

**WEAK STATES AND TRANS- BORDER SECURITY: THE EFFECT OF
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ON RWANDA**

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DECLARATION

I, Gladys Mureithi, declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of a degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family and the University of Nairobi for being supportive throughout my study. I have acquired a wealth of knowledge during my time at the university.

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I wish to thank The Almighty God for giving me the gift of life to write this work. I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. R. Anyona for her professional guidance and motivation that enabled me compile this project. I wish to extend my gratitude to my classmates whose presence offered me psychological motivation and the need to learn more.

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to identify numerous links between weak states and trans-border security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security. Criminal groups can thrive off the illicit needs of weak states, especially those subject to international sanctions; regimes and rebel groups have been known to solicit the services of vast illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel deadly conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Angola, and Sudan when arms embargoes had been imposed by the United Nations and other members of the international community. The study was organized into five chapters: Chapter one introduced the background content to the topic of research, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, study justification, literature review, theoretical orientation and study methodology employed, chapter two established the understanding, causes and the consequences of weak state where it also provided an analysis of the cause behind the statelessness, chapter three established the index of state weakness in the developing world. Moreover, the chapter reviews the scholarly contributions to understanding state weakness, and it suggests criteria and indicators to capture statelessness for comparative purposes, chapter four provided a critical analysis of how DRC weakness affects Rwanda's national security and finally chapter five provided a summary, conclusion and recommendations. This research employed a descriptive research design to obtain a secondary data in critical analysis of how DRC weakness affects Rwanda's national security. This approach was chosen because the study involves investigating variables which are not easy to quantify. The study heavily relied on secondary written materials and documents from the archives were used in collecting secondary data. The data analysis was qualitative and took place concurrently with data collection. Using mapping aspects, the various variables were categorized on an ordinal scale. This provided the most manageable way of measuring the variables in the study. The themes that emerged from the interviews and from document analyses formed the basis of further collection and summary. The analysis of the final data will make it possible for themes to be identified and findings to be presented descriptively. The researcher expects to have limited scope to examine the emerging patterns within this research to inform this study makes the cross-national comparisons of data with the study situation problematic. The study finding established the weak states and trans-border security by establishing the effect of democratic republic of Congo on Rwanda. The paper argues that there are structural causes that underpin the conflict such as colonial legacy, weak governance, fragility, contested citizenship, greed for resources, land tenure and group territorial claims. Factors that act as drivers to the conflict such as spillover effects of conflicts in neighbouring countries, organized armed groups, and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have also been identified.

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Chapter One

Introduction To The Study

1.1: Background

Weak states are often characterized by ongoing fighting and insecurity, a legacy of weak governance and the incapability to convey the competent and fair distribution of public goods. They have time and again grown extra slowly than other low-income countries, and the rate of extreme poverty is rising within them. They lag behind in meeting all the Millennium Development Goals; with a 50% higher prevalence of malnutrition, 20% higher child mortality, and 18% lower primary education completion rates than other low-income countries (World Bank, 2007).

Such countries can fall prey to and generate a host of trans-boundary security fear, including violence and organized crime. Though no universally accepted definition of weak states exists, there is general accord that such countries lack the capacity and/or will to execute core functions of statehood effectively. In other words, weak states are incapable or reluctant to provide necessary public services, which include fostering equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, and delivering basic services.¹

The Democratic Republic of Congo can be categorised as a weak state. Its history provides an explanation for its present situation. Years of unequal colonial rule were closely followed by 32 years of authoritarian rule under Mobutu, followed by the uncertain situation which prevails at present. The weakness of subsequent leadership regimes to centralize power has further led to a weakening of the state. The position of the regime in Kinshasa has been so weak and the state apparatus, most particularly the army, so weak and fragmented that it has been totally unable to use the war as an opportunity to strengthen its power. Moreover, the fact that Congo has been the battleground of the war as well as the victim of plundering by other

¹Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. 2001. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Washington D.C: World Bank.

states has further undermined the state's ability to centralize power. For Zimbabwe, by contrast, the war in the Congo did not represent a security threat. For Rwanda, the situation in Congo around 1996 represented a very real security threat. It is a fact that a large number of hutu-militants have used and continue to use Congolese territory to launch attacks at Rwanda.²

Given the experience of the 1994 genocide, it is clear that seen from the RPF-regime in Rwanda, the situation in the Congo appeared as a serious threat. The existence of this threat was used as the justification for Rwanda's decision to send troops to Congo in support of the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila in 1996. In 1997, Rwanda turned against Kabila, and supported the new rebellion, together with Uganda. Together with their local allies in eastern DRC, the RCD-Goma, Rwanda soon took control over almost one third of Congo's territory.³

Over the past 19 years, one of the most obstinate symptoms of mass violence in Congo's eastern regions has been the proliferation of armed groups that threaten security, perpetrate horrific human rights abuses, and undermine economic development. Two of these armed groups the M23 and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR—not only have committed some of the worst atrocities in the conflict, but they have also internationalized it in multiple ways. Kigali believes the FDLR poses an existential security threat. Rwanda's core concerns include what it believes to be an existential security threat posed by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, the Hutu extremist armed group based in eastern Congo, which has attacked Rwanda four times over the past year. The FDLR's leaders were some of the alleged perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and they have also, at times, received support from elements of the Congolese army.

The most basic role of the state is to offer physical security to its citizens through maintaining a domination of organized violence within the society. Where the government fails to do this and rival organizations of violence come out the state descends into civil war.

²Arrow, K.J. 1974. *The Limits of Organization*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Bayart, J-F. (1993/1989). *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly*, Paris: Fayard.

³Mkandawire, T. 2001. 'Thinking about developmental states in Africa', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 25.

However, in the modern world the demands legitimately placed upon the state extend beyond this basic function of security. Governments in all modern societies play some role as regulators of private economic activity, and as suppliers of public goods such as transport infrastructure, health and education. The quality of regulation and public goods is important for the capacity of citizens to earn a living.

Increasingly, as globalization makes economic action more mobile between countries, the quality of government matters in a relative rather than an absolute sense: governments that are much worse than others are likely to lose economic activities and this will rebound upon their citizens. Hence, a state can fail because its government provides a quality of regulation and public goods which is markedly worse than that provided by other governments. Throughout this study we are agnostic as to why states fail and concentrate on estimating the costs of state weakness. Some of the costs of weakness arise from organized violence. Such costs are likely to be different from the costs arising from a weakness of governance. In addition to these costs we also consider spillover effects to neighboring countries.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

States do not always become weak or weak in separation. The spread of volatility across a state can serve as a critical multiplier of neighboring states' vulnerability to threats.⁴ Instability has a tendency to increase beyond a weak state's political borders, through overwhelming refugee flows, increased arms smuggling, breakdowns in regional trade, and many other ways. The United Nations, Security Council⁵ acknowledges that state weakness and its associated regional implications pose an "enormous cost in resources and time" to member countries. In addition to the potential transnational security threats that weak and weak states pose to neighboring states, they also present unique challenges from a development perspective. Various scholars such as Liqueur, Longman, and Ndikumana identify numerous links between weak states

⁴ Clark, J. F. (2012) 'Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War: Uganda's Vietnam?', in John F. Clark (ed.) *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan.

⁵ United Nations, Security Council, (2010), *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2010/1146

and trans-border security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security. Criminal groups can thrive off the illicit needs of weak states, especially those subject to international sanctions; regimes and rebel groups have been known to solicit the services of vast illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel deadly conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Angola, and Sudan when arms embargoes had been imposed by the United Nations and other members of the international community.

Many of researchers including Ndikumana⁶, Reyntjens and Nordiska⁷, Ngaruko and Nkurunziza⁸ and Smith et al⁹ generally address weak states and trans-border relations with respect to four key threat areas: terrorism, international crime, nuclear proliferation, and regional instability. A section of researchers however, including Fukuyama¹⁰, and Laqueur¹¹ argue on the contrary, that despite empirical evidence supporting a potential nexus between state weakness and today's security threats, weak states may not necessarily harbor neighboring states' national security threats. Furthermore, the weakest states may not necessarily be the most significant threats to national security; relatively functional states, characterized by some elements of weakness rather than complete state collapse, may also be sites from which threats can emerge. Weak and weak states are perceived as primary bases of operations for most foreign terrorist organizations. Collier¹² finds, however, that not all weak states serve as safe havens for international terrorists.

⁶Ndikumana, L. (2011). "Towards a solution to violence in Burundi: A case for political and economic liberalisation." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3): 431 – 459

⁷Reyntjens, F. & Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (2010). *Small states in an unstable region: Rwanda and Burundi, 1999 – 2000*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrika institute

⁸Ngaruko, F. & J. D. Nkurunziza (2010). "An economic interpretation of Conflict in Burundi." *Journal of African Economies* 9(3): 370 – 409

⁹Smith, Z, K., Longman, T., Kimono, J-P. (2012). *Rwanda Democracy and Governance Assessment*. Washington; Management Systems International, Inc

¹²Collier, P. (2013) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Rebel groups have been known to utilize safe havens in non-weak as well as weak states. However, that the weakest states are not necessarily the most attractive states for rebel groups. This may be because some illicit transnational rebel groups might be too dependent on access to global financial services; modern telecommunication systems, transportation, and infrastructure that do not exist in weak states¹³. This study thus seeks to explore the link between weak states and trans-border security by examining the effect of democratic republic of Congo on Rwanda.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 Broad objective

To explore the link between weak states and trans-border security by establishing the effect of democratic republic of Congo on Rwanda.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

- i. To establish the effect of security challenges in the Democratic republic of Congo on Rwanda
- ii. To examine the various measures in place to address the trans-border security challenges.

1.4 Literature Review

Relevant literature that informs this research validates the link between weak states and trans-border security. This literature shall be divided into two sub-themes namely, the literature on effect of weak states on neighboring countries and the literature on the cost of weak states on external economic catastrophe.

¹³Cuvelier, J. &Stefaan, M. (2010).*Rwandan Economic Involvement in the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Discussion Paper, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp.

1.4.1 Historical development of weak states and their causes

Weak states are poor states suffering from significant "gaps" in security, performance and legitimacy (Brookings Institution). They lack control over certain areas of their territory, and therefore (critically from an international security perspective) the capacity to combat internal threats of terrorism, or insurgency; but given that so-called 'weak states' may still be capable of repression, or may exhibit authoritarian tendencies, some see this term as inherently contradictory and misleading. Furthermore, even in high capacity, well-functioning states, there can be peripheral regions where the state is weak and challenged by local actors. Neighbours suffer a variety of costs from weak states, but here we concentrate upon the economic losses. Globally, growth spills over onto neighbours. On average, if all of a country's neighbours grow at an additional one per cent, the country's growth rate is increased by 0.4 per cent (Collier and O'Connell 2007). Since being a weak state reduces growth, we would therefore expect neighbours to suffer reduced growth.¹⁴

Distinguishing between whether the state is weak only in the sense of having unfortunate policies and governance, or whether it is also at civil war.¹⁵ In the OLS regression, in each case being the neighbour of a weak state significantly reduces growth. Potentially, the dummy variables may be proxying geographic effects that are common to weak states and their neighbours rather than indicating a causal relationship. We therefore investigate the robustness of the result through GMM. We continue to find significant effects of the same magnitude.¹⁶

First, we consider the spillovers from weak states that are at peace. Having such a neighbour significantly reduces the growth rate. From the OLS regression the loss, were all the neighbours to be weak states, would be 1.8 percentage points. Next, we consider the cost to neighbours if a weak state has a civil war. The growth loss for a country surrounded by weak states at war is the same as that for one surrounded by weak states at peace, namely 1.8 per cent, although taking

¹⁴Tilly, C. 1985. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in P. Evans, D.

¹⁵United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All*, April 2005.

¹⁶Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C. 1982. *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

into account the confidence intervals, this need not imply that the costs are literally the same. Combining the two effects, on average 33 per cent of neighbours are weak states.³ Thus, on average this adverse neighbourhood effect reduces growth by around 0.6 percentage points. This reduction in growth persists for as long as the neighbouring state continues to fail. We thus repeat the calculation of section 3 in which each year the weak state faced some probability of turnaround.¹⁷

The growth reduction of 0.6 per cent for neighbours of a weak state is larger than would be expected from the more general results on how a country's growth is affected by that of its neighbours. Recall that a 1.0 per cent change in the growth rate of the neighbours on average changes the growth of the country by 0.4 per cent. Since the typical weak state suffers a growth reduction of 2.6 per cent, if all the neighbours were weak states this would imply a growth loss of around 1.0 per cent. Since only a third of neighbours are typically weak states the implied growth loss is around 0.3, or about half of the estimated loss of 0.6 per cent. This suggests that the routes by which a weak state reduces the growth of its neighbours extend beyond the reduced opportunities to trade due to slower growth of GDP.

For example, trade opportunities may be further reduced due to the policies of the weak state such as high tariffs or poor transport routes. Some channels of transmission need have nothing to do with trade. For example, the weak state may give the neighbourhood as a whole a bad reputation with foreign investors. Neighbours might also have to divert public expenditures into containing some of the social or political problems that spill over, such as heightened risks of disease consequent upon the migration of refugees, or the need for a higher level of military spending.¹⁸

We next use the loss of growth to estimate the cost that neighbours bear from a weak state. While the reduction in the growth rate of the neighbour is considerably less than that of the weak state itself, the typical weak state has 3.5 neighbours and the GDP of neighbours is on

¹⁷Kaldor, M. 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁸Cramer, C. 2002a. 'Angola and the theory of war'. Mimeo, Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

average considerably higher than that of a weak state itself. These two effects more than offset the smaller loss on the growth rate so that in aggregate the cost to neighbours, at US\$206 billion, considerably exceeds the cost to the weak state itself. As previously, with 23 weak states, the total cost to neighbours is thus 23 times the cost-per-state, or US\$4,732 billion. Since this is a present value, we again convert it into a flow using a 5 per cent interest rate, so that the cost per year is US\$237 billion.¹⁹Weak states also inflict costs beyond their direct neighbours; neighbours themselves have neighbours. If as in the global average, each 1.0 per cent of a country's growth spills over to 0.4 per cent on the growth of its neighbours, then the loss of growth echoes across the region. The direct neighbours of a weak state lose 0.6 per cent off their growth rates, their neighbours lose around 0.2 per cent, and their neighbours will lose around 0.1 per cent despite being separated from the weak state by two intervening countries.

