

**EXPLORING FACTORS THAT PREDISPOSE MATHARE SLUM DWELLERS TO  
VIOLENCE**

**BY**

**DAN ODHIAMBO ADINO**

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
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## DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.



Dan Odhiambo Adino



Date

This thesis has been submitted with my approval as the university supervisor.



Dr. Salome A. Bukachi



Date

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my mother Julie Adino, my father Nashon Adino and my wife Veronica, who have always believed in me and ensured that nothing stopped me from achieving my goals.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

- APHRC** - African Population and Health Research Centre
- DBA** - Development Bank of Asia
- AIDS** - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
- AMREF** - African Medical Research Foundation
- CREAW** - Centre for Education and Awareness
- CDF** - Constituency Development Fund
- FGDs** - Focus Group Discussions
- GBV** - Gender Based Violence
- KNBS** - Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
- KANU** - Kenya African National Union
- KPU** - Kenya People's Union
- ODM** - Orange Democratic Movement
- PRSP** - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
- PNU** - Party of National Unity
- UN** - United Nations
- WB** - World Bank.

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## ABSTRACT

Violence has dominated the lives of Nairobi slum dwellers in the recent past, thereby exposing them to a lot of suffering and loss of lives and property. This study was carried out in Mathare slum with the overall objective of exploring the factors that predispose Nairobi slum dwellers to violence. The study was guided by Marxist theory and the theory of relative deprivation. The study examined the predominant forms of violence in the slum, assessed the extent to which economic deprivation predisposes slum dwellers to violence and determine the role of ethno-political competition in predisposing Mathare slum dwellers to violence.

The study employed a descriptive and cross-sectional research design. Simple random sampling method was used to obtain 120 respondents from the study population. Data were collected using structured questionnaires, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Quantitative data were analyzed using the statistical package for social science (SPSS) computer software and the findings presented in tables of frequencies and percentages. On the other hand, non-computerized qualitative methods were used to analyze data obtained through focus group discussions and key informant interview. These data were analyzed thematically and interpreted on the basis of the study objectives. Verbatim reporting was used to present some of the qualitative findings.

Physical assault is the predominant form of violence in the slum. In the study, the majority of the respondents had been attacked in one way or knew people who had been victims of violence. Most of the respondents admitted the existence of ethnic violence in Mathare slum. They acknowledged that politicians play a major role in promoting ethnic violence in the slum. Politicians according to the findings of this study, contribute to violence by funding the activities of perpetrators of violence or by inciting members of the public against one another. From the findings, the majority of the respondents earned less than Kshs 5 000 in a month. Due to low income, violence related to rent is common and many of the respondents admitted to have either clashed with their landlords/landladies or knew someone who had been involved in such clashes. From the findings, the majority of the respondents indicated that males are the leading perpetrators of violence of which a half were youth below the age of 30 years. Based on the above findings, it is thus recommended that the rent dispute tribunal should work closely with

the slum inhabitants in order to reduce cases of violence arising from rent disputes. The government through the ministry of Sports and Youth Development should give priority to the youths in the slums when distributing funds set aside to empower the youth. This will be a good source of capital to start businesses and provide self employment.

## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Violence has dominated the lives of Nairobi slum dwellers in the recent past, thereby exposing them to a lot of suffering and loss of lives and property. Nairobi city is characterised by an institutional widening gap between the upper class and the urban underclass. Besides, it is a major threat to the peace of the city-dwellers' upper and lower classes. Obviously, there are many slums in Nairobi, but Mathare valley represents one of the classic examples of the slums, which have become citadels of poverty, underdevelopment and other manifestations of human suffering such as rampant violence (Mwangi, 1983). Economic deprivation together with ethno-political competition were seen as possible factors that predispose Mathare slum dwellers to various forms of violence and which formed the basis of this study.

Economic difficulties have exposed slum youths to risky business activities in order to earn a livelihood. Competition for scarce economic resources has sometimes led to bloodletting cases of violence in the slum. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs News Agency (IRIN) reported that two gangs fought for three days in Mathare on 26 November 2006. Eight people were reported to have died and at least 9,000 people displaced, after a row over control of a lucrative illicit brewing market in the slum. Government forces failed to restore calm between the 'Mungiki' and 'Taliban' gangs. Houses were set on fire and people fled, forced to carry their personal possessions and camp at the side of the main road nearby. Children were separated from their families. It was months before people felt it was safe to return. The youths join these gangs because they perceive them as cheap means of getting money in an increasingly competitive society (IRIN, 2007).

A research done by African Population and Health Research Centre revealed that violence is the second leading killer after AIDS and tuberculosis in Kibera slums. Injuries from violence are the second most common contributors to the mortality burden in the population aged five years and above. Gunshot wounds and blunt trauma as a result of mob justice are the most common modes of injury (APHRC, 2008).

Nairobi slums are not endowed with enough resources to serve the large masses of the poor who inhabit them. We live in an acceptable violent world because an estimated 1 billion people are living in slums, the vast majority of whom are the urban poor. They suffer high levels of unemployment, live in overcrowded conditions often without access to water, sanitation and security of tenure. They suffer all forms of social exclusions. The World Bank (2005) defines extreme poverty as living on less than a dollar per day and moderate poverty as living on less than two dollars per day. Almost a half of the world's population (over three billion) people live on less than 2.5 dollars a day. The majority of these poor are found in city slums. Absolute poverty is a situation where a population or section of a population is able to meet only its bare subsistence essentials of food, clothing, and shelter to maintain minimum levels of living (Todaro, 1997:676).

Much research is now directed at addressing violence in city slums all over the world. This is prompted by the high growth of urbanization leading to unchecked mushrooming of slums. Most poor people find residence in the slum because they cannot afford better houses elsewhere. According to the UN-Habitat (2003), 924 million people, or 31.6 % of the world's urban population are living in the slums. The majority of these were in the developing regions, accounting for 43 % of the urban population, in contrast to 6 % in more developed regions. Within the developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa had the largest proportion (71.9 %) of the urban population resident in slums, while Oceania had the lowest (24.1 %). In between these were South-central Asia (58 %), Eastern Asia (36.4 %), Western Asia (33.1 %), Latin America and the Caribbean (31.9%), Northern Africa (28.2 %) and Southeast Asia (28 %). With respect to absolute numbers of slum dwellers, Asia (all of its sub-regions combined) dominated the global picture, having a total of 554 million slum dwellers (about 60 % of the world's total slum dwellers). Africa

had a total of 187 million slum dwellers (about 20 % of the world's total), while Latin America and the Caribbean had 128 million slum dwellers (about 14 % of the world's total), and Europe and other developed countries had 54 million slum dwellers (about 6 % of the world's total). Slum dwellers increased substantially during the 1990s. It is further projected that in the next 30 years, the global number of slum dwellers will increase to about 2 billion, if no firm and concrete action is taken. The urban population in less developed regions increased by 36 % in the last decade. Evidence from cities, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, points to the need to confront the underlying causes of urban crime and violence to make slums safer for habitation (UN-Habitat, 2003).

In Rio de Janeiro there are close to 1.2 million people living in the slum on the hillsides surrounding the city. The population has increased in recent years, growing from 15 % of the total number of inhabitants of the city in 1991 to 17 % in 1996, a growth rate along the lines of 7.93 % during a period in which the total population of the municipality grew by only 1.29 %. The total number of slums in Brazil is 3,905, having grown in the last ten years. Sao Paulo is in first place, with 621 of them; Rio comes second, with 513. Given their geographical proximity to the elite neighbourhoods, they have become a daily nightmare for the predominantly white middle- and upper class population of Rio. The low minimum wage (close to US\$ 60.00 a month) is what draws so many young people into drug dealing, an illegal activity that attracts young blacks and mulattos, and also draws attention to the police repression that leads to high rates of death (Rial and Grossi, 2002). There is no well-demarcated, widely accepted concept for violence. "It is used as part of a discourse of social pathology in which we are perpetually threatened with disorder and decline, a discourse, which is more than alarmist; it is catastrophic" (Chesnais, 1981:8). Chesnais proposed that in the strict sense, the only violence that is measurable and indisputable is physical violence. It is defined by material use of force. The clearest cases of violence are those that cause physical damage and are direct in their effects (Williams, 1981:26). This study therefore focused on physical violence perpetrated against Mathare slum dwellers.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

The existing literature shows that slum dwellers continue to suffer death, loss of property, injuries and displacement (UN- Habitat, 2003). This also reveals a disparity between the rich who live in protected areas within the city and the poor who are exposed to all forms of violence in slums such as Mathare. According to UN-Habitat (2003), urban violence and crime are on the rise worldwide. In 1980-2000, recorded crime rates increased by about 30 %. In developing countries, 60 % of all urban residents have been victims of crime over the past five years, rising to 70 % in Latin America and Africa. Most of these violence cases occur in the slums. With more than a half the world's population projected to be living in urban centres by 2020, the World Bank (2005) has noted that the dream of a better life is being undermined by increasing cases of violence in the slums. Survey and poverty assessments show that slum violence has increased by 3% to 5% over the last 20 years and the degree of violence has intensified. Unless slum violence and its manifestation of exploitation of the poor is addressed as part of poverty reduction and governance improvements, programmes to improve the lives of slum dwellers will have limited impact (World Bank, 2005).

Violence in the slum has a negative impact on socio-economic and political development of the slum dwellers. Violence has inflicted a lot of pain on individuals and families because it leads to death and injuries. Violence is one of the greatest challenges facing the slum communities today and will continue to be a problem if not controlled. According to the study conducted by Development Bank of Asia (DBA), slum violence and its consequent feeling of insecurity erodes the poor's social capital, dismantles their organizations, prevents social and physical mobility, and perpetuates poverty. Violence inhibits productivity and income-earning capacity, affects the investment climate, destroys infrastructure and disrupts delivery of services (DBA, 2005). A research done by African Population and Health Research Centre revealed that violence is the second leading killer after AIDS and tuberculosis in Kibera slums. Injuries from violence are the second most common contributors to the mortality burden in the population aged five years and above. Gunshot wounds and blunt trauma as a result of mob justice are the



most common modes of injury (APHRC, 2008). The Kenya Police Crime Report Data (KPCRD) for 2007 indicated that there were 876 cases of rape, 1,984 cases of defilements, 181 cases of incest, 198 cases of sodomy, 191 cases of indecent assault and 175 cases of abduction in Kenya. This violence has taken a terrible toll on communities and left a lasting imprint on cultures, social institutions and people's psyches (Mkandawire, 2002). The scale of suffering, according to Aina (2002), is beyond the imaginable and beyond humanitarian concerns, and ought to be an important subject of inquiry for researchers as well. A lot of factors are responsible for the escalation of various forms of violence in the slums but this study focused only on violence generated by economic deprivation and ethno-political competition which has led to discrimination. Gurr (1993) defined active discrimination as a deliberate state policies limiting people's access to political positions or economic opportunities, or pervasive social practice by dominant groups. Violence in the slums is manifested in the activities of organized gangs who attack and kill people, individual confrontation at public and residential places, forced eviction of people from their houses, zoning of residential places, grabbing of property and rape.

Thus, the questions this research sought to answer were

1. What are the forms of violence which are predominant in Mathare slums?
2. How does economic deprivation predispose slum people to violence?
3. How does ethno-political competition encourage violence in Mathare slums?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.3.1 General objective**

To explore factors that predispose Mathare slum dwellers to violence.

#### **1.3.2 Specific objectives**

1. To examine the forms of violence which are predominant in Mathare slums.
2. To determine if economic deprivation predispose Mathare slum dwellers to violence.
3. To determine the role of ethno- political competition in encouraging violence in Mathare slums.

#### **1.4 Justification of the study**

The Persistence of violence in the slum has an impact on perpetuation of poverty and hence the need to look at the root causes of violence. This study aimed at bridging the gap by providing more information on violence in the slum. Such information will assist the relevant government ministries to develop policies that promote peaceful coexistence among different ethnic communities in Kenya and also initiate development programmes as well as enhancing national security for all citizens. Non-governmental organizations based in the slums can use the information from this study to implement their projects especially, those which are aimed at addressing insecurity in the slums. The study findings will be useful to other scholars who may use them as a reference point for future related studies in the slums. The slum inhabitants are the ultimate beneficiaries when the findings of this study are used to develop policies and programmes that promote their social and economic welfare.

#### **1.5 Scope and Limitations of the study**

The study was limited to physical violence in Mathare slums. The study focused on physical violence perpetrated against slum dwellers due to the struggle for economic opportunities, marginalization and exploitation. Perpetrators of such violence include state agents such as the police, mob justice, illegal gangs and slum dwellers themselves. The focus is on violence in the public domain as opposed to domestic violence. It covered socio-economic and political factors that predispose slum dwellers to violence. Basic demographic factors such as income, ethnic identity and employment status were also studied. It drew informants from distinct groups taking into account their gender, ethnic background and area of residence. Since it adopted qualitative methods of data collection, some informants may not have given the right information. This could affect the validity of the findings to a certain degree. However, triangulation was applied to corroborate the information collected from the informants.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

This section is divided into three parts, namely, literature review, theoretical framework and definition of key terms. The literature review comprises forms, an overview, and causes of violence. The causes of violence are reviewed according to the objectives of this study. The Marxist theory and the theory of Relative deprivation have also been highlighted in relation to their application to this study.

#### 2.2 Forms of violence

This study has focussed on physical violence in the slums but literature reviewed in this section also highlights other forms of violence such as symbolic and gender violence. Physical violence is said to be gender based if it targets a particular sex. Symbolic violence is the overt form which violence takes when physical violence is impossible. Violence can lead to physical damage to the body or property and also to psychological problems when it affects the mind and brain of an individual. The literature also reveals that these various forms of violence are often related and may sometimes feeds into each other.

##### 2.2.1 Physical violence

If there is a stand to be taken for the purpose of rational analysis of violence, then it is surely with those who argue for restricting the scope of the term. This may give us a sense of the term and a sense of proportion about just how violent our times actually are and counter the inflationary effects of treating violence indiscriminately. We might want to look at the manifestations of violence against the people, for example, the damaging effects on the poor of inegalitarian economic decision-making, the injustices of the routine and impersonal working of bureaucracy and the killing and maiming of persons (Hobsbawn, 1977).

Chesnais (1981) proposed that in the strict sense, the only violence that is measurable and indisputable is physical violence. It is defined by material use of force. The clearest cases of violence are those that cause physical damage and are direct in their effects (Williams, 1981:26). An act of violence is a considerable use of destroying forces against a norm (Honderich, 1980:153).

Collective violence is a situation in which people are harmed by the joint contribution of perpetrators, ranging from a small group to an entire society. The number and type of victims can also range widely. A gang attack on a single person, a person losing property or means of livelihood due to destruction during riot, or harm to entire population or ethnic group. Instances of collective violence vary along a continuum from spontaneous action through premeditated and carefully planned mass –killing projects (Summers & Markusen 1999).

