SECURITY, URBAN DYNAMICS AND PRIVATISATION OF SPACE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM NAIROBI, KENYA

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Introduction

One of the major social maladies that has in the recent times plagued urban centres of the world in general and Africa in particular, is insecurity. On the streets of major African cities and in almost all the residential neighbourhoods, instances of crime are becoming a normal daily occurrence. In Kenya, insecurity, especially in Nairobi, has become a national problem that threatens the fabric of the society and its institutions. It is hardly an exaggerated fact that most of us have been a victim of crime at one point or the other. Urban crime in Kenya is a manifestation of the high rate of urbanization process, which is associated with many socio-cultural, economic, political and environmental problems.

The consequence of the increased insecurity in Nairobi has been the rise in: the number of private security companies; car identification and immobilization systems; chainlink fencing; concrete panel walls; electric gates and barriers; electric perimeter fencing; computerized burglar alarms; mobile private security vehicles; private gates and security guards; warnings of "*mbwa kali*"[1]; high walls and gates with razor wires; radio back-up services; and the privatisation of space at the neighbourhood level.

This is an exploratory research project on *"Security, Urban Dynamics and Privatisation of Space in Sub-Saharan African Cities: A Case Study of Johannesburg, Nairobi and Ibadan"*. The Nairobi project is being conducted by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA - Nairobi) in collaboration with expertise from the Department of Geography, University of Nairobi. A similar project is going on in Ibadan (Nigeria) and Johannesburg (South Africa). The main objective of this study is to develop a Geographic Information System (GIS) research program on urban security in these three African cities.

The objectives of this phase of the research were:

1. Observation and mapping of security point locations organized by the residents' neighbourhood associations.
2. Observation and mapping of environmental areas (with homogeneous characteristics).
3. Conducting qualitative interviews with a few selected chairpersons of the residents' neighbourhood associations.
4. Administering quantitative questionnaires to a sample of chairpersons (or any other authorized official) of the residents' neighbourhood associations.
5. Production of three types of GIS layers: (1) security point location layer indicating the access type in each location; (2) street access type layer; and (3) environmental area type layer.

This report presents the various aspects of the research project that were undertaken by the Nairobi team. It is intended to give an overview of the areas identified for the project; methodological approaches; data set development and treatment; GIS database and mapping; methodological challenges and considerations for the next phase; analysis of the GIS layers; and the results emanating from the fieldwork.

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[1] A Swahili warning of "a fierce dog" (inside this compound)

This is to enable the research teams from Nairobi, Ibadan and Johannesburg to come up with a common approach (and also a research proposal) for the next phase of the project. The comparative analysis of three urban dynamics in the selected three different African countries can only be facilitated by the implementation of a common methodology.

The research team

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Areas identified for the project

Three regions of Nairobi were identified and successfully covered during the survey:

1. Eastlands region of Nairobi covering the area within Outering Road, Jogoo Road, Ruaha Road, First Avenue Eastleigh & Nairobi River, including the adjacent Umoja 1 and Tena estates.
2. Westlands region of Nairobi covering the area within Waiyaki Way, James Gichuru Road, Gitanga Road, Ole Odume Road, Argwings Kodhek Road, Elgeyo Marakwet Road, Ngong Road & Naivasha Road.
3. Southlands region of Nairobi covering the area within Ngong Road, the Railway Line, Mbagathi Way, including the adjacent Kibera-Ayany estate.

The three areas adequately represent the various types of community protections in public spaces and also the different socio-economic and environmental status in Nairobi. It should be noted that Nairobi is many ways an archetype of the African colonial city, having purely colonial origins, which shaped its structure and management at the time of Kenya's transition to independence. The different residential locations in Nairobi still depict the racial segregation brought about by the spatial organization in the early stages of the development of the city.

Methodology

This program commenced in Johannesburg by focussing on the privatisation of public streets. For the purposes of comparative analysis, the methodology used in this study (for both Nairobi and Ibadan) is based on Johannesburg's study. Since the same

program had just been implemented in Ibadan, the Nairobi team comfortably adapted the Ibadan methodology to Nairobi situation.

To achieve the set out objectives of this project, the following activities were first implemented:

- Constitution of the Nairobi Security Project (NASP) research team
- Adaptation of the Ibadan methodology to Nairobi situation
- Identification of the research areas after a reconnaissance tour of the city
- Preparation of the field maps and free access street maps
- Training of the research assistants
- Testing of the security point location observation sheets
- Setting up of an excel format GIS database to capture the fieldwork

Other activities were being implemented simultaneously as the fieldwork on observation and mapping of security point locations progressed. These were:

- GIS training
- Developing an interview guide to be used for the qualitative interviews with a few selected chairpersons of the residents' neighbourhood associations
- Developing a quantitative questionnaire to be administered to a sample of chairpersons (or any other official) of the residents' neighbourhood associations
- Preparation of the street maps and environmental area maps
- Developing an environmental area observation sheet
- Digitalisation of the road network
- Updating the digitalized maps in accordance with the changes found in the field

Maps used during the fieldwork

During the fieldwork and development of the GIS database, four types of maps were used. These maps were extracted from a (tourist) booklet[2] of the city. By the time the survey started, the team had not acquired a cadastral map of Nairobi.

1) Field maps (1cm: 50m): To capture the observations from the field (mainly for security point location). A total of 36 field maps were used to capture the observations in the three research locations.

2) Street maps (1cm: 100m) used to identify and highlight free access roads/streets. The free access roads/streets were observed in the field and also deducted from the field maps.

3) Street maps (1cm: 50m) used in identifying and highlighting street segments as per the segment street code (code number given by street to the free access streets and street segments with the same access characteristics). These were the manual GIS maps because the segments were highlighted based on the street access type as deducted from the access at the security point location.

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[2] Moss R.W. (1999) Nairobi A to Z: A Complete Guide

4) Environmental area map (1cm: 100m) used in identifying and highlighting homogenous environmental area.

Identification and observation of security point locations

The survey started with the identification and observation of security point locations. This was done by one team of 2 research assistants under the supervision of the coordinator. To avoid inaccuracies as a result of exhaustion, not more than 4 hours was spent in the field per day. The identification and observation of security point locations was done through the use of (1) a field map and (2) a security point location observation sheet.

A field map is a map of that particular area displaying the street and road network at a useful scale (1cm: 50m) that makes the collection of data easier. Once identified on the ground, the security points were consequently defined in the field maps (using serial numbers for each map).

A security point observation sheet (see appendix 1)[3] is a sheet designed to capture the following aspects of all the identified security points (see appendix 2 for more details):

- Whether the barrier is in use or not (in case of one)
- The type of gate (in terms of basic design)
- The type of protection on the gate (e.g. spikes, barbed wire, etc)
- The height of the gate
- The type of protection at both sides of the gate (e.g. wall only, wall with spikes, wall with broken bottles, live fence, etc)
- The height of the type of protection at both sides of the gate
- Security measures at the security point
- Whether the security point is accessible to pedestrians and/or motorists

A saloon car was used to drive through all the streets and roads in the three research regions. All the observations were done while driving through the streets and roads, a clear indication of the difficulty in balancing between suspicion, speed and accuracy. In some security points it was inevitable not to talk with the security personnel at the gate[4].

