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SUMMITRY SYSTEM AS A MECHANISM FOR MANAGING INTER STATE  
CONFLICTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN SUB  
REGION u

BY

JOHN NYADUWA ODHIAMBO

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
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DECLARATION


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DEDICATION

To my grandfather, Mzee Zephania Adede Ogalo.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for the University of Nairobi for offering me a scholarship which enabled me to undertake this study. Special appreciation also goes to the College of Humanities and Social Sciences (University of Nairobi) for offering me a temporary employment as a Graduate Assistant in the Department of Government to enable me complete the project. This was as a result of the refusal of the Office of the President to give me clearance to conduct research on two earlier proposed areas of study. Having spent one year on the rejected topics and my scholarship having expired, I had no extra resources for additional funding of the present study, hence the temporary employment became very handy.

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## ABSTRACT

Management of conflicts through peaceful means is a basic human aspiration. Given that conflicts permanently recur within and between states, societies have, throughout history, been concerned with aspects of conflict reduction through a variety of mechanisms. In the contemporary world particularly, there has been a growing concern with conflict management and this has become an important topic in international relations.

This study examines, analyses and explains a method of conflict management that apparently suffers from scholarly neglect. This is the use of informal bilateral and multilateral summits in conflict management. The informal Eastern African Summitry System is our case study and the central focus is on its concern with the promotion of sub-regional security and economic co-operation as a means of conflict reduction.

As a background to the study, we analyse conflict management through the frameworks of the informal multilateral congress and conference systems of the 'Concert Europe' and the formal institutional arrangements such as the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African

Unity. Our findings emphasize that the coexistence of states and their interdependence create common desires for peace, security and general co-operation as core values of common interest to all, hence the creation of continental and global informal as well as formal multilateral arrangements and organizations. Among the basic objectives of these arrangements and organizations are the pacific settlement of inter-state conflicts.

The central focus of this study is on the concern with the promotion of sub-regional security and economic co-operation as a means of conflict management through informal summitry. The study traces the origins of this informal practice; examines its aims and objectives; analyses the causes and nature of sub-regional conflicts and explains the processes and dynamics of the Summitry System in the management of inter-state conflicts.

Among the basic findings of the study are that first, the perceived shortcomings of the formal institutional continental body (the OAU) in conflict management partly explains states' resort to informal subregional arrangements. Second, the perceptions of common security and economic interests in

interdependence create desires for informal summitry to manage interstate relations. Third, different types of conflict require different means of management. Finally, although conflicts still exist in Eastern Africa, the Eastern African Summitry System has, through its informal conflict management mechanism significantly contributed to conflict reduction. Through the system, there has been a constant emphasis on the desire for a comprehensive subregional peace, stability and tranquility as well as broad economic cooperation. The system has also served as a political confidence-building process that has helped in reorienting participating states to new relations in which cooperation in various fields is emphasized.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

### Introduction:

1:0  
In this study, international system is taken to mean a collection of independent sovereign states and non-state actors which exhibit various kinds of regular interactions among themselves and each pursuing its own interests and objectives. The underlying assumptions regarding the behaviour of these actors are that they are always characterised by patterns of conflict and co-operation. In the words of James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, 'conflict is a universally ubiquitous and permanently recurring phenomenon within and between societies'<sup>1</sup>. In this context, there have been repeated efforts to manage inter-state conflicts and promote their peaceful settlement hence what Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff see as 'a rapid expansion of the fields of "conflict resolution" and "peace research"<sup>2</sup> - in recent decades. Some of these efforts are collective formal and informal enterprises while others take the form of individual formal and informal attempts at mediation and conciliation. Still others take the form of arbitration and/or adjudication. These reflect a variety of techniques and orientations aimed at reducing the intensity and frequency of inter-state conflicts.

Notable among the informal collective mechanisms for managing inter-state conflicts is the summitry system. The system is a relatively recent development but one that has become a distinct phenomenon of world politics and an established trend especially after the First World War. In our time, the superpowers, the United Nations Organization and its various agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (otherwise known as Warsaw Pact), the European Economic Community (EEC), the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League (AL), the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the grouping of the seven major industrial countries of the West (Japan, the United States, West Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Canada) and a host of other international organizations as well as regional and sub-regional arrangements have increasingly conducted diplomacy through summits. The summitry system has thus become a means of exchanging information, coordinating policies, arranging for co-operation, mobilizing support for a given line of action, and most importantly, managing inter-state conflicts and promoting peaceful settlement of disputes. With the rise of regional and sub-regional

international organizations and arrangements, summits have increasingly become part of the process of managing inter-state relations through the framework of those organizations and arrangements. Proponents thus see summitry as providing collective leadership that is vital in a turbulent world. This study analyses the Eastern African Summitry System - an informal sub-regional multilateral arrangement.

In this chapter, we shall state the problem of the study. Also included is a section on literature review which highlights the available information and contributions made by scholars and analysts on the subject of study and which helped us identify the academic gaps that needed to be filled. Other issues included in this chapter are the objectives and justification of the study, theoretical framework, hypotheses, methodology and definition of concepts.

### 1:1 Statement of the Problem

Whereas the Eastern African Summitry System has apparently become an important technique for managing sub-regional inter-state conflicts, what has remained obscure, however, is the dynamics of this sub-regional system and particularly its role in inter-state conflict management. Therefore, the problem that this study seeks to analyse and explain is the capacity and competence of the system for managing inter-state

conflicts. The study therefore analyses and explains the processes, dynamics and impacts of this informal arrangement in the management of inter-state relations in Eastern Africa.

The study starts with the assumptions that both conflict and co-operation are independent though related aspects of the foreign policy behaviours of nation-states and that the countries of the Eastern African sub-region demonstrate specific, regular and intense patterns of co-operative and conflictual interactions. It is further assumed that awareness of the sub-region's endemic inter-state conflicts together with the general political, economic and socio-cultural handicaps generate processes designed to sustain sub-regional stability and co-operation, with the summitry system providing a framework for the management of relations among the sub-regional states.

## 1:2 Literature Review

Conflict and conflict management have been at the core of scholarship in international relations for the past three or so decades. There has been a cumulative growth in studies concerned with inter-state conflicts within the international system. Many studies have also dealt with the role of the international system,

particularly the United Nations and regional organizations as conflict managers<sup>3</sup>. Kumar Rupesinghe aptly notes that:-

Institutional approaches to conflict resolution or conflict management have been the subject matter of a variety of disciplines, including peace research. A vast literature exists on social conflicts and their management, and indeed institutions have been established to manage social conflicts<sup>4</sup>.

He further observes that:-

concern has been expressed at the lack of the capacity of international institutions such as the United Nations, or the various regional organizations such as the OAU, to intervene effectively in violent international conflicts<sup>5</sup>.

What these general observations underscore is the fact that scholars have been variously concerned with conflict and conflict management.

In Africa for instance, inter-state and intra-state conflicts are frequent phenomena and these are analysed in a number of studies which are diverse in methods, time frame and states included in the analyses. The one seemingly general observation of most of these studies is that conflict and disorder are



prominent features of political life in the continent.

Most of the literature on the inter-state and intra-state conflicts in Africa deal with the nature and causes of the conflicts. Examples are the studies by Adda Bozeman,<sup>6</sup> Kenneht Adelman,<sup>7</sup> Colin Legum et al,<sup>8</sup> Daniel Katete Orwa,<sup>9</sup> among others. Other works are concerned with particular case studies such as Orwa's study of the Congo crisis,<sup>10</sup> Joseph Nye's analysis of five conflict cases in Africa,<sup>11</sup> Catherine Hoskyn's study of the Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia disputes,<sup>12</sup> and a host of scholarly articles on specific conflicts and disputes. From a different perspective, there has been concern with specific problem issues such as Alan Day's study of border and territorial disputes in Africa,<sup>13</sup> and Carl Gosta Widstrand's edited work on African boundary problems,<sup>14</sup> among others.

The problem of conflict management in Africa has so far escaped serious empirical research. The few studies on the subject can mainly be gleaned from the general assessments of the performance of the OAU in conflict management. Much scholarly work evaluating the OAU exist today. Examples are the studies by Zdenak Cervenka,<sup>15</sup> Kenneth Mathews,<sup>16</sup> Yassin El Ayouty,<sup>17</sup> Collin Legum,<sup>18</sup> Richard Friedland,<sup>19</sup> Berhanykun Andemicael,<sup>20</sup> just to mention but a few. Most of these scholars have agreed that the OAU has not been very successful in managing continental conflicts

but that it still remains one of the avenues for peaceful settlement of conflicts, notwithstanding its shortcomings.

While the theoretical significance of international co-operation and collaboration in various fields is widely recognised, empirical scholarship on summitry systems is still extremely rare. An interesting work is that of Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne<sup>21</sup> which traces the developments, processes and implications of the Western Economic Summitry of the seven industrialised states. Other relevant works include those of Robert Schaetzel and Herald Malmgren<sup>22</sup>, Charles Robinson, William Turner and Herald Malmgren<sup>23</sup>, and George de Meril and Anthony Solomon<sup>24</sup>. Other works on summitry have appeared in French,<sup>25</sup> Japanese and German. All these works however, have a bias towards Western Economic Summitry.

This brief literature review shows that a specific focus on sub-regional summitry system as a mechanism for managing inter-state conflicts is still lacking. Yet, the Eastern African Summitry System has established itself as a very important mechanism for managing inter-state relations. To the best of my knowledge, no specific study has been done on this sub-regional arrangement. Therefore, this thesis is considered an important contribution to the study of conflict management in Eastern Africa.

1:3 Objectives and Justification of the Study

The Eastern African Summitry System, being a recent phenomenon has not been a subject of inquiry among scholars and analysts and has only received passing casual references<sup>26</sup>. The system which appears to have been necessitated by a 'desire for informal security and economic co-operation'<sup>27</sup> is of great importance when the sub-region's endemic inter-state conflicts as well as the general political, economic and social handicaps are considered. It is a system that represents the great awareness of the need for inter-state and sub-regional cooperation among the countries of Eastern Africa and ought to be seen as an attempt to create a mechanism for managing inter-state relations.

The main objective of this thesis is therefore to examine and analyse the role of this sub-regional informal arrangement in the management of inter-state conflicts. The study therefore seeks to identify past and present subregional conflicts, their causes, and examine how the summitry system has been used to manage them. It further identifies possible areas of future conflicts and proposes ways and means of moderating them. The efficacy of the system is also assessed and

where possible alternatives suggested. Finally, the thesis tests the applicability of the theory of interdependence in explaining sub-regional politics.

Specifically, the thesis seeks to:-

- (i) examine the evolutionary growth of the summitry system in general and that of the Eastern African sub-region in particular.
- (ii) analyse the nature, aims and objectives of the system;
- (iii) identify specific, actual and potential conflicts and disputes in the sub-region, examine their causes and analyse the role of the sub-regional summitry system in their resolution/management;
- (iv) assess the performance and impact of the system in managing inter-state conflicts; and
- (v) examine the future prospects of the system.

As already shown in the literature review, a number of empirical studies have been done on inter-state conflicts and disputes in Africa, including the Eastern African sub-region. However, the use of informal sub-regional arrangements as a means of conflict management has not been a concern of scholars and analysts. Therefore, by examining the role of the summitry system in the management of inter-state

conflicts, this thesis will contribute to an understanding of the behaviour of states in the sub-region and the important process of conflict management. The study will also hopefully contribute to a better sub-regional approach to peaceful settlement of disputes. In particular, it is hoped the recommendations and prescriptions proposed in this thesis will be incorporated in sub-regional planning and policy implementation.

#### 1:4 Theoretical Framework

A number of theoretical frameworks have been developed in conflict and cooperation research. These include the integration theory, the systems theory, the general conflict theory, and the theory of interdependence. For a meaningful and productive empirical study of the summitry system as a mechanism for managing inter-state conflicts, a theoretical model which will guide us in analysing the phenomenon will be the most apt. In this study therefore, the theory of interdependence is adopted. Before justifying this model, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the other alternative approaches mentioned.

The integration theory whose origin is associated with David Mitrany has many variants-federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism. For the federalists, integration is dependent on political

unity, that is, integration can be best attained by integrating the political systems. In this way, political actors should be persuaded to shift their expectations, loyalties and political activities to a centre of decision making, in a kind of a process in which 'two or more actors form a new actor'<sup>28</sup>. The approach therefore advocates the reduction of sovereign power of the nation-state through the creation of federal institutions such as the military, police, a common legal system, adoption of a common constitution and finally ensuring a division of power between local and national levels. This process would later culminate in an integrated economy.

In the Eastern African Summitry System, political unification does not seem in the least a priority. This renders political determinism and therefore the federal approach to integration irrelevant to the present study.

The functionalist approach on the other hand believes in the gradual predominance of economics over politics in promoting integration. It asserts that co-operation would be best promoted if international activities were to be organised along basic functional needs such as transportation, health, research, cultural activities, trade, among others. In his doctrine of "ramification" David Mitran<sup>29</sup>y has observed that this easier form of cooperation would through

gradual processes move to more complex aspects of cooperation. This principle of gradualism has been demonstrated further by Bela Balassa in his five stages of integration<sup>30</sup>.

The neo-functional approach does not differ much from the functionalist model as it is the intellectual descendant of the former. Nevertheless, the principle difference between the two lies in the elaboration, modification, and testing of hypotheses about integration found in the works of neo-functionalists such as Ernst Haas,<sup>31</sup> Joseph Nye,<sup>32</sup> Robert Keohane,<sup>33</sup> Leon Lindberg,<sup>34</sup> among others.

The two approaches are found wanting for our analysis basically because of their insufficient emphasis on factors other than economic and their orientation toward the industrialised world rather than the developing areas. Most importantly, the phenomenon of conflict is conspicuously missing from the models yet traditional and contemporary writers in the field of conflict have considerably examined the integrative role of conflicts<sup>35</sup>.

The systems theory of international relations whose origin in the late 1950s is associated with Morton Kaplan<sup>36</sup> has had many adherents among them Richard Rosecrance,<sup>37</sup> Charles MacClèlland<sup>38</sup> and George Modelski<sup>39</sup>. The theory seeks to explain the politics

of cross-national boundary interactions and is basically concerned with developing a systematic theoretical framework for describing general relationships of the empirical world - what to Daniel K. Orwa is 'an attempt to develop a unified theory of politics which is applicable to all political systems'<sup>40</sup>.

Like other theories of international relations, the systems theory has its limitations and has been the object of major criticism. Its critics include Stanley Hoffman<sup>41</sup>, Kenneth Waltz<sup>42</sup>, George Modelski<sup>43</sup>, Oran Young<sup>44</sup>, among others. Criticisms of the theory range from its reification of abstractions, deficient models, problems of operationalization for quantitative study of politics, generalizations, to obscurity and ambiguities of concepts and emphasis on mathematical proof and verification of observable phenomena according to strict procedures. Because of these limitations, we find the approach inappropriate for our present purposes. Furthermore, the systems theory is laden with Western value premises and ideologies having evolved out of particular political and social experiences in North America and Western Europe and, was developed to explain international relations in the industrialised world. It thus best meets the requirements of developed world and cannot aptly



explain African politics given the continent's complexities and peculiarities. In addition, much of the data that the systems theory requires for its applicability is not readily available in Africa.

What is fashionably called the general theory of conflict are extrapolations from various fields notably Sociology, Social Psychology and Anthropology, which have intergrated to form a general theory and is not attributed to any single analyst. While there are many distinct approaches in the general theory of conflicts, these can be appropriately categorised into two main groups. There are those that examine conflict at the level of individuals, taking as their point of departure the behaviour of individuals from which they draw inferences to the behaviour of species. The second approach examines conflict at the level of groups, collectivities, social institutions, social classes, large political movements, religious or ethnic entities, nation-states, coalitions and cultural systems .

The theory is basically concerned with the causes of conflict and war, the conflict behaviour of nations and to a lesser extent the processes and methods of conflict management. However, as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, 'No single theory of conflict exists which is acceptable to social scientists in the several disciplines, much less to authorities in other

scientific fields from which analogous concepts might  
be borrowed'<sup>46</sup>

Critics of the general theory of conflict such as  
Michael Haas<sup>47</sup>, Dennis Pirages<sup>48</sup> and John Burton<sup>49</sup>  
stress the underdeveloped nature of the theory and its  
lack of sophistication in concept formation. This is  
mainly due to its heavy borrowing from many  
disciplines. The theory is not very useful for our  
purposes because its distinctive feature is in the  
nature and origin of conflicts and war and because it  
emphasizes much about the conditions that lead to  
political disorder than about the conditions and  
processes that maintain order, which is our focus of  
attention.

The theory of interdependence which is applied in  
this study is associated with a number of scholars  
among them Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye<sup>50</sup>, Edward  
Morse<sup>51</sup>, Richard Rosecrance<sup>52</sup>, Robert Gilpin<sup>53</sup> and  
Hayward Alker<sup>54</sup>. Intependence is variously defined  
but we adopt Keohane and Nye's definition that  
'Interdependence in world politics refers to situations  
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or  
among actors in different countries'<sup>55</sup>. In this study  
therefore, interdependence means that nation-states  
interact through multiple channels and that these  
interactions can be both costly and beneficial.  
Interdependence is thus differentiated from

'interconnectedness' which refers to a situation where nation-states are joined by interactions that do not involve significant costs and benefits.

Approaches to interdependence are many but all seem to accept and assert the interdependent nature of the world - that members of the international community are increasingly interdependent in social, economic, political, military, technological and ecological spheres of international life. This is so when they cooperate or when they are in conflict.

Two dimensions of the theory compete for dominance. On the one hand is the view that because of interdependence, factors other than military have become more important in the inter-state relations with a growing tendency towards peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes as opposed to resort to force or the threat of it. Thus, interdependence is seen as creating international peace although it does not necessarily eliminate international conflicts. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Edward Morse and Robert Gilpin all subscribe to this view. A second dimension attributed to the Realists suggest that although there is a growing interdependence of states, this is accompanied by greater and not less reliance on military force or its threat in inter-state relations. Thus to the Realists, interdependence produce increased

international conflicts for according to the Realists, idealistic models of world politics where world politics is conceived of as being continually characterized by active or potential conflict amongst states, the use of force is possible at any time. Stanley Michalak<sup>56</sup>, Edward Colodziej and Robert Harkavy<sup>57</sup> as well as Kenneth Waltz<sup>58</sup> and Mark Gasiorowski<sup>59</sup> are examples of Realists who address the issue of international interdependence and how it relates to international peace and conflict.

The choice of this theoretical orientation is determined by the fact that it appears a more conducive model in explaining the inter-state relations of the countries of Eastern Africa - relations which seem to be characterised by both cooperative and conflictual interdependence. That interdependence can be both cooperative and conflictual is very well documented. Gerhard Mally correctly points out that interdependence is not always a source of greater cooperation since it can also be a source of conflicts.<sup>60</sup> Putnam and Bayne observe that interdependence provides incentives for cooperation and opportunities for conflict<sup>61</sup> while Robert Keohane notes that 'Interdependence can transmit bad influences as well as good ones.....'.<sup>62</sup> The choice of this theory is further influenced by the fact that being a theory that has gained increased importance in international relations, there is great need to test

its applicability in an African sub-regional context. The basic questions to ask will therefore be: Do aspects of sub-regional politics approximate to conditions of interdependence? Do links of interdependence set up by sub-regional corporate activity act as a brake upon inter-state conflicts? Do these links encourage a kind of peace in which regionalist economic and social operations dependent on political stability thrive?

The choice of this model does not mean it has no shortcomings. Critics of the approach have aptly stressed the fact that the definitions and direction of the theory are not clear. Furthermore while advocates of the theory proclaim interdependence in economic, political, social and military spheres, they tend to emphasize economic aspects. But, we stress, this is not at the expense of political, social and military spheres as is the case with the functionalist and neo-functionalist models. From our point of view, sub-regional politics is too complex a phenomenon to be analysed from the perspective of single selection conceptual approaches. For this reason, the interdependence approach which though emphasizes economic aspects but does not exclude other spheres thus appears more appropriate for our present purposes.

In examining the role of the Eastern African Summitry System in the management of inter-state conflicts, a number of questions will be addressed, among them: What is the background against which summits are held? What expectations are sufficiently intense to motivate states towards sub-regional informal arrangements? What are the aims and objectives of the summitry system and are these achieved? Do the superpowers influence sub-regional summits? What impact do the personalities of sub-regional leaders have on the summitry system? What is the performance of the system in conflict management?

Three hypotheses are advanced to help in this inquiry.

#### HYPOTHESIS I:

That informal summitry system will arise when institutional framework for resolution of inter-state disputes/conflicts is either absent or perceived to be weak.

Specifically, this hypothesis suggest that (a) if formal multilateral institutions created with the specific aim of peacefully resolving inter-state conflicts are perceived to be weak then states will resort to informal summits, and (b) if there is lack of institutional framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts, then informal summitry system will arise.

## HYPOTHESIS II:

That inter-state summitry system will operate only when states have shared objectives.

This hypothesis generally assumes that (a) if geographical proximity creates a common desire for security then inter-state summits become necessary, and (b) if states have a perception of common economic interests, then inter-state summitry system will be used in the conduct of sub-regional relations.

## HYPOTHESIS III:

That the successful management of sub-regional conflicts largely depend on the means used and the issues involved.

It is here proposed that the effectiveness of informal and institutional multilateral mechanisms for conflict management as well as the nature of conflicts largely determine the success in the resolution of sub-regional inter-state conflicts.

## 1.6 Methodology

In carrying out the investigation one method of research is employed - library research. Relevant data is collected, recorded and analysed. Using the data, the patterns of relationships between the variables

under investigation are examined and the findings are subsequently interpreted to assess cause and effect relations. These are finally used for both tabular and descriptive analysis of the subject of study.

#### 1:6:1 Data Source

This study is basically a documentary research based on both secondary and primary sources of information. The secondary sources include periodical literature, journal articles, magazines, books and newspapers. Summit reports, agreements and communiques and other relevant documents provide the primary sources for the study.

#### 1:7 Definition of concepts

A number of concepts employed in the study require operational definitions: these include concepts such as the Eastern African Sub-region, conflict, conflict management, summitry system and security.

Regions are relative and there are no naturally  
64  
determined regions. Clive Archer correctly notes  
that there seems to be no satisfactory definition of a  
65  
region. In this context, the Eastern African Sub-region that form the basis of this analysis comprises of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, are members of the sub-regional summitry system and as such are considered



as part of this region. These counties have long standing, shared political economic and social interests. Excepting Ethiopia, all share an experience of colonial rule. They also share a common economic underdevelopment. At various points, they share common borders. Furthermore, the phenomenon of overlapping ethnic groups is a common factor to most of them. These collectively or independently generate interactions among these states. The relations resulting from these interactions must be managed.

The concepts of conflict and conflict management have become so common currencies that they have gained a respected place in academic thinking and entire journals are devoted to them. Yet, there are no shared definitions of the concepts and several have been advanced. Conflict particularly has multiple ranges of references and meaning to many people. To Michael Nicholson, 'A conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent'<sup>66</sup>. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note that 'the term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or, appear to be incompatible goals'<sup>67</sup>. In this thesis, we adopt these

two definitions with the understanding that "people" and "group of human beings" also include their collective institutions, organizations and nation-states. The "mutually inconsistent acts" and "conscious opposition" referred to in the definitions are what we regard as sharp cleavages and visible tensions in the relations between states and which constitute conflicts.

We want to note that conflicts differ substantially by type but as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff correctly observe, 'social scientists have not yet come forth with a generally accepted taxonomy for distinguishing, classifying, and arranging coherently various types of conflict'<sup>68</sup>. Generally, there are social, political, economic and military conflicts, among others and these are not mutually exclusive.