Honderich (1980) argues that we should examine the principles of violence from below directed towards changing a democratic political system. Mackenzie (1975:160,117) argues, that the problem may be “better stated by myth than definitions given this view that violence is itself symbolic and metaphor” According to Weber (1948), control of means of violence is an essential feature of the modern state though not by any means the only one and holds the key to the exercise of power within the political order. The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. The state is considered the sole source of right to use violence (Weber, 1948:78). Elias (1982), also contend that the formation of the centralized, national state has brought with it the creation of territorially based monopoly of force, observing that when a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence. By violence in this context, Elias means the exercise of physical force by non- authorized individuals or groups. In the modern era, physical torture, imprisonment and the radical humiliation of individuals has become the monopoly of central authority; hardly to be found in the normal way of life. With this monopolization, the physical threat to the individual is slowly depersonalized (Elias, 1982:237). Chesnais (1981) categorizes violence as either ‘private’ or ‘collective’.

Under private there is crime, suicide, and accident; while under collective there is soviet state terrorism and western anti- state terrorism. Williams (1981:28-31) distinguishes collective from individual violence. In the first category comes the international war, revolutions, guerrilla wars, insurrections, rebellions, political purges, genocide, riots, sabotage, political executions and assassinations. In the second category comes homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, vandalism and attacks on persons and property.

### **2.2.2 Symbolic violence**

One relevant line of argument conjoins the symbolic and the violent in the concept of “symbolic violence” which Pross (1981:69), has emphasized. He defined symbolic violence as the power to make so effective the validity of learning through signs that others identify themselves with it. Symbolic violence is bound up with the materiality of signs. According to Bourdieu (1977), the term symbolic violence is the gentle, hidden form which violence takes when overt violence is impossible. In the slum, zoning of residential places where some communities do not allow others to join them is an example of symbolic violence. A sense of disapproval is used to make the would be neighbours from other communities to shy away.

Symbolic violence, may be deconstructed into two analytically useful ideas; that the symbolic domain is coercive with respect to those who live within a collectivity (although differently according to social location and endowment with cultural capital); and symbolic violence efforts as alternative to physical coercion where political circumstances permit, and that under some conditions it may also be complementary to it.

### **2.2.3 Gender violence**

What is it about male sexuality that makes it a social problem? How have we reached the point where violence is automatically associated with men’s sexual behaviour and our relationship with women? Rape and battering are hardly new phenomena and it would be difficult to demonstrate in any conclusive way that men are now more violent than ever before. Yet in the last decade male violence towards women have become a central focus of feminist politics and a contentious social issue in all countries where women’s

liberation has emerged in any strength (Eardley, 1995). Previously much domestic violence had been hidden because of the deep and long-standing social consensus that viewed family as an element of cohesion and harmony, rather than as a site of sharp conflict and sexual antagonism. It has been variously suggested that men's violence is biologically determined, that it is learnt through cultural socialization, or that it is primarily the result of deprivation and the oppressive divisions imposed by alienated work process of capitalism. Radical feminism has further argued that men are reluctant to confront the problem of violence simply because men enjoy the power it gives (Eardley, 1995).

It is clear from evidence on rape, prostitution and sexual harassment that women are vulnerable to abuse and mockery. It is in this climate of contempt for women that domestic violence thrives and more so in the slums where majority of the women are poor (Metropolitan police working party 1986:86). Thus to eliminate domestic violence to women, values and social structures which promote and condone violence, as well as values and social structures which emphasize the power of men over women and children must be identified and changed (Macleod 1989:15). Effective early intervention is vitally important if men are to stop their violence and women are to be protected: very few men stop of their own volition and violence usually increases in frequency and severity over time. Violence is much more difficult if not impossible to stop, except by separation, when it progresses into a patterned feature of the relationship (Dobash et al 1985; Bowker 1986; Nicarity 1987; & Kelly 1988). Therefore, the best hope for effective prevention is very early effective intervention. However, women do not seek help from outside agencies until the violence has become established. For example, a Canadian study found that women had been assaulted an average of 35 times before contracting the police (Jaffe et al, 1986). The decision to involve outsiders is, in fact an extremely difficult, as well as potentially dangerous one. There is evidence that women are most likely to be murdered by their partners when attempting to get outside help or to leave the relationship. In 1987/1988, more than 90% of women killed by their partners in Minnesota, USA were actively seeking help from an outside agency or attempting to separate (Pence 1989:345). The quality of intervention at this initial stage and its perceived effect on the violent

partner's behaviour are crucial in determining whether a woman will continue to seek help as well as in ensuring her immediate safety. Dobash et al, (1985), pointed out that any one particular attempt to seek help may not directly correspond to the severity of the specific violent attack to which it is linked. It is important for professionals to recognise that it may not be the severity of a particular attack that leads a woman to seek help. Rather, it may be accumulative effect of persistent violence and intimidation, decreasing acceptance of the man's justification for violence and repeated failures to solve the problem alone. Even then, decision to approach a formal agency is so fraught with misgivings and trepidation that the nature of response can easily lead to discontinuation of contact (Dobash et al, 1985:154-5).

### **2.3 Causes of violence**

Violence is a central concern of humanitarian agencies, but it is actually only a symptom of the crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the structural causes of violence which, Nathan (1999) argues, is a manifestation of intra-state crises that arise from four structural conditions:- authoritarian rule, the marginalization of the minorities, relative socio-economic deprivation, and weak states .

#### **2.3.1 Weak states**

Several attempts have been made to explain the perpetration of violence in Africa, some focusing on structural factors others of a more or less essentialist kind invoking the cultural peculiarities of African societies. Others still relate violence to the collapse of the very mechanisms or ideologies that constituted part of the cement that until then kept the nations and societies in conflict together.

The recourse to or excessive production of violence, as seems to be the case with African societies is more often than not, the consequence of the weakening of the social institutions and the erosion of their legitimacy, or of the failure of politics. The increase in the number of African countries that are incapable of performing the quintessential task of maintaining law and order within their borders is currently one of the major challenges not only to the nation-state project but also the collective survival of some

groups and cultures (Abdullah, 2001). One consequence of the spread and intensification of violence in Africa over the last fifteen or so years is the heightening of scholarly interest in the phenomenon, and the redoubling of efforts to make sense of it. Africa shares with Asia the unenviable states of being the continents with the largest number of armed conflict in the world today and each conflict seems to add new kinds of horrors to those that had been perpetrated in previous upheavals.

Ebrima (2004) looked at the violence associated with the civil war that ravaged Sierra Leone from March 1991 to January 2002, when it was officially declared over. During this period, successive governments in Sierra Leone were confronted by what some observers considered to be one of the most nihilistic rebel movements in the world. In addition to the kind of violence that is usually associated with civil wars- killings, destruction of whole villages, abduction and rape of women and youth etc, this war was also associated with the unusual large number of deliberate amputations of the limbs of people. The perpetrators of the amputations included the rebel forces, as well as a host of other armed groups, such as troops of the official Sierra Leone armed forces and the pro-government civil defence forces also known as the *Kamajors*. Violence being a mode of social action, the explanation of the amputations and other kinds of violence that occurred during civil war probably lies not only in the nature of rebel movement itself, but also in the weakening of both state institutions and other social institutions.

When people are displaced due to violence, they face a lot of problems in the camps where they go and live. According to research done by the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness in Nairobi (CREAW, 2008) ,a respondent who formerly was at the Jamhuri Showground, acknowledged that young girls were being exploited by exchanging sex for money at the D O's camp in Kibera. Women happen to have more needs than men and they may ask for favours from men like the policemen or people who give rations. People who are displaced as a result of political violence find themselves in circumstances of emergency and conflict and are often deprived of shelter, food, medical aid or other inalienable rights against the dictates of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economics, Social and



Cultural Rights and other human rights instruments. Yet whether they live as (IDPs) in camps within the country's borders or as international refugees, whether these violations are occurring in public or in private life, they result in the aggregated suffering of individual in gross and arbitrary desecration of their rights. The physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated against civilians in this condition constitute serious abdication on the part of the state from its traditional role to protect and promote those rights and freedoms (CREAW, 2008).

### **2.3.2 Marginalization of the minorities**

A research done by African Population and Health Research Centre blamed violence in city slums on negligence by the police and the justice system (APHRC, 2008). The marginalization of residents in informal settlements means they are rarely served by social institutions such as the police and the justice system. The perceived indifference of such institutions in slum communities has led to the growth of community informal justice measures, which usually take the form of "mob justice", meted out on people suspected of committing crimes, even petty ones.

Jamaica has abandoned its ghettos to violent crime and shocking levels of police brutality, leaving communities terrorized. Armed gangs and corrupt police units have turned inner cities into arenas of mayhem and impunity, with killings taking place in daylight. It depicts a hobbesian world where many slum-dwellers are condemned to a life that is poor, brutish and short. There is a public security crisis in Jamaica and the state is failing to effectively provide human security to its population, especially to those most vulnerable to crime and violence, namely people living in poverty in inner city communities. The Caribbean island's high crime rate has long been recognized. An annual murder rate of around 1,500 in a population of 2.7 million puts Jamaica on a par with South Africa and Colombia as among the world's most violent countries. This violence is largely confined to slums. The scale and nature of what is happening in the *ghettos* is horrific. This is not a sudden crisis, but follows a steady increase in violent crime over recent years. Far from protecting people from violent crime, the Jamaica

Constabulary Force is contributing to the escalation of violence. Jamaica has one of the highest rates of police killings in the Americas (Carroll, 2008). Amnesty International accused the political establishment of dividing slums into "garrisons" where armed gangs delivered votes in exchange for near-impunity. Prejudice among public officials stigmatized people in slums as worthless and deserving of their fate, it said. Civic society organizations, some set up by former criminals, have improved security in some areas. Former Scotland Yard detectives who have joined the Jamaica force claim it is becoming more professional and accountable.

The areas into which post-1945 black settlers moved rapidly become identified as localities with crime-related behaviour and other "social problems" including decaying housing, lack of social amenities, and low level of community involvement (Solomos, 1995). In areas such as Notting Hill and Brixton in London Handsworth and Balsall Heath in Birmingham and in similar localities in other cities, the questions of the rising crime and law and order became intimately identified with the broader questions of the impact of black immigration on these areas. Such questions became even more pronounced during and after the 1958 riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham. Throughout the late 1960s fear about the increasing alienation of young blacks from the mainstream of British society were regularly expressed in the media and policy documents and became a constant refrain in both academic and policy writing on the subject. But by the early 1970s it became clear that this was not merely a passing phenomenon which would disappear with the integration of young blacks into the mainstream institutions of British society. It became clear that the calls for action to help "coloured school leavers" gain quality of opportunity in employment and other arenas did not necessarily result in the development of effective policy measures to put such calls into practise (Solomos,1995).

The history of the media and popular response to the "mugging" issue has been analysed in some detail by Hall et al, (1978). The premise of this study is that the construction of black communities as "social problems" was the ideological bedrock on which the black

youth/ urban deprivations, street crime and model of mugging was constructed during the early seventies. Mugging as a political phenomenon, according to Hall, et al, became associated with black youth because they were seen as a social group which suffered the most direct impact of the cycle of poverty , unemployment and social alienation which afflicted inner city areas, and suffering from the added disadvantage of belonging to a racial group with a “weak culture” and high levels of social problems, such as broken families and lack of achievement in schools (Hall et al, 1978).

The growth of permanent black communities in many inner city areas coincided with growing concern about “inner city problems and the impact of multiple deprivation on the residents of localities with a combination of problems arising out of the rising levels of crime and violence which afflicted particular areas of the cities and the emergence of racial disadvantages and inequality as a particular aspect of the social condition of inner city areas; and the development of ‘ghetto areas” with distinct cultural values and attitudes towards law and order and the police. Such concerns about the changing character of the inner city areas were intrinsically imbued with racial overtones as well, since the localities which were defined as particularly problematic in terms of racial dimension, which was in turn further accentuated by the wider social and economic process which confined black communities to inner city localities and excluded them from equal participation in the labour market and in society generally. Young people, white and black were increasingly moving into cities such as Birmingham and London, often in desperate and futile pursuit of better pay, amenities and conditions. They have themselves become a large floating element among the homeless and an element that was particularly disturbing to the police, because it is this reservoir of homeless young stars who, unless emergency action was taken, would become the young criminals of the next decade (Hall et al, 1978).

### 2.3.3 Economic deprivation

One of the structural conditions which led to the war in Sierra Leone is mass poverty. The spread of a culture of violence, particularly among the masses of unemployed youth contributed to the war (Ebrima, 2004). Poverty, for instance, is in many ways violence. Lovfing (2002), for instance, argues that the obvious implication of this way of looking at poverty is that the question of responsibility must be posed. This is actually implicit in some of the debates on the justifiability or otherwise of social and economic rights, poverty being one of the clearest expressions of the deprivation and non-enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights (Lovfing, 2002). Black seamen who settled in Port towns such as Cardiff, Liverpool and London were stereotyped. The areas in which they lived were seen as localities in which the presence of immigrants combined with social depression and poverty to produce not only patterns of criminal behaviour but social values outside the mainstream of the majority society. A number of studies of black images were in determining both the form and content of dominant ideologies of the “Negro problem” within official circles and local voluntary associations (Little, 1947).

Economic hardship can lead to unrest and sometimes extreme cases of violence such as civil strife or revolution. The French revolution led to the collapse of the regime partly because of its own rigidity in the face of a changing world, and the ambitions of a rising bourgeoisie, allied with aggrieved peasants and wage-earners and with individuals of all classes who were influenced by the ideas of the enlightenment. As the revolution proceeded and as power devolved from the monarchy to legislative bodies, the conflicting interests of these initially allied groups would become the source of conflict and bloodshed. These problems were all compounded by a great scarcity of food in the 1780s. A series of crop failures caused a shortage of grain, consequently raising the price of bread. Because bread was the main source of nutrition for poor peasants, this led to starvation. The two years previous to the revolution (1788-89) saw bad harvests and harsh winters, possibly because of a strong El Niño cycle caused by the 1783 *Laki* eruption at Iceland. The little ice age was also affecting agriculture: many other areas of Europe had adopted the potato as the staple crop by this time, whereas the French

generally refused it as a dirty food or the devil's food. The potato was more resilient to the colder temperatures during the little ice age and also could not be easily destroyed by scorched earth warfare. A normal worker earned anywhere from 15 to 30 sous a day while skilled workers received 30 to 40 sous. A family of four would need about two loaves of bread a day to survive. The price of bread rose by 88 % in 1789, going from nine sous to 14.5 or 15 sous. Many peasants were relying on charity to survive. The peasantry became a class with the ambition to counteract social inequity and put an end to food shortages. The 'bread riot' evolved into a central cause of the French Revolution. Mass urbanization coinciding with the beginning of the industrial revolution led residents to move into French cities seeking employment. French cities became overcrowded and filled with the hungry and disaffected. The peasantry suffered doubly from the economic and agricultural problems.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003) prepared by the government of Kenya shows that Kenya's economic performance weakened in the course of the 1990s to the point that in several years, real per capita income fell, while unemployment continuously increased and poverty became ever more pervasive. Among the causes of this unsatisfactory performance were stop-go macroeconomic policies, the slow pace of structural reform, and governance problems. The often-lax fiscal policy led to the accumulation of short-term government debt, which, in combination with declines in the saving rate, translated into very high lending rates in real terms in recent years. This, together with other high costs of doing business in Kenya accounts for increasing insecurity, deteriorating infrastructure and public utilities, inefficient parastatal sector, inappropriate regulatory framework and other market distortions like depressed investment and its effectiveness, and as a consequence employment and economic growth.