Other aspects captured in the field were:

- The hierarchy of the observed road or street in terms of: (1) major dual carriageway road; (2) major one-way road; main road within the residential area; primary access road within the residential area "feeding" to the main road; secondary access lanes or tracks in a residential court "feeding" to the primary access roads; and footpaths. This classification is based on the coordinator's expertise and also reflects the conventional national classification roads.

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[3] See appendix 2 for the definitions of the codes used
[4] The research was designed to be observatory in nature to capture (in practice) the existing security measures at the security points.

- State of the road in terms of: (1) passable (by car); (2) potholed (difficult to pass by car); and (3) impassable (by car). This attribute was created to give an indication of the state of the road at the time of survey. The state of the road was described in terms of its "passability" by car and therefore a footpath given code "0". We have to appreciate that these were generalizations – conditions of roads were not uniform throughout the stretch.

Identification, definitions and classification of the environmental areas

Environmental areas and their corresponding boundaries are quite difficult to define without following a systematic criterion. This survey used eight indicators to define and classify the research regions into various environmental areas. The indicators used were: (1) the nature of the street (in terms of maintenance); (2) presence and functionality of the streetlights; (3) garbage disposal; (4) maintenance of the open drains; (5) state of the streets; (6) state of the buildings; (7) population density; and (8) the concentration of unregulated or unplanned informal sector activities.

To reduce the risk of generalization, the field maps were further subdivided into smaller units based on the coordinator's experience and observations during the identification and observation of security point locations. The environmental areas were therefore a result of the observations made in these smaller units. The environmental areas were clearly highlighted in the environmental area maps (1cm: 100m).

A score of between 1-3 was given to the three definitions of each indicator (see appendix 3). Using the environmental area observation sheet (see appendix 4), it was possible to designate a score to each area by indicator. The recording of the scores was done in the field based on the observed prevalence of the characteristics (definitions) of each one of the indicators.

The total score for each region was later calculated to define the environmental area type using a ranking scale of 8 – 24 points. Any area with less than 14 points was defined as poorly maintained; areas with between 14 – 19 points as fairly maintained; and areas with 20 points and above were defined as well maintained.

Qualitative interviews and the quantitative questionnaires

The first actor involved in the privatisation of space is the residents' neighbourhood association that set up the collective security measures. It was therefore important to carry out a more qualitative research to complete the descriptive GIS survey. This would help to further understand the dynamics involved in privatisation of public space.

The Nairobi team conducted (in-depth) face to face interviews with the chairpersons of eight residents' neighbourhood associations in Buruburu, Ofafa Jericho, Kimathi, Jamhuri, Ayany and Olympic. The eight associations were randomly chosen based on the willingness of the respondent. An interview with two vigilante groups in Kibera slums was also carried out to get an insight on how they organize themselves spatially in terms of security arrangements. Each interview, some of them conducted by the

coordinator, took an average of one hour. An interview guide was developed for this purpose (see appendix 5).

The responses from the qualitative interviews were used to develop a standard (coded) questionnaire that was later administered to 37 residents' neighbourhood associations (see appendix 6). The questionnaire was distributed to 100 randomly selected neighbourhood associations but only about one-third (37) of them responded positively. The questionnaires were left with the security personnel at the security points to forward them to their respective chairpersons of the associations. Adequate time (one week) was given to them to respond to the questionnaire before collection.

The interviews and the questionnaire sought to have information on: issues about the association; reasons for privatising space; participation on security matters; crime in the neighbourhood; security personnel; security measures; cooperation with the police and local authority; and perception on crime.

The face-to-face interviews with the chairpersons of associations took place on Saturdays, as it was quite impossible to get an appointment for a weekday. Up to two interviews were done on that particular day (one in the morning and the next one in the afternoon).

Data set development and treatment

One data set in excel format was built to capture all the fieldwork (see appendix 7 for an example & appendix 8 for the codes). The data set was improved and updated as the fieldwork progressed. The data set was treated immediately after the field (for not more than two hours). The coordinator carried out constant checking on the data set to make sure that the entry was done accurately and in accordance with the observations from the field.

After the completion of the fieldwork and data entry, the Nairobi team decided to separate the main data set according to regions (Eastlands, Westlands and Southlands). However, a copy of the (main) data set was still retained. The separation of the data set according to regions facilitated the production of the GIS layers/maps for the three (distinct) regions of Nairobi. Another independent data set was created for the environmental area attributes by area and indicator (see appendix 9 for an example).

GIS database and mapping

Spatial data source

The baseline map used in the project was the new Nairobi map (not yet officially published). This map was then upgraded in terms of roads in the residential estates especially the within estate roads, paths and access points. Nairobi was then divided into three main project zones: (1) Eastlands, (2) Westlands and (3) Southlands. The updated field maps constituted the base maps for the zones in the spatial database.

Creation of spatial data

Arc View 3.2 GIS software was the main environment in the creation of GIS spatial database. The creation of the spatial database involved teamwork between the field group, the coordinator and the GIS specialist. This required that the field team be trained in basic GIS spatial data creation techniques (Arc View environment used). The procedure in the creation of spatial data was as follows:

1. The updated field maps constituted the base maps for the spatial database. The field maps were collated to form a base map for each region. The base maps were then scanned and saved as tiff files.

2. The View properties were set in all the maps to conform to the map properties of the Nairobi street map (2003):
   - Projection = Cassini Soldner
   - Map Units = meters
   - Distance units = kilometres
   - Central meridian = 37°
   - Reference Latitude = 0°

3. The scanned base maps were then imported into the configured View and digitised to create the following main layers (themes) for each zone: (1) roads layer; (2) security point layer; and (3) environment layer

The environment layer constituted the background followed by the road layer and finally the security point layer. Three other layers were also deemed necessary and these were the river layer, the surface water bodies layer and the railway line layer. These three minor layers were useful in defining the environment layer. The river system in the city creates the three divides used in the project spatial database creation. The railway line defines the development corridors of the city, as it is part of the history of Nairobi, while the dams have a recent contribution in the surface characteristics especially the drainage and river characteristics.

The spatial data attributes

The attributes of the spatial data were based on the field observations and universal (main) database classification system being used in the project. For each zone, the descriptive characteristics originating from the field were processed based on the universal database classification schemes.

Each observation on the security point, road access and environment were accurately described and processed according to the universal classification schemes. The agreed attributes were used to create a common attribute file (in excel). From the universal file, three sub-files were created, one for each zone.

No attempt was made to query the universal database as a whole although certain attributes will have to be queried together at a future date to generate some ranking scheme (may be for comparison).

Generating the GIS maps

To generate the GIS maps for each region, layers for security points, roads and environment were tiled into sub-layers using the attributes data. In all the layers, the tilling was done using the classification schemes provided in the universal database.

