THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY

by

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A Thesis submitted in fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Arts in the University of Nairobi.

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1978
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

(CANDIDATE)

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The study focuses on the administration of the Rural Development Fund (RDF) in Kenya. This is a case study, research for which was carried out in Machakos, Meru and Murang'a Districts. The RDF came to being in August 1974 when the District Development Grants programme, which was started in 1971, was put together with the Rural Works Programme which had been started due to increasing rural unemployment and the consequent influx of people from the rural areas to urban centres. The RDF is therefore designed to meet the development requirements of the rural areas; it does not finance projects in the urban areas. Scarcity of development resources and reliance on foreign resources plus the exploitation of rural areas by urban centres have over the years created big urban-rural socio-economic disparities. Hence the significance of the RDF.

Planning in the colonial period was both partial and discriminatory as it benefited only the minority White and Asian communities. Post-independence planning was by and large comprehensive but the rural areas were not given much attention. This necessitated the introduction of decentralisation in planning but it has not been very effective in practice.

The financial situation vis-a-vis development programmes in the country may not be said to be very good. Local finances are scarce thus resulting in
heavy dependence on foreign aid and outside influence in policy formulation. There are numerous problems involved in allocating these scarce resources. This again has tended to hit the rural areas most. Although local authorities have played some role in developing the rural areas, this role has been minimal because the funds available to them have been meagre.

The core of the study is the examination of the operation of the RDF programme. The membership of development committees is not representative enough to ensure that the projects selected for RDF funding reflect the wishes of the local people. The influence of politicians and top bureaucrats means a lot when project selection is done. Once projects have been identified and proposals sent to the Ministry of Finance and Planning headquarters though, influence is no longer an issue. The MFP decides how much money should be allocated on the recommendations of implementing officers.

In respect to the field administration of the RDF the financial control procedures provided by the MFP are in some cases a hinderance to fast implementation of projects. Implementation is also hindered by ministerial resource limitations - i.e. shortages in recurrent funds and skilled personnel. The size and multi-functionality of DDCs make it difficult for these bodies to monitor and direct implementation adequately. As a supplement to the RDF, "harambee" contributions are
expected to be raised before District Development Grants projects may be implemented. Though the "harambee" movement is very laudable in principle its operation has left the poorer sections of society skeptical of the whole idea.

The RDF has not fully realised its objectives. This has chiefly been because these objectives have been misconceived by both implementors and the intended beneficiaries. The Rural Works Programme has failed to enhance employment opportunities as originally expected. The management of projects after they have been constructed has not been up to standard. Projects are constructed in order to benefit the local people. It would be wasteful, therefore, if cattle dips, water schemes, dams, roads, etc. thus constructed are not properly maintained. In short, all is not well with the RDF.

The RDF has had its successes and shortcomings. It has, nonetheless, marked an important step in the right direction but it would do well with expansion and a number of organisational changes.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CARE - Cooperative of American Relief Everywhere.
DC - District Commissioner.
DDC - District Development Committee.
DDG - District Development Grants.
DDO - District Development Officer.
EEC - European Economic Community.
FAO - United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation.
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
IDS - Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi.
ILO - International Labour Organisation.
IMF - International Monetary Fund.
KANU - Kenya African National Union.
MFP - Ministry of Finance and Planning.
MP - Member of Parliament.
NORAD - Norwegian Agency for International Development.
PC - Provincial Commissioner.
PDC - Provincial Development Committee.
PPO - Provincial Planning Officer.
RDF - Rural Development Fund.
RWP - Rural Works Programme.
SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency.
SRDP - Special Rural Development Programme.
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme.
USAID - United States Agency for International Development.
This study covers an area in Kenya's development administration that has not been given any scholarly attention before. I had a problem in choosing a study topic which has not been covered and yet which would yield adequate research material for analysis. I guess I am not the only one faced with this problem. It was not until I was in the field that I realised how inadequate my research topic was in terms of data availability. The findings presented herein are a result of a strenuous exercise.

The findings relate to only three of the forty-one districts in Kenya. The analysis has been based on case data but various conclusions are drawn regarding the RDF programme generally. This act of induction (as opposed to deduction) is inevitable any time we intend to make observations on phenomena covering vast areas which we cannot handle in toto, because of financial or time limitations. It is my sincere hope that this study will truly make a contribution to the academic understanding of the problems facing Kenya's rural areas, the measures being taken to ameliorate the situation and the nature of limitations involved. To those involved in the exercise of rural development I offer them encouragement. Our people have suffered too long. It is time they were given a serious consideration.
In coming up with a work like this, one is bound to rely on the assistance (voluntary or otherwise) of many people. I have had some help from many, all of whom I cannot acknowledge here. To all of them - lecturers, fellow students, government officials and members of the public - I express my gratitude. I may, however, single out Drs. Walter O. Oyugi and Michael Chege who were my supervisors. They gave me a lot of inspiration even at times I felt despondent. Their criticisms and ideas were very helpful and I am sure I could not have managed without them. I am also grateful for the services of Ms. R. Kathuni in typing the work.

In thanking government officials I need to distinguish (though a bit Bohemian) two unlike groups. The first is that group of officials which was very willing to give me information and other assistance during the data collection exercise. Without their help I could not have come up with this work. The other group is that which refused to cooperate; indeed they were unwilling to give me any information. These made me realise two things. One, that a researcher needs more than "cultured" trust in official goodwill to make headway. Two, that there is too much "confidentiality" involved in conducting public affairs. Stretched too far, this may be an unhealthy state of affairs.
Though in writing this work I drew from ideas given by other people, any errors in interpretation and analysis should largely be my own responsibility.

N.N. Nthiga

INTRODUCTION

The developing countries are presently faced with the task of improving the living standards of their people, especially those in the rural areas. It is difficult to show the exact magnitude of the problems faced by the rural people - whom we shall call "ruralites" - mainly because of inavailability of data in these countries. Kenya is no exception. A few indicators may, however, be given to show, roughly, how the urbanites are well disposed, economically and socially, when compared with the "ruralites". A survey conducted by an ILO Mission in Kenya found out that in 1969 about 83% of the rural households earned less than £120 per household per year. Only 8% of urban households were in this income bracket. Whereas 29% of urban households earned £600 and over per annum each, there was only 1% of rural households in this category. This clearly shows that urbanites relatively earn much more money than "ruralites" and, therefore, can afford to live more comfortably.

This is not to say that all urban people live well and the reverse applies for the rural people. There are some poor people in urban areas and some rich people in the rural areas. It is also difficult to make a virtual separation of urban and rural households because family and clan relationships are not entirely severed by urbanisation. For the purposes of this study, though, we take urban and rural areas as different in socio-economic terms. The situation of income disparity is tabularly demonstrated on Table 1 which gives comparative household figures relating to income distribution in Kenya in 1969. The table should be interpreted with care as only Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu were taken as urban areas. The number of households was also approximate rather than exact.

Table 1: Household Income Distribution by Income Size, 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Size (£ per annum)</th>
<th>No. of Urban Households ('000)</th>
<th>No. of Rural Households ('000)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 119</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1783.7</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 - 599</td>
<td>119.7</td>
<td>340.3</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 and over</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191.8</td>
<td>2148.2</td>
<td>2340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income distribution is not the only, though, perhaps, the main, indicator of urban - rural inequalities. Distribution of services provided by the Government also depicts the same pattern. Table 2 shows the distribution of hospital beds and cots, by Province, in the years 1972 - 75. Using 1969 population figures, Nairobi, with only 4.4% of the total national population\(^2\), had about 27% of the total hospital beds and cots in 1972. If we consider that in the other Provinces a large proportion of the beds and cots were located in the towns (hospitals are located mainly at Provincial and District headquarters) we can see that the rural population is disadvantaged in the provision of medical facilities. The table also shows that there are provincial disparities. The rural areas themselves have differing socio-economic facilities and opportunities.

\(^2\)The total national population, according to the 1969 population census, was 10,942,705. Nairobi had 509,286 people.
Table 2: Distribution of Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, in the years 1972 - 75.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>1377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1177</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>1566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>2355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>2567</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>2767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9595</td>
<td>9829</td>
<td>10285</td>
<td>12584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The distribution of medical practitioners was even more uneven. Over half of the medical practitioners in the country in 1970 were established in the urban areas. The ratio of the population to the medical practitioners was very high in
the rural areas whereas it was very low in the urban areas. In 1970, Nairobi had one medical practitioner for every 84 of its residents. Nyanza Province had one medical practitioner for every 2219 people and Western Province had a record ratio of 3569. These ratios would be much higher if the major towns of these Provinces were not included. The national ratio was 871.

In the table below the Water Department (Ministry of Water Development from the end of 1974) capital expenditure on water supplies in urban and rural areas in the period 1968 - 75 is shown. Though, in absolute terms, from the 1969/70 financial year more money went to rural water supplies than to urban water supplies, in relative terms the urban areas benefited more, considering that less than 10% of the national population lived there.

Table 3: Development Expenditures for Water Supplies by the Water Department/Ministry of Water Development, 1968/69 - 1974/75, in K£'000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968/69</th>
<th>'69/70</th>
<th>'70/71</th>
<th>'71/72</th>
<th>'72/73</th>
<th>'73/74</th>
<th>'74/75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Water Supplies</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Water Supplies</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>2752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3 ILO, op. cit., p. 301.
In many other respects - education, road construction, housing, etc. - the rural areas have been far behind the urban areas. It is in light of these inequalities that more attention to the development of rural areas is necessary in Kenya, like in all other developing countries. These inequalities were created by the colonial system but have continued to persist after independence. The task of developing the rural areas is a difficult one and the process a long one. The task is difficult because of a shortage of required resources, lack of adequate and effective personnel, inadequate information and poor infrastructure.

The need to develop (regardless of what development is taken to mean) is widely acknowledged. Many people no longer think that the suffering they experience is inevitable and unavoidable. They are convinced that something can be done to ameliorate such poor conditions. The countries of the "Third World", for example, have had their people making various demands from their post-independence governments. The governments have in their turn, though in varying degrees of commitment and capability, set forth to deliver the goods. A government may take a variety of measures towards the ideal of development. Such measures may direct equal attention to the

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4 For distribution of these services, see the relevant sections of the Economic Surveys released by the Central Bureau of Statistics, MFP, every year.
public and private sectors or lay more emphasis on the former. It is, however, necessary in a developing economy for the government to have a measure of control on both sectors. Government involvement in the private sector will not concern us in this work.

The Kenya Government realises the need to improve the living conditions of the rural poor who comprise over 90% of the country's population. In this endeavour the Government has taken various measures since independence. Among these measures were the establishment of the experimental Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) in a few selected areas in 1970 and the introduction of the District Development Grants (DDG) programme which followed in 1971. The DDG programme was intended to boost the initiative of local development committees, government officials and local leaders in participating in local planned development. In 1974 the Rural Works Programme (RWP) was introduced in an attempt to reduce rural unemployment and raise the incomes of the "ruralites". It was hoped that this would generate further development and promote self-determinism among the people. The RWP and the DDG programme were soon combined to comprise the revolving Rural Development Fund (RDF). This study focuses on this Fund — money that the Government allocates to rural projects, through the District Development Committees (DDCs). This money is in addition to the individual Ministries' allocations and is intended to fill gaps that are left by the individual Ministries.
The machineries used in the disbursement, usage and supervision of these funds will be analysed. The structural and organisational problems which impede successful implementation of the two programmes will also be examined. The impact of this money on rural development and on the political awareness of the local people will also be assessed.

It is appropriate to state here why it is important to study the RDF. Unlike most other development programmes undertaken by the Government, the RDF is directed exclusively to the rural areas, which have their peculiar development constraints. In addition to the programme being geared towards increased economic growth it is also supposed to serve as a vehicle for income redistribution and welfare provision. This was to be manifested by its employment creation capacity, its operation in economically marginal areas and the inclusion of projects whose economic benefits (at least in the short run) are low. The RDF involves only a small percentage of the national development expenditure; it comprised 0.4%, 1.7% and 2.2% in the 1971/72, 1974/75 and 1976/77 financial years, respectively. Its special characteristics, however, make it extremely important for a study - for academic purposes and for the field practitioner's benefit. The RDF is useful for academic study because it will add to our knowledge of development administration. The issue of planned development and the funds employed thereof may be viewed as a field of economics. Actual implementation of plans and the administration of development finances is not confined to economics, however; it enters the realm of development admini-
stration - and political science. The RDF is quite recent (it has been in operation for only six years - i.e. from the inception of the DDG programme) and has not been subjected to any academic research.

The study is also important for field administrators because it may help them to view the RDF as it has been operating so far and may influence their future actions. The assumption here is that, important as the RDF is in the process of rural development, it has not really achieved its objectives. Has this been because the programme was not worthwhile in the first place? Is it because the guidelines issued for its implementation have not been followed or is it because they were initially faulty? Are there ways of making the programme work better? These are questions answers to which would be useful to all concerned in this exercise. The answers are nowhere available so far. It is hoped that this study will make a contribution in this direction.

Before plunging into the analysis of the RDF we shall have to look at the policy framework within which development committees and the local people get involved in the administration of the funds. This is the policy of decentralised planning. Decentralised planning was introduced apparently because centralised planning had flaws which rendered it ineffective in the rural areas. A historical account of planning in Kenya will be given, showing the various adjustments which have been made over the time and identifying the problems which necessitated the introduction of decentralised planning,
and especially district planning. We discuss planning in this text to use it as a spring-board to the central issues of the study. Development resources are extremely scarce. Choices have to be made between many sets of alternatives which need finance. This has to be done in an organised and rationally determined manner. This is the essence of planning. It is therefore important to understand the planning organisation of our system in order to discuss most effectively development finances, and in this case the RDF.

Three methods of data collection were used. This was inevitable as no one technique could yield all the information required. It is not in the scope of this study to discuss the merits and demerits of the various methods. It will suffice to say that each method used was indispensable and yielded data which could not have been got through other methods.

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First, secondary information was used. This information was got from Government files, plan documents, annual reports, policy circulars and, of course, published materials. This technique was necessary because there were factual data, especially those involving statistics, which could not have been got otherwise. Any citations from these sources will be acknowledged as far as possible.

Second, a lot of data were collected through interviewing. This is currently the most effective data gathering technique in social research in East Africa, especially in the rural areas. This technique was chosen in favour of mail questionnaires because of its relative advantages. These include the fastness in which interviewing yields results (one would need far much longer time for questionnaires to be sent back by respondents), the higher response rate that is characteristic of interviewing, and the necessity to probe and seek clarifications as the nature of the research demanded. Moser and Kalton have the following to say about interviewing:

The method of collecting data most usual in social surveys is personal interviewing. Although observation and mail questionnaires could probably be employed more frequently than at present, interviewing is without doubt generally the most appropriate procedure, even though it introduces various sources of error and bias.  

6 C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op. cit., p. 270.
Both formal and informal interviews were conducted. Formal interviews were served to Provincial Planning Officers (PPOs), District Commissioners (DCs), District Development Officers (DDOs) and members of the DDCs. Research was carried out in three districts - viz., Murang'a in Central Province, and Meru and Machakos in Eastern Province. The two PPOs, two DCs and the three DDOs were interviewed. A total of 35 other DDC members were interviewed in the three districts. Informal interviews were conducted with a wide range of respondents. These included officials at the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MFP) headquarters, implementing officers at district and divisional levels and some members of the public, especially members of project committees.

Both types of interviewing were necessary, one (formal interviewing) to gather information on some general topics, especially on the functions of the DDC, and the other to offer specific information regarding some specific projects or phenomena - notably the manner in which each type of projects was implemented.

Lastly, observation was the third technique used. This involved the researcher in attending DDC and divisional development committee meetings in an endeavour to get first hand information on the proceedings of these committees. The researcher also visited various projects which had been given money from the RDF - some had been completed and others were in progress - in order to see the sort of work which went
on these projects. This was to reveal that there was tangible work being done in the rural areas despite the many problems and mistakes.
CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN KENYA

The term development planning has been given various definitions, none of which is wrong but none of which is entirely complete. For the purpose of this study we take development planning to mean the systematic setting of goals and objectives, and of institutions and procedures by which to achieve the goals, consideration being given of possible resource availability. Development planning may be comprehensive, where it covers all aspects of the economy, or partial, where it covers one sphere of the economy or one area of the country. The major features of development planning are the relationship between means and ends.

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a feature largely expounded on by Waterston\textsuperscript{2} — and the consider-
ration of the present social, economic and political conditions to prepare for the future.\textsuperscript{3} Planning may be temporary (where it follows a natural disaster, like a flood, or a national crisis, like a war) or it may be a continuous phenomenon. We are here concerned with the latter.

Development planning during a particular period in a given country is influenced by various factors, which include: the political objectives of the people (at least those in political control); the availability of the necessary resources; and the availability of people with technical know-how to actualise these objectives. Development planning will therefore serve differing purposes at different times.\textsuperscript{4}


\textsuperscript{4} For a fuller discussion, see T. Y. Shen, "Objectives in Development Planning", Paper No. 49, 1971 East African Universities Social Science Council Conference.
The need for planning is currently widely accepted, though it cannot serve as a cure-all. Indeed Durbin tells us that after the Second World War the idea of planning has been taken seriously "all over the world." Griffin and Enos also tell us that, except for the content of planning which varies from country to country, "the idea of planning is accepted and endorsed by almost all." 

When we talk of development planning we do so at two levels. First, there is the level of formulating the plan- the document that outlines the goals, and the structures and procedures by which to achieve the goals. Second, there is the level of implementation - the putting into action what is contained in the plan. No planning agency can claim its job has been done until the plan has been implemented. Chambers has asserted that "a plan which cannot be implemented is in fact a bad one." One may go further than chambers and say that such a "plan" is not a plan at all, for it is not the


6 K.B. Griffin and J.L. Enos, op. cit., p. 221.

document which is important but the benefits which are derived from its implementation. At this level one may also include the processes of evaluation and revision. These are important processes because in the course of implementation new ideas and alternatives come to light.

Planning in Colonial Kenya

Planning in Kenya did not come with independence. It was the scope and content of planning that changed with the end of the colonial rule. The colonial period was characterised by partial planning - i.e. it was directed towards selected areas and very limited projects. Development was concentrated in urban centres and a few settlement areas where the small European and Asian communities lived. The government catered for the interests of metropolitan Britain and the settlers.

The colonial philosophy was to appropriate as much as possible from the colony through the extraction of raw materials, creation of markets for British manufactured goods and lavish living by the foreigners, with as little cost as possible. Provision of goods and services

8 It is not necessary to expound on this philosophy, which was held by all colonial powers, here. The following works, and others, have covered this adequately: E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939 (Heinemann, London, 1973); A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1967); and C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, 1964-1971 (Heinemann, London, 1975). All colonial motives advanced by the colonialists have been rejected. The only genuine motive, that would embrace all others, was exploitation.
beneficial to the Africans was made only where it was necessary for the perpetuation of colonial exploitation. In such cases the beneficiary would most probably be the urban African.

The first steps towards development planning in Kenya, like in most other British colonies, were taken after the Second World War. The initiative, however, came from the British Colonial Office rather than the colonies themselves. Kenya started with a Ten-year Plan (1946-55). Its purpose was to step up production in the "scheduled areas" or the European settlement areas. Funds for the implementation of this plan were to come from Britain under the conditions contained in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. This plan was replaced before the end of its period by a series of three-year plans (the first covered the period 1954-57) which, it was felt, would be more realistic and more implementable.9

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9 See Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, The Development Programme, 1954-57 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1955); The Development Programme, 1957-60 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1957); and The Development Programme, 1960-63 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1960). Of importance, too, was R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954), whose preparation was prompted by the political agitations of the emergency period and which had to be incorporated in the three-year plans. An attempt was made then to bring some Africans into the money economy.
Development planning in colonial Kenya was, therefore, partial and discriminatory. This could not be maintained after independence. All areas were supposed to be covered by planning after independence. Colonial planning was also centralised, a phenomenon characteristic of the initial post-independence years. Such a planning organisation was inevitable and understandable since planning was never intended to reach all areas (even after the Swynnerton Plan).

Planning responsibilities by 1963 were undertaken by the Development and Planning Division in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This was a small division as its duties at the time were not many. It was clear then that with the advent of independence a more expanded planning agency was necessary. Planning was going to affect many more areas and people, and more development projects would have to be undertaken. Early in 1963 T.P. Randle, the then DC for Fort Hall (now Murang'a) District observed:

"...there is no doubt that a considerable number of people in the District are now determined to assist in the development of the economy and are willing to cooperate in the schemes directed to this end. ... It is all the more frustrating therefore, that this change has occurred at a time when very little money is available for development and when the whole concept of administration in Kenya is to be changed."  

Randle had three fears: that people's enthusiasm for development would be frustrated by independence (presumably because political chaos would follow); that funds for development were meagre and were going to be even more so after independence; and that the administration that was to take over was unlikely to be capable of handling the development tasks. The same fears were held by the ten people who prepared the Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). They were greatly influenced by these feelings when they made their recommendations on the development course independent Kenya should take and what planning organisation should be adopted.

Post-Independence Planning

Development planning in post-independence Kenya has had its focus on almost all areas of activity, mainly in the public sector. One may call it "comprehensive" public sector planning. One aspect of comprehensive planning - that of distribution -

11 IBRD, Economic Development of Kenya (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963). The IBRD Mission prepared the report at the request of the governments of Kenya and the United Kingdom. No doubt its recommendations had to favour close post-colonial economic ties between the two countries in order not to curtail the economic benefits Britain was already enjoying.

12 This dimension of comprehensive planning is given by K.B. Griffin and J.L. Enos, op. cit. p. 6.
has not been very evident in Kenya's planning as it has never been indicated how each group or area will benefit. Worse still, little has been done to ensure that the skewed distribution of incomes and social amenities, in favour of a small section of society, is reduced. It was in realising this situation the Minister of Finance and Planning wrote:

......(The emphasis of the third five-year plan) lies in rural development, creation of more employment opportunities, a more equitable distribution of income, better educational facilities, and increased participation of people throughout the nation in the planning process and development.13

The Minister continued:

The Government will make a special effort to develop the rural areas to make them attractive places for people to live and work (in). The people must recognise these efforts, and collaborate with the Government in order to make the efforts to develop the rural areas successful.14


14 Ibid, p. v. The Minister was asserting a condition he felt was necessary for the successful implementation of the plan for which he was writing a preface. If this condition had already been met, then the Minister would not have wasted time stressing it so fervently.
The previous plans had also indicated that development efforts would attempt to distribute benefits fairly. The Minister, in the passages quoted above, apparently admitted this had not been the case.

The work of the IBRD Mission was said to be to:

".. undertake a good review of the economic potential of Kenya and to make recommendations designed to assist the Government in development planning for the period to 1967, and in formulating policies which would further expand and stimulate the economy and so raise the standards of living of the people."  

The Mission was in Kenya for only three months and started preparing its report after about six months of its first meeting. It is doubtful that its recommendations were based on properly collected and adequate data. The report was, however, significant because the post-independence government drew a lot from it in its (Government's) preparation of the first plan (1964-70) and subsequent ones.  

The post-independence government did not have the problem of deciding whether it was necessary to plan or not, whether a planning agency should exist or not. It was a foregone conclusion that it was necessary to plan. By the time, planning was widely accepted as necessary for a...  

15 IBRD, op. cit., p. vii.  
developing country – or planning had become fashionable, to paraphrase Griffin and Enos.\(^{17}\) Planning was also necessary to show the people that the new government was determined, though not proven capable, to do something for them. There was also another factor to consider, namely that the more developed countries would more readily give aid to countries which had taken planning measures. In fact it was, and still is, a condition of the World Bank that a country must have a development plan before borrowing money from it. Kenya was not prepared to risk missing such foreign aid, which was to be the backbone of her development programmes. The question was, therefore, what planning machinery should be adopted to "serve the broader social and economic aims of the new nationalist government."\(^{10}\)

In July 1964 a Directorate of Planning was created in the Ministry of Finance. It was felt that such an arrangement was necessary so as to bring together the financial planners and development planners.

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\(^{17}\) K.B. Griffin and J.L. Enos, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

\(^{18}\) R.H. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
No development plan can be implemented without money. It was only reasonable that the two processes should fall under the same Ministry. At the attainment of republican status in December 1964 the Government of Kenya deviated from the logical - as the author sees it - and created a Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, completely detached from the Ministry of Finance. This must have been prompted by the expanding duties of the Directorate of Planning and the need to make a more extensive look at the economy and lay down new targets and objectives. (Although the first development plan was out, it was officially acknowledged that it would be revised soon. This was to be the first assignment of the new Ministry.) It was, however, soon to be realised that this new arrangement would not work. The Ministry of Finance and that of Economic Planning and Development could not coordinate their aims and activities, collaboration between the two was not possible and the implementation of the development plan was not running smoothly. The result was the amalgamation of the two Ministries in October 1970 to form the present Ministry of Finance and Planning (MFP).

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The organisation of the MFP is shown in Figure 1. The Ministry is divided into three departments: Planning, Treasury and the Central Bureau of Statistics. In a later part of this chapter we shall have a close look at the functioning of the Rural Planning Unit of the Planning Department. It is important to note that the Planning Department is placed together with the Central Bureau of Statistics because the former cannot do without the latter. The Bureau collects data for the Planning Department and also for other Ministries.
FIGURE 1: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING ORGANISATION (1976)

CABINET

Minister of Finance and Planning

Other Ministries & Statutory Bodies.

Permanent Secretary to the Treasury

PLANNING

Deputy Permanent Secretary (Planning)

Chief Economist

Agricultural & Natural Resources (Senior Economist)

Human Resources (Principal Economist)

Industry & Infrastructure (Senior Economist)

- Macro-Economic Planning (Senior Economist)
- Project Planning & Evaluation (Senior Economist)
- Rural Planning Unit (Principal Economist)

Secretariat, National Council of Science & Technology.

TREASURY

Central Bureau of Statistics

Deputy Permanent Secretary (Finance)

External Aid Division

- Price Control.

Fiscal & Monetary Division

- Sales Tax
- Income Tax
- Inland Revenue

- Budgetary Supplies Division

Services Personnel Pensions Accounts
The MFP does not work in isolation. It has to work in close collaboration with other Ministries and statutory bodies. Some of these Ministries have planning units of their own. The MFP sends instructions and guidelines to other Ministries and statutory bodies directing them to prepare Ministry or departmental plans. These plans are sent to the MFP and are scrutinised by Planning Officers specialised in different fields of the economy and their foreign advisors. Once the sectoral plans have been passed by the respective experts they are sent to a "steering committee" of the Ministry. In this committee a number of divisions of the Ministry are represented but other Ministries are not. The "steering committee" integrates and redraws the sectoral plans and incorporates them into a national plan.

The highest planning organ, though largely in theory, is the Cabinet, which receives the draft plan for discussion and approval. The Cabinet is expected to ensure that the plan is in line with government policy and that the goals set are in keeping with the country's political ideals.

The generally expressed aims of development plans have been: raising of per capita income; creation of employment opportunities for the rapidly growing population; and equitable distribution of incomes and welfare. These aims had to be achieved by creating a free capitalist economy that was expected to be developed for the benefit of all "while safeguarding the principles of individual rights and property". It has not

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been easy to both maintain free ownership of factors of production and offer improved welfare to all equitably. These are two social values which are hardly compatible in a capitalist system. The first development plan, in its original and revised forms, did not lay any elaborate development strategy for the rural areas. While promising measures to increase per capita income and redistribute resources and incomes, the plan did not show clearly how the latter would be achieved. This is a problem the Kenya Government has been grappling with all the time without much success. Other government documents have contained similar statements. The KANU Manifesto, for example, laid down very lofty objectives which were from the very beginning difficult to attain. The famous Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya" did the same. This paper gave some points which were to be the guidelines for the development strategy that was envisaged but most of which were soon forgotten. 21

Centralised planning organisation had some flaws which made it ineffective at the local level. In the first place the organisation given in Figure 1 was never followed as laid

21 Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965), p. 48. It is an obvious fact that little has been achieved towards this end. Kenya's "African Socialism" was, has been and is, a cover for bourgeois development.
down. Most of the planning business was done by a few officers in the MFP headquarters. Very little, for example, happened at the Cabinet level. What the Planning Officers - and their advisors - had set down was more or less final.

The planning arrangement did not reach the local people, either at the formulation or implementation level. They were simply not involved. Local officials were involved only during implementation, a situation which made it difficult to implement plans. Despite the creation of the office of the PPO (he was supposed to help in the implementation of development programmes at the provincial and lower levels) little success was forthcoming. Central planning did not, also, take account of the varying socio-economic conditions and values of the different areas of the country. It was, therefore, difficult to adapt some of the programmes to meet local requirements. A move from centralised planning was, therefore, necessary in order for the rural areas to benefit from development programmes.22

This change of planning organisation was to be accompanied by a change in planning priorities in favour of the rural areas - viz.: more resources to the rural areas; participation by local people; more autonomy for local planners. In addition to decentralising development planning the government introduced specific programmes for the rural areas. These measures, however have not done much, nor will they in future, to change the structure of the economic system. This is so because the resources employed are meagre, their distribution is significantly uneven and little is being done to identify problems and rectify them. The programmes have, nonetheless, symbolised a step forward. In the remaining part of this chapter we shall present a case for decentralised planning and show how it has been carried out in practice in Kenya.

