A Philosophical Analysis of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge

BY

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C/80/7906/02

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in philosophy, in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Nairobi.

JUNE, 2011
DECLARATIONS

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my mother, Mercelina Musimbi and daddy Ernest Masia for their support throughout its formative stages.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has had the input of many whose influence has expanded, tested and allowed it coming to where it has arrived. This has been from the researcher's immediate and remote environment. This has then been the inspiration, formulation and finalization resulting from the creative and imaginative efforts of many. With all came the critical thinking that enabled a breakthrough for personal relationships and contacts that allowed for compassion, competence, consciousness and courage. Here then we have just a few of whom the author acknowledges their contribution, among the many who this study is indebted to.

First and foremost are the researcher's parents. They have had to be patient and understanding as the project was underway and even had to bear the demands of it all. Mum and dad thank you very much for being so understanding and for letting this work build our relationship to a higher and more meaningful and acceptable level. Thank you for being so understanding and for standing by me giving moral support as I needed you.

It will be unfair not to say this project has been a source of laughter, joy and compassion in the effort to bring it about. Many who listened to the author helped to shape the ideas and allowed them to remain philosophical. Among them were the author's students, colleagues and friends. To them all I say thank you very much. What would I have done without your help? You have been instrumental for this work being what it is.

Thanks too to the chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religious studies for allowing the author to be a part of the department in all respects. To all members of the department sincere regards are sent. There are many other acknowledgements to make besides those here.

On the whole the thesis would not have been without the interest, encouragement and patience of the named and unnamed individuals. Special and heartfelt thanks go to my supervisors: Professors Jack Odhiambo and Joseph Nyasani. In particular is Professor Jack Odhiambo who was always ready and willing to meet me and could even reschedule his duties. With him his office was a study room, telephone conversations were a pointer to clarity and accuracy of expression. He turned out to be a peer companion to listen,
challenge, accept and even encourage the author to work. His vision and lifestyle has helped build this work. He was an inspirational philosopher.

Above all thanks be to God for the graces provided through human relations to bring this work about. May all who participated in this project be blessed and rewarded by our dear God.

At the end of it all, in saying thank you for each one’s contribution, any errors found herein are the author’s own responsibility.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Analysis:** This is an objectively verifiable method to test the truth of putative knowledge on a way that goes beyond mere foundational alternatives, focusing upon both Deduction and Induction.

**Civic Culture:** This is a body of narratives, representations, and discourses that serve to render intelligible and support the effective internalization of the norms proper to liberal democratic citizenship.

**Community:** This is the basis for civic culture. It is a grouping of people that may have their own culture.

**Cultural Functions:** The manner in which communities exist in order to nurture, direct, and support the pursuit of the good life which is equivalent to happiness.

**Justice:** Explicit and refined principles of fairness believed to be operative in the moral intuitions of all reasonable persons.

**Knowledge:** In philosophy this is a justified true belief.

**Philosophical analysis:** This is a general term for techniques typically used by philosophers in the analytic tradition that involve "breaking down" philosophical issues. Arguably the most prominent of these techniques is the analysis of concepts (known as conceptual analysis).

**Rationality:** This is way of understanding the developmental and anthropological relationship between civic and communitarian identities that represents the experience of citizenship, and also positively supports the efforts to insure the cultural reproduction of civic values and attitudes.

**Totalizing:** Generalising to apply to all in the same way.
ABSTRACT

"A philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge" is an exploration of philosophy as it is done today basing itself on the history that has brought it this far. In a pluralistic society where we talk of political liberalism, the question is, what are the proper ends of education in a philosopher’s view? This project has been devoted to a philosophical outlook on the question of the cultural functions of knowledge. This has specially focused on education “as a chief method” for progressive reconstruction of civic culture within which philosophy is depicted. In a condensed way, the study has followed Dewey’s contribution to philosophy of education. Given Dewey’s idea of “democracy and education” and that of “education and experience,” we perceive of how human association is the ability to see in others beings like ourselves. Further, on in the quest of a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge in this project we answer to a unique problem of the clash of civilizations basing ourselves on what Plato suggested strongly “education be employed as the chief method of reforming both the individual’s character and that of the state.”

Education as a means to a good society is to be taken on as a “categorical imperative.” Kant suggested the perfection of “the human mind” through education as “knowledge of a practical moral character.” Aristotle had earlier on stated in his politics “there are three things which make humans good and virtuous....” Aristotle gave them as “nature, habit and reason.” For the reconstruction of our civic culture through education, “education should have a political purpose.” How then can education lead to progressive reconstruction of civic culture in Kenya?

This project proposes a rethinking of the prevalent civic culture in Kenya. We need to overcome corruption, insecurity, and now that we have a new constitution in place, it needs to be properly implemented. The thesis here is: Culture can be progressively reconstructed and affirmed in the education system; provided we understand properly the cultural functions knowledge does serve. These are namely, the primary components of an emerging liberal democratic civic culture in Kenya. Thus, the project of reconstructing civic culture, in the conceptions of reason and knowledge becomes the project of rethinking the cultural foundations of a liberal democracy. What comes after post-independence, then? The answer we may find offered here is that the
post-independence reconstruction of liberal democratic civic culture and civic society is dependent on education. What we are for is a “totally integrated quality education.”

The researcher has gone into an analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge by looking at the background information available on the question exploring the problem at hand and setting out to establish that a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge is important and attainable by meeting the specific objectives that this study has examined. These have been through an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge as a concept within the confines of Philosophy. An analysis of the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge showing how it produces psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures. The final objective has been recognising that cultural functions of knowledge can be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches.

The researcher used a transcendental method for the integration of the deductive and inductive critical philosophical analysis in this study. Given the study was qualitative, the study did not make much use of the experimental methods. For the presentation of the findings from the study the research has given a qualitative analysis in chapter four. The findings have revealed an analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge supports a liberal democratic civil society. Here the author has examined the complex development it represents leading to an attempt to think in new ways about humanity’s social, moral, and intellectual life at a time of profound and multifarious change. In one important respect, it was part of a general reaction against the mechanistic philosophy and against what was regarded as its social consequences in the emerging industrial civilization.

In this chapter the author has gone on to show the role played by philosophy particularly in modernist forms of civic culture. In this period we had the “collapse of Enlightenment civic culture,” the form of civic culture that was dominant in the West for three hundred years. It was based upon the ideas of modernist liberal political philosophy, ideas that are increasingly losing their credibility and thereby threatening the viability of the form of civic culture based on them. This phenomenon, points to the political consequences of the demise of modernist liberal social, economic and political philosophy. We base ourselves on this to explain philosophically the cultural functions of
knowledge as part and parcel of education for reconstruction of civic culture in our situation. The modern period had three historical developments that characterized it. The third part of chapter four goes into discussing what the invention of a postmodern civic culture requires. Here we have an orientation to see our cultural functions of knowledge as set within a given environment, community and social setting. The section goes on to discuss the invention of a postmodern civic culture as to what it requires and from it get a turning point for our civic culture and its impact on education. The researcher explores the lingering influence of modernist liberal political ideas and how they constitute one of the greatest obstacles to the postmodern reconstruction of civic culture.

Our thrust therefore, has been to see how Enlightenment civic culture systematically concealed the unique cultural conditions that made liberal democracy possible and how this ideological concealment was responsible for our present crisis from which we move to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge for the reconstruction of civic culture. This is in consonant with what Dewey states that "the reconstruction ... of education and society go hand in hand." Which then leads to the final section of the chapter where the study culminates by discussing how philosophy must change in its self-understanding and practice in a postmodern cultural environment.

This study has explored the nature of civic culture, culture and modern philosophy, and presently as it concludes the reconstruction of civic culture. The thrust of this study has been a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge. This has been by exploring the cultural functions of knowledge with the aim of determining culture as a support for a liberal democratic civic society. In the fourth chapter we have the first objective which was an exploration of the role played by philosophy in specifically modernist forms of civic culture. The second objective that went on to discuss what the invention of postmodern civic culture requires. The third objective has discussed how philosophy must transform its self-understanding and practice in political, social, economic and cultural spheres. As a way of winding up, the chapter on analysis of the findings examines Rawls's move from a metaphysical to a "political" theory of justice. This provided us with a model for the rhetorical turn that does define the reconstruction of philosophy based on the cultural functions of knowledge. The study concluded that explaining the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge within the
confines of Philosophy is possible and can be well done by taking the study seriously within the department and other university stakeholders. Analysing the concepts in arguments by either paraphrasing or diagramming them or both showing how they produce psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures is an interesting exercise for both teachers and students. It is seen to be profitable for those who have tried it and practice it in their lives. As it is central to philosophy to recognise arguments reasonably by deducing and validating them, speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture, the practical approach to it should be taken on more by every teacher and student.

Given the broad objective of this research to investigate philosophically the cultural functions of knowledge a number of issues need to be considered for future research. Hence, the researcher recommended that more research may be done on the concept of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge within the confines of Philosophy applying it to other departments and faculties within the university. There is need for a more in depth analysis of the concepts in arguments be done with special emphasis laid on the study of Logic by all students at the university. Another area that needs examination is that of recognising arguments reasonably by deducing and validating the arguments for philosophical value speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture by both students and teachers for cultural integration.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background Information
In our contemporary world, we have a debate that is both political and cultural that questions our “liberal democracies” and it is largely confined to questions about the pursuit of economic and social prosperity that is coupled with the maintenance of civil peace, respect for liberty, and the just distribution of wealth and privilege. Any debates in political and cultural education seem to follow the same pattern. Because the majority of the population talks about how educational institutions could help create a more productive workforce, mitigate the violence and lawlessness that afflict our communities, the tribal differences we have that affect our political affiliations, there is need to accommodate freedom of people who want a just society for their generations, since there are those who strongly think that their view of a constitution, for instance, is the correct one, and those who want a good education for their children in a more just and accommodative system.

Is it possible by any chance to make philosophical life less one-off, more a technical result of appropriate discipline? It is possible that, “There may well be an art whose aim would be ... not to put the power of sight into the soul’s eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, instead of looking the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.” In line with this thinking Richard Rorty observes, “[T]he desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint, a desire to find “foundations” to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose

themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid ... the desire for confrontation and constraint.” Epistemology as such involves a search “for the immutable structures within which knowledge, life and culture must be contained, structures set by the privileged representations which it studies.” Only if knowing is conceived as a quasi-visual, mirror-like reflection of things with a nature all their own, does the project enhance knowledge by learning more about the mirror. Doubt about Platonic conception of knowledge must therefore inspire doubt about the point or value of a “theory of knowledge” altogether.

In the systems of education, just as in philosophy, we engage in analysis of concepts by asking questions such as what do you mean? How do you know? As much as it is essential to ask such questions and engage in debates with the prevalent concepts such as knowledge, the job at hand is not to increase what we know, but to “rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already have.” This happens among people who are different and diversified. In a pluralistic society where we talk of political liberalism what are the proper ends of knowledge? This project, philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge, is devoted to education “as a chief method” for progressive reconstruction of civic culture. In a condensed way following Dewey’s contribution to philosophy of education, we take on his idea of “democracy and education.” From him we perceive of how human association is the ability to see in

3. Ibid.
4. This topic is developed from a thesis presented in a mini philosophy conference in Harare in April 2000. The thesis was: “For a better understanding of the human person and for a provision of better solutions to human problems there is need for *Breaking the Walls of Division.*” Henceforth referred to as Harare Conference 2000.
others beings like ourselves. More on this, we have Charles Taylor’s Politics of Recognition. He has an elaborate understanding of the concept of association in which he talks of the “dialogical character of human life.” By this aspect we proactively “create members of the community.” With this view is it possible that our human relationships have a creative and imaginative aspect in them? Can this be enhanced through education? May be it is through our imagination that we render others, sufficiently like ourselves for them to become, subjects of tolerance and respect, sometimes, even affection.

According to Dewey, “since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only in education.” Democracy is seen as “a mode of associated living of conjoint communicated experience.” This makes it “more than a government.” Democracy is, therefore, not a natural form of association. It is an extraordinary and rare contrivance of cultivated imagination. Imagination which has is to be taken on as a society’s driving engine. It is where creativity begins. It is so spontaneous and free that it needs cultivation to find its place in a community. In our search for quality school education imagination may have to be taken on as our primary concern. If ever we have to remain in democratic communities the imaginative capacity has to be activated as a medium for educational commitment.

6. Harare Conference 2000, in the introduction note 8. Dewey is here following in the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle. This also calls upon the “inescapable frameworks” of Charles Taylor. These frameworks give us a framework of operation.
7. See Amy Gutmann, (Editor), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32, 34. The title of Taylor’s work is The Politics of Recognition. Further use of this work will be abbreviated (PR). Also Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 14. The question raised here is “Why focus on education.” We also have Amy Gutmann, Democracy and Disagreement, (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1996), 199 treats the constitution of deliberative democracy. We are reminded that moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics. The question then is “what should be done about the conflict?”
How then can education in our philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge lead to progressive reconstruction of civic culture? This project proposes a rethinking of the prevalent civic culture. The thesis here is: Culture can be progressively reconstructed and affirmed in the education system provided we understand properly the political and cultural function that reason and knowledge have served for post-independence years, namely, as primary components of an emerging liberal democratic civic culture in Kenya. Thus, the project of reconstructing civic culture, in the conceptions of reason and knowledge, becomes the project of rethinking the cultural foundations of a liberal democracy. What comes after post-independence, then? The answer we may find offered here is that the post-independence reconstruction of liberal democratic civic culture and civic society is dependent on education. The concern here is how to put forth a “totally integrated quality education.”

1.2. Problem Statement
The cultural functions of knowledge as we have of them in philosophy have not been properly understood. Culture in the conceptions of reason and knowledge, can be progressively reconstructed and affirmed in the education system, provided we understand the cultural function properly in a philosophical manner. Liberal education as an aspect of culture has philosophical teachings with it. The first is the significance of education for the mind, and to this we have the second which deals with the relationship between knowledge and reality. Given that the significance of education on the mind is the peculiar and distinctive activity of the mind. It is therefore, the very nature of the

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mind, given this characterization, to pursue knowledge. In this pursuit of knowledge, the
mind on achievement of knowledge is satisfied and fulfilled. With this the mind attains
its appropriate end. The pursuit of knowledge is in itself the pursuit of the good of the
mind. Consequently, this builds itself as an essential element for the good life. From of
old, the achievement of knowledge has been regarded as a means, not only for the good
of the mind, but also for the good life of a whole human person and society. A human
being is much more than a pure mind. At the same time it is this mind that is essential and
distinguishing a mark in terms of knowledge and the direction of one’s whole life.

Saint Bonaventure had this advice for those in studies and involved in works of
inquiry. This is what this great saint had to say: “Let no one think he will find sufficiency
in reading which lacks unction, an enquiry which lacks devotion, a search which arouses
no wonder, a survey without love, intelligence without humility, application without
grace, and contemplation without inspired wisdom of God.”9 We may add on what
Vatican II says to those in seminary formation to cultivate a spirit of investigation,
observation and an ability to demonstrate the truths of what they are involved in.

In one of their recent conferences the Catholic Bishops10 pointed us to the
researcher’s problem for this study. To this problem almost all scholars are quiet. Given
that no one has directly dealt with the matter, which is that of the cultural functions of
knowledge. These have been disregarded, hence given rise to ideology, indoctrination
and deprivation. This is the problem this research sets out to analyze within the cultural
functions of knowledge with regard to how we do philosophy in the reconstruction of
civic culture. This problem is apparently contributing to the unrest in our institutions of

9. Opera Omnia, V, Quracchi, 1891, p 296. one of his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, Prol., n. 4.
10. Rt. Rev. Maurice Crowley, Statement given in his capacity as Bishop Chairman Commission for
Education on July 23, 2008.

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learning that calls upon philosophy to make itself relevant given rationality in the face of ideology, indoctrination and learning in our communities. The concern of this project is therefore to bring forth a good understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge.

1.3. The Goal and Objectives of the Study

a. Goal

This study is out to review current debates and analyze previous literature to determine whether or not philosophical analysis of cultural functions of knowledge is possible within the education system. Although it is not specific to a particular community or society, it is intended to give a general overview of the concept. Culture is known to be the generator of philosophy and this same philosophy shapes culture. This study takes these two approaches and draws conclusions about how to shape culture through education by examining the cultural functions of knowledge with the aim of reconstructing a civic culture.

b. Research Objectives

It is almost certain that the cultural development experienced of any society is through the knowledge systems the society has and the understanding the members receive from systems. In this study, the researcher has looked at education as more than the formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. Through “education, 'as a chief method,' for progressive reconstruction of civic culture” we may accept certain knowledge conditions. Our main objective therefore is to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge by meeting the following specific objectives:

i. Giving an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge as a concept within the confines of Philosophy.
ii. Analysing the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge showing how it produces psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures.

iii. Recognising that cultural functions of knowledge be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches.

1.4. Research Questions

i. What understanding do we have of the concept cultural functions of knowledge within the confines of Philosophy?

ii. Can the cultural functions of knowledge be given a proper analysis in arguments to show how they produce psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures?

iii. Is it possible to recognise that the cultural functions of knowledge can be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches?

1.5. Justification of the Study

This philosophical discourse intends to take on reasoning skills, affording genuine intellectual pleasure and exhibiting ways in which the skills may be exercised and practiced. In this regard, the significance of this study will be to students, researchers, writers, teachers, policy makers and other stakeholders to know what function they do at a given time. As a teacher, the researcher will use a number of specialties, which may be otherwise called methods or techniques, first as a way to prepare material to give to students and prepare lectures, seminars and workshops.

After dialectic's weighing values, the researcher will decide what to consider central to the material and helpful for students. Communication occurs better if philosophers "curb one-sided totalitarian ambitions." Shift of focus from a given specialty to the whole process may be encouraged more in this study. The researcher will move "from initial state of un-differentiation through a process of differentiation and specialization toward a goal in which the differentiated specialties function as an
integrated unity.” The researcher will move from initial contemplation of a whole to a (perhaps disoriented) centering on a part to a mature shifting focus between situated centering on parts and reflective consideration of a whole. The researcher will proceed on to lead others today, by calling them to converse with other persons of variously differentiated consciousnesses.

Given the above, it is possible the study opens the academia to a greater differentiation offered by epistemology and hermeneutics in the writing of a thesis of this stature. The process may call for focus shifts between cultures and philosophy, in an analogous way (partly the same and partly different) it shifts between political-economic life and philosophy. Given it is a field specialization it divides materials for receptive phase, where subject specialization will classify results of getting assertive. This may involve doing several specialties which may shift between specialisation and integration. The study may then lead to continued conversation as individuals and as communities of inquiry shift among stages of each phase and between the receptive phase and assertive one, but without confusion.

1.7. Scope and Limitations

a. Scope

Given that this study is a philosophical analysis, it means that the researcher will not go into experimental or field and other related data collection methods. The researcher’s main sources of data were theoretical writings. This project was an intended philosophical discourse on the cultural functions of knowledge. Hence, it was an analysis on how: “Culture, in the conceptions of reason and knowledge, can be progressively reconstructed and affirmed in the education system, provided we understand the cultural function properly in a philosophical manner.”
The study took not more than three years from the time the researcher was allocated supervisors to the intent for submission. The study was began in March 2003 and modified in June 2004. Given the developments in the study and the change of supervisor, the study had to be updated in 2007 with the allocation of two new supervisors. These two are the ones who have helped bring the study to its completion June 2009. In the first year much of it was spent on the critical collection of the required material from the relevant sources. The material was gathered mainly from the library. Whereas the second and third years were spent perfecting the work in readiness for presentation and an academic award.

b. Limitations
To philosophically analyse the cultural functions of knowledge the researcher has done so by influencing a curriculum for democratic formation in schools, thus affirming education as a means to freedom of thought and integration into society. This will be limited to the available philosophical sources in the library. There already are definitions of culture, knowledge and education in existence that have to be examined and reworked upon by:

i. Giving an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge as a concept within the confines of Philosophy.

ii. Analysing the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge showing how it produces psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures.

iii. Recognising that cultural functions of knowledge be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches.

To stimulate intellectual curiosity, engender satisfaction in intellectual achievement and cultivate the ability to think creatively, independently, and conscientiously the study was restricted here to library research and a study of current philosophical culture. The thrust
was to work at validating knowledge at both personal and civic level with the already set standards that need improvement.

To shape societal living the project has developed an appreciation of the ethical values that should under-gird all life in a democratic society by borrowing from other sciences. This was a difficult exercise as it went beyond the boundaries of philosophy to work with other disciplines.

In this study, the researcher was largely limited to phenomena and observation and how both influence the human mind. Therefore, the limit was mainly to the available literature at the researcher's disposal. Consequently, this factor led to a more intense library research for a comprehensive philosophical critical analysis.

Another limitation is language. The language for this work is English yet there were other quite diverse and useful literature in other languages, like French and German, for that matter. To minimize on error, the transcendental and integrative approach, which incorporates other methods of study, was taken on.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, truth, justice, beauty, validity, mind and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing these questions (such as mysticism or mythology) by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on reasoned argument. The word philosophy, as any good student of philosophy will understand, is of ancient Greek origin: φιλοσοφία (philosophia), meaning “love of knowledge,” “love of wisdom.”

One of the issues that some philosophers have dealt with is of "Cultural Revolutions: Reason versus Culture in Philosophy, Politics, and Jihad."11 In this remarkably well-written and closely argued book, Larry Cahoone offers a truly original account of the relation between culture and reason. After providing a reliable and critical analysis of the current literature on the subject, he offers an alternative theoretical perspective of his own that helps us both to understand and criticize religious, especially Islamic fundamentalism. This important book shows how to construct a culturally sensitive but non-relativist theory of rationality.

According to Cahoone, “all the basic categories of philosophy of culture” have to be rethought in a “breathtaking critical analysis of the major contending positions” and articulate a clear, though complicated, “new theory.” This exercise pays off brilliantly in his concluding analysis of “Islam in the contentious battle of cultures.” This book is a

basic reading not only for this study or for philosophers of culture but also for social scientists, theologians, historians, journalists, and political leaders.

In this engagingly academic book, Cahoone\textsuperscript{12} goes on to address an eminently timely topic with a clear-headedness that is often lacking in such discussions. With arguments that are unfailingly provocative, he points out that "acknowledging the cultural embeddedness of reason by no means requires us to accept a disabling relativism or to abandon our commitments to critical rationality and to intercultural dialogue and understanding." Following on this argument, Cahoone points out that "meaningful forms of rationality can be salvaged in the wake of postmodernism" and of the 'cultural turn.' Through a painstaking examination of the seemingly recalcitrant case of genuine or deep cultural difference, Cahoone deftly wends his way between, on the one hand, a "liberal culturalism that refuses to take seriously those differences that transgress the compass of liberalism" and, on the other, a "postmodernism that holds cultures to be bounded, homogenous wholes." He goes on to elaborate a conception of "culture" that allows him to "carve out a distinctive and compelling position" on the "vexed relationship between liberalism and cultural tradition."

In another of his works, Cahoone, "Civil Society: The Conservative Meaning of Liberal Politics,"\textsuperscript{13} he points out without reservation that "whichever variant of conservatism one adopts, the landscape is not attractive." It seems to grant conservatives two critical observations and claims: firstly, "Ideological Utopianism," which is,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 55.
\end{itemize}
"progressivism," which insists it can remake society according to some rationalist scheme into an improved model, is surely "tenuous at best, and often is accompanied by unintended deleterious consequences." Secondly, the "problem" of human actions we commonly label "evil" cannot be ignored, reprogrammed, or overcome by improving social structures.

While often two-sides of the same coin, the entire notion that some ideological utilitarian calculus will make all our lives better, or that if we "educate, indoctrinate, or inculcate" our citizens, that they will "achieve perfection," are both "empirically nonsense," but based on our "biological human natures," not on any "conservative conceptual scheme that claims these insights from logic," which is, of course, barred by the first claim.

On the whole, Cahoone's work is most valuable not for the conservatism it adopts and extols, but for demonstrating through persuasion the impossibility of the liberal principle of "neutrality." By virtue of demonstrating the impossibly of this "neutral" principle, conservatives believe they can introduce their conservative "values" as the preferred values of a pluralistic republican society. And, since the vacuum left by abandoning the liberal principle of "neutrality" requires some values to fill its void, arguably many conservative values may be better than other values. But these values have to be shown or demonstrated to be valuable first, and then as "values that society should prefer as conservative values over others; mere assertion of conservative principles is insufficient," is Cahoone's objective in the second-half of the book.
Since the principle of neutrality is widely misunderstood, it is important to understand it before we agree to bury it. As it pertains to liberal governance and to its mechanics in our civil society, neutrality is understood to be the government’s stance toward any particular individual’s choice of morals, modes of life, interests, pursuits, which are, according to this principle, to be left to the individual, not to the state, to adopt in the manner of his/her own choosing. While one may remain sentimentally attached this idea. Cahoone, to his credit, demonstrates this to be “impossible,” and if possible, “would be undesirable, to attain.” While the capitulation to this realization does force us to adopt non-neutral stances, it does not follow that the conservative stances are the ones to adopt.

Doing philosophy of education, which in short, is the study of the purpose, process, nature and ideals of education. The main concern for the philosophy of education is confined to; content of Education; methods of teaching and social concerns among other concerns. This can be within the context of education as a societal institution or more broadly as the process of human existential growth, in other words, how is it that our understanding of the world is continually transformed via physical, emotional, cognitive and transcendental experiences. It can naturally be considered a branch of both philosophy and education. The question is: Can education bring about progressive reconstruction of the civic culture? Or could it be the other way round? In our country, for example, what do we see of its civic culture? There is a definite rise in crime, decadence in morality, lawlessness, and a move away from constitutionalism as we move towards liberal democracy. This can be seen in the public life of both learned, knowledgeable and people who we seem to look at as our models. This is apparently a

cultural clash of civilizations in the country. If we assume for a moment that the global order emerging in the post-cold war era will eventually look something more like Huntington's picture of it than not; what sort of cultural tasks would such a global political and economic order impose on us in our education, the major pot of knowledge creation?

As seen in Cahoone, this view has apparently been “tainted,” if not absorbed, by the “arguments of social constructionists.” Their claim is that “individuals are socially embedded,” and thus individuals are constructed from this embedded-ness as the basis of their existence. Whether Cahoone adopts social constructionism as an ‘empirical’ or an ‘ontological’ claim is left unaddressed, and for his purposes probably not important. As an empirical claim, social constructionism offers insights as to how society moulds individuals, from which they arise, dwell, and interact. As an ontological claim, social constructionism is either “tautological or vacuous,” but neither is inadequate to any subsequent task. So, it may be assumed Cahoone invokes its empirical claims.

As an empirical claim, it is self-evident, if not circular, but it does offer insights in “how society moulds us individuals according to time, place, and space through the generations.” Apparently, yes, we all come to ‘this’ point embedded in our “social histories that are uniquely ours collectively.” To cut to the chase, we use a less nuanced example to obtain the same result. Americans did observe during the Multiculturalist Movement of the 1980s, the central tenet of which is that all cultures (political institutions, religions, artistic tastes, mores, technologies, etc.) are no better/worse than

any other. Depending on one's context and personal perspective, including one's own cultural and social inheritances, the world's cultures may be radically different, but in no sense can one claim that one culture/society is superior/inferior to any other. The "great equalizer" of Multiculturalism levelled Modern Western Liberal Democracies along with Medieval Arab Societies along with Aboriginal Societies along with Hebraic Tribal Societies, plus many others. Even the most egalitarian spirit cannot embrace the "parity" of these divergent societies. This extreme form of relativism was finally slain by America's acquaintance with Modern Arab Cultures in the Middle East.

A pluralist, in contrast to a multiculturalist, will readily admit that individuals value different aspects of various cultures differently and should be free to do so, and moreover that these diverse cultural and social features may pleasantly co-exist within the same society, as long as the prevailing/dominant "social contract" is understood and subscribed to, which then allows, even rebels, in this pluralism of expressions. But that already presupposes a value! Yes, a liberal value, but a value nonetheless. A liberal pluralist may indulge other cultures but would not dare equate a "modern pluralistic liberal democracy with that of a medieval feudal theocracy with that of an Australian Aboriginal Hunter-Gatherer Tribe," or any other that may be similar, which all multiculturalists insist we do.

So, the 'neutrality' principle of liberalism has been slain! So, what "values" should liberals adopt as "socially normative," since remaining "neutral" is not tenable, defensible, or even desirable? Cahoone offers a very sophisticated alternative that he labels "post-modern conservatism." In the final analysis, one may not be persuaded by
any conservatism, not even Cahoon's conservative principles (which incorporates many liberal principles), which, on the whole are clearly superior to any other "conservative's." Alas, that leaves liberals nowhere, or worse, vulnerable to some others' values which may be detested (for example, neoconservatives, social conservatives, theo-conservatives - assuming we/they stay within the 'liberal' tradition at all).

To exacerbate the dilemma, we have 'progressives' who once identified themselves as 'liberals,' but now have an aggressive meliorist agenda to 'cure' society of its social ills through "grand social engineering" (as seen of, socialists, Utopians, communitarians, theocrats, among many others), who are the "egalitarians" of the last resort that would flatten everyone and everything to achieve 'equality.' Some may prefer "universal poverty and impoverishment as the great" 'equalizer,' but after the USSR, Mao's China, Fidel's Cuba, Chavez's Venezuela, surely we can do better than equal impoverishment! What is clearer is that we cannot bury ourselves in a 'neutrality' nostrum any longer.

Cahoone, has cast the scales off this liberal's eyes, and seeing more clearly, that liberals have to adopt some values even if 'neutrality' is not one of them. But that requires that some moral values be established over others, and as a liberal, one needs to know that he/she must attend, but not very willingly.

In yet another of his works, Cahoone argues that the "foundations of a just community long sought by political theorists are, in fact, present in actual
communities."\textsuperscript{16} Even those who disagree with his thesis will have to acknowledge that a book like this, by virtue of its breadth and its fairness, will contribute to shaming the thoughtless and inspiring the considerate in both the academic and the public arenas. Cahoone rises to the challenge of "reformulating a notion of polity that promises to help heal the wounds caused by decades of distrust and misunderstanding between political factions." What is most unique about this study is the way in which it redefines the "standpoints of liberalism and conservatism without compromising the integrity of either." Cahoone adroitly weaves together philosophy, political theory, and contemporary and historical cultural analysis with a wit and often humorous style that promises to disarm even the most skeptical readers, while maintaining all along the intent seriousness of his undertaking.

This book is a valuable contribution to one of the most important debates in political theory of the last twenty years, namely that over the nature of liberalism and alternatives to liberalism. Cahoone is evenly engaging whether sharing his knowledge of "eighteenth-century political philosophy" or presenting his own original "analysis of freedom." This is an exceptionally well written effort to make political thought more relevant to social life. Cahoone's knowledge of important thinkers is wide ranging and his application of their ideas is both enlightening and telling.

There are few thinkers today, whose body of work can match the breath, conceptual distinctiveness and vitality of Charles Taylor's. Taylor has among other things

developed his own unique brand of hermeneutics, produced magisterial studies of Hegel and Western modernity, and penned a number of influential pieces on contemporary political thought, including his 1994 "Politics of Recognition" essay that has become a staple of undergraduate identity-politics courses. The full significance of Taylor is beginning to be appreciated by scholars. Within the past several years, three book-length studies have appeared in English. The book under review here is the second edited volume of critical essays devoted to Taylor’s work. The first volume, *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism* edited by James Tully (Cambridge: 1994) contained a series of varied essays responding to the many facets of Taylor’s career, from his work as an intellectual historian, to his critique of behavioural social sciences, from his political theory, to his involvement in Canadian politics. The contributions were also varied in their reception of Taylor with some such as the piece by Quentin Skinner quite critical of Taylor. This volume, while not nearly as varied in either its subject matter or its tone, does an excellent job of introducing the central features of Taylor’s thought as well as the uniqueness of it. Moreover, the contributors do well at chronicling Taylor’s many influences including Hegel, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Murdoch and Berlin.

The book has nine chapters. The first is a concise introduction by Ruth Abbey that does an excellent job at whetting the reader’s appetite for all of what is to follow, which is often a rarity in such collections. The rest can roughly be divided into three groupings; Taylor the philosopher, Taylor the political theorist, and Taylor the chronicler of life in a secular age (though there is considerable overlap among these categories).
The essays by Nicholas Smith and by Hubert Dreyfus fall into the first category. Smith's essay provides a very good introduction to Taylor's hermeneutics, his account of how humans function as self-interpretative beings. The piece reads like an introduction to the most important sections of Smith's excellent book on Taylor as he rearticulates the theme of his thorough study of Taylor that it is meaning in relation to human existence which is Taylor's primary concern as a philosopher. He notes how Taylor is partly able to square the hermeneutic circle by providing a means of making sense of the binding force of our moral demands/prejudices. Smith also alludes to a key claim he successfully defends in his larger study of Taylor: that Taylor's own brand of hermeneutics does have sufficient epistemological resources to overcome the Habermas' critique of neo-Aristotelian models of practical reasoning as being unable to unmask systematically distorted forms of communication within the given life-world in which its practitioners are situated. Dreyfus covers much of the same territory as Smith, while explicating what he calls Taylor's pluralist and realist anti-epistemology that collapses the inner/outer distinction central to post-Cartesian epistemology. Dreyfus provides a nuanced defense of Taylor against a Cartesian- or Matrix-inspired brain-in-a-vat fantasy, noting that all Taylor needs to show is that humans always cope with (and hence respond to) a perceived reality. Against Rorty here, Dreyfus argues that Taylor shows how our phenomenological acts of coping point us towards the realization that we can understand that nature exists (as what we are coping in response to) and that we can progressively generate better understandings of nature. These understandings are pluralist because there

might be many languages that correctly describe the universe though there isn’t one that exclusively does so\textsuperscript{18}.

Melissa Orlie and Stephen Mulhall provide two original contributions to what has become a large yet sterile secondary literature on Taylor’s political thought. Orlie’s piece is the most interesting because it deals with a genre of contemporary theory that rarely engages Taylor’s thought, and which Taylor rarely engages himself: feminist theory. Orlie does an excellent job chronicling why feminists, particularly those under the spell of Nietzsche and Foucault, should seek to incorporate a politics of the good into their frameworks. She also reiterates a point made by several critics that Taylor’s thought evinces a tension between the partiality of his reading how identity is conceived as something never quite exhausted by our articulations of it and his support for the recognition of static notions of identity such as those put forth by the Parti Quebecois in Quebec in the name of cultural survival. Despite his scepticism towards postmodernism, Taylor, Orlie reasons, could learn a lot by incorporating the insights of third-wave feminists like Judith Butler into the effects of power in shaping identity.

Mulhall provides a synopsis of Taylor’s contributions to the 1980’s liberalism-communitarianism debate. Unlike so many others, Mulhall correctly reads Taylor’s supposed communitarian critique of liberalism as an attempt to situate liberalism within the moral horizon of modernity that he articulates in Sources of the Self and essays associated with it. Playing off arguments Taylor makes in his 1987 essay “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal - Communitarian Debate” as well as his 1979 piece “What’s

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 79.
Wrong with Negative Liberty." Mulhall primarily focuses on Taylor's critique of his former teacher, Berlin, as well as of Nozick's libertarianism. Mulhall also glosses over the role played by Continental philosophy and Canadian politics in Taylor's political thought. Though the piece is primarily exegetical, Mulhall does raise one interesting critical question for Taylor, that an adequate theory of liberalism, it appears on Taylor's reading, must somehow be open to the possibility that the underlying ontology of values that empower it "will be most fruitfully formulated in theistic terms". This question is a bit unfair because Taylor repeatedly stresses the point that modern Western democracies must necessarily be secular. Yet there is a constant tension especially in Taylor's more recent writings between his awareness of the partiality of his faith and his yearning to advocate on behalf of it.

Fergus Kerr and William Connolly, who along with Elshtain and Terry Pinkard concern themselves with Taylor the chronicler of life in a secular age, also pick up on this tension. Focusing primarily on the moral ontology of modernity Taylor outlines in Sources, Kerr shows how this ontological argument is itself predicated upon Taylor's own brand of moral realism developed first in Explanation of Behavior and later in his reading of Heidegger. Kerr rightly illuminates the tension in Taylor's work between his pointing to the need for a non-anthropocentric source for moral motivation and the feeling readers often get that the only adequate one is something akin to Taylor's own theism. Kerr claims that Taylor never gets around to discussing moral dilemmas in any

19. Ibid, 125.
This isn’t true; Taylor devotes considerable space to explicating such dilemmas in works like *Ethics of Authenticity* (1995) and *Catholic Modernity*? (1999).

Connolly’s essay is as much about himself and clarifying his own thoughts on secularism and how it contrasts with Taylor as it is about Taylor. Evincing his own sense of agonistic respect for Taylor, Connolly does an excellent job clarifying the myriad of disagreements between them. The issues that Connolly raises are much too complex to fully explore here, and readers who are interested should consult Connolly two most recent books, *Why I Am Not A Secularist* (Minnesota; 1999) and *Neuropolitics* (Minnesota. 2003) as well as Taylor’s *Varieties of Religion Revisited* (Oxford; 2002), *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Duke; 2004) and the aforementioned. *Catholic Modernity*? I will briefly note that Connolly here as elsewhere rightly alludes to Taylor’s unduly harsh readings of Nietzsche and Foucault. Yet against Connolly and the secularist ethos of deep pluralism that he alludes to here, Taylor could justifiably argue that Connolly is himself unduly restrictive in his understanding of the hold certain values have over non-secular individuals like Taylor.

Elshtain goes in a different theistic direction than Kerr, Mulhall and Connolly. She plays on Taylor’s theory of recognition to engage in an interesting dialogue with him about the dilemma between toleration and proselytization. She notes that real toleration does itself generate a feeling of discomfort similar to what we feel when we are exposed to those attempting to assert their faith, which for many feels like (indeed is) proselytizing. Taylor, on her accurate reading, allows for deep toleration (a sense of

21. Ibid.
toleration that is pluralistic without being fragmented) in that he allows for the act of proselytizing and the possibility that citizens can be persuaded by voices from what appear to be incommensurable ways of life.

Finally, Pinkard, a fellow Hegel scholar, provides a reading of Taylor’s account of what agency means in the modern age. In particular Pinkard focuses on the Hegelian underpinnings of Taylor’s work as an intellectual historian and how Taylor follows Hegel in resolving Kant’s paradox of being a self-legislating subject who must respond and thus legislate in light of a moment of reason that cannot be strictly self-imposed (meaning, the self must respond to some extra-subjective moral force on non-self-imposed norms). Taylor responds to this by distinguishing three frontiers for moral reasoning (what Taylor calls moral sources): those that flow from the agent himself, those that flow from the natural or self-expressive world and those which flow from a theistic source. Taylor thus appears as a sober intellectual realist who strikes a middle ground between the naturalistic boosters of modern moral reasoning (Kantians and company) and the post-romantic pessimists, focusing on what has been lost in the modern story (presumably including folks like Macintyre). Pinkard’s narrative is quite accurate but he omits a discussion of how Taylor attempts to be the great reconciler of these three strands. A discussion of this Hegelian moment within Taylor’s work would yield a much more complex picture of Taylor’s understanding of the modern identity.

One general criticism of the book is the repeatedly reverential nature of the chapters. Each essay goes out of its way to praise Taylor over and over again while often

22. Ibid, 204.
23. See *Sources of the Self*, 107 & 495.
minimizing points of disagreement. Taylor, as even readers unfamiliar with his work soon realize, is a giant in contemporary philosophy. However what makes his work so interesting is not simply the genius of the positions he has crafted but how his development of these positions illuminates for his readers some of the more trenchant ethical tensions within our contemporary social imaginary. A little more critical work in the volume would have helped to better dramatize these tensions to the non-specialist. This point aside, the book is a fine collection that will prove valuable to all levels of students of contemporary philosophy given the focus it gives to knowledge, self and society. It is as such a resourceful text for the cultural functions of knowledge under investigation here.

