

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AS A BASIS OF CO-OPERATION  
AND POLITICAL COMPLIANCE IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS:  
A CASE STUDY OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS  
BRITAIN, 1963 - 1988

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL  
FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
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DECLARATION


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**DEDICATION**

This Thesis is dedicated first to my father, the late Nelson Okello Miyewe whose interest in my education and support was overwhelming. His warm and fatherly advise transformed me into what I am today and definitely saw me reach my present level of education.

Secondly, it is dedicated to my mother, Mama Roselida Auma Okello who has never ceased to encourage me to get moving even under the most difficult circumstances. Her pragmatic perception of the need for, and the significance of quality education, formed the wholemark of my success.

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To them, I shall for ever remain grateful.

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## ABSTRACT

Kenya's economic dependence on Britain since independence has had immense significance in determining Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain and therefore, the overall relationship between the two countries. Many scholars have been investigating the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy. To this end, the study will give further illumination of the dynamics of Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain within the context of economic dependency. This is done by critically examining the problem of the study and thereafter making recommendations and conclusions on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain between 1963 and 1988

The problem the study intends to investigate is why Kenya exhibits co-operation and compliance in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain and how such co-operation and compliance is manifested. The study therefore sets out to examine if Kenya's economic dependence on Britain compromises her foreign policy behaviour towards the former colonial power to the extent that it breeds political compliance, if not co-operation

Our key findings are that during the period under review, 1963 to 1988, asymmetrical economic vulnerability of Kenya led to her compliance with foreign policy preferences that were salient to Britain. Non-compliance was occasionally exhibited but on issues that were not salient to Britain. The study reveals that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is compromised by her economic dependence on the latter. The conclusion reached is that Kenya should tackle the issue of economic-underdevelopment to enable her pursue independent foreign policy goals towards Britain

In Chapter one, an attempt is made to justify the study on the grounds that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour, characterised by co-operation and political compliance towards Britain, and based on economic dependency will provide useful information regarding the likely political as well as economic benefits and losses from such behaviour. In this chapter, we have reviewed the existing literature with a view to finding loopholes or gaps

that warrant the significance of the study. Dependency theory is used and from it, relevant hypotheses are drawn.

In Chapter Two, we have discussed the historical ties between Kenya and Britain. We have also examined here the origins of Kenya's economic dependency on Britain, and its incorporation into the international capitalist system as a whole.

In Chapter Three, an analysis is carried out on the various aspects of Kenya's economic dependency on Britain. Limited data are pieced together, for the years 1963 - 1988 to indicate the financial, investments and trade aspects of Kenya's dependence on Britain

Chapter Four discusses co-operation and political compliance as exhibited by Kenya towards Britain during the 1960s. This period forms a whole chapter since during the 1960s, Kenya's dependency on Britain was greater than during the following decades

+ In Chapter Five, we have discussed Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and political compliance towards Britain, but unlike in Chapter Four, this chapter deals with the period of 1970s and 1980s. The difference between the two chapters lies on time period. We have grouped the 1970s and 1980s in one chapter since during these periods, Kenya undertook to diversify her dependency, a move that had foreign policy implications on her bilateral relations with Britain.

Chapter Six provides the general summary, conclusions and policy suggestions arising from the study. In this chapter, we have examined the crucial issue of whether the study has achieved its objectives or not.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study examines why Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is characterized by co-operation and compliance and why it revolves around the concept of economic dependency. Put in question form, why does Kenya exhibit co-operation and compliance towards Britain? How is such co-operation and compliance made manifest? In other words, the problem which the study intends to explain is that of Kenya's exhibition of co-operation and compliance in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. Secondly the study intends to find out how such co-operation and compliance is exhibited.

These questions are best examined by restricting our analysis within the boundaries of the consistently cordial relations between Kenya and Britain. Various aspects of the country's relations with Britain have been analysed, at the end of which an evaluation has been done. Both the analysis and the evaluation have been made in the light of what are considered in the study as essential elements of co-operation and compliance.

Co-operation and compliance in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour were exhibited in 1965 when Kenya refused to heed Organization of African Unity's (O.A.U.), call for member states to sever diplomatic relations with Britain following the unilateral Declaration of Independence in what is now Zimbabwe, and which was supported by Britain. Earlier in 1964, Kenya exhibited compliance by putting up a spirited defence of the British against what the Kenya government termed "Chinese Propaganda" attempt to portray the British as re-occupying East Africa with military forces<sup>1</sup>. This followed the 1964 army mutinies in East Africa.

In 1966, again in the spirit of co-operation and compliance, the Kenya government carried out the suppression of pro-socialist or what the British referred to as 'radical' politicians. This was done under pressure from the British and the United States during the famous Limuru Conference. The conference was in fact financed by the two governments<sup>2</sup>.

In 1984 and 1987, Kenya again maintained co-operative and compliant behaviour despite the presence of what she called "political fugitives" who had sought exile in London and were using the British press to attack the Kenya government<sup>3</sup>. These are but some of the examples when Kenya exhibited compliance towards Britain.

In examining such foreign policy behaviour of Kenya, the financial and technical assistance that Kenya gets from Britain as well as British investments in Kenya and trading links between the two countries will help in our conceptual understanding of behaviour.

Kenya, like other African states, has not developed sufficient control of her economy which continues to be dominated by foreign (and particularly British) firms. This is a major source of insecurity for the country as she cannot direct fully the future of the much needed industrial development and modernization programme. This insecurity means that Kenya's economic and political institutions, inter alia, remain vulnerable to influences and pressures from outside powers.

Kenya's strategy in respect of the conduct of her foreign affairs has made her try to maintain close ties with the major western industrial nations, especially Britain in order to build overseas markets for her products, expand tourism and maintain the flow of private and public foreign investment into the country<sup>4</sup>. This

situation which largely reflects asymmetrical interdependence has in fact enabled Britain as a dominant nation to exercise asymmetrical influence over Kenya.

African states are by design, products of colonialism which not only moulded but also created them as modern political entities - reflecting strong institutional resemblances with the former colonial states<sup>5</sup>. Important are the economic and bureaucratic institutions which form a base for western hegemony. This hegemony, it is argued in this study, leads to Kenya's continued economic dependence on Britain.

In terms of Kenya's economic development, British foreign aid remains great and crucial. But as will be found out in this study, the conditions under which aid is offered, provide opportunities for influencing or shaping the recipients' policies, both domestic and foreign. Important to this study is that Kenya's economy exhibits attributes of dependency on Britain in particular and the West in General. It has been gradually incorporated into the international capitalist system.

This study examines all the above issues which boil down to our research question.

There are different kinds of dependency, namely economic, cultural, strategic or military, political, diplomatic and psychological dependency. This study addresses economic dependency which covers trade, investments, technical and financial assistance (aid). It is these forms of economic dependency that we shall argue have fundamentally shaped Kenya's foreign policy behavior towards the former colonial master. The study does not discuss the other forms of dependency since they are not as important as economic dependency in terms of their influence on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

We have used data from 1963 to 1988 to examine Britain as a dominant nation with influence over Kenya's foreign policy behaviour. Kenya attained her independence from Britain in 1963. Since then, her new sovereignty gave her the qualification as an actor in international relations. Therefore her foreign policy can be rightly traced from that year. The choice of the years 1963 to 1988 will significantly enable us to critically analyse Kenya's relations with Britain during the first quarter century of Kenya's independence.

The time frame is important for several reasons. First it is during this period that Kenya-British relations were very cordial. Secondly throughout this period, Kenya constantly received generous and varied assistance from Britain. Thirdly it is our contention that the post 1988 election period in Kenya marked a 'slow-down' in the hitherto warm relations between the two countries since the Kenya government was accused of massive rigging in the elections and the British government tended to have lent credence to such allegations<sup>6</sup>. This change in the Kenya-British relations, not surprisingly saw Britain begin to give audience to critics of Kenya government, a move that eventually culminated in Britain supporting the move to impose aid embargo on Kenya in 1991. The post 1988 period therefore saw Kenya's dependency on Britain greatly reduced, and with this, a change in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour; at least to the extent that the two countries began to openly and frequently criticize each other<sup>7</sup>.

In this study, the word United Kingdom has been used to mean Britain.

## **1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The objectives of the study are:-

1. To illustrate the incorporation of Kenya into the British capitalist system which eventually led into her becoming a British dependency.
2. To identify the economic factors that influence Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain.



3. To examine in a foreign policy framework the relationship between political outcomes or political compliance in bilateral relations and foreign economic assistance.
4. To determine if Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest.
5. To determine whether or not there is consistency in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

### 1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Where as much has been written about the Western and Middle Powers in general, scholars have not adequately focused on the bilateral relations between Kenya and Britain. There is need for a detailed and systematic study on how Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is compromised by her economic dependence on the latter. Britain has been Kenya's biggest trading partner and provides her with more foreign aid than any other country. This is also true of British foreign investments in Kenya which surpasses that of any other country.

The purpose of this study is to bridge the above gap by analysing the empirical data on Kenya and Britain. Specifically, the study hopes to analyse Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain from a dependency perspective. It therefore represents an attempt at describing and dissecting economic dependency variables, as they relate to policy, practice and analysis in Anglo-Kenya relations. The study is also significant in that an analysis of the effects of Kenya's economic dependence on Britain with respect to the former's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance will provide important information regarding the likely benefits and losses from such behavior. The information generated may assist Kenya's decision-makers to formulate only those foreign policy choices which she can effectively promote and defend

towards Britain. The study may also serve as a useful basis for the formulation or conduct of foreign policy towards other powers.

The study is also significant for purposes of intellectual review and conceptual development. It will, at least to a reasonable extent, contribute to our understanding of the relations between developed and developing countries. This rests on the assumption that factors affecting developing countries like Kenya in their relations with the major powers can to some extent be universally applied.

#### 1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature will concentrate on aspects related to the main objectives of the study especially how economic dependency has led to co-operation and compliance in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. It is by reviewing and appraising what has been written about Kenya's foreign policy and its basic determinants that the subject can be analysed contextually. It is from such a broad spectrum that one may rightly ascertain how Kenya's foreign policy behaviour has been influenced by economic dependence on Britain. The literature review will also include the work of scholars who have written extensively on foreign policy and compliance. This will however, only be done if their work can fit within our framework of analysis.

John J. Okumu identifies two variables that largely shape the foreign policies of African states. These are the decolonization and economic development variables<sup>8</sup>. Decolonization was achieved in most African states in the 1960s, with Kenya doing so in 1963. By decolonization, the African states attained their sovereignty and therefore the capacity to assume active role in international relations. However, Okumu argues that African states are not fully decolonised because they are still dependent (economically) on the outside

powers<sup>9</sup>. The assumption underlying this dependency according to many scholars is that as long as African hierarchy remains subordinate, its policies are dependent on the developed powers<sup>10</sup>. The study will examine the applicability of this assumption to Kenya-British relations.

The concept subordinate as used above by scholars is understood here to mean that there exists asymmetrical economic vulnerability in the relationship between the developing countries like Kenya and the developed ones like Britain. Along this line of analysis, we can argue that in her economic relations with Britain, Kenya is asymmetrically vulnerable. Therefore because of this, she tends to exhibit compliance with British policy preferences. Our argument is quite consistent with that advanced by Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegley. they argue that:

It is widely believed that asymmetrical economic interdependence affords political leverage on foreign policy whereas symmetrical economic transactions generally do not. A more recent impression is that "vulnerability" (as opposed to mere "sensitivity") dependence identifies those particular asymmetrical economic ties that create political opportunity. ... The evidence is consistent with the expectation that the asymmetrical trade (and generally economic) vulnerability of dependent countries leads to their compliance, albeit selective ...<sup>11</sup>

We shall adopt the above argument to test the proposition that Kenya's economic dependency on Britain which ultimately leads to vulnerability on her part, compromises her foreign policy behaviour towards the latter, and therefore consequently leads to co-operation and compliance.

William Zartman identifies four ways through which economic dependency is manifested in the Third World. According to him, these are: dependency through foreign ownership and control of the key sectors of the economy, dependency through trade, dependency through imported consumption and production patterns and dependency through aid<sup>12</sup>. These aspects of

dependency as identified by Zartman will be studied with a view to finding out how they bring about compliance on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour. It is our contention that these forms of dependency as mentioned by Zartman underlie Kenya-Britain economic relations.

With specific reference to foreign aid, Eugene R. Wittkopf has argued that it has been used by the United States in seeking compliance from other states in its foreign positions<sup>13</sup>. This study will find out whether Wittkopf's argument is applicable in Kenya-British relations. We shall do this on the assumption that foreign aid is used as a political instrument in seeking compliance not by the U.S. alone, but also by other powers like Britain, in their dealings with their dependencies, particularly on issues salient to them. The implication by Wittkopf is that aid influences foreign policy behaviour of dependent states<sup>14</sup>.

Okumu also argues that the major factors that have been determining Kenya's quiet diplomacy is first, the threat of secession in Kenya's Coast and North-Eastern provinces which necessitated the need of consolidating her boundaries. Second was Kenya's need for security, a move that led to the policy of good neighbourliness. The third and most important for our study, was a policy of vigorous economic development at home and economic co-operation with her neighbours<sup>15</sup>. According to Okumu, these considerations determined Kenya's relations with the major powers which provide her with material means of security and economic development<sup>16</sup>. However, whereas Okumu's observation is quite relevant for our study, he nevertheless does not address the issue of compliance, particularly as concerns Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. This is what the study is concerned with. Moreover, Okumu's analysis is generalised and applies to all the major powers. Such a generalization could have its own limitations, however, which we do not wish to address here.

Of significance to us is Okumu's observation that the U.K. continues to be the main source of external assistance to Kenya. He adds that between 1963 and 1972, Britain aided Kenya to the tune of £250 million sterling, the highest aid given to any African country during this period by the major donor countries<sup>17</sup>. Besides the fact that Okumu is not dealing with the relationship between economic dependency and compliance in Kenya-British relations, it is also noteworthy that Okumu's work was published in 1973. Since then, a number of economic changes of interest to this study have occurred. These changes need to be reviewed to update our knowledge of Kenya's dependency on Britain with the latest data, and the resultant behaviour.

In his analysis of Kenya's foreign policy from independence to 1983, Samuel M. Makinda looks at the main goals and interests that facilitated Kenya's actions in international politics. Makinda, like Timothy Shaw seems to share the view that British neo-colonialism was expressed through Kenya towards her neighbours, particularly Uganda where after that government had expelled Asians from that country in 1971 leading into conflict between Uganda and Britain, British manufactured goods, nevertheless found their way into Uganda through Kenya<sup>18</sup>. Could this be an act of compliance? This will be interesting for our study. Makinda rejects Okumu's thesis that secessionist threats shaped Kenya's foreign policy, which in his opinion was influenced by the quest for and the continued presence and dominance of Britain among other western powers<sup>19</sup>.

Timothy M. Shaw on his part asserts that Kenya concentrated on economic development in line with her national interests and foreign policy towards Britain<sup>20</sup>. This was at a time when Ethiopia and Somalia, her neighbours were involved in military procurement during the 1960s and 1970s. Shaw uses the term "sub-imperial state" to refer to this economic might of Kenya in the East African region<sup>21</sup>. Since this assumed "sub-imperialism" partly derives from

Kenya's economic dependency, the study will find out, whether or not it has led to compliant behaviour on the part of Kenya, especially on her bilateral relations with Britain. This is an issue that Shaw does not address.

\* The sub-imperialism that Shaw examines can be attributed to a number of factors. Undoubtedly, the substantial trading links between Kenya and Britain, for example, is one such possible factor. Neil Richardson demonstrates this more graphically when he asserts that "nations that engage in substantial trade with a dominant partner should display compliant political behaviour towards it<sup>22</sup>." This, we believe, is because the dominant partner can sabotage the economy of the small nation, for example, by boycotting the latter's goods. The study will examine the extent to which this assertion is applicable to Kenya. If this is found to be valid, then to this extent, the political compliance of Kenya can be described as a manifestation of export dependence. However, as mentioned earlier, we shall examine the exhibition of compliance by looking at the other aspects of economic dependency, for example, British aid to Kenya.

D. Katete Orwa argues that it is a fact that Kenya is a dependent state whose development especially economic, is a reflection of Western European and North American economies. His main argument is that Kenya's economic domination by European and Multi-national corporations is a consequence of colonial historical realities. This to him can influence both domestic and foreign policies of Kenya<sup>23</sup>. It is this influence that the study will examine, with a view to ascertaining whether it has been compliant as earlier assumed or not.

Orwa adds that like all other sovereign states, Kenya pursues her vital national interests both within the international and regional systems<sup>24</sup>. These interests, in our opinion are also pursued within the framework of bilateral relations. It is specifically within this framework, born out of economic dependency, that we shall examine Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. Orwa's work

also becomes inadequate for our study to the extent that it is generalised towards the major and middle powers.

C.M.B. Utete observes that the relations between the newly independent African states and the former colonial powers have remained cordial despite the violent conflicts that preceded independence<sup>25</sup>. A good example is Kenya which attained her independence through a bloody struggle, the "Mau Mau" movement, culminating in the declaration of a state of emergency in 1952. Utete attributes this to historical factors. However in our case, we would like to explore what has led to this cordial relationship, not from a historical, but from an economic dependency perspective. Though Utete does not specify, it is our contention that the remarkably close relations he refers to have also been greatly brought about by the economic benefits that these African states obtain from the former colonial powers. It is our further contention that such benefits can and in fact do lead to submissiveness and therefore compliance on the part of the less developed African states.

In the case of Kenya-British relations, one of such economic benefits is aid that the former receives from the latter. Mason suggests for example, that the U S uses aid to influence voting behaviour in the United Nations (U.N.). He argues that "diplomats are frequently worried by voting records in the United Nations and suggest that an increase in aid to their particular country would improve this record<sup>26</sup>. Mason's suggestion implies that aid can be used by a dominant power to bring about compliance. This is very significant for our study which will examine whether Britain uses aid to influence Kenya's foreign policy behaviour on issues that are of interest to Britain.

On the same issue of the use of aid by the U.S. to influence other countries, Lloyd D. Black carries the argument further by stating that:

The State Department ... places high value on the employment of foreign aid to ... swing critical votes in international bodies ... While U.N. votes may not, and should not, be the primary determinant in aid decisions, it is reasonable to assert that they cannot be ignored - nor are they<sup>27</sup>.

Black, like Mason seems to equally share the view that the dominant powers are capable and in fact do use aid to bring about compliance on the part of those countries that dearly need this aid. On the basis of these critical arguments, we can emphatically observe that there is something more than a random relationship between these two variables - aid and behaviour in Kenya-British relations. Fortunately this remains one of the prime objectives of this study.

Mahmood Mamdani advances a very interesting argument in attempting to explain the recent hostilities between Kenya and Uganda. In his view, Kenya's foreign policy towards Uganda has contributed to the strained relations. Such policy he argues is the result of external pressure put on Kenya by British multinational companies<sup>28</sup>. He adds that the worsening of the relations was because British interests in Uganda were threatened during Amin's rule. This, according to him, is due to the character of the Kenyan economy which is not independent, but a neo-colonial economy in which Britain was the leading imperialist power for the better part of 1970s<sup>29</sup>.

Inherent in Mamdani's argument is that because the Kenyan economy is not independent of Britain, Kenya could have been working in alliance with Britain to the disadvantage of Uganda. His argument implies albeit indirectly, that Kenya's foreign policy towards Uganda was influenced by Britain, probably because of Kenya's "neo-colonial economy." This term directly links Kenya's economy to that of Britain. Mamdani's argument will be of special interest to this study, although he has not adequately addressed the issue of compliance by Kenya with Britain against Uganda.



Colin Leys analyses how the political economy of neo-colonialism has affected underdevelopment in Kenya. He argues that aid, the greater bulk of which was provided by Britain, was one means of luring Kenya into a neo-colonial situation<sup>30</sup>. This in itself suggests compliance on the part of Kenya. The study, while benefiting from Leys' work will seek to demonstrate the relationship between "neo-colonialism" as Leys puts it and Kenya's co-operative and compliant behaviour towards Britain.

Korwa G. Adar postulates that Kenya's foreign policy towards the Middle Powers is basically conducted in a manner consistent with her national interests. He agrees with Robert Keohane's argument that the more dependent a state is on a greater power for trade, aid or protection, the more responsive it is likely to be to pressure<sup>31</sup>.

This responsiveness, at a certain level, is synonymous with compliance. The study aims at finding out whether such views reflect the character of Anglo-Kenya relations. Specifically our role will be to examine whether Kenya has been subjected to bilateral pressure from Britain, and whether, because of her economic dependence on Britain, she has been responsive as Keohane suggests, by exhibiting co-operation and political compliance in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. Keohane is more direct when he adds:

Threats of retaliation of one sort or another - reducing foreign aid, for example - usually need not be made explicit. Often it is sufficient that the smaller state is aware that 'Big Brother' is watching<sup>32</sup>.

J.D. Olewe-Nyunya observes that Britain has been the major arms supplier to Kenya from colonial through post-colonial period. This to him justifies United States arms supply to Kenya in the 1980s, since Britain is a U.S. ally<sup>33</sup>. Though Nyunya's work is on Kenya's relations with the super-powers, it will be useful to this study. This is more so if we understand the arms supply to be part of

Kenya-British trade dealings. We shall therefore try to find out whether this kind of trade can lead to compliance from Kenya.

Ronald P. Barston argues that most small states have low levels of economic development and their gross national products (GNP) are normally low. However, he notes that a few states do have comparatively developed economies and pursue active foreign policies on a limited number of issues beyond their own region. But he also observes that the under-developed small states are not only economically dependent upon the major industrial states, but are less able to withstand external pressures on their economies from, for example, a shortage of international reserves or the terms of an economic assistance agreement<sup>34</sup>.

Barston seems to suggest that the small states, owing to their economic dependency are subject to influence, which can take the form of compliance in their foreign policy behaviour. We are therefore interested in finding out whether and how this economic dependency on Britain makes Kenya vulnerable to pressures from London in terms of her foreign policy behaviour.

Vincent B. Khapoya observes that Kenya like any other state, was expected to employ its foreign policy to attain both internal and external objectives. In pursuing economic development, Khapoya argues that Kenyan leadership saw foreign policy as an avenue for attracting resources from the international environment, especially the West. On the strength of this argument, Khapoya asks a very significant question, whether it is really possible for Kenya to pursue foreign policy goals that may in any way jeopardise the interests of the West, particularly Britain<sup>35</sup>.

Significant as Khapoya's work may be to us, this study underscores certain issues that Khapoya had only alluded to. For example there is no deep

analysis in Khapoya's work of the relationship between Kenya's political economy and co-operation or compliance with British interests.

This study is less ambitious. Whereas Kenya depends economically on the majority of developed countries, particularly the West, it is restricted to Kenya-British relations. The above literature review has helped us to identify the gaps which the study now hopes to attempt to fill in the succeeding chapters.

## 1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Our choice of theoretical framework<sup>36</sup> is mostly determined by the need to show the factors that underlie dependency as a variable that determines Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. The theories that may be used for this purpose include decision-making theory, power theory of national interest and dependency theory.

Decision-making theory has been propounded by Graham T. Allison<sup>37</sup>, Robert North<sup>38</sup> and Alexander George<sup>39</sup> among others. Allison focuses on three models crucial in explaining the foreign policies of nation states<sup>40</sup>. First is the rational actor model which assumes that nation-states are monolithic entities whose decision-maker rationally maximises national interests. Allison however, argues that this model is in itself inadequate in explaining foreign policy. This is so because according to him, Nation-states are not homogenous 'black boxes' and therefore analysts should understand internal foreign-policy making dynamisms.

He then proposes the organizational process model in which different organizations acting with standardised routines and capabilities greatly restrict the range of choices available to the Chief Executive (President) and the advisors. The decision arrived at is the outcome of inter-organizational debates and is accepted as the national interest.

The last is the bureaucratic politics model which assumes that a few people sit together and make momentous decisions whenever there is a crisis. Each member of the decision-making group undertakes decisions aimed at protecting and enhancing the interests of the department he or she heads. This makes Allison to assert that 'where you stand depends on where you sit'.

For the purpose of this study, this approach is lacking in certain respects. When looked at separately, the organizational process model becomes difficult to apply in the Kenyan context, where foreign policy decisions are not subject to inter-organizational debates, differing perceptions and manoeuvres that confound attempts at rational explanation of policy. Similarly, the bureaucratic politics model is limited to the extent that it assumes that different heads of departments make decisions designed to protect and enhance the interests of their respective departments. In Kenya, foreign policy, whether it is towards Britain or any other state, has been an exclusive concern of the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (presently renamed Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation)<sup>41</sup>. In fact Presidential directive of foreign policy in Kenya limits the relevance of bureaucratic politics model.

Foreign policy examined within the contexts of the three models advanced by Allison, aims at enhancing the interests of the different departments or organizations, and eventually, it is assumed, the interests of the state which is assumed to be monolithic. This is very difficult to apply to our study. Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain does not always enhance her national interests. Infact, the opposite often happens, where compliance by Kenya, owing to her weak economy, sometimes ends up serving the British interests at the expense of Kenya's.

The decision-making theory is also apparently concerned more with 'how' foreign policy decisions are made and ignores the fundamental aspect of 'why' they are made. It cannot therefore adequately address the question of why dependency on Britain drives Kenya into compliance.

The other theory that could be used is the power theory. This theory focuses on the component of national interest. The theory assumes that in international politics, the major concern of state action is national interest<sup>42</sup>.

Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the chief proponents of power theory argues that a state formulates and implements its foreign policy with its national interest as the determining factor. Morgenthau's definition of national interest is "a compromise of conflicting interests". It is not an ideal arrived at scientifically, but it is rather a product of constant internal political competition<sup>43</sup>.

Klaus Knorr, while not contradicting Morgenthau's definition argues that effective demands brought to bear on policy formulation, define the national interest which governments acting rationally pursue. But given that demands are frequently conflictual, foreign policy appears to represent the demands of the most influential coalition of particular interests<sup>44</sup>.

Survival is most important when considering national interest. Morgenthau suggests that the minimum requirement of nation-states is the protection of their political, physical and cultural identity against possible encroachment by other states<sup>45</sup>.

Morgenthau systematically supported the premise that diplomatic strategy should be motivated by national interest rather than by utopian and dangerous moralistic, legalistic and ideological criteria. He equates national interest with the pursuit of state power, where power stands for anything that establishes and

maintains control by one state over another. This power-control relationship can be achieved by coercive as well as co-operative techniques<sup>46</sup>.

This view of power centres on 'struggle' and entails the use and manipulation of military resources. This theory also has certain defects which invalidates it for this study. First Morgenthau may be criticized for constructing two abstract and imprecise concepts - power and interest - which he viewed as the ends and the means of international political action. For our study, we suggest that whereas Kenya may want to pursue her national interests vis-a-vis Britain in her own style, she lacks the necessary tangible political power to do so. This serious absence of power is brought about by her dependency on Britain.

Even if such power should be present by taking another different form, for example, diplomatic persuasion, it will always be limited by her dependent status. Indeed in studying Kenya-British relations, where the one is less powerful than the other, both economically and politically, it becomes problematic to relate the two concepts. Moreover, political compliance, if exhibited by Kenya towards Britain, does not even come closer to the pursuit of power and interest. Compliance denotes political submissiveness and therefore at times, runs counter to national interest. We are not suggesting that compliance with Britain will always compromise Kenya's national interests. After all, it depends on what Kenya's national interest is. Rather our argument is that this remains a possibility.

Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of compliance towards Britain can at times be a difficult choice aimed merely at her economic, if not political survival. For example, Kenya's refusal to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as called for by the O.A.U. in 1965 was a difficult choice. While it ensured that Kenya continued to derive important economic benefits from Britain like aid, it also

compromised Kenya's continental image as a strong O.A.U. supporter. These weaknesses of power theory therefore, cannot allow this study to adopt it.

This study will adopt the dependency theory as our theoretical framework. Our focus will be on the concept of dependency as a variable that has the capacity to influence behaviour, owing to the underdeveloped status of a given state.

Dependency theory has no single agreed upon definition. The Oxford English dictionary defines dependency as "the condition of being dependent; the relation of a thing to that by which it is conditioned; contingent, logical or causal connection; a state of subjection or subordination."

According to Dos Santos, dependency refers to a situation whereby the economies of certain countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected<sup>47</sup>. In this situation the dominant economies, usually those of the industrialized capitalist states, expand and maintain self-sustaining growth while the dependent economies of the non-industrial countries can only expand and grow as a reflection of the expansion of the former. It is this relationship which leads to the condition of underdevelopment<sup>48</sup>, and therefore in our opinion, continuous dependency.

Dependency is in the words of J. Caporaso "the process of incorporation of less developed countries into the global capitalist system and the "structural distortions" resulting therefrom"<sup>49</sup>. Dependency has a predominant focus on relation of inequalities among actors and is equally interested in the vulnerabilities of members of the global system resulting from these unequal relations.

The dependency orientation, Caporaso argues, seeks to explore the process of integration of the periphery into the international capitalist system and to assess the developmental implications of this peripheral capitalism. This approach in Caporaso's view, proceeds from a "structuralist" paradigm which focuses on the class structure in the peripheral country, the alliance between this class structure and international capital, and the role of the state in shaping and managing the national, foreign, and class forces that propel development within countries.

The dependency theory, observes Caporaso, also visualizes dependent relations in such a way as to make it impossible to focus simply on a pair of actors. Not the whole country, but a selected portion of it, is integrated into the international economic system in a particular way, making it difficult to consider dependency in terms of dyadic patterns<sup>50</sup>.

Havelock Brewster defines dependency as a causal relationship, a functional relationship among economies resulting in unequal autonomous developmental possibilities<sup>51</sup>.

Fernando H. Cardoso's view of dependency is one in which the national economy must "insert itself into the circuit of international capitalism". He expresses dependency as a "functional derangement" or "functional incompleteness" of a national economy. Dependency is therefore not just simple reliance on others for the provision of goods but a more complex and critical concept where reliance on external or transnational agencies for completion of basic economic activities is the main focus.

