

**THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF
CHILD SOLDIERS ON PEACE AGREEMENT: A CASE STUDY
OF MOZAMBIQUE**


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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.



Nerea Atieno Thigo

18/11/2005

Date

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor



Mr. Soita Chesoni

18/11/05

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mother Phoebe Thigo; my inspiration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration-----	i
Dedication-----	ii
Table of Contents-----	iii
Acknowledgement-----	iv
List of Abbreviations-----	v
Abstract-----	vi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction-----	1
Statement of the research problem-----	3
Objectives of the study-----	6
Justification of the study -----	6
Literature Review-----	8
Hypothesis-----	22
Theoretical Framework-----	23
Operationalisation of Keys-----	25
Methodology-----	25
Chapter Outline-----	26

CHAPTER TWO

Mozambique Conflict: The Rome Peace Agreement

Introduction -----	27
Stages of Conflict in Mozambique-----	28
Historical and Colonial Legacy-----	28
Areas of Conflict-----	30
Postcolonial Mozambique Conflicts (1975-1992)-----	34

The Rome Peace Agreement Process-----	41
The Churches-----	42
Sant' Egidio Initiative-----	48
The Rome Peace Agreement-----	64
Effect of the War on children-----	67
Conclusion-----	69

CHAPTER THREE

Disarmament and Demobilization in Mozambique

Introduction-----	71
Disarmament Process in Mozambique-----	72
Proliferation of Small Arms in Mozambique-----	75
Land Mines-----	78
Armed Crime and the Disarmament Process-----	79
Demobilization of Child Soldiers in Mozambique-----	87
Statistics of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique-----	87
The Demobilization Process of Child Soldiers in Mozambique-----	88
Consequences of lack of Demobilizations of Child Soldiers Mozambique-----	90
Conclusion-----	92

CHAPTER FOUR

An Analysis of the Disarmament and Demobilization of Child Soldiers and the General Peace Agreement of 1992 in Mozambique

Introduction-----	94
Analysis of Disarmament and Demobilization process of child soldiers And its effect on the Peace Agreement in Mozambique-----	96
Conclusion-----	102

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion-----	103
Bibliography-----	109
Index-----	117

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACC	-	Anglican African Council of Churches
AA	-	Assembly Areas
AFL	-	Armed Forces of Liberia
ANC	-	African National Congress
AU	-	African Union
CAC	-	Cessation of Armed Conflict
CCM	-	Mozambique Christian Council
CCF	-	Cease-Fire Commission
CIO	-	Central Intelligence Organization
CPU	-	Child Protection Unit
CRC	-	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSC	-	Supervision and Control Commission
DDR	-	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EU	-	European Union
FADM	-	Mozambique Defense Force
FRELIMO	-	Frente de Libertaco de Mocambique
INPLF	-	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
IRG	-	International Regional Government
ICRC	-	International Committee of Red Cross
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority
JVC	-	Joint Verification Commission

MNR	-	Mozambique National Resistance
MNRA	-	Mozambique National Resistance Army
MONAMO	-	Independent Movement for National Reconstruction
OUA	-	Organization of African Union
ONUMOZ	-	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
RENAMO	-	Mozambique National Resistance
SCS	-	Special Clearance Services
SISE	-	State Information and Security Service
SNASP	-	National Security Service
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
UN	-	United Nations
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
ZANLA	-	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

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ABSTRACT

This study was carried out to determine the effect of the disarmament and demobilization(DD) process of child soldiers on the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992 of Mozambique. This was through conducting informal interviews and book research.

The study revealed that Mozambique peace is one that has been described as a success after the signing of the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992. The analysis of the Process in disarmament and demobilization was a requirement in the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992 in preparation for the elections ending the 17 year war. This process was part of an initiative towards sustainable peace. The Peace Agreement left scholars and skeptics anticipating failure like in the case of Angola, Liberia and other African countries that have gone back to war as quickly as they have signed the peace agreements. The sustainable peace was a result of other factors such as fatigue due to long term fighting, natural disasters such as floods and droughts that threatened starvation and the possible withdrawal of the external actors who funded both RENAMO and FRELIMO.

The study revealed that Child soldiers went home and were naturally reintegrated into the society through traditional healing while others were sponsored for studies in Russian and Cuba. The children still suffered the effects of the war physically, psychologically, socially but they did not cause a war in Mozambique. The disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers did not feature in the peace process where RENAMO fought for power sharing with FRELIMO. Follow-up was lacking to reveal the actual whereabouts of these children.

It is therefore necessary to follow-up the ex- child soldiers in order to know their current status in Mozambique and the effectiveness of the traditional healing they went through. This is possible through more field study as the ex-child soldiers are now grown up as revealed in the study.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has witnessed a continuation if not an increase of violent conflicts. Some states strive to improve their military capability by accumulating weapons of mass destruction such as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in an attempt to secure their security and interests in the international system.

Africa though not highly advanced to the point of accumulating weapons of mass destruction, has been bedeviled by civil wars which have destabilized many states. The common causes of conflict are made worse by the proliferation of small arms into the continent. In the face of these wars children and women are the most affected and suffer greatly.¹ Children are recruited into the military forces of rebel groups and are used as spies, messengers, sentries, porters, servants and sexual slaves.²

The United Nations in an attempt to prevent future instability created by the increasing number of child soldiers is working with regional and sub-regional organizations to assist in monitoring and implementation of treaties and peace agreements concerning armed conflict. In Africa the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are the only organizations that have taken up and ratified the Optional Protocol which forbids recruitment of

¹O. Adenyi, 'General View of African Contemporary Political, Military and Economic Affairs and their Relationship to Peace', Disarmament, A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Vol. XIII Number 3 (1990) pp158-164.p160.

²'The Impact of Soldiering On Children: A Global Problem' Child Soldiers an Overview.
File//D:\data\PRE_OVERVIEW.html

child soldiers.³ ECOWAS has established a Child Protection Unit (CPU) in its secretariat with the strategy of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).⁴

It has been argued that child soldiers can be a threat to state security because they often remain armed after the conflict and find it difficult to integrate in the rest of the society. This is due to the fact that the children will have taken part in acts of violence and all they learn and know is violence.⁵

This study will analyze the General Peace Agreement of Rome, October 1992, which marked an end to seventeen years of warfare in Mozambique.⁶ In attempt to establish the impact of the disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers on the peace agreements in Africa with the case study of Mozambique.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

It is estimated that there are 300,000 child soldiers in the world half of whom are in Africa.⁷ The large number of child soldiers is a source of concern. Scholars like Bayo Adekanye have observed that this has become a post conflict problem due to the possibility of these children going back to

3 'The Impact of Soldiering On Children: A Global Problem' Child Soldiers an Overview.
File//D:\data\PRE_OVERVIEW.html

4 Ibid

⁵ International Conference on the Use of children in armed conflict (19-22 April 1990) Social Re-integration of Children involved in Armed Conflict: The Mozambican experience.

⁶C. Alden ,'The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique,' David Kimble(ed) The Journal of Modern African Studies, A quarterly survey of politics, Economics and Related topics in Contemporary Africa, Cambridge University Press Volume 33 March 1995.pp3-128

⁷ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood,' ISS Monograph series.no.82 p17, April 2003

conflict which she argues is a much greater problem than analysts would like to believe.⁸ Efforts are therefore directed at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of these child soldiers as part of the agenda on current trends and strategies to conflict resolution.⁹

This observation has been made and adopted as part of peace agreements. Some peace agreements have been unsuccessful because of lack of DDR. In Angola for instance, the Lusaka Peace Accord signed in November 1994 failed because the UNITA leaders were not willing to provide accurate information on the location of weapons for their troops.¹⁰ Child soldiers resist disarmament at the end of conflict for various reasons. To some the gun means food and is a source of security. Others resist because of concern about the future and insist on remaining in the army. In Mozambique for instance Leonard Kapungu reports that an ex-combatant who refused to submit his gun during a DDR process argued that the gun meant food and was good business.

¹¹ In Sudan it was observed that child soldiers refused to disarm and insisted on remaining in the army.¹²

⁸Ibid P 104

⁹J. 'Bayo Adekanye,'Conflict Prevention and early-Waming systems', in Lennart Wohlgemuht, Samantha Gibson, Steohen Kalsen and Emmah Rothchild(eds) Common Security and Civil Society in Africa, (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab,1999) pp103-117. P104

¹⁰T. Leomard Kapungu 'Arms Control and peace Settlements and the Challenges of Sub-states activities' in Ian Anthony and Adam Daniel Rotfeld(eds) A Future Arms Control Agenda,Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 118,1999, (New York: Oxford University press, 2001)pp150-157, P152

¹¹Ibid pp150-157,p150

¹²Humans Rights Watch /Africa, ' Children of Sudan; Slaves, Street children and Child Soldiers', New York 1995 in Pan- African Forum for Children, issue paper 4 Children and Peace in Africa.

Civil wars have however been a challenge to the disarmament and demobilization of child soldiers in Africa, which have been catalyzed by issues of governance such as dictatorship, autocrats and liberalization of political space in many African countries.¹³ In countries such as Sudan and Somalia these attributes have led to instability. Scholars have observed that in these countries the military regimes that were used to oust unpopular governments are still armed and mobilized causing the emergence of other fighters such as guerillas and warlords.¹⁴

The DDR process in Mozambique on the other hand following the signing of the General Rome Agreement is seen as one of the success stories.¹⁵ Therefore it is in this regard that we ask the question: to what extent does the DD process impact on peace agreements in Africa? Will the effective process of DD lead to sustainable peace agreements in Africa? This study will examine the Peace agreement in Mozambique with regard to the DD process to sufficiently establish whether or not the process leads to sustainable peace agreements in Africa.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate the peace agreement in Mozambique and the extent to which the Disarmament and the Demobilization process of child soldiers has influenced the agreement.

1.4 Specific Objectives

¹³ Ibid p104

¹⁴The role of Women in putting 'civil' back into civil military relations. Paper presented at the seminar organized by the Africa Center for Strategies Studies, Dakar Senegal (31 October-12 November 1999)

¹⁵Nicole Ball, 'Arms Control as a conflict Management tool' in Ian Anthony and Adam Daniel Rotfield, A Future Arms Control Agenda, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 118,1999, (New York: Oxford University Press,2001)pp141-152 .P 152

- a) To establish whether the process of disarmament and demobilization of child soldiers had any impact on the peace agreement in Mozambique.
- b) To examine the conditions of the 1992 General Peace Agreement in Mozambique on disarmament and demobilization.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION

The policy justification of the study comes as a result of the general concern about increased-armed conflict in Africa, attributed to among other things state weakness.¹⁶ The militarization of conflicts has increased and children have been actively involved which not only affects them socially, psychologically and in turn the future of peace of the continent is at stake. In the Winnipeg conference 2000 it was reported that children affected by war grow into a generation of adults more committed to violence than peace.¹⁷ This calls for preventive initiatives such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of these child soldiers to avoid further damage. Bayo Adekaye elaborates that former child soldiers have attracted the international community and shocked them on how they have been deployed into wars.¹⁸

The study will therefore assist governments and policy makers to come up with effective policies to curb the problem of child soldiers in Africa in terms of recruitment of soldiers and DDR strategies that will not only apply to the mainstream government forces but also rebel soldiers

¹⁶Philip O. Nying'uro, 'The Impact of the Cold War on Regional Security' in Munene M., Nyunya O.J.D and Nying'uro, The Case of Africa and the United States. From Independence to the End of the Cold War, (Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995).p65

¹⁷'Winnipeg Conference' Final Report 2000 in Pan African Forum for Children, Issue paper 4.

¹⁸J. 'Bayo Adekanye, 'Conflict Prevention and early-Warning systems', op cit pp103-117. P104

The academic justification of the study is that the issue of child soldiers is yet to be tackled in terms of research. Not much study has been carried out in relation to the impact of child soldiers on peace agreements. Child soldiers and conflict in terms of DDR need to be investigated comprehensively for clear understanding of the relationship of the two. Leonard Kapungu agrees that there is a relationship between arms control, peace settlements sub state activities which will rarely work if parties in conflict do not agree and sustainability will only be effective through comprehensive arms control, effectively implemented through a compelling and thorough DDR Process."¹⁹ It is in this light that we need to investigate the 'relationship' so as to confirm these remarks which can be very important to future conflict resolution and sustainable peace agreements.

It is therefore hoped that the study will add value to literature and policy interventions used in conflict resolution and sustainable peace agreements in Africa.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review will be covered in two parts. This will include the issue of child soldiers in the DD process and Peace agreements. The current strategy of peace resolution has incorporated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as part of a process towards sustainable peace. The DDR process is usually not easy and is used as a package for a complete process. Fusato Massimo explains that DDR 'supports the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe

¹⁹T. Leonard. Kapungu, 'Arms Control and Peace Settlements and the Challenges of Sub-state activities' op cit, pp150-157,p150

environment, transferring ex-combatants back to civilian life and enabling people to earn a livelihood through peaceful means instead of war."²⁰ Massimo explains that certain conditions have to exist for the process to be effective. The conditions are security, inclusion of all warring parties, political agreement, comprehensive approach and sufficient funds.²¹

The other challenge as perceived by scholars is the approach of the process towards child soldiers. It has been noted that some children do not go through formal DDR and may escape or leave the armed groups when war ends.²² Others go through the process with older soldiers and this has been criticized by scholars. Critics argue that children have special needs which need to be taken care of separately. Mark Lorey, for example, sees these needs as Physical s(including mental and reproductive health), basic medical care, screening and counseling, feeding and recreation.²³ Scholars like Fusato Massimo suggest that child soldiers should be:

separated from other ex-combatants, so that special needs can be addressed and so that they can avoid abuse by military authorities who may force them to enroll in new military forces, quickly discharged and reinstated into society, they should be placed in long term reintegration programs that give priority to family reunification, should be provided with long-term psychological support, to help them recover from the negative experience of war and to limit social attitudes and aggressive behaviors, provided with education and professional training, which offer children with no professional experience an opportunity for a sustainable livelihood.²⁴

The disarmament process in many peace keeping processes has been complicated by the fact that soldiers tend to have more than one weapon which they hide and revert if the DDR process fails.²⁵

²⁰ Fusato M., Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants, Intractable Conflict knowledge Base Project Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003 p2

²¹ Ibid p2

²² Lorey M., Child Soldiers, Care & Protection of Children in Emergencies, A field Guide, Save the Children Federation, 2001 pg 23

²³ Ibid pg24

²⁴ Fusato M., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants, op.cit p4

²⁵ Procedure of the IRG Workshop Addis Ababa, 4-7, December 1994. Brief 4

This was indeed highlighted in the International Regional Governments (IRG) workshop in Addis Ababa in 1994. It was noted that transparency with regard to arms collection is vital for there to be successful disarmament. In Mozambique for instance, the situation was partly made worse by the fact that both the leaders of FRELIMO and RENAMO ordered their soldiers to hide the weapons as insurance in case the peace broke down.²⁶ Chris Alden confirms that RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers had established illegal weapons caches.²⁷ The two parties refused to comply with the Rome Peace Agreement which required that "...all collective and individual weapons...be stored in warehouse under the United Nations control."²⁸

The main concern for parties in the disarmament process is the 'fear' of surprise attacks from their enemies. Barbara Walter observes that groups become extremely vulnerable once they send their soldiers home and lay down their weapons.²⁹ She explains that disarmament at this point creates tension as the fewer weapons one has the more vulnerable they feel.³⁰

This highlights the fact that disarmament is a challenge to be addressed with appropriate policy measures to ensure that it happens. So far it has proved difficult to implement and no efforts can

²⁶ Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Erante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986.p5

²⁷ Chris A. , *'The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique'*, op.cit.Pp3-128

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Walter B, *Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace*, Published in *International Security* Vol.24, No.1(Summer 1999)pg15

³⁰ Ibid pg 15

be predicted in the near future of the same. Scholars like Godfrey Kemp advise that an effective arms control will have to control supplier and buyer states.³¹

This has proved to be difficult as observed by Swadesh Rana who argues that the negotiation of such arms is at the international level and then trickles down to groups or individuals not accountable to any authority and anyway the proliferations have already occurred and to get the sources at this stage is difficult and monitoring strategies are wanting.³² Swadesh Rana adds that the readily available market for these arms is worth looking at.³³ He observes that a rifle could be bought for six dollars, a chicken or a bag of maize. His point is that the problem is at the source which is not easy to locate and hence a monitoring system is needed so that it would be easier to control the proliferation of arms. This is more of a preventive strategy. Swadesh Rana proposes strengthening of this offers an alternative to the small arms.