After the attainment of political independence, it became necessary for different ethnic groups in Kenya to see themselves as members of a large family. This was called the nation, within which their “various ethnic groups would harmoniously co-exist and work together for the good of all.” They were expected then, as now, to conceive of themselves as “one group of people forming one nation,” not as different ethnic groups constantly hostile to one another. Education was seen as the “best means to achieve this goal.” So immediately after independence, the government of Kenya assigned educational institutions the role of instilling feelings of nationhood and promoting national unity. Since then there is no single government document on education that does not emphasize this role.
In a number of his works Dr. Monyenye Solomon explores the question of nationhood and education. One of these is, "The Loss of a Nation's Conscience," in which he presents Kenya has declared war on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. But a victory in any war is often achieved when those managing the war possess unity of purpose, a common set of deeply cherished values and, above all, a conscience large enough to make them feel uncomfortable at the thought of deviating from those values. Further reading of this text reveals that Kenya lacks such a conscience. This has undermined the efforts to win the now much publicized war on the HIV/AIDS pandemic, just as it has done in many other countries in Africa today. This article, first, presents the situation of HIV/AIDS pandemic in Kenya today, highlighting the measures the country has taken to wage war on the pandemic. Second, the article attempts to show that the efforts to win the war are undermined by corrupt political leadership that lacks a nation's conscience to restrain leaders from committing economic crimes, resulting in reckless blunders and misappropriation of the very funds meant for the war on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. By analyzing the events that led to the loss of the nation's conscience, the article then shows how this political leadership without conscience has now left the ordinary citizen in abject poverty despite the availability of immense wealth in the country. This in turn has not only created a fertile ground for the spread of HIV/AIDS but has also rendered the citizen the pitiable inability to fight back the scourge. The paper then suggests that one way of winning the war on the pandemic is to direct more efforts towards the restoration

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25. Ibid.
of the nation’s conscience by putting in place measures that would ensure the cultivation of a culture of transparency, accountability and good governance in Kenya.

In post analysis, even if one cannot agree with Cahoone’s conservatism, it may certainly be understood now in a far better way than his “fellow” conservatives, Kekes, Scruton, Sullivan, included. As always, the conservative is first and foremost a moralist, because that instantiates a particular set of values. Even when a particular religion is excluded as a part of the moral values, the conservatives, they have to admit it enters fully through the front door, even if they would prefer it through a side door, even the back doors. But this illustrates their problem. Goldwater, who we all acknowledge was a libertarian, not a conservative, could not keep his conservatism from being overtaken and immersed in Evangelicalism. Once “morals” enter the foray, religion follows, whether or not it is welcomed. As Cahoone demonstrates, “some moral values must be accepted as normative, just not the moral values of the religionist moralists.” But that remains the central problem for conservatism, in whatever stripe it comes in, once we recognize the need for values, and we all do, we might choose Aristotelean ethics, benevolence ethics, but may not approve of Kantian morality, much less Judaism, Christian, Catholic, utilitarian calculi, as it is not even “moral,” but where does one draw that line? This explains why liberals shy away from conservatism, because even the best of conservatism gets contaminated by religionists, if not overtaken as well.

In the final analysis, for better or worse, at least Cahoone gets liberals off their ‘neutrality,’ as if they were ever there to begin with. That is the greatness of this work. Cahoone is not a partisan ideologue, in fact, just the opposite, but he lays out the landscape of the current political climate admirably, honestly, and accurately, and then
clears the underbrush and the overbrush to get to some values that we can all accept and trust, except for the fact that the clearings introduced the most toxic “conservatism” in recent memory, a year after this book was published. It only begs the question: How does conservatism get hijacked by such nefarious characters? Therein, is no answer, and therein is the problem.

Of the studies done in this area, in another work, Dr Monyenye, proposes it can be argued that much of the “cultural values and social meanings of the rites of passage have drastically changed” and are no longer relevant due to influences of “modernity and technology that has reduced the world into a small global village,” rural communities, such as the Abagusii, still mark the transition of the “young from childhood to adulthood through rites of passage.”26 This work attempts to show that, through “these rites an individual earns a social identity and a sense of belonging to one’s ethnic community.”27 The “social identity qualifies the individual” not only to assume given adult roles in the community, but, more importantly, it “enables the individual to engage inter-ethnic and inter-racial interaction in what has now become a global village.” The success or failure of this interaction does depend largely upon the “kind of instructions the individual receives during the performance of these rites.” Since the majority of those now interacting in the “small global village” grew up in the “rural social environment” that gave them the “social identity with which they interact in a global environment,” it is

27. Ibid, 36.
important that the content of these "rites of passage be understood in order to appreciate their impact upon the individual's behaviour in the changing global environment."28

The argument above has been explored further in Monyenye’s Education and the Development of Nationhood in Kenya – 2005. In this paper, Monyenye examines the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophy behind using education as a means to "instill nationhood and promote national unity."29 In order to do this he first examines the meaning of the terms 'nation' and 'nationhood.' Then, he proceeds to analyze the recommendations of the Ominde Commission Report of 1964 regarding the role of education in instilling feelings of nationhood. This is because the Ominde Report is the one that did lay the foundation upon which all the subsequent educational reports and other similar documents in Kenya are now built. The analysis reveals inherent difficulties in trying to use educational institutions as a vehicle for "inculcating nationhood and promoting national unity." This is mainly because "nationhood is an attitude of mind and the nature of attitudes" is such that their "formation and maintenance is influenced by factors largely found outside the school system." By way of conclusion the paper suggests that "schools are mere reflections of the society that maintains them," and that "nationhood can be achieved only if every section of the Kenyan community is involved in its promotion,"30 with the adult world and the political establishment leading the way as role models to be emulated by the learners in schools.

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid, 56.
30. Ibid, 77.
The question then is, What is a Nation? This question is asked here because of the frequent use of the term nation in public pronouncements by political leadership in Kenya and elsewhere and it has led to what seems to be a misconception as to the real meaning of the term. Some of the pronouncements often seem either to equate nation with state or give the impression that the different nationalities (tribes) that have come together under one government have automatically become one nation. Monyenye in his book, "What is a Nation? Clarifying Misconceptions Concerning Nationhood in Developing Countries," has attempted to bring together, analyze, compare and contrast the ideas of some of the philosophers who have written much on the meaning of a nation so as to clarify the misconceptions and help eliminate the consequent misuse of this term. This work of Monyenye has been a reference for the contextual analysis done in this study.

On the 23rd of July 2008, the Catholic Bishops had a message on the wave of unrest in Kenyan secondary schools. The text pointed out in a statement the concerns the Bishops like any other Kenyan had on the rising violence and unrest in our secondary schools. The concerns they had were put thus

We ... join with other interested parties in expressing our grave concern at the wave of violence and unrest in secondary schools. This unrest is not confined to any particular part of the country, it is a national problem. The extent of violence and destruction of property is a clear sign of how much our society has deteriorated in values and sense of responsibility.

The violence we are witnessing in secondary schools will not be solved by fake promises and unworkable strategies. It will be solved by practical measures which enhance, define and make concrete the role of those who make up the school structure. These include: Boards, PTA’s, principals,

deputy heads, the school sponsors, teachers, prefects, support staff, parents and the community where the school is situated.  

All tend to agree that knowledge is valuable. This agreement about knowledge seems not to go far. Philosophers disagree about what knowledge is, about how we get it, and even about whether there is knowledge at all to be acquired. Epistemology or theory of knowledge is a branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge. The term was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864). Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as scepticism about different knowledge claims. In other words, epistemology primarily addresses the following questions: "What is knowledge?" "How is knowledge acquired?" and "What do people know?" Given that the cultural functions of knowledge have been disregarded, hence given rise to ideology, indoctrination and deprivation. This study borrows from psychology the conception that psychological knowledge serves three functions according to which subsystems of psychology can be derived: Scientia provides an analytic account of parts of psychological objects or events, and is nourished by an implicit utopia to produce "better" and cumulative knowledge; Cultura produces psychological meanings for individuals, communities, and cultures, and is nourished by an implicit utopia to improve the human condition; and Critica involves the

32. Rt. Rev. Maurice Crowley, Bishop Chairman Commission for Education on July 23, 2008. The italics were edited by the author to correct principles as was used in the statement by the Bishops.


34. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007
deconstruction, reconstruction, and construction of psychological knowledge, and is nourished by an utopia to change psychological knowledge practices.

Accordingly, the thesis argues, from historical and theoretical points of view, that the proposed system can be used as a heuristic tool for understanding psychology's complexity. Consequences for accepting or rejecting an equilibrium among the different knowledge functions that are discussed by different scholars, need to be looked into. Many critical educators claim that knowledge construction and production in education are tools for dominating and domesticating people, not enlightening or emancipating them.
2.2. Conceptual Framework: Tree of Knowledge System for Philosophy

The conceptual framework here points to the philosophical problem of our time. At our own time the most difficult problem in philosophy as a discipline is that while there is incredible diversity offered by different approaches to it, there is no overall consensus model of what philosophy actually is. According to the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System, adapted here with modification, the “problem of philosophy,” is that a clear definition, an agreed upon subject matter, and a coherent conceptual framework have eluded its students for its entire history since the middle ages.

Figure: 2.2. Tree of Knowledge System for Philosophy

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Matter in our conceptualization here refers to the individual human person. The individual is seen as a dimension of matter and as such refers to the set of material objects and their behaviours through time. In accordance with modern cosmology, matter is theorized to have emerged out of a pure energy singularity at the Big Bang. Space and time were also born at such a point. Nonliving material objects range in complexity from subatomic particles to large organic molecules. The physical sciences (which have, physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy) describe the behaviour of material objects.

The human person is more than pure matter. This particular human individual has life. The dimension of life on the individual human person refers to the individual organisms and their behaviours through time. Living objects are considered a unique subset of material objects. Just as quantum particles form the fundamental units of material complexity, genes are the fundamental units of living information. Although many questions about the emergence of life remain unanswered, in accordance with modern biology, the ToK posits that natural selection operating on genetic combinations through time is the unified theory of biology and forms the foundational understanding for the emergence of organic complexity.

The individual human person has a mind. This mind in the ToK System refers to the set of mental behaviours. Mental behaviours are behaviours of animals mediated by the nervous system that produce a functional effect on the animal-environment relationship. As such, Mind is essentially synonymous with what behavioural psychologists have meant when they use the term behaviour. Thus, a fly avoiding a fly swatter, a rat pushing a bar or a human getting a drink of water are all mental behaviours.
Mind is not synonymous with sentience or the capacity for mental experience, although such processes are presumed to emerge in the mental dimension. Cognition, in the broad sense of the term, as meaning neuro-information processing, is seen as covert mental behaviour, whereas change between the animal and the environment is defined as overt mental behaviour. Thus, by defining mind as mental behaviour, the conception here provides a way to bridge the epistemological differences between cognitive and behavioural science.

Of great importance and the reason of this conceptualization is culture. This refers to the set of sociolinguistic behaviours, which range from large scale nation states to individual human justifications for particular actions. Just as genetic information processing is associated with the Life dimension and neuronal information processing associated with the Mind dimension, symbolic information processing emerges with the Cultural dimension. At the top of any given society is culture which has within it knowledge systems.

2.3. Hypothesis

This study took on a dialogical approach as a vantage point. This is an engagement that has an epistemological viewpoint that is comprehensive and points towards the acceptance of differences, seeking their grounds as real and apparent and eliminating superfluous oppositions. From this then the researcher has established that "basic beliefs" do exist and this amounts to the logical argument of overcoming ignorance combined
with the argument that knowledge has functions.\textsuperscript{35} For this study, by use of dialectics therefore,

| (i) | An analysis of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge has a basis for philosophy to reconstruct and affirm an emerging liberal democratic civic culture. |
| (ii) | In Cultural Functions of Knowledge are more than the set of sociolinguistic behaviours, which range from large scale nation states to individual human justifications for particular actions. |
| (iii) | Cultural Functions of Knowledge are as such not just a genetic information processing associated with the Life dimension and neuronal information processing associated with the Mind dimension, symbolic information processing emerges with the proper knowledge function of the Cultural dimension. |

\textsuperscript{35} See Sextus Empiricus. \textit{Outlines of Scepticism} 1.35-164.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction
This chapter outlines the overall research design used in the study. The chapter describes the methods used in sampling the target population, the data collection instruments and procedures. It further describes the methods used in the analysis of the data collected as well as the validity of instruments and ethical issues considered by the researcher. The specific techniques used in the study including the research design are justified with respect to the context of the study.

3.2. Research Approach
The researcher took on a transcendental integration of the deductive and inductive critical philosophical analysis in this study. The research approach here is an investigative philosophical design carried out as a library exercise that combined desk study and exploration of previous researches. The researcher chose the approach aware that Philosophy analyzes the foundations and presuppositions underlying other disciplines. Philosophy investigates and studies the underpinnings of science, art, and theology. Philosophers ask questions such as "Is aesthetic judgment a matter of personal taste, or are there objective standards that we can apply to evaluate a work of art?" They, Philosophers, also ask "How do we distinguish truth from error?"

This study took the approach because Philosophy attempts to develop a comprehensive conception of the world. More still, Philosophy seeks to integrate the knowledge of the sciences with that of other fields of study to achieve some kind of consistent and coherent world view. Philosophers do not want to confine their attention to a fragment of human experience that leads to knowledge being acquired. These lead to
a reflection upon life as a totality. The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it.\footnote{Charlie Dunbar, Scientific Thought, (New York: Harcourt, 1923), 20.}

Given that the study focused on the cultural functions of knowledge, Philosophy studies and critically evaluates our most deeply held beliefs and attitudes; in particular, those which are often held uncritically. Philosophers have an attitude of critical and logical thoughtfulness. They force us to see the significance and consequences of our beliefs, and sometimes their inconsistencies. They analyze the evidence (or lack of it) for our most treasured beliefs, and seek to remove from our perspectives every taint and trace of ignorance, prejudice, superstition, blind acceptance of ideas, and any other form of irrationality.

The researcher has explored the cultural functions of knowledge aware that Philosophy investigates the principles and rules of language, and attempts to clarify the meaning of vague words and concepts. For which case, the approach has helped examine the role of language in communication and thought, and the problem of how to identify or ensure the presence of meaning in our use of language. It is an approach, a practice, which seeks to expose the problems and confusions which have results from the misuse of language, and to clarify the meaning and use of vague terms in scientific and/or everyday discourse.

The approach was deemed appropriate as the study was intended to be an in-depth investigation of a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge. The
approach was considered an ideal methodology for collecting comprehensive, systematic and in-depth information on particular texts of interest.\textsuperscript{37} The study was qualitative in nature and both evaluative and descriptive methods were used in the analysis of the sources and the information they provided. The study aimed at collecting information from sources both primary and secondary with regard to the relationship between philosophical and cultural functions of knowledge.\textsuperscript{38}

3.3. Target Population
This study as qualitative research was carried out at the University of Nairobi where Philosophy as a discipline has a longer tradition. There was no target population as this was not an experimental study. This study made use of the transcendental method. This method is characterized by a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. The methodological approach is taken on here because the results envisaged were not confined categorically to some particular field, but regard any result that could be intended by the completely transcended notions. The operations of the method are fourfold. As an intentional process it takes on firstly, one's experiencing, judging, understanding and deciding; secondly, understanding the unity and relation of one's experienced experiencing; thirdly, affirming the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, deciding and fourthly, deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.⁴⁹

The transcendental method is a combination of major philosophical techniques associated with the notion of analysis, as well as the controversies surrounding it. The method thus is placed alongside induction and deduction in a complimentary rather than competitive context (the latter of which has been the primary trend at least since David Hume). Secondly, and of more direct importance to scientific method, is what Peirce put forth as the basic schema for hypothesis-testing that continues to prevail today. Extracting the theory of inquiry from its raw materials in classical logic. Here then it was refined in parallel with the early development of symbolic logic to address the then-current problems in scientific reasoning. The method was used to closely examine and articulate the three fundamental modes of reasoning that play a role in scientific inquiry today, the processes that are currently known as abductive, deductive, and inductive inference. Thirdly, in play was a major role in the progress of symbolic logic itself — indeed this is the primary specialty of analysis in philosophy.

3.4. Sampling

The researcher did no sampling as this belongs to the realm of experimental sciences used to identify a sample population in order to reach a diverse and representative population. The researcher instead went out receptively to experience go through relevant data reading texts and other materials, carefully examining, remembering relevant

³⁹. Ibid.
among events, writings, and conversations within the interactions with class, student-teacher, library texts, seminars and community of interpreters. With some knowledge of history, the researcher then receptively judged how relevant changes have come about in the basic structures of society and in the ideas relevant to guiding society, by reflecting analytically on how influences are exerted by such factors as the political or economic and by such ideals as the ethical and cultural.

In a dialectic manner and remaining receptive the researcher did appreciate contrasting values present in the situation and even those absent from it. The researcher then deliberated on the way toward deciding what questions were to be taken for the philosophical bend that has been addressed. This meant contrasting issues of knowledge and culture that include genuine cultural functions of knowledge that complement one another. This research did situate them by specifying diverse perspectives from which they were noticed. Contrasting functions did include those that conflict, cannot be realized simultaneously, for example rapid development and sustainable development that respects the environment. Dialectically then, the researcher did criticize what was merely apparent “cultural functions of knowledge” and to “rank” genuine ones.

Based on knowledge foundations, the researcher assertively decided where to stand so to take responsibility not only for position but also for the horizon within which the analysis took as to foundations. This was by borrowing from Lonergan, for whom “conversion” involves “taking responsibility.” Where then intellectual conversion is a taking responsibility for directing the process of knowing so that it is appropriately in
tune with reality, a reality which includes the functions related to the burning question or questions the researcher has tried to address.

The researcher has then systematically gone on to assertively understand how the positions that were analyzed here fit together in a coherent system. The researcher then proceeded to inquire into their relationships so as to eliminate incompatibilities and to bring out implications, analogies, and other connections. The systematic overview was aimed at to influence the order in which the researcher presents findings and prepare to find answers to the research questions that were asked as to the cultural functions of knowledge.41

Engaged in Communications the researcher assertively moved on to experience sharing of the thesis with others, by writing, listening to others’ questions and to answer them in a way that gave others some share in the world of the researcher’s experience and invited them to understand the researcher’s positions and affirm at least some of the propositions. The assertive specialties here often occur in philosophy, but in a variety of orders that were explored by the researcher.

3.5. Data Collection Instruments
Questionnaires were used to collect data for the study. These were used by the researcher as he explored the various sources at his disposal. Questionnaires were addressed one at a time in order to achieve the objectives of the study.

3.6. Data Collection Procedures
The instrument was self-administered by the researcher. This was on between May 2003 and May 2009. After permission from the University of Nairobi to carry out the research

41. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 21ff and appendix in this study.
and the researcher delved into data collection by the use of the questions prepared in advance for the study.

3.7. Data Analysis
Only qualitative techniques were used. After receiving the questions put forth by the researcher had been answered he checked to ensure that they were all comprehensively answered. Data then was analysed by computing percentages and presentation using graphs, charts and tables.

3.8. Reliability and Validity
The research instruments were checked for validity using expert judgement given the results of a pilot study that was pre-testing of the instrument. The researcher then gave the research supervisor the instrument for him to check if it would bring forth the expected answers that will facilitate the achievement of set objectives. A pilot study was done by giving sample of the questions to five respondents from Moi University. This was used to reveal if the respondent understood the questions and the answers given were judged useful for making inference, hence pointed towards reliability.
4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the actual findings of the data as well as the interpretation based on the data collected from the texts the researcher has explored. The analyzed data forms the basis of the research approach used in the study and is presented in relation to the objectives of the study. Which were derived from the general objective which was to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge by meeting the following specific objectives:

i. Giving an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge as a concept within the confines of Philosophy.

ii. Analysing the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge showing how it produces psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures.

iii. Recognising that cultural functions of knowledge be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches.

For the purposes of this work, we start here by defining the cultural functions of knowledge as the manner in which communities exist in order to nurture, direct, and support the pursuit of happiness. Such communities generate moral ideals, ranking systems, hierarchies, virtue concepts, and standards of excellence that shape and order human desire. It is always to an audience whose desire and self-understanding has previously been and is continuously being shaped by such communities that civic moral ideals must persuasively speak.
4.2. Cultural Functions of Knowledge Understood within Philosophy

The question answered here is what understanding do we have of the concept cultural functions of knowledge within the confines of Philosophy? The section had six questions that were generally answered to the affirmative as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Very Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td>Private Companies</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
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</tbody>
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From the table, it is shown that it is within the research fields that the concept is well understood as it is rated 70% and it is under the good column. Universities apparently seem not to have a good grasp of it as it is average at 50%. Those not sure we have the Judiciary and Private companies both rated 50%. For those whose understanding is bad we have three areas, Ministries and Local authorities both rated 50% for their knowledge of the concept as bad and other areas which are mainly individual communities have 50% rating for a bad understanding of the concept. None was in the very bad category. This shows that in one way or another the concept is known in institutions and some individuals have a good understanding of it.

A philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge on exploration pointed to the history of philosophy and that of the term in particular. This chapter has
gone into an understanding of culture as an originator of knowledge by exploring the history of the concept of culture to bring out its nature and links it to knowledge building on the fieldwork findings. To help move this definition of culture the Sources of the Self, 42 of Charles Taylor became handy. In the book, Taylor gives a historical epic of our modern moral identity. He eloquently brings forth a broader view of the specific arrangements of moral judgments characteristic of modernity in the West. Given the Sources of the Self aims at nothing less than an articulation of the moral sources of the modern conception of selfhood, this project then was conceived of as an attempt to bring about a horizon that helps “weave ... modern self-identity, the political theory, and the practice of liberalism,” as having a fundamental base in education aimed at shaping civic culture. Taylor has argued strongly for a conception of personhood and identity that this work made use of in advancing itself. The basis of this endeavour was what Taylor wrote thus:

The claim that living within ... strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside of these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged, human personality. Perhaps the best way to see this is to focus on the issue that we usually describe today as the question of identity. We speak of it in these terms because the question is often paraphrased by people in the form: Who am I? But this cannot be necessarily answered by giving name and genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an understanding of what is of crucial importance to us. To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or

42. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), 34; here Taylor gives an explanation of why articulation can never be complete. He gives a dialogical perspective as the one that helps in the articulation of identity.
As this dissertation hinges on cultural functions of knowledge, culture and knowledge, are both defined forth with do give the project's frame or horizon. To begin with, we have 'culture.' Raymond Williams, whose definition is much more appealing for this thesis than any other the author has come across, begins by looking at the etymology of the word. For Williams, the word culture in its social, intellectual, and artistic senses is derived from the act of cultivating the soil. The Latin equivalent of which is cultura. Hence, the early meanings of "culture" in this metaphorical sense, is centred on a process, which Williams gives as, "culture of the mind," rather than an achieved state. This sense of the word was first developed as a description of certain people as, be they individuals, "cultivated" and then went to a group of those who are cultivated.

A systematic study of culture as we have it today may be traced to the Middle Ages in the works of Thomas Aquinas. From these works humans are endowed with reason, freedom and language with which by the help other tools humans can "procure for themselves instruments of infinite styles for infinite aims." It was during the modern period that the term 'culture' attained significant development. This came about between the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before this time it is difficult to trace the development of the term. Overall, according to Williams, "there is only a slight difference between the older use, which refers to a process, and the early modern use,

44. Aquinas, Thomas *Summa Theologiae*, I, 76, 5 ad 4m.
45. Ibid.
which refers to a condition.”46 In this development, as early as the time of Milton, according to Williams, “there is use of the concept that can be read in either way, and there are many instances that can be read either way in Kant’s writings.” From the eighteenth century on, however, in both English and German social thought, the modern usage became more common. As time went on, the concept was developed in four ways. All the four ways still affect the meaning of the term today. The four meanings according to Williams can briefly be stated as:

1. “Culture” meaning, “a general state or habit of the mind,” with close relations to the idea of human perfection;
2. It developed to mean, “a general state of intellectual and moral development in a society as a whole”;
3. It went on to mean, “the general body of the arts and intellectual work” and
4. Lastly, it came to mean, “the whole way of life, material, intellectual, and spiritual, of a given society.”47

What we have seen so far confirms that there is an understanding of the term under investigation. What we see of it in its history is a complex development that represented an attempt to think in new ways about humanity’s social, moral, and intellectual life at a time of profound and multifarious change. In one important respect, it was part of a general reaction against the mechanistic philosophy and against what was regarded as its social consequences in the emerging industrial civilization. During this time, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in 1830, distinguished between the civilization of general humanity and a merely external civilization in which progress is calculated by reference to other

47. See Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society*. 48
things other than the human person. A little later, Thomas Carlyle who was followed by Matthew Arnold made the same distinction.

The fact that "culture was a metaphor derived from natural growth," Williams continues, "probably had an important effect on this meaning." During this same period, as we learn from history, the contrast between what is "natural" and "mechanical" was frequently pointed out, and members of the Romantic Movement, in describing intellectual and social phenomena, generally turned to biology rather than physics and mechanics for their analogies. Another aspect of the Romantic Movement that undoubtedly contributed to the modern meanings of "culture" was its high valuation of folk life and national tradition. This understanding was not only a contrast with what was often seen as a merely sophisticated "civilization" but also an emphasis on the particular and distinctive customs and arts of different people, what would later be called their national cultures, as distinct from what was still seen as the general and uniform development of "civilization." As Williams notes, "It is also possible that the concept was affected by the growing knowledge of the non-European civilizations of India and Persia and, later, China, even Africa, which possessed elaborate and quite different social organizations with long-standing artistic and intellectual traditions." Although many Europeans saw these societies as merely backward in comparison to their own, with its highly developed technology and politics, others saw them as distinctive in the shaping of the human mind that could easily be assimilated to a simple and unilateral idea of civilization. Finally, according to Williams, "during this period there was an important development in relating the arts and different forms of thought to particular kinds of

48. Ibid. 49
social organization."49 A new emphasis was placed on the strong connections between the ways of ordinary social and material life and the styles and assumptions of imaginative and intellectual work. The concept of a specific "culture" was an obvious way of expressing these relations.

In the preceding sections above, we have seen some of the possible relations between the modern meanings of "culture" and the whole range of reactions to the great social and political changes in Europe between the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has emerged from this time that culture has three main emphasis to it. First, there is the idealist emphasis, which survives, though with little support, very much in its original form. "Culture" is here seen as a process and a state of cultivation that should be a universal idea. This usage is ethical and indeed, spiritual and expresses an ideal human perfection. This idea can easily conflict with the emphasis on particular "cultures," which stresses the differences in which people find meaning and value in their lives and indeed, conceive of perfection itself. This latter emphasis, now widespread in anthropology and sociology, is necessarily relative and comparative, whereas the surviving idealist emphasis tends to be absolute and is commonly associated with the classical and Christian heritage of Europe.50

Standing between these emphases is what is still probably the most common and popular meaning of the word "culture," namely, a body of actual artistic and intellectual works. Williams, in his view, sees an "inevitable tension between this meaning and the other two."51 For him actual artistic and intellectual work often fails to conform to the

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
idea of a perfect or perfecting state of mind already associated with known, traditional meanings and values." It becomes necessary, in this middle position, as Williams sees it, "to distinguish 'high culture' from 'mass culture' or 'mid culture' and other similar twentieth century coinages."^52 On the other hand, we can say, "if culture is viewed as a body of artistic and intellectual work to which great, and at times supreme, value is attached, it is difficult from such a position, to accept the anthropological and sociological usages of the word "culture." In this respect, these uses are mainly neutral, since they refer to what different peoples do, make, and think, without regard to any artistic or intellectual merit. In any case, these uses include elements of social and economic life that do not seem to be culture in the artistic and intellectual sense at all. Recent studies show an important controversy within anthropology and sociology concerning the concept culture. However, beyond this dispute, and at times overlapping it, are the radical differences between "culture" as a social concept, and "culture" as an embodiment of universal and absolute values.^53

Following in the footsteps of Williams, "when such differences in usage refer, as in this case, to real and important differences in viewpoint and belief, it would be merely arbitrary and dogmatic to distinguish the one 'proper' meaning of 'culture' and to condemn the others." Rather, the immense and complicated argument that has centred on this idea should be seen as "an index of the issues to which it refers."^54 In addition, indeed, the idea of culture raises many of the "fundamental issues of Western civilization and has become a major point of division between idealist and materialist conceptions of

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^52. Ibid.
^53. Ibid.
civilization and between idealist and historical methods in intellectual and artistic criticism."\(^{55}\) It has also been a focus of the attempt to see societies as wholes, in new ways and with new interests in their various aspects. With all that the concept has undergone, the emphasis on culture seems to be an attempt to redefine the nature of society and civilization.

Many anthropologists and sociologists have apparently accepted this assumption, although the word "society," a relatively modern term, according to Williams, "with a general meaning, then becomes virtually identical with "culture" and is the more widely used term with authentic Marxist tradition."\(^{56}\) To many social thinkers, however, the primacy of the organization of material life was not acceptable. They pointed to the extraordinary cultural variations between peoples at comparable economic stages and rejected both the doctrine of economic primacy and the theory of unilateral evolution. Some retained the emphasis of the concept of culture as the "complex whole," although they denied primacy of economic factors within it. The material and economic elements would be included among other elements in the description of the "complex whole."\(^{57}\)

For a notable others, among them Alfred Weber and R. M. McIver, in conformity with the uses of "culture" outside the field of anthropology, reserved the concept of culture for the area of values and meanings while using "civilization" for the area of material organization. Weber regarded civilization as the product of science and

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ibid. This period had a significant influence from the followers of Marx. Basic to his thinking was the question of commitment to radical social change and transformation. It apparently was a conception of a "culture industry" and of the then penetration commodity fetishism into those realms of imagination and the psyche which had since classical times in German philosophy, always been taken as a stronghold against instrumental logic.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
technology and as universal and accumulative in that it relates primarily to nature rather than to humans. “Culture on the other hand, was the human interpretation, expressed in meanings and values, in philosophy, religion and art, of the purposes of life and society.” As to the findings of Williams, “McIver, particularly in his earlier work, made a broadly similar distinction; he related culture to ends and civilization to means and viewed the technological order of civilization as determined within the cultural order of meanings and values.”

In the study of the social sciences, there is a fundamental theoretical dispute that is perhaps more often conducted as a dispute over terminology than in any more general and abstract way. The degree of variation can be found, even when it is masked by the ordinary currency of disputed term like “culture,” to be large enough to show very forcibly the present difference between the social and physical sciences. In social studies, the scientific method is ordinarily a secondary discipline, concerned with the handling and presentation of evidence, and within these limits it is important. But it is difficult for any science to attain maturity when there is so basic a theoretical dispute about the nature of the evidence itself. It would be theoretically possible to resolve the disputes on the nature of the social evolution and on the relative effect of different elements in a culture by repeated case studies. It is significant, however, that in each case a historical perspective would be necessary; neither question can be resolved when a particular culture or group of cultures is investigated as if it were isolated in space and time.

58. R. M. McIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, (New York: 1931). The changing status of science and knowledge led to the question about the nature of the mode of production as a system and functional whole. This was central to the problem of culture. The solution of which had to come from the examination and positioning of the supernatural levels of given social formation.

59. Ibid.
Given the methodological problems experienced in the social sciences, the context of the modern emphasis of cultural relativity, as evident as it is, acquires a critical importance for this project. It is possible, therefore, as we have seen to relate contemporary theories of culture to materialist or idealist positions. Nevertheless, in it all, the critical area in this continuing argument seems to be the relation of cultural studies to history. The reason for this is, the historical study itself contains much the same variation and dispute, nevertheless only in a historical dimension that the critical questions of culture can be properly studied. The basic aid of these perspectives as attained from history is to shape human experience. It is a condition of the continuing usefulness that the idea of shaping should remain dynamic and that “a complex whole” should also be seen as complex in time. It is within the scope of these considerations that we can best follow the active and continuing inquiry, both inside and outside the social sciences, into the meaning of “culture” and relate it to “civilization.” In which case, the essential constitutive elements of a culture are values. Culture, therefore, becomes that “totality of meanings and values that inform a certain style of life.”

From the above pointers, we can see “culture” as having three meanings developed from its history. The three can be termed as elitarian, educational, and anthropological. Culture as elitarian signifies a great quality of knowledge. This could be in general or it may refer to specialization in some particular sector. For example, when a person is said to have a vas scientific, philosophic, artistic, literary culture or when it is simply said that one is “very cultured.” In the educational sense, culture indicates the learning, formation, cultivation of an individual human person. It may be seen as the

process of coming to maturation and the realisation of one's personality that an individual undergoes. Whereas, in the anthropological sense, culture signifies that totality of customs, techniques, and values that distinguish a social group, a tribe, a people, a nation. This is "the mode of living proper to a society."\textsuperscript{61}

The last two meanings, the educational and anthropological, are the ones that will shape this project. From both meanings we see how in effect, "culture is a dimension, a property of every individual human person as such." So then, the occupation of this dissertation is to bring forth in a more vivid manner how culture is the soul of society. This will be a middle way between nature and history. Here we move away from the classical understanding of the considering humans as natural beings and the modernist conception of the human being as the product of the self. This amalgamation between nature and history is what will be properly referred to as culture. At this point, we are partly in agreement with Thomas Aquinas, who said, "the human being [man], in place of all ... things, possesses the reason and the hands, which are the organs of organs, in that with their help humans can procure for themselves instruments of infinite styles and infinite aims."\textsuperscript{62} In a way to paraphrase John Paul II, "Culture is that by which humans, as humans, become more human."

With the foregoing understanding, of culture is a property of society. Hence, culture is essentially the "spiritual form of society" and descriptively it is that "totality of artificial objects, institutions, forms of life and thought that are not peculiarly individual but that characterize a social group." This therefore, gives "culture as the life of a people typified in contacts, institutions, and technological equipment. It includes characteristic

\textsuperscript{62} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1, 76, 5 ad 4m.
concepts and behaviour, customs and traditions." Consequently, "culture then signifies all those things, institutions, material objects, and typical reactions to situations that characterise a people and distinguish them from other people."\(^{63}\) What then is civic culture?

Talking of civic culture, with what we have seen above, it comprises political, economic, social and related factors that comprise a system where members can work and trade and satisfy their needs, plus the institutions needed to keep such a system going. This system has within it markets, courts and an administration of justice. We also have public works, social welfare and antimonopoly systems that run to keep the system in place. Hegel gives us a definition of such a culture as, "an association of members as self-sufficient individuals in a universality which because of their self-sufficiency is only formal. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system (the means to security of person and property) and by an external organisation for obtaining their particular and common interests."\(^{64}\)

4.2.1. Knowledge a Function of Cultural Representation

Each community offers in principle some more or less coherent way of addressing the most general issues of human life,\(^{65}\) sex, friendship, work, suffering, sin, death, and salvation. These global visions of life, embodied in various cultural representations,
communicate the ranking systems, virtue concepts, and standards of achievement that
distinguish one particularistic cultural community from another.

Answering the question about the intrinsic value of citizenship is no easy task. Citizenship is in many ways a difficult and peculiar way of life. Even the minimalist citizenship called for by *modus vivendi* liberalism, the citizenship that requires no more than the cultivation of an attitude of live and let live, a posture of benign mutual indifference in the name of civil peace, can be difficult for many who have strong commitments to totalizing life ideals. Such people often find intolerable the experience of being surrounded by people of alien belief and behaviour, even when the political arrangements producing that experience otherwise hold important advantages.

If such minimalist citizenship can be burdensome to many, then even more difficult is practice of the full cultural citizenship that alone insures the success of liberal democratic political institutions. The most complete development of the two moral capacities defining full cultural citizenship, which is, the capacity to pursue rationally a conception of the good and the capacity for an effective sense of justice, introduces tensions and complexities that far exceed those produced by the requirements of simple *modus vivendi* tolerance.

To answer the question of the intrinsic value of citizenship, we must understand anew how the inherent benefits of full cultural citizenship outweigh the burdens that come with it. The abstract question of the nature of the civic good can thus be reduced effectively to the question of what sort of case can be made for the desirability of full cultural citizenship in the light of the unsettling and even dangerous process involved in
its attainment. Before attempting to lay out such a case, let us make sure we understand clearly the sort of burdens and dangers that attend the pursuit of civic moral ideals.

At first glance, the discontents of citizenship seem painfully obvious. Viewed from the standpoint of a citizen of a modern constitutional democracy, a life passed within the cultural framework of a single ethnic, class, or religious community, say, a peasant village, seems to have an enviable sort of simplicity and tranquillity. Life within such a community is passed among people with the same general view of the world, people who share the same set of values and who agree in principle about the proper way to address the general human life issues of sex, friendship, work, suffering, sin, death, and salvation.

Identities in such communities are shaped by stable and well-known assignments of duties and responsibilities. Conduct is evaluated by ranking systems, by virtue concepts, by standards of excellence and achievement that are relatively unambiguous and unquestioned. Human desire is nurtured and given definite direction toward a clear and generally attainable set of goals.

In such mono-cultural communities, the everyday speech addressed to others from this standpoint gains a special intelligibility, effectiveness, and even profundity through its constant implicit appeal to and dependence upon a host of shared and unspoken background assumptions. Within such communities, whatever other problems arise to disrupt life and cause suffering, be they plague, invasion, oppression, or famine, this mono-culturalism generally prevents the emergence of problems focusing on questions of meaning and purpose, value and responsibility.
This fact alone makes it easy to understand why among citizens of liberal democracies there is never a shortage of communitarian nostalgia for this monocultural way of life. The establishment of a liberal form of political association breaks open irreparably the tranquil world of monocultural solidarity and exposes its former inhabitants to a whole new range of problems focusing precisely on questions of meaning, purpose and value, what I will call problems of narrative coherence and intelligibility.

To understand how these problems arise with the transition from membership in a closed monocultural community to citizenship in a liberal democracy, let us briefly examine the educational process necessary to make that transition. In this study we consider first one aspect of the process in particular: the process through which a capacity for civic freedom is developed. What sort of transformation in outlook, character, and self-understanding is necessary if a capacity for civic freedom is to be acquired?

4.2.2. The Civic Freedom a Cultural Function brought forth by Knowledge

What I call a capacity for civic freedom is linked to one of the two powers of moral personality distinguished by Rawls, the power to pursue rationally a particular conception of the good. We must note carefully the full significance of two of the terms central to the definition of this moral power.

First, the power in question is the capacity to pursue a particular conception of the good rationally. Second, the power in question is the capacity to pursue a particular conception of the good. Properly understood, these two terms together define what makes this capacity specifically a capacity proper to citizenship in a liberal democracy.
To pursue a particular conception of the good *rationally* is to pursue a life plan or life ideal critically rather than blindly or obsessively. This means not only that the methods selected for the attainment of the life ideal are subject to critical scrutiny, but also that reasons for the pursuit of the life ideal itself also require examination.

Further, to pursue a particular conception of the good *as a particular conception of the good* is to pursue a life plan explicitly as one among many other possible life plans rather than as an inescapable fate or a divinely ordained mission. This means that the life ideal being pursued is explicitly understood as an option, as an object of choice. To pursue a life plan either obsessively or as an inescapable fate is not to pursue it freely. Thus, the moral power to pursue rationally a particular conception of the good can be described as the capacity for civic freedom. Rawls tells us that

... citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good. This is not to say that ... they view themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good which they affirm at any given time. Instead, as citizens, they are regarded as capable of revising and changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so desire. Thus, as free persons, citizens claim the right to view their persons as independent from and as not identified with any particular conceptions of the good, or scheme of final ends.66

Accordingly, in order to move from the standpoint of a member of a mono-cultural community to the standpoint of liberal democratic citizenship, a person must acquire the capacity for freedom, the capacity effectively to define him- or herself independently of any single life plan or life ideal. Developing this kind of independence is far easier said than done. Its basic requirement is that persons make the Socratic distinction between the

good by itself and any particular conception of the good to which they might adhere at
one time or another.

This distinction is generally absent in mono-cultural communities. Its absence in
fact defines mono-cultural community. The particular conception of the good life pursued
by members of such communities is indistinguishable from the good itself. It is not a
conception of the good life that they pursue, it is simply the good life. The members of a
mono-cultural community bear identities that are wholly defined by the particularistic
standards of excellence, the virtue concepts, the ranking system, the ascriptions of rights
and duties grounded in the totalizing world view of their community.

Those who have been shaped by a single mono-cultural life ideal typically cannot
conceive of themselves or imagine their lives apart from it. They typically understand the
local cultural vocabulary they use to describe self and world not as one cultural
vocabulary among others, but rather as the vocabulary that alone expresses the very
nature of things. Members of other communities, to the extent that their ideals and
behaviour cannot be comprehended by this vocabulary, seem hopelessly alien.

Full cultural citizenship requires a break with this sort of mono-culturalism.
Citizens must acquire the moral power to pursue a particular conception of the good as a
particular conception, i.e., as one among others. They must learn to distinguish the good
as defined by their current particularistic life ideal from the good as such.

The first step in the process of developing this power, the first step in the process of civic
education, is learning how to address properly the Socratic question, "What is the good as
such? The capacity for freedom, the realization of full cultural citizenship, grows as the experienced distance grows between the good as such and one or another local conception of the good. As the experienced space between local good and the good as such increases, the citizen grows in the capacity to separate his or her own identity as a citizen from attributions based on the ranking system, virtue concepts, and standards of excellence defined by any one particularistic conception of the good.

This space is the space of civic freedom, the space of civic discourse. Within this space, citizens grow in the capacity to describe and address one another in terms of categories that do not give precedence to any one particularistic life ideal over others. They learn to address one another as free and equal individuals. Adherents of incommensurable world views or life ideals often find one another’s speech and behaviour alien and unintelligible. However, as they learn to meet and address one another within the space of civic freedom and civic discourse, a special sort of mutual understanding and even friendship becomes possible, even though full mutual understanding beyond that space may remain impossible.

