

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**WEAK STATES AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE INTER
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) REGION**

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DECLARATION

This research study is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning for examination.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

I hereby dedicate this research project to my family, colleagues and friends who have continuously been a source of encouragement and offered their endless support during the entire time I was writing this research project and even when at times I felt defeated and all hope seemed lost.

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the “weak states and regional integration in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region”. The major postulation is that regional integration leads to economic growth and development. It focuses on the main aspects of the integration that is Infrastructure (Transport and Communication) Development, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs, Food Security and Environment of the IGAD countries. It gives an overview of regional integration, provides an assessment of integration in the inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD) region and presents the key recommendations on how obstacles to the integration process can be overcome. This is generally applicable to other regional integration schemes particularly in Africa. From the findings, Regional integration attempt in the IGAD sub-region is far from success. There are a number of challenges that hinder effective integration in the sub-region of IGAD. The economic dependency status of IGAD countries, the poor performance of infrastructure and communications development, lack of political commitment on the part of the participating governments, the mistrust, suspicion and lack of confidence among the member states, among other things, are the major ones. The study concludes that regional blocs in most of the developing countries consist of weak states with limited size of national and sub-regional markets. Their low level of development may not allow much market expansion through regionalism. The dynamic gains from regional groupings-the enlarged size of the market and economies of scale - are unlikely to occur if the countries involved are very poor (having small market size and low per - capita income). However, larger regional integration arrangement membership will lead to a stronger international negotiating position in the world affairs. Regional arrangements that consist of larger members and 'big brother' are important for successful integration scheme. These assist them to extract economies of scale at a regional level and to enhance the strength of the regional groupings in international status and global bargaining power in the new trade system. The issues of economic dependency status of IGAD countries, the need to address the weak production structures and harmonization of national efforts to improve agricultural productivity and restructure industrial production are addressed.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION, IGAD AND “WEAK STATES”

1.0 Background

The phenomenon of integration, whether political or economic, has been a long standing creation by entities separated by artificial means. This is largely inspired by the need to pool tangible and intangible resources and complementing the efforts of one another in their own interest. This has been visibly exhibited by the countries in Europe through the European Union and the fusion of the fifty states to form the United States in America. Today, these entities remain formidable in their economic strides evident in, among others, high Gross Domestic Products. In Africa, the importance of regional integration as a means for supporting her economic development has long been recognized by African leaders. Far back as 1965, Nkrumah intimated that “It is only when the artificial boundaries that divide her are broken down so as to provide for viable economic units and ultimately single African unit that Africa will be able to develop industrially, for her own sake, and ultimately for the sake of healthy economy”. Nkrumah further discloses that “planned economic growth is necessary so that all states can benefit from industrialization and other important improvements made possible by unified direction”. Thus, the essence of regional integration is not a reflection of a constellation of states but a phenomenon that represents “functional cooperation with an emphasis on the economic aspects”.¹

¹Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton. (1999). Governance Matters. *World Bank Working Paper* 2196. Washington, DC: World Bank; Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. (2009).

Indeed, in the case of regional integration in East Africa, the cooperation dates as far back as the turn of the 20th century. However, the impetus for the establishment or strengthening of these arrangements, which have come to take the description of Regional Integration Institutions (RIIs) also known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), was born out of the birth of the Abuja Treaty of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) which came into force in May 1994². That Treaty envisages the creation of an African Economic Community through six phases of regional cooperation and integration using the RIIs as its building blocks.

The aim and objective of these institutions is primarily to bring about social, economic and political integration among Africa's countries with the aim of fostering increased economic growth and bolstering the prosperity of the African peoples. To mention but a few, these RIIs include the East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

Initially after its formation, the initial mandate of IGAD was on development issues yet over time the organization gradually took on security matters, an evolution that highlights the importance of the development-security nexus in the HOA region³. The IGAD is immersed in dealing with a number of East Africa regional issues. Somalia is not the only conflict in the

Governance Matters VIII. Development Research Group, *Policy Research Working Paper* 4798. Washington, DC: World Bank.

²United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (1999). *The ECA and Africa: Accelerating a Continent's Development*, Addis Ababa: United National Economic Commission for Africa. Kouassi, R.N. (2007). *The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks*, in *African Integration Review Vol.1.No.2*, Addis Ababa: Department of Economic Affairs in collaboration with Communication and Information Division, African Union Commission.

³Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 2007b. *IGAD Secretariat Annual Report*, 2007.

region. Member states of IGAD are ravaged by intra- and interstate conflicts. Sudan is in a crisis; Ethiopia was engaged in a civil war for a long time and still is confronted by small-scale armed resistance; Kenya is a very fragile state; neither Eritrea nor Uganda is doing well. The nature of the state in the region is at the root of all of the troubling news that comes out of the IGAD member states⁴. The state is oppressive and at least in fragile democratic transition. The regimes are characterized by bad governance, poor human rights records, and weak democratic institutions and culture.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

A regional approach empowers countries to assert their interests from a stronger and more confident position in the international arena. In light of this, African states have learned from such global trends that integration among states is a viable vehicle to foster development, with multiple benefits to their population⁵. It was these expected benefits from regional cooperation that gave Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda the impetus to come together and form Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). After a long period of common problems in the region such as drought, famine and conflicts, these Eastern African States realized that multisectoral approach to socio-economic transformation should be pursued as an urgent strategy to confront common challenges to development. In addition, it was envisaged that multisectoral approach would ensure that they adjust to the highly competitive movement towards globalization. Consequently, multisectoral approach to development was paramount in ensuring a positive move in improving the living standards of the Eastern Africa citizens.

⁴Armstrong, David (1982) *The Rise of International Organization: A short History*, London McMillan Press.

⁵Agubuzu, L. (2004). *Regional Economic integration a development paradigm for Africa*, in Adebayo Adedeji (ed) *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st C*. London, Zed books.

Africa's regional integration schemes have generally not been fully implemented as designed. As a result, in many of them, internal trade barriers have not been eliminated, free movements of factors of production remains a largely unrealized dream while poor infrastructure and other constraints continue to ensure that intra-regional transactions costs remain very high. As such, RIIs in Africa has denied the citizens of the participating countries the full enjoyment and benefits of integration. Many analysts⁶ of the integration process in Africa seek to explain the ineffectiveness of the RIIs in achieving their objectives on the grounds of the effectiveness of the integration process, notably the role played by the institutions themselves that are charged to spearhead the integration process. Important as these are, they⁷ ignore other important factors that underpin the political, economic and socio-cultural factors such as political instability, poor economies and cultural mistrust among neighbouring countries among others. The question this study seeks to answer is the impact of weak states on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

1.2 Objectives of the Research

The following are the objectives that will guide the study:

- i. To examine the influence of member states political will on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
- ii. To examine the influence of security on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

⁶Geda, A. & Kebret, H. 2007. Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A review of Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of COMESA, in Journal of African Economies, Available at: <http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/ejm021v1> (Accessed on 16 December 2007). Mpungwe, A.R. 1995. Strategic Political Considerations for Regional Integration in the SADC Region in *Change Magazine*, Vol.3 No.8-11, Dar-es-Salaam: Change Publications Ltd.

⁷Ibid p4

- iii. To examine the influence of economic management on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

1.3 Literature Review

The preceding literature review will be divided under the following sub-sections: background of weak states, regional integration, the stages of regional integration, peace & security and the research gap.

State weakness can be measured by the state's ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Many countries have critical gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance. In effect, they possess legal but not actual sovereignty. In the security realm, they struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, control borders and territory, ensure public order, and provide safety from crime. In the political sphere, they lack legitimate governing institutions that provide effective administration, ensure checks on power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice, and permit broad citizen participation. In the economic arena, they strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or establish a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth. Finally, in the social domain, they fail to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education, and other social services.

The IGAD is immersed in dealing with a number of regional issues. Somalia is not the only conflict in the region. Member states of IGAD are ravaged by intra- and interstate conflicts. Sudan is in a crisis; Ethiopia was engaged in a civil war for a long time and still is confronted by

small-scale armed resistance; Kenya is a very fragile state; neither Eritrea nor Uganda is doing well. The nature of the state in the region is at the root of all of the troubling news that comes out of the IGAD member states.⁸ The state is oppressive and at least in fragile democratic transition. The regimes are characterized by bad governance, poor human rights records, and weak democratic institutions and culture. The regional states have a long history of engaging in each other's internal affairs by supporting rebel groups. As a result, it is hardly possible to think of a common security policy and structure, since an air of mistrust and non-cooperation rather than of peaceful coexistence predominates.

1.3.1 Literature Review on Regional Integration

Regional integration is a term that has been in existence for a long time, yet to date no single precise definition has been formulated. The term has been used interchangeably with economic co-operation, regionalism and regionalization which, according to Onditi,⁹ are inherently imprecise and fuzzy notions yet impossible to ignore and have become ever more essential to the analysis of contemporary regionalism.¹⁰ According to Rosamond, regionalism often refers to “the tendency of geographically proximate territories or states to engage in economic integration and to form free trade areas and possibly common market” this perspective does not consider political integration hence lacks the element of peace and security which are essential in any regional integration¹¹.

In his contribution to the understanding of regionalism, Bach argues that regionalism goes beyond economics and markets to involve transformation of a geographical area into a

⁸Ibid p4

⁹Onditi, O.F. (2010). ‘Development Or Security? *The Dilemma of Policy Prioritisation, Institutional Coordination, and Sequencing of Integration in East African Community*

¹⁰ Emanuel, A. (1994). Imagined (security) communities; Paper presented at 1994. Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, pp.1-4.

¹¹ Rosamond, B. (2000) *Theories of European integration*, St. Martins. Press, New York.

clearly identified social space.¹² It is often the political choice of any given country whether based on political, economical, social or geographical considerations to be part of a regional bloc. Furthermore, each country, depending on the benefits of integration determines the degree of sovereignty it is willing to surrender.

The concept of Regional integration is further elaborated by Manboah-Rockson in his paper, ‘the end of geography’ when he asserts that Regional integration viewed in terms of numbers, scope and diversity is characterized by multi-dimensionality of events such as business transactions, increased homogeneity and political re-alignment.¹³ In terms of numbers, countries are allowed to join more than one regional organization and this could sometimes lead to overlapping of membership and independent integration agendas, like in the case of SADC, COMESA, and the EAC.

While capturing diverse views on integration, Lee notes that regional integration is a process by which a group of nation-states voluntarily and in various degrees access one another’s markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits from their interaction. Regional integration has contributed to economic development, political amalgamation and to some extent, harmonization of security and peace regimes.¹⁴ Felicio states that even with the rise in regional integration, still there has been a slow process in the importance of peace among the

¹²Bach, D (2003) *New regionalism as an alias; regionalization through trans-state networks*; In Grant, A and F, Soderbaum (eds). *The new regionalism in Africa*. Burlington: Ashgate, p. 21-30.

¹³Manboah-Rockson, J.K. (2003) *Regional and Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Experiences, Issues and Realities at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. University of Cape Town, SA

¹⁴Lee, M. (2001). *SADC and the free trade area in South Africa*. In Maloka, E. and Eddy E.L (Eds) *Africa in the New Millennium; Challenges and Prospects*, African Institute of South Africa, Pretoria. World Bank. *Accelerated Development and UN Committee for Program and Co-ordination, proposed Revision to the System –Wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development*, Thirty-Fourth Session. E/AC. 51/7, 7. 1994.

regional members¹⁵. Particularly in Africa, the debate on regional integration has dominated the agenda of African leaders in the past years. The Africanisation process and nationalism saw the culmination of calls for African unity which hatched the scheme for regional integration. Although, the contention has been, on whether the integration should be political or economical.

According to neo-functional theory of regional integration, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organization they created¹⁶. Eventually, even the citizens of the member states begin to shift their expectations to the regional organization. IGAD as a regional body is to some extent pegged on the neo-functional theory since the cooperation places emphasis on the role of the secretariat which is meant to reduce the influence of individual heads of states decision making.

1.3.2 Literature Review on Stages of Regional Economic Integration

This section discusses the stages of regional economic integration along with its drawbacks as an illustration of one aspects of the theory and practice of integration. According to Balassa five progressive stages of economic integration are possible. These are Free Trade Areas (FTAs), Customs Union (CU), Common Market (CM), Economic Union, and Total Economic

¹⁵Felicio, T., '*Managing Security as a Regional Public Good A Regional-Global Mechanism for Security*', in *UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers*, No. 48, 2005.

¹⁶Haas, Ernst B.: *The Uniting for Europe, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, 1958

Integration. This progress stages have often been typified by the process involved in the European Union.¹⁷

The lowest level of economic integration is FTAs. Members agree to completely dismantle trade barriers among themselves but continue to retain their trade practices with nonmembers. One disadvantage of FTAs is that trade deflation is likely to occur, whereby imports arrive in the lowest tariff country to be re-routed to other member states. Thus, the more protectionist external policies of partner FTAs members are 'circumvented'.

Customs Union (CU) is the next higher stage of integration, in which members agree to abolish all tariff and non-tariff barriers among themselves. But each member state adopts a system of common trade restriction to be applied to goods imported into the union from nonmembers.¹⁸ In other words, customs union builds on the structure of FTAs along with the adoption of common external tariff. It is noted that, at this stage, members forgo their respective rights to decide on their external trade arrangements. The establishment of CU solves the problem of trade deflation because external producers are now "prevented from discriminately targeting one specific member state as part of entry to re-route exports".

The third type is the Common Market (CM), which like the CU eliminates internal trade barriers and imposes common external barriers. However, this regional grouping permits the free movement of factors of production-labour and capital, within the regional arrangements.¹⁹ Thus, at this stage, national identities or differences are not in a position to hinder the conduct of business across borders of the members.

¹⁷Balassa, B. (1961). *The theory of economic integration*. London. George Allen and Unwin.

¹⁸Hodgson, J.S. and Herander, M.G. (1983). *International Economic Relations*. New Jersey, Prentice Hall International Inc.

¹⁹Ibid p9

All of the stages of integration discussed so far involved the lowering of restricting on the movement of goods and services or factors of production among the member nation-states.²⁰ Under this arrangement the member nation-states remain free to undertake their monetary and fiscal policies to achieve their domestic macroeconomic objectives such as inflation and employment goals. Nevertheless, in the most advanced stages of economic integration- Economic Union and Full Economic Integration, the freedom of each member to involve in an independent macroeconomic policy is diminished.

The fourth stage is an Economic Union. It not only does have all the characteristics of CM, but also the harmonization of policies (fiscal and monetary). At this stage, it is understood that the common monetary institution needs to act or make decisions on behalf of member states, to coordinate policy. This is believed to be partly necessitated by the preceding stage, for instance CU requiring single money to function at the union level.²¹

The highest form of regional grouping is Full Economic Integration. It presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal and social policies and culminates in the establishment of common political institution with the practical implication that the sovereignty of the member states of the union would be forgone.

The above progressive stage of economic integration, however, has got limitations. In the first place, as Kahnert, puts only in theory is this movement 'monetanic and automatic' because of the involvement of other considerations other than purely economic ones. The same line of

²⁰Danso, K. (1995). "The *African Economic Community*: Problems and Prospects." *Africa Today*, 31-55. Vol. 42 No. 4.

²¹Ibid p9

argument is furnished by Pelkmans, who maintains that the progress to higher stages of economic integration "tends to be accommodated by or to result from political integration".²²

Another criticism is that one scheme can be introduced by its own right without following the sequential stages. In this regard, Pelkmans points out "there is no compelling reason to follow the sequence rigidly". For example, COMESA by-passed FTAs and customs union; and the European Economic Community (EEC) started with a customs union, not FTAs. The sequence is important for comprehending the additionality in each stage when ' increasing ambitions' for economic integration. Most importantly, Balassa's original progressive stages excluded certain other forms of integrational cooperation; like preferential arrangements, project coordination, partial integration, which are mostly relevant in developing countries.²³ For example, there are a number of preferential arrangements whose 'ambition' do not match the first stage of FTA's. These are loose forms of integration in which members reduce (but not fully remove) trade restrictions among themselves and they may not be limited in the scope of products covered.²⁴ Developing countries have got a special treatment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that enable them to have "de facto unlimited discretion to conclude incomplete preferential agreements or any kind of (partial) FTAs."

1.3.3 Literature Review on Weak States

The initial task of defining weak states is to identify the population of weak and failing states. State strength is a relative concept. It can be measured by the state's ability and

²²Pelkmans, J. (1987). *The Community's Vivid Core: Integration Process in Industrial Product Markets*. In Dunning, J.H. and Usui, M. ed, *Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World Development*. Proceedings of the Seventh World Congress of the International Economic Association. Volume 4. Madrid, Spain.

²³Ibid p9,11

²⁴Daddieh, C. (1995). "*Structural Adjustment Programmes and Regional Integration: Compatible or Mutual Exclusive?*" In *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustment and Alternatives*, edited by Kidane Mengisteab and B. Ikubolajeh Logan 243-72, London: Zed Books.

willingness to provide fundamental political goods associated with statehood, notably: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Around the world many states have critical capacity gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance, broadly conceived. In effect, they possess legal but not empirical sovereignty.²⁵ In the security realm, they struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide security from external and internal threats, control borders and territory, ensure public order and provide safety from crime. In the political realm, they lack legitimate governing institutions that provide checks on political power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice and efficient administration, and permit broad citizen participation. In the economic realm, they strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies and lack a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment and economic growth. Finally, they are unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education and other social services.²⁶

But not all weak states look alike. Far from it. They range along a spectrum from collapsed states, such as Somalia, which have gaps in all four capacities, to fragile “good performers,” like Senegal. In between we find a number of states that are struggling on many fronts or muddling through. Not by coincidence, weak and failing states tend to be among those states farthest from eligibility for the Millennium Challenge Account, which ranks states

²⁵Robert, J. (1990). *QuasiStates: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990).

²⁶These four categories correspond to the broad components of state capability that USAID and DFID use to measure state “fragility.” USAID, *Fragile States Strategy* DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* (January 2005). They overlap significantly with the four sets of “essential post-conflict reconstruction tasks” identified by the Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. CSIS and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework* (May 2002).

according to their commitment to “ruling justly,” “investing in people,” and “promoting economic freedom.”²⁷

State weakness is not just a question of capacity, but also of *will*. History provides repeated examples of corrupt, venal or incompetent regimes -- Zimbabwe under Mugabe comes to mind²⁷ -- that have driven promising countries into the ground.²⁸ By distinguishing between capacity and commitment, we can differentiate four broad categories of states: (1) good performers with both the will and the way; (2) states that are weak but willing; (3) states that have the means but not the commitment; and (4) those with neither the will nor the way. (See Table 2) Such analytical distinctions have policy utility, informing the mix of incentives that external actors can deploy in engaging poor performers. The goal is to move weak states toward the upper left quadrant, either by filling capacity gaps, persuading unreconstructed elites to mend their ways -- or both.

Compared to other developing countries, weak and failing states are more prone to suffer from low growth and are among the developing countries farthest from the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals.²⁹ That is, their inhabitants are more likely to be poor and malnourished, live with chronic illness and die young, lack access to education and basic health care, suffer gender discrimination, and lack access to modern technology. They are also disproportionately at risk of violence and humanitarian crises, both natural and man-made.³⁰ The World Bank estimates that fragile states are fifteen times more prone to civil war than OECD countries, and such violence is both more extreme and longer lasting than conflict in other

²⁷Michael, C. and Todd, M. (2005). “Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe’s Crisis,” *CGD Notes* (Center for Global Development: July 2005).

