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RESERVE (832)

KITUI LIVESTOCK

By

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In The Development of Production and Trade in the Reserve Areas of Kenya

1895-1929, I.R. Spencer writes, "One of the most important elements in the calculations which fixed the final size of the pastoralists reserves was the observation that, for the immense extent of the land they occupied they contributed very little to the economic development of the country. Not only did they fail to produce exportable commodities in any quantity, they also refused to contribute labour to help the developing European economy. Their herds buffered them against the need to work by providing them with adequate food supplies, and hides and skins as well as livestock to sell to realize the necessary money for Hunt and Poll Tax. -----As well as being unproductive and administratively inconvenient, the pastoralists were also a direct threat to the successful establishment of a European cattle industry in Kenya.-----

-----The developing European herds needed protection from contact with African herds and, in the period before the First World War, the government veterinary service was primarily occupied with this service task. The powers to restrict the movement of cattle between districts were acquired with the approval of Commissioner Elliot of the Cattle Diseases Ordinance of 1902. -----

Pioneer settlers built up their herds with the assistance of the administration, which helped them to acquire both European and African cattle and provided them with advice. The African pastoralists, on other hand, paid the costs where the Europeans reaped the benefits. It was his land and his cattle that provided the basis of European ranching in Kenya. The very presence of European herds in the country had serious repercussions on the life of the pastoral people. The delimitation of reserves prevented them from following patterns of migration designed to maximise the use of available pasture. Often herds were confined to areas from which some of their richest grazing lands had been excluded. The problems of overcrowding, thereby created were further exacerbated by the wholesale imposition of quarantines on the reserves. This affected the pastoral reserves in two ways. Firstly by cutting down the movement of cattle, quarantine tended initially to lower the incidence of disease, and secondly under quarantine regulations the export of cattle from the reserves was prohibited and severely restricted. In these circumstances numbers tended to increase rapidly until the maximum grazing capacity of the reserve was reached - Overgrazing was inevitable result of this overcrowding, which in turn caused soil erosion and the reduction of the cattle carrying capacity of the land. In such overcrowded conditions, a lighter than average annual rainfall

had catastrophic effects and disease spread very rapidly. Herds, lost their natural increase to drought and sickness. Quarantine prevented the pastoral people from selling their cattle in order to pay their taxes, or meet other financial obligations. And once a quarantine was imposed, it often stayed in operation for a lengthy period ----- In Kitui District for example, the District Commissioner, G.H. Osborne, convinced that his district was entirely healthy, bemoaned in 1910 the absence of a stock inspector. 'It would appear', he wrote 'that the absence of European Settlement in the district is considered sufficient cause for neglect. The District cannot at any rate go on indefinitely paying its Hut Tax out of Goats and Wax'.¹

Spencer's extensive quotation summarizes the colonial macro policy on cattle and how it affected the life of pastoralists. Although Kitui is not currently thought of as a pastoral district a review of its production and trade shows that it has been a dominantly pastoral district to date. The small in the following pages show colonial macro policy on livestock affected Kitui's livestock markets and how this led to differentiation in wealth in the district and how in turn this led to bad ecosystem use. It was the ecosystem decay resulting from the macropolicy on livestock which was used as a rationale for introducing de-stocking policy as well as crop agriculture which was not suited to the ecosystem given the then available technology.

The Traditional System

Traditionally (pre 1896) Kitui livestock was kept in a system which emphasized the quality of the musyi and the Kyengo. At the musyi were kept few stock for consumption. These would include a few milk cows and goats and sheep. The bulk of the family stock would be at the Syengo. We emphasized before that the sending of Kyengo was a collective activity and nobody could send one by himself. The collective level was the village and not necessarily the clan. R.J. Cummings further suggests that prior to the 19th century cattle had been kept in the same village but the evolving stratification led to the scattering of cattle among kinsmen (UVITHYA) in 'the Early Development of Akamba Local Trade History C. 1780-1820'.² I would like to stress that this refers to the ownerships and not the management. A family or individual owner would scatter his cattle among many relatives (usually lineage and clan since the family would be more than likely to be living in the same village) in various motuf (villages). By scattering cattle one not only bought insurance against natural calamities but also one built new relationships of the various motuf. It is in this sense that Cummings is right about the expansion of the scale of a community. Cattle were 'scattered' into various ecological regions. Thus one would make sure that some cattle were in an area which was likely to get rain at different

times. Sometimes cattle would even be rotated so that they would take advantage of a region which had grass and water and in this sense the ownership dovetailed into management practices. It is important to note that it is not through the same cow/bull/goat or whatever which is returned after kuvithwya (process of KUVITHYÄ). Like in the institution where when one wanted to eat the fattest ram all one had to do was cut the ear of a poorer ram and put it in the mouth of the fattest - then eat the poorer one although symbolically you have eaten the fattest, many other symbolic institutions controlled the reciprocal exchanges after kuvithwya. This is an area awaiting detailed study for its own right.

As far as management of the herds was concerned, the Syengo gave greatest flexibility. They were not permanently established therefore they could as it were follow the grass and the water. Thus if an area became over exploited the syengo moved. Since there weren't hard and fast boundaries between clans it was possible to use the range maximally. Where the syengo moved too far from the settled areas (the misyi) because of local desertification then the misyi followed the syengo. In Kitui up to 1930s the colonial administration is constantly spending a lot of effort to force the misyi to stay in a permanent area for administrative purposes. This is of particular importance to the local chiefs whose pay levels and influence are determined by how much hut and poll tax they can collect. Ecologically it leads to localized desertification.

As colonial crop agriculture is introduced, particularly the cotton campaign of 1934-36, misyi are forced to stay in permanent areas with the effect of a) increasing local desertification based on cropping and b) limiting the range of syengo also resulting to regional desertification particularly of the areas near the hills and c) more important the return of bush in the under exploited Weu areas. It is these areas outside the range of syengo which become objects of colonial bush clearing in the 40's and 50's.

As far as management of livestock is concerned it is important to note that in the 19th century Kamba herds were in contact with Galla in Eastern Kitui, Somali in Northern Kitui, Embu, Tharaka, Meru in Northwestern, Masai in West and South.

These surrounding tribes were sources of breeding stock whether it was acquired by raids or trade. Thus there was a more extensive genetic pool from which to breed. All the early travellers and administrators note the particularly fine Boran cattle and Galla goats of Kitui district. One of the consequences of colonial policy / was the deterioration of the breeds

from closing access to neighbouring cattle.

Of importance also is trade. The oral tradition has it that Kitui Kamba sold most of their livestock to the Kikuyu who did not have good range given the endemic diseases (East Coast Fever and Contagious pleuropneumonia) in the colder Kikuyuland. There is oral evidence that for ages Kamba cattle went to the Kenya Coastal peoples particularly the Taita, Duruma and Digo through what is now Tsavo National Park. The coastal peoples sought Kamba cattle as breeding stock initially. Most of the Swahili traders in Kitui before World War II were trading in livestock.

What of the extent of grazing land and therefore syengo? The oral tradition of the Kitui Kamba claim to have been grazing in the last century as far East as Hola and to have grazed in the northeast as far as Garissa. To the West they claim to have grazed all Yatta, as far as the Mwea Plains, Katwanya and around Donyo Sabuk in the environs of Thika/Athi River. To the south they claim to have grazed all of what is Tsavo East and the Kibwezi region. These claims are not arguments for total and permanent occupation since the areas were also claimed by other neighbours as pointed out earlier. The point is as other tribes grazed elsewhere, Kitui Kamba could establish syengo and later recede to the tribal core areas. It is clear that their grazing lands were more extensive as the various administration boundaries (see maps L.1-L.4) show. The Closing of Yatta, Eastern Crownlands and the excising of 2,500 square miles to the south for Tsavo National Park was disastrous for Kitui Livestock. We shall return to these points later.

Livestock Trade

Previously we have pointed out that livestock and livestock products were central in Kitui exports since the earliest period. Table L.1 Kitui Cattle Exports 1913 to 1965 and Table L2. Kitui shoat Exports 1913-1965 shows the livestock exported as culled from Annual Reports. It is possible that in any given year perhaps as much as twice the numbers officially reported left the district basically for the Kikuyu, Embu and Mariakani markets not to speak of the Machakos market. Annual Reports are replete with claims by administrators of cattle leaving 'illegally'. What is striking with the official figures of cattle exports is, first the fact that in general there were on the average six times as many sale of shoats in drought and recovery years in the sense that goat prices hold very well as opposed to cattle prices. In this sense cattle prices are more vulnerable to drought than shoat prices. Cattle prices between 1927 and 1933 drop by more than sixty shillings from shs. 70 to shs. 10. During the same years

shoats drop from shs. 10 to shs. 2/-. However perhaps the most important conclusion out of the two tables may be the stability of shoat prices over time. This may be a function of the tradition of goats being perceived as a measure. Thus the producer of goats could be more sure of his return than the producer of cattle. Cattle prices suffered from the traditional quarantines which always lowered the prices. Also this may be related to the fact that the bulk of the goat market was internal and by implication the bulk of the cattle demand being external to the district. In the chapter on trade we also noted that cattle prices are more susceptible to droughts and destocking campaigns than goat prices. Goats can survive droughts better than cattle and they were not usually destocked. This seems to be supported by our monitoring of goat and cattle prices in four markets between 1972 and 1976 which showed average prices of cattle Mutha Shs. 390 (1972) Shs. 400(1973) Shs. 250(1974) Shs. 200(1975) and Shs. 200(1976 January - November). Kisasi Shs. 400(1972) Shs. 400(1973) Shs. 350(1974) Sh. 350(1976) Zombe Shs. 400(1972) Shs. 450(1973) Shs. 400(1974) Shs. 200(1975) and Shs. 200(1976). Mwingi Shs. 300(1972) Shs. 350(1973) Shs. 300(1974) Shs. 250(1975) and Shs. 300(1976). In the same years goat prices were Mutha Shs. 40(1972) Shs. 60(1973) Shs. 90(1974) Shs. 20(1975) and Shs. 20(1976). Kisasi Shs. 60(1972) Shs. 70(1973) Shs. 80(1974) Shs. 60(1975) and Shs. 40(1976) Zombe Shs. 40(1972) Shs. 30(1973) Shs. 20(1974) Shs. 25(1975) Shs. 30(1976) Mwingi Shs. 30(1972) Shs. 30(1973) Shs. 35(1974) Shs. 40(1975) Shs. 50(1976). Clearly then this seems to be an earlier reversal of cattle/Shoat prices. Shoat prices seem to fluctuate more. In fact the averaged prices which we got from 5 traders in each market monthly do not bear the fluctuations. Consider the case of Mutha. In 1974 prices fluctuated between 120 and Shs. 5. The explanation was that ivory money into the area in 1972 and 1973 had pushed prices up. The drought pushed them down. Nobody in the district was buying for breeding and external buyers for Nairobi illegal market forced the prices down by buying in large lots at Mutha and Zombe and thus blocking the small scale internal trader who would buy there and recycle in the district. On the cattle although in 1974 drought people lost a lot of cattle (estimates of 60 - 90%) cattle prices did not fluctuate as much since most people would not readily sell even the masoma (the super emaciated ones) and also that local demand for slaughter held prices up.

