

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

**COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES**

**YOUTH RADICALIZATION AS A TOOL FOR TERRORISM IN EAST
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA.**

BY

OSMAN ALI ABDIKADIR

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**A Research project submitted in partial fulfillment for the
requirements of Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies**

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

NAME: Osman Ali Abdikadir

REG. NO: R50/75682/2014

Sign: Date:

Supervisor

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

Sign: Date:

Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family who supported and encouraged me throughout this journey in completing this project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement I received from colleagues and more so my supervisor in ensuring that this work was completed in time. I also wish to acknowledge the lecturers that I interacted with during the time of pursuit of knowledge.

ABSTRACT

The overall aim of this study was to analyze youth radicalization as a tool for terrorism in Kenya. To achieve this, the study was guided by three objectives: analyze the involvement of youths in radicalization in Kenya, explore strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya and find out the challenges facing counter radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya.. In order to do so the study applied the theoretical framework based on the theory of relative deprivation guided by the works of Ted Gurr on why men rebel and engage in political violence and how governments respond. The theory explains that 'relative deprivation' denotes the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence. The study applied qualitative methodology, using both secondary and primary data sources such as questionnaires, books, journals, reports, legal provisions, among scholarly sources of data. The study found out the need for effective counter radicalization strategies in Kenya, while highlighting the dynamisms of terrorism in Kenya such as the 'home grown' aspects that must be examined and understood. The study thus, from the findings recommended for a multi-faceted approach to counter terrorism measure particularly in counter-radicalization where the Kenyan government applies the development approach. The study also recommended reforms in the judicial system so as to harmonize legal efforts with enforcement systems. The study also found the need for Kenya to develop a counter-radicalization that will also feature de-radicalization of recruits.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ATPU	Anti Terrorism Police Unit
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
GSPC	Group for Call and Combat
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HUMINT	Human intelligence
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre
NCTb	National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
NIS	National Intelligence Service
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY TERMS

Violent Extremism - Advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives¹

Terrorist radicalization - The process which an individual accepts terrorist violence as a possible, legitimate, course of action that eventually, but not necessarily, lead the individual to advocate, act in support of, or engage in acts of terrorism.²

Terrorism – It is an activity that involves criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.³

¹ USAID. (2011). The development response to violent extremism and insurgency. USAID Policy. Washington D.C.: USAID. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf

² Ibid

³ UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Globally, radicalization into extremist groups has been characterized by extreme violence based on different ideologies including nationalism, separatism, anarchism and extreme left-wing or even right-wing political ideas. Though the vast majority of the world populations practice peaceful coexistence and tolerance irrespective of their place of origin or opinion, the world is faced with a threat of extreme violence which is preceded by radicalization processes. The history of radicalization into violence or radicalization leading to terrorism is quite long and a complex psychosocial process.⁴

The region of East Africa has been prone to acts of terrorism in the last decades. Indeed, Kenya and Tanzania were among the first to be attacked under the basis of Islamic extremism during the 1998 twin attacks in Arusha and Nairobi. Since then, threats have increased with more attacks under different basis from American support to interventions in Somalia by state members of East Africa. Uganda for instance, has also added to the threats and attacks due to its military support in intervention efforts in Somalia.⁵ In general, member states and populace of East Africa have experience violent extremism and more so the radicalization of its youths into internationally affiliated terror networks as well as home-grown terror groups.

Though there are no consistent factors leading to radicalization, some factors have been identified as being mostly pertinent. Conditions conducive to terrorism that are recognized at the level of the UN and the OSCE include, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms

⁴ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Salafism in the Netherlands: A Passing Phenomenon or a Persistent Factor of Significance?* (The Hague: NCTb, 2008).

⁵ Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), “ Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, *ACSS Program Report*, 7-12

and manifestations, prolonged unresolved conflicts, violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, lack of rule of law and lack of good governance.⁶

Radicalisation of the youths into violent extremism is a great concern and reality in Africa, given that approximately 70% of African population is the youths. More so is due to the different push and pull factors in African nations that lead to many youths being radicalised. The study seeks to explore the drivers and factors that lead to their radicalisation into violent extremism. More so the study will examine the strategies used by the government, societies and their partnering organizations in countering radicalization, as well as the challenges encountered in effecting de-radicalization programs and measures.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Radicalization of youths in East Africa has continued to spread in many communities. Indeed, there are strong structural foundations for radicalization of youths in the region. In Kenya radicalization of youths has led to socio-economic effects in vulnerable communities, from fear to profiling of these communities in economic opportunities, to loss of an large number of Kenyan youths into radical groups that engage in terror activities. Indeed recruitment of youths in Kenya has been justified by the recruiters who used political Islam⁷ by convincing them of the needs and problems of certain vulnerable communities and individuals that have been marginalized by resource based conflicts and political processes.⁸ The international dimension of radicalization is indeed a major consideration and Northern Nigeria and Somalia could be

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Political Islam is the irruption of Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics. This phenomenon entails contemporary religious resurgence in private and public life.

⁸ Fadare and F. Butler (eds), *Political Islam and the State in Africa, Pretoria* (Centre for International Political Studies, (University of Pretoria, 200) 8, 133.

relevant cases. In isolation specific domestic and external context does matter. Therefore, applying a society-wide broad generalization to all the cases and regions in question often is misleading.

The sub-region of East Africa has different characteristics. It is: a major theatre for ‘the war on terror’ and a hot bed for radicalization; it is also home to multiple and complex insurgencies (LRA and others), it features a youth bulge and accommodates diasporas radicalization.⁹ The region is characterized by fragile states and is anchored in the underlying truism. It is also has ungoverned spaces and a net for militarized political culture as well as harboring Islamist movements and an Islamist state.¹⁰ This has further complicated the general war against terrorism and specifically counter radicalization due to its weak institutions, ineffective and rather ineffective judicial systems, corruption and lack of cooperation among states in the region.

In Kenya, the growth of radicalization in the last two decades has manifested itself in the spread of extreme ideologies. This led to the emergence of extremists and terrorist groups influenced by these ideologies. The development has further been influenced by the confluence of a number of socio-economic factors that have contributed to the growth of domestic radical groups.¹¹ ‘Home-grown’ terrorists¹² has emerged and the current wave of radicalization into extreme violence in Kenya may be associated to individuals and groups that are inspired by

⁹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), “ Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, ACSS Program Report, 7-12

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Rabasa, A. *Radical Islam in East Africa* (RAND project Air Force, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2008)

¹² Home grown terrorists areradicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, but draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from, al Qaeda core or affiliated movements. These groups are citizens or permanent residents of the states and commit against their own people or property within that state without foreign support.

religion and socio-economic factors. Among other most critical factors that facilitate radicalization is the rampant rapidly spreading immorality in Kenya and the region.¹³

Terror attacks have “grave economic, political, and social implications.”¹⁴ In past attacks, Kenyans and foreigners have died or injured in attacks such as Westgate Mall in 2013 and Kikambala hotel.¹⁵ Economically, the U.K, the United States and Germany, issued travel advisories that paralyzed Kenya’s tourism sector in 2003, leading to a loss of \$14 million a week, because foreign tourists cancelled their visits to Kenya in Malindi, Mombasa, and Lamu and safari destinations in Samburu, Masai Mara and Tsavo. After the advisories, the numbers of tourists visiting Kenya declined drastically, thereby affecting the Kenyan economy.¹⁶

Home grown terrorism has complicated the fight against terrorism. More so, one of the most complex counter-terrorism measures is counter-radicalization. Though many states affected by terrorism have had effective measures to prevent and mitigate terrorism, preventing recruitments is often a difficult measure. This is because the main problem with terrorism is those who carry out the activities, else, the ideologies of the recruiters would make terror groups void. More importantly, no terrorist or organization would exist without followers. According to Ricardo and Arce, “the most important resource in any terrorist organization is its militants.” The militants are the foot soldiers who carry out the leaders objectives on the ground such as suicide bombers and recruiters.¹⁷ Therefore effectively counter terrorism it is significant to understand

¹³ Ali, A. M, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa: Phases and Relevant Factors* (ISPSW Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin, Germany, 2008)

¹⁴ K. J. Kelley, Kenya Seeks 30 billion from U.S., *The Daily Nation Newspaper*, (Thursday, June 26, 2003, in Kefa Otiso, “Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery,” *Kenya Studies Review* 1, no.1 (2009), 117–119.

¹⁵ Westgate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/StateReport:Kenya.html>

¹⁶ Marc Lacey, “Threat of Terrorism Hurts Kenya Tourism,” *New York Times*, January 4, 2004, accessed August 16, 2012, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/432633287?accountid=12702>.

¹⁷ João Ricardo Faria and Daniel G. Arce M, “Terror Support and Recruitment,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 16, no. 4 (August 2005), 1

the factors that lead to the radicalization of the members of terror groups, since the foot soldiers enable the terror networks to thrive. Thus this paper seeks analyze the factors contribute to radicalization of youths, in order to formulate effective strategies to counter radicalization.

The factors determining individuals joining terrorist groups are important in the counter-terrorism war. The focus on the important process of recruitment of individuals, in this case the youth, into terrorist groups and activities is therefore vital. This will be important in building a greater understanding by examining the history of youth radicalization in East Africa, the cause and justification of terrorism under extremist ideologies, the challenges facing counter radicalization and effective strategies mechanisms for counter-radicalization. Thus the study examines and analyzes the factors that contribute to the recruitment and radicalization of youths by radical Islamist organizations in East Africa.

1.3 Research Questions

1. How do the youths get involved in radicalization in Kenya?
2. What are the strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya?
3. What are the challenges facing counter radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to analyze youth radicalization as a tool for terrorism in in Kenya. More specifically, the study seeks to:

1. Analyze the involvement of youths in radicalization in Kenya
2. Explore strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya

3. Find out the challenges facing counter radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya

1.5 Literature Review

This part of the study will introduce the aspects of radicalization and violent extremism. It will discuss the dynamics and complexities in the terms thereof such as the complexities of defining terrorism or violent extremism as well as the evolution and factors surrounding radicalization into violent extremism.

1.5.1 Violent Extremism

‘The term violent extremism is not universally defined. The African Union, United Nations and the European Union do not have an official definition of the term. Thus, other organizations such as the USAID defines violent extremism as an act of preparing, advocating, engaging in, or supporting ideologically justified or motivated violence to further political objectives, socio-economic.¹⁸ Nevertheless, this simple and obvious statement hides a great deal of controversy and uncertainty.

Violent extremism is considered to be a additionally inclusive term than ‘terrorism’, though they are broadly similar in use. Furthermore, even though USAID’s definition is wide, ‘violent extremism’ can be applied much more narrowly such as to Islamist violence alone, ignoring other forms of ideologically justified or motivated violence that affect states. However,

¹⁸ USAID. (2011). The development response to violent extremism and insurgency. USAID Policy. Washington D.C.: USAID. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf

though there is a vast literature on terrorism, even some of the most prolific authorities on terrorism complain about the deprived state of data and methodology in the field. A great deal of definitions remains uncertain, speculative and unknown.¹⁹ The majority of works on violent extremism focuses on how and why people are drawn to terrorism, referred to as radicalisation, and how violent extremist groups and networks are organized.

There are many types of violent extremism. The motivations are varied and many relate to particular ideologies such as interpretations of political movements or religious beliefs. Issues such as environmental or economic concerns, or ethnic or separatist causes are also related to these ideologies. When an individual's beliefs change from being conventional to radical, and the need for a drastic change in society, becomes radicalization. This is not necessarily a bad thing and does not mean these people will become violent.²⁰ However, if a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then acts accordingly, this is violent extremism. All forms of violent extremism seek change through fear and intimidation rather than through peaceful means. The motivation for violent extremism in Australia is often political. This includes right wing or nationalist extremism which has the goal of preserving the perceived majority culture at the expense of other cultures.²¹ These ideologies justify violence based on patriotism or a belief of superiority to other cultures and races.

¹⁹ Alex, P. Schmid. Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the Same Coin. ICCT Research Paper. The Hague: *International Center for Counterterrorism (ICCT)*, 2014) Accessed at http://www.trackingterrorism.org/sites/default/files/chatter/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-ExtremismMay-2014_0.pdf

²⁰ Allan, H.; Glazzard, A.; Jespersen, S; et al. *Drivers of violent extremisms: Hypotheses and Literature Review*. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015)

²¹ Ibid

1.5.2 The Concept of Radicalization

The first challenge to tackling radicalization successfully lies in the elusiveness of the concept. The possible motivations, ideas and other factors that might drive an individual towards radicalization are various, complex and no single factor is necessary or sufficient to account for terrorist radicalization. There is no single profile of individuals who have become involved with terrorism, and presumptions based on past or current individual cases are, therefore, extremely limited in their applicability. Broad profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, sex, or socio-economic status are not only discriminatory, but also ineffective.²²

Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, the political and human rights advocates who were instrumental in the abolition of slavery, and those who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical, as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies.²³

Terrorist radicalization is a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. This may eventually, but not necessarily, lead this person to advocate, act in support of, or engage in terrorism. There is, however, no clear-cut pathway towards terrorism.²⁴ Terrorist radicalization may occur in a great variety of circumstances in different ways and at different speeds. Each case of terrorist

²² European Commission. *Studies into Violent Radicalization: the Beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives* (European Commission: London: The Change Institute, 2008).

