

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

THE KENYA RED CROSS SOCIETY DISASTER
RESPONSE PROGRAMME: A Study of the effects of its
decentralization on service delivery in Kisumu Branch.

BY:

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


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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any University or any other award whatsoever.

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Signature


7th November 2009

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CERTIFICATION

This Project has been submitted with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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9/11/09

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....	i
Certification.....	i
Dedication.....	ii
Acknowledgement.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
List of Tables.....	vii
List of Figures.....	viii
Abstract.....	ix

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background information.....	1
1.2 Statement of the research problem.....	3
1.3 Key research questions.....	6
1.4 Goal and objectives of the study.....	6
1.5 Justification of the study.....	6
1.6 Scope and limitations of the study.....	8

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1 Decentralization defined	9
2.2 Forms of Decentralization	12
2.2.1 Devolution.....	12
2.2.2 Delegation	12
2.2.3 Privatization	13
2.2.4 Deconcentration.....	13
2.3 Factors affecting the implementation of decentralization polices.....	14
2.3.1 Political constraints	15
2.3.2 Inadequate physical infrastructure, transport and Communication	16
2.3.3 Inter-organizational relationships.....	16
2.3.4 Shortage of skilled personnel	17

2.3.5	Financial constraints and weak revenue raising capacity at local levels.....	17
2.3.6	Characteristics of implementing agencies.....	18
2.4	Disaster management concept.....	18
2.5	Disaster response strategies	20
2.5.1	Search and Rescue.....	20
2.5.2	Water and sanitation.....	20
2.5.3	Food.....	20
2.5.4	Health and nutrition.	21
2.5.5	Shelter.....	21
2.5.6	Reunification of families.....	21
2.5.7	Logistics and transport.....	21
2.5.8	Psychological Counseling	22
2.6	Factors affecting effective response to disasters.....	22
2.6.1	Decision Making and Authority	22
2.6.2	Accountability.....	23
2.6.3	Overloading local organizations.....	24
2.6.4	Competition.....	25
2.6.5	Lack of coordination.....	26
2.7	Decentralization and disaster management	27
2.8	Theoretical framework	29
2.8.1	Structural-functionalism theory.....	29
2.8.2	Sequential theory of decentralization.....	31
2.8.2.1	Decentralization as a process.....	31
2.8.2.2	Territorial interests of bargaining actors.....	32
2.8.2.3	Sequences of decentralization.....	32
2.9	Conceptual framework and study variables.....	33
2.9	Operational Definitions.....	34

CHAPTER THREE

3.0	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	36
3.1	Kisumu District Profile	36
3.2	Research design.....	38

2.3.5	Financial constraints and weak revenue raising capacity at local levels.....	17
2.3.6	Characteristics of implementing agencies.....	18
2.4	Disaster management concept.....	18
2.5	Disaster response strategies	20
2.5.1	Search and Rescue.....	20
2.5.2	Water and sanitation.....	20
2.5.3	Food.....	20
2.5.4	Health and nutrition.	21
2.5.5	Shelter.....	21
2.5.6	Reunification of families.....	21
2.5.7	Logistics and transport.....	21
2.5.8	Psychological Counseling	22
2.6	Factors affecting effective response to disasters.....	22
2.6.1	Decision Making and Authority	22
2.6.2	Accountability.....	23
2.6.3	Overloading local organizations.....	24
2.6.4	Competition.....	25
2.6.5	Lack of coordination.....	26
2.7	Decentralization and disaster management	27
2.8	Theoretical framework	29
2.8.1	Structural-functionalism theory.....	29
2.8.2	Sequential theory of decentralization.....	31
2.8.2.1	Decentralization as a process.....	31
2.8.2.2	Territorial interests of bargaining actors.....	32
2.8.2.3	Sequences of decentralization.....	32
2.9	Conceptual framework and study variables.....	33
2.9	Operational Definitions.....	34

CHAPTER THREE

3.0	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	36
3.1	Kisumu District Profile	36
3.2	Research design.....	38

3.2.1	Method of sampling	38
3.2.2	Unit of analysis and unit of observation	38
3.2.3	Methods of data collection.....	39
3.3	Data analysis	39

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0	DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS.....	40
4.1	Introduction	40
4.2	An Overview Kenya Red Cross Society Kisumu Branch.....	40
4.3	To assess the KRCS Kisumu Branch response to disasters.....	42
4.4	To assess the level of decentralization of the KRCS.....	46
4.4.1	Strategies and Intensity of the decentralization.....	46
4.4.2	Objectives for decentralization of the disaster response Programme.....	48
4.5	To assess the capacity of KRCS Kisumu branch in disaster response.....	50
4.5.1	Skilled personnel.....	50
4.5.2	Disaster response equipments and materials.....	56
4.5.3	Financial resources.....	62
4.5.4	Revenue raising ability.....	64
4.6	To examine the KRCS organizational structure and its relation to disaster response in Kisumu.....	65
4.6.1	Management structure.....	65
4.6.2	Governance structure.....	68
4.7	Stakeholder involvement.....	70
4.8	Conclusion.....	71

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	74
5.1	Introduction.....	74
5.2	Summary of findings.....	74
5.3	Conclusions.....	77
5.4	Recommendations.....	78
	References.....	81

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Profile of Eastern Africa countries.....	19
Table 2:	Direction of Impact of different types of decentralization on the degree of autonomy of governors.....	32
Table 3:	Kisumu district demographic characteristic.....	37
Table 4:	Categories of disasters handled by specific branch personnel between January 2007 and June 2009.....	44
Table 5:	Time taken by Branch Personnel to respond to disasters.....	45
Table 6:	Type of material and services given by the branch during disaster response.....	45
Table 7:	KRCS Regional Offices.....	47
Table 8:	Highest level of education attained by volunteers.....	51
Table 9:	Categories of trainings offered to specific branch personnel.....	52
Table 10:	Categories of training recommended by branch personnel.....	53
Table 11:	Disaster response stock at Kisumu branch as at 30 th June '09.....	57
Table 12:	Disaster response stock for the West Kenya region at the Kisumu branch warehouses as at June '09.....	58
Table 13:	Adequacy of support give to beneficiaries.....	59
Table 14:	Status of communication equipments at Kisumu branch	61

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Conceptual framework of the study.....	33
Figure 2:	KRCS Management structure.....	65
Figure 3:	KRCS Governance Structure.....	68
Figure 4:	Branch Governance Composition.....	68

ABSTRACT

Kenya has been exposed to a variety of disasters such as droughts, fires, floods, HIV/AIDS, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks among others (Draft National Disaster Management Policy 2006:1). These disasters have over the years caused loss of lives, disrupted people's livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure, diverted planned use of resources and interrupted economic activities thereby causing a retardation of the economy (G.O.K, 2002). In this regard the government has recognized the need to partner and work with other organizations like KRCS in order to develop the required capacity to respond to disasters as envisaged in the Draft National Disaster Management Policy of 2006.

KRCS responds to disasters within the country through its network of 59 branches spread throughout the country. In Kisumu, KRCS operates through its Kisumu Branch. The KRCS disaster response ability and recent involvement in disaster situations in Kenya has created a lot of pressure and incentive to find solutions and mechanisms for maximizing disaster response outcomes from the limited resources available. These pressures have seen the KRCS introduce the disaster response systems reform with decentralization as the core element. This is premised on the understanding that decentralization is expected to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of KRCS disaster response service delivery particularly in its 59 branches, by promoting grassroots participation in disaster response activities. It is envisaged that this would create a more effective and efficient administration of local branch and community disaster response programmes and lead to expanded programme administration outside its headquarters in Nairobi.

This study therefore sought to investigate the effects of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme on service delivery in its Kisumu Branch. The study had five key objectives, viz. to assess the KRCS Kisumu Branch response to disasters, to assess the level of decentralization of the KRCS, to assess the capacity of the KRCS Kisumu Branch in disaster response, to examine the current KRCS organizational structure and its relation to disaster response in Kisumu and to examine stakeholders involvement in disaster response in KRCS Kisumu Branch.

The study established that KRCS Kisumu Branch is majorly involved in disaster response which is the core business of the organization. Decentralization has contributed to better service delivery with regard to adequate disaster response materials provided and timely response to disasters within its area of jurisdiction. Its main strength lies in its grassroots' volunteer network and the ability to preposition relevant capacities at local level. With regard to the capacity of the branch, the study found out that the branch capacity had been significantly strengthened with the advent of decentralization. Specifically, the branch is comparatively having a strong material base necessary for effective disaster response. With the introduction of the decentralization, KRCS has constructed one warehouse and erected two additional rub halls which were adequately stocked with relevant disaster response materials at the time of this study. Relevant working tools and equipments were also assessed; the study established that decentralization has led to the installation of a better internet and network system and procurement of more computers amongst others. The availability of relevant technical personnel at branch and regional level who were either recruited or transferred from the headquarters during the rollout of the decentralization programme has boosted the technical capacity at local level and improved the image of the Branch with regard to enhanced accountability.

The financial capacity of the Branch was found to be very weak. Budgetary allocations from the headquarters remained the major source of funds for branch activities. The Branch had other sources of income that included membership subscription fees, training fees, donations, rent of the branch canteen and hire of tents and chairs. However, both sources of income were not adequate for branch needs and thus the Branch could not raise over 50% of its financial requirements. The Branch did not also have adequate strategies in place to collect revenue at local level. High poverty levels in the district, coupled with the global economic crisis limited the amounts that individuals and business firms are willing to contribute to charities. The existing partnerships between the Branch and local stakeholders have not been exploited to full to help the Branch increase its revenue base. The Branch also needed to explore possibilities of investing in more sustainable income generating projects/activities.

With regard to the level of decentralization, the study established that KRCS is still in its first phase of decentralization after having rolled out the same in 2006. There hasn't been any meaningful evaluation carried out yet to establish whether the decentralization is actually

achieving what it set out to do. In addition, KRCS did not have effective strategies for monitoring the progress of the decentralization programme so as to make necessary corrections, in order to maximize on the decentralization outputs. Key strategies put in place to enhance decentralization outcomes included; the establishment of the Regional offices, deployment of relevant technical personnel, review of organizational policies, repositioning of relief stock to the lower structures amongst others.

The study also observed that KRCS has established a decentralized structure which is currently characterized by three main management levels at the Headquarters, Regional and Branch levels. Stakeholder involvement in the Branch activities was found have substantially improved leading to more participation by stakeholders and more opportunities for networking.

The study therefore proposes continued efforts in strengthening partnerships with stakeholders to increase the resource base of the branch, introduction of more sustainable income generating projects, more capacity building efforts targeting training of the branch personnel, regular check and replenishment of relief stock including provision of the missing items and equipment. There was also need for the headquarters to put more elaborate and systematic monitoring and evaluation systems in place to establish whether the decentralization programme is achieving what it was set out to do. The need to build the capacity of the branch in logistics particularly with both a medium sized vehicle and a truck could not be overemphasized if the branch has to further improve on its efficiency during disaster response.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information

Throughout the world, voluntary organizations like the Red Cross have played a key role in disaster response. Cuny, (1983) states that these organizations have over time developed the practical approaches and technologies for disaster response. They have exceptional capabilities at the village level (including flexibility) such that governments and intergovernmental organizations rely on them to implement their disaster response programmes. Organizations like the American Red Cross and the Israel Red Cross are well respected all over the world due to the special role they play during disasters. Recent examples of their disaster response activities include the September 11th terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, USA and the 2004 Asian Tsunami where several people were killed and others displaced.

The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) is a volunteer based humanitarian organization established through an Act of Parliament, Cap 256 of the Laws of Kenya. Its mission and core business is to assist and respond to victims of disasters and those at risk in the most effective and efficient manner (KRCS 2006-2010 Strategic Plan). The Government of Kenya (GOK) draft National Disaster Management Policy 2006, recognizes KRCS as an important voluntary emergency response agency. The policy states that the National Disaster Management Agency (NADIMA) aims to work closely with the KRCS on emergency response and disaster risk reduction programmes.

Kenya has been exposed to a variety of disasters such as droughts, fires, floods, HIV/AIDS, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks among others (Draft National Disaster Management Policy 2006:1). These disasters have over the years caused loss of lives, disrupted people's livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure, diverted planned use of resources and interrupted economic activities thereby causing a retardation of the economy (G.O.K, 2002). The Kenya government has committed itself to mobilizing resources in order to minimize disruptions resulting from these disasters. In this regard the government has recognized the need to partner and work with other

organizations like KRCS in order to develop the required capacity to respond to disasters as envisaged in the Draft National Disaster Management Policy of 2006.

In majority cases KRCS responds to disasters within the country through its network of 59 branches spread throughout the country. The aim usually is to save lives and protect livelihoods of people threatened by disasters by providing sufficient basic needs such as food and non-food aid, water, sanitation, medicine and shelter acceptable to the people. In all cases KRCS takes care to preserve people's dignity, security and the environment. Since 2004 the organization has been the co-chair of the Rapid-onset Disasters Committee within the country in addition to being the 'lead agency' in implementing disaster response programmes in various districts in the country. According to KRCS, its disaster response ability and recent involvement in disaster situations in Kenya has created a lot of pressure and incentive to find solutions and mechanisms for maximizing disaster response outcomes from the limited resources available ([Http://www.kenyaredcross.org](http://www.kenyaredcross.org), accessed on 24th June 2008).

These pressures have seen the KRCS introduce the disaster response systems reform with decentralization as the core element. This is premised on the understanding that decentralization is expected to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of KRCS disaster response services particularly in its 59 branches by promoting grassroots participation in disaster response activities. It is envisaged that this would create a more effective and efficient administration of local branch and community disaster response programmes and lead to expanded programme administration outside its headquarters in Nairobi. In this context decentralization has been viewed as a solution to the challenges of centralized systems which are often associated with inefficiency and inflexibility.

Even though decentralization policies are considered to offer a lot of promises, weak institutions and institutional frameworks can cause it to have mixed outcomes and lead to considerable negative effects on service delivery. According to Cheema and Rondinelli (1983); experience gained from the implementation of decentralization policies within developing countries reveal that not all of the assumed benefits of decentralization ensue and indeed very few developing countries have succeeded in carrying out their decentralization programs. Ahmad et al (2005) have further observed that in reality decentralization is a process rather than an outcome. Accordingly

they state that “the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes”. From the foregoing observations it can be concluded that the manner in which decentralization is designed and carried out, the progression, the choice among different forms of decentralization, and how the politics are managed can be just as important to effective disaster response service delivery as the decision to decentralize itself. Decentralization is critical in disaster response programming. However, little literature exists on decentralization of disaster response programmes in public and private organizations. There is therefore need to study organizations like the Red cross which are largely considered as key partners to the governments in disaster response. Since all National Red Cross societies in the world are auxiliaries to governments in their respective countries it is expected that lessons learnt from their experience can benefit both government and other stakeholders in the disaster field. In view of the above misgivings, this study will aim at investigating the effects of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme on service delivery in Kisumu Branch.

The KRCS responds to disaster incidents in Kisumu district through its Kisumu Branch. In Kisumu District, there are four commonly experienced disasters; floods, drought, tribal clashes, epidemics and pest invasions (Kisumu District Development Plan 2002-2008:22). KRCS interventions in Kisumu have mainly been in the areas of tribal clashes, floods and disease epidemics. These disasters have over the years caused loss of lives, disrupted peoples livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure, diverted planned use of resources, interrupted economic activities and have at times retarded the economy (G.O.K, 2002). The choice of KRCS Kisumu Branch as the main of study is premised on the understanding that the branch has been in existence for close to 20 years. The branch has also had a decentralized management structure much longer than other existing branches.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

The KRCS has had a highly centralized management structure since its establishment in 1965 until mid 2005. This highly centralized management structure was characterized by the existence of a strong headquarters and 59 branches which were comparatively very weak. The Headquarters had highly trained and competent staff with access to adequate material and financial resources including warehouses and related logistical supplies required to respond to disasters. However, branches were characterized by inadequately skilled personnel, weak resource base and lack of

warehouses including related logistic support necessary for effective disaster response (KRCS 2004 Midterm Review Report of the 2003-2005 Strategic Plan).

According to the KRCS 2004 midterm report of the 2003-2005 Strategic Plan, this traditional and highly centralized system that was largely donor funded and centrally managed started to experience severe challenges. This, in effect, constrained the delivery of effective and efficient disaster response services in several ways. Firstly, there was lack of clearly defined functions, roles, schedule of duties and work plans starting from the Headquarters to the Branches. Secondly, there was poor management of donor funds in an organization that is even currently 100% dependent on donor funds. This was evidenced by among others delayed transfer of funds from headquarters to branches, aggravated by late submission of accountability statements. Thirdly, with increasing workload demands on its technical staff, the headquarters had been weakened in its core regulatory and policy making functions. Fourthly, there was a highly centralized monitoring and evaluation system since branches lacked the capacity to identify, collect, analyze, store, retrieve and utilize disaster related information for planning and decision making purposes.

As a result of the above mentioned factors the centralized management system was found to be inappropriate and inefficient in responding to local needs and priorities due to its inbuilt mechanism of replicating centrally designed solutions for all branches in disregard to existing variations in the local conditions and circumstances. Besides, it was blamed for stifling the growth of decision-making capacity at the lower levels thereby hindering effective community participation in local disaster management programmes.

The above issues resulted into a weakened disaster response service delivery system both at the headquarters and within the 59 branches. This in essence constrained timely response to disasters thereby negatively affecting quality of service delivery. Due to the weak disaster response systems there was inadequate community participation and interest in disaster response programme design and implementation. This was evidenced by a very weak planning and managerial structures that inhibited branches taking up their rightful role in managing effective disaster response service delivery. Moreover, the existing budgeting and resource mobilization structure did not allow flexibility at branch level to reallocate funds between items of expenditure that would have otherwise been considered as the main priorities at branch levels.

From 2005, the organization embarked on a decentralization programme as a means of addressing some of the challenges discussed above. The KRCS disaster response decentralization programme is premised on the understanding that it could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response service delivery by promoting grassroots participation in local disaster response activities, create more effective and efficient administration of local disaster response programs, and lead to expanded administration outside the headquarters. The programme is expected to strengthen and empower the Branch facilities and the communities in order for them to develop, manage and build the required capacities in modern disaster relief/response planning and management.

Although decentralization programmes are considered to offer a lot of promises, preliminary evaluation of the decentralization process in KRCS indicates that it is fraught with a lot of obstacles and challenges. Among these challenges are the financial costs of the rollout, resistance by Headquarter staff to delegate some of the decision making authority to lower levels, unwillingness among competent staff to be transferred to the Branches or Regions leading to inadequate skills and capacity at lower levels and inadequate material resources for effective service delivery. Ahmad et al. (2005) have noted that the implementation of decentralization programmes within weak institutions and institutional frameworks often undermine their effectiveness thereby hampering the achievement of their desired outcomes. Sharma, (2005) further notes that the success of decentralization programmes depends on how they are designed and implemented. While an appropriately structured decentralization improves the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, inappropriately designed and implemented decentralization programmes could have negative repercussions on the efficiency of service delivery.

In view of the above misgivings about the success of decentralization programmes this study sought to investigate the effects that decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme has had on service delivery in its Kisumu Branch.

1.3 Key research questions

The study was guided by the following research questions.

1. How does KRCS Kisumu Branch respond to disasters?
2. What is the level of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme
3. What is the capacity (Human, financial and material resources) of KRCS Kisumu Branch for disaster response?
4. (a) What is the current KRCS organizational structure?
(b) What is the relevance of the organizational structure to disaster response in Kisumu?
5. What is the role of the stakeholders in the KRCS Kisumu Branch disaster response programmes?

1.4 Goal and objectives of the Study

The goal of this study is: To investigate the effects of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme on service delivery in Kisumu Branch.