Finally out of the Table L.1 and L.2. we ought to note that the myth of pastoralists not selling does not hold. Within this comment is sublimed the problem of forced sales. The initial forced sales were for World War I. Probably these did not have a great impact in marketizing Kitui pastoralists other than inverting the traditional cattle price structure and marketizing shoats more than cattle. On the cattle price structure, traditionally cows were more valued than oxen or bulls but military procurement

of World War I preferred and offered better prices for bulls or oxen than cows. This not only inverted the traditional price structure but clearly became a factor in the herd structure. As more cows were left herds could regenerate faster and clearly as people continued to market more male stock then there was a herd structure left for faster regeneration. Thus later overstocking arguments had antecedents in previous forced marketing. On the marketing of shoats more than livestock we should note that there was a quarantine imposed in 1917/18. Thus Kitui could not 'contribute' cattle to the last War years but was forced to contribute goats. This deepened the already existant idea that shoats were more exchangeable/marketable than livestock. In subsequent quarantines for which documentation is not complete we hypothesize that goats would continue to be sold more than cattle.

Cattle Holdings

We wanted to establish estimates of cattle in the district with some kind of rigour so as to argue the suggested offtake rates by the export data as well as implied death and internal consumption from data on hide and skin exports. This has not been possible first since hides and skins data is itself highly unreliable. There are few attempted cattle census in the early and late periods, furthermore we have not been able to find any archival data on internal slaughter. This is an area needing further research.

However we have livestock census data for 1919, 1932, 1937, 1942 and 1949. This data is presented in Table L. 3 Kitui Cattle, Shoat Census. By calculating the per capital cattle and shoats and assuming a household (musyi) of ten people had 21, 15, 5, 5, 11, 10 or 13 cattle in 1919, 1932, 1934, 1942 and 1949. Similarly a household had 5, 6, 30, 28, or 31 shoats in 1934, 1937, 1942, 1949. To interpret the above data we should keep in mind the fact that the 1928 and 1934 famines devastated the cattle economy. In the oral tradition our informants argue that all cattle for small people were finished in 1934 and only andu anene who could move all over remained with cattle. Whereas this is an exaggeration clearly it is reflected in the crude calculations. Households clearly lost more in the 1928 and 1934 droughts than in even the forced sales and drought of 1942/44. It is interesting to note that 90% of our field interviews when asked 'How many cattle and shoats should a musyi have? Answer: 20 cattle and 50 goats. These figures seem to be approximated by the census data when we allow for drought and forced sales.

Table L.4 Kitui Livestock by Location 1937, 1942 and 1949 allows us to do further analysis. Grouping the locations according to per capita cattle holding as to those with 1 and above Group 1, .75 to .99 Group 2, .50-.74 Group 3, .25-.49 Group 4 and 0-.24 Group 5 we should note that on Mutonguni is in Group 1 in 1937. It is joined by the other wet locations of Matinyani, Migwani and Mulango as well as the dry locations of Mutha, Zombe, Mui, Mutito, Nuu, Endau, Ngomeni, Tharaka and Mivukoni in 1942. By 1949 Group one is Mulango, South Yatta, Mutha, Zombe, Mui, Mutito, Nuu, Endau, Ngomeni, Endui, Tharaka, Mivukoni, Matinyani and Migwani. Thus cattle increases are more dramatic in the dry locations. Since only Mulango, Matinyani and Migwani are wet locations. We know though Mulango location had weu in Kavisumi area. Matinyani and Migwani had weu towards Mwakini and Kithiko. Group D are Migwani, Matinyani (wet) and Ngomeni, Endau, Nuu (dry) in 1937, South Yatta Tseikuru, Endui, Katse (dry) and Changwithya (wet) in 1942; Zambani, Changwithya, Mutonguni (wet) Ikanga, Kanzi'ko, Tseikuru and Katse (dry) in 1949. Group 3 are Kanzi, Mui, Mutito (dry) in 1937, Zambani (wet) Ikanga, Kanzi'ko (dry) in 1942 and none in 1949. Group 4 is South Yatta, Zombe, Mivukoni/Kimangau (dry) in 1937 and none in 1942 and 1949. Group 5 is Zambani, Mulango, Changwithya (wet) in 1937 Ikanga, Ikutha, Mutha, Tseikuru, Endui, Katse, Tharaka (dry) in 1942, Ikutha in 1942 and Ikutha in 1949. Obviously it does not pay much to keep cattle in Ikutha, Tharaka Tseikuru, Katse Endui, Mutha and Ikanga particularly when there is a drought. It is in these locations that cattle losses in 1974 drought were estimated as between 60-90%.

Table L. 5. Kitui Population, Cattle and Shoaat Densities 1937, 1942 and 1949 shows the ten most populated locations in 1937 as Changwithya (103.89) Mulango (98.52) Matinyani (84.51) Mutonguni (55.70), Tseikuru (39.30) Mui (35.09) Migwani (33.15) Nzambani (31.89) Ikanga (30.34) and Mivukoni (24.77). One should note that these include all the wet locations but Tseikuru, Ikanga and Mivukoni some of the driest locations, are also densely populated. They are ignored by ALDEV development projects in late 40's though. The least populated is Zombe/Voo which we have argued elsewhere had lost population as a result of localized desertification during 1928 and 1934 droughts. The list of the ten most populated locations in 1942 are Changwithya (115.2) Matinyani (95.7) Mulango (78.6) Mutonguni (67.7) Tseikuru (48.7) Nzambani (42.5) Migwani (38.0) Mui (37.5) Ikanga (37.0) and Endui (28.6) Endui a dry location replaces Mivukoni in the top ten suggesting migration out of Mivukoni which is corroborated by the general data on the 1942 famine as having started in Northeastern Kitui. Note also that Nuu is losing population perhaps moving back into Endui. Nzambani and Yatta are receiving Mulango and Changwithya people as evident in the data and in the field interviews. Kanzi'ko and Zombe practically double their population. Field interview

data suggests that these were people from the central wet locations leapfrogging the intermediate zones for livestock keeping reasons.

In 1949 the most populated locations are Changwithya (135.32) Matinyani (109.90) Mulango (98.52) Mutonguni (82.65) Migwani (43.55) Ikanga (40.25) Mui (36.68) Endui (31.09) South Yatta (29.44) and Kanziko (24.35). We should though note that Kanziko loses a bit of her population. Mutha loses nearly two people per square mile, Mui loses one person per square mile. Tharaka loses five persons per square mile and Miuukoni loses one person per square mile. Mutha people seem to move back to Zombe/Voo. Mui people seem to move back to Endui and/or Nuu, Mutito Tharaka people seem to move to Tseikuru and Mivukoni people may be moving to Endui, Nuu and Ngomeni.

Cattle densities in 1937 are as follows: Mutonguni (96.28) Matinyani (83.44) Changwithya (51.13) Migwani (32.50) Tharaka (20.56) Mui (19.56) Mulango (17.62) Nuu (14.90) Mutito (11.68) Miuukoni (10.07). In 1942 cattle densities are Matinyani (129.33) Changwithya (105.02) Mulango (83.22) Mutonguni (71.31) Mui (60.20) Migwani (52.02) Mulango (83.22) Mutonguni (71.31) Mui (60.20) Migwani (52.02) Tharaka (45.73) Tseikuru (40.29) Mutito (31.82) and Nuu (30.21). Note that Mutonguni loses about 25 cattle per square mile. These cattle were grazing in Yatta B₂ and B₁ we shall return to them later. The dramatic new entrant in the top ten is Tseikuru. Again we draw attention to the inclusion of the 5 wet locations both years and in the 1949 ranking which is Changwithya Matinyani (140.94) Changwithya (131.04) Mulango (122.40) Mutonguni (81.45) Mui (58.90) Migwani (52.83) Tseikuru (52.67) Mutha (49.31) Nuu (48.95) Endau (46.17).

A look at the goat densities in 1937, 42, and 49 will show Mulango, Changwithya, Matinyani, Mutonguni, Migwani, Ikanga appearing in the top ten in the three years, south Yatta appearing twice in 1937 and 1949, Kanziko appearing in 1937, Endau and Mivukoni in 1942; Katse and Nzambani in 1949.

Yet if one looks at per capita cattle and goat holdings in 1937, 42, 49, the top ten cattle locations are ranked in descending order as Mutonguni, Migwani, Matinyani, Ngomeni, Nuu, Endau, Mutito, Mui, Kanziko, Mivukoni/Kimangau: Zombe, Ngomeni, Mutito, Tharaka, Nuu, Mui, Migwani, Matinyani, Mutha, Mivukoni. Tseikuru, Ngomeni, Nuu, Mutito, Tharaka, Zombe, Mui, Mivukoni, Matinyani and Migwani. The top ten goat holdings are ranked also in descending order as follows Tharaka, Kanziko, Mutonguni, Migwani, Ikanga South Yatta, Matinyani, Ngomeni, Nuu and Endau in 1937. Endau, Tharaka, Tseikuru, Migwani, Miuukoni, Zombe, Ikanga, Ngomeni, Ikutha and Mulango in 1942 and Tharaka, Zambani, Tseikuru, South Yatta, Katse, Matinyani, Mulango,

Endau, Mutonguni and Mutha. From the per capita holdings we re-emphasize the importance of the dry locations in livestock production and reiterate that their development was ignored by both the crop related agricultural development of the late '40's and '50's and the grazing control development of the same period. As agricultural programs were centered in the wet locations, the asomi from these locations moved their cattle into the dry locations.

Per capita arguments are very good for mystifying the actual holdings per household. Up to now for most of rural Kenya we do not have exact data on household sizes. But we would like to impute some idea of the distribution of cattle among households since central to our argument is the idea that as the wet locations differentiate socially they push the poor people to the dry locations and further that given traditional technology livestock production is a more equitable production system than crop agriculture. Table L. 4. gives us livestock data by location as well as the locational populations. It also gives us the numbers of stock owners. If we assume a household of eight people and further assume that during the 1949 stock census the respondents answered the question of ownership by starting misyi (households) then we can compute the households theoretically without cattle. The purpose is only to show the differences in ownership in different ecoregions and not to arrive at a conclusive statement at cattle ownership. These calculations are shown in Table L.6. Households without Cattle 1949. If our assumptions are correct then the locations with highest numbers (more than 50%) of non-livestock owning households are Changwithya (63.93%) Matinyani (58.65%) Mutha (58.37%) Kanziko (53.15%). Two of these Changwithya and Matinyani are wet and very densely populated. Thus the explanation for the uneven distribution of livestock is access to land. The other two are dry with intermediate population density. We should though note that in 1948 they and Ikutha got their stock pushed from Tsavo with catastrophic deaths. This may be then the explanation.