Attainment of this capacity for civic freedom is always a matter of degree. The difficulty involved in acquiring this capacity for freedom is that it involves at the same time both independence from and adherence to a particular conception of the good. The capacity for civic freedom does not imply an absence of wholehearted commitment to a particular conception of the good or a renunciation of membership in a particular ethnic, class, or religious community.
On the contrary, the practice of civic freedom assumes such commitment and presupposes such membership. We must remember that the perspective proper to the practice of civic freedom does not contain in itself cultural resources rich enough to provide the basis for a comprehensive life ideal. Civic freedom, as a component of the civic good, applies to the part and not to the whole of life. Accordingly, attainment of a capacity for freedom cannot be taken as the sort of good that could ever rival the totalizing conceptions of the good proper to particularistic cultural traditions. Even less can it be identified with the good as such.

The function of totalizing world views is to nurture human desire as a whole and to direct it toward some achievable set of goals. This sort of direction cannot come from the practice of civic freedom. Civic freedom, as a component of the civic good, exists only through its difference from every particularistic happiness ideal. To move from the standpoint of a member of a particularistic cultural community to the normative standpoint of citizenship, a person must both retain his or her adherence to one or another particular conception of the good, while at the same time adopting an attitude of critical independence toward all such adherence, viewing such adherence in all cases as subject to revision and revocation.

A capacity for civic freedom thus requires an almost self-contradictory attitude in the pursuit of a particularistic conception of the good. It requires both a continuing commitment to a particularistic life ideal and, at the same time, an affirmation of its revocability, an affirmation of the purely voluntary nature of that commitment.
What makes this stance difficult is the central role played by totalizing life ideals in the nurturing and direction of human desire. Human desire flourishes most completely not by being satisfied, but rather in the anticipation of its satisfaction. Human desire is a form of animal desire that is intensified by the expectation of fulfillment and diminished by the expectation of frustration.

In despair, for example, a sense of the futility of all desire diminishes desire itself, engendering apathy and self-destructive impulses. On the other hand, a sense of promised future satisfaction has the opposite effect, enlivening the senses and making the experience of desire itself ever more desirable. All this is to say that human desire is a form of animal desire that is bound up with a representation of time -- with primacy given to the representation of the future. Human desire, for this reason, flourishes most completely when the objects of desire are clearly identified, attainable, and unquestioned in their desirability.

It is the biological function, so to speak, of comprehensive doctrines or totalizing life ideals to provide this identification of the objects of desire and to represent those objects as attainable. The development of a capacity for civic freedom makes the exercise of this function, at the very least, more difficult and complex.

Civic freedom requires that the objects of desire be represented as optional and that the choice of those objects be represented as revocable. To the extent that human desire flourishes most completely when its objects are viewed as unquestioned in their desirability, civic freedom, by attaching in this way at least a question mark to every object of desire, can undermine one of the primary conditions for the flourishing of
desire. Development of a capacity for civic freedom can thus become, if badly managed and understood, an open invitation to despair.

Strictly speaking, democracy is not a given. It is a form of living that all have to agree upon, if possible, constitutionally. Thematically it is a proposed way for why a civic culture is required for the support of liberal democracy. On this, we have our parting question: Is it possible that we can have education for progressive reconstruction of any civic culture? If we are to have a liberal democracy, is it to be founded on a civic culture? How does this culture come about? Given our human nature, that is social, we need others to thrive or disintegrate, as to whichever comes first. The question here is could it be that education has to come in to inform the political and cultural functions of our society?

4.2.3. Cultural Functions of Knowledge

The foregoing questions point back to the nature of society as pluralistic, for education to be for progressive reconstruction of civic culture, we need a culture on which to base

67. See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, (New York: Free Press, 1916), 87. When it comes to change educators may have to adopt what research finds to be good practice. To the contrary, there is often reluctance by educators to modify their practice because of the way change is introduced to them. This can be seen in the works of W. Carr and S. Kemmis, Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research, (London: Falmer, 1986); D. J. Greenwood and M. Levin, Introduction to Action Research: Social Research for Social Change, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998); and also S. Kemmis and R. McTaggart, “Participatory Action Research,” in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), 567-605. These works are available to introduce approaches to educational invitation with particular significance for change agents who do not belong to the institution where the innovation is to be implemented. Such approaches call for action-oriented research. They highlight key ingredients in effecting change as the active involvement of the ‘clients’ themselves; these are to be the members of the society in question, the educational institutions and the members of those institutions. These have to be put into consideration for the change process to be successfully effected.
ourselves. This means that public education in a liberal democracy must have the effect of making relative hierarchies and ranking systems generated by particularistic cultural communities, so that the identities of citizens governed are not wholly or exclusively by the principles or values underlying those hierarchies. Of course, public education in liberal democracies today also serves other ends, notably, the creation of technical experts and skilled workers needed in modern industrial economy. Nevertheless, the basic political work of public education in liberal democratic regime is the creation of citizens; these are persons who identify themselves and one another as free and equal individuals. We call this basic political work of public education civic education. These then are seen as the cultural functions of knowledge in a given society.

Civic education to achieve its goals, therefore, must draw upon cultural resources available in the larger society. Most of the cultural resources available in any liberal democracy are not necessarily supportive of the goal of civic education. The goal of civic education is the inculcation of the normative standpoint, the ideal attitudes, dispositions and values, proper to citizenship. In Callan, however, the particularistic ethnic, class, and religious communities making up the larger society seek to reproduce and advance their own particularistic life ideals and conceptions of the good. These communities tend to generate global outlooks or totalizing worldviews that are supportive of their own

68. See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education, 35.
69. Ibid, 181ff.
70. See Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux, Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture and Social Criticism, 81-2, 98.
particular ways of life. These worldviews find expression in all sorts of popular cultural media.71

According to Dewey, civic culture provides the resources for civic education; but it is not without its dangers.72 Because of the dangers, civic education reproduces and strengthens civic culture. When civic culture and civic education function effectively, large numbers of people who have the formal status of citizens in a liberal democracy actually develop the attitudes, dispositions, and values proper to citizenship.73 Liberal democracies can exist only if these numbers are sufficient to meet whatever political challenges that arise.74

Finally, according to Rawls, the basic liberties to which we have a right under a just constitution are those essential for the "adequate development of a full and informed exercise" of the two moral powers that define the political conception of the human person.75 To gain and retain such adherence, an ongoing process of persuasion is necessary. This may be taken on as a frame of reference from the suggestion of Professor Michael Oakeshott, which for him is literal truth. In these various forms and ages of knowledge are seen as voices in conversation. This conversation is one to which all have and do contribute in distinctive ways. Taken figuratively these words do express what liberal education is and what its outcome will be.

As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor an accumulating body of information,
but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation, which goes on both in public and within each one of us. Of course, there is an argument, inquiry and information, but wherever these are profitable they are to be recognized as passages in this conversation, and perhaps they are not the most captivating of the passages.... Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield neither extrinsic profit, nor a contest where the winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure.... Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance.  

This ongoing process of persuasion takes different institutional, representational, and discursive forms in different types of communities. Whatever forms such processes of persuasion take, however, they are all subject to analysis and criticism in rhetorical terms, meaning, in terms of their logical, ethical and emotional appeals, their style, occasion, and intention.  

What is true of the sphere of culture in general has special application to the specific form of culture here referred to as civic culture. A very special kind of persuasive process is required to gain and retain adherence to the norms proper to the standpoint of liberal democratic citizenship. As already noted, civic culture is a type of countervailing culture. Liberal democracy as a form of political association is defined by the rather unusual assumption that the citizens of any particular liberal democracy will


disagree fundamentally in their conceptions of the good life. As members of the civic community, citizens will also be members of one or more particularistic cultural communities. Dewey, confirms this by stating, "since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in a voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only in education." Democracy is seen as. Dewey adds, "a mode of associated living of conjoint communicated experience." This makes "it more than a government." Democracy is, therefore, not a natural form of association.

A civic culture, then, has a very special sort of persuasive task and must have a very special sort of persuasive force. A civic culture consists of a set of institutional, representational, and discursive means of persuasion. As such, it must be conceived of in terms of its rhetorical intention and effect. As in the case of all efforts of persuasion, the persuasive means available to any civic culture are addressed to a specific audience, an audience defined by a specific set of historical, economic, and social circumstances among others.

Generically speaking, the sort of audience that any civic culture must address, however, is one composed of persons who already adhere to some specific conception of the good, some specific totalising worldview or way of life. The task of any civic culture is to win the adherence of that sort of audience to a secondary set of norms that necessarily stand in a relationship of tension with the primary set of norms to which the audience remains committed.

78. Democracy and Education, 87.
The first step toward addressing successfully the crisis produced by the contemporary demise of modernist liberal civic culture is to understand clearly the sort of persuasive or rhetorical effort involved in gaining adherence to any particular form of civic culture. A full understanding of this sort of rhetorical effort requires us (1) to recall at every step the rhetorical character of the very inquiry about civic culture that we are now undertaking, and (2) to grasp clearly the rhetorical character of the modernist liberal doctrines whose failing credibility is at the root of the contemporary crisis of civic culture.79 Let us here briefly address in a general way the first of these tasks.

An exercise in pure theory by definition leaves all rhetorical considerations behind, or at least makes all rhetorical considerations a matter external to the subject matter, a question of the greater or lesser charm of the language in which the truth is clothed. Truth claims produced by a purely theoretical inquiry, however, they may be expressed, carry the force and implications of the hard metaphysical “is” of traditional western propositional logic.80 Characteristics of truth claims expressing the hard metaphysical “is” is the assumption that both the truths being asserted and the subject matter being discussed exist independently of any audience. From our own experience and from the happenings in our environment do we see this practised?

Pure theoretical discourse, in other words, does not understand itself primarily as a rhetorical activity, an activity aimed at winning the adherence of a particular audience


for a particular purpose, an activity whose outcome is valid or invalid, meaning, one
whose conclusions are "true," only to the extent that they win audience adherence.
Construed as an assertion bearing the hard metaphysical "is," for example, a statement
like, "The liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good is a political and not a
metaphysical doctrine," would read as claiming that the doctrine in question is and
always was a political doctrine, regardless how it may ever have been otherwise
understood.81

An inquiry into civic culture, however, cannot be properly understood as an
exercise in pure theory. Civic culture itself, like every other form of culture, is created,
transformed, and reproduced by processes of persuasion.82 The norms proper to civic life
must be embraced and internalised by citizens as a matter of conviction, a conviction
produced by the rhetorical power of the persuasive resources available to some specific
form of civic culture. This culture unites persons who are members of the same
particularistic cultural community, persons who share a common worldview and use the
same primary moral vocabulary.83

81. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, for principles of practical reason and conceptions of person and
society used to construct content 109ff; and the good as contemporary to right 173, 175ff.
82. See David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986); on theory and practice, 90, 199.
83. See David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, 23, 24 in his treatment of Hegel's criticism of
society. Helen Brown is a teacher. For her alterity (to bring about change) is not so much a matter
of essential values. She finds herself walking a tightrope as she tries to teach her students moral
and ethical principles without "offending anyone in the process." Her students live fraught lives.
Apparently, they are students who live with men who treat their women badly, families fall apart,
and children re being beaten. Working within such demographically complex school requires that
teachers help to save students from such dangerous situations and provide them with correct
values so that: "boys will leave those classes with more respect for women's rights and the girls
will have more understanding of why their brothers and fathers and uncles, sometimes, appear to
be playing the heavy-handed persona, because they think that it is their right. In this case, we
hopefully, will have less marriages breaking down. We will have less children bashed, we will
The vocabulary we are referring to is an enrichment of human language, of both spoken and unspoken word. The language mediates our human experiences and it is important for collective experience. It is with language that speaking and writing have a heavy investment in the past, which registers in their highly conservative institutions and in their verbal performances and poetic processes, which are formulaic, relatively invariable, calculated to preserve the hard-won knowledge garnered out of past experiences which, since there is no writing to record it, would slip away.  

4.3.1. The Concept of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge that influence Individuals, Communities and Cultures

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Delving into the question of the cultural functions of knowledge required a detailed understanding of the question as to how well it is understood in practical matters. This brought forth the percentages as shown in the above table where the leading issues on the

have less problems amongst families, and if anyone family does something that saves their family and saves them a break-up that is all you can look for.

question are one of socio-cultural analysis. This item is rated 80% from the findings. On
the low category we have quantitative analysis which is rated lowest as 70%. This means
that in matters of quantitative analysis not much of it is done. This rating was done after
the researcher had received back the questionnaires from the field and after grouping all
the answer it came to what is in that table from all those involved in the exercise.

In understanding the cultural functions of knowledge, we find that civic
culture and modern\textsuperscript{85} philosophy are cultural functions of knowledge. Here then we are
rooting civic culture and modern Philosophy as Cultural functions of Knowledge in this
fourth chapter the author explores the role played by philosophy particularly in modernist
forms of civic culture. In this period we have the "collapse of Enlightenment civic
culture," the form of civic culture that was dominant in the West for three hundred years.
It was based upon the ideas of modernist liberal political philosophy, ideas that are
increasingly losing their credibility and thereby threatening the viability of the form of
civic culture based on them. This phenomenon, points to the political consequences of the
demise of modernist liberal social, economic and political philosophy. We base ourselves
on this to explain philosophically the cultural functions of knowledge as part and parcel

\textsuperscript{85} According to Jean-François Lyotard, "Science has always been in conflict with narratives." Judged
by the yardstick of science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the extent that science
does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate
the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of Legitimation with respect to its own
status, a discourse called philosophy, one which we engage in now. The term \textit{modern} is used here
to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to discourse of this kind making an
explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of spirit, the hermeneutics of
meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. The type
of examples we may have here include the rule of consensus between the sender and the addressee
of a statement with truth-value that is deemed acceptable if it is cast in terms of a possible
unanimity between rational minds. This conception belongs to the Enlightenment narrative, in
which we the hero of knowledge works towards a good ethical end socially, economically and
politically. See Jean-François Lyotard, \textit{The Postmodern Condition}, 11-14; here we find several
theories of society in modernity. We are give "the nature of the social bond" which is also seen as
a modern alternative.
of education for reconstruction of civic culture\textsuperscript{86} in our situation. The modern period had three historical developments that characterize it. According to Rawls, to start with, we had "the reformation in the sixteenth century." This development fragmented the "religious unity of the middle ages and led to religious pluralism." The consequences of this development were felt more in the following centuries. This turned out to be a catalyst of other pluralisms that became "a permanent feature of culture by the end of the eighteenth century."\textsuperscript{87} The second development was that of "the modern state with its central administration, at first ruled by monarchs with enormous if not absolute powers."\textsuperscript{88} Last of these three historical developments was "the development of modern science, beginning, in the seventeenth century."\textsuperscript{89} So when we talk of political liberalism it is an aftermath of the Reformation and the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This translates into the "modern understanding of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought" that began during this period. As Hegel is said to have observed, "pluralism made religious liberty possible, certainly not Luther's and not Calvin's intention."\textsuperscript{90}

What we see of the Reformation and its aftermath seems to point us to a liberal democratic civic culture that must provide cultural resources capable of rendering

\textsuperscript{86} We need to have positive duties and responsibilities as a society. See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), 229-243. Also Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). There are many examples that are found within our social, economic and political setting that we can refer. These then imply that a philosophy of history may be used to legitimate knowledge, questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing the social bond. These must be legitimized as well. Thus justice is consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth.

\textsuperscript{87} See Political Liberalism, xxiv.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} Political Liberalism, xxvii.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, xxvi.
intelligible to citizens the normative standpoint of citizenship. This is not an easy task. Liberal democracy requires citizens to cultivate for purposes of political association a special kind of identity, that is in this study called a civic identity, one that necessarily stands in a certain relationship of tension with the sort of identity that governs most life and action, what is here called a communitarian identity.

Specifically, modernist civic culture accomplished this task by means of the resources offered by modernist liberal political theory. Social contract theories, for example, misrepresented the normative standpoint of citizenship, the standpoint of

91. See R. S. Peters, "Hobbes. Thomas (1588-1679)," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, P. Edwards, (Chief Editor), (London: Macmillan, 1996), 41. Hobbes had a model ready at hand by means of which he might present his Galilean analysis of civil society. This was his social contract theory. See also P. Laslett, "Social Contract," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, P. Edwards, (Chief Editor), (London: Macmillan, 1996), 465-467. The social contract proper was thought of as bringing individuals together in society, where as the governmental contract was seen as establishing a formal government. John Locke on his part had a liberal bent of mind and did bring forth his love for freedom, tolerance, and truth. His attitude was pragmatic and based on considerable psychological insight into motives, needs, passions and follies of people. See James Gordon Clapp, "John Locke (1632-1704)," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, P. Edwards, (Chief Editor), (London: Macmillan, 1996), 487-503. In his Social and Political Philosophy, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), has a couple of theories: among them, "the economic theory," he treats of liberty as well, representation in go and on the "individual and society," it is said that Mill believed in democratic governance but he was convinced that it could not work well unless the citizens who lived under it were reasonably well educated, tolerant of opposing views, and willing to sacrifice some of their immediate interests for the good of the society. See J. B. Schneewind, "John Stuart Mill," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, P. Edwards, (Chief Editor), (London: Macmillan, 1996), 314-322. See also W. H. Walsh, "Immanuel Kant," (1724-1804), in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, P. Edwards, (Chief Editor), (London: Macmillan, 1996), 305-324; it is in Kant's Metaphysics and Morals, that his politics are situated. Kant is known for his notoriety in support of the retributive theory of punishment and an uncompromising advocate of the death penalty for murder. Kant combines a fundamentally liberal attitude with specific views that are conservative, if not reactionary. Following Rousseau, Kant attempted to explain political authority partly in terms of the general will and partly in terms of the original contract. Insofar as he insists on the contract, which he interprets not as a historical fact but as a regulative idea, he is advocating a version of political liberalism, which he lays particular emphasis on the rule of law; this is insofar as he grounds supreme political authority in the will of the people as a whole. Another important personality in contractual theory is "John Rawls," in defending a conception of justice in his works he aims at a modern democratic regime. He concerns himself with the idea of justice as a "fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons." The principles of justice for such a society, according to Rawls, characterize its fair terms of cooperation by specifying its citizens' basic rights and duties and by regulating the distribution of its economic benefits. He invokes the "social contract" to formulate his conception of justice.
autonomous individuality, as historically and anthropologically prior to other cultural 
standpoints. In the social contexts of the 17th and 18th century Europe and America, such 
misrepresentations were effective for purposes of generating arguments in support of 
liberal democratic institutions and providing a credible interpretation of civic ideals.

In the radically different social and historical context of the late 20th century 
Europe and America, however, these misrepresentations of the normative standpoint of 
citizenship have become problematic indeed. Rather than rendering intelligible to citizens 
the standpoint proper to citizenship, representations of free individuality as the 
historically and anthropologically prior or “natural” identity of human beings serve only 
to confuse citizens regarding the nature and status of citizenship.

This is true of other forms of modernist liberal political theory that provided 
resources for civic culture. Lockean92 or social contract varieties of liberal political 
theory drew part of their credibility and effectiveness from the conceptual and rhetorical 
common ground they shared from the beginning with modern Foundationalist 
epistemology.93 That common ground was defined by the doctrine of the autonomy of 
reason and this was the basis of another variety of modernist liberal political theory 
whose misrepresentation of citizenship continues to generate problems of intelligibility 
for us.

93. This is a Philosophy defended by among others John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz. *Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &Littlefield, 1999),chapter 5; R. M. Chisholm, 
*The Foundations of Knowing*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Paul Moser, 
*Empirical Justification*, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985). Pollock’s history is unusual in that the 
foundational states are not beliefs; he calls his theory a “non-doxastic” version of “direct realism.” 
Some might not call such a theory a foundation theory at all, but it is more closely allied with a 
foundation theory than with any other type of epistemological theory.
Rawls’s conception of person might seem to lend some support to the autonomy argument, even if that involves applying the conception in ways he did not anticipate. Rawls argued that the basic liberties to which we have a right under a just constitution are those essential for "the adequate development and full and informed exercise" of two moral powers that define the political conception of the person. These powers are the capacity for a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Moreover, it is the requisite development and exercise of these over a "complete life" that the basic liberties are intended to support.\footnote{See Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, 293, 322-323. When looked at "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Lect. I, pp. 533-34, Lect. III, pp. 567-68, there is a historical knowledge of influence that we get. In this knowledge, we have contained the principles of justice, which we allow the parties involved as alternatives. Along with these, we consider liberties are essential social conditions for the adequate development of moral personality over a complete moral life. Doing this connects the basic liberties with the conception of the person used in justice as fairness according to Rawls. There is also the question of the "original position" that Rawls examines. The question that we are confronted with here is of "which principles are available to the parties in the original positions," and as Rawls adds, are these "the most effective in coordinating and combining many social unions into one social union?" Rawls gives two desiderata: "first, these principles must be recognizably connected with the conception of citizens as free and equal persons, which conception should be implicit in the content of these principles and conveyed on their face as it were. Second, these principles, as principles for the basic structure of society, must contain a notion of reciprocity appropriate to citizens as free and equal persons engaged in social cooperation over a complete life. If these desiderata are not satisfied, we cannot regard the richness and diversity of society’s public culture as the result of everyone’s cooperative efforts for mutual good: nor can we appreciate the culture as something to which we can contribute and in which we can participate." Rawls goes on to show that this public culture is the "work of others; and therefore to support these attitudes of regard and appreciation citizens must affirm a notion of reciprocity appropriate to their conception of themselves and be able to recognize their shared public purpose and common allegiance." See \textit{Political Liberalism}, 99. Here it is suggested that we reject Kant’s moral constructivism.}
4.3.2. Cultural Functions of Knowledge Linkinking between Foundationalist Epistemology and Modernist Liberalism

Foundationalist epistemologists conceived of the faculty of reason itself as the origin of the critical standards it brought to bear in the assessment of cognitive claims that make a public culture. For them, reason was autonomous in the assessment of truth claims, subject to no authority other than itself. Modernist liberal political theory saw the theoretical justification of political arrangements as work proper to this autonomous faculty of reason in its practical application. More importantly, modernist liberals sought to establish a connection between the standpoint of autonomous reason and the attitudes, dispositions, and values proper to liberal democratic citizenship. They sought to extend the notion of a rationally autonomous knower from the cognitive into the political realm and use it to define the normative standpoint of liberal democratic citizenship.

Modernist liberalism thus not only attributed to the standpoint of citizenship a historical and anthropological priority, but also an autonomy in matters of political

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95. For example, the need for ethics is not to check the beast within. The want for ethics is a want for determination, an indifference to which choice is the solution and freedom the implication. It is pointless to defy freedom; the problem is to elucidate it without metaphysical confusion. Some think Hume already did that when he defined freedom as the power to do as they choose. If you do something because you wanted to and chose it, your action is "free" in the only interesting sense of the word. Freedom concerns what you want and expect. Whether an action is free or constrained has nothing to do with the speculative ultimate causes of motion or stillness. See David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Charles Hendel (ed.), (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), § 8. The usual objection to Hume is that freedom requires that one choose the act, but one may as well have done otherwise. This "counterfactual" possibility (a possibility of doing what you did not actually do) is an artifact. We create these possibilities as by-products of what we do when we act from preference. The preference comes first, then the possibility of doing, or having done otherwise. Looked at this way, there is something one could or should have chosen because there are many things one and many others may actually chose. May be we should be looking at liberal politics and virtue. However, our concern is the cultural functions of knowledge. This points us directly to our society. In it we see that the very idea that our basic political values require a distinctive education for virtue will seem wrong to some because liberal politics is often depicted as devoid of any distinctive ethical ideal, and in that respect, at odds with some traditional standards of human excellence. These brands of conservatism are consistent with the essentials of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, many critics regard them as legacy of earlier, pre-liberal political thought that is repugnant to the true moral sources of free government.
morality analogous to the autonomy of reason in matters of truth. This historical and conceptual link between modernist liberal political theory and foundationalist conceptions of knowledge continues today to generate confusion about the nature of liberal democratic citizenship, the sort of confusion that still compels some to view adherence to civic values as groundless and unjustified if those values cannot be shown to be the expression of an autonomous and universal faculty of reason. 96

In order to free ourselves from such confusions, it is important for us to see that the modernist liberal conception of liberal democratic citizenship as a function of an autonomous faculty of reason was not just a mistake. It is quite possible to construct an illuminating analogy between the normative standpoint of citizenship and the purported standpoint of an autonomous rational faculty. But while this analogy may have played a useful role in the context of modernist civic culture, today, in view of the contemporary demise of the modernist doctrine of the autonomy of reason, it invites only misunderstanding.

96. See Jeremy Waldron, “Rights,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 125; other-regarding moral distress is not for Mill, as referenced above, an emotional distraction from the cognitive process that the ethical confrontation engages. On the contrary, distress is an integral part of those very processes: “That a human person is morally distressed by another’s homosexuality, for example, is a sign that he takes his own views seriously, second, that he recognizes now the need to reassert vigorously his own convictions, being confronted so dramatically and disturbingly with a case of its denial, and third, if (as is probable) the moral truth about sexual relations is the monopoly neither of his own opinion nor its rival, it is a sign that ideas are struggling and clashing with one another in the way that Mill thought most likely to lead to a more balanced and sober truth about human sexuality. The aspect of “other-regarding” moral distress is the emotional fuel of ethical confrontation, and therefore, its presence in dialogue should encourage us as a sign that public moral education is proceeding as it should rather than alarm us as a portent of social conflict or demoralization. This means that dialogue must be characterized by a certain belligerence. Mill on his part, would cheerfully celebrate dialogical belligerence as a virtue, and dismiss those who would prefer a more ‘temperate’ style debate because ‘in the great practical concerns of life ...[truth] has to be made by rough process as a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners,’ see J. S. Mill, On Liberty, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993), 58, 65-66.
The project of inventing a viable postmodern civic culture requires that we find a new way of understanding the nature of liberal democratic citizenship, one that no longer commits us to viewing citizenship as involving the exercise of reason in some metaphysically or epistemologically privileged sense. The modernist liberal conception of the citizen as "man" of reason was grounded in a metaphor that has lost its power to illuminate the practice of citizenship. But to free ourselves from the influence of this metaphor, it is important to understand how it could have ever been illuminating.

4.3.3. The Doctrine of the Autonomy of Reason within the Cultural Functions of Knowledge

The modernist doctrine of the autonomy of reason received its first and most influential formulation as the methodological point of departure for Descartes (1596-1650) in his project of providing the new mathematical physics with an absolutely secure metaphysical foundation. That project arose in the early seventeenth century partially in response to the ethnic, class, and religious warfare that erupted in Europe following the Reformation. By 1620, Europe had suffered over one hundred years of civil strife provoked by disputes about religious doctrine and authority.

One cultural response to these conflicts over opposing truth claims was the re-emergence of a "Pyrrhonian" scepticism regarding all truth claims. This scepticism,

97. See Bernard Williams, "René Descartes," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, 344-354. In his own work on the Discourse on the Method, Descartes gives us "the method of doubt." Here he gives an account of four rules that he says he had found adequate to express his method.
99. A Latin edition of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus was published in 1562 and an edition of the complete works of Sextus was published in 1569. The Greek texts were printed in 1621. Academic Scepticism, especially as Cicero represented it in Academia, came in for attention in the sixteenth century. This is a second motivation that has been stressed by scholars who see Descartes as responding to the late Renaissance rediscovery of, and fascination with, ancient
identified today above all with Montaigne, was steeped in "the spirit of tolerance and openness that the rhetorical culture of the Renaissance engendered." Descartes' response took quite a different tack. Scepticism and religious warfare seemed to him to feed off one another. If reason can provide no criterion for assessing opposing doctrinal truth claims, then rational discourse is useless in the resolution of doctrinal disputes and force can plausibly be seen to have a legitimate role in resolving socially divisive disputes over matters of truth. Descartes' project was to rehabilitate rational discourse by an attack on scepticism. He set out to show that reason, by itself, does indeed provide a criterion for assessing opposing truth claims, a criterion that infallibly distinguishes true statements from false and the knowable from the unknowable.

Descartes discovered that infallible criterion of truth by giving free rein to scepticism, permitting himself to doubt every truth claim that in any way proved to be anything less than fully self-validating. If, after letting scepticism have full sway, he could indeed identify a proposition immune to sceptical argument, a proposition whose truth all who consider it must acknowledge, then Descartes could declare scepticism to be defeated and reason to be in possession of a criterion of truth. The self-validating proposition that Descartes claimed to have discovered was, of course, "I think, therefore I exist." \(^{100}\)

Descartes took this proposition to be a statement about the world, a statement affirming the actual existence of a particular entity, a particular thinking being. He took it

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\(^{100}\) See Bernard Williams, "René Descartes," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, 237.
to be a true proposition whose truth depended in no way upon any contingent state of affairs or personal religious commitments, a proposition that is necessarily true each time it is affirmed regardless of the time and place of its affirmation, for to affirm a proposition is in fact an act of thinking and no act can exist without an existing agent. For Descartes, the truth of this proposition was self-evident to every human being capable of affirming any proposition whatever.\textsuperscript{101}

Perception of its truth did not depend on the possession of prudence, special experience, or any other quality that persons possessed only by virtue of membership in one or another ethnic, class, or religious community. Perception of the truth of this proposition depended only on the capacity to inspect carefully the content of any proposition without regard to the pleasurable or painful consequences of affirming it, or the particular authorities asserting its truth, or the veneration in which it is held by friends and relatives, that is to say, without regard to its rhetorical dimension or the rhetorical situation it addresses.

This was a capacity for a special kind of reflection, a capacity for inspecting the content of a proposition without taking into account the context of its utterance, a capacity requiring the deliberate adoption of a standpoint imagined to be external to every particular rhetorical situation and therefore unaffected by any particular set of

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.

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cultural assumptions. For Descartes, this was the standpoint intrinsic to reason itself, the
"natural light."\textsuperscript{102}

This standpoint of pure reflection provided Descartes with the absolutely autonomous criterion that he needed in order to distinguish (i) statements that in fact carry truth claims from those that do not, and (ii), among statements actually bearing truth claims, the true from the false. Applying this criterion, only those propositions carry truth claims whose content can be clearly and distinctly conceived from the culture-neutral standpoint of pure de-contextualized representation. Only such propositions are candidates for admission into the realm of cognition.

Statements advanced as true only for certain purposes or in certain contexts or for certain audiences (for example, a particular community of religious belief) thus do not, strictly speaking, carry truth claims at all. Discourses consisting of such statements do not qualify as cognitive discourses. Such discourses are to be measured by other standards, standards derived from the external contexts and accidental circumstances to which they are addressed. Those standards are arbitrary and dependent. When such standards are applied in evaluating statements, reason is not being used autonomously. The standards are drawn from rules and principles external to reason itself.\textsuperscript{103}

Accordingly, if only those statements carry truth claims that can be conceived clearly and distinctly from the context-free, culture-neutral standpoint of autonomous reason, the truth or falsity of such statements must be determined solely by reference to

\textsuperscript{102}See Lilli Alanen, \textit{Descartes' Concept of Mind}, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 12, 106-7, 224-5, 228; there was no external force other than his will and the intellect that allowed him to make the conclusion he made.

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid, 66.
the rules and principles inherent in that standpoint, the rules, as we would say today, of deductive and inductive logic. These rules are inherent in reason itself in the sense that they are rules for connecting sentences to one another intelligibly without regard for their contexts of utterance, without regard to rhetorical considerations of speaker, audiences, intent, and circumstances. Thus, implicit in the methodological starting point of Descartes' project of overcoming scepticism is an unambiguous affirmation of the doctrine of the autonomy of human reason.

4.3.4. Enlightenment as the Political Standpoint of the Scholar or Scientist in the Cultural functions of Knowledge

Once this notion of an absolutely autonomous faculty of reason gained some credibility and acceptance, it was then used to license a whole range of new cognitive discourses that appealed to autonomous human reason as their sole basis and claim to authority. Hobbes was the first to extend the vocabulary and style of argument proper to these new cognitive discourses into the field of political affairs, the first to attempt the construction of a political and moral science that based normative political claims on criteria purportedly drawn from reason alone. But it was perhaps Kant who provided the most perspicuous expression of the modernist linkage of liberal political norms to the doctrine of the autonomy of reason.104

In his famous article, "What Is Enlightenment?"105 Kant answered the question posed in its title in such a way that his audience could have no doubt that liberal political

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104 See Political Liberalism, 99.
105 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. Here he quotes this article by Kant and acknowledges that the title he treats "The Idea of Public Reason," is suggested by Kant's distinction between public and private reason in this article "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784). This question of public reason,
norms were dictated by and alone consistent with the exercise of autonomous human reason. "Supere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' That is the motto of enlightenment." Needless to say, Kant here was not identifying enlightenment with just any person's capacity to think clearly about his or her particular interests and welfare as a member of a particularistic cultural community. Of course, members of particular ethnic, class, and religious communities differ in their ability to master the vocabulary and apply the ranking systems that prevail in their particular communities.

The application of general conceptions grounded in particularistic cultural world views definitely involves what we now call reasoning skills and some people develop these skills to a greater degree than others. But Kant's call to enlightenment was clearly not a call to develop reasoning skills of that sort. He was not interested in encouraging persons to become more thoroughly self-consistent and self-critical Lutherans, Prussians, or peasants. For Kant, as for all modernist liberals, the use of human reason in the honorific sense involved the use of critical standards that were drawn not from particularistic loyalties and commitments, but rather from reason itself. 107

To the extent that a person strives to think in an orderly way about any subject matter merely as a member of a particular ethnic, class, or religious community, that person is not, in Kant's vocabulary, using his or her own reason. Such a person, for Kant, would not be enlightened. To be enlightened, one must think and speak from a very

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106. See The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, 305-324.  
107. Ibid.  
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different standpoint or identity, one no longer subject to particularistic ethnic, class, or religious ranking systems and world views.

Kant’s injunction to use “one’s own reason,” thus implies the existence of a critical standpoint external to all historically-conditioned and particularistic world views. To think for oneself, in other words, to think independently of the rules laid down by Pope, prince, employer, class, profession, village, and nation, is to adopt this standpoint. It is this standpoint that Kant identifies with the faculty of reason. To whom, then, is the Kantian injunction addressed?

It is certainly not addressed to any person insofar as he or she is the bearer of what we have called a communitarian identity. A person bears a communitarian identity insofar as he or she accepts or answers to descriptions using the vocabulary and ranking systems proper to a particular ethnic, class, or religious community. Kant’s injunction to use “one’s own reason” is thus an injunction to regard the reasoning that goes on in the pursuit of particularistic conceptions of the good life as not “real” reasoning and thereby as not one’s own, which is to say that it was an injunction to regard one’s communitarian identity as external to one’s “real” self. What then is “real” reasoning and what is it that defines the “real” self?108

The answer that Kant gives in his article, “What Is Enlightenment?” is, of course, well known. Enlightenment is about the free use of reason.109 Reason is free only when subject to its own rules and criteria. The free use of reason is the use made of it by the

scholar (in this case, for us, the scientist). The scholar issues purely rational discourses, meaning, discourses governed by the criteria derived from reason alone. As discourses governed by reason alone, the scholar’s speech is genuinely cognitive speech.

The scholar or scientist is one who possesses knowledge that is universal. The scholar or scientist speaks not as a member of one or another ethnic, class, or religious community, but rather as one who stands outside all such particularistic communities. The scholar or scientist is the quintessentially public person. To use “one’s own reason,” therefore, is to speak as a scholar to the public. It is to speak to the whole community as a world-community, a community of persons not differentiated by particularistic ranking systems and world views. It is to speak from what we have called one’s civic identity, this is the same as, one’s identity as a member of the civic community.

4.3.5. The Epistemological or Cognitive Priority of the Standpoint of Citizenship as a Cultural Function of Knowledge

In this famous article, then, Kant clearly takes as a given the metaphorical link between the autonomous standpoint of pure reason and the normative standpoint of citizenship. The social embodiment of autonomous reason is the autonomous scholar or intellectual. The autonomous scholar is another name for the autonomous citizen. Here the faculty of

cognition and the capacity for political liberty are defined as mutually implied and interdependent.111

Here too civic identity is given a new sort of priority over communitarian identity. Just as social contract narratives attributed to the normative standpoint of citizenship a historical and anthropological priority, the metaphorical assimilation of the standpoint of citizenship to the standpoint of autonomous reason attributed to civic identity the sort of priority to communitarian identity that, in the defunct language of foundationalist epistemology, the transcendental ego had to the empirical ego. Just as the Kantian transcendental ego is the ground or underlying permanent reality of the conditioned and finite empirical ego, so also the civic self is the ground or underlying permanent reality of the conditioned and finite communitarian self. As the discourses that are genuinely cognitive and as the world that is genuinely known take priority over subjective impressions and the world of popular opinion, so also does civic identity take priority over communitarian identity.112

In this work of Kant, this peculiar cognitive/metaphysical common ground shared by modernist epistemology and by modernist liberal political theory could not be more obvious. The doctrine of the autonomy of human reason in the sphere of cognition mandates, when translated into the political sphere, the doctrine of political liberty. The normatively free citizen is also the cognitively free thinker, in Kant's terms, the scholar or intellectual. The foundationalist epistemological arguments that underwrite claims to objective truth also ultimately underwrite demands for the rights of citizenship.

111. See Allen, Knowledge and Civilization, 42ff.
112. Ibid.
This analogy between the standpoints of the ideally autonomous citizen and the ideally autonomous knower defined modernist liberal political theory and determined the character of the modernist form of civic culture that it generated. Like all great metaphors that succeed in shaping history, it gave rise to a comprehensive interpretation of the world by equating two very unlike things in a way that nevertheless illuminated both and gave both a new kind of intelligibility.

The modernist conception of the purely objective and autonomous knower was drawn from classical conceptions of the contemplative life. The modernist liberal conception of the normative citizen was drawn from classical conceptions of the political or active life. But, in the seventeenth century, for whatever the historical reasons, these two ideals were intertwined in ways entirely unfamiliar to classical philosophy. Whereas, for Aristotle, pursuit of the contemplative life led the philosopher to turn away from political affairs, for modern philosophy, the standpoint of the pure, contemplative knower became a model for the standpoint of the active citizen. It might be the case that this modern appropriation of the classical ideal of pure theory may tell us something about the concealed political significance of the contemplative life as it was classically understood. Without doubt, however, it tells us something important about the nature of modern citizenship.

Classical republicanism and classical conceptions of the political life presupposed a community united by a shared conception of the good. Modern liberalism presupposes the opposite. Modern conceptions of citizenship assume that the civic community will be composed of a number of diverse ethnic, class, and religious communities defined by
conflicting world views and ranking systems. Membership in such a civic community makes very different demands on citizens. Modern citizens must strive to attain a far greater degree of detachment from their particularistic value commitments. In order to address one another as free and equal individuals within the liberal democratic public sphere, citizens must cultivate a far greater critical distance from their communitarian identities than classical citizenship required.

The model for this extreme detachment became the detachment of the pure philosophical knower, the transcendental ego, the standpoint of a person who has embraced an identity completely separate from all particularistic commitments and beliefs in order to gain a knowledge of universal truth. This is what is illuminating about the modernist liberal identification of the normative citizen with the pure knower: it makes clear the degree of detachment from adherence to totalizing particularistic beliefs and values that modern citizenship requires.

This identification also served well as the basis for a form of civic culture. It provided a clear measure of and clear direction for development of the capacities proper to modern citizenship. In effect, modernist liberal civic culture invited citizens of liberal democracies to become citizens in the full cultural sense by learning to adopt the standpoint of the pure knower, in other words this is, the universal standpoint of one who has resolved to adopt only those criteria of truth that are applicable to all persons, without regard to their membership in particular ethnic, class, or religious communities.\footnote{Ibid.}
4.3.6. Why the Postmodern Reconstruction of Civic Culture Requires a Rethinking of Our Conceptions of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge

While this identification between ideal citizen and pure knower produced and supported a most effective form of civic culture for over three hundred years, it has now become a liability. The cognitive enterprise that originated with Galilean mathematical physics has by now become an enterprise that would no longer even be recognized by its founders. The Cartesian doctrine of the autonomy of human reason was designed as an explanation and defense of that earlier cognitive enterprise. But in an age when science is anything but the province of autonomous knowers, when cognitive enterprises have become well-financed, internally complex, multi-audience, nationally organized, economically necessary, militarily vital, professionalized research enterprises, the doctrine of the autonomy of human reason is simply obsolete, marginally useful today perhaps only as an ideology supportive of the independence of research institutions. Science, in short, has become something vastly different than anything that Descartes could have imagined.114

The myth of an autonomous faculty of human reason has retained whatever currency it continues to have because it has played such a central role in modernist civic culture. This doctrine has so far been the most effective cultural support for the production and reproduction of civic values in contemporary liberal democracies. But this usefulness is now at an end.