²³ Allan, H.; Glazzard, A.; Jespersen, S; et al. *Drivers of Violent Extremisms: Hypotheses and Literature Review*. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015).

²⁴ Ibid

radicalization and recruitment for terrorism results from the unique intersection of an enabling environment, with the personal circumstances and psychology of a given man or woman.²⁵

Terrorist radicalization and recruitment does not influence, including terrorist propagandists recruiters, broader developments in society, and the actions of public authorities. The terms “self-directed” or “self-initiated” radicalization are often used when there is a minimal degree of interaction with people actively seeking to radicalize and recruit an individual. It is associated with the phenomenon of so-called lone terrorists or self-starters, who seemingly act on their own without any clear outside direction or support. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process: it may be accelerated, possibly slowed down and in some cases reversed. Therefore, in order to be able to prevent and counter radicalization, it is important to understand the nature and impact of different factors and the degree to which they might vary and interact in different cases. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between push and pull factors.²⁶ Certain factors, such as a charismatic recruiter, might have traction, pulling the individual down a path of violent radicalization.

Other factors, such as experiencing violence, including at the hands of agents of the state, might make an individual more vulnerable to the appeal of terrorism, pushing him or her towards violent radicalization in a vacuum. It should be viewed as an interactive process between the individual and external influences, including terrorist propagandists and recruiters, broader developments in society, and the actions of public authorities. The terms “self-directed” or “self-initiated” radicalization is often used when there is a minimal degree of interaction with people actively seeking to radicalize and recruit an individual. Terrorist radicalization facilitated by the

²⁵ Sedgwick, M. *Radicalism Isn't the Problem: It's the Move to Violence We Need to Counter.* (Lancaster/London: Westminster Faith Debates, 2012)

²⁶ Andrew Silke, “Becoming a Terrorist”, in Andrew Silke (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003)

Internet has become of particular and growing concern to countries throughout the world. It is associated with the phenomenon of so-called lone terrorists or self-starters, who seemingly act on their own without any clear outside direction or support.²⁷

Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process: it may be accelerated, possibly slowed down and in some cases reversed. Therefore, in order to be able to prevent and counter radicalization, it is important to understand the nature and impact of different factors and the degree to which they might vary and interact in different cases. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between push and pull factors.²⁸ Certain factors, such as a charismatic recruiter, might have traction, pulling the individual down a path of violent radicalization. Other factors, such as experiencing violence, including at the hands of agents of the state, might make an individual more vulnerable to the appeal of terrorism, pushing him or her towards violent radicalization.

1.5.3 Causes for Radicalization

At hand are a range of views and prepositions on what causes youths to be radicalized. According to Maclean, persons drawn to radicalization have a aspiration to take action and do something important, at the same time, they view the world in black-and-white terms and seek out to side with themselves with a virtuous cause.²⁹ On the other hand, some, as the case with the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston bombing, resort to radical ideology in blame for their internal

²⁷ Radicalisation Awareness Network. *Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices*.(The Netherlands: Radicalization Awareness Network, 2016) Accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-bestpractices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

²⁸ Andrew Silke, "Becoming a Terrorist", in Andrew Silke (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003)

²⁹ Maclean, Why terrorism can grow in any soil including our own." *Maclean's* 126, no. 15 (April 12, 2013): 1

suffering on the society within and abroad.³⁰ The failure of their parents' marriage as well as the subsequent abandonment of the teenagers in America which left the brothers without social and financial support in rapidly deteriorating conditions.³¹ Radical Islamist ideology presented an outlet for their rage at the country that apparently botched them and set in motion the chain of events that led to the fatal end of Boston Marathon.

Sageman's dispute supports this proposition, underlining that the motive for joining Salafi jihad is the estrangement young men felt while living in foreign nations furthermore not having lucrative employment. Joining the jihad gave them a break away from own sense of objection as well as mortification.³² A comparable reason for radicalization can be seen in Western Europe, where second generation Muslims are still well thought-out as immigrants moreover fail to integrate in the society. Fascinatingly sufficient, the familiarity in France and the United Kingdom is rather dissimilar furthermore leads to variations in counter-terrorism policy triumph, plus as such ought to be discussed in further aspect. French model of assimilation of its immigrants was based on the tenure '*laïcité*,' which fated secularism in politics, thus each citizen acknowledged himself/herself as French first, and put all other ethnic and religious labels as second.³³

By disparity, British multiculturalism permitted for various Diasporas to be formed in England where narrowly knit ethnic and religious communities did not merge with each other.³⁴ Such multicultural approach backfired on counterterrorism in Britain, given that ethnic communities did not integrate with member Britons plus in consequence were Bizina and Gray 74 incapable to present data to law enforcement regarding potential radicalization in the midst of

³⁰ Reitman, Janet. "Jahar's World." Rolling Stone 1188 (July 17 2013): 46-57.

³¹ Ibid

³² Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004

³³ Kepel, Gilles. "French Lessons in Londonistan." National Interest no. 106 (March 2010): 42-52

³⁴ Ibid

its youths. Numerous experts say that some European Muslim youth, many of whom are second or third generation Europeans, feel disenfranchised in a society that does not entirely acknowledge them; they emerge to turn to Islam as a badge of cultural distinctiveness, furthermore are then radicalized by extremist Muslim clerics.³⁵ Regardless of the model for integration, Muslims from France to Germany to Belgium created what are often referred to as “parallel societies” in European countries.³⁶

In these sub-sets of European populace, immigrants live in common, often impoverished neighborhoods and continue to practice the religion and cultural norms of their homeland failing to share common values with the host country and subsequently becoming easy prey for radical propaganda. These marginalized parallel societies are full of youths vulnerable to recruitment. Furthermore, “the most defenseless potential recruits, whether born Muslim or changed to Islam, are those who are at a phase of life where they are looking for an identity, while looking for an endorsement and validation. They are in search of reasons that can be religiously and culturally justified, that offer them a means to identify who they are, and that give an apparent call for action”.³⁷

The period and process of radicalization differ from individual to individual, even though it is commonly recognized that the process occurs progressively over a period of time. Conscious decisions to, for example, join a terrorist organization or use violence for political ends are not made suddenly, but entail a gradual process that includes a multitude of occurrences, experiences, perceptions and role players. Having contact and listen to others with different opinions are important facilitators preventing radicalization, because discussions with people

³⁵ Archick, Kristin, John Rollins and Steven Woehrel. “Islamist Extremism in Europe.” Congressional Research Service. July 29, 2005.

³⁶ Baker, Kristin, James Mitchell and Brian Tindall. “Combating Islamic Terrorism in Europe.” American Diplomacy. November 2007.

³⁷ Ibid

with different opinions force people to constantly rethink and refine their own positions. On the other hand, sharing one's opinions with people who hold similar viewpoints will reinforce one's position, identify common problems and provoke collective action.³⁸ This form of isolation leads to 'groupthink', which can be described as an irrational style of thinking that causes group members to make poor decisions.³⁹

1.6 Justification of the Study

Research on terrorism and violent extremism has been conducted but not adequately, particularly on radicalization among the youth. The study notes the importance of studying the new dynamics of violent extremism, as a strategy for counter terrorism. The research study seeks to benefit the policy making and formulation, and contribute to existing academic knowledge. In policy formulation, the study will benefit formulating effective strategies for countering terrorism by the governments, societies and security sector. The findings from the study will highlight the legal, socio-economic and political challenges faced in counter radicalization. The recommendations will aid policymakers as well as law enforcement officers in providing a methodical accepting the menace posed by radicalization and the ultimate consequences.

The study will contribute to academic knowledge adding to the existing body of literature. Out of the finding the research seeks to add to the existing body of academic sources in radicalization studies. This will provide valid and relevant information on the factors

³⁸ E Quintelier, D Stolle and A Harell, Politics in Peer Groups: Exploring the Causal Relationship between Network Diversity and Political Participation, *Political Research Quarterly* 20 (10) (2011), 2.

³⁹ M Cottam, B Dietz-Uhler, EM Mastors and T Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004, 80.

contributing to radicalization to enable the security agencies combat the threat. More so the study will highlight all emerging issues that will be important for further studies.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

Measures for countering terrorism can barely ignore the dynamics surrounding radicalization of individuals into terrorism. In understanding the causes that motivates individuals into terrorism, the study is guided by the theory of relative deprivation. Gurr⁴⁰ explains that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves. Gurr explains political violence as the result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation. Gurr⁴¹ also writes that, 'relative deprivation' as the term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence." This gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent. The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece. Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure.

According to Gurr⁴², "For Aristotle the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration Gurr states that perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is what leads to discontent, not the millionaire's absolute economic standing. The study uses this theory as stipulated by Gurr, describing the frustration caused by relative deprivation, and the resulting

40 Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

41 Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

42 Ibid

aggression that is manifested as terrorism. Thus the levels of terrorism may be explained in part as an expression of country conditions conducive to relative deprivation.⁴³

For most youths, vulnerable to Islam radicalization in Kenya the search for their own personal identity involves defining their relationship, exploring and experimenting with issues of faith, heritage and their peer group, without necessarily leading to radicalization. However, some youths choose to adopt a radical religious identity which can be the outcome of an earlier ‘identity crisis’ or ‘identity confusion’ in attempting to reconcile the potential conflicts of being at odds with what the first generation perceives as a ‘identity’ while feeling that they are not accepted or do not belong to wider society. This can be intensified by perceptions or experiences of discrimination, a sense of blocked social mobility, and a lack of confidence in the political system. This can spur a search for a identity at a moment of crisis, leaving that person vulnerable to radicalizing influences or embracing religious fundamentalism as an antidote to these unresolved inner conflicts, one which offers a highly structured ritual and practice.⁴⁴

Socio-economic discontent, may also lead the Muslim youths in violent extremism. While individual economic indicators alone do not appear to be strongly correlated with terrorism, the interaction effect of an economic variable (unemployment) and a social variable (education) may provide better insight into understanding terrorism.⁴⁵ Because relative deprivation also can be used to describe a discrepancy in what an individual has in economic goods and what he believes he is justly entitled to have, a look into the effect of increased international interactions could serve as a more effective application of the theory.

⁴³ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

⁴⁴ Githens-Mazer, J. “Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10, no. 4 (2008a): 550–570

⁴⁵ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

1.8. Hypotheses

1. There are different socio-economic and political factors contributing to the radicalization of the youths in Kenya such as historical injustices, religious reasons and economic grievances.
2. There are strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya such as public vigilance and CVE programming.
3. De-radicalization measures such as reintegration and rehabilitation face challenges in Kenya

1.9. Methodology of the study

This section will provide research methodology and area of study under the following subheadings; study sites, research design, study population, sample and sampling procedure, data gathering instruments, instruments validity and reliability, data collection procedure and data analysis and ethical considerations.

1.9.1 Research Design

The study is a qualitative study intended to create preliminary as well as equivalent information in a multifaceted area while capturing the assortment of different contexts in addition to levels of disclosure to violent radicalization. The proposed study design will be an exploratory design using interviews and direct contact questionnaires to gather qualitative descriptions. Each questionnaire will address a specific objective and will be administered to the respondents from the sampled groups. By using qualitative techniques, the design will enable the researcher to obtain valuable insights into the attitudes/or feelings. This provides an opportunity capture the diversity of contexts and levels of exposure to radicalization among the Muslim youths in Kenya.

1.9.2 Study Sites

The study will be conducted in Nairobi and Mombasa counties in Kenya where most radicalization of Muslim youths occur. This will provide broad perspective and a triangulation that illustrates various factors that motivate radicalization. The study will review previous works on data collected by studies such as Institute of Security Studies on radicalization of youths in Kenya among others. The internet is gradually more being seen as a significant showground for the encouragement plus growth of violent radical groups and what's more presents a greatly potent 'open source' research resource.

1.9.3 Study Population

This study population will consist of people that have been radicalized and have either heeded to the government amnesty and have surrendered, those in prison, in remand or in police custody, their parents (where possible), preachers (Imams), local administrators and intelligence/anti-terrorism operatives. Local administrators will be approached to identify those who are living among the society while the prisons and police records will be used to identify those that are in custody.

1.9.4 Sample Size determination

The study will target interviewees into two broad categories; those individuals who have participated in radicalization or with firsthand experience of issues of violent extremism. This will be supplemented by the analysis from the internet monitoring. The researcher intends to cover this gap by collecting data from four sites that have different backgrounds. This methodological triangulation will increase credibility and validity of the results. This involves using more than one individual and institution from different areas and spreading the figure in all the sites to gather data. The interviews will cut across the study population which will include:

those that have/had been radicalized, parents, preachers, prisoners, and local administrators, intelligence/counter as well as, anti-terrorism operatives.

