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September, 2010
Declaration

I, Gilbert O. Onyango, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted and is not currently being examined for award of degree in any other university.

[Signature]

17. Nov. 2010

Gilbert O. Onyango

Date

This thesis has been submitted for external examination with approval as university supervisor

[Signature]

19. 11. 2010

Mr. Ochieng Kamudhayi

Date
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My period of study at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi was the most exciting moment in my schooling life. This great academic achievement would not have come to pass without the great guidance of the Almighty God, glory be unto God for the far He has taken me. I would like to pass my appreciation to my supervisor Mr. Ochieng' Kamudhayi for his assiduous efforts to ensure that this thesis meet the required academic standards.

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To my family, my wife Roselyn and my daughters, Lily and Nicole, I appreciate you for your prayers and moral support during my period of study bearing to miss daddy when he was busy with his academic work. I wish to appreciate my bothers Walter, Norbert and Leonard for your support. Thank you very much.

Above all, glory be unto God once more for preparing me for a great future through enabling me to jump start my professional career. It’s therefore my prayer that may Almighty Lord Jesus rein forever and ever! Amen.
Dedication

To my daughters Lilian T. Ndonji and Nicole A. Awuor
Abstract

This study investigates the structural causes of conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1996 and 2006. The study is based on the political, economic and social structures that the DRC society is structured. The study applies structural theoretical framework to provide profound insight into how political, economic and social structure generates violent conflict in DRC. Both primary and secondary data were used. This study argues that the scramble for natural resources in the DRC is the main structural cause of conflict. Natural resource exploitation in DRC is linked to all forms of cause of conflict, thus none of the cause would be looked in isolation without linking it to the resource based The study also contend that complexity of the DRC conflict is linked to the presence of multiple actors with diverse interest and motive, thus management of the DRC conflict can only be achieved when the wider conflict networks. The study asserts that the parties that have been intervening in the DRC conflict enhance conflict escalation. Inter Congolese dialogue would yield more peace than when multiple actors are involved.
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADFL</td>
<td>des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces of Congo-Zaire.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Association Internationale du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Compagnie des En Chemis de Fer du Congo superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNKi</td>
<td>Comite National du Kivu</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSK</td>
<td>comite special du Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-FAR</td>
<td>Former Forces Amees Rwndaieses (Rwandan Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armee Congolaises (Caongoles Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDC</td>
<td>Inter – State Defence and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of Africa Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORS</td>
<td>Operation Restore Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Democratic Rally or Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union of Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People Defence Forces</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Defence Force</td>
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<td>ZIPPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe people’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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CHAPTER TWO

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Post Colonial era

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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Introduction

Background Information of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is located in Central Africa. With a total land area of 2.344,885 km$^2$ that straddles the equator. The DRC is the third largest African country after Sudan and Algeria. Situated right at the heart of the continent, the DRC is bordered by nine countries, namely Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

The country’s population is estimated at 60 million and is made up of as many as 250 ethno-linguistic groups. The DRC is endowed with tremendous mineral resources and is drained by the Congo River and its many tributaries. The second longest river in Africa and fifth longest in the world, with regard to hydro-electric potential the Congo River is second in the world after the Amazon.

Despite a rich endowment of mineral deposits and huge potentials for hydro-electric power it is shockingly underdeveloped, boasting only about 500km of tarred roads. The vast majority of its population of 55 million people lives in poverty with an estimated average per capita income of only USD 110 per annum (USD 770 Purchasing Power Parity). Its Human Development Index ranking of 36.5 reflects not only poverty, but poor life expectancy (44.7 years) and literacy levels (65%).

There are more than 200 ethnic groups; the Luba, Kongo, and Anamongo are some of the larger ethnic groupings. The official language is French, with four main national languages – Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba. The DRC’s population is dispersed very

unevenly, with the highest density in the Kinshasa area and westwards towards the coast in
the Mayumbe region, followed by other peripheral areas such as Bandundu and the Kivu
highland area of the east.

Fast-growing population is concentrated in areas with fertile land, as well as in
economic enclaves. Much of the heart of the country, the north-east and south, are sparsely
populated. It is worth noting that, in rebel held areas, urban population has drastically
increased over the last five years owing to forced migration following persistent insecurity in
rural areas. According to the UNDP, it was estimated that in 2009, DRC was rated the third in
the world with the highest internally displaced persons (IDPs) of about 1.4 million, with
Sudan leading with 4.9 million followed closely with Iraq at 2.8 million out of the world 26
million IDPs.\(^3\)

**Statement of Research Problem**

In the colonial history of Congo, several issues are particularly noteworthy. First, the
Belgium rule were among the most exploitive. Leopold’s rule was especially atrocious,
however, many abuses continued even after the colonial rule.\(^4\) Secondly, Congo had no
tradition of national unity. The country was huge and culturally diverse. The African
population was by geography and ethno linguistic difference, and colonialism, introducing
new inequalities, greatly intensified the divisions. Thirdly, the colonial government did not
prepare the Congolese for independence.\(^5\) The number of university graduates was small, and
the overall university education was one of the lowest in Africa. Trained indigenous
leadership was hence lacking, and few leaders had postsecondary education. Congo
politicians often had feeble organizational support.

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Undp. 2009. p. 26


Ltd. 1985. pp. 20-36
The Congolese state and economy still bear the heavy imprint of Mobutu’s 32 years of predatory rule. Executive power in his Zaire was absolute, and the 1974 constitution granted him, as head of state, authority over the executive, legislature and judiciary branches. Mobutu also had the right to change the constitution at his discretion, and he banned political parties while making membership in his Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR) compulsory. Mobutu’s disastrous system was facilitated by continued support from France, Belgium and the U.S. Zaire was a key pawn in the Cold War, and each of these countries had considerable economic and political interests in it.

Corruption continues to undermine the economy and administration. The abuse of public office for personal gain reaches from minor civil servants to the highest members of government and implicates many international corporations. Political actors regularly interfere in the administration, customs service, army and control of natural resources to embezzle funds. This, in turn, has perpetuated a system of governance that is largely predatory, with the state living off the citizenry and the country’s resources without providing even the most rudimentary social services.

Hiring and promotions in the administration depend more on connections than competence. Mobutu, Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila have all placed political appointees in management positions, creating deep tensions between career civil servants and party cadres. The rule of Laurent Kabila, who toppled Mobutu in 1997, was similar in important aspects. He banned political party activity, dissolved parliament and suppressed all provincial and local deliberative bodies. There was no state budget between 1998 and 2001 and no new constitution. Laws were issued by presidential decree.

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The main issue surrounding structural conflict in DRC is the antagonism that exists between the Hutu and Tutsi. The ethnic Tutsis, who migrated from Rwanda generations ago, have often been the target of distrust due to their relative economic success and the fact that they have maintained a closed society, rarely marrying or interacting with other ethnic groups in the region. This distrust has continually been used by DRC governments to deny nationality and other citizenship rights to the Tutsi population. These actions have further added to the resentment of Tutsis by the Hutus. In addition, the Tutsis affiliation with Rwanda and the mass genocide have contributed to their hatred of the Hutus.

The presence of over one million refugees living in camps along the eastern border of the DRC pose a great threat to security in the region since they are housing genocidaires from Rwanda. These individuals are armed militarily and are a destabilizing force in the DRC. As a result, the Rwanda and Uganda governments continue to infiltrate the DRC border, adding to the militarization of the conflict.

The DRC has huge untapped mineral, timber and agricultural resources. In addition, the hydro-potential of the Congo River is almost unrivalled anywhere on the continent. Unfortunately, the civil and regional war being played out on the Congolese territory has reduced the country to little more than subsistence based barter economy. As such, much of the military activity and foreign interests in the Congo are focused on control over valuable resources such as diamonds and coltan. In addition, the Kabila government’s lack of capacity to deliver even the most basic levels of social, political, and economic development has further contributed to lack of legitimacy of the DRC leadership. The study therefore, seeks to investigate structural causes of conflict in DRC. This research, therefore attempts to answer the questions like; what are the effects of structural conflict on the social-economic development of DRC? What are the effects of structural conflict on the political governance
in DRC? And lastly, what are the roles of both internal and external factors on structural conflict in DRC?

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate the extent to which structural conflict generates violence in the DRC. Specific objectives include:

1. To determine the effects of structural conflict on the social-economic development of DRC
2. To determine the effects of structural conflict on the political governance in DRC
3. To investigate the roles of both internal and external factors towards structural conflict in DRC

Justification of the Study

This study intends to inform policy makers and peace researchers about how structural dynamics can lead to conflict in the society. This is important given the fact that most policy makers and peace researchers have been ignoring the structural causes of conflict in the society and concentrating a lot on other causes of conflict leading to conflict reoccurring since structural roots causes are not appropriately addressed.

The study aims at contributing/ adding knowledge to an emerging and changing dynamics in the field of structural conflict, peace research and conflict management. The findings of this study will therefore have an immense contribution to the existing literature on structural conflict and peace research.
Literature Review

Introduction

The literature review in this study will analyses the key subjects of structural conflict as discussed by various scholars under the following themes: Structuralism; effects of colonial legacy; Institutional framework, and Leadership

Structuralism

To achieve a proper understanding of structural causes of conflict in the society, one must first take, as a starting point, a structuralist view of the world, where structures and institutions are central to analysis. According to Landman, structuralist analysis focuses on the holistic aspects of society, including interdependent relationships among individuals, collectivities, institutions, and/or organizations. Structuralist analysis is interested in the social, political, and economic networks that form between and among individuals. Structures manifest themselves in a variety of forms both at the domestic and international levels. Politically and economically, structures include class and class coalitions, and institutions including business organizations, political parties and global institutions like the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Social structures include sexism and racism, as well as class-based structures.

According to Ho, distinct from rationalism, structuralism asserts that individuals and states do not make decisions solely on the basis of rational choice. Instead, individual actors are not completely free agents capable of determining particular outcomes. Rather, individuals are embedded in relational structures that shape their identities, interests and

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9 Ibid P. 45
interactions. Every peace researcher will agree that: the society is not composed strictly of structures without autonomous agents; the extent to which these structures constrain agency is highly contested. First, to what extent do international institutions constrain the choices made by states? Second, how do these structures, coupled with domestic institutions, constrain individual choices? And how does constraint of these individual choices constitute conflict/violence in the society?

Structural Conflict/Violence

This question of structure and constrained agency is particularly crucial for structural conflict/violence theorists. The pioneering professor of peace and conflict research, Johan Galtung, being the first to coin the phrase 'structural violence'. Galtung concerns were first and foremost related to peace research: his concept of structural violence is widely applicable and has extended to such fields as anthropology, clinical medicine, and sociology. The theory of structural violence provides a useful framework for the understanding of structural violations as a root cause of violent conflict in the society, through an assessment of how structures constrain agency to the extent that fundamental human needs/goals are unattainable.

Galtung first defines violence as 'avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs or, to put it in more general terms, the impairment of human life, which lowers the actual degree to which someone is able to meet their needs below that which would otherwise be possible. The first aspect of this definition to note is the inclusion of the word, 'avoidable'. According to Galtung, 'when the potential is higher than the actual [it] is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is present. Galtung gives an example, if a personal died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this

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as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite
the entire medical resources in the world then violence is present according to our
definition. Here, the potential and actual levels match in the case of the tuberculosis patient
in the eighteenth century; whereas the potential afforded by medical resources in the present
day is higher than the actual.

Ho highlights that the expanded conception of violence in terms of its avoidability
criteria and the idea of a gap between what is possible and what is actually attained presents a
myriad of contestable issues. The most troubling aspect among the peace researcher is how
would one determine/define what is possible or potential? How does one decide or even
ascertain when something is avoidable or not? What seems to be avoidable to a certain
community/society may be unavoidable to other thus the concept may draw a lot of critique
when one needs to define it.

For in-depth understanding of the crucial distinction between these types of violence,
Galtung constructs a typology of violence composed of three categories: personal, structural,
and cultural. According to Galtung, the case of the Burmese military junta would be a case
of personal or direct violence where the actor(s) and object(s) of violence are readily
identifiable. Here, the actor is the military junta and the objects are the victims of torture,
rape and forced labour. Galtung asserts that structural violence, as opposed to personal or
direct violence, is indirect in that ‘there may not be any person who directly harms another
person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power
and consequently as unequal life chances. Therefore, in the case of racial inequality for
example those experienced in South Africa during apartheid and elsewhere in Europe, social

14 Ho, Kathleen. Structural Violence as a Human Rights Violation. Essex Human Rights Review Vol. 4 No. 2
September 2007 p. 3
structures, particularly racism, systematically disadvantage African men and women who suffer from unequal life chances. The minority ethnic groups in DRC, for example the Banyamulenge has as well experience the same kind of treatment from the majority ruling class in DRC.

Ethical inequality, often coupled with poverty, experienced by minority Congolese is therefore an institutionalized social structure that lowers the level of actual fulfillment of one’s fundamental needs, such as healthcare, below the potential, where the potential is defined by the availability and access that other American citizens enjoy. Thus, ethical inequality is an example of structural violence and inequality itself is constitutive in the definition of avoidability and potential. Inequality, \textit{prima facie}, betrays the fact that an unrealized fundamental human need is avoidable. It also establishes a certain level of what constitutes the potential by comparing it to what others can achieve.

Moreover, structural violence as a theory helps to explain the distribution of such suffering. Structural violence, while it may not directly implicate the actor of violence, as outlined by Galtung, exposes a clear logic behind the systemic nature of how violence is distributed. Paul Farmer a medical anthropologist and physician, elaborates on Galtung’s formulation of structural violence and asserts that structural violence is ‘not the result of accident or a \textit{force majeure}; they are the consequence, direct or indirect, of human agency’.\textsuperscript{17} Specifically, this human agency is implicated through structures that reflect an unequal distribution of power. The inequalities that exist in terms of disproportionate life chances because of disease or poverty are directly caused by an unequal distribution of resources but the underlying problem is that ‘the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed’\textsuperscript{18} Structural violence has ‘exploitation as the centerpiece. This simply means that some, the top-dogs, get much more (measured here in needs currency) out of the

interaction in the structure than the other, the under-dogs. Structural violence, therefore, originates in this unequal distribution of power among actors and can further trace its origins to human agency. This unequal distribution of power then systematically disadvantages those who do not hold as much if any power at all.

**Objective and Subjective Views of Conflict**

According to the objectivist point of view conflict need not to be felt for it to exist. conflict is, therefore, not dependent on the subjective perspective and it can be perceived by the their parties even if it’s not perceived by the actors, and that what Groom refers to an “happy slave situations.” The objectives idea in conflict emerges from clash of real interests rather than a perceived interest however actors may not perceive who their real enemies are. Thus, this implies that if in a particular social system one group gains what the other group loses, then structural conflict exist even if the losing group does not perceive what is taking place; rather they would require the their party to identify to them that they are in conflict and things are not working in accordance.

According to subjective view, for a conflict to exist there has to be at least some perception of the incompatible goals by the actors. According to the objectivists, if people cannot subjectively perceive a conflict and its effects then they are not in a situation of conflict.

In the DRC, quite a number of individuals are politically, economical and socially under conflict. It’s clear that they are confronted with the consequences of the deeply embedded structural violence. A number of the Congolese are living as Groom state, happy slaves, since they cannot perceive the conflict they are involved in. However, majority of the Congolese are aware of these embedded structural conflict that they live under hence many

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21 Ibid.
have resorted to react to this structures in various way, violent conflict, to dismantling the existing structures that denies then meeting their potentials.

It is therefore important to distinguish between the objectivist and subjectivist point of view since both have implication for conflict management. The subjective viewpoint considers that for conflict to exist the parties must experience it; conflict management must focus on the efforts and inputs of the parties themselves. However, objectivists argue that people can be in conflict without realizing it and as such third parties should focus on changing the conflict generating structures. In cases of deeply embedded structures, a complete overhaul of the institutional frameworks would be necessary in order to change conflict generating structures within the society be it economic, political, or social structures. Concerning the conflict that is going on in DRC, there is therefore an urgent need to change the political, social and economic structures that have been responsible for generating these conflicts.

**Structural Violence and Human Needs Theory**

According to Burton who is among the key scholar in Human needs theory argues that systems, no matter how coercive, that neglect human needs must generate protest behaviour and conflict. According to the human needs theory, there are certain ontological and genetic needs which will be pursued, and that socialization processes, if not compatible with such human needs will lead to frustrations and anti-social personal and group behaviour.

