

**THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON INTRA-REGIONAL
RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ETHIOPIA-
ERITREA CONFLICT (1997-2004) AND ITS IMPACT ON
RELATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.//**

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
DECLARATION

This Dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for examination at any other University.

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This Dissertation has been submitted to the Board of Post Graduate Studies at the University of Nairobi for Examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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MR. ROBERT MUDIDA

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DATE

DEDICATION

I dedicate to my loving parents Mr and Mrs Kihara.

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I owe my gratitude to so many people without who this sojourn would not have been a success.

I am grateful to Dad and Mum Mr and Mrs Kihara who have supported me so much both financially and morally and above all have showed me parental love. To my dearest husband, Daniel kakata for his moral support plus the machinery to process this work. To my siblings; Carol, Edith, Henry and Joseph for their support in kind and prayers.

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ACRONYMES

ACCORD- African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

EPRD-Ethiopian Peoples Revolution Democratic Party

ENFA-Eritrea's National Forces Alliance

EPLF – Eritrea People liberation Front.

FRUD – Front Pour la Restauration De L'Unite'

G D P – Gross Domestic Products.

H O A – Horn of Africa.

I G A D – Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

LRA-Lords Resistance Army

NIF-National Islamic Front

N G Os – Non-Governmental Organizations.

O A U – Organization of Africa Union.

O L F - Oromo Liberation Front.

P R D F – Lords Resistance Army

S P L A/M - Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement

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Abstract

This research undertook the initiative to investigate the impact of inter-state conflicts on intra-regional relations. The case study targeted the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. The conflict is unique in the African context. Eritrea was the first territory in post-independence Africa to secede. Secession was previously forbidden by the OAU constitutive act. Eritrea independence has to date led to bitter contest over the border at Badme Triangle. The researcher first sought to find out what has been the regional response to the Ethiopia Eritrea border dispute. Secondly the researcher investigated the impact of the border dispute on relations between the two countries and the neighboring countries.

The findings of the research show that inter-state conflict has various effects on regional relations. The effect is observed on the level of politics, economics diplomacy and general development of the states. The Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute demonstrates that if a region is witnessing an on-going inter-state conflict, intervening in other regional intra-state conflict is impaired. The interdependence among states to resolve trans-boundary matters is possible when all member states share the same vision. The Horn of Africa region has faced obstacles in achieving this objective owing to the inter-state conflict as illustrated by Ethiopia –Eritrea conflict.

The research has managed to place the Ethiopia –Eritrea conflict in a context of searching for peaceful intra-regional relations. Since the conflict has evaded institutional intervention, the arbitration by the International Court of Justice has led to mounting tension among the parties. To settle the matter the research recommends that African leaders need to support institutions at sub-regional or regional level to end the numerous crises emerging among states.

The research is an appropriate reading for conflict managers and policy makers intending to reshape and transform intra-regional relations to be peaceful and development oriented.

CHAPTER I

1.1. INTRODUCTION

There have been some thirty wars that have been fought since 1970, majority of them intra-state and others like Ethiopia Eritrean war, inter-state. According to the figures of the human rights Research, PLOOM, in 1998 there was some 200 violent and armed conflicts world wide of these, 72 were in Africa,¹ quite a significant number of conflicts in a separate continent. There have been various conflicts in different parts of the continent; the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes regions, South African and West African regions. Focus on the Horn of Africa is important since the core study, which is Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, is located in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa comprises of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. The conflicts within this system are closely inter-connected not only in their international (and diplomatic) aspects but also in their 'internal' indeed internationalized aspects. All these states in the Horn have had a conflict and these conflicts have had regional linkages.

By late 1960s all African states, except a few in southern Africa had been liberated politically from the yoke of colonialism, and Africans had regained their sovereignty and independence. There is no doubt that colonialism made an impact on African states and how these states relate with each other. According to Boggs² the boundary controversies in Africa have resulted partly from the fact that colonial powers demarcated when little geography was known. He therefore concludes that the partition of Africa has sometimes engendered conflicts. However, the origin and nature of conflicts in African nations are

¹ M. Meken Kamp, P Tongeren, H Veen (ed 5) *Search for Peace in Africa:* (Netherlands: Vtrecht 1999) p11

² Boggs, *International boundaries: A study of Boundary Functions & problems.*(New York. AMS press 1966) p.156

as complex as they are in other parts of the world. This complexity arises from their main causal nature, which is rooted domestically. The domestic causes are basically of economic, ethnic, religious, ideological as well as personal ambition. Though these conflicts are mostly internal, the fact that borders are too porous and cannot be ignored. This implies that population groups transcend state boundaries, state interests are intertwined and issues such as the environment, human rights, economics and others are cross border. Conflicts in Africa exist within a conflict system. Porosity of borders has consequently led to internationalization of conflicts.

In May 1998, a war erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Initially, long-standing, strong economic, political and cultural ties¹. The Ethiopia Eritrea war was generated by various factors other than the border war. For example economic. Cultural and political disputes. The war was a manifestation of incapacity of two states to manage their internal crisis as well as their differences². The conflict led to the destabilization of the horn. A brief historical overview is necessary in order to enhance the understanding of the conflict and its ripple effects in the horn.

In 1951, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia after 51 years of Italian colonial occupation and a decade of British military administration. In 1962 Haile Selassie the Emperor annexed Eritrea as one of Ethiopian provinces thereby violating a UN resolution 390-A (V) Adopted by the General Assembly in December 1950. Subsequently various Eritrean groups begun armed resistance against annexation that lasted for three decades and

¹ ICG Report on Africa No. 68 *Ethiopia and Eritrea War or Peace?* 2003

² P. Toggia. *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa: Autopsy of Democracy, Human Rights and Freedom* (England; Dartmouth Publication Company 2000) p. 247

outlived both Emperor Haile Selassie's and colonial mengistu's military regimes leading to Eritrean Independence.

Expansionism as a foreign policy in Ethiopia has long existed. Haile Selassie's government had demanded a full incorporation of Eritrea and nothing less but through some understanding with US advisors, it finally accepted the compromise formula.

In principle the Federal constitution of 1952 is so structured that it could serve as the basis of a new federal order between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its dissolution in 1962 precipitated the Eritrean armed movement. Though resolution 390-A (V) characterized Eritrea as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown, Ethiopia however declined to accord Eritrea the status of a state¹.

The constitutions of both were different. The constitution of autonomous Eritrea was modeled on those of western Democracies while that of Ethiopia inhibited an autocratic character. Ethiopia's obsession with control and security as well as its approaches to administration were such that it could not feel comfortable with any arrangement other than that which ensured the unitary character of the state. Hence even Eritrea's status of mere regional autonomy was unpalatable to Haile Selassie's regime.

After Eritrea was annexed to Ethiopia, ten years later the genesis of the war was marked and this lasted for three decades. During a national convention in Ethiopia in 1991, the

¹ P. Wood Ward, *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federation and its Alternatives*. (England: Dartmouth. 1994) p 20.

new Ethiopia government, led by Meles Zanawi, accepted the '*de facto*' independence of Eritrea. Following a UN-Supervised referendum, the state of Eritrea acceded to independence on may 24, 1993 and this marked the end of a 30 year old internal war. The Eritrea independence was recognized by Ethiopians government. OAU and the UN.

The two leaderships enjoyed their friendships with good political, economic and cultural relations until February 1998 when a war broke out.

An account of the background of the conflict can most usefully begin with Ethiopia. Ethiopia is land locked neighboured by Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. Since the centralization of the administration, from 1850 onwards most Ethiopian rulers have tried to further centralize their administration and expand their territory. It is characterized by variety of people's cultures and religions. According to the most recent census (1984) there are 76 ethnic groups¹ in Ethiopia. These include Oromo, Amhara, Tigray and Somali. Ethiopians traditional ruling class is drawn from the Amhara and Tigray groups who have often fought each other.

Eritrea borders Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti and is inhabited by nine ethnic groups the Tigirinya, being the largest.. Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until in 1991 when the new Ethiopian government led by Meles Zanawi accepted the '*defacto* independence of Eritrea. On May 21, 1993 the state of Ethiopia was accorded the '*dejure* independence'.

¹ J.V Beurden," A Devastating War Between Former Friends", in M. Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* Op.cit pp.136-137

Friendship between the two countries flourished until 1997 when Eritrea introduced its own currency the Nakfa that expressed Eritrea's sovereignty implying economic differences between the two countries. Due to Ethiopians conviction that Nakfa was over valued, it demanded that all financial transaction between the two countries expressed in American dollars and this created tensions between the two countries. This was a serious set back for economic as well as political relations between the two countries. Economically, migrants and small traders from both sides crossed the border freely for centuries and Eritrea merchants were used to buying parts of the coffee harvest in Ethiopia and transporting it to one of the Red Sea ports for export¹ until Eritrea was granted independence, port Assab used to be a free port for Ethiopia. Despite agreements that Ethiopia should have a free access to the port, when conflict erupted, Ethiopia claimed that they were being over charged for port access. The trade ended with '*defacto*' closure of the border. Politically, frontier police and military patrols were stepped up and occasional armed exchanges were reported this was followed by the invasion of Yirga Triangle in May 1998 by Eritrea on the basis that Ethiopian troops had begun incursions into Eritrean territory as early as July 1997. The conflict between the two countries was predicated on the Ethiopian claims that Eritrea armed forces had invaded the Yirga Triangle, which Ethiopians considered their territory. Eritrea was not silent either; in defence it argued that Ethiopia troops had begun, into Eritrea territory as early as July 1997. The issue of territory was however, a proximate cause of the conflict. Some of the underlying causes were economic which had a domestic basis. For instance Ethiopians decisions to introduce its own currency following its independence.

¹ ibid p 34

Despite many regional and international, for mediation, the two sides showed no genuine commitment to a peaceful negotiation of the conflict. They did not positively respond to the peace initiatives initiated by the US, Rwanda, Djibouti, Kenya, the European Union , Libya, Egypt, the UN and AOU.

Following OAU's framework that called for the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Badme, Prime minister Zenawi's regime concurred with it while Efeweke's government insisted on the entire demilitarization of the contested area.

By August 199 both parties had accepted the framework Agreement and the modalities of implementation but Ethiopia judged unacceptable a third document prepared by the OAU, the UN and the US on the technical arrangements for the implementation. However on 12 December 2000 and after further negotiations both presidents signed the border Algiers Agreement, witnessed by the UN secretary general the OAU and the US. It made provision for first delimiting and then demarcating the border¹

The Horn of Africa conflict system has been characterized by states' involvement in social and political issues was initially pegged on domestic problems which limited to the two states rather it had a spill over effect throughout the region. Both states supported each other's insurgencies. They further supported various factions in Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti as well through provision of Arms hence intensifying insecurity. Similarly tension heightened along Ethio- Kenyan boarder in the south with the Oromo liberation front stepping up a military operation. This made the Kenyan government to dispatch its

¹ International Crisis Group Africa Report, *Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict: War or Peace?* Op cit

troops in the boarder region. In this set up governments in the HOA feared for their national security and territorial integrity. They had to take measures to incursion themselves from eventual threats of aggression from their neighbours. The events in these states generated a spillover effect into other countries in the HOA. Therefore political, social as well as economic issues pervade in the intra-regional relation to necessitate conflict or co-operation. In this regard, the actors in this conflict have not been limited to Ethiopia and Eritrea rather the entire Horn has been involved. The issues have been security in terms of insurgency support, proliferation of arms and territorial integrity.

The more parties that enter the conflict the more complex the issues in the conflict become. This is so because each party entering the conflict brings its own concerns and interests.

1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The Horn of Africa has been a theatre of many conflicts both intra-state and interstate. The region's unstable political environment has sparked state sponsored rebellions in each other country considered an enemy. The counter rebel support led the region to have edgy relations. The IGAD was constituted with a view to resolve ready to accept intervention-lacking neutrality on who should chair the peace processes in the affected countries. On this background, intra-regional relations have become unpredictable especially when trying to resolve one conflict interconnected to several other conflicts. This has been the case in the Sudan and Somali peace processes.

To understand how conflict system in HOA region has been dissipated by the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, it is therefore necessary to examine its original development and current status. This forms a pertinent foundation to address its impact on intra-regional relations.

Thus this study endeavors to answer the question: To what extent does conflict impact on the way states interact with each other within the region? Based on the above question, this research further seeks to answer the extent to which conflict affects the regional security system and Diplomacy. Secondly it seeks to answer the question as to what extent conflict invites co-operation in regard to its resolution and management within the region.

1.3. OBJECTIVES

The general objective of this study will be to investigate the impact of conflict on intra-regional relations. The general objective will be supported by various objectives.

1. To examine the impact of Eritrea's independence on Ethiopia and Eritrea in diplomatic, political and economic relations.
2. To examine the extent to which the conflict impacts on the recognition of states as well as on Diplomatic relations in the region.
3. To investigate the role of institutional conflict management in inter-state conflict
4. To examine the impact of conflict on regional security.
5. On the basis of analysis make suggestions on how peace can be maintained in past conflict period in the HOA.

1.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to capture all aspects of the study. It is reasonable to adopt a multi theoretical approach. This will entail the conflict system and internationalization approach together with national interest approach.

In order to understand the conflict system within the Horn of Africa conflict systems approach will be employed in this study. Conflict system and approach¹ argues that most international conflicts have domestic sources. In the case of Eritrea; its decision to introduce its own currency following its independence was rather a domestic one. There were further domestic pressures to expand its territory and hence the issue of territory was however a proximate cause of the conflict. Upon granting independence to Eritrea's Ethiopia suffered economically since the port of Assab now belonged to Eritrea. Hence it was agreed in parliament that there was need to go to war. In regard to other conflicts in the Horn, the sources are domestic, in Sudan the contention is on secessionism, Religion power sharing and resources whereas in Somalia, there are power issues over who should rule following the overthrow of Siad Barre. In Uganda, there are rebels who have been working towards overthrow of the government and in Djibouti there are rebels who are dissatisfied with the government. Issues in these states have been power and wealth sharing, self-determination. Basically it is about exclusion of some populations who in return become rebellious.

¹ M Mwangi, *Conflict: Theories, Concepts and Processes*, (Nairobi: Watermark publishers, 2001) p. 36

According to this approach internationalization of conflict implies looking at a conflict from a wider systematic perspective. This implies examining a conflict in the context of the conflict system it belongs to. To address the conflicts in a region the causes must be analyzed internally and their link to wider international and tribal interconnections that spread into other countries like Djibouti and Sudan. The conflict spill over raises sympathies and national intervention. There have been cases of support of insurgencies for instance both Eritrea and Ethiopia support each others insurgencies and as if that is not enough Eritrea support the insurgencies in Djibouti as Djibouti relates well with Ethiopia due to the economic gains of port usage. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea support various factions in Somalia. At some point, Eritrea severe relations with Sudan claiming that Sudan is attempting to export its fundamentalist's revolution.

The conflicts within this system are closely interconnected not only in their international and diplomatic aspects but also in their 'internal indeed, internationalized aspects'¹ The notion that no conflict is purely internal is a sound starting point for the analysis and management of conflict². It means that particular conflicts should be analyzed and managed in the context of the conflict system to which they belong. In this case the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict belongs to certain conflict system, which is the HOA. This approach gives useful pointers to the wider causes of the conflict, and eventually to the suitable management approaches that should be adopted. The conflict system and approach also suggests that within a particular conflict system, all other conflicts should be held in contemplation during the management of a particular one. In regard to Ethiopia

¹ M. Mwagiru, "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa", in IRG Conference Report on *Regional Security in the Horn of Africa*. (Series 8, Special Reports Volume 1 1996).

² Ibid

Eritrea case, adopting this approach it implies that the Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Djibouti conflicts should be held in contemplation. The rationale behind this is that resolving only one conflict in the system may prove insufficient between the settled conflict and the others within the system.

In an attempt to understand Eritrea Ethiopia relations, National interest approach will also be employed in the study. The tenets of national interest theory comprise of State centric security, which is defined by economics, military capability and territorial integrity. Secondly is the state centric interest of nationals abroad and thirdly, hegemony at regional level. In interstate relation, national interests take the leading role. Conflicts and co-operation are dynamics of international politics hence conflict of interest becomes a basic factor of interstate relations. It was in Eritrea's interest to introduce its own currency following its independence due domestic pressure as well as assertion of its sovereignty. Ethiopia was not impressed by this decision since before then the two were using Ethiopian currency the Birr, in their transactions. Ethiopia claimed that Eritrean Nakfa was over valued and any transaction be carried out in American dollars. Joseph Frankel¹ contends that clashes are particularly significant whenever they arise over vital interests, core values, so derived because people are attached to them to the point of being prepared to pay a very high cost for them, even to make ultimate sacrifices and are not prepared to compromise. On May 6, 1998 the Ethiopians attacked Eritrean troops on the border area. Earlier Eritreans had made incursions into the contested area and therefore Ethiopia was not ready to lose the area to Eritreans without a fight. It had to do what it takes when their interest is threatened. According to Ethiopians the war was

¹ J. Frankel. *International Relations in a Changing World 4th ed.* (Oxford: Oxford University press 1998) P.67

justified since Badme was considered their territory. The decision of Ethiopia to go to war was justified and is based on Coloumbis and Woulfe² Sentiment that primary justification of states action is the national interest.

