| dc.description.abstract | This study examines the process of management of crisis in forces management in a post
conflict situation in Uganda between 1995 and 2005. It examines and analyses policy
stakes and decisions, underlying politics of the reduction of armed forces in Uganda from
1991 - 1995.
The study is guided by two core questions; to what extent can the crisis in the DRR be
attributed to programme design and policy formulation processes or more specifically, its
inability to recognize the crisis of the state? How did institutional organizational logic or
lack of it inform the resultant crisis of forces reduction?
The study contends that when a state is in the process of reconstituting itself, its
rationalities are geared towards state building, which may imply an increase in force
levels to recapture society. When the said state engages with an external institution for
dialogue, the outside party tended to emphasis economic imperatives, disregarding
political realities. In this regard, the state will act to comply with the external actor to the
extent to which the cost of the policy construct shall and not be in disharmony with her
objective and subjective interests.
Both primary and secondary data was widely used including text books, academic journals and news papers, supplemented with World Bank and Uganda government
documents. For theoretical underpinnings and actual appreciation of reality, academic
materials and interviews with actors were conducted.
The study recommends that successful armed forces management for stability and
development should, by necessity, be a function of a policy design that seeks to respond
to internal dynamics of state re-constitution or building, taking into consideration existing
political, social, economic, institutional and organizational frameworks to effectively and
efficiently manage the DDR process. | en |
