

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**USE OF MILITARY POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC AND  
AUTOCRATIC STATES**

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## DECLARATION

I, Dalton Adwett Odhiambo hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for an award.

**Signature:** ..... **Date**.....

Dalton A. Odhiambo

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

**Signature**..... **Date**.....

Dr. Patrick Maluki

## **DEDICATION**

This research work is dedicated to the following: My loving family for support and patience during the entire period of my study. For their encouragement and continued prayers towards the successful completion of this course.

Finally I pay tribute and gratitude to my employer and colleagues for their understanding during the entire period of the study. Thank you and God bless you.

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## ABSTRACT

The successful application of national power lies in determining and utilizing the most appropriate mix of the instruments of national power to achieve a desired outcome or end state. And the principal instruments of national power include the economic, informational, diplomacy and the military. And in this case the Military power is applied as appropriate to achieve national objectives. Military power is normally used only as a means of last resort when other instruments of national power have failed, or are at risk of failing, to protect national interests. This research problem looked at the use of military power: a comparative study of democratic and autocratic states. The study was guided by the following specific objectives to determine the role of the military within a state, to find the constraints on the use of military power in democratic and autocratic states and the Core characteristics democratic and autocratic states. The research design that was employed in this study is descriptive survey. This study targeted a population from the public and military in Kenya. The population sample was 50 individuals both from both public and military. The researcher used primary data for this study and was collected using questionnaires; the questionnaires included closed and open ended questions. Closed ended questions was used in an effort to conserve time and money as well as to facilitate an easier analysis be based on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. Data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics. Data analysis was done with help of software programme SPSS version 21. Modernization Theory was looked at and it emphasized the importance of structural change and associated the rise of per capita incomes with the decline of the agrarian economy and the rise of urban industry. The study further came up with recommendations such as the role of the military should being broadened to other function so as to ensure that the military is efficiently used in the county. The government should ensure that the policies set by them facilitate the military in conducting function outside the barrack and such policies should permit the military to come to help the country in times of crisis. The military should be trained on observing prime functions such as protecting basic human rights and being capable of committing to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise. While the government should promote the principles of majority rule and individual rights in the country.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### **1.1 Back ground of the study**

For better understanding of some elements of the topic, a military is an organization authorized by its greater society to use lethal force, usually including use of weapons, in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats. The military may also have additional functions of use to its greater society, such as advancing a political agenda, supporting or promoting economic expansion through imperialism, and as a form of internal social control. Military power in this case, is the potential of the military capabilities that a nation possesses. The employment of military power within a comprehensive approach framework is rapidly becoming the norm at all levels of war, from the strategic to the tactical level. The individual elements of military power must therefore be more interactive and complementary in order to ensure success in meeting the aims and objectives of national strategy. A Democratic state that the researcher also looked at is a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally, either directly or indirectly through elected representatives in the proposal, development, and creation of laws. It encompasses social, religious, cultural, ethnic and racial equality, justice, and liberty. Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of all eligible citizens executes its will. One form of democracy is direct democracy, in which all eligible citizens have direct and active participation in the political decision making. In most modern democracies, the whole body of all eligible citizens remains the sovereign power but political power is exercised indirectly through elected representatives; this is called representative democracy or democratic republic. The concept of representative democracy

arose largely from ideas and institutions that developed during the European Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, and the American and French Revolutions

Autocratic states on the other hand, is a system of government in which a supreme power is concentrated in the hands of one person, whose decisions are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control (except perhaps for the implicit threat of coup d'état or mass insurrection) Contemporary debates on military intervention have continued to attract much scholarly attention. Ortega (2001) points out that certain interventions decided upon and carried out by states devoid of endorsement by the UN Security Council, was found to be acceptable. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes has been contentious both when it has happened, as in Somalia, and when it failed to happen, as in Rwanda. This new activism for some has been a long overdue internationalization of the human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of an international system dependent upon the sovereignty of states as well as the sacrosanct nature of their territory. Yet again, for some, the only real issue centres on ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, debates about the legality process as well as the possible misuse of precedent feature more prominently. This controversy has uncovered some fundamental divisions in the international community. It is therefore incumbent that these divisions be resolved in the interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail to protect them.

While the physical ability of the military to destroy or deny is undisputed, there are several ways in which this ability may be constrained. Some are self-imposed limitations compliant with ethical, moral or political considerations. Some are legally based and derived from the law of armed conflict. Others are the inevitable consequences of the physical environment or

the specific circumstances in which military forces find themselves, so, this study looked at the use of military power: A comparative study of Democratic and Autocratic States.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

The physical component of a fighting military force has got all the means to fight. It has five elements: manpower, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability. It is, therefore, a combination of the ships, land vehicles, aircraft, associated weapons and sensors, and other equipment's, the people that man them and the training they undergo to fight, both as individuals and as members of operational units, in order that they can be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by the state. But, why can't such a military force well equipped be allowed or given an opportunity to engage in internal conflict when human rights are violated? More also, the successful application of national power lies in determining and utilizing the most appropriate mix of the instruments of national power to achieve a desired outcome or end state. And the principal instruments of national power include the economic, informational, diplomacy and the military. And in this case the Military power is applied as appropriate to achieve national objectives. Military power is normally used only as a means of last resort when other instruments of national power have failed, or are at risk of failing, to protect national interests. This research problem looked at the use of military power: a comparative study of democratic and autocratic states.

## **1.3 Objectives of the study**

### **1.3.1 General objective**

To compare the use of military power in democratic and autocratic state.

### **1.3.2 Specific objectives**

The study was guided by the following objectives:

- I. To determine the role of the military within a states.
- II. To find the constraints on the use of military power in democratic and autocratic states.
- III. To find out the Core characteristics democratic and autocratic states.

### **1.4 Hypotheses**

1. Military interventions is often legally sanctioned by an international organization
2. National policies restricts military operations internally without the approval of the head of state and policy makers

### **1.5 Justification of the study**

The academic justification to carry out the study was based in the literature regarding military power in democratic and autocratic states. The critical need to focus on was based on the need to restore stability, promote welfare and growth and to restore peace. Insecurity and violent conflicts affects everyone and infringes on the principles of freedom that every citizen of a democratic and autocratic state deserves to enjoy. Kenya's internal security apparatus for instance, failed to contain violent conflict in various parts of the country during the post-election violence in the year 2007 and 2008 while a well-equipped military force was in place and had all the necessary resources to contain such violent conflict, the question is, why wasn't that military power used and yet Kenya is a democratic state?. The study seeked to enlighten the importance of the use of military power when other means fails. The study also

would be useful to the future researchers. The benefit of the study would also help to understand the nature and the use of military power in democratic and autocratic states.

## **1.6 Literature review**

This section involves the relevant literature review concerning the research problem which is the reason as to why the study was undertaken. The study discussed the organization of the military, low-intensity conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, the concept of intervention, humanitarian intervention since 1945, human interventions failures, the democratic state; its nature and characteristics, military power in general, and more importantly, its significance and role to the society.