Economic deprivation has exposed slum youths to risky business activities in order to earn a livelihood. Competition for scarce economic resources has sometimes led to bloodletting cases of violence in the slum. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs News Agency (IRIN) reported that two gangs fought for three days in Mathare on 26 November 2006. Eight people were reported to have died and at least

9,000 people displaced, after a row over control of a lucrative illicit brewing market in the slum. Government forces failed to restore calm between the 'Mungiki' and 'Taliban' gangs. Houses were set on fire and people fled, forced to carry their personal possessions and camp at the side of the main road nearby. Children were separated from their families. It was months before people felt it was safe to return. The youths join these gangs because they perceive them as cheap means of getting money in an increasingly competitive society (IRIN, 2007).

Economic growth with inequality creates an economics of deprivation and violence. The present model of economic growth in Asia displaces millions of rural and urban poor from their land and livelihoods. As a result of unprecedented displacement due to mining, infrastructure projects and corporate farming, a new generation of social-economic refugees and new poor are emerging across Asia. They are growing in urban slums, rural areas and in highly concentrated pockets of extreme poverty. A new discontent is brewing and has adversely affected development, democracy and human rights in Asia. While economic growth helps to create more opportunities for the more educated section of the middle class and a 'trickle-down' effect on a section of the poor, it is creating unprecedented levels of inequality within countries and between countries (John, 2008). Though China and India, two of the most populous countries in the world, are witnessing high rates of economic growth, there are regions lagging behind in both countries that have poor infrastructure or public service provisions. The urban and rural poor also face discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion, caste, gender and place of origin. Women are more marginalized and vulnerable to a system that perpetuates inequality, discrimination and consequent poverty. Economic difficulty has led to xenophobic attacks in many countries. South Africans were struggling to buy food as prices rose amid stubbornly high unemployment, and many complained the government hadn't worked fast enough to build houses, schools and hospitals for the black majority. Foreigners were attacked because they are seen as competing for scarce resources and because they were the closest targets at hand for the poor. Some victims were set on fire, cases of rape as well as gunshot wounds were also reported (Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2008).

The wide-scale violence that characterized the aftermath of the December 2007 presidential election in Kenya was alarming in its ferocity and scale, but was by no means a peculiar phenomenon with regard to the electoral environment in the country. Past elections in Kenya since independence have been characterized by varying degrees of electoral violence ostensibly on issues revolving around land problem and ethnicity. The major problem in the slum is the concentration of landless people from various parts of the country. The National Land policy has pointed out the inadequacies of land distribution in Kenya and recommended the need for appraisal and corrective measures to address them (Syagga, 2008). The Njonjo Commission of Inquiry into Kenya's land issues formed in 2001 made recommendations to improve land administration and management that was ignored by the government of the day. The Ndung'u Commission on Irregularly and Illegally Acquired Land made further recommendations on Kenya's land problems including the issue of resettlement of the internally displaced people and the landless. Nevertheless, the recommendations have largely not been implemented but remain at the core of addressing the land question in Kenya (Syagga, 2008).

One of the most discernible and equally compelling problems faced by almost all national and urban government is to eliminate or to control the factors contributing to poverty among the urban poor, and to develop an accountable sense of urgency to avert these factors. The problem of poverty among the urban poor is exacerbated by the existing Kenyan economic trends and that its consequences, implications and ramifications can be better understood within the framework of class or in terms of class factors. A four class structure in Kenya is conspicuously observable, *matajiri* (the rich), petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers. To be sure, the distinctive feature of this class structure is that the two upper class groups are based in all of the economy through overlapping ownerships and stages in their work lives. In the pursuit of political and economic power; the petty bourgeois ambitions for upward mobility are so strong and opportunities to gain *matajiri* status through the state are so good that a new petty -bourgeois political elite almost certainly would take on a *matajiri* identity and betray the underprivileged brethren classes left behind. As far as one can judge. not only have the rich (*matajiri*) and the petty

bourgeoisie in Nairobi asserted their political status position over the urban poor completely and over the working class partially but they also continue to exploit these two groups in their capacity as distributors of consumer goods in the slums (Mwangi, 1983). It is not strange to say that almost all underdeveloped countries pursuing capitalistic economic strategy will share certain common social structures. In such countries one could expect to find a small native bourgeoisie, a small capitalist- farmer stratum or perhaps a landed oligarchy, a large salaried employed by the state, an external state of representatives of international corporations (temporarily in society though not of it), a working class, a sub- proletariat of the unemployed and unproductive employed, and a large peasantry. Specifically, not only do the rich and petty- bourgeoisie in Nairobi dominate the commercial and banking economic and cultural interests in the inner city, but the type of slums which have been officially encouraged by the Nairobi city council.

Mathare and Kibera, for example are in large measure the consequences of an attempt to harness the urban poor on behalf of the profit making business class. It is something that puts an honest observer off and terrifies the poor. No one will deny that this unjust encouragement of slums and creation of underprivileged urban class has its objects basis in the capitalist's relations of production and distribution that overtly and covertly generate an economically stratified class. It must be stressed here that capitalist mode of production as it functions in Kenya's urban areas particularly , in Nairobi, Mombasa , Thika, Nakuru and Kisumu creates a form of human conditions which is characterized by class contradiction and competition that is measured by primitive accumulation in terms of status and prestige. It is not surprising therefore, to find that in the face of the widespread misery and suffering among the urban poor (which class formation and capitalism have created) a moral indignation has been awakened. In addition to international or multinational corporations, the two privileged upper class groups possess political and military powers. They are also the speculators who control land in the heart and in the suburbs of Nairobi, as well as those who enjoy a considerable monthly cheque from the nation's income.



True, many of the members of these upper classes may be ignorant, illiterate incapacitated, unproductive or even corrupt but as long as the urban poor remain pacified and contained in the slums and are well controlled, these two classes will always continue to dominate them economically, politically and militarily, until perhaps the urban poor have achieved political and rebellion consciousness. Experience has also taught us that without a method for clearly distinguishing between one group and another, systematic economic discrimination cannot be effectively practiced. It is important to note that in order to prevent the members of a certain group from freely choosing their jobs, enrolling in schools or joining a social club, it is absolutely indispensable that there be a reliable way of knowing who is a member of the group to be economically discriminated or segregated and who is a member of the group doing the segregation (Mwangi, 1983).

Political instability is manifesting itself in Africa as chronic symptom of the underdevelopment of political life within the imperialist context. Military coups have followed one after the other, usually meaning nothing to masses of the people, and sometimes representing a reactionary reversal of the efforts at national liberation. This trend was well exemplified in Latin American history so that its appearance in neo-colonial South Vietnam or neo-colonial Africa is not at all surprising. If economic power is centred outside national African boundaries, then political and military power in any real sense is also centred outside until, and unless, the masses of peasant and workers are mobilized to offer an alternative to the system of sham political independence. All of these features are ramifications of underdevelopment and of the exploitation of the imperialist system (Walter, 1972).

Africa suffered the humiliation of slave trade followed by colonization but still today has to bear the debt burden of unequal trade with the West. All these are forms of economic violence and have brought many suffering to the poor and especially those in urban areas. The question as to who, and what, are responsible for African underdevelopment can be answered at two levels. Firstly, the answer is that the operation of the imperialists system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining Africa's wealth

and making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with those who manipulated the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system. The capitalists of the Western Europe were the ones who actively extended their exploitation from inside Europe to cover the whole of Africa. In recent times they were joined and to some extent replaced by the capitalists from the United States, and for many years now even the workers of those metropolitan countries have benefited from the exploitation and underdevelopment of Africa (Walter, 1972).

#### **2.3.4 Negative ethnicity**

The term ethnicity refers to the degree of conformity with members of the collectivity to shared norms in the course of social interaction (Cohen, 1974). An ethnic group is a collectivity of people who share some patterns of normative behavior and form part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system. Ethnicity can be conceptualized in two ways, as an organizational form and as a process. As an organizational form, an ethnic group is regarded generally as a social collectivity whose members not only shares such objective characteristics as language, core territory, ancestral myths, culture, religion and political organization but also have some subjective consciousness or perception of common descent or identity.

On the other hand, as a process, ethnicity can be seen at two levels: intra –group and inter-group relations. John Lonsdale refers to these two levels of ethnicity as ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’ (Lonsdale, 1994). Moral ethnicity is where a distinct group applies its distinctiveness in mutual socio-economic obligation and support, whereas political tribalism entails rivalry and competition among different ethnic groups over access to state resources. The application of the subjective sense of common identity is developed only in context involving relationships. In other words, ethnic identity is an outcome of contact rather than isolation. In this context, ethnicity suggests a dynamic situation of variable contact and mutual accommodation between groups. Cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories but are invoked to provide identities

which legitimize claims to rights. They are strategic or weapons in competition over scarce social goals. The emergence of ethnicity is facilitated by group contacts, however minimal, in which cultural distinctiveness become the framework of that contact (Berman, 1988). Mnoli (1998) views ethnicity as phenomenon associated with competition, exclusiveness and conflict. Ethnicity emerges from mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity in situation of competitive or conflictual ethnic pluralism (Jonyo, 2003). Lonsdale (1994) argues that ethnic stratification will emerge only when specific ethnic groups are brought into contact with one another, and only when those groups are characterized by a high degree of ethnocentrism, competition and differential power. Ethnocentrism is the tendency to look at the world primarily from the perspective of one's own culture, and downgrade all other groups' outside one's own culture.

Koigi (2003) argues that negative ethnicity is responsible for the deep-seated tensions in Africa that the world has seen flare so terrifyingly. The genocide in Rwanda and "ethnic" killing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and elsewhere stand out as examples. He maintained that negative ethnicity is the force behind untold deaths on the continent, dispelling the myth of an intractable conflict waged along simple ancient lines. The current "ethnic" tensions have their roots in the colonial and pre-colonial eras. For most Africans, ethnic identity is ambiguous and obscured. Negative ethnicity can be linked to chronic poverty, a broken education system, preying dictators, corrupt officials, the colonial legacy of hate, and the ongoing exploitation of the West. When inequality has a direct co-relation with identity, it gives rise to new discontents. Such a sense of discontent and shared sense of alienation can often give rise to a new politics of violence -reacting to the prosperity of the dominant communities. Surrounding these islands of prosperity is a growing sea of poverty, discontent and consequent reactionary politics. This can perpetuate a cycle of violence, erasing the benefits of growth as well as poverty reduction. So the paradoxical trend of growth with inequality may not be able to sustain growth on a long-term basis.

Conflicts between the people of Kenya are not a new thing. They have been going on throughout the history of inter- ethnic relations and they are caused by many factors. Usually, they occur in areas where two ethnic groups share common border. Raids based on the differences in traditional ideologies about cattle (Odak, 1971), conflicts over political hegemony (e.g., between the Wanga kingdom and the Ugenya Luo), or cultural differences among others, are cases that can be cited. Within the urban setting we notice the conservation of ethnic identity in comparison to cultural identities. People who have migrated into the towns continue to retain their identities at various levels (Odak, 1996). At a higher level people from the same ethnic group see themselves as having something in common among them. This is particularly manifested in the occasional coming together either formally or otherwise of people belonging to an ethnic group. They could formally come together as members of the group under a welfare organization whose objectives are focused on the welfare of its members. But also occurs informally when people from an ethnic group drink in the bars owned by their compatriots. These organizations serve as a vehicle to champion the interest of an ethnic group.

Gurr (1993:123) identifies several conditions that have contributed to the animation and mobilization of ethnic grievances. These include unequal treatment of groups of communities by dominant or mainstream groups, competition with other groups for access to power in the state, the contagious effect of ethno-political activism in other regions, pattern of state building including political power and economic development that channel communal energies into either protests or rebellion and, finally the emergence of ethnic elites who are willing to , and are adept at mobilizing their constituents in response to changing political development, opportunities and resources.

According to Mayer (1974), the urban settlement pattern follows ethnic loyalty where members of a particular community dominate a certain section of the city and form informal organizations based on ethnic background. New comers are welcomed by their kinsmen when they come to the city. A study conducted in Nairobi by Parkin (1966), points out some developments that provide the basis of the belief held by the Luo in

Nairobi that since Kenya's independence the Agikuyu were acquiring political power, in the nation as well as the city, at their expense. The emergency period from 1952 – 59 resulted in the imprisonment, detention, and restriction of Agikuyu in Nairobi, they were removed from ethnically mixed housing estates, which are by far the most typical places of resident available. One such estate is Kaloleni. After the removal of the Agikuyu it became a predominantly estate inhabited by the Luo and is still popularly referred to as such. It was the scene of many of the Luo's political meetings and activities. A second consequence of restrictions on Agikuyu was that the Luo increased their hold on small business enterprises, especially market stalls. The third consequence was that the proportion of the Luo in Nairobi and the Labour force increased markedly.

### **2.3.5 Political competition**

The aftermath of the 2007 general election in Kenya presented a major challenge to the slum populations. On 5th January 2008, at the height of post election violence, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs News Agency (IRIN), observed that the majority of the city's inhabitants live in its sprawling slums and it is this impoverished population that bore the brunt of the violence and disruptions unleashed in the wake of the 27 December presidential elections (IRIN, 2008). This violence took an ethnic dimension but it was also noted that most people were shot dead or wounded by the police during demonstrations.

In Africa, competitive politics are held in a number of countries where new parties and people's organizations emerge that draw support from ethnic groups. The Kenyan case presents a complex experience where ethnicity asserts greater influence on polity, economy and social value. The permeating influence of ethnicity in Kenya weakens the nation state project, patriotism, democratization and governance in the country (Ocharo 2000; Omolo 1998; & Oyugi 1999). Historically Kenyan political parties enjoyed ethnic backing as pointed out by Parkin (1966). The Kenya People's Union was formed to cater for the interests of the Luo after the fallout in Kanu. As the proportions of the Agikuyu in

Nairobi began to increase after the emergency period, the labour force, housing estates, and small businesses, reverted swiftly to pre-emergency level. This scenario posed a serious threat to the Luo who owned most of these resources. The Kenya People's Union (KPU) factions within the Luo union became more popular, seeming to signify and confirm the common sense observation that the party (KPU) had increased significantly the desire of its Luo membership (Parkin, 1966).

