, as it brought together most of the major stakeholders. It was greatly limited, however, by its omission or denial of the government of Sudan as a partner in the peace equation.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1998 was signed by the government of Sudan and several splinter groups from the SPLM/A under Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol and the late Commander Kerubino Bol. It established a coordinating council to manage the affairs of the south, and the right to self-determination through a referendum after an interim period of four years under a federal system of governance.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement provided for southern citizens to participate in all federal political and constitutional institutions in numbers commensurate to relative population size. Given, however, that southerners remain a significant minority in the Sudan, this basis for representation did not place north and south on an equal footing.

Most environmental and natural resource management powers are vested under state governments with the exception of mining and oil projects that are considered national resources and are under the domain of the federal government.

Though the Khartoum Peace Agreement is still under implementation, key proponents of the agreement including the late Commander Kerubino and Dr. Riek Machar- defected from the agreement and resumed rebel activity, arguing that the government of Sudan had no intention of upholding its end of the agreement.

Several initiatives sought to resolve the conflict with limited success. Non-African initiatives include those led by former United States President Jimmy Carter in 1989,⁶⁹ calls by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners

⁶⁹Lind J. & Sturman K Editors: Scarcity and Surfeit, Institute for Security Studies 2002.

Forum (IPF); and, most recently, negotiations in Switzerland in 2002 convened by the United States. Mediation efforts have tended towards a 'quick-fix' approach emphasizing immediate cessation of hostilities without necessarily addressing the core issues of the conflict. This incomplete approach has produced half-hearted 'partial ceasefire' by the major belligerents-and the war continues. There is a sense of fatigue on the part of western nations in the face of the endless Sudan conflict.

Likewise, African led mediation efforts have made few gains on the key issues. The inability of track one-peace initiatives directly to challenge the parties to the conflict on contentious issues such as state and religion, the right to self-determination for the south, and the more recent issue of oil, has greatly limited any movement in negotiations. Relevant initiatives include the Abuja peace talks and the IGAD Sudan peace process.⁷⁰

The Sudan peace process, initiated by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development, has included seven countries since 1993 to date: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It was not until 1997 that a Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed by two parties, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A as the framework for a peaceful and just settlement of the conflict in the Sudan. The key components of this consensus statement were:

- Securing unity of the Sudan through the establishment of a secular and democratic state; and
- Affirming the right to self-determination for the south as per the borders of 1st January 1956, through a referendum.

Until a recent signature of the Machakos Protocol, negotiations towards the implementation of the DOP bore little fruit.

⁷⁰ Ibid

A joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative was started in 2000 to mediate between the government of Sudan, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)- the umbrella grouping for the northern opposition group and the southern SPLM/A other than being more inclusive in a structure of conflict, steering away from self-determination for the south, and from separating state from religion, both of which are opposed by Egypt and Libya.

On 20th July 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed the landmark Machakos Protocol although renewed fighting soon thereafter raised fears of a lack of commitment to the accord on the part of the signatories. Fighting has been particularly intensive in the oil fields in western Upper Nile (Wahdah/Unity State). Under the deal, the parties agreed that a referendum for the population of Southern Sudan, the scene of fierce fighting between Khartoum and the SPLM/A since 1983 be conducted in six years' time to choose between secession or to remain within a united Sudan. In the interim, negotiations are to continue on the modalities of a cease-fire and the normalization of the situation to facilitate the return of over three million displaced Southern Sudanese to their home areas. The Sudanese government and the rebels also have to agree on the disengagement of forces and whether they want to invite foreign observers to monitor the truce. Ahead of the negotiations lies the intricate issue of the sharing of power and wealth, particularly oil revenue during the six-year interim period up to 2008.

Several key issues that are centrally relevant to the resolution of the conflict emerge from an overview of the major agreements and peace initiatives:

- Generally, there has been some recognition of the need to ensure good governance over economic and natural resources and to ensure

equitable distribution of wealth and power in order to foster a harmonious society in the Sudan.

- Most initiatives recognize the need for the decentralization of economic and political powers to enhance the management of affairs.
- Most initiatives have assumed that decentralization is a southern concern that does not necessarily permeate the whole of Sudan.
- There is an emerging recognition that the conflict in the Sudan is increasingly seeking to address the issue of environmental and natural resource management definitively. The means to do so however remains elusive.

CHAPTER THREE

SOMALIA: 1960-1991: A DIPLOMACY OF CONFLICT IN THE PURSUANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY.

Introduction:

On 1st July 1960 Somalia was granted independence when the former Italian Somalia was merged with Somaliland, the former British protectorate by agreement with the UN Trusteeship Council.⁷¹The emerging state became Somali Republic.

The above date and year marked the birth of the Republic of Somalia, free from its pre-colonial traditions to some extent, free from colonial animosities to a free nation, sovereign state, in charge of its resources both natural and human; a nation free to make decisions and determine the destiny of its resources. As a newly independent state, the People's Republic of Somalia just like other independent African states like Sudan, Egypt, and others in independent struggle process were suddenly exposed to responsibilities, obligations and duties to compete in the international platform. One such obligation was the membership to the United Nations Organizations (UNO). The UN a world body formed after the Second World War was a function of the European Sovereigns and America. Its main objective was to sustain peace since the experiences of World Wars I and II whose atrocities and casualties did not warrant the human fraternity a second chance to witness with a fear that after Nagasaki the humankind would simply be wiped out. Therefore Somalia naturally was compelled to team first to the UN then to the Organization of African Union [OAU] and later to many more regional organizations like the Non Aligned Movement (NAM.)

⁷¹ Farah Ibrahim, Ussein Abbrashid, Lind Jeremy(Editors): Deegan, Politics and War in Somalia Chapter seven in the Scarcity & Surfeit : Institute of Security Studies, South Africa; 2002 pages 321-348.

Abdulle Osman popularly known as 'Aden Adde'⁷² became the first president of the Peoples' Republic of Somali and immediately faced the responsibilities and challenges to introduce Somali to the national and international race. From henceforth Somali nation faced the onslaught of the ever-changing political, social-cultural, economical, technological and ideological demands.

The international climate based on the above factors more especially the ideological one, time when the whole world defined its goals as either being those of capitalism; pro- America, or socialism; pro Soviet Union, the game that was being played at this time determined the social-cultural, economic, technological and political and more so military development of a nation. When a country leaned on one side, it got support and an attack from the other not necessarily direct, but through propaganda and support of local uprisings and that of the neighbouring countries. This scenario led to the situation in which for survival game especially for Asian and African countries private double dealings flourished. The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement only served in paper. In this game Somali also became a player. The game whose scores had to be determined by the tact, exposure, tolerance, and interests of its leadership starting with Aden Abdille.

An independent and sovereign country had to define its national interests. The national interests in this case had to serve both the Somalia nationals and nationals of other states. Compatible national interests free of prejudice had to be reflected in the foreign policy that Somalia embarked on to pursue right from the beginning under president Aden Abdulle Osman 1960-67 followed by his successors; Abdirashid 1967-69 and Siad Barre 1969-1991.

⁷² Ibid

Levels of analysis will be used to describe the various actors, their leadership methods and processes through which they attained their positions; diplomacy of peace and war competed against each other where the dominant one carried the day both at home and abroad in the above period during which offensive more than defensive and progressive foreign policy took prominence.

According to Morgenthau diplomacy that ends in war has failed in its objectives: promotion of national interests by peaceful means, a nation will only invite war if its diplomacy wrongly assesses the objectives of other nations and the power at their disposal and a nation that seeks to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy cannot cease to compare its objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light of their compatibility.⁷³

Somalia under Aden Abdille, 1960-67.

Immediately after independence, Somalia embarked on a foreign policy that sought to unite all the Somali dispersed in the three neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya under one government.⁷⁴

From the outset the leadership of Somalia in its foreign policy priority list to reclaim the lost Somalia nationals dominated. As much as this action may have been noble at home, it did not take care of the United Nations Objectives and purpose on which the organisation was founded. This in particular to Article (2,3 and 4) of the UN Charter that clearly defines the obligations to the members that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. To drive a point close to home against offensive foreign policies in 2.4 of the Charter, all members are reminded to

⁷³ Morgenthau H. *Politics Among Nations; Struggle for Power and Justice.*

⁷⁴ Ghalib Mohammed Jama: *The cost of Dictatorship: The Case of Somalia Experience.* Lilian Barber Press USA. 1995

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The world leaders had come to terms with the understanding that territorial disputes were at the center of power for any conqueror and loss of territory signified total weakness of states and therefore for Somalia to come up with such policy at this particular time meant that from both sides the territory had to be defended resulting to armed conflicts with the involved states be it Kenya or Ethiopia, both which were at the top agenda. In the international relations the act automatically led to diplomatic severance first with the target states and the United Nations as the custodian of the world peace and diplomatic fall out with other interested parties like the allies of the conflicting states.

In his experience, Jamma Mohammed Ghalib in his book observed the immediate Somalia diplomatic behavior of consistence call for the direct decolonizaion of the Ethiopian that held Somalia inhabited territory of the Ogaden named after one of the Somalia clans of the indigenous population and for the self determination of the Somalia people of the Northern Frontier District; the North-Eastern Province of Kenya the (NEP). It is this behavior, Ghalib observes, that went on to lead to chain of severed relations. For instance, in 1962 in the wake of imminent constitutional changes for the colony and protectorate of Kenya, the British Government organized a commission of enquiry to ascertain the wishes of the people of the NFP which failed later to honour the result for which more than ninety per cent of those eligible to, vote it was reported would favour secession from Kenya and opt for the union with the Somalia Republic. In response to this the British chose rather to yield the stand of the more vocal mainstream Kenyan politicians who were opposed to

the popular demands of the people of the Northern Frontier. The determining factor was Britain's vested interests in Kenya. Accordingly Somalia severed diplomatic ties with Britain in 1963 the position that was maintained for the next five years.

Equally with Ethiopia, the Somalia relationship over the Ogaden was equally severe, which led to a rebellion against the Ethiopian Government by the Ogaden people of the Somalia origin. This ultimately led to severe reprisals against Somalia with border skirmishes developing to locally open warfare between the two countries.⁷⁵

The open clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia obviously led to the diplomatic clash dragging in a newly created Regional body the OAU whose architecture and host was the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Sellasie. Consequently the two leaders of the warring nations met and in an agreement they agreed to ease the tension at their border frontlines in exchange of release of traders of both countries in the other which went further to the emperor diplomatically soliciting for the Somalia which was the determining factor to break between Ethiopia and Senegal for Ethiopia to become the permanent seat of the OAU.

Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke 1967-69

Following the foot steps of his predecessor whom he democratically defeated in the general elections of 1967, Abdrashid conspicuously failed to curb the activities of rebellion of Ogadens many of whose leaders were living in Mogadishu and were loyal to the Ethiopian government and were busy reporting the planned activities of the rebellion to the Ethiopian embassy in Mogadishu.

⁷⁵ Ibid-Ghalib Mohammed Jamma; Cost of Dictatorship, chapter xii page 130

Siad Barre, 1969-91.

Mohammed Siad Barre unlike his predecessors held the Somalia leadership the longest for slightly over two decades. In the process Siad Barre drove his country into a series of chaos that led to civil unrests, and towards his immediate neighbouring countries, Ethiopia and Kenya over borderlines trying to categorically and forcefully reclaim the Somalis of the Ogaden from Ethiopia and those of the Northern Front Province of Kenya now the North-Eastern Province. Depending on the angle from which one looks at the leadership of Siad Barre, he was both a success and a failure: one, due to the period he took in the presidency, and two, the structures and legacy he left behind after staying in power for twenty-one years. Like a two-sided coin, one sees what he wants to see.

Mohammed Siad Barre was born of a humble nomad family and trained as a police officer at the Kings Riffle Jeans School in Kabete Nairobi where he learnt basic English. However due to instability in the government which had witnessed the assassination of Abdirashid, and his influence in the army Siad Barre easily came to power in a bloodless coup d' tat on 21st October 1969. This marked the end of the civilian era and opened a new chapter for Somalia that witnessed two decades of military rule. Farah, Hussein and Lind have classified this period into phases. First and initial being that of military rule and scientific socialism in the early 1970s; as is remembered by many Somalis as the period of the real social and developmental progress. As evidence that clannism could be overcome by mobilizing national sentiments which was followed by militarisation and irredentism joined with the scientific socialism that was more of Siyadism than socialism. Lewis argues that Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung and the peripatetic Kim Il Sung all had some influence on the homespun philosophy of development and power constructed in the final phase of Siad

Barre's regime. If this is anything to go by then one is able to reason that the foreign policy of Siad Barre was the function of the aggressive, expansionist of the Eastern Socialist, which was being championed by the Leninist movement. This period that was dominated by the cold war; that produced suspicion of the between the competing superpowers and their allies represented by America in the capitalist ideology and Soviet Union that propagated the Socialist\communist ideology.

Barre's revisionist policy in the 1970s witnessed a war with Ethiopia along the ouster and death of Haille Sellasie to which Barre took advantage of Ethiopia's internal problems emanating from the ouster of Haille Sellasie to launch his offense against the country in an attempt to reclaim Ogaden from Ethiopia then under the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Through his Western Somalia Liberation Front Siad Barre attacked Ethiopia in June 1977.

Alarmed by the scale of the fighting, the OAU Good Offices Committee comprising foreign ministers of the eight member countries, met in Libreville Gabon for the first time with both Somalia and Ethiopia invited to attend which marked a real and first workshop to share ideas and solve the Somalia problem. Blinded by the success of the war front the Somali delegation failed to cooperate. This was reason enough to send Kenya into a panic state as the Soviet military support in form of equipments certainly could escalate the Somalia ambitions to limitless proportions. In preparedness Kenya sought help from the USA another power for arming and warning the Somalia of eminent danger should they dare. This was a common behavior though among most African countries whose theory of non-alignment was actually later confirmed to be truly double standard alignment.