Needs therefore reflect universal motivations which are integral part of response to the frustration of human needs by structural circumstances at all social levels and that relationship are affected by the total social environment. In a wider political economic and social arenas, it is always necessary for a few individual to lead in those complex political, economic and social organization and others, majority, to follow thus, such natural divisions

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22 M. Mwagiru op. cit.
outcome may result in alienation and are often aggravated by the social and physical separation which day a portion of the society an identity since they prevent the two parties from recognizing each other and individuals. For example during the regime of Mobutu, he would only consider his ethnic tribe for appointment and military positions and ignoring other marginalized ethnic sub-tribe, and those of deprivations had led to bloody coup that ensured that Mobutu’s regime was over thrown.

Burton comment further that in the pursuit of social, economic and political interests, the more influential members of society or elite develop nouns and systems to ensure that the status quo continues. This is often done at the expense of the majority and implies that the norms and institution have been designed by the elite in a given country to protect their interest, regardless of the needs of the majority. In this context therefore, structural violence occurs when certain groups of people are deprived of an aspects that satisfy their basic needs. President Mobutu changed the political institution in Congo especially the constitution so that he would have the powers to amend the existing constitution to allow him remain in power and to be an all the political parties so that Zaire remains to be ruled by only one political party NMC when Mobutu belongs, these worm and systems that were established under Mobutu regime deprived though majority over their political rights and also economically since the system allowed him to give concessions if wine field to multinational inspiration that he was party too.

Colonial legacy

European colonialism had profound, lasting, and wide-ranging effects on the development of contemporary African states. One of the most profound legacies of the colonial period has been ethnic conflict. When the European powers imposed formal territorial boundaries throughout the continent in 1885, the seeds for ethnic conflict in post-

colonial Africa were sown. Those boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to
the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. 

Despite colonialism’s central role in the development of weak and ethnically divided
African states, there have been few efforts to assess empirically the linkage between ethnic
conflict and Africa’s colonial legacy. Most efforts to analyze ethnic conflict have employed
grievance-based models, which emphasize economic, political, and social deprivation or
discrimination as sources of ethnic strife. Collier argues that ‘greed’ rather than grievance
explains the prevalence of civil war across the continent. Lack of economic growth in
Africa, rebellions, are more viable since most governments cannot financially afford the
resources to quell rebellions, and citizens have little to lose by joining a rebel movement.

This has been rampant in the eastern part of the DRC where the militia groups crops
up more frequently. Rothschild ascertains that most of the structural conflicts that have been
experienced in Africa are mainly as a result of leaders of dominate ethnic group gain office
and then use the state institutions to distribute wealth inequitably.

The structural configuration of ethnic groups in a society is itself a part of the nation’s
colonial legacy. The Belgium style of colonial administration practiced like other colonial
powers such as Great Britain and France had profoundly different effects on the structure of
inter-ethnic relations in a colony and, therefore, on the likelihood and form of postcolonial
ethnic conflict. After the end of colonial rule, these structures facilitated the mobilization of
aggrieved minorities for collective action.

Ethnic conflict has been frequent and pervasive in post-colonial Africa and a variety
of explanations have been offered to account for this phenomenon. According to Horowitz
colonial powers structured the ethnic groups either between ranked or unranked systems of

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DC, Brookings institution’s, 1997.pp 6-7
ethnic stratification, a distinction that 'rests upon the coincidence or non-coincidence of social class and ethnic origins. Where the two coincide, it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups; where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of unranked groups. These models suggest that the frequency, intensity, and forms of conflict should vary according to whether inter-ethnic relations are characterized as ranked or unranked.29

Hechter supported this colonial legacy of ranking by mentioning about other characterize vertically integrated or 'ranked' systems of inter-ethnic relations as systems of internal colonialism marked by a 'cultural division of labor.30 The cultural division of labor refers to a pattern of structural discrimination such that individuals are assigned to specific types of occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits or markers.31 Social stratification is synonymous with ethnic identity in the sense that the social structure of the nation-state is characterized by one ethnic group being subordinate to the other. In short, ethnicity and class coincide. Social mobility for subordinate group members is therefore restricted by the ascriptive criteria of ethnic markers.32

Bates on the same note of colonial ranking gave an alternative to ranking systems, that is horizontally integrated structure of ethnic stratification,33 where the cultural division of labor has broken down, a pattern of 'competitive ethnicity' emerges, as groups find themselves in competition for the same resources and the same occupational roles in the society's status hierarchy. Unlike the ranked system, this competition is unconstrained by a cultural division of labor that assigns one group, on an ascriptive basis, overwhelming competitive advantages over the others. In an unranked system, there are opportunities for

upward mobility within each group, and the exploitation of those opportunities by members of one group does not necessarily bring them into competition with members of the other group.\textsuperscript{34}

In 1908, Belgium established the Congo as its colony, following the international outcry over the dictatorship of King Leopold II, who made the Congo a free state. Young laments that the Belgian colonialism was unparalleled in the continent in its control and penetration of African society, organized by the “trinity” of bureaucracy, capital and the church.\textsuperscript{35} That trinity gave the Catholic Church the power to organize and run the entire education system. At independence, the country had fewer than 10 university graduates.\textsuperscript{36}

MacNulty point out that lack of qualified and higher educated people by were as a result different Belgium style of colonization unlike other major colonial powers, Britain and France. Belgium had done little to promote local elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, there was not the smooth transition to Western-favoured regimes which largely characterized independence elsewhere; instead, the Congo began rapidly to implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions which foreign interests did much to foment.\textsuperscript{37}

Structures established by the Belgians during colonization were not friendly to the development of what Iyande refers to as ‘sense of national identity and loyalty’.\textsuperscript{38} As a result of these factors for example administration, independence for the Congolese masses ultimately came to mean the eviction of Belgian interests rather than a common striving

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p.57
toward the construction of a viable nation-state. Lefever confirms that the Belgium failure to prepare the Congolese for political responsibility and the belated recognition of the political forces at work were rooted in the paternalistic and materialistic.

**Institutional framework**

Stremlav argues that conflicts in Africa, including this one in the DRC, are due to ‘bad governance’. Weak, authoritarian governments lack the institutional capacity to manage factional struggles and they exclude majority or minority groups from power. This produces tensions that can generate sparks that can start a war. Indeed, the current conflict in the Congo has multiple causes. The resort to arms was the result of a continuing deterioration of the entire situation in the field, which Mobutu’s government and the international communities have created and were well aware of.

Belgium had done little to promote local elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, there was not the smooth transition to Western-favoured regimes which largely characterized independence elsewhere; instead, the Congo began rapidly to implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions which foreign interests did much to foment.

The decision of the French President, General Charles De Gaulle, in 1958, to grant independence to neighboring French territories had an instant effect and a petition was produced for the same rights of determination for the Congolese. As a result of this political wave moving across Africa, Congolese equally demanded for independence despite being not ready to govern without the assistance of the Belgium. Lemarchand argued that the political

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developments that occurred in other African territories stimulated the political awakening of the Congolese. It made them all the more aware of the immobilize that seemed to govern Belgian colonial policy, and hence intensified their desire to change the status quo. Even though the Congolese were granted Independent in June 30, 1960, MacGaffey laments that despite the independent, the colonial African elite lacked education, administrative and managerial experience, and wealth. At independence, the Belgians handed over political but not economic control, so that the new dominant class based its power on control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big and foreign mining and plantation companies. It is quite ironical concerning MacGaffey sentiment that the African elite lacked wealth but the colonial wealth was gained in Africa. Thus, the structural framework inherited from the Belgium government led to the current structural challenges currently facing DRC.

The secession of Katanga made it possible for the Soviet bloc to pose as the true champions of Congolese unity, not only against Tshombe’s regime but against those Western powers upon which it became so heavily dependent, politically, economically and militarily. The intervention of the Soviet Union in support of the government established in Stanley Ville (now Kisangani) and led by Antoine Gizenga, the successor of Patrice Lumumba, made things more complicated. Therefore, the Congo became more a problem of East versus West, America versus Europe, some European countries versus others and some African countries versus others. The period from the installation of the Adoula government in August 1961 until late 1963 was marked by rising hope that the damage resulting from the failed

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decolonization settlement could be contained and that the state could be restored to a reasonable level of operation.

Leadership

Leaders play a pivotal role in political, economical and social agenda setting, the distribution of resources and political actions. The contemporary state in Africa is a remnant of a colonially imposed system. At the time of independence, elites attempted to transform this but only succeeded in entrenching their interests. The current and future problems that African Continent is facing can only be solve through legitimate political, economic and social leadership.

Politics continues to be conducted within a closely knit network of dependent relationships. Although this type of system occurs elsewhere, it is particularly prevalent in the majority of African states where political power is personal and politics is a type of business as political positions give access to economic resources which makes majority of leaders to change the existing constitutional structures to stay in power for life, former president Mobutu Sese Seko being the pioneer among other political leaders in Africa. Van Wyk argues that the s struggle leaders turned presidents are not only reluctant to surrender power, but state ownership is firmly held by the power holders of the former liberation movement. Most of the pre- and post-independence politics and leadership revolved around the personality of its first president.46

Political regimes in Africa range from an absolute monarchy (Swaziland), transitional governments (Somalia), governments of national unity (Sudan), one/no party state (Uganda 1986-2006), one party dominant government (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia) to a multi-party democracy (Botswana).47

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African states share the imposition of artificially created nation-states and imperial state structures. Africans had little time to prepare for independence and at independence the incoming elite inherited alien structures. It inherited state structures developed through coercive mechanisms and centralized political and economic controls such as the army, policy and the bureaucracy. This resulted in the establishment of a political culture based on ethnicity and authoritarian patterns of governance. Controlling the state and its resources became the primary purpose of political contestation.48

In situations where the state’s structures are unable to provide basic services and security, the concept of “failed/fragile state” often applies44 As in the case of DRC, this structures performance based understanding of statehood and political stability underscore states obligation to provide specific public goods, for which, in turn, its citizens instills it with legitimacy and authority. Failing to provide these results in crises where the DRC government has state lost its monopoly on the use of force. State failure, or state collapse, refers to a condition where the structure, authority, power, law and political order fall apart and must be reconstituted. 50

Contemporary African political leadership is neo-patrimonial featuring presidentialism, clientelism, the use of state resources, and the centralization of power. In presidentialism, the leader’s power is unlimited, unopposed and unchecked.51 Here, formal institutions exist, but are merely symbolic rather than democratic. President Mobutu rode on this paradigm to ensure that he commanded the loudest voice in DRC governance for his 32 years rule. Post independence examples of presidentialism include Ghana during Nkrumah’s rule, Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens, and Uganda during Idi Amin’s rule.

49 Ibid. p.7
50 These are, according to Foreign Policy’s 2006 Failed States index. Sudan, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Guinea, Liberia, CAR, Burundi, and Sierra Leone. Foreign Policy, ‘Failed states index’, May/June 2006, Available at <www.foreignpolicy.com> Accessed on 30 March 2010.
51 Ibid. P7
Presidentialism establishes imperial presidencies and produces strong presidents centralizing all power in the office of the president. In Libya and Egypt, for example, Muamar Qaddafi and Hosni Mubarak are seen to be grooming their sons (Seif al-Islam and Gamal respectively) as their political heirs.

Constitutional amendments are one way of staying in power. Historically, African presidents have been hesitant to leave office. Limited terms intends to prevent “presidents for life” as they have a bad record of accomplishment, elimination of opposition, narrowing of the political field, establishing personal armies, often looting national wealth and using the constitution to consolidate personal power.

In Gabon, the constitutional restrictions on how many terms a president may serve were abolished in 2003. Bongo came to power as the head of a one party state. A multi-party system was introduced in 1991. In August 2006, Chadian President Idriss Deby won a third presidential term after pushing through a referendum to lift the constitutional two-term limit. Some reports suggest Deby is eager to appoint his son, Brahim, as his successor. Kenya was not left behind in this euphoria when the former president Moi declared to be one party state dismantling all the existing political parties to ensure that it was only the ruling part Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) to stay and rule Kenya since independence.

Theoretical Framework

For an enhanced understanding of this study, peace research paradigm will be used as the main theory. This will equally help to develop the argument in this study. Peace research paradigm began with the works of Johan Galtung in 1960’s on structural conflict. The theorists of structural conflict built their theories on their observations of societies. The

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theorists saw conflict, and observed that conflict occurred among groups, and that groups have structures which define the groups.

Karl Marx sees rigidly structured economies that had to be overthrow forcefully for the sake of fairer, yet differently structured societies. Weber believes that structures had to evolve peacefully to retain their legitimacy, or conflict would result. Darhrendorf sees structures causing conflict, but discerned substructures within society that could exert influence, or be influenced in ways that might vary from the reactions of society as a whole.

Plato and the Founding Fathers of the United States also assert that societal structures caused conflicts and could resolve conflicts based on the traits of the structures. The common theme for these structural theorists is that the structure of society results in conflict.54

According to Mwagiru, who subscribes to the objective view of conflict which argues that it is possible for people to be in a state of conflict even though they do not immediately or readily experience it and since conflict is embedded in the social structure, it can exist independently of people’s perception of it, what he refers as being in the state of a ‘happy slave.’55

Peace research is the conflict management component of structural conflict which sees conflict as being rooted in the structure and that peace can only be attained by dismantling the structures which give rise to conflict in society.56 This, according to peace researchers can be done through conflict transformation by changing from negative peace to positive peace. The peace research also talks about values and morals which are about judging things according to humanitarian standards defined legally as human rights.

Peace researchers look for causes of war and condition for achieving peace rather than studying military strategies to win the war. According to peace researchers, critical evaluation

56 Ibid pp 4
of such realities as poverty and death leads to the development of policy proposals and strategies to prevent them. Active engagement of researchers with problems is thus an inevitable part of the peace research tradition.⁵⁷

Ho-Won Jeong observed that, given that the peace research is influenced not only by the tradition of causal analysis but also by a normative orientation, the question of policy issues cannot be left out in theoretical analysis. Strengthening the elements that support peace is thus an important policy question. The value based inquiries can easily translate into policy goals of establishing equitable social and economic structures. Jeong further observes that peace research attempts to link the levels of analysis as well to integrate different problem areas. He asserts the importance of the level of analysis to understanding how peace can be achieved in practice. He concludes that the effects of peace activities can be studied at transnational, international, national and local levels.⁵⁸

Structural theory as many other theories have been criticized, the critiques pinpoint how it ignores the influence that powerful individuals have over the actions of the group. Freud enunciated the concept of the id,⁵⁹ and how the ego attempts to satisfy the needs of the id by directing aggression outward.⁶⁰ Some individuals combine powerful drives with charismatic personality to which others are drawn.⁶¹ These individuals became what LeBlanc calls "the chiefs."⁶² LeBlanc ascertains that ‘Chiefs” competed personally to increase prestige, to capture more women, to have more material goods, and to defend their holdings from other ambitious, charismatic would-be chiefs. History is filled with examples of peacefully coexisting groups who suddenly erupt into conflict because of the ambitions of the “chief”.

⁵⁸Ibid. p. 48
Hypotheses

1. Structural conflict affects the socio-economic development of DRC.

2. Structural factors are the fundamental sources of all nature of structural violence currently evident in DRC.

3. External factors escalate structural violence in DRC

Methodology of the Study

This study will use both primary and secondary data. The primary data will be obtained through interviews. However, much of the data will be obtained through secondary data. The interview process will take the form of direct interview which involves presentation of an oral stimulus in from of a question and a verbal response from the respondent.

This instrument of data collection has the following advantages: The researcher can control the setting; it is a flexible instrument as one can probe and in the process get in-depth information; it is not restricted to literate people; it has a large response rate; one can adjust the language to the ability of the respondents; one can also control the environment; one can change the question order; lastly, the respondents alone is the one who answers with no assistance from the researcher or any other person.

Despite the above advantages, the instrument has also its disadvantages in that it is expensive in terms of time and money, interview assistants must be trained and distortions may occur due to interaction i.e. depending on how questions are asked and recorded, the data quality may be low as there may be interviewer biases. there is a lack of anonymity, it may be inconvenient to administer due to time, fatigue and other reasons. one cannot consult other documents or references, probing may make it difficult to start and lastly, it may be difficult to access the respondents.
structural violence. The publication, however, focuses fundamentally on the issue of economic social and political dynamic that generates violent conflict in DRC. This study extends that earlier analysis on colonial period and its impacts on the current political, social and economic dynamics in DRC. In addition to considering this broader range of conflict generating content issues within the various regimes in DRC, it provides a detailed analysis of finding on the root causes of structural conflict in DRC, the actors’ motives and interest and the management mechanism that would help to mitigate the escalation of conflict.

Chapter Outline

The structure of the study will be divided into five chapters;

Chapter one: Introduction

The chapter will introduce the subject under investigation, the statement of the problem, objectives, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and the methodology of the study.

