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presented for a degree in any other University.

THE OPERATIONS OF TRADE UNIONISM IN KENYA: A STUDY
OF THE RAILWAY AFRICAN UNION (KENYA), 1945 - 1975

BY

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
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
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ABBREVIATIONS

A.W.F.	African Workers' Federation
CxR	Carriage and Wagon Examiner
EAC	East African Community
EACSO	East African Common Services Organization
K.F.L.	Kenya Federation of Labour
R.A.U. (K)	Railway African Union (Kenya)
R.A.S.U.	Rilway African Staff Union.

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CHAPTER I

ABSTRACT

This study attempts to uncover and explain salient variables that have conditioned the behaviour of Railway African Union (K) - R.A.U. (K) in the industrial relations arena in Kenya between 1945 and 1975. The approach entails the identification of the major actors on the scene, both from micro-environment and macro-environment of the Union.

One important aspect of the micro-environment that had a bearing on the Union and which, along with micro-environmental factors, determined the quantity and quality of the Union's output, was the quality of the persons at the helm of the Union. In fact one feature of the findings of this research paper was that the achievements of the Union varied with the calibre of the Union leadership. But, inter alia, the personality dynamics also explained the cleavages that surfaced in the Union during the greater part of this period.

The two major components of the macro-environment that had impact on the Union were the Government and the Railway Corporation. These two institutions intervened on the industrial relations scene from time to time. The state played a peace-keeping role through the use of supervisory and regulatory instruments. The increasing use of these instruments made it very difficult for the Union to use strike to back its stand on issues that affected its members.

The Corporation, on the other hand, assumed a father - figure role, introducing and implementing policies that tended to camouflage conflicts inherent in the employment situation.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study deals with a number of related issues in the field of industrial relations in a developing country. The focus is on the operations or the functioning - i.e. activities and constraints - of a workers' organization. The said operations are deemed, for the purposes of this study, to comprise of the achievements made by the organization and the obstacles it has had to contend with. In this respect the task involved in this exercise is twofold: first, an attempt is made to show the benefits that have accrued to the workers through the efforts of their Union; secondly, an effort is made to analyse and explain the constraints within which the Union has operated.

Due to time constraint, only one Trade Union, i.e. the Railway African Union (K), was selected for this study. This Union changed its name in 1975 to "Railway and Harbours Union (Kenya)". A number of factors influenced the choice of R.A.U(K) and the need to undertake the study. In the first place, the Kenya Railway and the Harbours Corporations, whose workers R.A.U(K) represents, jointly employ one of the largest number of workers in the heavy industrial sector in Kenya (1), where the interest and welfare of such a large number of workers are involved it is necessary to critically examine an organization that is entrusted with the custodianship of all matters pertaining to such interests and welfare. Related to this is the fact that the Railways was one of the earliest large scale employers having labour force throughout East Africa. One, therefore, expects that railway workers not only should have been among the earliest to form a Trade Union but should also, over the years, have built a strong workers front. The contrary would surely call for some explanation and, hence, investigation. Indeed, the Trade Union movement in Kenya began during the early 1900's when attempts were made to organize the workers on the railroad (2). This

start of Trade Unionism was the first indication of the development of class consciousness among the railway workers. It would, therefore, be interesting to find out and explain factors that have conditioned the industrial relations behaviour of R.A.U(K).

While several scholars and some Trade Union activists have devoted their time to the study of workers' organizations in Kenya, none of them has undertaken an in depth investigation of any one individual Trade Union. In this respect, the R.A.U.(K), like other Unions in Kenya, has been only studied superficially as the researchers have been mainly concerned with the Kenya workers movement in general. Such studies do not, and indeed cannot be expected to, analyze in detail the specific and peculiar factors and variables that influence the operations of individual Trade Unions. However, Arap Korir wrote a paper on worker capital-relationship on the railroad in Kenya (3). Useful as this paper is, it was primarily based on secondary data and, moreover, does not address itself specifically to R.A.U.(K). But the details of this study have to await the section on Literature Review in chapter II of this study. This study sought to go beyond Korir's work and analyze issues that were pertinent to the R.A.U(K). It further sought to corroborate the secondary data with some primary data.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

2.1:1

To assess R.A.U(K)'s achievements with respect to salaries/wages, terms and conditions of service such as housing, medical benefits, leave and social and welfare services.

2.1:2

To find if, and to what extent, R.A.U(K), either on its own or in conjunction with the railway management, has undertaken social and economic projects geared towards the improvement of the condition of its members and to pinpoint factors that have hindered progress in this direction.

2.2

To show the nature of the relationship between R.A.U.(K) and the Government of Kenya on the one hand and R.A.U.(K) and the Railway Corporation on the other.

2.2:1

More specifically, to identify the areas and methods by which the Government of Kenya has intervened and exercised control over the industrial relations and the effects of this on R.A.U.'s pursuit and attainment of its objectives, and to examine the tactics used by the Railway Corporation to counteract the activities of R.A.U.(K) and how this has influenced or compromised the Union in the pursuit of its objectives.

2.3

To examine conflicts and factionalism within R.A.U.(K)'s leadership with a view to establishing their causes and highlighting their dysfunctional characteristics.

3. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is expected to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of R.A.U.(K). The results of this exercise will be valuable to leadership of the Union should it want to make some improvement in the operation of the Union.

4.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

4.1 THE KENYA RAILWAY CORPORATION

The construction of the railroad started at Mombasa in 1896, reaching Kisumu in 1901. The extension to Kampala was completed in 1931 (4). Almost simultaneously, the ports and harbours services were created. In 1949 the Kenya Uganda Railway and Harbours and the Tanganyika Railways and Ports services were amalgamated within the framework of the East African High Commission and became known as East African Railways and Harbours - EARH (5). In 1961, EARH was brought under the umbrella of the East African Common Services Organization -

EACSO, an embryo federal body to which the General Manager of the EARH was made answerable (6). The EARH was placed under the East African Community - EAC, the successor of the EACSO, in 1967. The break-up of the EAC in 1977 saw the creation of the Kenya Railway Corporation in the same year (7).

By the beginning of the twentieth century the Railways had emerged as one of the biggest employers of labour in East Africa. For the purposes of compensation and provision of other benefits, the Railways employees are divided into several grades.

The railway workers, regardless of their station of work within the country, have a similar experience because they are subjected to more or less similar industrial climate and, depending on grade, to similar living conditions. Thus they evolve a set of norms which are unique to themselves. They have certain words and phrases which are not found in other industrial and employment settings. Terms such as 'letter One', CxR, C.M.F. (which they pronounce as 'Siemi') among others, are only comprehensible to railwaymen themselves (8). This distinct social and communal pattern of life followed by railwaymen is enhanced and reinforced by a number of factors. Among these factors are: housing, frequency of inter-depot transfers and the process of work itself.

Most of the employees of the Railways are provided with housing. The houses are grouped into Railway estates such as Mokongeni and Muthurwa in Nairobi. There are housing estates at every Railway Station. Within each estate the houses are categorised into classes with houses of each class being grouped in a separate location. Altogether, there are seven classifications of houses corresponding to job status. The lowest class of houses consists of single ten-by-ten room (10' x 10') with a window at the rear and a small veranda at the front. Five Units (rooms) are served by one kitchen while Forty Units share one toilet block and one bathroom block.

The Railway management offers common facilities on the basis of rank. Thus, for instance, one still finds signs on toilet and

canteen doors reading 'Group "A" staff and above only !

All the foregoing, coupled with a system of comprehensive rules and regulations give the Railway authorities control over the workers.

4.2 R.A.U.(K): A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of R.A.U.(K) dates back to the period immediately after the second world war. Anxious to guide workers' organizations into purely economic pursuits and to use such organizations as vehicles for the alienation of workers from any progressive leaderships that might independently arise among them (9), the Railway Management guided the formation of the Railway Staff Association (RSA) in 1945, whose membership was confined to skilled African workers and clerks on the Railway (10). Existing alongside this were the European and the Asian Staff Associations. In 1946 A.S.A. was renamed the Railway African Staff Union (R.A.S.U.). R.A.S.U. evolved over the years and changed its name to Railway African Union (Kenya). The Union (R.A.U.) was registered in October, 1953 under the then Trade Unions Ordinance of 1952 (11).

R.A.U.(K) and the European and Asian Staff Associations met and discussed industrial relations matters with the management of the Railways Corporation through the medium of the Joint Staff Advisory Council which was formed in 1957. The Joint Staff Advisory Council, however, only played advisory role to the management.

The existence of the European and Asian Staff Associations alongside R.A.U.(K) made it difficult for all Railway workers, irrespective of their race, to speak with one voice in dealing with the Railway management. This was unfortunate since, as Scott says: "--- where specifically African interests were involved, any African representatives could be defeated by a combination between management and other races" (12). The 1959 strike by the Railway workers set management into action. A Commission of Enquiry under the chairmanship of H.A. Whitson started investigations which

culminated in recommendations upon which the present industrial relations machinery was built in 1962 (13).

Structurally, R.A.U. (K) had undergone enormous expansion by 1975. This is depicted by the organizational chart on Appendix I.

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13. Ibid. page 69.

CHAPTER II

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1

At the core of industrial relations is the labour contract. This is, as Crouch puts it, "---- economic relationship of domination and subordination ----" (1). It is an exchange relationship in which the worker offers the labour of his person in return for wages. But the exchange involved in this transaction is inherently unequal one (2). The contract places a worker in a subordinate position while the wage paid to him by the employer legitimizes the latter's control over the former.

Each of the parties in the employment contract endeavours to maximize its own interests. In Crouch's words:

The interest of the dominant role in such a relationship can be defined as the maximization of control over labour, offset by the extent to which such a maximization will reduce the effectiveness, or incite the revolt, of that labour. The interest of the subordinates consist in eroding, evading or replacing domination, offset by the extent to which attempts to do so will either incite coercive sanctions or involve destruction of existing means for securing existence (3).

Under capitalist system the interest of the workers and employers are more often than not at variance. This is more so with respect to remuneration. The employers always try to set a wage rate that leaves them with part of the profit that is sufficient for paying other factors of production as well as desirable business expansion. ^(max. profits) The workers try to get the highest possible wages in order to provide for themselves and their families with good and sufficient food, to live in good homes and to dress decently ^(derive max. pleasure) (4).

What a worker perceives as fair terms of service may not be perceived as such by the employer. This difference in perception creates a situation that is susceptible to misunderstanding and, hence, conflict. Because of this conflict inherent in the employment situation and the possibility of confrontation between employer and his employees as a result of this, employers feel more comfortable to deal with

workers individually. As Crouch has pointed out:

Purely capitalistic domination depends on the worker being treated as an individual in the sense that his labour may be bought and sold as a Unit commodity and is neither embedded in traditional constraints nor collectively organized as a restraint against the authority of the labour market (5).

Realising that they were subjected to more or less similar conditions, workers became aware of the need to unite in pressing for their demands. They realized that their strength lay in their numbers; that they had no alternative but to combine and bargain jointly for their demands and felt compelled to organize strikes if needed be. Workers' organizations (Unions) also aim at providing a countervailing power to that of the management. Trade Unionism, with collective bargaining that it gives rise to, has a wider intention of removing arbitrariness that the actors on the industrial relations scene may resort to (6). This role is crucial for securing greater security for the workers - protecting his job (against other workers or redundancy etc.), protecting him when unemployed, sick, injured at work, among others. The Union also seeks to protect the dignity of the workers from abuse by the employer or the superior (7). Unions also work for greater social justice. They wish to see workers treated on the basis of merit and not the colour of the skin.

Alongside the above, Trade Unions deal with other conditions of work such as hours of work, safety at the work place, holidays, sick leave and the accompanying benefits, and a host of other factors. The place he is asked to work in may turn out to be cramped or badly ventilated; it may be too hot or too cold; the lighting may be bad, the atmosphere dusty and the process of work injurious to health. These conditions do affect mental and physical power (8).

In some countries, particularly in the third world, Trade Unions are expected to participate positively in the process of economic development. In Kenya, for instance, Government's key policy statement appearing in sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 asserted:

the Government will assist Trade Unions to become involved in economic activities such as cooperatives, housing schemes, workers' discipline and productivity, and in general, to accept their social responsibilities (9).

All in all, Trade Union movement exists to extend the influence of the working people over the policy and purposes of industry and to arrange for their participation in its management (10).

1.2

Government has keen interest in Trade Unionism and Trade Union activities. The Government plays two major roles in industrial relations scene. Constituting the two roles are law-making and peace-keeping functions. In exercising its legislative right the Government generates statutes which are regulatory in nature. The peace-keeping role is practised through arbitration (either voluntary or compulsory), use of tribunals and, as a last resort, intervening directly by the use of instruments of coercion - usually in the form of police, paramilitary unit and even the military in some extreme cases.

Aware of the potential power of Trade Unions and the possible social, economic and political disasters that are bound to arise from the use of the said power, practically all the Governments all over the world have passed legislations with varying degrees of severity aimed at curtailing the power of the organized labour (11).

The extent to which the Government legislations and policies are restrictive depends largely on the relationship between Union goals and Government policies. As A. M. Ross amply argues:

--- the more stronger the Unions become the more consistently do they demand the higher wages and improved living standards which they are pledged to obtain. These demands confront them with a set of dilemmas: Workers desire more consumer goods but the Government feels that savings are necessary for capital expansion. Unions press for wage increases but the Government seeks to avoid inflation in order to conserve foreign exchange (12).

The capitalist system boasts of what has become known as free collective bargaining - a situation in which the state does not intervene

in industrial relations matters. But, as we are told by Ross, collective bargaining may create a wage structure which may be very different from the wage structure envisaged by the Government's economic plans. Because of the possible interference with the development plans many Governments in the developing countries have low degree of tolerance for anything involving work stoppage(13).

Sandbrook has given a statement which gives a fair summary of the above. He says:

Political leaders have employed both coercion and rewards to elicit the compliance of Trade Unionists within their conception of organized labour's proper role. Governments have legislated increasingly stringent regulatory and supervisory powers over Trade Union goals, selection of leaders, and internal administration.

--- the legislation, of course, stipulates penalties to be applied against Union leaders who infringe any of its provisions (14).

To recapitulate, Governments regulate labour - management ^arelations by providing industrial relations machinery which binds both the management and the Union in their interactions or, specifically, negotiations. Within this framework, the Government enacts legislation to safeguard the respective rights of management, employees, workers' Union as well as the rights and interests of the society at large.

1.3

We had earlier alluded to the fact that the employer - employee relationship is one of domination and subordination. Yet the two have to co-exist since they are interdependent. The militant stance often assumed by class conscious workers is perceived by employers as a threat to their profits, power, influence and authority. The owners of capital have, therefore, resorted to various ways and manouvres of counteracting the disruptive tendencies of the workers or workers organizations. One way of achieving this goal is through the use of ideology. In Crouch's word:

--- ideas may define certain social positions as carrying intrinsic entitlements to recognition of superiority, or to the

enjoyment of certain standards of life; and, by the same token, other positions will be defined in terms of negative entitlements. In this way, the concept of ideology and authority legitimation becomes closely related to the notion of social status (15).

The control of, infact monopoly over, economic resources provides an employer with a strong weapon for regulating the behaviour of workers. In Crouch's words, "The inequality of the exchange (in the employment situation) implies at one and the same time an inequality of economic reward and authority relationship ---" (16).

Thus in a situation where the product of labour is rising obedience may be secured by constantly improving economic reward (17). However, such reward will only be of a magnitude calculated to cool down a wage-motivated discontent at a given point in time.

Within a capitalist society, the biggest question that faces employers is "whether or not the autonomous collective organization of workers can be prevented" (18). If this cannot be done, and history has shown that this is the case, then other ways have to be found to handle the collective power of the workers. High rate of unemployment and the threat of dismissal have provided restraint.

