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**THE MILITARY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF
THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) IN POST-GENOCIDE
RWANDA 1994-2002.**

By **FRANK KANYAMBO/RUSAGARA**

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
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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Frank Kanyambo Rusagara (sign)



Date: 21/10/2003

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor

Makumi Mwangi, Ph.D. Signature:



Date: 21 October 2003

ABSTRACT

The military has often been ignored in the study and practice of conflict management. This study aims to vindicate its role in conflict management. The study will illustrate that being rooted in the society in pre-colonial Rwanda, the military (*Ingabo z' u Rwanda*) served the national interest. The RPF/A recaptured the spirit of the *Ingabo z' u Rwanda* through the concept of *Rwandanicity* in a concerted effort to fight against the negative perception of the role of the army as a guarantor of sectarian, as opposed to national interest. The RPF/A leadership saw the military as an institution that could be used to facilitate reconciliation and social stabilisation. The military's role in reconstruction and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda have not been adequately recognised. Hence the need to examine and analyse the RPF/A's role in conflict management, and its motivating factors.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-----------|--|
| AFDL | Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire |
| CDF | Common Development Fund |
| CDR | Coalition for the Defence of the Republic |
| CGS | Chief of General Staff |
| CSS | Credit and Savings Scheme. |
| FAR | <i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> |
| FPC | <i>Force Publique Congolais</i> |
| GNR | <i>Garde Nationale du Rwanda</i> |
| GP | <i>Garde Présidentielle.</i> |
| GTR | <i>Garde Territoriale du Rwanda</i> |
| MRND | <i>Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement</i> |
| NHRC | National Human Rights Commission |
| NRA | National Resistance Army |
| NURC | National Unity and Reconciliation Commission |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity. |
| RANU | Rwandan Alliance for National Unity |
| RDF | Rwanda Defence Forces. |
| RDRC | Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. |
| RPF/A | Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army. |
| UN | United Nations |
| PARMEHUTU | <i>Parti du Mouvement et d'Emancipation Hutu.</i> |
| UNAMIR | United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda . |
| VVTC | Veteran Vocational Training Centre |

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction, Methodology, Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis and Literature Review

Introduction

The military institution has often been ignored in the study and practice of conflict management. The literature¹ on conflict generally portrays the military and, often, individual actors within it, as perpetrators of conflict in Africa. This study aims at assessing the role of the military in conflict management, with a focus on the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army (RPF/A). The study will analyse the formation of the RPF/A and how it has been informed by the history of the Rwandan state, beginning in the 13th Century AD.

The ultimate goal of this study is to vindicate the role of the military in conflict management. In so doing, the study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the field of conflict management, including the wider discipline of International Relations. It is hoped that the study will stimulate further inquiry into the role of the military in conflict management in the Great Lakes region and Africa in general.

The military as an institution has generally been perceived to be at the core of conflict on the continent. This general perception, especially among state actors and other sections of the polity, is that for a regime to feel secure it has to have the military on its side, mainly through ethnicisation. Classic examples of this logic include the post-independence regimes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana in Rwanda, which were constructed around the fallacy of the Hutu "ethnic" identity, which is not sustainable as will be illustrated in the study where regionalism and family feuds took precedence. Others may include the post-independence regimes of Burundi, dominated by the Tutsi military, and the Amin and Obote regimes in Uganda dominated by their respective ethnic groups, namely, Kakwa-Lugbara and Acholi-Langi.

¹ Adebayo Adedeji (Eds), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 1999, p9

In Donald Horowitz's words, "control of the state, [or] control of a state and exemption from control by others, are among the main goals of ethnic conflicts"². In this sense, the control of the state strengthens and legitimises ethnic identity. It empowers a group, reaffirms its identity, preserves the group's interests and assures it of its continued survival.

This logic has generated a situation where the military as an institution has animated the polarization of the society on the one hand, while becoming an instrument for personal rule on other. The net effect of this kind of logic has not only been the weakening of the military as a national institution, but has also led to a situation where it becomes the originator and perpetrator of conflict.

In post-independence Rwanda, when the military was called upon to contain social strife, its actions tended to escalate and entrench the conflict. For instance, the military actively collaborated with local government administrations and Parme Hutu activists in the massacres of the Tutsi. This logic of the Tutsi elimination is well captured in the public address of the *Préfet* of Gikongoro *Prefecture* in December 1963 to Parme Hutu activists, when he said: "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsi. How? They must be killed"³.

On the other hand, as this study will show, being rooted in the society in pre-colonial Rwanda, the military (*Ingabo z' u Rwanda*) served the national interest.⁴ The RPF/A recaptured the spirit of the *Ingabo z' u Rwanda* in a concerted effort to fight against the negative perception of the role of the army as a guarantor of sectarian, as opposed to national interest.

This study will show that the process of recapturing this spirit was actualised through the following phases: The first phase was the formation of the RPF/A within the NRA in Uganda, followed by the integration of all Rwandan identities in the RPA during the war (1990 – 1994). This was followed by the RPF/A's seizure of power and the subsequent integration and re-integration of ex-FAR and militias (1994 – 2002) as a reconciliation and conflict management strategy.

² Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.5.

³ Rene Lemarchand *Rwanda and Burundi* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970 p.224.

⁴ Kagame, Alexis *Les Milices du Rwanda Pré-colonial*, (IRSAC), 1962 p.51..

Statement of the Problem

The Habyarimana and Kayibanda regimes remained reluctant to engender integration of the Tutsi identity into the military. The RPA, on the other hand, started as a national institution that sought to integrate all the Rwandan identities in its ranks. This is despite the RPA being perceived as a Tutsi instrument, and also the fact of its origin in the Diaspora. The RPF/A leadership saw the military as an institution that could be used to facilitate reconciliation and social stabilisation. Hence its vision to engender reconciliation through integration and de-ethnization of the military.

This study analyses the factors that have informed and continue to animate the process of military integration, and the efforts of the RPF/A to engender social stability in Rwanda. Especially, the study seeks to respond to the following questions: What role has the RPF/A leadership played in conflict management and the reconciliation process in Rwanda? How are the RPF/A institutions (i.e., RDRC, CSS, etc) engendering the process of conflict management? Under what circumstances would these processes be institutionalised?

There is no doubt that these are indeed large questions that may not be adequately addressed in this study. Yet the fragility of the Rwandan state and the centrality of the military in the Rwandan conflict demand a response to them.

Objectives of the Study

Broadly stated, the study seeks to examine the involvement of the military in conflict management in Rwanda. In specific terms the study seeks to examine and analyse how the pre-colonial Rwandan military (*Ingabo z' u Rwanda*) and the ideology behind it were instrumental in the formation and expansion of the Rwandan state; examine and analyse the role of the military and political leadership in conflict management and reconciliation processes in post-genocide Rwanda; examine and analyse the role of military institutions in the conflict management process in Rwanda; and, proffer policy recommendations geared towards institutionalising the military's role in conflict management.

Justification of the study

The military role in reconstruction and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda have not been adequately recognised. Hence the need to examine and analyse the RPF/A's role in conflict management, and its motivating factors. How these processes are taking place provides the academic premise on which this study is predicated. Such academic information provides the basis on which policy alternatives for conflict management may be evolved.

Prunier discusses the Rwanda conflict, yet very little mention is made of the RPF/A's attempt to facilitate conflict management through military integration. To Prunier, attempts at integrating Hutu identities in the RPA were driven by Maoist idealism acquired in Uganda, which would be abandoned sooner than later by what he calls the extremist Tutsi elements from Burundi in the RPA⁵. To Prunier, all attempts at integrating Hutu identities in the RPA, except for a few aligned to Col. A. Kanyaregwe, failed. This position is contested by the reality on the ground. In any case, this process was not driven by mere Maoist idealism, but the organizing ideology and conviction of the RPF/A leadership⁶. This is attested to by President Paul Kagame, who says that; "as a leader, I understand my responsibilities and I had a vision"⁷.

Neither does Mahmood Mamdani⁸ discuss military integration. Talking about the RPA's involvement in the DRC, he sees it as an instrument of protecting the Tutsi, and not one for conflict management and social integration in Rwanda. This position does not tally with the RPA's practice of integration. While the Arusha Protocol III provided for the integration of the combatants within the national military, based on agreed quotas between the RPA and the ex-FAR and the fallacy of their perceived identities, it did not consider the fears of non-Hutu domination of the military which contributed to the non-implementation of the Agreement.

There is an urgent need to highlight the positive role of the military in conflict management now more than ever before, particularly as Rwanda grapples with reconstruction, despite the negative role of the African military in conflict. The study also

⁵ Gérard Prunier *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 1959-1994*, London: Hurst and Co, 1995, p.8

⁶ Pamela Constable, "Kagame once led rebel troops- now he leads people shattered", *Washington Post*- 14th December 1994.

⁷ Charles Onyango-Obbo, Interview, *The Monitor*, 19th December 1977

⁸ Mamdani M. *When Victims Become Killers*, Kampala, Fountain Publishers 2001, p. 270.

seeks to analyse the role of the military in conflict management recognising their role not merely as sole actors, but as stakeholders.

Literature Review

Literature on causes of conflicts

This section will examine literature drawn from academic journals, news articles and scholarly books on causes of conflict. The literature defining conflict concurs that conflict is a process, which involves rational beings clashing over values, wants, interests and needs. Ascertaining the existence of conflict has posed a problem to many scholars. Some look at conflict subjectively, while others look at it objectively. To the subjective school, for a conflict to exist there has to be some perception of incompatible goals by the social actors. The objective school on the other hand, contends that conflict may exist without the awareness of the actors.

Peace researchers prefer to look at conflict as an objective phenomenon by focusing on underlying issues of structural violence. Galtung argues that, "conflict instigated by structural violence occurs when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and natural realizations are below their potential realization"⁹. There seems to be a general agreement that for conflict to exist, there must be a clash of interests of some kind.

Protracted conflicts have mostly been attributed to conflicting socio-cultural and ethnic relationships. Azar used the term protracted social conflict "to suggest the type of on-going and seemingly irresolvable conflict"¹⁰. Azar in his analysis developed a theory that relates the causes of conflict to ethnicity. Therefore, where ethnicity exists, there are higher chances of continuation of conflict for a longer time than necessary. He however adds that apart from ethnicity, protracted conflicts are also caused by underdevelopment, class differences and problems that involve identity and distributive

⁹ Galtung J. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* 3, 1969 pp.167-197.

¹⁰ Azar, E. "Protracted Internal Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in Burton and F. Duke (eds), *Conflict: Reading in the management and Resolutions*, London, Macmillan, 1990. pp:145

justice¹¹. This assertion may well explain the nature of conflict in Rwanda, which is characterized by deep-seated ethnic dimensions, and identity constructions that were effected by the colonial authorities.

Scholars of conflict theory have written extensively about the sources of conflict, but have usually, according to their respective discipline, merely looked at and emphasised only one specific source as the real explanation of the cause of conflict while sometimes undermining or diminishing the importance of others.

Since more and more conflicts in the developing world are protracted and ethnic in nature, rather than purely strategic, attention has been drawn recently by some theorists like Edward Azar, to the fact that in order to manage and hopefully resolve these kinds of conflicts, a comprehensive approach that identifies and tackles their multiple causal factors is necessary.

In a similar way, Stephen Ryan defined protracted conflicts as "usually conflicts between ethnic groups which have been going on for some time, and which may appear to be unresolvable to the parties caught up in them."¹³

Protracted social conflicts have typical preconditions that play important roles in shaping their genesis and account for their prolonged nature. The tendency has been for these conflicts to arise in societies characterised by multicommunal compositions. They flourish in environments of high politico-economic underdevelopment and manifest

¹¹ Azar E. 'The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations' in Dina Zinnes (ed) *Conflict Processes and Breakdown of International Systems*. (Denver CO. University of Denver, 1993) pp. 81-99). I William Zartman and Saadia Touval, 'Mediation: The Role of third Party Diplomacy and Formal Peace Keeping' in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimba M. Schraub (eds.) Resolving Third World Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 1992

¹³ S. Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), p.xxvii.

themselves over communal identity needs. "The roots of protracted social conflict are to be found at the interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation (political, economic, and psychological) and communal or identity cleavages."¹⁴ Moreover, it is assumed that 'structural victimisation' (i.e., social, political, and economic inequalities as well as psychological oppression) usually takes the form of ethnic discrimination in these kinds of societies. In fact, 'structural victimisation' is perceived to affect some groups disproportionately or to benefit others. Azar argues that, "It is at this juncture of actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural victimisation bursts into hostile and violent actions."¹⁵

These factors - economic, political, institutional, cultural, geographic, demographic, psychological, military, colonial, etc. - can be broken down into two main categories, despite the eclecticism of the terminology found in the literature, as structural ('objective' conflict) and psycho-cultural ('subjective' conflict)¹⁶.

Structural conflict is essentially defined as "an outcome of incompatible interests based on competition for scarce resources; it is objective because it is defined as largely

¹⁴ E. Azar and C.I. Moon, 'Managing Protracted Social Conflicts in the Third World: Facilitation and Development Diplomacy,' in *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol.15, N° 3, 1986), p.305.

¹⁵ E. Azar, 'The Theory of Protracted Social Conflicts and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situation,' op.cit. p.90.

¹⁶ See among others, M. Brown, 'Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict,' in M. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-27; 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,' in M. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp.571-603; M.Ross, *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); T. Woodhouse, 'Commentary: Negotiating a New Millenium? Prospects for African Conflict Resolution,' in *Review of African Political Economy* (N° 68, 1996), pp. 129-137; S. Van Evera, 'Hypothesis on Nationalism and War,' in *International Security* (Vol.18, N° 4, Spring 1994), pp. 8-9.

independent of the perceptions of participants and emanates from power structures and institutions (. . .)."¹⁷ On the other hand, psycho-cultural conflict theory defines conflict in terms of psychological and cultural forces that frame the beliefs about the self, others, and behaviour.

Psycho-cultural or perceptual or subjective explanation of protracted social conflict does not exclude other explanation, like structural explanation, however it may be argued that ethnic conflict as seen in Rwanda can only be understood, and ultimately resolved, by addressing psychological elements. As Donald Horowitz maintains "The sources of ethnic conflict are not to be found solely in the psychology of group juxtaposition, but they cannot be understood without a psychology, an explanation that takes account of emotional concomitants of group traits and interactions."¹⁸

Structural Conflict Theory

Structural and psycho-cultural conflict theories identify and analyse very different sources of conflict. Structural theory emphasises the competing interests of groups as prime motivations of conflict. In other words, it identifies the primary sources of conflict in the social, economic, and political organisation of society and in the nature and strength of ties within and between communities. In concrete terms, Marc Ross explains that if economic and political discrimination and weak ties of kinship exist in a society, the chance of conflict between groups will be higher.¹⁹

¹⁷ T. Woodhouse, *Ibid.*, p.137.

¹⁸ D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 181-182.

¹⁹ M. Ross, *The Management of Conflict*, op.cit., p.18.

Some objectivist conflict researchers tend to have a somewhat more reductionist view of what contributes to the emergence and prolongation of severe protracted conflicts. Neo-Marxist structuralists, for instance, view 'structural victimisation,' as defined by Azar, essentially in the form of economic deprivation of individuals or groups, producing eventually chronic poverty and overt conflict. Some structuralists have also attacked any subjective approach as being one "which has led to a concentration on unreal elements in situations of social conflict (those defined by the participants) . . ." ²⁰

The structural approach, taken as a whole, presents a broader range of underlying factors which may be the cause of a break out in internal conflict. Economic and social factors are obviously determinant, but others, such as political and institutional factors (state structure, discriminatory political institutions, inter-group politics, elite politics, etc.), security factors (intra-state security concerns, security dilemma, regional military environment, refugee problems, etc.), and ethnic factors (geography, demography, physical geography, etc.) are also important.

The argument thus far has been that it is irrefutable that individuals, and in Rwanda's case ethnic groups, do enter into hostile interactions about real interests. Problems of overpopulation, resource scarcity, economic underdevelopment in general, and unintegrated social and political systems, among other factors, do matter in the emergence of internal conflict. But with ethnic conflicts, material interests are not sufficient to explain the severity, ferocity, and protracted nature of such conflicts. Conflicts about real interests take place under certain psychological dispositions and in

²⁰ C. Mitchell, 'Recognising Conflict' in T. Woodhouse (ed.) *Peacemaking in a Troubled World* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991), p.218.

certain psycho-cultural contexts which serve to influence substantially the intensity and duration of conflict and ultimately determine the outcome. As Ross explains, "Although the identification of structural factors in severe conflict is rarely wrong, explanations for conflict based on these considerations alone are often incomplete and therefore misleading." He goes on to add that "people do fight about real interests, but the way this is done, the intensity of feelings, and the lengths to which disputants go to defend or acquire what they believe is their due are evidence that pursuit of interests has an important psychological component which is not well understood."²¹

In this respect, structural conflict theory has its limitations. Structural features may be critical in determining the targets of hostile action, psycho-cultural dispositions more relevant in explaining the intensity (e.g., ethnic cleansing, genocide) and the duration (e.g., protracted) of conflict. Structural factors often constitute the catalytic elements or, in Brown's words, the 'proximate causes' that transform latent conflict into manifest or overt conflict. In concrete terms, features like political transition, imminent military threat, or mounting economic problems are some of the factors that can act as a trigger. In serious ethnic conflict situations, however, these tend to occur in a predisposed psycho-cultural environment.

Structural and psycho-cultural conflict theories in identifying and defining the causes of protracted ethnic conflict differ. The role of competition for real interest is a crucial element in the explanation of conflict. As Azar stated, "It is the denial of human

²¹ M. Ross, *The Management of Conflict*, op.cit., pp.24,194.

needs that finally emerges as the source of conflict . . ."22 These human needs are usually defined in the literature as needs for effective participation in political, market, and decision-making institutions; physical security; nutrition; housing; etc. Structural factors, though playing a critical role in the break out of conflict, do not explain the intensity and, in certain cases, the protracted nature of severe ethnic conflict, features which contribute to their apparent intractability and which ultimately will influence substantially the way to manage and resolve such conflict. Thus psycho-cultural theory may well help in the understanding of protracted social conflict. This view is confirmed by Morton Deutsch who said, "Any comprehensive approach to understanding conflict will necessarily include consideration of both objective and subjective factors."²³

Psycho-cultural conflict theory, in Ross's words, "Emphasises the role of culturally shared, profound 'we-they' oppositions, the conceptualisation of enemies and allies, and deep-seated dispositions about human action stemming from earliest development."²⁴ As Elisabeth Crighton put it, "Protracted conflicts are 'identity-driven,' the result of an underlying 'fear of extinction' (Horowitz) that grows out of the experience of being a vulnerable ethnic group living with memories of persecution and massacre."²⁵

²² E. Azar quoted in M. Rabie, *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity* (London: Praeger, 1994), p.27.

²³ M. Deutsch, 'Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences' in R. Vayrynen (ed.), *New Direction in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Transformation* (London: Sage Publ., 1991), p.28.

²⁴ M. Ross, *The Management of Conflict*, op.cit., p. 18.

²⁵ E. Crighton and Martha Mac Iver, 'The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon,' in *Comparative Politics* (Vol.23 N°2, Jan. 1991) p.127.

Horowitz talks about the 'fear of extinction,' Volkan about the 'fear of dying off,' Rothschild about the 'fear of the future,' all these fears however seem to have the same underlying element, the fear of the threat of a loss of identity. This threat, real or perceived, emanates from a history of humiliation, oppression, victimhood, feeling of inferiority, persecution of one's group, and other kinds of discrimination. And this complete loss of dignity and self-respect is a constitutive element of what Rothschild calls the 'pathological dimension of ethnicity.'²⁶

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Jeanne Knutson, a political psychologist, has developed a conception of the psychology of victimhood. She understood from it that human needs for identity as well as for affection, self-esteem, and esteem of others are components of a sense of safety and security humans require for normal development. Hence, in order to protect their identity, individuals and groups will behave in a distorted and possibly violent way. This feeling of victimhood and threat of losing identity is based on real, but also mythologised facts, as well as memories of hurts and psychological wounds. History thus plays a crucial role. Historical experiences, the 'past,' shape the beliefs of one group over the intentions of another. In other words, "Actors form beliefs subjectively, largely on the basis of past interactions."²⁷

This 'past,' on which beliefs and behaviour of groups are based, is either mythologised or real. Myths or mythico-histories often, but not always, refer to a distant,

²⁶ D. Rothschild and A. Groth, 'Pathological Dimension of Domestic and International Ethnicity,' in *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol. 110, N° 1, 1995).

²⁷ D. Lake and D. Rothschild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,' in *International Security* (Vol. 21 N° 2, Fall 1996), p.51.

pre-colonial past and present the origins of different groups, the nature of their relationships, and their place in the social structure. These histories are usually distorted, exaggerated over time, and usually portray one's group as heroic and superior while disparaging the other. Irrational myths can also be created from a more recent past, the colonial past.

In such instances, facts are real, but they will also be mythologised, distorted, and reinvented in a way that best suits the interests of such groups. It can be assumed that colonialism has played a dramatic role in the formation of ethnic group psychology and subsequent (hostile) behaviour, although Mohammed Rabie's assertion that, "The primary causes of all types of contemporary ethnic conflicts are rooted in the colonial era"²⁸ should only be adhered to in part. In some cases, it can be argued that ethnic differences and hostilities existed in pre-colonial times and that other contemporary (i.e., post-colonial) objective factors (pattern of linkage with international economy, dependence or autonomy, nature of the political-military environment, etc.) also contribute to ethnic problems or violence. However, it is also true that colonial powers, in their search for political control, economic exploitation, and cultural domination, strengthened and further polarised group differences, creating real feelings of victimhood, new mythico-histories, and eventually strong ideologies.