While such distant repercussions may seem implausible.²⁰Murdoch and Sandler²¹ show that the reduction in growth caused by a civil war extends for a radius of around 800 kilometres. Some costs may even spread globally. For example, weak states are liable to become havens for international crime. This follows directly from their poor governance which gives them a comparative advantage in criminal activities. In those weak states in civil war the government loses control over part of its territory and this makes the environment well-suited for the cultivation of hard drugs. Around 95 per cent of the global production of hard drugs is estimated to come from such environments. Similar safe haven concerns arise with respect to terrorism.

Finally, the international community is increasingly intervening in civil wars to restore and maintain peace. For governments to send their soldiers on such missions is politically hazardous. All these effects beyond that of lost growth for immediate neighbours, such as more

¹⁹De Soysa, I. 2002a. 'Paradise is a bazaar? greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989

²⁰Paris. R. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil War Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²¹*Breaking the Conflict Trap*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press. Cramer, C. 2006. *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing*, London: Hearst & Co.

distant growth effects, crime, drugs, terrorism, and peacekeeping duties are important costs that we have not attempted to quantify.

1.4.2 The cost of weak states on internal economic catastrophe

In an inter-connected world, social and economic catastrophe in one country spills over onto neighbours. This contrasts with the state of the world when the concept of national sovereignty was formulated in the seventeenth century. Then, both a nation's economy and its society were very largely independent of other nations. Sovereignty as traditionally formulated thus does not take into account the costs that catastrophe inflicts on other countries. If these costs are 'large', the governments of such countries have a reasonable claim to the right of intervention in order to reduce them. Regardless of the rights of governments to inflict costs on their own citizens, it would be a radical extension of the concept of sovereignty for them to have the right to inflict large costs on neighbours. The magnitude of spillover costs is critical. Since all states inflict some costs on neighbours, only if they occasionally exceed a high threshold can such costs constitute an operational qualification to sovereignty.²²

The second basis for an intensity of sovereignty is the global worry to lessen social calamity in any country. This may primarily be a reaction to the globalization of television news coverage.²³ In September 2005 the UN unanimously endorsed the Responsibility to Protect, which creates the right to intervene if a government relinquishes its responsibility to protect, whether by lack of will or lack of capacity. 'Responsibility to protect' is defined as protection of citizens from large-scale violent conflict that the government is either unwilling to prevent or incapable of preventing, but which international intervention could feasibly curtail. While international concern is recent, the concept of the state as providing security to its citizens through the possession of a monopoly of violence is at the root of the traditional conception of

²²Olson, M. 2000. *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*, New York: Basic Books.

²³Nyugen, 2005. 'The Question of 'Failed States'', View on Asia Briefing Series: Sydney, Australia.

what constitutes a state. Governments that do not provide such a monopoly are thus ‘weak’ in this fundamental sense.²⁴

The third basis for a dilution of sovereignty is a counterpart to the responsibility proposed by the UN to provide aid to assist poverty reduction. Underpinning the norm that the governments of OECD countries should contribute 0.7 per cent of GDP as aid, is that in the extreme conditions of low-income countries, poverty reduction is not exclusively a national responsibility. Implicit in this responsibility of OECD countries to provide finance was a counterpart responsibility of the governments of low-income countries to manage their affairs in such a way as to be conducive to poverty reduction.²⁵

These twin responsibilities of aid and governance were formally recognized in the Monterrey Consensus of 2000. Just as some OECD states are weak to provide the level of aid judged to be adequate for poverty reduction, so some governments of low-income countries are weak to provide policies and governance judged to be adequate and this weak inflicts avoidable poverty on their citizens. The threshold of policies and governance necessary for poverty reduction is intrinsically less clear cut than that for aid. Nevertheless, there is now a reasonable internationally-generated threshold, namely that used by the World Bank to define low-income countries under stress (LICUS).²⁶

LICUS are defined using the annual global rating of policies and governance known as the Country Policies and Institutional Assessment, CPIA, (World Bank 2002). Despite limitations, the CPIA is a serious professional attempt to provide a rating that is comparable both between countries and over time. Nor is the concept of an identifiable class of countries in which the government is weak to provide an adequate environment for poverty reduction confined to the World Bank. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, which represents all bilateral aid programmes, adopted the closely equivalent concept of Difficult Partnerships.

²⁴Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford: James Currey.

²⁵Boyce, J. and O'Donnell, M. (eds.) 2007. *Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar State building*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

²⁶Mann, M. 1999. 'The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing', *New Left Review*, 235.

An identifiable group of governments of low-income countries can thus reasonably be described as weak to provide an adequate environment for the attainment of the objective of the reduction of severe poverty. In turn, the international community has judged this objective to warrant international pressure for governments to meet target norms. Just as international pressure for the governments of OECD countries to meet a norm of aid finance is legitimate, so potentially it is legitimate to bring pressure on those governments that fail to meet a norm of policies and governance. Whether a governance threshold should be treated as a responsibility equivalent to an aid threshold depends again upon the scale of the costs inflicted by weakness.²⁷ If the costs of such weakness of government are modest relative to aid, then the interventions implicit in concerns about them would be unwarranted interference. There are thus three distinct types of cost that might define a 'weak state'. Costs inflicted on neighboring citizens, violence avoidably suffered by the state's own citizens, and poverty avoidably suffered by the state's own citizens. Where any of these costs are large there is a basis for qualifying sovereignty because they would either breach the rights or trigger the responsibilities of other states.²⁸

Economic policies and governance differ massively between countries. Chauvet and Collier (2006) examine the opportunities for reform in weak states and provide some evidence that the most commonly found binding constraint is 'political will' due to a clash between elite interests and those of wider society. A further possibility of the underlying reasons for state weakness is the lack of capacity to reform.²⁹ As suggested by Chauvet and Collier (2006), poor policies and governance are themselves the consequence of other factors such as particular configurations of interest groups. These deeper factors may reduce growth directly as well as via policies and governance.

²⁷Lopez-Alves 2001. 'The Transatlantic Bridge: Mirrors, Charles Tilly, State Formation in the River Plate', in Centeno, M.A. and López-Alves (eds.) *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁸De Waal, A. 2000. *Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

²⁹Elbadawi, I. and Sambanis, N. 2002. 'How much war will we see? Explaining the prevalence of civil war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:3.

As a result, an apparent improvement that is divorced from underlying change may have only modest effects on growth. For example, interest groups may use other instruments to achieve their objectives and these may also be detrimental to growth. The poor policies and governance that define weak states should thus probably be regarded as the observable manifestations of a dysfunctional society. They can be thought of as lying on a continuum determined by their likely consequences for growth and poverty reduction. Potentially, a government ‘fails’ if it adopts policies and governance that persistently fall below some low threshold and so inflicts slow growth or even absolute economic decline on its citizens. We adopt the World Bank criterion for LICUS as defining such a threshold and combine it with a concept of persistence of such poor policies and governance. To meet our criterion of persistence a country must fall below the LICUS threshold for a continuous period of at least four years.³⁰

This is designed to exclude from the category of weak states those that merely suffer a temporary crash. Analogously, we wish to retain in the category of weak states those that having been below the LICUS threshold temporarily or weakly improve policies and governance a little above the threshold. A country exits the category of weak state only if it achieves a decisive improvement, by which we mean sustaining a level of policies and governance clearly above the threshold for at least three years. So defined, during the period 1998-2001 there were 23 such weak states which collectively accounted for only 7 per cent of the population of the developing world. We should note, however, that some countries that are evidently weak states on this criterion have been omitted due to missing data. Data are systematically more likely to be lacking if the state is weak. The most notable such omissions are Afghanistan and North Korea.³¹ Hence, the figure of 7 per cent is liable to be an underestimate with the true figure perhaps around 10 per cent. A likely, though not inevitable consequence of this level of policies and governance is that there is a weakness in the normal growth process. Over the period 1990-2001 the average per capita growth rate of non-LICUS countries was 2.8 per cent whereas that in LICUS was only -0.06 per cent, in other words zero. The exceptions to this presumption of stagnation are generally associated with natural resource discoveries: for example, Equatorial

³⁰Tilly, C. 2003. *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³¹Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guinea has been able to have a high rate of GDP growth despite very weak policies and governance because off-shore oil production has come to dominate its small economy.³²

Such stagnation only becomes critical in conjunction with both initially low income and the prolonged persistence of the inadequate policies and governance. The combination evidently results in persistent poverty. The same weak policies and governance in a country that was already at middle-income levels would not have such serious consequences. Hence, it is not that the international community should attach value to ‘adequate’ policies and governance in themselves, but rather that they become significant in the context of initially low income. In practical terms, policy-induced stagnation in the Middle East is of far less concern for the objective of global poverty reduction than policy-induced stagnation in Africa.³³ Our criteria of persistence have excluded by definition both temporary crashes that swiftly rebound and temporary improvements that quickly collapse, but they do not necessarily imply that the phase of inadequate policies and governance is prolonged. Chauvet and Collier (2005) use a logic regression to estimate the probability that a weak state will achieve a decisive exit from the condition. A few characteristics make exit significantly less likely: a small population and a low incidence of secondary education. In effect, turnaround is made harder if there are in absolute terms few well educated people in the society. Compared with other developing countries the typical weak state indeed has both of the characteristics that predict persistence.

The typical weak state has a population of only 15 million as compared with 42 million for elsewhere, and a far lower proportion of its population have completed secondary education: 3 per cent against 12 per cent for other developing countries. At the mean of weak state characteristics the predicted annual probability of exit is a mere 1.7 per cent. In turn, this probability can be converted into the mathematical expectation of the duration of being a weak state: in effect, how long the typical weak state will remain in the condition. The expectation is

³²Coase, R. 1960. 'The Problem of Social Cost', *Journal of Law and Economics*.

³³Mauro, P. 1998. 'Corruption: causes, consequences, and agenda for future research', *Finance and Development*, 35:1.

59 years.³⁴ Hence, the typical low-income weak state will indeed experience a prolonged period in which policies and governance are inadequate and so a high incidence of poverty is likely to be prolonged. During the period 1998-2001 despite accounting for only 7 per cent of the population of the developing world, the LICUS countries accounted for 15 per cent of the number of people globally living in absolute poverty of less than one dollar per day: their incidence of poverty was 40 per cent as compared to only 20 per cent in the other developing countries. However, this radically understates the importance of LICUS for global poverty.³⁵ As stressed by Wood (2006), the challenge of global poverty must be understood in a dynamic context. Essentially, the objective is to minimize the number of person-years in poverty. Because the non-LICUS developing countries are generally growing quite rapidly, even though they currently have considerable poverty this is not likely to be persistent. If the growth rates noted above persist, then by 2015 per capita income will have increased from 2004 levels by 47 per cent in non-LICUS countries while being unchanged in LICUS. The elasticity of headcount poverty with respect to mean per capita income is around -2.0 (Ravallion and Chen 1997; Bourguignon 2000).³⁶

Hence, the incidence of poverty can be expected to decline by approximately 5.6 per cent per year in non-LICUS countries while remaining constant in LICUS. By that time the LICUS countries would account for around 29 per cent of poverty instead of 15 per cent as of 2001. If these different growth rates persisted for a further decade, then in 2025 LICUS would account for around 42 per cent. Recall that these are likely to be underestimates because of the omission of countries such as Afghanistan and North Korea. While such a projection to 2025 is evidently fraught with uncertainties, the past extreme persistence of the condition of being a weak state suggests that it is not completely unreasonable. As Wood discusses, quite how poverty is aggregated over the future depends upon choices such as the discount rate. However, on any

³⁴Duffield, M. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development*, London: Zed Books.

³⁵Elbadawi, I. and Sambanbis, N. 2002. 'How much war will we see? Explaining the prevalence of civil war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:3.

³⁶Khan, M.H. 2005. 'Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries', *Democratization* 12:5.

reasonable discounting of the future it is clear that LICUS are a major part of the poverty challenge.³⁷

Further, the very fact that so much poverty is concentrated in a few countries offers the potential for a highly focused strategy for poverty reduction. Growth in these countries is going to become increasingly effective relative to growth in other developing countries in reducing poverty. The OECD is currently providing aid to developing countries of the order of US\$80 billion. Were all OECD countries to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, aid would be increased by around US\$135 billion. How do these figures compare with the costs inflicted on the citizens of weak states by poor policies and governance? To establish the latter we adopt the approach previously followed by Chauvet and Collier (2005), but using numbers specific to the present problem.³⁸

1.5 Justification of the study

The academic justification for carrying out the study is based on the gap in the literature on education regarding the link between weak state and trans-border security. Theoretically, the link between weak state and trans-border security is influenced by overlying effects that war-torn countries contribute to neighbor countries. The predominant component of the cost of weak states is the effects on other countries, especially neighbours: weak states are costly primarily because they inflict externalities on others. This in turn suggests that the ethical case for overriding the sovereignty of the governments of weak states may be better based on the rights of other governments to protect their own citizens, rather than the duty of other governments to protect the citizens of weak states.³⁹

³⁷Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C. 1982. *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

³⁸Robert I. Rotberg, editor, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

³⁹DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* (London: U.K. Department for International Development, 2005).