Other challenges involved in disarmament in Africa include the fact that some cultures recognize arms as part of life. This was mentioned in the IRG conference where it was argued these cultures believe a man without a gun is not a 'real man.'³⁴ Afua Twum however disputes the culture thesis arguing that culture is 'sometimes selected by the elite making it a conscious construction rather

³¹Geoffrey K. 'Regional Security, Arms Control And End of Cold War' in DC, Brown Sheryl J and Shraub Kimber M. Resolving Third World Conflicts Challenges for a New Era. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992) p119.

³²Rana S. , 'Light Weapons and Current Conflicts' in Disarmament , A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Volume XIX, Number 2, New York 1996.p41

³³Ibid P 39

³⁴ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood,' ISS Monograph series.no.82 p17, April 2003.

than spontaneous communications.³⁵ This argument questions the dynamism of culture as a rational yardstick for the process of disarmament. The measures of disarmament put in place have been neglected for instance in Somalia where although sale of guns is illegal towns like Hargeisa continue to roaring business as members of the IGA conference were informed.³⁶ The other threat is that after the demobilization process weapons are not destroyed hence still remain readily available.

The disarmament process makes way for demobilization of these child soldiers. Beth Verhey classifies the process into formal and informal. The formal process of demobilization follows a peace process or may occur as part of a military restructuring.³⁷ Informal demobilization on the other hand is characterized by gaining agreements from a particular armed group who then release the children in ongoing conflict.³⁸ The entire demobilization process according to Verhey includes training appropriate staff, establishing partnerships, generating resources and mobilizing policy coherence.”

The International Regional Governments workshop on the other hand cited the fact that the procedures for demobilization varied from one country to another . In some countries soldiers become self demobilized while other countries prefer to go through the government process. The government process entails encampment where the child soldiers are rounded up in camps where

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Procedure of the IRG Workshop Addis Ababa, 4-7, December 1994. Brief 4

³⁷ Berth Verhey, “Child Soldiers, Preventing, Demobilization and Reintegration.” Africa Region Working Paper series, No.23, November 2001.

³⁸ Ibid P 6

they are disarmed and receive health care material support and training that would assist them when they get back to society.³⁹

The participants of the conference were also alerted of countries like Somalia where the army of the Said Barre regime went back home after their defeat. In Ethiopia an estimated 50,000 soldiers went back to their homes.⁴⁰

The demobilization process has been faced with various challenges. Demobilization requires sufficient funds or risk dissatisfaction from the child soldiers as the IRG workshop heard. Beth Verhey observes that exclusion of child soldiers in peace agreements is risky and requires urgent political attention and that child soldiers have been excluded from peace agreements which in turn affect the demobilization process.⁴¹ In the IRG workshop it was argued that lack of preparation and insufficient information on the number of child soldiers to be demobilized is a common challenge and knowing the number helps in planning and budgeting for the process.⁴²

Human Rights Africa watch however found that child soldiers in some instances have refused to be demobilized. Sudan child soldiers as noted earlier refused to disarm and insisted they wanted to

³⁹ Procedure of the IRG Workshop Addis Ababa, 4-7, December 1994. Brief 4

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Berth Verhey, "Child Soldiers Preventing, Demobilization and Reintegration." Africa Region Working Paper series, No.23, November 2001. P7

⁴² Procedure of the IRG Workshop Addis Ababa, 4-7, December 1994. Brief

remain in the army.⁴³ Afua Twum concurs that this is possible because the children who join the army usually come from poor or disadvantaged, non-existent families or conflict zones. Brett and Nordstrom have observed that those children involved in child labor are likely to join armies. The other observations made are that the children lack birth registration certificates making it difficult to determine their age hence a high risk of being coerced into the armies.⁴⁴

The increase in the use of child soldiers has been attributed to the radical transformation in the nature of armed conflict in the post Cold War period.⁴⁵ Conflict has once again shifted in the 21st century from inter state conflict to intrastate conflict. Mary Kaldor argues that conflicts cannot be classified as internal since they do not just involve neighboring states but are also inclined to the notion of globalization due to increased interconnectedness in political, economic and military domains.⁴⁶ Afua Twum on the other hand suggests that this nature of intrastate conflicts 'blurs distinction between combatants and civilians with the very nature of increase and decrease in conflict causing a huge number of male casualties.'⁴⁷ This encourages recruitment of child soldiers to replace the male adult soldiers.

⁴³ Humans Rights Watch /Africa, ' Children of Sudan; Slaves, Street children and Child Soldiers', New York 1995 in Pan- African Forum for Children, issue paper 4 Children and Peace in Africa.

⁴⁴ Brett and Nordstorm in Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood,' ISS Monograph series.no.82 p17, April 2003.

⁴⁵ Mary Kaldor , 'The Structure of Conflict' in Lennart W., Gibson S, Klasen S, and Rothschild E Common Security and Civil Society in Africa,(Sweden: Elandars Gotab, 1999).pp118-144,p118.

⁴⁶ Ibid pp118-144.

⁴⁷ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82, April 2003.

Child soldiers in the world are estimated to be over 300,000 as described by the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers a non-government organization involved in child soldiers issues.⁴⁸ Afua Twum estimates that half of this figure, about 120,000 is found in Africa due to lack of manpower, ease of politics and military mobilization and a product of culture and tradition.⁴⁹ Berth Verhey argues that the exact number of child soldiers is not available as children have been ignored in the past.⁵⁰ Afua twum concurs with this, adding that it is difficult to asses the number of child soldiers which has resulted to the invisibility of the children. It is therefore imperative to note that the figures available are only estimates and that the child soldiers are between the ages 15 and 18 and could be as young as 7 years.⁵¹

Opinion is divided on the minimum age of recruitment into the army. For instance Afua Twum observed that two optional protocols of 1949 prohibited recruitment of child soldiers less than 15 years of age.⁵² Many countries at the time considered the age 18 years while others like the USA and Britain (UK) list age 16. The prevailing international law as observed by John Shanahan, listed age 15 as the minimum age for military recruitment.⁵³ Afwa Twum on the other hand

⁴⁸ 'A Growing phenomena', Stop using Child Soldiers: Coalition to stop use of child soldiers, 2nd Edition, (London:Radda Bamen, 1988). pp5-6. P 5.

⁴⁹ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82, April 2003.

⁵⁰ Berth Verhey, Child Soldiers, preventing, Demobilization and Reintegration. Africa Region Working Paper series,No.23,Nvember 2001.

⁵¹ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82, April 2003.

⁵² Ibid pg2

⁵³ 'A Growing phenomena', Stop using Child Soldiers: Coalition to stop use of child soldiers, 2nd Edition, (London:Radda Bamen, 1988). Pp5-6. .

observed that in 1989 the UNCRC made the situation worse with the provision in the convention which defined the child as anyone under 18 but allowed for the age to be explicitly lowered with regard to military service.⁵⁴ Afwa Twum further observes that "based on these existing standards the statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 1989 made it a war crime for both governments and armed opposition groups to recruit children under the age of fifteen or use them in national, regional and international conflicts."⁵⁵

John Shanahan observed that in 1986 there was 'dramatic turn of events' and attention was focused on child soldiers in Uganda where Yoweri Museveni's' army had children of ages four and five in its ranks.⁵⁶ This led to Optional Protocol in January 2000, a move by governments to prohibit the use of children in armed conflicts which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in March 2000 and opened for signature in June.⁵⁷

The contradiction in this international law was a major concern. This made implementation of the newly acquired Optional Protocol difficult as it could be argued that International Law allows recruitment of children of 15 years and above instead of adults of ages 18 years and above. The statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in Rome in 1998 only further complicates the whole issue as it spells out that both government and opposition groups will be treated as war

⁵⁴ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82, April 2003.P14

⁵⁵ Ibid14

⁵⁶ Shanahan J., The Invisible Soldiers: Child Combatants. The Defense Monitor, Center for Defense information Washington, DC-I.S.S.N#0195-6450.

⁵⁷ Ibid pg9

criminals if they recruit soldiers less than 15 years as observed by Afua Twum.⁵⁸ Such has been the case in countries like Angola, Sudan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Libya, Mexico Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America and many others where recruits have been from ages 15 years and above.⁵⁹

The plight of children as soldiers has been widely discussed, the main concern being the methods of recruitment and the treatment they receive. Brett and Margaret have observed that the children were forcibly recruited by both government and armed opposition groups.⁶⁰ Afua Twum adds that the forced methods of recruitment are brutal. Some children are forced to make the decision facing the barrel of a rifle while others face exclusion, hunger and hardship.⁶¹ Others are known to voluntarily join the military because of separation from families during the war. This applies mostly to those living in areas where there is persistent conflict, and the poor.⁶² Afua Twum questions voluntarism and whether children can make rational decisions to take up arms and fight a war they

⁵⁸ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82 p18, April 2003.pg4

⁵⁹Rana S.. , 'Light Weapons and Current Conflicts' in Disarmament , A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Volume XIX, Number 2, New York 1996.p48

⁶⁰ Brett & McCallin ,Children the Invisible Soldiers, (of the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, and the International Catholic child Bureau on behalf of the Child Soldiers Research Project), Grafiska Punkten, 1996 Pg112

⁶¹ Afua Twum- Danso, Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood, ISS Monograph series.no.82 p18, April 2003Pg2

⁶² Ibid

do not understand.⁶³ Graca Machel argues that children may not have the ability to make the right decisions on what is best for them.⁶⁴

Afua Twum supports his argument further by giving the example of Mozambique where RENAMO soldiers forced children to kill their relatives so that they do not escape. Mc Connas suggests that children join the armies for various reasons including revenge, refuge, peer pressure and need for a sense of belonging.⁶⁵ The report by the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers concurs with him arguing that child soldiers are coerced under the pretext of being offered education, kidnapped, and recruited through the press. Other children voluntarily join the military where they live under harsh conditions, act as spies, messengers, or porters. They are often supplied with drugs, and treated brutally.⁶⁶ Punishments for mistakes can be severe.

Swadesh Rana argues that the increase in the number of child soldiers can be attributed to technological changes and proliferation of weapons like small arms which are light enough to be stripped and assembled by a ten year old. He also cites issues of shortage of manpower during

⁶³ Ibid pg3

⁶⁴ Graca Machel in Afua Twum- Danso, 'Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood,' ISS Monograph series.no.82 p29 April 2003.

⁶⁵ MConnas in Afua Twum- Danso, 'Africa's' Young Soldiers, The co-option of Child hood,' ISS Monograph series.no.82 p29 April 2003.

⁶⁶ 'Child soldiers: an Overview,' Stop Using Child Soldiers, Coalition to stop Use of Child Soldiers .2nd Edition (London: Radda Barnen) 1998. Pp 1-3. P1

war,⁶⁷ noting that the current conflict is mindless violence not fought by regular armies with defined military strategies. That the average age for the fighter is getting younger, many of whom do not need training to use the weapons.⁶⁸ There is growing concern about the mobilization strategies of military regimes which are increasingly targeting children. Afua Twum puts it that a large proportion of child combatants are found in Africa and there is a need address their needs especially after conflict. The main concern being that the possibility of the child soldier returning to the army.

Africa grapples with conflict and the issue of sustainable peace is a concern. A number of peace accords have been signed to assist in cease-fires and ensure calm temporarily. Zartman argues that conflict resolution is rare, its frustration should not dissuade conciliators from seeking conflict management instead by inhibiting the pursuit of conflict and creating a momentum that parties can follow gradual coexistence and toward resolution.⁶⁹

Inis Claude on the other hand suggests that the world is not searching for answers to the problem of war but to develop some kind of sufficient means for dealing with the problem.⁷⁰ The United Nations(UN),the European union(EU),the Organization of African Unity(OAU), as well as sub regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West Africa(ECOWAS), the Inter-

⁶⁷Ibid P 5

⁶⁸Rana S. , 'Light Weapons and Current Conflicts' in *Disarmament , A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, Volume XIX, Number 2, New York 1996.p48

⁶⁹Zartman, I. W, Ripe For Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, updated edition,(New York: Oxford University Press,1989) P 274

⁷⁰Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords into ploughs shares , the Problems and Progress of International Organizations 4th edition,(New York: Random House)P 217

Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community(SADC) have undertaken conflict resolution and peace building activities in Africa.⁷¹

Peace agreements have been a step towards the resolution of these conflicts. Mozambique is seen as a success story after the General agreement of 1992 which brought an end to a seventeen year war between the rebels Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the government forces Resistance National Mozambique (RENAMO).⁷² The United Nations was instrumental in the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Mozambique.

Liberia on the other hand had its share of instability with the warring factions, the National Patriotic Front (NPLF), the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPLF) and Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).⁷³ Currently it is under the Abuja Peace Accord under monitoring by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after the previous peace agreements failed to hold.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Oosthuysen G. , in Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg2

⁷²Chris Alden , 'The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique', David Kimble(ed) The Journal of Modern African Studies , A quaterly survey of politics, Economics and Related topics in Contemporary Africa,Cambridge University Press Volume 33 March 1995.Pp3-128

⁷³Professor Ibrahim James, 'ECOMOG under Attack', in Margaret A. Vogt,The Liberian Crisis and Ecomog, (Lagos,Gabumo publishing,1995) P123-141.p128

⁷⁴Leomard T. Kapungu, 'Arms Control and Peace Settlements and the Challenges of Sub-state activities' op.cit .P150

It has been argued that these agreements are fragile due to the proliferation of light weapons across borders which contribute to intrastate conflicts.⁷⁵ John Shanahan maintains that collection and destruction of the weapons is vital for peace to be sustained.⁷⁶ These weapons are said to have been recycled in war situations and until disarmament process begins to address this issue effectively the 'cycle of violence' will continue.⁷⁷ In Mozambique, for instance, after the signing of the peace agreement the weapons were smuggled to the South African Apartheid regime where they were used between rival taxi operators ('Taxi Wars')⁷⁸ The fire arms unit of South African police and the Mozambican police joined forces and in July 1995 to recover and destroy weapons along their common border.⁷⁹ This operation was seen as unique.

The literature review highlights the process of disarmament and demobilization and the attendant challenges. These processes are a function of the looming problem of conflict in Africa which forces states to mobilize and arm military troops. Virginia Gamba argues that state security and defense have traditionally depended on the state ability to use armed forces, which has been a tool to carve a niche in international relations.⁸⁰ This has been a major problem with the rebel groups

⁷⁵ Oosthuysen G., in Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg2

⁷⁶ Ibid P2

⁷⁷ Oosthuysen Glen, in Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg2

⁷⁸ Ibid pg 10

⁷⁹ Ibid pg 10

⁸⁰ Virginia Gamba-Stone house, 'The Material and Non-Material Dimensions of Future Global Security Needs in Political Change ,Future ,Security needs and Military Expenditure' in Disarmament, A Periodic Review By the United Nations , Volume XIII, Number 3,1990.

in Africa. Having a mobilized military proves difficult to demobilize after a conflict as being in the military gives those involved some kind of security and future preparedness. There is always the issue of what if there is the need to fight again. This has made disarmament and demobilization processes difficult to achieve.

The literature review brings to attention an important conclusion that much of the conflict in 'Africa has now focused on mobilizing child soldiers because of their vulnerability, availability, ease to kill and use for other purposes other than armed conflict. These children are sometimes left out in peace agreements causing a problem in disarmament and demobilization of these children, termed as invisible. The mobilization and increased conflicts have further been catalyzed by proliferation of arms. This problem still poses a threat to the security and peace agreements in Africa as effective policies on disarmament and demobilization strategies are wanting. The study therefore is relevant to address this issue disarmament and demobilization of the child soldiers and their relevance in peace agreements in Africa.

1.7Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will provide direction for this study.

1. Disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers has an impact on peace agreements.
2. Effective disarmament and demobilization of child soldiers leads to sustainable peace agreement in Africa.
3. Child soldiers in Africa respond to the disarmament and demobilization process.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This study will adopt the realist theory which puts an emphasis on conflict of state interest and power politics.⁸¹ According to realists, nation states are the main actors in world politics since they answer to no higher authority and conflicts of interests among them are assumed to be inevitable.⁸² Realists explain this as the world being dangerous, insecure where 'violence is regrettable' but endemic.⁸³ This ability of the state as the main actor gives room for states to dictate their national policy according to their national interest which inevitably leads to conflict of interest.

States also have to find a way to survive in what Hans Morgenthau describes as a hostile environment' hence acquisition of power.⁸⁴ A leading realist, E.H.Carr, for example, saw the pursuit of power as a natural drive by states and power was indeed national interest which states 'neglected at their peril'.⁸⁵ States, therefore, will use their resources to defend themselves hence much is spend on military facilities, personnel to safe guard national interests. Child soldiers come in efficiently as military personnel and an increased proliferation of small arms which area easy for

⁸¹Groom A, J. The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher' in Approaches to Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations: Lessons From Theory to Practice Lecture 1
Langenhard, January 1992. P23

⁸² Morgenthau, Hans, J and Kenneth w Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The struggle of power and peace.
U.S.A Kalyano publishers, 1973.