The literature review was based on the specific objectives to ensure that focus remains on the research topic. To come to grips with the research problem on the use of military power: a comparative study on democratic and autocratic states, we'll examine some specifics. The major elements that influence the use of military power in democratic and autocratic states are: the nature of a democratic and autocratic state, the nature of military power, and the nature of the interaction between the military system and the society itself. The interaction applies particularly to the questions: first, how does a democratic or autocratic state create and maintain an effective system of military power and, second, how do the leaders of the nation and the executives in government control the employment of military force in the interests of the society and the state? This interaction presents a paradox because some elements in the society that strengthen freedom may also inhibit the efficient creation and maintenance of the military system and the effective employment of military force in the interests of the society (Eccles, 1965). Throughout this interaction there is the unresolved question: how and to what degree should the noncombat activities of the military system be

used to further the social and economic interests of the society and the partisan political interests of the national executives and legislators?

Given the dilemma inferred in the literature review on the use of military power or intervention, there emerges the need to defend and protect even a single human being in a society. And bearing in mind that responsibility to protect is a basic human right; the argument for military intervention in democratic and autocratic states should therefore seek to address the critical perspectives. For this reason, this study was conducted following a realist approach as derived from the works of Hans Morgenthau based on the assertion that the study of international relations is primarily concerned with inter-state relations. States are the dominant actors and they are conceived to be well integrated internally and to act externally as a clearly defined unit.

For Morgenthau, the “key concept” is interest defined as power” which “is indeed the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Power may comprise anything that established and maintains the control of man over man.” Thus “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.

The study of military intervention in Rwanda and the DRC for instance is rooted in the sub-discipline of civil military relations and security studies. This section thus seeks to examine theories of international relations dealing with interventions, mostly realism, and other national security approaches (Eccles, 1965). Various approaches which fall within the scope of security studies, such as realism, constructivism, and idealism and pluralism, were examined in the light of humanitarian assistance and military intervention in Africa. These approaches help us to understand the relationship between individual, national and international security. They explain in various ways the important role of sovereign states as



actors in international relations and how state interests shape security policies. The issue of states as independent actors is significant in explaining how and why decisions were taken by each intervening state.

It is clear that war and military means were a major strategy of the states that intervened in Rwanda and the DRC. This strategy was seen as a viable foreign policy tool in achieving their interests in all the targeted states. The intervening states perceive the use of force as the solution to intrastate conflict, rather than mediation and international conventions in conflict resolution that do not entertain military means. Therefore, realist theory may provide an insight into why neither regional nor continental organisations were consulted before military interventions took place. However, the explanatory strength of other theories mentioned above also requires analysis. And above all, the study looked into the use of military power: a comparative study of democratic and autocratic states.

Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers. One author, paraphrasing Samuel P. Huntington's writings in *The Soldier and the State*, has summarized the civilian control ideal as "the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority". The de jure opposite of civilian control of the military is a military dictatorship. De facto lack of control over the military may result in a state within a state. Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. One example is the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never

be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Communist Party of China (and communist parties in general) as decision-makers in Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theories of democratic centralism.

As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn "civilian control is not a fact but a process". Affirmations of respect for the values of civilian control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civilian leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. National Leaders with limited experience in military matters often have little choice but to rely on the advice of professional military commanders trained in the art and science of warfare to inform the limits of policy; in such cases, the military establishment may enter the bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particular course of action, shaping the policy-making process and blurring any clear-cut lines of civilian control. advocates of civilian control generally take a Clausewitzian view of war, emphasizing its political character. The words of Georges Clemenceau, "War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men" (also frequently rendered as "War is too important to be left to the generals"), wryly reflect this view. Given that broad strategic decisions, such as the decision to declare a war, start an invasion, or end a conflict, have a major impact on the citizens of the country, they are seen by civilian control advocates as best guided by the will of the people (as expressed by their political representatives), rather than left solely to an elite group of tactical experts. The military serves as a special government agency, which is supposed to implement, rather than formulate, policies that require the use of certain types of physical force. Kohn succinctly summarizes this view when he writes that: "the point of

civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around. The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it."

A state's effective use of force is an issue of great concern for all national leaders, who must rely on the military to supply this aspect of their authority. The danger of granting military leaders full autonomy or sovereignty is that they may ignore or supplant the democratic decision-making process, and use physical force, or the threat of physical force, to achieve their preferred outcomes; in the worst cases, this may lead to a coup or military dictatorship. A related danger is the use of the military to crush domestic political opposition through intimidation or sheer physical force, interfering with the ability to have free and fair elections, a key part of the democratic process. This poses the paradox that "because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection". Also, military personnel, because of the nature of their job, are much more willing to use force to settle disputes than civilians because they are trained military personnel that specialize strictly in warfare. The military is authoritative, hierarchical, don't require much discussion and no dissent.<sup>[2]</sup> For instance, in the Empire of Japan, prime ministers and almost everyone in high positions were military people like Hideki Tojo, and advocated and basically pressured the leaders to start military conflicts against China and others because they believed that they would ultimately be victorious. Many of the Founding Fathers of the United States were suspicious of standing militaries. As Samuel Adams wrote in 1768, "Even when there is a necessity of the military power, within a land, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it". Even more forceful are the words of Elbridge Gerry, a delegate to the American Constitutional Convention, who wrote that 's anding armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican

Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism."

In Federalist No. 8, one of the Federalist Papers documenting the ideas of some of the Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton worried that maintaining a large standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking. In his principal argument for the ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall. Using the European experience as a negative example and the British experience as a positive one, he presented the idea of a strong nation protected by a navy with no need of a standing army. The implication was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and expensive, and at worst invites war and division. He foresaw the necessity of creating a civilian government that kept the military at a distance. James Madison, another writer of several of the Federalist Papers, expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787: In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.

Finally, in Federalist No. 51, Madison argued that to create a government that relied primarily on the good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was folly. Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent leaders. Most importantly, no single branch of government ought to have control over any single aspect of governing.

Thus, all three branches of government must have some control over the military, and the system of checks and balances maintained among the other branches would serve to help control the military.

Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and (2) the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously. While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern after every war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and return to something approaching pre-war force levels. However, with the advent of the Cold War in the 1950s, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime military force engendered new concerns of militarism and about how such a large force would affect civil–military relations in the United States.

Maoist military-political theories of people's war and democratic centralism also support the subordination of military forces to the directives of the communist party although the guerrilla experience of many early leading Communist Party of China figures may make their status as civilians somewhat ambiguous. In a 1929 essay *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*, Mao explicitly refuted "comrades who regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and who refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks", prescribing increased scrutiny of the People's Liberation Army by the Party and greater political training of officers and enlistees as a means of reducing military autonomy. In Mao's theory, the military which serves both as a symbol of the revolution and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not merely expected to defer to the direction of the ruling non-uniformed Party members who today exercise control in the People's Republic of China through the Central Military Commission, but also to actively participate in the revolutionary political campaigns of the Maoist era.

Civilian leaders cannot usually hope to challenge their militaries by means of force, and thus must guard against any potential usurpation of powers through a combination of policies, laws, and the inculcation of the values of civilian control in their armed services. The presence of a distinct civilian police force, militia, or other paramilitary group may mitigate to an extent the disproportionate strength that a country's military possesses; civilian gun ownership has also been justified on the grounds that it prevents potential abuses of power by authorities (military or otherwise). Opponents of gun control have cited the need for a balance of power in order to enforce the civilian control of the military.