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23 See the last section of Chapter 2.
Decentralised Planning for Rural Development

Kenya's decentralised planning should be viewed as deconcentration rather than devolution. Smith writes that deconcentration is:

the delegation of authority to make administrative decisions on behalf of the central administration to public servants working in the field.  

Devolution, Smith continues, is where:

authority to make decisions in some spheres of public policy are delegated by law to sub-national territorial assemblies.

Kenya's decentralisation is viewed as deconcentration because development committees, which are supposed to play a vital role in planning and in which all operating Ministries are represented, are not autonomous and take their decisions on behalf of the central government. They are organs which, in many respects, coordinate the activities of the various Ministries. The activities of development committees are closely directed and controlled from above.


25 Ibid.
Authority may also be given, by law or delegation, to an agency or corporation (not a territorial assembly) which can take exclusive decisions regarding a particular sphere of activity or a particular region. A good example is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in U.S.A. The TVA was created in 1933 by the American Congress to undertake the development of the Tennessee Valley. The TVA was to be an autonomous regional authority whose powers transcended the existing territorial boundaries. All decision-making and administrative power was vested in a Board of Directors which was not expected to operate on directions from any existing department of the federal government or the states. The Board was to be accountable to only the President and Congress.

There were other characteristics which made the TVA a unique agency and which made it very successful - making it a showcase of how well devolution of authority can work. First, the TVA had full powers to hire and fire. This freedom of selection of personnel meant that recruitment and promotion were to be based on merit. The TVA Act prohibited political...

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considerations in recruitment and selection. Second, the directors of the TVA, right from the beginning, realised the dangers of overlooking and bypassing existing local institutions and introducing "imposed" federal programmes. Long established and popular institutions were, therefore, made use of as much as possible. Lastly, the TVA had wide powers in the disposition of available revenues. The money was spent on programmes which the Authority considered as most appropriate for the Tennessee Valley.

In Kenya we would talk of devolved authority if the functions of the development committees were performed by autonomous local authorities. This is not to say that local authorities do not exist; there are County Councils and urban-area councils but their activities are limited in many respects. The significance of the local authorities, especially in the rural area, is diminishing as they continue losing authority due to the taking away of their functions and sources of finance by the central government. More and more emphasis is being put on the DDCs as the agents of local development. This makes an evaluation of the activities of the DDCs very worthwhile.

What considerations make decentralisation necessary? In what respects is decentralisation superior to centralisation? In Kenya it was found necessary to decentralise planning to

the district level so as to:

(a) seek willing and active participation of local communities in the planning and implementation of development programmes, and

(b) train local leaders and officials with a view to making them planning conscious.

It was felt that district officials could implement a plan they had helped to formulate better than one that had been handed down on them. In addition local people's participation was considered essential in order to rally support for any development programmes started in the rural areas. This was also a gesture towards establishing limited "grassroots democracy" in the social and economic development of the country. The agencies of decentralised planning

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28 Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-1974, op. cit., p. 111. The link between decentralised planning and the RDF will be clearer when we look at the justification for the introduction of the DDG programme.

29 W.O. Oyugi, "Participation in Development Planning at the Local Level" in D.K. Leonard (ed.), Rural Administration in Kenya (EALB, Nairobi, 1973), pp. 54-59, discusses three schools of advocacy for popular participation: the "felt needs"; the "grassroots democracy"; and the "extractionist". It is a combination of the last two that I call limited grassroots democracy.
(development committees) were not expected, right from the start, to involve themselves in political issues.

The benefits of decentralised planning cannot be over-emphasized although some writers argue that decentralisation is detrimental to national coordination and integration of development strategies. Various considerations in development administration make decentralised planning almost indispensable. These considerations include the following.

(a) The vastness of the territory to be planned for.

At the plan formulation level it is quite difficult to collect information covering a vast territory and bring it together into integrated programmes of action. At the implementation level it becomes even more difficult to coordinate activities in all the areas. It requires having many officials at the centre to coordinate what happens at the periphery, a situation not very favourable for countries lacking in adequate personnel. Decentralisation tries to minimise these problems.

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(b) Variation in social and economic values and needs of the people requires that each local area be given priorities different from those of the other areas. The different geographical conditions, the different cultural values, the different levels of development and the diverse values given to the various development programmes make it difficult for centre-planned development to be realised in all areas equitably. Decentralisation in planning and administration makes it possible for planners to offer each area what it actually needs.

(c) The need for participation of the local communities calls for decentralisation as this is the only way to dissuade the local people from sitting back and waiting for everything to be done by the government. It also ensures local support for any development projects that are undertaken; in other words, local people are more likely to identify themselves with development projects when they participate in planning.

(d) The endeavour to make administration effective also leads to a need for decentralisation. The projects for each planning (territorial) unit are well known by those charged with implementation, if the projects were locally selected. The requirements for these projects are also known. Coordination of implementation is
quite easy because the hierarchy of authority is not very high or, if it is, the top does not have very strong administrative control over the bottom. This facilitates faster communication of information and feedback. Collins sums up the case for decentralisation thus:

(Decentralisation is necessary) in the underdeveloped countries where Governments with minimal human, financial and hence organisational resources are faced with certain environmental problems. The size of the countries creates problems of physical communications, and regional diversity produces a variety of local conditions. Thus in new nations which are underdeveloped and have poor communications, where Governments have limited administrative and political capability and where central authorities are already overburdened and lack information, there is no alternative to decentralisation.31

Decentralisation certainly does not solve all the problems identified by Collins. It, however, reduces their intensity and consequences.

It is the man in the field - at the very local level - who knows the problems and needs of the local people and the potentialities of the particular rural area. Planning, therefore, must be at the local level - i.e. "close to the people and their problems." Hicks, writing on local authorities in developing countries, felt that economic development in such countries would be faster if it was undertaken by efficient and democratic local authorities. To her, devolution of authority and administration was the only way of eliminating the "vicious circle" of rural poverty. An alternative strategy would be to deconcentrate administration to local bodies which are not detached from the control of the central government. This is the strategy that is being established in Kenya.

At the national level the plan is formulated by people who do not have enough information about local conditions (for the many areas in the country). The exercise is done with the help of expatriates - also given the dubious term of "experts" - who are even less informed. The result is

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that the document prepared for the country may be difficult to implement because it does not take into consideration the problems peculiar to each area. The planning process is thus reduced to mere formalism with no derivative benefits to the people of the country. Those responsible for planning at the district level would also be responsible for implementation. They are, therefore, more likely to come up with reasonable and implementable plans. After all they would have no one to blame if the documents so prepared ended up in the waste-paper basket.

Since this planning exercise is a measure of deconcentration there is bound to be prepared a national plan that would bring together the district plans. The national planners are bound to omit some parts of the various district plans in an endeavour to synchronize plan goals with the availability of money, capital and manpower. This appears to deny the district planners the right of giving the last word concerning what is being planned for. This is true. It is, nonetheless, inevitable in a system where the economy would not thrive without some central control and where the level of political development is so low that giving full autonomy to the planning units would frustrate efforts towards national integration.

How successful has been the policy of decentralised planning in Kenya? What structural and organisational impediments have been encountered? Is decentralised planning
actually feasible in the context of Kenya's political and bureaucratic control at all levels? These and other related questions will be answered, in view of existing information and practice.

The Practice of Decentralised Planning in Kenya

One may be tempted to hold the view that decentralised planning has always existed in Kenya because when Ministries prepare their sectoral plans they rely on their field officials for data and proposals. Consideration of two characteristics of decentralised planning makes such an assumption invalid, however. First, decentralised planning must not only be concerned with the problems and needs of the local people but it must also involve the utilisation of ideas and proposals of the local people themselves, for the people know better what their problems are. This characteristic has been lacking in central government planning. Only government officers were involved in planning and subsequent implementation. The local people were only marginally involved. Second, even assuming that government officers could represent the views of the people, those who were involved in planning and implementation had very little physical contact with the local people. Planning in that form was, therefore, lacking in the
aspect of local participation that is necessary for the success of local programmes.

The first move towards planning that would involve some local participation came with the setting up of development and advisory committees at provincial and district levels in 1966. The revised first Development Plan (1966-70) proposed that:

Development activities at the Provincial, District and Municipal levels must be carefully planned, coordinated and implemented. In addition to the appointment of the PPOs, various committees will be established to ensure that coordination and participation are fully effective down to the site of every project.\(^3\)

Directives concerning the formation of these committees were issued through a series of letters from the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development to the Provincial Commissioners (PCs) in the months of August, September and October, 1965. In one of these letters an ambiguous layout of the functions of these committees (specifically the Provincial Development Committees and District Development Committees) was made.

It was stated that:

The main function of Development Committees will be to deal with Government Plans for Provinces and Districts to see that planned targets and objectives are pursued energetically and on a coordinated basis, to examine the progress of economic and social development and to make recommendations for the improvement of the plan implementation strategy and the plan itself. The committees should also be controlling major self-help projects.

A few things may be observed from this quotation. First, the committees were not expected to plan or implement the plans. Their role was that of a watchdog. There was no assurance that their "recommendations" would be accepted either. Second, the Ministry did not seem to have any use for advisory committees at the time as nothing was said about them. They were later constituted, nonetheless, but never functioned. Third, these committees could hardly control self-help projects as they did not have the means to do it. Lastly, the ambiguity in what was expected of these committees made it difficult for the members to attend meetings, let alone deliberate meaningfully.

Circular letter from the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, to PCs on October 9th, 1965.
The 1966-70 Development Plan also indicated who would constitute the development and advisory committees at the two levels. Virtually all members of the DDC were to be civil servants, with the PC as chairman and the PFO as secretary. The Provincial Development Advisory Committee had to include all members of the PDC, a number of politicians and two "leading citizens" nominated by the PC. The DDC, like the PDC, had to have civil servants as its members. The DC was to be chairman and the PPO was to be secretary. The District Development Advisory Committee was to include all members of the DDC, a few politicians and two or three "eminent citizens" to be selected by the DC. Membership of development committees was also outlined in the letter cited above. The full list of those who later composed the various committees is given on Appendix A.

In Eastern Province the PDC was formed in 1966 but never met until 1970. The Central PDC was also formed in 1966, but never met until 1968. Their meetings have all along been rather infrequent as shown in the table below.
Table 4: NO. OF MEETINGS HELD BY EASTERN AND CENTRAL PDCs IN THE YEARS 1968 - 76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Province</th>
<th>Central Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: PPOs' files, Eastern and Central Provinces.

Meetings before 1971 were convened to discuss, almost specifically, the initiation of the SRDP and self-help projects. (Before the programme took root in 1971 discussions had to be held at district, provincial and national levels). In the years which followed the PDCs were chiefly concerned
with approving projects to be funded through self-help Grants by the Department of Social Services, the DDG and later the RWP. The difference in frequency of meetings in the two provinces may be attributed to the concern shown by the PC and/or the PPO. There is no indication that the PDCs involved themselves in planning at all. Their use has never been significant since their inception. By 1976 one PPO could confidently say that "at present there is no work for the PDC. It is the DDCs which seem to have any purpose these days." Indeed there has been no PDC meeting in Central Province since the middle of 1974. Meetings of the Eastern PDC do not seem to have much importance also.

District Development Committees were established in 1966 but did not operate until some time later. Records show that DDCs in Machakos, Murang'a and Meru started operating in 1967, 1968 and 1969, respectively. The frequency of meetings has been much higher than that of PDCs. This goes to show that not everything that went on in DDC meetings came before the PDCs. Like the PDCs, the DDCs were not involved

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in planning in the initial years. All the three districts studied were among the fourteen districts selected for the SRDP. In the first three years the DDCs were, therefore, engaged in the formulation of "shopping lists" for this programme. They also discussed the progress of self-help projects and made occasional remarks about the activities of the various Ministries. The little planning involvement the DDCs have had came about after 1974 when district planning was started. The frequency of meetings in the three districts until 1976 is shown on Table 5.

36 Although none of the three districts was among the first six districts under SRDP, and the second phase of the programme never took off, records show that these districts had started preparing for the programme.
TABLE 5: FREQUENCY OF DDC MEETINGS IN 3 DISTRICTS IN THE YEARS 1967 - 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MERU</th>
<th>MACHAKOS</th>
<th>MURANG'A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A - No records available.

Sources: Files from the PPO, Central Province, and DCs, Meru and Machakos Districts.
Variations in the frequency of DDC meetings between the Districts can only be explained by the level of commitment of different DCs and the importance they attached to these committees. In Meru, for example, the DC there from 1973 did not see much use for the DDC except to select projects for the RDF and self-help Grants. Machakos had a succession of three DCs who called meetings often, sometimes to discuss progress reports. It appears the difference had little connection with the volume of business at any one time.

Advisory committees never functioned at all or, if they did, no records of their meetings were made. The latter is however highly unlikely. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why advisory committees never took off at all. Jackson identifies three reasons:

(a) politicians refused to attend because they were not paid allowances;

(b) politicians like to criticize the decisions of administrators and they would lose some of their ability to criticize if they participated; and

(c) politicians may have realised that the advisory committees could not influence the government decisions on resource allocation.

This post-mortem is rather lop-sided. The civil servants were equally, if not more, to blame. Firstly, civil servants saw advisory committees as arenas for mere duplication of what went on in development committee meetings. Secondly, they were also not eager to meet with the politicians as the latter tend to criticize civil servants a lot. Politicians are usually not convinced civil servants work as much as they should. Thirdly, the PCs and DCs who were the chairmen of the advisory committees never bothered to convene meetings. Lastly, and on a neutral note, there actually did not appear to be any purpose of the advisory committees. It may be of interest to note that by 1970 the PC, Eastern Province, had suggested the inclusion of MPs in the PDC and DDC membership. They were eventually accepted into some DDCs and divisional development committees, notably in Machakos.

Generally one may say that both the development and advisory committees were innately incapable of making any meaningful contribution to planning for their areas and implementation of plans. They also lacked professional guidance from the government. One can only view with skepticism claims like "many development project proposals submitted by District and Provincial Development Committees (were) incorporated in this plan."^38

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There is evidence, though, that some areas, notably in Eastern Province, made some attempt to present their proposals. A letter emanating from the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and sent to the PC, Eastern Province, in May 1968 stated, inter alia:

I am thanking you, members of your Development Committees and your DCs for spending so much time and effort in producing district projects for the next Development Plan ......... I certainly hope that most of the promising ones will be included in the Development Plan.

The 1970 - 74 Development Plan did not include many - in case of Machakos, any - of these proposals. The proposals from the districts were either not promising or they were never looked at. Either way, this was rather demoralising to the committees. The reaction to this state of affairs was dramatised in a DDC meeting in Machakos in 1970. One of the minutes of the meeting ran like this:

Members of the committee wanted to know what had happened to the District proposals which had been submitted in 1968 during the Plan Preparation Exercise. They had noted with dismay that these proposals had not been incorporated into the plan, and that priorities assigned to local projects had not been accepted. They wanted to know whether their future work would only mean duplicating the 1968 paper exercise.

39 Machakos DDC, Minutes of the meeting held on April 13th, 1970 - Min. 4/70.
An expatriate present, apparently representing the PPO, could only say that the DDC had an important role to play in "Plan implementation" and went on to explain the purpose of the Project Planning and Evaluation Unit which had been set up in the MFP. It is justifiable to say that the committees never did much until much later when there was a change in the status of DDCs. The same goes with divisional and locational development committees which were created later and operated less consistently. The irregularity of meetings of development committees at these levels was, and still is, alarming.

In addition to the intrinsic ineffectiveness of the development committees, they were made even more so by their being looked down upon by the Ministries - notably - the Ministry of Works (before 1970 Ministry of Works, Communications and Power). This (works) Ministry's non-recognition went on until 1972. (It had even refused to implement DDG projects in 1971). This meant that Ministries did not bother to look at the recommendations - and criticisms - of the development committees. This also changed with time.

DISTRICT PLANNING

A change came in 1972 when decentralised planning was baptised District Planning, following a recommendation by the
Ndegwa Report\textsuperscript{40} and subsequent support by the ILO Report.\textsuperscript{41} The new approach that was being made towards rural development necessitated a revised planning organization such that each district would have its own plan (influenced by its peculiar socio-economic conditions). In a letter sent to PPOs in 1972, the Deputy Permanent Secretary (Planning) in the MFP stated the following:

As a step towards promotion of a more balanced development of different areas in the country and to stimulate the interest of field officers and local leaders in planned development, it is proposed to move shortly into formulation of plans for each district for implementation in the next Development Plan (period).\textsuperscript{42}

Guidelines on how these plans had to be formulated had to follow later, after which the planning process would have to be completed in "six weeks". Certainly this was a very short time in which to do the work and this would make the documents thereafter


\textsuperscript{41} ILO, op. cit., p. 318.

\textsuperscript{42} Circular letter from Deputy Permanent Secretary (Planning) in the MFP to all PPOs on May 19th, 1972.
formulated to lack force as far as "local participation" was concerned. (The planning exercise took some time to start and went on for over a year in some places). The Ndegwa Report had also recommended renovated development committees which would be made up of the old development committees and the advisory committees, plus a few local leaders. The new development committees had to take local planning as their major role. This recommendation was later accepted by the MFP. A list of those who are supposed to be on PDCs and DDCs is given on Appendix B. To facilitate smooth and effective planning the DDOs, who were expected to be knowledgeable in planning, project evaluation and budgetary procedures, were to be responsible for guiding the DDCs. The first group of DDOs started working in January 1975, long after some district plan drafts had been sent to Nairobi.

43 The office of the DDO was first proposed by the Ndegwa Report, op. cit., p. 113, along with that of the District Planning Officer (DPO) who was to be the former's helper. The office of the DPO has never been established.

44 In the early months of 1973 a few districts (Machakos was one) were given some officers, on an experimental basis, to take up the duties of DDOs. They were attached to DCs and were referred to as "District Officers (Planning)". They were frustrated by the Provincial Administration in less than two months and reposted as ordinary DOs. It is also said that most of them had failed to impress the PS, MFP, who did not support them.
Briefly the planning process had to be as follows. The DDC was to identify projects and programmes which would be undertaken in the District in the plan period (1974-78). The plan had to include a share of the programmes that had to be financed by the various Ministries and also projects to be given funds from the DDG. The field government officers had of course, to be involved fully in this exercise. The draft chapters were then to be sent to the PDC for comments. At both levels the PPO was the secretary to the committees and was to edit each district plan.

The comments of the PDC and the draft chapters were to be sent to the MFP headquarters where they would be scrutinised by a committee of officers in the Rural Planning Unit. These were the people to produce the final draft plan for publication. Perhaps due to the time limit and the apparent weakness of the development committees at the time, this procedure, simple as it may seem, was not followed. Let us see what actually happened in the three districts.

The plans for Machakos and Meru were prepared by a planning team in the PPO's office, Embu, from about the middle of 1973. A minute of a Machakos DDC meeting in June 1973
stated the following:

The Planning Team (the PPO had reported) intends to visit Government officers at divisional level and also any interested persons in Machakos. This exercise is to make the Team acquainted with the local needs and resources and also to see for themselves the area for which they intend to plan.

A programme covering all the Divisions (seven in all) was released in the same meeting. The programme covered a period of seven days starting the day following the DDC meeting. This situation raises some interesting points. First, that the time the Team was in the field was so short that the Team could not possibly have collected enough data to facilitate them to write a good plan. Second, the officers and "other interested persons" were caught unawares and could not have been ready with the necessary information at such short notice. Third, the local people were certainly denied the chance to offer their project priorities for consideration. Lastly, the DDC as an institution was given no chance to discuss the proposals submitted. This was a virtual contrast of what was expected to happen. (It is evident, though, that the DDC was expected to discuss the draft chapters of the National Plan, which were already in circulation). When the planning team finished its work, the draft plan was verified by the PPO and later sent to Nairobi.

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45 Machakos DDC, Minutes of the meeting held on June 11th, 1973 - MIN. 17/73.
It was not found necessary, or there was no time, to allow the PDC to discuss the plan. It was also overlooked, therefore. The same thing happened with the Meru Plan. It appears, however, that those concerned were given a bit more time to prepare for the Team's visit. This, however, did not alter the fact that local participation in the planning process was almost nil.

In Murang'a a different style was used. Here the identification of projects was done by District heads of departments. This exercise started some time in 1974. These proposals finally reached the PPO through the Provincial heads of departments. Early in 1974 the PPO wrote to Provincial heads of departments asking for "the breakdown of individual and miscellaneous projects...... for inclusion in the District Plans for Central Province." By the time this request was made some officers had simply not received any information from the districts. They had therefore to send proposals of their own choice. Two officers in Murang'a admitted having not sent any proposals for their departments and yet found "some proposals" in the District Plan. After the PPO had compiled the draft plan he sent it to Nairobi.

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46 Letter from the PPO, Nyeri, to Provincial Heads of Departments on April 1st, 1974.

47 Personal Communication, October, 1976.
Like in Machakos and Meru, planning in Murang'a did not involve the local people in any way. The apparatus of the DDC and PDC were not used either. Even without going into the contents of the plans, therefore, it is clear that the basic principle of district planning was not adhered to. What then did these irregularities mean?

(1) The fact that the district plans were prepared in 1974 and 1975, when the national plan was already out, meant that most of what appeared in them was extracted from the national plan and the Development Estimates for 1975/76. The only exception was projects which had to be financed through the RDF. The plans were, therefore, disaggregates of the national plan.

(2) The plans ended up being partly a report of what was happening in the districts at the time of preparation and partly a "shopping list" for projects desired without relating them to possible revenue. The districts had no control of any funds whatsoever and so could not plan with confidence. The PPO, Eastern Province, had an interesting suggestion as to what these plans really were. He seems to agree that the districts could not properly set their own targets when he says:
The District Plans are expected to closely resemble the national plan. In other words, the district is supposed to plan the implementation of the national policies.

(3) The plans never became sources for the national plan as it was expected. No change in central planning was effected to give any special place for the district plans. Except for the RDF projects, therefore, it was the national plan programmes which were important. It should also not be forgotten that the Ministries occasionally come up with programmes outside the Development Plan, thus overshadowing district plan proposals.

A STRATEGY FOR FUTURE PLANNING

It appears there is not going to be any great change in the way the 1978-83 national plan and district plans will be prepared. One would expect the district plans to come out before the national plan so as to base the latter on the former. The same seems to have been the feeling in government.

circles, but there appears to be no serious commitment.

In an address to DDOs, who were on a course at the Kenya Institute of Administration, The Minister for Finance and Planning made the following observations concerning district planning:

A primary objective is to utilize district plans in the preparation of the next National Development Plan. In the past national planning has consisted of largely "planning from the top" and subsequently disaggregating the components to the district level. This process will be reversed by basing the national plan on comprehensive district plans. You, the DDOs, will of course play a major role in this exercise.

It seems this is not going to be the case. The most likely thing to happen is that the two types of plans will come out at the same time. But should this be the case? One MFP official, when discussing the way the last district plans had been prepared, explained, "we had to start somewhere, we hope to have much better plans next time and they will come out before the national plan." If this was earnestly expected, then something went wrong.

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49 Minister for Finance and Planning, Speech closing the DDOs' induction course at KIA on June 23rd, 1976. (The speech was read on behalf of the Minister by an Assistant Minister).

50 It is understood that by mid-1977 directives had been sent to Ministries to start preparing their sectoral plans and to Districts to start on their plans.
somewhere. It is also doubtful that with the little time remaining the DDCs and local people are going to be fully involved in planning.

What is required is a planning process where the people in locational and, if possible, in village development committees will say what they want for their areas. The various hierarchical committees should be involved without being rushed. Of course, services of government officers are going to be very necessary. After all they have the technical know-how and can assess the implementability of the various projects. They should, however, not be the ones to choose the projects as it has been in the past. The local people do not view the projects as theirs when such a situation prevails. The local planning organisation, which has existed largely in theory, should be used more vigorously. This organisation is shown on Figure 2.

Two other changes are also necessary. The first is that membership of development committees should be expanded to include a wider range of people. They should not include only government officers and senior politicians as it is at present. Businessmen and farmers need to be represented. Religious leaders could also be helpful. The various cooperative unions and societies should be represented too.
Figure 2.

LOCAL PLANNING ORGANISATION IN KENYA

MFP

Rural Planning Unit

RDP

District Planning

Provincial Planning Officer

Provincial Dev. Committee

Other Departments

District Development Officer

District Dev. Committee

Divisional Dev. Committee

Locational Dev. Committee

Local People
In this way it can be ensured that the views of the committees are more representative of the wishes of the people. The second change is that more publicity should be made about the planning role of the development committees. At present few members (let alone the general public) realise that they are expected to play this role. For instance, out of the 40 DDC members interviewed in the three districts only 13 of them said that planning was the main work of the DDC (see Table 6).

Table 6: Distribution of DDC members who mentioned planning as the main work of the committee.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Planning Mentioned</th>
<th>Not Mentioned</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machakos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murang'a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table more or less shows that this important role of the DDC has not been grasped yet. The most popular role mentioned was "selecting projects to be financed through the RDF" followed by "to coordinate the activities of the various Ministries".
For district planning to be successful the districts need to have some control of the development funds from the Treasury. Each district should have a known amount of money to be used with some autonomy as long as it is accounted for. This is, I would think, why the government insists on having DDOs who are qualified economists. In the following chapters we shall focus on the efforts which have been made to give the DDCs a monetary incentive in order to make district planning more meaningful. It is assumed here that local officials and leaders would take the planning business more seriously when there is money to be given to the projects they identify for their respective areas - with minimum control from the top.

SUMMARY

The exploration of the history of planning in Kenya clearly reveals that the planning has been very centralised, both before and after independence. Even after district planning was introduced no major changes were made to give this planning strategy much practical meaning. The idea of "development from below" cannot therefore be said to be taken seriously in Kenya. It has been shown how the first district development plans were prepared. The process not only lacked "local participation" but even those who took part did not give it adequate attention.
One could justifiably say that, although the RDF programme is supposed to be implemented in a framework of decentralised planning, the latter has taken too long and, for political reasons, it has been quite difficult, to establish. The RDF programme is but one of a number of programmes in the rural areas for which planning is necessary. Until district planning takes practical form, and in a manner that will involve the various local interest groups, development efforts will continue missing the rural poor as these efforts are likely to be directed to areas of less priority.
CHAPTER TWO

FINANCING PLANNED DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter we shall show that Kenya's development programmes have been implemented largely with foreign resources and that finances have generally been scarce. These two factors, in addition to the administrative problems of relating revenues to expenditures, have played a great part in creating the urban-rural disparities. This has meant that the rural areas, and especially the economically marginal ones, have not benefited much from development finances. A move towards changing this situation (though in a rather mild way) came with the introduction of programmes intended only for the rural areas. These will be introduced, in a historical perspective, at the end of the chapter.

Sources of Development Finance

From the colonial days most of Kenya's development funds have come from outside the country, chiefly from Britain. For example, a forecast for funds which would be available for recurrent and development expenditure during 1954-57 (the first three-year Development Programme period) indicated that
about 96.3% of the money would come from outside Kenya.\(^1\)

Most of this had to come from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote and loans from the London money market. During the 1957-60 period, it was expected that 86.8%\(^2\) of the money needed to implement the plan would come from outside and in 1960-63 about 86.9%\(^3\) of the expected revenue was to come from outside Kenya. The total amounts of money expected in the three plan periods were £21.6 million, £23.3 million and £26.5 million, respectively. The money that was raised locally came from taxes and charges on services from development projects. Local funds were limited because the European settlers and Asians, who had resources with which to pay taxes, were few. The African population was basically poor and very little could be extorted from them. As mentioned in chapter 1 little of this money went to the development of African areas.

After independence Kenya's political leadership chose to rely on foreign aid and capital for the development of the country. In 1964, the Prime Minister had the following to say:


Rapid growth also requires the cooperation of other countries. We need external assistance both to finance Government development projects and to provide technical advice on managing development.4

In an endeavour to attract more and more foreign assistance, which was considered indispensable for development, the country embarked on raising economic growth (and hence per capita income) and ignored the question of distribution. It was hoped that before long the country would rely less on foreign aid and more on domestic resources for development. During the Kericho Conference in 1966, Jetha expressed this possibility, though on a regretful note. He said:

The practice of restricting foreign aid to the direct import content of the projects included in development plans is being increasingly adopted by the donors. As the direct import content of Kenya's development expenditure amounts to only around 20% of the total, if this policy were rigidly applied to Kenya, 80% of the development expenditures would have to be financed from local resources. This would make it impossible to utilize aid on the scale on which it has been used.5

What Jetha, who was then a Planning Officer in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, did not tell his colleagues, and what actually happened, was that Kenya had also the option of directing this aid to more economic projects in order to ensure large amounts of foreign aid. This meant that, in addition to urban areas getting the lion's share of development funds, the more developed of the rural areas had to have more than the marginal areas. Though the general trend has been that the percentage of external revenue has been going down, in real terms the yearly figures have been going up. The exceptions to this trend were the years 1965/67 and 1973/74. The continued pumping in of foreign aid - both loans and grants - and foreign investments has been facilitated by the Foreign Act of 1964 which allowed easy outflow of profits from Kenya. The table below shows the distribution of development Revenue, by source, in the years 1964/65 - 1976/77.
Table 7: Development Revenue, by source, for the years 1964/65 - 1976/77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>External Sources* (£m.)</th>
<th>Internal Sources (£m.)</th>
<th>Total (£m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964/65</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>15.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>14.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>15.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>15.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>29.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>11.14</td>
<td>12.11</td>
<td>23.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>28.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>24.95</td>
<td>21.91</td>
<td>46.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>17.64</td>
<td>19.43</td>
<td>37.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>28.29</td>
<td>15.84</td>
<td>44.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>50.66</td>
<td>52.80</td>
<td>103.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77**</td>
<td>59.90</td>
<td>25.30</td>
<td>85.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td>199.37</td>
<td>186.62</td>
<td>385.99</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* On average, excluding figures for 1976/77, about 78.3% of external resources were in loans and the remainder in grants.