The Specific objectives of the study are:

1. To assess the KRCS Kisumu Branch response to disasters,
2. To assess the level of decentralization of the KRCS,
3. To assess the capacity of the KRCS Kisumu Branch in disaster response,
4. To examine the current KRCS organizational structure and its relation to disaster response in Kisumu.
5. To examine stakeholders involvement in disaster response in KRCS Kisumu Branch

1.5 Justification of the study

This study can be justified through the following:-

- a) The increasing frequency and complexity of disasters exacerbates livelihood vulnerability hence there is need for greater investment on disaster response programmes and promotion of decentralization so as to reduce disaster impact on the victims of disasters,
- b) Decentralization has greatly been viewed as a solution to the challenges of centralized systems which are fraught with inefficiency and inflexibility. It enhances economic

growth, cuts red tape procedures and improves efficiency of service delivery. Decentralization further allows effective coordination of various government agencies, promotes citizen participation in decision making and allows local leaders to apply scarce resources more effectively,

- c) Despite all these benefits, some studies indicate that decentralization is fraught with a lot of obstacles and challenges. Sharma, (2005) further notes that the success of decentralization programmes depends on how they are designed and implemented. An investigation of the effects of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme on service delivery in Kisumu would give added knowledge on this subject,
- d) The choice of KRCS as the focus of this study was based on the fact that KRCS is recognized by the government and other disaster related stakeholders as a key partner in disaster response service delivery. It is well respected within the country as one of the key organizations that have a well established grass root structure that enables quicker response to disasters at community level,
- e) The choice of Kisumu Branch as the study site is based on the understanding that Kisumu Branch has been in existence much longer than other KRCS branches. It has also had a decentralized structure much longer than other KRCS branches. During the period 1999-20001, Kisumu Branch was one of the three KRCS branches that were targeted for the piloting of the decentralization concept. From 2002 to 2004, Kisumu Branch became a strategic branch for KRCS hosting the regional relief stock for branches in western Kenya. The branch is frequently ravaged by natural and manmade catastrophes such as floods, drought, HIV/AIDS and other crises. The findings will therefore provide insights to Kenya Red Cross Society on how to design and implement disaster response programmes. The research results could be replicated to other areas with similar challenges to disaster response in Kenya.

1.6 Scope and limitations of the study

This study focused on the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu. Findings of this study can be compared to other KRCS branches within similar geographical settings but within a similar decentralized structure in Kenya.

The results can also be compared to similar organizations that have been decentralized and have a more similar management structure like KRCS. Thus they must have a governing board in addition to the management.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a detailed review of previous works done on the subject of decentralization and disaster response. The aim is to be able to identify gaps that this research work will attempt to fill. The literature review will also provide the necessary theoretical background upon which the findings of this study could be compared with.

2.1 Decentralization defined

Decentralization concept is quite broad. It encompasses the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, resource generation and allocation away from the central organization and its agencies to the periphery. Chitere and Ileri (2004) have quoted Rondinelli and Nelli's (1986) definition of decentralization as "the transfer or delegation of legal or political authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the central government and its agencies to subordinate units of government, public corporations, area-wide or regional development authorities, functional authorities, local government or non-governmental organizations". The main goal of decentralization is to accelerate development and its benefits to the people. To attain the objective, governments and private agencies have attempted to decentralize its planning and administration to local leadership levels. Robert S. McNamara, former World Bank President reaffirmed this in 1976 when he observed that "if governments are serious about distributing the benefits of development more equitably, the experience shows that there are greater chances of success if institutions provide for popular participation and decentralization of authority".

As mentioned earlier, during the early 1950s up to 1960s control over development in most developing countries was centralized in national government ministries and agencies. Central planning by governments was aimed at providing rational and coherent policies by using scarce resources effectively to promote rapid growth. Central planning was also seen as a necessary strategy to guide and control economy and unify nations (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). However, by 1960s to early 1970s it was widely recognized that central planning had not achieved the economic goals: Poverty in developing countries increased rapidly; the gap between the rich and the poor escalated and the standard of living declined. The concept of decentralizing the

economies started to emerge as a strategy to accelerate equitable development in third world countries.

According to the World Bank, failure by central planning by governments to promote development and end poverty was highest in rural development programmes (Ayres, 1997). The reasons for the poor performance were mainly because many of the rural development programmes were initiated, designed and executed by central government representatives with little or no input from the communities. Ayres, (1997) further observes that central government failed to work well because the central government representatives are far too removed from communities to know their local needs and there is little ownership of projects by local people hence not sustainable. However, from the mid 1980s government's interest in decentralization has rapidly increased resulting to improved efficiency, effectiveness and equity of government programmes (Ayres, 1997). The examples below illustrate the centralized and decentralized systems.

In Kenya, Chitere (2005) observes that the government was highly centralized during the colonial period but attained its independence under a devolved constitution with two centers of power: federal and regional levels. In the regions were the regional assemblies with an elected governor as the chief executive. The legislature was bi-cameral consisting of the national parliament and senate. However, the adoption of the republic constitution in 1965 curtailed the decentralization process. The regional governments had replaced the colonial provincial administration.

Bwana (2002:55-56) observes that Uganda has a partially centralized and decentralized public administration system. The system of central government is based on parliament as the national legislative body and different government ministries as the administrative units. The system of decentralized government is through the local government where the district councils and departments are the administrative units (<http://www.cwm-uganda.org/uganda/administration.htm>). Below the central government, there are lower level administrative units. The Resistance councils and committees were renamed local councils by the 1995 constitution. They are organized through the ministry of local government from the village up to the district level. They are important for resource mobilization, security, defense and national unity.

India during its colonial period and up to independence heavily relied on central government with strong emphasis of administration of local areas by centrally recruited and trained personnel (Friedman, 1983). Local administration was centered on the district as a unit and a district officer as the administrator. Gradually modifications and additions were introduced to encourage decentralization and participation through councils. Friedman (1983) observes that the local government system consists of elected village *panchayats* with directly elected *panchayat samiti* at the block level and an indirectly chosen *zilla parishad* at the district level. These councils were expected to perform decentralized functions including agriculture, animal husbandry, rural infrastructure and social services. However, the *panchayati raj* system has failed to carry out many of their decentralized functions. Despite efforts to review the system, conflict between treating local institutions as extensions of the center and referring them as autonomous has impeded the progress.

A number of lessons can be drawn from the outlined Kenya, Uganda and India experiences. Decentralization has been adopted in different forms and levels in different countries. For instance, Kenya had fully adopted decentralization at independence while India had a central government which later was decentralized. Uganda's form of partial decentralization that is, lies between centralized and decentralized government has only one resident District commissioner. Decentralization has different impacts upon adoption. For example, in India it has been cited to slow development and has been implicated in causing conflict. Thirdly, in the three countries the role of decentralization in enhancement of emergency services has not featured. Thus it is important to study decentralization of disaster response programmes and its effectiveness in Kenya Red Cross Society.

Decentralization of responsibility for management, planning and resource allocation for effective disaster response and management is critical to reduce the effects of disaster and has not been well documented in the Kenya Red Cross Society. There is need to investigate the effectiveness of decentralization on disaster response programmes in KRCS to generate insights how to enhance and strengthen response efforts to reduce disaster losses.

India during its colonial period and up to independence heavily relied on central government with strong emphasis of administration of local areas by centrally recruited and trained personnel (Friedman, 1983). Local administration was centered on the district as a unit and a district officer as the administrator. Gradually modifications and additions were introduced to encourage decentralization and participation through councils. Friedman (1983) observes that the local government system consists of elected village *panchayats* with directly elected *panchayat samiti* at the block level and an indirectly chosen *zilla parishad* at the district level. These councils were expected to perform decentralized functions including agriculture, animal husbandry, rural infrastructure and social services. However, the *panchayati raj* system has failed to carry out many of their decentralized functions. Despite efforts to review the system, conflict between treating local institutions as extensions of the center and referring them as autonomous has impeded the progress.

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2.2 Forms of decentralization

There are about four different types or forms of decentralization as identified by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) and Owino et al (2000). These are devolution, delegation, privatization and deconcentration. They further argue that the different forms of decentralization identified above are not mutually exclusive and that any given model has characteristics of different types superimposed upon one another.

2.2.1 Devolution

Devolution is form of decentralization that seeks to create or strengthen independent levels or units through devolution of functions and authority (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). Fundamental characteristics of devolution include; local units of government are autonomous, independent and are clearly perceived as separate levels of government over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control, the local governments have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries within which they exercise authority and perform public functions and that local governments have corporate status and the power to secure resources and perform their functions, Rondinelli and Cheema (1983); Mills et al (1990). However, most central governments in developing countries often ensure devolved functions to organizations act in consistent with national development policies in discharging their functions. This may affect the effectiveness of decentralized functions.

2.2.2 Delegation

Delegation on the other hand implies the transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities or a variety of activities within specific spatial boundaries to an organization that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without direct supervision by a higher administrative unit. Examples of delegation include delegation of functions from central governments to organizations like public corporations, regional planning and area development authorities, multipurpose and single purpose functional authorities and special project implementation units.

2.2.3 Privatization

Privatization is another form of decentralization where functions may be transferred from the central government to voluntary, private, or non-government institutions (Owino, et al 2000). Delegation of such functions to the public corporations and other institutions has distinct advantages over central government administration as they operate independently from bureaucratic red tape and civil service requirements. In addition, the corporate image and better terms of service within the authorities attract highly qualified and motivated personnel resulting to improved performance. There is need to delegate functions to such organizations to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of services offered.

2.2.4 Deconcentration

Deconcentration is another form of decentralization that involves the transfer of functions within the central government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from central ministries to field officers, the creation of field agencies or the shifting of responsibility to local administrative units that are part of the central government structure, Chitere and Ileri (2004). Some fundamental characteristics of devolution include: a) the need for authority to be shared between the headquarters (centre) and the field administration or units (Maddick, 1963) quoted by Chitere and Ileri (2004). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) refer to this as functional de-concentration or field administration. b) A hierarchy of offices that is conceived in terms of specialized staff at the center (headquarters) of a public service agency and its field units which are less hierarchical such that field staff within them readily reach and work with members of communities and this is referred to as prefectoral deconcentration or local administration by Rondinelli and Cheema, (1983). They further identify integrated local administration where the field staff of central ministries work within a local jurisdiction under the supervision or direction of a chief executive of that jurisdiction who is appointed by and responsible to the central government and unintergrated local administration where field staff of central ministries and administrative staff of local jurisdictions operate independently of each other.

Decentralization in whatever form is based on the understanding that it can improve the efficiency of services by promoting grassroots participation in local development activities, create more effective and efficient administration of local and rural programs and lead expanded

administration outside the capitals (AMREF, 2001). It is therefore seen as a universal remedy for the problems of centralized systems of government and management characterized by slowness, inflexibility and stifling of local initiatives. Within the KRCS disaster response programme, decentralization is expected to assist in the transfer of authority and responsibility to plan, manage, generate and allocate resources from the headquarters down to the branches where the actual provision of service takes place. The policy is therefore expected to strengthen and empower the branches, facilities and the communities in order for them to develop, manage and build the required capacities in modern disaster relief or response planning and management. Consequently it is envisaged that decentralization of the KRCS will promote efficiency and effectiveness in disaster relief service delivery because of its perceived improved organization and decision making process. The policy further meets the needs of the vulnerable and the poor through increased local level participation in decision making on their local disaster response service needs in a more direct and immediate way thus making it a much more efficient way of meeting local needs Chitere and Ileri (2004); Owino et al (2002). In this respect, decentralization can cut red tape and as a result make the KRCS more flexible, accountable and responsive. In the end it would take resources and decision-making closer to the people, improve the link between supply and demand of goods and activate mobilization of resources on the local level. The decentralization of KRCS aims at empowering the lower level tiers in programme planning and management and by implication, promoting coverage and access to quality programme services particularly to women and children.

2.3 Factors affecting the implementation of decentralization policies

Although decentralization policies are formulated with a view to enhancing effective service delivery outcomes, their design and implementation is often determined and constrained by various factors including political, social, behavioral, economic and organizational characteristics. These factors influence the degree to which policies are achieved as they were designed and the degree to which they achieve their intended goals (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). An organization's political structure and the process through which its policies are formulated influence the pace and direction of its decentralization programme. The extent to which organizations receive sufficient financial, administrative and technical support determines the outcome and effects of decentralization programs. The degree to which implementing agencies have control over funds, the adequacy of budgetary allocations to decentralized functions, the

timely availability of those resources to the implementing agencies and the adequacy or revenue-raising and expenditure authority at the local level affect policy implementation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). Further the characteristics of local power structures, social and cultural characteristics of groups involved in policy making and administration and the degree to which beneficiaries are organized also play a role in policy implementation, as does the adequacy of the physical infrastructure for distributing the benefits (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983).

However experiences from the implementation of these policies show that there are a variety of factors including financial, personnel and infrastructure that determine the extent of implementation of such policies. Some of these factors are explained below.

2.3.1 Political constraints

Political commitment and support is a critical element in effective decentralization of programmes. In sub Saharan African political commitment to decentralization appears to be weak. In Tanzania, decentralization through Ujamaa had full political support from President Julius K. Nyerere but had little if any support from the other politicians, bureaucrats and professionals (Rondinelli, 1983). In Kenya, decentralization was mainly advocated by expatriates. This led Moris (in Rondinelli 1983) to conclude that 'Nairobi can nearly generate its own solutions to Kenya's internal problems without reference to the community'. This led to the increase in power of district and provincial governors with decentralization in Kenya. In Asia, Sri Lanka, success of decentralization was heavily affected by expenditure which depended on the political backing of the higher authorities and posting of senior administrators in the districts. Therefore building a sustained political support is prerequisite to making decentralization politically acceptable and take root. Weak political support poses an enormous challenge to decentralization especially in developing countries. There is need to have the support of national political leaders, local officials, and elites and they must receive administrative and technical support from the headquarters. In most developing countries local units and governments lack both the resources and the authority to raise sufficient revenues to carry out the tasks transferred from the center.

Closely linked to political challenges are the bureaucratic constraints. Central government bureaucrats resist transfer of government responsibilities to implementing decentralized administrative units. In a study in both Kenya and Tanzania revealed that bureaucrats maintained

total control over regional, provincial and district development planning. In Kenya the central ministries amassed resources to protect their influence over rural development planning.

2.3.2 Inadequate physical infrastructure, transport and communication linkages

Adequate physical infrastructure is an essential requirement for effective decentralization. Inadequate physical infrastructure, transportation facilities, communication networks and roads in the countryside could limit interaction between branches, regions and the headquarters including their ability to mobilize resources, supervise field personnel distribute services and disseminate information in Kenya (Chitere, 1983). In addition, the limit interaction between local officials, central officials and the community, poor road network, poorly maintained telephone network and lack of telex communication equipment hampered communication between the headquarters, provincial and district during decentralization in Tanzania through Ujamaa. Inadequate physical infrastructure and transport combined with administrative constraints severely impede local administrative activities and create physical obstacles to widespread participation in local decision making. In disaster situations, communication becomes more critical to enhance rapid emergency response to minimize disaster impacts. The study will review the status of infrastructure such as telephone, road network and other infrastructural facilities to establish their role in effective decentralization of disaster response programmes.

2.3.3 Inter-organizational relationships

Successful policy implementation requires the interaction and coordination of a large number of complementary actions by local, regional, and national agencies. According to Cheema (1983), the effectiveness of inter-organizational relationships and linkages in carrying out decentralization policies apparently depends on:

- (a) the clarity and consistency of policy objectives and the degree to which they give implementing agencies clear direction to pursue activities that will lead to their achievement;
- (b) appropriate allocation of functions among agencies based on their capacities and resources;
- (c) the degree to which planning and implementing procedures are standardized thereby minimize conflicting interpretations that make programs difficult to coordinate
- (d) the quality of inter organizational communication that enhances organizations involved in policy implementation to understand their roles
- (e) Effectiveness of linkages among decentralized units that allow coordination of activities.

2.3.4 Shortages of skilled personnel

According to Rondinelli (1983) in Rondinelli and Cheema decentralization programs in East Africa have been constrained by the scarcity skilled professionals. The shortages of trained manpower at local levels to perform function are common in East Africa. In Tanzania, decentralization resulted to dispersal of skilled personnel from headquarters to the provinces, districts and villages (Rondinelli, 1983). This weakened the administrative capacity of central ministries. Further the technical staff assigned to the Ujamaa villages proved ill equipped, inexperienced and lacked technical training leading to provision of poor quality services. In Kenya decentralization in the 1970s to 1980s left majority of the professionals and managers in Nairobi (USAID, 1980). Within Kenya local posts have in the past been seen as "hardship duty" or as temporal duty stations while awaiting promotion opportunities from the national capital (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). In both Kenya and Tanzania, top level bureaucrats appeared to negatively influence the decentralization process. There is rampant unwillingness by the trained officials to serve in local posts thereby weakening the ability of the local posts to effectively participate in development planning and administration. Ensuring all levels of decentralization-provincial, district and community level have adequate skilled manpower could drive the devolution agenda effectively. Training institutions should be supported to produce the personnel of desired competencies and number to meet the demand for trained manpower.

2.3.5 Financial constraints and weak revenue raising capacity at local levels

Financial constraints impede decentralization policies and programmes in most developing countries. Financial challenges in sub Saharan Africa such as balance of payment constrains, high rates of inflation, rising cost of fuel and rapid increase in recurrent expenditure have aggravated decentralization policies. In Tanzania, decentralization through ujamaa villages increased significantly the recurrent expenditures beyond the government's ability to finance (World Bank, 1985). The shortage of funds may force the country to borrow to finance the decentralization programme. Therefore there is need to match planned decentralization programme with available resources. Decentralization in Southern Sudan also faced serious challenges due to lack of funds. This resulted to government's budget deficit between 1970 and 1977. This deficit rose from 3% to over 10% of gross domestic product. Further study of decentralization in Southern Darfur province in 1976 revealed that the financial resources transferred to the province through the budget were far below the amounts needed to implement functions transferred from the central

government. The shortage of funds to operate decentralized administrative functions casts serious doubts on rationale of devolution. This clearly shows that there is need to match transferred administrative functions and budgetary support from the central government. Otherwise there is no need to decentralize services which does not have financial support. There is need to transfer both planning and administrative authority to the local levels as well as sufficient financial resources or the required legal powers to collect and allocate revenues. Financial resources transferred to the local levels need to be in line with the budgets to provide effective service delivery outcomes (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).

2.3.6 Characteristics of implementing agencies

The technical, managerial and political skills of the agency's staff, its capacity to coordinate, control and integrate the decisions of its subunits and the strength of its political support from national political leaders, administrators in other organizations and clientele groups. The nature and quality of internal communications, the agencies relations with its clients and supporters, and the effectiveness of its linkages with private or voluntary organizations are also important, as are the quality of leadership within the agency, the acceptance of and commitment to policy objectives among its staff, and often, the location of the agency within the bureaucratic hierarchy (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).

2.4 Disaster management concept

A disaster is an extreme event that disrupts the functioning of a society causing widespread human, material or organizational losses that exceed the ability of the affected society to cope with the effects by using its own resources (Maskrey, 1989). On the other hand, a hazard refers to a potential occurrence, in a specific time period and geographic area, of a phenomenon that may adversely affect human life, property or activity to the extent of causing a disaster (Maskrey, 1989). Therefore events such as earthquakes, floods, cyclones, and drought are by themselves, are not considered a disaster. Rather they become disasters when they adversely and seriously affect human life, livelihoods and property. Disaster management involves four main conceptual phases namely: disaster response, mitigation, recovery and /or rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. Disaster preparedness encompasses activities such as disaster early warning systems, stock piling of relief supplies, disaster risk reduction strategies, information management and trainings on emergency management and disaster preparedness planning. According to the International

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), disaster response include establishment of evacuation procedures, search and rescue, needs assessment and acquisition and distribution of emergency relief supplies (IFRC, 2002). Therefore disaster response is a specific emergency intervention measure to disaster victims to reduce suffering and protect livelihoods. The activities involved during disaster response include psychological counseling and rehabilitation of disaster victims.

Sub Saharan Africa suffers from various natural and manmade disasters that call for increased efficient disaster management. The Eastern Africa countries including Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda face enormous humanitarian challenges such as a turbulent past, armed conflict, political instability, drought, floods, famine and climatic shocks (IFRC, 2005). This has been aggravated by high population and poverty levels in the region (Table 1). The year 2006 saw internationally brokered peace deals signed between belligerents in Burundi and Uganda. The year 2004 up to 2006 saw Kenya suffer the worst recurring droughts and floods. The early part of 2008 also saw Kenya sign a peace deal between President Kibaki and Raila Odinga mediated by Koffi Anan that restored stability after more than two months of political unrest. The civil unrest in Kenya was triggered by a disputed presidential election that resulted to a daunting humanitarian crisis where over 1000 people were killed; over half a million people displaced and property worth Ksh 30 billion destroyed (Daily Nation, 2008). Tanzania hosts over a half million refugees, the largest in the region, mainly from Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (IFRC, 2005). There has been relative peace in the region in the last few months. However, despite the relative calm, there is need to engage the governments in the region and humanitarian actors for disaster preparedness and response. This will be through capacity building the governments, humanitarian organizations and the community to prepare for crises and respond appropriately. Decentralization of resources to the grassroots level or to the centre of the disasters needs to be pursued aggressively. This will promote efficient emergency management and avert losses upon occurrence of disasters.