1.9.5 Data Collection Methods

The interviews will be conducted using pretested interview guides that will be administered to those that have/had been radicalized, parents, preachers (Imams), local administrators and intelligence /anti-terrorism operatives. The study will use interview guides a sample of which is attached in Appendix 1.

1.9.6 Ethical Considerations

The study objectives and methodology will be explained to those who will be participating in the study. The principle of voluntary participation and the requirement of informed consent will be emphasized to ensure confidentiality. Any information collected will be handled confidentially. To protect interviewee's confidentiality, the timing and the location of the interview will not be disclosed to anybody else. Their personal details and identification will be kept confidential and all interviewees will be guaranteed. This will help to stimulate the interviewees to participate in the research. All permits needed to be able to conduct the interviews will be attained beforehand.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction and background to the Study

Chapter Two: The involvement of youths in radicalization in Kenya

Chapter Three: Strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya

Chapter Four: The Challenges facing counter radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya

Chapter Five: Presentation of Data Findings and Analysis

CHAPTER TWO

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE YOUTH IN TERRORISM

2.1 Introduction

The involvement of youth in violence all over the world has become an important issue politically, socio-economically and psychologically. The consequences of youth violence are much traumatic both for themselves and for the victims, their families and communities. The involvement of youth in political and religious violence especially requires special attention, due to external actor to the violence, such as organized crime like terror networks. It is crucial to identify the risks and vulnerability of the youth under risk of getting involved in violent activities in order to understand why they radicalize. This section of the research paper will look at characteristics of youth and risk factors which make them more susceptible to becoming involved in violence in order to be able to provide counter- preventive measures at the end of the research.

2.2 The Concept of Youth Involvement in Violence and Terrorism

In relations to youth and violence, the youth are either, the perpetrators of violence or the victims there of. Youth violence may be defined as any intentional physical, sexual or psychological assault on another person (or persons) by one or more young people aged 12 to 24 years.⁴⁶ The most common perpetrators of youth violence are young males. Although a growing number of female youth are violent, the males dominate in frequency and severity of the violence committed. Youth violence can be perpetrated collectively by groups or gangs, or even

⁴⁶ Elliott, S.D., Tolan, P.H. Edt. Flannery, D.J. ve Huff, C. R. *Understanding What We Know About Youth Violence Intervention Evaluation* (American Psychiatric Pres., Inc. First press. Washington, 1999), 47.

individually. In the same way, the victims of youth violence can be groups or gangs of youth, or individual youth.⁴⁷

There are numerous presumptions about why violence begins in their teenage years. The development stages in teenage-hood come with major physical and emotional changes that alter a young person's relationships and patterns of interaction with others. Some of the developmental characteristics of adolescence involve emotional instability, weak impulse control, difficulties in mood regulation, need for role models for identification, need to feel strong and powerful, lack of experience, challenges of self and identity development, and need to increase self-esteem.⁴⁸

Although these characteristics are considered as normal features of adolescence, they also play an important role as the factors contributing the youths to getting involved in violent activities. Weak impulse control and emotional instability makes them attractive targets for external controlling agents, because these features avail them to be manipulated according to the aims of the agents easily. Difficulties in mood regulation, as well, avails them to be easily manipulated by others usually by inducing rage-provoking emotional states which are difficult to control from acting out. The need to increase their self-esteem, frequently leads them to take risks, sometimes in the form of violent acts. Self –esteem increases as one feels oneself being successful and powerful. Any set purpose promising such gains will draw the interest of the youth.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Pepler, D. J., & Slaby, R. G. (1994). Theoretical And Developmental Perspectives on Youth And Violence. In L. Eron, J. Gentry, & P. Schlegel (Eds.), Reason to Hope: A Psychosocial Perspective on Violence and Youth. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

⁴⁹ Rubinetti, F. (1996). "Empathy, Self-Esteem, Hopelessness and Belief in The Legitimacy Of Aggression in Adolescents Exposed to Pervasive Community Violence" University of Maryland, College Park.

A study on the correlation of exposure to aggression among urban youths and the following variables: empathy, hopelessness, self-esteem, and belief in the legitimacy of aggression by Rubinetti⁵⁰ showed that, a combination of these factors predicted a significant proportion of the variance in the other factors, supporting the relationship between self-esteem and violence. Alternatively, O’Keefe’s study on youth protective and vulnerability factors for adolescents who had been exposed to inter-parental violence. Results revealed low self-esteem differentiated those who experienced and/or inflicted dating violence from those who had not.⁵¹ The combination of low self-esteem and an inability to cope effectively has been found particularly important. In short, what the youths feel about themselves make it an extra important factor in their vulnerability to involvement in terror activities for example.

2.3 Youths Involvement in Terrorism

After the events of September 11th in which there were older perpetrators, much of the literature on terrorism has focused on the fact that many terrorists are older.⁵² However there is limited literature on the intersection of crime and terrorism. In the absence of much analytical work on these subjects, this piece is necessarily an exploratory one that examines where the links are and where more research should be undertaken. Its focus is on the recruitment of youth to crime and terrorism and the forms of their subsequent participation in these two activities. The liability as well as pliability of youth builds them especially prone to exploitation by both criminals as well as terrorists.

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ O’Keefe, M.. Factors Mediating the Link Between Witnessing Inter-Parental Violence and Dating Violence, *Journal of Family Violence* 13, no. 1(1998): 39, 55.

⁵² Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011)

The demarcation in the majority legal systems in the world between juvenile and adult offenders means that there is a readiness to use minors to commit crimes or terrorist acts because they are subject to much shorter sentences and if very young may actually not be subjected to criminal penalties. Furthermore, they are less likely to arouse suspicion because of their youth.⁵³ The youth involvement in crime and terrorism are primarily male although there are some limited examples of female participation. Youth are involved in terrorism in many different organizations. Earlier studies conducted over two decades ago reviewing reports of terrorists in Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Europe found that the average urban terrorist was between 22 and 25 based on analyses of 350 terrorists of different organizations.⁵⁴ The involvement of youth in both terrorism and crime remains a persistent problem in many societies. The problem has achieved increasing currency as youth are a target of recruitment by many terrorist organizations.

2.4 Recruitment of Youths in Terror Organization

Recruitment of youths into terror organizations is one of the most crucial processes of a terror network. Members are needed to finance, plan, provide logistical support and execute terrorist activities. Behind every terrorist act are many people who help project extreme ideologies, recruit and effectively indoctrinate the recruited to be able to carry out the acts of terror. Facilitation of this act often requires the commission of many criminal activities including transport of weapons or explosives, illegal financing and money laundering, and illegal movement of people. Mostly, youths are rather secular before they enter the radicalization

⁵³ Mercy J, Butchart A, Farrington D, Cerdá M. 'Youth violence'. In: Krug E, Dahlberg LL, Mercy JA, et al., editors. *The World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva, (Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2002), 25-56.

⁵⁴ O'Keefe, M., Factors Mediating the Link Between Witnessing Interparental Violence and Dating Violence, *Journal of Family Violence* 13, no. 1 (1998):39-57.

process and, in general, radicalization is taking place within loose social networks of friends and peers.⁵⁵

According to Kruger⁵⁶, the individuals recruited often know they are serving the organization. But on many occasions, the individuals who are recruited may only be connected with the criminal side of the activities and will therefore not be aware that they are working with a terrorist organization. While this situation applies to all members of a terrorist organization, it is particularly true for the recruitment of juveniles and youth who may often have less political understanding of the environment in which they operate. In contrast, politicized youth in colleges and high schools may be more willing to commit criminal acts if they do this to support a political cause they believe in.

2.5 Process of Radicalization

There is significant diversity in those recruited into terrorism. Studies that have been done show that some who are recruited for terrorist groups are more affluent and educated. As previously mentioned, some who joined the Sendero Luminoso were university students, as the access to higher education is limited in the highly stratified society of Peru⁵⁷. Members are as likely to come from educated and relatively advantaged families as from economically disadvantaged and uneducated.⁵⁸ This means that there are numerous learned individuals drawn in, not the picture habitually painted by the mass media that regularly features the extensive role of the less educated. Nevertheless, Sageman's analysis of 400 terrorists based on court credentials found

⁵⁵ Precht, Tomas. "Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe." Research Report. *Danish Ministry of Justice*. December 2007.

⁵⁶ Krueger, Alan B. *What Makes a Terrorist?: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Lionel Robbins Lectures*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007)

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Mercy J, Butchart A, Farrington D, Cerdá M. (2002) 'Youth violence'. In: Krug E, Dahlberg LL, Mercy JA, et al., editors. *The world report on violence and health*. Geneva (Switzerland): World Health Organization; p. 25-56

that differing to the circumstances of Palestinians recruiting 14 year olds, members of Al Qaeda “unite the jihad at the average age of 26. Three-quarters were professionals or semi-professionals. They are engineers, architects, and civil engineers, mostly scientists.”⁵⁹

According to Precht, in Western Europe, for various, the course of radicalization commences when they are teenagers in search of a cause as well as a stronger Muslim distinctiveness furthermore progressively finding the response in the ideology of radical Islam. Regularly people are rather secular before they go through the radicalization course moreover, in general, radicalization is going on within slack social networks of pals as well as peers.⁶⁰ A chief aspect in radicalization is the occurrence of a charismatic person who can simply convey persuasive speeches not only in Mosques other than in schools, universities, or even prisons. “Official sources show that several American homegrown Islamists have as well been radicalized whilst incarcerated, counting the members of the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its tactics to assail not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles”.⁶¹ Numerous of juvenile potential radicals are not entirely conscious of their country’s past, as well, they lack suitable knowledge of Islam plus have not read the Quran to see that Islam is truly one of the most serene religions. The verity that preachers of Wahhabi Islam find to their benefit is that lots of young disenchanted persons are not knowledgeable about the whole scope of religion they are trying to clinch.

An imperative thing to mull over is the role of social networks in the process of radicalization. “Social links are key to the dynamics of terror networks”.⁶² Group phenomenon is a strong cause in forming such network, since the potential jihadists are frequently close

⁵⁹ Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

⁶⁰ Precht, Tomas. “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe.” Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice. December 2007.

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

acquaintances or relatives when joining terrorist network as well have done so not independently but as a group. Several youth join the circles of radicals after the society discarded them by ruling virtual networks online, or in youth social activities and places of worship. The local community, by outstanding disinterested in its youth, misses the cipher that shows the progression of radicalization, as was the case with the Millennial Plot bombers in Montreal. Having been seen as “a bunch of guys” involved in minor crimes, living in an apartment on wellbeing, they were not taken critically by the authorities, though their circle revolved around Kamel, who underwent military training moreover fought jihad in Bosnia.⁶³

Nonetheless, the progression of radicalization separately from social remoteness also includes the wish to impinge on political change. Krueger posits that terrorism is comparable to voting. High opportunity rate of times, for instance high paying job, ought depress people from voting, but on the divergent, it is specifically them who vote, since they care about influencing the result as well as regard as themselves amply informed to articulate their opinions.⁶⁴ Terrorists also worry about influencing political outcomes: they care regarding a cause so intensely that they are ready to die for it. Terrorists are responding to geopolitical issues, in addition to understanding the causes of terrorism can lend a hand avert countries from pursuing counterproductive courses of action.⁶⁵

2.6 Causes for Radicalization

There are a variety of views as well as prepositions on the reasons pro radicalization. According to Maclean, persons drawn to radicalization have a wish to be decisive as well as do something

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Krueger, Alan B. *What makes a terrorist?: economics and the roots of terrorism, Lionel Robbins lectures.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁶⁵ Ibid

momentous, at the same time, they view the world in black-and-white stipulations moreover try to align themselves with a good cause.⁶⁶ On the other hand, a few young men, as was the case with the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston bombing, twirl to radical ideology so as to project the blame for their inside suffering on the society surrounding them or abroad. The failure of their parents' marriage and the following desertion of the teenagers in America left the brothers devoid of pecuniary or social support in hastily deteriorating circumstances.⁶⁷ Radical Islamist ideology obtained an escape for their anger at the country that evidently failed them and set in motion the chain of proceedings that resulted to the fatal end of Boston Marathon.

Sage-man's disagreement supports this proposal, underlining that the cause for joining Salafi jihad is the estrangement young men felt while living in foreign countries and not lacking gainful employment. Joining the jihad gave them an flee from individual sense of criticism as well as mortification⁶⁸. A related cause for radicalization can be seen in Western Europe, where second generation Muslims are still well thought-out as immigrants furthermore fail to fit in the society. Amusingly adequate, the experience in France and the United Kingdom is somewhat unlike in addition to leads to variations in counter-terrorism policy victory, and as such ought be discussed in further aspect. French model of integration of its immigrants was based on the tenure 'laïcité,' which inevitable secularism in politics, hence each citizen identified himself/herself as French first, and put all other ethnic and religious labels as second.⁶⁹

By disparity British multiculturalism permitted for several Diasporas to be formed in England where narrowly knit ethnic and religious communities did not interact with each other.⁷⁰ Such multicultural advance backfired on counterterrorism in Britain, given that ethnic

⁶⁶ Maclean, Why Terrorism Can Grow In Any Soil Including Our Own." *Maclean* 126, no. 15 (April 12, 2013): 1

⁶⁷ Reitman, Janet. "Jahar's World." *Rolling Stone* 1188 (July 17 2013): 46-57.

