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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KENYA: THE POLITICS OF  
MYSTIFICATION AND POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM.

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WORKING PAPER No. 284

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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL  
MYSTIFICATION AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS

By

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Income Distribution in Kenya: The Politics of Mystification and Possessive Individualism.

Introduction:- Distribution Politics.

The main issue in the politics of distribution can be stated quite simply;. Why should a ruling class or if one wishes, a ruling elite that controls or directly owns the principal means of production- in the Kenyan case primarily land- suddenly or even gradually be interested in distribution? If we start by making the rather axiomatic assumption that it is in the interest of the ruling elite to control or directly own the land and the limited capital then the answer to the question ceases to be a straightforward one. Where it is straightforward it involves a prior demonstration that the question is the wrong one.

According to the latter position, such a ruling elite would never be interested in distribution. Rather it is likely to be more interested in consolidating its position so that it can eventually emerge as a ruling class proper able to defend its economic and political position by using the state machinery at its disposal. The question therefore, is not how to get the ruling elite interested in distribution, but rather how to organise the rest to take control of the principal means of production. In other words, distribution cannot be predicated on the very owners of the assets to be distributed but rather on the non-owning outsiders, be they the urban poor or the rural landless and millions of small-holders.

The other view is that a ruling elite will become interested in distribution out of what has sometimes been referred to as "enlightened self-interest." According to this view<sup>1</sup>, the rich may

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1. See for example, Hirschman, A.O. A Journey Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America. N.Y.: 20th Century Fund 1963. chapter 5, for a discussion of what he refers to as "reform-mongers" approach.

- 2 -

fear rightly or wrongly that unless the burden of the poor is somehow eased, the latter's revolutionary potential may be realised, in which case the farmer will lose all in a total revolution. In order, therefore, to avoid the "grim" prospects of losing all, the rich may be prepared to give up something, sometimes to the extent of investing heavily in certain areas such as education and health. The long-term pay-off would be better educated and healthier labour to operate the rich's capital.<sup>1</sup>

A variation of the "enlightened self-interest" view is that cleavages within a ruling elite may be serious enough for some groups to seek support from other groups in the polity thereby increasing the effective representation of the hitherto outside groups. Thus "in some circumstances a rising industrial bourgeoisie and the dominant rural groups (be they feudal lords or rich peasants) will eventually fall out over the setting of the prices of agricultural products relative to those of industrial goods." As all urban groups have an interest in cheap food this may lead to an alliance between the urban workers and urban capitalists against the landed interests. "With the same end in mind they may also side with peasant's demands for distributist land reform if the resulting small-holder system promises a better economic and political accommodation."<sup>2</sup>

The major problem with the "enlightened self-interest" argument and its variation is that they are both premised on the psychological and sociological "ifs" of the ruling groups and as such they put the destiny of the poor at the mercy of Social/Psychological variables they cannot control. At best the argument is patronising to the poor. At worst, the argument assumes "trickle down" benefits to the poor from a position of helplessness even if we assume increasing

1. See C.L.G. Bell Chapter III in Hollis Chenery et al., Redistribution With Growth Oxford University Press, 1974pp. 54 ff. for an elaboration of the argument.

2. Bell op cit

better representation, for the simple reason that no ruling group would be "enlightened" enough to work itself out of control.

A more likely situation is that the so-called "enlightened-self-interest" would be a public relations exercise aimed at blurring the contradictions by putting the emphasis on the less vital aspects of the economy, while all along ignoring the principal questions of land ownership and access to capital. Thus one would expect the question of incomes to be discussed primarily in terms of wage employment and taxation policies, and reforms would be instituted in these areas. This would be a "safe" approach in a capitalist country like Kenya which heavily subscribes to the notion of growth, for then "good" economic arguments could be adduced to show why things are the way they are, or should be. Thus it can for example be argued that the industrial sector is not growing as fast as the labour supply and thus there is increasing unemployment. At the same time it can be shown that taxes are not too heavy on the poor and the rich cannot be taxed anymore without endangering investment potential. Conversely it can be shown that tax relief on the poor increases consumption and dissipates investments. With reference to the supply of labour the question of the kind of training available and to whom, is likely to be discussed superficially and if discussed seriously, the obvious recommendations are likely to go unimplemented. By the same token, taxation is likely to be presented as a distributive mechanism while it is obvious that taxing the rich - even when the taxes are heavy - does not mean automatically benefitting the poor. The real issue is what one does with the revenue.

The Planning/Administrative equivalent of the "enlightened self-interest" view is decentralisation of decision-making from, in the case of Kenya, the national level to the district level, so that the smaller unit is able to take local conditions into account and thus

facilitate better allocation and utilisation of scarce resources. This argument, like its political equivalent has many shortcomings. First, decentralisation or devolution of decision-making is meaningful only if the poor are allowed to play an active role in determining how resources are allocated. Secondly, decentralisation though a necessary condition for reducing inequality need not involve the poor at all, unless the latter are already organised to take advantage of the opportunities offered by decentralised decision-making. In other words, real decentralisation - which must include financial decentralisation - must be complemented by local mobilisation otherwise the former might make the situation worse than before by allowing local dominant groups to capture the decentralised institutions and lines of access to the, detriment of the poor.<sup>1</sup> Thus, in the absence of a "poor-oriented mobilization", decentralisation could easily become the best form of mystification. It is difficult to imagine a "poor-oriented mobilization" springing from above, purely, as an administrative issue in the absence of a similar kind of ideology. In the presence of such an ideology, then, there would be no need to impose the administrative mechanism for then it would be a logical consequence of the former.

Kenya is at present engaged in decentralising planning to the District level, and to some it looks like an exercise in bringing the central government closer to the people for the purpose of better

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1. See Bell, *Op.cit.* p. 66. Also Ng'ethe "Development Administration and Decentralisation: Some Political/Administrative Considerations". *Univ. of Nairobi. I.D.S. WP. 257 1976* and Ng'ethe et al. "Reaching the Rural Poor: Lessons from The Special Rural Development Programme in Kenya". Paper originally prepared for the International Conference of Agricultural Economists at Nairobi, Aug. 1976. See also Schaffer, B.B. "The Deadlock in Development Administration" in Politics and Change in Developing Countries. C.T. Leys (Ed). Cambridge University Press 1969 for a critique of the Community Development approach in relation to issues of development administration.



control especially in the light of the miniscule finances and financial powers granted to the District Development Committees. This issue is, however, too broad to be fully discussed here. Instead, we shall concentrate on the issue of income distribution proper and the Government's reaction to the problem. First we shall present the findings of the I.L.O. mission to Kenya in 1972.<sup>1</sup> and secondly we shall discuss the Government's reaction to the findings.

Income Distribution in Kenya - A Study in inequality.

