Israeli-Palestinian Relations from a Gendered Geopolitical Perspective

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Declaration

I, Dan Michaels, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree at any other university.

Signed:    Date:

Dan Michaels

This research project has been submitted for examination purposes with my approval as university supervisor.

Signed:    Date:

Prof. Maria Nzomo
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I would firstly like to thank Prof. Maria Nzomo for opening my eyes to the relevance of gender as a perspective by means of which the behaviour of actors in international relations can be further illuminated, often in ways I not only found interesting but have come to believe are of much significance as regards the effective analysis of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

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Abstract

The subject of this study is the relevance of gender to the currently conflictual nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the geopolitical context of the Middle East. After reviewing the literature to begin assessing the significance of gender as compared to additional relevant factors such as international law, religion, prominent individuals and other actors in international relations, as well as the interplay between gender and these other factors, primary data obtained from a questionnaire is introduced. Results from the questionnaire reinforce findings from the literature: that women in general do, despite also being influenced by those gender conceptions influencing the thoughts and behaviour of men, comprehend the world in a less dogmatic and pessimistic manner as regards the desirability and possibility of achieving lasting peace through compromise. The study concludes that Israeli-Palestinian relations would benefit from more women in decision-making positions on both sides, not least due to the tendency of the most masculine individuals, more often men than women for reasons of both socialization and hormonally induced differences, to experience compromise as shameful submissiveness, and that both parties would therefore be well advised to implement policies in this sense. It also recommends that further research be undertaken on a far larger scale in order to confirm these finding amongst diverse sections of the Israeli and Palestinian populations, the confirmation of which would make the urgency of facilitating the accession of more women to positions of influence in this region all the more evident.
Abbreviations

ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights
GCIV: Fourth Geneva Convention
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD: International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights
ICJ: International Court of Justice
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IFI: International Financial Institution
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IHRL: International Human Rights Law
IL: International Law
ILC: International Law Commission
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IPE: International Political Economy
IR: International Relations
MNC: Multinational Corporation
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization
UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN: United Nations
UNC: United Nations Charter
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
WB: World Bank
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 Introduction of the Problem

The geographical region of Palestine, for the most part lying between the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the west bank of the Jordan River, is situated in Western Asia at its intersection with Africa and Europe, in the area also known as the Near East, the Fertile Crescent and sometimes even the Cradle of Civilisation. It is the region with the earliest recorded dates for agriculture and settled life (MacNeish 1992) and, as such, it is a region that has experienced conflict for many thousands of years.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the origins of which can therefore be traced back as far as the establishment of the first human settlements in the region (Tessler 1994), is a most complex phenomenon for which diverse factors can be argued to be of paramount significance. This study will focus on one such factor that has received limited attention in the literature, but that merits further exploration in the geopolitical context in question where virtually all crucial decisions to date have been made by men concerned with maintaining their ‘masculine’ image: that of the dominant gender.

1.1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study addresses the problem of the extent to which the factor of gender has influenced Israeli-Palestinian relations, especially as regards its significance in relation to other arguably significant factors such as political ideology, religion, international law, and the influence of institutional, state and individual political actors.
1.2.1 Objectives of the Study

The principal objective of this study is to examine the factors responsible for the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations and to ascertain the extent to which gender is a significant factor. Sub-objectives are: i) to explore the relationship between gender and those other factors identified from an exploration of the literature as being of most significance ii) to ascertain whether or not attaining a critical mass in the number of women decision-makers would be likely to heighten the chances of achieving a lasting peaceful coexistence amongst these two societies.

1.2.2 Research Questions

General questions this study seeks to answer are:

i) Which factors are most responsible for the current conflictual state of Israeli-Palestinian relations?

ii) Is gender one of these factors and, if so, why?

Resulting from the above are these more specific questions:

i) What is the nature of the relationship between gender and any other factors identified as being significant in explaining this conflict?

ii) Could any one factor, in particular that of gender, be considered the independent factor upon which the others are dependent?

iii) Would having a higher percentage of women amongst the decision-makers of both parties increase the chances of achieving a lasting peace?
1.3 Theoretical Framework

The theory that informs this research is the feminist theory which states that our world is currently dominated by patriarchal norms and values (from the Greek ‘pateras’, father, and ‘arho’, to rule / lead), whereby it has come to be considered ‘natural’ for the man to rule in the home and, by extension, in the society as a whole.

Even those societies where there are no widespread religious beliefs dictating the respective roles of men and women are patriarchal for reasons that predate all the world's major religions: At the time of the agricultural revolution, around ten to twelve thousand years ago, when humans first started to live in large groups and allocate specific tasks to different members of the group, the fact that men are, on average, taller and heavier than women, led to them being allocated the tasks requiring more strength.

The acceptance that certain of these tasks, for example defending the group from others, were of more value to the welfare of the group as a whole and, therefore, ‘superior’ to those requiring less strength, such as preparing food and cleaning, likely led to patriarchal societies.

Regardless of their origin, however, it can be argued that the most significant result of patriarchal societies has been that anything considered to be ‘masculine’ has become widely accepted as being fundamentally ‘superior’ to anything considered to be ‘feminine’, and this operates in both directions: anything considered to be ‘superior’ has therefore become widely accepted as being fundamentally ‘masculine’.
Due most likely to the fact that women give birth as opposed to men, to be ‘nurturing’ is widely accepted as being a ‘feminine’ gender characteristic. Other examples of widely accepted ‘feminine gender characteristics’ could be ‘weak’ and ‘emotional’, whereas examples of widely accepted ‘masculine gender characteristics’ could be ‘strong’ and ‘rational’. Therefore, any women considered to be strong and rational would thereby also be considered ‘masculine’, and any man considered to be weak and emotional would thereby also be considered ‘feminine’.

What is significant for international relations in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in particular, from this perspective is the ensuing use of metaphors of ‘masculine-superior’ and ‘feminine-inferior’ to conceptualize abstract concepts, for example to conceptualize ‘aggression’ and ‘war’ as being ‘masculine’ and ‘conciliation’ and ‘peace’ as being ‘feminine’. The result of this is that a leader or state employing aggression and warfare to solve a conflict would be considered ‘masculine’, and therefore in some way ‘superior’, whereas a leader employing ‘empathy’ and ‘conciliation’ would be considered ‘feminine’ and therefore in some way ‘inferior’, in the context of our patriarchal societies. From a feminist perspective, this can be used to a large extent to explain why societies have tended to adopt ‘masculine’ and ‘aggressive’ leaders and why states so often go to war with each other, and even to explain how the state came about in the first place with its ‘masculine’ values of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Unlike other ‘mainstream’ international relations theories, the most notable ones being realism, liberalism and Marxism, feminist theory puts gender conceptions at the centre of its analysis. Although there are distinct strands of feminist theory to be elaborated on further in the review of the literature, what they all have in common is a focus on gender from the perspective of which the aforementioned mainstream theories appear to be virtually, if not totally, ‘gender-blind’. In other words, if gender is indeed a significant factor in any specific phenomenon in international relations, it is only by applying feminist theory that one is likely to be able to comprehend it and analyse the degree of its significance. From any other perspective the fact that virtually all important decisions as regards the nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations have been taken by men would be assumed from the outset to be of little or no relevance. Equally it would be assumed that the nature of, and value given to, behaviour that is considered to be masculine has had little or no significance on the decisions that these men have taken to date.

Feminist theory is therefore essential to a study such as this one which seeks to evaluate the relevance of gender as a factor in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the relationship between gender and other factors also found to be of importance. The purpose of any theory is to describe, explain and prescribe, and in any study where it is the significance of gender that is being analysed, the feminist perspective alone provides the ‘gendered perspective’ necessary to make such an analysis possible.
1.4 Definition of Terms

In addition to ‘gender’ as defined from a feminist perspective in the previous section, another significant term for this study is that of ‘geopolitics’. As with patriarchy, geopolitics can also be conceptualized to a large extent by focusing on its etymology, linking the Greek ‘geo’, from ‘yi’ (γη) meaning earth, and politics, another word of Greek origin derived from ‘poli’ (πόλη) signifying city-state, thereby establishing a relationship between territory and the actions of its inhabitants. More specifically, it has become a paradigm by means of which political phenomena such as conflict are explained primarily as a result of geographical variables (O'Loughlin et al. 1991).