Distinction is also made between "intra-state" and "extra-state" conflicts<sup>69</sup>. In this thesis however, intra-state conflict is not differentiated from extra-state or inter-state conflict as a factor relevant to the problem of sub-regional order because, in its various forms, it has long been of major importance in attracting not only the interests of sub-regional and regional states but also the competitive involvement of external powers.

We use the term conflict management to refer to the processes of reducing the intensity and frequency of serious inter-state tensions, disputes and/or the systematic consequences of such conflicts. The manifest intention of conflict management is to prevent conflict from escalating because in most cases conflicts are never resolved irrevocably and totally. Thus, conflict management is usually a continuing part of inter-state politics.

We define summitry system as a practice of conducting international diplomacy by informal conferences. In this thesis therefore, we use summitry system in a particular reference to sub-regional arrangements (i) based on informal agreement among participating states, (ii) possessing diplomatic forums, (iii) not assisted by associational or constitutional structures, or institutional bureaucracy, and (iv) maintained by regular periodic collective consultations. In this context, the summitry system is distinguished from regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements which are structured, institutionalized and characterized by elaborate networks of rules, norms and institutions. The Eastern African summitry system is therefore an informal multilateral inter-state diplomacy

distinguished from two other contemporary inter-state diplomacy, namely: bilateral traditional diplomacy and diplomacy through multilateral international organizations.

It is worth noting however that with time summits can become institutionalized. In their analysis of the seven power summits, Putnam and Bayne<sup>70</sup> for instance trace the development of the Western Economic Summitry from an informal multilateral annual gathering to a later more structured and established institution with features such as a regular time-table, a customary range of subjects and procedural conventions as regards both the meetings themselves and their preparations. It is instructive, however, to emphasize that although summits may acquire features of an established institution as the Western Economic Summitry has done, they (summits) retain basic distinctive features of informality, lack of charter or treaty nor independent secretariat.

Security is an imprecise concept. Scholars and analysts do not agree on its definition. Mahnaz Zehra Ispahani notes that, 'security in the developed democracies where there exists greater coherence between government and society, is less a question of internal cohesion of political and economic stability. It is more externally defined and more outward looking'<sup>71</sup>. In this context, the dominant definition of security from the Western perspective is generally

military-strategic and concerned mainly with ability to attack, deter or defeat. This is in sharp contrast to the notion of security in the Third World countries where major issues of security are both domestic and external.

In this thesis, we adopt a general notion of security which defines the concept in broader dimensions that go beyond the purely military implications. It sees security in economic, social, military and political dimensions. Thus, security is the protection and promotion of core national values - values which to Daniel K. Orwa are 'independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and a political and economic way of life'<sup>72</sup>. It is the absence of adverse factors negatively affecting these core values and therefore encompasses general stability, peace and tranquility. As Bruce Arlinghaus observes, 'every security concern has its national, regional and international dimensions'<sup>73</sup>. From this perspective, we consider sub-regional security as relating to the absence of internal and external threat to the commonly shared objectives - the values or interests considered vital or important and which must be secured to maintain sub-regional peace, stability and tranquility.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### SUMMITRY SYSTEM: AN EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH

#### 2:0 Introduction

In this chapter, we shall briefly examine the evolutionary growth of the summitry system from two perspectives: global and regional. From the global perspective, we shall look at the pre-League of Nations summit diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of the disputes through the formal multilateral arrangements of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization. From the regional perspective, we shall examine the role of the Organization of African Unity in peaceful settlement of inter-African conflicts. This section will therefore provide a background to the study.

#### 2:1 Pre-League of Nations Summit Diplomacy:

The Summitry System as we know it today has its origins in the nineteenth century congress and conference systems generally known as the Concert of Europe. This was a system of Europe's great powers of the time that dealt with the pressing international problems<sup>1</sup>. It consisted of ephemeral ambassadorial committees and a number of congresses and conferences for the purpose of settling international affairs. The



system originated in the collaboration of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia against France in the Napoleonic Wars<sup>2</sup> which threatened the European Balance of Power. It provided a forum for consultation on common interests.

The Congress system began with the Vienna Congress (1814 - 1815) which, as Clive Archer correctly observes, 'codified the rules of diplomacy thereby establishing an accepted mode of regular peaceful relationships between most European states'.<sup>3</sup> At this conference, the victorious powers agreed to "concert together" against threats to peace and to meet in times of peace to prevent war, not only to sign peace treaties at the end of war as before.<sup>4</sup> Thus began what became known as "diplomacy by congress". A number of congresses were held in Europe after the Vienna one notable among these being the 1815 Paris Congress, the 1818 Aix-la Chapelle Congress, and the 1820 Congress of Troppau.

The congress system came to an end in 1822 and was replaced by attempts at solving international problems through conferences - hence the conference system. Through a series of these conferences, political issues that endangered peace and might have led to war were settled. For example, the Belgium Question at the beginning of 1830s, the Eastern Question (the future of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire) at the beginning of

the 1850s and again in 1878 were settled through such conferences<sup>5</sup>. The suppression of the 1830 - 1848 revolts against monarchical authority in Europe as well as the settlement of problems arising out of the revolts and the growing nationalism in Europe were achieved through conferences. In the second half of the nineteenth century, conferences were once again held more often after wars with a few exceptions. Archer notes that in 1856 the Paris Conference ended the Crimean War; in 1864 the Vienna Conference ended the Schleswig Holstein War; in 1866 Prague Conference ended the Seven Weeks War; in 1871 the Frankfurt Conference ended the Franco-Prussian War; in 1878 the Berlin Conference after the Russo-Turkish War attempted a long-term settlement of the Balkan Question; the 1884-5 Berlin Conference agreed on the division of Africa; and in 1906 the Algeciras Conference temporarily relieved pressure over rival claims in North Africa<sup>6</sup>.

Finally, there were the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 with the first adopting the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes thus contributing to the formulation of standing procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. S.J.R. Bilgrami has aptly observed that 'The First Hague Conference thus took the lead in establishing definite mechanisms to aid the settlement of disputes

among states by creating the permanent court of  
arbitration<sup>7</sup> .

Both the congress and conference systems of the Concert of Europe were uninstitutionalized - having no permanent institutions such as a secretariat. The then great powers of Europe met informally whenever the international situation seemed to demand collective concerted action. Therefore, what emerged from the Concert of Europe was a "loose format" or informal multilateral arrangement of European powers consulting together on international problems that were perceived as threatening the peace and security of the continent. Yet, inspite of this informality, the congress and conference systems were able to preserve the European status quo and balance of power by settling disputes, avoiding conflicts and preventing large scale wars. Thus, throughout the more than ninety years of its existence, the Concert of Europe was most successful in preserving the general peace and security of Europe.

What really brought the European powers together during the Concert of Europe was the inherent desire for peace and security as core values of common interest to all. Thus, the co-existence of the European states and their interdependence was such that national interests - defence of state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity - could not be secured except through the maintenance of European balance of power.

As such, a threat to the peace and security of one nation was considered as a threat to the peace and security of the European system.

The system of collective management through the Concert of Europe was to be the premise upon which the universal formalised multilateral organizations were established. Thus, the Concert of Europe was the forerunner of both the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization.

2:2 Settlement of Disputes in the Formal Multilateral Arrangements of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization:

Both the League of Nations (League) and the United Nations Organization (UNO) were born out of the appalling wastes of the First and Second World Wars respectively, just as the Concert of Europe came into being as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. Both were, at the time of their formations, manifestations of the desire for a more organized form of inter-state diplomacy. More specifically, the organizations were forms of co-operation of sovereign states set within the system of multilateral state system based on the agreement of states to engage in regular consultations, minimize conflict, maximize collaboration and harmonise their relations. Both were (and still is for the UN)

organs devoted to co-ordination of action among members and collective solutions of problems.

The formation of the League in 1920 was a formalization and institutionalization of multilateral arrangements as mechanisms of dealing with problems affecting international peace and security that had been established in the Concert of Europe system of congresses and conferences. Fredrick Hartmann writes that the League 'represented the institutionalization of the well accepted diplomatic technique of the international conference, although on a much broader basis than before'<sup>8</sup>.

Established in the aftermath of a major world war and conceived primarily as a means of preventing the occurrence of such a catastrophe, the League was a multilateral reaction to violent inter-state conflicts and a response to the danger of future conflict. Therefore, when government representatives met in Paris in 1919, they produced a Covenant which was a testament to the aspirations to enshrine the collective interest of all nations as supreme above the interests of any group of nations or any individual nation<sup>9</sup>. Thus, according to the Covenant of the League, the organization was designed to 'promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and

10  
security' hence its 'primary focus was on the  
political and security problems of war and peace' 11

At the very outset, the League was equipped to play many roles - a standing international conference, pledged to settle disputes in certain specific ways, a body guaranteeing the existing political and territorial status quo and an agency for promotion of disarmament. According to Bilgrami, the League 'served at once as a world forum, an instrument for continuous diplomatic negotiation, an international civil service and an organ of economic and social collaboration' 12  
The League's basic aims and objectives thus included promotion of international peace and co-operation, ensuring the fulfilment of accepted international obligations and providing safeguards against war.

The League was to accomplish these objectives by means of regular and periodic multilateral summit meetings within the context of a permanent, formal organization dependent on the voluntary co-operation of member states and their general moral commitment and consensus of opinion. Thus, the central organs of the League - the Assembly and Council - held multilateral summit meetings from time to time as occasion demanded to deal with 'any matter within the sphere of the League or affecting the peace of the world' 13

The League's multilateral summit meetings provided forums for regular consultations under set conditions and established mechanisms for the implementation of joint decisions. Parties to a dispute found forum in the sessions of the League Council and Assembly to present their view points and seek solution. Thus, in the field of conflict management, one finds that, as a legitimate multilateral channel for regulating inter-state relations, the League carried out its authority through the process of collective consultations and negotiations at the levels of heads of state and government or their representatives in formal multilateral summit meetings. In such meetings various issues of inter-state relations particularly those threatening peace and security of the international system were deliberated and solutions sought in conformity with the League's machinery for handling disputes as provided for in Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Covenant. In Articles 12 through 15, a logical procedure was laid down by which parties to a dispute were to choose between either a legal settlement or group mediation by the League Council while Article 16 provided for collective sanctions against a Covenant breaker.

Of the League's machinery for handling disputes, members often chose mediation by the League's Council or Assembly. This entailed multilateral summit

meetings between representatives of the parties to a dispute and the League mediators. Through such summit meetings, the League sought with varied results of success or failure, to settle a number of inter-state disputes that were brought before it such as the 1925 war between Bulgaria and Greece, the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the 1932-35 war between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the 1935-36 Italian attack upon Ethiopia.

Notwithstanding its weaknesses and shortcomings, the League provided a useful addition to international diplomacy as a formal multilateral arrangement. More importantly, it provided the framework and a stepping stone towards the more enduring United Nations Organization.

The UN came into existence in 1945 as a result of the intermittent war time summits and the intense diplomatic activity between Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, which culminated in the formation of the basic structure of the UN at the Dumberton Oaks meeting of 1944 and the Yale Summit of 1945<sup>14</sup> and the U.N. Charter was signed in June 1945 at San Francisco.



The basic aims of the U.N. according to its Charter, are to 'maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and achieve international co-operation'<sup>15</sup>. The UN was therefore conceived of as primarily a peace and security organization. Hartmann has observed that 'The major reason for the UN's existence is its role in peace and security matters'<sup>16</sup>. Therefore one of the most important functions of the organization is in the field of settlement of disputes between and among states.

Like the League before it, the UN is a form of multilateral cooperation of sovereign states devoted to consultation and coordination of actions among its members. It relies on collective solution of problems and depends on members' voluntary cooperation to achieve results. Thus, the UN seeks through open discussion and debate the reconciliation of differing national points of view and the widest area of final agreement among states. The discussions and debate take place in the sessions of the UN consultative organs, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The former organ meets for several months every year and sometimes convenes for special sessions particularly to deliberate on serious and urgent issues perceived to threaten the peace and security of the

international system. The security council, with wide ranging powers over issues of conflict between and among nations also conducts its affairs through regular and/or specifically convened meetings of its members. To these meetings of the UN organs, questions of disputes are submitted and as a result of debate, negotiation and consultation, resolutions are passed and recommendations for courses of action made.

On issues of disputes and/or conflicts between and among states, the UN General Assembly and Security Council have often recommended negotiation, mediation and conciliation under the auspices of the UN as means of conflict management because the organization believes that these are the most sensible methods of reducing or eliminating the danger of violence or destruction. Thus, in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, states are enjoined to seek peaceful settlement or adjustment of disputes and situations by mediation, negotiation, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice<sup>17</sup>. The UN, however, also invokes other means of conflict resolution such as provided for in Chapters VII and VIII of its Charter<sup>18</sup>. It should be noted, however, that the use of formal summit system as a method of managing disputes under the auspices of the UN is most manifest in the mediation and conciliation

efforts. UN mediation and conciliation aim at bringing about agreement between conflicting parties. This usually entails a series of progressively insistent negotiations and consultations to induce the parties to a dispute to come to acceptable and agreed settlement. Such settlement is usually arrived at in bilateral and/or multilateral summit meetings arranged under the auspices of the UN. The UN has since its inception attempted numerous mediation and conciliation efforts in a number of disputes such as the disputed territory of West Irian involving the Dutch and the Indonesians (1962); the Carribbean problems involving US and Cuba (1962); the Middle East Crisis (1956); Kashmir (1949); Palestine (1947) and Indonesian (1952) questions; the Congo Crisis (1960); the Western Sahara (1974) and the recent Iran-Iraq conflict, just to mention a few.

In these and other mediation efforts, the UN has increasingly used the Secretary General as an agent and instrument of peaceful settlement of disputes<sup>19</sup> either on his own or through his appointed representatives. Thus, either at the behest of the UN, on the request of parties to a dispute, or on their own initiatives, the UN Secretaries-General have throughout the history of the organization undertaken numerous mediation and conciliation missions most of which have led to meetings between parties to a conflict at which wide

agreements are reached.

It must also be noted that while the UN has, on occasions, succeeded through mediation and conciliation or through the use of military force, in contributing towards the containment, termination or resolution of some international conflicts, it has not made any substantial contribution in the management or resolution of conflicts involving the vital interests of the two superpowers. Such conflicts, as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff correctly note, 'require action, negotiation and adjustment'<sup>20</sup> by the superpowers themselves. Therefore, most important international agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union have been reached through bilateral summits of the superpowers outside the context of the UN. The Berlin issue, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Middle East Wars, are examples of conflicts in which the superpowers have vested interests.

Since the Second World War, the superpowers have held several summit meetings ostensibly to resolve international disputes in which they have interests or to generally manage their often chilly relations. Thus, between 1985 and 1988 for instance, the superpowers held the most frequent summits in their history - four in just thirty months<sup>21</sup> - underscoring the importance of summit meetings in managing superpower relations.

Negotiations and agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States outside the framework of the UN have also been useful in helping to facilitate and determine the outcome of UN sponsored talks. For example, the August 1988 Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan which paved the way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after nine years of war with anti-Communist guerrillas, came about only after prior negotiations and agreements between the superpowers. The same can be said of the Iran-Iraq cease-fire now being monitored by UN peace-keeping forces. Recent negotiations for the independence of Namibia and settlement of the Angola conflict which have shown remarkable progress can be meaningfully attributed to the vastly improved relationship between the superpowers with the UN playing only a secondary role in the talks. The breakthrough came only after the U.S sponsored summits between Angola, Cuba and South Africa produced a basis for settlement.

From the experience of the League and the UN a number of observations can be made. First, it is noteworthy that the exigencies of global warfare - the ferocious nature of the First and Second World Wars in the twentieth century - led to multilateral attempts to eliminate violence and institute peaceful means of managing inter-state conflicts. Thus, before the advent of both the League and the UN, the missing link

in the arsenal of techniques for settling disputes was the lack of institutional procedures to ensure that every dispute would have some opportunity to be settled by peaceful means. Both the League and the UN provided this.

Second, unlike the congress and the conference systems of the Concert of Europe, both the League and UN marked the rise of structured and institutionalized multilateral organizations in which conflict management has been on a formal basis. Therefore, the very real contribution of the League and the UN to settlement of disputes has been the provision of mechanisms for formalised multilateral discussion of international problems, alongside informal bilateral and multilateral techniques.

Third, we have briefly alluded to the importance attached to summitry system as a mechanism for managing superpower relations by the superpowers themselves.

Finally, although we may sincerely question the success of the League and the UN in their endeavours to end violence between and among states, promote peaceful settlement of disputes, and enhance cooperation' among states, the dedication of the two organizations to these tasks remain a fact of history. Their global perspectives also remain unquestionable. They stand out as global institutions devoted to peaceful

regional and sub-regional organizations have also come to perform. The latter thus complement the work of the UN. Nearly every region of the world today has a multilateral organization or arrangement performing the same task as the UN. The Organization of American States, the Arab League, the European Economic Community, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Organization of African Unity, are good examples.

### 2:3 Summitry system: The Experience of Post Independent Africa.

In Africa also, independence and nationalism generated demands that forced the African countries to not only look to the UN for solutions but also to evolve African frameworks for mediating these demands. The period witnessed what might be called "the Concert of Pan-Africanism" characterized by intermittent conferences of the late 1950s and early 1960s that launched direct consultations between African states and offered a platform for collective decision-making and action. In 1958 for example, the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana organized two conferences in Accra aimed at bringing all Africa together<sup>22</sup>. The first of these was the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) held in April 1958 and attended by the heads of government or their representatives of all the eight

African states then independent - Ghana, Libya,<sup>23</sup>  
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia .  
In their resolutions, the leaders 'proclaimed their  
solidarity with the independent peoples of Africa as  
well as the right of all nations to safeguard their  
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity'<sup>24</sup> .  
In December of the same year Nkrumah convened a second  
conference - the first All African Peoples Conference  
(AAPC) in Accra. Among other things, the conference  
'endorsed Pan-Africanism, the desire for unity among  
African peoples and the need for the creation of a  
commonwealth of free African States'<sup>25</sup> . The conference  
also established a permanent secretariat in Accra which  
later organized a series of All-African conferences  
such as in Tunis (1960) and Cairo (1961)<sup>26</sup> .

Issues of Pan-Africanism dominated these early  
conferences. However, as an increasing number of  
African states gained independence particularly from  
1960, splits, conflicts and cleavages centered on  
issues of leadership of the Pan-African movement,  
personal rivalries and ideological differences emerged<sup>27</sup>

. Thus, by the time the second conferences of All  
African Peoples Conference and the Conference of  
Independent African States were held in Tunis (January  
1960) and Addis Ababa (June 1960) respectively, sharp  
divisions of opinion, basic differences and ideological  
cleavages were glaringly apparent. On the one hand



were the so-called moderate states which included Nigeria, Ivory Coast and most French-speaking countries advocating a gradualist, functionalist approach to African unity and the formation of a loose association of states. Opposed to this group were the so-called radicals led by Ghana and Guinea who favoured a political union and the creation of a strong United States of Africa <sup>28</sup>. The former later became known as the Brazzaville Group following their summit in Brazzaville (Congo) in December 1960 while the latter, after meeting in Casablanca (Morocco) in January 1961 became known as the Casablanca Group <sup>29</sup>.

The emergence of the two groups with divergent views and antagonistic to each other posed the danger of a divided Africa. More disturbing was the view that the groups were becoming identified with the two antagonistic ideological blocs of the superpowers, hence a polarization on ideological lines. The Brazzaville Group viewed the Casablanca Group as radical and pro-Communists while the Casablanca Group viewed the former as pro the Capitalist West. However, leaders of the two groups soon realised the danger and took initiatives to avert the possibility of a divided Africa. The result was the Monrovia Conference of May 1961 boycotted by the Casablanca Group except Libya but attended by all the members of the Brazzaville Group and a number of other states outside the two camps.

cleavages were glaringly apparent. On the one hand

The participants became known as the Monrovia Group <sup>30</sup>. The conference placed great emphasis on 'absolute equality of African and Malagassy states... co-operation throughout Africa based upon tolerance, solidarity and good-neighbourly relations, and periodical exchange of views' <sup>31</sup>. It further asserted that the unity that the conference aimed at was 'not political integration of sovereign African states, but unity of aspiration and of action considered from the point of view of African solidarity and political identity' <sup>32</sup>. A follow up conference was held in Lagos (Nigeria) in January 1962 once again boycotted by the Cassablanca Group. The Lagos conference adopted 'a Charter based on a draft submitted by Liberia for the formation of an inter-African and Malagasy State Organization' <sup>33</sup>. It also agreed to hold its next summit in Addis Ababa.

It is instructive to note that like the pre-League of Nations conferences, the African conferences of the 1950s and 1960s sought to create continental solidarity and environment for political, economic, social, security and diplomatic cooperation among African states. They thus served as the forerunners of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Thus, in May 1963, thirty two independent African states met in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and established the OAU to

in various fields of politics, diplomacy and defence; the defence of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence as well as general economic development. The OAU was thus formed to provide a collective institutional framework for handling inter-African state relations.

The pre-OAU period had demonstrated clearly that conflict among African states could not be discounted and only formalised pattern of cooperation and a system of conflict resolution could contain the situation. The founding fathers addressed this issue in the OAU Charter. Articles III and XIX of the Charter and its protocol on mediation, conciliation and arbitration set down the procedure for settlement of inter-African disputes, with member states enjoined by provisions of the two articles and the protocol to settle all disputes between them through peaceful means.

#### 2.4 The OAU and Management of inter-state conflicts outside the Eastern African sub-region:

Since its inception twenty seven years ago, the OAU has had crisis battered years of existence and indeed it has lived through dramas and nerve wrecking situations due to the many conflicts between and among its member states. In this context, part of the organization's major functions has been to manage inter-

state and intra-state conflicts. Of the means at its disposal—mediation, conciliation, negotiation and arbitration, it has more often resorted to mediation, particularly presidential and ad hoc committee mediation, making conflict management in the continent a more or less informal affair. We here examine the role of the OAU as a formal multilateral institution in the management and resolution of two conflicts, one involving a territorial claim and the other concerning internal insurgency.

Conflicts concerning territorial claims arising from unclear boundaries, ethnic overlap, historic claims and desire of neighbour's resources are the most common in Africa and the OAU has, on numerous occasions been called upon to mediate in such conflicts. The 1963 Algero-Morocco conflict is our example.

In connection with the Algero-Morocco dispute, the OAU faced a severe test of its capacity to ensure adherence to its principles and goals when fighting broke out between the two adversaries over disputed claims to territory. Acting on behalf of the OAU, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modiebo Keita of Mali offered to mediate 'in the conflict. In late October 1963 they arranged a bilateral summit meeting between the belligerents in Bamako, Mali and a cease-fire was agreed on. This agreement enabled the OAU Council of Ministers special

session in Addis Ababa in November 1963 to appoint a seven-nation ad hoc commission to attempt settlement of the conflict. In February 1964 the Ethiopian and Malian mediators arranged a final withdrawal of forces of the disputants and during the OAU summit meeting in Algiers in 1968, the heads of state of Algeria and Morocco met <sup>34</sup> privately to symbolise their reconciliation. Soon after this meeting, the two countries exchanged ambassadors. A series of bilateral summits in 1969, 1970 and 1972 finally led to a border treaty which Algeria ratified in 1973 but which Morocco never ratified as a result of the emergence of the Western Sahara issue.