The basic conceptualization of dependency theory stresses that the phenomenon of dependency is both a worldwide and historical phenomenon. As a historical phenomenon, dependency is associated with the origins of



capitalism and the emergence of the international division of labour. Dependency assessments involve an evaluation of the ways in which the organization of capitalism at the global level “conditions”, “shapes” and “constrains” the domestic political processes and the ways in which changes in the organization of capital define and redefine the possibilities of domestic production and development.

This focus clearly targets our attention on relational differences like unequal exchanges (as in terms of trade), power inequalities (as in the unequal ability of actors to achieve compliance with their wishes), and structural inequalities in the more or less permanent relations among actors (e.g. the distribution of opportunities and constraints that impinge on each actor).

There are two types of power that are significant to the theory. First is bargaining power which is the power to control the outcomes of specific events. The second is what we have termed “structural power”. This is a higher order power as it involves the ability to manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities and pay offs that actors may utilize. The ability of Britain to incorporate Kenya into her capitalist system can be seen as an effort to put Kenya in a position of dependence on Britain. This is higher order form of power because it is a power to govern the rules which shape bargaining power. It is this type of power, structural, which is crucial to the understanding of dependency.

Despite its contribution to our understanding of the mechanisms of influence, poverty and underdevelopment, the dependency school has been criticized for various reasons<sup>53</sup>.

First it has been criticized for its circular reasoning and what has been termed “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” by Gerald Helleiner<sup>54</sup>. The argument of

circular reasoning derives from the problematic question of explaining the relationship between underdevelopment and the material base for development. Are African states dependent because of their small size, their extreme poverty, their limited power in international markets and international resource organizations or vice versa?

In other words are they dependent because they are underdeveloped or are they underdeveloped because they are dependent<sup>55</sup>? In our study, we shall handle this question by advancing the argument that Kenya, is dependent on Britain because she is underdeveloped. Her underdevelopment can be traced to her colonization by Britain, during which her resources were greatly plundered. We shall rely on the available empirical data to prove this proposition. A related problem for our study is whether dependency as a structural phenomenon and as a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence adds anything to our understanding of Kenya's essential dilemma of poverty and powerlessness.

Dependency has also been criticized for being too theoretical and abstract while some of its theoretically logical conclusions are empirically unsubstantiated and of dubious validity<sup>56</sup>. It also exaggerates the "all-pervasive and self-perpetuating character" of the core capitalist power with respect to the periphery, reducing virtually everything that happens in Africa to a capitalist conspiracy<sup>57</sup>.

In spite of these limitations, there are a number of reasons why we find the theory adequate for our study. The theory will help us emphasize the decisiveness of economic factors in shaping Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain which involves co-operation and compliance. This rests on the premise that Kenya has overtime been incorporated into the international capitalist system from the time it was colonised by Britain. Because of her

underdeveloped status, her foreign policy behaviour can be influenced by powerful industrially developed Britain on salient issue areas. We are suggesting that Kenya's vulnerability in her relations with Britain is directly related to the dependency syndrome and that this dependency will at times compromise her behaviour.

As we have just stated, colonialism incorporated Kenya's underdeveloped economy into the European worldwide capitalist system, causing her to become a satellite of Metropolitan Europe and later of the United States. The prices of raw materials exported from Kenya and generally Africa were fixed in the Metropolis. Likewise, the prices of manufactured goods were also determined in the Metropolis, like London and other European capitals. Consequently, there was an unequal relationship in which Kenya and the other African countries were exploited for the development of Europe. Being a victim of this unequal relationship, Kenya therefore finds herself in a situation where she has to rely on British assistance in trying to develop her own economy. Consequently, she has little choice and therefore can be coerced into compliance.

After independence, Kenya failed to break with colonial dependence. Her economy could therefore only expand as a reflection of the expansion of European economies led by Britain, with the consequence that underdevelopment has remained a characteristic of the country.

*stop*

The following simplified basic tenets of the school may be applied to the Kenyan situation.

1. Kenya is dependent on the capitalist world of which Britain is a major player in technology, finance, capital and monetary systems as well as

trade. This may be attributed to the fact that the capitalist world monopolizes "means of production".

2. This dependency relationship is the product of incorporation of Kenya into the capitalist system.
3. Kenya's dependency on Britain leads to compliance on issues of salience to Britain.

In this regard, Kwame Nkrumah's argument is worth noting. He argues that:

the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is in theory independent, and has all the outward trappings of internal sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside<sup>56</sup>.

The dependency approach therefore gives us the scientific tool and capability of analysing the factors at play that have determined Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain. In the final analysis, the approach should enable us to conceive the realities of dependency crisis in Kenya's formulation and conduct of her foreign policy towards Britain.

## 1.6 HYPOTHESES

For the purposes of this study, three hypotheses relevant for the study are generated.


1. Hypothesis One assumes that: Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is determined by her economic dependence on the latter.

2. Hypothesis Two assumes that: Kenya exhibits greater co-operation and compliance towards issues regarded by Britain as salient than on other matters.
3. Hypothesis Three assumes that: Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest.

We take as our working hypothesis that economic dependency variable influences Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance manifested in her relations vis-a-vis Britain. The other two hypotheses are however used to enable us identify other alternative variables which we need to explore in order to clarify the validity of the working hypothesis.

Figure 1.1

Interacting factors that shape Kenya's Foreign Policy Behaviour towards Britain.



Kenya's foreign policy behaviour can therefore be illustrated as indicated in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 assumes that British economic assistance to Kenya leads to her dependency on Britain with respect to economic issues. It is assumed here that British economic assistance to Kenya covers both financial and technical assistance, as well as British foreign investments in Kenya. Trade is also included in this aspect of dependency. The figure assumes that

owing to Kenya's economic dependence on Britain, this dependency influences Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

Figure 1.1 also assumes that dependency variable influences Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain with respect to British interests. Implicit in this assumption is that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is compatible with British interests owing largely to her dependency on the latter.

Figure 1.1 further assumes that since Kenya's national interest is served through her dependency on Britain, her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is thus shaped by this dependency.

The arrows in Figure 1.1 indicate the interaction of the factors that shape Kenya's foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Britain. For example, British economic assistance to Kenya in turn makes her a British economic dependency owing to massive economic benefits from Britain. The result is that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain exhibits co-operation and political compliance. Second, the arrows indicate that economic dependency by Kenya on Britain influences Kenya's foreign policy behaviour on issues of interest to Britain. So economic dependency ensures that British interests are served by Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, which is manifested in co-operation and compliance.

Third, the arrows indicate that since economic dependency serves Kenya's national interest, her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is also influenced and is characterised by co-operation and political compliance.

These explanations can be linked with our working hypothesis which assumes that economic dependency has an impact on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, based on co-operation and political compliance. British economic assistance, British interests and Kenya's national interest are treated as the independent variables. They explain Kenya's foreign policy behaviour.

Economic dependency is the intervening variable, while Kenya's foreign policy behaviour is the dependent variable.

These variables explain the co-operative and compliant nature of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. A correlation between economic factors and dependency is done and related to various co-operative and compliant events. Consequently, Figure 1.1 demonstrates the kind of matrices that is going to guide our explanation of the working hypothesis.

In connection with the research problem, it is necessary to ask the following questions:

1. Is Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain influenced by economic dependency on Britain as hypothesis one assumes?
2. Can Kenya choose to pursue foreign policy goals that are incompatible with British interests against the assumptions of hypothesis two?
3. Is Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain consistent with her national interest as assumed in hypothesis three? Answers to these searching questions require an inter-subjective and analytical examination of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

## 1.7 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

### DEPENDENCY

The concept of dependency refers to the process of domination where the dependent state relies on an outside body. As a British dependant, Kenya derives great benefits from British aid, investments, trade and technical experts. It is out of this dependency that she hopes to improve on or build her economy. Dependency in our case focuses on the many years of imperial or colonial

relationships, between Britain and Kenya. It helps to explain why Kenya has been kept in a condition of economic and by extension political bondage, resulting in a neo-colonial or neo-imperial relationship particularly between her and Britain. Several types of economic transactions between Kenya and Britain namely foreign aid, direct private investment and monetary relations render Kenya asymmetrically dependent on Britain. This is what dependency is about.

## **FOREIGN POLICY**

The concept of foreign policy may be approached by breaking it down into its component parts - foreign and policy. Policy may be described as a guide to an action or a set of actions intended to realize the goals a state has set for itself. Policy, then is rooted in the concept of choice - choosing actions to achieve one's goals. These choices should be reasoned, in the minimal sense that alternative choices are compared to see how well they will achieve the desired goals<sup>59</sup>.

Foreign applies to anything beyond the legal boundary of a state to areas where the state has no legal authority over people or territory. Briefly put, a government's foreign policy is the range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals of which these may or may not have internal cognizance or approval<sup>60</sup>. For action to constitute policy, it must essentially take the form of concrete measures, other than merely verbal statements, carried out by a government with a view to solving a particular problem or achieving a political objective.

## **POLITICAL COMPLIANCE**

This refers to political "submissiveness" or acceptance where one nation, supposedly less developed exhibits compliant and co-operative behaviour towards another which is supposedly more developed. Political compliance



therefore implies that the less developed nation is differentially constrained according to her ability or rank. Political compliance is therefore directly related to the perspective on influence capabilities which depend on the amount of resources a nation has.

In considering the fact that Kenya as a British dependent should be politically compliant, some outward signs of such submissiveness have to be considered. In her relations with Britain, Kenya continuously resorts to amicable and frequent diplomatic discourse, public and private diplomatic support on matters regarding British interests and so on. The essence of this study supposes that Kenya, as a British dependant should display greater compliance when the outcome is more important to Britain.

Regardless of its causes, political compliance or co-operation, as the case may be, might be expected to vary substantially. The questions treated here demand a measure which captures the extent of expected behaviour relative to the unexpected.

## **CO-OPERATION**

Co-operation here refers to a state where one country (in our case Kenya) voluntarily goes out of her way to embrace the policies or preferences of another country (in this case Britain) based on mutual understanding. However, it should be realized that like compliance, co-operation between countries exists on the assumption that certain benefits will be gained from it. In other words, different countries do not co-operate by accident, but by the realization that this will enhance their national interest.

## **ISSUE SALIENCY**

The concept of issue saliency refers to the distinction between foreign policy issues of importance to the dominant country (in our case Britain) and issues it discounts. It therefore seems likely that Britain would attempt to induce Kenya's co-operation and compliance on some issues that it regards as fundamental to the pursuit and attainment of her national interests, but not on others.

Operationally then, issue saliency in this study refers to the greater weight attributed by Britain to issues that will enable her to achieve her vital national interests than on other issues, for example those related to prestige.

## **NATIONAL INTEREST**

For the sake of clarity, we find it necessary to differentiate between the concept "national interest" and that of "national interests".

"National interest" may be taken to mean the overall common good of an entire society. This definition rejects the view that society is just a framework for the interaction - sometimes co-operative, more often competitive - of smaller interest groups, which form the real base of politics<sup>61</sup>. Instead, it sees the entire society as a community that has common standards of political ethics, ties of mutual respect and appreciation binding its members together.

The national interest lies, in part, in that which makes the state better able to fulfill its obligation of protecting and promoting the good of the society. This includes the ability both to protect the society from outside threats and to engage in mutually beneficial co-operation with other societies. The national interest, as it relates to foreign policy, is the end of maintaining the capacity of the state to protect the society, while it continues its search for its shared good<sup>62</sup>.

The term 'national interests', by contrast, means a number of narrower goals, which serve the broader end of the national interest by maintaining or increasing the power of the state<sup>63</sup>. National interests may include rights to military bases on foreign soil, friendly relations with a neighbouring country, or any other goal that protects a state's diplomatic assets, which may take any of a large number of forms. To distinguish them from the overall common good, these particular national interests can be referred to as 'state interests'.

Every state has one overall national interest; it possesses many particular state interests, and it must pick and choose among them. Any one state interest is only part of the national interest. Of these particular interests, not all are of equal importance, and some may be mutually exclusive<sup>64</sup>. Some must receive emphasis and attention at the cost of postponing the pursuit of others and this choice should be made according to the guidance provided by the overall national interest.

## 1.8 METHODOLOGY

For the purpose of this study, two sets of information were required. First was information on Kenya's economic dependency on Britain. Secondly was information on the country's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and political compliance in the conduct of her relations with Britain. These sets of information were obtained both from primary and secondary sources.

The bulk of information was obtained from secondary sources, namely foreign policy documents, speeches of Kenya's leaders that have a bearing on foreign policy and particularly the speeches dealing with Britain directly; official reports on parliamentary debates, as well as statistical information on the country's trade, aid and investments.

Additionally, newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals and books from a number of libraries were used to supplement the above sources. They were particularly useful for providing information relating to actions and statements of Kenya's leaders with regard to foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. The literature obtained from the secondary sources was critically analysed with special attention being paid to aspects related to Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

With respect to primary sources of information, oral interviews were conducted among former and present government officials involved in international relations in Kenya. A questionnaire (see Appendix I) was prepared and used to guide our oral interviews. The reason for having the questionnaire was to ensure that consistency was maintained in terms of soliciting for information related to Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain only. Former ministers in the ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation and Commerce and Industry were interviewed, along with some senior civil servants in these ministries. The oral interviews were an attempt to tap information regarding Kenya's foreign policy behaviour, diplomatic relations and overall economic policy dealing with Britain.

During the oral interviews informal questions were asked to clarify information given. We did not interview officials from other ministries for example Finance, because whatever we would have wanted to find out from them was available in books or written literature. The people from the two ministries interviewed are shown below. The criterion used in selecting the interviewees was based on preliminary field survey. The survey enable us to identify potential and willing informants.

English language was used as the medium of communication during the interviews. Before the interview commenced, the interviewees were given a copy of the questionnaire to enable them ask for clarification if any. They were also told the purpose of the interview.

In data collection, the researcher personally conducted the interviews and documented the information given. No research assistant was used even for collecting secondary data. With the aid of the questionnaire, the researcher asked the interviewees questions, did the listening, asked informal questions for the sake of clarity and made notes while the interviews were on using a note book. Time was adequate for taking the notes. The notes were compared afterwards and analysed.

In data analysis, various table analysis techniques were used in data processing and interpretation. These included figures. Correlational analysis was used to test hypotheses and related different variables to establish their interrelatedness.

## **People Interviewed**

### Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation

1. Dr. Josephat Karanja - Independent Kenya's first High Commissioner to Britain between 1963 and 1966.
2. Dr. Munyua Waiyaki - Former Minister for Foreign Affairs during the late 1970's and early 1980's.
3. A Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (still serving and name with held).

4. An Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (still serving and name with held).
5. An Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (still serving and name with held).

#### Ministry of Commerce and Industry

1. Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, former Minister for Commerce and Industry during the 1960's and 1970's.
2. A Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and industry (still serving and name with held.)
3. An Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and industry (still serving and name with held.)

The problem encountered was that some interviewees who had been approached earlier were not available while others were not willing to divulge the required information. In spite of assurances given to them that their identity would not be disclosed, these officials were reluctant to give information relating to foreign policy behaviour. Some of them even suspected the author of collusion with the security services with the aim of ascertaining their loyalty.

Interestingly, some of those who agreed for an interview even chose to repeat what could be found in books, and even then, they preferred not to have their names disclosed. However, we gathered a little vital pieces of information from them. All in all, the Official Secrets Act which binds civil servants was a major impediment in our effort to obtain vital information for this study.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### THE FOUNDATION OF KENYA'S DEPENDENCY ON BRITAIN: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter examines first the historical ties between Kenya and Britain. It examines the gradual integration of Kenya into the British, and generally the capitalist economic system. In other words, the chapter examines here the origins of Kenya's economic dependence on Britain.

Specifically the Chapter seeks to demonstrate that before independence, Kenya was already a British dependency, at least as far as her economic needs were concerned. Our examination of the historical ties between Kenya and Britain is necessary as it sharpens our understanding not only of Kenya's dependency on Britain, but also of her foreign policy behaviour towards the former colonial power, characterized by co-operation and compliance. This co-operation and compliance, it is our contention, is a function of this dependency, which are historically rooted. Finally, the chapter seeks to critically examine Kenya's behaviour vis-a-vis Britain during the colonial period. This will boost our understanding of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour during the post-colonial period. This is also necessary in order to draw a relevance between Kenya's behaviour during the colonial period and the fundamental assumptions of our hypotheses.

The Chapter is divided into six parts. Part one gives a brief overview of the origin of British colonialism in Kenya, beginning with the European scramble for Africa in the 1880s up to the declaration of British protectorate in Kenya in 1895. Part Two examines the major developments that transpired during the colonial period between 1895 and 1960. This part in particular examines how the British gradually but steadily established themselves in Kenya during this

period as well as the initial African reaction that climaxed in the outbreak of Mau Mau in the early 1950s. Part Three examines the transition period from 1960 to the attainment of independence in 1963. It briefly looks at the major developments that eventually led to independence. Part Four examines the colonially inherited dependence from Britain by Kenya. This part analyses the origins of Kenya's incorporation into the international capitalist system and its attendant effects.

Part Five examines, in line with our hypotheses, the influence that British economic assistance to Kenya had over Kenya's behaviour towards Britain. Our examination in this chapter is however, limited to the observable patterns of Kenya's behaviour only, as opposed to foreign policy behaviour per se. The concept foreign policy is willfully ignored in this chapter because Kenya's colonial status militated against her capacity to play any meaningful role in inter-state as well as international politics. The fact that only state sovereignty (political independence) bestows these privileges on a given nation-state is an issue that is well known. In other words, from a legalistic point of view, only sovereign states have foreign policy. Nevertheless, it will be assumed that economic dependency considerably influenced colonial Kenya's "behaviour" - not "foreign policy behaviour" - either positively or negatively towards Britain.

Our examination of "behaviour" and not "foreign policy behaviour" in this chapter does not run parallel to the objectives of this study. The emphasis here is on "behaviour". If Kenya lacked foreign policy during the colonial period, it is, as we have stated, largely due to legalistic reasons. But if the international law narrowly limited the concept of foreign policy to sovereign states only, the same law did not, fortunately, limit the concept "behaviour" to sovereign states alone. Hence its examination.

We are therefore confident enough to examine Kenya's behaviour towards Britain during the colonial period within the framework of economic dependency. Although the colonial period falls outside the time-frame of our study, its examination is necessary in order to draw a linkage as well as a relevance between "behaviour" during the colonial period and "foreign policy behaviour" during the post-colonial period. The latter period is examined in the succeeding chapters.

We feel inclined to emphasize that during the colonial era, there was no Kenya government - at least, one led by Africans - but the behaviour of the Kenyan Africans, based on their perceived interests was present. It is these same people led by leaders like Kenyatta among others, whose behaviour during the colonial period vis-a-vis Britain was transformed into foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Britain during the post-colonial period.

Lastly, part six is a brief conclusion of what has been analyzed in the whole chapter.

## **2.2. THE COLONIAL PERIOD UPTO 1960**

The name Kenya did not come into official use until 1920 when the former East Africa Protectorate was given this new name. It has been said that modern Kenya was created by the railway. This view, though highly Anglo-centric, contains the truth in that it was with the building of the railway, with British Government funds, that the political delineation of the area which became the Republic of Kenya firmly began<sup>1</sup>.

It was in 1883 that Thompson journeyed from Mombasa to the shores of Lake Victoria, becoming the first European to travel through Maasailand. The trek was the event that first aroused British interest in the area<sup>2</sup>. During the



European partition of Africa in the 1880s, British and German competition led to dividing the East African hinterland into spheres of national interest in 1890<sup>3</sup>, with Britain assuming responsibility for modern Kenya and Uganda and Germany taking what is now Tanzania. In 1895, the area was declared a British Protectorate and administration was taken over by the Foreign Office<sup>4</sup>.

The British Protectorate that was declared in 1895, primarily aimed at securing the route to Uganda<sup>5</sup>. In 1896, the British started building a railway line from Mombasa to Lake Victoria<sup>6</sup>. A striking sign of disaffection was the refusal by Africans to serve as labourers on the railway. Indians were therefore brought in instead<sup>7</sup>. The railway was completed in 1901 and it was about then that whites began arriving, not as administrators, missionaries, or railway engineers, but with the intention of settling and farming. They came from South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada as well as Britain and acquired much of Kenya's fertile highland areas. Thus was sown the seed of great discontent.

In 1902, there was the beginning of a deliberate policy of European settlement in Kenya. Settlement was made feasible by the railway; and settlement, it was hoped, would provide the traffic to make the railway pay for its construction<sup>8</sup>. In the same year 1902, the Eastern province of Uganda, covering the area stretching from Lake Victoria to a few miles west of Nairobi, was transferred to the British Protectorate. This transfer effectively put the entire railway, and the whole of the area considered suitable for European farming, under a single territorial administration. Henceforth the protectorate acquired boundaries not radically different from those of present day Kenya<sup>9</sup>.

The first World War gave opportunity for the settlers to consolidate their unofficial hold on government. They secured elective representation on the war council which co-ordinated civil support for the campaign in German East

Africa. Elections to the Legislative Council followed in 1919, with settlers also on the governor's executive council<sup>10</sup>.

### Politics and Administration in the Inter-War years

Following the return of peace after the First World War, a general reappraisal of the administrative and political problems of Kenya was necessary. The country was emerging from the pioneer stage into a new era in which clearly defined policies would be required and in which from the European point of view, the idea of responsibility for the well being of the African peoples under their charge was being thrust upon the colonial power<sup>11</sup>. This did not imply that thoughts of African self-government were already aboard. In so far as the British Government thought in terms of self-government for her East African dependency, it did so only as a thing of the very remote future, and even then not necessarily as government mainly by Africans<sup>12</sup>.

In 1921, Winston Churchill took over the leadership of the colonial office and stressed his intention that Kenya should develop as a characteristically British colony with responsible self-government as the ultimate goal<sup>13</sup>. But the Devonshire White Paper of 1923 laid it down unequivocally that:

His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the grant of responsible self-government as out of the question within any period of time which need now to be taken into consideration<sup>14</sup>.

This White Paper was the greatest blow to the settlers' hope. The statement added that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, but that there would be no drastic reversal of the conditions under which Europeans and Indians had established themselves in the territory. Nevertheless, another forty years were to pass before the paramountcy of these interests was translated into sovereign reality.

The European political tactics undoubtedly acted as an example to the African population of Kenya. By the end of the First World War, some of the African peoples of Kenya had already begun to show concern over their land, European claims for African labour, conditions of employment and wages<sup>15</sup>.

### Formation of Political Associations

Because of their grievances, many Kenyan peoples began forming associations to redress their grievances. It is important to note that in their early stages, the African associations which grew up between the two world wars were not political parties in the sense that they were striving to gain a place in the country's legislature. They were, more accurately, pressure groups which hoped to bring about a change in the Government's policy from outside<sup>16</sup>. The first real nationalist organization was the Kikuyu Association founded in 1920. Other associations included Kavirondo Tax Payers Association (1923) and Kikuyu Central Association (1925). The latter petitioned the government on a number of grievances, among them, that Africans be allowed to grow coffee<sup>17</sup>.

The association pressed for political, economic and social reforms, particularly the question of land tenure. In 1932, Britain consequently appointed a commission to look into the land question. The Chairman of the commission, Sir, W. Morris Carter, was instructed:

to consider the needs of the native population, present and prospective, with regard to land... and to define the area, generally known as the White Highlands, within which persons of European descent are to have a privileged position<sup>18</sup>.

In 1934, the commission duly reported that 16,700 square miles of White Highlands should be reserved exclusively and permanently for European settlers and the boundaries were gazetted in 1939<sup>19</sup>.

In spite of the strength of the political movements among the Kenyan communities, the colonial Government persisted in regarding most of these movements as being unrepresentative of general feeling and as consisting solely of dissident elements. From the European point of view, this is hardly surprising given their negative attitude towards the Africans, an attitude which nonetheless only encouraged the Kenya Africans to fight for their liberation.

Throughout the inter-war years, therefore, political development among the Africans of Kenya was forced into channels of permanent opposition to established authority, whether that authority was the European Government or the Chiefs who appeared to the whole society as the tools of the European Government<sup>20</sup>. The African grievances ranging from land alienation, forced labour and repressive laws to a host of other grievances combined together to bring about this opposition. In 1939, the whole world including Kenya found itself confronted with yet another world war<sup>21</sup>.

After the Second World War, the settler farmers finally attained prosperity and white confidence revived in keeping with the grandiose schemes for the colony's role in the post-war reconstruction of Britain. As white farmers prospered, black peasants were subjected to increasing government controls<sup>22</sup>.

If the Colonial Government was primarily concerned with economic reconstruction in the immediate post-war years, the African population, or at least the western educated sections of it, was more interested in politics and constitutional advances. It was moreover, in these latter fields that the most startling developments took place. First in 1944, Mr. Eliud Mathu became the first African to be nominated to the Legislative Council<sup>23</sup>.

Then in 1946, Kenya African Union (K.A.U.) was formed in Nairobi with James Gichuru as its leader. In 1947, a year after his return to Kenya from studies in Britain, Jomo Kenyatta became president of K.A.U. which was calling for meaningful African representation on the Country's Legislative Council<sup>24</sup>. Increasing political activity on the part of Africans in Kenya suggested that the time had come for elected African representatives to play their part in the Legislative Council. The Europeans, however, were anxious that any increase in the African membership of the council should not affect their own numerical superiority while the Indians were also concerned about their position in the light of the emergence of African political influence. Whatever the case, Britain had acknowledged the need for greater African representation in administrative bodies and by 1952, there were eight nominated African members to the Legislative Council<sup>25</sup>.

The land issue and the emergent desire for self-rule were, in spite of the above gestures, steadily assuming a dimension of their own when Kenya awoke with a shock to the presence of Mau Mau. Although Mau Mau was mostly confined to the Kikuyu, it can be argued that later on it was translated into a national freedom movement<sup>26</sup>. Attacks took place against European farms and against Africans believed to be disloyal to the nationalists. Consequently Britain declared a state of emergency in Kenya on 20, October, 1952<sup>27</sup>.

Despite serious attempts by the British troops to crush Mau Mau uprising once and for all, the violence that accompanied it made the British think otherwise. Perhaps more than any single event, it is to the credit of Mau Mau that the British embarked on gradual reforms to hand over independence to Kenyans in 1963.

### 2.3 THE TRANSITION PERIOD: 1960-1963

The 1960s may aptly be described in our opinion as a period when the international attitude toward colonialism was changing. Nationalists from a variety of dependent nations were forcing Europeans to rethink their old commercial, moralistic and christianising attitudes. Already countries in West Africa were beginning to achieve full independence. What choice did the British have in Kenya? The only one was to arrange and transfer power to Africans.

Following the official ending of the seven-year old emergency on January 12, 1960, the first main development was the first Lancaster House Conference on Kenya's independence which took place from January to March 1960<sup>28</sup>. The Conference followed quickly on the British government's change of policy. Assurances by the British government to Europeans ceased to be uttered. The settlement of Europeans stopped. The colonial government set about preparing as best as it could for independence, knowing that it would have less time than it needed.

The Second Lancaster House Conference opened in London in February 1962. From the onset, Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) and Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.), the main political parties, failed to agree. After five weeks of discussion in which no progress was made, the new Secretary of State, Reginald Maudling, attempted to formulate a compromise solution, including the proposal that there should be a strong central government in Kenya, together with six regional governments, each possessing extensive local powers<sup>29</sup>. The proposal was accepted.

In May 1963, there was a general election which K.A.N.U. won decisively. Jomo Kenyatta became the Prime Minister in June 1963, when internal self government was achieved. Kenya achieved full political independence on 12th

December, 1963 and became a republic one year later on 12th December, 1964. With independence, Kenya took over control of its foreign affairs.

## 2.4 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEPENDENCY

Prior to Kenya's independence in December 1963, a significant determinant of the nature of its economy and of the policies of its government was the existence of wealthy and relatively large non-African communities particularly the Europeans. British colonialism in Kenya was in certain respects, an extension and acceleration of pre-colonial commercial penetration<sup>30</sup>. But the construction of the Uganda railway, while giving a much firmer basis to such penetration, also provided impetus to British efforts to widen the area's agricultural base, to pay for the railway. This led to Kenya's incorporation into the colonial relationship, with the periphery providing raw material exports for metropolitan manufactured imports<sup>31</sup>.

The pattern of pre-colonial commercial penetration and the means by which the railway was built, both resulted into a considerable Kenyan role for a different group of expatriate merchants - other than the whites -, the British Indians. They acquired some economic if not political influence within the emerging periphery economy. These specific aspects of Kenyan incorporation deserve emphasis. On the one hand, the need for a viable standard of living for European settlers led to special efforts being adopted to structure the local economy in its favour and against the interests of indigenous Africans; alienation of African land was only one element in these efforts. On the other hand, the presence of Asian community was a potential threat to metropolitan commercial firms. This too necessitated the special structuring of the political economy, to stem off the threat.

The result, in Leys' phrase was that Kenya came to represent "monopoly on stilts."<sup>32</sup> Racialist rules and regulations were effected to ensure highly differentiated access to resources and opportunities among Europeans, Asians and Africans. This inevitably gave the state a central role - Kenya became an administered political economy. This was a crucial step in making Kenya dependent on Britain. There is no data on the racial distribution of money income, but it is clear that, despite the overwhelming numerical preponderance of Africans, non-Africans (particularly British citizens), received a high proportion of the total of money income. Eighty percent of the value of the marketed produce of agriculture came from the European-owned farms and estates, 55% of the total wage bill accrued to non-Africans, though they amounted to only 10% of the labour force. Profits from manufacturing and trade were received almost entirely by non-Africans and mostly by the whites or their companies<sup>33</sup>.

### Manufacturing

The part played by Africans in the economy except as wage earners in manufacturing, construction, and trade was of little importance. Of course, the smallest enterprises escape the statistical net (surveys of manufacturing, for instance, were confined to firms with five or more employees) and so understate the role of African business activity. But African initiative in any but the smallest manufacturing, construction, and trading activities remained negligible until the end of the colonial period<sup>34</sup>. Table 2.1 attests to this observation.