** The figures given were shown as provisional.

*** These totals exclude the 1976/77 figures because they had not been confirmed.

The percentage of foreign aid to the total government development expenditure in 1975/76 and the provisional figures for 1976/77 seem to dispel any possibilities of the Government cutting down on foreign aid. It would appear, therefore, that this dependence on the more prosperous countries will continue in future - predictably in a higher scale. Foreign aid has been coming from the more developed countries of the West including Britain, U.S.A., West Germany, Canada and the Scandinavian nations, and from multi-lateral sources like the World Bank, the IDA and the IMF, which, incidentally, are dominated by the countries mentioned above. Initially, Britain was the chief source of foreign assistance, mainly giving loans for resettlement of Africans in the former "White Highlands" (by buying out the European owners)\textsuperscript{6}, but gradually her contribution was surpassed by that of other countries and organisations.

This dependence on foreign resources is a neo-colonial relationship which may have many economic and political implications. It has been argued above that this situation tends to make a government forsake areas which are less endowed with economic potential. Decision-making in the recipient country is also influenced by the donors. This is so because aid is given with conditions, donors have project

\textsuperscript{6} By mid-1977 Britain had given Kenya foreign aid totalling £48 million for resettlement purposes - \textit{Daily Nation} (Nairobi, June 1st, 1977).
preferences and, almost always, aid is accompanied by personnel of a nature or another. Though underrating the role donors can play in influencing decisions in the recipient country, Lacey writes as follows:

To be sure, judgements about this (suitability of projects to be aided) are not always easy to make and donor agencies may have considerable influence in the decision. There are numerous channels through which donor agencies can express their project interests and in fact the identification and evaluation of projects can be important functions performed by aid agencies.7

In addition, the donors tend to have a lot of influence in respect to the projects which should be included in plans. Vente has the following to say on this issue:

...... much of the planning business is influenced by the attempt to please potential aid donors towards planning.8

Brokensha and Hodge have the same view:

Very often the stimulus for community (and economic) development program(me)s comes from the donor nations rather than the host countries (which should be the ones to initiate).....9


Waterston, in reference to countries whose individual ministries negotiate for foreign loans separately, paints even a grimmer picture of the planning process. He says:

Economic planning is reduced to little more than an effort to coordinate the various assistance programs sponsored by foreigners.¹⁰

Brokensha and Hodge were writing about community development in former colonial countries whereas Waterston was writing about economic planning generally. They all had a common view, however, regarding developing countries vis-a-vis the "developed" countries as far as the latter's aid was concerned. The aid relationship maintains a colonial-type dependence of the recipient country on the donor. As Caiden and Wildavsky aptly put it, "the tail of foreign aid wags the domestic expenditure dog."¹¹

Dependence on foreign resources has quite unfavorable implications at the local level. It has already been mentioned that the rural areas are disadvantaged because they lack many "economically viable" projects. Donors have often been unwilling to invest in the rural areas. It has been difficult,

¹⁰ A. Waterston, op. cit., p. 405.

¹¹ N. Caiden and A. Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 296.
for example, to band together a number of agricultural holdings into one viable unit which would qualify for foreign aid.

Reliance on foreign assistance has not been only financial. Kenya has greatly been reliant on technical assistance from various foreign countries ranging from Britain, India and the Scandinavian countries. This seems to have been the case in all Ministries. In the Planning Department of the MFP, for instance, every section had one or more advisors at the end of 1976. These advisors could be traced down to the provincial level. It has all along been hoped that sooner or later the country would dispense with foreign technical assistance. As early as 1970, Robert Jackson hoped that because of the recent scheme of service for economists and the Bachelor of Philosophy (Economics) programme which had been introduced at the University of Nairobi dependence on foreign "experts" would be reduced. He, however, cautioned that:

\[ \text{......this will not decrease the present dependence upon expatriate trained economists until the later stages of the current (1970-74) development plan.} \]

\[ 12 \]

R. H. Jackson, op. cit., p. 188.
In 1977 one cannot say that this dependence has ceased; the table below shows that the reduction in numbers over the years has been very minimal. If any serious steps have been taken to do away with foreign expertise the rate of reduction should have been much higher. We find, for instance, that within a space of six months in 1971 there was an increase of 326. This was a tremendous hike in so short a period and it is doubtful this was warranted.


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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Experts</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Experts*</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1268</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>955</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>721</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2730</td>
<td>2839</td>
<td>2627</td>
<td>2578</td>
<td>2904</td>
<td>2854</td>
<td>2802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Most of the operational personnel were supplied by Britain under the British Overseas Service Scheme.

Whereas it cannot be said that these expatriates have all not been needed (and, of course, some were more needed than others) it may be suggested that too much reliance on them, as it has been in Kenya, causes difficulties in line- and-staff relationships. There is a tendency for the expatriate personnel to assume too much and try their hand at operations they are not capable of handling. The author is, for example, aware of a "water engineer" who, eight months after he had been sent to a district to "advise" the Rural Water Officer there, had not grasped the technicalities of his duties.

Development programmes in Kenya have relied on foreign finance for implementation also because local finances, like in all other developing countries, have been meagre. Sources of local finance have been few and the yields from each have been limited. Local sources include: taxes (income tax, customs and excise duties, export tax, sales tax and, until 1973, Graduated Personal Tax); charges for goods and services;

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13 J.B. Westcott, "Governmental Organisation and Methods in Developing Countries" in I. Swerdlow, op. cit., p. 52, has interesting views. He says that in India and Pakistan Advisory (expatriate) staff, where they existed, were not fully used. The article by G.C. Abbott, "Why Visiting Economists Fail: An Alternative Interpretation" in Journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration (Vol. 54, Spring, 1976) is also relevant.

14 Until 1971 GPT revenues went to local authorities. So did school fees revenues. When, in that year, the central government took over responsibilities for schools, health centres and roads, it also took over control of these revenue sources. GPT was wholly abolished in June 1973.
interest on and repayment of loans; and local borrowing. Revenue yields from local sources have been low because the national income has been low (as such taxation could not yield much revenue) and local saving has been consequently low. There are also administrative problems which make it difficult for the government to realise substantial amounts from local sources. First, a good number of tax-payers are self-employed persons who are difficult to tax adequately. Many do not (some actually cannot) keep books of accounts and this makes it difficult for them to be assessed properly. Others try as much as possible to evade taxation. When such cases become prevalent the individuals prosper whereas government development programmes do not get completed, or do not get started at all, for lack of funds. Second, some tax-payers are in the rural areas where the economy has not been fully monetised. The non-monetary part of the national income is either difficult to assess for taxation or the tax officials are not aware of it at all. The continuing sub-division of large farms also adds to the problem. Lastly, the Finance Ministry, like all others, lacks adequate personnel. This makes it difficult for all revenue avenues to be explored and exploited. The existing sources are also not exhausted. The Capital Gains Tax which was introduced in 1976, for instance, has not been easy to collect.
Problems of Relating Plan Targets to Available Resources

In Chapter 1 it was argued that development planning has little meaning unless the document that is prepared is implemented; in other words, plan goals should be achieved as far as possible for continued planning (which is an expensive exercise) to be justified. In Kenya it has not been possible to implement all programmes included in development plans. Reasons for this have been multifarious.

1. Political reasons have played some part in this failure to adhere to planned targets. The government, like others in the developing world, operates in an aura of instability. The government has to constantly keep on substituting some new projects or programmes for some planned ones in order to contain any overt discontent from the various sections of the society. Since the resources are very limited and the needs are numerous, the government finds it difficult to keep all sections of the society satisfied. Planning cannot eliminate discrimination. Adjustments are, therefore, always inevitable to rectify oversights made by planners.
2. Economic factors have also played a part. In the course of plan implementation new information and ideas come up. Some projects, erstwhile thought to be economically viable, are found out of tune with the current economic demands. Others are found to be unimplementable under the prevailing conditions. Such projects cannot be implemented just for the sake of seeing all that is in the plan "implemented". They are, therefore, left out. For the same reasons, new projects are conceived during plan implementation and, if found viable, are substituted for those which are dropped. New proposals may originate with the Ministries concerned or with the development committees which operate throughout the country.

3. The major problems which make it difficult for plans to be implemented are financial. These problems include: poor estimation of revenues and expenditures; fluctuations in world prices; miscalculation of the national income; and domination of the national revenue by current expenditure. We shall briefly discuss each of these problems separately.
In planning, like in budgeting, an attempt is made to relate revenue to expenditure. An overestimation of revenue or underestimation of expenditure would mean that the planned projects would not all be implemented. Reverse estimations, *ceteris paribus*, would result in surplus funds after all projects have been implemented. The author is not aware of any time this has happened. Occasionally various Ministries have returned funds to the Treasury at financial-year ends but this was not because they had implemented all their programmes. In revenue estimation consideration is made of all possible sources - both external and local. Whereas it is easy to estimate revenue from outside (it only requires an assurance from the donor that a given amount would be provided) it is not so easy estimating revenue from local sources. Even the foreign funds are not always provided as expected. For example, although the 1966-70 Development Plan had projected foreign aid in the sums of £11.0 million, £12.5 million, £14.0 million and £15.5 million for the years 1966/77, 1967/68, 1968/69 and 1969/70, respectively, much smaller amounts were in the end made available (see Table 7). Overestimation of local revenue may be due to wrong information, false expectations or mere ambition. Economic conditions in the country greatly determine how much

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revenue can be collected at any given time.

Underestimation in expenditure occurs due to lack of information regarding the proposed projects (a problem very relevant in respect to rural projects), rises in costs of implementation and technical incapacity of those responsible for estimating expenditures. It is, for example, easier to estimate expenditure on housing projects in a town than a water project in a remote rural area. If the government finds it difficult to make annual budgets (this is evidenced by preparation of what are commonly referred to as "mini budgets" and non-implementation of some budgeted projects) then it can be appreciated that estimation of revenues and expenditures on long-term programmes can be a very difficult exercise. Caiden and Wildavsky write the following:

Poor countries have trouble budgeting because they lack accurate information on expenditures and revenues, knowledge of economic changes, political continuity, and resources to hedge off uncertainties. The difficulties they have in planning are reflected in miniature in the field of budgeting.16

The above problem is aggravated by fluctuations in world prices. Kenya's economy depends on agriculture.

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She exports agricultural products and imports manufactured goods from more developed countries. The prices of goods, either exports or imports, are normally determined outside the country. A rise in the price of imports or a fall in the prices of exports creates an unfavourable situation in the balance of payments and the economy suffers. More often than not it is the developing countries which suffer when there are changes in world prices. When some of the imports are capital goods - that is, they are supposed to go to the implementation of development programmes - one outcome is inevitable. The funds available would not complete these programmes. As a consequence, some programmes are not implemented. Early in 1975 the Government officially stated that certain projects should be considered as removed from the 1974-78 Development Plan. This was as a result of the economic recession brought about by hikes in oil prices (causing price increases the world over) from the end of 1973. Many projects had been left unimplemented during the previous plan periods without such pronouncements.

Miscalculation of the national income (or the Gross National Product) growth rate may also create problems in planning development. The assumption here is that a country cannot estimate an expenditure growth rate higher than the GNP growth rate plus the foreign aid increase.
The recurrent expenditure has a tendency to grow all the time (see Appendix D), at times at a rate higher than that of the GNP. Any time there is an economic recession, or actual revenues fall short of expectations, it is the development expenditure that has to be curtailed in the end. This, again, means that some development projects are left unimplemented.

Related to this is the fact that most of the government recurrent expenditure is always above 70% of the total. For example, the percentages of development expenditures in 1965/66, 1970/71, 1973/74 and 1975/76 financial years were 18.4%, 29.0%, 20.4% and 24.3%, respectively. What this means then is that development projects, once completed, cannot yield much revenue on their own (considering the fact that they also give rise to some recurrent expenditure).

When all the problems discussed above act in unison the planning process is turned into a mere game of chance rather than a purposeful exercise. It is difficult for a country like Kenya to get rid of these problems overnight. They can however be moderated. Perhaps then there can be cause to boast that what is planned is actually implemented. And in this way the purpose and need for planning can be fully justified.

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17 These percentages are calculated from the figures given on Appendix D.
Local Authorities and Rural Development

It has been shown that the rural areas have in the past benefited little from government development programmes. This is not to discount the contribution made by local authorities which over the years have played some role in rural development. But their efforts have been limited, just as their finances have been meagre. By the time of independence there were seven County Councils, and twenty-six urban and rural District Councils, all in settler areas. These had powers of taxation and received grants from the central government. They were also financed through the Local Government Loans Authority. There were also thirty-three African District Councils to forge some local development in limited areas. These had very limited funds and were supposed to spend them on education and health facilities. This meant that there were actually no funds to put into capital projects.18

After independence settler and African Local authorities were put together into a two-tier system. There were Municipal and Town Councils for the urban areas, and, of course, Nairobi City Council, on the one hand and, on the other hand, each

18 Most of the information in this paragraph was got from IBRD, op. cit., p. 12.
administrative district was to have a County Council. Some districts had also area councils. Sources of finance for County Councils have been grants from the central government, cesses, rates, Graduated Personal Tax and school fees. Councils ceased to receive revenue from the last two sources in 1973. County Councils have been operating, and still operate, chiefly in the rural areas. It has been shown elsewhere that rural incomes are low, and the process of funds collection rather difficult. Councils have, therefore, had very little money at their disposal. The programmes undertaken by Councils have consequently been small and limited in number. These have included minor water supplies, housing, education, health and roads. Councils handed over responsibilities for education, health and roads to the central government at the same time that they ceased to control the revenue sources mentioned above. The table below shows that local authorities in Kenya have had very low expenditures, due to meagre resources. It is quite evident that the money available to County Councils could not in any way transform the rural areas. Most of this money went to recurrent expenditure.

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Area Councils were abolished throughout the country in 1974 for financial reasons.
Table 9: Expenditures by Local Authorities in Kenya, 1967-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures by Municipal Councils* (£million)</th>
<th>Expenditures by County Councils (£ million)</th>
<th>Total (£million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>23.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>13.76</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>28.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>19.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>16.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>19.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>22.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>22.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>33.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975**</td>
<td>26.70</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>30.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976**</td>
<td>28.07</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>34.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes figures for Nairobi City Council.

** These were only estimates.

It has been shown that over the years it has been difficult for government Ministry programmes to reach the rural areas to an extent that would be described as equitable. It has also been argued that County Councils, though operating in a framework of financial decentralisation, have not been effective in transforming the rural areas. As a result rural-urban migration has been a continuing and increasing phenomenon. Living conditions have not been improving fast enough to keep pace with those of urbanites. These could have been the reasons (or, perhaps, some of them) which prompted the government to look for other ways of effecting rural development. There are in mind (1) the experimental SRDP which was the forerunner of (2) the DDG, and (3) the RWP.

In the rest of this chapter we shall examine the factors which led to the introduction of each, in temporal order, and also how the RDF came about.

An Introduction to the Rural Development Fund

The rural Development Fund has its origin in the SRDP which was the first attempt by the Kenya Government to fund an integrated rural programme. This was on an experimental basis as the experiences of the SRDP were to be replicated in the whole country.
The Special Rural Development Programme

In September 1966 a conference was held at Kericho, Kenya, to find out how an integrated rural development strategy could be undertaken in the country. A committee selected by those who attended the conference recommended fourteen pilot areas in fourteen districts which had differing economic and social conditions. The districts were Kwale, Taita-Taveta, Embu, Machakos, Meru, Muranga, Nyeri, Baringo, Nandi, West Pokot, Kisii, South Nyanza, Busia and Kakamega. The purpose of this integrated approach to rural development was "to raise the incomes of farmers, the opportunities for employment both on and off the farm and the direct contribution of education and training to this result." The idea was therefore to help the "ruralites" to move from a subsistence to a diversified market economy - but without overhauling the economic system.

A survey was subsequently carried out in the fourteen districts in 1968 to identify the development potential and requirements for each area. This was done under the guidance of the University of Nairobi.

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20 The subject of the conference was "Education, Employment and Rural Development". See J.R. Sheffield, op. cit., for the proceedings.

21 Circular from the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development to "field Officers" on November 9th, 1968.
The government accepted the recommendations which followed but decided to launch the programme in only six areas to start with. The other areas had to be dealt with later. The first National Rural Development Committee (comprising the Permanent Secretaries in the Office of the President, Treasury and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, the Deputy Secretary in the Office of the President, and an expatriate advisor) met in March 1969 and selected six areas: Tetu (Nyeri), Vihiga (Kakamaga), Migori (South Nyanza), Kapenguria (West Pokot), Yatta (Machakos), and South Kwale. Yatta was latter replaced with Mbere in Embu.

It was clear from the very beginning that the SRDP could not get off on local funds alone. The cooperation (assistance) of foreign countries and agencies - World Bank, UNDP, USAID, etc. - had to be sought. The result was that five areas had to rely on foreign grants and the sixth on funds from the Kenya Government:

- Migori - SIDA/FAO
- Vihiga - USAID
- Kwale - Britain
- Mbere - NORAD
- Kapenguria - Netherlands
- Tetu - Kenya Government.

This financial arrangement had to create some problems later. First, the donors turned out to have a lot of say regarding what projects should be undertaken. Second, the donors also
sent in a good number of their "experts" who greatly influenced the actual implementation of the programme. Lastly, it was not very easy to exploit local resources. It may also be mentioned that some Ministries took advantage of the SRDP finances to complete some of their on-going projects.

The programme started in the 1970/71 financial year and involved the employment of extra resources in the experimental areas but without curtailing the existing services and development programmes. The projects undertaken under this programme included: improvement of crop and stock farming; credit facilities to shops dealing with farm inputs; family planning to check the rapidly rising population; functional literacy expansion; and public works to create employment opportunities for the "ruralites". The programme was to act as a model for the whole country. It was hoped that the experiences of the SRDP would be replicated in all areas of the country in later years.

The projects initiated played a big role in raising agricultural and commercial output in these areas. The development committees in the SRDP areas had a chance to get involved in planning and implementation of selected projects. To some small extent, too, the local citizens participated in planned development, especially on projects which required local financial and labour contributions - like in public works (access roads, bush clearing, etc.) on which employment avenues had to be created for the local people. To make it possible to raise agricultural, commercial and industrial output it was also necessary to improve extension
services, education, health and other public services. These, however, seem to have been overlooked in favour of raising agricultural production. Reduction of unemployment in the SRDP areas, also an important function of the programme, was not being realised as expected. On the whole the SRDP succeeded in its development function but did not do as well in setting models for replication.22

There were a number of factors which impeded a smooth running of the SRDP and which had to be avoided, as far as possible, in subsequent programmes. First, there were not enough field officers in the areas to ensure that the principles of SRDP were adhered to, and those available did not have adequate knowledge and skills in their fields. This meant that implementation of projects was not very perfect. Second, there was not enough organisation in terms of coordination and integration, chiefly because the Area Coordinators had very many responsibilities without adequate matching powers. The Area Coordinators could therefore not handle the technical officers sufficiently. This was coupled with the indignation (at least in the initial years) with which the SRDP was viewed by the Provincial Administration, an institution whose support is extremely necessary for any programme to succeed. Third,

22 The implementation of the SRDP is documented in a number of papers by the IDS, notably Occasional Paper No. 8, An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme (1972) and Occasional Paper No. 12, The Second Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme (1975).
the participation of the local people was not high enough and so the officials responsible for implementation were finding it difficult to get their (local people's) cooperation. Lastly, as mentioned above, there was too much expatriate involvement in these areas. The expatriates were involved partly as representatives of the donor agencies and partly because the Kenya Government felt that the local officers were not good enough to implement the programme on their own. This created constant antagonisms between the expatriates and local officers which were not conducive to smooth administration of the SRDP. These and other problems had plagued the SRDP to a point of collapse (indeed Colin Leys claims the SRDP died in 1971\textsuperscript{23}) but it managed to persist for a period of six years.

The SRDP was not extended to the other eight areas. Two reasons may be advanced for this. First, the programme, in its original form, was too expensive to be tried in other areas without making it a discriminating venture. This was so because the programme would end up developing some areas quite highly without necessarily bringing in new lessons and experiences for replication. Second, the government had already realised, even in the first year of the SRDP, that there were aspects of it which were important for national applicability. What was necessary, then, was a

\footnotesize{Colin Leys, op. cit., p. 230.}
programme which would cover the whole country rather than
selected areas. After all the 1970-74 Development Plan had
suggested a strategy to "direct an increasing share of the
total resources available to the nation toward the rural
areas." The SRDP officially came to an end at the end of
1976.

The District Development Grants Programme

Though by 1971 the SRDP had had no notable results the
government decided to start a programme akin to it in a
national scale. This was the DDG programme. The programme
started with a modest sum of only £100,000 with each province
getting £14,000. This was a small amount of money compared
with the money the government was spending on development
programmes through other channels. The DDG were to come
from the vote of the MFP and were intended to "stimulate
the initiative of DDCs and to encourage them to take increasingly
active interest in planned local development." What is
important is not the magnitude of the grants but rather their
significance as a new approach for raising the level of

25 Circular from the Permanent Secretary, Treasury, to PCs and
PPOs on November 3rd, 1971.
development in the rural areas. Prior to this programme, every Ministry was allocated money - for both recurrent and development expenditure - and each would in turn apportion the money to programmes across the country. There being limited resources the rural areas tended to gain little as most of the development programmes were located in the urban areas. Apparently there was no way of ensuring that the rural areas got an equitable share of the money. The DDG therefore symbolised a step forward, in favour of the rural areas, because this meant that there was a known sum of money that would not be subjected to the urban-rural competition in the development process. The programme had, however, some inherent flaws - in addition to the sum being too small - which made it incapable of eliminating the development inequalities between the various rural districts.

Development committees were to be responsible for identifying the projects which were to be given funds from the "block grants". Complete autonomy in this respect was denied the committees as all proposals had to be sent to the MFP in Nairobi, through the PPO, for approval. A number of conditions respecting the types of projects and their nature were laid down to guide the development committees when identifying projects. This was partly to ensure uniformity in the implementation of the programme and partly to maintain some control over these development committees. (It was never the policy of the Kenya
Government to do away with central coordination and control as this would ultimately result in strengthening local identities which would jeopardise national integration). The conditions given included the following:

1. Only projects which would not ordinarily give rise to recurrent expenditure were to be chosen. If any recurrent expenditure was expected the operating Ministry would have to meet it as no DDG allocations would be made for that purpose. Alternatively the local people would have to meet the recurrent expenditure. Like in the case of the SRDP, there were outside countries and organisations which had promised grants but would not allow any amount of these grants to go to recurrent expenditure. What this meant, then, was that the DDG would go to only small projects whose recurrent expenditure would not be very high.

2. The projects chosen had to conform with the objectives of the National Development Plan. This would ensure that an experience of the self-help movement, where numerous projects had mushroomed without coordination or control, would not be repeated. It also meant that these grants would not normally go to the existing self-help projects. As it turned out, however,
such a requirement could not be met, as the local people were also expected to make contributions towards these projects, and most of the grants went to "harambee" projects. The PPOs (and later DDOs) were expected to play a big role in advising development committees as to which projects met this condition.

3. The projects chosen had also to contribute significantly to the improvement of the local planning machinery and capacity. Basically, this was an ambiguous condition. What this meant, perhaps, was that these projects should strengthen the capability of the development committees to plan further for their areas. One cannot say with certainty whether this condition was met or not.

4. The projects should be easy to implement with the existing resources - personnel, transport, tools, etc. - without halting the existing activities by operating Ministries. This implied that the approval of a project by the development committee and the allocation of funds by the Treasury was not enough to have the project implemented. The operating Ministry had to accept the responsibility considering the available resources and the work-load already at hand. This had, and has continued, to act as the major constraint in the implementation of DDC projects.
5. Priority in project selection had to be given to projects with direct economic benefits to the local people. Where this was not possible the projects should play a "complementary" role - i.e. the existence of such projects should facilitate the implementation of other projects in the area. For example, a road may be constructed to facilitate the construction of a dip. "Welfare" projects, like health centres, schools, nursery centres, etc, had to be left out. Consequently the projects which qualified for DDG were cattle dips, fish ponds, dam construction, afforestation, soil conservation, flood control, minor road construction, minor irrigation schemes, minor water supplies and promotion of food crops (crop bulking). As it was then, these projects included those with a small labour component, like cattle dips, and those with a high labour component, like soil conservation. The latter category was later placed under the RWP.

6. No project would be given all the money needed to complete it. The local people were expected to contribute a portion, at times more than half, of the estimated cost. This was to bring complications as some areas could either not raise the required money or the collection would take so long that the project would end up not being started.
at all. The money allocated to a project by the Treasury was not to be released until local contributions had been made. In the initial years of this programme some money had to be returned to the Treasury due to this condition.

Once project proposals had passed through the hierarchy of development committees the PPO was expected to send the proposals, with relevant information filled on a prescribed proforma, to the Treasury. MFP officials would approve these proposals or reject them; the decisions would be based on the information on these proformas. If the proposals were approved the DDC would be asked, through the PPO, to make detailed plans for the projects and start implementation. This procedure had to be slightly changed due to delays caused and to obviate approval of projects which would turn out to be difficult to implement. This change required the "responsible officers" of the operating Ministries to cost the proposed projects and explain how they would be implemented before the proposals were sent to the Treasury.

Despite some difficulties faced during implementation this programme proved useful. Development Committees started showing interest in what happened in their areas and local people started getting some tangible benefits. The magnitude
of the funds allocated to the districts has continued to grow over the years. A number of changes have also been effected to make the programme work better. It had also shortcomings which generated new ideas concerning rural development strategies. The requirement that the local people should raise some money for each project before the government grants were released meant that some areas were getting more from this funding process. Ways had to be sought to ensure that even areas incapable of raising enough local resources benefited from the grants. This programme did not also provide any job opportunities for the local people. All unskilled labour required for these projects was got free from the local populace - skilled and semi-skilled labour was paid but could be "imported" from any other area - yet there was need to raise the incomes of the people. The unemployment rate was, and has been, increasing both in the rural and urban areas. This was causing a high-pitch influx of people from rural to urban areas in search of paid employment and social amenities not found in the rural areas. This was an unhealthy state of affairs (for multifarious reasons) and something had to be done about it. In an effort to alleviate these problems the government instituted the RWP in the 1974/75 financial year.
The Rural Works Programme

The RWP was born out of recommendations made by the 1972 ILO report, and was first mentioned in government documents in the 1974-78 Development Plan. As it has been indicated earlier, this programme was a departure from the DDG programme. The DDG programme was intended to raise the initiative of local development committees and the local people to make them take a vigorous part in planning for local development whilst the other was intended to give the local people extra employment opportunities in a rural setting. This was in keeping with the theme of the 1974-78 Development Plan - that of employment creation.

The programme would help to:

(i) increase cash incomes of (the) landless and smallholders in rural (areas) and small towns, providing supplementary employment during slack working seasons,

(ii) construct rural infrastructure necessary to the increase of agriculture, livestock, forestry and production of its efficient processing and marketing, (and)

(iii) conserve and improve the basic land and forestry resources of the nation and, if possible, make the marginal and period areas less vulnerable to drought.

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28 Circular letter from the MFP to PPOs on March 5th, 1974.
It was hoped that the added incomes earned by the "ruralites" would have four major effects. First, the incomes would raise the living standards of these people as they would spend some of the income on their day-to-day needs. This would go along way to stop "ruralites" from flooding the urban centres. Second, the incomes would help promote production in commercial agriculture as some of the money would be used on purchasing agricultural inputs. The programme was expected to be in full swing only during low-activity periods - i.e. periods when there was little work in the agricultural sector. In this way rural labour could be employed on agriculture and RWP projects without any unnecessary competition. This turned out to be difficult to maintain, however. Third, the programme would play an income redistribution role as it would benefit the landless people and the under- and unemployed population in the rural areas. Lastly, the fact that the people had to fully get involved meant that a sense of identity, with these projects, would be cultivated. The people would feel that as they were a part of the implementing force they should give full support to these projects.