While the de-escalation of the Algero-Morocco conflict is usually seen as a success story of OAU conflict management efforts, we want to observe that this was through the mediation of individual African heads of state and not the institutional framework of the OAU. As James Mayall has correctly pointed out, it was, he asserts, 'the appeal to OAU principles (particularly to incompatibility of armed conflict and unity) rather than the mediatory efforts of the institution <sup>35</sup> itself, that contributed to a settlement'. It may be further said that Morocco, the irredentist state, responded to the appeal of the OAU principles because she had been diplomatically isolated in her stand both within and outside Africa.

Another challenge to the OAU in conflict management has been the Chad issue which is an example of internal insurgency. The multifarious conflict in Chad of warring interlocking factions and armies which at times have included involvement of foreign powers has been aptly dubbed the 'Chadian imbroglio', the 'Chadian quagmire' or 'Chad malady'. In about thirty years of independence, Chad has had a turbulent history, living through bitter feuding that has occasionally erupted into full-scale fighting with foreign, particularly Libyan and French interventions helping fuel the conflict. The conflict has presented the OAU one of its most serious challenges.

While the conflict can be traced back to 1960 when French granted Chad full independence, the real crisis began in 1965 between government forces and secessionists, mainly Moslem groups in the northern and central regions. Serious fighting escalated in 1979 between the ruling Supreme Council headed by Felix Malloum and Moslem rebels led by Hissen Habre. In the same year Goukhouni Weddeye took over the presidency and supported by Libyan forces, he captured the capital N'Dajema after heavy fighting with Habre forces. It is from then that the OAU became seriously involved in the Chad conflict. At the 1979 Lagos Summit, the organization endorsed Weddeye as the leader of the

government in Chad (the Transitional Government of National Unity - GUNT) and not Habre's Forces Armees du Nord (FAN). This was after various efforts to seek solution to the conflict, such as Nigeria's efforts in convening two OAU sponsored conferences in Kano and Lagos as well different initiatives of Sudan, Libya and France had come to nought .

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At the 1980 Freetown Summit, the OAU mooted a peace-keeping force to Chad but this remained in the drawing boards. It was not until the June 1981 Nairobi Summit that a decision was made to send to Chad a peace-keeping force comprising troops from - Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Zaire, Guinea, Togo and Benin - (the last three nations however never sent their promised contingents).

The mission of the peace-keeping force was to establish the conditions necessary for a round-table conference of Chadian leaders which could be organised to prepare for a nationally elected government. Once in Chad, the force faced many problems - lack of effective mobility, ineffectiveness, and spiralling costs. In short, the OAU peace-keeping force, unable to take sides and lacking the capability to disarm both parties, became part of the problem rather than the solution. It stood impotently in the middle, watching the GUNT, a government which had after all been established by the OAU, being overthrown by an invading

Habre forces with known foreign backers—France and the United States. The OAU was brought to near humiliation and the final ignominy was that it had to appeal for funds from the United States, Britain, France and the United Nations to foot the bill for the operation of its forces. With not enough funds forthcoming, Weddeye ousted, and Habre not talking peace, the then chairman of the OAU, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya in June 1982 ordered the withdrawal of OAU forces from Chad. The much enthused about peace-keeping force in Chad, as with the UN force in Lebanon and the general rule in policing actions when faced with determined adversaries, was largely superfluous and ignored. The OAU for the first time found itself charged with the physical task of restoring peace to an African country; it put some muscle and commitment behind its diplomacy through the peace-keeping force but failed.

With the failure of its efforts both at mediation and through the use of an official peace-keeping force, the OAU seems to have exhausted its machinery in resolving the Chad issue and has since 1983 left the military/political drama in the country in the hands of the French, the Americans, Libyans and the Chadians themselves. While the organization agrees that all the foreign forces should leave Chad, whenever the Chad issue has come up for discussion at the OAU forums since 1983, many members of the organization have chosen to ignore the dire implications for African



unity which are posed by the conflict in Chad. Thus, the Chad malady, within which several member states of the OAU and foreigners have been involved demonstrate the complexities which have frequently faced the OAU and is one of the most serious set-backs in the history of the organization particularly in its role on conflict management.

2:5 The OAU and the Management of inter-state conflicts in the Eastern African sub-region:

In Eastern Africa, as in other African sub-regions, the OAU has faced explosive issues most of which involve territorial claims. These include the 1964-67 Somalia - Kenya - Ethiopia conflicts, the 1964-68 Sudan - Ethiopia dispute and the 1972 and 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda conflicts.

The conflicts between Somalia and Kenya on the one hand and between Somalia and Ethiopia on the other hand arose out of Somalia's long standing expansionist policy of a Greater Somalia envisaged to comprise all areas inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti<sup>37</sup>. The two costly conflicts involved armed skirmishes between Kenya and Somalia supported shifita as well as between Somalia and Ethiopia. The long drawn skirmishes left many people

dead with the adversaries spending not inconsiderable part of their defence budgets in defensive or offensive operations by their security forces.<sup>38</sup>

Several early attempts to resolve the conflicts were largely unsuccessful. For example, during a meeting of some African heads of state in Monrovia in May 1961, Ethiopia and Somalia were called upon to peacefully settle their differences.<sup>39</sup> This call went unheeded. In August 1963 representatives of Kenya, Somalia and Britain met in Rome and tried without success to reach an agreement on the then Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD), (now part of North Eastern Province). Similar attempts between Kenya and Somali leaders also failed.<sup>40</sup> Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote also attempted to reconcile Kenya and Somalia when he sent a letter to the Somalia Prime Minister urging his government to drop its demand on the NFD and in his reply the Somalia Prime Minister rebuffed Obote's attempts repeating his government's firmness on the NFD question.<sup>41</sup> The NFD question was also discussed in the UN General Assembly in 1965.<sup>42</sup>

The Somali-Kenya and Somali-Ethopia disputes were further discussed at Dar-es-Salaam and Lagos meetings of the OAU Council of Ministers and resolutions calling upon the countries to settle their disputes peacefully were passed,<sup>43</sup> again quite fruitlessly. Though the

two were not discussed by the OAU heads of state and government during the 1964 Cairo Summit, a resolution was passed which inter alia asked member states to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence<sup>44</sup>. Somalia flatly rejected the resolution. In the same year (1964) Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in a brief direct military confrontation which only ended when the two countries set up a joint border commission.<sup>45</sup> The following year, Sudan Prime Minister Abboud tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the two. At the OAU Accra summit later in the year, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to refrain from hostile propaganda against each other.<sup>46</sup> President Nyerere of Tanzania also tried to mediate between Kenya and Somalia in 1965. His efforts led to a series of meetings between the two countries including a summit in Dar-es-Salaam in December of the same year but these achieved no remarkable results. Then in 1966 Ethiopia and Somalia signed agreements settling the border dispute between them.<sup>47</sup> Hostilities between the two however remained throughout much of 1966 and early 1967 with accusations and counter-accusations of border incursions, the agreements not withstanding.

The June 1967 elections in Somalia brought in a moderate Mohammed Ibrahim Egal as the Prime Minister. Egal began to pursue a policy of detente vis-a-vis

Kenya and Ethiopia. This policy, as Korwa Adar has correctly noted, was not meant to abandon the Somali primary objective of unification<sup>48</sup>. As Egal himself explained, 'it was however open to us to alter the policy of confrontation and seek accommodation for a detente with our neighbours as a preliminary to creating a suitable atmosphere without abandoning the context of our political aspiration and objectives'.<sup>49</sup>

Egal's moderate policy of detente made it easy for the disputants to seek negotiated settlement of their conflicts. Thus, during the fifth OAU summit meeting in Kinshasa in September 1967, President Kaunda of Zambia helped arrange for negotiations between Kenya and Somalia while Haile Selassie and Egal also met privately during this summit.<sup>50</sup> After the Kinshasa discussion, Kenya and Somalia produced a declaration which paved the way for further negotiations.<sup>51</sup> Then in October 1967 Prime Minister Egal and President Kenyatta met in Arusha, Tanzania in a multilateral summit chaired by President Kaunda with presidents Nyerere and Obote attending as observers.<sup>52</sup> Kenya and Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (also known as the Arusha Agreement) calling off mutual hostilities and forming the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries<sup>53</sup> as well as the consideration of measures encouraging the development of economic and trade relations.<sup>54</sup> In the

same month of October 1967, Prime Minister Egaf and Emperor Haile Selassie signed a similar Memorandum of Understanding during their bilateral summit meeting in Addis Ababa<sup>55</sup>. Finally, in December 1967, Presidents Kaunda, Kenyatta and Prime Minister Egaf met in Kampala, Uganda to review the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.

As a result of the 1967 negotiations and agreements, the conflicts de-escalated for a while with some aspects of good relations between the three countries apparently restored-but the underlying causes of the conflicts not resolved. The Kenya-Somalia conflict may be said to have ground to a stalemate around the old border by the mid 1980s with Somalia renouncing her claims to part of Kenya's territory. Skirmishes between Somalia and Ethiopia have however continued even after the 1978/79 Ogaden war and a final resolution is still awaited from the continuing mediation efforts of the Inter-Government Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) as well as bilateral negotiations between the two countries.

Another issue in which the OAU attempted settlement without reasonable success was the 1964-68 Sudan-Ethiopia conflicts centered around border issues and support for rebel and insurgent activities in another's territory. Several attempts were made to resolve the conflicts through regular consultative

meetings of OAU mediation commission and of ministers from the two countries but without success. Then in July 1965, a bilateral summit meeting between Prime Minister Mahgoub of Sudan and Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia was held in Addis Ababa and agreements were reached, inter alia, to respect each other's unity and integrity, prohibit the existence in each other's territory of groups hostile to another's government, and set up a joint standing ministerial consultative committee.<sup>56</sup> This summit marked the first major breakthrough in the conflict.

After a series of meetings of the joint ministerial consultative committee, agreement was reached in June 1966 to form a joint boundary commission to demarcate the frontier between Sudan and Ethiopia and this was upheld after another summit meeting between Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi and Emperor Haile Salassie in Khartoum in February 1967. After yet another series of consultative meetings at ministerial level, a summit between Haile Selassie and el Mahdi was held in Addis Ababa in August 1968 at which a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. In the memorandum, the two leaders expressed the view that 'solving the border problems and eliminating subversive activities would put an end to all causes of friction and misunderstanding'<sup>57</sup> between the two countries and to this end a joint Ethio-Sudanese

Standing Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence of the two countries was formed to follow up all agreements reached <sup>58</sup>. The Addis Ababa agreements brought to a halt the open hostilities between Sudan and Ethiopia and laid the basis for further negotiations for the two countries. As is already evident, this was not as a result of effective OAU efforts but that of the parties to the dispute themselves.

The OAU had mixed results in the two Tanzania - Uganda conflicts. Orwa aptly observes that 'while the OAU succeeded in resolving the 1972 Tanzania - Uganda conflict, it failed to prevent them from going to war in <sup>59</sup> 1978'. The 1972 conflict between these two sister states was triggered off in September when about one thousand armed soldiers of ex-President Obote invaded Uganda from Tanzania capturing the barracks at Mbarara and President Idi Amin retaliated by twice bombing the Tanzanian town of Bukoba and later Mwanza <sup>60</sup>. With the two countries dangerously close to open war, the OAU quickly swung into action. The then Secretary General of the Organization, Mr. Nzo Ekangasi on behalf of the then OAU Chairman King Hassan of Morocco conducted a series of contacts with African governments particularly Kenya, Sudan, Zaire and Somalia in an attempt to settle the <sup>61</sup> crisis. A number of African leaders appealed for restraint. As a result, President Siad Barre of Somalia

offered to mediate and soon arranged a cease-fire between the two countries. President Barre succeeded in bringing the two countries together in Mogadishu in October 1972 where a five-point peace agreement was concluded which committed both Tanzania and Uganda not to undertake military operations against each other <sup>62</sup>. The conflict subsided for a while.

Relations between Tanzania and Uganda however remained chilled as long as Amin remained in power and Nyerere refused to recognise him. Then in October 1978 a more serious dispute started when regular forces of the Uganda army invaded Tanzania territory and occupied the Kagera Salient on the north-west border with Uganda north of the Kagera river, claiming the territory belonged to Uganda. The Uganda invasion was also an attempt to allegedly repulse an earlier incursion into her territory by either Tanzanian troops or Uganda exiles in Tanzania <sup>63</sup>, and a full-scale war ensued. Tanzania, determined to ensure that no similar unprovoked attacks on its territory by Uganda occurred again, vowed to topple the Amin regime. Thus, serious fighting continued and by the beginning of 1979, some 45,000 Tanzanian troops, accompanied by a 2,000 strong Uganda National Liberation Army, entered South-Western Uganda, eventually captured Kampala and ousted Amin <sup>64</sup>.



Throughout the Tanzania-Uganda conflict, several mediation efforts by individual African states and the OAU were attempted to no avail. Kenya, purely for its sub-regional interests - concern with the preservation of sub-regional political, economic and ideological status quo and fear of the war spilling over its own territory - was the first country to offer to mediate in the conflict. It urged both Tanzania and Uganda to withdraw their forces from the common border to facilitate 'an atmosphere conducive to the rapid return of normality in the area.'<sup>66</sup> Both Nigeria and Libya sent special envoys to Nyerere and Amin with offers to mediate in the conflict. While these countries were offering their help, the then OAU chairman President Jaffer Numeiri of Sudan accompanied by the OAU Secretary-General 'travelled to Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam to appeal to the two Heads of State to stop fighting'<sup>67</sup>. It is to these leaders that both Amin and Nyerere set their conditions for ending the war. President Amin stated that he would only withdraw his forces from Tanzanian territory if Tanzania stopped interfering in Uganda's internal affairs, withdrew its forces and the OAU guaranteed that Tanzania would never attack Uganda again<sup>68</sup>. President Nyerere on his part demanded that 'the OAU publicly condemn Amin as the aggressor, call on him to withdraw his forces from Tanzanian territory, publicly renounce all claims to

the territory his troops had occupied, and promise to pay compensation for destruction of property and loss of life they had caused, before Tanzania would consider stopping the war' <sup>69</sup>,

In response to this new development, the OAU ad hoc committee on inter-African disputes set up by the fourteenth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State in Libreville in July 1977 comprising of ministers from Nigeria, Gabon, Zaire, Central African Republic, Zambia, Togo, Gambia, Madagascar and Tunisia invited the two governments to a reconciliation meeting. By the time the committee met in Nairobi in February 1979 (the first time the committee was to meet) <sup>70</sup>, both Uganda and Tanzania still stuck to their conditions for a settlement.- the former that the OAU guarantee that Tanzania would never again attack her and Tanzania that the OAU condemn Amin as the aggressor and produce an acceptable plan with which to deal with him. The committee failed to address the conditions and Nyerere rejected their mediation. However, the committee went ahead and recommended a ceasefire, an end to territorial claims against neighbouring countries, withdrawal of troops to recognized borders and adherence to the OAU Charter, particularly its provisions of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the sovereignty and inviolability of borders of member states. <sup>71</sup> Meanwhile, the war

continued and by March 1979, the mediation committee officially reported that its 'mediation' efforts had failed.<sup>72</sup> Amin's troops were defeated and he fled the country thereby bringing the hostilities between the two countries to an end.

The OAU under cover of the principle of non-interference failed to condemn Ugandan aggression against Tanzania, the central key to the resolution as demanded by Tanzania. As a result, the OAU failed to resolve the crisis.

The cases we have briefly examined have been an attempt to help us roughly assess the performance of the OAU in the management of inter-state conflicts in Africa. Overall, we have found out that in three of the cases examined (Chad, Ethiopia-Sudan, and 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda), OAU mediation efforts failed to resolve the conflicts. In the other four cases (Algero-Morocco, Somali-Kenya, Somali-Ethiopia and 1972 Tanzania-Uganda) deescalation of the conflicts was not as a result of OAU efforts as such but largely through individual mediation efforts under the auspices of the organization. The individual mediation efforts more often led to bilateral and/or multilateral summitry which produced final results of agreements. The summits tended to be at the heads of state and government levels but preceded by a series of

exploratory and preparatory meetings at ministerial or special commissions levels. We submit, therefore that in general, the OAU has not been very effective in dealing with inter-state conflicts in Africa. This clearly demonstrates, as Kenneth Mathews observes, that 'nowhere else is the OAU's weakness more clearly exposed than in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa' <sup>73</sup>. In an outline of major intra-Africa conflicts, Mathews shows that 'during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s the organization played practically no role not only in domestic conflicts or civil wars, for which clear inhibitions existed, but also in most intra-African disputes' <sup>74</sup>. Ambrose Omukada has also reached similar conclusions in his evaluation of the OAU in peaceful settlement of disputes <sup>75</sup>.

It should be noted, however, that what many have seen as the general failure of the OAU in peaceful settlement of disputes does not mean that the organization no longer presents the best hope for African states to live in peace with each other and indeed grow together to insulate the continent from divisive pressures both from within and without. Critics who overemphasize the OAU's failure to resolve continental conflicts fail to appreciate the dimensions within which it operates and the complexities it usually faces.

There are serious misconceptions over the OAU'S role and position within the African political setting. As an umbrella continental body, the OAU is a loose association of states whose approach to resolution of conflicts is characterised by settlement within the framework of the organization rather than by the organization. This requires the moral commitment and consensus of opinion by the members which unfortunately, is seriously lacking among the member states of the OAU. In short, we posit that personality and ideological differences, pursuit of conflicting national interests, intervention of extra-African powers in African affairs, the organic element of the OAU, its structural weaknesses and lack of resources are some of the strong forces that the organization - the world's largest continental body - has to contend with in its endeavours in the field of conflict management. In its present set up therefore, the OAU only exists to prohibit, only wielding a moral force. Herein lies a major weakness of the organization."

The OAU'S apparent incapacity to fully manage conflicts in Africa has led to two main alternative approaches. On the one hand is the resort to external forces and on the other hand is the use of informal summitry. The former involves the invitation of external forces either from within or from without the continent to help solve internal problems. The French,

American, Libyan, Nigerian and Zairean forces during the Chad crisis, the Cuban forces in Angola, the Russian and Cuban forces in Ethiopia during the Ogaden war, the Tanzanian forces in Zimbabwe and Mozambique during the two countries' liberation wars are but few examples. Informal summitry in Eastern Africa on the other hand involves both bilateral and multilateral informal attempts at conflict management outside the framework of the OAU and this is our concern in the next three chapters.

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2. Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 3rd edn., (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969) p.175
3. Archer, op.cit. p.6.
4. Ibid. p.7.
5. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p.455.
6. Archer, op.cit. p.8.
7. Bilgrami, op.cit p.11.
8. Hartmann, op.cit p.179.
9. George Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1973), p.15.
10. See the Preamble, Covenant of the League of Nations.
11. Bilgrami, op.cit. p.11.
12. Ibid.

13. Articles 3(3) and 4(4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
14. Archer, op.cit. p.23.
15. See Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.
16. Hartmann, op.cit. p.194.
17. See Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations.
18. Chapter VII allow the Security Council, if peace is threatened or broken, to apply economic and other sanctions to assure compliance and should these measures fail, Article 41 and 42 of the same Chapter provide for police action. In Chapter VIII members of the UN in regional arrangements "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies.....".
19. Mark W. Zacher, 'The Secretary General and the United Nations Function of Peaceful settlement' in International Organization, Vol.XX, No.4 (Autumn 1966) p.724.
20. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 2nd edn., (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 353.
21. These were the 1985 Geneva Summit, the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, the 1987 Washington Summit and the 1988 Moscow Summit.



22. C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1986), p. 41.
23. Ibid.
24. Keneth Mathews, 'The Organization of African Unity' in Domenico Mazzeo (ed). African Regional Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 51.
25. Ibid. p. 52.
26. Amate op. cit. p. 42.
27. See Mathews op. cit. p. 52.
28. Ibid.
29. For details of the Brazzaville and Casablanca meetings, see for example Amate, op. cit. pp. 44 - 48 and Mathews, op. cit. p. 54.
30. Amate, op. cit. p. 49.
31. Quoted in Amate, op. cit. p. 49.
32. See Mathews, op. cit. p. 54.
33. Ibid.
34. For the Algeria - Morocco conflict, see Patricia Berko Wild, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A study of New Machinery for Peace-keeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States' in International Organization, Vol.XX, No.1, (Winter 1966), pp.18-36.
35. James Mayall, 'African Unity and the OAU: The Place of a Political Myth in African Diplomacy'. The Handbook of World Affairs, Vol.27 (1973), p.122.

36. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.254.
37. Somali irredentism has been widely analysed. See for example, James Mayall, 'The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy' in the World Today (September 1978); Joseph Makokha, 'The Politics of Nationalism and Irredentism in North Eastern Province - Kenya' (M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1979); Korwa Gombe Adar, 'The Significance of the Legal Principle of "Territorial Integrity" as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963-83' (PhD Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1986).
38. Leonard W. Doob (ed) Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p.7.
39. Ibid.
40. This was during a visit to Somalia by the leaders of Kenya's two dominant political parties, KANU and KADU in the later part of 1962. See Korwa G. Adar, op.cit. p. 137.
41. See 'Somalia Rebuff for Uganda', The Times (London), May 1963, p.10.
42. See United Nations, General Asembly. General Debate. Eighteenth Session, 1222 ns, Plenary Meeting (UN Doc.A/PV 1222) 1963, p.8.

43. For the Dar-es-Salaam Resolutions, see Organization of African Unity, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second Extraordinary Session of Council of Ministers, Dar-es-salaam 12-15 February, 1964 (OAU Mimeographed Texts, February 1964), OAU Doc. ECM/Res.3(iii), and for the Lagos Resolutions see Organization of African Unity, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Lagos, 24-29 February (OAU Mimeographed Texts, February 1964) OAU Doc. CM/Res. 17 (ii).
44. See J.Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1964), p.162
45. See Africa Dairy 1967. p.2956.
46. Doob, op.cit. p.7.
47. Daniel K. Orwa, 'The politics of Stabilisation: Kenya's Policy Posture in Eastern Africa'. Department of Government Seminar paper No. 1 (University of Nairobi, 1987), p.30.
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64. Tordoff, op. cit. p. 252.
65. Omukada, op. cit. p. 29.
66. The Standard, (Nairobi) November 1, 1978. Quoting official government statement
67. Amate, op. cit. p. 428.
68. Ibid. See also Omukada, op. cit. p. 29.
69. Amate, op. cit. p. 428.
70. Ibid. p. 429.
71. Colin Legum, (ed). Africa Contemporary Record, 1978-79, p. B394.
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73. Mathews, op. cit. p. 66.
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EMERGENCE OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN SUMMITRY SYSTEM3:0 Introduction

As noted in the conclusion of the previous chapter, the apparent weakness in the capacity of the OAU to fully manage conflicts in Africa has led to attempts to seek alternative approaches to conflict management. One such approach in Eastern Africa has been the use of summits. In this chapter we examine the origin of the Eastern African Summitry System and analyse its aims and objectives. The chapter also includes a general survey of the summits between 1980 and 1987 with a particular emphasis on their basic concerns.

3:1 The Origins

The origin of the Eastern African Summitry System can be traced back to around 1963 when there occurred a series of summit meetings between the leaders of the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania since 1964), Kenya and Uganda (at times with representatives from Zanzibar) particularly concerned with the idea of an East African Federation. The basis for the proposed federation had been formed during a meeting held in London in June 1961 between representatives of the three countries (then still under colonial rule), the United Kingdom and the East Africa High Commission, with an observer from Zanzibar<sup>1</sup>.

The first of these summit meetings was held in Nairobi on June 5, 1963 attended by President Nyerere of Tanzania, Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta of Uganda and Kenya respectively. A communique issued after the summit and signed by the three leaders announced inter alia that they had agreed to establish a federation that year, that Zanzibar would be invited to take part fully in the federation and that any of the territories' neighbours would be allowed to join the federation in future. The summit further set up a Working Party to prepare a formula and draw up a draft constitution for the proposed federation <sup>2</sup>.