**TABLE 2.1: MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS IN KENYA 1957<sup>a</sup>**

	British Establi- shments	Non British Establi- shments	Number employed (thousand s)	Gross product (million)	Net Output (million)
Foodstuffs	150	11	9.8	17.0	2.7
Beverages	39	5	3.0	5.2	3.1
Tobacco	1	0	1.1	6.4	n/a
Clothing & Textiles	70	7	1.4	1.4	.4
Jute, Sisal and Coin products	3	0	1.5	.7	.3
Shoes including repairs	40	7	.9	.9	.3
Sawn timber	69	6	8.2	1.6	.6
Furniture, joinery e.t.c.	133	7	2.2	1.2	.5
Printing and publishing	55	5	2.1	2.2	1.3
Chemicals and soap	48	2	3.5	4.8	1.9
Clay and concrete products	15	5	1.9	.7	.3
Cement & other Mineral products	19	0	1.6	2.8	1.3
Metal products	62	9	2.4	2.8	.7
Machinery including repairs	32	10	1.5	1.1	.4
Ship building & rolling stock repairs	9	0	6.5	2.6	1.2
Motor repairs and motor bodies	162	10	4.7	3.4	1.4
All other manufacturing	<u>41</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>.7</u>
Total manufacturing	948	90	53.8	56.6	17.1

a: - includes repair shops, refers to all firms employing five or more persons.

SOURCE: Kenya Survey of Industrial Production, 1957, East African Statistical Department (Nairobi: 1957), p. 110.

Table 2.1 shows that in 1957 and generally before independence, manufacturing establishments in Kenya were dominated by the British. As indicated in the Table, there were 947 British manufacturing establishments in Kenya by 1957. The number of non British establishments by that year were only 91. This also applies to investments which were partly undertaken by 'local' businessmen particularly those of Asian origin but mostly dominated by British firms. From Table 2.1, a conclusion can be reached that before independence, Kenya was brought under the British capitalist system and hence incorporated into the western capitalist system during the colonial period. This situation with respect to manufacturing and investments has continued to date since independence. We believe this will continue in the foreseeable future because nothing suggests that Kenya will discourage British investments in the country soon.

### Financial Assistance

With respect to financial assistance for industrial development of the colonial Kenya, finance for industrial development was provided by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which was established by the Industrial Development Ordinance of 1954 "to facilitate the industrial and economic development of the colony by the initiation, assistance or expansion of industrial, commercial or other undertakings or enterprises in the colony or elsewhere"<sup>35</sup>. The corporation was financed by British Government loans. Up to June 30, 1960, it had received £466,000 from the British Government, and losses of £65,000 had accumulated to that date. In the last two financial years, of 1960/61 and 1961/62, the IDC had a further £79,000 of loan money from the Government<sup>46</sup>. From this information, it can be further argued that before

independence, Kenya heavily depended on loan from the British Government in fostering her industrial development, with the resultant effect that dependence on British financial assistance, has remained much of a reality today.

Between 1957 and 1963, taxes provided the Kenya Government with less than two-thirds of its annual revenue. The remainder came from development revenues, principal loans and external grants, emergency receipts from the United Kingdom, payments on loans and income from property and the provision of goods and services<sup>37</sup>.

Until 1960, when political uncertainty began to have a major effect on economic activity, loans raised in Nairobi, where a market for East African Securities had developed, were an important source of development revenues. In the three years 1957/58 to 1959/60, nearly £8 million or more than one-third of development revenue was obtained in this way<sup>38</sup>. Kenya was also able to borrow on the London market. and in 1961, loans raised there still accounted for nearly one-half of the public debt. as indicated in Table 2.2 below.

**TABLE 2.2** Composition of Kenya Public Debt (as of June 30, 1961)

(£ Million)	
Loans raised in London market	32.5
United Kingdom Exchequer	
Emergency and CDC loans	16.2
Other United Kingdom loans	1.7
IBRD loans	<u>0.4</u>
Total External debt	50.8
Loans raised on East African Market	16.8
Other East African loans	<u>1.5</u>
Total loans raised in East Africa	<u>18.3</u>
Grand Total	69.1

SOURCE: Economic and Statistic Division, Kenya Treasury (Nairobi: 1962), p. 89.

Note: Sinking funds at current prices amounted to £4.8 million.

CDC = Commonwealth Development Corporation.

IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

From Table 2.2, we learn further that as of June 30, 1961, external loan funds were being obtained almost entirely from government and international bodies. The principal source of loan finance (other than loans raised in London Market) was the Exchequer loans provided by the Government of the United Kingdom. The Table also indicates that the Commonwealth Development Corporation was also a frequent lender. Significant for this study is a report published for IBRD which notes that:

In the last few years, as local resources have declined, the Kenya Government has come to rely increasingly on grants and loans from the United Kingdom Government to finance its development expenditure. But the full extent of financial dependence on the United Kingdom Government in the last few years has been much greater. It included the cost of Kenya's full-time military forces, overseas aid scheme contributions to the emoluments of civil servants, flood and famine relief and grants-in-aid to cover deficits in the recurrent budget. In 1960/61 and 1961/62, United Kingdom aid to Kenya, other than for development purposes, amounted to 6.2 million and 6.6 million respectively<sup>39</sup>.

From the above quotation, we reach the conclusion that before independence, Kenya's dependence on British loans and aid was very strong. By 1988, this dependence was very real with no indication that it would altogether cease in the coming years. Additionally the above report added that since the early years of emergency, Kenya's recurrent budget was being assisted by the Government of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom covered, by grant-in-aid, deficits in the recurrent budget of £2.8 million in 1960/61, and an estimated £3.4 million (of which 1.4 million went for famine and flood relief) in 1961/62. In addition, the United Kingdom was meeting the cost of Kenya's regular military

forces, the Kenyan African Rifles (KAR), estimated at £1.9 million a year, and payments for overseas civil servants (working in Kenya) in excess of local salaries, which amounted to £1.5 million net a year<sup>40</sup>.

It is important to note that after independence, there was no immediate major external financial help to Kenya's current budget, other than that from the United Kingdom under the Overseas Aid Scheme<sup>41</sup>. Interestingly even after Kenya started getting financial assistance from other donors particularly from the Western nations, aid dependency on Britain, at least by comparison remained strong, and has always been so.

### **External Economic Relations**

On external economic relations, the external trade between Kenya and Britain played a significant role in the economy of Kenya before independence. However between 1950 and 1960, the pattern of commodity trade in Kenya's external economic relations was accompanied by some marked shifts in markets for exports and sources of imports (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 below). The Tables indicate that there was a striking fall in the proportion of trade between Kenya and British Commonwealth countries, particularly the United Kingdom. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that as evidenced in the two Tables, these countries remained Kenya's major trading partners, especially the United Kingdom.

**TABLES 2.3: Imports by Country of origin, 1950 - 1960**

		1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960
		£ Million					
Direct imports	<u>a</u>	-	-	-	84.6	77.0	90.0
Net imports	<u>a</u>	34.1	59.3	60.3	69.8	60.9	70.1
Unallocated, Parcel post, etc	<u>a</u>	2.2	5.2	6.0	4.7	3.9	-
Total	<u>a</u>	34.1	57.1	55.7	78.7	72.3	86.1
Percentage of total value							
Country or Area:							
United Kingdom		58	48	49	45	38	36
India		8	6	7	6	6	4
Other Sterling Area		<u>13</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>
Total Sterling Area		77	69	70	56	57	51
West Germany		1	3	6	6	7	
Italy		2	2	4	3	3	3
Other E.E.C.		<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
Total E.E.C.		7	13	19	16	17	18
EFTA (excluding U.K.)		2	2	3	3	3	-
U.S.A.		5	7	3	4	4	6
Canada		<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	-	-	<u>1</u>	-
Total Dollar Area		6	7	3	4	4	6
Japan		1	3	1	3	6	10
Iran		5	-	-	6	9	8
Other Countries		<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade Reports. (Nairobi: Government Printers, 1961), p. 74.

a: The aggregate for imports used here varies as the classification by countries in the Annual Trade Reports has changed. "Direct imports" equal all goods entering the country (including those subsequently re-exported). "Net imports" equal direct imports minus transfer of goods to Tanganyika and Uganda. Parcel post has been subtracted for 1952 and subsequent years since they are not allocated by country of origin.

**TABLES 2.4: Destination of Kenyan Domestic Exports to shown Countries, 1950 - 1960**

	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960
Total value (£ Million)	17.2	25.8	20.3	29.0	29.3	35.2
Percentage of total value						
Country or Area:						
United Kingdom	35	30	31	25	29	25
India	5	6	8	6	3	4
South Africa	5	4	4	4	4	4
Other Sterling Area	10	8	10	7	8	10
Total Sterling Area	55	48	53	42	44	43
West Germany	10	15	16	19	21	18
Italy	1	3	2	3	2	4
Netherlands	5	6	3	5	4	3
Other E.E.C.	2	4	3	2	3	3
Total E.E.C.	17	28	24	29	30	28
EFTA (excluding U.K.)	1	2	3	2	2	3
U.S.A.	13	10	8	16	11	11
Other Dollar Area	4	3	3	4	2	2
Total Dollar Area	17	13	11	20	13	13
Japan	1	1	1	3	5	4
Other (includes - Ships' Stores)	9	8	7	4	6	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade Reports (Nairobi: Government Printers, 1961), p. 75.



From the above Tables (2.3 and 2.4) it is evident that there was a great magnitude of the movements of goods in and out of Kenya from and to Britain. The Tables reflect the dependence of the Kenyan economy on foreign sources of supply particularly from Britain for many types of capital and consumer goods. In 1950 for example, Britain took 35 percent of Kenya's exports out of the 55 percent of such exports that were taken by Sterling area countries. Although this had declined to 24 percent (for Britain) in 1961, Britain still remained the largest market for Kenyan exports. The information provided by the two Tables leads this study to conclude that before independence, Kenya's dependence on Britain for trade was a functional reality. As has been demonstrated earlier, this dependency was also manifest with respect to manufacturing (investments) and aid.

### **African Bourgeoisie**

Leys has outlined the means by which colonial policy was re-oriented in the fifties to shape different social relations among Africans - allowing the quick emergence of a commercial petty bourgeoisie, underwriting the emergence of African cash crop producers, and changing the urban low-wage labour policy of the past<sup>42</sup>. Likewise, Wasserman has argued and rightly so in our opinion, that "independence bargain" was organized around settler land transfer<sup>43</sup>. The result was that power passed into the hands of the petty-bourgeois leadership, supported by the small-scale peasants as well as the better-paid urban workers, to the exclusion of the landless and poor people who nevertheless, formed the major potent of Mau Mau base.

These processes of change resulted into certain structural economic changes but with much institutional continuity after independence. The centre of continuity was the use of the powerful regulative role of the state, which was a legacy from Kenya's original pattern of international incorporation, initiated and

maintained by Britain. The petty bourgeois nationalist leadership was chiefly after removing the colonial barriers that threatened its rise within the structure of monopolistic regulation (as practiced by the Europeans) - as opposed to changing that structure all together. The control of the powerful state apparatus to guarantee that rise has been evident in Kenya since 1963: the state, it is the argument of this study, has been used as an instrument to Africanise and to retain the previous dependency relationship, and not to change that relationship. The consequence is that dependence on Britain and generally the Western countries has been closely and consciously guarded by the post colonial Kenya Governments. The administered system of colonial Kenya has been perpetuated then.

Despite a few changes in Kenya's economic structure after independence, Langdon observes that:

.... the institutional continuity.. meant that much of that state-oriented hierarchy endured. Dependency has shaped that hierarchy; it had influenced the dynamics of nationalist reaction; and it led to the deliberate decolonization strategy which helped the hierarchy endure<sup>44</sup>.

From the above quotation, it becomes much easier to comprehend the origin of Kenya's dependency on Britain. Throughout the colonial period, the British Government through the White Settlers, therefore, effectively incorporated Kenya into the capitalist type of economy. It is the contention of this study that Kenya has not been able to do away with this "inherited dependency" which as we argue in the next chapters, has greatly influenced her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

## **2.5 KENYA'S INTERACTION WITH BRITAIN DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD:**

As pointed out in the introductory remarks of this chapter, it is necessary to highlight what Kenya's internal behaviour (not foreign policy behaviour) towards Britain or what its interaction with the latter entailed during the colonial period. This is done against the fundamental assumptions of our hypotheses, with a view to finding out whether or not there was similarity or dissimilarity in behaviour, during the colonial and the post-colonial period, particularly between 1963 to 1988. This in our view, is necessary owing to the fact that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the post-colonial era is largely shaped by her economic dependency on Britain. Since this economic dependency is a function of the colonial ties between Kenya and Britain, it is necessary to try to bring into focus Kenya's internal behaviour vis-a-vis Britain prior to independence

The picture that shall emerge clearly from the subsequent analysis is that on many occasions, Kenya's internal behaviour towards Britain during the colonial period was rooted, not in co-operation and compliance, but as shall be demonstrated, in non-co-operation and non-compliance. The conflictual if not non-compliant attitude that the Kenyan people exhibited towards Britain is not beyond comprehension. While it is true that economic dependency was as real during the colonial period as it was in the post-colonial period, it is not true however, that indigenous Kenyans benefited from this dependency during the colonial administration. The serious absence (or little of it) of any meaningful direct economic benefits to indigenous Kenyans, coupled with the paternalistic colonialism imposed on Kenya by Britain ensured a period of stormy confrontation between the two nations.<sup>45</sup>

The acquisition by the white settlers of much of Kenya's fertile land with the blessings of the British government, the system of forced labour by Africans, the appalling conditions of African employment and wages in Kenya, and generally the blatant refusal by the British government to undertake any tangible economic reconstruction beneficial to indigenous Kenyans, negated the pursuit of co-operation and compliance with British interests. The economic activities undertaken in colonial Kenya by the British were mostly beneficial to the whites while Africans were victims of economic guagmire<sup>46</sup>. The Kenya - Africans' economic position was characterised by poverty, starvation and squalor. These factors made co-operation and compliance with Britain at best irrelevant, at worst irritating.

The point being emphasized here is that if Kenya's economic dependence on Britain after independence has had some positive effect as we demonstrate in Chapter Three of this study, there was almost no benefit at all to local Kenyans during the colonial period.

Another major issue which militated against co-operation and compliance by Kenyans during the colonial period was Britain's refusal to grant independence to Kenya. It was believed that political independence would translate itself into economic well-being of Africans<sup>47</sup>.

However, there were isolated cases of compliance by Kenyans with the position taken by Britain during the colonial period. Perhaps the best example was the decision by Kenyan leaders to participate in the Lancaster independence programme drawn by the British colonial office which they accepted<sup>48</sup>. The programme entailed the provision for a strong central government and regional governments with autonomous local powers. This followed the release of Kenyatta and the legalisation of political parties in Kenya.

Nevertheless, beneath this compliance was a willingness by Britain to grant independence to Kenyans. Therefore compliance here was in the interest of Kenyans.

From the foregoing evidence, it is the argument of this study that Kenya's internal behaviour towards Britain depended on whether or not her core national interest was being served. To the extent that this was accomplished, Kenya was ready to co-operate and comply with British interests.

During the colonial period, the overriding national interest was political emancipation of the peoples of Kenya (as well as an improvement in their economic well being). As long as this was not forthcoming, there was no co-operation and compliance with the colonisers. But when it was evident that independence programme was in place, the internal behaviour displayed by the Kenyan leaders, not surprisingly changed and they became more co-operative and compliant with the arrangements of the British colonial office.

During the post-colonial period, particularly during the time frame covered by this study - 1963 - 1988, it appears that Kenya's overriding national interest was the achievement of meaningful economic development. As is shown in the succeeding chapters, she was co-operative and compliant as long as British economic assistance geared towards this end was forthcoming. This foreign policy behaviour was quite consistent with issues of interest to Britain.

We wish to point out here that on the basis of the available empirical data which have been highlighted above, it appears that Kenya's internal behaviour towards Britain during the colonial period does not run counter to the assumption of our hypotheses.

Hypothesis one assumes that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is directly influenced by British economic assistance to her. Put differently, the hypothesis assumes that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour exhibited through co-operation and compliance would be absent if there is no economic assistance or benefits. This tallies with our argument that during the colonial period, indigenous Kenya did not benefit from British economic assistance which was calculated to benefit the white population only. This, coupled with the quest for political independence, meant that Kenya's national interest was not served at the same time. Consequently, Kenya's internal behaviour towards Britain during this period was one of non-co-operation and non-compliance. A good example was the refusal by local Kenyans to provide cheap labour for building the railway. In other words, it may be assumed that if Kenya's national interest was served, co-operation and compliance would have been exhibited.

Hypothesis Two assumes that because Kenya's dependency on Britain is beneficial to her, Kenya's behaviour vis-a-vis Britain will not jeopardise British interests particularly salient issues. The hypothesis implicitly assumes that Kenya's behaviour might run counter to British interests if her economic dependency on the latter turns out to be non-beneficial. Indeed it has been highlighted that the Kenya Colony did not meaningfully benefit from her dependency on Britain. Therefore her internal behaviour vis-a-vis Britain during the colonial period proved to be in collision with issues of salience to Britain.

Hypothesis Three assumes that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest. In line with hypothesis Three, Kenya's internal behaviour during the colonial period can defensively be portrayed as being consistent with her national interest. Since the core national interest during this period was political freedom and economic well being, Kenyans chose confrontation as opposed to co-operation and compliance as a

way of attaining these interests. In our opinion, they were largely successful with respect to political freedom.

A closer analysis therefore reveals that Kenya's internal, not foreign policy behaviour during the colonial period does not contradict the hypothesis of this study. And if there is any discrepancy, it is probably because first, the time-frame of this study (1963-1988) falls outside the colonial period and second, circumstances during the two periods were radically different from each other.

## 2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has suggested that the analytical thrust of the inherited dependency by Kenya from Britain focuses on two factors. First, is the impact in the periphery economy of the original institutional historical pattern of its incorporation into the international exchange system. Second is the impact of metropolis-periphery linkages in shaping foreign relations between the two countries. The consequences of both effects is not only economic polarization and segmentation of Kenya (the periphery) but also the tendency to exhibit co-operative and compliant behaviour in her political relations with Britain. The chapter has also suggested that as the state's power to manipulate the inherited economic and even political system rests on Kenya's external relations with Britain and generally the international capitalistic economy (in view of the inputs the latter supplies as well as the markets it provides), the emerging African bourgeoisie in Kenya has, at least for political expediency, maintained Kenya's dependency relatively intact.

Finally, it has been demonstrated in the last section of the Chapter that colonial Kenya's internal behaviour towards Britain, even though stormy and confrontational does not render our hypotheses irrelevant. If anything Kenya's internal behaviour vis-a-vis Britain during this period was quite consistent with

the desired interests of her people, and that far from political factors, the prevailing economic realities in colonial Kenya was a major determinant of her behaviour towards Britain.

In the next chapters, particularly chapters Four and Five, the role of this dependency in the ongoing functioning of the Kenyan foreign policy behaviour is investigated. Meanwhile chapter Three examines aspects of Kenyan economic dependency on Britain in the post colonial period up to 1988.



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# CHAPTER THREE

## KENYA-BRITISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS: DEPENDENCY IN PERSPECTIVE

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Kenya, like many other former colonies inherited an economy that was largely underdeveloped at the time of her independence. The economy was and still is dependent on primary exports and had an underdeveloped industrial sector and other associated structural features. Financial and technological dependency was much a reality at independence as it is today. Our analysis in this chapter focuses on Kenya's economic dependency on Britain.

The chapter examines Hypothesis Three which assumes that Kenya's economic dependency on Britain is consistent with Kenya's national economic interest. Specifically, the chapter seeks to highlight with available data, Kenya's economic dependence on Britain.

It will also be demonstrated in the chapter that although Kenya's economic dependency has been relatively diversified with the medium powers like Germany and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Commonwealth Development Corporation, this dependency is still greatest with respect to Britain, at least, at the bilateral level. By critically analysing Kenya's economic dependency on Britain, we shall then be in a better position to relate this to her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. This assumption largely rests on the premise that the separation of foreign policy from economics only makes sense, if one could define separate spheres of activity in such a way that they were, in fact, largely uninfluenced by each other<sup>1</sup>. But this is not possible. Some people may think that foreign policy is largely confined to the Machinery of the "political system". However, the

separation of foreign policy behaviour from that of economics (or social change) of all kinds, is in our opinion, as absurd as the restriction of the meaning of politics to its machinery. The "political system" does not stand actually on its own; it is flanked by an economic system as well as a social one<sup>2</sup>.

In this chapter therefore, we intend to demonstrate or show that the independent Kenyan economy exhibits attributes of dependency on Britain. This is different from what we have demonstrated in Chapter Two which dealt with economic dependency on Britain during the pre-independent period. The effects of this on her foreign policy behaviour towards the latter will as stated earlier, be analyzed in the succeeding chapters.

This chapter does not however analyse the relevance of Hypotheses One and Two for the simple reason that the two hypotheses deal directly with foreign policy, which is not the subject of this chapter. The main concern of this chapter is the examination of various forms of British economic assistance to Kenya. These forms of massive British assistance have ultimately turned Kenya into a British dependency. The Chapter therefore tries to examine whether this assistance serves Kenya's national interest. Components of trade, investments, financial and technical forms of assistance that are at the centre of Kenya-British economic relations are used as explanations to test the validity of Hypothesis Three.

The chapter is divided into Seven parts. Part one is the introduction. Part Two discusses the pattern of trade between Kenya and Britain with the resultant asymmetrical dependence of the former on the latter. The Third part examines British investments in Kenya and how this has positively affected the Kenyan economy. Part Four deals with British aid programme to Kenya, particularly what the programme entails. Part Five gives a breakdown of British financial

assistance to Kenya followed by part Six which examines British technical assistance to Kenya. Part Seven is the brief conclusion of the chapter.

### 3.2 KENYA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

Since independence, the main outlet for Kenya's exports outside East Africa has consistently been Europe. Within Europe itself, United Kingdom is the major trading partner<sup>3</sup>. This is not to say that Britain's share of Kenya's imports and exports has not declined over the years. But when compared with other industrialized powers, the United Kingdom's share remains substantial<sup>4</sup>. Table 3.1 below tends to support this observation.

**Table 3.1: Kenya's Trade with Selected Middle Powers (\$ Million) 1963 - 1967**

Country	Exports				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
France	2.7	2.8	2.2	2.1	1.6
Canada	4.6	5.2	5.2	5.7	5.8
Japan	4.7	4.6	4.8	5.0	3.4
Italy	5.3	3.4	3.4	4.6	4.1
W.	21.1	20.4	20.7	22.8	13.8
Germany					
U.K.	33.7	31.6	31.0	37.8	41.4
Imports					
France	8.3	5.7	7.0	10.0	10.8
Canada	0.7	0.6	1.5	1.5	2.1
Japan	34.4	19.9	25.4	7.6	16.4
Italy	9.5	5.2	5.9	10.1	10.9
W.	17.01	7.6	17.2	22.6	29.6
Germany					
U.K.	84.7	65.9	70.4	105.7	98.0

Sources: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, (Nairobi: Statistics Division, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1969), pp. 4 and 60.

What is remarkable in Table 3.1 is that throughout most of the 1960s, the United Kingdom consistently remained the biggest buyer of Kenyan goods outside Africa, or among the middle Western powers. It also sold more to Kenya than any of the other powers. Table 3.1 indicates that between 1963 and 1967, Kenya's total exports to and imports from the United Kingdom amounted to United States dollars 175.5 million and 424.7 million respectively. During the same period, West Germany which was second to Britain, received Kenyan exports worth only \$98.8 million while Kenya imported from her goods worth only \$106 million. Probably, historical ties may explain why Britain remained the biggest buyer and seller during this period.

Another important thing to note from the Table is that although the United Kingdom buys more from Kenya than any of the other powers, there exists trade imbalance between her and Kenya. For example during the period under review, the value of Kenyan imports from Britain was more than twice the value of her exports to that country. From the Table therefore, we can deduce first, that during the 1960's, Kenya was more dependent on British goods and not vice-versa and second, that the bulk of Kenyan trade during this period was carried with Britain, a situation that portrayed her as a "British trade dependency". However, the benefits that accrued from this Kenya-British trade greatly served Kenya's national economic interest, particularly foreign exchange from her exports to Britain.

Between 1970 and 1974, the major changes in the pattern of Kenya's import trade were the decline in the share of imports from the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) Countries by a further 5 points to 41 percent of the total value of all imports<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless as shown in Table 3.2 below, the U.K. was still the main source of imports though its share of imports dropped a further 6 percentage points to 17.4 percent in 1974. Japan was the second largest supplier with a share of 11.0 percent in total value of imports in 1974. The

information contained in Table 3.2 leads us to conclude that during the first half of the 1970s, Kenya's import needs were dominated by Britain.

**Table 3.2: Origin of Imports from Selected Countries, 1970-1974**

Country/Region	Value K£ '000				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
U.K.	41,197	56,249	50,560	50,742	63,949
W. Germany	11,197	16,104	16,867	20,312	36,193
Italy	6,185	6,951	7,846	8,165	12,396
France	5,138	6,771	7,122	6,5835	12,705
Netherlands	4,100	5,177	4,870	7,870	14,372
U.S.A.	11,906	16,321	11,954	16,762	20,788
Japan	15,196	19,330	17,870	25,998	40,438
	Percentage Shares				
U.K.	26.2	28.1	26.5	23.3	17.4
W. Germany	7.1	8.0	8.8	9.3	9.9
Italy	3.9	3.5	4.1	3.7	3.4
France	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.0	3.5
Netherlands	2.6	2.6	2.5	3.6	3.9
U.S.A.	7.5	8.2	6.2	7.7	5.7
Japan	9.6	9.7	9.4	11.9	11.0

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey. (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975), p. 81.

Table 3.3 below gives the details on the direction of Kenya's exports by country of destination during the same period, 1970-1974. As can be inferred from the Table, exports to the U.K. fell both in value from nearly K£18.7 million in 1974, and as a proportion of total exports; from 15.9 percent of the total value of exports in 1972, to 8.6 percent in 1974<sup>6</sup>. But despite this drop, the U.K. was still the major destination of Kenyan exports among the seven leading Western trading partners. By importing more Kenyan goods, Britain was undoubtedly an important source of Kenya's much needed foreign exchange. This was in the national interest of Kenya's economic needs. After the attainment of political



independence, Kenya's foremost national interest was not military growth, but to try to attain economic prosperity.

**Table 3.3: Destination of Exports\* to Selected Countries, 1970-1974**

Country/Region	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
E.E.C.					
U.K.	15,585	15,471	20,392	20,622	18,702
W. Germany	6,825	7,047	9,480	13,571	17,874
Italy	1,557	1,543	2,909	3,687	4,440
France	558	537	724	1,460	1,863
Netherlands	3,799	3,435	6,989	8,096	11,445
U.S.A.	6,772	5,625	5,491	7,532	8,029
Japan	1,231	2,648	2,093	5,031	5,364
	Percentage Shares				
U.K.	14.3	13.8	15.9	12.3	8.6
W. Germany	6.3	6.3	7.4	8.1	8.2
Italy	1.4	1.4	2.3	2.2	2.0
France	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.9
Netherlands	3.5	3.1	5.4	4.8	5.2
U.S.A.	6.2	5.0	4.3	4.5	3.7
Japan	1.1	2.4	1.6	3.0	2.5

\*Excluding gold and currency but including re-exports.

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey, (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975), p. 82.

When we further compare Table 3.2 with Table 3.3 the information we get is that Kenya imported more from Britain in terms of value than what she exported

to the latter between 1970 and 1974. This may partly be explained by the fact that most of Kenya's exports are agricultural products with low prices while the imports from Britain are mostly manufactured goods fetching high prices. Secondly economists generally agree that in a case where country A exports less and imports more from country B in terms of value, country B will have more benefits than country A. If we take country A to be Kenya and country B to be Britain, Kenya has to spend a lot of her foreign exchange to get what she wants. This leads to trade imbalance between the two countries, leaving Kenya the lesser developed country between the two and Britain the more developed. But it should be realised that this trade imbalance is only a disadvantage to Kenya in relative, not absolute terms. The imbalance, while a source of worry to Kenyan economists, does not render the benefits that accrue from this trade to Kenya irrelevant. Again, such benefits should be seen in relative terms. At another level, the information we get from Table 3.3 to the effect that most of Kenya's exports outside Africa are directed to Britain, arguably makes Kenya an export dependent of Britain more than any of the major Western countries.

When all these factors are considered, they lend quantitative support to the premise that Kenya is Subjected to asymmetrical trade vulnerability in her trade with Britain. This means that she exhibits greater trade dependence on Britain, due to historical ties among other reasons, a factor which, in our view, only helps to perpetuate the overall dependency. It is interesting to note that from 1963 when Kenya attained independence up to 1988, the only exceptional years when the United Kingdom was not the leading destination of Kenyan goods were 1979 and 1981. This is demonstrated by the available data (see Table 3.4). During the two years, West Germany overtook the U.K. A possible reason for this may be that during the two years, West Germany was able to open up her market for more Kenyan goods.

With respect to Kenya imports, it should be born in mind that there has not been any change. The U.K. has all along remained the main source of Kenyan

imports from among the Western developed countries. Between 1984 and 1988, there was a steady increase in the importation of British goods into Kenya, as is indicated on Table 3.4 and although exports to Britain were not consistently increasing as indicated in Table 3.5, they were nevertheless quite substantial, if only in comparative terms. What is significant about the two tables (Tables 3.4 and 3.5) is that the U.K. dominates the center of Kenya's external trade. It is the significance of the British market for Kenyan goods as well as the significance of Britain as a source of Kenya's required products that ultimately sustains the argument that as far as external trade is concerned, Kenya is a British dependency. This significance is consistently noted (perhaps with very few exceptions) between 1963 and 1988.

The bilateral trade between the two nations was worth over shs. 10 billion or £350 million sterling in 1984<sup>7</sup>, making Britain Kenya's major customer. By 1988, Britain was selling more to Kenya and buying more from Kenya than any other country. And the trade was expanding and diversifying all the time. Kenyan agricultural products were growing in popularity with British families<sup>8</sup>, and regular and frequent air links ensured that Kenya's tea, coffee, flowers, fruits and vegetables among other products were delivered to the U.K. in time. Trade between the two countries was therefore a major boost to Kenya's much emphasized desire for economic growth and development for the good of her peoples. It was thus in her national interest.