Chapter Two: Overview of DRC Conflict

Chapter two will provide for the detailed origin of DRC conflict from pre-colonial era to the present conflicts dynamics

Chapter Three: Structural causes of conflict in DRC

Chapter three will specifically analysis the selected structural causes of conflict in DRC and the extent to which structural conflict generate violence in the DRC.

Chapter Four: A critical Analysis of the DRC conflict

Chapter four will provide an analysis of the DRC conflict based on the data collected.

Chapter Five: Findings and Conclusion

Chapter five will highlight the findings of the research and give its conclusion.

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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DRC CONFLICT

Origins of colonialism

The region institutes present day DRC comprises an exceptionally wide range of cultural and linguistic groups. The pre-colonial histories of these groups were quite diverse and their political systems were influenced to a significant degree of geography.\(^\text{64}\)

European involvement in the region and not begin with the colonialism of the 19th century, but began much earlier, with the 'discovery of the Central Africa by the Portuguese in 1482, a Portuguese explorer, Diego Cao.\(^\text{65}\) One effect of the foreign contact was the gradual Christianization of the Kongo, the Congo Monarch, King Alfonso, became a major promoter of Christianity, and a large segment of the general population converted at least nominally to Roman Catholicism.

The Christian influence reached a high point in 1518, when the king's son, Henrique, was appointed a bishop in a church.\(^\text{66}\) This became the beginning of social conflict as the nature Congolese traditional religion was not recognized by the missionaries who were influencing the local to join Christianity. The entry of Christianity therefore initiated the social dynamics of conflict in those early periods.

Another result of the European arrival was slave trade. The 16th century was a general worldwide expansion in the demand for slaves, especially for the growing plantation in Europe. Slaves were procured from several regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Kongo Kingdom and surrounding areas, slave trade that had been a feature of life in central

\(^\text{66}\) Ibid, p. 38
Africa long before the arrival of Europeans in believed to have affected the demography of central Africa and especially Kongo kingdom.67

The most pronounced effect of the slave trade was an increase in violence and war. For African in the region, slave raiding was the most profitable form of commerce, because of the international demand, and various African groups would raid one another to procure captives for sale. Escalating warfare was thus triggered among the various groups.68 The violence profoundly disrupted the African societies in the Congo Basin region.

Throughout most of slave trade, the Europeans traders did not attempt to administer the Congo as a colony. The practice changed in the 19th C during the scramble for Africa, in which European powers vied for influence on the African Continent.69, the Congo Independent state was officially created by king Leopold II of Belgium. During the entire history of the independent state, from 1885 to 1908, the Belgium government held no authority whatsoever in the Congo. The Independent state was therefore governed by a private company, under King Leopold II.70

King Leopold's Era and the Belgium Colonial Era

In 1882, Leopold formed the Association Internationale du Congo (AIC), which was responsible for administering the colony.71 AIC was widely believed at that time to be truly an international organization, but this was a misperception; according Arendt, the AIC was not International organization at all but entirely an instrument of Leopold II. The formation of AIC gave birth to institutional structures that haunt DRC to date. AIC was not for the benefit of the entire Congo, but to the benefit of Leopold and his cronies, the structural inequalities that have been recurring in DRC.

69 R. Anstey, King Leopold Legacy London Oxford University Press, 1966
70 Ibid. p. 40
By 1870, Leopold got a lot of challenges among the European powers that had interest in the territory. France became one of the major threats since France had established control of territory east of the Congo River in what was later became part of French Equatorial Africa, and according to Ascherson French authorities from this base of operation threatened to overrun the whole of the Conge basin.72

Britain also wanted to extend their existing empire through their indirect rule methods, and since the Portuguese also had an interest to establish a colony in Congo, the British thus offered support for Portuguese claims in the Congo with condition that the Portuguese agreed to maintain free trade. Balandier argues that the alliance was widely regarded as a British bid to establish a sphere of influence in the Congo using Portugal as proxy.73

These rivalries among the European powers thus enabled Leopold to exploit an opportunity based on this division and this enable him to gain considerable support for his own colonial ambitions. The proxy war that is continuing in DRC is basically the continuation of what the European powers initiate, the dynamics have slightly changed in that, currently Africans are used against Africans.

An international consensus gradually emerged with regard to the Congo question; since none of the single power would govern it. As compromise, in 1884, German and Britain recognized Leopold’s colony with the AIC organization as the sovereign power.74 During the Berlin conference of 1884-85, the great powers all generally agreed to recognize Leopold’s claims in the Congo, and Leopold also received permission from the Belgium parliament to

become sovereign in both Belgium and newly created Congo Independent state. Thus, the Congo state officially came into existence at the time of its international recognition, on February 26, 1885.

The new state that was a Leopold property was unable to obtain public funds to launch the colonial enterprise. Thus, the Congo had to pay for its own colonization, and produces a profit for those backers that Leopold had found, in Belgium and elsewhere.

The resources that were initially available, ivory and rubber made the Free State to establish monopolies over these products and organized a system of taxes in kind. In forest areas according to Turner, each village had to bring in a certain number of kilos of ivory or raw rubber, or risk punishment. To avoid punishment from the Leopold each village had to move further deep into the forest hunting for ivory. This led to the competition for the limited resources available to meet the decree made by the king.

Harms acknowledges that as villages failed to meet their quota, punishment escalated. Many Congolese lost their lives. Thus, the Congo state was administered to yield the very highest level of revenues for the state treasury, as well as the profit for Leopold. The entire colony was opened for commercial activity.

Under Belgium administration, land was divided into three categories; native, crown and registered land. Native land was controlled by the African who had the right to do as they pleased with respect to the Land’s cultivation or with allowing it to lie fallow. The Native land owners had the right to expand their holding, and could not cede their rights to the land through the administrative authorities. Despite of these rights, the native land was

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75 Ibid, pp. 8 - 9
79 Ibid, pp. 12 -13
not completely in the hand of the Congolese, because there were certain planting restrictions as well as quotas and general crop controls.

Crown land was held neither by African communities nor by the private persons and thus constituted the private estate of the crown. The crown had powers to transfer such land or grant concessions for the purpose of development. Under crown land titles, the African retained the rights of harvesting, fishing, and tree cutting.

According to the registered land which consisted of concession given through the Belgium government registered land remain the minerals rights which were considered government assets.

During the reign of Congo Free state, immense concessions were granted to private concerns who were thereby empowered to control the land in their concessions, to hold authority over the Africans living on the concession, and to have considerable say in the government. Despite the land belonging to the African, they had very limited right of ownership since the Belgium government could give out their land to the person of their choice without consulting the Congolese. All vacant lands in Congo were under direct state control. Gradually, vacant lands came to include virtually the whole country.

The state developed further means of raising money, by leasing enormous parcels of land to private companies. The largest of the concession were owned by persons who had help finance king Leopold. The Anglo Belgium – Indian Rubber Company (ABIR) was permitted to exploit a huge track in the Northwest region.

Among other private companies that were given concession by the Belgium government included, comite special du Katanga (CSK) which was given concession of a third of territory of Katanga, including mining rights for 99 year. The special agreement of

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1900 and 1901 was made to establish a common administration of the lands and mines by the state and CSK in joint ownership this ensures that the profit would be shared equally.\textsuperscript{82} Compagnie des En Chemis de Fer du Congo superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains (CFL) was given concession for 99 yrs for the purpose of building a railway linking the Congo River with Lakes Albert and Tanganyika. CFL also held mining rights although the lands were to public prospecting. Comite National du Kivu (CNKi) also was given concession in which it held exclusive rights up to the time of independence.\textsuperscript{83}

On the administrative matters, Congo was governed by the central metropolitan government with its seat in the colony. The Belgium legislature was supreme in the matter of Congo, ignoring the native’s local administrative system. The legislative powers were delegated to the crown which issued decrees and order. Within the colony the two was presented by the Governor General. There was also a Government council which was purely consultative. Among all these high ranking government there was no African representation indeed, the Congo was set up as a vote less territory, neither Africans nor Belgium’s residing these had the vote.\textsuperscript{84}

**Post Colonial era**

DRC became independent on 30 June 1960 but mutiny and secessionist movements marred the post-independence era. Mac Nulty argues that unlike Africa’s other major colonial powers Britain and France, Belgium had done little to promote a local elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, there was not the smooth transition to Western-favoured regimes which largely characterized independence elsewhere; instead, the


\textsuperscript{83} A. P. Merriam, Congo Background of Conflict. USA. Northwest University Press. 1961, pp. 4-20

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. pp. 13-14.
Congo began rapidly to implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions which foreign interests did much to foment.\textsuperscript{85}

The problem got aggravated with the fact that the cold war era brought the fight between Soviet Union and US to the country. The Soviet Union supported Lumumba as the legitimate leader of the country and the US challenged it. The resource rich country also could not get economic freedom with powerful outsiders that continue to keep control on the economy of the country. MacGaffey comments that the colonial African elite thus lacked education, administrative and managerial experience, and wealth. At independence, the Belgians handed over political but not economic control, so that the new dominant class based its power on control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big foreign mining and plantation companies.\textsuperscript{86} The overall scenario culminated into a political crisis. Kasavubu and Lumumba got engaged in a power struggle and later Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba in September 1960.

Following years of extreme instability, Lieutenant General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, ousted both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 coup. The Congolese state and economy still bear the deep impact of Mobutu’s ‘predatory’ rule of thirty-two years. Executive power in Zaire, a name given to the DRC by Mobutu, was absolute. The 1974 constitution granted him authority over the executive, legislature and judiciary. Mobutu, the head of the state, also had the right to change the constitution at his discretion. He banned political parties while making membership in his party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement, compulsory.

In the name of democracy a one-party system was established wherein elections were held periodically, with the incumbent head of the state as the only candidate. Mobutu was

\textsuperscript{86} J. MacGaffey. \textit{The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth}. London: James Currey, 1991), p. 27
also guilty of severe human rights violations and political repression. Corruption was integral to the system, and politicians became entirely dependent on his good will. He consolidated power by co-opting potential rivals and exploited the country’s vast natural resources.

According to Turner, by the 1990s, the DRC’s economy was near collapse due to mismanagement, corruption and authoritarianism. This overall dismal scenario and the later happenings in the DCR gave credibility to the stance that conflicts in Africa, including the one in the DRC are due to bad governance.

Post Mobutu era

Bad governance within the state accompanied by the external dimension i.e. the Rwandan genocide of 1994 laid the foundation of conflict in the DRC. Some of the militias responsible for killing thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda fled across the border to the DRC. Rwanda wanted DRC to check these militias and sent its own troops twice to stop preparation of attacks on the country. The Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire, AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu in May 1997. The ascendancy of Kabila led to the end of first conflict.

The situation however was not stable as expected by many who thought that the change of leadership from a dictator, Mobutu to Kabila causes some positive structural change. Differences between Kabila and the neighbouring allies that helped him to ascend to power emerged soon afterwards, this was as a result of continued their presence of the allies military personnel in the DRC, and led to a no compromise situation.

According to Naidoo, good governance remained an unfulfilled dream for the people despite all the euphoria regarding the change that was expected. There was disappointment at

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87 T. Turner. War in the Congo. Foreign Policy in Focus, vol. 5, no. 10, April 2000, p. 1
the popular level as the government behaved in an authoritarian manner and renegade on its promise and did not provide a genuine democracy and combating corruption.89

The rule of Kabila was, thus, similar in many ways to his predecessor. He banned political activities, dissolved parliament and suppressed all local bodies. There was no state budget between 1998 and 2001. Laws were issued by presidential decree. Collaboration ended with international financial institutions since they were pressing him to investigate massacres that took place during the conflict. Kabila, just like his predecessor Mobutu, encouraged favouritism and nepotism. Poor monetary policy led to a near economic collapse.90

The internal and external factors colluded and pushed the country towards a Second Congo War, the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II in August 1998. From 1998 to 2003 the country suffered hugely with fighting between the Congolese government supported by Angola, Chad, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and on the other side Congolese rebels backed by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Many other militia groups that claimed to be defender groups for their community also became active participants in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement in 1999 and deployment of the UN peacekeeping force in 2000 notwithstanding, the violent conflict continued.

The conflict in Congo thus is primarily an outcome of authoritarianism, foreign interference, misgovernance and lack of democracy; these variables have basically ruined the political, economic and social fabric of DRC. Since independence in 1960, continuous inter-ethnic and civil strife, authoritarian rule, etc have ravaged the country. The erosion and collapse of state institutions has been discover by other studies as the another proximate cause of the Congo’s two wars between 1996-1997 and 1998-2003. By the time Laurent

Kabila - Rwanda backed military invaded in 1996; President Mobutu Sese Seko's abusive government had undermined the army, administration, parliament and court that the local population greeted the Rwandan-backed rebels with euphoria.

However, the new government of President Laurent Kabila was similar in many ways, and state institutions remained weak and corrupt. In the east, rebel movements established ad hoc administrative structures bent on extracting natural resources and taxes. The country was essentially divided into large chiefdom ruled by military movements. Other persisting root causes of the conflict noted include unequal access to land and unfair sharing of revenues from natural resource exploitation.

**Regional actors' motives and interest**

**Introduction**

DRC conflict is complex in the entire African conflict system. It involves a myriad of internal, regional and international actors. Mwagiru asserts that a complex conflict like the one in the DRC is one in which there are more than two parties in conflict and hence multiplicity of actors, interns and values. This therefore highlight that the DRC conflict is complex and for effective analysis for better understanding, in-depth knowledge of actors' interest and values would play an important role its management.

The multiplicity of actors, interest and values of any conflict dynamics has a direct relationship in terms of its complexity. Failure to pay an attention and identify actor's participation, interests and values would lead to conflict escalation and its internationalization impact. This section will tend to identify various categories of internal, regional and international actors involved in DRC conflict, their interests, motives and the values attached to their involvement in DRC conflict. The nature and magnitude of the protracted conflict and

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war in the DRC has been a cause of concern both for all states in the region and for the world community at large.\textsuperscript{93}

**Uganda**

The official reason according to Clark that motivated Uganda to enter into DRC conflict was that Kabila’s administration was not providing security along Uganda western frontiers and to stop the renewed genocide against the Bunyamulenge.\textsuperscript{94} Ugandan authorities believed that Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been conducting raids into Ugandan’s national territory since \textit{des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo} (Allies of Democratic Forces for the liberation of Congo- Zaire- ADFL) rebels who had overthrown Mobutu in 1997.\textsuperscript{95}

The deadly raid that annoyed president Museveni’s administration was the ADF raid against the Kichwamba technical School in Kasese district in June 1998, in which some eighty students were burnt alive inside their locked dormitory.\textsuperscript{96} The accusation by Museveni’s administration that Kabila had failed to provide for security along its border with Uganda is uncalled for because the security issues requires mutual responsibility between the neighboring states and no state should therefore accuse its neighbor entirely for not providing adequate security if they are not as well cooperating. Uganda should instead beefed up security along its common border with DRC instead of crossing the border in the name of fighting the ADF rebels.

Another motivation for Uganda’s administration to intervene in DRC conflict was that the Uganda People Defence Forces (UPDF) was already allowed into the DRC territory under the terms of DRC-Uganda Security Agreements that was signed shortly after Kabila’s rise to

\textsuperscript{93}A. Muchai, Arm Proliferation and the Congo War, p. 185.


\textsuperscript{96}East African, Nairobi Weekly. 15\textsuperscript{th} – 21\textsuperscript{st} June 1998.

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power that provided for joint operation of the UPDF and Forces Armes Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces- FAC). The UPDF under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between two countries could certainly give them safe and free passage to the DRC territory initially without engaging in all-out war against Kabila but instead to pursue the ADF rebel operating from the Congolese territory.

As a result of continued resistance raids from the Congolese territory, the Ugandan authority therefore felt that they need to stamp out the regime they established in 1997. Museveni and his allies believed that removal of the current Kabila’s regime would help to improve the security situation between along Uganda –DRC border. The perception here was Kampala administration thought that; first, its successor regime would be friendly to the Ugandan authority, and secondly, it would have the capacity to improve the security along their common border.97

The demands by Uganda’s authority in these context look unrealistic because any incoming regime would not accept to compromise its position in power to fight rebels in the periphery that are causing disturbance to the neighboring state, eve Museveni himself cannot afford to do same mistake and that is the reason to which Museveni has not been keen on improving security on the Ugandan side instead he concentrates in Kampala to ensure that he continue to hold on to power.

Many Ugandans that consider president Museveni as their small “god” and “Savior” believe according to the local standards that Museveni has achieved so much in the region and no any other head of state within the region, Great Lakes Region can match his achievements. This has therefore given president Museveni determination to spread his ideology beyond the Ugandan’s boundary to the Great lakes Region. Museveni helped Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990, and after the subsequent rise to power by President

Paul Kagame in Rwanda, provided prime facie evidence that Museveni was seeking to spread his ideology to the neighboring counties.

