UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ISLAMIC STATE AS A THREAT TO GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISMS USED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

BY

JOEL MWANGI KIHANGA

R51/67293/2013

SUPERVISOR:

DR. SHAZIA CHAUDRY

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

21ST SEPTEMBER 2015

DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other University.

Sign   Date

í í í í í í í í í í í í . .   í í í í í í í í í í í í .

JOEL MWANGI KIHANGA

R51/67293/2013

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor**.**

Sign   Date

í í í í í í í í í í í í .   í í í í í í í í í í í í ..

DR. SHAZIA CHAUDRY

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family members and friends for the support they have given me throughout my education.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis was only possible with the assistance and support of many people in university staff, family members and friends. First, I thank my supervisor Dr. Shazia Chaudhry for her guidance and thorough advice on the topic and for helping me to focus the direction of this thesis, many excellent suggestions, and her insistence on cutting excessive detail. I now know and appreciate the importance of brevity.

To my fellow post graduate students, thank you for your camaraderie, helpful discussions, and comic relief. I still remember all the discussions we had in class as we sharpened our teeth to serve the society. The program was one of the most important formative experiences in my life and most of all; I give thanks to the Almighty God who gave me strength and good health while doing this.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN: The United Nations

AU: African Union

EU: European Union (EU)

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

U.S: United States

QAP: Al-Qaøida on the Arabian Peninsula

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

AMZ: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

AQI: Al Qaeda in Iraq

ISN: Islamic State News

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

NCTC: National Counterterrorism Centre

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The greatest and gravest dangers to international security and peace is no longer military threats from rival great powers but transnational threats emanating from the world⌀s most poorly governed countries. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the emergence of a terrorist threat with global reach in the form of Al Qaeda, the first decade of the new millennium marked a low in the number and severity of armed conflicts worldwide. This situation has blossomed and become more threatening in comparison to the last decade. The purpose of the study was to investigate mechanisms employed by international community in managing Islamic states. It was guided by the following objectives: To investigate the evolution and continued growth of Islamic state and its effect to international peace and security, to investigate the strengths of Islamic states as a threat to global peace and security and to investigate challenges faced by international community in managing Islamic states. Owing to the nature of the research study, qualitative research design was employed. With reference to qualitative literature review, a number of existing literatures were used for this purpose, consisting mainly of reports and studies from the UN, research institutes and NGOs, articles, journals, internet, reports, theses, and archives among other sources and media accounts. Findings revealed the international community is pursuing a policy to reduce the financial resources available to the Islamic State focuses on disrupting IS revenue streams, limiting the group⌀s access to formal financial systems, and imposing sanctions on the group⌀s senior leadership and financial facilitators. The international community also has imposed sanctions against Islamic State officials and their external financial backers. The Department of the Treasury designated 12 individuals for their role in soliciting funds, procuring military equipment, and recruiting foreign fighters, two of whom are based in Syria and are associated with the Islamic State. The study concluded that U.S. military options should be evaluated in this broader context. Ultimately, U.S. military options should be deployed in the service of a broader political and diplomatic strategy. A more aggressive U.S. military posture in the absence of a deeper, coherent strategy is unlikely to bring Syria closer to resolution, improve humanitarian conditions, or minimize regional spillover. In fact, such involvement could exacerbate the situation. Moreover, greater U.S. military involvement in Syria must be assessed not only in terms of whether it would bring Syria closer to resolution. The impact of military engagement must also be measured on an Arab world that is fraught with tension and in the midst of destabilizing change. Across the region-from North Africa to Egypt to the Levant and the Gulf-U.S. engagement has been met with suspicion and at times, outright hostility. Policy makers and military planners therefore must also assess the impact of greater U.S. military engagement on this volatile region more broadly. The study recommended that the air strikes campaign should be complemented with the creation of a national guard in Iraq that includes representatives of the country⌀s Sunni as well as Shia communities, in order to prevent the Islamic State from playing on Sunni grievances, and with the strengthening of the only remaining moderate opposition coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria, the Southern Front.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

The greatest and gravest dangers to international security and peace is no longer military threats from rival great powers but transnational threats emanating from the world's most poorly governed countries.[1] According to Metcalfe, poorly performing developing countries have become porous in the form of terrorism, weapons proliferation and other dangers which threaten international peace and security. This new focus on weak and failing states represents a shift in how these states are perceived by the rest of the world as regards to peace and security. This new threat perception has quickly become conventional wisdom globally, hence threat to international peace and security. Scholars, governments, and the media have associated poorly performing developing nations to a vast range of threats to global security and well-being, from international terrorism to international crime, regional instability, humanitarian catastrophes, global pandemics, mass migration and environmental degradation.[2]

According to Liza the international community has made efforts to bring peace and stability back to Islamic states, mostly in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA).[3] Political wrangles in the region and internal wars as currently being experienced in these Islamic States have not only resulted to humanitarian crises but to also international concerns on security and peace. Islamists in these countries have become part of the largest terrorism networks in the world and have in the last decade continued to kill civilians in different countries, thus causing chaos, and reducing peace and security which have been enjoyed for the last recent years. Terrorism has been a menace to mankind for two millennia, but in recent decades it has become a pressing domestic and international security problem.[4] The Security Council for instance condemned explicitly in the strongest terms these perturbing terrorist attacks and regarded õsuch acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and securityö.[5] From a peace and security point of view, the current political situations in majority of the Islamic

---

[1] Wilkinson, P. (2006). Terrorism and the liberal state.

[2] Metcalfe, B. D. (2006). Exploring cultural dimensions of gender and management in the Middle East. *Thunderbird International Business Review*, *48*(1), 93-107.

[3] Liza B. D. (2008). Women, management and globalization in the Middle East. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *83*(1), 85-100.

[4] Varku, R. (2009). *Terrorism as a Threat to Peace. Review*, *48*(1), 90

[5] Ibid

States have resulted to internal wrangles and developing of Islamists extremists which when combined make these states a threat to international peace and security.

Islamic state is a type of government, in which the primary basis for government is the enforcement of shari'a, dispensation of justice, maintenance of law and order. [6] According to Zamani-Farahani, and Henderson Islamic State is a radical Islamist group which has seized territory across northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. [7] From the early years of Islam, numerous governments have been founded as "Islamic." However, the term "Islamic state" has taken on a more specific modern connotation since the 20th century. Today, one of the most serious threats to peace and security that have engulfed a large portion of the Middle East is the emergence of the Sunni Muslim extremist group, infamously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).[8] However, Wiktorowicz states that after capturing a sizeable territory in Iraq and Syria, the group changed its name to Islamic State (IS). The main objective behind the inception of this dreaded armed group was to establish a caliphate, or an Islamic state, based on Sharia law, across the world.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the emergence of a terrorist threat with global reach in the form of Al Qaeda, the first decade of the new millennium marked a low in the number and severity of armed conflicts worldwide.[9] This situation has blossomed and become more threatening in comparison to the last decade. In addition, the phenomenon has become more expressive of this trend that the increase in inter-state conflict, which was once the dominant pattern of war, has become more common in Islamic States. [10]

In the past three to five years the events in Islamic States have given serious reason to reconsider the apparent gains in peace and security at the international level. The effects of the

---

[6] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). *The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state power in Jordan*. SUNY Press.

[7] Zamani-Farahani, H., & Henderson, J. C. (2010). Islamic tourism and managing tourism development in Islamic societies: the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia. *International journal of tourism research*, *12*(1), 79-89.

[8] Ali, A. J. (2012). The Islamic work ethic in Arabia. *The Journal of psychology*, *126*(5), 507-519.

[9] Hickson, D. J., & Pugh, D. S. (Eds.). (2005). *Management worldwide: The impact of societal culture on organizations around the globe*. Penguin Uk.

[10] Briscoe, I. (2014). *Conflict, security and emerging threats*. Chapter for the Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014. [Online] Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Conflict,%20security%20and%20emerging%20threats%20-%20Ivan%20Briscoe.pdf accessed on 11th july 2014

Arab Spring and its impact on regional peace have compelled scholars and security experts to reconsider their position on the issue of peace and security and the threat these states have not only at the domestic, but at the international level. Brutal, intractable, high-casualty conflict has returned, most evidently in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Palestine as well as Somalia and Sudan.[11] Furthermore, it has done so in a way that often eludes the efforts of mediators and military and peace operations to end conflict, bypasses the mechanisms of the international community, and underwrites new forms of threat projection and displacement. Internal/home based terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) have resulted to internal wars with governments which have resulted to humanitarian crises, in addition to threating peace, security and order in these regions.

According to Sundararajan, and Errico findings recent conflicts, however, have been accompanied by far greater horizontal splintering between fighting groups.[12] Researchers internationally have found that globalized Islamist extremism has prompted the emergence or consolidation of new fronts for armed violence.[13] More importantly, Islamic extremist groups and franchised jihadist activities has thus grown ever closer to zones of existing conflict and tension and particularly to populous lower to middle income countries.[14] Therefore, political change coupled by extremism in Islamic states has contributed to increased concern on international peace and security hence the question what Mechanisms does International Community apply in Managing Islamic States? In addition the questions arise a) what factors have led to evolution and growth of Islamic state? B) How does Islamic impact global peace and security? What are the challenges faced by international community in managing Islamic states?

1.3 Objectives of the Study
1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to investigate mechanisms employed by international community in managing Islamic states.

---

[11] Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (*third edition). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[12] Sundararajan, V., & Errico, L. (2014). *Islamic financial institutions and products in the global financial system: Key issues in risk management and challenges ahead* (Vol. 2). International Monetary Fund.

[13] Al-Harran, W. (2013). *Islamic Finance: Partnership Financing*. Pelanduk Publications.p.23

[14] ayeb, M. (2012). Islamic revival in Asia and human resource management. *Employee Relations*, *19*(4), 352-364

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives that guides this current study were:

1. To investigate the evolution and continued growth of Islamic state and its effect to international peace and security
2. To investigate the strengths of Islamic states as a threat to global peace and security
3. To investigate challenges faced by international community in managing Islamic states

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review is categorized in parts: The Islamic state, the tactics employed by the Islamic State, the concept of international peace and security, Ways in which Islamists groups threaten international peace and security and provides ways in which they can be managed.

1.4.1 The Islamic state

By October 2014, the self-declared ─Caliphate‖ of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, also known as The Islamic State, was in control of territory stretching from North of Aleppo to South of Baghdad and including the cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.[15] About six million people on either side of the Syria Iraq border were living under its rule. !The Islamic Stateøs control of territory depends on alliances with various local actors, primarily Sunni tribal groups, members of Saddam Husseinøs army and intelligence services, and other casualties of the Shia-dominated governments of Bashar al Assad and Nouri al Maliki.[16] Nonetheless, The Islamic State has demonstrated a comprehensive approach to its accretion of land, taking over areas held by weaker adversaries, regardless of their political stance or sectarian belief, as well as areas that provide resources, such as oil, water, and wheat. According to Samad, and Hassan longer-term strength of Islamic State relies on it maintaining its alliances while it deepens its own independent levers of power.[17] It has to strike a balance between governing

[15] Akkizidis, I. S., & Khandelwal, S. K. (2008). *Financial risk management for Islamic banking and finance*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

[16] Ali, A. J., & Al-Owaihan, A. (2008). Islamic work ethic: a critical review. *Cross cultural management: An international Journal*, *15*(1), 5-19.

[17] Samad, A., & Hassan, M. K. (2009). The performance of Malaysian Islamic bank during: An exploratory study. *International Journal of Islamic Financial Services*, *1*(3), 1-14.

by fear and governing by consent in order to achieve sustainability, especially as international action against it becomes more determined.[18]

According to Hassan [19] Islamic State attempts to draw its legitimacy from religion. Even a self-declared Caliphate must project a strong ideological-religious appeal, and The Islamic State taps into the widespread belief of Salafists that the Muslim world can and should return to the simplicity and unity that they imagine existed in the earliest days of Islam. While the ideological appeal of The Islamic State, both inside and outside Iraq, draws on a narrative common to global terrorism that the governments in the Muslim countries of the Middle East are corrupt, irreligious, and heavily influenced by the United States and other Western powers - unlike al Qaeda, it is more immediately focused on violent revolution in Muslim majority countries than on attacking their Western sponsors.[20] In order to achieve both the revolution within the Islamic world and the purist government that The Islamic State advocates, it exacerbates the political fault line within Islam between Shia and Sunni traditions of belief.

Its most active supporters are generally insufficiently knowledgeable about their religion to challenge the distortions of Islam preached by the ideologues of The Islamic State. They accept at face value the justifications provided for the widespread murder and absolutist style of government that are its hallmarks. Their individual motivation for joining has more to do with the dynamics of a social network that provides direction, identity, purpose, belonging, empowerment and excitement, than it does with religious understanding. The Islamic State also offers an opportunity for potential recruits all over the world to join something new, and to leave behind unwelcome baggage from the past.

1.4.2 The Islamic State Tactics

According to Mutalib and Kua tactics employed by Islamic State are the tactics of insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare.[21] Most of its core leadership, many of whom are ex

---

[18] Ibid p.12

[19] Hassan, A. (2009). Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalam. *The Journal of Risk Finance*, *10*(1), 23-37.

[20] Haddad, Y. (2002). ―Islamists and the ‗Problem of Israel': The 1967 Awakening‖, *Middle East Journal* 46 , p.263.

[21] Mutalib, H., & Kua, E. H. (1993). *Islam in Malaysia: from revivalism to Islamic state?*. NUS Press.

Ba'athists, have been involved in clandestine and violent opposition to the Iraqi state since 2003.[22] Branine, and Pollard point out that several were held at various times in US-run detention camps, and some escaped from Iraqi prisons during the "Breaking the Walls" campaign of the predecessor group, The Islamic State of Iraq, from July 2012 to July 2013.Their combined knowledge and experience have made The Islamic State 3first and foremost a fighting force, but, at least in its main urban centers, the State has also attempted to consolidate its territorial gains by developing an administrative capacity. This has meant that as well as attracting fighters to its ranks, it has also set out to build a cadre of civilian technocrats. It is in this area that the long-term weaknesses of the State are most evident. Unless it can maintain existing public infrastructure and meet demands for food, water, health care, sanitation and energy, and build and sustain a functioning economy, it will not survive.

Economically, The Islamic State has revenue from oil sales, taxes on businesses and individuals, tolls on commercial road traffic, the sale of captured equipment, the operation of stolen factories, and a variety of more traditional criminal activity such as kidnap for ransom, looting, extortion and protection money. In its earlier days, individual donations from local and external supporters provided an important revenue stream, though by mid-2014 this was no longer so significant in percentage terms. The capture of large amounts of military equipment, vehicles, and fuel depots, as well as the appropriation of property abandoned by those fleeing its advance or belonging to people it kills, also provide resources that help it to continue its campaign and reward its followers.[23]

According to Martin Islamic State employs several thousand people, somewhere between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters, according to US intelligence estimates, and another army of administrators to keep the State functioning.[24] Its fighters are both volunteers, many from abroad, and conscripts, forced into service by local commanders either from individual families or from tribes in conquered areas. Similarly, administrative staff are a mix of volunteers and the coerced, with the latter category comprising the majority as The Islamic State has persuaded workers to stay in their jobs and has continued to pay them a salary. An Islamic State supervisor

---

[22] Branine, M., & Pollard, D. (2014). Human resource management with Islamic management principles: A dialectic for a reverse diffusion in management. *Personnel Review*, *39*(6), 712-727.

[23] Ibid

[24] Martin, V. (2013). *Creating an Islamic state: Khomeini and the making of a new Iran* (Vol. 24). IB Tauris.

may be appointed to oversee operations in key facilities such as bakeries or municipal services, but the essential staff are local people who, for one reason or another, have remained in place. Their loyalty therefore cannot be guaranteed. [25]

The Islamic State also tries to win support through its outreach via electronic media. It pays considerable attention to its image and tries to balance pictures of horror intended to demoralize its enemies with a softer image to encourage its friends.[26] In the short-term this has been successful, but as with its military and administrative victories, much of its success is a reflection of the weakness of the opposition rather than of its own inherent strength. The future of the State depends, therefore, on whether alternative centers of power in both Iraq and Syria are able to offer sufficiently credible assurances of a better life to persuade the uncommitted majority of people who live under Islamic State tutelage to risk their lives in opposing it.

1.4.3 Islamic States new Threat to International Peace and Security

Security and peace are indispensable for economic and social development. And for this reason, maintaining security, peace and stability in the 21st century has continued to remain a crucial challenge for the international community.[27] The United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) are some of the bodies which are affected by increased insecurity. The terrorists and criminals targeting Syria, Iraq, and other countries today are extreme reflections of a global threat. For example, groups such as the Mujahehedin/Taliban in Afghanistan, the Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Laskar et. Tayyiba in Pakistan, those in the name of Al-Qaeda throughout the globe pose a security threat to the world.[28] Although these groups operate independently, weakness in the institutions of politics and the security services in Islamic States have created a political situation where such threats to stability are not dealt with until violence is a certainty. In this context, it can be noted that the weakness of security institutions; their only method of dealing with any such threat is with violence. According to Nojumi majority of these Islamist states have experienced weakness in the institutions of politics and the security services as it is

---

[25] Kennedy, H. (2013). *The armies of the caliphs: military and society in the early Islamic state*. Routledge.
[26] Ibid p.10
[27] Nojumi, N. (2012). *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*. Macmillan.p.23
[28] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2005). *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Oxford University Press.

the case of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria.[29] For example, in Nigeria, Boko Haram which is an Islamic sect that believes northern politics has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims was formed as a result of political weaknesses.[30] The group has been waging a war against the public, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a õpureö Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Since 2009 it has been driven by a desire for vengeance against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in a brutal suppression of the group that year.

The major factors could be attributed to the current situation being experienced in the MENA region, which is composed of Islamic states. For instance, in the 1960s, different political changes were made in the region which resulted to regime changes. The U.S for instance was an ally to Israel and Egypt was allied to the Soviet Union which provided military support. The outcome of the war was disastrous for Arab nationalism. Whereas in the west it was seen as a ÷victory for a US proxy over those of the Soviets[31] in the Middle East it symbolized the greatest failure of Arab nationalism. In attempting to secure Islamist allegiance, Sadat had effectively given away the ÷stateøs monopoly on ideologyø[32]Thus, the United States encouraged Islamøs development as a form of anti-communist resistance in the decades that preceded the Afghan-Soviet war. This has led to the current situations in the region which has culminated into wars, which have destabilized peace and security level in the region. Many Egyptians sought an immediate alternative, so joined the ranks of the Islamists, who viewed the 1967 war as a ÷punishment for the misplaced trust in the promise of alien ideologies.[33] While the widespread sense of humiliation that arose in the aftermath of Egyptøs wars with Israel was a key factor that led to Islamismøs rise, it was not the only one. In fact, Sadat encouraged the Islamization of society in an attempt to counterbalance his weak power base among Nasserists and lack of

---

[29] Nojumi, N. (2002). *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*. Macmillan.
[30] Goodrich, L. M., & Simons, A. P. (1955). *The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security* (Vol. 3). Brookings Institution.

[31] Khalidi, R. (2009). *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East,* Boston: Beacon Press, 122
[32] Kepel, G. (2006). *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, London: I. B. Tauris, p.65.
[33] Haddad, Y. (1992). ÷Islamists and the õProblem of Israelö: The 1967 Awakeningø, *Middle East Journal* 46 , p.263.

national popularity: as well as giving amnesty to a great number of Muslim Brothers, Islam became the state religion and *shariʿa* 'a source of legislation.ø[34]

According to Ayoob the mushrooming of Islamist-extremist movements predates the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, emerging from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Before the 9/11 attacks, certain academic and security experts from within the region predicted continuing Islamist threats and further development of the broad-based Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, and beyond, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America.[35] However, resistance by Islam States in regard to the policies by the U.S could have attributed to the insurgencies and increased Islamist radicals which have become a threat to international peace and security. The U.S had developed policies against terrorist groups, including Islamist extremist organizations earlier, but 9/11 created an impetus and urgency for a more successful strategy of opposition to these groups.