If we compare trade between Britain and the Super powers with Kenya during the first three decades of independence in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it is again apparent that Britain has been dominating Kenya's external trade. During these decades, while trade with the Soviet Union was largely insignificant, that with America was relatively small, averaging about 8 percent and 5 percent on imports and exports respectively. That of Britain was 28 percent and 18 percent

TABLE 3.4: DOMESTIC EXPORTS: VALUE BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 1979-1988 K£ '000

Geographical Area/Country	1979	1980	1971	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>E.E.C.</b>										
U.K.	55,976	55,687	57,490	69,432	94,356	138,571	131,127	138,457	127,53	188,771
West Germany	60,514	55,592	58,368	60,229	81,932	97,520	93,348	136,328	75,663	114,530
Netherlands	17,135	17,647	21,025	27,673	32,260	52,264	52,615	91,708	56,736	48,280
France	4,931	6,324	5,850	5,971	11,126	11,126	27,174	14,005	15,351	17,472
Italy	23,110	23,636	20,043	14,909	21,241	21,241	17,775	20,449	16,978	32,763
<b>U.S.A.</b>	15,786	16,135	18,915	33,345	38,694	38,359	53,670	84,571	42,222	54,473
<b>Japan</b>	4,802	3,718	3,738	3,448	4,623	6,125	6,202	8,550	7,020	13,631

Source: Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract*, Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, (1990) p. 60.

TABLE 3.5: IMPORTS, VALUE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1979-1988 K£ '000

Geographical Area/Country	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>E.E.C.</b>										
U.K.	141,211	162,369	156,850	135,756	121,557	152,338	164,255	208,940	244,116	333,693
West Germany	68,809	77,659	75,115	75,627	70,321	98,060	95,681	146,069	118,288	167,311
Netherlands	14,111	22,879	21,103	23,214	27,692	29,309	32,558	32,352	41,757	86,218
France	17,627	32,690	31,149	28,110	38,632	56,000	42,036	153,036	98,089	106,869
Italy	23,745	37,682	25,229	22,959	15,685	34,095	33,295	48,845	48,397	63,922
<b>U.S.A.</b>	34,925	60,964	63,651	54,377	56,635	51,052	66,186	65,293	101,108	88,309
<b>Japan</b>	49,927	88,409	73,456	70,137	85,836	111,759	120,013	146,284	155,658	216,558

Source: Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract*, Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, (1990) p. 60.

for imports and exports respectively<sup>9</sup>. This information is clearly reflected in Table 3.6 below.

**Table 3.6: Kenya Dyadic Relative Data (Value as percent of total trade) Targets and type of Trade**

Time Period	Britain		U.S.A.		U.S.S.R.	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
1960s	31%	23%	8%	4%	0.4%	0.3%
1970s	28%	16%	9%	7%	0.5%	0.6%
1980s	25%	15%	6%	5%	0.1%	0.3%
Average	28	18	8	5	0.3	0.4

Source: Original Source - Percentage figures computed from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1957 - 1984 and Statistical Yearbook, 1957 - 1984. See also Adar, G. Korwa, "Kenya-Superpower Relations", in Cheluget Kipyego edited, Kenya's Quarter Century of Diplomatic Relations. Issues, Achievements and Prospect, (Nairobi: Longman, 1990) p. 65.

It is also emphasised that Kenya has always been a popular country for visiting British trade missions. In 1988, for example, Kenya received successful missions from the British Agriculture Export Council and the Agricultural Engineers Association (both as part of Britain's Africa Harvest Year designed to help improve agriculture, particularly breeding stock and farm machinery equipment) as well as missions from the London and Birmingham Chambers of Commerce<sup>10</sup>. By 1988, the Chamber had sent ten trade missions to Kenya. Birmingham, traditionally known as "the City of a thousand trades", is the second largest city in Great Britain.

The Birmingham Chambers association with Kenya has been both long and successful<sup>11</sup>. All these missions have greatly benefited Kenya tradewise, and in themselves, while serving Kenya's national interest of economic growth, they also serve, at least to a reasonable degree, to perpetuate Kenya's trade dependency on Britain. An analysis of the available data makes us conclude that the E.E.C. has all along continued to dominate as a destination of Kenyan products since independence. In 1988, it took 48 percent of Kenyan exports which comprised largely of tea and coffee. Africa was the second most important market for Kenyan products having taken 26 percent of the total exports in 1988<sup>12</sup>. During this period, the U.K. as has been demonstrated was leading within the E.E.C. as a market for Kenyan exports. In the second place was Germany, with the two countries accounting for nearly two thirds of the E.E.C. market<sup>13</sup>.

Special emphasis should be placed on the fact that before Kenya achieved independence, her external trade as well as foreign investments, had been largely unidirectional - to the U.K. This, it was argued, was politically and economically inhibiting to Kenya. This high degree of dependence on an economically powerful state like Britain meant that Britain could (perhaps more than is tolerable), greatly have influence over critical policy decisions of Kenya<sup>14</sup>. The Government of Kenya therefore found it necessary to undertake a diversification of trading partners, particularly from the mid 1960's. This diversification was to be effected in the free market areas while still retaining Britain as the major trading partner<sup>15</sup>.

Subsequently while 59% of Kenya's exports went to Western Europe in 1963 with 31.8% going to the U.K. alone; and while 52.6% of her imports came from Western Europe with 30.8% coming from the U.K. alone in the same year, in 1987 the corresponding figures had fallen to 45.5 percent for exports to Western Europe, with only 16.8 percent going to the U.K.; and 49.0 percent for

imports from Western Europe, with 17.0 percent coming from the U.K<sup>16</sup>. Kenya also established commercial links with some Eastern countries although these links were less important in Kenya's international economic interactions.

Significantly, Kenya's diversification of trading partners was mostly concentrated within the western states probably due to British influence, leaving the E.E.C. as Kenya's single largest market. According to some scholars, this is a demonstration of the distinction between idealism and realism in international politics. As has already been shown, Kenya's real economic world is to be found in the capitalist world system<sup>17</sup>. It can be argued that the only positive effect of Kenya's diversification policy was that it enabled her to avoid, not dependence, but over-dependence on Britain for her economic needs, with its resultant preponderance.

This is what we call "dependence in diversity". In other words, the dependency relations that existed between Kenya as a producer and exporter of raw material to Britain; and Kenya as an importer of manufactured goods from the former colonial master has only been expanded, and now includes other industrialized Western (capitalist) states. Obviously this expansion only aimed at serving Kenya's economic needs even better.

It is the contention of this study that Kenya remains more import and export dependent on Britain more than on any other single country, diversification of trade partners notwithstanding. This argument is based on the observation that over the years, Britain seems to have been exercising consistent trade dominance in Kenya's overall external trade transactions.

The argument here is that Kenya is more import and export dependent than Britain because the latter can, depending on the circumstances, manipulate more benefits and costs, for example, through trade interruption than does the

former. This could imply trade vulnerability for Kenya and therefore a threat to her economic development, resulting in a systematic weakness in the dependency's economy. Fortunately for Kenya this kind of trade interruption has never been undertaken and so far, her economic development, owing partly to her trade dealings with Britain, has been consistent with her national interest.

### 3.3 THE KENYAN ECONOMY AND DEPENDENCY ON BRITISH INVESTMENT

The commercial links between Kenya and Britain are more than just trade. About one-half of the investment in Kenya's industrial sector is foreign-owned, and, of this, about one half is owned by the British. The second most important foreign investor in Kenya is the United States<sup>18</sup>.

Britain's heavy investment in Kenya is hardly surprising. Apart from the historical factor, Kenya has since 1964 adopted economic policies aimed at giving incentives to foreign investors. In that year, the Foreign Investment Protection Act was passed by Parliament. The Act aimed at protecting foreign investment against nationalization and it further stipulated that the government would undertake to compensate immediately any foreign firm that would out of necessity be nationalized<sup>19</sup>.

The Act further guaranteed foreign firms in Kenya the freedom to repatriate their profits home if they wished, the payment of loan capital and interest secured abroad with earnings from Kenya, good depreciation allowances for machinery and equipment and the protection of the domestic market against any products from abroad that could compete with what the foreign firms were producing<sup>20</sup>.

It should be emphasized that in 1964, only the British were firmly entrenched in Kenya and therefore only they, were better placed to start more foreign investments in Kenya. Owing to this factor, they have been taking the lead all



along, in terms of foreign investments in Kenya. British foreign investments in Kenya have therefore been a vital source of foreign exchange to the country and are serving her national economic interest well.

The 1964 Act has since been amended many times so that foreign investors remain attracted to the country<sup>21</sup>. In 1982, President Moi, in an attempt to allay the fears of donors and foreign investors following the abortive coup in August that year, emphasized the government's policy of encouraging the private sector and foreign investment. His package of "corrective measures"<sup>22</sup> included reinstatement of the export compensation scheme, more favourable legislation on the repatriation of foreign investors' profits and capital and the establishment of an Investment Advisory and Promotion Centre.

The Government of Kenya has also continued to observe its open-door policy of encouraging foreign private investment. The policy has been able to attract capitalist countries led by Britain, whose multinational corporations dominate the Kenyan economy<sup>23</sup>. Furthermore, the Ministry of Industry in collaboration with the Investment Promotion Centre has been widely advertising, both at home and abroad, information on procedures for the establishment of industrial concerns in order to encourage more investments in the industrial sector.

In 1988, the British business community warmly welcomed the new measures by the government whose aim was to promote investment opportunity ties in Kenya. Among them was the "one-stop" approval process and the "manufacturing-in-bond programme"<sup>24</sup>.

The "one-stop" approval process aims at helping prospective investors who were previously frustrated by the old system of seeking approval from one Ministry to another in order to invest in Kenya. The "manufacturing-in-bond programme" hopes to encourage investors interested in exploiting comparative

advantages in Kenya's economy by establishing production facilities for 100% export. The new measures were outlined by the then Minister for Industry Dr. Robert Ouko at a London conference organised by the British Confederation of Industries on "opportunities for investment in Kenya"<sup>25</sup>. That these measures were announced in London explains how far Kenya values British investments in the country. The favourable terms of the Act also show how dependent Kenya is on foreign investments.

According to available evidence, it has been found out that British industry is the largest investor in Kenya. Because of good opportunities, many multinational corporations and other foreign firms invested in Kenya, so that by 1984, there were about 1,000 foreign companies in the country. Out of these over 360 were multinational corporations. By 1977, the United States which had entered Kenya's capital market mainly from 1965 had 140 firms in Kenya<sup>26</sup>. The U.S. firms were growing very fast. However, it is important to stress that the U.S. was only second after the U.K. Other countries with considerable foreign investments in Kenya are West Germany, Italy, France, Japan, India and Switzerland<sup>d27</sup>, among others. By comparison therefore, Kenya's dependency on foreign investments is greatest with respect to British firms.

By 1985, British direct investment in Kenya was valued at US \$500 million or Ksh. 8,500,000,000 while that of the United States (the second after Britain) amounted to US \$325 million or Kshs. 5,525,000,000. During the same period, the total investment from Japan, France Italy, India and Switzerland was only US \$125 million or Kshs.680,000,000<sup>28</sup>. By 1988, British investments in Kenya had increased to over £1,000 million sterling (over Kshs. 30,000,000,000) - a level that could not be matched by any other country<sup>29</sup>.

From the above figures, it is apparent that although Kenya depends on foreign investments from different countries for her economic needs, the biggest share

of this dependency as stated earlier, lies with British firms. This is partly due to colonial ties and partly due to immense British interests in the country. The heavy British interest in the country have also had a substantial positive impact on capital formation in Kenya. This, we believe is at par with Kenya's national interest, namely economic growth and development.

In February 1987, the Confederation of British industry convened an investment conference on Kenya and attracted 140 British businessmen. British investment, it is argued, will go along way in helping improve Kenya's economy. It brings employment and the firms train their employees both locally and in the U.K., thus transferring experience to Kenya. The goods they produce in Kenya serve as substitutes and earn foreign exchange as exports, the expert financial services offered, help the smooth functioning of the Kenyan economy, and the British firms introduce and transfer new technology. These are benefits that in line with her national interest, Kenya cannot afford to do without.

A few examples of British firms and what they do for Kenya may highlight their significance to the Kenyan economy. Such examples include Farm Machinery Distributors, a division of the Motor Mart Group that holds the local franchise for British-made Massey Ferguson tractors, and a full range of farm implements and equipments that include disc ploughs, disc harrows, tine tillers, ridges, maize planters and grain drills among others. These play an important role in Kenya's agricultural industry - the mainstay of the country's economic growth.

Another firm, Avon Rubber Company (Kenya) Limited, was established in 1953 with the aim of retreading tyres. Today, a substantial part of its turnover is derived from the manufacture of bicycle tyres and tubes, but the most important breakthrough has been in the fields of retreading and manufacture of tread rubber for sale to other retreaders in Kenya. Avery Kenya Limited, another firm established in 1971 is now the largest supplier of weighing equipment in Kenya.

It has branches throughout Kenya. On banking, Barclays Bank which is British-owned, has been in Kenya since 1916 and today, it is a leading bank with a branch network of 80 offices throughout the country and are major employers with a staff of more than 2,700 by 1988. The bank lends to all sectors of the economy; agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, and to private individuals all of which play an essential role in employment creation and export earnings. In 1986, 30% of the issued share capital was sold to nearly 40,000 Kenyans who now are profitably investing in Barclays<sup>30</sup>.

Other important British firms include, Blackwood Hodge (Kenya) Limited, Coates Brothers (East Africa) Limited, Twiga Chemicals; an associate company of the ICI Group in Kenya, Chloride Metals (Kenya) Limited, Kenya Shell and BP, Kenya Associated Battery Manufacturers (East Africa) Limited, United Touring Company and Dunlop Kenya Limited among others. These are but a few examples of British firms in Kenya. Through positive steps taken by Kenya, she has been able to attract more British firms.

It is also important to note that the Commonwealth Development Corporation (C.D.C.) has commitments in Kenya which amounted to £68.6 million sterling by the end of 1982<sup>31</sup>. The C.D.C. is wholly financed by Britain and provides investment in developing countries, mostly in the Commonwealth, for the financing of commercial developments which are industrially and socially desirable but which would be difficult to capitalise from a country's own resources. In Kenya, the C.D.C. has invested heavily in the Kenya Tea Development Authority. It is also involved with the Mumias Sugar Company, Bamburi Cement, Coffee development and the Olkaria geothermal power station<sup>32</sup>.

British companies established in Kenya make everything from soap powder to pesticides, from computers to chocolate bars. They play their part in providing

employment and training for thousands of Kenyans. It is for this reason that we advance the argument that because of the sheer magnitude of British investments in Kenya, both in terms of number and output, a situation has developed whereby Kenya has been made a British dependency with respect to such investments. The British Government is playing its part in ensuring investment continues to expand, for example through organising the investment conference on Kenya by the Confederation of British Industry in London. There is no area in which a revitalised British industry does not play some role in Kenya and its development.

Out of the over 140 British companies operating in Kenya, about 68 of them are in the manufacturing sector, 3 in motor vehicle assembling business, about 4 in the manufacture of paints while 11 companies are making automotive parts. Additionally 11 companies manufacture consumer products like soft drinks, beverages, cosmetics, cooking oils, spirits, toiletries and pharmaceuticals. There are also about 11 companies in the insurance industry, 3 banks, a tobacco company and a number of service companies. This breakdown reflects the situation by 1988<sup>33</sup>. The objective of these companies is to ensure that flourishing commercial links between Kenya and the U.K. continue to grow and to prosper and contribute to Kenyan economic development in the years ahead. This objective is consistent with Kenya's national interest.

Kenyans genuinely believe that private enterprise and individual initiative are the real pillars on which national prosperity and common will must always rest. Because of substantial British investments in Kenya, the country has been able to attract official British economic aid, both loans and grants. The above information reveals that Kenya is a British dependency as far as investments are concerned. The above British investments in Kenya, are to say the least, likely to contribute to Kenya's economic growth, if not development. It is not possible for Kenya to replace these British investments either with her own or

through diversification because such a step, if undertaken, would be done at a very great economic cost. Hence we are led to conclude that Kenya remains vulnerable in this area.

In fact it can be argued that British investments in Kenya and the resultant economic effects have led some scholars to conclude that Kenya is a "sub-imperial" power in East Africa. This is not to argue that Britain is not deriving much benefits from these investments. There is no denying that British investments in Kenya also affect Britain's interests. The investments are to a greater extent beneficial to both countries.

#### 3.4 KENYA AND BRITISH AID

British Aid Programme (Official Development Assistance) to Kenya comprises all British Government financial assistance, including the cost of technical assistance and other economic items accepted by Her Majesty's Government. It excludes military aid, British Government administration costs, payments for information and other special services not connected with economic development. British aid to Kenya is done both on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Aid is multilateral if it is channelled through an inter-governmental organisation and (normally) pooled, so that it loses its separate identity<sup>34</sup>. However, we are not going to venture into this kind of assistance to Kenya any more than is necessary. British aid to Kenya through multilateral agencies is very minimal in terms of percentage. We are therefore mainly concerned with bilateral aid to Kenya. This is more so because the study deals with Anglo-Kenya foreign relations particularly at the bilateral level.

Bilateral aid therefore refers to all transactions not classified as multilateral. Bilateral flows are normally and typically directed to a particular recipient government<sup>35</sup>. The allocation of British bilateral aid to Kenya is therefore done

on a country-by-country basis. It is what we call direct Government-to-Government aid.

First we would like to define what aid is all about. The term "Aid" was made popular in America after world war II, when the United States programme of reconstruction became known briefly as Foreign Aid, and in relation to Europe, as Marshall Aid. This was mainly an emergency programme to deal with a single vast disaster - the war. Today, the term also refers to measures and methods which are also called mutual Security Acts, International Development Bills, Technical Co-operation or Commonwealth Assistance<sup>36</sup>. The Americans used the initials "AID" to mean Agency for International Development.

The term today refers to the transfer of resources from rich to poor countries in the course of development, for the purpose of that development. The official objective of aid is social and economic development. The transfer is largely on an official Government to Government basis, between independent states. The most used definition of Aid is that established by the United Nations, which is; grants and net long-term lending, for non military purposes, by Governments and quasi-governmental International Organizations<sup>37</sup>. However, the United Nations definition is inadequate in our opinion to the extent that it excludes military assistance. Military assistance has been accepted by governments as part of aid, provided we can differentiate between economic and military aid. The U.N. definition also fails to mention directly technical assistance which is one of the best examples of aid.

For the purposes of our study, we shall divide British aid programme to Kenya into two areas - financial and technical assistance that Britain has extended to Kenya during the period under review that is 1963 - 1988. From the onset, it would be demonstrated that Kenya has had to depend on these forms of British assistance for her economic growth if not, development. It will also be

demonstrated that this kind of dependency has been consistent with Kenya's national economic interest.

### 3.5 BRITISH FINANCIAL AID TO KENYA

It is important to note that Kenya has carried out effective diversification of aid donors. This, we can argue was one way of dealing with the potential threat of sabotaging the economy by external interests. But even then, this diversification has largely been concentrated within the "Western Block". Table 3.7 below tends to support this observation.

**Table 3.7: Economic Aid to Kenya, 1970-1974**

Donor	Amount in U S. \$(Millions)	Percentage of Total
IBRD/IDA (World Bank Group)	336.81	36.4
United Kingdom	180.29	19.5
West Germany	95.47	10.3
Sweden	90.79	9.8
United Nations Development Programme	41.80	4.5
Canada	31.18	3.4
Japan	27.66	2.9
United States	26.78	2.9
Commonwealth Corporation	23.00	2.5
Netherlands	21.43	2.3
Norway	16.30	1.8
Denmark	15.30	1.7
African Development Bank	6.17	.7
European Economic Community	5.04	.5
Switzerland	3.64	.4
Soviet Union	2.43	.3
Yugoslavia	.78	.1
South Korea	.28	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>925.15</b>	<b>100.0</b>



Source: Susan A. Gitelson, "Policy Option for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania Reconsidered", Studies in International Development 12, No. 2 (Summer 1977), p. 43.

The Table shows that about 99% of the aid received by Kenya came from Western capitalist nations and the Western dominated International Organizations like the World Bank. Of greatest significance to our study is that when Kenya's aid receipts are analyzed from the bilateral perspective, Britain remains the largest single donor. This has been so since independence. During the period of 1970-1974, British bilateral assistance to Kenya in terms of percentage stood at 30.6% and accounted for a fifth of all the assistance. West Germany was next, accounting for 16.2% of the bilateral aid and 10.3% of all aid<sup>38</sup>.

Therefore, despite the fact that Kenya's economic aid dependence has been relatively diversified with the Western powers and multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the biggest percentage of bilateral dependence lies with Britain. British influence on Kenya's economic aid is greater than the above figures indicate. This is because of British contributions to the multilateral institutions (like the International monetary Fund and the World Bank) and close alliance with most of the Western nations (e.g. the United States and West Germany) which also provide Kenya's economic needs. For example according to the British High Commission in Kenya, in 1988, 17% of all E.E.C. aid to Kenya was contributed by Britain<sup>39</sup>. In the same year, Britain more than doubled her contributions to United Nations Environmental Programme whose headquarters is in Nairobi and at the same time, she contributes significantly to all United Nations Programmes. Kenya benefits greatly from these agencies.

Through financial aid, Britain provides the money to pay, directly or indirectly, for the physical requirements of economic development in Kenya. This kind of money is also referred to as capital aid. Between 1963 and 1973, about 45% of

British capital aid was for purposes other than general development<sup>40</sup>. Most of the money was spent for the Land Transfer Prograamm (LTP), settlement, adjudication or registration. Although there was bias towards LTP, British aid was greatly used to finance the Kenya Government's development budget in the early years of independence. During the 1963/64 period for example, gross financial aid accounted for 87% of development revenue, and 77% of that revenue came from Britain<sup>41</sup>. These details are contained in Table 3.8. below.

**Table 3.8: British Official Capital Aid Commitments to Kenya 1964-1973**

	£M
1964	
Independence Settlement Land Transfer Programme <sup>a</sup> : Unissued balance of commitment of £21.3 m as grant and loan.	11.0
Further loan for Land Bank	1.0
Development grants and loans:	
Unissued balances	4.3
Development grant 1964/5	1.0
Development loan 1964/5	1.5
Pension Loans	13.6
Budgetary grant	1.25
Special Land Purchase Scheme Loan	<u>1.275</u>
	34.925
1965/6	
General Development Loan (interest - free 42% import content)	3.0
Land Bank Loan	<u>1.0</u>
	4.0
1966/70	
Land Transfer Programme (interest - free loan)	6.3
General Development Loan (interest - free, 60% import content)	8.7
Land adjudication loan (previously classified under general development)	<u>18.0</u>
	33.0
1970	
Land Transfer Programme: Settlement (grant)	2.5
Agricultural Development Corporation and Agricultural Finance Corporation loan (2% interest)	1.0
Special scheme grant	0.25
General development loan (2% interest, 75% import content)	5.0
Land adjudication/Rural development loan (2% interest)	<u>2.75</u>
	11.5
1973	
Land Transfer Programme: Settlement grant	6.0
Agricultural Finance Corporation loan	2.0
General Development loan (2% interest, 50% import content)	<u>10.0</u>
	18.0
Total	101.925

Source: Holtham Gerald and Hazlewood Arthur, 'Aid and Inequality in Kenya (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1976), p. 53.

- a. In addition between 1963 and 1969, about £1 M was provided specially for the purchase of farms of cornpassionate cases outside the settlement areas.

From Table 3.8. it is clear that Britain used millions of pounds in terms of aid and grants to finance various development programmes in Kenya during the first decade of independence. As can be seen, land transfer programme received the greatest attention. Kenya exclusively depended on the British loan and grants to buy out the previously settler owned farms and to settle the thousands of its displaced citizens. Clearly, this kind of British financial assistance was serving Kenya's interest.

Before 1970, projects that received British aid of over a quarter million sterling pounds included the construction of the Nairobi-Mombasa road which was financed by money from more than one loan and which received £2.2 million sterling; the Chemelil Sugar factory which received £405,000; afforestation schemes which received £715,000 and £320,000 for the provision of road building equipment for the North-Eastern Region. The 1970 British loan was used to finance five projects<sup>42</sup>, namely Mumias sugar factory which received £2.9 million; Mombasa Television Programme which received £260,000; Naivasha-Suswa pipeline which was given £465,000; while livestock marketing scheme received £288,000. The fifth project was the provision of large hermetically-sealed bins for grain storage which received aid worth £170,000. This pattern for greater British disbursements to Kenya continued with the loan provided in 1973. The money used to finance projects like the above mentioned ones are called project aid. There is also non-project aid. Britain provides to Kenya both types of aid. Project aid is directed to a particular

project. All other financial aid such as budgetary aid, maintenance aid and disaster relief is non-project.

In 1976, Britain gave Kenya capital aid amounting to £38.4 million sterling. The money was to be spread over the next five years. Out of this, £28.8 million was set aside as grants to finance new commitments. Britain also agreed to avail Kshs. 192 million for previous aid agreements. While confirming this offer, the British High Commission in Nairobi said that "in accordance with the British Government's policy of easing the terms of aid for the poorest countries, all the new aid funds (to Kenya) will be on a grant basis"<sup>43</sup>. Out of the money, the projects that benefited included the upper Tana River Multi-purpose reservoir, the expansion of Mumias sugar project, the grain storage programme, rural water supplies and access roads and land adjudication programme<sup>44</sup>.

Table 3.9 below gives the details of British aid to Kenya during 1973 - 1977 period. The aid was for project and non-project aid only.

**Table 3.9: British Bilateral Aid to Kenya: Gross Disbursements of Financial Aid, 1973-1977\***

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Project	5,841	9,532	3,861	8,123	9,185
Non-Project	1,086	2,304	810	4,311	1,035
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,927</b>	<b>11,836</b>	<b>4,671</b>	<b>12,434</b>	<b>10,220</b>

Source: British Aid Statistics, 1973 - 1977. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978, pp. 48 - 49.

\* Includes Commonwealth Development Corporation assistance but excludes technical co-operation.

Table 3.9 above shows that a lot of British aid was used for projects as opposed to non-projects. The possible reason is that the Government of Kenya considered the projects as more beneficial to the country and therefore gave them more weight.

During the 1980s, British aid to Kenya continued to flow. In 1983 alone, aid to Kenya amounted to over shs. 610 million, according to figures published by the British Government. This brought the total British bilateral aid to Kenya since independence to well over Ksh. 6,500 billion<sup>45</sup>, making Britain's bilateral aid contribution by far the largest of all Kenya's aid donors. It also put Kenya amongst the largest recipients of British aid in the world. Her dependency on British aid was indeed great. The biggest single British aid project in Kenya, the construction of the new Thuchi-Nkubu road, at a total cost of Kshs. 380 million consumed the biggest share of the British aid budget in 1983<sup>46</sup>. Other major projects which benefited included the Mumias Sugar Company which continued

to attract British funds for its expansion, the Bura Irrigation Settlement and the new Kenyatta University College Library, amongst many others.

Also, large allocations went to the private agricultural sector, to Agricultural Development Corporation and to Kenya Railways; the last two of which are linked to technical co-operation designed to help improve the performance of these key sectoral institutions. By 1984, Kenya had received Kshs. 300 million worth of specialised equipment alone from Britain since 1979<sup>47</sup>. A large proportion of British aid funds were used towards the donation of equipment urgently needed by Kenyan Ministries, development authorities, municipalities and education bodies in order to save Kenya valuable foreign exchange.

One of the beneficiaries was the University of Nairobi, which in 1984, received equipment worth over Ksh. 6 million as part of the British aid programme<sup>48</sup>. The installed equipment comprised computers worth Kshs. 1.6 million for the Institute of Computer Science, a micro-computer worth Kshs. 1 million for the Department of Electrical Engineering and Physics, and other equipment worth Kshs. 3 million for the laboratories, and the Department of Crop Science.

Other equipment that Kenya received by 1984 included essential spare parts and soda ash "hopper wagons" for transporting soda from Lake Magadi to Mombasa donated to Kenya Railways valued at Kshs. 6 million; vehicles, radio equipment and tents for the Kenya Police worth Kshs. 40 million; drilling equipment for the Ministry of Water Development worth Kshs. 32 million and spare parts for Kenya Power and Lighting Company worth Kshs. 28 million. Others were a geothermal drilling rig for the Ministry of Energy worth Kshs. 20 million and vehicles for the Rural Access Roads Programme worth Kshs. 1,200,000<sup>49</sup>. All these assistance from the British government had a definite positive impact on the Kenyan economy, perhaps to the satisfaction of the Kenya government. In 1985, a British Council Project set aside Kshs. 37.6

million to be used in three years for different projects in Embu, Meru and Isiolo Districts. Out of this, Isiolo District received Kshs. 14.1 million for the improvement of livestock in the district. The remaining 23.5 million was to be used for forestry projects in the three districts<sup>50</sup>.

In 1987, the British High Commission in Kenya reported that Kenya receives nearly Kshs. 700 million annually in form of grants from Britain. The High Commission added that the British Government focuses its attention on transport, energy, natural resources and manpower development on which, by 1987, it was spending over US \$10 million (Kshs. 160 million) annually<sup>51</sup>. In the same year, Kenya received another £50 million sterling aid package from the British Government<sup>52</sup>.

In 1988, in a further show of good gesture to help Kenya, the then British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher who visited Kenya in January that year, announced that the British Government had written off Kshs. 2.1 billion (nearly £70 million sterling) of aid loans to Kenya and granted the country a further Kshs. 600 million (£20 million sterling) to support the balance of payments situation in Kenya<sup>53</sup>. This announcement by Mrs. Thatcher of her government's decision to buttress the Republic's balance of payments contributions and to redouble Britain's continued assistance to Kenya was a welcome bonanza to an industrious and peaceful developing people of Kenya. The Prime Minister also released the latest statistics to the effect that between 1979 and January 1988, Britain had committed a total of £173 million sterling (Kshs. 5.1 billion) to assist Kenya in the areas of agriculture and communications as well as meeting the need for jobs outside the big centres of Nairobi and Mombasa<sup>54</sup>.