Classical geopolitical theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century conceptualised conflict as an inevitable natural phenomenon with each group logically trying to maximize the resources at its disposal by expanding its boundaries in a Darwinian survival of the fittest between nations (Wanklyn 1961). The concept of geopolitics has, however, evolved as a result of the increasingly interconnected and interdependent globalized world of today and more recent theorists may well distance themselves from the determinism of their predecessors (Martin & Preston 1993).

Be that as it may, what unites them all is the fundamental geopolitical concept that specific characteristics of individuals and groups, however prominent, are of relatively little significance in relation to external forces as regards both the origins and outcome of any conflict.
For the purpose of this study, ‘conflict’ is defined as the lack of an agreement between the parties concerned as to the nature of their peaceful coexistence, and consequently the lack of such peaceful coexistence, including during periods in which there is no ongoing armed conflict. ‘Geopolitical factors’ are those factors pertaining to the specific characteristics of the territories concerned that may influence the political decisions of their respective populations. ‘Israelis’ are those citizens, regardless of their religion, ethnic background or current place of residence, of the modern State of Israel. ‘Palestinians’ are the people living in, or originating from, the geographical region of Palestine, again regardless of their religion or specific ethnic background, who have adopted that name\(^2\) precisely because they do not identify entirely, if at all, with existing states such as Israel, Jordan or Egypt.

As for the territory claimed, in addition to the Gaza Strip, for the purpose of the establishment there of a future sovereign Palestinian state, this paper generally prefers the term ‘The West Bank’, in reference to its location to the west of the River Jordan, more than the politically and emotionally charged terms ‘Judea and Samaria’ or ‘The Occupied Territories’, employed by the current Israeli authorities and many of their opponents, respectively.

It is important to note that it is logically possible for any individual to be at the same time an Israeli in terms of citizenship and a Palestinian as regards

\(^2\) Newt Gingrich, one of the United States Republican Party candidates for the presidential nomination in 2012, and former teacher of history and geography, referred, irrationally in our opinion, to the Palestinians as an “invented people” on the basis of there never having yet been a sovereign Palestinian state. As reported by Fisk, R. (January 14, 2012) in The Independent.
national identity, although these people are categorized as Arab-Israelis\(^3\) by the Israeli authorities to distinguish them from residents of Gaza and non-Jewish residents of the West Bank. It is equally possible for an individual to be a Palestinian Jew,\(^4\) an Arab Jew,\(^5\) and consequently even a Palestinian Arab Jew, although a detailed consideration of these identities is beyond the scope of this project.

\section*{1.5 Justification of the Study}
Numerous attempts to broker an agreement putting an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been undertaken since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the most recent one being initiated by US President Barack Obama in 2010 and currently being led on his behalf by Secretary of State John Kerry\(^6\). A better understanding of the relative significance of the various factors underlying this conflict would be useful to all those groups engaged in the pursuit of peace in the region. Moreover, as concerns theoretical relevance, this study may contribute to the knowledge of conflict in general by examining in detail and in a specific context its relationship with a factor that may explain the broader picture of this phenomenon, still highly relevant and consequential in the 21\(^{st}\) century.

\(^3\) Arab-Israeli Supreme Court Justice Salim Joubran criticized for not singing the Israeli national anthem, as reported by Michaeli, M. (April 25, 2012) in Haaretz.

\(^4\) For a biography of one such Palestinian Jew, Uri Avnery, see: http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/about/1177150070

\(^5\) An example of an Arab Jew would be any person of the Jewish faith whose native language is Arabic and who has a predominantly Arab cultural background. See: http://www.bintjbeil.com/E/occupation/arab_jew.html

\(^6\) In his article in The Guardian, McGreal, C. (September 2, 2010) makes reference to Barack Obama’s “one year deadline for a comprehensive peace agreement.”
1.6 Literature Review

The word ‘gender’ is often used to refer to the sex of human beings, either male or female, as an alternative to the word sex, itself now commonly used to refer to sexual activity. However, the definition of gender we are most concerned with here, its origin in English via the stem of Latin genus meaning ‘kind or class of things,’ refers to the distinctions made between who and what is classed as either masculine or feminine in human societies, and the implications of such distinctions.

In our current societies where men can, in all objectivity, be observed to hold most of the power (often thereby referred to as patriarchal societies), it is logical to assume that anyone or anything conceptualized as being masculine would be considered essentially superior to anyone or anything conceptualized as being feminine, and that this hierarchy would shape human relations on all levels, including international relations. ‘Feminists’ are those who make visible inequalities between men and women as a result of this gender hierarchy and attempt in various ways to redress them. ‘Feminist theory’ on the other hand is concerned with better understanding the implications of this hierarchy in a variety of fields, international relations being only one amongst many, not only as regards its impact on women but on society as a whole.

7 The word gender is used in this way as a synonym for sex, likely because the word sex was largely considered to have unwelcome erotic connotations, in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, for example Article 27 (8): “not more than two thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.”

This therefore involves delving deeper into the exact nature of its effect on various categories of men and women who, for one reason or another, are considered to be more or less masculine or feminine. Most significantly as regards international relations, it involves assessing its relevance to explaining the current nature of entities and phenomena such as state and non-state actors, power, governance, human rights, conflict, development, the environment, trade, terrorism and globalization.

When considering the relevance of gender to matters of international relations it is therefore just as necessary to consult feminist theory as it is, for example, to consult realist theory when considering the relevance of the selfish aspect of human nature, liberalist theory that of more social aspects of human nature, Marxist theory the relevance of class, and broad constructivist theory that of changing human perceptions in general.

Feminist theory in international relations came to the fore towards the end of the Cold War with Carol Cohn’s *Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals*, in which she examined to what extent a bias in favour of masculinist values, in particular within the militarized culture of a Cold War superpower, had led to the apparent disregard for human emotions. Cohn’s work not only shed light on the manner in which women are further sidelined in militarized societies, it also drew attention to how the dominance of the realist perspective in IR may have played a significant role in shaping those relations to the detriment of all concerned.

To illustrate the dominance of the realist perspective at that time, Larry Swatuk, at the end of the Cold War in 1991, noted that “since the inception of IR as a field of study, liberalism/idealism has (unsuccessfully) sought to displace conservatism/realism as the dominant mode of inquiry and method of analysis.”\(^{10}\)

A classic example of the form of realism that can be seen to be highly masculinised in the light of Cohn’s work is to be found in Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*.\(^{11}\) In this he defined anarchy as what he referred to as the ordering principle of the international political system, an assumption that was to be accepted, along with that of rational choice, by prominent liberalists such as Robert Keohane. It was indeed Keohane in *After Hegemony*\(^{12}\) who employed game theory as a means of explaining the actions of states to develop the idea of cooperation between states being facilitated by an iterative process.

The approach of this new version of liberalism, referred to as neo-liberalism or neo-liberal institutionalism, in particular its use of game theory, one of the most extreme examples of the disregard for human emotions highlighted by Cohn, found favour with realist scholars too. This inevitably led to a ‘rapprochement’ between these two rationalist paradigms and, at the same time, a need for a perspective such as the feminist perspective to oppose it.

\(^{10}\) Swatuk, L., 1991. *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Contending Theories of International Relations*. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.


Therefore, much as feminist scholars often share with liberalist scholars a particular concern for the issue of human rights, from the perspective of Cohn the liberalism of Keohane can be regarded as both gendered in its nature and gender-blind in its analysis.

In more recent times we can arguably observe a sort of agreed division of labour between paradigms no longer directly competing with each other, with challenges to realism henceforth coming predominantly from reflectivism, most often represented in the field of IR by constructivists with whom feminist scholars are oftentimes grouped, in particular as regards textbooks.

All constructivists put emphasis on the significance of the socially constructed, and therefore changeable, nature of actors in IR, and in particular of the way these actors construct ideas about other actors and the international system, and it is this approach which has been increasingly taking the place of Marxism, including neo-Marxist Dependency and World System theories, as the main ‘radical’ challenger to realism.