According to Acharya, major concern to the international community and UN Security Council is the level at which Islamic States have become radicalized.[36] For example, recently while Ban Ki-moon was addressing the United Nations (UN) on matter of security contends that "It is undeniable and the subject of broad international consensus that these groups pose an immediate threat to international peace and security.[37] This shows that Islamists groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have and continue to be threat to international peace and security. The Islamist groups operating in these countries pose a serious threat to International security and peace. This is because Islamist jihadists have training bases in the States, which affects the local people. The Islamist rebels have started a new insurgency war, launching suicide attacks. Thus, the world has witnessed a dramatic evolution in the nature of the terrorist attacks. In 2013, terrorist attacks killed, maimed, and displaced thousands of civilians-vast majority of them being Muslims from Afghanistan to Somalia to Nigeria, from Iraq to Libya. These attacks have been carried out by violent extremists who thrive in conditions of insecurity and injustice, fragility and failed leadership.

---

[34] Dekmejian, R. H. (1995). *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,* New York: Syracuse University Press, p.80.

[35] Ayoob, M. (2005). *The Third World security predicament: state making, regional conflict, and the international system* (p. 4). L. Rienner Publishers.

[36] Acharya, A. (2001). Human security: East versus west. *International Journal*, 442-460.

[37] UN News Center. (September 2014). *Remarks at the Climate Summit press conference (including comments on Syria)* [Online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2356#.VQvQtY6Ude8accessed on September 30th 2014

A report to the United Nations Security Council by the UN Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team has estimated that more than 13,000 foreign terrorists' fighters from 80 member states have joined ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.[38] What has alleviated the numbers has been a consequence rather than cause of Syria Conflict. Basically, the problem in Syria is just a tip of the iceberg as far as Islamic States being a new threat to peace and security is concerned. UNSC has voiced out õthe vicious and unjustifiable actions of those groups and the danger they pose to Iraq, Syria, the wider region and the international peace and securityö.[39] In the Middle East, terrorists pose an immediate threat to those in the region making the problem global and it is constantly evolving.[40]

Threat from terrorism undermines the security and stability of a peace loving nation and the threats which affect peace, security and democracy chaotic situations brought about politically displaced people from their home towns and robbing the people of their economy and social life as should be in a civil society.[41] Lack of education brings a human capital to zero level of intelligence application, thus open the possibility on the preoccupation towards criminal elements. The vicious cycle if unchecked will push the world into two divides namely that of people supporting terrorism as a result of failures by the government to take care of its own people and the other of course the people or group maintaining the issue that terrorism as a threat to their well-being.[42] This vicious cycle has affected not only the countries where terrorists emanate from by other countries at international levels.

Since 2001, different terrorist attacks have been launched in different countries, were different terrorists groups have claimed responsibility. Some of major attacks as provided by Sherifa Zuhur are: a suicide attack in April 2002 at a Tunisian synagogue killed 19 people; the bombing of a Bali nightclub packed with foreigners in October 2002. On October 1, 2005, three suicide bombers attacked three restaurants, killing 20; five suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003; Al-Qaøida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)øs violent attacks and bombings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2004 including a beheading, and one attack

---

[38] United Nations Security Council. (2013). *Threats to International Peace and Security caused by terrorists Acts*. P.55
[39] United Nations Security Council, pp. 3.
[40] Özdemir, O. B & Karda , T. (2014). *The Making of European Foreign Fighters*. SETA

[41] Solana, J. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy. *içinde Klaus Schilder ve Tobias Hauschild, der., Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy*.
[42] Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. *International security*, *25*(1), 5-41.

launched on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah; bombings in December of 2004 in General Santos and February 2005 bombings in Manila by Abu Sayyaf; British-born Muslims from Leeds attack the London underground and a bus killing 37 and injuring more than 700 on July 7, 2005 which were followed by thwarted attacks on July 21 in London by a different set of terrorists; 200 homemade bombs exploded at government buildings, courts, and in the streets in at least 60 different towns and cities of Bangladesh following Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's departure on August 17, 2005, for China and attacks on Shi`a mosques and Ashura celebrations in Iraq and Pakistan, as well as bombing of early-morning commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004.[43]

1.4.4 International Community versus Peace and Security

The traditional view of security is defined in military terms, with the primary focus on state protection from threats to national interests.[44] Kelsen confined the scope of his study to "the protection of men against the use of force by other men."[45] It was inextricably linked to national security, meaning the protection of territory from external military threats and attacks, which was recognized as the ultimate raison d'être of sovereign states. However, such a traditional notion of security, as defined by reference to national survival, physical protection of state territory, and military power, has expanded its scope in the second half of the 20th century, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

To start with, the idea of international security, as distinct from national/state security, emerged with the development of a collective security system. The League of Nations recognized an act of aggression and an act of war that commenced in disregard to the war avoidance procedures under its Covenant as security threats for all members of the League.[46] The establishment of the UN Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security[47], and its operation in practice, has gradually fostered an acceptance among states of the idea that the security of the international community, not simply the security of one state, can be undermined. This was no exception during the Cold

---

[43] Zuhur, S. (2005). *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats And The Future Of Counterinsurgency*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/100osamas.pdf accessed on 5th june 2005
[44] Nasu, H. (2011). The Expanded Conception of Security And International Law: Challenges To The UN Collective Security System. *International Security*, 3(3), 11-33
[45] Kelsen, H. (1957). *Collective Security under International Law*, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, p. 11
[46] Ibid p.34
[47] Nasu, H. (2011). The Expanded Conception of Security And International Law: Challenges To The UN Collective Security System. *International Security*, 3(3), 11-33

War, when strategic balance of power rivalries and nuclear deterrence to stabilize international relations remained the dominant international security concerns.[48]

The idea of international security evolved through the development of a collective security system, particularly under UN authority. The key to that development lies in the concept of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, and an act of aggression under Article 39 of the UN Charter. The fact that the Security Council's practice enlarged the concept of a threat to the peace is well documented.[49]

Security is an elastic and diverse concept that can be understood in different forms, depending on its objects: the perception of threats, the protected values, and the means through which these values can be protected.[50] The changing perception of security threats that already emerged in the 1980s, and ways in which these threats are addressed, has led to comprehensive and scientific studies of security concept.[51] While the multi-dimensionality of security is now widely acknowledged in the discourse of security, its impacts on and challenges to international law are yet to be fully examined.

Peace Studies have existed for the longest time possible and they play an integral role in both international and domestic relations. Paris explains that the word õpeaceö in layman language is defined as lack of conflict or violence. In spite of the assumed shared understanding of the term, peace usually embraces different connotations depending upon the context in which it is used and the person using the term.[52]

In the negative sense, the word peace refers to the absence of organized use of armed force; therefore, in order to constitute a threat to peace, the situation in question must have the potential of provoking armed conflict between states in the short or medium turn.[53] The term ‑threat to peaceø is sufficiently flexible and dynamic to include all major forms of serious international misconduct. However, in every case, a threat to peace is a situation that objectively

---

[48] Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979;p.23

[49] Wellens, K. (2003). ‑The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* pp. 15-70;

[50] Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition.* Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf

[51] Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition.* Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf

[52] Paris, R. (2001). Human Security Roland Paris Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?. International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87ó102

[53] B. Martenczuk. (1999). The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? ó European Journal of International Law, (10), pp. 543ó544.

can be characterized as destabilizing and potentially explosive. The positive concept of peace is wider and includes also friendly relations between states, as well as other political, economic, social, and environmental conditions that are needed for a conflict-free international community.[54] There is some textual support for the positive notion of peace in the United Nations Charter; for example, Article 1 sections 2 and 3 speak about the strengthening of universal peace through the development of friendly relations and co-operation among nations. According to Wiktorowicz, the absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security and that the õnon-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security[55]

Paris provides a basic but nevertheless useful definition øsecurity threatø connotes some type of menace to survival.ö The dilemma lies in interpretation, as there are three major aspects to the definition.[56] First, there is a õmenace to survivalö; security is about threats and even threat perception. Second, security involves a referent object or unit of analysis in that the õmenaceö poses a threat to someone or something and is also posed by someone or something; for instance, an attack by one state against another is a classic international security threat.[57]

1.5 Literature gap

The issue of peace and security studies have existed for more than 100 years, Kaldor did a study on New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era and concluded that peace and security are of global importance.[58] However, Buzan, and Waever also did a study on õRegions and powers: the structure of international securityö these researchers concluded that modern communication instruments allow actors to minimize their own casualties.[59] Kaldor in a

---

[54] United Nations Charter, Article 24 (1).
[55] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2011). *The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state power in Jordan*. SUNY Press.
[56] Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition*. Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf
[57] Ibid p. 13
[58] Kaldor, Mary. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California
[59] Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and powers: the structure of international security* (Vol. 91). Cambridge University Press.

book "New and Old Wars"[60]explained that the contexts of wars in the new era have changed and that conflicts and wars involve a myriad of transnational connections of global and local actors who fight for particular political goals at times using terror tactics and destabilization as well as criminalized economy. Nonetheless, there are limited literary sources which directly address the issue of Islamic States being a new threat to peace and security at the international level. For this reason, such limitation has compelled this particular study with the aim of reducing that particular gap. Moreover, given that international peace and security are of global importance, the study was deemed appropriate. Notably, the idea international security, as distinct from national/state security, emerged with the development of a collective security system, and therefore, security and peace at international level have not been highly studied. Such an investigation will provide the study with an overview and a collection of ways which can be employed as deterrence to the threat posed by Islamic States.

1.6 Justification of the Study

From an academic perspective, the study will be significant to scholars and academics in security and peace-related studies. It provides a platform for better understanding the grave matter and threat posed by Islamic States, in regard to international peace and security. In the same vein, the study will provide political scientists and security and peace policy makers on how Islamic States have over the years developed to the extent of being a threat to international peace and security. The study will provide ways in which the threat can be averted and nibbled at the top before it spreads to other non-Islamic States.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The study was based on the Concepts of "New Wars" which is central to security, war, and peace in both domestic and international.

---

[60] Kaldor, Mary. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

14

Mary Kaldor in her book "New and Old Wars"[61] explains that the contexts of wars in the new era have changed and that conflicts and wars involve a myriad of transnational connections of global and local actors who fight for particular political goals at times using terror tactics and destabilization as well as criminalized economy. In such a situation it is difficult to sustain the distinction between the local repressors and aggressors or between local and global. According to Kaldor, although it is difficult to trace the evolution of the new wars, this type of war started in the 20th century and is characterized by its different nature from the old wars as the former involved elements of pre-modernity and modernity; blurring of public and private, state or non-state, formal and informal. And the scholar believes these "new wars" are less understood by the international community and are wrongly treated in the same way as the "old wars".

Kaldor argues that these conflicts (new wars) are influenced by the globalization process; therefore, the contemporary wars are characterized by the global modernity since new war materials and techniques are applied in it. The new techniques and modern war materials, such as drones, robots and computers as well as modern communication instruments allow actors to minimize their own casualties. However, although the new wars are characterized by modern war characters, intervention using these modern technologies turns out to be clumsy in bringing the anticipated effects on the ground. For example, using drones as one of the most sophisticated war equipment became counterproductive in some conflicts. Kaldor explained that the technology might in some cases bring a positive impact in the warfare but not in most cases. As part of the new war character, conflicts magnetize international actors in many contexts; for example, Jihadists, nationalist and faith embedded actors participate in conflicts occurring in many parts of the world. Moreover, reporters, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), mercenary troops and military advisors are also actors of new war characteristics. And in today's conflict interventions do not necessarily represents the only actors that engage in the war activities in a way or another. New wars are also characterized by regional states and organizations; these can include aid organizations and peace keeping forces.

---

[61] Kaldor, Mary. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California p.18

In contrary to the old wars in which states mostly organized the war and confronted another state or groups formally, the new wars in the most present conflicts are involved by irregular groups such as warlords, clan militia and other organized elements with different goals. Moreover, in these wars actors apply more easily applicable war techniques. The conflicts of Somalia and Afghanistan are empirical examples of conflicts where improvised explosive devices (IED) that are controlled from elsewhere and causes massive deaths. This is not equipment and techniques that old wars applied. As conflicts in general jeopardize local productions and human development in their localities, the new warfare is mostly driven with illegal economy such as plunders, hostage-taking and black market or through external assistance comes through remittances from Diasporas, taxation of humanitarian assistance, support from neighbor states or illicit trade with armies and drugs.[62]

Actors in such conflicts widely depend on external assistance from ally states and organizations of a similar agenda in order to spread their activities around the globe. This could be terrorist organizations such as Al-qaeda which strives to spread their ideologies in existing conflicts. In most conflicts in stateless countries, war lords and other identity groups (Islamists, clan groups, political groups) that are involved in the conflicts take over humanitarian assistances and use it for maintenance of their war. Likewise, human trafficking and illicit natural resources exportation are utilized to sustain conflicts and wars in lawless countries. The new wars look like each other and operate in similar ways. Almost all conflict actors in the new era exercise identical approaches to achieve their goals. For instance, the Taliban in Afghanistan have carried out attacks and assassinations against liberal politicians and international interveners whose intention, as they claim, is to bring peace in Afghanistan. Their activities include bombs in hotels, institutional centers and communal facilities as well as carrying out terror activities in neighboring countries. Examples of conflicts with identical problems include Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq. All these conflicts are characterized by Kaldorøs explanation of new wars.[63]

1.8 Hypotheses

The following constitutes this studyøs hypothesis:

---

[62] Kaldor, Mary. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California p. 57

[63] Ibid p.23

i. Some Islamic States have become a new threat to international peace and security.

ii. The anti-terrorism techniques used by international communities currently are not in a position to effectively combat terrorism threats posed by Islamic states

1.9 Methodology

The methodology is the general research strategy that outlines the way in which research is to be undertaken and, among other things, identifies the methods to be used in it. These methods, described in the methodology, define the means or modes of data collection or, sometimes, how a specific result is to be calculated. Methodology does not define specific methods, even though much attention is given to the nature and kinds of processes to be followed in a particular procedure or to attain an objective.[64] According to Verd, a research design is a plan õwhich includes every aspect of a proposed study from the conceptualization of a problem right through to the dissemination of the findings.ö[65] Therefore, owing to the nature of the research study, qualitative research design was employed. With reference to qualitative literature review, a number of existing literatures were used for this purpose, consisting mainly of reports and studies from the UN, research institutes and NGOs, articles, journals, internet, reports, theses, and archives among other sources and media accounts. Such literary material covers the historical background to the security and peace threats, the dynamics leading up to the current situation and the latest developments on the ground, and how Islamic States have been considered a threat to international peace and security.

1.10 Chapter Summary

Chapter one is the introduction to the study and it provides background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, literature review, justification, theoretical framework, hypothesis and methodology of the research study.

Chapter two discusses the emergence of Islamic states it is divided in the following subtopics: The Origin of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State growth in Financial

---

[64] Brownlee, K. A., & Brownlee, K. A. (1965). *Statistical theory and methodology in science and engineering* (Vol. 150). New York: Wiley.

[65] Verd, J. M. (2004). Qualitative research methods.

Operations, The Islamic State growth in Media Operations, Propaganda as a Military Tactic, Impact of Islamic State War on global peace and security and finally the conclusion.

Chapter three discusses the findings on international responses to Islamic states. It is divided into the following subtopics: overview of international community, international community and international terrorism, Islamic States Terror and the AU/AMISOM intervention, Islamic states, humanitarian and military interventions, international community and the concept of peace in Islamic states, the international community mechanism to combat the Islamic state organization and finally the conclusions.

This chapter covers data presentation and analysis of the data collected through a number of existing literatures, consisting mainly of reports and studies from the UN, research institutes and NGOøs, articles, journals, internet, reports, theses, and archives among other sources and media accounts in relation to managing Islamic states: an analysis the mechanisms by the international community.

Chapter five provides a conclusion and recommendation of the dissertation with a discussion on each of the research questions. The discussion is to be carried with the intent of supporting or refuting the hypothesis. The limitations of the study and future directions for search will be provided.

CHAPTER TWO

EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC STATES

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the emergence of Islamic states it is divided in the following subtopics: The Origin of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State growth in Financial Operations, The Islamic State growth in Media Operations, Propaganda as a Military Tactic, Impact of Islamic State War on global peace and security and finally the conclusion.

2.1 Evolution of Islamic State

Based on the literature findings the Islamic State takes pride in claiming the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal al Khalayleh) as its founder and inspiration, and it has been assiduously polishing his reputation through its online propaganda. In truth, Zarqawi was a local Jordanian hoodlum who discovered that he had an ability to inspire following through the violent pursuit of an anti-State and anti-Shia agenda based loosely on the teachings of a fellow Jordanian, Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi (Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi), one of the most famous contemporary salafist/takfiri preachers, whom he had first met in Afghanistan in the 1990s. [66]Although in contact with al Qaeda at this time, Zarqawi regarded the Levant as a more important battleground than the West and generally kept his distance from Usama bin Laden and Aiman al Zawahiri. He set up a training camp in Western Afghanistan and established Jund al Sham (the Army of the Levant). The US invasion of Iraq provided Zarqawi an opportunity to build his organization, which he renamed al Tawhid wa al Jihad(Monotheism and Jihad), and by August 2003 he was well established to launch three major attacks: against the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, the United Nations headquarters there, and the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, an important Shia shrine. [67]

---

[66] The July 2014 issue of Dabiq, The Islamic State's on-line English language magazine
[67] Adis (2015).The Islamic State in organisation and appearance may originate from Zarqawi's time in the 9 country

Bellin pointed out that in 2004, after much discussion, Zarqawi joined al Qaeda and changed the name of his group to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[68] Zarqawi believed that an association with al Qaeda would attract 10 recruits and funds, while bin Laden needed a presence in Iraq as the most active front for ÷jihadø at that time. Bin Laden may also have hoped to limit Zarqawiøs ability to challenge al Qaedaøs leading role by accepting him as a subordinate. Zarqawi then brought together several other groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council in early 2005. Zarqawi died in an American airstrike in mid-2006 and soon afterwards, under its new leader, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, an Egyptian close to Zawahiri, the group again joined with others to become The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), headed by Abu Omar al Baghdadi. ISI was thus the local al Qaeda affiliate. Abu Hamza and Abu Omar were killed together in 2010, by which time the movement had been severely degraded even though it had allied with many secularist opponents of the Iraqi regime who found themselves excluded from power as ex Baøathists. It was at this point that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai)became leader of the movement and set about rebuilding it, largely through a relentless campaign of car bombs and suicide bombing attacks, but subsequently much helped by the Syrian civil war, which began in earnest around May 2011.[69]

2.3 Islamic State growth in Financial Operations

According to Davis [70] the Islamic State keep its war-machine going, including by supplying and maintaining equipment, rewarding successful operations, and providing salaries to its living fighters and benefits to the dependents of those who have died.[71] There could be over 30,000 fighters, who are said to receive anything from $200 a month, depending on nationality and size of family, which, if true is a significant increase over the $41 per month they received prior to 2010. In addition, the fighters receive free housing, generally by being allocated

---

[68] Bellin, E. (2014). The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective. *Comparative politics*, 139-157.