The employers also use the policy of 'welfare capitalism' (19) as a means of forestalling or delaying the development of a strong resistance to their policies, programmes and organization of work. Thus, they sometimes provide welfare facilities (even if inferior in quality), they exercise control over their workers even during the latter's non-working hours and, on the whole, always try to play a paternalistic role in the relationship with their employees. Through various tactics, they try as much as they can to ensure that only moderate persons who will be easy to handle, if not manipulate, are elected to Union offices. Infact, in extreme cases, the employing organization may patronize the Union so much so that it (the Union) comes to depend on it for virtually most of the essentials. Another tactic used to handle radical Union officials who are employees of the organization whose members they represent is to offer them

rewards by way of quick promotions so as to render them ineffective in their Union work (20).

In short, the method that some employers have used to humble their employees and the latter's organization has been called paternalism by some writers (21). But I would also call it tactical domestication!

1.4

Conflicts in human groups of whatever nature and size are not uncommon. Industrial relations as arena of conflict has attracted a broad spectre of interest.

Much of what has been said and written on conflict has emphasized the relationship between the persons who provide the labour and the persons, or their agents, who provide capital (22). In other words, much of the concern in the industrial conflict has been with the Union-management relations. In this study, however, focus will be on the intra-Union conflicts. These are conflicts that arise between two or more officials and potential or aspiring candidates for the Union posts.

Conflicts arise as a result of differences, real or perceived. These could be a difference about information available to the interested parties, a difference about means for attaining common goals, difference about goals, or difference of values (23).

Lack of information or accurate information leads to a breakdown in communication. This escalates into widespread rumours, distortion of issues and, consequently, mistrust and suspicion.

The means of attaining an agreed goal may cause a serious rift. For instance, some members of a group may prefer peaceful and diplomatic negotiations with the employer while another section of the group may opt for a radical approach that does not allow for modification in the original demands if such modification is seen to be in favour of the opponent (24).

Conflicts involving differences in goals have more serious consequences and are even more difficult to resolve. Infact if goals in question are of great significance it is difficult to imagine how the

parties involved can work together. In the context of industrial relations, some Union leaders may have the uplifting of the standard of living of the lowest paid workers as the first priority and would therefore, channel most of the Union's resources and effort to this end. On the other hand, other Union leaders' objective might be the equitable distribution of whatever gains the Union makes among all the cadres of the Union members.

Different value systems also breed conflict. In the worlds of Bruce Cooper et. al.: "Values are things that move us, that account for large portions of our behaviour ----" (25). There are, for example, those who believe strongly in workers participation in management while there are those who believe otherwise. Some feel happy and comfortable under a paternalistic system while others cannot just tolerate it.

Power struggles in Trade Unions involve competitions in building up support. The resulting formations are coalitions or factions. Richard Sandbrook has defined faction broadly as:

a segment of a clientage network organized to compete with a Unit or Units of a similar type within one or more political arenas. It is a coalition of followers recruited on the basis of mercenary ties by or on behalf of a leader, who is in conflict with another leader or leaders (26).

Building and maintaining factions involve using whatever relationships offered by the social networks such as ethnic identity. They are also based on expectation of some benefits accruing to the individual concerned. As Grillo has aptly said, "mutual support entails mutual benefits which may be as basic as cash transaction, a post on a committee, or a scholarship abroad" (27).

Where Trade Unions are expected or required to support the ruling political party, the party factions tend to spill over to the Union. Thus the Union officials get divided into opposing groups in line with the political party faction they identify with (29).

2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Serious studies on Trade Union movement in Kenya did not start until just about two decades ago. Dominated by foreign scholars -

mainly political scientists and historians - most of these studies have focused on the role the Government has played in industrial relations and the influence the Trade Unions have had on the politics of the country. The foreign scholars that have contributed in this field include Richard Sandbrook, Alice Amsden, Roger Van Zwanenberg, Kerstin Leitner, M. Kiloh and S. Stichter. The most prominent local writers in this area are Makhan Singh and Clement Lubembe. In addition to these books there are several articles and theses by both foreign and local students.

Most of these studies seem not only to emphasize the part played by the Trade Unions in the decolonization struggles but also endeavour to show the decline in the political influence exercised by the Unions since independence.

While most of these studies cover a wide spectrum of Trade Unions in Kenya, none of them, except Arap Korir's paper (29), deal specifically with the labour on the Railways. But several of them have a chapter or section of a chapter on R.A.U. (K). That notwithstanding, the conclusions they make are general and, by and large, apply to most of the country's Trade Unions, including R.A.U. (K).

Kipkorir's paper makes a stimulating reading. He applies dialectical approach to the analysis of the capital - labour contradiction on the Railways in Kenya during the time of the decline of colonialism in Kenya - i.e. from around 1945 to about 1963.

The crux of Korir's paper is that the Railway management, supported by the colonial administration, formulated and applied policies that were deliberately intended to blunt the growth of Railway workers' class consciousness (30). According to this author, the Railway management attempted to accomplish this mission by creating paternalistic relationship with the workers and by implementing 'welfare capitalism' programmes (31). In keeping with its policy of paternalism, the Railway management encouraged the formation of Staff Association among the African skilled workers in 1945. Korir traces the growth of R.A.S.A.

from its inception upto the time of independence. He argues that R.A.S.A was no more than a puppet of the management (32). This is evidenced by, among other things, the fact that their conferences (Association's) were usually officially opened by the General Manager of EARH (33). In reciprocation for its collaboration the Management gave the Association facilities for performing their official functions. Korir is convinced that the use of collaborating workers was employed to diffuse the class struggles of the Railway workers (34).

Korir appears to argue that the Railway Management's second policy of welfare capitalism took the extreme form of human relations (35). But inspite of these two policies - welfare capitalism and self-containment and isolation -----, Korir maintains, contradictions inherent in a capitalist system still could not but see the workers struggle and take strike actions to further their course. He documents a number of confrontations between the workers and the Management which, he implies, showed that the tactics employed by the management could only delay or distort the class struggle between the employer (EARH) and its employees, but could not eliminate the class struggles altogether.

The Railway Management's practice of paternalism and 'subordination' of the employees' organization is given a good treatment. It is the intention of this study to take this argument further, provide more documentation and cover the period since independence upto 1975, a period which Korir's paper does not cover. This paper also intends to analyse and explain the effects of the Government's restrictive measures on the functioning of R.A.U. (K), the Union's socio-economic ventures and Intra-Union conflicts.

One of the foreign scholars, Richard Sandbrook, who among the writers on Kenyan industrial relations has done the most extensive research, has devoted a good part of his book to the R.A.U. (K) (36). Sandbrook's write-up on this Union has three major points. First, he points out that the Union's leadership

was dominated by Group "B" workers - mainly clerical officers. He observes that until popular sixteen-day strike in November, 1959 the workers' Union failed to capture the imagination and support of the mass of the railwaymen - mostly Group "C" workers (37). Thus the Union was numerically weak.

Secondly, Sandbrook contends that the Union's leadership was weak, inexperienced and was under the patronage of the Railway Management. He says:

The leaders were too moderate and concentrated on issues that affected mainly the clerical, supervisory and skilled workers. It always presented its demands in conciliatory manner (38).

Factionalism or internal power struggle within R.A.U. (K) is given good treatment by the author. The conflicts were mainly between the General Secretary and the Chairman and arose from different interpretations of the role of the Union and its composition (39).

Sandbrook's major finding, however, is that occupational cleavage emerged as a significant source of cleavage in R.A.U. (K) much more than was noticed in other Unions. He cites domination of Union posts by members of a minority group, differential distribution of privileges among various status groups and interaction among members of a particular status for quite some time as the main causes of the aforesaid type of conflict (40)

Another scholar, R. D. Grillo, studied a section of the Railway African Union (Uganda) which resembled its Kenyan counterpart in many respects (41). His conclusions, therefore, can be generalized and used for understanding R.A.U. (K). This is particularly so because the two Unions and the Tanganyikan counterpart were under the same management. Grillo's most findings are similar to those of Sandbrook, which have already been mentioned. His most interesting discovery, however, is the fact that people struggle to join Union leadership because of the benefits they expect, such as scholarships for studies in industrial relations and high probability of promotion by the Management thereafter.

In his book entitled: "The Inside of Labour Movement in Kenya", Clement Lubembe gives a brief discussion of R.A.U. (K) (42). His cardinal point is that lack of provision for inter-territorial Unions reduced the bargaining power of the EARH workers quite tremendously. He laments at the fact that the variations in the inter-territorial legislations made the situation very cumbersome (43). Thus, according to the author, in order to simplify the system, Unions in the three sister countries of East Africa presented a case for introduction of a common negotiating machinery. This was later introduced in the form of Joint Staff Advisory Council (44). Lubembe also gives a brief account of constant squabbles among the Union leaders. He also gives a summary of the autobiography of R.A.U. (K) leaders, among others, that is quite revealing.

The other writers, Clayton and Savage report some of the squalid conditions of work and living that the pioneer Railway workers faced. They report the first strike of the Railway workers as early as 1910, followed by another in 1912 (45).

As for the Railway workers' conditions of living, the authors had this to say: Houses consisted of "long lines of tin huts of the Railway and PWD with windows and only one door through which sun or air penetrated" (46). The rest of the story touching on R.A.U. (K) is essentially the same with that given by the authors already reviewed.

The other writers on the Kenya Trade Union movement have not been reviewed either because they have negligible or nothing on R.A.U. (K) per se.

It is the intention here to examine these issues in depth and to cover the period 1945 - 1975. In addition, if I may repeat, the study is further expected to look at the socio-economic ventures entered into by the Union either on its own or in conjunction with the Management. The authors whose works have been reviewed do not appear to have paid fair attention to this important issue.

Finally, it is hoped that this study will be an improvement on the earlier works on the subject and not a mere repetition of the same.

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1. Crouch, C.: op. cit. page 4
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3. Ibid. page 6
4. Lenin on Trade Unions: op. cit. page 58
5. Crouch, C.: op. cit. page 21
6. Robertson N. and Thomas, J. L.: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations. London, Business Books Limited, 1968, page 35
7. Ibid. page 40.
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15. Crouch, C.: op. cit. page 9
16. Ibid. page 7
17. Ibid. page 6
18. Ibid. page 21
19. Korir, Arap K. M.: op. cit. page 10
20. For a better picture, see: Grillo, R. D.: op. cit. page 131

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23. Cooper, B. M. and Bariett, A. F.: Industrial Relations: A Study in conflict. London, Heinemann, 1976, page 155.
24. Ibid. page 156
25. Ibid. page 157
26. Sandbrook, R.: Proletarians and African Capitalism : The case of Kenya. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pages 21 - 22.
27. Grillo, R. D.: op. cit. page 174.
28. Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 27
29. Korir; Arap K. M.: op. cit. -
In this paper, Korir attempted to use the framework of dialectics to explain and understand the employer - employee relations on the Railway between the second world war and the attainment of independence in Kenya.
30. Korir, Arap K. M. : op. cit. page 1
31. Ibid. page 1
32. Ibid. page 6
33. Ibid. page 7
34. Ibid. page 10
35. Ibid. page 10
36. Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 99.
37. Ibid. page 101
38. Ibid. page 101
29. Ibid. pages 102 - 103
40. Ibid. page 104
41. Grillo. R. D.: op. cit. page 116

CHAPTER III

42. Lubembe, C. K. : *op. cit.* page 106
43. *Ibid.* page 106
44. *Ibid.* page 107
45. Clayton, A. and Savage, D. C. : *op. cit.* page 44
46. *Ibid.* page 48

QUESTIONNAIRE

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

1.

The main techniques used for this study consisted of perusal of written material, questionnaire and interview. The three techniques were used complementarily.

The initial stages involved going through published and other documentary material which provided invaluable insight into various aspects of the Railway Administration, the Railway African Union and the labour laws.

Starting with the newspapers, various important landmarks were identified such as periods of intensive activities, periods of major strikes, incidents of factionalism and introduction of restrictive legal measures. These were supplemented and verified by the material obtained from the Railway Department, official files at the office of the Registrar of Trade Unions and Reports of Boards of Enquiry into Trade Disputes. Other documents consulted included the Constitution of R.A.U., Memoranda to the Industrial Court and text books. Approximately two weeks were spent perusing these documents.

1.1

QUESTIONNAIRE:

A questionnaire was designed based on the objectives of the study. The questionnaires were administered to eight current and two former national officials of the Union and ninety ordinary members (rank and file). The method used in selecting these respondents is explained under the section dealing with the sample, see page 22 - 23.

The questionnaires for both categories of the Union officials were handed out to them and were collected after two days. Those for the rank and file were administered individually by the author. In other words, the author read each question to each respondent

In this group and recorded the answers accordingly. It took two weeks to administer all the questionnaires.

1.2

INTERVIEWS:

All the ten current and former Union officials who had earlier completed questionnaires were interviewed. Also interviewed were ninety rank and file members of the Union. These were the same members that had earlier completed questionnaires. (The details of the selection of the interviewees have been given under the section on "Sample"). Interviews were confined to those who had earlier completed the questionnaires because of the need to cross-check the answers obtained from each of the three different sources of information used.

Questions asked at the interviews were specifically intended to elicit information that would help clarify issues that were unclear both from the documents studied and the responses from the completed questionnaires.

1.3

SAMPLE:

The sample of the study consisted of the following;

- (a) All the eight current national officials of the Union.
- (b) Two former national officials of the Union. It was not possible to have more than two from this component of the population because efforts to trace the others were futile.
- (c) Ninety rank and file members. Of these, fifty were in Nairobi (twenty five at Makongeni and twenty five at Muthurwa Estates), twenty were in Mombasa and the remaining twenty in Kisumu. This was the number I estimated I could effectively handle within the time available - five weeks.

The questionnaires were administered and interviews conducted in the evenings at the housing estates - where the rank and file members of R.A.U. (K) reside. The exercise could not be conducted at the respondents' place of work because of the nature of work and general atmosphere at the railway workshops, goodshades, yards, among others.

At each railway estate - in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu - a list of all the houses numbers was made by the author. Then the number of houses corresponding to the respondents in the sample was selected randomly using table of random numbers. Questionnaires were administered and interviews conducted to each member of R.A.U. (K) residing in each of the houses selected.

The following were the Union officials interviewed:-

Current:

1. The General Secretary
2. The Deputy General Secretary
3. The Chairman
4. The 1st Vice- chairman
5. The Assistant General Secretary (Railways)
6. The Assistant General Secretary (Harbours)
7. The Treasurer
8. The Deputy Treasurer

Former:

1. General Secretary - 1969 to 1980
2. Chairman - 1961 to 1972

2. LIMITATIONS:

- 2.1 Due to time and financial constraints, Union officials at the branch levels were neither interviewed nor served with the questionnaires.

CHAPTER IV

2.2

Fieldwork was done in three major towns - Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. The other depots were not included due to both time and financial constraints.

Despite the two limitations mentioned above, it will still be fairly safe to generalize the findings of this research since the primary data was corroborated with secondary data.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH FINDINGS:

This chapter is concerned with the presentation and analysis of the data gathered for the study. All the three sources of information, i.e. documents, questionnaire and interviews, have been used. The responses from the questionnaire have been summarized and presented in a tabular form on appendix III.

The analysis of the completed questionnaires, the interviews with both the officials and the rank and file members of the Union, and the study of various kinds of documents that were available indicate that R.A.U.(K) reached its present position through a series of ups and downs. Its growth and development have been irregular, and its role as a custodian of workers' interests and rights rather inconsistent. Throughout this period it has fought battles - winning some in an admirable style, but incurring heavy losses in others. The story of Union can be told or analysed in three phases, if only for convenience and comparative purposes. The first phase extends from 1945 - 57. The choice of 1945 as the starting point was based on the fact that it was in that year that the first form of organized labour appeared among the Railway workers in Kenya. 1945 - 57 was a period of conception of the Union, birth, standing on two feet and eventually learning to walk. It was a trying period as in attempting to walk the Union, more often than not, 'stumbled on obstacles and fell on its knees'. For a good part of this period (1945 - 52) this workers organization existed as a staff Association whose role seemed confined to no more than consultation.