Moreover, a constructivist-feminist critique can logically lead to the accusation that these three ‘traditional’ paradigms, including realism, are in reality the three main historic political groups: conservative-realism, liberal and radical-Marxism. Much as realists in the field of IR have denied this by claiming objectivity and rationality backed by an epistemologically and empirically sound scientific approach, further research is needed to assess the link between the political ideology of the individual researcher and their orientation as a scholar in the field of international relations.
Regarding the realist claim that scientific theories such as game theory back up their assertions from a non-ideological standpoint, a feminist critique would point out that game theory was based on the premise of fully rational actors acting in total isolation and without constructing any ideas whatsoever regarding the other actors aside from their being ‘rational’. It would also consider highly significant the fact that when game theory was tested on employees of the Rand Corporation, where experiments based on the theory were first carried out, they chose to cooperate even in the absence of iteration. ¹³

This is something that feminist scholars employing cognitive and behavioural approaches could explain by the highly emotional element of what human beings consider to be purely rational decision-making and the fact that all people, by their very nature, do, and indeed should, take into account the perceived character of the other when making decisions.

For example, despite defection being the rational choice of both actors in the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ according to game theory, regardless of the decision of the other actor, a feminist-cognitive critique of this could be that in real life situations it would not be logical not to take into consideration the perceived character of the other actor: defection if the other were a mafia boss, and your defection would almost certainly lead to not only your death but that of your entire family, would not be logical.

Likewise, logical cooperation in the ‘Stag Hunt’ could be best explained by the embarrassment felt by the individual defecting in full view of the others.

Choosing to go for the ‘ideal’ outcome of becoming a hero by defection in the ‘Chicken Game’ is totally illogical if you have good reason to believe the other will not swerve under any circumstance. It is better to be a ‘chicken’ than dead, including for statesmen and the states they govern.\(^{14}\)

A feminist critique in the style of Cohn could be that naïve and misguided leaders, and their populations, have become the victims of illogical decisions inspired by highly masculinist realist theories. One recent possible example would be Saddam Hussein who didn’t ‘swerve’ and died in the process, and not as a hero. Taking into account the specific ‘character’ of the United States, something largely excluded by realism but essential from a feminist perspective, may have encouraged Saddam to act differently.

Furthermore, feminist scholars join other non-realist scholars in the claim that the still dominant realist perspective is an outdated perspective. They argue that its main fault is not taking on board the insights of post-modernist, post-positivist and post-structuralist research which has demonstrated that the specific character of a state, comprising aspects of religion, class, geopolitics, history, and gender, is of utmost significance.

\(^{14}\) ‘The Chicken Game’ is an example of a game with more than one ‘Nash equilibrium’, the rational decision being to swerve as being a ‘chicken’ is so trivial compared to likely death. However, if you understand the other to be ‘rational’, you can then assume he will swerve for this very reason and so you could ‘rationally’ not swerve and be a ‘hero’. Multiple Nash equilibria are very complex even for specialists of game theory and it could be argued that IR scholars who are not specialists of game theory, and even more so politicians, could easily misinterpret them and therefore draw unwise conclusions as regards implications for foreign policy. Moreover, in 1997 the documentarist Adam Curtis interviewed John Nash, the ‘father’ of game theory, who said that, with hindsight, he now believed, “human nature is not entirely moderated by self-interest. Some game theory concepts could be unsound because there is over-dependence on rationality. That is my enlightenment.” Curtis then added, “behavioural psychologists have since shown that only two groups in society actually behave in a ‘rational self-interested way’ in all experimental situations. One is economists and the other is psychopaths.” To see this extract from the interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54Dk3x4osik
when trying to predict its behaviour and deciding how you should behave towards it.

As for matters of international political economy, in its report on Africa in the 21st century even the World Bank attacks the realist gender-blind approach to assessing what should be considered successful policies of state actors with statements such as:

“Africa is losing out on the productive potential of more than half its effective workforce. So, measures to increase gender equality in Africa, in addition to their social and distributional implications, have considerable potential to accelerate growth.”15

However, with regard to positions of leadership, an important distinction is made by feminist scholars between “descriptive and substantive representation” of women.16 For example, Rwanda is currently the country with the greatest representation of women in national parliaments anywhere in the world, standing at 56.3% as of September, 2013.17 However, some feminist scholars point out that under Kagame’s regime this representation has not yet yielded significant impact in terms of contributing to conflict reduction in the region. This is largely due to the fact that, in Rwanda, much of the ‘substantive’ power resides in Kagame’s Presidency.


Carol Cohn has since been shown to have demonstrated foresight in her attack on the underlying realist assumption that individuals are primarily driven by self interest with recent studies identifying ‘mirror neurones’ in humans.\textsuperscript{18} Those employing the feminist perspective now have hard evidence that empathy and altruism find their origin in the very structure of the human brain, logically providing for cooperation and a repression of excesses of self-interest that would make the overly self-interested individual, and by extension state, more susceptible to hostility, and ultimately destruction, at the hands of vengeful others.

However, even before this evidence became apparent, feminist scholars were already deducing from their logic and observations that gender conceptions, and not ‘natural’ self-interest, were highly significant in understanding all human relations, including international relations.

Indeed, they were already questioning the ‘naturalness’ of everything, applying the ‘domestic analogy’ to matters of gender and making frequent reference to the idea that ‘the personal is political’ in this regard, all of which is epitomized by Cynthia Enloe’s book, \textit{Bananas, Beaches and Bases}.\textsuperscript{19}


Cynthia Enloe starts out (p.3) by giving the most concise possible definition of feminist theory, “Nothing is natural – well, almost nothing.” She goes on to argue that once we accept this, we can accept that “it is possible to imagine alternatives”, and that this reflection is of particular relevance with regard to the centrality of gender in the international political system.

The word ‘bananas’ in the title refers to all those sectors, not only banana plantations, where “plantation managers have defined most of the tasks as ‘women’s work’” (p.149). This, although Enloe could be criticized for not spelling it out in her text, should make us consider if this assumption, widely accepted by governments, multinational corporations (MNCs) and other actors in international relations (IR), leads to the underemployment of a large sector of the population and an ensuing loss of global productivity, in particular in countries and regions, such as Africa, that apply it most strictly.

The reference to ‘beaches’ takes the argument one step further, with Enloe arguing that many states, in particular the poorest ones with the encouragement of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), have adopted the strategy of using women as a means of attracting tourists and ‘servicing’ them in various ways, as “officials have looked to tourism to provide them with foreign currency, a necessity in the ever more globalized economies of both poor and rich countries” (p.40).

At the same time, women from these poorer countries have been encouraged to go abroad to provide these very same services, for example as carers,
cleaners, sex workers or all three combined, again adding to their home countries’ stocks of foreign currency as a result of their remittances.

Finally, ‘bases’ develops Enloe’s assertion that “the personal is international” (p.196), a reformulation of the personal is political argument, to move the question from how gender conceptions have shaped trading strategies to how they have shaped military doctrine:

“They (base commanders) count on presumptions about both femininity and masculinity that will make military wives raise their daughters to look up to their fathers and their sons to emulate their fathers by choosing a military career themselves” (p.72).

Again, Enloe could be criticized for not taking this argument further, for example by examining in detail how the idea most women have of masculine virtue, albeit largely socially constructed, may encourage men to act in ways that are ultimately counterproductive to society as whole, and arguably to women in particular. Even so, she does at least shed light on the concept of patriarchy in IR, most strikingly with her description of how the US ‘persuaded’ the Filipino government to agree to the imposition of compulsory AIDS tests on all Filipino women ‘servicing the servicemen’, but not for the servicemen themselves.

Much as this book is full of interesting anecdotes, it could however be argued that there are many significant omissions.

Firstly, although in her introduction (p.4) she states that, “by taking women’s experiences of international politics more seriously, I think we can
acquire a more realist understanding of how international politics actually ‘works’”, she doesn’t actually define what she means by international politics. More importantly, she doesn’t link her various anecdotes together by clearly attaching them to any specific underlying theory, leaving the readers to do that work for themselves.

A further criticism is that she has a tendency to consider gender in total isolation from other factors, for example when she responds to what she refers to as a “ritualistic jibe” of “men trying to invalidate any discussion of gender in international politics” (p.5), for example by invoking the likes of Margaret Thatcher, with what one could argue could just as well be referred to as a ‘ritualistic jibe of feminists’:

“When a woman is let in by the men who control the political élite it usually is precisely because that woman has learned the lessons of masculinised political behaviour well enough not to threaten male political privilege” (pp.6-7).