Siad Barre however kept the region on toe until 1980 when the government of Yemen intervened to mediate between Somalia and Kenya about which Siad Barre is

said to have accepted at his own personal diplomacy in return the Saudis invested time, effort and great deal of diplomacy through their former ambassador to Somalia one Sheik Taha Al-Dugheyther.

As time went both Barre and Mengistu continued to arm distant factions of the other's country until each fell from power because of externally supported armed groups. Barre fell from power in January 1991 with Mengstu following in May leading to the third stage of post-colonial history of the collapse of Somalia state giving way to decade-old civil wars.

Issues Leading Somalia to Constant Diplomatic Failure At Home and Abroad

Among others, two instruments are necessary for selling a country's foreign policy. In a revisionist, type of government foreign policy is propagated by means of war. In democratic and accommodative type of government, the policy is sold through diplomacy. In order to ascertain the type of policy underlies Somalia as a colonial state and independent Somalia, the various levels of analysis are given due consideration as outlined in committee six of Somalia National Reconciliation Conference –Nairobi 2002⁷⁶

These levels of analysis have been the key sources of conflict and consequential reasons for long-term diplomatic failure.

Systemic Level

At the systemic level Somalia in the 19th century went through colonial partition as was the case for most of Africa that after the scramble and Berlin

⁷⁶ Somalia National Reconciliation Conference phase two Eldoret-Nairobi, Kenya; committee six ; conflict resolution report dated march 2003 section 2 page 44; National conflict mapping. Unpublished.

conference of 1884-5 various European factions thus British, France and Italy fought over the land and subsequently Somalia was divided into sections which led to alienation of original ancestral groups whereas some remained in Somalia, while others found themselves in Ethiopia like the Ogaden and others in Kenya in the current administrative situations. Alongside land divisions and alienations the colonial powers employed divide and rule systems for arousal clan sentiments to their own advantage making some collaborators and others non-collaborators and hence pitting one group against the other.

After colonization and systemic dictates of independence in which every sole state had to govern and control their own resources found the Somalia nationals unprepared for self-governance due to inadequate education. The people to carry on their self-determination had not been fully exposed to take powers and this led to mismanagement, corruption and nepotism after a short period of attained independence.⁷⁷

During the cold war when the bi-polar system represented by the two super-powers Soviet Union and America, and arms race among the various allies of the two rivaling powers led to increased amount of weapons heavily militarizing the countries of the regions and the escalating tensions and violent conflicts. Somalia's stockpile of sophisticated Russian and American weapons fell into the hands of the various clan militias and factions which have been used in the fratricidal civil war.

Societal Level

At the societal level Somali communities are largely livestock keepers and hence livestock raids were prominent, as is tradition especially among the pastoralists.

⁷⁷ Ibid page 43

The practice has however persisted and is part of the tension among the communities and in the current civil war mayhem. The livestock keepers lost their animals to the militias thus robbed them their livelihood⁷⁸. The Somalia traditional form of compensation thus *dia* and *xeer* which is payment of livestock in situations of an offence arising to death or loss of property, the clan elders of the conflicting parties who usually determined the amount and by the time of the civil wars the powers of the elders had unfortunately diminished rendering the mechanism irrelevant.

The social structure of the Somalia society based on clan system hindered the building of a cohesive Somalia nation. In pre-colonial period, Somalia society was divided into tribal entities with autonomous clans and sub-clans. Successive postcolonial governments tried to control claims through measures like nationalism and socialism that both failed and instead clan sentiments kept recurring to date. This was seriously aggravated by the civil war as each clan resorted to its own people for protection and expansion benefiting those clans with military muscle to the total disadvantage to those lacking the might.⁷⁹

The illiteracy level has remained very high among the majority of the Somalia populations. The situation has even been compounded further by the civil wars by not only denying a portion of the current generation the chance to go to school but by completely destroying the educational infrastructure while the factions to their advantage are using the ignorance and illiteracy to propagate the war.

National Level

General nosier for power struggle, competition for resources, external interference, ideological competition, pastoral versus peasant cultures, political and

⁷⁸ Ibid

human abuse, total brain drain, natural and manmade disasters, violation of national laws, drug trafficking and abuse and general breakdown of the central government have heavily weighed on the national form of the country.

Government Level

At the governmental level Somalia has been governed by both civilian and undemocratically military regimes both, which embraced corruption at the center of their powers. Corruption, injustice and nepotism were the main characteristics of the previous governments. Allegations of corruption led to fall of the civilian government of President Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke in 1969 and consequently the same allegations led to uprisings, which led to the collapse and end of the military regime of Siad Barre in 1991.

Individual Level

At the individual level the character, career, religion, educational level and lifestyles of the previous Somali leadership has to be taken into account. While Siad Barre's youthful career as a policeman with basic communication in English,⁸⁰ that of his predecessors is not known at least it is not clear whether they had received proper formal education but a general understanding that most of the population was ill prepared to handle the highest state office tell it all that the first post-colonial leaders of Somalia were generally uneducated. Siad Barre's eventual slide to dictatorship was according to Mohammed Ghalib due to his inferiority complexes arising from inadequate education demonstrated by his outright murder of elite groups opposed to his policies of socialism which they viewed as being more of Siyaadism, rampant

⁷⁹ Ibid page 35

corruption was adopted and as dictator and admirer of the like of Mao Tse Tung the Barre regime administered terror both at home and abroad especially the immediate neighboring countries. Diplomatic relations never lasted at least respect for pledges never lasted.

In the assessment of most of the national leaders in Africa, their level of education was generally low. The fact that most African countries remained peaceful except for a few pockets of civil uprisings and coups like Uganda, the squabbles can be attributed to several factors that cut across the continent; thus unequal distribution of resources, the cold war ideologies arming one group against the other, greed for power and dominance, and resistance to multi-partism as it was construed as erosion of power. Somali under Barre fell victim of these factors in addition to deep-rooted family and clannism syndrome that from time immemorial as created divisions and suspicion among the Somalis.

Profiles of the Effective Diplomats

A late sixteenth-century European conception of the successful ambassador would disqualify most diplomats of our day. An ambassador, according to this conception,

Should be a trained theologian, should be well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and should be able at a moment's notice to solve the problems in our correct dialectal form, he should be expert in mathematics, architecture, music, physics, and civil and canon law. He should speak and write Latin fluently and must also be proficient in Greek, Spanish, French, German, and Turkish. While a trained classical scholar, a historian, a geographer, and an expert in military

⁸⁰ Ghalib Mohammed Jamma The Cost of Dictatorship-ibid

*science, he must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And above all, he must be of excellent family, rich, and with a fine physical presence.*⁸¹

Times have changed considerably since the sixteenth century, and so have the requirements for the contemporary diplomat who represents and protects his or her country's interests overseas. According to Nicolson, seven qualities are indispensable for successful ambassadors: truthfulness, precision, calmness, good temper, patience, modesty and loyalty. Truthfulness is essential because it contributes to good reputation, which enhances an ambassador's long-range credibility and subsequent effectiveness. Precision involves what Nicolson calls intellectual and moral accuracy. Intellectual accuracy is the faithful depiction of the reality perceived by the ambassador. Moral accuracy is the ability of the ambassadors to express their views and interpretations boldly and to avoid providing the home office with equivocal and, ambiguous, or politically agreeable reports. Calmness, good temper, and patience permit ambassador to maintain the detachment and precision of true professionals. Nicolson argues that the worst kind of diplomats are those with fanatic or missionary temperaments; the best are reasonable and humane skeptics. Modesty is a central quality: all good diplomats should studiously avoid vanity and should not be flattered by or, worse, boast about their diplomatic victories and successes. In fact they should try to play down even genuine victories and let them appear as fair compromises. Finally, ambassadors must be loyal to their governments, their ministries, their own staffs, their fellow ambassadors, and to a certain degree, the host country. Their highest loyalty naturally should be reserved for their country's overall foreign -policy objectives.

⁸¹ Ottaviano Maggic in Coulombis T.A & Wolf H. James. Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice 4th edition

In addition to these seven primary qualities, Nicolson takes for granted that effective ambassadors must possess qualities such as intelligence, imagination, knowledge discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage, and, of course, tact.

By synthesizing these prerequisites, a set of guidelines for effective diplomats have been constructed as follows:

Protocol suppresses personal likes and dislikes: think only of national interests in the policy directives of your government

Implement executive instructions faithfully, regardless of your assessment of the wisdom of these instructions. If you seriously disagree with your government's policy, seek reassignment or resign, if necessary, so that you can legitimately add your voice in public criticism

Understand the need and interests of the host country without losing sight of your country's overall policy objectives.

Recognize and assess public opinion, but do not be entrapped by it.

Do not dramatize your reports merely to attract high-level attention at home and abroad- or just for the sake of good prose.

Do not be over suspicious.

Do not act only for time frame of your incumbency as ambassador: think also of your successors.

Do not be contemptuous of the host country's customs and traditions.

Nicolson concludes that much of his work with the optimistic assertion that diplomats of the twentieth century have improved considerably over the predatory diplomats of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Back then, writes Nicolson," they bribed courtiers; they stimulated and financed rebellions; they encouraged

opposition parties; they intervened in the most subversive ways in the internal affairs of the countries to which they were accredited: they lied, they spied, and they stole."⁸²

In the light of the persistent revelations about the covert activities of various intelligence services that operate at times under diplomatic cover, Nicolson's conclusions appear to be overly hopeful, if not utopian. Convinced of the superiority in the long run of moral diplomacy over immoral practices, Nicolson may have been too eager in equating his own recommendations with reality.

Given their idiosyncrasies, styles, and methods, diplomats have not always escaped criticism. Critics argue, for example, that diplomats tend to acquire an excessive internationalist frame of mind. They become skeptical and even cynical about their own country and its culture, ideology, and values; they develop a special affinity for diplomats of other nation-states, and they invariably tend to be contemptuous of politicians and the press, who in their own view thrive on sensationalizing situations they do not understand. To put less elegantly, diplomats tend to be, by training and mentality, skeptical of democracy and its much-touted virtues.

Another frequent criticism of diplomats is lethargy- a tendency to avoid initiative and to let problems simmer on. Diplomats, according to this criticism, prefer to adopt a conservative and fatalistic mentality. They adopt the style of gardeners rather than that of engineers.¹ Gardeners are *organicists*: they assume the existence of a certain and *natural* way of things and merely try to affect at its fringes. Engineers, in contrast, believe in finding finite solutions to finite problems. They want to move mountains, procure the building materials, cut the trees, pave the roads, and generally

⁸² Nicolson *Diplomacy*; in Theodore and Wolfe, *ibid.*

order things from above. For them, *nature* can be fundamentally controlled by the will of those who understand it.

In our opinion, the lethargy and organicism that allegedly characterize diplomats may at times be blessings in disguise. So called drastic and final solutions in politics, whether domestic or international, frequently led to different and sometimes greater problems. So the diplomatic style of slow and cautious activity, the attitude of seeing events in relative rather than absolute terms, the instinctive opposition to certainty and moral superiority of any kind may all be important and useful traits in successful negotiators. As already suggested, the temperaments of diplomats tend to be quite different from those of politicians. We shall now turn to the latter, given the fact that they are primarily involved backed by sizeable diplomatic staffs in the foreign policy making process.

If we are uncertain as to whether truthfulness or duplicity better serves a diplomat's professional objectives, this uncertainty usually vanishes at the higher levels of statecraft. For the statesman and stateswoman, the ultimate criterion for action is the survival and prosperity of the state. A national leader will employ truthfulness to the degree that it serves the state and duplicity to the degree that it serves the state. Nicolo Machiavelli prescribed long ago the formula for the different mixtures of righteousness and deviousness that are appropriate responses to constantly shifting political fortunes. In a memorable passage that transcends all time, he advises rulers as follows: "That it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also be so; but you should have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities."⁸³

83 Ibid

Machiavelli, the intellectual father of contemporary realism, believed that the highest objective of leadership should be the protection of the state. The ends of the state, therefore, justify its means, whether these means are moral or immoral. Many generations of leaders have since read and probably obeyed Machiavelli's aphorisms:

The best fortress for a state and its prince is the love of the people.

It is safer to be feared and loved, but it is better to be feared as well as loved.

The "good" prince should abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.

It is better to trust in your own power than in the good will of others.

Legislate good laws and back them with good arms.

Laws are the way of men and force is the way of beasts, but you cannot rely on law only.

Imitate the fox and the lion. The fox is shrewd and cunning; the lion is strong and brave. If you have to be one or the other, it's better to be a fox.

Do not put your trust in mercenaries, for your adversaries can buy them.

Be prudent. Prudence is the ability of knowing the nature of the difficulties and taking that, which is least harmful as good.⁸⁴

Over the centuries, Machiavelli's flexible and amoral outlook has been the characteristic of rulers. A well known leader in the Machiavellian mold is former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. We could call Kissinger's career a study in

84 Ibid

realpolitik. The essence of a real politician's worldview is measured pessimism. The world is seen as heading for catastrophe, and the task of diplomacy is to postpone it. Damage is almost inevitable, and the diplomat's major task is to limit it to tolerable proportions. Leaders must be pragmatic rather than idealistic; they must be secretive and flexible and must view themselves as mere catalysts rather than controllers of change. Above all, they must understand and accept "force" as the elemental ingredient of history. In Kissinger's own words, "Much as we deplore it, most major historical changes have been brought about to a greater or lesser degree by the threat or use of *force*."⁸⁵ Applying this abstract principle to the Middle East crisis of October 1973, Kissinger interpreted the situation something like: "I hope we get a *military solution* quickly and then we can work on a diplomatic solution. You cannot have a *diplomatic solution* until you get a military solution."⁸⁶

Kissinger believed that policy makers, unlike lower-level diplomats, should be completely free of the bureaucratic mentality. They should be imaginative and mentally agile and should possess a keen sense of timing and the "killer instinct." They should know, in other words, the exact location of their opponents' political jugular vein. An opportunity to settle problems or to gain diplomatic points knocks only once. Once such opportunities are missed, they are lost forever.