Table 1: Profile of Eastern Africa countries

Country	Population (million)	Infant mortality	Maternal mortality	Life expectancy	HIV preference
Burundi	8	114 ³	1,000	44	6
Kenya	37	79	410	48	16
Rwanda	8.6	118	1,100	44	5.1
Tanzania	39	76	580	46	12
Uganda	30	79	510	49	4.1

2.5 Disaster response strategies

Disaster response therefore seeks to reduce the effects or losses of a disaster impact through planning and developing procedures that strengthen effective emergency response (IFRC, 2000). According to IFRC (2000) and Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (1988) disaster response include establishment of evacuation procedures, search and rescue, needs assessment and acquisition and distribution of emergency relief supplies. Therefore disaster response has various components including search and rescue, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, logistics and transport, health, shelter, reunification of families and protection which are described below.

2.5.1 Search and rescue

Major emergencies and disasters often results in massive displacement of affected population, deaths and injuries. Disaster response would therefore include search and rescue of affected populations, disposal of the dead bodies and provision of first aid supplies, evacuation and hospitalization. An effective and efficient disaster response programme clearly outlines the actors to provide the search and rescue services within a specified time period to mitigate the consequences of the disaster. This study will also assess the search and rescue materials stocked by KRCS Kisumu Branch in order to determine its effectiveness in search and rescue efforts.

2.5.2 Water and sanitation

In most disaster situations, there is lack of water which often aggravates health problems. Supply of clean water is critical and a priority in emergencies as people can live without food longer than without water. On the other hand, sanitation includes provisions for disposal of human excreta, waste water and garbage, insect and rodent control, safe food handling and site drainage. Effective disaster response strategies should plan for proper provisions of water and sanitation.

2.5.3 Food

Most disasters disrupt livelihoods and means of procuring food. Therefore food provision is aimed at meeting all or part of the nutritional needs of the disaster victims. Emergency response should plan for how food should be procured which depends on food supply needs assessment, consideration of traditional foods used in the community and calorific requirements of the affected population with due consideration of vulnerable groups such as children and lactating mothers.

2.5.4 Health and nutrition

Most disasters exacerbate the health condition of the affected population. Therefore planning for health and medical care of the affected population is critical. Emergency health plan should consider the local health structure, supplementary feeding requirements, vaccinations and assessment of the medical capacity available in the area when planning for disaster response.

2.5.5 Shelter

Most disasters destroy housing therefore urgent shelter provision to affected population is critical and mandatory. An effective shelter emergency plan should consider provision of tents, tarpaulins and sheltering the homeless people in public buildings such as schools, churches and other institutions. When establishing temporary housing there is need to determine the shelter needs of the affected population, shelter site, availability of construction materials and shelter supplies.

2.5.6 Reunification of families

Most disasters disrupt social and family setups. Therefore, searching missing people and reuniting lost family members is an integral component of most disaster response operations. This may be because the family is a basic social unit in most societies and plays a key role in solving family problems. An effective reunification strategy should include methods for reuniting the families and the stage of response when the search operations are started.

2.5.7 Logistics and transport

Emergency response operations require transport of humanitarian aid, personnel and equipment to the disaster scene. Logistics and transport includes assessing aid delivery routes to disaster areas and the affected population, identifying storage sites, specifying transportation modes, identifying fuel, spare parts and personnel responsible for logistics in the emergency. Therefore logistics and transport are crucial to a successful disaster response strategy. Other essential items include blankets, utensils, firewood, matches, and soap and water containers. Provision of security and psychological counseling is also critical in most emergency response operations (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 1988). Deliberate efforts will be made to examine the disaster response components and strategies and thus the influence of the response efforts in this project.

2.5.8 Psychological counseling

Psychological counseling is a key element of disaster response. This involves debriefing disaster victims so as to bear with the consequences of disaster effects.

2.6 Factors affecting effective response to disasters

The following factors influence disaster response; decision making, accountability, competition and poor coordination. They are discussed briefly below.

2.6.1 Decision making and authority

Distances, communication and transportation difficulties including cultural obstacles often inhibit effective humanitarian assistance in developing countries (Cuny, 1983). In order to be effective in these environment choices must be made at the field level and people making these choices need a supportive not restrictive framework of rules, procedures and policies to assist. Unfortunately in most disaster oriented organizations decision making is left for headquarters and attempts are made to improve communication links between the headquarters and the field through the establishment of direct telex links and installation of telephone and radio channels. Stockpiling of the relief supplies and maintaining computer lists of experts on standby are tried methods yet the results still fall short of the desired response (Cuny, 1983). Basically revising procedures and improving technology at headquarters does not improve field response. Most organizations working in disasters are seeking alternative approaches. Decentralization-devolution is the most effective structure since most of the decisions are made on the spot (Cuny, 1983). The headquarters' role is changed from that of decision making to that of policy making and coordination. The organization is also structured such that the senior personnel, with authority to act, within the policy framework and according to the rules of the organization are placed in offices near the areas where response is required. This is the background against which decision making should be examined. While procedures can be changed to simplify and speed emergency response within headquarters overall performance in the field will not be significantly altered (Cheema, 1983).

2.6.2 Accountability

Accountability is defined as the establishment of both formal and informal ways in which beneficiaries can influence the content and direction of the program, with reasonable expectations that those in authority will comply with their decisions (Cuny, 1983). Accountability weaknesses are brought about by certain challenges. On one level, many agencies have unsophisticated view of relief operations, and many feel that because they are trying to do good work, the impact cannot be negative. In most cases, this is the most restricting factor: failure of the agencies to look beyond what appears to be self-evident and to explore in-depth the impact of their programmes. Other reasons are more profound and relate to the very nature of the relief system. With decisions making often far removed from the scene of events, it becomes difficult to attach responsibility for actions in the field. Locally, as well as internationally, there are no recognized standards against which to measure performance of relief agencies and their programs, and governments are usually reluctant to enforce uniform policies or standards for fear of alienating the relief agencies and losing the aid they are providing. Where church-related organization is involved, governments anxious to keep religion and politics apart are not likely to criticize or hold liable errant relief programs. Aids organization must redefine their role in disasters and come to understand that they are participants in a process rather than the manager of that process (Ressler, 1978). The agencies must be committed to an understanding of the long-range effects of aid, and their programs must have built-in flexibility and be based on the time frames, technology and materials appropriate to the victims. Implementation of disaster response programs has been pointed out that while designed to help the victim, tend in fact to reflect the needs of the donors. This is the result of attempts by agencies to please their donors, as well as the lack of accountability of agencies and donors to the victims (Cuny, 1983). Two examples can illustrate lack of accountability. In the first, a relief agency establishes a food programme in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Due to language difficulties and lack of familiarity with the local community, the staff fails to ascertain what resources are available there. The relief effort inadvertently drives up the prices in the local markets, under cuts local shopkeepers by distributing massive amounts of free commodities and reduces the ability of local farmers to market the crops they have salvaged. While many victims have received food aid, many others have been affected adversely.

Accountability requires that decision-making mechanisms be restructured and decentralized to the local level. The programs must be built upon extensive participation by disaster victims at all

levels of the project planning and execution. The concept of accountability is rooted in the philosophical assumption that people have the right to determine their own lives, cultures, tradition, values and lifestyles. Three indicators of accountability are: beneficiaries can articulate their demands before the project activities begin; beneficiaries can on regular basis take the initiative and make their desires known to the managers of the project; beneficiaries participate extensively in control and management of the project.

Ian Davis (1975) has made clear the relation between accountability and relief orientation: "Practice has shown that the more an organization is strictly relief-oriented, the less accountable it becomes. An agency that is looking simply to giving away material goods already collected and delivered is not likely to be overly concerned with developing a program with full and meaningful participation. Short-term relief agencies can enter a community, dump the aid and withdraw within a matter of weeks, never taking the time to assess the quality of its aid nor impact. There is need to develop mechanisms to hold interveners accountable not only to donors but also to the disaster victims to enhance positive impact of disaster programs.

2.6.3 Overloading local organizations

The organizations in the field that carry out actual relief activities are subjected to constant demands by donors and parent organizations. Development groups in particular are often called upon to expand their scope of activities into many areas outside their normal range of work. The result of trying to meet all the demands placed on them, by both donors and victims themselves, is "overloading" (Ressler, 1978). Two forms of overloading are obvious. First, the organization can be asked to take on too many projects with too much diversity, overtaxing its staff and diluting its effectiveness. Second, the organization may expand after receiving funds far beyond its capacity to control or dispense widely. Funding of local organization must be handled very carefully. Many an effective development group has been destroyed because the amount of funds it received led to an overextension of its programs staff, or capabilities and the resulting poorly executed program precipitated a chain of events that led to the organizations downfalls. In disaster situations, overloading is a particular problem for the more effective development groups operating in a country. Not only do their parent organizations wish to channel funds received as a result of the disaster through them ,but often other organizations (governmental, inter-governmental, and even

other agencies) wish to capitalize on the experience and expertise of an agency by providing funding or asking it to expand its activities into areas of concern to the other interveners.

2.6.4 Competition

At all levels of relief system, competition is an inherent feature and a common practice. In the upper levels of the systems, agencies find themselves competing for funds, public awareness, and recognition from the same sources. At the middle and lower levels, competition for success is added to the list. Competition for recognition and influence can often be found in some donor governments. For organizations in the field, competition for success and recognition of their achievements can become an all-consuming motivation. In some agencies, success is measured by the number of victims reached, the number of houses constructed, the number of tents distributed, or the tonnages involved. Many agencies are "rated" in the public eye by the amount of materials they can deliver in the shortest period of time. There are mechanisms within the relief system that inadvertently encourage this attitude and competition. Examples are the donor lists maintained by various organizations.

The result of this competition is that attention is diverted away from real needs so that some agencies can get an edge over the others. In a recent study (Cuny and Colleagues, 1977) on the provision of emergency shelter and post-disaster housing, the authors found that "interveners" consistently set higher priority on the number of housing units produced, rather than the contribution made to the building process. "The number of houses is seen as the end product or result of the program. Success is measured in terms of the donor and not of the victims. As a result of the competition and the emphasis on numbers, the only contribution to the society is an artifact and few, if any contribution is made to the social, economic, and construction aspects of building within the community.

Beyond a distortion of objectives, there are other negative consequences. Competition normally results in inequitable distribution of relief materials. Nor do all victims receive equal attention. Each program wants to develop its own package and, even within the same communities, the level and extent of service offered by competing relief agencies can vary substantially. A third result of competition is that it discourages cooperation between agencies in post-disaster situations, where the lack of technical information and expertise is often very marked. Lack of cooperation can

mean that disaster victims are denied full access to major resources. Finally competition always results in redundancy and waste. On the whole, however, competition is more destructive than constructive, and should be restricted and discouraged. The governments of the affected countries have ultimate response for controlling the competition so that victims receive equal treatment by all intervenes. The methods that can be used are the development of uniform relief and reconstruction policies, the setting of basic standards for relief and the development of model program approaches for providing aid. The time to adopt these methods however is long before a disaster strikes. Trying to sort through the competing and conflicting values and goals of the relief agencies during the actual contact of post disaster operations is virtually impossible.

2.6.5 Lack of coordination

Coordination efforts normally go through several stages. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, there is high interest in coordination among relief agencies, and there are usually several attempts to establish effective cooperation. After about six weeks this interest falls off. This is because most agencies have already established their programs and are more interested in the field work. Coordination then becomes a more local or regional activity, with the sharing of information and resources by agencies working in nearby communities. During this period, coordination tends to be sector-oriented; for example, agencies working in housing tend to coordinate activities among themselves. In the final stage, which occurs well in the operation, usually in the reconstruction period broader inter-agency cooperation at the executive level is established. Agencies that tend to conduct programs for several months find that coordination is helpful for dealing with the local government and vice versa. Furthermore, many agencies will branch out into other sectors, and more formal cooperating arrangements are seen as beneficial. At this point it's not unusual to see the formation of a new organization to serve as an information clearing house and to provide a forum for inter agency meeting. However, competition among agencies not only for resources but also for publicity, works against cooperation among many groups. Alan Taylor (1978) has noted that "individual programs are regularly fashioned with an eye to their publicity value, rather than according to whether they will fit in with a coordinated, effective and efficient response by all agencies."

To improve coordination a certain amount of planning must be done prior to the onset of a disaster. Preparedness plans that will promote cooperation should be drawn up and agencies

operating in the country should be designated to serve as coordinator should the need arise. However, the most effective cooperation in the world is no substitute for pre-disaster planning. The time to decide what to do is when there is time to consider all the options thoughtfully, not amidst the confusion and pressure of the emergency.

2.7 Decentralization and disaster management

Decentralization of disaster management programmes has not been given adequate research despite the enormous benefits that emanate from the process. Decentralization has the capacity to reduce disaster vulnerability due to socio-political instability, climatic shocks, diseases, conflict and even natural disasters which afflict millions of people in the world (UNDP, 2006). For instance in Sri Lanka decentralization proved to be an essential element following the disastrous effects of the December 26, 2004 Tsunami. The country, with a tendency to centralize most of government activities, proved a serious setback for effective and efficient relief activities following the Tsunami (Rupashighe, 2005; Brigdon 2004). Rigid and centralized government structures impaired smooth emergency distribution and maintenance of law and order.

South Africa has a comprehensive disaster management is in place operating through the 2002 disaster management Act. The Act calls for a unified and coordinated framework for disaster management at National, provincial, Municipals, non-governmental organizations, the private and community level. The Act calls for community participation and capacity building (Republic of South Africa, 2002). The Acts also places emphasis on mitigation as a core principle of disaster management and as key criteria for sourcing disaster funds. Through the Act, disaster management committees are established up to the village level and devolution of resources has been made possible. This legal and institutional framework has enhanced effective emergency response. The decentralized authority to lower tier levels promotes faster resource mobilization and distribution upon impact of disaster. As the committees at lower tier levels are made up of elected representatives, they make high impact decisions that lead to agenda setting, resource allocation, training, staffing and ultimate decisions on effective implementation of disaster programmes.

In the United States of America (USA), the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA is the government agency mandated with the coordination of emergency relief (FEMA, 2002). Like in South Africa it has a devolved system but provides more broad-based emergency relief which

includes general relief provisions and insurance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is given full cabinet status so that the director can have full access to the President when necessary for swift action.

Kenya has formulated a draft policy on national disaster management in 2006. The policy proposes establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NADIMA) under the Ministry of Special Programmes in the Office of the President to be the lead agency in disaster management. The policy aims to address management of slow and quick onset disasters including floods, drought, landslides and lightening as well as human induced disasters (G.O.K, 2006). The main components of the National disaster management policy include: overview of disasters in Kenya; goal and objectives of the policy; policy guidelines; institutional and legal framework; resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation. The draft identifies key disaster management stakeholders and their role in disaster programme management. The stakeholder institutions include sectoral ministries, UN and international organizations, local Authorities, private sector, provincial committees, district committees and the community (G.O.K, 2006). The policy identifies Kenya Red Cross Society as a key voluntary emergency management stakeholder and proposes the government to work closely with the Society. However, the draft has not yet been enacted into an Act of parliament. Consequently, the proposed NADIMA is not yet operational.

A lot of lessons can be learnt from the Kenya, South Africa and Sri Lanka experiences. Lack of decentralized, institutional and legal framework made it difficult to coordinate and unify disaster management for smooth and efficient delivery of emergency services during the 2004 Sri Lanka Tsunami crisis. South Africa has a comprehensive disaster management policy which has enhanced its emergency management. Legal, institutional and administrative framework in Kenya is lacking. Thus, decentralization of management and resources in disaster management should be a top priority for Kenya Red Cross Society as well as the envisaged national disaster management policy draft. Efforts should be pursued aggressively to review and enact the national disaster policy to enhance efficiency in emergency management. Already the KRCS boasts of some remarkable achievements through the professionalism of the staff and volunteers as witnessed during the recent management of disasters such as floods and drought in 2006 and post election violence in 2008. Therefore, to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in disaster response

there is needed to move the emergency services of the Society closer to the disaster prone areas through decentralization which is the focus of this study. This effort will also promote provision of adequate humanitarian relief support in line with the provisions of humanitarian charter on minimum standards (SPHERE, 2004).

2.8 Theoretical framework

A *theory* is a conceptual scheme designed to explain observed regularities between two or more variables. It can be simply defined as a proposed relationship between two or more *concepts*. By selecting a particular theoretical framework within which the study will be undertaken, the theory will create a link between empirical findings and the general sociological thinking thereby enhancing the meaningfulness of this research. By providing this meaningfulness the theory will confirm the truthfulness of the findings.

This study will be undertaken within the structural functionalism Sociological theory.

2.8.1 Structural-functionalism theory

Structural-Functionalism is a theoretical framework based on the view of Society as a system composed of social structures and variously theorized institutions or roles that work together to generate relative stability.

The elements are characterized functionally depending on what they do and how they relate to other parts of the system. Generally in Sociology functionalist theories refer to theories that conform to the following Principle "Because societies are open systems—systems that exchange with their environments it proves useful to explain social structures on the basis of their consequences or functions for other parts of the system, especially as these parts of the system come under pressure from the environment".

A **social function** is, "the contribution made by any phenomenon to a larger system of which the phenomenon is a part." (Hoult 1969: 139). This technical usage is not the same as the popular idea of a function as an "event/occasion" or a duty, responsibility, or occupation. A distinction, first made by Robert K. Merton, is made between manifest and latent functions (Marshall 1994: 190-1) and also between functions with positive (functional or positively functional) and negative (dysfunctional) effects (Hoult 1969: 139). "Any statement explaining an institution as being

'functional or 'dysfunctional' could readily be translated with no loss of meaning into one that said it was 'rewarding' or 'punishing'." (Homans, 1962:33-4). Accordingly Merton, (1948) defined Manifest functions as those 'objective consequences contributing the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system'. 'Latent functions are neither intended nor recognized'.

Structural-functionalism draws its inspiration from the ideas of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim was concerned with the question of how societies maintain internal stability and survive over time. He sought to explain social cohesion and stability through the concept of solidarity. In more "primitive" societies it was mechanical solidarity, everyone performing similar tasks that held society together. Durkheim proposed that such societies tend to be segmentary, being composed of equivalent parts that are held together by shared values, common symbols, or systems of exchanges. In modern, complex societies members perform very different tasks, resulting in a strong interdependence between individuals. Based on the metaphor of an organism in which many parts function together to sustain the whole, Durkheim argued that modern complex societies are held together by organic solidarity (interdependent organs).

The central concern of structural-functionalism is a continuation of the Durkheimian task of explaining the apparent stability and internal cohesion of societies that are necessary to ensure their continued existence over time. Many functionalists argue that social institutions are functionally integrated to form a stable system and that a change in one institution will precipitate a change in other institutions. Societies are seen as coherent, bounded and fundamentally relational constructs that function like organisms, with their various parts (social institutions) working together to maintain and reproduce them. The various parts of society are assumed to work in an unconscious, quasi-automatic fashion towards the maintenance of the overall social *equilibrium*. All social and cultural phenomena are therefore seen as being *functional* in the sense of working together to achieve this state and are effectively deemed to have a *life* of their own. These components are then primarily analyzed in terms of the function they play. In other words, to understand a component of society, one can ask the question, "What is the function of this institution?" A *function*, in this sense, is the contribution made by a phenomenon to a larger system of which the phenomenon is a part (Hoult 1969:139).

From this theory; one can view KRCS Kisumu branch as a system composed of social structures (different sectors e.g. Finance, Water and Sanitation, Health and nutrition , Logistics) which work together to maintain stability and therefore bring about effective disaster response. If the Branch needs to respond to disasters and lacks vehicles or finances no matter how competent the branch personnel will be, the response to disasters will not be effective and will therefore lead to poor service delivery.

At the national level, the decentralized KRCS structures can also be viewed as functional and working together to enhance the effectiveness of disaster response. Each of the KRCS branches can be viewed as performing “the social function” of enhancing effectiveness of disaster response which will later lead to effectiveness response at national level. Poor performance by certain branches can be viewed as dysfunctional and can therefore slow down the overall performance of the whole organization.

2.8.2 Sequential theory of decentralization

The Sequential theory of decentralization has three main characteristics as identified by Falleti, (2004). First, it defines decentralization as a process, second, it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors and lastly it incorporates policy feedback effects.