At the point of Eritrea's Independence, it had been agreed that since Ethiopia was to become landlocked upon Eritrea's independence the port of Assab be of free access to Ethiopians but following the war, Ethiopia was denied the free access and thereby intensifying the conflict. In regard to relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea try to maintain good relations with Sudan. Eritrea, though had initially severed relations with Sudan claiming that Sudan was trying to export its Islamic fundamentalism, it restored diplomatic relations. This was in fear of Sudan aligning itself along side Ethiopia which Eritrea considers its enemy. This particular step would ensure security from the side of Sudan.

Insecurity along Ethio- Kenya border heightened when OLF is pushe by Etiopian government towards south on the Northern part of Kenya. It is de tØ Kenya's threatened security that Kenya engages in a peace mission between the two states so that they can end hostilities. Issues of national security have been regarded as vital interests and as such are values.

² T. Coloumbis. *Introduction to International Relations. Power and Justice.* (New Delhi; Prentice Hall 1986) P.106

1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Literature review will entail ideas and views from various scholars and publications regarding conflicts in the Horn of Africa and specifically Ethiopia Eritrea conflict. In this view this paper will explore literature on conflicts and on peace processes in the face of intra regional relations. That relate to the nature of conflicts, causes, actors, interests as well as peace initiatives in the region respectively. Secondly, regional relations in the face of conflict will also be explored.

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict prone parts of Africa. Mwangiru observes that these conflicts are characterized by among other things, their protracted nature. The traditional dichotomy of internal /international conflict, is not, therefore, strictly true since the process of internationalization of internal conflicts has rendered that classic dichotomy void of this and other conflict area¹. In addition to this concept, Beurden expounds internalization of External conflicts² in *Internal Conflict Internalized*. In this article, he observes that a decade old conflict between the government of Djibouti and armed faction of the Front Pour La Restauration de L'Unite et de la Democratic (FRUD) was aggravated by the outbreak of the Ethiopian –Eritrean war in May 1998. Eritrea accused Djibout's Gouled Aptidon administration of siding with Ethiopia subsequently. Djibouti feared an alliance between the FRUD and Eritrea rather than just being internationalisation of external conflict. It further externalized in the sense that after support of Ethiopia by Djibouti's Gouled Aptidon government of Djibouti fears an ally between his rebels and the government of Eritrea. This situation leads to poor relations between

¹ M. Mwangiru "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" in IRG Conference Report on Regional security in the Horn of Africa (Series 8 Special Reports) Vol I 1996.

² J.V Beurden, " External Conflict Internalized" in M. Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* OP cit PP 126-130

the two countries. In this case the conflict takes a regional dimension in regard to the relations within the states in the region. He further notes that Djibouti's economy is directly related to Ethiopians demand on the port Djibouti. However he does not address the complexity of relationships that lead to this demand. This implies that conflict can take a circular dimension.

Stanley Samara singe observes that conflict evolves through five stages. Pre conflict phase, conflict emergence phase, which is characterized by chaos and complex emergencies conflict settlement phase and post conflict phase.

Various reasons can be attributed to the causes of violent conflicts. Kenneth Waltz espouses this in his analysis of man state and war¹. He contended that an appropriate way to discuss and critically evaluate the multitude of approaches and theories on the causes of war was to divide them in terms of where along the social spectrum they locate the fundamental, nexus of war causality; Upon this basis he identified three main orientations on the cause of war. These are individual image; nation image and state system image² combination of the three is crucial for effective understanding of the war. John Markakis³ contends that ethnicity certainly is a factor in the conflict since in nearby all cases, the opposing parties being to groups with different ethnic and clan identities. Further, he argues that whether such differences in themselves are sufficient cause for conflict is questionable. It is only when they analyze situations and realize that there has been an

¹ K. Waltz. *Man State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. (New York: Columbia University press 1959) p.453.

² Ibid p.14

³ J. Makakis in K. Fukui *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*.(Ohio: Ohio University Press 1994) p. 217

element of marginalization by the incumbents government. In this context Enloe¹ highlights two factors considered as catalysts; competition for resources in conditions of great scarcity and secondly, the role the state plays on controlling the allocation of such resources. State controls the production and distribution of material and social resources and hence has become the focus of the conflicts. Access to power of the subjects is of vital importance for the welfare of its subjects. This has not been available to many in the Horn. This has consequently resulted to the state being both the object of the conflict and principle means by which it is waged. . However, Katsuyoshi² notes that Ethnicity is a necessary but not a sufficient element in explanation of the conflict prior to Eritrea's' independence competition for resources in conditions of increasing scarcity is the process that shapes the confrontations between groups and individuals in the Horn. The question we need to ask is why is ethnicity the preferred and most efficient basis for political mobilization.

Hussein³ Solomon observes that emergence of violent conflict is between the results of complex processes often with deep Historical roots. ACCORDS Early Warning Systems⁴ views conflict as the result of five sources of insecurity, which it defines in terms of political, economic, military environmental and social cultural variables.

Often in our analysis we are prone to emphasize the political and military dimensions of a conflict at the expense of other variables, which are often important and drive conflicts

¹ Enloe. *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*.(Boston Little Brown 1973) in Ibid

² Ibid p.224

³ H. Solomon, "Analyzing Conflicts" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit p.35

⁴ Ibid

more directly. Stanley Samarasinghe¹ sees a function correlation existing between poverty and conflict. Most Horn conflicts, actually all can be analyzed based on insecurities as well as poverty.

Since most conflicts have been internal and therefore granting them more attention, little attention has been accorded to inter -states conflicts. The inter-state conflicts can also have a regionalized aspect in a given conflict system. Though the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was perceived as an inter state conflict, at some level, it had correlations with other conflicts in the system.

Boggs² attributes African boundary problems² partly to colonialism. The case of Ethiopia Eritrea is partly predicated on the demarcation conducted by the colonial masters. Chweya observes that the imperial powers partitioned the continent based on topographical, non-social man in the continent, resulting in borders that both translated and transected pre existing Ethnic and political units and thereby prepared ground for future conflicts within and between states³ In this regard, the IGAD sub region has witnessed five important border disputes, the shifta dispute between Kenya and Somalia, the Ogaden dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Elemi Triangle dispute between Kenya and Sudan, the post secession Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and the Kenya Uganda dispute in 1976. He further notes that they have become increasingly few. Even

¹ S. Samaranghe (ed) *Conflict Management Throughout the Crisis Life Cycle* in H.Solomon, *Analyzing Conflicts* op cit p35

² Boggs op cit

³ L. Chweya, "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region". In M. Mwagiru, *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization.*(Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation 2004) p.38

though this is so, they should be held in contemplation since they could erupt anytime because the history underlying these boundaries is still intact.

While inter-state conflicts still exist, they are however rarely based on border questions but on claims over access to resources⁴. Following Eritrea's secession Ethiopia became landlocked thus depending on Eritrea ports of Massawa and Assab. Differences arose on port surcharges mishandling of import and export items and other conditions imposed by Eritrea port Authorities. This forced Ethiopia to use accordingly to Pietro¹ Toggia the most rational decision; to switch to Djibouti's port facility a situation that engendered resentment among Eritrean leaders who not only lost revenues, but also suddenly were left with under utilized port facilities. He further contends that the border issue was just a secondary one; rather, the free access to the sea was the most fundamental issue to the Ethiopia's national interest.

Woodward² observes that the war of expansion, which was known by conquerors as the war of pacification was the classical method of state building in Ethiopia. In this regard some scholars view the border war as a manifestation of Ethiopia's foreign policy of Expansionism since it has had a history of the same. In view of the same Wodayo³ argues that the body of evidence concerning the genesis of conflict reveal that Ethiopia began her acts of provocation in 1993 when Eritrea became independent state and won the

⁴ ibid p.39

¹ P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa*. (England Dartmouth publishers company 2000) pp 250-252.

² P. Woodward. *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its alternatives*, (England: Dartmouth Publishing company ltd 1994) p.3

³ A. K. Wadajo. *Networking With a View to Promoting Peace 2nd Conference Documentation* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation) pp137-140

recognition of the world body. He contends that the 'Shooting' war begun in may 1978, but the war that Ethiopia declared on Eritrea civilians begun in 1993. In support of this he argues that there were various acts of provocation initially undertaken in the rural areas of North West Ethiopia, in Adiabo district, Tigrai.

Differing aspiration between various organizations can generate conflicts⁴. In this respect Beurden observes that this was the case between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea introduced its own currency, the Nakfa in assertion of its independence while Ethiopia was not for that idea, and Ethiopia hoped that they would continue translating using Ethiopia's currency.

This literature reveals that the causes were both external as well as internal. External for instance Ethiopia's expansionism policy and internal in terms of political, economic and social insecurities emanating from within the state and this in return impacts on domestic policies which in return affect the relations with another state. It has further revealed that the border conflict was not the cause rather it was secondary to the underlying causes. This paper will adopt the view that the genesis of the conflict was internal or rather it originated from within the states and further escalated to an inter-state one.

For conflict management to be effective it is important to understand the complex relationships that exist between the conflicts actors and issues. M. Mwangi observes that

⁴ J. V Beurden "A D evastating War Between Former Friends" op cit p 134

the conflicts within the Horn of Africa conflict system are closely interconnected not only in their international aspects but also in their internationalized aspects¹.

According to Brown internal conflicts are a violent or potentially violent political disputes whose, are primary domestic and where armed violence takes place or threatens primarily within the borders of a single state².

The line between internal and External conflict is rendered very thin especially in this era of globalization. Even within states, the control of central authority as the custodian of sovereignty may also be limited by either conflict or structural and institutional weaknesses so as to generate crisis of state responsibility. This is espoused by Rupensinghe in his discussion about disappearing boundanes¹ Holding a similar view is John Koech who contends that the notion of internalization of conflict raises the issue of the relationship between borders and states².

Various scholars have discussed in depth on internationalization of conflicts. This is so probably because there have been many internal conflicts in the Horn. This has led to little attention on inter-state conflicts, which according to this study have introduced a concept of 'Regionalization of an interstate conflict' like in the case of Ethiopia Eritrea conflict.

¹ M. Mwagiru "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" op cit p.26

² M. Brown, *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, (Centre for Science and International Affairs Harvard University, Mit press 1996) p3

¹ K. Rupensinghe. *The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts* in E. Boulding, New England for Peace Research Conflict and Security Reexamined, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers) pp 43-64.

² John Koech, "Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD in M. Mwagiru", *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation 2000) p.128

Sandole³ holds the view that it is critical to distinguish between conflict-as-start up conditions and conflict as a process. The trend established that across the three stages of conflict systems development of self-stimulating or self perpetuating conflict processes it is important in evaluating relationship between different variables located at different levels through time conflict as start up conditions is seen to engender conflict-as-process and once process comes to characterize conflict, it does not matter how or when the conflict started. Therefore different start up conditions can lead to the same process initiation, escalation and controlled maintenance. This implies that in the conflict cycles conflict itself may become the main source of its continuation and procratedness. In support of this view, Lund explains that once some level of significant level has begun it is likely to escalate due to an interactive process of attack and retaliation leads to a self-perpetuating cycle¹.

It is therefore valid to contend that it factors beside start up conditions become part of conflict cycle. It is necessary to probe the dynamic process of conflicts themselves. Jaban observes that 'War mood' takes hold when conflicts escalate².

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This implies that overtime conflict, as a process may be more important than conflict start up conditions. Therefore it will not be sufficient to statically identify operating variable worth looking but also to identify the dynamic processes that may overtake the static start

³ Sandole, *Capturing the complexity of conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era*, (London: Pinter, 1999), p18

¹ M .Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A strategy for preventive Diplomacy*. (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press. 1996) pp133-134

² V. Jabri *Discourses on Violence* (Manchester:, Manchester University press, 1996). P.6

up conditions. In this regard, as conflict erupts the actors are few but as it proceeds the number of actors go on increasing and this gives it a regional dimension.

Various scholars have written literature on security concerns in the Horn of Africa. Hiteng³ observes that the proliferation of conflicts in the region has generated the problem of proliferation of light weapons. In addition he argues that the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of people within the region has made the trafficking of illegal arms much easier resulting into security vulnerability within and between communities in the Horn.

B.A Kiplangat⁴ on political and security implications of conflict in the Horn argues that there have been millions of internally displaced persons and refugees, a crumbling infrastructure due to the unresolved conflicts ranging like bush fire across the region a torrent of small arms that may be a source of insecurity for years to come.

On regional impact of the war P. Toggia¹ observes how Ethiopia Eritrea, inflicted concern upon all the neighbouring states. In this regard he contends that due to the Ethiopia Eritrea war, Djibouti reinforced its border with Eritrea. The conflict also diverted Ethiopia's port usage from Eritrea to Djibouti similarly, tension heightened along Ethiopia-Kenya boarder in the south.

³ C.Chiteng, "Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa in Mwagiru", *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* op cit p12

⁴ B.A Kiplangat, " Political and Security Implications" in *IRG* conference report op cit p15

¹ P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* op.cit p.252

On relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea various scholars, have concurred. Woodward², Toggia³, Beurden⁴ among others observe how the conflict resulted to severed diplomatic relations, collapse of trade relations, immigration problems as well as severing relations between the two leaders.

The literature reflects the impact of the war in the region but does not show the direct link between the conflict and how states relate due to a given conflict. Regional implication of a conflict is not exactly the same as implication on intra-regional relations. Relation implies a form of interaction between states. There is no available literature on trade relations apart from the two conflicting states and little on Djibouti. The literature tends to focus on political and security issues. It does not reveal what happens to the other states in the region when a conflict erupts, do they recall their citizens or not.

Conflict management has been viewed by various scholars as characterized by complexities given the nature and the complexity of the conflicts within the Horn Region.

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It is generally acknowledged that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa have had important repercussions for stability in the region. However the problem that is rarely addressed is which conflict management methodologies should be adopted in managing these conflicts. In this regard, Mwangiru¹ contends that a proper management approach to these conflicts requires a clear conceptual understanding of the interlinkages between several

² P. Woodward *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa* op cit p.252

³ P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa*. op cit p.252

⁴ J.V Beurden , *A Devastating War Between former Friends*. op cit .pp.134-136

¹ M. Mwangiru, “Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives” in IRG conference Report op cit p30

factors. These factors include the nature of conflicts within the system, the broader regional and sub-regional milieu of conflict management and the domain of the major approaches to management, namely the proper roles of track one and track two diplomacy in the process of conflict management.

John Koech² argues that the internationalization of conflict significantly changes the structure of conflict management.

There have been various developments that render a conflict not to be considered as internal. These includes the problem of ethnicity and borders inherited at independence given the increase in number of internal conflicts in Africa this is an important consideration. This is espoused by Mwangi³. In his attempt to conceptualize internationalization of conflict. OAU itself has had a problem in its efforts to manage conflicts since it had dichotomized conflict as either internal or international conflict⁴. However as noted by Mwangi the OAU has now realized the reality and the strict dichotomy no longer exists.

The context in which a conflict belongs should determine the type of conflict management^{4b}. Conflict system approach gives useful pointers to the wide causes of conflict and eventually to the suitable management approaches that should be adopted.

² J. Koech. 'Emerging challenges of security in IGAD'. Op. cit p128

³ M. Mwangi "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives". Op. cit p30

⁴ M. Mwangi, *The Internal Management of Internal Conflict in Africa; The Uganda Mediation 1985* (PhD Dissertation. University of Kent 1994) ch.4

^{4b} M. Mwangi. "Conflict and Peace management in the Horn of Africa" op cit p.30

This approach advises that when managing a particular conflict all other conflicts should be held in contemplation. In case of Ethiopia Eritrea, it might have been seen like a conflict between only the two states but as the conflict progressed, it had regional linkages with Sudan Somalia and Djibouti and therefore its resolution meant taking into consideration other actors. Ethiopia Eritrea conflict had both informal and formal diplomatic initiatives being led by American Secretary of State together with the Rwandan foreign minister, Africa led efforts-AU and influential heads of states among others. However, these peace initiatives focused on establishment of a cease-fire, freezing of the territorial control of all conflict parties deploying of a UN peacekeeping force in the contested Badme area and selecting out of the Boundary commission. The other regional parties to the conflict were not taken into consideration.