A second summit was again held in Nairobi in April 1964 and attended by the three leaders of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda together with Vice President Sheikh Hanga and Foreign Affairs Minister Sheikh Abdul Rahman both from Zanzibar. The meeting established an "emergency committee" to study trade relations between, and industrial development within the East African countries <sup>3</sup>. The result of the committee's deliberations was the April 1964 Kampala Agreement reached between ministers of the three countries. The agreement was an attempt at the 'equalization of the distribution of industry' <sup>4</sup> as a result of the apparent imbalances in inter-territorial trade which seemed to favour Kenya. The measures agreed upon were:-

- (i) to arrange a shift in the territorial distribution of production of a number of firms which operated in two or more of the countries;
- (ii) to institute quotas on inter-territorial trade;
- (iii) to allocate certain major industries between the countries;
- (iv) to increase sales from a country in deficit in inter-territorial trade to a country in surplus; and
- (v) to devise a system of inducements and allocations of industry to secure an equitable distribution of industrial development between the three countries<sup>5</sup>.

From a broad perspective, the measures were basically aimed at curtailing Kenya's lion share of new investment and inter-territorial trade. It is not surprising therefore that when the three leaders of East Africa met in Mbale in January 1965 to ratify the Kampala Agreement, Kenya refused to comply ostensibly because the new arrangement being agreed upon 'radically changed the regional economic status quo by calling upon Kenya to slow its development to permit Tanzania and Uganda to reach parity'<sup>6</sup>. What now



became known as the Kampala - Mbale Agreement was thus never implemented and the 1965 announcements that each of the three countries was to establish its own central bank and issue its own currency as well as Tanzania's intended severe restrictions upon imports from Kenya brought the economic relations between the countries to their lowest ebb <sup>8</sup>.

This new development of seriously strained economic relations threatened to endanger the Common Market through which the three countries had co-operated for decades and it called for a search for solutions. Thus, a series of summits of Heads of State of the three countries basically concerned with the issue of economic relations were held in 1965 - August 11-20, Nairobi; September 1, Mombasa; November 16, Nairobi among others. These were interspersed and preceded by a number of intense and regular meetings of a special Ministerial Commission of the three countries under independent chairmanship of a Danish economist, Professor Kjeld Philip <sup>9</sup>. These meetings finally culminated in the June 1967 Kampala Summit of the three East African leaders at which the Treaty for East African Co-operation, drawn up by the Philip Ministerial Commission, that established the East African Community (EAC) was signed.

What emerges clearly from the foregoing is that most of these early summits were primarily attempts to come to terms with, first, the issue of the East African federation and second, the demands for equitable economic arrangement in East Africa. The first issue was basically left in abeyance particularly when it became apparent that apart from Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda were not very enthusiastic about federation. It is instructive to note for instance that after the April 1964 Nairobi Summit, no other summit was held on the issue of federation and it appears only the back-benchers in the countries' parliaments still harboured some serious concern over the issue <sup>10</sup>. The second issue led to the establishment of the East African Community. The Community became a formal institutional framework for dealing with economic matters. It also provided a framework for consultation at the highest governmental level thereby contributing to management of political and economic conflicts.

While these early summits appeared basically concerned with the issues of federation and economic co-operation, politico-military issues also demanded attention. Of particular importance were the border and territorial disputes of the early 1960s between Kenya and Uganda; Kenya and Ethiopia; Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia; and Kenya and Sudan. The Kursuk border dispute between Kenya and Uganda was settled through

bilateral summits of the two countries in 1965. The same was done with respect to the Kenya - Ethiopia border and Kenya - Sudan border in the same year. In the latter two disputes, permanent joint ministerial committees and joint border security consultative committees were set up to deal with any problem that might arise out of common borders. The Somalia - Ethiopia - Kenya, and the Sudan - Ethiopia border issues were dealt with in the same spirit as discussed in Chapter Two. These agreements on border issues seem to have created an order of diplomacy in East Africa based on bilateral summitry and third party mediation in which the key players were Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, Uganda's Milton Obote and Somalia's Ibrahim Egal.

It is safe to argue that the new order seems to have helped in freezing the sub-regional conflicts and made East Africa a relatively stable sub-system especially after 1967. The informal bilateral and multilateral summits that were held during the period were basically concerned with enhancing sub-regional cooperation and collaboration. This apparent sub-regional equilibrium was, however, shattered in the second half of the 1970s when there occurred the most momentous breakdown in inter-state-relations in the history of the area. This was a response to the negative developments in the decade such as change of

leadership, escalating arms race and military buildups, economic, ideological, military and political conflicts, as well as superpower involvement. These, combined, created a sub-regional power disequilibrium<sup>11</sup> and raised serious security concerns .

The breakdown in the inter-state relations in Eastern Africa began with the 1969 Somalia military coup in which Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal was overthrown and a new military leadership under General Siad Barre installed.<sup>12</sup> . Barre's military government soon embarked on a policy of 'Greater Somalia' centered on military strength. To this end, the government forged an alliance with the Soviet Union<sup>13</sup> from whom it received enormous arms supplies. One year later, there came the 1971 Amin coup in Uganda in which President Obote was overthrown. This worsened relations between the three East African countries. By deposing Obote, Amin had gotten rid of Tanzania's friend and ideological ally. Matters worsened when contrary to Tanzania's expectations, Kenya recognised the Amin regime and continued to conduct normal diplomatic relations with the Uganda government.<sup>14</sup> This set in motion an ideological tension between Kenya and Tanzania.

In the neighbourhood, Sudan continued to experience frequent internal political changes while Ethiopia was in 1974 rocked with a revolution which saw the exit of the long serving Emperor Haile Selassie and the emergence of a new generation of leadership under the Dergue headed by Mengitsu Haile Mariam. As a result of the revolution, the Ethiopian army, long regarded as the balancing power in the Horn of Africa, was seriously weakened through purges and rivalry. Taking advantage of the weakness, the Ethiopian secessionist movements embarked on one of their fiercest campaigns thereby further weakening the army. In the meantime, Somalia's Pan-Somalia strategy continued to worry both the Ethiopia and Kenya.

The general negative developments climaxed in the mid 1970s to totally disrupt the East African order. First, the differences between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania persisted and combined with other factors led to the break up of the East African Community in June 1977. The Community had accommodated differences between the three East African countries and its collapse therefore created a vacuum. Second, Somalia, still pursuing the 'Greater Somalia' strategy and sure of defeating the weakened Ethiopian army, took the plunge in attempting to regain by force the Somali inhabited area of Ethiopia. The result was the

1977/78 Ogaden war. Finally, as this war came to an end Amin, finding it hard to contain internal problems and in an attempt to divert internal attention, invaded a part of Tanzania territory <sup>15</sup>. This triggered off a direct military confrontation between Uganda and Tanzania which ended with the overthrow of the Uganda government by Tanzania military forces <sup>16</sup>.

It is observable from the foregoing that the icebergs that capped the conflicts of the 1960s had melted by the close of the 1970s. The sub-region had now degenerated into confrontations and violent conflicts. The old order of diplomacy through bilateral summitry and third party mediation had crumbled and the situation called for a new system to contain it.

Apparently in response to this changed scenerio of actual and other potentially violent oriented conflicts in the sub-region, the Eastern African states of necessity sought to fashion new means for cooperation over issues of peace and security and for coordinating action in the socio-economic areas of life. Out of this desire emerged an informal summitry system based on the Concert of Europe system as a mechanism for managing inter-state relations. The system, it appears, is designed not to replace but to compliment the institutionalized framework of th OAU. The summits tend to be at the level of heads of state and

government as well as between various governmental representatives, particularly at ministerial levels. They are usually held at irregular intervals and a basic characteristic is informality

3:2      Aims and Objectives of the Eastern African Summitry System

Unlike formal institutional multilateral organizations and arrangements which usually have their aims and objectives clearly spelled out in their Constitutions, Charters or Covenants, informal multilateral summit systems operate without written down constitutional guidelines. The latter's aims and objectives are not spelled out in any written document. However, such systems do have identifiable aims and objectives. For example, a careful examination of summit reports and communiquees of the Eastern African Summitry System reveals a persistent concern with issues of peace, security and economic co-operation. The system therefore aims at reducing tension and conflicts in the sub-region through dialogue, consultations, negotiations and increased co-operation in various fields. Crudely put, the basic objectives of the system are to:-

- (i)      promote sub-regional peace and security,

- (ii) promote sub-regional cooperation in various fields of political, economic, social and cultural interests,
- (iii) provide safeguards against conflicts and tensions and commute the same, and
- (iv) encourage friendly relations

In this sense, the central focus of the Summitry System is on sub-regional security problems and economic cooperation. This has been particularly so during the 1980s.

### 3:3 The 1980 Arusha and Mombasa Summits

The departure of Idi Amin and the return of Milton Obote to power in Uganda in 1980 was a very significant development in the sub-region. Obote's return into the East African political leadership helped create conditions for improved relations among the three traditional East African states (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). Already just before the return of Obote to power in Kampala the process of normalisation of relations in East Africa had begun. On January 2, 1980 in Arusha, Tanzania, the first East African informal multilateral summit meeting since the coup in Uganda by Idi Amin in 1971 was held, attended by Presidents Julius Nyerere, Daniel arap Moi and Godfrey Binaisa<sup>17</sup>.



This was the first time in a decade that the leaders of the three countries - formerly partners in the defunct East African Community - met specifically to discuss issues affecting the sub-region <sup>18</sup>. Throughout Idi Amin's eight year rule in Uganda, the three presidents could not meet because of the hostility between Nyerere and Amin. Thus, while Amin's ouster from power by Tanzania forces 'caused further strains in the relations of the three East African countries' <sup>19</sup> particularly as regards Kenya's suspicion on Tanzania's motives in overthrowing Amin, it also opened the chances of dialogue which the three countries seized upon. While no official communique was issued after the summit, President Nyerere briefing newsmen noted that 'The achievements of today's meeting are tremendous, we are bound to achieve more in the coming days' adding that the leaders 'resolved to continue holding regular meetings to discuss issues affecting our countries' <sup>20</sup>. President Nyerere further noted that the meetings would enable leaders 'create confidence among ourselves and face our common issues through dialogue' <sup>21</sup>. Sources at the summit pointed out that some of the issues discussed included the reopening of the Tanzania - Kenya border, the 'sharing of the former assets and liabilities of the defunct East African Community and co-operation in such fields as communications and trade' <sup>22</sup>. That the leaders were

to emphasize on these inter-related issues was not surprising because together, they affected the relations between the three countries. For example, Tanzania had in the past insisted that the reopening of the border and resumption of trade between Kenya and Tanzania both depended on the 'successful finalisation of the sharing of the Community assets and the working out of new trade arrangements' <sup>23</sup>.

The significance of the Arusha Summit lies in the facts that it exemplified the emerging new relations in East Africa, endorsed the need to consolidate the spirit of good neighbourliness through regular meetings and identified issues that needed thrashing out to ensure co-operation. Thus, although problems still existed, a start had been made to solve them.

Three months after the Arusha Summit Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Binaiisa joined by President Jaffer Numeiri of Sudan met in Mombasa on April 14 and 15 1980 for a two day summit. This was 'a continuation of the dialogue started at Arusha last January' <sup>24</sup>. The communique issued after the summit noted that the leaders 'exchanged views and reached understanding on a number of matters concerning regional co-operation' <sup>25</sup>. Specifically, the leaders 'noted with satisfaction the continued improvement in the internal situation in Uganda and reaffirmed willingness to render to the best of their ability such assistance as Uganda may

request'<sup>26</sup> . On trade and cooperation the leaders agreed that 'ministers of trade of the four countries hold an early meeting to discuss ways of promoting trade relations in the region'<sup>27</sup> and that the ministers concerned with the affairs of the defunct East African Community should meet and expedite the work of sharing of the Community's assets<sup>28</sup> . Finally, the leaders expressed their strong desire to continue to make all endeavours to promote close understanding between the people of the region'<sup>29</sup> and agreed to hold their next summit in Kampala.

It is evident that the Mombasa Summit marked an important stage in emerging new relations in East Africa. For the first time, the leaders held substantive discussions on the major issues identified during the Arusha Summit. In particular, the issue of the defunct Community was gravely important as it was<sup>30</sup> 'the key to restoration of normal economic relations' between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It is against this background of a new spirit and commitment to East African co-operation that the 1981 Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi Summits were held.

The 1981 Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi  
Summits

As already noted, Obote's return to the East African political leadership was a very significant development. Obote together with Nyerere had been part of the old order which had crumbled in the mid 1970s. President Moi who succeeded the late Kenyatta had also been part of this system for as the Vice-President he on numerous occasions represented President Kenyatta in international forums particularly in East Africa. Obote's return therefore re-established the East African system.

After his election as President in Uganda in December 1980, Obote moved quickly to restore relations with Kenya. Thus, on January 5 1981<sup>31</sup> he met President Moi at the Kenyan border town of Webuye where they agreed inter alia to speed up business arrangements; re-schedule Uganda's debts to Kenya; and co-operate in anti-smuggling operations<sup>32</sup>. Having established new relations with Kenya, Obote realised the need to bring Kenya and Tanzania together and he assumed the role of an ideal mediator. On January 17 1981 therefore, he brought together Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Kaunda of Zambia in Kampala in what was to symbolise the emerging normalization of relations in the sub-region<sup>33</sup>. As Colin Legum was to later report,

this was a moment of triumph for Obote who had always deeply believed in full regional co-operation, and who had been an architect of the old East African Community which he now wanted to revive in some form as essential for the future well-being of all the three countries'<sup>34</sup>.

The final communique at the end of the Kampala Summit noted that 'the Presidents had agreed to develop mutual understanding, co-operation and partnership for the benefit of their peoples and commit themselves to peace and security in the region'<sup>35</sup>. They also agreed 'to establish political goodwill as a first step toward greater regional co-operation in economic matters, security and good neighbourliness'<sup>36</sup>, and to 'revive the inter-state security committee to handle security conflicts'<sup>37</sup>. Kampala was thus a new beginning and the leaders decided to open a new chapter of good neighbourliness and mutual collaboration in Eastern Africa. They sought to create, at the highest level, direct informal but highly influential multilateral exchanges.

Almost two months after the Kampala Summit, leaders of six Eastern African countries held a one-day summit meeting in Dar-es-Salaam on March 13, 1981. Present were Presidents Obote of Uganda Habyarimana of Rwanda, Bagaza of Burundi, Nyerere of Tanzania (host), Vice President Kibaki of Kenya and Prime Minister Nguza

of Zaire <sup>38</sup>. The Dar-es-Salaam Summit was 'aimed primarily at building better economic co-operation' <sup>39</sup> and the leaders reaffirmed the need to promote and intensify closer sub-regional co-operation in various fields.

After the Dar-es-Salaam Summit, President Moi, Nyerere and Obote met in Nairobi on July 24 1981 and deliberated on the need for greater sub-regional co-operation. In their joint communique they 'expressed the desire to hold further dialogue on periodical basis' <sup>41</sup> and underlined the significance of such meetings in consolidating the 'economies, stability and security of the three neighbouring states' <sup>42</sup>.

The 1980 and 1981 summits served as pace setters for the new arrangement emerging in the sub-region. The leaders appeared set to rebuild the sub-regional relations after the tensions of the late 1970s. The experiences of the period had taught them that the successful achievement of their domestic goals depended on sub-regional stability and inter-state co-operation. They seem to have realised that they could no longer assure their security and prosperity by individual national efforts alone hence the need for collective approach for the benefit of all. Sub-regional conflicts and bickering had cut off the beneficial trade between the countries and created

insecurity. It became apparent that there was need for reconciliation and strengthening of the principle of good neighbourliness to which all the sub-regional states claimed they were committed. The leaders therefore sought to work for broad consensus and for compatible approaches to their commonly shared objectives. The new spirit of co-operation emerging echoed Benjamin Franklin's cautionary advice that 'We must indeed all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately'<sup>43</sup>. The Eastern African leaders seemed set to "hang together" and the early summits so far discussed laid the foundation for these noble desires. The intermittent summits that later followed the first five were to attest to this.

### 3.5 The 1983/84 Arusha Summits

After the July 1981 Nairobi Summit, no summit was held in the sub-region until the October and November 1983 Arusha Summits. Political and economic developments in East Africa explain this lull in summitry.

In Kenya, the now defunct Kenya Airforce staged a short-lived coup d'état on August 1, 1982 and the coup leaders fled to Tanzania where they were given political asylum. Soon after in the same month, Tanzanian government discovered a coup plot against President Nyerere and the coup leaders fled to Kenya

seeking political asylum <sup>44</sup>. These developments seriously restrained relations between Kenya and Tanzania. Neighbouring Uganda was not having it easy either. The Obote government faced a Museveni-led rebellion as well as other opposition groups all of whom sought to use neighbouring countries as their operational bases. These unfortunate political developments seriously threatened the security of East Africa and realising this, Presidents Moi, Obote and Nyerere met in Arusha in October 1983 where they 'signed a secret security agreement the effect of which was the repatriation of dissidents from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda and from Tanzania to Kenya to stand trial in each of these countries for treasonable offences' <sup>45</sup>.

While the politico-security problems appear to have been temporarily managed by the 'secret security agreement' of October 1983 Arusha Summit, economic problems still stood on the way to full East African co-operation. Tanzania's economy had for instance been adversely affected by her involvement in the 1978/79 war against Amin while Uganda's economy was in shambles following Amin's eight year rule. The Obote government had embarked on reconstruction and the support of both Kenya and Tanzania was crucial. Kenya on the other hand had lost considerable trade particularly to Zambia and Tanzania following the closure of the border with



the latter and was in the early 1980s facing 'deepening economic recession'<sup>46</sup>. The Economist clearly summarised the situation then: 'All the three need any help they can get: Kenya's economy is showing its ribs, Tanzania's is far past that and Uganda's is in a desperate condition'<sup>47</sup>. Pragmatism therefore demanded that issues relating to economic co-operation be addressed and the result was the November 1983 Arusha Summit called specifically 'to agree on a formula for dividing the old Community's assets and liabilities and to chart guidelines for future economic co-operation'<sup>48</sup>.

During the summit, the Presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed what became known as the 'Arusha Accord' which apportioned and distributed the assets and liabilities of the defunct East African Community<sup>49</sup>. Most significant was the agreement to re-open the Kenya - Tanzania border closed by President Nyerere in 1977. On May 14 1984 the three Presidents met again in Arusha and 'signed the final winding up agreement on the division of assets and liabilities of the former Community and formally abrogated the Treaty of East African Co-operation of June 6 1967'<sup>50</sup>. They also agreed to preserve the three surviving sub-regional institutions - the East African Development Bank, the Soroti Pilot Training School and the 'Southern African Management Institute'<sup>51</sup>.

Following the 1983/84 Arusha Summits, years of political acrimony and economic conflicts between the three East African states were to be forgotten. A new spirit of co-operation had clearly emerged. Together with the earlier five summits therefore, the 1983/84 Arusha Summits set the stage for the later sub-regional informal multilateral summits in which all the countries of East Africa except Somalia and Ethiopia have participated. These summits have been complemented by informal bilateral summits between the leaders of the countries of Eastern Africa as well as meetings of joint consultative committees particularly those concerned with security and border issues.

It is clear that the catalyst for the evolution of the summitry system in Eastern Africa was the existence of sub-regional economic, ideological, political and military conflicts posing threats to order, peace and security. This situation was further compounded by the apparent weakness of the formal continental institutional framework in the management of these conflicts, and for East Africa proper, the demise of the institutional East African Community. The system, based on the Concert of Europe format, therefore emerged as a means of, among other things, managing

these conflicts in their political, economic, social and military dimensions, as well as regulating relations of participating member states outside the auspices of the umbrella continental body.

### 3:6 From Goma (January 1986) to Khartoum (June 1987)

While the summits of the early 1980s had set the stage for sub-regional summitry, internal political events in most of the countries in Eastern Africa particularly between 1984 and 1985 created conditions unfavourable for a sub-region wide summit.

Relations between Uganda and Rwanda continued to deteriorate and Rwanda closed its border with Uganda after an influx of thousands of refugees most of them<sup>52</sup> Rwandese exiles fleeing from Uganda. In Ethiopia, the Dergue government continued to face mounting rebel pressure, worsening relations with neighbouring Somalia and Sudan, and in 1984 a ravaging famine necessitating concerted international response. In Kenya, serious internal political problems arising from the affairs of the disgraced former Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo culminated into a major political purge in 1984 aimed at national power<sup>53</sup> consolidation and a new political arrangement. In Sudan, years of mounting internal problems finally led to the deposition of President Numeiri in a bloodless

military coup on April 6, 1985 <sup>54</sup> - and in Tanzania the long serving president Julius Nyerere resigned in 1985 and was replaced by Hassan Mwinyi.

Events in Uganda were the most devastating. The Uganda opposition groups intensified their campaigns. Obote was finally overthrown by a Tito Okello - led military coup in July 1985 and Obote fled to Kenya but was persuaded to take up exile in Zambia thus clearing the way for President Moi to sponsor a series of peace talks in Nairobi between the Okello government and the insurgent National Resistance Army (NRA) forces led by Museveni. The talks led to the signing of the Uganda Peace Accord on December 17 1985 in Nairobi <sup>55</sup>. The accord however crumbled when NRA forces finally took Kampala in January 1986.

It will be recalled that Obote's return to the East African political scene was instrumental in forging new relations in the sub-region. His sudden ouster thus shattered the newly created order and brought tensions between Kenya and Uganda in particular, as well as internal power struggle in Uganda. Obote's departure together with that of Nyerere thus dislodged the reconvened old order in East Africa.

In short, we submit that the changes in leadership and the negative developments in the sub-region called for a new order and it was against this background that the leaders sought to establish new broader co-operation amongst themselves. The result was the Goma Summit of January 29, 1986

Meeting at the Lake Kivu town of Goma in Eastern Zaire, Presidents Moi of Kenya, Mobutu of Zaire, and Habyarimana of Rwanda joined by Museveni of Uganda (who had been sworn in as President in Kampala only hours before) expressed desires for sub-regional peace, security and co-operation. They renewed their commitment to the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference by outsiders in the internal affairs of the sub-region<sup>56</sup>.

A joint communique signed by the four Presidents noted with satisfaction the progress made to restore peace and security in Uganda and pledged to support the Museveni government. It further noted the agreement by the leaders to intensify their efforts in the economic, social, cultural and security co-operation as well as the need to hold regular meetings and consultations among themselves and with other neighbours. They also agreed to hold the next summit in Uganda in March 1986<sup>57</sup>.

The Goma Summit was the most informal of all the previous and future summits. No advance extensive preparatory work had been done nor had the summit been announced. President Mobutu had to cut short his official visit to neighbouring Rwanda to host the summit<sup>58</sup> and the leaders 'held their deliberations under trees outside their host's lakeside lounge in the traditional African style'<sup>59</sup>.

The immediate political effect of the Goma Summit was its unifying effect. It demonstrated that the leaders had realised the need for solidarity to achieve their common objectives and underscored the importance of good neighbourliness and co-operation especially in security matters so as to boost stability and sub-regional development. The accent then was on co-operation and collective management as means of reducing sub-regional conflicts and insecurity.

The Goma Summit was followed by the Entebbe Summit of March 20, 1986. In attendance were Presidents Bagaza of Burundi, Mwinyi of Tanzania and Sawar El Dahab of Sudan in addition to the four who attended Goma summit. This was the largest gathering of African leaders in Uganda since the 1975 OAU summit.

The summit opened with the leaders being briefed by President Museveni on the situation prevailing in the country and then moved to discuss a wide range of sub-regional issues pertaining to co-operation on trade, development and security.