For us today, the doctrine of a universal and autonomous faculty of human reason has lost its credibility. The analogy between the ideal citizen and the pure knower no longer illuminates our contemporary experience of citizenship. We must today think

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beyond this analogy if we are to succeed in the invention of a new form of liberal
democratic civic culture that will succeed the old. But this analogy up until now has
provided the basis of the political vocabulary identified with liberalism as such.

The first task in the project of reinventing liberalism must be to free liberalism as
a conception of citizenship and political life from this modernist vocabulary. Because of
the origins of that vocabulary in the myth of an autonomous faculty of reason, the
postmodern reconstruction of civic culture requires a radical shift in the way we speak
not only about citizenship, but also about reason and cognition.

4.3.7. Manifest Cultural Functions of Knowledge

During the last three hundred years, the ideas central to the form of civic culture
prevalent in most North Atlantic liberal democracies were those supplied by modernist
liberal political philosophy. This means that, on the occasions when some kind of
coherent account or explanation of the moral and political norms proper to liberal
democracy was called for, the ideas most readily available and rhetorically effective were
those drawn from the tradition of political thought identified with authors such as Locke,
Rousseau (1712-1778), Bentham (1748-1832), Kant, and Mill.

Cambridge University Press, 1970), 54-60. Autonomy may be understood as precluding all
reliance on moral or religious authority or, less expansively, as permitting certain kinds of
obedience in the case of even the fully virtuous agent. See also R. M. Adams, *The Virtue of Faith
225. Here we are given a good treat of the life and "thought" of Rousseau. In a particular way his
thought on "the nature of society," "education," "political theory," and "religion." Of interest to
this work is his thought on the nature of society, education and political theory.
Monro gives the "moral theory" the "political and legal theory," as well as the "theory of
These ideas provided the dominant interpretation of the basic liberal democratic ideals of individual freedom and equality and were used to articulate the conception of political justice underlying liberal political institutions. In popular political discourse, rhetoric that appealed to notions of popular sovereignty, social contract, natural human rights, and to related ideas of authentic individuality and autonomous personhood seemed to have an immediate intelligibility and validity. The plausibility of these notions then served to reinforce adherence to the norms and ideals proper to civic life. However, during the last fifty years, the intelligibility and plausibility of these notions have eroded considerably and at an increasingly rapid pace. This erosion is related to a growing scepticism about the universalist and essentialist assumptions underlying modernist liberal political thought. Modernist liberal political philosophers drew their vocabulary and arguments from the intellectual and rhetorical resources produced by the European Enlightenment.  

The Enlightenment itself was a broader cultural movement that arose out of the religious and class warfare that engulfed sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Faced with the need to explain the meaning of the modern world, the Enlightenment thinkers developed a new rhetoric that was grounded in the ideas of the Scientific Revolution. They sought to explain the world in terms of natural laws and to establish a basis for a rational and democratic society. This new rhetoric was used to challenge the authority of the Church and to promote the idea of progress. It was also used to argue for the need for political change and to justify the overthrow of the old order.

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with the prospect of seemingly endless ethnic, class, and religious conflict, intellectuals sought to establish some neutral cultural ground upon which adherents of rival religious world views could meet and reach agreement. Following the lead of Descartes and Galileo, they sought to clear this neutral ground through appeals to new conceptions of reason and knowledge. Central to these new conceptions of reason and knowledge was a conception of a cognitive method, the method that much later became popularly known as the “scientific method” powerful enough to guarantee the culture-neutrality or “objectivity” of the beliefs generated by its use. The universalism and essentialism characteristic of the doctrinal claims of modernist liberalism were grounded in these universalist conceptions of reason and knowledge originating in the conflict-ridden world of seventeenth-century Europe. Liberal political philosophy from its beginnings expressed itself in the language of the Enlightenment. Its conceptions of the norms of civic life were presented as a body of propositions about Man and History, a set of cognitive claims about the nature of things as they exist in themselves, beyond the realm of conflicting cultural worldviews.

It is our growing scepticism about this universalistic and essentialist standpoint of Enlightenment culture that accounts for the erosion of the credibility of modernist liberal interpretations of the norms of civic life. This scepticism has several sources. First, the universalism and essentialism of the Enlightenment all too often has served as a cultural license for Western imperialism. Modern European claims to the possession of a privileged cognitive standpoint and therefore a privileged insight into universally valid

metaphysical truths invited and legitimized disparagement of non-Western cultures, a
disparagement entirely consistent with military conquest and economic exploitation.120

Second, the very notion that universally valid knowledge can be arrived at by the
mere application of a single cognitive method now seems a vast oversimplification.
Needless to say, research enterprises are more important than ever. But their organization
is now viewed by most as far more sociologically complex, their procedures and rhetoric
as far more intellectually diverse, than Enlightenment conceptions of truth and
knowledge could ever fully grasp.121

Third, worldwide intercultural communication has become so routine and so
economically important that any form of culture claiming a metaphysically privileged
status for one particular model of political organization now seems hopelessly parochial
and even an obstacle to international cooperation. Modernist liberal doctrine was based
upon ideas that gave such privileged ontological status to liberal political institutions.122

120. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxii-xxiv; reminds us that “science has
always been in conflict with narratives.” If we have to judge this by the yardstick of science, “the
majority of them prove to be fables.” This is seen in the extent to which science does not restrict
itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth. From what science does we may borrow a
practice that may oblige us to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then points us to produce a
discourse of legitimation with respect to its own status. This will be a philosophical discourse of
its own kind for our circumstances. With Jean-François Lyotard, the hero of knowledge works
towards “a good ethico-political end” in this “Enlightenment narrative.” This is a good pointer to
the cultural functions of knowledge that we have to look at today.

121. See G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); further
reference is made to Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern
University Press, 1974); a more precise treatment is given by Hans George Gadamer, in his Truth
and Method, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974). There is need to go further with reflections on the
narrative function and legitimation of knowledge.

122. See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday,
1959); also H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Peter Cole and Jeremy Morgan, (eds.),
Fourth, in America during the last 100 years, programmes of civic and technical education based upon Enlightenment conceptions of scientific objectivity and modernist liberal doctrine have been implemented extensively. However, today it is apparent to many that these programmes are failing not only as civic education, meaning, failing to produce citizens in the full cultural sense, but also as forms of technical education. This pushes us further on our exploration to also see the type of curriculum of differentiation in place as we work towards an all inclusive mind developed for a pluralistic society. In the words of Dewey,

a ‘disciplined intelligence’: to cultivate a habit of suspended judgement, of scepticism, of desire and evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment; discussion rather than bias; inquiry rather than conventional idealization.

Thus, the modernist liberal political ideas crucial for the effectiveness of modernist liberal civic culture have lost their plausibility and, I would say, are rapidly losing their very intelligibility. This fact is gaining recognition in many of the institutional spheres of our society that have been most influenced by modernist liberal thought and by Enlightenment culture, the universities in particular. The demise of forms of civic culture dependent on modernist liberal political philosophy, however, does not diminish our need for effective forms of civic culture and civic education. The proper functioning of free institutions requires citizens who have actually developed the normative attitudes, dispositions, and values proper to the standpoint of citizenship. To produce and reproduce

such citizens, we must have the cultural means of representing the liberal democratic norms of freedom and equality in a coherent and persuasive way.\textsuperscript{126} Rawls gives us a Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. This is at the centre stage of his Political Liberalism and is closely related with the norm of respect for citizens as free and equal. In his own words, Rawls wrote:

\begin{quote}
Our exercise of political powers is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution; the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

The liberal principle of legitimacy has direct implications for our desire for cultural functions of knowledge emerging through education and enabling in the reconstruction of civic culture. This may also borrow from Rawls's duty of civility. He demonstrates it thus:

\begin{quote}
And since the exercise of political power must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral not legal, duty – the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.... [All citizens] should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

In line with Rawls's account, the liberal principle of legitimacy entails a duty of civility and the duty of civility obliges a citizen to explain to fellow citizens just how one's favoured political policies enjoy public justification. It is clear then that Rawls understands the duty of civility to oblige a citizen to refrain from supporting political

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{126} See John Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, 218.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 137.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 217-218.
\end{footnotes}
policies for which one cannot provide requisite public justification. For when a citizen
who attempts to articulate a public justification for a favoured coercive law finds oneself
at a “standoff,” then one ought no to have resource to non-public grounds. 129

Accordingly, the question of whether liberal democracy, as a form of political
association, can survive the collapse of Enlightenment culture is the question of whether
we can succeed in inventing a new, postmodern form of civic culture, one that can render
intelligible the norms of civic life in a way that no longer requires claiming for those
norms universal and objective cognitive and moral validity. 130

Responsibility is a big question for educators. Recourse is made in this
discussion to Richard Stanley Peters’ concept of “Responsibility.” 131 From it we see
Peters’ contribution to philosophy of education. This contribution influences philosophy
to take on a different turn. In this writing there is a strong interest in philosophical and
social psychology. Slowly but surely, we are led to a well-focused ethical theory. This
theory will be looked at as we move on. In so doing we are left with a bearing on what
education has to involve of an individual. We find that within education there is an
inclination toward moral life and moral education. Basic to Peters’ account there is a
notion of reasoned out and critical understanding of morality. We live in a world that is
characterized by social change and economic expansion. The whole exercise calls for a
practical life experience.

It is not surprising that the concept of responsibility is both disturbing and
challenging. Responsibility like other concepts, for example, mind, authority, education

129. Ibid, lv; also of importance are pages 204ff.
130. Ibid, 218.
131. See R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, 71-79.
and many others has a social dimension. For a human being to be responsible, it calls upon relating with people. It becomes disturbing and even challenging because we find ourselves in situations that make us compromise who we really are and even that that matters to us. This leads us into an artificial polarization, a caricature of the alternatives, open to us in our actions and behaviour. There is first and foremost the intellectual challenge that we find ourselves confronted with as we try to make up our minds on complex issues that have no clear cut answers. There is also the challenge of trying out alternatives to get to which one works out best for our purposes. Philosophy students on their part have their own share of these disturbing and challenging tasks. They are taken with a reflective concern. This concern is for an analysis of concepts and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities.  

From what is said above let us turn to R. S. Peters,' Authority, Responsibility and Education. In admitting that the contribution Peters has made to philosophy of education is great and needs commendation from all, we are called upon to take education seriously. Precisely, it is this appeal it makes, on one, that is interesting and needs consideration. Along with this appeal, his works leave no room for indifference. It is similarly encouraging and motivating to continue reading and studying his works, especially on education.

Plunging into the question of "Responsibility" is much more captivating in its approach than content. We are to make reference to the achievements found in

133. See R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education: The pages that are of concern for this section are 71-79.
134. What Peters says in this section of the book is an illustration of what the concept of responsibility is held to be as to its descriptive, prescriptive, and ascriptive aspects.
Freudian psychology and Marxist philosophy.\textsuperscript{135} as we follow the educationist, Peters. In doing this we have to take caution. For in a way there is likelihood of being easily misunderstood as to what we are up to. Of course, as rational and intelligent people and involving our emotions, we are not out for any mischief.

4.3.8. Cultural Functions of Knowledge point to Responsibility\textsuperscript{136} and the Human Person

In this project we are to continually remind ourselves that our concern is of the cultural functions of knowledge that emerge from our institutions of learning and call to question value-oriented school education. This calls upon us to take on a certain amount of responsibility.\textsuperscript{137} This gives a strong inclination to philosophical psychology, by which we may be motivated. This is basically for our understanding of the nature of emotions, character, habit and the relationship between reason and passion.\textsuperscript{138} Underlying this phenomenon, as one may easily allude, is the effort of working out of a concept of person as a rational, emotional and autonomous being.\textsuperscript{139} It is on this ground that this engagement provides us with an interest in social philosophy. This has to bring about a thorough understanding of education that leads to a well-founded freedom and democracy.\textsuperscript{140} The work of Peters is on Freud, Marx and Responsibility.\textsuperscript{141} To set us on

\textsuperscript{135}For further treatment of the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy of education see \textit{Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, vol. 5 & 6: 245ff. On these pages we have foundations of moral education, the dynamics of learning, behaviourism, programmed instruction and moral issues and the education of personal feelings.

\textsuperscript{136}See \textit{Ignatian Pedagogy}, 19.

\textsuperscript{137}R. S. Peters, \textit{Authority, Responsibility and Education}, 71-79.

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid, 93-94. Also in \textit{The Logic of Education}, 39, 51. This can be also looked at as emotional development, 49-52. We also have emotional responses that people make in certain situations, 96, 102, 104.

\textsuperscript{139}We are here turning away from Kant’s and Descartes’ understanding of the human person as only rational.

\textsuperscript{140}\textit{Authority, Responsibility and Education}, 73, 100, 114. In \textit{The Logic of Education}, 82,114,117-22. Here we find treated elements of democracy for education and education for democracy.
the move we are here looking at what responsibility is all about building on Peters’ notion and in enhancing freedom and equality.

Contemporary Malaise\(^{142}\) is the first of the three sections in Peter’s work. In this first section Peters deals with how people “are moved not by what is the case but by what they think is the case.”\(^{143}\) This stems from the “half-truths” that people submit to through the process of “percolation ... distortion and exaggeration”\(^{144}\) of what the case is. It is no surprise that in “this manner race and class tensions spread.”\(^{145}\) It is the half-truths that become truth that end up being the order of the day. From them individuals become suspicious of others and it may end up in big events and clashes like ethnic cleansing or civil protests. On this distorted worldview we may have “Social beliefs father/mother”\(^{146}\)

141. *Authority, Responsibility and Education*, 57. There is need to critically look at what is happening in our education system and what is there in our public life. We have problems, some of them, are of the egalitarian type. How do we view the relationships we have with knowledge, authority and what is implication have they on each other? The problems that affect us in public life are they part and parcel of our education process or not? Our education is to be oriented to deal directly with the issues of power and relationships on a personal as well as public level. These issues, my transform as well as enhance one’s participation in the learning process and civic life. The engagement may be rather tangential, although it remains faithful to what the curriculum at school may have. What is at hand is to have all citizens engage rightfully and responsibly to being literate and above all being educated. The challenges of life and of education should permeate ones view of authority, responsibility, and education. Rousseau shares similar sentiments in his “education.” Having diagnosed the malady of modern civilization, Rousseau was faced with the task of suggesting a cure, and this led him into the domain of education and politics, activities that are, or should be, rooted in every human’s moral nature. For him, the educator must realize that “vice or error, alien to human constitution, are introduced into it from outside. He stressed the importance of progressive education. Hence, a “truly positive education begins only when one becomes aware of the relationships with other people. It is clear from his last book *Emile* that every human person “must be educated for society, though not necessarily for society in its present form.”

142. Ibid, 59.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145: Ibid. The case of the walls of division may suffice at this point to note that many of the things that keep us humans from each other are not that important. They are things we have learned and we are not ready to relearn them for our own good. Racial, gender, ethnic, issues and the question of superiority and its inverse inferiority are propagated by some and seen to be right by many, yet this is wrong.
146. The Italics here are meant to emphasize how social beliefs lead to social realities. We may do well here to have recourse to Tsenay Serequeberhan, in his *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 13. In spelling out the role of philosophical
social realities." Looked at critically, the underlying "feature" may be found to be, "a denial of responsibility coupled with a story about the causes of actions and standards." As a consequence, given our social nature, the beliefs we have may foster reality. This is in fact a "poor ground for this sort of belief and a number of other things." According to Peters, "these are unusual cases" because people, as he continues to say:

seldom act in ignorance or in their own sleep; not all impulses are irresistible. There is a presumption of reason in favour of people being usually responsible for their actions. The fact that we single out such odd cases for special consideration, suggests that we believe that in general people can help doing what they do.

Given this understanding we can concern ourselves with a form of public reasoning similar to other forms of reasoning in our concern for human behaviour. We see here what is done and is to be done with the past and the future by means of generalizations and rules. These generalizations in conjunction with particular circumstances constitute reasons for acting and how the moral life is conducted both personally and socially in these terms. When looked at, in the way mentioned above, reason cannot be some natural phenomena that befall an individual. In all its forms, reason, is a developing public tradition constructed and maintained in appropriate language and institutional forms.

The individual comes to reason by being initiated into this tradition, sharing in its discourse and patterns of thought, engaging in it as a self-critical enterprise with its own standards of achievement. Given that we like to have causes for our actions. Peters sees

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reflection, Serequeberhan points out the felt and lived situation for postcolonial Africa. Here we find a treatment of the Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Trust in African Philosophy.

147. Authority, Responsibility and Education, 60 and The Logic of Education, 45-51.
148. Authority, Responsibility and Education, 60.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid, 61. See also Ethics and Education, 49-51.
151. See Authority, Responsibility and Education, 61.

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this as a reason to have our responsibility "increase rather than decrease."¹⁵² In contrast to this Peters adds:

But if a person believes – as those suffering from this contemporary malaise appear to do – then all actions have causes and that once we can point to a cause for our acts we can use it as an excuse for our behaviour, this has two unfortunate effects; one logical the other practical.¹⁵³

In explaining the logical effect, for Peters, concepts such as 'could not help' could never have an application. We now talk of a person being responsible for one's own actions. This is so because, there are some occasions when the plea of exonerating circumstances cannot be sustained. The reason being:

It is always possible to unearth some cause for a person's action, then it would be pointless to talk either of 'could help' or of couldn't help' – a distinction which is a vital one for common sense and which arises from our common experience of different types of cases.¹⁵⁴

On the whole, when we talk about contemporary malaise we mean "the product of half-truths and of intellectual confusion"¹⁵⁵ which may have been encouraged by "the doctrines of Freud and Marx."¹⁵⁶ This confusion "shows itself in the denial of responsibility based on half-digested theories about the causes of actions and standards."¹⁵⁷

In this section on Destiny and Determinism¹⁵⁸ Peters gives us an illustration on how we are led to believe that all events including human actions, have causes and that if events have causes, then, they are inevitable. In Peters' own words, "these pictures of destiny and the prison-house derived from Marx and Freud have had a subtle effect on

¹⁵² Ibid, 62.
¹⁵³ Ibid.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 63.
¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 64.
¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 65.
¹⁵⁸ Ibid.
notions of responsibility." There may be "good evidence to suppose that the causes are connected with unalterable traits." But this is not reason enough not to look back with "a discriminating empirical eye" and even forward to "replace useless indignation by a more practical frame of mind." This may give a means of intervention to take on more responsibility for our own lives and not to escape in pretext of childhood reminiscences. How do we come to this "get-out?"

Peters has answered this question in the last section on responsibility. The section is entitled "Causes and Morality," is a discussion on "the relevance of the theories of Freud and Marx to morality." This is put forth in this way because there was a "very wide spread view at Peters' time that we are not responsible in our dealings with each other for the standards, which we observe - or fail to observe." Freud and Marx, it is argued, have shown that these are the product either of our "social class or of our childhood conditioning." Further on in this discussion, we discover that:

None of us altogether lose our childhood attitude to rules. But if by moral standards we mean those that we adopt because we see the point of them rather than merely as a result of our upbringing or class, it should follow that the causal theories of Marx and Freud do not in any way undermine our responsibility of them. After all, if a belief has good grounds to support it, there is little point in speculating about the causes.

The point in all this is the fact "that the mere production of causes by itself never establishes that a person is not responsible for one's own actions. So also, it is obvious

159. Ibid, 67.
160. Ibid, 69.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid, 70.
163. Ibid, 71.
164. Ibid. The italics are my own for emphasis.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid, 72.
that, the mere production of causes is never sufficient in itself to cast aspersions on a belief.” 168

4.3.9. Cultural Functions of Knowledge Reveal Humans are Free and Responsible Beings
This is a phrase, in education, for this case, that needs to be understood as implying a lived reality. Stemming from an experience within which there is an implied decision and choice. As this happens we have the demands of the law on the one hand. Whereas, on the other hand, we have the relationship between the choosing and the law in the process of having things worked out. Here, we have to also see how the judge and the philosopher (of education, for our case) consider the same issue. A judge or a school head-teacher has a range of penalties from which to select the appropriate one. From our practical understanding of responsibility, we then see how it is in deciding and choosing that we are held responsible. 169 It is from experience that we have this phenomenon clearly come out. We have implied in it what we may call mitigating circumstances or excuses produced that may lead toward leniency or strictness. What one may ask is the rationale that goes with this type of judgment. From another angle, it may not be so but it sounds very much like, we are talking of two very important factors that are considered along with the question of responsibility. The two are the elimination of responsibility and the justification of the retaining of responsibility. 170 The important thing to put forth is “We are responsible for our acts.”

168. Ibid, 75. There is found here the fallacy of causation and authority.
As seen above, basic to this account, learning and the need for educational integration, is the notion of rational and emotional consideration of morality and the law. From the point of view of morality and the law, in an implicit and general way, we may proceed in analyzing responsibility as a concept that is descriptive, prescriptive, and ascriptive. As to the psychological and philosophical worldviews we share there is an obvious emergence of a clash between codes of living and competing views as a result of social change and economic expansion. Along with the just mentioned factors we have principles of truth-telling, freedom, fairness and consideration of interests that do emerge as a result of finding what responsibility really is and how it is to be incorporated into the education of a person.

4.3.10. Responsibility and Social Demands affected by Cultural Functions of Knowledge

In our philosophical analysis we have an appeal to practical life situations. By closely examining Peter’s views on authority, responsibility and education it easily results into a critical look upon the basic rules about such matters as property, contracts, and the care

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171. Weakland, 294f.
172. Ethics treats of these factors when looking at multinationals corporations and developing countries. We have also the problem of tourism, aid and funding for development. There are duties that we humans have towards others especially the less fortunate in society. This is a responsibility that we are obliged as members of society to see to it that justice extends to all and at the appropriate time. As Peter Singer has it in his “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, (1972), 229-243; that affluent people in the developed world are morally obliged to transfer large amounts of resources to poor people of the developing world.

173. See Ignatian Pedagogy, 80. There is a general need of deconstruction of the traditional notions of education and highlighting contingencies of cross-cultural understanding around education. In our knowledge systems in general we are to shift our perspectives from the deficiencies to accomplishments. We should also be in a position to see more the abilities of the learners and how to bring out results that relate directly to issues of daily life experiences. See also. W. Cobern and C. Loving, “Defining ‘Science’ in a Multicultural World: Implications for Science Education,” Science Education, 85 (1), (2001), 50-67; also G. Snively and J. Corsiglia, “Discovering Indigenous Science: Implications for Science Education,” Science Education, 85 (1), (2001), 6-43; and also W. B. Stanley and N. W. Brickhouse, “Teaching Sciences. The Multicultural Question Revisited.” Science Education, 85 (1), (2001), 35-49. Philosophers are generally turning attention to particular issues of practical concern like justice and the accounts that would best facilitate theorizing about these issues.
of the young, without which social life would be impossible and about which fair degree of consensus is achievable. So also is the loss of values noticeable. There is no doubt that beyond what Peters says there is room for vast disagreement and alternative patterns of life. Of course, what we have here does not rule out the fact that the fabric of the society is unstable and needs consideration. Stability and consensus are a necessary condition at the basic level of society as they are compatible with change and experimentation at other levels. Given that no person is an island, and that we never act in a vacuum, there is no secure place in social and personal life without responsibility. We need principles to be always transposed into concrete life situations. Even with the given principles we do rule out certain courses of action and sensitization of our actions to the normally relevant features that occur in our daily life situations.

Thoughtfully fathomed, responsibility is rooted in no other sphere than that form of public reasoning.\textsuperscript{174} Responsibility is similar in many ways to other forms of reasoning, even though distinct, in its concern for human behaviour. Responsibility in all its forms is a developing public tradition constructed and maintained in appropriate language\textsuperscript{175} and institutional forms. The individual comes to be responsible by being initiated into this tradition. As it is a social phenomenon, the individual shares in its discourse and patterns of thought and engages in it as a self-critical enterprise. In continued use of reason the individual gets to a level of concern for proper representation of truth, becomes consistent, desires sincerity and all that has to do with leading an

\textsuperscript{174} For details see R. S. Peters, \textit{Ethics and Education}, 49-51. Public reasoning is here a relationship of bringing forth the worthwhile. In it we are able to come to what we really have to concern ourselves with for the sake of our life together in a society.

\textsuperscript{175} As used here language is to refer to whatever means that occur among as humans in relationships that involve us.
upright moral life. This points out for us that we are not responsible not until we relate with others.

The relationships we have with others when positive they build values for all in society. The picture we have here, on responsibility, calls for a further understanding of the moral life. This is the reason in education:

We are being asked to serve a wider range of human values and to accept an obligation on members of the public with whom we have no commercial transactions.176

This is filled out with the ideal of personal autonomy. For in being responsible one is in fact a chooser among values. One can entertain different goals, weigh alternatives in the light of evidence, and decide what to do and translate that into action. Thus become moral in getting on to that which is good and allows for happiness.

4.3.11. The Misrepresentation of Cultural Functions of Knowledge in Social Contract Theories

Modernist liberal political theory’s use of social contract narratives to define a concept of civic justice falsely represented the normative standpoint of liberal democratic citizenship as possessing a historical or anthropological priority to other cultural standpoints, a misrepresentation that must be overcome if the post-modern reconstruction of civic culture is to succeed. Here we are faced with the dilemma of how the anthropological essentialism of modernist social contract theories poses problems for the post-modern reconstruction of civic culture.177


177. See for example, D. J. de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Here we find an emphasis on the split between a small number of highly
A civic culture must perform effectively two related tasks: (i) it must provide cultural resources capable of rendering intelligible to citizens the standpoint proper to liberal democratic citizenship, and (ii) it must render this standpoint intelligible in such a way as to generate in citizens the motivation to develop the moral capacities required for citizenship. Specifically modernist civic culture is defined by its use of Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge to carry out both of these functions.

In this way, modernist civic culture made the intelligibility and motivational power of civic moral ideals dependent on the credibility of notions derived from foundationalist epistemology, what I have called the rhetoric of pure theory. We have now entered a period in which Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge are rapidly losing their credibility. Because modernist civic culture made the intelligibility and motivational power of civic moral ideals dependent to some extent on ideas that are losing their credibility, the effectiveness of modernist civic culture is bound to diminish. The postmodern period of Western culture will therefore, in all likelihood, be defined by a growing failure of the intelligibility and motivational power of civic moral ideals. \(^{178}\)

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productive researchers (evaluated in terms of publications) and a large mass with low productivity. The number of the latter grows as the square of the former, so that the number of high productivity researchers only increases every twenty years. Price concludes that science considered as a social entity is "undemocratic," 59; and that "the eminent scientist" is a hundred years ahead of "the minimal one," 56. Also see Barton et al., *Teaching Science in Diverse Settings: Marginalized Discourse and Classroom Practice*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 136. These authors show us how science can be used as a tool for generating personal change and that of the community as well. Understanding science as a political activity is not devoid of content for they say: "The implications of such a stance are that science (and nay education in science) will only be equitable and empowering if students learn, in addition to the standard knowledge base of ideas and skills, to unlock those assumptions, to draw strength from their exposure, and to expand understandings of agreed-upon boundaries for where and how scientific ideas are generated."

178. See Pierre Simon Laplace, *The System of the World*, (Dublin: Dublin University Press, 1830); also N. T. Giovanni, *A Universal History of Infamy*, (New York: Dutton 1972). The advent of quantum mechanics and atomic physics has limited the range of applicability of the principle of Laplace who knew "that all variables determining the state of the universe at a moment \(t\), and can thus
In discussing the problems of intelligibility and motivation we inherit from modernist liberalism, it is important to keep in view the rhetorical task specific to any liberal democratic civic culture. A civic culture is composed of discourses, narratives, and representations of various sorts invented by and addressed to citizens for the purpose of rendering intelligible and motivating attainment of the normative standpoint of citizenship. A civic culture is necessarily a countervailing and secondary form of culture. Liberal democracy as a form of political association assumes and even requires that citizens adhere to one or more particularistic conceptions of the good life. Liberal democracy assumes that citizens are first and will always remain members of particular ethnic, class, and religious communities. It assumes that the identities of citizens are first defined and will continue to be shaped by the totalizing world views and value systems associated with those primary communities.\(^{179}\)

On the other hand, in order for liberal democratic political institutions to function properly,\(^{180}\) citizens, as members of particular ethnic, class, and religious communities, must also internalize the values proper to the encompassing civic community. A liberal democracy is an association of free and equal individuals. In order to qualify as citizens in the full cultural sense, the members of particularistic cultural communities must develop the capacity to view themselves and others as free and equal individuals and to predict its state at \(t^*\). This principle was affected drastically. Given the consequences that emerge from it, the principle requires a complete definition of the initial state of a system (or all the independent variables) would require the expenditure of energy at least equivalent to that consumed by the system defined.

\(^{179}\) Barton et al., *Teaching Science in Diverse Settings: Marginalized Discourses and Classroom Practice*, 154. They tell us how the views of the youth correlate with those put forth by reform-based literature in science education. "The youth make a case for including as many people as possible for authenticity in their science work for responsibility both to the science at hand and to the members of the community."

\(^{180}\) Ibid, 136.
act accordingly, even as they maintain their primary adherence to the beliefs and practices of the particularistic cultural communities to which they belong.  

Attainment of this capacity is the central cultural and moral task that citizenship imposes on all members of the "liberal democratic political community." It is a cultural and moral task of great complexity. It requires citizens to develop and cultivate identities that involve standpoints intrinsically opposed to one another and that must be distinguished as clearly as possible. Every citizen must develop and cultivate not only an identity shaped by the values or ranking systems of some particularistic cultural community, but also the identity of a free and equal individual, this is, an identity defined by a certain kind of independence of any particularistic set of values. Let us call the first type of identity a communitarian identity and the second a civic identity.

To complicate matters further, citizens who have achieved the identity of a free and equal individual exercise that identity primarily through participation in activities related to the public sphere of their particular civic community. The public sphere of any particular liberal democracy is roughly defined by those types of interests, interactions, activities, and discourses in which the norms, the standards of excellence, the virtue concepts, the obligations, proper to citizenship apply. This sphere is never defined once and for all. Rather, its parameters are always a matter of dispute and

181. Ibid, 154. The ideas discussed in this text could inspire investigations in science education that would encourage more hopeful vision of school science, one that is more responsive to student’s needs, and more effective in promoting a richer understanding of the world as much as for their own communities.  
182. Ibid.  
183. Ibid.  
184. Ibid.
consensus, growing and shrinking as social, cultural, and economic conditions change.\footnote{185}

Definition of its exact boundaries at any given time is in fact one of the most fundamental issues that citizens enter the public sphere in order to decide.

In the process of participating in the political processes that define the boundaries of the public sphere, citizens must be able to call into play both their civic identities and their communitarian identities.\footnote{186} As bearers of a civic identity, they must be concerned to uphold the norms of civic justice wherever they apply. As bearers of a communitarian identity, they must be concerned to defend particularistic cultural beliefs, values, and practices against possible intrusive action by the liberal democratic state on behalf of some transitory electoral majority.\footnote{187} With Jacques Ellul

We must try to create positions in which we reject and struggle with the state, not in order to modify some element of the regime or force it to make some decision, but, much more fundamentally, in order to permit the emergence of social, political, intellectual, or artistic bodies, associations, interest groups or economic ... groups totally independent of the state, yet capable of opposing it, able to reject its pressures as well as its controls and even its gifts. These organizations must be completely independent, not only materially but also intellectually and morally, i.e., able to deny that the nation is the supreme value and that the state is the incarnation of the nation.\footnote{188}
Thus, to develop a capacity for liberal democratic citizenship is to develop a capacity for maintaining, cultivating, distinguishing, and exercising as appropriate both civic and communitarian identities. Citizenship requires persons to strike some kind of precarious balance between these two opposing standpoints.\(^{189}\) The rhetorical task of any liberal democratic civic culture is to provide resources that can be used to persuade citizens that this precarious cultural balancing act is not only possible, not only desirable, but even obligatory. To the extent that any particular historical form of civic culture effectively carries out this rhetorical task, a viable liberal democratic public sphere or civil society is established and liberal democratic political institutions can function as intended. Modernist liberal political theory, as a component of modernist civic culture, generated discourses that provided a characteristic set of resources and strategies for carrying out this rhetorical task.\(^{190}\) It provided a very specific interpretation of the relationship between civic and communitarian identities.

4.3.12. Cultural Functions of Knowledge View Communitarian Identities and Moral Ideals as Objects of Choice

Modernist liberal civic moral ideals, assigned the task proper to any civic moral ideal, naturally possessed a character very different from communitarian moral ideals. Civic moral ideals serve in the cultural production of free and equal individuality. Accordingly, both the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy were silent on the question of what sort of happiness to pursue or what the nature of the good life ultimately


is. Both mandated only that happiness be pursued in a certain way, namely, as a pursuit whose object was freely chosen by the individual.

However, communitarian moral ideals, identities, and conceptions of the good life are ordinarily not first perceived as objects of choice. Ordinarily, they are understood as ways of being rather than as matters of choice. The communitarian identity of a person is simply who he or she is. A communitarian world view is understood to describe simply the world as such. The moral language associated with a particular communitarian moral ideal is identified simply with the language as such that is spoken by the community.

Full cultural citizenship, on the other hand, requires the introduction of difference in all these spheres. It requires persons to develop the capacity to make a distinction between communitarian and civic identities, between their particularistic cultural world view and the world as such, between the primary moral language that they speak and the language that they share with citizens who speak different primary moral languages. But the capacity to perceive and apply these distinctions does not amount to the adoption of a new conception of the good or of a new comprehensive world view.

Accordingly, neither the civic ethics of authenticity nor the civic ethics of autonomy mandated acceptance of a specific conception of the good. What they did mandate was the development of a capacity to speak a primary moral language from a standpoint external to every primary moral language, the standpoint of the free individual, the standpoint of a speaker capable of viewing every primary moral language as if it were a freely chosen second language.

191.Ibid.
4.3.13. Authenticity, Autonomy and the Priority of the Right over the Good\textsuperscript{192} within the Cultural Functions of Knowledge

This general feature of all civic moral ideals accounts in part for the peculiarly abstract and reflective character of the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy. The civic ethics of authenticity required of its followers not the choice of a specific conception of the good, but rather a choice of a conception of the good that conformed to their own intrinsic individual natures or selves. This promoted, of course, a belief in the existence of such a thing as an intrinsic individual nature or self and encouraged the pursuit of its discovery.

In the same way, the civic ethics of autonomy required of its followers not the choice of a specific conception of the good, but rather a choice of a conception of the good whose pursuit could be rendered consistent with the principles or rules inherent in pure theoretical and practical reason. This promoted, of course, a belief in the existence of such universal human faculties and encouraged attempts to discover their principles.

At this point, we begin to bring into view what made the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy distinctive and distinctively modernist as civic moral ideals. What made these moral ideals distinctively modernist was the interpretation of the normative standpoint of citizenship that they drew from modernist liberal political theory.

\textsuperscript{192}Kant as explained by Rawls has a four-fold conception of "moral constructivism." This conception treats of a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy has a regulative for all of life. The second meaning of autonomy depends on how it represents political values as ordered. The third meaning says that justice as fairness uses as basic organizing ideas certain fundamental ideas that are political. Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common. Here we have a shared public political culture. See Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, 99ff.
Modernist liberal political theory attributed to the normative standpoint of citizenship an anthropological and a metaphysical priority.

Lockean (or social contractarian) versions of modernist liberalism viewed the standpoint of free and equal individuality as the standpoint proper to the natural condition, meaning, the condition of all human beings prior to political association and, in some versions, prior to any form of association at all. Kantian versions of modernist liberalism viewed the standpoint of free and equal individuality as the standpoint proper to the autonomous faculty of human reason, in other words, the standpoint governed only by the universally binding laws of pure theoretical and practical reason. In both cases, the relationship between civic identity and communitarian identity was defined as a relationship between the humanly essential and the accidental.

This way of attributing anthropological and metaphysical priority to the normative standpoint of citizenship governed formulations of modernist liberal political theory’s most general and distinctively modernist moral doctrine, the doctrine of the priority of the right over the good. In different ways, both the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy embodied this doctrine.

The doctrine of the priority of the right over the good states that the free pursuit of happiness must be subject to limits as defined by law that is applicable equally to all individuals as individuals. This doctrine is designed to rule out morally any political and legal order in which moral rightness, which means, an action’s conformity to law, is defined by the conformity of action with some particularistic conception of the good.
Every particularistic cultural community is governed by a set of rules to which all members are subject. These rules, usually informal and unspoken, coordinate and direct the action of community members in their common pursuit of a particularistic conception of the good. These rules derive from and express the totalizing world view and life ideal that all community members share. In a mono-cultural political community, this in other words is to say, in a community that is culturally homogeneous, there is usually no distinction between the legal order and the moral order grounded in particularistic cultural values and rules. In such a mono-cultural political and legal order, moral rightness, as the conformity of action to law, is determined by the conformity of action to a particularistic conception of the good and a particularistic cultural world view. Think, for example, of traditional Islamic law or of any other regime in which the legal order rests upon a foundation of particularistic religious belief.

The doctrine of the priority of the right over the good establishes and requires a distinction between moral rightness and the conformity of action to a particularistic conception of the good. Liberal democracy assumes cultural heterogeneity. A civic community is generally a multicultural rather than a mono-cultural community. For this reason, a liberal democratic political and legal order must apply a criterion of moral rightness distinct from criteria derived from or dependent upon any of the particularistic world views adhered to by the cultural communities that comprise it.

The doctrine of the priority of the right over the good, then, affirms the priority of this criterion of moral rightness over all criteria derived from communitarian moral ideals and world views. But because the liberal democratic criterion of moral rightness is not
derived from or based upon communitarian moral ideals, every liberal democracy must offer some account of precisely how the specifically liberal criterion of moral rightness is to be explained and justified. Modernist liberal formulations of this doctrine linked the criterion of moral rightness to philosophical theories that attributed an anthropological and metaphysical priority to the normative standpoint of citizenship.

Modernist liberal political theory thus claimed to derive the liberal democratic criterion of moral rightness from the nature of things. It identified the civic standpoint of free and equal individuality as the universal and essential standpoint of all human beings, whether that standpoint be defined in Lockean terms as the standpoint proper to the natural condition or in Kantian terms as the standpoint proper to the faculty of autonomous reason. For modernist liberalism, then, the liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good was to be read as a doctrine affirming nothing more controversial than the philosophically obvious priority of the humanly universal and essential over the humanly arbitrary and accidental.

Metaphysically, the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy offered different versions of this reading of the doctrine. On the one hand, Lockean styles of liberal political theory conceived of the humanly essential, which meant, the natural condition, as a condition of liberty, a condition free of all cultural and legal constraints on individual will. But if the natural condition is a condition of liberty, then, in order to claim derivation from that condition, any legal constraints on the free-standing individual’s will could be imposed only by gaining the individual’s un-coerced consent. For Lockean
styles of liberalism, then, the individual's un-coerced consent became the ground of the principle of right.

The basic content of the liberal criterion of moral rightness was then defined as the basic rules of cooperation that an individual in the natural condition of liberty would freely accept as binding. In accordance with the doctrine of the priority of the right over the good, adherents of the civic ethics of authenticity would then be licensed to pursue the conception of the good consistent with their own intrinsic individual natures (which is, the qualities that would emerge spontaneously in the condition of natural liberty), subject only to the constraints imposed by the rules of association that would be voluntarily adopted by all free-standing individuals pursuing the same formal goal of authentic self-realization.

On the other hand, Kantian styles of liberal political theory conceived of the essential, which is, a faculty of pure reason subject only to its own logical and practical laws, as a condition of pure self-determination, a condition free of all constraints except those dictated by reason itself. But if pure self-determination is the mark of the faculty that constitutes human nature, then, in order to claim the authority of autonomous reason, any legal constraints on the individual's will must be consistent with the principles of pure theoretical and practical reason.

Thus, for Kantian styles of liberalism, conformity with the rules intrinsic to the universally human faculty of autonomous reason becomes the ground of the principle of right. The content of the liberal criterion of moral rightness can be determined by an examination of the principles of pure practical reason. A will that accepts the constraints
imposed by a criterion of moral rightness derived wholly from the principles of pure practical reason actually obeys only itself and thereby remains autonomous.

In accordance with the doctrine of the priority of the right over the good, then, adherents of the civic ethics of autonomy would be licensed to pursue any particularistic conception of the good at all, so long as in their actions they observed the limits imposed by a legal order grounded in the principles of pure practical reason, that is, grounded in the basic rules that the autonomous will gives to itself.