[69] Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html

[70] Davis, E. (2005). *Memories of state: Politics, history, and collective identity in modern Iraq*. Univ of California Press.

[71] Ibid p22

accommodation confiscated from Shia, Christians, and other non-Sunni inhabitants, as well as from Sunnis who have decided to flee.[72]

The findings also reveal that Islamic State has to maintain the civilian infrastructure of the towns and villages it has captured and pay an increasing army of employees to manage its administration. Monthly salaries range from $300 to as much as $2,000 for those in senior management positions. In addition it must pay for its propaganda campaign and bribes and inducements to tribal leaders and others whom it needs to influence and cannot merely kill.[73] All in all, its expenses may equate to those of the Iraqi government before The Islamic State took control. Documents seized from the house of Abdulrahman al Bilawi in June 2014 suggest that the Islamic State had around $875 million in cash and assets before the fall of Mosul earlier that month. Although discounted by the governor of Nineveh and bank officials, it is widely reported that the group seized up to an additional $430 million from the Central Bank in Mosul and other financial institutions after their capture. In addition, The Islamic State has seized enormous amounts of government property, including military equipment abandoned by the Iraqi Army.

The main sources of income are oil production facilities in Syria and Iraq, and extortion/taxation of owners and producers in areas under its control. This ranges from preying on 136 small family businesses such as grocery stores or appliance repair shops to taxing large enterprises such as electric companies and other energy suppliers, cellular phone service providers, water delivery companies or others fulfilling government contracts. For example, The Islamic State has threatened to blow up cell phone towers unless the parent company pays protection money; the same for electricity substations and utility poles. The Islamic State has also profited from the sale of goods produced by factories that it has requisitioned or farms that it has seized, as well as of equipment stripped from facilities that it has decommissioned. In addition, The Islamic State has continued the criminal practices of its predecessor groups in ransacking and appropriating the wealth of entire neighborhoods if they are occupied by Shia,

---

[72] Barrett, R. (2014). Foreign fighters in Syria. *The Soufan Group, http://soufangroup. Com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria. pdf*, 6.
[73] Ibid

Christians, Yazidis, government supporters or employees, or anyone else that The Islamic State decides is an enemy. [74]

2.4 The Islamic State and its Media Operations

According to Thussu, the media effort of The Islamic State is an integral and essential part of its operations, on a par with its military and administrative effort.[75] In this respect it is greatly helped by the decentralized nature of social media (particularly Twitter), which has allowed each of its supporters effectively to create and operate his/her own ministry of information, echoing a standard party line as well as creating and spreading their own memes and messages. In effect, The Islamic State is crowd sourcing its propaganda. There is no precedent for this, given the novelty of social media platforms and file sharing sites, and so, in a counterintuitive move, The Islamic State has maximized control of its message by giving up control of its delivery. [76] The importance to The Islamic State of social media is evident in the way that pictures of Abu Bakr declaring the Caliphate on 4 July 2014 appeared on Twitter before the video of his full speech was uploaded on YouTube, helping to ensure that it would be carried on most major international news networks. Although occasionally its followers make mistakes and start sending links to products before the official launch time, for example with the video of the murder of Stephen Sotloff on 2 September 2014, The Islamic State has a well disciplined and well organized media department. [77]

According to Brown, the media department of The Islamic State is highly productive, churning out a wide range of media material that its supporters can use to attract potential recruits, raise money, promote the image of the organization, or just spread fear among its enemies.[78] The production of extremely violent action films right before the military offensive in northern Iraq in June 2014, ‑Clanging of the Swords I-IV,ø is a good example of both the nature of the groupøs propaganda and of the audience it hopes to attract.

---

[74] Ibid p.24

[75] Thussu, D. K. (Ed.). (2006). *Media on the move: global flow and contra-flow*. Routledge.

[76] A Special Report on the Use of Social Media by Jihadists http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/
157index.php/entry/192-follow-isis-on-twitter.

[77] Brown, R. (2003). Spinning the war: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism. *War and the Media*, 87-100.

[78] Brown, R. (2003). Spinning the war: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism. *War and the Media*, 87-100.

One of its products is a very sophisticated propaganda video series known as the õMujatweets,ö which shows various aspects of daily life in The Islamic State, from fighting in Iraq and Syria, to testimonials from Western militants about their joy in joining The Islamic State.[79] Al Hayat also provides English subtitles for videos put out by other Islamic State channels, such as Al I∅tisam and Al Furqan. Aside from videos, The Islamic State releases a newspaper, called the ISN (Islamic State News), a six-page pdf with picture-based material and a brief propagandistic commentary in English about various day-to-day events. These media materials can be found on independent, free, web-hosting sites, and new issues are announced by the official Islamic State news channels. [80]

In addition to the ISN, the ISR (Islamic State Report), also known as õAn Insight into the Islamic State,ö contains articles about Islamic State events and agendas. The Islamic State therefore shows a good understanding of both the importance and the use of media which poses a great challenge to the international community. It appeals to a wide range of audiences and designs both content and presentation accordingly, from violent action as in õThe Flames of Warö to a more intellectual appeal as in the õLend Me Your Earsö propaganda series first trailed on 18 September 2014 by John Cantlie, a journalist held hostage by The Islamic State since November 2012. The Islamic State is also reactive, as in the campaign it launched on Twitter following the start of the US air campaign in August 2014 with the hashtag a message from ISIS to US.

2.5 Propaganda as Islamic states' Tactic

The Islamic State has garnered much attention for its use of propaganda, particularly its releases of videos of violent acts, its publication of an online magazine and several pamphlets and booklets, and its use of social media. Propaganda is both a tool of recruitment for the organization and a tool of war that is often used to supplement military action, and sometimes to compensate for it.[81]

---

[79] Bagdikian, B. H. (2014). *The new media monopoly: A completely revised and updated edition with seven new chapters*. Beacon Press.
[80] Ibid p.30
[81] Rahimi, B. (2011). The agonistic social media: cyberspace in the formation of dissent and consolidation of state power in postelection Iran. *The Communication Review*, *14*(3), 158-178.

2.5.1 Islamic States and the Use of Psychological Warfare

Rosenau, states that the Islamic State regularly disseminates graphic images of violence that are a form of psychological warfare aimed at instilling fear among its enemies and constituents alike.[82] The group chooses to release information according to need and to changes in the local context. For example, if it senses that a local population is starting to get restive, it disseminates more propaganda about its development initiatives, and if it senses a growing potential for political or military challenges, it releases more brutal images in order to instill fear in its opponents.[83]

High-cost, higher-return tactics have helped the group to achieve both military and propagandist gains at once, with what has sometimes been referred to as õpropaganda of the deed.ö That was the case during attacks in Syriaøs Raqqa Province in the summer of 2014.[84] In one instance, a suicide bomber attacked the gate at the base that was home to the Syrian Armyøs Seventeenth Division, creating an entry point for a second suicide bomber, who attacked the headquarters inside. Soon after gaining access to the base, the Islamic State decapitated the base commander. Within the hour, this achievement was announced over loudspeakers as the battle was raging, and images of it were immediately released on Twitter. This lowered morale among the baseøs 700 soldiers and helped the Islamic State to take over the base.

According to Atran the same tactic was used in an attack on Raqqaøs Tabqa airport, where the heads of dozens of regime soldiers were hung in public spaces as a way of instilling fear in the enemy and showing off to potential and existing recruits as well as the local population.[85] Following a massive promotion campaign through social media, the Islamic State compensated for the few hundred fighters it lost in the Tabqa battle and other battles in 2014 with 6,000 new fighters. Propaganda has also been used to help overcome military limitations. When the Islamic State was unable to expand further east because of resistance from Shia-majority areas in Iraq after its advance on Mosul, the group announced the õreturnö of the caliphate on June 29, 2014,

---

[82] Rosenau, W. (2008). *Waging the war of ideas*. Rand Corp Washington Dc. *Review*, *2*(3), 23-25
[83] Ibid p33
[84] Rathmell, A., Overill, R., Valeri, L., & Gearson, J. (1998). The IW threat from sub-state groups: An interdisciplinary approach. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *6*(2), 146-156.
[85] Atran, S. (2014). Genesis of suicide terrorism. *Science*, *299*(5612), 1534-1539.

and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, made his first public appearance, giving a sermon as the õCaliph Ibrahimö at the Great Mosque in Mosul.[86]

With video of the sermon that was circulated around the world, the Islamic State projected to its existing and potential members an image of the emir al-momineen (commander of the faithful) that they could relate to a courageous leader unafraid to appear in the biggest mosque in Mosul, which carries historical significance for Sunni Muslims. The group also used the moment to make an open invitation to technocrats like engineers and medical doctors to join in building the caliphate and launched a social media campaign aimed at boosting recruitment and funding.[87]

It was observed that a similar pattern can be seen in the battle of Kobane, a Kurdish town in Syria near the Turkish border. Turkey was initially resistant to allowing Turkish Kurdish fighters to enter Syria to help their Syrian counterparts fight the Islamic State as it advanced toward Kobane, but it agreed to open its borders in December 2014. Consequently the Islamic State found itself trapped in the town, confronted with a stark choice: either hold ground and face this new onslaught from peshmerga and other Kurdish combatants, or flee and expose its fighters to the international coalitionøs air strikes.

The groupøs first reaction to this entrapment was not a military move but a media one: British hostage John Cantlie was made to appear in an online video in which he wandered around Kobane telling the camera that the town was dominated by the Islamic State. As the battle of Kobane approached its end in early 2015, the Islamic State resorted once more to its tried-and-tested approach to overcoming military losses: propaganda. The group had captured a Jordanian pilot, Lt. Moaz al-Kasasbeh, who had been participating in the air strike campaign, and proceeded to parade him naked from the waist down in a video. It also released another video showing the execution of one of two Japanese hostages in its custody and staged a video statement by the other hostage in which he called for the release of Sajida al-Rishawi an al-

---

[86] Smyczek, P. J. (2015). Regulating the Battlefield of the Future: The Legal Limitations on the Conduct of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Under Public International Law. *AFL Rev.*, *57*, 209.
[87] Ganor, B. (2014). Terrorism as a strategy of psychological warfare. *Journal of aggression, maltreatment & trauma*, *9*(1-2), 33-43.

Qaeda affiliate who had been on death row in Jordan for nine years following a failed terrorism attempt in return for his own safety.[88]

The three videos drew much media attention and after members of the pilot's tribe protested in Amman, asking the government to work harder to secure his release Jordan publicly agreed to release al-Rishawi in return for the Jordanian pilot. The Islamic State promptly responded by circulating videos of the executions of the second Japanese hostage as well as the pilot. In doing so, the group managed to humiliate both Japan and Jordan, two members of the international coalition against the Islamic State.[89] The Islamic State used propaganda to compensate for military loss once more following its defeat in the northern Iraqi city of Tikrit in April 2015, when it released videos of the destruction of the ancient archaeological site of Hatra in Iraq.

2.5.2 Centralized Media Operations

The Islamic State is able to use propaganda so efficiently because its media operations are highly centralized, with careful control over what is publicized when. All Twitter accounts associated with the group are centrally managed. When new high-profile fighters join the Islamic State, they are pressured to hand over their social media accounts to the organization.[90] Centralized control also protects the Islamic State from making errors that could prove fatal. Similar to the method used by Hezbollah, and unlike other Islamist jihadist groups in Syria, the Islamic State does not normally photograph or film its commanders; most of their names and photographs are only revealed in the event of their death (and, while they are alive, any photographs that are circulated carry fake names).[91] This means that leaders of the group who have been killed by the international coalition's campaign have mainly not been key commanders because the latter largely remain underground and unknown.[92]

Foxley points out that the Islamic State does not boast about specific military operations or their locations, keeping the videos it posts vague, likely worried that the release of some information

---

[88] ibid p.34
[89] Ibid p.33
[90] Peter J. (2014). Regulating the Battlefield of the Future: The Legal Limitations on the Conduct of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Under Public International Law. *AFL Rev.*, *57*, 209.
[91] Riedel, B. (2007). Al Qaeda strikes back. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK-*, *86*(3), 24..
[92] Theohary, C. A. (2011). *Terrorist use of the internet: Information operations in cyberspace*. DIANE Publishing

could expose the group militarily and attract a counterattack. The group has also leaked incorrect information about the location of planned operations and then conducted strikes elsewhere.[93] As such, it avoids the mistakes of other rebel groups, whose members or sympathizers have revealed sensitive military information. In one such incident in 2014, an activist sympathetic to Jabhat al-Nusra posted the details of a Nusra convoy heading from one village to another in the northwest of Deir Ezzor on Facebook, including exactly which weapons the convoy was carrying, thereby exposing it to attacks by the Islamic State and the regime.[94]

The findings indicates that certain operations are publicized heavily, such as the execution of 250 Syrian soldiers following the takeover of Tabqa airport in Raqqa in the summer of 2014. Videos of such operations are used to show that the Islamic State is effective when other groups are not and to help with recruitment as well as lowering enemy morale.[95]

The Islamic State also closely monitors sympathetic media, and the group has killed and kidnapped independent journalists. In rare cases, the group has attempted to brainwash journalists in its custody, but it generally prefers to murder foreign or local reporters it does not consider friendly to its cause.[96] On occasion, the Islamic State agreed to host foreign õembeddedö journalists as a way to promote itself internationally. However, the group was not pleased with the reports made by those journalists, saying that they misrepresented reality, and shut the door to outside reporters. This monopoly over footage and news from areas it controls helps the Islamic State in its global recruitment by minimizing alternative frameworks to its narratives. Similar to the method used by Hezbollah, the group also closely monitors and quotes what it considers to be enemy writings about it as a way to claim epistemological superiority over its opponents.[97]

---

[93] Foxley, T. (2007). *The Taliban's propaganda activities: how well is the Afghan insurgency communicating and what is it saying?*. Sipri.
[94] Ibid
[95] Mackinlay, J. (2014). Is UK doctrine relevant to global insurgency?. *The RUSI Journal*, *152*(2), 34-39.
[96] Torres Soriano, M. R. (2010). The road to media Jihad: The propaganda actions of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *23*(1), 72-88.
[97] Ibid p.35

2.6 Islamic State Success Ideology as a Tool

According to the findings the Islamic State has appropriated the ideology of al-Qaeda, but ideology is not the group's primary purpose; it is a tool to acquire power and money.[98] The group does not follow any particular Islamic marjaiya (religious reference) and rejects the four sects of Islam. Instead, it continuously interprets sharia in ways that justify its actions.[99] As such, its ideology must be seen as an instrument for cultivating legitimacy as well as resources, and it is still evolving.

Elements of ideology are used to build ties with local populations as well as to control areas the group has seized. In Raqqa and other places, the Islamic State has used the promotion of ideology in tandem with military strategy to instill confusion. As soon as it takes over a village, and even before it has secured the area, the group often engages in actions seen as promoting sharia, such as burning cigarette supplies, destroying alcohol containers, and whipping women dressed õinappropriately.ö These moves are intended to show that promoting sharia is the Islamic State's main priority and to help it cultivate legitimacy. But they are also aimed at throwing people off, because they take place when the group might instead be expected to focus on securing newly acquired areas.

The Islamic State takes hold of an area and begins to govern it, the group uses sharia as an excuse to prevent members of the Syrian opposition from working and to kill those who had fought for rival Islamist brigades.[100] The group also conducts periodic public executions and similar grotesque acts to intimidate its constituents and make them conform enough that the need for violence against them lessens. In this way, the population under the Islamic State's control becomes self-governing, which in turn is used as õproofö that its followers are loyal.[101] These people are often arrested under the pretext that they are criminals and then crucified or subjected to similar public brutalities.

---

[98] Chomsky, N. (2012). *Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda* (Vol. 7). Seven Stories Press.

[99] Nu m n , F. (2010). *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. Zed books.

[100] Kuru, A. T. (2007). Passive and assertive secularism: Historical conditions, ideological struggles, and state policies toward religion. *World Politics*, *59*(04), 568-594.

[101] Atasoy, S. (2011). The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?. *Middle East Policy*, *18*(3), 86-100.

The research revealed that hegemony helps the Islamic State to govern; for example, the group grants its constituents loans to open businesses, confident that it will be paid back out of fear.[102] And even in cases where this kind of rule becomes the norm, public executions are held periodically as a reminder of the Islamic State's power and as a tool of control. According to Arjomand ideology is also used to justify the group's stance toward the Syrian regime, which it did not begin fighting until June 2014, following Islamic State victories in Iraq. Even now, only a small percentage of its military activities in Syria are directed at the regime, with most targeted instead at the Free Syrian Army and other jihadist groups.[103] The Islamic State asserts that *"qital al-mortaddin awla min qital al-nusairiya"* (fighting apostates is a priority over fighting Alawites, the sect to which Assad belongs). It uses the same rhetoric to justify its lack of attacks on Israel; as an emir in Qalamoun put it, õQital al-mortaddin awla min qital al-yahoud" (fighting apostates is a priority over fighting Jews).[104]

2.7 Impact of Islamic State War on global peace and security

Since 2013 the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS) has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria, threatening the security of the region and drawing increased attention from the international community. [105] The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni Muslim-inhabited areas of Iraq and taken control of some Sunni dominated provinces in eastern and central Syria. The Islamic State's tactics have drawn the ire of the international community, and raised new U.S. attention to Iraq's political problems and to the civil war in Syria. The group also has sought to establish branches elsewhere in the Muslim world, and has attracted organized support in Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. It also appears to be inspiring attacks in Europe, and possibly in the United States.[106]

---

[102] Arjomand, S. A. (2009). The emergence of Islamic political ideologies. *The Changing Face of Religion. Londres: Sage*.

[103] Arjomand, S. A. (1989). The emergence of Islamic political ideologies. *The Changing Face of Religion. Londres: Sage*.

[104] Atasoy, S. (2012). The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?. *Middle East Policy*, *18*(3), 86-100.

[105] John F. (2015) *World Politics* .Canady School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge. Massachusetts.. 22-24

[106] Ibid p. 24

In February 2015 congressional testimony, U.S. Director for National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed the intelligence community's earlier estimate that the Islamic State can muster "somewhere in the range between 20 and 32,000 fighters" [107] but noted that there had been "substantial attrition" in its ranks since August 2014 and that the group had been turning to conscription in some areas. As of March 2015, international community officials estimated that coalition air strikes and ground operations had killed thousands of IS personnel. However, thousands of recruits also reportedly have joined the organization since the start of coalition military operations, and U.S. officials have stated that uncertainty about casualty-to-replacement ratios for the Islamic State may persist until new information about IS recruiting and conscription, as well as flows of foreign fighters to the conflict zone, can be more fully reconciled with intelligence about ongoing battlefield attrition.

Based on the findings statements and media materials released by the Islamic State reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview and a relentless ambition.[108] Statements by IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group's struggle to revive their vision of "the caliphate." The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as "rejectionists" and "polytheists" and paints the Iraqi government as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its antecedents benefitted from financial and security arrangements with Damascus that began during the 2003-2011 U.S. military presence in Iraq. [109]

A shooting attack by U.S. nationals in Texas in May 2015 was claimed by IS personnel overseas, but U.S. officials had not suggested any direct operational links between the attackers and the Islamic State organization as of early May. In November 2014, National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen said in congressional testimony that "the [ISIL] threat beyond the Middle East is real, although thus far limited in sophistication. However, if left unchecked, over time we can expect ISIL's capabilities to mature, and the threat to the United

[107] Mail, H. (2015). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Polity Press: Cambridge. p.34

[108] Cornell, S. E. (2006, February). The narcotics threat in Greater Central Asia: from crime-terror nexus to state infiltration. In *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* (Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 37-67).

[109] Buzan, B. (1998). *People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR Press.