Horowitz has shown that there is a direct link between colonial evaluations of imputed group character, the distribution of group worth, and the readiness for a group

²⁸ M. Rabie, *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity* (London: Praeger, 1994), p. 162.

to initiate ethnic violence or to use the political system to change the situation.²⁹ Evaluation, by foreign rule, of ethnic groups based on presumed 'racial superiority' and differences in levels of 'civilisation' contributes to a certain humiliation and feeling of weakness of 'backward' groups. As the feelings of 'backwardness,' inferiority, and helplessness are profoundly unsettling group feelings, it will induce the group to react by initiating violence or using the political system to transform the situation.³⁰ So, "to appreciate the full impact of group juxtapositions on ethnic conflict, it is necessary to understand the relations of the respective groups to the colonial powers as it is to grasp their relations to each other."³¹

In short, the 'past,' be it pre-colonial or colonial, mythologised or based on real experiences, often refers to a history of inequality, discrimination, persecution, and, in the extreme, massacre. This is interpreted as a threat to one's own or the group identity and, correspondingly, the group will be deeply affected by a fear of extinction and of what the future will be.

The 'pathological dimension of ethnicity,'³² born from fear and threat about ethnic identity, is the starting point of a psychological escalation process that will evolve and substantially act upon the duration and intensity of ethnic conflict, as well as on the outcome.

²⁹ D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, op.cit., pp.160-167.

³⁰ W. Davidson calls these hostile reactions: 'narcissistic rage,' see W. Davidson and J. Montville, 'Foreign Policy According to Freud,' op.cit., p.148.

³¹ D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, op.cit., p.167

³² "Pathology may be defined as a pervasive sense of anxiety, hostility, and estrangement project onto other surrounding ethnic groups, as opposed to a more neutral sense of one's own identity and distinctiveness," see D. Rothschild and A. Groth, 'Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity,' op.cit., p.69.

Northrup's Escalation Model as applied to ethnic conflict

Terrel Northrup has described the operation of identity in conflict escalation in terms of several psychological processes that tend to make conflict more and more intense and intractable. The different stages in the escalation are threat, distortion, rigidification, and collusion.³³ Northrup's escalation model is not based on any particular kind of conflict, but covers a range of conflicts from personal to social.

Threat, to group and individual identity, may be real or imagined. Members of both parties believe that their own existence is threatened by the mere existence of the other. Or as William Davidson stated, "Each side perceives the fulfilment of the other's identity as equivalent to the destruction of its own identity."³⁴

The second stage is called *distortion*. Northrup describes distortion as a psychological response to threat and termed *aggression*. The aggressive response is not necessarily violent. The response to the perceived threat will be distorted in the sense that it will be of a defensive kind. Individuals and groups, because of their defensive position, will behave more aggressively while interacting with another group.

Rigidification is the third psychological process in the escalation. "It is a process of crystallising and hardening what is construed as self and non-self . . . serving to put distance between the self and the threat."³⁵ "In effect, rigidification involves increasing

³³ T. Northrup, 'The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict,' in L. Kriesberg et al. (eds.), *Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989), pp.68-76.

³⁴ W. Davidson and J. Montville, 'Foreign Policy According to Freud,' op.cit., p.153.

³⁵ T. Northrup, 'The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict,' op.cit., p.70.

efforts to secure the boundaries for self. Self and other become mutually exclusive categories."³⁶ This rigidification process solidifies conflict as a whole because it sustains a mechanism of exclusion in order to preserve the identity of the group. At best, it creates an image of others that is characterised by suspicion, hostility, and mistrust, and at worst, a process of dehumanisation that renders violence against another group more tolerable, is put in place.

The last stage is *collusion*. As conflict or aspects of it become a part of the parties' identities, in a sense they collude in prolonging the conflictual relationship. At this stage, conflict becomes institutionalised.

What can clearly be seen from this escalation model is that identity, ethnic identity in particular, plays a crucial role in the hardening of relationships between groups that will leave them with strong negative perceptions vis-à-vis the 'other' and its intention. Destruction of the 'other' could be the ultimate stage.

Historical overview and analysis of the Rwanda Conflict

Mamdani explains that before people eliminate an enemy, they need to define it. He argues that the Rwandan genocide needs to be thought of within the logic of colonialism. The horror of colonialism led to two types of genocidal impulses. The first was the genocide of the native by the settler, the second was the native impulse to eliminate the settler. Following Frantz Fanon, Mamdani says the second seemed more like the affirmation of the natives humanity than the brutal extinction of life.³⁷

³⁶ Ibid., p.71.

³⁷ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, London, Penguins, 1967, p. 33

The Tutsi, a group with a privileged relationship to power before and during colonialism, was constructed as a privileged alien settler presence, first by the so called Hutu Revolution of 1959, and then by the *Hutu power* propaganda after 1990. During the colonial period and there after, 'Hutu' was made into a native identity and 'Tutsi' a settler one. In its motivation and construction, Mamdani argues, the Rwandan genocide needs to be understood as a natives' genocide. It was a genocide by those who saw themselves as sons and daughters of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence. It was not an ethnic but a 'racial' cleansing for the Hutu who killed – the Tutsi was a colonial settler, not a neighbour: 'the fact is, that the Belgian power did not arbitrarily cook up the Hutu/Tutsi distinction. What it did do was to take an existing socio-political distinction and racialize it'³⁸.

Mamdani asserts that the origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as 'alien'³⁹. He rejects the structural theorists postulation on conflict. 'No matter how depressing these facts may seem, we need to keep in mind that there is no necessary connection between a drastic reduction in resources and deadly human conflict'. Mamdani also rejects the infrastructural factors as causes of the genocide with the explanation: "As always humans shape their world based on human consciousness and human capacities."⁴⁰.

The Belgian authorities added another dimension to the Hutu /Tutsi conflict in 1960s, that the Tutsi were not only aliens, but also communists to flavour the conflict in the then prevalent and fashionable Cold War terminology. Col. Bem Logiest Guy further argues: "In short, in supporting Hutu against Tutsi, I acted with the unshakable conviction that in so doing, I was liberating the Hutu peasantry from both oppressive feudalism and communism."⁴¹ This unfortunate fallacy makes the two (communism and feudalism) strangely consenting bedfellows in Rwanda. Thus circumstances and

³⁸ Mahmood Mamdani *When Natives Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* Fountain Publishers, Kampala 2001 p.99.

³⁹ Ibid p.34.

⁴⁰ Op.cit. p.198

⁴¹ Rene Lemarchand *Rwanda and Burundi* New York : Praeger Publishers 1970 p. 176.

motives, which bred violence in Rwanda, may be imputed to the very measures taken by the Belgian colonial authorities to restore peace and order in the period 1959/60.

In the declaration made by the Special Resident Colonel Bem Logiest in the "*reunion des cadres*" of January 11, 1960 "Not only do we want elections but we want everybody to be aware of this. People must go to the polls in full freedom and in full political awareness. Thus we must undertake an action in favour of the Hutu, who live in a state of ignorance and under oppressive influences. By virtue of the situation, we are obliged to take sides. We cannot stay neutral and sit.⁴² Thus, far from being neutral or passive, the Belgian colonial administration became the prime legitimiser of Hutu rule and the subsequent violent conflicts it engendered.

The debate on the nature of ethnic conflicts in Africa hinges on an alternative to determine whether these conflicts are essentially based on identity (essentialism) or whether they are as a result of political manipulations (instrumentalism). The essentialist school claims that identity is the irreducible and antagonistic reason behind ethnic conflicts in Africa, while the instrumentalist school considers ethnic antagonism to be a result of a struggle between well defined different political groups which manipulate populations using ethnicity or identity as a tool for mobilization in the service of their own interests.

Today, this dichotomy is becoming outdated, and there is a growing consensus that acknowledges the existence of a multiplicity of factors that lead to conflicts in Africa and proceeds with synthesis of the above two schools of thoughts. According to Young, this also appears to be the case of the Rwandan conflict. Thus a good historical analysis of the Rwandan conflict may well serve to demonstrate its complexity.⁴³

Any historical overview shows the complexity of the history of Rwanda which should not in any way be reduced to a fundamental conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. That history also shows us the essentially planned character of an ethnic antagonism, which had to lead to genocide. The role of the Rwandan elite class in that process during the German protectorate and, especially, during the Belgian colonization

⁴² Rene Lemarchand *Rwanda and Burundi* New York : Praeger Publishers 1970 p. 175

⁴³ C. Young, "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Class in Africa: a retrospective" *Cahiers d' études africaines*, Vol. XXXVI-3 No. 103, 1986.

and the first and the second republic is primordial. The divisionist policy was, however, favoured by contradictions that were remotely based on identity but were, in reality, directly social and political and dating from pre-colonial Rwanda. These contradictions were themselves open to distortions, to corruption and racialization.

The exclusion policy, the struggle for power and resources among the Tutsi factions, among the Hutu factions or among Hutu-Tutsi factions and the colonization action would not, however, have led to conflicts of such a magnitude without the oppressing poverty of the country.⁴⁴

Magnarella in *Justice in Africa 2000* postulates a human materialistic theoretical framework that takes infrastructural problems on board. He sees Mamdani's works as suffering from a deficiency in analytical strength. Mamdani confuses proximate causes with ultimate ones. He does not provide a theoretical framework that can fruitfully integrate the economic, social, demographic, political and psychological elements that resulted in mass murder.⁴⁵

Magnarella, further argues that, the rule of dominant persons does not depend on political or economic power alone, but on persuading the ruled to accept an ideology that justifies the rulers' privileged positions and convinces the ruled that their best interests are being protected.

From the 1960s until 1994, the ideology promoted by the Hutu ruling elite was as follows: Tutsi were foreign invaders, who could not really be considered as citizens. The Hutu had been 'native peasants', enslaved by the aristocratic invaders; they were now the only legitimate inhabitants of the country. A Hutu controlled government was now not only automatically legitimate but also ontologically democratic (*Rubanda Nyamwinshi - Demographic Hutu majority*). This political ideology validated both the persecution of Tutsi and the autocratic rule by some elite Hutu.

Magnarella further asserts that, as for its economic ideology, the government promoted the idea that the Hutu 'holy way of life' was primitive tilling of the land using a hand-hoe, which provided a new identity to the Hutu as *bene sebahinzi*. It strictly limited

⁴⁴ Emmanuel Gasana et al., *Comprehending And Mastering African Conflicts: Rwanda*, p.163

⁴⁵ Paul J. Magnarella, *Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide*, Human Rights & Human Welfare Vol.2:1 – Winter 2002 (Centre On Rights Development 2002), p.32

rural migration to the city. People could not change their residence without government permission, and that was rarely given. Consequently, the government made no attempt to significantly diversify the economy so as to create a viable non-agricultural sector or to limit population except by killing and expelling Tutsi.

With regard to religious ideology, Magnarella further contends that it also contributed to the country's deepening demographic problems. The majority of Rwanda's population was Catholic. Despite Rwanda's evident overpopulation, those in the church and government hierarchy not only refused to promote birth control programs, they actively opposed them. Radical Catholic pro-life commandos raided pharmacies to destroy condoms with the approval of the Ministry of Interior. The authorities told the common Hutu that the Tutsi RPF and all those who sided with them were demons who had to be eliminated. In addition to relieving fear of supposed Tutsi evil, eliminating the demons also earned material rewards – land, cattle, loot – for the killers.

Huntington in his analysis of world peace argues that the greatest threat to world peace lies in the fundamental cultural incompatibility among civilizations. He attributes the conflict in DRC and the wider Great Lakes Region to "the clash of civilizations"⁴⁶. However, his model is inappropriate in explaining the conflict because, considering the cultural homogeneity between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic communities in Rwanda and Burundi, the model does not resolve the paradox of ethnically diverse, yet culturally coherent, societies dissolving into genocide.

As Lemarchand puts it, political exclusion, not clashing civilizations, is the key to conflicting identity formation of state⁴⁷. He further argues that unlike what is observed in other African societies where tribes are juxtaposed against each other, in Rwanda, ethnic relations revolved around a vertical system of stratification in which Tutsi and Hutu stood in ranked relationship to each other, with the Tutsi minority dominating power, wealth and status. Indeed, this is a generalization that is short in empirical sustenance.

⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* New York : Simon and Schuster 1996, p. 28.

⁴⁷ Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* New York: Cambridge University and Schuster 1996.

The dimensions of ethnicity in conflict in the Great Lakes Region have also been analysed within the context of the democratic practices of the states in the region. In vertical structured, minority-dominated societies, the verdict of the elections is never neutral any more than the state system to which they give birth. As Thomas Carothers puts it, rather than a "society-wide epiphany" the result is violent conflict⁴⁸.

Huntington in his analysis of the Great Lakes conflict refers to the escalation of conflict in the region as "kin country syndrome". He argues that where ethnic fault-lines cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to spillover from one area to the next, transforming kin solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational violence. In such circumstances, he argues, "conflict does not flow from above, it bubbles up from below"³⁵. At the heart of this bottom-up dynamics lies a phenomenon whose devastating effects are dramatically revealed in the Great Lakes conflicts.

Other literature has also centred on the theories of collapsing states and the implications of genocide, both as an empirical fact and as a phenomenon that profoundly alters the perception of one ethnic group of the other. In a society exonerated of moral constraints, and where the capture of power implies domination of one group by another, killing becomes a moral duty. The preservation of ethnic hegemony is perceived as a condition of physical survival, and the elimination of rival claimants the only means by which survival can be assured⁴⁹. In bi-ethnic, vertically structured social arenas with exclusionary policies, are a major source of state legitimacy as evident in Rwanda.

Lemarchand argues that because state institutions are fragile and lacking in effectiveness and legitimacy, they are at a poor vantage point to mediate the struggle between competing groups, and more particularly with the strong military interest such as in post-independence Rwanda. Unable to channel participation along predetermined lines, the overloaded state becomes isolated and aloof from society, unable to structure

⁴⁸ Thomas Carothers "Which Democracy Should We Export", in *Harper's Magazine*, September 1996, p.19.

³⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* New York : Simon and Schuster 1996, p.272

⁴⁹ Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, New York Cambridge University and Schuster 1996. p.43.

the relations between social interests or between these interests and itself.⁵⁰ These are indeed the shortcomings of the colonial and post colonial military in Rwanda.

According to Samuel P. Huntington the military officer corps is assumed to be a professional institution characterized by 3 cardinal qualities. The first is expertise, which is acquired through training and experience; the second is responsibility, where the officer corps are responsible to their client – in this case the society, and third, corporate identity, which is the sense of unity and consciousness of the officer corps as a distinct group from the laymen. It forms their *esprit de corps*⁵¹.

The military and the police are the states' apparatus of coercion, control and security. The colonial policy over the military has had a great impact on postcolonial politics and 'ethnicisation' of the military⁵².

Ethnic conflicts are rational and for real issues. They occur because of the imagined or real threat to group survival of the 'imagined community'. Marginalization of one ethnic group therefore poses a situation of insecurity and uncertainty. It is therefore normal for this group to use all possible means to counter the situation. The riskiest situation is when contenders over the same issue are only two like in a dual society. In plural societies their large number balances them out, 'however unconventionally'.

These conflicts therefore, like Hardin says, are positional goods, distributional goods and interaction between the two. He uses the term positional goods to refer to public office and authority, while distributional goods refer to income and welfare benefits⁵³. This ensures group security, survival and identity especially where the State is the main employer and provider. It cannot therefore be a simple cultural clash.

Rothchild argues that, although, a state maybe both weak in legitimacy and capacity to implement government policy, it is still a valued prize to fight for. Not only because of its recruitment and allocative activities, but also its ability to influence (if not set) the terms and costs of inter-group relations.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 173.

⁵¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* New York : Simon and Schuster 1996, pp.8-18

⁵² Donald Horowitz op. cit p.5.

⁵³ Russel Hardin *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*, New Jersey, University of Princeton Press, 1995 p.57.

⁵⁴ Donald Rothchild *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1997. p.66.

The African is a dual citizen. He is a citizen in his ethnic community and a citizen in his wider national community. Citizenship defines 'those who are and those who are not members of a common society'⁵⁵. When the African belongs to two societies, one ethnic and the other national, then he is a dual citizen. Individuals therefore, participate in two substantive authorities, the ethnic and the nation State.

In the post-colonial state, one is a citizen of that state constitutionally and therefore by right. He thus qualifies to be one and participate in that inclusive national community-the concept of liberal citizenship. However, in the ethnic community, one is required to participate in it, in its preservation and security, especially in competition against other communities and against the national community, unless that community is in control of the national state machinery, the concept of Republican citizenship⁵⁶. Many African states are plural whereas a few are dual. Rwanda may be said to be ethnically dual, but unlike the Sudan, this dual ethnicity does not manifest regionally. The Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda live in the same neighbourhoods and have intermarried over centuries, thus created cultural harmony. Ali Mazrui argues that the politicisation of the Hutu and Tutsi identities in Rwanda led to violent conflict that degenerated into the 1994 genocide, the cultural harmony notwithstanding.

He further argues that in the Sudan, whereas the Christians and animists live in the Southern region and the more arabized and islamized live in the north, the war has not resulted into mass killings or genocide of innocent civilians. The State has not collapsed, the National Army has not been on the rampage seeking helpless civilians for slaughter, from refugee camps and hospitals as happened in Rwanda in 1994⁵⁷. Thus ethnic conflict is likely to be more catastrophic in dual societies that are inter-mingled. However, such conflicts may be resolved in such communities given their proximity and cultural homogeneity when you deconstruct and depoliticize the ethnic identities.

The colonial politicisation of identities of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, entailed making the former the indigenous natives and the latter alien settlers. According to

⁵⁵ J.M. Barbalel *Citizenship* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 1.

⁵⁶ Stephen N. Ndegwa "Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transitional Moments in Kenyan Politics" in *American Political Science Review* 91, 3 (September 1997) pp. 599-616.

Mamdani; where colonial rule had been indirect, as in Uganda and Congo, the native prerogative was defined as ethnic. But where colonialism had imposed a version of direct rule, a halfway house, as in the case of Rwanda - the prerogative was racial. The 1959 Revolution in Rwanda against the Tutsi- targeted them as an alien race, to be recognized as an indigenous ethnicity by the Second Republic after 1973 but reconstructed as an alien race by the "genocidaires" after the coup of April 1994. As in the 1959 Revolution, so in the 1994 genocide too, the Tutsi were targeted as an alien race⁵⁸.

Literature on Conflict Management

According to Clausewitz,⁵⁹ "No one starts a war, or rather in his right mind ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind, what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it". The importance of this statement is that waging war, is a conflict management strategy, because one targets the state structures and instruments of coercion (the police, military) that are otherwise used to animate violence in the society.

Conflict management experts have in the recent years emphasized the need for mediators to utilize a leverage such as aid, trade, sanctions and embargoes⁶⁰. However, the Rwanda tragedy demonstrates that mediation remains an inexact science and may sometimes inadvertently provoke the very tragedies it seeks to prevent. In fact, the Rwanda experience demonstrates that such leverage is a double-edged sword, equally capable of driving the contending parties to the most extreme measures. Ironically, the pre-genocide mediation in Rwanda, which led to the 1993 Arusha Peace

⁵⁷ Ali A. Mazrui "The African State as A political Refugee" in *The African Conflict Resolution, The US Role in Peace making* (eds) David R. Smork and Chester A. Crocker, (Washington DC United States Institute of Press, 1995, pp. 13-16.

⁵⁸ Mamdani M. op. cit. pp. 274-275.

⁵⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Parret, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1976.P.579.

⁶⁰ Saadia Touval "The Super Powers as Mediators" in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds) *Mediations in International Relations*, New York St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Accords was a virtual textbook case of modern conflict management. The conflict was ripe for settlement because the civil war had reached a mutually hurting stalemate.⁶¹

Mediators used leverage, coordinated their activities and ultimately put aside individual agendas. The settlement seemingly addressed all the social, economic and political roots and consequences of the conflict, and the international community agreed to guarantee the settlement with a peacekeeping force. But the mediators had a blind spot. They failed to appreciate how much Rwanda's entrenched Hutu elite had to lose under political pluralism, and the lengths to which it would go to preserve the *status quo*. The mediator's application of leverage succeeded in compelling Rwanda's President to sign and begin to implement the Arusha Accords, but this very success raised the insecurity of Rwanda's Hutu elite to the breaking point.

That mediation not only failed to control the conflict, but propelled it into such a massive escalation, despite ostensibly propitious conditions, calls for a re-evaluation of prevailing conflict management theory. It demonstrates that the international community must be more cautious in applying leverage; especially in cases where it is unwilling to provide enforcement measures if events go awry.

The 1994 Rwanda genocide represented a total failure of preventive diplomacy. The existence of the Arusha Peace Accords and the deployment of UN forces (UNAMIR) to guarantee the peace were not enough to prevent genocide. A greater understanding of the realities, issues and personalities in Rwanda could have led to diplomatic efforts including peace making to defuse tensions before they derailed not only the peace process, but Rwanda itself. Up to one million people were massacred by Hutu extremists. 'Mediation is useful, but it helps peacemaking most where peacekeeping needs help least'⁶².

The Rwandan genocide clearly showed that the UN was a cumbersome and often inept bureaucracy lacking in accountability. In addition, the UN is in dire need of leadership.

⁶¹ Zartman I.W. *Ripe for Resolution :Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985 p.25.

⁶² Richard K. Betts " The Delusion of Impartial Intervention, in Foreign Affairs Vol. 73 No. 16 Nov/Dec. 1994, p,24

'If the USA or the UN wish to bring peace to violent places before tragedy unfolds in full, gruesome detail, they should act decisively-by either lending their military weight to one side or forcing both to compromise. In either case, leaders or outside powers should avoid what the natural instincts of successful politicians and bureaucrats tell them is sensible; a middle course.'⁶³

The number of conflicts in Africa is still on the increase, in spite of international efforts to manage them as exemplified by UN and regional efforts. The management of conflicts continues to pose serious and formidable challenges to Africa in the 21st Century.⁶⁴ Various arguments have been advanced for the inability of existing mechanisms for conflict management. One of these is the exclusive treatment of internal and external causes of conflict.⁶⁵ Another one has been the tendency to dwell on reactionary management after the conflict has ripened.⁶⁶

According to Mwangi, when a third party becomes involved in a bilateral conflict, it brings its own interest into the conflict. This transforms the overall dyadic structure into a triad and the original negotiation between the parties is transformed into a mediated negotiation.⁶⁷

Other scholars like Bercovitch have discussed the outcome of conflict management. He notes that there is a problem of noting and gauging success levels outcomes. These problems, he notes include the temporal problem (i.e. when the examination of the outcome should commence) and the problem of criteria to be used for determining outcomes.⁶⁸

⁶³ Richard Betts Ibid. p.31.