Tharaka is unique in the sense that there are theoretically less households than reported stock owners. We offer the explanation that perhaps Tharaka household sizes are less than 8 persons and rejoin that it has probably all the households with stock. Endau (1.2%) Katse (3.54%) Zambani (10.13%) Mulango (17.57%) and Mutonguni (19.84%) have the least households without livestock also. Endau and Katse are dry. Zambani is a location receiving population from the wet locations and the last two are expanding their frontiers into Weu (exporting population) Mulango towards Kavisuni and Mutonguni towards Yatta.

Thus a partial conclusion can be reached that households loose cattle as population densities increase. The alternative for these households has

been in Kitui to migrate to the drier districts where they try to accumulate livestock.

Finally it is not possible to update the quantitative data on livestock since there has not been any census. In subsequent sections we shall mainly be dealing with qualitative data.

Livestock in Kitui Society

We have in the Chapter on Trade presented the data on agricultural exports. In this section we discuss the relationship between traditional livestock production knowledge, accumulation by asomi, colonial images of development and the impact of the policies.

The centrality of cattle in Kitui production can be shown by the concerns of the L.N.C. who as early as 1927 had already hired a Reconditioning Officer whose work was provision of water.³ The asomi members of the LNC were very much concerned with provision of permanent water for cattle and it seems incidentally for human life. Maher writing in 1937 further points out that permanent water availability was the controlling settlement factor with people not willing to settle more than 19-20 miles away from permanent water.⁴ For existing water supplies in 1938 and 1950 see Maps L.10 and L.16 respectively.

At the same time traditional knowledge seemed to take care of some livestock production parameters. Maher writes "The moist districts near Kitui such as in parts of Changwithya and Nzambani locations are not heavily stocked but understocked. The native does not always appreciate how far diseases are concerned in the failure of the stock to thrive but he does know they do not do well on the tall grass which grows around Kitui".⁵ The annual Report 1918-19 had made the same point.

As far as grass knowledge was concerned Maher was able to note that the Kitui Kamba understood and classified grasses in a manner which approximates modern research on grasses. The grasses identified were 1. Vgiandiathi, 2. Irokā (Cynodon sp.), 3. Mbehetwa (Mbeetua?) (Eragostis superba), 4. Kithundi (Digitaria Species/Macroblephara?), 5. Kiemanduwa (Pennisetum sp.), 6. Kiemaviny'a (Chloris Myriostachya), 7. Jnyoe (Aristida sp.), 8. Mbwea - Panicum Maximum. They also ranked 8 as of / value and 6 and 7 as low value (even from their names!).⁶

Maher is also useful in alerting us to the cattle dispersal of the 1935/37 period. He points out that Yatta, Mutonguni and Matinyani cattle had dispersed into Yatta C (later B₂), "igwani Cattle were dispersed into Yatta B₁ (Kikuyu Yatta), "Far North cattle had crossed the Tana into Garissa and Meru and Eastern cattle were into Tana River."⁷

There artificial water systems had been created with INC Money there was already local desertification.⁸ The most important of the water systems are: A. Springs i.e. 'uu and Mbooni (Changwithya) B. Masonry Dams 1. Masiungwa (Mivukoni Ngomeni) C. Earth Dams 1. Migwani, 2. Mui 3. Wakavali (Mutonguni) D. Rock-Hill Storage Dams 1. Ndatani (Ngomeni) E. Boreholes 1. Komo (Migwani) unsuccessful and 2. Kitui Town - unsuccessful and 2. Kitui Town - unsuccessful F. Sand River Wells - numerous.⁹ Maher pointed out that earthdams were to present technical problems of design and loss of water because of the high evapotranspiration rates. He preferred the sandriver wells. This preference was ignored later by ALLEN who concentrated on earth dams, many of which washed away, not to talk of their inefficiency from an evapotranspiration point of view.

Maher was also to state that stock ownership was becoming uneven. He speculated that the 24.1% of unmarried men could afford to buy wives although they are of age.¹⁰ Since they did not have any access to livestock. But who was accumulating livestock? Stanner¹¹ calls them a powerful bureaucracy. I have called them an asomi class. These were the Headmen (chiefs) Nzama Elders Clerks, Chiefs Retainers and other minor functionaries of the colonial administration who were in a position to do favours to the population in return of payment by cattle. They used the administrative positions and the INC to get programs benefitting them more than the rest of society. Maher describes the process. "When a man has a legal case and wants support of his chief, he gives him cattle. If a man kills another, there will be no trouble made ---- a poor man who owes tax for four butts may give shs. 5/- to an elder of the local Nzama to swear that he is too poor to pay tax; similarly another may give a local elder a goat or 5/- to avoid having to do road work".¹² An illustrative case is Headman Kasina's accumulation of cattle from 70 to between 2,000 - 4,000 between 1930 and 1937 is cited.¹³ Other qualitative evidence of this large scale cattle owner is found in Annual Report of 1935 where the DC writes "In spite of the diminution in numbers of cattle, the export of ghee has nearly doubled itself. This simply means that the wealthy stock owners have been compelled to sit up and take notice, by no means a bad thing".¹⁴ Migwani Dairy which was established by the INC between November 1936 and June 1937 received 9703 gallons of milk. Of these 2520 i.e. 25.97% were Headman Kasina's milk.¹⁵

DESTOCKING

In chapter XI titled "The End of Location: Destocking Re-conditioning and the New Politics" of J.F. Munro's Colonial Rule and the Kamba¹⁶ the author discusses the rise of destocking in Machakos and its

leading to politics of opposition to destocking and new land reclamation by 1938/39. The author is essentially writing about the Machakos branch of the Kamba tribe which was in closer proximity to the colonial system both spatially and politically. Kitui Kamba were far removed spatially and politically. Thus destocking did not result into 'new' politics until the late 1950s. The explanations for this late peaking has to do with the available grazing given traditional technology and migration patterns, the nature of accumulation of cattle and the partial nature of the destocking policy input.

By 1930s, the asomi had accumulated cattle particularly during the 1934 drought at the expense of the poorer relatives. The asomi accumulators had their bases essentially in the wet regions (acquired out of enclosure of clan land) but they were pushing their stock into the dry locations of East, South, Southwest and Northwest. It is in this context of accumulation of cattle by asomi and the movement of cattle out of the wet regions that the 1936 Annual Report stated "There is surplus stock in the district though many of the larger herds could advantageously dispose of a number of male stock."

As destocking momentum gathered in Machakos Liebigs who had been set up to buy 'scrub' cattle from Machakos started moving into Kitui. The purpose of the Liebigs monopoly was to offer rock bottom prices to Africans and thereby economically kill pastoralism. Thus the prices they were willing to pay in Kitui were much less than the internal prices offered by asomi accumulators and the external price to Mariakani, Embu, Meru and Kikuyu. The Annual Report 1937 reports that Liebigs could offer only shs. 40/- whereas the general price of an ox of about 800 lbs. was shs. 60/-.¹⁸ This role of a monopoly depressing local prices is later continued by Liebigs in conjunction with Meat Control during the World War II years and after by Kenya Meat Commission in conjunction with African Livestock Marketing Organization.¹⁹

The DC Kitui is cognizant of opposition to selling to Liebigs at the low price and therefore laments that there should be a system of producing cattle for Liebigs. Together with the newly posted Livestock officer they in 1935 decided that the method should be double inoculation and census. This is the beginning of Maunda. Kitui Kamba therefore learn to associate any cattle inoculation with compulsory sales. Up to 1975 any discussion of stock inoculation elicits arguments of compulsory sales. To pay for the compulsory inoculation the officers "force natives to sell scrub cows or goats". The other should be that it is Liebigs which buys at next to nothing

prices. The campaign significantly starts in Migwani where Kasina, the Chief is one of the asomi accumulators. The significance of these forced sales is reflected in the 1937 1938 figures where livestock exports practically double as shown below. The most dramatic jump is in goats since they are the

	1937	1938
Cattle	3465	6984
Sheep	1139	4415
Goats	3926	13696

currency for paying for veterinary services. We should further note that as Liebigs and the veterinary system depress prices there is a chain effect where the asomi buy goats at next to nothing prices and move them out to the arid areas. For Migwani location this becomes the opening of land towards Kithioko and Tana. Thus the asomi establish claim to Yatta and set up the political issue of Machakos and Kikuyu Migrants incoming to the area.²⁰

As the World War II breaks all external sales to Meru, Embu, Machakos and Coast are restricted. Increasingly external sales are to Meat Supply Board. In 1941 Supply Board takes 65% of all cattle exported. In 1942 it takes 79%. Because of the restricted external market and the low prices by Meat Supply Board (Cattle Shs. 32/- in 1941 and shs. 34/- in 1942, Goats shs. 6/- in 1942 averages.) the internal prices controlled by asomi accumulators drop. They offer shs. 30/- per head cattle and shs. 4/- per goat in 1942.²² By 1943 all external exports are prohibited.²³

By 1942 there is circumstantial evidence to show that the livestock forcibly sold between 1938 and then had led to the poor lossing so much stock that they sought to replenish their stock by traditional techniques - raiding. The D.C. writes "Certain persons from Mivukoni, Tseikuru and Ngomeni Locations in the north do occasionally travel into the Garba Tula area of the Northern Frontier District for the purpose of stealing Boran Goats"²⁴. In fields interviews in Ngomeni, Endau and Nuu many of the herders talked about raiding during the war to replenish "goats eaten by munanda". Cornell also complains that the 6,892 cattle and 1,698 goats requisitioned through chiefs in 1942 up to May and the extra 400 cattle requisitioned for June are too much and doubts whether they can be met.²⁵ By 1944 requisition is for 4,800 cattle and 60,000 goats!²⁶

