

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL**  
**STUDIES**

**DYNAMISM OF TERRORIST THREATS IN KENYA**

**HARED HASSAN**

**R52/69193/2013**

**SUPERVISOR**

**DR. P.M. MALUKI**

**A DISSERTATION RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL  
FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**NOVEMBER 2015**

## DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Sign: ..... Date: .....

HARED HASSAN

R52/69193/2013

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

Sign: ..... Date: .....

SUPERVISOR

DR. P. M. MALUKI

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies University of Nairobi

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I would like to acknowledge and appreciate my supervisor Dr. Maluki for his advice, patience and guidance. I would also like to acknowledge my friends and post graduate fellows for their encouragement.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research project to my family.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                |             |
|--------------------------------|-------------|
| <b>DECLARATION .....</b>       | <b>ii</b>   |
| <b>ACKNOWLEDGMENT .....</b>    | <b>iii</b>  |
| <b>DEDICATION .....</b>        | <b>iv</b>   |
| <b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b> | <b>v</b>    |
| <b>ABSTRACT.....</b>           | <b>viii</b> |

### CHAPTER ONE

#### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

|  |    |
|--|----|
| 1.1 Introduction.....                          | 1  |
| 1.2 Background.....                            | 2  |
| 1.3 Statement of the Problem.....              | 6  |
| 1.4 Objective of the Research.....             | 6  |
| 1.5 Research Question .....                    | 7  |
| 1.6 Literature Review .....                    | 7  |
| 1.6.1 Defining Terrorism .....                 | 7  |
| 1.6.2 Terrorist Threat in Kenya .....          | 9  |
| 1.6.3 The Concept of Home Grown Terrorism..... | 17 |
| 1.6.3 Literature Gap .....                     | 19 |
| 1.7 Justification to the Study.....            | 20 |
| 1.8 Limitations to the Study.....              | 21 |
| 1.9 Theoretical Framework.....                 | 22 |
| 1.10 Research Methodology .....                | 23 |
| 1.11 Chapter Outline.....                      | 25 |

### CHAPTER TWO

#### DYNAMISM AND SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE TERRORIST THREAT IN KENYA

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 2.1 Introduction.....   | 26 |
| 2.2 Evolution of Terrorism and Terror Groups in Post 9/11 ..... | 26 |
| 2.3 The Dynamism of Al-Shabaab .....                            | 28 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 2.4 Refugee - Terrorism Nexus.....                          | 36 |
| 2.5 Kenya’s Susceptibility Due to its Domestic Issues ..... | 39 |
| 2.6 Kenya as a Target for Terrorist Activities .....        | 42 |
| 2.7 Susceptibility to Radicalization .....                  | 44 |
| 2.8 Home-Grown Terrorism in Kenya.....                      | 51 |
| 2.8.1 Al-Hijra as Kenya’s Home Grown Terror Network .....   | 51 |
| 2.9 Conclusion .....  | 53 |

### **CHAPTER THREE**

#### **THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM IN KENYA**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 3.1 Introduction.....   | 55 |
| 3.2 An Overview of Counter Terrorism in Kenya .....               | 55 |
| 3.3 Kenya’s Efforts in Countering Radicalization.....             | 59 |
| 3.3.1 Kenyan-Muslim Religious Leadership .....                    | 60 |
| 3.3.2 A Diverse Strategy to Counter-Radicalization .....          | 62 |
| 3.4 Kenya’s Success Failures on the Fight against Terrorism ..... | 67 |
| 3.6 Further Marginalization .....                                 | 71 |
| 3.7 Human Rights Violations in Counter-Terrorism Efforts .....    | 73 |
| 3.8 Lack of Public Confidence .....                               | 75 |
| 3.9 Conclusion .....  | 77 |

### **CHAPTER FOUR**

#### **REGIONAL EFFORTS IN RESPONCE TO TERRORIST THREATS**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| 4.1 Introduction.....  | 79 |
| 4.2 A Region Prone To Terrorism: HOA .....                                     | 79 |
| 4.3 Counter-terrorism Cooperation in the African Region.....                   | 82 |
| 4.3.1 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership .....                          | 84 |
| 4.3.2 The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) ..... | 85 |
| 4.3.3 IGAD and its Effort on Counter-Terrorism in the Region.....              | 86 |
| 4.3.4 Selected Country Profile on Counter-terrorism Cooperation .....          | 88 |
| 4.4 Challenges facing Regional Counterterrorism Efforts.....                   | 91 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 4.5 The AU's Fight against Terrorism in the Region .....      | 93 |
| 4.6 Challenges Facing AU in the Fight Against Terrorism ..... | 97 |
| 4.7 Conclusion .....  | 98 |

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

|                           |            |
|---------------------------|------------|
| 5.1 Summary .....         | 100        |
| 5.2 Conclusions .....     | 102        |
| 5.3 Recommendations ..... | 103        |
| <b>REFERENCES.....</b>    | <b>106</b> |

## **ABSTRACT**

The overall aim of this study was to examine the dynamism of terrorism in Kenya. To achieve this, the study was guided by three objectives: establish the dynamism and susceptibility of the terrorist threat in Kenya, to determine the effectiveness and impact of counter-terrorism in Kenya as well as to, determine the regional efforts to respond to the terrorist threat. In order to do so the study applied the theoretical framework based on the psychological frustration-aggression theory guided by the works of Ted Gurr on why men rebel and engage in political violence (riots, rebellion, coups, etc.) and how regimes respond. The theory explains that political violence is also more likely if the current leadership and/or the socio-economic/political systems are insufficiently in service to some marginalized groups of citizens. The study revealed for effective strategies in counter-terrorism in Kenya, the dynamisms of terrorism in Kenya such as the 'home grown' aspects must be examined and understood. In this case the study examined the homegrown terror groups such as Al Shaabab and Al Hijra as an example of domestic terrorism in Kenya. The study thus, from the findings recommended for a multi-faceted approach to counter terrorism measure particularly in counter-radicalization where the Kenyan government applies the development approach, as well as reforms in the judicial and law enforcement institutions in Kenya, and regional cooperation in counter-terrorism and de-radicalization.



## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has always existed. It is a tool that has been used by a wide variety of groups to achieve political or social aims.<sup>1</sup> Through the use of violent actions; creating chaos, confusion, and fear, these groups have disrupted the existing social life and the political stability of societies, in their aim of forcing the desired change to occur. Since the nineteen seventies, on average ten terrorist or violent political incidents have taken place in the Netherlands in each decade. The politics-driven activities of taking hostages, hijacking, bomb attacks, assassinations, and threats that occurred in the seventies and at the end of the previous century.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a form of terrorism appeared that was typified primarily by its international character, and the related shock wave brought about by the terrorist threats and attacks throughout the world. According to Rapoport, the previous century saw several waves of domestic and international terrorism, in more or less distinct periods of time.<sup>2</sup> According to various researchers, there has been a developing aspect of terrorism from the pure 'jihadism' and religion to 'religiously' inspired ideology, and that the main purpose of the people involved is to 'change the system'. This terrorist wave justifies that their terrorist acts are from a collective revolutionary ideology that exceeds specific and concrete domestic requirements and their acts bring about an effect throughout the international community.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Duyvesteyn, I., and Graaf, B. de (ed.), (2007). *Terrorists and their Adversaries in Former Days and Now*. Amsterdam: Boom.

<sup>2</sup> Rapoport, D.C. (2004) *The four waves of modern terrorism*. In A.K. Cronin & J. Ludes, (ed.), *Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy* (pp. 46-73). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

<sup>3</sup> Burke, J. (2004). *Al Qaeda: The true story of radical Islam*. London: I.B. Tauri

In this light, this study will attempt to examine the dynamics of terrorism in Kenya thus examining the changes and development of terrorist activities, why Kenya is a target by the terror groups, and the counter terrorist measures by the Kenyan government, including the impact of such counter measures on the Kenyan citizens. More importantly, the study will focus on the home grown aspect of terrorism in Kenya while exploring different terror groups particularly in the coast and northern region of Kenya. This chapter will therefore introduce the study to the conceptualization of terrorism and the psychological frustration-aggression theory which the study adopts to understand why individuals join and conduct terror activities and how the state responds to such acts. Moreover, the chapter will introduce the research methodology to be conducted and state the aims of the study.

## **1.2 Background**

Terrorism has been a historical phenomenon that has been used and experienced by humankind for a long time. Terrorism has been recognized as a serious security threat of concern to the international community since 1937 when the League of Nations adopted and signed the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. In the convention, it was recognized that the expression of act terrorism meant criminal act against a state and intended to create a state of terror in the minds of particular person or a group of persons or the general public.<sup>4</sup> In this context, the member states affirmed the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every member state to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against another state and prevent the acts which such activities take shape, undertake as provided to prevent and punish activities of this nature to collaborate for this

---

<sup>4</sup> League of Nations, Convention for the prevention and Punishment of Terrorism

purpose.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, the United Nations and regional inter-governmental organizations have dealt with terrorism from a legal and political perspective. Since 1963, the international community has elaborated universal legal related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism. This has seen international communities joining hands to fight the emerging global threat.

The impact of terrorism acts has been globally experienced and Africa has been plagued by terrorist incidents since the 1970s, and East Africa is no exception. Kenya has borne the brunt of terrorist attacks since August 7, 1998, when two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people - including 12 Americans - and injuring 5,000.<sup>6</sup> Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. The attack came when the February 1998 declaration of fatwa by Usama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri against the U.S. In this declaration, Bin Laden claimed that America had declared war against God and his messenger, and thus he called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the “individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”<sup>7</sup>

A subsequent investigation established that between 1993 and 1994, members of Al-Qaeda who were responsible for the attack relocated to East Africa, including Sudan and Kenya. These operatives were Mujahideen, who had fought in the Afghanistan-Soviet war of 1979-1989.<sup>8</sup> Four years later, another attack occurred on November 28, 2002, when suicide bombers detonated a truckload of explosives at the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 16

---

<sup>5</sup> League of Nations, Convention for the prevention and Punishment of Terrorism

<sup>6</sup> Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison; *The Terrorist Threat in Africa*; available at : <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa>. Accessed on 23 February, 2015.

<sup>7</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W Norton, 2004), 47.

<sup>8</sup> William W. Keller, *Anatomy of Terrorist Attack* (Pittsburg: Ridgway Center, 2005), 1-5.

people (12 Kenyans and 4 Israelis) and injuring more than 80 others, who were mostly Kenyan. Many of the dead were Kenyan dancers who entertained tourists. The attack came moments after a group of Israeli tourists had checked into the hotel. This bombing incident was coordinated with a simultaneous surface-to-air missile attack on an Arkia Israeli airliner carrying 264 passengers that had taken off from the Mombasa airport. However, the two missiles missed the airliner.<sup>9</sup> The attack came a week after Al-Qaeda had warned of an impending attack in Kenya, and both local and international intelligence agencies implicated Al-Qaeda in the plot. It is evident from this incident that Al-Qaeda had shifted its focus from hard targets such as embassies and government installations to soft targets. Finally a fourth attack occurred on June 7, 2007, when an explosion occurred outside the City Gate Hotel Nairobi, killing one person and injuring a dozen others. Subsequent investigations established that an unidentified terrorist abandoned a bag at the hotel after he failed to secure a seat in a commuter bus destined for the Jomo Kenya International Airport.

There were also several terrorism alerts issued between 2002 and 2009, and two major attempted attacks were thwarted by the Kenyan Security Forces. In June 2003, there was a plot to attack the U.S Embassy in Nairobi along Mombasa Road, using a truck-bomb and an explosives-laden plane which was to take off from Nairobi's Wilson Airport. One of the arrested suspects confirmed that a number of individuals from the November 2002 Paradise Hotel attack had planned this failed effort. It is noteworthy that the same airport acted as a staging base for Al-Qaeda operatives' entry flights to Somalia in the early 1990's.<sup>10</sup>

In August 2009, a group of terrorists operating from Somalia planned three bomb attacks in Nairobi during the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to attend the African Growth

---

<sup>9</sup> "Coast Bomb Terror," *Daily Nation*, November, 29, 2002, 1-7.

<sup>10</sup> Harmony Project, *Al-Qaeda's (MIS) Adventure in the Horn of Africa* (New York: USMA Combating Terrorism Center, May 2007), 149.

and Opportunity Act (AGOA) meeting. The terrorists intended to stage simultaneous attacks at the Hotel Inter-Continental, where Clinton was staying, the adjacent Hilton Hotel and the Kencom Bus Stage. The plot was linked to Al-Qaeda and its associated movement, the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia.<sup>11</sup> The attack was planned apparently in response to the firm stands taken by the Kenyan and US governments in opposition to Al-Shabaab's offensive against the Transitional Federal Government headed by Sheikh Sharif. These two thwarted attacks suggest departure from the past, when Al-Qaeda targeted the US and Israeli interests. Kenyans are the new target. The targeted premises are in the heart of the Nairobi Central Business District and, therefore, any attack could have had human consequences surpassing 9/11 in terms of fatalities.

Kenya has experienced escalation of terrorists' attacks from Al-Shabaan insurgency operating in Somalia since the invasion of Somalia by Kenya Defence Forces on 6 October 2011. The invasion was as a result of series of cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab. In these cross-border raids, on 11 September 2011, Judith Tebbutt British tourist, was kidnapped by gunmen, on 1 October, 2011, Marie Dedieu French national, was taken hostage from Manda Island and later died in the hands of her captors, on 13 October 2011, Blanca Thiebaut and Montserrat Serra: Spanish aid workers were seized from the Dadaab refugee camp. These kidnappings were attributed to Al-Shabaab militia operating from Somalia.<sup>12</sup> As a result of these activities Kenya's internal security minister, the late George Saitoti, said, "Kenya has been and remains an island of peace, and we shall not allow criminals from Somalia, which has been

---

<sup>11</sup> Mugo Munene, "How plot to Bomb Clinton in Kenya was Foiled," Daily Nation, September 5, 2009 (accessed October 13, 2009); available from [http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/how\\_plot\\_to\\_bomb\\_clinton\\_in\\_kenya\\_was\\_foiled.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/how_plot_to_bomb_clinton_in_kenya_was_foiled.aspx).

<sup>12</sup> Kenya sends troops into Somalia to hit al-Shabab, Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15331448>, accessed on 24 February 2015

fighting for over two decades, to destabilize our peace."<sup>13</sup> The Kenya Government felt that Al-Shabaab attacks was a serious threat to the prosperity of the state and therefore there was a need to secure its eastern border and to create a buffer zone inside Somalia.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

Kenya has experienced terrorist attacks which the political leadership and the executive have attributed the insecurity to Al-Shabaab militia operating in Somalia. This has resulted to the deployment of Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) in 2011. Despite the deployment, the creation of buffer zone inside Somalia and the capture of the key strategic port of Kismayu by the KDF, the country have continued to witness upsurge of terrorist attacks mostly in Nairobi, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera and the Coastal region. The Government has viewed the terrorist's attacks from an external perspective, however, media reports, comments from Anti-terrorism unit officers and the public in the Coastal and North Eastern Province regions point to a different narrative. There is the narrative that there are indication of internal breed terrorism which coordinate the activities of Al-Shabaab militia in the country. There is also the narrative that radicalization and recruitment of youth is taking place in the country unabated. Therefore, the focus of the study will be whether there are homegrown terrorism in Kenya.

### **1.4 Objective of the Research**

The objective of this study is to explore the possibility of homegrown terrorism in Kenya.

---

<sup>13</sup> Why Kenya Invaded Somalia, The opening of an aggressive New Pape, Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136670/daniel-branch/why-kenya-invaded-somaliar>, accessed on 24 February 2015

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. Establish the dynamism and susceptibility of the terrorist threat in Kenya.
- ii. Determine the effectiveness and impact of counter-terrorism in Kenya.
- iii. Determine the regional efforts to respond to the terrorist threat.

### **1.5 Research Question**

- i. What is the dynamism and susceptibility of the terrorist threat in Kenya?
- ii. What is the effectiveness and impact of counter-terrorism in Kenya?
- iii. What are the regional efforts to respond to the terrorist threat?

### **1.6 Literature Review**

This part of the study deals with the conceptualization of terrorism thus the definition and also the character and manifestation of terrorism in Kenya. This is a key introduction to the understanding of the ‘dynamism’ terrorism in Kenya as will be analyzed in consecutive chapters.

#### **1.6.1 Defining Terrorism**

There has been much debate among scholars and policy makers on the meaning of the word terrorism and as a result no common definition has been reached, and a consensus on one is not foreseeable. In addition, there has been no standard formula developed for the best way to deal with terrorism because of the notion that “one man’s terrorism is the other man’s freedom fighter.” Similarly, the United Nations is no closer to reaching a universal definition of terrorism than it was in 2001 – or indeed than it was five years before then, when negotiations first began on drafting a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The main hurdle, then as

now, is the insistence by the bloc of Islamic states that any definition of terrorism should leave a loophole for “resistance” against foreign occupation.<sup>14</sup>

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which was established in 1969 with “liberating” Jerusalem as its primary focus, is unwilling to give ground on the issue as many of its governments believe that doing so would be tantamount to betraying the Palestinian cause.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, any act of terrorism as a result of real or perceived resistance against foreign occupation cannot be defined as terrorism act. Accordingly, the UN has no internationally-agreed definition of terrorism. The definitional impasse has prevented the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the UN failed to adopt the Convention, and the deadlock continues to this day. As articulated, the prime reason is the standoff with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Arab Terrorism Convention and the Terrorism Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) define terrorism to exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination. This claim purports to exclude blowing up certain civilians from the reach of international law and organizations. It is central to interpreting every proclamation by the states which have ratified these conventions in any UN forum purporting to combat terrorism.<sup>16</sup>

The absence of a definition does not insinuate that the UN has not recognized the global threat posed by terrorist groups. In fact the UN has so far adopted 13 international conventions used for the combat of terrorism.<sup>17</sup> Faced with these challenges, this research will define terrorism based on the UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9,

---

<sup>14</sup> Patrick Goodenough; Almost 10 Years after 9/11, U.N. Still Grappling to Define Terrorism; available at <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/almost-10-years-after-911-un-still-grappling-define-terrorism>. Accessed on 25 February 2015

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Human Right Voices; UN 101; There is no UN definition of terrorism; available at [http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un\\_101/facts/?p=61](http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un_101/facts/?p=61). Accessed on 25 February 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Jori Duursma; Definition of Terrorism and Self-Determination; available at: <http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/1757>. Accessed on 25 February 2015.



1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," which describes terrorism as Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.<sup>18</sup>

### **1.6.2 Terrorist Threat in Kenya**

Kenya has experienced terrorist threat since the 1970s, however, the first major terrorist attack occurred in 1998, when two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people including 12 Americans and injuring 5,000.<sup>19</sup> Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Since then the country has experienced 167 attacks which has led to 763 fatalities and 5313 injuries.<sup>20</sup> Also these attacks were localized in Nairobi, Garissa, Wajir, Mombasa, Tana River, Kilifi and Lamu Counties.<sup>21</sup> While the 1998 and 2002 terrorist at Paradise Hotel, in Kikambala, Mombasa has been attributed to Al-Qaeda, most of the other attacks especially since 2010 has been attributed to Al-Qaeda affiliate groups such as Al-Shabaab. It is important to understand the historical context of terrorist groups in the region and therefore, since the mid-1990s, a number of loosely affiliated extremist groups operating from Somalia have carried out or facilitated terrorist attacks in the region.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, available at" <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm>. Accessed on 25 February 2015

<sup>19</sup> Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison; The Terrorist Threat in Africa; available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa>. Accessed on 23 February, 2015.

<sup>20</sup> The information obtained from National Police Service the Anti-terrorist Police unit Nairobi, Kenya

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> For more on terrorism and radical Islamist movements in Somalia, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11 July 2005; and N°100, Somalia's Islamists, 12 December 2005; and Briefing N°74, Somalia's Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010; see also Briefing N°85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012.

The first was al- Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), a Somali Islamist and nationalist political grouping with some longstanding links to al-Qaeda that aimed to establish an Islamic emirate in the Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa.<sup>23</sup> Its strategy relied upon regional and wider international networks linked to the Somali diaspora. Members travelled freely between Kenya and Somalia and elsewhere in the region and built considerable infrastructure for recruitment, fundraising and communication among the Somali populations in Nairobi, Mombasa and North Eastern Province.<sup>24</sup> In the mid-1990s, it claimed several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Following Ethiopian retaliatory raids on its Somali bases in early 1997, however, AIAI's military and political command structure was dismantled, and the movement formally disbanded. Some leaders remained active and may have played a supporting role in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Nairobi embassy. The 7 August 1998 attack, as well as one the same day against the U.S. Dar es Salaam embassy, were carried out by al-Qaeda in East Africa, also based in Somalia. Its Somali connections were instrumental in planning and executing the twin attacks, which together killed 225 and wounded over 5,000. Twelve of the dead were U.S. citizens; the vast majorities were Kenyans or Tanzanians. Increased international attention led to the capture or killing of a number of the group's leaders, but it remained a serious threat, and on 28 December 2002, it attacked the Paradise Hotel, in Kikambala Mombasa, Kenya, owned by Israelis and frequented by Israeli tourists, killing fifteen and injuring about 80.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> On 23 September 2001, less than two weeks after the 11 September terror attacks in the U.S., President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, blocking the assets of 27 organisations and individuals linked to terrorism, including al-Ittihaad.

<sup>24</sup> On 23 September 2001, less than two weeks after the 11 September terror attacks in the U.S., President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, blocking the assets of 27 organisations and individuals linked to terrorism, including al-Ittihaad.

<sup>25</sup> That same day al-Qaeda in East Africa also tried to bring down Arkia airline flight 582 departing Mombasa's Moi International Airport for Tel Aviv.

The latest mass attack – the 11 July 2010 bombings in Kampala that killed 85 civilians and injured dozens more – was attributed to Al-Shabaab, a successor to AIAI (although most participants were East Africans). It confirmed longstanding fears that the group could become a regional threat and came after several explicit warnings that it would “bring war to Uganda and Burundi” in revenge for their troop contributions to AMISOM in support of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and for civilian casualties caused by AMISOM shelling.<sup>26</sup>

Kenya has been hosting the World’s largest refugee camp-Dadaab refugee camp. Indeed, the Kenyan government has been in dilemma of a genuine humanitarian concern for the refugees and the need to control its borders as a security concerns. The persistent insecurity in Dadaab refugee camps has put pressure on the Kenya government on the need to obey the international law by continually hosting refugees and that of protecting its national interests as regarding its national security.<sup>27</sup> Kenya is now officially home to almost 500,000 refugees from Somalia.<sup>28</sup> This has exacted an enormous toll on locals and the government and raised concerns over the fast-growing refugee population.