Here it may have been more precise for Enloe to write of the woman acquiring and internalizing patriarchal values rather than ‘learning the lessons’ of masculinised political behaviour. This argument could also be considered deficient in that it does not take into account other essential categories of analysis such as class, religious convictions, national identity and, not least of which, political ideology.

The same deficiency is apparent in her categorization of international financial institutions, banks, markets and MNCs as ‘masculinised’ without
the slightest reference to class, let alone to Marxist theory, world system theory, international political economy (IPE) or dependency theory.

What is most absent here is the extrapolation of Enloe’s rejection of what is ‘natural’ as regards gender to an in-depth analysis of how these gender conceptions have fundamentally impacted on significant events on the world stage. She does on occasion throughout the book hint at such events, for example (p.34) when she states that, “men in nationalist movements may find it easier to be roused to anger by the vision of a machete-swinging man transformed into a tray-carrying waiter in a white resort,” but she does not follow this up with concrete examples of how gender conceptions may have influenced nationalist movements, and conflict in general, throughout the history of IR. Another possible criticism is that she does not sufficiently emphasise the repercussions gender conceptions may have for men, and how they are manipulated in the context of international politics and international economy.

In her follow-up to *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, the equally catchily titled *The Morning After*, Enloe sets out to examine “the varieties of masculinity and femininity that it took to create the Cold War” (p.5), arguing at the outset that none of the principle state actors “could have enlisted sufficient numbers of conscripts or voluntary soldiers without a large measure of support from mothers” (p.11).

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Her thesis is that the states in question took steps to reinforce the stereotypes of “male protector” and “female protected” in order to most effectively “militarize” the society, as “no person, no community, and no national movement can be militarized without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily lives” (p.245).

She notes that the end of the Cold War actually resulted in a fall in women’s descriptive representation in the parliaments of Eastern European countries, arguing that this fact “revealed the tenacity of patriarchy” (p.23), as well as demonstrating how revived nationalisms “can grease the wheels of militarization, a process that ultimately marginalizes women” (p.229).

This book continues Enloe’s approach of making women ‘visible’, this time in the context of the Cold War and its aftermath, thereby providing further examples of the existence of gender as a factor in international relations, although arguably it does not bring any new insights into its exact nature and relevance.

The book does however succeed, to its credit, in encouraging the reader to ask more questions concerning exactly why mothers would encourage their male children to go to war, the role of the state in this process, and to what extent the state itself is gendered, but it does not provide the answers.

Although published in 1992, one year earlier than Enloe’s The Morning After, the collection of papers edited by Spike Peterson, Gendered States,\(^2\) 

offers many possible answers to the various questions Enloe poses but, for the most part, is unable to suggest answers for herself.

For example, Jean Bethke Elshtain’s paper addresses the question of why many mothers throughout history have encouraged their sons to go to war, even considering their death ‘in action’ a source of additional pride. The answer she offers is that it is primarily an ethic of self-sacrifice rather than aggression that compels the sons to go to war and that the mothers are playing the corresponding role attributed to them by society in this context, that is to sacrifice their sons, and thereby their own happiness, for the ‘greater good’.

Both the mother and the son share a conception of sovereignty whereby “the Sovereign may bear a masculinised face but the nation itself is feminized” (p.149), and will regard self-sacrifice in one form or the other to the “motherland” as something noble, even “beautiful”, and necessary as regards the forging of the sovereignty of the state and its recognition by others.

Elshtain postulates that “we will remain inside a state/nation-centred discourse of war and politics, for better and for worse, so long as states remain the best way we have devised for protecting and sustaining a way of life in common” (p.150), but that it may be possible to move towards some form of “postsovereign politics” whereby there would be “a move from sacrifice to responsibility” (p.151), citing as an example Vaclav Havel’s
definition of politics as “practical morality… humanly measured care for our fellow human beings.”22

In her paper entitled “Feminists and Realists View Autonomy and Obligation in IR,” addressing the challenge of the feminist paradigm to the hegemony of realism, Christine Sylvester warns against the “habit of establishing identity against and in opposition to others,” concluding that to do so is to “reinforce realist international relations as a totality to be supplanted completely, rather than as a partial reality filtered through the standpoints of some men” (p.171).

R. B. J. Walker begins his paper on “Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations” by asserting that IR “has been one of the most gender-blind, indeed crudely patriarchal, of all the institutionalized forms of contemporary and social and political analysis” (p.179), going on to argue that “the extent to which this discipline has been impervious to almost any form of philosophical or political critique gives some indication of its role in generating and legitimating what is taken to be the crucial and incontrovertible about political life within the sovereign state” (p.180).

As regards state sovereignty, he observes that it is “so central that it is usually relegated to the (hegemonic) status of a simple and reified given” (p.180), arguing that the feminist paradigm is one of those most apt to challenge this “given”, but criticising the use of the term ‘world politics’ by those such as Enloe when he states that “politics is something that can only

occur within a coherent political community, in a polis, or its more complex successors” (p.182), rendering ‘world politics’ a contradiction in terms unless it is employed simply as a synonym for international relations.

He concludes however that “most analysts seem to concede that whatever is going on in ‘the world’ is rather more complex and puzzling than the available categories of explanations” (p.182), and again emphasises that the feminist paradigm may be able to fill this void.

In 1995 Christine Williams in *Still a Man’s World* refocused the regard of the feminist perspective clearly on men in a study, conducted throughout various regions of the United States between 1985 and 1991, by means of interviews with 76 men and 23 women doing jobs that are widely considered to be ‘women’s work’, namely elementary school teaching, nursing, librarianship and social work.

In her introduction (p.15), she points out that, “prior to the nineteenth century, when most teachers, nurses and librarians were men, these occupations did not connote femininity… as they do today.” To take the example of teaching, women were at that time believed to be “incapable of instructing or disciplining male students” (p.25), but the transformation of teaching from a male to a female occupation was heralded in during the mid-nineteenth century with the likes of Catherine Beecher who, in 1835, argued that:

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“Most happily, the education necessary to fit a woman to be a teacher is exactly the one that best fits her for that domestic relation she is primarily designed to fill” (p.25).24

Williams compares this to the transformation which took place in nursing after Florence Nightingale wrote, in 1860, that “every woman is a nurse” (p.25),25 and in librarianship when, in 1889, library planners were advised that “a woman’s natural domesticity amply fits her for work in libraries” (p.28).

When social work education was first introduced in the US in 1898, it was considered to be a most “appropriate activity for relatively high status ‘ladies’” (p.29), which at that time largely excluded blacks and Jews, amongst others, with the application of restrictive quotas: “The New England Hospital (training school)… allowed only one black and one Jewish woman admission each year” (p.30).

Williams concludes from the above examples that, “the identification of certain tasks and jobs as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ is thus extremely malleable: Jobs that are ‘masculine’ at one time are ‘feminine’ at others” (p.49).

Although she does not emphasize the point herself, the parallel with jobs that were conceptualized as being more suited to people from a particular ‘race’ is evident.


As a result of these four professions becoming highly ‘feminised’, the ‘token’ men choosing to undertake them in the late twentieth century found themselves in a position of having their masculinity put into question but, in contrast to women in ‘masculinised’ jobs, Williams observed that, “there seem to be subtle mechanisms in place that enhance men’s positions in these professions – a phenomenon I refer to as ‘a glass escalator effect’” (p.108).

The result of this was that these men, if they chose to, had the opportunity to ‘assert their masculinity’ by rising to the ‘top of their profession’, that is by acceding to administrative and managerial positions, thereby ensuring it’s ‘still a man’s world.’

She goes on to note that most of the men she interviewed did not define themselves differently from men in other ‘non-feminised’ occupations, and that personality tests conducted by Michael Galbraith in 1991 had actually found that male “nurses and teachers had higher average masculinity scores than the engineers. He (Galbraith) concluded that ‘men in non-traditional work retain traditional components of their masculinity’” (p.112).

However, Williams concludes her study with the assertion that, “even though the men that do ‘women’s work’ may be personally committed to gender differentiation, their very presence in these occupations… is an important step toward achieving gender equality” (p.188).

Much as her study makes for an interesting read and adds extra substance to Enloe’s attack on the ‘natural’ aspect of gender conceptions, one could...