1) Security point layer: The security point layer displays the access (type) at the security point location. Access at the security point location was deducted from the main characteristics of the security point (mainly, security measures and control type). The security point layer was tilled using the following classification scheme:

- ● Security point with no control
- ● Security point temporary open
- ● Security point with controlled access
- ● Security point with restricted access
- ● Security point completely closed

A temporary open security point is the one open during the day and probably closed at night. A security point with restricted access is where only the residents who have the keys can use the security point or sometimes the main gate is closed for vehicles but the pedestrian gate is used during the day and probably locked at night. A security point with no access for both vehicles and pedestrians is defined as completely closed.

2) Roads layer: The tilling was carried out to define road/street access type (and therefore street access type layer). This was mostly based on the security point status as described in the universal database. The definition of street access type was first done manually on a map (1cm: 50m). The tiles generated were:

- ═ Free access street
- ═ Temporary open street
- ═ Controlled access street
- ═ Restricted access street
- ═ Completely closed street

3) Environmental layer: The tiles generated for this layer were:

- ♣ Well maintained environment
- ♣ Fairly maintained environment
- ♣ Poorly maintained environment

The environment layer was then placed first in the hierarchy in order to form the background. This layer was then overlayed by the river layer followed by the railway line layer. These first three layers affect the road network in Nairobi. The road layer was then overlayed over the resulting spatial information. The security points layer was put over the spatial information resulting from the road network overlay to complete the security-environment spatial information for Nairobi.

Neighbourhood association layer

The Nairobi team was not able to come up with the neighbourhood association layer because of the difficulty in capturing the area controlled by the neighbourhood associations. It is quite difficult and time consuming to inquire systematically in all the neighbourhoods.

Methodological challenges and considerations for the next phase

1. No official up-to-date road map of Nairobi was publicly available and the most current had to be sourced from unpublished sources. In most cases, the available maps did not have the estate roads, especially those leading to closes or quarters. Footpaths are not official and were therefore not available on the existing maps. In this kind of a survey, it is important that an updated cadastral map is used for digitalisation and the extraction of field maps. To make progress, the Nairobi team extracted the field maps from a tourist booklet of the city. Though comprehensive in some areas, it was not complete especially for the informal settlements and new residential estates. Furthermore, some individual maps adjoining one another were not necessarily of the same scale, making the process of collating the maps very tedious.

   ➤ A budget should be allocated for the Nairobi team to purchase an updated Nairobi map (the local authority in collaboration with JICA is at an advanced stage of mapping the city of Nairobi).

2. Due to the security situation in Nairobi where strangers are treated with suspicion and hostility, the researchers were at a risk of being mistaken for thugs or persons with malicious intentions. There was the risk of being mistakenly shot at (by the dreaded "flying squad"[5]) or subjected to mob justice by the residents. In this case identification cards were given to the researchers. The researchers were further advised to use diplomacy as much as possible and to respond to whatever questions the people asked them. Despite these measures, some areas (parts of Buruburu 1 and Pioneer) were not covered due to increased hostility.

   ➤ The research team should display their identification cards at all times during the survey.
   ➤ Where necessary a copy of the research authorization and a covering letter explaining the aims and objectives of the research project should be left with all the chairpersons of the neighbourhood associations.
   ➤ Diplomacy should prevail when responding to questions from the residents.
   ➤ The vehicle being used should have a large visible sticker (**Nairobi Security Project**) on its sides.
   ➤ The researchers should have jackets with the (**Nairobi Security Project**) label on the back.
   ➤ Working closely with the police and other larger neighbourhood associations.
   ➤ Each region should have a research assistant coming from the neighbourhood.

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[5] Flying squad is a unit in the police force

3. All the observations were done while driving through the streets and roads, a clear indication of the difficulty in balancing between suspicion, speed and accuracy. The use of a car also made it impossible to capture many security points that might have not been visible while driving through.

➢ Some of the observations should be done on foot as opposed to a vehicle. In this sense the research will be able to capture all the security points, some of which might have not been visible while using a car.

4. Where new roads, footpaths or other features were identified, their mapping and location could not be properly established without the field measurements. The new features were simply sketched (drawn) on the map.

➢ There is need for GPS handset(s) for accuracy in referencing spatial data. GPS could have assisted in the location and mapping of new features. The security point locations could have been added as event themes to the road maps to ensure accuracy or consistency of location on map.

5. Training duration in GIS was too short and could not offer proper hands-on experience required for data capture, leading to a delay in this task.

➢ Adequate time should be devoted for GIS training not only for the research assistants, but also for other members of the project team to enable them better understand spatial data creation in GIS environment.

6. The indicators used in the definition and classification of environmental areas might not be exhaustive to clearly define homogeneous environmental areas. Furthermore, the scoring and ranking procedure was not based on any empirical or theoretical considerations. The environmental maps were based on maintenance characteristics rather than the known zonation, based on class and density.

➢ We need to come up with a universal procedure of defining and classifying the environmental areas.

7. It was very difficult to find the chairpersons of the neighbourhood associations for a face-to-face interview and that is why the Nairobi team decided to leave the questionnaires for them to fill. Even with that, the return rate was very low. Several trips were made to collect the filled questionnaires – but this never helped much as only one third of the sampled chairpersons returned the questionnaires duly filled. All the interviews were conducted on Saturdays and with prior appointment.

➢ More time should be allocated to this aspect of research.
➢ In-depth interviews to be conducted in not more than 10 neighbourhood associations.
➢ The rest should be left with the quantitative questionnaire and a stamped return envelope so that they can post them back to the coordinator within a given time frame. All the associations or a large sample should be taken to take care of the attrition rate.

8. Some of the streets had no names, making it difficult to complete the column of "street name" in the data set. In such a case, we assigned the street an appropriate name for identification purposes. Likewise, it was not quite clear how to relate a street (with a defined street name) with the street segments defined for the street access type.

➢ We can solve this based on the experience from other teams.

9. Some roads were extremely potholed for a saloon car that the team was using in the field. Some of these roads were found in Kawangware, Kangemi, Fort Jesus and better parts of Eastlands.

➢ The use of a four-wheel drive vehicle is recommended for the next phase.

10. Accuracy during the data entry can sometimes be compromised if the data is not constantly checked not only to ascertain the entry but also to make sure that the observations from the field are correctly captured.

➢ Stress the need for accuracy.

11. There was no link between the participating teams. This made it difficult to exchange and share our experiences and challenges as the research progressed on.

➢ Formation of a network of researchers from the three cities.

Lastly, it must be acknowledged that the quality of the GIS layers/maps highly depend on the accuracy with which the data was collected from the field, accurate data entry, treatment and assigning of IDs for mapping of the three layers (security point location, street and environmental area IDs).

Other considerations for the next phase

1. Correlating our GIS with other statistics (e.g. census data, police statistics, press statistics, etc). This will help to have a comprehensive view on urban violence phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa.

2. There is need to include training component in the research program. Students should be encouraged and sponsored (under the program) to pursue their MSc/M.A./PhD research on one of the components or themes of the larger research program.

3. There are many attributes in the data set that have not been used at all for GIS mapping.

4. Funds should be allocated for purchase of computers (with desired capacities), printers, scanners, GPS handset(s) and GIS software.