2.8.2.1 Decentralization as a process


Falleti (2004) argued that decentralization is a set of policy reforms aimed at transferring responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government within the same government (devolution). Accordingly decentralization policies can either be administrative, fiscal or political depending on the type of authority devolved.

Administrative decentralization entails transfer of policies on administrative services such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to sub national governments. When revenues are transferred from the centre to meet the cost of the administration and delivery of social services it's funded either the sub national government or the central government.

Fiscal decentralization on the other hand refers to the set of policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub national governments. This includes creation of new sub

national taxes, delegation of tax authority that was previously national and increase of transfers from the central government. On the other hand, political decentralization refers to a set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to open new spaces for representation of sub national policies and devolve electoral capacities to sub national policies.

Table 2: Direction of impact of different types of decentralization on degree of autonomy of governors



2.8.2.2 Territorial interests of bargaining actors

The sequential theory of decentralization proposes that national and sub national executives have territorial interests. The territorial interests are defined by the level of government (for example province, municipal) and characteristics of the territorial unit. The theory proposes that national executives prefer decentralization to fiscal decentralization which in turn is preferred to political decentralization. The rationale of this ordering is that the national government seeks to divest itself of expenditure responsibilities first and foremost. On the other hand, administrative decentralization is preferred to political and fiscal decentralization. In other words, sub national authorities prefer political autonomy, money and responsibilities in that order.

2.8.2.3 Sequences of decentralization

The sequential theory of decentralization proposes that the process follows a sequence of stages. The first type of decentralization is dictated by territorial interests prevailing at the outset of process. The first round of decentralization, in turn, produces policy feedback effects that account for the order and characteristics of the reforms that follow. Political leaders will find themselves in


a better position to advance their preferences because they enjoy greater political autonomy from the national executive. Thus, in the next round of decentralization political leaders will demand fiscal decentralization and will influence the terms of such. Administrative decentralization will follow as the last type of reform.

This theory would be useful in interpreting the different structures observed as well as the intensity of the decentralization in the KRCS Kisumu Branch

2.9 Conceptual framework and study variables

The study will use the conceptual framework shown in Table 4. The following will constitute the study variables: a) Capacity of Kisumu Branch which refers to material, human and financial resources; b) organizational structure of KRCS manifested through its organizational chart, c) Level of decentralization refers to the objectives, strategies and progress of the decentralization, d) stakeholder involvement refers to the participation of community members in decision making and disaster response activities. The study will determine their status and adequacy for effective and efficient disaster response.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the study



2.10 Operational definitions

1. **Disaster response:** Refers to those activities that occur in the aftermath of a disaster to assist disaster victims and to rehabilitate or reconstruct the physical structures of the Society. Such activities include search and rescue, provision of safe and adequate water, food, shelter and other necessary non food items. The response will be different when the disaster victims are successfully assisted with required aid. These are measured in terms of time taken to reach the victims with the required supplies, and the relevance of the response materials to the disaster victims needs.

2. **Branch Capacity:** - Refers to: a) skilled personnel, b) disaster response equipments and materials, c) funds needed for disaster response and d) revenue raising ability in Kisumu Branch.
 - (a) **Skilled Personnel (Human Resources);** Trained and experienced manpower in the various field related to disaster response. They include the following fields; disaster management, health, water and sanitation, finance and fundraising, logistics and warehousing administration and any other areas necessary for effective disaster response.
 - (b) **Disaster response materials;** refers to a wide range of items needed for effective disaster response. Such items include search and rescue equipment, food and nutrition items, shelter materials, logistics, communication and warehousing facilities, safe water and related hygiene facilities.
 - (c) **Financial resources;** refers to funds allocated to various activities related to disaster response
 - (d) **Revenue raising ability,** ability to raise income at local level in Kisumu

3. **Organizational Structure:-**Formal and informal framework of policies and rules, within which KRCS arranges its lines of authority and communication and allocates rights and duties. It determines the manner and extent to which roles, power and responsibilities are delegated, controlled and coordinated and how information flows between various levels of management in KRCS. Thus between the headquarters, regions and branches. An organizational chart will illustrate the KRCS organizational structure.

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4. **Level of decentralization:**-intensity of the decentralization programme. We shall look at the objectives, strategies and decision making process in KRCS.

5. **Stakeholders Involvement:** - Refers to the participation of various government and nongovernmental organizations/ministries and community based organizations in the KRCS disaster response activities in Kisumu. Their involvement will include their financial, material and human resource contribution to KRCS during disaster response activities.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section provides a description of the procedures that were employed in conducting the study. It outlines a description of the study site, research design, data collection and how the data collected was analyzed.

3.1 Kisumu district profile

The study was conducted at the Kisumu branch of the Kenya Red Cross Society's West Kenya region. Kisumu branch is found in Kisumu District, Nyanza Province. Kisumu District is located in Nyanza Province and borders Nyando District to the East, Nandi District to the North East, Vihiga District to the North, Siaya District to the Northwest, Bondo District to the West and Rachuonyo District to the South (Kisumu District Development Plan, 2002). It covers an area of 918.5 km². It is one of the oldest districts and has recently (2006) been subdivided into two districts (Kisumu East and Kisumu West Districts). Kisumu Branch takes on the administrative boundaries of the larger Kisumu district hence this is the data to be used for this study. The government is still working on an information profile for the newly split districts hence data for the larger Kisumu district will be used in this study. Kisumu District is divided into four administrative divisions namely Winam, Maseno, Kombewa and Kadibo. However at the moment Kombewa and Maseno Divisions fall under the new Kisumu East District while Winam and Kadibo fall in the new Kisumu West District.

The topography of the district is divided into two main zones: the Kano Plains and the Midland areas of Maseno and Kombewa. There are low ridges and rivers on the East of Kisumu City which break the Kano Plains at occasional intervals. Notable features include the escarpments in the North, East and South East of Kisumu town. The Kano Plains particularly the lower plains are vulnerable to flooding by heavy rains due to the structure on the floor of the above mentioned escarpments.

Major outstanding physical features in the district are the overhanging huge granite rocks at Kisian and the legendary Kit Mikayi in Maseno Division, the Lake Victoria being the largest fresh water

lake in the world, the Kano Plains and the Lake Islands. There are three major rivers flowing into the Nyanza gulf and which are also associated with flooding namely Kibos, Awach and Magada.

The district has along shoreline along the Lake Victoria. This shoreline is 80 km long, has more than thirteen beaches all of which are fish landing bays. Mean annual rainfall varies with altitude and proximity to the highlands along the Nandi escarpment and Tinderet. Maseno has a mean annual rainfall of 1,630mm, Kisumu 1,280mm, Kibos 1,290mm and Koru 1,103mm.

The lowland areas form a trough of low rainfall, receiving a mean annual rainfall of between 1,000mm and 1,800mm. This area has two rainy seasons with the long rains occurring in August/September. During the short rains the average annual rainfall ranges between 450mm and 600mm. Their reliability is low and the rains are distributed over a long period, making the cultivation of second crops difficult.

Although there is entirely no dry month, the peak generally falls between March and May, with a secondary peak in September to November.

Table 3: Kisumu district demographic Characteristics

	Male	Female	Total
District Population by sex	248,735	255,624	504,359
Total Dist. Pop. Aged 18yrs and Below	132,078	134,572	266,650
Total Dist. Pop. Aged above 18 yrs.	116,657	121,052	237,709
Population Density (Persons/Km ²)	549		

The district covers three constituencies namely Kisumu Town East, Kisumu Town West and Kisumu Rural with a population of about of about 535,664 with a population growth rate of 2 % per year (G.O.K, 2002). The average life expectancy in the area is 49 years with the female averaging 50.7 years while average for males is 47.2. The less than five mortality rate is 110/1000 while absolute poverty is 53%. There are pockets of poverty in Kisumu City concentrated in the informal settlements such as Obunga, Nyalenda, Nyawita, Manyatta and Bandani. Agriculture is the main socio economic activity accounting for over 75% of all employment. The literacy level for males is 98% while for females is 75% (G.O.K, 2002).

3.2 Research Design

This study combined both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Quantitative data was obtained through four different semi structured questionnaires administered to KRCS personnel in Kisumu. These include a questionnaire for the board members, a different questionnaire for the staff and volunteers and a different questionnaire for the Branch Manager. Key stakeholders were also interviewed using a questionnaire. An interview guide was used to interview the KRCS Human Resource Manager, Disaster Response Manager and Regional Manager. In certain cases the researcher observed. According to Rossman and 'Rallis (2003), qualitative research seeks to describe "life worlds from the point of view of those' who participate and can be open to what is new in the material being studied and to the unknown in the apparently familiar.

3.2.1 Method of Sampling

Sampling refers to the process of selecting individual observations from a population for the purposes of making statistical inference. The volunteers' sampling frame consisted of 850 elements. A total of about 85 of the 850 volunteers within the branch were selected through Simple Random Sampling and questionnaires administered to them. First a list of the 850 branch volunteers was provided to the researcher by the Branch Coordinator; each volunteer was then assigned a number from 1 to 850. The random numbers table was then used to select individuals for the interview. In total 85 individuals were selected through the random numbers table.

All fulltime workers were included in the sample. Key informant interviews were used to obtain specialized information from specific individuals with specific mandates in disaster response and to triangulate data obtained from other sources. Key informants were selected purposively and included the KRCS Kisumu Branch Coordinator, KRCS Disaster Response Manager, Regional Manager, Human Resource Manager as well as Stakeholders from the Provincial Administration and Kisumu City council fire department, representatives of various NGOs and CBOs.

3.2.2 Unit of Analysis and Unit of Observation

The unit of analysis of this study was the extent to which decentralization has enhanced the effectiveness of disaster response at the Kisumu KRCS branch. Unit of observation were various personnel involved in disaster response at the KRCS in Kisumu.

3.2.3 Methods of Data Collection

Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was gathered through questionnaires, observation and key informant interviews while secondary data was collected from available publications including, quarterly and annual reports, newsletters, books, journals, websites etcetera. Data gathered included KRCS response to disasters in general, capacity issues, and levels of decentralization, resource allocation and or generation at local levels and volunteers involvement in disaster response programmes.

A semi structured questionnaire was the principal method of data collection, which consisted of both open ended and close ended questions. Interview guides were be used to collect further information that may have been left out in the questionnaires from the key informants.

3.3 Data Analysis

Data analysis is a process of gathering, modeling, and transforming data with the goal of highlighting useful information, suggesting conclusions, and supporting decision making.

Descriptive statistics were used to analyze quantitatively measurable data obtained particularly in summarizing and condensing raw data into forms that supplied useful information that could be used to explain similarities and differences. Information gathered was presented in table form to show the range of scores, their variability and dominance. Percentages were also used to sum up individual values.

Data collected from the key informants was used to validate and fill in any gaps that the survey may have left out. Boydan and Biklen (1982) defines qualitative data analysis as “ working data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units , synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned and deciding what you will tell others”. The qualitative data obtained encompassing narrative accounts of the decentralization process, disaster response experiences, processes and opinions was organized into emergent themes as a basis for further analysis. From the emergent themes, patterns were elaborately described and classified and the information obtained summarized.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the main findings and interpretations of the study. It is preceded by a brief profile of Kisumu district and an overview of the Kenya Red Cross Society. Study findings are discussed as per the study objectives.

4.2 Overview of the Kenya Red Cross Society Kisumu Branch

The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) is a voluntary humanitarian relief organization created through an Act of Parliament, Cap 256 of the Laws of Kenya of 21st December 1965. Previously, KRCS existed as a branch of the British Red Cross Society between 1939 and 1965. As a voluntary organization, the Society operates through a network of 59 branches and about 8 Regional offices spread throughout Kenya (KRCS Strategic Plan 2006-2007). The KRCS Kisumu Branch is one of the 59 branches of the Kenya Red Cross Society. The branch is found in the West Kenya region. Its offices are in Kisumu along the Kisumu Kakamega road next to the New Nyanja Provincial General hospital.

The KRCS Kisumu branch was established in 1971 as a branch of the KRCS. The Vision of the branch is “to be the leading humanitarian organization in Kenya, self-sustaining, delivering excellent quality service of preventing and alleviating human suffering to the most vulnerable community”. Its mission is “to build capacity and respond with vigor, compassion and empathy to those affected by disaster and at risk, in the most effective and efficient manner” (KRCS Strategic Plan 2006-2007). The work of the branch is guided by the Seven Fundamental Principles (Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality) of the entire Red Cross movement.

The branch core values are transparency and accountability, integrity, respect branch boundaries, commitment to customers of branch; uphold principles of the movement, teamwork, respect

oriented, efficiency, professionalism, good governance, environmental consciousness, respect human dignity and quality of service.

The Branch has a total of 850 active volunteers. Other volunteers are based in learning institutions and are normally available on call when there is need. According to the Kisumu branch profile 2007, the branch limits the number of volunteers per given activity due to administrative constraints. The Branch operations are overseen by a board of 11 members consisting of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer and 7 other committee members. The Branch Coordinator is in charge of the day to day activities of the Branch and he is assisted by Project Officers who implement specific project activities together with the volunteers. Membership to the Branch is open to everyone without any discrimination based on race, sex, religion, class, political opinion or nationality. The branch has a total of 3240 members in various categories ranging from life members, ordinary, youth and corporate membership.

Section 5(1) of the Kenya Red Cross Society Act Cap 256 of the Laws of Kenya of 21st December 1965, mandates Kenya Red Cross to:

- ❖ Provide relief to those affected by catastrophe or disasters.
- ❖ Carry on and assist in the work for the improvement of health, the prevention of diseases and reduction of suffering in times of peace or war.
- ❖ Provide aid to the sick, wounded and non-belligerents in times of war, to prisoners of war and civilian sufferers, and relieve the effects of war.
- ❖ To promote the Junior Red Cross Movement among the youth of all races.
- ❖ To propagate the ideals and humanitarian principles of the Red Cross, with a view to developing a feeling of solidarity and mutual understanding among all human beings and all nations.

The branch core business areas are derived from the above mandate and are broadly classified into six major departments namely: Disaster Preparedness and Response (Disaster management), Health and Social Services, Organizational Development, Supply Chain Management, Water and Sanitation, and Finance and Administration (www.kenyaredcross.org).

According to the KRCS Head of Disaster Preparedness and Response department, the disaster management department is involved in “preparing for disasters before they occur (disaster

preparedness), responding to disasters (disaster response) as well as supporting and rebuilding society (recovery and rehabilitation) after the occurrence of disasters. In line with the same Kisumu branch operates with the understanding that the help “it provides to disaster victims is of a complementary and auxiliary nature and is given in the spirit of cooperation with the public authorities within the district.

The branch disaster preparedness programme include the development of disaster early warning systems, stock piling of relief supplies, training on emergency management, resource mobilization and launching of appeals. The disaster response programme on the other side focuses on “providing rapid, effective and coordinated relief to disaster victims; such interventions include search and rescue, provision of shelter, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, psychosocial support, tracing services and food items. The branch work plans and programmes are in line with the overall national strategic plan (currently 2006-2010).

With regard to partnerships, the branch works closely with relevant government departments depending on the specific programme at hand. According to the Branch Coordinator however, close relationships have however tended to be with the provincial administration in the areas of relief distribution and coordination of disaster activities, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Water. Key partners in the NGO sector are World Vision, Merlin, Care-Kenya, Concern Worldwide and African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF). Others from the United National (UN) include United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP).

4.3 To assess the KRCS Kisumu Branch response to disasters

The first objective of this study was assessing Kisumu Branch response to disasters. Main focus here was to assess the participation of the branch in activities that occur in the aftermath of a disaster to assist disaster victims and to rehabilitate or reconstruct the physical structures of the Society. The response will be different when the disaster victims are successfully assisted with required aid. These were measured in terms of time taken to reach the victims with the required supplies, and the relevance of the response materials to the disaster victims needs.

According to data gathered the branch is a major stakeholder in the district with regards to disaster response interventions. According to the District Officer I, Kisumu East District “the local Red

Cross Branch has mainly responded to disasters like floods which are common in Kadibo Winam divisions, fire accidents within the municipality, road traffic accidents and the 2007/8 election violence". According to the Branch Coordinator, the branch activities with regard to disaster response have mainly been in the following activities:-

- (i) Search and rescue activities that included looking for the missing persons and evacuating victims to safer grounds (particularly during flooding situation and more recently during the 2007 post election violence);
- (ii) Setting up of temporary shelter items and distribution of related items like tents, tarpaulins, blankets, mattresses, second hand clothes and bed sheets;
- (iii) Provision of water and sanitation related supplies like buckets, soap, towels, sanitizers, towels for ladies, undergarments for males and females, camp cleaning detergents and equipments and insecticides;
- (iv) Provision of medical services and supplies and supplementary feeding to expectant mothers and children under age five;
- (v) Tracing and family reunification and
- (vi) Psychosocial support.

Out of the 85 branch volunteers and staff interviewed 75% (64 respondents) of them stated that they are members of the disaster response team in the branch. Another 10% (9 respondents) indicated that they are not members of the disaster response team but have participated in disaster response activities. 15% (12 respondents) of the respondents indicated that they are not members and have not participated in disaster response activities, apparently the 15% above also happened to be volunteers who joined the branch within the last three months of the study.

With regard to the type of disasters the branch has been responding to, the branch personnel were asked to state the type of disasters they had participated in. Table 4 below gives a summary of the various categories of disasters volunteers have responded to in the last three years.

Table 4: Categories of disasters handled by Specific branch personnel between Jan. '07 to June '09

Category/Type of Disaster	No of volunteers who participated per category of disaster	Percentage of volunteers who participated per category of disaster	Volunteers who did not participate in the specified category	% of volunteers who did not participate	TOTALS (% Only)
Floods	47	55	38	45	100
Fire	43	51	42	49	100
Drought	39	46	46	54	100
Road Traffic Accidents (RTA)	45	53	40	47	100
2007 Post Election Violence	55	65	30	35	100
Tribal clashes/Riots	36	42	49	58	100

From the table 4 above there is a clear indication that the branch and its volunteers has been involved in disaster response activities ranging from the most recent 2007 post election violence (PEV) to road traffic accidents, floods, fires, drought and tribal clashes/ riots.

With regard to time taken to reach disaster victims with required aid and as pointed out in table 5 below; 48% of respondents indicated that the branch takes six to twelve hours on average while 34% of respondents indicated the branch takes less than six hours. Another 15% indicated that the branch takes about twelve to twenty four hours while the remaining 3% fell in the category indicated that the branch takes twenty four to forty eight hours. Most respondents (79%) indicated that this is a marked improvement attributed to decentralization. One volunteer observed that “in the past we would take more time as we would have had to wait for relief supplies to be released from Nairobi by road, this coupled with the poor road infrastructure and insecurity; would lead to delays of over three days. Sometimes we became too embarrassed to go to the community empty handed when assistance delayed for long”.

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Table 5: Time taken by the branch personnel to respond to disasters

Time (Hours)	No. of Respondents	% of respondents
0-6	29	34%
6-12	41	48%
12-24	13	15%
24-48	3	3%
Over 48	0	0

Respondents were also asked to indicate the type of assistance the branch provides to disaster victims. Table 6 below gives a summary of the items stated by respondents.

Table 6: Type of services and materials given by branch during disaster response

Assistance type	Items provided
Search and rescue	Evacuations Oxygen masks Life saver jackets
Water and Sanitation	Water tanks Buckets and jerricans Aquatabs and water purifiers
Health and Nutrition	Drugs to hospitals Mobile clinics Health education Provision of Information, education and communication (IEC) materials
Food	Cereals, pulses and cooking oil
Shelter	Tents, tarpaulins,
Tracing and family reunification	Tracing request forms Red Cross Message forms Physical reunification of Unaccompanied Minors
Psychosocial support	Counseling services

The information provided in the above analysis tended to agree with some of the previous beneficiary distribution lists sampled from the branch offices. In one of the forms, for example, a

beneficiary of a flood disaster in Dunga Kisumu received; 1 family kit (Containing bar soap, 2 blankets, 1 full kitchen set, 2 mosquito nets, 2 blankets and 2 tarpaulins), Water purifiers, maize flour, beans and cooking oil. From the intervention reports obtained for the same area 2 mobile outreach clinics were also carried out and the Kisumu district hospital supported with 5 interagency emergency health kits.