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argue that it does not adequately address their relevance to all men, seeming
to suggest that men should simply be encouraged to abandon their ‘gender
privilege’ without understanding what would be ‘in it for them.’

Even the most elementary explanation of why the constant questioning of
gender conceptions is beneficial to society as a whole is absent from this
book, which would almost certainly leave all those men, the vast majority of
them, who don’t already have a solid grasp of the subject concluding that
Williams’ study merely demonstrates just how lucky they actually are in the
current state of affairs.

What is totally absent from this book, although this is a natural result of the
scope of her study and in no way a criticism, is an evaluation of how gender
conceptions ensure that it’s ‘still a man’s world’ in the realm of
international relations and what, if anything, should be done to change it.

However, in 1998 a collection of papers written by various scholars, both
male and female, in the field of international relations, and edited by
Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, goes a long way towards filling this
void.27

It starts out by taking as its premise that women are not “a problem to be
solved… within the theories and practices of international relations” (p.1).
Zalewski then affirms as the primary objective to “highlight the ways in
which masculinities are implicated” in these theories and practices (p.6),

leading to the questioning of “the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in theory and practice of international relations” (p.8).

In their paper concerned with the concept of masculinity within the theory of IR, Lucian Ashworth and Larry Swatuk assert that “the gendered nature of this dialectic has been neglected,” with the presentation of the ‘two pillars of IR’, realism and liberalism, as gender-neutral descriptions of reality.\(^{28}\)

Firstly, they argue that the primary reason liberalism has failed to replace realism as the predominant paradigm in IR is that realists have been largely successful in portraying liberals as ‘idealists’, a term coined by the realist Edward Carr, which is widely considered to be a feminine trait. They go on to claim that if liberals have however been able to ‘make up ground’ in recent years, it is due to the relative success of their ‘counterattacking’ by asserting that, “the truly masculine man is the one who… accepts the superiority of progress, rationality and technological advance” (p.74), in addition to rejecting the term idealism and any over-association with other characteristics generally considered to be ‘feminine’ such as “empathy, compassion, nurturance, sensitivity and unselfishness” (p.75).\(^{29}\)

Ashworth and Swatuk proceed to refer to the conception of masculinity adopted by realists as “hypermasculinity” and that adopted by liberals as “rational masculinity” (p.83) with direct repercussions as regards the

\(^{28}\) Op. cit. Swatuk, p.73.

practice of IR in most fundamental ways. They claim that realist hypermasculinity has been responsible for, nothing less than, “the emergence and eventual militarization of the state system with imagery of protector/protected, inside/outside, and order/anarchy,” and that the rational masculinity of the liberals, with their belief that human, read ‘male’, rationality can overcome all obstacles has “fostered a split between man and nature where nature is to be dominated, and is consequently responsible for the widespread degradation of the environment” (p87).

Steve Niva takes this question of competing forms of masculinity further in his paper concerning masculinity in the ‘New World Order’, with a focus on the Gulf War of 1990-91, claiming that the liberal version is beginning to gain the upper hand and citing as an example the perceived, at least in the West, “contrast between the tough but tender and technologically sophisticated Western man and the hypermacho Arab villain (Saddam) from an inferior civilisation” (p.119). In more recent years, since the publication of this book, this ‘contrast’ has been made on numerous occasions, not least of which the ‘liquidation’ of the ‘hypermacho’ Osama Bin Laden by the ‘tender and sophisticated liberal’, but still ‘man enough’ to defeat the enemy, Barack Obama.

Niva concludes that, “this new masculinity can… easily justify its actions, however ill-intentioned, against those men and masculinities in different social and cultural contexts”, those associated with more traditional and even more patriarchal social orders, “without having to radically question
the persistent fact than men, particularly elite Western men, still dominate the major institutions… and shape the agenda of world politics” (p.122).

In her overall conclusion, Jane Parpart echoes Enloe’s ‘the personal is international’ and reminds us that it works both ways: “International politics presents a world where men ‘naturally’ hold power and women are ‘naturally’ subordinate”, reinforcing “the association between masculinity and power at all levels of society” (p.203).

She summarizes the key findings of all contributors with the assertion, “definitions of masculinity(ies) obviously vary over time and place” (p.203) and thus, “the complex, interactive and fluid nature of masculinity(ies) offers some hope to a number of the authors of this book” (p.205). In addition, she intersperses her own personal reflection that new thinking is required concerning, “the social construction of gender in international relations and its role in defining and maintaining rights, responsibilities, power (or lack of power) to those seen as male and/or female” (p.200).

From the perspective of this study, the evolution in thinking from Enloe’s book written in 1990 to this one of 1998, via Williams’ of 1995, is interesting in that demonstrates the adage that ‘new times require new thinking’. Whereas Enloe’s book was clearly focussed on the hardships faced by most women, and Williams’ on the advantages accorded to most men by the social phenomenon of the ‘masculine/feminine dichotomy’, Zalewski and Parpart’s collection focuses more intently on the repercussions on society as a whole, as well as opening up the debate to the differing
consequences that different conceptualisations of masculinity and femininity may have on competing societies.

In 2001, nearly ten years on from her critique of the gender-blind nature of post-Cold War conventional paradigms in *Gender in International Relations*, the book by J. Ann Tickner *Gendering World Politics* was published. In this work Tickner challenges the argument of wars being waged in order to protect women, claiming that this is merely a cynical excuse used by leaders, themselves well aware that women generally suffer the most in times of war as refugees, victims of rape or organised prostitution, and trafficking (p.47).

The reason for the effectiveness of this excuse is, from a feminist perspective, due to the acceptance of gender-based stereotypes not only by men but by women as well, in this particular case the one of ‘naturally’ dependent women being constantly potential victims in need of protection from violent men of their own ingroup against the violent men of various outgroups that seek to harm them and their children.

Tickner then turns her attention from conflict to globalisation and multinational corporations, criticising the imposition of ever-worsening pay and less stable employment on a mostly female labour force, and especially in the developing world, under the guise of “flexibility” (p.81).

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On the subject of democratization, Tickner, drawing on her experience as a post-Cold War feminist scholar, reminds us of the danger of widely accepted gender stereotypes leading to the further exclusion and impoverishment of women in newly democratized societies if this is not accompanied by a sufficient amount of resocialization to allow for women to be accepted as suitable candidates for positions of authority (p.104).

Finally, Tickner asserts that further research is needed from a feminist perspective on these and other matters most relevant to the broader discipline of IR in the 21st century, as far as possible incorporating non-Western perspectives into this still highly ethnocentric domain (p.147).

Concerning the evident gap in the literature as regards these non-Western perspectives, a 2010 collection of papers edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan sets out to contribute towards redressing this considerable imbalance,\(^2\) writing in their introduction of “the feminist perspective itself being very strongly rooted in specifically Western political and social practice” (p.9).

In his paper regarding the case of Japan, Takashi Inoguchi makes reference to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods in which he claims many Japanese scholars of the Marxist tradition “have transformed themselves into postmodernists, radical feminists and non-communist radicals” (p.53).

In her paper regarding IR in India, Navnita Chadha Behera states that “scholarly endeavours emanating from development studies, postcolonialism and feminism… lie outside the disciplinary core of (Indian) IR” and that “To the extent these debates are yet to be owned by Indian IR and these intellectuals acknowledged as part of its scholarly community, it may be termed as new IR” (p.92). Her conclusion is that the feminist perspective as part of this ‘new IR’ is only just beginning to make inroads into IR scholarship in India, for example as regards the masculinist nature of Indian nationalism (p.104).

In their conclusion, Acharya and Buzan affirm that what Japanese and Indian IR scholars, feminist scholars as much as any others, have in common is that they do not feel Western paradigms are ideally suited to describing, predicting and prescribing their realities; however they have not yet developed a clearly defined theoretical perspective of their own.

Even so, we are reminded that to date IR theories have developed within great powers and that with many of the rising powers being in the East, it would be logical to assume that new IR theories will be developed in this region. For example, they point to China where Chinese mainstream IR scholars are already incorporating notions of Confucian harmony between unequal powers into their theories in a way that can accommodate the ‘ideal’ of a tributary system, a concept excluded by mainstream Westphalian paradigms, realism and liberalism alike, where imbalances of power are always theorized as being inherently conflictual (p.226).
This may open up a space for a specifically Eastern feminist perspective, centred on the complementary nature of the yin and the yang, the masculine and the feminine, in international relations, but we may need to wait for further emancipation of Chinese women for such a perspective to develop.