The second phase covered 1958 - 66. This phase starts in 1958 because that year marked the beginning of new era

in the history of the Union. It was in that year that R.A.U. (K), for the first time, made its presence felt by declaring a trade dispute in respect of a demand for increase in wages, a demand that culminated in success in the same year. What followed after this was a series of hectic moments that continued upto 1966. The period saw an outburst of vigour by the Union leadership that often not only brought it into confrontation with the management but also created a sharp division within the ranks of its leadership - the radicals versus the conservatives.

The third phase runs from 1967 - 75. This period represented a new and different chapter in the history of R.A.U. (K) because after the highly charged atmosphere that prevailed in the preceeding years, 1967 started on a very low note. But even though the following years witnessed active involvement in industrial relation matters by the Union, and the squabbles among the leaders, the issues at stake, and the manner of their articulation were not exactly similar to those in the preceeding years.

The study could not proceed beyond 1975 partly because of time constraint and partly due to frustratingly scanty sources of written information on the R.A.U. (K) and the Railway Corporation from 1975 to the present.

PHASE I: 1945 - 1957

PART A: R.A.U. (K)'S ACHIEVEMENTS:

Early in 1945, a commission of inquiry appointed by the labour Commissioner to look into unrest among the Railway workers made recommendations on the basis of which the Railway and Harbours Corporation increased the basic wage rate and adjusted the cost of living allowance (1). Though there is no evidence that the Railway African Staff

Association, that had just been formed in the same year, participated in these unrests, it is known that its views were taken into account by the Commission in reaching its decision. In 1953, the Railway workers, with the support of R.A.U. (K), had threatened a widespread strike for September the same year to pressurise the Corporation to improve their wages. However, this threat was never translated into actual work stoppage (2).

In March, 1957, R.A.U. (K) submitted a wage claim to the East African Railways and Harbours Management based on the rise in the cost of living index relative to the changes in wages over the same period of time. The claim sought an increase in the minimum wage from shs. 73/= per month to shs. 161/08 per month (3). The Union arrived at this figure through Computation of monthly budget for basic requirements of a bachelor (4). Though this claim was turned down by the Management it demonstrated the Railway African Union's Commitment to the improvement in the remuneration of its members (5). It equally showed that the workers' organization was gradually becoming aware of its role and was shaking off the weaknesses inherited from its predecessor— Railway African Staff Association.

On the whole, it is worth noting that the period under consideration did not witness real significant achievements by the Union. The staff Association, in fact, very often sided with Management in disputes between the Railway workers and Railway and Harbours Corporation, particularly in cases involving strikes (6). For these twelve years, the workers' organization effected no improvement in its members' housing, hours of work, medical benefits, leave, allowances of various kinds and discriminative salary structures based on race. This workers Association was conspicuously compromised by the Management because, as Korir says ;

--- It had initially been formed 'Under fartherly official eye'. Secondly, it was dominated by the African Clerical and Skilled workers, and was therefore unrepresentative of the mass of workers who were employed on manual labour ----- (7).

PART B: R.A.U.(K) AND THE GOVERNMENT:

The colonial Government extended and exercised close control over Trade Union movements and other forms of workers' formations. This was even more so with respect to the EARH which had been classified as an essential service under the Essential Services Ordinance of 1950. This Ordinance was an instrument for controlling the workers' organization because it imposed serious limitation on the use of strike weapon. Some of the long service members of the Union and some of the Union officials that I interviewed argued that the Ordinance was a real obstacle on the path of the workers' organization in those early years as it was always invoked by the Management whenever the workers threatened a strike. This was demonstrated in 1950 when all the workers in Nairobi except the Railwaymen and the domestic workers went on strike. As Korir says:

One reason why these workers did not stop work was intimidation by Management - the notion that the Railway was an essential service from which it was illegal to strike --- (8).

These legislative controls were also intended to ensure that Trade Unions did not provide "breeding ground for potential political opposition" (9) to the Government of the day. This point was revealed by the reaction of EARH Administration to the general strike that involved every African worker on the Mombasa Island between 13th January and 24th January, 1947. The causes of the strikes were dissatisfaction with wages and conditions of work (10). In its 1947 Annual Report the Railway and Harbours Administration contended that:

Whilst some genuine grievances were present the strike was formented by a political group calling itself the African workers' Federation (A.W.F.) (11).

The Administration felt that without political motives the workers would have not 'downed their tools'. This argument was lent credibility by the fact that the Railway Africans Staff Union denounced the strike. But this was to no avail as they were not strong enough to keep the Railway section at work. (12).

The essential services Ordinance had a further controlling effect on the activities of the Union by the fact that it encompassed the principle of compulsory arbitration. It was, no doubt, in keeping with this requirement that the colonial state appointed a Trade Disputes Tribunal under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Thacker to study the demands made by the striking African workers in 1947 and make recommendations accordingly. (13).

The state also regulated the activities of the labour Unions through the office of the Registrar of Trade Unions. The 1952 Trade Unions Ordinance empowered the Registrar, among other things, to inspect Trade Unions books of accounts, list of members and other documents at any time he felt like doing so; he had the option to register a Trade Union on receiving its application to that effect, or to place such Union on probation. He was also granted powers to reject a Union's application for registration, cancel or suspend a Union's registration once this had been granted. (14). These massive powers conferred on the Registrar constituted a very significant control mechanism. It in effect meant that Union officials had to ensure that they complied with the provisions of the legislation if a possible de-registration was to be avoided. It also meant that splinter groups had little hope of having a rival trade Union registered as this had to be justified with sufficient evidence - one of which was to indicate clearly that the existing Union was not sufficiently representative of the workers it purported to represent. This then was the political-legal framework within which the Railway workers' organization had to operate. It was, no doubt, a fairly restrictive industrial

relations environment.

PART C: R.A.U. (K). AND THE RAILWAY AND HARBOURS CORPORATION

The wish of many an employer is to have a contented work force or, to put it the other way, to have a workforce that is obedient, loyal and unquestioning, while highly productive at the same time. There can be no doubt that the Railway and Harbours corporation had this feeling and went out of its way to ensure that such a system or an atmosphere was created and made to work. Various methods were used to this end.

The management set out to control the news, ideas and information to which its employees had access. The corporation, among other things, built social clubs for its employees at the housing estates. This was well presented in Korir's write up:

--- the Railway club building in Nairobi had facilities which included a room for religious services, a library and a reading room. Secondly, it was about then that the public address equipment was installed (15).

The public address equipment, according to the Management was installed for the following reasons ;

Firstly, in order that African staff may have reliable news of what is happening in the world today, so enabling them to discount any rumours or incorrect news which they may hear. Secondly, in order that he, the general manager or officers (of the management) may address them direct on any subject, from problems which may be troubling them to matters regarding the efficient running of the Railway, and thirdly, as a means of providing music in the African club, or in the open , as required (16).

This control of ideas yielded some fruits as shown by some statements originating from the management. To quote one of these :

There is little doubt that the facilities afforded by the Administration for the African workers to discuss their problems led to the use of such facilities for ventilation of grievances (17).

In point of fact, the aforementioned facilities were meant for propagation of propaganda tactfully aimed at convincing the African Railwaymen to accept their pathetically low wages and poor conditions of work.

Radio diffusion equipments were also installed at various workers' estates at several stations to serve a similar purpose. Such an installation was made at Muthurwa (18) and Makongeni (19). African Railway Housing Estates in 1955 and 1956 respectively. These wireless facilities were provided to workers who wanted them in their own houses at a nominal monthly fee deductible from the salary. But they were designed in such a way that it was only possible to switch on one particular station, e.g. Nairobi everytime. This, whether intended or not, ensured that the Railway employees who depended on these facilities for news - and many used them as they were apparently cheap, even if only in the short run - got only the information which the employer and the colonial authorities wanted them to get.

The corporation also mounted an extensive social welfare scheme which was deliberately designed to stifle the development of class consciousness among the Railway workers. These, inter alia, comprised of provision of housing, a loaning scheme intended to enable workers to acquire or buy their own houses; the engagement of a fulltime welfare officer and supporting staff such as land overseers; putting up consumer cooperative shops at various convenient centres where basic commodities were sold to railway workers at fixed and controlled prices; provisions of ration in some stations; free medical attention; maternity and welfare clinics for the wives of railway

workers; the provision of recreational facilities such as social clubs; publication of a staff magazine and provision of nursery schools for the children of railway workers (20).

These welfare programmes were pursued with a lot of zeal. During the period under discussion (1945-1957) the Corporation had built many estates in all the stations. Among these were the two well-known Railway Estates in Nairobi i.e. Makongeni and Muthurwa.

The following is the rough picture of the development of other welfare programmes during the period.

(a) Housing Scheme:

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Loans</u>	<u>Amount of money spent</u> £
1954	3	2,315
1955	28	56,895
1956	26	70,015
1957	23	52,667
	<u>80</u>	<u>181,892</u>

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957.

From 1954 to the end of 1957, the Corporation had given loan for purchasing houses to 80 of its employees valued at a total of £181,892.

(b) Co-operative shops

It was reported that two co-operative shops were under construction in Nairobi in 1955 (21). It was found from the interviews with the workers that more shops were built later.

(c) Clinics:

- 1956 - A temporary clinic was opened at Makongeni Estate(22).
1957 - Two childwelfare and maternity clinics were opened in Nairobi (23)

(d) Nursery Schools:

According to the available records, two Nursery schools were built in Mombasa and Nakuru in 1957 (24). From the interviews, however, I found that prior to this, some Nursery schools had been opened in Nairobi.

(e) Magazine:

Railways and Harbours quarterly magazine was published in 1954, with a circulation of 6,000 copies per issue (25). The publication was continued in 1955 and 1956 at the same level of production. In 1957 the production increased to 6,800 copies per issue (26). A staff newspaper, Sikio, was published fortnightly during the period (27).

These welfare schemes, and others, were geared towards the harmonization of the relations between the corporation and its employees. They were cleverly designed to camouflage the naked exploitation of the workers by the Corporation. According to the employees interviewed, the railway workers were envied by their fellow workers in other enterprises because of these services. To emphasize the degree of paternalism involved in this situation, it might be in order to quote what one senior officer of the Corporation reportedly said: "I try to be father to the employees".(28)

By having its own estates, well fenced and guarded; by having its own police - even if only on secondment from the central Government - and by having its own technical schools,

among a host of other services already discussed, the Railway and Harbours Corporation had set on a path that seemed well calculated to isolate its workers from the rest of the wage labour (29). Infact the 'tresspass' policy (which prohibited non-railway workers from entering Railway Estates without permission or real good reason) was applied at the Railway Estates with such vigour that most outsiders refrained from visiting relatives or friends at these Estates lest they are arrested and charged with tresspass.

The policy of self-containment and isolation was applied to prevent the Railway workers from mixing with others whose ideas might influence them and, hence raise the level of their class consciousness.

Given this kind of framework, it is hardly surprising that the Railway and Harbours Management encouraged and fostered the formation of Staff Associations among the Railway workers. One such Association, the African Staff Association, was formed in 1945 by the skilled and clerical African employees on the Railways. (30). The motivation for these alternative forms of workers' organizations was the fact that the "Staff Associations, restricted to individual companies, employing no fulltime officials and enjoying few legal immunities, were considerably easier to control than Trade Unions (31)". However, this staff Association evolved over time and was registered as a Trade Union on 1st October 1953 under the name of Railway African Union (Kenya).

For the whole period of its existence, the Railway African staff Association operated more like an industrial relations wing of the Railway and Harbours Management than as a defender and promoter of the workers interests particularly where such interests and objectives conflicted with those of the Management.

Consequent upon this posture, R.A.S.U joined the Corporation's Management in condemning practically every strike that was staged by workers during the period in question. Thus, it denounced the January 1947 Mombasa strike which involved practically all the African workers on the Island - including the Railwaymen (32). Three months after this, another three-days strike involving the African workers was called in Kisumu by the A.W.F. but the Railway workers did not take part (33). It was believed by the Management that the non-involvement by the Railway workers in the strike was the result of an effective grievance procedure which enhanced adequate communication between the Management and the staff Associations (34). The discontent of the workers with the manner in which the EARH administration intended to implement the salary recommendations of the Thacker Commission almost sparked off a strike in 1948. The credit for forestalling the strike went to R.A.S.U. This was born out by the Management's statement which read,

The African staff Association, whose position has been steadily strengthened with increasing experience, gave welcome evidence of a spirit of responsibility and was proof against subversive efforts to undermine the good relations which exist between the Administration and its staff (35).

In 1957, the Railway and Harbours Administration set-up Joint Staff Advisory Council under whose auspices the Management and the various workers' Unions and staff Associations were expected to meet and deliberate on matters pertaining to industrial relations (36).

By and large, the paternalistic policies employed by the Railway and Harbours Administration had a very significant compromising effect on the R.A.S.U. Nearly all the Corporation's annual reports during this period had some words of commendation for R.A.S.U. For instance, the management had the following to say on the aversion of the 1950 African workers' strike :

the two organizations, i.e. R.A.S.U. and the workshop committee;

Co-operated loyally, to disseminate information and dispel misunderstandings on terms of service which were being put forward by the instigators of the strike as grievances justifying the withdrawal of labour (37).

In deed every effort was made to domesticate the R.A.S.U. and later the R.A.U.(K) as the following statement indicates;

Much time has been devoted by the staff and welfare Assistant to this Staff Union to assist it become more representative and to create machinery which will enable it to carry more effectively its full responsibilities to its members and to the Administration (38).

Thus Anthony Clayton and Donald Savage could have not been any more right when they wrote that between 1945 and 1952 "Railway was the leading paternalist -----" (39).

This was the period during which the R.A.S.U. existed. The situation started changing slightly with the transformation of the staff Association into a fully fledged Trade Union - R.A.U.(K). This coming of a Trade Union shows beyond any shadow of doubt that the contradictions inherent in a capitalist mode of production cannot but lead to the developement of class consciousness among the workers. Any welfare programes and paternal treatments, among others, can only delay this development but cannot prevent it altogether. Not even the policy of divide and rule by which the Corporation encouraged the formation of three staff Unions based on racial lines (Africans, Europeans and Asians) could succeed in permanently thwarting this inevitable development.

PART D: CONFLICTS AND FACTIONALISM WITHIN R.A.U.(K)'S LEADERSHIP

From the available records, one is tempted to conclude that there do not seem to have been serious conflicts within the ranks of the Union

leadership between 1945 and 1957. But this does not hold true for the relationship between the Union and the workers it represented. The views of the two on various industrial relations matters were, more often than not, at variance. This was why for the greater part of this period the Union not only condemned every strike action taken by the workers but also never seemed to consider strike as an effective weapon that could be used to pressurise the employer to succumb to the demands of the workers (40). Certain factors explain this attitude of the Union. First, the Union's sense of direction and conception of its mission were seriously distorted by the environment in which it operated during the early years of its existence - an environment that was, among other things, mystified by the policies of 'domestication' pursued by the corporation. In section C I discussed these policies and how they were applied in practice. Second, membership of the Union was confined to the skilled and clerical workers - i.e. Group "B" employees whose outlook was different from that of Group "C" employees (41). It was the latter category of employees that engaged in strikes (42)

SUMMARY OF PHASE I:

Excepting the wage demands of March, 1957, which were turned down by the Corporation, the Union does not seem to have shown any signs of commitment to the improvement in the conditions of working for the lot of the Railway workers. Instead it collaborated with the Corporation, very much to the detriment of those whose interests it purported to represent.

The Government, through the use of statutory instruments, regulated and controlled the activities of Trade Unions, R.A.U. (K) included. In fact, R.A.U. (K) was subjected to even

stricter controls under the Essential Services Ordinance of 1950.