Refugees and Security of Host State has been a debatable subject and has been a torn in the flesh of the host countries. Gil Loescher stresses on the need to not only see refugees as a humanitarian problem but also as a political problem particularly in terms of security. He argues that: Too often refugees are perceived as a matter for international charity organizations, and not as a political and security problem yet refugee problems are in fact intensely political. The

---

<sup>26</sup> Al-Shabaab has been firing mortars from civilian-populated areas into AMISOM bases, prompting AMISOM troops to retaliate; the invariable result is civilian casualties and a growing rift between the people of Mogadishu and the AU mission.

<sup>27</sup> Peter Kirui and Dr. John Mwaruvie; The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya; *International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8 [Special Issue - April 2012]*

<sup>28</sup> 2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya”, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org).

presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in the host countries. During the 1980s for example, the proliferation of arms following the influx of three million Afghans contributed to a resurgence of Pathan conquest in Pakistan. Elsewhere, Palestinian refugees upset delicate domestic balances in Lebanon and Jordan.<sup>29</sup> The presence of refugees in many third world host states is further compounded by armed groups of exiles actively engaged in warfare with political objectives. Refugee warriors invite military retaliation, complicate relations with other states and threaten the host states and the security of their citizens.<sup>30</sup> As a result, host countries have often been unwillingly drawn into conflicts with their neighbours. For instance, the tension between Rwanda and Uganda due to the presence of large number of Rwandese's exiles who have been accused of subverting the Kigali government.

In the Kenyan context, according to Garissa District Development Plan (GDDP) 1994-1996, the influx of refugees into the district resulted into insecurity hence adversely affecting the supervision of development programmes.<sup>31</sup> The insecurity problem posed by the coming of refugees to Dadaab has always been stressed by the various government officials as manifested in the various Garissa District Development Plans. Further, the GDDP report of 1997-2001 reiterated on the insecurity posed by the refugee influx. The report reads in part that: With the political instability in the Republic of Somalia and the resultant influx of more than 150,000 refugees, a lot of insecurity in the district is now being experienced. A lot of resources have been diverted to attending refugees and in stemming the problem of insecurity. Sophisticated weaponry have found their way into the district promoting banditry, cattle rustling and general

---

<sup>29</sup> Gil Loescher and Ann Dull Loescher, *The Global Refugee Crisis*, (London: Oxford,1994), 7

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Republic of Kenya, *Garissa District Development Plan (1994-1996)*, (Nairobi: Government printer), 81

violence in the district.<sup>32</sup> Similarly in the GDDP of 2002-2008 the report captured that: Dadaab and Jarajila divisions are a bit insecure compared to other divisions in the former Garissa District. This has mainly been caused by the presence of refugees these divisions, which has made the divisions adjacent to be insecure. Therefore, proximity to Somalia Republic border in these regions makes insecurity a challenge to development.<sup>33</sup>

The presence of large number of refugees and laxity in issuances of Kenyan identification documents has seen a large but unknown number obtain Kenyan identification cards, birth certificates and passports illegally, largely due to corruption, but also because it is often difficult to distinguish between Kenyan Somali and other Somalis. Another concern is the movement of Somali refugees into Nairobi and Mombasa. The Somali population of Eastleigh, originally an Asian neighbourhood of the capital, is now estimated at over 100,000.<sup>34</sup> Demographic changes is a concern for the political establishment, because they have direct political implications. For example, an ethnic Somali, Yusuf Hassan, won the parliamentary seat in Eastleigh through the numbers of the Somali population and financial muscle of this community.

As much as the Kenyan government has come to terms with the threat posed by the presence of refugees, Kenya is a signatory to the UN refugee convention, which bars forced return of refugees.<sup>35</sup> Instead it is hoping to establish a “safe zone” to which the Somalis among them could return, but its justification for this – that they are fleeing famine rather than political instability – sheens over the root causes of the problem. Sending refugees back would be no

---

<sup>32</sup> *Garissa District Development Plan 1997-2001*, Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, (Nairobi: Government Printer), 59.

<sup>33</sup> Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, *Garissa District Development Plan 2002-2008*, (Nairobi: Government Printer), 16.

<sup>34</sup> Manuel Herz, “Somali Refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi” (no date), at <http://roundtable.kein.org>.

<sup>35</sup> “Kenya’s political gamble in Somali border regions”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 15 November 2011.

solution to the difficulties that plague Somalia and created the refugee situation in the first place.<sup>36</sup> The government, however, appears set to move ahead on its plan. The former internal security ministry's permanent secretary, Francis Kimemia, stated at a press conference, "there are safe places inside Somalia following the operation by Kenyan troops; these refugees will be moved anytime".<sup>37</sup> The government decision was prompted by the increasing cases in which some of the more than 400,000 refugees at the camp are colluding with Shabaab militants to attack security agents. The refugees are also involved in the proliferation of illegal arms in the country, which are smuggled in from war-torn Somalia and later sold to criminals. In fact Security officers have been targeted in explosions at the main camps in Dadaab even before the KDF troops ventured into Somalia. At least ten officers have died and several others wounded in the attacks that have also destroyed several vehicles.<sup>38</sup>

Kenya military intervention was justified, but the timeline was accelerated by a string of cross-border kidnapping attacks targeting Western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab. Tourism is a key industry, and Kenya, particularly Nairobi, is host to a large UN presence, including many international and local NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and other activities.<sup>39</sup> When several Europeans were seized in the Lamu area in September and October 2011, the key tourism industry was hit hard and thus directly affected the economy. The last straw appeared to be when two Spanish aid workers with Médecins Sans

---

<sup>36</sup> Cyrus Ombati, "Relocation of Somali refugees from Dadaab to start 'soon'", *The Standard*, 22 January 2012. The U.S. and others have urged Kenya not to send the refugees back to Somalia.

<sup>37</sup> Horseed Media; Relocation of Somali refugees from Dadaab to start 'soon'. Available at <http://horseedmedia.net/2012/01/23/somali-relocation-of-somali-refugees-from-dadaab-to-start-soon/>. Accessed on 8 April 2015

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Tourism was a major casualty of Kenya's election violence in late 2007-2008. The sector recovered to 2007 levels only in 2010, earning almost \$1 billion. "Tourism Performance Overview 2010", Kenya tourism ministry (no date). The UN has a large campus housing many of its agencies, including the Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), in Nairobi. UNPOS recently announced it would relocate to Mogadishu. "UN Special Representative moves to Mogadishu – first time in 17 years", 24 January 2012, at <http://unpos.unmissions.org>.

Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dadaab refugee camp, near the Kenya-Somalia border, on 13 October 2011 (the third incident in less than a month).<sup>40</sup> Several days later, Kenyan troops moved into Somalia.

As reports from the battlefield in Somalia indicated KDF's gains against Al Shabab inside Somalia. The same cannot be said inside Kenya. The government has the manpower and machinery to combat a well-organized Al Shabab, however, the group has evolved in ways the government and policy makers are still trying to grapple with. The group has resorted to soft target attacks inside Kenya. Indeed Kenya's intention in sending troops to Somalia was to weaken Al Shabab's ability to carry out attacks on Kenyan soil. KDF operations had been successful to drive group from their positions in South Central Somalia, destroyed their bases, cut their supply routes, and suffocated their economic life line through the capture of Kismayo. However, at home, several cases of terrorist attacks has been experienced especially in Nairobi, North Eastern Province and Coastal cities.

This has forced the government to step up action against perceived Al Shabab sympathizers, mainly targeting Somali refugees and ethnic Somalis in general. This has not gone very well with the Kenyan Somali community and innocent refugee's majority of whom are affected by terrorism just like everybody else.<sup>41</sup> Operation Usalama Watch one of the operation launched by the National Police Service at the height of terrorist attacks in Nairobi has elicited negative reactions from the Somali community and Human Right Groups. Continues, questions have been raised on the manner in which the operation was initiated and continues to be carried out. Human Rights agencies and political leaders have questioned its discriminatory/profiling

---

<sup>40</sup> The two aid workers were reportedly sold, in January, to pirates and moved to a hijacked ship. "Update: Kidnapped MSF workers moved to MV Albedo", *Somalia Report*, 12 January 2012.

<sup>41</sup> Eric Omwanza Momanyi; How We Aid Terror in Kenya; A System Analysis of Terror Dynamics

nature and human rights violations, with many wondering how the two approaches shall 'suddenly' make Kenya a more secure Country.<sup>42</sup>

The security concerns of the refugees come to the fore after the 2 April 2015, bloodiest killing in the history of Kenya of 148 university students at Garissa University College by terrorists associated with Al Shabaab. In view of the attack, the Kenya's Deputy President, William Ruto reignited the flames of return of refugees to Somali. The Deputy President insisted the United Nations move the Dadaab refugee camp across the border. "*We have asked the UNHCR to relocate the refugees in three months, failure to which we shall relocate them ourselves,*"<sup>43</sup> The sentiments were echoed by many other politicians including those from Garissa County. The forceful repatriation of the refugees might be a double edged sword. One could argue that the measure, might give fodder to Al Shabaab and thus increase their reach. The forceful repatriation of refugees might force thousands of young men among the refugee population who their better living in Kenya would be cut short join the group for revenge against their forceful return.

A part from the presence of high population of refugees, Kenya has been target of Al Shabaab due other factors such as porous borders, weak, corrupt security and immigration officials and readily available recruits. The Kenyan government has announced plans to build a wall along parts of the 424 mile-long border with Somalia, the structure could cost as much as \$17 billion.<sup>44</sup> The wall would run from Mandera in the north to Kiunga in the east coast,

---

<sup>42</sup> Samson Omondi Operation Usalama Watch; Too little too late? Available at <http://www.knchr.org/OperationUsalamaWatchToolittletoolate.aspx>. Accessed on 31 March 2015.

<sup>43</sup> Al Jazeera America; Somali refugees decry Kenya's demand that the UN relocate their camp. Nairobi wants Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp, relocated to Somalia in order to help rid itself of Al-Shabab. Available from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/13/somali-refugees-decry-kenya-demand-that-the-un-relocate-their-camp.html>. Accessed on 15 April 2015

<sup>44</sup> Ian Bremmer, World Terrorism These 5 Facts Explain Terrorism in Kenya. Available at <http://time.com/3817586/ian-bremmer-facts-explain-shabab-terror-attack-kenya/>. Accessed on 15 April 2015



covering Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu counties. The purpose of the wall is to demarcate the Kenya-Somalia border besides securing the country from Al Shabaab militants, however, the wall would not bar cross border movement, since there would be designated points for exit and entry into the country.<sup>45</sup>

The end state is that the security wall will provide a long-term security effort to secure the border. For, instance the many terrorist attacks in Mandera has been attributed to the fact that Mandera and Bula Hawa, an adjoining town in Somalia, are barely two km apart, thus making it easy for terrorists to cross the border and conduct attacks in Kenya. Somalis living at Bula Hawa town had also violated the No Man's land and encroached into Kenya.<sup>46</sup> The wall will thus address the security gaps. The construction of the wall alone might not solve the security challenges but the most important is tackling the perceived or existing corruption in the security forces and immigration. You could have the best security system but the human interaction might render these systems ineffective.

### **1.6.3 The Concept of Home Grown Terrorism**

According to scholars such as Egerton and Wilner, violent jihadism is not limited to one country or region. Indeed, there emerging trends suggest that there is a widening political and geographic area that is threatened by homegrown terrorism.<sup>47</sup> Home grown terrorism has been evident in different states in the Europe such as the 2006 liquid-bomb plot targeting transatlantic aircraft flying from London to Canada and the US involved a number of British-born individuals and at

---

<sup>45</sup> Business Standard; Kenya begins constructing security wall along Somali border. Available at [http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-begins-constructing-security-wall-along-somali-border-115041400713\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-begins-constructing-security-wall-along-somali-border-115041400713_1.html). Accessed on 15 April 2015

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Frazer Egerton and Alexandre Wilner, 'Militant Jihadism in Canada: Prosecuting the War of Ideas', Justice, Policing, and Security (Ottawa, Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009): 2-5

least three converts to Islam. The 2007 car bombing of Glasgow's International Airport (along with two foiled car bombing attempts in London) involved four British doctors

The growth of radicalization in Kenya in recent years has manifested itself in the spread of extreme Islamism mainly perpetuated by the Wahhabi ideology. This has resulted to the emergence of extremists and terrorist groups influenced by these ideologies. The development has further been influenced by the confluence of a number of socio-economic factors that have contributed to the growth of domestic radical groups.<sup>48</sup> 'Home-grown' extremist has emerged and the current wave of radicalization into extreme violence in Kenya may be associated to individuals and groups that are inspired by religion and socio-economic factors. Among other most critical factors that facilitate radicalization is the rampant rapidly spreading immorality in Kenya and the region.<sup>49</sup>

Islamist radicalism is not new in Kenya. A Kenyan citizen was, for instance, involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. These coordinated bombings killed about 220 people and were the first suicide bombings by an East Africa al-Qaeda cell. Similarly, in al-Qaeda's 2002 coordinated attacks on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and a plane at the Mombasa airport, at least one Kenyan was involved.<sup>50</sup> More recently, in September 2013, Al-Shabaab fighters carried out a deadly attack at the Westgate upscale shopping mall in the Westlands area of Nairobi. The assault, in which automatic weapons and grenades were used, left 67 people dead.<sup>51</sup> The recent attack in Garissa University has brought to the realization that counter-radicalization is key and a major measure for counter

---

<sup>48</sup> Rabasa, A. (2009). *Radical Islam in East Africa*, RAND project Air Force, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

<sup>49</sup> Ali, A. M. (2008). *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa: Phases and Relevant Factors*, ISPSW Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin, Germany  
<sup>50</sup> Carpenter's Waal, Alex, „Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect“, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.6 (2007), pp.1039-1054

<sup>51</sup> Byers, Alex J. *Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? 2005 The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq*, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol.19, No.2 (2005), pp.31-53

terrorism. The attack left 142 students, 3 police officers, and 3 soldiers dead, while 78 civilians were injured.<sup>52</sup> Since then the government has given ultimatum to UNHCR to relocate refugee camps to Somali, as they are recruitments environments for radicalization.

Despite recent military setbacks, growing internal schisms and public backlash, it remains a major threat to Somalia's and the region's security and stability. In the last four years, it has built a formidable and secretive support infrastructure in Kenya.<sup>53</sup> A tiny, but highly radicalized, close-knit and secretive Salafi Jihadi fringe looks up to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation (marja'iyah), supports its jihad, funnels money and recruits and is the primary agent of radicalization. Even without the physical threat posed by Al-Shabaab, Kenya would have to contend with this small but dangerous, homegrown threat.<sup>54</sup> Further aspects of home grown terrorism will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

### **1.6.3 Literature Gap**

Although there has been amount-able research done on terrorism internationally and locally, there is still inadequate literature on the aspects of addressing the terrorist threats in Kenya from a home grown perspective. Indeed terrorist have the transnational aspects that have so been studied vividly in many security and conflict studies. The study aims to fill a gap in the literature in examining the home grown terror groups and their dynamism as it also examines the government's and regional response to this sort of dynamism. This includes highlighting the impact of the counter terrorism on the Kenyan citizens and whether the responses are effective. The limited existing literature on the home grown aspect of the current terror wave therefore

---

<sup>52</sup> Africa Union, Incident Analysis: Terrorism Attack Garissa University, Kenya, 2 April 2015, Algiers

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), S/2010/91, 10 March 2010, pp. 30-37.

makes this study distinctive. When it comes to Kenya, surprisingly few comprehensive studies have been conducted on the topic of dynamisms of terrorism from a domestic aspect that does not purely lean to international links of terrorism in the country in general. A great deal of the academic literature available on terrorism in Kenya focuses on the transnational aspects whether international or regional. Though this view cannot be divorced from the study of terrorism in general, the study notes that terrorism is very dynamic and new and emerging aspects need to be taken into consideration.

### **1.7 Justification to the Study**

The study aims to make a contribution to the literature on terrorism in Kenya and consequently counter terrorism. This research will therefore assess the dynamism of terrorist threat in Kenya and the Kenyan government strategy to address the vice. The evaluation will bring out the source of the threat and whether it is an external or homegrown threat or both. The research will suggest areas for improvement of the present counterterrorism strategy. The finding will be based on evidence adduced during the research. The end result is that the research will come up with recommendations that the Kenyan government will be able to incorporate into the counterterrorism strategy to tackle the threat.

The study generally seeks to enlighten and add to existing literature gap on the terrorism and counter terrorism studies and policy making and implementation. Thus the study is intended to generate both academic and policy-relevant debate that will potentially lead to the application of the right policies for countering terrorism. The findings of the research will play a key role in the academic and practice arena of implementing and making of counter terrorism policies.

Aside policy making, the study findings will assist in the field of academic by contributing to the existing but rather in adequate literature on the home grown terrorism. Additionally, the study contributed to the general public with who the effects of terror attacks lay heavily on. This will help give a better and clearer understanding of terrorism and demystify the 'jihadism' concept that has previously been misunderstood as the reason behind most terror activities. The study will assist the public in general with ideas of de radicalization that will assist communities that are more susceptible to radicalization.

### **1.8 Limitations to the Study**

No author has produced a book on the terror threat in Kenya and the Kenyan government response, albeit there are a few scholars and media practitioners who have written on the subject and organized seminars and policy presentations on terrorism in Kenya. There are also the "so called security experts" who have widely commented on Kenya security threat without much credence in their contribution. Similarly, some aspects of Kenyan government counterterrorism response remain classified and are not accessible. Therefore, this research undertaking may experience challenges of political and institutional goodwill from stakeholders within the security sector. Therefore, this paper makes use of those secondary sources that exist, complemented by interviews with people who are involved in counterterrorism measures, Muslim human rights groups, Kenya National Commission on Human Right, NGO's, and the general population affected by counterterrorism measures. Additionally, the researcher's experiences as a member of the Kenyan Security Sector and his social networks have been mobilized.

## 1.9 Theoretical Framework

The research is guided by the works of Ted Gurr; why men rebel and engage in political violence (riots, rebellion, coups, etc.) and how regimes respond. The author had examined the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence. This hypothesis will be explained with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get.<sup>55</sup> As argued by the author, "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectively." It is noteworthy that people can become inured to a bad state of affairs, even one that offers so little access to life-sustaining resources that members of the group are starving or dying of remediable diseases or exposure. If, however, there is a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood of rebellion. Gurr posits this to be the case even if there is no question that their basic needs will be met. The first situation may be a desperate one, but it is the second that is frustrating.

Terror groups in Kenya such as the Al Shabaab have used the aspect of frustration in their radicalization of individuals into terrorism. With regards to the perception and psychology of the masses, Al-Shabaab has resorted to a simple but offensively effective mechanism of mobilization: to spur on frustration and provoke the desire of revenge. Al-Shabaab's use of language offers an attractive justification for millions of people who need to find the ultimate cause of their misfortune and stagnated future.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Ted Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1970

<sup>56</sup> D. Altheide (2002). *Creating fear*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter

According to Gurr, just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of an individual, so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by social groups. A number of other variables influence the use of violence as well, for example the culture, the society, and the political environment. The culture must at least accept, if not approve, violent action as a means to an end. Political violence is also more likely if the current leadership and/or the socio-economic/political system is seen as illegitimate. Another factor is whether violence is considered to be a viable remedy to the problem. Therefore, the research will use this theoretical framework to understand and analyze the dynamism of terrorism threat in Kenya and what makes Kenyans susceptible.

## **1.10 Research Methodology**

### **Study Design**

This research will be based on qualitative and quantitative research design. A survey questionnaire, Key informant interviews, desktop reviews and Focused Group Discussions with the Anti-terrorist unit commanders, National Police Service, Human Right Groups, NGOs, Faith Based organizations, Islamic Scholars, interest groups, the National Government Representatives at the County among other stakeholders.

### **Sampling Procedure**

A sampling frame will be developed from select groups such as Anti-terrorist unit commanders, National Police Service, Human Right Groups, NGOs, Faith Based organizations, Islamic Scholars, interest groups, the National Government Representatives at the County among other stakeholders

## **Data Collection**

Quantitative and Qualitative data will be obtained using both primary and secondary sources. A semi structured survey questionnaire will be used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative on the dynamism of the terrorism threat in Kenya. Qualitative data collection will also involve in-depth interviews with the selected key informants and focused group discussions.

Primary data collection will involve the use of semi-structured interview questionnaires, Key informant interviews and focused group discussions. Secondary data and information will be sourced from police records, academic journals, books, policy briefs, government statistics and publications among other sources.

## **Focused Group Discussions**

Focused group discussion sessions will consist of groups such as Anti-terrorist unit commanders, National Police Service, Human Right Groups, NGOs, Faith Based organizations, Islamic Scholars, interest groups. The purpose of the focus group discussion is to obtain in-depth information on concepts, perceptions, and ideas. This technique has the strength of allowing the study participants to express their views rather than merely respond to researchers questions typical in questionnaires. A Focused Group Discussion Guide will be utilized to collect qualitative data.

## **Key Informant Interviews**

A key informant will be purposively selected based on their resourcefulness in different areas of this study. For this study, key informants will be purposively selected based on their position and role in the management of security affairs in Kenya. Key informant respondents will include the groups such as Anti-terrorist unit commanders, National Police Service, Human Right Groups,



NGOs, Faith Based organizations, Islamic Scholars, interest groups, and individual police officers. The key informant interview guide will consist of open ended questions to elicit responses.

### **Data Analysis and Reporting**

Quantitative data analysis will be done using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Qualitative data will be analyzed by descriptive and intuitive interpretation along key themes of the research. The results of this study will be presented in a report incorporating tables, graphs, pie charts, explanatory texts and summary statistics to elucidate relationships among key variables.