⁶⁴ See the World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*, Washing D.C., The World Bank, 2000. p.61.

⁶⁵ D.K. Orwa. "Causes of Conflict in the Relations in African States" in O.J.C.B.Ojo, et al. *African International Relations*, London, Longman, 1985. p.130.

⁶⁶ Zartman W,I. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflicts and Intervention in Africa*, New York, Oxford University press,1989. p.267

⁶⁷ Mwangi M. *International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa, The Uganda Mediation*, 1985, (Ph.D. Thesis) University of Kent at Canterbury; October 1994.

⁶⁸ Bercovitch J. *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* op. cit. pp. 112-113.

Pruitt and Lewis examine the process by which negotiators reach agreements that reconcile their separate needs and values. They argue that distributive and integrative strategies are the key methods adopted by negotiators. A distributive strategy involves the use of threats, demands political commitment and extraneous arguments for one's offers as to why the other party should concede. This amounts to rigidity thus blocking the development of integrative agreements⁶⁹.

Because of the difficulty of assessing outcomes, Anagnoson *et al*,⁷⁰ suggest a success index, which can form a reference point for settling the conflicts. It is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the parties. Also, third party achieves limited success when it attains only a temporary halt to hostilities or cease-fire and unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the conflict.⁷¹

The problem with this index is that it is difficult to know who gauges the efforts: whether it is the actors in the conflict, the mediators or the observers. This difficulty of knowing from which standpoint to assess the conflict makes the application of the success index difficult.

For Burton, a successful outcome is where a resolution rather than a settlement is reached. Thus conflict settlement addresses negotiable interests while conflict resolution involves shared values such as identity and recognition, which are not negotiable.⁷² Further, "resolution of a conflict assumes that given a full understanding of the shared goals, an appreciation of the environmental constraints, the parties would resolve the conflict."⁷³

Conflict settlement according to the literature, involves power bargaining and is likely to be short lived since it involves coercion and imposition⁷⁴. It exists when

⁶⁹ Pruitt D. G. and Lewis S. A. "The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining" in Druckman D. (ed) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives*, London Sage, 1977, pp. 161.

⁷⁰ Anagnoson J.T, Bercovitch, J and Willie, D., "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations" in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.28, 1991 pp. 7-17.

⁷¹ *Ibid* p.17.

⁷² Burton J.W., "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy" in S.J.D. Sandole and H. Van Der Merwe (eds) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 1993, pp. 55-64.

⁷³ Burton, J. W., "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution" in J.W. Burton and F Duke (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and resolution* (London: Macmillan 1990) pp. 328-335.

⁷⁴ Banks M. and Mitchell C. "A Note on Terminology" *Hand Book of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem Approach* (London: Redwood Books, 196) pp XVII-XIX.

destructive behaviour has been reduced and hostile attitudes lessened. This may be achieved by the use of force.⁷⁵ Burton contends that conflict resolution is based on the parties' analysis of the causes of their conflict, leading to an end to the conflict.

Mamdani proposes that decolonisation requires a combination of deracialization and de-ethnization, as indeed Nyerere had done in Tanzania⁷⁶. Thus in Rwanda, in terms of conflict management, it is imperative that the Tutsi settler and the Hutu native identities be deracialized and de-ethnicized.

Mamdani further contends that Hutu and Tutsi need to be understood both as historical identities and as political identities. As majority and minority, the Hutu and Tutsi are not natural identities brought into political realm; they are political artifacts of a particular form of state⁷⁷. That particular state may only be sustained by strong national institutions, including the military.

Mamdani further argues that, Rwanda has become the epicentre of the wider crisis in the African Great Lakes. Tied together by the thread of a common colonial legacy – one that politicised indigeneity as a basis for rights – the region has little choice but to address the Rwandan dilemma, if only to address its own dilemma. To do so will require, first of all, reform state and citizenship within their own borders so that power recognizes equal citizenship rights for all based on a single criterion: residence⁷⁸. The present Rwanda citizenship rights and immigration policies tend to embrace this postulation.

Appraisal of the Literature

In the literature reviewed, it is evident that many studies have grappled with the conceptual issues of conflict, its causes and its implications. Others have concentrated on conflict management especially the peace process where issues of mediation, negotiation and outcomes have been centred. However, details such as the role of the military in the negotiation process involving a multiplicity of actors with varying interests

⁷⁵ Mitchel C. and M. Banks, *Hand Book of Conflict Resolution* op. cit. p. XVII.

⁷⁶ Mamdani M., (When Victims Become Killers), Op cit P.275

⁷⁷ Mamdani M. Ibid. p.281.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p.280

and multiple issues in a conflict such as that of Rwanda have eluded analysts. Much of the literature also explores the discourse on conflict management. The military concerns analysed in the literature also suggest strong linkages between the interests of the military and their involvement in conflict.

The Rwandan conflict therefore presents a real opportunity to evaluate and verify initial theoretical positions on the role of the military in conflict management. This is a *lacuna* worth filling through this study. The focus on the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army in this study thus provides an important starting point for analysis.

Theoretical Framework

Conflict is nested on structural violence in society. Structural conflict is attributed to incompatible interests based on competition for scarce resources. Structural theorists put emphasis on the competing interests of groups as prime motivators of conflict. Primary sources of conflict are traced to the social, economic and political organisation of society and in the nature and strength of ties within and between communities. As Marc Ross notes, where economic and political discrimination and weak ties of kinship exist in a society, the chance of a conflict between groups tends to be higher.⁷⁹ This position is shared by Galtung who attributes structural violence to the existential conditions under which human beings are unable to realize their full potential; where their somatic and mental realization are below their potential realization⁸⁰.

The essence of structural conflict theory lies in its ability to outline circumstances under which conflicts are structured. Yet as Ross points out, explanations for conflicts based on these considerations alone are often incomplete and therefore misleading. As he notes, "people do fight about real interests but the way this is done, the intensity of feeling and the length to which disputants go to defend or acquire what they believe is their due, are evidence that pursuit of interests has an important psychological component which is

⁷⁹ M. Ross. *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993, p.18.

⁸⁰ Galtung J "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* 3, 1969. pp. 167-197.

not well understood.⁸¹ What the theorists do not say, is how the institutions can be reconfigured to guard against the outbreaks of violence.

Applying this model on the Rwandan conflict, there is no doubt that, much of the conflict is rooted in the politics of exclusion and state predation. Core in this process has been the state instruments of violence, in this case the military. Yet this instrumentalization in the military seems more a phenomenon of the colonial and postcolonial regimes.

In his model on leadership and institutional organisation, Katumanga attributes the success of the NRM/A and RPF/A struggles against the Ugandan and Rwandan dictatorial regimes to the evolution of progressive national military leadership, and the requisite investment in national interest driven institutions. To Katumanga, positive institutional development is a function of the evolution of a communal interest, which is harnessed by pro-institutional and visionary leadership that is above narrow and subjective interests. The institutions seek to provide values to the society as a whole, as they become values through which the state acquires legitimacy, and as these values penetrate the society. Such penetration is critical to the state's fulfilment of its core roles of resource extraction and allocation, and value provisioning. The ability to provide these enables the state to command societal support in its efforts of defence and security provision. Instruments of violence in this sense play the vital role of ensuring the survival of the state as an entity, while the allowing other institutions of governance and democratic participation to mobilize the society for development.

Rwanda's pre-colonial military seemed to have followed the classical logic of institutional development. To Huntington, institutions must seek to create a political community under which the legitimacy of those who rule becomes predicated on the ability to take cognisance of the interests of all social formations in society. Institutions are supposed to check the weaknesses of individuals and maximize their capacities to deliver the values to the society⁸².

The military being an instrument of violence that is monopolised by the state has a higher social responsibility in facilitating social cohesion. This role is not only done in the protection of social values from external aggression but also the enhancement of these

⁸¹ M. Ross. *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 24.

⁸² Katumanga M. PhD Thesis, *Theories on Post-Independence African Leadership*, (Un-published), p. 120

values through the prevention of internal destabilization. Huntington captures the role of the army more succinctly when he notes that, "the skill of the physician is diagnosis and treatment, his responsibility is the health of his client. The skill of the officer is the management of violence, his responsibility is the military security of his client."⁸³ This presupposes an officer who understands the collective national interests as opposed to subjective and sectarian interests. The question becomes one of how to nurture this type of officer.

Here the model used by the pre-colonial Rwandan society provides the best starting point. The classic military organization was rooted in the society. It sought to under-gird it and facilitate its social reproduction. In pre-colonial Rwanda, this is captured under the concept of *Rwandanicity* (an idea and the philosophy that guides the peoples conduct). *Rwandanicity* is what the people of Rwanda understood themselves to be, what they knew about themselves, and how they defined their country. *Rwandanicity* was codified into does and don'ts that have historically been the performance parameters expected of each individual in the Rwandan society. Living by this, constituted *Kamere y' Urwanda*, the moral rectitude of a true Rwandan within and without physical Rwanda.

With the military rooted in the society, it was a symbiotic relationship of the military being produced and nurtured by the society, and the military in turn storing, propagating and defending the society's values. This is what Muzungu B means when he says; "The history of Rwanda is the history of its military."⁸⁴ As Clausewitz notes, the tangible elements of the gravity of power (military), must be in harmony with the intangible elements, the government and the people's will to that government. As a shield (*Ingabo z' u Rwanda*), the military protected all in pursuit of national interests.

Notably, the survival of the state is ingrained in its ability to manage instruments of violence at one level and, on the other, their development for the general good of the society. This leads to the nurturing and development of a nationalistic leadership at the political and military levels. Such leadership must seek to evolve and invest in the

⁸³ Samuel P. Huntington *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, University of Havard Press, Cambridge, 12th reprint, 1995, p.15.

⁸⁴ Muzungu B., *Histoire du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, Harmattan, Paris, 2003, p.354

development of the necessary institutional frameworks that must consistently renegotiate the leadership's relevance with the aspirations of the society.

When the leadership evolves a shared vision of *Rwandanicity*, which in itself is an organising ideology, the state tends to stabilize and forge ahead with its task of developing the society. Where it fails in this, the resulting effect is the evolution of a predatory military that preys on the society, engendering polarisation.

This framework provides the description of the construction of military leadership, its relationship with the society, and the sustenance of its behaviour. It also provides a prediction of what happens when the military has no conception of its role and begins to predate on the society it is expected to protect. Essentially this is what happens when the construction of the military in colonial and post-colonial states is understood along sectarian and subjective lines. The essence of *Rwandanicity* disappears. People begin experiencing the state's rule as a simple predation instead of protection.⁸⁵ In the context of a society characterised by structural scarcities, it is only a matter of time before structural violence becomes rooted, as institutions of violence become *informalized* and lend themselves to criminal activities.

The analysis of the history of the military mediated violence in Rwanda including the 1994 genocide is premised on this analysis. Conversely therefore, the role of the military in society as a unifying element in a polarised society, presupposes the reconstruction of '*Rwandanicity*' in the logic of *Kamere y' u Rwanda*. The argument is that, RDF and its' precursor, the RPA have sought to re-institute these values at the ideological and institutional levels, hence the increasing deployment of the military as an instrument for social reconstruction, cohesion and conflict management.

Hypotheses

This study will test the following hypotheses:

⁸⁵ Dr. Katumanga M., op.cit. p.142

- That the history of a military and its ideology can be invested through an enlightened leadership to attain positive and objective social ends in conflict management
- That the sustainability of the RDF and its institutions in conflict management will be anchored on progressively working towards shared prosperity and sustainable peace

Methodology

In carrying out this study, a variety of data will be used. Primary sources will include interviews with elders, scholars, diplomats, political and military leaders. Secondary data will be derived mainly from relevant literature that addresses the issue of conflict and conflict management in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region. The study will also use magazines, newspapers, and relevant journals, published and unpublished papers from relevant workshop and seminars.

Chapter Outline

This study is divided into six chapters:

Chapter One will consist of the introduction, objectives, literature review, justification, theoretical framework, hypothesis and study methodology.

Chapter Two outlines and examines historical perspectives to situate the role of the military in the building and sustaining the Rwandan state. The chapter is specifically interested in defining the ideology that facilitated the formation of the Rwandan state from the pre-colonial period to the present. It will also examine the role played by the military in ensuring a coherent society in the pre-colonial period that was deconstructed in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

Chapter Three relates the RPF/A ideology to the concept of *Rwandanicity* and how these under-girded the struggle for the liberation of Rwanda. The study will also show how *Rwandanicity* was at the core of mobilizing the society towards common national

objectives. The study will also trace the formation of the RPA and the process of integration towards a national institution, the RDF.

Chapter Four will show how the RPF/A process of military and social integration can be viewed as a role model in conflict management and reconciliation. It also seeks to test the second hypothesis – that, the success of the RPF/A as an institution for conflict management is a function of the construction of positive institutions that seek to promote national interests.

Chapter Five will discuss the role of the Rwandese Patriotic Army's institutions such as the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and the Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS). It will seek to explain the logic underlying their formation. It will also illustrate the extent to which they have helped to under-gird social integration.

Chapter Six contains the critical analysis of the study.

Chapter Seven is the conclusions drawn from the study

CHAPTER TWO

The Ideology and the Role of the Military in the History of Rwanda

Introduction

To Muzungu B, "the history of Rwanda, is the history of its military."⁸⁶ Accordingly, the military created Rwanda by securing territory and providing the basis for social organization and values. This chapter contextualises the current process of military-led social integration by tracing its logic in pre-colonial Rwanda. It also provides a historical background to the Rwandan State. Its central argument is that the drift from the logic of *Rwandanicity* towards narrow interests, not only destroyed the social fabric of the military but in the process it also reoriented the state towards genocidal tendencies.

As noted in the theoretical framework, the logic of *Kamere y' u Rwanda* ensured a standard mode of behavior and conformity within the wider Rwandan society. This chapter examines the concept of *Rwandanicity* and how it may help in conflict management and reconstruction in the post-genocide period.

The chapter will outline the history of Rwanda and the culture, customs and values that harmoniously bonded the society.

The chapter will also examine the institution of the military and its role in the expansion of Rwanda. It will note that through military training, *Rwandanicity*, was inculcated.

The chapter will further examine the advent of colonialism, which lasted between 1896–1962, and which witnessed the deconstruction of *Rwandanicity*. It will be argued that the colonial administration and the church jointly conspired to destroy the Rwandan military and state. Leading eventually to the demise of *Rwandanicity*.

The study will also examine the post-colonial period, 1962 – 1994 which was characterized by the entrenchment of the misguided logic of the Hutu revolution.

⁸⁶ Muzungu B, *Histoire du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, Harmattan, Paris 2003, p.354

Rwandanicity: Defining the Ideology

Rwandanicity as an ideology is what the people of Rwanda understood themselves to be; what they knew about themselves, and how they defined their country. To the Rwandans, Rwanda is a state of mind. Rwanda was the best country. In *Kinyarwanda* it is said *Nta gihugu cyaruta u Rwanda, Kanaka ni imfura y'I Rwanda* (Rwanda is the best of the best, and only a gentleman comes from Rwanda).

A gentleman of Rwanda (*imfura y'iRwanda*) meant adherence to the standards and values that had been inculcated over a period of time. Those standards and values of conduct were codified in *Kamere y'u Rwanda*, which in essence defined a true Rwandan. *Kamere y'u Rwanda* literally means the roots that facilitate and sustain growth. It was a terrible insult, for instance, to be referred to as lacking in *Kamere* (having no roots)

Living by *Kamere y'u Rwanda* in essence meant moral rectitude of a true Rwandan within and without Rwanda. To the Rwandan diaspora, therefore, *Rwandan-ness* lived in them but had to be taken back to its roots for fulfillment and self-actualization. This was the essence of the RPF/A struggle in the 1990s, as opposed to the post-colonial leadership of Kayibanda and Habyarimana who themselves had not internalized *Rwandanicity*, and thought that they could exile *Rwandan-ness*.

This can be illustrated by the King Ruganzu II Ndoli in the 16th Century who, after being banished into exile in neighbouring Karagwe Kingdom, reorganized and contrived to claim back his *Rwandanicity* which could never be actualized outside Rwanda. Since then, the saying goes that *nta munyarwanda uhera imahanga* (there is never permanent exile for a Rwandan).⁸⁷

Indeed, research for this study⁸⁸ finds that the two post-independence leaders may not have been true Rwandans, as they are said to be first generation Rwandans who rose to leadership – the former a Congolese through affiliation to the Catholic Church and the latter a Ugandan through the colonial military. In any event, Kayibanda and Habyarimana indeed could not have been *imfura z' u Rwanda* (gentlemen of Rwanda).

⁸⁷ Kagame A., *Un abregé de l'ethno-histoire du Rwanda*, Butare, 1972, pp.89-101

The Formation of the Rwandan State

Rwanda is believed to have been founded around the year 1279 AD by King Nsoro I Samukondo. Samukondo is credited with having founded the *Banyinginya* dynasty, which effectively ended with King Mibambwe IV Rutalindwa in 1896 with the advent of colonialism⁸⁹.

The kingdom of Rwanda started in the east of the present country, at a place called *Gasabo* which is referred to as the cradle of the state of Rwanda (*Rwanda rugali rwa Gasabo*). It was a small pastoral principality based on the *Nyiginya* lineage. Its history, with its vicissitudes of progress and regression, is that of growth through the annexation of the neighbouring pastoral or mainly agricultural kingdoms and principalities⁹⁰. The growth of Rwanda through annexation is rooted in people's cultural self-perception of Rwandan-ness as defined in the concept of *Ku-aanda*.

Ku-aanda in its literal meaning is spreading out from the center, thus the saying *Ku-aanda igihugu Kigali* (*enlarging the territory*). The process of *Ku-aanda*, which involved annexation, also entailed military conquest. Thus the military throughout the period was not only the midwife but also the guardian of the state of Rwanda as it grew and prospered. Indeed the military in *Kinyarwanda* was described as *Ingabo z' u Rwanda* (shield of the nation).⁹¹

The principalities of Bwanacyambwe, Buganza, Kigali, Buriza and Busigi formed the earliest Kingdom of Rwanda under the *Nyiginya* dynasty. This was later expanded to include the *Bwishya* and *Nduga* under the successive four reigns, after King Ruganzu I Bwimba in the 14th century. The expansion and growth of Rwanda reached its height in 1675 (see map on page 119) under the reign of Yuhi III Mazimhaka where the border extended to the north as far as Lake Edward in Uganda, then known as Lake *Rwicanzige*, and to the west as far as Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire). In 1910, more than half of the Rwandan territory was ceded to the Congo Free

⁸⁸ Interview with Prof. Sebasoni and Ambassador Mutaboba in Kigali, July 2002

⁸⁹ Kagame A., *Ibid.* pp.11-12

⁹⁰ Vansina I., *L'évolution du royaume du Rwanda des origines à 1900*, Bruxelles: Academie royale des sciences d'outre-mer, 1962

⁹¹ Kagame A., *op.cit.*, p.50 & Muzungu B., *Op.cit.* p.76

State and another part to the British Protectorate of Uganda. The border remains to this day.⁹²

The tracing of the expansion of the Rwanda Kingdom was mostly derived from the poem, *Umugore Mukuru*, of the court poet Musare who lived in the 18th Century through the reigns of Ndabarasa, Sentabyo and Gahindiro (see Table on Rwandan Kings on page 117). Poetry formed the repository of historical information that was handed down from generation to generation of successive court poets who were mainly of the Abasinga Clan.⁹³

Pre-colonial Institutions

The Rwandan Monarchy (*Ubwami*)

The King on the throne was always the Commander-in-Chief of the Rwandan military (*Ingabo z' uRwanda*). In the Rwandan expansionist ideal, conquest was through a political programme in a royal cycle that revolved around a martial axis⁸⁹. It began with alternating kings. The first were either Cyilima or Mutara who were "cowherds-kings" (those of prosperity).

Under Cyilima or Mutara the country mobilized and reserved resources for the next two reigns, which were characterized by war. The war years would be under either King Kigeli or Mibambwe, who were "warrior-kings". Their mission was to enlarge the country by conquests. The cycle closes up on a pacific reign of Yuhi who was the "king of Fire", which means the one of consolidation and continuity of the kingdom. It is under the reign of Yuhi that the country used to relax and devote itself to activities of ordinary life.⁹⁰

The king had specific missions, which required him to selflessly address the problems of the country. The King therefore had to be superb. When he was young, he normally had a regent; usually his mother. If he was past a certain age, then he left the

⁹² Kagame A., *Un abregé de l'histoire du Rwanda, de 1853 à 1972*, Butare 1975, p.170

⁹³ Muzungu B. (ed), *Cahiers Lumière et Société (Review): Ibisigo comma source de l'histoire*, N0.23, Mai 2003, pp 1-5 & Jean Paul Harroy, *Rwanda, Hayez: Bruxelles, 1894*, pp.55

⁸⁹ Kagame A, *Le Code des Institutions politique du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, Bruxelles 1952, p.59

⁹⁰ Kagame A, *op.cit.* pp.114-115 & Muzungu B, *op.cit.* p.354

throne. It was taboo, for instance, for a Rwandan king to have grey hair or a bald head. If so, it was incumbent upon him to abdicate from the throne by committing suicide (*kunywa*).