Nzomo, M. (2002) provides an example of ‘second generation’ feminist scholarship by placing gender at the centre of research into specific issues of IR, in this case governance and conflict in Africa. In the introduction (p.3) Nzomo asserts that “most of Africa’s conflicts and related disasters are self-inflicted wounds arising from bad/undemocratic governance, partially manifested in gender inequities in the structures and processes of public governance.”

This very much echoes the previously cited World Bank Report which established a correlation between both lack of democracy and of equality, the two invariably going together, and an increase in conflict. In the same vein, Nzomo also points to a similar correlation between lack of literacy and of general education with a further increase in conflict (p.16).

Concerning equality and education, however, there is a warning against over-simplifications and generalizations of any kind with reference to the negative role played by many educated and influential women at the time of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (p.10), reminding us that women can also be the victims of tribalistic impulses that may lead them to encourage and / or commit atrocities.

Just as both Tickner and Parpart & Zalewski felt the need to renew their focus on the significance of gender to salient issues in IR one decade on, the second decade of the 21st Century seems an opportune moment for Nzomo to do the same, especially as regards the non-Western and, most particularly, African perspective.

One interesting strand of the non-Western feminist perspective is that of Islamic feminism, the principal idea of which is that equality for all human beings is mandated in the Qur’an and that observed inequalities in both the private and public sphere result from (mis)interpretations of sources of Islamic law in the context of the prevailing patriarchal cultural norms.

This perspective is very similar to the one of Jewish feminism, both for example pointing out that various dress codes and the separation of women from men during prayer have developed differently in different societies over the centuries in line with these cultural norms and not any objective reading of religious scripture.

The way in which both Islamic and Jewish feminism rejoins the feminist perspective in IR is in the questioning of what is ‘natural’. Secular feminists may conceptualize the natural as a product of nature and evolution, non-secular feminists, of whichever denomination, as a product of God and

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34 See also Parpart, J. & Zalewski, M. (ed.), 2008. Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations. New York: Zed Books. Published ten years after the previously cited The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations, in which they explain a certain status quo in both IR theory and practice, despite advances in terms of increased equality for women in the intervening years, by the central role of persistent and all-pervasive gender conceptions which shape the thoughts and actions of us all.

‘intelligent design’, but what they will all agree on is that there is another most significant factor, that of the socially constructed.

They also concur in that social constructions, for example those of patriarchy and of conflict, occur within specific geopolitical contexts whereby some individuals, often men but not all men to the same extent, find themselves at an advantage and others, often women but not all women to the same extent, at a disadvantage for reasons that were in no way divinely ordained.

“Much of human history has consisted in unequal conflicts between the haves and the have-nots.”36 This quotation by the Jewish American liberal scholar Prof. Jared Diamond epitomizes his ‘broad pattern’ thesis of factors underlying both the origins and outcomes of human conflict, and of human history in general. The “haves” are those who, at a specific moment in history, find themselves to be at an advantage in terms of geopolitical factors over the “have-nots”, whom they are therefore able to dominate.

The key factors he identifies are those of geographical area, axes and suites of “domesticable” plants and animals, arguing, for example, that the phenomenon of colonization is in no way related to supposedly innate differences in the peoples concerned but rather in these geopolitical factors that shape the nature of their relationships: domesticable plants and animals result inevitably in larger, politically organised societies, fostering

technological developments that spread most rapidly on an East-West axis throughout those largest of all geographical landmasses with a minimum of natural barriers.

As a result, therefore, of the accumulated political and technological advances developed due to their more favourable natural environment, and to the immunity to diseases acquired from their close proximity to the animals they used not only for food but also for traction and transport, inhabitants of Eurasia were able to dominate Oceania, the Americas and subsequently Africa.

O’Dowd, L. (2012), focussing his attentions on the “claims of ethnonational groups to exclusive national homelands in what is shared territory,” argues that conflict is an inevitable consequence of the “unfinished business” of nation-building set in motion when the era of states supplanted that of empires. Such conflict is “crystallised” in what he refers to as “frontier cities,” prominent examples being Belfast, Nicosia, Sarajevo and Jerusalem.

Moving from ethnonational conflict in general to the more specific problem at hand, any search for studies concerning factors affecting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict invariably lead to numerous detailed and well researched articles concerning the significance of water and other limited natural resources in the region (Nijim 1990; Morag 2001) or the

correspondingly limited dimensions of the territories concerned (Starr 2000; Newman 2002).

However, there has not as yet been any analysis in the vein of the one undertaken on a global scale by Prof. Diamond of to what extent factors of a far broader nature, in particular that of gender, may have shaped the destinies of, and ensuing conflict between, the descendents of the original inhabitants of this region. This represents a significant gap in the knowledge of Israeli-Palestinian relations that this research has for its primary objective to fill.

Finally as regards a review of the literature, given that this study employs a gender perspective to analyse a bilateral relationship that is predominantly conflictual, it should be noted that the UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was adopted by unanimity in October 2000. This is significant as it recognized that the capacities of women were being under-valued, and therefore under-utilized, in initiatives to prevent the conflicts of which they were very often the principal victims.

A key provision is the increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making in matters of peace and security, with all UN Member States responsible for the implementation of this binding resolution; however the Security Council has still not as yet instituted a mechanism of accountability to this respect and therefore the demands of women to be involved in ongoing peace talks and negotiations, not least in the Middle East, still go largely unheeded.
1.7 Research Hypothesis

Following a review of the literature, it is predicted that: i) gender is the most significant independent variable affecting the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations ii) the influence of other significant independent variables such as international law, religion and the decisions of prominent actors are largely dependent upon their inherently gendered nature iii) women tend to be more optimistic than men concerning the possibility of achieving a lasting peace and iv) women are less likely to be influenced by religious dogma and their opinions will tend to lean more to the left of the political spectrum.

1.8 Assumptions and Limitations

This study assumes that there are indeed numerous factors that have an impact on the current conflictual state of Israeli-Palestinian relations and that these factors are in some way interrelated. The more data that can be collected pertaining to this relationship, the greater the probability of most accurately assessing the impact of individual factors and hence identifying any broader pattern. In addition to a time constraint, there is also a budgetary limitation which prevents the gathering of data in situ. This research endeavours to compensate for these limitations by striving to prioritize the most pertinent data available.
1.9 Methodology and Chapter Outline

This is essentially a post-positivistic study focussed on textual analysis, supplemented with primary quantitative data analysis as a further means of evaluating the findings. Chapter 2 will outline the background to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by drawing on studies pertaining to both the origins of its protagonists and the evolution of the conflict itself as a distinct phenomenon, from biblical times up until the 20th century.

Chapter 3 will examine other factors relevant to Israeli-Palestinian relations such as international law, religion and the decisions of prominent actors, and the gendered nature of these factors, in an attempt to ascertain the significance of gender itself as a factor. Primary data in the form of a questionnaire is introduced but, due to limitations concerning access to the target population, in particular as regards Palestinians, the questionnaire is administered to a local Kenyan population sample. This is an attempt, within the limitations of this project, to begin to evaluate whether or not women, in general, may be: i) more or less optimistic concerning the possibility of achieving lasting peace ii) more or less influenced by religious dogma iii) have opinions which tend more to the left or right of the political spectrum as compared to men.

Chapter 4 will present a discussion of the findings from the questionnaire, followed by a conclusion based on the relation between these findings and observations previously drawn from the secondary data. Recommendations will be made regarding where further research is needed.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND (‘IN THE BEGINNING…’)

The beginning of what is now termed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may logically be considered to be May 15, 1948, the day following the proclamation of the modern State of Israel, when those who now considered themselves to be citizens of this new state found themselves at war with those opposed to its establishment in the region, prominent amongst them the Palestinians (Dershowitz 2005). However, the origins of this conflict, as we shall see, go back much further in time and we shall begin by examining the background of its protagonists.

A University of Arizona study by Hammer, M. et al. (2000) concerning the genetics of Arabs and Jews and focussing on Y-chromosome haplotypes, the genetic material passed down from father to son, revealed that Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, are more closely related to Jews, including those termed Ashkenazi Jews from countries such as Germany and Russia, than they are to Greeks, Turks, Egyptians and Tunisians.