Since the costs inflicted by weak states upon other nations accrue predominantly to neighbours, this suggests that sovereignty over a weak state should be vested regionally or sub-regionally. For example, the sovereignty of an African weak state might be shared between the country's government and the African Union. Evidently, this would not transfer any sovereign rights to the governments of donor countries. However, a regional organization that acquired partial sovereign powers could, for example, empower international agencies to act on its behalf. This study will explore existing picture in weak states in the present system as well as the practical and academic gaps that exist in the absence of appropriate evaluation initiatives.⁴⁰

So far, no known study has been carried out in Kenya which examines the weak states and trans-border security. It is anticipated that the findings in this study will be important towards highlighting the guiding recommendations for intervention. Above all, the findings of this study may lay the groundwork for further investigation and debate on the problem. Lastly, the results of this research will be beneficial to a number of stakeholders and decision makers alike. These include conflict managers and peace practitioners who compose the main actors that provide humanitarian intervention activities and can thus provide best practices in terms of activities provided. Similarly, the findings will be beneficial to educators, politicians and administrators by providing lessons from which they can learn and shape national policies.⁴¹

1.6 Hypotheses

1. There is a significant effect of security challenges in the Democratic republic of Congo on security changes in Rwanda
2. There is significant effect of insecurity in DRC on the refugee influx in Rwanda.

⁴⁰For a discussion on the FY 2007 budget request to fragile states, see Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Fragile States and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money*, Center for Global Development Working Paper 96, August 2006.

⁴¹ Development Assistance Committee, OECD, "Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States," *DAC News*, July 26, 2006,

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The concept of internationalization is fundamental in understanding state weakness and its effect on trans-border security because it encompasses the relation between states. Internationalization and the nation state still stand as the most fruitful point of departure. State, Power and Socialism, are the conceptions of the state as a thing and the state as a subject⁴². The conception of state as a thing has marked the instrumentalist Marxist theories of state as well as neo-classical approaches that regard the state as an intrinsic entity external to other state interference. The conception of state as a subject, on the other hand, is characteristic of neo-institutionalism approaches that regard the state as an institution with a power of its own and absolute autonomy from capital. The state is treated as an external to capital and thus as an entity with sovereign power. State is the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions⁴³. The internationalization by the nation-states of the reproduction of the international accumulation process means that nation-states have to politically organize the unity of an internal capitalist class which is divided along new and more complex terms. In other words, the nation-states have to manage the contradictions within a capitalist class that is internally divided according to its differential form of integration with the process of international accumulation.

The fact that the state is not given as internationalized but is being internationalized and unevenly at that suggests the need to look for the effects of particular struggles over the forms and functions of the state. Much analysis of state policy focuses on the latter of these, but it is equally important to emphasize the struggle over forms of the state. As Gordon Clark and Michael Dear note that a capitalist social formation should give rise to a distinctively capitalist state form, and an evolving social formation should realize concomitant change in the state structure. Thus, there is a need to focus on how different classes and class fractions attempt to transform the forms of the state through political struggle, rather than assuming an automatic evolution of state form in relation to evolution of the social formation. What can be identified, if the state is examined in this way, are struggles which correspond to the evolution of the social

⁴² Poulantzas, N. (1974). *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books).

⁴³ Poulantzas, N. (1974). "The Internationalization of Capitalist Relations and the Nation State", *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books).

formation and the rise or decline of particular fractions of capital—but the specific dynamics of which depend upon concrete political mobilizations by classes a class fractions.

The notion of the internationalization of the state grows from, first, the conception of capital and capitalist classes as inherently geographically expansive and, second, the conception of the state as a set of institutions through which class and other types of social struggles are worked out. Rather than seeing dualisms such as foreign domestic or politics as identifying separate realms of activity which compete with one another for primacy, the perspective offered here sees classes and other social forces as working simultaneously through both foreign *and* domestic markets, politics and economics. The primacy accorded to one or another of the poles in these dualisms, then, reflects not the dominance of one realm over the other but rather the balance of forces in class struggles which involve different fractions of capital with differing geographical ranges.

Given the dilemma inferred in the literature review in linking theory with practice of weak state and trans- border security, there emerges the need to advance the potential added value of education to fill the gap in this study. Bearing in mind that trans-border security is a basic neighbouring nation's right; the argument for weak states should therefore seek to address ontological concerns while incorporation critical perspectives.

1.8 Methodology

This research study employed a descriptive research design in critical analysis of how DRC weakness affects Rwanda's national security. This approach was chosen because the study involves investigating variables which are not easy to quantify. The study heavily relied on secondary written materials and documents from the archives were used in collecting secondary data.

The data analysis was qualitative and took place concurrently with data collection. Using mapping aspects, the various variables were categorized on an ordinal scale. This provided the

most manageable way of measuring the variables in the study. The themes that emerged from the interviews and from document analyses formed the basis of further collection and summary. The analysis of the final data will make it possible for themes to be identified and findings to be presented descriptively. The researcher expects to have limited scope to examine the emerging patterns within this research to inform this study makes the cross-national comparisons of data with the study situation problematic.⁴⁴

⁴⁴World Bank 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study is organized into five chapters:

Chapter one introduced the background content to the research topic. The statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, study justification, literature review, theoretical framework and the study methodology employed.

Chapter two established the understanding, causes and the consequences of weak state

Chapter three established the index of state weakness in the developing world. Moreover, the chapter reviews the scholarly contributions to understanding state weakness, and it suggests criteria and indicators to capture statelessness for comparative purposes.

Chapter four provided a critical analysis of how DRC weakness affects Rwanda's national security

Chapter five provided a summary, conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter Two

The Concept of Weak States

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides literature on the several causes for state weakness that have been posited. These fall into two categories: one focused on resource explanations and one focused on a functional examination of the state. Suggested causes comprise: resource shortage provoking disagreement; resource wealth provoking sleaze and segregation; clienteles regimes leading to a criminalization of the state; and the 'new war' thesis, which argues that current wars have generated an economy built on plunder and sustained through violence.⁴⁵

2.2 Concept of weak states

Weak state is inept of supporting itself as a member of the international community⁴⁶. Failed state would put in danger their own citizens and [threaten] their neighbors through refugee flow, political volatility and random warfare. State weakness occurs when 'the central government loses the monopoly of the means to reinstate order and calm within her territory and across the border. State weakness has also been developed along the lines of Hobbesian social contract theory⁴⁷. State weakness occurs when 'the aspic functions of the state are no longer performed. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart'.⁴⁸

State weakness can also occur in many scopes such as security, economic development, political representation and income distribution. Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people⁴⁹. Their governments lose legitimacy, and in the

⁴⁵Gleditsch, N., Wallensteen, P., Sollenberg, M., and H. Stand. 2002. 'Armed conflict 1946-2001: a new dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 39:5.

⁴⁶Helman, G. and Ratner, R. 1993. 'Saving Failed States', *Foreign Policy*, 89.

⁴⁷Zartman, W. 1995. *Collapsed States*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner

⁴⁸Levi, M. 1988. *Of Revenue and Rule*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁴⁹Rowthorn, B. 1971. *Capitalism, Conflict and Inflation*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.⁵⁰

In severe cases, weakness may happen on all compasses simultaneously as in Somalia. However, in most cases, there is a wide variation in the extent to which a state ‘fails’ across different dimensions. In Colombia, for instance, the state has been relatively inspiring in macroeconomic management, but has been unable to manage large parts of its rural areas where guerrilla and paramilitary groups and drug cartels are powerful. It is thus imperative for any definition of ‘weakness’ to be explicit in which dimension a state fails. The weak states literature stress that there are certain indicators that are essential (if not sufficient) to categorise a state as ‘failed’. The persistence of political violence is salient in most definitions of ‘weak states’. Weak states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions⁵¹. In most weak states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more warring factions.⁵²

The total force of aggression does not describe a failed state rather, it is the long-term character of that violence (as in Angola, Burundi, and Southern Sudan), the course of political or geographical demands for shared power or self-government that reduce or justify that violence that identifies a failed state. In this view, political and criminal violence does not condition weakness and the absence of violence does not necessarily mean the state in question has not failed. A closely related indicator of state weakness is the growth of criminal violence⁵³.

Here the presence of gang organization, arms and drug-trafficking are the most common vices. As a result of the weakness of a state to grant security from violent non-state actors, people often seek security from warlords or other armed rivals of the state. A second indicator of weak states concerns their incapability to control their borders. They lose authority over portion

⁵⁰Libecap, G. 1989. *Contracting for Property Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁵¹Rotberg, R. 2003. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press.

⁵²Lockwood, M. 2005. *The State They're in: an Agenda for International Action on Poverty in Africa*, Bourton-on-Dunsmore: ITDG Publishing.

Krueger, A. 1974. 'The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society', *American Economic Review* June.

⁵³Rotberg, R. 2002. 'The New Nature of Nation-State Failure', *Washington Quarterly*, XXV.

of their territory. Often the expression of official power is limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Indeed one measure of the degree of state weakness is how much of the state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls.⁵⁴

Rotberg also introduces the idea that it is possible to rank weakness according to in how many dimensions a state fails to deliver positive political goods. Nation-states exist to deliver political goods - security, education, health, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, making and enforcing an institutional framework, providing and maintaining infrastructure. In order to rank the severity of state weakness, Rotberg suggests that there is a hierarchy of positive state functions. These are: security; institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts; rule of law, secure property rights, contract enforcement; political participation; and social service delivery, infrastructure, and regulation of the economy. In this analysis, strong states perform well across these categories and with respect to each separately. Weak states show a mixed profile, and weak states are a sub-category of weak states. The main idea developed by Rotberg is that no single pointer provides certain proof that a strong state is becoming weak or a weak state is beginning to fail. As a result it is necessary to take the indicators together.⁵⁵

While this hierarchy is a useful starting point to describe state weakness, identifying precise tipping points where state weakness transforms into either weakness or collapse is difficult. There are several examples of countries that have failed economically but have not experienced large-scale political violence (such as Tanzania and Zambia). Moreover, the lack of political participation does not necessarily weaken a state internally.

Much of the literature in fact finds that semi-authoritarian regimes are more prone to political violence than either more open democracies or more authoritarian regimes⁵⁶. The extent of corruption and bureaucratic capacity, which is cited as an indicator of weakness, is also misleading. Cross-country evidence for less developed countries suggests that levels of

⁵⁴Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. 2003. 'Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war', *American Political Science Review*, 97:1.

⁵⁵Gerschenkron, A. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

⁵⁶Marshall, M. G. and T.R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003* (College Park, MD.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003).

corruption and bureaucratic capacity do not determine long-run growth rates⁵⁷. Finally, the presence of large-scale political violence and criminal activity does not indicate the extent to which the state fails to secure a large section of the territory and/or can manage other functions⁵⁸.

The intricacy comes in defining states where ability varies significantly across functions (such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Mozambique). Iraq under Saddam Hussein, however, was not 'failed state' despite the absence of widespread political participation. The idea that repression is a necessary indicator of 'weakness' is an historical proposition given the construction of many developmental states before democracy became a source of legitimate government rule⁵⁹.

However, the idea that state 'weakness' should be broken down into sub-categories is helpful. This is because of the co-existence of variations in state capacity at a given time in one country and because of the movement of states to and from more and less severe conditions of weakness. Vague and imprecise definitions of 'weaknesses' abound in the literature. State collapse occurs when it can no longer perform the functions required of them to pass as states. State collapse means that the basic functions of a state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state. Understanding why fragile states slide toward weakness will help policymakers to design methods to prevent weakness, and in the cases of states that nevertheless fail (or collapse), to revive them and assist in the re-building process.⁶⁰ There have been other important initiatives in defining 'state weakness' though the focus on the dimension of each definition varies. Below are brief summary of the range of definitions.⁶¹ Failed states are characterized by a growing incapability or unwillingness to warranty terms of even vital services

⁵⁷Khan, M. 2000b. 'Rent-Seeking as a Process: Inputs, Rent-Outcomes and Net Effects', in M. Khan, and K.S. Jomo (eds.), *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁸Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks on Foreign Assistance," January 19, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408>.

⁵⁹Moore, M. 1998. 'Death without taxes: democracy, state capacity and aide dependence in the fourth world', in M. Robinson, and G. White (eds.) *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design*. *Oxford Studies in Democratisation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁰United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All*, April 2005.

Torres, M. and Anderson, M. 2004. 'Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction', Policy Division, Department for International Development (DFID); London.

and security to their populations. 'Fragile States Strategy' offers three operationally relevant definitions for failing, failed, and recovering states. The approach to assessing state feebleness focuses on a state's effectiveness (administrative capacity and resources) and authority by measuring four type dimensions: political, economic, social and security. Provides dynamic explanation but focuses on security, conflict management and state capacity building. Issues of equity and inclusion are brought to the fore, but the disadvantage of this approach is that effectiveness is not sufficiently disaggregated to understand the difference between willingness and capacity.