With the end of cold war, the United Nations and regional organizations were called upon to assume greater responsibility for conflict resolution and prevention than ever before. But to the changing nature of conflicts which was mostly within states a significant problem was posed for inter governmental organization which well designed to manage disputes between states and whose characters specifically prohibited them from interfering in the internal of its affairs of its members¹

Connie Peck further argues² that the UN and regional organizations had to reconsider how to meet this new challenge. This led to the ongoing debate about which kind of organization is best fit to carry out conflict prevention and resolution – the UN regional

¹ C. Peck. "A More Strategic Partnership for Preventing and Resolving Conflict" in M. Mekenkamp, *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit p.39

² *ibid*

or sub-regional organization. She carried out a comparative study and concluded that strategic co-operation between the UN regional and sub regional organization and NGOs could also be expected to have a synergetic effect. Further She argues that increasing resources for conflict prevention and shifting the focus for preventive assistance approach could go along way to helping member states of the UN and regional organization work move effectively to ameliorate the many existing and potential conflict².

IGAD was formed in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) with the purpose of coordinating member states policies on desertification and other environment issues. In 1996, IGAD'S mandate was restructured to address three more ambitious priority areas, which include conflict prevention and resolution³.

IGAD has been move involved in Sudan conflict though as Lund and Betts observe, it has not been neutral due to cross border conflicts between Sudan, Sudan and Ethiopia. They further observe that IGAD has marginally involved in the Somalia conflicts primarily placing it on the IGAD agenda and reiterating the need for international attention. In regard to the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, the most militarized conflict in the region, IGAD has had no serious involvement¹. However they do not explain why the sub-regional organization has failed to deliver throughout the region and opts to partly participate in conflict resolution and management. Given that the Ethio- Eritrea conflict existed within the HOA conflict system, there was every need to adopt the conflict system and

² Ibid p.44

³ Discussed by W. Betts, " Search of Regionalism" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit pp.121-122

¹ ibid

internationalization approach which advises that while managing a certain conflict within the conflict system, all other conflicts should be taken in to account.

1.6. JUSTIFICATION

The Horn of Africa is characterized by conflicts which have been internationalized. The case of Ethiopia Eritrea conflict is unique in the sense that it starts as an interstate conflict but further escalates to have a regional dimension. The two states have supported various insurgency groups throughout the region as well as provided arms to those groups to destabilize the national governments, which they belong. The conflict has had various regional repercussions which are discussed in the literature review but how the conflict has affected the way states interact within the region has not been adequately discussed. This study aims to link conflict and intra-regional relations rather than the regional impact, which various scholars have discussed.

Various issues have not been adequately discussed critically like why the regional organization (IGAD) did not take part in the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict.

It is for this purpose that the study will investigate and come up with corrective policy measure for institutional conflict management. For academic purpose, this study will endeavor to contribute towards literature in the field of conflict and raise issues for further research through theory development.

1.7. HYPOTHESES

1. Eritrea independence led to negative developments in political and diplomatic relations in the horn of Africa
2. Institutional peace processes are an effective tool for an inter-state as well as internationalized conflict management.
3. Regional security is affected negatively by inter-state conflict

1.8. METHODOLOGY

Both secondary and primary sources of data will be employed in this study. Secondary data will comprise of textbooks, journals, newspapers, Internet sources and reports. It will also comprise of library research at various institutions like universities, organizations concerned with conflicts like Africa Peace Forum, International Crises Group among others.

The primary data will include interviews with the personnel at the ministry of foreign affairs and diplomat at the Ethiopian embassy

1.9. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

CONFLICT: Refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic cultural, religious, social economic political or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals. It can either be violent or non violent.

Internal Conflict: A conflict with a domestic source as its origin¹.

Internationalized conflict: A conflict with a domestic source as its origin but further escalates to the neighbouring states

Conflict Management

It is defined as the process of introducing external actors or exogenous managers for example mediators to a conflict. Endogenous are conflict managers who hail from within the conflict, while exogenous are external to the conflict and heterogeneous exhibit both characteristics¹.

Conflict Resolution

It is the mutual analytical process or procedure where the parties analyze the sources of their conflict and together create the basis for a new set of post conflict relationships.

Intra regional relations

This refers to how the states within a region interact with each another²

¹ M. Mwangi. *International Management of International Conflict Management in Africa* op cit p24

¹ Ibid p24

CHAPTER II

2.0. THE HORN OF AFRICA CONFLICT SYSTEM

2.1. Introduction

The horn of Africa has been conceptualized traditionally as comprising of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti¹. Due to the restrictive nature of this definition, the whole systems of conflicts in the region have not been addressed. For instance one cannot fully address the Sudan conflict without touching on the Uganda since the two governments have particularly been supporting each other's rebels. Mwigiru observes that the conflicts within this system are closely interconnected not only in the international (and diplomatic) aspects but also in their internal indeed internationalized aspects². This therefore arrives at a wider and broader definition of the horn, which in this case will include Kenya, Uganda and Eritrea³.

Within the horn of Africa, there is an important core conflict system, which includes Sudan, Somalia Ethiopia/Eritrea Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. The epicenter of the conflict system has been said to be Sudan⁴. The implications of this that only when that conflict is resolved will all other conflicts be settled⁵. This conception however is disapproved since Ethiopia Eritrea conflict was "settled" before the Sudan civil war. Nevertheless, the lasting of this settlement is contentious.

¹ J. W Heberson, *The International Politics of Identity in the Horn of Africa* in J. W Herbeson & Droth Child (eds), *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder: west view press, 1991) pp 119 – 143.

² M.Mwigiru, "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" in International Crisis Group Report on *Regional Security in the Horn of Africa*. Op cit p. 34

³ Eritrea was not recognized as part of this system earlier because it did not exist as an independent political unit.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

The conflicts in this system are closely interconnected not only in their international aspects but also in their indeed internationalized aspects as discussed in details later in this chapter. The change that conflicts have undergone in the Horn of Africa since the end of cold war cannot be termed as significant as such. However, the cold war was an important burning point, and had important repercussions on the direction the conflicts took and consequently for their post cold war management.

Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict does not exist independently and since it exists with the horn of Africa conflict system, it will be futile to analyze its impact on intra-regional relations without having an overview of the conflicts in the region. These conflicts have been interlinked and this gives the fundamental basis for analysis. The actors in the horn of Africa happen to be external actors in the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict and therefore provide the basis for analyzing intra-regional relations

Most of the wars waged in the horn of Africa during the past thirty years have been described in terms of ethnic conflict, both by the adversaries themselves and by external analysts. However, the Somali case was an exception since it is a conflict among various clans. The first and second Sudan Civil wars have been characterized as conflicts between the Arabized northerners and African southerners with cleavages along religious racial, cultural and linguistics lines various civil wars in Ethiopia have been characterized as wars between the Amharas and the Tigreans, Oromos Eritreans and so on. In the case or Somali, clanism has been the major driving force in the conflict. It has been described as conflicts between the Moraneens and the Isaaqs or between the Darods and the

Ogandenis and so on. The bone of contention has been largely power and control over resources. In Djibouti, the conflict has been between the Afars and the Issas. When we look at the Eritrea/Ethiopia conflict, we observe the opposite configuration⁶. Though each has structural conflict within their states the major conflict which is the case for analysis is an inter-state one. The internal actors that are the insurgencies come in as secondary actors in the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict.

Some of the major justifications given for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia have been that the Eritrea people are different from Ethiopians; that Ethiopians it self is not a legitimate nation state since it is a conglomeration of very diverse peoples; and that as a separate people Eritrea's have a right to exercise their right of self-determination. But when one examines Eritrea itself one sees that it is also an entity comprising of nine major ethnic groups, having nine different languages and cultures.

Though ethnicity has been viewed as a cause of conflict it has been used as an instrument in order to access wealth and control of resources since it is easier to mobilize people of homogenous identity.⁴

Since the end of colonialisation HOA has largely been characterized by violent repression and insurgency owing to poor governance.

⁴ H Assefa, "Ethnic Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Myth & Reality" An Article accessible at www.unu.edu

Attempts by groups inside and outside the horn countries to manipulate and control their states, and the inequitable distributions of resources generate intense armed. Conflicts among different social groups. In this regard the resources within these states are in the hands of the minority who cling to power at the expense of the majority. For instance in Sudan, the power and wealth is in the hands of the northerners while the poor southerners continue to rebel and perish in poverty. In regard to external interference, there has been insurgency support by neighbouring governments in order to oust the incumbent governments. For instance Uganda supported the Sudan rebels (SPLA/M) while Sudan has supported Lords Resistance Army in Uganda. The Sudan conflict has interlinkages with Uganda on the Basis of accusation by governments in both sides make about supporting rebels* Uganda supports SPLM/A by providing logistical support. SPLA was therefore perceived more empowered to launch offensive against Khartoum Government from Ugandan territory. In retaliation, Khartoum government decided to offer support to LRA in order to create a buffer zone in Northern Uganda from Where the SPLA was suspected to launch offensive exercise. In this set us the conflict in Sudan acquired an internationalized dimension that was more complex to resolve. The SPLA got more will to fight while located in Ugandan territory while LRA acquired more stability while located in Sudanese territory.

Lund and W. Betts⁷ observe that with the onset of the Ethiopia Eritrea conflicts in 1998 all the home states were embroiled in active or simmering military conflicts. Most of these involving competition for influence over areas within the states, but each of them

* *A Dend War of Visions*, (Cairo: 1998) Al Jamil Publishers 1998) pp31-33
⁷ W. Betts Lund, "In Search of Regionalism". In Mekenkamp, *Search for Peace in Africa*. op cit p 120.

has spilled in to the neighbouring states. This takes the form of both of fleeing refugees and the policies or states to support dissident groups that are opposed to the governments of neighbouring states. Such policies risk provoking state against state. The idea of interdependence implies that internal and external actors are linked by many transactions and relationships and these become more evident as the conflict progresses. The relationships include those between internal parties and their environment between each of the parties and external actors such as allies and supporters between each party and constituents and the relationship between external actors.

Political instability, civil strife and inter- state conflict have for a long time defined the features of the Horn of Africa⁸. Though Ethiopia and Eritrea have ended the bitter border conflict that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people, with an estimate of at least 6000 reported to have died, over 350,000 internally displaced and about 80,000 people expelled from each others countries⁹ the relations between the two states have not yet fully normalized. In Sudan, there was a conflict between the Arab Northern and the Christian Southerners over wealth and power sharing. However through various efforts and largely by IGAD, the war has come to an end. Sudan finally signed a peace agreement to end the devastation that has afflicted Africa's largest country for an entire generation. Clan conflict in Somali has been existence since the fall of Said Bare with power sharing being the bond of contention. Though various efforts in peace processes, there has been an agreement although lasting peace is yet to be seen.

Internationalization of conflicts in the HOA is defined by the idea of interdependence, conflicts having domestic sources but having an international implication like Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, the problem of refugees, ethnicity and ethnic relations as well as the media in the sense that the effects and brutality of a conflict are known almost immediately in various parts of the world.

2.2. Internal, External and Internationalized Conflicts

External

Chweya contends that Interstate disputes were more prevalent during the period after independence and in some cases culminated in war. Countries like Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia and Uganda and Tanzania actually went to war with each other between the 1960's and 1970's¹⁰. He further observes that the greatest security threats for all the countries in the region emanated from the neighbouring states rather than internal sources. For a conflict to qualify as external at least two hostile groups are involved and which in this case must belong to different states. Secondly, at least one of the groups uses armed forces, clashes even if sporadic are extended over a long period of time and both sides or rather states are organized to a certain extent.

However today there are no longer severe security threats to IGAD members in terms of its territorial integrity or its sovereignty. Somalia's initial foreign policy of larger Somalia, which applied to Ethiopia Kenya and Djibouti and Uganda's claim to parts of Kenya have arguably been consigned to history. In recent times, the region has faced a

¹⁰ L. Chweya, "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region" in M. Mwangi, *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* op.cit p 40.

single boarder dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea over unfinished autonomy business¹¹.

Internal Conflicts

The real challenge that IGAD has faced in recently has been new internal rather than external security challenges. According to Brown, internal conflicts are violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins are primarily domestic and where armed violence takes place or threaten to take place primarily within the borders of a single state¹². In this regard most Horn countries have had an internal origin for instance the conflict in Sudan has been between the Northern and Southern parts that are characterized by different religions. These have been over power and wealth sharing, as has been the case in Somalia only that the conflict is between the clans. In Uganda, there have been rebels. as in Kenya, the country had faced challenges in regard to internal democratization struggles that frequently involve ethnic clashes that conservative state operations have instigated. Chweya¹³ attributes internal security challenges to disputes over organization of state authority situation, which has been very prominent in the horn of Africa.

The conflicts in the HOA have been wide spread and have represented the most pervasive form of armed conflict. Secondly, these conflicts have a high civilian casually rate and

¹¹ Ibid

¹² M. Brown, *International Dimension of Internal Conflicts*, (Center for Science and International. Harvard University MIT Press 1996) p 3.

¹³ L. Chweya, 'Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region' in M. Mwangi, *African Regional Security in the Age of Civilization* op cit 40

entail enormous suffering. Thirdly, internal conflicts have had spill over effects for instance the issue of refugees flowing from the conflict zone to other relatively stable states for instance refugees from Somalia and Sudan to Kenya Further this could take the form of proliferation and sneaking of weapons to areas of relative peace and stability and also the issue of insurgency support Most of these refugees cross borders while armed thereby transporting the weapons to the areas of relative stability This in return destabilize security in these regions that they move to. For instance, the Northern part of Kenya is characterized by insecurity due to so many armed people. The refugees either sell them to criminals or use them to terrorize the nationals of the state they reside. These factors in return affect the neighbouring states. These issues give the basis for according internal conflicts concern as espoused by Brown¹⁴.

In determining an internal conflict, Kamar¹⁵ argues that it can be distinguished by cause firstly he outlines ideological caused by social inequalities. In this regard we can analyse the Sudan conflict in that there exist social inequalities between the Arabs of the North and the Christians of the south. The government has enforced Islamic Law upon the Southern and on top of this, it has failed to develop the south. Secondly, he cites governance and authority caused by distribution of power and authority in society. This aspect can be used to analyze almost all countries of the HOA. The major bone of contention has been distribution of power a situation that has given some groups for instance the southern in Sudan Oromos in Ethiopia and also in Djibouti feel that they have been left out in power sharing thereby resulting to rebellions. Thirdly, he contends

¹⁴ M Brown *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* op cit p 3

¹⁵ K. Rupesinghe, 'The Disappearing boundaries between Internal and External Conflict' in Boulding, *Conflict and Security Reexamined*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1992) pp.43 – 64.

that identity in which ethnic religious tribal or linguistic issues are dominant can be used to characterize the Horn conflicts.

The conception of a conflict as either internal or external is based on realistic view of international relations but the recent developments demand that we go beyond realism. Given the increase in the number of internal conflicts in Africa this is an important consideration. Dichotomizing the conflict as either internal or external has over a long time hampered the OAU's management of internal conflict¹⁶ For example the structural conflicts existed in both Somalia and Ethiopia but the OAU was reluctant to respond and termed them as internal yet they had spill over effects in the neighbouring countries. According to the OAU's principles, states were not supposed to interfere with internal affairs of states. If a conflict was termed as existing within the boundaries of a certain state the OAU was not supposed to intervene. However, with realization that dichotomy is null and void, the OAU has been restricted.

2.3. Internationalized Conflict

Internationalization of conflict means that the previously 'internal' conflict becomes endowed with many international characteristics that render it no longer purely internal.

The main feature of an internationalized conflict is that the effects of the internal conflicts cross border, thereby raising the issue of the relationship between borders and states.