⁸³Ibid P 71

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵E. H., Carr , The Twenty Years Crisis(1939) in Theories of International Relations, 2nd Edition
Deakini university, Palgrave, New York 2001.P78

them to use. Increase of proliferation of arms complicated the disarmament and demobilization processes.

Scott Burchill observes further that the realist seeks to describe and explain the world just as it is not the way we would like it to be⁸⁶. We would like the world to be a peaceful place guided by law and moral principles to ensure coexistence and reduce conflict. According to the realist respect for moral principles is a waste of time and may interfere with sound policy making.⁸⁷ The principle of sovereignty of states gives states responsibility and freedom to do whatever is necessary for their survival. This brings difficulty especially when it comes to recruitment of child soldiers. Countries have recruited child soldiers in their army despite the existence of the International Law which stipulates that recruitment should be of personnel above 18 years.

The criticism of this theory is that it considers the state as the main actor. The world is also seen as anarchical meaning no authority to govern behavior of nation states and international law is seen as interfering with the sovereignty of nation-states.⁸⁸ Despite its criticism realism helps explain conflict such as the ability to accumulate weapons and civil conflicts which are usually out of the interests of individuals who use military regimes to achieve their goals. The issue of power has been a weakness in the African continent and has contributed to internal conflicts that become internationalized through interventions by human rights organizations and the United Nations.

⁸⁶Burchill Scott, Realism and Neo-realism, in Theories of International Relations, 2nd Edition Deakini university, Palgrave, New York 2001. P 71

⁸⁷Morgenhtau, Hans, J and Kenneth w Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The struggle of power and peace, U.S.A Kalyano publishers, 1973

⁸⁸Burchill Scott, Realism and Neo-realism in Theories of International Relations, op.cit. ,P 85,

This study is best described by the strategist realist;

To ensure the relationship between the balance of forces is it ensure that the relationship between the balance of forces and political system is an appropriate one. ... the strategist acts from a vantage point of either status quo powers or revisionist powers. ... his business is manipulation of threats that is to deter and if necessary deter. His currency therefore is military technology to the political positions of either shoring up the status quo or getting the necessary coercive ability to change it.⁸⁹

Groom further elaborates the need for states to keep their powers dry due to the current state of security in the society. This theory will assist to explain the ability of mobilization of military regimes including children so as to sustain its potency which incase conflict ensues and probably the difficulty in disarmament demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in Africa.

1.8 Operationalisation of Key Concepts

Disarmament: "The collection, control and disposal of weapons and development of arms management programs."⁹⁰

Demobilization: "The process by which armed forces either downsize or disband."⁹¹

⁸⁹Groom A, J. The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher in Approaches to Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations: Lessons From Theory to Practice Lecture 1 . Langenhard, January 1992. p23

⁹⁰ Secretary General of the United Nations, Report the Security Council, S/2000/101, 11 February 2000 in Berth Verhey 'Child Soldiers, Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating', Africa Region Working Paper Series November 2001.

⁹¹ Berth Verhey 'Child Soldiers, Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegration,' Africa Region Working Paper Series, Number 23 November 2001. P28

Child Soldier: "A child soldier has been defined as any person under 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage."⁹²

1.9 Methodology

The study will use both primary and secondary data. The primary data will be collected through interviews with project coordinators of organizations concerned with child soldiers such as United Nations Education Children's Fund and Save the Children (Radda Barnen). Informal interviews will be carried out in various non-government organizations that deal with children. A final informal interview at the Mozambique high commission in Kenya on the success of the Disarmament and Demobilization process.

The secondary data will be collected from published and unpublished material concerning child soldiers, books from the library, journals, newsletters, internet sources and reports.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction: An overview of child soldiers and the disarmament and demobilization process in Africa.

Chapter 2: Mozambique: The General Peace Agreement of 1992 Disarmament and Demobilization provision

Chapter 3: The Disarmament and Demobilization process of child soldiers in Mozambique.

Chapter 4: An analysis of the Disarmament and Demobilization Process and the General Peace Agreement of 1992 in Mozambique

⁹² Ibid P 28

Chapter 5: Summary, Findings, Recommendations, Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 MOZAMBIQUE CONFLICT: THE ROME GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1992.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Mozambique achieved its independence in 1975 after a bitter liberation war against the Portuguese colonial regime. Independence from Portugal however did not end the conflict in the country as internal conflict replaced the war against colonialism. The internal conflict left the country in a state that analysts suggested would take years to recover. This was made worse by drought and floods that ravaged the country. The Peace Agreement of 1992 was a sign of hope and relief for the warring factions and the civilians in Mozambique.

This chapter gives a background of the war in Mozambique leading to the Rome General Peace Agreement of 1992. This is necessary so as to better understand the reasons for the war and the various actors and interests which culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement of 1992. This General Peace Agreement has the component of disarmament and demobilization of the soldiers as part of the process to sustainable peace.

Knowledge of the intricacies of the warring factions is important at this point. The main protagonists were Mozambique National Résistance (RENAMO), the government forces and Frente de Libertaco de Mocambique (FRELIMO) the rebel forces. Thirdly, the process of the peace agreement and the various parties involved will be discussed. This will shade light on the disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers in Mozambique to be discussed in chapter three.

2.2 Stages of conflict in Mozambique

The 30-year conflict in Mozambique began in 1964 with a national liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism. This particular war lasted 10 years (1964-1974).¹ The conflict was followed closely by the 1975-1980 Zimbabwean liberation war against the Rhodesian Government and lastly the most recent conflict of 1987-1992 leading to the Rome Peace Agreement.²

2.2.1 Historical and Colonial legacy

Mozambique is located in the eastern coast of southern Africa, bordering South Africa and Swaziland in the South west and Tanzania in the north.³ Its long coast along the Indian Ocean is reported to provide a vital access to the sea to landlocked countries on its western borders.⁴ Alex Vines explains that the borders in Mozambique were influenced by Portuguese conflicts with Britain in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁵ Other colonial rival powers eyed Mozambique too and in fifty years its map had been redrawn to suit British, French, Southern Africa, Southern Rhodesia and German interests.⁶

¹Social Re-integration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict: The Mozambican Experience, International Conference on the Use of Children in Armed Conflicts (19-22 April 1999)

²Ibid

³Frances M. Deng, Report of the Representative of the Secretary –General, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human rights resolution 1996/52 P4

⁴Ibid

⁵Vines A. , Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation)p

⁶Ibid

The 'large majority' of the Mozambicans are employed in the Agricultural sector, mostly subsistence farmers.⁷ Before the war, Mozambique was among the world's poorest and least developed countries.⁸

Mozambique is a former colony of Portugal and according to Francis Deng while there was clamor for independence through out Africa, Portugal not only ignored this demand but also went ahead and encouraged increased settlement by Europeans.⁹ In 1962 in Dar-es-Salaam FRELIMO was established, led by Eduardo Mondlane who launched a war of independence against Portugal.¹⁰ FRELIMO received backing from Algeria and Zambia and launched its operations from the Tanzanian territory.¹¹

Mozambique achieved its independence in June 1975 from Portugal. FRELIMO was instrumental in achieving this. Frente de Libertaco de Mocambique was known for its slogan 'O Inimigo Interno' (Internal Enemy)¹². Alex Vines argues that the internal enemy was that of class meaning those who rumored, conspired against FRELIMO and sabotaged the economy at independence. He further argues that unlike

⁷ Frances M. Deng, Report of the Representative of the Secretary –General, submitted pursuant tp commission on Human rights resolution 1996/52 Pg4

⁸Ibid Pg4

⁹ Ibid Pg3

¹⁰Ibidpg4

¹¹Carbone M,Giovanni, Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique the FRELIMO-RENAMO party system, Development Research Center, London School of Economics,2002pg3

¹²A.Vines, Renamo from Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? Op. cit p10

its counterpart Zambia that achieved its independence in 1964 and advocated for national unity, FRELIMO was obsessed with fighting its enemies within its borders.¹³

In the same year (1975) FRELIMO had succeeded in driving Portuguese officials, traders and small farmers from rural areas.¹⁴ A report issued by the Ministry of health, National Directorate for social welfare, Mozambican Red Cross and the Catholic Church explains that at independence many Portuguese settlers sabotaged and destroyed all they could from factories and hospitals.¹⁵ However these areas were freed from colonialism and this was the beginning of internal wrangling in FRELIMO. Alex Vines observes that there were three areas of dispute, namely power struggles, the production policies which involved issue of control of farms and their produce and the issue of tribalism.¹⁶

2.2.2 Areas of conflict (1960-1975)

After FRELIMO had conquered territories in the rural areas from the Portuguese, a conflict arose between FRELIMO leaders and the Makonde chiefs and elders who wanted policies in neo-traditional terms. This in turn brought up issues about the role of women and access to land and its use.¹⁷ The second issue in

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Selected papers from the Conference of Children in situations of armed conflict in Africa: An Agenda for Action, 10th July 1987 (Nairobi: Kulgraphics Fundi Road, 1987)

¹⁶ A.Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? Op.citp11

¹⁷ Ibid p 10

dispute was control of marketing and production of profits from peasant cash crops within the cooperatives in marketing that had come up in the 1960s.¹⁸

The third area of dispute was tribalism where the Makonde chiefs satisfied with the liberation of their territories showed little interest in the national struggle for southern and central Mozambique and demanded that FRELIMO proceed only to the Northern parts of Mozambique.¹⁹ Part of the dispute was also a generational struggle between the young Mozambicans trained in Algeria in 1962-1964 and the older generation that left Mozambique as labor immigrants.²⁰

According to Alex Vines, these disputes were a source of concern to the then leader of FRELIMO Eduardo Mondlane who was assassinated in 1970. Mondlane's strategy was to unite the people by defining the Mozambican population as that of workers united by the fact that their labor was exploited by the Colonial capitalism in the 1960s²¹. The Mozambicans provided cheap labor and raw materials for the colonialists and the available health and social services were limited to urban areas and were racially discriminatory.²²

This strategy was meant to make the population realize that the common enemy was the colonizer who had

¹⁸Ibid p10

¹⁹Ibid p11

²⁰Ibid p11

²¹Ibid p11

²²Selected papers from the Conference of Children in situations of armed conflict in Africa: An Agenda for Action, 10th July 1987(Nairobi: Kulgraphics Fundi Road, 1987)

exploited their labor. This, he hoped would unite the people. The country was divided as a result of the privilege accorded to the urban and industrial sectors which were subsidized by the state while the rural community was neglected and forced to 'modernize'.²³

Alex Vines argues that this strategy of uniting the people was instrumental in FRELIMO laying the ground for adopting the Marxist-Leninist program. William Zartman observes that this assisted FRELIMO in attracting support from the communist states.²⁴ Andrea E. Ostheimer observed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) provided military and political aid to FRELIMO.²⁵ In 1976 FRELIMO signed several trade treaties with the USSR.²⁶ The Marxist Lennist program was a control strategy for FRELIMO. The intention of the movement was to marginalize and bring churches and every sector of society to submission.²⁷ Martin Rupiya described the Marxist Lennist mission as that which had the intention to 'to lead, organize, orientate and educate the masses thus transforming the popular mass movement into a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism and the construction of socialism'.²⁸

²³ Carbone M,G. Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique the FRELIMO-RENAMO party system, op.cit.p3

²⁴William I. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution ,Conflict and Intervention in Africa*(New York: Oxford University Press) P 179

²⁵ Ostheimer E, Andrea, *Transforming peace inti demorcracy: Democratic structures in Mozambique*, published in *African Security Review* Vol 8 No 6, 1999

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Morier -G Eric, *The politics of Church and Religion in the First Multiparty Elections of Mozambique*

²⁸ Rupiya M, in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources*, 1998.

Mozambicans were forced to resettle by collective villagisation programmes, their traditional authorities structures were eradicated and little or non of state services was offered by FRELIMO.²⁹ This was not received well in some regions such as Sofala, Manica, Zambezi, Tete and Nampula resulting in the emergence of the opposition, RENAMO.³⁰ These conditions led to a continued struggle by the people especially the peasants for independence, which was achieved in 1975, 5 years after Mondlane's assassination.

2.2.3 Postcolonial Mozambique conflicts (1975-1992)

At independence, FRELIMO saw the main challenge to attainment of its goals as emanating to certain forces. The internal enemy of class spilled over from colonialism to independence of Mozambique. The civilians were divided variously as the bourgeois, petite- bourgeois or capitalist. This was not the only class but also others were classified as the saboteurs and collaborators, alcoholics, polygamists and Joes (American Style hippies).³¹ This shows that colonization played an important role in the conflicts in Mozambique. Margaret Vogt explains that these conflicts were as a result of unresolved colonial rivalries.³²

²⁹ Ostheimer E, Andrea, Transforming peace into democracy: Democratic structures in Mozambique, published in African Security Review Vol 8 No 6, 1999

³⁰ Carbone M, Giovanni, Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique the FRELIMO-RENAMO party system, op. cit.p3

³¹ Ibidp3

³² Margaret A. V, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping - The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations in Gunnar M. Sorbp and Peter Vale (eds) in Our of Conflict From War to Peace in Africa(Sweden: Motala Grafiska, 1997)pp58-78.

These internal enemies were classified into four groups. The first groups were the white settlers who owned or represented industries and economic investments. The second group was the elite of the society who acquired education at higher levels and was not committed to the armed struggle. Alex Vines observes that only 5% of Mozambicans were literate at independence and this included the white Portuguese.³³The country had one black doctor, one qualified black agronomist and no single Mozambican engineer despite four generations of gold miners in South Africa.³⁴

The third group FRELIMO was in conflict with was the Catholic Church and the Jehovah's Witness. Alex Vines notes that some members of these groups who had traveled to the United States for further studies were despised and described as Janitors who cleaned the American toilets. Many of these students remained in exile following such accusations. The church and Mosques were seen as threat as they were independent of any party control, cut across culture and race and formed a large group.³⁵

The last group was the peasant majority. They played a major role in the struggle for the independence of Mozambique and were largely used by FRELIMO as an instrument to achieve its goal of ousting the colonial regime. It is this group that suffered immensely under colonial rule and their men were forced to work in plantations and mines while women worked in the cotton and rice schemes. They were found in the rural areas where most of the attacks against colonialism begun. It is this group that FRELIMO used in its

³³A. Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996)p8

³⁴ Ibid p8

³⁵ Ibid

campaigns, listening to their grievances. After independence they lost favor with FRELIMO who introduced collective production and villagisation which was imposed uniformly to the extent that some women were arrested for head-loading baskets of rice into the market.³⁶

The attempt by FRELIMO to fight the so-called internal enemy gave rise to opposition as their policies were not readily welcomed. A series of small groups rose not just after independence but also in the 1960's to oppose FRELIMO. The main opposition group however that posed a threat to the FRELIMO government was known as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) established by Rhodesian security forces.³⁷

RENAMO was formed as a result of the hostility of the FRELIMO government towards Rhodesia, its support of Zimbabwe African National liberation Army (ZANLA) and for closing the Mozambique border with Rhodesia.³⁸ The President, Samora Machel allowed the guerilla group, ZANLA to establish bases in Mozambique in order to wage attacks against the 'white minority regime of Ian Smith.'³⁹ This kind of support according to Elsie Boulding is termed as cross border affiliations or networks where a neighbor provides sanctuary or arms for the guerillas.⁴⁰

³⁶Ibid

³⁷Ibid

³⁸Ibid

³⁹Democracy factfile, supporting Democracy in Southern Africa, Mozambique, February 2000

⁴⁰Boulding E, New Agendas For Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992)

Initially RENAMO was dominated by disgruntled Portuguese who had left their property to the government. It was however realized that it would be ineffective hence it began recruiting the native Mozambicans. This was effectively carried out through a rebel radio station known as the A 'Voz da Africa Livre.' A good number had been recruited to be trained by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) of Rhodesia who were the sponsors of RENAMO leading to the civil conflict of 1977.⁴¹ Its main task was to ' sabotage, to disrupt the population and disrupt the economy of Mozambique... obtain recruits, attack FRELIMO and ZANLA bases and gather intelligence on them.'⁴²

They achieved their mission by destructive activities like burning villages, attacking shops and clinics, attacking rail roads, plundering of Agriculture co-operatives and many other atrocities.⁴³

The leader of the group was a former FRELIMO commander Andre Matsangaissa. Matsangaissa who had been sent to a FRELIMO re-education camp for theft later escaped to join the rebel forces RENAMO.⁴⁴ He was put in charge of RENAMO which fully depended on Rhodesian aid to carry out its activities. It was named MNR or MNRA by mid 1977 and was commonly known to the Portuguese as RNM or RENAMO. Its activities at the time were described as the opposition or anti-FRELIMO fifth column operating in

⁴¹S. Aird, B. Efraime Junior, A. Errante, Mozambique: The Battle Continues for former Child Soldiers, Youth Advocate program International Resource Paper.