The US-based Task Force, now called the Political Instability Task Force, at the University of Maryland, defines 'state weakness' as an instance where central state authority collapsed for several years'. These included four types of events: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides/politicizes. The literature on 'state weakness' has received considerable attention across the range of social science enquiry. The genesis of the term 'state weakness' dates back to the rent-seeking literature, which emphasized the economic costs of state intervention, which welfare economics had previously ignored. State weakness, in the form of inefficient growth-retarding institutional interventions is often more costly to the economy in terms of rent-seeking and corruption costs than the market weakness states were attempting to correct⁶². The rent seeking literature, while influential in the increased interest in governance, has been inadequate in explaining why the effectiveness of state intervention varies within countries over time and across polities. However the interest in 'state weakness' has gone beyond the analysis of why government regulation may or may not enhance economic growth and development. The problem in many less developed countries has not been only poor economic performance but a breakdown in the legitimacy and political viability of states.⁶³

There are several studies which point to the importance of poor economic performance as a cause of state breakdown and the onset of civil war there are really many poorly performing states in economic terms such as Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, and Venezuela that have not

⁶²Krueger, A. 1974. 'The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society', *American Economic Review* June.

⁶³Arrow, K.J. 1974. *The Limits of Organization*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Bayart, J-F. (1993/1989). *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly*, Paris: Fayard.

experienced anything like the collapse of some other poor economic performers (such as Angola or Somalia)⁶⁴. In recent times, the weakness of US interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Iraq, and the flourishing of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan have heightened academic and foreign policy interests in conceptualizing the notion of ‘failed’ states. US foreign policy has been shaped, particularly since the September 11 bombings, by the potential threat of so-called ‘weak states’. Weak states are seen as places where terrorist organizations and international criminal networks can flourish.

The document that established a focus on the hazard of weak states is the National Security Strategy study in 2002, which stated: 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than [it is] by failing ones'. Although academic debates about ‘weak states’ commenced in the early 1990’s, the notion of ‘state weakness’ has been relevant to the political economy of international relations for centuries. The problem of state weakness was taken seriously by colonial occupiers.⁶⁵ Indeed, European colonial powers justified their empires, in part, on the idea that their rule would bring an end to ‘savage’ and ‘barbarous’ rule in the colonies. Powerful countries often intervened in poor, weaker states to stem social disorder that potentially threatened their security and trade interests⁶⁶. Moreover, 'the weak state provided an opportunity for territorial expansion by the great powers' (ibid.). Sovereign states are expected to perform certain minimal functions for the security and wellbeing of their citizens as well as the smooth working of the international system. The political science and international relations literature has been concerned with identifying why the state itself ceases to perform core Weberian functions. States that fail to meet these minimal standards have been described as ‘weak’,

⁶⁴Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. 1998. 'On the economic consequences of war'. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50.

⁶⁵Bloomström, M. and Meller, P. (eds.) 1991. *Diverging Paths*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

⁶⁶Dorff, R. 2000. 'Addressing the Challenges of Failed States', paper presented to Failed States Conference, Florence, Italy, April

'fragile', or 'poorly performing' (Torres and Anderson 2004: 5). More extreme cases have been labeled 'failed' or 'collapsed'.⁶⁷

The importance in state collapse at this core stage has been sparked by the need of understanding the factors behind political violence and civil war, and the growth of terrorist organizations in many less developed countries (Cramer 2006; Menkhaus 2004). The increase of labels - ranging from 'crisis states' to 'countries at risk of instability' and 'countries under stress'- reflects the range of ways in which the core problem has been conceived (Torres and Anderson 2004: 5). The growing interest in state weakness is no coincidence. This is because the number of new or embryonic states has grown dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century. In 1914, in the wake of decline of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, there were fifty-five recognised national politics. In 1919, there were fifty-nine nations. In 1950, that number reached sixty-nine. Ten years later, after the independence movements in Africa, there were ninety nations. After more African, Asian, and Oceanic territories became independent, and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the number of nations increased dramatically to 191; East Timor's independence in 2002 brought that total to 192.⁶⁸

Historical proof suggests that the process of state arrangement is riddled with conflict, violence and uncertainty over the institutional structure as groups compete to establish positions of power and legitimacy⁶⁹. Five big ideas pervade the state weakness literature. The first is the pre-requisite view of development. This view, which dominates the governance literature, argues that liberal markets and transparent, accountable states with bureaucracies with classic Weberian structures are a necessary input for successful economic development to proceed. The persistence of clientelist, corrupt and patrimonial states is seen in this view at best as anti-developmental and at worst a trigger for predatory state action and violent reaction among both state and non-state factions. The second is the liberal view of war and violence, which posits that

⁶⁷Herbst, J. 2000. *Power and States in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁶⁸Hardin, R.1987. *Why a Constitution?* Manuscript, University of Chicago.

⁶⁹Moore, M. 1998. 'Death without taxes: democracy, state capacity and aide dependence in the fourth world', in M. Robinson, and G. White (eds.) *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford Studies in Democratisation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

economic liberalisation and democracy promote peace. In the liberal view, war is always negative in its reasons and consequences and thus represents 'development in reverse'.⁷⁰

A third view build up the idea that clientelist and patrimonial states, while perhaps not developmental, are purposefully constructed by elites to promote their interests in capital accumulation and maintaining power. This view contrasts with the first two big ideas in that it sees identifying and measuring state weakness as a misleading exercise since it fails to incorporate how leaders adapt to the historical constraints of the post-colonial environment by constructing informal mechanisms of social control and capital accumulation. This view attempts to incorporate the role of political agency in concrete historical contexts.⁷¹

The fourth is the idea that the disentanglement of states is closely related to the nature of so-called 'new wars'. The proponents of the 'new war' thesis argue that contemporary wars are distinct from old wars in their method of warfare, their causes and their financing. In this view, new wars can be understood only in the context of globalisation where the distinction between war and organised crime is blurred and where war financing is dependent more on webs of legal and illegal global networks. Moreover these wars have generated an economy that is built on plunder, which is sustained through continued violence. The proponents of this view claim that wars are nowadays apolitical: resources used to be thought of as a means of struggle, now they are conceived of as the *object* of struggle. Fifth, the 'resource curse' argument, which is the idea that abundance of natural resources, and in particular oil, causes poor growth, and raises the incidence, intensity and duration of conflict has been an influential part of the state weakness literature.⁷²

While mineral profusion has long been considered helpful to economic and political development, the recent poor economic performance of oil exporters and the growing incidence of civil wars and political instability in mineral-rich economies have revived the idea that their resource abundance may be more of a curse than a blessing. This study will address some of the

⁷⁰International Development and Conflict Management, 2003). Mansfield, E. and Snyder, J. 1995. 'Democratization and war', *Foreign Affairs*, 74:3.

⁷¹Marshall, M. G. and T.R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003* (College Park, MD.: Center for

⁷²Kaplan, R. 1994. 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February.

important insights and shortcomings of each of these ideas and examine the extent to which they can explain the variation and change in state formation and capacity in fragile states.⁷³In the same way, the current times is the so-called 'resource curse' argument: the idea that abundance of natural resources, and in particular oil, causes poor growth, and raises the incidence, intensity and duration of conflict. While oil abundance has long been considered beneficial to economic and political development, the recent poor economic performance of oil exporters and the growing incidence of civil wars in mineral rich economies have revived the idea that their resource abundance may be more of a curse than a blessing.

The most influential empirical work on the causes of civil war has been undertaken by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2002a, 2004) who find that primary commodity exports increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war. Their most recent work, which covers 161 countries and 78 civil wars between 1960-1999, claims that a state's dependence on natural resources - measured as the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP - has a significant influence on the likelihood that a civil war will begin in the next five years.⁷⁴

Their data suggest that resource dependence has a non-linear effect: it increases the likelihood of conflict until the resource-GDP ratio is 32%; beyond this point resources diminish the likelihood of conflict. They also find this effect is substantial: when other variables are held at their mean, a rise in resource dependence from zero to 32% increases the likelihood of civil war from 1% to 22%. More recent quantitative analyses found important methodological deficiencies with the natural resource-conflict correlation (Sambanis 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ross 2004a). For example, Collier and Hoeffler's dataset does not include diamonds and narcotics, which are often salient in the 'war economies' literature as critical to the financing opportunities of 'greedy rebels' (Malone and Nitzschke 2005: 5). Ross (2004a:356) concludes that 'the claim that primary commodity exports are linked to civil war appears to be

⁷³Homer-Dixon, T.F. (1999), *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton University Press.

⁷⁴Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 2004. 'Greed and grievance in civil war'. *Oxford Economic Papers*56:4

brittle and should be treated with caution'. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 87) provide the sharpest challenge to Collier and Hoeffler: they report that 'neither the share of primary commodities in GDP nor its square is remotely significant' in their model.

There is, however, greater consensus among most analysts that oil profusion is considerably correlated to the onset of civil war in less developed countries in the period 1945-1999. Some analysts have estimated that oil exports are notably correlated with the full set of civil war onsets (de Soysa 2002a; Fearon and Laitin 2003), while others find that oil export abundance is significantly associated with a sub-set of civil wars, namely, secessionist wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2002a; Collier et al. 2003).¹² Ross (2004a), in assessing the recent evidence, concludes that 'there is good quantitative evidence that oil exports are significantly associated with the onset of civil wars'. Furthermore, Ross makes an important contribution by presenting the various mechanisms that may account for the link between oil and political violence. Some of the possible mechanisms he suggests to explain these links are supposedly well-known manifestations of the 'resource curse' in oil economies, namely, poor economic growth, high corruption, and authoritarianism.⁷⁵ The resource curse argument has two variants. The first is the so-called 'honey pot', or rent seeking argument, which suggests that oil abundant less developed countries generate valuable rents and that the existence of these rents tends to generate violent forms of rent seeking that take the form of 'greed-based' insurgencies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Overall, their form of rebellion finds that low-income, economic decline and dependence on primary commodities increase the danger of the onset of civil war (Collier et al 2003: 101). Collier and Hoeffler) further suggest that one particular mineral, oil, is especially relevant in secessionist wars. They attempt to demonstrate that oil abundance helps predict the type of war (secessionist as opposed to non-secessionist) once primary commodity exports have been controlled for.

⁷⁵Väyrynen, R. 1996. 'The age of the humanitarian emergency', WIDER Research for Action25, Helsinki: WIDER.

The second option of the resource curse disagreement, used to explain the mechanisms through which resource abundance generates violent conflict, is the rentier state model. The main argument of the rentier state model of governance is that when states expand a large proportion of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents, the reduced necessity of state decision-makers to levy domestic taxes causes leaders to be less accountable to individuals and groups within civil society. Fearon and Laitin (2003), drawing on the work of rentier state theorists (for example Karl 1997), argues that oil states are more likely to have weak state structures because they have less need to create strong bureaucracies to raise revenue.⁷⁶ Weak state structures, in turn, can make the state more vulnerable to insurgency. Because oil economies possess the highest levels of rents available in the economy, the validity of the resource abundant-political violence link in such economies is crucial to claims that mineral resource rents contribute to armed rebellion in less developed countries.⁷⁷

The idea that mineral resource rents create economic incentives for aggressive rebellion was developed first in a series of papers by Collier and Hoeffler. Their so-called 'greed' thesis is an application of rent-seeking theory, which, in its simple form, posits that the continuation of a valuable 'prize' induces individuals to spend time and resources to appropriate the 'prize'. Mineral resource rents (such as from oil), in this model, provide both the motivation to try to capture the state, and, potentially, the means to finance rebellions. The idea that rebels can 'do well out of war' was proposed as a more convincing explanation of the onset of conflict than socio-political grievances, income and asset inequality, ethnic rivalry, or the absence of democracy (Collier 2000).⁷⁸

⁷⁶Allen, C. 1995. 'Understanding African Politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 65. Amsden, A. 2001. *The Rise of 'the Rest.'* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁷⁷Centeno, M.A. 1997. 'Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America' *American Journal of Sociology*, 102:6.

⁷⁸Mansfield, E. and Snyder, J. 1995. 'Democratization and war', *Foreign Affairs*, 74:3.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) suggest that mineral rents can lead to rebellion through a 'looting' mechanism. If rebel organisations have the opportunity to extract and sell resources (or extort money from those who do), then they are more likely to launch a civil war. From this perspective, war is caused by 'greed' rather than 'grievance'. As Cramer (2002b) notes, the logic of homo economics posits that: rebellion against injustice has something of the qualities of a public good and, therefore, will also display the weaknesses of a public good, primarily susceptibility to free riders: hence, injustice might exist but will not produce sufficient conflict. Similarly, there is a time-consistency problem in that actors of violence are presumed not to trust the promises of leaders, reasonably expecting them to renege on their mobilizing pledges to put right a range of social wrongs or sources of grievance. On the other hand, appealing to people's demand for instant gratification through loot nicely overcomes these difficulties.

Collier and Hoeffler note that natural resources offer insurgent groups a funding opportunity because they create rents that are location-specific and can be looted on a sustained basis. The possibility of looting or extorting money from manufacturing firms is less because these firms are more mobile. The notion that the existence of oil rents necessarily generates greater conflict is consistent with mainstream theories of rent-seeking. Rents refer to the 'excess incomes', or the 'proportion of earnings in excess of the minimum amount needed to attract a worker to accept a particular job or a firm to enter a particular industry.