### **1.11 Chapter Outline**

**Chapter One:** Introduction and Background to the Study.

**Chapter Two:** Dynamism and Susceptibility of the Terrorist Threat in Kenya.

**Chapter Three:** The Effectiveness and Impact of Counter-Terrorism in Kenya.

**Chapter Four:** Regional Efforts to Respond to the Terrorist Threat.

**Chapter Five:** Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **DYNAMISM AND SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE TERRORIST THREAT IN KENYA**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter explores the organization, motivation, operational capabilities, and threat posed by terrorists on a national level. However the chapter will also highlight the general evolution of terrorism from a global perspective narrowing down and concentrating on the case study - Kenya. Since the end of World War II, terrorism has accelerated its development into a major component of contemporary conflict. Primarily in use immediately after the war as a subordinate element of anti-colonial insurgencies, it expanded beyond that role. In the service of various ideologies and aspirations, terrorism sometimes replaced other forms of conflict completely.<sup>57</sup> It also became a far-reaching weapon capable of effects no less global than the intercontinental bomber or missile. It has also proven to be a significant tool of diplomacy and international power for states inclined to use it. Indeed, terrorism has evolved over time and in Kenya, it is a security challenge and has evolved into the dynamics we witness where the threat is more of the internal as opposed to external. To address the menace resources has to be dedicated to tackle both the internal and external threat.

#### **2.2 Evolution of Terrorism and Terror Groups in Post 9/11**

The study of the evolution of terrorism and the use of terror through history, requires the essential focus of forms of society and government in the past were significantly different than they are today. Modern nation-states did not exist in their present form until 1648 (the Treaty of

---

<sup>57</sup> Elliott, Andrea. 2007. "Where Boys Grow Up to Be Jihadis," The New York Times, November 25.

Westphalia), and the state's monopoly on warfare, or inter-state violence, is even more recent.<sup>58</sup> The lack of central governments made it impossible to use terror as a method of affecting a political change, as there was no single dominant political authority. Also, the absence of central authority meant that the game of warfare was open to many more players. Instead of national armies, a variety of non-sovereign nobility, mercenaries, leaders of religious factions, or mercantile companies participated in warfare. Their involvement in warfare was considered to be perfectly legitimate. This is in contrast to the contemporary era, where nations go to war, but private participation is actually illegal in war.

During the early years of the 20th Century nationalism and revolutionary political ideologies were the principal developmental forces acting upon terrorism. When the Treaty of Versailles redrew the map of Europe after World War I by breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire and creating new nations, it acknowledged the principle of self-determination for nationalities and ethnic groups. This encouraged minorities and ethnicities not receiving recognition to campaign for independence or autonomy.<sup>59</sup> However, in many cases self-determination was limited to European nations and ethnic groups and denied others, especially the colonial possessions of the major European powers, creating bitterness and setting the stage for the long conflicts of the anti-colonial period. In particular, Arab nationalists felt that they had been betrayed. Believing they were promised post-war independence, they were doubly disappointed; first when the French and British were given authority over their lands; and then

---

<sup>58</sup> Laitin, David D. and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2008. "The Political, Economic and Organizational Source of Terrorism." In Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds), *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, pp. 209-232

<sup>59</sup> Devji, Faisal. 2005. *Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. Ithaca: Cornell University

especially when the British allowed Zionist immigration into Palestine in keeping with a promise contained in the Balfour Declaration.<sup>60</sup>

Since the end War II, terrorism has accelerated its development into a major component of contemporary conflict. Primarily in use immediately after the war as a subordinate element of anti-colonial insurgencies, it expanded beyond that role. In the service of various ideologies and aspirations, terrorism sometimes supplanted other forms of conflict completely. It also became a far-reaching weapon capable of effects no less global than the intercontinental bomber or missile. It has also proven to be a significant tool of diplomacy and international power for states inclined to use it.

The seemingly quick results and shocking immediacy of terrorism made some consider it as a short cut to victory. Small revolutionary groups not willing to invest the time and resources to organize political activity would rely on the "propaganda of the deed" to energize mass action. This suggested that a tiny core of activists could topple any government through the use of terror alone. The result of this belief by evolutionary in developed countries was the isolation of the terrorists from the population they claimed to represent, and the adoption of the Leninist concept of the "vanguard of revolution" by tiny groups of disaffected revolutionaries. In less developed countries small groups of foreign revolutionaries such as Che Guevara arrived from outside the country, expecting to immediately energize revolutionary action by their presence.<sup>61</sup>

### **2.3 The Dynamism of Al-Shabaab**

Al-Shabaab originally emerged as a remnant of al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI) - a Wahhabi Islamist terrorist organization which arose in Somalia in the 1980s with the intention of replacing

---

<sup>60</sup> Brooks, David. 2002. "The Culture of Martyrdom." *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 289, No. 6 (June).

<sup>61</sup> Laitin, David D. and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2008. "The Political, Economic and Organizational Source of Terrorism." In Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds), *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, pp. 209-232

Barre's regime with an Islamic state<sup>62</sup>. In 2000, AIAI remnants – mostly young members – reformed into Al-Shabaab and were incorporated into the ICU as its radical youth militia. The group operates as a decentralized organization with formal structures which are meant to provide the movement with a legitimate leadership structure and predictable decision-making processes. The structure of Al-Shabaab follows a pyramidal, three-layered superstructure: 'the *Qiyadahi or shura* (the top leadership), the *Muhaajirrum* (the foreign fighters and Somalis with foreign passports) and the *Ansar* (the local Somali fighters)<sup>63</sup>. By ideology, Al-Shabaab has been labeled by many observers as *Wahhabist* because of the extreme Islamism it advocates<sup>64</sup>. In terms of funding, Al-Shabaab generates revenues from various local and international sources, including 'duties and fees levied at airports and seaports, taxes in kind on domestic produce, "jihad contributions," checkpoints and various forms of extortions justified in terms of religious obligation, or *zakat*'. However, Al-Shabaab's main source of external funds remains Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, the deployment of AMISOM and the invasion of Somalia by the Kenya Defence Forces and subsequent capture of Kismayu and other major parts of Southern Somalia, the group has been suffocated of its major sources of funding.<sup>66</sup>

In December 2006, the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia marked a turning point in the transformation, legitimating and radicalization of Al-Shabaab. First, it provided Al-Shabaab with the opportunity to draw on deep-seated Somali hostility towards Ethiopia to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers, as well as to legitimize its existence by discrediting the TFG and external actors like Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and AMISOM, and also to mobilize public support for its

---

<sup>62</sup> R. Wise (2011). "Al-Shabaab." Case Study Number 2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. pp.3

<sup>63</sup> O. G. Mwangi (2012). "State Collapse, Al-Shabab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia." *Politics, Religion and Ideology* 13(4): 513-527: 519

<sup>64</sup> M. Ibrahim (2010). "The Al-Shabab Myth: Notoriety not Popularity." NCEIS Research Papers, 3(5), p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> Mwangi, O.G. (2012). "State Collapse, Al-Shabab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.", op cit., pp.519

<sup>66</sup> The information is based on interview of senior security officials who have requested to remain anonymous

armed rebellion, especially jihad.<sup>67</sup> In essence Al-Shabaab coined a powerful narrative of “us versus them” in its jihadist rhetoric which both the local Somalia youth and foreigners were able to adopt it. Mobilization revolved around the war between the Muslims and “infidels”.<sup>68</sup> Consequently, ‘Al-Shabaab emerged as the main source of armed resistance to the Ethiopian occupation and combined its jihadist rhetoric with Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopian sentiment to win both passive and active support from many Somalis, including those who had been wary of its extremist Islamism’<sup>69</sup>. Second, the invasion forced Al-Shabaab to adopt an effective guerrilla-style operational strategy as a means of resisting Ethiopian advance into the South. Third, ‘by forcing the Islamic Courts Union leaders who had exerted a level of moderating influence on Al-Shabaab to flee Somalia, the invasion allowed the group to become even more radical, while at the same time severing its ties to other Somali organizations’<sup>70</sup>.

Although the Ethiopian invasion succeeded in routing the ICU and pushing Al-Shabaab to the south of the country, it failed to curb Islamic radicalism in Somalia; in fact, it was a primary factor in the ultra-radical turn of Al-Shabaab, ‘transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country’.<sup>71</sup> In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its troops from Somalia, replaced by the AMISOM comprising thousands of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces.

Al-Shabaab has demonstrated that it has the operational capability to launch deadly attacks against outposts of the West and perceived enemies outside Somalia since 2008. In

---

<sup>67</sup> Ibid pp.520

<sup>68</sup> Based on interview and discussion with security officials on Al-Shaabab initial mobilization strategies

<sup>69</sup> Menkhaus, K. and Boucek, C. (2010). “Terrorism out of Somalia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 23. pp. 4-5

<sup>70</sup> R. Wise (2011). “Al-Shabaab.” Op cit., pp.2

<sup>71</sup> Ibid pp.4

October 2008, Al-Shabaab coordinated five suicide bomb attacks that hit the UN Development Programme compound, the Ethiopian consulate and various government offices, killing several dozen<sup>72</sup>. In September 2009, Al-Qaeda bombed the African Union peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu, killing more than 20 people and damaging the offices of a US firm that was purportedly providing support to peacekeepers.<sup>73</sup> In July, 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for suicide bombing of two groups of fans watching the World Cup in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, which killed more than 70 people, including one American citizen. The Ugandan attacks, according to Al-Shabaab, were launched to punish the country for its active role in assisting AMISOM forces in Somalia, in the same way that the recent Westgate attack was launched to punish Kenya for its military operations in Somalia since August 2011.<sup>74</sup> The deployment of AMISOM increased the group reach and hence a threat to the region.

Indeed the Al-Shabaab has transformed as a terrorist group to be incorporated within a global jihadist movement led by Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda operated in Sudan in the early 1990s hosted by the Islamist regimes of Omar al Bashir and Hassan al Turabi.<sup>75</sup> However, the organization soon set its sights on war-torn Somalia when it learnt that American troops were going to be deployed into it in order to restore order and provide supplies to the local population. Addressing a core group of Al-Qaeda members in late 1993, Bin Laden declared: ‘The American army now they came [sic] to the Horn of Africa, and we have to stop the head of the snake... the

---

<sup>72</sup> H. Ali Noor. “Suicide Bombers Kill at least 28 in Somalia.” *Reuters*, October 29, 2008.

<sup>73</sup> D. E. Agbiboa (2013b). “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective.” *African Conflict and Peace-building Review* 3 (1): 144-157: 154

<sup>74</sup> F. Onuoha (2013). “Westgate Attack: Al-Shabab’s Renewed Transnational Jihadism.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 10 November. Available online at, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/11/11/20131111123040955734Kenya.pdf> (Accessed 20 November, 2013)

<sup>75</sup> Lorenzo Vadini, et al. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict”. *African Security*, 3: 216-238: 218, 2010.

snake is America, and we have to stop them. We have to cut the head and stop them’.<sup>76</sup> Following discussions between Al-Qaeda’s military wing commander Abu Hafs al Masri and AIAI’s military wing commander Shaykh Hassan Awey’s, four Al-Qaeda instructors were sent to Somalia to ‘train other Somalis’ linked to the AIAI in advanced combat tactics and weapons. According to the Al-Shabaab Media Foundation, Al-Qaeda’s official propaganda wing, these instructors taught Somali Islamists ‘the tactics of guerrilla warfare, in addition to taking part in a number of combat operations against the Americans’<sup>77</sup>.

The affiliation between Al-Qaeda and the AIAI leadership continued after the US withdrew from Somalia. In 1996, Al-Qaeda moved its base to the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where Bin Laden forged a close relationship with the Taliban.<sup>78</sup> A number of key members of the AIAI leadership travelled with Al-Qaeda to Afghanistan to receive training in Al-Qaeda’s combat strategy, including suicide attacks and simultaneous bombings of different targets. One of them was Aden Hashi Farah Ayrow, a senior AIAI military commander. Propaganda materials released by Al-Shabaab suggest that Ayrow grew ‘fond of the way Al-Qaeda worked and admired its doctrine, its strategy to change the Islamic world, and its call for jihad against Christians. Ayrow met many mujahedeen brothers in various positions within the organization, and he also met Shaykh Usama Bin Laden’.<sup>79</sup> The report further noted that at the end of this first tour of Afghanistan, Ayro had become ‘a military encyclopedia’ – he was unparalleled in the Horn of Africa region. Starting in late 2001 the US war on terror in

---

<sup>76</sup> Lorenzo et al. 2010, op cit., pp.218

<sup>77</sup> Ibid

<sup>78</sup> CNN (2013). “Transcript of Bin Laden’s October Interview.” February 5.

<sup>79</sup> Lorenzo Vadini, et al.(2010) op cit., pp. 219



Afghanistan dispersed the organization and forced it underground as its personnel were attacked and its bases and training camps destroyed.<sup>80</sup>

Al-Shabaab has transformed itself from a predominantly nationalist organization with the localized agenda of driving the Ethiopians from Somalia to a ‘hybrid movement’ that has increasingly embraced the Al-Qaeda-led global jihad against the West.<sup>81</sup> On several occasions leaders of Al-Shabaab have pledged the group’s allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Muktar Robow, for example, stated that ‘Al-Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia... We are negotiating how we can unite into one... We will take our orders from Sheikh Osama bin Laden because we are his students’.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, a January 2010 communiqué by Al-Shabaab stated that the ‘Jihad of Horn of Africa must be combined with the international jihad led by the Al-Qaeda network’.<sup>83</sup>

Al-Shabaab’s deepening ties with Al-Qaeda, especially since 2009, has had profound effects on its structure, targets, and operational strategy. First, Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda significantly altered its leadership component. After the death of its leader, Aden Hashi Ayro, in May 2008, Al-Shabaab’s command structure welcomed a number of Al-Qaeda core members into top leadership roles.<sup>84</sup> Second, until 2008, Al-Shabaab made use of relatively conventional guerrilla tactics in its attacks against the invading Ethiopian forces. However, the group’s increasing ties with Al-Qaeda has led it down the path of suicide attacks as a means of achieving its objectives; the group has claimed responsibility for several bombings – including suicide attacks – in central and northern Somalia and in Mogadishu.<sup>85</sup> Reflecting a shift largely

---

<sup>80</sup> Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

<sup>81</sup> Wise, R. (2011). “Al-Shabab.” Op cit., 218

<sup>82</sup> Fletcher, M. (2008). “How the War on Terror Pushed Somalia into the Arms of Al-Qaeda.” *Times of London*, November 18.

<sup>83</sup> BBC News (2010). “Somali Islamists Al-Shabab ‘Join Al-Qaeda Fight.’” February 1.

<sup>84</sup> Roggio, B. (2010). “Al-Qaeda Leaders play significant role in Shabaab,” *Long War Journal*, August 1. [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al\\_qaeda\\_leaders\\_pla.php.html](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_leaders_pla.php.html) (Accessed 16 August 2013).

<sup>85</sup> D. E. Agbibo (2013a). “Al-Shabaab’s Dangerous Affair with Al-Qaeda.” *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 38(4): 425-440.

driven by its growing friendship with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has emphasized the development of training camps for suicide bombers across Somalia and beyond.<sup>86</sup> In fact, Al-Shabaab has been linked to the training of Nigeria's Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram. According to Boko Haram; western education is unlawful in Hausa. Since its founding in 2002, the group has killed over 10,000 people.<sup>87</sup> Indeed to emphasize the threat posed by the group, in August 2011, General Carter Ham, Commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) claimed that Boko Haram is financially sponsored by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. He also alleged that both jihadist groups shared training and fighters with Boko Haram. He described that as 'the most dangerous thing to happen not only to the Africans, but to us as well'.<sup>88</sup>

In September 2009, Al-Shabaab officially pledged its allegiance to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda.<sup>89</sup> In February 2012, Al-Shabaab's emir in Somalia, and Al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a joint video to formally announce a merger of the two organizations. The merger has predictably worried the United States, which, already, on 18 March 2008 designated Al-Shabaab as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224.

The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against the provision of material support or resources to Al-Shabaab and blocking of all property and interests in property of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of U.S. persons.<sup>90</sup> Indeed the killing of Nebhan prompted an open threat from the Al-Shabaab

---

<sup>86</sup> R. Wise (2011). "Al-Shabaab." op cit.

<sup>87</sup> D. E. Agbibo (2013c). "Peace at Daggers Drawn: Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37(1): 41-67.

<sup>88</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2011). "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Growing New Headache." *Strategic Comments* 17 (9), p. 3.

<sup>89</sup> Agbibo, 2013a. op cit.

<sup>90</sup> US State Department (2008). "Designation of Al-Shabab." Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism."

leadership directed at America: On September 14, 2009 Saleh Ali Nabhan was listed on the FBI's third major "wanted" list and associated with multiple attacks in Kenya in 2002, as well as his possible involvement in the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in which over 250 people lost their lives.

After the death of their regional Al Qaeda leader, Al Shaabab has vowed revenge 'The United States is Islam's known enemy and we will never expect mercy from them, nor should they expect mercy from us'.<sup>91</sup> In 2010 the relationship between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda was all but confirmed when, following Nabhan's death, Al-Shabaab was taken over by fellow Al-Qaeda operative Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a native Comoran who has been linked to several terrorist plots and has long been a middleman between the two groups<sup>92</sup>. For the first time, on 7 June 2012 the US Department's Rewards for Justice offered rewards for information on seven key leaders of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group.<sup>93</sup> This was a clear indication that the group not only posed a regional threat but global.

It is important to note that the growth of information and communication technology (ICT) has enhanced the operational capability of jihadist groups like Al-Shabaab, enabling them to stay in contact with the wider jihadist community, as well as to recruit and train potential fighters abroad.<sup>94</sup> A Galvin notes, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated that it is extremely media savvy and has used social media effectively to advance, and gain traction for, its cause. Websites like Facebook and Twitter have allowed terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab to 'disseminate propaganda

---

March 18. Available at <http://www.state.gov/j.ct/rls/other/des/143205.htm>. (Accessed 18 November 2013).

<sup>91</sup> Agence France Presse (2009). "Shabaab Militants Vow Revenge for Death of Regional Al-Qaeda Leader." September 15.

<sup>92</sup> Lorenzo et al. 2010. Op cit., pp. 224.

<sup>93</sup> US Department of State (2012). "Rewards for Justice – Al-Shabab Leaders Reward Offer." June 7. Office of the Spokesperson. Washington, DC. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/191914.htm>. (Accessed 19 November 2013).

<sup>94</sup> Saltman, S. (2008). "The Global Jihad Network: Why and How Al-Qaeda Uses Computer Technology to Wage Jihad." *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, 1(3). Available at <http://www.acsa.net/TW/samples/saltman.pdf>. (Accessed 18 September 2013).

to an impressionable age bracket that have the potential to empathize with their cause'.<sup>95</sup> Over the last decade, there has been an exponential rise in the number of terrorist internet sites from less than 100 to over 4,800 a couple of years ago.

Galvin posits that 'the internet has enabled terrorist organizations to research and coordinate attacks, to expand the reach of their propaganda to a global audience, to communicate with ethnic diasporas and international supporters, to foster public awareness and sympathy for their causes (as well as) to convey their messages to international audiences with whom it would otherwise be difficult to communicate.'<sup>96</sup> Already, we have seen how, during the Westgate attack, Al-Shabaab used Twitter handle to disseminate messages goading Kenyan authorities and claim responsibility for the Westgate attack. Lastly, ICT has allowed Al-Shabaab to tap into wealthy Salafi networks keen on supporting Al-Qaeda's global jihadist campaign. In August 2009, Al-Shabaab launched an online fundraising forum that raised over \$40,000 from members of the Somalia Diaspora.<sup>97</sup>

## 2.4 Refugee - Terrorism Nexus

Although Al-Shabaab began as a militant group focused on domestic politics within Somalia, but now the group has made a gradual shift from Somali national politics to East African regional politics. This shift is related to the region's support for the TFG in Mogadishu. Ethiopia's militant ousting of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from government in 2006

---

<sup>95</sup> Galvin, K. (2013). "How Al-Shabab is Using Twitter for Terrorism." *PolicyMic*, October 6. Available online at, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/66443/how-Al-Shabab-is-using-twitter-for-terrorism.html> (Accessed 19 November, 2013).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid

<sup>97</sup> United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia (2010). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853(2008)*. March 10. Available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=s/2010/91.html](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2010/91.html) (Accessed 16 June 2013).

sparked threats from Al-Shabaab against Ethiopia.<sup>98</sup> Al-Shabaab has openly threatened Kenya in the last year, at least in part because Kenya has attempted to combat piracy, which demonstrates Kenya's new activism against external threat. Kenya has also actively attempted to secure its border against armed factions. The International Crisis Group (ICG) states, "Al-Shabaab's threat to strike Kenya, which could reasonably be dismissed as bravado, may become real. Al-Shabaab has honed its terror tactics and skills in recent years and is now by far the deadliest guerilla movement operating in the Horn."<sup>99</sup> The danger to Kenya from Al-Shabaab is no longer a perceived threat sparking precaution but a real menace. The group wants to expand its territory and now threatens the security of Kenya's NEP. Kenya's ethnic Somali and Muslim populations mostly live in the NEP and along the south-eastern coast. Although Kenyan citizens, these populations are politically and economically marginalized, making these regions prosperous recruiting grounds for groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. It is well known that Kenya has been used by Al-Qaeda in the past as a point of transit.<sup>100</sup>

Therefore, because Kenya has a large Muslim population that is vulnerable to recruitment and a history with terrorism, it is fair to assume that Kenya is taking the Al-Shabaab threat seriously. In the last year open threats from Al-Shabaab against Kenyan sovereignty have been increasing. For example, a song was released by the organization in January 2010 cautioning Kenya of its presence: "We have arrived at the border, we will enter Kenya, and Inshallah we

---

<sup>98</sup> "Al-Shabaab—Terrorist Groups," National Counter- terrorism Center (NCTC), [http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al\\_shabaab.html](http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html). Daniela Kroslak, "Somalia: Militant Islamists Try to Draw Kenya into a Trap," International Crisis Group, June 26, 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6185>.

<sup>99</sup> Daniela Kroslak, "Somalia: Militant Islamists Try to Draw Kenya into a Trap," International Crisis Group, June 26, 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6185>.