⁴²Ibid

⁴³Ibid

⁴⁴Vines A., Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op. cit p16

Mozambique.⁴⁵ RENAMO activities became clear in the late 1977 when its role was fully defined as “to sabotage, disrupt the population and to disrupt the economy” of Mozambique.⁴⁶

Andre Matsangaissa’s assassination is said to have ignited a major power struggle in the party. This characteristic according to Alex Vines is a common phenomenon in various groups leading to internal wrangles which in most cases divide the group. ⁴⁷It is revealed that Dhlakama, the then deputy to Andre Matsangaissa and his natural successor, was not popular both with the Rhodeisians and the black people of Mozambique. This was evident in the party as the then challenger of Dhlakama, Lucas Mlanga was killed in a gun fight and his supporters fled. More trouble was witnessed in the party as the political commissar Henrique Siteo and a radio presenter surrendered to the government.⁴⁸

Defection from the party to FRELIMO or other splinter groups increased and a splinter group (MONAMO) operating in Lisbon was as a result of the tension in the party. ⁴⁹ However, by 1980 the party is said to have dominated 9 out of the 10 provinces of Mozambique which led to the steady increase in violence and decrease in production levels that were evident following the lull of rebel activity.⁵⁰ It was reported that between 1980 and February 1988 approximately 1800 schools, 720 health units, 900 shops, and 1300 trucks and buses were rendered unoperational by RENAMO activities.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Ibid pg 16

⁴⁶ Ibid pg16

⁴⁷ Ibid pg16

⁴⁸ Vines A., Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op., cit., p8

⁴⁹ Ibid pg17

⁵⁰ Ibid pg17

⁵¹ Africa confidential (UK), Vol 29 No.5 4 March 198

RENAMO's existence was of great interest to South Africa, concerned about African National Congress (ANC) incursions. ANC used Mozambique as a gateway to South Africa. The main aim of the movement (RENAMO) was to ward off domestic anti-apartheid opposition, the main one being ANC.⁵² Destabilizing Mozambique economically meant a direct attack on ANC cutting off its support from Mozambique. This activity was carried out through the military "Total Onslaught" theory as part of the military "Total National Strategy" whose main objective was to cut off support for all the anti-apartheid opposition groups.⁵³ According to Alex Vines this method entailed 'neutralizing diplomatic, economic and military policies'.⁵⁴ Mozambique was sabotaged economically; direct attacks on ANC were launched and destabilized through "proxy warfare".⁵⁵ South Africa was therefore active in supplying arms to RENAMO for destructive activities.⁵⁶ However the internal dispute in RENAMO seemed not to be favoring South Africa who in turn sought to negotiate with FRELIMO.⁵⁷

The Mbabane talks of 1983 brought South Africa and Mozambique to the Nkomati Accord on non-aggression and good neighborliness.⁵⁸ This was fueled by the United States, which brought pressure on South Africa to reduce its onslaught on Mozambique for the reasons of the instability in the region and a possible invitation of the military attacks by the Soviets courtesy of Mozambique. The terms of agreement

⁵² Democracy fact file, supporting Democracy in Southern Africa, Mozambique, February 2000

⁵³ Vines A, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op cit p18

⁵⁴ Ibid p18

⁵⁵ Ibid p18

⁵⁶ Vines A, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op.,cit., p8

⁵⁷ Ibid pg8

⁵⁸ Ibid

for the talks were that South Africa would stop supporting RENAMO and in turn Mozambique would halt the operations of ANC from its territory.⁵⁹The Nkomati agreement however did not bring an end to RENAMO violent activities in Mozambique which instead it worsened.

The good intentions of the agreement which was to stop guerilla activities in Mozambique was disrupted by the guerillas who were determined to increase their activities and become self sufficient from the South African support.⁶⁰ The then Secretary General of RENAMO, Orlando Cristina had just been assassinated because of the belief that he was running the affairs of the party independent of South Africa.⁶¹ His position was taken over by an ex-FRELIMO member Bonaventura Bomba who was against the South African and Portuguese control of the party. Bomba is believed to have murdered Cristina. Bomba disappeared in the late 1983 and is believed to have been murdered. RENAMO remained divided with members resigning from the pro-Bomba camp and later resurfacing as the anti-Fernandes RENAMO splinter.⁶²

A solution was needed to bring peace in Mozambique and the lack of results from the Nkomati talks led to a top-level meeting in Cape Town where South Africa was accused of breaching the Nkomati agreement to stop support for RENAMO.⁶³ Accordign to Alex Vines, South Africa denied the claims put forward by Minister Jacinto Veloso of Mozambique and instead offered their offices for negotiated for peace settlement. The talks however, failed despite the discussions organized by Pik Botha the South African

⁵⁹ Democracy fact file, supporting Democracy in Southern Africa, Mozambique, February 2000

⁶⁰ Carbone M,Giovanni, Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique the FRELIMO-RENAMO party system, op.,cit.,p3

⁶¹ Vines A. , Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op.,cit.,p8

⁶² Ibidp18

⁶³ Democracy fact file, supporting Democracy in Southern Africa, Mozambique, February 2000

president. The talks failed because of South Africa's military involvement and support of RENAMO activities.

2.2 The Rome Peace Agreement Process (1992)

The Rome Peace Agreement of 1992 was a long and tedious undertaking. The process involved multiple players such as the Catholic Church in Mozambique, countries in Africa and outside the continent. The countries involved were Portugal, West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Malawi, Kenya, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.⁶⁴ All these countries had vested interests in one way or another. The agreement went through twelve rounds of talks from 8th July 1990 to October 4th 1992 when it was signed.

2.2.1 The churches

The church in Mozambique according to Alex Vines is said to have begun negotiations for peace as early as 1984 through the establishment of the "Peace and Reconciliation Commission" by the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM).⁶⁵ The church organization of 17 protestant churches in Mozambique held a meeting with Samora Machel in June 1985 but failed to convince him to have "low-key and confidential dialogue with RENAMO on national reconstruction and Social developments".⁶⁶ Earlier in February the same year the Franciscan Assisi "International Centre for Peace" tried to arrange a "round table meeting

⁶⁴For detailed discussion about the Peace Process, see A. Vines, *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*(Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996)chapter 5

⁶⁵Vines A, *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* op., cit.,p120

⁶⁶ *Ibid* p120

between RENAMO and the government” but still failed.⁶⁷ The war went on and churches sent an “Episcopal letter of the Catholic Bishops in Mozambique published by the Archdiocese of Maputo entitled *A paz Que O Povo Quer*(*The peace that people want*)” in 1982 to Samora Machel calling for dialogue. They were not able to bring the both sides together however.

Alex Vines explains that the relationship between the church and the government was ‘ambivalent’.⁶⁸ The Catholic Church had been harassed for several years and restricted to worship by the government. Andrea Bartoli observes that this hostility towards the Catholics was a result of the perception that they were too close to the ‘old’ colonial regime.⁶⁹ Eric Morier Genoud disagrees, arguing that the sour relationship between FRELIMO and the church emanated from difference in ideologies.⁷⁰

The Catholic Church in Mozambique in the 1940's and 1950's was powerful with a monopoly over 'African Education' with a focus on primary level.⁷¹ Mozambicans had no other option but to attend the Catholic schools which were said to be biased against non-Catholic students. Eric Genoud observed that the church fathers took advantage of this situation to forcefully convert non-Catholics into the religion.⁷² Samora Machel was a victim of this prejudice and was blackmailed into converting to be a Catholic in order to sit for his final primary exams.⁷³ Samora Machel was a protestant. This behavior by the Catholic Church made it

⁶⁷ Ibid p120

⁶⁸ Vines A. , Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique ?op., cit.,chapter 5

⁶⁹ Bartoli A, Mozambique and the Catholic Church, Interview by Julian Protilla,2003

⁷⁰ Genoud M. E, OF GOD and Caesar, *The Relationship Between Christian Churches and the state in Post- Colonial Mozambique,1974-1981* ISSN:1420-2018 .1996

⁷¹ Ibid pg 15

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Ibid p16

very unpopular among the Mozambicans who felt the church was colonialistic. Barry Munslow observes that this could have been the reason for Samora Machel's negative attitude towards religious organisations.⁷⁴

The protestant church on the other hand was held in high esteem as it's education system was applauded for its 'quality and independence from the colonial system.'⁷⁵ The church allowed and gave scholarships to Africans to study at the secondary and tertiary level. Eduardo Mondlane, the first FRELIMO president was a beneficiary of this protestant system becoming the first Mozambique Doctorate holder.⁷⁶ This shows that these two leaders had different experiences of religion one favorable and the other hostile. This is critical in explaining the attitude towards religious institutions by the two leaders. At independence religious institutions lost much of their power and impact through the nationalization process of all schools and health institutions as declared by FRELIMO. To further suppress the Church Samora Machel declared that in 'independent Mozambique there would be freedom to believe or not, but religious institutions would not be allowed to proselytize nor baptize children.'⁷⁷

In October 1986 President Samora Machel died in a plane crash and was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano. President Chissano explained the problems between the Catholic Church and the government as deriving from the church's tendency to condemn everybody including those giving aid to any of the

⁷⁴ Munslow, Barry, Samroa Machel. An African Revolutionary Selected Speeches and Writings, Zed Books, London,p210

⁷⁵ Genoud M. E, OF GOD and Caesar, The Relationship Between Christian Churches and the state in Post- Colonial Mozambique,1974-1981 ISSN:1420-2018 .1996 p 16

⁷⁶ *ibid* p16

⁷⁷ *ibid* 25

parties. In addition, he criticized their sermons which he said were turned into political rallies.⁷⁸ The church at this point had been pushed to this after the harsh treatment by Samora Machel.

However, in the early 1980's that Samora Machel began to tone down his hostilities towards the church. He invited the churches to play a role in assisting victims of war and natural disasters although he did not respond to any of their pleas for dialogue with the rebels.⁷⁹ In late 1987 serious initiative by churches to lobby for peace began with the encouragement of President Joaquim Chissano.

The Catholic Church having gained confidence from the warring factions through personal visits began establishing contact between the rebel leaders and the government.⁸⁰ The first talks were held in Washington DC by the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) and RENAMO delegates. The church delegation was however disappointed with RENAMO delegates whom they accused of being out of touch with the real issues in Mozambique.⁸¹ The Catholic Church and the protestant churches began working together and in May and October 1988 two CCM and two Catholic leaders approached Daniel Toroitich arap Moi the then president of Kenya for assistance and facilities in negotiating for the peace.⁸²

⁷⁸ Vines A, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op.,cit., chapter 5

⁷⁹ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources, 1998.

⁸⁰ Key Actors in the War and Peace Process, Main Antagonists www.cr.org/accord/moz/accord3/keyactors.shtml

⁸¹ Vines A, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op.,cit., chapter 5

⁸² *ibid* pg 121

The Kenyan Permanent Secretary in the ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat was sent to Maputo in 1988 for talks with President Chissano who gave him a go ahead to speak with the RENAMO leaders. This round of talks took place in September in Frankfurt. Ambassador Kiplagat became a 'peace broker' and this enabled him to travel through RENAMO controlled territory in Mozambique.⁸³ Kenya's role in the peace process is said to have been as a result of the long standing relationship with RENAMO. It has been claimed that toward the end of the Mozambique war, Kenya provided 'significant military training and channeled arms to the rebels' and in 1984 it is said that Kenya was the site for RENAMO offices.⁸⁴

In February 1989 meetings were held in Nairobi with various people such as President Moi, before the arrival of the RENAMO leaders.⁸⁵ Raul Manuel Domingos the 'rebel's secretary of Affairs' met the clergymen who tried to convince them that 'dialogue was the only way to end the war'. Further to this they added that 'no one was benefiting from the war and that people were suffering above all, the churchmen emphasized their neutrality, arguing that the reconciliation was a basic vocation for churches.'⁸⁶

In August 1989 after several 'abortive attempts' the clergymen met a RENAMO delegation led by Dhlakama. This meeting was made possible after several attempts by 'Tiny' Rowland who facilitated travel plans for the various parties involved. 'Tiny' Rowland was the then chief executive of the UK based

⁸³ Ibid pg 122

⁸⁴ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resources, 1998. p4

⁸⁵ Diniss. \$ Jaime p. Goncalves ,in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resources, 1998. p7

⁸⁶ Ibid p7

multinational, Lonrho.⁸⁷ It is reported that Rowland's relationship with Mozambique began in the 1960's when he 'negotiated' the building of an oil pipeline from the port Beira to Southern Rhodesia for Lonrho.⁸⁸ A significant event was when he signed a secret protection agreement with RENAMO which stipulated the payment of \$500,000 to the rebel group indefinitely unless the contract is terminated by either party.⁸⁹ It is reported that such similar agreements were made covering the Lonrho's northern tea estates which payment continued up to the signing of the General Peace Agreement.⁹⁰ Tiny' Rowland's interests in Mozambique could be seen as one of the reasons for his active participation in the peace process.

In the August meeting of 1989 face to face meeting between the warring parties, FRELIMO had drafted a list of 12 principles for direct dialogue with RENAMO which was handed over to Dhlakama in the meeting.⁹¹ RENAMO responded with a document they called the '16 point Declaration'.⁹² Neither of the warring factions would agree with the other document. Analysts agree that the contentious issue was FRELIMO would not accept RENAMO as a 'legitimate political force in Mozambique'.⁹³

The Nairobi talks however did not manage to bring RENAMO and FRELIMO on a face to face discussion. This was achieved in July 1990 by Sant' Egidio in 'their Rome headquarters. However the church did not stop contacts and initiative to bring the two warring parties together. They had already formed a bond with

⁸⁷ Vines A, Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resources, pg1

⁸⁸ *Ibid* pg 1

⁸⁹ *Ibid* pg1

⁹⁰ *Ibid* pg 1

⁹¹ Vines A, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?op., cit., chapter 5

⁹² See index for the documents 'Twelve principles for Peace of the Mozambican Government' and the Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance(RENAMO)

⁹³ *Ibid* p 8

both parties and the fact the church was neutral gave them an upper hand to assist in negotiating the peace.

2.2.2 Sant' Egidio Initiative

The key mediators of the agreement were Sant Egidio. The Sant Edigio was a community which was founded in the 1960's whose purpose was to express concern of Catholic students and is documented as being inexistent in 20 countries with 15,000 members worldwide.⁹⁴ The community engages in international mediation and the staff are said to be purely volunteers. The president and founder of the movement was Andre Riccardi, a professor of ecclesiastical history at Romes La Sapienza University.⁹⁵ Andrea Bertoli explains that the group is 'fundamentally a religious organization that simply tries to live the gospel through a life of prayer, service and friendship.'⁹⁶

The Mozambique government had established links with the Sant'Egidio community in 1976 and had a committee of friends of Mozambique in Italy. Alex Vines established that they had informal meetings with the Mozambique government in 1982 to improve their relations.⁹⁷ It is this community that facilitated

⁹⁴A.Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique ?op.,cit.,chapter 5

⁹⁵Bartoli A, Mozambique and the Catholic Church, Interview by Julian Protilla,2003(Andrea Bartoli is the Director of the International Conflict Resolution program of Columbia University 's school of International and Public Affairs and Chair of the Columbia University Conflict Resolution Network)

⁹⁶ Bartoli A, Mozambique and the Catholic Church, Interview by Julian Protilla,2003

⁹⁷ *ibid*

meetings with the Pope in 1985 and 1988 with Samora Machel and Chissano respectively.⁹⁸ The purpose of President Samora Machel's visit was to request the Vatican to assist in ending the support RENAMO was receiving from various catholic churches.⁹⁹ In 1988 President Joaquim Chissano made another visit and this changed the Vatican 'policy towards Mozambique by the pope accepting to visit the country as part of a southern Africa tour in 1988'.¹⁰⁰ On his visit to Mozambique, the Pope made it clear that the church was "not a political organization" and emphasized their neutral ground in the process.¹⁰¹ There were a number of visits documented by Alex Vines which led to a better relationship between Sant'Egidio and the government.¹⁰²

In 1989 Dhlakama of RENAMO visited Rome with the facilitation of the Italian government in collaboration with the Kenyan government. It is during this visit that RENAMO was assured of equal representation in any negotiations and would be given equal treatment as the government. Alex Vines established that the Italian government promised full support to Sant' Egidio in trying to bring the two parties to an agreement. This was the beginning of the negotiations for peace in Mozambique. Sant'Egidio was able to hold the peace process because of the 'high profile and effective links into Italian political life and the long standing

⁹⁸Vines A., *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996) chapter 5

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid pg 128

¹⁰² See: Vines A., *Renamo from Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique* (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996) chapter 5 pg129 for more details of the visits by the conclaves from Rome.

personal friendships and ethnicity significantly contributed to the ability to host talks... as observed by Alex Vines.¹⁰³ President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi agreed to act as mediators.¹⁰⁴

The first direct meeting described as the first round of talks between the government and RENAMO took place on the 8th of June 1990 to the 10th in Rome hosted by the Saint Egidio.¹⁰⁵ The mediators for the talks were 'Archbishop Goncalves because of his knowledge of RENAMO and his contacts in Italy, Mario Rafaelli, a socialist parliamentarian representing the Italian government and two senior members of the Sant' Egidio Community, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi.'¹⁰⁶ Sant Egidio is said to have provided a neutral forum for direct negotiation of major players.¹⁰⁷ Sant Egidio received full backing from the Italian government which provided US\$35 million which helped finance RENAMO's continued commitment to the process.¹⁰⁸

The talks were however termed difficult owing to the pressure created by the fact that back in Mozambique the civilians were suffering and dying yet there was lack of trust between the two parties and both parties

¹⁰³Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Key Actors in the War and Peace Process, Main Antagonists, www.cr.org/accord/moz/accord3/keyactors.shtml

¹⁰⁶ Diniss. \$ Jaime p. Goncalves ,in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resourses, 1998. p7

¹⁰⁷ Key Actors in the War and Peace Process, Main Antagonists, www.cr.org/accord/moz/accord3/keyactors.shtml

¹⁰⁸ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resourses, 1998. p7

would not accept discussion agendas raised by either side.¹⁰⁹ During the peace talks the government wanted to bring an end to the fighting by calling for a ceasefire but the rebels on the other hand wanted to discuss 'sensitive political issues' which included their security and 'make up' of the new constitution.¹¹⁰

Despite this the talks went on but not as fast the churches desired. This led to the launching of 'petition campaigns by the church with signatures gathered in Mozambique, Italy and Portugal and public prayers for peace were also organized.¹¹¹ This was all in the hope to remind the leaders that the people of Mozambique continued to suffer. This caused the European Community to put pressure on both sides.