5. Adequate attention should be paid to finding out how the informal settlements (with no security points) deal with their (in)security issues.

Privatisation of space in Nairobi: analysis of the GIS layers

Security point locations

A total of 345 security point locations were identified in the three regions (see appendix 10 for the total number of security point locations by field maps. 253 (73.3%) of them were located in Eastlands, 68 (19.7%) in Southlands and 24 (7%) in Westlands. The high numbers of security points signal the rising levels of both crime and insecurity in Nairobi.

Over half of the security point locations in Eastlands were concentrated in Buruburu, an expansive middle-income residential neighbourhood while those in Westlands were concentrated in the high-income areas of Bernard (Lavington), Thompson and Mountain View. In Southlands, about half of the security points were concentrated in the middle (to low)-income estates of Ayany and Olympic, bordering Kibera slums.

There were no security point locations in the informal settlements of Kawangware and Kangemi in Westlands and Kibera's Fort Jesus and Laini Saba in Southlands. The Mountain View residents erected a security point (barrier) at the border of Kawangware and Mountain View to spatially separate the two contrasting neighbourhoods. In Eastlands, security points were not observed in the low-income estates of Makadara, Ofafa Maringo and Bahati. In Kibera, the residents mainly depend on vigilante groups to facilitate their safety. These groups ensure that security is availed to the residents who in exchange give out a small cash token as appreciation.

Residents of Kawangware, Ofafa Maringo and Bahati denied having such groups and insisted on getting security from the Chief's camp, police patrols and/or through individual arrangements of securing one's house. For example, in Ofafa Maringo and Bahati, many households have used iron sheets to secure their compounds. Likewise, high-income neighbourhoods of Amboseli and Kilimani in Westlands that had no security point locations depend largely on the private security arrangement by each household.

The high-income neighbourhoods of Kimathi (Eastlands), Bernard/Lavington, Thompson, Mountain View (Westlands) and Woodley (Southlands) tend to privatise the main streets that lead in and out of the estate. Apart from Kimathi, the barriers and/or gates are controlled 24hrs a day by private security guards with alarm back-ups and mobile security vehicles. Even with this, each individual household still employs all sorts of security measures around his/her house – a private guard to man the gate, wall fencing, security alarms, etc.

There is, seemingly, in Westlands and Southlands, a relationship between environmental area type and the concentration of security points. No security points were observed in the poorly maintained environmental areas of Westlands and Southlands. These are the informal settlements of Kawangware and Kibera mentioned above. While the security points in Westlands are concentrated in the well-maintained environmental areas, those in Southlands are mainly found within the fairly

maintained areas. The same cannot be said of Eastlands since security points can be easily identified in all the three types of environment. However, the western part of Eastlands, which is poorly maintained, is also devoid of security points.

Access type at the security point location

It is evident from Table 1 that controlled access points dominate not only in Nairobi but also across the regions. In Eastlands they account for 41% of all the security points in that region, Southlands 47% and in Westlands 63%. Many neighbourhoods prefer having both day and night security personnel to man their gates. In case of a visitor, the guards have to inquire and register his or her entry into the court. Strangers with no business in the court are definitely denied entry.

Table 1: Access type at the security point location[6]

	Eastlands		Southlands		Westlands		Nairobi	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No control	15	5.9	4	5.9	2	8.3	21	6.1
Temporary open	74	29.2	16	23.5	6	25.0	96	27.8
Controlled access	104	41.1	32	47.1	15	62.5	151	43.8
Restricted access	47	18.6	16	23.5	1	4.2	64	18.6
Completely closed	13	5.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	3.8
Total	253	100.0	68	100.0	24	100.0	345	100.0

Completely closed security points are common in Eastlands. All the closed security points (13) were observed in Eastlands. This is because many neighbourhoods in this region have decided to have only one entry and exit point. All other access points are permanently closed (for both pedestrians and vehicles) to prevent free access through the estate.

Tena and Umoja 1 estates had the highest number of permanently closed security points because of robbery, thugs, pedestrians and *matatu* menace. Most of the gates are permanently closed so that only one entrance is functional. This prevents free access through the estate by pedestrians and *matatus* from the adjacent Kayole and Umoja 2 estates. It is also a way of minimizing the rapidly increasing house break-ins and car jacking incidences.

Abandoned security points (with no control) were again common in Eastlands and specifically in Tena and Umoja 1 estates. This is an indication of the difficulty the residents experience when they organize themselves in space for security reasons. Because of the high rate of intra- and inter-residential mobility of tenants in Eastlands, many of them are not enthusiastic to contribute towards the construction of gates and employment of security guards. The strength and activeness of the association seem to be determined by the permanence of stay and cooperation of the residents.

Being tenants, they leave the responsibility to the landlords. The landlords on the other hand refuse to take up the challenge claiming that it is the responsibility of the tenants to provide themselves with security. The landlords are not bothered because they do not otherwise stay within the neighbourhood.

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[6] That is access type at the security point as observed at the time of survey.

Restricted security points were not a common feature in Westlands – where security guards control almost all the security points. In Eastlands, restricted security points are common in Tena and Umoja 1 estates or around estates bordering low-income neighbourhoods. The same applies to Southlands where restricted security points were observed in Olympic and Ayany, estates bordered by the Kibera slums.

Street access type

With security points concentrated in a small area, free access roads are easily noticeable in Westlands. Apart from Umoja 1 and Tena estates in Estlands, all the poorly maintained environmental areas have only free access roads. Temporary open and controlled access streets are common in all the three regions while Southlands leads with restricted access streets. The few closed roads occur in Eastlands.

Privatisation of space in Nairobi: results from the questionnaire survey

This section presents the results emanating from the survey carried out by the Nairobi team. As indicated earlier, the first actor involved in the privatisation of space is the residents' neighbourhood association that set up the collective security measures. It was therefore important to carry out a more qualitative and questionnaire based research to enhance our understanding on the dynamics involved in privatisation of public space.

Organizational structure of the neighbourhood associations

Formation of residents' neighbourhood associations is not a recent phenomenon in Kenya[7]. Their emergence (in some residential estates) is as old as the residential estates themselves whereas in other places it is a process, taking place as the concept of community policing becomes popular and also as lack of confidence in the government machinery (mainly the police) to fight crime in the neighbourhoods continues to increase.

The neighbourhood associations in Nairobi have all sorts of names, most of them reflecting the reasons behind their formation: residents associations; security associations; neighbourhood associations; welfare associations; security and social services associations; and welfare development associations, etc. Apparently, the number of houses covered is not a factor considered before an association is formed. The number of houses covered by the associations ranged from 17–300.

Table 2 presents the organizational structure of the residents' neighbourhood associations. Nine (30%) associations were formed over 10 years ago, 13 (43%) during the 1990s and 8 (27%) between the year 2000 and 2002[8], (partly) confirming that the formation of neighbourhood associations is not a recent phenomenon.