Mwagiru observes that frontiers sweep away borders and make them largely irrelevant

¹⁶ M. Mwagiru, *The international Management of Internal Conflict in Africa* op cit Ch . 4
M. Mwagiru, "Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa" op.cit p.34

and blurred. It is in such frontiers that interstate conflicts take place.¹⁷ The idea that internal conflicts cross the borders of countries and involve the communities in neighbouring countries and involve the communities in neighbouring countries is explained by the term internationalization of conflicts. There are various agents of internationalization of conflicts; the idea of interdependence. Analysis of conflicts comprises of vast pattern of relationships that are between the internal parties themselves, between each internal party and its environment and external parties such as the allies and supporters between each party and constituents and the relationship between external supporters. The impact of the complexity of relationship is that what initially appears as internal conflict develops significant characteristics that are not internal. Secondly is the domestic source of international conflict. In this sense it becomes difficult to separate domestic from international source because of the fact that international conflict has a domestic source. Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict seemed like a conflict separating the two states but the underlying cause was domestic located in introduction of a new currency by Eritrea. Thirdly is the internationalization of human rights. The emergence of idea of internationalization of human rights implies that human rights treaties^{3/} especially those dealing with fundamental human right are binding on all states. Though the doctrine of non-intervention is one of the pillars of International Law, in cases of Human rights violation, 3rd party state may intervene even if it means forcefully in order to bring such violations to a halt. In Ethiopia the traditional ruling class is drawn for the Amhara and Tigray groups who have often fought each other. The Oromos who form the largest ethnic group have perceived oppression from the two tribes and this has consequently led

¹⁷ M. Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institution of Management* in Mwangi, African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation op cit p 128.

to formation of movement to oppose Ethiopia Peoples Revolution Democratic party, which is the ruling party. In 1999 tension heightened along Ethio-Kenya border in the South since the OLF had stepped up a military operation. This was as a result of OLF facing heavy counter offensives by Ethiopia troops a situation that forced the OLF armed guerrillas units to retreat beyond the Ethio-Kenya border. This consequently provoked Kenyan government to dispatch troops. In the border region in what it perceived as security threats¹⁸.

Armed insurgents have frequently crossed borders thereby intensifying insecurity through arms proliferation. Mostly Kenyan government has often complained about Somalia sneaking illegal fire arms to the northern part of Kenya thereby intensifying insecurity in the country. There have been cases reported on how refugees have smuggled illegal weapons in the country. *

Given the porosity of the borders, population groups transcend state boundaries. A conflict almost immediately has the effect generating refugees who run away in search of security. This introduces us to the forth agent of internationalization for a conflict. The refugees cross border and interaction with other communities generate conflict due to pressure on land and the fact that some are normally armed threatens issues such as security.

¹⁸ P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* .op. cit p 252.

* Discussion With The Public Relations Officer Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wachira

The existence of absolute internal conflicts is however nullified M. Mwangiru therefore concludes that conflicts exist within a system, and this settlement of conflicts will have to have a regional focus if they are to hold¹⁹. An international conflict has multiple actors with multiple actors with multiple issues. Internationalization of conflict raises profound issues about the proper methodology of conflict management. It also raises the question of whether its necessary to develop new mechanism for the management of internationalized conflict, which has both internal and internalized characteristics. It raises challenges about the mediators identifies

2.4. Cold War Trends of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

Internationalization of conflicts in the region can to a large extent be explained using cold war. In this regard, the conflicts in Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, while having internal and colonial origins, were greatly internationalized; inter war by this super power rivalry²⁰.

The cold war complicated the diplomacy of conflicts using the game²¹ of ideological in which superpowers engaged. These prolonged and exacerbated the conflicts and rendered the HOA very unstable. In their struggle for ideological and strategic dominance, the two super powers, supported whichever regimes were in power regardless of whether they upheld morality, democracy and accountability²¹. The USSR supported Somalia's regime while USA supported Ethiopia's regime. This necessarily meant maintenance of

¹⁹ M. Mwangiru, "Conflict and Peace Management In the Horn of Africa" op cit p. 9

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Z Laidi, *The Super power and Africa, The constraints of a Rivalry 1960 – 1990* Chikago University of Chicago Press in IRG Conference on Regional Security in the Horn of Africa op. cit p. 35

dictatorial regimes regardless of their actions. Resolutions of these conflicts in the region were non-existent in their diaries and this led to exacerbation of the situation. So due to OAU charter particular article 3(2) it became increasingly difficult to resolve the conflicts regionally²².

2.5. Post cold war trends in the Horn of Africa

The end of cold war and the regional conflicts are interconnected in the sense that it changed the landscape not only of international relations but also of the diplomacy of the horn. With the end of cold war, the states in the horn were abandoned and this generated pressure from the citizenry. In addition, it consequently led to the fall of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia and Said Barre of Somalia since they were over thrown. The overthrow meant no more political and financial support for their regimes. Since the two regimes were no longer powerful, the already politically oppressed citizens of the respective countries felt the need to pressure their governments. The structural conflicts also led to their downfall. The fall of Mengistu's engendered the victory of EPLF, which ended the thirty-year-old war leading to independence of the state of Eritrea in 1993. According to Galtung*, Structural violence refers to any constraint on human potential caused by structures in the society. Structural violence exists in those conditions which human beings are unable to realize their full potential: where their somatic and mental realizations are below the potential realization. Unequal access to resources,

²² The operations of OAU have for a long Time been hampered by the principle of non – interference
* Galtung. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.3, 1969: pp167-191

The international relations of the HOA have been reconfigured since the end of cold war. In this regard Sudan continued to be the center of horn of Africa conflict system and this entanglement has adversely affected interstate relations in the horn. Sudan claimed that Uganda was supporting its rebels; the SPLM/A and Sudan in return supported LRA, which is a rebel group in Uganda. These claims resulted to severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Eritrea accused Sudan of hostile acts against it and the two severed relations. Ethiopia had as well strained relations with Sudan and accuses it of harboring Islamic fundamentalists and supporting their attempted assassination of Egyptians president Mubarak.


The end of cold war also witnessed diverse official and unofficial efforts to manage conflicts in the region. Okwedba²³ observes that the end of cold war meant the reduction if not the total withdrawal of ideological and strategically motivated security and economic assistance from the super-powers which led to weakening of governors and their instruments of oppression a situation that brought about demand for democracy, respect for human rights and sometimes rights to self determination²⁴ by previously oppressed persons. The structures in the society were only servicing the class interests and majority citizens were suffering excessive intimidation and could not achieve their full potential. These structural conflicts have for a long time contributed to poor intra regional relations in the sense that the oppressed groups seek support from the neighboring countries in an attempt to oust the incumbent governments and when neighbouring states want to destabilize certain states, they support the insurgencies.

²³ O Nnoli *Government and Politics in Africa*. (Harare AAPS Book, 2000)p. 842.

Though reality of outside interference has changed substantially in the post cold war era, the conflicts themselves have not changed much especially in terms of impact on the security of the region

2.6. Inter-linkages of the Conflicts in Horn

Conceptual analysis of the interlinkages



Designed by the researcher

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the conflicts in the horn have domestic origin, which are caused by social inequalities, poor governance and authority, and identity in which ethnic, religious, tribal or linguistic issues are dominant. These domestic political crises in those countries have also gone beyond their borders dragging them all into extreme destruction of each other. It has been characteristics of the Horn countries to foment or rather exacerbate conflicts within other neighbouring states as a way through which to

achieve national interest. As long as there exists a common enemy in any administration, relations between rebel organizations and neighboring governments within the horn remain close.

In order to capture the point of linkages within and among various conflicts, various conflicts in the Horn will be analyzed with specific focus on how they interlink.

Since the states in the Horn are neighbours, the issue of the border cannot be ignored with addressing those conflicts. The affected populations freely cross these borders as refugees. These refugees are known to smuggle weapons into the neighbouring states which are also conflict manifested and availing the weapons to these populations only makes the situation worse. In some cases where ethnic communities straddle the territorial borders of two or more states a conflict on one side will definitely affect the kith and kin on the other side as noted by Starvenhagen²⁴ for instance if a certain ethnic group is being marginalized by the government their ethnic members on the neighbouring states come to their rescue by helping to topple the incumbent government for instance the Somalis in Ethiopia being aided by their Somali counterparts in Somalia.

In terms of sub-regional organizations, the very same members of IGAD are the same who support the insurgencies of their neighbours but since IGAD is meant to bring about peace and security in the region at some point, there are conflicts as to who should share a certain peace process. There have been efforts although many members have interest in these peace initiatives, as we shall see later in this chapter.

²⁴ R. Stave Hagen *Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International Society* op cit pp117 – 131.

2.7. Sudan Conflict and Interlinkages

Sudan and Uganda

Since 1994, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has long been supported by Sudanese government in terms of providing safe havens and arms. Though not sufficient, the Khartoum factor is a necessary explanation for the Uganda's continuing conflict dynamics and sustainability of LRA operations²⁵.

It is reported that both have, in various instances provided each other's rebels with arms and ammunition and in some cases anti tank landmines. The ICG report²⁶ cites an example in 2002. This situation led to a subsequent in October 2002. This situation led to a subsequent flow of arms and ammunitions.

In twelve years since president Yoweri Museveni's revolutionary forces marched into Kampala, Uganda has shed its shameful reputation for state violence and the government has succeeded in stabilizing and pacifying large parts of the country. Sadly however as Veen notes, the situation in recent years has deteriorated, partly due to the fact that Uganda borders three countries that are involved in armed conflict²⁷. Uganda and Sudanese leaders signed an agreement paving the way for normal relations. Among other things the agreement called for the parties to renounce the use of force in resolving the differences, disbandment and disarmament of terrorist groups and cease support to any

²⁵ ICG Africa Report No. 77, 14 April 2004, Article on Northern Uganda: *Understanding and Solving the Conflict*.

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ H.V de Veen, "Explosive Mix of Problems could Re ignite Civil War" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op. cit p 258.

rebel groups. However, despite an agreement brokered by the Carter center between Uganda and Sudan. Sudan continued to support the Lords Resistance Army from the bases near Torit and Juba, which it claims are refugee camps²⁸.

Sudanese support is reportedly in retaliation for the Ugandan government's support of the SPLM/A. The security implication of this is that when one's national security in terms of the incumbent government is threatened, the reaction lies in doing the same to the threatening governments so that they can stop the insurgency support. In terms of actors, interest and issues, both governments accuse each other of supporting rebels. Uganda supported the SPLA by providing logistical support. Sudan perceived SPLA as more empowered to launch offensive from Ugandan territory. In order to create a buffer zone in Northern Uganda, Khartoum decided to offer the LRA support since SPLA was suspected to attack from Northern Uganda.

Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia

Actors, interests and issues

During the early 1990's, Sudanese government led by Islamic fundamentalist Dr. Turabi advocated for Islamic movement in the region. The justification of this was that Eritrea and Ethiopia had joint hands against Sudan. In turn, the Sudanese government also became a safe haven for Eritrea rebel groups the Eritrea jihad and Eritrea Liberation Front. The Ethiopian Oromo liberation front and the Uganda Lords resistance army.

²⁸ ICG Interviews With Uganda Officials Quoted in ICG Report "Northern Uganda: Understanding Conflict" No.77
op.cit.
A.Deng. *War of visions* Op.cit pp.31-33

Sudan's interest in Eritrea was dualistic* first Sudan Helped Eritrea to fight for its independence as a retaliatory gesture against Ethiopian government that supported the South Sudan rebels, the SPLA. Secondly, Sudan intended to have a strong ally as a neighbour in Eritrea that shared the same Islamic ideals. With an ally in Eritrea, Sudan hoped to have a supporter during the IGAD peace talks for Sudan to push the Northern Islamic agenda. The issue of secession was widely supported by other IGAD members. Eritrea suddenly opposed this position when Sudan started preaching Islamic fundamentalism across its borders. Eritrea was discontented with Islamic fundamentalism. . Hence the Eritrea government ditched its former allies.

Eritrea has supported Ethiopian rebel groups among them, Oromo Liberation Front while at the same time it has supported the Sudanese opposition groups among them SPLA. Sudanese government has repeatedly accused Eritrea for active involvement in armed conflicts along with the SPLA.

Ethiopia has supported and supplied the Eritrea opposition groups with arms. The Eritrea National Alliance, which is composed of more than ten groups, was founded in Ethiopia. However, this alliance lost public support for the mere reason that it was established on the backing of the Ethiopian government, which has engaged in a bloody conflict with Eritrea. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have severally attempted to foment internal conflicts in each others country either through propaganda or indirect arms support to dissident

elements²⁹ to be precise the Eritrea government has supported the Oromo liberation movement which is a rebel movement in Ethiopia. Subsequently, Ethiopian government has supported the Eritrea liberation front, which is a rebel movement in Eritrea.

Ethiopia/Eritrea /Somalia

During its border war with Eritrea, Ethiopia stepped up its military activities in Somalia. In June 1999, Ethiopia was reported to have actively participated in RRA military operation that captured Baidoa. Ethiopia increased military involvement following reports that Eritrea was channeling weapons to Ethiopian opposition groups in Somalia through Hussein aided, who was critical of Ethiopian operations in Somalia and its support for his rivals. The actors are the Somali Factions OLF, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea is interested in destabilizing Ethiopia through channeling arms to the OLF via Hussein Aidid's faction The Eritrea supported Somali in the fighting Ethiopia as a result of common approach of irredentism. The Eritrea and Somali identified each other as allies since they were fighting the common enemy thus they required each other's logistical support to destabilize the common enemy common enemy

Ethiopia/ Eritrea/ Djibouti

Actors, issues and interests

The conflict was between Ethiopia Eritrea and Djibouti's rebels,(FRUD) A ten year old, low intensity conflict was intensified in the advent of Ethiopia| Eritrea conflict³⁰. The

²⁹ L. Lata, "The Search for lasting Resolution of the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict" Article accessible at <http://www.ploughshares.ca>
³⁰ V Beurden, "External Conflict Internalized" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa*. Op cit p 126

conflict between the government of Djibouti and armed faction of Front Pour la Restauration de la Demacrate (FRUD) was aggravated in may 1998. Eritrea accused Djibouti's Gouled Aptidon administration of siding with Ethiopia while the government feared an alliance between FRUD and Eritrea. This was actually a case of external conflict internalized as espoused by Beurden³¹. The government Eritrea accused Djibouti of allowing Ethiopia channel weapons through its port. In agitation, Eritrea broke its diplomatic links and supported FRUD. This conflict will be discussed in details in the last chapter.

Refugees

There has been large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. Indeed the UN report³² estimates the number to be six million in the horn of Africa by the year 2002. Among those, 4 million are Sudanese. The refugee issue cannot be overlooked when addressing the interlinkages of the conflicts within the HOA. They are not always a neutral group to the conflict. When relations between Sudan and Eritrea deteriorated, the latter accused the former of forcefully recruiting Eritrea refugees in to its military. This introduces us to the issue of susceptibility of refugees to the parties to the conflict. In addition, these refugees are not only rendered vulnerable by the necessity to flee but also frequent victims of the suspicion and mistrust that characterize relations the horn.

³¹ *ibid*

³² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; "Affected Population in the Horn of Africa" Region, Nairobi, UNOCHA, Aug, 2002

2.8. The IGAD Peace Process in the Horn of Africa

Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn Of Africa

Due to shortcomings of OAU, insecurity and conflict management it was suggested that continental management of peace and security was impossible³³. The primary sub-regional organization within the HOA is the intergovernmental authority on development, consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Kenya. It was formed in 1986 but as Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification with the purpose of coordinating member states' policies on desertification and other environmental issues. However in 1996, IGAD'S mandate was restricted to address three more ambitious priority areas namely: food security and environmental protection, political and humanitarian affairs including conflict prevention and resolution and regional economic security³⁴.

A high degree of security interdependence which link the IGAD states implies that war has become an illegitimate policy instrument. In the early 1990's the threat that several conflicts in the region would spill over into neighbouring countries causing refugees and serious humanitarian emergencies prompted IGAD to become involved in regional political affairs and undertake attempts at direct conflict management.

The shared interests in regional stability means that security integration and management operates on the fundamental assumption that regional member states recognize the need

³³ J. Koech, "Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD" in M. Mwagiru, *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* op cit p 129

³⁴ W. Betts, "In Search of Rationalization" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* Op. cit p.121

for regional cooperation in maintenance of regional peace and security. Independence entails the thinking that states and other actors in the international system are networked together in a complex way and that each relies on the other in diverse areas ranging from the economic political and social. Common regional security assumes that there are regional vulnerabilities which threaten the entire system and which cannot be simply solved by protecting boundaries. By emphasizing common danger it bases its appeal on cooperative behavior and larger sense of collective self-interest.

Internationalization of conflict brings about regional insecurity and this in return demands response from the sub-regional organization which itself comprises of the very members party to the conflict among other regional members. The interlinkages of the conflicts demand a regional approach, which is generated by threatened interest of its members. In this regard the most vigorous and challenging initiative was the effort begun in 1993 to actively mediate the Sudanese civil war. This comprised primarily of four of its members (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea) brokering talks between the regime in Khartoum and rival factions of the SPLA/M. Lund and Bett³⁵ observe that the partners motivation was guided in part by the support Sudan was giving to rebel group in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. However disagreement over declaration of principles that emphasized the importance of national unity under secular state but recognized the right of self determination for the people of the south led to Sudan's withdrawals from the process resulting in third year collapse of the peace initiative.