Thus, the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy amounted to two different universalist and essentialist interpretations of the liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good. Both of these civic moral ideals offered powerful rhetorical resources for motivating the development of civic attitudes and virtues, rhetorical resources drawn mainly from their essentialist and universalist philosophical underpinnings. The aim of both of these civic moral ideals was to produce in citizens the capacities proper to full cultural citizenship. Persons who have developed the capacities proper to citizenship are those who understand and act in accordance with the liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good. In their judgments and actions, such persons apply the liberal criterion of moral rightness and give precedence to it over any competing criterion of moral rightness deriving from particularistic conceptions of the good.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 173ff; the idea of priority of right is an essential element in what John Rawls has called “Political Liberalism.” This is a thought that enhances the view of justice as fairness. The question that Rawls raises and which is also relevant for us is “How can justice as fairness even use ideas of the good without making claims about the truth of this or that comprehensive doctrine in ways incompatible with political or cultural liberalism? This then may
In order to understand let alone apply a liberal conception of moral rightness, however, citizens must first achieve an understanding of themselves as free and equal individuals. If persons who have become citizens in the full cultural sense can be identified by their acceptance and application of the liberal criterion of moral rightness, the condition for their attainment of full cultural citizenship is the attainment of a civic identity, the attainment of a standpoint involving a certain detachment from or externalization of their communitarian identities and moral ideals.

The task of a civic moral ideal is to provide rhetorical resources powerful enough to persuade citizens that this detachment from and externalization of their primary moral identity and moral language is a goal worth pursuing. The essentialism and universalism of modernist liberal political theory provided the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy with two powerful and simple themes that could be exploited in this persuasive effort.

Unfortunately, these themes could be exploited effectively for persuasive purposes only by drawing a contrast between civic and communitarian moral ideals that at least implicitly tended to depreciate and disparage particularistic cultural beliefs and practices. Given the anthropological and metaphysical priority attributed to the normative standpoint of citizenship by modernist liberal political theory, modernist civic moral

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extend on to the conceptions of the good and political (cultural) virtues. The case of Herbert Wechsler may help here. This is in reference to his well known discussion of principled judicial decisions. The concern for him was mainly of the decisions of the supreme court. He thought of neutral principle as those general principles that we are persuaded to apply not only to the present case but to all reasonably foreseeable related cases likely to arise given the constitution and the existing political cultural structure. Neutral principles and justice transcend the case at hand and must be defensible as widely applicable. Wechsler says little about the derivation of such principles from the constitution itself or from precedent. See “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” in Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press, 1961).
ideals could claim that the ideals of authentic and autonomous individuality were written into human nature itself.

To be an authentic individual meant to choose a way of life or conception of the good that conformed to the essential properties of one's own real self, meaning, those properties that would presumably have emerged spontaneously in the natural condition of liberty, a condition free of all arbitrary cultural and political constraints. To be an autonomous individual meant to choose a way of life or conception of the good that conformed to the universal principles of pure practical reason and therefore to take one's direction and bearings not from prince, Pope, habit, or appetite, but rather from laws deriving from principles inherent in one's innermost metaphysically real self.

Further, to the extent that a person had become either authentic or autonomous in these senses, they could claim also to pursue a way of life essentially unstained by all cultural particularism or ethnocentricity, a way of life not only accessible in principle to all human beings equally, regardless of the accidents of ethnicity, class, and religion, but also expressing most purely the universal nature of humanity as such.

This essentialist and universalist conception of the ideals of authenticity and autonomy provided ample and powerful means of persuasion to modernist civic culture. These modernist civic moral ideals represented free and equal individuality not as a cultural requirement for full membership in a particular contingent and very unusual sort of political community, but rather as a standpoint conforming both to human nature as such and to the individual nature of each human being, a perfect wedding of the universal and the particular.
Thus, in becoming an authentic or an autonomous individual, a person could claim not only to have fully realized his or her innermost metaphysically real self, but also to have thereby achieved identification with all human beings everywhere. On the other hand, the civic ideals of authentic and autonomous individuality painted a rather grim picture of those who failed to realize these ideals. If authentic individuals are those who have discovered and realized their own true selves, then inauthentic individuals are those who have been shaped passively by the social and cultural environment, those who have mistaken as their real selves the internalized descriptions applied to them by others. If autonomous individuals are those who are governed by rules issuing ultimately from their own intrinsic rational nature, then heteronomous individuals are those who are governed by rules imposed by external and arbitrary authority, those who are in effect metaphysically enslaved by accidental cultural and political arrangements. There is little doubt that citizens who were exposed to and who took seriously moral discourses employing these modernist distinctions between authentic and inauthentic, autonomous and heteronomous individuality had little trouble in telling which of the presented alternatives it was most desirable to be.194

Thus, the modernist civic moral ideals of authenticity and autonomy offered abundant rhetorical resources for motivating citizens to achieve full cultural citizenship. But they carried disadvantages and dangers as well. Both the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy were subject to self-destructive dialectics or confusing paradoxes rooted in their essentialist and universalist claims.

For example, in their claims to universality, both of these civic moral ideals made ethnocentrism or cultural particularism a *bête noire*. Yet nothing could be more ethnocentric than Western claims to cultural universalism. Persons motivated to attain authentic or autonomous individuality because they were attracted by the universality of this ideal were thus defeated at the very moment when they achieved their goal.

Again, in their claims to embody only the essential, both of these civic moral ideals impugned the culturally arbitrary and circumstantial. Yet the ideals of authentic and autonomous individuality were purely formal. They mandated only a way to be and not specifically what to be. In choosing specifically what to be, meant, a specific conception of the good or a specific way of life, a person has only limited options, options that just happen to be available at a particular place and time, that is to say, options that are arbitrary and circumstantial. Persons motivated to attain authentic or autonomous individuality because they were attracted by its claims to embody only the essential were thus defeated at the very moment when they achieved their goal.

These paradoxes reflected more fundamental contradictions and more dangerous implications lurking deep within the universalist and essentialist logic of modernist civic moral ideals, contradictions and implications whose culturally and politically destructive
impact are only now beginning to be widely felt. As we have seen, for the moral ideals of authenticity and autonomy, the paradigm of the authentic and autonomous person is the person who no longer recognizes as final the authority or legitimacy of any culturally particularistic moral ideal, recognizing instead only those claims to moral authority based upon purely universal principles.

Given this understanding of authenticity and autonomy, it follows that the paradigm of the inauthentic and heteronomous person is the person who in fact does recognize, as final and sufficient, claims to moral authority based only upon particularistic cultural beliefs and practices. The problem is that the vast majority of human beings on this planet happily fit this paradigm of in-authenticity and heteronomy. The remainder, however, adherents of the moral ideals of authenticity and autonomy, also fit this paradigm (though unhappily) insofar as the claims to moral authority asserted by those modernist civic moral ideals are also based upon particularistic cultural beliefs and practices, the cultural beliefs and practices of modernist Western liberal democracies.195

Thus, the universalist and essentialist logic of the modernist civic moral ideals of authenticity and autonomy carried within itself the seeds of a blanket condemnation and depreciation of all moral ideals, both communitarian and civic, as inauthentic and heteronomous. The more seriously the universalist and essentialist claims of modernist

195. This comes about because of a "public understanding that is at bottom a mere modus vivendi." This is as Rawls sees it, that is, must be abandoned if by such a community a political society united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. This possibility is excluded by the fact of reasonable pluralism together with the rejection of the oppressive use of the state power to overcome it. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 146.
civic moral ideals were taken, the more suspicion was generated about the cultural particularism of even those moral ideals.

During the last fifty years, with the discrediting of Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge, we have added to this internally-generated suspicion the full weight of a growing scepticism about the purely intellectual foundations of modernist civic moral ideals. The net effect of these developments today, the net effect of the three hundred-year hegemony of the modernist civic ideals of authenticity and autonomy, is a growing doubt about the value of all moral ideals, a doubt whose entire strength is drawn paradoxically from the culturally particularistic modernist belief that moral ideals in general, to be theoretically justifiable and therefore worthy of respect, must be grounded upon purely universal principles.

Thus today, at the end of the roughly three hundred-year reign of modernist liberal political theory, the continuing influence of the civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy pushes us in the direction of a generalized cultural nihilism, a generalized sense of the groundlessness and un-justifiability of all moral ideals. Ironically, the very ideas that for three hundred years served to motivate development of the capacities proper to citizenship now serve to confuse and undermine the pursuit of any moral ideal whatever. It is this consequence of modernist liberalism that above all must be addressed by the project of the cultural functions of knowledge. 196

Modernist liberal political theory, presented in foundationalist theoretical discourses, defined the standpoint of citizenship in essentialist terms, that is, they defined the civic standpoint of free and equal individuality as the essential or natural standpoint proper to every human being. In this essentialist interpretation, modernist liberalism in fact reversed the developmental relationship between the standpoint proper to citizenship and non-civic standpoints, leading to, among other things, the characteristically modernist failure to recognize the importance of a civic culture for the support of liberal democratic political institutions.197

Lockean (or social contractarian) varieties of modernist liberal political theory, for example, defined the standpoint proper to citizenship as prior in a historical or anthropological sense.198 Social contract theories of the liberal state and of political obligation derived their conceptions of civic norms from narratives supposedly describing the first establishment of political association. In social contract narratives, liberal theorists represented individuals, living under natural or pre-political conditions, meeting together to decide upon mutually advantageous conditions of political association. Such negotiations, of course, would be carried on by free individuals (or at least family heads) subject to no common power, individuals whose identities would therefore be shaped by the natural condition alone rather than by a set of historically contingent political arrangements.199 The primary question all parties would face in such negotiations would be how much of their natural liberty to relinquish for the sake of maximizing the benefits

199.Ibid.
of association. Such negotiators would of course want to insist upon placing strict limits
on governmental authority and on the state's power to coerce. They certainly would
not grant to the state the power to institute any sort of regime that would impose on
citizens a particular conception of the good life. In other words, such negotiators would
definitely insist on constitutional recognition of their natural liberty to pursue happiness
as they saw fit.

The graphic clarity and simplicity of such contract narratives had great rhetorical
force. Those narratives gave plausibility to the notion that the natural human condition,
the universal condition of all human beings prior to political association, is a condition of
liberty, a condition of free individuality unencumbered by limits imposed or obligations
incurred by membership in particularistic ethnic, class, or religious communities.

However any particular liberal theorist represented the outcomes of this imagined
negotiation, the social contract narrative itself gave the general idea of the priority of
human liberty an aspect of self-evidence. The social contract narrative licensed claims
affirming natural human rights, which is made up of, claims that certain legal protections

200.Ibid.
201.Ibid.
202.See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, trans., P. S. Falla, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), for a useful summary and evaluation of these theories. Also Immanuel Kant,
"Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Hass Reis (ed.), Kant's Philosophical Writings,
trans., H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 114. The idea of
constitutional patriotism provides a justification for allegiance to a state to the extent that it
embodies just institutions. While this idea of constitutional patriotism is quite suggestive for a way
in which solidarity within a community may be combined with adherence to principles of justice,
it must be understood in a certain way in order to avoid problems that have arisen with earlier
understandings. These have two problems that could arise and they pose something of a dilemma.
See also G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans., H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge:
203.See Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of
Europe," Praxis International, 12 (1992), 1-18; reprinted in Omar Dahbour and Micheline R.
and entitlements were mandated by the original or pre-associational condition of human liberty.204

As in the earlier tradition of natural law (influenced by classical metaphysical conceptions of nature), the standard of justice or the principle of right was affirmed by modernist liberal political theory as existing prior to the establishment of every particular historical regime. But, in the case of Lockean varieties of modernist liberalism, this priority was conceived of historically rather than metaphysically, in terms of a narrative of cultural and material progress. The principle of right was derived from the purported natural or spontaneous form of life that would be followed by human beings not subject to the power of governments. Since the establishment of a government would then be a voluntary act, it must be represented as an improvement upon the natural condition, as a story of progress. These were the minimal narrative rules imposed upon Lockean or contractarian varieties of liberal political theory.205

Thus, Lockean varieties of modernist liberal political theory attributed to the normative standpoint of citizenship, that is, the standpoint of free and equal individuality, a historical or anthropological priority to other cultural standpoints. Once again, as a rhetorical strategy, this attribution of priority was very effective in the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century political struggles. It allowed liberals to claim that

204. See G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Section 333, 368.
civic values were grounded in human nature and in nature generally, as opposed to the artificial and arbitrary values of court and Church. It also interpreted the standpoint of citizenship in a very specific way, as a standpoint that was universally accessible and available to all human beings, provided that certain impediments to its development be removed.

206. See Marx Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, where he argues that in modern society, science must replace religion defining the aim of life. Also Tallcott Parsons, *The Social System*. See also A.W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. Again Tallcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, 216-18. Of great importance is the argument of John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137. For Rawls, “the liberal principle of legitimacy,” that is, “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution with the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.” “Reasonable” seems to have something to do with a populist conception of public justification. Stephen Macedon, *Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism*, 477; in agreement Rawls argues that “Citizens are asked to put aside their comprehensive moral and religious conceptions, in the sense that they should acknowledge the political authority and adequacy of reasons that can be shared by reasonable people who disagree about their ultimate ideals.” The same is shared by Peter de Memeffe, *Liberalism. Liberty and Neutrality*, 255ff. This is indeed a point to consider in the process of constitution making. As Rawls favoured conception of justice as fairness being articulated and defended on the basis of common ground, but need not elicit consensus among even reasonable persons, which, of course, it has not; seems a good ground for a nation or state. This is when we have to consider the fact that the members of such a society are pluralistic in their affiliations. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson defend a comparable restriction on the composition of the public: “Deliberative reciprocity expresses two related requirements, one primarily moral and the other primarily empirical. When citizens make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are similarly motivated. The moral reasoning is in this way mutually acceptable. The qualifying phrase, ‘similarly motivated’ indicates that a deliberative perspective does not address people who reject the aim of finding fair terms for social cooperation; it cannot reach those who refuse to press their public claims in terms accessible to their fellow citizens. No moral perspective in politics can reach such people, except one that replicates their own comprehensive set of beliefs. And since that perspective would entail rejecting entirely the comprehensive beliefs of their rivals, it would not help reduce, let alone resolve, moral disagreements.” See *Democracy and Disagreement*, 55. Also Charles Larmore, *Patterns of Moral Complexity*, 60; and also Kai Nelson, *Liberal Reasonability*, 175-253.

207. There is an argument by Baker that human persons cannot be animals. The reason they cannot is that they differ in their persistence conditions. This is found in the passage: “Although a person is essentially a person, a human person is not essentially a human person. What makes human persons human is that they are constituted by biological human bodies, where a biologically human body is an animal, an organism. Although a human organism could not become a non-biological being and still continue to exist, a human person (originally constituted by a human organism) could come to be constituted by non-biological body and still continue to exist. For it may be possible for a human person to undergo gradual replacement of her human body by bionic parts in a way that did not extinguish her first-person perspective; if so, then she would continue to
Properly understood, social contract narratives were educational devices that helped persons formed by various ethnic and religious cultures to imagine what it would be like to be the free and equal individuals who were described as parties to the social contract. Ideally, by imagining themselves in that role, they could imaginatively strike the attitudes and demand the political arrangements compatible with it. But, paradoxically, social contract narratives could have this educational and empowering impact only by denying their rhetorical status as educational devices and by claiming the status of theoretical discourses about the nature and origins of political association.  

To admit that the social contract narrative was merely an educational device, a component of civic culture, would have been to admit that the standpoint of citizenship was a constructed and an acquired cultural standpoint just like any other. To admit the artificiality of that status would have been to lose the rhetorical edge gained by the claim that civic values, unlike those of court and Church, were grounded in the nature of things.

This successful modernist rhetorical strategy has today become a liability. Our primary task, as seen of citizens of developed North Atlantic liberal democracies, is no
longer to fight for the initial establishment of liberal political institutions, using against the entrenched power of court and Church all the ideological weapons available. Rather, our task today is to maintain a supportive liberal democratic civic culture, one capable of strengthening in ourselves and others the dispositions and attitudes proper to citizenship. In short, our task consists in creating cultural means for the effective reproduction of cultural values. There are many challenges that face our contemporary society. Among them, we have disease (and some of the medical practices used), poverty, natural and human made disasters, fundamentalism coupled with scepticism in both religion and science and the moral implications of the progress science is making.

From a purely physical perspective, disease can arguably be considered the greatest threat to human survival. Every generation since the fall of humanity... has struggled with the problem of humanity's susceptibility to disease.... [I]t is an intruder, a corrupter of what is good or healthy, something that is not part of the original design of the Creator. Disorder in the human body can occur because of nutritional deficiency, environmental factors, toxicity, infection and from developmental or genetic errors.

We are faced with the benefits and dangers of both cultural revolutions and knowledge functions as evidenced in religious fundamentalism and scientific scepticism. In this world, we have both benefits of alleviating human misery and at hand, we have the critical present and future misuses of religion and science in the name of cultural revolutions. Important for our purpose is the historical relationship between cultural revolutions and knowledge functions in the face of religion and science. It certainly has not been that simple. In a more radical manner, the relation between culture and knowledge functions had its obvious contrasts seen in religion and science from the

212.Ibid.
“Enlightenment” period “forward” and some accounts of this history have oversimplified the relationship making the story very insignificant. In a precise way, for example as put forth in Religion and Science

[Many earlier histories (both popular and professional) have cast the relationship largely in terms of competition and conflict; accordingly, they tell the story of a steady retreat and narrowing of religion and its domains in the face of growing strength and influence of science. This rather blunt interpretative idea may have yielded some insight, but today historians find there are some subtleties lost, deep intellectual connections between religion and science minimised, and variations of expression within each era unaccounted for.... There are several aspects to this complexity including, first, the contingency and unpredictability of history in general. 214

Modernist liberal political theory, to the extent that it attributed to the normative standpoint of citizenship a historical and anthropological priority, does not serve us well in the pursuit of this task. 215 By claiming this sort of priority for the standpoint of free and equal individuality, modernist liberalism suggested that the primary obstacles to the development and reproduction of civic values come from accidental cultural and political circumstances. 216 It suggested that a civic identity is somehow the native and original identity of persons and that civic identity emerges somehow spontaneously once impediments deriving from these accidental cultural and political circumstances are removed. 217 Because it at least implicitly assigned to civic identity a metaphysical status, modernist liberalism systematically discouraged reflection about civic identity as a cultural construction. It also systematically discouraged reflection about the sort of

215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
133
cultural resources that are required for the development and maintenance of civic identities.
2.3.14. Cultural Functions of Knowledge in Overcoming Our Social Contractarian Hangover

In concluding this section it is important to remember civic culture and modern philosophy belong to a particular culture as functions of knowledge. This is one way in which modernist liberal political theory, to the extent that it continues to influence our understanding of liberal democratic citizenship, generates for us what I have called problems of intelligibility. An effective civic culture must provide resources for rendering intelligible to citizens the tasks involved in developing the values and attitudes proper to citizenship. With respect to this function, modernist liberal political theory today produces confusion rather than clarity. It produces confusion above all by its denial that the process of developing the capacities proper to citizenship is a particularistic cultural process requiring particularistic cultural support.

218. This is an idea created from Hegel’s thought “Overcoming Modern Formalism,” in his *Science of Logic*. George Lasson, (ed.), 2 Vols., (Hamburg: Meiner, 1963), 2:501/839-40, cf. 2:485/825. (References here are by volume number and page in both German and English respectively. The English translation is by Arnold Miller, *Hegel’s Logic*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969). Hegel does not reject the modern emphasis of form, but tries to go it one better. What makes absolute form the overcoming of modernity is that absolute form cannot be posited as different from its content. One cannot posit this difference because the absolute form already includes the difference of form and content would be to fall back to a stage already posited and passed by. According to David Kolb, Hegel claims that such an overarching motion, which comprehends itself, is the final condition for making any of the distinctions others takes as ultimate. Such a comprehensive unity has already posited and overcome the dichotomies one might want to make. No ultimate distinction of form from content can be posited either within the logic as a whole or between the logical sequence and the reality “outside” it. See Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 227-230; shared answers to questions in this area will fix the general structure of government and the political process, determine the basic rights and liberties of citizens, and mark the limits of tolerable social and economic inequalities. What is basic in political liberalism is “good public reason.”

219. See J. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 424. Social sciences are frequently mired in sterile methodological debates, and seem to have lost sight, at least provisionally, of the real questions associated with understanding social life. Indeed, methodologists often protest that the turn to complex mathematical calculation is just a prelude to addressing these problems with scientific precision, free of the speculative sloppiness characteristic of the older practitioners. For now, social science, particularly sociology, has abandoned theory to philosophers and other humanists, at least in the United States. In Western Europe, particularly Germany, social scientists are split between those like Habermas and Offe, for whom the older conception of the *Geisteswissenschaften* describes the ongoing parameters of
By representing the standpoint of citizenship, the standpoint of free and equal individuality, as the universal standpoint of all human beings in their natural or pre-associational condition, modernist liberalism represented the standpoint of citizenship as a standpoint stripped of all particularistic cultural attributes. The process of developing a civic identity was thereby defined as a process of stripping away the culturally accidental in order to arrive at a supposedly culture-neutral, natural, and universal standpoint.

This way of understanding the developmental and anthropological relationship between civic and communitarian identities not only misrepresents our contemporary experience of citizenship, but also positively impedes our efforts to ensure the cultural reproduction of civic values and attitudes. Today we encounter regularly in the media social investigation, and those like Luhman, who wish to revive general sociological theory as a description of a "real" social world by reinventing its categories. See Niklas Luhman, The Differentiation of Society, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

220. See S. Aronowitz, and H. A. Giroux, Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture and Social Criticism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 14-15. All efforts remained partially constrained by modernist assumptions. Where artists, scholars, and critics wanted to establish the ground for inclusion of subaltern discourses within academic precincts as well as in publishing and the art world; women and people of colour fashioned their assault on hegemonic culture in terms of the demand for a place in its ample sun, just as civil rights movement felt obliged, throughout the 1960s, to simultaneously assert black autonomy and inclusion into the white world, educational and art movements moved in contradictory directions; on the one hand, they attempted to develop aesthetic and social conceptions incommensurable with the mainstream; on the other, they asserted equivalence and demanded to be recognized and rewarded by the dominant world.


222. See Ernesto Laclau, "Politics and the Limits of Modernity," 65. In a Postmodern age, we move beyond the "crisis of modernism" that bedevils us by having an educational criticism of the educational theory and practice of our time. Three things have emerged from postmodernism. One is the changing conditions of knowledge it points us to which are embedded in the electronically mediated culture; second, the questions the age helps to raise about the terrain of culture as a field of both domination and contestation; and the third thing is the provision of theoretical foundation for engaging the Other not only as a deterioralised object of domination but also as a source of struggle, collective resistance, and historical affirmation. In other words, what we have of
the inescapable facts of global cultural diversity. Awareness of this cultural diversity makes it all too clear to us that civic values and civic identities are particularistic cultural constructs that have emerged from and that are still largely local to a given culture as seen of North Atlantic European traditions.

The analysis of Modernist liberal political theory reveals the reversal of the actual developmental and anthropological priorities when it represented the standpoint of the free and equal individual as the natural and universal standpoint of all human beings prior to political associations. The civic standpoint of free and equal individuality, where it is widely attained at all, is one that presupposes and emerges from historically specific communitarian cultural standpoints. It can be successfully attained by large numbers of persons only under the most favourable cultural, economic and political conditions.223

Finally, in this chapter, the understanding of the culturally contingent and particularistic nature of citizenship must be incorporated into the civic culture that succeeds modernist liberal civic culture.224 If one of the central tasks of any liberal

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postmodernism is a problematisation of Otherness that brings about a focus on the importance of history as a form of counter-memory; see E. A. Kaplan, (ed.), *Postmodernism and Its Discontents*. We find here an emphasis on the value of the everyday as a source of agency and empowerment. Further we have a renewed understanding of gender as an irreducible historical practice constituted in a plurality of self and social representations.

223. See H. A. Giroux, *Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics: Redrawing the Boundaries of Educational Criticism*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); further details in note on responsibility and social demands section 2.15.0. above.

224. See Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 59; this as a different argument stresses the intrinsic value of the ways of life to which toleration might be extended. One of the burdens of judgment that Rawls notes is the inevitable partiality of anyone’s conception of the good, given the many values that are worthy of election. We have many examples that could be seen in the life of many of us. One may chose a life that revolves around teaching, scholarship, and familial intimacy. Once a choice is made, it is against many other worthwhile possibilities. Choosing one way means it is done at the cost of another. One cannot have it all ways; nor can one have all worthwhile goods. The choice of one good remains within the borders of reasonable pluralism. What one does not choose continues to endure. In a pluralistic society, we need reasonable pluralism. It is possible that from
democratic civic culture is to render intelligible liberal democratic citizenship as an ideal to be realized, a postmodern civic culture must represent and affirm citizenship as an ideal that is contingent, particularistic, and culturally constructed. The cultivation of a civic culture can very often seem actively hostile to the cultivation of communitarian solidarity. Communitarian solidarity supports the pursuit of a particularistic conception of the good life. It seeks to nurture and perfect in fellow community members those attitudes, dispositions, and skills necessary for the attainment of a particularistic ideal of happiness. The mark of communitarian solidarity is thus a desire and even a commitment to change others, to help them to conform more completely to the highest standards of the community.

Therefore, Citizens who are not firmly anchored in communitarian solidarity will neither understand nor appreciate the practice of civility. Accordingly, the affirmation of otherness and difference proper to civility is inappropriate when it has the effect of undermining the ordered and disciplined pursuit of a particularistic ideal of happiness. The practice of civility as a civic virtue, then, requires moral insight. It requires a prudence guided by a clear understanding of the good civility serves.

his writings Raz means a move towards "transcendental servility," as in his, The Morality of Freedom, 391.
225. Though seen above, here we state again that the idea of postmodernism, according to Ernesto Laclau, which first appeared in aesthetics, "has been displaced to ever wider areas until it has become the new horizon of our cultural, philosophical, and political experience." In these, we have the global project of emancipation, which has brought about change in "thought and culture," as in Ernesto's "Politics and the Limits of Modernity," 63.
This section explores objective three and goes into an analysis of the primary Cultural functions of Knowledge. This third objective is discussing what the invention of a postmodern civic culture requires. Here we have an orientation to see our cultural functions of knowledge as set within a given environment, community and social setting.

From the field the study gave what the researcher has grouped in the table below.

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226 This idea or reconstruction is borrowed from Rawls' discussion on "the idea of public reason." He talks of a "political society" but the researcher does add the question of culture. Hence, "a political and cultural" public reason gives this view of reconstruction thus: "Suppose we agree that the three most innovative periods of our constitutional history," taken civilly, "are the founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal." For him, Rawls, it is important that all three seem to rely on, and only on, the political values of public reason. The constitution and its amendment process, the Reconstruction amendment that sought to remove the curse of slavery and the modern activist so-called welfare state of the New Deal, all seem to fit that description, though it would take some time to show this according to Rawls. Yet accepting this conception a lot has to be done to develop it. Here we have to see the court as the highest judicial though not final interpreter of this body of higher law. The point is that the political and cultural values we develop have to provide the Court's basis for interpretation. A political and cultural conception of justice covers the fundamental questions addressed by higher law and sets out political and cultural values in terms of which they can be decided. Robert Dahl, in his *Democracy and Its Critics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), deals with this thought at length. There are a number of institutions that we need to put in place to help in the democratization process that we have embarked on as a nation. Although Dahl is himself a critic of the judicial system he discusses, he thinks there is no one universally best way to solve the problem of how to protect fundamental rights and interests. He says: "In the absence of a universally best solution, specific solutions need to be adapted to the historical conditions and experiences, political culture, and concrete political institutions of a particular country" see page 129. Though the court may not be the only institution that affects public reason, other institutions have to be put in place to assist this institution. It is essential that other social arrangements also do the same. This may extend to an orderly public financing of elections and constraints on private funding that achieves the fair value of the political liberties, or at least significantly move the political process in that direction. See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 224-27; VIII: 7, 12 as from 324-31 and 356-63 respectively. See also Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 10, 22, 76-79, 80 where he treats reconstruction as a function of education. Dewey also sees the reconstruction of education as necessary. This reconstruction, Dewey, extends it to Philosophy, society and sees them as interdependent with education included.
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This part of the study showed quite a different picture of what would have been expected from the other sections. For we see an average view of those who have the view that their approach to the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge is more literal and it is rated 90% which is very high. This is followed by the historical approach which is rated 80% and seems to be what many in the society do. The other percentages are grouped in relation to what the categorisation showed in terms of the numbers on the ground. This shows that a majority of the people are of the view that their approach to issues is mainly historical.

Back to the historical perspective, we see how Enlightenment civic culture systematically concealed the unique cultural conditions that make liberal democracy possible and how this ideological concealment is responsible for our present crisis from which we move to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge for the reconstruction of civic culture. Within this discussion we see how communities generate moral ideals, ranking systems, hierarchies, virtue concepts, and...

227. Can the liberal political ideals of individual freedom and equality be rethought coherently while being stripped of their trappings? This rethinking is apart of the reconstruction found in Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 331ff. As a Kenyan, is there a Kenyan dream that the researcher is pursuing? Is it possible to attain the dream?
standards of excellence that shape and order human desire. It is always to an audience whose desire and self-understanding has previously been and is continuously being shaped by such communities that civic moral ideals must persuasively speak. Knowledge as such becomes essential in the reconstruction of culture in general. This is in consonant with what Dewey state that "the reconstruction ... of education and society go hand in hand."²²⁸

Unique in this chapter is the need to bring about recognition of arguments reasonably by deducing and validating them for philosophical value speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture. This is pointing to the context in which we do philosophy.

With the demise of modernist civic culture, this was, the form of civic culture based upon the doctrines of modernist liberal political theory, we must invent the resources for a new form of civic culture if liberal democracy is to survive. The question to ask here is how do we get to do this? Can the central normative doctrines defining the liberal political ideals of individual freedom and equality be rethought coherently while being stripped of their Universalist and essentialist Enlightenment trappings?

The foregoing is a question, then, that defines perhaps the most formidable intellectual and cultural challenge that we (referring to citizens of the so called, third world liberal democracies. Kenya included) now face. One of the most significant obstacles we must overcome is the lingering influence of modernist liberal political theory itself. For where the vocabulary of modernist liberal political theory is still

²²⁸ See Dewey, Democracy and Education, 331.
influential, it continues to generate universalist discourses and perspectives that do not even allow proper the definition and understanding of the task facing us. This is because modernist liberal political philosophy was built upon a denial of the particularistic character of the civic culture that liberal political institutions require for their support.

The form of civic culture based upon modernist liberal doctrine was a strange form of civic culture indeed. Essential to Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge was their claim to articulate a standpoint that transcends all culturally particularistic and historically-conditioned belief. The universalism of Enlightenment culture appealed to seventeenth and eighteenth-century proto-liberals because, in an age rife with religious and class warfare, the conflicts between particularistic local cultures seemed to them to be the central political problem. The idea of a political programme whose basic ideals and agenda could claim derivation from absolutely universal, culture-neutral principles had an irresistible rhetorical appeal. The universalism and essentialism that governed Enlightenment conceptions of knowledge and truth, when applied politically, tended to conceal systematically the particularistic cultural requirements for the support of liberal political institutions. Modernist liberalism appropriated Enlightenment conceptions of knowledge and truth for use as rhetorical weapons against the remnants of feudalism. Modernist liberal political philosophy presented itself as a purely theoretical discourse articulating discoveries about the essence of human political association. As such, it constituted the first political ideology, the prototype of all those that were to follow in its wake.
This shows that Modernist liberalism did not originally conceive of itself as an attempt to provide the conceptual foundations of a particularistic form of political culture. It adopted a (purportedly) culture-neutral vocabulary to achieve its culturally particularistic rhetorical and political goals. As a result, it not only concealed its own political function, but also tended to discourage systematic reflection on the characteristics of the particularistic political culture required for the support of liberal democratic institutions. Yet, paradoxically, in spite of its posture of cultural neutrality, modernist liberalism provided the basis of the peculiar form of civic culture that became increasingly influential in Western countries throughout the nineteenth century and that finally achieved dominance in the twentieth. This form of civic culture was characterized by a distinctive interpretation of the normative standpoint of liberal citizenship. Modernist liberalism took over the classical republican political ideals of freedom and equality and gave them a radically non-classical twist.

Liberal democracy, as a historically specific form of political association, begins with the assumption that a liberal democracy will be composed of a number of diverse ethnic, class, and religious communities and assumes therefore that the citizens of a liberal democracy will disagree in their answers to the most basic questions of human life. Liberal political institutions are designed to function in spite of such disagreement or, perhaps better, to function best when such disagreement exists. The liberal state, however differently its legislative, executive, and judicial mechanisms may be designed to meet local historical and political circumstances, is above all designed to rule over

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229. See Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, 2ff. We need to move beyond the certain affiliations to establish a more deliberative system where agreement or disagreement allows reason to recognize that a position held by the other person is worthy of moral respect even when seen as morally wrong in their own thinking.
persons who are willing to associate with one another in spite of the fact that they, as members of different ethnic, class, and religious communities, pursue conflicting conceptions of the good life. This is with the help of the knowledge acquired and reasoned opinion we then move toward reciprocity with the help of the state.230

To make such rule a practical possibility, the citizens of a liberal democracy must be shaped by a political culture that supports the exercise of civic virtues such as tolerance of difference, a disposition to resolve disputes rationally (in a special sense), and a personal acceptance and attribution to others of individual (as opposed to group or collective) responsibility for actions.231 In short, for liberal political institutions to work, citizens must undergo a very unusual and difficult process of individualization, a process by which they must come to identify themselves both as members of particularistic ethnic, class, and religious communities and as members of a civic community that regards them as free and equal individuals, bringing them to a level that disregards the rankings, privileges, and responsibilities they hold within any particularistic cultural community.232

230 Ibid. 85-96.
231 See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, 203.
232 For liberal political institutions to work, as seen above, citizens must undergo a very unusual and difficult process of individualization. Here we have to see an authentically liberal moral doctrine as indicative of the good life in all its fine detail. Consequently, what liberal doctrines characteristically indicate is something of the style or manner which we should conduct our lives, without insisting on the priority of any particular ends. For example, according to Mill, individuality can thrive in devotion to political activism as well as in lives that accord civic obligation a marginal place. See J. S. Mill, 1976, 13, 67-90; Kymlicka. 1990, 203. Similarly, autonomy may be seen as precluding all reliance on moral or religious or, less expansively, a permitting certain kinds of obedience in the case of even the fully virtuous agent. In Kant, Kant’s Political Writings, (ed.) Hans Reis, trans., H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 50-60; R. M. Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 123-7; B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 87; J. Feinberg, Harm to Self, (New York: Oxford University
Thus, the normative standpoint of liberal citizenship, in reference to the ideal standpoint of the ideal citizen of an ideal liberal democracy, requires persons to develop a capacity to define themselves and others effectively within two very different and often conflicting cultural and moral perspectives. Specifically, citizens whose identities have already been shaped by some particularistic cultural conception of the good life must learn to view themselves and others apart from the ranking systems, the standards of excellence, the concepts of virtue, which are among others that normally determine their judgments as members of particularistic ethnic, class, or religious communities.

Within the context of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European ethnic and religious conflict, modernist liberal doctrine had to assign a name to this normative standpoint of liberal citizenship. Since the rhetorical imperative faced by modernist liberals was to avoid identification of their political programme with established warring ethnic and religious factions, they naturally sought to identify this normative standpoint of liberal citizenship in the most universalistic and culture-neutral terms. As a result, the normative standpoint of free and equal civic individuality came to be conceived of as the standpoint proper to the natural pre-political condition of all human beings, or, alternatively, as the universal standpoint proper to the faculty of autonomous human reason. In this way, the modernist liberal conception of the normative standpoint of liberal citizenship became inextricably linked to Enlightenment conceptions of reason and nature.


233. See R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, 136. When we talk of moral a 'good' does it have "contexts?"
4.4.2. Cultural Presuppositions of Liberty Set within the Cultural Functions of Knowledge

Today we see this universalist conception of the idealized standpoint of liberal citizenship as a rhetorical strategy. That was not the way that the founders of modernist liberal political theory understood their doctrines. For them, all serious cognitive efforts specifically excluded rhetorical calculation and embellishment.

Nevertheless, as a rhetorical strategy, it was successful because it provided a vocabulary in which a set of entirely novel political norms and structures could be described as "natural." Liberal political philosophers could show that the coercive and objective order of nature itself made all human beings as such, in their natural or pre-political condition, at least, free and equal individuals. Liberal political norms, economic structures and organizational principles could henceforth, in the language of the Enlightenment, claim derivation from the natural order of things. Feudal social and economic structures could then be identified as arbitrary arrangements in need of special explanation and justification.234 As MacIntyre states:

A national community ... in which the bonds deriving from history were in no way the real bonds of the community (having been replaced by the bonds of reciprocal self-interest) would be one towards which patriotism would be, from any viewpoint, an irrational attitude .... Since all modern bureaucratic states tend towards a condition in which any genuine morality of patriotism would be an unjustifiable simulacrum.235

234. In Enlightenment civic culture, the normative standpoint of liberal citizenship was identified as the universal standpoint proper to the faculty of autonomous human reason.

235. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in R. Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship, (Albany, New York: Albany University Press, 1995), 225. In Enlightenment civic culture, the normative standpoint of liberal citizenship was identified as the universal standpoint proper to the faculty of autonomous human reason.
However, feudal structures are, as we may have them, invariably tied to local cultures and histories. They cannot be explained and justified by reference to the universal and coercive order of nature, an order that is always the same everywhere. Feudal economic and political structures could thus easily be shown to be subversions of the natural freedom and equality of individuals. In this way, the rhetoric of modernist liberalism pretty much turned the "natural order of things" on its head.

It does not require much anthropological or historical insight today for us to realize that, if any type of economic and social organizational principles can be called "natural," then it would be the type of feudal organizational principles that modernist liberalism attacked as unnatural. Hierarchical structures grounded in local ethnic, class, and religious cultures in fact do represent the "natural order of things" in matters political, which implies that, these are the sort of political structures that we find most frequently and spontaneously occurring in human groups. On the other hand, it is the sort of political norms and institutions that modernist liberalism claimed to be in conformity with nature that, if any, is utterly unnatural in this sense. That is to say, such norms and institutions can find widespread acceptance and can flourish only rarely and under the most extraordinarily favourable economic and cultural conditions.236

It is this fact that the universalist political rhetoric of modernist liberalism was forced systematically to conceal. Classical republicanism understood all too well how rare and fragile was the flower of political liberty. Classical republicans, both ancient and modern, reflected incessantly about the cultural presuppositions of political liberty. They

were almost obsessive in their awareness of the threats to liberty produced by class, ethnic and religious factionalism.

Modernist liberalism is, nevertheless, another story. To the extent that modernist liberalism spoke the cognitive and moral language of the Enlightenment, liberal political institutions had to be presented as those that would in fact occur spontaneously everywhere in the absence of obstacles created by arbitrary and oppressive regimes. Liberal political norms had to be presented as those that would in fact be affirmed spontaneously by all human beings in the absence of superstition and priestly domination. Thus, the rhetoric of modernist liberalism was governed by a logic that systematically concealed or at least de-emphasized the unique cultural requirements for the flourishing of liberal political institutions. 237

This feature of modernist liberalism continued to produce well into the twentieth century a blindness to the vital role of the very peculiar sort of political culture that is required to support liberal democratic institutions. 238 As Galston Recommended:

On the practical level, very few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal societies through a process of rational inquiry. If children are to be brought up to accept these commitments as valid and binding, it can only be through a process that is far more rhetorical than rational. For example, rigorous historical research will almost certainly vindicate complex ‘revisionist’ accounts of key figures in ... history. Civic education, however, requires a more noble moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions and constitute

237. The rhetoric of modernist liberalism was governed by a logic that systematically concealed the unique cultural requirements for the furnishing of liberal political institutions. See William Galston, Liberal Purpose: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 243-4.

238 See William Galston, Liberal Purpose: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, 244. The rhetoric of modernist liberalism was governed by a logic that systematically concealed the unique cultural requirements for the flourishing of liberal political institutions.
worthy objects of emulation. It is unrealistic to believe that more than few adult citizens of liberal societies will ever move beyond the kind of civic commitment engendered by such a pedagogy. 239

For example, what sort of perception of political reality allowed Americans at the end of the Second World War to impose upon the Japanese a liberal democratic constitution so alien to their national culture, and to impose it with the expectation that it would "take" and produce a nation of liberal democrats? What is it that led American governments since then to repeat the same mistake again and again in innumerable peasant societies? Of course, such policies can easily be explained as pretexts, as elements of an economic strategy to open foreign markets and a Cold War strategy to impose friendly liberal regimes everywhere in order to "stop the spread of communism." 240

Even though such a strategy would make no sense, even as a pretext in the absence of a belief that liberal democratic political regimes were somehow expressions of the natural order of things, during the Cold War, liberals continued to view liberal democracy as the political order that people everywhere would spontaneously choose if they were genuinely permitted to do so. Liberal democratic regimes were imposed in the name of universal and natural human rights. Where such regimes did not exist, liberals believed that it was because those universal human rights were not recognized by backward and oppressive governments.

Ironically, the war against fascism and the Cold War extended the influence of modernist liberal rhetoric well beyond the time that its intellectual credibility had effectively ceased. John Dewey's project of "rethinking the conceptual foundations of

239.Ibid.
liberalism early in the last century could not possibly have been as influential as it was had it not spoken to a widespread sense that the world view of the Enlightenment had lost its relevance.  