Payment can take many forms, such as: higher than competitive rates of return in monopolies; extra income earned from exclusive ownership of a scarce resource, whether natural resources or specialised knowledge; extra income from politically organised transfers such as subsidies (Khan 2000a). In the mainstream view, the availability of rents is the ultimate source of rent seeking and corruption Mauro and some have even postulated an 'iron law' of rent seeking 'wherever a rent is to be found, a rent-seeker will be there trying to get it' (Mueller 1989: 241).⁷⁹ Rent-seeking broadly can be interpreted as activities which try to find to generate, conserve or

⁷⁹J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathon Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary* (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2008).

change the rights and institutions on which particular rents are based. Since rents specify incomes, which are higher than would otherwise have been earned, there are incentives to create and uphold these rents (Khan 2000b). Rent-seeking can be conceptualised as influencing activities, which range from bribing, political lobbying, and advertising, to taking up arms. The greed-based theories of war make two implicit assumptions: the first is that the existence of oil rents will induce greater rent-seeking generally and second, that violent forms of rent seeking are more likely to occur when oil rents exist.⁸⁰

Inherent in the rent-seeking models of revolt is that *non-violent forms of rent-seeking* are *not* sufficient to prevent *violent* challenges to state authority. It is useful to consider that there are a multiplicity of mechanisms that link state and society. The first are legal and institutional influencing activities, which are the dominant form of rent-seeking in advanced economies and the least developed form in poor economies. Business chambers and labour unions represent a small part of the population. Moreover, political parties, who potentially could aggregate interests and mobilise ‘voice’, are often factionalised in less developed countries. In contrast, lobby groups, political parties, labour unions and legal campaign contributions to parties on the part of business groups are well established forms of institutionalised rent-seeking or influencing in richer countries. The second mechanism of influencing is informal patron-client networks, which are a central feature of many poor economies. Such clientelism is a substitute for the welfare state, which is often inadequate in meeting welfare demands of large parts of the population.⁸¹

Third, and closely related to the second, are unlawful forms of rent-seeking or corruption. In the absence of viable legal and institutionalised mechanisms to influence the state, corruption and clientelism become important substitute forms of influencing the policy-making process in less developed economies. When one or more of the above three mechanisms fail to provide influencing opportunities to political actors, political violence represents a fourth path to influence and/or capture the state. The models of Collier and Hoeffler, and that of Fear on and

⁸⁰Nyugen, 2005. 'The Question of 'Failed States'', View on Asia Briefing Series: Sydney,

⁸¹Mosely, P. Subasat, T. and Weeks, J. 1995. 'Assessing adjustment in Africa', *World Development*, 23 (9).

Laitin, do not specify why or if the three non-violent forms of influencing/rent-seeking are less effective in oil-abundant economies as opposed to non-oil abundant economies. Indeed, it may be equally plausible to argue that large oil rents permit state leaders to buy off political opposition through corrupt transactions and patronage-led rent allocations, and thus prevent violent challenges to their authority.⁸²

The deterministic replica of hostile rent-seeking proposed by Collier and Hoeffler ignores how the level of political contestation and political processes of disagreement resolution are likely to affect distributive struggles over oil rents. Is it, however, necessarily the case that increases in rents, of whatever type, inducing increases in rent-seeking? The answer would depend on the political conditions that induce struggle in the first place and the relative power of competing groups to engage in rent-seeking struggles, including violent ones. One of the possible factors that might induce rent-seeking struggle could be a dispute over the distribution of rights and assets sanctioned by the state. If there is at least a passive acceptance of the distribution of rights and rents that emanate from mineral income, then rent-seeking struggles may be low.⁸³

This means that the issue of political authority needs to be central to any analysis of the impact of mineral abundance or rent-seeking on political outcomes, including patterns of conflict and violence. It is when the distribution of rights is perceived as illegitimate by significant groups within a society that conflict and violence becomes more likely.¹⁵ It is not clear, *a priori*, that oil-rich economies generate a more unjust or illegitimate distribution of rights and income than non-mineral dominant economies. Even if it were the case that oil economies generate greater inequality of income, the evidence suggests that injustice and inequality do not inevitably generate conflict (Cramer 2002b:1848-49).⁸⁴

⁸²Mann, M. 1999. 'The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing', *New Left Review*, 235.

⁸³Libecap, G. 1989. *Contracting for Property Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁸⁴Mkandawire, T. 2005a. 'Maladjusted African economies and globalisation', *African Development*, 25:1&2.

What is largely difficult for the idea that oil economies are susceptible to violent rent-seeking is that the pillaging instrument is not so applicable in such economies since oil rents are point resources, not diffuse, and thus should be less likely to be 'lootable'. As a result, there are not convincing theoretical arguments as to why violent rent-seeking is either more likely in economies dominated by oil (or other 'point' resources such as kimberlite diamonds or copper), which rely on capital-intensive production methods and are subject to significant barriers to entry.¹⁶ More generally, without incorporating political analysis, it is not possible to understand why and how violent forms of rent-seeking become feasible in the first place.

The second main dispute of the mineral wealth-conflict premise is the rentier state model. The core argument of the second variant, which has been called 'political Dutch Disease', is that rentier state leaders, by relying on 'unearned' income (in the form of mineral rents and/or aid), do not develop a set of reciprocal obligations with citizens via the nexus of domestic taxation. As a result, mineral rents (particularly oil and gas) can, in lower-income countries, coincide with weak or illegitimate state institutions which may trigger conflict.⁸⁵ 'Unearned' income through mineral supply rents can allow elites to purchase security through corrupt patron-client networks, rather than with the establishment of a 'social contract' based on the exchange of public goods financed through domestic taxation.

Such arrangements, according to this model, can reduce a regime's legitimacy and relative military, administrative, political and economic power, which, in turn, can render the regime vulnerable to rebellion drawing on rentier state theorists posit that oil dependent poor countries are more prone to conflict than non-oil economies because 'oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because rulers have less need for socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic systems to raise revenues a political Dutch Disease'⁸⁶ According to rentier state theorists, the reliance on unearned income can have several negative effects on a regime's legitimacy and capacity to combat or prevent rebellion.

⁸⁵Hirshleifer, J. 1994. 'The dark side of the force'. *Economic Inquiry*, January.

⁸⁶Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 1998. *Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America.*,

The first outcome of increased unearned income is a growing independence of states from citizens. This increased independence of states from citizens can augment the ability of state leaders to act in greedy ways, or at the very least reduces the need for state leaders to develop long-run political bargains with interest groups.

This, in turn, makes taxation and revenues more erratic, which may increase arbitrary confiscation when volatile mineral rents suddenly collapse. The second retarding effect on state capacity of unearned income is the decline in bureaucratic capacity. With little bureaucratic presence in tax collection and limited information about what goes on at the grassroots level, states may be vulnerable to organized predators including guerrillas and private armies.

A third argument of rentier state theorists is that mismanagement of resource wealth can create grievances that, when combined with a history of ethnically-based secessionist tendencies, can increase the likelihood of organized armed rebellion (Malone & Nitzschke 2005: 5). The plausibility of these arguments depends on the extent to which oil wealth necessarily generates the aforementioned problems.⁸⁷

Rentier state theories are subject to several important shortcomings. First of all, leaders are implicitly assumed to ‘own’ the natural resources, that is, they are assigned the ‘property rights’ over resources. How rulers appropriate and maintain power is not adequately analysed. By assigning ‘rights’ to leaders (whether in the state or civil society), the whole problematic of how ‘common pool resources’ are managed is neglected, when the real problem of common pool resources is, in fact, analysing the processes through which rights are assigned, enforced, maintained and changed.⁸⁸ In other words, it is assumed that there are no combined actors within the society that can oblige some domestic conditionality on how those who occupy the state exercise their power.

⁸⁷ Ashraf Ghani et al., *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005).

⁸⁸ “The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 13, no. 1 (2006): 1-35.

Second, it is assumed that a weak state exists at the time of the discovery of 'external rents'. It is not clear in this framework whether resource endowment caused a particular state to be weak in the first place. Third, leaders are assumed to have ravenous as opposed to developmental aims. The overlook of the political processes through which a leader appropriates power limits our understanding of the motivations of state leaders. The state is not a thing, such as 'a predator', but a set of social relations. The existence of oil abundance does not preclude the possibility that state leaders share income from resource rents with groups that comprise their political support base.

Even if it is assumed that the leader has absolute power and is thus the 'owner' or 'residual claimant' in an economy, it does not necessarily follow that leaders will act in predatory ways. Following Olson (1993), a leader that has a long time horizon, what he calls a 'stationary bandit', has the incentive to maximise the rate of economic growth as this will maximise the resources accruing to the state in the long-run. A dictator, who does not have to tax citizens to maintain power, still can rationally have developmental as opposed to Predatory motivations. Predatory behaviour on the part of leaders - that is, making money out of perpetuating civil war - cannot be assumed or simply described, but needs to be explained. Predation will occur as a consequence of the weakness to adopt much more lucrative and broad based legitimacy-enhancing developmental aims. The decision of leaders to purposefully engage in rapacious acts to accumulate capital thus assumes that they have made a prior decision that long-run economic development is either undesirable or politically and/or economically unfeasible.

However, the conditions under which predatory behaviour dominates developmental behaviour in an oil economy are not addressed in the rentier state model and thus there is little relevant policy advice on offer from such a deterministic perspective.⁸⁹ Indeed, in a recent proportional work on oil states, Smith has found that, in the period 1974-1999, oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime stability, even when controlling for repression, and

⁸⁹Sen, A. 1981. *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

with a lower likelihood of civil war. Smith finds that neither boom nor bust periods exerted any significant effect on regime stability in states most dependent on exports, even while those states saw more protests during the bust. This is an interesting finding since patronage levels to buy support declined significantly in the bust period. This again points to political processes of durable coalition-building, a facet lacking in the rentier state proposition. The durability and long-run resistance to organised rebellion in many oil states suggest regimes in these economies have generally avoided the substitution of oil for statecraft, and there is little in the literature to guide scholarship in the study of how oil wealth and strong institutions might mix.⁹⁰

In sum, the rebel centered models of Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin do not consider the crucial prior question of how and why regimes became vulnerable to insurgency in the first place. There is thus no attempt to incorporate political processes in analyses of state capacity to resist and prevent rebellion. As such, there is little guidance into explaining how and why the resource curse can be avoided. Mainstream theories of rent-seeking neglect the role that politics plays in the use of state created rents. Because political struggle and settlements are historically specific, deterministic models are misleading in explaining rent allocation in actual political systems.⁹¹

The extent to which mineral economies generate both higher rent-seeking costs and less developmental rent-seeking outcomes is ultimately an empirical issue. It has been suggested that the risk of civil war is increased in oil states because oil states tend to produce authoritarian governance. Implicit in this argument is that authoritarian governments are more predatory, and thus more likely to engage in violent attacks on opponents. This in turn may induce violent retaliations since non-violent forms of influencing the state and non-violent forms of conflict resolution are generally less developed in authoritarian regimes.⁹²

⁹⁰Rowthorn, B. 1971. *Capitalism, Conflict and Inflation*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

⁹¹Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2007," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* (Cambridge) 17, no. 1 (March 2007): 3–22.

⁹²Ashraf Ghani et al., *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005).

There are, however, important shortcomings in this argument. First, there is no convincing evidence to support this position. In the period 1974-1999, oil states were no more likely to enter civil war than non-oil states (Smith). Secondly, there is no evidence that democratic regimes in less developed countries were less likely to succumb to civil wars.

In fact, there is some evidence that the process of democratization in less developed countries can be used to exacerbate nationalist and ethnic tensions and thus increases the risk of civil wars (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder). These authors find that democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions and high energy mass politics. Elites need to gain mass allies to defend weakened positions, and often whip up nationalism to bolster fragmented support. These arguments are consistent with other institutional analyses that find, in transitions to democracy, increased competition over resources often leads to greater rent-seeking, weakening of property rights, and worsening economic performance (Clague et al. 1997). In sum, the argument that oil states are more prone to conflict because they are authoritarian is not convincing.⁹³

While Ross (2004a) finds that there is satisfactory evidence that oil states are more prone to civil conflict than non-oil economies, here too the evidence is fragile. Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that, in the period 1945-1999, oil states are more prone to civil war than other developing economies after controlling for income per capita and a series of other variables. However, this result breaks down in later time periods, is sensitive to the definition of civil war, and is not statistically significant when one excludes a small group of countries, which were questionably coded as undergoing 'civil wars'. Let us consider each of these factors that undermine the robustness of the correlation between oil abundance and the onset of civil war.⁹⁴

First, the result breaks down for the post-1965 period: Humphreys reports that, in the Fearon and Laitin model, the 'oil exporter' dummy loses significance when observations prior to

⁹³Cramer, C. and Weeks, J. 2002. 'Macroeconomic Stabilization and Structural Adjustment', in Nazfiger, W. and Vayrynen (eds.) *The Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies*, Basingstoke: Palgrave/UNU WIDER.

⁹⁴Keen, D. 1998. *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War*, Adelphi Paper 320.

1965 are dropped from the estimations. This period is part of the boom period in oil prices, which takes place largely in the 1970s and early 1980s, when oil surpluses are greatest as a percentage of GDP in oil-rich LDCs. This is further refutation of the proposition that the size of oil rents in the economy does increase the risk of civil war.