<sup>100</sup> Koert Lindijer, "In Kenya, Fear of Al Qaeda Ally Stokes Hatred of Somalis," NRC Handelsblad, February 2, 2010, <http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2473952>

will get to Nairobi when we get there, we will fight, we will kill, because we have weapons, enough weapons.”<sup>101</sup>

The affirmations made by refugees and NGO workers in Dadaab, one of Kenya’s refugee camps, assure the Kenyan government that Al-Shabaab has not only arrived at the border, but has infiltrated the country and is spreading within. In an interview with a Dutch news agency one Somali refugee stated, “Al-Shabaab operates here in Kenya. I expect terrorists will strike here.”<sup>102</sup> Other refugees go as far as to state that Al-Shabaab fighters come across the border not only to recruit and strengthen the organization, but also to rest from the fighting and seek treatment in Kenya’s hospitals.<sup>103</sup> Many refugees who have been interviewed on the subject acknowledge that Al-Shabaab’s purpose in Kenya is to gain support in Somalia by radicalizing disaffected refugees and Kenyan Muslims to further alienate the TFG from its neighbors.<sup>104</sup> As argued, if the TFG falls, it was highly predictable that the horrors that go on in Somalia will spill over into Kenya, a country that is already unstable and politically fragile. This fragility is compounded by the significantly high numbers of Somali refugees living within Kenya’s borders. In interviews with journalists many Somali refugees state that they do not support Al-Shabaab, as they do not believe in its use of violence as a means to implement Sharia law in Somalia. However, the group has been successful in recruiting young men and boys to return to Somalia to fight. Ahmed Hussien, president of the Canadian Somali Congress, noted that joining Al-Shabaab is a “one way ticket you don’t come back.”<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Garowe, “Kenya: Al Shabaab Threaten to Attack Kenya Capital,” Garowe Online, January 21, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201001210933.html>.

<sup>102</sup> Koert Lindijer, “In Kenya, Fear of Al Qaeda Ally Stokes Hatred of Somalis,” NRC Handelsblad, February 2, 2010, [http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2473952.ece/In\\_Kenya,\\_fear\\_of\\_Al\\_Qaeda\\_ally\\_stokes\\_hatred\\_of\\_Somalis?service=Print](http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2473952.ece/In_Kenya,_fear_of_Al_Qaeda_ally_stokes_hatred_of_Somalis?service=Print).

<sup>103</sup> “Al-Shabaab,” New York Times, November 24, 2009, <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/al-shabab/index.html>

<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> CBC “Al-Shabaab,” interview by Anna Maria Tremonti, The Current, CBC Radio, Ottawa, March 10, 2010.

Despite this, most of these recruits are enticed to join in order to earn some income. These youths are disaffected and therefore ideologically vulnerable to the messages delivered by the recruiters to persuade refugees to fight in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's infiltration of Kenya's refugee community demonstrates the strategic use of refugees in war and reiterates that Kenya's borders are hugely insecure and vulnerable to attacks. Al Shaabab threat has exposed Kenya's under belly. Kenya's territorial integrity faces severe consequences. In the context where Kenya has been a victim of terrorism before and is under immense pressure from inter- national actors like the UK and the US to tackle terrorist cells infiltrating the country, one can begin to piece together the present situation of Kenya's reaction to refugees. Kenya's response of repressing refugee populations outside of the camps and closing the border is not supported by the humanitarian agencies but it is a clear response to a perceived crisis and threat to national security.

## **2.5 Kenya's Susceptibility Due to its Domestic Issues**

There is a saying that, "When Kenya sneezes, East Africa catches a cold."<sup>106</sup> Kenya is the epicentre for East African economic, political, and humanitarian discourse. It is a major player regionally and internationally because, until recently, it has been one of the most prosperous and politically stable countries in East Africa. To understand the present decision to opt for national security over humanitarianism, it is important to understand Kenya's major domestic issues, which cause it to be more wary of refugees, as a result of heightened vulnerability to external attack. The international and regional community is pressuring Kenya to address these issues so that it can remain a valuable player in international discourse and a recipient of donor money.

---

<sup>106</sup> Wanjohi Kabukuru, "Kenya," *New African*, May 1, 2009, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/When+Kenya+sneezes.html>

Some of these major domestic issues came to the fore in December 2007 during Kenya's elections. Accusations that the election was rigged provoked national civil unrest with waves of ethnic and gang-related violence.<sup>107</sup> The election violence left nearly one thousand people dead and thousands of people displaced. It reminded the international community that Kenya, despite being stable in comparison to its troubled neighbors, is not the rock of East Africa that it was thought to be. It shows Kenya's troubling ethnic issues and political corruption but also demonstrated how much the whole of East Africa relies on its stability.<sup>108</sup>

Despite being considered a developing country, Kenya has a fairly developed infrastructure compared to its neighbors, who depend on Kenya's roads and harbors for shipping. Kenya borders five countries: Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Some of these countries are highly dependent on the Northern Corridor, which is a vital road network that connects Kenya's neighbors to its busy harbor in Mombasa. During the election violence, this road was blocked and many countries were hard-pressed to receive vital shipments of fuel and essential goods.<sup>109</sup> East African businesses also rely on Kenya because it is home to East and Central Africa's most significant stock exchange, the Nairobi Stock Exchange.<sup>110</sup>

Kenya's election violence hurt the entire region economically. Some countries were so desperate for Kenya to stabilize that even the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, was ready to call for a military intervention in Nairobi.<sup>111</sup> Not only were Kenya's neighbors anxious for the violence to end, but so was the international community. Many international organizations and governments have their regional headquarters based in Nairobi. The majority of international

---

<sup>107</sup> Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, "Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya," *African Affairs* 108, no. 430 (January 2009): 2.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>109</sup> Wanjohi Kabukuru, "Kenya," *New African*, May 1, 2009, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/When+Kenya+sneezes.html>

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>111</sup> David Kezio-Musoke, "Kalonzo Meets Kagame over Crisis," *Daily Nation*, February 24, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200802240025.html>.



governments' and NGOs' economic, political, and humanitarian programs for the region are headquartered in Nairobi. Many of these programs stalled as Kenya went up in flames.<sup>112</sup>

Politically vulnerable, the Kenyan government has also had to deal with external political pressure. The threat from Al-Shabaab to Kenya's political and territorial integrity is not a threat that Kenya can choose to ignore. Kenya's large marginalized Muslim and refugee populations make it vulnerable. By recruiting Somali refugees in Kenya, Al-Shabaab intensified the potential threat of refugees to Kenya's security as a nation-state. Like Al-Shabaab, Kenya has realized the strategic value of using refugees for their own ends. Although it originally deemed refugees a nuisance, the government of Kenya has been able to counter Al-Shabaab's strength in the Somali refugee communities by infiltrating these communities itself. By using refugees as pawns in the war against Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government may alienate humanitarian organizations and donor nations. As previously mentioned, it could also invite reprisals from Al-Shabaab.<sup>113</sup>

These are to be the risks that the government of Kenya is willing to take. Weighing the alternative of waging an overt invasion in to Somalia to tackle the Al-Shabaab threat, Kenya may also deem that being reprimanded by the international community is another risk it is willing to accept. This has led Kenya to renegotiate its stance on guarding refugee rights. Therefore, relying on refugees for a covert intervention in Somalia allows Kenya to spare its forces and at the same time confront the threat to its territorial integrity with deniability. For the Kenyan government, it may appear to be win-win situation: send the refugees back to Somalia and give them the means to take matters into their own hands, and at the same time counter the threats from Al-Shabaab.

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> "Kenya: Al Shabaab Threaten to Attack Kenya Capital," Garowe Online, January 21, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201001210933.html>.

Moreover, if these allegations of Kenya recruiting within the refugee populations remain just that, allegations, then the government of Kenya can remain in good light to the international community and donors.<sup>114</sup> However, the complexity of the situation demonstrates that Kenya is a vulnerable state that is suffering from severe internal disorders; it has an enormous refugee population that continues to grow day by day; and it is being threatened by an armed faction which is fully capable of playing on the refugee crisis for the advancement of their strategy. Kenya has to address all of these issues, which may affect its security or its integrity as an international player.<sup>115</sup> The biggest priority is to address its internal problems, which were revealed in the election violence of 2007. Nevertheless, it is unable to fully focus on these internal problems with Al-Shabaab at its door and following the refugees as they pour in. These problems are compounded by the refugee crisis because Kenya lacks the resources to fully address the needs of these people and is continuously pressured by the international community to do something. In any case, as demonstrated, Kenya can barely feed and care for its own citizens let alone thousands of refugees who may or may not be enemies of the state.

## **2.6 Kenya as a Target for Terrorist Activities**

Till recently, terrorism in Kenya was mostly a foreign affair. Operatives from elsewhere saw Kenya as a permissive, target-rich environment. The first major attack of the modern era was the Norfolk Hotel bombing in December, 1980, which killed sixteen people and injured more than one hundred. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility. Most believe the attack served as retaliation for Kenya's decision to allow the launch of the 1972 Israeli military raid on Entebbe, Uganda from Kenyan soil. Nearly two decades later, on August 7,

---

<sup>114</sup> Tayler et al., "Kenya Recruits Somali Refugees to Fight Islamists Back Home in Somalia."

<sup>115</sup> Ibid

1998, al-Qaida attacked the American Embassy in Nairobi with a truck-bomb. This attack killed some 220 people and injured roughly 5,000 Embassy staff, passers-by and people in neighboring buildings. Al-Qaida simultaneously attacked the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 and injuring another 70. An attempt to destroy the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was reportedly foiled on this same date.<sup>116</sup> All three embassies were accessible and relatively unprotected, making them particularly attractive targets.

Kenya, moreover, remains a potentially prime target for terrorists in its own right. It has substantial Western tourist activity, the headquarters of the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations Habitat Program, a large number of Western embassies, and several international businesses. Kenya sustained terrible casualties in the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 1998. That act, and the 2002 attack on Israeli facilities in Mombasa, revealed the extent of terrorist cells operating within Kenya.<sup>117</sup> The cells have taken root in the Muslim community, which traces its roots to the Middle East.

The society has experienced a steady decline in political and economic influence since Kenyan independence, as Kenya's African population gained power and competition for jobs increased. As conditions have declined, religious interest has risen, Muslim religious and social groups have taken on more responsibility and influence, and there has been more interchange among young people seeking opportunity in the Middle East. The radical cells that developed in this milieu represent only a small portion of the Muslim community, which itself is only about

---

<sup>116</sup> Arye Oded, *Islam & Politics in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000); 82, and, David H. Shinn, "Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn," *Foreign Service Journal* (September, 2004).

<sup>117</sup> Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller, eds., *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2006), pp. 60–61.

10 percent of the Kenyan population. Nevertheless, the outsiders directly involved in the bombings of 1998 and the Mombasa attacks were clearly assisted by Kenyan citizens.<sup>118</sup>

## **2.7 Susceptibility to Radicalization**

Although a number of definitions of radicalization exist, Gurr defines the concept as: A process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become disillusioned and discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modelling or ‘imitative’ behaviour occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt.<sup>119</sup> The period and process of radicalization differ from individual to individual, even though it is commonly recognized that the process occurs progressively over a period of time. Conscious decisions to, for example, join a terrorist organization or use violence for political ends are not made suddenly, but entail a gradual process that includes a multitude of occurrences, experiences, perceptions and role players. Having contact and listen to others with different opinions are important facilitators preventing radicalization, because discussions with people with different opinions force people

---

<sup>118</sup> Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: The Struggle Against Terrorism,” in Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism*, pp. 173–192. See also Gilbert Khadiagala, “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism,” in *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report no. 113, January 2004.

<sup>119</sup> TR Gurr, *Terrorism in democracies: its social and political bases*, in W Reich (ed.), *Origins of terrorism: psychology, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990, 87.

to constantly rethink and refine their own positions. On the other hand, sharing one's opinions with people who hold similar viewpoints will reinforce one's position, identify common problems and provoke collective action.<sup>120</sup> This form of isolation leads to 'groupthink', which can be described as an irrational style of thinking that causes group members to make poor decisions.<sup>121</sup>

There is no shortage of scholarly publication on the root causes of terrorism. However, most concentrate on the broad circumstances that motivate people to commit acts of terrorism and are therefore not always pertinent. While acknowledging the influence of external factors, this section intends to explain radicalization as is evident in Kenya. In explanations of why individuals resort to violent extremism or terrorism scholars frequently stress the "root causes," "structural factors," or "underlying conditions" that allegedly drive this phenomenon. Among these "underlying conditions," in turn, social and economic ones (e.g., large-scale poverty and unemployment, inadequate government services, and insufficient economic opportunities) often receive a lopsided level of attention. Although perhaps to a lesser extent, political factors (such as bad governance, government repression, and/or the existence of ill-governed or poorly governed areas) also frequently loom large in "root causes" explanations. In the Kenyan context, there are four key factors that have increased the Kenya's susceptibility to radicalization into terrorism. These are structural and institutional factors, socio-economic factors, foreign and military intervention, and jihadist ideology are some of the underlying conditions for radicalization and subsequent terrorist activities. These underlying conditions can further be

---

<sup>120</sup> E Quintelier, D Stolle and A Harell, Politics in peer groups: exploring the causal relationship between network diversity and political participation, *Political Research Quarterly* 20 (10) (2011), 2.

<sup>121</sup> M Cottam, B Dietz-Uhler, EM Mastors and T Preston, Introduction to political psychology, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004, 80.

classified as “push factors” (those characteristics of the societal environment that allegedly help thrust vulnerable individuals onto the path of violence), and “pull factors” as:

- a. The appeal of a particular leader, “guru” or self-appointed imam.
- b. The resonance of certain ideas that reach deep into a society’s culture or history, that evoke powerful imagery and symbols, and that often remain thoroughly embedded in the fabric of daily life.
- c. The many and diverse rewards which membership in a group or movement, and participation in its activities, may confer. Such potential benefits include: access to material resources; social status and respect from peers; self-esteem; a feeling of brotherhood; thrills and a sense of adventure; the prospect of achieving glory and fame; or the sense of personal empowerment that individuals and groups that long have viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history. In short, affiliation with extremist movements can provide material rewards, as well as emotional and spiritual benefits the importance of which should not be glossed over.
- d. The desire to emulate a perceived “hero” or “icon” of “resistance against oppression.” The urge to conceive of oneself as a righteous avenger, and to project that image of oneself to others, may be particularly strong where feelings of personal and/or collective humiliation run high. A related variable may be the aspiration to follow in the footsteps of a friend or relative who was “martyred” or “fell to the cause.”<sup>122</sup> As argued by Segeman, one critical pull factor which empirical evidence suggests often trumps all alleged push factors combined consists of the

---

<sup>122</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas, 2006. Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, pp. 39-60 (Winter).

social networks and personal relationships that often pull individuals into violent extremist organizations, and the group dynamics that subsequently keep them there and radicalize them.<sup>123</sup>

Radicalization involves both external and internal factors. External factors can be subdivided into domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy.<sup>124</sup> Internal or personal interpretations of the external environment are influenced by psychological factors that refer directly to political socialization. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy identifies ‘conducive conditions’ to terrorism. These ‘push factors’ or enabling circumstances include political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses; economic circumstances; sociological circumstances, e.g. religious and ethnic discrimination; counter-terrorism operations and their impact; and perceived injustice and international circumstances.

Although a basic understanding of these conditions provides an insight into radicalization, without pressure from domestic and personal circumstances individuals might support the ideas of extremists (nonviolent extremism) without becoming actively involved in acts of terrorism (violent extremism). Secondly, not all people faced with the same set of circumstances will become radicalized, while not all of those who are radicalized will join a terrorist organization or commit acts of violence and terrorism. Despite these circumstances, it is still the individual who decides to join a terrorist organization or is drawn to the ideals and activities of extremist organizations. Ultimately one realizes that human behaviour is extremely complex and that the key to radicalization is the individual’s response to the aforementioned.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> Segeman Marc, 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press

<sup>124</sup> United Nations, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>125</sup> Annie Botha and Mahdi Abdile, 2006, *Radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia*, Institute for Security Studies

Islamist extremism did not appear in Kenya for the first time after the country's military intervention in Somalia in 2011 or with al-Shabaab's subsequent attacks on Kenyan restaurants, public places and churches. The first significant manifestation of the growing threat of extremism in post-independence East Africa can be traced back to the 7 August 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which were attributed to al-Qaeda. Although a number of political officials in Kenya and Tanzania claimed that their respective countries had merely been used as a battleground to target the United States and its interests, individuals involved in the attacks included both foreigners and locals. Since then violent extremism has gradually lost its exclusively foreign character and national and regional extremism has expanded, which suggests that there must be a local/national and regional element to this growing threat.<sup>126</sup>

The first dynamic is structural and institutional factors. Several structural and institutional factors that make Kenya susceptible to radicalization. One is the advanced economy and infrastructure that has allowed for freedom of movement and an abundance of targets. The issue of weak governance in strategic of security, criminal justice system, and rule of law impede effective action against terrorist groups.<sup>127</sup> Geographical proximity to conflict ridden and politically unstable states, such as Somalia, in conjunction with the porous borders that have so often been entry points for terrorists.<sup>128</sup> Another aspect, is that of the economy and Infrastructure. Kenya's robust economy and infrastructural system is attractive to some of its neighbours thus making it vulnerable. However, as Muhula asserts that it, Kenya's attractiveness to terrorists is exacerbated by the fact that it also boasts the best infrastructural facilities in the region. Thus in

---

<sup>126</sup> Annie Botha, 2014, Radicalization in Kenya, the Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>127</sup> Smith, G.D. (1990): *Combatting Terrorism*, London

<sup>128</sup> Smith, G.D. (1998b): »Single Issue Terrorism, Canadian Security Intelligence Service«, Commentary No. 74.



Kenya operating a terrorist cell is easier compared to other states in the Horn countries.<sup>129</sup> Due to the fact that, radical and terrorist groups need resources to thrive, infrastructure and economic stability thus allow the terrorists to navigate and travel easily, faster and more reliable communications, and access to resources.

Concerning of communications, Mwinyihaji and Wanyama view the Internet as of particularly great importance. The rapid internet diffusion has led to a rapidly increase of cyber-cafes which are apparently affordable (less than a dollar per hour). The cafes have become fundamental sites of Kenyan Muslims' engagement with the global Muslim ummah, enhancing their knowledge of Islam through cyber-literacy, and networking within and between (cyber)-communities with shared interests.<sup>130</sup> One of the most enticing targets for terrorist groups are the soft targets-Airports, hotels, resorts, restaurants, and nightclubs, public transport terminals, places of worship, learning institutions, shopping malls, as well as government buildings such as the U.S. Embassy<sup>131</sup> had been earlier accessible to terrorists.

Corruption in governance and leadership, especially in critical areas such as criminal justice, border security, and the provision of essential services, also increases Kenya's vulnerability to radicalism and terror. For instance, corruption along unguarded borders, and ineffective security and police organizations has facilitated many terrorist organizations with the freedom of movement, and ability to operate as long as they can bribe the officers in charge.<sup>132</sup> Jihadist Ideology is another factor that has caused the radicalization of individuals to join Al-Shabaab. In addition to the general motivation that they perceived Islam to be under threat, and there the narrative that they need to stand up for their religion to protect from the invaders has

---

<sup>129</sup> Smith, G.D. (1998a): »An electronic Pearl Harbor? Not likely«; in: Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1998, pp. 68–73

<sup>130</sup> Ibid

<sup>131</sup> Based on the profile of terrorist attacks witnessed in Kenya

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Chapter 9 (Responding to Terrorism) of the U.S. Department of Defense's 1997 Annual Defense Report

made many youth get radicalized. Also the Kenya invasion of Somalia to protect its national interests reinforced the narrative of foreign aggression. In this aspect, the agent of radicalization were the Muslim preachers. According to studies conducted by the Institute for Security Studies, According to respondents, ‘preachers delivered sermons for hours about destiny and the sweetness of the holy war. They distributed leaflets on Islam, showed video recordings from other jihadist in the world and how AMISOM [the African Union Mission in Somalia] or the Christian crusaders invaded our beloved country and were converting our children to Christianity.’<sup>133</sup>

On the other hand, the root cause of youth radicalization in Coast region stems from the region’s desperate economic, social, and political conditions. This has been evident in unsuccessful decentralization of development plans and governance problems since independence.<sup>134</sup> Lack of education adversely affects employment opportunities. Self-employment is an option when formal employment opportunities are limited, but lack of education is a limiting factor in obtaining a meaningful employment. In a study conducted in Uganda, Tushambomwe-Kazooba showed that the majority of new business owners were not properly trained, leading to poor business planning and management decisions.<sup>135</sup> For instance, at the Kenyan coast, those who were employed had low-income jobs, largely because they did not have the education needed to obtain better jobs. It was therefore due to adverse economic circumstances as a recruitment factor saw al-Shabaab as a potential employer. In Kenya, the coastal community feels economically marginalised despite the growth its members, leading to unmet expectations. It is when access is based on ethnic, cultural or even religious differences

---

<sup>134</sup> Sopko, J.F. (1996): »The Changing Proliferation Threat«; in: *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1996/97, pp. 3–20.

<sup>135</sup> Tushambomwe-Kazooba, Causes of small business failure in Uganda: a case study from Bushenyi and Mbarara towns, *African Studies Quarterly* 8(4) (2006), 27–35.

between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ that economic conditions can possibly contribute to radicalisation and instability. The coastal region and North Eastern Province are not only less developed than the rest of the country, but are the two regions that have been traditionally Muslim. Due these factors, the youth are more vulnerable to radicalization.