This also applied if he was not an active king or on the frontline during a war. In such cases he was encouraged to commit suicide for being weak and a non-performer. This ensured a strong king who could ably lead the military in its mission and unify the society.⁹¹

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The Pre-colonial Rwandan Military

The military was rooted in the society. It was part and parcel of society and every Rwandan male belonged to a specific military regiment (*Itorero*) within the society. The *Itorero* formed the basic military formation within the *Umutwe w' Ingabo* or battalion. In the *Itorero*, strong bonds were formed between the recruits, where one learnt military tactics and about past exploits, including those of their fathers and grandfathers, and how one should emulate them and perfect their military ability. And as one aged, his son took over in the same company in hereditary succession. The belonging of the male youth was a duty, and indeed an initiation into responsible adulthood. It was imperative that one belonged to a regiment. Failure to belong to one would result, for instance, in one missing a spouse given the perception that such a person was not man enough.⁹²

The overall effect of the military was the strong social bonds it ensured within the community. This gave it strength for its sustained growth and prosperity. In times of war the whole society mobilized logistics in a bid to support the war efforts. The elder women whose sons were headed to war would offer moral support for courage and safe return. They would hold their right breast and shower it with saliva, while uttering words of encouragement, or offer a prayer to win the war and bring prosperity.

Weddings were not allowed during a military campaign. Young and married women abstained from sex when their husbands were at war. This was believed to offer a protective shield to their present and future husbands. This protective shield was known as *imhumbya*. Borrowing from this in 1990 when the RPF/A went to war, the

⁹¹ Muzungu B, Ibid. p.59

⁹² Kagame A, Le Code des institutions politiques du Rwanda pre-colonial, Bruxelles 1952, pp.20-22 & Jean Paul Harroy, op.cit. p.46

wives of the soldiers formed the *Ababambaye Imhumbya* Association to look into their welfare, solidarity and social support, and indeed offer the protective shield to their loved ones on the war-front. The association survives today under the name *Benishyaka Association*⁹³. This illustrates the connection between the past and the present.⁹⁴

This only emphasizes that the military was a national institution that guaranteed not only internal security, but guarded against external aggression. This was because the military was part and parcel of the society that produced it. In its turn, the military acted as the cohesive force in the community. Towards this end, the society's values, customs and taboos were enshrined and codified into *Imigenzo n'imizilirizo* (dos and don'ts), which in military terms were actualized in how one conducted himself or herself in times of war and peace.⁹⁵

Evidently therefore, the military was rooted in the society, the emphasis being that it was the vanguard of social values and ideals. Through the *Amatorero* (military regiments), the ideals and values of *Rwandanicity* would be inculcated to instill common identity. This was done through lessons in history and culture, which were about self-identity as a Rwandan. These were often expressed through poems, song and dance. For instance, the famous Rwandan dance, *Intore*, was the military dance of the *Itorero* (regiment). *Intore* was a hero's dance. In fact, heroes and celebrities are referred to as *intore* in Kinyarwanda.

Rwandan history in general, would be expressed through poems composed by court poets and taught in the *Amatorero*. The court poets, much like the *griots* of West Africa, were the "keepers" of history. One of the most celebrated court poets was Poetess Nyirarumaga, who was Regent Queen Mother of King Ruganzu II Ndoli in the 16th Century. She speaks of the Rwandan history as akin to a string of beads, which adorned the Rwandan women. She sees each bead as encapsulating an epoch or chapter in Rwandan history, and for her case, beginning with the Reign of King Ruganzu I Bwimba in the 14th Century. Whatever lessons there might have been to learn in this history were imparted, as noted, through the *Amatorero* for both young men and

⁹³ Research Interview with Ms Christine K.R. Mukankanza, Chairperson Benishyaka Association, Kigali, July 2002

⁹⁴ Kagame A, op.cit. pp.64-65

⁹⁵ Bigirumwami A, *Imihango. Imigenzo n' Imizilirizo*, Nyundo 1968

women^x. It was through poetry that *Rwandanicity* found an enduring repository that manifested itself in social stability and military strength.

By the time the Europeans came to Rwanda, the Kingdom's military prowess had been perfected under the reign of Cyilima II Rujugira (1675 -1708). Indeed, the inability of the Arab slave traders to capture slaves in this region is attributed to the existing political and military organisation under the Rwandan kings. This in itself is attested to by the fact that the slave trade never affected Rwanda. The Arabs captured slaves from the vastness of the Congo and other surrounding areas. Indeed, if there had ever existed any divisions or conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis during this period, it would have been a recipe for slave trade. According to Rene Lemarchand, when the explorer Stanley reached Karagwe in 1878, he met one Ahmed Ibrahim, an Arab, who explained that the *Banyarwanda* were "a great people, but covetous, malignant, treacherous, and utterly untrustworthy...They have never allowed an Arab to trade in their country, which proves them a bad lot."⁹⁶

For all the perceived identity differences, Mamdani grudgingly confirms that it was in the military that cohesiveness and Rwandan unity found enduring manifestation. He notes that "By the end of the 19th Century, every Rwandan male – Twa, Hutu or Tutsi – was affiliated to the army... To the limited extent that the state managed to create one of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda, it did so more on the battlefield than anywhere else."⁹⁷

That practice of forging national unity, beginning in the military, continues to inform reconciliation and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda.

The Colonial Period

The Demise of the Pre-colonial Military

Rwanda became part of German East Africa following the Anglo-German Treaty of 1880. It was only in 1894, when the official contacts were established between the Rwandan monarchy and an emissary of the German government, when King Kigeli IV

^x Cahiers Lumiere et Societe – Poesie Traditionnelle, Ibisigo – N0.21 of December, 2002 Imprime par Kinyamateka

⁹⁶ Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, op.cit. p.147

⁹⁷ Mamdani M., When Victims Become Killers, op.cit. pp.67-68

Rwabugili received Lieutenant Count Gustav Adolf von Goetzen in audience.⁹⁸

In 1889 King Mibambwe IV Rutalindwa was enthroned as a co-regent with his father King Kigeli IV Rwabugili and the Queen Mother Nyiramibambwe Kanjogera. This was against the *Ubwiru* (constitutional) tradition where an aged monarch had to abdicate from the throne to make way for the next generation. This was further complicated by the fact that the Queen Mother was not the younger King's natural mother.⁹⁹

As if that was not enough blow to the institution of the monarchy, only six months into their reign, Rwanda was invaded and occupied at Shangi by Congolese forces under the command of a Belgian officer by the name Lt Sandrart. King Rutalindwa sent his elite force, the *Ingagura-rugo*, under the command of Bisangwa bya Rugombituli and Prince Muhigirwa. Bisangwa, who had earlier on distinguished himself as an able commander of the *Inkaranka* battalion, was killed by the Belgians during that invasion.

Several weeks after the Shangi battle, a German colonial officer from the newly established station at Bujumbura arrived to notify Sandrart that he was violating the German territory, as defined by the Congolese-German agreement of 1884. Rather than do battle, Sandrart withdrew from Rwanda. The German officer returned directly to Bujumbura without passing by the King's court to explain why he had expelled Sandrart and his troops. Bisangwa, who epitomized the dignity of the Rwandan military, died an unsung hero at the hands of an adventurous Belgian officer with implied German complicity. This marked the end of the pre-colonial military prowess, and the beginning of dependency of the weakened Rwandan monarchy on the colonial military, which was to pave the way for the subsequent palace *coup* of 1896.¹⁰⁰

That palace coup, now popularly referred to as the coup d'état of Rucunshu, saw the death of King Mibambwe IV Rutalindwa along with his wife and three children. The coup was instigated by the Queen Mother Nyiramibambwe Kanjogera in order to install her under-aged son, King Yuhi IV Musinga. His maternal uncle, Kabare ka Rwakagara from the *Abega* clan, was appointed the Regent for the under-age king. The death of the king, who was also a strong Commander-in-Chief of the *Ingabo z' uRwanda*, was the

⁹⁸ Adebayo Adedeji, *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts* (eds), Gasana et al, Rwanda, op.cit.p.146

⁹⁹ Kagame A, op.cit. pp.112-113

¹⁰⁰ Allison des Forges, 'Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda under Musinga 1896-1931', Yale University, Ph.D

thesis

final blow to an already weakened military.¹⁰¹

On declaring Rwanda a protectorate, the Germans opted for indirect rule. This to a great extent left the King's authority and that of the notables untouched. At the time, the Tutsi notables wanted to impose the institution of *ibikingi* (similar to *Mailo* land in Buganda), which demanded that they impose paying rent for the use of land by Rwandans of lower social status. For the cattle keepers, they paid the rent in the form of cows, while the agriculturalists paid with their crops. However, some parts of Northern Rwanda rebelled against this imposition provoking enforcement action by the ruling elite.

Due to a weakened military, however, the chiefs and the royal court in Rwanda were forced to seek armed help from the Germans in order to stop the rebellions. They took advantage of the German pacification to expropriate more lands. In many regions of the north that policy had created a situation of hatred against Tutsi chiefs and their attendants. Indeed, war was avoided only through the fear of German guns.¹⁰² It was at this point that the effectiveness of the pre-colonial military institutions began to be rendered redundant and irrelevant with the introduction in the country of the superior German military technology.

Another blow to the military institution, and indeed, of *Rwandanicity*, is exemplified by the conduct of commanders of the two most powerful military formations, namely, *Imbabaza-abahizi* and *Impama-kwica*, respectively led by Nturo ya Nyilimigabo and Kayondo ka Mbanzabigwi.¹⁰³ The two commanders converted to Christianity to become "princes of the Catholic Church", thereby abdicating from their military obligations to the Rwandan people. The two gentlemen were later to form a group called *Ishongore* (rebels against the traditional monarchy) that conspired with the Roman Catholic Church and the Colonial Administration in dethroning King Yuhi V Musinga as a pagan monarch, and replaced him with his son King Mutara III Rudahigwa who was a protégé of the church.¹⁰⁴

Passing over tradition, which required that a king be enthroned by *Abiiru* ritualists, Msgr. Classe and Governor Voisin enthroned King Mutara III as the new king,

¹⁰¹ Kagame A, *Un abregé de l'ethno histoire de Rwanda de 1953 a 1972*, Butare 1975, p.171

¹⁰² Adebayo Adedeji (eds), *op.cit.* p.146

¹⁰³ Kagame A, *op.cit.* p.118

¹⁰⁴ Adebayo Adedeji (eds), *Ibid.* p.147

symbolizing, in Gatwa's words, "the alliance of the alter and the throne." The "pagan monarch" – Yuhi V Musinga, done away with and banished, the new young king and the Tutsi hierarchy converted to Catholicism. The effect on the population was mass conversion, leading Rwanda to become a second "Christian Kingdom" after that of "Priest Jan".¹⁰⁵

This joint conspiracy of the church and the colonial administration against the Rwandan people was passively resisted with the expression of the words *Kiliziya yacyiye kirazira* (the church outlawed our cultural values).

In our study, these are the ideals and values of the people of Rwanda under the term *Rwandanicity*, which should have inspired rebellion in the people in defense of their Rwandan-ness, that was indeed their only reason to be. Alas, the Rwandan pre-colonial military was dead, and its commanders had abdicated from their vanguard role in defending *Rwandanicity* to become "princes of the church"! In fact, the Rwandan greetings of *Gir' Umwami* (in the name of the King) were corrupted and replaced with *Yezu akuzwe* (praise Jesus) a feat that survives to date even amongst the *genocidaires*.

However, tracing the history of the family of Nturo ya Nyilimigabo, a "prince of the church", and their respective roles illustrate the demise of the pre-colonial military and its ideals, as enshrined in *Rwandanicity*. His father, Nyilimigabo ya Marara, was the last commander of the *Intaganzwa*, that was formed under King Yuhi IV Gahindiro and commanded by Nturo's great grandfather, Munana ya Gihana.

Nyilimigabo ya Marara died in battle around 1881 in Bunyabungo (Congo). That he died on the frontline was considered an act of heroism for one's country, comparable to the great feat of heroism of his grandfather, Gihana, who died a national hero (*Umucengeli*) in Burundi.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, his son, Nturo ya Nyilimigabo, commanded a company called *Imbabaza-bahizi* around 1910 against the *Ibikingi* rebellion with the support of the German colonialists, before converting to Catholicism. This marked the beginning of the deconstruction of the traditional military. Indeed, as a homeguard, Nturo so adored the white man that he named his son "Bwanakweli", a popular term of adoration referring to the white man, who was supposed to always be

¹⁰⁵ Mamdani M, When Victims Become Killers, op.cit. p.93

¹⁰⁶ Kagame A, Un abrege de l'ethno histoire de Rwanda de 1953 a 1972, Butare 1975

right.¹⁰⁷

Bwanakweli, a purported progressive democrat, would later form the political party *Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais* (RADER) in 1959, which further contributed to dividing the Rwandan community despite its high ideals¹⁰⁸. Nturo's other son, Butera, a celebrated performing artist (*Intore*) made little impact in promoting *Rwandanicity*, but ended up promoting comprador capitalism with his portrait in Coca Cola commercials.

The Colonial Military

After the First World War, Rwanda and Burundi were ceded to Belgium. Together with Congo, these were administered as Congo-Belge with the Governor General based in Leopoldville. Congo-Belge had a *Force Publique Congolaise* (FPC), which was deployed in Rwanda. The Rwandans were never recruited to form any part of the FPC. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the FPC were Belgians and the men were Congolese. The Brigade headquarters of the FPC was based in Stanleyville (Kisangani) and had three battalions. One battalion was in charge of Province Orientale (Haut Zaire), the other for Kivu Province and the third for Ruanda-Urundi.¹⁰⁹

The performance and effectiveness of the FPC in Rwanda however left a lot to be desired. In fact, in the 1959 Hutu revolution, a battalion of Belgian paratroopers from Kamina in the Congo was deployed to supplement the FPC's efforts in quelling the fracas, only to stand by and watch the Hutus massacre Tutsi women and children. In the bloody uprising that was presided over by the Belgian paratroopers, ten thousand Tutsi's were slaughtered and approximately 130,000 driven to exile.¹¹⁰

In 1960 after the independence of Congo, the Congolese battalion in charge of Ruanda-Urundi was withdrawn. In the same year, the Belgians formed the *Garde Territoriale du Rwanda* (GTR) under the command of Lt Col Van Damme who had earlier served as the Commanding Officer of the FPC Battalion in Bujumbura. The first

¹⁰⁷ Adebayo Adedeji, *Ibid.* p.147

¹⁰⁸ Rene Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, op.cit. p.160

¹⁰⁹ Research interview with Col Ruhashya Epimague, Kigali, July 2002

¹¹⁰ The report of the UN Visiting Mission, 1960, p.32

intake of Rwandan officers was in October 1960, which included Col Ruhashya Epimaque and Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a future president of Rwanda.¹¹¹

The GTR was constructed to be Hutu dominated, given their superior number in the Rwandan population. As Col. Bem Logiest Guy – the Belgian Special Resident (Governor) in Rwanda – put it in his book *Mission au Rwanda*, “I deemed it necessary to rapidly put in place a local military force officially composed of 14% Tutsi and 86% Hutu but in effect and for practical purposes 100% Hutu.”¹¹² The GTR was supposed to have the strength of 1,200 officers and men. In deployment each territoire (district), ten at the time, would have a platoon of 50 soldiers and a battalion intervention force comprising of 700 officers and men.¹¹³

In the recruitment and enlistment of men to the GTR, a system called *Pignet* was introduced. It was used to sift the “able” from the “unfit” according to their body sizes. For instance, for one to qualify he or she had to score at least 5 or less points of *pignet*. It worked on a formula that took the measurement of the height of the recruit in centimeters, less the sum of breadth of the chest in centimeters, plus the weight in kilogrammes. This system of recruitment favoured the short and stocky Hutu identities to the exclusion of the taller and slender Tutsi identities. The assumption here was that the shorter and stockier the better the military material, which is not scientifically sustainable.¹¹⁴

The Post-Colonial Military

The *pignet* system carried on even after independence. And to perfect the purity of the Hutu identity within the military, Hutu officers were barred from marrying Tutsi wives. Colonel Ruhashya Epimaque, the only Tutsi Colonel in the Hutu-nised military between 1960 and 1992, gives the example of how one Muramutsa Joachim, a Hutu officer of Second Promotion of 1964, who had a Tutsi fiancé, was barred from proceeding for further studies in Belgium.¹¹⁵

Despite the *pignet* system and outlawing the marrying of Tutsi women, the Hutu

¹¹¹ Research interview with Col Ruhashya Epimaque, Ibid.

¹¹² Logiest G, *Mission au Rwanda*, Didier Hatier, Bruxelles, 1988 p.65

¹¹³ Ruhashya Epimaque, Ibid

¹¹⁴ Bernard Logan, *Histoire du Rwanda, de la préhistoire à nos jours*, Bartillat, 1997, pp 547-557

¹¹⁵ Jean Paul Harroy, *Rwanda*, Bruxelles, 1984, pp.24-32

ideologues in the military were still not satisfied. The emphasis, therefore, was shifted to recruiting soldiers from the northern Prefectures of Byumba, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, which in the 1959 so-called revolution were "cleansed" of Tutsi identities and were known to have had less intermarriages. This discrimination resulted in a northern Hutu dominated army. This facilitated and animated the 1973 military *coup d'état* under General Habyarimana who would rule Rwanda until the eve of the genocide, in 1994.¹¹⁶

Much as it was not nationally Rwandan but a Hutu military, its training, mission and orientation continued to be colonial. In the years after independence, the Belgian officers continued to serve in military both in command and training. The first African Chief of Staff was Major General Habyarimana who assumed office in 1965.

How the post-independence military related to the population may best be defined by the 1959 Hutu Revolution, which engendered perennial pogroms. These were perpetrated by the Hutu military against the Tutsi population wherever there were armed attacks from Tutsi exiles. For instance, between March 1961 to November 1966 there were a dozen such attacks that were significant. A case in point is the repression that followed the raid of March 25, 1962 on the commune of Nkana in the prefecture of Byumba, when four Hutu (including one policeman and two civil servants) were killed and the communal cash box stolen. About a month earlier, a similar raid on the communes of Mugira and Gatunda, also in the region of Byumba, had resulted in the death of two policemen. Apparently exasperated by these repeated acts of terrorism, the Hutu population of Byumba decided to teach the *inyenzi* (cockroaches) a lesson. On March 26 and 27, between 1,000 and 2,000 Tutsi men, women and children were massacred and buried on the spot, their huts burned and pillaged and their property divided among the Hutu population.¹¹⁷

Inyenzi in Kinyarwanda means cockroach, a despised insect for its dirty habits and nocturnal activities. It was used to dehumanize all the Tutsi people and make it easier to exterminate them the way one would an insect to clean one's immediate environment with self-righteousness and without any sense of guilt. In order to be entrenched in the psyche of the Hutu masses, it was authored by Msgr Andre Perraudin and Col. Bem Logiest Guy. This underscores yet another joint conspiracy between the

¹¹⁶ Kagame A, Un abregé de l'histoire du Rwanda, op.cit. p.183

church and the colonial authorities against the Rwandan people. This equation of the Tutsi to *inyenzi* would again effectively inform the future genocidaires in the 1994 genocide.¹¹⁸

Not being fully Rwandan meant that the military could not serve the national interest. Indeed, due to its narrow interests, the military would further degenerate into not just a northern Hutu military, but mutated into a district oriented military to entrench the ruling dictatorship, before becoming a clan-based military that would end up being a family feud. It is this that would see the end of the Habyrimana regime.

Further compounding Habyarimana's military, political and socio-economic problems, was an armed struggle against the government. On 1st October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered the north-east of the country from Uganda, thus launching an armed struggle against the regime. The movement was composed of Rwandan refugees who were scattered in neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the world.

The RPF/A demanded the implementation of the rule of law, the abolition of the policy of ethnic and regional discrimination, and the right for refugees to return to their motherland. With the military assistance of France and Zaire, the advance of the RPA was halted. After that, the RPA installed itself in the North from where it launched a guerrilla war.¹¹⁹

The war marked the beginning of remote-controlled massacres of Tutsi by the authorities, which characterized the four years of armed hostilities. There were massacres in Kibilira, in Gisenyi Prefecture (mid-October 1990), those of the Tutsi in the Mutara war zone and the massacres of January 1991 in Ruhengeri Prefecture and Bugesera in 1992.

In response to the RPF/A invasion, the 5,000 man FAR rapidly expanded with French training assistance to nearly 30,000 by 1993. The Presidential Guard and Hutu extremist militias MRND's *Interahamwe* and *Impunzamugambi*, who comprised the main perpetrators of the genocide and preceding political violence, emerged during the

¹¹⁷ Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda, Op.cit. p.219

¹¹⁸ The report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events/OAU, Paragraph 3.14

¹¹⁹ Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending and mastering African Conflicts, op.cit. pp.158-164

expansion. France, Egypt and South Africa provided the bulk of the arms used to equip the expanded army and militias.¹²⁰

In July, 1992 after the attack of Byumba by the RPF/A, a ceasefire monitored by the Organization of African Unity was put in place. This formed the beginning of the protracted Arusha peace negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF.

Arusha was an African initiative in which both the OAU and several African states played a central role. The President of Tanzania was the facilitator of the process. But western nations were involved as well, including just about every party that should have some presence. All told, this included Belgium, Germany, France, and the US; the relevant regional actors – Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi; as well as the appropriate regional and international organizations – the UN, the UN High Commission for Refugees and, perhaps most importantly, the OAU. The OAU was instrumental not only in bringing the parties to the bargaining table, but also in setting an agenda that addressed the root causes of the conflict.

In a series of separate negotiations, all the major issues were tackled: the establishment of the rule of law and a culture of human rights, power sharing in all public institutions, the transitional arrangements that would obtain until elections were held, the repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of internally displaced persons, and the integration of the two opposing armies.