⁶⁸ Sage-man, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

⁶⁹ Kepel, Gilles. "French Lessons in Londonistan" *National Interest* no. 106 (March 2010): 42-52

⁷⁰ Ibid

communities did not integrate with fellow Britons and in consequence were Bizina and Gray not capable of providing data to law enforcement on potential radicalization amid its youths. Numerous experts say that some European Muslim youth, several of whom are second or third generation Europeans, feel disenfranchised in a society that does not completely acknowledged them; they emerge to convert to Islam as a badge of cultural distinctiveness, and are then radicalized by extremist Muslim clerics.⁷¹ Regardless of the model for integration, Muslims from France to Germany to Belgium formed what are habitually termed to as parallel societies in European countries.

In these sub-sets of European populace, immigrants live in common, over and over again insolvent neighborhoods in addition continue to carry out the religion and cultural norms of their homeland⁷² failing to allocate common values with the host country moreover then becoming easy prey for radical propaganda. These marginalized parallel societies are full of youths vulnerable to recruitment. Furthermore, “the most vulnerable potential recruits, whether born Muslim or converted to Islam, are those who are at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity, while looking for approval and validation. They are searching for causes that can be religiously and culturally justified, that provide them a way to identify who they are, and that provide a clear call for action”⁷³.

The period and process of radicalization differ from individual to individual, even though it is commonly recognized that the process occurs progressively over a period of time. Conscious decisions to, for example, join a terrorist organization or use violence for political ends are not made suddenly, but entail a gradual process that includes a multitude of occurrences,

⁷¹ Archick, Kristin, John Rollins and Steven Woehrel. “Islamist Extremism in Europe.” *Congressional Research Service*. July 29, 2005

⁷² Baker, Kristin, James Mitchell and Brian Tindall. “Combating Islamic Terrorism in Europe.” *American Diplomacy*. November 2007.

⁷³ Ibid

experiences, perceptions and role players. Having contact and listen to others with different opinions are important facilitators preventing radicalization, because discussions with people with different opinions force people to constantly rethink and refine their own positions. On the other hand, sharing one's opinions with people who hold similar viewpoints will reinforce one's position, identify common problems and provoke collective action.⁷⁴ This form of isolation leads to 'groupthink', which can be described as an irrational style of thinking that causes group members to make poor decisions.⁷⁵

2.7 Susceptibility to Radicalization

Although a number of definitions of radicalization exist, Gurr defines the concept as a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become disillusioned and discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modeling or 'imitative' behaviour occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ E Quintelier, D Stolle and A Harell, "Politics in Peer Groups: Exploring the Causal Relationship Between Network Diversity and Political Participation, *Political Research Quarterly* 20, vol 10 (2011), 2.

⁷⁵ M Cottam, B Dietz-Uhler, EM Mastors and T Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), 80.

⁷⁶ TR Gurr, Terrorism in democracies: its social and political bases, in W Reich (ed.), *Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), 87.

While acknowledging the influence of external factors, this section intends to explain radicalization as is evident in East Africa. In explanations of why individuals resort to violent extremism or terrorism scholars frequently stress the “root causes,” “structural factors,” or “underlying conditions” that allegedly drive this phenomenon. Among these “underlying conditions,” in turn, social and economic ones (such as, large-scale poverty and unemployment, inadequate government services, and insufficient economic opportunities) often receive a lopsided level of attention. Although perhaps to a lesser extent, political factors (such as bad governance, government repression, and/or the existence of ill-governed or poorly governed areas) also frequently loom large in “root causes” explanations.⁷⁷

In the context of East Africa, there are four key factors that have increased the Kenya’s susceptibility to radicalization into terrorism. These are structural and institutional factors, socio-economic factors, foreign and military intervention, and jihadist ideology are some of the underlying conditions for radicalization and subsequent terrorist activities. These underlying conditions can further be classified as “push factors” (those characteristics of the societal environment that allegedly help thrust vulnerable individuals onto the path of violence), and “pull factors” as: the appeal of a particular leader, “guru” or self-appointed imam; the resonance of certain ideas that reach deep into a society’s culture or history, that evoke powerful imagery and symbols, and that often remain thoroughly embedded in the fabric of daily life.⁷⁸

Additionally, the many and diverse rewards which membership in a group or movement, and participation in its activities, may confer. Such potential benefits include: access to material resources; social status and respect from peers; self-esteem; a feeling of brotherhood; thrills and

⁷⁷ Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2011. *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

⁷⁸ Institute for Security Studies (ISS). *African Counter Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001*. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011).

a sense of adventure; the prospect of achieving glory and fame; or the sense of personal empowerment that individuals and groups that long have viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history. In short, affiliation with extremist movements can provide material rewards, as well as emotional and spiritual benefits the importance of which should not be glossed over.⁷⁹

Lastly, the desire to emulate a perceived “hero” or “icon” of “resistance against oppression” is another factor that leads many youths into being susceptible to radicalization. The urge to conceive of oneself as a righteous avenger, and to project that image of oneself to others, may be particularly strong where feelings of personal and/or collective humiliation run high. A related variable may be the aspiration to follow in the footsteps of a friend or relative who was “martyred” or “fell to the cause.”⁸⁰ As argued by Segeman, one critical pull factor which empirical evidence suggests often trumps all alleged push factors combined consists of the social networks and personal relationships that often pull individuals into violent extremist organizations, and the group dynamics that subsequently keep them there and radicalize them.⁸¹

Radicalization involves both external and internal factors. External factors can be subdivided into domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy.⁸² Internal or personal interpretations of the external environment are influenced by psychological factors that refer directly to political socialization. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy identifies ‘conducive conditions’ to terrorism. These

⁷⁹ Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison; *The Terrorist Threat in Africa*; Accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59534/princeton-n-lyman-and-j-stephen-morrison/the-terrorist-threat-in-africa>. Accessed on 23 February, 2016.

⁸⁰ Hegghammer, Thomas, 2006. Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, pp. 39-60 (Winter).

⁸¹ Segeman Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)

⁸² United Nations, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006, Accessed at, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?>

‘push factors’ or enabling circumstances include political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses; economic circumstances; sociological circumstances, such as religious and ethnic discrimination; counter-terrorism operations and their impact; and perceived injustice and international circumstances.

Although a basic understanding of these conditions provides an insight into radicalization, without pressure from domestic and personal circumstances individuals might support the ideas of extremists (nonviolent extremism) without becoming actively involved in acts of terrorism (violent extremism). Secondly, not all people faced with the same set of circumstances will become radicalized, while not all of those who are radicalized will join a terrorist organization or commit acts of violence and terrorism. Despite these circumstances, it is still the individual who decides to join a terrorist organization or is drawn to the ideals and activities of extremist organizations. Ultimately one realizes that human behaviour is extremely complex and that the key to radicalization is the individual’s response to the aforementioned.⁸³

The prevalence of a large and dynamic youth population is shaping East Africa’s security landscape. The region’s population is already one of the youngest in the world and is projected to grow younger over the coming decades. Seventy percent of Kenya’s population is under the age of thirty, and Africa’s overall population is expected to double by 2030. Initial reactions to East Africa’s “youth bulge” are frequently negative. Thus Kenyans wonder how they will feed, house, educate, and prepare for future generations of young people. Research on conflict and political violence indicates that young populations are more prone to conflict than older ones, and that youth are more likely to join radical organizations than adults.⁸⁴

⁸³ Annie Botha and Mahdi Abdile, *Radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia* (Institute for Security Studies, 2006)

⁸⁴ Zaddock Angira, Police Name 15 Key Shabaab Fugitives, Daily Nation, 31 December 2011, accessed at <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/1297974/-/10c6s8kz/-/index.html>

The potential for Kenya's and the entire East Africa's youth to serve as drivers of economic growth are apparent when comparing its demographic trends to other world regions. In other regions such as South Korea, the country's youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern and globally connected economy.⁸⁵ However, in Kenya for instance, the government has not conducted sufficient government planning, attracted adequate amounts of private sector investment, or fostered the social awareness necessary to convert these demographic trends into national advantages, or even to properly accommodate their current and future young citizens.

East Kenya's up-and-coming youth generation, or "cheetah generation," as it is increasingly identified, is marked by a number of unique characteristics. It is increasingly connected to each other and the global marketplace of ideas via information and communication technology. Even very poor youth in Kenya are willing to sacrifice large portions of their income to purchase cell phones. In addition, improvements in Internet penetration have increased the number of Kenyan youth accessing information online, albeit at relatively low levels when compared to other parts of the world.⁸⁶ The modern Kenyan youth is using social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, SnapChat and others to share ideas about a range of topics with each other and their peers in the diaspora. Although social media use is on the rise, texting and FM radio broadcasts remain the predominant modes of youth communication in Kenya.

Youth in Kenya are migrating to cities in search of educational opportunities, employment, and the modern amenities that accompany urban life. Although East Africa's

⁸⁵ Sabahi, Muslim Youth Centre vows violent response to killing of its leader Rogo, 27 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01 (accessed 26 March 2013).

⁸⁶ Ibid

rapidly growing cities provide opportunities, they are also places where youth experience hardships connected to job shortages, high costs of living, and a lack of traditional family and social structures. The difficulties of urban life are a source of youth frustration and may render certain young people vulnerable to radical influences. Counter-radicalization programs make special efforts to reach young people struggling to survive in large cities.⁸⁷ Some Kenyan youth choose to live in rural areas, adhere to more traditional lifestyles, and are far removed from the activities of the state. The region's youth bulge is both an urban and rural phenomenon.

2.8 Conclusion

The Kenyan youth also vary according to different identities, economic backgrounds, social settings, religious preferences, among others. These experiences are an important factor when addressing youth radicalization, both as potential drivers of and antidotes to violent extremism. Thus the governments should apply multi dimensional approaches and leaders and mentors in their counter-radicalization planning and program implementation.⁸⁸ Certain youths in Kenya have experienced war, civil war, ethnic conflict, or post-election violence, while others have enjoyed relative peace. In addition, the Kenyan youth have divergent experiences with their country's public institutions. The diverse interactions that Kenya maintains with its youth populations shape how young people view political involvement and their trust in or disillusionment with political leaders. Thus confidence in political institutions discourages youth radicalization, while skepticism leads to feelings of frustration and increased vulnerability.

⁸⁷ Anzalone, Christopher. "Kenya's Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab's East African Recruitment." CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 2012).

⁸⁸ Combating Terrorism Center, "Al-Qaida's (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa," 2 July 2007, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidasmisadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa>.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

A variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors are required to successfully counter the message of extremists. The first step is addressing the factors or circumstances enabling radicalization. One of the greatest mistakes governments and security agencies often make is to copy other countries or regions in this regard. This does not imply that countries cannot borrow from other successes, but they should primarily understand that the circumstances of each country are unique. Understandably, Kenyan circumstances in one will impact on the other, but the local dynamics in each country are different. This chapter addresses the state actors and machinery and non state actors in counter radicalization measures in an overall attempt to counter terrorism.

3.2. Intelligence

The Republic of Kenya's unique social, cultural, religious, political, psychological, and economic aspects factor emergence of diverse genera of terrorists. The convergence of these positive and negative factors requires an equally diverse counter-radicalization strategy. A diverse strategy identifies threats posed by terrorists based on typologies or generic profiles of terrorists. As such, each aspect of the strategy focuses on a unique strategies used by terrorists to radicalize youths.⁸⁹ Recent events in Kenya signals existence of a diverse intelligence led counter-terrorism strategy. Closure of radicalization and indoctrination into terror cells and

⁸⁹ Asim Qureshi, "Feeding grievances: The killing of Makaburi", available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411

groups in East Africa by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is indicative of a successful multifaceted strategy. The Intelligence Service has also profiled dozens of terror recruitment agents operating on the cyber-space and several have been arrested. Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations targeting terror cells operated by the Somali Islamist group Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen were scaled up since Q4-2014 throughout 2015.⁹⁰

Increased army operations against the Somali Islamist, besides border operations by special army units, and confound proliferation of the border by the terror groups are paying off. This has led to the arrests of recruiters and killings of dozens of key Al Shabaab terrorists, and many facing cases in court, nearly a hundred are on the terror watch-list, while key terror cells in East Africa are being closely monitored by intelligence services.⁹¹ The role of the intelligence service is to identify and provide effective counter intelligence on threats on national security, as such the intelligence service is limited in its counter-intelligence operations. It depends on the police service to effectively neutralize the threats.