Adequacy of the material/supplies to disaster victims was also assessed to find out the views of the respondents on the same. On average, 88% of the respondents felt the support given was adequate based on what has been planned at branch level and in line with the provisions in the “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response” (SPHERE standards). The 88% respondents noted that before any supplies were sent to the field there was a rapid needs assessment conducted prior to the response with a view to determining the actual needs of the affected population, the numbers and the extent of the damage. According to the Volunteer Emergency Response Leader, ‘The affected population often demanded more than was necessary hence the branch put certain benchmarks upon which it would measure its performance and therefore the branch is contended with its performance’.

With regard to stakeholder opinions 76% of the stakeholders rated the role and service of KRCS during disaster response as very good. On average they indicated that KRCS arrives at the site within the first six hours just at the same time with the police. They did list down the support given by KRCS as distribution of relief items and in particular food and non food items, tracing and counseling services and health services. However, 48% of stakeholders felt that KRCS is very good in handling relief while other organizations in the district are stronger with the healthcare aspect.

4.4 To assess the level of decentralization of the KRCS

4.4.1 Strategies and intensity of the decentralization

According to the data collected 78% of respondents were aware that KRCS had decentralized its operations with effect from 2005. According to the Regional Manager KRCS adopted decentralization policy in 2005 and was rolled out in 2006 “The decentralization process aimed to create nine regional offices by the year 2010, currently; six Regional offices have been set up as shown in table 7 below.

According to the Regional Manager and in ensuring effective rollout of the process, certain key documents including the organizations' Constitution and strategic plan were reviewed by the National board and taken to the Council for approval. Subsequently various dissemination meetings were conducted all over the country to disseminate the concept to the volunteers, members and staff all over the organizations branches.

Table 7: KRCS Regional Offices

No.	Name of Region	Location of Regional Office	Branches Constituting the RO
1	Lower Eastern**	Machakos	Nairobi, Karen/Lang'ata, Parklands, Limuru, Kiambu, Makueni, Kitui and Machakos (8)
2	Central	Nyeri	Nyeri, Murang'a, Kariua/Maragua, Laikipia, Thika and Kirinyaga (6)
3	West Kenya	Kakamega	Kisumu, Nyando, Siaya, Rachuonyo, Homabay, Migori, Gucha, Nyamira, Kakamega, Vihiga, Butere/Mumias and Busia (12)
4	North Eastern	Garissa	Garissa, Wajir, Ijara, Mandera, and Mwingi (5)
5	Coast	Mombasa	Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Malindi, Mpeketoni, Lamu and Garsen (7)
6	North Rift	Eldoret	Lugari, Bungoma, Mt. Elgon, East Pokot, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Nandi North, Nandi South, Moi's Bridge, Marakwet, West Pokot and Turkana (12)
7	South Rift**	Nakuru	Kajiado, Bureti, Nakuru, Kericho, Narok, Olkalaou, Koibatek (7)
8	Upper Eastern	Isiolo	Isiolo, Meru, Embu, Marsabit, Moyale and Samburu (6)

** Regions not fully operational

This process was then followed up by the recruitment of key staff required. According to the Decentralization Concept Paper reviewed July 2007; it was expected that each regional office would have a minimum of 5 key staff (Regional Manager, Regional Health Officer, Regional Finance Officer, Regional Disaster Management Officer and two support staff being driver and Administrative Assistant). However the same paper noted that out of the 5 established regions 3 only had some of the technical staff mentioned above. The West Kenya region where Kisumu branch lies had one technical staff thus Regional Manager until in early 2008 when most of the other required personnel were hired. Financial challenges were mentioned as the main reasons constraining timely recruitment of personnel to support the branches in the regions.

Key strategies put in place from the above foregoing therefore can be summarized as;

- a) Preparation of a concept paper for review by the Management
- b) Subsequent review and approval of the same by the board
- c) Review of all relevant policy documents to provide for the decentralized structure. Among the key documents pointed out were the KRCS constitution reviewed in 2005/06, the preparation of the five year strategic plan 2006-2010, review of human resource policies to adopt new reporting structures,
- d) Setting up of the regional office: - This was the most outstanding strategy put in place since it was also mentioned by 96% of the respondents. According to the Regional Manager, "KRCS did not have regional offices before 2006. Branches used to report directly to the Organizational Development Manager stationed at its headquarters in Nairobi directly. With the rolling out of decentralization it was proposed that nine regional offices be established as per table 6 above". She further mentioned that in 2007 the organization realized that it did not have adequate resources to rollout the entire process and decided to reconstitute some of the functional regional offices. The West Kenya regional office where Kisumu branch falls was reconstituted from the former Nyanza Region which covered 8 branches then. Currently the region covers 12 branches namely Kisumu, Nyando, Vihiga, Kakamega, Siaya, Busia, Butere/Mumias, Migori, Homa Bay, Gucha, Rachuonyo and Nyamira branches. The essence of the regional office is to be able to provide technical, logistical and financial support to branches in realization of the fact that the organization does not have adequate funds to employ technical staff for each of the branches in the region. Other reasons advanced included the need to take services nearer to the vulnerable people and improve on response time in the case of emergencies; to reduce costs with regard to the Monitoring and evaluation function and to exploit the fundraising potential amongst other reasons
- e) Transfers and deployment of technical and experienced staff to the region. Among those transferred were the Regional Manager and the Regional Finance Officer.
- f) Offloading of certain headquarter functions to the regions

4.4.2 Objectives for decentralization of the disaster response programme

According to the KRCS decentralization concept paper, April 2005 the following were the key objectives for decentralization with regard to disaster response; - The paper states that "decentralization as a policy on our part is an effort to improve efficiency, as experiences in

various humanitarian organizations and National Societies show". The following are the key objectives for the decentralization of the disaster response programme:-

- (i) To strengthen and empower the branches, their facilities and the immediate communities in order for them to develop manage and build the required capacities in planning and management of their development and disaster/emergency programmes.

54% of respondents stated this as one of the objectives for decentralization. Based on identified branch capacities there was a notable improvement in the branch capacity with regard to disaster response stock, equipment and working tools. However there were notable challenges with regards to inadequate branch staff and a weak financial capacity as stated by the Branch board.

The Branch Coordinator was interviewed regarding the role that the branch plays in the overall planning and budgeting process for the organization. Accordingly he stated that the organization with effect from 2007 has introduced a bottom up approach in planning with clear roles and deadlines at every stage. First the branch board is expected to call its members volunteers and stakeholders into a planning meeting where they draw their branch plans and budgets including prioritizing their main areas of focus. After that the plans are forwarded to the regional office during which process a consultative workshop is held with all branches in the region represented through their respective managers. The initial plans are reviewed and adjusted where necessary before they are forward to the headquarters for a similar review exercise at national level, this time all regions are represented through their regional managers. According to the branch Board this process has contributed into greater ownership of the branch activities by the branch volunteers and members. The participatory process also ensures that the community members and stakeholders contribute to the decisions made at the branch level leading to more efficiency.

- (ii) Decentralization will take services nearer to the vulnerable people and improve on response time in the case of emergencies.

With regard to this objective 51% of the respondents were familiar with it. Asked in what way this objective has been achieved; they noted that with decentralized the head office constructed one warehouse at Kisumu branch and also provided additional storage facilities in the form of rubhall. It then went ahead to preposition adequate disaster response stocks at regional level so that whenever there is need branches don't have to wait for supplies to come from Nairobi. This has actually reduced response time from over three days to less than six hours on average. With the availability of response stock at regional level, the region has further prepositioned stock at branch level to

enable them respond to the needs immediately as they wait for more supplies to arrive. Minimum stock kept by Kisumu branch was stated as 100 families translating to 600pax (Using an average family size of 6) while that by the regional office was for 5000 families or 30,000persons.

(iii) Decentralization will eliminate duplication.

According to the Regional Manager and the Branch coordinator, decentralization has brought about frequent consultation with various stakeholders involved in disaster response through the activation of the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) meetings where the branch is represented. This provided a forum for consultation and coordination and ensures that the branch is in constant touch with other intervening organizations hence any likely cases of duplication or unwanted completion are eliminated leading to more effective services to the beneficiaries.

4.5 To assess the capacity of the KRCS Kisumu branch in disaster response

The capacity of the branch was assessed using four main indicators thus a) skilled personnel, b) disaster response equipments and materials, c) funds needed for disaster response and d) revenue raising ability of the branch.

4.5.1 Skilled Personnel

Availability and requirements of various personnel necessary for effective disaster response was assessed. The study revealed that the branch had one employed staff, the Branch Coordinator. The branch did not however have a specific employed staff to assist in the design and implementation of disaster response activities. The Branch Coordinator was therefore responsible for the implementation of disaster response activities alongside other branch activities. To resolve the challenge of inadequate staff, the branch relied on the services of volunteers who worked on a regular basis referred to as 'focal persons'. The 'focal persons' were paid some competitive allowances equivalent to a monthly salary (currently KES 16,500 a month) as compared to normal branch volunteers who were paid about KES 300 a day only during the days they are involved in a whole days activity. According to the Branch Coordinator "he KES 300 is not a salary but rather a refund for the daily fare and lunch used by the volunteers". At the time of this study the branch had three such 'focal persons' responsible for the Blood Donor, Malaria Keep Up and HIV/AIDS 'Maanisha' Projects.

With regard to staff recruitments, the study Human Resource Manager stated that “All our staff at whatever level are competitively recruited through placing of advertisements in the daily newspapers at national level, any Kenyan who meets the specific competencies and skills being sought for is encouraged to apply”. She further indicated that the short listing and interviews are done at national level and staff posted to the respective branches. A notable weakness pointed out by the Branch Board was that the process is centrally managed by the Human resource department from the headquarters who often consult with the regional office but the branch boards have no say. This according to one of the board members creates a lot of suspicion and mistrusts between the board members and the staff at branch level. The board recommended the need for their involvement in the selection of branch staff. The Human resource department was however commended by the branch board for giving priority to local candidates who meet the expected requirements during the recruitment process. Regarding average level of education for branch staff, 82% of respondents stated that branch staffs have an average education level of a degree.

The Branch Chairman stated that their volunteers are recruited from the local community. With regard to what competencies the branch seeks for during volunteer recruitment he stated that “It depends on specific work we have at hand, this is the key determinant; firstly, a list of the skills and competencies being sought for are defined, and then we advertised within the notice boards in the villages and through other avenues like the Chiefs barazas. In most cases interested applicants visit the Branch and are taken through a brief information dissemination session outlining the background to the Red Cross movement and those who are interested and meet the minimum stated requirements are selected”. Volunteers were also interviewed to determine their education levels. Table 8 below summarizes the responses got.

Table 8: Highest level of education attained by volunteers

Highest Level of Education attained	No. of volunteers	%
Secondary (KCSE)	48	57
College(Diploma)	11	13
College(Certificate)	7	8
University (Degree)	13	15
Postgraduate	6	7
Totals	85	100

From table 8 above it is noted that 56% of respondents had an average level of O-level education, 8% certificate level, 13% diploma level, 15% degree level and the rest (7%) postgraduate level.

Respondents were also interviewed in order to find out what skills and capacities they have with regard to effective disaster response. Table 9 below presents a summary of various categories of trainings offered to specific branch personnel that respondents stated at having undergone at the branch.

Table 9: Categories of trainings offered to Specific branch personnel

	Category of Training	No. of respondents trained per category	% of respondents trained per category	% of respondents untrained per category	Totals
1	First Aid training	35	40	60	100
2	Sphere standards training	13	15	85	100
3	Basic fire fighting skills	30	35	65	100
4	Water rescue skills	10	12	88	100
5	Basic disaster management training	40	47	53	100
6	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST)	20	23	77	100

From table 9 above, it is noted that a majority of the branch personnel are still untrained in various disaster related fields. All the categories of trainings stated had below 50% of personnel trained. This poses a challenge to the branch to increase the number of personnel trained since most of the staff trained are deployed on the basis of availability meaning some volunteers who are trained may not be available during a given emergency and those available may not have the requisite skills. On average 53% of those trained felt that the trainings undertaken were adequate for their current tasks while 47% felt they would have required other trainings. Table 10 below outlines the various training recommended as necessary.

As far as staff training is concerned both branch and headquarter staff have access to training opportunities. However the Human Resource Manager pointed out that “certain donor funded projects have bigger financial allocations for personnel training than others, and hence this causes some level of discrepancy”. She however recommended that there was need for standardization of training opportunities so that all staff benefit from the same level of training opportunities. There was however a big discrepancy when it comes to volunteer training as seen in table 10 below; accordingly there is some notable discrepancy in the type of trainings undertaken as regards quality and quantity. While 52% of respondents needed further training in trauma and counseling, 45% needed further training in Conflict resolution, 52% needed training in SPHERE standards while 47% needed training in water rescue. This study also noted that certain volunteers appeared to have been trained in all the areas while others were not trained at all.

Table 10: Categories of trainings recommended by branch personnel

Category of training	No. of respondents who requested for this training	% of Respondents who requested for this training	No. of respondents who did not request for this training	% of Respondents who did not request for this training	Totals in %
Trauma and counseling	45	52	40	48	100
Conflict resolution	38	45	47	55	100
Sphere standards	44	52	41	48	100
Water rescue	38	45	47	55	100

The adequacy of branch volunteers for activity implementation was also assessed. According to the Branch Coordinator, the branch has 850 active volunteers. Other volunteers are also available based on activity needs but the 850 mentioned above are the most regular and readily available. According to the Branch Coordinator ‘the large number of volunteers gives the branch a wide range of skills and specializations from which the branch can draw its human resource from’. The only impediment cited was in relation to high turnover noted with the volunteers necessitating continuous training in disaster management which is a costly exercise.

Out of the 85 branch volunteers interviewed, 73(85%) of them said they had participated in disaster response activities ranging from the post election violence, floods, cholera, accidents and fire outbreaks. According to the Branch Chairperson, “due to lack of a Disaster Response Officer at branch level, the branch utilizes the services of the Regional Disaster officer whenever we need guidance in any disaster related issue’. He further indicated that “the Regional Disaster Officer is currently stationed in Kisumu at the regional offices since the introduction of the decentralization concept and process.; there is also a Regional Manager who offers further support as may be required”. The Regional Manager reaffirmed the above sentiments by stating that “budget constraints as the main reason why branches like Kisumu do not have a specific employee in charge of disaster management”. These sentiments were further echoed during the interview with the Human Resource and the Disaster Response Managers respectively.

According to the Regional Manager, “voluntary organizations like KRCS over rely on donors to support most of their activities; the branch is not an exception, due to such challenges and in view of the ever fluctuating donor funds, it is not possible for the branch to hire a specific staff for disaster management due to lack of sustainable funding to cater for personnel costs”. The branch treasurer further stated that “we would have wished to have our own employed staff in charge of disaster management were it not for the fact that we do not have adequate resources to employ one”. According to the Human Resource Manager “there are other technical personnel needed to support the branch in the context of a disaster at the regional office for utilization by various branches”. Such personnel included the Regional Health officer, Regional Water and Sanitation officer, Regional Logistics Officer and Regional Finance Officer.

The branch treasurer observed that “there is a good level of consultation between the headquarters, the region and the branch board with regard to staff/volunteer management at branch level”. It was also pointed out by the Branch Coordinator that the decentralization process led to the establishment of the regional office currently located in Kisumu. 70% of respondents interviewed indicated that the presence of the Regional office and Regional Manager to whom the Kisumu Branch Coordinator reports to, has heavily contributed to boosting the staff morale as there are frequent consultations. According to the Regional Manager “there is a clear performance based management system put in place where staff are appraised on quarterly basis and feedback given to them on areas that need improvement”. The Branch Chairman seemed to agree with these

sentiments when he stated that “We receive regular support from the regional office particularly in guiding our branch staff which is a great motivation to us and the staff. This was said to be a great improvement from the earlier centralized system where feedback was very rare as described by the Branch Coordinator and the volunteers interviewed.

With regards to staff motivation, the Branch Coordinator noted that the organization has currently put in place a performance management system that encourages hard work and that there was a clear incentive structure and reward system for good performers. He cited an example of a certain Branch Coordinator that had been promoted to the Regional Manager position and a Regional Manager that had been promoted to take up a head of department position. According to the Human Resource Manager, the performance management system was introduced two years ago and as a result the Branch Coordinators were upgraded to one scale higher in recognition of the critical role they play at local level.

The Branch Coordinators opinion with regard to supervision was also sought. He stated that “management has recently introduced the regional office coordinating the work of 12 KRCS branches drawn from Western and Nyanza provinces; currently the regional office has about 8 employed personnel (Regional Manager, Regional Disaster Management Officer, Regional Health officer, Regional Finance Officer, Regional Logistics Officer, Administrative Assistant and 2 drivers) who support us when need arises”. The essence of introducing this structure was as stated in the KRCS decentralization concept paper of May 2005, ‘ensure that branches like Kisumu can be able to get adequate technical assistance from the regional personnel in various sectors of disaster management’. According to the Branch Coordinator ‘there are frequent consultations with the Regional Manager with regards to disaster response which has enhanced timely decision making with regard to disaster response’.

There was also a notable change in the branch board. According the Regional Manager the branch board was reconstituted in 2008 after dissolution of the previous board. The previous board was said to have lacked in integrity and accountability. The purpose of the reconstitution was therefore to ensure a board that is stronger and accountable as perceived by beneficiaries and stakeholders.

4.5.2 Disaster response equipments and materials

Availability and requirements for various equipments and supplies related to disaster response at the branch was assessed. The study revealed a well stocked warehouse both at branch and regional level. There was also a clear and simplified system of accessing additional supplies from the regional warehouse currently located within its premises. Within the branch compound there were two huge rub halls and one medium size warehouse. One of the rub halls was said to belong to Unite Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF) one of its partners/stakeholders while the other rub hall plus the warehouse were said to belong to KRCS under the management of the regional office. The branch had a smaller storage facility where it stored basic items for responding to about 100 families as stated by the Branch Coordinator. Upon exhaustion of the above items there was an arrangement between the branch and the region whereby the branch is expected to request for the replenishment of the same from the regional warehouse currently located within its premises. At the time of this study thus, the regional warehouse and rub hall stored items necessary to respond to the needs of about 5000 families in the event of a disaster. Table 11 and table 12 below give a summary of relief stock found within the regional and branch warehouses respectively. However it is important to note that the region supports Kisumu branch as well as 11 other branches within its jurisdiction.

From table 11, it was observed and noted that the branch had an adequate number of First Aid and Medical supplies. However, 75% of respondents cited lack of flood lights as a major constraint when conducting search and rescue activities at night. According to the 75% respondents above, the use of torch light is not adequate as it does not produce an adequate lighting system. About 90% of respondents also indicated that the branch lacked an ambulance to transport the rescued victims to hospital in a safe mode. The Branch Coordinator and Regional Manager respectively reiterated the same both at branch and regional levels leading to visibility challenges when responding to emergencies at night. The Regional Manager stated that "the branch and others within the region rely on the headquarters located in Nairobi (about 450 Kms away) to send such items during disaster response activities". The branch did not also have any vehicle and trucks needed for faster movement to disaster sites. According to the branch board, the branch vehicle is currently being used by the region. The Regional Manager however indicated that the branch vehicle is not in a good condition and that the region is working towards purchasing a new vehicle for the branch after selling the current one. There was also a notable lack of relevant identification

items like volunteer identification cards, disaster response jackets/aprons/bibs needed by the branch personnel when responding to disasters.