The job of the policy maker (especially if he or she is in a position to define the interests of a great power) is to help the international system to attain a stable state of balance. To do this, according to Kissinger, leaders must be cunning and patient:

They must be able to manipulate events and people. They must play the power game in total secrecy, unconstrained by parliaments, which lack the

⁸⁵ Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity for choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* [New York: Harper & Row, 1961]

⁸⁶ Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalib in Kissinger [Boston Little Brown, 1974]

temperament for diplomacy. They must connive with the largest possible number of allies. They must not be afraid to use force when necessary, to maintain order. They must avoid iron-clad rules of conduct; an occasional show of "credible irrationality" may be instructive. They must not shy away from duplicity, cynicism, or unscrupulousness, all of which are acceptable tools for statecraft. They must never burn their bridges behind them. And if possible they must always be charming, clever, and visible.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national security affairs advisor under President Jimmy Carter, echoed the sentiments of Henry Kissinger in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. He spoke of the need for "some degree" of "duplicity of intent" in diplomatic maneuvering. Explaining his view to some of the startled senators, Brzezinski added: "At some times when you are pursuing an objective...you cannot state openly what your objective is." For example, he added, "We may seek to improve the relations with country A, as a means of putting pressure on country B, but it would be impossible to acknowledge that openly." The "awesome dangers of the nuclear age," according to Brzezinski, "have put a further premium on the rapidity of response on the centrality of decision making, on the covertness of some needed action, and even on some degree of duplicity in the area of publicity proclaimed intent." Brzezinski admitted that these characteristics of action clearly run into conflict with the traditional requisites of democracy. But he concluded, "While duplicity in foreign affairs is publicly treated as out of bounds, it exists in the real world of diplomacy."

Idealist critics consistently question the real politicians' credo of power without purpose, unrestrained by principle. They also object to the realists' artificial separation of prudence and morality. In fact, the idealists argue principled rather than

predatory behavior is the most prudent behavior. The realists respond that moral principles, as constraining rules of conduct, are and should be irrelevant to but should not necessarily be excluded by realist behavior. For the realist, the *only* operative principle is the survival and prosperity of the state and its people. Survival, in a system that is close to being an international jungle, is purpose enough. The method of attaining it is a pragmatic concoction of force, bribery, urge implore, warn, promise, threaten, and plead their way into yet one more day of “security” for their country.

This debate among realists and idealists will probably continue for some time, and basic questions about the purpose of statecraft will puzzle future generations. Is political survival as the sole purpose of statecraft adequate? Should survival not be qualified somewhat? Survival, after all, to what purpose and by what means? Should it be survival in honour or dishonor? Should it be survival with growth, with freedom, with justice, with glory, with humiliation, or what? Real politicians are content to stop at survival *per se*: the rest is a luxury. And for them, people who die for the sake of honour or defense of a set of principles or ideals are no more than just plain dead.

The policy maker, according to Kissinger, must also exhibit a certain amount of arrogance or, more politely, immense self-confidence. That person alone, sitting at the pinnacle of power can make the momentous decisions that move masses of people and machines and account for the zigzags of destiny. Kissinger’s semi contemptuous attitude toward the American’s foreign policy bureaucracy is typical of this outlook. Kissinger is supposed to have voiced his sentiments toward the bureaucrats as follows: “There are twenty thousand people in the State Department and fifty thousand in Defense... They need each other’s clearances in order to move... and they all want to

do what I'm doing. So the problem becomes: How do you get to push papers around, spin their wheels, so that you can have your work done?"⁸⁷

In the last analysis, we must not forget that different leaders with radically different idiosyncrasies fulfill the duties of statecraft in radically different fashions. We must not, therefore, assume that the real political profile sketched above aid the exclusive method or model of operation for all policy makers. It would be safe to assume, however, that this profile probably suits the majority of foreign policy makers.

⁸⁷ Ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

PREVIOUS PEACE AND RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA, 1991-2001

Introduction:

The United Nations, European Union and the Djibouti government have facilitated a number of peace and reconciliation efforts. Although they have failed to take root, some of them have had positive impacts. The UN tried official diplomacy by targeting the direct warring groups, mainly the warlords while the EC and the Djibouti government tried unofficial diplomacy by targeting members of the civil society. None of these initiatives have considered the importance of *the all inclusive that is to bring on board the states, individuals, organizations and the procedures/ methods of application.*

This chapter will present the previous peace initiatives in a chronological order beginning with the earliest response to blocker for return of calm immediately the world realized that Somalia was headed for more trouble as soon as the Barre regime was overthrown in January 1991. The UN took the lead followed by Djibout which twice has mediated with little success but in its second attempt May –August 2000 that under the Arta declaration, a transitional government was forestalled and saw formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Their mandate had been confined to Mogadishu only due to resistance by the opposing faction groups.

The United Nations in Somalia, Jan-March 1991

With the assistance of the Ethiopian government, the UN facilitated itself in two peace and reconciliation efforts in Addis Ababa in January and March 1991.

Fifteen factions attended two national reconciliation conferences and produced the Addis Ababa Accords. The Accords were never implemented, however, owing in part to the focus on the warlords (whom many Somalis considered criminals) and the political aspects of the Somali conflict.⁸⁸

In late 1992, following intense media coverage, the United States decided to join ongoing international efforts in Somalia, and to lead what it termed “an international humanitarian intervention” in Somalia. They came under the name Unified Task Force (UNITAF), later on code renamed United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), when the nominal command was transferred from the United States to the United Nations. Their intent was to stop the factional fighting and to end the famine. The UNOSOM intervention force was created on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 751 and was mandated to undertake a peacekeeping mission with the consent of the Somali factions.⁸⁹

Later, the United Nations was drawn into an armed conflict with General Aideed, a powerful warlord in Mogadishu at the time. The conflict became one between the UN-led forces and General Aideed’s United Somali Congress (USC) forces, and eventually led to the loss of 24 Pakistani and 18 United States troops, as well as thousands of Somalis, both Aideed’s militiamen and civilians. Following these losses the United States announced a phased withdrawal, with most western forces in the UN following suit. UNOSOM completely withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 with neither a national peace nor a revived government structure in place.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid; Scarcity & Surfeit, pages 327-331

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

Djibouti One and Two, May & July 1991.

In order to defuse the deepening crisis in Somalia, President Hassan Gulaid Aptidon of Djibouti offered his good offices to mediate and bring the different groups and parties to the negotiating table. He invited to Djibouti leaders of the movements that included the SSDF (the Somali Salvation Democratic Front), the SPM (the Somali Patriotic Movement), USC (the United Somali Congress) and SDM (the Somali Democratic Movement). The SNM (the Somali National Movement) which had declared the independence of Somaliland in May 1991 did not attend⁹¹.

The conference was attended also by Aden Abdulle Osman, first President of the Republic, Abdirizik Haji Hussein and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, both former Prime Ministers of the Governments before the 1969 army take over.

Adan Abdulle Osman was elected Chairman of the Conference while the two former Prime Ministers became his Assistants.

President Hassan Gulaid Aptidon opened the conference on 5 June 1991. In his speech he appealed to the participants to work with wisdom towards the general interest and the future of Somali. After a week long debate, Djibouti One adopted, on 11 June 1991, the following declaration:

The conference declared that Mohamed Siad Barre, who was overthrown by the people and all Somali groups, on 26 January 1991, had committed a crime against the people and the Somali Nation and that his presence constituted a permanent danger towards peace, security and the unity of the Somali nation. Therefore, the delegates agreed on the following points: to appeal to Mohamed Siad Barre to leave the country within a short period; otherwise, they would use a common force against him; and to bring Mohamed Siad Barre and his allies before a competent judicial authority.

⁹¹ Mohamed Osman Omar. Nation driven to Despair, Case of Leadership Failure

The conference issued an appeal for a general peace throughout the Somali National Territory and the creation of a climate of hospitality and mutual understanding.

It was decided that the title of the forthcoming meeting would be “National Reconciliation Conference of the Somali People” to be held in Djibouti starting on 13 June 1991. It was also decided that the participants of the second meeting, besides the groups, which attended the first conference, would be the SNM and USF.

The conference reiterated that the Somali nation be indivisible and launched an appeal to the to leaders of the SNM and other brothers in the north of Somalia to participate in the National Reconciliation Conference. It decided to send a delegation composed of the members of the Peace Mission and representatives of the various groups attending the Conference to the North.

Two months later the president of Djibouti again invited the Somali groups to meet in Djibouti. Djibouti Two started on 15th July and ended on 21st July 1991. Again, the Somali National Movement did not attend, insisting that they were an independent republic and had nothing to do with the internal affairs of the other side.

Djibouti Two was more elaborate and many foreign guests were also invited to the event. The President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi and the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni were the special guests of the conference. Also present were representatives from Germany, the United States, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Sudan, Oman, USSR, China, the Arab League, OAU, OIC, EEC and IGAD.

Undoubtedly, the Presidents of Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya and all the delegates from different countries who attended this Conference wished to see an end to the civil strife in Somalia. Donor governments promised help in the reconstruction

of the country that Somalis themselves had demolished with their own hands, provided that the warring factions reached a peaceful solution and restored stability.

At the end of the conference, the representatives of the Somali Movements which attended the Conference adopted a resolution which was also counter-signed by the members of the Committee of “Wisemen of Somalia”, Aden Abdulle Osman; former President of the Republic, Shaikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein; former resident of the National Assembly, Mohamed H. Ibrahim Egal, former Prime Minister, Abdirizak, former Prime Minister and of behalf of the Government of Djibouti, Mumin Bahdon Farah, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the conclusion, the representatives of SSDF, USC, SPM, SDM, SDA, and USF solemnly promised to abide by the resolutions of the conference.

The international organizations as well as governments endorsed the conference's outcome. King Fahad of Saudi Arabia for example immediately invited all the delegates of the conference to Makka al Mukarama, Holy Shrine of Islam, to perform Umra and to pray for the success of the agreement. For a good Muslim, once you make a promise while in Mecca you are duty-bound to try to fulfill it. The king wished to solemnize the Agreement by bringing the signatories to the Holy Place. He spoke to all the members about their responsibilities before Allah and before their people. King Fahad promised that his kingdom was ready to offer all possible assistance for the reconstruction of the county if the situation improved and life returned normal in Somalia.

However, the efforts of these well wishers went in vain. From the Holy Place of Mecca, the delegates who were expected to bring peace to a war-torn country dispersed to different parts of the world. A few of them went back home. General

Farah Aideed, the Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC) refused to accept the Agreement of the Djibouti Conference.

General Farah Aidid did not attend the swearing-in ceremony of the Interim President, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, on 18th August 1991, but a message from him was read at the ceremony by his representative. Later it was reported that Aideed's absence from the ceremony was due to health reasons.

However, he later made his position very clear. Aideed said:

“The manifesto Group announced the self- appointed Government with Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the self-styled Acting President, on instigation by Siad Barre before running out, (I have documents to prove this), refusing my advice not to do so in a meeting which lasted five hours on 29th January 1991.” He added: “I refused to extend any recognition to the illegal, illegitimate and self-appointed Government of the ‘Manifesto Group’ headed by Ali Mahdi, since it was nothing but the continuation of Siad Barre’s regime indirectly.”

The end result was chaos, civil strife and widespread violence.

The Destructive War

On 17th, November 1991, exactly 120 days after the Djibouti II Agreement, the power struggle between General Farah Aideed, the chairman of USC and Ali Mahdi, the Interim President, of USC, exploded in Mogadishu.

Unlike earlier when the clans fought each other with arrows, knives and later rifles, this time the leaders contending power exchanged artillery and rocket barrages, causing the death of innocent civilians and the destruction of national and private property. Thousands of citizens were forced to flee their homes to save their lives. Those who had their roots in the interior of the country returned

to their clan territories. While the residents of the capital, Mogadishu, which became the battle ground had only two alternatives: either to stay at home, face death, rape and looting or risk life by going to sea. In Mogadishu even the mosque, the house of God was not safe. Marauders and thugs invaded the houses of the families of Shaikh Suufi and killed one of his grandsons who was sick, partially paralyzed, and raped teenage girls and then killed them.

As the Somali crisis worsened, in October 1992 the United States Institute of Peace organized the first of what became a series of conferences and workshops on Somalia. The Somali Study Group was formed after an initial conference. Over a two-year period, this Study Group prepared recommendations regarding international intervention in Somalia, as well as ideas about reconstruction and reconciliation. The Study Group was composed of Somali intellectuals and former Somali officials who were then residing in the US. It organized these meetings in collaboration with Ambassador Robert Oakley, former US Ambassador to Somalia and at the time Director of the Institute's Middle East initiative.

The European Commission on Somalia, 1995-1996

In addition to the UN initiatives for Somalia, the European Commission was pursuing its own approach for peace and reconciliation. The EC commissioned the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1995 to conduct a comparative study to assess the implication of various types of political and administrative decentralization in Somalia, and to avail this information both to the general public and leading Somali intellectuals and decision makers.

The report, *Study of decentralization structure in Somalia: A menu of options*, focused four models: (1) confederation, (2) federation, (3) a decentralized unitary state, and (4) a community-based type of power sharing known as consociation. The EC sponsored two seminars each in Naivasha and Nakuru, Kenya in June and November 1996 to discuss the studies' findings. Somali traditional and religious leaders, intellectuals, professionals, women and other representatives of the Somali civil society attended the seminars and supported the concept of establishing "a decentralized state with constitutional guarantees for the full autonomy of the constituent units"

In addition to the seminars held in Kenya, three follow-up seminars were held in Somalia. Aside from establishing the 'Puntland' regional government in north-eastern Somalia, Somali sentiment and the nature and the extent of the civil war remained unchanged. The limited effectiveness of the EC initiative was probably due to the fact that it focused on constitutional debates, rather than on conflict management, and did not include the grass- roots people or the warring factions.