According to Nsubuga, Museveni claims to stand for national unity, democracy, self-reliance, development and intra Africa cooperation and against corruption, tribalism and dictatorship... Nsubuga argues that Museveni initially presented himself as a Marxist while in the bush as a gorilla struggling to rise to power but quickly abandon such conviction and warmly embraced the neoliberal strategies. This is a clear indication that the true picture of Museveni to the involvement to the DRC conflict is not yet known by majority of its allies. Prunier argues that the ideology of Museveni’s regime is difficult to discern in the assemblage of rhetoric and action of regime. In practice, Museveni has famously rejected multiparty politics as being in appropriate for Africa’s fragmented politics, same ideology that they share with the former president of Kenya Daniel Moi, and constructed a no – party movement system which effectively functions like one party system.

According to Clark, another set of putative motive for Uganda’s second intervention in DRC conflict has to with the exploitation of the country natural resources. Thus, the main motive of Uganda in DRC conflict is to advance its economic agenda. William Reno claims that, the officials of the Ugandan government purposively planned and executed Uganda’s invasion in order to further the economic interest of the state. Reno further argues that the invasion and occupation of Eastern DRC could plausibly be part of a long- term rational process of state building.
The extraction and export of the Congolese natural resources, including timber, coffee, gold, and diamond among many others through Uganda in some regards had salutary effects on Uganda’s national economy, these revenues has helped Uganda to ease the burden of Uganda’s growing current account deficit. According to EIU report, gold and gold components were Uganda’s second largest sources of export earning after coffee amounting to US $ 81 million equivalent to 12% of all export revenues.

A part from the state being involved in looting the natural resources of DRC, Perrot argues that Museveni ordered his army into DRC so that they can as well plunder for their personal benefits. Thus, the UPDF are acting in the DRC basically with the blessing of their leader, president Museveni, hence for the UPDF they should put in more effort and ensure that the conflict escalates to enrich them. This kind of blessings from the head of state may at one point lead to state competing with its own military personnel, basically because of human nature, military personnel would rather enrich themselves rather than serving the state that would not offer them equals to what they are likely to get on their own.

Uganda’s motive again in the involvement in the DRC conflict would be seen as a strategy to expand and realize its foreign policy frameworks. Clark claims that Uganda’s evolving strategies in the DRC conflict must first and foremost be seen in the context of its boarder foreign policy exigencies. Clark further argues that the root purpose of Uganda’s foreign policy like any other African states is to keep its rulers in power over the medium term. The medium term in this context is questionable and very ironical, whether to be the life president, or otherwise. Uganda’s foreign policy can therefore be seen as an adjunct of Museveni domestic goals, which serves Museveni regime fundamentals goals most directly.

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\textsuperscript{105}J.F. Clark, Evaluating the Efficiency of Foreign Policy: An Essay on the Complexity of Foreign Policy Goals. Southeastern political Review 23 No. 4 December, 1995, pp. 559-579
As much as many domestic strategies might be pursued to stay in power, Museveni seems to have chosen the positive strategy that relies on the economic growth and building of capacity through economic exploitation of natural resources of the DRC.

Like reward, Uganda also had employed strategies that had to do with non-state, private goals of the main military officers as well as non-state goals. These strategies involved the extraction of economic wealth from DRC and they serve the purpose both of enriching individual UPDF officers and important civilian supporters of president Museveni, and of furnishing off-budget funding of Uganda’s continuing occupation of the northeastern DRC.

Uganda’s evolving strategies in the DRC conflict have traced its own evolving goals and exigencies of events themselves. The private goals of Museveni’s cronies in DRC have come to overshadow its original goals of intervention; the Museveni regime entered the war without a clear set of goals and strategies. Kampala administration supported a very weak ally that would not even exist if were it not for Uganda’s intervention. Museveni entered the war with multiple and unclear goals, and his strategies had been determined by the events on the ground. According to Clark, Uganda’s strategies in DRC do not accord well at all with its most important putative goal there; Uganda has deployed its troops deep into Congolese territory, rather than along the Western frontier, where the ADF operates. As a result relatively few Uganda’s would understand their government justification for its involvement in DRC conflict.

Angola

The main aim and objective of Angola participating in DRC war according to Turner comprised of several elements; to pursue the fight against Savimbi especially by interdicting his supplies; to protect the oil installation that finance its own war efforts; to maintain a
favorable or complaint regime in Kinshasa, and to support regime in power or replace it with a more suitable one.  

Both in Angola and Congo minerals dominate the economy. Two extractive industries therefore provide most of Angola’s revenue and are target of fighting in the civil war. The major oil deposits along the coast of Cabinda and Northwestern Angola, as well as Congolese coastline separating the two pieces of Angola territory. Thus, oil and diamond finance the military efforts of the government and (UNITA) of diamond.  

Turner further comments that Angola’s participation in the first Congo war was only partly successful, it hoped that the fall of Mobutu would bring to end destabilization efforts from the territory of Congo and it’s intended to clear the rear bases of Savimbi’s army. Immediately following the fall of Kinshasa under Mobutu leadership, Angola carried its own offensive in DRC, attempting to locate and destroy UNITA bases. However, UNITA hung unto some of its bases in Congo and kept the support of its local allies.  

Angola’s intervention into Congo conflict has many dynamics. Breackman argues that there are three main factors which include; ideology, economic and security as the main reasons for Angola’s intervention in Congo wars. Angola came to rescue Laurent Kabila and his people mainly as the remembrance of heroic hours of November 1975 when the intervention of the Katangan soldiers saved the destiny of Luanda government.  

On the eve of independence, Katangan soldiers alongside the MPLA troops who were threaten by FNLA, UNITA that got support from Mobutu’s soldiers, thus, Angola involvement in the support of Kabila administration is basically paying back what Luanda owes Kinshasa. Tuner on the same note comments that whatever the weight this sentimental factor, Angola had other more substantial reasons to break with its former allies, Uganda and

108 Braeckman. L’Enjeu Congolais, p. 24  
109 Ibid. p. 85
Rwanda and support Kabila, one of the allegation indicates that UNITA vice president Antonio Dembo and Savimbi had paid a secret visit to Kampala without the knowledge of Luanda administration, and that Kampala and Kigali had sent their troops to Bas Congo without consulting Luanda administration. These ideological differences made Luanda to break ranks with Uganda and Rwanda and to extend its support to Kabila because Dos Santos had realized that his former allies are supporting his enemy.

Like any other regional actor, Luanda government had demanded compensation in form of diamond concession for its military expense incurred during the military support. Angola had an interest in oil well near Cabinda enclave that is known to be having the richest oil deposits. Tuner comments that the economic spoil of the DRC war have been distributed by Dos Santos to help him hold to power. The presidency controls Sonango (National Angolan Fuel Company) which in return for Angolan army assistance gain control of Congo’s petroleum distribution and production networks. International Crisis Group confirms that Angola gained control of 1000 km stretch of Atlantic seaboard including DRC, Congo –Brazzaville and its own Cabinda enclave.

Despite being the strongest ally to Kabila, Angola is being accused of being the master mind in the assassination of Kabila. Turner claims that, there is a fairly circumstantial case that Angola had Laurent Kabila killed or at least allowed it to happen. It was well known that from mid 2000 Angola wanted war to end but Kabila was resisting. This is a clear indication that Angola was in the same way had the same hidden motives like Uganda and Rwanda to support only the friendly regime that would allow them to pursue both their national and individual interest.

10 Ibid. p. 85
11 Ibid. p. 87
Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe like any other regional actor in the DRC conflict was equally faced with challenges. Zimbabwe remained locked in a conflict that has so far undermined its domestic political stability, eroded its economic well - being due to the unprecedented unbudgeted expenditure on security, and finally, stunted its already tenuous military capacity.\(^{114}\)

Zimbabwe mainly came to DRC conflict as a result of being a member of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) that intervened military in Congo conflict. Zimbabwe political and military intervention appears to have followed a legitimate cause despite the evolving dynamics that followed later that had a great impact on Zimbabwe's domestic political, economic and military structures.

According to Rupiya, Zimbabwean official before intervening to war had some secret that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi had, to carve out territories of security influence in the regions of Congo that share contiguous borders with those states.\(^{115}\)

President Mobutu departure left a political vacuum in that he had left no legitimate successor and this gave the greedy neighboring states (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) an opportunity to plot an attempt to manage/ control this relation with their large but poorly organized rebels groups to defend their neighbor, DRC. This followed by deliberate installation of Laurent Kabila through ADFL as the successor to Mobutu. Other allies, Angola, Eritrea, and Tanzania practically assisted in the forced removal of Mobutu from power but were not aware of the hidden agenda that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi authorities had. Rupiya confirms this secret agenda when Uganda and its allies invaded Congo, against

\(^{114}\) The 1998 third report o the Departmental committee on Security; Presented to the Zimbabwe 3rd session of the 4th Parliament on 24 March (SC2 – 1998)

Kabila mainly because of the public fallout between former allies, when Kabila ordered Rwanda and Uganda to return to their countries on 28\textsuperscript{th} July 1998.\textsuperscript{115}

The main reason therefore for Zimbabwe involvement into DRC conflict according to Manhood Maindani was to accept an appeal to intervene in the conflict made to President Robert Mugabe by President Yoweri Museveni in Windhoek something that look very ironical. Subsequently a meeting was organized for all belligerents at Victoria Falls, following an appeal from the international community and by the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) and SADC.\textsuperscript{117} The appeal therefore made Zimbabwean authority to revisit their foreign policy framework to initially deploy a contingent of 600 Zimbabwean forces under Operation Restore Sovereignty (ORS) in August 1998.

The second development that led to the decision to intervene stemmed from the formal request made to SADC by a member state, DRC itself.\textsuperscript{118} This request was brought up by for consideration by a member state in the meeting of the Inter – State Defence and Security Committee (ISDC) help in Harare in July 1998. Zimbabwe then as chair of the organ in politics, Defence and Security, and imbued with the spirit of the former front line state, felt that it could not shirk its responsibilities to a neighbor under threat from "Imperialism" since some western state were as well involve in this conflict with some key belligerents interveners made Zimbabwe leadership not to hold back but instead participate in the perceived Pan African Venture.\textsuperscript{119}

Another thing that motivated Zimbabwe to intervene is what Rupiya termed as "permissive conditions".\textsuperscript{120} Zimbabwe had adequate military forces at his disposal to

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid, p. 95
\textsuperscript{117}Article 4 of the Operation Restore Sovereignty Declaration
\textsuperscript{118}Ibid, p. 96
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116 Ibid, p. 95
118 Article 4 of the Operation Restore Sovereignty Declaration
119 Ibid, p. 96
undertake the mission. This followed by the built up by Zimbabwean authorities to support the foreign policy objectives subsumed in its Pan Africanist ambitions.

Rupiya further argues that since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had embarked upon a major force integration that brought together elements of the former Rhodesian security forces and the armed elements of two major political parties, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe people’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPPA). Rupiya continues to elaborate that the manpower training and availability of equipment soon benefited from a wide range of military assistance from Britain, China, Tanzania, Pakistan and North Korea. These factors therefore made the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) to put into the field a brigade – sized combat unit: involving air-power, tanks, and special infantry forces. The period of intervention therefore made ZDF to gain anticipated operational experience under various UN peacekeeping missions on the African continent.121

Rwanda

On the same note as the first Congolese war, the second Congolese war began with ethnic Congolese Tutsi arming to defend themselves against claims of an attack by government supporters. Both wars had one thing in common, they began along the Congolese – Rwanda borders in Usira, Bukavu, and Goma and later on spread up to Congo River, Katanga and Kasai.122 Rwandan authorities are in records initially denying their involvement in both wars, something that later on changed when Kigali administration eventually admitted to participation, justifying its intervention on humanitarian and defensive grounds.

Rwanda authorities’ involvements in the war are not self – evident. In fact, Kigali authority seems to have been motivated by a wide range of objectives that have changed over

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122 Ibid, p. 129.
time and again. Officially, the Rwanda stated justification for intervention mainly were; to eliminate continuing threats to Rwandan security posed by Hutu rebels based in Congo, to protect Congolese Tutsi and to promote democracy among other motives that Longman considers as ‘less defendable’ in international circles which include the need to a well domestic unrest, opportunities for personal and national enrichment, and the desire to be a regional power.123

These unofficial, unstated grievances as pinpointed by Longman could have been some of the reasons why Rwanda took long to withdraw its forces from the Congolese territory when demanded by the international communities through the peace accords.

As it was a well spread claim that Rwandan authorities had initially denied involvement in Congo wars seems to be a fact that they were using so that they do not fall a prey of the international law on inter territorial intervention. Longman claims that Rwandan authorities were taking their time preparing the international community to accept their justification.124 Congolese Democratic Rally/Party (RCD) later on gave their justification bored on humanitarian interests, complaining about Kabila’s corrupt and authoritarian tendencies and his move towards genocide. RCD claimed that was a continuation of the first war against Mobuto to accomplish the objections, a friendly regime. Kigali administration were determined to be involve in Ituri war because they were claiming that Kabila administration had launch a genocide against Congolese Tutsi and warned strongly that Rwanda could be drawn into DRC if the killing of the Congolese Tutsi’s is not stopped.

There is broader understanding that Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) claims of humanitarian motives, this dynamic is specifically linked to the understanding of the RPA to the 1990 –1994 war in Rwanda and mainly to the 1994 genocide. RPA invaded Rwanda in 1990 on humanitarian grounds and continue to fight in 1994 to put a halt to the genocide of

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124 Ibid, p. 30
their Tutsi relatives. This gives Tutsi in the RPA strong perception of ethnic connection to all Tutsi elsewhere. Thus, the Kigali intervention in Congo conflict therefore had both humanitarian interest and ethnic solidarity among the Banyarwanda living in Congo.

Rwanda on the other hand claims to fight for democracy in Congo, something that is lacking in Kigali. According to Mahmood, he argues that foreign invasion cannot give democracy. Longman comments that the involvement of Rwanda in Congolese was not about democracy, the real goal was to topple Kabila and replace him with a more compliant puppet.

The problem with the humanitarian justification for intervention in Congo is the same problem posed by the RPA's relationship for the genocide in Rwanda. According Longman, attacking a country increases the vulnerability of scapegoat groups and makes genocide more likely, while this is no way justifies genocide, nor makes it less heinous a crime against humanity, the knowledge that the context of war is a major causal factor in explaining genocide does place a burden of caution on thou who would wage war.

Melson argues that the ideology of genocide generally portrays the dominant group as vulnerable, so that genocide becomes a defensive action in the mind of perpetuators. Attacking a country with a well developed genocidal ideology lends credence to the argument that the dominant group is in fact threatened and need to defend itself by eliminating the internal enemies. Thus, these kind of genocidal ideology therefore would explain why the violence against Albanians increased after NATO began bombing Serbia. This happens cause the war augmented the Serbia sense of vulnerability similarly the invasion of Rwanda's RPA of Congolese Tutsis for short time period, the Congolese Tutsi vulnerability far heightened.

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Another motive for involvement in Congo war that Rwanda authorities will publicly admit is the continuing threat to security in Rwanda posed by elements of former Rwandan Army and the Interahamwe militia operating out of Congo. Thus given the security threat posed for Rwanda by the Interahamwe and EX-FAR present in the camps in Congolese territory, Kigali authority intervention gain support and understanding from the main stake holder. As much as the Rwanda authority intervention gain understanding, a cross board, very limited attention was paid to over look that RPF that were attacking Hutu without discriminating between the combatants and unarmed civilians, in clear violation of humanitarian law.

Thus given the diplomatic success of the defensive justification for intervention in the first war, it does not come as a surprise that RPF change their concern in the second war as security concern for its justification. According to Ian Fisher, the Rwandan government did, thus, have legitimate security concerns and its claim that the insurgents were using Congo as a base of operation seems to have well founded.

Domestic security concern also formed the basis for justification for Rwandan intervention in Congo. Longman comments that nothing serves to unite a divided country like an external threat, and nothing so well as a war. This concept applies in Kenyan case that remain ethnically divided along political parties in 1998, but when terrorist network -Al-Qaeda bombed the American embassy in Nairobi, killing innocent Kenyans, this external threat made Kenya that was divide politically based on their ethnic tribes to come together and unite as one nation and with the same voice to condemn the attack with the strongest words possible without looking at their past differences.