Like the Goma Summit, the Entebbe meeting was held in an informal, cordial and brotherly atmosphere in Entebbe State House. The summit clearly defined specific areas of sub-regional co-operation in security and economic matters. It went another step further by charging the respective Foreign Affairs ministers with the responsibility of ensuring that co-operation in various fields is achieved.

What is evident is that through the Goma and Entebbe summits, the Eastern African Summitry System clearly chartered its course as being specifically concerned with issues of security and co-operation. The "Big Seven" (as the pressmen now referred to the seven leaders) found that they were able to meet and talk informally and to achieve common ground across a wide range of issues. The summits had provided opportunities for frank unfettered discussions of problems and preoccupations of the sub-region. Not being bound to a strict agenda or papers prepared by officials, the summiteers were able to express

themselves with great freedom and build up mutual trust often finding more common ground among their fellow leaders.

The two summits firmly established that the quest for security, peace and stability was necessary for sub-regional development. It is on this basis that the summits reiterated the leaders' commitment to the principles of good neighbourliness; promotion of mutual trust, solidarity and unity; support to each other politically, materially and morally as well as enhanced co-operation in security, trade and development. The Nairobi Summit which followed the Entebbe Summit was specifically convened to seek ways of concretising these common sub-regional objectives now shared by the leaders.

The July 1986 two-day Nairobi Summit was a big success - perhaps more successful than the two previous and two latter ones - judging from representation (seven heads of state and government) and issues discussed. Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Habyarimana of Rwanda, Bagaza of Burundi, Mwinyi of Tanzania, Museveni of Uganda and Prime Minister El-Mahdi of Sudan (the only newcomer) joined the host, President Moi of Kenya. On July 13 a ministerial meeting attended by the representatives of the seven countries began at the



Kenya International Conference Centre to draw up the agenda <sup>60</sup> thereby breaking from the norm in the earlier summits in which no formal agenda was prepared before hand.

The first session of the summit got underway on July 14 followed by a second and final session the following day. After the two-day summit a joint communique signed by all the seven leaders was issued. The communique noted that the leaders discussed at length issues pertaining to sub-regional co-operation in security and economic matters.

Like the previous summits, the Nairobi Summit was held in an atmosphere of brotherhood and solidarity. President Moi had observed during the state banquet in honour of the visiting heads of state and government that the seven leaders were members of the same family sharing common heritage and destiny and were meeting, as most families do, to share a meal and exchange experiences as they discussed family issues and problems. He noted:

It is proper and in keeping with our African traditions when a neighbour drops by, however pressing his other engagements, to keep him a little longer and secure his friendship, even if it is

with a glass of water. It is in that same spirit that I welcome you here --- as members of one family with a common heritage and destiny .

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It is this spirit of brotherhood and solidarity that prevailed throughout the two-day summit.

The Nairobi Summit clearly demonstrated that the leaders were extremely serious about Eastern African security and economic development and as evident in the two previous summits were prepared to rebuild what was destroyed by unfortunate past political trends in the sub-region. In the previous summits, the leaders had expressed common wishes for sub-regional security and economic co-operation but the Nairobi Summit goes down in history for charting out specific strategies of achieving these shared objectives and in this lies the success and importance of the summit.

The Nairobi Summit was followed by another held on November 27, 1986 at Kigali, Rwanda . The same leaders gathered at the Rwandese capital as had met at Nairobi a few months before - except President Museveni who was represented by Prime Minister Kisseka. They were now the most experienced summiteers in the sub-region; for three of them (Presidents Moi, Mobutu and Habyarimana) Kigali was at least their fourth summit within a year. Presidents Mwinyi and Bagaza were

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attending for the third time while for the Prime Minister El-Mahdi it was the second summit. Coming so soon after the extensive Nairobi deliberations, Kigali Summit was a much less weighty affair devoted specifically to a review of the Nairobi resolutions with emphasis on security and economic issues. Though it ended with no new resolutions, it was still significant.

First, that the leaders were able to meet so soon after their exhaustive deliberations in Nairobi was a clear indication that the summits were not mere holiday outings for the sub-region's chief executives but, occasions for transacting practical business hence their commitment to their own earlier call in the previous summits to maintain and intensify contacts on a regular basis.

Secondly, Kigali Summit demonstrated that the leaders were keen on building up a sense of collective responsibility and solidarity in the sub-region. The experimental periods of the summits were obviously over; evidently, the summits had now become a regular event and as President Moi observed in his speech during the Kigali Summit, leaders in Eastern Africa 'needed to review constantly the quest for security and peace which was necessary for development' .

The official communique issued after the one-day Kigali Summit indicated that the leaders reviewed developments in the sub-region since the Nairobi Summit. In particular, the leaders noted that various bilateral border meetings had been held to enhance security and that these were clear indications of the leaders' commitment towards enhancement of peace and stability which would continue to serve as a basis for future co-operation<sup>64</sup>. Finally, the leaders reaffirmed their individual and collective responsibility in strengthening economic co-operation noting also that the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was a shining example in this regard<sup>65</sup>. It was agreed that the next summit would be held in Sudan.

The last sub-regional summit to-date (February 1990) was held in Khartoum on June 9 and 10 1987<sup>66</sup>. Only three heads of state were present - the summit veteran President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Museveni of Uganda and the host, Prime Minister El Mahdi of Sudan. Tanzania was represented by Prime Minister Warioba, Zaire by Vice President Kasenda and Burundi by Foreign Affairs and Co-operation Minister Nkurivingoma. Kenya was not represented<sup>67</sup>.

The absence of four of the seven sub-regional chief executives from the two-day Khartoum Summit perhaps reduced its importance and like Kigali, Khartoum was basically a review summit. In the joint

communique issued at the end of the summit the gathered leaders reiterated that 'relations between their countries continue to be consolidated in an atmosphere of mutual trust'<sup>68</sup> and that decisions reached at the preceding summits be implemented urgently. They further reaffirmed 'the desire of the people in the sub-region to promote co-operation' particularly in communication, air-links, security, trade and information. Finally, the leaders expressed the need to develop co-operation in the field of university education through scientific symposia, exchange visits and scholarships<sup>69</sup>.

By the end of Khartoum, a full circle of the 1980 summits - thirteen in all - seem to have ended. The 1980-84 summits served as pace setters. In the summits broad objectives for sub-regional security and economic co-operation were expressed. Then came the Gomma and Entebbe summits in which sub-regional agenda were clearly defined. The general consensus was that there was need for co-operation in security matters, economic and social aspects. The two summits firmly established that the leaders committed themselves to seek peace, stability and security which are necessary for sub-regional development. The July 1986 Nairobi Summit was devoted to charting out specific strategies of achieving the objectives as outlined in the earlier summits. Finally, the Kigali and Khartoum summits were

concerned with reviews of achievements so far made and reaffirmation of the leaders' continuing commitment to collective management of sub-regional affairs.

The dominant themes throughout the summits are not hard to discern. As we have seen, in almost each summit, issues of security and economic co-operation have prevailed. Thus, in realization of their co-existence and interdependence, the aspirations of the leaders have been that the sub-region be a zone of peace, stability, dynamic trade and economic as well as socio-cultural co-operation for the benefit of their peoples. This implies that actual and potential conflicts must be managed to achieve these shared objectives.

The Summitry System has been used as a means of managing sub-regional conflicts and in the next two chapters we examine the role of the Summitry System in this regard.

### 3.7 Footnotes

1. Donald Rothchild, (ed). Politics of Integration. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968) p. 257.
2. Ibid. pp. 76-78. See also Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1963-64 p. 19488A.
3. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1963-64, p. 20226A.
4. Colin Legum, (ed). Africa Contemporary Record, 1968/69. p. 15.
5. Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Integration: The East African Experience (London: Heineman, 1975) p. 61.
6. Daniel K. Orwa. 'The Politics of Stabilisation: Kenya's Policy Posture in Eastern Africa'. Department of Government Seminar Papper No.1 (University of Nairobi, 1987), pp. 24-25.
7. Hazlewood, op.cit. p. 61.
8. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1968, p. 15.
9. Hazlewood, op.cit. p. 61.
10. See Rothchild, (ed). Politics of Integration op. cit., particularly pp. 78 - 163 for the 'numerous parliamentary debates on the federation issue spearheaded by back-benchers.

11. For an enlightened analysis of the collapse of the Eastern African power equilibrium see Orwa, 'The Politics of Stabilisation, op. cit. particularly pp. 30 - 36.
12. See D.K. Orwa 'Foreign Policy' in William R. Ochieng (ed), A Modern History of Kenya 1895 - 1980 (Nairobi: Evans Brothers, 1989) p. 234.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See Orwa. 'The Politics of Stabilisation' op. cit. p. 36.
16. See C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1986), p. 428.
17. The Standard (Nairobi) January 3, 1980, p. 1. See also The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January '3, 1980, p. 1.
18. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) January 4, 1980, p. 5.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 3, 1980, p. 1.
22. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) January 4, 1980, p. 5.
23. Ibid.



24. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) April 18, 1980, p. 5.
25. The Standard (Nairobi) April 16, 1980, p. 7.
26. Ibid. See also The Weekly Review (Nairobi) April 18, 1980, p. 4.
27. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) April 18, 1980, p. 4.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81, p. B336.
31. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) (February 1981) p. 5766 A.
32. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81, p. B379.
33. See Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) (February 1981), p. 5798A.
34. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81, p. B379.
35. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) (February 1981) p. 5798 A.
36. The Standard (Nairobi) January 19, 1981, p. 4.
37. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 19, 1981, p. 6.

38. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) March 14 1981, p.1.
39. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) February 1981), p. 5828A.
40. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 25 1981, p.3.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Benjamin Franklin, on the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776 appearing on the title page of Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne's Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits 2nd edn. (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1987).
44. Orwa. 'The Politics of Stabilisation' op. cit. p. 38.
45. Ibid.
46. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81, p. B379.
47. The Economist (London) November 26, 1983, p. 58.
48. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1983/84, p. A87.

49. For details of the formula for the settlement, see for example The Economist (London) November 26 1983, p. 58; The Daily Nation (Nairobi) November 17, 1983, p. 1; and The Standard (Nairobi) November 17, 1983, p. 1.
50. The Kenya Times (Nairobi) May 23, 1984, p. 13.
51. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1984/85, p. B275.
52. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Cultural Series) 20 (1) (February 1983) p. 5321 B.
53. See The Weekly Review (Nairobi) September 21, 1984 pp. 3-9 and May, 27, 1988, pp. 18-19.
54. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) April 7, 1985, p. 1.
55. For details of the 'Uganda Accord' see for example The Daily Nation (Nairobi) November 18, 1985 pp. 1, 6 and 7.
56. See The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, p. 1 and The Standard (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, pp. 1 and 28.
57. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, p. 1.
58. The Standard (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, pp. 1.
59. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, p. 1.
60. The Standard (Nairobi) July 15, 1986, pp. 28.

61. Ibid. p. 6.
62. Africa Research Bulletin, (Political Series) 23 (11),  
p. 8290 C.
63. Ibid.
64. The Standard (Nairobi) November 28, 1986, pp. 1.
65. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1986/87, p.  
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66. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 24 (6) July  
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## CHAPTER FOUR

### EASTERN AFRICAN SUMMITRY SYSTEM IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SUB-REGIONAL POLITICO-MILITARY CONFLICTS

#### 4.0 Introduction

In examining the aims and objectives of the Eastern African Summitry System in the previous chapter, we asserted that the largest single motive for this informal arrangement has been the desire to maximize security at the sub-regional level and promote co-operation especially in economic areas. Our examination of the summits further revealed that they have been basically concerned with issues of security and economic co-operation. This concern arises from the prospects and problems of managing relations in interdependencies. In this chapter, we examine the management of politico-military conflicts in the sub-region. We first examine the causes of conflict and insecurity which motivate the desire for security cooperation. We then analyse the summitry system in the management of politico-military conflicts.

#### 4.1 Causes of Sub-Regional Conflicts and Insecurity,

The desire for sub-regional peace and security among the countries of Eastern Africa is paramount. Carl Deutsch observes that 'Among the many goals which individuals and nations pursue, the broadest and most common is security' and that 'throughout history people have grouped together in matters of defence, economic advancement and political solidarity to achieve security goals'<sup>1</sup>. To Vernon Van Dyke, 'The paramount objective of every state, as a general rule, is self-preservation or survival. More broadly, the objective is security.'<sup>2</sup> It is our submission that the overriding concern of the Eastern African Summitry System is sub-regional peace and security. Consequently, we may ask: What are the causes of conflicts and insecurity in the sub-region which motivate the desire for security?

As in most sub-regions of Africa, the causes of conflict and insecurity in Eastern Africa can be attributed to several factors. These include territorial and boundary disputes, military armament, ideological differences, military coups, refugees, dissident and rebel activities, civil wars, economic relations and to a lesser extent, external factors.

Territorial and boundary disputes constitute the most explosive conflicts in the African sub-ordinate state system<sup>3</sup>. Combined with rise in military armament these disputes often erupt into war. It is with the serious nature of these disputes in mind that the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a resolution during the 1964 Cairo Summit that 'all member states pledge themselves to respect borders existing on the achievement of national independence'<sup>4</sup>. This resolution reinforced the legality and legitimacy of the existing inter-state boundaries as enshrined in the OAU Charter Article III which enjoins member states 'to respect ... the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state...'<sup>5</sup>.

Notwithstanding the 1964 Cairo resolution that the present African state boundaries are inviolate, territorial and boundary disputes in Eastern Africa have since the early 1960s continued to surface and resurface in tensions and rivalries between the countries of the sub-region. For example, Somalia's claims to the whole of Kenya's North Eastern Province (formely Northern Frontier District (NFD)) and the Ethiopian Ogaden and Haud regions led to 'armed conflicts between Kenyan security forces and Somali supported shiftas as well as to a direct military confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1963. These early conflicts were only ameliorated by third

party mediation which resulted in temporary agreements in 1967 as discussed in Chapter Two. Somalia and Ethiopia have however remained enemies for decades and even went to war in 1977/78 over border disputes. The border and territorial disputes of the early 1960s and late 1970s involving Kenya and Uganda; Kenya and Ethiopia; Kenya and Sudan; and Tanzania and Uganda which were discussed in the two previous chapters, are further examples of these disputes.

Disputes over territories and boundaries often lead to serious tensions and unending, sometimes violent armed conflicts in which thousands of people are killed and governments spend not inconsiderate part of their meagre resources in defensive and offensive operations by their armed forces and police. They also lead to involvement of foreign actors who heavily arm either side of the combatants. Thus boundary and territorial disputes have a strong military escalating potential.

Increased military armament renders it possible for states to become belligerent and contemplate intervention in neighbouring states and thereby create insecurity. Uganda and Somalia best illustrate this point.



Armament in Uganda had grown steadily since the 1966 Obote-Mutesa conflict. After the 1971 Amin coup, the process increased remarkably for the Amin regime was dependent entirely on the military. The military establishment grew in terms of numbers and the regime also embarked on major weapon modernization with arms from Libya, Israel and the Soviet Union. Amin acquired 12 Soviet Mig 21s, a number of Soviet battle tanks and Sam II Ground to Air Missiles.<sup>6</sup> Uganda's increasing armament not only threatened the Ugandan society but also the security of her immediate neighbours as well as the sub-region as a whole. Having dislocated the Uganda society and confident of his growing military power, Amin became belligerent, claiming parts of both Kenya's and Tanzania's territories. Uganda's military armament thus became a security threat in Eastern Africa,

In Somalia, the coming to power of General Siad Barre's military regime in 1969 set in motion a process of increasing military armament. Barre's "Greater Somalia" strategy centred on a military solution and he embarked on an increasing arms purchase, personnel recruitment and forces modernization. This policy was strengthened by a military alliance with the Soviet Union enabling Somalia to receive massive arms supply. Thus, between 1970 and 1976 Somalia military build up grew rapidly and there were marked qualitative and

quantitative changes in the army. For instance, Somalia had by then acquired 250 T-34, T-54 and T-55 Soviet made battle tanks, the largest and most powerful tank battalion in Eastern Africa then. She also acquired some 300 BTR-40 and BTR-152 armoured cars. The Somali Airforce of about 2,700 men equipped with 66 combat aircraft consisting of Soviet Mig-15s, Mig-17s, and Mig-21s was the largest and perhaps the most powerful in the sub-region<sup>7</sup>. The developments in Somalia seriously threatened the security of Eastern Africa and sent shock-waves to Ethiopia and Kenya parts of whose territories Somalia had been claiming since the 1960s. Kenya's response to this apparent military threat to her security was to increase defence expenditure from \$64 in 1976 to a record high \$256 in 1979<sup>8</sup>.

With her newly acquired military strength, Somalia became belligerent and invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977 and there ensued a full-scale war which ended in a Somali defeat the following year.

Military armament in both Uganda and Somalia reflected more or less similar developments in the sub-region. It is evident that during the second half of the 1970s there was a general arms race in Eastern Africa as compared to the previous decade. Most of the countries, save for a few, registered a remarkable growth in military expenditure, arms procurement and size of forces. This is illustrated in Table I.

Table 1: Militarism in Eastern Africa: Levels of Military Expenditures (ME), Arms Imports (AI) and Sizes of Armed Forces (AF), 1975 - 1983

COUNTRY	BURUNDI			ETHIOPIA			KENYA			RWANDA			SOMALIA			SUDAN			TANZANIA			UGANDA			ZAIRE		
	ME <sup>1</sup>	AI <sup>2</sup>	AF <sup>3</sup>	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF	ME	AI	AF
1975	16	15	7	138	66	50	70	16	9	15	0	4	47	115	30	176	0	50	162	16	25	161	115	25	214	46	55
1976	16	0	7	182	78	65	64	0	9	15	7	4	47	156	31	183	78	50	151	78	25	156	46	25	184	176	55
1977	23	13	8	219	650	225	113	14	13	21	0	4	50	118	53	275	147	50	148	88	31	112	7	23	192	41	53
1978	24	0	7	183	1513	233	204	68	13	16	12	4	116	330	54	310	165	71	202	110	63	97	27	6	169	38	53
1979	25	11	7	354	266	250	256	114	13	19	5	5	112	164	54	312E	139	65	470	279	53	51	25	6	154	35	23
1980	36	10	7	410	727	250	248	69	13	22	10	5	112	232	54	188E	116	65	146	93	53	41	11	6	133	54	26
1981	37	5	7	NA	276	250	181	191	17	21E	0	5	133	53	54	276E	181	87	189	42	43	43	42	6	71	50	26
1982	45	18	7	381E	290	250	235	70	19	NA	0	5	151	140	54	263E	180	86	143	20	43	52	60	10	NA	84	26
1983	NA	NA	7	NA	503	199	133	40	18	NA	NA	5	NA	57	NA	172E	76	86	117	20	43	58	28	13	NA	NA	26

1 Military Expenditures in million dollars - figures in constant 1981 and 1982 dollars

2 Value of Arms Imports in million dollars - figures in constant 1981 and 1982 dollars

3 Armed Forces in thousands

E Estimates based on partial or uncertain data

NA Not Available

Sources:

1. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1973 - 1983.

2. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1972 - 1982.

It is observable from Table I that there was a general upward trend in military expenditure, arms imports and size of armed forces particularly in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania between 1975 and 1980. For example, Ethiopia's military expenditure which in 1975 was \$138 increased to \$354 in 1979 and \$410 the following year. Similarly, her arms imports which in 1975 accounted for \$66 increased to a record high \$1513 in 1978 and her armed forces of 50,000 in 1975 increased to 250,000 in 1979. In Tanzania, the military expenditure which in 1975 was \$162 increased to \$470 in 1978 and her armed forces of 25,000 in 1975 increased to 63,000 in 1978. Similar trends are observable in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The other countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire and Uganda) did not however register very dramatic increases during the same period.

In short, we posit that the increased military armament in Eastern Africa during the second half of the 1970s was a major cause of sub-regional insecurity and combined with other factors led to the 1977/78 Ethiopia-Somalia and 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda wars which seriously destabilised the sub-region. Considering that this is a trend that continues, military armament remain a potential cause of insecurity in Eastern Africa.

Yet another cause of conflicts and insecurity in Eastern Africa arises from issues of ideology-ideological differences. The emergence of apparent Socialist ideologies in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan in the second half of the 1960s upto early 1970s and the avowed Socialist orientation of Tanzania since the mid 1960s have variously aroused a sense of insecurity in the non-Socialist countries of the sub-region such as Kenya, Zaire and until 1974, Ethiopia. The point is best illustrated by Kenya and Tanzania which pursue different development strategies - the former mixed economy which favours Western Capitalism and the later Socialism which emphasizes on self-reliance.

Relations between Kenya and Tanzania remained relatively warm throughout the first decade of independence despite some misunderstandings, misgivings and differences which were temporarily accommodated by the East African Community. These, accentuated by traits of strain in trade imbalances favouring Kenya and worsened by political acrimony led to serious tensions between the two countries. Accusations and counter-accusations as well as constant arguments became the hall-mark of their relations.' The seriousness of the ideological rifts was captured by the Daily Nation which on August 8, 1976 noted Kenya's stand that:

Our posture must be to diversify our exports and imports to other areas and to find alternative routes so that economic blackmail should not succeed..... especially given irreconcilable ideological differences between us and our neighbours.<sup>9</sup> (My emphasis).

These 'irreconcilable ideological differences' partly explain the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and the subsequent closure of the Tanzania-Kenya border, events which posed serious security challenges in the sub-region. Therefore, ideological differences have been and continue to be potential causes of conflicts and insecurity in the relations of states in Eastern Africa.

Military coups are further causes of conflicts and insecurity. The military in Africa has become a major power contender in domestic politics of a number of countries and has on numerous occasions intervened in politics by overthrowing constitutionally elected governments. Orwa observes that:

The importance of military intervention in African politics is underlined by the fact that by 1981 more than half of the OAU member states either had military governments or had experienced attempted military takeovers.<sup>10</sup>

It is interesting to note that seven of the nine countries in Eastern Africa have been or still are under military regimes. Only Kenya and Tanzania have not been under military rule but the former has experienced an attempted military coup. Military coups have become common phenomena in Africa and are in themselves causes of conflicts and insecurity in the relations of states. In particular, military coups lead to domestic internal strife and increased internal instability thus creating conflict and insecurity. Furthermore, military coups result into displacement of nationals many of whom become refugees in neighbouring countries.

In Africa and particularly the Eastern African sub-region, the influx of political refugees is a major problem and a cause of conflicts and insecurity. A 1984 report on the refugee population in Eastern Africa at the time gave the following breakdown: Burundi 256,000, Ethiopia 46,000; Kenya 7,300; Rwanda 49,500; Somalia 700,000; Sudan 699,000; Uganda 173,000; Tanzania 180,000 and Zaire 293,000.<sup>11</sup> The figures are frightening and starkly illustrate the magnitude of the refugee problem in Eastern Africa, a sub-region which hosts the highest number of refugees in the continent.

A majority of the refugees in Eastern Africa come from the countries of the sub-region. As Orwa correctly notes, their existence in neighbouring countries create

political tensions and acrimony between the countries concerned particularly when they (refugees) attempt to use the host's territory as an operational base for purposes of destabilising their home governments.<sup>12</sup> This has been the case in Eastern Africa. For example, the activities of Ugandan refugees in Tanzania between 1971 and 1979 was a major cause of the tensions and conflicts between the two countries. For the last two decades the acrimony between Rwanda and Burundi, Ethiopia and Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, Uganda and Zaire, among others, has much to do with the activities of each country's refugees. Suffice it to say that the refugee problem in Eastern Africa is a major cause of conflict and insecurity in the sub-region.