An autocracy is a system of government in which a supreme power is concentrated in the hands of one person, whose decisions are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control except perhaps for the implicit threat of coup d'état or mass insurrection.

The debate about the relationship between domestic institutions and uses of force has also played out in the literature that focuses on the variance in the types of domestic institutions that characterize autocratic regimes. Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez (2002) seek to determine if there is evidence for a dictatorial peace by comparing the conflict behavior of single party, military, and personalist dictator regimes. In a dyad-year analysis, they find that single party regimes tend to have less conflict with other single party regimes, while other autocratic regime types are more conflict prone overall. Lai and Slater (2006) confirm the latter results, showing that military regimes are more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes. Weeks (2008) shows that differences in autocratic states' propensities to use force can be attributed to varying degrees of audience costs, which are higher for single party and monarchy regimes. Weeks (2012) also argues that the ability to hold autocratic leaders accountable and the preferences of civilian elites implies that personalise and military

regimes should be the most conflict prone; she finds that the only regimes that are as peaceful as democracies are non-personalised civilian regimes (machines), a result that is different than Lai and Slater (2006).

Pickering and Kisangani (2010) examine how autocratic institutions might condition the likelihood of diversion. They challenge Lai and Slater's argument by developing a political incentive theory that focuses on the size of the electorate and winning coalition. They argue that single party regimes have greater incentives to use diversionary force because they are more beholden to a larger winning coalition and electorate group. The larger the winning coalition of the autocracy and the greater reliance on public goods provisions, the more likely is an autocratic state to use diversion to respond to domestic problems. As the size of the winning coalition increases, the resources available to buy support for a leader are relatively smaller because of the increase in the size of the winning coalition, making it more difficult to simply buy support during tough domestic times. Yet Pickering and Kisangani's (2010) empirical results are more in line with Lai and Slater's (2006) study, suggesting that military regimes are the only type of autocratic government to initiate force in response to higher inflation domestically.

When comparing democratic and autocratic states' propensities to engage in diversionary force, we must also consider the strategic environment in which interstate conflict occurs. Potential targets could make greater concessions to states with higher opportunities for diversionary force, which could then create a selection effect whereby states with high opportunities use diversionary force less often than low opportunity states. This is the logic of strategic conflict avoidance, whereby democracies might have the strongest motives for diversion, but the fewest opportunities (Mitchell and Prins, 2004). Pickering and Kisangani (2007) argue that democracies will divert by using benevolent force like humanitarian

missions, which are not as prone to strategic conflict avoidance. These varied findings could reflect the debate about how regime type conditions diversion because the samples used to test strategic conflict avoidance arguments often focus on a heavily democratic sample of states. To tease out the effects of regime characteristics on diversionary uses of force, we think it is important to control for opportunities to use force. We can think about strategic conflict avoidance as one form of the opportunity set, whereby democratic or single party authoritarian states might desire to turn domestic attention away from economic or political problems, but may find themselves in an opportunity poor international environment if potential targets anticipate their behavior. Meernik (1994) thinks about opportunities to use force in terms of international situations that present themselves as plausible crises for countries like the United States to become involved in. Mitchell and Prins (2004) extend this to the set of enduring rivalries, showing that states are much more likely to use force when inflation is high if they have one or more enduring rivals to target. Mitchell and Thyne (2010) show a similar pattern using data on contentious issues, whereby states are more likely to use militarized force to gain advantage over a territorial or water issue when inflation is high. Foster (2006) also shows that major powers have a much more opportunity rich environment relative to minor powers, and thus that rivalry may condition the diversionary behavior of minor powers more strongly than major powers.

### **1.7 Modernization Theory**

Modernization theory was first developed by Daniel Lerner (1958), a behavioral scientist studying the role of the media in development (see also Deutsch 1961). Lerner designated as modern societies those whose people are literate, urban-dwelling, and better off, in the sense of commanding higher incomes. The later works of economists, such as Rostow (1960), Kuznets (1966) and Chenery and Taylor (1968) focused on economic development.



In doing so, they emphasized the importance of structural change and associated the rise of per capita incomes with the decline of the agrarian economy and the rise of urban industry. The classic statement of the relationship between modernization and politics originates from Lipset (1959), who first established the link between the level of per capita income and democracy in a global cross-section of nations. Lipset hypothesized that as societies developed economically, their citizens no longer tolerate repressive political regimes. A rise in per capita GDP should therefore trigger a transition to democracy. Modernization theory gave rise to a large political science literature. Drawing on detailed historical case studies, Barrington Moore (1966) related democratization to the rise of the middle class and the terms of its. Scholars have also used large-N data sets, with important contributions from Cutright (1963), Dahl (1971), and Burkart and Lewis-Beck (1994), among others. Londregan and Poole (1996) perform an especially careful test of the relation between income and democracy and find a significant, albeit modest, effect. Taking this literature as background, Przeworski and his co-authors advanced a new hypothesis.

Because correlation does not necessarily imply causation, they noted, countries may become democratic due to reasons unrelated to their level of economic development, but once prosperous, democracies with higher levels of GDP per capita avoid slipping back into autocracy. If this were the case, PACL note, then over time a relationship would emerge between GDP and democracy, even though economic growth is not a primary cause of regimes becoming democratic in the first place. We agree with PACL that a true test of modernization theory should examine both the impact of GDP on democratization and its ability to promote the consolidation of established democracies. However, we take issue with their conclusion that economic development does not play a significant role in transitions away from autocracy. One reason for our disagreement lies in our different conception of regime types, to which we now proceed. Huntington proposes an alternative explanation of

the development of democracy from the perspective of “process” arguing that the outcome of economic development would lead to political decay; then the political system under instability would move toward democracy through and after institutionalization (Huntington, 1968). Third, in contrast to modernization theory, Mesquita and Downs find that in the case of China, the result of economic development would not lead to democracy because authoritarian regimes and autocracies around the world show people that they can enjoy the benefits of economic development on the one hand and avoid political liberalization on the other (Mesquita and Downs, 2005). Their finding runs counter to the argument of modernizationists that democracy is the necessary result of economic development. Fourth, scholars who support “democracy first, development later,” such as Siegle, Weinstein, and Alperin, argue that democracies consistently outperform non-democracies on most indicators of economic and social well-being, so that promoting democracy should be prior to expanding economic development in developing nations (Siegle, Weinstein, and alperin 2004, 2005). And fifth, some scholars, such as Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, argue that although politics indeed influences economic performance, the impact of regime type is not significant on states’ economic growth; and people do not know whether democracy improves or limits economic development (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000).

## **1.8Methodology of research**

### **1.8.1Research Design**

Kothari (2004) observed that research design is a blue print which facilitates the smooth sailing of the various research operations, thereby making research as efficient as possible hence yielding maximum information with minimal expenditure of effort, time and money. The research design that is employed in this study is descriptive survey. The major purpose of

descriptive research design is to describe the state of affairs as it is at present. A descriptive research is a process of collecting data in order to answer questions concerning the current status of the subjects in the study (Mugenda and Mugenda 1999). The research design was both quantitative and qualitative with the aim of determining the relationship between the study variables.