The war in Congo could therefore help to create internal Rwanda unity; Longman suggests that it could unify a divided Tutsi population. An important division exists between

129 Longman, Op. ct p 133
131 Ibid, p. 134
the survivors of genocide and the Tutsi who had returned to Rwanda from exile. Longman points out that the RPF is composed predominantly of returned exiles, while the genocide survivors had little representation in the government and very little power.\textsuperscript{132}

Another notable division that exists is within the RPF and the community of returned exile between exiles from the francophone countries of Burundi and Congo and those from Uganda and other Anglophone countries. Longman comments that the power within the RPF is clearly dominated by Tutsi who like Kagame, were exile in Uganda while some Tutsi returned from Burundi and Congo are in prominent government positions, the most powerful positions are held almost entirely by Ugandan returnees\textsuperscript{133}.

Thus the war in Congolese territory by RPF made these division less important and all the major division that were merging in Kagame’s government united towards common enemy in Congo. The Rwandan situation hears resemblance to Israel’s relationship with its neighbours. Since many Israeli politicians seem to have a sense that only Israel is willing and capable to ensure the survival of the Jewish people, and that the experience of holocaust gives a moral sanction to the action of the state, and that no other power can match their superiority.

As much as humanitarian and security concern may have been important motivating factors for Rwanda involvement in the second war, these grievances do not fully explain Rwandan continued engagement in Congo conflict, instead, less internationally accepted reasons that appear to have had a strong influence, despite denial by the RPF. The most obvious of these according to French is the opportunity for national and personal enrichment.\textsuperscript{134}

Strong evidence suggests that Rwanda has profited substantially from its involvement in Congo. Rwanda and Uganda have both become transit points for diamonds and other...
mineral extracted from DRC and generally smuggled out of the country illegally. Rwanda is a small, overpopulated country with almost no mineral resources in contrast; Congo is extremely rich in natural resources and has abundant land.

Longman argues that the exact extent to which Rwanda is profiting from its intervention in Congo is difficult to determine, but evidence of the economic benefits taken from DRC is clearly visible in the current level of prosperity in Kigali. Thus this prosperity comes despite the high cost of sustaining the war, which one would reasonably assume is being financed by Congo itself. Hence, the extraction of natural resources and goods from Congo seems to benefit not only the Rwandan government and Army but also individuals engage in smuggling and other forms of trade including RPA officers and others.

**South Africa**

Like any other actor in the region, South Africa had a different dimension as far as DRC conflict was concern. South Africa had been committed towards conflict resolution, promotion of peace and stability and good governance and economic reconstruction and development. According to the South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) considering a retrospective of South Africa's policy in the Congo war over the past half-decade or so is mainly to ensure that Southern and Central Africa form post apartheid South Africa sphere of influence and areas of economic comparative advantage in African and International affairs. Thus, Pretoria administration needs a stable environment for economic growth.

Kornegay, Landberg, and McDonald, suggest that any assessment of the rationales behind South Africa's policy towards conflict in DRC should focus not so much on exclusive, bilateral relations but on Pretoria's broader georegional policy and strategies. For South Africa, the conflicts in Central and Southern Africa are inextricably intertwined.

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135 See Longman, p. 137
forming an "arc of conflict" Hence Pretoria's policy positions and option towards embattled DRC must be located within the framework of South Africa's overall Africa policy.

A part from pushing for the united front of central and Southern African, South Africa Posses the evidence of attempted diplomacy between the waving functions in DRC, even though they never worked out as anticipated. South Africa is in records under the leadership of former President Nelson Mandela for various attempts of diplomatic conflict resolution, Mandela launch a diplomatic initiatives to end the war, this was followed by the announcement by Mandela on 19/2/97 that he had invited the Kabila, then chairman of ADFL and Mobutu to visit South Africa for mediation, something that he got opposition from his fellow South Africa elite concluding that Mandela had no international experience on mediation.

Namibia

As a result of SADC intervention Namibia was drawn to DRC conflict. The existing personal friendship between President Sam Nujoma and Kabila also became a motivating factor for Namibia intervention.

Namibian administration under President Sam Nujoma was drawn into DRC conflict without further consultation with the parliament and when the first casualty of Namibian forces occurred, Namibian population badly perceived the incident; this caused a lot of political battle between the ruling party and the opposition.

Namibia like any other regional actor was motivated not only by its national interest but also for individual gains especially among those individuals that are known to be in good books with the president Sam Nujoma. This allegation infirmed by International Crisis Group, that Namibia also gain its share of DRC resources as it was awarded a stake in the

137 Landberg., Op. ct. p. 171
Miba Diamond mining company, where brother in law to the president Sam Nujoma, Aaron Musimba was awarded a stake in the diamond mining company.\textsuperscript{138}

Laurent Kabila is as well on records that he has been financing his military recruitment, diplomatic campaign and political Programmes by signing an agreement that enabled the transfer of all the activities of Gecamines a major state mining company and other two private companies Ridge point overseas Development Limited and Central Mining Group Corporation where both Kabila and Mugabe and Nujoma had a stake. The consortium enables the two companies to form an alliance that enabled them to exploit the mineral assets of central sector of DRC.\textsuperscript{139}

Thus the Namibia Intervention strategy in DRC war therefore meant to work for few individual that were regime friendly and not for the diplomatic interest of the Namibian and the entire SADC fraternity.

**Burundi**

Burundi also shares the same motive for their involvement in DRC conflict, security concern. Burundi was therefore drawn in this war mainly to flush out the Hutu extremist that ran to DRC and using the DRC as safety haven and to launch an attack to the Bujumbura transitional government. The Hutu extremists were using the refugees to deprive the humanitarian aid work off aid and relief.

Apart from pursuing the Hutu extremist in DRC, Burundi also had an economic interest that was initially cut off as a result of its civil war. Nabudere argues that Burundi has been known to export diamond, Coltan and Timber that have been exploited from the DRC.


Some key individuals that are part of the network that are involved in the exploitation of DRC natural resources on behalf the key Bujumbura officials.\textsuperscript{141}

**International Actors**

**Western powers**

States that are not intervening directly in the DRC conflict are also affected by it. These states fall into two categories, those bordering Congo, and thereby suffering economic disruption as a result and those states that have had trade and investment opportunities curtailed by the war.\textsuperscript{141} This shows that indirectly the western states are funding the natural resource conflict based in the DRC.

The interest of the Western states began with the first Congolese war the USA interest led by the former U.S President George Bush convinced the Ugandan authority that was in their joint interest to work together to regain the DRC natural resources.\textsuperscript{142} Despite the magnitude of the tragedy, international community has generally remained silent about this crime of looting DRC by the major western powers and its perpetrators both internally (Uganda) and externally (U.S.A). It has persisted in observing a policy of benign neglect. It’s therefore ironical that the former Liberian president Charles Taylor has been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone, while the key perpetrators of a much large tragedy in the DRC have gone unpunished, even though some have been named in the UN Panel of experts’ report on the looting of Congolese natural resources.\textsuperscript{143}

The US sees its major interest in Africa as fighting transnational threat including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, narcotic trafficking, and humanitarian disasters. A close


\textsuperscript{141} Koyane’ Mungbalembwe and Clark. John F. The Economic Impact of the Congo War. P. 201


ally of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda as guardians on the frontline vis-à-vis the Ishamist threat from Sudan. Washington supported their sponsorship of Laurent Kabila to remove its formerly Mobutu from power. But Kabila’s incompetence, erratic behaviour, and friendship with countries to which the US In hostile, such as Cuba, Libya and Sudan, did not endear him to American policy makers.144

According to Nzongola, until July 1998, U.S military personnel were training Rwandan troops in counter insurgency and a U.S military and diplomatic team was sighted at Rwanda – Congo boarder when war broke out on 2nd August, 1998. Officially the team was there to assess the Rwandan government’s ability to prevent genocide. There could be no better expression of support for Rwanda’s aggression in DRC, which Kigali justified in terms of preventing genocide. Thus, despite official US statement that Rwanda and Uganda had to withdraw their troops from the DRC, both countries continued to receive assistance from the United States and World Bank. This encouraged the invaders to continue with their aggression in the DRC.145

Winer argues that the two major powers involved in the region are the U.S and France. Since both have a strategic interest in rare metals, thus they would like to see their transnational corporation have access to these rare resources. For this interest/ reason and for fear that such resources might fall into the wrong hands, particularly those of international terrorist groups, they cannot remain indifferent as to who holds state power in the various countries of Great lakes Region. He further elaborates that it has been reported that al-Qaeda, the major terrorist organization in the world today, has used diamonds purchased in Sierra

145 Ibid, pp. 9-24
Leone and the DRC to fund its activities, in return laundering these commodities through Dubai. 146

The ironical thing about these resources getting into ‘wrong hands’ is questionable, they are only in wrong hands when the US and its western allies are directly affected, however, when Africans are affected through the arms proliferation and the military support to destabilize. African continents, then those resources are not in the wrong hands.

As dominant power in Central Africa, France has had a major stake in the region’s political dynamics. In Rwanda for example, Paris supported the Hutu regime of Juvenal Habyarimana against the Tutsi RPF. It’s United Nations (UN); approved post genocide intervention in June 1994 resulted in bringing to DRC the remnant of Habyarimana’s regime and military with a lot of equipment and supplies. Together with the *interahamwe*, this military machine posed a serious threat to the newly established RPLF regime in Kigali, and its raids into Rwanda were the immediate cause of the war of 1996-1997. 147 A major reason for France’s intervention was to stabilize the Mobutu regime and help rehabilitate the discredit dictator internationally.

CHAPTER THREE

STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN DRC

Land- Access

Land is widely recognized in the eastern part of the DRC, land and other natural resource factors contribute to conflict and also draw out ethnic dimensions as contributory factors to the instability in the region, the larger Great Lake region. Land questions in DRC like elsewhere in Africa for instance has contributed greatly to the conflict. The multiple interests in land can be a means to satisfy ambitious economic interests, such as mining, and can also form the basis of subsistence and survival, such as through farming activities.

In many parts of the DRC, especially in the eastern provinces, land access has been a source of conflict for many years. Changes introduced during the colonial period tended to politicize and intensify conflicts under disputed access of land. Colonialism institutionalized the link between ethnic identity and land access within the political structures of the state. On the hand, it intensified the local competition for land with the promotion of migration of labour forces from the neighboring Rwanda.

Before the colonial conquest, large parts of eastern Congo were characterized by markedly stratified patriarchal social structures. Access of land was regulated by a hierarchical administration based on communal territorial ownership.

The Belgian colonial power took notice of the existence of these indigenous systems and pushed them into a new regime of customary law, which consequently containerized the local population. The process of 'containerization' involved a 'rigidification' and in some cases a re-definition of ethnic identities and a codification of customs. A second characteristic of the land tenure system was the introduction of a double system of property rights. Next to

the custom existed a modern system for the white settlers enabling them to establish their plantations. through forwarding their application to the state, the consolidation of such control and subsequent regulation of acquired lands was effected through the promulgation of a variety of European laws, and establishment of political, administrative and economic management systems, which were grafted onto a diverse range of indigenous economic and cultural practices thus leading to dualistic land tenure and land administration regimes.\footnote{Land Policy In Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods. African Union.2006, p.19}

All vacant land was declared to be the property of the colonial state. Land was expropriated for settler- owned concession, and compensation was paid to the customary leaders, rather than to the people. The dual nature of the system allowed for ‘forum shopping’ in order to gain access to land, which eventually undermine the legitimacy of both the customary and statutory systems. Major conflicts in DRC are mainly linked to who owns and controls land. A class of business men, politicians, traditional authorities and land owners according to Turner work out their strategies to control tracks of land;\footnote{T. Turner. The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality. London. Zeds Books. 2007. p. 42} this brings about the strong linkage between local land disputes and the larger regional/international struggle for economic control and military power in DRC.

The land dispute in DRC is not an issue that had started by current rebels backed both regional and international proxies; the Belgium under King Leopold began building his colony in Congo by declaring all the vacant land to be the property of the state, this led to larger tracks of land taken from the natives since most of the native were practicing shift cultivation and grazing their cattle across board without permanent ownership. Turner points out that a larger percentage of Congolese land was taken from the Congolese, then granted in concession to the development companies or to religious missions, or used by the colonial
state for its own purpose,\footnote{Ibid. p.42} this eventually undermined the legitimacy of both the customary and statutory systems.

The scramble for the limited tracks of land left by the Belgium authorities started among the Congolese. As a result of conflict that started among the Congolese over land as a result of concession, by King Leopold, Belgium authority restructured the traditional political of land allocation. Land was expropriated for settler-owned concessions, and compensation was paid to the customary leaders (mwami), rather than to the people. Chiefs were give power to allocate land to both native and strangers as Turner refers to them. This new structural framework on land allocation instead intensified frequent conflict between the native and 'stranger'.

The entry of Mobuto into Congo leadership was thought to be useful especially in addressing the structural conflicts that was being experienced by both natives and non-natives. Under the leadership of Mobutu, linkages between land access, ethnic citizenship and economic development were reinforced and Bakajika Laws were introduced by Mobutu administration that made all land including land held under custom into state property, the same footsteps of the Belgium that were heavily opposed by the Congolese, these structures never brought to an end the role chiefs as they were during the Belgium rule, instead new dynamics emerged that brought about the networks of new rural capitalists, politicians administrators and chiefs or their representatives with one common goal of controlling as bigger tracks of land as they could together with their cronies.

**Land, Ethnicity and Citizenship**

To the vast majority of societies in Africa land is regarded not simply as an economic or environmental asset, but as a social, cultural and ontological resource. Land remains an important factor in the construction of social identity, the organization of religious life and
the production and reproduction of culture. The link across generations is ultimately defined by the complement of land resources which families, lineages and communities share and control. Indeed land is fully embodied in the very spirituality of society. These are dimensions which land policy development must address if prescriptions for change are to be internalized.

While one cannot conclude that the wars of the DRC are mainly over the access of land, land figured more prominently in the mobilization of violence than is usually assumed. Despite the expansive territory of the DRC, in the eastern part of the country pockets of high population densities on low productivity lands have also played a part in violent conflict. There, struggles over land have been intimately tied up with, and reflected by, debates over citizenship.

A major dynamic dimension of on-going conflicts in the Kivus can be traced back to patterns entrenched in the colonial period where access to land was governed by “native authority”. The Banyarwanda population – those from the territory of what is now Rwanda who settled in Congolese territory even as early as colonial times – had no native authority of their own and thus no secure access to land. They were only “tolerated” on the land by a native authority (largely Hunde) that was not their own. Later some among them, with means, could purchase land, but the legitimacy of such contracts was never secure. Large scale violence broke out in the Kivu’s just after independence in 1963-64, directed against Banyarwanda Congolese. Despite the reputation of the Mobutu regime as the epitome of the “predatory” state, during his first decade in power, the President presided over a period of significant state-building.

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154 J. Putzel, Land policies and Violent Conflict: Towards addressing the root causes. London, Crisis State Research Centre, p. 1
Former president, Mobutu Sese Seko attempted to overcome potential regionally and ethnically based challenges to central state authority by building a bureaucracy where appointments were detached from local origin, a centralized form of patronage, which he attempted to organize through his single party state. In 1972, after the massacre of some 200,000 Hutu in Burundi, there was a large movement of refugees into the Kivus, precipitating renewed violence against the Congolese Banyarwanda at the instigation of Hunde and other traditional authorities. This was the context in which Mobutu moved against tribal authorities with his 1972 Citizenship Decree recognizing most of the Banyarwanda population as citizens of Zaire. In 1973, Mobutu’s General Property Law nationalized all land, which also was seen as a measure to marginalize traditional authority. 156

However, while Mobutu promoted a few model farms as show-pieces for the international community, and while there was some expansion of plantation based agriculture, the agricultural sector and especially the vast expanses of subsistence farming received little attention from the Mobutu regime. When economic crisis set in during the late 1970s and deepened throughout the 1980s, there was a vast expansion of the informal economy and even the limited areas of export production in agriculture did not escape this trend. The period was marked by a decline in plantation agriculture and a sharp increase in smuggling of the most important export crop, coffee. By 1992 except for coffee, cocoa beans, and groundnuts, agricultural production was below production levels at independence.

The failure of Mobutu to make any substantial progress in transforming the rural economy was one of the reasons he had to abandon his state-building project and actually engineered a shift in the patterns of patronage through which he was able remain in power. He abruptly moved from efforts to build a horizontal integration of elites, to rely on what Peemans (1997) called “networks of ethno-central penetration”. He attempted to maintain his

power in the face of the decline of revenues that had funded the central state through promoting the multiplication of vertical networks based on ethnic and regional affiliation—reviving tribalist logic within the state. It was at this time that he began to privilege his own ethnic group from Equateur in both administrative and military offices.