Closely related to the issue of refugees is the question of dissident and rebel activities as a cause of conflict and insecurity in Eastern Africa. Charges and counter-charges of states recruiting nationals from their neighbours for subversive activities or actively supporting dissident and rebel operations have been common among the countries of the sub-region. Somalia and Ethiopia have over the years constantly accused each other of supporting dissidents in another's country. The worsening relations between Kenya and Uganda from the mid 1980s has been largely attributed to accusations and counter-accusations of each country aiding the rebels and dissidents of the other. Kenya



and Sudan have also occasionally traded bitter verbal exchanges on the issue of rebels and dissidents. The acrimony between Uganda and Zaire has much to do with what the former sees as destabilising activities of her rebels residing in Zaire. Dissident and rebel activities are thus explosive issues in Eastern Africa and major causes of conflicts and insecurity.

The issue of civil wars stemming from a combination of several domestic factors is yet another cause of conflicts and insecurity in the Eastern African sub-region, bedevilled as it is with several internacine wars. Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi are cases in point. The civil war in Sudan has been raging on and off for over thirty years. The South, led by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) is fighting to end what it sees as a Muslim and Arab clique in the North and demands for political, economic and legal equality. The war has caused untold serious suffering in Sudan. Strife and starvation reign supreme not to mention the costly nature of the war, the heavy casualties, displacement of nationals and ruined economy. In Ethiopia, the over twenty years old civil war between the Addis Ababa government and the Northern Eritrean and Tigrean rebel groups have had similar if not worse consequences.

Civil wars create sub-regional insecurity in that they transcend national boundaries and have spill-over effects thus turn internal struggles into inter-state conflicts. The influx of refugees in Eastern Africa is largely as a result of the civil wars in the sub-region. Relations between countries are further strained when they accuse each other of supporting one side in a civil war. This has been the case between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example. Sudan has in the recent past continually accused Kenya of supporting the SPLA, an accusation which Kenya vehemently denies.

Civil wars further have the tendency of creating conditions favourable for the involvement of foreign actors in sub-regional conflicts. The criss-crossing strands of foreign involvement is in itself a source of insecurity for the presence of foreign actors in the sub-region is not a tantalizing idea.

Various external actors particularly the Soviet Union and the United States have been involved in the on going civil wars in Eastern Africa by heavily arming one side against the other. The efforts of these two superpowers in their competition for influence in the sub-region are often supplemented by those of their allies world-wide. For example, in the Ethiopian civil war, the United States has since the 1974 revolution supported the Eritrean guerrillas and is backed by her

Arab allies particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, Jordan and Iraq. The Soviet Union backed by Cuba, East Germany and South Yemen on the other hand support the Dergue Government in Addis Ababa.

The foreign involvement in the sub-regional civil wars has exacerbated the conflict by reducing the likelihood of resolution of these conflicts. Evidence support the assertion that the intrusion of external variables into sub-regional conflicts makes conflict resolution even more difficult.<sup>13</sup> Thus, foreign involvement in sub-regional issues remain a cause of insecurity.

Economic relations between countries as well as within economic and political organizations have the propensity of causing conflicts arising from national self-interests and collective interests. The experience of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from the time of independence, upto the demise of the East African Community best illustrates this. The three countries entered independence with economic arrangements which mainly favoured Kenya. With Nairobi emerging the centre of economic and communication activities in the sub-region and investors establishing their capital in the city, Tanzania and Uganda soon developed into dependencies of Kenya. Kenya had a complete comparative advantage over her two trading partners and this became a bone of contention. Conflicts over Kenya's positive

balance of trade with Tanzania and Uganda which never seemed to close became major issues in the first half of the 1960s. The 1964 and 1965 Kampala-Mbale Agreements were basically concerned with trade imbalances. Kenya did not ratify the agreements because they 'radically changed the regional economic status quo by calling upon Kenya to slow its development to permit Tanzania and Uganda to reach parity'<sup>14</sup>.

Although the 1967 Treaty of East African Cooperation which established the East African Community accommodated the economic conflicts among the three countries, constant arguments in the days of the Community still centered on Kenya's positive trade balance vis-a-vis her partners. It is the persistence of these conflicts which partly explains the collapse of the Community in 1977 and the political acrimony among the three countries thereafter. The same arguments appear to have reared their head in the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) where both Kenya and Zimbabwe are already being accused of dominating total intra-PTA trade and running favourable balances with the entire sub-region. The experience of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda therefore clearly demonstrate that economic relations are in themselves a cause of sub-regional conflicts.

Other factors that also contribute to sub-regional conflicts and insecurity include issues of poaching and cattle-rustling across national boundaries particularly those widely assumed to be aided by neighbouring governments; incessant hostility and suspicion aggravated by verbal exchanges, public criticisms, incriminations and accusations; intermittent border skirmishes; adverse press reports and economic problems such as food crises, famine and drought. Such issues often escalate to long-standing bad blood between states and seriously strain inter-state relations. These factors combined reflect and further the corrosion of the normative basis of sub-regional security hence produce a sense of insecurity.

In the foregoing analysis we have shown that a number of factors either on their own or combined with others are the causes of conflicts and insecurity in the Eastern African sub-region. It is important to note that these factors have continued to linger on and still characterise the relations of states in the sub-region. It is this situation combined with the realities of interdependence and coexistence that motivate the desire for peace and security in Eastern Africa. Countries in the sub-region seem to have realised that conflicts and insecurity create a hostile environment which disrupts the achievement of vital

domestic goals. They also contribute to a climate of unpredictability and risk which discourages sub-regional co-operation and development. Conflicts of all sorts must therefore be managed to attain sub-regional tranquility and security. This has been the main concern of the Eastern African Summitry System.

#### 4.2 Summitry and Management of Politico-Military Conflicts.

In the previous section we highlighted some of the main causes of conflicts and insecurity in Eastern Africa and emphasized that the factors continue to linger on and characterise relations among the countries. It is important to note that interdependence present these countries with several common and intertwined political, military, economic and social problems. Therefore, besides cooperation, countries in the sub-region continue to experience conflictual situations. These conflicts are of various types but can be broadly categorized into politico-military and economic conflicts. We are here concerned with the former.

Politico-military conflicts typically manifest themselves in political-military confrontations below the level of conventional war. They frequently involve protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies and range from subversion to direct use of

military force. These are diverse in Eastern Africa. They include territorial claims, internal insurgencies, inter-state antagonisms, refugee problems, and little incidents of diverse nature such as border skirmishes and many others, which affect inter-state relations. Methods of managing such conflicts have varied in Eastern Africa but mediation and in the 1980s, summitry have been used.

Mediation is a political process which involves third party conflict management. Saadia Touval and William Zartman note that 'Mediation is a form of third-party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation'.<sup>15</sup> Mediation is thus usually concerned with attempts to help find solutions to disputes, restrain conflict and restore relations by bringing to a compromise the divergent views of disputants. Mediators can come from many sources - a common neighbour or a distant state. Often they propose themselves, generally on their own initiatives, but at times they are mandated by organizations such as the OAU. However, they are accepted or rejected on the basis of their neutrality and ability to bring about outcomes acceptable to the conflicting parties.

As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, several mediation efforts have been attempted in Eastern Africa with varied successes and failures. It would be fastidious to repeat the cases. However, evidence suggest that management of conflict through mediation becomes more difficult when one or more of the parties to a conflict become belligerent. This for example explains the difficulty experienced in managing the Somalia-Ethiopia and Tanzania-Uganda Conflicts. Furthermore, conflicts of internal insurgency which challenge the legitimacy of established governments are usually difficult subjects for third-party mediation. The on-going internal conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda are good examples.

Summitry System has become a means of managing politico-military conflicts in Eastern Africa. Unlike mediation, summitry does not involve attempts to find solutions to specific conflicts. It is broadly concerned with attempts to resolve the underlying causes of conflict, reduce means of carrying out conflicts, remove tensions and disagreements and reorient participating countries towards new relations. This basically involve collective peacemaking and provision of security as means of conflict reduction. Therefore, the approach to conflict management in the Eastern African Summitry System has been through collective discussion of a wide range of sub-regional



problems. The aim is to thrash out bilateral and/or multilateral misunderstandings and suggest measures that reduce uncertainty about actual and potential politico-military conflicts. This requires that during the summits each of the leaders make credible, binding commitments to reduce conflicts hence the focus is on mutual accommodation based on genuine consensus - building.

Throughout the summits that we analysed in Chapter Three, the leaders have been mainly concerned with reducing sub-regional insecurity. For example, the bilateral summits of the mid 1960s also involving third-party mediation and which temporarily settled border and territorial disputes were concerned with the management of political military disputes. Similarly, following the tumultuous decade of the 1970s characterised by actual and potential violent oriented politico-military conflicts, a strong desire emerged for managing such conflicts. A glance at the joint communiques of the 1980 summits thus reveal that issues discussed included or centred on "peace and security". At the end of the January 1981 Kampala Summit for instance, the leaders declared their commitment to greater cooperation and understanding in the sub-region. The summit communique noted that:

The presidents have agreed to develop mutual understanding, cooperation and partnership for the benefit of their peoples and commit themselves to peace and security in the region.<sup>16</sup>

The summiteers further resolved to 'tighten border security'.<sup>17</sup> pledging also to establish political goodwill needed to promote all sorts of cooperation and to hold further meetings to create the climate for this cooperation. The 1981 Nairobi Summit between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania focused on the security issues affecting the three countries <sup>18</sup>. Similarly, the secretive summit of the three countries held in Arusha in October 1983 was primarily concerned with issues of security and at the end of the summit the leaders 'signed a secret security agreement' <sup>19</sup>.

The concern with sub-regional security largely explains why immediately after Museveni took Kampala in January 1986, he was invited to join Presidents Moi, Mobutu and Habyarimana in a hurriedly convened summit in Goma, Zaire to pledge support for the Museveni government. During the summit, the leaders discussed the security situation in Uganda and agreed, among other things, to intensify security co-operation <sup>20</sup>.

Meeting at Entebbe a few months after the Goma gathering, leaders of the Eastern African countries once again emphasized that concern for security and stability in the sub-region is a commonly shared objective hence the need for cooperation in security matters <sup>21</sup>. The Entebbe communique first noted the leaders' appreciation of the security situation prevailing in Uganda and pledged their collective assistance to Uganda on her general rehabilitation programme <sup>22</sup>. On sub-regional security the communique underlined the importance of stability and security as a condition for development and bilateral as well as sub-regional cooperation. It further noted that 'instability and insecurity in any of the states in the region affects stability and security in other states' <sup>23</sup>. To this end the leaders agreed to promote cooperation in security matters and be committed to the principle of good neighbourliness. Therefore, the communique also noted the leaders' commitment 'to the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of their states and non-interference by whatever means in each other's internal affairs' <sup>24</sup>. They also pledged to work actively for the promotion of bilateral and sub-regional trust.

Opening the Nairobi (1987) Summit, the host and Chairman President Moi of Kenya reminded the leaders of their shared experiences and common desires emphasizing on security, unity and cooperation. He observed:

All of us do appreciate that the primary requirement for meaningful development is adequate security for life and property in our individual countries and in the region as a whole <sup>25</sup>.

Adding that:

The concern for security and stability in our countries is the common concern that we all share. As such, the legitimate search for peace and stability within the borders of each of our sister countries calls for a high degree of co-operation and understanding within the region<sup>26</sup>.

Security issues were to dominate the summit and the final communique issued first noted that the political atmosphere in the sub-region had improved considerably since the Entebbe Summit and that this encouraged stability in the individual countries and throughout the sub-region<sup>27</sup>. On security, the leaders reiterated that security in the area was indivisible and a common concern and agreed that the ministers and officials responsible for security in the seven countries should

strive to maintain and intensify contacts with each  
other on a regular basis <sup>28</sup> . It was also agreed that  
'practical measures [will] be taken to ensure that  
dissidents or any other groups will not be permitted to  
carry out subversive activities against their countries  
of origin or any other neighbouring states' <sup>29</sup> .  
Furthermore, the leaders agreed that crime detection  
should be strengthened through agreed bilateral and  
multilateral arrangements <sup>30</sup> .

At the Kigali Summit (November 1986) <sup>31</sup> the  
leaders once again discussed at length issues relating  
to sub-regional security. The final communique noted  
that they (leaders)

reiterated their firm determination to  
continue working for the consolidation of  
peace, security and stability, both at the  
level of each country and at regional level,  
in order to provide their respective peoples  
with favourable conditions for social and  
economic development, and to promote, in an  
atmosphere of trust between their countries,  
fruitful and dynamic co-operation based on  
brotherhood and on the effective solidarity  
required by the interdependence of their  
interests <sup>32</sup> .

They further particularly stressed the need for regular contact to promote co-operation between their respective security services to enable them to adopt concrete measures aimed at discouraging any possible attempt to organise subversive activities likely to endanger security along their respective countries' borders or to endanger the maintenance of peace and stability of each of the countries <sup>33</sup>.

Finally, the leaders noted that 'the presence of refugees in a country can present an element of insecurity for their countries of origin if they are not sufficiently cared for' <sup>34</sup> and in this regard stressed five major principles, viz:

1. that the states have committed themselves clearly to the continuation of a humanitarian policy for refugees,
2. that the states have committed themselves to preventing refugees from indulging in any political, military or propaganda activities likely to spoil good relations between their host country and their country of origin,

3. that the states must not use refugees as combatants in any way,
4. that the states must assist in creating conditions for voluntary repatriation, whilst at the same time considering the particular situation of the country of origin, and
5. that any armed person applying for refugee status must be disarmed immediately and arms and other military equipment in his possession must be surrendered to his country of origin <sup>35</sup>.

The last summit to date held in Khartoum (June 1987) <sup>36</sup> basically reviewed the sub-regional security issues discussed in the earlier summits.

It is evident from the foregoing that throughout the summits issues of sub-regional security have been paramount. This suggests that politico-military conflict reduction in Eastern Africa depends on provision of sub-regional security hence the leaders' concern with security. It is also observable that the summits have been used as a means of collective

informal discussion of a wide range of security issues aimed at thrashing out both national and sub-regional problems and suggesting measures that may reduce uncertainty about actual and potential politico-military conflicts.

The very close attention to security issues in the summits is hardly surprising. First, informal arrangements throughout the world have increasingly been concerned with security issues. This concern arises from the fact that security regimes are so rare as Robert Jervis and others have concluded<sup>37</sup>. Charles Lipson has also noted that 'There are few equivalents in the security field to the comprehensive, rule guided arrangements in trade and money'<sup>38</sup>. This lack of adequate security regimes in the international sphere has given informal arrangements opportunities for coordinating security issues in interdependencies and it is precisely this role that the Eastern African Summitry System has attempted to play.

The second factor explaining the concern with security in Eastern Africa has to do with sub-regional politics. The countries in the sub-region have for years faced nagging security problems arising from a combination of domestic and sub-regional factors hence the need to chart out possible strategies of dealing with the problems. Summitry system has provided the



leaders with a particularly useful venue for addressing these problems. As the leaders trade stories about domestic and sub-regional politico-military woes during their face to face summit exchanges, they understand better how to adjust to their mutual constraints. In particular, summits have enabled leaders in Eastern Africa to address the sub-regional implications of the politico-military problems grappled with domestically. Issues of dissidents, opposition guerrilla movements and other subversive groups, problems of refugees, among others, create domestic security problems which touch on the security of other countries. This is why they elicit collective sub-regional response as evidenced in the summits reviewed. A brief illustration explains this.

In Sudan for instance, the government is seeking to end a civil war in the South. The situation in Sudan touches on the security of other countries in the sub-region and this is why the Nairobi Summit communique says that the Sudanese Prime Minister appraised the other leaders on his government's efforts to restore peace and security in the country and that the leaders wished him well and pledged their support to him in his efforts<sup>39</sup>.

Uganda for one has to deal with armed bandits loyal to former leaders who operate from the Sudanese border and from within Uganda itself. Some Uganda dissidents are in Zaire where they seek support<sup>40</sup>. On the other hand, Sudan accuses both Kenya and Ethiopia of supporting the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) by arming them, accusations which both countries vehemently deny. The situation in Southern Sudan is further compounded by the fact that the area not only teems with refugees but has also witnessed mass dislocation of nationals who seek refuge in neighbouring countries. These refugees place powerful burdens on the economies and societies of host countries within the sub-region. This is why the Kigali Summit paid particular attention to refugee problems.

Kenya has her own problems with dissidents particularly members of the clandestine Mwakenya movement some of whom have sought asylum in Uganda and Sudan which she has repeatedly accused of supporting the dissidents in various ways. Apart from subversive activities, armed bandits and cattle rustlers operating across national boundaries also create serious security problems in the sub-region. Because of interdependence, these problems have cross-boundary effects, and can only therefore be addressed collectively.

The summits as mechanisms of conflict management have allowed the leaders to consider informally the key security issues that face them. The face to face discussions among the leaders build mutual confidence and ease inter-state tensions. The gathering of the chief executives in summits has the necessary clout and the requisite unity of action in conflict management. The summits build a sense of community that reduces tensions as they make cooperation easier particularly if leaders are so disposed. Thus, the basic premise of the summits has been that by working collectively the participating countries can achieve greater sub-regional stability and tranquility hence reduction of conflicts. This collective approach to politico-military conflict management is supplemented by bilateral summits between the leaders as well as bilateral joint consultative committees particularly those concerned with border and security issues. Although the effect seem to have passed with little notice, the Eastern African Summitry System has had significant effect on the limitation of politico-military conflicts in the sub-region.

#### 4.3 Footnotes

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2. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics 3rd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall Inc. 1972), p.199.
3. Daniel K. Orwa, 'Causes of Conflicts in the Relations of African States' in Olatunde J.C.B Ojo et al. African International Relations (London: Longman, 1985), p.135.
4. See Alan J. Day (ed). Border and Territorial Disputes 2nd edn., (London: Longman, 1987) p.103.
5. I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) p. 135.
6. Daniel K. Orwa 'The Politics of Stabilisation: Kenya's Policy Posture in Eastern Africa' (A Department of Government Seminar Paper No. 1, University of Nairobi, 1987), p.34.
7. Strategic Survey (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 19.

8. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-83 (Washington D.C.: United States Arms control and Disarmament Agency, 1985), p.69. (Figures in 1982 constant dollars).
9. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) 8th August, 1976, p.6. See also Orwa 'Politics of Stabilisation...'. p.32.
10. Orwa 'Causes of Conflict.....' p.133.
11. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 21(6) (April 1984), p7298/A.
12. Orwa ' Causes of Conflict....' p.133.
13. For a discussion on how external variables exacerbate sub-regional conflicts, see for example Neil Macfarlane 'Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention' International Security 8(4) (Spring 1984), pp.127-151.
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15. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, 'Introduction: Mediation in Theory' in S.Touval and I.W.Zartman (eds) International Mediation in Theory and Practise (Boulder and London: Westview press, 1985), p.7.
16. See Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) February 1981), p.5798A.

17. Ibid.
18. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 25 , 1981, p.1.
19. Orwa, 'The Politics of Stabilisation' op. cit. p. 38.
20. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) January 30, 1986, p.1.
21. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) March 21, 1986, p.1.
22. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 16, 1986, p.1.
23. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 23(3)  
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24. Ibid.
25. The Standard (Nairobi) July 15, 1986, p.6.
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28. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1986/87, p.  
C63.
29. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 23(7)  
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30. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1986/87, p.  
C63.
31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
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37. Robert Jervis, 'Security Regimes' in International  
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EASTERN AFRICAN SUMMITRY SYSTEM AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONFLICTS5:0 Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, economic relations between countries as well as within economic and political organizations have the propensity of causing conflicts. This is more so in interdependent economies and Eastern Africa is no exception. Almost everywhere in the world various economic organizations and arrangements exist which are concerned with the management of economic affairs. This arises out of interdependency.

That states in the contemporary international system are economically interdependent is a durable truth. That no state can assure its prosperity on its own efforts alone is equally important. Marvin Soroos correctly notes that 'The multiple and complex ways in which states are dependent upon one another are arguably the most compelling feature of the contemporary world order'<sup>1</sup>. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne argue that 'Everywhere growing interdependence has ineluctably dissolved the barriers between foreign and domestic economies hence between foreign and



domestic politics' <sup>2</sup>. Already more than a decade ago Richard Cooper had pointed out that 'increased economic interdependence, by joining national markets, erodes the effectiveness of (national economic) politics and hence threatens national autonomy in the determination and pursuit of economic objectives' <sup>3</sup>. This situation of economic interdependence has led nations to seek to cooperate with their counterparts to manage the resultant mutual interference that is the price of interdependence. Thus, like politico-military conflicts, conflicts that arise out of economic relations must be managed. This is the focus of this chapter.

#### Summitry and Management of Economic Conflicts

5:1 More than any other aspect, the economic interdependence among the countries in Eastern Africa has grown steadily and substantially over the years. The countries have thus had to face a basic choice which the advanced market economy countries once had to face: 'either to move forward to new far-reaching forms of collective management of problems they can no longer handle separately or to put the breaks on their growing interdependence...' <sup>4</sup>. The Eastern African Summitry System represents an ambitious effort to manage the sub-regional conflicts arising out of interdependent economies thus supplementing institutional sub-regional

arrangements such as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA).

The approach taken in the management of economic conflicts within the framework of the Eastern African Summitry System is the same as that used in the management of politico-military conflicts. That is, it involves conflict reduction through informal collective discussion and coordination of economic issues. Generally, the summitry system has tended to emphasize broader sub-regional economic cooperation as a means of abating conflicts. It is assumed that by strengthening and tightening cooperation in their economies, conflicts are minimized. Thus, throughout the summits the basic concern in the economic sphere has been cooperation.

In Chapter Three we noted how the early summits of the 1960s between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were basically concerned with the demands for equitable economic arrangements in East Africa. These demands arose out of economic conflicts centered on maldistribution of benefits, particularly the perceived lion shares accruing to Kenya at the expense of her partners. Through the various summits, attempts were

wade to redress the imbalance and the resultant Kampala - Mbale Agreements of 1964-5 aimed at the 'achievement of a more equitable distribution of benefits, notably a more balanced industrial development' <sup>5</sup>. These attempts were however largely unsuccessful and as Katete Orwa correctly observes, the differences in ideology 'that emerged among the East African states at the beginning of the 1960s can partly be explained by the failure to redress the economic imbalance, which extended from location of industrial plants into the area of trade' <sup>6</sup>. The East African Community established in 1967 and which in any case excluded the other sub-regional countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire only partially managed to address the economic conflicts of the time. It is no wonder therefore that the conflicts persisted and in 1977 the ambitious Community collapsed.

The demise of the Community seriously affected trade in East Africa. For instance, there was a remarkable decline of intra - East African trade as a percentage of total trade among the three countries. This is illustrated in Table II.

TABLE II: EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES: INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1973-1979

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
KENYA	13.7	14.1	14.0	13.3	8.3	6.3	6.1
TANZANIA	13.3	10.5	9.0	10.5	3.7	2.0	3.4
UGANDA	17.1	17.2	15.6	15.9	17.7	4.5	13.5

Source: Anjaria, 1982, pp. 28 - 29<sup>7</sup>

It is observable from the table that one year after the collapse of the Community, Kenya's share of intra-East African trade to total trade dropped precipitously from 13.7 per cent in 1973 to the lowest level ever - 6.1 per cent in 1979. Similarly, Tanzania's dropped from 13.3 per cent in 1973 to a mere 2.0 per cent in 1978 while Uganda's was 4.5 per cent in 1978 from 17.1 per cent in 1973. Both Kenya and Tanzania were most affected by the collapse of the Community and the subsequent closure of the border between the two countries. For example, Kenya lost her trade to not only Tanzania but also Zambia and Malawi. The loss of Tanzanian and Zambian markets meant a decline of more than 10% in Kenya's total exports<sup>8</sup>. Similarly, Tanzania was deprived of the Kenya market for her assortment of goods.