States homeland ultimately to increase. õIn May 2015, a State Department official described the Islamic State as posing a formidable, enormous threat, and estimated that the group has attracted more than 22,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries.

AL Baghdadi has threatened to attack the United States since 2012, and routinely describes the United States and its non-Muslim allies as õcrusaders,ö while encouraging Islamic State supporters to attack U.S. persons, facilities, and interests overseas and at home. The groupøs propaganda suggests that it welcomes the prospect of direct confrontation with the United States and its partners, viewing such conflict as a harbinger of apocalyptic confrontations described in some Islamic religious materials. In November 2014, Al Baghdadi argued the Islamic State would continue to expand and welcomed the potential introduction of Western ground forces, saying: õsoon, the Jews and Crusaders will be forced to come down to the ground and send their ground forces to their deaths and destruction, by Allahøs permission. õSome unconfirmed reports suggest Al Baghdadi has been injured, with uncertain implications for the leadership of the Islamic State organization. Nevertheless, in May 2015, an audio recording purportedly from Al Baghdadi praised the Islamic Stateøs fighters, called for more Sunni support, and promised continued war against the groupøs enemies.

2.8 Threats Posed by Syria- and Iraq-Based Sunni Extremists

According to Mansfield[110] for every event in human endeavor, there is always definite cause and effect. War is one of the conventional causes which effects represent greater impact in various forms on the world peace and security. War or armed conflicts in one way or the other always have memorable consequential impact on the peace and security of the world. Such effects that have been rightly qualified by G. Schwarzenegger as õLegal Effects õare specifically classified into effects in reaction to the interstates affairs relations between belligerent states and enemy nationals, the impact of war on private relations as well as in the light illegal war. When interpreting the Peace Treaty of Nevilly, the World Court i.e. the ICJ contrasted the relations between belligerent states which are õgoverned by the laws of warö with those affairs between belligerent and non-belligerent states which are governed by the õlaw of peace and neutralityö. In essence, the laws of war and neutrality considerably

---

[110] Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. L. (2007). *Electing to fight*. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.p.23

widened the discretionary powers of belligerent states towards one another and towards non - belligerent states. Thus, the varied relations in time of peace is naturally distinguished from the relations between the warring parties known as the belligerents as well as between any of them and the neutral states and ultimately between private individuals or nationals of the belligerent or neutral states in times of war.[111] Hostility or armed conflict symbolizes cause while the consequential impact on the peace and security of the international community sufficiently represent the effect.[112]

Since January 2014, U.S. officials have made several public statements describing the potential for Syria-based extremists to pose terrorist threats to the United States. In particular, U.S. and European officials have highlighted the threat that may be posed by foreign fighters, some of whom hold U.S. and European passports. Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan said in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2014 that there are three groups of people that are a concern, from an extremist standpoint; Ahrar al Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, which is the Al Qaeda element within Syria, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Itøs those latter two most dedicated to the terrorist agenda.[113]

In August 2014, the U.S. government supported the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2170, which strengthened international sanctions; measures designed to combat the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. The resolution calls upon all Member States õto take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,ö and reiterates Member Statesø obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and exchange information on the groups. On September 5, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced plans to õform a multinational task force to share more information about the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and from Syria into Iraq,ö saying, õThese foreign fighters represent an acute threat to our NATO allies.[114]

---

[111] Hulmes, E. (2009). Commitment and Neutrality in Religious Education, London: Geoffrey Chapman
[112] Kepel, G. (2004). *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West*. Harvard University Press.
[113] Ben H., (2014).õSyria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fireí ö New York Times, January 17, 2014.p.54
[114] Testimony of CIA Director John Brennan, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2014.p.23-24

2.8.1 Islamic State Terror Short-Term Risks

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (ANF) ISIL and ANF pose a significant threat to the populations resident in the territories they have seized. Both groups have a track record of summary killings of detainees, many filmed and released on social media or video -sharing sites. These killings straddle many different communities.[115] While minorities and Shia Muslims have borne the brunt of this violence, many Sunnis have also been murdered at the hands of ISIL and ANF. There are also credible reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence. ISIL and ANF threaten health and humanitarian workers from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic who are trying to alleviate human suffering. They have targeted and killed journalists for simply doing their job. They have taken and murdered hostages either in efforts to generate ransom payments or for political Messaging. [116]

The actions of ISIL and ANF also pose a serious threat to territorial integrity of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The presence of ISIL complicates efforts to forge a fresh political order in Iraq, despite the establishment of a new and more inclusive Government. The actions of both ISIL and ANF in the Syrian Arab Republic challenge moves towards a political settlement in a complex, violent civil war that has already lasted for over three years. Foreign terrorist fighter networks within ISIL and ANF already threaten a range of other States, with those in ANF appearing to have supported a covert network of core Al-Qaida external operations attack planners, the so -called õKhorasan groupö.

2.8.2 Islamic State Terror Long-term risks

The long-term risks from ISIL and ANF are many. In the region, both groups threaten civilian populations with the risk of summary executions , rape, extortion, the forced expulsion of ethnic and religious minorities, intimidation and violence towards the Sunni and Shia Muslim population, and the continuing use of IEDs and suicide bombers in indiscriminate attacks in

---

[115] Al-Hamarneh, A., & Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.

[116] Foreign Ministry of France, Declaration of the Core Group Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris, January 12, 2014.

public places. [117] If either group continues to seize territory and dominate local populations, these risks will persist. Meanwhile ISIL will continue to exacerbate sectarian tensions through its violence towards Shia Muslims and through the killing and oppression of Sunnis who reject its warped, extremist ideology. This will likely have an impact beyond Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, generating tensions in the region.

This could have a broader impact on inter-State relations in the Middle East, in addition to increasing internal tensions among communities. The exclusivist ideology of ANF, meanwhile, also encourages violence against minorities and against many Muslims, both Sunni and Shia. The campaign against minorities has already altered the demography of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; if this expanded it could threaten further pogroms against civilians and reshape the social geography of a number of countries in the Middle East.[118]

The threat beyond the region derives from three primary strands. The first of these are the large and diverse networks of foreign terrorist fighters, primarily associated with ISIL but also present within ANF, that originate from over 80 countries and number over 15,000.Just as ANF and ISIL were established by veterans, there is a high risk that alumni of ISIL and ANF will threaten peace and security in other countries in the months and years to come. Not all foreign terrorist fighters will pursue Al - Qaida-associated goals when they leave Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but a number will, and these will engage in radicalization, recruitment and terrorist attack planning. There is also a clear intent by ISIL to target the West and a range of other Member States, as demonstrated by ISIL propaganda on the Internet as well as the execution of four Western hostages since August 2014 and attacks like the one in Belgium perpetrated by assailants associated operationally and ideologically with ANF and ISIL. This is also supported by plans of selected foreign terrorist fighters to conduct attacks in their countries of origin.[119]

---

[117] Robert P. Mikulak, õStatement to the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Executive Council,ö The Hague, Netherlands, February 21, 2014.
[118] Howard, M. (2012). Whatøs in a name? How to fight terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, *81*(1), 8-13.
[119] Deisler, P. F. (2013). A perspective: Risk analysis as a tool for reducing the risks of terrorism. *Risk Analysis*, *22*(3), 405-413.

According to Pape a range of ethnic Chechen terrorist commanders from the Russian Federation are fighting with ANF, but with continuing loyalties to Emarat Kavkaz.[120] Their short-term presence in the Syrian Arab Republic should not mask their long-term objective to resume their campaign against the Russian Federation or generate new terrorist networks in Europe. ISIL fighters include experienced combat troops veterans of conventional engagements against United States forces inside Iraq, including some former Iraqi armed forces members, both pre- and post-2003. The transfer of skills from these to incoming foreign terrorist fighters represents another dimension of the threat. Moreover, in the case of ISIL, the potential to use seized funds to resource future terrorist attacks is another risk, and may even be a factor in some of the more opportunistic announcements of affiliation by Al- Qaida-associated groups. The second is the power of the toxic ideology of ISIL and ANF, neatly packaged in digital propaganda available in varying forms and many languages. This radicalizing material, from videos to social media feeds, from online magazines to cults of personality anchored around deceased terrorists, could help sustain a new wave of actions related to the Al-Qaida movement. ISIL propaganda, meanwhile, is setting a new standard within the Al-Qaida movement. Its Al- Hayat Media Centre is a sophisticated operation. Its videos are professionally produced, and its materials are translated into a number of different languages.[121]

However, in contrast to Al-Qaida core, which has largely centralized the production and dissemination of its propaganda message, ISIL is taking full advantage of a plural and decentralized social media environment. Using a crowd-sourcing strategy, ISIL produces digital propaganda in greater volumes and with greater frequency than other groups. This diversification complicates attempts to attack the ISIL messaging campaign. One speech by ISIL spokesman Abou Moham ed Al-Adnani (QI.A.325.14), for example, was translated into seven languages (English, Turkish, Dutch, French, German, Indonesian and Russian). Counter-terrorism officials from a number of Member States have expressed their concern about the high quality and rapid spread of ISIL propaganda material, which is often distributed (and reposted) even in countries with no past presence of Al-Qaida cells. Social media are also

---

[120] Pape, R. A. (2013). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review*, *97*(03), 343-361.

[121] Pape, R. A. (2013). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review*, *97*(03), 343-361.

used extensively to recruit, promote, propagandize and publically display and glorify extreme violence to intimidate opponents and critics of ISIL.

According to Cauley, the temporary progress of ISIL has already excited a wave of emulation by other groups, including networks outside the Middle East. A series of declarations of allegiance to ISIL from groups in locations as varied as North Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia point to the widespread influence of ISIL. It also threatens to provoke further so-called õlone wolfö attacks in which self-radicalized individuals launch difficult-to-anticipate terrorist attacks.[122]

ISIL branding has already appeared in a viral wave of õselfiesö at a range of international locations, suggesting that ISIL rhetoric has the ability to animate a small but scattered cross-section of international youth. One risk from this radicalizing ideology is the rise of less visible radicalization. A wide range of non-combatants provide critical support to Al-Qaida networks in the form of propaganda, funding, recruitment, facilitation, advice on travel and equipment and the cultivation of community support. The third threat derives from operational innovation that has taken place during the fighting in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, including the technically advanced use of õtunnel bombsö to target high-value security force buildings among other targets. The depth of veteran experience among local and foreign terrorist fighters runs the risk of creating a long-wave, transnational cadre and mobile pof expert terrorists who can combine terrorist, guerrilla and conventional tactics when planning attacks.[123]

It was observed that the impact of the ISIL phenomenon will be long-term and likely substantial, even in the event of the groupøs progress being rapidly and comprehensively reversed in late 2014. The parallel with previous conflicts involving Al-Qaida networks, such as the one in Afghanistan, is striking, as the international community continues to grapple with its after-effects decades later. At the time of writing, ongoing airstrikes by a coalition of Member States could disrupt the conventional capabilities of ISIL and ANF and make the groups revert to more asymmetric attacks. If ISIL is pushed back inside Iraq and the Syrian Arab

---

[122] Cauley, C. (2014). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. *Psychology of terrorism: Coping with the continuing threat, condensed edition*, 33-65.

[123] http://www.c-span.org/video/?321417-1/secretary-hagel-general-dempsey-isis-threat

Republic, it is likely to seek fresh avenues to advance its goals through organizing terrorist attacks elsewhere. ISIL has pursued a strategy of õshock and aweö to create fear, attract supporters and establish its primacy within the overall Al-Qaida movement.[124]

2.9 Conclusion

Administration officials and military officers have described the fall of Ramadi as one such setback, rather than accepting the arguments made by some that the loss of the city is a harbinger of strategic defeat. U.S. officials continue to suggest that the biggest threat to sustainable success in the anti-IS campaign may be the potential for renewed intensification of sectarian tension in Iraq or the persistence of leadership weakness in the Iraqi military. Administration critics argue that U.S. strategy lacks effective partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on the ground and suffers from a basic contradiction in not confronting the regime of President Asad of Syria. These critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives requires U.S. or other ground combat troops and expansion of the mission to include compelling Asad to accept a political solution that will allow more pressure to be brought to bear against the Islamic State in its Syrian strongholds.

---

[124] Ibid p.38

CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO ISLAMIC STATES

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings on international responses to Islamic states. It is divided into the following subtopics: overview of international community, international community and international terrorism, Islamic States Terror and the AU/AMISOM intervention, Islamic states, humanitarian and military interventions, international community and the concept of peace in Islamic states, the international community mechanism to combat the Islamic state organization and finally the conclusions.

3.1 Overview of International Community

In the past few years, journalists, politicians and academics have closely associated international law and international relations with the concept of the international community. It is their view that the international community is a protector of collective values and bearer of identical interests without which humanity could not exist in a peaceful and moral society. According to Cassese, the ―international community‖ needs to take measures to secure peace and security, to send humanitarian assistance, to prevent massive refugee flows and so on.[125] Yet, despite the numerous references made to the international community, there is hardly any agreement as to its composition.[126] A definition is of paramount importance for determining the legal and moral validity of the ‗war on terrorism‖ lead by the United States and of the claims and criticisms aired against the policy of that State. [127]

According to Beck a classical definition of international community would encompass all sovereign States, each State being equal and independent from other State entities.[128] A more contemporary approach would also include other entities which enjoy legal personality on the international level such as international organisations or entities which are legally recognized on the national level and have a certain leverage on international affairs such as non-international organisations, and transnational corporations. An even wider definition of the international

---

[125] Cassese, A. (2009). Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?. *European Journal of International Law*, *10*(1), 23-30.
[126] Ibid p.25
[127] Ibid p,24,pp. 75-80.
[128] Ibid p.49

community would include non-State entities (such as rebels, terrorist networks, and transnational regions), international scholars and probably the press. [129]

This modern definition appears to be more relevant in the current context since the fight against terrorism aims to disarm and dismantle the Al Qaeda network, a non-State entity that contests the concept of territory upon which the principle of sovereignty is based. Another reason for adopting such an approach is that inter-ethnic conflicts have shown the limits of contemplating the world in terms of an assembly of States. Yet, as of now, õthere are no grounds for concluding that the state-based system cannot meet the challenge[s] because the war against terrorism is being waged by States, which, thereby, proves the utmost relevance of States in international affairs. If the contemporary definition is adopted, it might be contended that, to some extent, the United Nations represents the international community. Indeed, its actors and partners are not only States but also, among others, NGOs, multinationals, and individual experts although the States are the primary subjects of UN decisions and negotiations. Unfortunately, the current predominance of the Security Council in international affairs gives the impression that apart from that body no other UN organ is taking any action. [130] It is a matter of fact that the public opinion does not even know that the General Assembly has wide-ranging powers. Worth being mentioned is that, in 1950, the General Assembly adopted the United for Peace Resolution that led to military intervention in Korea. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Security Council, because it is endowed with enforcing powers, often has overshadowed the painstaking work carried out by other bodies of the United Nations. [131]

If the UN is seen through the lenses of the Security Council, then it does not represent the international community but the leadership of five States that are bestowed with the right to veto. On the other hand, if the entirety of the work accomplished by the United Nations and more particularly by the General Assembly, the Human Rights Commission and by the Special Rapporteurs is taken into account, then it may be argued that the UN adequately represents the international community. In addition, õwhoever assumes the existence of a community suggests that States live under a kind of constitution which, from the very first moment they come into

---

[129] Francis Fukuyama,(2007) ÷The West May Be Crackingø, International Herald Tribune,

[130] Saul, B. (2005). *Defining'terrorism'in international law* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford).

[131] Arzt, D. E. (1990). The application of international human rights law in Islamic states. *Human rights quarterly*, 202-230.

being, they are bound to respectö. It is argued that such a community exists because certain norms of international law are of customary nature and have been accepted by the international community of States. For examples, the prohibition of a war of aggression, the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of torture are well entrenched.[132]

3.2 International Community and International Terrorism

The fight against international terrorism, the United States has pointed to several States suspected to be involved in supporting terrorist activities or harbouring terrorists. [133]As a matter of fact, Afghanistan was the first country upon which the US decided to take action. Indeed, the United States was convinced that a group based in Afghanistan carried out the attack. Previous events such as the attack on the US embassy in Kenya had pointed at a terrorist cell called Al Qaeda which, at that time, was based in Sudan but later took refuge in Afghanistan.[134]

On several occasions, the United States had requested the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the head of this terrorist group. Afghanistan had nevertheless refused even after the Security Council of the United Nations had passed resolutions demanding his extradition. After the September 11 attack, the United States understood that it would have to enforce this resolution by using force. Very few members of the international community criticised the US decision to send troops to Afghanistan in order to capture terrorists and destroy their training camps. Only the international legal community raised the issue of the legality of the operation, for under international law, as established in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, force can also be used in self-defence, namely after a State has suffered an actual armed attack. Still the majority supported the US intervention, notably NATO States which shortly after the attack declared their unanimous support to the United States. Some countries such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany also sent troops on the ground to help the US in the war against terrorism and to create a new State respective of human rights and rule

---

[132] Dallaire, R., & Dupuis, R. (2013). *Shake hands with the devil* (p. 608). Seville Produtions (Dallaire).

[133] Paul B. A. (1994). Islamic states and the United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women: Are the Shari'a and the convention compatible. *Am. UL Rev.*, *44*, 1949.

[134] Graaf, H. J. (1976). *Islamic states in Java 1500-1700: eight Dutch books and articles by HJ de Graaf* (Vol. 70). University of Washington Press.

of law. The member States were less supportive after the Bush statement relating to the "axis of evil" [135]

US prefers to give way to home popular opinion and advantageous military and political outcomes over ethics and the rule of law or, as others argue, probably because the US believes that the position of Germany and France does not reflect current international law. The United States is constantly using terminology relating to the discourse of "just war" and to the need to come to an end with Iraq before it is too late.[136] "By engaging in a "just war" in opposition to core Charter objectives to prevent states from using force in international relations to promote their policy agendas no matter how just, except for the right of self-defence or a collective decision by the Security Council",36 the US would be in breach of international law. Besides States, organisations are questioning the real aim of an attack against Iraq, whether such an operation serves any purpose other than finding a scapegoat and thereby gaining internal popular support in the United States. The lack of definition of terrorism has unfortunately led the US to believe that under the fight against terrorism, it could cover other aims of its current foreign policy. The international community is nonetheless well aware that an attack upon Baghdad and the thwarting of the regime of Saddam Hussein is not linked to the war against terrorism but the continuity of the US policy that began in 1991 against Iraq.[137]

3.3 International Community and the concept of Peace in Islamic states

According to Spalek[138] conflict resolution can be seen as a collection of peace building processes which include reconciliation, cooperation, dialogue, training and educational projects and conflict analysis. Peace on the other hand, can be said to be a definite end that can only be achieved by no means other than conflict resolution. This probably explains series of peace conferences which in the history of the world community have always been the natural result of major armed conflicts. For instance, the first officially recognized world war between 1914 and 1918 resulted to the 1919 peace conference which was opened in Paris. This conference was distinguished in many respects from any previous international conferences of its kind.

[135] Saul, B. (2005). *Defining'terrorism'in international law* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford).
[136] De Kock, P., & Sturman, K. (2012). The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State. *Governance*.
[137] Ibid p.45
[138] Spalek, B. (2010), "Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in relation to New Terrorism" Politics & Policy, 38/4.