## **2.8 Home-Grown Terrorism in Kenya**

Kenya, with its porous borders, political corruption, and high density of Western targets is now being described as a breeding ground for al-Shabab, a terrorist group with origins in Somalia and links to al-Qaeda. According to Bryden, it is probable that the greatest misunderstanding of al-Shabab is that people underestimate the degree that al-Shabab has become a ‘Kenyan problem’. In expounding on the ‘reinvention of Al-shabaab’, Bryden states that Kenya remains susceptible to Al-Shabaab, given the existence of domestic jihadist affiliates such as the Al-Hijra (Formerly, The Muslim Youth Centre-MYC). Others include Kenyan fighters in Al Shabaab’s ranks.<sup>136</sup>

### **2.8.1 Al-Hijra as Kenya’s Home Grown Terror Network**

The Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) was founded in an Eastleigh in 2008 and led by Ahmad Iman Ali, also known as Abdul Fatah of Kismayo, who has been operating from Somalia since 2009. This Kenyan jihadist professes his total submission and obedience to al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane. The MYC took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction and radicalization in certain sectors of the community to build a significant presence in Nairobi and in the coastal city of Mombasa. This means that the group actually pre-dates al-Shabaab as a formal organization. After initial denials, the group confirmed its association with al-Shabaab. Security officials and

---

<sup>136</sup> Matt Bryden, the Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program, CSIS, February 2014. Available at: [http://csis.org/files/publication/140221\\_Bryden\\_ReinventionOfAlShabaab\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf)

analysts state that the MYC 'is out to create sectarian violence in Kenya'.<sup>137</sup> The MYC, which is also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth, in a post on its website on 14 January 2012 the group vowed to carry out "attacks against Kenya's 'kuffars' (infidels) for our al-Shabaab brothers until the country withdraws its troops from Somalia".<sup>138</sup>

In 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia cited MYC for recruiting, fundraising, training and supporting a jihadist movement on behalf of al-Shabaab in Kenya. Since its inception, the MYC has developed a strong network of members and sympathisers in Kenya.<sup>139</sup> In 2011 the UN already warned that the group intends to conduct large-scale attacks in Kenya, and possibly elsewhere in East Africa. Since the 2011 UN report, the MYC has been very active trying to garner support for al-Shabaab using a two-pronged strategy of publishing threatening messages to spread fear among the public, and igniting religious strife in Kenya.<sup>140</sup>

The MYC, which re-branded itself as al-Hijra (named for the journey of the prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) and his followers from Mecca to Medina to escape an assassination plot) in 2012, has been linked to several of the small-scale terrorist attacks that have hit the country. According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, most of the operatives who conspired in the attack were Kenyan and close to MYC (al-Hijra) leaders. MYC attacks have been restricted to low-level grenade and rifle attacks against Kenyan security forces, as well as softer targets like transports hubs, bars, and nightclubs frequented by locals in Nairobi and

---

<sup>137</sup> Ibid

<sup>138</sup> Watts, Clint, "Was Kenya Westgate Attack More AQAP/AQ Central than Shabaab?" Selected Wisdom, October 7, 2013, <http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=164>

<sup>139</sup> Bryden, M, et al, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853* (2008), UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

<sup>140</sup> Ibid

coastal tourist hub of Mombasa.<sup>141</sup> Examples can be seen in March 2012 when suspected MYC followers staged grenade attacks against a church and restaurant; this was followed by the multiple grenade attack in June targeting Euro 2012 spectators at the Jericho bar, in Nairobi.<sup>142</sup>

According to Bryden, till recently al-Hijra was “a group that appeared to be fumbling and amateurish, operationally.” However, he observes that a core of committed fighters has emerged and they have been learning.<sup>143</sup> The Kenyan authorities have also claimed that they have been monitoring al-Hijra’s activities in Kenya, including online postings, and working with security officials in Tanzania to neutralise any possible terrorist threat. They stated that they were aware of most of the information contained in the UN report long before it was published and released, but the report has provided some additional insights about the individual and the groups the authorities were analysing. Kenyan investigations have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of several people, and a crackdown against al-Hijra, assisted by the United States, has weakened the group. According to a United Nations report released on 17 July 2013, long before the Westgate siege, “Al-Hijra members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous 'catch and release' arrest raids and operational disruptions.”<sup>144</sup> However much more need to be done as recruitments still continue.

## 2.9 Conclusion

The chapter has explored the different aspects of terrorism and radicalization narrowing to the Kenyan situation. Indeed, the course of terrorism over the next few decades cannot be predicted,

---

<sup>141</sup> Bryden, M, et al, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

<sup>142</sup> Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab's Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline’,” (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

<sup>143</sup> Matt Bryden, the Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program, CSIS, February 2014. Available at: [http://csis.org/files/publication/140221\\_Bryden\\_ReinventionOfAlShabaab\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf)

<sup>144</sup> Ibid

just as the actual evolution of terrorism over the last 30 years could probably not have been predicted, meaning terrorism is changing even so more rapidly than most of the counter-terrorism strategies can be implemented. Lastly it is important to understand that Al-Hijra and Kenya's home-grown al Shabaab, and other domestic terrorist groups, are networks that are growing more sophisticated and dangerous. They are learning and evolving, tightening security, devising new procedures and new attack strategies, scouting new targets, recruiting new adherents and ensuring that they receive training and indoctrination, while extending its contacts and building the regional network. The next chapter will discuss the different measures that Kenya has taken in counter-terrorism and particularly the impacts of such strategies and measures. This will guide in bringing to the understanding the effective measures and weigh the cost of the measures on Kenya and its citizens as well as highlight effects that may also affect regionally and internationally.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM IN KENYA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter of the study will focus on the effect of the strategies and measures in the activities of Kenya's fight against terrorism. In order to tackle the issue of radicalization, one of the most important consideration for counter- terrorism policy would be to understand the measures and their outcome and overweigh the results so as to avoid further deterioration of the security situations. Thus this chapter will discusses the implications as well as the effectiveness of the Kenyan Government counterterrorism measures.

#### **3.2 An Overview of Counter Terrorism in Kenya**

The role of counterterrorism efforts significantly increased in Kenya since 9/11. However, prior to September 11, 2001, there were undoubtedly counterterrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The National Security Intelligence Service was established previously known as the national Security Intelligence Service – NSIS (which originated as a special Branch of the department of the national police in 1952 during the colonial rule)<sup>145</sup> has been firmly endorsed with the mandate to co conduct counter-intelligence (among other services) as part of counter-terrorism measures

In the regard to global war on terror, Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. The addition to ATA was largely a formality and no significant

---

<sup>145</sup> National Intelligence Service Cancels Recruitment.  
Accessed (8/17/2015) at: <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000106274/national-intelligence-service-cancels-recruitment>

funding was dispersed until several years later.<sup>146</sup> This was, nevertheless, a statement made by both America and Kenya to reiterate their joint fight against terrorism. Since 2002, The ATA Program has “trained more than five hundred Kenyan Security officials in the United States” and many more in U.S. designated training facilities throughout East Africa. The Kenyan Government has also created an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint Terrorism Task Force [that has since been disbanded], a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee.<sup>147</sup>

The addition of these entities has required substantial funding from the United States. The direct funding for counterterrorism, which nominally existed prior to 9/11, increased roughly 15 times its previous value in the immediate year following the attack<sup>148</sup>. Additionally, President Bush – in 2003 – authorized a \$100 million aid package titled the East African Counterterrorism Initiative. Of this funding that was directed towards the entire region, \$88 million went directly to Kenya. Further, an additional \$122 million was requested for the 2004. After all of this money was dispersed through the various government entities, the problem still remains that the “infrastructure has yet been seen to affect authorities’ ability to identify terrorists, foil terrorist plots, and bring criminals to justice”<sup>149</sup>. The flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years, success has been minimal. For one, the definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents.

---

<sup>146</sup> Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

<sup>147</sup> Aronson, S.L.” Kenya and the Global War on Terror:Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism”. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS*, Vol.7, Nos1 &2 November 2013

<sup>148</sup> Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126.

<sup>149</sup> Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27



In its definition; the Kenyan government defines terrorism as “anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious goals”<sup>150</sup>. This definition neglects terrorism based on political, ideological, and criminal rationales and thus, and in their counter terrorism efforts, they place an unfair target on the minority religion in Kenya. Second, actual legislation has been very difficult to pass and put into practice, therefore the government has been operating without official and encompassing anti-terrorism laws and standards.<sup>151</sup> The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill did not make it into law after a public outcry over unconstitutionality, international human rights violations, and overt discrimination against Muslims.

Two years later, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was again brought before Parliament. This bill contained many of the same issues as its predecessor and was, therefore, not passed into law. Certain crimes committed by terrorists (such as murder) can be prosecuted in Kenyan courts; however, there has yet to exist a comprehensive anti-terrorism law insofar as one exists in other Western democracies. The lack of this comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform questionable means and violate the human rights of many in the Muslim community. Intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence.<sup>152</sup> As the proper prosecutorial infrastructure is hardly in place, Kenyan authorities frequently hand-off terrorism suspects to neighbouring countries or the United States.<sup>153</sup>

---

<sup>150</sup> Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid

<sup>152</sup> Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27

<sup>153</sup> Nelson Odhiambo, “Experts Split on Calls to Withdraw Kenyan Troops from Somalia After Terror Attack,” *Daily Nation*, April 12, 2015.

Rather, the untrained law enforcement personnel and lack of proper legislation in Kenya make the amount of counterterrorism aid flowing into the country largely irrelevant. In the aftermath of the Westgate attack in Nairobi, it is clear to academics and policy experts that Kenya is still heavily reliant on Western security resources. This is not surprising for a developing democracy still dealing with critical levels of poverty and corruption. Still, the counterterrorism units that were expanded and funded for the sole purpose of responding to acts of terrorism were quickly overwhelmed by an inability to work together. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta activated the military – in direct contradiction to its usual role, leading to allegations that the success of the militants was a direct result of ineffective law enforcement and counterterrorism strategies, ultimately calling into question the extensive training and funding of recent years.<sup>154</sup>

The Westgate Attack and the Kenyan response displayed weaknesses that faulted the counter-terrorism efforts. After neutralizing the alleged hostage there were accusations of KDF forces looting and using an opportunity of chaos to profit financially. Additionally, Kenya detained and later released numerous Kenyan Muslims who were held under the country's existing anti-terrorism legislation and were subsequently released due to lack of evidence<sup>155</sup>. To the extent that post-9/11 counterterrorism laws around the world allow for varying degrees of detention with little oversight, one can all but expect Kenyan authorities to use its power indiscriminately, albeit legally, to search for perpetrators, often at the expense of innocent civilians.

---

<sup>154</sup> Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

<sup>155</sup> Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from [http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28](http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/)

### 3.3 Kenya's Efforts in Countering Radicalization

There is a consensus from the Somali and Islamic community that the madrasa system needs to be modified, but there is insufficient will to draft a strategy. The issue is deeply divisive. Realistically, madrasa reform can only be part of wider reform. Conservative groups and hardliners dismiss the idea as primarily driven by the West. It would be unwise for the state and donors to intervene. Modest and discreet attempts by the U.S. in recent years to encourage debate (especially in Coast Province) have galvanised hardliners.<sup>156</sup> Competent, respected Muslim educators should be encouraged to prepare an action plan, drawing on experiences throughout the Muslim world. Even a Muslim-led plan may not be readily acceptable because of sectarian and ideological divisions, but failure to reform would strengthen the case of those who want to scrap the whole system. Indeed there is no evidence of an appetite for comprehensive madrasa reform in Kenya.<sup>157</sup>

Many remain ambivalent or disinclined to the idea of reform, while a tiny but vocal constituency is implacably hostile. This aversion is mostly due to the religious and socio-cultural dominance of Wahhabism and other Salafi theologies and ill-advised state counter-terrorism policies that focus largely on security and heavy-handed policing and alienate and radicalize the Muslim community.<sup>158</sup> Salafi groups oppose reform because they fear it could highlight troubling aspects of their theology. Modernisers and moderates prefer inaction because they consider the issue either not a great priority or to be inexpedient, since they could lose ground to the hardliners.<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>156</sup> Ibid: 11-12

<sup>157</sup> Ibid: 12

<sup>158</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Nairobi, September 2011. In, "Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation" *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

<sup>159</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Nairobi, Garissa, September-October 2011. "Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation" *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

There is no model of a successful madrasa reform program to serve as a template, though lessons could be drawn from the modestly encouraging steps toward reform in a few countries, especially in South East Asia. These might include bringing private madrasas under the education ministry; requiring registration and enrolment information; setting academic standards that can be checked; and instituting a module of non-religious courses and government help that would also justify supervisory visits. But any reform plan must balance Muslim integration and the community's right to live its faith. Reform will also entail a substantial overhaul of madrasa curriculum and a qualitative improvement in teaching, ideally by creating local teacher training colleges and universities. This requires technical interventions to progressively transform the system.<sup>160</sup> More important, it is about modernising and integrating traditional madrasa education with mainstream secular schooling. Many other faith communities in Kenya have already done this.

### **3.3.1 Kenyan-Muslim Religious Leadership**

Many problems faced by the Muslim community, especially sectarian and regional divisions; inability to confront major challenges like radicalisation; and mounting tensions with other major faith groups, are blamed on the lack of Kenyan-Muslim leadership. There is great disaffection with the “official” Muslim leaders, many of whom are widely viewed as elitist and self-serving; their integrity tainted through ties with the regime or foreign interests; and disconnected from harsh community realities.<sup>161</sup> This trust and credibility deficit compounds the leadership crisis and undermines community cohesion. Radical organizations have emerged in

---

<sup>160</sup> Crisis Group interview, former madrasa teacher, Eastleigh, Nairobi, September 2010. In, . Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation” *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

<sup>161</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Nairobi and Garissa, September-October 2011. In, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization” *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

the last decade to challenge the “official” leadership and institutions. Their political activism and radical anti-establishment politics are attractive to many youths, disillusioned with what they see as timid, pragmatist and moderate political views and style of the established institutions. The institution whose ageing leadership is at the centre of this backlash is the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), whose status as the pre-eminent Kenyan-Muslim body is increasingly contested. Its traditional strategy of cultivating close links with regimes and the major political parties, as well as its preference for dialogue and engagement, may have been understandable and useful in the past but is now part of the crisis of confidence. It’s viewed its officials personally profited from those relationships.<sup>162</sup>

During the Moi era, many were stalwarts of the ruling party and campaigned for it. In return, they received Moi’s patronage.<sup>163</sup> That culture has not changed. Many now support the former Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s ODM party.<sup>164</sup> Yet while it has close ties to power, SUPKEM has not been effective in modifying the heavy-handed security tactics and perceived or real discrimination faced by Muslims. There are also allegations of corruption and nepotism. Critics complain of poor financial records and an inability to account for large grants from Gulf benefactors.<sup>165</sup> Some also suggest the long-standing scholarship program, funded through a grant scheme of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), has not been well-managed or has often been awarded in a nepotistic manner. SUPKEM remains useful to the state, primarily for channelling grievances in a non-confrontational, pragmatic and moderate manner. It appears, however, that the authorities suspect the body’s diminished influence and role are beyond repair. Rumors are

---

<sup>162</sup> Ibid p.13

<sup>163</sup> <sup>163</sup> Matt Bryden, *Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013

<sup>164</sup> Ibid

<sup>165</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Nairobi, September 2011. In, *Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation*” *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

rife that the main parties in the governing coalition are looking beyond SUPKEM to find influential Muslim partners ahead of the 2012 elections.<sup>166</sup>

### **3.3.2 A Diverse Strategy to Counter-Radicalization**

**Counter-Intelligence:** A Diverse strategy identifies threats posed by terrorists based on typologies or generic profiles of terrorists. As such, each aspect of the strategy focuses on a unique typology of terrorists. Recent events in Kenya signals existence of a diverse intelligence led counter-terrorism strategy (involving counter-radicalization). Closure of radicalization and indoctrination into terror cells and groups in East Africa by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is indicative of a successful multifaceted strategy. The Intelligence Service has also profiled dozens of terror recruitment agents operating on the cyber-space and several have been arrested. Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations targeting terror cells operated by the Somali Islamist group Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen were scaled up since Q4-2014 throughout 2015.<sup>167</sup>

For instance, The role of the intelligence service is to identify and provide effective counter intelligence on threats on national security, as such the intelligence service is limited in its counter-intelligence operations. It depends on the police service to effectively neutralize the threats. Kenya's strategy focuses on both preempting the threat posed by radicalization and the threat of terrorism. In-fact the core objective of the strategy is to secure civilians and the property of the country from destruction by terrorists. The government is ensuring the identification and destruction of conditions that create and facilitate terrorism. Devolution is playing a key role in

---

<sup>166</sup> Ibid

<sup>167</sup> Asim Qureshi, "Feeding grievances: The killing of Makaburi", available at [www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411) (accessed on 9 June 2015)

making conditions such as economic, political, and social negatives, become impossible to exploit for terrorists. However, this diverse strategy does not exclude the use of force to enforce law and safe guard human life and protect property of the Kenyan's.<sup>168</sup>

**Domestic Legislation:** Kenya's weak judicial system forced many ATPU to resort to assassinations, as police have failed to produce strong enough evidence to prosecute terrorism suspects. Domestic legislation is not the sole determinant of whether states have the capacity to arrest and prosecute terrorists, nor is it necessarily reflective of a state's ability to deter terrorist activities. Other factors, including the effective implementation of these laws, the state and strength of the judicial system, and whether or not states approach counterterrorism in a manner that addresses its root causes, are equally important.<sup>169</sup> Nevertheless, this surge of interest among African governments to enact and expand their counterterrorism laws suggests that this will be an area of increased activity in the years to come. The recently passed Kenyan Security Laws (Amendment) Act offers a cautionary example of how such laws may necessitate stronger political and structural counterbalances.

The NIS is now allowed to authorize covert operations to "carry out any of its functions," which can include entering any place, obtaining anything or any information, and search, take, return, and install anything. This was not the only provision containing broad definitions. The court allowed up to 14 years in prison for saying anything "that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism," whether or not that person actually does so. Another section allows any NIS officer to "detain any person whom the officer... suspects of engaging in any act or thing or

---

<sup>168</sup> Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

<sup>169</sup> Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.'

being in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security,” thus allowing a wide berth for interpretation.<sup>170</sup> Other provisions left in the bill reduce legislative oversight over the NIS, allow the organization to demand any information from any government entity, allow suspects to be detained for up to 90 days, and allow individuals to be arrested more than once for the same crime without any new evidence and without a warrant.

Counterterrorism laws in Kenya that focus on expanding government prosecutorial powers can be more problematic than helpful. Before this second wave of counterterrorism (as discussed earlier in the study) legislation gains momentum, a third wave of legislation focused on civil liberties and human rights protections from counterterrorism responses would achieve more progress towards peace and stability in the region, at least in countries that do not already have these liberties enshrined in their constitutions.<sup>171</sup> In Kenya’s case, as in many others with expansive constitutional protections in this area, the independence and strength of the judiciary, combined with a determination by government leadership to balance citizen security with civil freedoms, is the real determinant of progress in this realm.

**SUPKEM:** The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) has been on the forefront in counter terrorism measures within the Muslim community. SUPKEM has conducted a survey in the coastal region to first get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalisation, and together with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission are also advocating an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organisation. SUPKEM was established in 1973 to consolidate efforts to promote Muslim interests under one umbrella organization, and among its senior officials were Kenyan cabinet

---

<sup>170</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

<sup>171</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake



officials. In 1979, it was officially recognized as the only organization entitled to represent all Muslims within Kenya and to maintain links with Islamic organizations outside Kenya. The Council of Imams, SUPKEM and council of elders from both the Borana and Somali communities that largely profess the Islamic faith have also been noted to swear to combine forces with the Kenyan government to root out any false ideologies by Muslim radicals that has led to loss of many innocent lives.

**NGO's and the Civil Society:** A strong civil society is vital to democracy, security, and prosperity. The UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.”<sup>172</sup> A September 2008 General Assembly resolution on the occasion of the first formal review of strategy implementation efforts is expected to go slightly further and specifically encourage them to “engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy, including through interaction with member states and the UN System.”<sup>173</sup>

The inclusion of the clause “as appropriate,” however, leaves it to states to determine the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus reflecting the range of views on CSOs among the UN membership. This diversity was reflected during the September 2008 negotiations, where a number of countries objected to the inclusion of the proposed language encouraging more CSO engagement. Despite this ambiguity in the Strategy itself, as will be discussed in greater detail below, CSOs can play important roles in promoting implementation of a number of its discrete elements. The Strategy has been hailed as a “living document” that will

---

<sup>172</sup> meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

<sup>173</sup> U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dldid=220124#wrapper>

evolve over time. CSOs, with their long-term presence in the field and often deep understanding of the local context in which the Strategy needs to be implemented, can play an important role in ensuring that implementation keeps pace with the changing realities on the ground. For any comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to be effective, civil society needs to be part of its development and implementation, as broad-based engagement between the state and CSOs can help serve as a medium for addressing concerns between the state and the public in the context of specific counterterrorism actions.<sup>174</sup>

NGOs and other CSOs around the world have been actively engaged in long-term efforts to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism well before the Strategy labeled those efforts as such. However, the misguided mistrust of mainstream Civil Society to cloud its judgment towards the need to focus at common citizen-focused goals. Information as to how Civil Society could participate in the meeting was not readily available, and some NGOs discovered that they were required to apply for accreditation and “vetting” to the NGO Council if they wished to participate. “The exclusion of Civil Society from this regional conference on CVE is a disturbing indication that Kenya continues to employ an approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism that has proved to be divisive. This, as has been evidenced in the past, is not useful for the longer-term tackling of CVE” as stated by Njonjo Mue, Senior Advisor of Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice<sup>175</sup>.

Over the years a consensus has evolved where governments acknowledge that their efforts to CVE must be inclusive and that productive relationships must be built with all stakeholders and the communities, as evidenced by the White House Summit. It is only by

---

<sup>174</sup> meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

<sup>175</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

collective effort that this battle can be won. Kenya has, however, chosen a path of alienating communities where radicalisation occurs as well as estranging organisations and individuals that are critical of counterproductive approaches employed in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

### **3.4 Kenya's Success Failures on the Fight against Terrorism**

Despite Al-Shabaab being weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximise its asymmetric advantage.<sup>176</sup> One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanised infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons<sup>177</sup>. This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of southwestern Somalia, and they were annihilated by ground and air fire power.<sup>178</sup> That almost finished Al-Shabaab, but to survive it adapted, becoming an efficient guerrilla force.

To date, the KDF has not succeeded in the critical task of winning hearts and minds in Somalia. The window for possibly being viewed as liberators and before it can expect to be considered an invader is very narrow and closing fast. Al-Shabaab has begun a campaign of painting the Kenyans as an occupying force.<sup>179</sup> Even if Kenya captures all, or large chunks, of southern Somalia, it will have to provide a credible alternative political leadership in a region where Al-Shabaab has been relatively successful. The allied Somali militias are unlikely to

---

<sup>176</sup> Rudner, M. (2013). "Al-Qaeda's Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36(12): 953-980.

<sup>177</sup> "Somalia", *The New York Times*, Topics (online), 25 January 2012

<sup>178</sup> I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 183-201.

<sup>179</sup> "Somalia", *The New York Times*, Topics (online), 25 January 2012

achieve the necessary unity and will be hard pressed to provide security. Something similar happened in 2006, when Ethiopian troops were sucked into an unpopular “occupation” that turned local Somalis against them and the TFG of President Abdullahi Yusuf that they were propping up.<sup>180</sup>

The situation may have been tamed by the Kenya military based on the reduced cases of piracy in the Indian ocean but however statistics in the country indicate a different thing as Kenya has since had to deal with a number of terror attacks in the main towns which the militia group has claimed responsibility despite lack of evidence. The attacks range from grenade attacks, minor bombs in buildings and cars and also gunmen shooting innocent civilians in churches and other social gatherings<sup>181</sup> Despite the governments call of reassurance that the country will be safe from such attacks the situation continues to escalate throwing the question to the public that is the government doing enough.