³⁵ ibid

In 1995 the countries that had initiated mediation and emphasized diplomacy later adopted an actively hostile approach a situation that raises the question as to whether IGAD was any longer a body for conflict resolution or an alliance of four states against Sudan.

IGAD provides for member states to request intervention from the union in order to restore peace and security. In response to this, it was the government of Sudan that required IGAD to mediate in 1993 but this according to Wondu³⁶, and Lesch it is not without a reason, that request was based on certain calculations by the government of Sudan, which saw in a group of IGAD countries that would be sympathetic to its cause. if only to return certain favours. Khartoum had facilitated the overthrow of Mengistu's in 1991 there by weakening SPLA since Mengistu was supporting them when he was in power. This made Sudanese awesome to Ethiopians to aid the removal of whom they termed as a dictator. At the same time, having been aided by Sudan to obtain independence in 1993 Eritrea owed Sudan. Wondu and Lesch sum the calculations of the Sudan government as follows: -

“According to Khartoum’s arithmetic, Eritrea and Ethiopia were governed by former insurgents indebted to Sudan legend’s Uganda’s sympathy for the SPLM could be neutralized. Kenya was considered neutral and would be paralyzed by the responsibilities of the chair³⁷.

L.S Wondu and A Lesch, *Battle for Peace in Sudan: Analysis of the Abuja Conference 1992-1993* New York. University Press of America, 2000pp152-153

L. S. Wondu and A. Lesch, *Battle for Peace in Sudan: Analysis of the Abuja Conference* Op. cit pp152-153

However J. Odera³⁸ observes that in the end the calculation seemed myopic since it was actually a miscalculation, which had ignored the dynamism of Horn countries. Unpredictability of intra regional relations in relation to conflict situation is evidenced by above particular incident. Due to this, SPLA was impressed since its enemy the Sudan government lost its allies whom he thought would join hands with him to defeat SPLA³⁹. On 20th July 2002, the Machakos protocol was signed. Since that time the parties under the watchful eye of IGAD mediation team and internal observes include towards agreements on the outstanding issues. In early 2005 the two warring sides finally signed a peace accord bringing to an end a more than 40 years old conflict to a halt.

Contrary to the Sudan conflict IGAD has been marginally involved in the Somali conflict, primarily by placing it on the IGAD agenda and reiterating the need for international attention. However at the 9th summit, in December 2001, it was resolved that Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti should coordinate their efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia under the chairmanship of president Moi of Kenya.

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Most of peace processes launched since 1991 including the US and UN peace mission in 1992, came from several interconnected and sometimes contradictory and competing direction. Firstly, there existed a competition among the peace initiated by the neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti). This so because of the vested interest and either tended to favour one faction over the other.

³⁸ J. Odera, "Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa," A Paper Presented at Africa Peace Forum in Oct 2003
³⁹ ibid

The transformation of OAU to AU brought about some changes that paved way for more Effective conflict management. The AU constitutive act changed the clause for non-Interference in domestic issues of states. It opened up states in scrutiny for any internal Affairs that may spill over and affect other states. Thus internal conflict would be Subjected to other states scrutiny interfering with the states internal affairs.

The OAU through the IGAD also tried to initiate formula for peace resolution of the Somalia conflict with several meetings conducted under the auspices between 1992 and 1999 with the aim of bringing to an end the conflict. Unfortunately most of these efforts were in vain due to disagreement of the IGAD members. Lund and Betts⁴⁰ contend that the animosities among the northern countries precluded IGAD from any serious discussions of inter-state cooperation such as regional peace keeping forces lack of consolidation among these states exacerbates the competition among member states. Their resulting insecurity and fear of threats to their sovereignty intensifies the efforts to strengthen themselves at the expense of the others. This regional competition prevents IGAD members from developing a coherent, consolidated approach to security issues.

2.9. Conclusion

This chapter unravels the existence of various conflicts internal, external and internationalized conflicts, which exist in the conflict system. They need to be addressed from a broad perspective if peace is to be realized in the region. They interlinkages of the horn of Africa have also to be discussed. It has further been noted that the responses to conflict management have changed since the end of cold war. The reality of outside

⁴⁰ M. Lund and Betts "In Search of Regionalism " In Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit

interference in the conflicts of the horn had substantially changed in the post cold war period though the reality of the conflict themselves has not changed much especially in terms of their impact on the region. It has also been noted that the members of the region have been serious in their quest for peace in the horn and especially through IGAD. However IGAD has also been facing with challenges in trying to maintain peace in a region whose commitment to peace is challenged by states' interests.

7

CHAPTER III

3.0. ETHIOPIA ERITREA CONFLICT: *CASE STUDY*

3.1. Historical Background

Woodward contends that history is more important to understanding than to solving current problems¹. However it is the view of this paper that good understanding is often a part of the solution for no event is exactly the same as another, and neither the requirements of a particular time nor the responses offered by contemporary authorities can be identical to subsequent ones. But each historical happening is inevitably related to a host of other events so that we are entitled to search into distance past and find out affinities to prevailing developments and to draw lessons that may enable us to tackle current problems from the right presence.

For quite a long period of time, strong economic political and cultural ties characterized the relationship between the two warring states. For four decades, before gaining independence Eritrea was part of Ethiopia.

In 1951 Eritrea was Federated with Ethiopia after 51 years of Italian colonial occupation and a decade of British military administration. Haile Selassie the emperor annexed Eritrea as one of the Ethiopia provinces in 1962 thereby violating a UN resolution 390 – 4 (v) adopted by general assembly in December 1950² This violation can be said to have given the basis of the conflict that lasted for thirty years. Peter Wood Ward and Murray

¹ P. Woodward, *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa* Op cit P. 3

² P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op cit P. 247

Forsyth³ concur that the war of expansionism, which was known by the conquerors as the war of pacification, was the classical method of state building in Ethiopia as also elsewhere in the World. Federalism has had an unfortunate history in the region. The Ethiopia Eritrea federation, which set as ominous precedent had two inherent problems⁴. It was imposed from outside and was tolerated by both Ethiopia and Eritrea on the basis of half a loaf is better than none. Secondly, it was a marriage between two incompatible entities, which Peter Woodward describes as giant and dwarf, the strong, and the weak, the rich and the poor, and the autocratic and democratic. Adopting the stand that Federalism necessarily implies equality, the situation of Ethiopia and Eritrea is characterized by contradictions in the sense that the two inhibited totally different characteristics. The fact that the two were incompatible, it can arguably be said that, that very fact contributed to the first conflict.

According to the 2nd article and part one of the constitution the territory of Eritrea including the Islands, is that of the Italian colony Eritrea. The Article (3) stipulates that Eritrea is an autonomous unit Federated with Ethiopia implication or which is that the two are an independent state. However not a sovereign state, but rather a politically organized unit linked Federally with Ethiopia.^{4b}

This situation attracted even the international actors. In this regard, the US was in total support of annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia this was not without a reason. Since the US and Ethiopia had enjoyed good political relations, it was easy for the US to acquire the

³ P Woodward. *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa* Op cit P3
⁴ Ibid
^{4b} ibid

naval base at the Red Sea since Ethiopia would not be landlocked. This affirms Morgenthau's⁵ contention that states seek to achieve their national interests¹. Nevertheless, other International Communities like the USSR were in total protest. In this regard they argued that only separate existence would guarantee the sovereignty and progress on Eritrea. In total disregard of the USSR's view, the western powers reached an agreement under the auspicious of the USA. This was embodied in the compromise formula which became the UN resolution 390 A (V) the resolution that federated Eritrea with Ethiopia⁶

National interests are defined in terms of state centric security; economics, military capability, and territorial integrity. Ethiopia has also been keen at maintaining regional hegemony. Ethiopians obsession with control and security which originated from its classical method of expansionism, as well as its approaches to administration were such that it could not feel comfortable with any arrangement other than that which ensured the unitary character of the state. It was the political and security interest of Ethiopia to ensure a unitary arrangement. This meant access to the sea for trade as well as for naval reasons, which would at least, improve the security of Ethiopia. Annexation also meant a larger state since its territory would include those of Eritrea. Hence even Eritrea's status of mere regional autonomy was unpalatable to Haile Sellasie's regime.

⁵ H. Morgenthau *Politics Among Nations: (6th ed) The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New Delhi : Kalyani Publishers, 2001) pp. 4 -17

⁶ P. Woodward *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa* Op cit p.3

The dissolution of 1952 Federation in 1962 triggered the Eritrea armed movement. The Eritreans felt marginalized by Ethiopians both politically and economically. Application of ideologies of national self-determinism initially articulated in a very different setting, contributed to the conflict. The analysis by the ~~EPLF~~^{TPLF}⁷ in 1986 of its differences with EPLF in terms of the correct interpretation of Stalin's view of the national question (In regard to self-determination) provides only one of the most bizarre examples.

The idea that all the people in a given group are related by blood to one another, characteristically through descent from a mythologically common ancestor has had a powerful affect on the character of ethnicity in many African societies. Fukui⁸ however notes that ethnicity is a necessary but not sufficient element in explanation of the conflict prior to Eritrea's independence. It is the view of this paper that ethnicity can hardly be used to explain conflict prior to Eritrea's independence since the People of Eritrea come from 9 ethnic groups and therefore what held them together was the fact that they belonged to a common territory and since they were aware of the previous resolutions of federation, they felt the need for secession and self determination.

EPLF and TPLF fought the Ethiopians military state by forging a military alliance in the northern battlefields. The EPLF had provided the TPLF with arms military training and prisoners of war as recruits since the latter's inception in 1975. This definitely made TPLF indebted when Haile Selassie's government was toppled. The endorsement of the referendum for secessionism saw Ethiopia the first state in Africa to allow succession of

⁷ See *Adulis* for the EPLF Vol. 1 No. 11, May 1985, and *Peoples Voice*, (for the TPLF) Special Issue on "Our Differences With the EPLF" 1986

⁸ K. Fukui *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Athens Ohio University Press 1994) P. 224

one of their administrative regions. TPLF granted independence to Eritrea partly because they felt indebted after fighting from one camp and the fact that they were friends. They however, failed to focus on fundamental issues like access to the sea and the implication of the relations between the two states. According to the United States brokered London Agreement of May 1991 between EPLF and TPLF, Ethiopia was granted access to use, Assab as the main seaport for its international trade. In addition it was agreed that should Eritrea decide to amend any part of the Agreement, including the use of the Ethiopian currency the Birr, should inform Addis Ababa before hand. Other conditions for settlement of the dispute are first should Eritrea secede it should provide firm guarantee for Ethiopia's access to the sea and secondly, firm guarantee⁹ of non-alignment of Eritrea, preferably through defense treaty with Ethiopia to allay its fears. Eritrea violated this agreement upon introduction of a new currency as well as charging Ethiopia port fees. Violation of an agreement which gives the basis of a peace agreement leads to re eruption of a conflict.

The regional actors also came to Eritrea's rescue. Somalia was allied to Eritrea in fight for secession. This was because they had a common enemy. Through pursuit of the 'Larger Somalia Policy' Somalia Perceived Ethiopia as an enemy. Since Ethiopia was supporting Sudan's rebels, the SPLA, Sudan also felt the need to align itself with Eritrea in fighting Mengistu's regime. This Background helps us to understand Sudan and Somalia's role in the 1998 Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, as we shall see in the last chapter.

⁹ J. G. Nyuot, "Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa." *Africa Security Review* vol. 12. (3), 2003

After 30 years of war, in 1991 the incumbent government led by Zenawi granted independence to Eritrea following a UN supervised referendum, the state of Eritrea formally acceded to independence on 24th May 1991.

In principle, the Federal Constitution of 1994 is so structured that it could serve as the basis of a new Federal order between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Haile Selassie's disregard of the autonomous unit brought about rebellion from the side of Eritrea, a situation that perpetrated serious conflict. If Haile Selassie had retained the status quo and the US stayed out of the regional politics, the possibility that the two nations would have co-existed peacefully in their relations remains high. This history is an imperative one because it gives us the basis of understanding as to why the conflict erupted in the first place between the two countries and who were the actors. Even as the two countries came to an end of 30 years old conflict, we see issues that were not addressed to avoid another war but were in this case ignored.

3.2. Conflict dynamics

An eruption of border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea occurred on 6th May. Clashes are particularly significant whenever they arise over vital interests, core vanities, so defined because people are attached to them to the point of being prepared to pay a very high cost for them even to make ultimate sacrifices and are not prepared to compromise¹⁰.

The war forced hundreds of thousands of villagers to flee from sides of the joint border

¹⁰ J. Frankel, *International Relation in a changing World* 4th ed. (Oxford : Oxford University Press 1988) P. 102

over one million people became refugees, mainly because both sides resorted to mass expulsion¹¹.

International Crisis Group observes that the war forced hundreds of thousands of villages and nomads to the free from both sides of the joint border; reducing them to a precarious existence in makeshift settlement¹². On May 8th Eritrea members of a joint commission, set up in 1994 to deal with border problems arrived in Addis Ababa but left on May 9th. Unfortunately, they never took place after which Eritrea took control of Yirga Triangle. Eritrea alleged that Ethiopia had taken the place 10 months earlier. It further held that Ethiopians troops had begun invasions into Eritrea territory as early as July 1997. Ethiopia demanded the immediate withdrawal of Eritrea troops from an area it considered its own territory. Eritrea further contended that Ethiopians government troops had occupied this Eritrean owned area in July 1997 and replaced the Eritrean administration by an Ethiopian one.

After a short while, war broke out on two further fronts outside the Yirga Triangle region. One near the border town of Zalemessa and another near Buri on the road to Assab. Fighting was sporadic for about two months, from September 1998 until the beginning of 1999 but international pressure and several mediation initiatives helped transform the conflict into a propaganda war¹³.

¹¹ J.V. Beurden, "A devastating War between former friends" in Mekankamp *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit p. 136
¹² ICG Africa Report No. 68, *Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace* 24th Sep, 2003
¹³ J.V. Beurden *A Devastating War between Former Friends* Op cit p. 136

Eritrea's Achilles' heel is Assab, which is virtually inaccessible by road. Until the war erupted it was a free port for Ethiopia where thousands of Ethiopians were employed. By far the largest part of Assab's traffic –estimated value of USD 300,000 per day in fees was a transit cargo from and to Ethiopia¹⁴. When Ethiopia was over charged leave alone accessing it freely, it meant loss on the side of Eritrea. Initially Ethiopia's access meant that its economic interests were taken care of and not threatened. Threatened economic interests meant that Ethiopia had been provoked and in the end, war was inevitable.

Relations between Djibouti and Eritrea had turned sour since the latter accused the former of allowing Ethiopia to use its port as a conduit for arms. Diplomatic relations were severed and followed expulsions of each other citizens from both countries.

Several attempts were made to resolve the conflict starting with one brokered by US assistant secretary of state, Susan Rice, and the Rwandan government minister, Patricia Mazimhaka. The last was arbitration by international border commission, which settled the dispute.

3.3. Causes

There are various factors that surround the conflict without in-depth analysis it is easy for one to view the conflict as having its primary causes as the border dispute. Nevertheless

¹⁴ Ibid

John Prendergast¹⁵ notes that it is imperative to distinguish between proximate and root causes of this conflagration.

Proximate causes

Proximate causes are problems in the social, political economic and communications processes and institutions that mediate the effect of systematic conditions on peoples lives and behaviour proximate factors are crucial influences and whether systematic conditions give rise to violent reactions or to more peaceful conflicting interests¹⁶.

The proximate cause was certainly a dispute over the common border. The parties alternately alleged encroachment along the undemarcated border and the moving border markings as evidence of disputes going back years regarding administration on of border towns. However these border issues simmered until May 1998 when frustration boiled over. In February 1998, the former rebel allies were fighting each other over the control of Badme, a stretch of barren border area with little economic value¹⁷. The contention over Badme was a very difficult issue since the 100 km border kept shifting with various administrations in Ethiopia. The Ethiopia Eritrea border has been a unique one as Woodward and Forsyth¹⁸ note: Firstly, contrary to other African borders the treaties that delimited it were signed not by two European power by a European power (Italy) and the African power (Showal.) Secondly, the Eritrea border, a legacy of

¹⁵ J. Prendergast. "US Leadership in Resolving African Conflict: The Case of Ethiopia Eritrea." United States Institute of Peace Special Report. 74, Sep. 2001

¹⁶ Beyond Intractability. Org. "Understanding conflict and peace", <http://www.caii.com>

¹⁷ L. Leenco. "The Search for a Lasting Resolution of the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict". **The Plough Shares Monitor** March 1999 Pp. 6 -8

¹⁸ P. Woodward et al *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa* Op. cit P.240

colonization was not a mere gift but was carried by the blood of generous Eritreans. Thus Eritreans felt that the right to their border is to international treaties and the law that governs them as well as the wise of its population.