Table 11: Disaster response stock at Kisumu branch as at 30th June 09

Description	Unit of Measure (UOM)	Required Stock	Available Stock	Variance
Tarpaulins	Pieces	200	200	0
Mosquito Nets	Pieces	100	750	(650)
Blankets	Pieces	200	200	0
Water Jerrycans	Pieces	200	200	0
Water buckets 10 ltrs	Pieces	200	100	100
Kitchen Sets (IFRC)	Pieces	100	50	50
Panga bar soap	Bars	200	100	100
Generator	Pieces	1	1	0
Family tents	Pieces	20	10	10
Second hand Clothes	Bags	50	50	0
Sanitary Pads	pkts	100	1000	(900)
Mobilets	Box	20	5	15
Panga (Machetes)	Pieces	50	50	0
Umbrella	Pieces	50	50	0
Jembes	Pieces	100	50	50
Knapsack sprayer	Pieces	5	5	0
Chlorine	kgs	4,500	4,455	45
Aquatabs	Pieces	10,000	10,000	0
Water purifiers(Pur sachets	Sachets	10,000	10,000	0
Inter agency emergency Health kit	Boxes	5	5	0
Hoes/ Axes/dustbins	Pieces			
Life Jackets	Pieces	30	10	20

Table 12: Disaster Response Stock for the West Kenya Region at the Kisumu Branch Warehouses as at June 30th 2009

Description	Unit of Measure (UOM)	Required Stock	Available Stock	Variance
Tarpaulins	Pieces	10,000	7,790	2210
Mosquito Nets	Pieces	10,000	2,170	7830
Blankets	Pieces	10,000	4,384	5616
Water Jerrycans	Pieces	10,000	7,460	2540
Water Buckets 10ltrs	Pieces	10,000	8,010	1990
Kitchen Sets (IFRC)	Pieces	5,000	3,598	1402
panga bar soap	Bars	10,000	9,830	170
Generator	Pieces	4	0	4
Flood Lights	Units	4	0	4
Family tents	Pieces	400	338	62
Learning tents	Pieces	20	20	0
Used Clothes	Bags	100	70	30
Sanitary Pads	Box	5,000	4,965	35
Wheel chairs	Pieces	50	10	40
Plastics Tanks 2000ltr	Pieces	100	100	0
Mattresses	Pieces	5,000	225	4775
Mobilets	Box	100	82	18
panga (Matchetes)	Pieces	1,000	424	576
Rigid jerrycans	Pieces	10,000	9,950	50
Pump	Pieces		- 1	1
Umbrella	Pieces	100	85	15
Jembes	Pieces	1,000	339	661
Knapsack sprayer	Pieces	30	8	22
Dust bin buckets	Pieces	5,000	4,984	16
Water filter small size	Pieces	100	99	1
Unimix	Kgs	3,000	0	0
BP-5	Kgs	3,000	0	0
Plumpy nuts	Kgs	3,000.00	0	0
Chlorine	Kgs	4,500	4,455	45
Aquatabs	Pieces	250,000	250,000	0
Pur sachets	Sachets	100,000	100,000	0
Lysol	Litres	6,000	6,000	0
Dextrose 5% 500ml	Bottles	2,400	2,400	0
Normal Saline 500ml	Bottles	2,400	2,400	0
Inter Agency Emergency Health kits	Boxes	100	100	0
Life Jackets	Pieces	200	200	0
Motor Boats	Pieces	4	4	0

Respondents were also interviewed with regard to their opinion on the adequacy of the assistance given to disaster victims. Table 13 below illustrates the consolidated views of respondents with regard to particular sectors of disaster response.

Table 13: Adequacy of support given to beneficiaries

Assistance Provided	Assistance given is adequate (% of respondents)	Assistance is inadequate (% of respondents)	TOTALS
Search and Rescue	48	52	100
Water and Sanitation	75	25	100
Health and Nutrition	80	20	100
Shelter	93	7	100
Food	44	56	100
Tracing (Family reunification)	88	22	100
Psychosocial support	47	53	100

From tables 13 above, the adequacy of search and rescue equipment was found to be about 48%. 75% of respondents indicated that the assistance given to beneficiaries in Water and Sanitation (Watsan) materials was adequate. This information tallies closely with the stock levels in tables 11 and 12 above. From tables 11 and 12 it was noted that the branch had adequate water treatment chemicals like aquatabs and water purifiers (PUR), it also had water jerrycans and buckets. Mobile toilets (Mobilets) were also available including other drainage materials like hoes, axes, spades, dustbins and disinfectants. From the data gathered, none of the respondents mentioned watsan supplies as an area of weakness.

With regard to the adequacy of health and nutrition supplies, 80% of respondents indicated that the branch had adequate drugs like the interagency emergency health kits and related supplies like infusion fluids and gloves. Other drugs included antibiotics, pain killers and antimalarial drugs. However the Branch Coordinator pointed out that “We however lack nutritional supplies specific to the needs of special groups like malnourished children, expectant and lactating mothers, under five children, diabetics and other related groups that require special nutrition”. According to the Branch Coordinator ‘the branch does not normally stock such items and would rather buy them on

a case to case basis due to a short expiry time'. Available drugs for vaccinations were also not available.

Adequacy of relevant stock for shelter at the branch was also assessed; 93% of respondents indicated that the branch had provided adequate stocks of items like tarpaulins, blankets, mosquito nets, and second hand clothes, undergarments for men, ladies and children and sanitary towels for mothers to beneficiaries. This information tallied with the stock levels provided in table 10 and 11.

The branch capacity was also assessed with regard to adequacy of food items provided to beneficiaries and this was rated at 44%. The Branch Coordinator stated that the branch does not have food and relies on the government to provide. According to the Branch Coordinator "the reliance on the government to provide food is a major constraint in effective disaster response as government food is always delayed due to the bureaucratic process involved in acquiring the same".

With regard to adequacy of tracing and family reunification services, 88% of respondents indicated that the support given to beneficiaries was adequate. According one of the stakeholders "KRCS is the only organization that deals with tracing and family reunification matters within the country during disaster situations and I think they have really done well".

Psychosocial support adequacy was rated at 47%. The Branch Coordinator stated that "the Branch outsources this service from other agencies like the Kenya Association of Professional Counselors".

With regard to communication and related equipments;

According to the Branch Coordinator, the branch has over 60% of the equipments they require. Key working equipments like computers, printers, internet connection and radio communication were adequate and in good working condition. The telephone system was considered as inadequate while the telefax system was not available. The Branch had the telefax head but did not have a fax line. Other equipments like the scanner, Global Positioning System (GPS) and LCD Projector were not present in the Branch. Table 14 below gives the status of working conditions of various

communication equipment in the branch at the time of this study as given by the Branch Coordinator.

Table 14: Status of Communication equipment at Kisumu Branch

Communication item/gadget	Status
Telephone lines (Both landline and mobile)	The branch has one landline but requires atleast 2 of them
Computer (Desktop and laptops)	Branch has three desktop computers and 1 laptop adequate for its current needs
Printers	Branch has one operational printer which is shared through the network system. Currently they require one more printer
Internet connection	Branch has a good internet connection system with a well connected Local Area Network (LAN) system adequate for its needs
Fax machine	Present but not connected
Photocopier	Present but very slow
Digital camera	Branch has one adequate for its needs
Scanner	Has none but requires one
VHF radio	Has abase radion with several handsets
GPS equipment	Has none but requires one
Maps	Has several adequate for its needs
Mediuma & Small size vehicles	Has one but very old and currently being managed by the region
Traillers/trucks	Does not have any

At the time of this study the branch had one permanent staff and three volunteers ‘focal persons’ in charge of the Blood donor, HIV/AIDS ‘Maanisha’ and Malaria ‘Keep Up’ Projects. The three ‘focal persons’ shared two computers while the Branch Coordinator used one. However the branch has one printer while the respondents indicated that they would have required at least two printers one for the Branch Coordinator and the other for sharing between the other personnel. In terms of internet the branch has an excellent network system that allows over 30 people to access internet at ago. As far as telephone and fax are concerned perhaps this was the weakest link in communication. Although the branch has a PABX system in place including a telefax headset, the branch did not have telephone lines connected to these machines. The main communication system in place is therefore the Branch Coordinators individual mobile line. About 60% of respondents noted that in the event of a disaster it is challenging for victims and stakeholders to contact the branch since there is no official telephone line in place. Other communication items needed for effective disaster response like the GPS and scanners were also not present in the

branch. However the branch has effective radio communication equipment in place including handsets that are normally used during disasters.

According to the Branch Chairman, the branch is logistically constrained as far as vehicles are concerned. At the time of this study the branch did not have a vehicle for use. Although the branch has access to vehicles owned by the region, there is usually a challenge during response to disasters as they are required to place a request at least 5 days in advance. The branch relies on motorbikes and currently has three in possession. One of the motorbikes was said to be held at a garage after it was taken for repair and has been there for close to a year. During disaster response, the branch requires its own vehicle to transport relief items as well as personnel to disaster sites. A major challenge observed was also lack of a truck both within the branch and at the regional office. Both structures rely on the headquarters for support whenever they need a truck. There is therefore need for the branch to strengthen its fleet as well as the telephone communication system.

In conclusion therefore the capacity of the branch with regard to disaster response equipments and materials can be rated as average based on data from the study. It is important to note that the Branch Coordinator appreciated the role played by the regional office (A product of the decentralized structure) in supporting the branch to acquire internet, additional storage facilities like the two rub halls and training the disaster response teams.

4.5.3 **Financial resources;**

Budgetary allocations by the headquarters, local donations, membership recruitment fees, First Aid training, renting of tents and the branch canteen were cited as the main sources of income for the branch. However budgetary allocations from headquarters through specific donor funded projects remained the major financier of branch operations and activities. During the 2007 financial year the overall branch budget was KES 26,738,853 out of which KES 4,553,272 was meant for disaster response.

Out of the overall budget of KES 26,738,853 the branch managed to raise KES 3,906,669.20 only.

The funds were raised as follows:-

- a) Income from rent- KES 24,000,

- b) First Aid trainings- KES 144,150;
- c) Membership fees- KES 31,950;
- d) Collection tins- KES 22,677;
- e) Tents and chairs hire- KES 62,450;
- f) Transfers from headquarters earmarked for the Keep Up project was KES 1,924,500; and
- g) Transfers from headquarters earmarked for the LVP Project KES 1,084,714.90.

Out of the KES 3,906,669.20 collected about KES 570, 600 were used for disaster response activities in total. This represented a 14.5% of the total income collected and a 12.5% of the total amount of funds they required to effectively respond to disasters respectively. According to the Disaster Response Manager at the headquarters; each branch is also expected to keep some minimum amount of funds on its account for disaster response. These funds are referred to as Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF). Currently the minimum DREF per branch is about KES 100,000. However the branch did not have these funds in its account at the time of this study. It was also observed that currently the branch does not receive any funds from the head office to support its disaster response activities. According to the Disaster Response Manager branches receive funds for donor funded projects only and at the moment there is no specific donor for the disaster response programme for Kisumu Branch. Certainly this situation creates the need for the branch to think of alternative sources of funds for its activities as opposed to planning with donor funded programs in mind only as these are not necessarily driven by the community priorities at hand.

During the interview with the branch board, there were various reasons cited as contributing to weak financial base by the branch. Firstly it was pointed out that the branch had previously suffered from credibility challenges which led to the dissolution of the former branch board in 2007 and the subsequent installation of a new one. The same fate had befallen the branch staff leading to a total overhaul of the branch personnel as part of the wider decentralization strategies to improve the image of the branch in order to be seen to be transparent. These challenges had created a scenario where the branch was previously not being trusted by local partners. Currently the branch has embarked on profiling itself in order to regain its previously not so positive public image.

In conclusion therefore the branch financial situation can be on average described as very weak. There is urgent need for the branch to explore the possibilities of investing in more viable income generating projects like real estate and through shares. This would be the only way of ensuring that branch priority areas are adequately planned and budgeted for.

4.5.4 Revenue raising ability,

Out of the overall budget (26,738,853) for 2007, the branch managed to raise 14.6% (3,906,669). Out of the total income raised about KES 624,255 was raised locally representing a 16% of the total income raised locally. The main sources of local income were given as First Aid trainings and selling of products (First Aid Kits), membership recruitment fees, rental income from the branch canteen, collection tins in the supermarkets (Nakumatt), hiring of tents and chairs over the weekends to event organizers and local donations (in cash and in kind).


From the analysis given by the Branch Coordinator, total income collected from all the above sources is very unreliable and not adequate to support the core functions of the branch. Since the introduction of the decentralization concept, there have not been adequate efforts put in place to address the financial weaknesses of the branches. About 68% of respondents stated that there has been a high level of expansion of the branch functions and responsibilities however these has not been the case with the financial situation which they even noted has been growing more 'slimmer'. According to the branch board there are a number of factors that affect effective revenue collection at local levels. First the high poverty levels from the community determine the amounts that families can give to charitable organizations, Red Cross included. According to the Kisumu district information fact sheet, it is estimated that, 53% of the population in Kisumu live below the poverty line. Accordingly, 90% of the districts population depends on agriculture which is quite unreliable due to inadequate and unreliable rainfall patterns that at times lead to flooding of major rivers in low lying areas, destroy crops and cause waterborne diseases for both human and livestock.

4.6 To examine the KRCS organizational structure and its relation to disaster response in Kisumu.

4.6.1 Management Structure

The study established that the branch has two main administrative organs being the management and the governance. The management are employees who are hired by the governance and are in charge of the day to day administrative functions of the organization while the governance are the owner trustees of the organization and mainly concern themselves with the policy formulation (KRCS constitution reviewed 2006). Figure 2 below shows the linkages between the various levels of the KRCS management structure and their relationship to Kisumu branch

Figure 2: KRCS Management Structure



According to figure 2 above; the Branch Coordinator is the overall in charge of the branch and oversees the day to day functioning of the branch. In the case of Kisumu branch, the Branch Coordinator was the only employee at branch level. There were three ‘focal persons’ in charge of the HIV/AIDS ‘Maanisha Project, The Malaria ‘Keep Up’ Project and the Blood donor projects. According to the Branch Coordinator “the existing structure is very clear with regards to monitoring and reporting lines, and was recently revised to conform to the decentralized structure after having rolled out the decentralization process”. According to the Regional Manager, “there is need to constantly remind the branch and headquarters’ personnel to respect their new reporting lines since they were both used to communicating to each other directly”. From the quarterly implementation reports reviewed and the reports of coordination meetings it emerged that all Branch Coordinators

were reporting to the Regional Manager as opposed to the previous structure where they would report to the Head of the organizational development department directly.

With regard to the planning and budgeting process, the Branch Coordinator noted that the branch planning and budgeting process was currently being done at branch level and later integrated into the regional plans and budgets through a consultative process. According to the Branch Coordinator "previously branches would send their work plans to the headquarters and that the same were not being included in the national work plans making it difficult for the organization to have an overall picture of its financial base, but this has now changed".

From figure 2 above it can be noted that the Branch Coordinators together with the regional technical officers are on the same grade and both report to the Regional Manager. According to the Human Resource Manager, "the Branch Coordinators were upgraded to the current scale after the introduction of the decentralization process so as to harmonize the structure and attract more competent personnel for these positions, previously the Coordinators were a scale lower than the regional technical staff and this resulted into a lot of contradictions and lack of clarity in the reporting lines". According to the Disaster Response Manager, there was also "frequent consultations between the Regional Manager, Regional Disaster Management Officer and the Branch Coordinators hence this makes the decision making process very fast".

The Disaster Management Officer stated that "in the event that the disaster occurring in the branch is of a higher magnitude and needs a higher intervention than that of the region and the branch, then the Regional Manager who currently reports to the Deputy Secretary General will notify the headquarters accordingly". The headquarters would then be expected to send more personnel and resources.

Procedures for disaster response were also assessed through an interview with the branch board. The Branch Chairman pointed out that "in the event of a disaster outbreak at branch level, the branch coordinator mobilizes his team to respond and informs his board plus the regional manager accordingly. After the initial assessment, he updates the Branch Chairperson and the Regional Manager on the situation and if there is need the Regional Disaster Management Officer and other technical officers from the region are dispatched to the affected branch to support. Where the regional team feels they need a further support from the national level the Regional Manager will

inform the Head of disaster management and the Deputy Secretary General at the national level who take appropriate action including from deployment of extra personnel and resources as need arises”.

During the interview with the Human Resource Manager, it was pointed out that the introduction of the regional offices as part of the decentralization process is a key characteristic of the decentralization process. This is because established of the regional offices necessitated the continuous review of the headquarters and branch roles as below (Decentralization Concept Paper updated July 2007):-

- i) Headquarters role- Currently the headquarters role has been reviewed to include policy formulation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, supervision (of regional offices) capacity building and regulatory roles in addition to the role of systems analysis and development including resource mobilization. Previously the headquarter role included implementation of activities as well as direct coordination of branches. Currently these roles have been given to the region.
- ii) Regional offices role: - Was previously none existent but currently include coordination of all branch activities in the region, Supervision, Monitoring and evaluation of branches in the region, partnership creation at regional level, local resource mobilization, coaching and mentoring of personnel in the regions, plan and rationalize financial resources, collects and maintain data banks and oversee the functioning of the BMCs through the regional committee.
- iii) Branch roles; - Membership and volunteer recruitment, planning budgeting and implementation of specific funded projects, Needs assessments and problem identification.

With regard to the monitoring and evaluation systems the Branch Coordinator reported that ‘we have recently enhanced our monitoring and evaluation system through partnerships with local universities, as a result we have developed new tools for our projects monitoring through the assistance of students on attachments and those undertaking Masters”. An example given here included the current projects which the branch runs; the Maanisha Project in particular was commended by Amref (Current Project funders) as a good example of a well managed project. According to Amref Kisumu branch has been partnering with Masinde Muliro University in getting students attached to their projects and giving the student an opportunity to undertake studies on their projects as part of the Masters Project studies. Feedback from such studies including existing project Monitoring reports has greatly contributed to projects success as it

highlights areas that need to be addressed in time. Results from such learning processes are disseminated and shared with other branches.

4.6.2 Governance Structure

Just like the management structures KRCS has a defined governance structure at all levels. At branch level, the branch governance team is composed of 10 members and is headed by the Branch Chairman. Other officials include the Vice Chairman, Treasurer and seven other committee members. Figure 3 below illustrates the linkages between the various levels of the KRCS governance structure and its relationship to Kisumu Branch. Figure 4 on the other hand illustrates the composition of the branch board.

Figure 3: KRCS governance structure





Figure 4: Branch Governance composition



As observed during the study, the current Kisumu branch board is headed by Dr. Stephen Okeyo a medical doctor by profession. The Vice Chairman is Mr. Yogesh Dawda a successful businessman in town while the treasurer is Mr. G.P.O Onyango a retired banker by profession. The Branch Chairman stated that the “board is new and is serving on an interim basis after the dissolution of the previous board due to ‘mismanagement’. The branch board meets once every month to review progress of activities implemented during the quarter and approves expenditures for the following month”.

During discussions with the Branch Chairman he stated that “board has Committee members that chair various committees responsible for various programmes”. Within the Committee there was a member responsible for disaster management otherwise referred to as the Action Team (Emergency Response Leader). In case of a disaster this is the individual who acts as the link between the branch volunteers and the branch board. He therefore works very closely with the Branch Coordinator and keeps the branch board informed.

The Branch Chairman also indicated that he is also the Vice chairman of the Regional Board. He noted that the “representatives from various branch boards form the Regional Governance Board that is charged with the responsibility of overseeing all branch activities and operations, currently, the Regional Board is made up of a total of 13 members including the Regional Manager who is the Secretary to the board. Other members include the Board Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer and 9 other members. The board meets once quarterly and its main function is to oversee the functioning of the branch boards”.

According to the KRCS Constitution (2006 edition), the Regional Committees report to the National Executive Committee; through the Development Committee as indicated in figure 4 above. The Branch Chairman however pointed out that there was need to review the structure with regard to the composition of the National Executive Committee. According to him “the National Executive Committee needs to draw its membership from the Regional board, currently this is not the case”.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) operates through four main standing committee being Health Committee, Disaster Committee, Finance Committee and the Development Committee.

These Committees are chaired by any elected member from amongst its membership and meet once every three months just before the NEC meeting. They deliberate on various agenda in line with their mandate and report to the NEC. Functions of the NEC are defined in Article 18 of the KRCS Constitution (2006 edition). They include approval of the annual plans and budgets of the organization, to hire/ dismiss the Secretary General, to set up and define areas of operation of the regions and branches amongst others.

One of the key weaknesses pointed out by the Kisumu branch board was that members of the national standing Committee and NEC are not necessarily drawn from the Regional Boards hence there is lack of clear information from the grassroots' when making certain decisions critical for branch performance. They recommended a proper representation of the regions.

4.7 Stakeholder Involvement

Development of strategic partnerships was very instrumental for the branch since there is need to enhance local resource mobilization. According to the key stakeholders interviewed; the branch is considered a strategic partner by various NGOs in the district due to "its highly experienced staff and volunteers in disaster management". The main stakeholders of the branch with regard to disaster management as stated by the Branch Coordinator were stated the government line ministries, the community members/public, community based organizations (CSOs), United Nations (UN) and the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

With regard to the specific role each stakeholder contributes to the branch, the Branch Coordinator stated that, "all stakeholders play a critical role in mobilization of resources, joint planning and coordination of the relief efforts for the victims of the disasters". He further stated that "each stakeholder has a specific role to play, while the Provincial administration provides security, the Ministry of Health provides personnel during medical outreaches and we provide the drugs and related supplies, stakeholders like the United Nations (UN) provide the much needed resources but are in themselves not implementers hence such resources are channeled to the beneficiaries through the branch and other stakeholders involved in disaster management".