²⁸On the role of authoritarian, corrupt and incompetent leaders in failed development, see Nic van de Walle, *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005)

²⁹DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*.

³⁰UNHCR, 2004.

developing countries.³¹ Such countries are the overwhelming source of the world's refugees and internally displaced peoples, and many are among the world's worst abusers of human rights.³²

Compared to other developing countries, weak states are more likely to suffer from low or no growth and to be furthest away from reaching the Millennium Development Goals, a set of commitments made by UN member states in 2000 to make concrete progress by 2015 in critical development objectives, such as eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, and reducing child mortality.³² The inhabitants of these weak and failing states are likely to be poor and malnourished, live with chronic illness and die young, go without education and basic healthcare, suffer gender discrimination, and lack access to modern technology. Compared to OECD, or developed, countries, weak states are times more prone to civil war, with such violence both more extreme and longer lasting than even in other developing countries. Such states are the overwhelming source of the world's refugees and internally displaced peoples. Many are also among the world's worst abusers of human rights.

State weakness is not just a question of capacity but also of will. History provides repeated examples of corrupt, incompetent, or venal regimes, Zimbabwe today under President Robert Mugabe, for example have driven promising countries into the ground.³³ By distinguishing between capacity and will, four categories of weak states can be differentiated: relatively good performers, states that are weak but willing, states that have the means but not the

³¹Paul, C. and Anke, H. (2004). "The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of War," *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper* (2004).

³²DFID , Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, p. 9; United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "2004 Global Refugee Trends," June 17, 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/events/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=42b283744>; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of War," *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper*, March 26, 2004, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf; Freedom House, *The Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2004).

³³Michael, C. and Todd, M. (2005). "*Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe's Crisis*," CGD Notes, July 2005, <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2918/>.

will, and those with neither the will nor the way to fulfill the basic functions of statehood. Such analytical distinctions have policy utility, informing the mix of incentives external actors might deploy in engaging poor performers.

1.3.3.1 Literature Review on the State of IGAD States

IGAD Region has experienced severe civil and inter-state conflicts, which coupled with weak governance and statelessness (in the case of Somalia) have led to instability, poverty, and political isolation. These factors contribute towards the region's vulnerability to exploitation. Ethiopia, for instance, has been simultaneously at war with several rebel groups³⁴ and against Eritrea. The main triggers of conflict have been border disputes as well as personal disputes between the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the President of Eritrea. Furthermore, Ethiopia has also accused Eritrea of providing support to religious extremist groups with links to al-Qaida (such as Al Shabaab), which furthers Ethiopia's military objectives. The dispute has led to thousands of deaths, the repression of opposition political movements, increased human rights violations³⁵, and Eritrea's withdrawal from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development. The attacks on Chinese oil exploration facility on the border with Somalia, which also led to numerous deaths³⁶.

In northern Uganda, insurgent groups especially the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), which fight against the Ugandan government, have employed brutal and terrorist tactics that have reportedly caused the deaths of over 5,000 people

³⁴McGregor (2007), A., "*Ethiopia Faces Ethnic Fallout from Somalia Intervention*," Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, No. 17, June.

³⁵Amnesty International (2010), *Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia*, Report, at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2010#> Accessed 20 July 2011

³⁶Rabasa, A. (2009a), *Radical Islam in East Africa*, RAND Project Airforce, RAND Cooperation. McLure, J., „*Dueling Dictators*, “ in Newsweek at www.newsweek.com/id/72707 Accessed 22 September 2010. China Daily, April 2007, „Nine Chinese Workers Killed in Ethiopia, “ CJTF-HOA Web site, at <http://www.hoa.centcom.mil>. Accessed on 26 October 2010.

across the country³⁷, which in turn has helped to increase public tolerance of measures against others under suspicion.

In Sudan, the signing of the Naivasha-Machakos Accords in 2004 led to the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) and brought the southern insurgency led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to an end. Practically however, the country was split along ethno-religious lines between the Muslim North and the non-Muslim African South. In a referendum held on 11 January 2011 the majority south Sudanese people voted for independence from the North.

Since the referendum the conflict has cooled down in the South. However, tensions have flared up in the western part of Darfur region, which has been affected by conflict since 2004. The Sudanese government has supported an Arab militia called the Janjaweed, which has attacked the local ethnic groups in Darfur: the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit. This has resulted in a major humanitarian crisis including death, strife, and mass displacement of people³⁸.

In the post-referendum period, a new conflict has emerged with a series of attacks by troops from (Northern) Sudan on villages disputed border region of Abyei. There are fears the Abyei dispute could reignite the two regions' civil war. Sudanese troops (North) moved into Abyei on 21 May 2011 and seized the region's capital, Abyei town. According to the 2005 peace deal, which ended the 22-year civil war, Abyei was granted special status and a joint administration was set up in 2008 to run the area until a referendum decided its fate. That vote

³⁷International Crisis Group (2007), „Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, “ ICG Africa Report 124, Nairobi/Brussels, 26 April at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4791 Accessed 29 September 2010

³⁸Rabasa, A., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Daly, S. A., Gregg, S., Karasik, T., O'Brien, K. and Rosenau (2007), W., Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 1, *The Global Jihadist Movement*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

was due to take place in January, when the south decided to separate from the north, but it has now been postponed indefinitely³⁹.

Southern Somalia has faced the burden of the civil conflict for the past two decades. Since the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, Southern Somalia has not had a functioning government, making it the most unstable and insecure region of the country. Clan-based warlords ruled this part of Somalia until June 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took over the control of Mogadishu after defeating the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). The ARPCT was a group of Mogadishu warlords and power brokers, who operated with the support of the US and some regional countries.

However, the reign of the ICU was short-lived, ousted by the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006, which installed the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in power in Mogadishu. The TFG is supported by the US, Ethiopia, and other regional governments⁴⁰ except Eritrea which has been accused of supporting the insurgency groups in Somalia⁴¹. Rabasa argues that the Ethiopian intervention did little to help the country attain security and stability. External intervention by different external actors with different agendas was, of course, both the result of, and a contributing factor to, the long period of statelessness⁴². Ibrahim has observed that the "policy follies of regional and international players" in Somalia has contributed to the rise of insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab⁴³. Hon. Adan Abdi Salam, the former deputy prime minister of Somalia argues that the support for the transitional government that is not recognized

³⁹Africa Review (4 June 2011) "UN Condemns Sudan's takeover of disputed Abyei" <http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1174732/-/hnegaxz/-/index.html> Accessed 20 August 2011

⁴⁰Ibrahim, M. (2010), "Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection?" *Journal of Contemporary African studies*, Volume 28:3, pp.283-295.

⁴¹United Nations (2011), *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)*, UN Doc. S/2011/433, 18 July.

⁴²Ibid p2

⁴³Ibid p4

by all Somalis has left a power vacuum in the country⁴⁴. This has been filled by various groups ranging from warlords and militia groups to various localized Islamic organizations. The end result was that various rival groups including Islamist movements emerged leading to a state of anarchy in the country⁴⁵.

Porous borders represent a major challenge to ensuring security and stability for national governments in EA. The presence of the state security apparatus is marginal in many border areas, which reflects a general inability of the governments to enforce order within each country's territorial boundary⁴⁶. This allows for free movement of people and illicit trade across borders. This is particularly true in the case of the Kenya – Somalia border, which has not only allowed the movement of refugees fleeing the conflict in Somalia but also allows movement of terrorist and easy flow of illegal weapons.

There is lack of agreement on the level of terrorist operations inside Somalia itself. This could partly be because of the lack of accurate intelligence that is an effect of the operational difficulties of running human sources in such complicated operating environments especially in Central and Southern Somalia which are held by Al Shabaab and Hizb Islam. However, there seems to be a consensus that the country serves as a transit and shield for al-Qaeda operatives in the region⁴⁷. Somalia has been linked with a number of terrorist attacks in neighbouring states, and in each of these cases al-Qaeda used Somalia as a co-ordination point and transit route. Of note are the use of the Somali borders for safe passage for the August 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 hotel

⁴⁴Interview with Hon. Ahmed Abdisalam Adan, Former Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia, (Nairobi, 14 January, 2011).

⁴⁵Ibid p5

⁴⁶Ibid p1

⁴⁷Ibid p3

and international airport attacks in Mombasa (Kenya), for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility⁴⁸.

Presently there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters may move into Somalia through its numerous porous entry ports to join forces with Islamist fundamentalist groups such as Al Shabaab. From late 2006, the steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world (including numerous young radicals from the Somali Diaspora around the world) was estimated to range from several hundred to, less plausibly, several thousand. According to the 6 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), it is the sparse population, uninhabited and poorly patrolled arid areas that have made the border between Kenya and Somalia „leak.“ In spite of the presence of some customs checkpoints at the main entry points to Kenya, the other parts of the border are mostly not patrolled. This creates ideal entry points not only for terrorists but smugglers as well⁴⁹.

The Indian Ocean adjoining East Africa is the most prone to piracy in the world.⁵⁰ According to the ICC International Maritime Bureau, in 2008, there were 293 actual and attempted piracy attacks globally. 92 of these attacks took place in the Gulf of Eden and 19 of them were in the coastal waters of Somalia. In 2009, there was an increase in the piracy attacks to 410 globally with 117 of them taking place in the Gulf of Eden and 80 in the coastal waters of Somalia. In 2010, the piracy attacks increased to 445 globally. Due to heightened international surveillance and counter-piracy activities, the piracy incidents in the Gulf of Eden dropped to 53 attacks in the Gulf of Eden, but the piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia rose to 139⁵¹.

⁴⁸Kimani M., (2009), *“Tackling piracy off African shores: More regional cooperation needed for peace and security,”* Africa Renewal, Volume 22, No. 4:3, January.

⁴⁹Human Rights Watch (May 2002), *Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya*, Human Rights Watch.

⁵⁰Ibid p6

⁵¹Combating Terrorism Center (2006b), *“Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI),”* A Research Note, Combating Terrorism Center.

There are claims that part of the proceeds from piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Eden serve to finance extremist groups⁵². According to Ibrahim 20-50% of the ransom money pirates receive is given to Al-Shabaab. He notes that although Al-Shabaab would prefer being paid cash for letting pirates use their ports, the organization (Al-Shabaab) is open to “being compensated through the acquisition of weapons. Pirates in turn, need Al-Shabaab to provide protection for captured ships and crews until ransoms could be extracted”.

In addition to the prevailing regional instability and conflict, the IGAD region lacks a regional power. Nigeria and South Africa are taking the lead with regard to ECOWAS and SADC, respectively. But, no one state takes such responsibility from IGAD member states; none of them has the capacity to assume an unchallenged regional leadership (Interviews with ICG official and IGAD official two). Though Ethiopia has the military might and large number of people, it lacks the economic muscle to exercise regional leadership. Kenya does not have the military supremacy to set the tone of regional agendas and, Sudan despite its oil wealth and territorial supremacy is weakened by internal conflicts.

1.3.4 Justification of the Study

Achieving peace, security and stability in IGAD has been a monumental task. Since its establishment, IGAD has recorded several achievements the main ones being establishment of effective and efficient mechanisms networks, processes, specialized institutions and partnerships for the execution of its regional activities. For example specialized institutions established include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Business Forum, East Africa Standby Brigade and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre for Monitoring and Forecasting (ICPAC). Among the shortcomings of IGAD is that it has failed

⁵²Ibid p4

to achieve food security for the people of the horn of Africa. This can be attributed to insufficient agricultural technology, lack of low level infrastructure and lack of proper storage facilities for produce all of which are challenges that IGAD needs to work on. Further members of IGAD also belong to COMESA hence here is need of coherence and avoidance of duplication of objectives.

This topic is relevant and timely, given that Africa is trying to enhance its regional integration process. There are outstanding issues that need to be recognized and addressed by African states, individually and collectively, in order to take this process forward. First and foremost is to recognize the importance of regional economic integration in the general integration process. In terms of the institutional framework for regional integration in Africa, integrative institutions will be examined on how far and how efficient they are. Another observation is that the sub-regional integration framework, formed by the Regional Communities, serves as the pillar of the continental integration agenda. In this regard, this study will also look at the key issue of how to optimize the current configuration of RECs as the building blocks. The analysis of this issue will end by stating areas in which improvement and review are needed.

There are a substantial number of theoretical studies that have addressed the issue of regional integration. These include ones which specifically address the main issue of the importance of and/or necessity for regional economic integration, but most of them have focused on regions other than Africa. Most literature on IGAD addresses industrialization and economic reforms with limited literature on impact of weak states on regional integration within IGAD. Given that IGAD cannot pursue its economic and social objectives without first consolidating the peace, security and stability agenda; there is still a major gap on this emotive issue. This study therefore, seeks to explore impact of weak states on regional integration within IGAD.

The findings generated from this study were expected to lead to a better understanding of not only the dynamics of how regional integration works; but specifically the experience of the East African integration process. This is of great significance to academicians and academic researchers in that it increases to the body of knowledge. This leads to a larger pool of academic material on regional integration which leads to a better understanding. This might lead to arrival at an African specific model of integration. The findings therefore do not only draw an insight into the working of the IGAD, but also help in projecting what tangible economic impacts the integrating states are to accrue. The study also aims to share and popularize the importance of regional integration and to identify potential state weaknesses that threaten socio-economic stability in the IGAD region.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Currently, there are about fourteen regional integration organizations (RIOs) in Africa overlapping and maintaining competition with each other⁵³. The situation is often illustrated with the picture of a “spaghetti bowl”⁵⁴. This metaphor refers to the complexity and lack of clarity of tangled spaghetti (representing RIOs) sharing one bowl (representing fifty-four African nation states and their multiple memberships), which hinders positive economic integration. The African RIOs overlaps each other, which means (in addition to remaining in competition with one other) they are creating artificial production areas, hindering liberal economic development. Within East Africa, the area that forms the focus of this article, there are about five main RIOs (East Africa Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Inter-Governmental Authority on

⁵³Asche, H. and Jonne, B. (2009). “*Myth and Reality of African Regional Integration,*” *Recht in Afrika* 2/2009: 169–86.

⁵⁴Draper, P., Durrel, H. and Philip, A. (2007). *SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From Spaghetti to Cannelloni?* Johannesburg: SAIIA

Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); however, some of them are more advanced than others in terms of their institutional and functional development⁵⁵. The best established of the region, or consistent with the metaphor: the thickest of the pieces of spaghetti is known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Since IGAD is probably the most ambitious African integration project, it is important to explain and understand its development, for example via the application of a theory of regional integration.

Referring to this, the research seeks to follow some aspects of such an IGAD integration process by using the analytical tools of the theory of Neofunctionalism. In combining a well-established integration theory with an empirical case that is still unfolding, the aim is to determine whether the East African integration pasta can be partly understood by using Neofunctionalism developed by Ernst B. Haas. As a theory originally conceived to explain the European integration process, it might have the potential to reveal analogies between the uniting of Europe and other integrating regions elsewhere, especially if Neofunctionalism is taken “out of area” to explain phenomena like the uniting of East Africa. Compared to other integration theories, the theory proposed by Haas has significant advantages in offering an adequate and abstract theoretical framework as well as a dynamic process character and a modern view of different actors in several political settings. It is neither “obsolete nor obsolescent” but an appropriate theoretical basis that has the strength to analyze other regional integration phenomena even beyond Europe⁵⁶.

⁵⁵Ibid p31

⁵⁶Jaspert, J. (2009). *Regionalismus im südlichen Afrika*—Die Handels und Sicherheitspolitik der SADC, Bochum, Wiesbaden: VS.

Hence, the study tries to comprehend the specific case of the uniting of East Africa, via the projection of the most important elements of Neofunctionalism. For this purpose, the central ideas of Neofunctionalism are elucidated. The main section then takes a closer look at IGAD from a Neofunctionalism perspective, one aim of which is to draw some comparisons with the integration process in Europe in the 1950s. As regional integration in East Africa is a complex process, this paper examines only some aspects of the current development, such as the main actors and their motives, the process character, as well as the finality of IGAD.

First, according to Neofunctionalism, it is very important to understand the reasons why nation-states are keen to integrate and create RIOs. Therefore, it is useful to introduce Haas' definition of regional integration. For Haas, integration is a mixture of common ideas, necessities, internal and external constraints, and the political will to find new solutions for national and regional problems. He defines the origin of motives as a combination of political calculations, national and/or regional interests, constraints and the socially constructed shift of loyalties and activities of diverse actors involved in the process⁵⁷.

For Neofunctionalism, regional integration is a mixture of voluntary and forced cooperation, which can lead to deeper integration via the loss of national sovereignty if interests and/or constraints are complementary and if the RIO solves problems better than the national entities. Through spillover and spillback effects between various levels of functional intrastate politics, regional integration then becomes a process of institutionalization and regionalization of the societies that can ultimately lead to the construction of a new supranational unity. Hence, the

⁵⁷Haas, E.B. (2004) *The Uniting of Europe*, Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press. Haas, Ernst B. (2004) "Institutionalism or Constructivism?" in *Ibid.*, *The Uniting of Europe*, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

basic assumptions of Haas' main book the *Uniting of Europe* are that regional integration finally is a supranational overlay atop former intergovernmental cooperation. This means that even the fact that states started to integrate more or less voluntarily, it would not prevent them from a dynamization of an integration process through their loss of sovereignty⁵⁸.

Such a deepening is not only linked with constraints and interests states are faced with but also with the rise of alternative actors. Second, this leads to the political actors involved in the decision-making processes. According to Neofunctionalism, it can be said that, as Haas declared in his book, nation-states are no longer the only decision makers⁵⁹. Their role is not only challenged by the rise of national and transnational interest groups but also via the establishing of regional institutions. In this regard, it is important to note how strong the influence of civil society and/or other political actors is on important decisions. Furthermore, Haas illustrated that shared interests and ideas, as well as common constraints, can speed up integration, whereby an active and supranational regional institutions also capable of intensifying such a process.

Altogether, the performance of institutions regarding their capacity to solve cross-border problems and the activities of non-state actors (combined with the other factors explained) can push nation-states forward toward deeper integration. Third, in this regard, it is obvious that Haas did not consider regional integration as a grand "bargaining game"⁶⁰ but as a detailed process with various actors, influences, and decision-making levels. Therefore, each integration process has its own process-related "logic of sector integration" according to Neofunctionalism. This means states are likely to begin their coordination within politically non-sensitive areas with potentially high absolute gains such as economy, infrastructure, or energy politics. After a process in which states make profits, learn from and increase in trust for each other, the initial cooperation can spill over to other

⁵⁸Ibid p32

⁵⁹Ibid p32

⁶⁰Hoffmann, S. (1983). "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(1/2): 21–37.

policy areas through the state actors but also via pressure from interest groups or the ruling of regional institutions.⁶¹ In cases of economic gains, overlapping interests and trust are very likely; Haas even presumes that an automatism of the process can develop via spillover.

According to Haas and Schmitter⁶², regional integration is in this sense much more than negotiations; it is a long-lasting, complex, and dynamic process with different types of actors and influences acting between them. Hence, in between grand, steps-based approaches like inter-governmentalism and detail focused theories without a particular paradigm, like new regionalism, Neofunctionalism offers a third and second image paradigm to provide an overview, as well as insights into the black box is not only challenged by the rise of national and transnational interest groups but also via the establishing of regional institutions. In this regard, it is important to note how strong the influence of civil society and/or other political actors is on important decisions.

1.5 Hypotheses

- a) There is significant relationship between governance and the success of regional integration by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa.
- b) There is significant relationship between security and the success of regional integration by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa.
- c) There is significant relationship between economic management and the success of regional integration by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa.