The I.L.O. mission took a fairly comprehensive view of the problems of incomes in Kenya. That is to say, the Mission concerned itself not with the purely technical aspects of income distribution but with what it termed a developmental "strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya." As the title of the report correctly implies, "Productive employment" was the key organising concept of the report. Thus, the mission tried to provide descriptive data on rural employment problems, migration into the urban areas, urban employment problems, employment problems among particular groups, inequality and imbalance, and the colonial emergence of the whole problem of employment and income maldistribution. The report then went on to suggest a sector by sector analysis with a view to providing guidelines for increasing sectoral productive employment. Throughout the report, the authors were at pains to point out that their conception of employment was a great deal broader than the conventional one. They conceived employment to include the formal sector, the informal sector, and most important, the people with insufficient land and those "occupied for very long hours" but whose "return from this work provide no more than a poverty standard of living". In other words, the mission claimed to

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1. Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya. I.L.O. Geneva 1972.

have focussed on the poor and not just the unemployed. Said the mission:

"Focusing on poverty has one fundamental implication for the coverage of the report: One is drawn to consider all poverty groups, not just the unemployed or even those working short time. Those with insufficient land, or the working poor in the towns, are often occupied for very long hours. But if their returns from this work provide no more than a poverty standard of living they are just as much part of the problem of the unemployed."

Since the data is readily available in the report, we shall in this section concentrate on the major conclusions and focus specifically on the issue of income distribution, per se. The overall conclusion of the mission was quite clear viz. that the development strategy in Kenya since independence has relied primarily on the continuation of the former colonial structures. Those structures invariably created inequalities and were intended to do so. The strategy of the colonial regime was to emphasise growth mainly of the formal agricultural sector since that was the main source of income for the settlers' exports and foreign exchange for the country, tax revenue for the Government and, in turn, a level and pattern of demand for goods and services somewhat above the average level of the middle class in Europe." The reliance on the old structures and strategies has, not unexpectedly, we might add, resulted in growth particularly in agriculture, small-scale sector, as well as industry and services. Yet unemployment and gross inequality continue and in some respects may even have increased."<sup>2</sup> The data below illustrates some of the bases of the conclusion. It should be pointed out, however, that

1. I.L.O. Mission. op. cit. p.3

2. Ibid p. 83: Several other people have arrived at this conclusion independently. See in particular Colin Leys Neo-Colonialism and Under-development in Kenya . HEP 1975

data and particularly data on income distribution in the colonial days is not easily available and, therefore, the I.L.O. report lacks a vital historical dimension.

To state the obvious, the majority of the people in Kenya live in the rural areas. It is, therefore, important to first and foremost focus on this majority, which not only includes the majority of the poor in Kenya, but also the poorest of the poor, and hence most of the largest groups for any strategy aimed at mitigating inequality. Table I, overleaf, shows the state of income distribution in the rural areas. The table only gives the sources of incomes in the rural areas and as such does not address itself to the question of individual incomes or rural regional incomes, and neither does it address itself to the question of incomes among various groups in the rural areas. An interesting observation from the data is that 40% of the K£231 million came from sources other than agriculture as such.

Of more relevance to us is table II which shows the distribution of earnings among people employed in the formal agricultural sector and forestry. (The two are often statistically grouped together.)

The data from table II shows that over 90% of the people earned less than K£200/= per month, which is an indication of a highly skewed distribution of incomes in these two sectors. Now, it might be argued that there is something intrinsic to the formal agricultural sector that forces the distribution of incomes to be skewed in the manner shown in Table II. Additional data suggests that the size of the farm is an important contributor to the skewness of the distribution, for among other things it is the big farmer who is likely to have access to credit, knowledge and modern agricultural

Table I Rural Incomes, 1969

	£ million
1. Gross domestic product at factor cost outside the monetary economy:	
Agriculture	89.0
Other	26.1
2. Contribution of small-scale agriculture to the gross domestic product in the monetary sector at factor cost:	
Accruing to owners	20.7
Other items	9.1
3. Estimate of contribution of African-owned part of large-scale agricultural sector to the gross domestic product in the monetary sector, at factor cost (net of worker's earnings)	8.7
4. African agricultural wages in the modern agricultural sector	10.6
5. Assumed remittances from the urban sector (20 per cent of the remainder of the African wage bill)	18.3
6. Contribution of small-scale rural non-agricultural enterprises to gross domestic product in the monetary sector:	
Accruing to owners	13.6
Accruing to hired workers	4.6
7. Earnings from wage employment in rural non-agricultural industries in the modern sector	30.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>231.4</b>

Source: ILO, Employment Incomes and Equality, p. 333.

Table II Distribution of Income in Agriculture and Forestry

Income Groups (Sh. per month)	Percentage of Employees
100 and less	61.5
100 - 149	19.9
150 - 199	9.9
200 - 299	3.3
300 - 399	1.6
400 - 599	1.1
600 - 999	0.7
1000 - 1499	0.7
1500 - 1999	0.5
Over 2000	0.9

Source: ILO , Employment, Incomes and Equality, op.cit., Table 60,p.354.

technologies.<sup>1</sup> Table III, among other things suggests that land size is an important factor. In complementing table II, Table III shows that even when all the economic groups in the rural areas are considered, we still have a skewed distribution, thus making the majority of the rural households poor, since the majority of them belong to the last category of small-holders, pastoralists, unemployed and landless.<sup>2</sup>

1. Studies on rural technology and credit availability have tended to confirm this hypothesis. See among others. "The Second Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme in Kenya" Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, Ocassional Paper No.20,1975.

2. For more information see I.L.O. op.cit. pp. 33-43. p. 75 and p.96

Table III

- 10 -

Household Income Distribution by Economic Group and Income Size,  
1968 - 70.

Economic Group	Annual Income (£)
Big Farmers	1000 and over
Less Prosperous Big Farmers	600 - 1000
Prosperous Smallholder and better - off Owners of non-agricultural rural Enterprises	200 - 600
Significant proportion of smallholders and most owners of non-agricultural Rural Enterprises	120 - 200
Employees in Formal Sector Agriculture and a small proportion of owners of non- agricultural Rural Enterprises	60 - 120
Workers employed on small holding and in rural non-agricultural enterprises; sizeable number of smallholders	20 - 60
Smallholders; pastoralists in semi-arid and arid zones; unemployed and landless persons in rural areas	20 or less

Source: ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality, Table 25, p.74

It should be pointed out here that there is a real dearth of firm data on personal incomes in the rural areas. It is for this reason that some researchers have argued that it is better to assess the distribution of income related items such as consumer durables, cattle etc. Studies at the Institute for Development Studies show that even using the criteria of "income related items" an "unequal

distribution of economic status" is still revealed.<sup>1</sup>

Referring specifically to the question of rural incomes, the I.L.O. mission concluded that "the group of persons who have failed to derive much benefit from the growth generated since independence includes the great majority of small-holders, employees in the rural sector urban working poor and the urban and rural unemployed".<sup>2</sup> We now turn to the question of urban income distribution. Table IV below summarises the situation as of 1968 - 1969. The data presented in Table IV has

Table IV Urban household Income distribution before and after tax  
1968-69

Income brackets (Sh. per month before tax)	House holds Absolute Number (thousands)	Share of total urban households income (percentage) Percentage	Before After tax Tax	
			Before Tax	After tax
0 - 199	16.3	8.5	1.1	1.1
200 - 299	31.9	16.6	4.8	4.8
300 - 399	25.5	13.3	5.2	5.3
400 - 499	17.4	9.1	4.6	4.6
500 - 699	26.0	13.5	9.2	9.3
700 - 999	19.0	9.9	9.6	9.5
1000 - 1399	18.9	9.9	13.4	14.3
1400 - 1999	17.8	9.3	17.9	17.8
2000 and Over	19.1	9.9	34.1	33.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>191.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

1. Total may not add up exactly owing to rounding.

Source: I.L.O. page 75.