In an attempt to make up for the loss of the Community, both Kenya and Tanzania sought to create alternative economic and political power centres. Tanzania looked to the North, West and South and helped found the Kagera River Development Authority (KRBA) comprising of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania as well as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) of the Front Line States in an attempt to isolate Kenya. In response, Kenya countered by turning to the North and to the West of the sub-region focusing attention on Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi<sup>9</sup>, and strongly supported the emerging Preferential Trade Area (PTA) both in an attempt to find new markets and undermine Tanzania's growing influence in Eastern and Southern Africa.

The measures proved beneficial particularly for Kenya which now gained access to the Central and Southern markets with Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire<sup>10</sup> emerging as major trading partners. This market shift could not however replace the lost Tanzanian market. More important for the sub-region was the fact that these attempts by Kenya and Tanzania to search for new arrangements brought the awareness of the futility of going it alone hence the need for greater co-operation. Thus, as the countries of Eastern Africa entered the decade of the 1980s, the leaders were acutely

aware of the traumatic economic experiences of the 1970s and they sought to fashion new beneficial economic relations. As with security issues therefore, economic issues became a central focus of the 1980 summits.

On January 2, 1980, Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Binaisa met in Arusha<sup>11</sup> in what was to be a beginning of normalisation of economic co-operation in Eastern Africa. While no official communique was issued after the summit, summit sources indicated that the issues discussed included the reopening of the Tanzania-Kenya border, the sharing of the former assets and liabilities of the defunct Community and new arrangements for co-operation in communications and trade<sup>12</sup>. Meeting in Mombasa a few months later, the three presidents together with President Numeiri of Sudan<sup>13</sup> addressed the main issues hindering the resumption of normal economic relations and, among other things, agreed to expedite resolutions of issues pertaining to the defunct Community and find ways of promoting trade<sup>14</sup>.

The two first summits of the 1980s clearly demonstrate that the leaders had learnt the bitter lessons of the 1970s and were prepared to chart a new course and this became the concern of the later summits.

During the Kampala (1981) Summit the leaders declared their commitment to greater sub-regional cooperation and understanding and to freer trade in Eastern Africa<sup>15</sup>. The Dar es Salaam (1981) Summit was 'aimed primarily at building better economic cooperation',<sup>16</sup> and the leaders reaffirmed the need to promote and intensify closer cooperation in the fields of commerce, tourism, science and technology, air and land transport, agriculture among others<sup>17</sup>. The leaders further emphasized that the economic benefits of their cooperation far outweigh any political differences they might have<sup>18</sup>. Thus the accent during the two summits was on economic cooperation.

While the 1980 and 1981 summits concerned themselves with broad objectives generally emphasizing the need for economic co-operation, the 1983/84 Arusha summits took a more practical step towards the management of economic conflicts in East Africa. For example, the November 1983 Arusha Summit settled the issues of assets and liabilities of the defunct Community<sup>19</sup> and agreed to the immediate reopening of the Tanzania Kenya border<sup>20</sup> - two main issues which impeded economic co-operation between the East African countries. The signing of the 'Arusha Accord' was thus correctly dubbed 'the most important diplomatic development [in East Africa] for some years'<sup>21</sup>. It marked the 'beginning of the end' of East Africa's

unnecessary and unwise estrangement into which the region was plunged by the Community's break up in 1977, <sup>22</sup> and its wider meaning was the revival of inter-state sub-regional economic co-operation as signalled by the reopening of the Tanzania - Kenya border. In an editorial following the signing of the 'Arusha Accord', The Daily Nation aptly noted that the 1970s experiences had taught the leaders that the three countries 'are so closely interlinked that any attempt to set them apart from one another is bound to be misguided' <sup>23</sup>. The Presidents of the three East African countries again met in Arusha in May 1984 <sup>24</sup> and signed the final winding up agreement after which President Nyerere made his now famous remark that 'We know from bitter experience that our countries need each other' <sup>25</sup>.

Following the Arusha summits a new spirit of co-operation emerged in East Africa and it was only logical that the leaders focus their attention to strengthening sub-region wide economic co-operation. Thus, meeting at Entebbe in March 1986 <sup>26</sup> Presidents Moi, Mobutu, Habyarimana, Mwinyi, Museveni, Bagaza and Prime Minister El Daab stressed the need for economic co-operation and 'expressed a strong desire to see the furtherance of meaningful political, economic, commercial, social and cultural relations in the region based on mutual benefits and sovereign equality, to



raise the living standards of their people' . They  
agreed to focus attention on promotion of trade,  
transport, communications and disease control, among  
others, and to achieve these objectives they mandated  
their Foreign Affairs ministers to meet and work out  
mechanisms of cooperation in these fields' .

The July 1986 Nairobi Summit charted out specific  
strategies for achieving the objectives of economic co-  
operation as outlined in the earlier summits. The  
final communique noted that the leaders reviewed the  
Entebbe Summit decisions and reiterated a strong desire  
to intensify co-operation in the fields of trade,  
transport and communication, science and technology,  
disease control, and social and cultural matters .  
The leaders stressed that these areas are vital for  
stimulating development in the sub-region and agreed to  
strengthen and intensify bilateral and multilateral  
arrangements . They further agreed to facilitate  
border trade and eliminate smuggling so as to enhance  
legitimate trade . Finally, the leaders equated  
successful economic co-operation to sub-regional  
peace, security and stability stressing that such  
atmosphere 'created the right climate for economic  
developments and co-operation' .

Meeting at Kigali in November 1986 the Eastern  
African leaders reaffirmed their individual and  
collective responsibility in strengthening economic co-

operation noting also that the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was a shining example in this regard<sup>34</sup>. They expressed 'satisfaction with the progress achieved so far and stressed the need to strengthen co-operation in trade, transport and communication, cultural exchanges', and to 'intensify co-operation by implementing existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements'<sup>35</sup>. These and other earlier resolutions<sup>36</sup> were reviewed during the June 1987 Khartoum Summit.

In the foregoing run down of the economic concerns during the 1980 summits we note that the accent has been on broad economic co-operation. This concern arises out of interdependence. As noted earlier, more than any other aspect, the economic interdependence among the countries in Eastern Africa has grown steadily and substantially over the years. There are multiple and complex ways in which the Eastern African countries are dependent on one another. For instance, while Kenya depends on Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda for her sub-regional trade, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire and Uganda depend on Kenya's Mombasa port as well as rail and road transport for their imports and exports. The almost 2,000 kilometres long rail and road routes between Mombasa and Bujumbura carry 95% of Uganda's trade, 80% of Rwanda's and 60% of Burundi's<sup>37</sup>. About 468,000 tons of goods a year pass through Mombasa to the three countries alone<sup>38</sup>. Both Kenya and Tanzania act as outlets for goods to and from landlocked Uganda,

Zaire Rwanda and Burundi. Trade patterns further illustrate the nature of economic interdependence in the sub-region. This is illustrated in Tables III and IV.

Table III: TRADE FLOW OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: ANNUAL AVERAGES 1975-1979 (in US Million Dollars)

COUNTRY		KENYA	UGANDA	TANZANIA	RWANDA	BURUNDI	ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	SUDAN	ZAIRE
KENYA	EXPORTS		476.33	177.62	82.41	29.44	23.81	34.92	64.72	33.37
	IMPORTS		17.85	61.42	19.9	3.19	8.39	0.96	3.5	6.37
	BALANCE		458.48	116.2	62.51	26.25	15.42	33.96	61.22	27.0
UGANDA	EXPORTS	15.93		1.05	3.31	0.54	0.79	4.56	12.85	----
	IMPORTS	503.30		16.77	0.6	0.52	0.02	0.49	0.58	----
	BALANCE	-486.37		-15.72	2.71	0.02	0.77	4.07	12.27	----
TANZANIA	EXPORTS	74.78	15.36		7.48	37.87	1.00	14.0	1.22	10.07
	IMPORTS	126.08	0.1		----	0.27	0.2	1.0	0.15	10.17
	BALANCE	-51.3	15.26		7.48	37.6	0.8	13.0	1.07	-0.1
RWANDA	EXPORTS	23.58	1.06	3.11		0.44	---	----	----	0.88
	IMPORTS	106.38	9.56	15.08		4.28	2.43	----	----	5.11
	BALANCE	-82.8	-8.5	-11.97		-3.84	-2.43	----	----	-4.23
BURUNDI	EXPORTS	1.17	----	0.09	3.18		----	----	----	0.31
	IMPORTS	26.1	0.3	14.03	0.56		----	----	----	4.0
	BALANCE	-24.93	-0.3	-13.94	2.62		----	----	----	-3.69
ETHIOPIA	EXPORTS	6.63	0.2	0.2	1.39	----		1.63	1.65	----
	IMPORTS	29.21	----	1.35	----	----		0.2	0.38	----
	BALANCE	-22.58	0.2	-1.15	1.39	----		1.43	1.27	----
SOMALIA	EXPORTS	2.62	1.16	0.36	----	----	0.05		----	----
	IMPORTS	46.23	2.5	8.19	----	----	12.79		----	----
	BALANCE	-43.61	-1.34	-7.83	----	----	-12.74		----	----
SUDAN	EXPORTS	2.2	0.5	0.3	----	----	0.6		----	----
	IMPORTS	6.2	23.2	0.4	----	----	2.6		----	----
	BALANCE	-4.0	-22.7	-0.1	----	----	-2.0		----	----
ZAIRE	EXPORTS	3.8	---	0.9	3.1	3.8	----		----	----
	IMPORTS	24.1	---	12.4	0.7	0.2	----		----	----
	BALANCE	-20.3	---	-11.5	2.4	3.6	----		----	----

SOURCE: COMPILED FROM DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, IMF, 1976 and 1980 issues

Table IV: TRADE FLOW OF THE EASTERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: ANNUAL AVERAGES 1980-1985 (in US Million Dollars)

COUNTRY		KENYA	UGANDA	TANZANIA	RWANDA	BURUNDI	ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	SUDAN	ZAIRE
KENYA	EXPORTS		690.4	75.3	250.6	102.34	24.9	39.0	173.5	65.9
	IMPORTS		10.6	8.9	33.7	3.3	36.6	0.4	---	9.4
	BALANCE		679.8	66.4	99.0	99.0	-11.7	38.6	173.5	56.5
UGANDA	EXPORTS	9.54		19.82	7.92	----	0.28	0.4	9.51	----
	IMPORTS	759.44		44.51	0.32	1.02	----	0.4	----	----
	BALANCE	-749.9		-24.69	7.6	-1.02	0.28	0	9.51	----
TANZANIA	EXPORTS	9.5	40.5		12.7	36.4	2.1	4.3	21.8	15.1
	IMPORTS	70.1	19.6		0.3	1.9	0.2	1.4	1.4	4.0
	BALANCE	-60.6	20.9		12.4	34.5	1.9	2.9	20.4	11.1
RWANDA	EXPORTS	36.38	.29	48.43		1.51	---	----	----	0.56
	IMPORTS	289.75	9.37	15.94		9.97	---	----	----	12.99
	BALANCE	-253.37	-9.08	32.49		-8.46	---	----	----	-12.43
BURUNDI	EXPORTS	8.11	0.92	1.48	8.95		----	----	----	9.62
	IMPORTS	49.28	---	30.68	1.82		0.53	----	----	12.99
	BALANCE	-41.17	0.92	-29.25	7.13		-0.53	----	----	-12.43
ETHIOPIA	EXPORTS	1.93	0.47	0.36	----	----		0.41	19.63	----
	IMPORTS	13.35	0.55	0.54	----	----		----	1.23	----
	BALANCE	-11.42	-0.08	-0.18	----	----		0.41	18.36	----
SOMALIA	EXPORTS	1.54	0.03	0.95	----	----	---		0.06	----
	IMPORTS	44.61	0.03	2.1	----	----	7.32		0.09	----
	BALANCE	-43.07	0	-1.15	----	----	-7.32		-0.03	----
SUDAN	EXPORTS	----	----	0.9	----	----	1.3	----		----
	IMPORTS	84.4	14.3	11.57	----	----	20.1	----		----
	BALANCE	-84.4	-14.3	-10.67	----	----	-18.8	----		----
ZAIRE	EXPORTS	8.1	---	3.5	13.4	10.2	----	----	----	
	IMPORTS	72.4	---	18.97	0.7	8.5	----	----	----	
	BALANCE	-64.3	---	-15.47	12.7	1.7	----	----	----	

SOURCE: COMPILED FROM DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICAL YEAR BOOKS, IMF, 1981 and 1986 issues

Tables III and IV give a broad outline of the nature of inter-sub-regional trade during two different periods: 1975 - 1979 and 1980 - 1985. Figures from the tables illustrate that trade as does exist in Eastern Africa is not very intense but is nonetheless dominated by strong bilateral trade flows. Thus, Kenya and Tanzania both trade with every state in the sub-region while Uganda also trades with all except Zaire. The tables further show that the direction and intensity of the bilateral trade flows in the sub-region are largely determined by geographical proximity of the trading partners. Thus, although Kenya and Tanzania have both extended their trade links beyond their immediate neighbourhood, trade with the latter is much more intense compared to that with the rest of the sub-region. For example, between 1975 and 1979 Kenya's exports to Tanzania and Uganda combined amounted to an average \$653.95 million compared to only \$268.67 million average to Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire all combined. Following the closure of the Kenya - Tanzania border in 1977, trade between the two neighbours declined considerably while Kenya's trade with the rest of the sub-regional countries

increased remarkably. However, even with this new development, Kenya's exports to her two most immediate neighbours - Uganda and Tanzania combined still amounted to an average \$765.7 million between 1980 and 1985 (with exports to Uganda alone averaging \$690.4) as compared to \$656.2 million average to the other six countries all combined. Furthermore, during the two periods well over 50% of Uganda's and Tanzania's imports from the sub-region came from Kenya. The same is true of Somalia's, Sudan's and Ethiopia's imports from the sub-region. Between 1980 - 1985 Zaire exported goods worth \$13.4 million and \$10.2 million on average to her most immediate neighbours - Rwanda and Burundi respectively - compared to an average \$8.1 million and \$3.5 million to Kenya and Tanzania respectively. These examples show that the direction and intensity of trade in Eastern Africa is basically bilateral and largely determined by geographical proximity.

It can also be deduced from the tables that economic variables to some extent reflect relations between states. For example, trade between Somalia and Ethiopia has not been significant over the periods due

to their strained relations. Similarly, while between 1975 and 1979 Kenya's exports to Tanzania averaged \$177.62 million and her imports from the same averaged \$61.42 million, these fell to \$75.3 million and \$8.9 million on average respectively during the 1980 - 85 period. This fall was as a result of the closure of the Kenya - Tanzania border and the subsequent political acrimony between the two countries from 1977 to 1983. The impact of economic variables on inter state relations is further illustrated in Tables V and VI.

TABLE V: KENYA'S EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM SOMALIA, 1965-1970 AND 1976-1987 (Kf'000)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
EXPORTS	658	324	7	639	881	735	2373	2397	3574	2678	4738	1916	4116	2734	2981	5526	6826	783
IMPORTS	9	10	-	57	18	22	103	105	20	71	44	30	33	40	36	71	235	38
BALANCE	649	314	7	582	863	713	2270	2292	3554	2607	4694	1886	4083	2694	2945	5455	6591	779

Source: Kenya, Economic Survey, 1967, 1971, 1978 and 1988 issues



Table V shows Kenya's exports to and imports from Somalia between 1965 and 1970, and between 1976 and 1987. It will be recalled that the period between 1963 and 1967 was marked with strained relations between Kenya and Somalia during which time there occurred armed conflicts between Kenya security forces and Somalia supported shiftras. After signing the 1967 Arusha Memorandum of Understanding, there was a thawing period between the two countries and in 1968 they resumed full diplomatic relations with the exchange of ambassadors. However, following the 1969 military coup the new Somalia leadership resumed the 'Greater Somalia' strategy which led to the 1977/78 Ogaden War. The 1970s therefore witnessed another peak period with respect to the strained relations between Kenya and Somalia, specifically since Kenya supported Ethiopia during the war,<sup>39</sup> and since in January 1980 Kenya and Ethiopia renewed their 1964 defence treaty and the Heads of states exchanged bilateral visits. Relations between Kenya and Somalia only began to improve in June 1981 when Presidents Moi and Barre signed a co-operation accord ending several years of hostility between the two countries.<sup>40</sup> In 1983 Somalia declared it no longer held any claim to parts of Kenyan territory.<sup>41</sup> From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the dominant peak periods of strained relations between Kenya and Somalia are: 1963-67 and 1970-80. 1968-69 can be considered as

a cooling down period and 1981 to 1987 a period of rapproachment and normalisation of relations. Trade patterns as illustrated in Table V roughly reflect these periods.

From the table we note that Kenya's exports to and imports from Somalia fell between 1965 and 1967 reflecting the effects of strained relations. For example, while Kenya's exports to Somalia stood at K#658,000 in 1965, these fell to a mere K#7,000 in 1967 and while its imports from Somalia in 1965 were worth K#9,000, it imported nothing from Somalia in 1967. Following the resumption of normal relations after the 1967 agreements, Kenya's exports to Somalia rose to K#639,000 in 1968 and K#881,000 in 1969. Between 1976 and 1980 there was some marked increase in Kenya's exports to Somalia despite the strained relations. One possible explanation for this increase is that this was the period Kenya sought alternative markets following the closure of Tanzania - Kenya border. Another possible explanation is that Kenya's exports to Somalia were in more demand in Somalia during the Ogaden War. It is also noteworthy that from 1981 to

1987 there was a more or less consistent increase in both Kenya's exports to and imports from Somalia reflecting the effects of normalisation of relations during the same period. Thus to some extent, economic variables reflect relations between Kenya and Somalia.

Table VI depicts Kenya's trade with Uganda and Tanzania for a thirteen-year period - 1975 - 1987. The three countries were partners in the defunct EAC between 1967 and 1977. Relations between the countries have however been erratic over the years. Between 1963 and 1965 for instance, there seemed to be a marked readiness by the countries to work together with suggestions for a possible political federation which never came to be. However, traits and strains in the trade imbalances accentuated by ideological rifts during most of the late 1960s and early 1970s characterised relations culminating in the collapse of the EAC and the closure of the Tanzania - Kenya border in 1977. In 1978 Uganda and Tanzania went to war. Normalisation of relations among the three countries only began after the return of Obote to power in Uganda in December 1980 and specifically with the agreements settling the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC in 1983 as observed earlier. However, throughout the second half of the 1980s, particularly between 1986 and

1987, periodic incidents gradually building up into more serious confrontations such as the brief military exchange in December 1987<sup>42</sup> have clouded relations between Kenya and Uganda. In contrast, since 1983 relations between Kenya and Tanzania have considerably improved during the same period. Therefore, it can be said that the period between 1977 and 1980 was marked with strained relations among the three countries, 1981 onwards normalisation of relations, and 1986-88 strained relations between Kenya and Uganda.

TABLE VI: KENYA'S TRADE WITH UGANDA AND TANZANIA, 1975-1987 (K£'000)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
<b>UGANDA</b>													
EXPORTS	32910	33162	51992	38443	37747	66378	52608	58596	71476	67583	70073	72625	69687
IMPORTS	1486	818	581	1977	804	1206	800	547	855	1149	2528	2155	910
BALANCE	31424	32344	51411	36466	36943	65172	51808	58049	70621	66434	67488	70470	68777
<b>TANZANIA</b>													
EXPORTS	28540	33442	9822	2756	4075	5216	6307	6861	6285	9727	19176	27257	19554
IMPORTS	9166	12406	1622	353	102	309	273	846	1015	3019	1713	2212	3438
BALANCE	19374	21036	8200	2403	3973	4907	6034	6015	5270	6708	17463	25045	16116

Source: Kenya, Foreigner Survey, 1978 and 1988 issues

From table VI we observe that trade patterns between Kenya and Uganda do not reflect periods of strained and unstrained relations suggesting that for these two countries trade patterns are not necessarily consistent with changing relations. For example, we note that even after the collapse of the EAC in 1977 Kenya's trade flow to Uganda remained generally unchanged. In fact, Kenya's exports to Uganda increased from K£38.4 million in 1978 to K£66.3 million in 1980 and K£71.4 million in 1983. Even between 1986 and 1987 when relations between Kenya and Uganda were severely strained, the drop in Kenya's exports to Uganda from K£72.6 million in 1976 to K£69.6 million in 1987 was quite insignificant particularly considering that this was at a time Uganda was attempting to find new markets especially in Sudan and Libya. Overall, Anjaria has noted that while before 1976 Kenya met about 33% of Uganda's imports, by 1980 Kenya met between 40% and 50% of Uganda's imports<sup>43</sup> suggesting a significant per cent increase after the demise of the EAC.

One main explanation to the consistency of Kenya's trade with Uganda is that Uganda remains its most important trading partner in Africa and in fact the third most important in the world next to West Germany and Britain. This importance may explain why even during periods of strained relations, trade between the two countries is hardly affected.

Unlike trade with Uganda, Kenya's trade with Tanzania has over the years reflected their strained and normal relation periods. For example, from the figures in table VI we note that following the collapse of the EAC and the closure of the Tanzania - Kenya border in 1977, both Kenya's exports to and imports from Tanzania fell dramatically. Thus, while in 1976 Kenya's exports to Tanzania were worth K£33.4 million, this fell to K£9.8 million in 1977, and K£2.7 million in 1978. Similarly, Kenya's imports from Tanzania fell from K£12.4 million in 1976 to K£1.6 million in 1977 and the lowest ever - K£0.1 million in 1979. Only after the settlement of the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC and the reopening of the Kenya - Tanzania border in 1983 do we note a significant increase in both Kenya's exports to and imports from Tanzania and specifically from 1985 we note a remarkable upward trend.

From our examples of Kenya's trade with Somalia, Uganda and Tanzania we can deduce that to some extent trade trends reflect relations between states in the Eastern African sub-regions.

Our analysis in the foregoing reveal that the direction and intensity of the bilateral trade flows in Eastern Africa exemplify the economic interdependence of the countries. It is this interdependence that

calls for cooperation and collective management of economic issues as has been the case during the summits. Richard Cooper has aptly argued that

The growing interdependence of world economy creates pressure for common policies, and hence procedures whereby countries discuss and coordinate actions that hitherto were regarded as being of domestic concern exclusively<sup>44</sup>.

Therefore, the realities of economic interdependence have brought the countries of the Eastern African sub-region into an informal multilateral arrangement through which efforts are made toward collective management of economic problems the countries can no longer handle separately. The Eastern African Summitry System thus represent the recognition by the leaders that they cannot solve their own problems without collectively attending to sub regional issues given their interdependence.

Like in the management of politico military conflicts, the Eastern African Summitry System has not been concerned with the management of specific economic conflicts. The objective, as the evidence adduced in the analysis of the summits suggest, has been to cooperate and coordinate economic issues. Thus, while economic issues are characterized far more often by

elaborate networks of rules, norms and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable, convergent expectations.<sup>45</sup> The need for informal maintenance of economic cooperation among sovereign self-interested states still arise. This further explains the establishment of numerous bilateral and multilateral inter-governmental joint co-operative commissions to enhance economic co-operation. In Eastern Africa, for example, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi are grouped in the Kagera River Basin Authority (KRBA) while Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi participate in the Great Lakes Economic Community (CEPGL). Likewise, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) formed in January 1986 groups Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti while the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (NCTA) which came into existence in November 1986 groups Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda.