In 1989, the British High Commission announced that the Isiolo District Hospital had been completed in December 1988 at a cost of Kshs. 100 million. The British Government also announced that it had undertaken a programme in



1988 to build and equip 68 secondary school science laboratories costing £3.83 million sterling. Another programme was the resealing of the Embu-Thuchi-Nkubu road (originally built with British aid) at a cost of about Kshs. 35 million and the rehabilitation of 800 Kenya Government Land-Rovers over three years at a cost of more than Kshs. 100 million<sup>55</sup>.

In education, a wide range of projects were undertaken at University level, from support for University libraries and a micro-computer programme at Kenyatta University to pioneering project in communication skills. Britain also undertook to provide specialist lecturers and materials to help first year students who were to join the Universities under the 8-4-4 education structure to cope with the demands of university education. Links were also established between Kenya and Mombasa polytechnics and similar institutions in Britain. In health, the United Kingdom contributed to the fourth population project as well as to the National Aids Control Programme<sup>56</sup>.

During the first three decades of Kenya's independence from 1963 to 1988 therefore, Kenya continued to depend on British capital aid (project and non-project) to develop her economy. British aid programme to Kenya is in the form of grants - and has been so since 1978 when all previous aid loans to Kenya were converted into grants. The picture that emerges from the above analysis is that of a country that is greatly dependent on Britain for her aid needs. This dependency is beneficial in some ways to Kenya's declared national economic interest. Kenya also depends on British technical assistance, which the study now analyses below.

### **3.6 BRITISH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO KENYA**

British technical assistance to Kenya includes the provision of "know-how", usually in the form of qualified manpower not readily available within developing

countries, or of facilities for training nationals of developing countries. The emphasis is on making skills rather than cash.

In Kenya the value of technical assistance, which is complimentary to financial aid, cannot be directly measured by its financial cost to the British aid programme because, for example, the full cost is met of some experts' salaries, but in other cases, only part of the cost of these experts' salaries is met. Technical assistance is thus measured in volume terms - by the number of persons sent overseas and by the number of students and trainees on course provided by Britain. Technology - high level manpower in professional, scientific, technical and engineering fields - is very necessary for economic development in Kenya. Like most former colonial African states, Kenya has been technologically dependent<sup>57</sup>, mostly on Britain.

Diversification of technology has also been carried out since independence, but again, like in other areas such as trade and investment, this has been largely within the Western capitalist economies. Similarly, Kenya depends on Britain more than any other western country for technical assistance. This has been the case all along since independence.

According to available Government data, by 1971, 60% of all expatriate personnel in Kenya were from Britain, 13% from the U.S. and Canada and 11% from Nordic countries namely Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. East European countries (only the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are represented) accounted for one half of one percent of expatriates in Kenya either as highly paid experts advising Government Ministers or as volunteers<sup>58</sup>.

Table 3.10, which gives a breakdown of technical assistance to Kenya in 1973 by type of personnel and country of origin is a clear testimony to our contention

that technologically, Kenya's dependency on Britain has been great, particularly during the 1960's and 1970's.

**Table 3.10: Technical Assistance to Kenya: September 1973**

Country of origin	Operational posts	Advisers	Volunteers	Total
Australia	5	--	--	5
U.K.	987	62	107	1,565
Canada	--	54	--	54
Denmark	30	63	106	199
Finland	--	10	--	10
France	19	10	--	29
Ford Foundation	--	4	--	4
W. Germany	--	74	34	108
India	--	1	--	1
Italy	--	8	24	32
Japan	--	28	44	72
Netherlands	2	63	73	138
Norway	30	39	33	102
Rockefeller Foundation	--	6	--	6
Sweden	43	5	25	73
Switzerland	2	12	--	14
UNDP	5	91	--	96
U.S.A.	11	12	180	203
U.S.S.R.	8	--	--	8
W.H.O	--	33	--	33
Yugoslavia	3	--	--	2

Source: Kenya Government; Personnel Working in Kenya, (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1974), p. 8.

Table 3.10 shows that by September 1973, British technical assistance to Kenya in terms of personnel which numbered 1,565 formed the bulk of the overall technical assistance to Kenya. The second after Britain was U.S.A. with only 203 personnel. British technical assistance personnel in Kenya can be classified into three groups. There are volunteers and experts, the latter being further divided into wholly - and partly-funded personnel. Volunteers are not

part of the official aid programme. The wholly funded personnel are usually advisers to the Kenya Government or a parastatal organisation whose salary is met entirely by Britain. This is in conformity with Kenya's national interest. They do not have established posts in Kenya and only work for contract period<sup>59</sup>.

Table 3.11 below shows the concentration of British expatriate technical personnel in Kenya by March 1974.

**Table 3.11: British Technical Assistance to Kenya: By Recipient Ministry at 31 March 1974**

Ministry	OSAS*	Advisers <sup>a</sup>	% of Total
Agriculture	54	18 <sup>b</sup>	8.2
Commerce and Industry	1	1	0.5
Finance and Planning	17	3	2.3
Education	559	4	64.0
Natural Resources	5	-	0.3
Health	25	1	2.9
Home Affairs (Police etc)	42	2	5.0
Information & Broadcasting	4	-	0.5
Attorney General's Office	8	-	0.9
Judicial Department	14	-	1.6
Office of the President	23	-	2.6
Power & Communications	4	3	0.8
Lands and Settlement	13	1	1.6
Tourism and Wildlife	1	1	0.2
Works	74	-	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>844</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Kenya-British Technical Assistance Programme. (London: Ministry of Overseas Development, 1975), p. 112.

a. This figure includes some advisers not strictly attached to a Ministry but to other organisations like Tana River Development Authority. In such cases, the expert has been imputed to the Ministry appropriate to his work.

b. This figure excludes personnel serving with research schemes, mostly in the field of agriculture and natural resources. There were 66 of these.

\* Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS).

Kenya's experience in technical co-operation with Britain has greatly improved since independence. The available records show that British professionals are officially seconded to Kenya, including trained personnel<sup>60</sup>.

Manpower training has proved to be a significant part of co-operation in Anglo-Kenya relations. The existence of reputable training institutions in Britain has made this possible. This co-operation takes two forms. The first is where Britain provides training facilities and teachers while Kenya meets the cost of maintenance for the trainees either from its own resources or through an international organization. The other form is through the direct offering of scholarships by the British Government because of a standing agreement or through special and temporary arrangements<sup>61</sup>.

After independence and perhaps as a way of ensuring that Kenyans would be able to decide their destiny, Britain provided training facilities for senior and middle-grade public servants, agricultural and nutrition officers and hotel and general management. Virtually all fields including research were covered.

Technical co-operation has two aspects: the supplementation programme and the provision of Technical Co-operation Officers (TCOs) to carry out specialised assignments in an advisory capacity. Under the supplementation Agreements, Britain has provided large numbers of staff to fill cadre posts within the Kenya Government and has supplemented their local salaries to levels comparable to those obtaining in the U.K. In 1982, for example, some 300 such staff were

working in Kenya, the bulk of them in higher education (secondary schools, the polytechnics, the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University College, and the Harambee Institutes of Technology)<sup>62</sup>.

In 1983, Britain assisted some Kenyan librarians to study at the Universities and other institutions in the U.K. This training was part of the British Technical Co-operation Programme which in 1982-83, enabled some 300 Kenyans to travel to Britain for training in a wide variety of development fields<sup>63</sup>. In 1983, the large technical co-operation programme continued, at a cost of nearly Kshs. 200 million from 1982 and with the number of students and trainees given scholarships in Britain rising to 456<sup>64</sup>. In the same year, Britain further undertook to provide specialised training to a good number of Kenyans who were expected to bolster the new development concept which placed districts as the focus for development. The training programme reflected the Mutual Anglo-Kenyan relations and the beneficiaries of the programme were expected to become effective nuclei of the new development concept, again in line with Kenya's national interest. The training included District Commissioners.

The role of the British Council is particularly noteworthy. The Council has been working in Kenya since 1947, with many concrete achievements, not least, providing library and information services in Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi - and from them countrywide and managing the technical co-operation programme of scholarships and training between Britain and Kenya, the largest of its kind in Africa. The British Council libraries have over 45,000 books, newspapers, journals, as well as audio visual materials, cassettes and videos<sup>65</sup>.

The British Council manages the technical co-operation training programme in Kenya on behalf of the Overseas Development Administration (O.D.A.). By 1988, the Council was granting over 500 new scholarships each year and at any one time during the second half of the 1980s, over 900 Kenyans were in the

U.K. on such training awards. The Council also helps to arrange training in Britain for Kenyans sponsored by other aid donors such as Norad and Danida. The Council is managing a number of educational projects in Kenya, costing almost shs.150 million funded by O.D.A<sup>66</sup>.

Overall then, during the first three decades of Kenya's independence from 1963 to 1988, Kenya had received financial and technical assistance worth 570 million pounds from Britain according to Kenya Government sources. The figure represented 14 percent of Britain's total aid to Africa, with Kenya as the highest recipient of British aid in the continent<sup>67</sup>.

It is therefore appropriate to conclude that between 1963 and 1988, Kenya was dependent on Britain for the bulk of her financial and technical assistance, a factor which makes her a British dependency. Over and above, these forms of British assistance were consistent with Kenya's national interest, namely the economic well being of the nation-state as well as her peoples.

### 3.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, it has been demonstrated that at independence, Kenya was largely economically dependent on Britain for external trade, investments and aid. After independence, Kenya's efforts to diversify this dependency has been done mostly within the Western capitalist countries. Her economic relations with the East European countries have been at a minimal level. It has also been demonstrated that during the first three decades of Kenya's independence, she has relatively continued at the bilateral level, to depend on Britain more than any other single country for her economic needs, inspite of her diversification efforts. Britain remains Kenya's principal aid and trade partner.

It has also been shown that Kenya imports more in value from Britain than it exports to that country. This requires Kenya to embark on serious bilateral negotiation with Britain to open up her market for more of Kenyan goods. The general course of the Kenyan economy has, however, been very favourable to British interests while at the same time serving Kenyan interests. It is therefore not surprising that Her Majesty's Government continues to support Kenya to develop her economy beyond the present level. In view of the foregoing facts therefore, the validity of Hypothesis Three, which the chapter set out to confirm and which assumed that Kenya's dependency on Britain is consistent with her national interest has been found to be correct.

Many links that continue to bind Kenya and Britain have been highlighted particularly trade, investments, development and history (as well as culture). It is these links, which at any time are expanding, that would continue making it difficult for Kenya to stop her dependency on Britain. This stems from the assumption that for Kenya to attain economic independence, she must continue to benefit from these links and rely on them initially as a springboard to her economic development. This is in line with Kenya's policy that the dynamic entrepreneurship of the private sector is essential for stimulating industrial development.

Kenya-British economic ties, the study has found out, contradict her policy of "economic non-alignment" as outlined in the 1965 Sessional Paper Number 10. Underlying this policy is the establishment of economic relations with any state regardless of its ideological orientation, or political and economic systems. There is little doubt if any, that Kenya is ideologically allied to the British-oriented capitalist system. This has been shown.

Kenya's record during the first three decades of independence has entitled her to be placed, in terms of the growth of output, among the most successful of



African developing countries. Her dependence on Britain in particular and the Western economies in general has therefore to some extent bore fruits. It is with this dependency in mind that we now turn to investigate in the next chapters, how it influences Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AS THE CONCEPTUAL MODAL DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE CASE OF KENYA AND BRITAIN, 1960s.

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Three, we have demonstrated that Kenya depends on Britain for her economic needs. This dependency as it is argued in this chapter constitutes the modal determinant of Kenya-British relations. Kenya's economic dependence on Britain dates back to the pre-independence years. British economic assistance, it is argued, laid the groundwork for what was to become Kenya's mode of foreign policy behaviour towards the United Kingdom. Kenya hoped that by forging co-operation and compliance with Britain, she would be able to continue benefiting from the essential British financial and technical assistance necessary for her own economic development. Such benefits would also accrue from her trade relations with Britain, which it was assumed, required co-operation. It is this view that the present chapter seeks to examine. In other words the chapter seeks to examine the role of economic dependency in the functioning of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, which is based on co-operation and compliance.

The dependency aspect is examined within the context of Hypothesis one which assumes that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance is influenced by her economic dependency on Britain. Specifically, the chapter seeks to explore the nature of the connection between economic dependency and Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

The chapter also seeks to test the validity of Hypothesis Two by finding out whether or not Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistently compliant with respect to issues of salience to Britain.

We shall further find out if Kenya's foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Britain is consistent with her national interest as Hypothesis Three assumes. In other words, the study will find out whether co-operation and compliance, or alternatively, whether non-co-operation and non-compliance are either beneficial or injurious to Kenya's national interest or goals. Therefore, all the three hypotheses that were set to guide our study will be examined in this chapter.

This chapter examines Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the 1960s only. There are several reasons why we find it reasonable to isolate this period and review it as a full chapter. First this is done in order to make the chapter manageable in scope. This is validated by the assumption that many activities with a bearing on foreign policy (towards Britain) were undertaken by Kenya during this period. Consequently, we have isolated the period of 1960s (the first decade of Kenya's independence) to form a whole chapter so as to avoid making the chapter stylistically bulky. This bulk, we contend, cannot be reasonably trimmed, if we are going to examine the whole time frame covered by the study (1963-1988) in one chapter.

Secondly, Kenya's economic dependency on Britain appears to have been greatest during this period. Although diversification of economic dependency was already an economic policy in Kenya, particularly during the late 1960s, no dramatic change in this direction took place during this period. In other words, during 1960s, there was no pronounced shift in the nature of dependency process. Effective and meaningful diversification was evident during the second decade. This is interesting for our study. It may for instance, enable us

to draw a distinction between the degree of dependency and the degree of co-operation and compliance.

Thirdly, the Kenya Government's desire to achieve rapid economic growth and development was of utmost immediacy during this period. Perhaps it may be argued that this desire was greater in the 1960s than any other period, owing to the pressure the ruling elite were experiencing to deliver "independence goods" to the people. There is no gainsaying the fact that the people's expectation of what independence entailed in terms of economic prosperity, made the Government to resort to foreign policy, during this period, as an instrument of economic development. These reasons, particularly the last two, in our view, make the 1960s unique enough to warrant its examination in a whole and separate chapter.

The chapter is divided into two major parts. Part one deals with Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the 1960s based on the concept of economic dependency. Various examples of actions leading to co-operation and compliance have been analyzed. Part two is a conclusion of the chapter.

#### **4.2 CO-OPERATION AND COMPLIANCE IN THE 1960s**

Kenya's achievement of political independence in December 1963 was subject to different interpretations. To some people, it marked the end of Anglo-Kenya co-operation or compliance<sup>1</sup>. To others, the occasion meant that all British nationals would leave Kenya with the hoisting of the Kenya National Flag and the lowering of the colonial Union Jack<sup>2</sup>. This latter school of thought believed that if the British nationals did not leave on their own, the new Kenya government having fought a bloody war of independence with Britain would simply expel them. Such a step would then prove to be an effective obstacle to

any form of co-operation and compliance by Kenya. This belief however, proved to be illusionary.

To those who knew the attendant political and economic implications like the founding father of the nation Mzee Jomo Kenyatta did, they believed that what had happened was change of guard from the colonial to indigenous Kenyans. Kenya had taken command of her destiny with a president guided by the ruling party to formulate policies instead of relying on the Whitehall.

Although the political struggle in Kenya created the impression that there were severe hostilities between Kenya and Britain, Kenyan political leaders recognised that the struggle for independence throughout the free world has been like that<sup>3</sup>.

They were therefore not going to blow this issue out of proportion. Instead they emphasized that henceforth Kenya had to interact as a sovereign state with both great and weak powers on the principle of sovereign equality. To this, Kenya had to identify its vital national interests like economic development, formulate foreign policy, and establish a system for managing its relations with other states<sup>4</sup>. It is within this framework that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain can be explained.

Kenya's economic situation at the time of independence reflected great dependence on Britain. At the time, no significant diversification of trade partners, sources of aid and technical assistance had been meaningfully carried out. Kenya lacked most of the production factors needed to fuel national development. Consequently she decided to maintain an uninterrupted link with Britain<sup>5</sup>. She therefore sought to use foreign policy as an essential instrument of molding and developing her economy. It is correct to state that Kenya's



primary problem at independence and all along is the economy, for economic performance is the foundation of any nation's foreign policy.

John J. Okumu argues that one of the three major factors that have conditioned Kenya's quiet diplomacy is the policy of vigorous economic development at home<sup>6</sup>. This, it was hoped, would strengthen her position in the East African region and in Africa as a whole. Okumu observes that these considerations were instrumental in determining how Kenya related to the major powers which provide her with material means to security and economic development<sup>7</sup>. One of the major powers is assumed to be Britain.

K.J. Holsti on the other hand argues that the foreign policies of nation-states seek to achieve specific objectives. At the top of the objectives is what Holsti assumes to be "core interests:", which include territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and national security<sup>8</sup>. These are connected to what he calls the "middle range" objectives which comprise economic, cultural and commercial relations, diplomatic representations and political influence. He argues that middle-range objectives often require outside aid of some sort<sup>9</sup>. Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, it is argued in this study, has been shaped by these middle range objectives. This argument is quite consistent with Holsti's observation. On attaining independence, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain in the minds of her leaders was intended "to maximise independence, promote economic development and ensure social-political stability in a way that enhances national power"<sup>10</sup>. Such a foreign policy was essentially designed to be conservative in outlook as it was feared that a radical policy could scare away the British capitalists whose investments in the country were greatly needed. The belief among many Kenyan leaders was that, stimulated by British encouragement and aid, Kenya would make the efforts and reforms essential for material progress which would

ultimately sustain itself. This, it was realised, required that co-operation and by implication compliance in Anglo-Kenya bilateral relations be exercised.

In accepting the Constitutional Instruments embodying Kenya's independence on December 12, 1963, Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta said: "Kenya's relationship with Britain will in future come from the heart and would be much deeper than that imposed on her in the past"<sup>11</sup>.

Inherent in the Prime Minister's statement was a major policy framework of co-operation and compliance which was to guide Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. Kenyatta was consciously adopting a co-operative and friendly if not, compliant posture towards Britain with the full realization of the benefits that it entailed. At independence, Kenya was grossly underdeveloped. It was therefore generally believed by the Kenyan leadership that co-operation with Britain, and not conflict, would ensure that Kenya benefited immensely from British resources and especially financial and technical assistance. Co-operation and compliance, it was further hoped would strengthen trading links between the two countries, beside providing an incentive for further British investments in Kenya.

#### **4.2.1 MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMONWEALTH**

On December 11, 1963, Kenya was officially invited to join the Commonwealth headed by the Queen of England. The Commonwealth is an association consisting of the U.K. and various independent states previously subject to Britain as well as British dependencies. The invitation came from the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, who in a telegram to Kenyatta said:

I am very happy to let you know that all members of the Governments of the Commonwealth have agreed that Kenya should become a member of the Commonwealth when she

becomes independent. We all look forward to welcoming you at our next meeting<sup>12</sup>.

Kenya readily joined the Commonwealth on becoming independent. This we can argue, was one of the first signs of co-operation and compliance in Anglo-Kenya relations. It is significant to stress here that compliance as a concept can be exercised in response to a request or demand: In this particular case, Kenya complied with a request sent out by Britain.

In joining the Commonwealth, Kenya's foreign policy option of co-operation and compliance in her bilateral relations with Britain was thus openly demonstrated. It was in the interest of Kenya to adopt this policy option in responding to the request or desire of a nation whose economic help was greatly needed to set the country on a sound economic footing. Through the Commonwealth, Kenya was politically linked with Britain.

In her decision to join the Commonwealth, Kenya hoped that her economic policy of undertaking rapid economic growth would be enhanced. Indeed Kenya realised that she would benefit greatly from the Commonwealth funds. Joining the Commonwealth, it was hoped, was one vital way of fostering closer co-operation with Britain. Even if Kenya would have been reluctant to go by the British desire that she joins the Commonwealth, she may have felt compelled to do so because Britain as a dominant state has asymmetric control over the costs and benefits (both long and short-term) that Kenya derives from trade, investments, financial and technical relations with Britain. Joining the Commonwealth in over view, was an issue of salience to Britain, which had invested a lot in the former colony. Kenya's compliance as far as joining the Commonwealth is concerned fits in with the observation by Richardson and Kegely that: "the foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country"<sup>13</sup>.

The political component of economic ties can be regarded as behaviour “compliance” on the part of Kenya. It is behaviour that accedes to the wishes of others as H.C. Kelman argues<sup>14</sup>. In this context, the proposition of interest holds that Kenya as a dependent state exhibits foreign policy compliance vis-a-vis Britain. At the independence celebrations, the Queen's message stated, inter alia, that:

On this momentous day, Kenya takes her place among the sovereign nations of the world and I am happy to welcome her as a member of our great Commonwealth family. I am sure that in the counsels of the Commonwealth and beyond, your country will have a valuable and distinctive contribution to make<sup>15</sup>.

In his response, Prime Minister Kenyatta stated that “We request when you go back to England, that you give the Queen our greetings and tell her that, although we have become independent, we are still friends<sup>16</sup>”.

It is our contention that Kenyatta's response implied readiness to co-operate with Britain or go along with her, and that it is this readiness which more often than not translates itself into compliance. Yet beneath this co-operation and compliance is Kenya's desire to achieve her national interest of rapid economic development through continuous British economic assistance. This could be done by displaying co-operative foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Britain.

#### 4.2.2. ACCEPTANCE OF THE LAND TRANSFER PLAN

During the 1962 Lancaster House Conference talks, which paved the way for Kenya's independence, one of the most crucial issues was on how the White Highlands “owned” by white farmers could be transferred to the indigenous people. The agreement reached between the British government and the Kenyan leaders was that the local citizens could buy the land from the white

farmers once independence was achieved<sup>11</sup>. Britain was to provide loan to facilitate this process. Upon the attainment of independence in 1963, Kenya government's response to this agreement was one of co-operation and compliance<sup>19</sup>.

Following lessons from the Congo, many white farmers feared that an independent Kenya government could simply consider the agreement unacceptable because the land had been taken illegally in the first place. There was fear that Kenya could take a leaf from the Congo. Minister Patrick Lumumba launched a scathing attack on Belgium for the humiliating slavery which had been imposed upon the Congolese by force<sup>19</sup>. However in Kenya, the newly acquired political power was not used to change the agreement.

The Kenya Government therefore implicitly in our view, opted for co-operation and compliance with respect to the land question. This we can argue, was partly to ensure smooth transition to power and partly to maintain political and economic linkage with Britain which would ultimately ensure that British assistance to Kenya would continue long after independence. The economic dependency that Kenya inherited from colonialism could not be ended abruptly by adopting conflictive approach towards Britain; at least not without serious economic repercussions to the country. An independent Kenya therefore, preferred co-operation and compliance to conflict in her external relations with Britain.

The land issue was of great salience to the British Government. The saliency derived from the fact that the white farmers, many of whom were now migrating back to Britain would have been disappointed with their own government if Kenya would have chosen not to comply with the agreement concerning the 'white highlands'. Since most of the farmers were economically better off, they could, arguably, in the event of Kenya failing to compensate them, sway public

opinion against the British Government. This would have probably meant lack of confidence in the government, a move that would be fatal for a country like Britain whose duty to protect its citizens is always fundamental. Therefore it can be argued that much as exhibiting compliance with this agreement by Kenya was beneficial to her, such compliance was equally in the best interest of Britain.

With respect to the guiding proposition of this study, we can therefore argue that the issue of salience intervened with respect to the 'white highlands' agreement to identify one of the foreign policy occasions when compliance was expected of Kenya, a British economic dependant.

Soon after independence and effectively from 1964, Kenya found herself dependent on British grants to finance the 'buying out' of European settlers under the 'million acre' settlement scheme<sup>20</sup>. In 1964, Kenyatta announced a new 'two million-acre scheme' to resettle 200,000 families on peasant farms. The scheme was effectively abandoned in 1966, and the 1966-1970 Development Plan declared that the objectives of resettlement had been largely attained<sup>21</sup>.

What is significant to this study is that the 'buying out' of white farmers was a policy which was worked out and which was acceptable to both the Kenya and British Governments. The acceptance of this policy was a reflection of co-operation and compliance on the part of Kenya since its success depended on Kenya's decision. It is also important to note that the loans used in the scheme were provided by the British Government and was aimed at preserving the agricultural sector very much as it was, while at the same time accelerating the growth of a national bourgeoisie. This was in line with Kenya's economic policy of development and therefore, national interest<sup>22</sup>. Limited land was distributed to the landless peasants, but generally only economically well off Kenyans were

able to acquire and develop land from the departing European farmers. As Claude Ake observes:

The land transfer scheme was a rather brilliant stroke of colonial policy. In effect, farmland was being bought from European farmers and sold to Africans. But the settlers got good, and sometimes inflated prices for land they had taken illegally in the first place, and had developed by crazily exploiting African labour and by taking advantage of extension services supported by the African taxpayers. The money for buying the land was provided by the United Kingdom and other Western sources. The Africans who got the land were grateful for a real opportunity to become prosperous; they were getting rather easy loans to buy out well-established farmers. In the meantime, the loans and grants the Kenya government got from abroad for this transaction ensured neo-colonial dependence. The Africans who took over the European farms had a vested interest in this dependence<sup>23</sup>.

The Kenya government in what amounted to policy statement thanked the United Kingdom for assisting the indigenous Kenyans in acquiring the white highlands. In 1966 long after Kenya had become a republic (this had been in December 1964) and the post of Prime Minister abolished, President Kenyatta in reference to the British loan scheme remarked:

My Government has continually affirmed its determination to build a nation based on greater welfare for all its citizens. We believe that our goal of rapid economic growth requires the co-operation of other countries. In this regard, we would like to register our appreciation to the British government for their assistance in settling landless people in areas formerly occupied by European farmers. We need more external assistance both to finance Government development projects and to provide technical advice on managing development<sup>24</sup>.

The President's statement reflected the policy of co-operation and compliance that Kenya had adopted in her foreign relations with Britain. Significantly, the ruling elite became more concerned about the dangers to Kenya nationhood from her grossly underprivileged status as a poor nation than from the wounds

of British colonialism. Together with an increased awareness of international affairs through the mass media and a heightened national consciousness, these factors, it is argued, militated in favour of the need for co-operation and compliance with the United Kingdom<sup>25</sup> on issues salient to the latter. The perceived benefits arising from British economic assistance to Kenya must have carried the day. Thus the question of national interest in an environment characterised by dependency, dictated the course that foreign policy behaviour was expected to follow.

#### 4.2.3 RACIAL ACCOMMODATION: INTEGRATING BRITISH CITIZENS

It is not surprising therefore that at independence, Kenya adopted the policy of racial accommodation. This policy augured well for Europeans and Asians most of whom were British citizens. This was in line with her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain which was calculated to avoid any kind of entanglements. Kenyatta made it clear that so long as Britain recognised Kenya's sovereignty, Kenya would continue to co-operate (and comply) with her for the benefit of the peoples of the two nations. Hence his famous exhortation to all the people of all races to forgive the past and pool their efforts together for more rapid development<sup>26</sup>.

This policy has continued to tighten the ties between a once repressive colonial power and a people it once treated with brutality and racial contempt. The policy was cautiously adopted by the Kenya Government as one way of furthering co-operation between the two governments. At this time, already British loan of substantial amount was being used in the land scheme, besides other financial, technical and military assistance to Kenya. A continuation of these undertakings by Britain unquestionably required co-operation and compliance from the Kenya Government.



In 1964, "Africa Diary" reported that it was increasingly accepted in Nairobi that Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta was determined to submerge the racial bitterness of the past and to assure whites of a place in 'nation building'. This was something none of the whites ever offered him. Kenyatta had extended the same assurances to the country's settlers - her 1976,000 Asians of Indian and Pakistani descent, who were shopkeepers, carpenters and mechanics of Kenya, and her 34,000 Arabs<sup>27</sup>. Kenyatta's words are worth quoting here. He said:

We are all human beings. We all make mistakes. But we can all forgive. That is what we need to learn in Kenya. Where I have harmed you, I ask forgiveness. We must put the past behind us. The only settlers who will not be wanted are those who consider themselves 'bwanas' (Kiswahili word for masters), who look down at Africans as boys. Anyone who still wants to be called 'bwana' should pack up and go, but others who are prepared to live under our flag, are invited to remain<sup>28</sup>.

The policy of racial equality adopted by the Kenya government while extending to all races in the world, became more meaningful in her foreign relations with Britain. This is because most of the Asians and white settlers in Kenya were British citizens. Such a policy therefore ensured continued co-operation with Britain. In this respect, it can be argued that Kenya realised that the conduct of her foreign policy towards Britain was going to be more effective only if the domestic agenda of 'racialism' was tackled imaginatively as it did. Kenya's poverty and Britain's economic strength, no doubt, had a big role to play in adopting the policy of racial equality, at a time when public opinion was against it due to bitter colonial experience. This extension of olive branch to Asians with British citizenship was of significant salience to Britain. But as long as it ensured that British economic assistance to Kenya was forthcoming, this foreign policy posture was also in Kenya's national interest.

#### 4.2.4 THE ARMY MUTINY: BRITISH ACTION DEFENDED

Kenya's cordial foreign policy behaviour towards Britain was again illustrated very clearly in 1964. On January 31 of that year, Kenya's then Home Affairs Minister, Oginga Odinga launched a scathing attack on Britain, blaming her for the Zanzibar revolution and the army mutinies in Tanganyika and Uganda. In a statement issued by the Kenya Government press office in Nairobi, Odinga said that the imperialist press had attempted to place the whole responsibility for the events in Zanzibar on communists and those whom they regarded as communist sympathizers.

He added:

I strongly disagree with this claim by which the British are trying to avoid responsibility for what took place in Zanzibar. It was the British who encouraged unjust policies in Zanzibar which were intended to make the minority rule over the majority<sup>29</sup>.

Referring to mutinous events in Uganda and Tanganyika, Odinga said that Kenya should take them as a serious warning. He charged that:

British staff employed in responsible places by those governments failed to train Africans so that they could fill their places. Instead they used their privileged positions to suppress Africans below them, thereby creating an explosive situation. Kenya must learn from these events and make adjustments accordingly<sup>30</sup>.