The Djibouti Initiative, May –Sept.2000.

President Gelle of Djibouti initiated a long-awaited peace process in September 1999 when he appealed to Somali leaders and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states to join him in addressing Somalia's situation. The Djibouti president hosted a preliminary conference in Djibouti with over 60 intellectuals to discuss how best to approach the reconciliation process. He focused on the civil society, the traditional clan leaders, community elders and prominent political figures for the necessary support and back up for the peace process.

The peace process began in May 2000 in Arta, Djibouti with delegations from all corners of Somalia. The discussions continued for over four months and concluded

with the election of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) of 244 members, an interim president, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan and a Transitional National Government (TNG) led by the interim prime minister, Ali Khalif Gallayr. The first interim government of Somalia for more than a decade moved to Mogadishu in September 2000 and was overwhelmingly received by Mogadishu residents, although its de facto authority was soon to be restricted to the environs of Mogadishu.

A number of faction leaders refused to accept the authority of TNG and formed a coalition of opposing groups with a rotating chairmanship called the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The interim government continued to meet resistance because the opposition groups believe that labeling warlords as criminals and sidelining them prevented them from participating in and contributing to the peace process. Like the EC initiative, the delegates who took part in the Djibouti Initiative delegates focused on institutional and constitutional solutions to the conflict, instead of reconciliation.

As the security and humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate, IGAD member states established a technical committee consisting of representatives from the front-line states of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. The committee's mandate included monitoring of the Somali peace process and drawing up the terms of reference for the resumption of broad based talks to consider the completion and implementation of the Arta Agreement. These events were taking place against a backdrop of public expressions of disappointment by Hassan at the lack of support from the international community for the rehabilitation of Somalia as well as the poor progress with the internal political process. According to him; "external interference" in the country's internal affairs, the supply of arms to the warlords and the lack of support from the international community were "the main hurdles standing in the way of progress".

On the eve of the resumption of talks during September 2002 in Eldoret, Western Kenya, the EU offered financial and technical support to a “provisional, all-inclusive, broad-based” government in Somalia, as successor to the TNG. In order to encourage a “bottom-up approach”, the EU would support “emerging regional governance” which had effective control of population centres and economic infrastructures, and demonstrated a commitment to peace.

Civil Society Initiatives and Alternative Strategies

Due to lack of formal governmental policies at this time and because the formal central authority collapsed, nomadic communities use *xeer* to negotiate for access to and use of resources in the absence of government policy.

Various local and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community -based Organisations (CBOs), are implemented environmental projects.

A conference held in Kismayu in early 1993 during the UN Operation in Somalia brought together elders and politicians from the Lower Jubba region. They agreed on a ceasefire, disarmament, reopening of roads, reunification of the people and communities and to return looted properties. These agreements were revisited on 6th August 1993 with the signing of the Jubbaland Peace Agreement.

The communities in the Gedo and Bay regions of Somalia organised and held another important conference on early 1994. Representatives of the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and a large number of community elders, clan leaders, and intellectuals from both regions attended. The purpose of the conference was to reconcile the warring factions, the SNF and the SDM, and to unite the peoples of the two communities. The conference endorsed the Bardera Agreement, which included General Morgan’s Somali Patriotic Movement

(SPM). It also allowed the peaceful interaction of the communities of Gedo, Bay, Bakol, the Middle and Lower Jubba regions.

Nicolson suggests that negotiations (as opposed to foreign policy making) be carried out exclusively by seasoned professional diplomats rather than by politicians. Politicians, argues Nicolson, are frequently trained as trial lawyers; and consequently, exhibit an adversary and combative mentality. Politicians like to play the grandstand. They like to win cases, to score points, to trap and checkmate their opponents, to debate and outclass the other side, and to impress judges and juries. Frequently, politicians find themselves inadequately informed about foreign cultures and outlooks; their views are understandably parochial in that they are oriented to their constituency. Assuming that this portrait is accurate, we can assert that the characteristics of politicians and courtroom lawyers do not make for successful negotiations. The object of negotiations is not victory but a viable, acceptable, and preferably favourable compromise. The successful negotiator, therefore, is more likely to be the reliable diplomat than the adversary politicians. Diplomats, by training and personality, are often indifferent if not opposed to public recognition and applause. They have studied and experienced foreign cultures closely. They tend to dislike controversy, avoid publicity, and take enough time to study policy options carefully before applying them to problem situations.

In summary, foreign-policy-making should be an open and publicly accountable process carried out by politicians with the advice and support of seasoned

diplomats. Negotiations in contrast, should be carried out privately and discreetly by trained diplomats, and should promote the goals established by policy makers.⁹²

⁹² Nicoloson ; Old and New Diplomacy in Coloumbis and Wolfe; Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice 4th Edition .Prentice Hall International. Chapter 8 page 151.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOMALIA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN KENYA, 2002-2003: A CASE STUDY

Introduction

In Chapter four the study analyzed the past peace initiatives whose efforts and resources least achieved the intended return of peace to Somali. This Chapter, which will be divided into two parts, will examine, in part one, the initiative, participation, logistics, strategies and phases set up to broker for the Somalia National Reconciliation Process. Part two of the study will examine the primary data collected during the field study and interview of various participants the majority of whom were the Somali faction leaders, “war lords,” civic society representatives, IGAD secretariat, diplomats from the Frontline States and IGAD Partners Forum. Others were professionals from the military and peace resolution oriented institutions.

The Khartoum Summit

Following the resolution issued at the 9th summit of Heads of State and Government on 11th January 2002 held in Khartoum, the Heads of States endorsed a number of issues. First, they reaffirmed IGAD’S commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. Second, they called upon Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to coordinate their efforts for the National Reconciliation in Somalia. Third, they decided to hold a reconciliation conference on Somalia in Nairobi within two months under President Moi as coordinator of the Frontline States to continue the peace process in Somalia and to report to the IGAD chairman. Finally, they urged the

Transitional National Government (TNG) to commit itself to combat terrorism in all forms.⁹³

Communique Issued Following the IGAD Foreign Ministers Committee Meeting on Somalia on 14th February 2002

Under the chairmanship of Kenya, the Frontline States were requested through IGAD's Foreign Ministers Committee to coordinate initiatives on Somalia including the establishment of the main Technical Committee. The committee had the following responsibilities: to draw up the Terms of Reference for the proposed conference; to determine the criteria for participation; to decide the number of participants; to monitor and guide the peace process; to determine a budget and report to the chairman of the Council of Ministers.⁹⁴

The long peace process kicked off with the practical invitation by Hon. Marsden Madoka the then minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of the Republic of Kenya, the IGAD Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail of the Sudan, current chairman of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Ali Abdi Farah of Djibouti, Colonel Kahinde Otafiire, Minister of state and Foreign Affairs of Uganda, Ambassador Tewelde Woldemikael of Eritrea and Dr. Attalla Hamad Bashir, Executive Secretary of IGAD attended the IGAD Foreign Ministers Committee Meeting on Somalia in Nairobi on 14th February, 2002. Observers present at the opening session included members of the Diplomatic

⁹³ IGAD NEWS: A Bi-monthly Newsletter published by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; Issue 1 March- April 2002 & Ministry of Foreign Affairs Annex ii of Minutes of Resolution of the 9th IGAD Summit of the Heads of State and Government on Somalia 11th January 2002

⁹⁴ Ibid Igad News letter front page

Corps resident in Kenya, members of the IGAD Partners' Forum, the European Union and a representative of the United Nations.

In conformity with the Resolution of the 9th IGAD Summit on Somalia, held in Khartoum on 11th January 2002, the Ministerial Committee of IGAD Foreign Ministers reviewed the Somali National Reconciliation Process with particular emphasis on its current status, the situation in Somalia and the concerns of the Frontline States and the Horn. In addition the Committee discussed at length the harmonization of the reconciliation process under the aegis of IGAD and considered ways and means of moving forward the regional initiative.

The Ministerial Committee expressed concern regarding the grave situation in Somalia over the last decade whose spillover effects had impacted negatively beyond that country's borders posing a threat to peace, security and stability in the region. While noting that the Frontline States had borne the socio-economic fallout of the crisis, it further noted that the conflict in Somalia had resulted in an exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries and that arms destined to factions contributed to illicit trade and proliferation of small arms leading to insecurity. It was noted that the worsening situation in Somalia could have a disastrous impact on the precarious humanitarian situation in that country.

The committee observed that the absence of a central authority in Somalia over the last decade had created a situation whereby terrorists and extremist groups operated freely in the country thereby threatening the national security of neighbouring states. It urged the TNG and all other parties in Somalia to commit themselves to combat terrorism in all its forms. The committee also reiterated that the establishment of peace and governance in combating terrorism in Somalia are inseparable.

The urgent need for intensifying efforts in national reconciliation process aimed at working towards a broad based and all-inclusive government while maintaining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the country was underscored. In this context, the committee appealed to all political leaders to participate in the reconciliation process in the interest of their people and country. The committee reiterated its commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement to the problems of Somalia.

The committee was briefed on the efforts being undertaken by the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia to facilitate implementation of the Agreement it signed with some Somalia factions in Nakuru, Kenya, on 24th December 2001. It welcomed the TNG's willingness to co-operate with the international community in combating terrorism.

The committee recognized the achievement attained so far in the reconciliation process in the endeavor to work towards establishing an all-inclusive political framework in Somalia. To this end, a technical committee comprising the Frontline States (Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti) chaired by Kenya and including the IGAD Secretariat was established to work out modalities to facilitate the proposed National Reconciliation Conference during the 2nd half of April, 2002, that would include the TNG and other Somali parties without any conditionalities. The technical committee's mandate was outlined as follows:

To draw up the terms of reference for the conference, determine criteria for participation, decide on the number of participants, monitor and guide the peace process, report to the chairman of the council of ministers, propose convening of a ministerial committee meeting if necessary, and work out the budget for the peace process.

It was then unanimously agreed that the IGAD Secretariat in conjunction with the current Chair of IGAD Council of Ministers and foreign ministers of Frontline States would be responsible for sourcing for funds.

The ministerial Committee then appealed to the international community and humanitarian agencies to continue providing assistance to Somalia. In particular, it appealed for active involvement of the United Nations in the Somalia National Reconciliation Process in the rehabilitation, and restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The committee then underlined that the effort to resolve the crisis in Somalia was a collective objective that required each and everyone's support.

In conclusion, marking the end of the meeting, the IGAD Foreign Ministers expressed their gratitude and appreciation to Hon. Marsden Madoka, the Government and the People of Kenya for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded them during their stay in Kenya.⁹⁵

Indeed this may have been the beginning of the long journey of hosting a conference of a foreign nation and its ten-year warring factions. A conference marking the fourteenth peace initiative on Somalia where the previous thirteen had not been able to hold water at least not much enough to arrest the conflict situation and sustain peace in Somalia once and for all. A big challenge for the involved and expected logistics, tact, patience, and humility for the involved parties in steering the on going Somalia peace conference at Mbagathi under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kiplagat and his team.

⁹⁵ Annex iii: Minutes of the IGAD Foreign Ministers meeting held in Nairobi on 14th February 2002. Foreign Affairs Ministry materials and records; unpublished Document Done in Nairobi.

The Technical Committee

The Technical Committee mission was composed of two members of each Frontline States and one official from IGAD secretariat. The mission's objective was to meet with the various entities involved in Somalia and seek opinion on the issues for the planned conference.

The Technical Committee met from 3-5 April 2002 in Nairobi to work out the modalities for the proposed National reconciliation Conference for Somalia. During the meeting, a number of decisions were reached including determining the criteria for participation in the proposed future peace conference.

Further activities expected in the coming days were to be the convening of the main Technical Committee, receive the Mission report as well as a meeting of foreign Ministers of the frontline states to study the report of the technical committee.

The mission began its work on 17th April 2002 with a visit to Bosaso in the self-administered Puntland where they met the administration of Jama Ali Jama. On 18th April, the mission visited Somaliland and held discussions with its leaders. On the same day the mission flew to Galkayo where it met and discussed with the group of Col. Abdullahi Yusuf. On the 19th April they traveled to Mogadishu and met the Transitional National Government (TNG) and all factional leaders based in Mogadishu. Civil society organizations based in Mogadishu also had a chance to present their views with some traveling to Mogadishu to make their presentations. On 20th April the mission went to Baidoa to meet the administration of South West Region of Somalia including Shaati Quodudu and other leaders of the region.

Members of the Technical Committee mandated by the IGAD Foreign Ministers Committee to facilitate the proposed National Reconciliation Conference for

Somalia returned from Somalia on 20th April having met numerous factional leaders and Governmental representatives in various Somali regions.⁹⁶

Somalia National Reconciliation Process-Eldoret October 2002

The peace process was finally settled in Eldoret Kenya; the Technical Committee having satisfied the IGAD Foreign ministers requirements, and after laying down all the modalities and logistics suitable for a conference including the venue which ideally was considered physically far from the location of the conflict and free of any association with any part to it. This was to insulate the parties from the conflict so that the participants could feel themselves to be on a mental 'island';⁹⁷ offered a conducive atmosphere; far from the city and its interferences of both press and inciters or faction advisors. A venue good and remote enough from the real world of international or intra-national conflict, it could provide enabling climate for the conflict parties to face and discuss their problems amicably.

Upon settling and with guidance of the Technical Committee, the team came up with a consensus constituting three structures namely; The Plenary, The Reconciliation Committees and The Secretariat. The Plenary was the decision making structure, which also sets the agenda; the reconciliation committees carry out the negotiations in accordance with the agenda provided by the plenary and the secretariat services both the plenary and the committees.