It was during their long struggles against various forms of fascism and Marxism, however, when Western liberal democracies found themselves opposed by enemies that, in different ways, provided a set of purely political motives for adherence to the doctrines of modernist liberalism. Fascism, with its virulent and nihilistic cultural particularism that was itself produced by a reaction to universalist Enlightenment values, seemed to demonstrate the cataclysmic political consequences of any abandonment of modernist cultural universalism.  

On the other hand, in Marxism, Western liberal democracies faced an enemy armed with a world view no less rooted in the universalist culture of the Enlightenment than was modernist liberalism itself. In the same way that modernist liberals spoke of universal human rights deriving from the natural human condition, Marxists spoke of universal history, the class struggle, the laws of capitalist accumulation, the stages of development toward socialism, and so on. Both sides supported their political agendas by offering grand historical meta-narratives that provided totalizing narrative representations

242. During the Cold War, liberals continued to view liberal democracy as the political order that people everywhere would spontaneously choose if they were genuinely permitted to do so. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 11; also Talcott Parsons, The social System, A. W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, (New York: Basic Books, 1970). This conflict has a special place in the thought of Habermas, who is simultaneously the heir of the Frankfurt School and in a polemical relationship with the German theory of the social system, especially that of Luhman. Also Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1939), 239.  
of the match of human events. In advancing these totalizing visions, both sides appealed to the doctrine that, through the application of one or another cognitive method, human beings can successfully free themselves from the limiting perspectives imposed by historical conditions and adopt the transcendent standpoint of universal human reason. In this way, both fascism and Marxism during the middle years of this century provoked a cultural reaction in the West that strengthened the political appeal of modernist liberal rhetoric even as the intellectual credibility of its assumptions continued to erode.

With the end of the Cold War, this artificially extended life of modernist liberalism has now ended. The universalist and essentialist philosophical vocabulary of the Enlightenment, the language used by liberals to explain and advocate the establishment of liberal political institutions, is now irretrievably lost.

Central to the cultural project of the Enlightenment was the doctrine of the autonomy of human reason. This doctrine expressed the belief that human reason, on its own, using methods derived from an analysis of its own powers, could transcend the limits imposed by historical circumstances and attain universally valid knowledge. It is this doctrine that simply no longer makes sense in the world that has emerged in the course of the twentieth century.

In this world, we are everywhere confronted with the inescapable reality of cultural differences and the power of historical circumstances to shape belief. In the same realm, the particularism of the cultural assumptions underlying liberal political doctrine is

244. Ibid. xi, 31, 35 and 48.
245. Ibid.
246. See Crane Brinton, "Enlightenment," 525. From various modifications, we have of this era, it was doomed to be extinct.
also impossible to deny. In this same world, liberal political institutions can no longer be credibly explained and justified by appeal to self-evident truths, universal natural law, the principles of pure practical reason, or any other supposedly culture-neutral metaphysical or epistemological theory.247

In undertaking this philosophical project, the researcher is aware, the challenges we face are many and significant. Even though the conceptual underpinnings of modernist liberalism have lost their credibility, the essentialist and totalizing language of modernist liberalism continues to be virtually the only political language available to us. As a result, all postmodernist initiatives in the sphere of political discourse are easily subject to misunderstanding. As noted above, in appropriating the universalist rhetoric of the Enlightenment, modernist liberalism systematically concealed the particularistic character of the political culture required for the support of liberal political institutions.

As a result, a vocabulary that allows us to comprehend and speak of liberal political norms in their cultural particularism can easily be taken as one that embodies a rejection of the validity of those norms. Out of this misperception arise the usual accusations that postmodern political vocabularies support “relativistic” or nihilistic world views. Such accusations have the effect of identifying liberal democracy as a form

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of political association once and for all with the defunct cultural vocabulary and world
view of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{248}

Such an identification, would prevent us from undertaking, in the manner of
classical republicanism, the sort of reflection upon the unique cultural presuppositions of
liberal democracy, the sort of reflection that alone can open the way to the creation of a
post-Enlightenment civic culture capable of supporting liberal political institutions in the
years ahead. This sort of final identification of liberal democracy with the vocabulary of
modernist liberalism constitutes a failure of imagination of fateful proportions and must
be avoided at all costs.\textsuperscript{249}

As noted above, in appropriating the universalist rhetoric of the enlightenment,
modernist rhetorical turn from postmodern civic culture must differ from modernist civic
culture in two ways: (i) it must embrace the cultural particularism and contingency of
liberal democratic values (the rhetorical turn) and (ii) it must reverse the priority given by
modernist liberalism to the right over the good (the teleological turn). How the
postmodern reconstruction of civic culture must start from a rejection of the universalism
and formalism of modernist liberalism.

A postmodern civic culture will no doubt differ in many significant ways from the
form of civic culture that developed under the influence of modernist liberal political
theory. But in whatever other ways a postmodern civic culture may differ from its
predecessor, it definitely must differ in two respects.

also Frederick Schauer, \textit{Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), 15-34.
\textsuperscript{249}Jean-François Lyotard, \textit{The Postmodern Condition}, 6, 12, 13 and 49.

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i. It must provide a new conception of the nature of liberal democratic citizenship, one that can successfully address the intelligibility problems produced by modernist liberalism.

ii. It must provide new rhetorical resources for motivating citizens to develop civic identities, resources that can successfully address the motivational problems produced by modernist liberalism.250

Let us examine briefly what these two tasks specifically require.

In order to address the intelligibility problems produced by modernist liberal political theory, a postmodern civic culture must provide a conception of citizenship thoroughly independent of foundationalist epistemological modes of thought. Modernist liberalism, in its rhetorical use of Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge, as understood then, in its use of the anti-rhetorical rhetoric of pure theory, established and worked from an analogy between the nonnative standpoint of liberal democratic citizenship and the standpoint of the autonomously rational objective knower, did not appeal to both independent and individual perspectives of what is within and without.251

This lack of connection generated an essentialist and universalist conception of the standpoint of citizenship that represented civic identity as anthropologically and metaphysically prior to communitarian identity.252

Among the negative consequences of this twofold attribution of priority were, first, the systematic neglect of civic culture as a factor in the production and reproduction of civic values and, second, the widespread belief that civic moral ideals were somehow

250. Ibid, 49.
dependent for their legitimacy on a proof demonstrating their deducibility from timeless and universal principles, whether these principles be drawn from some imagined natural human condition or from the imagined traits of the faculty of pure practical reason.

A postmodern civic culture must sever once and for all this connection between the normative standpoint of citizenship and an autonomous faculty of reason. A postmodern civic culture will no longer require the services of epistemologists or metaphysicians. It will take as its point of departure a rejection of the anti-rhetorical rhetoric of pure theory, or, more positively, it will embrace rhetorical practice and analysis as instruments and resources for the production and reproduction of civic values.

In short, a postmodern liberalism must take a rhetorical turn. It must start from a rejection of the essentialist and universalist conception of the normative standpoint of citizenship identified with modernist liberalism and an affirmation of the historically situated and particularistic nature of civic values.253

In order to address the motivational problems produced by modernist liberal political theory, a postmodern civic culture must offer new resources for motivating citizens to develop civic identities and capacities, resources that are no longer dependent upon the essentialist and universalist conception of citizenship proper to modernist liberalism. This essentialist conception of citizenship had the effect of undermining and disparaging particularistic conceptions of the good life. The communitarian identities shaped by particularistic conceptions of the good were represented by modernist

253. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 81ff and Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 49.
liberalism as arbitrary and groundless. This basic strategy of motivation was embodied in
the two most influential moral standpoints generated by modernist liberal political theory,
what I have called the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy. These
moral ideals differed from the moral ideals identified with particular ethnic, class, and
religious communities not only by their claim to universality, but also by their peculiarly
formal nature.

The civic ethics of authenticity, largely associated with Lockean or social
contractarian styles of modernist liberalism, motivated citizens to achieve the normative
civic standpoint of free and equal individuality by representing as an ideal the free­
standing individual of the pre-political natural condition. But the free-standing individual
of the natural condition is represented in social contract narratives as motivated only by
the goal of self-interest in general. A person motivated to pursue only his or her own self­
interest is not motivated to pursue any specific goal or move in any specific direction.
From the admonition to be authentic alone, no specific conception of the good or ranking
system or concept of excellence can be inferred.

The same formalism also characterizes the civic ethics of autonomy. The civic
ethics of autonomy, largely associated with Kantian styles of modernist liberalism,
motivated citizens to achieve the normative civic standpoint of free and equal
individuality by representing as an ideal a pure self-determination analogous to that of the
autonomous rational knower. Once again, the purely self-determining individual is

254. See Giddens, 79 and Sharon Wegscheider-Cruse, *Learning to Love Yourself*, (Deerfield Beach, Fa:
Health Communications, 1987), 79.
conceived of only as an autonomous chooser. The actual content of the choice remains undetermined. From the admonition to be autonomous alone, no specific conception of the good or ranking system or concept of excellence can be inferred.

Thus, both the modernist civic ethics of authenticity and autonomy were characterized by a peculiar formalism or lack of specific content. As moral ideals, they mandated not a particular way of life, but rather universal ways of choosing and living a particular way of life. This formalism was expressed in modernist liberal political theory in the doctrine of the priority of the right over the good. As evidenced by the Kantian "categorical imperative."

In different ways, both the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy embodied this doctrine. They were non-teleological: they mandated a particular how of action rather than a particular why or end of action. At the extreme, as we have seen, these moral ideals even called into question the value of all particularistic conceptions of the good, affirming the priority of the right by calling attention to the contingent and arbitrary character of all particularistic and historically conditioned conceptions of the good.

At the extreme, then, the moral ideals generated by modernist liberal civic culture represented the worst of both worlds. They required citizens to develop a sceptical attitude toward the values of the particular ethnic, class, and religious communities to
which they belonged and to adopt as their primary stance in life the purely formal and vacuous identity of an authentic self or an autonomous chooser.\textsuperscript{257}

As already alluded to above, a postmodern civic culture must take as its point of departure a rejection of this modernist conception of the priority of the right over the good. It must begin with the affirmation of the ideal of citizenship as a particularistic moral ideal capable of giving life particularistic content and direction. As a particularistic moral ideal, it is not a merely empty and formal mandating of a particular how of choice, but rather the mandating of a specific what, in other words, a specific life ideal, a specific conception of the good life.

In short, a postmodern liberalism must take a teleological turn. It must reinterpret the modernist liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good in a way that both gives the notion of moral rightness specific ethical content and, at the same time, makes the affirmation of moral rightness compatible with respect for and the pursuit of particularistic cultural conceptions of the good.

The postmodern shift from the metaphysical liberalism proper to modernist civic culture to a political or rhetorical liberalism requires a rethinking of virtually every aspect of liberal democratic citizenship. This is a rethinking that will seem to some like a rejection of liberal moral ideals altogether. Here we mention the demise of modernist civic culture which requires a radical change in the vocabulary we use to make intelligible the nature of liberal democratic citizenship.

\textsuperscript{257}Ibid.
Let us make sure that we understand the connection between what I call the rhetorical turn in liberal political philosophy and the issue of the intelligibility of the standpoint and norms proper to liberal democratic citizenship. Liberal democracies make extraordinary cultural demands on their citizens. They require that citizens develop and cultivate attitudes, dispositions, identities, and moral capacities that do not just spontaneously occur among human beings. These qualities must be produced in citizens by a special sort of countervailing culture, what is here called a civic culture. A civic culture is composed of discourses, narratives, and representations of various sorts that are designed to promote among citizens the development and cultivation of civic capacities.

Any civic culture has two functions of knowledge in particular that it must successfully carry out: (i) it must provide cultural resources for rendering the normative standpoint of citizenship intelligible to citizens, and (ii) it must provide cultural resources for motivating citizens to develop and exercise the capacities proper to citizenship. Among the cultural resources available at least to modern forms of liberal democratic

258. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, where he gives narratives of self-identity. Also Alasdair MacInyre, After Virtue, (London: Duckworth, 1981). All of us have an ongoing story about the self. In order to have a sense of who we are, therefore, we need to have a notion of how we have become, and where we are going. Giddens treats of this same notion in four of his works. First in The Consequences of Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), also, in The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity, 1980), a third treat is in his Central Problems of Social Theory, (Cambridge: Polity, 1979), and lastly, The Constitution of Society, (Cambridge: Polity, 1984). In all these works, we see how the identity of self is shaped with the help of ontological security and the prevailing existential anxiety. This work has no links with political parties whatsoever. If anything partisan politics have to be transformed.

259. See A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 1999ff: a chapter that treats "the constitution of deliberative democracy." Also John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Xlv. He re we have the basic structure of society accounting for the first function from the time we enter it by birth and exit by death. The second is the provided for relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body.
The researcher calls this development a rhetorical turn in order to characterize the sort of shift that has occurred. Other terms could be used. Rawls, for example, characterizes this reorientation of liberal political philosophy as a shift from a metaphysical liberalism to a political liberalism. At this point, no characterization can be final, since the process of reorientation is still in its infancy. In my view, the description of this reorientation in political philosophy as a rhetorical turn has some advantage right now in that it establishes a contrast between old and new suggestive directions for inquiry. This has to lead the society to see itself as constituted of members who place primacy on the rule of law.

Modernist metaphysical liberalism in both literary form and content defined itself in opposition to rhetorical conceptions of reason and knowledge. Rhetorical conceptions of reason and knowledge are characterized by an affirmation of the audience-directedness of all discourse and the audience-dependence of all subject matter. Modernist metaphysical liberalism embraced the anti-rhetorical rhetoric of pure theory. In its literary form, it presented itself as a purely theoretical discourse, a discourse seeking to articulate the audience-independent truth about an audience-independent subject matter. Characterizing the contemporary reorientation of political philosophy as a rhetorical turn, then, helps to keep in focus not only the crucial issues raised by this reorientation, but also where it is leading us.
In any case, whatever terms we use for it, it should be clear how a shift of this magnitude affecting an important component of civic culture could produce problems. We should not exaggerate the importance of metaphysical liberalism as a cultural support for liberal democracy. Until the early 1900s, for example, Protestant Christianity no doubt played a more crucial role in the effective civic culture of the United States than modernist liberalism did. But, as the cultural diversity of the American society has increased and the influence of Protestant Christianity has diminished, civic culture in America has become more dependent upon the universalist and essentialist ideas of modernist liberal political philosophy as its primary resource for rendering intelligible to citizens the nature of liberal democratic citizenship.261

The influence of modernist liberal ideas has been particularly evident since the 1950s in discussions of universal human and civil rights and in conceptions of the cultural neutrality of the liberal democratic state. This means that, to the extent that American civic culture has been effective in actually producing citizens in the full cultural sense, citizenship will be understood by such citizens in large measure through the use of a vocabulary shaped by the universalist and essentialist world view of modernist liberalism.262

The shift from modernist metaphysical liberalism to political or rhetorical liberalism therefore entails significant changes in the vocabulary that citizens must use to

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understand and reproduce in others the civic capacities they have achieved. This is what I have referred to as the intelligibility crisis in contemporary civic culture. The old vocabulary of citizenship is now defunct. The new one has yet to be coined.

The project of inventing a postmodern civic culture is the project of inventing this new vocabulary. The difficulties and dangers involved in this project are substantial. To the extent that modernist liberal political theory has indeed been influential in forming culturally effective conceptions of citizenship, our understanding of what it means to be a citizen is bound up with the totalizing and universalist vocabulary of modernist European culture in general. The vocabulary of a political or rhetorical liberalism will be radically different.

The perspectives underlying that vocabulary will be even more alien. Universalist and essentialist conceptions of liberal moral ideas will disappear. The new vocabulary of citizenship will be shaped by conceptions of liberal moral ideals that emphasize their cultural particularism and their partial nature. To some, the reorientation within liberal political thought will seem, as a result, like a rejection of liberal moral ideals altogether. The shift from modernist metaphysical liberalism to political or rhetorical liberalism thus amounts to a cultural transformation not merely of generational but even epochal proportions.

This shift requires a rethinking of virtually every aspect of liberal democratic citizenship. One of the most difficult tasks involved in this project is the reinterpretation of the capacities and attitudes proper to citizenship as qualities pertaining to only a partial
aspect of life. Rawls gives special emphasis to this feature of the shift from metaphysical to political liberalism.

Modernist metaphysical liberalism presented itself as what Rawls terms a “comprehensive” doctrine. According to Rawls, a comprehensive doctrine is a doctrine that, at the extreme, applies to all subjects. It is a doctrine including “conceptions of what is of value in human life, ideals of personal virtue and character . . . that are to inform much of our non-political conduct (in the limit our life as a whole).”

On the other hand, according to Rawls, political liberalism is a doctrine that is partial, meaning, it is “worked out for a specific subject, namely, the basic structure of society.” As such, it is a doctrine that pertains to a specific part, which is, the political part, our lives as citizens, and not to the whole of life. Rawls thus distinguishes modernist metaphysical liberalism from political or rhetorical liberalism in two ways.

First, while metaphysical liberalism was universalist and essentialist doctrine, a doctrine claiming to pronounce the truth about the very essence of political morality, political or rhetorical liberalism is a particularistic cultural doctrine, defining only the norms proper to one particular and contingent form of political association. Second, while metaphysical liberalism, in its universalism and essentialism, was a comprehensive or totalizing doctrine, a doctrine applying to the whole of life, political or rhetorical liberalism is a doctrine that applies to only a part of life, the part concerned with the capacities and norms proper to liberal democratic citizenship.

For Rawls, then, the postmodern reorientation of liberal political philosophy should be read as a shift from a conception of liberalism as a universalist and comprehensive doctrine to a conception of liberalism as a particularistic and partial doctrine. When we speak of liberalism as a doctrine in this way, however, we should remind ourselves that we are not talking about mere “theories” of liberalism. If we understand liberal political philosophy as a component of civic culture, then we must see it as addressed to an audience, made up of, citizens, and, to the extent it is effective, as shaping that audience’s experience of the subject matter, contributing to, its experience of citizenship and liberal democratic political life in general. This means that the postmodern reorientation of liberal political philosophy entails much more than a mere doctrinal shift. It entails a reorientation and reconstruction of citizenship and of the liberal democratic political sphere as such. To the extent that this reconstruction actually occurs, then, the normative standpoint of citizenship will come to be lived differently. It will come to be lived as a standpoint that is culturally constructed (this is, contingent and culturally particularistic) and that pertains to only a part and not the whole of life.

At this point it has to be borne in mind that, when the postmodern reorientation in liberal political philosophy is viewed concretely at the level of its impact on everyday life, that specific problems of intelligibility arise. If the role of philosophical reflection as a component of civic culture is in part to provide resources for rendering intelligible to citizens the normative standpoint of citizenship, then postmodern liberal political philosophy must make it clear to citizens precisely what it means, precisely what

difference it makes, to experience citizenship as culturally constructed and as pertaining only to a limited part of life.

It is the partiality or, for lack of a better term, the non-totalistic character of citizenship, that is particularly problematic. As we have seen, modernist metaphysical liberalism represented citizenship as a comprehensive or totalizing standpoint. The totalizing character of metaphysical liberalism was shaped by the totalizing character of modernist Enlightenment culture in general. Modernist Enlightenment culture generated that totalizing perspective we have come to call the “scientific world view.” Modernist liberal political theory, as a component of Enlightenment culture, became an agent of the scientific world view. Its self-appointed task of “legitimating” liberal democracy really amounted to a reading of liberal democratic moral ideals in terms of the assumptions proper to a totalizing scientific naturalism.

For this reason, in the characteristically modernist conflict between the opposing totalizing world views of science and religion, liberalism has generally been seen not only as friendly to the claims of scientific rationalism, but even as its political expression and embodiment. As represented by modernist metaphysical liberalism, liberal moral ideals thus have often seemed to be part and parcel of a totalizing world view that was not only in competition with other totalizing cultural world views, but also actively hostile to religious world views in particular. If this is true, then we know roughly what it means to say that, under the regime of modernist civic culture, citizenship and the liberal democratic political sphere in general were experienced as elements of a comprehensive

266. See Crane Brinton, “Enlightenment” 519ff.
or totalizing world view. Liberal moral values often seemed to promote if not require a process of cultural secularization, a process in which religious communities, in order to remain civicly respectable, are pressured to "liberalize" their beliefs by making them logically compatible with the scientific world view.  

If this sort of conflict is entailed in a comprehensive or totalizing interpretation of citizenship and liberal moral ideals, then the impact of, once again, for lack of a better term, a de-totalizing interpretation of those ideals would be to eliminate the possibility of any such conflict. To say that liberalism is not a comprehensive doctrine, but a doctrine pertaining only to part of life is to say that citizenship, liberal moral ideals and the liberal democratic political sphere in general do not and should not entail, promote, or require any particular totalizing world view at all.

If we are indeed to be affected by the postmodern reorientation of liberal political philosophy and thereby experience the reconstruction of our own understanding and practice of citizenship, then we must learn to draw new lines that distinguish very clearly between the partial civic identities and perspectives proper to the liberal democratic public sphere and the comprehensive communitarian identities and totalizing cultural perspectives proper to non-political life.

How and where should those new lines be drawn? What might a non-totalistic and de-totalizing liberalism, civic identity, and public sphere look like? One way to address these questions and thereby to set at least part of the agenda for post-metaphysical liberal

political philosophy is by taking a clue from traditional rhetorical analysis. A political or rhetorical conception of liberal political philosophy views it as a discursive component of civic culture, addressed to citizens for the purpose of rendering intelligible and motivating development of civic capacities and attitudes.

Accordingly, we may examine and describe the character of a post-metaphysical form of liberal political philosophy with respect to any of the relational standpoints proper to the structure of the rhetorical situation, for example, the address itself, its general definition of the subject matter, its addressors, its addressees, its general occasion or proper context, its intended effect, and so on. For instance, we might ask about the self-understanding and rhetorical self-definition proper to a de-totalized/de-totalizing conception of liberal political philosophy or we might ask about the way in which the boundaries of the liberal democratic public sphere might be redrawn by such a de-totalizing liberalism. These and other analogous lines of inquiry are bound to open entirely new horizons in liberal political philosophy. For which case this study has modernist liberalism represented with the cultural perspectives proper to the liberal democratic public sphere as possessing a certain primacy and self-sufficiency in relation to communitarian cultures, a relationship that must be reversed by any viable postmodern civic culture. This has a metaphysical liberalism proper to the public sphere as primary and self-sufficient in relationship to communitarian cultures and how postmodern civic culture must reverse that relationship.\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{268}See \textit{Political Liberalism}, 213ff.
The rhetorical turn in the reconstruction of liberal political philosophy addresses the issue of the intelligibility of liberal doctrine and of liberal democratic citizenship itself. This rhetorical turn, the move from a metaphysical to a political interpretation of liberal doctrine, calls for a rethinking of the discursive form or cognitive status of liberal political ideas. But it also requires a certain reversal in our understanding of the relationship between the public sphere and the private sphere.

According to Rawls, a political or rhetorical version of liberal doctrine presents liberalism as a doctrine that is partial rather than comprehensive in scope. But I think we must take this conception of the partial character of liberal doctrine one step further. To conceive of liberalism now as a doctrine pertaining only to the part rather than to the whole of life is to do more than merely introduce into our view of liberalism the idea of its limitation in scope. Rather, and far more, it is to assign to liberal doctrine, within the context of a postmodern civic culture, a new rhetorical function. To the extent that modernist liberal political theory represented liberalism as a comprehensive or totalizing doctrine, a political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine must actively undo this totalization. It must reverse the effects of the modernist representation of liberal moral and political ideals as elements of a totalizing world view.

One particular area in which this reversal must be accomplished concerns our understanding of the relative cultural standing and significance of the public and private spheres. The direction of this reversal is indicated in Rawls's conception of an overlapping consensus. According to Rawls, a political conception of justice is in fact, one that fully acknowledges and affirms its own restricted scope, cannot provide a basis
for social unity and stability. Social unity and stability can be provided only by an overlapping consensus in support of liberal moral ideals and political arrangements among members of diverse cultural communities.269

This means that the liberal conception of justice that governs political arrangements and provides order to the public sphere must be defined and presented in such a way that it is capable of gaining the support of the diverse cultural communities subject to it. Rawls himself does not emphasize it, but this view of the role of an overlapping consensus definitely constitutes a reversal in our understanding of a certain aspect of the relationship between the public and private spheres in a liberal democracy.

It is this reversal that must not only be observed, but also pursued actively as one piece of the postmodern reconstruction of liberalism and liberal democratic civic culture. This reversal concerns the relative dependence and independence of the cultural perspectives proper to the public and private spheres. The reversal is due to the demise of modernist liberal conceptions of liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine.

When conceived as a comprehensive doctrine or totalizing world view, liberalism seemed capable of providing the basis of social unity and stability. For modernist liberalism, the totalizing cultural standpoint proper to the liberal democratic public sphere was capable by itself of providing norms and justifying political arrangements, independently of the diverse cultural world views proper to particular ethnic, class, and religious communities.

269 See Political Liberalism, 150ff and 385 for the three kinds of overlapping consensus. These have to do with what reasonable justice is and what is reasonable about political and moral reasonableness.
Currently, with the abandonment of totalizing modernist conceptions of liberal doctrine, the tables must be turned. The relationship of dependence must be reversed. Liberalism, as a doctrine pertaining only to the part and not to the whole of life, can no longer, using its own resources alone, provide a cultural basis for social stability and unity. That cultural basis must be supplied by a consensus among members of the diverse cultural communities that make up any particular liberal democracy. It is this reversal that I have in mind when I speak of the de-totalization of the public sphere.270

In this section the researcher has explored briefly a few of the implications of this reversal above. First, let us make sure that we clearly understand the nature of the reversal itself. What the researcher has called the de-totalization of the public sphere is a project that is part of a general reorientation of liberal political philosophy. This project aims at replacing the modernist conception of liberal doctrine as one sufficient by itself to provide the cultural basis of the unity and stability of society with a political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine, one that views the stability and unity of society as dependent upon the development of an overlapping cultural consensus supportive of liberal moral ideals and political arrangements supported by knowledge.

Liberal moral ideals and political arrangements define the public sphere of a liberal democracy. The public sphere is the realm of speech and action within which the issues pertaining to the basic institutional structure of society are addressed and within which citizens address and behave toward one another explicitly as citizens. This means they are free and equal individuals. Modernist liberal political theory conceived of the

270 See Political Liberalism, 153ff. In any given society, like ours, we have moral pluralism and political consensus that are evident. What is largely in play is reasonable pluralism.
public sphere in a way that represented it as culturally self-sufficient, as sufficient to provide a cultural basis for the unity and stability of society. It interpreted those ideas and ideals as components of a comprehensive or totalizing world view, a world view capable of addressing satisfactorily all the basic issues of human life.  

Let us recall briefly how this cultural totalization of the public sphere was represented by modernist liberal civic culture. As we noted earlier, modernist liberal political theory identified the normative standpoint of citizenship, the standpoint of free and equal individuality, as the universal and essential standpoint of humanity as such. If the public sphere of a liberal democracy is the field of activity wherein citizens assume the standpoint of free and equal individuality and if the standpoint of free and equal individuality is identified as the universal and essential standpoint of humanity as such, then, in this interpretation, the liberal democratic public sphere assumes a profound moral and metaphysical significance. It becomes the primary locus or encompassing setting within which the metaphysical drama of human life is played out. It is in the liberal democratic public sphere that the metaphysically defining traits of human beings, the basis for conceptions of universal human rights, are either given their full weight or denied.

Interpreted in this way, the public sphere could not be viewed simply as one contingent field of activity and aspiration among others. The properties attributed to human beings as members of particularistic cultural communities are not metaphysically

271. *Political Liberalism*, xlix, where Rawls is concerned with what is the most reasonable basis of social unity available to citizens of modern liberal democracy by giving it three features. The features are the basic social structure, reasonable comprehensive doctrines and a public political discussion. See also 133ff.
272. Ibid, 411.
indelible. As persons alter their ethnic, class, and religious identifications and affiliations, old descriptions are replaced by new. But, through all such changes, a person’s underlying, metaphysically permanent identity, that of a free and equal individual, remains.

This way of representing the relationship between civic identity and communitarian identity was the basis for the modernist liberal interpretation of the public sphere as the culturally basic and all-encompassing field of activity and aspiration. Thus interpreted, the public sphere could easily be represented as culturally self-sufficient. This representation is viewed, as containing within itself all the cultural resources necessary to provide a cultural basis for the unity and stability of society.

We must keep in mind, of course, that we are now speaking only of the way in which the public sphere was represented by the form of civic culture shaped in its content specifically by the ideas of modernist liberal political theory. Further, we must keep in mind that this attribution of metaphysical significance and priority to the public sphere affected only the beliefs of those citizens actually influenced by modernist civic culture, which points to, the citizens most politically active and self-consciously liberal.

Needless to say, large numbers of nominal citizens in every liberal democracy develop the moral and linguistic capacities of citizenship either only partially or not at all. Such nominal citizens either marginalize themselves to some degree politically and culturally, at the extreme, for example, think of the various political parties in Kenya or the small religious sects, or participate in reactionary cultural and political movements.

273 Ibid, 14ff.
actively hostile to the values of the liberal democratic public sphere, like in the present Kenya.

Among such nominal citizens, the totalizing culture of the public sphere generally had little positive impact. But where modernist liberal civic culture did take hold and create citizens, the totalizing culture of the public sphere did influence beliefs. From the standpoint of this totalizing culture, there was no question as to the proper rank and cultural significance to be assigned to the public sphere. The cultural worlds inhabited by particularistic ethnic, class, and religious communities were seen as having a clearly secondary and subordinate status.

In the norms proper to those cultural worlds, the metaphysically defining traits of humanity at large are not at issue. At issue in those particularistic cultural worlds are merely the arbitrary projects fostered by the accidental historical conditions of local community life. Thus, among citizens actually influenced by the totalizing culture of the modernist liberal public sphere, the consequence of affirming the cultural self-sufficiency of the public sphere was a certain diminution of the cognitive and moral authority of particularistic cultural beliefs and life ideals. Since it was above all the particularistic cultural beliefs and life ideals of religious communities that were diminished in moral authority by the modernist liberal totalization of the public sphere, let us refer to this general consequence as the process of secularization.274

274 What we have is the prominent drift away from religious practices that are held as divinely instituted to flawless differing conclusions regarding moral, religious and metaphysical matters. Reason then leads to a dissensus on some of the matters and the disagreement we have. This is all because of the belief that pluralism is dangerous to religion and religion is undermined by pluralism. Hence, politics quarantines pluralism. For example, see Richard S. Wagoner, *Mormon*
Modernist liberal political theory represented the liberal democratic public sphere as containing within itself the cultural resources necessary to provide a cultural basis for the unity and stability of society. The unity and stability of society was an interest common to all citizens. A good citizen is one whose beliefs as well as actions are consistent with the goal of maintaining a united and stable society. When the public sphere is represented as containing within itself the cultural resources necessary for social unity and stability, the natural presumption is that the cultural resources offered by the public sphere are alone consistent with good citizenship.

To the extent that this sort of presumption made itself felt, the cognitive and moral requirements of good citizenship seemed to be in direct conflict with the cognitive and moral requirements imposed by adherence to particularistic cultural world views, especially religious world views. The totalizing culture of the liberal public sphere offered moral ideals that were incompatible with those identified with particular ethnic, class, and religious communities. Two of these liberal moral ideals, what I have called the civic ethics of authenticity and the civic ethics of autonomy, were particularly hostile to religious values and beliefs. Yet, from the standpoint of modernist liberal civic culture, it seemed that the unity and stability of society could be guaranteed only by widespread, if not exclusive, adherence to these liberal moral ideals.278

4.4.3. Cultural Functions of Knowledge Beyond the Secularization Imperative276

Polygamy: A History, (Salt Lake City, UT: Signature Books 1986), 114. Pluralism seems to be a consuming fire for religion but finds its place in politics founded on reason.

275 Ibid.
From what we have seen so far, the totalization of the public sphere by modernist liberalism seemed to impose on society as a whole a process of cultural secularization, in other words, it is a process mandating, in the name of good citizenship and the unity and stability of society, acceptance of a totalizing cultural world view that diminished the authority of beliefs and values held by particular ethnic, class, and religious communities.

The totalization of the public sphere in modernist liberal civic culture produced in this way something like an informally established, state-sponsored secular "religion," meaning, a totalizing cultural world view whose acceptance was tacitly required as a condition for full cultural citizenship.277

Fundamentalist Christian critics of liberalism, critics whose entire point of view has been largely determined by their reaction against this secular "religion," have given it the name of "secular humanism." Devotion is here given to the human person as a human being.278 If nothing else, their campaign against what they call secular humanism demonstrates their acute awareness of the cultural forces arrayed against them (and against all other religious persons inclined toward orthodoxy) in modernist civic culture. It also points to a problem that any political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine must address.279


278. See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology. 97-99 and 275 where he treats secularism and humanism.

279. See Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 84ff.
Metaphysical liberalism asserted the cultural independence and self-sufficiency of the public realm in a way that set it in opposition to the moral ideals and world views of particularistic cultural communities. The totalizing culture of the modernist liberal public sphere defined the public sphere in a way that was in principle and always potentially totalitarian, joining the liberal democratic public sphere with a cultural world view claiming inclusive and exclusive dominion (time when excommunication was rife).

Rawls's conception of an overlapping cultural consensus addresses this problem. With the demise of Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge, the world view that provided the cultural resources supporting the cultural independence of the public sphere has collapsed. This fact alone renders obsolete the modernist liberal representation of the political sphere as culturally self-sufficient.280

A post-Enlightenment political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine is one that acknowledges and embraces its restricted cognitive and moral scope. For such a conception of liberal doctrine, the public sphere cannot supply the cultural resources necessary to provide a cultural basis for the unity and stability of society. This cultural basis must be supplied by an overlapping consensus among the particularistic cultural communities that make up any given liberal democracy. This does not mean that the public sphere by itself cannot offer some cultural perspectives supportive of social unity and stability.281

280 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 390ff.
281 Ibid, 38ff.
What it means is that the liberal moral ideals and political arrangements defining the public sphere must be supported primarily by cultural resources drawn from particularistic ethnic, class and religious world views. It also means that, in order to secure this support, liberal doctrine must not be formulated or understood in such a way as to conflict gratuitously with beliefs and moral ideals sponsored by particularistic cultural communities, it must be conceived explicitly as a doctrine pertaining only to a part and not to the whole of life, one that leaves plenty of room for orthodoxies of all kinds.

This is the nature of that reversal in our understanding of the relationship between the public and private spheres that is announced in Rawls’s conception of an overlapping cultural consensus. The philosophical project of carrying through this reversal systematically the researcher has called this the de-totalization of the public sphere. Once the nature and goals of this project have been roughly defined, the next step is to begin the process of rethinking liberalism in a way that no longer represents the liberal democratic public sphere as culturally self-sufficient. One of the primary tasks of a political or rhetorical conception of liberalism is to establish clearly the cultural limits of the public sphere. If liberalism is a moral doctrine pertaining only to the part and not to the whole of life, the next task must be to define that part.

282 Ibid, 6. The researcher here takes cue with Rawls who sees the content of this conception as made up of three main conceptions. First, we have a specification of certain basic rights, liberties and opportunities (a kind familiar from constitutional democratic regimes); second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties and opportunities, especially with respect to claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and third, on this conception, measures assuring all citizens of adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities. These elements can be understood in different ways, hence, a variant liberalism may ensure. The issue of an overlapping consensus still comes up.
political arrangements apply to only limited range of life issues, then just what is their specific range of application?\textsuperscript{283}

According to Rawls, liberalism as a political doctrine takes as its subject the basic institutional structure of society. A particular conception of civic justice defines a specific way of ordering that basic structure. Needless to say, the way in which this question is answered by citizens of any particular liberal democracy has an impact on every aspect of their lives. The basic institutional structure of a liberal democracy shapes an entire way of life. It defines rights, liberties, and protections and it assigns duties and responsibilities. From the basic structure of society are derived rules that govern the relationships between employer and employee, husband and wife, parent and child, merchant and customer.

To determine the basic institutional structure of a society is to structure these relationships. Because questions about the basic structure of society involve every aspect of life and affect every citizen, the perspective that must be adopted in answering those questions, which is to say, the perspective proper to the liberal democratic public sphere, is a perspective on the whole society. The legislator, the elected official, the civil administrator, the judge, all these roles require that the individuals assuming them adopt this perspective on the whole.

This perspective on the whole, however, encompasses the whole of society only with respect to one issue, the issue of civic justice.\textsuperscript{284} The basic structure of society structures the relationships between employer and employee, husband and wife, parent

\textsuperscript{283}Ibid, 382-385, Rawls treats of these perspectives.

\textsuperscript{284}Ibid, 208ff. This conception is developed from the overlapping consensus on political conception that establishes mutual good of mutual justice.
and child, merchant and customer, but only with respect to the question of whether the
definition and the functioning of these relationships are just. This means that the
relationships are in accordance with the fundamental conception of civic justice
embodied in the basic political arrangements of society. On the other hand, each one of
these relationships have their primary setting within a more encompassing context of life
issues, the general life issues of sex, friendship, work, suffering, sin, death, and salvation.
a context in which civic justice is but one issue among others. Thus, while it is true that
the cultural and political perspective proper to the public sphere is a perspective on the
whole of society, it therefore, encompasses all citizens and affects all their relationships
and activities, it nevertheless encompasses the whole only with respect to one issue in the
universe of human concerns. A political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine
addresses only this one issue. Comprehensive doctrines or totalizing world views, on the
other hand, speak to them all.285

Liberal democracy is distinguished from other forms of political association by
the way it makes questions of civic justice answerable independently of the global
answers given to other life issues. The citizens of a liberal democracy, in a continuous
process of public deliberation, decide how they will organize their cooperation. Whatever
decisions they may make in any particular case, the point of agreement from which they
begin their deliberation is the principle that political or civic justice is not to be
determined by the criteria established by one or another global response to the entire
context of human life issues. This relative independence of the issue of civic justice finds

285 Ibid, 192ff. Public policy has to be what the state puts in place to ensure there is equal opportunity
for all citizens to advance any conception of the good they freely affirm.

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its expression in the liberal doctrine of the priority of the right over the good. Within the entire context of human life issues, only civic justice, as conceived by liberal doctrine, can be given this kind of independence.

In decisions involving judgments about sex, friendship, work, suffering, sin, death, and salvation, human beings apply criteria drawn from one or another comprehensive conception of the good life. Decisions about these questions normally require reference to ultimate purposes and goals, some conception of what life is finally all about, some conception of what is of lasting importance, some more or less clear specification of priorities. Particular decisions by individuals about these questions determine and reflect their membership in particularistic cultural communities.286

The criteria applied in such decisions are normally drawn from and guided by shared traditions of coherent and comprehensive belief, traditions that attempt to provide a coherent set of responses to the full range of human life issues, so that responses to the issue of sex or reproduction cohere with responses to the issue of friendship or companionship and responses to the issue of work, and so on. In questions of political or civic justice, however, liberalism requires citizens to apply criteria drawn from a source that lies external to any particularistic cultural tradition or community. They must measure the justice of their relationships and their actions not by reference to criteria drawn from one or another shared conception of the good, but rather by reference to

286 Ibid, 164ff. The constitution should be the basis for the principles of basic political rights and liberties and so should be our democratic procedures, they should become an overlapping consensus only because of the constitution in place.

criteria drawn from a set of agreed-upon principles of civic justice that govern their cooperation.287

Liberal doctrine pertains to the part rather than the whole of life, then, in this sense that it concerns only that sphere defined by the principles of civic justice. It is important to note that, more strictly, liberal doctrine pertains not just to a part of life, but to a part of a part. The issue of civic justice is only one aspect of the general life issue of justice. The general life issue of justice arises from the human need for a socially confirmed sense of dignity or self-respect.288

The rule of justice is "equals to equals."289 This means that persons who are considered equal (in some respect and in accordance with some measure) should be treated equally. To be socially confirmed in one's self-respect, meaning, to be treated justly, one must be treated in ways that are perceived to be equal to the treatment of other persons who are considered to be of the same status and rank. In defining status and rank, criteria must be applied. Some criteria that define differentials of status and rank are drawn from intrinsic features of particular life activities or life issues.290

Thus, with respect to the life issue of sex or reproduction, rank and relative worth are determined by beauty, strength, fertility, and so on. With respect to the life issue of friendship or companionship, rank and relative worth are determined by family

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287 Ibid.
288 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 164. See also his A Theory of Justice, 302-3 and 475. All social primary goods: liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect, are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured.
289 A Theory of Justice, 52-53.
290 Ibid.
relationship, common interests, and personal compatibility. With respect to the life issue of work, rank and relative worth are determined by talent, economic resources, and industry.