1.6 Research Methodology

This study is quantitative in nature and mainly adopted a historical research design due to the time and budget constraint which impeded on the collection of primary data. It therefore

⁶¹Ibid p22

⁶²Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, P. (1964). "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity of Latin America," *International Organization* 18 (4): 711–19.

seeks to explore, explain and understand the core elements of the study from already available data which is mainly of a secondary nature. This greatly borrowed from what has already been an observed as prevailing trend in the past and upon this, the present is explained and the future predicted. A historical study best qualified to examine the objectives of the study. The study attempts to trace the impact of weak states on the success of regional integration and correlate this with the within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) impacts realized thereto. The two variables: weak states impact and regional integration are hypothesized to be positively related. This makes use of data generated from past years hence the need for a historical study.

Data is obtained from different published books and periodicals. The data and information to examine the foundational, objective and structure of IGAD are available in the Charter of IGAD, Strategic Framework of IGAD, the Lagos Plan of Action, the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, archives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), IGAD publications, and IGAD and others web sites. Regarding data and information on the socio-economic and political settings of the member states of IGAD, published books, Country Reports of each country, Horn of Africa Bulletin are used. Data and information sources to identify the challenges to integration are provided from published books, periodicals by IGAD and others, Declaration of Heads of State and Government of IGAD, Charter of IGAD and archives from MOFA.

1.7 Data Collection

The data collection instrument employed in this study is document analysis. Document analysis in this context means a critical examination of public or private recorded information

related to the issue under study. Its purpose is to obtain information and data with ease for the researcher and without interruption of the working of the subject under study.

1.8. Research Procedure

Quantitative data is collected on the IGAD from existing data sources focusing on the overall aspects of the integration framework. The main data collection instrument is document analysis. The data is collected by the researcher himself without the involvement of field or research assistants.

1.9 Data analysis

Data from public documents is analyzed to derive inferences from the findings. This analysis is chosen due to the relative ease that it offered in explaining the relationship between the variables.

This is done by analyzing the degree of correlation which is a measure of the degree of association between two or more variables that have been obtained from the same group of subject(s). This is useful because it helps to predict and describe the association in terms of magnitude and direction. This also helps in forecasting and providing guidance to facilitate further research studies once the relationship between weak states impacts and regional integration is established to be existent.

1.10 Chapter Outline

This research project is organized into five chapters with an introduction and conclusion of the themes discussed in every chapter.

CHAPTER ONE gives a general introduction to the thesis. It provides the problem statement, objectives, hypothesis, theoretical framework, literature review and methodology in relation to weak states in IGAD region.

CHAPTER TWO analyzes the governance structure in the individual member states and the region as a whole by looking at existence of legitimate governing institutions that provide effective administration, ensure checks on power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice, and permit broad citizen participation all this in relation to the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

CHAPTER THREE analyzes the security situation in the individual member states and the region as a whole. Specific attention will be paid to the struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, control borders and territory, ensure public order, and provide safety from crime in relation to the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

CHAPTER FOUR analyzes the economic arena in the individual member states and the region as a whole; weak states strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or establish a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth. Finally, in the social domain, they fail to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education, and other social services.

CHAPTER FIVE discusses, concludes and recommends on the findings.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of weak states followed by a discussion on the rationale for the establishment of regional integration institutions. It further describes the characteristics of regional integration institutions, brief overview of the performance of selected regional integration institutions in Africa and summarizes the key reasons for the formation of regional integration institutions.

Weak states include a broad continuum of states that are: inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks; and a mixture of the two. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent. Urban crime rates tend to be higher and increasing. In weak states, the ability to provide adequate measures of other political goods is diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructural networks have deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass civil society. Weak states are often ruled by despots, elected or not. There is a special category of weak state, as explored in Erin Jenne's chapter. That is the seemingly strong case, always an autocracy that rigidly controls dissent and is secure but at the same time provides very few

political goods. In extreme cases, such as North Korea, the regime permits its people to starve. Cambodia under Pol Pot also qualifies, as does contemporary Belarus, Iraq, and, possibly, Libya. Across recent times, the list of states that are fundamentally weak but appear strong is even more extensive.

Regional integration is part of the present global economic order and is a trend which is now acknowledged as the future of the international scene. The nation-state system, which has been the predominant pattern of international relations, is increasingly evolving towards a system in which regional groupings of states are becoming more important than sovereign states. There is generally a powerful perception that the idea of the state and its sovereignty has been made irrelevant by processes that are taking place at both the global and local level. Lippman⁶³ states, “The true constituent members of the international order of the future are communities of states”. Groom and Taylor⁶⁴ further capture this spirit by their observation that, “the process of going beyond adjustment to a rebuilding of the state system has been neither easy nor uncontroversial, but it is real in that the sovereignty of the units has been fundamentally adjusted, although not in such a way as to go altogether beyond the notion of a state system. It is, in effect, a rebuilding of the state system into what are deemed to be more viable units”.

In the light of the above, it can be agreed that the international system is now characterized by groups of states (often geographically close to each other and/or sharing common problems) that have come together for purposes of safeguarding or promoting issues of common interest. In so doing, these states jointly come up with cohesive regional stances on policy issues which each participating state is required to implement. It is between these two

⁶³Lippman, W. (2008). *Quotes by Walter Lippman in Brainy Quotes*, Available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/walter_lippmann.html (Accessed on 29 April 2008)

⁶⁴Groom, A.J.R. & Taylor, P. (1990). *Framework for International Cooperation*. London: Pinter.

stages, namely policy determination and the execution of policy in the regional sphere that the role of RIIs, also known as RECs, manifests itself; they transform policy made at the regional level by implementing it. Much of this policy execution revolves around coordinating, harmonizing and implementing policies aimed at increasing cooperation between the cooperating groups of states often with the objective of establishing a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, an Economic Union and/or ultimately a Political Union. Each of the above levels of integration requires their own distinct level of commitment and degree of harmonization of policies on the part of member countries of the RII.

The execution of policy occurs within organizational structures where the different steps are divided into specialized roles and functions. At the national level, the relevant institution is the department of foreign affairs or any other department charged with regional integration matters. At the regional/international level, it is the international governmental institution established by the member states which thus serves as the administrative agent of all member states.⁶⁵

RIIs serves a useful function in channeling a portion of state interactions and in providing vehicles for increased co-operation. Their main function is to make cooperation possible in virtually all spheres of life through international public administration. Such cooperation could have specific advantages for states. In many cases, RIIs are not only the place where a decision can be made, but also provide the administrative infrastructure to implement the decisions. They further create channels of communication which states can utilize in their own and in the common interest. In conflict situations, views can be aired and influence used in an attempt to avoid serious consequences. Member states are free to take their disputes to the RII for

⁶⁵Auriacombe, C., & De Giorgi, B. (2000). *International Public Administration, Pretoria*: University of South Africa.

discussion and for a ruling, and if a certain member state does not do so, fellow members can. The decisions of the RIIs can be either accepted or rejected since RIIs can normally not enforce decisions on their own. All in all RIIs have become indispensable instruments within the international system.

2.2 Rationale for the Establishment of Institutions of Regional Integration

According to Kebret⁶⁶, irrespective of the type of integration established, all have the following common ultimate objectives: they all seek to benefit from trade creation, economies of scale, product differentiation and efficiency gains through policy coordination that follow implementation of regional integration agreements. Regional integration is also expected to reduce vulnerability to external shocks induced by fluctuations, instability and uncertainty in the rest of the world. Such a process is motivated by the recognition that national economic welfare could be enhanced in a more efficient way through such partnership than by adopting unilateral policy at each country level.

Other non-economic objectives of regional integration, as outlined by Schiff and Winters⁶⁷, include the desire by governments to bind themselves to better policies e.g. democracy, desire to help neighbouring countries stabilize and prosper to avoid spillovers of unrest and population, the fear of being left out while the rest of the world is swept into regionalism either because this would be actually harmful to the excluded countries or just because of the perception that if everyone else is doing it, we also should.

⁶⁶Kebret, H. (2000). *Regional Integration in Africa: A Review of the Outstanding Issues and Mechanisms to Monitor Future Progress*, Available at <http://www.uneca.org/aknf/pub/regionalint1.htm> (Accessed on 17 December 2007).

⁶⁷Schiff, M. & Winters, L.A. (2003). *Regional Integration and Development*, Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

In the specific case of regional integration in Africa, Kebret⁶⁸ argues that there are several reasons that have propelled governments of African countries to establish RIIs. These include the recognition that their respective economies were small in size, with poor infrastructure, vulnerable to external shocks and dependent on limited primary commodities for exports. African countries thus see regional integration as a means for successful structural transformation of African economies. Additionally, in recent years, the formation and reasonable success of many regional blocs in other parts of the world (in Asia, Europe North America and Latin American countries), the end of the cold war, the implementation of more liberal national economic policies across the continent and the rapid globalization of production, distribution and investment activities, have given further impetus to integration at the regional and continental levels. This is widely seen as a way to avoid further economic marginalization of the African region. Cultural ties and colonial heritage have also largely dictated the basis of the cooperation as in the case of the EAC in East Africa and SADC in Southern Africa.

The UN Economic Commission for Africa⁶⁹, on the other hand highlights four main reasons that have driven African countries to establish or strengthen RIIs. Firstly, in the last twenty years there have been changes in the world trading system which has seen the general consensus that free trade is good for growth. The transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the World Trade Organisation also saw a significant reduction in tariff and non tariff barriers resulting in rich economies pursuing bilateral trade liberalization with poor ones. These changes have resulted in greater integration of world markets and increased world trade. Indeed, the Commission notes that since the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1995, world trade increased by 25%, twice as fast as production. This rapid expansion has been

⁶⁸Ibid p37

⁶⁹United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (2006). *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II Rationalizing Regional Economic Community*. Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa.

facilitated by developments in information and communication technology, liberalization of financial markets and factor movements across national and regional borders. Countries' and regions' responses to these new opportunities have to some degree determined their share of the benefits. Africa's share has been relatively small; in the early 1960s Africa accounted for as much as 10% of world exports, by 2000 its share had declined to about 2%. Among the factors contributing to this decline are restrictions in market access in the major economies, limited intra-African trade-a result of weak regional integration, small domestic markets that do not provide enough opportunities for firms to learn or enough cushion for the export sector during shocks in the international market. The realization that a larger African market would provide opportunities for firms to compete effectively in the international arena led to appreciation for need for deeper regional integration and hence the establishment or strengthening of RIIs. Further the nature of some WTO negotiations and their requirement that African countries negotiate as a group have promoted the establishment of RIIs.

Secondly, there is globalization by African policymakers and leaders as increasingly marginalizing the African continent. Globalization is characterized by an accelerated pace of interdependence and connectivity and aided by innovations in communication technology. Cross-border movements of goods, services and finance are estimated the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to be over US\$1.5 trillion worth of currency transactions per day, an amount equal to more than twice the total foreign exchange reserves of all governments.⁷⁰ These transactions greatly reduce the ability of governments to intervene in foreign exchange markets to stabilize their currencies, manage their economies and maintain fiscal autonomy. Weak African economies have fared very poorly under this new regime. The

⁷⁰Hodgson, J.S. and Mark G. H. (2003). *International Economic Relations*. New Jersey: Prentice - Hall

renewed emphasis on regional integration reflects attempts by African leaders to stem this marginalization.

Thirdly, the success of the European Union has also driven African governments to establish or strengthen RIIs. The European Union today accounts for over 41% of world trade and is Africa's largest trading Partner.⁷¹ Further the recent requirement by the European Union to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with regional integration communities is likely to have a significant impact on regional integration in Africa.

Fourthly, unilateral initiatives by the major economies are another recent development that has seen the establishment of RIIs in Africa. The best known initiative is the United States (US) African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) whose objective is to provide African exports improved access to the US market on a nonreciprocal basis. There are also several other new initiatives between Africa and its major trading partners that are likely to drive the continent's integration agenda in the short to medium plan such as the plan to establish the United States and the Southern Africa Customs Union, negotiations between the European Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the free trade agreement negotiated between South Africa and the European Union, the Tokyo Initiative for Cooperation for Africa's Development and the Chinese Africa Forum. Some countries' self interest is also driving regional integration. South Africa for example has successfully negotiated a free trade agreement with the European Union and is negotiating similar arrangements with China, India and MERCOSUR.

States are thus inclined to try to establish RIIs because they have to cooperate in so many fields at present, have to make adaptations, have to try to accommodate one another, must make

⁷¹Inter-Africa Group (2002). "Peace and Security Dimensions of the African Union." A Paper Presented for Panal Discussion Organized by the United Nations Economic Commission. United Nations Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 3-8 March.

compromises to promote their own and communal interests, must try to solve problems across boundaries and must try to avoid conflict. As a result they will also try to make use of such institutions. Indeed, Auriacombe and De Giorgi⁷², observe that because the world trend indicates a greater need for contact, and because problems will become more diverse and complex, it can be expected that the role of RIIs and consequently, also that of international public administration, will become more important rather than less so in future.

2.3 Characteristics of Institutions of Regional Integration

Regional integration institutions (RIIs) are international governmental institutions that have been assigned the specific function of coordinating, harmonizing and implementing policies meant to increase the level of interactions among a group of countries with regard to economic, security, political and even socio-cultural issues often with the long term objective of establishing a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, an Economic Union and/or ultimately a Political Union. RIIs have specific distinct characteristics especially with regards to their formation (which is inter-state and voluntary), structure, autonomy, functions and nature of workforce among others.

RIIs are created on an international basis and therefore have governmental sanction. They are created by way of multilateral agreements that normally result in a founding document, which usually describes the structure, functions and powers of the various organizational components and the mutual relations between the various components. Such document could have different names such as treaty, constitution, convention, articles of agreement, general

⁷²Auriacombe, C., & De Giorgi, B. (2000). *International Public Administration*, Pretoria: University of South Africa.

agreement, statute, founding document or constituent agreement. Thus in essence the membership of a RIIs must be derived from two or more sovereign states.

RIIs are established on a voluntary basis. Only states which prefer to become members do so, provided that their application for membership is accepted. Similarly, states can terminate the membership voluntarily in fact, as Auriacombe and De Giorgi⁷³ note, “they remain members only for so long as they wish”. States, can however, also be suspended for various reasons usually stipulated in the founding document.

In order to function continuously, RIIs have a formal, fixed structure the nature of which may differ from one institution to another. Provision for this is made in the founding document. The organizational structure usually consists of a policy making organ, an executive organ and an administrative organ. Some RIIs also have their own judicial organ.

The autonomy of RIIs arises from their power to make decisions and from their organizational structure. According to Auriacombe and De Giorgi⁷⁴, autonomy exists in the sense that decisions can be made which need not be identical to the sum total of the decisions of the individual member states. This is possible because the member states either participate in the decision-making process or give to the RII a distinctive organizational component which enables it determine policy within its sphere of authority. The autonomy of RIIs is however limited. Normally, their functions are also demarcated. Just as these institutions are created through voluntary cooperation, they also have to rely on voluntary cooperation to attain their objectives. Where RIIs act directly, their authority (which is usually for strictly defined objectives) is derived from member states. Because the governments of member states have to accept the

⁷³Auriacombe, C., & De Giorgi, B. (2000). *International Public Administration, Pretoria*: University of South Africa.

⁷⁴Ibid

ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the decisions of RIIs, such governments tend to keep a very close eye on the decisions concerned. The autonomy of RIIs is also limited when it comes to budget matters. Often RIIs have few or no resources other than those that are made available by member states through annual contributions. If members do not pay their contributions, they are often powerless although in some cases their founding documents provide for disciplinary action such as deprivation of the right to vote. Thus as far as autonomy of RIIs is concerned, it can be said that the institution normally does not have a will of its own, and can thus, not enforce its decisions.

The functions assigned to a RIIs are contained in its founding document, which indicate the RII's powers and sphere of influence. However, the fundamental mission of all RIIs is the administration of cooperation between member states in various spheres so that the functions laid down in its founding document can be performed with a view to the attainment of a common objective. These objectives often vary from the establishment of a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, Monetary Union and/or Political Federation of the member states. In the process, the harmonization of policies of member states must be encouraged. This involves the search for solutions to conflict situations which could arise in the economic, political, socio-cultural or even technical areas. The operational activities by the RIIs themselves are undertaken in cooperation with the government of member states.

Auriacombe and De Giorgi⁷⁵, highlight the cooperative role of RIIs by observing that in many cases RIIs are not only the places where decisions to cooperate are made but they are also the institutions by means of which these decisions are implemented. Cooperation is further facilitated by the fact that RIIs can provide governments with many channels of communication through which to address problems which may arise. In conflict situations, RIIs are the places

⁷⁵Ibid p35

where opinions can be expressed by the parties involved. At the same time, they provide the other members with the opportunity to exercise their influence formally, and also informally, in an attempt to settle a dispute. In other situations, where conflicts of interest do not really occur, as in the case of functional matters, cooperation is facilitated by the existence of RIIs. Mutual agreements are reached which can be beneficial to all members. Agreements in the fields of, for example, health and postal services can hardly be detrimental to any member.

Neutrality: RIIs come into being for the purpose of pursuing the common interest of its members and are thus expected to be neutral. Since their existence depends on retaining the support of an effective majority of member states, they run the risk of endangering their expected characteristic of neutrality if they identify with any state or group of states. As a result, RIIs do not serve the express purpose of pursuing the interests of only one member. Staff of a RII, therefore have to give effect to the collective will of the majority of member states, as contained in decisions and resolutions. They serve the community of states and must be loyal to all the member states and therefore to the RII and not to their homeland.

Unique workforce: According to Auriacombe and De Giorgi⁷⁶, the staff of RIIs are international public servants and this bestows on them four unique characteristics. Firstly, the guideline of loyalty is regarded as a critical aspect. The staff of RIIs must give up their national loyalty and must serve the interests of the RII only. Associated with this is the fact that as international public officials, they may not receive any instructions from home governments or from any person or institution outside the RII or in any way try to represent the interests of their home governments. Secondly, staff of RIIs are expected to be impartial. As international public officials they are supposed to be administrators and not politicians. Their function is to implement decisions conscientiously that were taken elsewhere, and, if possible, to avoid

⁷⁶Ibid p35

involvement in controversies that arise from the RII's decisions. They must be apolitical in the sense that they must voluntarily implement all decisions which have been taken by the political-organizational components of the RII.

Thirdly, staffs of a RII are independent. The assumption is that, if an international public secretariat seeks to maintain its independence, it must consist of career public officials who have a high degree of occupational security. They should be given work contracts of such a nature that they feel that, if they promote the interests of the institution, they will be protected against retribution or even dismissal arising out of political considerations. It is thus common for staff of RIIs to be accorded diplomatic immunity in the course of their duties. Fourthly, is the multinational nature of the workforce of RIIs. This arises out of the requirement for geographical representation in the recruitment policies of all RIIs. The rationale underlying the requirement of geographical representation is that the RIIs are a joint effort of member states and that citizens of all member states must be able to serve as international public officials.