A series of military actions culminated in unprecedented use of force by the Eritrea army, which moved with heavy armour into areas previously administered by the Ethiopia. Subsequently, Ethiopians parliament met and demanded Eritrea's withdrawal. However, Eritrea claimed that it was taking back areas that belonged to it according to colonial treaties²⁰.

The fact that the war resulted from a large-scale Eritrea military invasion of Ethiopian territory is incontrovertible. Eritrea announced claims on these territories that were being peacefully administered by Ethiopia. This subsequently led to an invasion of May 12 violating the fundamental tenet of international law which states that a country which has territorial claims on areas peacefully administered by another country must not resort to force, it has to bring the issue to international mediation²¹. Both states defended themselves to exonerate themselves from blame. The monitor from Addis Ababa²² indicated that the war between the two states is not a border conflict but a result of invasion of a sovereign state of Ethiopia by state of Eritrea. It further added that it is not only Badme that was annexed by Eritrea but also Irab, Zalanbesa and Africa. The two states had to protect their national interests.

²⁰ L. Leeco "The Search for a Lasting Resolution of the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict" Op cit
²¹ ibid
²² Global Policy Org. "Two opposing perspectives on the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict",
<http://www.globalPolicy.org>

Expansionism as a foreign policy in Ethiopia has long existed but in this case it has been long suppressed such that any trigger could cause an eruption of a war. Ethiopia felt that it had given away too much already and any further pressure would just have resulted to war. Since that is violating the fundamental principle of national interest. If the border dispute was the root cause of the war, it would have commenced earlier than 1998 since the parties alternately encroached along the undemarcated border. The question that arises is why it is that the border issues simmered until May 1998 when frustration boiled over? This leads us to a further analysis of the root causes of the conflict.

3.4. Root Causes

The root causes are predicated on the economic causes J. Prendergast argues that at the time of Eritrea's independence, there were immediate structural and policy differences concerning relations between the two states²³ Ethiopia inherited a huge debt, a economies population unlinked by roads and commerce and major internal political divergence²⁴. On the other hand, Ethiopia inherited no debt a somewhat and cohesive and limited populations and relatively good infrastructure. Over time, policy differences emerged over trade currency, port usage customs, labour and migration.

Currency problems

At independence, both states agreed that Eritrea would continue using Ethiopian Birr and at the same time. Ethiopia would have access to the ports of Assab and Massawa.

²³ J. Prendergast. "US Leadership in Resolving African Conflict". Accessible in www.esp.org/pubs
²⁴ Ethiopias Political System was Autocratic while that of the Eritrea was democratic in Nature

In assertion of independence, and sovereignty, together with macro economic reasons Eritrea introduced its own currency, the Nakfa. It further proceeded to vigorously request that Ethiopia allows the new currency to circulate inside Ethiopia. This request was disregarded and dismissed as an illogical request by Ethiopian government. Secondly, Eritrea further demanded that Ethiopia convert Eritrea's stock of old Birr into US dollars. However, Ethiopia proudly rejected the demand, the old Birr notes had no inherent value as Eritrea had already translated the value of the old Birr notes into its new Eritrean currency on a one to one basis. It is reported²⁵ that Eritrea intended to export its currency fraud and receive in return roughly 200 million dollar in currency. According to data obtained by the US embassy commercial section, Eritrea's current account deficit was 22 percent of GDP in 1996. It is logical to discuss in detail the micro economic situation, which led to the introduction of the Nakfa.²⁵

Haile Selassie ²⁶ contends that Eritrea's who lived abroad came back to their country and begun to run businesses worth million of dollars. He argues that these were possibly the front men and women for the big organizations such as EPLF who were willing to dominate the market at the expense of Ethiopia business community. He further claims that Eritreans living in Ethiopia who were already well off prior to independence also did manage to get soft loans from Ethiopian banks for the purpose of dominating the market and accumulating Ethiopian required assets and bank ratios as all prudent banks must do in order to meet demand for cash against their accounts tradable goods such as

Report from dagmawi@geocities.com in P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa*

H. Girmay, "The Role of Nakfa", <http://www.ethoembassy.org.uk>

coffee, hides and skins oil seeds gold via their front men and women. This was then resold abroad to earn much needed foreign currency.

Research further reveals that the banks in Eritrea exchanged Birr for hard currency at a cheaper rate than in Ethiopia where by the exchange rate market forces determined. This continued for several years a situation that engendered shortage of Birr holdings consequently leading to failure to pay the customers cash on demand against their account at the counters. In addition Eritrea government was faced with difficulties in paying salaries for employees with Birr and short of cash to buy goods and services for government related productive and non-productive consumption.

The decision of Eritrea to introduce to new currency Nakfa was a sudden such that out of the officially estimated circulation of 44 billion Birr only an equivalent of two hundred million dollar Birr were left un converted to either the new Birr or other hard currencies. The sum was then finally presented to Ethiopian government for replacement possibly in hard currency for which Ethiopian government declined to oblige. Shortage of the Birr culminated in malfunctioning of the government hence the necessary for introducing the Nakfa. The Nakfa and the Birr were both declared as equal in value in order to assure the bank depositors. By then the Eritrea government had accumulated enough dollars gold and hard currencies from Ethiopia in order to help launch the new currency. Since no new currency can be launched without having gold or leading currencies to defend its value and sustain its validity.*

* H. Girmay, "The Role of Nakfa" Op. cit

As the supply of Nakfa outstripped the demand for it, its value started to go down faster than expected²⁷. Eritreans just felt betrayed by their government as the Nakfa started to free-fall. The frustration of the government of Eritrea led to aggression towards Ethiopia since Ethiopia rejected their currency. This Eritrea began incursions into Ethiopia territory a region, which was of no economic importance.

Trade Problems

The economic cooperation between the two countries was designed to bring joint benefits to the two functions. The two states conducted relatively smooth bilateral trade relations with mutually advantageous custom and tariff regulations²⁸. Eritrea's largest trading partner is Ethiopia, accounting for 67% of Eritrea exports market³⁰. However, Ethiopia required that Eritrea simply conduct its trade with Ethiopia using hard currency. The Eritrean president declared this unacceptable. However some Eritrean companies were starting to adjust to the use of letter of credit (foreign exchange or trade with Ethiopia).

Another issue related to trade is disagreement over port access. Eritrea's Achille's heel is Assab which is virtually inaccessible by road. According to the United States brokered London agreement³¹ of May 1991, the port of Assab is supposed to be a free port for Ethiopia. Until the conflict, it was so and thousands of Ethiopians were employed. By far the largest part of Assab's traffic –estimated value of US dollars 300,000 per day in port

²⁷ Resourceful Person. dagmawi@geocities.com in P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* PP243-256
²⁸ P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* op cit Pp. 243 - 256
²⁹ *ibid*
³¹ H. Wiberg, "The Horn of Africa" in *Journal of Peace Research* 14 (3) 1979, P.194

fees was a transit cargo to and from Ethiopia³². Geography is a major determinant of a states foreign policy. Access to the sea in any country determines how that particular country formulates as foreign policy in relation to the neighbouring states. This has led to the view of A.Shar that the port access led to the war in the sense that the fact that Ethiopia lost a border along the red sea and therefore has to rely on going through other countries such as Eritrea in order to ship and trade goods along that line³³ so if a country that had free access to the port start paying fees or is denied access totally, the repercussions are likely to bring forth or exacerbate a conflict situation. The introduction of a new currency was already a painful idea for Ethiopia to accept. Eritrea further exacerbated the problem by charging Ethiopia fees for port access. This made the relations between the two states sour to an extent that Ethiopia diverted from Assab to Port Djibouti, a situation that generated sour relations between Djibouti and Eritrea. The latter accused Djibouti of allowing Ethiopia to use its port as a conduct for arms.

In conclusion, the failure of Eritrea to recognize Eritrea Nakfa made Eritrea retaliate by charging Ethiopia port fees.

Foreign markets

Dagmawi observes that Eritrea has consistently viewed itself as the centerpiece of economic activity in the horn and as such they have based their economic strategies on the assumption that Eritrea companies would have preferential access to the Ethiopian market.

³² V. "Burden Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict" in Mekenkamp, *Search for Peace in Africa* Op. cit op cit pp 136 –140
³³ A. Shar "Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea" <http://www.global issues.org>.

Various companies, which are controlled by EPLF, operate in Ethiopia. In this regard Horn International Bank and Trans Horns Africa transport. They also planned that Eritrea would be an export based manufacturing and financial service centre for the region (Ethiopia). Nevertheless, Eritrea's plans conflicted with Ethiopians intention to develop its own manufacturing capacity and to process its own raw materials rather than simply exporting them to Eritrea³⁴. This is because these multi million companies are managed by top party officials³⁵ and due to corporate interests and greed to dominate the markets across borders: the existing comprehensive bilateral trade and economic agreements are compromised.

The two leaders ascended to power establishing authoritarian one party states. However, the geopolitical ambition of the leaders of the two respective nations created conflicts as they sought to exert great political influence Toggia contends that in their bilateral regional power. none of the two presidents has been willing to take a subordinate position in their relations. According to some findings³⁵ apart the border war, there was personal inhibited by both leaders. Lata, Leenco argues that in politics there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies as long as national interests are guiding principle.

3.5. Actors, Interests and Issues

Attempts to resolve any conflicts are bound to fail if the actors are not identified. The term actor refers to all the participants in the conflict. This could range from warring

³⁴ A Resourceful Person –dagmawi@geocities .com in P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op. cit pp.240-250
³⁵ P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op cit P. 250
³⁶ Strategic Survey 1999 2000, Smyth 2000 in P. Toggia, *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* p250

parties to mediators. Mediators¹ refer to all the groups who help the conflicting parties by bringing them together, gaining trust, setting the agenda, clarifying issues and formulating agreements. The interaction of actors and issues in a conflict creates the mediating system. This includes third parties and the issues and interests that affect them. Inter-state and internationalized conflicts are distinguished by the multiplicity of actors issues and interests involved. Complexity of the conflict calls for more analytical levels and hence the more complex are the methodologies and strategies needed for its management. For effective conflict management, it is vital to comprehend the complex relationships that exist between the conflict's actors and issues. Divisions between parties and conflicts between the third parties can complicate a conflict situation.

The conflict is characterized by Ethiopia and Eritrea as initial actors. The creation of the currency and the problem of its convertibility had blocked the flow of goods and services between the two countries before Badme conflict.³⁶ This is coupled with charging of port fees to Ethiopia and eventually denial of its usage secondly, Eritrea inversion into the Ethiopia territory and claiming ownership resulted in Ethiopia's defence hence fight over the border.

The objection of the Ethiopian government to contend with the plan led to an aggravated tension between the two nations.

¹ O. Kamudhayi, "The Somali Peace Process" in M. Mwangiru, *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation* p116

³⁶ F. Lortan, "A fragile Peace" *Africa Security Review* Vol.9 | 1 04, 2000

McGinnis³⁷ in analyzing the pattern of a conflict contends that conflicts endure for a long time, at relatively low interval of intensity but as it proceeds that interest increases as well as the number of actors. To begin with, when Ethiopia is denied access to the port Assab, it turns to using port Djibouti, Eritrea subsequently blames Djibouti that is allowing its port to be used as a conduit for arms and Ethiopia consequently breaking relations with Eritrea. Eritrea further supports the FRUD rebels in order to destabilize the regime security.

In Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea support various factions thereby including Somalia in their conflict Somalia has effectively become a 'second Front' Eritrea has channeled arms to faction movements via Hussein Aidid's Faction in Somalia and in response Ethiopia step up its security in South West Somalia and increases support for Aidid's opponent in South Central Somalia.

The main beneficiary of the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict has been Sudan's National Islamic Front NIF. In 1997 Eritrea gave support for campaigning for overthrow of N.I.F. But with the eruption of the war Ethiopia was the first to seek rapproches with Khartoum for fear that Sudan would permit Ethiopia to attack Eritrea from Kassala. For the same fears Eritrea made up with Sudan to a point of restoring their severed diplomatic relations³⁸. In as far as restoration of diplomatic relations is a positive move that emanates from the conflict, the relations between Eritrea and Sudan remained tensed since Eritrea suspected that Sudan was allowing Ethiopia to attack from the western part of Eritrea.

M.D. MCGinnis, 'Conflict dynamics in a three levels game: Local, National and International Conflicts in the home of Africa'. Paper presented at the 33rd North American meeting of Peace, Science Society International
L. Leen 'The Search for a lasting Solution of the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict' Op cit

The actors have not only been Ethiopia and Eritrea but have extended to the rebel organizations in the two countries. Ethiopia has supported the Eritrean opposition (Eritrean Liberation Front, ELF) group while Eritrea has done the same and especially to the OLF this is in order to overthrow the respective governments. The opposition groups have wanted power in their respective countries due to the perceived oppression. The interest of the opposition groups has been power, which they can get through overthrowing the incumbent government.

In regard to conflict management, the US and Rwanda have taken the lead plus the OAU as well as regional states especially Kenya. The interest of the regional states in conflict management is security. It is their own national interest that they resolve the conflict in the region. For the United States; control Eritrea's strategies location has always taken the first priority such that even during annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia it was in total support. In a conflict situation it is rather difficult for the US.

For detailed analysis of the actors, the chapter on intra regional relations will capture all aspects

3.6. Peace Initiatives

There are two diplomatic approaches to conflict management that were employed namely, track one and track two diplomacy³⁹. Track one is official diplomacy of the type practiced by states and creations of states. Given its formal character, it is constrained by

³⁹ M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa' in International Crisis Group Report on *Africa Regional Security in the Horn of Africa* op cit p34

official policies. Contrary to track 1, track II is unofficial therefore informal. It is not carried out by states; on the contrary non-state actors carry it. Though conducted by people who are formally officials, its essence is that it does not involve states.

Several attempts were made to resolve the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict. Both track one and Track two were employed.

Track 1: Diplomacy

The US Secretary of state for Africa, Susan Rice together with Rwandan government minister. Patrick Mazimhaka, brokered the first attempt. The US Rwandan Peace plans comprised of four points⁴⁰.

- ◆ Commitment by both parties to resolving the border and any other disputes by peaceful means and renouncing force as a means for imposing solutions.
- ◆ Deployment of small observer mission to Badme while Eritrea forces should re deploy from Badme to position held before May 6. 1998.
- ◆ Agreement to a swift and binding delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopia Eritrea border.
- ◆ Demilitarization of the entire common border

This peace plan though never included the other regional actors In this regard; it concentrated only on Ethiopia/ Eritrea conflict with both states construed as the only actors in the conflict. This peace process failed to recognize the fact that this inter-state

⁴⁰ J.V. Beurden, 'A Devastating War Between Former Friends' in *Search for Peace in Africa* op cit p. 136

conflict existed within a conflict system. Conflict System approach demands that all other conflicts should be held in contemplation while managing a particular one. Nevertheless it become the basis for most other mediation efforts Ethiopia agreed to this proposal but Eritrea was reluctant and more so due to un conditional withdrawal of Eritrea forces from Badme to positions held before hostilities broke out.

Italy's secretary of state for African affairs Rino Serri together with US president Bill Clinton deliberated and both Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed on June 15, 1998 to suspend air raids. A proposal by Libya called for cease-fire and true deployment of an African peacekeeping force the separated the belligerents. Contrary to the US peace plan, this particular one did not call the withdrawal of Eritrea troops from the contested area. Conflicting parties tend to support and comply with the peace plans, which serve their own interest States focus on national interests to determine whether they sign a peace deal or not. Hence Eritrea agreed to this peace plan while Ethiopia cling to the terms of the US Rwanda peace proposal. This agreement had in the interim been endorsed by the OAU while the UN security council had in turn endorsed the OAU efforts to find a peaceful solution.

On June 18 and 19, 1998 the prestigious delegation headed by secretary Salim Ahmed Salim and the President of Bukinafaso, Rwandan and Zimbabwe tried to Convince the two governments to accept the two peace plans.