The Arusha Protocol III on military integration was the most difficult part of the negotiations, as it was based on ethnically perceived quotas that would still ensure the Hutu domination of the military. For instance, the RPF/A were allotted 40% of the men in the military, and the FAR 60% on the understanding that the former were Tutsi and the latter Hutu.¹²¹

Following new massacres of several thousand Tutsi in the North-west of the country in 1993, and following Habyarimana's declaration over the radio qualifying the Peace Agreement as a useless piece of paper, the RPA launched a major offensive on

¹²⁰ Richard Orth, *Four Variables in preventive Diplomacy: Their Application in the Rwanda Case*, Journal of Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, Spring 1997

¹²¹ The report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events/OAU, Paragraph 8.4 – 8.5

8th February 1993. The Government defense lines were completely overrun and the RPA, which had advanced towards the capital city, stopped its advance and then withdrew from the gained territory under strong international pressure. The regime was in total disarray and the show of force by the RPA pushed the hardline wing of the MRND to accelerate the process of branding the war as an ethnic conflict. The President multiplied efforts to divide the opposition by buying off or threatening certain leaders so that they join the Hutu coalition, which would unite as one body behind the president and the army. At the time, the creation and militarization of *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias accelerated.¹²²

On 6th April 1994, a regional summit of heads of State had been summoned in Dar es Salaam during which, it would seem, President Habyarimana had finally yielded to the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. On his way back to Kigali, the presidential plane was hit by two missiles in the neighbourhood of Kigali airport. No final proof has yet been produced to identify the perpetrators of that crime in which the president and his entourage perished.

On 9th April 1994, Col. Theoneste Bagosora became the *de facto* head of State. His government was composed of MRND members and the leaders of the opposition *pawa* factions. The government organized, supported and actively encouraged the implementation of the genocide. From the beginning of April to the beginning of July 1994, in less than one hundred days, about one million Tutsi were massacred.

The most devastating political consequence of the genocide was the relic and the continuation of the genocide project. In June 1994 the genocide forces (ex-Rwandan armed forces and militia) and their political and administrative leaders started to flee before the advance of the RPA. The others crossed to Burundi and Tanzania. In Zaire political and military mobilization continued the work of indoctrinating hundreds of thousands of refugees in the camps.

Military training was carried out in the camps and a 100,000-strong force was at the point of being formed when the RPA decided to intervene. Following the incapacity of the international community to separate the genocide leaders from refugees, the RPA intervened militarily in October 1996 in order to bring an end to that threat and to enable

¹²² Adebayo Adedeji, *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts*, Op.cit. p.161

refugees to come back home.¹²³

In November and December 1996 and January 1997, the greater part of the refugees in Congo, Tanzania and Burundi had been repatriated. After a few months of peace, the genocidal force started a guerrilla war in May 1997 in the north-western part of the country by attacking security forces and massacring Tutsi peasants in the region. Following a strong riposte, those forces which had reaffirmed their objective to eliminate the Tutsi, stopped attacking security forces only to massacre the Tutsi civilians and commit terrorist attacks targeting local authorities.

That continuation of the genocide plan through guerrilla action and terrorism cost the lives of hundreds of civilians on the one hand, and obliged the government to maintain a costly security action, both in terms of human and financial resources, on the other. In terms of conflict management the captured rebels in the counter insurgency operations were integrated in the RPA. This resulted into the stabilization of the north and saw the end of insurgency in May/June 2001.

¹²³ The Cycle of Conflict: Which Way out in the Kivus, African Rights, London 2000, p.5

CHAPTER THREE

The RPF/A as a National Institution

Introduction

Chapter One noted that the logic of *Kamere y' uRwanda* ensured a standard mode of behavior and conformity within the wider Rwandan society. This chapter explains how the concept of *Rwandanicity* informed the RPF/A ideology, on which it is anchored as a national institution. The chapter will also examine how Rwandan culture, customs and values bonded the society. In this context, it will examine the institution of the monarchy, which was central in enhancing common identity.

It will finally be argued that *Rwandanicity* was inculcated through military training, and that it was the vehicle used by the RPF/A in the mobilization of resources for the liberation struggle.

The RPF/A Ideology

Nationalism, couched in the concept of *Rwandanicity*, informs the RPF/A ideology. It is rooted in Rwanda's past in the role of the pre-colonial military in inculcating social stabilization and cohesion. As was noted in Chapter Two, the military formed the vanguard of *Rwandanicity* through its institutions, such as the *Amatorero* that were at the lowest rank, and social initiation schools that graduated boys into adulthood.

In the early eighties, the precursor of the RPF, the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) managed to operate clandestinely in Nairobi through the *Intore* Association that was registered as a welfare group with the Government of Kenya. The

Association drew its name from the *Intore*, which other than traditionally being an initiation school, was also a cultural vehicle that actualized *Rwandanicity*. Adopting this, Rwandans in the Diaspora in Kenya were able to organize a political movement that would later become the RPF and mobilize Rwandans to liberate their country. Among the prominent leaders of the *Intore* Association then were Brig. Charles Muhire, the Chief-of-Staff of the Rwandan Airforce and the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cyprian Gatete, who was the treasurer of the Association.¹²⁴

Even during the NRM/NRA struggle in Uganda, the Rwandan spirit and identity would be manifested amongst the Rwandans in the NRA through the *Intore* tradition, which was expressed through dance and tales that told of personal triumphs and bravery in war (*Ibyivugo*). The late Major General Rwigema Gisa – himself an accomplished *intore* – excelled in those attributes that inspired the other Rwandans, even those who had not come out in the open about their Rwandan heritage. That facilitated organization within the NRA without raising any suspicions.¹²⁵ This *Rwandanicity* continues to inspire the RPA in its vanguard role of post-genocide reconstruction of Rwanda.

The RPF/A and the Re-birth of *Rwandanicity*

The RPF is often described in Kinyarwanda as *Umuryango w' Abanyarwanda* (the large family of the nation of Rwanda). As a matter of priority in the reconstruction of post-genocide Rwanda, the Government of National Unity abolished the national identity cards that erroneously ethnicised Rwandans into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.¹²⁶ And in the

¹²⁴ Research Interview with Cyprian Gatete, ACP, Kigali, July 2002

¹²⁵ Research Interview with Lt Col. F.M. Muzungu, Kigali, July 2002

¹²⁶ The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Chapter One, Article 11

concept of *Rwandanicity*, as defined in Chapter Two, it manifests itself into a common national identity and bondage that characterized the pre-colonial Rwandan society. Whether one was perceived a “Tutsi” or a “Hutu” it was incumbent upon him or her to live the ideals of *Rwandanicity*. And this, really, is what gave a common identity to all the Rwandans.

That common identity was embraced in 18 common clans (see table below) amongst the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi in the social fabric that was actualized through division of labour. For instance, the construct of the “Tutsi” in the traditional Rwandan society expressed the notion of pastoralism as a socially superior economic activity, which prized cattle as capital and currency that aided social relations. On the other hand, “Hutu” denoted agriculturalism. Any Rwandan, therefore, could be a Tutsi or a Hutu depending on his social economic activity.¹²⁷

Table 1.0

| | | |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| Abasinga | Abazigaba | Abagesera |
| Abasindi | Ababanda | Abanyiginya |
| Abega | Abacyaba | Abungura |
| Abashambo | Abatsobe | Abakono |
| Abaha | Abashingo | Abanyakarama |
| Abasita | Abongera | Abenengwe |

According to Bishop Kanyamacumbi Patient of Goma, a scholar of the Rwandan society, some of the present Tutsi or Hutu constructs do not have corresponding ancestors in their lineage. Kanyamacumbi therefore urges that ethnic identity that can be dusted off the individual is no ethnicity at all. Given the fluidity in social status that would make any Rwandan to be of one construct or another goes a long way to prove that Tutsi, Hutu or even Twa never existed as distinct ethnic identities.¹²⁸ For instance, the *Abasyete* sub-clan of the present Tutsi identity traces its origin to a Twa named Busyete who was *Tutsi-fied* by Cyilima II Rugujira towards the end of the 17th Century.¹²⁹

The three identities found expression through the institution of the monarchy. The King (*Umwami*) had neither tribe, nor clan. On enthronement, he ceased to be a member of any clan or tribe. This signified that he was king of all Rwandan despite any differences that might be - Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. The monarch in Rwanda epitomised justice and was the representative of all the people of Rwanda. If for any reason one cried and sent an SOS, and say, *Rubanda rw'Umwami ndarengana* (I swear in the name of the king, I am offended, please come to my rescue) everybody came to their aid with the words, *Kiriz' Umwami* (save him in the name of the King).¹³⁰

Rubanda rw'Umwami was later corrupted by Hutu extremists, the "genocidaires" in 1994 into *Rubanda Nyamwishi* (Hutu majority) as a rallying call for extermination of the Tutsi. The original *rubanda rw'Umwami* was an SOS call that rallied the community around the distressed Rwandan in the name of the king, while the latter *rubanda*

¹²⁷ Bernard Lugan, *Histoire du Rwanda, de la pre-histoire a nos jours*, op.cit. pp.547-557

¹²⁸ Kanyamacumbi P, "Le Conflits Ethniques en Afrique interlacustre, in *Cahiers Lumiere et Societe* No.20, December 2001, pp.26-53

¹²⁹ Kagame A, *Les Milices du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, Butare-IRSAC, 1962, pp.41

¹³⁰ Kagame A, *Le Code des Institutions Politique du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, op.cit. p.41

nyamwishi was a corrupted rallying call to bring together a “distressed majority” to exterminate a “minority”.¹³¹

The King was also known as *Sebantu* (the supreme patriarch of all peoples and clans in the country). He was the ultimate proprietor of all lands and cows in the hands of the large family of the nation (*Umuryango w’Abanyarwanda*). The King was also the guarantor of personal wealth and health of all. Common greetings in Kinyarwanda, in fact, emphasized this guarantee from the King by saying *Gir’ Umwami* (Greetings in the name of the King). The king would be the final arbitrator in case of any dispute. The saying was that “The King does not kill, it is his entourage who are the conspirators (*Ntihic ‘Umwami, hica rubanda*.)” This emphasized that he was above personal, petty issues and trivialities in the society. He was the caretaker of justice among his people in matters of property and was easily accessible to all.

Rene Lemarchand quotes Msgr Leon Classe, one of Rwanda’s first Apostolic Vicars, account of King Kigeli IV Rwabugili’s reign: “Rwabugili was a conquering monarch, benevolent towards the masses, ruthless towards the Batutsi. The masses loved him because anyone could approach him and lay his claims and grievances before him.”¹³²

The religious institution was also of great importance, as it ensured social cohesion and was expressed in every aspect of life, including the military. Rwanda, in this sense, was God given. It was God privileged and, in fact, God was a resident of

¹³¹ Mamdani M, *When Victims Become Killers*, op.cit. p.34

¹³² Rene Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, op.cit. p.20

Rwanda. He spent the whole day elsewhere but at night came to Rwanda (*Imana yilirwa ahandi igataha i'Rwanda*).¹³³

Rwanda in the minds of the people was invincible and inviolable. It could not be attacked or occupied, and was eternal. It was always there and would be there forever. One of the Kinyarwanda saying is that *Agakambye ugatega u Rwanda*: whatever will happen, whatever the problems, the people of Rwanda are resilient and will always overcome.

When we say that Rwanda is invincible or could not be attacked, how this was manifested was especially in the military from their strategic and tactical point of view in terms of how they related to other states. The saying was that "Rwanda was never attacked, but will always take the initiative" (*U Rwanda rutatera ntiruterwa*). While securing the state of Rwanda, it was never put in a defensive position in guaranteeing the security of the state. Although this was a common thought throughout the period, the saying is credited to King Cyilima II Rugujira towards the end of the 17th Century.¹³⁴

In *Rwandanicity*, what held the Rwandans together were the patriotic values that were often encapsulated in religion under one God resident in Rwanda (*Imana y'I Rwanda*). Every Rwandan was mobilized to defend Rwanda without question. Before any military expedition took place, Rwandans asked their God for blessings and permission to go ahead. If that did not happen, that expedition would not take place. Otherwise with God's blessing they were sure to win the war.

It may seem, however, that *Imana y' i Rwanda* (the God of Rwanda) deserted His people with the advent of colonialism and its superior military technology. And with the

¹³³ Bigirimwami Aloys Imihango, *Imigenzo n' Imizilizo*, op.cit. p.43

¹³⁴ Muzungu B, *Cahiers Lumiere et Societe - Poesie Traditionnelle, Ibisigo*, No.21, op.cit. p.25

Christian God ready to take over, all that remained was an ideology to explain away *Rwandanicity* and its ideals as pagan and primitive.

In the period from 1910 to 1940, the White Fathers, led by Msgr. Leon Classe, developed the Hamitic ideology. Classe and his acolytes then re-wrote Rwandan history to conform to it, designating the Tutsis as Hamites, inventing a Christian origin for them, and arguing that they were “lapsed” Ethiopians destined for a privileged place in Christian evangelism.¹³⁵ The theory coincided neatly with colonial anthropologists’ quest for racial topologies – Tutsis were on the whole taller, thinner, and more “European-looking” than Hutus.

This Hamitic hypothesis legitimized a rigid pseudo-racial hierarchy, which had profound and long-reaching political consequences. The elevation of the Tutsi meant the relegation of the Hutu to the status of Bantu serfs, and of the Twa to the lowest position. Under the Belgians, Tutsi dominance was extended; Tutsi powers and privileges intensified and the entire population was required to be registered as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.¹³⁶ Such was the slender basis of this formal racial classification that the authorities were obliged to use cattle ownership as their criterion – people with ten cows were Tutsi (in perpetuity); those with fewer were Hutu. These same ID cards informed the 1994 killers whom to kill and whom to spare.¹³⁷

To reverse the effects of the divisive Hamitic ideology that had led to the genocide, the RPF/A had to recapture *Rwandanicity*. Some of the values and the philosophy behind pre-colonial community mobilization and military expeditions were adopted and assimilated by the RPF/A in recapturing the glory of Rwanda.

¹³⁵ Leon Delmas, *Genealogies de la Noblesse (Les Batutsi) de Rwanda, Kabgayi*, 1950, pp.1-6

¹³⁶ Classe L, “Les Populations du Rwanda” in *Congo, Revue generale de la colonie belge*, May 1922, pp.3-5

***Rwandanicity* as an RPF/A Vehicle for Mobilization**

Indeed, *Rwandanicity* was the vehicle that inspired Rwandans to struggle for liberation. This liberation called for the mobilization of Rwandans in the diaspora and within the country to deconstruct the oppressive and violent machinery that had been put in place during the colonial and post-colonial regimes.

The Hutu ideology and its colonial precursor that marginalized and disenfranchised the rest of Rwanda, thereby denying them their *Rwandanicity*, was a great crime unprecedented in the history Rwanda. As was observed in Chapter Two, due to the belief of the Rwandans of the past that theirs was the best country, the exclusion of a section of the community amounted to a denial of their citizenship to that “Garden of Eden-like” country, which demanded immediate redress even if it meant armed struggle.

As observed earlier, King Ruganzu II Ndoli claimed back his *Rwandanicity* after being banished into exile. Since then there has “never been permanent exile for a Rwandan” (*nta munyarwanda uhera imahanga*).

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda admits that before and during the NRA struggle “Rwanda was always at the back of our mind. I joined the NRA to acquire skills and help other Rwandans to join.”¹³⁸ This contextualizes the concept of *Rwandanicity* in the minds of Rwandans in the diaspora, which informed and sustained their struggle through the RPF/A.

The ultimate aim of the struggle and its manifestation in the current Government

¹³⁷ Kanyamacumbi P, *Les Conflits ethniques en Afrique interlacustre*, op.cit. p.26-50

¹³⁸ Interview with *The Monitor*, Kampala, December 19, 1997

of National Unity in Rwanda, was to borrow and actualize *Rwandanicity* as a heritage in articulating a common national identity. This details the process and the culmination of the ideal in conflict management for a country beset by total state collapse leading to the 1994 genocide.

The process it took that was to later inform the struggle to win back the “Rwanda at the back of our minds”, President Kagame recalls his visits to the country in 1978 and 79: “I was involved in a number of things, mostly I managed to sneak into Rwanda, spent some time with relatives in Butare. I was looking around and learning a few things. I was a student. I looked young, so no one suspected me. I went to Zaire, traveled through Goma, Rutshuro so that I had more or less a picture of the situation around.”¹³⁹

President Kagame, was out to rediscover himself – his Rwandan-ness, which would inspire him to wage an armed struggle to liberate his country. In order to succeed, there had to be mobilization of resources for the war effort. This entailed rallying Rwandans in the diaspora through dances and other cultural activities, which served to actualize *Rwandanicity* by bringing them together for a common cause.

The RPF/A cultural troupe, *Indahemuka*, which derives its name from the military formation *Abadahemuka* during the reign of Cyilima II Rujugira towards the end of the 17th Century, played an important role in galvanizing Rwandans in the diaspora to finance the war effort. Another cultural troupe, which served a similar purpose was the *Imitali* based in Brussels, Belgium. It derives its name from the military formation of the same name during the reign of Mibambwe II Gisanura in the 17th Century. This underscores the continued vanguard role played by the pre-colonial military in actualizing *Rwandanicity*.

This mobilization also included artists and musicians in the diaspora, such as Ms Cecil Kayirebwa based in Brussels. Indeed, her song *Inganzo y'umunezero*, which would later serve as a signature tune for RPF Radio *Muhabura*, was something akin to a national anthem in the RPA training schools. The song captured the essence of Rwanda as though in a painting, detailing the landscape, the people, the heroes, the culture and values and rooting them in Rwanda. It was a strong vehicle of *Rwandanicity* from an artist's perspective, which inspired patriotism and brought *Kamere y' I Rwanda* to the fore.

The Rwandan artists, poets and cultural performers illustrate a long-standing tradition in which *Rwandanicity* was captured and transmitted through narrativization. To Dr Katumanga, narrativization was used by the RPF to acquire its own legitimacy and ideology.¹⁴⁰ RPF outlined Rwandan history in a bid to cast it in what it considered a realistic perspective. The narrativisation of the past glory of Rwanda was passed around in order to create a sense of belonging to a community and history that transcended the experience of conflict.¹⁴¹

The RPF struggle was not only informed by *Rwandanicity*, but was also defined by the traditional institutions and practices in the pre-colonial period that actualized the state of Rwanda. The practice of *Abacengeli*, for instance, which demanded spilling blood in self-sacrifice for the country, expressed the highest level of patriotism and was demanded of every Rwandan, including the king. In fact, among the first *Abacengeli* was King Ruganzu I Bwimba and his sister, Princess Robwa, who died in Gisaka in the 14th

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Katumanga M, Ph.D Thesis, 2002

¹⁴¹ Eric Hobsbawn and Terrence Ranger (ed) *The Inversion of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 1993

Century in defense of Rwanda.¹⁴²

Mamdani speaks of meeting a senior RPA commander in Kigali in 1995. This is what the commander put to him: "You stake your life and at the end of the day you recognise that no amount of contribution can make you what you are not. You can't buy it, not even with your blood."¹⁴³

To Mamdani, the question was what had happened to leave such a bitter after taste. What the RPA commander implied within the context of *Rwandanicity*, was that it was only Rwanda that was worth his blood. It reflects the saying in Kinyarwanda: *wima igihugu (Rwanda) amaraso, imbwa sikayanywera ubusa* (when you deny your country blood, then the dogs take it for free).

That was the level of mobilization of the RPF/A at the beginning of the struggle, to which President Kagame recognizes in the following words, "Much as there was a big commitment for sacrifice to join the struggle and sacrifice themselves, the problem was organization, people met from different areas and simply wanted to do things together but lacked organization. For war, you need room to figure out who is doing what, how and why."¹⁴⁴

Given that commitment and determination which patriotism demands, deserting from the frontline in the RPF/A struggle was the worst crime any Rwandan could commit. One who was discovered to be a deserter would not be accepted back into society. An example is given of a deserter who escaped from the frontline in 1991 and returned to Southern Africa to join his family. He was shocked when his Rwandan wife disowned him and collaborated with the local RPF cell to return him to the front. Another

¹⁴² Muzungu B, *Histoire du Rwanda Pre-colonial*, op.cit. pp.336-337

¹⁴³ Mamdani M, *When Victims Become Killers*, op.cit. p.174

deserter returned to Rwanda and landed a good job with an international organization, but he remains traumatized for having deserted the struggle, and needs occasional reassurance and counselling in order to cope.¹⁴⁵

On the other hand, Major General Rwigema Gisa, who was the first Chairman of RPF and Commander-In-Chief of the RPA, and who died on the second day of the invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990, is recognized as a national hero for his vision and leadership and the act of selflessly putting his life at risk for his country.

In the context of *Rwandanicity*, the blood of Major General Rwigema may be likened to that of *abacengeli*, which demanded spilling blood and fighting for it in the name of Rwanda. This symbolises the fact that the original Rwanda had been desecrated by colonialism and Christianity, and created the future genocidaires, and had to be redeemed through armed struggle.

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The Formation of the RPA as A National Institution

The endurance of *Rwandanicity* manifests itself in the formation of the RPA. Indeed, the RPA struggle and organization was started by refugees in Uganda, especially those who had fled the 1959 and the early sixties pogroms, when they were still young children. That endurance is further emphasized by the fact that most of the fighting forces were born in exile, but fought to proclaim their Rwandan-ness. Driven by a lack of belonging and perpetual persecution for being exiles in their host communities, nurtured their *Rwandanicity*.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with *The Monitor*, op.cit.

¹⁴⁵ Research interview with Major Jill Rutaremara, Kigali, July 2002

Indeed, it was during the second Obote regime and its expulsion and harassment of the Rwandans in Uganda in 1982 that concretized this *Rwandanicity*.¹⁴⁶ When Obote expelled the *Banyarwanda*, a new sense of nationalism of the Rwandans was born through the harassment of not only the Rwandan refugees, but also of Ugandans of Rwandan descent. Not only the Tutsi identities were expelled, but all the Rwandan identities living in Uganda. Around this time, Uganda's NRA was waging war in the Luwero Triangle, where Rwandan emigrants had settled for decades.