2.4 An Assessment of Selected Institutions of Regional Integration in Africa

The Abuja Treaty stipulates that African States must endeavour to strengthen the RIIs in particular by coordinating, harmonizing and progressively integrating their activities in order to attain the African Economic Community which would gradually be put in place during a thirty-four (34) year transition period subdivided into six (6) varying stages.⁷⁷ At the end of the first stage, which ended in May 1999 and which was characterized by the strengthening of the institutional framework of the existing RIIs and the creation of new ones where none existed, the Conference of Heads of States of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) selected eight (8) RIIs which, with coordination, harmonization and progressive integration of activities, would

⁷⁷United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 1999. *The ECA and Africa: Accelerating a Continent's Development*, Addis Ababa: United National Economic Commission for Africa.

in 2028 lead to the materialization of the African Common Market. These eight RIIs are: (i) the East African Community (EAC); (ii) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); (iii) the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); (iv) the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); (v) the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); (vi) the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); (vii) the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); and (viii) the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

2.4.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS is a regional group of 15 West African states that was founded by a Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States in 1975. The main objectives of ECOWAS are to promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of the member states.⁷⁸ So far, ECOWAS has recorded several achievements in as far as regional integration is concerned. These include the abolition of visas and entry permits for member state citizens, introduction of the ECOWAS passport, introduction of the Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme to facilitate road transport within the ECOWAS region, the introduction of harmonized customs documents and the establishment of several institutions such as the Commission, the Community Parliament, Community Court of Justice as well as a host of other financial and specialized institutions such as the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Health

⁷⁸Department of Economic Affairs African Union Commission, 2008. *Status of Implementation of the Regional Integration Agenda in Africa: The Achievements and Challenges*, Addis Ababa: African Union Commission.

Organisation (WAHO), the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI).

Despite its achievements, ECOWAS has also experienced several shortcomings. For example, though formed primarily as a regional trade pact, it has taken on an increasing regional security role with the emergence of failed states in West Africa. During the 1990s, ECOWAS peacekeepers were deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and were deployed again in Liberia in 2003 after the departure of President Charles Taylor. According to Jonathan⁷⁹, in the past decade, ECOWAS has been the African RII that has been most active - although not always most effective - in the field of conflict resolution. Further despite its achievement in establishing certain institutions to aid the regional integration process, the Department of Economic Affairs, African Union⁸⁰, notes that “the strength of these institutions are yet to be seen”.

Ichim⁸¹ notes that ECOWAS was created with the purpose to become the most important international economic instrument for economic co-operation and development in West Africa. Thus, it was envisioned to achieve elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among member states and ultimately to form an economic union, of course after going through the important stages of economic integration, namely, Free-Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union. He notes further that the goal of a Monetary Union in ECOWAS has long been an objective of the organization, being intended to accompany a broader integration process including enhanced regional trade and common institutions but that although there have been

⁷⁹Jonathan, M. (2004). *African Regional Integration: A Spotter's Guide*. Available at: <http://headheeb.blogmosis.com/archives/019886.html> (Accessed on 3 December 2007).

⁸⁰Ibid p46

⁸¹Ichim, O. (2007). *Governance and Regional Integration Seminar Presentation*. Available at: <http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:NPA6zz4faycJ:hei.unige.ch/sections/sp/courses/05> (Accessed on 17 December 2007).

attempts to advance the agenda of ECOWAS monetary cooperation, political problems and other economic priorities have slowed down the process.

Bach⁸², points out that the experience of ECOWAS's first 20 years seems to indicate that ECOWAS has reached a state of paralysis in virtually every area of endeavour. For example he observes that twenty years after the 16 member states of ECOWAS signed the Lagos Charter, official intraregional trade still represents an insignificant portion of total exports. Also the plan, adopted in 1983, to create a single monetary union by 1994 had made no progress by July 1992, when the target was changed to the year 2000. Likewise the protocols on the freedom of movement, residency and rights of establishment for ECOWAS citizens have also suffered a series of setbacks since their implementation began in 1979. By 1992, the seven ratifications required to implement the final phase had still not been obtained, 2 years after the deadline.

2.4.2 Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SADC is a regional grouping of 15 Southern Africa states. SADC had a security function from the beginning. At the time it was founded in July 1979 (originally known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and later changing to SADC in 1992), apartheid South Africa was a participant in a number of regional conflicts, and the intent of SADC's founders was to provide collective security as well as reducing economic dependence on South Africa. It had its moments - for instance, when a Zimbabwe-led intervention force halted the RENAMO offensive of 1986 - but wasn't remarkably successful at either.⁸³ Since the end of the apartheid era, SADC has undergone a radical realignment, with South Africa becoming its de facto leader rather than its primary target. Among the main objectives of SADC

⁸²Bach, D.C. (1997). *Institutional Crisis and the Search for New Models in Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective*. Lavergne R. Eds. IDRC/Africa World Press, Available at: http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9349-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (Accessed on 17 December 2007).

⁸³Ibid

are to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. Other objectives include evolving common political values systems and institutions, promoting and defending peace and security; as well as strengthening and consolidating the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.

With the major regional power South Africa on board, SADC's security and economic functions have become somewhat more effective; the member states in 2007 established a standby peacekeeping force, and the organization has had some success in mediating conflicts in the Comoros and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Further, more than two thirds of SADC protocols on regional integration have entered into force and most substantive provisions of the regional integration policy are in the various degrees under implementation. For example in terms of infrastructure, SADC has made achievements in the building and rehabilitation of transport link between its members states, further with regard to trade, SADC intends to achieve a Free Trade Area by end of 2008 as well as establish a SADC Customs Union by 2010.⁸⁴

Despite its achievements, SADC also has its share of challenges. For example, since it plans to have a Free Trade Area in the cause of this year, and a Customs Union in the year 2010, it must have a strategy in order to accomplish it on time. Further, the Customs Union can only come into place only when there is a full Free Trade Area which is currently not the case. It is important to note also that within SADC there is also SACU, which is at an advanced state of integration being already a Customs Union. There is thus a need to get all the SADC member

⁸⁴Bach, D.C. (1997). *Institutional Crisis and the Search for New Models in Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective*. Lavergen R. Eds. IDRC/Africa World Press, Available at: http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9349-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (Accessed on 17 December 2007).

states to the level of that Customs Union. Some SADC member states are also members of COMESA, which plans to have its own Customs Union in the year 2008. WTO rules stipulate that countries cannot belong to more than one Customs Union at the same RII therefore posing a challenge to countries that are members of both SADC and COMESA as well as in the case of Tanzania which is already a member of the EAC Customs Union.

Jonathan⁸⁵ notes that with regard to its objective of ensuring peace in the region, SADC has been relatively timorous about flexing its political muscle; an example is the ongoing meltdown in Zimbabwe. Further, the Xenophobic attacks in South Africa where black South Africans turned against foreigners from other parts of the world and particularly from fellow SADC member states of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, goes against the SADC objective of consolidating the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.

2.4.3 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

ECCAS is a regional grouping of 10 Central African states. It was founded in 1983 with the main objective of achieving collective autonomy, raising the standard of living of its populations and maintaining economic stability through harmonious cooperation with the ultimate goal of establishing a Central African Common Market.⁸⁶ ECCAS became operational in 1985 but was largely dormant until 1998 due to lack of funds and constant conflicts in its member states which handicapped it. In the past few years, however, the ECCAS countries have begun to phase in free trade and have created a number of technical and development

⁸⁵NISER (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research) 2002 “Regional Integration and African Development: Issues and Approaches.” A Paper Presented for Panal Discussion Organized by the United National Economic Commission. United Nations Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 3-8 March.

⁸⁶Ibid

institutions. A brigade-strength standby force agreed to in 2001 has begun to get off the ground and is intended to reduce member states' dependence on mercenaries and paramilitary forces.⁸⁷

Among the main achievements of ECCAS is the creation by its member states of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) with the aim of promoting, maintaining and consolidating peace and security in Central Africa. COPAX entered into force in January 2004. The COPAX Protocol set up two important mechanisms: the Multinational Peace Keeping Force in Central Africa (FOMAC) and the Central African Early-Warning System (MARAC). According to the Department of Economic Affairs, African Union⁸⁸, however, both mechanisms have been largely ineffective. Conflicts have continued uncontrollably among ECCAS member states, while funding to the organization has shown little result.

Despite the challenges facing ECCAS, the institution continues to pursue new projects. One recent endeavour is a joint European Union (EU) and ECCAS project that is aimed at supporting the organization's Department of Human Integration, Peace, Stability and Security in fulfilling its role of detection, prevention and management of conflict within the Central African region. Other programmes being pursued by ECCAS include trade liberalization, free movement of persons, goods and capital, infrastructure development in transport and communications. Further ECCAS intends to establish a Customs Union in 2008.

Among the shortcomings and challenges facing ECCAS are perennial conflicts in its member states and inadequate funding. It is also left to be seen whether ECCAS's objective of establishing a Customs Union by this year will materialize given that its member states have not yet harmonized their common external tariff nor have they removed non-tariff barriers or harmonized their customs documents. Further, Rwanda, one of the founding member states quit

⁸⁷NIWD (The New International Dictionary) 2000 The New International Dictionary: Thesaurus. Canada: Trident Press International.

⁸⁸Ibid

ECCAS in June 2007 in favour of the EAC. Like Rwanda, Burundi also joined the EAC, leaving its attachment to ECCAS in doubt. The Democratic Republic of Congo, on the other hand is embracing membership of both ECCAS and the SADC. Withdrawals and divided loyalties pose a significant threat to the viability of ECCAS.

2.4.4 Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD)

CENSAD was created in 1998 and consists of 24 countries in the Maghreb, the Sahel and the horn of Africa. The main objective of CENSAD is to create a comprehensive economic union of its member states. Among CENSAD's achievements include its Strategy developed in 2007 which covers food security, poverty eradication, water management and desertification. In liaison with AMU and UEMOA, CENSAD has also designed a community-based programme to counteract desertification. On peace and security, CENSAD played a key role in bringing Sudan and Chad together during the Sudan/Chad conflict. CENSAD has also launched the trade liberalization process as well as the process for the free movement of people; in this regard it has developed draft conventions in Free Trade Area and convention on Common Market on Agriculture sector.⁸⁹

With Nigeria and Egypt as members, CENSAD contains two heavyweights and is a potential bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. According to Jonathan⁹⁰, in practice, however, neither Egypt nor Nigeria has been an active participant, and such programs as CENSAD has instituted have primarily been vehicles for Libyan hegemony. The CENSAD Development Bank and the organization itself are headquartered in Tripoli, and the pact's sole

⁸⁹Cobb, R.W. and Chales, E. (1970). *International Community: A Regional and Global Study*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

⁹⁰Ibid p47

regional security operation to date has been a widely criticized Libyan-led mission in the Central African Republic.

2.4.5 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA was initially established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). The PTA was transformed into COMESA in 1994 with the main objective of creating a full free trade area guaranteeing the free movement of goods and services produced within COMESA and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers with the ultimate objective of creating an economic community. With 19 member countries with a total population of US\$400 million covering an area of 12.89 million Km and a GDP of US\$230 billion, COMESA is the largest of the regional groupings in Africa.⁹¹

Among the achievements of COMESA are elimination of tariffs among COMESA countries which has resulted in the growth of intra-COMESA trade from US\$3.1 billion in 2000 to US\$6.8 billion in 2006 – an increase of 119.4 %. Further, the focus of COMESA in year 2008 is the launch of the Customs Union in December. This will be yet another step in the integration agenda after the region attained Free Trade Area status in October 2000. The Free Trade Area that initially started with nine member states has expanded to include fourteen of the nineteen member states. Of the key steps towards the establishment of the Customs Union, COMESA has finalized the elaboration of a Common Tariff nomenclature, adopted a common customs valuation system, elaborated a common commercial policy including common customs rules and procedures, elaborated a common external tariff and established a legal framework and administrative structure for the management of the Customs Union.

⁹¹Brown, M.B. (1995). *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank*. London: Penguin Books.

Despite its achievements, COMESA is faced with the challenge of ensuring that its entire member states that are not yet participating in the Free Trade Area (FTA) join the FTA before the launch of the COMESA Customs Union in December 2008. Other challenges are highlighted by El Sawie⁹², who notes that despite the COMESA Charter and signed agreements stating that member states were to eliminate all tariffs between themselves by October 1, 2000, progress reports show that only Egypt, Kenya and Madagascar have made 90% reductions so far. Other countries have not introduced any kind of tariff reductions. Further, the Secretariat of COMESA has also pointed out that gross violations by member states have occurred especially against Article 46 of the Charter, which states that no member country shall raise its tariffs on inter-trade with COMESA member states. In reality however, many countries have raised their tariffs substantially in their trade with fellow COMESA member states. Evidently, economic cooperation and integration between the COMESA member states will not be an easy task.

2.4.6 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD is a regional grouping of six countries in the Horn of Africa that was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was founded in 1986. Though IGADD was originally established for the main purpose of developing a regional approach for drought control in the region, the revitalized IGAD that was launched in 1996 was given expanded objectives of regional cooperation. Among the main objectives of IGAD include promotion of joint strategies and harmonization of macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields, harmonization of policies in trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture and natural resources, promotion of free movement of goods, services and people within the region, creating an

⁹²Ibid p10

enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic trade and investment, development of coordinated and complementary infrastructure in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region, promotion of peace and stability in the region and achieving regional food security.⁹³

Since its establishment, IGAD has recorded several achievements the main ones being establishment of effective and efficient mechanisms networks, processes, specialized institutions and partnerships for the execution of its regional activities. For example specialized institutions established include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Business Forum, East Africa Standby Brigade and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre for Monitoring and Forecasting (ICPAC).⁹⁴

Among the shortcomings of IGAD is that it has failed to achieve food security for the peoples of the horn of Africa. This can be attributed to insufficient agricultural technology, lack of low level infrastructure and lack of proper storage facilities for produce all of which are challenges that IGAD needs to work on. Further, IGAD's objective of peace and stability in the region seems to be a mirage due to the intra-state conflicts in its member states of Sudan, Uganda and Somali and inter-state conflict between its member states such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea. IGAD needs to sort out these conflicts as they derail the growth of the economies of IGAD member states. Further members of IGAD also belong to COMESA hence here is need of coherence and avoidance of duplication of objectives.

⁹³Bhalla, A.S. and Bhalla, P. (1997). *Regional Blocs: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

⁹⁴Ibid p46

2.4.7 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

AMU is a regional grouping of five Arab countries in northern Africa that was established in 1989. AMU was originally formed principally to enable its members to negotiate with the EU when it declared a single European Market and to encourage trade and economic cooperation by allowing freedom of movement across frontiers. The main objectives of the AMU treaty are to strengthen all forms of ties among member states. As well as to gradually introduce free circulation of goods, services and factors of production among them. The union proclamation states that the creation of the bloc was a step towards the eventual unity of all Arab states.⁹⁵

Among the achievements of AMU include electricity inter-connection among the five member states, establishment of a joint groundwater monitoring system for the Sahara, the Albian Aquifer Systems shared by three member states (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia) and the establishment of a Union of Maghrebine Banks in Tunis.

The main shortcomings and challenges of AMU include an absence of harmonization of standards which hampers the establishment of the proposed Free Trade Area. Further, AMU's objective to have free movement of factors of production and goods within an economic space may be difficult to achieve as the region has not harmonized its social, cultural and environmental policies. There is also tendency for some member states to be willing to sign agreements outside the same region but find it difficult to sign similar agreement amongst themselves. For example Morocco signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US in 2004 and has also signed several agreements with the European Union on economic cooperation and one establishing a free trade zone for industrial goods.⁹⁶

⁹⁵Dent, C.M. (1997). *The European Economy: The Global Context*. London: Routledge.

⁹⁶Ibid p46

The above overview of RIIs in Africa shows that all RIIs have made some achievements, however, it also reveals that all the RIIs have not effectively achieved their objectives and the speed in terms of the implementation of their programmes is still very slow. This is further corroborated by several studies that have been carried out to assess the performance of regional blocks in Africa. Among such studies are those of Foroutan and Pritchett; Ogunkola; Elbadawi; and Lyakurwa et al.⁹⁷ though the results of the studies slightly vary, the general conclusion seems to be similar; that the experience of RIIs in Africa has been a failure in achieving their objectives. Foroutan and Pritchett⁹⁸ for example observe that despite the proliferation of RIIs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the past two decades many of which were specifically created to boost trade among the countries in the region, intra SSA trade is still very limited and has hardly grown over time.

Asante⁹⁹, further captures these sentiments by arguing that although RIIs which have been established in Africa are expected to play a vital role in the socio-economic transformation of the African economies and help alleviate poverty through sustained recovery and growth, there is the striking contradiction between general emphasis on the need for economic integration in Africa and the scanty evidence of practical success. Indeed, in his view, evidence tends to suggest that to date none of the economic groupings has made any appreciable progress towards the all-engaging objective of creating a sub-regional economic market, let alone an economic

⁹⁷Foroutan, F. & Pritchett, L. (1993). Intra-Sub-Saharan African Trade: Is it too Little? in *Journal of African Economies*, 2(1); Ogunkola, E.O. (1994). *An Empirical Evaluation of Trade Potential in the Economic Community of Western States*, AERC Research Paper, Nairobi: African Economic Research Centre; Elbadawi, I. (1997). The Impact of Regional Trade and Monetary Scheme on Intra-Sub-Saharan African Trade, in *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Volume I: Framework, Issues and Methodological Perspectives edited by Oyejide, A., Elbadawi, I. and Collier, P. London: Macmillan; Lyakurwa, W., McKay, A., Ng'eno, N. & Kennes, W. (1997). Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Experiences and Issues, in *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Framework, Issues and Methodological Perspectives*, edited by Oyejide, A., Elbadawi, I. and Collier, P. Vol. 1:159-209.

⁹⁸Ibid p56

⁹⁹Asante, S.K.B. (1995). The Need for Regional Integration: A Challenge for Africa, in *Change Magazine Vol.3. No.8,9,10&11*, Dar es Salaam: Change Publications Ltd.

community, despite the human and financial resources deployed. For example, no significant progress has as yet been made on industrial and fiscal harmonization which is an important objective of the treaties establishing these institutions.

Further, the main objectives set out in the Final Act of Lagos in 1980 in the field of promotion of cooperation at the sectoral level are yet to be achieved. There is also generally a lack of harmonization of sectoral policies in agriculture, industry, transport, energy etc., and more basic studies for the formulation of such policies are urgently required. Besides, much more still needs to be done in designing and elaborating agricultural and industrial programming policies in many of the African integration groupings. Common rules governing foreign direct investment such as those concerning investment incentives are matters still under discussion.¹⁰⁰

In effect, Asante¹⁰¹, argues that the necessary policy guidelines and programmes for sub-regional industrial development have not been put in place. As a result, most integration groupings in Africa have not been able to successfully promote the establishment of major multinational industrial projects, for example. Asante thus concludes that despite great expectations, the existing regional integration schemes have still not been able to make positive steps towards achieving their pre-established goals.

The AMU has not met at the level of Heads of State since April 1994, and has in effect been paralyzed by the dispute over the status of Western Sahara, annexed by Morocco in 1975, but claimed as an independent state by the Polisario Front with Algerian backing. AMU has no working defense or conflict resolution structures. Its treaty states in Article 14: "any act of aggression against any of the member countries will be considered as an act of aggression against the other member countries", but provides no definition of what would constitute

¹⁰⁰Ibid p56

¹⁰¹Ibid p56

'aggression'. Common defense and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the partners are important aspects of the Treaty but have not been translated into practice. While disagreements over issues such as the Western Sahara still handicap cohesive regional security arrangements, the member states have been able to aid one another in response to natural disasters.

The objectives that RIIs in Africa have been mandated to achieve are noble objectives which if properly implemented have the potential of transforming the African continent into a economic and political powerhouse. It is thus imperative to establish the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of RIIs in achieving their objectives.