1. See. Diana Hunt. "Methodological Issues and Selected Findings of an Analysis of the Distribution of Wealth and Income in Mbere Division, Eastern Kenya" I.D.S. Working Paper No. 212. (March 75) and Michael Cowen "Concentration of Sales and Assets: Dairy Cattle and Tea in Maguti, 1964-71." I.D.S. Working Paper No. 146 1972. The point made above did not originate with the author. It was made in L.P. Mureithi and J.O. Otieno "Food, Population and Rural Development in Kenya: Progress, Policies, Problems and Prospects." p. 47, Paper presented at the XVI International Conference of Agricultural Economists. Nairobi, Kenya, August, 1976.

2. Op.cit. page 96.

serious shortcomings by self-admission of the I.L.O. mission. The major shortcoming is that the sample omitted most of the urban shanty areas and also European and Asian households. The result was an exclusion of many African household servants, many of whom earn less than 200/= a month. The data thus understates both the proportion earning more than 1,000/= a month and the proportion earning less than 200/= a month. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the data shows a high degree of income concentration among households. The top 10 and 20 percent of households account for 35 and 55 percent of the total urban household income respectively, while the bottom 25 per cent receive a mere 6 percent.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from showing the income concentration among households, the data in table IV raises important questions on the distributive role of taxation in Kenya. It is quite evident that income tax did little to alter the situation. Even highly progressive income tax might simply reduce the shares of those earning very high incomes without in any way affecting the low income earners. That is to say, the benefits to the poor accruing from highly progressive taxation system are not automatic. They can only follow through extra distributive measures other than mere penalising of the rich to increase government revenue. In other words, the issue is really not the rate of taxation but the existence or non-existence of distributive mechanisms.<sup>2</sup> If the

1. Other less biased data shows that the proportion of employees in the formal sector (excluding agriculture and mining) earning less than 200/= was 17 percent in Nairobi, 17.6 per cent in Mombasa and 33.9 per cent in Kisumu compared with 6.5. per cent, 14.7 per cent and 8.9 per cent respectively according to Table IV. I.L.O. Op. Cit p. 76.

2. There is some evidence to show that the Income Tax structure in Kenya has attempted to become slightly more progressive since 1972 especially with reference to personal Income Tax. This was especially so after the introduction in 1973 of "tax relief" system of deducting allowances for income tax purpose. i.e. allowances are given on total tax liability rather than on gross income as in the past. The old system, by its way of calculation gave more tax relief to those with higher income and less to those with lower incomes. In the same year 1973, a new personal income tax rate was introduced, which some claim



issue is not taxation as such but how the money is spent, then, table overleaf; . . . assumes some importance because it throws some light on regional expenditures and disparities.

It is correct to say that a high proportion of national output and income is generated in a few districts. Other districts, and especially in Eastern and North-Eastern Provinces have a very small share in total economic activity. However Table V gives just one indication of regional disparities. Another way of measuring regional disparities would be to look at total government expenditure in each district. Unfortunately the Kenya Government provides statistics only on a ministerial basis although work is under way by the Ministry of Finance and economic Planning to disaggregate the statistics on a District by District basis.<sup>1</sup> In terms of the vital question of land availability, Table V begins to answer some questions. When columns G and H are read carefully, one begins to form pretty accurate hypotheses as to where the race for land acquisition is going on. It should be noted in this respect that the most crowded provinces currently hold the political power.

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Footnote No.2 from Page 12 Continues.

was more progressive than before. However, the problem of escaping taxes or even downright waiving through political influence still remains. For details on the structure of income tax in Kenya see among others. "Income Elasticity of Tax structure, in Kenya", by A.M. Ole M.A. thesis, University of Nairobi, 1975, J.R. Nellis. "Who pays Tax in Kenya?" Scandinavian Inst. of African Studies. Research Report No.11. 1973; Westlake "Kenya's Extraneous and Irrational System of Personal Income Taxation". I.D.S. Staff Paper No. 101 1971; M.Westlake "Kenya's Indirect Tax structure and the Distribution of Income" I.D.S Staff Paper 102 1971.

1. District level research shows that even within the Districts there are enormous disparities with resources and Incomes tending to flow into areas which were originally ~~settled~~ settled by the colonial settlers. This is certainly true of Baringo District. See for example Kabiru Kinyanjui and Njuguna Ng'ethe. Training Within Underdevelopment: The Case of Baringo Development Training Centre: An Evaluation on Behalf of the Ministry of Housing and Social Services. Nairobi June 1976.

Table V

## SELECTED INDICATORS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES, 1969-70

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Province and District	Population (thousands)	Population per km <sup>2</sup>	Km. of road <sub>2</sub> per 1,000km <sup>2</sup>	Banking in terms of educational expenditure	Percentage of population in primary school	Area under cash crops as % cultivated area	Percentage of high-potential cultivated area	Availability of Good agricultural land (Hectares per person)
<u>Coast</u>								
Kilifi	302	24	56.7	19	7.6	66	8.4	0.5
Kwale	206	25	60.7	21	7.1	42	15.3	0.8
Lamu	22	4	22.2	32	4.6	-	1.1	3.3
Mombasa	247	-	200.5	n.a	10.6	-	-	n.a
Taita	111	6	22.5	20	16.7	66	2.5	0.5
Tana River	51	1	14.1	25	7.7	-	1.9	2.4
<u>North-Eastern</u>								
Garissa	64	1	11.8	31	2.5	-	-	-
Mandera	95	4	10.6	33	1.5	-	-	-
Wajir	86	2	17.9	29	1.5	-	-	-
<u>Eastern</u>								
Embu	179	62	123.3	17	17.2	7	24.4	0.6
Isiolo	30	1	13.6	30	8.3	-	-	n.a
Kitui	343	11	40.8	14	12.4	16	2.2	0.9
Machakos	707	50	65.6	3	17.8	24	8.8	0.4
Marsabit	52	1	13.7	27	3.9	-	0.05	n.a
Meru	597	63	69.0	7	13.3	35	24.3	0.4
<u>Central</u>								
Kiambu	476	127	267.3	1	20.9	41	48.1	0.4
Kirinyanga	217	146	151.2	15	14.5	23	68.5	0.5
Murang'a	445	178	204.1	4	21.9	18	84.0	0.5
Nyandarua	177	54	127.6	18	19.5	86	75.0	1.5
Nyeri	361	108	130.5	5	23.8	37	48.6	0.4