### **1.8.2 Sample and Sampling Technique**

Sampling procedure is explained as process or technique of sampling a suitable sample or representative of population for purpose of determining parameters of the whole population (Peil, 2003). The study used stratified random sampling. According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) the goal of stratified random sampling is to achieve the desired representation from various sub groups in a population. According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) the goal of stratified random sampling is to achieve the desired representation from various sub groups in a population and a sample of 10-30% is required to do a good research.

### **1.8.3 Data collection Instruments**

Andre (2004) explains that primary data is data that is used for a scientific purpose for which it was collected. The researcher used primary data for this study and was collected using questionnaires; the questionnaires included closed and open ended questions. Closed ended questions were used in an effort to conserve time and money as well as to facilitate an easier analysis as they are in immediate usable form; while the open ended questions were used as they encouraged the respondent to give an in-depth and felt response without feeling held back in revealing of any information. With open ended questions, a respondent's response gives an insight to his or her feelings, background, hidden motivation, interests and decisions

#### **1.8.4 Data collection procedure**

The study was based on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The study made use of both primary and secondary data. With regard to secondary data, the following types of data were collected: official statistics and information about dynamics of security in regard to military forces. Secondary data and information was sourced from academic and policy literature (especially, books and journals); and publications of governments, international organizations and civil societies.

Regarding primary data, the study adopted the use of semi-structured questionnaire method of data collection for the military, police, civil society, and specific catchments of the public.

#### **1.9 Scope of the Study**

The research focused use of military power through a comparative study of democratic and autocratic states. The time scope for the study was from August 2014 to September 2014.

#### **1.10 Limitations of the Study**

The study was carried out in the confines of the following possible limitations: Respondents might be hesitant to give information since talking about their view since they feared political implications and details would seem in appropriate due to the sensitivity of the information.

#### **1.11 Definition of Significant Terms**

**Military Power:** the ability to achieve a desired effect in a specific operating environment

**Democratic States:** a state of society characterized by formal equality of rights and privileges

**Autocratic States:** government in which one person has uncontrolled or unlimited authority over others; the government or power of an absolute monarch.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF DEMOCRATIC, AUTOCRATIC STATES AND USE OF MILITARY POWERS

#### 2.1 Democracy and the Military

Huntington (1957), in a study based primarily on the history of the military in Western societies, elaborated what was widely accepted as the liberal democratic model of civil-military interaction. The principal responsibility of the military officer', Huntington said, 'is to the state' Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism. The military officer must remain neutral politically. The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. The military profession exists to serve the state and the superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact (Huntington 1957. P. 16, 71, 73, 76).

The idea of the subservience of the military to civilian authority, as Grundy (1968) has pointed out, follows a tradition going back to Plato. Huntington, however, challenged the simple identification of civilian control with democratic government, and military control with absolute or totalitarian government: the military may undermine civilian control in a democracy, he argued, acquiring power by legitimate processes, and within a totalitarian system the power of the military may be reduced by such means as creating competing military or paramilitary units or by infiltrating it with 'political commissars'. 'Subjective civilian control', he concluded, 'this is not the monopoly of any particular constitutional system' (ibid, 1982). Huntington went on to distinguish five patterns of civil-military relations, based on differing relative degrees of military/anti-military ideology, military

power, and military professionalism, but as evidenced in his later study (Huntington 1968), for Huntington military ‘intervention’ represented an essential breakdown of the liberal democratic political order.

While Huntington’s concept of military professionalism has remained influential, the spate of post-independence military coups in the new states of Africa and Asia from the late 1950s prompted a more critical examination of the relation between civilian government and the military. Some commentators, indeed, suggested that the presumed neutrality and separation of the military from politics was at best a Western concept, if not a complete fiction (for example Perlmutter 1980, p.119; Valenzuela 1985, p.142). Not only did military intervention sometimes occur in response to the effective breakdown of democratic civil regimes – with the ostensible aim of restoring democracy, and often with substantial popular support – but in some new states, notably the communist ‘people’s republics’ and the ‘guided democracy’ of Indonesia’s President Soekarno, an alternative model of ‘democracy’ was espoused, in which the military was seen as an integral part of the political system rather than, as in Huntington’s formulation, an agency outside the political realm.

That a variety of political regimes, in which the pattern of relations between civilian politicians and the military covers a broad spectrum, should claim to be ‘democratic’ is testimony to the popularity of the term in international political discourse. Such popularity reflects the extent to which the term acts as an agent of political legitimation in a world where democracy is accepted, at least rhetorically, as a universal ‘good’. But can military regimes ever be described as democratic? Or, indeed, are they necessarily anti-democratic? Gallie’s (1956) formulation of democracy as an ‘essentially contested concept’ lends support to a relativist position, the extension of which is that democracy can mean all things to all people. As Hewison, Robison and Rodan (1993) point out, this effectively denies the possibility that

any universal understandings can be reached and serves to ‘indemnify the most scurrilous of dictatorships and to undermine the legitimacy of democratic and reformist oppositions’.

For military rulers, however, the widespread association of democracy with civilian supremacy has created a particular crisis of legitimacy. A central pillar of modern democratic theory is the doctrine of constitutionalism which, in its simplest form, refers to limited government, a system in which anybody of rulers is as much subject to the rule of law as the body of citizens. An important corollary to the democratic doctrine of constitutionalism is civilian supremacy though this in itself is not a sufficient condition for democracy since; as Huntington pointed out, many non-democratic governments maintain civilian control over their military and police organisations. Democracy requires, therefore, not only that armed forces be subject to civilian control, but that ‘those civilians who control the military and police must themselves be subject to the democratic process’ (Dahl 1989). A fundamental principle of the democratic model of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations resides in the important distinction between the state and the legitimate government. It is to the latter that the military owes its primary allegiance, and any implicit distinction that the military might be tempted to draw between the goals of the government and those of the state must provoke a serious legitimacy problem (Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn 1976); this is so because the democracy model insists that the military’s power is legitimate only in so far as it has been endorsed by society as a whole and that its practical objectives are those set for it by the government of the day. Van Gils (1971:274) states this succinctly: Under the conditions of pluralistic democracy, the relations between the armed forces and civilians are, at least theoretically, quite straightforward. Soldiers are public officials. They are not the embodiment of any particular set of values. They are not the chosen defenders of any specific social or political institution. They hold public office on the assumption that they will provide

society with a specific set of services whenever society considers itself in the need of having such services performed.

This reflects the deeply embedded assumption of modern democratic theory, that it is the popularly elected government, and no other body or person that is wholly responsible for deciding what policies are to be pursued in the name of the people. In so doing, the government is constrained by the limits to action set out under the law of the constitution, and is ultimately held accountable for its activities and decisions when it faces the judgment of the people at the polls.

But what if a constitutionally and popularly elected civilian government once in office abrogates the constitution and rejects the democratic values embodied in it (including genuinely competitive elections)? In such circumstances – which have been not uncommon in post-colonial states – the military may be the only entity within the country capable of reversing such a development and reinstating democratic government.