With the war in the Luwero Triangle, and the government response in harassing the communities there, the reaction was a banding together of the victimized Rwandan settlers to join Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA). As Mamdani puts it, "The Obote regime, in turn, baptized the 'Museveni soldiers' as 'Banyarwanda'. The more the repression of the Banyarwanda was stepped up, the more Banyarwanda joined Museveni and the NRA in the bush. The regime's claim was fast turning into a reality."¹⁴⁷

In this case, Obote unconsciously played into the hands of Rwandans by provoking their *Rwandanicity*, thereby giving them an agenda for future action. And when the time came for the Rwandans to liberate themselves in 1990, the RPF/A had all Rwandans responding across the board to fight for their country. Most of the officers and men deserted from the NRA to start the RPF/A struggle. They never looked at themselves as being refugees or Banyarwanda settlers in Uganda, nor referred to their Hutu or Tutsi identities.

The RPF/A started as a national institution, right from the very beginning. Most of the RPA recruits were volunteers, and anybody who chose to join it was welcomed

¹⁴⁶ Mamdani M, *When Victims Become Killers*, op.cit. p.168

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

regardless of their background. By including everyone, the argument was that it was the Rwandan who had complained, and therefore it had to be the Rwandan who had to liberate their country. This underscores the concept of *Rwandanicity*. For instance, at the beginning of the struggle, some officers and men did not know a word of Kinyarwanda, while others had Ugandan names.

This joining together for the same cause, emphasises that *Rwandanicity* goes beyond language and names, despite up-bringing in a different culture. This is typified by the late Lt. Col. Adam Wasswa, who grew up a Ugandan, given his typical Kiganda name, in the Luwero Triangle but who rose through the ranks in the NRA struggle to become a brigade commander. When the Rwandan struggle started in 1990, Lt. Col. Wasswa joined the RPA to the surprise of his colleagues in the NRA who never suspected that he was Rwandan. In his admission to this researcher during the RPA struggle, he was aware of his very roots in Rwanda. In fact, he knew that his ancestral roots were in Secteur Rwimishinya of Commune Rukara, Prefecture Umutara.¹⁴⁸

During the period 1990 to early 1992, most of the RPA recruits were drawn from the Rwandans in the diaspora in Burundi, Tanzania and the Congo. However, after June 1992 the RPA started getting recruits from inside Rwanda during the ceasefire that was part of the Arusha Peace negotiations. This was all in the effort by the RPF/A leaders to Rwanda-nise the military institution as a first step in actualizing *Rwandanicity*.

¹⁴⁸ Discussion with Lt Col Adam Waswa, Muhabura Volcanic Ranges, 1991

CHAPTER FOUR

The RPF/A Process of Military and Social Integration

Introduction

The chapter focuses on the role of the military in the integration and reconstruction of Rwandan society. The RPA was the locomotive force that spearheaded the liberation of Rwanda and the stopping of the genocide. As observed in Chapter Two, the decline of Rwanda began with the advent of colonialism and deteriorated further during the post-colonial period in the first and second republics.

The destruction of the state of Rwanda during these periods was spearheaded by the military, as already observed. In the colonial period, it was first the Congo-Belge *Force Publique Congolaise* (FPC) and the *Garde Territoriale du Rwanda* (GTR). In the post-independence period it was the sectarian and Hutu-nised *Garde Nationale du Rwanda* (GNR) in the first republic and then the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) in the second republic. None of these armed forces had a national ideology or character. No wonder, therefore, they were mid-wives of untold misery and suffering wrought on the Rwandan people.

In liberating the Rwandan people, reconstruction of the state could only begin with the deconstruction of the negative military forces and institutions. According to Clausewitz, "no one starts a war, or rather in his right mind ought to do so without first

being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.”¹⁴⁹

Waging war for the RPA was first and foremost a conflict management strategy aimed at the structures and instruments of state oppression – the military. In the process, the RPA was able to build a national army through the integration and re-integration process of the ex-combatants. This essentially informed the change of name from the RPA to the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF). Indeed, the RDF model entails a departure from the traditional post-conflict management of armed combatants that are merely disarmed and returned to their respective communities.

Background to Integration

With the genocide over, the task that lay ahead was enormous if Rwanda was to find its feet. This had to begin with integration, first within the military and then within the wider society. This was to be done against a grim background. The aftermath of the genocide entailed one million people dead and an entire population displaced internally or having fled as refugees; a divided society with a collapsed socio-economic infrastructure; perpetrators of genocide were defeated, but relocated in the neighbouring countries; an absence of institutions, and a discredited international community whose failure to prevent or stop the genocide made it even more skeptical about Rwanda’s chance to survive as a nation; and relentless efforts by those who had supported the genocidal regimes to support the remnants of the latter to regroup and recapture state power so as to complete the genocide.

¹⁴⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, op.cit. p.579.

Pre-1994 Rwanda typifies the seamless web of causes and effects that very often cloud analysis, and leads to errors of judgment on the part of sometimes an indifferent international community. When this is coupled with confused local actors, usually with vested interests, the consequences can be disastrous. The phenomenon of failed states has its origins in this kind of thinking and practice.¹⁵⁰

It is worth recognizing that whether preventing and managing conflicts is successful will largely depend on elements which are never in large supply, including leadership and institutions. There is a need for leaders and institutions that unite, create and enforce laws and regulations, and embrace diversity. The leaders and institutions should seek to improve the livelihood of all citizens without discrimination, recognize national mandates, look beyond boundaries for a common ground, and progressively work towards shared prosperity and sustained peace.¹⁵¹

It is in the context of this thinking that Rwanda found its defining mission to integrate and re-integrate its people, beginning with the military.

The Process of Integration and Re-integration

In order to move ahead with its mission, the RPA found it necessary to integrate captured ex-FAR soldiers in its fighting forces. For instance, in January 1991, in the attack of the Ruhengeri prison, three senior officers, who Habyarimana had imprisoned as his enemies, were released and joined the RPA ranks. Indeed, two of them became members of the RPA High Command right from the start.

¹⁵⁰ President Paul Kagame, Speech, US Institute of Peace, Washington, May 2003

¹⁵¹ Ibid

The integration and, later on re-integration of the ex-FAR and militias, continues to-date. By the end of the war in July 1994, the RPA had a force of 41,000. Between 1995 and 1997, a total of 10,500 ex-FAR officers and men were re-integrated in the RPF/A. And between 1998 and 2002 a total of 39,200 ex-militia resistors were integrated in the RPF/A. *Table 2.0* details the integration and re-integration of the ex-FAR in the RPF/A from 1994 to 2002.

Table 2.0

| <i>Year</i> | No. of integrated/re-integrated |
|-------------|---------------------------------|
| 1995 | 4,000 |
| 1996 | 1,500 |
| 1997 | 5,000 |
| 1998 | 13,000 |
| 1999 | 14,000 |
| 2000 | 3,200 |
| 2001 | 8,000 |
| | |

| | |
|-------|--------|
| 2002 | 1,000 |
| Total | 49,700 |

The process of integration or re-integration entailed assembling the ex-combatants in reorganization camps or centers, orienting them to national politics, and emphasizing reconciliation and national unity. The concept of the re-organisation camps, which were later called solidarity camps by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), were modelled along the idea of the *Amotorero* of the pre-colonial period. Within the same context these are referred to as *Ingando* (traditional military encampment), implying that the individuals in the solidarity camps are reconstructed using the ideology of *Rwandanicity*.

The NURC was established through an Act of Parliament in 1999 to educate and sensitize Rwandans on the need for reconciliation, create a forum for national dialogue, fight and remove all forms of discrimination, and monitor political parties and the Government to ensure policies and programmes are responsive to reconciliation.

The RPF/A pioneered the *ingando* concept through the integration process of the ex-combatants, but has assumed a national character under the NURC. Indeed, as one of its main vehicles of integration, the *ingando* has been adopted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission for replication in the wider society.

The political commissars of the RPA continue to serve in the solidarity camps under the NURC, both as active staff and as consultants. This underscores the continued facilitative role, beginning in the military to all strata of the society in reconciliation and conflict management.

The *ingando* can also be described as participatory workshops, where the RPA officers and men interact with the ex-FAR officers and men in a process that normally takes a minimum period of two months. According to Mwangiri, any management process by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and do something about their conflict is an important step in conflict management.¹⁵²

Regarding the integration of the militia, the emphasis was not so much in the interaction with the RPA, but on military training and political education, which would take more than six months.

The Socio-political and Economic Impact of Integration

Integration meant being taken on by the RPF/A and being offered gainful employment. In the period 1995 to 2002 nearly 50,000 jobs were created by the military with all the attendant socio-economic benefits to the officers and men and their families. From being a security menace to the society, they were turned into bread-winners for their families, thereby contributing to social stabilization. The resulting enhanced security is the basis for socio-economic development, which is a necessary in-put in reconciliation and conflict management.¹⁵³

The RPA's strategy entails providing a platform to search for ways of building a united and reconciled Rwanda based on the ideals of *Rwandanicity*. Based on the *Ingando* participatory exercises, the RPA set up a civic education programme among others to create awareness, among Rwandans, of the need for reconciliation and reconstruction of a cohesive society. The purpose is to empower the inductees to draw

¹⁵² Mwangiri M, *Conflict: Theory, Practice and Processes*, Nairobi, 2000, p.43

Lessons from the past legacy with a view to rebuilding a united and prosperous country. Participants are equipped with analytical skills and knowledge to enable them understand socio-economic and political events that shaped the present Rwanda.

Participants are encouraged to take individual and collective responsibility in addressing the national challenges. Through such *Ingando*, participants are challenged to understand that unifying factors such as history, language, culture, common heritage and socio-economic challenges provide a common ground on which to address issues of national importance. The stress is on promoting Rwandan identity as a basis for durable peace and development.¹⁵⁴

The *Ingandos* have also been inclusive of the entire society, including the youth joining higher institutions of learning, opinion leaders at the various levels of administration, *Gacaca* judges, returnees and, recently, the provisionally released prisoners. The returnees and released prisoners are prepared for smooth reintegration back in their societies. The *Ingandos* have also lately been used to complement the *Gacaca* legal system. The provisionally released prisoners, for instance, have to pass through the *Ingando* for orientation before they appear in the *Gacaca* courts.¹⁵⁵

The *Ingandos* are restorative and reconciliatory for the participants. The *Ingando's* purpose is to enlighten them on national development, give them space to discuss the causes of genocide and their role in it. They are also encouraged to openly confess and ask for forgiveness before the victims and the community. In the process they are prepared for smooth re-integration back to their communities. During the

¹⁵³ Research interview with CGS James Kabarebe, Kigali, November 2002

¹⁵⁴ Research interview with Capt. Claude Bizimana, Ruhengeri, January 2003

¹⁵⁵ Organic Law No.40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up "Gacaca Jurisdictions", Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 15th March, 2001

Ingando sessions, the information gathered from the participants on their role in the genocide will hopefully add value to the *Gacaca* legal process. While in the *Ingandos*, the participants interact in community programmes such as providing shelter for the victims of Genocide across the board.¹⁵⁶

Integration as a Tool for National Reconciliation and Conflict Management

The interaction within the military between the different identities that formally had been at war with each other offers a role model of reconciliation and national unity to the society at large. The military, which is engendered by teamwork and efforts towards joint goals easily facilitates the attainment of national objectives and aspirations. This is because the military clearly defines the common enemy to the national ideal of guaranteed security. In the case of post-genocide Rwanda, the RPF/A was able to demystify the notion of incompatibility between the Hutu and Tutsi identities through the integration process.¹⁵⁷

As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the former government with its military machinery comprising of the ex-FAR and the militias fled and relocated in Zaire, beginning July 1994. The genocidaires continued with their mission in the Kivu region causing more turmoil that brought in new dimensions to the conflict. This transformation of the conflict in the region was animated by various factors. Firstly, the ex-FAR and the militia forces relocated to the refugee camps with their arms and ammunition, including other military hardware, intact without being disarmed by the host government of Zaire under Mobutu. Secondly, the host government allowed them to continue military training

¹⁵⁶ Research interview with Anglican Bishop Rucyahana, Ruhengeri, February 2003

¹⁵⁷ Research Interview with CGS Maj. Gen. James Kabarebe, op.cit.

and organization within the refugee camps. Thirdly, the international community provided massive humanitarian assistance to the refugees that was transformed to military use.¹⁵⁸

The fourth factor was that the genocidaires formed alliances with the local *Banyarwanda* Hutu to harass the Tutsi including the *Banyamulenge*, and later other known Tutsi communities in the Kivus. To cap it all, the Zaire Government took sides with the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* and massacred the Tutsi, including the *Banyamulenge*, many of whom were forcefully expelled.

All these factors conspired to enable the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* to begin making armed incursions into Rwanda from Kivu in late 1994, with the campaign intensifying in 1995. In October 1996, the RPA intervened to end the menace. This serves as an important example of use of force as a strategy in the conflict management process in post-genocide Rwanda.

After this intervention, the RPA dismantled the refugee camps in north and south Kivu and repatriated nearly 2 million refugees back to Rwanda. Among the repatriated refugees were some ex-FAR and militia. The majority of the armed ex-FAR and militias dispersed and disappeared in the vastness of the Congo. While pursuing the dispersed ex-FAR and militias, the RPA greatly assisted the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (AFDL) to overthrow the Mobutu regime in May 1997, and ushered in the regime of President Laurent Kabila.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ The report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events/OAU, Paragraph 19.22

¹⁵⁹ African Rights: The Cycle of Conflict - Which Way out in the Kivus? London 2002, pp.3-6

Even as this regime change was taking place in Zaire, the first priority for Rwanda was the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees back in their country – an important step in the conflict management process in post-genocide Rwanda. To begin with, the very act of repatriation provided safe passage of the refugees to their original homes and villages. It also built confidence and rapport between the refugees and the RPA, who had earlier fled the country in the belief that the RPA was the enemy. Another important aspect was the RPA overseeing their peaceful resettlement and re-insertion back into their communities. This entailed an assurance of security and mediation in disputes over property and other scarce resources.

The model the RPF/A employed was based on the precepts of realism and power politics paradigm. The primary concern of the realist approach is power politics, which asserts that peace, other than a temporary absence of violence (i.e., negative peace) cannot exist. The traditional realist approach to conflict management, therefore, involves compromise and settlement, which rests ultimately on elements of power and coercion.¹⁶⁰ The other traditional approach is based on structural conflict theory, which concentrates all efforts at conflict management exclusively on economic and political reconstruction.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ J. Burton, *Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict* (Virginia: University Press of America, 1987), p.5; M. Banks, 'The International Relations Discipline: Assets or Liability for Conflict Resolution?', pp.51-70 and A. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,' pp.71-74, in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London: Macmillan, 1990).

¹⁶¹ See among others, M. Brown, 'Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict,' in M. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-27; 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,' in M. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp.571-603; M. Ross, *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); T. Woodhouse, 'Commentary: Negotiating a New Millennium? Prospects for African Conflict Resolution,' in *Review of African Political Economy* (N° 68, 1996), pp.

The model notwithstanding, all was not smooth, as isolated incidents of insurgency began after the mass repatriation and resettlement in November 1996. They would develop into a full-blown, organized insurgency in May/June 1997 after the fall of Mobutu. The growth of the insurgencies can be traced back to the massive repatriation that included armed ex-FAR and militia.¹⁶²

Counter-insurgency measures taken by the government forces, which included the integrated forces, were yet another conflict management strategy. By this time, the integrated forces and their Hutu and Tutsi identities gave more assurance to the population that had earlier been fed on the divisive Hutu extremist propaganda.

The intensification of the insurgency in 1997 entailed the spread of insecurity from the northwest to some parts of western and central Rwanda. The government response was to intensify counter-insurgency operations that saw the ex-FAR and the militia withdrawing back to Congo in 1998. In August of the same year, the RPA re-launched its campaigns in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in pursuit of the fled insurgents as a continuation of the conflict management strategy. This marked the beginning of the end of insurgency in Rwanda that saw its conclusion in May, 2000.

The end of insurgency in Rwanda coincided with the increased integration and re-integration of 30,000 ex-FARs and militia by the year 2000. The insurgency was mostly in northwestern Rwanda and most of the integrated militias came from the region – a process that resulted in pacification in the area. This underscores the efficacy of the integration process as a tool for conflict management. Thus the RPF/A model of conflict

129-137; S. Van Evera, 'Hypothesis on Nationalism and War,' in *International Security* (Vol.18, N° 4, Spring 1994), pp. 8-9.

¹⁶² African Rights – Rwanda: *The Insurgency in the Northwest*, London, 1998, pp.1-5

management, which is predicated on forming a national military as required by *Rwandanicity*.¹⁶³

When the RPA re-launched into Congo after August 1998, it necessitated an increased deployment of officers and men. That foreign milieu provided a conducive environment for further bonding among the integrated forces serving a common cause for Rwanda. It also re-inforced their sense of patriotism and nationalism. It was indeed this active politicization and socialization that furthered the common cause for Rwanda, and re-inforced their sense of patriotism and nationalism. It was also active politicization and socialization that enhanced their bonding through practicing the theories they learnt from the *ingando*. The working together among the soldiers from different identities and backgrounds further cemented their solidarity and comradeship. On returning home after their tour of duty in the Congo, they influenced change within their respective communities and demystified hitherto perceived animosities between the different identities.

The *Ingandos* formed were the main problem solving mechanisms. The *Ingando* workshops helped the parties redefine their situation, facilitate a mutual understanding of each other, and identify the grievances, perceptions, and values of the parties and disputes. "Creative problem-solving searches for ways of redefining, fractioning, or transcending the conflict so that positive-sum, or win/win solutions, which leave both parties better off, can be discovered."¹⁶⁴ In short, the psychological barriers of suspicion, rejection, fear and deception are changed through the *Ingandos* by injecting knowledge

¹⁶³ Research Interview with the CGS Maj Gen James Kabarebe, op.cit.

¹⁶⁴ H. Kelman, 'Interactive Problem-Solving: a Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution,' in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, op.cit., pp. 201.

and experience about conflict, conflict behaviour, and psychology into the socio-political relationships. Herbert Kelman, a professor of psychology and conflict resolution, argues that "As long as the psychological barriers persist, the parties are locked into rigid assumptions and postures rooted in past history."¹⁶⁵

Thus, integration through the *Ingandos* entailed refocusing the individual from being a manipulated tool of negative forces into an *imfura y' i Rwanda* (from a genocidaire to being an agent of social change and development) actualizing the ideals of a patriotic Rwandan. With this transformation, the RPA has been able to mediate the various conflicts that characterized the deconstruction of pre-genocide Rwanda.

As the country continues to heal, a few lessons can be drawn. It must be recognized that conflict is an outward manifestation of underlying causes. As such, any conflict resolution or management process that is based on treating signs is palliative and is doomed to fail sooner or later.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, the argument is that conflicts are rarely resolved because their underlying causes are ill-defined and too narrowly conceived. Hence, the means and traditional methods employed to manage and resolve them inadequate or insufficient. Michael Banks noted that "we live in a world in which conflict is rarely understood and often mismanaged." A causal link should rather be established; conflict is often mismanaged as it is misunderstood.¹⁶⁷

Stephen Van Evera indicated that "Regimes that face overwhelming tasks - e.g., economic or social collapse - will be tempted to use myths to divert popular impatience

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p.203

¹⁶⁶ President Paul Kagame, Speech, US Institute of Peace, op.cit.

¹⁶⁷ M Banks, quoted in M. Rabie, *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity*, London: Praeger, 1994, p.11

with their inability to improve conditions."¹⁶⁸ The conditions in Rwanda - increasing poverty, fear of domination and threat of war - accentuated the receptivity of mythmaking by the people. The Hutu were more amenable to believe that 'others' were responsible for their pain. In this respect, the economic situation played the role of what Rothschild called "internal magnifier of enemy idea."¹⁶⁹ The Hutu propaganda was obviously also responsible for scapegoating and dehumanising the Tusti. The threat of war, combined with fear of domination, also played an important role in further dehumanising the 'evil other,' the RPF, and the whole Tutsi population.¹⁷⁰

The prevalence of such an anti-Tutsi atmosphere was indubitably inflamed by extremist propaganda and a burdensome structural socio-economic situation, but the genocidal mentality was a product of a longer and much more complex process. As Ross observed, "Objective situations alone do not cause overt conflict: the interpretation of such situations is central."¹⁷¹ These internal mental interpretations are the result of early social experiences (pre-colonial and colonial) reinforced through culturally sanctioned messages and experiences (notably the 1972 genocide of Hutu in Burundi), as well as through recent objective situations (socio-economic problems, threat of war). Actors are thus conditioned by experiences, fears, and belief system to act aggressively

¹⁶⁸ S. Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,' *op.cit.*, p.31.

¹⁶⁹ D. Rothschild and A. Groth, 'Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity,' in *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol 110, N0.1), 1995, pp.73-76.

¹⁷⁰ V. Volkan, 'Psychoanalytic Aspects of Ethnic Conflicts,' in J. Montville (ed), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), p.89.

¹⁷¹ M. Ross, *The Management of Conflict*, *op.cit.*, p.27.

and to even try to exterminate a whole ethnic population. They act in that way at present by fear of the future, lived through the past."¹⁷²

A serious, rational enquiry into the causes of conflict in Rwanda almost invariably points a finger to bad governance, which in turn gets reflected in the dire socio-political and economic performance during the pre-genocide period.¹⁷³

The government of national unity is working within the regional framework to promote cooperation and economic integration. And, at the continental level, through the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), it is benefiting from Africa's capacity to confront the twin challenge of underdevelopment and globalization.¹⁷⁴ This is indeed a structural approach to conflict management and resolution.