Ashkenazi Jews in turn proved to be more closely related to Palestinians than they are to non-Jewish Germans or Russians, and those termed Sephardic Jews from countries such as Spain and Turkey were demonstrated to be more closely related to Palestinians than to non-Jewish Spaniards, Turks, Italians and Tunisians.
This study claims to provide clear scientific evidence of the two peoples descending from a “common Middle Eastern ancestral population.”

As concerns mitochondrial DNA, the genetic material passed down from mother to daughter, the 2001 study by Arnais-Villena, A. et al. found Palestinians to be as closely related to Ashkenazi Jews as they are to Cretans, and far more closely related to all Jews than they are to, for example, Greeks from Attica, the Aegean and Cyprus. The study concluded that, “Jews, Cretans, Egyptians, Iranians, Turks and Armenians are probably the closest relatives to Palestinians.”

Even more recent studies, such as the one in 2010 by Atzmon-Ostrer et al., have only served to corroborate the above, making it clear that Jews and Palestinians are of the same predominantly “Canaanite stock,” with only subtle genetic differences, such as Palestinians being possibly more closely related to Cretans and Ashkenazi Jews more to Italians.

This is explained in the study by a possible immigration from Crete to coastal areas of the region of Canaan, for which the Romans later adopted

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1 See: http://www.pnas.org/content/97/12/6769.full
4 Who the ‘Philistines’ were and where they originated from is still being debated. Many scholars consider them to be one and the same as the ‘Peleset’, one of the groups named by the Egyptians as being part of the so-called ‘Sea Peoples’, who arrived in the region in around 1200 BC, causing the collapse of both the Hittite and Egyptian empires. Who the ‘Sea Peoples’ were is still unclear; they may have been a loose confederacy of peoples from regions as diverse as Greece, Crete, Sicily, Sardinia and Italy. The Peleset are considered by some scholars to have originated from Crete, but this is by no means universally accepted. What is clear is that the archaeological record in southern Palestine at around this
the name “Palaestina,” as well as both conversions and intermarriage between Jews and Romans at the time of the Roman Empire, respectively.

The genetic evidence supporting the common Canaanite origins of both Palestinians and Jews, Jewish people representing approximately three quarters of Israelis in April 2012, and their having both mixed to much the same extent with other Near Eastern, Mediterranean and North African peoples, is further reinforced by the archaeological data (Qleibo 2007).

For the earliest records of conflict involving the common Canaanite ancestors of the two peoples now protagonists of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is necessary to turn to the Bible in which the Book of Joshua describes how the Israelites conquered the land of Canaan, an event which, according to Dever (1996), may have occurred at some time during the period between the 13th and 10th centuries BCE.

However, as no conclusive archaeological evidence has been found to date of a military conquest of this region at that time, all that can be asserted with any degree of certitude is that some of its inhabitants adopted the new Jewish religion whilst others did not, ethnic lines between these entities not having fully emerged before the 9th to 8th centuries BCE (Finkelstein 1996).

time shows the destruction of the Canaanite cities, and the appearance and expansion in the region of new peoples such as the Philistines, Edomites, Moabites and Israelites, identified by archaeologists largely on the basis of their differing pottery and building styles. It’s only later, for the Iron Age, that the picture becomes clearer, with more epigraphic and historical evidence providing a clearer picture of the different cultural, tribal and political dynamics of the region.

See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society & Culture/newpop.html
From the 8th century BCE onwards, however, historical records backed by archaeologi
cal evidence can attest to the conquest of the northern Jewish Kingdom of Israel by the Neo-Assyrian Empire in 722 BCE and that of the southern Jewish Kingdom of Judah by the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 586 BCE (Grabbe 2008), resulting in the destruction of the First Jewish Temple in Jerusalem and the deportation of many Jews to Babylonia.

In 333 BCE the entire region was conquered by the army of Alexander the Great and became part of his extensive empire, remaining for the most part under Hellenistic rule until its conquest by the Romans in 63 BCE. In 70 CE, following a Jewish revolt against Roman rule, the Second Jewish Temple was destroyed and many Jews were again deported, this time to various locations all over the Roman Empire (McLaren 1991).

Some of the inhabitants of Roman, and subsequently Byzantine Palestine, both Jews and non-Jews alike, adopted the new Christian religion that developed during this period, just as many of them were to adopt the Islamic religion when the region was conquered by Arab Muslims in 638 CE. Indeed, a study by Nebel et al. (2000) found genetic evidence to corroborate the historical records of this, concluding that many, possibly even the majority, of Muslim Palestinians are the descendents of “local inhabitants, mainly Christians and Jews, who had converted after the Islamic conquest in the seventh century AD.”

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The region was to remain under predominantly Muslim rule until the final demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, and Khalidi, R. (1997) claims that it is in the period just preceding this, in the late 19th century, that the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in the revolt against their status as subjects of that Empire.

During precisely this same period, a group of European Jews who claimed, and this claim seems to be backed by the recent genetic studies previously cited, to be amongst the descendants of Jews who had been deported or otherwise driven out of Palestine since ancient times, met in Basel, Switzerland, to discuss a future "home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured by public law."\(^7\)

From this point onwards there was a clear divergence of interests between those inhabitants of Palestine who wanted their own sovereign state for the first time in their history and those, both within Palestine and outside, who wanted to re-establish a sovereign Jewish state that had existed for the last time between 164-63 BCE, when the ancient Jewish State of Judea successfully revolted against the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire and remained independent until its conquest by the Romans.

This conflict of interests was to develop into open conflict between the two parties, under British rule following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and it was the British who brought the matter before the United Nations (UN) in 1947.

\(^{7}\) See: Basel Program, 1897, quoted in Harris, 2005, p.1.
The subsequent decision by the UN to partition Palestine was only accepted by one of the parties concerned, comprising those who were to become citizens of the new State of Israel after its proclamation on May 14, 1948.

The proclamation was also rejected by Israel’s Arab neighbours and the resulting war ended with Egypt governing the Gaza Strip, Jordan the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and no sovereign state whatsoever for the Palestinians, a name that was not to become widely recognized until the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.

Jordan relinquished any claims to sovereignty over the West Bank in 1988 (Human Rights Watch 2010), as had Egypt over Gaza in 1978, following the Camp David Accords, and both support the establishment of a sovereign state for the Palestinians in those territories. To date, however, no such state exists and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has yet to be resolved.

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8 Israel retains ultimate control over both of these territories since the war of 1967.
CHAPTER 3: THE GENDER FACTOR IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

Various factors can be argued to be the most determinant factor to have impacted on Israeli-Palestinian relations. This chapter therefore examines the relationship between Israeli-Palestinian relations and various significant factors in turn, both understood as existing in isolation from that of gender (‘gender-blind’ perspective) and then re-examined with the understanding that gender is itself a most significant factor (gender perspective).

3.1 Israeli-Palestinian Relations, International Law and Gender

First of all it is important to remember that, in the words of Mario Telò as recently as 2009, “the realist theory has dominated International Relations… and today remains the leading paradigm in the United States and emerging countries.”¹ Despite Telò’s statement implying that the dominance of the realist perspective in the field of international relations (IR) has lessened, at least in Europe, he nevertheless admits that it still remains dominant overall.

Therefore, especially in light of the neorealist-neoliberal ‘rapprochement’, when legal scholars and practitioners look to international relations theory for possible explanations as to how international law (IL) has impacted on issues of IR and why, it is inevitable that they will first and foremost be exposed to this dominant ‘mainstream’ perspective.

The principal tenets of this currently mainstream perspective are the following: human beings are primarily interested in maximising their

individual self-interest, the first of which being survival, and, in light of the ‘domestic analogy,’² states act in this same way; there is no world government to enforce laws, referred to as ‘anarchy’ in the context of IR, so the state is ultimately responsible for its own survival and this is, and should be, its primary concern; due to states never being sure of the intentions of other states and the threat these intentions may pose to their survival, they should strive to attain as much power as possible in order to deter any such existential threats,³ a concept referred to as the ‘security dilemma’ in the field of IR and considered by mainstream IR scholars to best explain phenomena such as militarization, arms races, regional and other alliances and, to a large extent, conflict.