Table V continued

Province and District	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Baringo	162	15	61.2	13	9.8	-	15.6	1.2
Elgeyo Marakwet	159	57	99.8	8	9.7	23	38.1	0.7
Kajiado	86	4	39.0	23	9.0	-	1.1	n.a
Kericho	479	97	139.3	11	11.2	16	77.7	0.8
Laikipia	66	7	55.3	22	12.1	-	13.4	2.1
Nakuru	291	40	127.1	13	9.8	-	41.5	1.0
Nandi	209	75	133.7	8	9.7	8	85.4	1.1
Narok	125	7	46.3	24	5.0	-	49.0	7.3
Samburu	70	3	20.2	28	3.3	-	6.7	2.2
Trans-Nzoia	124	50	134.6	8	9.7	-	84.2	1.7
Turkana	165	2	13.2	26	0.9	-	0.2	n.a
Uasin Gishu	191	50	135.8	8	9.7	-	86.5	1.7
West Pokot	82	16	71.8	8	9.7	-	28.2	1.3
<u>Nyanza</u>								
Kisii	675	304	212.1	9	12.6	31	100.0	0.3
Kisumu	401	192)	173.4	6	(10.8	21)	93.7	0.6
Siaya	383	151)			12.9	9)		0.9
South Nyanza	663	114	149.5	10	7.2	20	99.1	
<u>Western</u>								
Bungoma	345	113	138.0	12	16.8	13	82.1	0.7
Busia	200	119	196.9	16	13.9	20	100.0	0.8
Kakamega	783	220	176.1	2	12.4	13	92.3	0.4

n.a. = not available - a magnitude negligible.

Source: ILO, Employment Incomes and Equality (Geneva, 1972), Table 28.p.78 & Table 1, p.35

The data provided by the I.L.O. mission does not give very good basis for making a final observation comparing income disparities between the rural and the urban areas. However the overall conclusion of the mission on this issue was that:-

"It is highly misleading to talk in terms of average rural and urban incomes. In both rural and urban areas there is a high degree of income inequality. Owners of large farms, a sizeable number of better of farmers (Some 225,000), many owners of non-agricultural enterprises as well as the highly skilled agricultural employees in the formal sector and the majority of rural non-agricultural employees in the formal sector can be described as relatively well off i.e. with incomes in excess of £200 a year. On the other hand nearly 25 per cent of urban employees in the formal sector, and the majority of urban employees and self-employed persons in the informal sector, must be counted among the working poor. Nevertheless it remains true that in terms of absolute numbers the great majority of the poor people in Kenya are to be found in the rural areas".<sup>1</sup>

The opposite side of the coin is that broad groups of persons have benefited substantially from the growth of the economy since independence. These groups include Kenyans who have filled the high level jobs previously held by expatriates, people who somehow acquired land transferred from European farmers to African settlers, those who have been in a position to take advantage of new opportunities in trading, building, transportation, small-scale manufacturing, repair and service firms, and finally the relatively large group of employees in the modern, urban sector who have been able to secure increases of

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1. I.L.O. op.cit p. 76

6-8 per cent a year in their real incomes since independence.<sup>1</sup>

The final diagnosis by the mission was that "a high degree of income inequality is a characteristic features of private enterprise economies in an early stage of development. Further, those inequalities tend to be intensified with the growth of the economy over long periods of time. There are reasons to believe that such dynamic factors tending to perpetuate and intensify inequalities may be operative in the Kenya social and economic system."<sup>2</sup>

The situation has changed little if at all since 1972 when the I.L.O. team conducted its study. If it has changed some believe it has changed for the worse or at best remained constant. The data in the appendix shows that the situation with reference to wage employment has not changed much. In every year, over  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Africans in wage employment continued to earn less than 200/= per month and could be classified as poor. If one raises the poverty level to take account of the inflation since 1973, then the percentage of the poor increases astronomically. If the unemployed are taken into account, the situation assumes crisis proportions. This however is an issue that cannot be treated in detail here without going outside our principal concern with the Government policies in relation to the I.L.O. findings and recommendations. Here we shall concern ourselves with three issues which are central to income distribution and as such more problematic.

1. I.L.O. op.cit. Page 96. It is interesting to note that the I.L.O. report does not mention the politicians among those who have benefitted from growth. The other point is that the four categories (Five when we include politicians) are by no means mutually exclusive. If anything there is considerable, albeit non-systematic evidence to show that they overlap considerably. On the question of real incomes again there are signs that they have declined considerably since 1973, to the extent where some are actually poorer than they were in 1972. The hardest hit could be the rural people due to the rise in prices of urban goods.

2. I.L.O. Ibid page 97.

These are 1. The issue of unemployment and low incomes which was seen by the I.L.O. as a direct result of population growth, centre-periphery imbalances, and the imbalance between the formal and informal sectors. 2. The issue of income distribution proper whose major recommendations were a stabilization of the incomes of the top ten percent and of specification of rural and urban minimum incomes. 3. The issue of labour employment in agriculture through land redistribution.

The Response - Mystification or Enlightened Self Interest?

The Kenya Government's response to the I.L.O. findings and other criticisms related to income distribution is contained in the 1974-78 Development Plan and the Sessional Paper no. 10 on Employment, 1973. The latter document was the immediate and direct response to the I.L.O. findings and recommendations.<sup>1</sup>

According to the Government, six factors have contributed to unemployment in Kenya.<sup>2</sup> The factors are 1. rapidly increasing population. 2. increased school enrolments. 3. modernization itself which has rendered many of the traditional roles of men redundant. 4. greater efficiency in production leading to displacement of workers. 5. rapid growth of urban areas leading to rural urban migration. 6. institutional factors that have aggravated the cheapness of capital to labour. Of the six factors, the Government claims the last "which include the tax system, tariffs, industrial relations, and government regulations are especially within the power of Government to control".

1. There is no reason here to go into details on the ideological nature of the I.L.O. recommendations. The interested reader may want to look at 1. Livingstone "Creating Employment in Kenya the I.L.O. Mission Report" Journal of Administration Overseas vol XII(2) April, 1974 where he rightly argues that the I.L.O. recommendations were largely capitalist in nature.

2. Development Plan: 1974-78 Part 1: page 90-91.

The implication seems obvious. The rest of the factors are not especially within the power of the Government to control, though they must be taken into account when formulating the Government's strategy which comprises 1. Continued Rapid Growth 2. Family planning 3. Income Redistribution 4. Agricultural and Rural modernization 5. Education Reform 6. Promotion of small scale Enterprises.<sup>1</sup> With specific reference to low incomes, the Government sees the causes to include "lack of land to cultivate, insufficient education and training, and insufficient access to credit and technical knowledge".<sup>2</sup> This is a rather frank admission of the problem. One can argue that the Government can afford this kind of admission in a Development plan, by virtue of the fact that the plan does not need to address itself either to specifics or to immediate solutions.

The Sessional Paper is no more specific than the Development Plan. In general, however, the Government accepts in rather vague terms the I.L.O. recommendations except the one calling for a specification of minimum rural and urban incomes. The basis for the hedged non-acceptance is that "the Government feels that it possesses neither sufficient information nor sufficient means by which it can accept as policy objectives the specific minimum incomes suggested in the report."<sup>3</sup>

1. Development Plan op cit Page. 91

2. Ibid. Page 97.

The most interesting thing about this is that it is phrased in terms of "low incomes." The other side of the coin is of course, excessively high incomes due to easy (political) access to land, credit & technical knowledge,. It can be argued that this side of the coin is even more relevant in the context of scarce and finite resources and where the nature of the game comes dangerously close to a zero-sum situation. In terms of priorities, therefore, limiting unfair access is perhaps more important, for once groups of people become unfairly entrenched there would be no point, in a zero-sum situation, of "giving" access to the other groups, for by then it would simply be meaningless, and too late."