Azar asserts that "peace is development" and trying to resolve conflict without addressing in general the question of underdevelopment, in a general sense, is futile.¹⁷⁵ Development diplomacy is needed to help economic and political reconstruction while addressing communal inequalities.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) seeks, among other things, to create a framework for preventing conflict as a first priority, redressing political and economic governance problems, and investing in people and infrastructure. Also, there is a compelling reason to argue that, depending on where one stands, a conflict

¹⁷² D. Lake and D. Rothschild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,' in *International Security* (Vol. 21 N° 2, Fall 1996) p.43

¹⁷³ President Paul Kagame, Speech, US Institute of Peace, op.cit.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

¹⁷⁵ E. Azar, 'Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,' in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), pp.153-155

may have a justifiable basis, for instance, to challenge the status quo or to redress injustice. Hence the need for the African Union's proposed peace enforcement mechanisms in the offing.¹⁷⁶

CHAPTER FIVE

The Role of RPF/A Leadership and Government Institutions in Conflict Management

Introduction

The RPF ideology is geared towards the attainment of national unity, security and development. The chapter seeks to examine how RPF-initiated national institutions and policies have complemented these objectives, and the institutions' role in the conflict management process in post-genocide Rwanda.

The chapter will illustrate the logic underlying the formation of these national institutions, and how they provide the means for the development and socio-economic empowerment of the society. It shall also seek to determine and illustrate the extent to which they have helped to entrench social integration.

As President Kagame sums it: "The major question is how to develop Rwanda and get rid of poverty, which affects a big part of our country. This is a major challenge because democracy, reconciliation and good governance are the foundation on which you build many other things. Having a democratic and well governed, but poverty stricken country is not sustainable in my view."¹⁷⁷

The Credit and Savings Scheme of the Ministry of Defense (CSS) and the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) provide an example of the military initiated institutions that are helping to stabilize Rwanda by being innovative, and underscoring the vision of Rwandan military leadership. On the other hand, the

¹⁷⁶ President Paul Kagame, Speech, US Institute of Peace, Ibid

Gacaca process is re-incarnating *Rwandanicity* and is helping to rebuild social structures torn apart by the genocidal State. A combination of these processes is contributing to internal security and aiding in the conflict management.

The Policy of the Government of National Unity

The RPF started in 1987 with an eight-point program to address its quest for the liberation of Rwanda. The first point was, and still remains under the government of national unity, keeping Rwandans united as one people. This forms the basis of the RPF/A ideology, which was not an invention but a rediscovery of the concept of *Rwandanicity*, which defined the pre-colonial Rwandan national state. As was noted in Chapter Three, the concept of *Rwandanicity* manifests itself in a common national identity and bondages that characterized the pre-colonial Rwandan society. And, as was further observed in Chapter Four, the Rwandan nation has been re-born through integration, irrespective of the backdrop of a devastated and total state collapse in 1994.

The second point in the RPF/A programme is ensuring peace and security for all Rwandans. This safeguards and re-enforces the importance of national unity, despite the distorted identities on which the Rwandan conflict rested. This further lays the foundation on which the Rwandan society can be propelled towards self-actualization. It is on this realization that development, which is the RPF's third point in its eight-point programme, is predicated.

Development, being all about human beings – their lives and well-being – is most essential, as the failure to ensure man's self-realization has often led to conflict. As observed in Chapter One, structural conflict is attributed to incompatible interests based

¹⁷⁷ President Paul Kagame, *The EastAfrican* 28th April 2003

on competition for scarce resources. When the RPF sets as its third point to address development, it is indeed making resources available as a conflict management strategy. This is what President Kagame attests to when he says, "Having a democratic and well governed, but poverty stricken country is not sustainable in my view."¹⁷⁸

It is on the basis of those three core points that the RPF/A actualises its leadership and national policy in reconciliation and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda.

The RPF/A Leadership

In order for the government to effectively cater for the needs of the citizens in Rwanda, it has designed policies that are actualised through national commissions, which will be discussed later in this Chapter. The reconstruction process in post-genocide Rwanda is hinged on good governance in order to succeed. Good governance broadly entails rule of law, respect for human rights, national reconciliation and devolution of power. Good governance also includes an independent judiciary and enhanced mechanisms of accountability and transparency in order to allow a full functioning of democracy.¹⁷⁹

In the post-conflict context, the promotion and protection of human rights remains of paramount importance. As a matter of policy, the government is committed to supporting the integration of human rights issues in all its programmes. Thus the National Human Rights Commission the (NHRC) was established in 1999¹⁸⁰, as an independent institution. The mandate of NHRC includes, among others, examining and prosecuting human rights violations committed in Rwanda; sensitising the population on human

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ The Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Year 42 No. special of 4th June 2003

rights; and, instituting legal proceedings in case of human rights violations. The NHRC works closely with local and international NGOs in the promotion of human rights.

The advancement of education in post-independence Rwanda violated individual rights of the people because it was based the “quota and equilibrium system” rather than merit. In the system, slots of vacancies were allocated according to the “ethnic” composition of the population which was 85 per cent Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Twa. Under normal circumstances the available vacancies were not enough given the resource constraints affecting Rwanda. This quota system, therefore, was not only implemented at the expense of competence and efficiency, but was also subject to abuse and corruption by the Hutu elite. To address this anomaly, the government of national unity instituted the National Examinations Council (NEC) to streamline the education system and effect placement to vacancies according to merit.¹⁸¹

The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was established in 1999 by an act of parliament. The NURC continues to undertake civic education at the national and the grassroots levels aimed at promoting reconciliation and social cohesion. As observed in Chapter Four, the NURC continues to hold regular training sessions (*ingando* workshops) for various members of the society, including re-integration programmes for ex-rebels from DRC and, recently, the provisionally released prisoners. Since 2002, the NURC civic education programme has also been incorporated in the national education curriculum.¹⁸²

The police force has been reformed with a community-policing approach, which all the members of the community. In the year 2000, 3,500 policemen were deployed. The

¹⁸⁰ Law No.04/99 of 12/03/99 establishing the National Human Rights Commission

¹⁸¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 16

appropriate size of the police force in conformity with the UN standards of one policeman per 450¹⁸³ Rwandans is presently unattainable because of resource constraints. The local defence force, which is community-based, supplements the policing.

Devolution of power has entailed decentralization through creation of democratic structures of governance. The law of decentralization was enacted in 2001. The main unit of local government is at the level of the district (formerly *commune*), with the next layer at the level of the province (formerly *prefecture*).¹⁸⁴ The Common Development Fund (CDF) comprising of ten per cent of total government revenue was set up to finance development programmes identified by the districts.

The Government is committed to strengthening accountability and transparency, because basic freedoms and human rights can only be delivered by making the government accountable. It is for this reason, for instance, that independent institutions such as the National Tender Board (NTB) and the Office of the Auditor General were established in 1998.¹⁸⁵

The Rwandan Re-integration and Demobilization Commission (RRDC)

The Rwandan Re-integration and Demobilization Commission (RRDC) was established in 1997 as an autonomous government commission.¹⁸⁶ It was charged with planning, formulating and implementing the Rwandan demobilization and reintegration programme.

¹⁸² Law No.03/99 of 12/03/99 setting up the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

¹⁸³ The United Nations Development Programme Annual Report 2002

¹⁸⁴ Law No.43/2000 of 29/12/2000 establishing the organisation and functioning of provinces

¹⁸⁵ Law No.05/98 of 4/6/98 establishing the Office of the Auditor General

¹⁸⁶ Presidential Decree No.37/01 of 9/4/2002

The commission has its roots in the Arusha Peace Agreement of 1993.¹⁸⁷ The Agreement sought to address the issue of down-sizing the army, consequent to the merger of the FAR and the RPA. The Arusha Peace Agreement was later to be part of the law of the land in the reconstruction process of post genocide Rwanda.

The demobilization process has taken place in four phases, as detailed in *Table 3.0*. In the first phase 8,869 soldiers were demobilized, including 2,600 child soldiers (*kadogos*).¹⁸⁸

Table 3.0

| Phase | Year | Number |
|--------------|--------|---------------|
| I | 1996/7 | 8,869 |
| II | 1998 | 4,847 |
| III | 2000 | 5,118 |
| IV | 2002 | 11,166 |
| TOTAL | | 30,000 |

The four phases of demobilization comprised retrenching and re-integrating the RPA soldiers, ex-FAR and the militias back into the society. The re-integration process involves a payment of a safety-net allowance to enable the demobilized soldier easily start off his civilian life. In the first two phases, the allowance was FRW 300,000, which

¹⁸⁷ Procol III of the Arusha Peace Agreement, Integration and Demobilisation of the fighting forces

¹⁸⁸ Rwanda Re-integration and Demobilisation Commission, 2002

was the equivalent of USD 700, that would be disbursed in three equal installments over a period of six months.

Support for the social reintegration of the ex-combatants is largely provided through access to further education and training. Part of this was through access to the formal education system, and another part through a special vocational training scheme. In phases one, two and three, for instance, 79 per cent of the soldiers had at least started primary education. An estimated 40 per cent of those with primary and secondary education have since gone back for further education and training. In the re-organisation centres the veterans receive training and counselling on socio-economic issues, including HIV/Aids.¹⁸⁹

In the first three phases about 2,000 disabled veterans were demobilized. Only about 28 per cent had received some kind of medical aid before their demobilization by 1998. At present, most of the disabled veterans have received the requisite medical attention from the RDRC. The rehabilitation of the disabled soldiers and veterans has continued to be a challenge to the Ministry of Defense and the RDRC. Plans are under way for the government to establish a rehabilitation center for the disabled at the Ngarama Hospital in Umutara Prefecture¹⁹⁰

After the war, the Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration and the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, established a special support programme for child soldiers. They were put in a special *Kadogo* school in Butare, where they underwent rigorous training and

¹⁸⁹ UNDP Report, Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (Cr.3634Rw), November 2002

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*

transformation in order to fit them in the society. By the end of 1998, 25 per cent of the ex-child soldiers had been reunited with their parents.

Social integration of the *Kadogos* was also provided through access to further education and training. Part of this access was through the formal education system and vocational training. A special vocational training scheme for veterans was started in September 1998 in Butare. The Veteran Vocational Training Centre (VVTC) was established in a former military training facility, which had been used between 1995 and 1998 for the care and education for the former child soldiers.¹⁹¹

Demobilization was part of the conflict management process in that it entailed facilitating the socio-economic integration of the demobilized soldiers in the society. However, demobilization of soldiers and the presence of ex-combatants has the potential of impacting on security, either positively or negatively, depending on how the process is handled. The economic element is animated by the fact that demobilization has an impact on the national budget. Thus the need to reduce the military expenditure in order to liberate resources to cater for other socio-economic requirements in the society. In order to achieve these, the RDRC works closely with the World Bank, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, and Australia.

The efforts of the Commission have been at the heart of the process of conflict management and state rebuilding process. The fact that the ex-FAR are being treated with respect similar to that accorded to RPA soldiers has continued to engender a sense of common belonging. The fact that over 30,000 ex-combatants have been reintegrated

¹⁹¹ Kingma K, *The Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, Evaluation Report*, UNDP Project RWA/97/039 & RWA/97/B39, August 2001

in society without any hitches is testimony to social stabilization in reconciliation and conflict management.¹⁹²

The Credit And Savings Scheme

The Ministry of Defense Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS) started as a welfare initiative to cater for the needs of the RPA soldiers. Overwhelmed by financial requests from the soldiers, the military leadership creatively responded to this challenge by upgrading it into a savings scheme. A 10 per cent deduction from the soldiers' monthly salaries was initiated. That 10 per cent deduction was to serve as fixed capital for the CSS. Although the process started in the military, it was later extended to the police and civilians working in the Ministry of Defense, their families and demobilized soldiers.¹⁹³

Later, the military leadership used the accumulated savings to offer short and mid-term loans for meaningful investments. The start of CSS coincided with the demobilization process, a factor that rationalized the need for a long-term perspective akin to a pension scheme. The process started in 1997 and by November 1998 it had accumulated 600 million Rwandan Francs (1.5 million USD). This allowed the CSS to begin awarding loans and receiving repayments through a check-off system from RPF/A salaries, with a negligible default rate of repayment.

The credit scheme was boosted by the circumstances emerging from DRC conflict that began in 1998. The fact that a large number of the RPA soldiers (20,000) deployed in Congo took a long time before withdrawing their salaries, boosted the

¹⁹² Research interview with the Chief of General Staff Maj. Gen. James Kabarebe, *op.cit.*

¹⁹³ Research Interview with Col. Geoffrey Byegeka, Director General CSS, July 2002 (The capacity of the CSS as a financial institution is as follows: A membership of 93,000, with 75 per cent of them maintaining active accounts. The CSS has so far disbursed a total of USD22 million to about 40,000 members in a period of less than four years.)

working capital of the CSS. Thus the CSS seized the opportunity and made short-term investments with commercial banks.

When the soldiers returned home from their tour of duty in the DRC, they were able to access accumulated salaries and savings, with higher interests earned. A private soldier could access in the region of 1,000 to 1,500 USD. The withdrawal of the RPA from the Congo by the end of the year 2000, made available a sum exceeding USD 20 million in salary arrears and accumulated savings. After withdrawing the money, the soldiers proceeded on leave to their respective communities where they invested the USD 20 million. This had positive socio-economic impact in the communities, which translated into social stabilization and conflict management.

The contribution of the CSS in conflict management may be appreciated further when its impact is closely analyzed. Most of the integrated soldiers between 1998 and 2002 were deployed in the DRC. The majority of the soldiers were from the Northwest Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri which had experienced insurgency during the same period. On their return from their tour of duty, they would invest their accumulated salaries and savings in their communities. In the process they would serve as a role model of success to their communities, there-by influencing the change of negative perceptions in the two prefectures about the intentions of the government of national unity.¹⁹⁴

The socio-economic empowerment of the integrated soldiers through the CSS not only served to discourage their peers from the two prefectures from joining the insurgents, but it also influenced the insurgents to surrender and benefit from military integration. This makes the CSS a noteworthy partner in conflict management.

The CSS has about 10 branches countrywide that are electronically networked. Its capacity was put to the test during the troops withdrawal from the DRC. The suddenness of the process was such that the CSS had to handle the 20,000 troops in 10 days. In essence, it paid out USD7.2 million in cash. Branches had to work overtime. Contrary to widespread perceptions that the returning soldiers would generate a crisis for the government, the CSS was able to rise to the occasion and vindicate the ability of the government of national unity to deliver on its promises. Salaries and other benefits were well handled by the CSS. As a conflict management strategy, according to John Burton, "The facilitated conflict resolution has to be innovative in guiding the translation of discovered shared values into political structures and institutions that will promote their fulfilment."¹⁹⁵

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Efforts are being made to enhance CSS's links with the RRDC. CSS interacts with the commission on behalf of soldiers seeking demobilization to have their benefits passed through the CSS. The CSS is indeed in a better position to advise the demobilized soldiers on how to best invest their benefits to enhance their socio-economic situation.

Politically, the inclusion of the militia and the ex-FAR veterans makes them become stakeholders in the entire process of reconciliation and conflict management.

Economically, especially on the domestic front, the CSS facilitated wives of soldiers on tour of duty in the DRC to collect their salaries on production of written notes authorized by their husbands. These wives, as empowered stakeholders, would later be influential in ending insurgency activities in the northwest in May 2001. Being residents

¹⁹⁴ Research Interview with Col. Mbarak Muganga, 408 Brigade Commander, July 2002

¹⁹⁵ J. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict*, op.cit., p.17.

in the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, they knew the rebels and their sympathizers, who they exposed to the then Operation Commander, Major General James Kabarebe. This enabled the routing of the insurgents, thus peace and security in the regions. This is further testament as to the facilitating role of the CSS in conflict management.¹⁹⁶

The Gacaca Process

As observed in Chapter Three, the *Gacaca* justice system was institutionalized as an integral in post-genocide conflict management. It was traditionally used to resolve conflicts in the family, and in the society at large. Despite the advent of the western legal system in Rwanda, *Gacaca* has always been a way of life and a medium through which family, individual and clan conflicts are resolved.

In the aftermath of the genocide, the *Gacaca* was resorted to, to fill the void and complement the conventional legal system. The existing western legal framework simply could not cope, given the sheer numbers of suspects and victims.

The main weaknesses of the western justice system included bureaucracy, the cumbersome and inefficient process of adducing evidence, the quality of the judicial officers (judges, prosecutors) and the lack of resources. As the Amnesty International attests, since coming to power, the current Rwandan government decided on a policy of maximal accountability for the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed. Arrests and detentions for these offenses outstripped releases and trials. This led to the detention of more than 112,000, crowding the Rwandan detention facilities usually in cruel and degrading conditions. Most of the detainees have not been tried in a

¹⁹⁶ Research interview with the Chief of General Staff Maj. Gen. James Kabarebe, op.cit.

court of law and there was little likelihood of most of them having their cases heard by the countries existing and overburdened ordinary jurisdictions, which have a capacity of only 1,500 trials per year.¹⁹⁷

On the other hand, the *Gacaca* courts are traditionally widespread, down to the community level, and could be marshalled to speedily dispense justice. *Gacaca* is based on popular participation, which enables it to facilitate reconciliation within the community. Its dispensation of justice is fair and equitable, and is carried out in reasonable time. Justice is not only done, but seen to be done in the *Gacaca* process. Hence the passing of the *Gacaca* law, whose objective was to adopt the traditional system of justice to the contemporary situation in post-genocide Rwanda as a conflict management strategy.¹⁹⁸

As stipulated in the law, the *Gacaca* courts would comprise of popularly elected citizens who, according to their known qualities in the community, were indeed *imfura z' uRwanda* (gentlemen and ladies of high moral standing). They would be offered basic training in legal dispensation before setting up court. In undertaking the process, the government was making a huge investment in human resource development, as it was required to train and deploy more than 400,000 *Gacaca* judges and prosecutors. With such a huge investment in human capital, the implication was also that they would not only be used in the *Gacaca* system, but would play a vital role in social stabilization and in the facilitation of the emerging democratic process. Indeed, the system has had an

¹⁹⁷ Amnesty International, AI Index: AFR 47/007/2002, 17th December 2000

¹⁹⁸ Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Year 40 No.6 of 15th March, 2001

element of empowering people, which is crucial in the struggle for democracy and justice in Rwanda.¹⁹⁹

The process has been organized around four categories that correspond to four levels of courts. Under category one, are the masterminds of the genocide. These are the actors who conceptualized and implemented it. These will be judged in the normal Magistrate's Court and High Court. They will have the maximum punishment meted to them if found guilty. The aim of this punishment is to have them serve as examples to deter impunity. In pre-genocide Rwanda gross violations of human rights were rampant and were rarely punished tending to the culture of impunity.

In the second category of meting punishment to suspects of the genocide consists of people who executed the killing but did not plan the process. This comprises the largest cluster of suspects. They will serve jail sentences, part inside and part outside the prison. Category three includes those who wounded but did not kill. These will be punished according to circumstantial evidence adduced, with maximum sentences ranging from five to seven years. The fourth category consists of people who looted and destroyed property. The guilty will retribute the looted and destroyed property.

The heaviest responsibility lies at the *cellule* (village) level. It has the task of listing the names of all victims in that particular *cellule*. *Cellules* must account and give meaning to the statistics of the dead by humanizing the victims, by naming, giving the life profiles and personal details of the victims. Secondly, they will establish the list of the suspects in that particular *cellule*. Thirdly, they will classify the culprits into the four categories established by the law. Lastly, they will judge and sentence the guilty under

¹⁹⁹ Research interview with Justice T. Karugarama, Kigali, January 2003

category four. Category three cases can be dealt with at the *secteur* (location) level. Cases in this category may be appealed at the Court of Appeal. Category one and two will be charged in the ordinary courts following due process of law.

According to Amnesty International, post conflict situations, particularly ones involving the heinous crime of genocide, demand a resolution of the conditions that led to them in the first place. If this is not done, the foundation for further conflict remains in place. Peace is the most desired commodity in post-conflict situations. Peace, however, depends not only on the absence of war but also on the existence of both justice and truth, with both justice and truth dependent on the other. Without justice and truth, the deep rifts in the Rwandan social fabric will not be healed and peace will not be achieved.²⁰⁰

The Rwandans are beginning to evolve a common interpretation of a traumatic experience. They are also beginning to interrogate their past as a means towards avoiding similar pitfalls as the genocide. The *Gacaca* is at the core of this process. To cement it, the state has decreed a compensation process built around a special genocide fund, of which it is contributing 8 per cent of the annual recurrent budget. By setting a special fund financed by the Exchequer for the rehabilitation of the genocide victims, the government of national unity is owning up and taking responsibility for the genocide. Both the state and every Rwandan will contribute to this fund as a mark of shared responsibility of the tragedy.

²⁰⁰ Amnesty International, *op.cit.*

CHAPTER SIX

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter forms the critical analysis of this study. As noted in the study's justification, the military role in reconstruction and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda have not been adequately recognised. Hence the need to examine and analyse the RPF/A's role in conflict management, and its motivating factors.

The study noted Muzungu's observation that "The history of Rwanda is the history of its military."²⁰¹ It also noted that the pre-colonial institution of the military created and continually expanded the state of Rwanda. This was sustained by *Rwandanicity*, which was inculcated through military training and practice. *Rwandanicity* as an ideology is what the people of Rwanda understood themselves to be; what they knew about themselves, and how they defined their country.

The logic of *Kamere y' uRwanda* (the moral rectitude of a true Rwandan within and without physical Rwanda) ensured a standard mode of behavior and conformity within the wider Rwandan society. This was held in the concept of *Rwandanicity*, which informed the RPF/A ideology, anchoring it as a national institution.

The destruction of the state of Rwanda started with its military during the colonial period, and in the same process banished *Rwandanicity* to the periphery of the Rwandan society. However, social integration and reconstruction of the Rwandan state necessitated re-incarnation of *Rwandanicity* as the ideology of the RPF/A. Thus the RPA

²⁰¹ Muzungu B, *Histoire du Rwanda Precolonial*, op.cit., p.354

assumed its historical role and became the locomotive force that spearheaded the liberation of Rwanda and the stopping of the genocide.