Odinga's stipulated position could have had serious repercussions on Kenya-British relations if it had the blessings of the government. However, the government moved fast and distanced itself from Odinga's statement. That Prime Minister Kenyatta took it upon himself to put the government's position straight highlighted its determination to maintain Kenya's cordial foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain on issues salient to the latter.

Kenyatta categorically rebuffed his Home Affairs Minister's statement that had exonerated communists of all blame for East Africa troubles. The statement which came as a sensation in East Africa was the first time that Kenyatta had openly disagreed with his leading lieutenant<sup>31</sup>. It greatly helped to cool down temperatures in London. In an effort to please the British capitalists with vested interests in Kenya as well as those from other western nations. Kenyatta, an avowed capitalist decided to adopt a hard stance against communist China, which was thought to be supporting Odinga. It was believed that the British government had expressed concern at the growing Chinese influence and requested the Kenya government to act on it<sup>32</sup>.

Interestingly, Chinese hopes of opening a large embassy in Kenya were accordingly halted by the Government's decision to limit the strength of all foreign embassies to ten. An official government spokesman explained on February 3, that similar limitations existed in Tanganyika and Uganda. Following this decision, six Chinese nationalists were refused permission to enter Kenya and had to be flown back to Tanganyika. The spokesman added perhaps not surprisingly, that the restriction on the number of diplomats was not applicable to Commonwealth countries<sup>33</sup>. This was evidently another sign of co-operation and compliance that the Kenya government undertook in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. It is significant to realise that in 1964, Chinese assistance to Kenya was still very minimal while trading links were yet to be established. This contrasted sharply with British assistance to Kenya which was very high and strong trading links that had long been established.

Following the investigation which Kenyatta had ordered to find out the extent of foreign influence trying to undermine the Government's authority and which resulted in the above order, he was outraged at the Chinese propaganda attempt to portray the British as re-occupying East Africa with military forces,

while ignoring the fact that the British troops had arrived in the three East African states at the specific request of the heads of state of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda<sup>34</sup>. This way, the Kenya government lent credence to the fact that her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain entailed co-operation and compliance. This foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance was perhaps more of a reciprocity than could otherwise be thought. The 1964 January mutiny by the Kenya army was quickly suppressed with British military aid at the request of Kenya government<sup>35</sup>. This act of assistance on the part of the British, alongside economic assistance, can help explain why the Kenya government had to restrict the size of the Chinese embassy in Nairobi, when it was evident that the British were getting alarmed at the speed with which China was trying to gain influence in Kenya<sup>36</sup>. Significantly, this was the period when the cold war was at its zenith.

Kenya's policy option of co-operation and compliance with Britain was serving her national interest well. In the above incident, Kenya had used her foreign policy to provide a framework and an atmosphere of physical security which had been threatened by the mutiny. Her tough stance against China was of course a pleasant outcome to the British, who in 1964, were being relied upon considerably for skilled manpower, foreign exchange and capital.

It can be argued that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain reflected a realist approach, in so far as it recognised that presently, Kenya's economic structure demanded close political understanding with the West, and with Britain in particular<sup>37</sup>. Kenyatta's condemnation of Odinga came as no surprise. While the former was pro-West and therefore capitalist minded, the latter was pro-East. His action was seen as a victory for the West particularly Britain, and as long as he remained in power, it could be assumed that the British were victorious.

Kenya's spirited defence of Britain against what it called "communist propaganda" is at least partially supportive of the proposition that asymmetrical economic dependence has foreign policy implications. Kenya's behaviour can best be understood within the theoretical framework of dependency mold. At any rate, stemming the growth and influence of Chinese communism or any other communist country like the Soviet Union was of great importance to Britain which was incidentally an American ally.

Having invested heavily in Kenya, Britain had enough cause to worry about such influence. Nevertheless, Kenya's dependency on Britain for trade investments, financial and technical assistance as well as military assistance inevitably made her adopt a compliant and conflictive foreign policy behaviour towards Britain and China respectively. Significant to this study is the dependency view that the accompanying economic vulnerability has profound political ramifications, including a loss of dependency's control over her own foreign policy behaviour, a situation that inevitably brings about compliance.

#### **4.2.5. ATTACK ON KENYATTA AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**

Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation with Britain was further demonstrated following an attack on Prime Minister Kenyatta in London by a man who was a member of the British Fascist Party<sup>38</sup>. Because of this, some Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U) members of the National Assembly marched to the British High Commission office on July 23, 1964 to deliver a memorandum of protest against the attack on Kenyatta outside his hotel. However, they failed to see the High Commissioner and took great exception to this. Consequently, the K.A.N.U. members passed a resolution demanding the recall of the British High Commissioner to Kenya, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, as well as the deportation of a senior British police officer, after a fracas outside the commission office. The memorandum was in the words of the M.P.s. a

protest against the "cowardly and shameful attack" on Kenyatta in London and the damage to the house of the Kenya High Commission in London<sup>39</sup>. In their memorandum, they said that,

The attack reflected an arrogant attitude of the British people towards the people of Kenya. The blame must be the responsibility of the British Government, which failed to give adequate protection to Kenyatta<sup>40</sup>.

Kenyatta, who had been attending a week-long Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London however, escaped injury and the man was arrested although he was not jailed<sup>41</sup>.

Although many people expected a terse government statement and possible action after Kenyatta returned to Nairobi, the government instead chose to ignore the issue including the demands of the K.A.N.U. MPs<sup>42</sup>. In truth, the attack on the Prime Minister was serious enough to lead to a strain on the relations between the two countries. This is more so if it is realised that there was no official, if not, acceptable apology from the British government to the Kenya government. The British High Commissioner only drew the attention of the Kenya government to the incident outside his office. The Kenya government in this case, once more stuck to her foreign policy option of co-operation with Britain.

One may theorize that the Kenyatta government, aware of her dependence on Britain, was not ready to take risks, such as declaring the British High Commissioner to Kenya "persona-non-grata" as demanded by some K.A.N.U. MPs. Such an action would have amounted to severing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moreover, it would not be consistent with Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain for the benefit of Kenya.

Diplomatic relations may in this case be viewed as salient to Britain. Any move to disturb such relations, such as expelling a British High Commissioner would therefore be unwelcome. And the repercussions would turn out to be very costly for Kenya, which is a British dependant. Perhaps this explains why Kenyatta's government chose to exhibit co-operation as opposed to conflict following the London attack. In this case therefore, we share McGowan and Gottwald's suspicion that the personalities of foreign policy makers in weak societies are of secondary importance to their environmental circumstances. They observe that "within a context of powerlessness and dependence, character and ideas cannot overcome a passive-subordinate role in international (as well as inter-state) affairs"<sup>43</sup>.

The implication here is that external dependence is more significant to foreign policy making in Kenya as a poor society than are the idiosyncrasies of her policy makers.

Korwa G. Adar while analysing Kenya's foreign relations with the middle powers observes that the foreign relations between Kenya and Britain are viewed as special. This speciality is enhanced by Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation, as shown for example by her refusal to rebuke Britain following Kenyatta's attack. His observation is quite consistent with our foregoing analysis. Adar observes that as early as 1964, Kenya and Britain signed a military agreement<sup>44</sup>. One of the contents of the agreement allowed the British military personnel to train in Kenya. Adar argues that since then the Kenya-British relations have grown steadily. Kenya's decision to agree to provide the British with military training grounds, possibly at the request of Britain, was quite consistent with her foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance. This foreign policy behaviour of Kenya was in our view, influenced by economic if not military assistance from Britain. Makinda's argument that Britain remained

Kenya's main arms supplier from independence until the mid 1970s<sup>45</sup> is supportive of our observation.

Moreover, British Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, announced in 1964 in a speech to the House of Commons that Kenya was to get more than fifty million sterling pounds for its civil and defence needs, over half in gifts and service and the rest in loans. He added that the whole aid agreement for Kenya had been drawn up not as a treaty, but as an "informal memorandum of understanding"<sup>46</sup>. This was in keeping with British pledge to assist Kenya in her economic and military needs. It is on the basis of this assistance that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain partly stems from. It is a policy that has consistently served Kenyan interests well.

#### 4.2.6 THE U.D.I. QUESTION: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MAINTAINED

In 1965, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with British interests, owing largely to dependency, was again clearly demonstrated. This followed Ian Smith's illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia (and now Zimbabwe) on 11th November 1965<sup>47</sup>. The declaration obviously vested power in the hands of the white minority, implying perpetuation of colonialism in Southern Rhodesia. On the same day, the then Kenyan Vice-President Oginga Odinga moved a motion of adjournment in Parliament to allow the House to discuss the Rhodesian question<sup>48</sup>. Rejecting and condemning the illegal regime, the government declared its strong support for the resolution of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) and of the General Assembly which had been passed in anticipation of the illegal declaration of independence.



The O.A.U. resolution in question was passed at Accra in October 1965, and by it, the O.A.U. members agreed to use all possible means including the use of force against an illegally constituted regime in Rhodesia. Making his contributions in Parliament, one Member of Parliament, Z. Anyieni asserted that they would not be satisfied with the government statements in denouncing the racist regime. In his view, they wanted action taken and although such an action could not be taken unilaterally, the Kenya Government could take the lead and encourage other African states to join. Answering criticisms from the M.P.s, the government assured the members that it felt strongly as them but the question of Rhodesia was not only a Kenya problem but that of Africa and therefore Kenya must work with the other African nations. The government observed that:

We need to know what other nations in Africa want us to do, so that we can do it together. We want the action that is going to be taken to be fast and effective. Kenya has declared right from the beginning that we are ready to take action, whatever the O.A.U. decides, we are prepared to go with the O.A.U. , up until the very bitter end<sup>49</sup>.

Despite such total commitments to O.A.U. , Kenya refused to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as demanded by the O.A.U. resolution of its member-states. The resolution followed the fact that the British government not only recognised Smith's U.D.I., but equally supported it<sup>50</sup>. This action by Britain ran counter to the O.A.U. Charter<sup>51</sup> which advocates for total eradication of colonialism in Africa through concerted effort.

Interestingly, Kenya as a member of the O.A.U. had committed itself in the K.A.N.U. Constitution and Manifestos that the country would work with the other nationalist democratic movements in Africa and other continents to eradicate imperialism, colonialism, racialism and all other forms of national or racial foreign oppression<sup>52</sup>.

Following the declaration of U.D.I. by Rhodesia in November, the O.A.U. held an emergency meeting in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, on December 3, 1965. It is in this meeting that a resolution calling for an ultimatum to Britain to end U.D.I. by December 15, or have the O.A.U. states break relations with her, was passed. Joseph Murumbi, then Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, voted for the resolution on behalf of Kenya. He felt that for political and emotional reasons, he could follow no other course<sup>53</sup>.

President Kenyatta however, felt that for reasons that were nonetheless also political and economic, his government could not go along with Murumbi's action. Kenyatta thus promptly disowned the action, as did a number of other African leaders. Only 9 countries - among them Tanzania and Zambia - finally broke relations with Britain<sup>54</sup>.

On December 9, 1965, the government was asked by Parliament to declare its stand on the O.A.U. resolution. Pushed to state whether it was going to break off diplomatic relations with Britain in tune with the O.A.U. resolution, the government replied that:

Kenya is an independent sovereign state and as such, must decide in the light of prevailing circumstances (economic and political) and must not be rushed into a decision by anybody<sup>55</sup>.

On December 10, while addressing Parliament on the government's stand on Rhodesia and defending the government for not breaking diplomatic relations with Britain, President Kenyatta pledged his government's support for the O.A.U. resolution and promised that the government would remain a faithful member of the organization. He added:

It is however, obvious, since the resolution was announced that there have been conflicting reactions by various African States. This means that action taken would not be effective and could in fact be abortive<sup>56</sup>.

Despite Kenya's spirited but disguised defence of her position, her refusal to comply with the call by the O.A.U. to act against Britain, in our opinion, further demonstrated her foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain. By exhibiting non-compliance with the O.A.U. call, Kenya was instead transferring that compliance to Britain. Kenya declined to behave in the fashion of other countries such as Tanzania which promptly severed relations with Britain and even more than that, pulled out of the Commonwealth. Though it has been the Kenya Government's policy to implement the O.A.U.'s resolutions on colonialism and racialism, the Government made it clear that it did not consider that political differences between independent states can be resolved by breaking diplomatic relations. Kenya's policy with respect to Britain reflected the importance it attached to the maintenance and expansion of British assistance to her as well as mutual trade between the two countries.

Kenya believes that it is in the mutual interest of all in both countries that differences with respect to the political situation in Southern Africa should not be allowed to affect the bilateral relations between her and Britain. It is for this reason that we have argued that one predictable result of this officially sponsored campaign to promote and maintain co-operation and compliance with Britain is the seeming close British involvement in promoting the Republic's economic interests. This process had advanced to the point where Kenya could not break off relations with Britain. Maintenance of bilateral relations with Britain is a prerequisite for Kenya's continued economic benefits. The bilateral tie maintained through active diplomacy is therefore a salient issue in Anglo-Kenya relations.

J. Okumu attributes Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain (on the U.D.I. issue) which he rightly calls "quiet diplomacy" to historical factors<sup>57</sup>. However, we would like to argue that historical circumstances alone could not have made Kenya to behave in the way she did. If that was the case, then how do we explain the fact that Tanzania, which achieved her independence from Britain decided to break off diplomatic ties with Britain? How do we explain the steady worsening in relations between Zambia and Britain in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the former's more militant and critical approach to the British policies in Southern Africa<sup>58</sup>, at a time when Kenya remained less militant and watchful? Are historical factors lacking in Tanzania-British relations, for example?

It is the argument of this study that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain is not influenced by historical factors alone. As has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, this influence is greatly attributed to economic (as well as military) considerations. Compared with Tanzania for example, Kenya received more assistance from Britain. Logically therefore, she could not behave in a similar manner like Tanzania, which in any case was steadily going socialist<sup>59</sup>. Kenya realised that a conflictive foreign policy behaviour towards Britain could endanger her economy. Moreover, in 1965, Kenya had not effectively diversified her economy with the other powers and so her dependence on Britain was quite great. Breaking diplomatic relations with Britain at a time when Kenya needed her most was not in the best interest of Kenya. It was never lost to the Kenyan leadership that internal political stability which the country was trying to build up greatly depended on sound economic base. This was only possible by maintaining cordial bilateral relations with Britain as a major donor. The leadership therefore felt that co-operation and compliance was desirable.

It is our contention that if one wants to appraise Kenya's compliance in Kenya's case with Britain, particularly on the U.D.I. issue, then questions of economics and politics must be of paramount importance. Essential is the realization that underlying compliance in Kenya's case is the need for faster development. Indeed the level of Kenya's development could not be where it was at independence and after, without British economic support. The relevance of Kenya's compliance has to be understood in the context of the quest for this development which was affirmed in the 1963 KANU Manifesto.

#### **4.2.7 THE LIMURU CONFERENCE AND PRESSURE FROM LONDON: THROWING THE 'LEFTISTS' OUT**

In 1966, there was tremendous pressure from the British government and the United States to suppress individuals whose preference for ties with the East was a threat to the Western governments<sup>60</sup>. By this time, Kenya found herself trapped in a debate which was increasingly ideological in tone, with Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya leading the 'radical' and 'conservative' groupings respectively<sup>61</sup>. The 'radicals' (also variously referred to as the leftists, socialists or pro-East) attacked class differentiation among Africans and called for more nationalizations; the 'conservatives' (capitalists or pro-West) believed Kenya's highly developed export sector was too fragile to survive such treatment, a caution stigmatized by their critics as deference to neo-colonialism.

The pressure from the two governments (Britain and the U.S.) came about because Odinga was suspected of receiving cash and arms from communist sources. In order to do away with the radicals, the government orchestrated the famous Limuru Conference held from 11-13 March, 1966<sup>62</sup>. The Conference successfully rooted out of the ruling party, the socialists or the K.A.N.U. left wing who subsequently quit the ruling party and formed a new socialist political party, the Kenya Peoples Union. It is significant to note that this otherwise

expensive Conference was financed by the British and the U.S. Governments<sup>63</sup>. The outcome of this conference, it can be argued, was a further manifestation of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of compliance with Britain on salient issue areas.

The government's decision and ability to effectively contain the socialist minded politicians, was in the interest of Britain and generally the West. With respect to the Conference, Okumu argues quite convincingly that:

Potential Russian influence was a threat to the entrenched British farming, commercial and industrial interests which control the country's economy and determine the direction of its development especially in the private sector. The urge, the desire to protect British interests in Kenya is stated to be an integral part of the golden handshake, a set of agreement that together constituted the price of independence<sup>64</sup>.

Kenya's pre-occupation with her economic difficulties at home and the need to solve them increasingly came to dictate her approach and her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. In order to maintain the British support in Kenya's economic development, it was necessary to silence any critic of British capitalism which had pervaded every sector of the Kenyan economy.

#### 4.2.8 NON-ALIGNMENT: KENYA'S TIES WITH THE WEST

Kenya's pro-west stance is what has led some people to question the acceptability of her foreign policy of non-alignment. This pro-west stance is in itself a reflection of co-operation and compliance in foreign policy behaviour. With respect to Kenya's policy of non-alignment, V. Khapoya argues quite interestingly that:

Non-alignment, enunciated soon after independence by the Kenya government as a foreign policy, was infact nothing more than a statement designed to serve as a guideline for the country's international behaviour ..... In practice this policy would have allowed Kenya to maintain acceptable contacts with both the East and West.

The policy helped to assure the departing British that their interests would probably be well looked after since the country was not-going socialist or radical. In practice, it became difficult for Kenya to remain non-aligned as the domestic debates and quarrels increasingly reflected proxy conflicts. The matter was resolved by the suppression of domestic forces referred to as radical or socialist and by the ascendancy of individuals whose preference for ties with the West were unashamed and unequivocal<sup>65</sup>.

Khapoya argues further on the question of non-alignment that although the famous government manifesto, "Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (1965)", was adopted so that the government could seek technology and capital from any source, whether East or West, it was not easy to implement it. Khapoya's main argument is that it was not clear from the government's own Sessional Paper on African Socialism, how the West, with whom Kenya was already allied in many important ways could become a willing partner in an economic experiment designed to lessen the West's and particularly the British's dominance in the existing economy<sup>66</sup>. He asserts quite rightly in our view, that the declaration of socialism only helped Kenya to remain in the mainstream of ideological thinking in Africa at the time.

Owing to its significance as one of the pillars of Kenya's foreign policy, the principle of non-alignment was raised in Parliament following the formation of the opposition party, Kenya Peoples Union (K.P.U.)<sup>67</sup>. Led by Odinga, who until 1966 was Kenyatta's Vice-President, the K.P.U. members demanded that the Kenya Government should define the nature of its non-alignment. The K.P.U.'s contention was that the Kenya Government had refused to pull itself from the 'Western Camp' so as to be able to take a really middle course, in terms of getting aid from either block, establishing cultural exchanges with the East and so on. Odinga summed up their argument quite succinctly:

If aid investment come from one source only, we can banish the prospect of pursuing an independent policy, for we will be brought under control by the withholding of aid, or other economic pressure .... I cannot tolerate an African regime

dominated by either 'West' or 'East'. If non-alignment is used to justify relations with one of these worlds alone, it is not non-alignment. Kenya is still today largely part of the Western sphere of interest and investment<sup>68</sup>.

Recalling that soon after independence, negotiations carried out with the Soviet Union and China to give Kenya several assistance were not implemented, save for the Soviet built Kisumu hospital and attributing this to the government's refusal to accept such assistance, Odinga put it even more vividly that:

Non-alignment was Kenya's cardinal policy but the country has been through seventy years of "Capitalistic Nursing", whatever economy our country has known in the past seventy years (as championed by Britain) has been completely tied and closely woven to the capitalistic system. Tearing away from it is already meeting with an established force or resistance<sup>69</sup>.

There is little doubt that K.P.U. members saw Kenya's support for the capitalist system as a form of compliance with the demands of such a system, and logically therefore, compliance with the Western nations (Britain included) which formed the power base of this system. Because of Kenya's economic support from the West, it is little wonder that K.P.U. was banned in 1969, its leaders detained and with that, the country witnessed the end of ideological debate in Parliament.

It is for the above reasons that we reach the conclusion that Kenya's foreign policy of non-alignment exhibits co-operative and compliant behaviour towards Britain and other Western nations, because it has a bias towards these nations. With respect to Britain, this is in keeping with Kenya's policy of co-operation (and compliance) with Britain whose overwhelming economic support in terms of trade links, financial and technical assistance is behind her relative success story as sub-imperial power in East Africa<sup>70</sup>. It should be emphasized here that capitalism as a system had no link with communism while the latter lasted. Kenya therefore while collaborating with the capitalist system more often than



not rejected the communist system. It is on this basis that Khapoya further points out that:

No one familiar with Kenya ever believed that Kenya was non-aligned. One only had to look at economic relations between Kenya and other countries to realise that more than 90 percent of Kenya's import and export trade was with Western Countries, principally the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany .....it is significant also that most of Kenya's students were being trained in the West<sup>71</sup>.

Katete Orwa, while recognising Kenya's foreign policy of non-alignment observes that almost any other economic indicator confirms the reality of interest between Kenya and the West. This according to him is because Kenya is most indebted to the capitalist world both in terms of funded and unfunded external debt. Of greatest significance is Orwa's observation that although Kenya's foreign policy sought to diversify sources of trade so as to reduce dependence on one state (Britain) or group of countries, in practice diversification has been mainly within the capitalist market, although limited participation in the planned economies has been maintained. Orwa contends that Kenya's real economic world lies in the capitalist world system and nothing short of revolution could change that fact<sup>72</sup>.

Therefore, the argument of this study is that in order to ensure that her economic interests continue to be served, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain has exhibited co-operation and compliance particularly on issues of salience to Britain. In the 1960 KANU Constitution, one of the four stated aims relating to foreign policy is a commitment by the nationalists to vigilantly safeguard national interest<sup>73</sup>. In keeping up to this commitment, and as a demonstration of her co-operation and compliance with Britain, Kenya in our view adopted and to-date, has maintained the colonial economic structures initiated by Britain. British private investments in Kenya for example, continue

to grow to the satisfaction of both countries. Kenya's compliant and co-operative behaviour towards Britain assumes that Britain will continue with her bilateral support of Kenya. This assumption is largely true as has earlier been demonstrated in Chapter Three.

From the foregoing analysis therefore, we make the observation that Kenya's dependence on Britain makes her desire, however serious, to apply the principles of non-alignment largely irrelevant. Despite her professed non-alignment, Kenya, owing to her dependency on Britain, created a strong political and military alliance with the latter if not the West as a whole. This, we submit is an act of compliance. Significant to this study is that although Kenya did not completely discard a controlled socialist economy, she favoured the western-oriented capitalist economy. She has never hated multinational corporations.

Overall then, the above analyses reveal Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the 1960s. However, we should not accept the erroneous assumption, commonly found in the more pietistic literature of the dependency genre, that such dependence is somehow immutable and allows only little if any initiative (action) for the dependent state. Perhaps Kenya's policy towards South Africa vis-a-vis that of Britain towards South Africa serves to highlight this contention as can be seen below.

#### **4.2.9. APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA: LITTLE IMPACT ON KENYA-BRITISH BILATERAL TIES**

Kenya was able to differ with Britain throughout the 1960s on the question of apartheid regime in South Africa. She constantly criticized British policy in the region. However, such criticism did not threaten Kenya-British bilateral

relations. Neither did Britain threaten to disturb any kind of economic activity with Kenya. One possible reason for this was that perhaps Britain did not view criticisms by Kenya as a direct challenge to her interests in South Africa. Secondly, Kenya herself did not push the policy differences on South Africa too far as to send alarm to Britain. Moreover, Kenya's criticism did not go beyond verbal rhetoric. For example the U.D.I. issue did not see her sever diplomatic ties with Britain. It therefore seems likely that Britain would attempt to induce its dependency's (Kenya) compliance on some issues but not on others. The question of issue salience therefore becomes very relevant when analysing Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of compliance towards Britain. Ideally, therefore, one must, while looking at Kenya's policy towards Britain based on compliance, look at the issues known to be highly salient to both Kenya and Britain, before reaching any meaningful conclusion.

Operationally, issue salience refers to the greater weight attributed by Britain to certain issues than it attaches to others. Since it is apparent that differences over how the problem of apartheid could be solved between Kenya and Britain in the 1960s did not in themselves threaten British interests in South Africa, Britain simply discounted such differences. Significant to the study is the fact that despite such differences in the 1960s, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain remained above co-operation.

### 4.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, we have analyzed Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain on different occasions in the 1960s. The conclusion reached is that throughout the 1960s Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain was one of co-operation and compliance. We have shown that compliance, as assumed

by Hypothesis Two, was greatest with respect to issues that Britain considered salient to it. This applied even to questions of principle where Kenya would not have wished to compromise her position. The U.D.I. issue is a case in point. Even where there were differences between the two countries, Kenya's behaviour towards Britain remained pragmatic and above co-operation.

In this chapter, we have also demonstrated that throughout the 1960s, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain was in line with her national interest, as assumed by Hypothesis Three. We therefore further conclude that Kenya's economic needs, apart from historical factors, had direct implications on her foreign policy behaviour towards the United Kingdom, which was exhibited through co-operation and compliance. To this extent, Hypothesis One which this chapter also set out to examine, and which assumed that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain is influenced by economic dependency on Britain has been proved to be valid. Therefore, all the three hypotheses that the chapter set out to examine have been found to be valid and are thus accepted.

The Chapter has highlighted the fact that Kenya's main problem during the 1960s was the backwardness of her economy. This threatened and indeed compromised the country's ability to play an effective role in world politics. It is this same problem that as we have tried to show, was behind her compliant and cooperative attitude or behaviour (however remotely) towards Britain. The economic backwardness, it has been demonstrated in the Chapter, completely undermined the ideological claim as pronounced in the African Socialism Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965, that it was only African Socialism that was capable of advancing the country. Instead, Kenya, for the explained political and economic reasons, embraced Western capitalism to advance the country. In this respect, even non-alignment as a principle was compromised with the apparent alliance with the West.

Finally and by way of emphasis, the conclusion reached in this Chapter is that Kenya's relations with Britain during the 1960s had the character of co-operation and compliance while defending her national interest namely economic growth and development.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### KENYA'S RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN IN THE 1970s AND 1980s

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

#### 5.2

During the 1970s and 1980s, Kenya vigorously embarked on undertaking the economic policies she had outlined, to bring about economic growth development. One such policy was diversification of sources of trade and aid. Although this policy was already in place during the 1960s, it was meaningfully implemented during the 1970s and 1980s as has been demonstrated in Chapter Three (1970s and 1980s). It is for this reason that the two periods have been examined together in one chapter to see, whether effective and widespread diversification had any effect on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

We have also put the two periods (1970s and 1980s) to constitute a whole chapter for another reason, besides making our chapter less bulky. We would like to find out whether the change of leadership from Kenyatta to Moi, which occurred during this period had any significant change in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. In other words, the Chapter specifically seeks to find out whether there was consistency or inconsistency in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the said period.

The chapter will test the validity of Hypothesis One which assumes that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is shaped by her economic dependency on Britain. The chapter also seeks to find out if Kenya exhibits greater compliance towards Britain on salient issues more than on other areas as assumed by Hypothesis Two. The chapter will also help us understand whether Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest over time, as Hypothesis Three tends to suggest. This is done by

looking at various instances of co-operation and compliance in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain specifically during the 1970s and 1980s.

We wish to emphasize here that the objectives which this chapter seeks to address are not different from those which Chapter Four sought to address. However, the difference is to be found in the fact that the specific examples or events that will be analysed here are different from those analysed in Chapter Four.

The chapter is divided into three major parts. Part one looks at Kenya's foreign policy behaviour during the 1970s. Part Two looks at the same but during the period 1980 to 1988, the time limit covered by this study. The foreign policy behaviour exhibited by Kenya during the period covered is examined again within the framework of dependency. Instances of non-co-operation (conflict) and non-compliance if any, are also looked at with a view to understanding the operative forces underlying them. They are also examined with a view to finding out whether they had any effect on Kenya's relations with Britain. Part Three is a brief conclusion of the whole Chapter.

## **5.2. FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS BRITAIN DURING THE 1970s**

During the 1970s, Kenya's need but inability to generate capital resources on a sustained basis meant that the search for external finances from a variety of sources was central to foreign policy. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the policy of diversification was undertaken quite effectively in the 1970s.

Regional organisation, though necessary, was not a major source of meaningful economic support and the reality for Kenyatta, as for all African leaders, was that capital had to be sought outside Africa and primarily on a bilateral basis.

The search for finance helps us explain Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain during the 1970s<sup>1</sup>.

In spite of the diversification policy which was being undertaken, Britain remained the most significant foreign bilateral donor<sup>2</sup>. Recognition of this dependency on Britain which also covered public investments as well as recurrent budgetary support, it has been argued, automatically made Kenya keen to diversify as much as possible its sources of funding, particularly in the 1970s<sup>3</sup>.

However, it must be re-emphasized that diversification was not intended to secure less from Britain, rather it aimed at securing more from elsewhere, especially from the western nations. Accordingly therefore, it is assumed that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, based on co-operation and compliance has not changed with the diversification. The quotation below by President Kenyatta in 1970 which reflects Kenya's behaviour of co-operation if not, compliance is worth noting. He said that:

My Government has continually affirmed its determination to build a nation based on greater welfare for all its citizens. We believe that rapid economic growth is essential to our goal ... Rapid growth requires the co-operation of other countries. We need external assistance both to finance Government development projects and to provide technical advice on managing development ... While we appreciate the benefits of this dependence, we propose to achieve greater control over our economic destiny by reducing the influence of external factors<sup>4</sup>.

The above statement by President Kenyatta is very relevant with respect to Kenya-British relations based on co-operation and compliance. Significantly, Kenyatta himself acknowledged the existence of Kenya's dependence in the above quotation. Because of heavy dependence on Britain, Kenya was not able to bring to an end her neo-colonial relations with Britain during the 1970s

and beyond. It is within these neo-colonial relations maintained by economic factors that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain partly stems from. It is the contention of this study that Kenya's decision to maintain neo-colonial ties with Britain amounts to compliance.