The National Intelligence Services however needs robust homeland security policy, public awareness, effective law enforcement, and most important, inter-agency coordination to achieve effective counter-terrorism. Kenya's strategy focuses on preempting the threat posed by radicalization and the threat of terrorism. The core objective of the strategy is to secure civilians and the property of the country from destruction by terrorists.⁹² The government is ensuring the identification and destruction of conditions that create and facilitate terrorism. Devolution is playing a key role in making conditions such as economic, political, and social negatives,

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Interview with Law Enforcement, September 2016

⁹² Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

become impossible to exploit for terrorists.⁹³ However, this diverse strategy does not exclude the use of force to enforce law and safe guard human life and protect property of the Kenyan's.

3.3 The Judicial System in Kenya

The Anti-Terror Police Unit officers contend that Kenya's weak judicial system forced them to Result to assassinations, as police have failed to produce strong enough evidence to prosecute terrorism suspects. Domestic legislation is not the sole determinant of whether states have the capacity to arrest and prosecute terrorists, nor is it necessarily reflective of a state's ability to deter terrorist activities.⁹⁴ Other factors, including the effective implementation of these laws, the state and strength of the judicial system, and whether or not states approach counterterrorism in a manner that addresses its root causes, are equally important.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, this surge of interest among African governments to enact and expand their counterterrorism laws suggests that this will be an area of increased activity in the years to come. The recently passed Kenyan Security Laws (Amendment) Act offers a cautionary example of how such laws may necessitate stronger political and structural counterbalances.

Whereas Kenya was one of the countries that had previously strongly resisted pressure to enact counterterrorism legislation in the post-9/11 period, in 2014 it was the Kenyan government, at least the executive branch and its allies within the legislature, that introduced and fought for the passage of the Security Laws. The main political opposition party and numerous civil groups strongly objected to the provisions of the bill, as well as the manner in which it was passed, which they alleged violated parliamentary rules and constitutional requirements. These

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Interview with Law Enforcement, September 2016

⁹⁵ Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.'

objections were partially upheld by the High Court in a ruling that found eight provisions of the Act unconstitutional. Even with some of the most controversial provisions struck out, the law expands the power of the president, the cabinet secretary, and the director general of the National Intelligence Service, which human rights activists and political commentators claim takes Kenya back to the Moi era.⁹⁶

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) is now allowed to authorize covert operations to carry out any of its functions, which can include entering any place, obtaining anything or any information, and search, take, return, and install anything. This was not the only provision containing broad definitions. The court allowed up to 14 years in prison for saying anything “that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism,” whether or not that person actually does so. Another section allows any NIS officer to “detain any person whom the officer... suspects of engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security,” thus allowing a wide berth for interpretation.⁹⁷ Other provisions left in the bill reduce legislative oversight over the NIS, allow the organization to demand any information from any government entity, allow suspects to be detained for up to 90 days, and allow individuals to be arrested more than once for the same crime without any new evidence and without a warrant.⁹⁸

In the Kenyan case, counterterrorism laws that focus on expanding government prosecutorial powers can be more problematic than helpful. Before this second wave of counterterrorism legislation gains momentum, a third wave of legislation focused on civil liberties and human rights protections from counterterrorism responses would achieve more

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

⁹⁸ Interview with Human Rights Lawyer , September 2016

progress towards peace and stability in the region, at least in countries that do not already have these liberties enshrined in their constitutions.⁹⁹ In Kenya's case, as in many others with expansive constitutional protections in this area, the independence and strength of the judiciary, combined with a determination by government leadership to balance citizen security with civil freedoms, is the real determinant of progress in this realm.

3.4 Efforts by Religious Leaders and Groups

A significant element of religious leaders can also contribute to addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism through their work within and among different communities of faith. Religious leaders at all levels representing different faiths have an essential role to play in promoting inter- or intra-religious dialogue, tolerance, and understanding among religions, all of which are identified in the Strategy as important.¹⁰⁰ For example, one respondent noted that, compared with other segments of civil society, the clergy is often in the unique position of both having access to those in high-level government positions and engaging with the masses on the ground.¹⁰¹

The role Kenyan religious groups and leaders cannot be underestimated in counterterrorism. This is because terrorism in Kenya has religious aspects to it and that terror groups have had a degree of intentions to divide the country into religious line and form a conflict of that sort. The latest major attack at Garissa University saw the religious leaders coming together to condemn the attack, while demystifying the conflict between Muslims and Christians. The Anglican Archbishop Julius Kalu of Mombasa, a coastal city in southeastern

⁹⁹ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015

¹⁰⁰ Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.'

¹⁰¹ Interview with CVE NGO worker, September., 2016

Kenya, said the terrorists wanted to divide the country along religious lines and called for resistance to this religious conflict. Indeed, the Muslim leaders condemned the attack and disowned terrorists, terming them as criminals using religion to commit crimes.¹⁰² In Garissa following the university attack, the Muslim community in Garissa County strongly condemned barbaric acts committed against innocent university students as stated by Abdullahi Salat, chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.¹⁰³

Additionally, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican's secretary of state, sent a telegram to Kenya's Conference of Catholic Bishops to express Pope Francis' condolences. The telegram stated that the Pope who is the head of Catholic Churches worldwide condemned the terror act of senseless brutality and prays for a change of heart among its perpetrators. He called upon all those in authority to redouble their efforts to work with all men and women in Kenya to bring an end to such violence and to hasten the dawn of a new era of brotherhood, justice and peace.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) has been on the fore front in counter terrorism measures within the Muslim community. SUPKEM has conducted a survey in the coastal region to first get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalization, and together with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission are also advocating an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organization. SUPKEM was established in 1973 to consolidate efforts to promote Muslim interests under one umbrella organization, and among its senior officials were Kenyan cabinet

¹⁰² Fredrick Nzwili, Kenya religious leaders urge unity after Garissa attack. Religion News Service6:12 p.m. EDT April 6, 2015. Available <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/03/religion-news-service-kenya-garissa-attack-religious-leaders/25254935/>

¹⁰³ Fredrick Nzwili, Kenya religious leaders urge unity after Garissa attack. Religion News Service6:12 p.m. EDT April 6, 2015. Available <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/03/religion-news-service-kenya-garissa-attack-religious-leaders/25254935/>

officials. In 1979, it was officially recognized as the only organization entitled to represent all Muslims within Kenya and to maintain links with Islamic organizations outside Kenya. The Council of Imams, SUPKEM and council of elders from both the Borana and Somali communities that largely profess the Islamic faith have also been noted to swear to combine forces with the Kenyan government to root out any false ideologies by Muslim radicals that has led to loss of many innocent lives

3.5 Civil Society Organizations- CSOs

A strong civil society is vital to democracy, security, and prosperity. The UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.”¹⁰⁴ A September 2008 General Assembly resolution on the occasion of the first formal review of strategy implementation efforts is expected to go slightly further and specifically encourage them to “engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy, including through interaction with member states and the UN System.”¹⁰⁵ The inclusion of the clause “as appropriate,” however, leaves it to states to determine the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus reflecting the range of views on CSOs among the UN membership. This diversity was reflected during the September 2008 negotiations, where a number of countries objected to the inclusion of the proposed language encouraging more CSO engagement.

¹⁰⁴ Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs (New York, 12 July 2007).

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=220124#wrapper>

Despite this ambiguity in the Strategy itself, as will be discussed in greater detail below, CSOs can play important roles in promoting implementation of a number of its discrete elements. The Strategy has been hailed as a ‘living document’ that will evolve over time. CSOs, with their long-term presence in the field and often deep understanding of the local context in which the Strategy needs to be implemented, can play an important role in ensuring that implementation keeps pace with the changing realities on the ground.¹⁰⁶ For any comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to be effective, civil society needs to be part of its development and implementation, as broad-based engagement between the state and CSOs can help serve as a medium for addressing concerns between the state and the public in the context of specific counterterrorism actions.¹⁰⁷

NGOs and other CSOs have been actively engaged in long-term efforts to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism well before the Strategy labeled those efforts as such. For example, CSOs have been working to support sustainable development, realize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), provide humanitarian relief, empower marginalized communities, promote dialogue, protect human rights, improve governance, expand political participation, empower women, and prevent and resolve violent conflict. They are working to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable groups and provide a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances. In many instances, CSOs have access to and have engaged with groups that states have little contact with or limited influence over. More broadly, CSOs can serve as a stabilizing force in communities when governments are temporary, changing every few years, or even completely absent.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

¹⁰⁷ Interview with NGO worker, September, 2016

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

As asserted by a respondent, the mistrust of mainstream Civil Society clouds its judgment towards the need to focus at common citizen-focused goals. Information as to how Civil Society could participate in the meeting was not readily available, and some NGOs discovered that they were required to apply for accreditation and “vetting” to the NGO Council if they wished to participate.¹⁰⁹ A Summit addressing such grave issues affecting the region, while it seems intent on not being a cosmetic talk shop of profound speeches also seems fearful of dissenting opinion and criticism. This could also mean it is a missed opportunity that will certainly not have the buy-in of a vital sector in society that could offer a vital bridge between the state and sometimes marginalized communities. “The exclusion of Civil Society from this regional conference on CVE is a disturbing indication that Kenya continues to employ an approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism that has proved to be divisive. This, as has been evidenced in the past, is not useful for the longer-term tackling of CVE,” says Njonjo Mue, Senior Advisor of Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice¹¹⁰.

3.6 Conclusion

From the chapter, it is important the governments acknowledge that their efforts to counter terrorism and CVE must be inclusive and that productive relationships must be built with all stakeholders and the communities. It is only by collective effort that this battle can be won. Kenya has, however, chosen a path of alienating communities where radicalization occurs as well as estranging organizations and individuals that are critical of counterproductive approaches employed in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with CVE NGO worker, September., 2016

¹¹⁰ Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES FACING COUNTER RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

A variety of countermeasures involving multiple actors are required to successfully counter the message of extremists. The first step is addressing the factors or circumstances enabling radicalization. One respondent is noted to have said that, “one of the greatest mistakes governments and security agencies often make is to copy other countries or regions in this regard.”¹¹¹ This does not imply that countries cannot borrow from other successes, but they should primarily understand that the circumstances of each country are unique. Understandably, Kenyan circumstances in one will impact on the other, but the local dynamics in each country are different. This chapter addresses the state actors and machinery and non state actors in counter radicalization measures in an overall attempt to counter terrorism.

4.2 Challenges Facing Kenyan Law Enforcement

The law enforcement in Kenya has accumulated a tattered reputation because of their use of excessive force, allegations of corruption and extrajudicial killings. By sending its troops to Somalia, Kenya lost its distinctive regional profile as the only country whose military never went to war with any of its neighbours. This had two consequences. The first was that al-Shabab explicitly targeted Kenya for retribution. Since Kenya intervened in Somalia, there have been a total of 30 attacks involving grenades or improvised explosive devices.¹¹² This succession of relatively minor incidents precluded the attack on the upscale Westgate shopping mall on

¹¹¹ Interview with a Think Tank Security researcher , September, 2016

¹¹² Nelson Odhiambo, “Experts Split on Calls to Withdraw Kenyan Troops from Somalia After Terror Attack,” *Daily Nation*, April 12, 2015.

September 21, 2013. The second consequence was to reinforce Kenya's explicitly prominent role in the War on Terror in the region. Domestically, the face of the aggressive counter-terrorism posture was the enhanced role of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and the passage of an anti-terrorism bill in 2002.

Policing terrorism as a transnational crime is posing significant multifaceted challenges. A respondent noted that, on a general scale, there are significant challenges in terms of personnel capacity gaps and operational infrastructure needed to police these crimes.¹¹³ The legal framework of these growing attacks has a couple of challenges mostly with regard to formulation and enforcement of regulatory laws. For instance, on 30th April 2003, the government introduced the suppression of terrorism bill (through Supplement No. 38 of Kenya Gazette).¹¹⁴ The anti-terrorism bill was abandoned midway as anti-lobbyists of the bill perceived that if enacted, it could be perceived as calculated to stereotype and victimize the Muslim population. Critics of the bill argued that it was a reproduction of the US PATRIOTS Act.¹¹⁵ Opponents of the bill, such as sections of the civil society organized rallies countrywide to educate Kenyans on the evils of the bill. Indeed, the US and Britain had issued travel advisories to their nationals against visiting Kenya until the anti-terror legislation was enacted. One of the claims made against the bill was that it allowed problematic police searches and extra-judicial actions against suspected terrorists who would have no recourse within the law.¹¹⁶

The secrecy concerning the training and equipping of the special units of the police for counter-terrorism operations have in the past heightened the chances of repression and

¹¹³ Interview with Law enforcement Officer, September, 2016

¹¹⁴ Counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

¹¹⁵ Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

¹¹⁶ Interview with Researcher in Counter Terrorism and Counter Violent Extremism in Kenya, September, 2016

unaccountability by a police largely perceived to be incompetent, corrupt, repressive and alienating the public that it serves.¹¹⁷ As one interviewed police officer put it, the fight against terrorism is viewed as being discriminatory to the Muslim community in Kenya:¹¹⁸ Curbing terrorism is, however, challenging because the Muslim population claim the efforts put in place are discriminatory to them. Terrorism continues to pose significant challenges to the police. The interviewed Kenyan police officers have “securitized” terrorism as a major threat issue that needs to be addressed urgently. The police officers perceive terrorism threats as emanating from the lawless state of Somalia that has lacked a central governing authority since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. There are striking narratives of interviewed law enforcement officers to the effect that terrorist threats abound from the famous Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab said to have clandestine recruitments and training centers in Kenya.¹¹⁹

Terrorism is a transnational crime that goes beyond the purview of the state police. It has increasingly become a global problem that requires concerted action by the comity of nations. Kenya has been a target of terror attacks in the past. On August 7th 1998, the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked in which over 200 lives were lost. Apparently, the anti-terrorism debate in Kenya is dominated by the regional policy agenda of the US government in which the Kenyan government is considered an important ally given the country’s geographical and historical proximity to the Middle East and the Arab world believed in Western security agendas to be the principal source of contemporary international terrorism. Hence, with regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the US foreign policy goals on

¹¹⁷ Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, “Transnational Crime,” in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Collins, A. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 346-367.