Shlomo (1969) observed local election campaigns in a provincial Israeli town called Ayara that was established in the 1950s and was inhabited mainly by recent immigrants from various North African and Eastern European countries. For about ten years, until 1965, the *Lammed Aayin*, (a middle – of the road liberal party on the national level) branch of Ayara was virtually a Moroccan ethnic party. In 1969 there was a change, the leader of *Lammed Aayin*, a Moroccan, had left town, and the leadership vacuum created at the top had not been adequately filled by another Moroccan, with the consequence that the main position in the party was taken by a veteran European. It lost its attraction for the Moroccan electorate that had formerly supported it with enthusiasm: at the 1969 polls it failed dismally and lost all its representation (Shlomo 1969).

## **2.4 Conflict theories**

A theory is the mechanism by which discrete results of empirical research activities, often conceived independently of one another and reported in different conceptual contexts, are codified and related to one another within a single framework (Smelser and Warner, 1994). Conflict theories explain the causes of conflict in the society. Most conflict theories in contemporary sociology derive from the formulations of Karl Marx: that all historical societies –and notably bourgeois capitalism- are based on economic mode of production that produces bipolar system of social classes, one exploiting and the other exploited. By virtue of that relationship, the classes stand in a relation of irreconcilable conflict with one another. This conflict, moreover, is the engine of historical change in Marx's theory, insofar as the ultimate victory of the exploited class ushers in a new type of society and a new phase of evolutionary history (Marx 1913; Marx & Engels 1954).

In recent decades the influence of Marxism has experienced a decline among Western European and (to a lesser degree) North American scholars and a virtual demise in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where the socialist and communist regimes erected on Marxism-Leninism have collapsed dramatically. Nevertheless, the materialist class perspective still finds expression in theoretical writings and political outlooks of scholars from the third world and among some western scholars. Among the latter, however, its vitality is seen not so much in its presentation as a total theory of society (with the exception of the theory of monopoly and capitalism) but rather in its application to specific areas. Among these are Braverman's (1974) and Burawoy's (1979) analyses of change and domination in the workplace; certain interpretations of contemporary race relations in the United States—for example, the internal colonialism model of Blauner (1972) which borrows heavily from the neo-Marxist theory of colonialism; the interpretation of gender domination as a special manifestation of the capitalist domination of labor (Hartmann, 1976).

Most other contemporary conflict perspectives maintain one or more elements of Marxism or combine them with so many non-Marxian ideas, however, that they can scarcely be said to be “Marxian” without overstretching that perspective. An example of this kind of theoretical formulation is that of Dahrendorf (1959), who rejects the fundamental Marxian proposition that economic relations are the basis of inequality in the modern society. He criticizes the Marxian theory of class derived there from. At the same time, Dahrendorf retains the idea of domination as an organizing principle, tracing that domination, however, to a differential position in a relationship of authority (thus giving his work a Weberian cast). He also retains ideas similar to those of Marx to the effect that class groups based on authority relations gradually crystallize from latent interest groups into action groups as the interest become manifest through ideology, consciousness, leadership, and organization and that these groups are the main vehicles for conflict and change. Another major conflict perspective which derives in part from the Marxian tradition is the “critical school” of sociology. Mainly German in origin- and within Germany, stemming mainly from Frankfurt. This critical school arose in the

interwar period as a confluence of Marxian, psychoanalytic, and various cultural perspectives. Marcuse (1964) retained the Marxian notion that contemporary European and North American societies are divided into two great classes of the oppressors and the oppressed and that oppression is related to the capitalist organization of the economy. However, because of the rise in influence through technological advance, the distribution of wealth through welfare, and continued transfer of wealth from the third world to the advanced countries, the proletariat has become passive and is no longer a revolutionary force. Rather, domination works through technological manipulation by big government and is sustained through the mass media, which perpetuate a kind of false consciousness of material well-being in the population as a result, the masses are subdued, and conflict is rare (except for occasional defiance and violence by outcast racial minorities and the unemployed underclass). The apparent consensus that exist is only a superficial cover for domination and suppressed conflict.

Another feature of the classical Marxian world view is that culture (philosophy, religion, ideology) is derivative from the economic substructure in the society and functions mainly in the interest of the dominant economic classes. Several recent theoretical developments have attributed greater independence to culture however. One line of development concerns the analysis of cultural codes themselves, building on the seminal work of Levi-Strauss (1963) and others; this view pervades cultural sociology in both the United States and Europe. Another line of development stresses the fusion of culture with power and domination. Much of the impetus for this last view stems from Gramsci (1971). He nevertheless assigned independent significance to the notion of "cultural hegemony" a process by which the ruling classes in society achieve domination by persuading the subordinate classes of the correctness of their cultural, moral, and political views through avenues such as mass-media and educational system.



## **2.5 Theoretical framework**

### **2.5.1 Marxist theory**

Marxism holds that class struggle is the central element of social change since the tension between social classes is deemed to be the cause of political unrest. Marxism attempts to solve this problem by establishing public ownership as its dominant feature. Marxism theory is based on these principles: an attention to the material conditions of people's lives and social relations among people, a belief that people's consciousness of the conditions of their lives reflects these material conditions and relations, an understanding of class in terms of differing relations of production and as a particular position within such relations, an understanding of material conditions and social relations as historically malleable, a view of history according to which class struggle, the evolving conflict between classes with opposing interests, structures each historical period and drives historical change, a sympathy for the working class or proletariat, and a belief that the ultimate interests of workers best match those of humanity in general (Williams,1978). Marxism holds that the existence of class structures in the society creates a conducive environment for the exploitation of one class by another. According to Marx, the lower class of workers are being exploited by the upper class. Marx referred to the workers as proletariats and capital owners as the bourgeoisies.

### **2.5.2 Relevance of Marxist theory to the study**

Marxist theory has been used in this study to explain how class factor plays a critical role in promoting violence in the slum. Three classes are eminently present in the slums these include, the politicians, the landlords and the slum dwellers. The slum dwellers are the majority and belong to the lower class. They are poor and do not own any means of production such as land. The landlords exploit slum dwellers by hiking rents on houses build on the land they do not own in the first place. They employ the tactics of divide and rule by provoking ethnic animosity among slum dwellers. Politicians also belong to the upper class and controls massive wealth in the city. They exploit the slum dwellers by dividing them along ethnic lines so that they could get votes from the slums and continue enriching themselves. These various forms of socio-economic exploitations have led to

tension between these competing classes. Marxist theory is used to the extent that it accounts for the violence and tension arising from the class struggle among the three classes that are evidently present in Mathare slums. Marxist theory does not account for other causes of violence such as gender inequality, social exclusion, poverty, landlessness and negative ethnicity. The theory also failed to account for the existence of violence among slum dwellers themselves as they all belong to the same class. The theory of relative deprivation has been used to account for violence caused by all forms of social-economic deprivation which exist in the slum. The presence of mugging, mob justice, land grabbing and illegal connection of water and electricity in Mathare slums can be explained using the theory of relative deprivation.

### **2.5.3 Theory of relative deprivation**

In one of the first formal definitions of relative deprivation, Runciman (1966) noted that there are four preconditions of relative deprivation (of object X by person A): A does not have X, A knows of other persons that has X, A wants to have X and A believes obtaining X is realistic. According to Polanyi (1966), relative differences in economic wealth are more important than absolute levels, or that relative deprivation is more significant in determining human quality of life. This debate has important consequences for social policy, particularly on whether poverty can be eliminated simply by raising total wealth or whether egalitarian measures are also needed. Feelings of deprivation come from a comparison with perceived social norms that may change over time and place, not with absolute standards. This differentiates relative deprivation from objective deprivation (also known as absolute deprivation) - a condition that applies to all people with fewest opportunities (the lowest incomes, the least education, the lowest social status, etc.). Therefore while the absolute deprivation in the world may decrease over time, relative deprivation is unlikely to change as long as some humans are better off than others (Polanyi, 1966).

A specific form of relative deprivation is relative poverty. A measure of relative poverty defines poverty as being below some relative poverty line. An example is when poverty is defined as households who earn less than 25 % of the median income is a measure of relative poverty. Notice that if everyone's real income in an economy increases, but the income distribution stays the same, the number of people living in relative poverty will also stay the same. Relative poverty is contrasted with the measure of absolute poverty - one that quantifies the number of people below a poverty line, and is independent of time and place. Political scientists and economists note that relative deprivation is a form of inequality which distorts all policies, since participants need the means to engage in the discourse (Robert, 1938).

#### **2.5.4 Relevance of the theory of relative deprivation to the study**

Relative deprivation is eminent among slum inhabitants. Slum dwellers are deprived of affordable better houses, land for constructing business premises or structures, electricity, affordable tapped water, better education facilities and good paying jobs. Youths in the slum engaged in violent activities and also join terror gangs in order to earn a living. Relative deprivation has also led to violence against some particular ethnic groups who are perceived by others as owning more resources at their expense. Cases of mugging, stealing, land grabbing and illegal connection of water and electricity are all attributed to relative deprivation. The theory of relative deprivation has important consequences for both behavior and attitudes, including feelings of stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action. It is relevant to researchers in social psychology, sociology, economics, politics, and other social sciences, especially those interested in inter group relations, prejudice, social identity, group processes, social comparison, social justice, and social movements. Social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, have cited 'relative deprivation (especially temporal relative deprivation) as a potential cause of social movements and deviance, leading to extreme situations to political violence such as rioting, terrorism and civil wars or social deviance. such as crime.

## 2.6 Assumptions

Following the research problem highlighted, and the objectives set and the subsequent review of literature, the following assumptions were formulated:-

- 1- Physical violence is predominant in Mathare slums.
- 2- Economic deprivations predispose Mathare slum dwellers to violence.
- 3- Ethno- political exploitation encourages violence in Mathare slums.

## 2.7 Definition of key terms

**Violence-** A considerable use of destroying forces against a norm.

**Physical violence-** Causing direct injury to the body of an individual. It also includes destruction of property.

**Gender violence** – Violence perpetrated against an individual because of his/her sex.

**Economic deprivation-** Feelings of deprivation that comes from a comparison with perceived socio-economic norms between people or groups within the society.

**Ethno-political competition-** Competing for political power along ethnic lines.

**Ethnicity-** The degree of conformity with members of the collectivity to shared norms in the course of social interaction.

**Slum** - An area which has one or more of the following characters: Inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, poor structural quality of low overcrowding and insecure residential status.

## 2.8 Conclusion

The reviewed literature gives a detailed definition of violence. Poverty, economic factors, politics and ethnicity has also been widely discussed. The state has also been depicted as being responsible for the persistence of violence in Africa. The type of violence associated with the state's failure is mainly civil war. Thus the gap which still exist is a detailed account to show how relative deprivation, negative ethnicity, political competition and economic exploitation interact to produce violence and more so in urban slums. The study also gives more information on various forms of violence in slums.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This section covers the methodology that was used in this study. Study site, research design, study population, methods of data collection, data analysis, and ethical considerations are also discussed.

#### 3.2 Study site

The study was carried out in Mathare slum of Nairobi city (Map 3.1). Mathare slum falls within two locations which are Mathare and Ruaraka locations. Ruaraka is in Kasarani constituency while Mathare location is in Starehe constituency. The two constituencies fall within Nairobi North district. The ten villages that constitutes Mathare slum includes Village 1, 2, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4B, 3C, NO 10 and 4A. The last national census survey conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in 2009 revealed that the human population of Mathare location was 87,000 ( KNBS, 2010).

African Medical Research Foundation indicated that Mathare slum is one of the 78 informal settlements in the city. The distance from the city center to Mathare slum is 5 Km. Mathare slum is spread along the Mathare and Gitathuru Rivers of Nairobi (AMREF, 1994).



Map 3.1 Mathare valley slum and the neighbourhood

Source: Data Exchange platform for the Horn of Africa and Medicines Sans Frontiers  
<http://www.depha.org>

The study by AMREF also defined the study sites in terms of housing structure, food availability, hygiene/cleanliness and languages.

### **3.2.1 Housing structures**

Mathare residents are low income earners who can't afford good housing structures. They live in shanty structures. On average, the rooms occupied are eight feet square in size. The largest rooms were 20 x 24 feet and the smaller five feet square. The rooms have to be reinforced with polythene paper. Rent payment is a major problem because the money they earned went into feeding the family and paying rent. The roofs of these houses were made of corrugated iron sheet and tins (*debes*). In most cases the rooms were old and leaking. Walls were made up of mud and wattle, sometimes cardboard plywood and where the walls were falling ultra milk packets covered the wall. The floor in the majority of the respondent's houses was made of mud. For privacy the rooms were partitioned with curtains. Generally the houses were poorly ventilated.

### **3.2.2 Food availability**

One very striking thing about Mathare slum was the abundance of food available, yet the lack of resident's ability to pay for it. Most families prepared their food at home though there were numerous food vendors who sold cooked food right at their door steps. Food commonly sold included "chapati" and "mandazi" and parts of chicken-mainly the heads, legs and intestines which the sellers obtained from large- scale chicken-meat processors, who under normal circumstances would dispose of such products. Also on sale for consumption were the hoofs of animals, like pigs, goats, and cow. The prime parts of chicken and beef are not known in the slum.

### **3.2.3 Hygiene and cleanliness**

There were volunteer workers in areas of community health (community health workers), family planning (community-based distributors) and environmental cleanliness (sweepers who clean the estate weekly). These associations have come up to provide services by the people for the people. The sewerage disposal system in the area is poor.

### **3.2.4 Languages**

The languages spoken by respondents were diverse. The first spoken languages were given as Kikuyu (41.7 %), Dholuo (15%), Kiswahili (13.3 %), Kikamba (11.7%), Luyia (11.7 %), Kisii (3.3%) Somali/Gar (1.7 %) and Maasai (1.7%). On the basis of the most spoken languages, the predominant language was Kiswahili, which is the national language (AMREF, 1994).

### **3.3 Research design**

Research design is the programme that guides the researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2005). This study was descriptive and cross-sectional in nature. The cross-sectional research design is the most predominant design employed in the social sciences. The design is identified with survey research a method of data collection in which researchers usually ask a random sample of individuals to respond to a set of questions about a particular phenomenon. Such researches are carried out in natural settings and permit the researcher to use random probability sample. The researcher is able to make inferences to broader populations and permits them to generalize their findings to real life situations thus increasing the external validity of the study.

Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect the data. Quantitative data were collected through a structured questionnaire (Appendix I) and generated information on frequency of the violence occurrence. Qualitative data were collected through key informant interviews guide (Appendix II) and focus group discussions (FGDs) guide (Appendix III). This gave information on the ethno-political and economic factors that predisposes slum inhabitants to violence as well as various forms of violence. The results of the structured questionnaire were coded and simple frequency tables generated to summarize them. Qualitative data were analyzed by reading, coding, displaying, reducing and interpreting. A thematic content analysis was applied.



### **3.4 The study population**

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2005) define the study population as the total population of the subjects the researcher intends to study. The study population was the residents of Mathare slum who were eighteen years old and above. The unit of analysis was the individual respondent.