For the purpose of enthroning peace, representatives of so many nationalities came together for the first time in the history of the global community. [139]

It was observed that the conference of 1919 had to make not just one but several peace treaties; and of course it was not just a series of negotiations among the parties but a very useful discussion among the envoys of the victors about peace terms to be imposed on the vanquished.[140] As far back as 1648, the international community had been searching for peace and security. Almost a three and half centuries ago, by the peace of Westphalia, the thirty year armed conflict between the Catholic and Protestant states of Europe was laid to rest. The peace of Westphalia of 1648, also as an instrument of conflict resolution terminated the long-time political domination of the Holy Roman Emperor which of course gave birth to political freedom of the protestant states of Europe. In-spite of these efforts to enthrone peace in place of war in the world, peace became elusive. By the end of Second World War, it became glaring that peace was the only.

The concept of peace is often confused with the concept of conflict resolution. Whereas, conflict resolution in accordance with the definition of Ladan, M.T., is õabout activities that seek to discover, identify and resolve the underlying root causes alternative to war. Thus, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in October 1944, the general idea of the United Nations was formulated. This gave birth to a new international organization to replace the discredited League of Nations, which was originally the brainchild of American President Wilson in 1919. With this latest development, the first draft of the Charter of the United Nations was signed by fifty-one Nations in San Francisco. Article 1of the Charter stated the purpose of the organization as the maintenance of World Peace and security.[141] According to the findings by the provisions of Article 2 of the UN Charter, the organization covenanted non-interference in the internal affairs of member states except whenever it is inevitable like enforcement of measures already approved by the Security Council. All these efforts and similar ones were directed towards achieving global peace as the sole alternative to armed conflict in the world. The question is where these purposes achieved? Or in other words to what

---

[139] Ibid p.23
[140] Hashmi, S. H. (2003). Is there an Islamic ethic of humanitarian intervention?. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 7(1), 55-73.
[141] Address delivered by General Tariq W. Ghazi in (2005), translated by BGen (Ret.) Feroz Khan

extent has the united nations maintained peace and security in the international community? It is against this background that this study is devoted to the concept of peace and Islamic state management. [142]

3.4 The International Community Mechanism to Combat the Islamic State Organization

According to the findings elements of the U.S. government are leading a multilateral coalition that seeks to õdegrade and ultimately destroyö the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it.[143] The international community is undertaking various measures, including direct military action, support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts to restrict flows of foreign fighters and disrupt the Islamic Stateøs finances. [144] Administration officials have described U.S. policy in Syria and Iraq as being driven by õISIL-firstö and õIraq-firstö approaches. Administration officials have identified areas where they believe progress has been made in implementing U.S. strategy to date, but have stated clearly that it may take months, and in some cases years to achieve the full range of U.S. objectives. In Iraq, the Administration emphasizes the importance of providing support tomultisectarian security forces under central government command and the preservation of Iraqøs political and territorial unity pursuant to its constitution. [145]

The United States seeks to isolate and reduce the areas where the Islamic State can operate in Syria in support of the top U.S. priority of rolling back IS gains in Iraq. To date, the Syrian government and Syrian military have fought the Islamic State in some areas but are not active partners in U.S. or coalition efforts against IS fighters inside Syria. In September 2014, U.S. officialøs reportedly warned the Syrian government of impending strikes on Syrian territory, but President Obama has said that the United States will not coordinate its actions in Syria with the Asad regime, which he said õterrorizes its own peopleö and õwill never regain the legitimacy it has lost. õIn January 2015, President Asad said in an interview that he was open to cooperation

---

[142] Bellamy, A. J. (2015). Responsibility to protect or Trojan horse? The crisis in Darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *19*(02), 31-54.

[143] Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. L. (2015). *Electing to fight*. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.

[144] Council on Foreign Relations, Conversation with Iraqi Kurdish President Masoud Barzani, May 8, 2015.

[145] White House Office of the Press Secretary, õStatement by the President on ISIL,ö September 10, 2014

with coalition forces but suggested that Syria had not granted õpermissionö for the ongoing coalition military strikes in Syria. [146]

According to the findings international community strategy seeks a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Syria and argues that President Asad and some of his supporters must leave office as part of such a settlement.[147] Congress and the Administration have provided nonlethal aid and reportedly provided lethal support in the form of weaponry and funding to some opposition groups in Syria. A new international community training program for Syrian fighters to combat the Islamic State has begun in earnest, and mirrors U.S. military training and support programs for Iraqi and Kurdish fighters. By all accounts, Syrian opposition forces remain divided in their goals and varied in their cohesiveness and capabilities. At the same time, some experts have taken note of setbacks for the strategy and argue that the U.S. goal should change to one of õcontainmentö of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, rather than outright defeat. [148]

Those who take this view maintain that defeating the Islamic State is likely beyond U.S. and partner capabilities in the context of resources and risks that the United States and partner countries are willing to bear. Advocates for a containment strategy tend to assess that linkage between Islamic State success in the Middle East region and any direct terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is tenuous. Opponents of this view contend that allowing the Islamic State to continue to exist risks perpetuating the threat to U.S. partners and interests and may provide the group with an opportunity to focus on attacking the United States, whether at home or abroad.

3.4.1 Disrupting Islamic State Financing

The international community is pursuing a policy to reduce the financial resources available to the Islamic State focuses on disrupting IS revenue streams, limiting the groupøs access to formal financial systems, and imposing sanctions on the groupøs senior leadership and financial facilitators. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen stated in late 2014 that the United States seeks to disrupt the groupøs revenue streams by targeting those who refine, transport, handle, or sell IS oil.[149] The United States is also working

---

[146] White House Office of the Press Secretary, õStatement by the President on ISIL,ö September 10, 2014.
[147] Ibid p.34
[148] Dov Zakheim, õThe Only ISIS Strategy Left for America: Containment,ö *The National Interest*, May 23, 2015.
[149] Testimony of Secretary Carter and Gen. Dempsey before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 11. 2015.

with regional partners to identify cross-border smuggling routes and persons involved in smuggling networks. The United States has urged United Nations (U.N.) member states to help cut off resources to the Islamic State, and the U.N. Security Council in September passed resolution 2178 and 2199 to combat the flow of money and foreign fighters to the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front). [150]

However, the findings[151] have stated that while some countries in the region have passed legislation aimed at curbing the flow of funds to terrorist groups, these laws are often not implemented or enforced. Moreover, foreign donations comprise only a small portion of the Islamic State's income. A U.S. military operation in Syria in May 2015 killed a senior Islamic State official reportedly involved in oil-related transactions for the group. In addition to financial and political measures, the United States is also employing military means to target IS funding streams. Beginning in August 2014, U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State have targeted oil facilities, including collection points and mobile refineries. In a November hearing, Cohen reported that the Islamic State's revenue from oil sales had dropped from $1 million a day to several million dollars a week.[152]

In January, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that coalition strikes had destroyed nearly 200 oil and gas facilities used by the Islamic State. The resulting loss of revenue, Kerry stated, was restricting the group's operations and in some cases limiting its ability to pay salaries. Restricting access to the financial system. Cohen[153] noted that the United States aims to restrict the Islamic State's access to the international financial system and to limit its ability to move, store, and use funds it acquires locally. In particular, the United States works with Iraqi authorities, banks' headquarters, and the international financial community to prevent the Islamic State from using local bank branches in areas under its control. However, Iraqi sources in January stated that the Islamic State had established its own bank in Mosul, which granted loans and accepted deposits.

---

[150] "Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State," testimony submitted by Matthew Levitt to the House Committee on Financial Services, November 13, 2014.
[151] Ibid p.43
[152] Ibid p.22
[153] Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014.

2.8.1.1 Financial sanctions

The international community also has imposed sanctions against Islamic State officials and their external financial backers. The Department of the Treasury designated 12 individuals for their role in soliciting funds, procuring military equipment, and recruiting foreign fighters, two of whom are based in Syria and are associated with the Islamic State. To date, few members of the Islamic State have been designated by the Department of the Treasury; U.S. officials have said this is in part due to the challenges in identifying individuals with a foothold in the formal financial system. U.N.[154] Security Council Resolution 2199 (February 2015) condemns engagement in direct or indirect trade, particularly in oil and oil products, õwith ISIL, ANF, and any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated as associated with Al Qaeda.ö The resolution reaffirms several requirements to restrict flows of arms, combat financing, and prevent trade in Syrian and Iraqi cultural property. The resolution also establishes a reporting mechanism on international implementation of existing related resolutions.[155]

3.4.2 Restricting Flows of Foreign Fighters

International community officials from the intelligence community, State Department, and other agencies concerned with domestic security continue to assess, monitor, and respond to threats posed by foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. Diplomatic and intelligence efforts focus on coordinating with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures.[156] In March 2014, the State Department named Ambassador Robert Bradtke as õsenior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters,ö and former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas Krajeski replaced Bradtke in that role in January 2015. Although the Islamic State organization is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is unclear whether it currently poses direct threats to U.S. homeland security.

Based on the findings a shooting attack by U.S. nationals in Texas in May 2015 was claimed by Islamic State personnel overseas, but U.S. officials had not suggested any direct operational links

---

[154] U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators, September 24, 2014.
[155] House Financial Services Committee hearing on Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State, November 13, 2014.
[156] White House, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region, September 24, 2014.

between the attackers and the Islamic State organization as of May 11. The Texas attack followed a spate of similar attacks in Europe and elsewhere, in which the alleged perpetrators appeared to be inspired by the Islamic State but not necessarily operationally linked to it. In November 2014, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen said in congressional testimony that õthe [ISIL] threat beyond the Middle East is real, although thus far limited in sophistication. According to U.S. officials, approximately 180 U.S. citizens have travelled or attempted to travel to Syria to support armed groups there since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, and approximately 12 Americans were believed by U.S. officials to have been fighting there as of September 2014. As noted above, anti IS operations have killed thousands of Islamic State personnel since August 2014, including an unknown number of foreign fighters. [157]

In May 2015, an unnamed senior State Department official said: weøve never seen something like this. Weøve never seen a terrorist organization with 22,000 foreign fighters from a hundred countries all around the world. To put it in context again, the numbers are fuzzy but itøs about double of what went into Afghanistan over 10 years in the war against the Soviet Union. Those jihadi fighters were from a handful of countries. These guys are coming from a hundred different countries. You combine that with social media, their efforts to inspire home-grown attacks, not even to have fighters come and train but do attacks at home, this is a formidable, enormous threat. [158]The U.S. government has supported the adoption of several U.N. Security Council Resolutions to strengthen international sanctions and halt flows of foreign fighters and financing to the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. Resolution 2170 (August 2014) calls upon all Member States õto take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,ö and reiterates Member Statesø obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and exchange information on the groups. Resolution 2178 (September 2014) requires Member States, consistent with international law, to prevent the

---

[157] Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Intelligence Committee, November 20, 2014.

[158] Deng, F. M. (2003). *Protecting the dispossessed: a challenge for the international community*. Brookings Institution Press.

"recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts." In December 2014, Ambassador Bradkte said, "Several countries have already enacted or proposed legislation to permit [prosecution for foreign fighter facilitation]; other countries have stepped up their enforcement of existing laws. We continue to urge partners to meet their obligations under UNSCR 2178, and are offering assistance to partners who may need help in doing so.

3.4.3 "Train and Equip" Assistance; Iraqi Security Forces

As of June 2015, approximately 3,100 U.S. military personnel have deployed to the Iraq theatre of operations to advise and train Iraqi forces, gather intelligence on the Islamic State, and secure U.S. personnel and facilities. Of the total, about two-thirds are advisers and trainers for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the peshmerga, and the rest support these forces and provide protection for U.S. civilian and military personnel in country. Coalition partners also have pledged and begun deploying about 1,500 advisers and trainers for the ISF. On June 10, President Obama announced the deployment of an additional 450 military personnel to expedite training of Iraqi forces at the Taqqadum military base near Habbaniyah in Anbar Province.[159]

According to the findings U.S. and coalition personnel are implementing joint Iraqi-coalition plans for the training of 12 Iraqi brigades (nine Iraqi Security Force [ISF] brigades and three Kurdish peshmerga brigades a total of about 25,000 personnel).[160] According to Major General Paul Funk, commander of Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq and the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. forces working at five capacity building sites had trained two Iraqi brigades as of early April and another three were "in various stages of readiness." In mid-April, the Obama Administration reported that 6,500 ISF personnel, "including peshmerga," had completed instruction and "more than 4,900" were then in training.[161]

Training is expected to continue over a period of about 8 to 10 months. The U.S. and partner deployments are intended to address severe weaknesses in Iraq's ground forces. After

---

[159] Ibid p.55

[160] Castells, M. (2014). *The power of identity: The information age: Economy, society, and culture* (Vol. 2). John Wiley & Sons.

[161] Ibid p20

undertaking an assessment of Iraqi military forces in 2014, U.S. advisers concluded that only about half of all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units were sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory through the provision of further targeted advisory assistance.[162]

The definition of õcapable,ö according to U.S. officials, included whether an ISF unit integrates both Sunni and Shiite personnel. Some private assessments by nongovernment observers argued that even fewer ISF units were capable of reversing the Islamic State gains, and underscored the continuing role of Shiite militia groups in defending Iraqi-government held territory and conducting offensive operations against IS forces. U.S. military personnel in Iraq are currently not tasked with providing advisory or training support to Iraqi personnel in combat settings or with engaging directly in combat against hostile entities other than for force protection purposes. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign against the Islamic State progresses and more complex operations are required by Iraqi Security Forces, he could recommend that U.S. personnel accompany Iraqi forces.[163]

Congress authorized and provided $1.6 billion in funding for the U.S. training efforts in Iraq in the FY2015 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) and FY2015 appropriations act (H.R. 83, P.L. 113-235). The funding provision (Iraq Train and Equip Fund in Division C of P.L. 113-235) stipulates that 40% of the requested U.S. train and equip funds is not eligible to be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1236 of P.L. 113-291) includes this cost-sharing provision, and also limits the availability of funds for the newly authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program and strategy reports to Congress.[164] It also requires 90-day progress reporting. Under the FY2015 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized: to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and other security

---

[162] Ibid p.31
[163] Briefing by White House Spokesman Josh Earnest, May 26, 2015.
[164] Hashmi, S. H. (2003). Is there an Islamic ethic of humanitarian intervention?. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *7*(1), 55-73.

forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through December 31, 2016, for the following purposes: Defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations from the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and groups supporting ISIL. Securing the territory of Iraq. The Administration's FY2016 Defense appropriations request seeks a further $715 million in U.S. funding for the Iraq training program. The House-passed version of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1223 of H.R. 1735) would authorize the appropriation of $715 million in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for security assistance to Iraqi security forces, including the Kurdish peshmerga; Sunni tribal security forces with a national security mission; and a proposed õIraqi Sunni National Guard.ö Prime Minister Abadi and some other leading Iraqis have criticized congressional proposals to authorize the provision of U.S. assistance directly to certain forces other than the ISF.

3.4.3.1 Foreign Military Sales and Arms Transfers

According to the findings the United States also has undertaken new efforts to equip existing Iraqi forces. Since the Islamic State-led capture of Mosul in June 2014, the United States has proposed sales of over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad and has delivered õthe equivalent of roughly 5-6 brigadesø worth of individual soldier weapons and equipment.ö Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s, first proposed for purchase by Iraq in 2011, remain in their early stages, with Iraqi pilots õin the training pipeline.ö Deliveries of 250 U.S.-donated Mine Resistant Armor Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) were completed in early 2015, with 50 more planned as of April 2015. In December 2014, U.S. officials also proposed sales to Iraq that may be worth nearly $3 billion for 1,000 M1151AI Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 175 M1A1 tanks with spare parts, communications, and ammunition. Press reports suggest that during his April 2015 visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Abadi sought U.S. approval for the delivery of Apache attack helicopters first proposed for sale and lease in 2014and unmanned aerial vehicles.

In the wake of the fall of Ramadi and the Islamic State's reported mass use of armored vehicle bombs there, U.S. officials announced plans to speed the delivery of 2,000 unguided AT-4 anti-tank weapons to Iraqi forces. The Senate Armed Services Committee-reported version of the

FY2016 NDAA (Section 1225 of S. 1376) would prohibit the provision of further assistance to Iraq õunless appropriate steps have been taken by the Government of Iraq to safeguard against transferring or otherwise providing such assistance to violent extremist organizations.ö The bill would require the Administration to report on any such transfers and on end-use monitoring and assistance security arrangements in Iraq.

3.4.4 "Train and Equip" Assistance; Iraqi Kurdish and Sunni Arab Forces

It was observed that U.S. training and advisory programs in Iraq also include efforts to support Kurdish peshmerga and Sunni Arab tribal forces affiliated with Iraqøs national government. Current U.S. policy provides U.S. material and advisory support to these forces in coordination with the national government in Baghdad.[165] This policy corresponds with the Iraqiøs governmentøs request and reflects U.S. law that identifies countries and international organizations as the specified lawful recipients of direct U.S. security assistance. To date, Congress has adopted Iraq-specific legislation authorizing U.S. assistance to Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and other security forces provided that these forces are affiliated with the Iraqi government. The FY2015 NDAA (Section 1236 of P.L. 113-291) authorized the provision of assistance to security forces õof or associated with the Government of Iraq,ö as well as õtribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission.ö For the specific training of the 12 brigades discussed above. Several legislative proposals in the 114th Congress would authorize the direct provision of U.S. assistance to Kurdish and/or other non-national level security forces in Iraq, more broadly subject to several conditions. These proposals have been the subject of considerable debate in Iraq.[166]

3.4.5 The US Military Strikes Against IS Targets

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency[167] the U.S. and coalition forces have used combat aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea launched cruise missiles to conduct more than 3,700 strikes in Iraq since August 8, 2014, and in Syria since September 22, 2014.The stated objectives of U.S. strikes have evolved as circumstances have changed and some goals have been

---

[165] Chase, A. E. (2004). Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism. *Va. J. Int'l L.*, *45*, 41.
[166] Press report In August 2014
[167] Jackson, R. H. (1993). *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World* (Vol. 12). Cambridge University Press.

achieved: The initial focus was on stopping the advance of Islamic State forces and reducing threats to American personnel and religious minorities in northern Iraq; now it is supporting defensive and offensive military operations by Iraqi military and Kurdish forces and weakening the Islamic State organization's ability to support its operations in Iraq from its bases inside Syria. Other U.S. strikes have targeted individuals and locations associated with what U.S. officials describe as "the Khorasan Group," a reputed affiliate of Al Qaeda's central leadership still based in Pakistan and that reportedly has engaged in preparations for transnational terrorist attacks.

The findings revealed that President Obama has stated that he does not believe the introduction of large-scale U.S. ground forces for combat operations is necessary in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Rather, he has stated that U.S. efforts to reverse Islamic State gains on the ground will pair continued airstrikes with expanded efforts to advise and strengthen local Iraqi and Syrian partner forces. Some U.S. military officials have indicated that they are prepared to recommend the introduction of some ground forces if they believe such forces are required to achieve U.S. objectives. Some Members of Congress have suggested U.S. military ground forces may be required to achieve short-term objectives and protect long-term national security interests. In March 2015 congressional testimony, some U.S. military officials suggested that U.S. and coalition air operations in Iraq and Syria could continue for three or more years.[168]

3.5 Strengths of Islamic states as a threat to global peace and security

It was observed that in recent months the Islamic State (IS; formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS) has managed to position itself as the most significant threat to regional stability in the Middle East. The organization has become a reviled global term, a synonym for extremism and a symbol of unbridled slaughter.[169] The mass executions carried out by IS in Iraq and Syria, documented and distributed en masse for all to see, reflect the shock and awe strategy used by IS in the areas it has captured. In addition, its threats to conquer other Middle East states have resounded widely, giving it the media status of a global power in the

---

[168] Testimony of U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Ellen M. Pawlikowski and Lt. Gen. James M. Holmes, House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, March 26, 2015.
[169] Benjamin, D., & Simon, S. (2002). *The age of sacred terror*. Random House Incorporated.

making. In this way, IS has made itself the de facto replacement of al-Qaeda as the jihadist terror organization endangering world peace.