The process of Meat Supply Board requisitioning did not just help local accumulators from a pricing point of view. The Administration of the requisitioning probably even contributed more to asomi accumulation than the price mechanism. Once the D.C. got a quota he divided the quota by locations and send the amount of cattle, shoats supposed to be contributed by the location

to the chief. It was the responsibility of the chief to make sure the quota was filled. Chiefs were the most important and powerful category in the asomi class. They would thus allocate who was to produce the particular cattle and there was room for corruption and buying poor beasts to contribute while their good beasts had been moved away to the drier areas - with understanding between the chiefs there. They were responsible for declaring local quarantines²⁷ a tool they used to force forces down when buying. The 1943 Annual Report states that "there is always a danger at these sales that poor people will be victimized and the wealthy cattle owners will evade their obligation by various methods. It is usually necessary to reject a number of immature beasts at each sale and to return beasts which have been taken from people who cannot afford to part with them".²⁸ The D.O., Askwith in Safari Diary September 18th 1944 writes on the problem of requisition in Nzambani as follows "On enquiry it appeared that collecting Livestock Control cattle was not easy as an extra askari was wanted. The Thome elders were reluctant to take stock from the wealthy who naturally make it worth their while. The wealthy claim that all should produce equal amounts. This reacts hardly on the poor. Chief Askwith collects on a rate of 20% of all herds above 4 of both cattle and goats. Even this seems somewhat severe on the poor. It would be preferable, if quotas can be met, if only herds in excess of 10 were drawn on. This would at least leave about one hide price. 20 drawn from a man owning 100 stock is not so serious as 1 from an owner of five or even two from the owner of 20".²⁹

That the Livestock Supply Board Prices and the method of requisitioning had contributed to maldistribution of cattle which led to a rise in internal price (profits of which went to asomi accumulators) is reflected in the 1945 prices. In the Annual Report 1945 the D.C. writes "Internal prices were grossly inflated, a bullcock which would fetch shs. 40/- on the open market being valued at two and a half times that value (i.e. sh. 100/-). Sales to the Livestock Board did nothing to reduce the price and perhaps even made owners resolve to sell their other saleable beasts at a price calculated to recoup them for their imagined losses on the compulsory sales. 1'34 cattle and 6456 'shoats' are known to have left but probably three times these numbers were moved illicitly. The Board-Livestock Control purchased 4660 cattle and 28245 'shoats'.³⁰ It is the asomi accumulators who are in a position to smuggle cattle and to get licences for export thereby inflating the internal price. The poor who want to buy after being forced by the asomi to contribute to locational quotas were thus exploited.

1 1946 was a drought-famine year probably only rivalled by 1934. "The natural consequence was a grave depletion of the monetary resources of the reserve, possibly a blessing in disguise, which was indicated by a vertical drop in internal stock prices and repeated and urgent requests for the attendance of the Livestock Control Buyer whose presence had hitherto been anathema to the stock owning community ----- . The consumption of meat too rose to abnormal heights; sporadic butcheries sprang up especially in the vicinity of roads and it was a common experience to observe a dozen or more cattle awaiting slaughter in the larger markets. Nor were the resources of nature neglected. Emissaries from the southern locations travelled to Mutito Andei and even remoter parts in the uninhabited Kyulu area of Machakos District to collect the seeds of the Baobab tree which flourishes in that locality ----- Cattle (were) taken into fly area (Tana Valley, Thua and Yatta) ----- Export of slaughter stock ----- except through the Livestock Control were prohibited for most of the year and, though this was the only avenue open to them, the Kamba did not respond since the internal price of stock was grossly inflated and money during the first nine months was plentiful. When eventually money became scarce and the internal value of stock slumped quantities were offered voluntarily to the Control buyer but the quality was so poor owing to the lack of fodder that he was unable to purchase. The commandeering of stock by the control was most unpopular, especially in view of the low prices and despite explanation and nauseum, entirely incomprehensible to the average native, who had resented it bitterly since actual hostilities ceased".

Extensive interpretation of this lengthy quote is not necessary. All one wishes to point out is that the poor lost more stock by death and slaughter in drought than the rich. The poor had to revert to gathering wild fruits. The asomi hired labour to move stock out to fly areas and outside reserve. The asomi also exported stock. Significantly Livestock Control lost the edge in term of numbers of livestock exported (45% cattle and 45.5% shoats) but given that it had monopoly for nine months and other export markets opened after the quality of cattle deteriorated still meant that it was to dominate the price structure. Finally the poor resorted to raiding Boran as a method of getting some stock. When the range recovered in 1947 the asomi reduced their selling and given the pressure by the poor to acquire some livestock the internal price moved up again. The Annual Report 1947 reports, "Internal stock prices remained high throughout the year and the Meat Marketing Board Buyer met with little success, despite advance publicity for his visits, because the prices he was able to offer were substantially below those the Kamba was prepared to accept. It is very likely, however, that if stock could

be purchased by weight after being weighed on scales or a balance in the presence of the seller, a very substantial increase in stock offering for sale would result.³³

By 1948 the hope of a better price by the Meat Marketing Board had not improved because of the weighbridge installed at Mwingi. "Prices paid were slightly below the internal price ----- During 7 weeks of September and October, 272 slaughter cattle were purchased at an average of shs. 103/- and many were rejected. The M.M.B. price had the scale been in order, would have been nearer shs.60-"³⁴ M.M.B. was taking only 20% of all cattle exported and no goats. Embu stock traders were dominant and were allowed access at Mwingi on Permit.³⁵ Shoats were basically exported to the Mariakani Coast market.³⁶ In 1949 Meat Marketing Board only bought 2.6% of Kitui stock³⁷. It is important to note that whereas during the War years livestock was collected by locational quotas (up to 1946) between 1947 there was a system of regulated auctions for Livestock Control/Meat Marketing Board. From 1949 there is a dual system - auctions and open market. Of the 7417 cattle offered in 1949 53% were in the open market.³⁸ It is these open markets which were responsible for the growth of the Kitui Cattle Trader who was buying to move cattle to the auction market which were the only markets where Embu and Kikuyu buyers were allowed. The most important auction market was Mwingi. Thus the Kitui cattle trader category of the asomi class are significant in the later consolidation of the class. As much as 80% of the present big traders (by reputation) in the district learned trading as cattle traders.

1949/50 was a drought/famine year, but its impact was not as bad as the previous years since "Prices for Kitui livestock remained high and enabled the people to import cereals, especially from Meru and Embu where there had been bumper harvests. Distribution was facilitated by increased transport, and by a real improvement in the secondary roads. By a stroke of luck, sisal became so valuable that fibre from sisal hedges was exportable. During the last half of the year (1950), markets were white with inferior fibre selling at 90 cents a lb. and giving its name to the food shortage - Nzaa ya 'makonge'.³⁹ Auctions sold 14490 cattle and 27754 shoats but "By samples taken of private slaughtering in the locations and butchering for sale in the smaller markets it is safe to say that at least 30,000 cattle and 60,000 'shoats' have been removed from the district by export or slaughter".⁴⁰ It is in this sense then that the drought-famine is "a blessing in disguise"⁴¹ But we should compare the 1950 sales with 1951 a good year. In 1951 more cattle are sold i.e. 15034 but less shoats i.e. 24932.⁴² The point to make is that goats are more evenly spread and will be sold more in a bad year by the poor especially, whereas cattle are less evenly spread and the asomi accumulators

will await a good grazing year to make a profit. We should further note from the Annual Report that 13,204 cattle and 34,537 shoats are offered in auctions and NOT SOLD. Obviously these are poor animals but we can surmise that the Kitui Stock traders who were in these markets did not accept what they considered high prices and would reject those animals in the main auction markets (at Mwingi Kisasi & Mutomo Weekly) and buy them in the small non-auction markets thus forcing the poor to sell at lower prices. Those livestock would end up in the internal market mainly and to some extent export as summarised in the Annual Report "Slaughter figures for each market and location do not exist, but conclusions can be drawn from the number of hides and skins exported, and the interesting record kept by Chief Wilson of Mutonguni for Kauai and Talia market. At Talia 380 cattle and 544 goats were slaughtered by butchers and at Kauai 308 cattle and 364 goats. Mutonguni population is about one sixteenth of Kitui District, thus the internal slaughter figure based on Chief Wilson's records confirms the total derived from the export of hides (11212) and skins (41,024)"⁴³ Furthermore certain amount is exported straight outside auctions.⁴⁴

The Annual Report 1951 congratulates the District for achieving a higher rate of destocking than the natural increase. The argument is that the 1949 Branded Census had shown 279, 265 cattle and 664,108 shoats. "If the natural increase is taken as 10% destocking is in excess of the rate of increase".⁴⁵ We should though note that this 'good' export of livestock is not dependent on Livestock Control/Meat Marketing Board/Kenya Meat Commission since "Prices were too high for Meat Commission to operate in the District". "----- The highest price paid for slaughter bullocks was shs. 315/- ----- Slaughter stock went mainly to Kikuyu but some to Mombasa and Voi ----- the Giriama bought breedingstock".⁴⁶ Clearly the traditional export markets for Kitui were more lucrative from a producer point of view than the rigged wartime and subsequent Meat Marketing Board/Kenya Meat Commission Markets. The emergency in 1952-56 was to deny Kitui its natural market in Kikuyu.

By 1952 the administration position on overstocking is summarized in the Annual Report as follows "Overstocking is controlled by water supplies and only occurs round permanent water and in higher rainfall areas. Generally speaking, in the opinion of the Livestock Officer, the district is not overstocked as there are large areas which are definitely understocked due to lack of water. ----- So long as there are large numbers of surplus stock in the district, famine cannot be considered to exist unless there is total failure of rains, as stock can advantageously (though often unwillingly) be sold to buy food imported by the traders"⁴⁷

This view of overstocking led to encouraging the wet locations to move their cattle. Migwani cattle had moved into B₂ Yatta between 1953 and 1955. B₂ Yatta was then carrying between 9-10,000 cattle.⁴⁸ Ikanga and Mulango cattle move into Athi-Tiva.⁴⁹ In these new areas it is communal labour which is utilized to build crushes, and to do reclamation work thus further subsidizing the asomi accumulators. From 1952 with the closure of the Kikuyu market, the Mariakani/Coast Market became increasingly more important. It is reported that as much as 1,200 cattle left first in one month. This is about 1/6 of all cattle exports for the year,⁵⁰ but one should note that the Mariakani/Coast market required immature breeding stock⁵¹ and not the more valuable slaughter stock. It is recorded that the 72 auction and 728 market sales led to 12,782 cattle sales and 7,724 goat sales, 56% of the cattle and 29% of the goats were exported. Thus local traders handled 44% of the cattle and 71% of the goats for local consumption. In 1954 there are 30 auctions and 250 market sales with sales going to the usual markets other than the contract for Manyani Detention Camp.⁵² 1954 also is the first year that the African Livestock Marketing Organization buyer - to feed into the Kenya Meat Commission - attends auctions in the District.⁵³

1955 saw the reintroduction of forced sales based on locational quotas. Between June and December 1955 20,383 cattle were sold at auctions with ALMO taking 35%. Other buyers were from Voi, Mariakani, Kakamega, Embu and Fort Hall. We do not know their take or the take of the local traders. What we do know is that there was a price forced down. The Annual Report 1955 explains "This spectacular start to a culling campaign which had been received with widespread cooperation, led to high hopes for 1956 and the laying down of a programme for the export of 40,000 head of stock with an ALMO buyer maintaining the price structure. The turn of the year however with vastly improved conditions and better stock in the rings, has brought drastic downgrading at Athi River and an instance of an average price of shs. 29/-, 22/- a head being paid for a herd of 205 beasts. It is less than the price of a reasonable goat in the local markets and the immediate future of this most promising venture looks very bleak."⁵⁴ ALMO had been caught in the vice of European ranchers who controlled KMC, and wanted a monopoly to sell to African rural areas - specifically Kikuyu and Nyanza Markets as well as monopolizing the urban market.⁵⁵ Given that 15,000 cattle "either died or were slaughtered because of the 1955 drought and the low price structure of ALMO prices,^{internal} dropped.