### **3.5 Sample and sampling procedure**

A sample is a subset or portion of the total population (Bailey, 1987). A sample of 120 respondents was drawn from the three sampled villages of Mathare slums. The three villages were 4B, 4A and Number 10. Simple random sampling was carried out to sample villages and respondents. The list of villages was used to construct a sampling frame. As already stated there are ten villages in Mathare valley. To obtain a representative sample, each village was assigned a number and then sampled through the simple random sampling method. This was done by writing down the name of each village on a piece of paper. The pieces of papers were then folded, mixed in a container and one person was asked to pick at random. The selected villages were included in the study and they included Mathare 4A, 4B and NO 10. From each sampled village, 40 respondents were obtained through simple random sampling using village registers. Village heads provided the registers. The sample consisted of every respondent in the register who was above 18 years. Simple sampling method gives all the villages and respondents equal opportunity to be included in the sample (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2005).

### **3.6 Methods of data collection**

The research adopted the qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection. They included key informant interviews, survey method, focus group discussion (FGDs) and secondary methods.

### **3.6.1 Key informant interviews**

Important issues were further probed by interviewing key informants. In total eight key informants were interviewed. This entailed face-to-face interviews with three village chairmen, each from every sampled village. Other key informants included, a health worker at Upendo city council health clinic, a chairman of a garbage collection CBO called *Manigro*, The chief of Mathare location, one political activist nicknamed Garang, and an official of local gathering place called *Duol Kokech*. These were individuals who hold key positions in the slum and are respected by the slum dwellers. The data was collected using the key informant interview guide (appendix II).

### **3.6.2 Survey Method**

The survey method encompasses any measurement procedure that involves asking questions of respondents. They are divided into two areas namely questionnaire and interviews (Trochim, 2006).

A survey research is therefore a self-report study which requires the collection of quantifiable information from the sample (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). In this study, a structured questionnaire with closed and open ended questions was used to collect the data (appendix I). Informants were asked to respond to a set of questions aimed at identifying factors that promote violence in the slum. The aim was to generate basic demographic information of the slum population and additional information on the causes of violence. A total of 120 questionnaires were administered to the respondents by the help of research assistants under my supervision. Forty questionnaires were administered in each of the three sampled villages.

### **3.6.3 Focus group discussions (FGDs)**

A focus group discussion is a form of qualitative research in which groups of people are asked about their attitudes towards a certain concept (Mugenda and Mugenda 2003). Six focus group discussions were held during the study. Two FGDs were held in each sampled village. Each village had a separate focus group discussion for both men and women. When constituting the groups, the researcher considered the duration of time one

had stayed in the slum and one's knowledge about violence incidences in the area. Gender balancing was of utmost importance. All discussants were eighteen years and above. This generated additional information on factors that promote violence in the slum. The data was collected using focus group discussion guide (appendix III).

#### **3.6.4 Secondary data**

Secondary data included information from books, journals, world organization's reports, newspapers reports and a variety of internet reports. These gave more information on ethnicity and economic deprivation and how they interact to produce violence in the slums. Various dimensions of violence were also obtained from the secondary data.

#### **3.7 Data analysis**

Data was analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Data from the survey was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software and simple frequency tables generated to summarize them. Data from key informant interviews and focus group discussions was analyzed qualitatively by reading, coding, displaying, reducing and interpreting. A thematic content analysis was applied. Verbatim quotes were used to present the data.

#### **3.8 Ethical Considerations**

This study was carried out after getting approval from the Ministry of Education Science and Technology and the provincial administration namely the Nairobi North district commissioner. The researcher ensured that every respondent was given enough background information about the study to enable them make informed decisions about their participation in the study. Informed consent was sought from them before they participated in the study. The respondents were also informed of their right to withdraw from the study if they so wished to do so. The researcher and the research assistants also ensured that they maintained professional and personal codes of ethics throughout the study. The informants were carefully handled and so as to protect their privacy, pseudo names were used. This ensured that they were accorded maximum protection. In addition, the ethical principles of respect for respondents and justice were upheld.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### VIOLENCE IN MATHARE SLUM

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the study. The findings are discussed according to the objectives of the study. Findings concerning socio-demographic characteristics of Mathare slum dwellers are also highlighted in this section

#### 4.2 Socio-demographic characteristics

Majority (59 %) of the respondents fell in the 18-30 age group. The high prevalence rates of violence in the slum could be linked to the high population of the youths who are active and energetic to participate in violence activities. Large percentage (69 %) of the respondents were males while 31 % were females. The Luos are the predominant community accounting for 59 % of the respondents. Education is another important aspect of socio-cultural and economic importance that can determine people's ability to engage in acts of violence. This may provide insights into how people, especially slum dwellers position themselves in society in regard to violence and peaceful co-existence. It also determines decision-making, family expenditure and family income. Only (14 %) of the respondents had attained college/university education while 46% had attained secondary level education. This implies that due to their low level of education, they can easily be taken advantage of by some confounding factors that trigger off the violence such as incitement from politicians, hate speeches and poor judgment of the situations.

A half (54 %) of the respondents were self-employed. According to key informant interviews, the kinds of self employment that Mathare slum dwellers engaged in included, carpentry, welding, plumbing, masonry tailoring, brewing *chang'aa* and shop keeping. According to a key informant, permanent employees included a few teachers and civil servants in lower cadres and factory workers. Twenty eight percent of the respondents were casual labourers mainly those working in construction firms commonly referred to as *mjengo*. In general majority of Mathare slum dwellers are limited in skills

that could facilitate their entry into formal employment. This of course ties in very well with the level of education attained by the majority of the respondents. Thus the main source of income in Mathare is self-employment or informal employment.

Fifty six percent of the respondent's spouses were unemployed. Twenty nine percent were self employed. According to a discussant, the economic activities that provide self employment to the women included selling vegetables and fish by the roadside. The kinds of economic activities cited by the respondents do not generate enough money to sustain the economic needs of the slum dwellers. From the findings, the majority (83 %) of the respondents earned less than Kshs 5 000. For those who were married, 46 % of their spouses earned less than Kshs 5000. Limited family income has affected the household expenditures of many households in the slum. Majority (70 %) of the respondents spent between Kshs 100 – 200 in a day.

With the current high cost of living, it can be concluded that Mathare slum dwellers spent less due to poverty and unemployment that characterize the population. More than a half ( 53 % ) paid between Kshs 500-1000 for rent. Majority (83 %) of the respondents obtain their water from city council taps while 17 % from the local streams. According to a key informant, two rivers namely Gitathuru and Mathare rivers pass through Mathare slum. Those who said that they got water from the stream boiled it before use. This is because the water is highly polluted. They travelled upstream to collect the water before it flowed into the slum environment where it was subjected to all forms of pollution. Eighty three percent of the respondents paid for water services while 17 % did not pay for the same service. Table 4.1 presents demographic characteristics of the respondents.

**Table 4.1 Socio- demographic characteristics of the respondents**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Frequency (%)</b>
<b>Age (yrs)</b>	
18-30	71(59)
31-40	27(23)
41-50	19(16)
>50	3(2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120 (100)</b>
<b>Gender</b>	
Male	83(69)
Female	37(31)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Ethnic background</b>	
Luo	71(59)
Agikuyu	33(38)
Abaluhya	11(9)
Others	5(4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Highest level of education</b>	
Secondary	56(46)
Primary	39(33)
College/ university	17(14)
None	8(7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(1000)</b>
<b>Marital status</b>	
Single	56(46)
Married	53(44)
Widowed	6(5)
Divorced	3(3)
Separated	2(2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Employment status</b>	
Self	65(54)
Casual	33(28)
Permanent	13(11)
Unemployed	9(7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Employment status of the spouse</b>	
Unemployed	67(56)
Self	35(29)
Casual	15(13)
Permanent	3(2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(1000)</b>
<b>Monthly income (Kshs)</b>	
Less than 5000	100(83)
5000 and above	20(17)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Household expenditure (Kshs)</b>	
Between 100-200	84(70)
200 and above	36(30)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120(100)</b>
<b>Rent paid (Kshs)</b>	
Between 500-1000	64(53)
Between 1000-2000	25(21)
Less than 500	24(20)
2000 and above	7(6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>120 (100)</b>

### 4.3 Forms of violence reported in the slum

More than a half (58%) of the respondent reported that physical assault was the dominant form of violence in Mathare slum. Rape and destruction of property accounted for 17% and 15% respectively. According to a key informant, other forms of violence included hate speech and abusive languages. In the study, majority (88 %) of the respondents said that they had been attacked in one way or another while at least 85 % knew people who had been victims of violence. Only 12 % of the respondents reported that they had never been attacked. So far this clearly indicates that most residents are exposed to physical violence in Mathare slums. Table 4.2 indicates various forms of violence that Mathare slum dwellers are exposed to.

**Table 4.2: Forms of violence cases reported in the slum**

Forms of violence	Frequency	Percentage
Assault	69	58
Rape	20	17
Destruction of property	18	15
Others	13	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

Further interviews with a key informant revealed that rape leads to psychological torture among survivors. Post burial experiences of widows who lost their husbands due to violence also leads to psychological torture as depicted in the following statement from a key informant at village 4B:

*I have never settled since I lost my husband in the post poll violence. Single parenthood is challenging because today I'm the sole breadwinner of the family. To add on this, the memories of my husband being hacked to death in my presence and the children has caused us untold psychological trauma. (A female informant).*


In one of the focus group discussion in Village number 10, we concluded that rape exposes the victim to isolation by the close friends and even relatives. The following statement from a discussant confirms the general views of the other discussants.

*My life has taken a terrible turn since I was raped. My husband disappeared after some neighbours convinced him that people who raped me infected me with AIDS even though the test proved negative. People who used to be my friends nowadays avoid my company and I find this lonely life more difficult. (A female discussant).*

### **4.3.1 Gang attacks**

Sometimes violence is meted on the slum dwellers by criminal gangs. Slightly more than half (54 %) of the respondents admitted to have been attacked by gangs while 46 % said that they have not been attacked as shown in figure 4.1

**Figure 4.1 Gang attack**





It was noted that the mention of 'gang' could send shivers on people for fear of repercussions. According to a key informant, the reasons for being attacked included refusal to give them money or being a member of another ethnic group. One of the informants had the following to say about terror gangs who are based in an area called Kosovo:

*Kosovo is a well known place for an illegal sect called Mungiki. They interrupt other people's businesses in the roadside, disrupt public transport and also rape women. They are also hired during campaigns by politicians. Members of the sect shot dead four policemen at Kosovo and this led to a major police operation in the area where people believed to be members of the sect were executed. Some unsuspecting members of the public also became victims of the police crackdown. (An official of a local CBO).*

When we enquired from one of the provincial administration officials in Mathare location about the activities of illegal sects, he made the following statement:


*Today we deal with criminals who instigate violence independently without giving them tags such as Mungiki or Taliban. A criminal will face the full force of the law without hiding in a sect. (Provincial administration officer).*

The respondents estimated the age of those who attacked them based on their perceptions of young, middle and old age. Fifty percent of the respondents estimated that their attackers were middle aged, 38% estimated them as young while 12% claimed that their attackers were old. From the findings, the majority (96%) of the respondents indicated that males are the leading perpetrators of violence. Four percent of violence cases were attributed to females. It was clear that most violence in the slums were perpetrated by young and middle aged men. According to a key informant, the majority of the members of illegal gangs are young unemployed males.

### 4.3.2 Mob justice

Most of the respondents (83 %) confirmed that they have seen many people being lynched in public while those who denied having seen anyone lynched accounted for 17 % as depicted by figure 4.2. Key interviews revealed that mob justice is triggered by robbery, mistaken identity and suspected members of terror gangs.

**Figure 4.2 Mob justice**



During a focus group discussion at Village 4A, we noted that mob justice is frequently reported in Mathare slum. This was attributed to rampant cases of theft that occur in the study area. A discussant supported this observation in the following statement.


*On 3rd May 2009, two young men escaped death narrowly after being intercepted by the public while fleeing after they waylaid a passerby next to Huruma bridge and snatched him a mobile phone and Kshs 2,600. These two men survived because some of the people in the mob identified them and protected them from the crowd who were baying for their blood. Nevertheless they sustained serious injuries and were rushed to the hospital. (Female discussant).*

## 4.4 Causes of violence

### 4.4.1 Economic deprivation

Majority (88%) of the respondents reported that economic deprivation is the major cause of violence in the slum. A small portion (12%) said that economic deprivation does not play a role in the violence witnessed in the slum. This finding indicates that most of the residents of the study area are exposed to violence originating from relative deprivation as shown in figure 4.3

**Figure 4.3 Economic deprivation**



#### 4.4.1.1 Example of Violence caused by economic deprivation

From the study findings, violence which is caused by economic deprivation included fighting over illegal connection of water and electricity (11%), eviction due to failure to pay rent (31%), fighting for land to build business premises and residential houses (18%), fighting for lucrative business opportunities such as brewing sites and strategic kiosks (38%). Others included mugging and mob justice. Table 4.3 shows examples of violence caused by economic deprivation

**Table 4. 3: Example of violence caused by economic deprivation**

<b>Example of violence</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Fighting for lucrative business opportunities such as brewing sites and strategic kiosks	45	38
Eviction due to failure to pay rent	37	31
Fighting for land to build business premises and residential houses	22	18
Fighting over illegal connection of water and electricity	13	11
Mob justice and mugging	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Violence due to struggle for land:* Business land was reported to be a hotly contested issue in the slum. A key informant explained that in most cases the land in question belonged to the government and in this case controlled by the city council of Nairobi or land donated by well-wishers for the benefit of the slum dwellers. Over a period of time slum dwellers use this parcels for business accomplishment. One of the informants elaborated this issue when he talked about land grabbing at Village number 10 in the following statement:

*This three hectares of land once belonged to a certain Hindu whom after his death left it to his son who later gave it out freely to peasant workers who have used it for the last 30 yrs. The land was later grabbed by a certain wealthy man who had the support of a local politician and acquired an illegal title deed. Eventually he came and evicted the slum dwellers from the land. Chaos erupted*

*and several people were injured in a confrontation with the police and the security guards who were carrying out the evictions. Some people were arrested and charged in a court of law (Garang (not real name), an informant and political activist from Village Number ten).*

According to a key informant, people would also want to extend their houses or business structures to cover areas which are owned by colleagues without consensus. There are also conmen who sell other people's houses. An in-depth interview with a key informant at Village 4B revealed the following:

*There are several cases of people trying to extend their houses without consulting their neighbours especially when fire razes down a number of houses and the boundaries are lost. Such cases have also led to serious confrontation of the people involved. This slum has a high number of cases of fire reported almost on a monthly basis. There are also some conmen who do not fight for housing space but sell other people's houses to unsuspecting buyers. Land in the slum belongs to the government and in most cases there would be no document to prove ownership of any structure here. These people operate in the slum and are well known but they disappear or retreat to their rural homes after pocketing such money. The buyer and the real owner of the house would now be left locked in a tussle of war which has sometimes led to death, injury and destruction of property. (An administrative official of Village 4B).*

Another informant had the following to say about land grabbing:

*The slum dwellers strongly believe that any public land in the slum belongs to them and every member of the slum has a right to benefit from the spoil from the sale of such lands whether sold legally or illegally. On 28th April 2008, a piece of land in Mathare was allocated to ten men by the local councillor and later sold. Youths of village 4A got wind of the sale and quickly organized themselves into a group of 30 people and that night they carried out an operation dubbed "Toa Mali" where the beneficiaries mainly old men were targeted. At the end of the*

*“operation” an old man lost his leg. Another incident was in the year 2002 when youths fought over land in Kasarani constituency and five people sustained serious injury after being slashed. (Chairman of a local gathering place at village 4A). An informant at village Number ten said that business people try by all means to ensure that their businesses are strategically well placed so as to attract more customers. The following statement from an informant demonstrated this further:*

*Two businessmen were involved in a confrontation after one of them tried to demolish a kiosk belonging to his fellow claiming that the kiosk was in front of his premise and blocked his customers. The latter tried to resist and the scene became very chaotic. The village elders had to intervene. Violence connected to business space is so common in the slums and sometimes involves government agencies who try to demolish illegal structures constructed by the slum dwellers for business purposes. (A village elder).*

***Violence as a result of competition for lucrative business opportunities:*** A key informant said that most young men who have missed employment have turned to illicit brewing to earn a living. They go an extra mile to protect this business even if such measures risked their own lives. An informant who is acquainted to the activities of these youths said the following:

*Rival groups have been trying to wrestle the control of an illicit brewing site in the slum from one another. These youths are so hostile that even the police rarely visit the brewing site. Even foreigners are attacked when they visit this area. In 2007 members of ‘Mungiki’ tried to take over the site but it turned tragic when their rivals called ‘Taliban’ resisted, leading to the death of nine people and displacement of several families. (A young man who worked with a garbage collecting CBO called Manigro at village Number ten).*

***Violence due to illegal connection of electricity and water:*** During one of the FGDs, we identified illegal connection of water and electricity as one of the economic related causes of violence in the study area. This violence occurs between the gangs who control these connections and the slum inhabitants who may fail to pay for these illegal services. There is also confrontation between the government officials who occasionally come to disconnect the lines and the gangs who will always resist such attempts. A discussant made the following statements and was supported by the rest of the discussants.