If the major objective of the RWP was employment creation there was one obvious requirement: that the projects falling in this category had to be labour-intensive projects. This was expressly stated when the programme was introduced. This was the only sure way of facilitating the local people to make financial
gains from the programme. It was however never thought that machinery could be dispensed with altogether. A balance had to be struck but in favour of labour. The types of projects that meet this condition include afforestation, soil conservation, minor irrigation schemes, rural access roads, flood control, and bush clearing. The minimum labour component for these projects was set at 60% of the total cost. For projects like afforestation, where use of machinery was expected to be extremely low, the labour component had to be as high as 75%. A total of £4 million was set aside for the RWP for the 1974-78 Plan period. 29

Like DDG projects, RWP projects have to be approved by development committees, up the hierarchy, costing has to be done by officers of the operating Ministries and then sent to the MFP headquarters for final approval and funds allocation. This, again, maintains some control of the development committees by the central government.

Both programmes are funded by the Kenya Government and outside donors. Until 1975 donors could decide which types of projects were to be given their money. This caused serious administrative problems as each donor had to get a separate report concerning their grants and the projects financed therefrom. It also meant that these funds could not be transferred

freely to the needy projects. This situation resulted in SIDA and UNICEF financing water projects, Denmark financing dips, EEC financing agricultural projects, etc. This was a SRDP legacy that had to be changed. After long consultations with the donor countries/agencies the government managed to pool the donations and its contributions together to form the Rural Development Fund which was promulgated in the first half of 1975. The Fund was established under the legal provisions of the Audit and Exchequer Act and its administration was to be governed by the Statutory Regulations of April 1st, 1975 promulgated by the Minister for Finance and Planning. The DDG and the RWP, however, continue to operate with different accounts. Donors, as by the end of 1976, were Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, USAID and the EEC "en block".

At the same time that the RDF was established it was made clear that it had to be a revolving fund. This was a reversal of the system existing then, where any money that had not been spent by the end of any financial year had to be returned to the Treasury. From 1975 a project may continue utilising the money allocated to it without any end-of-financial-year restrictions. Expenditure on projects is a continuous process and any funds that are unused at the end of any financial year are carried forward to the next year. This has the advantage that implementation is now not hurried and projects that are given funds are planned for much more properly.
One other important feature of the RDF may be mentioned. This is that it was a civil servants brainchild - of course with participation of foreign advisors - and the involvement of politicians was, and still is, only secondary. Both the DDG and the RWP were borne out of meetings in bureaucratic circles. There is no indication of participation by politicians - ministers, MPs, KANU officials, etc. - in the initiation and preparation of these programmes. Even foreign grants were negotiated for by civil servants. This, however, was not a phenomenon peculiar to the RDF. It was quite in keeping with the nature of Kenya's bureaucratic politics. Major decisions are taken in bureaucratic circles and political stalwarts are used only to legitimise and, to some extent, popularise them. This makes Kenya's civil service politicised in a rather indirect manner, a situation standing in contradistinction to the popular bureaucratic principle that the civil service should be apolitical. The civil servant is, therefore, in many ways more superior than the politician in regard to decisionmaking. It is worthy noting that the RDF is governed by the Audit and Exchequer Act and is a part of the vote of the MFP. There was no opportunity for deliberations regarding its merits and administration by politicians.

The supremacy of civil servants over politicians in Kenya also permeates to the local level. As it will be shown in Chapter 3, it is the civil servants who have the final
word about what should be done for their areas. The politicians may talk, even criticise, but they lack the means with which to put into action what they desire. They also lack adequate political backing from the centre as the provincial administrators are considered the President's representatives in their territorial units. The politicians have to heavily rely on civil servants' goodwill for the success of their public endeavours. This has, for instance, caused the ruling party KANU to be extremely ineffective, to a point of dormancy, both at the national and local levels. (The argument here is that the political party, and its units, is weak because of the reliance by the government on the bureaucracy for political control and mobilisation and that the civil service attained this dominance because the party was initially too weak to play these roles). That the RDF is a civil servants' programme is, therefore, clear. There is also evidence to show that politicians are only marginally involved in the implementation of RDF projects.

Summary

This chapter has identified some financial problems which relate to the development process in Kenya. It has been shown that the finances available for development have been very limited indeed. In addition, quite a lot of these finances have been coming from outside Kenya, from donors
who have their own interests to propagate. These donors have often influenced the politico-economic decisions made by those in authority. This state of affairs has been facilitated further by the reliance on technical assistance personnel. One major result this has had is that the rural areas, and especially the marginal ones, have been made to lag behind. There are also the difficulties of relating development targets to the resources available. These difficulties also hit the rural areas more than the urban centres. Rural local authorities have not done much to improve the living conditions of the people. The resources at their disposal have been minimal and the needs of the people have been many. The introduction of the two programmes which comprise the RDF programme was, therefore, a move symbolising a realisation (certainly not a commitment) that the rural areas needed serious attention. The move was not only important but also overdue. The following chapters focus fully on the RDF programme.
The central thesis of this chapter is that the selection of projects to be given RDF money is influenced by those who are highly placed socially and who wield much political power in their areas and that the more well-off areas benefit more than the marginal ones. We shall look at the way these people use their positions to secure funds for projects in their (socio-political base) areas and, in case of civil servants, sectors. Of course the civil servants do not have any areas they would be expected to favour but, being human, they too have their preferences and limitations. Before actors engage into debates or lobbying for specific projects (for specific locations or even villages) there are some factors which naturally dictate what types of projects may be started in certain areas. These factors will be variously discussed in the chapter.

Membership of Development Committees

The membership of development committees, as mentioned earlier, is organised in such a way that only government officers and politicians are presented. The basic assumption behind such composition is that civil servants, as implementors of planned development, have an indisputable right of having representation
and the politicians are included in order to represent the local people. The involvement of politicians is, however, not a bona fide condition that the local people's interests are taken care of. The composition of these committees reflects a representation bias in favour of the progressive "ruralites"—whom Mutiso calls the rural "asomi"—and against the less progressive (generally the illiterate poor) ones. A look at who actually compose these committees will explain this.

In the three districts studied there was no indication of locational development committees having been used in any significant way. They generally had not existed. Where they had existed, their meetings had been extremely infrequent and no records had been kept. Any reference to development committees in this and the following chapters, therefore, excludes locational level committees. Selection of projects had, therefore, started at the divisional level though, again, this was not the case everywhere.

A divisional development committee is composed of the District Officer (who is the chairman), the DDO (who is secretary), the divisional heads of departments, chiefs, the MP of the area, councillors and the divisional KANU chairman.

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The DDOs do not always attend divisional development committee meetings, partly because of the number of divisions they may have under them (note the meetings may be held almost at the same time and at short notice) and partly because the DDOs feel these meetings are not important enough for them to attend. Where, and when, a DDO does not attend a meeting the divisional Community Development Assistant acts as the Secretary; this is the way it was before the appointment of DDOs. In addition to DDOs having as many as seven divisions under them (Machakos has seven, Meru has six and Murang'a has five), they had also two districts each before July 1976 when more of them were posted. They were, therefore, overburdened and could not service the development committees in a satisfactory manner.

As there were no locational development committees in almost all the divisions the proposals made at the divisional level were those of the members. The civil servants at this level, like at all other levels, were representatives of the central government and direct field agents of those above them. As such most of their activities were overly controlled from the top.\(^2\) Having no decision-making powers (or, in other words, lacking decision-making autonomy) meant that they

\(^2\) This may be taken as a contradiction of an earlier statement that the Government has of late introduced decentralisation measures. This is not the case. The thing is that although there exist development committees this has not changed the attitudes of Government officers. They still more or less stand as advocates of development from above.
could by no means be spokesmen of the local people. Councillors and KANU officials (who are the other members) are either teachers or notable businessmen. These are people with many personal interests to propagate and preserve. Most of their concerns, therefore, are those which would get them material gain or help them to maintain their positions. In one divisional development committee meeting the author attended in North Imenti, Meru, for instance, there was a heated debate on which four roads should be recommended to the DDC under the RWP. One councillor was vigorously arguing that there was a "very important but unusable" road which should be included. Another one argued that the road in question should not be included because it would serve only a few people. The proposer moved to the other to explain - at close quarters - why the road was "important". He explained: "it seems you do not know which road I am talking about. It is that one which goes to the quarry where we get building stones. If it is dug it will benefit us a lot". His colleague could not help but agree that the road was more important than the others traversing agricultural areas. This road was included after the two gentlemen came to an agreement.

The meeting was near a pandemonium. The chairman appeared to have no control over the members. Each person was moving around in the meeting-room canvassing for support for particular projects. It was evident, therefore, that what was important was not so much the benefits of the projects
to the people but the part they would play to promote the
interests of the members... One chief, too, argued that he had
helped to raise some money for a water project and had promised
the people government assistance. If this assistance was not
given, he pointed out, the people would get demoralised and
in addition they would think that "I am not a good man".

Nothing needs be said about MPs at this level because
they never attended these meetings. The reason given was that
MPs were usually too busy to attend. It would appear, however,
that this non-attendance was caused by the realisation that
divisional meetings were of little consequence. If an MP
wanted to have any projects assisted he could easily do this
in DDC meetings. After all there is no rule that only proposals
taken forward by divisional development committees should be
discussed by the DDCs. For two reasons an elaborate discussion
of the functioning of divisional development committees is
unnecessary. One, their meetings were so irregular and
infrequent that their work was neither continuous nor coordinated.
It is unlikely that there was no business for these committees
during the long periods they never met. For an illustration,
Table 10 shows the number of divisional development committee
meetings held in Machakos since 1971.

3 Only statistics for Machakos were readily available. In Muru
there were very limited records and so not worthy analysing.
In Murang'a the records were denied the author, like many
other documents, and so little is known. The deputy to the
DC, though, said that "there is little on such meetings."
Table 10: No. of Divisional Development Committee Meetings in Machakos, by Division, 1971-76.

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<td>Makueni</td>
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* Before 1973 Makindu and Makueni Divisions were in one (Southern) Division. It was only after the split that they held separate meetings.

Sources: DC's files, Machakos.

The table clearly shows that meetings were extremely infrequent, especially in Central, Makindu and Yatta Divisions. It would be naive to argue that nothing was happening in these divisions vis-a-vis the DDG and the RWP in the years there were no meetings. Certainly things were happening regardless of lack of
divisional level participation. This leads us to the second reason why it is unnecessary to give a deep analysis of divisional committees' involvement: that the DDCs were not bound by the proposals from the divisions in their deliberation. If Table 10 is read together with Table 5 (especially column 3) it will be realised that the Machakos DDC was meeting relatively frequently when there were no meetings in some divisions. Where did the DDC get material for deliberations? The answer is simply that the DDC members went to meetings with their own proposals. (DDCs also ignore, not unusually, the recommendations of the divisional development committees and substitute their own proposals with ease. This practice is encouraged by the fact that DDC meetings are not preceded by divisional meetings all the time. Yet all divisions must be covered by the DDC).

Divisional development meetings are convened at very short notice. This makes it difficult for some of the committees to meet. Hence the low frequency of meetings. No doubt, then, one may justifiably say that the idea of "local participation" is as mythical as it is misunderstood. As late as 1976, though a lot of lip service was being given to the importance of "grassroots participation" through the involvement of development committees below the district level, very little was being done to encourage these committees and ensure their survival. Project selection was, therefore, largely a district level affair.
The membership of the DDC includes persons of even higher social status than that of lower committees. Government officers, even more than at the divisional level, identify themselves with the aspirations of those above, rather than those below, them. As the political system in Kenya requires full bureaucratic cooperation, the civil servants are instruments of (or are they in alliance with?) the political leadership. The political leadership is characterised by motives of personal aggrandisement and their objectives are often not those favouring the masses. The civil servants are quite educated people who view themselves as a lot with a future. They also have eyes on a share of the national cake - a cake which happens to be small. To accentuate these material aspirations, the civil servants have to work in alliance with the political leadership rather than the masses. Dips are recommended for construction and money collected from every household around the projects even when there are only a few people with herds of cattle. Roads are approved for construction which join administrative centres but not those which traverse areas of the small-scale farmers. People contribute money for water projects which will provide water to schools and market centres first and only later to their homes, if at all.

The politicians, who invariably are said to be the representatives of the people, would be expected to be
dominating the scene in conference rooms. The only politicians who are widely accepted as necessary members of the DDCs are MPs. Not all MPs attended all DDC meetings at the same time; generally only about half attended any given meeting. Once elected MPs identify with the centre rather than the periphery. This is the only way they can ensure a sizeable share of the national cake. In addition chances of survival on the political arena are increased if one is 'terms with the centre. The local citizen has nothing to offer, except his vote during the following election.

The ruling party is supposed to be represented by the District KANU chairman (see Appendices A and B). In Meru and Machakos the KANU chairmen have always been MPs - in fact Cabinet Ministers - who also were the rarest in DDC meetings. Party representation was the same in Muranga until early 1976 when the long time incumbent chairman, also a Cabinet Minister, was replaced by a local businessman. One is tempted - and rightly so - to infer that representation through the party was non-existent in DDCs.

4 In the three districts there was only one meeting in each where all MPs were present. These meetings were convened in 1973, not on the same dates, to review the electoral constituencies of each District. The nature of business explains why all attended.
The third possible political representation is by councillors. Despite a directive from the Office of the President and the MFP that at least one councillor should represent each division in the DDC, this was not the case in Meru and Machakos. In Murang’a councillors were invited to attend DDC meetings. It is considered of no adverse consequence to our analysis if we overlook the involvement of local council staff in DDC meetings. They were never concerned with RDF projects except where, and this was rare, these projects tied with their own programmes. An example is the involvement of the Machakos County Council in the implementation of some rural afforestation projects in the 1975/76 financial year. This meant that the council officer concerned had to work in collaboration with the Forester (who was also responsible for rural afforestation).

The membership of the PDCs reflects participation of persons high in the civil service and political hierarchies. Only provincial heads of departments, DCs and MPs constitute the PDCs. These, more than those below them, are well detached

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5 It is difficult to tell how much councillors could contribute in meetings in face of competition with the more flamboyant MPs and the specialist government officers. A request by the author to attend DDC meetings in Murang’a as an observer was turned down by the DC’s office. In theory, though, councillors can articulate the interests of the local people better than MPs or even government officers.
from the local people and would in no way directly represent the interests of the local people. As regards RDF projects the PDCs only confirmed, in most cases without any alterations, what had been approved by the DDCs. (It has been indicated earlier that no PDC meetings were held in Central Province since the end of 1974, apparently because they were not necessary). At the PDC level, therefore, there was little chance of anyone trying to push inclusion of his own projects. The place that mattered was the DDC meeting place in particular and the district level in general. The factors at play in the determination of which projects are selected, which are dealt with in the next section, will be analysed at the level of the district.

The Selection of RDF Projects

Before looking at the methods employed by DDC members to canvass or lobby for the selection of particular projects, let us briefly discuss some factors which may initially influence the location of certain types of projects in certain areas.  

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6 Most of the material on the "natural" factors was got from District Plans for the three Districts. In our analysis intra-district comparisons will be based on divisions. See Appendix C for the list of divisions in the three districts, and also the maps at the back.
Each of the three districts studied has areas with contrasting climatic (and hence economic) conditions. The Tigania and Tharaka Divisions of Meru are usually dry and receive very low rainfall. Cash crop farming is barely developed and at any rate difficult. The areas can, however, be developed for the production of cotton, sisal and sunflower as cash crops. Only food crop farming (mainly maize, beans, millet and peas) is prevalent and native cattle are kept. The Nithi, Igembe, and North and South Imenti Divisions, or the greater part of them, are of medium or high potential with regular high rainfall. Cash crops grown in these areas include coffee, tea, miraa, pyrethrum and wheat, with maize, beans and bananas serving as regular food crops. Grade cattle are also reared together with the native ones. Most of the District, excepting Tigania, Tharaka and the eastern parts of the other divisions, is served by permanent streams. The areas that produce cash crops are also covered by the three Cooperative Unions operating in the district. These are the areas which benefit from Government loans which are channelled through Cooperative Unions.

7 This crop is only grown in Igembe Division. Its production and marketing had been restricted by the Miraa Prohibition Act of 1962 until January 22nd, 1977, when the President suspended the Act. In practice this Act did not hinder production or sale of the crop—locally or outside the country.

8 Before 1970 there was one Cooperative Union for the whole district. Due to political squabbles (no economic factors seem to have been responsible) the Union split into three: Meru North, Meru Central and Meru South Cooperative Unions.
Most of Makuyu and Kigumo Divisions of Murang'a District are arid and not very suitable for farming although some large-scale farms engaged in sisal and coffee growing are found there. In the settlement schemes, which are found in the two divisions, cotton and bananas are grown although production is low. Goats and sheep are also reared. In the rest of the district - Kiharu, Kandara and Kangema Divisions - the soils are medium to high potential with considerably high rainfall and suitable for cash crop growing. Coffee, tea, cotton, pyrethrum and wattle, and a variety of food crops, are grown. Most of these crops are marketed through the district-wide Cooperative Union, a body which provides credit facilities for its members. Dairy industry in Murang'a is yet to be developed as coffee has stolen the show.

In Machakos, most of the area, unlike in the other two districts, is arid and receives very little rainfall. Makueni, Yatta, Makindu and parts of Central, Western and Eastern Divisions are dry areas. Some cotton is grown as cash crop and maize, peas and millet are grown for subsistence. The high potential areas (covering less than 10% of the total area) are in Central and Northern Divisions. These receive relatively high rainfall and coffee, wattle and fruits are grown in commercial agriculture. These crops are marketed through the District Cooperative Union. Like in Murang'a, the dairy industry is small, and only noticeable in the high altitude areas.
This information on the topography and land use in the three districts is important because it helps us to understand the needs of the areas. The lower drier areas would be the ones to have priority in the distribution of water projects; the higher areas are more advantaged because they are served by permanent and/or semi-permanent streams. The drier areas would also be the ones to get more dams and more agricultural development projects. This is not usually so. Principally this is because the drier areas are also the poorer ones and cannot easily raise the self-help portion required for DDG projects. For example, by the end of 1974 the arid Tharaka and Tigania Divisions in Meru had only three and four pipeline water schemes, respectively. The more affluent North Imenti Division had over forty of this type of project. Some of these schemes were on self-help and others had been aided by the government. By the same time Yatta, an arid division in Machakos, had only eleven dams. The Central Division, which was, and is, relatively more well-off, had more than forty-five dams. In Murang'a, there were three water schemes in Kangema which had received aid and were being maintained by the government by 1974. There was only one each in Kigumo and Makuyu. The other divisions had two each. The trend has, therefore, been that government help has been going to those who were already better placed. This theory was propounded by Nyangira in his book on "Relative Modernisation and Resource Allocation" at the national level.
He wrote:

"... the greater the level of modernisation, the greater the resources allocated to that (more modernised) unit." 

This uneven distribution of projects characterises the RWP, too, although the local people are not expected to contribute any money. The more progressive areas have had a bigger share of RWP projects. Here, however, it would appear that the determining factor has been the amount of canvassing done by people from the various areas. This will be discussed in detail shortly. In the 1974/75 financial year, for example, there were three rural afforestation projects in Kandara, Murang'a, which received RDF money. There was one similar project in Makuyu whilst the other divisions had none. In the same year in Meru only four rural afforestation projects received RDF money; three were in Tigania and one in Igembe. Tharaka and Nithi which deserved afforestation projects as much, if not more, had none even by the end of 1976.

It should be stated at the outset that in recent years - especially since 1974 - an attempt has been made to offer each area (for our analysis, each division) some opportunity to benefit from the RDF. This, however, has not been easy partly because the poorer

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9 N. Nyangira, Relative Modernisation and Resource Allocation in Kenya: A Comparative Analysis (EALB, Nairobi, 1975), p. 77. According to his analysis Murang'a is the most modernised of the three districts we are concerned with. Meru takes second place and Machakos is the last. Comparative allocations from the RDF closely follow that pattern.
areas could not raise the local contributions required for DDG projects, partly because some people have been more articulate than others at pushing through their projects and partly because the implementors tend to favour certain areas, chiefly due to behind-the-scenes pressures. The first factor causing the unequitable distribution of projects has been discussed above. It does not need any intellectual reasoning to know that an area which is well off can afford some saving. If then there is a condition that people will get government grants only if they have made self-help collections, it follows that the more progressive areas will benefit more. And so the development gap between the various areas will continue to expand. In the following pages the other two factors are examined.

What happens in DDC meeting rooms? What considerations influence the various actors when selection of RDF projects is made? How important are manoeuvres outside DDC meetings? An attempt will be made to provide answers to these questions. When members of the DDC meet they do so to select projects to be given funds from the RDF, among other things. Ever since 1974 members have had to select projects for each type of programme separately, though some still do not distinguish between the two. When asked what factors are considered when members select projects, respondents gave a variety of answers, ranging from "because the project meets the MFP requirements"

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10 Even if the local contribution is not voluntarily saved but extorted from people, as it has been in some places, it still holds true that "you cannot squeeze out sap from a dry tree."
to "because it has a high economic benefit to the people". Let us mention those which were most popularly mentioned. The most popular factor mentioned was "the need of the people for the project" (mentioned by 29 of the 40 respondents). This consideration has a "welfare" connotation. The second most popular consideration was the ability of the people to contribute for projects and their readiness to initiate projects in their areas (17 respondents). This appears to imply that areas with little initiative, due to either ignorance or economic incapacity, would be discriminated against. The third consideration mentioned was the economic benefit of the project to the people. This, though related to the first consideration, emphasizes the usefulness of the project in terms of immediate increased productivity. An egalitarian consideration, that the socio-economic inbalances between areas had to be reduced, was mentioned by very few (seven) respondents. Broadly then, DDC members view the RDF as a vehicle for increasing rural productivity rather than one playing a redistributive role. It is hard to reconcile this assertion with the claim by most respondents (75% of the 40 DDC members interviewed) that the distribution of projects and funds was fair in their districts. About 18% of those interviewed stated that the distribution was not fair and the rest said they did not know.
A look at the reasons given for claiming the distribution was fair, however, shows the contradiction is more apparent than real members The arguments were that since most of the DDC did not have political allegiances (being civil servants), since all divisions had representation of one kind or another—and since Ministry regulations were being closely followed, then there was no possibility of unfairness. None of these conditions guarantees automatic fairness, though. In addition to the factors mentioned above, there are others, perhaps even more important, which respondents did not consider important enough or were not comfortable with them to mention. We shall now turn to them.

The views and requests of leading politicians are taken very favourably—whether they are present in DDC meetings or not. At times they informally discuss their proposals with the DC, the DDO or even the implementing officers. Other times they write to these officers and make their propositions. This practice is quite common with Ministers, especially so in Murang’a and Machakos. The officer so requested (or is it directed?) takes the proposals before the DDC. This type of lobbying, though, is not a monopoly of politicians. It is also practised by notable citizens who happen to come from the particular district but work away from home. One government official from Machakos, but working in Nairobi, for instance, was very eager to have projects in his area given RDF money. He wrote a chain of letters to the DC explaining why certain projects should be given money and suggesting how much was needed.
In Murang'a Nairobi-based business executives, who were reported to have political ambitions, frequently visited the DC and some implementing officers to lobby for projects in their areas. All these people happen to have a lot of influence (and sometimes economic or social ties with) implementing officers and other DDC members. Their proposals will, more often than not, sail through without much questioning. A consequence of this situation is the occurrence of cases where DDG projects are approved before local contributions are made. When this happened the understanding was always that the money would be raised immediately. The passage below illustrates the seriousness of the situation and goes to show that these things happened without the knowledge of those above. In his annual report for 1974 one PPO wrote:

> It is not possible for the Provincial Planning Officer to visit each of the recommended projects before he completes the application forms for District Development Grants. In some cases we entirely depended on the information given by the responsible officers of the operating Ministries. However, some of this information turned out not to be correct........ We managed to discover this when we visited the assisted projects to see the implementation progress. For some projects we found that some self-help committees received the assistance before they were ready (with their contributions) to use it in the implementation of the projects.11

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The PPO should not have sounded so affected as most, not a few, DDG projects were given grants before all local contributions were ready. Even by the time research for this work was done the situation was the same. It appears this had been accepted as inevitable. And not without reason as people are likely to contribute money when the grant has been given faster than when they are only hoping.

At times proposals are handed down from the top - sometimes from those who should know better - and DDCs are asked to approve them. In most cases such proposals go through. Citation of a few cases may be in order. In 1974 the PC, Eastern Province, proposed to the PPO that a water project in Meru be given Shs. 25,000/- from the DDG. The PPO wrote to the DC asking him "for comments" and cautioning that three of recommended projects would have to be struck off because "the projects already recommended for Meru District have a total cost of over and above the Meru DDG allocation for the financial year." One wonders why this project had not gone through the DDC as required by regulation if it was all that important. Whereas no reason was given why this request (or directive) was made one may infer that there must have been pressures from some quarters. At any rate the project was near the Municipality (North Imenti Division) and it is unlikely it deserved
all that priority. Nonetheless, the project got the money in
the end.

Local dignitaries, too, have their share of influence, even if they may not be members of the DDC themselves. Church leaders, social group leaders and political aspirants, not to forget civil servants with local interests, occasionally play influential roles. A case in Murang'a in 1972 does well to illustrate this point. A girls' secondary school in Gatanga Location of Kangema Division needed a dining hall, a kitchen and a store. A priest who headed the school and happened to be very popular in the area knew that the DDC could help him to get DDG money. His visits to the DC, the PPO and others were enough to get him the money. The DDC approved the project and the school was given the grant of Shs.50,000/- asked for. It was the only project which received a grant in Murang'a that year. This project was not only outside those recommended by the MFP (schools are "welfare" projects), but it also was not the most needy among the schools, let alone other types of projects. This infuriated the District Education Officer who wrote to the DC complaining about it. This had to create a disagreement between the complainant and the PPO.

12 Some chiefs, for example, are so powerful that few people will resist them. MPs and councillors need them for political survival whilst civil servants need them for support for their other projects.
A picture might have been portrayed that implementing officers are at the receiving end, that proposals are made to them and they only play the implementation role. This is not the way it is. In the final analysis it is the decisions of the implementing officers which carry the most weight. It is they who decide how much money to apply for for each project. Not all projects approved by the DDC are submitted to the Treasury immediately, if at all. The cooperation of the implementing officers is very much sought by those who want certain projects to be approved. That is why DDC members, be they MPs, councillors or District Officers, continually contact implementing officers before and after the DDC's approval of the projects. A project that gets the support of the implementing officer concerned is sure to go through. (It should also be mentioned that implementing officers also go to DDC meetings with proposals of their own.) In addition to the support of the implementing officer, support is also sought from the DDO and the DC, especially the latter. Regarding implementation of projects, they are both generalist administrators but with remarkable significance.

The power and influence of the DC are unrivalled in his area of jurisdiction. He is legally empowered to licence, and refuse to licence, public meetings in his district.13

These meetings may be political, social or developmental, like fund-raising meetings. Some of the local contributions for DDG (and self-help) projects are raised in this manner. When DDC members seek the approval of such projects they also want to be sure that licences for fund-raising meetings would be issued. This is why the support of the DC is important (not forgetting that he chairs DDC meetings). In the three districts there were no records to show that certain individuals or groups were given licences whilst others were refused them. This was because of three factors rather than that the DCs (or the Provincial Administration generally) had no biases. One, requests for licences were first made verbally before application forms were submitted. It was, therefore, difficult to tell where a licence may have been refused. Two, sometimes members of the Provincial Administration were asked by those concerned to lead the fund-raising campaigns. In such instances no licences were required. Third, in the three districts there was no political group that was so out of favour with the Provincial Administration that they were refused development meetings. 14 This, however, is not to say that there was harmony between political leaders.

In Murang'a there were two political groups, one behind Gikonyo Kiano, the Minister for Water Development, and the other

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14 In some other parts of the country some individuals have been known to be refused licences to hold public meetings of any nature.
behind George Mwicigi, an Assistant Minister for Agriculture, with strong support from some Nairobi-based business executives. In Meru there were two groupings, too. One was led by Jackson Angaine, the Minister for Lands and Settlement, and the other by James Njeru, the Assistant Minister for Defence. In Machakos the situation was the same. One group was led by Paul Ngei, the Minister for Cooperative Development, and the other by Mullu Mutisya, the Chairman of the New Akamba Union which is said to be a "welfare" organisation. These groupings have never been rigid. Association with these groupings has always been fluctuating.

The political situation in the districts is a reflection of what happens at the national level. Kenya is characterised by what one may loosely call "national bloc politics". Any time there is an important political issue there are two major groupings to fight it out. Perhaps this is a legacy of the KANU-KADU rivalry in the early 1960s. In the districts, though, the rivalries are created by the desire of certain individuals to establish themselves as "leaders and spokesmen" of their districts. In an endeavour to do this they identify their supporters from the Divisions (usually sitting MPs and

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15 KADU stands for Kenya African Democratic Union.
other parliamentary aspirants) and in the locations (usually councillors and other prospective candidates), and at both levels KANU officials. A political hierarchy is, therefore, created where there are rivals trying to establish their hegemony at the various levels. The political prestige accruing from this dominance is almost always associated with material gains at the particular time or in the days to come. These political rivalries are most evident during campaigns for elections.