While contemporary democratic theory appears to be entirely at odds with the notion that the military has any role in unilaterally acting to ‘safeguard the national interest’, the most common justification for military intervention is just this. Such appeals to the national interest have frequently been coupled with references to some perceived crisis or threat involving the security of the state or serious economic or social problems. As Goodman (1990) observes for Latin America: The frequent military ascension to power has often been motivated by a perceived need to save their nations from weak, corrupt, and undisciplined civilian leadership.

Numerous commentators on the role of the military in politics have observed the tendency of armed forces to justify their intervention in terms of the national interest, and thereby to



identify themselves with the desiderata of nationhood. Most have been sceptical. Lisa (1976), for example, notes that the military can acquire a self-image as guarantor of the fundamental and permanent interests of the nation, thereby arrogating to itself the requisite legitimacy to assume the right to rule. Similarly, Nordlinger (1970) highlights the manner in which the military's corporate interests can be defined, legitimized, and rationalized by a close identification with the interests of the nation, while at the same time portraying oppositional protests to their actions as 'expressions of partial and selfish interests'.

Nevertheless, authoritarian rule is not exclusive to military regimes and, as the case studies in this volume illustrate, armed forces have played a role in pro-democracy regime transitions. The critical factor for most commentators on civil-military relations concerns the intention of military rulers to return to the barracks.

To legitimize their intervention, military regimes commonly contend that their rule is only a preparatory or transitory (but entirely necessary) stage along the road to a fully democratic political system, and promise an early return to civilian rule, thereby recognizing, Dahl (1989) argues, that 'an indispensable ingredient for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy'. In some cases, military rule has been justified 'as necessary for the regeneration of the polity to allow for stable and effective rule'; military regimes have even portrayed their role as that of 'democratic tutor' (Huntington 1968). Yet once out of the barracks military rulers have seldom been anxious to relinquish power and even where there have been transitions back to civilian rule the armed forces have typically retained an involvement in politics and have been more likely to intervene again if dissatisfied with the performance of civilian governments. Observing processes of transition from authoritarian military rule to democracy in Latin America, Goodman (1990) comments that, 'successful transitions have utilized a process of incremental rather than immediate civilian control'; he

goes on to suggest: For democracy to take root in Latin America, both military men and civilian leaders must take on new roles. Recognition that the military is one of the strongest formal institutions in societies that are in dire need of political and social coherence poses challenges to Latin American civilian leaders that are very different from those confronted by their developed-nation counterparts.

Goodman, however, is not explicit on the nature of these ‘new roles’, and other contributors to the same volume suggest that recently democratized regimes in Latin America remain vulnerable to ‘the rapid rebirth of military authoritarianism’ (Rial 1990).

In Asia and the Pacific armed forces have played a role in both democratizing and anti-democratic transitions, and though, as elsewhere, their tendency as rulers has been towards authoritarianism, patterns of civil-military relations and degrees of authoritarianism/democracy in governance have varied widely. Any attempt at understanding this variety must begin with an appreciation of the particular historical and cultural circumstances under which military involvement in politics has developed in different countries.

## **2.2 Autocracy and military**

Autocratic leadership is a classical leadership approach, and the corporate equivalent of dictatorship or tyranny. This leadership style is marked with the leader having complete authority and the followers obeying the instructions of the leader without questioning and without receiving an explanation or rationale for such instructions.

This leadership style bases itself on Douglas McGregor’s Theory X that considers employees as inherently lazy and disliking work, and assumes they seek to avoid work as much as

possible. Theory X advocates close supervision and comprehensive control systems, reinforced by a hierarchical structure and a narrow span of control. Following is a critique of autocratic leadership's styles, along with its pros and cons.

An authoritarian leadership style is being used when a leader who dictates policies and procedures, decides what goals are to be achieved, and directs and controls all activities without any meaningful participation by the subordinates. This leader has full control of the team leaving low autonomy within the group. The leader has a vision in mind and must be able to effectively motivate their group to finish the task. The group is expected to complete the tasks under very close supervision while unlimited authority is granted to the leader. Subordinate's responses to the orders given are either punished or rewarded. Authoritarian leaders are commonly referred to as autocratic leaders. They provide clear expectations for what needs to be done, when it should be done, and how it should be done. There is also a clear divide between the leader and the followers. Authoritarian leaders make decisions independently with little or no input from the rest of the group. Authoritarian leaders uphold stringent control over their followers by directly regulating rules, methodologies, and actions. Authoritarian leaders construct gaps and build distance between themselves and their followers with the intention of stressing role distinctions. This type of leadership dates back to the earliest tribes and empires. It is often used in present day when there is little room for error, such as construction jobs or manufacturing jobs. Authoritarian leadership typically fosters little creativity in decision-making. Lewin also found that it is more difficult to move from an authoritarian style to a democratic style than from a democratic form to an authoritarian form of leadership. Abuse of this style is usually viewed as controlling, bossy and dictatorial. Authoritarian leadership is best applied to situations where there is little time for group discussion. Autocratic leadership can be beneficial in some instances, such as when

decisions need to be made quickly without consulting with a large group of people. Some projects require strong leadership in order to get things accomplished quickly and efficiently.

In situations that are particularly stressful, such as during military conflicts, group members may actually prefer an autocratic style. It allows members of the group to focus on performing specific tasks without worrying about making complex decisions. This also allows group members to become highly skilled at performing certain duties, which can be beneficial to the group. While autocratic leadership can be beneficial at times, there are also many instances where this leadership style can be problematic. People who abuse an autocratic leadership style are often viewed as bossy, controlling, and dictatorial, which can lead to resentment among group members.

Because autocratic leaders make decisions without consulting the group, people in the group may dislike that they are unable to contribute ideas. Researchers have also found that autocratic leadership often results in a lack of creative solutions to problems, which can ultimately hurt the performance of the group.

While autocratic leadership does have some potential pitfalls, leaders can learn to use elements of this style wisely. For example, an autocratic style can be used effectively in situations where the leader is the most knowledgeable member of the group or has access to information that other members of the group do not.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND INTERVENTION**

#### **3.1 Organization of the military**

Every nation in the history of humanity had different needs for military forces. How these needs are determined forms the basis of their composition, equipment and use of facilities. It also determines what military does in terms of peacetime and wartime activities. All militaries, whether large or small, are military organizations that must perform certain functions and fulfil certain roles to qualify for being designated as such. If they fail to do so, they may become known as paramilitary, civil defence, militia or other which are not military. These commonalities of the state's military define them. The first requirement of the military is to establish it as a force with a capability to execute national defence policy. Invariably, although the policy may be created by policy makers or Policy analyst, its implementation requires specific expert knowledge of how military functions and how it fulfils roles.

The first of these skills is the ability to create a cohesive force capable of acting on policy as and when required, and therefore the first function of the military is to provide military command. One of the roles of military command is to translate policy into concrete missions and tasks, and to express them in terms understood by subordinates, generally called orders. Military command make effective and efficient military organisation possible through delegation of authority which encompass organisational structures as large as military districts or military zones, and as small as platoons. The command element of the military is often a strong influence on the organisational culture of the forces.