The relationship between the Union and EARH management was characterised by a high degree of inequality. The management played the role of a father-figure in this relationship. In fulfilling this role, the Management established an extensive network of social and welfare schemes that were meant to cater not only for the needs of the workers themselves but also for their wives and children. This was reinforced with a propaganda-oriented and regulated communication system and isolation. The entire approach aimed at providing self-contained facilities that would make a Railwayman a contented worker. The Management, no doubt, believed that this approach was essential for creating and maintaining stable Industrial relations climate which was crucial for the realization of its objectives. To this end, it tamed the Union leadership and used it for furthering its course. Infact the Union had been formed and operated under the guidance and fatherly hands of the Management. It depended on the Management for all facilities it needed: office, office furniture, supporting staff such as clerks and free-travel by train while attending Union meetings and conferences.

The effect of all these developments was a situation of "dependency complex" which not only retarded the development of a responsible and independent workers organization among the railwaymen but also saw frequent subordination of the interests of workers to those of the Corporation. Thus the Union leadership was prepared to sacrifice the interest of the workers and relagate them to the dust-bin if by so doing it was sure of getting praise and commendation from the benevolent employer.

Since the entire leadership was more or less an appendage of the Management, we find that this period was

devoid of any power struggles within the Union leadership.

In short, throughout 1945 - 1957 period, R.A.S.U. and its successor R.A.U. failed to produce any impact on the Industrial relations scene. Instead, it allowed the employer, the Railways and Harbours Corporation, to steal the show.

5. Reasons for limiting down the demand are given in R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1957, page 27.
6. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1956, page 11.
7. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1957, page 7.
8. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1958, page 3.
9. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1959, page 11.
10. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1960, page 7.
11. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1961, page 3.
12. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1962, page 3.
13. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1963, page 3.
14. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1964, page 11.
15. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1965, page 11.
16. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1966, page 11.
17. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1967, page 11.
18. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1968, page 11.
19. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1969, page 11.
20. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1970, page 11.
21. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1971, page 11.
22. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1972, page 11.
23. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1973, page 11.
24. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1974, page 11.
25. R.A.S.U. Annual Report, 1975, page 11.

REFERENCE TO PHASE I, CHAPTER IV

1. EARH: Annual Report, 1967, page 32
2. EARH: Annual Report, 1969, page 23
3. Lubembe, C.K.: op. cit. page 108 - 112. Also see appendix III for details.
4. See appendix III for further information
5. Reasons for turning down the demand are given in:
EARH: Annual Report, 1957, page 27
6. Korir, Arap K. M.: op. cit. page 17.
7. Ibid., page 7
8. Ibid., page 9.
9. Muir, J. D. and Brown, J.: op. cit. page 1
10. Korir, Arap K. M.: op. cit. page 7
11. EARH: Annual Report, 1947, page 34.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Sandbrook, op. cit. page 32
15. Korir, Arap K. M.: op. cit. page 11
16. EARH: Annual Report, 1945, page 38
17. EARH: Annual Report, 1945, page 38
18. EARH: Annual Report, 1956, page 2
19. EARH: Annual Report, 1956, page 2
20. Clayton, A. and Savage, D. C.: op. cit. page 298-299.
21. EARH: Annual Report, 1955, page 29
22. EARH: Annual Report, 1956, page 27
23. EARH: Annual Report 1957, page 4
24. Ibid, page 5
25. EARH: Annual Report 1954, page 1

26. EARH: Annual Report, 1957, page 5.
27. Ibid ., page 29.
28. Clayton, A. and Savage D. C.: op. cit. page 299
29. Ibid., page 298
30. Korir, Arap K. M.: op. cit. page 6
31. Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 31
32. EARH: Annual Report, 1947, page 34
33. Korir, Arap K. M. : op. cit. page 8
34. EARH: Annual Report, 1947, page 34
35. EARH: Anuual Report, 1948, page 53
36. EARH: Annual Report, 1957, page 4
37. EARH: Anuual Report, 1950, page 11
38. EARH: Annual Report, 1947, page 34
39. Clayton, A. and Savage, D. C. : op. cit. page 298
40. See, for example, EARH : Annual Report, 1947, page 34 where R.A.S.U. is reported to have condemned strikers.
41. See appendix II for details of the grading system.
42. Korir, Arap K. M. : op. cit. , page 7

PHASE 2 : 1958 -- 1966

PART A: R.A.U. (K) 'S ACHIEVEMENTS

We had earlier referred to a wage claim submitted by R.A.U. (K) to the Railway and Harbours Management in March 1957, which claim was rejected. Not convinced by the Management's argument against the claim, R.A.U. (K) declared a trade dispute on 5th February, 1958. The dispute was later referred to an arbitration tribunal which awarded group "C" workers an increase of 5% per month conditional upon their accepting to forfeit ten days from their annual leave. The Union was far from satisfied with this as it not only fell far below their demand of 15% and 10% wage increase for category "C" and "B" workers respectively, but also because the offer was conditional. Realising that tension was rising, the Management convened Joint Staff Advisory Council meeting which, after discussing the matter, recommended an increase of shs. 4/= for workers in group "C" with effect from 1st September, 1958. No condition was attached and the adjustment, therefore, superceded that given by the tribunal earlier (1). This small measure of success was a breakthrough for the Union because for the first time R.A.U. (K)'S relentless and persistent effort yielded dividends. This achievement would have not been realized if the Union did not bravely turn deaf ears to the warnings by the labour commissioner who called upon R.A.U. (K) executive to withdraw the dispute on the grounds that EARH was an essential service (2).

R.A.U. (K) leadership was revitalised with the election and subsequent registration of J.B.A. Ohanga as fulltime Secretary General of the Union on 5th April, 1959 (3). Upon resumption of office, Ohanga embarked upon members recruitment drive, particularly among group "C" employees, who were the majority.

On Friday, 13th November, 1959 Ohanga led what was to be one of the most historic strikes not only in the Railways but in the country as a whole. On that day about 4,000 Nairobi-based members of R.A.U. (K) withdrew their labour in order to reinforce their demand for the removal of a European building supervisor who had treated one of the African workers in a way that was considered very inhuman (4). The strike had originally started suddenly in the civil Engineering Department but soon received official support and direction of the Union (5). As days passed by Railway workers from other stations joined the strike.

But what had initially started as a pressure seeking a remedy for the injured reputation and personal respect of one of the members of the Union gradually acquired other dimensions as the Union took the opportunity and quickly added more items to its list of demands. By 20th November, 1959 the Union's demands had increased tremendously and now included :

a basic wage for members of shs. 7.75 a day; a revision of the system of grading and responsibility; improved housing; a forty-hour working week; Africanization of the Railway services and to look into the workers' grievances about the supervisor (6).

Whatever the other outcomes of this sixteen-days strike, one significant thing about it was that it was not only the longest strike in Kenya then (the average duration had been two days) but it also popularized the Union a great deal. Thus, the Union, which hitherto "had failed to capture the imagination and support of the mass of the Railwaymen" (7) became a very respectable institution in the eyes of the members and within a wider context of the Trade Union movement in the country as a whole. As for Ohanga, he emerged from the strike as a hero, a capable and undoubted popular leader of the Railway workers; a man whose commitment to the course of the working people was unquestioned. The major achievement of the 1959 strike, in my opinion, was the fact that it

tremendously reduced apathy that had gripped the Union for a long time and, for the first time, greatly reduced the gap between the Union leadership and the members as well as prospective members of the Union - particularly those in group "C".

Sometime in 1961 the Union presented a case before the Management asking for increase in wages. The request was turned down, whereupon the Union declared a trade dispute which was eventually referred to the Minister of labour early in 1962. Through conciliation a compromise was reached which increased the minimum wage from shs. 94/= to shs. 103/50 per month (8). The Union, however, not satisfied with these increases, raised further claims at the meeting of the Central joint council in June. Due to lack of agreement at the meeting the matter was forwarded to the staff tribunal which, sitting in November, 1962 increased the minimum wage in the rural areas by shs. 6.50 per month and shs. 7.50 per month in urban areas (9).

The Union held further discussions with the management which culminated in an agreement in November, 1964, authorising increase in the minimum wages of group "C" employees to shs. 175/- per month in Nairobi and Mombasa. The rates for other towns and rural areas went up by shs. 20 and shs. 10 per month respectively. The other group "C" employees who were already earning well above the new minimum rate were offered shs. 5/- increase per month (10).

R.A.U. (K) made claims for increase in wages early in 1965, which claims were rejected by the Management. Seeing no justification for the Management's stand the Union called all its members out on a general strike on 5th March 1965. The strike ended three days later after the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to the Kenya Industrial Court for Adjudication. On 3rd July, 1965, the court announced its award which increased minimum wages EARH workers. But it also ordered a standstill in wages until 1st July, 1967 (11).

In relative terms, R.A.U.(K) appears to have played a much more active role in defending and fighting for workers' rights and interests in the period 1958 - 1966. On several occasions wages and housing allowance were increased as a result of persistent Union demands. Where necessary, the Union did not shy from using strike weapon to force the corporation to negotiate with a more compromising attitude or to cause the matter to be investigated by an independent party or to be adjudicated by an arbitrator - a tribunal or industrial court. It is, therefore, no wonder that between 85 and 87 percent of the ordinary members interviewed by the author viewed the period 1959 - 1966 with nostalgia, for they felt that it was during that time that the Union scored most major successes. (see Table 2.7, appendix III for more information).

PART B : R.A.U.(K) AND THE GOVERNMENT

The Government continued its regulatory and supervisory role in the industrial relations of the country. However, one important change occurred at the end of 1958 with the amendment of the Essential Services Ordinance of 1950. East African Railways and Harbours was removed from the list of essential services and hence forth ceased to be covered by the machinery for compulsory arbitration (12). But this situation did not last even a decade before a compulsory arbitration was reintroduced in a different form - i.e. the industrial Court.

More and more restrictive measures were introduced in due course of time. While restrictive measures contained in 1952 Trade Unions Ordinance were carried forward more provisions curtailing Trade Union powers were introduced vide Trade Union Act, 1964 (cap 234). In addition to providing for the establishment of an industrial court, these Acts greatly increased the powers of the Minister for labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions.

Among other things, the Minister was empowered to order investigation into any trade dispute (whether or not it had been reported to him by the parties concerned), to suspend Trade Union elections if he deemed it necessary, to appoint conciliators and investigators and to declare illegal any strike, whether threatened or actual. Most cases where Unions and management failed to reach agreement were eventually referred to the Ministry of Labour. An example of such cases was a claim for increase in minimum wage rate made by R.A.U. (K) towards the end of 1961. This dispute was eventually resolved through conciliation provided by the Ministry of Labour (13). A similar action was taken in another dispute in 1964 (14).

The Registrar's responsibilities were increased so tremendously that he now, in addition to the other powers mentioned in phase I part B, determined validity of any purported change of a Union's office - bearers. If the Registrar did not use his powers R.A.U. (K) would have disintegrated during the power struggles within the Union's leadership in the period 1960 - 1961. In fact the Registrar refused to register the Ohanga-led rival Union in the name of National Union of Railwaymen (later renamed: Railway Union of Subordinate Staff) in spite of the fact that most of the railway workers, particularly those in group "C" had resigned from R.A.U. (K) and joined Ohanga's "splinter group" (15). More will be said about this and others in part D. During another major split in the Union in early 1964 attempts were made to form a separate multi-racial Union to be known as the Kenya Union of Railway workers. But once again, the proposed Union was refused registration by the Kenya Government. (16). Other interventions by the Kenya Government involved requesting the parties to take the matter to the Industrial court. Such was the case in a deadlock between R.A.U. and Railway Management over wage increases in 1965 (17)

It is certain from the foregoing that the Kenya Government exercised an increasing degree of control over the Trade Unions

during the period 1958 - 1966. The R.A.U. was no exception. Many agreements between the Union and the Railway and Harbours Management were facilitated by the intervention of the Ministry of Labour. More than once, R.A.U.(K) was saved from total disintegration by the intervention of the office of the Registrar of Trade Unions.

17 additional social clubs were built and 3 additional women classes opened in 1961 (15). These programs continued in 1962 and 1963 and even beyond. Provision of housing and loans for purchase of houses by individual employees went on as did consumer cooperative shops, free medical attention, canteen and Welfare Clinics, nursery schools, publication of staff magazines, among others.

Tabular presentation of some of the social and welfare programmes implemented by the Corporation during the period:-

(a) Housing Scheme

Year	Amount of Funds allocated for construction of houses
1958	2,71,311 (Rupees only)
1959	Figure not available
1960	Figure not available
1961	Figure not available
1962	Figure not available
1963	Figure not available
1964	Figure not available
1965	Figure not available
1966	Figure not available

PART C: R.A.U. (K) AND THE RAILWAY AND HARBOURS CORPORATION:

The corporation's social and welfare policies that were the chief instrument for 'humbling' the Railway Workers and, hence, rendering their organization ineffective in the period 1945 - 57 were still applied during 1958 - 66 period.

17 additional social clubs were built and 9 additional women classes opened in 1964 (18). These programs continued in 1965 and 1966 and even beyond. Provision of housing and loans for purchase of houses by individual employees went on as did consumer cooperative shops, free medical attention, maternity and Welfare Clinics, nursery schools, publication of staff magazines, among others.

Tabular presentation of some of the social and welfare programmes implemented by the Corporation during the period:-

(a) Housing Scheme

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount of funds authorised for construction/ leasing/purchase of houses</u>
1958	£ 73,811 (Loans only)
1959	figures not available
1960	figures not available
1961	" " "
1962	" " "
1963	" " "
1964	" " "
1965	£ 564,000
1966	£ 250,000

Sources: EARH: Annual Reports, 1958 - 1966

(b) Attendance at maternity and clinics

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of women</u>
1964	18,400
1965	109,000
1966	130,000

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1964 - 1966

(c) Nursery Schools:

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of new schools</u>	<u>Total no.to date</u>
1964	17	41
1965	10	51
1966	10	61

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1964 - 1966

(d) Publications

<u>Year</u>	<u>Name of publication</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Copies per issue</u>
1958	E.A.R.H. Magazine	every two months	6,800
	SIKIO	fortnightly	-
1960	E.A.R.H. Magazine	every two months	6,800
	SIKIO	fortnightly	10,500
1962	Spear	monthly	-
	SIKIO	fortnightly	-
1964	Spear	monthly	6,700
	SIKIO	fortnightly	13,000
1966	Spear	quarterly	6,000
	SIKIO	fortnightly	14,000

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1958 - 1966

The Railways and Harbours Management's motive behind these elaborate Social and Welfare Schemes remained the same during this period - i.e. Producing a completely loyal, if subservient, workforce.

The exhaustive discussion of these motives in phase I of the paper (page 38) is relevant to this part. However, while these policies secured a large measure of success in 1945 - 57 period, they were less successful in 1958 - 66 period. As we have seen, during this latter period, R.A.U. (K) had a hand in almost all the increases in wages and housing allowance for the workers. It called and staged strikes to force Management to adopt a more compromising attitude when dealing with the Union's demands. The reason for this is not far to fetch: For a good part of this period, leadership of the Union was in the hands of experienced, capable men who took up the position of General Secretary on a fulltime basis. These were J.B.A. Ohanga (1959 - 1960) and Walter Ottenyo (1961 - 1966), both of whom were men of tremendous organizational ability whose approach to industrial relations had wide and popular appeal to the mass of the workers. Infact if it was not for the restrictive nature of the various labour legislations, paternalism by itself would have not succeeded in forestalling the Union's militancy.

In addition to the above, the policy of 'isolation' with its concomitant of 'trespass' was not followed with as much vigour as was the case in the pre-independence days.

PART D: CONFLICTS AND FACTIONALISM WITHIN R.A.U. (K)'S LEADERSHIP

The period 1958 - 1966 witnessed some of the most ugly scene of

conflict and power struggles among the top R.A.U.(K) leaders.

The first major conflict and split in the union occurred during 1959 - 1961 period. The root cause of the trouble was that the General Secretary, Mr. Ohanga, perceived the Union's primary goal very differently from the rest of the members of the executive, not to mention that his militant approach to Trade Union matters differed very diametrically from the approach adopted by the rest of the executive.