The overriding objectives of the RPF are the attainment of national unity, security and development. The RPF-initiated policies and national institutions such as the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) complement these overall objectives in the conflict management process in post-genocide Rwanda.

The Pre-colonial Period

As was observed in Chapter Two, *Rwandanicity* as an ideology, informed and defined the Rwandan way of life. It pervaded every aspect of life, and would be described as the life itself for the dignity and unity it invested in all the Rwandans as one society. It is also the force that sustained Rwanda's growth and prosperity.

Indeed, the very concept of *Rwandanicity* informed "the history of Rwanda, [which] is the history of its military," according to Muzungu.²⁰² The military created Rwanda by securing territory and providing the basis for social organization and values, which were espoused in *Kamere y' u Rwanda* (the roots that facilitate and sustain growth). It was also observed that *Rwandanicity* is what the people of Rwanda understood themselves to be; what they knew about themselves and how they defined their country and its growth.

Beginning from 1279 AD, the Kingdom of Rwanda is believed to have started in the East of the present country under King Nsoro I Samukondo. The growth of Rwanda was through annexation, which was rooted in people's cultural self-perception through

Rwandanicity as defined in the concept of *Ku-aanda* (spreading out from the center).

Under the King, the military throughout the period was not only the mid-wife, but also the guardian of the state of Rwanda as it grew and prospered. The *Itorero* (regiment) formed the basic military formation within the *Umutwe w' Ingabo* or battalion. It was imperative that one belonged to a regiment, as the military was the vanguard of social values and ideals. The overall effect of this was the strong social bonds the military engendered within the community. This gave strength for its sustained growth and prosperity.

This emphasizes that the military was a national institution that guaranteed not only internal security and cohesion, but guarded against external aggression. The Kingdom's military prowess can be recognized by the fact of the inability of the Arab slave traders to capture slaves in Rwanda.

It is the above attributes that have been manifested in the RPF/A in the reconstruction of post-genocide Rwanda.

The Colonial and the Post-Colonial Period

The advent of colonialism ushered in change that saw the demise of the strong pre-colonial state and its military. The palace coup of Rucunshu in 1896 formed the beginning of the weakening of the institution of the monarchy and the military with the death of King Mibambwe IV Rutalindwa, who was Commander-in-Chief of the *Ingabo z' u Rwanda*.

In the period from 1910 to 1940 Msgr. Classe and colonial Governor Voisin jointly conspired and re-wrote the history of Rwanda by developing the Hamitic ideology,

²⁰² Ibid

racializing the Tutsi as alien settlers and ethnicising the Hutu as the natives. Classe and his acolytes also invented a Christian origin for the Tutsi arguing that they were "lapsed" Ethiopians destined for a privileged place in Christian evangelism. Classe and Voisin also conspired with the Tutsi notables – the *inshongore* – and dethroned King Yuhi V Musinga as a pagan monarch, and replaced him with his son, King Mutara III Ruhadigwa, who was a protégé of the church.

The 1959 Hutu revolution was the result of the Hamitic ideology in which "Hutu natives" were "emancipating" themselves from their "alien" Tutsi "oppressors". A battalion of Belgian paratroopers from Kamina in the Congo were deployed to supplement the *Force Publique Congolaise's* efforts in quelling the fracas, only to stand by and watch the Hutus massacre Tutsi women and children. Ironically, the authors of the Hamitic ideology this time around had shifted alliances and oversaw the massacre. Ten thousand Tutsi's were slaughtered and over 100,000 driven to exile. It is these exiles who would later found the RPF.

It was observed how the *pignet* system was used to alienate the Tutsi and Hutu-nise the military that would be dominated by the Northern Hutus, whose military doctrine continued to be Belgian. These facilitated and animated the 1973 military *coup d'état* under General Habyarimana who would rule Rwanda until 1994 on the eve of the genocide. Although Rwanda had got its independence in 1962, the colonial status quo was maintained through the French and Belgian military cooperation with the FAR. This underlined and confirmed the continued banishment of *Rwandanicity* in the military and society at large.

The RPF/A

In order to liberate the country, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered the north-east of the country from Uganda. The movement was composed of Rwandan refugees who were scattered in neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the world since the so-called Hutu revolution of 1959. The war marked the beginning of remote-controlled massacres of Tutsi by the authorities, that would culminate in the 1994 genocide.

Nationalism, couched in the concept of *Rwandanicity*, is what continues to inform the RPF/A ideology. Indeed, *Rwandanicity* has continued to inform Rwandans through time including those in the diaspora. In the early eighties, the precursor of the RPF, the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) managed to operate clandestinely in Nairobi through the *Intore* Association that was registered as a welfare group by the government of Kenya. The Association drew its name from the *Intore*, which other than traditionally being an initiation school, was also a cultural vehicle that actualized *Rwandanicity*.

The late Major General Rwigema Gisa – himself an accomplished *intore* while in the NRM/A struggle in Uganda – inspired and mobilized other Rwandans. This facilitated RPF organization within the NRA without raising any suspicions. Indeed, *Rwandanicity* engendered mobilization of Rwandans in the diaspora and within the country to opt for war to dismantle the oppressive and violent machinery that had been put in place during the colonial and post-colonial regimes.

This mobilization also included artists and musicians in the diaspora, such as Ms Cecil Kayirebwa. The Rwandan artists, poets and cultural performers illustrate a long-

standing tradition in which *Rwandanicity* was captured and transmitted through narrativization.

It was also observed in Chapter Two, that it was in the military that *Rwandanicity* was bred and nurtured. No wonder, therefore, RPF/A adopted from it and continues to play a vanguard role in the reconstruction of post-genocide Rwanda.

The Post-genocide Period

In liberating the Rwandan people, reconstruction of the state could only begin with the deconstruction of the negative military forces and institutions. And with the genocide over, the task that lay ahead was enormous if Rwanda was to find its feet. This had to begin with integration, first within the military and then within the wider society.

The process of integration and re-integration entailed assembling the ex-combatants in reorganization camps or centres and orient them to the national politics, emphasizing reconciliation and national unity through the *Ingando*. The RPF/A pioneered the *ingando* concept through the integration process of the ex-combatants, but has assumed a national character under the NURC.

For the ex-combatants, integration meant being taken on the strength of the RPF/A and offered gainful employment. From being a security menace to the society, they were turned into bread-winners for their families, thereby contributing to societal stabilization.

The *Ingando* strategy as a tool for conflict management is used by the RPA to provide a platform to search for ways of building a united and reconciled Rwanda

predicated upon the ideals of *Rwandanicity*. The returnees and released prisoners are prepared for smooth reintegration back into their societies through the *Ingandos*.

On the whole, the *Ingandos* have proved useful in the peace and reconciliation process. The pacification of the Northwest, especially the Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, who produced the majority of the *Ingando* participants is testament of the success of the RPF/A initiative.

The long-term objective is for the government of national unity to invest in the education its people as a strategic choice of empowering Rwandans to enhance their socio-economic development as a conflict management strategy.

The Policy and Institutions of the Government of National Unity

The three core themes of national unity, peace and security, and development are the ones through which the RPF/A actualises its leadership and national policy in reconciliation and conflict management processes in post-genocide Rwanda.

Development, being all about human beings – their lives and well-being – is most essential, as failure to man's self-realization has often led to conflict. President Kagame attests to this when he says, "Having a democratic and well governed, but poverty stricken country is not sustainable in my view."²⁰³

The problem-solving approach has been the most utilised version of Track-Two Diplomacy. Its underlying assumption is that in protracted ethnic conflict enemies have mutually exclusive psychological frames of reference that predispose them to a zero-sum interpretation of their relationship and block a co-operative search for constructive

²⁰³ President Paul Kagame, *The EastAfrican*, op.cit

outcome.²⁰⁴ The aim of the problem-solving approach, which consists of an unofficial and private workshop including the parties and a neutral third-party, is therefore to help the parties redefine their situation, facilitate a mutual understanding of each other, and identify the grievances, perceptions, and values of the parties and disputes.

The efforts of the *Ingandos* and the RDRC with the participation of the World Bank and IGOs, for instance, have been at the heart of the process of conflict management and state rebuilding process.

Further to this, the contribution of the CSS as another institution in conflict management may be appreciated when its impact is closely analyzed. The socio-economic empowerment of the integrated soldiers through the CSS not only served to discourage their peers from joining the insurgents, but also influenced the insurgents to surrender and benefit from military integration.

As yet another institution in conflict management, the *Gacaca* was resorted to, to complement the conventional legal system. The existing western legal framework simply could not cope, given the sheer numbers of suspects and victims. Justice is another precondition for lasting peace. Not only must impunity be eradicated because it is an incitement to repeat crimes, but individuals responsible for crimes must be brought to justice as it is necessary for victims and relatives to, one day, forgive. Justice is, therefore, also an integral component of the process of reconciliation. As Professor

²⁰⁴ A. de Reuck, 'A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem-Solving,' in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, op.cit., pp.183-197

Antonio Cassese said during a lecture on criminal international justice, "If criminals are not brought to justice (in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia), we must live in fear."²⁰⁵

It is through enlightened policy formulation and institution creation that that provide alternative approaches to conflict resolution that and preventive even after the 1994 genocide. It is prevention by resolving the sources of conflict. This why alternative approaches need to be undertaken in Rwanda, even, and above all after the events of 1994.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ A. Cassese, President of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Lecture: *Why do we need criminal international justice?*, European University Institute, Academy of Law (Summer session on Human Rights), Florence, Italy, 07 July 1997.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusions

The resilience of the pre-colonial state of Rwanda and its institutions, which took more than 617 years²⁰⁷ (1279-1896) to build and internalize through culture and a value system, could not be destroyed within a mere 100 years (1896-1994) of colonialism and neocolonialism. Indeed, the pre-colonial period still serves to inform the present, including the ongoing reconciliation and conflict management processes. For instance, the *Gacaca* judicial system and the military integration processes are pre-colonial constructs that are serving the present reconstruction of Rwanda.

This study being on the military and its role in conflict management, indeed vindicates and confirms the traditional role of the Rwandan military in social harmony and stabilization. As a matter of fact, the present military has drawn its inspiration from the *Ingabo z'uRwanda* (shield of the nation – the traditional military) that actualized *Rwandanicity*, which continues to provide the ideological foundation to the RPF/A in post-conflict Rwanda.

The linkage however is not only ideological, but also socio-cultural and hereditary. As can be illustrated in Table 4.0, the military formations or battalions, such as the *Abanyasanga*, that were formed even earlier than the 13th Century survived up to the advent of colonialism. For instance, Nkwya, the last commander of the *Abanyasanga* towards the end of the 19th Century during the reign of Kigeli IV Rwabugili

²⁰⁶ Steve Utterwulghé, Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict; Considering the Subjective Perspectives in Conflict Resolution Strategies, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Issue No.2.3 August 1999

²⁰⁷ Kagame A, Introduction aux Grands Genres Lyriques de L'Acien Rwanda. Butare, 1969, p.189

has a great grandson in the present Rwanda Defense Forces. Captain F. Nkwaya, the grandson, illustrates the hereditary link through *Rwandanicity*. President Paul Kagame's great grandfather, Cyigenza cya Rwakagara, who lived in the 19th Century commanded the *Nyantango* battalion, which had survived from the 16th Century during the reign of Ruganzu II Ndoli. Lt. Col. Tom Byabagamba in the present Rwanda Defense Forces provides the third example. His grandfather, Rwatangabo, and great grandfather, Nzigiye ya Rwishyura, both commanded the *Ndushabandi* battalion from father to son from the mid 19th Century. Indeed, President Kagame's son is Cyigenza and Lt. Col. Byabagamba's is Nzigiye, respectively named after their great great grandfathers.

To further illustrate the link with the pre-colonial military, the present RPF *Inkotanyi* derives its name from the *Itozero* (battalion) *Inkotanyi* of the *Ingabo z' Abarasa* (the *Abarasa* military formation) that was commanded in the 19th Century by Mugugu ya Shumbusho, whose great grandson, Lt. Mugugu is currently in the RPA.

These and many other examples illustrate the hold of *Rwandanicity* on posterity and its ability to inspire and forge a new nation learning from the old, while creating new *avacengeli* (Rwandan heroes), both the sung and the unsung. The institution of *Uvucengeli* has always meant investing the destiny of Rwanda in its people through self-sacrifice. The continuity of Rwanda as a state and as a nation, therefore, is guaranteed by the fact of *Uvucengeli*, as there will always be Rwandans who will be willing to sacrifice for the sake of the country and its people. And because of this, Rwanda propels ahead under the banner of *Rwandanicity* in search of a common and prosperous destiny from the ashes of the 1994 genocide – a product of colonial and neocolonial bigotry that ethnicised and racialized an otherwise one people.

The impact of colonialism was the creation of racism, a system the colonizers and

their spiritual partners the Catholic Church were evidently not ashamed of. Indeed, the two supported and reinforced each other in mutually beneficial ways. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans converted, making the church the country's main social institution. Indeed, 90% of Rwandans today are Christian. Christianity however was not internalized as would be later attested to by the future "Christian" *genocidaires*. Christianity served to replace and marginalize Rwandan ideals as enshrined in *Rwandanicity*, thereby creating a cultural void that was exploited by the colonialists and the Hutu elite to lay a firm foundation for the 1994 genocide. To the Belgians, and later to be exploited by the post-independence leadership, they had created the Rwanda they wanted; centralized, easy to control, efficient, intolerant of non-conformity and Catholic.

This conspiracy engendered the total collapse of the state of Rwanda in the genocide. Thus the government of national unity inherited an exceptional and daunting set of challenges of which it had to overcome to ensure the re-birth of Rwanda. The country's reconciliation and reconstruction efforts since 1994 are a tale of "courage under fire", despite negative perceptions that still linger with the former colonial masters and their accomplices. Through *Rwandanicity* a new society anchored on the rule of law is being built seeking to bring justice to those responsible for the genocide through the formal courts, and the innovative yet traditional community-based jurisdiction – the *Gacaca*.

The vision is to create a new outlook that is Rwandan and not ethnic and cultivating a culture of inclusive and democratic politics in a decentralized framework that allows people in their respective communities to have a stake in governance. This stake in governance is what is encapsulated in the concept of *Rwandanicity* as invested

in the people through an internalized but shared value system that characterized the pre-colonial Rwanda.

Today this shared value system in conflict management has been reincarnated through the inception of institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a new Constitution and a Law Reform Commission. Through these institutions, every citizen of Rwanda has a stake and role to play in governance.

The institutions, a committed leadership and an enlightened citizenry are pre-requisites for sustainable conflict prevention and management mechanisms. There is a need for leaders and institutions that unite, create and enforce laws and regulations, and that embrace diversity. The leaders and institutions should seek to improve the livelihood of all citizens without discrimination, recognize national mandates, look beyond boundaries for a common ground, and progressively work towards shared prosperity and sustained peace. The enlightened citizenry on its part will ensure that their rights are not violated and be guarantors of their own destiny and well-being. In pre-colonial Rwanda, this is what it all entailed in the concept of *Rwandanicity* to ensure a culturally informed citizenry.

The role of the RPF/A in society as has been illustrated in this study derives its foundation from *Rwandanicity*, which was nurtured, bred and transmitted through military formations (*amatorero*) that were essentially national institutions. The present and future role of the RPF/A, as it has demonstrably illustrated, is to ensure a culturally enlightened citizenry that will guarantee sustainable peace, security and development. From its achievements to-date, the RPF/A stands out as a role model in Africa, where

many of the military on the continent are colonial outfits without a home-grown ideology such as *Rwandanicity*.

For democracy to thrive in Africa, the country and its people have to have a common socio-cultural ideology and have the leadership with the enlightened will, such as the RPF/A's, to follow through for the sake of unity and development of its people. Like in post-genocide Rwanda, deliberate efforts should be made to stop the widening of ethnic cleavages that characterised the country's colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. The essence is to guard against wilful manipulation of demographic majorities, such as the Hutu, for personal gains of political demagogues, the likes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana.

Many Rwandans, as the majority of Africans in general, are still a colonised lot and it is up to the African leadership, again as demonstrated by the RPF/A, to play the vanguard role in the liberation and decolonisation process of the citizenry. In the case of Rwanda, it took *Rwandanicity* to actualise the process. *Rwandanicity* in effect de-ethnicised and de-racialized the Hutu and Tutsi colonial constructs that had led to the conflict that matured into the 1994 genocide.

The full extent of the genocide made Rwanda the epicentre of the wider conflict in the Great Lakes Region. The Rwandan conflict continues to inform and replicate itself in the region, such as in Bunia in the DRC between the Hema and the Lendu and in Burundi between the Tutsi and Hutu. The common thread of this regional conflict is predicated on a colonial legacy that politicised indigeneity to legitimise citizenship, such as in the false ethnization and racialisation of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda in its well used tactic of divide and rule.

The new Rwandan Constitution, championed by the RPF/A, is indeed a vindication of *Rwandanicity* by encapsulating the ideals and practices of the *imfura y' iRwanda* as codified in the traditional *Imihango, imigenzo n' imizirilizo*. This makes Rwanda a nation that belongs to all of Africa and the world, by not only basing citizenship rights on residence, but also allowing dual citizenship or nationality.


This was what was meant by being an *imfura y'iRwanda*, which is in essence moral rectitude and practicing civility towards your neighbour irrespective of colour, race, gender or nationality. This makes post-genocide Rwanda worth emulating in conflict management, especially as it has recaptured the dignity of Rwandans through the enlightened struggle of the RPF/A.

| | | | |
|-------------|------------------------|---|--|
| 1279 – 1312 | Nsoro I Samukondo | Abamiza Ishyama-Abanyakaringa | Bwanacyambwe |
| 1312 – 1345 | Ruganzu I Bwimba | Abakaraza Gakondo Inyanga-Kugoma Abashira-Mujinya Abariza Ababarabiri | Buganza Kigali |
| 1345 – 1378 | Cyilima I Rugwe | | Bwisha Nduga |
| 1378 – 1411 | Kigeli I Mukobanya | Abatsindiyingoma Ibidafungura Uburunga Abadaheranwa | |
| 1411 – 1444 | Mibambwe I Mutabazi | | |
| 1444 – 1477 | Yuhi II Gahima | Amatana-ngabo Abazira-kubingwa Nyaruguru | |
| 1477 – 1510 | Ndahiro II Cyamatatare | Inkindi | Gisigali Bwishya Bufumbira |
| 1510 – 1543 | Ruganzu II Ndoli | Ibisumizi Abaruhije Nyakare Nyantango | Tongo Bugara Bugonyi Buberuka |
| 1543 – 1576 | Mutara I Semugeshe | Abaganda Impara | Kinyaga Bukunzi Busozo Bufundu Busanza |
| 1576 – 1609 | Kigeli II Nyamuheshera | Inkingi | Bungwe Burwi Murenge Bunyabungo |
| 1609 – 1642 | Mibambwe II Gisanura | Imitali Inyanga-kurushwa Abadacumura Abangogo Abarembo | Ndorwa |
| 1642 – 1675 | Yuhi III Mazimhaka | Indara Abashahuzi Inkuba Abankungu Abatabaga Ababanda Ababaga Intaremba Inkora-maraso | |

| | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|--|---|
| 1675 – 1708 | Cyilima II Rujugira | <p>Abakemba Indilira Imvejuro</p> <p>Abadahemuka Urwasabahizi Abadaha Abalima Intarindwa Ibenga Inzirwa Abatanguha Ibisiga Igicikiza Imanga Abarota Abashubije Abashumba Abanyoro</p> <p>Abatsindiyingoma Ibidafungura Uburunga Abadaheranwa</p> | Buyenzi Bugesera Mubali |
| 1708 – 1741 | Kigeli III Ndabarasa | Ababito | UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION |
| 1741 – 1745 | Mibambwe III Sentabyo | <p>Abatsinzi Abagina Abatabashwa Abiyahuzi</p> | |
| 1746 - | Yuhi IV Gahindiro | <p>Abadahindwa Abashakamba Uruyange Abazimya Intaganzwa</p> | |
| - 1853 | Mutara II Rwogera | <p>Abakwiye Abazira-mpuhwe Inzira-bwoba Abazira-kigisha Imvuza-rubango Imanzi Abarasa Abahilika Abadahigwa</p> | Gisaka |
| 1853 – 1895 | Kigeli IV Rwabugili | <p>Ingagura-rugo Impama-kwica Imbanza-mihigo Inkaranka Ndushabandi Abashozamihigo Abasharangabo Abamaragishyika Abarinda Abakeramihigo</p> | |

The Expansion and Formation of Rwanda

The map below details the extent of the expansion of Rwanda beginning the year 1279 when King Nsoro I Samukondo consolidated the small principalities of Bwanacyambwe, Buganza, Kigali, Buriza and Busigi (red region on the map) to form earliest Kingdom of Rwanda under the Nyiginya Dynasty. This was later expanded to include the Bwisha and Nduga under successive four reigns (refer to table). The expansion and growth of Rwanda reached its height in 1675 under the reign of Yuhi III Mazimhaka where the border extended to the north as far as Lake Edward in Uganda, then known as Lake Rwicanzige, and to the west as far as Kivu in the DRC. In 1910, as indicated by the dotted line on the map, about a half of the Rwandan territory was ceded to the Congo Free State and another part to the British Protectorate of Uganda. The border remains to this day. It would be of interest to note that tracing the expansion of the Rwanda Kingdom onto a map was derived from the poem, *Umugore Mukuru*, of the court poet Musare who lived in the 18th Century through the reigns of Ndabarasa, Sentabyo and Gahindiro. Poetry formed the repository of historical information that was handed down from generation to generation of successive court poets who were mainly of the *Abasinga* Clan.



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