### **3.2 Low-Intensity Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Since the early 1990s, low intensity conflicts have occurred with increasing frequency throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Sadly, untold millions of Africans have suffered or died because of this warfare. At the 1986 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for example, Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, revealed that at least 750,000 people had died in his country as result of nearly 20 years of fighting. To make matters worse, on occasion, such as during the 1960-64 Congo crisis, the superpowers became involved because they had perceived hostilities between Africans as yet another manifestation of East-West struggle. At other times, So-called surrogates-presumably acting on behalf of, or in concert with, the Soviet Union or the United States-have intervened in Africa to stop or prolong a particular conflict. A typical case involved the Cuban deployment of approximately 50,000 combatants and civilians to Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s.

### **3.3 The Concept of Intervention**

While there is no commonly-agreed upon definition of intervention, some of the general characteristics associated with such actions include the provision or withdrawal of various forms of assistance, the attempt to alter domestic-state society relations, and their convention-breaking nature. At the most general level, Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman use the term intervene “broadly to include any action undertaken to change the course of a conflict process” (2000, 37). Richard Falk argues that an intervention must have three elements: it involves a reliance on military power, it seeks some degree of political restructuring, and it only occurs when consent is not given by either the host government or the political forces in operational control of the country (1993, 756). However, this definition is overly restrictive as it not only excludes the use of other instruments such as economic sanctions but by

emphasizing the lack of consent it also removes from consideration interventions where consent might be initially or supposedly given but later withdrawn (Chadda, 1997).

Again, this conception eliminates the potential influence of other forms of external assistance. Some studies utilize the definition put forward by Oran Young and qualified by James Rosenau (e.g. Regan, 1996; Yoon, 1997). Young asserts that “intervention refers to organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authorities of the target. These activities may be designed either to replace existing structures or to shore up structures thought to be in danger of collapse” (1968, 178). Rosenau suggests that the convention-breaking nature of these acts be noted so that distinctions can be made between regular diplomacy and intervention (1968, 170). S.Neil MacFarlane adopts a similar notion of intervention which he states “...is an engagement in the domestic affairs of a state intended to change (or to preserve) the structure of power and authority within it” (2002, 13). He qualifies this by asserting that intervention usually involves a coercive action (Ibid.). This study conceives of intervention in a similar way as discussed by Young and MacFarlane, in that these acts are meant to influence the domestic political structures of a state.

The work by Smith (1974) on *Military Intervention in a Changing World*, examines the key facets of the changing world situation to determine the future applicability of armed intervention. The author argues that armed intervention has been widely applied in the past, however its usefulness is being challenged on a number of grounds; for example, the inherent risk of escalation, which was acceptable during the nuclear age; the respect for sovereignty and international law as exemplified by the United Nations; the absence of situations where vital national interests could be served by such tactics; as well as the adverse domestic and world opinions toward any form of intervention (Innis, 1962).

The interventionist debate is set out by a number of authors and, in this case, the scholarly work by Ellen Stern (1977) on *The Limits of Military Intervention*, is an outgrowth of the need to identify the achievements, the misconceptions and mistakes of the recent past to assess the direction of international relations, and to identify the changed potentials and consequences of military intervention. This analysis focuses on the limitations of military intervention primarily as an analytical tool. Through a concern with limitations, it is possible to highlight changes that are taking place in the role of force and violence in international relations. Given that conventional, popular and polemic thinking about military forces is fragmentary; this book aims to be more holistic and systemic in examining both consequences and limitations of military intervention (Stern, 1977).

Yoon (1997), in an article, *Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989*, conversely outlines the United States (US) intervention behaviour in the Third World. His work is an empirical study that analyses the U.S. intervention in such wars, by testing hypotheses emphasising strategic and economic interests (Yoon, 2003).

### **3.4 Humanitarian Intervention Since 1945**

Unlike humanitarian intervention practices in the nineteenth century, virtually all of the instances in which claims of humanitarian intervention have been made in the post-1945 period concern military action on behalf of non-Christians and/or Non Europeans. In that sense, the universalizing of the “humanity” that might be worth protecting seems to have widened in accordance with the normative changes described above.

What is interesting is that States that might legitimately have claimed humanitarian justifications for their intervention did not do so. India’s intervention in East Pakistan in the wake of Muslim massacres of Hindus, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda toppling the Idi Amin regime, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia ousting the Khamers Rouges; in every



case intervening states could have justified their actions with strong humanitarian claims. None did. In fact, India initially claimed humanitarian justifications but quickly retracted them. The argument here is that this reluctance stems not from norms about what is ‘‘humanitarian’’ but from norms legitimate intervention. While the scope of who qualifies as human has widened enormously and the range of humanitarian activities that states routinely undertake has expanded, norms about intervention has also changed, albeit less drastically.

### **3.5 Human Interventions failure**

In the early 1990’s the answer to the question, ‘‘who can and will intervene?’’ was the UN as the universal political authority, combined with ad hoc multinational forces assembled for each operation and composed of military units from several different nations. The UN had accumulated a relatively successful record of peacekeeping operations over the 1970s and 1980s this way. With the collapse of Soviet Union, which had sometimes vetoed UN peacekeeping missions, it seemed that the UN could build upon its peacekeeping record and even expand its scope to peace-enforcing. Thus, when Somalia and Bosnia posed humanitarian problems in 1992, the major powers, including the United States proposed this UN formula. It was also the answer initially applied to Sierra Leone when its state failed and the country fell into anarchy, murder and mayhem.

As it turned out, each of these UN interventions in failed states became notorious failures themselves. In Somalia, the UN forces first had to be rescued by the U.S forces and then both withdrew and left the Somalis in chaos. In Bosnia, the UN forces did not stop the ethnic massacres, which culminated in the murder of 7,000 men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995. In Sierra Leone, the UN forces had to be rescued by the British forces, which then carried out an effective intervention. And in Rwanda, the UN forces were prevented by the UN leadership in New York from stopping the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi (Kraehenbuhi 2004). There has

been improvement in UN interventions more recently. UN forces have been engaged in a continuing, though largely ineffective, intervention in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the anarchy and violence continue.

### **3.6 The Democratic State: its nature and characteristics**

The democratic state represents an idea for which men have fought and died since the beginning of history. Ideally the democratic state (free society) is one in which freedom is exercised in five major categories: freedom of expression, freedom of enterprise, freedom of electoral choice, a free judiciary, and freedom from external domination. The first four are internal, the last external. This distinction is important. Among the internal freedoms, freedom of expression includes free communication media and freedom of religion. A judiciary free from domination by either the legislative or executive authority is an essential guardian. Freedom from external domination implies both national sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency (Kraehenbuhi, 2004). In a democratic state the authority making the change is very complex, a combination of government legislators, executives, bureaucracies, private enterprises, and individual actors. The channels of information are similarly complex with each of the authorities having its own sources and channels, but with a group of private enterprises known as the media playing a major role (Kraehenbuhi, 2004).