On becoming the Secretary General of R.A.U.(K) on 15/5/59, Ohanga discovered that the Union was dominated by the white collar workers, i.e. job group "B" employees, not only at the leadership level but also at the level of the general membership. The subordinate staff - job group "C" employees - not only had no representative in the Union's executive Committee but were also heavily under-represented at the rank and file level (20).

In these circumstances, Ohanga gave intergration into the Union of hitherto neglected group "C" workers top most priority. His subsequent campaigns to this end received extremely enthusiastic response, especially at the grassroot level (21). Though the R.A.U Executive was not happy with this trend of thinking, Ohanga was determined to go ahead with his policies, come what may. But the executive would not let him have things his own way. As Korir reports:

Thus within only three months after assuming his post he (Ohanga) was publicly at odds with his president, Hillary Paul Oduol. The latter

claimed that Ohanga was responsible for a resolution passed by a general meeting of the Mombasa Branch calling upon him to resign (22)

As the protracted power struggle continued, it increasingly became clear that the cleavage was primarily based on occupational status. This fact was underscored by statements made by both Ohanga and his opponents. It was reported, for instance, that Ohanga claimed that:

Clerical and supervisory employees were already well paid and enjoyed superior facilities, yet they used the Union to boost their own salaries at the expense of the lower - paid workers (23)

Ohanga's opponents, on the other hand,

pointed to the presence of illiterate cleaners for key Union positions as evidence that Ohanga intended to dominate the Union by surrounding himself with officials who would necessarily be dependent upon him (24)

The two opposing parties also differed in terms of the means for pushing forward the Union's demands. Ohanga opted for a militant approach while the rest of the executive preferred soft, liberal approach. These different stands are explainable. First, as Richard Sandbrook has rightly said, "since all Union Officials were part-time and inexperienced in Trade Unionism the failure of the Union to make impact" (25) prior to Ohanga's appointment is understandable. Secondly,

The leaders (except Ohanga) were too moderate and concentrated on issues that affected mainly the clerical, supervisory and skilled staff. Apart from wage demands, the two commonly voiced grievances were relevant only to Group "B" employees (26)

It should be noted that on accepting Ohanga into the Union leadership the R.A.U.(K) executive never imagined that he could initiate ideas on his own and popularize them among the workers. This point was well presented by Korir when he said:

As General Secretary, he (Ohanga) was merely expected to execute the orders of the executive committee and supervise the Union's day to day Administration (27)

Let it be noted that Ohanga's militancy had not only provoked opposition from R.A.U.(K) executive and EARH Management but also from the K.F.L. Lubembe's statement attests to this contention. He says,

----Early in the year (1961), it had been decided to remove some of the confused elements within the affiliated Unions to K.F.L. ---- Those Unions which were to be cleared were the Railway African Union ---- Those were believed to be few which were infected with people who were opposed to the Trade Union movement in Kenya being supported by the Western power blocs (28)

Lubembe further states:

Another immediate move (by K.F.L.) was made to oust J.B.A. Ohanga as the General Secretary and replace him with Walter Ottenyo -----(29).

The foregoing argument is supported by the finding from the interviews. Practically all the respondents stated categorically that Ohanga was not defeated in an election but, rather dismissed by the Union's executive committee with the backing of K.F.L. (see 6.2, appendix III).

By the time the Registrar of Trade Unions refused to register Ohanga's breakaway Union in 1961, R.A.U.(K) was

left with less than 1000 paid-up members (30). When Walter Ottenyo took-up the post of General Secretary of the Union in December, 1961, he devoted much of his time during the first two years to the task of reorganization, especially convincing Railwaymen to sign 'check-off' agreements. Ottenyo's mass appeal was close to that of Ohanga. In deed oposition to his leadership was quite similar to the one that his predecessor had faced. Infact by the time Ottenyo was relieved of his duties by the National Executive Committee in 1966, the cleavage based on occupational status had surfaced once again.

So important a tool had occupational status become that even Management used it to achieve its own ends. When R.A.U.(K) threatened to call a general strike on 5th November, 1964, the Management reacted by appeals over the radios, press and leaflets. The General Manager's appeal to group "B" had entirely different contents from that addressed to group "C".

The message to group "B":

The Railway African Unions ----- are calling --- strike on 5th November, 1964. This strike will be unconstitutional because it contravenes the Industrial Relations Machinery Agreement. Many of you in supervisory positions will be anxious to know to whom you should be loyal. You should be loyal to East Africa and EARH which serves the public. All group B staff are expected to show a high degree of responsibility and loyalty. They are not expected to strike. If they do their suitability as supervisors and managerial staff is doubtful -----(31)

The message to group "C":

I wish to give you my opinion on the strike ----
The strike will be unconstitutional ---- For

this reason, any man who leaves his work will do so without permission and might lose money ---- If you strike all you will do is be without wages for the whole period in which you strike and you might lose your job. For this reason I ask you to think of EARH and all our fellow Africans. Take my advice and do not stop work (32).

Needless to say that the Management was using the age - long tactics of divide and rule to avert the threatened strike. It was simply a question of demonstration of allegiance either for the Management or the Union. Group "B" was told in no uncertain terms that participation in strike on their part would be tantamount to a rebellion against their own class. And if they disowned their own class then they did not deserve the positions they were holding let alone promotions, with more managerial responsibilities that this entails. For group "C" the message was simple: Strike and face not only the loss of wages for the entire period involved but also the likelihood of dismissal.

We had seen earlier how Ohanga had used statements couched in class terms to appeal to the sentiments of Group "C" employees. Ottenyo too followed on his footsteps. The Management on the other hand evoked the class consciousness of the Group "B" workers. Since at this point in time, all top eight officials in the executive, except the General Secretary, were group "B" employees, one notices immediately the dilemma they faced in the crisis. This, no doubt, is one of the reasons why they had always been mild and reconciliatory in handling trade disputes.

In all these intra - Union conflicts, the General Secretary and the President were on the forefront. Indeed it often looked like a battle between the two, with the rest of the executive playing a peripheral role. Two reasons emerged from the interviews as to why there have been protracted struggles between these R.A.U.(K)'s two top officials: The dominant view maintained that the Management tactfully played the two against each other in order to weaken the Union. It was argued that the President (Chairman) is susceptible to manipulation by the Management since he is an employee of the Corporation and, in most cases, a supervisor at that. The second view was that conflict arises from a desire by each of the two combatants to have more say on the running of the Union. (see 6.4, appendix III).

The Ottenyo - Mango conflict intensified. The President (Mango), is said to have insisted that Ottenyo must consult him on all matters pertaining to the activities of the Union. But Ottenyo had no wish to comply, and this, coupled with his leftist leaning in the nation-wide Trade Union spectrum, was to prove his undoing as R.A.U.(K)'s national executive committee met and dismissed him in February, 1966 (33).

The period 1958 - 66 was a period of rivalries, mistrust, suspicion and hatred. The rivalries and power struggles that resulted from these had far-reaching consequences. While they showed clearly what a fulltime, knowledgeable and experienced high calibre Trade Unionist was capable of doing in terms of defending and fighting for the workers' rights and interests, they also uncovered and exposed the difficulties that a reactionary executive committee can pose to such enlightened and

committed leader.

It was also noted that the conflicts were encouraged by both the K.F.L. and the EARH Management for no reason other than that both were interested in weak, moderate and unquestioning leadership, incapable of independent thinking, that would be amenable to direction from both the National Trade Union Centre and the employer.

The parties to the conflict resorted to, and exploited occupational status or class differences among the employees to advance their own course.

While both Ohanga and Ottenyo were talented and capable Trade Unionists whose power-base was popular mass support from the workers, particularly the group "C" cadre, their careers with the Union ended prematurely because the opposition forces were more entrenched and had political and other vital connections whose support was indispensable at crucial moments like those experienced during the period in question.

All in all, it seems logical to conclude that in both Ohanga's and Ottenyo's cases, the forces of conservatism triumphed over those of progress.

SUMMARY OF PHASE 2:

The period 1958 - 66 was certainly the most eventful since the inception of R.A.U(K).

Both Ohanga and Ottenyo are credited with some outstanding achievements made during the period. Most of the wages and housing allowance increments that were effected would have not been possible if the Union did not push its demands with sufficient force, occasionally backed with strike - actual or threatened. The Union was instrumental in the setting - up of Commissions of inquiry and other independent investigation bodies whose recommendations usually improved workers' wages.

The Government's control of Trade Union activities through statutory instruments continued. Railways and Harbours was removed from the list of essential services. But the advantages derived from this were more or less neutralized by the provisions of the Trade Unions Act of 1964 and Trade Disputes Act of 1965 which granted enormous powers to the Registrar of Trade Unions and the Minister for Labour, not to mention compulsory arbitration that was institutionalized with the creation of the Industrial Court.

The Management's Social and Welfare programmes continued. More money was spent in the construction or purchase of houses; more Social Clubs were built, as were nursery schools, publications, among others. The number of women attending maternity and Welfare Clinics more than tripled during the period. However, during the same

period these policies achieved only partial success. The Union managed to push forward its demands with more vigour and success. The workers showed more and more awareness of their plight, thus demonstrating that the elaborate Social and Welfare policies as well as isolation and various kinds of propaganda systems were reaching their limits and, perhaps, could only be stretched further with diminishing returns. All these were as a result of high leadership qualities injected into the Union by both Ohanga and his successor, W. Ottenyo.

The period 1958 - 66 also witnessed one of the most dramatic and conspicuous power struggles in the Union. Conflicts revolved around the persons of the General Secretary and the President. Occupational status formed the basis of the conflicts while the real issues at stake had to do with the interpretation of R.A.U.(K)'s primary goal and means of achieving it. The role of external factor in these crises is not possible to assess accurately, but that it was present in the form of K.F.L. is undisputed.

On the whole, the Union was more lively and faced management with more determination and bravery during 1958 - 66 period than was the case during 1945 - 57 period.

REFERENCE TO PHASE 2, CHAPTER IV

- 1 Lubembe, C.K.: op. cit. Page 108 - 113
- 2 Ibid., Page 112
- 3 Files of the Registrar of Trade Unions - show that Ohanga officially replaced J.P. Muinde as General Secretary of R.A.U.(K) on 5th April, 1959.
- 4 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 101 and Korir, Arap K.M.: op. cit. page 19
- 5 Government of Kenya: Labour Department, Annual Report, 1959, page 15.
- 6 East African Standard, November 17, 1959, page I.
- 7 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 101
- 8 EARH: Annual Report, 1962, page 31
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 EARH: Annual Report, 1964, page 32
- 11 EARH: Annual Report, 1965, page 34
- 12 EARH: Annual Report, 1958, page 28
- 13 EARH: Annual Report, 1962, page 31
- 14 EARH: Annual Report, 1966, page 34
- 15 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 103 and Government of Kenya, Labour Department, Annual Report, 1961, page 11.
- 16 EARH: Annual Report, 1964, page 34.
- 17 EARH: Annual Report, 1965, page 34
- 18 EARH: Annual Report, 1964, page 34
- 19 Lubembe, C.K.: op. cit. page 123
- 20 For a detailed treatment of this issue, see: Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 102 - 103.

- 21 Ibid., page 103
- 22 Korir, Arap K.M.: op. cit. page 18
- 23 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 103
- 24 Ibid., page 102
- 25 Ibid., page 101
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Korir, Arap K.M.: op. cit. page 18
- 28 Lubembe, C.K.: op. cit. page 26
- 29 Ibid., page 28
- 30 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit. page 103
- 31 Grillo, R.D.: op. cit. page 116
- 32 Ibid., page 117
- 33 Odit, F.J.: The ideological underpinings of the Kenya Trade Union movement upto 1972 (An Independent Study paper presented to the University of Nairobi in partial fulfillment for the M.B.A. Degree in 1974).

PHASE 3: 1967 - 1975

PART A: R.A.U.(K)'s ACHIEVEMENTS:

For along time the Railways and Harbours Administration had operated two salary structures, one for the expatriate staff and another for the local staff, the former being more advantageous. This had been a recurring source of misunderstanding and hence, poor industrial relations. Through R.A.U.(K)'s unfailing efforts, the two structures were replaced with only one uniform salary structure applicable to both categories of staff (1).

In 1968, following the expiry of a two-years wage standstill ordered by the Industrial Court at the end of 1965, R.A.U.(K) submitted claims for wage increase. The negotiations that followed were not successful and, as a result, the matter was referred to the East African Industrial Court by the Kenya's Minister for Labour. In August, 1969 the Court made an award granting an overall increase of sh.10/- per month for Group "C" employees and the lowest graded staff in Group "B", effective from 1st January, 1969. The court also ordered 30 months wage freeze with respect to these groups of employees.

Towards the end of 1970, in anticipation of the end of thirty months wage freeze, R.A.U.(K), in conjunction with its Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts, asked for a salaries review commission to be appointed. After protracted negotiations, which involved a

conciliator, Management and Unions agreed, in February, 1971, on terms of reference for the commission. The commission was eventually appointed in July, 1971 under the chairmanship of Danstun Omari (3). The Commission submitted its report early in 1972.

But while accepting the implementation of the Omari report recommendations for salary increases in respect of the lowest paid workers the Communications Council, East African Community, was dragging its feet on the implementation of other recommendations of the report. This led to a declaration of a dispute by the Unions towards the end of 1972 (4). R.A.U.(K) even threatened a strike action on 2nd November, 1972 and only refrained from carrying it out after the Management had accepted that, following mediation by the Ministry of Labour, the issue be referred to the East African Industrial Court (5).

But earlier in 1972, R.A.U. had successfully negotiated a new agreement with Harbours Corporation (6) which resulted in sweeping benefits including salary increases and improved terms and conditions of service. Lowest paid workers were added sh. 65/- per month, which raised their basic pay to sh. 175/- per month (7)

On 9th February, 1973, the East African Industrial Court

ordered the Railways Corporation to implement in full, and immediately, Omari Commission Report with effect from 1st January, 1972. The award was made in a case in which the Corporation failed or delayed to implement a voluntarily negotiated agreement signed on 21st July, 1972, on the Omari salaries and terms of Service Report (8).

The R.A.U.(K) had two other claims submitted to the Industrial Court in 1974. These were cause No. 4/74 and cause No. 5/74 both of which concerned wage increments. Judgements on both were delivered on 19th October, 1974 and 7th February, 1975 respectively (9).

R.A.U.(K) showed quite a bit of concern about wage guidelines issued by the Government in 1973 to control wage increases. On 21st February, 1974 R.A.U.(K)'s Secretary General was reported to have asked COTU to declare a national Trade Dispute with both the Government and the Federation of Kenya Employers in protest against the Government guidelines (10).

Needless to say, R.A.U.(K) registered some tangible successes in the period 1967 - 75. It managed to have wages raised and other terms and conditions of service improved through sheer negotiation and threat of an Industrial action. Where agreements were not forthcoming through negotiations with the management

it managed to have the matter referred to the Industrial Court. But, in my opinion, the greatest achievement of the Union during this period was the appointment of the Salaries Review Commission in 1971, an appointment that was only made after strenuous effort by the Union.

PART B: R.A.U.(K) AND THE GOVERNMENT

The Trade Disputes (EACSO employees) Act of 1965 whose repeal R.A.U.(K) and its Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts had fought for over along period of time was finally repealed when the Treaty for East African Cooperation became effective on 1st December, 1967. During the period in question Trade Disputes involving Railways and the then other Community Corporations had been processed in accordance with the relevant state law and the East African Industrial Court that had been established under article 84 of the Treaty (11).

The Government's restrictive statutory measures that were observed in the preceding period continued. Infact the degree of control was increased through the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, passed in July, 1971. One of the amendments re-defined strike to include 'go-slows'. A provision was also introduced requiring that all collective bargaining agreements be approved and registered by Industrial Court. This institution was also

empowered to consider any proposed increases in wages and fringe benefits with a view to determining whether they were justified on the basis of guidelines established by a Committee of the Cabinet (12). The wage guidelines, however, were not established until 1973.