The 1956 average prices for the 30733 cattle exported were shs. 108/-. ALMO exported 24% of all exports an average price of Shs. 107 but we take the inked figures in the Annual Report suggesting correction of the price change, ALMO prices are Shs. 95/-, a good Shs. 22/- below market prices.⁵⁶ Further evidence that the ALMO prices were below internal prices is provided in the

Annual Report which states "Prices paid by buyers rose steadily throughout the year as did the quality of the animals brought in for sale. Towards the end of the year prices were forced up by the traders beyond the capacity of the ALMO buyer to complete and at one time a suggestion was made that he should withdraw from the district. This was opposed on the grounds that his presence at sales had a stabilizing effect on prices and prevented the formation of rings. This argument prevailed and he continues to attend all sales where he still manages to purchase the odd beast"⁵². Two points ought to be clear - first that ALMO was to be used for lowering prices, two that local traders were strong enough to make rings i.e. bid up stock because they could dispose of it at a profit either within or without the district.

In 1957 the price of exported cattle had barely crawled up to shs. 119/-. There were 61 auctions where 14,831 cattle were sold.⁵⁸ By 1958 even the DC accepts that the District Livestock has been overexploited and nothing but immatures remain.⁵⁹ Prices continue to crawl upward up to shs. 126.20 in 1959 when there are 96 auctions, 4 had been cancelled because of foot and mouth disease.⁶⁰ However the planned quota was 22500 cattle and only 16343 were offered. Opposition to forced sales was increasing with the politicization of the last colonial days. The Marketing system was changed. "In the past weekly sales were held and it was not possible for all available buyers to attend every sale. To overcome this the Livestock Officer in 1959 arranged fortnightly sales of three days duration with (locational) quotas of over a thousand head. This enabled more stock traders to attend every sale and proved most successful, both to the trader and to the stock owner who received better prices as a result. In the later half of the year these fortnightly sales have also been tied up with Machakos cattle sales, thus enabling the local Kitui trader to purchase on our sales and resell to Central Province traders on the Machakos sales. It was felt that this procedure might be of reasonable help to the Kitui traders many of whom are at present handicapped by not having enough ready cash to purchase in large numbers and are therefore loth to come as far as Kitui with only enough cash to purchase four or five head each time ----- ALMO has only operated in a comparatively small way in the district during the year."⁶¹ Thus the Kitui Livestock trader had come to his own and was getting the backing of the administration to streamline the market. We should further note that the access to Kikuyu market is not direct but through Machakos - perhaps it is higher prices out of this flow which turns Kikuyu cattle traders into the White Highlands as sources after 1959.⁶²

1960 was a year of drought famine and national political agitation which led the A.D.C. to reject forced cullings. The D.C. writes "A serious presentation of the problem of overstocking to the African District Council resulted in an almost out of hand rejection of any enforced control. Such is the emotional devotion to cattle owning that the only constructive suggestion was that cultivation which has spread enormously over the last few years should be restricted".⁶⁴ Obviously the A.D.C. speaking for Asomi accumulators favours cattle over cultivation. Their wealth is more in cattle than farming. It is the poor who farm after loosing their stock. By 1962 the system of forced sales had disintegrated. Only 10,900 cattle are requisitioned and only 6056 are offered.⁶⁴ Of 38 planned auctions 6 were cancelled because of foot and mouth disease, 4 were cancelled when the trader ring forced all animals to stay away because they refused to pay the A.D.C. cess of shs. 2/- per beast bought.⁶⁵ It is the 28 auctions which do not get the quota. KMC is relying on Kitui traders to supply 300 head monthly i.e. an annual quota of 3600 but the traders have supplied only 750. Laconically the D.C. writes "it is likely that the KMC will loose patience with the traders and the quota will be withdrawn".⁶⁶ The main source of export is through Machakos traders to K.M.C. since the Kikuyu market is buying from White Highlands.

One of the significant source of Asomi accumulation was their access to betterment schemes. These are Yatta B₂ and Athi Tiva. The later is shown in Map. I. 9.⁶⁷ The B₂ Yatta had been an area of contention between the Machakos and Kitui Kamba for a long time. It is an area of 187 square miles with a rainfall of about 20 annually. It is good weu. Wealth people from both sides grazed it illegally in the twenties and thirties until it was formerly given to Kitui as a reserve area by the 1932 Carter Land Commission. The wealthy of Mutonguni, Matinyani, Changwithya, Miambani, Mulango-Kisasi and Migwani Locations grazed there on and off in the 1930s. In fact as chiefs like Mwendwa of Matinyani and Kasina of Migwani accumulated cattle in the 1930s this was the area they moved their herds. However in 1938 the D.C. of Kitui coerces the Kitui LNC to pass Minute No. 51/38 providing a) to allow limited number into Yatta B₂ for a few years on payment of fees, b) use fees to put water, c) after putting water transfer cattle from over-grazed wet locations to Yatta and close reserves for rotational grazing. (See Archives file D.C. KTI to PC 7th July 1938). In a sense this may be the first idea of closure. It is Chief Mwendwa who had extensive herds in B₂ Yatta who proposed the LNC resolution! Policing the area and collecting charges were impossible particularly during the war years. Thus the wet location asomi transferred more of their herds into the area. There was no B₂ - wet location grazing officially instituted. In 1946-47 the B₂ was closed to recover. It has been over exploited by the asomi accumulators. After good

rains of 1947 it was opened and in 1948 designed as a commercial ranch of 41,000 cattle of the asomi who agreed to stump one acre of 6 months for each 30 heads of cattle. These asomi were supposed to cull their cattle but they allowed herds to increase and refused to cull. In 1951 the Yatta B₂ became the "first scheme in Kenya to depend on a capital loan, repayable with interest, for the development of land in native areas". The LNC requested Central Government for a loan of £14,500 repayable at 2½% interest over 30 years with 5 year moratorium. Government gave £4,500 grant and a loan of £10,000 with 3½% interest payable in 20 years without moratorium.⁶⁹ By July 1951 there were 72 owners paying fees for 3436 cattle and 963 calves. By November 1951, 450 cattle and 220 calves were added. The area could carry 10,000 head of cattle at 1 beast for 12 acres.⁷⁰ By 1952 the scheme had 7050 cattle and owners were refusing to cull "since most of the stock is perceived by participants as 'breeding stock'".⁷¹ By 1952 the same participants had 9-10,000 cattle.⁷² The same figure stands for 1954 but there is a plan to raise the total to 12,000.⁷³ In 1955, 500 cattle are sold to reduce the number back to 10,000.⁷⁴ By 1956 the scheme was making money. It had paid loan shs. 14072 and undertaken Capital Improvements of shs. 32,059 and had a profit of shs. 7,400 for a total income of shs. 53531/-. The ADC changed policy so that rather than keep steers and cull all animals for the market they would be reintroduction into the reserve of higher quality animals since intake would be "90% yearling steers and 10% heifers to run with selected bulls".⁷⁵ In 1957 there were 7820 cattle and 1,100 calves and the scheme were converting into steers for sale and 3/4 Sahiwal bulls for stock improvement. 377 cattle are sold at an average price of shs. 175/- earning the asomi participants more than possible in the open market.⁷⁶ In 1958 there were 7420 matures, 1680 calves, 235 matures were sold at average price of shs. 191.⁷⁷ In 1959 there are 5540 matures and 2854 calves. Relief grazing was offered to 2,200 cattle and 1,000 calves for six months to Mutonguni, Migwani and Matinyani Stock owners (probably the same people), 594 matures were sold for an average price of shs. 154.⁷⁸ In 1960 there are 8,000 head of which 2900 were calves and the scheme concentrated on steer fattening and breeding Sahiwal.⁷⁹ By 1962 there were 6,000 matures and 3,000 calves. The breeding Sahiwals were sold. Machakos and Kitui graziers were infiltrating, pumps were being vandalized, shs. 45,833 were outstanding in loan payment and the A.D.C. was refusing to pay Central Government shs. 14,000 in loan repayment since Government was not taking strong enough measures to remove trespassers".⁸⁰ By 1961 Yatta had been converted into the Cooperative ranches of Kanyonyoni and Katoteni by pretty much the same original asomi. The point of all this survey is to show how the wet locations asomi were able to utilize the A.D.C. which they controlled to supplement their accumulation by first

getting better range and range service than was available in the reserve. They also got better breeds of animals and because they were tightly managed better return out of their investment. When their herds were in distress in the reserve they also got relief grazing. After independence they converted this area into co-operatives which continued to give them economic advantages of better breeds and beef for the market.