3. The figures were. Sh.120 for rural families and Sh.200 per month for Urban families. The Govt. goes on to add that the idea is "essentially a good idea." Sessional Paper. Op cit P. 23-24.



Referring to income distribution as apposed to low incomes the Government admits that the past policy of emphasising growth was wrong because it was based on the mistaken belief that "rapid economic growth would achieve sufficient employment automatically". The overall strategy, therefore would be one of emphasising competitive labour-intensive technology. The means for pursuing the strategy would be.

1. an Industrial Court to regulate increases in modern-sector wages and salaries so that the wage increases do not exceed the general growth rate of the economy.<sup>1</sup>
2. Labour Survey to enable the Government to discover the target groups.
3. Rural Works programme in order to increase the cash incomes of the landless and small-holders.<sup>2</sup>
- 4 Labour Market information. The Government then goes to enumerate what it refers to as "fundamental changes" which are tariffs, other taxes, promotion of small-scale industries, education, investment in amenities and rural development with particular emphasis on district planning.<sup>3</sup>

It is rather obvious from the above that the Government's strategy does not involve some of the most fundamental issues, True, the questions of access to land and credit (both agricultural and industrial) are discussed elsewhere in the plan - outside context of income distribution - but not in terms of reducing the unequal access.<sup>4</sup>

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1. At the time when the plan was being authored, the Government accepted the recommendations of Report of the Commission of Inquiry-Public Service Structure and Remuneration 1971 chaired by D.N. Ndegwa which among others recommended heavy increases in the salaries of certain categories of civil servants and also recommended that they be allowed to own and operate businesses. The Government's acceptance was contained in Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1974.

2. The Government has already started giving grants to District Development Committees under this programme. The grant is meant for labour-intensive rural activities such as afforestation and conservation activities. The projects however must be approved by the Provincial Planning Officer. The grants are quite small per District (64,000/= for Baringo District in 1974/75) and yet they have sometimes been reclaimed by the Treasury for non-utilisation, which raises the issue of local mobilisation.

3. Development Plan op.cit pp.95-98.

4. See the relevant chapters in the plan, especially chapters 4, 7, 10, 12, and 17.



The question of land is of particular importance since the Government agrees that lack of land to cultivate is one of the causes of low incomes. But having accepted that, the issue is then seen in terms of resettling the landless in the non-utilised state land. This is somewhat tricky for the underlying logic seems to be that there is an infinite supply of good agricultural state land in the country. If anything the case is quite the opposite. The demand could be infinite but the supply is definitely limited. The issue here is whether the logic of settlement schemes on unused state land is not actually incompatible with the logic of distribution and equity. In the case of land, the latter, if it is genuine, must assume a fixed supply, otherwise the issue of distribution does not arise at all except in the administrative sense of making sure that the land is acquired in an orderly fashion.<sup>1</sup> Assuming an infinite supply seems to be a political strategy intended to defer the questions on how the already occupied land has been distributed. Since the assumption is in reality wrong, the ensuing strategy can only be effective as a temporary measure, without the usually expected advantages of supplying guidelines for long-term policies.

The political importance of the land issue is underscored by the fact that while the Government was prepared to partially accept the recommendations of the I.L.O. mission with specific reference to income distribution,<sup>2</sup> it was not prepared to accept or even discuss the recommendations on land redistribution. The I.L.O. recommended.<sup>3</sup>

1. Even in the administrative sense, it is not that straightforward, unless we make the prior assumption that the landless are clearly recognised as such and furthermore that they are the only ones who are free as a matter of right to state their claims on unused state land and all the state has to do is recognise the claims. There could of course be a distributive element where the Government re-settles the people on land formerly owned by foreigners. The distributive element, however, depends on whether the resettled people receive the land at subsidised prices, and also on who and how many people get resettled on formerly occupied land.

2. Except the recommendation that minimum household income targets should be specified. Sh. 120 per month for rural families and Sh. 200/= per month for urban families (p.15).

3. I.L.O. Op.cit pp.17-18.

- (a) If the joint owners of a farm prefer to run it as a number of individual plots they should be actively encouraged to do so.
- (b) The Government should act as a willing buyer for any large farm offered for sale in the high potential areas for subdivision into settlement plots.
- (c) The Government should reposes any farm seriously in arrears with repayment to the Agricultural Finance Corporation or the Agricultural Development Corporation.
- (d) The larger holdings on existing settlement schemes should be subdivided.
- (e) In the longer-term, a progressive land tax related to the size and productive potential of the holding should be introduced.
- (f) In the longer-term, a ceiling on individual land holdings should be considered.

The Government's total response to these specific proposals was:- "The discussion of agriculture in the report generally conforms to the Government's understanding of the important issues in this sector. In particular, the Government accepts that programmes to achieve a more intensified use of land should be the central thrust of the country's policy for agriculture; this will be done in a framework which promotes co-operative farming in the large-scale farming areas. It is in the context of an intensification policy that programmes for land redistribution, for an expansion and improvement in extension services, and for farmers' education will be formulated. In addition, the Government's pricing policies and agricultural research programmes will be

formulated with this objective in mind."<sup>1</sup>

Considering the specific nature of the proposals, and the fact that in other sections of the Sessional Paper the Government's response is quite specific, the above statement is astounding in its vagueness. The Development Plan<sup>2</sup> is perhaps more specific in its mention of the need to start new settlement schemes.<sup>3</sup> "so that more people will be employed and the land will be used more intensively." However, the plan is equally specific in its emphasis of the importance of largescale farms which "in 1972 produced about 48 per cent of the gross marketed agricultural production / and / will therefore continue to receive support from various Government programmes such as the credit facilities organised by the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the extension services". Smallholder production is expected to become more important over time.<sup>4</sup> The issue of individual land ceiling is again not mentioned, and subdivision is referred to strictly in terms of large-scale farms formerly owned by expatriates and which have encountered capital and managerial difficulties after transfer to Africans. Where appropriate "the ministry will encourage subdivision of these farms into smaller more manageable units".<sup>5</sup>

1. Sessional Paper No 10 of 1973 on Employment, Republic of Kenya, Government Printer, P. 34.6p cit

2. Development plan op.cit Page 199-200.

3. In keeping with the Government's conception of the land problem.

4. It is interesting that the percentage quoted is that of large farms. The rest, (52%) largely comes from small farmers.

5. Plan op. cit Page 199-200.

Note: The refusal to discuss the land question in specific details assumes some importance when one observes that out of the more than eighty specific proposals that are discussed in the Sessional Paper, only about ten are rejected outrightly. The others are either "shown" to be part of existing government policy or they receive modified acceptance.