*In November 2007 people confronted Kenya Power and lighting company (KPLC) workers and police over destruction of illegal connections. More than 50 people were arrested and charged but were released on a fine of Kshs 2500 each. Slum dwellers feel that it is their right to use electricity and water even if they can't afford it. Any attempt to deny them this has always been resisted or met with violence. Cases of slum dwellers fighting with the KPLC and Nairobi city Water Company officials over disconnection of such illegal connection are on the rise these days. In most cases illegal gangs charge residents for providing them with power and water through the illegal connections. Those who fail to pay face violence from the gang members. Even the gangs sometimes fight amongst themselves in order to control such ventures. (A male discussant).*

#### **4.4.1.2 Factors contributing to violence related to rent**

The findings of this study show that rent contributes to a lot of violence in the slum. A lot of people admitted to have either clashed with their landlord and land lady or knew someone who had clashed with their landlord and landladies. The reasons they gave varied from rent delay, rent dispute, and forced evictions, misuse of the building to a combination of the above factors. In summary a big percentage 76 % of the study population indicated rental issues is a major cause of violence in the slums. Rent delay accounted for 39 % of the conflict. Factors contributing to violence related to rent are presented in Table 4.4 below.

**Table 4.4 Factors contributing to violence related to rent**

<b>Factors contributing to violence related to rent</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>percentage</b>
Rent delay	47	39
Rent dispute	18	15
Rent delay, forced eviction, rent dispute and misuse of the building	18	15
Eviction	15	13
Misuse of the building	12	10
Others	10	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

A focus group discussion in village 4A concluded that rent is a major cause of violence in Mathare slum. We also explored further the reasons as to why many slum inhabitants fail to pay rent promptly and the discussants agreed that low income is responsible for this kind of scenario. One discussant made the following statement which also concurred with the general views of the group members.

*A land- lord in Mathare hired goons to help him evict his tenants after they failed to pay rent for several months. The fateful event led to the death of several young people who were on an eviction mission. They were overpowered by the tenants who killed several of them and only a few escaped. (A male discussant).*



Another informant had the following to say:

*Today the provincial administration under the guidance of the chief has instructed us not to allow any landlord to evict any tenant in the slum. If someone is not paying rent, the landlord has to come to the chief who will arrange for a peaceful solution to the problem including co-ordinated eviction (Administrative official of Village 4B).*

Discussants at a focus group discussion in village 4B agreed that structures left behind to children by their deceased parents were also a source of violence. This was attributed to lack of legally binding ownership documents. We were convinced further by one of the discussant who made the following statement.


*In May 2008, a young man was discovered hanging on a rope in a room they shared with his brother. The boy was murdered by his brother over a struggle to collect rent from the houses left by their father. The sister of the victim confirmed that the two had a long standing misunderstanding over rent collection. The assailant was arrested and later charged with murder in a court of law. (A female discussant).*

#### **4.4.2 Political competition**

##### **4.4.2.1 The role of politicians in promoting violence in the slums**

The majority (90%) of the respondents believed that politicians played a role in fanning violence especially intercommunity violence in Mathare slums. Politicians participate in promoting violence in the slum indirectly through giving false promises (27%), incitement (18%), use of hate speeches against members of different communities (14 %) mobilizing for votes along ethnic lines (41%). Figure 4.4 shows how politicians contribute in promoting violence in Mathare slum.

**Figure 4.4: The role of politicians in promoting violence in the slum**



According to a key informant, politicians have also been accused of allocating land to members of their ethnic group. He elaborated this view in the following statements:

*There is a cartel that has controlled the allocation of land since time immemorial. And they give them along ethnic consideration. This fuelled ethnic tensions during the post election violence when slum dwellers especially in village 4A and 4B ganged up and looted, burnt and beat the roadside retailers from one ethnic group. These people you see here today are our people. These spaces were occupied by others until we took over during the post election chaos. (A political activist at village 4A).*

An FGD held in Village 4B yielded more information on the role played by politicians in promoting violence in the slum. They concurred that politicians tempt fate by promising slum dwellers goodies such as jobs and more development. This has pitted politicians against slum dwellers who feel betrayed. In most cases campaigns are characterised by ethnic mobilisation where one gets votes from his or her ethnic group. National issues

and party matters are second to ethnicity in slum politics. It was interesting to note from the FGD that when politicians fail to deliver on the promises, they are attacked mainly by members of their own communities whom they had relied on for support and whom they promised to favour over other constituents. A discussant said the following concerning the failure of politicians to fulfil the promises they make to the slum inhabitants and was supported by other discussants.

*Things are not good in this constituency, we voted for her, but today she is just concentrating on a few individuals who did not even fight or campaign for her. We are waiting for her to come but this time we are not going to wait for the next election, our children have not been given bursaries, she does not give us lunch or fare when we go to see her, and we also want Constituency Development Fund money to "eat."*(A male discussant).


The violence meted on politicians by slum dwellers shows that they are not ready to forget these promises. A key informant in Village 4A had the following to say about the violent encounters between politicians and the inhabitants of Mathare slum:

*A former member of parliament for Kasarani was attacked by youths in Mathare 4A in 2002 who demanded handouts from him but they were angered when he gave them sweets. His car was vandalized and tyres and public address system taken by the rowdy youths. He reported the matter to the chief's camp. They later bargained for the return of the equipment at a fee that he paid to the youths. Similarly in December 2007 the then area Member of Parliament was attacked during nomination in Mathare Village 4A by rowdy youths and was rescued by Kasarani police chief. (A political activist).*

**Hiring the youths to cause chaos:** Majority (78 %) of the respondents said that they could not accept to be hired as goons to cause chaos during political campaigns while 22% said they were ready to be hired as shown in figure 4.5. This implies that those who said that they cannot be hired attributes factors such as family responsibilities and being

enlightened especially after the controversial 2007 elections whereby they saw many Mathare slum dwellers dying due to violence. For those who accepted to be hired attributed this to poverty whereby the politicians give handouts and some fees to cause chaos during political campaigns.

**Figure 4.5 Hiring the youths to cause chaos**



The following statements made by two of the discussants represent a consensus from a focus group discussion and also concur with the views of the respondents:

*I can't be used by politicians because I saw how many people died in the post election violence. I'm the bread winner in my family and they can't afford to live without me. (A male discussant).*

Another one made the following statement:

*I am very poor and ready to do anything so long as the politician is willing to give me money to buy food for my children. (A male discussant).*

An interview with one of the informants confirmed the above findings as depicted in the following statement:

*Politicians bear the blame for the escalation of violence in the slum. The politicians will always support the defaulters of rent because they know that majority of them voted for them. In case of dispute, the slum dwellers will always report to the politicians before going to the provincial administration officials. Even if they are summoned by the chief, they will only do what the politician has directed them to do. Because they are the majority and they enjoy financial support from such politicians sometimes, it becomes difficult for the government officers to carry out eviction. Sometimes I find it difficult when it comes to choosing village elders or village chairmen in this location; at one point you find that members of another community gang up against a village chairman if he does not come from their community. This has led to hate campaigns against such officials and even physical attack. The matter is made worse by tribal politics where one gets votes in areas dominated by their kinsmen. (A local provincial administration officer).*

The official attributed the tribal politics to perceived injustices where one community feels that if one of their own is not chosen then they stand to be sidelined in the administration of the village. Village chairmen are important people because they represent the government at the village level and participate in the allocation of resources, and relief food. He insisted that they have to consider ethnic balance in appointing such persons to ensure fair representation.

#### **4.4.3 Negative ethnicity**

Majority of the Mathare residents were from the Luo community who accounted for 71 %, Agikuyu 33 %, Abuluyia 11 % while other communities accounted for 5 %. From the findings, it was evidenced that there are some inter-community violence in Mathare slums since 91 % admitted to have participated in ethnic violence either directly or indirectly only 9 % denied seeing or participating in these fights as shown in table 4.5.

**Table 4.5 Negative ethnicity**


<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	109	91
No	11	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

According to a key informant, some landlords take advantage of ethnic differences to exploit tenants from certain ethnic groups. In most cases they are forced to pay high amount in rent as compared to other tenants. This is depicted in the following statement.

*The issue of rental houses raises high emotions and causes ethnic conflicts. Some landlords deny members from a particular ethnic group chance to rent their houses. In some cases such tenants may be allowed in but rent is hiked. This has contributed to ethnic animosity between tenants when some of them pay different amounts based on ethnic linkages. Ethnicity also plays a role in rent disputes. The majority of the tenants in Mathare belong to one community while the majority of the landlords come from a different community. Sometimes tenants don't want to pay rent because they claim that the land belongs to the government, and landlords should not collect more rent after recovering the cost of constructing the house. If they pay then they should decide on the rent by themselves as tenants. Tenants claim that this is a scheme by one ethnic community to exploit them. While landlords also claim that people are taking advantage of their ethnic background to stay in their houses without paying rent. This has raised ethnic tension in Mathare. Those who pay rent promptly are threatened and even attacked by the majority who do not want to pay. (A health worker at Upendo health clinic in Village 4B).*

***Voting for a non member of the community:*** Most (80 %) of the respondents admitted that they can vote for somebody outside their own community. Only 20 % said they wouldn't vote somebody outside their communities as shown in figure 4.6. We went further to enquire why this is so but I came to realise that even though most people had voted along ethnic lines during the previous election, they have issues with the current sitting members of parliament and the councillors whom even though comes from their own ethnic community are not doing anything to support them. They today see no different whether the politician comes from your community or not.

**Figure 4.6 Voting for someone from a different community**



***Advantages of electing a member from one's community:*** Most people indicated that there are some advantages that accrued from voting somebody who is from their own community. Those who admitted that they could get handouts easily accounted for 14 %, get jobs 12 % get bursaries accounted for 14 % while a combination of all the above reasons accounted for 52 % and other reasons accounted for 8 % as shown in table 4.6. This shows that in slums people tend to depend on assistance from politicians hence they are able to use any means including violence to ensure that their own candidates is elected to political office.

**Table 4.6 Advantages of electing a leader from one's community**

<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
You get handouts	17	14
Get jobs	14	12
You get bursary	17	14
All of the above	62	52
Others-specify	10	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

In one of the FGDs at village number ten, a discussant gave the following reasons as to why majority of slums dwellers could accept to elect leaders from other different communities and the rest of the discussants agreed with her.


*Prior to the 2007 general elections, I and my family members together with most of my tribesmen never attended campaigns organised by candidates from different ethnic communities. Indeed we voted for a candidate from my own community who managed to win because we are the majority in this constituency. She has done nothing to support me. My condition of living has worsened in the recent past. (A female discussant).*



#### 4.4.4 Violence coping strategies

In any given society, there exists some counter-mechanism to deal with any form of threat that tries to derail the normal operation of the society. As such, we went further to know what Mathare residence do to cope up with violence cases reported in this place. From the findings indicated in figure 4.7 below, 50 % of the respondents said that they organize themselves into protection groups, arming themselves 4 % walking in groups 4 %, staying indoors 18 % depending on police 20 % and other means 4 %.

**Figure 4.7 Strategies for coping with violence**



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the findings of the study and compares these with those of other studies which have been conducted in various parts of the world. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are drawn from the main issues arising from the discussion. The discussion is done according to the objectives of the study.

#### **5.2 Socio-demographic characteristics**

The findings of this study revealed that most of the Mathare slum dwellers were youths aged 18-30 years. This confirmed the findings of other studies conducted by UN-Habitat in various slums around the world which showed that a half of the slum dwellers are younger than 25 years and 40 % fall under the age of 19 years (UN- Habitat, 2007). Most perpetrators of the violence in Mathare were male youths. This suggests that males generally contribute to the escalation of violence in the slum while women are mostly victims of the violence (Oxfam. 2007). This study also noted that even though men were largely perpetrators of violence as compared to women, they were also at greater risk of violence in the slum. The culture of dependency that requires males to provide for their wives is one of the factors that lead men to violence. Eardley (1995) has argued that men's violence is biologically determined, that it is learnt through cultural socialization, or that it is primarily the result of deprivation and the oppressive divisions imposed by alienated work process of capitalism. Radical feminists have also argued that men are reluctant to confront the problem of violence simply because they enjoy the power it gives them.

### 5.3 Forms of violence

The findings of this study reveal that physical violence is predominant over other forms such as psychological violence. The majority of the respondents acknowledged that they had been victims of physical violence or at least knew someone who had been a victim. Qualitative data revealed that women in the slums are exposed to the danger of being raped by criminals. Mob justice was also reported to be a common occurrence where people have been attacked or killed by members of the public upon being suspected of wrongdoing. Even innocent members have been victims of such attack. During the 2008 post election violence, the majority of the victims from Mathare were either brutally murdered or had parts of their bodies chopped off. Others sustained deep cuts inflicted on their bodies using sharp objects such as pangas. The findings of this study confirm the findings of a study conducted by African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC) in Kibera slums in Nairobi. This study revealed that physical violence is the second leading killer after AIDS and tuberculosis in Kibera slums. On the other hand, injuries from violence are the second most common contributors to the mortality burden in the population aged five years and above. Finally, gunshot wounds and blunt trauma as a result of mob justice are the most common modes of injury (APHRC, 2008).