2.5 Conclusion

In summary, RIIs are international governmental institutions established by groups of states (often geographically close to each other and/or sharing common problems) for purposes of safeguarding or promoting issues of common interest to the states concerned. The key reasons for the formation of RIIs is the desire by states to benefit from trade creation, economies of scale, product differentiation and efficiency gains through policy coordination that follow implementation of regional integration agreements. Other reasons include desire to reduce vulnerability to external shocks induced by fluctuations, instability and uncertainty in the rest of the world, the desire by governments to bind themselves to better policies e.g. democratic policy making, desire to help neighbouring countries stabilize and prosper to avoid spillovers of unrest and population and the fear of being left out while the rest of the world is swept into regionalism.

RIIs have got several unique characteristics: they are created by way of multilateral agreements; thus in essence the membership of a RII must be derived from two or more sovereign states. Further, their establishment is voluntary in that only states which prefer to become members do so; similarly, states can terminate the membership if they wish. RIIs also

have a formal and fixed structure. They also have limited autonomy in that they have to rely on voluntary cooperation to attain their objectives. Where RIIs act directly, their authority (which is usually for strictly defined objectives) is derived from member states.

Another unique characteristic is in their fundamental mission which is the administration of cooperation between member states in various spheres. RIIs are also neutral; they come into being for the purpose of pursuing the common interest of all members and thus do not identify with the interests of only one member or group of members. Lastly RIIs have a unique multi-national workforce who are required to give up their national loyalty and only serve the interests of the RII.

Several RIIs have been established in Africa, the main ones being: the EAC; ECOWAS; ECCAS; COMESA; CEN-SAD; IGAD; SADC; and the AMU. All these RIIs are working towards some form of economic, social, cultural and political integration of their respective member states. Whereas an overview of RIIs in Africa shows that all RIIs have made some achievements, it also reveals that all the RIIs have not effectively achieved their objectives and the speed in terms of the implementation of their programmes is still very slow. The general conclusion by most scholars is that the experience of RIIs in Africa has been a failure in achieving their objectives. This is certainly a cause for concern. The objectives that RIIs in Africa have been mandated to achieve are noble objectives which if properly implemented have the potential of transforming the African continent into an economic and political powerhouse. It is thus imperative to establish the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of RIIs in achieving their objectives and possibly come up with recommendations on how they can be able to undertake their mandate effectively.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

This Chapter discusses the main conditions for successful economic integration in developing countries in general and in the IGAD region in particular. A realistic evaluation of the challenges to economic integration in the sub-region of IGAD requires the knowledge of the foundation, objectives and structure of the organization as well as the existing economic and political situations. Thus, this chapter focuses on these aspects, which are important to depict the environment of the integration arrangements.

3.1 Introduction

IGAD is one of the youngest regional organizations even in the African context. It was founded only in 1986 as a response to the severe drought and desertification in the countries of the Horn of Africa with the prodding of the UN Environment Programme and a massive publicity given to the sub-region by international media during the height of famine.¹⁰² It appears, it is the weakness of the countries in the sub-region and the conflicts among these governments that impede “even the most basic functional cooperation for many years”.¹⁰³

It was because the severe drought and famine and the economic hardship which this subregion suffered in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UN General Assembly urged the countries of the sub-region to create a regional structure within which the problem could be

¹⁰²Adam, H.M. (1992). “*An Introduction to IGADD: Comment.*” In *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan*, edited by Martin Doornbos *et al.*, 115-16. London: Institute of Social studies.

¹⁰³Lyons, T. (1998). “*Can Neighbor Help? Regional Actors and African Conflict Management.*” In *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance*, edited by Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons, 61-99. Washington D.C.: Bookings Institution Press.

addressed.¹⁰⁴ The basic documents of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) were developed by a series of experts (within and outside the sub-region) and ministerial meetings. Experts from the UN first drafted the document before it was re-adopted by the experts of sub-region.¹⁰⁵ Finally, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda endorsed the document, and signed the Agreement establishing Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) on 6 January 1986 to coordinate their efforts to fight against drought and desertification, and ensure development. Convinced that drought and desertification can be curbed effectively through development, the member states later changed the name of the organization to Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). After Eritrea got de jure recognition, it was admitted as the seventh member state at the Fourth Summit, which was held in Addis Ababa for the first time outside Djibouti in September 1993.¹⁰⁶

Countries from outside the sub-region had shown interest in IGADD, particularly some European countries and Egypt. France's interest is due to its military base in Djibouti and Italy because of historical ties with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia and it provide economic assistance.

¹⁰⁴IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification) 1986 Assembly on Heads of State and Government, 1st session. Djibouti; ESAMI (2001). IGAD Institutional Assessment. A Report Prepared by Eastern and Southern African Management Institutes (ESAMI). Arusha. IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) (1996b). IGAD Forges Regional Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) (1998b). Communiqué by the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee Meeting on the South Sudan Conflict. Nairobi; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) 1996a Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Nairobi; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) 1996d IGAD Strategy Framework. Djibouti; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), (1998c). IGAD Trade Policy Harmonization Workshop. Kampala. <http://www.igadregion.org/geninf.html>; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). (2000). IGAD's Khartoum Summit Issues its Final Declarations. Nairobi; ESAMI (2001) IGAD Institutional Assessment. A Report Prepared by Eastern and Southern African Management Institutes (ESAMI). Arusha.

¹⁰⁵Ibid p60

¹⁰⁶IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification), 1996b. IGAD Forges Regional Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti.

As Adam¹⁰⁷ points out, Egypt was very much interested in being given an observer status at IGADD meetings. This is basically because of the Nile being the life line of Egypt and water development was /is one of IGADD's objectives. This encouraged Egypt to have close relations with the group of donor countries.¹⁰⁸

At the first IGADD meeting in January 1986, despite the border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mengistu and Said Barre met for the first time and initiated a dialogue. In May 1988, IGADD was able to bring the two countries together to sign an agreement, which helped them to reduce tension after the 1977-78 war.¹⁰⁹

The preparatory phase of IGADD took four years, which ended in 1990 at its Third Summit. During the formulation period, the Authority developed a programme and plan of action, which defined three areas for its activities. These are emergency drought relief measures, medium term efforts and long-term programme. The purpose of emergency drought relief measure was to provide immediate relief and assistance to drought affected member states. The short and medium terms were geared towards the recovery from drought and its effects and toward establishing a new base for development. The long-term programme aimed at re-establishing a productive and sustainable ecological balance. In order to implement the plan of action two strategies were identified by the secretariat in 1990 namely; food security strategy and the strategy to protect the environment and combat desertification.¹¹⁰

However, little success has been achieved. This little achievement is mainly in the areas of diplomacy. In addition, the original IGADD had limited objectives and issues to address. But,

¹⁰⁷Ibid p49

¹⁰⁸Woodward, P. (1996). *The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations*. London: I.B Touris Publishers.

¹⁰⁹Yacob, A. (2000). "Predicaments of Integration in the Horn of Africa." *Economic Focus*, 28-31. Vol. 3 No. 1.

¹¹⁰Ibid p54

the change of global circumstances and the realization of forming economic grouping in the 1990s have led to the revisiting of IGADD that resulted in the expansion of cooperation beyond the narrow focus of combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought.¹¹¹

There was a belief that there should be “a political forum for consensus building on development goals and strategies and for spearheading the new approaches to sub-regional self-sufficiency and reliance on one another”, which indeed was supported by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. To this end, between, April 1995 and March 1996, two extra-ordinary summits were held in Addis Ababa and Nairobi to revitalize the organization and expand its mandate. At the Summit held on 18 April 1995, the Heads of State and Government of IGADD countries deliberated on ways and means of revising the organization to expand cooperation among their countries in all areas of endeavor, including economic, social, trade, communication, humanitarian and security. The revitalization of IGADD was required to enable the organization respond to emerging subregional challenges such as inter-and intra-state conflicts and to find a mechanism for their resolutions and to address economic problems as well as poverty through close economic cooperation and integration. In this connection, the Declaration of Heads of state and government on the revitalization of IGADD, states the following: Africa's future and challenges for promoting sustained economic growth, its prospects for extricating itself from marginalization , its ability to interact and compete in the global economy on an equal footing and its capacity to enhance the welfare of its inhabitants will largely depend on its determination and ability for pooling its considerable natural endowments and human resources through suitable and practical arrangements of cooperation.¹¹²

¹¹¹Sorenson, J. (1995). *"The Horn of Africa-States of Cisis."* In his Disaster and Development in the Horn of Africa, edited by John, 1-30. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

¹¹²Ibid p56

The Declaration further states about the need to extend cooperation among the countries of IGADD so that the sub-region plays its role in the sub-regional and continental integration as stipulated in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. On 21 March 1996, the Heads of State and Government of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda met in Nairobi and finalized the structure of the organization and adopted a new Charter that expanded its mandate. The revitalized IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Other than food security and environmental protection, it incorporates peace and security, intra-regional trade and development of improved communication infrastructure in order to enable the subregion to interact and compete in the global economy, eventually leading to regional integration.¹¹³

The interplay of internal and external forces were very important for the revisiting of IGAD; mainly the coming of new leadership in the sub-region and the change of global system. In 1991, the Derg regime was overthrown by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia and officially became independent in May 1993. Until late 1997 Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea had been cordial. In the case of Sudan, its government gave moral and material support that helped the overthrow of the Derg regime. Consequently, friendship and cooperation ties existed between the two states until 26 June 1995 when the assassination attempt was made on the life of President Hosni Mubarek in Addis Ababa. Kenya and Djibouti have had amicable relations with Ethiopia more often than not.¹¹⁴

After the coming of the EPRDF to power in May 1991, these cordial relationships between Ethiopia and Djibouti on the one hand and between Ethiopia and Kenya on the other

¹¹³ESAMI (2001) IGAD Institutional Assessment. A Report Prepared by Eastern and Southern African Management Institutes (ESAMI). Arusha.

¹¹⁴Ibid p55

had been continuing. According to Sosina¹¹⁵ relations between Ethiopia and Kenya even became solid by widening their relations in the area of trade, economic and regional issues. On the whole, it can be argued that the smooth relations that existed in the early 1990s, between and among member states of IGAD contributed to the coming together of these countries that helped widen cooperation among them. At the same time, economic crises such as the increasing debt burden and domestic conflict that beset the countries of the subregion also considered as factors that forced them to make efforts to jointly solve their problems.

The international political situation is equally important for the revisiting of IGADD. The end of Cold-War altered the old assumption of patron-client relationships based on ideology and new patterns evolved, which gave much attention to "democracy, free market and human rights".¹¹⁶ And at the same time, new pattern of regionalism developed both in developed and developing countries as a response to increasing globalization which called for forging closer cooperation. All these developments created a conducive environment for the countries of the Horn to come together to revitalize IGADD. For example, the end of confronting on the basis of ideology (communism- capitalism) helped the reduction of differences among the countries of IGADD. This, of course, necessitated the coming together by the countries under the revitalized IGAD. However, this is not to argue that there is no ideological difference between IGAD countries. The interest of Europe and the United States in regionalism can also be pointed out as a factor for the revitalization of IGADD. This was evident in their backing the process of revitalization of IGADD. Furthermore, the Abuja Treaty that set up the African Economic Community has a great influence in a revitalized IGAD.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Sosina A. (1994). *"A Synopsis of the Foreign Policy of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) Since the Adoption of the Charter in July 1991."*Ethioscope, 3-10. Vol. 1 No 1.

¹¹⁶Ibid p50

¹¹⁷Ibid p41

At its inception the OAU incorporated economic cooperation as one of its principal objectives.¹¹⁸ This resulted in the formulation of guidelines, 1980 and the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 1991: Article 6) that divides the continent geographically into North, South, East and West and envisaged each sub-region to pass through at least three stages: free trade, customs union and economic community before the final goal of establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The Abuja Treaty Establishing AEC (1991) Article 6 calls the strengthening of the already existing economic community and the establishment of other economic groupings to pass through the successive stages before the final goal of achieving the African Economic Community. Accordingly, the OAU recognized, the revitalized IGAD as a Regional Economic Community (REC) in an attempt to realize the establishment of African Economic Community.¹¹⁹

The new IGAD, which was revitalized in January 1996, has a vision based on the determination of member countries to pool resources and coordinate activities to achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through the promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intra-regional trade and development of improved communication infrastructure. It adheres to the well known principles of the OAU and the UN; namely, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue, sovereignty and equality of members' states, as well as mutual and equitable sharing of benefits accruing from cooperation.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸OAU (1963). *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*. Addis Ababa.

¹¹⁹OAU (1980). *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*. Addis Ababa.

¹²⁰Ibid

3. 2 Objectives of IGAD

The ultimate goal of IGAD is to achieve economic integration and sustainable development for the sub-region.¹²¹ In order for IGAD to play its proper role in regional and continental integration and be recognized as a suitable vehicle for promoting development in the region, Article 7 of the Agreement establishing IGAD underlines the following aims and objectives; Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macroeconomic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movements of goods, services and people and the establishment of residence; Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment.

Achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences; Initiate and promote programmes and projects for sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection; Develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure particularly in the areas of transport and energy; Promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the subregion for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue; Mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium term and long term programmes within the framework of sub-regional cooperation; Facilitate promote and strengthen cooperation in research, development and application in the fields of science and technology.

The attainment of the above objective; calls for the development and implementation of appropriate strategies in economic, social, cultural, political and environmental sectors, which in turn, commensurate with the existing capacity both at national and sub-regional level. In other

¹²¹Ibid p61

words, because of the limited capacity of IGAD and its member states, the Authority emphasizes on three priority areas; Infrastructure Development, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs, and Food Security and Environment.

3.2.1 Priority Areas

(i) Infrastructure (Transport and Communication) Development

Development of infrastructure has a great impact on the attempt to bring about sustained economic development in the sub-region. Consequently, priority is given to the development of infrastructure. This sector focuses on increased co-operation, coordination and harmonization of macroeconomic policies in trade, industry, tourism, communications (transport, by road, rail, and water) and telecommunications and the elimination of physical and non-physical barriers to inter-state transport and communication, Construction of missing links on the Trans-African Highway and the Pan African Telecommunications Network (PANAFTEL), improvement of ports and inland container terminals· modernization of railways' telecommunications services and training in grain marketing. IGAD has been trying to secure for its projects its projects owing to its emphasis on infrastructure development from external sources. But the result is not encouraging. Hence, constraint of finance resources makes the implementation of these projects difficult.¹²²

(ii) Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs.

Peace and stability are crucial for economic development. Among the list of problems that Africa encounters, conflicts must be given top and urgent attention, for without peace development is impossible. In the Horn, instability and conflicts have caused 'endless cycles' of

¹²²International Crisis Group (2007), "Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace," ICG Africa Report 124, Nairobi/Brussels, 26 April at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4791 Accessed 29 September 2010.

drought and environmental degradation which in turn, producing impediments to economic development in the sub-region.¹²³

Realizing that economic development ultimately depends on the prevalence of peace and security, the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution is enshrined in the Agreement establishing IGAD. Article 18A of the Agreement states that "member states shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress". Another priority area under this sector is to alleviate and mitigate humanitarian crisis in the sub-region. To this end member states agree; to establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; and to accept to deal with dispute between member states within the sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional and international bodies.¹²⁴

At this initial stage, three projects are pursued. These are:- Capacity building in the area of conflict, management and resolutions;- Alleviation and Mitigation of humanitarian crisis- Reactivating IGAD peace and security initiatives in Somalia and Sudan IGAD recognizes the fact the bulk of activities within the realm of conflict management should be in the field of prevention, since it is cheaper to prevent than to put out the flames of war .In order to enhance an effective mechanism for consultation in the region, and cooperation for peaceful settlement of disputes that could help respond early to conflicts the establishment of early warning system was sought. This resulted in the promulgation of the Protocol on Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for IGAD member states on 9 January 2002.¹²⁵

¹²³Ibid p62

¹²⁴Ibid p61

¹²⁵IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification) (2002). Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. Djibouti.

Some of the functions of(CEWARN include the following;¹²⁶ Promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response on the basis of timeliness, transparency, cooperation and free flow of information; Gather, verify, process and analysis information about conflicts; Communicate all such information and analysis to decision makers of IGAD policy organs and the national governments of member states; To take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to sub-regional cooperation, peace and stability.

IGAD, however, faces difficulties in implementing a conflict early warning mechanism. For example, lack of tradition of press freedom, transparency of association and information sharing in the sub-region is considered a road block. Consequently, gaining support and implementing a shared information collection and analysis system will be difficult.¹²⁷

iii. Food Security and Environment

The purpose of IGAD's policy on food security and environment protection, as stated in the strategy framework is " to ensure that all people in the IGAD sub-region have access to sufficient food at all times for a healthy and productive life without destroying the natural resources base and the environment of the sub-region".¹²⁸ In this regard, the priority projects identified are the following; Establishment of regional information system; Promotion of sustainable production of drought resistant, high yielding crop varieties through research and extension; Improvement of trans-boundary livestock diseases control and vaccine production; Promotion of environment education and training.- Strengthening environment pollution control- Capacity building in integrated water resources management; Promotion of community based land husbandry.

¹²⁶Ibid p69

¹²⁷Rusu, S. (2002). "Conflict Early Warning in the Horn of Africa: Can it Work?" The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 12-13 Vol. 20 No. 85.

¹²⁸Ibid p58

The three priority areas are interlinked with each other. For example, the maintenance of peace and security is essential for successful implementation of both food security and environment protection and infrastructure development. It is to be noted that the absence of peace and security can cause loss of opportunities and means of production, destroys food and other resources supply networks thereby causing and aggravating food shortages.¹²⁹ The development of efficient and reliable infrastructure also facilitates rapid delivery of relief services in times of disaster and fosters inter-and intra-state dialogue to solve imminent conflicts.

3.3 Structure of IGAD

IGAD is composed of four hierarchical policy organs: An Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, A Committee of Ambassadors and a Secretariat. The Assembly, consisting of Head of State and Government of member states, is the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority. It holds a Summit at least once a year and decisions of the Assembly shall be reached by consensus. The functions of the Assembly include policy-making, directing and controlling the functioning of the Authority, determining the main guidelines and programs of cooperation, giving guidelines and monitoring political issues, especially on conflict prevention, management and resolution.¹³⁰

The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of foreign affairs and other focal minister from each member state. It meets at least twice a year. The Council makes recommendations to the Assembly on matters of policy activities and approves the budget of the Authority. Decisions of the Councils are based on consensus. But, if the Council is notable to reach an agreement by consensus, decision is taken by two-third majority of members.¹³¹

¹²⁹Ibid p70

¹³⁰Ibid p58

¹³¹Ibid p58

The Committee of Ambassadors, comprising of IGAD member states' Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters, advises and guides the Executive Secretary on the promotion of his efforts in realizing the work plan approved by the Council of Ministers and on the interpretation of policies and guidelines, which may require further elaboration. The procedure of decision making of the Committee is similar to the case of the Council.¹³²

The Secretariat, the executive arm of IGAD, is headed by the Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the Assembly for a term of four years, renewable once. Some of the duties and responsibilities of the Executive Secretary include: promotion of cooperation with other organizations for the advancement of the Authority's objectives, preparation of recommendations concerning the work of IGAD for consideration by the appropriate policy organ, and negotiating with the approval of the chairman of the Council, with other countries and international organizations in order to procure financial and technical assistance on behalf of IGAD. In addition to the office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretariat comprises the following three divisions: Agricultural and Environment, Economic Cooperation and Political and Humanitarian Affairs.¹³³

3.4 The State of the Economies and Politics of IGAD Countries

The seven IGAD member states-Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, cover an area of 5.2 million square kilometers. The Sudan and Djibouti are the largest and smallest countries in their area coverage, respectively. The IGAD countries have a total population of more than 155 million and over 70% of them live in rural areas. The average

¹³²Onwuka, R.I. (1985). "An African Common Market or African Free Trade: Which Way Africa?" In the Future of Regionalism in Africa, edited by Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, 58-72. London: Macmillan Publishers.