The findings indicate that without minimizing the achievements of IS, it appears that the secret of its power rests primarily on the weakness of its enemies.[170] So far, IS has made territorial gains only in Iraq and in limited areas of Syria, two failed states whose central governments suffer from a lack of legitimacy among their citizens and ineffective control of large parts of their territory. The Iraqi army has proven a spiritless failure, while in Syria the army is mainly engaged in maintaining the survival of the regime in the country's principal cities. This power vacuum lets IS operate with relative freedom in outlying regions and towns. Yet while in the areas it has conquered IS has apparently encountered so little opposition due to its policy of coercion and terror against the local populations, in the long run it is actually this policy that could spur many to resist it. [171]

Most Sunni Muslims are not interested in the extreme interpretations of IS, but at this stage have no choice but to obey the organization, if only for the sake of appearances. Should IS try to extend its conquests to areas of Iraq where there is an established Shiite population, such as the capital Baghdad or the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, it may well encounter a fighting population protected by an Iranian military force and deeper involvement of Western countries, as happened when it threatened to penetrate the heart of the Kurdish region of Iraq. A similar response is expected to happen if IS dares to confront Jordan or Turkey. For that reason, its threats to make similar advances against other countries of the region Jordan, Lebanon, and certainly Iran and Turkey are weak.

It was also observed that the main danger posed by IS does not concern the integrity of countries in the region, but its ability both to channel money and advanced weapons to terror organizations active in the region, and to make the territory it controls, which connects western Iraq with northern and eastern Syria, an impervious haven. This could serve as a base for promoting subversive activity and spreading terror, which in turn would increase regional instability. An area of this sort controlled by an extremist, messianic organization such as IS will enable jihadist Salafist terror groups from all over the world to find refuge, and use it as their base for further

---

[170] Bush, G. W. (2009). *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. Wordclay.
[171] Rice, S. E., & Patrick, S. (2008). *Index of state weakness in the developing world*. Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution.

terror activity. It will provide training, with people and weapons moving freely in and out, and will turn the al-Qaeda dream of two decades ago into the nightmare reality of this decade.

It appears that the fears recently expressed by the leaders of Britain, the US, and France about the export of terror from the Middle East to their own countries has a solid base. Even if IS, as expected, is confronted effectively in Iraq and Syria by stronger and better organized forces, the phenomenon of global jihad, whose main proponents until now were al-Qaeda and its affiliates and are now IS and its affiliates, will presumably continue to be strengthened by a new generation of jihadis. Their goal is to revive the international terror system that was to a large extent thwarted over the years since the attacks in the United States. It is inconceivable that thousands of young people from Western countries who are participating in the battles in Syria and Iraq will not return to their countries of origin and try to spread the militant jihadist Salafist indoctrination they have received. They stand to use their experience in terror attacks in Western cities, whether as part of IS or al-Qaeda, or by setting up independent terror networks or even acting alone. Therefore, the broad international coalition of countries that were called on belatedly to take action against the terror of al-Qaeda and its affiliates following the shock of 9/11 should now wake up in time to stop the IS phenomenon in its infancy, before they are obliged to do so under the threat of terror in their own cities.

3.6 Conclusion

The findings points out that maintaining international peace and security in all corners of the world is the primary objective of the international community Security Council; it is necessary for the Security Council to address all threats to international peace and to the lives of innocent civilians.[172] For several years, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a self-proclaimed Sunni state has posed a threat to international security in the Middle East and especially in the war torn Syrian Arab Republic and the politically volatile Republic of Iraq, carrying out terroristic activities, committing crimes against humanity, and claiming the lives of innocent civilians.

It was observed that with the involvement of the majority of the P5 nations, and a sizable amount of the international community, in terms of conducting air strikes against the Islamic

---

[172] Stein, J. G. (2013). *Threat Perception In International Relations*. Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

State in Syria, new problems arise. These problems range from the possibility of collateral damage, the unintentional killing of civilians and the question of Syrian and Iraqi sovereignty. The international community must thoroughly address this threat to international peace, reaching international consensus on an action plan to be carried out to maintain peace in the region once again.

CHAPTER FOUR
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY

4.0 Introduction

This chapter covers data presentation and analysis of the data collected through a number of existing literatures, consisting mainly of reports and studies from the UN, research institutes and NGOǿs, articles, journals, internet, reports, theses, and archives among other sources and media accounts in relation to managing Islamic states: an analysis the mechanisms by the international community

4.1 General Overview of Islamic state

The Islamic State, also known as ISIL or ISIS, has been described by senior U.S. officials as one of the best-funded terrorist organizations. Its wealth has contributed to the groupǿs ability to finance sophisticated military operations across parts of Iraq and Syria. It also seeks to use its revenue to administratively control and govern the territory it has seized. In several respects, the Islamic State presents a unique policy challenge to combating terrorist financing. Its financial strength lies in its ability to secure large amounts of funding from primarily internal sources, its lack of reliance on international sources of funds, and its exploitation of ungoverned spaces and porous borders to move funds with impunity.[173] These characteristics often place the organizationǿs finances beyond the reach of some of the most common counterterrorist financing policy tools. The Islamic State controls a variety of public resources and infrastructure in parts of Iraq and Syria, enabling it to assemble a õdiverse financial portfolio.ö[174]

The findings indicated that some of these resources, such as oil and antiquities, can be smuggled and sold for considerable profit.[175] Others agriculture and energy and water utilities generate limited revenue and require a significant investment in inputs or technical expertise, but help the group portray itself as exercising the functions of a legitimate government. Activities such as kidnapping for ransom or the looting of state banks in Iraq are profitable in the near-term but not

---

[173] Arkoun, M. (2007). *Rethinking Islam: Common questions, uncommon answers*. Westview Press.
[174] Ibid p.39
[175] Benthall, J. (2009). The overreaction against Islamic charities. *Isim Review*, *20*, 2.

necessarily sustainable. In other cases, IS control over a set of resources is notable not solely for the revenue the group derives from it, but also for the extent to which it limits the ability of the Iraqi and Syrian governments to conduct trade, provide utility services, or feed its citizens. Targeting the Islamic State's finances is one of five core lines of effort to degrade and defeat the terrorist organization. General John Allen, the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, stated in early 2015 that the United States cannot defeat ISIL through military efforts alone, and highlighted the need to deprive the group of access to financial resources.

Based on the findings U.S. policy to counteract IS financing has concentrated on three primary areas: disrupting the group's main sources of funding, restricting its access to the international financial system, and imposing sanctions on its senior leadership and financial facilitators.[176] The United States also has sought to collaborate with international partners, including through cooperation on financial intelligence collection and analysis. Although military airstrikes on IS-linked oil infrastructure and supply networks have already altered the organization's financial profile, counterterrorist financing policy responses remain nascent. Policymakers continue to grapple with how to develop quick and effective responses to combat IS financing. Some caution that counter-finance tactics may need to be balanced with consideration of the economic harm such actions may inflict on civilian populations in IS controlled territory. In the absence of alternatives, particularly for key resources such as oil, utilities, and agriculture, efforts to counter IS-financing could damage local economies and services and contribute to an expanding humanitarian crisis in the region.

4.2 Islamic states mission
4.2.1 Enticement, Then Brutality

According to the findings many members have joined the Islamic State out of economic interest. In Syria, for example, some FSA fighters left their $60 per month positions to join Jabhat al-Nusra, which offered them $300 a month, and later joined the Islamic State, which offered them

---

[176] Smith, M. (2013). Between ‑soft power ‑and a hard place: European Union foreign and security policy between the Islamic world and the United States. *International Politics*, *46*(5), 596-615.

even higher salaries.[177] Gerdes states that the Islamic State also seeks to increase its population by attracting foreign recruits, not just to become fighters but also residents. Foreigners are attractive because they often possess skills that would enable the group to realize its goal of establishing a lasting state. Foreign recruits like technocrats are therefore offered higher salaries than local recruits (reportedly $1,200 a month and $400 a month respectively, in addition to family benefits).[178] But economic need is only part of the reason for joining. Many become members in pursuit of a higher aim, a sense of identity, and power.[179] For ordinary individuals in the Middle East or elsewhere, the Islamic State provides an opportunity to become extraordinary almost overnight. This cult like appeal has managed to attract people from 80 different nationalities. In interviews with members of the group in Tunisia, the largest source of foreign fighters in Syria, whole families were reported to have moved to the self-proclaimed caliphate in pursuit of what they said was an õauthenticö Islamic way of life following decades under a secular regime.

According to the findings East of Raqqa, such as in western Deir Ezzor, the Islamic State has been able to expand through alliances with tribes and the local populations.[180] When the group first entered areas of Aleppo, its fighters distributed food parcels. Such enticement has helped to establish deep ties with locals and cultivate a sense of legitimacy for the Islamic State that may enable it to survive in the long term. But enticement is only the initial phase of the Islamic Stateøs approach to governing new areas. Once the group establishes its presence, those who have lived under its control say it begins to systematically intimidate the population to keep it in check.[181]

---

[177] Bekele, Y. (2013). *Samuel Zwemer's missionary strategy towards Islam* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham).

[178] Gerdes, F. (2013). *Civil war and state formation: the political economy of war and peace in Liberia* (Vol. 9). Campus Verlag.

[179] Watheka, C. W. (2015). *The Youth and the Potential for Involvement in Acts of Terrorism: A Case Study of the Eastleigh Surburb in Nairobi, Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa).

[180] Hashemi, K. (2008). *Religious legal traditions, international human rights law and Muslim states*. BRILL.

[181] Ibid p,80

Based on the findings Islamic State has been increasing the level of brutality used in dealing with the local population and forcing its compliance. For example, schoolteachers were sent written notices to report to the group's offices to repent for teaching an õinfidelö curriculum. Those who did not respond were subsequently threatened that their homes would be destroyed if they did not comply. While there are signs that popular resentment of the Islamic State is growing, ordinary people who live in areas under its control lack the capacity to resist its force. And because the Syrian regime has largely stopped renewing passports, many people who would like to leave those areas to go abroad are no longer able to do so.[182]

4.3 Impact of Islamic states on international peace and security

Based on the findings the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a clear threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and to the broader Middle East, as well as U.S. persons, allies and interests in the region. Left unchecked, ISIL could pose a growing threat beyond the region, including to the U.S. homeland. In Raqqa, Syria, the Islamic State's "caliphate" has already become a reality.[183] All women in the city are required to wear the niqab veil and pants are banned. Thieves have their hands hacked off and opponents are publicly crucified or beheaded, with the images of these horrific acts then posted on social networks. The few hair salons that are still open are required to black out the pictures of women on the packaging for hair dye solutions. Weddings are only permitted to take place without music.[184] And at livestock markets, the hindquarters of goats and sheep must be covered in order to prevent men from viewing their genitalia and having uncomely thoughts. Any person caught out on the street during the five daily prayer times is risking his or her life.[185] The jihadists with the Islamic State, or IS, are

[182] Waziri, F. (2011). *Strengthening of Anti-Corruption Commissions and Laws in Nigeria* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).

[183] Ikechukwu, E. (2013). *Being a Christian in Igbo Land: Facts, Fictions and Challenges*. Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH.

[184] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2011). *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Oxford University Press.

[185] Rubin, B. R. (2012). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system*. Yale University Press.

acting out their fantasies of omnipotence in the name of God. They're murdering, torturing and forcing families to give their daughters away for marriage to Islamist fighters coming in from abroad. One girl whose family agreed to marry her off took her own life.

The findings further indicated that in Syria, IS militants and their predecessors have killed countless people in recent years, and over 160,000 in total have died during the Syrian civil war. Yet it is only now that the world is waking up, now that the conflict has spilled into Iraq, where the Islamic State also appears to be spreading its tentacles without much resistance.[186] Pictures were needed in order for the international community to understand the scale of the horror unfolding in Iraq and just how inhumanely the Islamic State terrorist militia is acting. Images allowed the global community to become witnesses to the plight of the Yazidis, followers of one of the world's most obscure religions, as they were forced to flee into the mountains, begging for help as they died of thirst. In the eyes of the IS fanatics, the Yazidis are "devil worshippers," people who deserve to die. It was only this threat of genocide that moved the global community to act. Countries around the world quickly united in the battle against IS, by far the world's most brutal, most successful and most sinister jihadist troop.[187]

In recent weeks, IS fighters managed to drive out the peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Autonomous Government of Iraq with disturbing ease. In some cases the Kurdish soldiers, previously considered the best Iraq has to offer, didn't even resist. The IS threat has even brought rapprochement between the peshmerga and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), who had long been enemies.

4.3.1 A Common Enemy for the US and Iran

As observed the United States and Iran have likewise found a common enemy in the Islamic State.[188] And within just a few weeksø time, countries in the West have proven capable decisions

---

[186] Rubin, B. R. (2012). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system.* Yale University Press.

[187] Huntington, S. P. (2010). Democracy for the long haul. *Journal of democracy*, *7*(2), 3-13

[188] Khalilzad, Z., & Byman, D. (2010). Afghanistan: The consolidation of a rogue state. *Washington Quarterly*, *23*(1), 65-78.

that would have been inconceivable not long ago. European countries, for example, now want to deliver weapons to the Kurds, seeing them as the only reliable allies in the region. Meanwhile, the US, which withdrew its troops from Iraq just two years ago, saw no alternative to intervening in the new conflict with Special Forces and fighter jets.[189]

Little could do more to underscore the failure of America's Iraq adventure than the bombing of US weapons systems by US fighter planes in northern Iraq in recent weeks. They also had to eliminate armored vehicles and mobile artillery units that they had once delivered to the Iraqi army -- and which fell into the hands of the Islamic State in June. But the IS isn't just brutal, it is also sophisticated. Until the peshmerga regained the territory late last week, IS even temporarily had control of the Mosul dam, the largest rivers and, with them, large parts of Iraq's supplies of drinking water. And it still controls large stocks of wheat and important agricultural areas. [190]

4.3.2 Effect Islamic states to all stakeholders

ISIS makes a large number of enemies, most of which can be divided into two categories. The first category includes pagans, atheists and their regimes. The United States, Europe and Russia belong to the pagans and China belongs to the atheist. According to their division, most people in the world are õenemies of Islam.ö Enemies are not to be totally exterminated, and those who convert will be treated in the same manner. The second category mostly refers to Islamøs so-called õtraitors,ö a category that includes individual traitors and traitor regimes. Since ISIS is an extremist ideology and Sunni fundamentalist movement that worships the doctrine of õJihadi Soldiers of God,ö the teachings and fiqh of Shia Islam are deemed to be heresy and their followers are required to convert to Sunnism, or be treated as õindividual traitors.ö Shia regimes should be overturned, as they are against Islamic law and are thus õtraitor regimes.ö On the basis of such divisions, the regimes of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon should to be overturned. In light of al-Masri and al-Baghdadøs fatwas, it is not just Shia individuals and regimes that are the enemies of Islam. Many Sunni Muslims are also õindividual traitorsö and õtraitor regimes.ö Other ideologies, movements and organizations have become apostates, with the exception of the

[189] Parsi, T. (2012). *Treacherous alliance: The secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.
[190] Lewis, B. (2014). *The crisis of Islam: Holy war and unholy terror*. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Nigerian Boko Haram, Jemaah Islamiah in Egypt and Southeast Asia, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Philippines Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and al-Shabaab. The Islamic world is therefore earnestly in need of salvation and transformation.

According to the findings the expansion of ISIS, resting on Syria and Iraq, challenges the United States' interests in the Middle East.[191] The fruits of geopolitics and õdemocratic transformationö in the wake of the Iraq War will come to naught in light of the establishment of ISIS. The Islamic State is also bent on eliminating Israel, which is unacceptable to the United States. The Islamic jihad led by the Islamic State directly squeezes the õShia Crescentö and threatens Iran's geo-strategic interests. The Islamic State has also committed itself to overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad regime, posing a challenge to Russia's õsphere of influenceö in the Middle East. It also swears to occupy Xinjiang, which is a potential threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[192]

4.3.1 The Islamic State and Syrian Oil

It was observed that much of the physical and economic damage to the Syrian oil sector took place between March 2011 and June 2014, when IS forces expanded their control of oil producing regions in northeast Syria. The Islamic State organization needs and uses oil for a variety of purposes. Refined oil is needed to fuel ISIS vehicles as well as for civilian use within areas under IS control. Crude oil can be sold for cash to finance the group, or traded for refined products. Selling IS oil is technically difficult because the group has no traditional export facilities or access to the open market. As a result, the group must ship its oil by truck to the Turkish border where oil brokers and traders buy the oil and make cash payments, or payments in kind of petroleum products. Because the Syrian government considers IS oil to be stolen contraband and because international sanctions limit the markets the oil can legally enter, IS oil trades at a steeply discounted price. Reliable, documented oil quantity and price data for IS transactions are unavailable due to their illegal nature. It has been reported that IS oil might have been selling for as little as $18 per barrel at the Turkish border, when Brent, a world price

---

[191] Slavin, B. (2009). *Bitter friends, bosom enemies: Iran, the US, and the twisted path to confrontation*. Macmillan.

[192] Clarke, R. A. (2013). *Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror*. Simon and Schuster.

reference crude oil was selling for about $107 per barrel. Recently, the price of Brent has declined to about $65 per barrel, a decrease of over 50% since June 2014. The fall in world oil prices has likely further reduced the net price received by IS leaders for the oil they sell.[193]

4.4 Strategies Used By International Community to Counter Threats by Islamic State

The findings established that even though Iraq lost a quarter of its territories in after the first six months of international coalition air strikes, it still managed to advance into the city of Ramadi in May 2015. The coalition's focus on Iraq has allowed the Islamic State to double the area under its control in Syria, despite a number of tactical withdrawals and losses in Kurdish areas.[194] Additionally, the group has enlarged the scope of its operations southward, where it has been targeting the Free Syrian Army's Southern Front, and westward in Aleppo. But the success of the Islamic State must not be judged by the size of territories under its control. Rather, it should be measured by the resilience of the group as a whole.[195] Part of this resilience is due to the group's constant search for solutions to the challenges it is facing and to its ability to adapt its theater-level operations and tactics accordingly. But the Islamic State's successes are also a product of the opportunities it is taking advantage of. The findings indicate that those opportunities are the result of weaknesses in the international coalition's strategy, including inadequate attention to addressing sectarian grievances in Iraq and the continuation of the Assad regime in Syria in the absence of a solution to the conflict. For the international community and regional actors, the Islamic State represents a serious threat to regional and even global security. The coalition established and led by the United State is a positive step toward tackling this threat; however, it is far from adequate. While the Islamic State's strategy is diverse and includes social and economic components as well as military ones, the coalition's campaign remains focused on military activity; that military activity is largely limited to air strikes mainly targeting the Islamic State's urban centers, as opposed to its desert-based command centers. As a result, the group has retained the ability to direct its global operations.

According to the findings the air strikes themselves have been a double-edged sword. In Syria, they have resulted in the deaths of FSA fighters who had been held by the Islamic State. At the

---

[193] Amuzegar, J. (2015). Iran's crumbling revolution. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK-*, *82*(1), 44-57.
[194] Ibid p. 39
[195] Ibid p.70

outset of the strikes in 2014, 200 such fighters were killed in a coalition strike on an Islamic State court where they had been detained in Abu Kamal, in the east, while 300 FSA fighters faced a similar fate in Raqqa.[196] The air strikes on Raqqa have also killed mostly civilians, thereby increasing the population's anger at the West. Some Syrian tribes in the eastern part of the country have grown closer to the Islamic State as a result, as they complain that the international community did not intervene against the Assad regime but only against an organization that is presenting itself as fighting the regime.