In addition to these criteria of rank and status drawn from intrinsic features of particular life activities and life issues, other criteria are drawn from the ranking systems defined by different conceptions of the good or cultural traditions. In different cultural traditions, the various life issues are assigned different degrees of importance for the overall meaning and purpose of life. In some cultural traditions, sin and salvation are accorded supreme importance, while sex and reproduction are ranked lower. In other cultural traditions, work and friendship are given primacy over both sex and salvation. These cultural differences determine the culturally, defined status and rank of any particular individual with respect to any particular life issue and life activity. General features of human life, such as age, health, gender, and race or birth, will affect an individual's rank or status differently depending on membership in different cultural communities.

Accordingly, if the general life issue of justice, in other words, the issue raised by the need for a socially confirmed sense of self-respect, is a matter of securing equal treatment for persons of equal rank or status, then this issue will be decided in most cases by resort to local, culturally determined ranking systems, for it is such local ranking
systems that define with respect to most life issues what constitutes equal status and rank in any given case.  

Let us call issues of justice that are resolved by resort to such local, culturally sensitive ranking systems issues of **communitarian justice**. In matters of communitarian justice, the reverse of the liberal principle holds, that is, the good has priority over and defines the right. In matters of communitarian justice, the rule of justice, "equals to equals," is given its concrete application and content by reference to one or another local conception of the good.  

With the establishment of liberal political institutions, the issue of justice is defined in a new way. Of course, even in a liberal democracy, most questions of justice remain questions of communitarian justice. But liberal political institutions introduce a new set of criteria for determining rank and relative worth. We have called issues of justice that are resolved by resort to these new criteria issues of **civic justice**. Liberal doctrine pertains only to that sphere of life defined by the proper application of the criteria of civic justice.  

Liberal doctrine thus pertains not only to a part of life, to one life issue among many. but, more exactly, to a part of that part, to the life issue of justice as civic justice. Issues of civic justice are resolved not by resort to ranking systems belonging to one or another particularistic cultural community, but rather by resort to a set of agreed upon principles underlying the institutional structure of a liberal democracy. These principles
constitute the criteria of civic justice, the criteria according to which the rule of justice is applied to define the equal status and determine the equal treatment of citizens.\textsuperscript{294}

Of course, the specific principles that determine the specific criteria of civic justice will differ from one liberal democracy to another. Those specific principles are always a matter for decision by citizens. They are subject to revision. There can be no "theory" of civic justice that could claim to define the principles of civic justice for any particular liberal democracy in advance of the political process through which those principles are actually found acceptable. However, while the principles of civic justice cannot be defined in advance of that political process, if they are to qualify as principles of liberal or civic justice, they must be consistent with the conception of equality inherent in the notion of citizenship itself.\textsuperscript{295}

A citizen is a human being whose rank or status is determined by reference to the basic structure of a modern constitutional democracy. As citizens, in their relationship to the state and to the basic structure of society, human beings are not distinguished by reference to their membership in particular ethnic, class, or religious communities. They are not distinguished by reference to their race, age, or gender. Thus, in their relationship

\textsuperscript{294} A Theory of Justice, 83ff.
to the basic structure of a liberal democratic society, human beings are taken simply as individuals belonging to that given society. 296

Further, the differentials of status, rank and relative worth that come into play for various purposes when human beings are viewed as members of ethnic, class, and religious communities have no relevance when they are viewed simply as citizens. Thus, in their relationship to the basic structure of liberal democratic society, human beings are viewed as possessing equal status or rank, whatever may be their rank or status in other contexts. 297

Further, the personal goals and commitments assumed by human beings as members of particularistic ethnic, class, or religious communities define their identities as members of those communities. But when viewed in relationship to the basic structure of a liberal democratic society, the identities of human beings are defined only by rights and duties, liberties and constraints applying to all citizens equally as specified by law. In that relationship, human beings are understood as being free. The meaning of which is that they are free to alter their purely personal goals, commitments, and identities at will. 298

In their relationship to the basic structure of a liberal democratic society, then, human beings are viewed as free and equal individuals. When addressing and acting towards one another explicitly in this way, meaning, as free and equal individuals, human beings explicitly assume the attributes and standpoint proper to citizenship. In addressing one another as citizens, human beings adopt standards of relevance that render

296. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Citizens are members of the entire society regardless of anything else.
297. See Political Liberalism. 19 and 30 citizens are free and equal persons in a democratic state.
298. Ibid.
differences of race, age, gender, ethnicity, social class, and religious belief irrelevant. The specific principles of civic justice adopted at any given time by any particular liberal democracy may vary widely in their content. But, to qualify as principles of liberal or civic justice, they must be consistent with this normative conception of free and equal individuality inherent in the very notion of liberal democratic citizenship.299

4.4.4. Cultural Functions of Knowledge towards an Overlapping Consensus Supportive of a De-Totalized Public Sphere300

In any case, it is clear that liberal doctrine, understood in this way as pertaining only to matters of civic justice, pertains only to the part rather than to the whole of life. In the same way, the liberal democratic public sphere, as the sphere defined by a common interest in civic justice, must also be represented as encompassing issues relevant only to a restricted set of concerns.

Conceived of in this way, the public sphere cannot be represented as a sphere providing on its own resources sufficient to provide a cultural basis for social stability and unity. The interest in civic justice, however intense, is simply too abstract, too culturally “thin” to generate the deep commitment to civic values and the strong feelings of civic friendship required for social stability and unity. The cultural resources required for the generation of such commitment and feeling must be drawn from the resources of the various cultural communities that make up any particular liberal democracy.301

299.Ibid.
300.Ibid. 150ff.
301.Ibid. 137, also lv. 217-218 and 240ff. Rawls’s Political Liberalism, brings forth the close association there is with the norm of respect. This is in the principle of citizens as free and equal. This principle has direct implications for cultural communities and particular practice of liberal democracy.
But if, conceived in this way, the liberal democratic public sphere cannot be represented as culturally self-sufficient; neither can it be represented as mandating acceptance of a totalizing cultural world view as a condition for full cultural citizenship, a totalizing world view that is competitive with or hostile to the cultural world views and life ideals of particularistic cultural communities. With this conception, the cultural perspectives proper to the public sphere cannot present an obstacle to the formation of the overlapping cultural consensus necessary for the survival of any postmodern liberal democracy.\footnote{Political Liberalism, 137.}

The de-totalization of the cultural perspectives proper to the public sphere thus can make an important contribution to the intelligibility of postmodern liberal democratic citizenship. Rawls's conception of the overlapping cultural consensus that must provide the cultural basis for social unity and stability effectively reverses the relationship of dependence between the public and private spheres. Speech and action within the public sphere must be modified accordingly.\footnote{Ibid.}

If the cultural perspectives proper to the public sphere encompass only matters relevant to the issue of civic justice, then the public sphere can no longer be understood as a secularized and secularizing setting within which the drama of human life as a whole is played out, a totalizing cultural domain demanding acceptance of its moral and cognitive ideals in the name of social stability and unity. Rather, the liberal democratic public sphere must find its cultural foundations beyond itself, by appeal to beliefs and values that have their home outside the domain of political life. Liberal doctrine in the

\footnote{Political Liberalism, 137.}
future must be understood and formulated in such a way as to make that appeal successful. This is not to say, however, that, with the de-totalization of the public sphere and of liberal doctrine in general, all tension is removed between civic and communitarian moral ideals. But the tensions that remain have more to do with questions of motivation than with questions of intelligibility.

Civic and communitarian moral ideals, after all, serve very different life functions. The ideal of civic justice, for example, will always in some measure conflict with ideals of communitarian justice. The criteria proper to communitarian justice are specified by the totalizing world views of particularistic cultural communities. These cultural communities are communities of shared aspiration and interest. Such communities are ultimately rooted in the soil of biological life. They develop distinctive styles of reproduction, nourishment, labour, speech, and mutual care that are at the same

304. See Kenneth Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), 64; here we find quoted the challenge by Martin Luther King Jr., to the American Christians to oppose racial segregation and any other form of discrimination in obedience to God’s will. Thus, “you have a dual citizenry. You live in both time and eternity. Your highest loyalty is to God, and not to the mores and folkways, the state or the nation, or any man-made institution. If any earthly institution or custom conflicts with God’s will, it is your Christian duty to oppose it. You must never allow transitory evanescent demands of man-made institutions to take precedence over the eternal demands of the mighty God.”

305. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” 105. He insists on the obligation to obey God extending into the political realm. He says, “It belongs to religious convictions of a good many religions in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions. They do not view it as an opinion whether or not to do so. It is their conviction that they ought to allow the word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their experience as a whole, including, then, their social and political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and political existence, it is also about their social and political existence.”

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time styles and modalities of human desire. These totalizing world views or conceptions of the good have as their function the nurturing, direction, and support of that desire.\textsuperscript{306}

Wherever human desire and aspiration must be nurtured, there also must hierarchy and rank exist. Characteristic of communities of aspiration and common interest are relations of command and submission, dependence and domination. In such communities, various forms of servitude, hierarchical social organization, and segregation based on age and gender are typical. The moral ideals sponsored by such communities are designed to give form and direction to the lives of individuals by shaping desire in specific ways. Those ideals define hierarchies of excellence and achievement that determine the rank order of the individuals subject to them. Nothing could be more foreign to such communities than the civic moral ideals of freedom and equality.\textsuperscript{307}

Here the issue of motivation arises. Properly understood, civic culture is always a partial and a countervailing culture. Civic culture is the culture proper to the public sphere. It is a “thin” culture, addressed to only one general life issue, for instance, the issue of civic justice. Civic culture differs radically in purpose from communitarian cultures. It does not provide an interpretive framework for life as a whole. It does not define a standard reproductive style, an ideal of family life, or a set of answers to life’s deepest questions. It does not provide hierarchies of excellence and achievement designed to nurture and direct human desire and aspiration. Rather, civic culture has but one knowledge function. It must provide the cultural resources sufficient to render

\textsuperscript{306}See \textit{A Theory of Justice}, the good as it is defined and extended to other cases. 384-385 and the question of motivation itself as a good and the question of congruence. 496-504.

\textsuperscript{307}See \textit{A Theory of Justice}, 274-275.
intelligible the liberal democratic moral ideals of individual freedom and equality and to motivate citizens to pursue those ideals. When a civic culture successfully carries out this function, it does not create a new particularistic community of aspiration and common interest that stands opposed to other particularistic cultural communities. It does not create a new totalizing communitarian culture that provides a global conception of a complete and flourishing human life. Rather, when civic culture functions effectively it provides citizens with the linguistic and moral capacities to meet the requirements of civic justice, this means, to treat one another as free and equal individuals in accordance with a set of agreed-upon principles or rules. These civic capacities do not exist apart from the capacities required for the successful pursuit of goals defined by communitarian culture. They exist only as a modification of those capacities.\textsuperscript{308}

Civic culture, then, as a partial and countervailing culture, presupposes and remains dependent upon communitarian culture. It cannot stand by itself. The modernist liberal project of constructing a civic culture that could be misunderstood as something like a communitarian culture resembles the project of making the tail wag the dog. This is what Rawls's doctrine of the overlapping cultural consensus tells us. It tells us that the relationship of dependence between civic and communitarian culture established by modernist liberal political theory must be reversed. A civic culture, to carry out its function successfully, must draw upon the traditions and moral ideals of the

\textsuperscript{308}Ibid, 340.
particularistic cultural communities it addresses. What the notion of an overlapping cultural consensus does not do is tell us how this can be done.\textsuperscript{309}

The civic moral ideals of individual freedom and equality are not only partial and "thin" as moral ideals. They also can be unsettling to adherents of communitarian cultures. Civic moral ideals can be dangerous. Citizens in the full cultural sense are those who have developed the capacity to put aside the ranking systems and hierarchies proper to their communitarian cultures and to address other citizens within the public sphere as free and equal individuals. But to put aside communitarian ranking systems and hierarchies is at least to place limits on their otherwise all-encompassing claims to authority. Liberal civic culture can often appear to adherents of communitarian cultures as a culture that requires the abandonment of all ranking systems and the overturning of all hierarchies.

Whereas the specific conflict between civic and communitarian cultures produced by modernist liberalism can be overcome by the de-totalization of the public sphere, this other conflict, the conflict between civic and communitarian ideals of justice, is intrinsic to the relationship between civic and communitarian cultures. Civic culture is a countervailing culture. It seeks to modify the speech, action, and very identities of the adherents of particularistic communitarian cultures in ways that can be unsettling.

If civic culture is to be effective in producing these modifications, it must be persuasive. But what means of persuasion are available to it? If civic culture seems to threaten the abandonment of all ranking systems and the overturning of all hierarchies,

\textsuperscript{309}See \textit{Political Liberalism}, 184ff.
ranking systems and hierarchies required for the nurturing and direction of human desire, how can adherents of particularistic communitarian cultures be convinced that it is worthwhile to undertake the considerable moral and intellectual task of becoming citizens in the full cultural sense?

From the questions raised above there is need to develop cultural resources that support an overlapping consensus. This could be a way of seeing how arguments are reasonably formulated by deducing and validating the arguments for philosophical value speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture. Hence, we may appeal to the basic analogy between the civic good and the Christian good which depends on perception of the following similarities: (i) Both liberalism and Christianity seek to produce a global affirmation of particularistic human desire; (ii) Both seek to accomplish this by producing a transformation of desire, so that attainment of the new object of desire involves an abandonment of the standpoint proper to particularistic desire and thus a modification of particularistic desire itself; and (iii) The standpoints proper to the new objects of desire, in the case of liberalism, the standpoint of the love of civic justice and, in the case of Christianity, the standpoint of the love of God, are standpoints that, in different ways, cannot be represented in narrative terms and require the development of identities characterized by the externalization of all narratively-defined traits.\textsuperscript{310}

Once again, the perception of this analogy is not the assertion of an identification of the civic good with the Christian good, an identification of the space of civic discourse with the eternal order. As in the case of all analogies or metaphors, the perception of this

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid. 134.
analogy is a creative act. It is not some sort of direct intuition of a pre-existing essential relationship between liberal democratic cultural values and the values of Christianity.

Otherwise, analogies also can transform in a profound way our understanding of the analogues. This is the sort of creative process that must occur among the members of a number of different cultural communities if a new overlapping cultural consensus in support of liberal democratic institutions is to be achieved. Christians (like Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, among many others) in any given liberal democracies are also citizens. As citizens, it is their civic duty to identify and strengthen the resources within their own cultural tradition that support the practice of citizenship. As Christians, love of God and neighbour dictates the identification and strengthening of Christian theological, confessional, and pastoral resources that can enhance the practice of Christianity by persons who are citizens of liberal democracies.311

In this way, the perception and further development of this analogy between the civic good and the Christian good would support Christians in the performance of both their civic and their Christian duties. But the development of an explicitly civic form of Christianity is not only a matter of duty. The very survival of liberal democratic political institutions in the postmodern era may depend on it. Given the fact that a large majority of citizens in a number liberal democracies are Christians or at least strongly influenced by Christianity, it may be the case that only the emergence of an explicitly civic form of

311 Ibid, 194ff and 217.
Christian belief and practice can provide the motivational support necessary for an effective postmodern civic culture.\textsuperscript{312}

There is good reason to believe, however, that a civic Christianity can emerge that can play this role. The analogy between the civic good and the Christian good can be extended further in many different directions. For example, let us consider briefly a possible analogy that could be developed between civic friendship and the Christian love of neighbour.\textsuperscript{313}

Christians, like all citizens of liberal democracies, are called upon to cultivate both civic friendship and communitarian solidarity. They are therefore called upon to develop the moral insight or prudence required for the full and proper development of both. As citizens, it is the civic duty of Christians to locate within their own cultural tradition resources supportive of a liberal democratic civic culture. The potential resources of that tradition for such a purpose are vast. Another case of this might be noted in the congruence between civic friendship and the Christian love of neighbour. Let me point out a few general parallels.

Christian love of neighbour, however greatly it may differ from civic friendship, is paradoxical in many of the same ways. To see the similarity, we must remember that liberal democracy requires persons to move within two very different moral contexts, contexts that stand in a relation of tension with one another: the sphere of local community life and the liberal democratic public sphere. Participation in the public

\textsuperscript{312} Ibid, 134.
\textsuperscript{313} See Ibid, li; given as having a relation to the criterion of reciprocity. It may as well do to find such analogies in other religions.
sphere, in the space of civic discourse, requires a kind of abandonment or surrender of the
standpoint proper to membership in a particularistic cultural community.

Where as, liberal democracy requires citizens to develop and cultivate a
standpoint and an identity proper to civic life, one that involves a significant modification
of communitarian identity. The development and cultivation of civic identity includes,
among other things, the cultivation of a capacity for civic friendship, a friendship uniting
all citizens without regard to their diverse and conflicting communitarian commitments
and interests. But a cultivation of this civic bond of affection can be disruptive to
relationships of communitarian solidarity because the libertarian and egalitarian nature of
civic friendship can seem incompatible with the exclusivist and rank-sensitive nature of
communitarian friendship. 314

At out time, Christianity draws distinctions and imposes responsibilities similar to
these. Like citizens of liberal democracies, Christians also belong to two worlds, the
world of temporal affairs, or the City of Man, and the world of eternal things, or the City
of God. Full membership in the City of God, like full liberal democratic cultural
citizenship, requires a relinquishing of the standpoint proper to particularistic desire. Like
citizens of liberal democracies, citizens of the City of God must develop and cultivate a
new standpoint and an identity, in the case of Christianity, a standpoint distinct from and
even alien to identities and roles adopted within the sphere of temporal affairs.

Among scientists, to stress the point of temporality, the success of molecular
biology in accounting for many of the basic mechanisms of genetics and biological

314. See Political Liberalism, li.
activity has often been taken as a vindication of the reductionist approach. Thus Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA,315 wrote: "The ultimate aim of the modern in biology is in fact to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry."316 Other findings of science suggest that humanity is alone in an immense and impersonal universe. Physicist Steven Weinberg holds that scientific activity itself is the only source of consolation in the meaningless world. The earth is "just a tiny part of an overwhelming hostile universe."

The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. But if there is no solace in the fruits of research, there is at least some consolation in the research itself.... The effort to understand the universe is one of the very few things that lifts human life a little above the level of farce, and gives it some grace of tragedy.317

Given the findings of science, like liberal democratic citizens, Christians, as citizens of the "heavenly" City, must also cultivate a new kind of friendship, in the case of Christianity, a kind of friendship that is alien to the communitarian solidarity that unites members of the City of Man. This friendship that unites the citizens of the City of God is Christian love of neighbour or charity. Further, just as civic friendship and communitarian solidarity coexist uneasily, so also the Christian love of neighbour introduces tension and ambiguity into the communitarian relationships proper to the City of Man.

Here we find how the "genetic trails left by our ancestors are leading scientists back across time in an epic of discovery of human migration."
Let us now fill in a few details of this comparison in an attempt to show precisely how the Christian love of neighbour might become a vital element of a postmodern civic culture that supports the cultivation of civic friendship.

We must keep clearly in view the fact that, within the civil order, the Christian community constitutes one cultural community among others. As a particular cultural community united by a shared conception of the good life, the Christian community has all the general features of every other such community. Christianity is a comprehensive doctrine that addresses (at the limit) all the general issues of human life. It offers to its adherents a totalizing world view that encompasses human life in its entirety.¹⁸

Moreover, the Christian community is embodied in institutions with different types and various degrees of organization. These institutions, Christian churches, have a variety of functions beyond their strictly religious function. They are political organizations, advancing the political interests of Christians as Christians within the encompassing civil order. They are welfare organizations, satisfying the material, psychological, and social needs of Christians. They are economic organizations, often owning property, buying and selling goods, raising and spending money in pursuit of various other goals. They are educational institutions, teaching their members not only about Christian faith, but also offering them information, narratives, and arguments relating to current issues of concern.

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¹⁸ See Kenneth Wald, *Religion in the United States*, 64; once more we recall the challenge by Martin Luther King, Jr., to American Christians to oppose racial segregation and any other form of discrimination in obedience to God's will. This, "you have a dual citizenship. You live both in time and eternity. Your highest loyalty is to God, and not to the mores or the folkways, the state or the nation, or man-made institution. If any earthly institution or custom conflicts with God's will, it is your Christian duty to oppose it. You must never allow transitory, evanescent demands of man-made institutions to take precedence over the demands of the mighty God." Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues," 105, he insists on the obligation to obey God above all else.
to all citizens. As political, welfare, economic and educational organizations, Christian churches generate institutional structures not unlike those of non-religious organizations. Organizational activities must be initiated and managed. Some minimally hierarchical system of responsibility must be established to direct and oversee such activities.319

As political, welfare, economic, and educational organizations, Christian churches create their own distinctive and separate cultural identity within the larger society. They constitute more or less exclusive particularistic cultural communities and their members are necessarily united by an awareness of their differences from members of other such communities. Governed by this awareness of difference, Christian churches generate their own forms of communitarian solidarity. They generate their own local cultures, their own ranking systems, styles of speech and dress, rites of initiation and passage, preferences in entertainment and leisure activities, and so on.

The Christian community, however, understood in this way as a community united by communitarian solidarity, an institutionally organized association serving many different purposes, is not yet understood with respect to what makes it a specifically Christian community. In the vocabulary of theology, the Christian community, understood as a community united in communitarian solidarity, belongs to this world, the world of temporal affairs, the City of Man. Christian churches, as political, welfare, economic, and educational institutions, constitute the visible church, the church that stands organizationally distinct from all other forms of association found within the encompassing civil order.

However, what unites Christians specifically as Christians is not a form of communitarian solidarity. To the extent that persons who are members of Christian churches have developed and cultivated a specifically Christian understanding of who they are and what their lives are about, they are united in a different way. The bond of affection that unites Christians as Christians is the bond of charity, the Christian love of neighbour. How does charity differ from all forms of communitarian solidarity? This is one question to answer in view of what our project is all about: which is philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge in directing us to have education for reconstruction of civic culture.320

Whatever other pursuits may unite Christians in communitarian solidarity, the pursuit that unites them specifically as Christians is the pursuit of the Christian good, the love of God. As noted in the previous section, the love of God consists in the unique transformation of human desire that Christianity seeks to accomplish in its adherents.

Christian faith seeks the salvation of particularistic desire. Human desire characteristically takes the form of the desire for desire or the desire for narrative significance. But the desire for narrative significance in human life is vulnerable to a variety of obstacles and frustrations. To the extent that human desire is exclusively bound to the logic of narrative representation, those obstacles and frustrations pose a threat to the affirmation of particularistic desire itself.321

320 Much of what is in this section is made up of personal study and reflection that stems from the researcher’s background in religious and priestly formation in the Society of Jesus, a constituent religious order in the Catholic Church.

321 Ibid.
One obstacle in particular, death, appears to constitute an insuperable narrative disruption that seems to be alone sufficient to destroy the narrative coherence and significance of a human life. In order to overcome this appearance and to save particularistic human desire from this apparent threat of defeat, human desire must be freed of its bondage to the logic of narrative representation. The problem is not death, but this bondage. What is desired in the desire for narrative significance is the desire for desire itself, the closing of the circle of desire that escapes all narrative representation utterly. Christianity seeks to foster a kind of desire for desire that escapes its bondage to narrative representation and that closes the circle of desire. This desire is the desire for the un-narrated and dateless present, the desire for the eternal present, the love of God. Members of Christian churches whose desire for desire has been successfully transformed in this way are united by their shared love of God. The bond of affection by which such Christians are united is charity.

This specifically Christian form of fellowship differs from communitarian solidarity in many of the same ways that civic friendship differs from communitarian solidarity. Christians who are actually united in the love of God, the desire for the eternal present, are united in a different way than they are when joined in communitarian solidarity. United in charity, they are citizens of the City of God. United in communitarian solidarity, they are citizens of the City of Man. United in communitarian solidarity, Christians are members of the visible church, an institutionally organized association that is distinct and seeks to be distinct from other kinds of association.

322. See John 15: 19-16:4. Here we find the narrative of Jesus and how his disciples have to be in the world.
Members of the visible church know who numbers among them and who does not. The visible church has public criteria for inclusion and exclusion. Members of the visible church actively differentiate themselves from members of other religious communities as a means of strengthening their communitarian bond and it is very much at the centre of their traditional teaching.323

This awareness of difference and distinction introduces pressures for conformity and submission to authority into Christian forms of communitarian solidarity as it does into all forms of communitarian solidarity. But charity follows a different logic. Charity follows a libertarian and egalitarian logic similar to that of civic friendship. Charity is libertarian, i.e., affirms and empowers otherness and difference, and egalitarian, i.e., establishes a bond that disregards all measures of relative rank and merit, by virtue of the good that it serves and attains. Christians are united in charity through their shared love of God. But the love of God is a love for the eternal present that releases human desire from its bondage to the logic of narrative representation. This transformation of desire produces (1) a transformation of identity and (2) a transformation of desire that are the sources of the libertarian and egalitarian nature of specifically Christian friendship.324

Christians who have fully attained the standpoint of faith, the standpoint proper to the love of God, gain an identity that is no longer defined by any particular personal life narrative. The standpoint of completed desire, the standpoint of the eternal present, is dateless and not subject to narration. The personal identity that is shaped by a particular life narrative is formed by the narrative internalization of personal traits and attributes of

323.Ibid.
324.See Political Liberalism, 8, 50, xlv and 152.
rank assigned through a process of comparison with others. This narrated personal identity is defined by a reading of life events that distinguishes a person in terms of biological and economic properties, goals, interests and achievements. A person thus defined becomes the central character in the ongoing construction of his or her personal life narrative.  

In attaining the standpoint of faith, however, the Christian gains an identity that is different from any narrated identity, an identity that cannot be defined or expressed in narrative terms. In the standpoint of completed desire, the object of desire is always already fully possessed. The identity proper to this standpoint thus cannot in principle be understood as one belonging to a character undergoing a process of life narrative construction, a character on the way to some specific narrative closure. As a result, the differentiations and distinctions that define any narratively-constructed identity fall into irrelevance.

In the Christian love of neighbour, persons are united on the basis of the sharing of an identity that stands beyond all differences and distinctions subject to narrative representation. This includes, at the extreme, even those differences produced by injurious and hostile actions. The Christian love of neighbour thus encompasses (at the

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326. Once again, see Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, xxiii-xxiv; reminds us "science has always been in conflict with narrative." If we have to judge this by the yardstick of science, "the majority of them prove to be fables." This is seen in the extent to which science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks truth. From what science does we may borrow a practice that may oblige us to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then points us to produce a discourse of legitimating with respect to its own status. This will be a philosophical discourse of its own kind for our circumstances. With Jean-François Lyotard, the hero of knowledge towards "a good ethico-political end" in this Enlightenment narrative. This is a good challenge for us in our discourse on the philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge pointing to a civic culture.
limit) even the love of enemies. Of course, who is loved in the love of enemies is not the other as enemy, for the characterization of actions as injurious and hostile belongs to the sphere of narrative representation. In the Christian love of neighbour, even the enemy becomes a neighbour as the entire sphere of narrative representation itself falls into the oblivion of the eternal present.  

Further, the Christian love of God and neighbour transforms not only personal identity, but particularistic desire as well. The Christian good is the salvation of particularistic desire. Christian faith achieves this not by the denial or disparagement of particularistic desire, but rather by freeing it from its bondage to the logic of narrative representation. The Christian love of God fulfils human desire for desire by transforming it completely into itself as the desire for the un-narrated and dateless present.

It is apparently inevitable, however, that no human life could ever live wholly within an un-narrated and dateless present. In human life, contemplation of the eternal present, the silencing of the narrative imagination, is inevitably an affair of the moment. Human beings are living things whose desire is distinctively qualified by the human power of narrative representation. The love of God closes the circle of desire momentarily not in order to close it permanently, but rather in order to permit this momentary completion of desire to liberate particularistic desire from the constraints of an exclusively narrative self-understanding narrative.

327. The classical example we have of this narrative is of the “Good Samaritan” treated in the Synoptic Gospel of Luke 10:29-37.
328. See Kenneth Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 64 for the challenge to all Christians.
329. Ibid.
This liberation of particularistic desire abolishes permanently any appearance that desire can remain incomplete as a result of events that disrupt the construction of coherent personal life narratives. The power of death, as one such event, is thereby overcome. The result of this liberation of particularistic desire from bondage to the logic of narrative representation is a global affirmation of the narrative significance of human life in the face of all narrative disruptions.\(^{330}\)

In the vocabulary of Christian faith, this global affirmation of narrative significance is the theological virtue of hope. In any case, this global affirmation of narrative significance is an affirmation not of any particular life narrative pattern, but rather of any and all life narrative patterns. In short, this affirmation entails an equalization of particularistic desire, an equal affirmation of every human project of constructing a coherent personal life narrative. Therefore, the Christian love of neighbour, as a bond of affection between persons based upon an identity beyond all differences, is also a bond of affection that embraces equally every life in its particularity.\(^{331}\)

Thus comes into view clearly the intrinsically libertarian and egalitarian nature of Christian charity. Christian love of neighbour is libertarian because it imposes no conformity and requires no submission to authority. Charity flourishes there where differences are greatest, even at the point of the most extreme difference, in the Christian love of those who hate Christianity. Further, Christian love of neighbour is egalitarian because the Christian salvation of particularistic desire is a salvation of narrative significance.

\(^{330}\)Ibid.

\(^{331}\)As seen above of the challenge that Martin Luther King, Jr., to the American Christians in all things to engage in hope for the eternal future.

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significance in general, without regard to the particular life project or to the person who undertakes it.\textsuperscript{332}

Thus, once again we see a possible congruence between the pursuit of the civic good and the pursuit of the Christian good, between Christian charity and civic friendship. If guided by this perception of congruence, those who attain fully the standpoint of faith and who practice the Christian love of neighbour will find the practice of civic freedom and civic justice an inevitable and natural extension of their Christian way of life. In fact, if this analogy between Christian charity and civic friendship is plausible at all, Christian charity is bound to appear as an even more radical, extreme, and demanding form of civic friendship than that required by liberal democracy itself. The friendship of citizens of the City of God might then be viewed as the fulfillment of that bond of affection realized in civic friendship only as promise.

We may press this analogy between civic friendship and Christian charity one step further, a step that reveals what may be the most important contribution Christianity can make to the invention of a postmodern civic culture. We have noted the way in which libertarian and egalitarian civic friendship stands in a relationship of tension with communitarian solidarity. Communitarian solidarity is a vital force in the shaping and direction of human desire. Communitarian friendship nurtures and supports human aspiration by grounding it in collective life narratives that provide models of human achievement and success.

\textsuperscript{332}See \textit{A Theory of Justice}, 472ff.
However, the equalization of all particularistic desire that is affirmed in civic friendship seems to involve a certain relativization of all models of achievement and lead to a general debunking of heroes. In other words, the egalitarian character of civic friendship can seem to promote a general disaffection from all particular ranking systems, a disaffection that, at the extreme, becomes full-blown nihilism.

Further, the sort of collective narrative that supports civic friendship, in other words, the narrative of the liberal political community’s quest for civic freedom and civic justice, is not the sort of narrative that can give human desire specific direction. In the narrative identification with the story of liberty, a citizen must adopt a narrative standpoint external to the particular collective life narrative that frames his or her own personal life narrative.

The cultivation of this narrative standpoint that looks at all local collective life narratives from the outside, so to speak, is necessary for the development of a capacity for civic friendship. But it can also promote a scepticism toward every community narrative that is presented with moral or inspirational intent. Such skepticism can in turn promote a generalized disengagement from the particular cultural communities whose members are motivated by these local moral histories.

In other words, the libertarian character of civic friendship can foster a detachment from community life that, at the limit, can become full-blown alienation. In this way, the cultural resources required to support civic friendship seem to conflict with the cultural resources required to support communitarian solidarity. The citizen’s civic duty to cultivate equally both civility and communitarian solidarity can thus seem to be
self-defeating, to require the development and reconciliation of hopelessly contradictory and mutually undermining normative standpoints.

The Christian love of neighbour coexists with communitarian solidarity no more comfortably than does civic friendship. The libertarian and egalitarian nature of Christian charity, however, gives rise to different tensions for different reasons. Christian love of neighbour also affirms the equality of all particularistic desire. The proper Christian response to the question, “Who is my neighbour?” is “Anyone at all.” But the Christian community is also one particularistic cultural community among others, with its own identity and organizational structure. The members of the Christian community are united in communitarian solidarity as they carry out the political, welfare, economic, and educational tasks that constitute part of the mission of Christian churches.

Christianity, in order to survive as a doctrine and way of life, must create organized and institutionalized forms of association, forms of association that cannot flourish in the absence of communitarian solidarity. But Christian love of neighbour is the affirmation of an identity among persons that lies beyond all differences of community membership and local culture. Communitarian solidarity, on the other hand, is based precisely on an affirmation and cultivation of such differences. It then would seem that the communitarian solidarity necessary for the survival of Christian churches stands in hopeless conflict with the highest ideals of the Christian love of neighbour.

Further, Christian love of neighbour is libertarian in a way that could promote, at the limit, the abandonment of community membership entirely. Christian charity is the bond of affection that unites persons in their pursuit of the Christian good, the love of
God. As noted above, the love of God releases human desire from its bondage to the logic of narrative representation. The love of God consists in a transformation of human desire for desire such that desire receives its perfect completion as the desire for the unnarratable, dateless present. This standpoint of the eternal present provides the Christian with a radically new identity, an identity wholly stripped of all those personal properties that define the main character of any particular personal life narrative. The Christian love of God realizes the most extreme liberation of human self-understanding from the constraints of narrative representation.

For the Christian, this unnarratable identity becomes the “real” or preferred self. Christian love of neighbour is the recognition and affirmation of either the actuality or potentiality of such a “real” self in all other persons at all times and in all places. But such an unnarrated self must always be juxtaposed with a narratable identity. Human beings are living things whose desire is subject to narrative representation. It is as narratively representable selves that human being speak and interact with one another. It is as narratively representable selves that human beings organize community life and enjoy communitarian solidarity.

But the Christian love of neighbour seems to require a turning away from narratively representable selfhood and association. The Christian love of neighbour seems to follow a logic that leads toward a radical separation of the City of God from the City of Man. It would seem to promote an otherworldliness utterly inhospitable to involvement in temporal affairs and participation in the life of any particularistic community. Thus, like civic friendship, Christian love of neighbor seems to stand in a
very uneasy relationship to communitarian solidarity, potentially generating its own unique forms of disaffection from particularistic desire and alienation from particularistic community life.

The inherent conflict between civic and communitarian moral ideals can, at the extreme, produce disaffection and alienation among the citizens of liberal democracies. Given the structural similarities between civic and Christian ideals of community life, we might well expect the Christian love of neighbour to produce among Christians a similar sort of disaffection and alienation from bonds of communitarian solidarity.

But the chance of this happening is greatly reduced by the nature of the collective narrative that unites the Christian community. The collective narrative of the Christian community, the narrative into which every Christian incorporates his or her personal life narrative, is grounded in the narratives contained in the Bible. These narratives are accorded extraordinary status. This extraordinary status attributed to them gives the collective narrative of the Christian community its power to hold together Christian love of neighbour and communitarian solidarity in a mutually supportive and creative tension.

For Christians who are also citizens, this synthesis of charity and communitarian friendship made possible by biblical narrative could provide, in the context of a postmodern civic culture, a model for an analogous synthesis of civic friendship and

333. See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 536-537. The argument Rawls presents has two dimensions to it. From the way he argues, there has to be both a domestic application and still a greater force applied internationally. This is because for most people national boundaries mark out salient spheres of comparison. Admittedly, international society lacks one feature which Rawls sees as counterbalancing material inequalities, namely equal citizenship. Like in our case as a nation, there is no common public sphere in which global citizens encounter one another as equals. On the other hand, which we are enmeshed, cultural differences between societies make it less likely that people will be drawn into comparing themselves with each other along single dimension as material wealth. Hence, a complex equality.
communitarian solidarity. A clear articulation of this analogy by an explicitly civic Christian theology could perhaps have the effect of limiting, for Christians and for those citizens influenced by Christianity, the risks of nihilism and alienation endemic to libertarian and egalitarian civic friendship.

Given the fact that the great majority of citizens in North Atlantic liberal democracies are at least nominal Christians, such a civic theology could make a significant contribution to the creation of a viable postmodern civic culture. It would provide a resource for the motivation of civic virtue that could perhaps be developed in no other way. Let me briefly sketch here the outlines of a postmodern civic theology that might accomplish this.334

The capacity of the Christian community to unite Christian charity and communitarian solidarity into a creative synthesis hinges on the extraordinary status Christianity accords to biblical narrative. In the vocabulary of theology and faith, biblical narratives constitute revealed or divinely inspired truth. The import of this description is to affirm that the narratives contained in the Bible are not subject to the standards applied to stories told by human beings. In order to understand the rhetorical function of this extraordinary status accorded to biblical narrative by Christians, we must briefly consider once again the variety of rhetorical functions served by narratives in general.

As we have noted, stories told by human beings may be divided into two different kinds: closed-criterion narratives, this means, stories whose narrative closure is fixed and

334. See Method in Theology, for narratives as both an expression of religion, 118 and as a tale of history, 215 and 219.
predetermined, and open-criterion narratives, in other words refers to, stories whose narrative closure is not fixed, stories whose narrative order is therefore always subject to revision. In any narrative, the order and significance of the events described are determined by their relationship to the end of the story. The end of the story, the narrative closure, serves as the criterion for determining narrative order and significance.

Stories told by human beings most typically are closed-criterion narratives. During a trial, for example, stories are told as part of the presentation of evidence. The criterion of relevance that determines the narrative order and significance assigned to events in these stories is the question, “Guilty or innocent?” On other occasions and with respect to other criteria of relevance, many different stories could be and always are constructed out of the very “same” events described in witness narratives. This, of course, does not mean that the narrative of a crime finally constructed by a jury when it arrives at its verdict is somehow fabricated or false. As long as there is consensus regarding the narrative criterion to be applied in constructing a story, there can be consensus about the order and narrative significance of the events described by the story.

Storytelling has many different rhetorical functions. Human beings tell stories to entertain, to inform, to explain, to warn, to give advice, to command, and so on. Whenever a story performs its rhetorical function successfully for a given audience, it is because the story was constructed artfully and in accordance with a narrative criterion acceptable to its audience. Literary or fictional narratives constitute one special class of closed-criterion narratives. An understanding of the way in which fictional narratives
differ from "historical" narratives is important for an understanding of the extraordinary status accorded to biblical narrative in Christianity.

Fictional or literary narratives differ from "historical" narratives in that the events related by fictional narratives are invented. When a person constructs a story about events that actually occurred, in other words, that the person did not deliberately invent or imagine, he or she imposes a narrative order on those events that is only one possible narrative order among others. It is always possible to construct other stories about or to impose a different narrative order on those events for different purposes and different audiences.

Thus, historical events such as the Mau Mau war, ethnic clashes or the assassination of J. M. Kariuki, Bishop Muge can be woven into any number of different stories and given any number of different narrative interpretations. However, in the case of fictional or literary narratives, it makes no sense to incorporate the events described into different stories, to impose a new narrative order on them. The narrative order and significance of the events described in a fictional or literary narrative are fixed once and for all because they are a matter of decision for its author. The author determines the narrative closure to which all the events described refer. Once the end of the story is known to its audience, the events it relates are understood in their narrative order and significance with finality.

Keeping this difference between fictional-literary and historical narratives clearly in view, we must recall one further point before returning to the question of the

335. See Method in Theology, 171-173.
extraordinary status of biblical narrative. Human life narratives, both personal and collective, differ from both historical and literary narratives. Human life narratives describe events that have actually occurred. In that respect, they are like any historical narrative. Many different stories can be constructed out of the events occurring during a particular person's life. But human life narratives differ from historical narratives by virtue of their special rhetorical function.

Human life narratives serve to provide meaning and direction to human desire. To construct a life narrative is to construct a life. A person relates the story of his or her life to others (including self as other) in order to render intelligible and to assess the current status of desire with respect to its satisfaction. By virtue of having this function, human life narratives belong to the class of open-criterion narratives. In their function of providing meaning and direction to human desire, human life narratives are never finished. The order and significance of human life events always depend upon the future, which means the same as they, depend upon events that have not yet occurred, and therefore are subject to nearly infinite reassessment and reinterpretation in terms of different possible narrative closures. Where the end of the story is always not yet finally determined, the narrative order and significance of events are also always not yet finally determined.336

When persons do construct their own life narratives as if they were closed-criterion narratives, imposing a fixed narrative order and meaning on their lives, they often do this because their life narrative has become bound up with some malady of

desire. To construct a human life narrative as if it were a closed-criterion narrative, as if the end of the story were fixed and the narrative significance of particular events were determined with finality, is to construct a human life as if it were a work of fiction.