Kenyans continue to decry the escalating insecurity that affects their socio-economic fabric. They fault the government for not having forensic laboratories that can record data with profiles of suspected terrorists, their sponsors and sympathizers. Retired Captain Simiyu Werunga, who is a security expert and the director of African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, maintains that “it would be difficult for Kenya to win the war against terrorism in the absence of a proper mechanism to profile suspects, which creates a reserve of information that security organs can easily refer to.”<sup>182</sup> Nonetheless, the Anglo-Leasing scandal which rocked Kibaki’s government during his first term is blamed for having hindered the creation of such labs. The National Intelligence Service is also in question for not justifying its huge annual

---

<sup>180</sup> Ibid

<sup>181</sup> Murithi Mutiga, “Are the Terrorists of Al Shabaab about to Tear Kenya in Two?” The Guardian, April 4, 2015. - See more at: <http://africacenter.org/2015/04/garissa-counterterrorism-and-public-trust/#sthash.FV22XPjp.dpuf>

<sup>182</sup> Ibid

allocations of over Ksh10 billion, in relation to curbing insecurity. During the 2013/14 fiscal year, a total of Ksh1.2 billion has been set aside to erect a National Forensic Laboratory to facilitate criminal investigations in order to get justice for victims of crime.<sup>183</sup> Time will tell whether the plan to build a National Forensic Laboratory will be actualized.

It is therefore clear that the Kenyan government must have a new approach in counter-terrorism by advancing its weaponry, applying new technologies, gathering intelligence by infiltrating terrorist cells and by being ahead every time. Kenya is a key ally of the West in their fight against terrorism and should seek more assistance in terms of cash and equipment. In October 2012, former president Kibaki assented to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which is expected to lawfully disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers used by terrorists, to conduct their crimes.<sup>184</sup>

According to Werunga, some factors affecting the security sector in Kenya include: lack of modernization of the security system and serious lapses of coordination between intelligence, the police and the Executive. Generally, there is no centralized coordination in the security sector. Within the top security apparatus, there is the element of shifting blame and giving excuses such as “I was not aware; I was not informed; we were not given the intelligence; this caught us unawares”<sup>185</sup> The state security organs are reactionary and not proactive and to a good extent, do not apply early warning systems. Poor governance and the use of security forces by politicians to divide the electorate are also part of the problems ailing the sector.<sup>186</sup>

---

<sup>183</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

<sup>184</sup>Westagate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/>

<sup>185</sup>State Report : Kenya. Available at <http://www.state.gov.html>

<sup>186</sup> Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

Kenya's Presidents have been reluctant to give up their control over policing; it has always been the surest way for them to gather intelligence on threats to their authority and has forever been a tool for interdicting this threat. The fight against crime cannot be fought alone and fortunately, many countries [including the United States] are placing substantial resources within the borders of Kenya. Stability within Kenya has the potential to create an example for surrounding African nations. While the figures of crime facing Kenya are still some of the worst in East Africa, there is still considerable potential for a stable economy, government, and successful police force. First, the ratio of police to citizens needs to improve drastically. It is extremely unlikely for such a low number of police to actually make a significant difference in Kenya's security. In addition to hiring more police officers, the salary and living conditions need to improve. Low pay and a lack of public respect breeds a substantial amount of corruption, which puts a severe impediment on the economy. Until the relationship between the police and Kenyan people improves, it is unlikely for crime levels to make any major statistical decline. Furthermore, the court system in Kenya needs a reorganization and overhaul because the utilization of police prosecutors has proven itself to be ineffective and outdated.”<sup>187</sup>

In 2015, during his state visit to Kenya; the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his statement on the current state of Kenya, said the UN is determined to work with the Kenya government in combating terrorism. He said the UN will support Kenya's efforts to fight the global threat by boosting the capacity of the country's security agencies. This was after he had a meeting with the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, which he stated as very fruitful discussion on major political and security issues concerning counter-terrorism, Somalia, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region.

---

<sup>187</sup> Crime and Development in Kenya, 2010, Vol. 2 No. 09. pp.1-2

### 3.6 Further Marginalization

The fight against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular and Muslims in general.<sup>188</sup> Kenyans have historically been suspicious of the Somali community, and police harassment and discrimination in the name of “Global War on Terror” continue deep-rooted trends dating back to the Shifta War. Somalis are often without distinction labeled “Al-Shabaab”.<sup>189</sup> Hostility toward them is exacerbated by their commercial success in Nairobi and other major urban areas, as well as their assumed but unproven association with piracy, extremism and terrorism. Though the government has repeatedly urged Kenyans not to stereotype or discriminate against Somalis, politicians’ statements and media rhetoric risk further demonizing them. Deputy Defence (former and late) Minister Joshua Orwa Ojode, for example, likened Al-Shabaab to a snake with its tail in Somalia and head in Eastleigh.<sup>190</sup>

Somali Kenyans feel marginalised by the state. Amnesty International has reported that government counter-terrorist operations, such as Operation Usalama Watch (Security Watch), have unfairly targeted Somali Kenyans, serving as a pretext for blanket punishment and mass human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest, extortion, ill-treatment, forced relocations, and unlawful expulsion.<sup>191</sup> Afrobarometer survey findings going back to 2005 indicate that a considerable proportion of Somali Kenyans have consistently felt marginalised by the government. In 2005, almost seven in 10 Somali Kenyans (68%) said that their community was

---

<sup>188</sup> Crisis Group observations; “Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border”, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

<sup>189</sup> Guled Mohammed, “Hounding Somalis hurts terror fight”, *The Star*, 2 November 2011.

<sup>190</sup> Tom Odula, “War fears: Somalis in Kenya afraid of xenophobia”, Associated Press, 11 November 2011.

<sup>191</sup> Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

“often” or “always” treated unfairly by the government. This proportion steadily dropped to 45% by 2011 before rising again to 51% in 2014.<sup>192</sup>

Somali Kenyans are mostly concentrated in Kenya’s North eastern counties, and there have been fluctuating levels of tension between the community and wider Kenyan society since the 1960s. This social fault line poses challenges to national cohesion and has the potential to incite civil unrest if left unaddressed.<sup>193</sup> While radical and intolerant views may generally be held only by a minority of a given community, extremist organisations recruit from these peripheries, and it is the size and distribution of this minority that is most important to security risk analysis frameworks. Among the 131 Somali Kenyan respondents in Afrobarometer’s 2014 survey, 75% are aged 18-35 years, compared to 57% of Kenyans of other ethnicities, and 99% are Muslim, compared to 4% of Kenyans of other ethnicities. A majority of Somali Kenyans express tolerance regarding people of other religions, ethnicities, and nationalities<sup>194</sup>

The National Cohesion in its reports noted that the coastal residents have been marginalised in allocation of resources.<sup>195</sup> With youth unemployment comprising 70 percent of the country’s total unemployment rate, the lack of opportunity among Kenya’s rapidly growing youth population has been associated with a growing sense of socioeconomic and political marginalization. There have also been concerns related to marginalized and frustrated youth in the Coast region, whom they categorized as ‘easily influenced’ and ‘idle’ with a greater propensity to engage in behaviours that create insecurity within the community. Some Mombasa

---

<sup>192</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>193</sup> National Cohesion and Integration Commission. (2011). Preach hate: Face charges: The National Cohesion and Integration Commission’s concerns of rising religious, ethnic, and political intolerance. Press statement (Nairobi, 5 November 2011). Available at: <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/press-statements/press-statement-on-rising-religious-ethnicand-political-intolerance.html>

<sup>194</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>195</sup> NCIC, Report Of The Youth Integration Forum , December, Kwale County. January, 2015.Reconciliation And Integration Department National Cohesion and Integration Commission



elders and traditional leaders mentioned unemployment and a lack of education as the primary reasons for youth frustration.<sup>196</sup>

### **3.7 Human Rights Violations in Counter-Terrorism Efforts**

In Kenya's attempts to address the threat of violent extremism, the Somali Kenyan community is often stigmatized, and serious human rights violations during counter-terrorist operations by the police and other security forces have been reported.<sup>197</sup> According to the **-Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)**, which advocate for constitutional means to counter terrorism while also observing human rights. In the, Muhuri report on ATPU abuses from 2007 to the 2015. The abuses include but not limited to, the use of excessive force during house raids; torture and ill-treatment of detainees; arbitrary detentions, including disappearances; and rendering terrorist suspects to countries where they faced a real risk of torture. The report cites a case scenario of the November 13–14, 2012 operation in Mombasa, during which ATPU human rights abuses included capturing several suspects and beating them prior to bringing them to various police stations, without evidence, upon which all cases were later dropped.<sup>198</sup> This raises the question: Is the current political context in Kenya exacerbating the Somali Kenyan community's vulnerability to recruitment by terrorist organisations? Recent Afro-barometer survey data show that Kenyans disapprove of their government's handling of terrorism and that the Somali Kenyan community is even more critical than citizens from other ethnic communities. Somali Kenyans feel marginalised by the state and express problematic levels of social intolerance, factors that

---

<sup>196</sup> Shetret, L. and M. Schwartz, And Danielle Cotter, Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism Center on Global Counterterrorism Co-operation: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland, January 2013

<sup>197</sup> Amnesty International. (2014). Kenya: Somalis scapegoated in counter-terror crackdown. 27 May 2014. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenya-somalisscapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>.

<sup>198</sup> MUHURI, "We're Tired of Taking You to the Court" Human Rights Abuses by Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit Accessed on 8/18/2015 at <http://www.muhuri.org/index.php/media-center/publications#>

indicate the presence of political and social conditions associated with higher levels of violent extremism. Like most Kenyans, a majority of Somali Kenyans see the police as corrupt and untrustworthy.<sup>199</sup> These results suggest that the Kenyan government should curb police abuses and explore more developmental approaches to counter-terrorism to ensure that measures aimed at engaging Al-Shabaab do not generate further grievances among an already isolated and vulnerable community.

Since 2010, Organizations such as Amnesty International has continued to report and warn reports of police abuse. Most of these violations have occurred in the context of Kenya's counter-terrorism operations, led by the AntiTerrorism Police Unit (ATPU). In July 2010, following a bomb explosion in Kampala, Uganda, the ATPU arbitrarily detained at least six people who were later the subject of rendition to Uganda.<sup>200</sup> The renditions were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court.<sup>201</sup>

Members of the Somali community in Kenya, particularly refugees, have been disproportionately impacted by counter-terrorism operations in Kenya.<sup>202</sup> Since early April 2014, thousands of Somalis have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, harassment, extortion and ill-treatment in the context of the counter-terror operation known as "Usalama Watch". Over five thousand individuals have been relocated to refugee camps in the north of Kenya and hundreds of others have been deported back to Somalia. Prior to the April 2014 crackdown on Somali refugees, a tripartite agreement was signed in November 2013 between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR, establishing a framework for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees over a three year timeframe. Research conducted by Amnesty International

---

<sup>199</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>200</sup> Ibid

<sup>201</sup> Ibid

<sup>202</sup> Amnesty International, "Somalis are scapegoats in Kenya's counter-terror crackdown", 27 May 2014

indicates that most Somali refugees were deciding to return as a result of negative ‘push’ factors in Kenya rather than positive ‘pull’ factors in Somalia. Such returns do not qualify as voluntary and may violate the principle of non-refoulement.<sup>203</sup>

From the Muhuri report, the Coast region has been marginalized: its predominantly Muslim population is still largely landless and has other long-standing grievances against the central government. The residents therefore hope for the central government to provide greater economic and political opportunities for them. However, even with the arrival of the new constitution and new elections in 2013 many in the coastal region are still not satisfied with the changes. The dissatisfaction was in some cases, articulated through support for the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), with its slogans of “Pwani si Kenya” (the Coast is not part of Kenya), and “Tumechoka na Ahadi” (we are tired of promises).<sup>204</sup> The MRC has made secession demands throughout its history and at times called for a boycott in the run-up to Kenya’s 2013 elections. It has also been labeled by some as a political party that resorts to violence.

### **3.8 Lack of Public Confidence**

According to Transparency International, Kenya is plagued by high levels of corruption, ranking 145<sup>th</sup> of 175 on the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, which cites the police as the state’s most corrupt institution.<sup>205</sup> Furthermore, allegations of arbitrary and unlawful killings of suspected criminals are common; human rights groups estimate the police to be responsible for at least 1,000 extrajudicial killings between 2008 and 2012<sup>206</sup>. In 2013, the Kenyan government

---

<sup>203</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

<sup>204</sup> International Crisis Group, Kenya’s 2013 Elections, Report N°197, 17 January 2013, p. 43, at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf>, accessed September 3, 2013.

<sup>205</sup> Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

<sup>206</sup> U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at:

established the Independent Policing Oversight Authority to “conduct impartial and independent investigations, inspections, audits and monitoring of the National Police Service to prevent impunity and enhance professionalism in the interest of the public.”<sup>207</sup> Similarly, Amnesty International describes the extortion of bribes as a common part of abuses of Somali Kenyans by the police and other security forces.<sup>208</sup>

On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered the border regions of southern Somalia as part of a military offensive against Al-Shabaab named Operation Linda Nchi. The primary goal of the operation was to create a 100km buffer zone along the border and eliminate Al-Shabaab militants, who had been mounting increasing numbers of terrorist attacks on some of Kenya’s northern and coastal towns. A month after deployment, most Kenyans (82%) held a favourable opinion of their government’s handling of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. By 2014, after a substantial increase in major AlShabaab attacks in Kenya, public approval of government counter-terrorism efforts declined sharply, to 44%, with 51% of Kenyans indicating that their government is doing “very badly” or “fairly badly” in the fight against violent extremism.<sup>209</sup> Whilst two-thirds of Kenyans say that KDF involvement in Somalia has been necessary despite Al-Shabaab reprisals, 48% of citizens support KDF withdrawal.<sup>210</sup> Disapproval of how the state is handling the fight against terrorism, in addition to the increased frequency and scale of attacks, has put pressure on the Kenyan government to step up its security efforts. It is important to be cognizant that aggressive security-led approaches could exacerbate underlying social tensions

---

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dclid=22012>

4#wrapper

<sup>207</sup> Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) “Introducing IPOA” Accessed 8/18/2015

<http://www.ipoa.go.ke/>

<sup>208</sup> Amnesty International. (2014) Op Cit

<sup>209</sup> Ibid

<sup>210</sup> Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

and community grievances that improve conditions for radicalization and recruitment by extremist organisations.

Public confidence in the government's ability to provide security impacts the success or failure of counterterrorism efforts. Closely linked to this is the public's resilience to narratives that might deepen religious and ethnic fissures and play into the hands of terrorists. Shattering this resilience is exactly the objective of such terrorist acts so as to create an atmosphere of fear and paralysis that would generate public pressure on the government to make policy hitches.

Addressing these concerns is paramount as the Garissa university attack is not an isolated event but part of an ongoing escalation of terrorist incidents targeting Kenyan citizens. In fact, Kenya seems to be more important to al-Shabaab's long term strategy than ever before. Since the 2013 Westgate event, al-Shabaab has carried out 63 attacks in Kenya, killing 415 people. This compares to 42 attacks between 2012 and 2013 resulting in 77 deaths.<sup>211</sup>

### **3.9 Conclusion**

Despite different attempts and successes in counter terrorism, Kenya's overall strategy has been marred by grave weaknesses as it lacks vision and finesse. The country has still not secured its border with Somalia and human rights abuses during counter-terrorism Somali-Kenyan communities (and other Kenyan communities), among other concerns such as the extra-judicial killings and disappearances at the Coast Region during security crackdowns rather than establishing effective partnerships for fighting terrorism. Additionally, Kenyan police have often failed to conduct good policing that is required to gather quality evidence and convict terrorism suspects in court. Without addressing these factors, Kenya's counter-terrorism strategy cannot

---

<sup>211</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2014. Available at: <http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indicesdata/global-terrorism-index>

work very well. While much attention in the aftermath of the Garissa university attack is understandably focused on the responsiveness and capability of the Kenyan security forces, the larger challenge is at the governance level. Maintaining social cohesion in the face of a sustained effort by al-Shabaab to foment ethnic and religious divisions in Kenya is vital for marginalizing extremist actors and avoiding sectarian strife. Key to this will be building trust in the effectiveness, professionalism, and transparency of Kenya's security sector. Counter terrorism efforts for it to be successful, must be intelligence lead and thus calls for the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### REGIONAL EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREATS

#### 4.1 Introduction

No single country can address the threat of terrorism alone. Nor can this threat be resolved through military interventions alone; rather it requires a comprehensive approach including continual exchange of intelligence and engagement with the international community. Addressing the challenge of terrorism over the long term demands multilateral cooperation; capacity building; and considered efforts to counter violent extremism by all levels of society and government.<sup>212</sup> The African regional and international community has been working hard to bolster alliances and strengthen existing partnerships; this is especially true in the arena of counterterrorism.<sup>213</sup> Terrorists are not only using the Internet for communication, recruiting, training and planning – but also to transfer funds, although international action has made significant progress towards addressing this illicit activity. This therefore calls for regional cooperation in fighting terrorism as is addressed in this chapter.

#### 4.2 A Region Prone To Terrorism: HOA

The Horn of Africa is intimately linked, in geographic, religious, ethnic, political, and economic terms, to the Middle East.<sup>214</sup> The development of the radical Islamic Courts Movement in Somalia reflects those linkages. People, arms, money, and material flow from the Middle East

---

<sup>212</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: The Operations; US Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub," *New York Times*, 17 November 2002.

<sup>213</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum, Co-Chairs' Summary of the Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group (8-10 Feb 2012) <http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10303/20542/Co-Chairs%27%20Summary+of+9-10+Feb+2012+Working+Group+Meeting+in+Dar+es+Salaam>.

<sup>214</sup> Anneli Botha, "Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism," Institute for Security Studies Paper 245 (Institute for Security Studies, Apr 2013) <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf>

along the Red Sea coast, through Somalia and south to other East African countries, while commerce and religious interaction moves in both directions.<sup>215</sup> More than anywhere else on the continent, the Horn of Africa has become a front in the military battle against internationally sponsored terrorism, backed largely by the United States but involving ever more deeply the Africa Union.<sup>216</sup>

The Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of Africa during the last 50 years.<sup>217</sup> Although there have been long-standing disputes in places like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, no other region on the continent has had as many conflicts over such a long period of time. The root causes are numerous and sometimes complex even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources including pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state, and the sheer desire for power.<sup>218</sup>

There are underlying conditions in East Africa and the Horn that contribute directly to conflict and the use of terrorist tactics. Poverty and social injustice are widespread. Borders are porous. Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. Weapons are readily available throughout the region, but particularly in Somalia.<sup>219</sup> All of the countries have a severe shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements. Corruption is endemic in the region and a particularly serious problem in several countries<sup>220</sup>. Transparency International surveyed 102

---

<sup>215</sup> Ibid

<sup>216</sup> Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 89- 111.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid

<sup>218</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: The Operations; US Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub," *New York Times*, 17 November 2002.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid

<sup>220</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: The Operations; US Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub," *New York Times*, 17 November 2002



countries in 2002 for its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. Kenya tied Indonesia for position 96 on the list while Uganda shared 93 with Moldova. Tanzania contested with several nations for position 71 and Ethiopia shared position 59 with several nations. There were not sufficient data to rank the other countries in the region.<sup>221</sup> Countries facing serious corruption combined with low pay for security personnel leave officials wide open to the temptation of accepting money from terrorists in return for easy and safe passage.<sup>222</sup>

Important to the understanding of terrorism in the region is the inter-connectedness of most of the indigenous conflicts. They often result in refugee flows in various directions. Based on the Denney and Jenkin's works on "Securing Communities" with all countries of the region, they frequently lead to support for a dissident group in one country by a neighboring country. That support, in turn, causes the affected country to back another dissident organization against the offending government.<sup>223</sup> At different points in time, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea have supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) against Khartoum while Khartoum has supported the Lords Resistance Army against Uganda, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) against Ethiopia, and the *Eritrean Islamic Jihad* (EIJ) against Eritrea. Following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean war, Eritrea has supported the OLF against Ethiopia. Ethiopia responded by supporting a coalition of Eritrean dissidents against Eritrea. Somalia also plays this game. This has developed into a incapacitating tit for tat in the region that shows no sign of lessening. It also increases the prospects for the use of terrorist tactics.<sup>224</sup>

---

<sup>221</sup> Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, 28 August 2002. <http://www.transparency.org>

<sup>222</sup> AUPSC, 2013. "The African Union Counter terrorism Framework," Accessed on 16/04/2014; from <http://www.peaceau?.org/en/?page/?64-counter-terrorism-ct>  
Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins "Securing Communities: the what and how of community policing (ODI, Jul 2013) <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7633-community-policing>.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid

<sup>224</sup> Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 89- 111.

The primary terrorist threat to American and Western interests comes from those organizations that are not indigenous to the region. Although Americans and other foreigners sometimes find themselves at the wrong place at the wrong time and are, therefore, caught up in attacks aimed at harming local authority, the indigenous groups generally do not target foreigners.<sup>225</sup> There have been exceptions when attacks on bars and hotels frequented by foreign tourists or residents seem designed to attract international publicity and/or embarrass the local government. Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda, for example, have suffered from such attacks.<sup>226</sup>

#### **4.3 Counter-terrorism Cooperation in the African Region**

The Africa region experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2013. In East Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remained the primary terrorist threat.<sup>227</sup> Somali security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued to make gains against al-Shabaab in 2013, but an inability to undertake consistent offensive operations against the group permitted al-Shabaab to develop and carry out asymmetric attacks, including outside of Somalia. Most notably, al-Shabaab launched retaliatory attacks in Kenya and Uganda in response to their military involvement in Somalia, which resulted in late 2012 the dislodging of al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayo, a major revenue source for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab issued tenacious threats to other countries contributing troops to AMISOM. Driven out of major

---

<sup>225</sup> Ibid

<sup>226</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: The Operations; US Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub," *New York Times*, 17 November 2002.