Necessary preparations of airlifting the identified participants and settling them in Sirikwa Hotel-Eldoret were all in place to enable a smooth take off of the

⁹⁶ IGAD News Issue No. 1; March-April 2002 Headline referred to as Somali Peace Process: IGAD Technical Committee on Somalia Moving Ahead Despite Challenges.

⁹⁷ Mitchell Christopher and Banks Michael, 1996 Handbook of Conflict resolution- the Analytical-problem solving Approach. Chapter 4 page 87.

conference which kicked off with its first business of a declaration to cease fire at home in Somalia. All and present faction leaders had to pledge for peace and a signed cease fire declaration veto was finalized, a commitment to suspend fighting as long as the peace process was going on.⁹⁸

The process as a whole was categorized into three phases for ease of deliberations. Phase One, referred to as; Process and Structure, which took place between 11th, October-15th November 2002, the period during which negotiations and discussions were largely held in Plenary. This was to enable all the Somali groups invited, and representatives of the actors in the Somalia conflict, set the agenda for the National Reconciliation Process. The most important outcome of Phase one of the process was the setting of the agenda that would guide the discussion and form the framework for phase Two of the process. To facilitate this there was need for the formation of three informal working groups which were to deal with the following issues respectively; Review of conflict issues, Review and formulation of core reconciliation issues and Review of the past peace processes. Issues arising from these reviews would form the basis for negotiations by the formal Reconciliation committees appointed during the Eldoret sessions of Phase Two of the Process.⁹⁹

Phase Two of the Peace Process.

At this stage the formal committees responsible for deliberations of the phase two issues had been set up. In all a total of six committees was constituted and the

⁹⁸ Informal interview with IGAD Somalia National Reconciliation Process Secretariat on 23/7/2003 at Mbagathi.

⁹⁹ Somalia National Reconciliation Process: Phase One, 11 October – 15th November 2002; Unpublished Process and Structure AN IGAD Secretariat open Document.

following six issues which arose from the phase one reviews were deliberated and recommended as follows;¹⁰⁰

Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter

The specific issues the committee dealt with were 'inter alia' drafting of the provisional Federal Charter, based on the 1960 Constitution of the Somali Republic and Proposals of the sub groups of the charter committee of the reconciliation conference.

For this study Article 1 (The Republic) of the general provisions sufficed as follows;

That the Somali Republic is an independent and fully sovereign state, which is a representative Republic, determined to re-establish democratic institutions and culture.

That the Republic shall adopt a federal system to be completed within a period of three years. While the interim years would be governed through a decentralized governance system to prepare the prerequisites for full-fledged federal system to be established in the third year of the transition.

The official name of the state shall be Somali Republic until the future constitution is adopted and federal authorities are elected. That sovereignty belongs to the people who shall exercise it in the forms determined by the Charter and the laws. Islam was the agreed religion of the state.

Mogadishu was the recommended national capital whose boundaries and administrative structure would be established by law. And the interim government would select another town in the country as its seat during the interim period.

¹⁰⁰ IGAD Secretariat undated committees terms of reference & Daily Nation/ Monday, December 2, 2002 page 15 entitled; Somalia talks in vital phase.

In article 4 of the Provisional Charter, official language recommended should be Somali with its two main dialects; the Maay and Maxaatiri, while Arabic and English would be second languages.

The boundaries of the state were defined as follows; that the national territory is sacred and inviolable, that the territorial sovereign shall extend to the continental territory, the islands, the exclusive economic zone, territorial waters, the sub-soil and the air space above. It was further defined according to the Somali State neighbors.

Article 7; of the charter relates the Somali Republic with the international order that the generally accepted rules of international law and treaties duly concluded by the Republic and published in legislative acts to have the force of law. That the Somali Republic shall promote and encourage solidarity among the peoples of the world, in particular among the Africans, Arabs and the Islamic people.¹⁰¹

Committee on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

The committee on disarmament in order to come up with effective strategies highlighted the history of Somalia and weapons, types of weapons available, and those in possessions of the weapons. Considering the fact that the weapons were in the hands of unauthorized civilians, in plenty and dangerous in nature, the committee came up with the following collection strategies;

That disarmament would be done both through persuasion and encouragement, and when the two methods fail, force would be applied but as last resort. It was further recommended that the national government should ask the international community for disarmament force and monitors which would be assisted by regional and district

¹⁰¹ Charter Committees Drafts; Groups A undated & B dated 23rd March 2003 addressed to H.E Hon.Ambssador B. Kiplagat, Kenya's Special Envoy to Somalia and Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee on Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya.

administration. For a quick and decisive disarmament, a period of six months was recommended from the commencement date. Custody of the weapons recommended would be identified warehouses within the designed collection centers. The TNG, the only authorized institution to handle weapons would also hand over all the weapons in their possession to the incoming government.

The committee generated plans for assembly and cantonment of military personnel and weapons at appropriate sites, including either central and / or regional locations. Along with this the committee planned the modalities of gradual reduction of armed militia and weapons, which would involve progressive confidence building and disarmament between all Somalia political actors with a clear and monitored timetable for implementation.

It was also recommended for rationalization, regulation and training of forces, recruitment of the establishment of command and control systems for national military personnel and regional police forces. Socio-economic reintegration of military personnel through education, employment and psychological support programmes and establishment of corrective services.¹⁰²

Committee on Land and Property Rights

Committee three on land, and property rights was an establishment that looked at issues regarding land, and property rights like farmland, pastoral land, residential or business property to be the root cause of conflicts between the colonists and Somalis and also among the Somalis themselves in the civil war, the committee recommended the following;

¹⁰² Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Draft Report Dated 3 December 2002

That to find a solution to all the cases of movable and immovable properties, one would consult the region or district courts that shall act with advice and opinion of the traditional elders at the region, district, villages, or the neighbours.

It was also recommended that an investigation be conducted, and identification of the location and conditions of public property inside and outside the country effected by the supreme court to resolve any disputes about public properties claimed by the individuals.

Formation of the national commission to look into land and property rights was recommended whose membership should have a fair clan balance. Part of the duties of the commission would be to establish grabbed public and private properties.

Committee on Economic Reconstruction, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization

This committee while assessing the economic status of Somali, acknowledged that Somali at the beginning of the 21st century needed a vision for socio-economic reconstruction and development and a strategy formed and guided by an enlightened leadership, a national commitment and a will.

Key components of the vision that were recommended included peace, stability and unity which are paramount to the nation and individuals in their pursuance of poverty reduction, and high economic growth. Good governance and the rule of law were encouraged to make the leaders and public servants accountable. The role of the private sector was commended as it plays a leading role in the economy while it would be the responsibility of the government to regulate the framework and institute appropriate macro-economic framework. Public sector services such as health, education, sanitation, and water would be reconstructed and made efficient and responsive to the needs of the communities through active participation in planning

and implementation; pursuance of a strong, diversified and competitive economy to effectively cope with the challenges of development and to adapt to changing market conditions, in the country, region and global. Implementation of the appropriate macro-economic policy to ensure financial stability and sustainable external accounts and low inflation would be mandatory to attract investments.

Committee on Regional and International Relations

The outcome of the above committee's deliberations focused on three dimensions of regional, and international relations of Somalia post war reconstruction, and peaceful reconciliation. The committee however proposed a number of recommendations as follows;

First, that of regional security and international terrorism. It was recommended that regional security measure to be undertaken by Somalia and the neighbouring governments. This would be done through the promotion of inter-state dialogue, resolve inter-state disputes and joint security implementation.

The second dimension of Somalia's regional and international committee would deal with regional integration, cooperation and cross-border trade and outlined mechanisms for combating illicit trade across the borders. Law empowerment, creation of an independent authority with full accreditation in the execution of all duties in line with the combat of illicit cross boarder trade, were the proposed mechanisms.

Also to be considered was the establishment of Somalia diplomatic service, which would be poised to facilitate Somalia's post-war regional and international relations.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Regional and International Relations Committee Draft Dated March 2003.

Committee on Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

Conflict resolution and reconciliation committee was mandated to pursue clan, regional and leadership reconciliation with priority to the resolution of conflicts that inhibited the re-establishment of state structures, including those conflicts in areas like; Mogadishu, Puntland, Bay/Bakol Juba valley and others. The Conflict resolution and reconciliation committee was supported by a committee of elders identified in the final list of civil society participants while the Technical Committee identified others. The committee and elders worked in consultation with the relevant leaders' committees to undertake dispute resolutions at the political level.

After close consultations and evaluation of the causes of the conflicts in Somalia, a number of proposals and general guidelines were recommended to restore trust and prevent future conflicts. The following were considered most crucial;

First, confidence building measures to restore trust of the parties involved in the conflict was considered crucial since it would be employed as long term interactive process and as an educative and awareness promotion tool. Second, improvement of the resource of rural, pastoral and farming communities and ensure their participation in decision-making process in order to reduce rural urban migration and resource based conflicts. Third, involvement of the traditional clan leaders, religious leaders, women groups and civil society to play leading roles in post-conflict peace building, finally, seeking international community funding for reconstruction and economic recovery.

The above six committees had the following common characteristics:

Somali participants constituted the committees. Experts facilitated each committee and delivered lectures on key issues and prepared discussion documents. Experts had the

right to consult with the technical committee and leaders. International observers were allowed in sessions of the committees. National resource persons from Kenya had to give support where never required.

Existing Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution

Traditional, religious and dialogue have essentially formed the basis for conflict resolution for the last twelve years since the central and institutional state structures in Somali became dysfunctional as a result of civil wars. The traditional methods basically are the strong extended family and clan based ties. The family and clan dynamism dictate that certain procedures and rules are followed strictly. The adherence to these norms is observed through traditional rites and ceremonies during which the family and clan elders have the occasion to give rules and guidance to the members. Offences and wrongs committed by any member is punishable with the payment and observance of the *dia* and *xeer*.¹⁰⁴ The obedience to family and clan regulations however continued to heighten war and animosity among the Somalis. This is due to the fact that the clan system in Somalia is very discriminative among the numerous exiting clans. Elsewhere the clan system is a unifying factor while ethnicity and racial are the discriminatory and dividing factors.

Religiously the majority of the Somalis are Muslims. The Islamic Sharia (law) is introduced and taught in madarasi (schools) and mosques. This means that the law is homegrown since it starts in early years of a child and continues to be repeated whenever prayers are observed. The Mosques have been commended for social and domestic control in the large Somali community¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁴ Committee six, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Report dated march 2003. Unpublished. Sec. 11, page 47.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Dialogue has basically been the work of the civic societies, NGOs, Inter-governmental Organizations and states and governments offering their free hand and good offices help alleviate the escalating fights. The dialogue had always been directed to faction leaders to try and show the sense in ending the war by encouraging them that living in a peaceful environment is more rewarding than living and operating in the midst of the artilleries. Through dialogue various peace initiatives had been organized and humanitarian assistance had been provided to the injured, the sick and the helpless Somali civilians¹⁰⁶.

Relocation of the Peace Process from Eldoret to Mbagathi (Nairobi)

The conclusion of the Phase Two peace process came up with numerous changes. First there was the postponement of the process due to eminent general elections in Kenya, on 26th-31st / December/ 2002. The outcome of the general elections witnessed the end of the 24 year regime of Daniel Arap Moi and Kanu as a party that had been entrusted with the chairmanship of the negotiations. The IGAD Foreign Affairs Ministerial committee headed by Marsden Madoka the minister in the Moi government also lost in the general elections. The NARC government under President Mwai Kibaki that took over power in the dawn of January/ 2003 had to reorganize itself and set strategies for take over and control. The changes that came up against the peace process included the change of venue and leadership of the Somali National Reconciliation Process.

Whereas Elijah Mwangale had been the Eldoret Technical committee coordinator serving in the Moi government, Bethuel Kiplagat took over as a NARC

¹⁰⁶ ibid

appointee to head the peace process. The venue became Kenya College of Communications Technology (KCCT) at Mbagathi. The change of the peace process leadership may have been political and technical due to the fact that Elijah Mwangale was only a politician and at best had been in the chairmanship of various agricultural state corporations long after he fell from ministerial posts.

The alleged reasons for the change of the venue as stated by Bethuel Kiplagat included high costs levied to the convener of the conference that was Igad and partners. The hotel charges at Eldoret, a country hotel in the agricultural region in the North –Rift Valley of Kenya short up and levied exceptionally high fee for services, one, due to the fact that the hotel owners feared the Somali conducts with the facilities, and two due to the fact that IGAD a regional body and International organizations had for once offered an opportunity for rip –over.

The high turn-over of the participants that went into excess due to gate-crushing shot from four hundred invited guests to well over one thousand. This ultimately exerted pressure on finances. The budget got blown out of its ceiling and left the organizers with huge bills of over Ksh 400,000 (\$ 5 million). These expenses and uncooperativeness by the hotel owners to continue offering services became the push factor.¹⁰⁷

The second reason for change was attributed to coordination. The fact that the venue had initially been identified as being the ideal one for inaccessibility to inciters it proved to be inaccessible to even state agents and other instrumental role players to reach and solve urgent issues. The working facilities were all to be ferried from Nairobi, an issue that the operating secretariat could not cope with. Communication

¹⁰⁷ Kiplagat Bethuel; *The East African*, February 2003, An interview with Cathy Majtenyi

facilities between Nairobi to Eldoret and the rest of the world proved slow and ineffective almost leading to jeopardy of the peace process.¹⁰⁸

Phase Three of the Peace Process

This was to be the election phase where 351 members of parliament were to vote for their president, who would then nominate the prime minister who would in turn nominate three deputy prime ministers with whom they were to form the government to be endorsed by the president. The government formed in Mbagathi referred to as the government in exile was to stay behind for about two weeks during which time the UN, and AU troops would be sent to Somalia to disarm the combatants and provide security for the incoming government¹⁰⁹.