These massive powers vested in the hands of state agencies had, no doubt, a telling effect not only on the freedom of Industrial action on the part of R.A.U.(K) but also on the part of all other Trade Unions in the Country. It is not surprising, therefore, that during this period R.A.U.(K) never called any major strike. This contrasts sharply with 1957 - 66 period. Other factors may explain this, but stringent state legislation is certainly one of the major ones.

PART C: R.A.U.(K) AND THE RAILWAY
CORPORATION

The Corporation maintained a benevolent relationship with its employees. This meant, in practical terms, provision of a network of social and Welfare Services.

By 1967 the Corporation had built a total of 81 Social Clubs and 56 Women's Clubs with a membership of 12,560 and 1740 people respectively (13). By 1969 Women's Clubs had increased to 70. Social Clubs for men had, however, decreased to 61. (14).

Housing Scheme: In 1970, the Corporation spent sh. 24,435,000 for construction of staff houses and sh. 3,800,000 for leasing and renting houses for the staff (15). But in 1973, the Management abolished house ownership scheme under which individual employees were given loans to purchase personal houses. Free housing policy was withdrawn in the same year (16).

Attendance at Maternity and Clinics:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Women</u>
1969	60,000
1970	50,201

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1969, 1970.

Figures for the other years were not available.

Nursery Schools:

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of new schools</u>	<u>Total to-date</u>
1967	13	74
1969	3	77
1970	4	81

Figures for other years were not available.

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1967, 1969, 1970

Publications:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Name of publication</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Copies per issue</u>
1967	Spear	3 issues	6,000
	SIKIO	fortnightly	14,500
1969	Spear	monthly	6,000
	SIKIO	fortnightly	16,700

Figures for other years were not available.

Source: EARH: Annual Reports, 1967, 1969.

The desired end results of these programmes, as far as the Railway Corporation was concerned, remained as originally designed. These desired results were analysed in greater details in phase I of this paper (i.e. page 11-15).

It appears from these analyses of the Social and Welfare programs that there was a general decline in the rate of increase of various facilities. The last expenditure on housing was in 1970 while house ownership scheme and free housing policy were withdrawn. The number of women attending maternity and clinics showed a down-ward trend as was the number of new nursery schools.

Nevertheless, the declining trend, in my opinion, did not in any way imply a decline on the importance attached to these policies by the Management. It all had to do with the Corporation's state of finances at that material time. The Corporation recorded continuous deficits of £951,000, £ 3.3 million and £ 3.1 million in 1969, 1972 and 1973 respectively (17).

While it is not easy to gauge precisely what impact these policies had during this period, one can still make some reasonable conclusions from the industrial relations climate that prevailed then. The R.A.U.(K) was active and scored some tangible success during the period in terms of increase in workers' pay and other terms and conditions of service. It occasionally threatened a strike action and by so doing managed to get the Management to cooperate and act fast to find solution to the problems raised by the Union. What appears conclusive from this is that if the Corporation's 'paternalistic policies' succeeded during this period such a success was only partial. It means that the policies failed somewhat to produce the contented worker that would not engage in industrially disruptive activities - i.e. unquestioningly obedient employee.

Comparatively, it looks like 1967 - 75 period saw less dramatic industrial actions than did 1958 - 66 period. But it would be wrong to attribute this solely to the impact of the Corporation's

policies of 'domestication'. Other factors must have played some part. I have reasons to believe that one of these factors was the nature and calibre of leadership during this third period. Between early 1966 and late 1969 the General Secretary of R.A.U.(K) was not only from a small tribe at the Coast (Taita) but was also an employee of the Railway Corporation. This gentleman, Mr. Jonstone Mwandawiro, was seconded to R.A.U.(K) to serve fulltime in the Union, the understanding being that he could return to his former job at any time, without loss of seniority (18). Given high risks in the Trade Union leadership, Mwandawiro surely could have not tackled the Railway Management forcefully as he might have felt, humanly of course, that his salvation only lay in his job with the Corporation. In addition to this, the control of the Union at this time rested with the President (19). Indeed, others have argued that Mwandawiro mostly acted on orders from the President of the Union who was himself an employee of the Corporation. Thus leadership played a role in making the Union less militant than it might have been otherwise.

Legal restrictions also had an effect on the Unions approach to the industrial relations matters. The developments that occurred in this area of state control had been examined in part "B" of this phase.

PART D: CONFLICTS AND FACTIONALISM

WITHIN R.A.U.(K)'s LEADERSHIP:

Johnstone Mwandawiro was elected Secretary General of R.A.U.(K) on 9th June, 1966 and for some time it looked like his coming was opening a new chapter of peace, cooperation and understanding among the members of the Union's executive. This calm and harmony was more apparent than real, because underneath it coalitions and realignments were taking place. It did not take long before Mwandawiro was disowned by many of his colleagues in the executive who felt that he was not competent enough to handle effectively the demanding and taxing duties of the office of the Chief Executive of the Union.

From the interviews, I learnt that the real power struggle surfaced just when Mwandawiro's first term of office was about to end in 1968. Mwandawiro was determined to contest the next elections. In a quest to build a strong following he found, among others, a ready ally in the person of Christopher Opondo, the then Chairman of the powerful Nairobi Branch of R.A.U.(K). It so happened that Opondo and R.A.U.(K) national President, Mr. Mango never saw eye to eye. One year or so that followed was a period of struggle and a show of power between Mango and his supporters on the one hand and Opondo and his supporters on the other hand. Mango's move to have Opondo expelled from the

National Executive Committee failed because the latter had tremendous influence within the said Executive. Paradoxically, it was Opondo and his group that dismissed Mango from his post at a meeting of the National Executive Committee that had been convened by Mango to discipline Opondo. The dismissal was, however, rejected by the Registrar of Trade Unions on the grounds that it was not done constitutionally.

Meanwhile, the Executive Committee had dismissed Mwandawiro on 1st August, 1969. John Mollo took over as General Secretary on 24th November, 1969. From the outset, Mollo started on a program of reorganization aimed at improving the efficiency of the Union. He was particularly concerned with the performance and conduct of the employees of the Union, most of whom were seconded by the Corporation. Mango, however, was not happy with Mollo's approach to reorganization. Tensions built gradually and factions formed around Mango and Mollo.

The hostilities between the two factions intensified as each faction tried to consolidate its power before the Union's Triennial Conference convened on 7th April, 1972 at Kisumu. At the elections held during this Triennial Conference, Mollo's faction won all the seats, except that of the National Treasurer which went to the former Treasurer and Mango supporter, Mr. Opiyo. Mango himself was defeated by Arthur Oduor. However, many former officials who

their seats questioned the validity of the Kisumu elections.

Despite having his men in majority of the Union's national posts, Mollo was still unable to rid the Union of disruptive conflicts. By May 1972, just one month after the elections, Mollo was already at odds with his chairman, Mr. Oduor. Thus opposing groups appeared once again. The period between May, 1972 and March, 1974 was characterized by a serious rift between "Mollo group" and "Oduor group".

These conflicts assumed very serious proportions when the top officials started sacking each other. On 1st October, 1972 at a meeting of the National Executive Committee, Oduori group allegedly sacked Mollo. But Mollo and his group in turn allegedly sacked Oduor and Mzigo, the Assistant National General Secretary, at a meeting of the Central Council of R.A.U.(K) held on the 5th October, 1972 (21). However, the Registrar of Trade Unions received objections to the validity of both meetings. After investigations, he rejected the notices of change of office bearers on the grounds that the meetings at which the changes were made were unconstitutional.

Meanwhile, conflicts continued to plague the Union. On 26th February, 1974 it was reported that a group of railway workers was seeking to register a new Union that was to be known as Railway workers Union (22). But it was reliably learnt that the Registrar

rejected the application.

Earlier in January, 1974, the Registrar of Trade Unions had referred the issues of the conflict to a Trade Union Arbitration Tribunal. The Tribunal was required to look into the validity of the then R.A.U.(K)'s leadership. Sitting in Nairobi on the 25th February, 1974, the Tribunal ordered the warring factions to hold fresh elections after they had agreed to go to the polls before the Tribunal could give a ruling. A special conference at which elections would be held was scheduled for 19th April, 1974. But prior to this conference, the Union was to hold another meeting on March 29th, 1974 to amend the constitution in line with the recommendation adopted at a Triennial conference held in Kisumu on 7th April, 1972 (24).

At the elections of 19th April, 1974 Mollo was returned unopposed. All other seats were also taken by his men. The seat of chairman-general, formerly held by Arthur Oduor, went to David Kariuki (25).

It can hardly be disputed that R.A.U.(K) leadership was torn apart by internal strife for the greater part of 1967 - 75 period. As had been the case in the earlier periods, the General Secretary and the President/Chairman - General were at the forefront of the rival camps. However, it appears to me that these quarrels were not caused by fundamental disagreements regarding the Union goals and

the means of achieving them. Rather, they seemed to have been caused by sheer personality differences. Central to these struggles was the desire by each of the two top officials to exercise more control on the Union. The President/Chairman expected the General Secretary to do no more than implement the decisions and carry out the directives of the executive committee or the President/Chairman himself. The General Secretary, on the other hand, saw the role of the President/Chairman as consisting of no more than presiding over the meetings of various Union organs.

But the reasons given by the combatants in such quarrels were, more often than not, just a cover-up. They were given merely to justify one's position in the conflict. Oduor was behaving exactly in this manner when he justified the dismissal of Mollo by claiming that he (Mollo) did nothing to ensure that the Railway Corporation implemented recommendations of the Omari Commission Report as soon as possible (26).

SUMMARY OF PHASE 3:

R.A.U.(K) showed a determined effort to fight for the workers rights during 1967 - 75 period. Through relentless negotiations and the threat of strike where necessary, the Union caused a rise in wages and improvement in other terms and conditions of service. The Union was amply rewarded when a Uniform salary structure, which it had persistently fought for, which did not discriminate against the African workers was achieved. The Union was certainly instrumental in the setting-up of a salaries review commission.

The Government continued to exercise stringent control over Trade Union activities. The Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1971 increased the regulative powers of the Government by increasing the responsibilities and powers of the Industrial Court and by providing for wage guidelines to be set by a Committee of the cabinet. These restrictive measures may partly explain why R.A.U. never called a major strike during this period.

The Management's benevolent relationship with its employees was maintained. But there was a noticeable decline in the quantity of additional social and welfare facilities provided during the period. Yet this trend did not imply a diminishing

significance of these policies. It was simply due to the poor financial status of the Corporation during the period in question. The social and welfare policies did not attain maximum success. In other words, they failed to produce a totally contented and subservient employee and, by implication, Union. This was evidenced by the Union's efforts and achievements that have been presented in section A of this phase.

R.A.U.(K)'s leadership was in shambles as a result of internal strife. This continued for most part of this period. The opposing splinter groups were led by the General Secretary and the President/Chairman respectively. The disagreements resulted from sheer personality differences and a desire by each of the two leading officials to have more and exclusive control on the Union. Each of the two certainly misconceived the responsibilities and the extent of the powers of the other. But the reasons given by those in conflict, and which are believed by their respective followers, are often far-fetched and simply meant to smear the dignity and integrity of the opponent. The R.A.U.(K) leadership conflict was no exception to this. There is no doubt that these conflicts had serious repercussions on the performance of the Union. R.A.U.(K) leaders occupied a good part of their time with simply maintaining or advancing their positions, relegating industrial relations matters to the background only to be looked into occasionally.

REFERENCE TO PHASE 3, CHAPTER IV

- 1 EARH: Annual Report, 1967, page 32.
- 2 EARH: Annual Report, 1969, page 23
- 3 East African Railways and Harbours Administration: Report of the Salaries and Terms of Service Review Commission, 1971 - 72, page 8.
- 4 EARH: Annual Report, 1973, page 26
- 5 East African Standard: November 1, 1972, page 1.
- 6 Harbours Corporation was separated from the EARH by the East African Community Charter of 1967.
- 7 East African Standard: February 15, 1972, page 5.
- 8 Daily Nation: February 9, 1973, page 1.
- 9 Government of Kenya: Department of Labour Annual Report, 1974, page 6.
- 10 Daily Nation: February 22, 1974.
- 11 EARH: Annual Report, 1967, page 34.
- 12 Sandbrook, R.: op. cit., page 45.
- 13 EARH: Annual Report, 1967, page 15.
- 14 EARH: Annual Report, 1969, page 23.
- 15 EARH: Annual Report, 1970, page 2
- 16 EARH: Annual Report, 1973, page 5
- 17 EARH: Annual Report, 1969, page 5 and East African Standard, November 20, 1972, page 1
- 18 Sandbrook, R.: Politics in Emergent Trade Unions: Kenya, 1952 - 1970 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1970), page 92.
- 19 Ibid., page 106.

- 20 Taifa Leo: October 6, 1972, page 1
- 21 Daily Nation: February 26, 1974 page 11
- 22 Ibid., page 11
- 23 Ibid., page 11
- 24 Daily Nation: April 20, 1974, page 3.
- 25 Taifa Leo: October 6, 1972, page 1

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

THE FOCUS OF THE PAPER:

The primary focus of this paper has been three-fold: First, a systematic attempt has been made to gauge the benefits made available to reilwaymen by the R.A.U. (K) in fulfilling its role as a vanguard of workers' rights and interests. In doing so, attention has been paid not only to the traditional Trade Union role - the procurement of wages, decent housing and the betterment of other terms and conditions of service for the workers-or to the provision of counterveiling power to that of Management particularly in as far as the workers' dignity and personal respect are concerned, but also to the Union's efforts in organizing and stimulating the workers' interest in pulling their resources together and collectively, with or without assistance from the Management, providing some of the essential social and welfare services which might have been lacking. Second, an effort has been made to expose and explain the nature of the interaction between R.A.U.(K) and its external environment - specifically, the Government and the Railway Corporation. The emphasis has been on the intended as well as the actual effects of those relationships on the policies of R.A.U.(K) and its functioning. Third, analysis of internal dynamics of the Union has been undertaken, the centre of interest being to show the nature of conflicts that have plagued the Union leadership for so long and to unveil the main pressures, differences and disagreements which have fueled such conflicts. As the specific aspects of all the foregoing issues, except the Unions' Socio-economic programmes, have been discussed in details in various sections of this paper, it is not considered necessary to repeat them here.

Suffice it, therefore, to outline briefly what R.A.U. (K)'s pledges in social and welfare schemes were all about and how far the Union went in its endeavours to fulfil them.

In its objectives, outlined in its constitution, R.A.U.(K) pledged to initiate or obtain and maintain some services for its members both inside and outside their places of work. She promised to seek facilities for members to get training and education relevant to their work, and for making them aware of their rights and obligations as workers; to obtain legal advice and any other assistance on any matters affecting any of the members and arising from their relations with the management. She also promised to collect and circulate among members information concerning the Union and to print, publish, and issue papers, periodicals, books, circulars and other literature for the general education of the members. She also pledged to provide relief in sickness, accident, disablement, victimization or trade disputes, and any assistance to the member's immediate dependants or funeral expenses of a member or his immediate dependants. She also envisaged to establish and operate consumer cooperative shops for the members and to institute a Co-operatives Savings and Credit Finance Schemes. She was to make arrangements for life insurance scheme for Union members by a company or companies that would be approached from time to time. On housing, she sought to establish and to assist in the operation of tenant purchase housing schemes for Union members and to provide social and welfare services like nursery schools, adult literacy classes, recreational centres and the like. Committees were set-up to pursue these goals.

However, it is evident that only a few of these objectives had been realised by R.A.U.(K) by 1975. There was a regular circular for emitting information from the headquarters to the branches, but there was no newsletter and unlike other Trade Unions in the country, ideas could not emanate from the branches on a regular and systematic basis. It was a one-way traffic from the head office through a circular known as "R.A.U. YASEMA".

An attempt had been made to implement the Union's pledge on education, but at best this mostly benefited Union officials and some employees of the Union such as secretaries. Seminars had been organized jointly with the International Transport Federation in London to which R.A.U.(K) was affiliated. Another scheme which had taken off was the group Insurance Scheme. Members received legal assistance in deserving cases but the Union had yet to employ its own fulltime legal adviser.