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[7] Nairobians have always organized themselves (spatially) for a common cause (tribal, welfare, women's organizations, merry-go-rounds, security, etc)

[8] Seven chairpersons could not tell when their associations were formed because they were recent residents in their neighbourhoods

Table 2: Organizational structure of the neighbourhood associations

	%
Year of forming the association (n=30; %=100)	
Before 1990	30.0
1990-1999	43.3
2000-2002	26.7
Status of the association (n= 37; %=100)	
Registered	16.2
Not registered	83.8
How the officials get their positions (n= 37; %=100)	
Through elections	48.6
By being proposed	35.1
By volunteering	16.2
Composition of members (n= 37; %=100)	
Majority are tenants	56.8
Majority are house owners	43.2
How does one become a member? (n= 37; %=100)	
Voluntarily	21.6
Formal registration	8.1
Automatically	70.3
(Usual) attendance rate in regular meetings (n= 34; %=100)	
Over 75% of members	17.6
Between 51-75%	47.1
Between 25-50%	23.5
Less than 25%	11.8

By being (informal) community initiatives, most of these neighbourhood associations (84%) are not formally registered. Formal registration[9] is a recent development, as the need for recognition becomes an important component in them. Registration is also a way to establish (formal) collaboration with the police and the local authority.

Despite the fact that these associations are not registered, they internally "formalize" their activities through democratic practices of having office bearers (usually the chairperson, secretary and treasurer). About half of the associations (49%) hold elections to determine their officials, 35% propose[10] their officials while another 16% get their officials through volunteering.

It is a common occurrence to find both tenants and house owners in all the residential estates of Nairobi, except for the city council (tenant) housing estates where all the residents are supposed to be tenants. In over slightly half of the associations (57%),

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[9] It was not clear under what ministry or government arm the registration takes place.
[10] The proposals are usually done during a general meeting. More often than not, the persons proposed are the residents who initiated the idea, residents with connection with the police and/or have some influence to help the association.

the majority of the members[11] are tenants. In most neighbourhoods (70%), membership is automatic as soon as one becomes a resident.

However, in a few instances (22%) membership is voluntary to accommodate those who refuse to cooperate. Less than 10% of the associations have encouraged formal registration of membership to show their commitment to being members. Formal registration to be a member of a neighbourhood association is done through the payment of a membership fee (once or yearly).

All the associations, except three, hold both regular executive and general meetings to discuss, amongst others, security related matters. The frequencies of these meetings depend on the organizational structure of individual associations. However, over half of the associations (59%) conceded holding their meetings any time as security matter arises. It is within the framework of these meetings that matters relating to (in)security are discussed and resolutions passed for implementation.

Apparently the attendance rate to these meetings is very encouraging. Over three quarters (65%) of the associations usually record an attendance rate of at least half of the members. This is an indication of the residents' commitment towards addressing (in)security matters that indeed affect them.

Some of the main problems facing these associations are: (1) non-payment and late payment of the monthly contribution by some members, making it quite difficult to pay the security guards; (2) some members do not adhere to the laid down rules and regulations; (3) the attendance rate is still relatively low as some members hardly attend the meetings and yet they are the first to criticize the resolutions passed; (4) arrogance from some members; and (5) some officials are not committed to their duties.

While affiliation is not mandatory, half (51%) of the associations are affiliated to a larger welfare or neighbourhood association. Affiliation enhances collective bargaining on matters affecting the neighbourhood as noted below:

> *"We do have an umbrella welfare association for the entire estate. The welfare association, in which I am also the chairman, is meant to guard against land grabbing by taking legal actions against the culprits and also to address security matters in the estate. The welfare plans to put up a police post, one main gate and a fence around the entire estate. We also work very closely with the police. For example, after witnessing many armed robbery cases we approached the police station for help. We were assigned two policemen who patrolled the estate for three to four months."* [Security point location 1:20 - Southlands]

The police and the local authority recognize these (larger) associations and their organizational structure and activities are much stronger. In case of a major security or welfare issue, a meeting is called of all the residents. Otherwise, officials of the

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[11] Membership to an association is by household where the household and/or spouse represent that particular household in all the meetings. All the contributions and payments are also done per household.

individual associations meet regularly to discuss and implement security and welfare matters on behalf of their members.

The following larger associations were identified in the three regions of Nairobi:

- Buruburu Residents Welfare Association (for the various associations by courts in Buruburu Estate – Phase 1 to Phase 5)
- Kimathi Estate Welfare Association (for the various associations by courts in Kimathi Estate)
- WE CAN DO IT
- Ayany Estate Security Association (for the various associations by courts in Ayany estate)
- Greater Golf Course Welfare Association (for the various associations by courts in Golf Course Estate)
- Lavington Residents Association (for the various associations in Lavington area)

Reasons for the formation of a neighbourhood association

Figure 1 confirms the hypothesis that neighbourhood associations are formed mainly because of security reasons. All the associations (100%) sampled were formed to address, amongst other things, insecurity in and around the neighbourhood. Half (51%) of the associations are also embracing the social side and another one fifth (19%) of them were formed to prevent land grabbing, mainly of the public open spaces.

Figure 1: Reasons for forming an association (%)

The motivation (how the association was formed) was also security related. Nine out of every ten associations (92%) were formed after insecurity related experience within the neighbourhood (Table 3).

Table 3: How was the association started?	
After a security related experience	91.9
Mobilization by a few members	51.4
General consensus of all the residents	18.9
Inspiration from another association	2.7

It is sometimes very difficult at the initial stages to get the general consensus of all the members, but at least it needs mobilization of a few members: half (51%) were formed through mobilization of a few members (probably after a security related experience). Only one association (Batian Court Security and Social Services) was formed through inspiration from another association. This indicates lack of enthusiasm to form an association before actually experiencing a crime in the area.

Why privatise space?

To answer this question, the chairpersons of the neighbourhood associations were asked why they decided to have a common gate or gates of entry and exit. Figure 2 clearly shows that the decision to privatise space is obviously security related. A large majority of the associations (84%) decided to have one entry and exit point to monitor all persons coming in and out of the court. Other access gates are normally closed or their usage restricted.

Equally important is the need to prevent free access through the court or estate. The intra-estate roads are public spaces and are meant to provide free and convenient access not only within the estate but also between the courts and estates. This means that the public, regardless of where one comes from, could use the roads. More often than not the roads provide a short cut to pedestrians moving from one point to another. The roads eventually become busy corridors and throughways of human traffic, some of who engaged in criminal activities within the courts. To prevent this, many of the courts (81%) decided to block the throughways within the estate. For example, there are hardly any throughways between the courts in Buruburu estate.

One of the chairpersons explains further:

> *"The association was started in the 1980s. Before the association was formed this area used to be open with no perimeter fence. It was easy for anybody to enter here from any point. Also the human traffic to industrial area was passing through this place, making it very dirty. Our safety was also at stake: there was a lot of petty stealing (e.g. stealing clothes from the lines)."* [Security point location 37:1 - Eastlands]

The *matatu* menace was evident in Umoja 1 and Tena estates. To avoid the morning and evening traffic jams characteristic of the Outer Ring Road the *matatus* turned the within estate roads into throughways to Umoja 2, Komarock and Kayole. Two barriers were erected in Tena to prevent this. They (*matatus*) cause several accidents within the estate, play loud music, and when dry, the dust becomes evidently unbearable. A couple of these barriers and gates have been abandoned indicating defiance from the *matatu* operators. They physically break the gates to force their way through. They do this frequently so that the residents can no longer bear the costs of repairs every now and then.