The findings of this study also revealed that criminal gangs contribute to physical violence in the slum. Rivalry between the different gangs and the police has led to serious confrontations where members of the public have also fallen victim of police shooting, thus increasing the number of deaths associated with physical violence in the slum. In a similar study, Carroll (2008), reported that there was a public security crisis in Jamaica and the state was failing to effectively provide human security to its population, especially to those most vulnerable to crime and violence, namely, people living in poverty in inner city communities. The Caribbean island's high crime rate has long been recognized. An annual murder rate of around 1,500 in a population of 2.7 million puts Jamaica at par with South Africa and Colombia as being among the world's most violent countries. This violence is largely confined to slums (Carroll, 2008).

The findings of this study indicate that there are a few cases of homicide in Mathare. These are mostly reported at night thus posing a serious threat to the night travellers. This however contrasts the findings of Rial and Grossi, (2002) which revealed that there was a high rate of cases of homicide reported in the slums of the city of Sao Paulo in Brazil where homicide rates are 90 per 100,000 inhabitants. A map of homicides rates in Sao Paulo showed a clear concentration in the neighbourhoods located on the outskirts of the city, that is, where the number of slums is greater. Christian Action Network (2004) has also provided evidence from a study in South Africa that contradicts the findings of the study in Mathare. While police crime statistics show that there were 21 683 murders in the year 2000, the Medical Research Council puts the figure at 32 482. Interpol claims even higher numbers of murders in South Africa - up to 54 298 in one year (Christian Action Network, 2004). South Africa has the highest recorded per capita murder rate, second only to Colombia. South Africa is probably the most murderous society on earth, even with the probable under reporting.

Crime has become South Africa's pre-eminent sociological problem. It now eclipses even unemployment in concerns of all South Africans. According to the official statistics, in the 44 years from 1950 to 1993, there was an average of 7036 murders per year. This covered the turbulent strife of the apartheid years of warfare, conflict, terrorism, riots and repression. However, in the first eight years (of peace) of the new democratic dispensation, under the ANC, an average of 24 206 murders were committed each year. However, if the Interpol statistics are accepted, then the murder rate in South Africa during the ANC years has averaged 47 882 per year (Christian Action Network, 2004).

## 5.4 Causes of violence

### 5.4.1 Economic deprivation

Most of Mathare slum dwellers have low level of education and fall within the bracket of low-income earners that stood at less than Kshs 5, 000 per month. Most of the slum dwellers earned less money and spent less than a dollar per day. Most households in the slum were living below the poverty line. The World Bank defines poverty as living on less than a dollar per day (World Bank, 2005). The study findings acknowledged that hard economic conditions had pushed the slum inhabitants to violence.

Most of the youths in the study area lacked formal employment and engaged themselves in various forms of informal employment. Data revealed that such kinds of informal employment included carpentry, welding, plumbing, masonry, tailoring, brewing *chang'aa* and shop keeping. Very few slum dwellers were employed permanently and these included a few teachers, lower cadre civil servants and factory workers. In general, most Mathare slum dwellers are limited in skills that could facilitate their entry into formal employment. This of course ties in very well with the low level of education attained by a majority of the respondents. Low level of education coupled with lack of meaningful employment contributed to violence in the slums.

The high rate of unemployment in most slums around the world as was the case with Mathare slum is also depicted in the findings of Rial and Grossi (2002) in a study done in the city of Sao Paulo in Brazil. The study reported that there were high rates of unemployment (21.1%) in the periphery or the outskirts of the city where slums are concentrated while in Jardim, one of the centrally located neighbourhoods with no slums, the rates of unemployment were very low (8.3%). This meant that one in every five economically active residents were unemployed in the slums of Sao Paulo, whereas in the centrally located neighbourhoods, there was on average, one jobless person out of every 12.7 who were economically active. Almost a half (48.25 %) of the unemployed were less than 24 years old, and 70.1% of them lived in the slums. The streets are even more dangerous for the unemployed and oppressed class made up of blacks who live in the

slums where even the police will not go, where the law is dictated by gangs of criminals and drug dealers (Rial and Grossi, 2002). Quality education is the cornerstone of economic stability and is closely tied to one's level of education. Where the majority of the population lacks such economic ingredients as was the case with Mathare slum, their living conditions become compromised. The findings from Mathare indicate that most of the inhabitants had low level of education. Most of their time is spent idling in the slum vicinity where one cannot find any meaningful employment opportunity by all standards. This exposes them to violence related behaviors. Their judgment of what is likely to cause a breach of peace is also impaired and their acts tend to justify their very violent nature. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) have produced evidence that support the findings of this study. They argue that education level has a direct co-relation to violence especially in most African countries. They point to Mozambique where secondary schooling rates were very low and were declining before the country went to war. They have also indicated that there were virtually no educated Congolese before the start of the 1960 war. Similarly, the findings from this current study point to low level of education as being a contributory factor to violence in Mathare.

However, Makdisi and Sadaka (2002) have produced evidence that contrast the findings of the study in Mathare. According to them, there may be a regional effect at play here, since other countries that had a long experience of war such as Yugoslavia, Georgia, Russia and Cyprus, all had very high levels of schooling. Lebanon, which had a long and bloody civil war was among the countries with the highest level of education in the Arab world with a 60% adult literacy rate compared with 15% for Iraq between 1950s and 1960s, and a schooling enrolment ratio of 76% in the 1950s. Saudi Arabia by contrast, had a schooling rate of 4% but no war. Most post- Soviet states which witnessed civil wars had high levels of education. Typically, more than 90% of the population had a secondary education. Darden (2002) argues that in many countries or regions in federal states for example Lebanon, the curriculum is the primary mechanism of inculcating children with nationalist ideology, which later feeds into support for violence.

Mathare valley residents are leading a life of their own. This is the slum where a majority of the inhabitants live in despair and squalor. There is a social boundary where the people in the neighbouring posh residential areas will rarely visit the slum areas. This type of social isolation is promoting hostility between the slum residents and other members of the public. They are easily provoked into violence because they feel other members of the society do not like them. This confirms the findings of Rial and Grossi (2002) in their study where they reported that Brazil is an extremely segmented society. The rich and the poor- that is, whites and blacks- live in two different but permanently articulate worlds, reflected in the space they occupy. A study conducted in Mathare by Mwangi (1983) attributed this unjust encouragement of slums and creation of underprivileged urban class to capitalist's relations of production and distribution that overtly and covertly generate an economically stratified class. Experience has also taught us that without a method for clearly distinguishing between one group and another, systematic economic discrimination cannot be effectively practised. It is important to note that in order to prevent the members of a certain group from freely choosing their jobs, enrolling in schools or joining a social club, it is absolutely necessary that there be a reliable way of knowing who is a member of the group to be economically discriminated or segregated and who is a member of the group doing the segregation (Mwangi, 1983).

The economic factors that cause violence in the slum include, rent, business space, water, electricity and land. The wide-scale violence that characterized the aftermath of the December 2007 presidential election in Kenya was alarming in its ferocity and scale, but was by no means a peculiar phenomenon with regard to the electoral environment in the country. Past elections in Kenya since independence have been characterized by varying degrees of electoral violence ostensibly on issues revolving around land problem and ethnicity (Syagga, 2008). The major problem in the slum is the concentration of landless people from various parts of the country. Housing is a necessity yet some of the respondents had problems with affording a decent roof over their heads. Lack of necessities can cause people to behave in violent ways especially when they compare themselves with those who seem to have everything. This problem can sometimes lead to people using violence to try and obtain things they are lacking hence the high rate of

muggings and robbery with violence in slum areas. Relative deprivation has important consequences for both behaviour and attitudes, including feelings of stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action. Social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, have cited relative deprivation (especially temporal relative deprivation) as a potential cause of social movements and deviance, leading to extreme situations to political violence such as rioting, terrorism and civil wars or social deviance such as crime. Social movements arise when people feel deprived of what they perceive as their fair share (Runciman, 1966, Koigi 2003 & Syagga 2008). The majority of the respondents admitted to have either clashed with their landlords/ landladies or knew someone who had been involved in such clashes. In most cases slum inhabitants failed to pay rent on time because of lack of money. Accumulated arrears would force the landlords to evict the tenants thereby creating a conducive environment for violence. In some cases people have lost their lives in violence related to rent issues.

Youths continue to flock the city of Nairobi where they are faced with many economic difficulties because the available jobs have been taken up by their colleagues who had come to the city much earlier. This problem is compounded by the slow economic growth which has impacted negatively on job creation. The only choice for such people is to look for settlements in the slums. While in the slums they are lured to join the gangs in order to earn a living. From the findings of this study, it was revealed that *Mungiki* and *Taliban* gangs are in the forefront in fighting over resource allocation in the slum. They sell to people water and electricity which they get from illegal connections from the main lines. Those who fail to pay are intimidated by the use of violence. They are also ready to fight the government officials who may want to disconnect such services. The findings of this study indicate that economic deprivation encourages the formation of illegal gangs who promote violence in the slums. This confirms a previous report by IRIN (2007) which indicated that two gangs fought over the control of a lucrative illicit brewing market in the area and eight people were reported to have died and at least 9,000 others displaced. Economic difficulty has led to xenophobic attacks in many countries. South Africans were struggling to buy food as prices rose amid stubbornly high unemployment, and



many complained the government had not worked fast enough to build houses, schools and hospitals for the black majority. Foreigners were attacked because they were seen as competing for scarce resources and because they were the closest targets at hand for the poor. Some victims were set on fire, cases of rape as well as gunshot wounds were also reported (Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2008).

This study finding also suggest that youths in Mathare engaged in violence in order to extort money from the public through grabbing or charging illegal levies on electricity and water. This is in agreement with the findings of a study conducted by UN-Habitat (2003), where it was found that the youth join gangs because of economic hardship. In Colombia's Cumunas and Rio's slums, the problems associated with urbanization bolster the ranks of *Pandillo* gangs of disillusioned young men. When interviewed by UN – Habitat, one gang member had the following to say: *“I'm really scared of dying but what can I do?”* Another teenager in Fumace slum in Realengo, on the western outskirts of Rio said the following: *“We are not here because we like it, we're here because we have families---- I have a small child and there is no other work”* (UN- Habitat 2003). According to a recent Oxfam report, the youth join gangs, in part, to protect themselves and their neighbourhoods but also to engage in criminal activity in the absence of a steady source of employment and in the absence of effective social support mechanisms (Oxfam, 2007).

Most members of the gangs in Mathare are youths who flocked the city and failed to get meaningful economic activity because of their late arrival in the city. They are engaged in unlawful activities such as forceful collection of illegal levies from Matatu and business owners and those who refuse are threatened with violence or even killed. They are the once who control illegal brewing markets in the slums. The findings of this study are in agreement with the finding of Bell (1961). He discussed the prominent role of an illegal gang called *Cosa Nostra* in Italian – American's organized crime. As a consequence of the late arrival and original position in the American opportunity structure and immigrating in large numbers later than most European groups and having no particular sponsors among those who had preceded them there, they had to start from the bottom of

the socio-economic system. They found their progress even more completely blocked in most areas by other groups. Even in crime they had been preceded by the Irish and Jews who had, for sometime, been in similar disadvantaged positions, but for various reasons they were later able to advance themselves more legitimately (Bell,1961). They formed *Cosa Nostra* which engaged in gambling, prostitution, and labour racketeering. They were the major loan sharks and providers of narcotics (Ulf, 1968).

#### **5.4.2 Negative ethnicity**

The findings from Mathare also indicated the Luo and the Agikuyu are the majority in Mathare slums followed by the Abaluyia. The residential areas are segmented and the study findings showed that the Luo occupied village 4A, the Abaluyia 4B and the Agikuyu village 10. When new comers arrive in Mathare slums they are welcomed by people from their ethnic groups. This category comprises young men who come to the city to look for waged employment. The zoning of residential places along ethnic cocoons has been blamed for promoting ethnic animosity among slum residents and this was evident in the 2008 violence in Kenya. Communities in the slums declared certain areas no go zones for people who did not speak the same language as their own. Some landlords denied people from certain ethnic communities chance to rent their houses. In some cases some landlords/ladies hiked rent for people from certain ethnic groups. This also contributed to bad ethnic relationships between landlords and tenants and also between tenants from different ethnic groups who reside in the same building but paid different amounts in rent.

This confirms the finding of a study done in Kampala by Grillo (1966). He demonstrated that in a 10 per cent sample of household heads conducted at Nsambya in April 1965, it was found that 15.4 per cent of the estate population consisted of relatives and friends of working railway men. This section of the community made up of roughly equal numbers of employed men looking for accommodation, unemployed men looking for jobs, and children schooling in Kampala. In any one year most households had at least one temporary visitor of this kind. In another sample conducted at the Kiswa housing estate

in Kampala East, 78 % of the respondents claimed to have lived with a friend or relative on first arriving in the city. Such processes give rise to ethnic clusters in multi-ethnic occupied dwellings and, in some places, small ethnic neighbourhoods. These clusters and enclaves are perceived by outsiders and interpreted by insiders in ethnic terms, thus the heavily Luo populated area near Kibuli in Uganda was known as “Little Kisumu” (Parkin, 1966).

The finding of the study in Mathare also supports views of Brass (1991). He pointed out that ethnicity provides a basis for recruitment of criminal organizations. People play the trump card of ethnicity when access to certain rights or quotas provided by affirmative action policies such as allocation of jobs and housing, reserved seats in parliament or recruitment and waivers of school tuition fees are linked to ethnic affiliation. Ethnic identity formation is the result of the dynamics of elite competition (Brass, 1991). In a worst case scenario, however, the construction of ethnicity may result in ethnic cleansing and the total segregation of ethnic groups that used to be intermingled (Obserschall, 2000). Koigi (2003) argues that negative ethnicity is responsible for the deep-seated tensions in Africa that the world has seen flare so terrifyingly. The genocide in Rwanda and “ethnic” killing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and elsewhere stand out as examples. He maintained that negative ethnicity is the force behind untold deaths on the continent, dispelling the myth of an intractable conflict waged along simple ancient lines. A report by IP- Global (2009), confirms the finding of this study in which ethnicity stands out as the major cause of violence in Africa. According to IP-Global, Africa’s longest civil war has claimed two to three million lives and displaced seven million from their homes in Darfur. The Darfur case represents one of the worst ethno-political violence in the continent. The violence also revolves around the sharing of natural resources, mostly oil, in the disputed region. The basic conflict is between the Arab Sudanese government in Khartoum and the majority black African Sudanese. The US has called the slaughter of blacks by *janjaweed* militias a genocide; the UN has called it today’s worst humanitarian crisis. But far too little is being done to help the victims.