The Provincial Administration (which happens to be very politicised) has almost always sided with one of these groupings. Asked what adverse effect this political disharmony had on development, the DC, Murang'a, quipped, "None at all. In fact each group fights to contribute the most to development and this is very good for the people". In a way there was sense in what the DC said. It should, however, be pointed out that some projects failed to start (or implementation was slow) because of political squabbles. In Magumoni Location of Nithi Division, Meru, one water project could not be started quickly because people could not agree on how they should collect money. In Mitaboni Location, Central Division, Machakos, a dip project could not be started because the people could not

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16 Personal communication, November 1976.
agree on where, in the sub-location, the project should be situated. In contrast to the Murang'a DC's views, the DC in Machakos felt political differences could have negative effects on development. He is reported to have told the people of Kangundo (Northern Division) that they were "a disgrace to development in Machakos" because "people are letting political squabbles rip them apart". It is difficult to tell with any certainty whether political squabbles have been conducive to development (or not) in the three districts. In the long run, however, this situation is likely to have serious effects especially if civil servants continue taking sides.

It is difficult to identify any one factor which influences the selection of projects in a given district; all the factors discussed operate together. We find, however, that in Murang'a pressure from individuals outside the DDC is a more important factor than the others. This is, perhaps, because a good number of important persons in Kenya (both in the political and the economic spheres) come from the district and are bound to be influential. In Meru the whims of the DC seem to have the upper hand. This is partly due to the fact that the DC (who had been in the district for over four years) is quite powerful and partly because there are few people with great prominence. It is not easy to say which

17 The Daily Nation of February 12th, 1977, Nairobi, p. 5.
factor is more important in Machakos but MPs in the area appear to be quite articulate.

In DDC meetings deliberations are likely to be smooth, meaningful and beneficial to the local people if the DC, the chairman of the meeting, is knowledgeable, strict and unbiased. He can make these meetings more effective in a number of ways.

(a) He should be able to guide members to dwell more on important development matters and less on small issues.

(b) He should be in a position to question implementing officers where other members are not in a position to do so.

(c) He should be capable of resolving squabbles, personal or otherwise, on the floor of the meeting rooms as these tend to distract members from the business of the day.

(d) As the overall boss in the district, though technically indisposed to command, he should be ensuring that the decisions of the DDC are actually carried out by those concerned.

(e) He should encourage members to be more critical of the RDF operations as this is the only way improvements can come about.
In order to understand better how DDC meetings are conducted two cases are given below. The author was present in the two meetings but did not participate in the deliberations. He was an observer. These cases will help the reader to understand more clearly (especially in the first case) how projects are selected in DDC meetings. The cases will also introduce some issues which will be discussed in the following chapters. Matters not concerning the RDF are only mentioned while some detail is given on the discussions on RDF issues.

CASE I.

The place was the DC's boardroom in Meru. The day was October 25th, 1976. The meeting was scheduled to start at 10.00 a.m. but started 30 minutes later. The DC was in the chair and the DDO was recording the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting started with twenty members present. There were two MPs, the Mayor, The Town Clerk, the Clerk to the County Council, a B.A.T. representative and the rest were civil servants, with the Ministry of Agriculture being represented by five officers. The civil servants present were those with some role to play in the implementation of the RDF programme; these included district heads of departments and divisional District Officers.

I would have liked to offer a case from each district but this is not possible. See footnote 5.
In his opening address the DC explained (after of course thanking the members for attending) that in the past he had been reluctant to call DDC meetings because almost all matters discussed in the meetings came from district heads of departments. He was happy to note that the divisions (through the divisional development committees) had started making notable participation. This, he said, was because "it has been realised development is best possible when proposals come from the grassroots". He then commended implementing officers because they had "done quite alot" on RDF projects despite the fact that transport facilities were inadequate. He also explained that DDC meetings were held on Mondays (this was the practice since early 1973) to enable MPs to attend always. (Records showed that no more than four of the eight MPs ever attended meetings at the same time. Some, especially those with ministerial responsibilities in government, had a notable record of non-attendance. This was because they had other duties elsewhere or because they did not consider the meetings important).

The chairman then mentioned that minutes of the previous meeting (held on December 15th 1975) had been circulated to the members and hoped that they (members) had studied them. As there was no response from the members the chairman signed the minutes. What followed indicated that either the members had not read the minutes or, if they had, they had forgotten all about them. There was no discussion on "matters arising". The chairman, however, reported that all
the RDF proposals made in the previous meetings had been approved by the PDC and that the Treasury had allocated money to some of the projects. He also lamented that the Ministry of Works had not been represented in the previous meeting, like in many others before, and this was making it difficult for road and bridge projects to be discussed. He, nonetheless, said that matters were being sorted out. Under "matters arising" members were expected to question what had been done by the various implementing officers, the DC, the DDO, etc., regarding the deliberations of the previous meeting. The failure to raise any implied issues at this point implied a lack of understanding by the members of what was being done by the individual Ministries.

After this it was upon the DDO and the implementing officers to report on the "progress and problems" on existing funded projects. Copies of a list of all projects funded in the years 1974/75 and 1975/76 were given to members by the DDO. This list showed the amounts given by the Treasury, the amounts contributed by the local people (DDG projects only) and a short progress report for each project. The DDO also said that three problems had been identified as being hinderances to the implementation of RDF projects. These were:

(a) that "harambee" groups were slow in collecting money for DDG projects;

(b) that there was a shortage of surveyors (especially for water projects) in the district; and
(c) that project committees were not active enough because no regular elections were being held.

On the last problem he suggested that the Community Development Officer should ensure that elections for RDF and self-help project committees were held every two years. After the DDO, each implementing officer gave a short account of what he was doing on the projects under him. (It should be noted that in one Ministry there may be more than one implementing officer. The Ministry of Agriculture, which has the most, is a good example. The District Livestock Officer deals with cattle dips, the District Land and Farm Management Officer deals with soil conservation, the District Crops Officer deals with Crop development projects and the District Home Economist deals with home demonstration projects).

At 2.00 O'clock, after an hour's lunch break, the DDC members embarked on the selection of RDF projects for the year 1977/78. The chairman cautioned that this selection had to be as equitable as possible. This was almost done but it should be noted that not all projects passed by the DDC are subsequently costed and proposals sent to the Treasury. A list had been compiled of all types of projects sent from the divisions (some did not have projects of some types) from which a predetermined number had to be selected. Some projects on the list were
left out while others not on the list were included. Five afforestation projects were selected. Three were on the list and two were not. In all there were nine afforestation projects on the list. The Rural Afforestation Extension Services Officer was also given the mandate to include two other projects from Tharaka Division. There was only one soil conservation project on the list and it was accepted. The Land and Farm Management Officer was to select two others.

There were 50 road and bridge projects on the list (one division had no road project and another had no bridge project) from which to select. The members felt this would take along time and the responsibility was delegated to a sub-committee composed of the DDO, divisional District Officers, the District Agricultural Officer and the Roads Inspector. These had to meet "at their own convenience". Out of four livestock fodder projects on the list one was selected and two others were added. Another sub-committee composed of the DDO, the Community Development Officer, the Forester, the District Water Officer and District Officers was set to sit later and select water projects, dams and water furrows. Their proposals were to be final. Of the eight dip projects on the list, six were selected and another one was added.

There was only one fish pond project on the list. This was left out when four others were approved. Two irrigation projects were selected but not the only two on the list. Three tree nursery projects were also selected. There were none on the list. The DDC also approved six electricity installations
although these were not to be funded from the RDF. (This was one of many such proposals this and other DDCs make to government departments, statutory bodies and private firms).

After the committee had selected the RDF projects it went ahead and endorsed all the 32 projects which had been approved by the District Community Development Committee (DCDC) for self-help grants by the Department of Social Services. It also endorsed all the five projects recommended by the DCDC for assistance by CARE. The committee also endorsed ten projects of various types to be financed under the "EEC Micro-project Programme". Apparently these had been selected by the DDO and the Community Development Officer.

Other than the reporting (implementing) officer the only people who were participating, by asking questions or making comments, were the MPs and non-government members. The chairman occasionally made some clarifications on factual points. Generally the government officers did not ask questions or criticize their colleagues. Why was it so? A few reasons, which are by no means exhaustive, may be advanced. First, the officers were not bothered with what the others were doing (the "each paddle his own canoe" attitude). In addition to their being technically incapable of knowing how the others were operating they also had an inclination not to care to know what the other Ministries did. (This is, of course, unlike the generalist staff of the administration who always know something about everything taking place in their areas). Second, unlike politicians, government officers have a very
low propensity to criticize the activities of any branch of the government. They have the general, rather misconceived, idea that each officer is responsible for his own activities and should not be interfered with. Third, many implementing officers used the no-criticism stance as a defence against criticism from other officers. If they did not criticize their colleagues then they could expect similar treatment from them. Lastly, some of the progress reports given were so short and uninformative that they did not give any room for questioning.

The committee also discussed a variety of other issues which included an Irrigation Research and Training Centre in the district, the Integrated Agricultural Development Programme which had to be financed by the World Bank and the shortage of fuel during the implementation of RDF projects. By 6 o'clock members had apparently exhausted the business for the day and the chairman closed the meeting.

The author made some observations during this meeting.

1. The membership of the committee was very restricted. DDC business seemed a concern of chiefly government officers. The two MPs who were present when the meeting started did not turn up in the afternoon. Another one, however, attended. There were no councillors present as recommended by the MFP in 1974. It has been shown in Chapter 1 what membership is considered representative.
(2) Though government officers appeared reluctant (or incapable) to indulge in discussions on the activities of Ministries other than their own, majority of them seemed to know their fields quite well.

(3) The fact that the DDC could ignore proposals from the divisions and substitute others with impunity showed that members did not take the idea of "grassroots participation" seriously.

(4) Projects were easily approved, whether it had been passed at the divisional level or not, if any MP vehemently requested for their approval. On the whole any project proposed, or supported, by the DC was accepted without question.

(5) Decisions were taken by consensus rather than by vote. The use of the term consensus here should not be misunderstood. What is meant is that at no time was the vote taken. There were conflicting views occasionally but in the end an agreement would be reached. Generally a view that had the support of the chairman ended up the accepted one. This emphasized the respect the chairman commanded and the weight his decisions carried.

(6) A corollary of the above observation, the chairman was very much in control of the members. This made the
proceedings of the meeting extremely orderly. This dominance of the chairman had also a negative effect in that it did not facilitate debate in instances where implementing officers appeared not to have done their work properly.

(7) There was no formula that was being followed to ensure equitable distribution of projects. As long as each division got something equitability was not a deeply considered issue.

CASE II

The place was the DC's boardroom in Machakos. The day was February 21st, 1977. It was just after 10.00 a.m. and the DC was in the chair. The DDO was taking down minutes. There were 20 government officers (district heads of departments and their assistants, and District Officers), four MPs (out of eight in the district), the Chairman and Clerks to the County and Town Councils, an expatriate from the MFP and a Nairobi-based EEC representative. The two expatriates were present to explain how far negotiations between the EEC and the Kenya Government had gone concerning a proposed Sh.200 million loan to Machakos District. The head of the Rural Planning Unit (MFP) also joined later for the same EEC loan issue. On welcoming those present the chairman said that the item on the EEC loan would be discussed first so that "our visitors may go back to Nairobi".
The expatriates informed members that: negotiations concerning the loan had reached "an advanced stage"; Ministries had been asked to submit their financial proposals; about 75% of the money was to be spent on water and agricultural programmes; the rest would be spent on roads, health services, afforestation, etc.; a district plan respecting this loan was about to be completed; etc., etc. The topic generated a lot of debate especially regarding the question of implementation. Of note was the concern members had about the proposal that a contractor would be engaged to construct all the dams in the district because "this would be the most efficient way". Members, spearheaded by the chairman and one MP, insisted that there should be a number of "dam construction units" which could be used later by the local people, and so that "the money does not go out of Kenya." The situation was rescued by the head of the Rural Planning Unit who suggested that if the "dam construction units" proposal was "found feasible" his Ministry would support it.

After the EEC matter was conveniently finished with the chairman referred members to the minutes of the previous meeting. This had been held about four months earlier. About half of the members complained that they had not received the minutes. They could consequently not remember what had transpired in that meeting. (There were no extra copies available for distribution).

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19 Apparently these would be very useful for any RDF dam projects which would be started after the EEC loan had been spent. The chairman even said that if their views were not taken seriously the loan may as well not be given.
Nonetheless, the chairman signed the minutes "as the true record" of the deliberations of the previous meeting.

Members appeared not to have any "matters arising" from the minutes, some because they had not received the minutes and others because they had either forgotten all about them or they were satisfied with the record. It was only the Community Development Officer who reported that, because of "the financial crisis", self-help grants had been reduced from Sh. 300,000/- to Sh. 120,000/- per province per year. Some recommended projects would, therefore, not get any grants.

The chairman then asked the implementing officers to report on the progress on their projects. The DDO did not have much to say on this matter, like on many others. He was either not conversant with the progress on RDF projects or he felt what implementing officers gave was adequate. The rural water schemes officer was not present and so nothing was said about water projects. An expatriate "water engineer" present gave the names of the projects under him and said that he did not know how much work had been done on them. The District Crops Officer reported that the Drought Resistant Crops Programme involving maize, beans, millet, sunflower, etc., was taking root and appeared successful. The Land and Farm Management Officer reported that soil conservation was going on well in the locations (all in Eastern Division) which had received RDF money. The Forester, who was responsible for rural afforestation,
too, informed the members that his projects were going on despite problems with the County Council. The District Livestock Officer told the committee that, for the first time, dip projects would be funded from the RDF as the Danish Dip Project had come to an end. There were few questions put to the reporting officers by other members of the DDC. They were either satisfied or disinterested.

Members were not ready with RDF project proposals for 1977/78. The divisions had also not sent any proposals. It was, therefore, decided that each location should bring forward two water projects under the DDG for consideration. Any other needy project could be substituted for one of the two projects. With 28 locations in the district, the DDC would have 53 DDG projects to choose from. Each location had also to bring forward two RWP projects. Another meeting was fixed for March 14th, 1977, to select these projects. It was hoped that divisional development committees would have met by then and selected projects for their areas. Various other issues (rural access roads under the Ministry of Works, an information office in Makueni, a water shortage in Machakos town, etc.) were discussed before the chairman closed the meeting at 1.00 p.m.

20 This meeting was not held because officials were busy preparing for an expected visit by the President. The visit never materialised.
The following observations were made by the author during the course of the meeting.

(1) Membership of the DDC was dominated by government officers. Representation was not wide enough for one to claim that the deliberations of the DDC reflected the views of the local citizenry.

(2) There were occasional verbal confrontations between the MPs present. This was a reflection of the political differences current in the district between political leaders. It was also an indication that the chairman, unlike in Meru, did not have virtual control of the other members. His views, however, seemed to prevail over those of the others.

(3) Although no project selection was done during the meeting it appeared members were determined to distribute projects on an equal basis. This had not been the case in the past.

(4) Like in Meru, decisions were taken by consensus although there were more heated debates in Machakos, especially where the MPs felt that government officers were not carrying out their responsibilities efficiently.
Government officers did not appear concerned with what happened in departments other than their own. Their participation was, therefore, confined to their own activities on RDF, or other, projects. Most of the officers did not appear to consider criticisms directed to them as justified or even necessary.

**The Issue of Money Allocation**

The question of money allocation is one which has little room for political bickering and prejudice. This is so because this exercise involves only technical government staff and the MFP officials in Nairobi. When development committees approve projects they do not state how much money they require for the individual projects. Their work is only to list down projects under the two programmes. Once this is done implementing officers (also referred to as responsible officers) are left with the responsibility for costing the projects which fall under them. An implementing officer is generally the district head of department, or one of his specialised staff, and works with continuous assistance and support from his subordinates. When costing a project the implementing officer works with some amount of freedom,
with little interference from his superiors, the politicians or the local leaders. This is because once money is given to a project there is no way of influencing its expenditure. Chances of misappropriation are extremely minimal. Transferrence of money from a project to another is also not allowed.21

When an implementing officer costs a project he has to make consideration of all possible expenditures on the particular project. Costs include purchase of materials, employment of skilled, semi-skilled and, in case of RWP projects, unskilled labour, and transportation of materials. Expenditure on subsistence and transportation of government officers during implementation is not chargeable to the RDF. Such expenses are supposed to be met by the operating Ministry. Costing details are filled on a prescribed form which also requires further information on the nature of the project. For a project to be considered for RDF assistance the following information has to be provided by the implementing officer.

(1) The name of the project.

(2) The exact location of the project.

Although RDF regulations do not allow money to be moved from a project to another there was one case in Meru where money was transferred from one dip project to another because no local contribution had been made for the former. It appears there were no more such cases in the three districts. There is evidence, though, that there have been a few more cases of this nature elsewhere in Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces.
(3) The date on which the project was approved by the DDC. This is to obviate the funding of projects which have not gone through the DDC.

(4) The nature, purpose and benefits of the project. This is to find out whether the project meets the laid down requirements and whether it has any economic advantages to the local people.

(5) Total estimated cost of the project. The breakdown of this cost has also to be given. It has to be shown how much money would go to materials - cement, steel piping, timber, seedlings, fertilizer, etc. (each type of project requires different materials) - and how much would go to labour. The number of people to be engaged has to be shown, the pay rate given and, where possible, the number of days indicated.

(6) In case of DDG projects, the amount of local contributions, in materials, labour and cash, has to be shown. This contribution may be there at the time of application or it may be expected. The amount applied for is total cost less local (self-help) contributions.

(7) It must be indicated whether the project would require recurrent expenditure and, if so, who would meet it. The responsibility may lie with the County Council (afforestation projects) or the local people (dips, dams, soil conservation, etc.).
(8) It has also to be indicated whether the "responsible officer" and his field officers are willing to implement the project.

(9) The target date of completion has also to be given.

Before the application forms are sent to the MFP headquarters they have to be signed by the "responsible officer", the DDO and the PPO. This binds the three and insures their continued participation and concern during implementation.

The data available revealed that it took implementing officers a long time (from the time the DDC approved projects) to cost the projects and submit application forms to the Treasury. The period taken ranged from two months (a rare minimum) to one year. This delay in applying for money was due to a number of reasons. The implementing officer might have had many projects under him at the particular time. Applying for money immediately would mean more work before completing the other projects (not forgetting his routine work). Many implementing officers found it more convenient not to get the money at all rather than have it and fail to spend it at the expected time. This reason was especially valid for water projects in Machakos and dip projects in Meru.

Some implementing officers were not keen to implement RDF projects. They needed a lot of coaxing from the DDO, the DC and the PPO. They, therefore, delayed costing in order to escape the responsibility of implementing projects.
This was especially so with roads implementing officers in the three districts. There were also actual difficulties in the costing exercise. Some implementing officers, though responsible for particular projects, did not have the skills to enable them to know how much money and time would be required for their projects. This was especially so with water projects for which survey work required a qualified engineer. Such surveyors are few in the country and so districts do not have their own. As such surveyors had to come from Nairobi. This took time as surveyors had many areas to visit. The sentiments of the Meru DDC in October 1976 clearly demonstrate the seriousness of this problem. One of the minutes of the committee proceedings stated, inter alia:

The other major problem (the first concerned local self-help contributions) experienced in the process of water and bridge projects' implementation is that of survey. There is no water surveyor or bridge surveyor in Meru while about half number of our projects need surveying before they are implemented (sic). The committee discussed and noted this as a major problem because there was a shortage of such surveyors in the country.22

Even for projects where no external help was required those responsible for costing found it difficult to make proper estimates.

22 Meru DDC, Minutes of the meeting held on October 25th 1976 - MIN. 37/76.
This was one of the reasons why some projects could not be completed with the funds allocated and supplementary allocations had to be asked for or the local people were asked to make further contributions. (This is not to ignore other factors like rising costs of materials, increasing labour wages and adverse climatic conditions). Three cases in Yatta, Machakos, involving noteworthy earth dams, are / ... For one dam project only Sh.15,000/- was asked for. The contractor later claimed that for the work to be completed about Sh.655,000/- was required. This dam could not be constructed. In another case an amount of Sh.26,020/- was asked for only to be realised later that Sh.67,000/- was required. In the third case a sum of Shs.44,900/- was asked for although only Sh.20,995/- was necessary to complete the project. 23

A lot of delay in costing DDG projects was caused by lack of the required self-help contributions. When a DDC approved DDG projects before local contributions were made implementing officers were made to wait until these contributions were made before applying for grants. In majority of cattle dip and water projects this was the case. In some cases, though, grants were applied for after the self-help money was collected, in which case delay would be in field implementation.

23 From a note sent to DDC members by the DDO, Machakos, on July 23rd, 1975.
The PPOs also caused delays because some projects' application forms were delayed in their offices for a time, though rarely exceeding one month, before sending them to Nairobi. This was partly because of the vast number of applications going through their offices and partly because some application forms were returned to the implementing officers for more details.

Generally, the time taken by implementing officers was unduly long. Though there were problems of inadequate staff, commitment on the part of the officials available needed stepping up. Though DDCs have constantly requested for more autonomy in project selection it is doubtful that this would solve the problem of delays as Nairobi seems not to be the cause at all.

The Role of the MFP Headquarters

When application forms leave the PPO's office they go straight to a Planning Officer in the Rural Planning Unit (MFP) who is charged with the responsibility for scrutinising them and approving those which meet the requirements. His decisions are wholly based on the information contained in the application forms. If the information given is incorrect or inadequate there is no way he can get to the truth himself. It is generally assumed that the information given by the implementing officers is genuine. The fact that the FPO counter-checks this information, however, minimises chances of cheating. There is no
evidence to show that any officers submit only "arm-chair" estimates, though there have been many cases of under-estimation.

After this officer "satisfies" himself that the project under scrutiny is economically viable and is in keeping with the Ministry's guidelines he passes the application form to the head of the Rural Planning Unit. (Before July 1976 this stage was bypassed because the post was vacant). He, too, scrutinises the application form and, if satisfied, sends his recommendations to the Chief Economist. This is a busy man and rarely goes through the many application forms. He, therefore, acts by the recommendations of those under him. Any project that goes up to him is certain to get money. The Chief Economist basically sends a note to the Ministry Accountant advising him to issue an Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE) to the PPO concerned. This is readily done. On receiving the AIE the PPO communicates the information to the DDO and the implementing officer concerned and implementation commences.

All this process appears to be mere formality. Almost all project applications sent to the Treasury are approved. "If I am not satisfied with costing or other information I return the forms to the PPO". These words were uttered by the officer responsible for the initial approval of projects at the Ministry headquarters. He, however, added that he rarely did that because most of the applications were adequately made. This was inevitable considering the tight
central control and the thoroughness of the proforma used.

In Murang'a only one project, Kandara water project, had its application rejected. This was because "the project is too big". This was in February 1973. The decision was, however, reversed in the same month after a request by the PC, Central Province, who was apparently very close to the MP of the area. It was later said that the grant given, a mere Sh.22,000/-, was a token donation to stimulate local contributions and that this was "a special case". The only reason, it would appear, why no more projects were rejected by the MFP headquarters was because in Muranga, and Central Province as a whole, only projects requirements of which totalled about the amount allocated for the district were sent to the Treasury. In Eastern Province the situation was rather different.

In Eastern Province as many projects as possible were sent to the Treasury regardless of whether their total cost exceeded the set district maximum or not. For example, in the 1973/74 financial year Machakos DDC submitted 55 projects to the PDC and

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The total estimated cost of Kandara water project is more than Sh.70 million. It has been receiving donations from foreign governments and voluntary organisations - in addition to numerous local contributions in form of materials, money and labour. There is no rigid definition of a "big" project. One MFP official, however, informed me that a project requiring more than Shs.150,000/- would be considered too big for RDF funding.
the latter approved only seven. The Treasury gave money to only three of them. In Meru, in the same year, the DDC approved 26 projects. Only 9 of them were passed by the PDC. The Treasury gave money to only four of these. The idea was to submit as many projects as possible with the hope of getting the maximum amount of money possible. This strategy was unnecessary as no projects seem to have been rejected as economically unviable. Those which missed grants did so because there was no money to go to them; in other words, the districts had exhausted their allocations.25 This, however, is not to say that all districts in the province reached the maximum allocation. Two tables given below show some actual comparative figures of RDF allocation.

25 Although there is an allocation for each district (an equal sum) every year - it was Shs.1000,000/- for both programmes in the 1975/76 year - some districts spend slightly more whilst others spend much less. As Table 12 shows the three districts studied had big allocations when compared with other districts.
Table 11: Actual DDG and RWP Allocations to the Three Districts, 1971/72 - 1976/77* (in shillings)

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* Figures for the years 1971/72 - 1973/74 may not be exact because they were gleaned from various places in PPOs' files.

Sources: Files in Central and Eastern PPOs' offices and MFP headquarters.
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Sources: Files in the MFP headquarters, Nairobi.
Virtually all projects which go through all the stages outlined above are allocated the amounts asked for by the implementing officers. In the three districts studied there were only a couple of projects which did not get all the money initially asked for. In these cases the remaining amounts were given on request. For example, in 1975 an amount of Sh.42160/- was asked for for a "katumani" maize project in Ithanga Location, Muranga. The Treasury issued an AIE of Sh.40000/-. Even before this amount was spent the PPO asked for the remaining Sh.2160/- which was released immediately. The fact that headquarters officials do not go out to make on-the-spot checking makes it difficult for them to refuse to allocate the amounts asked for. In addition, they are not technically qualified to question the validity of certain estimates. They, for instance, would not know how much ballast would be required for the construction of a bridge or how many mandays would be required to dig a kilometre of road given the fact that soils are not the same everywhere. This state of affairs prevails also because the sectoral economists in the Ministry are not always consulted before projects are approved.

The requirement that all RDF projects have to be approved by the DDC (the PDC does not have to approve them - at least since 1974) makes it difficult for people
to go to the headquarters to lobby for money for projects in their areas as it happens with other government programmes.  

Though the PPO, Nyeri, as early as 1973, complained that the procedure followed in project selection and grants allocation was "unnecessarily long", thus causing delays in releasing funds (the blame was laid on MFP headquarters), records show that Nairobi was, and has been, very fast in clearing project applications. The process was, however, not fast enough when the Treasury had to approve projects before full costing was done. After the procedure was revised the Treasury has been taking less than two months (at times as few as two weeks) to clear individual project applications. A few examples will elaborate this.

(a) A dam project in Ithanga Location of Makuyu Division, Muranga, was approved by the DDC in November 1973 and an application form was submitted to the Treasury exactly a year later. The AIE for this project was issued in about two weeks after the application was made.

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26 An interesting case, though outside our study areas and, perhaps, a bit sensitive, may be cited. Early in 1971 the President promised a secondary school in Nyeri a donation of Shs.5000/-. Over a year and a half later letters were exchanged between the Permanent Secretaries in the Office of the President and the Treasury to have the money given from the DDG. Apparently the PC, Central Province, had given the donation and wanted reimbursement. The money was sliced from the DDG allocation for the district at the beginning of 1973.

PPO, Central Province, Annual Report for 1972, p. 3.
(b) A road project joining Nyakihai and Gikaranga areas of Kiharu was approved by the DDC in June 1974. The application for a grant was not made until March 1975. The AIE was issued in April 1975 and implementation started the following month.

(c) A fodder production project in the Kariara area of Kandara was approved by the DDC in July 1974. The application form was sent to the Treasury in April 1975 and the AIE was issued the following month.

(d) A soil conservation project in Iyego Location of Kangema Division, Muranga, was approved by the DDC in September 1975 and an application made in December the same year. An AIE for the project was issued in January 1976.

Many other examples can be cited. They all indicate that application forms are rarely delayed in Nairobi. Delays are, therefore, caused by field staff as they stay too long before costing and submitting application forms after DDCs have approved projects. They cause further delays in implementation because at times they stay quite long before materials for the approved projects are purchased. Despite the fact that the Treasury approves and allocates money to projects promptly there is need to give DDCs more autonomy in deciding which projects
should be given RDF money. The DDCs should be given the right to the final say, at least for small and medium size projects - say, projects requiring less than Shs. 80,000/-. This would facilitate implementing officers to start work on these projects as soon as the preliminary survey is completed. This, of course, would be possible only with improvements in other factors, like increasing technical staff, availability of skilled and unskilled labour, availability of self-help contributions, etc.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter two important processes have been dealt with. These are the processes of project selection and money allocation. It is only in the former process we can find political manoeuvring by various actors who strive to have their projects picked for financial assistance. Such actors may be politicians, leading civil servants, local leaders or other well-off citizens. The influence of these actors may be exercised in DDC meetings or outside them. It is difficult to identify any one "style" of manoeuvring that is used in a particular district as a number of factors are at play simultaneously.
The district level has been identified as the one at which decisions regarding project selection are made. The lower levels are usually bypassed, apparently because few influential citizens operate "down there". This is, however, contrary to how it should be. Project selection should follow a hierarchy from the village level upwards. The provincial level can be bypassed without any adverse repercussions.