Part of Mobutu's “about face” was directly evident in relation to patterns of land conflict. In 1982, in an effort to buy loyalty from traditional authorities, especially in the Kivus, he revoked the inclusive citizenship decree, reverting to the 1960 definition of citizenship, and thus rights to occupy and farm the land, as limited only to those who could trace their lineage in their territory to 1908. In the context of conflicts over increasingly scarce land resources, “native” authorities in the Kivus took the revoked citizenship of the “non-native” Banyarwanda as justification for ethnic mobilization, bloody persecution and exclusion of Banyarwanda from the land. This decision on citizenship was reaffirmed as late as 1992, thus fuelling violent conflict over land in the era of multiparty politics the preceded the Congolese wars.

The beginning of the end for Mobutu came when, under pressure from Western donors who sharply reduced foreign assistance, he introduced multiparty politics in 1990. During this period, problems of access to land, especially in the Kivus, were recast in tribalist terms. Local violence there escalated into full-scale warfare by 1993 opposing so-called “native” agriculturalists, particularly the Hunde against “non-native” Banyarwanda leading to thousands of dead and some 140,000 displaced people. With the massive influx of “refugees” on the heels of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, including the intact armed forces of the former Rwandan government, the FDLR, and the interahamwe militias that had perpetrated the genocide, eastern Congo was beset by large scale violence for control over land.

Congolese populations of Tutsi origin became a target for both Hunde and other tribal groups who resented their socioeconomic position and a target of the Hutu forces that had fled Rwanda. From 1996, the ethnic violence shifted to target the Tutsis of South Kivu – the Banyamulenge who had lived in the area for many decades. Laurent Kabila relied heavily on Banyarwanda forces that had emerged as self-defence groups when he successfully fought his way to power in 1996. These same patterns of conflict characterized the second Congolese war and conflict in the Eastern part of the DRC since the peace agreement of 2002. The persistence of institutional multiplicity and the association of access to land with ethnicity have fuelled conflicts in the Kivus right up to 2009. No basis of enduring peace can be found without a clear resolution of the citizenship question and strong state enforcement of universal laws over access to property rights. This also is necessary as a prerequisite for any sustained effort to increase productivity in agriculture in this country that remains primarily rural and needs to rely increasingly on agricultural production both for rural livelihoods and as a means to develop a manufacturing sector.

Economic causes of structural conflict in DRC

Horizontal inequality

To avoid euphoria of what majority perceive as the causes of conflict in the DRC, scrambling of the abundant natural resource, this study will address the economic root causes of structural conflict in the DRC. Examining at the economic causes, the study will therefore highlights the horizontal inequality rather than concentrating on vertical inequality. According to Ostby, horizontal inequality occurs when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways, for instance by race, religion or language. Vertical inequality in this case relates to inequality between

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63
individuals. It is important to note that not all horizontal inequalities would lead to conflict, but assessing if there would be any linkage between horizontal inequality and conflict would be of great importance for this study to help future scholars interested in the study of DRC to avoid coming up with baseless conclusion but instead rely on proven facts and findings.

Esteban & Ray argue that a society that is split into two well-defined groups with substantial intra group homogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity in incomes is particularly likely to experience social unrest. Such a society would be marked by both strong group identification and sharp divisions (alienation) between the groups. Such a society would be marked by both strong group identification and sharp divisions (alienation) between the groups. Economic inequality can as well be motivated in the society depending on the concepts that Montalvo and Reynal-Querol refers to as ethnic fractionalization and polarization.

Ostby argues that the level of ethnic fractionalization increases when the number of ethnic groups in a society increases, and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnic groups. Ethnic polarization, on the other hand, increases when there are few (equally) large groups with homogenous characteristics within each group, and differences in a cluster of characteristics among groups. Indices of polarization are highest when there are two relatively large groups of exactly the same size. In DRC it is has been clearly evident that political/rebel leaders often use ethnic identities to achieve their own political and financial objectives. If this is the case, it should be easier for group leaders to mobilize groups in societies with few rival

groups, because few groups imply clearly defined ethnic divisions, and because the recruitment pool becomes larger with few groups.

Gurr argues that ethnic cleavages that coincide with systematic socio-economic inequalities may enhance both collective grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived, thus enhancing the levels of both frustration and opportunity for group mobilization. A common cultural identity can thus become a powerful mobilizing agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances. This has been common in the Eastern DRC where the Banyarwanda of Rwanda origin mobilize their Rwandese counterpart to defend their right of ownership (Land) in DRC.

Ethnicity

There are between 200 - 250 ethnic groups in DRC, each with different languages or dialects and customs. The majority groups are Bantu (including the Mongo, Luba and Kongo/Congo tribes) and the Mangbetu- Azande (Hamitic). These two ethnic groups make up about 45% of the population. Ethnicity, citizenship and nationality are complex factors. Nationality, for example, can be seen as an artificial construct, having been created through the imposition of colonial rule without regard to ethnic boundaries. People are likely to identify themselves in relation to their tribal or ethnic backgrounds and the region from which they come.

Relationships between ethnic groups in DRC vary. During the country’s turbulent recent history, many competing interests have at times encouraged and exploited ethnic tensions to gain political, military and economic power.

Since memorial conflicts in Africa, DRC has not been left behind in experiencing ethnic conflict, what many scholars believe that was initiated as a result of colonialism. Berman argues that modern African ethnicity is a social construction of the colonial period

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through the reaction of pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism, as an instrument of policy, ethnicity was adapted to enhance the “divide and rule” system of colonial administration in Africa.¹⁶⁴

The structural characteristics of the colonial state, an apparatus of authoritarian bureaucratic control, and of the colonial political economy, based on African cash-crops and wage labour in capitalist commodity and labour markets, radically, albeit only partially, transformed the structural and spatial organization of African societies. These institutions constituted the structural context shaping both the form and content of ethnic communities, identities and interests, as well as the modes of ethnic political mobilization and organization. The ideology and culture of colonialism, especially in the imagining of African societies by colonial officials and European missionaries, provided the dominant cognitive context molding the invention of tribes and their customs by Africans themselves.

As a creation of colonialism, ethnicity sowed new seeds of conflict in Africa. It also facilitated the subjugation of African masses because ethnic strife provided an excuse for military intervention by colonial powers. European colonialists set Africans against Africans by hand-picking pliable collaborators, giving them traditional titles and using them as agents of colonial administration. The result was chieftaincy disputes within and across ethnic groups throughout Africa.¹⁶⁵

According to Deng, ethnicity is more than skin color or physical characteristics, more than language, song, and dance. It is the embodiment of values, institutions, and patterns of behavior, a composite whole representing a people’s historical experience, aspirations, and

world view. Deprive a people of their ethnicity, their culture, and you deprive them of their sense of direction or purpose.

Traditionally, African societies and even states functioned through an elaborate system based on the family, the lineage, the clan, the tribe, and ultimately a confederation of groups with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics in common. These were the units of social, economic, and political organizations and inter-communal relations.

In the process of colonial state-formation, groups were divided or brought together with little or no regard to their common characteristics or distinctive attributes. They were placed in new administrative frameworks, governed by new values, new institutions, and new operational principles and techniques. The autonomous local outlook of the old order was replaced by the control mechanisms of the state, in which the ultimate authority was an outsider, a foreigner. This mechanism functioned through the centralization of power, which ultimately rested on police and military force, the tools of authoritarian rule. This crude force was, however, softened by making use of traditional leaders as extended arms of state control over the tribes or the local communities, giving this externally imposed system a semblance of legitimacy for the masses. Adding to this appearance of legitimacy was the introduction of a welfare system by which the state provided meager social services and limited development opportunities to privileged sectors. National resources were otherwise extracted and exported as raw materials to feed the metropolitan industries of the colonial masters.

This new system undermined the people's indigenous system, which provided them with the means for pursuing their modest but sustainable life objectives, and replaced it with centrally controlled resources that were in short supply and subject to severely competitive demands. Development was conceived as a means of receiving basic services from the state, rather than as a process of growth and collective accumulation of wealth that could in turn be invested in further growth. The localized, broad-based, low-risk, self-sustaining subsistence
activities gave way to high-risk, stratifying competition for state power and scarce resources, a zero-sum conflict of identities based on tribalism or ethnicity. Independence removed the common enemy, the colonial oppressor, but actually sharpened the conflict over centralized power and control over national resources.

Today, virtually every African conflict has some ethno-regional dimension to it. Even those conflicts that may appear to be free of ethnic concerns involve factions and alliances built around ethnic loyalties. Analysts have tended to have one of two views of the role of ethnicity in these conflicts. Some see ethnicity as a source of conflict; others see it as a tool used by political entrepreneurs to promote their ambitions. In reality, it is both. Ethnicity, especially when combined with territorial identity, is a reality that exists independently of political maneuvers. To argue that ethnic groups are unwitting tools of political manipulation is to underestimate a fundamental social reality. On the other hand, ethnicity is clearly a resource for political manipulation and entrepreneurship.

**Ethnic Relations during the Belgian Colonial Administration**

The Belgians ruled over Congo from 1909 to 1960, while their rule over Rwanda lasted from 1918 to 1962. In the Congo, the Belgians created an apartheid-like system between the Europeans (Belgians) living in Congo and the Congolese, thereby marginalizing the Congolese in their own society. Among the Congolese, the Belgians used the strategy of divide and rule. They favored certain ethnic groups, especially the ones that would allow them to continue to colonize and plunder the rich natural resources of the Congo.

Before the coming of the Europeans, the Kingdom of Kongo had well-organized political and administrative structures that rivaled those of the Europeans. The economic system of the kingdom was organized into guilds based on agriculture and handicraft industries. The European incursion into the west coast of Africa and the consequent slave
raids increased the migrations of refugees into Kongo. These migrations created myriad problems both at the time and in subsequent periods.

When the Belgians took over the administration of Rwanda from the Germans in 1918, they significantly changed the Rwandese system of government and social relations. The Belgians found willing elites to help them rule Rwanda. The Tutsis were willing collaborators to the Belgian colonization. The Belgians, in turn, gave the Tutsis privileged positions in politics, education, and business. The Belgians even took the few leadership positions that the Hutus had and gave them to the Tutsis. Specifically, in 1929, they eliminated all the non-Tutsi chiefs, and as a result the Hutus lost all their representation in the colonial government.

A further blow came in 1933, when the Belgians issued identity cards to all Rwandans. These mandatory identity cards removed the fluidity from the Rwandan stratification (caste) system, thereby confining people permanently as Hutus, Tutsis, and “pygmies.” The Belgians empowered the Tutsis so much that their exploitation of the Hutu majority reached new heights. As the independence of Rwanda became inevitable in the 1950s, however, the Belgians changed course and started to empower the Hutus by increasing their political and economic muscle and providing them access to modern education.

These conflicting measures brought anarchy and led to the creation of extreme groups—from both the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis—wanting to protect the interests of their respective peoples. It was the activities of these extreme groups that led to the various episodes of genocide that reached appalling heights in 1994 with the killing of nearly one million people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, by extreme Hutus.

The first wave of genocide by the Hutus against the Tutsis took place earlier, however, under the administration of the Belgians in 1959. Like the 1994 genocide, it started when extremist Tutsis attacked a Hutu leader, and the Hutus retaliated by killing hundreds of
Tutsis. In the Western press, this conflict was portrayed as a racial and cultural one, between the tall, aristocratic, pastoral Tutsis, and Hutus who were uneducated peasant farmers. That the Tutsi and Hutu were originally two castes of the same people, speaking a common language, and that the antagonism had been created by Belgian colonial forces for their own purposes, were facts somehow lost in the international dialogue.

To summarize, the ethnic rivalries and tensions in the former Belgian colonies of Congo and Rwanda that escalated following independence and continued into the twenty-first century had their roots in the Belgian colonial administration. It was during the Belgian colonial administration that the foundations for the postcolonial and present-day ethnic tensions and political instability were laid.

**Bad Leadership /Governance**

African problems are not only due to lack of good governance of the state. They are also related to lack of management and eradication of negative ideologies inherited from colonial times. Nepotism, clientelism, corruption and exclusion which have been practiced by the successive powers in this country since it acceded to independence have led to social split and identity-based fission and, eventually, to the crystallization of conflict-generating cleavages.166

The role of politicians continuously remains at the heat exacerbation of identity-based conflicts, which are tearing African peoples apart. Identity-based wars would not occur today in DRC if post-colonial leaders had not systematically built their political discourse on themes dividing communities. Bad governance as a causal factor has formed around three fundamental structures: A bad start of independences, unequal distribution of national resources and conflict-generating systems.

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166 A. Shyaka, The Rwandan Conflict Origin, Development, and Exit Strategies: A Study Ordered by The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. pp. 23-25
In Congo like in the other Belgian colonies, ethnization was the only guarantee of political success. Ethnic groups and political parties were one and the same. Tribal associations changed automatically into political parties and the decolonization process was combined with struggles among local political leaders through intermediary tribal segments. As a result, the ethnic problem, engendered and exacerbated by the colonial power then cashed in on national leading classes, has tremendously confronted social relations, to such an extent that, the creation of real nations in some African countries remains a problem whose solution is still fragile or non-existent.

Poor management and unequal distribution of national resources are the epidemics that have been devastating Africa since independence, particularly in DRC. In Rwanda, the new political oligarchies monopolized the power and the resources of the young independent State on the basis of identity, be it "ethnic" (Hutu), regional (South, North) or other. As a result, political powers favoured the climate of corruption, hegemony and exclusion. Jobs, schools were distributed unequally in favour of groups in power. This situation complicated social relations, resulting in frustration of the underprivileged and in crystallization of the sense of belonging to an identity, from crises and conflicts.

In DRC and in particular in Kivu, violence against the Banyarwanda was triggered by the intention of people to take over their land and their property. According to Congolese people, Rwandophone people are known for being a community whose members have succeeded socially, economically and politically. For instance, it is among them that we could find the big farmers in Kivu, which is the real agricultural storehouse of DRC with big plantations and herds of cows. In addition to that, whether in East or in Kinshasa, they are among those whose businesses flourish best.

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Within the context of social explosions, jealousy of any kind, identity-based and ideology-connoted political rivalries, with the help of lack of state control in Congo, those Rwandophone people have automatically become the scapegoats of the Congolese evil and have been targeted not only for who they are but also for what they possess. It is worth noting also the north of Uganda is prone to insurrectionary activities since it is economically underprivileged.

Furthermore, international politico-financial choices have their part of responsibility in the intensification of conflicts when significant reductions of social expenditure due to structural adjustment programmes are associated with the fact that some social groups have the feeling of being wronged during the distribution process of resources that are running lower and lower, a risk of conflicts increases against others. What is most often involved is group mobilization of people with particular shared identities or goals attacking others in the name of the group. While young men may fight because they are unemployed, uneducated, and have few other opportunities, they also generally fight out of loyalty to a group (sometimes an ideology or a cause). Examples the Mai Mai fighters in the Eastern DRC, and the Banyarwanda fighting in the Kivu to defend their right to access land and in political participation.

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Introduction

This chapter introduces the various debates in the DRC conflicts between 1996 and 2006. It will critically looks at the root causes of the DRC conflict, the actor's motives and interests, impacts of conflict to the region and the conflict management efforts in place to mitigate the problem.

Apart from the interviews that were conducted on the 30th June, 2010, when the Congolese residing in Kenya joined their fellow Congolese to celebrate their independence day at the Bomas of Kenya, the secondary data were equally used to obtained more data for the purpose of the analysis.

The verbal open ended questions were asked to various target groups; Congolese citizens residing in Kenya, Embassy officials, both Non-governmental and Governmental organization that had previously worked in DRC, and Lastly, the Scholars that have established interest in the DRC. This categorization of respondents was helpful because it captures various classes of persons that have diverse knowledge and experience in DRC.

Demographic profile

The demographic profile of the respondent for example DRC citizens, DRC embassy officials, none and Government Organizations, and scholar with interest in DRC and gender disparities were analyzed to determine the general classification of respondents. The results of the analysis found on table 4.2
Table 4.2: Educational profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by researcher

Level of education

The respondents were required to indicate the highest level of education they had attained. 8.57% of the respondent had attained post graduate level of education, 11.42% were graduates, the majority of the respondent, 42.88% had a minimal of college level of education, followed closely with high school graduates that were made up of 32.49%, and lastly respondents with primary level of education that were 2.88%. This shows that the respondents that were approached by the researcher for an interview had attained the minimum level of education that enable them to understand the questions raised and respond them effectively.

Table 4.3: gender disparity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher Compilation
Gender disparity

In terms of gender disparity, the ratio of male to female was 2:1.5. This was a well balanced researched that ensure that both male and female were given equal opportunity to share their view as far as structural causes conflict are concerned. Thus male respondent were represented by 57.14% against the female respondents that were 42.86%.