On 7th October the US special envoy Anthony Lake met with the Presidents of both countries and the two leaders promised to continue with the cease-fire but disregarded to change their positions⁴¹. However, he focused more on the issue of secession of hostilities between the two states but failed to address the issue of insurgency support by the two states of the Somali factions and Djibouti.

In November 7 and 8 1988, a high-powered OAU delegation again met in Ouagadougou, Bukina Faso on November. On behalf of UN secretary General Kofi Annan, Muhammed Shanoun attended the meeting as an observer. The delegation proposed for a framework agreement for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia which was accepted by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea since Ethiopia demanded for unconditional withdrawal of Eritrea troops from the contested area. As if in vengeance, Ethiopia in return rejected Eritrea's proposal that the leaders to meet amongst themselves⁴².

December 17 and 18 was the OAU's final attempt at mediation. This took place in Ouagadougou. However Eritrea still had a number of unanswered questions and consequently no progress was made by Late January 1999. Following heavy military loses Eritreas accepted all the elements, but Ethiopia had questions about technical arrangements⁴³. Nevertheless, in May 2000 Ethiopian's conducted a massive offence breaking Eritrea's defensive supply lines. This offence created further urgency at the Niger's negotiations, where the mediators priotised a ceasefire that was signed on 18th

⁴¹ Ibid P. 137
⁴² Ibid
⁴³ Ibid

June 2003⁴⁴. It called for a peacekeeping to monitor it, the deployment of forces, and demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) completely inside what was considered Eritrean territory.

Due to the intensity of the fight, in May 2000 mediators immediately converged in Algiers with the two foreign ministers and went into round the clock negotiations led by Ouyahia and A. Lake Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. They made a trip to the two capitals that helped lay ground work for talks⁴⁵. Mediators and parties collectively agreed to split off the longer-term issue of determining the border and paying compensation for war damages from immediate need to cease the fighting. The mediators took this approach due to the interests they had if the war came to an end. According to Bercovitch⁴⁶ mediators come into a conflict with specific interests. Some of the interests would be based on enhanced security once the conflict comes to an end. Secondly the mediators would be perceived to provide certain resources meaningful to the parties to conflict. Therefore Eritrea and Ethiopia found it valuable to attach importance to the outcome of the mediation as they looked into the OAU to sanction either party and prevent further aggression. As for the US intense involvement, its interest is on the Red sea. Establishment of a naval along the red sea in order take care of its interest in Middle East. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea would adhere to US proposal so that they get foreign aid upon establishment of peace. Both parties therefore accepted to be bound by the mediator's resolution. Intensive negotiations finally produced a document acceptable to both parties and in mid June 2000, cease-fire was implemented.

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group. *Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict: Peace or War* African Report No. 68 Op cit

⁴⁵ Prendergast. *US Leadership in Resolving African Conflict* Op cit

⁴⁶ Bercovitch, *Mediation Theories*, (McGraw Hill, New York.1981) p.136

The cease-fire and peace agreements signed in Algiers in 2000 gave hope for gradual normalization⁴⁶. However Prendergast observes that the peace agreement finally signed by President Isias and Prime Minister Zenawi on December 2000 does not deal with all of other economic and political issues that divide the two countries. It fails to address exhaustively the proximate cause of the fighting by establishing a commission to delimit and demarcate the border. Secondly it does not address the reasons for fighting since it created an independent commission to investigate all of the causes.

It does not include the regional actors by addressing the impact the conflict had on the neighbouring nations for instance insurgency support. The opposition groups in either state have been left out. L Leeco argues that attempts to resolve the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict needs to address root causes using a holistic approach that encompasses the entire it HOA region.*

Arbitration team was established to deliberate on which side the contested area belongs. In arbitration, the parties choose their own judges, which are referred to as the arbitrators. The parties and arbitrators agree on the rules of the game and its less expensive. The award once given by the administrators becomes binding of the parties and has the same status as the judgment of a court. One party is normally left aggrieved its coercive elements thus remain and this reduces its usefulness as a method of conflict management. In April 2002, however, the boundary commission established by the peace agreement handed down its decision delaminating the 100km border and placing the town of Badme.

International Crisis Group. "Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict: War or Peace?" report No. 68 Op cit
Leeco, "The Search for a Lasting Peace of Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict" Op Cit

on Eritrea, side. In spite of the Agreement 's terms that the Boundary Commission ruling would be accepted as final and binding by both parties, Ethiopia claimed the judgment resulted from a flawed process and launched a legal and political campaign designed to reverse or alter it. By mid 2003, implementation war stalled and tensions well risking. The arbitration treated the conflict as an interstate dispute and as Leeco⁴⁷ contends, it fails to address the root causes.

In regard to Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, IGAD had no serious involvement despite the fact that it was most militarized conflict in the region. IGAD is not seen as neutral due to cross border conflict between Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea and as such members conflicting political interests have completely precluded any direct action from Ethiopia⁴⁸. The regional organization should be non-partisan in its attempts to deliver security in the region. It lacks a regional peace keeping mission, which would have been deployed in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

7

Track Two Diplomacy

Compared with other countries such as Kenya, the NGO sector in the two countries is particularly undeveloped. Religious organizations held conferences and made common appeals to their government to halt any armed conflict that could lead to allot war and to settle their differences peacefully and expeditiously. In their endeavor to restore peace, Ethiopia religious leaders tried to convince Ethiopia government to accept the US-

Leeco op cit
land and W Betts op cit P. 123

Rwanda peace proposal while at the same time their colleagues in Eritrea called upon the Ethiopian leader to let innocent Eritreans in Ethiopia live in peace⁴⁸.

There have been a number of informal initiatives to encourage dialogue between citizens from both countries for instance academics from both countries held several meetings in Western countries⁴⁹.

International NGOs were also involved for instance UNCHR and International Red Cross Committee but they were helping the internally displaced persons. However International NGOs avoided any critical utterances about the conflict and concentrated exclusively on their development activities⁵⁰.

In conclusion, the track II diplomacy concentrated more on the resolving the border dispute but overlooked the root causes of the conflict. In addition, the emphasis was on termination of hostilities between the two states but did not concern themselves with the other actors in the region and how the conflict was interlinked with the other conflicts in the horn since it belonged to the Horn of Africa conflict system. Mwagiru contends that the analytical approach of perceiving conflicts system has important implications for conflict management, not only within the particular conflict system but in other conflicts

⁴⁸ J. V. Beurden, 'A Devastating War between Former Friends' in Mekenkamp, *Search for Peace in Africa*, op cit P

⁴⁹ Ibid
⁵⁰ Ibid

as well⁵¹. A conflict system management approach helps, inter alia, in facilitating a comparative approach between different conflict systems.

3.7. Conclusion

The root causes of the border conflict were the economic, which stemmed from Eritrea while the border dispute was the proximate cause of the conflict. The history of the two states have provided the basis for understanding the conflict since the two signed a US based London agreement which Eritrea later violated

Conflict management must not only be limited to the causes of the conflict but also the structures of its transformation. The structure of the conflict is made more complex by the involvement of different actors at every stage of a conflict. All parties in a conflict including the third party have important relationships with their continents. In this regard Djibouti and Somalia should have been included in the peace deals that were made reason being the conflicting parties supported factions in these countries thereby destabilizing their national securities The more parties that enter a conflict, the more complex the issues in the conflict become. This owes to the conflict brings its own concern and interests and these interact in a complex way within the conflict management process. The peace process focused only on the Ethiopia and Eritrea ignoring the complex web of inter-relationships surrounding the conflict. Rather than focusing only on the objective approach in which the participant is taking action to change the structure generating the conflict, there is need also to adopt a subjective approach and approach the conflict from

M. Mwangiru 'Peace and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa' in International Crisis Group Report on *Regional Security in the Horn of Africa* Op cit P. 30

the perspective of negotiation and analysis between all parties involved. The peace processes involve both track I and Track two and out of the two non was concerned with the root causes as well as the regional actors who exacerbated the conflict rather they were emphatic on the border dispute. The international actors, the US and EU can work hand in hand in an attempt to bring peace in the region. However, the sub-regional organization (IGAD) was not involved seriously in the peace and conflict management.

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CHAPTER IV

4.0. ETHIOPIA ERITREA CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON –POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS


4.1. Introduction

The impact of Ethiopia, Eritrea conflict on regional relations has been manifested when dealing with regional framework on peace and security. However, while trying to analyze the relations between the two states, the economic dimension of the war has been highlighted since the root causes of the war are predicated on economic conflict. The IGAD peace processes for Sudan and Somalia have been a centre piece of interlinkages of Ethiopia Eritrea war. The war has torn IGAD members when formulating resolutions and committees to solve the two protracted conflicts. Ethiopia Eritrea conflict is complex as compared to other conflicts in the horn in the sense that it is conflict existing between two states and within those states there are internal wrangles that are between the governments and the rebel organizations. It characterizes the dynamics within the Horn of Africa.

The countries involved in the conflict have supported each other's insurgencies as well as destabilized security in the regional countries and in response the affected states have taken action against the aggression.

This chapter analyses how the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict impacts on how various states within the horn of Africa interact.

Conceptual Framework



Conflicts in the region impacts on how various states interact. In this regard, the conceptual framework explains how a conflict affects both political and diplomatic relations between the HOA states.

In regard to diplomatic, a conflict situation triggers a certain conflict management framework. States are interested in conflict resolution and management since they realize the importance of regional security. Secondly, Various states sever their diplomatic relations as well as taking in to account the nationals abroad.

The political relations within the Horn of Africa conflict system have taken a certain dimension. In this regard, there has been support of insurgencies of the states considered enemy in order to destabilize their regimes. This happens to the states that are seen as if they are supporting opponents. The conflict has generated refugees and displaced persons and these in return destabilize securities in neighboring countries. There has been proliferation of arms brought about by the parties in conflict and this destabilizes security in the region. This generates suspicions as well as provoking the affected states to step up military along the border and some retaliating through insurgency support.

4.1. Eritrea – Ethiopia Relations

The relations between the two states will not be left in the analysis since the two states exist within the same region which is the Horn of Africa Analyzing the relations between the two warring countries though it has an economic origin gives the basis of understanding the political and diplomatic relations with other HOA states. The economic relations between the two states form the basis of understanding why the regional states

behave the way they do.

Since 1993 when Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia, the two countries enjoyed a robust political, security and economic relations⁴¹. The smooth relations owed to the fact that the two presidents were friends having formed an ally in order to oust the Mengistu's regime.

Political relations

Personal Relations

As discussed earlier in this paper, the relations between African states are to a large extent predicated on the relations between leaders hence discussing interstate relations without a touch on the relations between the leaders would be futile. The two leaders never foresaw the eruption of conflict hence the cessation plan was hastily concluded.

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In May 1998 a conflict erupted between the two former friendly states predicated on boundary as the proximate cause. The war forced hundreds of thousands of villagers and nomads to flee from both sides of the joint border, reducing them to a precarious existence in makeshift settlements. Over a million people became refugees, many because both sides resorted to mass expulsions⁴².

Following the conflict, the relations between the two states were severed causing each state to close down the diplomatic relations and further supporting each other's rebels.

Security Relations

First and foremost, the former friends who allied to oust Mengistu had relations gone sour. They were such good friends such that lack of bilateral institutional mechanisms initially did not matter. This owed to the fact that historically the two inhabited close ties. This confirms that leadership relations in Africa determine interstate relations.

Eritrea and Ethiopia have struggled to destabilize each other's frontiers. The Eritreans support the rebel factions in Ethiopia for instance the OLF and Somalia in order to diffuse the concentration of Ethiopia on the Eritrean war front⁴³ the Political relations between the two states are steered towards destabilizing each other's states' regimes. The arming and training of rebels in each other's territory points to insecurity along the common borders. The issue of insecurity has encouraged huge government expenditures military ware. It has been noted that the war has been quite expensive to the extent that both sides have spent huge amounts on arms and other war materials from China, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and states of former Soviet Union. Russia has supplied both sides with aircraft, MIG-29s to Eritrea and 27s to Ethiopia⁴⁴. It has further been estimated that Eritrea spent up to 44 percent of its GDP on the war in 1992⁴⁵.

When there is real or perceived conflict between states the rational thing to do is to beef up security on the common border. There is evidence that at least six thousand people or more died from the war. The war went on with no official admission of the casualties. For

Hizkias. Asseffe, 'Lack of Visionary Statedmanship and Democratic Leadership in Africa'. in M. Mekenkamp
Search for Peace in Africa Op Cit Pp. 115
Defence and Security 26 May 2000
The Economist. Intelligence Unit Forth Quarter Report, 1999.

as long as the war continued the tension at the common border remained high. On both sides of the frontiers, police and military patrols were stepped-up and occasional armed exchanges were reported as early as 1998⁴⁶.

Refugees displacement of persons and diplomacy

When two states are in conflict, they expel each other's nationals – a situation that results to refugees. An estimated 75,000 Ethiopians of Eritrean origin was expelled to Eritrea on national security grounds without any hearing or appeal. In return, Eritrea expelled an estimated 70,000 Ethiopian residents despite its claims against any existence of an official expulsion policy comparable to Ethiopia's⁴⁷. Other refugees had been filtering in mostly men who claimed to be fleeing forced conscription in Eritrea.⁴⁸

4.2. Impact on Sudan

Political and Diplomatic Relations

Sudan is drawn into the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict as a result of its common border. Borders create the opportunity for conflicts between the states but it is not the borders that cause conflict since a border creates a certain structure of risks and opportunities in which various interactions appear more or less likely to occur⁴⁹. In this regard, the proximity of Sudan to Eritrea has not been for the best of their interest. Eritrea detests the Sudan government policies on Islamic Fundamentalism.⁵⁰ Which is disastrous to Eritrean regime. The Eritrean liberation Front (ELF) is supported by Sudanese regime. The initial

J. V. Beurden." Devastating War Between Former Friends" in Search for Peace in Africa Op Cit p. 134.

IRIN, Eritrean Deserters in 'Enemy' Land, 22

H. Staar & B. Most. "The Substance and Study of borders in International Relations Research." *International*

Studies quarterly 20 1976, Pp 581 – 620. 588. 195

McDeng, Sudan Contested. Identities, Oxford, Oxford university Press 1999 P. 56

support Eritrea got from Sudan to fight for independence did not create everlasting friendly relations, as Lata Leenco notes⁵¹. In Politics, there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemy as long as national interests are the guiding principle. The Eritrean independence gave them a chance to exercise sovereignty and soon started supporting Sudan opposition groups. This gesture of supporting Sudan rebels angered Khartoum government.⁵²

In retaliation to Eritrea's support to Sudanese rebels, the Khartoum government is not endeared to Eritrean regime. Sudan has mended up fences with Ethiopia as both regard Eritrea as a common enemy.⁵³

Fiona Lortan⁵⁴ observes that the main beneficiary of the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict has been Sudan's National Islamic Front. Until the Outbreak of the war in 1998 both Eritrea and Ethiopia were hostile to Sudan regime and provided political and material support. Sudanese opposition national democratic alliance (NDA) however, with the eruption of the war this anti-Khartoum alliance collapsed. Ethiopia was the first to seek rapprochement with Khartoum prompting fears in Asmara that Sudan would permit Ethiopia to attack Eritrea from Kassala (In Sudanese territory, on Eritrea's Western border). Eritrea was left with no choice other than to make overtures to Khartoum in mid 1999. This culminated in the restoration of full democratic relations between Asmara and

L. Leenco. 'The Search for a Lasting Resolution of the Ethiopia Eritrean Conflict' *The Plough Shares Monitor*. March 1999 Pp. 6 – 8.

A. Lier. A. *Sudan. Dishonoured Agreements*, (Lebanon, Ithic Press, 2002) P. 184.

Ibid P. 192

F. Lortan, 'A Fragile Peace', *Africa Security Review* Vol. 911 04, 2000.

Khartoum in late 1999⁵⁵. This was followed by an order for the NDA to vacate the Sudanese embassy that had been its headquarters since 1994.

The Sudanese government found itself in the unlikely position of being courted by its two erstwhile enemies, while the Sudanese opposition suffered a retaliating blow. Efforts to restore good relations with Sudan by both Ethiopia and Eritrea is based on the fears that Sudan could form an alliance with either of the parties and this could mean a defeat by the opposed party.

Lortan⁵⁶ notes that Ethiopian attack on the Western front in May 1999 caught many by surprise since the expectation was that it could attack the central point. This leads to the growing question surrounding Sudan's role in the offensive. The first attack penetrated deep into Western Eritrea very close to the Sudanese Eritrean border in areas that are relatively un militated⁵⁷.