The other scheme which colonial scholarship sees as development but which the context of destocking really designed for asomi accumulation is Athi Tiva. This is an area of 585 square miles and an annual rainfall of 20". This is shown in Map. L. 8. It embraces all Yatta location and bits of Ikutha location. Oral tradition has it that it had great herds before 1898 but the rinderpest of that year and again in 1922 wiped not only the livestock but also the wild game. Ikutha and Ikanga people who used to graze there are almost superstitious about its killer role. However its northern part Yatta location was a belt free of tsetse fly. The southern Ikutha part was a tsetse fly area. The momentum for the scheme seems to have come from the Veterinary Department specifically Dr. Glover who wanted a tsetse fly clean area next to Makueni which they were clearing. Very expensive chain and bulldozer clearing was undertaken at the then fantastic cost of shs. 94.80 per acre.⁸¹ There was regrowth soon after and from a bush clearing point of view Athi Tiva was a failure. By 1953 it was carrying 14,100 Mulango and Ikanga cattle so as to allow reclamation.⁸² By 1955 there were 8,000 cattle.⁸³ By 1956 ALDEV which had initiated the scheme had already spent £40,000 bush bulldozing and chain dozing and they had no more money.⁸⁴ They were further harassing the original population to get rid of goats. This led into conflict between the ALDEV agent Major Wells (ex Ghurkhaa) and the Administration.⁸⁵ In 1958 the scheme was revised with grazing fees being raised from shs. 6/- to shs. 8/- per head per year and there were plans to fatten steers on borrowed ADC money.⁸⁶ The originally settled top half of Yatta Location was taken out of the scheme.⁸⁷ By 1959 the Annual Report states "This scheme is at present suffering financial difficulties. The hoped for increase in cattle to compensate for the loss in 1958 of the top half of the scheme had never materialized and the total stock numbers have fluctuated between 3,300 and 4,000 adult fee paying animals. Consequently the scheme is at present unable to meet the running costs plus £1588 annual loan repayment. Despite propaganda by the government departments which included tours of the area by elders and African District Council members, the scheme is not popular with local people. The reasons given are fear of disease, distances from their home locations, and a deep rooted suspicion of this area resulting from heavy losses of stock in years gone by. As from April 1960 grazing fees will be raised from shs. 9/- per head per annum to shs. 10/- and it is expected

that cattle numbers will fall off even further at this time as grazing in the locations should be plentiful in April.⁸⁸ A scheme for fattening steers on A.D.C. loan money was rejected by government and the A.D.C. was stuck with the debt. Even after demonstrating to the locals that cattle will not die in 1960 with grazing, "60 surplus head of Government cattle" and 300 head of ALMO stock did not break local opposition which now was tied to the prohibitive cost in the view of locals.⁸⁹

In 1961 European ranchers from Machakos were rented the scheme for shs. 10,000/- monthly in the 1961 Drought. They stayed until February 1962 and the £1200 profit went into buying steers for and ADC farm there.⁹⁰ This ADC venture collapsed with the collapse of ADC finances after 1963 and to date there is still a small loan outstanding for Athi Tiva.

However the explanation of the refusal by Africans to support the scheme must tie in the wide use of the range. B₂ Yatta had been taken by asomi of the locations of Mutonguni, Migwani, Mulango, Matinyani, Chan-withya who moved their surplus cattle there. Whatever other cattle they had they used clansmen to move into B₁ Yatta beyond Kithioko and towards Tana as well as Eastern Crownlands through Waita, Ngomeni and Nuu or Zombe. People from Ikanga, Ikutha, Kanziko whose grazing land around Ndiandasa had been cut into Tsavo National Park could still move their cattle into Mutha Endau and into Eastern Crownlands without having to pay the prohibitive fees. Thus the main cause of the failure of the scheme was its capital intensive bush clearing which necessitated high stock fees. The disease was a subterfuge. Ironically by 1970-73 the Ikutha portion was made into group ranches and the lower Yatta is privatized with plans to get it adjudicated to some of the most influential members of the tribal elite. The Kanyangi area has two members of parliament as land holders, six councillors and ten senior civil servants. They are the ones pushing for privatization. Thus the scheme has come to serve the asomi in 1976 in ways ALDEV did not dream about!

The second prong of destocking evolved during the war years also. This is the process of closing an area to grazing. A chief had powers to declare an area closed to grazing. Those people would have to move their livestock and also sometimes myisi. It is this process of closure which led to many leaving for fringe areas to the wet locations. The D.C. Safari Report 14-17 December 1943 reports that Mbitini "area which has a good rainfall is being terribly exploited by 'gat' rich quick' cultivators - a mixed bag completely uncontrolled. Tree burning very serious. Suggests terracing and strict control of burning next year."⁹¹ These were some of the Mulango people wiped out of livestock and trying to make a comeback by opening up Mbitini. Some were to trickle to Kanduti as enclosure caught up with them in the early fifties. The first reference to closed areas is in 1943 when

the Annual Report states that 940 acres had been closed.⁹²

The policy of destocking was not easily accepted by the administration. Osborne in his Handing Over Report 5th July 1944 writes extensively, "The economic wealth of the tribe is essentially dependent on stock products: a proportion of the tribe at present depends for its existence on illegal grazing outside the Gazetted Reserve Boundaries. In my opinion destocking is not the answer to the districts problem: improved grazing and watering supplies and the resulting increase in the quality of the stock, should, I believe, be the goal at which to aim. This may necessitate temporary or permanent extension of the Reserve and the eradication of (tsetse) fly in two acres within the reserve⁹³ He further points out that the expansion area is Yatta and Eastern Crownlands.⁹⁴

Ironically the closure system contributed to the safeguarding of asomi accumulators by opening for them other areas to move their cattle initially and by fifties by allowing them to claim ownership of originally closed areas. After the devastating drought of 1946 Yatta B₂ was opened, Mutonguni was closed and it was argued that other wet locations would be closed seriatim. The DC in the Annual Report 1946 wrote "This area, upon which all the adjacent locations cast covetous eyes, is with the cessation of poaching and a certain degree of control in good heart with the exception of the southern portion as yet completely unregenerated after the merciless over grazing of previous years. It was previously open on payment of grazing fees to a limited number from the surrounding locations and had in effect become a private preserve for the excess stock of a small group of wealthy ranches, without contributing appreciably to the relaxation of pressure upon the worst eroded areas of the reserve"⁹⁵ It was silly for the Administration to expect closure of Mutonguni to lead to all Mutonguni people to transfer all their cattle to B₂ Yatta. The poor could not because they did not have the capacity to hire labour to move with the cattle. They therefore either sold the cattle at the rock bottom drought prices or moved to locations like Migwani-Tan. River tsetse fly area - where they could exist until the fly got their cattle or enclosure caught up with them!

Throughout 1947, there is extensive agitation against the asomi accumulation or enclosure by the poor. D.O. Wilson's Safari Report 5-6-47 to 11-6-47 reports that around Tulia (Mutonguni Location) that the A.A.O. programme of resting and grass planting was being refused since the chief leaves his wealthy friends out and further since the chief has allowed 'foreigners' (Machakos, Kamba & other Kifui Poor) to settle the dry parts around Ndolo's corner, but he will not allow his people (poor) to move from Tulia to the dry areas of Ndolo's corner.⁹⁶ At Kanziko the D.C. is under pressure to open Kamba³

Galla cattle trade ⁹⁷. At Katse D.C. gets a similar request ⁹⁸ At Mui D.O. Hardy meets a Baraza unanimously of the opinion that they would not sell to Meat Marketing Board as they could get better prices elsewhere⁹⁹ Hardy then puts the question "WHY CAN'T WE START TO COMPULSORY SALES AGAIN?"¹⁰⁰ These had been stopped in 1947.

It became clear to D.C. Kelly who came into the district in 1948 that there were basic problems to closure. He wrote "The effect of closing the fore area is now beginning to be visible in the growth of bush and grass and no doubt in time, the approach to the hill (Mumoni) a terribly eroded grove of baobab will recover, but the danger of closure as a method of reclamation, is the return of fly, besides a) the cost of removing the bush when it is decided to re-occupy the area and b) the political and other objections to removing people. I prefer enclosure and good management, even for land like Tharaka, the advantages being a) communal labour supply available on the spot b) no social or political upheaval c) bush far less dense d) no fly problem"¹⁰¹ For Kelly then the solution was to lie in dam construction so as to spread not only the cattle population but the human population as well. The source of labour was to be communal which gave the Chief another source of accumulating livestock in the name of providing "fresh meat" for communal labourers¹⁰²

Out of this Kelly system evolved the livestock management system where cattle were to be forced to stay in their location. The LNC under pressure from Kelly debated the issue of keeping a locations population of livestock in the location and rejected it in 1950. Kelly wrote in the 1950 Annual Report "There is no doubt that Council would be in favour by more than a two thirds majority, of confining stock to their locations. But there were several have not locations on the Eastern border whose cattle multiply on Crownlands in good years and rely on better locations in times of drought. Such are Ngomeni whose cattle invaded the carefully protected areas of Migwani, trampling terraces and destroying cover and Kinsiko who have lost the privilege of grazing in the lower Tive, now taken for Teavo Park. This privilege was supposed to be exercised only in times of great need, but during the war came to be regarded as a permanent right, including settlement and cultivation, as well as grazing"¹⁰³ Kelly should have noted that the so called Ngomeni Location Cattle belonged to Migwani people and that they had deliberately gone to Ngomeni to avoid closure in the earlier years. O'Leary field work¹⁰⁴ and my field interviews 1972-76 show clearly that Migwani people have always integrated their grazing all the way to the eastern limits of the district. Of course it is the asomi herds who are most mobile.

Secondly Kelly should also have noted Mutha, Zombe and Voo cattle were moving back into Nzambani, Kisasi, Miambani etc. in the central highlands. Kanziko herders were basically wiped out as large scale cattle keepers when they lost the 2,500 square miles to the Tsavo National Park in 1948.

As Kelly was leaving in 1952 in his Handing Over Report to Browning 24th July 1952 he stressed that the proposal to keep cattle in their locations was catching and would like the Administration to "force" cattle to not just stay in the location but to stay in the specific Thome. Thus enclosure was completed. If a location was to have a specific number of cattle and there had been some reclaimed areas and the chief is to enforce this obviously there are fantastic benefits for the asomi. These were access to the reclaimed land and thus privatization of ownership and faster accumulation by the asomi since the poor had no private land to graze their livestock. In 1952 there are 14,362 acres closed, 1090 acres paddocked and 1,296 acres planted with grass. These are resources within to by the asomi especially chiefs. They had been prepared by communal labour and they were utilized by the asomi at no cost to them. In 1953, 18,000 acres are closed. In the 1954 Annual Report states that "19,300 acres bush cleared and 28,000 acres closed". It further states that "416 square miles were opened suggesting that up to that year the total closure must have been very high indeed. The six camp rotation per sublocation was being introduced. Inclusion was dependent on the Chief's goodwill. Many a poor man were left out.