The fictionalizing of human life narratives is always motivated in some way. For example, when persons have done or experienced something that would, if incorporated into their acknowledged life narrative, disrupt or threaten the narrative significance of their lives as a whole, then those events are either excluded from the narrative (meaning, they are “repressed”) or arbitrarily given a significance that consists in a denial of the significance that they threaten to have. The function of psychoanalysis understood as a “talking cure” is the de-fictionalization of life narrative meaning. Only because such fictionalization is bound up with a malady of desire can the de-fictionalization of life narrative meaning constitute a cure for that malady. 337

To de-fictionalize a personal life narrative is to incorporate into that life narrative events excluded or denied because they were too disruptive of narrative coherence and significance. Such a cure always amounts to a restoration of the proper rhetorical function to human life narratives, the function of rendering intelligible and assessing the current status of desire with regard to its satisfaction. Persons who are cured of maladies of desire in this way can once again take up the construction of their own life narratives in freedom as open-criterion narratives, as narratives that are indefinitely revisable.

In view of these distinctions, we can perhaps now understand properly the rhetorical significance of the extraordinary status assigned by Christian faith to biblical

337. Ibid, 67.
narratives. To say that the narratives contained in the Bible are "revealed," "divinely inspired," or "literally meaningful or true" is to attribute to biblical narrative characteristics of all three types of narratives we have discussed.

First, it is to take biblical narratives as historical narratives in that they relate events that actually occurred, in other words these are, events that it makes sense to offer alternative stories about. Second, it is also to take biblical narrative as a species of fictional or literary narrative in that biblical narratives determine with finality the intrinsic narrative order and significance of the events they describe. The final and authoritative determination of the intrinsic narrative order and significance of events is possible only if the end of the story is infallibly known. This is possible in fictional/literary narratives because the end of the story is a matter of decision for the author. To attribute to biblical narratives, as historical narratives, this property of literary/fictional narratives is to attribute to the authors of these narratives an extraordinary status. Biblical narratives define the narrative significance of the events they describe in terms of a narrative framework that encompasses the totality of historical events. Biblical narratives describe the beginning of time and speak of the end of time. To assert that biblical narratives have this literary characteristic of determining with finality the intrinsic narrative order and significance of the particular range of events they cover is therefore to assert that those narratives were written by authors possessing a privileged understanding of the relevant narrative closure. In the case of biblical narratives, a privileged understanding of the end of time, the last things. Since only a divine author could possess such a privileged understanding, biblical narratives are thereby attributed to an authorship beyond that of the human beings who clothed the narratives in words.
Third, biblical narratives also have the character of life narratives; they together constitute the basis for the collective life narrative of the Christian community. Just as the civic community is united by a collective life narrative whose theme is the pursuit of civic freedom and civic justice, so also the Christian community is united by a collective life narrative whose beginnings and narrative foundations are offered in the Bible. If the collective life narrative of the civic community is the story of liberty, then the collective life narrative of the Christian community, whose basis lies in biblical narrative, is the story of salvation, the story of the attainment and full possession of the Christian good. Like all collective life narratives, the rhetorical function of the Christian collective life narrative is to give meaning and direction to a collective pursuit of the good.

But the Christian collective life narrative, by virtue of possessing characteristics of both historical and literary narratives, differs significantly from the collective life narratives of other communities. The collective life narrative of the civic community tells a story of the quest for political liberty. It begins with certain events, political reforms or revolution, for example, and tells a story of continuing struggle for civic freedom and civic justice that anticipates victory but includes also the possibility of failure. On the other hand, the Christian collective life narrative encompasses the whole of historical time and tells a story of the pursuit of a good whose final and perfect attainment can never be in doubt because the divine author of the story has already decided upon its narrative closure, i.e., the salvation of all those who accept this story in faith.

It is the blending of these three narrative properties that constitutes the extraordinary status accorded to biblical narrative by the Christian community. To say
that the narratives of the Bible are divinely inspired or constitute revealed truth is to say that those narratives define with finality the narrative order and significance of the historical events they describe because they are "authored" by one who knows and who has decided upon the end of the story, the end of the story of salvation. God, as the ultimate author of scriptural narrative, knows the end of the story because God, in the biblical tradition, is defined as the ruler of history, the ultimate author who determines the narrative significance of all actually occurring events from the beginning of time until the end. God, as the ruler of history, as the inventor of the final narrative significance of all historical events, foresees and foreknows the end of story. In foreseeing the end, God provides narrative order and meaning to all historical events. The narrative order God provides constitutes the providential order, the story that describes the totality of historical events in their intrinsic narrative significance as a story whose narrative closure is the salvation of all particularistic desire.338

Of course, even though the providential order encompasses all narratively representable events, this does not mean that Christians can claim to possess a privileged knowledge of the meaning of historical events beyond those described in the Bible. The narratives contained in the Bible offer Christians their only authoritative access to the narrative order willed by God, the Divine Plan, the "real story." The narratives of the Bible reveal, open a window upon, the story that is written into the very fabric of things. Beyond the events described in biblical narratives, however, the details of the Divine Plan, the final narrative significance of historical events, must remain forever hidden from those who live through them. The affirmation of the "revealed" or "divinely

338. Ibid, 274.
inspired" character of the biblical narratives, therefore, constitutes an affirmation that such a Divine Plan exists, that all events do in fact have a preordained and final narrative significance, even though Christians can have no final or authoritative knowledge of it.

Perhaps now, with these points in view, it is possible to understand how this conception of the providential order of history can ground a collective life narrative that enables the Christian community to reconcile the love of God, the desire for the eternal present, with an affirmation of particularistic desire and communitarian solidarity. The collective life narrative that unites Christians encompasses historical events in their entirety it also, encompasses the entire sphere of narrative representation. Christians who, in faith, accept the narratives of the Bible as a revelation of the Divine Plan affirm also that the Divine Plan encompasses their own lives as well. Even though Christians do not and cannot have any privileged insight into the final narrative significance of events occurring in their own lives, they can nevertheless affirm that there is indeed a Divine Plan working itself out in their own lives and that they are constructing a personal life narrative that has already been written into the universal story of salvation by the very author of that story.

By incorporating their own personal life narratives into this collective life narrative of the Christian community, Christians are given cultural support for a twofold affirmation of the temporal order and of particularistic desire. First, since every event that occurs belongs to the story of salvation willed by its author, no event can disrupt the final narrative coherence of human life and thereby threaten to strip human life of its narrative significance. Natural catastrophes, unemployment, illness, death, events that can threaten
to disrupt and even destroy the narrative coherence of human life unsupported by the Christian collective life narrative, can be affirmed in their narrative significance by being written into the collective story of human salvation. In the vocabulary of faith, regardless of what events occur to threaten the desire for narrative significance, nothing occurs without God willing it as part of an overall Divine Plan for salvation, a Divine Plan that guarantees the narrative significance of all human life events.

Second, since the providential order embraces all historical events, even the most apparently insignificant, every event of a Christian's life can be viewed as a manifestation of the Divine Plan. This means that the Christian can conform to the Divine Plan and thus affirm the narrative significance of events whatever may be his or her particular life circumstances. In the vocabulary of faith, God's narrative will for particular persons is to be detected in the particular events and choices that are decisive for their lives.

This twofold affirmation of narrative significance and particularistic desire, when it is effective in a particular life, can mediate and reconcile the conflict between Christian love of neighbour and Christian communitarian solidarity. As noted above, the Christian love of God and neighbour can create a certain kind of disaffection from particularistic community life and from the goals sought by particularistic desire itself. Christian love of neighbour is an affirmation of an identity with the neighbour that lies beyond all differences of culture and personal traits. Christian love of God is a desire for the eternal present that stands essentially beyond all possibilities of narration.
In both of these ways, Christian love of God and neighbour tends to pull those persons governed by it away from the particular narratable circumstances of their lives. It can create an "otherworldliness" that seems to entail a generalized rejection of the sphere of narratively representable events, the realm of temporal affairs. But the collective life narrative of the Christian community, the conception of history as a providential order whose narrative significance is determined by God alone, operates as a countervailing force in Christian life to prevent all disaffection from the narrative order and from the goals of particularistic desire.

When Christians read their own personal life narratives into the narrative framework of the providential order of history, the temporal order and particularistic desire are saved in a special sense. Particularistic desire is saved most fundamentally by the transformation of desire by which human desire for desire becomes the desire for the eternal present. But particularistic desire is saved in this secondary sense by its narrative incorporation into the order of providence. God as the author of the story of salvation determines the narrative order and significance of events by reference to an end of the story, the end of time, which is already known.

Faith in God's providence, faith in God's knowledge of the narrative closure of all history mirrors within the realm of temporal affairs the closing of the circle of desire achieved through the unnarratable love of the eternal present. In this way, by the affirmation of God's providential role in history, historical events themselves gain their meaning by reference to this eternal present. Particularistic desire is permitted to flourish
in full confidence that no human aspiration is foreign to the love of God and that the love of God is most fully realized in the providentially directed service of human aspiration.\footnote{339}

Christians whose self-understanding has been shaped by this conception of the providential order of history could conceivably draw a parallel between this Christian conception of history and the liberal democratic collective life narrative. As noted above, the representation of history as the story of liberty also introduces a tension into the relationship between civic friendship and communitarian solidarity. The demands of citizenship too can create an alienation and disaffection from the pursuit of particularistic conceptions of the good.

However, the collective life narrative of the liberal democratic community offers no specific remedy for this. Left to the resources of the story of liberty alone, citizens seem faced with a choice between a commitment to libertarian and egalitarian civic values and commitment to the hierarchical values of communitarian solidarity. The civic affirmation of the equality of all particularistic desire seems to undermine the narrative intelligibility of desire itself. The civic affirmation of difference and otherness seems to call into question the validity of human goals and aspirations. The demand that citizens cultivate both civic friendship and communitarian solidarity thus makes liberal democratic civic culture continuously vulnerable to the threats of alienation and nihilism.

\footnote{339 See R. M. Hare, \textit{The Language of Morals}, 137-139; virtue is not virtue unless it is understood in line with the question of the good. This calls upon citizens to be conscious of the moral implications of their involvement in political matters. This goes a long way to see to it that there is need to fight against all forms of corruption with vigilance and by practicing integrity and accountability.}
It may be possible for Christians who are also citizens to neutralize these threats, at least among fellow Christians, and thus to close this gap between civic and communitarian virtue by appeal to elements of the Christian collective life narrative. In such an appeal, an explicit parallel would be drawn between the Christian love of neighbour and civic friendship. The libertarian and egalitarian nature of the Christian love of neighbour would be articulated in its analogy to the libertarian and egalitarian nature of civic friendship. The practice of civic friendship by Christians would then be viewed as not only consistent with, but even demanded by Christian charity.

In the same way, this parallel would inform the practice of civic friendship, keeping clearly in focus those attributes of civic friendship that liken it to the Christian love of neighbour. Once this analogy has been recognized, the cultural resources offered by the Christian collective life narrative could then support, at least for Christians, an overcoming of the tensions between civic friendship and communitarian solidarity in the same way that they support an overcoming of the tensions between Christian charity and communitarian solidarity.³⁴⁰

The Christian collective life narrative supports both the unnarratable love of God and neighbour and the commitment to the narrative significance of participation in the life of particularistic cultural communities. It accomplishes this synthesis by its affirmation of the temporal order, the order of narrative representation, as the providential

³⁴⁰ St Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus, a religious order in the Catholic Church, in his classical legacy left a text known as The Spiritual Exercises. This is a book widely used by many across religions. Within it are found two standards of good and evil. With the standards one has to make a choice within a given duration either for God, the ultimate good, or the devil. The Jesuits in upholding the spirit of their founder have their education and ministry built around the text and they have the heart of their constitution on the same text that forms their heritage.
order, an order in which the narrative significance of events is determined finally by the will of God. Thus, Christian faith requires an abandonment of the standpoint of particularistic desire for the sake of the salvation of particularistic desire.

The Christian affirmation of the temporal order as the providential order in effect transforms the Christian abandonment of the standpoint of particularistic desire into a commitment to and affirmation of all human aspiration. In faith and guided by the love of God, the desire for the eternal present. Christians submit to God’s providential or narrative will for them by serving human aspiration in the particularistic communities and in the particular historical circumstances where God has placed them. In this way, the most perfect liberation of desire from the logic of narrative representation becomes identified with the most perfect service of narratable human aspiration.

For Christians, this conception of the providential order could also provide the cultural basis for a synthesis of civic and communitarian virtue. The pursuit of the civic good also requires a certain abandonment of the standpoint of particularistic desire for the sake of the liberation of particularistic desire. It is this requirement that introduces tension into the relationship between civic friendship and communitarian solidarity. For Christians guided by recognition of the parallels between Christian love of neighbour and civic friendship, however, these tensions between civic friendship and communitarian solidarity can come to be viewed simply as a special case of the tensions produced by the intersection of the eternal and the temporal orders of human desire.

Christians as Christians understand their eternal destiny to be bound up with the providentially assigned historical circumstances of their lives. Christians as citizens can
understand in the same way that the practice of civic virtue and civic friendship is to be identified not merely with active participation in the political sphere, but also with active participation in the life of particularistic cultural communities.

Christians as Christians understand that the love of God, the desire for the eternal present, is to be achieved most perfectly not through a withdrawal from temporal affairs, but rather through an abandonment to the providential will of God realized in service to others at a particular time and place. Christians as citizens can understand in the same way that love of civic freedom and civic justice can be fully exercised not only in the political sphere, but also through the progressive "civilization," which means as well, the progressive realization of the civic values of liberty and equality, within particularistic hierarchical and exclusive cultural communities.

A Christian community shaped by this analogy between the Christian good and the civic good, between the Christian love of neighbour and civic friendship, would provide immense support for the cultivation of civic virtue in the emerging postmodern era. Given the numbers and the influence of Christian communities in Western liberal democracies, it is in fact difficult to imagine a viable and effective postmodern civic culture without this support. In order to shape an explicitly civic form of Christianity, a new civic theology is required, a theology dedicated to the persuasive articulation of the parallels between the love of civic justice and the love of God. But a Christian community shaped by such a theology could also serve as the model for all other cultural communities party to the overlapping consensus required to support liberal political institutions.
Therefore, all the particularistic cultural communities that comprise particular
liberal democracies stand under a similar civic obligation. Each such community must
identify within its own cultural traditions resources that encourage its members to
cultivate capacities for civic freedom and civic justice. Communities without such a
commitment will effectively exclude their members from participation in liberal
democratic political life. Every such community that refuses or fails in this commitment
will with all certainty contribute to the failure of the institutions of liberty bequeathed to
us by the Enlightenment.

4.4.5. Cultural Functions of Knowledge in the Reconstruction of Philosophy
This study has explored the understanding of culture as an originator of knowledge, civic
culture and modern philosophy are cultural functions of knowledge. Presently as it
concludes the philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge it is important
to remember that the thrust of this study has been just that; a philosophical analysis of the
cultural functions of knowledge. This has been exploring the cultural functions of
knowledge with the aim of determining culture as a support for a liberal democratic civic
society. In the second chapter there was an exploration of the role played by philosophy
in specifically modernist forms of civic culture which are functions of knowledge. The
third chapter went on to discuss the cultural functions of knowledge given what the
invention of post-modern civic culture requires. This far, we culminate by discussing how
philosophy must transform its self-understanding and practice in political, social,
economic and cultural spheres.

In finalising this study, we briefly examine Rawls’s move from a metaphysical to
a “political” theory of justice. This provides us with a model for the rhetorical turn that
does define the reconstruction of philosophy based on the cultural functions of knowledge.

It is the remarkable shift in the thinking of Rawls, an American political philosopher, most identified in recent years with modernist styles of liberal political theory, who is also the one who has most rigorously and seriously addressed the challenge to Western political thought posed by the demise of Enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge. It is therefore the view in this work that, to be sure, Rawls’s response to this challenge falls short. He does not take what this study calls his “rhetorical” and his “teleological” turns nearly far enough. Yet he certainly points us in the right directions, directions that Western political philosophy is bound to follow, to the extent that it remains true to its liberal democratic past.

According to Rawls himself, he characterizes the “turn” in his thinking since 1980 as a move from a metaphysical to a “political” conception of liberal political theory. This turn in his thinking is incomplete and he himself (to say nothing of his more ardent students and followers) recoils from full acceptance of its implications. Nevertheless, it points the way toward the more complete transformation and reconstruction that liberal political philosophy must yet undergo. Let us briefly sketch the nature of that

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341 See *Political Liberalism*, 234.
342 This move is characteristically based on the two major works of John Rawls. The first is *A Theory of Justice* and the second *Political Liberalism*. Both works present a shift, though not an automatic one, in Rawls’s thinking. It is this shift that has prompted much of this project and with the shift we engage in a philosophy that is local and at the same time tends to being global. We do this given the transcendental method that was proposed and also the conceptual frame of mind we need to have of the cultural functions of knowledge seeing education as the main method of reforming both the individual’s character and that of the society. In this discourse much may be drawn from his “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 (1985).
343 *Political Liberalism*, 234.
transformation by tracing the path that Rawls has followed over the last 35 years that preceded his demise. 344

In 1971, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice. 345 That book presented a theory of the principles of social justice, which he called the theory of justice as fairness. Rawls began by assuming that reasonable human beings are capable of correctly evaluating the justice of particular social arrangements, even though they are often not able to provide a theoretical account of the criteria they apply in arriving at their evaluation. 346

Further, in this same text, Rawls believed that the intuitive judgments reasonable persons made regarding justice were frequently at odds with the judgments licensed by utilitarianism, the dominant academic theory of political morality at the time (in the 1950s and 60s). The fact that reasonable persons intuitively judged questions of social justice differently than utilitarianism mandated constituted, for Rawls, a prima facie case that utilitarianism, as a theory of social justice, was untrue. 347

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls set out to uncover, make explicit and refine the principles of justice that he believed were operative in the moral intuitions of all reasonable persons. A theory of justice would consist, then, at least in a statement of those principles, along with an argument in their support. A correct theory of justice

344. Ibid, 10 and 97.
345. This was Rawls's first book.
347. Ibid, 154-147.
would be one whose principles yielded judgments that conformed to the moral intuitions of reasonable persons. 348

This test for determining the truth of a theory of justice determined the methodology that Rawls adopted. 349 The theory would be arrived at through engaging in a process of mutual adjustment between stated principles and the intuitive judgments of reasonable persons. When a state of reflective equilibrium between moral intuitions and stated principles had been achieved, the resulting principles would be established as the content of the true or correct conception of social justice. This true conception of social justice could then be applied or appealed to in disputed questions of political morality. This is roughly how Rawls conceived of his philosophical project in 1971.

In summary, therefore, for our present purposes, the actual principles of justice Rawls arrived at in his 1971 inquiry are less important than his conception of the theoretical enterprise itself and how that conception has changed since then. Although Rawls before his demise rejected this interpretation, there is no doubt that most readers of A Theory of Justice understood the book to present a theory of the essence of political morality. If true, the theory of justice as fairness would state the criteria by which the justice or injustice of any political regime, existing at any place and time, are to be judged. 350

In other words, using Rawls’s later vocabulary, most readers interpreted A Theory of Justice as offering a metaphysical, rather than a political conception of justice, meaning, a

348 Ibid, 144-148.
349 See his A Theory of Justice, 283-284, 486-489 and 492, 494.
350 Ibid, 97, 300-301 and 306.
conception of justice claiming universal truth known for its own sake. Admittedly, even at his passing on, Rawls himself had not yet completely freed himself at least of a certain style of thought that supports a metaphysical interpretation of his work. Nevertheless, the book’s central argument as well as its peculiar methodology resists this metaphysical interpretation and points in the direction that Rawls has followed in his published writings since 1980.351

This new direction was signalled most conclusively in 1985, when Rawls published an essay entitled, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical.”352 In this essay, Rawls disassociated himself decisively from earlier metaphysical interpretations of his project and offered a very different conception of it. His starting point remained the intuitive judgments of reasonable people regarding what is just and unjust. The subject matter for analysis remained the implicit principles underlying those judgments. But both starting point and subject matter were reinterpreted by Rawls in such a way as to place his entire inquiry within a radically new context and to give the results of that inquiry a radically different character and status.353

In that 1985 article (whose content was largely incorporated later into his book, Political Liberalism Rawls defined the “reasonable people” whose intuitions provided the subject matter and standards for the method of reflective equilibrium as those persons whose self-understanding and moral standards had been shaped by the institutions and political culture of a modern constitutional democracy. The moral intuitions that serve as

351. This is clearly pointed out in his Political Liberalism, 96 and “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 14 (1985).
353. Ibid.
both data and control for his project were thus no longer to be understood simply as the moral intuitions of reasonable people in general, without regard to any particularistic or historically conditioned assumptions that may influence them.\textsuperscript{354}

On the contrary, the relevant moral intuitions were identified as precisely those that had been produced by a historically specific political culture. They were identified as the moral intuitions specifically of those persons who had been shaped by the civic culture of contemporary liberal democracies and who as a result had in some degree developed the intellectual and moral capacities proper to citizenship. Given this reinterpretation of the starting point of Rawls's project, its subject matter and goals had to be reinterpreted accordingly.\textsuperscript{355}

If the relevant data are the historically conditioned intuitions of members of a specific type of political regime, then the principles underlying those intuitions are no less historically conditioned. The theory of justice as fairness therefore cannot be understood as a statement of the principles of justice as such, as a claim about the universal essence of political morality or as a revelation of the truth about an objective moral order. Rather, the theory of justice as fairness seeks to articulate only those principles and assumptions actually operative in the intuitions of persons influenced by the public culture of modern constitutional democracies.\textsuperscript{356}

This 1985 essay marked a decisive shift in Rawls's philosophical project. One sign of this shift is his dropping of the word "theory." Rawls in culminating his career

\textsuperscript{354} Political Liberalism, 61ff.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid. 61ff.
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid, 40ff and xxv.
spoke to us by offering not a theory of justice that claims to be true, but rather a conception of justice that claims to be reasonable. Consider for a moment what might be implied (from the standpoint of modernist epistemology) by the very notion of a "theory" of justice.\(^{357}\)

The notion of theory deriving from modernist philosophy is roughly understood to refer to a discourse that seeks to provide a uniquely satisfactory (as determined by logical considerations alone) explanation of the patterns actually observed in some field of data. The data are understood to be "givens." Their patterns are stable and they are logically independent of the theory explaining those patterns.\(^{358}\)

On the other hand, a theory pertaining to a field of data continuously in a state of flux, that is, one showing no stable and observable patterns, would have nothing to explain. A theory pertaining to a field of data whose patterns can be described only through the use of the theory could not be said to be a correct account of that field. The theory would then constitute its subject matter rather than provide a true explanation of it, the sort of relationship between theory and observation familiarly associated with the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.\(^{359}\)

Further, the modernist notion of theory suggests that this discourse is undertaken from a purely impartial standpoint, one that aims at "getting it right," this therefore

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\(^{357}\) See Barry Allen, *Knowledge and Civilization*, 20ff. Here we find and attempt to answer the question what is knowledge? Any answer here must fit within the stipulated practice of epistemology. By and large, this is a cognitive practice. But does the practice answer to particularistic situations of particular groups or individuals?

\(^{358}\) Ibid.

\(^{359}\) See Barry Allen, *Knowledge and Civilization*, 149 and also Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, vii, viii, and xx.
means, arriving at the one true or correct understanding of its subject matter, truth for its

own sake. This notion of theory assumes that there is a "fact of the matter" and that the

facts can and ought to be finally coercive with respect to both the theoretical discourse
and its audience and everywhere all the time.³⁶¹

The criteria for ranking rival theories in terms of the degrees to which they give a

satisfactory explanation of the data must be determined by the rules of inductive and
deductive logic alone. On the basis of purely logical considerations alone, then, if one
particular theory, among all its competitors, offers the most satisfactory account of the
facts, the theory can be affirmed as true whether any particular audience happens to
affirm its truth or not.³⁶¹

In Rawls's original conception of his project, the theory of justice as fairness
could plausibly be interpreted as a theory in roughly this sense. The field of data
consisted in the set of intuitive judgments made by reasonable people regarding disputed
questions of social justice. It assumed that these data were "given" independently of any
particular theory of justice and that the goal of every theory of political morality was to
provide a satisfactory account of the patterns evinced in our intuitive moral judgments.
But Rawls's revised conception of justice is clearly not a theory in this sense.³⁶²

At this point we try to answer the question, can there be a correct theory about the
historically conditioned principles used by members of a specific type of historically-

³⁶⁰ See Barry Allen, Knowledge and Civilization, 20ff.
³⁶¹ Ibid.
³⁶² See Political Liberalism, where the conception transforms into political liberalism, xxxii, and
takes on an adjudication of the traditions of liberty and equality, 5 and 35ff.

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conditioned community to decide disputed questions of political morality?\textsuperscript{363} In this case, the field of data itself is clearly unstable and subject to variation. The moral intuitions of the better citizens of constitutional democracies are not fixed once and for all, but can be changed through persuasion and may even be influenced by Rawls's theoretical discourse itself or by the discussion it produces. This means that there exists no theory-independent set of intuitional patterns or regularities a correct theory could be objectively correct about.\textsuperscript{364}

Moreover, a theoretical discourse is thought to aim at truth for its own sake. It assumes that there is a fact of the matter and the goal of the discourse is to get those facts right. A theoretical discourse is thus to be distinguished from discourse seeking to persuade, discourse that aims at producing a certain rhetorical effect upon its audience. A theory can be true whether or not any particular audience has been persuaded of its truth.\textsuperscript{365}

But can the conception of justice as fairness, in the light of Rawls's 1985 reinterpretation of it as a political and not a metaphysical conception, be viewed as a theory in this sense? Could we affirm its truth even if an audience made up of the most insightful citizens of constitutional democracies does not find it to be a persuasive account of the principles of justice? Would we be willing to say that the members of such an audience are mistaken about their own assumptions and intuitions, that they are victims of false consciousness?

\textsuperscript{363}Ibid, xxx and 44ff. This points us to what we are faced with as a kind of different subject matter and the use of abstract concepts in the practice of philosophy.


\textsuperscript{365}Ibid.
And what if the theory of justice as fairness not only were rejected by this audience, but also produced among its members such a negative reaction that they were led to embrace a new set of assumptions and therefore a new pattern of intuitive judgments radically incompatible with it? Would we be willing to say that this change in the patterns of intuitive judgments because it produces patterns different from those explained by the theory, shows that the audience has "fallen away" from the correct principles and its members are in need of reformation?

In short, can there be anything that we would call a theory (in other words, in the traditional modernist sense) about a subject matter that the theory itself can decisively influence and that must win the actual adherence of an audience in order to be considered acceptable as a product of inquiry?

It seems obvious that, understanding the term "theory" in its modernist sense, Rawls quite properly no longer speaks of offering a theory of justice. Not only would the data, as gathered from, the moral intuitions of reasonable citizens of modern constitutional democracies, of any such "theory" be variable and historically conditioned, but the explicit goal of inquiry would be to win the acceptance of those reasonable citizens and not simply to arrive at a statement of what is the case.366

How are we to classify the status of Rawls's political conception of justice as fairness then? A practical political proposal? An attempt to influence public judgment by proposing a set of principles that reasonable persons who disagree about matters of social

366. See Political Liberalism, xlvii.
justice might find acceptable as a means of settling disputes? This is the interpretation of his project that Rawls embraced in his 1985 article.367

Now suppose justice as fairness were to achieve its aim and a publicly acceptable political conception of justice is found, then, this conception provides a publicly recognized point of view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political and social institutions are just. . . . It should be observed that, on this view, justification is not regarded simply as a valid argument from listed premises, even should these premises be true. Rather, justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true; or better, publicly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of establishing a working agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice.368 Thus, in 1985, although he himself did not describe it in these terms (and, for that matter, no doubt still wouldn’t), Rawls in effect reinterpreted his philosophical project as a project belonging to the cognitive realm of rhetoric.

Traditionally, rhetorical reason defined its cognitive realm as the realm of pistis or belief as opposed to the cognitive realm claimed by philosophy. the realm of episteme or science. Belief or pistis is the state of being persuaded. To the extent that any discourse aims at producing belief, which means, it is the un-coerced adherence of its intended audience, to that extent it belongs to the cognitive domain of rhetoric. This is the way it seems that Rawls, since 1985, had conceived of his inquiry into the principles of justice. His aim was no longer (if it ever was) to arrive at a timelessly true statement of the

368 Ibid
universal principles of social justice, but rather to offer a statement of the principles of justice that might win the un-coerced adherence of the reasonable citizens of a modern constitutional democracy.\textsuperscript{369}

The principles of justice produced by Rawls's inquiry are to be judged cognitively not by the traditional standard identified with modernist political philosophy, meaning, the standard of timeless truth, but rather by the traditional standard identified with rhetoric, which is the standard consisting in the successful establishment of a body of un-coerced shared belief. This reinterpretation by Rawls of his philosophical project as a project whose goal is consensus and the adherence of a specific audience, then, this study has called it his rhetorical turn. It is this rhetorical turn that constitutes the first defining mark and guiding maxim of postmodern liberalism\textsuperscript{370} giving it as a cultural function of knowledge.

4.4.6. The Uses of Greek Models of Political Philosophy\textsuperscript{371}

As a conclusion to our discourse of the cultural functions of knowledge, we go back into history to see what sort of use could be made of Aristotelian and Socratic models of political philosophy in the postmodern reconstruction of liberal political philosophy. This reconstruction involves a shift from a metaphysical to a political or rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine. A rhetorical conception of liberal doctrine defines liberal doctrine explicitly as a component of liberal democratic civic culture. As a component of civic culture, liberal doctrine must define its cognitive task using rhetorical categories. Civic

\textsuperscript{369} \textit{Political Liberalism}, xxv.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{371} Jean-François Lyotard, \textit{The Postmodern Condition}, 29, 42 and 77. The stress in our education has to shift from being merely classroom work to life situation problem solving education.
culture is always a countervailing culture. It is addressed to citizens who are adherents of comprehensive doctrines or totalizing cultural world views. The doctrinal, narrative, and representational resources of any civic culture serve to render intelligible to citizens the norms proper to liberal democratic citizenship and to motivate them to internalize those norms. These provide for fundamental interests and at the same time motivate the citizens towards the aims in place.372

As a component of civic culture, liberal doctrine must define its cognitive tasks in terms of this basic rhetorical situation. Our initial question was how specifically these cognitive tasks of a political or rhetorical liberalism might be defined. It is in answer to this question that I briefly considered what in this study has been called the Aristotelian and Socratic models of classical political philosophy. To the extent that both of these forms of political philosophy identified as its cognitive domain the realm of practice as opposed to theory, *pistis* as opposed to *episteme*, both can usefully be represented as components of Greek republican civic culture. Of which our education and philosophy for that matter may be built as the hinge on which our culture as a nation swings and as specific cultures we contribute. Our system of education has to build a vocabulary that is concrete as much as we contribute towards a national vocabulary.373

Aristotelian and Socratic forms of political philosophy performed different tasks within that civic culture. Aristotelian political philosophy addressed citizen-rulers and provided concepts and vocabulary for the evaluation of constitutions and laws. Socratic

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372 Ibid, 208 and 105ff.
373 See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 42. This practice has to extend well into the vocabulary of citizenship. Equality and liberty should form our vocabulary from a very tender age. Our curriculum should be at the forefront of empowering and emancipating our learners. May be it is also something to do with our search for new information and how we use the information.
political philosophy offered vocabulary and procedures for civic education. It is in the
definitions of their respective cognitive tasks that these two forms of classical political
philosophy might serve as models in the postmodern reconstruction of liberalism. These
are aspects of our education and culture. Hence, we engage in education and philosophy
for the reconstruction of civic culture as a dynamic process constituting the cultural
functions of knowledge.

Finally, philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge is a pointer
to questions of justice, national concern, particular deprivation and marginalization of
people near us or even those distant. We need to constantly concern ourselves of how
human we are becoming as citizens and how does this becoming affect others and how do
the changes in the nation affect one's individual life, at a personal level. This conception,
taken on, is congruent to what was said by Plato, Aristotle and Kant who have talked
about education, knowledge and morals for personal and communal cohesion. They
aimed to have people lead good and happy lives as members of society. As to the
elitarian, pedagogical and anthropological aspects of culture, it may suffice for us at
this point, with the help of the transcendental method, to take on the various conceptual
approaches to solve our cultural crisis within our education system practically by:

Bringing the department's studies in philosophy to a higher level, where
interpretation, and culture address the ways in which cultural functions of knowledge and
expression shape and are shaped by human practices and experience. Of particular
importance are recent developments in continental philosophy, feminist philosophy,

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374. See Battista Mondin, in his *Philosophical Anthropology*, 145.
pragmatism, cultural critique, and multicultural studies, including social, political, and legal issues.

Getting to know that within philosophy, the focus of these studies is first upon the nature of philosophy itself, its history and self-understanding, then, second, upon how philosophy has understood itself to be related to other forms of knowledge. Within such forms of knowledge, this study has raised issues of interpretation pertaining to language, history, and society.

Laying emphasis of the specialization upon history and tradition, a concern with how they are to be thought and how they contribute to thought. The history of philosophy along with other histories in Western and non-Western traditions of art and literature, political and social theory, philosophy of history and social science, and theories of gender, ethnicity, culture, and class form the centre of the discussions.

Another major emphasis is upon social and political philosophy and ethics, addressing a broad spectrum of relevant issues and concerns in the context of multiple points of view and diverse philosophical perspectives, including traditional and non-traditional approaches. Among the topics addressed are the obvious inclinations of ethical and political concerns throughout human life and practice.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter gives the conclusion according to the study carried out. It also gives recommendations on issues that need to be explored more.

5.2. Summary of Major Findings
The general objective therefore is to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge. This was by answering to the research questions with an aim to meet the specific objectives. In which regard the study found out that there is an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge as a concept within the confines of Philosophy. This was done by exploring the concept from the historical point of view and narrowing it down to the philosophical perspective where the understanding has been determined as the manner in which communities exist in order to nurture, direct, and support the pursuit of the good life which is equivalent to happiness basing on culture as an originator of knowledge.

Analysing the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge has shown that it produces psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures. This has been done by exploration of the term through history by understanding civic culture and modern philosophy as cultural functions of knowledge. These functions have pointed us to realise that cultural functions of knowledge are very specific and particular to given communities. This has confirmed that these functions do produce psychological meanings that influence people in their given cultures.
The final objective for this study was recognising that cultural functions of knowledge can be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches. This has been by discussing what the invention of a postmodern civic culture requires. Where we have seen our cultural functions of knowledge as set within a given environment, community and social setting. Here we have seen how Enlightenment civic culture systematically concealed the unique cultural conditions that make liberal democracy possible and how this ideological concealment is responsible for our present crisis from which we move to have a philosophical analysis of the cultural functions of knowledge for the reconstruction of civic culture. Within this discussion we have seen how communities generate moral ideals, ranking systems, hierarchies, virtue concepts, and standards of excellence that shape and order human desire. It is always to an audience whose desire and self-understanding has previously been and is continuously being shaped by such communities that civic moral ideals must persuasively speak. Knowledge as such becomes essential in the reconstruction of culture in general. This is in consonant with what Dewey state that “the reconstruction ... of education and society go hand in hand.”

5.2 Discussion of the Findings
From the sources that the study has reached out to it was established that the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge can be well explained within the confines of Philosophy. From the findings, it is shown that it is within the research fields that the concept is well understood as it is rated 70% and it is under the good column. Universities apparently seem not to have a good grasp of it as it is average at 50%. Those not sure we have the Judiciary and Private companies both rated 50%. For those whose
understanding is bad we have three areas. Ministries and Local authorities both rated 50% for their knowledge of the concept as bad and other areas which are mainly individual communities have 50% rating for a bad understanding of the concept. This shows that in one way or another the concept is known in institutions and some individuals have a good understanding of it.

It has also been ascertained that it is possible to have a good analysis of the concepts in arguments by either paraphrasing or diagramming them or both showing how they produce psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures. From the study the percentages as shown in the findings in chapter four the leading issues on the question are one of socio-cultural analysis. This item is rated 80% from the findings. On the low category we have quantitative analysis which is rated lowest as 70%. This means that in matters of quantitative analysis not much of it is done. This rating was done after the researcher had received back the questionnaires from the field and after grouping all the answer it came to what is in that table from all those involved in the exercise.

Finally, the research has shown that it is possible to recognise arguments reasonably by deducing and validating the arguments for philosophical value speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture. For the study showed an average view of those who have the view that their approach to the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge is more literal and it is rated 90% which is very high. This is followed by the historical approach which is rated 80% and seems to be what many in the society do. The other percentages are grouped in relation to what the
categorisation showed in terms of the numbers on the ground. This shows that a majority of the people are of the view that their approach to issues is mainly historical.

5.4 Conclusions
The study concluded that explaining the concept of the cultural functions of knowledge within the confines of Philosophy is possible and can be well done by taking the study seriously within the department and other university stakeholders. Analysing the concepts in arguments by either paraphrasing or diagramming them or both showing how they produce psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures is an interesting exercise for both teachers and students. It is seen to be profitable for those who have tried it and practice it in their lives. As it is central to philosophy to recognise arguments reasonably by deducing and validating them, speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture, the practical approach to it should be taken on more by every teacher and student.

5.5 Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research
The broad objective of this research project was to investigate philosophically the cultural functions of knowledge. This brought out a number of issues that need to be considered by the university’s department in question and also the various ministries that deal with education as a whole. This then may mean

i. More research may be done on the concept of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge within the confines of Philosophy applying it to other departments and faculties within the university.
ii. More in depth analysis of the concepts in arguments be done with special emphasis laid on the study of Logic by all students at the university.

iii. Another area that needs examination is that of recognising arguments reasonably by deducing and validating the arguments for philosophical value speculatively, analytically and synthetically as citizens in a civic culture by both students and teachers for cultural integration.
REFERENCES


14. The question raised here is “Why focus on education.”

Aquinas, Thomas *Summa Theologiae*, I. 76, 5 ad 4m.


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_________________________. How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process, (Boston. MA: Heath, 1933).


Peter Singer has it in his "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1, (1972), 229-243.


Sextus Empiricus. *Outlines of Scepticism* 1.35-164.


Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1, 76, 5 ad 4m.


RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Livombolo, Hillary Masia, a student at the University of Nairobi, pursuing a Doctoral degree in Philosophy. As one of the requirements for the fulfillment of this programme, I am to undertake a research project to enable write a thesis. This research project is on “A Philosophical Analysis of the Cultural Functions of Knowledge.” Kindly, you are requested to fill in the attached questionnaire to the best of your knowledge. All the information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality and used only for the sole purpose of this research.

Thank you very much for accepting to be part of this noble course.

Yours faithfully,

H. L. Masia.

15/07/2004
SECTION A: UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT CULTURAL FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

1. Have you ever heard of the concept “cultural functions of knowledge?”
   Yes ( )  No ( )

2. If no above give as suggestions what you think the concept could mean.

3. How much in your rating as to the scale below do you think this concept could be applied to our institutions of learning and governance? (Tick appropriate column.)

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4. Do you have good knowledge of the way the concept may be used in relation to your institution?
   Yes ( )  No ( )

5. Has institution developed effective cultural functions of knowledge policies for success? (Tick where appropriate).
   a) Staff – staff communication  Yes ( )  No ( )
   b) Management – Management     Yes ( )  No ( )
6. If No to the above question, give what would be workable suggestions:

Once the organizational culture is in place the standards of the company should be taken into consideration and a basic employee morale by a good package to take home benefits.

SECTION B: ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

7. Do you think this concept deserves to be properly analysed for proper understanding?

Yes [✓] No [ ]

a) Give at least three ways that this concept may be analysed if your answer to 7 above is yes.

- The way we relate with one another
- Educational Institutions
- Work ethics

b) If no what is your view with regard to the analysis the concept has had so far from our institutions?

It is not satisfactory and should be seriously considered.

8. Besides the suggestions you have provided above how would you rank the analytical approaches provided in the scale below? (Indicate by ticking the appropriate column.)

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SECTION C: POSSIBLE WAYS TO RECOGNIZE, DEDUCE AND VALIDATE
THE CULTURAL FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

a. Do you think there are ways that an understanding of the cultural functions of knowledge can help in recognising, deducing and validating arguments in favour of the concept?  Yes [ ]  No [ ]

Give at least five of these approaches if your answer to a) above is yes

- In matters of law
- Employee rights
- Rural-Urban migration
- Minority rights

b. Besides the approaches you have provided above how would you rank the approaches provided in the scale below as observed at your institution? (Indicate by ticking the appropriate column.)

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<th>Approaches to the Concept</th>
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME!
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

i. What understanding do we have of the concept cultural functions of knowledge within the confines of Philosophy?

ii. Can the cultural functions of knowledge be given a proper analysis in arguments to show how they produce psychological meanings that influence individuals, communities and cultures?

iii. Is it possible to recognise that the cultural functions of knowledge can be deduced and validated philosophically using the speculative, analytical and synthetic approaches?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME!
SECTION C: POSSIBLE WAYS TO RECOGNIZE, DEDUCE AND VALIDATE THE CULTURAL FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

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