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Interviews with Law Enforcement Officers, October, 2016

security.¹²⁰ From a purely Kenyan state-centric position, this relationship is arguably beneficial because international cooperation and support may assist the Kenyan state to overcome capacity deficits in terms of policing terrorism. Police officers interviewed, cognizant of the fact that they cannot effectively prosecute the anti-terrorism campaign alone, advocated the need for partnership with international bodies, such as Interpol.

A cross section of police officers of various ranks in Nairobi allege that terrorist organizations operating from Somali have established a range of secret training bases in Kenya and that this is a challenge to their provision of internal security. The following excerpt from one of our fieldwork respondents is illustrative:¹²¹ Regarding law enforcement, some of the interviewed police officers cited the lack of a comprehensive legislation as an impediment to curbing the growing threat of new crime waves such as those that operate through modern technologies like cyber crimes, identity impersonation and theft, copyright infringements, and so forth. They noted that the Kenya Communications Amendment Act of 2008 in which cyber crimes are defined is not sufficiently comprehensive as there are a number of new crimes that are not covered by the Act. For instance, respondents observed that over the past two years there has been an increase in fraud involving mobile phone money transfer services that is not adequately addressed in the 2008 legislation. Interviewed police officers stress the need to constantly review legislations to make them more responsive to changing crime trends, especially cyber crimes.¹²²

More so, prison conditions in Kenya are harsh and sometimes life-threatening, though the government attempted to improve conditions between 2005 and 2006, according to a U.S. State Department report. Most prisons were severely overcrowded. In 2006, 93 prisons were home to

¹²¹ Interview with a Police Officer, September, 2016

¹²² Ibid

at least 50,000 inmates, more than three times their intended capacity. Meru Prison had three times more inmates than its intended capacity.¹²³ There is strong evidence that Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has carried out a series of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The ATPU was created within the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in 2003 in response to the attacks on the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on an Israeli-owned Mombasa hotel in 2002. Terrorist attacks have increased in Kenya in recent years, particularly after Kenya sent its military into neighboring Somalia in October 2011. Human Rights Watch also found evidence of arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of terrorism suspects in detention.¹²⁴

4.3 Existing Divisions among Kenyan Societies

Kenya is critical to the stability and regional development of the entire Horn of Africa. Following the post-election violence in 2007, it became apparent that Kenyans are extremely divided. While diversity can be celebrated if mutual respect exists, it can also destroy a country from within if that respect is not present. How does this relate to the radicalization and vulnerability of Kenya's youth? Young people are at the centre, for they are not only Kenya's future leaders, but also Kenya's future parents. They are unfortunately also the easiest to manipulate and operationalize into a collective.

The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim. The reality is that Islamist extremism on the continent often manifests around issues that are a concern to the Muslim community as a whole. These issues are then 'hijacked' by Islamist militants with the ultimate goal of converting moderate Muslims to their interpretation of the world. In order to achieve this, the Islamist militant will endeavour to

¹²³ Crisis Group observations; "Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border", Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

¹²⁴ Kazungu Chai. UN to help Kenya Fight Terrorism, Says Ban Ki-Moon. *Daily Nation* Saturday, June 28, 2014

exploit existing sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, accompanied with feelings of frustration and alienation from the government. In attempting to secure the success of this strategy, extremists capitalize on the government's inability to provide basic services and offer an alternative. Creating or infiltrating bona fide charity organizations in areas with poor socioeconomic conditions and uplifting the community is a sure way to win the general support of ordinary people and 'buy' loyalty.

The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslim and non-Muslim. The new Kenyan Constitution recognizes freedom of religion. Although everything should be done to protect not only this right but all basic human rights, these rights also bring with them responsibilities, the most important of which is the responsibility to respect the rights of others.¹²⁵ Irrespective of your family heritage, being a citizen means that you are equal not only before the law, but also as a human being in relation to others. This calls for introspection on the part of the police officer stopping and searching a person because he looks Somali or the Muslim throwing a hand grenade into a church because he sees Christians as the 'enemy'. Both of these examples touch on collective punishment based on perceptions.¹²⁶

Even more challenging is the fact that most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans are responsible for attacks in Kenya or that Kenya is an innocent bystander when acts of terrorism are committed on its soil.¹²⁷ Addressing and breaking down these perceptions extends well beyond the responsibility of the police or the Kenyan government, but the government can set an example and provide some of the tools to prevent

¹²⁵ Interview with Member of Religious Organization, October, 2016.

¹²⁶ Peter Taylor, "On the trail of al-Shabab's Kenyan recruitment 'pipeline'," (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

¹²⁷ Ibid

radicalization and enable de-radicalization. Importantly, there is no quick fix for the level of radicalization seen in Kenya.

4.4 The Challenges of Home Grown Terrorism in Kenya

Despite Al-Shabaab being weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize its asymmetric advantage.¹²⁸ One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanized infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons¹²⁹. This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of southwestern Somalia, and they were annihilated by ground and air fire power.¹³⁰ That almost finished Al-Shabaab, but to survive it adapted, becoming an efficient guerrilla force. This has been noted from the interviews with respondents at the community level who assert on the need for research to focus on homegrown terrorism in Kenya. The respondents stated that there are different violent groups that are not associated with Al shabaab, especially at the Coast region who fall in the danger of being associated with ISIS in the future.¹³¹

In expounding on the ‘reinvention of Al-shabaab’, Bryden states that Kenya remains susceptible to Al-Shabaab, given the existence of domestic jihadist affiliates such as the Al-Hijra (Formerly, The Muslim Youth Centre-MYC. Others include Kenyan fighters in Al Shabaab’s

¹²⁸ Rudner, M. (2013). “Al-Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, vol.12 (2013): 953-980.

¹²⁹ “Somalia”, *The New York Times*, Topics, 25 January 2012

¹³⁰ I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford, 2002), 183-201.

¹³¹ Interviews with CVE Researchers , September, 2016

ranks.¹³² MYC was founded in an Eastleigh in 2008 and led by Ahmad Iman Ali, also known as Abdul Fatah of Kismayo, who has been operating from Somalia since 2009. This Kenyan jihadist professes his total submission and obedience to al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane. The MYC took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction and radicalization in certain sectors of the community to build a significant presence in Nairobi and in the coastal city of Mombasa. This means that the group actually pre-dates al-Shabaab as a formal organization. After initial denials, the group confirmed its association with al-Shabaab. Security officials and analysts state that the MYC ‘is out to create sectarian violence in Kenya’.¹³³ The MYC, which is also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth, in a post on its website on 14 January 2012 the group vowed to carry out “attacks against Kenya's ‘kuffars’ (infidels) for our al-Shabaab brothers until the country withdraws its troops from Somalia”.¹³⁴

In 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia cited MYC for recruiting, fundraising, training and supporting a jihadist movement on behalf of al-Shabaab in Kenya. Since its inception, the MYC has developed a strong network of members and sympathizers in Kenya.¹³⁵ In 2011 the UN already warned that the group intends to conduct large-scale attacks in Kenya, and possibly elsewhere in East Africa. Since the 2011 UN report, the MYC has been very active trying to garner support for al-Shabaab using a two-pronged strategy of publishing threatening messages to spread fear among the public, and igniting religious strife in Kenya.¹³⁶ According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, most of the

¹³² Matt Bryden, *The Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program*, CSIS, February 2014. Available at:

http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Watts, Clint, “Was Kenya Westgate Attack More AQAP/AQ Central than Shabaab?” *Selected Wisdom*, October 7, 2013

¹³⁵ Bryden, M, et al, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853* (2008), Also see, UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

¹³⁶ Ibid

operatives who conspired in the attack were Kenyan and close to MYC (al-Hijra) leaders. MYC attacks have been restricted to low-level grenade and rifle attacks against Kenyan security forces, as well as softer targets like transports hubs, bars, and nightclubs frequented by locals in Nairobi and coastal tourist hub of Mombasa.¹³⁷ Examples can be seen in March 2012 when suspected MYC followers staged grenade attacks against a church and restaurant; this was followed by the multiple grenade attack in June targeting Euro 2012 spectators at the Jericho bar, in Nairobi.¹³⁸

According to Bryden, till recently al-Hijra was “a group that appeared to be fumbling and amateurish, operationally.” However, he observes that a core of committed fighters has emerged and they have been learning.¹³⁹ The Kenyan authorities have also claimed that they have been monitoring al-Hijra’s activities in Kenya, including online postings, and working with security officials in Tanzania to neutralize any possible terrorist threat. They stated that they were aware of most of the information contained in the UN report long before it was published and released, but the report has provided some additional insights about the individual and the groups the authorities were analyzing. Kenyan investigations have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of several people, and a crackdown against al-Hijra, assisted by the United States, has weakened the group. According to a United Nations report released on 17 July 2013, long before the Westgate siege, “Al-Hijra members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous 'catch and release' arrest raids and operational disruptions.”¹⁴⁰ However much more need to be done as recruitments still continues.

¹³⁷ Bryden, M, et al, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), UNSC Document S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, 51

¹³⁸ Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab's Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline’,” (2 Oct 2013) <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-02-on-the-trail-of-al-shababs-kenyan-recruitmentpipeline>

¹³⁹ Matt Bryden, the Reinvention of Al Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? A Report of the CSIS Africa Program, CSIS, February 2014. Available at:

http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

4.5 Prevalent Socio-Economic Challenges

Kenyans continue to decry the escalating insecurity that affects their socio-economic fabric. They fault the government for not having forensic laboratories that can record data with profiles of suspected terrorists, their sponsors and sympathizers. Retired Captain Simiyu Werunga, who is a security expert and the director of African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, maintains that “it would be difficult for Kenya to win the war against terrorism in the absence of a proper mechanism to profile suspects, which creates a reserve of information that security organs can easily refer to.”¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, the Anglo-Leasing scandal which rocked Kibaki’s government during his first term is blamed for having hindered the creation of such labs. The National Intelligence Service is also in question for not justifying its huge annual allocations of over Ksh10 billion, in relation to curbing insecurity. During the 2013/14 fiscal year, a total of Ksh1.2 billion has been set aside to erect a National Forensic Laboratory to facilitate criminal investigations in order to get justice for victims of crime.¹⁴² Time will tell whether the plan to build a National Forensic Laboratory will be actualized.

Interviews conducted in this study stated the Kenyan government needs to have a new approach in counter- terrorism by advancing its weaponry, applying new technologies, gathering intelligence by infiltrating terrorist cells and by being ahead every time, including allowing the vulnerable communities to participate in countering violent extremism.¹⁴³ Kenya is a key ally of the West in their fight against terrorism and should seek more assistance in terms of cash and equipment. In October 2012, former president Kibaki assented to the Prevention of Terrorism

¹⁴¹ Ibid

¹⁴² Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. *Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin*. Vol.3 Issue 20

¹⁴³ Interviews with the law enforcement, NGO workers and researchers in Nairobi, October, 2016

Act, 2012 which is expected to lawfully disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers used by terrorists, to conduct their crimes.¹⁴⁴

According to Werunga, some factors affecting the security sector in Kenya include: lack of modernization of the security system and serious lapses of coordination between intelligence, the police and the Executive. Generally, there is no centralized coordination in the security sector. Within the top security apparatus, there is the element of shifting blame and giving excuses such as “I was not aware; I was not informed; we were not given the intelligence; this caught us unawares”¹⁴⁵ The state security organs are reactionary and not proactive and to a good extent, do not apply early warning systems. Poor governance and the use of security forces by politicians to divide the electorate are also part of the problems ailing the sector.¹⁴⁶

Kenya’s Presidents have been reluctant to give up their control over policing; it has always been the surest way for them to gather intelligence on threats to their authority and has forever been a tool for interdicting this threat. The fight against crime cannot be fought alone and fortunately, many countries [including the United States] are placing substantial resources within the borders of Kenya. Stability within Kenya has the potential to create an example for surrounding African nations. While the figures of crime facing Kenya are still some of the worst in East Africa, there is still considerable potential for a stable economy, government, and successful police force. First, the ratio of police to citizens needs to improve drastically. It is extremely unlikely for such a low number of police to actually make a significant difference in Kenya’s security. In addition to hiring more police officers, the law enforcement admit to the need salary and living conditions need to improve. Low pay and a lack of public respect breed a

¹⁴⁴Westagate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. Available at <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/>

¹⁴⁵Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. *Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin*. Vol.3 Issue 20

substantial amount of corruption, which puts a severe impediment on the economy. Until the relationship between the police and Kenyan people improves, it is unlikely for crime levels to make any major statistical decline.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the court system in Kenya needs a reorganization and overhaul because the utilization of police prosecutors has proven itself to be ineffective and outdated.”¹⁴⁸

In 2015, during his state visit to Kenya; the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his statement on the current state of Kenya, said the UN is determined to work with the Kenya government in combating terrorism. He said the UN will support Kenya’s efforts to fight the global threat by boosting the capacity of the country’s security agencies. This was after he had a meeting with the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, which he stated as very fruitful discussion on major political and security issues concerning counter-terrorism, Somalia, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region.