Ideally, all the members are expected to contribute equally towards the costs of constructing the gates, barriers or blocking other entry/exit points. Not all the associations have managed this. However, it is encouraging to note that in over two-thirds (68%) of the associations members shared the costs equally. Another 32% received contributions from willing members only. Safaricom mobile phone service providers sponsored two gates and guardhouses in Jericho.

When asked later "In what way have the common gates and barriers helped to curb crime in this neighbourhood?" almost all of them (92%) indicated that they had witnessed a decrease in crime. Three of the neighbourhoods have not experienced any crime since then.

Security measures

To enhance security within the neighbourhoods several security measures are put in place. One common measure is hiring of security personnel to man the security points (gates/barriers). Most of the associations (70%) prefer locally hired security guards who are relatively cheaper to negotiate with than the guards hired from private firms (Table 4).

Table 4: Security measures

	%
Security personnel hired from: (n=30; %=100)	
Locally hired	70.3
Hired from private firm	29.3
Security personnel (n=30; %=100)	
At night only	24.3
Both day and night	75.7
How the security personnel paid (n= 37; %=100)	
Equal monthly contribution through the treasurer	75.7
The guard collects money personally from each house	21.6
Security firm bills each house	2.7
Who are the security personnel answerable to? (n= 37; %=100)	
The officials	73.0
The (employing) private firm	16.2
A security committee	10.8

The number of security guards depends on the internal security arrangements of the courts and also the ability of the residents to pay for the (extra) services. Over three quarters (76%) of the associations have controlled access at their security points: that is, having both day and night security personnel.

Just like with the construction of gates and barriers, the residents have to share the costs of paying for the services rendered by the guards. In three quarters (76%) of the associations, the treasurer pays the guard(s) through monthly contributions from the residents. In a few cases (22%) the guards collect the money directly from the residents. Apart from where the guards are hired from a private firm, they are answerable to the officials or a special security committee within the court. In some neighbourhoods, households with vehicles are charged an extra fee.

Crime in the neighbourhood

All the associations have experienced crime within their area of operation, most of them being petty crimes of stealing clothes from the drying lanes, house break-ins to steal household goods (mainly the electronics), mugging (commonly known as *kupigwa ngeta*), snatching of mobile phones, drug abuse within the estate, stealing of batteries and radio cassettes from parked vehicles, etc.

Some of the crimes are common during the day while others occur at night. For example, house break-ins occur during the day while car jacking, armed robbery and violent crimes are common at night. In case of a crime in the neighbourhood, the police are informed accordingly and as a formality.[12]

Cooperation with police and local authority

There is still need to strengthen the cooperation between the police and the residents to go beyond merely reporting crime cases to them. The initiative by some of the associations to hold regular meetings with the police (22%) and to seek support from them (39%) is a step forward in this direction (Table 5). The police response to crime is still poorly rated as about half (54%) of the associations reported that their response is extremely slow and not helpful at all.

On the other hand, police patrol should be enhanced in the neighbourhoods as only one-fifth (20%) of them reported frequent police patrols. Despite that poor rating, about one-quarter (25%) of the associations reported that the police have been very quick and helpful in responding to crime occurring in their neighbourhoods.

The cooperation with the local authority is even wanting. About three-quarters (61%) of the associations reported having no linkage at all with the local authority. The local authority is supposed to repair the streetlights, potholed roads and clear the roadsides of thickets and bushes. These services are only provided in a few neighbourhoods (25%) who have developed good working relations with the local authority. It is

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[12] The officials or the guards are the ones who report crime cases to the police. It is in very rare cases that the victims report to the police.

interesting to note that most of the associations do not even bother to seek approval of the local authority before they privatise space (erecting gates/barriers).

Table 5: Cooperation with the police and their response to crime

	%
Cooperation with the police (n=30; %>100)	
We get support from them	38.9
We hold regular meetings with them	22.2
We only report cases to them	72.2
Police response to crime (n=30; %=100)	
Very quick response and helpful	25.7
They patrol the area frequently	20.0
Very slow and not helpful	54.3
Cooperation with the local authority (n=30; %>100)	
We get support from them	25.0
We hold regular meetings with them	13.9
None	61.1
We sought approval from them to erect gate	13.9

The neighbourhoods not adequately served by the local authority complained bitterly:

"We are not satisfied with the services of the city council because they do not pick the garbage although we pay, they have not controlled hawkers e.g. kiosk owners all over here are involved in selling illegal drugs. Such hawkers are known to monitor us and organize theft. It is we the residents who have put up the security lights because the city council has failed to do it. We do even clearing of bushes around the estate. Extensions are coming up and illegal kiosks yet the city council seems unconcerned. When we decided to control on pedestrians and this street, we did not have to consult the city council, which do very little for our welfare." [Security point location 22:1 - Eastlands]

How can we reduce crime in the neighbourhood?

This part presents the officials' perceptions on how crime can be reduced in the neighbourhoods. These perceptions have been categorized into various levels.

1) Police related:
- Regular day and night police patrols without harassment
- Quick response and action when crime is reported
- Facilitating convenient procedures in reporting crime related information by the residents
- Police should be adequately equipped and their terms and conditions of service reviewed
- Corrupt officers colluding with the thugs should be weeded out of the force

2) At the community level:
- Youth should be continuously counselled
- Be "our own police" by being vigilant and reporting any suspicious individuals

- Voluntarily giving information to the police

3) At the local authority level
- Provision of recreational facilities in the residential areas
- Encouraging security point locations and neighbourhood security and welfare associations
- Discouraging the mushrooming of "unregulated and unplanned" informal sector activities and bars and wines and spirits joints within the residential areas.

4) At the security guards level:
- To be properly trained
- To be adequately equipped
- To be paid well with regard to their work

5) At the macro (policy) level
- Reducing unemployment and poverty
- Better roads
- Need to have the coordination of security matters beyond the associations

How can neighbourhood associations be strengthened to fight crime?

1) Support and encouragement from the police through:
a) Holding regular meetings with the residents and officials of neighbourhood associations
b) Policing together and collaborative sensitisation activities
c) Installation of police booths at strategic places[13]

2) Support and encouragement from the local authority through:
a) Provision of adequate streetlights and in good working condition. There are other associations, which have come up with the "adopt a streetlight"[14] campaign.
b) Clearance of grass and garbage heaps
c) Controlling the escalating number of *kioks*[15] in the estates

3) Cooperation and commitment amongst the members through:
a) Prompt monthly contributions
b) Setting up registers for domestic staff

4) The government should recognize and encourage by organizing seminars and/or campaigns to popularise the concept of community policing. Furthermore, registration of such associations under the department of social services of the local authority should also be encouraged.