While it is difficult to summarize the overall government's reaction to income distribution issues, it is fair to say that on the whole the reaction reveals three strategies. The overall broad strategy has been to admit that the development policy of emphasising growth has left a lot to be desired by way of generating employment and reducing inequalities either inherited from the colonial era or generated since independence. Secondly, the Government has adopted the strategy of accepting as many proposals for reform as possible either in a modified form, or by simply arguing that the proposed reforms have already been incooperated into on-going government programmes. Where it cannot be argued that the reforms have already been incooperated into on-going programmes, the Government has attempted to argue that they are already part of the overall policy. Finally, the Government has tended to reject outright any suggestions that call for basic structural changes. The real political issue, however, is not really the Government's strategies for coping with criticisms, but the explanations of these strategies.

The Politicians' Explanation - Possessive Individualism.

The strategies outline above are perhaps not surprising given the nature of the Kenyan economic and social system and the general weakness of any would-be countervailing forces. What is perhaps surprising is that most of the proposed reforms have been fairly mild and generally compatible with the Government's philosophy of development and the institutions that it has accepted since independence. Some reform-minded members of Parliament have tended to see this contradiction in terms of the personal interests of some of the members of the executive arm of the Government. This was perhaps best revealed during the parliamentary debate urging the Government to adopt the I.L.O. recommendations. Most of the contributors to the debate were arguing within the framework of the present Kenyan economic system

and as such they cannot even today be constructed as radicals. Yet they saw themselves as outsiders to the extent where some sounded desperate. Said one member.

"--- some of us have started wondering where we are heading. One member said we are moving towards the right direction.... he happens to be in that class of wrong doers and when this class is going to be attacked by the mob there will be no time to explain his position. So long as the goods have not been delivered to the people the whole class is no good and is condemned by the masses. .... The court of the masses will take action and money will not help ... where are the Ministers? They are loving their neighbours as they love themselves by grabbing all the wealth"<sup>1</sup>

Another member sounded a similar note when he argued that "we have left the low income group in the same place where they were before we attained our independence, if not in a worse state than they were before. It is this same group of the top fellows that members of this House belong. It is this same group that this report directs it's stand". He went on to argue that the recommendations on land were one of the reasons why the report "has been opposed by certain people.. because [the report] recommends that the land which is at moment owned by the large-scale farmers should be splitted into smaller farms". Though this particular member was opposed to splitting of low potential land he saw the need for splitting high potential land and for the introduction of land tax for non-utilization of land because "we have people today who own hundreds of acres of land which is not being used simply because they have enough in terms of income because they

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1. Proceedings of the National Assembly. Vol. 30 Page 49.

may be landlords somewhere .... if this does not happen now, tomorrow may be too late because we are getting a few people entrenched in the whole system and they are grabbing everything: everything is being grabbed by only a few people".<sup>1</sup>

A third member came very close to making a theoretical statement refuting the "enlightened self-interest" view. Speaking on the issue of land he said.

".. It is difficult to change when the people who are supposed to change it are involved. ... We have sung this song long enough because we started in 1963. Let us not blame anybody now because has the Cabinet sat down and drafted a policy on land ceiling ... No! Because they are the biggest grabbers of land in this country. We must not just talk in this house. We must be able to lay the blame where it belongs and the Cabinet is the precise place where it belongs .... However, are we to sacrifice the interests of 12 million people on the altar of twenty three people?"<sup>2</sup>

Although the majority of the reform-minded members who contributed to the debate saw the problem in terms of individual possessiveness, the rare one saw it in terms of the capitalist economic system, but even here some confusion is revealed as the following quotation illustrates.

" Our economy is capitalist and any country which bases it's economy on capitalism is bound to have troubles. There are always troubles. There are always troubles because the idea of capitalism is to grab and ran. They do not mind the others

1. Ibid Vol. 29, 1973 Page 877 - 898.

2. Proceedings op. cit Page 950-1054. This particular M.P. was then an Assistant Minister.

because they believe that if they can possess the whole world and die tomorrow they are excused. .. what can prevent us from enacting a law to the effect that nobody can cultivate our land unless he is black like myself? ... what can prevent us from owning all the property in this country? We should have a land ceiling so that no man can own vast tracts of land".<sup>1</sup>

Very few saw the issue in terms of the post-independence ideological foundations of the Kenyan economy. One who did blame the situation on the Sessional Paper No. 10, 1963 On African Socialism. He argued that "The KANU manifesto has something that causes unemployment in that it is said clearly in this document that there will be equal opportunities for all. ... Equal opportunities could be interpreted in different forms. Those who have wealth have interpreted it to mean that everybody has equal opportunities to grab what he can. Nobody is stopped by the KANU manifesto to grab what he can and therefore there is that equal opportunity"<sup>2</sup> He concluded by urging the Government to review the manifesto.

On the issue of implementation one member probably echoed the majority opinion of the disenchanted when he stated that "our government has a tendency of saying yes to anything but not doing anything about it ... The Government has accepted very many reports in this country but only one of these reports has been implemented. This is the Ndegwa Commission Report<sup>3</sup> ... This report has worsened our economic system. it has concentrated more on people who are already earning thousands and thousands of shillings in this country and disregarded

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1. Proceedings. Op. cit Vol.30 P.44
  2. ibid Page 77-144
  3. This is the report referred to earlier in a footnote (p.20) which raised the salaries of high-ranking civil servants and approved their ownership of businesses.



the majority in this country".<sup>1</sup>

It is true that the excerpts presented above are not a systematic representation of the parliamentary debates on the I.L.O. report in particular and inequality in Kenya in general. However, they do represent some of the general issues usually discussed in Kenya in the context of inequality and poverty. One issue that probably deserves special mention is the question of foreign control and ownership. This features very prominently both in parliamentary debates and the general public debate. As the excerpts above imply and sometimes explicitly state, the issue is usually discussed, not in the context of international capitalism but rather in the context of Kenyanization of the economy. The Government has an impressive record in terms of Kenyanization of some sectors of the economy though the vital sectors in industry are foreign-controlled and the indigeneous commercial and industrial entrepreneurs are - as is well recognised - dependent on foreign capital. The facts notwithstanding, it is to the interest of the Government to encourage the discussion in the context of Kenyanisation for then the issue of international capitalism can easily be mystified. Thus one should probably not be suprised to see even reform-minded parliamentarians discussing the issue strictly in terms of Kenyanization.

The explanation by the politicians tends to draw attention on the failure of the Kenyanization policy - not in terms of who has benefitted from the policy but in terms of the policy not having gone far enough - and more important on the accumulative tendencies of individuals who happen to occupy certain key political positions. How accurate is this explanation?

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1. Proceedings Op. cit Vol 29, 1973 Page 975.



The major problem with the explanation is that, more often than not, it fails.<sup>1</sup> to raise the question of the nature of the system within which individuals can legitimately accumulate. In theory the nation of possessive individualism is premised on an atomised market relations society with selfperpetuating rule,<sup>2</sup> and fails to take into account the class basis of political obligation. When the nature of the modern state is taken into account, it soon becomes clear that possessive individualism as an explanation is at best a crude first estimation that is in itself in need of an explanation. None of the modern states strictly speaking have self-perpetuating rule, and few, if any, operate on the basis of complete absence of political obligation on some kind of group basis. If the obligated group happens to be the possessing group, then we have a ruling economic class. Increasing the opportunities for others to accumulate would simply enlarge the class i.e. it is not a distributive measure as such, but a strategy for enlarging the power base for the purposes of controlling the majority. Thus the explanation of the tendencies to "nyakua"<sup>3</sup> by powerful individuals in Kenya, must be sought in the class nature of the Kenyan society as a result of the system being capitalist.