Suspicious emerged from the attacks with Eritreans conviction that Ethiopia was allowed to launch its attack at least in part from Sudan's Kassala province and this led to intensification of Eritrean bitterness at what it viewed as international abandonment. This subsequently led to deterioration in Eritrean – Sudanese relations, prompting speculation in the pro-Khartoum Sudanese press that Eritrea is massing troops on the border and planning to attack on Sudan.⁵⁸

However though at pains to object the speculation, Eritrea sent a high level delegation to Khartoum in a bid to mend the rift.

⁵⁵ Ibid
⁵⁶ F. Lortan "A Fragile Peace" *Africa Security Review* Op Cit
⁵⁷ Ibid
⁵⁸ Ibid

The Ethiopia Eritrea conflict generated insecurity both in Eritrea and Ethiopia in regard to Sudan hence leading to efforts to make peace with neighbouring state (Sudan) However, it was unfortunate that Sudan allows Ethiopia to attack Eritrea on the Western side and this generates a lot of insecurity among Eritreans.

Djibouti Relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea

A decade old conflict between the government of Djibouti and the armed faction of the Front la Restauration de l'Unite' et de la De'mocrate' (FRUD) was aggravated by the outbreak of the Ethiopian Eritrean border conflict in May 1998.' There existed a systemic interconnection between the two conflicts, which exist in a 'Horn of Africa conflict system'. The uniqueness of the Djiboutian case in relation to the Ethio-Eritrea conflict is that it was a situation whereby an external conflict was internalized rather than an internal one internationalized. Eritrea was quick to accuse Djibouti's Gouled Aptidon administration of siding with Ethiopia while the government feared an alliance between FRUD and Eritrea⁵⁹.

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Economic Relations

The economic Relations are relevant in explaining the political and diplomatic relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti relations. It is not possible to analyze the political and diplomatic relations

Djibouti's port activity increased by 161% since may 1998. This consequently led to serious bottlenecks initially but has largely been resolved. Since the trade between

Ethiopia and Eritrea ended with *de facto* closure of the border. Ethiopia had no choice but to use the Djibouti's port facility. Djibouti forged strong links with Ethiopia cutting ties with Eritrea, which it accused of trying to destabilize the region. *Political and Diplomatic Relations*

Eritrea offered insurgency support in Djibouti through provision arms. This in return forced Ethiopia to provide Djibouti with military assistance. The two countries jointly patrolled the road and rail links between Addis Ababa and Djibouti port against attacks by Eritrean – sponsored rebel groups.⁶⁰ In fear of incursion and military strikes, Djibouti reinforced its border with Eritrea. This invited foreign assistance from France such that the French foreign legion stationed in Djibouti was on the alert to defend Hassan Gouled's Issa dominated regime since the onset of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict.⁶¹ Diplomatic ties between Eritrea and Djibouti were cut following claims that Djibouti was allowing Ethiopia to use its port as a conduit for arms as well as Eritrea's support for FRUD.

However, though Djibouti restored relations with Eritrea towards the end of 1999, the suspicion and insecurity existed throughout the war period.

Fiona Lortan, 'A fragile peace' – Accessible at www.iss.co.za/pubs
P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op Cit P. 252

4.4. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somali Relations

Political Relations

The actors in these relations have been Ethiopia Eritrea, Somalia factions and Ethiopia Factions the OLF The Eritrea supported Somali in the fighting Ethiopia as a result of the common approach to of irredentism. The Somali state had declared a firm interest in retaining the Ogaden Triangle. The Eritrea and Somali identified each other as allies since they were fighting what they perceived as a common enemy. Thus they required each other's moral and logistical support to destabilize the common enemy.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported armed opposition groups fighting to overthrow each other's government. Eritrea has supported Oromo Liberation front together with other opposition groups operating in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia. Somalia factions have been at the middle point. In this regard, Eritrea has channeled arms via Hussein Aidid's faction in Somalia. Lortan notes that two plane-loads on arms arrived in Mogadishu in February 1999, another in May 1999 carrying several hundred Oromo fighters fresh from training, military advisors and land mine experts.⁶²

In response to this Ethiopia steps up its security in South west Somalia the intention of which is to set up a buffer zone which is to set up a buffer zone which will prevent OLF and ONLF infiltration in the Ethiopia's vulnerable Southern and Eastern regions. Since Eritrea supports the Hussein Aideed's camp, Ethiopia counters by supporting Aidid's

⁶² F. Lortan, 'A Fragile Peace' Op Cit

opponent in South Central Somalia most notably Rahanwein Resistance Army⁶³ Through the assistance that Ethiopia gave in form of equipment and Troops, The RRA drove Aideed's forces out of Baidabho in June 1999. In response to Ethiopia's action, Hussein Aideed's Militia channeled arms to Somali Islamic Front Militant groups in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia a situation that fueled demand for secession by the two groups.⁶⁴

In the IGAD peace process for Somalia, Eritrea were caught up in a mix of contradicting positions over which parties to support in the peace talks. Ethiopia was supporting factions within the Somalia war. On the other hand, Eritrea supported different Warlords in the Southern part of Somalia. The view and interests held by each clan differed on the peace talks and it reflected the patrons' wishes. This dualistic factional support in Somalia has made peace to be elusive in the country. The Ethiopian regime could not be trusted to head peace negotiations nor can Eritrea. The scenario jeopardizes the IGAD efforts to reconcile the factions and pool the member states supports support for the same cause. Attempts to resolve any conflicts are bound to fail if the actors are not identified. The term 'actors' refers to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties⁶⁵ Achieving peace in the Somali peace continued to be difficult not because of internal interests but due to those external actors.⁶⁶ Any conflict resolution therefore needs to take into account even the invisible actors or rather the external actors. It is unlikely that the Somali Conflict could have been resolved before Ethiopia Eritrea conflict.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op Cit P. 253

⁶⁵ H. O. Rornsbotham et al. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. (Cambridge: Policy Press 1999), Pp. 158 – 159.

⁶⁶ O. Kamudhayi, *The Somali Peace Process* in M. Mwangi *African Regional Security in the age of Globalization* Op Cit P. 115.

4.5. Kenya and Ethiopia Relations

Ethiopia directed its aggression to OLF since it blamed Eritrea for supporting OLF. In this regard, tension heightened along Ethio-Kenya border in the South with the Oromo Liberation Front in the Southern Borana region stepping up a military operation.⁶⁷ This increased insecurity in Kenya and in response, in 1999, the Kenyan government reacted to control its border territories by dispatching troops in the border region. This was as a result of OLF facing counter offensives by Ethiopian troops a situation that forced the OLF armed guerilla units to retreat beyond the Ethio-Kenya border. Ethiopia Eritrea conflict caused insecurity in Kenya to a point that it necessitated military action.

An interview with officials at the Kenyan embassy revealed that Kenya sheltered many refugees from both countries. These refugees came in with small arms and weapons leading to threatened security in Kenya. In regard to Kenyan nationals there is elaborate policy for recalling the Kenyan nationals. It is the nationals who decide to leave or not. There is no Kenyan Embassy in Ethiopia but there is in Djibouti.

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4.6. Ethiopia Eritrea Peace Process and the Regional States

Various attempts were made to resolve the dispute the first attempt being the one brokered by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Susan Rice and Rwandan government minister, Patrick Mazimhaka.⁶⁸ The OAU made attempts through various stale mates, eventually, the cease-fire and peace agreements signed in Algiers in 2000 gave hope for gradual normalization. In April 2002, however the boundary commission

⁶⁷ P. Toggia *Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa* Op Cit P. 253

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, African Report "Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict: Peace or War?" Op Cit

established by the peace agreement handed down its decision delimiting the 1000 km border and placing the contested area on Eritrean side.⁶⁹

Though IGAD has been involved in Somalia and Sudan peace process, in regard to the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict, currently the most militarized conflict, IGAD though involved, it has had no serious involvement.⁷⁰ Independent countries tried to broker peace even if the regional body IGAD did not. An interview with the Kenya's foreign office revealed that Kenyan government tried to broker a peace agreement between the two. This was due to the threatened regional security, when neighbouring states are at war, the national security of a neighboring state is threatened.

The Horn members view each other with suspicion. In Sudan, IGAD was not seen as neutral due to cross border conflicts between Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea Lund observes that it is the member's conflicting political interest that have precluded direct action in Ethiopia. However the efforts to bring peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea have been done by independent states in the region. The regional competition among IGAD members prevents IGAD from developing a coherent consolidated approach to security issues.⁷¹

4.7. CONCLUSION

Ethiopia Eritrea was not confined to the two warring states rather it has been impact in the entire horn of Africa. The warring states severed relations leading to diversion of Ethiopia to Djibouti for port access. Eritrea supports both Ethiopia and Djibouti's insurgents and Ethiopia supports those of Eritrea. The conflicts led to even better

⁶⁹ ibid

⁷⁰ M. Lund and W. Betts. "In Search of Regionalism" in Mekenkamp *Search for Peace in Africa* Op Cit P. 122

⁷¹ ibid

relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti since they have a common enemy – Eritrea. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia enhance their relations with Sudan for fear that either party would form an alliance with Sudan. However Ethiopia's attack on the Western side by Ethiopia provokes suspicion that Ethiopia and Sudan are working for a common good. Eritrea therefore steps up its security along the Western border. In regard to Somalia, both states support different factions in Somalia thereby intensifying the conflict in Somalia. They supply the factions with arms and this spreads to neighbouring states, even the refugees are armed. This destabilizes regional security.

In regard to Kenya, Eritrea's support of OLF leads to Eritrea's attack on OLF such that they are pushed to Kenya. This leads to Kenya intensifying its military along the Ethio Kenya Border.

The conflict has therefore led to severed diplomatic relations in the region. Fear of alliance had restored diplomatic relation but fear and suspicion has reigned. In regard to recognition of state, conflict does not impact. The conflict has destabilized the regional security to a great extent through insurgency support; military step up as well as proliferation of arms.

5.0. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus of this research is how conflict has contributed to poor intraregional relations.

In Chapter two, it was established how the various conflicts interlink. Interlinkages are paramount to the study, since it is at the point of interlinkages that we observe conflict and how it relates to how the states relate. In the interlinkages we conceptualize it in terms of borders, the porosity of the borders makes it easy to cross borders and even transfer arms from one state to another. This is done by refugees as well as the rebelling groups in the conflicting states. It was established further that insurgency support has been going on in the conflict situation. Various states in the horn have supported the various faction groups in the neighbouring states thereby inviting a similar action from the governments who the insurgency has been opposing. This in return has generated animosity and insecurity among the horn members. Some states have gone to an extent of severing their diplomatic relations. This has also generated mistrust and suspicions. In terms of conflict resolution, the states in the region are characterized by suspicion and mistrust and yet the same states are involved in dispute settlement. This leads to conflicts arising even at the point of settlement and peace maintenance.

Due to insurgency support, it was further established that diplomatic relations have been severed to some extent like in the case of Sudan and Uganda. This chapter established further that the security of the region destabilizes leading to poor security relations between and among the states. When security or states is threatened there is tendency to

step up the military along the border. The regional organization IGAD has endeavored to maintain peace and security due to the eruption of conflicts in the region. It is for this very reason that IGAD was formed; maintenance of peace and security in the region.

Chapter three analyzes the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict since the case study is based upon it. In this chapter, the historical background revealed the conditions under which Eritrea was granted secession one of which is never to change the currency not unless it gives Eritrea notice and secondly, the port of Assab was supposed to be a free port for Ethiopia. Eritrea violated both of these agreements therefore necessitating a conflict. This provided the root cause while the Border dispute was a proximate cause. When Eritrea ceded to independence, the research reveals that, Ethiopia lost its control of the port of Assab and therefore when Eritrea started charging fees, Ethiopia was angry at that decision and therefore decided to use port Djibouti. This severed relations between Eritrea and Djibouti to an extent of Eritrea giving Djibouti insurgents support. This chapter further reveals that actors in the conflict were not merely Ethiopia and Eritrea but other regional states as well justifying that no conflict is purely between the original parties rather actors and interests increase with time. It also established that conflict leads to severed diplomatic relations between conflicting parties though IGAD did not participate in conflict resolutions as an institution, the OAU members which comprises of all African states took the role of conflict resolution plus other international actors like the U.S.

The fourth chapter investigates the impact that the Ethiopia Eritrea war had on the relations between various states in the region. To begin with both Eritrea and Ethiopia severe relations and expel each other's citizens. In addition, they support each other's insurgencies in a bid to overthrow respective governments thereby intensifying internal

wrangles in their states. This conflict does not end there, due to severed relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia results to using the port of Djibouti a situation that severe relations between Eritrea and Djibouti a situation that severe relations between Eritrea and Djibouti. Eritrea goes ahead to support Djibouti's insurgencies leading to worse relations. This is done through giving arms to the insurgencies. The chapter further establishes that Somalia becomes a second front in the War. In this regard both Ethiopia and Eritrea support opposing factions in Somalia exacerbating the fragile situation in Somalia.

In Kenya, Kenya steps up its military at the Kenya Ethiopia border due to the Oromo liberation front. They were attacked by Ethiopia when Ethiopia learns that they have Eritrea's support. Kenya's security is threatened that's why it steps up the military along its border. Kenya also has to contend with the increasing number of refugees who bring in arms in the country. There is no embassy of Kenya in Ethiopia. The IGAD institution through involved with Somalia and Sudan, it had little involvement with Ethio- Eritrea conflict due to mistrust among IGAD members. A lot of involvement is found with the OAU and the international actors, the US and EU.

The hypothesis testing reveals that Eritrea's independence to a great extent led to poor political and diplomatic relations in the HOA. Secondly, regional security was affected by the interstate conflict. Finally institutional peace processes are an effective tool for inter-state conflict management

RECOMMENDATIONS

Prospects throughout the Horn region are bleak. The security response must include attention to peace and reconciliation efforts in particular; regional efforts must be supported and strengthened.

Efforts at destabilization must be stopped. All governments in the region are involved in supporting insurgencies in other countries in the region. This in return makes them vulnerable to a similar action thereby leading to poor security relations between these states, in order to curb this, sanctions must be introduced against any state that supports insurgencies as the neighbouring state. This problem must also be included during the peace making efforts. Peace efforts should involve all parties. In this regard, when trying to settle a dispute or maintained peace between conflicting parties, even the invisible actors must be taken into consideration. In most cases there is tendency to concentrate on the visible actors and this leads to prolonged conflict since the neighbouring states continue to support through provision of arms.

African leaders need a code of conduct since conflicts do not persist because they are misunderstood or because of lack of information rather it is because the leaders lack the political will to end them. As African leaders seek absolute power, perhaps the answer lies in good intraregional relations in terms of socio political and economic aspects.

The animosities among the IGAD members have precluded IGAD from any serious discussion on interstate security cooperation such as regional peace keeping forces. The IGAD region is adequate in terms of establishing peace keeping forces so that they can respond in conflict situations.

The states should stop competing since this regional competition prevents IGAD members from developing a coherent consolidated approach to security issues. IGAD should always be ready to respond to a conflict situation no matter how many conflicts there are since conflicts throughout the horn are shared by all states, similarly, peace and prosperity will be shared throughout the region.

Rather than being emphatic on individualism or national leadership, it is paramount to institutionalize security relations between countries. In many instances, such relations are too dependent on the personal relationship between the heads of state.

Though recently, there have been extensive warfare within the horn of Africa, there have been periods of peace in the past and the question is how can those periods of regional peace be prolonged.

Settlement involves managing power relations through bargaining, and when those power relations change, the settlement is in jeopardy. Resolution attends to the causes of the conflict and seeks changed relationships and attitudes states have tended to concentrate more on seeking settlements without resolving conflicts: Although the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict was settled in 2000 by intense and both the strong domestic pressure not to concede any land. The regional Organization as well as the international community should set peace and a reconciliatory commission between both states so as to ensure that peace is maintained in post conflict period.

QUESTIONNAIRE

GUIDELINE QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS AT NAIROBI.

My name is Nancy Mumbi Kihara. I am a student at Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. I am undertaking a research on Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. I would wish have some insight on the conflict. Your information will contribute towards my effective analysis and conclusion of research.

1. What do you perceive as the core cause of Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict?
2. Are you aware if your country accepted the outcome of the arbitration ?
3. What are the current relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
4. What is the future plans to normalize the border dispute at Badme?
5. Did the neighboring states play any role in management and resolution of the conflict?
6. What role did the regional community especially the IGAD play to ensure there is peace between the two states?
7. In the context of regional security, do you perceive any role for AU and IGAD

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