Views Collected from Various Personalities on The 12-Year Somalia Conflict and National Reconciliation Peace Process

Introduction

A field study to the venue of the peace process at Mbagathi was conducted with interviews on various personalities. Various forms of interviews were applied which depended on the interviewees' convenience. But because the majority preferred face to face discussion as issues arose, a descriptive, consultative and friendly discussion type of interview dominated the whole exercise. The Mbagathi was a press free zone so anybody collecting views had to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the information was pure academic and to the benefit of future resolutions.

The whole interview exercise came up with various categories of respondents ranging from; one, State representatives; these were the key actors who determined the

¹⁰⁸ Source. Respondent at the Mbagathi Training school- Nairobi.

¹⁰⁹ ibid

success or failure of the whole exercise. They included ministries of Foreign Affairs of the frontline states, warlords representing their own parties with potentials and aspirations of heading the Somali government one day once formed, and military advisors.

The other categories were those that constituted the international organizations, and the Somali nationals from the Diaspora (intellectuals and traders), civic society leaders, and clan elders. Professionals with diplomatic background were the fourth category while the members of the public with interests in the Somali peace process formed the fifth and last category. Views collected were analyzed according to its category while those with similar general consensus were generally analyzed.

Category 1 Respondents: (State Representatives)

In this category various representatives from frontline States steering the Somalia peace process at the Mbagathi and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya were interviewed while observations in state involvement varied as follows;

A senior retired Kenyan Major and Ambassador heading Immobilization and Disarmament Committee had this to comment concerning Kenya's stand on the conflicts in the Horn: "They should be resolved quickly and permanently". On the same note a senior IGAD/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kenya) official had this to say on his country's stand: "There should be good neighbourliness, peace and security within the horn".

On Diplomatic stand and elements associated with the on going exercise Major Rt. Musomba said that the process was mainly a diplomatic event since it was headed and supported by diplomats like Bethwel Kiplagat a renowned retired Kenyan diplomat who had in the past been actively involved in previous peace initiatives like

Mozambique between Renamo and Frelimo in the 1980's in Nairobi which was the initiative and lead of the priests of San Egidio Order from Italy that among others earned Kiplagat enormous experience to deal with such protracted conflicts. Among other diplomatic dignitaries included Ambassador Lesunye (Kenya), Ambassadors Ismael (Djibouti), Shawvel Dip (Ethiopia), and Musomba himself (Kenya).

In agreement, Mr James Kiboi of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kenya) and IGAD Secretariat head concurred with this by the fact that IGAD had a group of International partners known as IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) who were represented by different Diplomatic Missions and International Organizations who were also principal Financiers of the Process.

Musomba while observing that approaches that had been applied previously to Somali conflicts that ended up in long periods of negotiations and mediations as means of ending conflicts were frustrating, protracted, time consuming on understanding of the 12 years of conflict existence and 13 unsuccessful initiatives. Kiboi took a different and explained that, "Time and patience is, however, a requirement for the on going process to produce a legitimate result" The difference in perception was attributed to the background of the two; whereby Musomba a major in the army may sought to quick fix techniques of a true realist, Kiboi himself as a career diplomat banks in patience and time to attain his goals.

It was observed that the failure of the previous initiatives was as a result of poor planning which should have been all-inclusive like the on going one which first reconciled the frontline states themselves which for the on going 14th initiative have developed a common approach which is the same with the faction groups themselves.

Kenya's Diplomatic relations with Somalia have been cordial and hence the choice for Kenya as a host for the on going process. This was in agreement with all the

respondents including various faction leaders like Mowlid Maa'n Mohamoud – Chairman Somalia African Muki Organization (SAMO) who previously worked as Chief cabinet officer among others in the Siad Barre government. Another interviewed leader was Hassan Mohammed Noor popularly known as *Shati Gurut* meaning Red shirt, and head of Rahuen Resistance Army (RRA). The two faction leaders concurred with each other as being ready if elected presidents of Somalia of forging and developing a cordial diplomatic relations and continue working with world communities.

The position of Kenya in regard to conflicts in Somalia has been that of neutrality, does not support any faction leaders despite the adverse effects the conflicts have caused Kenya's economy through refugees, illicit trafficking of weapons and total insecurity. The main objective as regard to this is to see a united, peaceful and reconstituted Somalia. It was agreed variously on the period of Kenya's involvement in this process, which at the time was estimated as being between 9-10 months since inception in 15th Nov 2002 as an Igad directive. Kenya has previously been involved in several country initiatives like Sudan also going on in Machakos referred to as the Machakos Peace Protocol headed by Rtd Major Sumbeiywo. Others before these were Mozambique and Uganda among others.

On the issue of interests, it was agreed that various actors represented various interests while there were those who are genuine and wanting to see Somalia reconstituted, those who wish to position their friends to power, and those who wanted to steal the sweet victory of the process which is seen to succeed.¹¹⁰

Others observed that the interests are as a result of history e.g. Ethiopia historically over the Ogaden war wished to see a fallen Somalia; Djibouti's interests

¹¹⁰ Source at Mbagathi

are more of religious affiliation just like other Muslim states are genuinely in support of Somalia as an Islamic nation which more seriously is to strengthen and build an Islamic country.

The interest of Kenya is to see an end to conflict is due to the spillover problems. Especially those that are negative have led to the delay and sometimes threaten to collapse the conference. It was recommended that the peace process might continue for sometime translating itself to the processes as before, during and after to ensure a total resolution including evaluations.

Category 2 Views: (International Organizations)

Led by IGAD, a regional intergovernmental organization whose initiative by its member of heads of states' and government Summit in Khartoum in January 2002 commissioned this process and directed the Frontline States to coordinate its implementation process. The various International, regional and local organizations involved at the peace process in one way or the other included the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, the European union, Life and Peace Institute, a media and Cultural Organization among others all of which were referred to as IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).

Representatives of these organizations gave various reasons for their participation in the peace process. For instance, a respondent from the media and cultural organization explained their presence at the conference in terms of being there to inform the Somalia people back at home and the international community about the peace and reconciliation efforts with a view to empowering the electorate to bring positive influence into the ongoing talks and to impress upon the international community about the importance of the initiative. The organization in their various

forums hosts other local and international media, members of the Diplomatic corps, and partner states among others.

Respondent from an organization called Novib-Somali explained that the existing mechanisms for establishing peace in the war torn Somali included dialogue, debates, traditions, religion, education, consultation, and consensus building.

Most organizations agreed that their involvement in state matters is as a result of their involvement in their organizational development and issues, which are only possible if there is peace and stability in that particular environment. Asked what he understood by diplomatic conduct, Wanditi from Novib had this to say; “The organizational understanding of diplomatic conduct is the international law requirement of pursuance of peaceful means to the resolutions of conflicts through mediation”, He went a head to explain that the preferable processes and conditions in organizational conflict resolutions included consultative, open discussions, clear timetable and inviolable principles. As for the nature of the Somali National Peace process; he said it was diplomatic as it involved frontline states’ committee of diplomats and due to the mediation type involving several factions groups and many states. Like Kiboi, Wanditi observed that time is the main factor in the achievement of peace, which called for an element of patience. That however conduct of diplomacy can be construed as external interest, which is sensitive when looked from the sovereignty point of view.

Category 3: (Somalia Nationals at Mbagathi)

The nationals of the Somali origin at the Peace talks at Mbagathi during this interview included the main actors- the warlords and faction leaders, clan elders, civil society representatives, women leaders, youth leaders and religious leaders.

Those interviewed all felt that the conflicts in the Horn had a negative impact within the region generally. In regard to Somalia they felt that the situation demonstrated to the world that people (Somalis) could exist for more than a decade without a central government and the conflicts have caused the Somalis a delay in development from the rest of the world, observed Abdirizak Dirie, a twenty-nine year Somalia youth leader. This kind of remark could mean that the Somali conflicts have become part and parcel of their lives that can be interpreted to mean a remark out of ignorance, or an achievement due to benefits earned as long as they remained in war.

On the issue of the previous peace initiatives the interviewee concurred that thirteen of them had failed but Arta partially succeeded to form the interim government, while Arta's shortcomings were lack of inclusiveness of all the warring factions and Somali civil societies that rendered it ineffective. They alleged that Arta's or TNG's ineffectiveness was due to commitment to external recognition while ignoring the local factions. Arta also did not focus on disarmament, remarked Mohamed Aden.

"The main approaches for ending conflicts in Somalia are the involvement of the international community and the enforcement of peace". The respondents were unanimously happy with the conference due to its inclusiveness and methodology applied in the approach. In his understanding of diplomacy, Aden felt it is a peaceful way of achieving a political objective and in the conference there was an element of diplomacy that needed to be used effectively.

Category 4: (Professionals with International Relations and Diplomacy Background)

In this category, professionals were consulted and interviewed using questionnaires that they administered personally. In response to the question to extent

to which diplomacy had been applied at the SNRP in Mbagathi it was expressed that in most times Shuttle Diplomacy had been applied to overcome the deadlocks and a few of the difficulties experienced during the conference had to be overcome by "coercive diplomacy" The issue of shuttle diplomacy precisely explained the extent to which the peace process was mainly a states affair. Shuttling in by Foreign Affairs ministers of the frontline states showed the extent to which at the higher level of coordination the peace process was essentially the task of the IGAD member states foreign ministers.

As advice to policy makers and coordinators of peace forums, Ochieng Bernard, a political and diplomatic liaison officer at the IGAD secretariat at Mbagathi expressed that peaceful methods to conflict resolutions is the main approach to ending conflicts but any other means like use of force which have been applied in the past would not ensure peace in Somali.

It was further observed that conflict resolution fora require a well-planned approach and not to leave the warring parties to resolve their disputes by themselves, but through a unified diplomatic pressure. "Alongside this, a proper research is mandatory to establish the cause of the conflict and factors that are at stake", expressed Mohammed Ibrahim, a Somalia national living and working with the UN in another country but a participant and observer of the peace process.

When asked if there was any preferred means of achieving peace if the diplomatic one failed; this was the feeling that, "combined effort was mandatory for the purpose of installation and establishment of a symbol of a government, be it a peaceful or forceful one as long as a system of governance is instituted in Somalia since the Somalis have for over a decade failed to achieve their own peace. Moreover, Somalia lacks resources and structures to jump- start a young government".

The effectiveness and application of diplomacy in the SNRP was not an openly applied one but in the real sense it mainly served as a mechanism to support the negotiation. In advise to future researchers of this nature it was felt that there is need to establish a “linkage between diplomacy and conflict” in terms of conflict resolutions, remarked Ochieng, while Mohamed Ibrahim felt that there should be consistence in planning and a sense of vision in diplomatic actors as a back up for various peace initiatives and conferences.

Category 5: (Members of the Public with Interest In The Peace Process)

Among the respondents, a senior university lecturer in the Department of Design and Architecture expressed sympathy for the Somali nationals for what they have gone through in the last decade. He felt that Kenyans should cope and encourage for the establishment of peace.

Concluding remarks it was observed that Somalis were tired and ready for peace given what they had gone through and comments gathered about the Kenyan delegation to the conference had been seen as the most tremendous one, sacrificial and had proven that diplomacy and negotiation including compromise could ensure success in a peace process.

CHAPTER SIX

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF ACTORS AND PROCESSES IN THE CONDUCT OF DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: 2002-2003.

Introduction

This chapter will analyze critically the role of actors and processes in the conduct of diplomacy in Somalia National Reconciliation Process in Kenya that first was based at Eldoret and later moved to Mbagathi Communication College, Nairobi. The scope of the analysis will include the role of the actors and processes from January 2002 –2003 at the Mbagathi conference. This chapter will be divided into four sections. Section one will analyze critically the actors involved directly or through representatives in deliberations of the SNRP, their interests both positive and negative with focused aim to establish whether the long protracted and frustrating efforts of the previous thirteen Peace Initiatives were as a result of negativity or positive interests. To some extent, these interests will form the basis of prediction as to whether the Mbagathi Peace Process will go through its phase two which was already slowing down during the finalization of this research in July 2003 as a result of disagreement over the Federal Charter after which Phase three would start culminating to elections and formation of the Federal Government.

Section two will examine critically the processes and procedures applied during the peace talks and their conformity to the theories of these processes.

Part three will examine the extent to which the process was handled in conformity with the Main Theoretical Framework of this study (problem solving approach)

Part four, which is the final section, will establish whether the findings are in conformity with the hypotheses of this study.

The Actors: Who Were They?

The magnitude of actors at the Somalia National Reconciliation Peace Process was enormous. Every party present ranging from states, international and regional organizations to local institutions to individuals concerted themselves very well as interested parties with one big difference on whom was who?

In Chapter One, actors are categorized as large and small but intimately interwoven with the decisions of the governments.¹¹¹ Large actors in this case are those described as with the muscle to bear meaning those who determine decisions which are related to financial support and political approach.

In this case the actors ranged from states, specifically Frontline States made of Kenya (host), Djibouti (immediate former mediator for ARTA in 2000), and Ethiopia. In international relations states are regarded as the principal actors. The main actors in this case; Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia had been sanctioned by the regional body (IGAD) which is the regional body performing the duties of states acquire legal personality to act on international Platform. Nevertheless other actors included, The United Nations, IGAD, the Arab League, African Union (AU), and European Union (EU), local organizations like Life and Peace Institute and Novib- Somalia.

¹¹¹ Joshua Goldstein- IR 6th Ed.

Individual actors have constituted the diplomats who at the same time served as agents of states. These actors entirely depended on decisions of states and international organizations like the UN and EU. The principal actors consent and finance while the agents (individuals) implement.

What Were the Roles and Interests of Various Actors?

As far as the SNRP is concerned, the various roles of the Frontline States as commissioned by IGAD were to coordinate¹¹² their efforts for the national reconciliation of Somalia. In law the role of the state is to provide security for its citizens and safeguard its territories. This role ties with interests in which case the interests of Kenya especially was to safeguard the security of her nationals which is becoming increasingly threatened as the situation in Somalia remains volatile. It was claimed that the interests of Djibouti were to safeguard the Islamic law by virtue of being a Muslim state. Views from other respondents claimed that the interests of Ethiopia were to derail the peace¹¹³ process. Historically Somalia and Ethiopia have had conflicts since the Ogaden border war of 1978 between Somalia and Ethiopia in which Ethiopia suffered heavy losses.