Secondly, the relationship between oil and conflict breaks down when certain outliers and/or cases that are questionably included (such as the first two years of Algerian and Indonesian independence, and Russia) are left out of the model. A robust correlation should not break down with the removal of one or two cases. As Humphreys notes, there are non-trivial grounds for the removal of these particular cases: the early Algeria conflict may be regarded as a continuation of the independence struggle rather than the onset of a new war; while the Indonesia and Russia cases each involve multiple occurrences of war onset (at least 4 each).⁹⁵

The Fearon-Laitin model incorrectly treats these numerous occurrences as if they were definitely independent. As a result, the likelihood of civil war onset in oil states rests on the questionable inclusion of two rather idiosyncratic cases. Thirdly, Smith using the Gleditsch et al. dataset finds that oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime stability, even when controlling for repression, and with a lower likelihood of civil war in the period 1974-1999. This corroborates the weakness of Fearon and Laitin to find a significant relationship between oil wealth and civil in the period 1965-1999.²⁰

It is essential to note that Iraq, Angola, and Qatar are excluded from the regressions in Smith's study due to lack of data availability for certain variables. While Smith acknowledges that the inclusion of these countries may alter the results, this once again underscores the sensitivity of the result to very few cases. Even so, of the three missing cases for this period, Qatar and Iraq were both durable regimes and did not experience civil war during this period. In the case of Angola, there is substantial case evidence that the onset of civil war began before oil

⁹⁵Milliken (Boston: Blackwell Publishers, 2003). See also Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press, 2003).

and diamonds were salient economic sectors and had much more to do with the weakness to diversify the economy in the 1960's⁹⁶

The second worry is that correlation does not demonstrate causality. For instance, it is at least as probable that civil wars might produce or sustain mineral resource dependence. This could occur if conflict raised transaction costs and risk and thus reduced the amount of manufacturing investment, which tends to have a longer gestation period (Ross 2001a). At the same time, the mineral investment may continue through conflict since the returns are higher given the higher level of ground rent and given that investment in the sector cannot flee because mineral resources are location-specific.

Even though Collier and Hoeffler employ lagged independent variables in their regressions, this does not rule out reverse causality; since civil wars are not recognised as 'beginning' until they have generated at least a thousand combat-related deaths, they might be preceded by significant enough levels of violence and political conflict that it is a disincentive to long-run manufacturing investment, generating a higher level of resource dependence before the civil war technically begins.⁹⁷

The case of Angola in the 1960s is revealing. According to Cramer, oil and diamonds had little to do with the onset of war in the 1960s. Minerals were a very small part of total exports and gross domestic product at the onset of political conflict. War and policymaking in the 1960's can be seen to have created a dependence on mineral exports. The Angolan economy was undergoing a dramatic structural change. Manufacturing accounted for 25 percent of GDP by independence in 1961 and the late 1960s and early 1970s saw Angola achieve one of the most rapid manufacturing growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The onset of war along with inefficient industrial policies led to falls in agricultural and industrial production on the eve of oil windfalls

⁹⁶Elbadawi, I. and Sambanis, N. 2002. 'How much war will we see? Explaining the prevalence of civil war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:3.

⁹⁷DFID 2005. 'Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states. London: Department for International Development' (downloadable at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/fragilestatespaper.>).

in the early 1970s. The direction of causality seems to be the reverse of that posited by the rent-seeking and rentier state model.⁹⁸

Fourth, it is also potential that war may prevent an economy from becoming more resource plentiful in the first place. If state leaders are to appropriate oil revenues, for instance, they need to secure and enforce property rights in the territory where there is oil. Oil rents, like all rents, themselves require the specification of rights, which do not occur naturally. Moreover, state leaders need to be able to either extract taxation from multinationals, or what is even more difficult, extract the mineral wealth through public enterprise production. Wars can just as easily prevent a state becoming a more abundant mineral producer. The case of war preventing the further development of oil in the Sudan in the 1990's is a case in point. In this case, the causality between resource abundance and war would be the opposite of the rentier state argument.⁹⁹

Fifth, there is a desert of the effect of prior wars and neighboring wars as a cause of disagreement. In the poorest region, sub-Saharan Africa (where most of the civil wars have occurred in the period 1960-1999), a main trait of many current conflicts is that they occur in countries or sub-regions that have had a previous and/or neighbouring conflict. In the period 1989-1999 de Waal (2000: 1-34) shows that there are two important elements of war in Africa: first is the persistence of war and second, wars are readily transmissible from one country to another. Of the sixteen cases of war de Waal highlights, seven had recent wars before and a further five suffered wars within twenty years of their most recent conflict.¹⁰⁰

Fifteen of the wars occurred in the countries where there was a recent war in a neighboring country (the so-called 'war next door' syndrome). Only one case, Liberia, is an exception. Of these sixteen cases, seven cases (Burundi, Djibouti, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia-Eritrea) were non-mineral dominant economies, and only one,

⁹⁸Homer-Dixon, T.F. (1999), *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton University Press.

⁹⁹Reno, W. 2002. 'The politics of insurgency in collapsing states'. *Development and Change*,33:5.

¹⁰⁰Putzel, J. 1995. 'Why had democratization been a weaker impulse in Indonesia and Malaysia than in the Philippines?', in Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M. and Lewis, P. (eds.), *Democratization*, Cambridge: Polity Press and the Open University.

Angola, is an oil economy. Even here, the ‘wars before, war next door’ syndrome was present. The prevalence of the ‘wars before, war next door’ syndrome in both mineral resource-rich and mineral-resource poor, countries, suggests that the dynamics of persistence and contagion are the result of contingent issues of political economy.¹⁰¹

Sixth, all of the statistical studies discussed are culpable of selection bias. By definition, most countries that do not have a diversified agricultural and manufacturing base become mineral dependent. In historical terms, almost all countries began as mineral-dominant economies. For instance, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, and Malaysia were, in earlier stages of development, more mineral-dominant, less diversified economies.

If that is the case, then it makes sense to ask why political conflicts prevented growth in some mineral dependent economies and not in others. This is also an important problematic because the majority of countries suffering civil wars and humanitarian emergencies have experienced several years, or even decades, of prolonged stagnation and/or decline in economic growth (Nafziger and Auvinen 2002: 155). In the period 1980-1991, 40 of 58 (69%) African and Asian countries experienced negative growth. In contrast, only 9 of 53 had experienced negative growth in the period 1960-1980 (ibid.). While it is a complex issue to explain why there is such a difference in this total between periods, one economic factor has been the deflationary impact of structural adjustment programs throughout the region.¹⁰²

An important political issue has been the end of the regulation of the arms trade after the Cold War. In sum, there seems to be little convincing evidence that oil abundance per se causes conflict although there is some evidence that once a conflict is underway, some types of natural resources may facilitate the prolongation of war. The evidence thus suggests that factor endowments do not determine politics. The indeterminacy of oil wealth and violence suggests

¹⁰¹Väyrynen, R. 1996. 'The age of the humanitarian emergency', WIDER Research for Action25, Helsinki: WIDER.

¹⁰²Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

that the nature of conflicts in mineral-dominant economies does not exist prior to politics. Because political bargaining surrounding common pool mineral rents is historically specific, the case study and comparative political economy approach will be useful in furthering our understanding of political violence in poor economies.¹⁰³

Historically grounded study on the origins and nature of political organisations and their support base may enable us to develop a framework for understanding the extent to which conflict becomes more or less divisible (see Hirschman 1995 on divisibility). Systematic analysis of competing political party strategies and their effects in generating more or less divisible parameters of contestation should prove useful. In order to specify the mechanisms through which political settlements and coalitions generate political violence, future research needs to focus more on the case study and comparative approach and less on variable-oriented approaches.

The salience and intensity of ethnic, regional and/or religious cleavages is conditional on political party organization, co-optation and other strategies. The approaches of Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin cannot accommodate these important contingencies, sequences of action and interactions of political action. The most influential models of conflict do not examine important relationships between political parties and the state, the structural characteristics of inter and intra-party competition, and as such, cannot illuminate historically specific processes of conflict/cleavages in a given society. Ethnic conflict and natural resource plunder do not, like class, exist prior to politics.¹⁰⁴

The indeterminacy of natural resource plenty on conflict also suggests that examining historically specific processes of political conflict and conflict management in economies, and

¹⁰³Mueller, D.C. 1989. *Public Choice II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nafziger, W. and Auvinen, Y. 2002 'Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence', *World Development* 30: 2.

¹⁰⁴North, D. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

the effect these processes have on economic growth and diversification, defines a major research agenda to understand the genealogy of war in poor economies. Given the importance of low per capita income and economic decline in increasing the risk of war, it would be helpful if further research examines the extent to which mineral/oil resource abundance leads to conflict by perpetuating growth-restricting governance, Dutch Disease, and underdevelopment. While there may be nothing more practical than a good theory, it is clear that simplistic and deterministic theories of resource abundance, as posited in the rentier state model, do not adequately capture the range and interaction of factors that constitute a complex emergency. The focus on the role of oil abundance as a cause of conflict simply delves deeply into the surface of conflicts in poor economies. As a result, the rentier state model, while useful in bringing issues of the source of taxation and resource mobilisation back into a discussion of state capacity and accountability, is an inadequate framework and guide for more profound, penetrating and lasting interventions for peace-building, state capacity building and economic reconstruction in conflict-ridden societies.¹⁰⁵

Finally, if it is reasonable to conclude that politics and policy have been important for the course of mineral-dominant economies, then several policy implications may be suggested. The first is that more effective intervention in humanitarian emergencies will require an account of the causes of conflict that move beyond economic and factor endowment determinism. Second, attention should shift toward understanding how past government. Very negative economic performance contributes to undermining regime and government legitimacy and therefore may increase widespread support for abrupt and even violent changes. Third, greater attention should be paid to understanding the political economy dynamics of regional war zones that transcend the nation-state. The econometric evidence focuses on the nation-state as the unit of analysis. This misses the importance of how easily war can spill over into neighbouring countries and perpetuate what Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998) call 'regional conflict complexes'. Fourth,

¹⁰⁵Moore, M. 2001. 'Political Underdevelopment: what causes 'Bad Governance'?', *Public Management Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3.

more attention might be paid to patterns of the arms trade and the extent to which changing patterns of production and distribution of arms in the post-Cold War period exacerbates ongoing violent conflicts in mineral dependent and more diversified economies.¹⁰⁶

Karl Max elaborated on this idea in his definition of statehood: 'a state [is] a human community that (successfully) claims the domination of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' even when 'the right to used physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it'. All of these models, however, are based on a liberal view of the state that defines state weakness by the degree to which a state deviates from 'best practice', as represented by Western developed economies. This undermines their applicability because it fails to recognize that late developers in Africa and elsewhere face unique challenges in terms of institutional formation and economic change. Indeed, the significant involvement of the state in economic development makes the process of institutional and economic growth decidedly more political.¹⁰⁷

Given these limited circumstances, late developers, particularly fragile states, require different analytic tools. Several lenses might be used to develop a sophisticated political economy of conflict in these states: Institutional multiplicity: a situation in which different sets of rules of the game coexist in the same territory, putting citizens and economic agents in complex, often unsolvable, situations, but offering them the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another, state capacity and capability: the abilities and skills of personnel and the organisational culture within the subsystems of the state, 'influencing' or rent-seeking: legal and institutional influencing activities, informal patron-client networks, or corruption, coalitional analysis: according attention to the shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements and divisibility and boundary activation:

¹⁰⁶Hutchcroft, P.D. 1997. 'The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Terns, Corruption and Clientelism on Third World Development', *Political Studies*, 45:3, pp. 639-658. Ignatieff, M. 2002. 'Intervention and State Failure', *Dissent*, Winter.

¹⁰⁷Chandler, A. and Hikino, T. 1997. 'The large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern economic growth' in A. Chandler, F. Amatori, and T. Hikino (eds.) *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

the creation and activation of boundaries contribute to the escalation of political conflict and violence.¹⁰⁸

Political economy analysis of late developing states illustrates the magnitude of understanding the economic underpinnings and interdependencies of conflict for examining state weakness and post-war reconstruction. In addition to raising interesting questions as to the nature of state weakness, it also suggests an explanation of how political order can be maintained in late developing states. Indeed, existing evidence suggests that centralized patronage contributes significantly to state resilience, but further research is needed to understand the mechanisms underlying this relationship. Some initial propositions concerning centralized patronage include: it enables the executive to have an encompassing interest in the maintenance of political stability it draws on a strong national political organization to limit predatory and violent actions, it increases the likelihood of forming a loyal and unified army ,while it cannot eliminate factional conflict, it provides an institutional context for bargaining and it is relatively resilient to economic shocks and crises without triggering state weakness.

2.3 An analysis of why we call DRC a weak state

Land and mineral has contributed to state weakness of DRC especially in the eastern part of DRC. In eastern DRC, land issues are closely connected to dynamics of violence and conflict. The poor governance of land allocation and transfers has been a source of structural violence in the entire country, but it is mainly in the Kivu provinces where it has led to massive violence. A context of multiple and often contradictory land rights, a weak governance framework and a failing justice system have had a considerable impact on the socio-economic and legal position of rural populations and have led to growing confusion over land rights and access. In most cases, the consequent disputes and disagreements have remained limited to the individual level. But in certain areas, land issues have been a major source of conflict between different communities. The Congolese wars have only reinforced the importance of land issues in local

¹⁰⁸Gerschenkron, A. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

conflict, with references to land being a key ingredient of mobilization efforts by armed groups. But land has also turned into a resource of war and of speculation. The effects of these dynamics, however, tend to vary from place to place depending on the local history, the composition and density of the population, the local governance context and administrative organization, and the implication of politico-military elites¹⁰⁹.

Most studies define 'the land problem' as a result of contradictions in the existing legal framework and the lack of a transparent land governance framework. As in many other contexts, access to and use of land are governed in the DRC through a multitude of systems, practices and institutional structures (just for variety), including a statutory land system, customary systems and a variety of informal land governance practices. These systems lack harmonization, have different legal statuses and are based on different rules, rights and obligations. The effects of these contradictions are further worsened by the lack of a true land policy. Land tenure policies are based on often conflicting documents and statements, which explains why there are no clear standards for the registration of land. This, in turn, leads to confusion, tension, competing claims of ownership or user rights, and, ultimately, various forms and degrees of violent conflict.