The other parties that reacted to this initiative was the American Ambassador to Mozambique, the Holy see, the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe whose role was to keep the parties focused on the important issues.¹¹² Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Anglican Bishop of Cape Town and the secretary-general of the AACC Jose Chipenda approached President Chissano for permission to get involved to speed up the process. This led to a new initiative that was set up comprising of the Bishop Senuglane, Bishop Somane Machado, the vice president of the CCM and Pastor Lucas Amosse Tivane who traveled to Malawi in 1992 where they met Amb. Kiplagat who organized a meeting with Dhlakama and Chissano.¹¹³ This led to

¹⁰⁹ Diniss. \$ Jaime p. Goncalves ,in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resourses, 1998. p7

¹¹⁰ Ibid p10

¹¹¹ Ibid p10

¹¹² Ibid p10

¹¹³ Ibid p10

various meetings which Alex Vines termed as the 'Twelve Rounds of Rome Peace Talks' that led to the signing of the Peace Agreement on 4th October 1992.¹¹⁴

The second round of talks was held from the 13th -14th August 1990. In this round of talks, the bone of contention was the issue of external mediation. RENAMO wanted Kenya to be the sole mediator in the peace process while the government (FRELIMO) wanted to 'minimize the importance' of mediators in the process.¹¹⁵ The meeting ended in a deadlock with the conclusion that confidence of both parties had to be built. RENAMO's chief concern was that of the security of its members throughout the process. RENAMO feared the government might plot attacks on them referring to a case where a joint government-Zimbabwe offensive in September 1985 and July 1990 which almost killed Dhalkama.¹¹⁶ The negotiators Mario Raffaelli, Don Matteo Zuppi, Andrea Riccardi and Dhalkama met in Malawi later to finalize the arrangements of the four observers to be 'upgraded' to official mediators. During the same period it is reported that the United States of America offered technical support to Sant Egidio for the negotiations.¹¹⁷ However progress was made in Malawi as RENAMO pledged not to attack Nacala railway line.¹¹⁸ The government was informed of this process.

¹¹⁴ Vines A, , *Renamo from Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996) pg131 (Author note: 'The section is based on interviews with officials with the peace process from Renamo the government, mediators and observers. These were made in Lisbon, Rome, Washington and Maputo during peace talks and in 1993" Alex Vines)

¹¹⁵ *Ibid* p133

¹¹⁶ *Ibid* p133

¹¹⁷ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resources, 1998. pg7

¹¹⁸ *Ibid* pg7

Malawi's Relationship with Mozambique dates back to the years before independence for economic and political reasons.¹¹⁹ Malawi is landlocked depending on Mozambique for 60% of its trade routes.¹²⁰ In the 1970's Malawi provided support to anti-FRELIMO forces and in the 1980's it provided 'bases' to RENAMO, channeled assistance from various evangelical mission societies based in South Africa and the west.¹²¹ It is reported that this was because of territorial ambition where Malawi claimed part of Tanzania and Mozambique (as its historic territory) in exchange for the use of Malawian territory by RENAMO for transit and services.¹²² In 1986 President Banda expelled RENAMO from Malawi having faced costs from attacks and counterattacks from Mozambique which affected Malawi.¹²³ Apart from hosting the rebels Malawi is believed to have been a refuge for up to some million Mozambican Refugees.¹²⁴

The third round of talks took place in November ending on December the 1st 1990. The talks led to a partial cease fire along the Beira and Limpopo corridors. The Limpopo was quite significant and was used by the government as a vantage point for attacking RENAMO rebels. It was agreed that the government would cease these activities. To ensure that this was done, first a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) was

¹¹⁹ Ibid pg10

¹²⁰ Vines A., *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996)p132

¹²¹ Ibid p52

¹²² Ibid p 54

¹²³ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources*, 1998. pg5

¹²⁴ Ibid p5

appointed by both sides on 30th of November in a plenary meeting. RENAMO appointed Kenya, Portugal, US and Zambia while the government's choice was Congo, France, USSR and UK. ¹²⁵

The choice of the two parties could be due to the fact that these countries played a role in assisting both parties to achieve their goal during the war. Britain under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is said to have dissuaded the United States from supporting RENAMO. It also offered Mozambique aid and military assistance from 1984-1987. This relationship is said to have developed when Mozambique supported Britain in the Lancaster negotiations leading to the Zimbabwean Independence.¹²⁶ The USSR is said to have offered military, economic and humanitarian assistance to Mozambique and in 1976 FRELIMO had signed several trade cooperation treaties with the USSR.¹²⁷ France on the other hand provided military aid to the government in the 1980's.¹²⁸ Zambia was used by RENAMO to search for provisions .¹²⁹

Secondly, under the same agreement the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed to carry out humanitarian operations throughout the country. This round saw the significant entry of the United States into the talks. Apart from offering technical support the US Secretary of State Herman Cohen had a

¹²⁵ Ibid p132

¹²⁶ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources, 1998 p9

¹²⁷ Ibid pg9

¹²⁸ Ibid pg 9

¹²⁹ Ibid pg9

separate meeting with Dhlakama and Geubuza in Rome and encouraged both parties to accept the mediators' proposal.¹³⁰

The fourth round of talks begun with RENAMO accusing the government of 'advancing' with political reforms 'unilaterally' without considering the rebel position.¹³¹ However, the JVC met during this period and appointed the Italian Ambassador to Maputo Manfredo di Camerana as the chairman. A military sub commission was subsequently established composed of 'eight nations not directly involved in the agreement to act as monitors.'¹³² In this round of talks no progress was made.

In the fifth round of talks from the 27th to 30th January 1991, issues of violation of the Rome agreement were tabled. RENAMO accused the JVC of not investigating the Zimbabwean troops activities outside the corridors and being biased as most of the members were 'ambassadors and military attaches in Maputo', hence supporting the government.¹³³ The mediators on the other hand tabled a proposal to RENAMO by ICRC to keep the Tete corridor open for relief assistance. This was rejected by RENAMO who said that it would be used for resupply of weapons. On the 30th June 1991 Dhlakama issued an ultimatum for the withdrawal of all

¹³⁰ Ibid pg132

¹³¹ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resources, 1998. pg7

¹³² Vines A, , *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996)p132

¹³³ Ibid chapter 5

Zimbabwean troops from the Beira and Limpopo corridors failing which RENAMO would increase its attacks on both corridors. Indeed RENAMO went ahead and begun attacking the Limpopo corridor on the basis that the Zimbabwean troops were still in the area. Investigation by the JVC proved that this was true and Dhlakama agreed to only honor part of the agreement by keeping Beira out of attacks.¹³⁴

The sixth round of talks followed and the government wanted a negotiated settlement that would not weaken its sovereignty arguing that it was the parliament in Maputo which had the authority to legislate and not Rome. The sixth round of talks was from the 6th May to 5th June 1991. RENAMO on the other hand argued that Rome had to produce the principles for reform.¹³⁵ Both sides also insisted on a signed detailed agenda specifying each item for discussion. RENAMO wanted Military issues discussed such as dissolution of the National Security Service (SNASP) and the liberation of political prisoners. The mediators and Assistant Secretary Cohen urged RENAMO to wait until military issues were to be discussed. At the same time it was made clear to RENAMO that it would be fully blamed if the talks failed.¹³⁶ On the 28th of May 1991 both sides signed a detailed agenda agreement.

At this point a 16 page draft which called for reintroduction of the death penalty and a return of all expropriated property to all the landowners was 'diplomatically' ignored by the mediators. The draft was

¹³⁴ Ibid 134

¹³⁵ Ibid p134

¹³⁶ Ibid 134

authored by a RENAMO Washington Lobbyist, Bruce Fein a specialist in constitutional and international law and a former columnist on the Moonie-owned Washington Times.¹³⁷

The seventh round of talks held from the 1st to 13th August saw the US and Portugal requesting to play a greater role in the ongoing peace process. In the late June, the response from the mediators was that they should hold on until 'Military issues and International role in implementation were being negotiated then other foreign governments would be involved.'¹³⁸ However key in this round of talks was the introduction of a draft of protocol on basic principles drafted by the mediators who called for a suspension of this round of talks so that both parties can reflect on the document.¹³⁹ The government claimed that the proposal would violate Mozambican sovereignty while RENAMO did not respond. During this period RENAMO remained in the bush out of contact. On September 22nd in Malawi a secret meeting was held between the Italian government and church mediators, Malawian officials, and a RENAMO delegation under Dhlakama. The outcome of the meeting was that RENAMO dropped its insistence on post-ceasefire transitional government and proposed that key government ministries be brought under UN control until elections.¹⁴⁰ This proposal was rejected by the UN represented by the US ambassador to the UN who stated that he UN would never take the lead to end war without a government request.¹⁴¹ This round saw the church leaders appeal for an immediate cease fire and blamed both sides for prolonging the conflict.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Vines A, , *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* op.,cit., p135

¹³⁸ *Ibid* p 135

¹³⁹ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, conciliative resourses, 1998 p9

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid* p9

¹⁴¹ Vines A, *Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* op., cit.,

¹⁴² Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*,

In the eighth round which started on 7th October to 13th November 1991, Protocol 1 'Basic Principles' and Protocol 2 "Criteria and Modalities for Forming and Recognizing Political Parties" were produced.¹⁴³ A political breakthrough was achieved after both parties accepted Protocol 1 with two significant changes. The government 'undertook not to impede' the "International movements and external contacts of RENAMO" and both sides agreed that the UN would supervise and control the fulfillment of the General Peace Accord as a joint commission with both parties."¹⁴⁴ In addition RENAMO agreed to recognize the legitimacy of the Mozambican laws after a cease-fire.

Protocol two was signed on the 13th November 1991. Analysts have attributed this to the fact it provided for recognition of RENAMO as a political party once the General Peace Agreement was signed.¹⁴⁵

The ninth round saw the introduction of the 'electoral law' protocol by the mediators. This protocol advocated ...

for presidential and parliamentary elections to be held simultaneously, for the elections to take place within one year of the signing of the cease fire accord and for the UN and OAU to be involved.¹⁴⁶

conciliative resources, 1998 p9

¹⁴³Vines A., Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op., cit., pg135

¹⁴⁴ Ibid p135

¹⁴⁵ Ibid 135

¹⁴⁶ Vines A., Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996

The US on the other hand is reported to have been negotiating with both sides for an 'end year truce' in military issues.¹⁴⁷ They did not succeed in achieving this end. This round of talks was held from the 17th December to 20th December 1991 before breaking for Christmas.

The tenth round of talks held from 21 January to 12th May 1992, saw the signing of protocol three. There were a number of issues that came up that the parties disagreed on. For instance, the definition of 'refugee' to be qualified by 'Mozambican' meant that the 'ex-Portuguese colonial settlers would be included. RENAMO objected to this but the government won the motion to retain this. The US State Department continued to push for the peace process to move forward. Herman Cohen the US assistant Secretary of State for Africa managed to convince Dhlakama to discuss military issues rather than constitutional issues that he had insisted on since April 10th 1992.¹⁴⁸

The eleventh round introduced military issues from the 10th of June to August 1992. Both sides had agreed on the involvement of Portugal and the US in the process. The government on the other hand wanted France and Britain to come in 'since they were major donors.' This was rejected by RENAMO on the pretext that both Britain and France were 'too supportive of Maputo.'¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources*, 1998 p9

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁹ Vines A., *Renamo from Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* op.,cit., p136

RENAMO insisted on the involvement of the UN as it suggested in the seventh round of talks.¹⁵⁰ This was resolved in May in what Alex Vines describes as 'quid pro quo'.¹⁵¹ The military issue verses constitution issues still came up advocated by RENAMO who wanted to discuss constitutional issues. RENAMO stopped its complaints when the delegation was assured that this would be discussed before a cease-fire. In July 1992 there was pressure from the humanitarian relief agencies for the opening of the roads and air space.¹⁵² This was accepted and an agreement was signed both by the government and RENAMO and a monitoring commission was set up to ensure the roads and airspace remained open.¹⁵³

On the 4th of July 1992 'Tiny Rowland' facilitated a summit meeting in Botswana attended by were Dhlakama, Botswana's President Quett Masire and President Mugabe. This meeting resulted into a possible face to face meeting between Chissano and Dhlakama. This was after President Mugabe personally guaranteed Dhlakama that his government would assist RENAMO into becoming a political party.¹⁵⁴ On the 5th to 7th August 1992 the parties met in Rome and signed a declaration of intent to sign a cease-fire in October. At this point there was still need to sign in a truce for both sides. Dhlakama insisted that he would only sign the truce if 'his safety, security for his organization and the constitutional demands he presented were guaranteed. President Mugabe assured him personally once more that this would be done.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Ibid p137

¹⁵¹ Ibid 137

¹⁵² Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources, 1998 p10

¹⁵³ Ibid p10

¹⁵⁴ Ibid p10

¹⁵⁵ Vines A., Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African

This led to the drafting of a declaration 'Committing both sides to the spirit of the protocols signed in Rome and ensuring that the constitutional guarantees they outlined would be submitted to the Assembly of the Republic and adopted as law before the General Peace Agreement was signed.'¹⁵⁶

The twelfth and last round begun on the 20th of August and ended on the 4th of October 1992. This meeting led to the signing of the General Peace Accord. The Dhlakama and the Chissano delegations agreed to signing protocol five (guarantees), Protocol six (cease fire), and Protocol seven (donors conference).¹⁵⁷ At this point the military issues had still not been settled. RENAMO insisted on an army that would give them a 50% representation from their party. The government had agreed on 15,000 troops but RENAMO wanted 24,000 plus. The total number of government troops was 50,000 and was scaled down to 35000 at RENAMO's insistence.¹⁵⁸

The second issue of contention was the State Information and Security Service (SISE) which RENAMO wanted abolished.¹⁵⁹ The mediators began sending out official communication to the leaders of the two parties to come to an agreement. Meanwhile Tiny Rowland and President Mugabe organized for a face to face meeting of the two leaders in Gaborone Botswana.¹⁶⁰ A general understanding was reached at the

Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996 p136

¹⁵⁶ Ibid pg 140

¹⁵⁷ Ibid pg 140

¹⁵⁸ Ibid 136

¹⁵⁹ Ibid pg 141

¹⁶⁰ Ibid pg 141

meeting after Dhlakama and president Chissano reviewed issues referred to by the mediators. On the 4th of October the final protocols were completed and the Rome Peace Agreement was signed.