By 1955 the informal mechanisms for asomi to privatize land were formalized by the African district Council (former Local Native Council). The Annual Report states "considerable care is needed in land cases as it has become apparent that people who have taken the trouble to develop their land by sound farming practices have suddenly found themselves brought to court and deprived of their land, The African District Council considered this matter in general terms, when it discussed the question of limitation for land claims.....An important decision was that to limit the time limit allowed for litigation over land which location council considered should be reconditioned. The reason for the decision to limit time that, if the location Council undertakes the work of reconditioning, it is quite unreasonable for an individual to return and claim land having neglected it for many years past. Before reconditioning is undertaken by a Location Council, three months notice of the intention to recondition is given. This enables people working outside the district to stake

their claims and to take steps to put the land into proper condition."¹¹¹
That was the theory, the practice was that the asomi were able to get claims on la
land since it was not a notice widely discussed and, to claim it or allow it to be
reconditioned and use it later. Many of the land cases in the 1960's revert
back to this period where asomi accumulated by having access to the chief.
This has to be seen in the context of D.C. Balfour confession in his Handing
Over Report Balfour to Jackson Mahony October 1956 where he writes "The Stock
culling policy sold 44,000 heads in the year ending 30.6.56. The principle is
that everyone with ten or more head must sell 10% of the holding per annum.
The assessment is made by Culling Committees of the Location Council, and
the only direct pressure brought to bear is that the chief is told the locations
quota (which is 10% of the estimated stock population) and given more or less
to understand that his reputation stands or falls on the results. The sales
are widespread and organized by the Veterinary Department and attended by ALMO
buyer, and all stock sold is branded CUL and must be exported or slaughtered.

Nobody can quite say who started this thing. My own view is that it
came to pass, strangely enough, out of some degree of triangular departmental
discord, when all three realizing the gravity of the situation, started prodding
each other into doing something about it. The Vets made the first concret
step by arranging sale centres and stock routes, and getting the ALMO buyer,
and famine conditions at the time induced some of the needy to sell. But in
the long run, I think one of the wisest moves was the avoidance of any attempt
at legislation, and the placing of the ponus squarely on the Chief and his
Locational Council, mostly the later. Chief Wilson and Chief Kasina, in
particular have never faltered.....

The ten percent quota together with deaths from old age, disease and
local consumption, has now got rid of a lot of useless stuff and quality as
the sales has been improving and prices have risen. The time may shortly be
here when the quota can be reduced to match only the annual increases and the
sales be fewer but larger and with quality and high prices as the aim. You
will continue to hear grumbles from the old diehards and from the Police and
the KAR. Old men will stand up from time to time and ask if Government intends
to sell all Kamba stock. They must be banged down and in any case I think
we have fixed the KAR". A policy to decimate the wealth of a people and to
mal-distribute it had been arrived at in confusion at the local level but at
the national colony level destocking was intended to subsidize White Settler
farmers.
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As far as the livestock herds were concerned the policy had changed the herd structures. The 1958 Annual Report states "The point has now been reached where large mature animals are no longer available in great quantities and the district is filled with a lot of immatures for which there is little demand. Nevertheless it is essential that this type of animal be disposed of if the grazing areas are not to revert to their former state and this problem will be occupying all officers during the forthcoming year." An unbalanced herd regenerates very fast and was to lead into desertification as the Kikuyu Market tapped beef from the former White Highlands in the 1960's and thus became closed to Kitui livestock.

Notes

1. pp. 146, 147, 148, 153, 154, 155.
2. Kenya Historical Review Journal Vol. 4 No. 1 1976 pp. 85-110.
3. Maher p. 148 LNC Reports 1927-1935.
4. Ibid p. 57.
5. Ibid p. 76.
6. Maher pp. 79-81.
7. Ibid. p. 89.
8. Ibid. p. 119.
9. Ibid. p. 119-125.
10. Ibid. p. 50.
11. op. cit. p. 146.
12. Maher op. cit. p. 184-858, Stanner op. cit. p. 146.
13. Ibid.
14. Annual Report 1935.
15. Maher p. 90.
16. London OUP 1975.
17. 1936 Annual Report p. 33.
18. p. 31 and 35.
19. See Mutiso: Origins of National Beef Policy forthcoming.
20. Annual Report 1939 p. 3.
21. Annual Reports 1941 & 1942 p. 10 and 12 respectively.
22. Annual Report 1942 p. 13.
23. ^{See} Handing Over Report Lambert to Osborne 1st December 1943.
24. Handing Over Report Cornell to Kitching July 1942.
25. Ibid. p. 10.
26. See Handing Over Report - Osborne to Ryland 1st December 1944. p. 8.
27. Annual Report 1946 p. 22.
28. p. 9
29. p. 1
30. p. 14.

31. Annual Report 1946 p. 2, 3, 21, 22.
32. Ibid. p. 8.
33. p. 14.
34. Annual Report 1948 p. 16.
35. Ibid. p. 16.
36. Ibid. p. 16.
37. Annual Report 1949 p. 15.
38. Ibid.
39. Annual Report 1950 p. 1.
40. Ibid. p. 16.
41. Ibid. p. 16.
42. Annual Report 1951 p. 15.
43. Ibid. p. 16.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. p. 16.
46. Ibid. p. 18.
47. p. 3 and 10.
48. Annual Report 1953 p. 11, Annual Report 1954 p. 14, Annual Report 1955 p. 10.
49. Ibid. p. 12.
50. Ibid. p. 15.
51. Ibid. p. 15.
52. Annual Report 1954 p. 18.
53. Ibid. p. 18.
54. Annual Report 1955 p.
55. See Mutiso National Beef Policy op. cit.
56. Annual Report 1956 p. 16.
57. Ibid.
58. Annual Report 1957 p.
59. Annual Report 1958 p. 1.
60. Annual Report 1958 p. 14.
61. Annual Report 1959 p. 14.

62. Mutiso National Beef Policy op. cit.
63. Annual Report 1960 p. 1.
64. Annual Report 1962 p. 12.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. p. 13.
67. Sources for the data on these are African Land Development in Kenya 1946 - 1962: Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi. 1962 National Archives File, Land Survey LND 16/6/Vol. II Original Number 8, and Annual Reports 1962.
68. Annual Report 1951 p. 13.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Annual Report 1952 p. 11.
72. Annual Report 1953 p. 11.
73. Annual Report 1954 p. 14.
74. Annual Report 1955 p. 16.
75. Annual Report 1956 p. 14.
76. Annual Report 1957 p. 10.
77. Annual Report 1958 p. 9.
78. Annual Report 1959 p. 12.
79. Annual Report 1960 p. 11.
80. Annual Report 1962 p. 10.
81. Annual Report 1952 p. 12.
82. Annual Report 1953 p. 13.
83. Annual Report 1955 p. 17.
84. Harding Over Report Balfour to Hickson Mahony October 1956.
85. Ibid.
86. Annual Report 1958 p. 10.
87. Ibid.
88. Annual Report 1959 p. 13.
89. Annual Report 1960 p. 11.
90. Annual Report 1962 p. 10.
91. p. 1.

92. p. 6.
93. p. 2.
94. Ibid. p. 4.
95. p. 7.
96. p. 1.
97. Safari Report D.C. 23-28 October 1947 p. 3.
98. Safari Report D.C. 16-22 December 1947 p. 3.
99. Safari Report D.O. Hardy 28th December 1947 - 3rd January 1948 p. 5.
100. Ibid. p. 5.
101. Safari Diary D.C. Kelly 29th March - 6th April 1948 p. 1.
102. See Sari Report D.O. Brayne Nicholas February 8-12th 1949 p. 2.
103. p. 8.
104. 1975 p. 71.
105. Handing Over Report Kelly to Browning 24th July 1952 p. 10.
106. Annual Report 1952 p. 10.
107. Annual Report 1953 p. 11.
108. p. 16.
109. Ibid. p. 14.
110. Ibid. p. 17.
111. p. 14.
112. p. 4.
113. See Mutiso - National Beef Policy op. cit.
114. p.

TABLE L.1 KITUI CATTLE EXPORTS 1913 - 1965

	Number	Total Value Sh.	Unit Value Sh.*
1913 - 14	7,298	192,450	26.37
1914 - 15	7,475	186,875	25.00
1915 - 16	5,709	172,792	30.26
1916 - 17	11,285	338,550	30.00
1918 - 19	802	24,060	30.00
1919 - 20	2,802	111,980	39.96
1920 - 21	5,563	Na	Na
1921	4,543	Na	Na
1922	4,680	Na	Na
1923	5,895	471,840	80.00
1924	4,949	395,920	80.00
1925	3,000	300,000	100.00
1926	4,285	281,850	65.77
1927	12,126	850,800	70.16
1928	9,479	659,850	69.61
1929	18,831	473,600	25.15
1930	10,552	257,620	24.41
1931	11,312	272,660	24.10
1932	19,500	253,500	13.00
1933	15,350	153,500	10.00
1934	10,690	160,350	15.00
1935	20,698	310,470	15.00
1936	6,077	243,080	40.00
1937	3,465	138,600	40.00
1938	3,984	279,360	70.12
1939	Na	Na	Na
1940	Na	Na	Na
1941	Na	Na	Na
1942	3,967	158,680	40.00
1943	5,084	177,940	35.00
1944	5,417	189,595	35.00
1945	5,659	282,950	50.00
1946	3,649	161,005	45.00
1947	1,484	66,750	45.00
1948	1,486	148,600	100.00
1949	7,223	433,380	60.00
1950	14,490	1,158,400	79.94
1951	15,034	Na	Na
1952	6,064	754,960	124.49
1953	6,893	709,980	103.00
1954	3,334	400,080	103.00
1955	24,239	1,460,000	60.23
1956	30,733	3,349,280	108.97
1957	14,681	1,768,700	120.47
1958	7,840	1,302,880	166.18
1959	13,929	1,671,480	120.00
1960	12,805	766,440	59.85
1961	Na	Na	Na
1962	12,520	2,566,600	205.00
1963	Na	Na	Na
1964	Na	Na	Na
1965	2,848	864,180	303.43

Sources: Annual Reports, Stanner, Spencer
 * 1913/14 to 1919/20 Prices are in rupees.

TABLE L.2 KITUI SHOAT EXPORTS 1913 - 1965

Year	Number	Total Value Sh.	Unit Value Sh.*
1913 - 14	21,858	87,432	4.00
1914 - 15	17,365	69,460	4.00
1915 - 16	27,078	108,312	4.00
1916 - 17	23,351	93,404	4.00
1917 - 18	24,570	98,280	4.00
1918 - 19	10,075	50,375	5.00
1919 - 20	Na	Na	Na
1920 - 21	Na	Na	Na
1921	Na	Na	Na
1922	Na	Na	Na
1923	58,618	586,180	10.00
1924	30,763	307,630	10.00
1925	20,000	200,000	10.00
1926	18,099	180,990	10.00
1927	37,588	375,880	10.00
1928	32,252	322,520	10.00
1929	80,472	321,888	4.00
1930	59,368	237,472	4.00
1931	58,038	232,152	4.00
1932	71,000	142,000	2.00
1933	40,350	80,700	2.00
1934	23,375	70,215	3.00
1935	63,718	127,436	2.00
1936	15,278	91,668	6.00
1937	5,067	30,402	6.00
1938	18,111	108,666	6.00
1939	Na	Na	Na
1940	Na	Na	Na
1941	Na	Na	Na
1942	13,881	69,405	5.00
1943	8,710	43,550	5.00
1944	35,525	184,730	5.20
1945	30,557	168,064	5.50
1946	16,904	101,424	6.00
1947	8,352	58,464	7.00
1948	6,777	121,780	17.99
1949	18,000	324,000	18.00
1950	27,734	499,200	17.99
1951	24,932	Na	Na
1952	22,900	553,740	24.18
1953	2,306	43,840	19.01
1954	308	5,820	18.89
1955	3,002	40,000	13.32
1956	2,658	53,160	20.00
1957	0	0	0
1958	2,892	57,840	20.00
1959	8,282	248,460	30.00
1960	0	0	0
1961	Na	Na	Na
1962	842	16,840	20.00
1963	Na	Na	Na
1964	Na	Na	Na
1965	0	0	0

Sources: Annual Reports, Spencer, and Stanner, and DCKTI/13/1 Veterinary Monthly Reports 1942-1957.