The role and interests of the UN is obviously that of overseeing peaceful resolution of disputes as stipulated in its charter. The EU, the IGAD, other organizations and individuals were involved due to one reason or the other, as argued by Mwangi on motives for third party involvement as being altruistic and for what they can gain from their involvement as third parties which is true for both the individuals and institutions that engage in conflict management¹¹⁴

¹¹² IGAD News: Bi-monthly March-April 2002.

¹¹³ Raw questionnaires and Chap.5 of this study.

¹¹⁴ Mwangi: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management- Water mark Pub. 2002 Pg.55.

Mwagiru goes on to argue that motives define the roles that third parties choose to play. And they will choose to play those roles that enable them to reap the rewards that they expect to reap as third parties. Those roles define the strategies adopted. Furthermore, motivation of states includes maintenance of balance of power in international or regional relations.¹¹⁵

What was conspicuously missing at the SNRP was the role of the church. Unlike other African countries like Mozambique whose mediation was mainly coordinated by the church that sensitized¹¹⁶ states, the SNRP operated a mid states', regional and international organizations, and partly on Islamic norms given Somalia is an Islamic state.

The Warlords

Warlords acted on double standards as the individual actors,¹¹⁷ and leaders of groups or parties they variously represented to the conflict. In the categories of actors; individuals, terrorist groups, organizations and states are ranked in that order from bottom up approach. In essence the warlords qualify as individuals and terrorist actors since their actions and conduct kept on to influence the decisions and policies internationally. These international entities legally recognized as actors is also due to their performance significantly and continuous functions impacting on the inter-state relations, their actions by holding onto war and facilitating insecurity in their own country has led to foreign policy of caution towards Somalia.

Somalia was declared as a haven of all illegal deeds and terrorism and therefore leading to the neighbouring states and elsewhere to be cautious on dealings

¹¹⁵ Ibid Pg. 56 Par.3

¹¹⁶ Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique; Alex Vines, 1996 Pg.120

¹¹⁷ Chapter 5 of this study

with Somalia. Thus policies of avoidance and closure of borders is the case easily effected. The most notable interests of the warlords as actors at the SNRP were struggle for leadership. Each warlord attempted to be elected federal head of Somalia. Acting behind the warlords are other interested parties also with their own interests due to the roles they have played in support of the warlords to keep the fight and struggle to attain the leadership posts. These, according to Mwangiri, are constituents (people to whom warlords are answerable), the audience (other states, NGO's, IO's and media) and allies and patrons (supporters and financiers).¹¹⁸

The Processes

Mediation and negotiation are the main tools of diplomacy. These two processes i.e. mediation and negotiation featured prominently at the Mbagathi conference that was viewed as the driving and sustaining force within. The two processes would operate interchangeably as much as the main process was mediation due to the element of third party present but at times negotiations was necessary just like the popular Camp David style of 1997 when Jimmy Carter in 1997 dealt with Egyptian and Israel leaders separately whenever they refused to meet¹¹⁹

Bethwel Kiplagat chaired the SNRP conference and played the Camp David role at times negotiating with Somalia Party leaders to ensure that the deliberations of the peace process don't stall. The whole issue becomes very complicated as the third party also becomes an interested party. It is summarily observed that mediation being complex, it demands intellect, time and patience. Successful application of it would also require experience, professionalism and judgment of the sort all international

¹¹⁸ Ibid- Mwangiri, Pg.49-50.

¹¹⁹ Diplomacy Part: The Concepts, Actors, Organisations, Rules and Processes
Kapeller, Mwangiri & Odera- IDIS Library- Unpublished Pg. 107.

actors possess.¹²⁰ The choice of leadership at Mbagathi after dropping Elijah Mwangale opting for Kiplagat may have been based on this analogy but immediate reason was political since President Kibaki had to replace Moi's appointees.

The day-to-day processes and procedures included those of choice of venues, setting of the agenda and general observation of the conference rules. These pertained to who contributed what (committees), participation and respect of the choice of participants. In observation, mediation as a process was carried out in conformity with mediation theories and requirements taking into consideration issues like making contacts with parties and gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, choosing meeting site, control pace and formality of meetings. Mediation theory also takes into consideration the control of physical environment, identification of issues and interests, avoidance of taking sides and helping to devise framework for acceptable outcome among others. In summary, these are categorized as being communication and facilitation strategies, formulation strategies and manipulation strategies.¹²¹

Conformity to the Theoretical Framework

Problem-solving approach as the theory that was applied in this study featured prominently throughout the whole research process.

On the question of who conducts problem-solving exercises and where, the choice of participants (e.g. diplomats, academicians, voluntary civil society groups and other services) fitted what it requires to handle an analytical problem-solving workshop like that at Mbagathi. The alternative second choice a campus- Mbagathi Communication College (KCCT) was also ideal for discussion of hostile

¹²⁰ Bercovitch & Rubin (Editors): *Mediation in International Relations; multiple approaches to Conflict Management*: 1992- Macmillan Press Ltd. 1992 Pg.10

¹²¹ *Ibid* -Pg.17

relationships.¹²² The analytical approach was the first step which started by the setting of the technical committee that went to the ground (centre of conflict) to establish the truth of the matter as to how to address the conflict; quickly, decisively and be resolved once and for all. The analysis also included examining the degree of severe relationship among the conflict parties, who were spoken to and convinced that the deliberations had to take place to their own advantage and that of the entire Somali community.

Back to Eldoret, thorough analysis of the situation and history as to the origins of the conflicts took place. Hence the establishment of the six committees (refer to chapter 5). The committees continued operating independently according to the task accorded to them; to analyze the issues and come up with resolutions.

Principles of the problem solving require that a complete service should be envisaged, enabling parties in violent conflicts to find their way towards a solution with its procedures specifying that representatives of the parties in dispute meet in the presence of a panel of “consultants” who facilitated the exchange to which the technical committee quite well fulfilled. The competence and qualification of the consultants in relevant disciplines and practical experience guided the choice of the consultants.

The objective of the workshop was to analyze the conflict in all aspects that the party representatives deemed relevant and examination of the options for moving the conflict towards an acceptable solution.

The whole model of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process took the Model of Problem-Solving approach following the steps stipulated in Chapter 5. Thus

¹²² Mitchell & Michael Banks: Handbook of Conflict Resolutions, The analytical Problem-solving approach.

approaching the parties, initial talks with party representatives, the organizational background as financial support, setting of the workshop, assembling of the panel, re-analyses of the available information (committee tasks), preliminary preparations and deliberations which would continually be analyzed, were all considered.

Controlling the Process

In dealing with a protracted and deep-rooted conflict the SNRP emphasized maintenance of overall control over the process. It becomes the third party's responsibility and any blame for failure of the process rests with the third party. The control of the process involved being clear about what was and what was not left in the hands of the parties. What was not left to the party decision-makers is the determination of who could and who could not attend the workshops.

The whole workshop exercise was manned by background of considerable and large administrative support, coupled with adequate funds and experts managers. Alongside this, communication facilities in form of telegrams, Internet and telephones were efficiently catered for to ensure smooth running of the exercise.

Characteristics of Arta That Made It Different From SNRP

From the onset Arta initiative was a single man game, the idiosyncrasy-decision making tendencies that characterize most world leaders. In this process that president Gelle of Djibouti single handedly initiated a peace process and only appealed to the IGAD member states to join him. Gelle in his worthy course failed to recognize the strength of collective responsibility in addressing a difficult and protracted Somalia conflict and given the fact that twice Djibouti had blocked for peace in Somalia and failed.

The composition of the participants at the Arta peace process was basically intellectuals, civic societies, traditional clan leaders, community elders and prominent

political figures from the previous governments. This was a conspicuous miscalculation by lifting men and women of no consequences while the warlords with all the capability of welding machines and in control of all the strategic positions were denied a chance. This however led to the resistance and confinement of the Arta government later on to within Mogadishu environs.

The time and resources committed to Arta were very minimal, considering the peace commencement period of between May – September 2002. A typical of political block rage characterized by impatience, and dominance. This was a political quick-fix approach that ends up into settlement of conflicts that usually erupt at the opportune time when the dominated party finds strengths to challenge decisions reached earlier.

Strengths and Activities of the Somalis in the Diaspora:

It was established that while ordinary Somalis languished in poverty, hunger, and ailments due to lack of structures, there existed a crop of other Somalis living in all corners of the world controlling huge stocks of wealth ranging from heavy commercial vehicles, to communication channels of waterways in the sea routes and the most modern and sophisticated telephone equipments. So far Somalia is one of the leading countries best served with mobile networks. This is facilitated by lack of control to external investors, need to communicate to fellow Somalis all over the world and facilitation to merchandise deliveries. Merchants of all sorts, like those dealing with arms, drugs and other businesses favorable to lawless societies have found their entries into Somalia.

Quick deals like machine holders finalize business contracts, port controllers and widely traveled and correctly connected Somalis. Besides finalizing contracts, these people are mostly associated with support and financing of the continued wars. At the Mbagathi conference suspiciously looking tycoon's agents played the intelligence

secretive reporting services. While the average and field marshal warlords lived within the conference hostels, their financiers living in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi where they run tracks of lorries, transport buses, lodgings and restaurants to skyscraper buildings kept advising the warlords on what decisions to make, what to accept and reject depending on how well it served their particular interests.

The intellectual Somalis from the rest of the world came in as observers. Some of the legally resettled elsewhere were represented as well. This loyalty to home, mobility from one corner of the world to other has resulted to multi-citizenship among the Somalis. Hardly can Kenyan government and others can establish the origin and destinations of various Somalis. Duplication of names and similar looks either caused from within proximity marriages architected by the family and clan ties. It was surprising to hear that peace observations and attendance to initiative conferences had become a hobby and career of most Somalis. This was largely due to enumerations from the sponsors and good treatment accorded to peace blockers in some international fora. To these, quick conclusion of processes would mean loss of livelihood.

Conformity to the Hypotheses

Three hypotheses were stated in chapter one. In this section we make reference to those hypotheses given our understanding of the role of actor in the SNRP.sand

The study findings comprised of all the above ingredients which stood the true test that the main objective of any state in its relations with other states is to direct and influence these relations for its maximum advantage and if self-interest. The state in this case has the responsibility of formulating its policies towards other states and managing its relations in the interests of world harmony, thus helping to prevent wars and the waste of wealth. It emerged as usual that the talk of formulation of foreign

policy is one of the aspects of national politics and is the task of politicians, while the management of international relations and the reconciliation of diverse foreign policy priorities is the task of the diplomat. At the Khartoum Summit of 9th January 2002, it was decided by heads of states and implemented by ministers of foreign affairs of the Frontline States. Diplomacy assumed its role in SNRP mainly in communication of thoughts and ideas between the governments of states and to some extent, international organizations. Playing the role of spokesmen of their respective heads of states dominated much of the deliberations sometimes directly or indirectly through consultations. The presence of ambassadors from Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya demonstrated the great height of track-one diplomacy at its best taking the lead and determining what issues concerning their respective states must be handled, meaning priority one defense of their national interests abroad and within.

An ambassador rarely works on his own, but as the head of the diplomatic mission working as a team, providing the basic and all-important link between government and government or between government and international organizations. At Mbagathi most issues were centered on the consent and approval of Ambassador Kiplagat as the head of the mission for this case and others from other Frontline States formed part of this working team.

The degree to which Ambassador Kiplagat (and his team) matched the seven qualities of a diplomat as stipulated by Nicolson according to Ottaviano Maggini in Coulombis¹²³ as being truthfulness, precision, calmness, good temper, patience, modesty and loyalty. Nicolson observed that truthfulness is essential because it contributes to good reputation, which enhances an ambassador's long-range credibility and subsequent effectiveness.

¹²³ Chapter 3 of this study- Profiles of the effective diplomats.

The negative aspects of diplomacy are alleged as being slow, full of processes and protocols such that decisions cannot be made without consultations. Diplomats have been referred to as gardeners and not engineers meaning they do not initiate issues by themselves. Diplomacy has been in existence but has not been able to arrest and contain violence. A respondent remarked that application of diplomacy with mean motives might lead to stagnation of the peace process.

Historically, where diplomacy had been applied, situations were always contained.

Given the qualities and professional tact of a diplomat, states can be misled to make wrong decisions.

Diplomacy is a fact in religious circles of patience and persuasions to tame the minds of the followers. As in the Old Testament angels were regarded as being God's diplomats. Tactful and skilled to communicate effectively for their sender and thus they played the role of agents and God the actor¹²⁴. Rulers and sovereigns were believed to be God chosen which formed the basis as to how they were next to interact through diplomats in situations of persuasion. States from time immemorial have engaged in the practice of diplomacy. Starting with the Greek city-states and later Italian city-states that practically practiced diplomacy as a means of restoring relations already severed by wars.

The qualities and principles of diplomacy of being an application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states by use of the powerful instruments of negotiation, and mediation to bridge the gaps whenever communication broke down as a result of conflicts, was clearly demonstrated and applied throughout at the SNRP.

¹²⁴ Agum.A. ; Language and Diplomacy. Dissertation submitted to IDIS (UON) 2001 Unpublished.

African traditional settings practiced a form of diplomacy in order to open closed systems like bridges while crossing to distant destinations among traders. Broken relations among the communities of the Somalia, diplomacy of livestock exchange in form of payment; a ritual popularly known as 'dia' was highly practiced to amend the severed relations.

A diplomat is described variously as somebody who must possess qualities such as intelligence, imagination, knowledge, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry and tact. This is the conviction of Nicolo Machiavelli and in reference to chapter two of this document, three notable leaders of the 19th century to practice the above qualities to sustain peace and expansion of their empires were the Mahdi of Sudan, Menelik of Ethiopia and Sayyed Mohammed of Somalia. It is believed that the Horn has not witnessed peace ever since the reign of the above respected rulers.