4.6 Counter Productive Terrorism Measures by the Kenyan Government

4.6.1 Further Marginalization

The fight against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular and Muslims in general.¹⁴⁹ Police harassment and discrimination in the name of “Global War on Terror” continue deep-rooted trends dating back to the Shifta War.¹⁵⁰ Though the government has repeatedly urged Kenyans not to stereotype or discriminate against Somalis, politicians’ statements and media rhetoric risk further demonizing them. Deputy

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Law Enforcement Officers, September., 2016

¹⁴⁸ Crime and Development in Kenya, 2010, Vol. 2 No. 09. pp.1-2

¹⁴⁹ Crisis Group observations; “Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border”, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

¹⁵⁰ Guled Mohammed, “Hounding Somalis Hurts Terror fight”, *The Star*, 2 November 2011.

Defence (former and late) Minister Joshua Orwa Ojode, for example, likened Al-Shabaab to a snake with its tail in Somalia and head in Eastleigh.¹⁵¹

Somali Kenyans feel marginalized by the state. Amnesty International has reported that government counter-terrorist operations, such as Operation Usalama Watch (Security Watch), have unfairly targeted Somali Kenyans, serving as a pretext for blanket punishment and mass human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest, extortion, ill-treatment, forced relocations, and unlawful expulsion.¹⁵² Afrobarometer survey findings going back to 2005 indicate that a considerable proportion of Somali Kenyans have consistently felt marginalized by the government. In 2005, almost seven in 10 Somali Kenyans (68%) said that their community was “often” or “always” treated unfairly by the government. This proportion steadily dropped to 45% by 2011 before rising again to 51% in 2014.¹⁵³

Somali Kenyans are mostly concentrated in Kenya’s North eastern counties, and there have been fluctuating levels of tension between the community and wider Kenyan society since the 1960s. This social fault line poses challenges to national cohesion and has the potential to incite civil unrest if left unaddressed.¹⁵⁴ While radical and intolerant views may generally be held only by a minority of a given community, extremist organizations recruit from these peripheries, and it is the size and distribution of this minority that is most important to security risk analysis frameworks. Among the 131 Somali Kenyan respondents in Afro-barometer’s 2014 survey, 75% are aged 18-35 years, compared to 57% of Kenyans of other ethnicities, and 99% are Muslim,

¹⁵¹ Tom Odula, “War fears: Somalis in Kenya afraid of xenophobia”, *Associated Press*, 11 November 2011.

¹⁵² Transparency International.. Corruption by country: Kenya. (2014) Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

¹⁵³ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

¹⁵⁴ National Cohesion and Integration Commission. Preach hate: Face charges: The National Cohesion and Integration Commission’s concerns of rising religious, ethnic, and political intolerance. Press statement (Nairobi, 5 November 2011). Available at: <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/press-statements/press-statement-on-rising-religious-ethnicand-political-intolerance.html>

compared to 4% of Kenyans of other ethnicities. A majority of Somali Kenyans express tolerance regarding people of other religions, ethnicities, and nationalities¹⁵⁵

The National Cohesion in its reports noted that the coastal residents have also been marginalized in allocation of resources.¹⁵⁶ With youth unemployment comprising 70 percent of the country's total unemployment rate, the lack of opportunity among Kenya's rapidly growing youth population has been associated with a growing sense of socioeconomic and political marginalization. There have also been concerns related to marginalized and frustrated youth in the Coast region, whom they categorized as 'easily influenced' and 'idle' with a greater propensity to engage in behaviours that create insecurity within the community. Some Mombasa elders and traditional leaders mentioned unemployment and a lack of education as the primary reasons for youth frustration.¹⁵⁷

In Kenya's attempts to address the threat of violent extremism, the Somali Kenyan community is often stigmatized, and serious human rights violations during counter-terrorist operations by the police and other security forces have been reported.¹⁵⁸ According to the - Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), which advocate for constitutional means to counter terrorism while also observing human rights, in the, MUHURI report on ATPU abuses from 2007 to the 2015. The abuses include but not limited to, the use of excessive force during house raids; torture and ill-treatment of detainees; arbitrary detentions, including disappearances; a government must render terrorist suspects to countries where they faced a real risk of torture.

¹⁵⁵ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015

¹⁵⁶ NCIC, Report Of The Youth Integration Forum , December, Kwale County. Reconciliation And Integration Department, *National Cohesion and Integration Commission* . January, 2015.

¹⁵⁷ Shetret, L. and M. Schwartz, And Danielle Cotter, Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism Center on Global Counterterrorism Co-operation: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland, January 2013

¹⁵⁸ Amnesty International. (2014). Kenya: Somalis scapegoated in counter-terror crackdown. 27 May 2014. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenya-somalisscapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>.

The report cites a case scenario of the November 13–14, 2012 operation in Mombasa, during which ATPU human rights abuses included capturing several suspects and beating them prior to bringing them to various police stations, without evidence, upon which all cases were later dropped.¹⁵⁹

Recent Afro-barometer survey data show that Kenyans disapprove of their government's handling of terrorism and that the Somali Kenyan community is even more critical than citizens from other ethnic communities. Somali Kenyans feel marginalized by the state and express problematic levels of social intolerance, factors that indicate the presence of political and social conditions associated with higher levels of violent extremism. Like most Kenyans, a majority of Somali Kenyans see the police as corrupt and untrustworthy.¹⁶⁰ These results suggest that the Kenyan government should curb police abuses and explore more developmental approaches to counter-terrorism to ensure that measures aimed at engaging Al-Shabaab do not generate further grievances among an already isolated and vulnerable community. This is a view echoed by respondents asserting that most of the Kenyan government counter terrorism measures are not effective an often counter-productive.¹⁶¹

In the last six years, organizations such as Amnesty International have continued to report and warn reports of police abuse. Most of these violations have occurred in the context of Kenya's counter-terrorism operations, led by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). In July 2010, following a bomb explosion in Kampala, Uganda, the ATPU arbitrarily detained at least

¹⁵⁹ MUHURI, "We're Tired of Taking You to the Court" Human Rights Abuses by Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit Accessed on 8/18/2015 at <http://www.muhuri.org/index.php/media-center/publications#>

¹⁶⁰ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's Anti-Terrorist Crackdown Exacerbating Drivers of Violent Extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

¹⁶¹ Interview with CVE NGO Worker, Law Enforcement Officers and Human Rights Lawyers and September and October., 2016

six people who were later the subject of rendition to Uganda.¹⁶² The renditions were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court.¹⁶³

Members of the Somali community in Kenya, particularly refugees, have been disproportionately impacted by counter-terrorism operations in Kenya.¹⁶⁴ Since early April 2014, thousands of Somalis have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, harassment, extortion and ill-treatment in the context of the counter-terror operation known as “Usalama Watch”. Over five thousand individuals have been relocated to refugee camps in the north of Kenya and hundreds of others have been deported back to Somalia. Prior to the April 2014 crackdown on Somali refugees, a tripartite agreement was signed in November 2013 between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR, establishing a framework for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees over a three year timeframe. Research conducted by Amnesty International indicates that most Somali refugees were deciding to return as a result of negative ‘push’ factors in Kenya rather than positive ‘pull’ factors in Somalia. Such returns do not qualify as voluntary and may violate the principle of non-refoulement.¹⁶⁵

From the MUHURI report, the Coast region has been marginalization: its predominantly Muslim population is still largely landless and has other long-standing grievances against the central government. The residents therefore hope for the central government to provide greater economic and political opportunities for them. However, even with the arrival of the new constitution and new elections in 2013 many in the coastal region are still not satisfied with the changes. The dissatisfaction was in some cases, articulated through support for the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), with its slogans of “Pwani si Kenya” (the Coast is not part of

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Amnesty International, “Somalis are Scapegoats in Kenya’s Counter-Terror Crackdown”, 27 May 2014

¹⁶⁵ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya’s anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

Kenya), and “Tumechoka na Ahadi” (we are tired of promises).¹⁶⁶ The MRC has made secession demands throughout its history and at times called for a boycott in the run-up to Kenya’s 2013 elections. It has also been labeled by some as a political party that resorts to violence.

4.7 Lack of Public Confidence in Government

According to Transparency International, Kenya is plagued by high levels of corruption, ranking 145th of 175 on the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, which cites the police as the state’s most corrupt institution.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, allegations of arbitrary and unlawful killings of suspected criminals are common; human rights groups estimate the police to be responsible for at least 1,000 extrajudicial killings between 2008 and 2012.¹⁶⁸ In 2013, the Kenyan government established the Independent Policing Oversight Authority to “conduct impartial and independent investigations, inspections, audits and monitoring of the National Police Service to prevent impunity and enhance professionalism in the interest of the public.”¹⁶⁹ Similarly, Amnesty International describes the extortion of bribes as a common part of abuses of Somali Kenyans by the police and other security forces.¹⁷⁰

On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered the border regions of southern Somalia as part of a military offensive adjacent to Al-Shabaab named Operation Linda Nchi. The primary goal of the operation was to form a 100km buffer zone along the border and eliminate Al-

¹⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, Kenya’s 2013 Elections, Report N°197, 17 January 2013, p. 43, at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf), accessed September 3, 2013.

¹⁶⁷ Transparency International. (2014). Corruption by country: Kenya. Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN>.

¹⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.. Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. (2013) Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220124#wrapper>

¹⁶⁹ Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) “Introducing IPOA” Accessed on 9/18/2016 <http://www.ipoa.go.ke/>

¹⁷⁰ Amnesty International. (2014) Op Cit

Shabaab militants, who had been mounting increasing numbers of terrorist attacks on some of Kenya's northern and coastal towns. A month after deployment, most Kenyans (82%) held a favourable opinion of their government's handling of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. By 2014, after a substantial increase in major AlShabaab attacks in Kenya, public approval of government counter-terrorism efforts declined sharply, to 44%, with 51% of Kenyans indicating that their government is doing "very badly" or "fairly badly" in the fight against violent extremism.¹⁷¹ Whilst two-thirds of Kenyans say that KDF involvement in Somalia has been necessary despite Al-Shabaab reprisals, 48% of citizens support KDF withdrawal.¹⁷² Disapproval of how the state is handling the fight against terrorism, in addition to the increased frequency and scale of attacks, has put pressure on the Kenyan government to step up its security efforts. It is important to be cognizant that aggressive security-led approaches could exacerbate underlying social tensions and community grievances that improve conditions for radicalization and recruitment by extremist organizations.¹⁷³

Public confidence in the government's ability to provide security impacts the success or failure of counterterrorism efforts. Closely linked to this is the public's resilience to narratives that might deepen religious and ethnic fissures and play into the hands of terrorists. Shattering this resilience is exactly the objective of such terrorist acts so as to create an atmosphere of fear and paralysis that would generate public pressure on the government to make policy hitches.

Addressing these concerns is paramount as the Garissa university attack is not an isolated event but part of an ongoing escalation of terrorist incidents targeting Kenyan citizens. In fact, Kenya seems to be more important to al-Shabaab's long term strategy than ever before. Since the 2013

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's Anti-Terrorist Crackdown Exacerbating Drivers Of Violent Extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 (2 July, 2015)

¹⁷³ Interview with CVE NGO worker, law enforcement officers and community (Eastleigh and Majengo, Nairobi) and religious leaders and September and October., 2016

Westgate attack, al-Shabaab has carried out more than 65 attacks in Kenya, killing over 500 people. This compares to 42 attacks between 2012 and 2013 resulting in 77 deaths,¹⁷⁴ meaning the attacks have intensified.