Out of the 10 stakeholder representative's interviewed, 80% stated that they are involved in disaster response interventions in Kisumu. According to Kisumu East District Officer I, the branch

was assigned the lead agency role in the district with regard to disaster response". According to one of the UN representatives "We work a lot with Red Cross since they have a transparent way of working. They actually play a critical role at all stages during disaster response ranging from search and rescue, provision of relief supplies, provision of medical services and camp management".

About 70% of the respondents rated the services offered by KRCS as very good, 20% rated the services as good and 10% rated the service as fair. On average the stakeholders indicated that the branch take less than six hours to respond to disasters. One stakeholder equated the KRCS response to lightening and wondered how KRCS manages to get information about disaster outbreaks very fast as compared to other organizations in the district.

About 60% of the respondent as rated the KRCS personnel's technical and managerial skills as being very good while another 80 rated the integrity and honesty of the branch personnel as good. Regarding the strength of the stakeholders' support for the branch activities; 50% of the respondents rated this as good, while 40% of the respondents rated the support as fair. Close to 80% of the stakeholders indicated that they had previously donated resources to the branch which ranged from vehicles, relief stock, seconding of personnel and financial support.

Stakeholders were also asked to state their pinions with regard to how the branch values its partners. About 88% indicated that the branch personnel value its stakeholders although it does not have regular feedback meetings to inform them of where they can be involved. 90% of the stakeholders stated that they would choose KRCS Kisumu branch as their preferred partner of choice. With regard to challenges facing effective disaster response 70% of the respondents cited the high poverty levels, poor infrastructure and limited resources as the major areas.

4.8 Conclusions

From the data collected and the discussions raised in chapter this study the following conclusions can be made: Firstly, the KRCS Kisumu branch has been involved in disaster response activities in Kisumu. Having looked at the midterm review of the KRCS 2003-2005 strategic plan that pointed out that the branch was previously weak in its disaster response ability occasioned by weak capacity; data collected indicate that this trend seems to be changing. Respondents that included

branch personnel, the Branch Board and the stakeholders all indicated that the branch seems to have changed for the better with regard to its involvement in disaster response. Issues studied like the time taken to reach beneficiaries with required aid, material and human resource capacities were on average rated highly. There were areas pointed out that could further be improved and this included the weak revenue raising ability and the weak financial base.

Secondly; with regard to the level of decentralization the data collected tended to indicate that the organization has put in a lot of strategies to enhance the outcomes from the decentralization process. Such strategies included the introduction of a middle level management structure consisting of the management and the governance, hiring of more competent technical personnel, deployment of the headquarter personnel to the lower structure, preposition of the headquarter relief stock to the lower structures and improvement of the communication facilities. The decision making process has also been enhanced through the regional offices. The objectives for the decentralization programme with regard to disaster response were also stated at the onset of decentralization. From the data gathered however the researcher noted that the organization has not undertaken any meaningful evaluation of the decentralization programme. It is therefore difficult to tell whether the strategies' they are using are serving the purposes they were intended to and whether the decentralization has realized what it set out to do.

Thirdly, the capacity of the branch can be said to have greatly improved as a result of the decentralization. The branch has over 50% of the disaster response stock at its disposal as opposed to the centralized administration where all relief stock was centered at its headquarters' in Nairobi. The upgrading of the Branch Coordinator positions to a higher level has attracted more competent staff including the dissolution of the previous board in favour of a new board that is seen to be more credible. Logistics required for relief operation can be found at the region if not at the branch and this also the case for communication and other related equipment.

Fourthly and with regard to the organization structure the KRCSs introduction of a middle level management structure, the regional offices is pointed out as having contributed to enhanced decision making and branch capacity. Due to perceived credibility arising from more competent staff the headquarters releases material and funds much more easily and does not have to send headquarter staff to verify information provided by the branch as was previously the case.

Perceived credibility has led to more stakeholder participation and more willingness from the stakeholders to network and donate resources to the branch. The branch should therefore take advantage of this to enhance its rather weak financial resource base.

CHAPTER FIVE:

5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the main finding of the study including the main conclusions and recommendations derived from the study findings.

5.2 Summary of Findings

This study established that the KRCS adopted a decentralized mode of operation in 2006. For Kisumu decentralization was rolled out in 2006 and has had a significant positive impact on the branch. The branch was established in 1971 and its offices are located in Kisumu town, off Kakamega-Kisumu road next to the New Nyanza Provincial Hospital. The branch is managed by a Board of 13 people and is administratively headed by the Branch Coordinator. The study established that the branch is majorly involved in disaster response and is considered a major stakeholder in disaster management by various stakeholders in the district. Other activities implemented by the branch include HIV/AIDS, Malaria Prevention, Blood donor, First Aid, Water and Sanitation and Poverty reduction.

From the data gathered the KRCS Kisumu branch has been involved in disaster response activities in Kisumu and its environment. Having looked at the midterm review of the KRCS 2003-2005 strategic plan that pointed out that the branch was previously weak in its disaster response ability occasioned by weak capacity; data collected indicate that this trend seems to have changed. Respondents that included branch personnel, the Branch Board and the stakeholders all indicated that the branch has changed for the better with regard to its involvement in disaster response. Issues studied like the time taken to reach beneficiaries with required aid, material and human resource capacities were on average rated highly.

The study established that the typical form of decentralization practiced by KRCS is deconcentration with great emphasis placed on decongesting the headquarters and establishing

functional regional offices. It is then expected that there would be trickle down effects of the decentralization process to the branches covered by the regional offices established. The organization is however still in the first phase of its decentralization programme. According to the data gathered; one of the key strategies put in place to enhance the decentralization outcomes has been the introduction of a middle level management structure, the regional offices. The regional offices are currently serving as the main link between the headquarters and the branches. The regional offices have been equipped with competent technical personnel and disaster response materials and equipment for branch support. Key objectives for the decentralization of the disaster response programme were: (i) To strengthen and empower the branches, their facilities and the immediate communities in order for them to develop manage and build the required capacities in planning and management of their development and disaster/emergency programmes; (ii) decentralization will take services nearer to the vulnerable people and improve on response time in the case of emergencies; and (iii) decentralization will eliminate duplication amongst others. Neither the branch nor the entire KRCSS have conducted an evaluation to establish whether decentralization has achieved what it set out to.

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The capacity of the branch to respond to disasters has greatly been strengthened by decentralization in various ways. First, the establishment of the regional office and the subsequent recruitment of more competent personnel both at branch and regional level has positively changed the way in which the branch conducts its activities. The branch is now more professional in executing its services and has also been viewed as more credible after the dissolution of the previous weak board and the subsequent installation of a new board. Over 80% of the stakeholders are willing to network with the branch and to donate resources to its activities. The local staff hired currently have better management and coordination skills and are able to articulate the vision and mandate of the branch in a professional way. Second, disaster response materials and resources have been prepositioned from the headquarters to the region and the branch due to improved accountability. This has contributed to faster response to disasters. Third, enhanced communication and logistical capacities has hastened movement to disaster sites and subsequent sharing of information therefore enhancing decision making.

The branch's financial capacity was however found to be very weak. The study established that the branch is not able to raise more than half of its annual budget. During the interview with the

Branch Board, issues to do with delayed funds disbursements (by donors) were raised which at times led to postponement of activity implementation. The ability of the branch to generate revenue at local level was also very weak. Respondents cited the high poverty levels in the branch's main area of coverage coupled with high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDs as key contributing factors to the weak revenue raising ability. There was however a great opportunity for the branch to build partnerships with other agencies operating in Kisumu to support its activities. Most partners interviewed seemed to be happy with the branch and were willing to donate resources. There was also need for the branch to consider investing in income generating projects as its overreliance on donor funding is likely to affect its performance in lieu of the current global economic crises.

With regard to the organizational structure, KRCS has overhauled its previous centralized administrative structure in favour of a decentralized one. There has been a significant level of restructuring observed. Firstly, anew middle level structure was introduced and roles redefined for the headquarters and the branches taking into consideration the roles of the new structure. Secondly, the transfer of staff from the headquarters to the branches with a view to availing more competent staff at branch level for effective programme administration has led to better management and coordination with other stakeholder. Thirdly, the strengthening of local infrastructure at regional and branch level to deliver more efficient services including the construction of warehouses, prepositioning of relief material and equipment has led to faster response. Fourthly, the installation of a regional governance board to support the work of the management has been critical in enhancing the performance of the branch and the KRCS by extension.

Stakeholder involvement in branch activities included financial support to their programmes as well as material contribution during disasters. Certain stakeholders also second their vehicles to the organization during major disasters. Key partners in the region were very generally happy with the branch. There is room for the branch to exploit the existing goodwill with its stakeholder to strengthen its rather weak financial resource base. This is a contradiction with the previous centralized mode of management where the branch could not attract any stakeholders due to perceived lacked of transparency and professionalism from its personnel.

5.3 Conclusions

Decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme was designed to bring services closer to the victims of disasters thereby enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in disaster response at branch level. A number of lessons can be drawn from this study which shows that decentralization can help realize these objectives at branch level and also point out gaps and ways in which this could even work out better thereby enhancing the outcomes.

Firstly, the study revealed that KRCS Kisumu branch is regarded as a major stakeholder in the district with regard to disaster response, this was according to the ten stakeholder interviewed and as stated by the District Officer I Kisumu East. Key strengths noted included the huge network of volunteers with different skills and abilities including their commitment to the work of the branch. The branch had also a good stock of disaster response materials at its disposal hence its able to response to disaster very fast. The high competency and administrative skills of the KRCS staff in coordination and management of disaster response activities was another key strength noted.

Secondly, with regard to branch capacity there is need for any branch to always have requisite capacity so as to respond very fast. In the case of Kisumu branch the branch had an adequate number of personnel for disaster response however due to inadequate training some of the volunteers lacked the necessary skills to effectively respond to disasters. There is therefore need for the branch to build the capacity of its personnel in this line. Branch capacity with regard to disaster response materials and equipments is also critical for the success of any disaster response programme. When disaster response stock are decentralized to local levels, this minimizes the response time since material being centrally stored in Nairobi can take up to three days to arrive at the disaster sites. It was quite notable that the branch had a minimum amount of stock in its possession and that it could get additional stock from the regional warehouses in Kisumu any time their stock are depleted. There was need for the KRCS to consider availing other items currently missing from the branch and regional stock so as to maintain the response standards.

Thirdly, effective working tools like the computers, printers, camera etc are very important in ensuring that communication and reporting which is highly needed during disaster response is properly done. Items recommended by the branch as lacking including the GPS and the scanner need to be procured for them.

Fourthly, decentralization requires effective organizational structures that enable proper functioning, consultation and decision making. In the case of KRCS it was observed that a new structure was introduced to support the decentralized management structure. The creation of the regional offices was a notable feature and branches currently have adequate technical support from the region to support their work. Other facilities lacking at branch level including vehicles and related machinery can be borrowed from the regional office and returned when the emergency has ended. There was however need for close monitoring of the decentralization programme to ensure that the strengthening of the middle level management structure leads to real outcomes at branch level.

Fifthly, the intensity of decentralization is also a critical factor in determining the success of the decentralization programme for KRCS. This study learnt that KRCS is in its fourth year since the introduction of the decentralization concept and process and so far there hasn't been any progressive monitoring and evaluation of the strategies and steps being undertaken to show whether they are achieving what they set out to do. Although guidelines were in place this study noted that there ought to have been some form of systematic monitoring and evaluation of the programme done.

Sixthly, the study also revealed that there was a good level of involvement of various stakeholders and partners in the KRCS work with regard to disaster response. This presents a good opportunity for sharing resources and planning together to avoid duplication of efforts and unnecessary competition. A notable feature in the creation of effective partnership was transparency and integrity of the branch. The Branch Coordinator together with the branch board is expected to nurture and grow such partnerships. As this study pointed out there were a number of partners and stakeholders who were very much willing to work with the branch.

5.4 Recommendations

There is need to further enhance the capacity of the branch in various aspects:-

- i) The existing branch personnel (volunteers) need to be trained in various aspects related to disaster response. Those trained further need a refresher training to ensure that their knowledge and skills are up to date. There is also need to provide the personnel with

- adequate identification material (Jackets and Volunteer Identification numbers) which can easily be used during disaster response. There was therefore need to have some form of uniformity in the quality of training and also to ensure that those trained are regularly exposed to refresher courses and simulation exercises.
- ii) From observation, the Kisumu Branch Coordinator appeared overwhelmed with work. There is need to consider having an extra staff to assist him. Though the branch was using the services of volunteer's referred to as 'focal persons' to assist the coordinator with programme implementation. This could be termed as illegal as it does not conform to the organizations HR policies or to the country's labour laws.
 - iii) There is also need to constantly update the branch disaster response stock to ensure that there is always adequate stock. At the time of this study certain items were lacking both at the branch and at the regional warehouse meaning in case of any disaster such items will have to be got from Nairobi. The Branch Coordinator also expressed an interest to have the branch stock upgraded from 100 families to 500 families to avoid frequent requests for restocking. However, this will also mean that adequate measures have to be put in place to ensure that such stock is not misused. This study noted that there was lack of a proper record updating (inventory list) of most stock at branch and regional level.
 - iv) Due to the introduction of the new management structure (regional offices) there is need for the headquarters to continue to build the capacity of the region while keeping in mind the fact that regions are only meant to support the strengthening of the branch/grassroots structure and not an end in themselves. There is therefore need for continuous monitoring to ensure that the anticipated trickle down effects from the region to the branches are realized. Regions should always keep in mind that the actual work lies in having strong branches which are the main centers of delivery.
 - v) There is need for KRCS to carry out continuous monitoring of the decentralization programme to evaluate if it is achieving what it set out to do. This would then inform the decentralization strategies to be adopted during the next phase. It was observed that the organization is in its fourth year of decentralization yet there hasn't been any meaningful reviews done to inform the next strategies to be achieved.

- vi) The allocation of disaster response budgets to the branch from the headquarters needs to be on a planned level as opposed to being donor dependent. The headquarters and the regional office need to ensure that branches are given a defined minimum financial support for disaster response which is independent of normal donor funded programmes. This would be very important in profiling the KRCS further since disaster response is the core business of the branch and the KRCS in totality.
- vii) There is also need for the branch to put in place more stringent monitoring systems that ensure that the DREF funds are kept aside no matter whether the branch has financial challenges or not. The branch also needs to put in place measure to enhance its capital base and in particular to consider investing in stronger income generating projects like real estate. This could be done if the branch takes a bank loan.
- viii) Contributions by charities, businesses and the public to the disaster response kitty were limited mainly due to limited economic base and resource base in the district. The financing sources and the flow of funds for disaster response to the branch therefore raises three distinct concerns; Firstly, with limited headquarter based funding and budgetary allocations for disaster response activities in the branch, implies that the branch will begin to rely more on local sources and donations for financing of its disaster response programme. Secondly, the branch needs to enhance its measures for appropriate partnerships at local level. These could mean exploring possibilities of tapping into local disaster response kitty both at Municipality level and through the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). There is also need for the branch to seriously think about alternative and more reliable income generating projects and put in place measures to effectively market its products and services as well. During this study all the collection tins from Nakumatt had been withdrawn on request from Nakumatt headquarters and this therefore means that the branch income will continue to dwindle if other strategies are not critically thought through. Other alternatives lie in establishing more partnerships with line governments' ministries and organizations in the district that are likely to have resource for disaster response but with weak implementation capacity so that the branch becomes their implementing partners as is the case with the Amref supported 'Maanisha' Project.

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UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Questionnaire for KRCS Kisumu branch personnel (volunteers and staff)

Dear Respondent,

I am a Masters student at the University of Nairobi department of sociology undertaking research on “the effectiveness of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu Branch”. The aim of this study is purely academic to fulfill the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Rural Sociology and Community development. Focus of this study is based on the fact that KRCS decentralized its operations in 2005, and thus what has been the effect of this decentralization on disaster response service delivery.

In order to facilitate the achievement of this research you have been selected to participate in this survey. Kindly fill in this questionnaire for me and try be as honest and objective as possible. All information given will be treated as confidential and will be used for this study only.

Thank you.

With Kind regards

Pamellah Indiaka

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

1.	Name of Respondent (Optional)	
2.	Gender (Tick appropriately)	a) Male b) Female
3.	Title of Respondent (e.g. Accountant)	
4.	Are you a volunteer or Staff member? (Tick appropriately)	a) Volunteer b) Staff
5.	Professional Background	
6.	Area of work in the Branch (Tick appropriately)	(a) Finance & Administration (b) Water & Sanitation (c) Health & Nutrition (d) Relief Distribution (e) Others Specify
7.	When did you join the KRCS Kisumu Branch? (Tick appropriately)	a) Before 2005 b) In 2006-2008 c) In 2009
8.	What is your highest education Level? (Tick appropriately)	(a) O-Level (b) Certificate (c) Diploma (d) Degree (e) Postgraduate (f) Others(Specify)

SECTION B: RESPONSE TO DISASTERS

9.	Are you a member of the KRCS disaster response team in Kisumu?	(a) Yes (b) No.
10.	If yes when did you last participate in disaster response activities?	(Indicate month and year)
11.	What type of disaster was it? (Tick appropriately)	(a) Floods (b) Fire (c) Drought (d) Road accident (e) Post Election Violence (f) Tribal Clashes (g) All of the above

		(h) Others (specify)
12.	What services and materials did the branch provide to the beneficiaries?	
13.	In your opinion was your response adequate and in line with the beneficiary expectations?	
14.	What more could have been done by the branch?	

SECTION C: CAPACITY OF THE BRANCH

15.	Have you been trained in any disaster related field in the last 3 years? If yes indicate the name and level of the training.	
16.	If yes to 15 above, was the training adequate for your current tasks?	a) Very adequate b) Adequate c) Fairly adequate d) Not adequate e) Below expectation
17.	What other trainings would you require (please write down.)	
18.	During response to disasters do you have access to relevant response gear and equipment? State the relevant items available.	
19.	In your opinion does the branch have adequate logistics and warehousing facilities for effective disaster response? Elaborate your answer	
20.	If No Please indicate what is lacking.	

SECTION D: LEVEL OF DECENTRALIZATION

21.	Are you familiar with the	
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	KRCS decentralization policy?	
22.	If yes to 17 above list any three objectives for decentralization as stipulated in the policy.	
23.	When did KRCS introduce decentralization? Were you consulted?	
24.	In your opinion is decentralization good or bad for the branch?	
25.	What are the key changes observed in the branch as a result of decentralization?	
26.	What changes in the structure of KRCS have accompanied the process of decentralization? (Include the structure of the Disaster response programme)	
27.	In general, what are some of the benefits of decentralization accrued so far?	
28.	What are some of the challenges being experienced?(Both internal and external including communication infrastructure)	
29.	What would you recommend needs to be done to enhance the outcomes in decentralization?	
30.	What is your perception of Kisumu Branch personnel on decentralization?	
SECTION E: FUNDRAISING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION		
31.	What is the average budget for KRCS Kisumu Branch disaster	

	KRCS decentralization policy?	
22.	If yes to 17 above list any three objectives for decentralization as stipulated in the policy.	
23.	When did KRCS introduce decentralization? Were you consulted?	
24.	In your opinion is decentralization good or bad for the branch?	
25.	What are the key changes observed in the branch as a result of decentralization?	
26.	What changes in the structure of KRCS have accompanied the process of decentralization? (Include the structure of the Disaster response programme)	
27.	In general, what are some of the benefits of decentralization accrued so far?	
28.	What are some of the challenges being experienced?(Both internal and external including communication infrastructure)	
29.	What would you recommend needs to be done to enhance the outcomes in decentralization?	
30.	What is your perception of Kisumu Branch personnel on decentralization?	

SECTION E: FUNDRAISING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

31.	What is the average budget for KRCS Kisumu Branch disaster	
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	KRCS decentralization policy?	
22.	If yes to 17 above list any three objectives for decentralization as stipulated in the policy.	
23.	When did KRCS introduce decentralization? Were you consulted?	
24.	In your opinion is decentralization good or bad for the branch?	
25.	What are the key changes observed in the branch as a result of decentralization?	
26.	What changes in the structure of KRCS have accompanied the process of decentralization? (Include the structure of the Disaster response programme)	
27.	In general, what are some of the benefits of decentralization accrued so far?	
28.	What are some of the challenges being experienced?(Both internal and external including communication infrastructure)	
29.	What would you recommend needs to be done to enhance the outcomes in decentralization?	
30.	What is your perception of Kisumu Branch personnel on decentralization?	