### **3.7 The Military Power**

For 2,500 years the main themes of classical literature have concerned authority, sovereignty and power. These matters form much of the substantive content of humanism and are special province of political science, sociology and international law. The subject military power in democratic and autocratic state is inextricably bound up in them, for they include the fundamentals on which the use of military power should be based. The term ‘Military power’ as does Innis Claude: ‘...the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the

capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy” (Kraehenbuhi, 2004). Military power is based on organized combat forces. The principal responsibilities of military command are to create combat forces, to support combat forces, and to employ combat forces. The whole rationale for the establishment of a military system is to be able to employ combat forces effectively to attain a political purpose. Military power is a vital but not the only component of national power. Military forces are of no value unless they can be tactically employed. The effective tactical employment of military forces depends on a group of related factors. These are: strategic purpose, logistic support, sound tactical concepts, tactical training, appropriate choice of weapons and equipment, and above all, discipline, morale, and leadership.

Moreover, we can expect that the people of each nation state will demand protection for the rights of the nation and the rights of its citizens. This was translated into a demand for national security; and while there may be many arguments about its precise nature or definition, it will require organized protection or defence. If the formally constituted armed forces are not adequate or sufficient to provide this protection, other forms of defence or protection was created and used. These will vary greatly in size, efficiency, nature, and legitimacy. They will vary from loosely coordinated individual activists or terrorists to large-scale paramilitary forces under private sponsorship. Generally speaking, these forces will recognize no law or restriction, national or international, but will develop and legitimize their own codes.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter is presented in several sections. The first section looks at the demographic information and the other sections are according to the research objectives of the study. The data has been presented in tables and figures. The responses were analysed using descriptive statistics.

#### 4.2 Background Information of the Respondents

##### 4.2.1 Gender of the Respondents

The study sought to find out the distribution of the respondents by gender to know which the gender distribution for the study. The findings are presented in the Table 4.2:

**Table 4.1 Gender of the Respondents**

Respondents	No. of respondents	Percentage (%)
Male	27	57.4
Female	20	42.6
Total	47	100

Source: Researcher (2014)

From the table above 27(57.4%) were male and 20(42.6%) were female. This shows that all genders were represented in the study.

##### 4.2.2 Age Distribution

The findings represented in the table 4.2 below shows that the 21.3 percent of the total respondents were of age 18-25years, 25.5 percent were between 26-30 years of age, 29.7

percent were between 31-35 years of age, and 10.6 percent were of 36-40 years of age while 12.8 percent were age more than 46 years of age. According to the survey, majority of the respondents were between the ages brackets of 31-40 years of age.

**Table 4.2: Age Distribution of Respondents**

Ages	No. of respondents	Percentage (%)
18-25	10	19
26 – 30	12	25.5
31 – 35	14	29.7
36 – 40	5	10.6
Above 41	6	12.8
Total	47	100

Source: Researcher (2014)

According to data representative in table 4.2 it was noted that most of the respondents were between the ages of 31– 35. The respondents were from various ages representing different opinions according to age

#### **4.2.3 Highest Level of Education**

The study further sought to establish the respondents level of education in order to ascertain whether they were well equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to perform their duties. From the study findings as shown in figure 4.2, 11(20.9%) indicated that they had reached an secondary level as their highest academic qualification, 17(32.3%) indicated that they had reached college level, 13(24.7%) of the respondents indicated that they had reached university level as the highest level of education and lastly 12(22.8%) had reached a reached postgraduate level.

**Table 4.3 Highest Level of Education**

Level of education	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Secondary level	11	20.9
College level	17	32.3
University level	13	24.7
Postgraduate level	12	22.8
Total	47	100

Source: Researcher (2014)

Majority of the respondents were college level at 32.3% but there were also various respondents from the college level and university level at 24.7% which implies that the respondents had information on the study.

## 4.3 ROLE OF THE MILITARY WITHIN STATES

### 4.3.1 Roles of Military

The study sought to establish the role of military in the country and the respondents responded in the following way.

**Table 4.4 Role of Military**


Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Protection from external enemies	30	66.9
Assisting in building infrastructure	2	4.5
keeping law and order	12	26.8
Ensuring the country borders are not breached	3	6.7
Total	47	100

Source: Researcher (2014)

30(66.9%) responded that the role of the military was to protect the country from external threats, while 12 (26.8%) felt that the military work was to maintain law and order in case of chaos, 3(6.7%) felt that the military's work was to ensure that the country's borders were not breached and 2(4.5%) felt the work of the military was to assist in building infrastructure.

### 4.3.2 The Military Be Let Out Of the Barracks

The study sought to find out whether the military should be let out of the barracks in times of crisis. The respondent responded in the following way as shown in the figure




**Figure 4.1 military being let out of the barracks**

Majority of the respondents responded yes at 79% that military should be let out of barracks in times of crisis while 21% felt that the military should not be left in the barracks. They explained that the military should be let out of the barracks because it is better having more manpower on the ground to alleviate the crisis while the ones who responded that letting them out of the barracks would result in a democratic violation since it would be seen as a military rule.



### 4.3.3 Military Effectiveness

The study sought to find out the effectiveness of the military when let out of the barracks the response are as follows




**Figure 4.2 Military Effectiveness**

Majority of the respondents 68% responded they felt that the military was effective when let out of the barracks while 32% felt that they weren't as effective when out of the barracks. The ones who responded in the affirmative explained that the military was more effective dealing with more dangerous threats as opposed to police, who were found to be less effective since they had not experienced the same type of training. The ones who did not agree with the statement explained that the military was not trained to deal well with civilians and so would result in civilian casualties.

#### 4.3.4 Military and Development Projects

The study sought to find out the effectiveness of the military in developments. The respondents responded in the following way




**Figure 4.3 military and development projects**

87% of the respondents felt that the military should be let be involved in development projects. While a small number 13% felt that they should not be let out to deal with development projects. The respondents explained that the military should be involved in the construction activities since they are not always busy and the government needs as much work force on the ground to help in all projects it is undertaking to help also reduce the cost of man power in this development projects. The ones who responded they should be involved felt that this wasn't the work of the military and so no need to be involved in this projects.

## 4.4 CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF MILITARY POWER

### 4.4.1 Military Constrains

The study sought to find out whether the military has any constrains. The study got the following responses




**Figure 4.3 Military Constrains**

68% felt that the military did not have any constrains and while 32% felt that there were some constrains that the military was subjected to. They explained that the military did not have any constrains because it was well funded and had anything it needed for it to conduct its work. The ones that felt that the constrains the military experience in the country`s policy on its governance.

#### 4.4.2 Policies and the Use of Military

The study sought to find out whether the policies affect the use of military. The study got the following responses




**Figure 4.4 Policies and the Use of Military**

85% felt that the policies set did affect the military and 15% felt it did not. These policies did affect the military because the military cannot operate outside the barracks without the presidents and national assembly's consent.

### 4.3.3 Military Out of the Barracks Have Domestic Implications

The study sought to find out whether the military when out of the barrack have domestic implications. The responses were as follows.




**Figure 4.5 Military Out of the Barracks Have Domestic Implications**

53% felt that the military out of the barracks has an implication in the country and 47% felt that it did not have any implications. They continued to explain that when the military is out of the barracks the possibility of a rise of a military state is likely, while the others felt that when the military is out of the barracks it didn't mean much and that there was nothing to worry about.

#### 4.4 CORE CHARACTERISTICS

##### 4.4.1 Democracy in Kenya and the Principles of Majority Rule and Individual Rights

The study sought to establish whether democracy in Kenya rest on the Principles of Majority Rule and Individual Rights. The response was as follows.