5) Exchange of experiences with other associations

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[13] Just like it happens in the central business district. This is an initiative between Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) and the police.
[14] This is where one residents agrees to maintain a streetlight, basically in terms of replacing the bulb
[15] Unregulated/unplanned informal sector activities

Case studies

This section presents a summary of case studies as reported by the respondents. In a number of them, some parts have been edited to conceal the identity of the respondent and those of the association.

Case study 1& 2: Low-income neighbourhoods in Southlands

Case study 1: This association was re-started in December last year (2002) through the women resident's initiative. It covers 21 houses with some extensions. Every member contributes kshs 50/= for membership and kshs 100/= for saving with the treasurer. Furthermore, there is kshs 200/= contributed monthly per house for security. Vehicle owners contribute kshs 350/= per month.

The women meet after every month. General meetings for all the residents are not held regularly because this is also a welfare organization for the women. We embraced the security aspect in our welfare association because of rampart theft cases that were happening in this court, especially during daytime. Clothes, shoes and gas cylinders are some of the things that were once stolen from the court. A car was also once stolen from here at night. Another day they stole wheels from the cars that were parked outside here.

We only have one watchman at night: that is what we can afford. During the day, the court is left just like that. Since many petty thefts occur at daytime, we blocked all the *'panya-routes'*[16] into the estate just a week ago to ensure that we stop this practice of people passing through the court. Previously we used to hire company security guard, but they stole a lot of things and disappeared. We now hire a boy from the Kibera slums whom we pay directly every month. In case he shows bad character we just blame the resident who brought him here.

We erected this gate in 1986 using iron sheets, but due to increased theft we decided to put up the present one. We also have plans of improving this one. The present gate costed us kshs 6000/= to construct. Each resident paid approximately kshs 350/=. Theft cases in this area are common at around 3pm when the train is passing. This has been a definite factor in ensuring that almost all courts in this area have a security association. Plans are underway to have an umbrella organization to steer us ahead.

I personally experienced crime when so many thieves came and even cut another woman's hand. The residents raised an alarm and three of the thieves were killed. When the police were informed, they delayed to come until after 10am the following morning.

Case study 2: This association started long before I came here in 1997 on the basis of responding to crime incidences that were rampant in this neighbourhood. Apart from that the association was a platform for the residents to know each other and also to promote our social welfare. The association covers 14 houses plus extensions,

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[16] *Panya* is a Swahili word for a rat: thus "rat routes" meaning many unwanted entries and exits the pedestrians were using.

which may shoot the figure to around 28 houses. To become a member of this association is determined by one's willingness to contribute to any financial need of the court. However, no one is forced to become a member.

We have a guard only at night. During the day, the main gate is closed, leaving the pedestrian one opened. When a resident comes with a car he or she opens for himself or herself. Being a neighbour to a nursery school, the gate bordering the school is normally opened at 7am, over lunch hour and in the evening to enable the pupils to access and leave school. This discourages other persons from using the gate as an access route. You know some of them are the thieves.

We do not hold our meetings on a regular basis but when crisis strikes then we are forced to call for one. You know people are usually less concerned until a problem occurs. During that time everybody becomes active and decisions made through consensus. Before this association was formed, petty crime was very common in this neighbourhood. There were various incidences of house break-ins and stealing clothes from the drying lines. This mainly affected the houses lying at the extreme ends than the ones at the middle of the court. The watchman collects kshs 100/= from each house monthly. This gate was erected in 1999 at a cost of kshs 14000/=. Each member contributed kshs 800/= for this purpose.

Because of lack of trust we hardly work closely with the police and neither with any other organization. This is more aggravated by the fact that our organization is still not well established.

Case study 3 & 4: Middle-income neighbourhoods in Eastlands

Case study 3: Apart from security matters, this association was formed as an effort to also fight other kinds of social vices including land grabbing and even sometimes help in promoting welfare spirit. The association covers 102 houses from which each house contributes kshs 300/= per month. We are affiliated to an umbrella association to which every member contributes kshs 1000/= per year.

Formed to fight a multiple of social misdeeds and misdemeanours, the association was registered in 1988 but installed the first security guards 10 years later. Before 1988 and within these ten years, land grabbing was very rampant in this estate. Our first challenge was therefore to fight this vice and the associated security problems. We hired 8 watchmen who work in shifts: 4 at night and 3 during the day. Two watchmen are usually at the gate while the rest patrol the estate.

We have never employed guards from a private security company. The security firms demand a lot of money from their clients while they pay very little to the guards. One of our executive committee members is assigned the responsibility of delegating duties to the guards and whenever there is any dissatisfaction from the end of both divides, the executive committee member is normally the mediator.

The two gates were erected in 1998 at a cost of kshs 100,000/=. This cost was met by the amount the residents had been contributing over the previous ten years as membership fee. The association had to incur this cost since the rate at which the crimes were being committed was very high, and something had to be done to change

this. We blocked all the "*panya-routes*" routes into the estate although there is one private developer who has really frustrated our efforts to block one of them. The case is still pending in court.

Just before we finished erecting the gates, there was an incident of car jacking here. A station wagon car followed a resident after entering the estate by the other open gate that had not been completed. They removed the resident from his Nissan and sped off with the vehicle via the other locked gate. When realizing the gate was locked, the station wagon that was following the car-jacked Nissan made a quick U-turn and sped off through the other unfinished gate while the other car-jackers in the Nissan jumped off the car and ran through the open pedestrian gate of the other gate.

We hold our executive meetings after every fortnight while a meeting with all the residents is held monthly. The officials of the larger umbrella association of which I am the vice-chairman, meets every Tuesday. As long as one is a resident of the court, he or she automatically becomes a member of the association. It is a mandatory for every resident. However, there is only one isolated case where a resident adamantly refused to become a member. We, as an association, instructed the watchmen never to let him, his family or his visitors through the gate whatever time of the day or night. He reported the matter to the police but since the police support communal policing, he was encouraged to be a member. He responded positively and nowadays he is an active and responsible member.

Ever since we erected the gates and employed the watchmen there has never been any major crime experienced in this estate. Once in a while we experience isolated cases of petty theft. Security cum safety, being a subject to many people's concern, has attracted us to many partners. The police commend us for a job well done and wishes that other estates could do the same. If they followed suit, Nairobi would be a haven of peace. We have also been working closely with the Nairobi City Council. Whenever water pipes burst in the court, we mobilize on resources, buy the pipes and call for their technical assistance. Similarly, when our security lamps go off, we call them to do the repairs.

Case study 4: This Association is an old one. I think it is as old as the estate itself. I moved here in 1999. The main purpose of the association is to steep up our security: that is, to control entry into the court because of instances of break-ins. The association covers 42 houses and one becomes a member once he or she is an occupant with a commitment to pay kshs. 350/= per house monthly. Majority of the residents here are also landlords although some have moved out and rented out their houses.

We are only using one gate and we control only one street. We had all the exits to other courts fenced out. We do have monthly meetings as the executive committee but once a year for all residents. The attendance rate is about 85% of the members. If there is a crisis, then we can hold the meetings at anytime. In our meetings we discuss matters concerning improving our security and collection of funds. Any question or disputes can also be discussed as they arise.