Structural cause of conflict in DRC

The response received from the interviews conducted concurred that there are various root causes of conflict in the DRC. These included exploitation of the DRC natural resources, weak institutional frame works that leads to bad governance, colonial legacy left by the Belgium rule, negative ethnicity, access to land and external interference. The DRC natural resources exploitation became the strongest concern among the interviewees as the major economic root cause of conflict in DRC followed by weak institutions, colonial legacy, Citizenship, Negative ethnicity, access to land, and external interference with national, regional and international actors.

Natural resource exploitation

DRC has valuable natural resources that can be crucial in the improvement of the standard of living of the Congolese. However, this has not been the case. Much of the conflict in the DRC has centered on gaining control of natural resources rather than other factors such as identity and ethnicity. Rebel groups as well as regional actors and multinational corporations have been profiting from the war by developing political, military and business elite networks.¹⁶⁹

If DRC would have been stable politically, it would have benefited a lot from its natural resources. However it’s marked by violence and injustices that creates conducive environment for both internal and external actors to exploit its natural resources for their

personal gains. Natural resources in the DRC have high rate of loot ability. Natural resources in DRC are both available closer to the centre of power and as well located at the periphery. Distance resources are found along the porous borders or among the marginalized groups territory or opposition can easily exploit without the prior knowledge of those in the authority. DRC natural resources are widely spread, and requires less capital to exploit since they can be extracted manually without involve capital extensive machineries. This has encouraged lightly armed groups to enjoy the exploitation for their masters.

As much as majority of interviewees agreed that those natural resources exploitation are the major root cause of conflict. their availability combined with weaker institutional frameworks that leads to bad governance would be the underlying causes. Natural resources in the DRC not only finance conflict but also motive, sustain and transform strategies of power based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around the valuable natural resource areas and trading networks. The rebels therefore have sought to establish permanent stronghold or areas of insecurity wherever resources and transport routes are located. Natural resources in the DRC have therefore intensified confrontations over areas of economic significance as belligerents focus on military activities on areas of economic importance.

These rebel movements have established de facto sovereignty that is characterized by crime, commercial opportunities like mining, logging and managing smuggling networks. Exploitations of these resources also lie so much on the porous borders and strong networks between the rebels, government and multinational business networks. The government and the rebels groups have been engaged in illegal economic activities either directly or indirectly through international criminal networks engaged in trafficking of arms among others. This nature of conflict environment has favored business opportunities for rogue companies that

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have taken advantage over the conflict to make huge profits and sometimes support the combatant to ensure that the war continues.\textsuperscript{172}

The war economy has benefited civilian in the DRC who participate in the war economy to secure their livelihood. The war economy has benefited civilians especially where the informal economy is widespread and where traditional livelihoods have been destroyed during conflict. Artisanal miners in the DRC earn their living from mining and small scale trading on these mines.\textsuperscript{173}

The war economy in the DRC is a connection between trade in natural resources, global financial institutions and the major trade markets in the western world. These international institutions have formed alliance with certain regional governments that directly or use the internal rebels to exploit these natural resources. War economies thrive with certain corporation, arms brokers, international criminal networks and corrupt governments reaching well beyond war zones to the world's commodity markets and major financial markets. This in turn gives the conflict both regional and international dimensions.\textsuperscript{174}

This kind of war in the DRC over natural resources, therefore is often more war than winning, those benefiting from the conflict always have vested interest in conflict. This clearly shows that conflict in the DRC rotates around the abundant and available of loot able natural resources. Thus natural resources exploitation forms the spring board of conflict since the colonial era.

Institutional weakness

Institutional weakness has been pinpointed by the interviewees as another of the root causes of conflict in the DRC. Conflicts in DRC are deep rooted in institutional frameworks that lead to poor governance.

State institutions, often with repressive colonial origins, may be weakened or become illegitimate as a result of intervention, or the end of intervention, by external states. The weakness of state institutions, including citizenship and border control, facilitates transnational trade networks, war economies, and the spread of regional rumors, all of which can further undermine the state.

Because of the social, economic and political linkages in the Great Lakes region, one state's crisis weakens neighboring states and increases the risk of conflict. In this volatile environment, groups and individuals manipulate fear and ethnic hatred to create and control militias, parallel economies, populations, and territories. The collapse of institutions is linked to the endemic underdevelopment and poverty in the region, as some states exist only to extract and control resources valued in the international market.

People in the DRC perceive poor governance in three interrelated ways: poor services, corruption, and ineffective governance. First, the government fails to provide basic social services. Most of the people in the DRC who receive services receive them from churches or NGOs. Many people fend for themselves without access to basic government services. In a country where even the legal military and police prey off the population, people see little if any benefit from the government.

Corruption continues to undermine the economy and administration. The abuse of public office for personal gain reaches from minor civil servants to the highest members of government and implicates many international corporations. Political actors regularly interfere in the administration, customs service, army and control of natural resources to
embezzle funds. This, in turn, has perpetuated a system of governance that is largely predatory, with the state living off the citizenry and the country’s resources without providing even the most rudimentary social services.

Corruption, winner take all attitudes, and lack of any political space for the opposition create a system in which people perceive the governmental officials as taking all they can get for themselves. High-level governmental officials are assumed to be trying to get all they can (in terms of accumulating wealth and power) while they remain in office.

Leaders are not held accountable to any expectation that they will work for the greater good of the population as a whole. Fonctionnaires (civil servants) are often frustrated with their corrupt bosses who make it hard for an honest civil servant to accomplish basic duties. Opposition politicians find little if any room to influence the country’s governance.

Finally, the governance of the country by the government is simply ineffective in numerous ways and often entirely absent. Nationally, extreme executive interference undercuts the efficacy of other government structures, and even of professional efforts within the executive branch. The judges and lawyers are few in number and poorly trained to work with laws often contradictory to rights provided in the constitution. Prisons are “easy to escape”, overcrowded, under-funded, places of human rights abuse, and subject to large riots.

Locally, provincial governments are caught in a bind that leaves them cash-strapped. On the one hand, they are unable to effectively capture taxes from the extractive industries. On the other hand, they see the central government failing to enact the promised 60% - 40% revenue sharing deal (particularly in Katanga and Bas Congo). This dynamic leads to non-performance and paralysis of the new decentralized governance structures.

**Land, Ethnicity and Citizenship**

Access to land, negative ethnicity and citizenship are structurally intertwined, and thus form part of the root causes of structural conflict in DRC. These three major aspects
cannot be tackled in isolation. Ethnicity, citizenship and nationality are complex factors. Nationality, for example, can be seen as an artificial construct, having been created through the imposition of colonial rule without regard to ethnic boundaries. People are likely to identify themselves in relation to their tribal or ethnic backgrounds and the region from which they come. Relationships between ethnic groups in DRC vary. During the country's turbulent recent history, many competing interests have at times encouraged and exploited ethnic tensions to gain political, military and economic power.

There is strong linkage among the access land, ethnicity, and citizenship as major structural cause of conflict. Major conflicts in DRC are mainly linked to who owns and controls land. A class of business men, politicians, traditional authorities and land owners according to Turner work out their strategies to control tracks of land.\footnote{Turner, \textit{The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality}. London. Zeds Books. 2007. p. 42} this brings about the strong linkage between local land disputes and the larger regional/international struggle for economic control and military power in DRC.

The vast majority of societies in Africa land are regarded not simply as an economic or environmental asset, but as a social, cultural and ontological resource. Land remains an important factor in the construction of social identity, the organization of religious life and the production and reproduction of culture.\footnote{African Union. \textit{Land Policy In Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods}, African Union. 2006, p. 22} The link across generations is ultimately defined by the complement of land resources which families, lineages and communities share and control. Indeed land is fully embodied in the very spirituality of society. These are dimensions which land policy development must address if prescriptions for change are to be internalized.

While one cannot conclude that the wars of the DRC are mainly over the access of land, land figured more prominently in the mobilization of violence than is usually assumed. Despite the expansive territory of the DRC, in the eastern part of the country pockets of high
population densities on low productivity lands have also played a part in violent conflict.\textsuperscript{177} The struggles over land have been intimately tied up with, and reflected by debates over citizenship.

The presence of transnational identities in a region with porous borders and contested citizenship has heightened the spread of conflict in DRC and the entire the Great Lakes Region. The political grievances of the Banyamulenge (Tutsi origin) in South Kivu and Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi origin) in North Kivu, involve access to citizen rights and claims to resources such as land, based on those rights. These grievances developed from the introduction of narrow criteria for citizenship within Congo-Zaire, the effects of which were exacerbated by the influx of refugees and armed militias from Rwanda, and to a lesser extent, from Burundi. In some instances, refugees support rebel militias as a means to advance their claims for citizenship, and others for economic necessity.

A major dynamic dimension of on-going conflicts in the Kivus can be traced back to patterns entrenched in the colonial period where access to land was governed by “native authority”. The Banyarwanda population – those from the territory of what is now Rwanda who settled in Congolese territory even as early as colonial times – had no native authority of their own and thus no secure access to land. They were only “tolerated” on the land by a native authority (largely Hunde) that was not their own. Later some among them, with means, could purchase land, but the legitimacy of such contracts was never secure.

Large scale violence broke out in the Kivus just after independence in 1963-64, directed against Banyarwanda Congolese. Despite the reputation of the Mobutu regime as the quintessence of the “predatory” state, during his first decade in power, the President presided over a period of significant state-building.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{177} J. Putzel. \textit{Land policies and Violent Conflict: Towards addressing the root causes.} London. Crisis State Research Centre, p. 1

Former president, Mobutu Sese Seko attempted to overcome potential regionally and ethnically based challenges to central state authority by building a bureaucracy where appointments were detached from local origin, a centralized form of patronage, which he attempted to organize through his single party state. In 1972, after the massacre of some 200,000 Hutu in Burundi, there was a large movement of refugees into the Kivus, precipitating renewed violence against the Congolese Banyarwanda at the instigation of Hunde and other traditional authorities. This was the context in which Mobutu moved against tribal authorities with his 1972 Citizenship Decree recognizing most of the Banyarwanda population as citizens of Zaire. In 1973, Mobutu’s General Property Law nationalized all land, which also was seen as a measure to marginalize traditional authority.\(^{179}\)

The failure of Mobutu to make any substantial progress in transforming the rural economy was one of the reasons he had to abandon his state-building project and actually engineered a shift in the patterns of patronage through which he was able remain in power. He abruptly moved from efforts to build a horizontal integration of elites, to rely on what Peemans called “networks of ethno-central penetration”. He attempted to maintain his power in the face of the decline of revenues that had funded the central state through promoting the multiplication of vertical networks based on ethnic and regional affiliation – reviving tribalist logic within the state. It was at this time that he began to privilege his own ethnic group from Equateur in both administrative and military offices.

In 1982, in an effort to buy loyalty from traditional authorities, especially in the Kivus, Mobutu revoked the inclusive citizenship decree, reverting to the 1960 definition of citizenship, and thus rights to occupy and farm the land, as limited only to those who could trace their lineage in their territory to 1908. In the context of conflicts over increasingly scarce land resources, “native” authorities in the Kivus took the revoked citizenship of the

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"non-native" Banyarwanda as justification for ethnic mobilization, bloody persecution and exclusion of Banyarwanda from the land. This decision on citizenship was reaffirmed as late as 1992, thus fuelling violent conflict over land in the era of multiparty politics that preceded the Congolese wars.

The beginning of the end for Mobutu came when, under pressure from Western donors who sharply reduced foreign assistance, he introduced multiparty politics in 1990. During this period, problems of access to land, especially in the Kivus, were recast in tribalist terms. Local violence there escalated into full-scale warfare by 1993 opposing so-called "native" agriculturalists, particularly the Hunde against "non-native" Banyarwanda leading to thousands of dead and some 140,000 displaced people.\(^{10}\) With the massive influx of "refugees" on the heels of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, including the intact armed forces of the former Rwandan government, the FDLR, and the interahamwe militias that had perpetrated the genocide, eastern Congo was beset by large scale violence for control over land.

Congolese populations of Tutsi origin became a target for both Hunde and other tribal groups who resented their socioeconomic position and a target of the Hutu forces that had fled Rwanda. From 1996, the ethnic violence shifted to target the Tutsis of South Kivu – the Banyamulenge who had lived in the area for many decades. Laurent Kabila relied heavily on Banyarwanda forces that had emerged as self-defence groups when he successfully fought his way to power in 1996.

These same patterns of conflict characterized the second Congolese war and conflict in the Eastern part of the DRC since the peace agreement of 2002. The persistence of institutional multiplicity and the association of access to land with ethnicity have fuelled conflicts in the Kivus right up to 2009.

No basis of enduring peace can be found without a clear resolution of the citizenship question and strong state enforcement of universal laws over access to property rights. This also is necessary as a prerequisite for any sustained effort to increase productivity in agriculture in this country that remains primarily rural and needs to rely increasingly on agricultural production both for rural livelihoods and as a means to develop a manufacturing sector.

**Colonial legacy**

The Belgians did little to prepare their Congolese subjects for the transition to independence. When political parties did emerge, most of them were ethnic or regional in scope. The most successful party, the Congolese National Movement of Patrice Lumumba (MNC/Lumumba) was nationalist and pan-African. However, it gained barely a third of the seats in parliament.\(^{181}\)

The Congolese state and economy still bear the heavy imprint of Mobutu’s 32 years of predatory rule. Executive power in his Zaire was absolute, and the 1974 constitution granted him, as head of state, authority over the executive, legislature and judiciary branches.\(^{182}\)

Mobutu also had the right to change the constitution at his discretion, and he banned political parties while making membership in his Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR) compulsory. Through the MPR he controlled most aspects of society, particularly in the west and north. MPR cadres held key trade union, student association and security services positions.

To forestall any threats, Mobutu kept his government factionalized while maintaining the loyalty of elite military and police forces. Corruption was integral to the system, and politicians became entirely dependent on his good will. In the first decade of his rule, 1965-

\(^{181}\)Ibid, p. 46
1975, only 41 of the 212 top figures in government kept their positions.\textsuperscript{183} There were frequent purges in army and government. Many senior officials were imprisoned or rotated into different positions or from one geographical area to another.

All this came at great economic cost. After the stabilization of the economy in 1967, the country enjoyed several years of relative prosperity and growth. However, Mobutu needed money to maintain his patronage network. In some years, he personally disposed of over 20 per cent of the country's operating budget.\textsuperscript{184} At the same time, huge loans were taken out to build white elephant projects, including a dam on the Congo River for $1 billion and a steel mill at Maluku for 250 million that was barely functional. By the mid-1970s, profligacy and corruption had crippled the economy.

Mobutu's disastrous system was facilitated by continued support from France, Belgium and the U.S. Zaire was a key pawn in the Cold War, and each of these countries had considerable economic and political interests in it. Zaire's debt was rescheduled fourteen times between 1976 and 1990, when the Briton Woods institutions finally cut off new funds. At that point, the country had accumulated $14 billion in debt.\textsuperscript{185}

The rule of Laurent Kabila, who toppled Mobutu in 1997, was similar in important aspects. He banned political party activity, dissolved parliament and suppressed all provincial and local deliberative bodies. There was no state budget between 1998 and 2001 and no new constitution. Laws were issued by presidential decree. Collaboration ended with international financial institutions, which were pressing him to investigate war-time massacres.

Kabila gave Zimbabwe management of many copper, cobalt and diamond mines in return for military support. Similarly, in the East, the rebels financed their armies with

\textsuperscript{183} C. Young and T. Turner, \textit{The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State} (Madison, 1985). p. 166.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid, p. 169
revenues from gold, diamond, coltan and tin mines, much of which went to Ugandan and Rwandan officials, whose armies were closely involved in the mines. Military spending, lack of financial oversight and poor monetary policy produced near economic collapse.

By 2000, inflation was 511 per cent and per capita GDP $100 – far below the $259 level at independence 40 years earlier. Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001 ushered in an era of halting reform and relative growth.

The colonial legacy has taken the centre piece as a root cause of conflict in DRC. However, there are so many countries among the African states that were under colonial rule yet are stable. Focusing so much on the colonial power that left the country so many years ago should be the thing of the past. Congolese are no longer under colonial rule. The ruling class has taken advantage to use the colonial legacy as a mask to exploit the underdogs that still would identify any mistake on the misgovernance and corruption as the white man’s making yet the its their own people that are doing the injustices to the people of Congo.

The generations that exist during the colonial that felt the impact, very few are alive. It should be therefore the role of the new generation to work out ways that would make the people of DRC happy and stop the blame game the colonial power. If it a matter of staying under the bondage of the colonial practices, then South Africa would be practical than DRC, because the apartheid rule impact is of more recent the Belgium administration of 1960s.