¹³³PSSA (1997). "Poor State of Sub-Saharan African's (SSA) Debt." The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 27-29. Vol. 6 No. 39.

population growth rate, is almost 3%, is one of the highest population growth rates in the world and nearly half of the population is under 14 years of age.¹³⁴

Diversity of resource endowments, population size, climatic conditions, level of infrastructure, and ideological orientation exist among member states of IGAD. But, despite their diversity, most of them do share, in varying degrees, a number of important socioeconomic and political characteristics. The sub-region has had a historical significance and has important strategic zones like that of the Nile River, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It also possesses other common resources such as mineral ores, wild animals of various species, rivers and lakes, forests, sea ports and grazing lands. The people who live in the borders of the IGAD countries have ethnic -linguistics affinities, cultural ties and religious similarities.¹³⁵

The countries of the sub-region also share similar problems. They are classified as the least developed countries of the world. The average GNP, per capita for the period 1996-98 was less than 350 U.S. dollar. It ranges from US \$ 111 in Ethiopia to US\$ 328 in Kenya. The average life expectancy of the IGAD countries is 51.3 year in 1997. Out of 1000 live births, almost 90 infants die. This makes the countries of the sub-region one of the highest infant mortality rate in the world. The sub-region's market economies are highly concentrated on primary products. Though Kenya is better than other member states, the exports of IGAD countries are not well diversified. Their exports include coffee, cotton, livestock and oilseeds and pulses. Recently, the Sudan has begun producing oil and gas for export. The oil industry picks up to 180,000barrels /day and is expected to rise to more than 200,000 barrels /day in the recent future.¹³⁶ Their import includes food, petroleum, transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods.

¹³⁴Ibid p58

¹³⁵Ibid p62

¹³⁶CRS 2002 Country Report: Sudan. (1st Quarter) London: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Even though the countries of the sub-region are highly dependent on the exports of primary goods, they have not been even able to feed their population. According to Yohannes¹³⁷, this is mainly because of lack of adequate investment in research, education, land conservation, rural road and related development infrastructure. In addition, the industrial sector in the sub-region is not yet fully developed. Thus, the contribution of industrial products is insignificant and it accounts to a very small per cent of work production.

Another characteristic of IGAD countries, which is very relevant to integration, is the small margin of their trade with each other. In fact, trade among countries of the sub-region is insignificant, which stood at 3% in the 1980s. The production of similar primary products by almost all member states resulted in the lack of material basis for exchange of commodities among themselves. As a result the main origins of imports and destination of exports of the countries of the sub-region are Europe and the United States.¹³⁸

From the standpoint of economic cooperation and integration, political conditions of the subregion are equally serious. The sub-region is politically unsettled. No country in the subregion is without internal strife, conflict and/or war. In this connection, African Center for Development and Strategies (ACDESS)¹³⁹ identified triple -typological classification of African countries in terms of political conditions. These are countries engaged in armed conflict or civil strife, countries in several and prolonged political crisis and turbulence, and countries enjoying a more or less stable political condition. At the end of 1998, no country in the IGAD sub-region

¹³⁷Yohannes, H. (1993). "Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration Prospects for Development in the Horn of Africa: The case of Eritrea and its Immediate Neighbours." In *Emergent Eritrea: Challenges of Economic Development*, edited by Gebre Hiwot Tesfagiorgis, 3-15. Trenton: Red Sea Press.

¹³⁸Maruye, A. (1992). "The Refurbishing and Expansion of Trade Networks in the Horn of Africa." In *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan*, edited by Martin Doornbos et al., 115-16. London: Institute of Social studies.

¹³⁹Adedeji, A. (1999). "*Comprehending African Conflicts.*" In his *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts*, 3-21, London: Zed Books.

was enjoying a fully peaceful political condition. While Djibouti was in severe political crisis and turbulence, the rest of IGAD member states engaged in armed conflict or civil strife.

Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in two major wars in 1964-65 and 1977-78. The latter war was intensified due to the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰ The territorial claim between Somalia and Ethiopia as well as Somalia and Djibouti has not yet settled in any final form. Ethiopia and Eritrea whose 30 years long civil war ended in 1991, again involved in an interstate war in 1998. Sudan and Eritrea have been engaged in occasional fighting since particularly 1998. Somalia, in 1991, fragmented into warring states. In the northern part, Somaliland declared independence. Yet it does not get international recognition. 'Islamic fundamentalist' forces are also active in Somalia with potential threat to neighboring states. Still no central government exists in Somalia. In Djibouti, the government battles against the Afar-based Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD). The Sudan has also been fighting with SPLA since 1983.¹⁴¹

Moreover, relations between and among the IGAD member states are marked by mistrust, suspicion, and uncertainty. For example, in spite of the hostility cessation agreement signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea, they have remained suspicion of each other. Similarly, Uganda and Sudan recently agreed to make efforts to improve relations, there are, however, accusations and threats from both sides. The mutual suspicion and mistrust among IGAD countries have also resulted in a reciprocal of conflict. Though it is often 'ferociously denied, Eritrea, Uganda and Ethiopia, individually and surreptitiously jointly", have intervened in Southern Sudan.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰Gorman, R. (1981). *Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

¹⁴¹Ibid p63

¹⁴²Ravenhill, J. (1985). "The Future of Regionalism in Africa." *In The Future of Regionalism in Africa*, edited by Ralph I Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, 205-24. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

The causes of conflict include the combination of the legacy of colonialism, neocolonialism (the working of the international political economy), internal political and economic distress, corruptions, maladministration, ambitions of regional character and super power rivalry.¹⁴³

Famine, drought, desertification and deforestation have been characteristic of this region. Along with war, famine and desertification have made the sub-region the largest movement of refugees and displaced persons to be found in the world.¹⁴⁴ In an attempt to redress these problems and stimulate a high level of development, countries of the sub-region indebted themselves and borrowed from bilateral and multilateral sources. However, rather than mitigating, it magnifies the already existing problems. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit¹⁴⁵, the total debt burden of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda is estimated to be 280 millions, 242 million, 5.5 billion, 16.1 billion and 4.1 billion U.S dollar, respectively in 1999. To make matter worse, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed by World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on African countries, which focused on austerity measures, currency devaluation and termination of social services, only aggravated the crisis that was supposedly being mitigated.

¹⁴³Patman, R.G. (1990). *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

¹⁴⁴Harbon, J.W. (1991). "The International Politics of Identity in the Horn of Africa." *In Africa in World Politics*, edited by John W. Harbenson and Donald Rathchild, 119-43. Colorado: West View Press.

¹⁴⁵CR (2001). Country Report: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti. London: *The Economist Intelligence Unit*.

CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRATION IN THE INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

This chapter analyzes the economic arena in the individual member states and the region as a whole; weak states strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or establish a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth. Finally, in the social domain, they fail to meet the basic needs of their populations by making even minimal investments in health, education, and other social services.

4.1 Introduction

Regional integration is a multidimensional process. That is to say, besides economic considerations, it involves cultural, social and political aspects. Likewise, the success of regional integration depends on a combination of social, economic and political factors. Four main conditions are considered for successful regional integration. One is that there should be at least economic management in the regional bloc.¹⁴⁶ This would help increase the bargaining power of the sub- region and make the dynamic gains from regional blocs (i.e. enlarged size of the market and economies of scale) more likely to occur. A second consideration is the need for promoting and developing an efficient regional security system in order to improve intra-regional trade and facilitate the movement of people and idea. The third is that the commitment of the participating governments to empower the institutions and involve the grassroots and private sector is required

¹⁴⁶Bhalla, A.S. and Bhalla, P. (1997). *Regional Blocs: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

for the realization of the objectives of the scheme. Thus, there is a need for commitment on the parts of the participating governments to implement the projects, honour financial contribution and cede power to the sub-region. A fourth consideration is the need for the existence of stability, compromise, tolerance and political harmony among the members.¹⁴⁷

The issues involved in this Chapter are interrelated and their expositions complicated. Thus, each of the following section and sub sections should not be taken in isolation but should be seen as part of a whole. Furthermore, the conditions that are necessary for successful integration are drawn from past experience of different regional grouping.

The goal of IGAD is to achieve regional cooperation and economic integration through promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intra-regional trade and development of improved communications infrastructure. As clearly indicated in the IGAD Strategy Framework,¹⁴⁸ its vision in the future is as follows: The sub-region has the required natural and human resources that could be developed and propel the sub-region to collective self-reliance where peace and security prevails. The vision is based on determination of the governments of the sub-region to pool resources and coordinate development activities in order to face the present and future challenges, enabling the sub-region to interact and compete in global economy on behalf of its inhabitants, eventually leading to regional integration.

On the whole, IGAD is expected to play an important role in the socio-economic transformation of the sub-region's economies and directed towards the achievements of the establishment of the African Economic Community. Here the key questions are: to what extent IGAD has realized its goal? What are the main internal and external challenges to the attempt to

¹⁴⁷Mosha, Felix G.N. (1998). *"An Era of Stability for Africa's Integration and Transformation."* EIIPD: Occasional Papers, 3-13. Vol. 3 No. 8.

¹⁴⁸Ibid p61

economic integration scheme in the sub-region? This Chapter attempts a critical assessment of the performance of IGAD.

4.2 The influence of economic management on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

IGAD itself was the product of external assistance as a response to the severe drought and famine in the sub-region. And at the initial stage member states relied heavily on the financial and technical assistance of the Western states and their institutions. For example, the initial funding was made available by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, and the basic documents of the organization were first developed by experts from outside the sub-region.¹⁴⁹ Thus, further recourse to external agents or ‘partners’ such as Western governments and their International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was and has been seen as ‘normal’ by the member states of IGAD.¹⁵⁰ The result has been the increasing dependence of the members of the sub-region on the developed countries of the West. It can be argued that the low level of development strengthens the chains of dependence, making national and regional policies highly vulnerable to external environment. Dependence here is defined as the increasing attachment and /or reliance by the IGAD member countries upon the Western countries and their institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, whether political, economic and financial, and cultural nature or a combination of all these aspects. Though these aspects of dependence are interrelated this section emphasizes economic and financial dependence.

¹⁴⁹Ibid p62

¹⁵⁰ESAMI (2001). *IGAD Institutional Assessment*. A Report Prepared by Eastern and Southern African Management Institutes (ESAMI). Arusha.

4.2.1 The Challenge of International Economic Relations

One of the most glaring reflection of Africa's in general and the sub-region of IGAD's economic weakness is the small size of domestic market and the low volume of trade among them. This has led to the intensification of Africa's in general and the IGAD sub-region's dependence on external market and supplies. In this connection, the changing face of international relations that began in the 1980s, along with the trend towards the creation of more integrated trading blocs, have not only revived interest in regionalism in Africa and other regions of the world, but they have also posed some formidable challenges to the promotion of regional or sub-regional integration in Africa and African development as a whole. In this regard, Danso¹⁵¹ points out that: The end of the Cold War also marked increased concern for the marginalization of the African continent. Africa's share in the world economy fell to below 2 percent by 1985, its terms of trade fell by 40 percent since 1980s, and the poverty level has catapulted while incomes per head have plummeted by 20 percent since 1980 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is further argued that: Among others, the impact of the end of Cold War which has made the developing countries no longer of geostrategic interest to superpowers and the substantial implications of the Uruguay round are factors that marginalize African interests. According to Shaw¹⁵², by the mid-1990s "African's political economy and political culture have transformed from economic and political colonies to political without economic independence." Since, the IGAD sub-region is within the African continent, the arguments presented by the

¹⁵¹Danso, K. (1995). "The African Economic Community: Problems and Prospects." *Africa Today*, 31-55. Vol. 42 No. 4.

¹⁵²Shaw, Timothy M. (1995). "*Africa in the Global Political Economy at the End of the Millennium: What Implication for politics and Policies?*" *Africa Today*, 7-30. Vol. 42 No. 4.

above writers have direct bearings on the socio- economic situation of the IGAD member countries. This remains the great challenge to effective economic integration of the subregion.

4.2.2 The Challenge of Trading Blocs

The increasing tendency towards the establishment of larger, stronger and more cohesive trading and economic blocs, as one of the most striking features of the existing economic relations, either between developed or developing countries of the world, constituted a major challenge to Africa.¹⁵³ Generally, the African integration scheme seems to be on the losing side in the unfolding of trading blocs. In this connection, it is argued that: The economic implications of trading blocs, especially Europe 1992, for Africa are more crucial and more widely understood because of historical, geographic and political reasons. Africa trades for more with Europe than any other area of the world. Therefore, the implications of Europe 1992 for Africa are more significant... than the implication of similar existing trading blocs elsewhere in the world.

It can be argued that the completion of a Single European Market (SEM) in 1992 could affect the traditional relations of African countries with the EU without much opportunity of equal value being offered in return. That is to say with the shift in the world trade regime towards global liberalization and away from generalized and selective preferences, there not appear to be much space afforded to support preferences for African countries in general and the IGAD countries in particular.¹⁵⁴

Moreover, the regional blocs such as NAFTA and APEC may constitute a challenge to Africa, in particular since they now contain some of the most dynamic economies in the world. For example, the emergence of NAFTA in North America and APEC in the Pacific Rim and

¹⁵³Ibid p56

¹⁵⁴Ibid p56

their possible extension the rest of their neighbours with the objective of achieving free trade and open trade in their respective region in the near future, is likely to diminish Africa's access to export commodity markets by raising the average level of further substitution for Africa's commodity exports and impose losses in terms of trade, higher costs of imports and reduced export earnings from those markets.¹⁵⁵

4.2.3 The Challenge of the Lome Convention /Cotonou Agreement

The subsequent Lome Convention (the first in 1975) has an impact on the future of the EU African cooperation in general and the EU- IGAD countries' relations. The major problem arises as the decades of privileged relationship have not brought about development nor solved structural problems.¹⁵⁶ The IGAD countries remain trapped in processes of economic decline, adjustment, debt and poverty. More importantly, it has been argued that the problem of economic integration in Africa is compounded by the external orientation of the African states and the tendency towards Euro-African integration rather than pan-African or intra-IGAD integration, particularly in area of intra-African economic and trade penetration.¹⁵⁷

In African countries the impact and image of the Lome Convention (Cotonou Agreement) are more problematic. It tends to generate further inequalities rather than development. It is further argued that: Structural problems such as debt and community prices are not addressed: trade preferences are eroding, aid budgets are shrinking and subjected to a multitude of conditionalities. Thus, although the Lome Convention celebrated its twentieth birthday in February 1995, yet for many African states, the instrument is still 'a mystery', whose potential

¹⁵⁵Ibid p54

¹⁵⁶Amin, S. (1996). "On the Origins of the Economic Catastrophe in Africa." *In The Underdevelopment of Development*, edited by Sing C. Chew and Robert A. Denmark, 200-16. California: Sage Publications.

¹⁵⁷Ibid p82

both in the realm of aid and trade, remains largely untapped. More serious, however, is the impact of Lome on the process of African economic cooperation and integration.¹⁵⁸

Some also hold the view that African and EU economic and political links through the Lome Convention /Cotonou Agreement perpetuate and institutionalize neo-colonial links at the expense of the collective self-reliance of African states (Martin, cited in Danso, 1995:48).¹⁵⁹ Shaw contends that the future of inter-African trade is “unlikely to increase much, other than through smuggling and the black market, until the continent escape from its colonial heritage of North-South links and produces goods with markets on the continent as well as outside.”¹⁶⁰

To conclude, although greater economic self-reliance is a necessity for the regional integration schemes in Africa, as it enables them to escape from the historic dependency on industrial countries in Europe and facilitates their development, the successful implementation on this strategy within the Lome framework remains problematic. Cotonou represents a vertical Euro-African orientation, while IGAD and other sub-regional groupings in Africa reflect an interest in horizontal South-South links. Thus, it can be argued that the North-South relations reflected in Euro-Africa (or IGAD countries) links remain a challenge to the process of integration in the sense that it hinders great autonomy.

4.2.4 The Challenge of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)

Promotion of regional economic integration and implementation of the IMF and the World Bank mandated (SAPs) are considered the two strategies of the response to problems facing Africa in the 1980s. The two strategies, however, have been pursued independently of

¹⁵⁸Ibid p56

¹⁵⁹Ibid p80

¹⁶⁰Ibid p80

each other. While SAPs are national responses to national economic crisis and are implemented without regard to their regional consequences, economic integration is a joint effort by groups of contiguous countries to come together with a view of forming large markets.¹⁶¹ Of course, one critic has noted that: “Every country is thinking as an individual, with all its individual adjustment conditionalities. If integration is to be realized, all countries have to streamline their economies and tackle adjustment as a single unit.”¹⁶²

In this connection, Asante has rightly remarked that; Regional elements are missing from the adjustment programmes designed for Africa, as it is indeed a national concern with priority put on macroeconomic policies. Not only are structural adjustment policies designed and implemented at the national level: the aims of SAPs, which are macroeconomic can only be measured correctly also at national economic level.

It is further argued that “Consequently, not only do programmes fail to explore collective or regional reform responses in spite of the general recognition that African countries suffer from broadly similar problems; they also tend to over look development and transformation objectives such as sustained growth, collective self-reliance or regionalism. The approach of SAPs therefore, tends to lead African governments and people to overlook the existence of potentially important partners-regional and sub-regional organizations and local communities.”

In the same vein, Kidane and Logan¹⁶³ contend that SAPs do not encourage collective self-reliance; “rather they produce reliance on external source of growth and thereby, exacerbate the malintegration of African economies with the global economy. In addition, macroeconomic

¹⁶¹Daddieh, C. (1995). “Structural Adjustment Programmes and Regional Integration: Compatible or Mutual Exclusive?” In *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustment and Alternatives*, edited by Kidane Mengisteb and B. Ikubolajeh Logan 243-72, London: Zed Books.

¹⁶²Ibid p83

¹⁶³Kidane, M. and Logan, B.I. (1995). “Conclusion.” In their *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustment and the Alternatives*, 226-42. London: Zed Books Ltd.

policy reforms requiring expenditure cutback mandated by SAPs lead to reduced consumer demand which lowers trade in general. Furthermore, the quest for balance of payment equilibrium will tend to favour hard currency exports and reduce priority for self sufficiency, both of which will favour exports outside the region”. It can thus be argued that the adoption of the World Bank and IMF stabilization and structural adjustment measures can pose a great challenge to the efforts by the Africa states in general and the IGAD countries in particular towards the attainment of the goal of economic integration.¹⁶⁴

4.2.5 Aid, Debt and Economic Integration

The aid projects that make headline do not add much to the welfare of the developing countries.¹⁶⁵ It is argued that aid is not an essential ingredient of development. This is not to deny, for example, one could find that aid given in telecommunication sector may have helped to remove bottleneck in communication. However, aid cannot be justified from this concept. Great self-reliance is a necessary condition for regional integration in Africa as it enables them to escape from the historic dependency on the developed countries and facilitates development. Viewed from this point, aid works against the viability and strength of sub- regional economic integration in Africa in general and in the IGAD sub-region in particular. Two decades ago Onyemelukwe warned: “Projects aid in the way they are administered, cannot add to the objective of rapid economic take-off in the underdeveloped countries.”¹⁶⁶

More importantly, as some writers¹⁶⁷ contend, aid has sapped people’s energy, initiative, creativity, and enterprise and substituted the superficial and ‘irrelevant glitz’ of imported advice. Moreover, aid “ has created a moral tone in international affairs that denies the hard task of

¹⁶⁴Ibid p83

¹⁶⁵Onyemelukwe, C.C. (1974). *Economic Underdevelopment: An Inside View*. London: Longman Group Limited.