A complicating issue is the lack of precision about the exact duties and competencies of customary chiefs. Given their double status as representatives of the traditional order and heads of the local administration units, customary chiefs have always played a prominent role in the distribution of land. However, the local authority and legitimacy of these customary chiefs has been seriously affected by their involvement in the selling of communal land (often without informing the communities they are supposed to represent), their dubious position during the war (some have supported rebel groups while others have left their territories) and their involvement in local networks of patronage. The Congo wars have had a devastating impact on the already very fragile land governance context, which further exemplifies the negative effects of the

¹⁰⁹Wallenstein, P. and Sollenberg, M. 1998. 'Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes, 1989-97', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35:5.

existing legal framework. A first impact is the lack of any reliable land regulating or legal protection mechanisms for small farmers. The justice system today has a very marginal role in resolving land disputes because it is extremely fragile and affected by corruption, and thus considered an unreliable arbiter by parties in conflict. Customary justice mechanisms have also lost much of their credibility and capacity for similar reasons.

During the fighting, land access guide in conflict-affected areas have thoroughly changed, partly as a result of forced displacement, but also because of the loss of authority of customary chiefs and administrations to the advantage of a new class of politico-military strongmen. Land turned into a new source of conjecture and of rent-seeking activities, which was facilitated by the institutional vacuum created by the collapse of the Congolese state. In the Kivus, politico-military leaders came to be deeply involved in land-grabbing strategies, either to redistribute land to their supporters or to confiscate ranching land for their own benefit. In order to consolidate their control over land transactions, rebel groups also tried to further reduce the power of customary chiefs, or created new administrative entities and boundaries and instituted parallel power structures¹¹⁰.

Another complicating factor is the revisit of refugees to their areas of origin. Particularly the recent return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to Masisi and Kalehe has instigated new land claims and has intensified tensions between local communities. In these areas, lack of legal protection, weakness of the local administration and lack of available arable land causes renewed competition and tension, and has affected ethnic cohabitation and security conditions. In North Kivu, there have been several moves by high-ranking military officers to organize and encourage the return of refugees or to facilitate the migration of large groups of people to other areas, in some cases with the complicity of customary chiefs. This has gone hand in hand with a forced

¹¹⁰Sen, A. 1981. *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

redistribution of land to the advantage of refugee-returnees, which has caused renewed tension between different communities and mobilisation by armed group.

Besides non-state armed groups, normal armed forces are also involved in exploiting mineral commodity chains to enrich themselves or, in some cases, to make up for low and unpaid wages. The FARDC's ranks include numbers of former rebels; many of them, particularly a substantial new influx in eastern DRC since 2009, are only superficially integrated into the FARDC command structure and retain their former composition. Elements of the regular army, up to and including high-ranking officers, are involved in the various forms of exploitation, which range from ad hoc looting attacks to investment in mineral trading enterprises. The aim of securing control of lucrative mining areas and positions in mineral trading chains has resulted in sometimes violent rivalry between FARDC units and has undermined effective command and control within the FARDC. Some former rebels, even those who have embarked on integration or demobilization, have defected from the FARDC and rejoined non-state forces, dissatisfied with slow progress and poor and often delayed payments. In addition, competition between non-military actors such as local state and customary authorities, mining enterprises, and miners' cooperatives, has frequently turned violent thereby causing insecurity in DRC.

2.3.1 Population Displacement


In 2008, approximately two million IDS were reported in DRC while close to three hundred thousand refugees were reported in other countries. The number of IDS and refugees is an indicator of the level of conflict in DRC which spills over to Rwanda. The number of IDS increased from 2008 to 2010 and 2012 saw a decline of IDPS and refugees. This can be attributed to the restoration of peace invoked by democratic election and reconciliation

Table 2.3: Population Displacement 2008-2012

Year	IDPs	DRC refugees in Neighboring countries
2008	2000000	355940
2009	2700000	373640
2010	3400000	397662
2011	2329000	405000
2012	166000	201406

Source: UNDP 2014

Figure 4.1: Statistical presentation of the ration between IDPS and Refugees in DRC



2.3.2 Armed Groups in DRC

According to UNODC (2013), there exist a number of armed groups in DRC as indicated in the table below. Each member groups enjoy some autonomy of control over the locals. They exert their authority on the locals; strive to exploit the available natural resources and fight with the rival armed groups. Armed group has been blamed on insecurity in DRC.\

Table 2.4: Statistical presentation of Estimated armed groups in DRC

CNDP	2400-4000
FRF	1000-2000
PARECO	450-500
ACPLS	500-2000
FPLC	200-500
ADF/NALU	300
FNL	30-40
FRPI	200-250
FPJC	80-120
MAI-MAI Yakukumba	200-225
Nai-Mai Kifuafua	300-1000
Mai-Mai Simba	100-200
Mai-Mai Mongol	500-1500
Mai-Mai Kirikitcho	100-150
Mai-Mai Populaire	30-40
Totals	6,490-12,945

Source: UNODC 2013

Chapter Three

The Link between DRC and Rwanda's Insecurity

3.1 Introduction

This chapter brings a link between DRC weakness and Rwanda insecurity. A myriad of factors contribute to DRC weakness that have negative impacts on Rwanda's security.

3.5 Colonial Legacy

The people of Congo have been deprived of a voice to decide their fate of the country from the colonial time to the present regime. From 1885 to 1960 under Belgium colony, Congo experienced some of the worst atrocities. Its rich natural resources like rubber, gold, diamond and timber were exploited by foreign countries. Colonialism created a new power system that brought to the fore the inequalities and injustice embedded in pre-colonial hierarchical social order. DRC was embroiled in cold war politics after independence. Mobutu ruled the country for 32 years, from 1965 to 1997 with an iron fist, exploiting the resources of the country without delivering tangible benefits to the people. His rule was brought to an end by the eastern rebellion led Laurent Kabila in 1997. Since then eastern DRC insecurity situation has been at its worst. The conflict in DRC caused human displacement where many people fled to neighboring countries like Rwanda. The refugee camps in Rwanda caused logistic challenges and hence insecurity in Rwanda¹¹¹.

3.2 Citizenship and Land

In eastern DRC, land issues are closely connected to dynamics of violence and conflict. The poor governance of land allocation and transfers has been a source of structural violence in the entire country, but it is mainly in the Kivu provinces and Ituri where it has led to massive violence. A context of multiple and often contradictory land rights, a weak governance

¹¹¹Krueger, A. 1974. 'The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society', *American Economic Review* June.

framework and a failing justice system have had a considerable impact on the socio-economic and legal position of rural populations and have led to growing confusion over land rights and access. In most cases, the consequent disputes and disagreements have remained limited to the individual level. But in certain areas, land issues have been a major source of conflict between different communities. The Congolese wars have only reinforced the importance of land issues in local conflict, with references to land being a key ingredient of mobilization efforts by armed groups. But land has also turned into a resource of war and of speculation, to the advantage of politico-military elites. The effects of these dynamics, however, tend to vary from place to place depending on the local history, the composition and density of the population, the local governance context and administrative organization, and the implication of politico-military elites:

Most studies define ‘the land problem’ as a result of contradictions in the existing legal framework and the lack of a transparent land governance framework. As in many other contexts, access to and use of land are governed in the DRC through a multitude of systems, practices and institutional structures, including a statutory land system, customary systems and a variety of informal land governance practices. These systems lack harmonization, have different legal statuses and are based on different rules, rights and obligations.

The effects of these contradictions are further worsened by the lack of a true land policy. Land tenure policies are based on often conflicting documents and statements, which explains why there are no clear standards for the registration of land. This, in turn, leads to confusion, tension, competing claims of ownership or user rights, and, ultimately, various forms and degrees of violent conflict.

A complicating factor is the lack of clarity about the exact duties and competencies of customary chiefs. Given their double status as representatives of the traditional order and heads of the local administration units, customary chiefs have always played a prominent role in the distribution of land. However, the local authority and legitimacy of these customary chiefs has been seriously affected by their involvement in the selling of communal land (often without informing the communities they are supposed to represent), their dubious position during the war

(some have supported rebel groups while others have left their territories) and their involvement in local networks of patronage.

The Congo wars have had a devastating impact on the already very fragile land governance context, which further exemplifies the negative effects of the existing legal framework. A first impact is the lack of any reliable land regulating or legal protection mechanisms for small farmers. The justice system today has a very marginal role in resolving land disputes because it is extremely fragile and affected by corruption, and thus considered an unreliable arbiter by parties in conflict. Customary justice mechanisms have also lost much of their credibility and capacity for similar reasons.

During the war, land access patterns in conflict-affected areas have radically changed, partly as a result of forced displacement, but also because of the loss of authority of customary chiefs and administrations to the advantage of a new class of politico-military strongmen. Land turned into a new source of speculation and of rent-seeking activities, which was facilitated by the institutional vacuum created by the collapse of the Congolese state. In the Kivus, politico-military leaders came to be deeply involved in land-grabbing strategies, either to redistribute land to their supporters or to confiscate ranching land for their own benefit. In order to consolidate their control over land transactions, rebel groups also tried to further reduce the power of customary chiefs, or created new administrative entities and boundaries and instituted parallel power structures.

Another complicating factor is the return of refugees to their areas of origin. Particularly the recent return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to Masisi and Kalehe has instigated new land claims and has intensified tensions between local communities. In these areas, lack of legal protection, weakness of the local administration and lack of available arable land causes renewed competition and tension, and has affected ethnic cohabitation and security conditions. In North Kivu, there have been several moves by high-ranking military officers to organize and encourage the return of refugees or to facilitate the migration of large groups of people to other areas, in some cases with the complicity of customary chiefs. This has gone hand in hand with a forced

redistribution of land to the advantage of refugee-returnees, which has caused renewed tension between different communities and mobilization by armed groups.

Citizenship has endangered calm in DRC and the neighboring Rwanda. At the centre of conflict is the right of migrants to own land. The indigenous people feel that foreigners should not own land and should not have political voice. The migrants from Rwandans crossing over to DRC have not been recognized by the indigenous and are to fight for recognition. This exacerbates insecurity in the volatile region of eastern DRC. The displacement of people in DRC has created conflict within the IDPS camps. Tribal association informs conflict dynamics in the region with most communities separated along their ethnic lines. The Rwandese also split between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Rwandans in DRC is not welcomed by the local DRC tribes. They are regarded as outsiders who are out to exploit the wealth of the locals.

Who is the rightful Congolese has fuelled on the ongoing violence. Exclusive and polarized notions of identity and belonging have thrived (and been encouraged) in DRC where the state is so weak that it lacks the ability to control its own resources and protect its people. Warlords have effectively dominated the way in which the benefits derived from abundant natural resources have been, and continue to be, distributed. Consequently, the fragile peace in the country is constantly under threat not only from outbreaks of violence, but also from “entrenched power dynamics that determine wealth extraction and distribution – and sustain instability. These structures are deeply rooted: following Congo’s independence in 1960 and under the leadership of Mobutu Sésé Seko, power structures and networks were built that emphasized ethnicity and regional autonomy. As a result, certain groups became marginalized according to local structures which were partisan and unregulated. With parallel systems of formal and informal governance in place, customary authority – based primarily on ethnic or ancestral group – continues to dominate decision-making processes on the ground in relation to critical, livelihood-related issues such as land distribution and customary taxation.

In 1994 saw many Rwandans enter DRC with weapons and this resulted to the increase of illegal firearms in DRC. The security and human rights situation deteriorated. The refugees from Rwanda were not trained on their rights and their expectation. The Kivus, where the government controls the least of its territory, are the most conflict prone region in the DRC. More than 40 armed groups have emerged in the Kivus in the recent past. In North Kivu alone there are about 27 armed groups. The armed groups have emerged to fill the loophole left by inability of the DRC government to control its territory or provide security to the local people. Ethnic based armed militias emerge to advance and protect community interests. These communal militias exacerbate insecurity by creating incentives among communities to establish their own armed groups. Community militias have mutated over time and become a security phenomenon of their own outside the community's control.

Land alienation since colonial times has reduced land accessible for peasant agriculture. Subsequent internecine wars in the region caused migrations and movement out of Congo and back. Though North and South Kivu are the most populated regions in DRC, they were usually less populated than Rwanda and Burundi. This creates incentives for the latter to move into this region. Migrants from Rwanda and Burundi have found comfort in the Kivus since colonial times. In eastern DRC communities fight for control of land that is not properly protected through legislation and proper registration. People who are perceived to be newcomers in the region or foreigners are often perceived as landless. Communities have their own traditional means of land administration that is often overlooked by the government, armed groups or foreign investors. There are multiple land ownership systems in eastern DRC that are prone to conflicts. Statutory land registration is an expensive exercise often beyond the reach of many peasants. Various political definitions of citizenship in DRC have affected ownership of land and ethnic relations.

In 1966 a new land law (Bakajika Law) was introduced giving the state powers to nationalize land. The land law of 1973 went further by rejecting customary ownership of land. It made the state the only provider of title deeds. This law accompanied by a policy of *Zairenisation* enabled

acquisition of large farmlands in North Kivu by political elites close to the leadership in Kinshasa. At the national level there has been shifting definition of citizenship sometimes accommodating migrants or alienating them depending on their relationship to the ruling regime. During the Mobutu era, citizenship was defined according to political loyalty. In 1972 Mobutu imposed a law that the Banyarwanda (people of Rwandan descent) who came to Congo before 1960 would be granted citizenship only for this law to be changed in 1981 to push the period further back to 1885. This political move was a reflection of his changing relationship with the Banyarwanda. In 1991 the National Sovereign Conference that informed transition to multiparty system also barred Banyarwanda from attending the conference and also endorsed the 1981 citizenship law. In 2004 the transitional government reintroduced the 1960 date for determining citizenship and eligible persons were issued with identity cards.