Since I came here, we have witnessed a few cases of crime. One of the houses has been broken into and valuables taken. Also 5 vehicles were vandalized at night and all

the radio cassettes stolen from them. In other occasions the guards have also been attacked and injured twice. All these events took place at night and we reported all the cases to the police station.

Intensive attacks started after we changed our security service provider. We thought that the former service provider who was terminated was revenging so we decided to have *Maasai* guards instead. We have two guards during the day and three at night. Since our court is T-shaped we have them stationed at the three corners and they keep changing positions.

The *Maasai* guards have been hired through a local private security firm in this estate. They also offer security services to many other courts. A personnel from the firm supervises the guards day and night. The firm is answerable to the court committee if some of the guards are not performing their duties as required. We as a committee continuously inform the firm on how the guards are doing their work. We pay the firm a monthly fee and they are the ones responsible in paying their employees. The collection of money from the residents is a great challenge to us. Some may not have the money to pay (being late) while others totally refuse to pay. We had a case where both parents died and left the children only. So the committee decided to exempt them from paying. Those living in the extensions also contribute. The extra money is used to mend fences.

In order to have efficient control at the gate we resolved that guards stay long enough to know our frequent visitors and us. This is to reduce the issue of inquiries, registration or escorting the person to the host. That is to say that we maintain no log sheets or registers. We have an umbrella association for the entire neighbourhood although according to me its existence is not very relevant except for sharing information, which is also limited. People here do not take associations very seriously. We also share information and experiences with other associations having the same service provider like us.

When we erected this gate and blocked all the other passages, there were no complaints from neighbours as they were also doing the same. We did not even seek any authority to erect this gate. Due to our good relations with the Nairobi City Council, they clean our streets more often and our streetlights are nowadays working. We get quick response from them in case the streetlights need any repairs and/or replacements. In case of a crime, the service provider deals directly with the police. This ensures that resolving of certain issues is done quickly.

Case study 5 & 6: High-income neighbourhoods in Westlands

Case study 5: Lavington Residents' Association (LRA): This case has
been quoted from a neighbourhood association newsletter.[17] According to this newsletter, the chairman of Njumbi residents association, together with representatives of other Lavington residents associations, and under the umbrella of the LRA met with City Council planning officials[18] to discuss the needs and concerns

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[17] Njumbi Newsletter Issue 11- March 2003
[18] The date of the meeting was not given

of area residents. Some of the recommendations reached and forwarded to the council for action were:

- Close down all the illegal *kiosks* in Lavington. However, on LRA advice some will be upgraded and retained
- Conversion of residential premises into commercial use (mainly bars) without authorization should stop
- Illegal water tapping to be stopped
- A priority list of roads needing repair to be submitted to the council and some of these will be repaired by the residents' support
- Benard estate residents association can be allowed to levy a charge on heavy vehicles wishing to use their roads[19]
- Access to the estate by non-residents can be restricted on the grounds of security
- Residential high-density developments, including high rise buildings, to be discouraged
- Illegally grabbed land will be recovered for public use and enjoyment

Case study 6: Mountain View Residents Association (MVERA): This case has been quoted from "Neighbour View"[20] a newsletter for Mountain View Residents that is published every two months by the communications committee. MVERA is an association currently undergoing the process of formal registration. It is involved mainly in:

1. Joint management of security within the estate to which they have contracted a private security firm to provide patrol vehicles, guards on bicycles and on foot and radio contact to all guards and their mobile vehicles.

2. Joint management of environmental matters, including garbage collection, sweeping of streets and clearance of drainage

The members contribute kshs 1200/= per year for all the services provided by MVERA. Most of their services are run professionally with an Estate Manager specifically employed to oversee the implementation of its activities. They have about 156 members.

Case study 7: Vigilante groups – Kibera Slums in Southlands

Crime is believed to flourish well in an environment inadequate and devoid of police authority. In an event of such inadequacies, some spatial organization must eventually be put in place to give redress and a check to the heightening levels of crime. Individuals are social actors who are knowledgeable and capable of processing social experience, and that human beings are not passive recipients of change, but active participants who process information and lay out strategies on how to deal with both internal and external forces.

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[19] The residents want to preserve the heavy investment they have pumped into a renewed road network of the area
[20] Neighbour View Volume 1, Issue 4 January/February 2003

Given the nature of informal settlements, and by lacking the basic social and economic infrastructures, mandates them to ensure that in a way or the other, their own welfare is facilitated. One such example is Kibera slums where vigilante grouping is a known case and every slum resident acknowledges their operations. Two of these groupings agreed to give us an audience on condition that we do no ask them sensitive questions because of their unofficial outfit.

Lang'ata Elders Group (LEG): LEG was formed about eleven years ago. It is mandated to serve the common interest of the residents of Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Mashimoni, Raila and Lindi villages. Some of the social responsibilities they embrace include: ensuring fair housing rates, transporting dead bodies home and ensuring fair allocation of plots, amongst others.

Being a well established social grouping, LEG has the Youth Law Enforcers (YLE) that ensures law and order laid down by LEG is strictly adhered to. In this manner they have successfully executed their responsibilities. Some politicians are even known to be funding this group in recognition of their success. Such funds are used to pay the (jobless) YLE members.

LEG has executive meetings on a weekly basis to address the issues aforementioned. Once in a while they organize for grand meetings at the Kamukunji grounds where they call the councillors, chiefs and their assistants to air their views on the pertinent issues on the general welfare of the residents.

In case of crime like theft, the victim has to pay kshs 300/= as a fee before the YLE are released to go and look for the offenders. This money is meant to pay the youth for the work done. When the offenders are apprehended, they are thoroughly beaten and later forced to return the stolen things (most of which are household goods) to the victim. LEG is a dreaded group, especially by the landlords who overcharge the tenants. They have the power to influence the tenants to pay or not to pay the rent.

Sarang'ombe Youth Reinforcement Group (SYRG): The formation of this group is political in nature and dates back to 1998. Its formation owes much to the partnership between KANU and NDP political parties. This group was formed on the basis of mobilizing support for the party. It has undergone a considerable transformation given the current political desperation.

A vibrant but dominated by jobless youth the group is a self-styled community police whose jurisdictional area covers Olympic, Soweto and Kianda villages. They have ensured that peace and order prevails in the given areas and this has earned them some goodwill in terms of being endorsed by the Assistant Chief and councillors as the sole security operatives in the area.

They hold their meetings on a weekly basis to discuss security matters. When a crime is reported kshs 200/= is paid as a fee before they set out to apprehend the thieves. Serious criminal cases are forwarded to the police who later take the suspects to the court. In case they are required, once in a while they appear in court to give evidence.

Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to develop a GIS research program on urban security in Nairobi. It is clearly evident that many security points coming up signal the rising levels of both crime and insecurity. Privatisation of space through the resident's neighbourhood association is one way the residents of Nairobi organize themselves to fight against insecurity – perceived or real. This calls for a systematic study, with a common approach, to further understand the dynamics involved in privatisation of public space in the three cities (Nairobi, Johannesburg and Ibadan) of sub-Saharan Africa.

Appendices