The process of money allocation is the responsibility of the MFP headquarters but only after implementing officers have costed projects and submitted their estimates. The MFP headquarters, when compared with the field, have been very fast in executing their duties. For a number of reasons the distribution of RDF money is very uneven; the more well-off areas have tended to get more money.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FIELD ADMINISTRATION OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND

In this chapter issues relating to the field administration of the RDF will be dealt with. Some administrative constraints and bottlenecks will be discussed. These include poor financial control, incapacities of the operating Ministries, practical limitations of the DDCs and insufficient management of self-help contributions. It will be shown that, although rules governing the use of RDF money appear quite tight, smooth implementation of the programme is impeded by these same rules, in addition to their being flouted occasionally. Implementation is also made difficult by lack of adequate skilled personnel and implementation funds, and also by the fact that DDCs do not dedicate adequate time and effort to RDF project implementation. It will also be shown that, despite the good elements of the "harambee" (self-help) movement, there are some aspects of it which adversely affect the implementation of RDF projects.
Financial Control: How Effective?

It is generally held in government circles that all public finances should be carefully expended and adequately accounted for. Whether this is always done is another matter. The RDF is a "block grants" system that is not excepted from the general financial regulations governing government finance. As the RDF is a part of the vote of the MFP, the Permanent Secretary is the Accounting Officer. But he happens to be a headquarters official and cannot be expected to know details regarding expenditure of all the money allocated to the Ministry. Hence the need to have a field official who is expected to give a full account of the way certain monies are spent. This official is referred to as the holder of the Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE). In case of the RDF, the AIE holding has changed hands a few times since 1971. At the inception of the DDG programme the Accounting Officers of the operating Ministries were made the AIE holders for money allocated to projects falling under them. At the time this was seen as the most logical action as the Ministries were to be responsible for implementation of the projects. It was, however,

1 An Accounting Officer, almost always a Permanent Secretary, is the official answerable to the Comptroller and Auditor - General concerning all monies allocated to his Ministry.
to prove difficult to coordinate DDG expenditures as there was a tendency for them to be mixed up with other Ministerial expenditures. There were fears that some of the grants were going to projects which were supposed to be directly and wholly financed by the Ministries concerned. In less than a year (March 1972, to be specific) this procedure was changed. From that time PPOs were made the AIE holders for their respective provinces but were allowed to delegate this power to the DCs. This was an added responsibility for the PPOs, which had to make them more concerned about the way projects were implemented. It may be appreciated that where a PPO had six or more districts, and with some districts having more than ten projects at a time, this was no easy task. The PPOs, therefore, took the easy way out; they made the DCs the AIE holders for their own districts.

The DCs were, in effect, empowered to authorise expenditures on DDG projects and make payments. It was claimed by MFP officials later that the DCs found in this an easy way of giving some of the "harambee" projects in their districts money. They could also transfer money from one project to another. This was considered a breach of the rules governing the management of development grants and was attributed to the ambitions
and partisanship of the DCs. Whereas it was true most of the grants went to "harambee" projects, there were, on the other hand, very few cases of transfer of funds. It should be noted that even today most of the DDG money goes to "harambee" projects. This could not have been a genuine cause for a change in AIE holding. The MFP people had, however, made up their minds that the Provincial Administration was not good enough to take care of the money and the procedure was changed again in 1974, soon after the introduction of the RWP.\footnote{Letter from the Deputy Permanent Secretary (Treasury) to the PPOs on July 8th, 1974.}

By this change the PPOs were made the sole AIE holders. The PPO was the only person entitled to issue Local Purchase Orders (LPOs), to receive invoices and to make payments. The implementing officers were supposed to send their requirements to the PPO who would order materials for them. Each LPO was to cater for a single project. The PPO was also to pay labour after receiving payment vouchers from the implementing officers. As the RDF grew so did the number of projects located in each district every year. The work of the PPOs has increased so much that this has acted as an impediment to fast implementation of projects.
DDC members have frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with this procedure (they say it is very time consuming) but the MFP has stuck to its guns. The implementing officers and other DDC members feel that AIEs should be held by either the DDOs or the DCs so that materials can be available when they are needed and payments can be made without unnecessary delays. As one rural afforestation implementing officer said, "sometimes we do not pay the labourers on time because the payment vouchers have to be approved by the PPO first. Sometimes this takes time."

In December 1976 the author visited an afforestation project near Muthara market centre in Tigania Division, Meru, at which payment of wages to labourers had been delayed for about two weeks because approval of payment vouchers had been delayed by the PPO. Similar delays had been experienced in the previous months. It is difficult to comprehend how further financial decentralisation would cause "misappropriations" and "mismanagement" as the MFP maintains. In fact one cannot rule out this provincial centralisation of financial administration as one of the factors which make implementation of projects a rather slow process. For instance, in May
1976 the Treasury issued an AIE to the PPO, Central Province, for a second phase of a water project in Muthithi location of Kigumo Division, Muranga. The PPO informed the implementing officer about the allocation the same month. The latter was to wait for materials. Four months later the materials had not been delivered; the materials were to be supplied by a Nairobi firm.

The regulations which govern procurement of stores—building materials, implements, etc.—by government departments also apply to the RDF. Stores whose cost does not exceed Sh.1000/= may be bought from anywhere and without restriction. Stores costing over Shs.1000/= but not exceeding Shs.3000/= may be bought locally from government contractors (who are quite few) or by way of quotations. If the cost of the things required goes beyond Shs.3000/= they have to be bought through open tender. Tenders for stores costing between Shs.3000/= and Shs.20,000/= have to be adjudicated by a Ministerial Tender Board, whereas tenders for stores worth more than Shs.20,000/= are adjudicated by the Central Tender Board. These Boards sit in Nairobi and virtually all successful tenderers come from Nairobi. Since most RDF projects require materials worth substantial amounts of money rarely
are materials bought in small towns. This has two major consequences. The first is that transport costs are usually unnecessarily very high. For example, by the beginning of 1977 the cost of a 50 kilogramme bag of cement was Sh.27/10 in Nairobi, Sh. 28/30 in Machakos, Sh. 30/45 in Meru and Sh. 27/10 in Muranga. An implementing officer in Meru would spend Sh.3045 to buy 100 bags of cement locally. When the same amount of cement is bought in Nairobi it costs Sh.27/10. But at least Sh.1000 is required to transport the cement to Meru. When the cost of materials and that of transport are considered it becomes cheaper to buy materials locally in Muranga and Machakos too. The same may be said about corrugated iron sheets. The cost of one foot of a "gauge 30" iron sheet in Nairobi is Sh.3/80. The cost of the same item is Sh.3/85 in all areas in Central and Eastern Provinces. DDC members in Meru have occasionally voiced their concern regarding the question of transport expenses. Similar feelings have been expressed in Machakos despite the fact that some parts of the district border Nairobi. The PDC in Eastern Province has even gravely exaggerated the matter by suggesting that transport costs go as high as 80-90% of the total cost. 

3 Eastern PDC, Minutes of a meeting held on July 4th, 1977 - MIN. 20/77.
The second consequence is that sometimes it takes too long for materials to reach project sites thus delaying the starting (or completion) of projects. A good example is the water project in Muthithi Location, Muranga, cited above. A few other examples may be given. A water project in North Imenti, Meru, was given money at the beginning of 1976. By October of the same year work had not started because materials had not been delivered from Nairobi. Two dip projects in Meru (one in Igembe and the other in Northern Tharaka) were given money in May 1976. Implementation did not start until the end of the year because materials had not been supplied by a trader in Embu. It is likely if the materials had been ordered from dealers nearer these areas implementation of projects would not have been delayed.

Another argument that is advanced by committee members is that the local traders should be given a chance to benefit from the RDF programme by way of supplying the required materials.\(^\text{4}\) Whereas this argument does not have any direct economic bearing with RDF project implementation, in a wider sense,

\(^{4}\) For example, in the DDC meeting held in Meru on October 25th, 1976, a number of members expressed this feeling.
it may be said to touch on general local development.
All things considered, there is simply no justification for some materials to be moved all the way from Nairobi to an area 150 miles away in Northern Meru.

As soon as the PPO receives an AIE for a particular project he is supposed to open a file for that project. The "responsible officer" (the implementing official) is also supposed to do the same. In practice this has not always been done and this has made it difficult for officials, let alone outsiders, to have all the necessary information concerning the projects under implementation. This filing system was intended to facilitate thorough documentation and hence continuous and speedy implementation. In Central and Eastern Provinces the PPOs had files for each project as required although in some of them there was very little information. This was so even in cases where some projects were said to be at "an advanced stage". Few implementing officers open files for their projects. It is, therefore, not unusual to find an implementing officer who knows how much money has been allocated to a project but does not know how much has been spent or how much is remaining. This may also be because all financial responsibilities are borne by the PPO. Perhaps to
make up for this lack of adequate documentation by implementing officers, and certainly in order to make their work easier, DDOs have opened files for RDF projects in their districts. The case of Muranga is rather different, though. Here it was found that there were files only for types of projects. The information contained in files in the DDOs' offices was more inadequate than at the provincial level, perhaps because DDOs were still relatively new in their areas. Though it cannot be verified that this lack of thorough documentation facilitates misappropriation of funds, it no doubt hampers immediate and quick action by those concerned. Some projects simply get "lost" in files.

There was a water project in Magumoni Location of Nithi Division, Meru, which was allocated some money in the 1973/74 year. Some materials were bought in Meru town but were not delivered. Apparently the local people were expected to raise money to meet transportation costs but they were not informed. The matter seemed to have been forgotten by all concerned until months later when it was found out that the end-of-year deadline was approaching before any work had been done. Though the materials were
eventually delivered this matter left a demoralising imprint in the minds of the people. Implementation was also delayed for many months. An issue discussed in a Machakos "Implementation Committee" meeting is even more interesting. One of its minutes states:

The committee viewed with concern the situation of project which received aid in the past but the projects were neither implemented nor completed (sic). The committee observed further that some of (these) projects received material aid from the DDC and these materials were never utilised.

The committee went further to recommend that supplementary allocations should be asked for but nothing was said (or even asked) about the fate of money and materials given earlier. If the statement quoted above was not a wild one, then it leaves in question the perfection of the accounting system and the financial administrative procedures used. The fact that noone posed a question concerning the money and materials also casts doubts on the commitment of those concerned in safeguarding public funds. If this money

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Machakos DDC Implementation Committee, Minutes of a meeting held on October 18th, 1976 - MIN. 30/76 (c). It should have been Min. 31/76 (c).
and materials actually disappeared with no serious consequences then the financial control procedures, erstwhile said to be very tight, are not very tight after all.

Whereas cases of misappropriation are rare or unknown, it is not so with cases of wastage. In the case of the DDG programme materials are bought and used carelessly. In most cases contractors are blamed for using materials without due care. In other cases misuse occurs due to inadequate supervision. One case in Mbiri Location of Kiharu Division, Muranga, provides an excellent example. A dip project was given a grant of Sh.7000/= in March 1973. The divisional Veterinary Assistant, on request by the project committee, picked on an unqualified "fundi" to construct the dip. It was not after the pit had been dug and 31 bags of cement, some concrete and other materials used that the District Veterinary Officer visited the project only to find that work was being done wrongly. Work was consequently stopped and the "fundi" expelled. But the damage had been done. It is interesting to note that the District Livestock Officer had the audacity to support the action of the Veterinary Assistant. The PPO
wrote a long but definite letter to the DC and suggested, inter alia, that the DC should "follow up the matter and see that the "FUNDI" in question pays the Harambee group the money and labour he had made them to waste." There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the "fundi" paid for the loss. It would also have been justified to penalise officers who had acted in this negligent manner. This wastage resulted in the project getting an additional grant of Sh.3000/= in 1974.

Wastage of funds on RWP projects has taken more diverse forms. Some wastage is made by planting seedlings (on rural afforestation projects) at a time when it is almost certain that they would eventually dry up. This happens when an implementing officer does not want to stop work on a project until the following season. There have been a few cases in Meru and Muranga Districts. Funds are also wasted by spending them on projects which in the end turn out to be of little or no use to the people. One road the author visited in Makuyu Location, Muranga, was being dug for the second time because the first round had left the road still unusable. The officer responsible for roads said that

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6 Letter from the PPO, Central Province, to the DC, Muranga, on July 20th, 1973.
the work had not been supervised properly during the first round. The question of supervision also raises another problem: that those employed on RWP projects do not work conscientiously and so may take a long time to finish work they would otherwise complete quickly. It is common to find supervision on RWP projects being done by one of the casual workers employed on the projects. It is doubtful that such a "supervisor" cares much how the other labourers work. Except for one time in 1975 when the PPO, Central Province, complained to the Divisional Forester that a "member of the gang" should not be allowed to play the supervisory role, there appears to have been little concern about this state of affairs. It is also considered as wastage where a project is implemented but does not get completed with the money allocated. One tree nursery project visited at the foot of Nyambene Hills in Igembe Division, Meru, had been abandoned after terraces had been dug and a number of boxes made. This was because money had run out. Though a supplementary application had been made, it was obvious that by the time the supplementary funds were allocated the whole area would be bushy again. More money would have to be spent on further bush clearing and, perhaps, more digging.
The argument here is that at times costing officers ask for inadequate money either because they are afraid of being considered extravagant or because they know they can always ask for more. Where the projects concerned cannot be phased - say, dips, water furrows, dams and even roads - the period of waiting for supplementary allocations makes it imperative for some work to be repeated later. Since all funds remaining after a project has been completed are always returned to the Treasury there is nothing wrong with costing officers over-estimating expenditure.

The MFP headquarters tries to control (or rather get informed about) the field administration of the RDF by requiring the PPO, with the help of implementing officers, to send monthly "progress reports" for each of the RDF projects. The information contained in a "progress report" includes: amount of money allocated by the Treasury; expenditure at the time of reporting; expenditures from other sources; and general remarks pertaining to the particular project. Under "remarks" officers are expected to give an exhaustive account of the work already done, work remaining to be done, problems encountered, any expected financial inadequacies, etc. In practice this is never the case. Very little information is contained in these
reports. Remarks like "the implementation of the project has reached an advanced stage", "work in progress" and "work about completed" are quite common. This leaves the headquarters with very sketchy information which gives no indication whether implementation is being done properly or not. A more elaborate reporting system would be more appropriate even if it has to be conducted quarterly instead of monthly. This would make it possible for Nairobi officials to know enough about physical progress on project implementation in addition to expenditure progress. It would also help them to discover financial control loopholes, especially at the project level, and formulate new rules accordingly. The rules which exist at present are rather too general. It would, perhaps, be necessary for each operating Ministry to come up with financial control rules for its own projects.

It has been mentioned earlier that until the second half of 1974 money which had not been utilised by the end of any financial year, whether the particular project had been completed or not, had to be returned to the Treasury. What this meant in terms of financial
administration was that implementing officers, together with the generalist administrators, were more concerned with having the money spent fully and quickly than implementing projects successfully and efficiently. The removal of the end-of-financial-year restriction was meant to give implementing officers more time in which to implement projects and to facilitate them to have a change of priorities. How far was this feasible? Although this change made it possible for those concerned to plan implementation of projects more accurately it did not solve other problems which affected the administration of the RDF. It, for instance, did not increase the quality of supervision. The change did not, also, come with new rules which would compel operating Ministries to take up their RDF responsibilities more seriously. Neither did it come with any changes to improve the management of self-help contributions. In short, other constraints remained. It should also not be forgotten that at the time the revolving Fund was being introduced implementing officers were getting more and more projects under them. These constraints will be discussed in the rest of the chapter. All we may note here is that the financial control procedures employed in the implementation of the RDF are in some respects a hinderance to project
implementation. Ironically, these procedures do not adequately reach the day-to-day expenditure of money at the project level. Hence the incidences of misuse of finances with no serious repercussions.

Ministerial Resource Limitations

We are here concerned with deficiencies, in personnel and operating funds, which make it difficult for operating Ministries to give enough attention to RDF projects. The question of personnel is a very important one in development administration. The speed and effectiveness of project implementation will greatly depend on the availability and the quality of technical officers of the operating Ministries. Officers are not only inadequate but those available are lacking in technical knowledge and skills required for some of the projects they handle. This is a phenomenon characterising the whole economic system - not just the RDF programme - and, like in all other development programmes, it has at times been found necessary to use the services of expatriates. Some of them have, of course, come to Kenya because their mother countries have made aid contributions to the RDF.
Virtually all implementing officers interviewed claimed that their projects were not being implemented fast enough (if they had been started at all) because there were not enough officers to supervise work on all the projects. This had made it imperative for them to utilise the services of some of the casual labourers (also referred to as gangleaders) at the supervisory level. In such cases the gang-leaders would be paid a little more than the rest. This situation is prevalent during the implementation of almost all RWP projects. It should be realised that these people do not have any obligation (service, contractual or otherwise) to ensure thorough supervision. They can do anything they like (even in collaboration with those they are supposed to supervise) when no government officer is around. (Perhaps if the gangleaders were to play the supervisory role for long periods, thus appearing to be on permanent employment, they might strive to do their best with the hope that they may later be absorbed in government service). Implementing officers and their subordinate/make only occasional visits to the projects and almost always they are in a hurry. The officer responsible for rural afforestation

7 In case of DDG projects work that is done free of charge by the local people is supervised either by officials of the project committee or by the contractor responsible for construction work.
in Meru, for example, said that he visited projects only twice a month, one of those times to pay the workers. He had no subordinates in the field. The Roads Superintendent in Muranga also visited projects twice a month but he had subordinates who paid visits to projects almost every day. The Land and Farm Management Officer in Machakos visited his soil conservation projects only once in a month. The Locational Agricultural Assistants, however, visited them quite often. In case of DDG projects work is given to a contractor. How well (or badly) he does his work largely depends on his goodwill. Supervision by government officers is very minimal indeed.

No Ministry has special staff set aside to deal exclusively with RDF projects, except for a few sporadic cases. In Meru and Muranga there is an officer for each to deal with rural afforestation projects whilst in Machakos the work is done by the Divisional Forester himself. They have no subordinates in the divisions, let alone in the locations. In Machakos there is an RDF Water Officer, perhaps because of the priority water is given in the district, and also an officer to deal with dip projects. The officer responsible for dips was passed over from the Danish Dip Project which came to an end in 1976.
These special facilities are not provided in the other two districts. All other projects in the three districts are implemented by officers who have other responsibilities. This means that officers have always to divide their loyalty and energies, just as they are accountable to their superiors and to the DDC. Their responsibilities become numerous, therefore, and especially so when there is an overconcentration of a particular type of project.

Water projects in Machakos and, to a lesser extent, in the other two districts are far too many for the officers concerned to cope with. The situation is made more difficult by the fact that there are no water officers below the district level. Dip projects were also very many in Meru until the end of 1975. In 1976 there were enough road projects to keep the Roads Superintendent in Muranga trotting all over the district. The table below gives a rough indication of the amount of work the various implementing officers had at the end of 1976. The table should be interpreted with care because some projects, like dips, take a short time to be completed whilst others, like water supplies, take a long time, sometimes over a year.
Table 13: Number of Projects, by District, under Various Implementing Officers, December 1976

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Source: Interviews.

Almost without exception this state of affairs makes it difficult for all recommended projects to be implemented at the same time. Some of them stay for many months (even years) before they are implemented. One bridge project in Karingani Location of Nithi Division, Meru, was given a grant in 1974 and materials were bought. It had not been implemented by the end of 1976. Implementation of a dip project in Mitaboni Location of Central Division, Machakos, was delayed for about 4 months (work started in March 1977) because the officer concerned was dealing with other projects
and because "there is no 'fundi' to work on it."\(^8\)

A soil conservation project in Gikindu Location of Kiharu Division, Muranga, was allocated money in January 1977. Work had not started on the project by June of the same year.

No doubt the quality of implementation is also affected by this shortage of personnel. The gravity of this problem (inadequacy in personnel and skills) was expressed by the PPO, Eastern Province, in one PDC meeting in 1975, although he laid his emphasis elsewhere. His sentiments were recorded thus:

The Provincial Planning Officer informed the committee that in spite of the Sh.1 million provisionally earmarked for every District for RDF projects last (1974/75) year not a single district approached the Sh.one million mark due to poor selection and identification coupled with ineffective implementation of the projects. He added that even those projects approved for implementation about half of them had not been implemented (sic).\(^9\)

In 1976 the same PPO did some mathematical exercise and came up with some project implementation statistics

\(^8\) Personal communication from the dip projects Officer, February 1977.

\(^9\) Eastern PDC, Minutes of a meeting held on October 13th, 1975 - Min. 11/75.
He reported that in the 1974/75 financial year the RDF implementation rate for the whole province was 67%. This percentage was arrived at by multiplying the total amount of money disbursed by a hundred and dividing by the total amount allocated to projects that year. The DDG project implementation rate was as low as 40% (one district had a low 27%). In the 1975/76 year the overall implementation rate dropped to 44%, apparently due to an increase in the load of work. The large number of projects led by each implementing officer and the fact that there had been no corresponding increase in personnel clearly showed that the rate would be even lower in the 1976/77 year. It is difficult for the government to employ adequate personnel but if the situation is left as it is it may go out of hand. At this juncture one may question the rationale of the frequent salary increases awarded to civil

10 It was not possible to calculate the implementation rates for the three districts because records did not show how much had been spent by the end of each year. The PPO's figures should be handled with caution because they were based on the payments he had made. Some materials had been bought for projects but had not been used by the end of the particular year. The figures are, however, illustrative of the problem being discussed.
servants and other public servants at a time when the country requires more personnel (not to mention the high rate of unemployment). If the RDF is to be expanded, as it should be, then a corresponding increase in personnel is necessary. This should be coupled with a change in attitude by the officers of the operating Ministries. They should dedicate more time and resources to RDF programme implementation than at present. It is also imperative to improve the skills of those who are already in employment in order to raise the quality and scale of project implementation. This may be done by organising frequent training courses and seminars for the various categories of personnel, which would also help to "professionalise" administration. 11

There is inadequacy in transport and financial resources too. Here we consider the availability of vehicles for use by implementing officers and the shortage of money available for fuel and officers' subsistence during supervision rounds. At the close of Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the

11 This is discussed in separate articles by G. Hyden, N.A. Shaath, J.E. Kariuki, D. Carney, and A. Adedeji, respectively, all under the heading "From Africanisation to Professionalisation" in A.H. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden (eds.), A Decade of Public Administration in Africa (EALB, Nairobi, 1975), pp. 89-143.
RDF programme is supposed to be implemented without the use of extra resources by implementing officers. All expenses on fuel (except when transporting materials) and subsistence are supposed to be charged on Ministerial yearly allocations. Even without the RDF projects Ministries have all along been operating under very tight financial constraints. (This is not to overlook the fact that there are frequent misuses of the available resources). Officers are at times "office-ridden", when they should be in the field, either because they have no vehicles or because they have no fuel.

The number of vehicles available is generally small but the major problem appears to be one of routing. The Ministry of Agriculture appears to be the most hard hit because it has many officers at the district level (like at all other levels). Though most of these officers have certain projects under them, they have to share as few as two vehicles. This was the situation in Meru at the close of 1976. This greatly restricted the movement of the

12 This problem was identified by Judith Heyer, Dunstan Ireri and Jon Moris in their report of a survey which preceded the SRDP. See J. Heyer, et. al., Rural Development in Kenya (EAPH, Nairobi, 1971), p. 103.
implementing officers. Though no officer indicated he felt he had adequate vehicles, virtually all of them were more concerned with lack of adequate running funds. No money allocations are made to cater for recurrent expenditure during RDF programme implementation. When RDF projects are added to the normal Ministerial programmes the limited resources become strained. This is one major reason why some projects do not get started even when there is an official to supervise implementation. As recently as March 1976 the Provincial Engineer, Central Province, stated that his department would not implement any RDF projects which would make his office to incur extra expenditure. This gave the impression that RDF projects would be implemented only if there were surplus funds and left the DC and the DDO in Meru in a very confused position. The matter was later settled between the DC and the Provincial Engineer and implementation of projects was continued.

The general view held by implementing officers when interviewed was that the MFP should set aside a part of the RDF to meet running costs. The Ministry,

13 Letter from the Provincial Engineer, Central Province, to the DDO, Meru, on March 31st, 1976.
on the other hand, says that this is not possible because donor countries/agencies do not allow their money to go to recurrent expenditure. Since the Kenya Government also contributes to the RDF, there is no reason why some of the government's contribution cannot go to running costs. Alternatively, the yearly recurrent allocations to the operating Ministries should be raised with the understanding that RDF projects would be fully integrated with the Ministries' on-going development programmes. These "prescriptions" cannot wipe out the problems facing the RDF but they can help minimise the problems. The major concern here is to question the prevailing situation.

While we are on the issue of resource inadequacy we may, perhaps, discuss briefly the conditions under which DDOs, who are expected to visit projects as often as possible, operate. The DDOs are housed in DCs' offices and report directly to the DCs. The DDOs are also expected to (and actually do) report to the PPOs. This dual accountability to DCs and to PPOs—sometimes brings complications in the work of the DDOs. The DDOs in Machakos and Meru explained that at times the PPO may want them in his office when the DCs want them to be visiting certain projects. The PPO may also require them
to concentrate their attention on certain projects whilst the DCs have other ideas. The DDO in Muranga did not mention these complexities, perhaps because he was very new (less than four months) in the job when he was interviewed. He in fact did not seem sure what his duties were.

When DDOs were first posted in 1975 the MFP expressed a need for each DDO to have at least one vehicle, a driver, a typist and a messenger. This has never been done. They operate on the grace of their DCs. In Machakos and Muranga, DDOs were found to have a vehicle each to themselves. But they had other problems though. As the Machakos DDO explained, "it is very difficult to work the way I would like to because my work is never typed on time. My drafts take secondary priority and I may have to wait for days." Others had the same problem. Money for running vehicles and for the DDOs' subsistence is provided by the DCs. In short DDOs do not have anything they can call their own and which they can control. If the DCs do not allow them the use of the available resources they have nothing to do but to sit in their offices.
It is appropriate to mention here a minor administrative constraint that affects the work of DDOs. The DDO may be a qualified economist (some are not) or he may be an adept administrator but he cannot combine all the skills essential for the implementation of various types of projects. He cannot, therefore, give a thorough evaluation of the work being done by implementing officers. No wonder then that the DDOs' "progress reports" are derived "raw" from what implementing officers tell them rather than what they have assessed themselves. The same may be said about the PPOs and the entire hierarchy of the Provincial Administration. But, unlike the staff of the Provincial Administration, the DDO does not have any power over implementing officers. He cannot, therefore, compel them to work faster than they are willing to, nor to implement projects if they are unwilling. As far as championing fast development is concerned, he is a toothless dog. It should, however, be conceded that he plays a big and important role in the flow of information from the field to the provincial headquarters and to Nairobi.

14 There are still some government officers who view the office of the DDO as playing the role of watching over what they are doing. They, therefore, do not have full trust in the DDO.
Participation of DDCs in Project Implementation: How Feasible?

In Chapter 1 it was stated that DDCs in the 1970s are expected to prepare district plans, identify projects for RDF financing and coordinate the activities of government Ministries. Over the years DDCs have evolved into organs with many functions. Though they lack statutory force, they have established themselves into a force to reckon with, especially when they have the full backing of their respective DCs. It is argued here that the assumption of too many functions by the DDCs has made it difficult for them to dedicate adequate time and efforts to supervision of RDF project implementation, a role currently supposed to be one of their main responsibilities. Although DDOs act on behalf of DDCs it is considered necessary that all members should be fully involved.

In discussing the planning role of DDCs in Chapter 1 it was established that DDCs have not been involved in planning in any significant way. Regarding the RDF, DDCs are supposed to select projects to be given funds by the Treasury. This responsibility has always lain on the DDCs, irregular manipulations within them notwithstanding. Once
money has been given to projects a DDC is supposed to follow up implementation of each project as closely as possible. The DDC, as a collectivity, is supposed to be well informed on the progress of the projects at the various stages. DDC members are expected to question irregularities and delays which may be made during implementation. In short, the DDC members should be in a position to say exactly what is happening on each project about every time. But this is usually not the case. Except for the implementing officers concerned, the DDOs and, to a lesser extent, the DCs, other members of the DDCs are poorly informed. They are unaware of what happens on the projects they themselves passed for financial assistance. This was found to be true in the three districts studied. This situation was chiefly due to three factors: (1) too much concern with other matters, (2) infrequency and poor attendance of DDC meetings, and (3) lack of physical checks on projects by the DDC. These factors are discussed below.

The other responsibilities of DDCs are only crudely defined and their discussion here can only be brief. The DDC is a superordinate committee - i.e. there are many other committees that are subordinate to it and whose activities have always
to be reviewed by the DDC. Such committees include the District Community Development Committee, the District Agricultural Committee, the District Education Board, and other ad hoc committees which may be formed by operating Ministries from time to time. The DDC also involves itself with activities of organisations like CARE, UNICEF, SIDA, etc. For these organisations to fund rural projects the DDC has to endorse them first. A look at DDC minutes would clearly reveal the variety of issues dealt with by these committees. The DDC also involves itself with the "harambee" projects undertaken in the particular district. Unlike in the past, self-help projects are supposed to be controlled in order to relate them with the general development programmes. This is why all new self-help projects have to be registered with the Office of the Community Development Officer - after the DDC has given them its "blessings". As important, if not more, the DDC is variously involved in making proposals and suggestions to government Ministries, statutory bodies and local authorities about projects.