### 5.2.1. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON BRITISH-ASIANS

During the 1970s, co-operation and compliance was exhibited by Kenya with respect to the question of British Asians in Kenya. Between 1970 and 1971, there were 140,000 Asians remaining in Kenya out of which 61,000 were Kenyan citizens or considered themselves to be such<sup>5</sup>. Most of the rest had opted for British nationality, which was offered to them at the time of independence in 1963. Their economic, social and cultural exclusivity made them natural targets for racial and national chauvinism among some people. The government, however, did not give in to pressures in favour of discrimination particularly against the British Asians - the fact that most of the Asians were still working more than seven years after independence was proof of this<sup>6</sup>. There was also an element of self-interest, for Kenya wanted their skills, experience and capital.

During the same period that is between 1970 and 1971, about 4,000 Kenya Asian families totalling 20,000 people wanted to go to Britain at once. However, the British government was only willing to provide 1,500 entry vouchers annually not just for Kenyan but East African Asians as a whole. While Kenya and Britain accused each other of racialism and indulged in shadow-boxing, the two countries avoided direct confrontation during 1970. Significantly Kenya generally refrained from deporting the British Asians, although any person arriving in Britain under such conditions would probably have to be admitted.

In spite of a decrease in the number of citizens from other Commonwealth countries taking up available entry vouchers to Britain, permits for East African Asians with British passports were kept by Britain as a political and administrative decision under powers deriving from the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, to 1,500 heads of household per year. This Act was largely acceptable to the Kenya Government without any great opposition.

In January 1975, Kenya raised the possibility of increasing the actual quota of British Asians allowed into Britain each year from the fixed number of 1,500. This possibility was raised with the then British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan during his visit to Nairobi. However, Callaghan was opposed to this suggestion<sup>7</sup>, but the Kenya government did not pursue the issue any further.

At the beginning of 1974, Kenyatta announced that non-citizens issued with notices to quit their businesses would have to leave the country as soon as they had handed over their businesses to Kenya citizens. But in March, it was reported that there were still non-citizen traders who continued to trade 'through the back door' after their licenses had expired<sup>8</sup>. Despite this, the Kenya Government did not at any one time even contemplate expelling the Asians. Yet there always remained the possibility that Kenya could as well expel the Asians in the same way that Amin's Uganda had done.

With respect to the Asian question therefore, we reach the conclusion that Kenya continued to comply with the transfer plan of Asians with British passports. Significantly, this transfer plan was drawn by Britain. Kenya also continued to exercise compliance with respect to the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act<sup>9</sup> which was masterminded by Britain and which only allowed a maximum of 1,500 Asian heads of household to go to Britain per year. This foreign policy behaviour of Kenya, based on co-operation and compliance with Britain ensured that relations remained cordial. This policy, while serving

British interests was equally in the interest of Kenya as it kept the British willing to supply Kenya with foreign aid and private investment<sup>10</sup>. Britain as well as other Western countries especially the United States was also providing the bulk of Kenya's defence requirements<sup>11</sup>. By complying with the above Act, it can be argued that this was infact, a case of British aid being an example par-excellence of external policies affecting internal policies in Kenya.

Within the framework of co-operation and compliance based on economic dependency, it is easy to understand why again in 1976, when there were reports that the British government would be forced to give preference to British Asians from Malawi over those in Kenya and elsewhere, Kenya reacted quite moderately and diplomatically. The ministry of Home Affairs, when asked about the government's position on the issue, replied through a spokesman that: "We would certainly like Britain to take in more British Asian citizens from Kenya annually than is the case now, but we are satisfied with the present arrangements"<sup>12</sup>. The ministry spokesman added that the phasing out of British Asians in Kenya according to the government, was to continue as had been agreed. He further added that it was the hope of the Kenya government that it would be informed in advance in case of anything that would affect the existing agreement on British Asians in Kenya, such as switching of extra vouchers from Kenya to Malawi. In maintaining this kind of policy option with Britain, Kenya was actually using foreign policy as an instrument for her economic development. This foreign policy was based on co-operation and compliance. It is for similar reasons that Khapoya argues that:

Kenya's actual foreign policy behaviour throughout much of the 1960s and early 1970s is very much in keeping with her emphasis on economic development and most probably a consequence of her dependence on western capital<sup>13</sup>.

The entry of Asians even with British citizenship into Britain has always been a salient issue in British politics. This salience owes much to the fact that far from its effects on the geo-politics of the region, a large entry of Asians into Britain



was seen as adding to the problems of unemployment, housing and over-population among other problems that Britain was trying to grapple with during this time. So the fact that Kenya refrained from expelling the Asians as Amin did was in Britain's interest, but as long as Kenya continued to receive various forms of economic assistance from Britain, it can be argued that it was also in Kenya's interest.

## 5.2.2 POLICY ON BRITISH ARMS SALE TO SOUTH AFRICA: DIGNIFIED DIPLOMACY

In 1971, Njoroge Mungai, the then Kenya Foreign Minister proposed the key resolution on arms sales to South Africa. He did this at the O.A.U. Ministerial Council which preceded the O.A.U. Summit<sup>14</sup>. The resolution opposed any sale of arms to South Africa. In August, Mungai visited Nigeria to discuss the same issue and to "encourage co-operation between East and West Africa". He was a member of the Kaunda delegation which visited a number of European countries including Britain and the U.S. on the arms issue, on behalf of the O.A.U. and the Non-Aligned Summit.

Kenya did not hide her feelings but criticized Britain for her policy or proposed resumption of arms sales to South Africa. The criticism by Kenya came at the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1971<sup>15</sup>. Nevertheless, this attitude did not upset the British Prime Minister Mr. Heath as much as the attitude of other African leaders. This was probably because Kenya's criticism was put in a moderate and diplomatic manner, quite consistent with her foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain. This kind of foreign policy behaviour was further displayed when at the same Conference, Kenya agreed to join the Commonwealth Study Group on Indian Ocean security which collapsed when Britain resumed arms sales to South Africa in February<sup>16</sup>.

On the question of Rhodesia, Kenya's position at the Singapore Conference again displayed co-operative behaviour towards Britain. In a closely argued statement, Kenya said on 2 November that the proposed Rhodesian settlement was unsatisfactory, though it contained some positive aspects. But Kenya insisted that only "British military presence in Rhodesia" could make the agreement more than a "paper settlement"<sup>17</sup>.

On the question of the sale of arms to South Africa by Britain, it can be argued that the Kenyan delegation resorted, both publicly and in the corridors, to effective and dignified diplomacy to prevent Britain from pursuing her policy of entrenching further in power the obnoxious apartheid regime through supply of weapons of mass destruction, for internal oppression and external aggression against free independent Africa<sup>18</sup>. Although the British government persisted with her policy of selling arms to South Africa, this did not necessitate a change in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. This is a clear indication that Kenya preferred co-operative to conflictive behaviour towards Britain. This is probably a consequence of her economic dependency on Britain.

In commercial relations, Kenya's trend towards widening international economic relations was maintained between 1972 and 1973, but this did not affect the continuance of her cordial relations with Britain. An agreement was signed for example, on 30th January, 1972 under which the British Government assumed responsibility for the pensions of British former civil servants who served in Kenya up to the time of independence<sup>19</sup>. It is such forms of economic assistance to Kenya that ultimately, mediate Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, with respect to the latter's links with South Africa.

### 5.2.3 RENEWAL OF SPORTING LINKS WITH BRITAIN

In May 1974, Kenya broke off all sporting links with Britain because of the British Lions Rugby tour of South Africa<sup>20</sup>. The Chairman of the Kenya National Sports Council, Isaac Lugonzo, said the boycott would last until such time as the bodies controlling sports in Britain gave assurances that they would not allow her sportsmen and women to participate in activities organised by South Africa and other racist regimes. Not surprisingly, however, the ban lasted only until July when British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Joan Lestor, informed Kenyan sports officials that her Government was taking positive steps to prevent British teams playing in countries practicing racial discrimination.

Though one would have expected Kenya to maintain the ban a little longer than three months, while closely examining the Under Secretary's statement and ascertaining the truth in it, Kenya felt that it did not have to go this far. Perhaps Kenya agreed to go by the British Under Secretary's position, not because Britain had actually stopped sporting links with South Africa immediately, but because of the need to avoid sour or hostile relations with Britain. Interestingly, economic dependence relations were not affected as a result of the break. By accepting to lift the ban that soon, Kenya in our view, was exhibiting compliance.

It is important to realize that even with respect to such low areas as sports, Kenya has been ready exercise compliance with the position taken by Britain.

The fact that Kenya imposed the sporting ban only to backpeddle on this decision, before the expiry of three months is very significant for this study. This reflects the dilemma of a state, which while trying to pursue her foreign policy goals, is handicapped by her own economic weaknesses. This tactical

retreat or compliance can best be understood within the dependency framework.

Emphasis should be placed on the fact that it was not until 1980 that Britain finally agreed to accept official ban on sporting links with South Africa. This happened when the British Government confirmed its support for the Gleneagles Declaration of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on sport with South Africa and officially discouraged a British Lion Rugby team from going there; but it refused to match what France had done in enforcing the ban by refusing to grant visas<sup>21</sup>.

The foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance with Britain on issues of salience to her is in Kenya's interest since she remains Britain's largest recipient of foreign aid. Underlying this policy also is the close defence relations which are maintained but which we shall not discuss here<sup>22</sup>. Because of Kenya's positive and compliant attitude, not even the size of her economic problems are out of proportion with the means which Britain can devote to a prolonged action outside of her own frontiers, whether this means technical experts, financial aid or the military resources which can be brought to bear through the defence agreements.

#### **5.2.4 VOTING AT THE UNITED NATIONS: KENYA'S VOTING PATTERN VIS-A-VIS BRITAIN**

Although we have argued that during the 1970s, Kenya exhibited co-operation and compliance towards Britain, there were instances when non-compliance was preferred to compliance by Kenya. Such exceptional occurrences have been most likely due to different interpretations of the issues in question by the Kenya government and the British government. For example, K.G. Adar's findings on Kenya's and Tanzania's voting behaviour in the United Nations (UN)

on the issues of the Namibian independence and the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace reflect non-compliance<sup>23</sup>. Adar notes that while Kenya and Tanzania voted in favour of the issues between 1974 and 1980, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany either voted against the same issues or abstained. Adar observes that a greater voting compliance would have been expected particularly from Kenya. Adar raises the question of whether the countries concerned viewed the issues at stake as important to them. One possible reason for non-compliance by Kenya with respect to voting at the U.N. is that her approach to multilateral issues may be different from that on bilateral issues.

Another example of non-compliance with respect to voting behaviour in the U.N. is a case whereby Kenya, Cameroon, Mauritania and Iraq called for the expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. General Assembly on 30th October 1974. The resolution was not adopted because of the negative votes by France, U.S.A. and Britain<sup>24</sup>. In line with Adar's arguments, we can conclude that Kenya and Britain (as well as France and the U.S.) did not view this issue as bilaterally very significant. It is again possible that Kenya voted for South Africa's expulsion because she believed that such an action, owing to its multilateral as opposed to bilateral character, would not necessarily compromise the cordial bilateral relations between her and Britain. Moreover, since Britain has veto power, it did not probably consider votes by Kenya and other countries as being salient. Thus Britain may not have bothered which way Kenya voted. Richardson and Kegley's argument is supportive of our observation:

They argue that:

It is presumably true that a dominant country is more interested in receiving foreign leader's support on some issues than on others. Accordingly, it would more consistently and more forcefully seek the accord of its dependencies on issues that it regards as salient. Indeed, a dominant country should find that some of the dependencies concerns are of no interest to it at all<sup>25</sup>.

Along the same line of argument, Coplin observes that:

Even when an actor has substantial resources on an issue, if that issue is not ... salient to him, he is unlikely to spend the time necessary to exercise power on the issue. The relative salience of different foreign policy issues to different potentially powerful actors is one of the most important determinants ... (of) foreign policy<sup>26</sup>.

The above arguments can be used to explain why Kenya exercised no compliance with Britain when it came to voting at the United Nations on issues dealing with South Africa. With respect to the guiding proposition of this study, the salience concept determines when an economically dependent country like Kenya can comply in foreign policy decisions.

Given the fact that British economic assistance to Kenya continued quite considerably between 1974 and 1980, despite the different votes taken by the two countries in the U.N. particularly with respect to South Africa, the argument that the two countries did not view the issues at stake as important to them remains quite valid. Throughout this period, there was no strain on Kenya-British relations arising out of Kenya's voting behaviour at the U.N. Significantly, Britain continued to provide the bulk of Kenya's economic needs and defence requirements<sup>27</sup>. This was consistent with Kenya's national interest.

#### **5.2.5. THE MOI REGIME: CONTINUATION OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

In line with her foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain, President Moi's first overseas visit since occupying the presidency was to the United Kingdom in mid 1978<sup>28</sup>. Significantly it was also the first visit by a Kenyan President to the U.K. This heralded a series of subsequent tours to Britain in the spirit of co-operation and political compliance. That Moi's first

overseas visit should have been to the U.K. was not an accident but a demonstration of how important Britain was to Kenya.

On the eve of President Moi's visit to Britain, the then Kenya Minister for Foreign Affairs, Munyua Waiyaki, in a message released in Nairobi remarked that:

The most successful and well known area of co-operation between our two countries is in the fields of agriculture, industry and manpower training .... We plan to continue with co-operation with Britain and other nations in order to further strengthen our economic ties<sup>29</sup>.

Inherent in such a statement is a reflection of co-operation and therefore compliance totally geared towards the achievement of economic development. Industrial development cannot be maintained and sustained without the support of properly trained manpower, and for a less developed country like Kenya, without the support of a friendly industrialized nation like Britain.

The visit was therefore very beneficial to Kenya. Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, while paying the highest tribute to Kenya during Moi's visit to London, assured the President of continuing British aid to Kenya. But this assurance, we presuppose was made on the assumption that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain would remain unchanged. Thatcher's assurance came only hours after a group of leading bankers and industrialists outlined plans for new investment in Kenya which was running into millions of pounds. Thatcher said: "We are glad that our substantial aid programmes can play a full part in support of Kenya's own development plans"<sup>30</sup>.

Moi, while thanking Britain for her assistance to Kenya said that "British support might be of significant value to Kenya if it was conducted beyond the bilateral stage within such bodies as the World Bank and other institutions of the European Economic Community"<sup>31</sup>.

In reference to special Kenya-British ties, Moi underscored the special relationship in his own speech when he spoke of "the friendship without patronage .... nowhere tinged by exploitation" between the two countries and to the interdependence which he said "pays many human dividends in practise". Moi added that Kenya's growth since independence in 1963 was part of a joint effort or partnership endeavour between the two countries<sup>32</sup>.

However, Moi's assertion that Kenya-British friendship is without patronage is doubtful since as we have argued, British economic assistance to Kenya can be and indeed has been used as an instrument of patronage in foreign policy matters, albeit silently. A good example as seen earlier is Kenya's quick move to lift a ban on sporting links with Britain in 1974 even before its impact could be felt. What is certain in Moi's speech however, is that Kenya's policy of co-operation and compliance with Britain basically springs from the latter's role in the implementation of Kenya's national development programmes.

The foregoing analysis reveals that throughout the 1970s, Kenya was always willing to exhibit co-operation and compliance in her dealings with Britain. Perhaps the only area where there was constant non-compliance was on the question of whether or not economic sanctions should be imposed on South Africa, a position that Britain vehemently opposed but which Kenya supported. However, Kenya's position was understandable given the fact that their different interpretations of the South African question did not affect her relations with Britain. In any case the South African question assumed a multilateral dimension and not a bilateral one; this was to Kenya's advantage. Because of this, we can argue that when it came to salient issues that could directly threaten the cordial bilateral relations between Kenya and Britain, Kenya was always cautious and preferred co-operation, if not, compliance. We now turn to



the 1980s to find out what the situation was like with regard to Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain.

### 5.3. RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN IN THE 1980s

Between 1980 and 1988, the Kenyan government under the leadership of President Moi, continued to use foreign policy as the avenue for attracting the vital resources needed for economic development from Britain as well as from other Western nations. These resources as has been mentioned earlier included financial and technical assistance, foreign investments as well as trade links. The government's uppermost commitment remained largely the same; namely that of raising the living standards of Kenyans. In turn, this ensured that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, which consistently remained the leading bilateral donor, remained the same: It exhibited compliance, albeit with selectivity.

President Moi, who on succeeding the late President Kenyatta in 1978, had devised a political motto - "Nyayo" (meaning footsteps), was through this motto affirming a continuation of past policies, a determination to follow Kenyatta's successful road to political stability and economic development<sup>33</sup>. Moi introduced new activism in Kenya's foreign policy when he resumed presidential direction of foreign affairs, unlike Kenyatta who left the conduct of foreign relations to his Minister for Foreign Affairs. This was because he (Kenyatta) never travelled outside the country<sup>34</sup>. In his desire to strengthen co-operation and compliance with Britain, Moi as well as senior Kenya Government officials made a number of visits to Britain and continuously made efforts to maintain structural and functional relations with the latter even under very difficult

circumstances. In other words, there was consistency in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, during Kenyatta's as well as Moi's regimes.

As Kenya's principal source of aid, as well as its main trading partners, the Western community's ties with Kenya remained close particularly the case of Britain and the U.S. President Moi visited the latter in February 19980. His American state visit was preceded by a brief stop over in London for official talks as a follow-up to the state visit he had paid to Britain in 1979<sup>35</sup>.

In 1981, while replying to critics who complained of Kenya's foreign policy as being too pro-British and generally pro-west, President Moi explained thus:

The freedom of this Republic is real and unquestioned (sic). In the framing and pursuit of our policies we are our own masters, in no way subject to commands or intrigues from any quarter<sup>36</sup>.

Sincerely as Moi believes in the truth of such statements, it was not a view shared by all Kenyans. In our view, we would like to argue that just as Kenya was acknowledging the reality of an underdeveloped economy at home, so it had to grant the force of events beyond its control in its relations with Britain. One devise was to concentrate on mundane trade and political relations. The reality behind co-operation and compliance was that Britain, besides other Western nations was doing a lot to help Kenya solve her economic problems<sup>37</sup>. Indeed there was little doubt that for reasons of national interest, Moi was advancing rather than diminishing Kenya's pro-British orientation.

### 5.3.1 KENYA'S POLICY ON BRITISH PLANES TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA: GOING AGAINST O.A.U. RESOLUTION

From a critical point of view, Kenya's criticism of British arms sale to South Africa as noted earlier is rather paradoxical. The criticism which amounted to nothing supposedly came about because of the latter's apartheid policy. This policy in the long run made most African states to declare openly that they would have no links, directly or indirectly with South Africa, be it social, political or economic links. Kenya was one of such states<sup>38</sup>. But the paradox arises from the fact that Kenya allowed, contrary to O.A.U. resolutions, British planes, as well as other western international airlines, going to, or coming from South Africa to use her air space and her airports<sup>39</sup>. This, in our view, amounted to compliance with British economic interests.

In 1980, Kenya's Minister for Transport made a policy statement that Kenya would continue to service aircraft of other international airlines flying to and from South Africa. These included planes from London. He pointed out that Kenya Airways would face a loss of Ksh. 13 million in royalties if such contracts were cancelled, while the Government would sacrifice Kshs. 60 million in landing fees. He added that, as a civilized state, Kenya intended to honour international agreements and treaties<sup>40</sup>. This is the heart of the paradox. Kenya failed to honour O.A.U. resolution on planes to and from South Africa, which was an international agreement anyway.

The Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 18-28 June, 1980, while recalling its decision contained in CM/Res. 13(II) of 3 June 1964, re-affirmed and called on member states to take necessary steps to deny any aeroplanes or ships or any other means of communications going to or coming from South Africa, the right to fly over their territories or utilize their airports or any other facilities<sup>41</sup>.

Against this background, the decision by Kenya, which was represented at the above mentioned session to continue allowing unabatedly British planes,

among others to land in the country, on their way to and from South Africa, amounted, as earlier noted, to political compliance with salient British economic interests. Here again, Kenya's economic dependence on Britain determined her foreign policy behaviour towards the latter.

As a British dependent ally, she could not object to the use of her airspace and airports, in the style of Tanzania, by British planes to and from South Africa. Apart from the money levied from these planes, the economic assistance received from Britain and other western nations, and which far surpassed the fees from the use of her airports, constrained Kenya into allowing British planes to use her facilities.

### 5.3.2 MAINTENANCE OF DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH BRITAIN

One of Kenya's pro-British and U.S. policy critic was Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first Vice-President. Odinga and other 'radical' politicians in 1981 particularly singled out Kenya's permission to British troops to continue enjoying naval and military training facilities in Kenya. Odinga charged that the British military presence in Kenya was a clear manifestation of the continuation of neo-colonialism and called for an end to this "dangerous British imperialism"<sup>42</sup>. The Kenya government, without mentioning Odinga warned its detractors to watch out and made it clear that her policy of allowing the British troops the right to carry out military training on Kenyan soil, and which was made in 1964, would continue to be guaranteed. The government observed that the military arrangement with Britain was not a threat to national and regional security<sup>43</sup>.

The above position by the Kenya government as regards allowing the British troops the freedom to train in Kenya is a true reflection of co-operation and political compliance with issues of salience to Britain. Maintaining training ground in Kenya ensured that British investments and interests in East Africa

region was secure. For students of international relations as well as those familiar with the workings of international politics, we have argued that this kind of foreign policy behaviour exhibited by Kenya is hardly surprising. This is more so against the background that Kenya continues to be the single largest recipient of British overseas aid. So, on the basis of a realpolitik approach analysis, there was every logic in the government's policy, or so, it appeared.

In line with Odinga's criticism of Kenya's compliance with British interests, we are inclined to advance the argument that compliance, however remotely manifests itself in Kenya's inability to react to forces of imperialism and to those structures created to continue the links and perpetuate the relationship; for international relations are largely economic relations, and all other relations are dependent on the economic order that is operative. Yet as long as Kenya's national interest of economic development received British assistance, the government could not be swayed by her pro-British policy critics like Odinga.

### 5.3.3. THE NJONJO AFFAIR IN KENYA-BRITISH RELATIONS

One major development within Kenya which had major diplomatic repercussions in Kenya-British foreign relations was President Moi's charge that unnamed 'foreign powers' were plotting to replace him with an unnamed Kenyan. This shock announcement in May 1983 pointed directly at Britain<sup>44</sup>. The unnamed individual who was henceforth referred to as "the traitor" was named as Charles Njonjo in parliament by Elijah Mwangale, then Minister for Tourism<sup>45</sup>. Njonjo was by then Kenya's Minister for Constitutional Affairs and as independent Kenya's first Attorney General, he was immensely powerful in his own right.

Njonjo's visits to Britain and his contacts there became the subject of frequent gossip. He was known to be friendly with senior members of the British Foreign Office and with many Right-Wing British politicians. Before Mwangale named

Njonjo, politicians claiming to be close to the President were supplying their own elaborations of the story, implying that the traitor was a cabinet minister, with others making pointed references to the man in the 'three-piece suit' - Njonjo's way of dressing<sup>46</sup>.

Since Moi had never appointed any Marxist, or even Leftist politicians in his several Cabinets, speculation excluded the Communist nations as being behind the plot. Instead, many Kenyans began looking at Western nations as the culprits, especially at Britain because of Njonjo's long-standing and intimate links with certain British politicians and businessmen<sup>47</sup>. Suspicious fingers were also pointed at South Africa and Israel, which are British allies. Njonjo had long favoured President Banda of Malawi's policy of having links with Pretoria, and he was known to be well-disposed to the Israelis.

With suspicion focusing largely and strongly on Britain, Sir Leonard Allison, the then British High Commissioner to Kenya asked for a meeting with President Moi within three days of his first reference to the role of an unnamed foreign power. Already many politicians were asking the government to reconsider her bilateral links with Britain<sup>48</sup>. After requesting President Moi to clear the U.K. of any suspicion, Moi assured the High Commissioner that his government harboured no suspicion against Britain who, he said, he regarded as "a loyal and substantial friend of Kenya" (sic)<sup>49</sup>. Despite this private assurance, Moi on no single occasion made any public disclaimer of the allegations against Britain - even though some of his own ministers had mentioned it as the 'foreign power' engaged in allegedly plotting with Njonjo.

As pressure mounted for the "traitor" to be named and ruthlessly dealt with, together with the foreign power supporting him, Njonjo who incidentally happened to be in Britain<sup>50</sup> at the time, issued a statement denying any involvement in a plot, or that he was the 'traitor' referred to by Moi.

President Moi's private assurance to the British High Commissioner that the U.K. was not suspect in the eyes of his government, in our judgment amounted to political compliance undertaken implicitly to ensure the continuation of co-operation between the two countries. However, we would like to observe that this act of political compliance was not a matter of choice. Most appropriately it was one of necessity. Our contention arises from the difficulty in understanding the disparity between President Moi's private assurance on the one hand, and the continued attack on, if not serious accusations against Britain by none other than his own cabinet ministers. The disparity becomes even more glaring when we realise that Moi did not call upon his ministers after meeting the High Commissioner to stop their attacks on Britain<sup>51</sup>. When all the facts concerning the Njonjo-British affair are logically analyzed, we can then see clearly how the weaker states like Kenya can find their hands tied up in a situation of dependency where the dominant state (in this case Britain) can afford to play the game of "the carrot and the stick".

Under normal circumstances, governments throughout the world have never been willing to compromise on issues touching on national security. Accusations against outside governments trying to destabilise another government have all too often led to hostilities or even severing of diplomatic ties between independent states. The fact that the Kenya government was not even willing to prove the exact role of Britain in Njonjo's plot to overthrow the government, merely lends credibility to our earlier assertion that Kenya, owing to her dependency on Britain, had very little choice, if any on this issue. Although Moi appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to probe Njonjo's activities, finding the role of Britain or any other government for that matter in the affair was not a subject of the Commission of Inquiry. So eventually when the Commission found Njonjo guilty of trying to overthrow Moi's government, it could not name the country that was involved in the plot.

Our view, is that by playing down any possible role of Britain in the Njonjo affair, Kenya was exhibiting her foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and political compliance with Britain. This political compliance was the result of Moi's meeting with the British High Commissioner, who on behalf of his government, had urged Kenya to clear Britain of any possible involvement<sup>52</sup>.

The Kenya government's reaction towards the U.K. following the accusations of its involvement in the plot to overthrow the Kenya government contrast very sharply, for example with the government's swift action against Norway in 1990<sup>53</sup>. When the Norwegian Ambassador to Kenya, Dahl, appeared in court to listen to charges against Koigi Wamwere who had been in exile in Norway, the government did not take kindly to this move which it viewed as an extension of sympathy by Norway to Koigi. Because of this sympathy to a man who had been charged with treason, Kenya promptly severed diplomatic relations with Norway. In breaking off the relations, Kenya alleged that Norway engaged in illegal activities to destabilize the Kenyan Government<sup>54</sup>. This may be partly explained by the fact that in terms of economic and even military dependence, Norway, is much less important to Kenya than Britain. Therefore, whereas the government could afford not to exercise compliance in her relations with Norway, this could not be the same in her relations with Britain. The cost of such an action presumably would have been too much to bear.

The same argument can also be applied to Kenya government's decision to break off diplomatic ties with Israel earlier in 1973. Israel had annexed the Palestinian land and in line with the O.A.U. call, Kenya severed her diplomatic links with Israel<sup>55</sup>. Here again, we may advance the argument that the costs to Kenya were not as great as in a case where the same action could have been taken against Britain or the other major Western powers whose economic support to Kenya is quite enormous.



### 5.3.4 ACCOMMODATION OF KENYAN POLITICAL EXILES IN LONDON

In 1985, Kenya's relations with Britain was slightly jarred by the refusal of the British government to extradite 'dissident' Kenyans in London, or at least, to put a stop to their activities there. After being officially informed by the British government through its High Commission in Nairobi that the "so called" "dissidents" could not be legally extradited to Kenya, and neither could the British government restrict their access to the press which enjoys overwhelming freedom in Britain, the Kenya government simply backed down and did not pursue the matter any further. This was despite the fact that the Kenyan leadership believed that the country's sovereignty was being threatened.

Until 1988, Britain remained Kenya's closest foreign ally, and while the former continued to play a major role in the affairs of the Commonwealth, she also continued to give more economic aid to Kenya than any other country in the world. By 1985, the total amount of British aid to Kenya since independence was £440 million sterling<sup>56</sup>. An additional £6.5 million sterling was donated in 1985 in support of existing capital investments. Much of Britain's technical co-operation by 1985 was in the form of manpower aid, supplementing the local salaries of 180 British staff and providing 44 fully UK-funded technical co-operation officers directly employed by the Ministry of Overseas Development. Against such a background, it becomes less problematic to understand why Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is characterized by co-operation and compliance.

In 1987, the issue of Kenyan exiles in London again surfaced. Many political observers believed that the presence of Kenyan exiles in London, at a time when Kenya had launched a full scale crackdown against 'dissidents' everywhere would lead to low relations between the two countries. The British

High Commission took the initiative once again to explain to the Kenya government that exiles in Britain were protected under the United Nations Human Rights Law of which Britain was a signatory<sup>57</sup>. The Kenya government therefore did not ask for their repatriation after consultations with the British High Commission, even though it showed a lot of concern over the issue.

Incidentally, during this time, the British press was highlighting damaging reports of the Aids disease in Kenya<sup>58</sup>. Believing the stories to be true, the British Ministry of Defence decided to ban British troops from Mombasa and Malindi because of the Aids scare<sup>59</sup>. The action by the Defence Ministry had implicit serious political and even more, economic implications particularly on Kenya's tourism industry. The move was equally dangerous to Kenya's international image. However, the ban was not eventually effected at the intervention of the British High Commissioner to Kenya<sup>60</sup>.

What is important for our study is that Kenya chose to play down these otherwise disturbing incidents. Kenya's ability not to allow such differences to lead to sour relations with Britain is arguably an act of co-operation and a show of compliance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, while maintaining a pragmatic approach to foreign policy issues, did not issue any serious criticism against Britain. The assumption underlying this foreign policy option is that in the long run, it ensures that Kenya continues to receive the much needed British assistance to develop her economy. This is consistent with her national interest.