Scholars like Alex Vines and Andrea Ostheimer have argued that these talks became possible when South Africa withdrew support for RENAMO due to change in its regional foreign policy and the fall of the Soviet Union that the Mozambique government depended on.¹⁶¹ This meant no support for both sides. The end of the war as they report was attributed to the withdrawal of western Aid from the Mozambique government, conflict fatigue, the drought of 1992, and withdrawal of support of RENAMO from external sources.¹⁶² Sengulane and Goncalves from a churches perspective attribute the peace to the fact that the church put their 'spiritual vitality' to use, and secondly the parties involved were patient.¹⁶³

2.2.1 The Rome Peace Agreement¹⁶⁴

Peace agreements are for the purposes of ending a violent conflict or to 'transform that conflict in a significant way into one that is approached more constructively.'¹⁶⁵The overall purpose for the Rome peace

¹⁶¹ Ostheimer E, Andrea, Transforming peace into democracy: Democratic structures in Mozambique, published in African Security Review Vol 8 No 6,1999

¹⁶² A.Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? op.,cit., chapter 5

¹⁶³ Sengulane S. & Goncalves J.,in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, Alex vines, (eds) The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, conciliative resources, 1998. p10

¹⁶⁴ This summary is derived from the book Acordo Generale de paz de Mocambique, published by AWEPA. This book specifically contains this agreement of 1992 in two languages- English and Portuguese.

¹⁶⁵ Ouellet J. Peace Agreements, Intractable Conflict Knowledge Based Project , Conflict Research Consortium , University of Colorado, 2003

agreement of 1992 is to maintain a lasting peace and effective democracy in Mozambique.¹⁶⁶ The issues addressed in the peace agreement were largely to do with the military, refugees and elections.

Andrea Bartoli and Rati Jebashvili have summarized the issues as the : 'The assembly and demobilization of troops ;formation of a new armed forces; reintegration of demobilized military personnel into civil life; resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and process of holding the first democratic multiparty elections."¹⁶⁷ The agreement contains a number of documents to guide the country achieve this end. It has seven protocols each stipulating actions to be undertaken.

Protocol one contains basic principles, which emphasize dialogue and collaboration as a means of achieving lasting peace in Mozambique. These principles dictate that the government refrains from ignoring this protocol and avoid adopting laws inconsistent with the agreement. A ceasefire by RENAMO was dictated which included refraining from any combat activities and observance of the law as per the conditions on the General Peace Agreement.

The principle further stipulated that the parties should come to an agreement soon. It placed emphasis on the importance of the preceding protocols, which should enter into force immediately the agreement is

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

¹⁶⁷ Bartoli A, & Rati J. International Council on Human Rights Policy, Review Meeting, Belfast, March7-8,2005 pg 10

signed. Lastly, it stipulates the consensus of the parties to accommodate a commission to supervise and monitor compliance of the General Peace Agreement.¹⁶⁸

Protocol II is titled "Criteria and Arrangements for the Formation and Recognition of Political Parties."¹⁶⁹

This protocol concludes with the parties agreeing to a multi-party democracy in which they are to work together to express the will of the people.

The protocol outlines in detail the nature of the political parties, general principles to guide these parties, rights of the parties, duties of the parties, registration and lastly implementation of the above as soon the agreement was signed .

Protocol III contains principles of the Electoral Act. This protocol contains guidelines to drafting of the Electoral Act and any possible amendments to laws in connection with conduct of the electoral process. It also includes issues such as freedom of the press and access to media, the right to vote and a national elections commission for organizing the whole election process. Other sections include election of president, financing and facilities.

Protocol IV deals with military questions. This entails formation of the Mozambique Defense Force (FADM). It details how the military should be formed from its personnel to command structures, issues of the various military groups such as the navy, air force, and army command. It also includes rules in regard to technical

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

Africa at the time, Dr Mary Racelis.¹⁷⁰ Statistics show that in 1986 alone there were 84,000 deaths and between 1981 and 1986 320,000 deaths.¹⁷¹ These deaths were as a result of diseases curable or incurable, mutilation, an increase in infant mortality rate and those killed in combat. The diseases specifically mentioned are malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, measles and malnutrition.¹⁷² A former child soldier reported that they were denied food, and treatment incase they fell sick.¹⁷³

Apart from diseases and deaths displacements and homelessness was rampant. The street children became easy pray for RENAMO soldiers who are also reported to have abducted some of the children from their homes.¹⁷⁴ The abducted children were seized during night raids. These attacks were brutal and many watched their relatives being murdered or were forced to commit the murders themselves.¹⁷⁵ John Shanahan explains that this brutal act of killing close to you was relatives was a kind of orientation in to the RENAMO forces where the whole village would watch as the young soldiers carried out the murder.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰Selected papers form the Conference of Children in situations of armed conflict in Africa: An Agenda for Action-10th July 1987(Nairobi: Kulgraphics Fundi Road, 1987)P50

¹⁷¹Ibid

¹⁷²Ibid

¹⁷³Selected papers form the Conference of Children in situations of armed conflict in Africa: An Agenda for Action,6-10th July 1987(Nairobi: Kulgraphics Fundi Road,1987).P50

¹⁷⁴Afuwa. Twum D., Africas Young Soldiers, The Cooption of Childhood, ISS Monograph Series, April 2003, No28. P28

¹⁷⁵Pan-African Forum for Children, Children and Peace in Africa. Issue paper 4, 2000.

¹⁷⁶Shanahan, J., The Invisible Soldiers: Child Combatants, Center for defense Information- Washington,DC- I.S.S.N no. 01956450

Stuart Maslen observes further that discipline in the army tended to be frequently merciless, punishment severe, and was accompanied by the the threat of death in the frontline and the risk of physical or sexual abuse at the hands of the soldiers they were fighting for.¹⁷⁷ He adds that the children were cut off from their homes and cultural heritage and frequently depended on external aid and the danger of landmines, social and economic instability were the frequent reality for the children in Mozambique.¹⁷⁸ Apart from this the children often suffered injuries during the war. Brett and Mccallin list the common injuries as "deafness, blindness, burns, damaged limbs leading to amputation, given the frail nature of their bodies and from the hazards of carrying heavy weights, inhaling toxic substances, landmines and long marches..."¹⁷⁹

The number of child soldiers recruited is not exactly known. However, the child soldiers underwent extreme hardship.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The war in Mozambique lasted for 30 years and can evidently be attributed to colonization and the regional, national and international actors each with vested interest. The conflict that begun as a struggle for self-determination saw a long and exhausting civil war that destabilized the country politically, economically and socially. In all this, children suffered the most and were forced to join the armies voluntarily or involuntarily where they committed various atrocities.

¹⁷⁷ Marslen S., *The reintegration of War- affected youth. The experience of Mozambique*, ISBN 92-2-110755-8, 1997 Pg6

¹⁷⁸ Ibid pg6

¹⁷⁹ Brett & McCallin, *Children the Invisible Soldiers*, (of the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, and the International Catholic child Bureau on behalf of the Child Soldiers Research Project), Grafiska Punkten, 1996 Pg 133-134

The challenge of the Mozambican government was to find a lasting peace to save the country from more destruction. The drought of 1992 and withdrawal of external support to the parties may have played a huge role in catalyzing the signing of the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992 among other things that will be discussed in chapter four.

CHAPTER III DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The disarmament and demobilization process in Mozambique was the outcome of the Rome Peace Agreement signed in 1992. This was a condition in the peace agreement provided for in Protocol IV which called for a cease-fire and the formation of the FADM. Statistics show that 90,000 soldiers were demobilized of which 70,000 were from the government forces (FRELIMO) and 20,000 from rebel forces (RENAMO).¹ The number of child soldiers was estimated at 10,000.²

The disarmament and demobilization (DD) process was intended to reduce and disarm the soldiers after the conflict and to prevent them from going back to war.³ It was therefore necessary to prepare the ex-combatants for reintegration into the society. This was however not an easy task especially for the children who had been exposed to violence that affected them psychologically, emotionally and socially.

The ultimate goal of the DD process is to create an environment of peace in preparation for implementation of peace agreements. The warring factions have to stop hostilities giving room for possible negotiations for the whole process to begin. A report by the Bonn International Conference Centre from a workshop held on the issue of DD, noted that peace should not only be internal but also regional. Looking at the Mozambican war, many countries in Southern Africa were

¹ Kees K, *Demobilization and its Aftermath I, A profile of South Africa's Demobilized Military Personnel*, Monograph No. 59, August 2001.

² Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

³ Mungoi S, *Demobilization and Reintegration in Mozambique; An overview from the ex-Combatant's perspective*.

instrumental in fanning the war that lasted more than 17 years as seen in chapter two.⁴ This chapter introduces and attempts to explain the disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers in Mozambique.

1.2 Disarmament Process in Mozambique

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was given the mandate to ensure that the peace agreement, which included the disarmament process, was in place.⁵ The mandate bestowed upon ONUMOZ was to “monitor and verify the cease-fire, the demobilization of forces, the collection, storage and destruction of weapons.”⁶ These processes of arms management and micro-disarmament according to Mark Malan have been recognized as key dimensions in all contemporary peace missions which arms have mentioned as a primary contributor to violence, violent crime and even a return to war.⁷

The weapons reclaimed by the UN were handed over to the government, which at the time was charged as inadequate to control the weapons stocks because of lack of trust by both RENAMO and FRELIMO immediately after the cease-fire.⁸

⁴Kees K, *Demobilization and its Aftermath I, A profile of South Africa's Demobilized Military Personnel*, Monograph No. 59, August 2001.

⁵ *Ibid*

⁶ Oosthuysen Glen, in *Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations*, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg9

⁷ Malan Mark, *Disarming and demobilizing child soldiers: The Underlying challenges*, Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Published in *African Security Review* Vol 9 No 5/6, 2000 pg 2

⁸ Vines A, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

The soldiers were to be disarmed as part of the demobilization process awaiting elections.⁹ The lesson borrowed from the Angolan peace process was that the 'election should be held only after both sides have been demobilized and that the peacekeeping operations should not be cheap.'¹⁰ ONUMUZ thought it wise to disarm and demobilise before the elections to make it possible for the peace process to be sustainable. During the disarmament process RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers were to hand in their weapons willingly for storage in the Assembly Areas(AA). According to Alex Vines these areas were to be temporary storage for the guns but the security was lax.¹¹

The weapons handed over by the soldiers were of low quality and the better quality ones were hidden in caches elsewhere. A FRELIMO soldier was quoted saying "...we knew the guns make good business so we kept the best for ourselves..."¹² Eduardo Adao observed that RENAMO soldiers had the same idea and handed in bad guns retaining the good ones for use in search for food.¹³

The reluctance by both sides to hand in all the weapons made it difficult for the peacekeepers to perform the disarmament function effectively. Alex Vines observed that one peacekeeping soldier

⁹ Vines A, "Angola and Mozambique. The Aftermath of conflict", Conflict Studies 280, Research Institute for the study of Conflict and Terrorism, May /June 19595.

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Vines A, The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

¹² Author Interview Maputo, March 1995, Alex Vines, The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

¹³ Author Interview Maputo April, 1995, in Alex Vines, The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

from Uruguay admitted that "Active disarmament" was dangerous and that the mandate of ONUMOZ was not to sent back bodybags¹⁴. A Zambian military official was of the same opinion, explaining that they had witnessed wandering groups with guns but could do nothing about it and that they knew where the caches were but the areas were a no-go zones.¹⁵ Some soldiers had even admitted to the United Nations Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) Chairman, Colonel Segala that they were hiding guns outside the AA areas. Segala warned the Commission that the presence of guns in Mozambique would 'seriously imperil public security' especially after the UN left the country.¹⁶

Chachiu however criticized ONUMOZ claiming that it neglected issues of 'security first' and concentrated on the military instead of working comprehensively to deal with political, humanitarian, and electoral issues which are said to have an impact on 'post conflict scenarios.'¹⁷ He further observed that the mandate overemphasized the preparation of the country for elections through cleaning up the military which was not the usual United Nations Peace keeping operation.¹⁸ The process was purely military. The UN Secretary General in his report on the operation in Mozambique emphasized the military nature of the operation by stating...

Obliged to recommend that very substantial resources be made available for this purpose especially on the military side. This reflects my conviction that it will not be possible in Mozambique to create the conditions for successful elections unless the military situation has been brought fully under control. If the United Nations is to undertake the

¹⁴ Author Interview, Xai Xai, September 1994, in Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ UN Cease- Fire Commission, "Report of CCF Chairman to CSC Meeting on 18 July, 1994," CSC/MIN/033, annex1.

¹⁷ Cahciua M, and Mark, M Institute for Security Studies, Publish3d in *African Security Review* Vol No, 1998

¹⁸ Ibid

responsibilities entrusted to it by the Mozambicans, what has to be done must be done well and quickly.¹⁹

Kigma Kees argues that disarmament should be taken with utmost care as it later trickles down to the demobilization process if not done accordingly.²⁰ This process should not be concentrated on the military only but the society as a whole. This he explains has led to increase in banditry and the weapons ending up in wrong hands if no proper disarmament or protection of the, ammunitions is done.²¹ The question to ask is how did the ammunition get into Mozambique? At this point it is necessary to explore the origin of the guns in Mozambique and the various types of ammunition that were available

1.2.1 Proliferation of Small arms in Mozambique

According to a report by the Youth Advocate Program International Resource paper, small arms and light weapons in Mozambique were estimated to range from 500,000 to 6 million during and after the peace agreement according to a report by the Youth Advocate Program International Resource paper.²² The arms are said to have originated mostly from China and Russia with the latter providing the bulk of them. The international Coordinating Policy Agency (Interpol) on the other hand reported that approximately 1.5 million AK-47 guns were distributed to the Mozambique population during the war.²³

¹⁹ Berman E., *Managing Arms in Peace Processes*, UNIDIR, New York, 1996 p34

²⁰ Kees K, *Demobilization and its Aftermath I, A profile of South Africa's Demobilized Military Personnel*, Monograph No. 59, August 2001

²¹ Ibid

²² Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

²³ Vines A, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

FRELIMO has been recorded as having distributed tens of thousands of ammunition to civilians in 1982 of which few were returned during the disarmament process.²⁴ RENAMO is reported to have received weapons from Rhodesia and South Africa. Further studies indicate that in the late 1980's Kenya, Portugal, Germany, the United States and Gulf states also provided weapons to RENAMO.²⁵

Apart from guns Virginia Gamba explains that , light weapons also include landmines, machine guns, grenades, pistols and rocket launchers.²⁶ According to the United Nations Department of Public Information, the following weapons were registered during the United Nations Operation in Mozambique:

46,193 various arms registered, 2,703,733 rounds of various types of ammunitions,19,047 of various types of mines, 5687 kilograms of explosives, 4,997 individual grenades, 220 intact boxes,unilateally demobilisied goevernment troops,43,491 wesapons.²⁷

Though these large numbers of weapons were recorded there was still concern about the hidden weapons. The ineffectiveness of disarmament in Mozambique was blamed on the nature of the United Nations mandate since it did not allow peacekeeping forces to tackle arms beyond the AA

²⁴ Vines A, RENAMO. From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? Oxford, James Currey, 1996.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Gamba V, Connecting Weapons with Violence, published in Monograph, no.5, May 1998.

²⁷ United Nations Department of of Public Information,The United Nations and Mozambique1992-1995(NewYork:United Nations Department of Public Information,1995)

areas. In August 1994 the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) took upon itself to verify the existence of the caches and undeclared areas of hiding.²⁸

It is said that the UN efforts were hampered by resistance from both sides who showed little interest in the process. After the AA's were closed the CCF arranged further visits to the listed areas that both sides had indicated having military activity and hidden arms caches. In total it was estimated that CCF visited 744 sites before their mandate expired.²⁹

The arms were to be destroyed or taken under the UN control for transfer to the new army which was a condition of the peace agreement. The CCF made progress compared to the UN which reported 130 hidden caches including truck loads of arms.³⁰ Since the elections were just about to begin the disarmament process became politically motivated. It is reported that the UN had sited large weapon caches belonging to FRELIMO but they were not exposed publicly so as to build up their confidence.³¹ Ado Ajello, a representative of the United Nations and a politician had his focus on the elections stating that disarmament could continue after elections. He noted that ONUMOZ had wanted to destroy more weapons but were stopped by the government.³² Ajello did not want the peace process implementation to delay any further and exposing this could hamper the process.

²⁸ Vines A., *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ R.Sygne, Mozambique .Un Peacekeeping in Action , Washingron, DC: US Institute of Peace Press,1997. p110.