15 In Chapter 3 two cases of DDC meetings were given. They may be considered quite representative of what happens in most DDC meetings.
these institutions should undertake in the district. Though little comes out of these proposals and suggestions in terms of action, DDC members all the same spend a lot of time on them. When so many things have to be discussed in a meeting which may last only a few hours, it is inevitable that no thoroughness will be given to the deliberations.

DDC meetings are infrequent partly because members appear not very keen to attend meetings very frequently and partly because DCs do not have the initiative to convene meetings frequently and to enforce attendance. In the three districts studied DDC meetings are convened usually when project selection is to be done.

There is poor attendance in these meetings due to a number of reasons. First, no attendance allowances are paid and members find it expensive to attend many times. This problem does not affect

16 These problems were discussed in Chapter 1 in connection with advisory committees. The views expressed by R.H. Jackson (op. cit., p. 197) regarding the failure of these committees were also discussed.
most government officers as they do not incur any personal expenditure when they attend. In addition most of them are stationed at the district headquarters where meetings are always held. Second, government officers find it monotonous attending meetings in which they are only asked how far they have gone with project implementation. Many of those interviewed expressed the feeling that they would do without constant reports to the DDC and, therefore, favoured infrequent meetings. Third, there is the general view held by DDC members that they have many other pressing duties (both public and private) which do not allow them to attend many DDC meetings. This, however, does not appear a convincing reason considering the fact that attending meetings is supposed to be one of their duties. Lastly, there is no advance programme that is laid down to be followed by the DDC and its sub-committees. In Eastern Province, the PPO has occasionally tried to draw programmes but they have rarely been followed. The need for more frequent meetings (and better attendance by members) still exists. As the PPO, Central Province, wrote, "the DDCs should meet more frequently to review the progress of the projects given government assistance and help in the implementation
Because of the size of the DDCs, the problem of members not attending regularly and the multiplicity of issues dealt with, DDCs in the three districts have taken measures to institute district-level sub-committees to meet regularly to deal with specific RDF issues. These measures have, without exception, been unsuccessful. In Muranga sub-committees of about six people each were started in 1974 on a sector basis. There was a committee to deal with water supplies, another to deal with agricultural issues, another to deal with health matters, etc. By the beginning of 1975 only the health sub-committee had started functioning but also died soon thereafter. This sub-committee system could not survive because the decisions of the sub-committees were not only subject to endorsement by the full DDC but they could also be rejected altogether. In Machakos a DDC "Implementation Committee" was set up at the end of 1975. This committee was supposed to meet on the first Friday of every month to review progress on project implementation and make recommendations to the implementing officers. This sub-committee had

ten members. By the end of 1976 the sub-committee had met seven times. In Meru no standing sub-committees appear to have been constituted at any time. Ad hoc sub-committees have at times been used but their purpose has been chiefly to select, and not to review implementation of, RDF projects. These sub-committees are usually composed of five people and are always given specific assignments.

DDC members know little about what happens on RDF projects also because they rarely pay visits to these projects. As far as records go, the Meru and Muranga DDCs made one visit each to some of the RDF projects in their areas in 1975 and 1976, respectively. In Machakos the DDC "Implementation Committee" visited water projects and dams in Yatta, Makindu and Makueni Divisions in August 1976. No money is set aside for such visits. Any time the DDC members have to visit projects government vehicles have to be used and fuel expenses met by the operating Ministries. With the financial constraints facing implementing officers in mind (these have been discussed above) it is understandable

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18 No meeting was held between November 1976 and April 1977 when the author went through the relevant file for the last time.
why visits to projects by the DDC as a body are difficult. The work of making physical checks is, therefore, left to the DDOs, who work in the name of their DDCs, in spite of the problems facing them.

The role of the DDCs in project implementation is not only minimal, it is also impossible. Their functions are too numerous and ambiguous to allow them to make any noticeable contribution. The lack of pooled resources to facilitate participation by the DDCs in actual implementation is quite in evidence. Under the circumstances no reorganisation in DDC membership and attendance can be expected, of its own, to remove this incapacity.

"Harambee" Contributions: A Complement or a Burden?

"If you expect any help from outside you must be prepared to help yourselves first." This may sound like a paraphrase of the adage that "God helps those who help themselves" but it is far from it. At least there is nothing religious about the statement. Very often political leaders and government officers may be heard making the state-
ment in public addresses, especially when speaking in "fund-raising" meetings. What is generally meant is that local people should always be prepared to contribute money (and labour) for their development projects before the government or organisations and individuals from outside can give them financial assistance. This is the case with all DDG projects, as it has been mentioned earlier. A look at the nature of and methods used to raise local contributions will make us understand more clearly how the self-help ("harambee") component affects the administration of the RDF.

Basically the idea of self-help is a laudable one because it helps tap local resources which would otherwise stay idle or would be spent on non-capital consumption. If the government was left on its own to finance all development programmes it would hardly manage. (The financial limitations of the government were discussed in Chapter 2). The "harambee" movement, therefore, acts as a vehicle to raise funds to supplement, rather than to supplant, government efforts. Good as the movement is, it has some socio-economic implications which the author considers unwarranted when the welfare of the rural poor is considered. These implications
will be discussed insofar as they affect the implementation of the RDF programme.

Although RDF regulations require the local people to raise their contributions (for DDG projects) before any DDG allocations are made, this is not always the case. The methods used in raising local contributions are basically the same everywhere although the severity with which they are employed differs from place to place and from time to time. When a DDG allocation is made before local contributions are raised there is a tendency for the local people to be hurried to contribute presumably because "the Treasury is unlikely to release any District Development Grants unless and until the promised (or expected) self-help contribution element is in the DC's custody". The practice is that an allocation is made but expenditure is withheld until the local people have contributed their portion. It is interesting to note that even after the 1974 changes (regarding expenditure deadlines) people are still told that if they do not raise the money quickly the grants would be returned to the Treasury or transferred to other districts. Whereas this may be considered a tactic to get things done it has also its ramifications.

19PP0, Eastern Province, as contained in MIN. 6/75 of the minutes of a PDC meeting held on February 11th, 1975.
What methods are used in raising self-help contributions and what politico-economic implications do they have? It is argued here that the methods employed are basically unfair to the poorer segment of the rural population. This produces a negative attitude towards RDF projects and hence there is not adequate local support. This hampers fast project implementation. In addition money is not readily got from these people thus resulting in delays in starting, or completing, project implementation. This is mainly why DDG project implementation rate is usually low and funds stay unspent year after year. Three methods of realising self-help contributions may be identified. (1) Money may be raised in a meeting attended by residents of the area in which the project is located and by outsiders. (2) Money may also be collected from people individually by paying visits to their homes and asking them to contribute specified amounts. (3) The money may also be got through a Cooperative Society or a Cooperative Union. A combination of two or the three methods is also

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The Cooperative Societies referred to here are composed of rural farmers and peasants. The societies help members to market their produce and also provide credit facilities to them. A Cooperative Union is a body to which a number of societies are affiliated.
employed. Which method or methods is/are employed will depend on the amount of money to be raised, the willingness of the people to contribute, the economic well-being of the people of the area, etc. Each of these methods will be examined separately.

Fund-raising meetings are now commonplace in Kenya. A fund-raising date is set, a "guest of honour" selected and people are asked to attend and "contribute generously" towards the particular project. This is considered the most fair method as far as the local people are concerned because those who attend contribute according to their means and capabilities. In some cases, especially where local leaders are influential nationally (notably Muranga) or where the local leaders are economically affluent, the "guest of honour" and other notable personalities bring lots of money (it is difficult to say how it is collected) from themselves, relatives and friends. This type of "generosity" is growing into a very significant facet of the "harambee" movement and should be encouraged. It is one way, albeit intrinsically inadequate and complex, in which the rich can use some of their wealth for the benefit of many. (It is important to note that these people who bring large sums of money to "harambee" meetings consider it an act of charity and are happy about it.
This boosts their ego and also promotes their socio-political status in the community. Whether this is really charity, or whether it should be prevalent at all, is open to debate. The phenomenon would most probably be redundant in an egalitarian economic system.) This voluntary method of fund-raising is, however, uncommon on its own as it is known not to raise large amounts of money from the local area and is, therefore, combined with the second method.

This is the method whereby leaders and government officers sit and decide that every adult male and/or female should contribute a certain amount of money (the contribution required may be uniform or graduated) towards a particular project. Such a decision may affect people of sub-location, a location or even a larger administrative unit. People do not usually give this money easily and it is often extorted from them by use of threats, coercion or confiscation of property. When such incidents occur the poorer members of the society are made to contribute more than they can actually

21 One only needs to look at readers columns in the daily papers, especially throughout 1976, to know the sort of feelings people have about the way "harambee" contributions are wrung out from the rural population.
afford. They, therefore, sacrifice some of their basic needs in order to have some development project completed. At times this practice leaves people apathetic and skeptical about the whole idea of "harambee". For example, recently a lot of coercion (both physical and psychological) was employed in order to have people to contribute for a hospital in Nithi Division, Meru. (This project was not funded through the RDF but people view government programmes as one and the same thing.) Many people were left with very bitter memories.

The responsibility for seeing to it that people make the contributions required is laid on the Provincial Administration which is bestowed with political and physical power.\textsuperscript{22} The quotation, \textit{infra}, demonstrates how important it is to make people contribute. A minute of one of the Meru DDC meetings stated the following, \textit{inter alia}:

\begin{itemize}
\item A more elaborate discussion on this method is contained in N.N. Nthiga, \textit{Implementation and Management of Harambee Projects in Kenya: A Case Study in Nithi Division, Meru District} (B.A. Dissertation, Makerere University, 1975).
\end{itemize}
One of the main problems that (faced) DDG projects' implementation was local self-help contributions. Committee learned that some self-help groups failed to deposit the promised self-help contribution with the District Commissioner (sic). After a thorough discussion on the issue it was recommended:

(1) That the self-help groups that fail to raise and deposit their promised self-help contributions with the District Commissioner in time will have their G.K. grant withdrawn and given to projects that fulfil the required conditions (and)

(2) That District Officers and the Community Development Officer assist in checking and organising self-help groups in their respective divisions in order to contribute enough money, materials and labour in which can attract Government assistance (sic). 23

The methods to be used to make people contribute were not mentioned by the DDC apparently because those concerned knew them. The methods could be anything like the ones discussed above.

23 Meru DDC, Minutes of a meeting held on October, 25th, 1976 - MIN. 37/76. "Self-help group" is a term loosely used to refer to any number of people coming together for the purpose of contributing for and working on a project. Sometimes this may refer to people in a location or a larger unit for money collection purposes.
The third method used to realise self-help contributions is the use of Cooperative Unions or Cooperative Societies. This is a relatively easy exercise as long as management committees of these Unions/Societies pass that money should be deducted from members' earnings. The General Manager of Muranga District Cooperative Union had this to say about the Union's role in self-help: "We are always ready to help if the Administration asks us and if we think the project will benefit our members we make deductions from all the members." A standard amount of money may be set for all the members. When this is not done members are expected to pay different amounts depending on the yields of their crop, say one cent for every kilogramme of coffee delivered to the Cooperative Society. Once again it is the "smaller" members who are burdened especially if all members have to contribute equally. In relative terms (just like it is with regressive taxation) the poorer members pay more than the richer ones. This then places the cooperative movement in line with the larger socio-economic system whereby the poorer segment of the society contributes more relative to the richer.

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24 Personal communication, November, 1976.
The management of "harambee" contributions towards DDG projects, once they have been deposited with the DCs, is about the same as that of the RDF. Most of the local contributions are spent on paying skilled labour whilst most of the grants go to buying of materials. Where materials have to be bought with local contributions orders are made by the PPO and payments by the DC concerned. It was not possible to detect specific cases of mismanagement of funds in the DCs' custody mainly because of the way these funds are kept and spent. "Harambee" deposit contributions are kept in "floating" accounts. There are loopholes which can facilitate misuse of these funds. In the first place there appear to be no records of expenditure of these funds (this also applies to money contributed to self-help projects). Then it happens that self-help contributions are not subject to the accounting procedures which regulate public finance expenditure.

There have been a number of allegations (by DCs and politicians) of misappropriation of self-help contributions before they reach the DCs. These allegations are certainly not directed to funds collected in "fund-raising" meetings and those remitted by Cooperative Unions/Societies as they are directly deposited with the DCs or, as a temporary measure, with their District Officers. The funds that are collected by self-help group leaders, sometimes over long periods, are doubtlessly more difficult
to account for. It is difficult to tell how much is collected from people or how much is misappropriated. The author cannot pinpoint any specific cases of misappropriation chiefly because no accounts are kept for these funds. No elaborate accounting is done, because, so far, no rules exist to regulate the collection, keeping and use of "harambee" money. Lack of specific cases does not mean there is no misappropriation. By the fact that there is room for mismanagement, there is no doubt there must be truth in the allegations of misappropriation.

The connection between the management of self-help contributions and the RDF is twofold. First, the delays experienced in the collection of "harambee" contributions make implementation of RDF projects difficult. When money is misappropriated it means more delays (or even abandonment of a project) as additional contributions have to be made. In places where people fail to (or cannot) contribute enough money, very few projects are located there and implementation is rather slow. Second, the negative attitude that the local people give to the "harambee" movement when excessive methods are used is also extended to RDF projects. This reduces local support for these projects and affects the speed of implementation.
One other aspect of local contributions - the unskilled labour component of DDG projects - may be briefly mentioned here. According to RDF regulations no unskilled labour engaged on DDG projects should be paid. The local people are expected to provide their services free of charge. This compels some self-help groups to contribute money in order to employ casual labourers, if the members of these groups cannot avail themselves because of engagements elsewhere. This was found prevalent on dip projects in parts of Machakos District. What this condition (of no payment to unskilled labour) essentially means is that people have to occasionally leave their normal work in order to offer free labour on these projects. Whereas this may be necessary as a means of gauging the commitment of the local people on these projects it is also disruptive on other economic activities. In addition it may affect the management of the RDF in that the labour may not be available at the time it is most needed and in the right quantities. The rate of project implementation is therefore affected. If it is assumed that money contributions are enough to display local people's commitment on their projects (as the author thinks) it may, perhaps, be more realistic to pay all labour, whether skilled or unskilled, employed on DDG projects - like it is on
RWP projects.

On the "harambee" movement, one may conclude that, although it plays some part in tapping local potential, it is largely oppressive to those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. If the movement is to survive, and without the kind of coercion that characterises it now, serious changes need to be made both at the decision-making and the implementation levels. The richer members of society tend to benefit more from development programmes. For this reason, in addition to the need for equity, they should bear the bigger burden when it comes to contributing towards these programmes. This may help change the attitudes of the people towards development projects. The tying of DDG projects to local contributions also needs relaxing in order to reduce delays in the implementation of projects.

**SUMMARY**

The salient problems encountered during the implementation of the RDF programme have been dealt with in this chapter. It has been shown that some aspects of financial control procedures act as a hinderance, rather than a facility, to smooth and
fast implementation of RDF projects. Other aspects of these procedures are ignored by implementors with the result that projects are either not implemented or they are implemented badly. The major problems faced during implementation however relate to resource inadequacies. These include personnel (both quantitative and qualitative), transport facilities and running funds.

Of importance, too, are the limitations of the DDC as a collective actor in project implementation and the problems involved in the management of "harambee" finances - when they are being collected and when they are being expended. As the body responsible for selecting projects and for the overall "supervision" of RDF programme implementation, the DDC is presently not sufficiently involved. The problems of "harambee" affect, quite greatly, the pace and extent of RDF (specifically DDG) programme implementation.
CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEMS OF ACHIEVING RDF PROGRAMME

OBJECTIVES

When introducing the RDF in Chapter 2 it was stated that the DDG programme was started in order to get the DDCs and the local people more involved in planned development and that the RWP was initiated in an endeavour to create rural employment opportunities, raise the incomes of the rural poor and, consequently, curtail the influx of people from the rural areas to urban centres. These aims have, to a large extent, not been achieved. This has been due to some factors the discussion of which forms the core of this chapter. We shall look at misconceptions about the objectives of the RDF, the employment creation aspects of the programme and problems of project management after completion.

Misconception About RDF Objectives

A major problem that the RDF programme has encountered throughout its history is the attitude many government officers (more than anyone else) have had towards it all along. They have viewed it as completely separate from other government
programmes. Though this attitude has undergone some change over the years, it has not disappeared altogether. As recently as early 1977 the PPO, Eastern Province, had this to say:

..... an erroneous impression has been created in some Districts to the effect that Rural Development Fund projects are not an integral part of the normal Ministerial functions and that the DDO's sole function was to implement RDF projects. This has been very unfortunate and it is hoped this impression will be corrected by the DDC chairmen in time.  

We find, for example, that by the beginning of 1977 there was not a single road project under the RDF programme in Machakos. The officer concerned claimed that this was because he was waiting for the start of the Rural Access Roads Programme which had been proposed by his Ministry. The fact was, however, that he did not want extra work. In Meru, the Agricultural Officer explained that when there was a shortage of fuel RDF projects were not inspected regularly to give "our department's programmes" priority. The District Water Officer in Muranga took a similar stand when he said that

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transport facilities should be provided for RDF projects as the existing facilities were only for his Ministry's programmes.

This situation is aggravated by lack of firm directives from operating Ministries' headquarters concerning RDF projects. Here, too, there is still the hangover of the view that RDF projects are the responsibility of the MFP. Various inter-ministerial meetings in Nairobi have facilitated exposure of this "disease" and helped improve the situation. More of such meetings may be useful. But, more important, the Ministries need to direct their field officers to dedicate all possible resources and efforts to the programme. Perhaps occasional seminars to be attended by government field officers and other DDC members should be organised in every district. One such seminar was held in Meru (for all districts in Eastern Province) in August 1972. It was said to have been very helpful to those who attended.

The attitudes of the intended beneficiaries are also important if any programme has to achieve its objectives. Through informal and unstructured interviews with some local citizens, it was found out (not quite unexpectedly) that the local people are not aware that there is a difference between the RDF programme and other government programmes. There was
general consensus, though, that the government was doing some work, although it was felt that more could be done. Generally, the people are appreciative of all that the government does for them although they are unaware of how much the government may be capable of doing but does not do. It has been argued in Chapter 3 that local leadership is dominated by those who have had some economic and social benefits from the system. These people always make claims of the "good work" that has been done, is being done and is to be done "for the people" by the government. The local citizenry is not well placed to question such assertions and tend to take them as gospel truth.

Some dissatisfaction with the RDF programme, like others, is manifested in the actions of some local people, in addition to verbal expressions. Afforestation projects, for example, are viewed by some people as being geared towards reducing the amount of land available for agricultural purposes. People, therefore, act in adverse ways to frustrate the work being done. In Meru and Machakos there is widespread practice by people to graze livestock on areas newly planted with seedlings. In Tigania Division, Meru, there was even one case in 1975
of a person who set an afforestation area on fire. On attempting to arrest the culprit, Administration policemen were confronted by the local people who were in sympathy with the culprit. One may attribute these destructive tendencies in the two districts to the fact that most (in case of Meru, all) afforestation projects are on individually owned land. Though the owners initially allow some of their land to be afforested they later feel that they are being deprived of their property. Destruction of water pipes is not uncommon too. Such acts of vandalism may be committed by people who do not clearly understand the purposes of the projects or by others who feel dissatisfied with what is being done. In Igembe Division, Meru, pipes were destroyed in 1976 allegedly because people were being made to contribute money yet only the chief's camp and a Catholic Mission were to be supplied with water. People who have been made to contribute for a project which turns out to be of no direct benefit to them will be inclined to be opposed to the implementation of projects of similar or related nature. For example, because of failure of some dams to function properly after construction (mainly in Makuyu, Muranga, and Yatta and Makindu in Machakos) some people became skeptical of subsequent attempts to construct more dams.
The discussion on "harambee" contributions in Chapter 4 concluded with a note that the "harambee" movement is a great benefit to the progressive members of the society and an enormous burden to the poor majority. Despite the benefits that may accrue from "harambee" the methods used to get money from people are loathed by the poor. This, to some extent, is a factor negatively influencing attitudes towards RDF projects. Perhaps if "harambee" was left strictly voluntary (like it is with the rich few) the attitude of the people would be different. This may in the initial period delay completion of projects but it would pay dividends in the long run. Were it not for the fact that people have undergone a long experience of material and labour exploitation during the colonial period it is unlikely the "harambee" movement could have produced the results it has so far.

The argument here is that the colonial regime placed the people in a submissive posture which the post-independence government was quick to exploit by introducing the philosophy of "harambee". By insisting that people must help themselves in order to be helped (even by their own government) the people were made to clear all blame for their underdevelopment from those in authority and place it onto themselves.
When the "local contribution" burden is combined with the poor results that accrue from some project implementation the people are left skeptical about what is done for them. Most dams in Machakos and Muranga are constructed in such a way that "both animals and human beings get water from the same water point". The water in these dams looks perpetually unclean and certainly unhygienic and in some cases is not available during the dry seasons. When the dams dry up the people go back to where they had started - hunting for water. There are also dips which are constructed and stop functioning after a short while because of structural defects. There were two cases each in Meru and Machakos at the end of 1976. In Muranga (Mitubiri Location of Makuyu Division) and Méru (Mikinduri Location of Tigania Division) there was one afforestation project each on which seedlings had been planted but dried soon afterwards. There are other results of the RDF programme, which can be mentioned, which leave local people with ambivalent feelings concerning government efforts to help them.

The RDF programme is supposed to create employment for the rural populace while at the same time inducing the people to promote local development through local resources. If this idea is to have any
meaning to the local people (as this seems to be lacking at present) the people should also be "educated". The government programmes have to be popularised through the use of all available media so that the people do not get a wrong conception of what the government is doing or is supposed to do. They should also be explained in detail what exactly is expected of them. The chief's "baraza", in which all taking part in rural development efforts would voice their ideas, is a handy tool for mobilisation. It cannot be argued that "barazas" are not used at present. It is the approach that needs a change, priorities need shifting and speakers need diversifying. It is, for example, inappropriate for a District Officer to address "wananchi" on the benefits and methods of soil conservation (perhaps in the presence of the Agricultural Officer) when he is not going to be anywhere near when actual conservation work is being done. Technical officers should be given more say in such meetings than they have at present.

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2 In N. Nyangira, Chiefs' Barazas as Agents of Administrative and Political Penetration (IDS Staff Paper No. 80, July, 1970), this method is adequately discussed.
The idea of a "rural newspaper" may also be tried in every district. The only paper of this nature is currently being produced in Muranga with funds given by UNESCO. The monthly paper, titled "Kisomo", is written in Kikuyu and is very informative about the development efforts being made in the district. Although the paper has in the past run into financial difficulties (it was started at the end of 1975 and sells at 30 cents) which stopped its publication for some time, the idea is worthy continuing and replicating. Such a paper does not only inform but it also gives credibility to what is being done for the rural people.

**Employment Creation: A Principle of the RWP**

In Chapter 2 it was stated that the RWP was initiated in order to alleviate rural unemployment. It was hoped at the time that the programme would make a significant impact on the rural employment situation and that it would serve as a worthy supplement to the normal agricultural employment. The actual implementation of the programme, however, does not seem to have met these assumptions as expected. Its results have been minimal and its potential to disrupt agricultural activities has been exposed.
In addition to playing a role in "employment creation", the RWP may also be said to play the role the DDG programme was initially supposed to play: that of encouraging DDCs to take a keener interest in planned development. Since the RWP has more purposes than the DDC programme, the former would be expected to take a much bigger share of the RDF.\(^3\)

Since no local contributions are expected for RWP projects there is no reason why this programme should not take a larger share of the RDF.

Yet we find that in the three districts studied, like in most others, DDG projects have been taking the bigger share (see Table 11). (The 1976/77 figures for Machakos are very much in the right direction). By the fact that the amounts of money going to the RWP are extremely small (in absolute and relative terms) one wonders whether the "employment creation" principle of the RWP is being taken seriously by both decision-makers and implementors of the RDF.

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3 The 1974-78 Development Plan (pages 111 and 113) indicated that the RWP would be getting the bigger share - except in the 1974/75 year. In practice, as the PPO, Central Province, informed me, it is assumed that each programme should get a half of the money available for each district. It is interesting to note that in the 1976/77 financial year no money was allocated to Marsabit District in Eastern Province under the RWP.
The manner in which the RWP is implemented at the project level throws even a bigger shadow on this important principle. The numbers of labourers involved on these projects are rather too small to make much impact on the employment situation. Rarely will you find more than 60 people on any one project (and, where there are, this would almost always be a road project) although all implementing officers declared that they always had more "applicants" than they were prepared to employ. By the fact that funds which go to RWP projects are minimal, projects which are located in any one division at the same time are very few indeed. For example, there have been only five RWP projects in Nithi Division, Meru, since the programme was started. Four of these projects were roads of less than seven kilometres each and a water furrow of about eight kilometres in length. In Tharaka Division of the same district there have been only two (road) projects. It can well be figured out how many people in that division know there is anything like an employment creating RWP.

The method used to select those who are offered jobs is quite simple. Once the implementing officer decides how many people he requires for a project he asks the Chief or Assistant Chief of the
area to select "able-bodied grown-up people" (men or women) from the area where the project is situated. (Note that no transport or accommodation is offered to those who are employed. They have to come from their homes and report for work before 8 o'clock in the morning). The Chief uses the "first-come-first-picked" method or picks those he knows. In very few cases are labourers picked by use of the ballot. These selection methods do not take account of the economic standing of the "applicants". Neither do they eliminate those who might be in some employment elsewhere. This is partly because the government has never stated who exactly should be offered employment and partly because of the practical difficulties involved in determining who, among the "applicants", are more deserving. What happens, then, is that some people who would be more useful elsewhere waste the chances of those who have no means to a living. It cannot be suggested here what alternative courses of action may be taken but it may be pointed out that recruitment

4 In the rural areas, in addition to there being people who are in no employment, there are many others who operate under "disguised unemployment" in agriculture or in small commercial enterprises. These and others who are fully employed in agriculture, but who may not be getting reward in ready cash, will always flock to RWP project sites to try their luck.
for RWP is taken too much for granted. For example, when the officer responsible for roads in Muranga was interviewed he said that it did not matter to him who were engaged as long as they were able adults.

If the recruitment exercise had been taken seriously the rates of absenteeism (or labour turnover) experienced in some places would not have occurred. For reasons given above, it is wasteful to start off with, say, 50 people and after some days find that only 30 or fewer people are reporting for work.

There is also the problem of some projects whose labour component is very low. Noting that there are some serious problems involved in making accurate estimates (these have been discussed in Chapter 3) it may be understood where the actual percentage of labour component only barely falls short of the estimated percentage. We can only point out two instances in Muranga where this condition was blatantly flouted. In one instance a dam project in Ithanga Location of Makuyu Division was given Sh.15000/=  

5 Martin David and Peter Hopcraft, writing on road construction in SRDP areas, argued that the number of "applicants" would be reduced by lowering the wage rate, thus raising the "opportunity cost" of seeking employment on SRDP roads. See their "Labour Intensive Road Construction and SRDP" in IDS, Second Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme, op. cit., pp.12:15-20. It is doubtful this would adequately resolve the problem as long as it is difficult to measure the "opportunity cost" and as long as some people do not get "cash" from their agricultural activities.
under the RWP. All the work was done by tractor. In the other instance an afforestation project in Kandara was allocated Shs.18,000/= and only 20% of this went to labour. When such cases occur the local people are deliberately deprived of a chance to make some earnings.

We cannot make an accurate determination of the adequacy or inadequacy of the amount of money paid to the casual labourers who work on RWP projects. We shall, however, give a brief account of what implementing officers and the labourers themselves feel about the pay rate. We may start by pointing out that, since the inception of the RWP, the pay rate has gone up a number of times in order to conform with the occasional pay increases "awarded" by the government. When the programme started the pay rate was set at Shs.4/= per day for all Kenya but was raised to Shs.4/50 almost immediately after it was realised that the then current minimum labour wages in some rural areas were much higher. The decision to standardise the pay rate in all SRDP areas was challenged by a number of researchers who played a part in the evaluation of the SRDP. David and Hopcraft, for example, argued that pay rates should differ according to wage levels prevalent in the various areas.  

argument may be put forward in respect to the RWP. But, contrary to the economic argument given by the two writers, there should be a set minimum wage below which implementing officers should not go irrespective of the number of "applicants". The feeling in government circles is that one rate should apply throughout the country in order to impede arbitrary overpaying or underpaying. The prevailing system does not solve the problem.

After the May 1975 wage increases which were proclaimed by the President, the wage rate on RWP projects was raised to Shs. 6/75 per day. Research for this work was done over a year after this increase. At the time almost all the implementing officers interviewed felt that the pay rate as it stood was quite adequate. They argued that this was evidenced by the abundant availability of labour. If, however, adequacy is to be measured by relating wages to the cost of living, then this is another matter. No

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7 It is understood that the pay rate was raised again to Shs. 7/90 in July 1977 after a Cabinet decision to raise wages throughout the country.
attempt was made to determine this relationship but it is doubtful the wages were anywhere near adequate if the cost-of-living criterion was considered. Perhaps (and only perhaps) this may be reflected by the complaints which were constantly made by labourers at the work places. In the places the author visited the labourers felt that they were being paid too little and the rate needed to be raised.