It is therefore evident that economic interdependence is pregnant with opportunities for countries to work together to achieve what they could not acting on their own. This need for co-operation as we have seen is both formal and informal. The Summitry System, supplemented by bilateral and multilateral arrangements has thus provided a means for this co-operation and through it, management of economic conflicts



5:2 Footnotes:

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3. Richard N. Cooper, 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies', in World Politics Vol. 24 (January 1972), p. 164.
4. Miriam Camps, The Management of Interdependence: A Preliminary View (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974, p. 43 as cited in Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, second edition (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981, p. 14.
5. Domenico Mazzeo, 'The Experience of the East African Community: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Regional Co-operation' in Domenico Mazzeo, (ed) African Regional Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 152-3.
6. Daniel K. Orwa, 'The Politics of Stabilisation: Kenya's Policy Posture in Eastern Africa' Department of Government Seminar Paper No. 1 (University of Nairobi, 1987), p. 25.

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8. Daniel K. Orwa, 'Kenya's External Economic Relations' in William Ochieng (ed). Economic History of Kenya, (Forthcoming 1990).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. See The Standard (Nairobi) January 3, 1980, p. 1.
12. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) January 4, 1980, p. 5.
13. The Weekly Review (Nairobi) April 18, 1980, p. 4.
14. The Standard (Nairobi) April 16, 1980, p. 7.
15. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 18 (1) (February 1981), p. 5798A.
16. Ibid. p. 5828C.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. The Economist (London) November 26, 1983, p. 53.
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22. The Standard (Nairobi) November 16, 1983, p. 4.
23. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) November 18, 1983, p. 6.
24. The Kenya Times (Nairobi) May 23, 1984, p. 13.
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26. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 23 (3) (April 1986) p. 7997C.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. See the full text of the Nairobi Summit Communique for specific resolutions on each of the fields of co-operation in The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 16, 1986, p.6).
30. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 23 (7) (August 1986) p. 8143C.
31. Ibid.
32. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 16, 1986, p. 6.
33. The Standard (Nairobi) November 28, 1986, p. 1.
34. Ibid.

35. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1986/87, p. C64.
36. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) 24 (6) (July 1987) p. 8523A and 8524B.
37. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series) 22 (6) (March 1986), p. 8460C.
38. Ibid.
39. See Korwa G. Adar, 'The Significance of the Legal Principle of "Territorial Integrity" as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963-83' (Ph.D Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1986), p. 250.
40. Ibid.
41. See Colin Legum, African Contemporary Record 1985/86, p. A55.
42. See The Weekly Review (Nairobi), December 25, 1987 p. 1.
43. Anjaria et. al., op. cit., p. 8.
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THE EASTERN AFRICAN SUMMITRY SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE

6:0

Introduction

On the basis of the analysis of the Summitry System presented in the previous chapters, one is bound to ask 'So what?' Have the summits played any significant role in the relations of states in Eastern Africa, or have they been evanescent public relations spectacles? Have the summits sustained sub-regional stability and co-operation? What has been the summits' capacity and competence in conflict management? What in short, has been the efficacy of the Eastern African Summitry System? While we offer no comprehensive or definitive answers to these questions, the importance of the problem of evaluation demands that they be raised. In this chapter we address the questions by generally analysing the implications of the sub-regional summitry system. We first look at the summits and the entanglements of sub-regional interdependence and then assess the system in conflict management. Finally, we discuss the shortcomings and future prospects of the summitry system.

We have noted in our discussion in Chapters Four and Five that the countries of Eastern Africa are engaged in extensive relationships of interdependence with one another. They are bound together by a dense network of shared interests, affiliations and communications. As permanent neighbours, their geographical proximity bring about cross-national boundary interactions of all sorts. The countries share inter-locking system of trade and communications; some of them have ethnic groups with overlapping relations and affinities straddling their common borders while others have had decades of close cultural, social, political, economic and educational links; in normal circumstances, key officials in these governments consult one another on a very regular basis. If ever a set of sovereign states were prepared to co-operate, it should be these.

However, underneath the apparent commonly shared interests and experiences are deep rooted differences and the very entanglements among these countries give them a great deal to fight about. This is the logic of interdependence which provides both incentives for co-operation and opportunities for conflict<sup>1</sup>. As Katete Orwa observes, interdependence produces a degree of integration (by which he means increased interactions

or close contacts) among independent sovereign states and because states pursue different interests, increased contacts is likely to cause conflicts as it is to promote co-operation<sup>2</sup>. Co-operation among the Eastern African countries thus face serious challenges and obstacles rooted in national sovereignty and the leaders have realised the need to collaborate to ensure success in their various policies hence the practise of informal collective management of conflicts.

Our analysis in the two previous chapters showed that the nature of interdependence in Eastern Africa is more manifest in both security and economic aspects two broad issues in which both conflict and co-operation are comingled. From the perspective of security interdependence, we have, in Chapter Four, analysed how in Eastern Africa insecurity in any one of the countries affects stability and security in the others. Therefore, the security of the countries is inextricably linked. The leaders' perception that they are interdependent in security aspects and the realization that security issues are inherently conflictual explain their concern with collective co-ordination of security issues. Thus, in addition to bilateral arrangements, the leaders have forged informal multilateral co-operation in the security field. In the economic aspect we in Chapter Five examined the multiple and complex ways in which the Eastern African

countries are dependent on one another and how the summitry system has been used to manage this economic interdependence. Furthermore, we have noted that throughout the summits the leaders equated successful cooperation in economic aspects to sub regional security, peace and stability. In Nairobi for instance the leaders noted that such atmosphere (of stability, peace and security) 'create the right climate for economic development and cooperation'.<sup>3</sup> This underscores the fact that for the leaders security and economic development are complementary issues. President Moi made this point very clearly when in his opening address to the (July 1986) Nairobi Summit he observed that 'the attainment of peace and stability and the strengthening of our unity of purpose are the two most critical prerequisites for the prosperity of our region...'<sup>4</sup>

From both security and economic interdependence in Eastern Africa therefore, we want to observe that first, the pattern of contemporary sub-regional interdependence appear much more complex than many have believed. Second, interdependence present the countries of Eastern Africa with opportunity for cooperation to achieve significant joint gains, or at least for the prevention of joint losses. Lastly, as



Marvin Soroos reminds us, it is noteworthy that 'the extent to which interdependence furthers the interests of the countries caught up in it depends on how effectively the situation is managed'<sup>5</sup>.

The history of the Eastern African Summitry System suggest that owing to their interdependence, countries in the sub-region have through the system sought to ensure that the conflicts, disputes and tensions that arise in the relations of the states are managed. Interdependence therefore explain what to Charles Lipson is a central issue in international relations theory: 'the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among sovereign, self-interested states, operating without any centralised authority'<sup>6</sup>.

We submit that like in the Concert of Europe, the perceptions of the leaders in Eastern Africa that they are interdependent and that their decisions are mutually contingent motivate the desire for informal multilateral cooperation in economic and security fields. The Eastern African Summitry System is thus an example of how cooperation has been and can be organized informally when commonly shared interests exist.

Summitry and Management of Inter state Conflicts:  
An Assessment

The previous section has highlighted some aspects of sub-regional interdependence in Eastern Africa particularly in economic and security fields, generally pointing toward requirements for coordinating these broad issues through informal arrangements. Here we assess the role of the Summitry System in management of inter-state conflicts. We want to ask: to what extent has the Summitry System contributed to the sub-regional stability and tranquility?

Assessing the consequences of the Summitry System particularly in conflict management is a daunting task. First, the summit is not a supranational institution in which binding decisions are taken about the great problems facing the sub-region. Second, summits are merely events in a continuing stream of sub-regional diplomatic exchanges and its specific effects may be hard to disentangle from the effects of other international sub-regional contacts. However, as we argue here below, the summits have played an important role in conflict management.

The history of the Eastern African Summitry System suggest that it is crucial to see the successive summits not just as individual isolated encounters, but as a series of attempts over a period of time to

address similar sets of issues. We have seen how throughout the summits issues of sub regional security and economic cooperation have prevailed. The concern has been to provide collective management of conflicts arising out of these two broad issues and ensure sub-regional stability. Have the summits achieved these?

One common misunderstanding of summitry must be avoided. The summit is not a kind of grand assizes of the sub-regional leaders, a supranational forum in which decisions on problems facing the countries are rendered by the leaders. This implies a unity of purpose and a decisiveness of collective action that is inappropriate for informal multilateral arrangements. Nations do not go to summits to 'make policy' or reach great conclusions about their problems. They go to explain their problems and to see how they can collectively solve them. Thus, at the centre of the summits are the leaders themselves. Sitting around the table reminds them of their collective sub-regional responsibilities. The agreements, policies and courses of action that they collectively arrive at thus depend on their own mutual consensus and willingness to cooperate.

In Chapters Four and Five we noted that the approach to conflict management in the Eastern African Summitry System has been through collective discussion

of a wide range of sub regional problems aimed at resolving underlying causes of conflict, reducing means of carrying out conflict, removing tensions, disagreements and misunderstandings and reorienting countries towards new relations. Evidence suggest that this approach has been very helpful in substantially contributing to peace and stability. Before the emergence of the Summitry System, Eastern Africa had experienced almost a decade of breakdown in state relations. Constant arguments and bickering had become a hallmark of inter state relations and general political instability prevailed. The period also witnessed direct military confrontations between Somalia and Ethiopia (1977/78) and between Tanzania and Uganda (1978/79). Since its inception however, the Summitry System has managed to foster a reasonably favourable political environment in the sub-region.

It is noteworthy for instance that serious tensions which once plagued the sub-region because of sour relations between the countries have been significantly reduced. The normalization of relations between Kenya and Tanzania as well as between Ethiopia and Somalia for example are cases in point. Furthermore, there has never occurred any serious military confrontation between any of the states in the sub-region since 1979. When in December 1987 Ugandan soldiers engaged Kenya's security forces in a two day

skirmish at the border town of Busia, Presidents Moi and Museveni soon met in a bilateral summit at Busia to talk peace <sup>7</sup>. Since then, there have been several constant consultations between officials of the two countries aimed at facilitating improved relations. Similarly, throughout most of the 1980s attempts have been made to thrash out misunderstandings between states in the sub-region through bilateral and multilateral discussions. Most countries in the sub-region now have standing bilateral agreements to solve any incident through good neighbourly discussions.

It can further be safely argued that the common desire for sub-regional peace and stability has had an influence in the progress of the peace talks between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrean rebels and between Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). In 1988 for example, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to restore diplomatic relations eleven years after the two went to war over the Ogaden region. Since then, the two countries have been engaged in a series of talks aimed at improving their relations. Preliminary peace talks between Ethiopia and the secessionist Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, (EPLF) brokered by former U.S President Jimmy Carter have also been in progress in preparation for the substantive talks. Thus, while fighting between the Dergue government and the secessionist movements still

continues, it is noteworthy that peace initiatives have been made. Similarly, there have been attempts toward finding a peaceful resolution to the Sudan conflict. For example, in October 1989, Col. John Garang, leader of the SPLA went on a seven nation tour (mainly Southern African) to promote SPLA peace proposals. Barely a month later, a Sudanese delegation went on a similar tour to five Eastern African states (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and Somalia) to promote the government's peace proposals.<sup>8</sup> However, when representatives of the Sudan Government and the SPLA met again in Nairobi on December 1, 1989<sup>9</sup> they failed to agree on a peace formula. Like in Ethiopia, the fighting in Southern Sudan continues.

It will be recalled that the few cases referred to in the foregoing analysis have presented the sub-region with serious security challenges. That at least some attempts have been made toward management are signs of a new willingness to negotiate peace settlements and resolve the conflicts informally. The cases also illustrate the prevailing spirit of general sub-regional stability and tranquility. This, among other factors, is largely as a result of the collective cooperation through the summitry system. It will be noted for instance that the first opportunity for the normalisation of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia was provided by the informal two-day summit in Djibouti

(December 11-12, 1986) which established IGADD. During the summit, the Ethiopian leader Mengitsu Haile Mariam is reported to have held conciliatory talks with Somalia President Barre<sup>11</sup>. The summit thus provided an opportunity for rapproachment between the two countries.

While the Eastern African Summitry System has contributed to conflict reduction, particularly toward deescalation of serious conflicts and confrontations, the continuity of cross-border skirmishes between some countries in the sub-region suggest that although the summits allow leaders to meet and exchange views, thereby reducing tensions, they (summits) have not managed to eliminate suspicion among leaders. However, overall the summitry system has offered some respite from the usual mix of political instability and civil conflicts.

It could be argued that the objectives of the summitry system in conflict management have been very noble but several factors impede their achievement as we discuss in the next section. Generally however, that states in Eastern Africa have apparently resorted to informal conflict management mechanisms suggest that peacemaking in the sub-region is beyond the capability of the institutional continental body - the OAU as presently constituted. African countries, particularly those in Eastern Africa have thus continually resorted

to informal conflict management mechanisms. We submit that the Eastern African Summitry System has at least contributed to sub-regional stability and tranquility by reorienting participating countries toward new relations and providing a mechanism for informal conflict management.

6:3            Shortcomings and Future Prospects of the Summitry System

One major weakness of the Eastern African Summitry System is that, like all other informal arrangements, its informal structure prevents it from creating or enforcing binding rules. Its success in promulgating norms and principles to be observed by participating members as well as its capacity to manage inter-state relations thus depend on the willingness of the members to cooperate and their political will. As is common knowledge, this willingness can, and often do lack, and when it does it renders the arrangement based on mutual consensus ineffective. This has been a major impeding factor in conflict management through the system.

Another shortcoming is the unexplained exclusion of both Somalia and Ethiopia from participation in this grouping. As had been noted earlier, these two countries are part and parcel of the sub-region and are in many aspects linked to the other seven countries.



Developments in the two countries have direct bearings on, and affect the entire sub region. Their exclusion from the system is thus a very significant omission and does not augur well for the sub regional summitry.

Yet another shortcoming is the lack of at least some form of even a rudimentary institutionalization particularly for specific functions. For example, the lack of a specific organ charged with conflict management has meant that no assurance is made for adherence to summit resolutions and no follow up is carried out. This has weakened the system.

Finally, the inconsistency of the sub-regional summitry has been a cause for concern. Since they began, the summits have been intermittent and irregular. In 1980 for example, two summits were held - Arusha (January) and Mombasa (April). The following year also two summits were held - Kampala (January) and Dar-es-Salaam (March). In 1982, there were no summits while in 1983 two summits were held in Arusha (October and November). While one summit was held in 1984 - Arusha (May), none was held in 1985. In 1986 alone there were four summits - Goma (January), Entebbe (March), Nairobi (July) and Kigali (November) - while in 1987 only one was held - Khartoum (November). Since then no sub regional summit has been held to date (February 1990). As noted earlier, it is the regular sub regional summits that provide opportunities for

leaders to constantly discuss and review issues as well as exchange ideas on various fields. This enables them to manage inter state relations on a regular basis. Therefore, the long lull in the summits reduce their effectiveness.

However, judging from the prevailing sub-regional political climate, the potential of the Summitry for helping the Eastern African leaders to manage their interdependence is still great. It is hoped that the strong desire for sub-regional peace and cooperation in security and economic issues will drive the countries into yet another circle of summits in the 1990s.

1. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits 2nd edn. (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1987), p. 12.
2. Daniel K. Orwa, 'Causes of Conflicts in the Relations of African States' in Olatunde J.C.B. Ojo et. al. African International Relations (London: Longman, 1985), p. 129.
3. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) July 16, 1986, p.6.
4. See The Weekly Review (Nairobi) July 18, 1986, p. 10.
5. Marvin S. Soroos, 'Interdependence and the Responsibilities of States: Learning from the Japanese Experience' in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1988), p. 17.
6. Charles Lipson, 'International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs', in World Politics Vol. 38, No.4 (July 1986), p.6.
7. For the skirmish see The Weekly Review (Nairobi) March 17, 1989, p.4.
8. See The Kenya Times (Nairobi) November 23, 1989, p. 8.
9. See The Daily Nation (Nairobi) December 2, 1989, p. 1.
10. See Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary, 1985/86, p. C.70.
11. Ibid.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

#### 7.0 Introduction

The major objective of this study was to examine and analyse the role of the Eastern African Summitry System in the management of inter-state conflicts. We have in the previous chapters examined the evolution of the Summitry System, its processes and most importantly, its role in conflict management. To provide a clear picture of what has been done in this thesis we first offer a brief summary of each hypothesis and the findings. We then suggest some policy recommendations which we hope will contribute to better sub-regional approaches to conflict management.

#### 7:1 Hypotheses and Findings

Three hypotheses were advanced to help guide in this study. Hypothesis One assumed that if formal multilateral institutions created with the specific aim of peacefully resolving inter-state conflicts is perceived to be weak then states will resort to informal summits. It further assumed that if there is lack of institutional framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts then informal summitry will arise.

Our analysis show that in Africa, the OAU exists as an institutional framework whose objective, among others, is to peacefully resolve inter state conflicts. In this sense, the second assumption of the hypothesis is not valid. However, in our examination of the OAU's encounters in the field of conflict management, our findings indicated that the organization has not been very effective in dealing with inter-state conflicts in Africa. In a number of cases examined, it was found out that it was not the OAU as an institution which helped in the management of conflicts but that de-escalation of most of the conflicts was largely as a result of individual mediation efforts. The perceived weakness of this formal multilateral institution in conflict management partly explain state's resort to informal arrangements. The Eastern African Summitry System thus proves the first assumption of hypothesis one.

Hypothesis Two assumed that if geographical proximity creates a common desire for security then inter state summits become necessary, and that if states have a perception of common economic interests then inter-state summitry system will be used in the conduct of sub regional relations. In both Chapters Four and Five we found out that countries in Eastern Africa are interdependent in both security and economic aspects.

Our findings further indicated that this interdependence calls for informal collective management of sub regional security and economic issues. Throughout the summits, issues of co operation in economic and security aspects become standard summit fares. These findings prove the two assumptions of hypothesis two. Thus we assert that perceptions of common security and economic interests in interdependence create desires for informal summitry to manage inter-state relations. These findings further illustrate that aspects of sub-regional politics approximate to conditions of interdependence and that links of interdependence set up sub-regional corporate activity which act as a brake upon inter-state conflicts. This corporate activity, as we have noted, takes the form of informal multilateral arrangement. Furthermore, as illustrated in Chapters Four and Five, links of interdependence encourage a kind of peace in which economic and social operations dependent on political stability thrive. Because of their interdependence therefore, countries in Eastern Africa have through the Eastern African Summitry System sought to maintain sub regional peace and stability. From this perspective, we find the theory of interdependence apt in explaining relations in an African sub regional setting.

Hypothesis Three assumed that the effectiveness of informal and institutional multinational mechanisms for conflict management as well as the nature of conflicts largely determine the success in the resolution of sub-regional inter-state conflicts. In other words, this hypothesis relates success in conflict management to the effectiveness of the means used and the nature of the conflicts themselves. Our findings suggest that different types of conflict require different means of management. For example, we found out that while mediation is usually a useful means in managing conflicts involving territorial claims, conflicts involving insurgency are usually difficult subjects for mediation. In the same token, we also found out that conflict management becomes difficult when parties to a dispute become belligerent. We further noted that successful management of conflicts through institutional multilateral arrangements such as the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African Unity as well as informal mechanisms such as the 'Concert of Europe' and the Eastern African Summitry System depend on the effectiveness of these mechanisms and the willingness of the participating members.

Thus, compared to the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization has been more effective in the management of conflicts. Similarly, it is because the OAU has not been very effective in conflict management that informal mechanisms such as the Eastern African Summitry System have emerged to supplement its efforts.

## 7.2 Policy Recommendations

This study has demonstrated that sub-regional informal multilateral Summitry System supplemented by bilateral summitry as well as joint consultation committees has been a useful mechanisms in the management of inter state conflicts. By providing a forum for collective co operation on a regular basis, the system has not only helped foster personal ties among the leaders in the sub-region, but has also managed to re orient the participating member states to new relations in which good neighbourliness and sub regional stability as concerns for all are emphasized. In essence, the system has helped to usher in a new epoch of peace in Eastern Africa. The desire for peace now seems to be in vogue throughout the sub-region as the leaders search for lasting solutions to some of the most difficult security and economic problems. While a number of conflicts remain unresolved, we note that throughout the period that the Summitry System has been in existence the realisation appears to have dawned on



the sub region's leaders that political stability and general tranquility are pre requisites of sustained development. This is what the Informal Summitry System has attempted to achieve.

For improved and better sub-regional peace and conflict management however, we offer some policy recommendations. We do not in any way assume that the policy recommendations given here are the only ones available. It is only hoped that they would contribute to general peace as well as conflict management and resolution.

It has been noted in the study that informal summitry largely depend on the willingness of leaders to co operate so as to achieve common goals and objectives. This co operation may vary in intensity and scope. For more meaningful sub regional stability, it is here recommended that Eastern African countries strengthen the intensity and scope of their co operation. This means that first, they should maintain very regular and constant bilateral and multilateral consultations at both the highest (chief executives) and ministerial levels. Second, they should seek to co-operate not only about narrow issues but also about issues of the broadest economic,

political and social import. Such intense co operation would sharpen perception of common stakes and enhance mutual understanding among the leaders. It is not here assumed that intense co operation will eliminate all forms of sub regional conflicts. As asserted in this study, inter-state relations are always characterised by both conflict and co operation. However, in instances where co operation among sovereign states is both intense and wider in scope, costs are usually reduced and benefits are increased. This significantly contributes to conflict reduction.

A second recommendation is that member states of the Eastern African Summitry System should endeavour to redouble their efforts in seeking measures that reduce uncertainty about potential conflict areas. One such measures would be to demarcate on the ground the already delimited boundaries between states. This would significantly reduce boundary and territorial conflicts which have been rampant in the sub-region.

A third proposal would be that the countries in the sub-region seek co operation among their military establishments with the aim of later developing small sub regional armies. This co operation would involve joint training, joint exercises and exchange of intelligence information. Such common sub regional military activities organized on a rotating basis would

build a sense of communality that reduces tensions. A co-operative military venture of this sort would not be difficult in the sub region given the existing security linkage among the countries and the growing interest in informal sub-regional security in Eastern Africa.

A fourth proposal is that the grouping in the informal summitry be extended to incorporate other countries in Southern and Central Africa - perhaps to comprise of the entire membership of the Preferential Trade Area. This recommendation arises from the fact that since the Eastern African Summitry System focuses on sub-regional security and economic co operation, the exclusion of countries such as Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Somalia and Ethiopia seems to suggest that developments in these countries do not have direct bearings on the sub region. It is however an established fact that these countries have strong security and economic links with their Eastern African counterparts. For example, Tanzania actively participated in the Mozambiquean and Zimbabwean liberation wars and troops from both Tanzania and Zimbabwe are known to have been fighting alongside Mozambiquean forces against the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) guerillas. Similarly, some Mozambiquean soldiers reportedly fought alongside Tanzanian troops during the 1978/79 Tanzania - Uganda war. All the countries are also linkeded in the

Preferential Trade Area. Consequently, an informal grouping of the countries in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa would be more apt.

A fifth proposal is that while the Summitry System should remain generally informal, some rudimentary form of institutionality is desirable to enable it to be more effective. For instance, we recommend that there should be regular meetings at specific times and places even when situations do not call for meetings. A standing agreement that there be two summits annually would be most helpful. Similarly, specific institutions should be established within the system to deal with specific issues. For example there should be organs concerned with say conflict management and economic co-operation at ministerial levels that deliberates issues and makes recommendations to the Heads of State summit for further deliberation and decision-making. In the same line, we recommend that the joint bilateral ministerial committees concerned with security and economic co operation should be incorporated sub-regionally.

Finally, it is recommended that African academics should devote more attention to the study of 'conflict management. This is an important area that require much scholarly attention.

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