In addition the findings indicate that a similar sentiment is expressed in Iraq, where local resentment against the coalition's indirect cooperation with Shia militias in the fight against the Islamic State is increasing, especially given the level of looting that those militias have been engaged in in areas like Tikrit.[197] The high degree of sectarianism in Iraq and the fact that the Islamic State emerged from the area in 2003 mean that the group has deep ties in the country that will be difficult to undo without comprehensive measures to win the trust of the local Sunni population. Even coalition successes have come at a great material cost. In Kobane, peshmerga ground forces provided intelligence about Islamic State locations in the town, which coalition fighter jets used to set their bombing targets. The result was the flattening of Kobane. Applying the same approach to other areas like Mosul would be catastrophic.

Further the findings established that while the air strikes may have weakened the Islamic State, they will not be able to eradicate it. The group has a long-term goal and it is counting on Syria's descent into a failed state in order to raise a new generation of loyalists. This should prompt reflection on the impossibility of eliminating the Islamic State without achieving a political solution to the Syrian conflict. The Syrian regime has presented itself as a counterterrorism partner to the West, and some countries have explored the idea of working with the Assad regime to fight the Islamic State. But this is not a realistic approach. It is important to remember that the group is partly a product of the Assad regime itself; even if the regime were to be

---

[196] Ben H., (2014)."Syria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fire" New York Times, January 17, 2014
[196] Testimony of CIA Director John Brennan, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2014.
[197] Al-Hamarneh, A., & Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.

engaged in the fight against the Islamic State, it would remain in Assad's interest to retain jihadist activity in Syria to support his assertion that he is countering extremism.[198]

According to the findings it is equally unrealistic to expect to eradicate the Islamic State first and then deal with political transition in Syria. The two should run simultaneously, which means that there must be an internationally supported political strategy for Syria that would prevent the country from descending into the kind of chaos witnessed in Libya after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi. In the short term, the challenges faced by the Islamic State can be used as opportunities for the international coalition to identify and exploit points of weakness.[199] Although the group's leadership is attempting to find solutions to those problems, from overstretched resources to governance challenges to local grievances, many of them can be utilized to increase pressure on the organization from within. Attempts to use propaganda against the Islamic State must therefore not focus on ideology and, for example, arguments that the group is not truly Islamist but on the contradictory dynamics of everyday life and of battlefields under its umbrella, such as its inconsistent governance practices. The nations arrayed against the Islamic State should also increase the monitoring of individuals and groups outside Syria and Iraq who might act as sleeper cells. Turkey can also play a seminal role in the short term. Before 2011, the Syrian-Iraqi border was difficult to penetrate. The conflict in Syria made this border porous, which allowed what was then al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State's parent organization, to gain access to fighters who were crossing into Iraq after having entered Syria through Turkey. Turkey has stepped up its cooperation with the anti-Islamic State coalition, including through closing its border with Syria, but it has stopped short of allowing coalition aircraft to operate from Turkish bases. Access to such bases would help the coalition campaign better reach targets in Syria.

4.5 Challenges faced in Countering the Islamic State

On challenges faced in countering the Islamic State the findings indicate the Islamic State depends on controlling territory in order to finance its operations; if the group loses or fails to seize additional territory, its financial strength may not be sustainable in the long term. Even though international community are trying to interfere with finance its operations a great

---

[198] Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.
[199] Ibid p. 37

challenge is that the Islamic State's appropriation of illicit trafficking networks for its financial gain is a testament to the enduring nature of cross-border smuggling in the region, which the Saddam Hussein regime used in the 1990s to evade U.N. sanctions against Iraq and exploit the U.N. Oil-for-Food program. The existence of long-standing smuggling routes in the region also suggests that dismantling the smuggling routes will be difficult. Islamic State's ability to draw on multiple sources of funding poses a challenge to U.S. and international efforts to contain and degrade the group's strength. The diverse sources of revenue may well safeguard the group, at least in the short term, from shocks that could result from the disruption of any single revenue stream. For example, although some observers have expressed hope that recent reductions in the global price of oil may disrupt the Islamic State's financial base, the group seems to have found viable alternative fundraising opportunities, including local extortion, kidnap for ransom schemes, increased import duties, and receipt of donations from foreign benefactors.[200]

4.6 Conclusion

The growing influence of the terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS) is a worrisome prospect for international community. However, the international community is undertaking various measures, including direct military action, support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts to restrict flows of foreign fighters and disrupt the Islamic State's finances. Administration officials have described U.S. policy in Syria and Iraq as being driven by ðISIL-firstö and ðIraq-firstö approaches. Administration officials have identified areas where they believe progress has been made in implementing U.S. strategy to date, but have stated clearly that it may take months, and in some cases years to achieve the full range of U.S. objectives. In Iraq, the Administration emphasizes the importance of providing support tomultisectarian security forces under central government command and the preservation of Iraq's political and territorial unity pursuant to its constitution.

---

[200] Nu m n , F. (2010). *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. Zed books.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of the findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to on mechanisms employed by international community in managing Islamic states.

5.2 Summary of the findings

The findings of the study revealed that the Islamic state has its origins in an obscure militant group, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) that was stood up in 2000 by a Jordanian one-time criminal-turned-Islamist named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ). However the findings established that Islamic state has appropriated the radical Islamist ideology of al-Qaeda while implementing the centralized command model of the paramilitary Hezbollah and some tactics from the Talibanøs local governance structures. Its strategy for survival and growth has relied on a number of components: pragmatism regarding the Syrian regime; the control and development of territories as a method of commanding local populations and attracting foreign fighters; the use of ideology and the media as tools to control populations, recruit fighters, and raise funds; and a centralized military strategy.

Based on the findings since Islamic state expansion into Syria in 2013, the Sunni extremist group has been engaged in an existential battle with al-Qaeda. And, with all of its strategic tools, the Islamic State has presented itself as the õtrueö al-Qaeda, asserting that it is making al-Qaedaøs ideological goal of an Islamic state a concrete reality, which provides a cloak of authenticity that has appealed to donors and recruits. But although ideology plays an important role in how the Islamic State operates, the organizations strategic objectives are not driven by ideology but instead revolve around the acquisition of money, resources, and power.[201] Establishing a caliphate in Iraq and Syria is therefore the beginning, not the end, for the group the clue to the Islamic Stateøs long-term aims lies in its slogan, õlasting and expandingö (*baqiya wa*

---

[201] Ibid p. 70

tatamaddad). However, this does not mean simply the indefinite geographical expansion of the caliphate's physical boundaries, but also the expansion of its global influence in order to support the viability of the state project. The Islamic State has garnered much attention for its use of propaganda, particularly its releases of videos of violent acts, its publication of an online magazine and several pamphlets and booklets, and its use of social media. Propaganda is both a tool of recruitment for the organization and a tool of war that is often used to supplement military action, and sometimes to compensate for it.

Based on the findings the long-term risks from ISIL and ANF are many. In the region, both groups threaten civilian populations with the risk of summary executions , rape, extortion, the forced expulsion of ethnic and religious minorities, intimidation and violence towards the Sunni and Shia Muslim population, and the continuing use of IEDs and suicide bombers in indiscriminate attacks in public places. Meanwhile ISIL continue to exacerbate sectarian tensions through its violence towards Shia Muslims and through the killing and oppression of Sunnis who reject its warped, extremist ideology. This has an impact beyond Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, generating tensions internationally.

The findings further indicate that the threat beyond the region derives from three primary strands. The first of these are the large and diverse networks of foreign terrorist fighters, primarily associated with ISIL but also present within ANF, that originate from over 80 countries and number over 15,000. Just as ANF and ISIL were established by veterans, there is a high risk that alumni of ISIL and ANF will threaten peace and security in other countries in the months and years to come. Not all foreign terrorist fighters will pursue Al - Qaida-associated goals when they leave Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but a number will, and these will engage in radicalization, recruitment and terrorist attack planning. There is also a clear intent by ISIL to target the West and a range of other Member States, as demonstrated by ISIL propaganda on the Internet as well as the execution of four Western hostages since August 2014 and attacks like the one in Belgium perpetrated by assailants associated operationally and ideologically with ANF and ISIL. This is also supported by plans of selected foreign terrorist fighters to conduct attacks in their countries of origin.[202]

---

[202] http://opcw.unmissions.org/.

On Strengths of Islamic states as a threat to global peace and security the findings established that no one knows how many fighters ISIS has, but some estimates have put their numbers at 15,000 or more, with up to three times that number available to fight if necessary. Their increasingly brutal, brazen attacks and tactics have raised alarms that they could have their sights on expanding their operations beyond Iraq and Syria. It is evident from the modes of operations and manner of gruesome attacks of ISIS that the group is likely to be more powerful than the al Qaeda. According to the findings the group is expanding its reach on the long border between Iraq and Syria, where the combination of the Syrian civil war and a weak government in Iraq has allowed ISIS to expand. Just like terrorist organisations in other parts of the world including Nigeria where a weak government and religious and ethnic divide has helped in the growth of the Boko Haram insurgent group. ISIS also regenerated the capacity to execute a combined arms attack against a fixed site, such as a prison. In September 2012, ISIS achieved its first victory on this front, breaking 38 former AQI leaders from Tikrit Tasfirat prison.

It was established that another strength of Islamic state is that it doesnøt depend on foreign funds to survive, but instead theyøve hoarded millions due to the theft and the sale of oil from areas theyøve overrun. The group is reported to have pulled off the biggest bank heist in history, allegedly lifting more than $430 million from a Mosul bank after overrunning that Iraqi city. They have also reportedly extorted money from humanitarian workers and have been selling electricity back to the Syrian government they are fighting against. The group has also bragged of stealing millions of dollars in U.S. military equipment, making it one of the worldøs most well-funded terrorist groups.[203]

According to the findings the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant seized control of Syriaøs largest oil field, al Omar, from Jabhat al-Nusra. Jabhat al-Nusra took control of the field in November 2013, and claimed to be producing around 10,000 barrels of oil per day. Under al-Baghdadiøs leadership, ISIS gained considerable financial clout. ISIS previously relied on donations from wealthy individuals in the Gulf Arab states who were supporting ISIS in the Syrian conflict. ISIS now has cash and assets of its own. Al-Baghdadi has secured two

---

[203] Ibid p.54

primary revenue streams: oil sales from ISIS-controlled oil fields in Syria and sales of antiquities from looted historical sites. ISIS accumulated cash and assets worth an estimated two billion dollars. When ISIS overran Mosul, Iraq, ISIS forces looted banks of cash and precious metals.

According to the findings many security experts, including those based at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, have argued that Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the most professional and capable security service in the region. "GID has [the] highest level of professionalism in handling internal and external security crises. The GID's approach includes several new strategies, such as enhanced military forces along all borders, urban combat training for military personnel, increased intelligence-gathering operations on the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq, internal watches and intelligence-gathering on suspected Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra supporters in Jordan, and a campaign to spread 'moderate Islam' messages among the Jordanian population and security forces.[204]

According to the findings the international community is pursuing a policy to reduce the financial resources available to the Islamic State focuses on disrupting IS revenue streams, limiting the group∅s access to formal financial systems, and imposing sanctions on the group∅s senior leadership and financial facilitators. The international community also has imposed sanctions against Islamic State officials and their external financial backers. The Department of the Treasury designated 12 individuals for their role in soliciting funds, procuring military equipment, and recruiting foreign fighters, two of whom are based in Syria and are associated with the Islamic State.

International community officials from the intelligence community, State Department, and other agencies concerned with domestic security continue to assess, monitor, and respond to threats posed by foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. Diplomatic and intelligence efforts focus on coordinating with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures.[205] In March 2014, the State Department named Ambassador Robert Bradtke as õsenior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters,ö and former

---

[204] Ibid p.66
[205] White House, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region, September 24, 2014.

U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas Krajeski replaced Bradtke in that role in January 2015. Although the Islamic State organization is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is unclear whether it currently poses direct threats to U.S. homeland security. Additionally, U.S. and coalition personnel are implementing joint Iraqi-coalition plans for the training of 12 Iraqi brigades (nine Iraqi Security Force [ISF] brigades and three Kurdish peshmerga brigades a total of about 25,000 personnel. It was also observed that U.S. training and advisory programs in Iraq also include efforts to support Kurdish peshmerga and Sunni Arab tribal forces affiliated with Iraq's national government. Current U.S. policy provides U.S. material and advisory support to these forces in coordination with the national government in Baghdad.

5.3 Conclusion

Based on the findings the study concludes that roots of the IS can be traced back to the early 2000s, particularly, the United States (US) invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003. While the US-led coalition forces were trying to establish control in Iraq, a group by the name al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was formed in 2004, primarily to wage a guerrilla war against the coalition forces and their domestic allies within Iraq. In other words, IS had started as an al -Qaeda franchise. The first leader of AQI was an Arab of Jordanian descent named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The US State Department declared AQI as a terrorist organization. Al- Zarqawi's AQI started an extremely brutal campaign to õignite a sectarian war against the majority Shia communityö.

However, al- Zarqawi's leadership was cut short as he was killed in a US airstrike, and he was replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri in October 2006. Abu Ayyub al-Masri changed the name of the group from AQI to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader. The name ISI was given with an aim to garner support from the people of Iraq. In 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi met the same fate as alZarqawi (as he was

killed in a joint US-Iraq operation). From April 2010 onwards, the onus of running ISI fell on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who again changed the name of the outfit to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or ISIS. ISIL has been named after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in early 2013, declared the absorption of al-Qaeda backed militant group in Syria, known as Jabhat al-Nusra or Al-Nusra Front.

The one of the most serious threats to peace and security that have engulfed a large portion of the Middle East is the emergence of the Sunni Muslim extremist group, infamously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). After capturing a sizeable territory in Iraq and Syria, the group changed its name to Islamic State (IS). The main objective behind the inception of this dreaded armed group was to establish a caliphate, or an Islamic state, based on Sharia law, across the world. On 29 June 2014, IS declared its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as the new caliph, or the õleader of the faithfulö. His real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, but to his followers, he is Caliph Ibrahim. The word Caliph or Khilafa in Arabic means õsuccessorö and this signifies the ultimate ambition of the leader to establish the above mentioned state. The last Caliphate was destroyed with the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I.A rather quick unfolding of such a situation in this already war-torn region has shaken up security establishments in the region. Most importantly, the alarming pace at which the militant group is gaining control over a large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria is something that the affected countriesø political and security establishments need to grapple with. ISøs resonance is being felt in Europe, Central Asia and South Asia, including India.

Based on the findings the study concludes that U.S. military options should be evaluated in this broader context. Ultimately, U.S. military options should be deployed in the service of a broader political and diplomatic strategy. A more aggressive U.S. military posture in the absence of a deeper, coherent strategy is unlikely to bring Syria closer to resolution, improve humanitarian conditions, or minimize regional spillover. In fact, such involvement could exacerbate the situation. Moreover, greater U.S. military involvement in Syria must be assessed not only in terms of whether it would bring Syria closer to resolution. The impact of military engagement must also be measured on an Arab world that is fraught with tension and in the midst of destabilizing change. Across the region-from North Africa to Egypt to the Levant and the Gulf-U.S. engagement has been met with suspicion and at times, outright hostility. Policy makers and military planners therefore must also assess the impact of greater U.S. military engagement on this volatile region more broadly.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings the study recommends that The air strikes campaign should be complemented with the creation of a national guard in Iraq that includes representatives of the country's Sunni as well as Shia communities, in order to prevent the Islamic State from playing on Sunni grievances, and with the strengthening of the only remaining moderate opposition coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria, the Southern Front. The õtrain and equipö program set up by the United States and the UK in early 2015 to increase the number of vetted moderate fighters is not sufficient. There is need to help Southern Front at the coordination and financial levels to be able to attract other independent brigades to join it. In addition, the more the moderate opposition is shown to be able to deliver, the higher the level of local trust in it, which would translate into increased impact and operational efficiency. This is not only because local support increases the Southern Front's information-gathering capacity, but also because it facilitates the Southern Front's work with local civilian councils. This is crucial because the Southern Front operates in Daraa, a strategic location only 100 kilometers (about 62 miles) from Damascus. If the Islamic State manages to overwhelm the Southern Front, it will be easier for the group to advance toward Damascus.

The study recommends that in the long term, plans for an equitable distribution of resources and for giving citizens a say in local governance would restore trust in government and attract those who are affiliating themselves with the Islamic State in pursuit of material gain. One way to achieve this would be through initiating a discussion about federalism in Syria and Iraq and getting Syrians to decide on the shape and implementation of such a governance structure. Ultimately, the way to eradicate the Islamic State is not by conducting military strikes alone, but by cutting its two main lifelines: grievances in Iraq and the Syrian conflict. There is need to address sectarianism in Iraq and implementing a wider comprehensive road map to end the Syrian conflict.

5.4.1 The international community and other actors

The international community and other actors should understand that effectively coping with the phenomenon of terrorism requires local and international action on two levels addressing both terroristsø motivation and their operational capabilities. It is a stateøs responsibility and duty to protect its citizens, and so it must work to reduce terrorist organizationsø operational capabilities through preventative and offensive action (and sometimes also defensive action) based on intelligence resources. The international community should also understand that establishing an alliance of countries that share the common goal of effectively countering global terrorism would be one step in creating a broad-based and international response to terrorism. Such an alliance could reflect the NATO model, but, unlike NATO would include third-world, Arab and Muslim states in addition to Western countries for effectiveness. The UN must make efforts to eradicate radical Islamic terrorism and encourage democracy in the Muslim world should start with a long and thorough stage of pragmatic liberal education and legal restrictions on incitement to violence and terrorism. Such efforts can take place both within Muslim countries and internally in western states with large Muslim communities.

5.4.2 Governments of Syria and Iraq

The study recommends that Governments of Syria and Iraq must accept a shared responsibility to investigate and prosecute war crimes and other crimes under international law committed in Syria and elsewhere in the world. In particular, seek to exercise universal jurisdiction over these crimes before national courts in fair trials and without recourse to the

death penalty. Additionally, the study recommends that government of Syria must call on states to suspend arms transfers to ISIS and other armed groups implicated in the commission of war crimes and serious human rights abuses.

5.4.3 Recommendations of the Future Research

The current study investigated Islamic state as a threat to global peace and security: an analysis of the mechanisms used by the international community. The study therefore recommends that further research could extend analysis of the sub-regional institutional relationship to these varieties of peace operations. The problem of hand-off –between the time of forging an initial agreement and implementing the agreement, while noted in the literature, seems extremely problematic for Africa‐s sub-regional organizations. Including IGAD in Sudan, the AU in Burundi and ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, regional participation and commitment often drops off after an agreement has been forged, leaning on the UN or other international partners to finance and lead long-term efforts. Problematizing this development and exploring how the regional organizations can better contribute their regional capacities through all stages of conflict management and peace building is another substantial area of inquiry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abootalebi, A. (2013). Civil society, democracy and the Middle East. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, *2*(3), 46-59.

Acharya, A. (2001). Human security: East versus west. *International Journal*, 442-460. Address delivered by General Tariq W. Ghazi in (2005), translated by BGen (Ret.) Feroz Khan

Adis (2015).The Islamic State in organisation and appearance may originate from Zarqawi's time in the 9

Ahmad, Z. (1994). Islamic banking: state of the art. America, I.C.J. 14, 95, 27 June 1986.