*N.B. 1913-1920 prices are in rupees. All other prices are in shillings.

TABLE L.3 KITUI CATTLE, SHOAT CENSUS

Year	Cattle	Shoats	Population	Percapita Cattle	Percapita Shoats
1919	220,000	Na	104,163	2.10	-
1932	240,000	Na	152,584	1.50	-
1934	88,914 (count)	78,356 (count)	154,681	0.57	0.50
1937	92,049	94,840	159,329	0.57	0.59
1942	210,942 (count)	580,371 (count)	189,926	1.11	3.05
1949	230,834 (count)	607,280 (count)	213,622	1.08	2.8
	279,265 (estimated)	664,108 (estimated)	213,622	1.30	3.1

Source: Annual Reports

NB. Other than where specified as actual counts the figures are estimates

Total 14,400 (Kilometers) by the

Location	1937 Population Density	1937 Cattle Density	1937 Goat Density	1942 Population Density	1942 Cattle Density	1942 Goat Density	1949 Population Density	1949 Cattle Density	1949 Goat Density
Nzambani	31.89	4.9	6.00	42.5	30.25	95.16	50.65	44.86	314.74
Mulango	98.52	17.62	25.49	78.6	83.22	246.88	98.52	122.40	361.20
Souch Yatta	17.95	6.01	10.97	23.4	19.48	71.33	29.44	32.49	151.07
Ikanga	30.34	5.02	19.95	37.0	16.69	131.02	40.25	39.58	113.83
Ikutha	12.43	0.66	5.98	12.9	0.13	40.68	15.60	1.70	33.62
Kanziko	13.27	7.41	17.31	24.8	16.62	47.20	24.34	21.59	53.90
Nutha	20.97	4.13	6.20	23.7	30.63	60.97	21.37	49.31	64.22
Zombe/Voo	7.14	2.35	3.57	17.1	17.91	61.40	21.06	36.99	51.49
Yatta B2	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
Mui	35.09	10.56	8.86	37.5	60.20	79.09	36.68	58.90	51.43
Mutito	14.92	11.68	5.16	15.4	31.82	28.66	16.74	38.63	36.47
Nuu	18.47	14.90	9.11	17.4	30.76	47.61	19.13	48.95	37.24
Endau	10.41	7.93	5.14	11.6	30.21	99.51	15.74	46.17	53.63
Taeikuru	39.30	6.95	16.75	48.7	40.29	210.21	52.90	52.67	271.87
Ngomeni	10.35	8.52	5.19	10.7	22.35	37.61	11.22	29.44	25.74
Endui	20.76	4.42	2.46	28.6	22.32	78.43	31.08	36.24	40.86
Katse	21.97	3.69	5.86	25.0	19.25	Na	26.93	22.45	121.62
Tharaka	23.82	20.56	31.31	26.4	45.73	216.24	21.8	41.28	307.49
Mivukoni	24.77	10.07	11.70	25.5	30.70	95.70	24.55	34.51	62.67
Changwithya	103.89	51.13	34.80	115.2	105.02	147.85	135.32	131.04	205.69
Matinyani	84.51	83.44	45.74	95.7	129.33	192.75	109.90	140.94	446.04
Mutonguni	55.70	96.28	65.98	67.7	71.31	138.85	82.65	81.45	278.20
Migvani	33.15	32.50	31.79	38.0	52.02	164.03	43.55	52.83	85.93
Total	23.31	14.62	15.06	30.1	33.51	92.20	33.94	44.37	105.51


TABLE. L.5. KITUI POPULATION, CATTLE AND GOAT DENSITIES 1937, 1942 AND 1949


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Mulango	98.52	17.62	25.49	78.6	83.22	246.88	98.52	122.40	361.20
Souch Yatta	17.95	6.01	10.97	23.4	19.48	71.33	29.44	32.49	151.07
Ikanga	30.34	5.02	19.95	37.0	16.69	131.02	40.25	39.58	113.83
Ikutha	12.43	0.66	5.98	12.9	0.13	40.68	15.60	1.70	33.62
Kanziko	13.27	7.41	17.31	24.8	16.62	47.20	24.34	21.59	53.90
Nutha	20.97	4.13	6.20	23.7	30.63	60.97	21.37	49.31	64.22
Zombe/Voo	7.14	2.35	3.57	17.1	17.91	61.40	21.06	36.99	51.49
Yatta B2	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
Mui	35.09	10.56	8.86	37.5	60.20	79.09	36.68	58.90	51.43
Mutito	14.92	11.68	5.16	15.4	31.82	28.66	16.74	38.63	36.47
Nuu	18.47	14.90	9.11	17.4	30.76	47.61	19.13	48.95	37.24
Endau	10.41	7.93	5.14	11.6	30.21	99.51	15.74	46.17	53.63
Taeikuru	39.30	6.95	16.75	48.7	40.29	210.21	52.90	52.67	271.87
Ngomeni	10.35	8.52	5.19	10.7	22.35	37.61	11.22	29.44	25.74
Endui	20.76	4.42	2.46	28.6	22.32	78.43	31.08	36.24	40.86
Katse	21.97	3.69	5.86	25.0	19.25	Na	26.93	22.45	121.62
Tharaka	23.82	20.56	31.31	26.4	45.73	216.24	21.8	41.28	307.49
Mivukoni	24.77	10.07	11.70	25.5	30.70	95.70	24.55	34.51	62.67
Changwithya	103.89	51.13	34.80	115.2	105.02	147.85	135.32	131.04	205.69
Matinyani	84.51	83.44	45.74	95.7	129.33	192.75	109.90	140.94	446.04
Mutonguni	55.70	96.28	65.98	67.7	71.31	138.85	82.65	81.45	278.20
Migvani	33.15	32.50	31.79	38.0	52.02	164.03	43.55	52.83	85.93
Total	23.31	14.62	15.06	30.1	33.51	92.20	33.94	44.37	105.51

Sources: Annual Reports


TABLE L. 6 HOUSEHOLDS WITHOUT LIVESTOCK 1949


Location	Total Households (Total Population)	Stock Owners 1949 (Households)	Households Without Livestock	Households Without Livestock as % of Total Households
Zambani	760	683	77	10.13
Mulango	3,078	2,529	541	17.57
South Yatta	920	683	237	25.76
Ikanga	1,610	1,031	579	35.96
Ikutha	916	462	454	49.56
Kanziko	852	399	453	53.16
Mutha	454	189	265	58.37
Zombe	1,632	984	648	39.70
Yatta B2	Na	Na	Na	1.2
Mui	687	399	288	41.92
Mutito	586	436	150	25.59
Muu	765	496	269	35.16
Endau	413	408	5	1.2
Tseikuru	793	492	301	37.95
Ngomeni	827	546	281	33.97
Endui	676	283	390	57.69
Katse	1,010	954	56	5.54
Tharaka	518	663	145	-
Mivukoni	1,473	1,007	466	31.63
Changwithya	2,537	915	1,622	63.93
Matinyani	1,236	511	725	58.65
Mutonguni	1,653	1,325	328	19.84
Migwani	3,266	2,189	1,077	32.97
	26,702	17,609	9,093	34.05






Source: SPENCER 1974





NAME AND LOCATION NUMBER

- A CHANGWITHIA
- B NGOMENI
- C MATINYANI
- D MUTONGUNI
- E TSEIKURU
- F MUTITO
- G MUI
- H ENDAU
- I MIGWANI
- J KATSE
- K ENDUI
- L NUU
- N KIMANGAU
- O THARAKA
- P MIVUKONI
- Q MULANGO
- R NZAMBANI
- S YATTA
- T ZOMBE
- V IKANJA
- X MUTHA
- Y KANZIKO
- Z IKUTHA



MAP L 6. NUMBER OF CATTLE 1936/37.

EACH DOT REPRESENTS 200 HEAD OF CATTLE.

Source: Annual Report 1937

NAME AND LOCATION NUMBER

- A. CHANGWITHIA
- B. NGOMENI
- C. MATINYANI
- D. MUTONGUNI
- E. TSEIKURU
- F. MUTITO
- G. MUI
- H. ENDAU
- I. MIGWANI
- J. KATSE
- K. ENDUI
- L. JUU
- N. KIMANGAU
- O. THARAKA
- P. MIVUKONI
- Q. MULANGO
- R. NZAMBANI
- S. YATTA
- T. ZOMBE
- V. IKANGA
- X. MUTHA
- Y. KANZIKO
- Z. IKUTHA



MAP 4.7.


NUMBER OF SHEEP AND GOATS 1936/37.

EACH DOT REPRESENTS 200 SHEEP AND GOATS.

Source: Annual Report. 1937

NAME AND LOCATION NUMBER

- A. CHANGWITHIA
- B. NGOMENI
- C. MATINYANI
- D. MUTONGUNI
- E. TSEIKURU
- F. MUTITO
- G. MUI
- H. ENDAU
- I. MIGWANI
- J. KATSE
- K. ENDUI
- L. NUIU
- N. KIMANGAU
- O. THARAKA
- P. MIVUKONI
- Q. MULANGO
- R. NZAMBANI
- S. YATTA
- T. ZOMBE
- V. IKANJA
- X. MUTHA
- Y. KANZIKO
- Z. IKUTHA




MAP 8 DENSITY OF ADULT MALE POPULATION 1936/37.

EACH DOT REPRESENTS 100 ADULT MALES

Source: Annual Report 1937

MAR. L. 89. KITUI ATHI-TIVA SCHEME 1950



Scale 1:500,000
Based on metric grid
Shaded to be cut in Mar 1950
Boundaries -
AKAMBA LANE UNLI
Isavo NATIONAL PARK
Ikutha-S. VAITA locations
Athi-Tiva Scheme
ROADS BUILT
" PROPOSED (1950)
Fireholes . ©

Source: Veterinary Rec. 1949.