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1. The failure is perhaps not accidental. It could reflect the fact that the very critics of the "accumulating individuals" really want removed of barriers to their own accumulation, and not basic changes in the system that facilitates accumulation.

2. "Possessive Individualism and Liberal Democracy" chapter VI in C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Oxford, 1962. pp 263-277.

3. A Swahili term meaning to "grab" or "snatch".

Conclusion.

The paper has only touched the surface of the problem of income distribution in Kenya. It has not gone into a discussion of the related problems of nationalization, access to capital, taxation, and distribution of educational opportunities. The limited aim of the paper was to high-light the politics, rather than the economics. It is implicitly argued that the politics of distribution in Kenya is nowhere better illustrated than in the land issue. The limited nature of the paper, therefore, only allows even more limited conclusions.

First, the strategy of accepting criticisms and proposals, and then implementing the least consequential tends to support the argument that the so-called "enlightened self-interest" can be no more than a good Public relations job and even here there is a limit to how much can be accepted, even if it is not going to be implemented.

Second, the limit to acceptance could be seen as a function of possessive individualism as some of the excerpts above suggest. On the other hand, there are some of us who would argue that it is it is neither possessive individualism nor Kinship ties. Rather it is class politics with the double nuclei of individualism, by those in decision-making capacity, and Kinship ties.

Third, if the issue is class politics, there are reasons to argue that the very notion of income distribution is itself a mystifying notion even when there are some noticeable cleavages within the ruling class as is the case in Kenya. (The cleavages take the form of intra-class conflict which is very carefully controlled in order not to involve the masses) Disposale incomes are a function of many factors the most important being ownership of land in the Kenya case. Without the poor's control of the process of generating incomes, the distribution question becomes a secondary political variable that can be manipulated to the interests of those who have economic and political power. To

manipulate the secondary variable constitutes mystification. To explain the manipulation in terms of possessive individualism constitutes further mystification, and the whole equation adds up to the very essence of politics. The poor are likely to come out the losers.

Year	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
1970	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1971	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1972	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1973	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1974	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1975	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1976	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1977	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1978	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1979	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1980	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1981	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1982	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1983	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1984	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1985	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1986	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1987	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1988	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1989	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1990	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1991	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1992	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1993	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1994	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1995	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1996	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1997	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1998	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
1999	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2000	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2001	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2002	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2003	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2004	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2005	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2006	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2007	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2008	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2009	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2010	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2011	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2012	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2013	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2014	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2015	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2016	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2017	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2018	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2019	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2020	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2021	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2022	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2023	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2024	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%
2025	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%	100,000	100%

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974

1965 Sh.	AFRICAN		ASIAN		EUROPEAN		OVERAL	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Under 100	177,980	39.0	267	1.3	324	3.3	177,689	36.5
100-149	77,550	17.0	52	0.2	5	0.1	77,607	15.9
150-199	58,841	12.9	110	0.5	216	2.2	59,167	12.1
200-299	64,633	14.2	416	2.0	28	0.3	65,077	13.4
300-399	31,451	6.9	690	3.3	96	1.0	32,237	6.6
400-599	20,722	4.5	1,865	8.8	179	1.8	22,766	4.7
600-999	15,319	3.4	5,293	25.0	639	6.5	21,251	4.4
1000-1499	6,354	1.4	7,005	33.1	1,796	18.4	15,155	3.1
1500-1999	2,666	0.6	1,948	9.2	1,585	16.2	6,199	1.3
2000-3999	1,177	0.3	3,288	15.5	3,602	36.9	8,067	1.7
4,000 & Over	489	0.1	216	1.0	1,298	13.3	2,003	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>456,300</b>	<b>100.3%</b>	<b>21,150</b>	<b>99.9%</b>	<b>9,768</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>487,218</b>	<b>100.1%</b>

1966 Sh.								
Under 100	176,865	38.8	354	1.6	440	4.3	177,659	36.4
100-149	77,591	17.0	56	0.3	8	0.1	77,655	15.9
150-199	58,396	12.8	123	0.6	223	2.2	59,287	12.2
200-299	64,770	14.2	425	2.0	32	0.3	65,227	13.4
300-399	31,579	6.9	689	3.2	102	1.0	32,370	6.6
400-599	20,767	4.6	1,903	8.8	198	1.9	22,868	4.7
600-999	15,261	3.3	5,378	24.9	698	6.9	21,337	4.4
1000-1499	6,263	1.4	7,127	33.0	1,825	18.0	15,215	3.1
1500-1999	2,600	0.6	2,012	9.3	1,612	15.9	6,224	1.3
2000-3999	1,133	0.2	2,319	10.7	3,628	35.7	8,080	1.7
4,000 & Over	387	0.1	228	1.1	1,396	13.7	2,011	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>456,152</b>	<b>99.9%</b>	<b>21,614</b>	<b>95.5%</b>	<b>10,167</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>487,933</b>	<b>100.1%</b>

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974

1967 Sh.	ARICAN		ASIAN		EUROPE		OVERAL	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Under 100	177,243	38.1	360	1.6	434	4.1	178,037	35.8
100-149	79,418	17.0	59	0.3	12	0.1	79,489	16.0
150-199	60,604	13.0	130	0.6	281	2.6	61,015	12.3
200-299	66,409	14.3	438	2.0	36	0.3	66,885	13.4
300-399	33,150	7.1	702	3.2	112	1.0	33,964	6.8*
400-599	21,997	4.7	1,914	8.7	202	1.9	24,113	4.8
600-999	15,636	3.4	5,425	24.8	704	6.6	21,765	4.4
1000-1499	6,388	1.4	7,268	33.2	1,974	18.4	15,630	3.1
1500-1999	2,794	0.6	2,018	9.2	1,732	16.1	6,544	1.3
2000-3999	1,091	0.2	3,349	15.3	3,796	35.4	8,236	1.7
4,000 & Over	371	0.1	245	1.1	1,426	13.3	2,042	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>465,101</b>	<b>99.9%</b>	<b>21,908</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>10,709</b>	<b>99.8%</b>	<b>497,718</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\* wrong in statistical Abstract 1975 (added "2" at the end)

  

1968 Sh.								
Under 100	140,894	30.5	372	1.3	445	3.2	141,711	28.1
100-149	75,213	16.3	56	0.2	8	0.1	75,277	14.9
150-199	64,139	13.9	165	0.6	292	2.1	64,596	12.8
200-299	69,802	15.1	439	1.6	38	0.3	70,279	13.9
300-399	49,151	10.6	978	3.5	116	0.8	50,245	10.0
400-599	24,336	5.3	1,940	6.9	204	1.5	26,480	5.2
600-999	22,253	4.8	6,790	24.1	769	5.6	29,872	5.9
1000-1499	10,635	2.3	7,951	28.2	2,202	16.0	20,788	4.1
1500-1999	3,139	0.7	4,698	16.7	2,065	15.0	9,902	2.0
2000-3999	2,381	0.5	4,242	15.1	4,767	34.7	11,390	2.3
4,000 & Over	641	0.1	515	1.8	2,818	20.5	3,974	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>462,584</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>28,146</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>13,724</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>504,454</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974