Akkizidis, I. S., & Khandelwal, S. K. (2008). *Financial risk management for Islamic banking and finance*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Al-Hamarneh, A., & Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.

Al-Hamarneh, A., & Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.

Al-Harran, W. (2013). *Islamic Finance: Partnership Financing*. Pelanduk Publications.p.23

Ali, A. J. (2012). The Islamic work ethic in Arabia. *The Journal of psychology*, *126*(5), 507-519.

Ali, A. J., & Al-Owaihan, A. (2008). Islamic work ethic: a critical review. *Cross cultural management: An international Journal*, *15*(1), 5-19.

Al-Tamimi, A. J. (2014, March). The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham. In *Middle East Forum, January* (Vol. 27).

Amuzegar, J. (2015). Iran's crumbling revolution. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK-*, *82*(1), 44-57.

Arjomand, S. A. (1989). The emergence of Islamic political ideologies. *The Changing Face of Religion. Londres: Sage*.

Arjomand, S. A. (2009). The emergence of Islamic political ideologies. *The Changing Face of Religion. Londres: Sage*.

Arkoun, M. (2007). *Rethinking Islam: Common questions, uncommon answers*. Westview Press.

Atasoy, S. (2011). The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?. *Middle East Policy*, *18*(3), 86-100.

Atasoy, S. (2012). The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?. *Middle East Policy*, *18*(3), 86-100.

Atran, S. (2014). Genesis of suicide terrorism. *Science*, *299*(5612), 1534-1539.

Ayata, S. (2014). Patronage, party, and state: The politicization of Islam in Turkey. *The Middle East Journal*, 40-56.

Ayeb, M. (2012). Islamic revival in Asia and human resource management. *Employee Relations*, *19*(4), 352-364

Ayoob, M. (2005). *The Third World security predicament: state making, regional conflict, and the international system* (p. 4). L. Rienner Publishers.

Martenczuk. (1999). The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? ó European Journal of International Law, (10), pp. 543ó544.

Bagdikian, B. H. (2014). *The new media monopoly: A completely revised and updated edition with seven new chapters*. Beacon Press.

Barrett, R. (2014). Foreign fighters in Syria. *The Soufan Group, http://soufangroup. Com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria. pdf*, 6.

Beck, L. (1990). Tribes and the state in nineteenth-and twentieth-century Iran. *Tribes and state formation in the Middle East*, 185-225.

Beck, U. (2002). The terrorist threat world risk society revisited. *Theory, Culture & Society*, *19*(4), 39-55.

Bekele, Y. (2013). *Samuel Zwemer's missionary strategy towards Islam* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham).

Bellamy, A. J. (2015). Responsibility to protect or Trojan horse? The crisis in Darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *19*(02), 31-54.

Bellin, E. (2014). The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective. *Comparative politics*, 139-157.

Ben H., (2014).õSyria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fireí ö New York Times, January 17, 2014

Ben H., (2014).õSyria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fireí ö New York Times, January 17, 2014

Benthall, J. (2009). The overreaction against Islamic charities. *Isim Review*, *20*, 2.

Bonventre, E. V. (2008). Monitoring and evaluation of department of defense humanitarian assistance programs. *Military Review*, *88*(1), 66.

Borum, R., & Gelles, M. (2015). Al-Qaeda's operational evolution: behavioral and organizational perspectives. *Behavioral sciences & the law*, *23*(4), 467-483.

Borum, R., & Gelles, M. (2015). Al-Qaeda's operational evolution: behavioral and organizational perspectives. *Behavioral sciences & the law*, *23*(4), 467-483.

Brachman, J. M. (2014). High-tech terror: Al-Qaeda's use of new technology. *Fletcher F. World Aff.*, *30*, 149.

Branine, M., & Pollard, D. (2014). Human resource management with Islamic management principles: A dialectic for a reverse diffusion in management. *Personnel Review*, *39*(6), 712-727.

Briefing by White House Spokesman Josh Earnest, May 26, 2015.

Briscoe, I. (2014). *Conflict, security and emerging threats*. Chapter for the Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014.

Brownlee, K. A., & Brownlee, K. A. (1965). *Statistical theory and methodology in science and engineering* (Vol. 150). New York: Wiley.

Brown, R. (2003). Spinning the war: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism. *War and the Media*, 87-100.

Brown, R. (2003). Spinning the war: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism. *War and the Media*, 87-100.

Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S. (2009). *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention*. ME Sharpe.

Bush, G. W. (2014). *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. Wordclay.

Buzan, B. (2008). *People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR Press.

Buzan, B. (2008). *People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR Press.

Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and powers: the structure of international security* (Vol. 91). Cambridge University Press.

Cassese, A. (2009). Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?. *European Journal of International Law*, *10*(1), 23-30.

Castells, M. (2014). *The power of identity: The information age: Economy, society, and culture* (Vol. 2). John Wiley & Sons.

Cauley, C. (2014). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. *Psychology of terrorism: Coping with the continuing threat, condensed edition*, 33-65.

Chase, A. E. (2004). Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism. *Va. J. Int'l L.*, *45*, 41.

Chomsky, N. (2012). *Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda* (Vol. 7). Seven Stories Press.

Chongkittavorn, K. (2004). Thailand: international terrorism and the muslim South. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 267-275.

Chossudovsky, M. (2001). Who Is Osama Bin Laden?. *HUMANIST-BUFFALO-*, *61*(6), 11-14.

Choueiri, Y. M. (2010). Islamic fundamentalism.

Chung, C. P. (2004). The Shanghai Co-operation organization: China's changing influence in Central Asia. *The China Quarterly*, *180*, 989-1009.

Clarke, R. A. (2013). *Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror*. Simon and Schuster.

Cornell, S. E. (2006, February). The narcotics threat in Greater Central Asia: from crime-terror nexus to state infiltration. In *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* (Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 37-67).

Dallaire, R., & Dupuis, R. (2013). *Shake hands with the devil* (p. 608). Seville Produtions (Dallaire).

Dar, H. A., & Presley, J. R. (2014). Lack of profit loss sharing in Islamic banking: management and control imbalances. *International journal of Islamic financial services*, *2*(2), 3-18.

Darling-Hammond, L. (2014). *Doing what matters most: Investing in quality teaching*. National Commission on Teaching & America's Future, Kutztown Distribution Center, 15076 Kutztown Road, PO Box 326, Kutztown, PA 19530-0326.

Davis, E. (2005). *Memories of state: Politics, history, and collective identity in modern Iraq*. Univ of California Press.

De Kock, P., & Sturman, K. (2012). The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State. *Governance*.

De Kock, P., & Sturman, K. (2012). The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State. *Governance*.

De Wijk, R. (2002). The limits of military power. *Washington Quarterly*, *25*(1), 75-92.

Defense Intelligence Agency Feb 2015

Deisler, P. F. (2013). A perspective: Risk analysis as a tool for reducing the risks of terrorism. *Risk Analysis*, *22*(3), 405-413.

Dekmejian, R. H. (1995). *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,* New York: Syracuse University Press, p.80.

Deng, F. M. (2003). *Protecting the dispossessed: a challenge for the international community*. Brookings Institution Press.

Dov Zakheim, ōThe Only ISIS Strategy Left for America: Containment,ö The National Interest, Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014.

Ensminger, J. (2013). Co-Opting the Elders: The Political Economy of State Incorporation in Africa. *American Anthropologist*, *92*(3), 662-675.

81

Esposito, J. L. (Ed.). (2003). *The oxford dictionary of Islam*. Oxford University Press.

Falola, T. (2008) The Power of African Culture, Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

Fischer, J. (2013). *Proper Islamic consumption: Shopping among the Malays in modern Malaysia* (Vol. 113). NIAS press.

Foreign Ministry of France, Declaration of the Core Group Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris, January 12, 2014.

Fowden, G. (2014). Empire to Commonwealth. *Theological Studies*, *55*(3), 584.

Foxley, T. (2007). *The Taliban's propaganda activities: how well is the Afghan insurgency communicating and what is it saying?*. Sipri.

Francis Fukuyama,(2007) ‑The West May Be Crackingø, International Herald Tribune,

Ganor, B. (2014). Terrorism as a strategy of psychological warfare. *Journal of aggression, maltreatment & trauma*, *9*(1-2), 33-43.

Gerdes, F. (2013). *Civil war and state formation: the political economy of war and peace in Liberia* (Vol. 9). Campus Verlag.

Goodrich, L. M., & Simons, A. P. (1955). *The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security* (Vol. 3). Brookings Institution.

Haddad, Y. (1992). ‑Islamists and the õProblem of Israelö: The 1967 Awakeningø, *Middle East Journal* 46 , p.263.

Haddad, Y. (2002). ‑Islamists and the õProblem of Israelö: The 1967 Awakeningø, *Middle East Journal* 46 , p.263.

Harper, M. (2012). Getting Somalia Wrong. *Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered*.

Harper, M. (2015). Getting Somalia Wrong. International African Institute. The Royal African Society and Social Research Council, Cynthia Street. London

Hashemi, K. (2008). *Religious legal traditions, international human rights law and Muslim states*. BRILL.

Hashmi, S. H. (2003). Is there an Islamic ethic of humanitarian intervention?. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *7*(1), 55-73.

Hashmi, S. H. (2003). Is there an Islamic ethic of humanitarian intervention?. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *7*(1), 55-73.

Hassan, A. (2009). Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalam. *The Journal of Risk Finance*, *10*(1), 23-37.

Haynes, J. (2001). Transnational religious actors and international politics. *Third World Quarterly*, *22*(2), 143-158.

Hickson, D. J., & Pugh, D. S. (Eds.). (2005). *Management worldwide: The impact of societal culture on organizations around the globe*. Penguin Uk.

Howard, M. (2012). Whatøs in a name? How to fight terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, *81*(1), 8-13.

http://news.intelwire.com/2014/07/is-backlash-spills-over-on-jabhat-al.html.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?321417-1/secretary-hagel-general-dempsey-isis-threat

Hukul, A. (2015). Management concerns in United Arab Emirates state schools. *International Journal of Educational Management*, *9*(4), 8-13.

Hulmes, E. (2009). Commitment and Neutrality in Religious Education, London: Geoffrey Chapman

Huntington, S. P. (2010). Democracy for the long haul. *Journal of democracy*, *7*(2), 3-13

Huntington, S. P. (2013). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Penguin Books India.

Ikechukwu, E. (2013). *Being a Christian in Igbo Land: Facts, Fictions and Challenges*. Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH.

Islam, N. (2015). Growth empirics: a panel data approach. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1127-1170.

Jackson, R. H. (1993). *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World* (Vol. 12). Cambridge University Press.

Jamie Shea,(2002) ―NATO - Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy‖ Cambridge Review

Jamie Shea,(2002) ―NATO - Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy‖ Cambridge Review of

Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition*. Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf

Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition*. Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf

Jean. L. (2010).*The Changing Nature of "International Security": The Need for an Integrated Definition*. Available at: http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf

Jimmy C. (2009), ―The Troubling New Face of America‖ The Washington Post, 5 September 2009, p. A31.

John F. (2015) Canady School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge. Massachusetts.

Kabeer, N. (2015). The quest for national identity: Women, Islam and the state in Bangladesh. *Feminist Review*, *37*(1), 38-58.

Kaldor, M. (2015). New and Old Wars, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

Kaldor, M. (2012). New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (*third edition). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Keane, J. (2003). *Global civil society?* (p. 5). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kelsen, H. (1957). *Collective Security under International Law*, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, p. 11

Kennedy, H. (2013). *The armies of the caliphs: military and society in the early Islamic state*. Routledge.

Kepel, G. (2004). *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West*. Harvard University Press.

Kepel, G. (2006). *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, London: I. B. Tauris, p.65.

Khalidi, R. (2009). *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East,* Boston: Beacon Press, 122

Khalilzad, Z., & Byman, D. (2010). Afghanistan: The consolidation of a rogue state. *Washington Quarterly*, *23*(1), 65-78.

Kuru, A. T. (2007). Passive and assertive secularism: Historical conditions, ideological struggles, and state policies toward religion. *World Politics*, *59*(04), 568-594.

Lewis, B. (2014). *The crisis of Islam: Holy war and unholy terror*. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Liza B. D. (2008). Women, management and globalization in the Middle East. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *83*(1), 85-100.

Mackinlay, J. (2014). Is UK doctrine relevant to global insurgency?. *The RUSI Journal*, *152*(2), 34-39.

Mail, H. (2015). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 3rdedition. Polity Press: Cambridge

Mail, H. (2015). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Polity Press: Cambridge

Mark Basile (2004), ‑Going to the Source: Why al Qaedaøs financial network is likely to withstand the current

Martin Nettesheim, (2007) ‑Das Kommunitäre Völkerrechtø, Juristen Zeitung, pp. 569-620.

Martin, V. (2003). *Creating an Islamic state: Khomeini and the making of a new Iran* (Vol. 24). IB Tauris.

Martin, V. (2013). *Creating an Islamic state: Khomeini and the making of a new Iran* (Vol. 24). IB Tauris.

McAllister, B. (2004). Al Qaeda and the innovative firm: demythologizing the network. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *27*(4), 297-319.

Metcalfe, B. D. (2006). Exploring cultural dimensions of gender and management in the Middle East. *Thunderbird International Business Review*, *48*(1), 93-107.

Michael E. (2015). The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Center for Science and International Affairs.

Mutalib, H., & Kua, E. H. (1993). *Islam in Malaysia: from revivalism to Islamic state?*. NUS Press.

Nasu, H. (2011). The Expanded Conception of Security And International Law: Challenges To The UN Collective Security System. *International Security*, 3(3), 11-33

Nasu, H. (2011). The Expanded Conception of Security And International Law: Challenges To The UN Collective Security System. *International Security*, 3(3), 11-33

Newman, E. (2007). Weak states, state failure, and terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *19*(4), 463-488.

Nojumi, N. (2002). *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*. Macmillan.

Nojumi, N. (2012). *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region*. Macmillan.p.23

Nu m n , F. (2010). *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. Zed books.

Nu m n , F. (2010). *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. Zed books.

Özdemir, O. B & Karda , T. (2014). *The Making of European Foreign Fighters*. SETA

Ozzano, L. (2009.) õReligious Fundamentalism and Democracyö Politics and Religious states, Vol. 3, No. 1.

Pape, R. A. (2013). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review*, *97*(03), 343-361.

Pape, R. A. (2013). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review*, *97*(03), 343-361.

Paris, R. (2001). Human Security Roland Paris Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?. International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87ó102

Parsi, T. (2012). *Treacherous alliance: The secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

Patrick, S. (2007). õFailedö States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas1. *International Studies Review*, *9*(4), 644-662.

Rahimi, B. (2011). The agonistic social media: cyberspace in the formation of dissent and consolidation of state power in postelection Iran. *The Communication Review*, *14*(3), 158-178.

Rathmell, A., Overill, R., Valeri, L., & Gearson, J. (1998). The IW threat from sub-state groups: An interdisciplinary approach. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *6*(2), 146-156.

Riedel, B. (2007). Al Qaeda strikes back. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK-*, *86*(3), 24..

Risso, P. A. (2014). *Merchants and faith: Muslim commerce and culture in the Indian Ocean*. Westview Press.

Robert P. Mikulak, õStatement to the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Executive Council,ö The Hague, Netherlands, February 21, 2014.

Rosenau, W. (2008). *Waging the war of ideas*. RAND CORP WASHINGTON DC.

Rosenstock, R. (2009). International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Another International Community Step Against Terrorism. *Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y*, *9*, 169.

Rubin, B. R. (2012). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system*. Yale University Press.

Rubin, B. R. (2012). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system*. Yale University Press.

Sabala, K. (2011). 4 Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in) security in Somalia. *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, 95.

Samad, A., & Hassan, M. K. (2009). The performance of Malaysian Islamic bank during: An exploratory study. *International Journal of Islamic Financial Services*, *1*(3), 1-14.

Saul, B. (2005). *Defining'terrorism'in international law* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford).

Shane, S., & Hubbard, B. (2014). Isis displaying a deft command of varied media. *New York Times*, *31*.

Singerman, D. (2004). The networked world of Islamist social movements. *Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach*, 143-63.

Slavin, B. (2009). *Bitter friends, bosom enemies: Iran, the US, and the twisted path to confrontation*. Macmillan.

Smith, M. (2013). Between ˵soft power ˶and a hard place: European Union foreign and security policy between the Islamic world and the United States. *International Politics*, *46*(5), 596-615.

Smyczek, P. J. (2015). Regulating the Battlefield of the Future: The Legal Limitations on the Conduct of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Under Public International Law. *AFL Rev.*, *57*, 209.

Solana, J. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy. *içinde Klaus Schilder ve Tobias Hauschild, der., Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy*.

Spalek, B. (2010), õCommunity Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in relation to New Terrismö Politics & Policy, 38/4.

Stein, J. G. (2013). *Threat Perception In International Relations*. Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Steiner, C. (2014). Islamic tourism: Rethinking the strategies of tourism development in the Arab world after. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *24*(1), 173-182.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2005). *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Oxford University Press.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2011). *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Oxford University Press.

Sullivan, D. J., & Abed-Kotob, S. (2014). *Islam in contemporary Egypt: Civil society vs. the state*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sundararajan, V., & Errico, L. (2014). *Islamic financial institutions and products in the global financial system: Key issues in risk management and challenges ahead* (Vol. 2). International Monetary Fund.

Supyuenyong, V., Islam, N., & Kulkarni, U. (2013). Influence of SME characteristics on knowledge management processes: the case study of enterprise resource planning service providers. *Journal of Enterprise Information Management*, *22*(1/2), 63-80.

Tavares, R. (2009). *Regional security: The capacity of international organizations*. Routledge.

Theohary, C. A. (2011). *Terrorist use of the internet: Information operations in cyberspace*. DIANE Publishing

Thussu, D. K. (Ed.). (2006). *Media on the move: global flow and contra-flow*. Routledge.

Torres Soriano, M. R. (2010). The road to media Jihad: The propaganda actions of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *23*(1), 72-88.

United Nations Security Council. (2013). *Threats to International Peace and Security caused by terrorists Acts*. [Online] United Nations Security Council, pp. 3.

Varku, R. (2009). *Terrorism as a Threat to Peace*. [Online] Available at: ttp://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2009_1_216.pdf

Von Hippel, K. (2002). The roots of terrorism: Probing the myths. *The Political Quarterly*, *73*(s1), 25-39.

Wakengela, M. T. (2011). 13 Keeping an elusive peace. *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, 377.

Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979;p.23

Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. *International security*, *25*(1), 5-41.

war on terrorist financingø Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (27), 169-185, 170

Watheka, C. W. (2015). *The Youth and the Potential for Involvement in Acts of Terrorism: A Case Study of the Eastleigh Surburb in Nairobi, Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa).

Waziri, F. (2011). *Strengthening of Anti-Corruption Commissions and Laws in Nigeria* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).

Wellens, K. (2003). ̵The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* pp. 15-70;

Weston, B. H. (2011). Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy. *American Journal of International Law*, 516-535.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). *The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state power in Jordan*. SUNY Press.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2011). *The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state power in Jordan*. SUNY Press.

Williams, P. D. (2009). Into the Mogadishu maelstrom: the African Union mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(4), 514-530.

Zamani-Farahani, H., & Henderson, J. C. (2010). Islamic tourism and managing tourism development in Islamic societies: the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia. *International journal of tourism research*, *12*(1), 79-89

Zolberg, A. R., & Woon, L. L. (2009). Why Islam is like Spanish: cultural incorporation in Europe and the United States. *Politics and society*, *27*, 5-38.

Zuhur, S. (2005*). A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats And The Future Of Counterinsurgency*.

[Online]. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/100osamas.pdf