The one phenomenon which we consider doubtlessly unfavourable to labourers, more than the question of pay rates, is that of failing to pay workers employed on RWP projects. Where and when this happens the people concerned are reminded that the idea of offering free labour is not new to them. For example, in 1975 a District Officer in Tigania, Meru, wrote to the officer responsible for rural afforestation concerning an overseer who was asking to be paid after working on a RWP project. A few other labourers were also involved. The District Officer wrote:

I have already made the chief to understand that the public has to contribute towards the (rural afforestation) project. The question of the DDC paying the overseer therefore need not arise.  

8Letter from the District Officer, Tigania Division, to the Rural Afforestation Extension Services Officer on January 25th, 1975.
Apparently money had got finished and there was no more with which to pay the overseer and the others involved. The District Officer suggested that the local people should be told that any work they had done was their contribution to the project. No negotiations would, therefore, be entertained afterwards. In other cases officers were more tactful. If the money allocated to a project got finished before the labourers were paid for all the work done they were either paid with money allocated for another project or they were asked to wait for a supplementary allocation. (Perhaps the case cited above occurred before this idea of transferring funds or deferring payments was conceived.) By the end of 1976, for example, there were about ten people who had worked, or were working, on one afforestation project in Igembe Division, Meru, but were paid from funds allocated to another nearby afforestation project in Tigania Division. When this happens it means that the project under implementation may not get completed with the money available. If, on the other hand, labourers are made to wait they might end up not getting the money at all. At the beginning of 1977 there were people who were working on soil conservation projects in the Eastern Division of
Machakos while supplementary allocations were being awaited. Though cases of non-payment were (or appeared) quite few, they nonetheless, indicated a disposition of some officers to exploit the local people's ignorance about their rights vis-a-vis the RWP.

This situation is demonstrated further by the way work on RWP projects is apportioned to the labourers. They (labourers) are paid on a daily basis. Some officers have, however, gone into the practice of giving work on piece-rate, but without paying workers according to the amount of work done. This system was used on various occasions on almost all types of projects - notably roads, soil conservation, afforestation, and water furrows - in the three districts. What is usually done is that every morning when labourers report the supervisor or "patrolman" apportions a piece of work to each person. When one finishes the piece one leaves and has a day on one's account. If one cannot finish the piece of work on a particular day the work has to be finished.

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9 When interviewed, the PPO, Central Province, stated that this system was at times unfair to labourers but argued that due to supervision problems it could not be done away with altogether.
the following day before another piece is taken on. What this means is that the slower workers get overworked and they have to work long hours every day. This, from a social point of view, is unfair.

The system used on soil conservation projects in Machakos is, perhaps, the most absurd when one considers the amount of money earned by the individual. The labourers are not employed individually. One has to be a member of a "mwethya" group (a self-help unit) to qualify as jobs are given to "mwethya" groups as such. The organisation of these groups is excellent and the groups can be put to very good use to communally accelerate rural development. A visit in areas (notably the Eastern Division) where they have dug terraces to conserve soil would reveal how successful they have been. It is not the organisation or effectiveness of the "mwethya" groups that is questioned here but the method in which they are remunerated.

By the end of 1976 "mwethya" groups were paid Shs.7/= for every 25 feet of about two feet trenches dug. The trenches were said to facilitate soil and water conservation. One "mwethya" group of 35 people was said to have earned just over Shs.2000/= in one month. If one month is taken to have 26 working days it will be clear by simple calculation
that each person was getting just over two shillings a day. It cannot be said that we are raising the incomes of the rural poor when they earn so little in a day. It is likely there are members of these groups who are not happy with the pay rate because they can earn more elsewhere but would not pull out of the social units as this may later have unfavourable repercussions, like not getting help from their "neighbours" when in need. There is, nonetheless, the consolation that all the conservation work has so far been carried out on the farms of those who make up the "mwethya" groups.

What is required on RWP projects generally is a work and payment system that does not exploit the labourer by either underpaying or overworking him. A system that does not take these conditions into consideration would be defeating the basic principle of the RWP.

So far it has been argued that the RWP creates employment of some sort but it is not enough. It should be mentioned that the RWP is likely to distract people from other types of employment in agriculture, a situation that may be economically catastrophic as the programme expands. (It is likely that this has already started happening).
The RWP is supposed to be on when agricultural activity is low. The practice has been different. People have been engaged to work on these projects almost throughout the year. Since some agricultural workers do not get cash from their work they are made to leave their work by the pull of money and go for RWP employment. In this way they fail to carry out their responsibilities on the farms. This could result in a reduction in food supply. It may be understandable to engage people on afforestation projects even when work on farms is heavy (seedlings have to be planted at the same time with crops) but it cannot be so with roads, water furrows, soil conservation, etc. The eagerness to implement projects quickly appears to have blinded some implementing officers and the generalist administrators to the extent that they fail to realise that the rural man can easily be lured by the availability of a little money and forget, even if temporarily, his farm responsibilities.

Project Management After Construction

What happens to a project after it has been implemented and a "completion certificate" has been issued? This is considered an important question because lack of proper maintenance of projects
constitutes mismanagement or misuse of the RDF. There is no point spending money on structures which cease to be useful to the people soon after they are constructed. Before any project is given money it must be indicated by the implementing officer who would maintain the project after its completion. Do the agencies concerned take up the task and do they maintain projects properly? In order to make the analysis clear, we shall look, separately, at the various types of projects given assistance from the RDF.

For every water project there is a project committee (also referred to as management committee) which, even before construction starts, organises to raise self-help contributions and also draws a programme for the provision of free labour. After the implementing officer has finished his part - i.e. after the "completion certificate" has been sent to the Treasury - he hands over the project to the committee. The committee has to employ a water operator who inspects and maintains the equipment. The committee also decides how much money should be paid by the water consumers - usually on a monthly basis.
The Ministry of Water Development occasionally gives "free" technical advice and repair services. The Water Officers interviewed said that this was bound to be difficult in future as the number of projects increases. At the time research for this work was carried out there were very few RDF water projects which had been completed; there were three in Meru, three in Muranga and five in Machakos. It is too early and difficult, therefore, to assess the efficiency of these committees. In a few of these projects, though, it was found difficult to collect money from consumers and hence there was not a constant supply of water. For example, in Magumoni Location of Nithi Division, Meru, there is one water project from which there may be no water for three months running although it only serves a dispensary, the chief's camp and a market centre. In time it might be found necessary for the government to maintain these projects, especially when equipment is old and needs major repairs or overhaul.

Most of the water operators engaged by project committees are not adequately trained. This is partly because qualified technicians are scarce and partly because those available are too expensive to hire. This lowers the quality of
maintenance and, in the long run, may adversely affect the usefulness of these projects. In a course organised for water operators at Kenyatta Farmers Training Centre in Muranga in September 1976 it was found that the operators were not qualified enough to maintain large projects. More courses of this nature (for all districts), and with a helping hand from the government, would ease the problem and maintain some level of efficiency.

There is also a project committee for every dip project. These committees determine the dipping charges (these depend on the chemicals used) and also employ dip attendants. There have been many management problems with dip projects in all the three districts. Firstly, some people refuse to take their cattle for dipping, especially if they consider the charges too high. Secondly, project committees often find themselves in financial straits because they try to keep charges as low as possible. Sometimes this entails use of very little chemical which renders the dipping ineffective. This problem is especially rampant in

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10 It should be borne in mind that most of the dips now in existence were constructed under the Danish Dip Project. As the procedure followed in implementation and problems encountered are exactly the same as those on RDF projects, no distinction will be made in the analysis.
Mem. Thirdly, there are occasional cases of misappropriation of funds which tend to kill the enthusiasm of dip users. Two such cases were discovered in Machakos in 1976. Government officers complained of having no legal powers to inspect the finances of dip projects (in fact few of them have bank accounts) and so the officers cannot tell how the money collected from dip users is spent. Lastly, virtually all committees lack adequate management skills. They are often in conflict with dip users, if members are accessible at all.

In all the three districts there were dips which were not functioning by the end of 1976. This was because of lack of water (chiefly in Machakos), because of lack of money to run them or because of construction defects. Involvement of government officers is restricted to what they refer to as "giving technical advice". This advice is not always readily available as the officers have many other duties to occupy themselves with. The problems which face dip projects can only be solved by a take-over of all dips by the central government. This may turn out a costly venture but it is a necessary one.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} In mid-1977 the government took over dips in a few districts - including Muranga. It is not yet clear whether this is a move towards a complete take-over throughout the country.
Unlike DDG projects (these, after completion, are wholly maintained by the local citizens), RWP projects do not have management committees during or after implementation. After completion, RWP projects are managed differently. All RWP road projects are supposed to be maintained by the Ministry of Works. (Machakos had no RWP road projects even by the beginning of 1977). All RWP roads are what, in government terminology, are called "unclassified roads". Normally (i.e. where RDF money is not involved) the Ministry of Works has nothing to do with such roads. They are constructed, if at all, and maintained by County Councils or by local people themselves. By the end of 1976 there were no road projects in Muranga which had been used long enough to require repairs. In Meru there were a few that required attention but nothing had been done on them since initial implementation had been completed. If past performance by the Ministry of Works is anything to go by - there are still signs that there has been no complete reversal in attitude - it is unlikely that it will maintain these roads. (Note that by Ministry of Works standards, these roads are too minor to be given much attention). The three roads officers interviewed expressed their fears that RDF projects may make their work too heavy and also strain the limited resources available. What is likely
to happen in the future, therefore, is for the local people to be compelled to maintain the projects. It need not be repeated that the rural population is already hard pressed by other public projects.

The last type of project we shall examine is rural afforestation. Responsibility for maintenance seems to lie on different agencies depending on where a project is situated. In Meru all afforestation projects are supposed to be taken over by the County Council. The projects are situated on individually or group-owned land. None has been handed over yet as no project is considered completed. The Clerk to the County Council, however, agrees that such an arrangement is acceptable to the Council. In Machakos some projects are on gazetted public land. These are to be maintained by the Forest Department. Those on individually owned land are to be maintained by the County Council. By the beginning of 1977 there were plans to start some projects in schools. Such projects would be maintained by the schools concerned. In Muranga there are three projects on individually owned land (to be maintained by the County Council, one on gazetted public land (to be maintained by the Forest Department) and six on school land.

The arrangement regarding afforestation projects appears adequate as long as projects are handed over when there actually are trees already
growing. In Meru and Muranga there were some projects on which money had been spent but which had very few trees. The seedlings were said to have dried up because of the hot weather. It is difficult to pinpoint who was to blame but there is no question thousands of shillings went down the drain. If such "projects" are handed over to the County Councils or to schools it is doubtful that these agencies would replace the dry trees. It is likely there was faulty timing when these projects were implemented.

On the whole it appears that decision-makers and implementors are very concerned about having some work done without equally getting concerned about how these projects serve the local people eventually. It is of no use constructing a dip that will cease to function a few months after completion because there is no money for chemicals. It is also unnecessary to dig terraces (or trenches) for soil conservation if there is no one to take care of them when rains start taking their toll. It is not the structures left behind by implementors which are important but the benefits which the local people get from them. And no benefits will accrue from them if they are not managed properly after implementation. It is, therefore, necessary to review the present situation and take some corrective measures.
The aims of the RDF programme are not being attained as expected. Three reasons have been given. (a) There is a misconception about the aims of the programme by both the implementing force and the supposed beneficiaries. In fact these aims are only vaguely defined. (b) Partly because of the small size of the Fund and partly because of the manner in which the RWP is implemented, little, by way of employment creation, has been achieved. (c) Some projects are implemented only to turn useless shortly afterwards. They do not add anything to the well-being of the "common man". This may also be because the government has never stated categorically for whom "rural development" is supposed to be and how it can be ensured that the very poor truly benefit.

On the whole certain policy changes are necessary if the RDF programme is to be truly developmental - i.e. if it has to reach the poor and raise their standard of living. Such changes would have to relate to the three problem areas identified above.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND

A comprehensive analysis of the RDF is difficult to do when one considers one major feature of the programme. This feature is that the programme has not been in existence long enough. Perhaps it has not been easy for uniform patterns of implementation to be established. The methods used in both selection and implementation of projects are rather haphazard despite the fact that there are guidelines from the MFP. This haphazardness is equally characteristic of the general process of planning at the local level. In addition no research data exist in respect to the RDF. There is even no appraisal of the programme by the Government itself. The author does not, therefore, claim to have presented an exhaustive review. There is more to be researched on, given time and resources.

The RDF, as it has operated so far, has its successes and failures. We shall briefly look at both, starting with the successes. In spite of the small size of the RDF (it should have grown faster than it has) it has brought with it some benefits (though minimal) to the rural population. Where dips exist cattle diseases can now be minimised.
Some areas, hitherto inaccessible, can now be reached, and residents can get to other areas, more easily because some new roads have been opened. Improvement in the infrastructure of an area has numerous concomitant changes in the socio-economic system — namely, easy marketing of products, better diffusion of innovations, easy accessibility by change agents, and so on. People now served with piped water can spare time they would otherwise spend drawing water from afar for other tasks on their farms or small businesses. Some people have also got direct agricultural benefits through finances given to buy farm inputs. Virtually all projects which have been completed, and which have continued to function, have benefited some people, though in many cases the numbers involved might have been small. It has to be mentioned that it is difficult to quantify these benefits. It is difficult to measure the benefits of roads, bridges, afforestation projects, and so on, as far as they meet people's needs. In short we cannot use the cost-benefit analysis as it is known in our evaluation of the RDF programme.

The RDF has made DDC members more concerned about the committee's activities. They now realise that
the DDC has some purpose. They have, therefore, increasingly made use of it (and its secretariat - in the office of the DDO) in making suggestions regarding local development.

The existence of the RDF has, to some degree, increased the awareness of local citizens of what the government can do for them. Never before did they realise that the government could spend money to conserve soil on individual persons' land. Nor were they aware, before 1974, that the government could give money for small access roads to be constructed. In the past the local people were expected to construct such roads, either voluntarily or by order. Water, too, was known to be provided through self-help efforts until the government got involved. People's demands are, therefore, becoming more and more numerous and diversified. This is evidenced by the nature of issues deliberated on in DDC and sub-DDC meetings and others raised in public meetings.

The "local contribution" element of the DDG programme, in spite of its excesses, helps realise local resources which might not have been directed to

development projects. By "matching" government grants with local contributions, the initiative of some (the more well-off) people for further development has been sharpened and heightened.

The RDF has also played an important role in bringing the various operating Ministries closer together. Whereas functional specialisation is still maintained, government officers are now more aware of what others are doing, the problems experienced by each and the capacities of the various Ministries. This brings about improved coordination and a pooling together of the available resources. As one Agricultural officer put it, "It is now easy to make use of other departments' vehicles even when I am doing routine work". This work fraternity is also evident in the use of secretarial services and frequent joint field tours made by officers.

Let us now look at the failures of the programme. By its intrinsic characteristics and the manner in which it is implemented the programme fails in its redistributive role. As it was shown in Chapter 3, the more developed areas receive more RDF money thus intensifying existing intra- and inter-district disparities. The PPO, Central Province, realised this and cautioned that something has to be done, but without saying what
exactly should be done. He wrote:

.... data showing the distribution of District Development Grants since the year 1971/72, when DDG were established, indicate that some Districts have seriously to work harder in order to identify many viable projects so that the Districts' share of these grants does not go to other Districts .......(and) if the trend is left unchecked development in some Districts will continue to lag behind in District Development Grants aspect. 2

As an officer deeply involved in RDF programme implementation the PPO should have given concrete measures to be taken in order to reduce development differentials and, consequently, to avoid what Nwosu calls "serious dissatisfaction and hence serious political unrest" in some areas. 3 Such political unrest may eventually supervene what may otherwise be a stable economy. What is required is a redirection in objectives and priorities. For example, existence

3 E.J. Nwosu, "The Politics of Development Administration" in Institute for World Economics, Studies on Developing Countries (No. 75, 1974), p. 45. This situation would occur where the government perpetually neglects certain areas.
of local contributions, as a prerequisite to projects being given government grants, should not be given the prominence it currently receives. Factors like population, economic well-being of the local people and "felt needs" should be given more emphasis when allocations are made.  

The condition that government grants should not be utilised until the local people have raised their contributions tends to rationalise the use of coercion in raising the local contribution. This is done in the name of "helping" the local people to realise faster development, presumably because the local man does not know when and how much to contribute. This brings about a negative effect on the local people's perception of the programme.

The employment creation principle of the RDF has not been met. This has been partly because the

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funds employed for this purpose have been too meagre and partly because the guidelines given by the MFP in respect to this programme have not been followed properly. One cannot claim that the RDF has in any way halted the influx of people from the rural to urban areas. It was implicitly supposed to play this role. The indications are that this rural-to-urban-areas trend will continue unless and until major policy changes vis-à-vis rural poverty and unemployment are effected.

The RDF has been made to cover so wide a field that it has tended to overshadow, and even to replace, other programmes. This has caused a lot of confusion on the part of implementing officers. In Meru and Muranga Districts the RDF programme was found to be running side by side with Danish Dip Project. By the beginning of 1977 the RDF programme had supplanted the Danish programme. The RDF programme (whose tentacles extend to micro agricultural projects and minor access roads) now runs concurrently with the Integrated Agricultural Development Programme and the Rural Access Roads Programme. As early as 1974 the Chief Economist in the MFP advised that DDCs should put little emphasis on road projects because the Ministry of Works was about to embark on its new programme.
As it turned out, there were more road projects than any other RWP projects which were passed by DDCs. No wonder the Ministry of Works officials were initially unwilling to be involved in DDC activities. It would be more appropriate (as this would obviate duplication and confusion) if RDF activities were confined to projects for which no specific programmes have been instituted.

The specialist-generalist tangle\(^5\), which is characteristic of administration everywhere, is very evident in the administration of the RDF. By the fact that RDF projects are not strictly Ministerial projects the generalists are inclined to commanding the specialists. Implementing officers are, in a sense, supervised by non-specialist officers (the PPO, the DC and the DDO) who frequently give directives - and advice - even where they are not capable. This places implementing officers in an unpleasant position; they have to strive to acquiesce with their generalist colleagues while at the same time trying to keep their technical autonomy. This situation adversely affects the performance of the officers concerned. It is difficult, yet, to say

how this problem can be resolved.

Activities on RDF projects disrupt, to some extent, other activities in the rural areas. People are employed on RWP projects at a time when their services may be required in the agricultural sector. People are also called upon to provide free labour on DDG projects when they may be having other plans. In instances where the local people are not well organised Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs literally compel people to provide labour. As the RDF programme is not seasonal (it goes on throughout the year) some people are faced with the problem of dividing their time between their private work and public works.

The RDF, as an output of District Planning, was supposed to reflect endogenous development aspirations. Sometimes projects funded through the RDF have been exogenous - ie. they have been handed down on the local people from outside. As long as this practice persists opposition to this imposition will also persist, even though in a rather sporadic manner.
The idea of planning for RDF projects, of course, erodes the initial condition of "filling gaps left by operating Ministries" but this cannot be helped. There is a price to pay if those concerned have to pick projects hurriedly in order to maintain an outmoded condition. The local people should not only be involved in the implementation of RDF projects but they should also be involved in identifying them. As Mbithi correctly argues, the target or beneficiary units are extremely important in determining the direction and pace of any "planned social change".

The RDF has so far been a worthwhile experience. It has managed to adapt itself to changing circumstances and demands to survive that far. Similar "block grants" programmes have been tried elsewhere in Africa without similar success or expansion. Zambia started her "Bottleneck Fund" in 1966 to facilitate Provincial Development Committees to "overcome unforseen bottlenecks in the execution of approved programmes of development that either are not the responsibility of any single Ministry or cannot be easily solved by normal procedures or through local authority

action". The "Bottleneck Fund" programme was abandoned because it could not work. It failed because the rules set for its implementation were too tight to be followed and because civil servants, who were the implementors of the programme, were subjected to excessive surveillance by politicians.

In Uganda the Rural Development Programme was introduced in 1969 to "coordinate and assist all self-help efforts in the rural areas." This programme collapsed in its second year of operation for two reasons: first, because it had been started with political motives (only parliamentarians in the ruling Uganda People's Congress were involved) thus rendering it devoid of local support, and, second, because civil servants were completely excluded in its implementation.


Tanzania's case is a different story. The Regional Development Fund was introduced in 1967 following recommendations by the National Executive Committee of the ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The Fund was said to be "monies provided by the Central Government and made available to the Regional Development Committees to assist in financing small-scale development projects initiated by the people themselves or through their representatives ..."\textsuperscript{10}

The Regional Development Fund is in operation to date. It has continued to grow and it has undergone a number of changes in order to meet the differing conditions in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{11}

The Kenyan programme is similar to the three discussed above in that they were all introduced exclusively for the rural areas and

\begin{footnotesize}

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that they were intended to cover where Ministerial activities could not reach. In the three non-Kenyan programmes politicians had, more or less, an upper hand over civil servants in the programmes' implementation. Except in Tanzania, where the ruling party is quite strong and active, the programmes could not survive given the little or non-existent involvement of civil servants. This is where Kenya's programme differs with those others. The civil servants in Kenya are not only fully involved in the implementation of the RDF programme, they have almost eclipsed the politicians.12 This has ensured continued survival of the RDF. Had the politicians the upper hand it is unlikely much would have been achieved noting that they are likely to spend most of the time debating minor issues and acting less. This, however, is not to say that the political leadership has no influence on the activities

12 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1954), pp. 222-27, argues that this is inevitable in transitional societies where politicians are unsure of themselves and where duties of bureaucrats increase immensely. His arguments concerning the efficiency of these bureaucrats are, however, inadequate.
of the administrators. The studies on "block grants" programmes, cited above, focused on the organisational problems affecting programme implementation. The writers were concerned chiefly with the general problems impeding the success of these programmes. My study covers this ground, too. But it goes further than that. It examines the effects the programme has on the well-being of the rural man. It also explores the difficulties involved at the project level. Whereas the other studies, more or less, only identify problems this study tries to offer "prescriptions" which, it is hoped, will be useful to project implementors. The outlook of this study is, therefore, broad and prescriptive. Herein lies the uniqueness of our findings and analysis.

One can only conclude with an assertion that the RDF represents an important turning point, a mark of unprecedented concern for the rural areas. The

Fred W. Riggs, Ibid, discusses "interference complex" - a situation where politicians influence the activities of bureaucrats and vice-versa. The relationship, as it applies in an African context, is described in D.J. Murray, "The Impact of Politics on Administration" in A. Adeedeji (ed.), Nigerian Administration and its Political Setting (Hutchinson Educational, London, 1968), pp. 11-23. Such a situation exists in Kenya, too, only that the administrator dominates in decision-making.
size of the Fund, however, impedes its making any significant impact in the dire need for rural transformation. The financial, human and material resources employed are hardly enough.\textsuperscript{14} There are some organisational flaws, too, which have affected the implementation of the RDF programme.

The government also realises that the RDF could do with some modifications and changes (not clearly defined). It was in this spirit that in the early months of 1976 the Kenya Government requested the services of two "experts" who were made available by the Ford Foundation. The two "experts" were supposed to look into the organisation and operation of the RDF and make recommendations on ways of improving its administration. The Norby and

\textsuperscript{14} By the end of 1976/77 financial year all the money available under the RDF was said to have been committed (sources in the MFP headquarters). It is ironical that by the same time the whole of Eastern Province had returned Shs.15 million (for the previous three years) to the Treasury. This was revealed by the PPO, Eastern Province, to PDC members and reported in the \textit{Standard} (Nairobi, October 26th, 1977), p. 2.
Gerhart Report (named after the two "experts") has long been presented to the Government but it is still held "confidential" in government vaults. It has neither been "accepted" nor "discussed". It can only be hoped that any good points (if there are, at all) made in the report will be put into action. Throughout this text we have made various suggestions. They all point to one thing: that the RDF needs expansion - if rural development is to have any significant meaning in Kenya - but not in its present form. Rural development should not just involve construction of structures and provision of services in the rural areas. These should actually reach the mass of the people - to improve their living conditions and end their dependence on "patronage" and "welfare" trickling from the rich. This is the only true meaning of socio-economic development.

For the RDF to make a more significant impact on rural development in future the following recommendations are made. They may be useful to both decision-makers and programme implementors.

(a) Decentralised planning should be effected more vigorously in order to give the district planning units more say in regard to what projects are given funds in their respective areas.

(b) Membership of DDCs and other lower committees should be more representative so as to ensure that the benefits of the RDF reach as many people as possible.

(c) The amount of money available under the RDF should be increased so as to raise the number and range of projects funded and subsequently improve the welfare of the people.
(d) To achieve (c) resort should not be made to foreign aid as this may result in foreign influence on projects selection and subsequent implementation. Instead, the government should explore ways of raising extra funds locally by curtailing expenditure on unnecessary imports, exhausting existing tax sources and exploring new ones, expanding local borrowing, etc.

(e) The distribution of the RDF should be made as equitable as possible between provinces and between districts. The present trend is that the more developed areas get even more.

(f) The process of project selection, funds application and allocation should be speeded up to reduce delays in implementation once projects have been identified.

(g) Financial control procedures should be streamlined to remove existing bottlenecks at the implementation level.

(h) Implementing ministries should be given adequate recurrent funds, vehicles and equipment to facilitate continuous implementation. The funds should either be included in the allocation for the various projects or the annual recurrent votes should be increased.

(i) The DDC as a unit should monitor implementation progress more effectively to ensure implementation officers do not relax.

(j) The collection of "harambee" contributions should be made more considerate to the poorer members of society and the accounting procedures which govern public finances should apply to "harambee" money also.
(k) The objectives of the RDF should be defined more clearly so that both implementors and intended beneficiaries understand them well.

(l) The employment creation principle of the RWP should be considered more seriously and ways found to continuously offer the rural poor some income.

(m) Measures should be taken to ensure proper and constant maintenance of projects after they have been constructed.

(n) For effective implementation to be achieved an adequate pool of qualified and professional personnel has to be maintained. The government must look for ways of training more Kenyans to reduce the shortage of technical personnel that is presently apparent.

(o) The RDF programme should be reviewed periodically to reveal bottlenecks and inadequacies and to pave way to improving the operation of the programme.

To the scholarly readers two points may be made. One, as this work was a case study of only three districts, there is need to carry out more case studies in other parts of the country for comparison purposes. Two, given adequate time and other resources a survey covering the whole spectrum of the RDF programme, and one placing emphasis on implementation at the project level should be carried out. This will give a general picture of the operation of the programme. The generalisations made may then be used to make predictions and inferences for specific cases.

The RDF cannot, on its own in the present form, transform the rural areas. Other government programmes - rural industrialisation, education, health services, agricultural extension services, etc. - also need intensification in order to buttress RDF objectives. This has to entail a shift and improvement in manpower planning and resource allocation at the national level.
APPENDIX A

Membership of Development and Advisory Committees as proposed by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (1966)*.

PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE**

1. Provincial Commissioner - Chairman.
2. Provincial Planning Officer - Secretary
3. Provincial Agricultural Officer.
4. Provincial Education Officer.
5. Provincial Medical Officer.
6. Provincial Community Development Officer.
7. Provincial Engineer.
8. Provincial Cooperative Officer.

PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1. Provincial Commissioner - Chairman.
2. All members of the PDC.
3. One MP from each District.
4. Senators in Province (went with Regionalism).
5. Three Provincial Advisory Committee members, including its chairman.
6. Two leading citizens to be nominated by the PC in consultation with the PDC.
DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

1. District Commissioner - Chairman.
2. Provincial Planning Officer - Secretary.
3. District Community Development Officer.
4. District Agricultural Officer.
5. District Medical Officer.
7. District Cooperative Officer.

DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1. All Members of the DDC.
2. All MPs in the District.
4. Three members of the County Council, including the chairman.
5. Two or three eminent citizens to be appointed by the DC in consultation with the DDC.

* By 1970 the composition of these committees had changed, but only slightly.

** Other Provincial and District government officers were free to attend PDC and DDC meetings, respectively, if they wished and when matters concerning their duties were being discussed.
APPENDIX B

Members of the PDC and DDC as given by the Office of the President and the MFP, 1974.

PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

1. Provincial Commissioner - Chairman.
2. Provincial Planning Officer - Secretary.
3. All Provincial heads of Departments.
4. All District Commissioners in the Province.
5. All MPs in the Province.

DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE* 

1. District Commissioner - Chairman.
2. District Development Officer - Secretary.
3. All District Heads of Departments.
4. All District Officers in the District.
5. The District KANU Chairman.
6. All MPs in the District.
7. One Councillor from each Division.

* All Districts later included Clerks to County and Municipal/Town Councils as members. In Meru and Machakos councillors do not attend DDC meetings.

The DCs are entitled to coopt other people who may be useful but this rarely happens.
# APPENDIX C

Names of administrative Divisions in the study Districts.

## MACHAKOS DISTRICT

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<th>Locations</th>
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<td>Yatta</td>
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<td>Makindu</td>
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<td>Makucni</td>
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## MERU DISTRICT

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<td>Tigania Division</td>
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<td>Igembe Division</td>
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## MURANGA DISTRICT

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<tr>
<td>1976/77*</td>
<td>294.97</td>
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* Given as provisional.

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