External interference

Conflict in the DRC is taking new dimension frequently; it becomes difficult to understand exactly who the parties to this conflict are. Due to weak internal institutions internal actors have taken advantage to develop trade and business networks with both regional and international actors.

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187 International Monetary Fund, op. cit., p. 5.
External interference does not account much as a root cause for conflict in the DRC; they are more of the proximate causes to the DRC conflict. The availability of weaker institutional frameworks and the presence of rebel movement have motivated both regional and international groups to participate in the escalation of this conflict. External actors would only be effective when operate as the link the market and internal actors that would cause disturbance at the local level.

**Actors’ Motivation and interest in DRC conflict**

Concerning the internal rebels, the findings specify that the conflict in DRC conflict are mainly taking place due to the internal wrangles between the government backed forces against the rebels that are backed by other regional governments to weaken the central government in Kinshasa. There are two main groups of internal actors at the national levels. On one side there are the rebels consisting of the RDC, RDC-ML, RCD-Goma and the MLC. On the other side, there are the government backed *Forces Armees Congolaises*, the *Interahamwe* Hutu militia and the FDD. However, it is important to recognize that these alliances are interest-driven and therefore loyalties are subject to change suddenly i.e. Mai-Mai often shift their allegiance between the government and rebel factions.

In contrast, the views of the Congolese differ on exactly which group is to be blamed for conflict in DRC. Majority strongly agreed that internal rebels groups are primarily responsible for the conflict, whereas certain group disagrees with their counterpart and argue that it is the responsibility of the government backed forces that are initiating conflict to maintain status quo. The blame game continues in circles and identifying where it starts and ends becomes a big issue, and if not checked the conflict circle would continue. Both government backed rebels and other internal rebels opposing the government have one thing in common, both have a wider networks with both regional and international actors that use them as proxies.
Regional actors

At the regional point of conflict analysis, seven regional governments were mentioned to be the major actors in the DRC conflict. These included Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

From the data analysis perspective, Rwanda and Uganda are involved equally in DRC conflict with almost the same objectives. However, the four main regional actors in the DRC conflict are Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Zimbabwe. As much as South Africa, Namibia, and Burundi have been intervening in the DRC conflict, their levels of involvement are at minimal compared to other regional actors.

Uganda and Rwanda features most because they are have their internal proxies actively participate in DRC conflict. The areas controlled by Uganda, diamond-rich areas are found around Buta and Isiro. The elite network in this area controls all elements of the diamond trade, from local buying houses, through army protection, tax exemption, export and connections in Antwerp under the aegis of a front company. Some of the individuals concerned have been implicated in activities such as counterfeit currency and money laundering as well as diamond smuggling. Rwanda has been supporting RCD rebel group.

Some interviewees' suspect that Uganda and Rwanda had acquired territorial ambitions in Congo and eager to retain the ability to exploit the eastern regions resources rich, charges both countries deny. However, repeated clashes in 1999 and 2000 between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani, at the center of a resource rich region, lent credence to the view that the two erstwhile allies were actually rivals for Congo’s riches.

188 A Stabrawa, Environmental Endowment and Conflict: The Case of Diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Paper prepared by Anna Stabrawa, Division of Early Warning & Assessment, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), while at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA under the UN Sabbatical Leave Programme 2003, pp. 6-20
To investigate the motives and interests of the various regional actors to DRC conflict, various variables were used. These dependent variables included security concern, economic benefits, Regional unity/integration, Political empowerment, Identity, and Ideology. The findings indicate that all seven main regional actors had economic interest for the purpose of their intervention with Uganda leading according the findings from the interviews conducted.

The intervention of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi as much as they had common security issues with their borders with DRC, their main interests and motives were far beyond even the ethnic identity, all had the economic agenda to enable them fill their respective domestic economic needs that were threatened to collapse due to the civil wars that affected their respective countries.

Among the Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) members’ states, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe had a common motivation of strengthening SADC within the region. Angola had a deep security concern of the rebel group UNITA under the leadership of Savimbi that Luanda administration believed that operates from DRC territory.

Due to vast availability of lootable natural resources, SADC members’ states, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe expanded their motive to economic interest, and like Rwanda and Uganda became part of the looting group. According to interviews conducted, South Africa took a neutral ground and hope that peace would be eventually be found within DRC territory to capitalize on the prevailing peace to expand economic dominance within the SADC region and Africa at large.

The intervention by major actors within the African regional context had been changing their dynamics. The official reason of intervention in DRC conflict is only to justify their involvement to the international community, but the main reasons for this conflict that
are not official that are not even known to their respective governments but to a few individual beneficiaries, that have the blessings of the ruling regime. The regional intervention in DRC conflict is mainly the scramble for economic superiority as a result of the much wealth looted and business networks established to ensure its continuity in the war.

**Approaches to the management of DRC conflict**

**Constitutional reforms**

DRC like other African states share the imposition of artificially created nation-states and imperial state structures.\(^{189}\) DRC had little time to prepare for independence and at independence the incoming elite inherited alien structures. It inherited state structures developed through coercive mechanisms and centralized political and economic controls such as the army, policy and the bureaucracy. This resulted in the establishment of a political culture based on ethnicity and authoritarian patterns of governance. Controlling the state and its resources became the primary purpose of political contestation.\(^{190}\)

The “scramble for Congo” created a state without any regard for ethnic diversity. This “great transplantation” of certain European conceptions of the state, its institutions and authority created nation states, which the eminent African scholar Basil Davidson described as “the black man’s burden” and a “curse” as it included and subjugated ethnic groups within specific superficial political spaces. It was exactly the politics of inclusion/exclusion by some ethnic groups that caused many of Africa’s inter and intra state wars.\(^{191}\)

Post independence constitutions of DRC were a compromise between major political actors and their interests. As post independent incumbents took on a winner takes all approach, they amended constitutions, contravened the norms of constitutionalism and good

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governance – accumulation of state power was the sole objective. DRC like other African
states experienced its own wave of democratization in the 1980s and the 1990s. For the first
time since independence, Africans revolted against personalized dictatorships and accepted
the idea of limited terms for heads of government.192

In DRC, authority is often backed by coercive power. Authority is located along a
compliance-defiance continuum, where compliance indicates recognition of one or all of the
following types of authority: moral authority, knowledge authority, reputational authority,
issue-specific authority and afflictive authority. Defiance often occurs when there is an
imbalance between the needs and expectations of the community and that of specific
individuals in authoritative positions.

For the effective conflict management mechanism, an all inclusive constitutional
dispensation need to be in place that will enable the voices of all Congolese heard and due
respect given to human rights. The new constitutional framework will ensure that the colonial
inherited institutions are strengthened to unite the divided nation.

**Inter Congolese Dialogue**

According to the interviewees' opinions, for an effective conflict management and
smooth DRC transition process, all stalled dialogues need to be effected so that a political
compromise between the five main armed groups: the former Kinshasa government, the
*Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC), the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Démocratie* (RCD-Goma), the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de
Libération* (RCD-ML), the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (RCD-
N), as well as Mai-Mai militias can be reached to ensure a stable socio political environment
for development to benefit all Congolese.

Exit of external armies operating in DRC territory.

The interviews revealed that the raw profit derived from exploitation of Congolese natural wealth by neighboring countries played a major role in the continuation and escalation of the war.

The Lusaka Accords called for a ceasefire between warring parties and the formation of a 90-day Congolese political dialogue that would lead to the eventual establishment of a new transitional power-sharing government. This can only be effective when there is no more external army’s interference. However, during the Lusaka negotiations, both RCDs claimed to have wanted to sign the agreement but that they would only do so if the other faction did not, resulting in neither one signing it. Moreover, without an enforcement mechanism, the ceasefire deal offered little reason for Rwanda and Uganda to pull out of the war, as it was in fact the war that was most profitable for them.

Dunn argues that a few of the combatants actually wanted peace to thrive. They had too much invested in the war, and their own economies were linked to the draining of Congo’s resources. Withdrawal of external forces operating within Congolese territory should be prioritized by all parties involved. Congolese according to one of the interviewee pointed out that Congolese deserve respect among the regional governments that do not respect their sovereignty. Opportunity therefore needs to be given so that the Congolese would initiate dialogue among themselves dialogues for lasting peace.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter gives the overview of the researcher project outlining the chapter’s details, findings and conclusion. Chapter one looks at the background of the research problem, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, theoretical framework, Hypotheses, methodology, scope and Limitations of the study, originality of the study. Chapter two discusses the historical background of DRC conflict; chapter three analyzes the structural causes of conflict in DRC. Chapter four examines critical analysis of the structural cause of conflict in DRC between 1996 -2006 and finally chapter five that provides for findings and conclusion for the research project.

The mismanagement and plundering of the DRC’s natural resources underpin much of its conflicts and tensions. The defining feature of the resource-fueled conflicts in the region is the numerous interests tied to the DRC’s vast mineral and forest resources. However, even though conflict may arise for reasons other than the economic agendas of combatants, the available evidence suggests that economic interests of states and foreign companies often significantly prolong conflict in DRC and regional wars – as in the Great Lakes.

The Plunder of Minerals in the DRC

Rich natural resource endowment can be a curse rather than a blessing for a developing country, resulting in corruption and conflict over their exploitation and the realization of benefits, the underdevelopment of the country and considerable suffering for the people concerned. This section examines findings and discussions concerning the plunder

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of natural resources, continuing conflict and underdevelopment of the Democratic Republic of Congo, within the context of DRC’s historical heritage and foreign intervention.

This section has attempted to give a brief but comprehensive overview of the complex conflict situation in the DRC, without being able to go into great detail. What seems clear is that, regardless of the origins of the conflict in this country, its continuation is based on greed fuelled by the opportunity to illegally exploit the country’s vast natural resource endowment, resulting in immense human suffering of the local population. The numerous parties involved, have evolved from crude looting to sophisticated, multi-faceted and deeply entrenched networks of exploitation and control over the resources and the associated populations.

The DRC has large deposits of diamonds, gold, silver, iron, zinc, copper, cobalt, columbite-tantalite (coltan), manganese, bauxite, uranium, and radium. Private external companies and regional states have competed for access to these resources, often through the financing of the country’s rebel groups or other proxy armies. These hostile interests have actively looted the DRC’s minerals resources to finance their involvement in the conflicts, including the purchase of weapons and recruitment of troops.195

UN expert panel report on the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources found that Rwanda and Uganda, neither diamond nor copper producers, plundered enough of the minerals from the DRC to become leading.196

A peace agreement is in place, and although the scale of conflict has declined since the withdrawal of foreign troops in 2002, there are still many rebel militias and signs that this fragile peace may not hold. In addition, the peace deal does not address some of the key economic issues behind the conflict, and has no timetable for demobilization of armed groups

and their integration into the army and police force; key pre-requisites for ending the armed conflict.

A comprehensive package of recommendations has been made to re-establish government authority and control over the country and its endowment of valuable natural resources for the benefit of the population of the DRC, but little or no progress has been made in implementation. Thus, any solution to the conflict must be comprehensive and all-embracing, involving the agreement and participation of all the parties involved both within the country, the Great Lakes sub-region and all neighboring countries involved in some way. But the solution also needs to actively target the commercial aspects of the conflict, which work to sustain it. This means along the whole chain from producer to consumer.

In the case of diamonds the Kimberly Process of certification has been launched to certify diamonds as "conflict-free". However, this scheme has its flaws and will only succeed if it has universal membership by producers, and an independent monitoring programme. Without these two elements, it is open to abuse, particularly where there is a lack of governance and oversight.

In addition, the international diamond industry itself lacks transparency in the way it operates, which facilitates the illegal marketing of conflict diamonds. It is too early pass judgment on the Kimberly Process, but without addressing the highlighted shortcomings in the process as well as reform and greater transparency within the international diamond industry it is less likely to succeed.

One area that has not been addressed in the search for a solution to the situation in the DRC is that of the use of traditional structures and institutions in relation to the restoration of

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governance and the management of local resources. Although it seems that such traditional structures were badly affected by the waves of violence and exploitation associated with the DRC’s historical past, once sustained peace is achieved this area should be explored further to encourage sustainable exploitation of resources by and for the local population.

**Failure to address social needs**

There is an increase in disease, criminality and social dislocation - one measure of this is the increasing numbers of abandoned children. The miserable living standards of workers and artisanal miners in Katanga breeds resentment against outsiders and foreigners, which can fan inter-ethnic violence or assaults on foreigners like Chinese workers. The influx of Chinese has driven up the cost of rented accommodation in Katanga, particularly in Lubumbashi, which has forced many local people into the cités (shanty towns) where there is no sanitation or access to clean water.

**Land acquisition**

According to the 1973 Land Law the State is the single sole owner of the soil and subsoil of which it has exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible ownership. This law brought all land back into the State domain (article 53). However the promised presidential ordinance, which was supposed to deal with indigenous or traditional communities’ land, has never materialized.199

In Katanga industrial mining is displacing traditional and mixed communities. The customary system of land allocation through traditional leaders is breaking down. Chefs de Terre allocates and authorizes the use of small parcels of land, and may delegate this authority to Chefs de Village for smaller agricultural plots. They informally receive an annual fee from the people to whom land is allocated. For bigger areas Chefs de Terre may allocate, but a temporary authorization for use will have to be granted at a higher level. Many of the

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199 P. Feeney, “Extractive Industries - Their Contribution To The Congo’s Development” Rights And Accountability In Development (Raid) Issue Paper No. 2: Natural Resources Management, pp.1-9
communities who have been displaced by mining companies do not have any security of
tenure and run the risk of secondary displacement as mining exploration activities expand.\textsuperscript{200}
Frequently the replacement fields are barely adequate for the needs of the community and
their access to natural resources, including water is greatly reduced.

\textbf{Actors, Motives and Interactions in Regional Conflicts}

One of the vexing features of conflicts in DRC and Great Lakes Region conflict
system in Africa, as a whole is the question of the multiplicity of actors. Apart from the
visible conflict parties, who are relatively easy to identify, there are always other actors either
lurking in the background or actively working in the foreground. These other actors normally
play roles that may, intentionally or otherwise, promote the peaceful transformation or
intensification of the conflicts.\textsuperscript{201} Furthermore, some of these actors are quite powerful and
capable of influencing conflict patterns and trends in significant ways.

The visible other actors may have the most noble stated motives, but in certain cases
their actual activities on the ground may not be consistent with their stated motives and goals.
This may arise either from deliberate strategies of deception or from weaknesses of peace
orientation. Some actors like international humanitarian organizations, etc. may have the best
of intentions but may fall prey to the unilateral designs of imperialist actors in the Security
Council, for example. The problem is that such visible ‘humanitarian’ actors are usually
studied either as disaster relief organizations or as peace facilitators. Rarely are they ever
perceived as a hindrance to peacemaking efforts.\textsuperscript{202}

The invisible actors in DRC conflict are quite powerful and even more problematic.
Some may work invisibly to promote peace but more often than not they work to subvert it.

Private military and security companies, drug dealers, arms merchants, money launderers.

\textsuperscript{200} Mining Code (Law No 007/2002 Of July 11 2002)
\textsuperscript{201} S. J. Steadman, D. Rothchild and E. M Cousens. Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of Peace
Agreements. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2002)
\textsuperscript{202} M. Berdal and D. Malone. Greed and grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. (Boulder & London:
Lynne Rienner, 2000)
plunderers (diamond and gold diggers), lords of poverty, International Financial Institutions, weak states, and warlords among other invisible actors all work together in complex interdependencies.

Complexity and multiplicity of actors in the DRC conflict has changed the conflict system, from the national to international thus its management becomes complex. The availability of different with diverse interest and motives from different levels, national, regional and international contributes greatly to the extent at which the conflict escalates.  

The activities and impact of these actors may be decisive in determining the eventuality of a violent conflict in the region. Yet they are hardly ever studied and when they are, the tendency has been either to give them casual treatment or to treat them as peripheral actors. Furthermore little attempt has been made to link their activities as integral and sometimes determinative in the conflict dynamics.

Conclusion

Conflict is DRC is complex. The main root cause of this conflict revolves around the natural resource. However, there are quite a number of structural causes of conflict. Land access, bad governance, colonial legacy issues are the main root cause of DRC conflict, however none would be looked in isolation without linking with natural resource exploitation. Over relying on natural resource as the main source of the economic pillar for DRC has made the conflict more complex. Multiplicity of actors, national, regional and international have equally contributed to the complexity of this conflict, hence its internationalization. These diverse actors have different motive and interest combined complex conflict network that will continue to affect the socio-economic development and political governance of DRC. DRC had been since pre-colonial era been ruled by leaders that lacked national focus for the socio, economic and political development of DRC, instead they

have been acting as puppets to the colonial masters that use their regime for their personal and their respective national gains. Conflict in DRC is mainly proxy war.
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