<sup>227</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "Mid-term evaluation of three countering violent extremism projects" (2013)

urban areas, al-Shabaab has returned to a strategy focused on asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia.<sup>228</sup>

Various East African countries continued to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; enhance domestic and regional efforts to bolster border security; and create integrated and dedicated counterterrorism strategies.<sup>229</sup> Counterterrorism cooperation across the region picked up following the Westgate attack and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to attacks on soft targets. In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northern part of the country, with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, reportedly resulting in over a thousand casualties in 2013 alone. This violence reportedly spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.<sup>230</sup>

French and allied African forces successfully disrupted and pushed back efforts by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent extremist groups to control northern Mali.<sup>231</sup> In August 2013, successful elections took place in Mali and a regional African peacekeeping force was installed with Western support to restore stability and governance to the country after elections. France and other international partners continue to contribute forces to the region to assist the Malian government to rebuild and to deter terrorist threats. Western efforts to increase counterterrorism capacity in the region were focused in 2013 on enhanced border security, regional information sharing and cooperation, and countering violent extremism.<sup>232</sup>

---

<sup>228</sup> Anneli Botha, "Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism," Institute for Security Studies Paper 245 (Institute for Security Studies, Apr 2013) <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf>

<sup>229</sup> Ibid

<sup>230</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "Mid-term evaluation of three countering violent extremism projects" (2013) [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACX479.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX479.pdf).

<sup>231</sup> Gunning, J and Jackson, R. (2011). "What's so 'Religious' about 'Religious Terrorism.'" *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4(3): 369-388

<sup>232</sup> Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins 'Securing Communities: the what and how of community policing (ODI, Jul 2013) <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7633-community-policing>.

### 4.3.1 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.- funded and implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism.<sup>233</sup> Areas of support include: (1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations; (2) integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and other supporting partners to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; (3) enhancing individual nations' border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement's ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; (5) monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and (6) reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.<sup>234</sup>

TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (joined in 2014), Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. TSCTP has been successful in building capacity and cooperation despite setbacks caused by coups d'état, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress with select partner countries.

While assistance to Mali under TSCTP was suspended following the March 2012 military coup that overthrew Mali's democratically elected government, that suspension ended on

---

<sup>233</sup> Ibid

<sup>234</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum, Co-Chairs' Summary of the Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group (8-10 Feb 2012) <http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10303/20542/Co-Chairs%27%20Summary+of+9-10+Feb+2012+Working+Group+Meeting+in+Dar+es+Salaam>.

September 6, 2013, following successful elections in that country.<sup>235</sup> Several TSCTP programs have worked to counter violent extremist radicalization and recruitment of youth, including educational and training courses in Algeria and Morocco, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs, community development, and media activities in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.<sup>236</sup> Retaliation threats following the French-led military intervention in Mali, the Government of Burkina Faso increased its security posture at diplomatic facilities and at major public event while in Chad, border security and interdiction of illicit goods trafficking as well as Niger which has porous borders and a huge expanse of Niger lacks a persistent government presence provided terrorist groups with an environment conducive to recruitment of terrorist operatives and acquisition of resources by illegal means such as smuggling and kidnapping. Terrorists committed coordinated, asymmetric attacks in Niger in 2013.<sup>237</sup>

#### **4.3.2 The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT)**

Established in 2009, PRACT is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including (1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, (2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, (3) enhancing border security, (4) countering the financing of terrorism, and (5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. PRACT member

---

<sup>235</sup> Crisis Group. Understanding Islamism Middle East/North Africa. *Crisis Group Africa Report No.37*, 2 March 2005

<sup>236</sup> Ibid

<sup>237</sup> U.S. State Department, **Country Reports: Africa Overview, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013**. Available at [Http://Www.State.Gov/J/Ct/RIs/Crt/2013/224820.Htm](http://www.state.gov/J/Ct/RIs/Crt/2013/224820.Htm)

countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.<sup>238</sup>

In 2013, the U.S. government, through PRACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and counter the threat posed by, al-Qaida, al-Shabaab, and other violent extremist organizations. PRACT complements the U.S. government's dedicated efforts to promote stability and governance in Somalia, including support for AMISOM. For example, training and equipment have assisted Djibouti in monitoring its land and maritime border with Somalia and supporting professional units in operations against al-Shabaab.<sup>239</sup> Similarly, training and equipment for light infantry, technical intelligence, and crisis response units have supported Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda's efforts to protect their borders and respond to terrorist incidents.<sup>240</sup>

#### **4.3.3 IGAD and its Effort on Counter-Terrorism in the Region**

In its formation, the initial focus of IGAD was on development issues yet over time the organisation gradually took on security matters, a evolution that highlights the importance of the development-security nexus in the HOA region.<sup>241</sup> In 2006, IGAD launched a four-year programme in Addis Ababa called the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT), funded by EU and other donors.<sup>242</sup> This programme has largely focussed on issues

---

<sup>238</sup> Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel. GAO-11-637. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011.

<sup>239</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum, Co-Chairs' Summary of the Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group (8-10 Feb 2012) <http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10303/20542/Co-Chairs%27%20Summary+of+9-10+Feb+2012+Working+Group+Meeting+in+Dar+es+Salaam>.

<sup>240</sup> Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel. GAO-11-637. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011

<sup>241</sup> Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J. (2007), „Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa,“ African Security Review, 18:2.

<sup>242</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

regarding capacity- and confidence-building in the IGAD region and it also works closely with partners at the regional and global level. It targets five areas: (a) enhancing judicial measures; (b) working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; (c) enhancing border control; (d) providing training, sharing information and best practices; and (e) promoting strategic cooperation.<sup>243</sup>

Highlighting this approach, in September 2007, ICPAT, with the support of UNODC's TPB, organised the first-ever IGAD ministerial-level meeting on countering terrorism in Kampala to which six IGAD member states sent high-level delegations. The statement adopted in Kampala calls on IGAD members, to take the necessary legal, administrative, and regulatory measures to counter terrorism. These include establishing inter-ministerial counterterrorism coordination mechanisms in each country; to respect human rights while countering terrorism; and exchange information and experiences related to combating terrorism, including through the establishment of a forum of counterterrorism experts. The Kampala statement also requests member states to implement the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and continue with the UNODC and ICPAT capacity-building programme especially.<sup>244</sup>

ICPAT faces a number of challenges, the first of which regarding the conditions in the region sub-region, which hinder the development of a successful sub-regional security and counterterrorism agenda. For instance, it has been difficult to date to launch a special programme for Somalia in light of its unique needs. Furthermore, the absence of Eritrea from the IGAD forum has a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of ICPAT. There is also little political

---

<sup>243</sup> Ibid

<sup>244</sup> Inter Governmental Authority on Development (2007), The Kampala Statement, "Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD member states on legal cooperation against terrorism," Kampala, Uganda, 20–21 September at [http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65](http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65) Accessed 15 October 2010

will among the member states countries in EA to cooperate to implement effective counterterrorism strategies.<sup>245</sup>

#### **4.3.4 Selected Country Profile on Counter-terrorism Cooperation**

Ethiopia: Ethiopia is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. Ethiopia participated in regional and multilateral forums for counterterrorism, including IGAD Security Sector Program trainings, which build the capacity of IGAD member states to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity. Ethiopia was an active participant in AU counterterrorism efforts, which included activities of the Center for Study and Research on Terrorism and meetings of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa.<sup>246</sup>

Kenya: Kenya is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, and is a strong ally of the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab and al-Qaida (AQ). The September 2013, al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall focused the world's attention on Kenya and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, highlighting significant shortcomings in the Kenyan security forces' response. The attack appeared to strengthen Kenyan resolve to fight al-Shabaab, including increased operations by Kenya Defense Forces units under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).<sup>247</sup> President Uhuru Kenyatta announced his intention to appoint a commission of inquiry into Westgate "lapses and how we can avoid them in the future," but no such report had been released publicly by the end of 2013.

---

<sup>245</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

<sup>246</sup> International Crisis Group, "Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation' Africa Briefng, no. 85 (25 Jan 2012); Peter Taylor, "On the trail of al-Shabab's Kenyan recruitment 'pipeline'," (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

<sup>247</sup> Anneli Botha, "Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism," Institute for Security Studies Paper 245 (Institute for Security Studies, Apr 2013) <http://www.issafrika.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf>



Kenya's counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other partner nations remained strong: the Kenyan government welcomed substantial U.S. assistance in the post-Westgate investigation and requested additional support on border security and other issues following Westgate.<sup>248</sup> Kenya is a member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the East African Community.<sup>249</sup> Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked with these organizations and the broader international community, including the United States, to increase their counterterrorism capacity and secure land, sea, and air borders.

Kenya also cooperated with the United States and other nations to secure especially dangerous pathogens and enhance the Kenyan government's capability to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise.<sup>250</sup> Kenya's primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.<sup>251</sup>

Uganda: Uganda is a strong force for regional stability, security cooperation, and counterterrorism efforts.<sup>252</sup> Uganda is an active member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),

---

<sup>248</sup> Westgate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/StateReport:Kenya.html>

<sup>249</sup> Ibid

<sup>250</sup> Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and IGAD Security Sector Program, *Fighting Terror Trough Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism* (New York and Addis Ababa, May 2012) [http://www.globalct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/TaskForce\\_Report\\_May20121.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/TaskForce_Report_May20121.pdf).

<sup>251</sup> Ibid

<sup>252</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

the East African Community, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Uganda contributed troops to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to counter al-Shabaab; continued to pursue the LRA with neighboring countries as part of the AU Regional Task Force; and remained concerned about possible attacks by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Uganda is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and participates in Global Counterterrorism Forum events focused on the Horn of Africa.<sup>253</sup>

Eriteria: In May 2013, the United States re-certified Eritrea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended.<sup>254</sup> In considering this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed Eritrea’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.<sup>255</sup> The Government of Eritrea has been under UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions since December 2009. UNSCR 1907 (2009) imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political leaders, calling on the nation to cease arming, training and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region.<sup>256</sup>

In July 2013, the UNSC called on Eritrea to begin cooperating with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), so that the body could determine the reliability of regional claims about Eritrean assistance to regional destabilizers. Refusal of the Government of Eritrea to hold substantive discussions with the SEMG, on grounds that the sanctions regime aimed

---

<sup>253</sup> Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins ‘Securing Communities: the what and how of community policing (ODI, Jul 2011) <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7633-community-policing>.

<sup>254</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>255</sup> United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) p. 149, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433).

<sup>256</sup> Ibid

simply to “humiliate” Eritrea and that the international community had turned a blind eye to Ethiopian misdeeds, prevented international investigations of charges against Eritrea.<sup>257</sup>

#### **4.4 Challenges facing Regional Counterterrorism Efforts**

Yet the vast majority of conflict and “terrorist” activity in Africa is not linked to international sponsorship or any vast conspiracy against the West. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the various militia in eastern Congo, the militants in the Niger Delta, the extremist groups in Kenya, Nigeria, and elsewhere are the principal security threats to the African population.<sup>258</sup>

Programs that seek to bolster African capacity against internationally sponsored terrorism, the kind of most concern to the United States and Europe, must also build capacity against these threats. Yet the roots of these conflicts go much deeper and are more complex than a ‘global war against terrorism.’ They demand stronger and more just African states, significant progress on economic development, and regional peace agreements, as much as improved intelligence and military capacity. And because the conditions that breed these home-grown forms of violent activity are the same as those that open the door for internationally sponsored terrorism, any “war” on the latter must address these broader issues.<sup>259</sup>

Thus, the challenge in combating terrorism in Africa is to balance a legitimate program of security improvements with a continuing and sustained attack on poor governance, poverty, and deprivation of human rights. Getting the balance right is particularly critical because the democracies in Africa are fragile, and any crackdown on terrorist activity has to be carried out

---

<sup>257</sup> Biswaro, J. M., 2012. *The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality-A Comparative Study*. Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam

<sup>258</sup> Agbiboa, D. E. (2013b). “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective.” *African Conflict and Peace-building Review* 3 (1): 144-157

<sup>259</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary of the Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group (8-10 Feb 2012) <http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10303/20542/Co-Chairs%27%20Summary+of+9-10+Feb+2012+Working+Group+Meeting+in+Dar+es+Salaam>.

with great sensitivity to the historic grievances of marginalized groups, the incipient struggle for human rights, and the relatively weak civilian oversight of the military and security institutions.<sup>260</sup> This is why, despite the best efforts of the planners of AFRICOM to follow such a broad approach, the heart and center of American counterterrorism programs cannot be based within a security apparatus.<sup>261</sup> U.S. support for military civic actions programs, designed to win the hearts and minds of local populations, the centrepiece of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is not the same as USAID support for the strengthening of African institutions, the building of economic infrastructure, and the support of African civil society. Nor is it a substitute for strong political leadership from the Department of State to maintain the right balance. African institutions are at a similar crossroads.<sup>262</sup>

The Africa Union was met with tremendous expectations when it was created in 2000, especially in the area of conflict resolution. Departing from the more traditional and narrow defense of sovereignty of its predecessor organization, the AU has stated that conflict within any African state could affect the region. It established a Peace and Security Council and promised African leadership and responsibility in bringing such conflicts to a close. It backed this declaration by sending African peacekeepers to Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Darfur, ahead of the United Nations.<sup>263</sup> The AU and regional organizations, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), IGAD, and Southern African Development Community (SADC), have taken the lead in negotiating peace agreements in

---

<sup>260</sup> Liat Shetret, "Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (Feb 2011) [http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS\\_policybrief\\_119.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS_policybrief_119.pdf).

<sup>261</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid

<sup>263</sup> Liat Shetret, "Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (Feb 2011) [http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS\\_policybrief\\_119.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS_policybrief_119.pdf).

Burundi, Liberia, the DRC, and elsewhere. But Somalia has brought the AU directly into the global war on terrorism.<sup>264</sup>

In other such situations, the AU, like the UN, has striven to be neutral, to help parties negotiate peace, and to provide peacekeepers to back up an agreed-upon settlement among the contending parties, or, as in the case of Darfur, with the agreement of the host government. A new administration in Washington after the 2016 elections will need to re-examine these issues and the effectiveness and totality of American counterterrorism efforts. Fortunately, for the United States, most African states share the concern over terrorism and are prepared to cooperate in fighting it, for their own safety and security. They are also, however, beset with other priorities and limitations. The United States and other western powers will have the tools to respond broadly, with initiatives such as President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Millennium Challenge Account, and generally rising aid levels. It has skilful diplomats and the ability to call on the United Nations and others to advance complex political solutions, as will be needed in the Horn of Africa. Keeping these fully engaged along with direct security programs, and the benefits of a well-organized AFRICOM, the partnership with Africa in this area can be advanced and deepened.

#### **4.5 The AU's Fight against Terrorism in the Region**

The OAU/AU efforts in fighting against terrorism have a long history since they are threat to peace, stability and security in Africa.<sup>265</sup> While some struggles for independence and decolonization were termed as acts of terror, "the 1999 OAU Convention, which makes a

---

<sup>264</sup> Biswaro, J. M., 2012. *The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality-A Comparative Study*. Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam

<sup>265</sup> Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly*20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 89- 111.

distinction between acts of terrorism and the acts of people fighting for self-determination.”<sup>266</sup> Therefore, in Africa as elsewhere in the world, the AU and its predecessor the OAU have conceptualized the fight against crime and terrorism at four levels: national, sub-regional, regional, and global.<sup>267</sup>

In 1992, a *Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States* was adopted in which OAU pledged to fight the phenomena of crime, extremism and terrorism. This effort culminated in the 1999 *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* while in September 2002 *AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* was adopted. Thus, pursuant to Article 7(i) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC); AUPSC is mandated to “ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions and instruments and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental levels to combat international terrorism.”<sup>268</sup> Established and officially inaugurated in 2004, AUPSC has been active in countering terrorism in various ways.

In fighting crimes in the continent, there has been remarkable progress from national, sub-regional and at the regional bodies. Remarkably is the *Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation* called the *African Police Cooperation Organization* (AFRIPOL) on 11 February 2014 in Algiers is reaffirming of determination “to contribute to the revival of the Continent and the emergence of an African society freed from the

---

<sup>266</sup> Ewi, M. and Aning, K. (2006). “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa,” *African Security Review* 15.3, pp. 32-46.

<sup>267</sup> Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 89- 111.

<sup>268</sup> AUPSC, 2013. “The African Union Counter terrorism Framework,” Accessed on 16/04/2014; from <http://www.peaceau.org/en/?page/?64-counter-terrorism-ct>

scourges of organized crime and terrorism.”<sup>269</sup> As such AFRIPOL is charged to ensure prevention and fight against all forms of crime; such as organized transnational crime, in particular illicit traffics in drugs, light arms, munitions, migrants, and traffic in persons, maritime piracy, cybercrime, counterfeit medicines, environmental crimes, serious disturbances of public order, and social peace though technological advancement poses challenges on its initiatives.

The AU’s approach in countering terrorism ranges from national, sub-regional, regional to global levels. Firstly, it has induced its member states to sign and ratify OUA/AU protocol and declarations that call for prevention and combating crime and terrorism in the region and international level. For example, this effort has culminated in the adoption of the 1999 OAU Convention in July 1999 and in December 2002 it came into force after 30 states had ratified<sup>270</sup>. Article 2(a) of this Convention requires that States Parties to review their national laws and establish criminal offences for terrorist acts as defined in this Convention and make such acts punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account the grave nature of such offences.

Therefore, this approach requires national legal and institutional measures to investigate, prevent, prosecute and punish terrorism related activity.<sup>271</sup> Thus, enacting and enforcing laws and regulations against crime and terrorism is strategic asset in this war. Furthermore, in 2011, the AU Commission developed *African Model Law on Counter Terrorism*, which was adopted February, 2014, as the result AFRIPOL has been established. Both initiatives encourage member States “to initiate, harmonize, and strengthen African legal instruments for the fight against

---

<sup>269</sup> Algiers Declaration on the Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation– AFRIPOL. From <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/algiers-declaration-afripol-english.pdf>, 14/04/2014.

<sup>270</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid

transnational crime and terrorism and to promote the tools necessary for their implementation”<sup>272</sup>.

Additionally, in its declarations, conventions and code of conduct of Inter-African Relation against terrorism, AU has established standards and a continental agenda for preventing and combating terrorism, which is not only condemned but also criminalized in Africa. African Heads of States and Government have “denounced, among others, extremism and terrorism particularly based on political sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion as undermining the moral and human values of the peoples, particularly fundamental freedoms and tolerance.”<sup>273</sup> The AU also works closer with member states to identify, detect, confiscate and freeze or seize any funds and any other assets used or allocated for the purpose of committing a terrorist act or crime, and to establish a mechanism to use such funds to compensate victims of terrorist acts or their families. Besides this AU has entrenched its member states to criminalize as offence any attempt(s) to organize, instigate, facilitate, finance, encourage, or tolerate terrorist activities or harbour terrorist elements.<sup>274</sup>

The African regional bloc in 2004 established the *African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)*, in Algiers - Algeria to serve as a structure for centralizing information, studies and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and to develop Counter-Terrorism capacity building programmes. Also, the ACSRT provides a forum for interaction and cooperation among Member States and Regional Mechanisms such as the *AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation* established in 2010. S/he serves, concurrently as ACSRT director and undertakes a number of important assignments to mobilize

---

<sup>272</sup> Algiers Declaration on the Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation– AFRIPOL. From <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/algiers-declaration-afripol-english.pdf>, 14/04/2014

<sup>273</sup> Ewi, M. and Aning, K. (2006). “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa,” *African Security Review* 15.3, pp. 32-46.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid



support for the continent to fight the scourge of terrorism, assess the situation in various member states and identify, with the concerned national authorities, priority issues to be addressed.<sup>275</sup>

Additionally, there is specifically progress in fighting against human trafficking. For instance, the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU.COMMIT) as well as the Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2013 which among others intends to assist Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in developing and implementing regional action plans to strengthen protection, prevention and prosecution of human trafficking, in line with the Ouagadougou Action Plan and AU.COMMIT, that covers countries of origin, transit and destination. More effort is done by AU, RECs at the national level to monitor, implement and evaluate all mechanisms used in the fight against all forms of crime and terrorism to the best practices in the Continent.<sup>276</sup>

#### **4.6 Challenges Facing AU in the Fight Against Terrorism**

Inadequate resources: the AU is yet to overcome some of its internal short comings and build its own financial and human resource capabilities. This makes it to largely rely on member states that also have their own financial difficulties or may turn to dictate the organisation. This situation makes it easy for crime and terrorism to go on unchecked. A case in point is the massive human trafficking in West African countries and repeated kidnapping or other activities of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.<sup>277</sup>

---

<sup>275</sup> AUPSC, 2013. "The African Union Counter terrorism Framework," Accessed on 16/04/2014; from <http://www.peaceau?.org/en/?page/?64-counter-terrorism-ct>

<sup>276</sup> Biswaro, J. M., 2012. *The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality-A Comparative Study*. Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam

<sup>277</sup> AUPSC, 2013. "The African Union Counter terrorism Framework," Accessed on 16/04/2014; from <http://www.peaceau?.org/en/?page/?64-counter-terrorism-ct>

Institutional framework: member states which are signatories to regional or international conventions and protocols are reluctant to ratify and/or establish new national legislation(s) to fight crime and terrorism. AU needs to ensure that these instruments are ratified and domesticated uniformly in national laws in order to create competent institutional framework with new structures to co-ordinate and monitor the situation. For example, definitions of crime vary from one country to another that means a criminal act in one country is not necessarily a criminal act in another.<sup>278</sup> As for terrorism, some most Southern and West African countries are reluctant to commit themselves to the fight against terrorism as is partly linked as an external priority that is imposed on African states.

The development of science and technology: Advancement in science and technology poses several challenges to fighting crime and terrorism in Africa. This is because the security agencies, mainly the police forces in many countries are not equipped to match with forces of technological advancement related crimes such as cyber-crimes. For instance, there is an increase in cyber-crime in Nigeria, Cameroon, South Africa and Ghana leading in the vice on the continent. Lastly, is the; *legacy of the OAU*: "the AU is yet to overcome a legacy of the OAU, namely a tendency to adopt landmark decisions and make pronouncements without ensuring effective and appropriate follow-up".<sup>279</sup>

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

Africa as a continent is very susceptible to harbouring terrorists, facilitating their activities and unable to effectively combat terrorism. The continent has a disproportionate share of failed states, weak institutions, poverty, wars and conflicts, incomplete peace consolidation efforts,

---

<sup>278</sup> Ibid

<sup>279</sup> Ewi, M. and Aning, K. (2006). "Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa," *African Security Review* 15.3, pp. 32-46.

porous borders and youth unemployment etc. In order to deal with these issues, African states, bilaterally and multilaterally, need to develop a greater sense of common purpose, common destiny and common agenda, an agenda that is capable of addressing generalized insecurity and eliminating loopholes and weak-points in its security systems. And in partnership with Africa, the United Nations, G-8 countries (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia), the European Union and the international community have important roles to play. Such partnerships would cover many areas, including addressing the root causes of conflict in Africa and enhancing the capacity of African states to engage effectively in counter terrorism.