¹⁶⁶Ibid p85

¹⁶⁷Hancock, G. (2001). *Lords of Poverty*. Nairobi: Camerapix Publishers International; ibid p85

wealth creation and that substitutes easy handouts for the rigours of self-help". Hancock argues that Africa contains many lessons from the aid lobby. He notes: Since the IGAD sub-region is within the continent of Africa, the above argument is relevant to the sub-region.

Apart from the economic and political arguments, aid has an impact on Africa's development in that it can alter the entire psychology of a people in the direction of mental impotence. In this connection, Onyemelukwe has rightly remarked that: The problem linked with the psychology of aid tends to undermine the very essence of economic development by building up the attitude" that someone else is better qualified and can do it for me' amongst the recipients. This remains a major challenge to pursue the policy of self-reliance which is the one of the main rationale for economic integration.

It is further argued that aid and grants are being used, not for development, but to repay creditors in the North.¹⁶⁸ African governments are transferring wealth to rich creditors. This has led to the neglect of basic social needs such as health, sanitation, education and water provision. For example, though Uganda is at the center of an AIDS epidemic, its government spends only 1.69 Pound per person on health and 19.00 per person on debt repayment to rich creditors.

According to the Economic Intelligence Unit¹⁶⁹ in 1999, the total external debt of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda was estimated to be 280 million, 242 million, 5.5 billion, 16.1 billion and 4.1 billion U.S. dollar, respectively. The consequence of this debt burden, among others, include the following: The neglect of spending on health, sanitation, education and water provision; cutbacks in imports and infrastructure investment-which harm

¹⁶⁸PSSA. (1997). " Poor State of Sub-Saharan African's (SSA) Debt." *The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa*, 27-29. Vol. 6 No. 39.

¹⁶⁹Ibid p75

productivity and contribute to declining national income; the inability to change the structure of production from primary products to products with greater added value.¹⁷⁰

4.2.6 Dependence on External Funding

As mentioned earlier from its inception, IGAD has not been in a position to financially maintain the organization's personnel, let alone the priority areas. The Organization has totally relied on IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) for implementations of the projects.¹⁷¹ As Daddieh argues, external sources of financing would only exacerbate Africa's vulnerability to external pressure and cooperation. This greatly affects negatively the attempt to effective economic integration in Africa in general and in the IGAD sub-region in particular.¹⁷² In this regard, Yacob remarked that: IGAD's dependence on outside resources for the maintenance of the organization and functioning of its activities has been one of the fundamental predicaments.¹⁷³ The potential significance of self-help and cooperation at the sub-regional level could not materialize with the unsustainable hopes and funding promises from outside sources. IGAD, as rightly identified by the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) report, "has compromised sustainability by its external overdependence". This remains a great challenge to an attempt to effective integration in the sub-region of IGAD.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰Ibid p59

¹⁷¹Tekeste, G. (1997). *"The Role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Sub-Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration in the Horn of Africa."* A Paper presented at Conference on Economic Integration and

Transboundary Resources, Addis Ababa, 8-11 September, 1996.

¹⁷²Riddel, J.B. (1992). " Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa." *The Journal of Modern Africa*, 53-68. Vol. 30.No.1.

¹⁷³Ibid p62

¹⁷⁴Shaw, T.M. (1995). "Africa in the Global Political Economy at the End of the Millennium: What Implication for politics and Policies?" *Africa Today*, 7-30. Vol. 42 No. 4.

4.3 The influence of member states political will on the success of regional integration within Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

According to Asante “if a government is unwilling or unable to play an active positive role, then the government itself can be considered a barrier to development or a fundamental cause of failure of policy orientation. This is particularly evident in the case of regional cooperation and integration where the most crucial factor is strong and sustainable political commitment to keep to the agreed regional agenda. This makes the African political leaders key figures in cooperation and integration. It is their decision which determines the role of regional organizations and institutions, as well as that of the private sector...Hence; the establishment of effective sub-regional economic schemes crucially depends upon the extent to which the member states have committed themselves to the concept of regionalism in Africa.¹⁷⁵

With regard to commitment, IGAD countries like most of African countries have been unable to articulate minimum conditions for cooperation. Yet three important issues for success are left unsolved in Africa. These are: how much to cede to the regional body, how to incorporate regionally adopted policies into national programmes, and how to meet the human and financial resource commitments.¹⁷⁶ This holds true also in the case of IGAD countries.

4.3.1 Lack of Supernationality

To begin with, like most of economic integration arrangements in Africa, IGAD is intergovernmental organization devoid of power to enforce decisions over its constituencies. IGAD has a supreme organ that comprises Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministries, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Secretariat and the Secretariat is appointed by

¹⁷⁵Ibid p62

¹⁷⁶Kimuyu, P. (1999). “Regionalism in African Development.” *In The African Economy Policy, Institutions, and the Future*, edited by Steve Kayizzi -Mugerwa, 172-84. London: Routledge.

Heads of State and Government.¹⁷⁷ This structure is "top heavy and cumbersome" that resulted in the increased level of politicization of the one man organization pattern (Kifle, 1995:30). In this connection, Nomvete¹⁷⁸ contends that the follow up of decisions taken at subregional meetings is left to Heads of State or to few ministers and to civil servants in the ministries dealing with cooperation matters without the involvement of the rest of the population. He further argues that people even do not know that there is a treaty establishing the cooperation arrangements.

As the case in most of regional groupings in Africa, this is an inhibiting factor to an attempt to integration in the IGAD sub-region. In other words, integration in the sub region lacks a strong supranational authority. The supreme policy-making organ of IGAD is the Assembly consists of Heads of State and Government and a decision is reached by consensus. This allows governments to avoid a loss of sovereignty through unilateral decisions on the applications of regional agreements. Consequently, IGAD lacks the power and hence the leverage on governments.¹⁷⁹ And this remains a roadblock to integration process in the sub region of IGAD.

The lack of political will on the parts of the participating governments is also reflected on their reluctance to give executive independence to the Secretariat in the running and management of the institution.

As Nomvete points out, the problems of management of secretariats of the economic cooperation institutions in Africa are administrative in nature, but arise from policies passed by governments. He further contends: Reluctance by member states to give chief executives independence in staff recruitment and the management of the secretariats, and the tendency of some countries to force candidates on the secretariat and to listen to complaints from staff

¹⁷⁷Ibid p61

¹⁷⁸Nomvete, B. (1997). " Regional Integration in Africa: A Path Screwn with Obstacles." *The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa*, 17-25. Vol. 6. No. 39.

¹⁷⁹Ibid p61

members who are their nationals about the management of the secretariats.¹⁸⁰ As a result, some officers of the secretariats become more loyal to ministers in their home countries or their ambassadors in the host country of the secretariat than to the institution through its chief executive.

Moreover, the secretariats of the regional groupings, composed of international civil servants who have sworn to be faithful to the treaty but who are answerable to the Council of Ministries, made up of incumbent ministers, and members' states are too weak to enforce the organization's view point.¹⁸¹ This argument seems very relevant to the case of IGAD. Most officers are loyal to their governments than to the institution. This has become one of the hurdles to effective integration in the sub-region.

4.3.2 Lack of Commitment to Incorporate Regional Policies into National Programmes

Commitment by governments to incorporate regionally adopted policies into national programmes is crucial for effective integration. However, this is not the case in Africa in general and the IGAD sub-region in particular. As some writers¹⁸² argue, member countries of regional groupings in Africa are individually developing their own strategies, plans and priorities while declaring their commitment to regional economic integration. This has led to the mismatch between national and regional economic policies. In particular, Kifle contends that: Since independence, African countries have proposed economic integration as a desirable objective in itself as well as an indispensable means for ensuring their national economic development.¹⁸³ However, despite several efforts, progress to that end has remained limited. A principal reason for this poor performance is that African governments have followed mostly national policies

¹⁸⁰Ibid p88

¹⁸¹Ibid p74

¹⁸²Ibid p56, Kifle, W. (1998). "Economic Integration in Africa." *Ethioscope*, 7-12. Vol. 3 No. 2.

¹⁸³Ibid p90

designed to achieve national objectives while at the sometime they endeavor to pursue common policies towards common objectives.

This has led to the lack of harmonization and coordination of national policies at the regional or sub-regional level. Even though " African countries continue to speak of collective action for economic integration, no single country has as yet designed its national plans to be consistent with the promotion of effective integration for development".¹⁸⁴ This argument seems valid also in the countries of IGAD sub-region. Consequently, the lack of commitment to harmonize national and regional policies remains a challenge to effective integration.

4.3.3 Lack of Resources Commitment

The lack of commitment has also been reflected in tardy payment of budgetary contribution and a low level of participation in meetings. To begin with, the finance of IGAD is unenviable. As of the end of January 2001, the total arrears owed to the secretariat of IGAD alone stood 2,347,201 US dollar. Article 14 (c) of the Agreement Establishing IGAD stipulates that any member state that is in arrears for the preceding two years and above is not able to speak and vote at experts and policy organs of IGAD and is not allowed to present candidates for managerial positions at the secretariat. But this is not put into practice.

This adversely affects the attempt to economic integration in the sub-region of IGAD. Let alone carrying out its expanded mandate, IGAD is not able to financially maintain the organization's personnel. In this regard, Tekeste,¹⁸⁵ the then executive secretary of IGAD, reports at his termination of office the following: On numerous occasions there were threats to our services by service providers to interrupt them due to our arrears. During the past year [1999] we borrowed for 9 months from the Bank to pay salaries by making staff gratuity and donor fund

¹⁸⁴Ibid p56

¹⁸⁵Ibid p68

as collateral. All other expenses were kept to a minimum. Travelers were exclusively financed by partner's funding.

What is more, the lack of commitment, by the participating governments is manifested itself in the different meetings. For example, in most of the meetings of the Heads of State and Government, Uganda was represented by its foreign minister. Duplication of membership is also a hurdle to the attempt to sub regional integration. Some IGAD member states (Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan) are also member of the Arab League, which has incompatible interest with the aspiration of some other member states particularly Ethiopia. In this connection, As Walwal, some years ago argues: The Sudan's commitment to regional cooperation in the Horn remains questionable. Through its own cooperation policies, which have tilted towards pan-Arabian, or in more recent years towards Islamic fundamentalism, the Sudan had failed to strike an external balance between its commitment to African and to the Arab-World.¹⁸⁶

Kenya and Uganda have also become members of the revived former Eastern African Community. What is more, IGAD member states, are members of different organizations which have similar functions that range from Kenya's forty-five to Djibouti's fourteen. Such duplication of functions create constraints in the integration process in that they, in the first place, lead to conflicts over mandates and divided loyalty among government and secondly, they impose heavy financial and administrative burdens on individual government.¹⁸⁷ This works against integrational scheme in the IGAD sub-region.

¹⁸⁶Walwal, S. (2006). "Introduction: *Requisites for Viable Integration*." In his Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and Prospects, 3-20. New York: Frederick A Praeger.

¹⁸⁷Ibid p90

4.3.4 Poor Communication among the Partners

What is harder to see is whether growth causes infrastructure or infrastructure causes growth. But it is generally recognized that the link works both ways. Despite the ambiguity about causality, it seems clear that inadequate infrastructure is a major barrier to growth and poverty reduction, particularly because it lessens competitiveness and impedes market integration.¹⁸⁸ Since the IGAD governments have committed themselves to seeking rapid integration of their economies and expansion of intra-trade as promulgated in the Agreement Establishing IGAD (Article 7) there is a great need to develop transport and communications which is, according to the IGAD Strategy Framework, essential to achieve sustained Economic Development of the sub-region.¹⁸⁹ Thus, harmonization of macroeconomic policies and programmes in the infrastructure sector including the harmonization of transport and communications policies and the removal of physical and non-physical barriers to interstate transport and communication have been viewed in the Strategy Framework as a priority area of cooperation. Yet, not much has been achieved. Still intra-regional communication is poor.

To begin with, there is no adequate social and physical services such as adequate roads, railways, airways, sea ways which connect the countries of the sub-region. This makes the effort of economic integration very difficult. In this connection, in an interview held with the Reporter, the current Secretary General of IGAD, Dr. Atalla Hamed Al-Beshir, states the following: The region is also very compartmentalized. If you want to go from Djibouti to Eritrea, though it is just across the border, you might have to go through Paris or Nairobi. Instead of flying half an hour, you fly ten hours. If you want to go from Kampala to Sudan, you have to go through

¹⁸⁸World Bank (2000). *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Washington: The World Bank.

¹⁸⁹Ibid p61

Nairobi or Addis Ababa, flights that only leave a week. This contributes to making the region very compartmentalized and integration difficult: poor roads, little aviation, and no sea route.

All IGAD countries have very poor transport system (road and railway) maintenance records. According to the reports of IGAD expert's workshop, which was held in Addis Ababa in April 1998, the main reason for this is "poor government policies and insufficient allocation of funds for maintenance". IGAD has been trying to secure funds for its projects owing to its emphasis on infrastructure development from its 'partners', particularly EU.¹⁹⁰ The result, however, is not encouraging. It only increases the dependence of IGAD countries on the developed world.

Thus constraint of financial resource remains the basic challenge to effective economic integration in the sub-region of IGAD. Moreover, though the IGAD Charter emphasizes promotion of regional trade and gradual harmonization of policies and removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to inter-state trade, transport and communications, there are barriers to the intra-regional trade. These are: major differences in tariff rates among member countries, use of different custom declaration documents, cumbersome administrative procedures, different legal interpretation of insurance claims, restriction of foreign exchange allocation, imposition of unilateral bans and discriminative procedure at points of entry/exist.¹⁹¹ This weakens the process of economic integration in the sub-region of IGAD.

The challenge to effective integration is also reflected in the poor records of intra-trade in the sub-region of IGAD. Some years ago, writers like Babu argued that there was no material basis for exchange as almost all states were producers of similar primary products; and trade among countries in the Horn of Africa were insignificant, which stood at about 3% in the

¹⁹⁰Ibid p61

¹⁹¹Ibid p61

1980s.¹⁹² It is further argued that: Official trade between neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa has been stagnating and even declining over the years. In addition, the composition of this trade has remained basically unchanged. Constraints on the expansion of trade in the sub-region can be seen as political, economic, institutional and also physical.

This argument is still valid. Inter-trade among states of the sub-region is still nascent and at its primary level while the North is still the main trading partners, and raw materials are the main exports. Political differences between countries and political instability within countries in the sub-region are partly responsible for the low level of official trans-border trade in the sub-region.¹⁹³

Poor communication among the members of IGAD is also manifested in the lack of common currency. Three decades ago Robson argued that effective integration demanded the use of common currency. He pointed out that the use of common currency would help in settlement of payments among governments and people and promotes intratrade and investment. Yet all countries use their own currencies: Djibouti Shilling, Eritrean Nakfa, Ethiopian Birr, Kenyan Shilling, Somali Shilling, Sudanese Dinar and Ugandan Shilling. This is a roadblock to effective integration in that it retards the achievement of a free flow of goods and services, capital movements and unilateral transfer.¹⁹⁴

Economic constraints on the expansion of intra-regional trade are attributable to the existing structure of production.¹⁹⁵ There is a clear divergence between supply and demand patterns among neighboring countries. All the countries in the sub-region are mainly primary

¹⁹²Babu, A.M. (1992). "An Introduction to IGADD: Comment." *In Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan*, edited by Martin Doornbos, et al., 116. London: Institute of Social Studies.

¹⁹³EIIPD (1998). *Economic Integration in the IGAD Sub-region*. Addis Ababa: International Institution for Peace and Development (EIIPD).

¹⁹⁴Robson, P. (1968). *Economic Integration in Africa*. London: George Allen & Union Ltd.

¹⁹⁵Ibid p74

producers while the demands are manufactured goods and capital. This limited demand for raw materials, which is a reflection of their low level of development results in production geared largely toward export to developed countries outside of Africa.

Moreover, institutional constraints on regional trade are manifested itself in the lack of information on regional demands and of marketing institutions). This has led to the low level of trade in the IGAD sub-region. In addition, labour and capital movement in all regions of Africa in response to economic incentives had remained negligible.¹⁹⁶ These limited trade links among member states of IGAD restrict the foundation on which regional economic integration scheme between them have been based.

4.4 The influence of security on the success of regional integration within Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

It seems to me rather obvious that one cannot think of effective economic cooperation, let alone of integration among countries, if relations among states are not underpinned by modes of behavior that foster mutual trust and mutual confidence. In the absence of normal and predictable relations among nation states whereby all subscribe to principles which constrain them from engaging in activities which create lack of confidence in others, there can hardly be the necessary foundation for a healthy relations among those states, let alone those states being able to develop the common capacity for solving problems that might arise with regard to the proper and fair utilization of Transboundary resources.¹⁹⁷ Conflicts constitute one of the greatest challenges currently facing IGAD. No country in the sub-region is without internal strife, conflict and/or

¹⁹⁶Ibid p88

¹⁹⁷World Bank (2000). *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Washington: The World Bank.

war. From the political point of view, it can thus be argued that an attempt to economic integration in the IGAD sub-region is far from success.¹⁹⁸

4.4.1 Intra-State Conflict

The sub-region of IGAD is characterized by internal strife, conflict and/or civil war. To use the words of Shaw, the sub-region "is viewed as being in a state of crisis, the crisis is also that of the state itself".¹⁹⁹ In the early 1990s, two entities- Eritrea and Somaliland were created though the latter has not yet got formal international recognition. The rest of Somalia disintegrated because of a war between factions and is now going into an eleventh year without a central government capable of enforcing civil order. Almost in all other IGAD member states, there are also opposition forces that are fighting against the regime in power.

Since independence in 1956 Sudan has been in civil war in most years of self rule. It was only for the period between 1972 and 1983 that Sudan achieved relative peace. Starting from the 1950s the government had been fighting against the Anya Nya movement until 1972. In 1983, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was created by assimilated former Anya Nya.²⁰⁰ Since then Sudan has been in civil war.

The thirty years of long civil war in Northern Ethiopia ended in 1991. Yet it has barely recovered from civil war. For example, the government is fighting against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) have put up an armed opposition to the regime in power. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and other opposition forces have been operating against the Eritrean government. In Djibouti, the Afar-based Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) battles

¹⁹⁸Hansson, G. (1999). "The Political Economy of the Horn." *In The African Economy: Policy, Institution, and the Future*, edited by Steve Kayizzi -Mugerwa, 248-63. London: Routledge.