SECTION E: FUNDRAISING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

31.	What is the average budget for KRCS Kisumu Branch disaster	
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	response programme?	_____
32.	Where does the branch get its funds for disaster response activities from?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Headquarters b) Local donations c) From Income generating Projects at the Branch d) All of the above e) Other specify
33.	Are the funds adequate for branch activities particularly disaster response?	_____
34.	Who makes decisions on disaster response activities in Kisumu branch?	_____
35.	How would you describe your role in planning, budgeting and fund raising?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Very adequate b) Adequate c) Fairly adequate d) Not adequate e) Below expectation
SECTION F: STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT		
36.	Who are your main stakeholders during response to disasters	_____
37.	What role do they normally play?	_____
38.	Are your stakeholders useful to the Branch during disaster response.	_____
39.	If yes in what way? If no explain what can be done to enhance their usefulness.	_____

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Questionnaire for Branch Manager

Dear Respondent,

I am a Masters student at the University of Nairobi department of sociology undertaking research on "the effectiveness of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu Branch". The aim of this study is purely academic to fulfill the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Rural Sociology and Community development. Focus of this study is based on the fact that KRCS decentralized its operations in 2005, and thus what has been the effect of this decentralization on disaster response service delivery.

In order to facilitate the achievement of this research you have been selected to participate in this survey. Kindly fill in this questionnaire for me and try be as honest and objective as possible. All information given will be treated as confidential and will be used for this study only.

Thank you.

With Kind regards

Pamellah Indiaka

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

1.	Name of Respondent (Optional)	
2.	Gender	a) Male b) Female
3.	What is your highest level of education attained?	_____ _____
4.	Area of specialization	_____
5.	When did you join the KRCS Kisumu Branch?	_____ _____
6.	What is your age? Tick appropriately	a) 25-35 years b) 35-45years c) 45-60 years d) Over 60years

SECTION B: HUMAN RESOURCES

7.	How many volunteers/staff are in KRCS Kisumu Branch?	a) Volunteers _____ b) Staff _____
8.	Are the Volunteer/Staff numbers adequate for branch activity requirements? (Please explain)	_____ _____ _____
9.	Kindly provide a list of the staff presently working in the branch and state their titles.	_____ _____ _____
10.	Do the volunteers and staff possess adequate skills for effective disaster response?	_____ _____ _____
11.	What is the average level of education for the branch staff and volunteers?	a) Volunteers _____ b) Staff _____
12.	How do you recruit your volunteers and staff ?	a) Volunteers _____ b) Staff _____
13.	What key competencies do you look for in the recruitment of the Staff and Volunteers?	a) Volunteers _____ b) Staff _____
14.	Is there a specific training programme for volunteers and staff?	a) Volunteers (Explain) _____ _____ b) Staff (Explain) _____

15.	Since the introduction of the decentralization process in 2005 are there any staff transferred from the HQs to Kisumu Branch? (If yes please provide details)	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
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SECTION C: DISASTER RESPONSE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT

16.	Below is a list of communication items required for effective disaster response. Kindly tick in the column that best describes their reliability and effectiveness for disaster response.	Fill in table 1 below.
17.	For each of the categories of the disaster response materials listed below comment on their adequacy and reliability for effective disaster response.	Fill in table 2 below.
18.	Does the Branch have storage facilities for its daster response supplies?	<hr/> <hr/> If yes indicate the numbers please _____
19.	Kindly provide me with a list of relief stocks currently in your warehouses. If possible comment on the adequacy of each of the stock items.	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
20.	Do you have access to adequate motor vehicle(s) for use (relief and personnel transport) during disaster operations in Kisumu branch?	(i.) Strongly agree (ii.) Agree (iii.) Dont know iv) Disagree
21.	If you have vehicles, please provide me their details as indicated in the table 3 below.	Fill in table 3 below.

SECTION D: DISASTER RESPONSE

22.	Please provide me with details of disaster(s) or emergencies that Kisumu branch has responded to in the past three years as shown in the	Fill in table 4 below.
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	table below.	
23.	On average how much time does the branch take to reach the disaster victims with required aid?	(a) 0- 6 hrs (b) 6-12 hrs (c) 12-24 hrs (d) 24-48 hrs (e) More than 48 hrs
24.	What assistance does the branch provide to the disaster victims? State the support per category provided	(a) Search and rescue _____ (b) Water and Sanitation _____ (c) Health and nutrition _____ (d) Food _____ (e) Shelter _____ (f) Tracing and family reunification _____ (g) Psychosocial support _____
25.	In your opinion are the materials provided to disaster victims relevant to their requirements? Elaborate please.	_____ _____ _____
26.	What more does the branch need to ensure effective response to disasters	_____ _____ _____

SECTION E: LEVEL OF DECENTRALIZATION

27.	When did KRCS decentralize its operations?	_____
28.	What were the objectives for the KRCS decentralization?	_____ _____
29.	Are the decentralization objectives clear and consistent with other KRCS policies and structures?	_____ _____ _____
30.	Does the decentralization policy specify appropriate allocation of functions for Kisumu Branch based on its capacity and resources?	_____ _____ _____
31.	How far is the KRCS decentralization process in Kisumu Branch?	_____ _____ _____
32.	Are there any achievements realized in the decentralization of the disaster response programmes up to	_____ _____ _____

	date? Please elaborate	
33.	What are the main constraints to 31 above? Please elaborate	
34.	What management strategies has KRCS put in place in order to effectively decentralize?	
35.	Are the strategies in 33 above adequate? What more needs to be done. Also mention any shortcomings.	
36.	Who makes decisions on when and how to respond to disasters in Kisumu?	
37.	Is the decision making process effective enough to allow faster response to disasters?	
38.	If no to 36 above, what more needs to be done to enhance the decision making process.	

SECTION F: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

39.	Are you familiar with the current KRCS organizational structure? Please provide a copy	
40.	Is the branch planning, implementation and reporting procedure clear and standardized in the provided organizational structure?	
41.	Are interbranch linkages effective to allow smooth coordination of activities?	
42.	Are there any structural changes effected in Kisumu Branch in the last three years? Please explain	

SECTION G: STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

43.	Who are the main stakeholders for the Branch during disaster response activities?	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
44.	What role do the stakeholders listed above play during response to disasters	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
45.	What strategies has the branch put in place to enhance stakeholder involvement?	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
46.	Does the branch have a monitoring tool for evaluating its stakeholder perception and involvement?	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
47.	In your opinion has the involvement by stakeholders in the Branch disaster response activities declined or increased for the last three years?	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
48.	What reasons explain the trend in 46 above?	<hr/> <hr/>

Table 1: Use this table to answer question 15 above.

Communication item/gadget	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor	Remarks (Indicate Nos if possible)
Telephone lines (Both landline and mobile)						
Computer (Desktop and laptops)						
Printers						
Internet connection						
Fax machine						
Photocopier						
Digital camera						
Scanner						
VHF radio						
GPS equipment						
Maps						
Medium & Small size vehicles						
Trailers/trucks						
Others (Specify						

Table 2: Use this table to answer question 16 above.

Category	Item	Does the Branch have them? (Yes/No)	Are they Adequate (Yes/No)	Are they reliable (Yes/No)	Other Remarks
Search and Rescue Materials	First Aid Materials				
	Medical Supplies				
	Flood lights				
	Ambulance				
	Others				
Water and Sanitation supplies	Aquatabs				
	Water purifiers				
	Water storage/ tanks/Buckets/jerrican				
	Mobilets/Sanplasts				
	Dustbins				
	Gumboots and related drainage facilities				
	Insecticides and other				

	rodent control chemicals				
Health and nutrition	Supplementary Feeding supplies e.g Unimix				
	Vaccinations and related drugs				
Shelter	Tents				
	Tarpaulins				
	Construction materials				
	Blankets				
	Mosquito nets				
	Bedsheet				
Food	a) What foodstuffs are available in the Branch warehouses?				
	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>				
	b) Are they foodstuffs compliant to the local community food needs and are they customarily acceptable				
	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>				
Reunification of families	What tools does the Branch use for its tracing and family reunification activities?				
	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>				
Psychosocial Support	What tools does the Branch use for its counselling activities?				
	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/>				

Table 3: Use this table to answer question 20 above.

Motor vehicle type	Reg. No.	Year acquired	Source of funds	Condition*	Comments**

Note

- * **Conditions:** Tick as
- a) Excellent condition and on road;
 - b) On road but require minor repairs;
 - c) grounded and require major repairs

** **comments:** Comment as either Adequate or not adequate

Table 4: Use this table to answer question 21 above.

Year	Disaster/ Emergency	Area/location	Casualties or damages	Actors/responders (e.g G.O.K, KRCS)	Main Constraints

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Questionnaire for Stakeholders

Dear Respondent,

I 'am a Masters student at the University of Nairobi department of sociology undertaking research on "the effectiveness of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu Branch". The aim of this study is purely academic to fulfill the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Rural Sociology and Community development. Focus of this study is based on the fact that KRCS decentralized its operations in 2005, and thus what has been the effect of this decentralization on disaster response service delivery.

In order to facilitate the achievement of this research you have been selected to participate in this survey. Kindly fill in this questionnaire for me and try be as honest and objective as possible. All information given will be treated as confidential and will be used for this study only.

Thank you.

With Kind regards

Pamellah Indiaka

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

1.	Name of the Interviewee	_____
2.	Name of the organization represented by the Interviewee	_____
3.	Title of the respondent	_____
4.	The period the stakeholder has worked in Kisumu area	_____
5.	The period the stakeholder has been involved with KRCS-Kisumu branch	_____

SECTION B: RESPONSE TO DISASTERS

6.	a. When was the last time your organization participated in a disaster response activity in Kisumu? b. What disaster was it?	a. _____ b. _____
7.	What role was played by various organizations in disaster response? List down the organization and the role it played.	_____
8.	What role did KRCS Kisumu Branch play? (Indicate the resources donated if possible)	_____
9.	In general how would you rate the role and services offered by KRCS Kisumu branch during the above mentioned disaster?	a) Very good b) Good c) Fair d) Bad e) Very bad
10.	On average how much time did it take for the Branch to respond?	(a) 0-6 hrs (b) 6-12 hrs (c) 12-24 hrs (d) 24-48hrs (e) Over 48 hrs

SECTION C: CAPACITY OF THE BRANCH

11.	How do you rate the technical and managerial skills of the KRCS Kisumu branch personnel during response to disasters?	(a) Very good (b) Good (c) Fair (d) Bad (e) Very bad
12.	How do you rate the capacity of the KRCS Kisumu Branch personnel to coordinate, control and integrate decisions during disaster response activities?	a) Very good b) Good c) Fair d) Bad e) Very bad
13.	How do you rate the integrity and honesty of the Branch personnel in handling disaster response stocks?	a) Very good b) Good c) Fair d) Bad e) Very bad
14.	How do you rate the quality and adequacy of the disaster response materials donated by the Branch to beneficiaries during disasters?	(a) Excellent (b) Good (c) Fair (d) Bad (e) Very bad
15.	Does the branch have adequate Logistical and warehousing facilities for effective disaster response? Please explain	_____ _____ _____ _____
16.	Does the Branch have effective communication facilities and networks? Please explain	_____ _____ _____ _____
17.	In your opinion does the Branch have adequate funds for its disaster response activities?	_____ _____ _____ _____

SECTION D: STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

18.	How do you rate the strength of the local politicians,	(a) Very Good (b) Good
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	Provincial administrators and other NGOs support for KRCS Kisumu Branch activities?	(c) Fair (d) Bad (e) Very bad
19.	Has your organization previously donated any resources to the Branch during a disaster activity in Kisumu?	(a) Yes (b) No
20.	If no to 17 above state the reason please.	_____ _____
21.	If Yes to 17 above kindly list down the support given	a) Financial resources b) Logistical support e.g. Vehicles and rub halls, warehouses etc c) Materials e.g. food, drugs etc d) Personnel e.g. Doctors, nurses, counselors etc
22.	In your opinion does the Branch value, respect and appreciate its stakeholders? Explain your answer	a) Yes (Explain) _____ b) No (Explain) _____
23.	Would you choose KRCS as your preferred partner of choice during disaster response activities? Explain your reason for doing/not doing so.	_____ _____ _____ _____
24.	In your opinion what are the main challenges affecting effective disaster response (internal and external) by government and NGOs in Kisumu area (including logistics, cultural, political, coordination, personnel, resource mobilization, communication, infrastructure)	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
25.	In your opinion what could KRCS Kisumu Branch do to be more effective in disaster response?	_____ _____ _____

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Questionnaire for Branch Board Members

Dear Respondent,

I am a Masters student at the University of Nairobi department of sociology undertaking research on "the effectiveness of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu Branch". The aim of this study is purely academic to fulfill the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Rural Sociology and Community development. Focus of this study is based on the fact that KRCS decentralized its operations in 2005, and thus what has been the effect of this decentralization on disaster response service delivery.

In order to facilitate the achievement of this research you have been selected to participate in this survey. Kindly fill in this questionnaire for me and try be as honest and objective as possible. All information given will be treated as confidential and will be used for this study only.

Thank you.

With Kind regards

Pamellah Indiaka

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

1.	Name of Respondent (Optional)	_____
2.	Gender	a) Male b) Female
3.	Title of respondent in the Branch Board	_____
4.	Professional Background e.g. Medical Doctor, Accountant etc	_____
5.	For how long have you served on the KRCS Kisumu branch board? Tick appropriately	a) Less than 3 years b) Within the last 3 years c) 3-5 years d) More than 5 years
6.	What is your highest level of education attained?	a) O-Level b) Certificate c) Diploma d) Degree e) Postgraduate f) Others(Specify)

SECTION B: FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND REVENUE RAISING ABILITY

7.	Where does the branch get funds for its disaster response activities from?	a) Transfers from the headquarters' b) Locally through various fundraising initiatives c) Locally from Income generating Projects d) All of the above e) Others Specify
8.	Does the branch have adequate financial resource that match its disaster response programme requirements?	_____
9.	Are there any Income generating Projects initiated in the Branch in the last three years? If yes please elaborate	_____
10.	Is the branch disaster response budget in line with available funds?	_____
11.	Is the branch allowed to raise its own resources locally?	_____

12.	Are there any policies that constrain effective revenue generation at local level? If so Please explain	
13.	Is the public willing to donate to the branch activities freely? Explain	

SECTION C: LEVEL OF DECENTRALIZATION

14.	Are you familiar with the KRCS decentralization policy? If yes please state the main objectives.	
15.	What strategies have been put in place to ensure effective decentralization?	
16.	In your opinion is decentralization good for effective disaster response? Please elaborate your answer	
17.	What achievements have been realized so far?	
18.	Who makes decisions on when and how to respond to disasters in Kisumu?	
19.	In what specific ways has decentralization expanded the autonomy, flexibility and innovativeness of the branch with respect to decision making in disaster response? (Key issues here include resource mobilization, flexibility in determining personnel and stock levels)	

SECTION D: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

20.	What structural changes have characterized the process of	
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	decentralization? (Changes in the functions of the board)	
21.	What organizational capacities have been enhanced to cope with these new organizational structural changes?	
22.	Are the reporting and communication channels clear?	
23.	Is the Branch roles, duties and responsibilities clear as compared to other structures of the organization at regional or national level? Please explain.	
24.	How has decentralization enhanced branch level monitoring and evaluation and how has this enhanced organizational learning and effectiveness in disaster response?	
25.	Are there any constraints that have been posed by the Act of Parliament that established KRCS and the KRCS Constitution in effectively rolling out the decentralization process?	

SECTION E: STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

26.	Who are the main stakeholders for the Branch in disaster response?	
27.	In what ways do they contribute to the branch activities during disaster response? Indicate the	a) Human Resource _____ b) Financial resources _____ c) Material resources _____

	contributions for each stakeholder you mention	
28.	In what ways has decentralization affected relationship with the various stakeholders in disaster management, particularly governmental and Nongovernmental organizations?	
29.	In what specific ways has Stakeholder participation in disaster management been enhanced by the decentralization process?	
30.	Has decentralization enhanced utilization of local capacities (of stakeholder) in any way?	
31.	What impacts has decentralization had on the following phases of disaster management?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Disaster response _____ b. Disaster mitigation _____ c. Disaster recovery _____ d. Disaster preparedness _____

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Interview Guide for Human Resource Manager, Disaster Response Manager and Regional Manager

Dear Respondent,

I am a Masters student at the University of Nairobi department of sociology undertaking research on "the effectiveness of decentralization of the KRCS disaster response programme in Kisumu Branch". The aim of this study is purely academic to fulfill the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Rural Sociology and Community development. Focus of this study is based on the fact that KRCS decentralized its operations in 2005, and thus what has been the effect of this decentralization on disaster response service delivery.

In order to facilitate the achievement of this research you have been selected to participate in this survey. Kindly allow me to ask you a few questions with regard to this and try to be as honest and objective as possible. All information given will be treated as confidential and will be used for this study only.

Thank you.

With Kind regards

Pamellah Indiaka

SECTION A: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER

1.	Name of the Interviewee	_____
2.	Gender	a) Male b) Female
3.	Highest level of education attained.	_____
4.	How long have you worked with the KRCS?	_____
5.	What is the overall mandate of the Human Resource unit? Please tick appropriately.	a) Staff recruitment and placement b) Staffing policies and Job profiles c) Volunteering policies d) Staff appraisals e) Remuneration f) Professional development and training for Staff and volunteers g) Personnel Administration h) All of the above i) Other Specify
6.	Who is responsible for HR functions at Kisumu Branch level?	_____
7.	What role does the Kisumu Branch play in HR functions listed in 4 above?	_____
8.	What competencies do you look for in recruiting disaster response staff and volunteers?	_____
9.	What criteria do you use for selecting staff to work at specific branches in particular Kisumu Branch?	_____
10.	Do you have a clear policy on staff transfers particularly in regard to transferring staff from Headquarters to regions	_____

	or branches? Please elaborate	
11.	What is the general perception of staff on these transfers are they willing to be transferred?	
12.	What factors do you consider in effecting inter branch or inter organizational staff transfers?	
13.	Is there a difference in the level of competencies between headquarter, regional and branch staff?	

SECTION B: DISASTER RESPONSE MANAGER (To be answered by the Disaster Response Manager only)

14.	Name of Interviewee	
15.	Gender	a) Male b) Female
16.	What is the role of the disaster response unit in KRCS?	
17.	What does effective disaster response entail?	
18.	What is the role of the Regions and Branches in disaster response?	a) Regions b) Branches
19.	What strategies have been put in place to ensure effective	

	response to disasters by the branches?	
20.	When did KRCS adopt decentralization as a strategy for effective disaster response?	
21.	What are the objectives for decentralizing the disaster response programme?	
22.	What key strategies have been put in place to ensure effective decentralization?	
23.	What structural changes in reporting lines if any have been introduced due to decentralization?	
24.	Are there any outcomes so far. Please list them down	
25.	Are there any changes in structure, planning and reporting lines as a result of decentralization? Please list down.	
26.	On average within what time frame do you expect a branch to have reached disaster victims with required aid?	(a) 0- 6 hrs (b) 6-12 hrs (c) 12-24 hrs (d) 24-48 hrs (e) More than 48 hrs
27.	Do you have a tool for monitoring and evaluating disaster response by the Branches? If yes kindly provide a copy.	
SECTION C: REGIONAL MANGER (To be answered by Regional Manager only)		
28.	Name of Interviewee	
29.	Gender	a) Male b) Female

30.	How long interviewee has worked in Kisumu area?	
31.	When was the region established?	
32.	What is the role and mandate of the region with respect to disaster response?	
33.	Are the roles and policies of the organization clear to allow effective linkages and coordination of disaster response activities?	
34.	Who makes decisions on disaster response in Kisumu branch?	
35.	Are there any overlaps between the region and the branch with regards to local resource mobilization for disaster response?	
36.	Are communication and reporting lines between regions and branches clear and understood by KRCS personnel at all levels.	
37.	What is the role and mandate of the regional office with regards to disaster response in Kisumu?	
38.	Does the region have the required financial, human resource and material resource capacity to support the branches in ensuring effective response to disasters? Please explain	
39.	What support does the region provide to the branch? Is the	

	support adequate?	
40.	What challenges if any has the region experienced in trying to ensure branches respond to disasters effectively?	
41.	What more needs to be done to ensure effective disaster response?	
42.	What is the role of the regional board in disaster response programming?	
43.	What resources do you have in the region for disaster response?	
44.	Are the resources adequate?	
45.	What challenges do you experience in responding to disasters that are likely to affect your effectiveness?	