Owing to disagreement of Hutu and Tutsi citizenship in DRC, the issue has never been completely resolved. Citizenship is a major issue of concern that exacerbates conflict in the region. It stems from the right of migrants to access land. The indigenous people (Bafuliro at el 1999) feel that foreigners have no right to ancestral lands. Given the significance of land in the economy, cultural and political expression of this region, citizenship contention becomes a major driver of conflict. The Rwandan immigrants to DRC, perceived as foreigners by other communities, have to fight hard for their recognition. Large scale displacement has created conflicts in the areas where the IDPs settle Ethnicity informs conflict dynamics in the region with most communities divided along the line of pro or anti Banyarwanda and with the Rwandans themselves divided along Hutu and Tutsi affiliations. Though the Tutsi are some of the largest land owners and wealthiest elites in North Kivu; there is widespread distaste for the Rwandese in the DRC that make them feel vulnerable.

3.3 Fight over Natural Resources.

Conflict eastern part of DRC has been gravitated by the fight of abundant natural resources. Armed militia in eastern DRC and some emerging from the neighboring Rwanda compete for the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Multinational companies have been exploiting minerals

in DRC since independence. Most of these companies establish good relationship with the rebel groups for the benefit of securing minerals. The vast and numerous looted minerals such as gold and diamond finances rebellion and attract formation of armed groups for control of the lucrative trade. The role of resources to the conflict in DRC is essentially a product of domestic political fragility in the DRC state.

Unpredictability in the neighboring countries of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda produced armed groups operating in the DRC and exploiting the resources in the region for their sustenance. The prevalence of high value minerals that are easily mined such as gold, diamond and coltan increased the incentive for external predation. Attempt by people of Rwandan descent to control north and South Kivu has created resentment and conflict with communities that consider themselves indigenous to this region.

3.4 Neighboring Countries interest

There has been accusation by the international community and DRC of Rwanda's involvement in eastern DRC conflicts. Rwanda is heavily involved in the DRC conflict for its perceived security threats from FDLR. Rwandan forces often attack FDLR in eastern DRC to prevent attacks in Rwanda. Ugandan forces teamed up with Rwandan forces to support Laurent Kabila bid to oust Mobutu from power in 1996/7. Ugandan military was accused by the international community of looting mineral resources in the DRC during that period. The security situation in eastern DRC is of major concern to Rwanda because it has created space for operations of rebels in the region.

Peace agreements are stop gap measures in the search of long term interests among neighboring countries and international actors. Many agreements have been signed among parties in the Great Lakes conflict but there is hardly any improvement in security. This is mainly due to non declaration of the hidden interests that drive the conflict in the region. The Lusaka agreement of 1999 on which MONUC was based did not succeed while Sun City (South Africa, 2002), Ituri 2006 and Goma 2008 agreements were flouted many times and did not

deliver justice or protection to civilians. Impunity is a major problem in DRC since armed rebels and therefore, negotiations become war by other means. This situation creates suspicion and mistrust among parties in conflict especially pitting DRC against Rwanda. Prevailing power dynamics inside DRC, neighboring countries and positions of individual UN Security Council members towards the Great Lakes conflict are important considerations in overcoming past failures and breaking a path for sustainable peace.

Chapter Four

Critical Analysis

The effect of DRC weakness on Rwanda's Security.

4.0 Introduction

This chapter critically examines the challenges facing DRC and its impact on Rwanda security situation. It also tests the research hypothesis.

Democratic Republic of Congo is such a massive and region that makes it not easy to administer. Such a big nation creates logistic challenges in terms of governance and administrative structure. Eastern DRC is marginalized with poor access to health and education facilities. There is poor infrastructure and insecurity is extensive due to government neglect. Congo has experienced instability since attaining its independence and as result most of its regions lack strong and adequate institutional capacity. National government is weak, susceptible and lacks the capability to defend the citizen against the armed group. The conflict in Eastern DRC is as a consequence of power vacuum owing to the inability of the government to stamp its authority. Absence of government authority gives room for local armed groups and their foreign sponsors to exploit minerals and to exert authority in the region. The disillusioned locals use unorthodox means pursue their interest. Weak national government capacity gives room for the formation of local armed groups who operates with autonomy. They instill fear through brutal act like rape and recruitment of children to their camps. Sometimes they resort to abduction of the foreigners and government agency. The weakness in the government of DRC affects security in Rwanda in terms of small arms and light weapons and activities of armed groups. The DRC provides safe havens for Rwanda fugitives and rebels

4.1: Hypothesis Testing

4.1.1: There is a significant effect of weak states in DRC on trans-border security in Rwanda

The study sought to establish the likelihood of the research hypothesis that there is a significant effect of weak states in DRC on trans-border security in Rwanda. As established from a recent study done by BSR, (2010) on Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Responsible Action in Supply Chain, Government Engagement and Capacity building, Washington DC, BSR and Responsible Sourcing Network; it established that *indeed* The DRC State has not managed to exert control across its vast territory despite numerous local and international efforts to settle differences and create stability and sense of peace. BSR, (2010) report contends that, public institutions lack authority, capacity for governance or for protecting civilians. The National Military Forces, Armed le Republique du Congo (FARDC), numbering about 120,000, are poorly trained and remunerated. They are actually perceived as a threat to, and have been accused of committing atrocities on, civilians. The eastern DRC has epitomized the ills afflicting the entire nation. Organized armed groups control large swathes of the territory and illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) abound.

The existence of armed groups that champion foreign agenda is armored by the presence of multi-national companies that sometimes engage in illegal mining. These continue to pose significant challenges to peace and security in the region and the possible solutions are elusive. Moreover, Coglan, B. and Pascal, N. (2008) on their study of Mortality in the DRC: *An Ongoing Crisis*, Fifth Mortality Report on the DRC, International Rescue Committee (IRC), they contend that, the reasons for elusiveness are not that clear but the inability to settle issues in Congo is then compounded by its spillover effects in neighboring countries which also have security challenges of their own.

Rwanda faces challenges of national integration and social cohesion. Rwanda has managed to bury the ghost of genocide but the challenges of national security, cohesion, democratization and protection of human rights still exist.

Despite significant progress in peace and security in Rwanda, there are still challenges of armed groups operating near eastern DRC border. There has not been adequate research and conflict analysis to inform some of the international responses to the complex security situation. The study therefore supports the research hypothesis that there is a significant effect of weak states in DRC on trans-border security in Rwanda. Neighboring countries and international mining companies' greed for Congolese valuable minerals is also a driving factor of the conflict. Organized armed groups and arms proliferation are the outcome of the above DRC conflict drivers.

The future conflict trajectory in the region will be informed by; how the Congolese state transforms politically and economically, patterns of international community engagement, domestic politics of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda and the leadership of the African Union and the United Nations. As long as the UN continues to be perceived as acting at the behest of global powers with special interests in the region, UN peace support operations will continue to be irrelevant to the Congolese peace and security situation. The covert and overt interests of regional and global actors in the Congolese conflict must be brought to light for the UN and other actors to succeed in steering the region to durable peace and security.

For example, the present conquer (November, 2013) of M-23 by DRC army and the UN Force Implementation Brigade boosts the image of MONUSCO but this outcome should be treated as a window of opportunity not victory. It should herald disarmament of all the armed groups and domestic and cross border political settlement. This study has identified and analysed the key factors that fuel cross border conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the neighbouring countries. The study has also assessed the capacity of the national governments and the international community to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region.

4.1.2 There is a significant effect of security challenges in the Democratic republic of Congo on security changes in Rwanda

The DRC state has been weakened by poor political choices that do not advance the wellbeing of the country. This has created a weak state whose domination of aggression is challenged both by internal armed groups and organized armed groups sponsored by neighboring countries. Due to this weakness neighboring countries have also invaded and interfered directly with politics of DRC. The DRC therefore cannot provide security and other services expected from the state. Adherence to rational choices that advance the interests of DRC could have enhanced a strong nation that can defend its interests. Economic, military and political interests from the global powers and neighboring countries have also been proposed as possible main drivers of the conflict DRC.

The existence of high value lootable minerals (resource abundance) has been associated with the emergence of organized armed groups aiming to take benefit of the specific economic opportunity. The presence of gold, diamond and cobalt has been cited as main drivers of the conflict in DRC. Resources however do not cause conflict in isolation; other factors such as need for security among communities, political empowerment and demand for equality in distribution of public resources play a significant role. This study ranks realism as the most applicable theory for explaining conflict occurrence in the region. The probability of the emergence of conflict is dependent on the interrelationship between the significance of each variable such as power, identity and needs in an internal or external context.

The study establishes that the rural people do not enjoy access to justice. There is lack of political good will in the marginalized Eastern DRC. There is not legitimate political representation. Election is unheard of in these remote areas. Leadership is by self-imposition by popular individuals who enjoy support from the locals. Security is left in the hands of the armed groups who exploit the security lapse to spearhead their interest and the interest of the groups. Security system is the hands of the militia groups who terrorize the locals. The police and the government military unit are perceived with skepticism among the locals.

Chapter Five

Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.0 Introduction

This chapter contains the key finding of the research, conclusion and recommendation for the study.

5.1 Summary

According to the study, lack of institutional ability of the government of DRC has contributed to the increase of security challenges in Rwanda. Eastern DRC is marginalized leaving it in the hands of armed militia groups. The social, economic and political state of DRC has been severely destroyed by the conflict in DRC and its neighboring countries. By October 2011, there were about 1.65million IDPs in the DRC, one third being in North Kivu. Two out of five children die in infancy, 40% of children have no access to education, and there are thousands of children involved in armed conflict.

An estimated 5.4 million have died since 1998 and about 80% of the population live on less than 1\$ per day. The invasion of DRC by neighboring countries, assisted by their collaborators in DRC, led to mass killing of civilians, rape and commitment of crimes against humanity, torture, recruitment of child soldiers and, war crimes committed by organized armed groups. In 2010 about 1000 civilians were killed in the Kivus, 7000 women raped and about 900,000 people were displaced. There has also been increased flow of SALW to and from DRC and increased illegal mineral trade. Rich business people work closely with corrupt government officials, international gems traders, and companies. Organized armed groups also rape, murder, loot and impose illegal taxation in their areas of operation.

The majority of populace in the eastern DRC suffers from poverty. There are thousands of refugees from eastern DRC in Rwanda. These refugees can be sources of recruitment by OAG. Refugees from DRC face killings, rape and poor maternal health. Fugitives who have committed

crimes in Rwanda escape to DRC. The Congolese people have been disenfranchised since they cannot participate effectively in democratic elections amidst conflict. The internal conflict in DRC, including operations of rebel groups such as M-23 and FDLR bring a lot of insecurity to Rwanda including the influx of refugees to the country. Communities in Rwanda cannot operate their businesses safely. The conflict has also affected Rwanda diplomatically since the country is accused of supporting M-23.

5.2 Conclusion

This study has identified and analyzed the key factors that contribute to weakness of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its consequence to the insecurity in Rwanda. The study has also assessed the capacity of the national governments and the international community to prevent manages and resolves conflicts in the region. The most conspicuous factor that emerges is the inability of the national government of the DRC to protect its citizens and territory. A situation that creates power vacuum that is filled by organized armed groups and neighboring countries' armed forces or their surrogates. Local communities become victims of this conflict and are divided along ethnic lines as they attempt to organize their own security provision mechanisms.

Neighboring countries and international mining companies' voracity for Congolese valuable minerals is also a driving factor of the conflict. Organized armed groups and arms proliferation are the outcome of the above DRC conflict drivers. The future conflict trajectory in the region will be informed by; how the Congolese state transforms politically and economically, patterns of international community engagement, domestic politics of neighboring countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and the leadership of the African Union and the United Nations. As long as the UN continues to be perceived as acting at the behest of global powers with special interests in the region, UN peace support operations will continue to be irrelevant to the Congolese peace and security situation. The covert and overt interests of regional and global actors in the

Congolese conflict must be brought to light for the UN and other actors to succeed in steering the region to durable peace and security.

The recent defeat of M-23 by DRC army and the UN Force Implementation Brigade boosts the image of MONUSCO but this outcome should be treated as a window of opportunity not victory. It should herald disarmament of all the armed groups and domestic and cross border political settlement.

5.3 Recommendation

The government of DRC and the UN should enhance governance in DRC through capacity building and streamlining of the justice sector. The armed militia groups should be disarmed through peaceful negotiation to restore peace in the volatile region. This can be achieved by offering incentives to militia groups who voluntarily surrender their arms to the government authority.

The marginalized groups in Rwanda need to feel a sense of being part of the national government. The government should initiate development projects at the local level. Infrastructures like roads, hospitals, schools and health facilities should be provided at the local level. Addressed within the ICGLR structure and specific conversation initiative with DRC government, MONUSCO's strategies must be entrenched in the local peace building structures. They must win the hearts and minds of the people they have come to protect. The UN should also build the capacity of local actors and provide resources to address the conflict as a first line of response before other external measures are implemented.

The DRC government must also institute community based security structures to improve effectiveness of peace building and reconciliation. The DRC government should enact and implement progressive land legislation and policies that recognize customary rights to landownership. Historical injustices where land was irregularly appropriated from local people should also be addressed. The subject of citizenship among Congolese of Rwandan origin should

be decided as soon as possible by DRC authorities in collaboration with government of Rwanda. Governments in the region should be involved creating a suitable environment for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

5.4: Recommendation for further studies

The researcher recommends that future researchers should be carried out in area of the effect of weakness of DRC on the security of republic of Rwanda. Changing political dynamics could result to different result in the long run. One of the major challenges of this study is the acquisition of data. Future research should be done with an extensive data collection and come with findings based on correct data analysis. The study further recommends a similar study should be done on a different political block for comparative purpose.

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