The rest of the objectives had not been implemented by 1975 and there were no indications that they would in the foreseeable future. The reasons for this were said to have been inadequacy of funds coupled with uncommitted and incompetent leadership.

SOME SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS:

The following specific conclusions and inferences arise from the various issues discussed in the paper:-

1. Competition for leadership in Trade Union arena propels the incumbent officials to keep up the fight for better terms and conditions of service for their members. This is because the retention of their official positions in the Union depends, among other things, on the degree of backing they get from the rank and file, which backing is enhanced by the tangible benefits that flow to the Union members as a result of the Union's efforts.

In the light of this, the R.A.U.(K) officials were very likely to continue pressure for improvement in the terms and conditions of service for the Railways and Harbours employees. They would also continue the role of protecting the Union members from the arbitrary and unfair decisions or actions of the management. This is because their survival as R.A.U.(K) leaders depended very much on whether or not they convinced the Union members that they were actively committed to the objectives of the Union.

However, it is worth noting that with the stringent provisions of the labour laws and the constant warnings and threats of punitive measures by the political leaders against those bent on disrupting industrial peace, it was very unlikely that any militant posture assumed by R.A.U (K) would be translated into industrial action of the kind witnessed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This means that the Union's success in getting the management to improve the workers' remuneration and other terms and conditions of service as well as protecting workers' dignity would be determined, largely by shrewd negotiations and adjudication by the industrial court.

2. Many workers join a Trade Union only when it is sufficiently attractive to them. In other words, it has to be reasonably clear to them that the Union is making a genuine effort, accompanied by a high probability of success, to improve their lot. This explains why R.A.U.(K) witnessed a big increase in its membership during Changa's and Ottenyo's respective terms of office. On the basis of this proposition, it was possible to predict R.A.U(K)'s future membership trend.

Given the increased restriction imposed by the Government by the middle of 1960s and early 1970s, particularly with respect to the use of strike weapon, R.A.U.(K) would increasingly find it difficult to pressurise the Railway Management to yield to its demands. Though not of its own doing, this situation would portray the Union as a 'toothless bulldozer' in the eyes of its members. This would most likely lead to apathy and, hence, lack of interest to join the Union since it (the latter) would not be adequately attractive.

3. R.A.U.(K)'s objectives concerning socio-economic ventures were unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future primarily because of lack of adequate Funds resulting from the situation explained in No. 2 above.

4. So long as a Government sets out to create and maintain a climate that is attractive to foreign investors, and so long as it holds that such an investment is sine qua non for rapid 'economic development', so long will it continue to regulate the activities of the Labour Unions - defining and dictating what they may or may not do.

Thus the Kenya Government's restrictive measures were very likely to continue into the future, more so because its priorities in economic development and emphasis it placed on harmonious and peaceful industrial climate were unlikely to change, at least not in the foreseeable future. In this respect, R.A.U.(K)'s weak power base, emanating from the aforesaid restrictions, would continue to be so vis-a-vis that of the Management.

5. The ultimate aim of EARH paternalism was 'complete control' of the EARH workers. This was necessary because expansion of capital depends on the effective exploitation of labour. This situation was well explained by Bogomolova when he observed that,

.....bourgeoisie are compelled to introduce welfare and culture schemes as a result of pressure from the working class. An aspect of this human relations syndrome is 'Communication': both from the employers to the workers and vice versa. But the Corporations do not lose sight of the workers even during the latter's leisure hours. In other words, capital attempts to control labour in a total sense (1).

5.1: These welfare policies were likely to continue in the future. However, the proportion of the Corporation's annual expenditure committed to these programmes would continue to decline as there was no indication that the Corporation would arrest the deficit trend and, hence, build a viable, longlasting financial base.

5.2: It was very unlikely that the aforesaid policies would achieve their desired results in the future - i.e. producing contented and absolutely loyal workers. First, their impact was already much less by 1975. Secondly, with increase in communication and education, workers were set to gain more and more awareness as regards their plight vis-a-vis their counterparts in other enterprises - more so as workers are primarily concerned with their actual take-home pay regardless of the value of non-monetary benefits. Thirdly, given the corporation's deteriorating income, the facilities it provided for its employees were likely to be inferior to those provided by other employers with sound income base. This might erode and water down the claim by the Management of the Railways that the facilities it offered to its employees were the best.

6. Most of the factional struggles that plagued R.A.U.(K) during the period of study were, to a very large extent, confined to incumbent officials. This contradicts Richard Sandbrook's finding to the effect that "factionalism usually assumes the form of the 'ins' versus the 'outs'...."(2).

7. Intra-Union conflicts and factions are certain to arise when the goals of the Union and, some times, the means of attaining them are perceived and interpreted differently by high ranking Union officials. This was reflected in the Ohanga-Oduol and Ottenyo-Mango conflicts. Ohanga, as Secretary General, saw the basic responsibility of the Union as being that of improving the conditions of work for the lot of the lowest paid workers and was convinced that militant approach and uncompromising attitude was an indispensable means of striving towards the said goal. Oduol, on the other hand, was for a white-colla dominated Union whose main concern would be the improvement of the workers' wages through cultivation of amicable and reconciliatory relationship with the management.

8. Intra-Union conflicts usually involve elements of intrusion from other Organizations, political or otherwise. The external factor may either creep in after the internal conflicts have already started or may actually cause them. The outside parties come in to provide support so that, in reciprocation, the clique they have given support could, in turn, back them in the power struggles in their respective organizations or at the national Trade Union Centre. The K.F.L. involvement in R.A.U.(K)'s internal conflicts during both Ohanga's and Othenyo's eras and Denis Akumu's role in Mollo -Oduor quarrels are reminiscent of this observation. This point confirms, in part, Richard Sandbrook's conclusion in a study conducted on Kenyan Trade Union movement. He observed that "intra-Union factionalism often reflects conflict in other arenas (3)

9. Incidents of intra-Union conflicts are highly resistant to arbitratory or reconciliatory measures and usually only subside when the ardent leaders of one of the warring parties are either defeated in a valid election or are removed from the office by the use of other constitutional instruments. This, indeed, was the case with Ohanga-Oduol, Ottenyo -Mango, Mwandawiro- Mango, Mollo-Mango and Mollo-Oduor conflicts that plagued R.A.U.(K) at different times between 1945 and 1975. In all these five incidents of conflicts, peace prevailed only after one of the opposing groups was removed from the leadership of the Union.


SOME SUGGESTIONS:

1. It was noted that by 1975 R.A.U.(K) had not made any reasonable headway in meeting the social services objectives that were established in its constitution. The major reason for this was lack of sufficient funds emanating from meagre subscriptions which, in turn, were caused by low membership. There was no indication that the situation would improve soon. Given this state of affairs, and noting that the Railway Management was already committed in this area, I would suggest that, if funds are secured, the Union should only concentrate on those aspects or items of its objectives which are not covered by the Corporation's welfare programs. For the others, it might be logical for the Union to bargain with the Management to provide more and better of such services.

2. A way needs to be found to limit the number of Union officials who are at the same time employees of the Railway Corporation. This is because these people are not very reliable as they have a divided loyalty. Things are even more critical at the branch levels where none of the officials is fulltime employee of the Union. Thus these officials devote very little of their time to Union activities as they have to work fulltime for the Railway Corporation. I feel that away out of this lies in making at least the Branch Secretary a fulltime employee of the Union. The snag here is likely to be shortage of funds. However, with proper planning there is no reason why this bottleneck should not be overcome.

REFERENCE TO CHAPTER V


1. Cited in Korir, Arap K.M. : Op.Cit.
Page 9.
2. Sandbrook, R.: Politics in Emergent Trade Unions : Kenya, 1952 - 1970.
(Ph.D Thesis, University of Sussex, 1970), Page 499
3. Ibid., Page 499



APPENDIX I

RAILWAY AFRICAN UNION (KENYA)

PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION CHART HQ & BRANCHES



KEY TO APPENDIX I

- ASSISTANT SEC. GENERAL (R) - Assistant Secretary General
(Railways)
- ASSISTANT SEC. GENERAL (H) - Assistant Secretary General
(Harbours)
- D.C. - Director of Co-operatives
- D.O. - Director of Organization
- D.R. - Director of Research
- D.E. - Director of Education
- D.P.A. - Director of Personnel Administration
- S.A. & F.S. - Senior Accountant/Finance Secretary
- D.C. & C.R. - Director of Constitutional matters and Credentials.
- D.T. & O. - Director of Trade and Occupation.
- D.S.W. - Director of Social and Welfare Services.
- D.I.R. - Director of Industrial Relations
- P.S. TO S.G. - Personal Secretary to Secretary General.
- Asst. D.P.A. - Assistant Director of Personnel Administration
- S.A. - Senior Accountant
- Asst. D.I.R. - Assistant Director of Industrial Relations.
- S.D. - Senior Despatch
- STENO I - Stenographer I
- STENO II - Stenographer II
- STENO III - Stenographer III
- ASST. ACC. - Assistant Accountant.
- J.D. - Junior Despatch
- T. & R. - Typist & Recorder
- STENO IV - Stenographer IV
- S.O.A. (NBI) - Senior Office Assistant (Nairobi).
- S.O.A. (M/R) - Senior Office Assistant (Mombasa Railway)
- S.O.A. (M/H) - Senior Office Assistant (Mombasa Harbours)
- REC. ASST. - Records Assistant
- O.A. (KSM) - Office Assistant (Kisumu)
- O.A. (NRO) - Office Assistant (Nairobi)
- O.A. (VOI) - Office Assistant (Voi)
- O.A. (ELD) - Office Assistant (Eldoret)
- O.M./HQ - Office Messenger (Headquarters)

APPENDIX II

TO THE RESPONDENT

Attached to this note, please find a list of questions concerning some aspects of the Railway African Union - RAU(K). The questionnaire is intended to assist the undersigned who is currently undergoing a Business Administration course at the University of Nairobi, to gain insight into the operations of a Trade Union.

I very much appreciate your cooperation as the success of any effort in studying the Union will very much depend on the correct response you give to the questions.

(P.O. KOBONYO)

QUESTIONNAIRE

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

1. I would like you to answer the following questions about yourself.

1.1 Present designation

1.2 For how long have you been on the present position (desination)?

1.3 Unions Organs/Committees in which you are a member

1.4 Present employer

1.5 For how long have you worked for your present employer?

2. OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF RAU(K)

2.1 What are the main objectives of RAU?

.....
.....
.....

2.2 What is the minimum salary paid to the Railway workers?

.....
.....
.....

2.3 Considering the general wage level in the economy as a whole, would you say that the salaries paid to the Railway employees are (Tick one);

- (a) above average
- (b) average
- (c) below average

2.4 Would you say that all the salary increases that have been given to the Railway workers since 1953 have been due to the efforts of RAU? Yes/No (Tick one)

.....
.....
.....

2.5 If the answer to 2.4 is No, what other factors influenced the increase in salaries of the Railway workers?

.....
.....
.....

2.6 It appears from records that most of the salary increases were as a result of the recommendations of the commissions of enquiry. What part then did RAU play in bringing about these increases?

.....
.....
.....
.....

2.7 During which periods was the Union most successful in securing increases in workers' wages?.....
.....
.....

2.8 What factors accounted for the successful periods you have mentioned in 2.7 above?
.....
.....

2.9 What reasons would you give for the periods that witnessed little or no rise in workers wages?
.....
.....

2.10 What is the Union doing currently about the workers wages?
.....
.....

2.11 What tangible achievements has the Union scored in connection with the following issues since inception?..
.....
.....
.....

(a) Hours of work
.....

(b) Medical benefits
.....

(c) Allowances (such as Disturbance)
.....

(d) Leave
.....

(e) Allowances (such as Disturbance)
.....

2.12 What does the Union do to ensure that a member's dignity is not lowered by the Management or section of the Management of the Corporation?

.....
.....
.....

2.13 Would you please mention any specific instances when the Union acted to protect a worker or workers who received inhuman (i.e. undignified) treatment from the Management.

.....
.....
.....

2.14 How many cases involving the following issues has the Union handled since its inception?

- (a) Dismissals
- (b) Redundancies
- (c) Demotions

2.15 How many cases has the Union handled successfully with respect to each of the issues listed under 2.14 above?

.....
.....
.....

3. CONTROL OF THE UNION BY THE GOVERNMENT

3.1 In what ways, if any, does the Government restrict the activities of the Union?

.....
.....
.....

3.2 What particular aspects of the Union's activities are affected by the restrictions referred to in 3.1 above?

.....
.....
.....

3.3 Is the Railway Corporation classified in Law as an essential service?

- (a) Yes) Tick one
- (b) No)

3.4 What difficulties does the Union face in attempting to use strike as a weapon for furthering its course?

.....
.....
.....

3.5 In what ways is the Union answerable to COTU?.....

.....
.....
.....

3.6 (a) Does COTU have any say on what RAU may or may not do?

.....
.....

Yes/No (Tick one)

(b) Mention such areas where COTU comes into the Union's affairs

.....
.....

3.7 In what ways does COTU assist the Union in the pursuit of its objectives?

.....
.....
.....

3.8 What are the sources of the Union's finances?

.....
.....
.....

3.9 Does the Union get any foreign financial aid?

(a) Yes)
(b) No) Tick one

3.10 If the answer to 3.9 is Yes, State whether this aid comes to the Union directly or through some other body

.....
.....
.....

4. UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

4.1 How many of the Union's Headquarters officials are employees of the Railway Corporation?
.....

4.2 What Union posts are held by officials who are not employees of the Corporation?
.....
.....

4.3 Does the Union have any fulltime officials at the branches?
Yes)
No) Tick one

4.4 Has the Union, at one time or another, experienced a situation where Union officials who are employees of the Railway Corporation have been given quick promotion to weaken their commitment to the Union objectives?
Yes)
No) Tick one

4.5 Has there ever been a situation where the Railway Corporation has transferred the Union's officials at the Headquarter in Nairobi who are the Corporation's employees to other stations with the sole purpose of making them ineffective in terms of their contribution to Union activities?
.....
.....
.....

4.6 Has the Railway Corporation at any time sponsored people of its choice to Union leadership positions during elections?
.....
.....
.....
.....

4.7 If the answer to 4.6 is positive has the practice been regular?
.....
.....
.....

4.8 Is it true that some of the Union employees such as clerks have been seconded by the Railway Corporation who continues to meet their remuneration?

4.9 If the answer to 4.8 is yes, does the practice not compromise the Union's bargaining power?

4.10 Have the various kinds of tactics employed by the Corporation to weaken the Union been successful?
.....
.....
.....

5. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VENTURES

5.1 One of the Union's objectives was to engage in tenant-purchase housing schemes for its members.

(a) What progress has the Union made in this direction ?
.....
.....
.....

(b) If little or no progress has been made, what are the reasons for it?

(c) What are the Union's future plans as far as this issue is concerned?

5.2 (a) Has the Union mounted any educational/training courses for its members?

(b) If the answer to 5.2(a) is positive, what are the objectives of such educational programmes?

(c) How successful have the programmes been?.....

(d) How many of your members have benefited from this programme?

(e) If little has been done with respect to this objective, what would you say have been the main problems?

5.3 (a) Does the Union have a permanent or a fulltime legal adviser?

(b) Would you mention any number of occasions, if any, when the Union offered a legal assistance to its members on matters arising from the members' relations with the corporation?

5.4 (a) Does the Union operate consumer cooperative shops?

Yes)

No) Tick one

If your answer to 5.4 (a) is yes, then answer (b) and (c) otherwise go to 5.5

(b) How many shops are there?

(c) In what way do they (the shops) benefit the members?

5.5 What means or media does the Union use to disseminate information to its members?

5.6 Which of the following does the Union publish?

- (a) periodicals
(b) Books
(c) Pamphlets
(d) any other, specify

5.7 Does the Union give any kind of relief to its members in cases such as long sickness, accident, disablement, among others?