If the economic factor was not a major determinant of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, it is reasonable to assume that Kenya could have reacted with some 'reasonable' hostility to Britain's decision to accommodate Kenyan political exiles on both occasions in 1984 and 1987. Interestingly giving accommodation to Kenyan political exiles led to war of words between

Kenya and Norway in 1987 and threatened to tear apart the diplomatic relations between them which were finally broken by Kenya in 1990. Indeed the issue of political exiles has always led to conflicts between Kenya and her neighbour Uganda<sup>61</sup>.

Kenya has been quick to severely criticize Uganda whenever the latter even gives passage to Kenyan political exiles. It is for the same reason that after the 1982 abortive coup in Kenya, her relations with Tanzania were very low chiefly because Tanzania had granted asylum to those who were involved in the coup attempt, among them Hezekia Ochuka<sup>62</sup>. It is only after their repatriation that relations improved again. This repatriation was part of an agreement that also saw Kenya repatriate Tanzanian political exiles.

If therefore, one compares Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain and that towards her neighbours or Norway particularly on the issue of accommodating political exiles, the conclusion one makes is that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is characterized by co-operation and political compliance. It is this kind of policy option brought about by massive British economic assistance to Kenya that makes the relationship to be very special. Indeed Kenyan leadership has always been conscious of the fact that it must maintain a working and political relationship with Britain for the good of the country.

The necessity for co-operation with Britain was further emphasized in May 1988, when the then Minister of State in the Office of the President, Burudi Nabwera, told Parliament that unless British Press stops attacking Kenya and her people, Kenya shall reconsider her relationship with the British people<sup>63</sup>. Nabwera was reacting to a report published by Britain's "Sunday Times" newspaper which had attacked Kenya over human rights issue. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation dismissed Nabwera's statement,

noting that the issue did not arise and affirmed that "the relations between Kenya and Britain continue to be excellent"<sup>64</sup>. The "Sunday Times" had specifically branded Kenya as a country whose justice had been eroded<sup>65</sup>. The ministry's swift action was reflective of Kenya's policy of compliance with Britain, born out of dependency. It emphasized that Kenya wished to perpetuate political compliance with Britain. It is a policy that has consistently worked well for her economic and political interests.

#### 5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined consistency with respect to Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain between 1970 and 1988, based on economic dependency. We have found out in the course of our analysis that Kenya consistently and persistently pursued the same policy vis-a-vis Britain on issues of salience to the latter. The chapter also set out to examine the effect of Kenya's dependency on Britain, on her foreign policy behaviour towards the latter. We have shown that as suggested by Hypothesis One, there is a direct linkage between Kenya's foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance towards Britain with her quest for economic development. Since economic assistance was forthcoming from Britain, Kenya opted for co-operative and compliant working relationship with Britain. This policy is based on the following factors:

1. It enhances economic development and thus quite in line with the country's national interest.
2. It helps Kenya to continue getting more British assistance.

The findings also support Hypothesis Three which assumes that Kenya pursues cordial relations with Britain as a strategy for her economic development. Economic development is in Kenya's national interest. The economy of Kenya

which is marked by unbridled state and private capitalism in close co-operation with Britain and other external associates has allowed rapid economic growth in the country. Under such circumstances, Kenya was quite content to pursue a domestic policy of peace, love and unity and a foreign policy of co-operation and compliance with Britain. Although critics may point out that such a domestic policy was never successfully pursued, that is not our concern here.

The findings further show that as assumed by Hypothesis Two, compliance and co-operation by Kenya was mostly directed on issues of salience to Britain, but not on non-salient issue areas.

The conclusion reached therefore is that one predictable result of the officially sponsored campaign to promote and maintain co-operation and political compliance with Britain is the seeming close British involvement in promoting Kenya's economic interests.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The major purpose of this study was to examine the prevailing economic factors and how they influence Kenya's foreign policy behaviour, which is manifest in the form of co-operation and political compliance towards Britain. In this framework, we used economic dependency as our unit of analysis. During the period under review, 1963 to 1988, the evidence consistently showed that asymmetrical economic vulnerability of Kenya led to her compliance, albeit selective, with British salient foreign policy preference.

However, there were few occasions when non-compliance was exhibited by Kenya, for example, on the question of imposing economic sanctions against South African which was supported by Kenya but opposed by Britain. Nevertheless, non-compliance it has been shown, was almost always exhibited after the realization that this would not affect the warm relations between the two countries. In other words, this happened mostly with regard to non-salient issues to Britain.

In keeping with the notion of issue salience, it is very important to note that accord with Britain was higher on issues touching on bilateralism. This result may reflect Britain's willingness to accede to the wishes of Kenya on issues the former considered less salient but which Kenya perceived to be important for her national interest.

Our findings also indicate that Kenya's policy option towards Britain was also influenced by the relatively cordial relations between the two countries. Underlying this cordiality was the massive economic assistance that Kenya was getting from Britain. Because of economic factors, Kenya has chosen to take

what might be called a *realpolitik* approach. This approach according to Samuel M. Makinda is based on the assumption that state's own interest provides the spring of action<sup>1</sup>.

For the purpose of this study, three hypotheses were used to guide the analysis. In order for us to provide a clear picture of what has been done in this study, we have given the summary of each hypothesis together with the findings.

However, even if we shall have done this, the question that scholars will still want to ask is: How can this study help us to understand future foreign policy behaviour? Is it possible to predict with certainty the course it will take? In our attempt to answer these questions, some policy recommendations have been offered. We do not assume however, that the policy recommendations we have provided are the only available or viable ones. Nevertheless, we hope that they would meaningfully shed some light on what can be done, in order for Kenya to continue pursuing foreign policy goals that she can possibly promote in her relations with Britain. Such policy options should meaningfully serve her own national interest.

### **6.1.1 HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS**

#### **Hypothesis One**

Hypothesis One assumed that British economic assistance to Kenya shapes Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. In other words, the hypothesis assumed that co-operation and political compliance exhibited by Kenya towards Britain, is the direct result of Kenya's economic needs.

Our findings indicate that Kenya pursues the foreign policy behaviour of co-operation with Britain because this has helped her to attract more British foreign investments, financial and technical assistance, as well as immense benefits from her trading relations with Britain. The findings also indicate that Kenya exhibited political compliance towards Britain for the same economic considerations. Kenya also chose the path of political compliance to avoid being branded by Britain as a socialist or 'radical' state; a position which would have greatly jeopardised her political and economic relations with Britain. The hypothesis was supported by the fact that overtime, British economic assistance to Kenya was more than that given to the latter by any other country. At the same time, Britain consistently remained Kenya's leading trading partner. Interestingly during the same period, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain on salient issues, consistently revealed a co-operative and compliant attitude.

The hypothesis is therefore widely applicable, given the observation that Kenya consistently directed more co-operation than conflict towards Britain. This applicability is further enhanced by the fact that even where there were differences on principle like the South African question, Kenya co-operative behaviour to the U.K. did not drop to a very low level. Kenya co-operative and compliant behaviour towards the U.K. therefore consistently rose during the period covered.

## **Hypothesis Two**

Hypothesis Two assumed that Kenya exhibits greater compliance toward Britain on issues that are salient to the latter. The assumption was that Kenya's dependency makes her foreign policy behaviour compatible with or accommodative of issues of direct interest to Britain.

The findings indicate that overtime, the relationship between Kenya's economy and British assistance has indeed mediated Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain on salient issues. Consequently Kenya has tended to exhibit more co-operation and compliance on issues that are salient to Britain. Kenya has consistently refrained from pursuing goals that could lead to "cool" bilateral relations with Britain. In this study, we have treated anything that could lead to break-up of Kenya-British diplomatic relations as a salient issue. So far Kenya has never allowed this to happen by way of exhibiting co-operation and compliance whenever the relations were threatened.

The findings also indicate that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour has been compatible with or accommodative of British interests. For example, we found out that although Kenya is a non-aligned country, it has always practised what some scholars have referred to as "Western oriented non-alignment"<sup>2</sup>, a policy which favours the British interests as well as those of the other Western powers. We have, for example, noted in Chapter Four, that under pressure from Britain and the United States, the Kenya government actually convened the Limuru Conference where socialist minded politicians or "radicals" were rooted out of the government. This favoured capitalist Britain. This way, it is apparent that even the domestic policy was mediated to please Britain, as well as other Western Powers.

By blending her foreign policy behaviour to favour the British interest, Kenya is facing the stark reality of international politics, where the weaker states' economic, political and other institutions remain vulnerable to influences and pressures from outside powers. Put in other words, Kenya finds herself mystified in economic insecurity, evidenced by the domination of her economy by British and other foreign firms. This insecurity transcends the economic boundaries and spills over into the political field. Our findings therefore show that the Hypothesis is valid.

It is interesting to observe that despite the fundamental differences adopted by the two countries with regard to South Africa, Kenya did not generate any recordable patterns of conflicts to Britain. Whereas Kenya had cut off trading and diplomatic links with South Africa and actually "condemned" Britain for allowing such links to continue with the racist regime, such a move did not affect Kenya-British ties. Although the fact that Kenya was able to differ with Britain on such an issue, contrary to our findings, shows to some extent Kenya's external political economy and legitimacy in conducting her foreign relations with Britain, we should not lose sight of the fact that bilateral relations were not at stake. In fact the issue was not salient to Britain. If such a difference would have pushed Britain to review her bilateral relations with Kenya, perhaps Kenya would have behaved differently. In fact in our view, the 'condemnation' was no more than rhetorical.

With respect to the two countries' different policies vis-a-vis South Africa, it appears that Britain was not greatly affected by Kenya's support for economic sanctions on South Africa which Britain opposed anyway. Probably, Britain felt that Kenya's support for the sanctions, just like the other African states, would not affect British economic interests in South Africa after all.

Nevertheless, it is significant to note that in Kenya-British relations, co-operation and political compliance on the one hand and economic development on the other, based on British assistance are necessarily interlinked. Where there was non-compliance on salient issues, we can use the term "odd periods" to refer to such occasions. This allowance is always provided for in foreign policy. However, during the period covered by this study, we did not come across such an occasion worth mentioning.

### Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis Three assumed that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest. It is hypothesized that because Kenya's national interest (need for economic development) is served, the need for co-operation and political compliance becomes even greater. The hypothesis further assumed that it is primarily because her national interest is served that Kenya has maintained consistency in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain.

Our findings have clearly indicted that Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is consistent with her national interest. This is based on the fact that since independence, Kenya has continued to reflect co-operative and compliant behaviour towards Britain. This has immensely contributed to her commendable development records during the period under review, to the point where she has become "an economic giant" in the East African region. Compared with her East African neighbours, Kenya's economic development will no doubt enhance Kenya's capacity to participate in international affairs.

The findings further show that on the few occasions when Kenya exhibited non-compliance in her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain, this was also in line with her national interest. For example the O.A.U. supported economic sanctions against South Africa which Kenya supported in order to maintain functional relationships with the O.A.U. member states. But equally significant is that she only did this after weighing all the probabilities and after ascertaining that such an action would not on the other hand jeopardise the interests of Britain. Therefore at any given time, her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain ensured that structural and functional relationships between the two countries remained warm.

However, our findings have also revealed that there are times when Kenya's principles that should be pursued in her national interests are compromised. For example her refusal to break ties with the U.K. while beneficial to her, nevertheless compromised her continental image as a strong supporter of the liberation of South Africa. To this extent therefore, the hypothesis is found to be limited with respect to certain questions of national interest. But it must be emphasized that this limitation, as a matter of fact did not run counter to Kenya's top and overriding national interest - that of economic development. Nevertheless, the limitation serves to highlight the dilemma of Kenya's dependency on Britain.

The hypothesis has however been found to be widely valid. Because of her foreign policy behaviour, Britain continues to expand her economic interests in Kenya, an undertaking which is also quite beneficial to Kenya. Kenya's co-operative policy behaviour toward Britain was perhaps the most fundamental reason why she was able to convince the British as well as the United States to stop supplying Somalia with arms during the Somali-Ethiopia conflict in 1977 and 1978. Since Somalia was also a great threat to Kenya's sovereignty, the decision by the two powers not to sell weapons of mass destruction to Somalia was in Kenya's national interest.

Out of the three hypotheses that we chose for this study, hypothesis one, which was our working hypothesis, according to our findings, was able to produce generalizations that can be consistently applied overtime. In terms of consistency, the first hypothesis was more applicable than the other two. As has been demonstrated, the generalization was based on the fact that the Kenya government continuously pursued a pragmatic foreign policy behaviour towards Britain between 1963 and 1988. In a nut shell, the foreign policy hypothesis (Hypothesis One) predicts that Kenya's asymmetrically vulnerable economy will lead her to comply with salient British political preferences.

We believe that this study has revealed evidence of a positive relationship between economic vulnerability and foreign policy compliance for much of the period covered. There is therefore more reason to assume that asymmetric economic interdependence can sometimes be a potent political resource for the dominant partner.

Without prejudging the roles of unexamined factors, it nevertheless seems likely that some non-economic factors influenced Kenya's behaviour towards Britain. For example, Kenya may have been more compliant in the 1960s because the military agreement it had made with Britain in 1964 ensured her physical safety from Somalia irredentism. Another factor could have been due to British support for the ruling elite. This study has not attempted to test such political influences on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. But the results presented here leave room for speculation that factors other than the three economic-related determinants - trade, investments and aid (financial and technical assistance) were at work.

The three hypotheses have important policy implications that deserve to be mentioned. From these hypotheses, we have been able to derive several observations that have meaningfully contributed to the significance of this study.

#### **6.1.2. Contribution of the Study**

We stated in Chapter One that although much has been written about Kenya's foreign policy towards the Western nations generally, scholars have already ignored focusing on the bilateral relations between Kenya and Britain.



In particular there has been no systematic and elaborate study on Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. This study therefore contributes meaningfully to our understanding of inter-state relations, particularly the relations between the underdeveloped (or the developing) and the developed states. The study also provides some modest contributions to the field of international relations in general. It in particular highlights some of the constraints that developing countries face in the formulation of their foreign policies and how they can go about them while preserving their vital national interests.

We found out that Kenya's concerns with regard to co-operation and political compliance was more influenced by her underdeveloped status. Specifically, the findings indicated that between 1963 and 1988, Kenya consistently exhibited co-operation vis-a-vis Britain. Political compliance was also considerably exhibited except in the few instances that have been mentioned. Such exceptions were particularly to be found in cases where Kenya preferred to act collectively with the other O.A.U. member states as well as the other non-aligned states at the U.N. They revolved mostly around non-salient issues.

This policy of co-operation and political compliance was pursued because of Kenya's need for economic development. We therefore found out that enhancement of co-operation and compliance with Britain in bilateral relations promotes Kenya's economic growth and this might lead to development. Because development is quite significant to Kenya's external image it is little wonder that irrespective of their slight differences over South Africa, Kenya therefore maintained cordial relations with Britain through co-operation and compliance. It can therefore be argued that Kenya's economic concerns were more important to her than the issues related to South Africa.

Second, the findings indicate that both Kenya and Britain have persistently preferred co-operation to suit their national interests. Whereas Kenya's economy has been able to benefit from British aid, investments and trade between the two countries, Britain, besides benefiting from the trading links, also enjoys the use of Kenyan soil for her military training facilities. British investments in Kenya are also beneficial to both the British individuals with such investments and Britain as a country.

As indicated earlier, the relations between Kenya and Britain can at times be low keyed, but above hostility, and instead become co-operative and collaborative. This was shown, for example by Kenya's readiness to engage in direct negotiations with Britain and hold face to face talks in order to achieve a workable formula in solving the problem of apartheid; one area where the two countries have always differed.

It is on record that President Moi extensively dwelt on this issue during his London visit in 1987 with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The latter visited Kenya in 1988 and the issue was again a very important topic. The Kenyan involvement in this diplomatic exercise was largely, a state-interest-affair.

The findings clearly show that Kenya, while holding to her principled stand of support for the liberation struggles, has at the same time been concerned with her own economic and security needs, a factor that cannot allow her to entertain any of entanglement in her bilateral relations with Britain. For Kenya, Britain continues to offer substantial hope for its own economic arrangements. This is why Kenya showed a readiness to co-operate with Britain, notwithstanding Britain's refusal to stop arms sales to and trade links with South Africa, as well as support for economic sanctions. Thus the issues which came to dominate and, in the end, to cause co-operation and compliance in Kenya-British relations was the need for economic development and security.

Third, the findings indicate that despite Kenya's attempt at diversification, her dependency on the British economic system is still inescapable. For the foreseeable future, our analysis reveals that the economic requirements of Kenya make co-operation and political compliance with Britain an indispensable element in her foreign and domestic policies. With the present signs of continuing economic decline in her economic position, these needs are more likely to increase than to diminish.

A different analysis, taking a more dynamic view of the interaction between the two countries suggests that co-operation and political compliance with Britain is sometimes voluntarily preferred by Kenya because it serves her national interest. Continuation of this foreign policy behavior remains a high possibility even if substantial differences were to crop up.

But both the above analyses eventually boil down to the same thing, that co-operation and political compliance are inevitable elements in inter-state relations, where the end result is to achieve economic development or better still, to serve national interest.

### **6.1.3. Policy Recommendations**

Kenya and Britain already enjoy good relations between them. This is manifest in the exchange of visits between the two countries even at the highest level. Notable among these are the visits made to London by President Moi in 1979 and 1987 and the one made by Prime Minister Thatcher to Nairobi in 1988. There has been co-operation on the economic, military, and cultural fronts including the granting of scholarships to Kenyans to study in Britain.

However, despite the great economic assistance that Kenya continues to receive from Britain as well as other friendly developed nations, Kenya's economy is not yet developed. This leaves room for her foreign policy choices towards Britain to continue to be compromised. In order to undertake independent foreign policy choices towards Britain while at the same time deriving economic benefits from the latter, we offer the following recommendations.

First, Kenya has to tackle the issue of economic under-development which has more often than not compromised her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain. Such compromise, we have noted, springs from her dependency on British assistance (financial and technical), investments and trade relations. Although the future will be challenging, Kenya should be encouraged by the results of the development efforts she has so far achieved.

It should be more serious than hitherto, in tackling her economic problems because the basic economic and social foundation for accelerated development in the future has already been established. For example, Kenya has the necessary physical infrastructure for such an undertaking.

Going by the past experiences, Kenya, like the rest of Africa, should realise that it is very much on its own and must find a solution to its own problem. It should realise that Britain, like the other developed countries, is only interested in pursuing its national interests even at the expense of weak states like Kenya. International issues, particularly extending development assistance to poor countries seems to be receiving less attention from the developed countries. In view of this fact, Kenya should gradually move away from relying on British aid (as well as aid from the other developed nations) and that whether the aid comes or not, the central focus should be on how to develop the country through the citizens' own efforts.

We are not arguing here that Kenya need not value the support it gets from Britain as well as other donors in the form of development assistance. The support has significantly helped, even if in the short term, to strengthen Kenya's economy, which now needs to be based on accelerated industrialization. Nevertheless, there is urgent need for Kenya, to carefully and gradually reduce her reliance on foreign assistance in the management of her economy. With adequate, but sincere external support, Kenya can try to get out of this dependency on foreign assistance.

One way of doing this is to rely more greatly on private investment. And the focus should not just be on foreign, but even more, on domestic investment. To this extent, the Kenya government should give the maximum and necessary attention to the measures that would promote such investments. Such measures should include the removal of exchange control regulations, the elimination of administrative redtape, discouragement and elimination of corrupt practises and more importantly, strengthening investor confidence in Kenya's economy.

It is the contention of this study also, that Kenya has the potential to graduate from foreign aid dependency syndrome through promotion of trade, not only with Britain and the other developed nations, but also with developing nations. Indeed, emphasis should switch to promotion of regional trade. In our opinion therefore, trade and investment, not aid, is needed to make Kenya's economy thrive.

Our recommendation that Kenya should stop relying on foreign aid arises from our belief that this will have direct implications for the kind of foreign policy behaviour she will pursue vis-a-vis Britain and other nations. There is no gainsaying the fact that only if Kenya's need for economic development stops

relying on British aid, can she meaningfully further her foreign policy goal of independence vis-a-vis Britain. By reducing her dependency on Britain, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain will no longer be grossly compromised. This means that she will only exercise co-operation, as opposed to compliance with British interests if she feels that, this is also in line with her own interests. This feeling should not be constrained by any external factor like dependency.

In other words, a strong economy devoid of British assistance will enable Kenya to freely choose whether or not she can co-operate and comply with issues of salience to Britain. Only then will Kenya's political sovereignty become meaningful and avoid being dominated and exploited by imperialist forces; only then will Kenya stop being a victim of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination. Consequently, her capacity to accomplish her domestic and foreign policy objectives will not be adversely affected. In other words, if Kenya is economically developed enough, she will maintain her favourable foreign policies with formal authority.

It is in Kenya's interest, therefore, to disengage from deleterious economic dependency relations with Britain (as well as other developed countries) and set up others which are based on inter-dependence in areas of mutual benefit.

Secondly, Kenya should continue to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy vis-a-vis Britain. Such a policy assumes that non-compliance will also be exhibited by Kenya if this will serve her national interest. In other words, Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain should not compromise her own interest.

Thirdly, since our findings indicate that Kenya imports more from Britain in value than it exports to it, the government should use its diplomatic machinery to persuade Britain to allow more Kenyan goods to be exported there. This means

that Kenya should use her foreign policy vigorously to ensure she benefits more from her bilateral trade with Britain. Foreign policy should therefore be used to redress the trade imbalance between the two countries.

Lastly Kenya should sincerely carry further aid diversifications than the present level reveals. This will effectively reduce her dependency on Britain even further. This recommendation derives its validity from the near certainty that Kenya's dependency on British aid will persist for a while. From a practical point of view, this dependency cannot stop overnight. Through diplomatic negotiations, such diversification could be intensified with countries like China, South Korea and Taiwan which have been classified as the 'Newly Industrialised Countries'. This will also enable Kenya to borrow a leaf from them.

As noted earlier, Kenya does not comply wilfully. The power behind this is in large measure economic. Economic liberalisation is therefore, as vital as political freedom.

In this spirit, Kenya should call on Governments, international institutions and voluntary agencies to give priority to increasing financial resources to support Kenyan efforts towards economic liberalisation and independent economic development. This, we believe, is the route to genuine inter-dependence and represents the best hope for a just and co-operative future of the two countries.

### **Development Objectives**

Briefly therefore, the development objectives which should be pursued through co-ordinated action are:-

1. The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only on Britain.
2. The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration. In this case, the efforts by the three East African heads of state (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) to revive the East African Community should be encouraged and transformed into a reality.
3. The mobilisation of available resources aimed at promoting the implementation of national, regional and inter-state policies.
4. Securing international co-operation through concerted action within the framework of our strategy for economic liberalisation.

We would strongly recommend that Kenya should not just invent policies, but should go out to implement them to the hilt. Kenya should have policies and visions that are aimed at acquiring a scientific and technological potential needed for competition and survival in the harsh socio-economic arena of the 21st Century. Kenya should be more aggressive in its approach to the use of research results and the 'Jua Kai' sector which is considered the measure of the country's real technological potential innovations. But Kenya should go beyond the 'Jua Kali' sheds which was at least a positive move indicating that the government recognised the sector's potential in putting the country on the path to sustainable development.

Our policy makers should face the stark reality that in order to survive in a fast changing world, Kenya must wake up from its slumber and adhere to the slogan - "manufacture or die".



## ENDNOTES

1. Samuel M. Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy", Third World Quarterly 5(2) (April, 1983), p. 5.
2. Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 17 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984-1985), p. B274.

## APPENDIX I

Below are the model questions in the questionnaire which guided our oral and informal interviews and discussions with some past and present Kenya Government officials (including ex-cabinet ministers and senior civil servants in ministries relevant to the present study, especially Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation). The oral interviews and informal discussions were carried out in an attempt to get information pertaining to Kenya's interpretation of foreign policy behaviour of co-operation and compliance based on her (Kenya's) economic dependency on Britain.

### Questionnaire

1. What is Kenya's official position on co-operation and compliance with Britain?
2. Why does Kenya exhibit co-operation and compliance? Or What are the perceived advantages of co-operation and compliance in terms of the pursuit of national interests/goals/objectives (particularly economic development)?
3. How has co-operation and compliance with Britain been manifested by Kenya?
4. Some scholars and politicians have asserted that Kenya's political independence is there only in theory, but not in actual foreign policy behaviour (towards Britain). What is your reaction to this?
5. What factors, if any constrain Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain?
6. Looking at Kenya's foreign policy behaviour, one can argue that Kenya exhibits more co-operation and compliance towards Britain than Norway. How would you react to this?
7. Following President Kenyatta's death in 1978, what changes, if any took place in Kenya-British foreign relations between that period and 1988?

8. Do you agree or disagree with the assumption that Kenya's dependence on British assistance for her economic development necessarily compromises her ability/willingness to undertake decisions that may run counter to British national interests? Explain.
9. In what way might Kenya undertake independent foreign policy choices towards Britain?
10. Generally what would you say is the impact of economic dependency on the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Britain?

## APPENDIX II

The following are summaries of the response that we received while carrying out our oral interviews and informal discussions. The names of the persons interviewed have been withheld due to their request for anonymity.

1. Kenya's official position is that it is ready to co-operate with Britain as a friendly nation. Compliance with British interests should also advance Kenya's own interests. However, Kenya has made it known that this co-operation and compliance must not compromise her sovereignty.
2. Kenya, wishing to develop her economy and generally improve the welfare of her citizens co-operates and complies on the belief that this will be more beneficial. Co-operation and compliance not only with Britain, but also with the other developed Western nations was seen as the most suitable posture for the achievement of these important goals. In adopting this foreign policy behaviour, Kenya saw the opportunity to promote her economic status.
3. Kenya has manifested this by:
  - a) Directing more co-operation and compliance towards Britain than conflict, for instance, on the question of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia in 1965.
  - b) Accepting the use of diplomacy as the most appropriate means of solving any misunderstanding that may develop between the two countries. Diplomatic solutions are usually accepted and honoured.
  - c) She has, infact, actively pursued a policy of co-operation with Britain in all spheres of life.
  - d) She has worked closely with Britain on touchy issues like the need to maintain Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

e) Kenya has allowed Britain to use her soil for tropical military training despite her claim of being non-aligned. For this, Kenyans receive military training from British military institutions. She has continued to protect this military arrangement with Britain despite dissenting voices from those opposed to the plan.

4. The present international system is such that the power and influence of a nation depends almost entirely on its economic and military might. Without these two variables, a country's power - that is the ability to influence affairs for her own good - is obviously limited. Unfortunately, this is very true for Kenya. Despite her efforts to develop the economy, Kenya is still an underdeveloped country and her military capability is insignificant, to say the least. These factors obviously militate against Kenya's political independence. Her ability to pursue independent foreign policy behaviour towards Britain can therefore be compromised. But to argue that Kenya's independence in terms of foreign policy decisions towards Britain is non-functional is wrong. Indeed Kenya has always emphasised to the whole world that her sovereignty is not for disgoring. There are occasions, however few, that she has remained firm on decisions she has taken regardless of the British position. Infact it should be clear to all that despite Kenya's policy of co-operation and compliance, she is not a stooge of Britain. Kenya will not co-operate and comply at the expense of her sovereignty. Kenya must be recognised as an independent state and a full member of the United Nations whose capacity to decide on her own is paramount. Kenya's co-operation and compliance is exercised within the following criteria:

- a) Independence in policy
- b) Undertaking to promote the country's economy. Kenya will continue to observe these as the guiding criteria of co-operation and compliance with Britain.

5. The constraining factors are largely historical, military and economic in nature. Kenya's colonial ties with Britain have been a significant source of influence. Because of this, there is a close identity linguistically and culturally. The same applies to education. Language has played quite an important role in the determination of all forms of exchanges between Kenya and Britain. All these can act as constraints in one way or another in the pursuit of foreign policy towards Britain. The role of economic and military factors is overwhelming. To the extent that Kenya depends on Britain for her economic and military well being, the influence on her foreign policy behaviour towards Britain is apparent.
6. First and foremost, this is a function of Kenya's historical background. Compared with Norway, Britain has put a lot of foreign investments in Kenya right from colonial days. Her economic and military assistance to Kenya far outweighs that from Norway. Naturally therefore, realism demands that co-operation and compliance be directed more towards Britain than Norway. In any case, Britain is far more developed than Norway. Whoever pays more demands more.
7. Kenya-British relations grew from strength to strength between 1963 and 1988. President Moi's government did not introduce any changes in the relationship. If anything the only change noticeable was one of style, not substance. Unlike Kenyatta, President Moi introduced new activism in the relations by making official trips to London which Kenyatta, perhaps due to old age did not do. Otherwise Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain has been characterized by consistency. This is why Moi adopted the "Nyayo call" - meaning following in the footsteps of Kenyatta both in foreign and domestic policies.
8. There is a general agreement that dependence by Kenya on British assistance more or less compromises her capacity to undertake decisions that might jeopardise British interests. However, the compromise is only to a tolerable level, a level that does not

threaten the existence of Kenya as a state. The fact that the pursuit of independent decisions require the necessary power (particularly economic and military) to back it up cannot be gainsaid. Since Kenya's economic and military power is limited, her inability to go against salient British national interests may be understood along such lines.

9. First, Kenya may need to further reduce her dependency on Britain through effective diversification both towards the East and the West. She should be ready to persuade other friendly nations like Norway and China to provide her with more aid. Trade and investment missions should be sent to other emerging powers like South Africa so as to diffuse the present level of concentration on Britain. This should be extended to other countries like those of Scandinavia, China and Latin America. Above all, the government should ensure that acceptable levels of economic growth and development are achieved through discipline, rooting out of rampant corruption, economic blackmail, transparency and accountability and skillful utilisation of scarce resources. These are fundamental steps towards economic independence which will then make political independence much more meaningful. But more than anything else, Kenyan leaders and the entire populace must be ready to sacrifice to realise the above suggestions. Kenya has to formulate economic policies and establish sound economic management.

10. Economic dependency undermines Kenya's political independence and therefore sovereignty. To this extent therefore, it becomes problematic to pursue independent foreign policy choices towards Britain. Economic dependency has generally restricted the role that Kenya could play in international relations. It has made Kenya a weak player in the international system.

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