One of the key lessons of September 11, for the West is that the security of the North can no longer be separate from the security of the South. It therefore, calls for the strengthening of the North-South Relations to address the global security threat. On their part, the Africans realise that when terrorists attacked the US Embassies in Nairobi and Kenya, more Africans were killed than the Americans who were the targets and this has implications for the future. This therefore re-enforces the collective desire to find regional and global solutions to regional and global problems. Closer cooperation with African nations and multi-dimensional support from the Western partners for capacity building, technology transfer and additional resources are crucial if the continent is to increase its ongoing role and efforts against terrorism.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

Chapter one discussed the concept of terrorism and the dynamism thereof. From the chapter, the study observed that there are emerging trends that suggest there a widening political and geographic area that is threatened by home-grown terrorism. Home grown terrorism has been evident internationally. In Kenya, attacks such as the Garissa attacks have also shown home grown aspects as the terrorist are Kenyan. Indeed, the growth of radicalization in Kenya in recent years has manifested itself in the spread of violent extremism. This has resulted to the emergence of extremists and terrorist groups influenced by Wahhabi ideologies.

Chapter two discussed the dynamism of terrorism and terror groups and the most susceptible group to radicalization. From the chapter, the marginalized groups and youths and refugees as well as religious groups are more susceptible to radicalization. Kenya's ethnic Somali and Muslim populations mostly live in the NEP and along the south-eastern coast are also susceptible. Although Kenyan citizens, these populations are politically and economically marginalized, making these regions prosperous recruiting grounds for groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. However, the study noted that recruitment went beyond the Somali community as other ethnic groups were also recruited such as Luhya and Kikuyu. Al Shabaab has also been noted to evolve in time to affiliate with Al-Qaeda and the study observes that the group has evolved much that technology is used by the group to enhance its agenda in recruitment and media coverage of its activities among others.

Radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable groups to terrorism and violent extremism has further been influenced by the convergence of a number of socio-economic factors that have

contributed to the growth of domestic radical groups. 'Home-grown' extremist has emerged and the current wave of radicalization into extreme violence in Kenya may be associated to individuals and groups that are inspired by religion and socio-economic factors. Among other most critical factors that facilitate radicalization is the rampant rapidly spreading immorality in Kenya and the region.

In chapter three, the study discussed the effectiveness of the strategies and measures in the activities of Kenya's fight against terrorism. Kenya has applied different measures in counter radicalization and counter terrorism. These range from military 'intervention' in Somalia, attempts to secure borders, tightening surveillance, counter-intelligence and police and security agents operations such as in Easleigh and detention at Kasarani. These efforts have had effects and at some point have weakened the Al Shabaab and made it less possible for attacks as counter intelligence have leaked different plots by the terror groups attack in Kenya. However, some of the strategies have also marginalized the already marginalized communities in Kenya and with the corruption and human rights violations of the police during operations, the trust of Kenyans citizens on the government's ability to protect them has dwindled.

The study observed in chapter four there are regions that are more prone to terrorism activities than others. The Horn of Africa for instance, has been the most conflicted part of Africa. It is also inter-linked, in geographic, religious, ethnic, political, and economic terms, to the Middle East thus, people, arms, money, and material flow from the Middle East along the Red Sea coast, through Somalia and south to other East African countries, while commerce and religious interaction moves in both directions. This calls for regional cooperation in counterterrorism measures as terrorists are not only using the internet for communication,

recruiting, training and planning – but also to transfer funds regionally, as well as crimes that support and fund terrorism activities such as extortion.

## **5.2 Conclusions**

Kenya's counter terrorism strategies have been hampered by different setbacks including but not limited to, domestic issues. Corruption in governance and leadership, especially in critical areas such as criminal justice, border security, and the provision of essential services, also increases Kenya's vulnerability to radicalism and terror. For instance, corruption along unguarded borders, and ineffective security and police organizations has facilitated many terrorist organizations with the freedom of movement, and ability to operate as long as they can bribe the officers in charge. More so is the issue of marginalization and development disparities in different regions. External pressure such as refugee influx along porous borders has given terror suspects the opportunity to camouflage amongst the refugee populations and make it vulnerable. By recruiting Somali refugees in Kenya, Al-Shabaab has intensified the potential threat of refugees to Kenya's security as a nation-state.

From the study, it is clear of the importance of the regional bodies, both bilaterally and multilaterally to cooperate in counter-terrorism. Indeed individual State cannot address the threat of terrorism alone. The study also concludes that terror threats cannot be resolved through military power alone; but requires a comprehensive multifaceted approach including continual exchange of ideas and intelligence and engagement with the international community. Addressing the challenge of terrorism over the long term demands multilateral cooperation; capacity building; and considered efforts to counter violent extremism by all levels of society and government. Through training and military assistance, sharing of intelligence, regional and

international policing, legal frameworks that can help arrest terror suspects across regional borders; the fight against terrorism is made more effective.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

It is vitally important to reform the judicial and the law enforcement systems in the region to ensure the adoption of necessary counter-terrorism legislation and practices. This includes both international laws and domestic laws. There is need to harmonize regional legal and enforcement systems as well as improve information exchange and other joint strategies to combat cross-border security challenges like terrorism and terrorist networks.

Kenya must continue to utilize the law enforcement and intelligence entities that are already in place. These specialized units and departments, though not operating to their full potential, have the potential to mitigate terrorist threats. They act as both a deterrent and reactive force to terrorists, deterring the planning of attacks on Kenyan soil and reacting to intelligence gathered in the course of investigations. Additionally, there must be systematic improvements made at the individual and departmental levels. Equipping and training only a specialized unit such as the ATPU is paramount.

There is need to create a multi-faceted approach to counter terrorism measure particularly in counter-radicalization where the Kenyan government applies the development approach, and socio-psychological approaches to curb radicalization. Through dialogue with communities, the government should undertake genuine political reforms aimed at creating socio-economic and political institutions with which citizens can identify radicalizations and the issues emanating from it. In this regard, there is the need to address seriously the plight of the youth, especially as

it relates to unemployment, since they form easy targets for recruitment, posing a dangerous challenge because of the youth population bulge that exists in all the African countries.

Creating and enhancing regional law enforcement cooperation bodies. This is of decisive importance, both in terms of prevention and repression when addressing radicalization problems. Regional centres of this kind can not only create the conditions necessary for better exchange of intelligence information within the region, they also enable capacity-building measures that can improve correctional treatment in different countries, management of radical sub-cultures and information exchange for initiatives that work against radicalization.

Regional and international cooperation is of paramount need in all matters security particularly in the Horn of Africa. Through regional organizations like the Eastern African Standby Force, there is need to seriously address regional security challenges including the Somali question. This is because security threats easily become regionalized, threatening neighboring states. The Somali challenge is increasingly having national ramifications across the borders including in countries like Kenya and Uganda including acts of terrorism. In this way, destructive forces operating in remote corners of the country, far away from the Eastern African capitals, can be sustainably dealt with.

Kenya should as well use some of the best practices such as de-radicalization strategies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore which have had some success with the use of certain methods. These include:

Reform within the prison structure: The ability to segregate extremists from the general population is important in preventing radicalization. Saudi Arabia has addressed prison concerns by building five new prisons specifically to support their deradicalization programs. Despite the budgetary constraint, the government needs to serious source funds for this initiative.



The Religious leaders: Radical ideologies can only successfully be countered by someone who not only is knowledgeable about Islam but can also garner the respect of the extremist. Indonesia has found success with the use of reformed extremists to counter ideologies. Singapore has also been able to elicit significant support within its Muslim communities; however, some have questioned the legitimacy of the Islamic scholars involved in its program. A difficulty experienced by many Western countries is the lack of access to Muslim scholars who the radicals perceive as credible. A benefit of Saudi Arabia is that it has a vast number of Islamic scholars that can be utilized in the program. Therefore, government should identify credible scholars to spearhead the de-radicalization programme.

Monetary support for families of detainees: this has been successfully applied in Singapore which has recognized the importance of providing support to families of detainees to prevent marginalization of the family or further radicalization. The Saudi program also addresses the prisoner's social needs by including families in its efforts and providing monetary support, which encourages goodwill towards the government, and also prevents radical groups from stepping in to influence families, spouses and families often are a significant factor in the disengagement of violent activism.

More important from this study is the very need for the government of Kenya to adapt to the concept of terrorism in Kenya as being home-grown in nature. This will enhance the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies that de-radicalize recruits and deal with the factors that make the most susceptible groups to be recruited, since no terror group can function without its 'foot soldiers'.

## References

Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

Asim Qureshi, "Feeding grievances: The killing of Makaburi", available at [www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411) (accessed on 9 June 2015)

Amnesty International, "Somalis are scapegoats in Kenya's counter-terror crackdown", 27 May 2014

Amnesty International. (2014). Kenya: Somalis scapegoated in counter-terror crackdown. 27 May 2014. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenya-somalisscapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>.

Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

Agence France Presse (2009). "Shabaab Militants Vow Revenge for Death of Regional Al-Qaeda Leader."

Arye Oded, *Islam & Politics in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); 82, and, David H. Shinn, "Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn," *Foreign Service Journal* (September, 2004).

BBC News (2010). "Somali Islamists Al-Shabab 'Join Al-Qaeda Fight.'" February 1.

Brooks, David. 2002. "The Culture of Martyrdom." *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 289, No. 6(June).

Bremmer, Ian, World Terrorism These 5 Facts Explain Terrorism in Kenya. Available at <http://time.com/3817586/ian-bremmer-facts-explain-shabab-terror-attack-kenya/>. Accessed on 15 April 2015

Burke, J. (2004). *Al Qaeda: The true story of radical Islam*. London: I.B. Tauri

Business Standard; Kenya begins constructing security wall along Somali border. Available at [http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-begins-constructing-security-wall-along-somali-border-115041400713\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-begins-constructing-security-wall-along-somali-border-115041400713_1.html). Accessed on 15 April 2015

CBC “Al-Shabaab,” interview by Anna Maria Tremonti, The Current, CBC Radio, Ottawa, March 10, 2010.

Cf. Chapter 9 (Responding to Terrorism) of the U.S. Department of Defense’s 1997 Annual Defense Report

CNN (2013). “Transcript of Bin Laden’s October Interview.” February 5.

D. E. Agbiboa (2013a). “Al-Shabaab’s Dangerous Affair with Al-Qaeda.” *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 38(4): 425-440.

E. Agbiboa (2013b). “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective.” *African Conflict and Peace-building Review* 3 (1): 144-157: 154

D. E. Agbiboa (2013c). “Peace at Daggers Drawn: Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria.”

Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from

Daniela Krosiak, “Somalia: Militant Islamists Try to Draw Kenya into a Trap,” International Crisis Group, June

David Kezio-Musoke, “Kalonzo Meets Kagame over Crisis,” Daily Nation, February 24, 2008,

Devji, Faisal. 2005. *Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. Ithaca: Cornell University

Elliott, Andrea. 2007. “Where Boys Grow Up to Be Jihadis,” The New York Times, November 25.

Onuoha, F. (2013). “Westgate Attack: Al-Shabab’s Renewed Transnational Jihadism.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 10 November. Available online at, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/11/11/20131111123040955734Kenya.pdf> (Accessed 20 November, 2013)

Fletcher, M. (2008). “How the War on Terror Pushed Somalia into the Arms of Al-Qaeda.” *Times of London*,

Galvin, K. (2013). “How Al-Shabab is Using Twitter for Terrorism.” *PolicyMic*, October 6. Available online at, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/66443/how-Al-Shabab-is-using-twitter-for-terrorism.html> (Accessed 19 November, 2013).

Garowe, “Kenya: Al Shabaab Threaten to Attack Kenya Capital,” Garowe Online, January 21, 2010,

H. Ali Noor. “Suicide Bombers Kill at least 28 in Somalia.” *Reuters*, October 29, 2008.

Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2011). "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Growing New Headache." *Strategic Comments* 17 (9), p. 3.

Koert Lindijer, "In Kenya, Fear of Al Qaeda Ally Stokes Hatred of Somalis," NRC Handelsblad February 2,

Laitin, David D. and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2008. "The Political, Economic and Organizational

Lorenzo Vadini, et al. "Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict". *African Security*, 3: 216-238: 218, 2010.

Ibrahim, M (2010). "The Al-Shabab Myth: Notoriety not Popularity." NCEIS Research Papers, 3(5), p. 9.

Menkhaus, K. and Boucek, C. (2010). "Terrorism out of Somalia." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 23. pp. 4-5

Mwangi, O.G. (2012). "State Collapse, Al-Shabab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.", op cit., pp.519

O. G. Mwangi (2012). "State Collapse, Al-Shabab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia." *Politics, Religion and*

R. Wise (2011). "Al-Shabaab." Case Study Number 2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. pp.3

Roggio, B. (2010). "Al-Qaeda Leaders play significant role in Shabaab," *Long War Journal*, August 1. [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al\\_qaeda\\_leaders\\_pla.php.html](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_leaders_pla.php.html) (Accessed 16 August 2013).

Saltman, S. (2008). "The Global Jihad Network: Why and How Al-Qaeda Uses Computer Technology to Wage Jihad." *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, 1(3). Available at <http://www.acsa.net/TW/samples/saltman.pdf>. (Accessed 18 September 2013).

Smith, G.D. (1990): *Combatting Terrorism*, London

Smith, G.D. (1998a): »An electronic Pearl Harbor? Not likely«; in: *Issues in Science and Technology*, Fall

Smith, G.D. (1998b): »Single Issue Terrorism, Canadian Security Intelligence Service«, *Commentary* No. 74.

Sopko, J.F. (1996): »The Changing Proliferation Threat«; in: Foreign Policy, Winter 1996/97, pp. 3–20.

Tayler et al., “Kenya Recruits Somali Refugees to Fight Islamists Back Home in Somalia.”

United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia (2010). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853(2008)*. March 10. Available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=s/2010/91.html](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2010/91.html) (Accessed 16 June 2013).

Office of the Spokesperson. Washington, DC. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/191914.htm> . (Accessed 19 November 2013)

US State Department (2008). “Designation of Al-Shabab.” Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism.”

Wanjohi Kabukuru, “Kenya,” *New African*, May 1, 2009,

Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller, eds., *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 60–61.

Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: The Struggle Against Terrorism,” in Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism*, pp. 173–192. See also Gilbert Khadiagala, “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism,” in *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report no. 113, January 2004.

Crisis Group observations; “Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border”, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27

Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) “Introducing IPOA” Accessed 8/18/2015 <http://www.ipoa.go.ke/>

International Crisis Group, Kenya’s 2013 Elections, Report N°197, 17 January 2013, p. 43, at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf>, accessed September 3, 2013

MUHURI, “We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court” Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit Accessed on 8/18/2015 at <http://www.muhuri.org/index.php/media-center/publications#>

Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491.

Nelson Odhiambo, “Experts Split on Calls to Withdraw Kenyan Troops from Somalia After Terror Attack,” *Daily Nation*, April 12, 2015.

Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Nairobi, September 2011. In, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation” *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* No. 85, 25 January 2012. pp. 10-14:12

Matt Bryden, *Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013

Rudner, M. (2013). “Al-Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36(12): 953-980.

“Somalia”, *The New York Times*, Topics (online), 25 January 2012

Lewis , I. M., *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 183-201.

Kenya for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. ‘Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.’

Murithi Mutiga, “Are the Terrorists of Al Shabaab about to Tear Kenya in Two?” *The Guardian*, April 4, 2015. - See more at: <http://africacenter.org/2015/04/garissa-counterterrorism-and-public-trust/#sthash.FV22XPjp.dpuf>

Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

“Westgate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements” September 23, 2013. [http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/State\\_Report\\_Kenya\\_Available\\_at\\_http://www.state.gov.html](http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/State_Report_Kenya_Available_at_http://www.state.gov.html)

Kazungu Chai. UN to help Kenya Fight Terrorism, says Ban Ki-Moon. *Daily Nation* Saturday, June 28, 2014

Guled Mohammed, “Hounding Somalis hurts terror fight”, *The Star*, 2 November 2011.

Tom Odula, “War fears: Somalis in Kenya afraid of xenophobia”, Associated Press, 11 November 2011.

Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

National Cohesion and Integration Commission. (2011). Preach hate: Face charges: The National Cohesion and Integration Commission’s concerns of rising religious, ethnic, and political intolerance. Press statement (Nairobi, 5 November 2011). Available at: <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/press-statements/press-statement-on-rising-religiousethnicandpolitical-intolerance.html>

Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dclid=220124#wrapper>

Global Terrorism Index 2014. Available at: <http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iepindicesdata/global-terrorism-index>

Algiers Declaration on the Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation–AFRIPOL. From <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/algiers-declaration-afripol-english.pdf>, 14/04/2014.

Anneli Botha, “Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 245 (Institute for Security Studies, Apr 2013) <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf>

AUPSC, 2013. “The African Union Counter terrorism Framework,” Accessed on 16/04/2014; from <http://www.peaceau.org/en/?page/?64-counter-terrorism-ct>

Biswaro, J. M., 2012. *The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality-A Comparative Study*. Mkuki na Nyota: Dar es Salaam

Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and IGAD Security Sector Program, Fighting Terror Trough Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism (New York and Addis Ababa, May 2012)

[http://www.globalct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/TaskForce\\_Report\\_May20121.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/TaskForce_Report_May20121.pdf).

Ewi, M. and Aning, K. (2006). “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa,” *African Security Review* 15.3, pp. 32-46.

Global Counterterrorism Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary of the Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group (8-10 Feb 2012) <http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10303/20542/Co-Chairs%27%20Summary+of+9-10+Feb+2012+Working+Group+Meeting+in+Dar+es+Salaam>.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

International Crisis Group, “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation’ Africa Briefing, no. 85 (25 Jan 2012); Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab's Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline’,” (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

Liat Shetret, “Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes,” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (Feb 2011) [http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS\\_policybrief\\_119.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS_policybrief_119.pdf).

Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 89- 111.

Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins 'Securing Communities: the what and how of community policing (ODI, Jul 2013) <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7633-community-policing>.  
Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: The Operations; US Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub," *New York Times*, 17 November 2002.

United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) p. 149,  
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433).

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "Mid-term evaluation of three countering violent extremism projects" (2013) [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACX479.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX479.pdf).

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, 28 August 2002. <http://www.transparency.org>

Crisis Group Africa Reports N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11 July 2005; and N°100, Days and Now. Amsterdam: Boom.

Duursma, Jori; Definition of Terrorism and Self-Determination; available at: <http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/1757>. Accessed on 25 February 2015.

Duyvesteyn, I., & Graaf, B. de (ed.), (2007). Terrorists and their Adversaries in Former *Garissa District Development Plan 1997-2001*, Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, (Nairobi: Government Printer).

Goodenough, Patrick ; Almost 10 Years after 9/11, U.N. Still Grappling to Define Terrorism; available at <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/almost-10-years-after-911-un-still-grappling-define-terrorism>. Accessed on 25 February 2015

Gurr, Ted. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1970

Harmony Project, *Al-Qaeda's (MIS) Adventure in the Horn of Africa* (New York: USMA Combating Terrorism Center, May 2007).

Herz, Manuel, "Somali Refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi" (no date), at <http://roundtable.kein.org>.

Horseed Media; Relocation of Somali refugees from Dadaab to start 'soon. Available at 'http://horseedmedia.net/2012/01/23/somali-relocation-of-somali-refugees-from-dadaab-to-start-soon/. Accessed on 8 April 2015  
[http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/how\\_plot\\_to\\_bomb\\_clinton\\_in\\_kenya\\_was\\_foiled.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/how_plot_to_bomb_clinton_in_kenya_was_foiled.aspx).



Human Right Voices; UN 101; There is no UN definition of terrorism; available at [http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un\\_101/facts/?p=61](http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/EYEontheUN/un_101/facts/?p=61). Accessed on 25 February 2015.

Keller, W. W., *Anatomy of Terrorist Attack* (Pittsburg: Ridgway Center, 2005).  
Kenya sends troops into Somalia to hit al-Shabab, Available at:  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15331448>, accessed on 24 February 2015

Kirui, Peter and Dr. John Mwaruvie; The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya; *International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8 [Special Issue - April 2012]*

League of Nations, Convention for the prevention and Punishment of Terrorism

Loescher, Gil and Ann Dull Loescher, *The Global Refugee Crisis*, (London: Oxford,1994).

Munene, Mugo, “How plot to Bomb Clinton in Kenya was Foiled,” Daily Nation, September 5, 2009 (accessed October 13, 2009); available from

Ombati, Cyrus, “Relocation of Somali refugees from Dadaab to start ‘soon’”, *The Standard*, 22 January 2012. The U.S. and others have urged Kenya not to send the refugees back to Somalia.

Omondi , Samson Operation Usalama Watch; Too little too late? Available at <http://www.knchr.org/OperationUsalamaWatchToolittletoolate.aspx>. Accessed on 31 March 2015.

Omwanza, Eric Momanyi; How We Aid Terror in Kenya; A System Analysis of Terror Dynamics

Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison; The Terrorist Threat in Africa; available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa>. Accessed on 23 February, 2015.

Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison; The Terrorist Threat in Africa; available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa>. Accessed on 23 February, 2015.

Rapoport, D.C. (2004) The four waves of modern terrorism. In A.K. Cronin & J. Ludes, (ed.), *Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy* (pp. 46-73). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

Republic of Kenya, *Garissa District Development Plan* (1994-1996), (Nairobi: Government printer).

Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, *Garissa District Development Plan 2002-2008*, (Nairobi: Government Printer).

RNW, “Kenya’s political gamble in Somali border regions”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 15 November 2011.

Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005; and Briefing N°74, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010; see also Briefing N°85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, 25 January 2012.

The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W Norton, 2004).

The two aid workers were reportedly sold, in January, to pirates and moved to a hijacked ship. “Update: Kidnapped MSF workers moved to MV Albedo”, *Somalia Report*, 12 January 2012.

UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, available at "

<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm>. Accessed on 25 February 2015

UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya”, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org).

Why Kenya Invaded Somalia, The opening of an aggressive New Pape, Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136670/daniel-branch/why-kenya-invaded-somaliar>, accessed on 24 February 2015