³² Ibid

1.2.2 Land Mines

Land mines in Mozambique were used by both RENAMO and FRELIMO during the war.³³ According to alex Vines, 10,000 people were killed by the mines and a total of 1000 were subject to mine injuries everyday after the signing of the peace agreement.³⁴ The RENAMO and FRELIMO forces are accused of planting the mines to wage war against each other.³⁵ The mines posed a major threat to Mozambique's economic reconstruction efforts.³⁶

This was not made any easier as the initiative to clear the mines was delayed several times. In 1995 president Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique was reported saying that the country would hold an international campaign against land mines but little action was taken for nearly two years.³⁷ On February 26th by the Mozambique Foreign Minister in October during a conference held in Maputo 1997.³⁸

1.3 Armed Crime and the Disarmament Process.

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Vines A, The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

In November 1999 an estimated 10 million small arms were in the hands of the population of only 15 million Mozambicans.³⁹ The proliferation of small arms and light weapons made recruitment of child soldiers easier and was an obstacle to disarmament.⁴⁰

Virginia Gamba observes that the illegal use and abuse of such weapons is "substantial" as the civilians and ex-combatants use the guns as a means of livelihood.⁴¹ Reports indicate that former child soldiers were indeed responsible for some of the banditry in Mozambique at the time.⁴²

Reports indicate that the rate of criminality increased significantly from 1994-1996. According to Martinho Chachua firearm related cases in 1994 were 1,112 and 1,679 in 1996. It should be noted that the gun related cases increased by 49.6% at this time while other non-gun related cases increased by 44 %.⁴³ Martinho Chachua further gives hospital statistics which indicate that there were two of bullet-related cases a day reported in Maputo alone. This totaled 720 cases a year in 1994 and an increase in 1996.⁴⁴ In 1996 the total number of criminal cases was 37,725.

The Mozambican Attorney General reported in 1998 that out of those (16-30 year olds) arrested 10% were youngsters' under the age of 18 years, a good proportion of whom constituted former

³⁹ Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Virginia Gamba, *Connecting Weapons with Violence*, published in Monograph, no.5, May 1998.

⁴² Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁴³ Martinho Chachua, *Demilitarization of Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Demobilization of Youth in Mozambique*, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

⁴⁴ Ibid

child soldiers.⁴⁵ One of the child soldiers explained that "We make money by selling guns from the parastatals. Some of our people also engage in banditry to get extras. It's a war to survive."⁴⁶ The selling of these weapons in Mozambique was quite rampant. Soldiers sold them in the black market cheaply. According to Kigma Kees an AK 47 automatic rifle, for example, would go for US\$14 as compared to US\$400 in South Africa.⁴⁷ The need for disarmament was evident in the attempt to maintain the security of Mozambique.

Alex Vines observes that the guns used were new and hand guns were weapons of preferred choice.⁴⁸ He reports further that most Mozambicans at the time adopted crime as an 'occupational hazard' as it was during the war.⁴⁹ Traveling on some roads and driving a four wheel vehicle made one a potential victim of the crimes committed in Mozambique.

Crime in Mozambique is attributed to the economic need and a means for survival. Former child soldiers saw it as the only way to survive, as they were not included in the disarmament and demobilization process. Another young man was quoted saying that there was nothing else for him to do and that the gun offered him survival, and that the police used the guns for money and everything around was about money.⁵⁰ Alex Vines reports that there were plenty of guns and

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁴⁷ Kees K, *Demobilization and its Aftermath I, A profile of South Africa's Demobilized Military Personnel*, Monograph No. 59, August 2001.

⁴⁸ Vines A, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Author Interview, Maputo, March 1995. Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

rounds of ammunition to keep poachers and criminals in business for decades.⁵¹ Something had to be done as the crime rate in Mozambique escalated. The Mozambican police sources gave the crime statistics as follows.

July 1993- March 1994 19,630 cases

March 1994-July 1995 22,602 cases

July 1995-MArch 1996 24,300 cases

March 1996- July 1997 25,100 cases

Source: Mozambique police, Maputo.⁵²

This prompted action by the Home Affairs Minister in Mozambique at the time, Manuel Antonio. Manuel Antonios' agenda was to deal with the large quantity of illegal weapons circulating in Mozambique.⁵³ His plan was to step up patrols along Mozambique highways, establishing police district commands and increasing cooperation between the Mozambique police and police forces in neighboring countries.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Vines A, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁵² *Mozambique Crime Statistics, July 1993-July 1997* Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁵³ Vines A., *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*

He made progress as in the first three months of 1995, 30 armed gangs and sixty-nine arms caches were uncovered of which 6,000 guns and 24,000 rounds of ammunition.⁵⁵ Alex Vines reports that between November 1995 and November 1996 fifty arm caches and more than 1000 guns and hundreds of grenades and landmines were discovered.⁵⁶ More and more weapons were discovered as time went by.

A special police force known as the "Lightning Battalion" was formed to beef up security further along highways, which was initially the work of FADM which refused to undertake issues of internal security.⁵⁷ It is reported that in 1996 the crime rate declined after the appointment of a new Home Affairs and Police Minister, Almerino Manhene. He ordered police to move in on known armed crime gangs and a better trained police, unarmed group was deployed to do this.⁵⁸

RENAMO leader Alphonso Dhlakama and President Joaquim Chissano also had an important part to play and between 5th February and 21 December the same year, they reached an agreement

⁵⁵Vines A., *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁵⁶Ibid

⁵⁷Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁵⁸Ibid

on the issue of neutralizing arms caches.⁵⁹ This resulted in the formation of working groups to deal with dismantling of arm caches following concern about increasing insecurity caused by armed gangs. This was however not easy as the issue was politicized. The idea originally was to form a tripartite agreement between the South African police, Mozambican Police and former RENAMO military officers, but disagreement between RENAMO and the government ensued. The government desired working group to stamp down its authority over FRELIMO while FRELIMO wanted a commission to increase its authority over the government.

A table compiled by Alex Vines describes progress by the Mozambican police on disarmament in different provinces in Mozambique. This included light weapons, heavy weapons, and landmines. Statistics from some of the provinces as discovered by the police were: Inhambane province 360 light weapons, 5 heavy weapons and 450 landmines; while Tete had 150 light weapons, 4 heavy weapons, 83 crates of munitions; Nampula had 22 light weapons, 7 heavy weapons, 16 crates of munition and Niassa had the least with 23 light weapons only.⁶⁰

Police confidence was however dwindling at the time as questions of police ethics were raised. In 1995, 102 police officers were expelled for various offences including disregarding the law and constitution maltreatment of detainees and beating suspects. In 1997, 137 police were expelled for

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Vines A., *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998. Author interview with police, 1997

the same crimes.⁶¹The community then started getting involved in the process of disarmament and was led by the Mozambican churches which started a program to provide incentives to those who turned in weapons known as the 'guns and hoes' programme.⁶² Some of the incentives included tools, sewing machines and other practical items. The program is said to have collected and destroyed 100,000 weapons.⁶³

Other Non-governmental organizations were also instrumental in the process. Special Clearance Services (SCS) was actively involved in collecting and destroying weapons most of which were found by the roadside having been left by members of the community. SCS believed that the community practiced local-level disarmament because they did not trust the police and preferred to hand the weapons over to international organizations.⁶⁴

Local disarmament was believed by the community to be a special symbol of the end of war. Despite this, crime is said to have persisted and a crime wave in 1996 saw the killing of expatriates

⁶¹Vines A., *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁶²Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5Erd..pg5

⁶³Ibid

⁶⁴Author Interview with Bernie Auditorie, Director of SCS, Maputo, 27 February 1997 in Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

and other foreigners. This rising insecurity prompted Germany and Switzerland to threaten to freeze funds to Mozambique until something was done.⁶⁵ The situation eventually improved but some provinces still reported some incidents of crime which spilled over into Zimbabwe.⁶⁶ The effect of high crime rate saw a rapid growth in the security industry. Many Mozambicans found job opportunities as security guards with weapons, vehicles and radio communications.

The challenge of disarmament in Mozambique until 1997 was to control the flow of illegal weapons into their country and sever links between senior officials and crime syndicates.⁶⁷ Alex Vines reports that sufficient political will is necessary for tangible results in disarmament. This was evident after the signing of the Ottawa land mine treaty by the government in December 1997 and banning of antipersonnel mines in February 1997. The replacement of the Home Affairs and Police Minister Manuel Antonio with Almerino Manhenje in November 1996 is another example.⁶⁸

Child soldiers in Mozambique engaged in crime and violence in part because of lack of proper guidance in the camps regarding the traditional concepts of right and wrong.⁶⁹ The disarmament process was a fundamental step towards demobilization.

⁶⁵M. Massinge, "Mozambique .Riding on a Crime Wave", Southern Africa political and Economic Monthly (Harare) November 1996.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸Vines A., The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, NO. 28 ISSN 1353-0402, April 1998.

⁶⁹Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁶⁹Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

2.1 DEMOBILISATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN MOZAMBIQUE

2.1.1 Statistics of the child soldiers

The Youth Advocate program International Resource Paper reports that 90,000 government and RENAMO soldiers were demobilized from 1993-1994.⁷⁰ Child soldiers formed a quarter of the soldiers though neither party admitted having children in their ranks. In cases where the armies actually accepted having children as soldiers, the numbers provided were understated. In a conference held in Maputo in July 1999 the Minister for Social Action and Coordination, Acucena Duarte, was said to have been silent about the issue of child soldiers while at the same time an NGO 'Rebuilding Hope' raised the issue including the number of child soldiers said to have undergone formal demobilization.⁷¹ It was reported at this conference that 28% of the conscripted soldiers in the ranks of the warring parties were children. RENAMO was notably ranked highest in the recruitment of the child soldiers under the age of 17 years, at 40% by the time of demobilization.⁷²

The Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, gives a breakdown of the 92,881 demobilized soldiers: 25,498(28%) child soldiers were officially demobilized. Included in the 25,498 were, 4678 under 13 years, 6,289 were 14-15 years and 13,982 were 16-17 years old. 23% were

⁷⁰Ibid P5

⁷¹Antonio Gumende, A conference of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in Africa, Maputo Mozambique, July, 1999.

⁷²Ibid

said to be FRELIMO soldiers while 40% were from RENAMO.⁷³ The figures are however not accurate as both sides tried very hard to conceal the existence of child soldiers in their armies. Save the Children (US) reported that it worked with 2000 child soldiers before the 1992 Peace Agreement, where 850(those in the battle frontline) were found in the RENAMO bases in 1994 and another 6000(those who acted as porters and other domestic chores) were reported by the community to have returned home.⁷⁴

2.1.2 The Demobilization Process of Child Soldiers in Mozambique

A number of scholars have analyzed the demobilization process. Chris Alden, for example, observes that the demobilization process in Mozambique was the most delicate process ever to be attempted by the United Nations as the peace process was fragile with the potential for destabilization by the ex-combatants.⁷⁵ The whole process including reintegration cost Mozambique 95 million dollars, which was donor supported.⁷⁶ He argues that the process was much needed in response to the brutal nature of conflict in Mozambique, which highly affected the socio economic status of the government soldiers, the guerillas and left the country's economy in disarray.⁷⁷ He adds that the United Nations developed the Mozambique demobilization process under the backdrop of the collapsed Angolan demobilization process.⁷⁸

⁷³Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P3

⁷⁴ AIA/ Sayagues, *Traditional Rituals heal child soldiers*, press release, Maputo, 18 Nov. 1995.

⁷⁵Chris Alden. *Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of he Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique*, the journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 29 January , 1993.

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Ibid

According to the International Youth Advocate Program the children returned to civilian life with virtually with no support of any kind.⁷⁹ This view is supported by Stuart Maslen who points out that children under 15 years were excluded from official demobilization for the purposes of 'political sensitiveness'.⁸⁰ Maslen argues that of those who were demobilized, the vocational training programs offered as part of the process were not 'targeted' to the youth. According to him these young soldiers were 'ineligible for pension allowances under Decree No. 3/88 of July 1988' which was entitled to 'veterans severance pension (Reforma)'.⁸¹

John Legrand, the UNICEF chief advisor is of the opinion that demobilization must be enforced at all times and is a right for all children and former child soldiers.⁸² He further argues that this process should not be politicized as was with the case of RENAMO and FRELIMO. Other scholars have also observed that it is not effective to demobilize child soldiers with the older soldiers because children have special needs that should be addressed specifically.⁸³

Kigma Kees explains that demobilized soldiers were transported to a destination of their choice where they were offered assistance packages, which included civilian clothing, food for three months, vegetable seeds and a tool kit, cash payments for two years and specific programmes to

⁷⁹Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, *The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers*, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁸⁰ Maslen Stuart, *The Reintegration of War-affected youth. The experience of Mozambique*, ILO Action Program on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict, SIBN 92-2-110755-8, 1997 p15

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Legrand J, *Child Soldiers: A Co-operative Approach to Defining Good Practice*, Report, Brussels, October 25-26, 2001

⁸³ Brett & McCallin, *Children the Invisible Soldiers*, (of the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, and the International Catholic child Bureau on behalf of the Child Soldiers Research Project), Grafiska Punkten, 1996 Pg 133-134

support reintegration such as occupational skills and small grant projects.⁸⁴ He further observes that a socio-economic survey to determine characteristics of each soldier to be demobilized was done to determine the age, marital status, district of origin, level of education, military rank and subsequently the years of military service.⁸⁵ The money issued was an extension into the reintegration programme, which included an "eighteen-month subsidy for ex-soldiers, an agricultural kit, information and advisory bureau and a training component."⁸⁶

2.1.3 Consequences of lack of demobilization of Child Soldiers in Mozambique

The risk of having not demobilized child soldiers is conscription into military once again.⁸⁷ In 1997 the Mozambican parliament passed a law on military service which stipulated that all Mozambicans between the ages 18 and 35 were subject to military recruitment.⁸⁸ Many child soldiers became eligible for recruitment but a screening process was conducted by child advocate organizations to weed out ex-combatants. This was however difficult since some were never formally demobilized.⁸⁹

The findings of a study conducted for the United Nations on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children by Graca Machel⁹⁰ emphasized that "only through appreciation of the conditions of life

⁸⁴Kees K, Demobilization and its Aftermath I, A profile of South Africa's Demobilized Military Personnel, Monograph No. 59, August 2001.

⁸⁵Ibid

⁸⁶Alden C., Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of the Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique, the journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 29 January, 1993.

⁸⁷Sara Aird, Boira Efraime and Antoinette Errante, The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers, Youth Advocate Program International Resource Paper, 1986. P5

⁸⁸Ibid

⁸⁹Ibid

⁹⁰UN doc. A/51/306 of a August 1996.

which define the children's social and cultural environment upon demobilization that effective strategies can be implemented to address the consequences of their participation and effect their social reintegration."⁹¹ The study further revealed that the link between "education, employment opportunities and the economic security of the children's families were factors that would not only determine successful social integration but also contribute to efforts to prevent further recruitment."⁹²

This was later proved by Wray Herbert who visited and interviewed some of the Ex-combatants. In his findings, he noted that most of former child combatants were not successful in terms of finance, marital stability and classical measures of health like clear thinking and emotional steadiness.⁹³ Firince Nfahala, for instance, lost his speech, was delusional, depended alot on his mother and finally drowned in a river. Armando Massingue on the other hand could not find work. Other teenagers are said to move to South Africa, get a job then come back to Mozambique to spend their savings to get married.⁹⁴ Basically the former child soldier is incapacitated due to lack of education and the time they lost in the army which is reflected in their behavior as observed in their actions. If they were demobilized the psychological issues would have been dealt with.

The community in Mozambique however believes in the traditional healing. The children who went home were subjected to the traditional form of cleansing before they were accepted into the community. The children were sent to healers who believe that since the children had murdered

⁹¹ Stuart M., *The Reintegration of War-affected youth. The experience of Mozambique*, ILO Action Program on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict, ISBN 92-2-110755-8, 1997. p11

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Herbert W., *Mozambique- The Children of War*, U.S. News & World Report, December 20, 2004

⁹⁴ Ibid

the spirit of the dead takes residence in the murderer and has to be driven out.⁹⁵ The effectiveness of this traditional method or the psychiatric western type of healing needs further social research.

2.1.4 CONCLUSION

The disarmament and demobilization processes are important for former child soldiers to assist them lead a normal life after the war. However, this is determined by the effectiveness of the process where finances are enough, commitment and determination of the parties involved and the soldiers are taken back into the community to lead a normal life. Disarmament process seemed to have been well coordinated in Mozambique but effective implementation was lacking. This saw the country plunge into insecurity with a good number of former child soldiers involved or associated with the problem.

The demobilization process on the other hand may have left some of the child soldiers out because the warring parties denied their existence. The future of these children is a great concern. Olara A. Otunnu, the UN special representative for Children and Armed Conflict, stated that "...children represent the hopes and future of every society-destroy them and you have destroyed the society. If we do not address the exploitation of children as soldiers, the cycle of violence will continue."⁹⁶ Hence the need to take proper measures in the process of demobilization of child soldiers.

⁹⁵ Herbert W., Mozambique- The Children of War, U.S. News & World Report, December 20,2004

⁹⁶ Otunnu O. Children in the Cross fire-Event Overview, U.S. Department of Labcur, Bureau of International Affairs, WWW.dol.gove/ilab/programs/iclp/childsoldiers/event_overview.htm

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS AND THE GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1992 IN MOZAMBIQUE

1.1 Introduction

Mozambique has been described as a success story by various analysts after the 1992 Peace Agreement signed in Lusaka, Zambia in so far as remaining peaceful.¹ Various reasons have been cited for the prevailing peace in the country after the signing of the 1992 Peace Agreement.