4.8 Conclusion

Despite different attempts and successes in counter radicalization, Kenya's overall strategy has been marked by serious institutional weaknesses that limit the effectiveness of set strategies. The country is still challenged within (such as home grown terrorism) and without (porous borders) among other concerns. Additionally, Kenyan police and the larger public security sector have often failed to conduct good policing with the community, which is required to gather quality evidence and have effective de-radicalization. Without addressing these factors, Kenya's counter-radicalization strategies cannot work effectively. Building community cohesion in the face of a sustained effort by al-Shabaab to foment ethnic and religious divisions in Kenya is vital for marginalizing extremist actors and avoiding sectarian strife. Key to this will be building trust in the effectiveness, professionalism, and transparency of Kenya's security sector among Kenyan societies. Counter radical efforts for it to be successful, must be intelligence lead and thus calls for the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.

¹⁷⁴ Global Terrorism Index 2014. Available at: <http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indicesdata/global-terrorism-index>

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Chapter one introduced the research study while laying out the structure and design of the study on youth radicalization as a tool for radicalization into terrorism. From the chapter, the study observed that there first challenge to tackling radicalization successfully lies in the elusiveness of the concept. The possible motivations, ideas and other factors that might drive an individual towards radicalization are various and complex, and no single factor is necessary or sufficient to account for terrorist radicalization. It can be noted from the chapter that radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Therefore terrorist radicalization is a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. This may eventually, but not necessarily, lead this person to advocate, act in support of, or engage in terrorism

In chapter two, the concept of involvement of youth in terrorism was discussed. The weakness and pliability of youth make them particularly at risk of utilization by equally criminals and terrorists. The study noted recruitment as being one of the most crucial processes of a terror network. This was also echoed by most respondents during the interviews acknowledging that, members are required to fund, plan give logistical prop up as well implement terrorist activities. Behind every terrorist act are many people who help project the extreme ideologies, recruit and effectively indoctrinate the recruited to be able to carry out the acts of terror. Therefore, facilitation of this act often requires the commission of many criminal activities including transport of weapons or explosives, illegal financing and money laundering,

and illegal movement of people. Mostly, youths are quite secular sooner than they join the radicalization course and, in overall, radicalization is on within loose social networks of associates moreover peers. The study notes that rejection by society, socio-economic deprivation among other reasons that differ from individual to individual.

Chapter three looked at the strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in Kenya. Kenya has applied different measures in counter radicalization and counter terrorism. These range from military ‘intervention’ in Somalia, attempts to secure borders, tightening surveillance, counter-intelligence and police and security agents operations such as in Eastleigh and detention at Kasarani. Respondents noted that these efforts have had effects and at some point have weakened the Al Shabaab and made it less possible to recruit and attacks as counter intelligence have leaked different information and plots by the terror groups in Kenya. However, some o the strategies have also marginalized further the already marginalized communities in Kenya and with the corruption and human rights violations of the police during operations, the trust of Kenyans citizens on the government’s ability to protect them has mostly been ineffective. This has become counter-productive as many youths justify reasons such as marginalization and police harassment some of their frustrations and thereby join the terror networks.

Finally, chapter four examined the challenges that hinder counter-radicalization measures. These range from lack of public confidence in the government’s ability to protect them, given the level of corruption at its institutions. The study observed in chapter four that there is need to build trust between the police and the community and also build community cohesion in order for the community to participate in countering radicalization. More notably, the governments ‘hard’ responses in countering terrorism have led to police harassment and discrimination of certain communities. There are regions that are more prone to terrorism

activities than others. The Horn of Africa for instance, has been the most conflicted part of Africa. It is also inter-linked, in geographic, religious, ethnic, political, and economic terms, to the Middle East thus, people, arms, money, and material flow from the Middle East along the Red Sea coast, through Somalia and south to other East African countries, while commerce and religious interaction moves in both directions. This calls for regional cooperation in counterterrorism measures as terrorists are not only using the internet for communication, recruiting, training and planning – but also to transfer funds regionally, as well as crimes that support and fund terrorism activities such as extortion.

5.2 Conclusions

The overall Kenyan counter terrorism strategies have been hampered by different setbacks including but not limited to, domestic issues. Corruption in governance and leadership, especially in critical areas such as criminal justice, border security, and the provision of essential services, also increases Kenya's vulnerability to radicalism and terror. For instance, corruption along unguarded borders, and ineffective security and police organizations has facilitated many terrorist organizations with the freedom of movement, and ability to operate as long as they can bribe the officers in charge. More so is the issue of marginalization and development disparities in different regions. External pressure such as refugee influx along porous borders has given terror suspects the opportunity to camouflage amongst the refugee people and formulate it vulnerable. Through recruiting Somali refugees in Kenya, Al-Shabaab has intensified the probable hazard of refugees to Kenya's security as a nation-state and therefore yielding to the prospective relocation of the world's refugee camp - Daadab refugee camp.

From the study, it is clear of the importance of the regional bodies, both bilaterally and multilaterally to cooperate in counter-terrorism. Indeed individual State cannot address the threat of terrorism alone. The study also concludes that terror threats cannot be resolved through military power alone; but requires a comprehensive multifaceted approach including continual exchange of ideas and intelligence and engagement with the international community. Addressing the challenge of terrorism over the long term demands multilateral cooperation; capacity building; and considered efforts to counter violent extremism by all levels of society and government. Through training and military assistance, sharing of intelligence, regional and international policing, legal frameworks that can help arrest terror suspects across regional borders; the fight against terrorism is made more effective.

Homegrown radicalization in Kenya is on the rise given al-Shabab's growth in neighboring Somalia. Kenya has become a prime location for recruitment and radicalization for al-Shabab. Religious groups and workers from NGOs that deal with CVE programs have noted in the interviews that Kenyan converts are typically described as young and zealous and can be difficult to detect and monitor since they are able to blend easily into the general population.

The Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has allegedly been responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and mistreatment of individuals arrested on terrorism charges. Instead of responding to these concerns, Kenyan lawmakers passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014, which further empowers security forces and inhibits the freedom of the media and other sources of independent scrutiny. This new legislation also allows Kenyan police to hold terror suspects for nearly a year, and gives authorities the power to monitor and tap phones.

The study concludes that while the government is involved in taking different measures in countering terrorism, it is far from applying measures that counter the reasons why the youths in vulnerable communities become radicalized. Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the radicalization of Kenya's youth, a situation that must be addressed through economic empowerment and inclusive policies. As noted from the respondents, terrorist recruiters are exploiting sub-standard socioeconomic conditions, and the government's inability to provide basic services, by positioning themselves as providers of assistance.

The issue of home grown terrorism is one that cannot be ignored. As state in chapter four, there is growing influence of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Kenyan group whose objectives include promoting community health and social welfare, but which also advocates "an extreme interpretation of Islam and prepares members to travel to Somalia for 'jihad' (holy war), thus attracting the attention of security agencies in Kenya and abroad." According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Al-Shabab announced a merger with MYC in 2012.

5.3 Recommendations

1. Multi-faceted approach to Counter-radicalization

There is need to create a multi-faceted approach to counter terrorism measure particularly in counter-radicalization. In this case the Kenyan government needs to apply the development approach, and socio-psychological approaches to counter radicalization. Through dialogue with communities, the government should undertake genuine political reforms aimed at creating socio-economic and political institutions with which citizens can identify radicalizations and the issues emanating from it. In this regard, there is the need to address the plight of the youth,

especially as it relates to unemployment, since they form easy targets for recruitment, posing a dangerous challenge because of the youth population bulge that exists in Kenya and the larger Africa.

2. Counter-radicalization policy

There is urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, and some say Kenya's newly elected government may be an opportunity to tackle the issue. NGOs say the government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging. More important from this study is the very need for the government of Kenya to adapt to the concept of terrorism in Kenya as being home-grown in nature. This will enhance the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies that de-radicalize recruits and deal with the factors that make the most susceptible groups to be recruited, since no terror group can function without its 'foot soldiers'.

3. Legislation

There is need to reform the judicial and the law enforcement systems in the region to ensure the adoption of necessary counter-terrorism legislation and practices. This includes both international laws and domestic laws. There is need to harmonize regional legal and enforcement systems as well as improve information exchange and other joint strategies to combat cross-border security challenges like terrorism and terrorist networks. Creating and enhancing regional law enforcement cooperation bodies.

4. Cooperate with other States in Eastern Africa and beyond in Countering Radicalization

Kenya should borrow some of the best practices such as de-radicalization strategies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore which have had some success with the use of certain

methods. No single country can address the threat of terrorism alone. Nor can this threat be resolved through military interventions alone; rather it requires a comprehensive approach including continual exchange of intelligence and engagement with the international community. Addressing the challenge of radicalization over the long term demands multilateral cooperation; capacity building; and considered efforts in all levels of society and government.

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Interviews

Interview with Law Enforcement, September 2016

Interview with CVE NGO worker, September., 2016

Interview with Human Rights Lawyer , September 2016

Interview with CVE NGO worker, September, 2016

Interview with a Think Tank Security researcher, September, 2016

Interview with Member of Religious Organization, October, 2016

Interviews with CVE Researchers, September, 2016

Interview with CVE NGO worker, law enforcement officers and human rights lawyer and September and October, 2016

Interview with CVE NGO worker, law enforcement officers and community (Eastleigh and Majengo, Nairobi) and religious leaders and September and October., 2016

Appendix 1

Questionnaire

Kindly tick in the space provided (✓) the correct answers or supply the required information where, required, please specify and elaborate.

Section A: Respondents Information

1. Name..... (Optional)
2. Age of the respondent
Below 25 years () 26 to 35 years () 36 to 45 years ()
45 to 50 years above 51 years ()
3. Gender of the respondent?
Male [] Female []
4. What is your highest level of education?
Postgraduate [] Degree [] Diploma [] Form four []
Primary School () No school ()
5. Occupation?
6. How long have you worked in the organization?
Less than 1 year [] 1-3 years [] 4-6 years [] above 6 years []

Section B: Radicalization of Youths in Kenya

7. Are Kenya youths currently been radicalized by terror networks?
Yes []
No []

If yes please explain the level of radicalization?

.....
.....

8. In your opinion what are the different causes of youth radicalization in Kenya?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

9. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to Radicalization of Youths in Kenya (Scale 1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Radicalization in Coast and Northern region of Kenya is largely influenced by marginalization					
Radicalization of youths is largely influenced by poverty					
Radicalization is largely influenced by unemployment					
Radicalization is purely based on religious justification					
The reasons for joining terrorist groups is the need political change					
Youths in Kenya join terror networks for income opportunities					

10. What makes Kenyan youths more susceptible to recruitment into terror groups in the region?

.....

.....

11. According to your opinion which is the main terror group that the recruiters affiliated with?

11.b What are other terror networks that recruits youths in Kenya?

.....

12. Are there any aspects of homegrown terrorism and radicalizations in Kenya?

11b. If Yes, please explain your answer.

.....

.....

Section C: Counter Radicalization Measures and Strategies

13. What measures is the Kenyan government taking to prevent youths from being radicalized?
(this question applies to government stakeholders)

.....

14. To what extent have counter-radicalization measures been effective in Kenya?

- Very great extent []
- Great extent []
- Moderate extent []
- Little extent []
- No extent []

15. Is there any evolving nature of partnership between the states and none-state actors in counter-radicalization efforts?

- Yes []
- No []

If yes please explain how?

.....

16. What is the role of non-state actors in partnering with the Kenyan government in countering radicalization?

.....

17. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to measures of Counter-radicalization and Counter-terrorism measures. Scale (1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree.)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
-----------	---	---	---	---	---

Counter-terrorism and radicalization measures have been effective in Kenya in the past few years					
Communities have been involved in countering radicalization in partnership with the government					
Some of the counter-terrorism measures by the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have worsened the fight against terrorism in Kenya					
There is need to adopt multi-sector approach in countering radicalization in Kenya					

18. In your opinion, how best can the religious leaders and groups in Kenya be involved in countering radicalization among the youth in Kenya?

.....

19. Do you think that community involvement and public participation is important in countering radicalization in Kenya?

17.b. If yes, explain your answer

.....

Section D: Policy Adjustment

20. Is there need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and count radicalization?

Yes []

No []

If yes please explain how?

.....

21. To what extent should policy adjustment involve different non-security sectors and stakeholders in countering radicalization?

Very great extent []

Great extent []

- Moderate extent []
- Little extent []
- No extent []

Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating policy adjustment on youth radicalization in Kenya (Scale 1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree.)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
The government should make an effort to raise the de-radicalization options of those radicalized who choose to enter the programs offered					
The government should provide alternatives to those engaging in terrorism activities.					
Regulations measures should be formulated to assist in prosecution and imprisonment of recruiters and terrorists.					
The Judicial system in Kenya does not compliment the works of intelligence and police officers leading to human rights violations by these officers					

22. In your opinion, what the challenges facing current counter-radicalization measures in Kenya?

.....

23. In your opinion, what other measures can be adopted for effectiveness in preventing and countering youth radicalization in Kenya?

.....

24. Any other comments?

.....

Thank you for your time