1969 Sh.	AFRICAN		ASIAN		EUROPEAN		OVERAL	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Under 100	150,435	30.8	388	1.6	521	4.0	151,344	28.6
100-149	61,285	12.5	58	0.2	6	0.04	61,349	11.6
150-199	65,616	13.4	132	0.5	310	2.4	66,058	12.5
200-299	80,133	16.4	443	1.7	44	0.3	80,620	15.2
300-399	59,127	12.1	719	2.7	121	0.9	59,967	11.3
400-599	24,265	5.0	2,027	7.6	206	1.6	26,498	5.0
600-999	26,853	5.5	5,563	20.8	863	6.6	33,289	6.3
1000-1499	13,253	2.7	7,316	27.4	2,023	15.5	22,592	4.3
1500-1999	4,473	0.9	4,814	18.0	1,904	14.6	11,191	2.1
2000-3999	2,934	0.6	4,636	17.4	4,140	31.8	11,710	2.2
4,000 & Over	746	0.2	609	2.3	2,875	22.1	4,230	0.8
Total	489,130	100.0%	26,705	100.2%	13,013	99.8	528,848	99.9%

  

1970 Sh.								
Under 100	146,411	29.1	379	1.3	463	3.4	147,253	27.0%
100-149	59,374	11.8	63	0.2	9	0.1	59,446	10.9%
150-199	70,189	13.9	268	1.0	442	3.2	70,899	13.0
200-299	83,956	16.7	524	1.9	54	0.4	84,534	15.5
300-399	61,752	12.3	841	3.0	126	0.9	62,719	11.5
400-599	27,020	5.4	2,172	7.7	259	1.9	29,451	5.4
600-999	28,321	5.6	5,664	20.2	919	6.7	34,904	6.4
1000-1499	14,412	2.9	7,465	26.6	2,120	15.5	23,997	4.4
1500-1999	5,251	1.0	4,834	17.2	1,913	14.0	11,998	2.2
2000-2999	4,053	0.8	4,882	17.4	4,154	30.3	13,089	2.4
3,000 & Over	2,848	0.6	994	3.5	3,248	23.7	7,090	1.3
Total	503,587	100.1%	28,086	100.0%	13,707	100.1%	545,380	100.0%

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974

1971 Sh.	AFRICAN		ASIAN		EUROPEAN		OVERAL	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Under 100	121,074	21.9	351	1.4	607	5.2	122,032	20.7
100-149	74,750	13.5	37	0.2	6	0.1	74,793	12.7
150-199	71,194	12.9	232	1.0	7	0.1	71,433	12.1
200-299	85,987	15.5	332	1.4	28	0.2	86,347	14.7
300-399	68,297	12.3	666	2.7	46	0.4	69,009	11.7
400-599	64,724	11.7	1,731	7.1	146	1.3	66,601	11.3
600-999	35,095	6.3	4,251	17.5	652	5.6	39,998	6.8
1000-1499	16,545	3.0	5,548	22.9	1,052	9.0	23,145	3.9
1500-1999	8,548	1.5	4,481	18.5	1,725	14.8	14,754	2.5
2000-2999	4,625	0.8	5,130	21.1	2,416	20.7	12,171	2.1
3,000 & Over	2,566	0.5	1,509	6.2	4,973	42.7	9,048	1.5
Total	553,405	101.4	24,268	100.0	11,658	100.1%	589,331	100.0%

1972 Sh.

Under 100	90,502	15.5	154	0.6	79	0.6	90,735	14.6
100-149	79,069	13.6	31	0.1	7	0.1	79,107	12.8
150-199	62,839	10.8	127	0.5	1	0.0	62,967	10.2
200-299	160,145	27.5	697	2.8	97	0.7	160,939	25.9
300-399	87,720	15.1	1,516	6.1	144	1.1	89,380	14.4
400-599	42,091	7.2	1,811	7.3	320	2.5	44,222	7.1
600-999	21,105	3.6	2,261	9.1	217	1.7	23,583	3.8
1000-1499	20,716	3.6	5,658	22.7	1,529	11.8	27,903	4.5
1500-1999	9,550	1.6	4,534	18.2	2,002	15.4	16,086	2.6
2000-2999	5,690	1.0	5,224	21.0	2,512	19.3	13,426	2.2
3,000 & Over	3,033	0.5	2,863	11.5	6,092	46.9	11,988	1.9
Total	582,460	100.0%	24,876	99.9%	13,000	100.1%	620,336	100.0%

APPENDIX

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974

1973	Sh.	AFRICAN		ASIAN		EUROPEAN		OVERAL	
		Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Under 100	104,182	16.8	128	0.6	85	0.9	104,395	16.0	
100-149	75,739	12.2	8	0.0	11	0.1	75,758	11.7	
150-199	51,861	8.4	27	0.1	4	0.0	51,892	8.0	
200-399	177,581	28.6	514	2.6	62	0.6	178,157	27.4	
400-599	96,788	15.6	873	4.4	126	1.3	97,787	15.1	
600-799	46,886	7.6	1253	6.3	144	1.5	48,283	7.4	
800-999	22,655	3.7	1422	7.2	205	2.1	24,282	3.7	
1000-1499	22,189	3.6	3917	19.8	681	7.1	26,787	4.1	
1500-1999	10,606	1.7	3491	17.6	958	10.0	15,055	2.3	
2000-2999	8,105	1.3	4386	22.2	2166	22.6	14,657	2.3	
3000 & Over	3,407	0.5	3776	19.1	5125	53.6	12,308	1.9	
<b>Total</b>	<b>619,999</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>19,795</b>	<b>99.9%</b>	<b>9,567</b>	<b>99.8%</b>	<b>649,361</b>	<b>99.9%</b>	

  

1974	Sh.	AFRICAN		ASIAN		EUROPEAN		OVERAL	
Under 100	47,013	7.0	49	0.2	7	0.1	47,069	6.7	
100-149	102,625	15.2	5	0.0	1	0.0	102,631	14.6	
150-199	66,706	9.9	22	0.1	13	0.2	66,741	9.5	
200-399	179,295	26.6	465	2.3	30	0.3	179,790	25.6	
400-599	121,015	18.0	845	4.2	69	0.8	121,929	17.4	
600-799	58,693	8.7	1,011	5.1	165	1.9	59,869	8.5	
800-999	37,326	5.5	1,309	6.6	186	2.2	38,731	5.5	
1000-1499	31,697	4.7	3,780	18.9	690	8.0	36,167	5.2	
1500-1999	15,041	2.2	3,358	16.8	751	8.7	19,150	2.7	
2000-2999	9,255	1.4	4,302	21.6	1,620	18.7	15,177	2.2	
3,000 & Over	4,380	0.7	4,802	24.0	5,115	59.2	14,297	2.0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>672,956</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>19,948</b>	<b>99.8%</b>	<b>8,647</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>701,551</b>	<b>99.3%</b>	

CALCULATED FROM

Source: Statistical Abstract 1975.  
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