Andrea Ostheimer of the Africa Watch pegs the success of the process to the peaceful election which was declared as 'free and fair by international observers.'² Ostheimer also considers 'political reconciliation, pacification and recovery of the economy as having contributed to the success of Mozambique.'³ Robert Lloyd on the other hand is of the opinion that a lengthy military stalemate might have contributed to the peace.⁴ Foreign aid has also been cited as a factor by people like Eric Berman where Italy and USSR contributed a lot of money towards the peace process.⁵ The draughts that threatened starvation for the soldiers on both sides has also been proposed by scholars such as Alex Vines.

¹ See chapter 2 and 3

² Ostheimer Andrea E, Mozambique, The permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism? Africa Watch, Published in African Security Review Vol 10 No1,2001.pg 1

³ Ibid pg 1

⁴ Lijod R, Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tensions of Peace," Current History, Vol 94(April 1994)

⁵ Berman, E., Managing Arms in Peace Process: Mozambique(Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1996)pp19-20

Mark Malan on the other hand observed that the success of Mozambique was in relation to the disarmament process which saw the United Nations recover 190,000 weapons from 1993-1995 through the ONUMOZ operation.⁶ Glen Oosthuysen however disagrees with Mark Malan, noting that the Peace Agreement did not provide for 'arms embargo' which was a challenge to ONUMOZ operation because arms were still imported by both RENAMO and FRELIMO troops.⁷

Alejandro Bendana describes successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process as 'the touch stone, of the moment of truth for any peace building process'⁸ The DDR process however is no 'substitute for a comprehensive peace process' and no peace has succeeded where the peace process has been tampered with.⁹

How then do we measure the relationship between the disarmament and demobilization of child soldiers' process in relation to the 1992 peace agreement and the prevailing peace in Mozambique.

1.2 Analysis of Disarmament and Demobilization process of child soldiers and its effect on the Peace Agreement in Mozambique

⁶ Malan M.. Disarming and demobilizing child soldiers: The Underlying challengers, Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Published in African Security Review Vol 9 No 5/6,2000 pg 5

⁷ Oosthuysen G., in Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg2

⁸ Bendana A, in Demobilization ,Disarmament and Reintegration, specialization course, Australian Development cooperation, Peace Center Burg Schlaining, October 2001 Pg 8

⁹ Ibid pg 9

The mandate bestowed upon ONUMOZ by the United Nations in Mozambique was to “monitor and verify the cease-fire, the demobilization of forces, the collection, storage and destruction of weapons.”¹⁰ This process of arms management and disarmament has been recognized as key dimensions in all contemporary peacekeeping missions where arms have been mentioned as a primary contributor to violence, violent crime and even a return to war.¹¹ If the weapons are not destroyed, they find their way back into the streets. For instance in Mozambique, ONUMOZ due to lack of a clear mandate failed to ‘effect disarmament during its peace keeping operations which led to serious security problems to both Mozambique and South Africa.’¹² Those arrested were mostly former child soldiers.¹³

In the report of the Secretary –General on United Nations Operation in Mozambique, it was reported that soldiers relinquished one weapon on average per soldier and that these weapons were old and in poor condition.¹⁴ John Stedman in his policy paper termed disarmament in Mozambique a failure¹⁵ note that despite this failure’ we have not had of any war yet in Mozambique.”

¹⁰ Oosthuysen G, in Basic Publications, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peace Keeping Operations, NO 23, ISSN 12353-0402 December 1997 Pg9

¹¹ Malan M., Disarming and demobilizing child soldiers: The Underlying challengers, Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Published in African Security Review Vol 9 No 5/6,2000 pg 2

¹² Vines, A. The struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, Basic Papers, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, April 1998 NO. 25, ISSN1353-0402

¹³ See chapter 3

¹⁴ Report of the Secretary General On the United Nations Operation in Mozambique,s/1994/89pg3

¹⁵ Stedman S, Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers” IPA policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, May 2001pg16

In the Peace Agreement disarmament and demobilization process is mentioned as part of the process to form the Mozambique Defence Force (FADM) in Protocol IV Section 1.¹⁶ The statement is phrased as

the process of forming the FADM shall be conducted simultaneously with the concentration, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the personnel demobilized in stages as a result of the cease-fire. The Government and RENAMO shall be responsible for contributing units drawn from the existing forces each side; this process shall proceed until the new units of the FADM have been formed with all existing units being demobilized when the FADM has reached full strength.¹⁷

The aim of the process was to reduce the 'size of the regular army and paramilitary forces' and also the civilian personnel employed by the armed forces.¹⁸ The United Nations was actively involved in this process from registration of soldiers, to their disarming and storing the weapons. They also selected the soldiers for the new army and took part in the formal demobilization and transportation of the ex-soldiers.¹⁹ Demobilization is revisited in Protocol IV section IV as a necessary process in preparation for the E-Day (Election day) with reference to the process as described in Protocol IV section IV.²⁰

The children and older soldiers were demobilized at the same time and the only difference was that child soldiers did not receive the rations of money that the soldiers received.²¹ The rations were

¹⁶ See chapter 2

¹⁷ Peace Agreements Digital collection: Mozambique, United States Institute of Peace Library, www.usip.org/library/pa/Mozambique_1991-92_toc.html pg1

¹⁸ Rugumamu S(Prof), Gbla O(Dr.), Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building In Post Conflict Countries in Africa ,Some Lessons of Experience from Mozambique, ACBF Operations Based Study, December 2003pg30

¹⁹ Ibid p31

²⁰ Peace Agreements Digital collection: Mozambique, United States Institute of Peace Library, www.usip.org/library/pa/Mozambique_1991-92_toc.html pg1

²¹ See chapter 3

said to be good incentives such that when recruiting the FADM some soldiers opted not to join the army they were fatigued by the war.²²The children and the older soldiers received vocational training and others went through psychosocial care. The disarmament and demobilization process in Mozambique however neglected some of the children. It is reported that they were not considered a threat and hence their needs were not given priority.²³

Those who did not go through the process went back to their families. Other studies show that there was an influx of street children who when confronted alleged that they were refugees.²⁴ The children were also reported as performing odd jobs such as 'washing or guarding cars, begging, transporting fishing nets or fishing, delivering messages, shopping and looking after children of certain families.'²⁵ Others had been maimed during the war and others were considered to be too old to go to school.²⁶ Some of the children had to go through traditional cleansing rites before they were accepted in to their community.²⁷ The traditional rites included expelling spirits from the children and later the children were not allowed to speak of what they went through as soldiers.²⁸

A former child soldier the researcher interviewed currently working with Mozambique High Commission in Kenya revealed that some warring parties invested in youth organizations and other

²² Rugumamu S(Prof), Gbla O(Dr.), Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building In Post Conflict Countries in Africa ,Some Lessons of Experience from Mozambique, ACBF Operations Based Study, December 2003pg30

²³ Ibid pg30

²⁴ Stuart M. The reintegration of war- affected youth. The experience of Mozambique, ISBN 92-2110755-8,1997pg15

²⁵ Ibid pg15

²⁶ Ibid pg 15

²⁷ Bendana A, in Demobilization ,Disarmament and Reintegration, op.,cit.,Pg 8

²⁸ Ibid

helpful activities for them. Sergio Muchanga explains that some of the children were taken to colleges in Russia and Cuba while others were involved in income generating activities in Mozambique.²⁹

The Rome Peace Agreement did not include child soldiers. The struggle between RENAMO and FRELIMO was evidently that of a power. RENAMO was keen on being recognized as a party and to get equal share of the leadership of Mozambique. FRELIMO on the other hand did not want to share the power with the rebels. The peace process brought their main demands to light.³⁰

RENAMO was for instance keen on constitutional reforms. This is further seen as they demanded representation in the army at equal numbers from both sides. Lack of trust was also evident as RENAMO wanted security as they claimed that the government may try to assassinate their leader Alfonso Dhlakama who was once almost killed.³¹ The agreement was signed after a long tussle with RENAMO seeking to be reassurance of the government commitment before accepting to any proposal.

The election was carried out in October 1994 and the government won.³² Although FRELIMO refused to incorporate Dhlakama into its government after it won the polls, RENAMO did not go

²⁹ Sergio Muchanga Interview at the Mozambique High Commission.

³⁰ See chapter 2

³¹ See chapter 2

³² Walter B, *Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace*, Published in *International Security* Vol.24, No.1(1999)

back to war.³³ However the two parties did not go into war. RENAMO was represented in the cabinet but it is reported to have very little influence.³⁴ this was because of out of the 10 provinces, FRELIMO won in five provinces and RENAMO won in five provinces too , which it refused to relinquish to the government leading to dual administration.³⁵

Scholars like John Stedman in their study of peace attribute peace to eight variables which are the number of warring parties, the absence of peace agreement signed by all major warring parties before intervention and with a minimum coercion; the likelihood of spoilers; a collapsed state; the number of soldiers; the presence of disposable natural resources; the presence of hostile neighboring states or networks and demands for secession.³⁶ Whether some of these factors apply to Mozambique peace success or not is subject to discussion.

Mozambique had a peace agreement signed willingly by both parties. The election victory by FRELIMO saw it refuse to acknowledge RENAMO officially, yet Mozambique still did not go to war. Other factors prevailing that may have led to this peace are the issue of external states which stopped supporting both RENAMO and FRELIMO leading both parties to cooperate in the peace agreement. Secondly, the number of soldiers in Mozambique was not too large from both sides as both were weary from the war. Mozambique also does not have any disposable natural resources

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Walter B, *Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace*, Published in *International Security* Vol.24, No.1(1999)

³⁵ Cremilda M., in Walter B, *Designing Transitions From Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace*, Published in *International Security* Vol.24, No.1(1999)

³⁶ Stedman J, *Implementing Peace Agreements in civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy makers*, IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, New York , May 2001

hence the lack of interest from both internal and external actors. These factors are applicable to Mozambique especially the issue of spoilers and external actors. Mozambique war was perpetuated by the various countries in South Africa.³⁷

Mozambique is a show case of resilience even after the government did not adhere to some of the conditions of the peace agreement by the government. The fatigue experienced by the warring parties, the draught, pressure from the international community and availability of funds for the peace process are possible reasons leading to the signing of the peace agreement.

Conclusion

The child soldiers do not seem to have much of an impact on the peace agreement in Mozambique. The presence of the children was not even considered as a threat. The leaders concentrated on power sharing in the peace agreement leaving no clause for child soldiers and in fact they played a part in making the child soldier invisible by refusing to acknowledge them among their troops. Others went to the streets and secured illegal odd jobs while others were involved in crime. The effects of the war are still with child soldiers affecting them physically, psychologically and socially.

Many firearms were still at large by the time Mozambique went into elections in 1994 but Mozambique is still peaceful with the only concern being insecurity.³⁸ Child soldiers are still unaccounted for. Probably the effect of their exclusion from the DD process may be felt much later. The future of the child soldiers that were not lucky to go through the DD process or even get

³⁷ See chapter 2

³⁸ See chapter 3

the opportunity to go to Russia or Cuba for education is still questionable. The children just seem to have disappeared and have become adults who can only stay at home get married and move on with life. Scholars need to think about tracking these children over a period of time to evaluate the effect and impact of war in them after a certain period.

CHAPTER V

1.1 SUMMARY

The war in Mozambique left the country in ruins. The infrastructure and health facilities were destroyed in the war that drove many Mozambicans out of their country to become refugees in the neighboring countries of Malawi, South Africa, and Botswana. The economy that largely depended on agriculture was equally affected as most of the working force was displaced internally or became refugees.

This war was about governance where RENAMO wanted the government to share power with them. The civilians were however most affected as attacks by FRELIMO targeted the innocent population and the necessary social amenities needed. These displaced families became a target for recruitment into the rebel forces. RENAMO forces preferred recruiting children who were used as porters, sexual slaves and others fought in the war.

Finally there was a call for peace and both parties agreed to this. The drought of 1992 catalyzed the peace process because both sides could not sustain their troops and the country needed to survive this draught. Hence the Rome Peace Agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia.

This agreement however did not include children in the disarmament and demobilization process yet to date Mozambique is still enjoying peace. Both sides did not accept that they had children

among their troops. Apart from the few that UNICEF and Save the Children demobilized the rest remain unaccounted for.

1.2 FINDINGS

The fact that only few children in Mozambique went through the disarmament and demobilization process, does not seem to have affected the peace agreement. In fact children were not involved in the process and were not acknowledged by both RENAMO and FRELIMO forces.

The demobilization and disarmament process was important as it released children back to their communities where they were accepted after the traditional rituals were performed. However other children ended up in the street and contributed to increased insecurity in Mozambique. Ex-child soldiers were reported as among those arrested in such cases. Other children went back to their homes where they were either delusional, others got married with no jobs and their future did not seem bright. The fortunate ones got education in Cuba and Russia.

The DD process stipulated in the peace agreement did not seem to have any relation with the issue of child soldiers.

Peace processes in different countries vary and generalization may be misleading. What has worked in Mozambique may not work in other countries as observed in chapter two and three.

1.2.1 Prevailing conditions that may have led to sustainable peace in Mozambique

First, the Peace Agreement was successful as the people of Mozambique were determined to create peace in the country with the assistance of the international community. Mozambique received both regional and international support in the peace process. Many countries were keen to see the war come to an end. They provided their financial resources and personnel to see the process succeed. The determination of the leaders also contributed to the success. Joaquim Chissano, the president of Mozambique, and leader of FRELIMO toured the country organizing meetings with the people of Mozambique¹ to seek their opinion on whether the government should make peace with RENAMO.

Secondly, the declining economy made worse by the war and draught made it difficult for both sides to continue prosecuting the war. Peace appeared more appealing as an outcome at this point. It is reported that from 1977 Mozambique was adversely affected by draughts.² RENAMO tactics on the other hand targeted structures in Mozambique where they destroyed factories, health posts and other economic structures built by the government.³ There was a spell of draught in 1992 which affected Mozambique adversely after the river Limpopo dried up and crops failed in the whole country apart from the north.⁴ This affected RENAMO who depended on civilians for

¹ Bendana A, in Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, specialization course, Australian Development cooperation, Peace Center Burg Schlaining, October 2001 Pg 34

² Ibid pg 33

³ A.Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Amsterdam: Center for Southern African Studies University of York Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1996) chapter 5

⁴ A.Vines, Renamo From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (op.,cit., Pg142

supplies and support.⁵ The soldiers also became 'poorly nourished and their effectiveness decreased.'⁶

The government forces on the other hand had poorly motivated troops, poorly disciplined and disgruntled men who escaped from service occasionally which Alex Vines explains as part of the reason that led the government to accept the peace.⁷

Fourthly, an examination of the conditions that led the children to join the military, we reveals that they were either forced and others joined voluntarily. Those who joined voluntarily needed a family because their families were displaced or dead. Those who were poor needed to be provided for. This is a characteristic of children to depend on the grown ups to protect them and care for them. Those who were forced joined at gun point or through killing relatives or friends. The conditions at were harsh and it is not shocking as indicated in the UNICEF report that some of the children wanted to be reunited with their families. The children also may have just gone home and settled in and were naturally reintegrated with their families.

Conclusion

The Peace Agreement cannot be associated with the demobilization and disarmament process of child soldiers in Mozambique. The child soldiers were not mentioned in the agreement neither were they given a special provision. The case of Mozambique is more of a peace that was the effort of both warring parties to stop fighting after long years of war that had destroyed the economy and

⁵ Ibid pg142

⁶ Ibid pg142

⁷ Ibid 142

the country as a whole. The prevailing conditions such as may have played a key role in encouraging both parties to stop fighting and attracted the international community.

The armed violence after the war or the influx of street children did not make Mozambique go back to war. It is the determination of the leaders and the long suffering of the population that may have led Mozambique to peace. The Peace Agreement was a vital key for both warring factions to have a common ground for discussion leading to the peace in Mozambique.

Recommendations

1. A Study should be considered on the effectiveness of the rituals performed on child soldiers after the child soldiers were demobilized as an alternative to the United Nations initiatives.
2. Secondly child soldiers who are now grown ups should be traced and studied especially in Mozambique to follow up on their progress since 1992. This could assist the United Nations or any other interested parties on child soldiers to create policies or strategies to deal with child soldiers and the Demobilization and Disarmament process.

Limitations of the Study

1. It was difficult to find current data on the disarmament and demobilization process of child soldiers in Mozambique. This could have been attributed to the fact that Mozambique currently is at peace and the then child soldiers are now adults.

2. Resources were not available to make a field trip to Mozambique which would have assisted in finding individuals to interview and make a follow up on the child soldiers who studied in Russia and Cuba and also those who did not go through the DD process.
3. The reluctant staff at the Mozambique High Commission to give information on the issue of child soldiers

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