¹⁹⁹Ibid p80

²⁰⁰Ibid p62

against the government. The Islamic party of Kenya has been engaging in subversive activities against the Kenyan government.²⁰¹

It is to be noted that these domestic conflicts have negative impact on inter-state relations among the countries of the IGAD sub-region. As it is argued, no civil conflict in Africa can be considered solely as an internal domestic affair. It is further asserted that: most African governments, faced with a war in a neighboring country, know that it is only a matter of time before they feel the consequence themselves, whether in terms of refugees, or destabilization, or inflow of armaments. Another consequence of war is that it has a tendency to spill over boundaries. Africa's wars have also of been magnets from criminality, and these plagues easily infect neighbors, whether directly involved or not.²⁰²

This argument is very relevant in the case of the IGAD sub-region as the domestic and regional security problem is interdependent. As Tafese points out “the domestic structure of states and policies and the attitudes of their decision-makers have significantly oriented their regional policy goals and diplomatic activities”. Consequently, such conflicts offer a challenge for IGAD member countries to work together for pursuing their common goal of development.²⁰³ To use the words of Tafese such conflicts “virtually inhibited attempts at least, at some sort of a *modus vivendi*.”

²⁰¹CRK (2002). *Country Report: Kenya*. (1st Quarter) London: The Economist Intelligence Unit; CRS (2000). *Country Report: Sudan*. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit; CRS (2002). *Country Report: Sudan*. (1st Quarter) London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. CRU *Country Report: Uganda* (1st Quarter). London: The 2001 Economist Intelligence Unit. CRU (2002). *Country Report: Uganda* (1st Quarter). London: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

²⁰²Inter-Africa Group (2002). “*Peace and Security Dimensions of the African Union*.” A Paper Presented for Panal Discussion Organized by the United Nations Economic Commission. United Nations Conference Center, Addis Ababa, 3-8 March.

²⁰³Tafese O. (1998). “*Resources, Conflicts, and the Need for Cooperation in the Horn of Africa*.” *Ethioscope*, 24-28. Vol. 4 No.1.

4.4.2 Inter-state conflicts

There is no a single country in the IGAD sub-region that is not engaged in conflict with at least one of its neighbours. For example, relations between Sudan and Uganda remain poor, largely because of Uganda's support of the SPLA and Sudan's links to Ugandan rebel groups, such as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF).²⁰⁴ Sudan's relations with Eritrea have also been marred by repeated border incidents since 1993. The Sudan government has supported Eritrea's opposition groups like that of Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). In turn, Eritrea has provided assistance to SPLA. Sudan has been in conflict with Kenya particularly over the sovereignty of territory on the Kenyan side of the Kenyan-Sudan border, known as 'Elemi-triangle', which is believed to contain substantial deposits of petroleum. Sudan's relations with its neighbor (Ethiopia), also characterized by conflict. Ethiopia's accusation of Sudan of its exporting Islamic ideology to the region and Sudan's suspicion of Ethiopia's support to SPLA can be cited as examples of conflicts between the two IGAD member countries.

Similarly, though the scale of conflict differs from one case to another, Ethiopia was/has been in conflict with Djibouti (over the use of port), with Eritrea (over boundary and economic reasons), with Kenya (over boundary and other issues) and with Sudan.²⁰⁵ The same holds true as far as Eritrea's, Djibouti's and Kenya's relations with their immediate neighbors is concerned. Such inter-state conflict "have eclipsed the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between and among the states in the sub-region".²⁰⁶

Domestic conflict has affected inter-state relations in the IGAD sub-region. Inter-state rivalries and suspicions have also helped fuel the civil war within the sub-region. In most cases,

²⁰⁴RSWASS (2001). *Regional Survey of the World: Africa South of the Sahara 2002* (31st ed). London: Europe Publications.

²⁰⁵Ibid p97

²⁰⁶Ibid p62

the inter-state and intra-state conflicts are interwoven and there are a number of instances “where the opposition forces operate in alliance with the host states and with their commissioning”.²⁰⁷ Such situations create mistrust, suspicion and lack of confidence among member states of IGAD and this offers the greatest challenge to effective economic integration in the subregion.

4.4.3 Role of IGAD in Resolving Conflicts

Convinced that economic development ultimately depends on the prevalence of peace and stability, IGAD introduced, inter alia, conflict prevention, management and resolution as additional priority areas for the sub-region. Its objective is to play a more visible and pro-active role in conflict prevention and in maintaining peace by contributing to the restoration of existing conflicts.²⁰⁸ This is, however, far from success.

IGAD's peace initiative on the Sudan and Somalia has stalled since the mid-1990s. In September 1995 negotiation between the Sudanese government and the rebels were initiated under the auspices of IGAD, with the aim of resolving the conflict in southern Sudan. These were subsequently been reconvened periodically. In 1998, IGAD was able to bring the two sides to reach an agreement on basic principles. Under the agreed principles, the government conceded that the predominantly non-Muslim south is to be allowed to hold a self-determination ballot to decide if it wishes to be independent or to remain part of a confederal Sudan.²⁰⁹

However, there remain a significant number of obstacles that must be addressed before any single negotiation forum could be formed, let alone a peace deal concluded. These include differences on the definition of what constitutes South Sudan, divergences over the relationship of religion and state, the definitions of the water areas of the mineral rich country should be

²⁰⁷Malwal, B. (1992). “*Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in the Horn of Africa.*” In *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan*, edited by Martin Doornbos *et al.*, 6-12. London: Institute of Social Studies.

²⁰⁸Ibid p61

²⁰⁹Ibid p61

included as part of the South Sudan, who should be allowed to vote and what options the ballot should offer.²¹⁰

As it is argued, "the difficulties in reaching a framework within which these issues could be negotiated are compounded by the divergent interests of the regional players".²¹¹ Egypt and Libya came with their own peace plan which did not support a vote on self-determination in the south that could lead to southern independence, mainly because Egypt "fears the impact such a move could have on the security of its water flows through the Nile". Moreover, while the Arab countries have been linked closely with the Arab, Islamic government in Khartoum, the African states of IGAD have allied closely to the SPLA due to ethnic differences and political allegiances. This has paralyzed IGAD's peace initiative.

IGAD has also been trying to broker a lasting peace between factions in Somalia. Yet it has not been able to bring all factions into a round table (and more importantly the peace initiative is compounded by the divergent interests of the regional players as in the case of the Sudan.²¹² As mentioned elsewhere in this section, almost all IGAD countries engaged in an inter-state conflict. However, IGAD has not been able to broker such conflicts. As Yacob argues: "IGAD does not have the clout and the necessary abilities to deal with the inter-state and intra-state conflicts."²¹³

IGAD adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (IGAD, 1996a: Article 6A). This limits the effectiveness of the Organization in charging the mandate entrusted in it. Moreover, the IGAD conflict management action is limited in the sense

²¹⁰Ibid p61,97

²¹¹Ibid p97

²¹²Ibid p97

²¹³Ibid p62

that it does not pass binding solutions. It only appeals and urges to the disputing parties to refrain from further action without passing binding resolution.

4.5 Conclusion

To summarize, as clearly indicated in the opening citation in this section, in the absence of normal and predictable relations among countries that guarantees mutual trust and mutual confidence, it is unthinkable to attain effective cooperation among states, let alone economic integration. The evidence on the ground indicates that relations between and among the countries of IGAD sub-region have been characterized by mutual mistrust suspicion and uncertainty. Today's amicable relations might be reversed overnight. Such insecurity and instability remains a great challenge to the attempt to economic integration in the sub-region of IGAD for some time in the future. To use the words of Hansson, "from the political point of view, the prospect of successful regional integration in the Horn of Africa is even remoter."²¹⁴

With at least 14 currently existing RECs and most countries belonging to at least two of them, regional integration within IGAD is a very complex and confusing affair, what Alves, Draper and Halleson characterize as "a spaghetti bowl that hinders regional integration by creating a complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements". As documented in many studies, multiple and overlapping memberships in RECs have created a complicated web of competing commitments which, combined with different rules, result in high costs of trade between African countries, in effect undermining integration. Multiple and overlapping memberships occasion resource and effort wastage due to duplication/multiplication of effort. It complicates harmonization and coordination among member states and according to the ECA: "tends to muddy the goals of integration leading to counterproductive competition

²¹⁴Ibid p96

among countries and institutions”. Political and strategic reasons are cited as the overriding motivation for this multiplicity of memberships within IGAD.

The well-acknowledged issue of multiple and overlapping memberships makes regional integration costly, inefficient and ineffective. It complicates Africa’s trade and economic relations with the rest of the world, as for example evidenced the within IGAD. Many analysts believe that overlapping memberships in RECs cause complications and inconsistencies due to conflicting obligations and divided loyalty. In fact, the lack of progress or success of African integration schemes has been attributed in part to conflicting interests brought about by overlapping memberships in several RECs such as within IGAD. Such overlaps mean *inter alia*: RECs adopt different sectoral harmonization models and policies, thus creating dilemmas for countries leading to delays in implementation of region-wide program objectives; Competition for resources poses a dilemma for development partners; Complexities arise in the legal and financial structuring of cross border regional projects where participating countries belong to different RECs with different legal systems.

It has been suggested that countries would deliberately seek membership to several groupings with the hope of maximizing the benefits of integration and minimizing losses by spreading risks. In the case of economically weaker countries, this reason may be a strong incentive for aligning to several integration blocs. There has been considerable dialogue to address the issue of multiple memberships resulting in clearer definitions of mandates, objectives and responsibilities. However, the use of coordination mechanisms including the AEC/RECs protocol; memorandum of understanding; regular exchange of information and joint programming is limited. Moreover, such mechanisms are not legally binding and lack benchmarks to ensure coordination objectives are met.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional integration attempt in the IGAD sub-region is far from success. There are a number of challenges that militate against the attempt to effective integration in the sub-region of IGAD. The economic dependency status of IGAD countries, the poor performance of infrastructure and communications development, lack of political commitment on the part of the participating governments, the mistrust, suspicion and lack of confidence among the member states, among other things, are the major ones.

The study was guided by the hypotheses that; Governance influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Security influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Economic management influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Accordingly, these hypotheses were tested and the findings elaborated in the foregoing discussion.

The study concludes that regional blocs in most of the developing countries consist of weak states with limited size of national and sub-regional markets. Their low level of development may not allow much market expansion through regionalism. The dynamic gains from regional groupings-the enlarged size of the market and economies of scale - are unlikely to occur if the countries involved are very poor (having small market size and low per - capita income). It is, thus, proposed that at least one of the partner countries in the bloc should have a reasonably big market to enable the reaping of economies of scale at a regional level.

A larger number of participating countries are also thought to be conducive to an economically successful economic integration. Larger regional integration arrangement membership will lead to a stronger international negotiating position in the world affairs. Regional arrangements that consist of larger members and 'big brother' are important for successful integration scheme. These assist them to extract economies of scale at a regional level and to enhance the strength of the regional groupings in international status and global bargaining power in the new trade system. While the success of economic integration in developing countries depends in part upon the perception of both poor and rich partners to be benefited from participating in collective action, the existence of 'big brother' and larger partners depends at the same time in part also on the efficient performance and effective support of the transport and communication sectors and harmonization of coordinating efforts of the partner states.

The study also concludes that regional transport and communication networks within most sub-regions of Africa are either obsolete or dilapidated or are virtually non-existent. Yet without adequate and efficient transport and communications, infrastructure economic integration, particularly market integration is difficult to take place. The weak infrastructure linkages (such as transport, telecommunication, information sharing), for example, limited the prospects of enhanced economic and trade cooperation in SAARC and ECOWAS. Hence, governments should concentrate, as a first step, on the development of adequate transport and telecommunication infrastructure, training and research, control of foreign investment and transfer as a *sine qua non* for economic development in general and for the expansion of intra-trade in particular.

In addition to the development of transport and telecommunication infrastructure, the study concludes that encouraging social interaction and communication among people are also important conditions not only to intra-African trade *per se* but also to economic integration in general. Frequent contact and communication will lead people to know one another better and hopefully, abandon stereotypes and caricatures of one another. Thus, for economic integration to succeed, social barrier (immigration rules, for example) should first be relaxed and lead to the formation of common set of rules and beliefs in the long-run. Transport and communication are important conditions for successful regional integration. Most importantly, regional economic schemes should not be based on liberalizing trade where the major need is not for consolidation of existing production according to comparative advantage, but must be based on creating the basis for trade and promoting development of such programmes and projects as transport communication and telecommunication infrastructure, training, research, and promotion of social interaction.

The study concludes that as one of the important pre-conditions and features of successful integration is the political will for closer cooperation, a strong political commitment is required to advance towards common objectives. In this regard, three important issues for success are needed: ceding power to the regional body, meeting the human and financial resource commitments made and incorporating regionally adopted policies into national programmes.

Willingness to cede their sovereignty by the partners is essential for a successful integration scheme to exist. In this connection, the European Union offers the most advanced example. The lesson is that strong and independent institutions, which are endowed with sufficient decision making powers, sufficient amount of resources and clear mandate, are

required for effective integration scheme. The commitment is not only required at the initial stages but it must be sustained over a long period. In this regard, the most remarkable feature is the irreversible nature of progress accomplished. That is, politicians could not easily backtrack on the progress made. Though regional policies are formulated at the regional level, the responsibility for implementation rests with the various national governments. Thus, there is a need for the existence of coherent policy between the national and sub-regional or regional programmes.

The study further concludes that, member states of an integrative scheme need to develop planning capacity and tools that would enable the national and regional programmes to complement each other in terms of planning, management and implementation. Adopting a coherent policy framework and a consistent strategy that attempts gradually to eliminate the mismatch between national and regional policy objectives is essential for effective economic scheme.

There cannot be a dynamic regional cooperation if a national government in any African region pursues policies that create obstacles to the free movement of resources or that destroy incentives for people to work hard or to invest. Successful regional integration would depend on the extent to which there exist national and sub-regional or regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity to stimulate and manage efficiently and effectively the complex process of integration. Weak national institutions may seriously hamper effective cooperation and integration.

Economic cooperation and integration has little chance of contributing to economic development and structural change without concerted efforts of the participating states to coordinate their sectoral plans and programmes as well as their overall development strategies and

perspectives. Hence, for an economic integration scheme to be effective, regional economic relations must be given a central role in the activities of governments, which offers commitment to incorporate agreements reached by integration scheme in national plans.

The study concludes that security issues created by tension and conflict in most of developing countries was and has been major prohibitive factor in an accelerated process of integration. Serious political disagreements and disputes over territory and other issues led to the failure or break up of many well functioning groupings. In East Africa, the ideological differences between Kenya and Tanzania on the one hand, and personal differences between Nyerere and Amin, on the other hand, with the combination of other factors resulted in a constant friction and misunderstanding among the members of EAC and eventually the collapse of the Community in 1977.

The study also concludes that stability is an essential precondition for successful integration. In this regard, the higher the level of domestic stability and the greater capacity of key decision makers to respond to demands within the irrespective political units, the more likely they are to able to participate effectively in a larger integration unit. Hence, for effective economic integration, relations among member states must be normal and predictable, which guarantee peace and stability in the sub-region.

Finally the study concludes that, what needs to be underlined is that the factors for successful integration are interconnected and cannot be seen in isolation. For the attainment of regional economic scheme, at least most of the conditions should be fulfilled.

The following hypotheses were confirmed by this study; Governance influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Security influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa

by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Economic management influences the success of regional integration in Eastern Africa by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Recommendations

For effective economic integration to exist in the sub-region of IGAD, the following issues need to be given due attention. First, the economic dependency status of IGAD countries is one of the factors that works against the viability and strength of the sub- regional economic cooperation and integration. Thus an approach should be devised for the sub-region to the relationship between the individual states and the regional bodies and curtail external influence. In this regard, the following should be taken into account:

Take measures to address the weak production structures with virtually no intersectoral links, that is, between the primary and the secondary sectors in general and between agriculture and industry, between mining and manufacturing, in particular. Thus, the revitalized IGAD should also give priority to production and devote substantial resources to production integration in order to reduce excessive external dependence and critical lack of production capacity. It is to be noted that the veritable gains of Africa's self-reliance will be derived from the integration of the productive structures.

Harmonization of national efforts to improve agricultural productivity and restructure industrial production to rely more on domestic rather than on imported inputs are major components of cooperative programmes that IGAD ought to promote in order to have significant impact on the development of member states.

No serious development endeavor and integration programme can be exclusively based on foreign assistance. As Orakwue puts it; “real, lasting, positive and sustained development in

Africa can only be created by Africans, of all classes, themselves. No one else has the motivation or the interest." Thus, a step towards strengthening the institution to have enough autonomy and own resources to undertake the tasks assigned to it should be taken. A significant progress towards self-financing mechanism that guarantees a regular and sufficient flow of resources needs to be devised. For example, the origin of self-resource can be a percentage of duties levied on goods traded within the sub-region and originating from outside the sub-region, mobilizing funds from people and different organizations, encouraging people to contribute voluntarily, and a specific tax for economic integration purposes and other possibilities.

Decades of African's relations with the Western countries and their institutions have not brought about development nor solved structural problems; rather it prevented the establishment of mutually beneficial economic ties among African States. Thus to minimize the impact of the European Union and other potential trading blocs and be able to participate and compete in the global trading system, Africa in general and the IGAD sub-region in particular are required to de-link their historical colonial and neo-colonial links with Europe and North America and encourage a South - South relationship.

A larger number of participating countries are thought to be conducive to successful regional integration in that it will lead to a stronger international negotiating position in the world affairs. To this end, the inclusion of new membership such as Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda can be proposed. Secondly, the development of adequate transport and telecommunication infrastructure are very crucial for effective economic integration in the sub region of IGAD. Therefore, continued support for and intensification of concerted efforts towards the development of such sectors are required. In this regard, harmonization and simplification of customs union are important.

Thirdly, another important point is that regional integration needs to be approached from a wide variety of angles: cultural, social and economic. Thus, the success of economic integration requires the combination of cultural, social and political aspects. Such inextricably linked should serve to facilitate the achievement of the economic objectives of integration scheme. Hence, measures such as removal of visa requirements for the citizens of the sub-region, promoting cultural exchanges through organizing seminars, workshops, conferences and student and researcher exchanges, establishing sub-regional cultural and economic information centers and research institutions can serve as mechanisms for people to "know each other better and hopefully, abandon stereotypes and caricatures of one another". Such measures, in addition to strengthening intergovernmental relations, promote "people to peoples" interaction.

Fourthly, governments are required to involve the different section of people (students, civil and professional associations, academicians; political parties and other local nongovernmental organizations) in the process of economic integration. The involvement of these groups will help successfully implement the integration process.

Moreover, governments should encourage private sectors to participate in the sub-regional economic activities. For example, private sectors should be encouraged to participate in the establishment and development of road, railways and maritime shipping. Such measures will strengthen the economic integration process.

More importantly, whatever regional integration scheme is to exist in the sub-region of IGAD, its success basically depends on the will and commitment of those directly involved, and especially of the top political leaders. Therefore, Heads of State and Government in the Horn of Africa should be committed to advance integration towards common objectives. It is not enough

to have a strong motivation in the initial stages. The commitment must be sustained over a long period of time. And politicians should not easily backtrack on the progress made.

Finally, integration is best developed in a climate of trust and confidence among nations and their populations. One way of stimulating this ambiance of harmony, as Kiefe points out, is capitalizing on commonalities and promoting equality in diversity. Enlightened leadership is bound to lead the way in such efforts. Moreover, the mechanisms of prevention conflicts should be enhanced and culture of tolerance should be promoted. To this end, governments must commit themselves to peace by the development of institutions such as fair courts that facilitate negotiation and resolution of conflicts.

It is also important to consider what Kiefe has suggested: plan polices on shared transboundary resources, like international rivers, lakes, etc; strengthen bilateral links, which in turn provide a basis for multilateral cooperation and make short-term compromises in the interest of long-term goals and benefits.

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