The geographical existence and placing of the River Nile had also been a source of diplomatic practice within the region between the governments of Sudan and Egypt since it forms the basis of the livelihood through agricultural and transport usage of the Nile waters.

Tracks of Diplomacy used in the Mediation Process

Generally in conflict management, there are two types of conflict management approaches. Track one is the type of conflict management approaches practiced by states and international organizations, while track two is the one used by non-state actors such as private individuals and religious organizations. Track one is featured by official rules of conduct observed in formal structures while track two-conflict management is characterized by informality because of lack of ceremonial arrangements.

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The mediation of the Somali conflict by the Frontline States was performed within the principles of track one management approach. Several factors attest to this. These included the officials involved in the mediation, the question of power basis, time pressures and pressure of constituents.

The issue of power basis was clearly manifested in the clan sharing of the parliamentary seats and the election of the president. Since track one approach are based on bargaining, most of the discussions centered on interests such as how many posts each clan would take and who would fill the key posts.

Diplomacy: A Synthesis of Problem- Solving, Realism and Idealism Approaches

In summary, it appears that the major functions of diplomacy have been to establish and to maintain communications and to negotiate and bargain for tolerable agreements and other arrangements between sovereign centers of decision making in the international system. This system, as pointed out throughout this study, is a political system on primitive form. In contrast, the process of government within well-developed nation-states is highly institutionalized and rule bound. Intergovernmental disagreements are therefore quite likely to be settled effectively and conclusively by legitimate high-level political and judicial organs. For example, in the Watergate affair in the United States, deep divisions and fundamental disputes between the chief executive (Richard Nixon) on the one hand and significant congressional groups, the press, and the public on the other hand had reached explosive proportions. The dispute was eventually resolved by a mix of the executive, legislative, and judicial process involving the U.S. Supreme Court and the relevant lower courts, congressional

investigating and impeachment committees, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor (part of the Department of Justice).

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one's point of view, major disputes among nation-states can be settled only by diplomacy, an admittedly primitive political process relying on mixtures of threats and persuasion during negotiations and war. Diplomats perform the basic functions of regulation in the nearly archaic international system. Yet despite the primitiveness of this system, its agents (the diplomats of nation-states) are expected to abide by certain rules that promote the rational conduct of diplomacy. Hans Morgenthau has offered four such rules, which, in our view, help close the gap between ultra-realists and utopian idealists respectively.¹²⁵

First, diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit. Diplomats who act as crusaders for higher causes (whether these be moralistic, legalistic, or ideological) cease to be pragmatic and flexible and may impede the process of negotiation and lock themselves into belligerent and uncompromising stances. It is nearly impossible for crusaders and other fighters for "truth" to compromise their principles without seriously embarrassing themselves.

Second, the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest and must be supported with adequate power. This rule qualifies and clarifies the previous one. If the diplomats are to avoid the crusading stance, what are they to do? The answer is that whether or not they are involved in the formulation or the implementation of policy, they must present their positions on the basis of the national interests (strategic, economic, and political) of their countries and no more. They must, that is avoid acting sentimentally, promoting the interests of a third nation-state or

¹²⁵ Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace* 5th edition [New York; Knopf 1973]

group, being motivated by hatred or spite, and, finally, seeking to promote the interests of a particular pressure group within their own country. But defining objectives in terms of the national interest is not enough. One's diplomatic hand ought to be fortified with adequate power, which includes perhaps primarily military force and economic capability. To define national interests that are beyond one's country's power to achieve is to court either ridicule or defeat and destruction at the hands of more powerful opponents.

Third, diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations. Defining foreign -policy objectives in terms of one's own national interests is inadequate in diplomacy. Most of the time, one's interests can be served only at the expense of the interests of someone else. It is important, then, for prudent diplomats to develop a very good understanding of the interests and perceptions of foreign nation-states. The threat of war is magnified when conflicting and vital interests of two nation-states intersect. It is the task of diplomats to defuse such situations and to avoid war by using techniques of bargaining and compromise. To return briefly to an analogy, when rats are involved in disputes they settle them with fierce violence, for they can accept only victory or death. Mice, on the other hand, allow themselves a third alternative between total victory and total defeat-compromise. Diplomats, as a minimum, should emulate mice in this respect and avoid the behavior of rats.

Fourth, nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them. We must look at this rule with care, for much depends on what we mean by the word *vital*. For instance, we could arbitrarily call anything from defending one's territory and system of government to securing lucrative markets and military bases

abroad to continuing one's imperial and semi colonial presence in distant territories. To offer an example, the deposed (in 1974) Portuguese government of Marcello Caetano considered the maintenance of the status quo in Portugal's African colonies vital. It therefore fought a protracted ant guerrilla war in order to maintain Portuguese control over these colonies. The revolutionary regime that assumed power in April 1974 decided, in contrast, that this war was counterproductive, that the maintenance of colonial control in places such as Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique was anything but vital. This shift resulted in the granting of independence to the Portuguese colonies. Likewise, America's objectives and in South Vietnam were considered vital by the Johnson and early Nixon administrations, but not so vital in the later phase of the Nixon/ Kissinger/Ford policy calculations. So the question remains; who is going to define and interpret the word *vital* for us? A given government at a given time, wise men and women in academia, a computer (programmed by mortal human beings), or an abstract entity signifying the collective will and presumed to be public opinion?

We should also ponder the possible results of the use of Morgenthau's fourth rule by great powers confronting one another in nuclear era. If, say, the Soviet Union and the United States were to find themselves locked in acute controversy over what both perceive to be vital interests, according to our interpretation of this rule they *must not* compromise. If they do not compromise, they may escalate into war. A conventional war might escalate further into nuclear war, which might entail mutual suicide and destruction of our planet. We suggest, therefore, that Morgenthau's fourth rule be seriously reconsidered in this nuclear era. The option of "no compromise" might just be the luxury of a bygone era. After all, there is nothing more vital than life itself. In the end, it may take mutual compromise on vital issues to secure mutual survival. The

Frontline States this case define the situation in Somali as being vital to them due to the proximity and the continued inconveniences and disturbance caused by the crisis through refugees, unabated arms and drugs smuggling into their territories. While this happens to these states, others may define the situation as an opportunity to excel internationally as they sell their foreign policies. The US involvement in 1992-95 when leading the UNSOM forces was an indication of lack of vitality on the part of the Americans. Lack of caution in dealing with this situation led to disastrous encounter between the peacekeepers and the Somali militias forcing UNSOM to pull out of Somali without achieving any remarkable success.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The study analyzed and examined the Somalia conflict, which was characterized with long-standing extended family and clanism ties dating to the pre-colonial era. The clan factor among the Somalia people has given the region its unique global outlook though negative due to persistence and strong adherence to clan issues that divide them instead of forging a national unity that would possibly accord and provide them an international standing like other states.

The strong clan customs portray a picture of minimal exposure that would not qualify a nation and its people to compete favourably in the international realms in terms of trade, technology, and socio-cultural and even political. Technological advancement more especially in the 21st century has advanced to an extent of overlooking the national boundaries and hence the language of globalization -seeing the world as a global village. The concept of globalization takes notice of a globe as a nation leaving only one gap; that of centralizing the administration into choosing a global leader which is possible given the fact that the world nations currently operate in a unipolar system which became possible after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, marking the end of the cold war and hence the bi-polar system when the balance of power was shared between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Given the current world political trends especially those facilitated by George Bush Junior, which has no respect for other countries' national boundaries and sovereignty whereby a nation can be attacked and a puppet government installed by

force, an issue which totally violates the United Nations Charter of respect of national integrity of other nations. Somalia nationals seem to be holding unto nothing (clanisms) which don't reflect anywhere in the UN Charter, in international law; and more so will never be recognized in this era when trends are drawing one international boundary through technology that has led to high trades and businesses of politics, religions, social events that no longer seek consent, approval or clearances from government authorities. Thence electronic transfer of money and information in a flash of a second through the Internet highways. Somalia would just be part of the world trade partners, which is only possible with political stability and advanced technology by its nationals.

A loss in focus for over a decade has possibly led to economic, religious, educational, socio-cultural and total political decay not only to the sons and daughters of Somalia but to the rest of the world and especially the neighbouring states that wish to be part of that country in one way or the other. Instead the Somalia problems have only been problems of the global community in the sense that refugees to neighbouring countries pose an economic and security threat, as much as human lives previously devoted to Somalia Peace Processes through humanitarian and Peace Corps ended in Somalia while operating amidst fierce fighting among clan militants. The world resources in form of human resources and funds in the last twelve years did not yield any achievable objectives of restoring peace in Somalia.

The role of actors and processes examined in this study comprised of the states as principal actors, intergovernmental organizations (IO's), individual, parties of the faction groups in Somalia engaged in protracted fracas that saw Somalia torn and flattened by the groups in the last twelve years in pursuance of power. The processes examined were basically mediation and negotiation, the two of which are persuasive

diplomacy. Negotiations and mediations enable diplomacy as a discipline and profession to achieve its objectives of arriving at peaceful resolutions.

IGAD member states through the frontline states (Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia) came up with the strategy of handling the Somalia conflict once and for all to finally restore a central government in that country.

Through formation of committees comprised of technocrats by the ministries of Foreign Affairs of the frontline states, individuals of professional backgrounds ranging from members of diplomatic Corps, military based officers, international organizations specialized in peace resolutions and other areas of development like IGAD, EU, UN, Arab League among others were all committed in one way or another- by financing, overseeing and coordinating to the successful peace resolution in Somalia.

In mediation process, the strategy employed at the SNRP Eldoret/ Nairobi 2002/2003 was that of reconciling and mediating the frontline states themselves so that they could forge a common objective and hence the approach of inclusive reconciliation by bringing all the stake holders thence, the faction leaders (warlords), civic organizations, frontline states as principal mediators and the traditional clan elders. Views of all the above groups represent the views of the large Somalia nationals and other interested parties like nationals of neighbouring states.

It was also learnt that there had been previous peace initiatives, thirteen in number with Arta 2002, a Djibouti government initiative which partially achieved its objective by installing Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and Transitional National Government (TNG) which had however been limited within Mogadishu and had not been able to contain the war in the entire nation.

The mediators of the conflict, states and intergovernmental organizations operated the exercise alongside their national interests first and foremost then interests of conflicting parties came secondary. At this point the interplay of the realists and idealists agree whereby in the course of serving national interests, the spill off benefits are the benefits of those in conflict as passive members –the civilians who do not have any interests in conflicts but to see it end.

In the process of serving interests, parties also serve the interests of their constituents. Constituents to all the parties or actors include the actors and sponsors, the public who depend on this conflict resolutions in one way or the other. The media was part of the constituents, which depended on all the actors so that they could publish information that would have to be manipulated to suit the media interests of high sales. Enemies of Somalia also were constituents that wished the conflict to continue forever. This category depends on the warlords whom they wished to continue fighting and occasionally supported.

The arms dealers' control the huge money markets for supplying the warlords with fighting weapons and those that have been invented find their testing ground in the lawless society like Somalia.

The approach applied in the SNRP at the beginning of the discussion was very analytical. The scholarly approach to study that evaluated the historical basis of the conflict in Somalia, the trends and the proposal for solutions to the conflicts were all examined at the initial implementation stage in form of study committees.

The analytical approach that employed and formed six committees with scholarly and academic approach to discuss and analyze the key issues that would enable them to meet the objectives. The committees were conflict resolution

committee, the Federal Charter, the international relations, disarmament among others (refer to Chapter 5).

The entire discussion was in three phases where phase one was orientation and declaration, phase two committees and phase three elections leading to the formation of the federal government with resource and power sharing in the ratio of 4.5, which is a symbolic figure for various clans of Somalia. This is actually clan-based power sharing whereby the dominant clans of Hawiye and Darot have the majority shares and several minor clans would hold 5 shares. Discrimination based on clan superiority even at the time of this peace initiative featured prominently and one expects a future government that may be biased in composition.

It was evident that diplomacy was at its full play. Right from the formation of the technical committee. Individuals with diplomatic scholarly background were consulted and others committed in long discussions. Given that scholars do not usually have interests in power struggle and other resources, the composition of these personalities headed by Bethwel Kiplagat after the fallout of Elijah Mwangale a politician and obviously with no patience but employing quick-fix tact that made him unpopular to the participants. At this point track one diplomacy however led as states sanctioned diplomats hence Kiplagat (Kenya), the honourable chairman of the peace talks and Ismael of Djibouti as the spearheading team player of the process on the day-to-day businesses. All the interviewed participants and local dailies positively commended the personality and service of Bethwel Kiplagat.

Recommendations and Way Forward Towards the Development of A Possible Realist and Idealist Interplay

Nations while pursuing national interests will forever be encouraged to employ moderate approaches for this matter since extremist tends to isolate everybody other nations included. The radical approach of Somalia engaging in war has for a long time isolated it and kept others at a distance.

The social recommendation accorded this study given the findings is establishment of rehabilitation structures and programmes to help the Somalis accept, settle and develop their nation once peace is attained. The world communities in particular IGAD will have to go extra miles to solicit for funds for this worthy course. If anything there is need for continued application of diplomacy and remaining patient to fully attainment of these services.

The interplay of the two mother theories of International Relations whereby realist is extreme national interest that applies use of power while idealist propagating for the formation of social institutions with collective responsibility regardless of boundary and race. The interplay of the two will go a long way to develop a theory, which serves the interests of the nature of SNRP and all the actors/ stakeholders while problem- solving approach becomes the unifying factor of realist and idealist interplay.

I recommend that this research be advanced from where I have reached to establish the extent to which phase three of the Peace Process achieved and post mediation of the SNRP since this research was concluded before the end of the Reconciliation Process.

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