5.8 If the answer to 5.7 is positive, state the specific areas in which this relief is given

5.9 Which of the following Social Services does the Union provide to its members?

- (a) Nursery Schools
- (b) Adult literacy classes
- (c) Recreational centres
- (d) Scholarships to members to pursue education in Industrial relations or any other field.

6. CONFLICTS AND FACTIONS

6.1 What were the main reasons for the defeat of Muinde by Ohanga as General Secretary of RAU?

.....

.....

.....

6.2 What reasons led to the defeat of Ohanga by Walter Ottenyo?

.....

.....

6.3 Why did John Mollo become so unpopular as to lose in the recent RAU elections?

.....

.....

6.4 To a large extent, the history of RAU has been marred with protracted leadership struggles, particularly between the General Secretary and the Chairman. What have been the causes of these quarrels?

.....

.....

7.1 Please write here any comments you would have wanted to make but were not provided for in the questionnaire.

APPENDIX III

ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES

Abbreviation used in the computation of the Results

UO - Union Officials
 RF - Rank and File members of the Union.

2.3: Salaries paid to Railway workers

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Above average	0	0	0	0
Average	10	100	90	100
Below average	0	0	0	0

2.4: Union's Contribution to Salary increases

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Yes	10	100	70	78
No	0	0	20	22

2.5: Other factors that have influenced salary increases

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Commissions	0	0	0	0
Government	5	50	40	44
Union + Commissions + Government	5	50	50	56

2.6: How the Union related to the Commissions

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Union presents proposals to commissions	10	100	90	100
Union proposes formation of Commissions	10	100	90	78

2.7: Periods during which the Union scored major successes in wage increases

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
1959 - 1961	2	20	85	94
1962 - 1966	4	40	87	97
1971 - 1972	8	80	60	67

2.8: Factors that accounted for major successes

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Competent Leadership	10	100	90	100

2.9: Factors that accounted for less successful periods

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Incompetent leadership	10	100	90	100

2.10: What the Union is Currently doing about the wages

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Negotiating with Management Officials Still Settling down	8	80	70	78
	0	0	20	22

2.11: Unions' tangible achievement

Hours of work: Both the Union officials and the rank and file members interviewed agreed that R.A.U (K) has not succeeded in having the Railway Management reduce the number of hours of work per week.

Medical benefits:

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
No improvement	0	0	88	88
Some improvement, but not much	10	100	2	2

Leave: All the respondents said that leave has been increased from 14 days (applying before independence) to 22 days for the lowest grades.

Allowances:

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Alot of improvements	10	100	0	0
Very little improvement	0	0	90	100

2.12: Protection of workers' dignity by the Union

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
By taking up all cases of abuses with the Management	6	60	20	22
By taking strike action to demand removal of a member of the Management who treats an employee with grave disrespect	4	40	70	78

2.13: All respondents agreed that cases where the Union has acted to protect dignity and respect of its members are numerous.

2.14: Cases of:

Dismissal)
 Redundancies) All respondents say that the Union has
 Demotions) dealt with many cases of this kind.

2.15: Cases handled successful (as listed under 2.14)

More than three quarters of the Union officials given the questionnaires and about two-thirds of the rank and file dealt with argue that the union has won almost as many cases as it has lost.

3.1: Methods used by the Government to control the Union

(a) Laws Prohibiting Strike:

This was mentioned by all 8 current and 2 former Union officials served with the questionnaires and all the 90 rank and file members dealt with.

(b) Wage guidelines: This was mentioned only by the 8 current and the 2 former officials of the Union.

3.2: Aspects of the Union's activities that are affected by the control mentioned in 3.1 above

Negotiations for better salaries and other terms and conditions of service. This was mentioned by all the respondents.

3.3: Is Railway Classified as an essential service under the Law?

Every respondent gave a positive (Yes) answer to this question.

3.4: Difficulties encountered in using strike weapon

15% of the rank and file members in the sample did not answer this question. The rest and all the current and former Union officials in the sample identified the law particularly the Trade Disputes Act as the main obstacle, more so because of the enormous powers it gives the Minister of Labour in his dealings with the Unions. - - - -

3.5: Answerability of the Union to COTU:

All the respondents argued that R.A.U.(K) has not been directly answerable to COTU.

3.6: R.A.U. (K)'s affairs over which COTU has a say

10% of the respondents from the category of the rank and file claimed that COTU has no say whatsoever in R.A.U.(K)'s affairs. The rest of the respondents, however, said that COTU might only come in when the Union contemplates taking a strike action.

3.7: How COTU assists R.A.U.(K)

Only Union officials, both current and former, in the sample responded to this question, and all the ten of them indicated that COTU's assistance to the Union comes in form of advice during the Union's negotiations with the Management, and on matters of research and education.

3.8: Sources of R.A.U. (K)'s Finances:

Every respondent mentioned members' monthly subscriptions and donations as the only sources of the Union's revenues.

3.9: Foreign Financial Aid:

Each respondent gave a negative (no) answer to this question.

4.1: Corporation's employees who are R.A.U. (K)'s Officials:

All the respondents said that all the Union officials, except four, are employees of the Corporation.

4.2: Union Posts not held by the Corporation's employees:

- (a) Secretary General
- (b) Deputy Secretary General
- (c) Assistant Secretary General (Railways)
- (d) Assistant Secretary General (Harbours)

NB Secretary slip

4.3: Branch Officials

The Union does not have fulltime officials at the Branches, respondents were unanimous on this.

4.4: Promotion of the Corporation's employees who hold offices in the Union.

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Yes	10	100	60	67
No	0	0	30	33

4.5: Transfer of Union officials by the Corporation

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Yes	10	100	85	94
No	0	0	5	6

4.6: Sponsorship of Union election Candidates by the Management

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Yes	3	30	70	78
No	7	70	20	22

4.7: Is the practice referred to in 4.6) frequent?

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Yes	4	40	70	78
No	6	60	20	22

4.8: Does the Corporation Second some of its employees to work for R.A.U. (K)?

All the respondents agreed that some of the employees of R.A.U.(K) are seconded by the Corporation. They however, said that the salaries of the employees so seconded are met by the Union and not the Corporation. why?

4.9: Union's bargaining power

All the Union officials dealt with and 78% or 70 rank and file members in the sample maintained that the secondment of the supporting staff to the Union by the Corporation does not in any way compromise the Union's bargaining power.

	UO		RF	
	NO.	%	NO.	%
Compromises	0	0	70	78
Does not Compromise	10	100	20	22

4.10: Have the Corporation's attempts to weaken the Union been successful?

All the respondents submitted that all the various tactics employed by the Corporation to weaken the Union have been successful.

5.1: Tenant Purchase Housing Scheme:

All the respondents noted that the Union has made no progress towards this goal. They blamed this on the lack of funds and leadership problems.

None of the 90 rank and file members was aware of any future plans regarding this issue.

All the current Union officials in the sample, however, indicated that the Union is currently negotiating with some financial institutions with a view to getting the scheme started.

5.2: Educational/Training programmes

- (a) All the respondents affirmed that the Union has been mounting educational and training programmes for its members.
- (b) The objectives of such educational and training programmes, according to Union Officials in the sample, are:
 - (i) To impart organizational skills to all cadres of Union leaders such as shop stewards.
 - (ii) To enlighten the members of the Union on their rights and responsibilities not only to the Union or the Corporation but to the nation as a whole.
- (c) According to the 8 current Union Officials, the success of the Union's education programmes has been demonstrated by a sharp decline in wild-cat strikes in recent years.
- (d) None of the Union officials who responded to this question was able to give the exact number of those who have benefited from the education program since its initiation. According to the Deputy Secretary General, what could reasonably be done within the constraints has been done - though alot more remains to be done.

5.3: Legal Advisor

- (a) All the respondents said that the Union does not have a fulltime legal advisor.
- (b) None of the respondents mentioned any specific cases in which the Union offered legal assistance to its members. However, seven of the Union officials included in the sample said that the Union had provided legal assistance to several of its members who had been charged with criminal offences allegedly committed while performing their official duties for the Corporation.

5.4: Consumer Co-operative shops

The finding here was that the Union had not established any consumer Co-operative shops.

5.5: Disemination of information

The Union diseminates information to its members through a periodical called 'Mfanyi Kazi' as well as through public rallies.

5.6: Publications:

The Union only publishes one periodical, i.e. 'Mfanyi Kazi'

5.7: Relief:

Not much has been done in respect of this objective. This was expressed by both the Union officials and the rank and file members.

5.8: Areas of Relief Assistance:

The Union, so far, has only been able to assist with funeral expenses in case of a death of a member, a member's wife/husband or child.

5.9: Social Services given to members

- (a) Until the beginning of 1980, the Union used to operate some Nursery Schools for the Children of its members. However, the running of these schools was taken over by the Corporation in 1980.
- (b) Union offers scholarships to its members to pursue education in industrial relations. However, due to lack of sufficient funds, this scheme has so far benefited only the Union officials. This was the feeling of all the respondents.

6.1: Muinde's defeat by Ohanga

The respondents generally felt that Muinde was defeated by Ohanga for the seat of Secretary General of R.A.U.(K) because the latter was a better organizer and advocated policies and programs of action that had a direct appeal to the workers at the grass root level.

6.2: Ohanga's demise

Ohanga was not defeated in an election. He was dismissed by the Union's executive Committee with the backing of the Kenya Federation of Labour and the blessing of the Corporation. This view was expressed by practically every respondent.

6.3: Mollo's defeat:

It was generally felt by the respondents that John Mollo lost the Union's seat of the Secretary General to Makanyengo because:

- (i) He had lost touch with the general membership.
- (ii) He was collaborating with the Management for his personal ends.

Mollo himself, however, blames his downfall on the external forces. He claims that the group he was opposed to in COTU undermined him a great deal and was instrumental in his defeat at the elections.

6.4: Factions within the Union leadership

The dominant views about historic quarrels between R.A.U.(K)'s Secretary General and the Chairman were:

- (i) The Management tactfully plays the two against each other in order to weaken the Union. This has been a divide and rule strategy.
- (ii) The desire by each of the two Officials to have more or final say on the running of the Union.

APPENDIX IV

7.1: Comments:

No respondent gave any other comment.

(1) Group	(2) Grade	(3) Salary Minimum	(4) Salary Maximum	(5) Pay Class	(6) Leave Days	(7) Skill Class
Supervisor	1	-	3,600	1	30	First
	2	-	3,100	1	30	First
	3	2,550	2,700	1	30	First
	4	-	2,370	1	30	First
	5	-	2,160	1	30	First
	6	1,550	1,950	1	30	First
Group "A"	I	1,338	1,524	2	30	First
	II	1,101	1,272	2	30	First
	III	900	1,040	2	30	First
	over	752	826	2	30	First
Group "B" Executive	A	-	1,500	2	30	First
	B	-	1,350	2	30	First
	C	-	1,200	2	30	First
Division I	I	1,065	1,110	3	30	First
	II	975	1,020	3	30	First
	III	786	903	3	30	First
	IV	618	726	4	27	Second
	V	540	582	4	27	Second
Division 2	VI	-	-	-	-	-
	VII	402	474	5	24	Second
	VIII	324	378	5	24	Second

APPENDIX IV

The grading system of the FARH as at 1964/65

(1) Group	(2) Grade	(3) Salary Minimum	(4) £.p.a. Maximum	(5) House Class	(6) Leave Days	(7) Ticket Class	
Superscale	1	-	3,600	1	30	First	
	2	-	3,100	1	30	First	
	3	2,550	2,700	1	30	First	
	4	-	2,370	1	30	First	
	5	-	2,160	1	30	First	
	6	1,650	1,950	1	30	First	
Group "A"	I	1,335	1,524	2	30	First	
	II	1,101	1,272	2	30	First	
	III	900	1,040	2	30	First	
	cadet	762	826	2	30	First	
Group "B"	Executive	A	-	1,500	2	30	First
		B	-	1,350	2	30	First
		C	-	1,200	2	30	First
Division I	I	1,065	1,110	3	30	First	
	II	975	1,020	3	30	First	
	III	786	903	3	30	First	
	IV	618	726	4	27	Second	
	V	510	582	4	27	Second	
Division 2	VI)	402	474	5	24	Second	
	VII)						
	VIII	294	366	5	24	Second	

Division 3	IX)	222	270	6	21	Second
	X)					Second
	XI	150	186	6	21	Second
Group "C"	NC1	132	156	6	21	Third
	NC2	96	120	7	21	Third
	NC3	78	84	7	21	Third

SOURCE: Grillo, R.D.: op. Cit. Page 23

Apple	4 lbs.	\$ 2/35 per lb.	1.40
Banana	3 lbs.	\$ 2/50 per lb.	2.00
Blueberry	1 lb.	\$ 2/75	11.00
Butter, sweetened			6.00
Cheese, salt and			
Curry			6.00
Green Vegetables			10.00
Sugar	4 lbs.	\$ 2/50 per lb.	2.00
Tea Leaves	1 lb.	\$ 5/50 per lb.	5.00
Coffee	1 lb.	\$ 4/00 per lb.	4.00
Milk	1 pint	\$ 2/50 per pint	10.50
Peas			5.00
Bread	4	\$ 4/75 each	3.00
Wheat Flour	1 pint	\$ 2/95	2.95
Rice	2 lbs.	\$ 2/20 per lb.	2.40
Flax	4	\$ 1/50 each	5.00
Total expenditure on Food			118.25

Charcoal	11 bags	\$ 5/00 per bag	7.50
Paraffin Oil	5 pails	\$ 2/50 per pail	1.25
Peas	2 bags	\$ 2/50 each	0.50
Salt	2	\$ 2/75 each	1.50
Sugar	1 bag	\$ 1/00 each	1.00
Black Tea (100 g)	10 blocks	\$ 2/00 each	1.00
Instant Coffee			3.00
Instant Tea	10	\$ 2/00 each	20.00

APPENDIX V

MONTHLY BUDGET FOR A BACHELOR

Items	weight	cost in Shs.
Posho	approx. 38 lbs. @ -/30 per lb.	11.40
Meat	" 8 lbs. @ 1/50 per lb.	12.00
Maize	" 4 lbs. @ -/35 per lb.	1.40
Beans	" 4 lbs. @ -/50 per lb.	2.00
Kimbo	" 4 lbs. @ 2/75	11.00
Spices, tomatoes, Onions, salt and Curry		6.00
Green Vegetables		10.00
Sugar	" 4 lbs. @ -/65 per lb.	2.60
Tea Leaves	" 1 lb. @ 5/50 per lb.	5.50
Coffee	" 1 lb. @ 4/00 per lb.	4.00
Milk	" 1 pint @ -/55 per day	16.50
Fruits		5.50
Bread	" 4 @ -/75 each for one	3.00
Wheat flour	" 1 pkt, @ 2/85	2.85
Rice	" 2 lbs. @ 1/20 per lb.	2.40
Fish	" 4 @ 1/50 each	6.00
Total expenditure on Food		102.15
Charcoal	" 1½ bags @ 5/00 per bag	7.50
Paraffin Oil	" 4 pints @ -/65 per pint	2.60
Matches	" 2 Boxes @ -/25 each	0.50
Soap	" 2 @ -/75 each	1.50
Soap	" 1 bar @ 1/00 each	1.00
Blades (for shaving)	10 blades @ -/10 each	1.00
Hairdressing twice a month	@ 1/50	3.00
Transport	52 trips @ -/25	13.00

Shirts	2	@ 15/00 for a year	30.00
Tin of Boot Polish			1.50
Socks per month			1.50
Blankets	2	@ 18/00 per year	3.00
Bedsheets	2	@ 8/00 per year	1.25
Pillows	2	@ 3/00 per year	0.50
Poll Tax		25/00 annually	2.08
Cotton Flannels and			
2 pairs of underwears		@ 3/00	1.00
Jacket and Trousers			7.00
@ 45/00 and 35/00 for 12 months			
Two shorts at 25/00 each for 12 months			4.00
Total expenditure on other items			58.93
Total monthly expenditure		Shs.	161.08

SOURCE: Lubembe, C.K.: op. cit. Page 110 - 111

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