Assesment Of Kenya’s Military Intervention In Somalia Against Al Shabaab In Light Of Just War Theory

Abstract

The study was designed to asses Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia against Al Shabaab using the Just War Theory. Key objectives were: To assess the extent to which Kenya was justified to intervene in Somalia using jus ad bellum framework; to assess Kenya’s compliance to the right conduct of war during the intervention in Somalia using jus in bello approach and to assess the jus post bellum strategies after the end of the intervention in Somalia. The researcher reviewed diverse literature on the Just War Theory, the history of conflict in Somalia and on Al-Shabaab. The researcher used qualitative research design and employed the use of in-depth interviews with high-profile respondents with the knowledge of international relations, international security and international law. The researcher found out that the intervention in Somalia did not meet the basic thresholds as deemed fit by the Just War Theory under the framework of jus in bello. KDF did not get the requisite approvals from parliament plus the provocations from Al-Shabaab were not too serious to warrant a military intervention. Further, during war, KDF, in some instances failed to comply with the right conduct of war especially on the principle of discrimination. Several civilians were either killed or maimed because of this behaviour. On the just post bellum, Kenya did not have any blue print for a post-conflict Somalia. This reality, in totality makes the Kenya’s intervention unjust. The researcher recommends that the future interventions should be within the acceptable just war tradition. Importantly, exit strategies are critical as are post-conflict blue prints. Kenya and other actors in Somalia now should be strongly thinking of a post-conflict strategy for Somalia to bring lasting peace. The researcher recommends further areas of research for instance further exploration on how KDF treated the prisoners of war.