**Figure 4.6 Democracy in Kenya and the Principles of Majority Rule and Individual Rights**

The majority of the respondents 83% felt that democracy in Kenya rested on the principal of majority rule and individual rights while 17% felt that it wasn't. The respondents explained that the majority had the say as it was seen in elections where a simple majority won the election. While others explained that the country was yet to get to where the majority rule.

#### 4.4.2 Military Out of Barracks and Prime Functions

The study sought find out whether the military when out of the barracks the would be able to understand that one of their prime functions is to protect such basic human rights




**Figure 4.7 Military Out of Barracks and Prime Functions**

64% felt that the military would be able to protect basic rights of the people while 36% felt that they would not be able to protect the prime functions. They continued to explain that it was the work of the military to protect the people and so they would protect the prime functions but the ones who did not agree with explained that in other countries military has been used to commit atrocities.

#### **4.4.3 Military and Committing To the Values of Tolerance, Cooperation, and Compromise**

The study sought to establish whether the military capable of committing to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise. The responses are as follows



**Figure 4.8 Military and Committing To the Values of Tolerance, Cooperation, and Compromise**

70% felt that the military can be able to commit to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise while 30% did not agree. They did not agree because they felt that the military would favour the one in power and their inclinations. While the ones that agreed explained that the military's work was to protect the people and the interest of the nation.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter is a synthesis of the entire study, and contains summary of research findings, exposition of the findings, commensurate with objectives, conclusions and recommendations based thereon.

#### 5.2 Summary of the Major Findings

From the study 27(57.4%) were male and 20(42.6%) were female. This shows that all genders were represented in the study. The study further sought to establish the respondents level of education in order to ascertain whether they were well equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to perform their duties, from the study findings , 11(20.9%) indicated that they had reached an secondary level as their highest academic qualification, 17(32.3%) indicated that they had reached college level, 13(24.7%) of the respondents indicated that they had reached university level as the highest level of education and lastly 12(22.8%) had reached a reached postgraduate level. 30(66.9%) responded that the role of the military was to protect the country from external threats, while12 (26.8%) felt that the military work was to maintain law and order in case of chaos, 3(6.7%) felt that the military's work was to ensure that the country's borders were not breached and 2(4.5%) felt the work of the military was to assist in building infrastructure.

Majority of the respondents responded yes at 79% that military should be let out of barracks in times of crisis while 21% felt that the military should not be left in the barracks. Majority of the respondents 68% responded they felt that the military was effective when let out of the barracks while 32% felt that they weren't as effective when out of the barracks. 87% of the respondents felt that the military should be let be involved in development projects. While a

small number 13% felt that they should not be let out to deal with development projects. 68% felt that the military did not have any constraints and while 32% felt that there were some constraints that the military was subjected to. 85% felt that the policies set did affect the military and 15% felt it did not. These policies did affect the military because the military cannot operate outside the barracks without the president's and national assembly's consent. 53% felt that the military out of the barracks has an implication in the country and 47% felt that it did not have any implications. The majority of the respondents 83% felt that democracy in Kenya rested on the principle of majority rule and individual rights while 17% felt that it wasn't. 64% felt that the military would be able to protect basic rights of the people while 36% felt that they would not be able to protect the prime functions. 70% felt that the military can be able to commit to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise while 30% did not agree.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The study made the following conclusion

The military is very important to the nation since it helps in protecting the country from external and internal enemies. The military role in the country as discussed in this study varies and can change according to what the policy makers deem important. The military can work as part of forces to keep law and order when there is an internal conflict. The military functions vary according to time to time and they can be used for nation building and providing support to the country through construction projects and relief assistance. The study was able to identify that the military doesn't have a lot of constraints because it is well funded and trained. It was also seen that there is no major implication in letting the military out of the barracks. The military was seen to be effective in looking out for human rights when conducting their operations.

## **5.4 Recommendations**

The study makes the following recommendations

The role of the military should be broadened to other function so as to ensure that the military is efficiently used in the county. The current function of the military seems to be narrow and more duties and activities should be given to the military.

The government should ensure that the policies set by them facilitate the military in conducting function outside the barrack. These policies should permit the military to come to help the country in times of crisis.

The military should be trained on observing prime functions such as protecting basic human rights and being capable of committing to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise.

The government should promote the principles of majority rule and individual rights in the country.

## **5.5 Areas of Further Research**

Future research can be done on use of military power: a comparative study of democratic and autocratic states in different countries so as to shed more light on the use of military power in different countries.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX I**

#### **INTRODUCTION LETTER**

University of Nairobi

Nairobi, Kenya

Dear Respondent,

#### **Re: Data collection for my research**

I am a student at University of Nairobi undertaking the degree of Master of Arts in international conflict management. I am conducting a study on the use of military power: comparative studies of democratic and autocratic states in Kenya and you have been chosen to contribute to it. Please answer the following questions honestly and objectively to the best of your knowledge, the information obtained was treated with confidentiality. Please do not write your name on the questionnaire. Thank you for your acceptance and support.

Yours faithfully

**DALTON A. ODHIAMBO**

## Appendix II: Questionnaire

### 1. DEMOGRAPHICS

Please read each question carefully and follow the instructions. Please answer all questions by circling the number in the box that best describes your answer. All individual answers will be kept confidential.

Q1.1 Please circle the number in the box best describes the range in which your age falls

<b>Range In Years</b>	<b>Please Circle One</b>
Below 20 Years	1
Between 20 to 30 Years	2
Between 30 and 40 Years	3
Between 40 and 50 Years	4
Over 50 Years	5

Q1.2 Please indicate your gender (Please circle an appropriate Box)

Male

Female

Q1.3 To date, what has been your highest formal qualification? (Please circle one box only)

<b>Level of Education</b>	<b>Please Circle One</b>
Secondary School Level	1
Some College (Certificate/ Diploma)	2
University (Bachelor Degree-Level)	3
Post graduate level (Masters/Doctorate Degree)	4



**PART A: ROLE OF THE MILITARY WITHIN STATES**

1. What are the roles of military in your country?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2. Should the military be let out of the barracks to help the country in times of crisis?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If no why, .....

3. Has the military been effective in times it has been allowed of barracks to assist the people?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If no why, .....

4. Can the military be used in development projects in the country?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If no why, .....

5. What has been the nature of activities conducted by the military personnel?

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.....  
.....

**PART B: CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF MILITARY POWER**

6. Does the military have any constraints?

Yes

No

Please explain

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.....

7. What has been Kenya military development strategy if any since independence?

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8. Do policies affect the use of military in Kenya?

Yes

No

Please explain

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9. Does letting the military out of the barracks have domestic implications

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

Please explain

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**PART C: CORE CHARACTERISTICS**

10. Does the Democracy in Kenya rests upon the principles of majority rule and individual rights?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

Please explain

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.....  
.....

11. With military out of barracks will they be able to understand that one of their prime functions is to protect such basic human rights?

Yes

No

Please explain

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12. Is the military capable of committing to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise?

Yes

No

Please explain

.....  
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.....  
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