The findings of the study in Mathare suggests that politicians favor people from their ethnic communities when allocating resources such as bursary fund, business lands or kiosks or political jobs such as CDF management team in the slums. A key informant said that some politicians incite their supporters from their ethnic groups not to pay rent or take instructions from the provincial administrative officials. This supports the views of Jonyo (2003), who pointed out that ethnicity emerges from mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity in situations of competitive or conflictual ethnic pluralism. Ethnicity is so dramatically evidenced in the cities, in both developing and developed countries. Here the division of labour is usually highly advanced and the struggle for resources, like employment, wages, housing, education, and political following is intense. Cohen (1974) derived two main theoretical points regarding ethnic competition in urban areas. First, urban ethnic groups are interest groups engaged in a struggle with other groups for resources in the public arena and, second, the peculiar contribution of ethnicity to the struggle is to provide an idiom which promotes solidarity as a moral duty - the specific common interests for which the battle is waged are embedded in a much wider, more complete unity. Ethnicity emerges from mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity in situation of competitive or conflictual ethnic pluralism (Jonyo, 2003). Lonsdale (1994) argues that ethnic stratification will emerge only when specific ethnic groups are brought into contact with one another, and only when those groups are characterized by a high degree of ethnocentrism, competition and differential power. Ethnocentrism is the tendency to look at the world primarily from the perspective of one's own culture, and downgrade all other groups' outside one's own culture. This high competition for resources has sometimes led to conflict and violence.

#### **5.4.3 Political competition**

According to the findings of this study, politicians play a major role in promoting violence in the slum. They organize and fund the perpetrators of violence or incite the members of the public against one another. They also use hate speeches during campaigns. Politicians give false promises to the electorate during campaigns but never fulfill such promises. This causes bad relationship between the politicians and slum

dwellers. A study conducted by Mwangi (1983) in Mathare suggested that politicians are not honest to the slum dwellers. He reported that endemic poverty in Kenya is nowhere more palpable than in the urban areas. The socio-economic, political and cultural situation of the underclass in Kenya, especially in Nairobi, represents the dark side of the so-called urban renewal development. This is not only the crux of the matter, but it is a timely observation and a fact that continues to challenge the conscience of the urban and national authorities. For example, there is still a tragic gap between promises made to the slum dwellers by the politicians and the fulfillment of such promises. So the problem today is that we have mayors, councillors and members of parliament who have been making promises to the inhabitants of the slums but have not kept those promises (Mwangi, 1983).

Most respondents acknowledged that ethnic violence which engulfed Mathare slum in the aftermath of the 2007 General Election in Kenya was a result of ethnically polarized politics. Mathare slum became a death bed where ethnic cleansing was the order of the day. Politicians managed to divide slum inhabitants along ethnic lines in order to get the votes. The violence that rocked Mathare slums pitted the supporters of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) against the supporters of the Party of National Unity (PNU). The violence was between the two major ethnic communities in Mathare, that is the Luo and the Agikuyu. The formation of political parties along ethnic lines as was the case with ODM and PNU is also reported by Ocharo (2000), Omolo (1998), and Oyugi (1999). Their studies suggested that competitive politics are held in a number of countries in Africa, where new parties and people's organizations that draw support from ethnic groups emerge. The Kenyan case presents a complex experience where ethnicity asserts greater influence on polity, economy and social value. The permeating influence of ethnicity in Kenya weakens the nation state project, patriotism, democratization and governance in the country.

The study in Mathare also revealed that ethnic animosity is prevalent in the slum where there is a strong intra- ethnic cohesion as opposed to inter- ethnic cooperation. This fuels violence in the slum because members of different ethnic groups view one another with suspicion and can easily be provoked into fighting. Political parties draw ethnic support in the slum areas because the slum inhabitants believe that their interests can be well taken care of by “one of their own”. This supports the findings of Parkin (1966) in a study conducted in Nairobi. He has pointed some developments that provided the basis of the belief held by the Luo in Nairobi that since Kenya’s independence the Agikuyu were acquiring political power in the nation as well as the city, at their expense. The emergency period (1952–59) led to the imprisonment, detention, and restriction of the Agikuyu in Nairobi. They were removed from ethnically mixed housing estates, which were by far the most typical places of residence available for the poor. One such estate was Kaloleni. After the removal of the Agikuyu, it became an estate predominantly inhabited by the Luo and is still popularly referred to as such. It was the scene of many of the Luo political meetings and activities. A second consequence of the restrictions on the Agikuyu was that the Luo increased their hold on small business enterprises, especially market stalls of which there are many in Nairobi. The third consequence was that the proportion of the Luo in Nairobi and the labour force increased markedly during that period (Parkin, 1966). As the proportions of the Agikuyu in Nairobi began to increase after the emergency period, the labour force, housing estates, and small businesses, reverted swiftly to the pre-emergency level. This scenario posed a serious threat to the Luo who owned most of these resources. The Kenya People’s Union (KPU) was formed to cater for the interests of the Luo after the fallout in the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The KPU factions within the Luo Union became more popular, seeming to signify and confirm the observation that the party had increased significantly the desire of its Luo membership.

According to the findings of this study, it was revealed that some of the respondents were able to vote for candidates from other ethnic groups different from their own. This, however, is in contrast with the findings of a study conducted by Shlomo (1969) in a provincial Israeli town (Ayara) that was established in the 1950s and was inhabited mainly by recent immigrants from various North African and Eastern European countries. He produced evidence which showed that ethnic based political parties were a common phenomenon the world over. He observed local election campaigns in Ayara. For about ten years, until 1965, the *Lammed Aayin*, (a middle – of the road liberal party on the national level) branch of Ayara was virtually a Moroccan ethnic party. In 1969 there was a change, the leader of *Lammed Aayin* a Moroccan, had left town, and the leadership vacuum created at the top had not been adequately filled by another Moroccan, with the consequence that the main position in the party was taken by a veteran European. It lost its attraction for the Moroccan electorate that had formerly supported it with enthusiasm, in the 1969 polls it failed dismally and lost all its representation.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

In the light of the discussions above, the study concludes that physical violence is the most common form of violence in the slum while ethno-political competition and economic deprivation are the major causes of violence in Mathare slums. Most violence is perpetrated by middle aged male youths. This category of the population comprised the majority of the slum inhabitants. Their involvement in violence has been attributed to the fact that they were not employed. This means that they lacked steady income and were easily lured into activities involving the use of violence. The most common forms of physical violence included police shooting, robbery with violence, mugging, burning houses, vandalizing other people's property, mob justice, rape and zoning of residential places.

Economic hardship has forced slum dwellers to engage in stiff competition for scarce resources. This has resulted in a high rate of violence cases being reported in the slums. Issues related to rent was reported to account for many violence incidents where a large majority of the respondents acknowledged that they had clashed with the landlord/landlady or at least knew someone who had been involved in such clashes. Rent problems are exacerbated by the fact that many slum inhabitants are poor and can't afford to pay rent promptly.

There is also a feeling among the slum dwellers that the slum land belongs to the government and thus they should not be under any obligation to pay rent. On the other hand, landlords/landladies also believe that they are the genuine owners of the structures and by extension the land on which they are erected on and so they claim the right to be paid the rent. Such grand standings have been the major cause of violence related to rent in the slum. There is also violence arising from the need to control lucrative business opportunities such as illegal brewing sites. Other economic factors leading to violence include fighting for business spaces such as areas for constructing kiosks or selling places by the road side. There was also the aspect of violence arising from the sale of grabbed land or land allocated to political supporters by the politicians.

Illegal connections of water and electricity also contributed to violence between the criminal gangs and the members of the public who fail to pay for such services and also between the gangs and the government officials who may want to disconnect such lines. This mainly concerned water and electricity services. Ethnicity played a major role in promoting violence in the slum. Some landlords/landladies deny tenants from certain ethnic communities a chance to rent their houses. Or when they are allowed, rent is hiked. Ethnic discrimination on rental houses has also led to violence. Business spaces are allocated to individuals based on ethnic affiliations. Gang recruitment is based on ethnic background. When such gangs clashed, the innocent members of the public are also attacked because of the ethnic difference. Politics in the slum has also taken the ethnic dimension where people vote along ethnic lines. Politicians have been blamed for



fuelling violence in the slums. They have perfected the art of ethnic politics where one gets votes in areas dominated by one's tribesmen. Politicians play a big role in fuelling violence in the slums. This was evident during the campaigns when a lot of inter-ethnic violence was instigated. This led to the heightening ethnic tension among slum inhabitants who bore the brunt of ethnic clashes. Politicians also allocate resources to the slum dwellers along ethnic lines. Such resources include jobs, land and education bursaries.

## **5.6 Recommendations**

The recommendations made in this section are derived from the study findings. There are two categories of recommendations namely, policy recommendation and recommendation on areas for further research. Policy recommendations call for closer working relationship between the government agencies and the slum communities. The agencies that are critical in solving some of the problems identified in the study area include National youth development fund and the Rent dispute tribunal. The study also give recommendation on areas for further research to identify the root cause of some problems such as negative ethnicity and poverty which play a major role in promoting violence in Mathare slum.

### **5.6.1 Policy recommendations**

This study has come up with the following policy recommendations:

- The rent dispute tribunal should work closely with slum communities to arbitrate on rent disputes in order to avoid violence arising from cases related to rent.
- The government through the ministry of Sports and Youth Development should give priority to the slum youths when distributing youth funds. This will be a good source of capital to start businesses and provide self employment.

### **5.6.2 Recommendations on areas for research**

This study has come up with the following recommendations for future research:

- A study on the root cause of ethnicity to address the ethnic grievances that the country has continued to grapple with over the past years.
- A detailed study on how to tackle the problem of poverty in the slums.

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**APPENDIX I : STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE**

This questionnaire is going to enable me obtain information about the factors that predisposes slum dwellers to violence. The information given will only be used for the purpose of this and will remain confidential.

Tick the appropriate answer and where applicable write the required responses in the spaces provided.

**SECTION 1****SOCIO- ECONOMIC & DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

S/NO	QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
1.	How old are you?	1-Between 18 to 30yrs 2-Between 31 to 40yrs 3-Between 41 to 50yrs 4-51Yrs and above
2	What is your gender?	1-Male 2-Female
3.	What is your ethnic community?	
4.	What is your level of education?	1-None 2-Primary 3-Secondary 4-College /university 5-Others (specify)
5.	What is your marital status?	1- Single 2- Married 3- Divorced 4- Widow 5- Separated 6- Others (specify)
6.	What is your employment status?	1-Self employed

		2-Permanent employment 3-Casual labor 4- Unemployed.
7	If married what is the employment status of your spouse?	1-Self employed 2-Permanent employment 3-Casual labor 4-Unemployed
8.	What is your income per month?	Kshs 1-Less than 5,000 2-Between 5,000 to 10,000 3-10,000 and above.
9.	If married what is the income of your spouse per month?	Kshs 1- Less than 5,000 2-Between 5,000 to 10,000 3- 10,000 and above.
10	What is your household daily expenditure?	Kshs 1-Less than 100 2-Between-100 to 200 3-200 and above
11	How much do you pay for rent?	Kshs 1-Less than 500 2-Between 500 to 1000 3-Between 1000 to 2000 4- 2000 and above.
12.	Where do you obtain water from?	1-Local stream 2-City council taps 3-Others (Specify)
13	Do you pay for water?	1-Yes 2-No
<b>SECTION 2</b>	<b>FORMS OF VIOLENCE</b>	

1.	What are the common forms of violence in this slum?	1-Physical assault 2-Rape 3-Psychological torture 4-A combination of the above 5-Others (specify)
2.	Have you ever been attacked by anyone?	1-Yes 2-No
3.	What happened to you?	1-Sustained injury 2-Lost property 3-Sustained injury 4-Others (specify)
4.	Estimate the age of the perpetrator	1-Young 2-Middle age 3-Old
5.	What was the gender of the perpetrator	1-Male 2-Female
6.	Do you know someone who has been attacked?	1-Yes 2-No
7.	What happened to him/her?	1-Sustained injury 2-Lost property 3-Sustain injury and lost property 4-Others (specify)
8	Have you ever been attacked by any illegal gangs?	1-Yes 2-No
9	If yes how are they called?	
10	Do you know of any person who has been attacked by these gangs?	1-Yes 2-No
11	Have you ever been involved in any confrontation in public?	1-Yes 2-No
12	Have you ever seen anybody being lynched by members of the public?	1-Yes

		2-No
<b>SECTION 3</b>	<b>ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT CAUSES VIOLENCE</b>	
1	Which economic factors have always caused violence in the slum?	1-Fighting for business space and control 2-Fighting over water and other resources 3-Conflict over rent rates 4-All the above 5-Others (Specify)
2	Have you ever clashed with your landlord or landlady?	1-Yes 2-No
3	If yes what was the cause of the clash?	1-Rent delay 2-Rent dispute 3-Forced eviction 4-Misuse of the building 5-All the above 6-Others (specify)
<b>SECTION 4</b>	<b>ETHNO-POLITICAL FACTORS THAT CAUSES VIOLENCE</b>	
1	Have you ever seen members of your community fighting with members of another ethnic community?	1-Yes 2-No
2	Do you think politicians contribute to violence in this slum?	1-Yes 2-No
3	If yes, in what ways?	1-They organize and fund the groups 2-Incite people 3-Use hate speech during campaigns 4-Others (specify)
4	Can you vote for a president, councilor or	-Yes 2-No

	an MP who is not from your community?	
5	What are the advantages of electing a leader from your community?	1-You get handouts 2-You get jobs 3-You get bursary 4- Others (specify)
6	What are the disadvantages of electing a leader from your community?	1-You miss handouts 2-You miss jobs 3-You miss bursary 4- Others (specify)
7	What can you do if someone is rigging out your preferred political candidate?	1-Beat him 2-Abuse him 3- Others (specify)
8	Can you accept to be hired to cause chaos during political campaigns?	-Yes 2-No
<b>SECTION 5</b>	<b>STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH VIOLENCE</b>	
1 .	How do you cope with violence cases in this slum?	1-Organizing protection groups 2-Arming one's self 3-Walking in group 4-Staying in door 5-All of the above 6- Others (specify)

## APPENDIX II: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Position held in the village -----

Sex-----

Education level-----

Village-----

Ethnic community-----

1-How long have you stayed in this slum?

2-What are the major causes of violence in this slum?

3-Which types of violence are common in the slum?

4-In what ways do politicians contribute to the violence?

5-Are there economic factors which have always led to violence in this slum?

6-What role does ethnicity play in promoting violence in this slum?

7-What types of ethnic relationship exist in the slum?

8-What have been the consequences of violence to the victims?

## **APPENDIX III**

### **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE**

1-What are the major causes of violence in this slum?

2-Which types of violence are common in this slum?

3-Are there economic factors which have always led to violence in this slum?

4-What are the people's perceptions about the forms of violence that are reported in the slum?

5-Are there cases of landlord-tenant based violence?

6-Are there violence originating from waste disposal?

7-Can you vote for a leader from another ethnic community?

**Thank you very much for taking your time to answer my questions and your assistance.**