As concerns Israeli-Palestinian relations, viewed from this perspective each party would be expected to regard its existence and survival as a state to be an overriding objective, resulting in their respective non-compliance with IL whenever they consider it to be in contradiction to this objective. It would equally follow that other states and organizations in the anarchical world system would not be able to oblige either party to comply with IL against its wishes without not only the will but also a sufficient military capability to enforce any such decision.

It should be noted that this long-standing intention not to abide by IL if it is understood to go against the national interest applies to the Palestinians as

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well as to the Israelis, as can be seen in Article 6 of the 1964 Constitution of Fatah, the more moderate of the dominant factions in Palestinian politics: “UN projects, accords, and resolutions, or those of any individual country which undermines the Palestinian people’s right in their homeland are illegal and rejected.”

Having said that, Falk and Weston have consistently made a strong case for the Israeli authorities being the less respectful of the two parties as regards IL in general, and that established by United Nations (UN) resolutions in particular. They make specific reference to Yasser Arafat, as chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), following the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November 1988 in which he, on more than one occasion, acknowledges UN resolutions concerning Israel and Palestine up to that date, thereby recognising the ‘right to exist’ of the State of Israel, and renounces “anti-civilian terrorism” (p.130).

Falk and Weston argue that, at the time of writing, Israel already finds itself in contravention of both the 1907 Hague Convention, notably Section IV concerning the respect of laws and customs of war on land, and the 1949

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4 See http://www.ipcri.org/files/fatah1964.html. Fatah did issue an ‘Internal Charter’ in 2009 which does not include any such article, although neither does it make any reference whatsoever to the UN, international law, the Jewish people or even the State of Israel: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/fatah-charter.pdf


6 The principal UN resolutions referred to are UNSC Resolutions 224 and 338, following the wars of 1967 and 1973 respectively. In addition to the Palestinian Declaration of Independence itself, Falk refers to posterior clarifications by Arafat including a subsequent interview with the New York Times. It should also be noted that Falk, despite often accused of being an apologist for terrorism, makes it clear he too believes that ‘anti-civilian terrorism’ can never be justified.
Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) concerning the protection of civilians in
time of war, in particular due to its confiscation of land, resources and
property, and its refusal to repatriate (p.135), compounded by restrictions on
movement, curfews, arbitrary arrest and detention of Palestinians (p.145).
They refer to as “abstraction” and “ingenuity” the counter-arguments of
lawyers who refute their position, and that of the wider international
community, with claims such as there is no “belligerent occupation” in
place, rather just measures of “security” that are of absolute necessity
(p.137), as there exists no other “legitimate sovereign” of the territories
under Israeli “administration” (p.138), or that Israel is a legitimate “trustee
occupant” as a result of the protracted nature of its occupation (p.139).7
According to Falk and Weston, none of these arguments are “juridically
credible” (p.141), including for reasons of “proportionality” (p.147), and
Israel is under both a legal and moral obligation to exercise effective control
over the territories in question “no longer than necessary” (p.148).
Falk and Weston then go on to address the issue of a ‘right to resistance’ in
response to “systematic and severe abuse” and “erosion of sovereignty” of
the Palestinian people (pp.151-2).
Their conclusion is that due to the prospect of any mutually agreed solution
being “remote” or even “impossible”, coupled with Israel’s “refusal to
accept authority of the UN” and “failure of US to exert sufficient pressure”
(p.153), the Palestinians have a right to resistance based on their unalienable

7 These arguments can be to a large extent be summarized by the view that “Israel rejects
the interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention applying it to Israeli settlements in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, stating that those territories were captured in 1967 as a
result of a defensive war against countries which had illegally occupied them since 1948.”
See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Human_Rights/geneva.html
right to self-determination, but this is however limited to “resistance to the activity of the (Israeli) military forces” (p.155).\textsuperscript{8}

However, in a reply to Falk and Weston in the subsequent edition of the Harvard Law Journal, Michael Curtis argues that their article had more to do with “political advocacy” than IL.\textsuperscript{9}

Curtis objects to the use of the word ‘invasion’ in place of ‘defensive action’ when referring to the war of 1967 and implies that Falk and Weston are, at best, naïve to give credence to Yasser Arafat’s assurances concerning his respect for Israel’s right to exist and its long-term security. He first points to Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and argues that this is in order to solicit Saddam’s assistance at a future date to destroy Israel, going on to assert that history has shown that this has always been the intention of all Israel’s Arab neighbours, with the exception of Egypt since 1979, and this intention is likely to only get more virulent with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

He then asserts that, since the time of Arafat’s assurances, acts of terrorism during the First Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, had not ceased, and that this would not be possible were it not the wish of Arafat himself.

Curtis’ next argument centres around the ‘no such thing as Palestinian’ viewpoint, based on there never having been a sovereign Palestinian state to date, with the word Palestinian itself having been used only since around the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. He goes on to mention the successive rejections of peace with Israel by the

\textsuperscript{8} As regards the ‘right to self-determination’, in his conclusion Falk makes specific reference to the UNGA International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) in which this right is stated in Article 1. This right is likewise stated in the UNGA International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the same year (ICESCR), and upheld by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decisions of 1971 and 1975 regarding Namibia and Western Sahara, respectively.

Arab world since 1947,\textsuperscript{10} the ignoring of human rights within Arab states,\textsuperscript{11} and their ‘anti-Semitism’.\textsuperscript{12}

As regards Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Curtis argues first of all that Israel should still be regarded as being in a state of war and, as such, international human rights law may be considered not to apply, rather only international humanitarian law (IHL). Here he adds that Israel cannot be accused of not respecting the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions as it is a non-signatory, and in any case they are not IL in his view due to their not having been ratified by other significant states parties, notably the United States.\textsuperscript{13}

In response to Falk and Weston’s argument that no state can claim to be in a perpetual state of war and thereby disregard the basic human rights of the inhabitants of any occupied territory, Curtis counters that Israel finds itself in a \textit{sui generis} situation whose specificities have not been addressed by international law, and therefore Falk and Weston’s argument in this respect has no legal foundation. Curtis concludes by arguing that the Palestinians have no claim to a right of self-determination, and thereby a right to resistance, due to their never having

\textsuperscript{10} One example Curtis cites is paragraph 3 of the Arab League’s 1967 Khartoum Resolution which states the “main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it…” See http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/khartoum-resolution/p14841?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dessential_document%26page%3D69

\textsuperscript{11} Curtis mentions Arab states such as Saudi Arabia that have neither signed nor ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which he argues should exclude them from criticizing Israel.

\textsuperscript{12} Here Curtis recounts the disregard for the holy sites of Judaism under the control of the Jordanians before 1967, and accuses the UN as a whole of anti-Semitism due to the UNGA Resolution 3397 of 1975 (revoked in 1991) which determined that “zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.” See http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/761C1063530766A7052566A2005B74D1

\textsuperscript{13} This opinion was subsequently disputed by the 1997 appeal of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
previously had a state of their own. Moreover, when referring specifically to Falk and Weston’s assertion of a Palestinian right to resistance, Curtis states that “bias of this kind can only encourage extremism.”

In the Harvard Law Journal of January 1992 Falk and Weston wrote a brief reply to Curtis in which they accused him of being a “propagandist disguised as a scholar,” or otherwise “a scholar suffering from the severest kind of psychological denial.” They went on to remark that “a bruising offense is not a convincingly scholarly substitute for a sound legal defence,” before concluding that no wrong committed by any other actor in international relations, Arab or otherwise, could excuse any wrong committed towards the Palestinians by the Israelis.

Ultimately, they argued, the perceived intention of Israel to remain indefinitely in those territories acquired by war must be regarded as contrary to IL as derived both from custom and treaties, and supplemented by judicial decisions such as those by the ICJ, which may also take into account UNGA resolutions pertaining to the matter in question, and the juristic writings of a majority of legal scholars. Moreover, they assert that observed abuses of international human rights law (IHRL) and other peremptory norms cannot be justified under any circumstances.

Moving from a Palestinian ‘right to resistance’ to that of a ‘right of return’ of displaced Palestinians, John Quigley makes the case for such a right being

14 For example, in this respect Falk and Weston had referred to a right of self-determination and resistance under UNGA Resolution 2625 of 1970, which adopted the ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNC),’ and the assertion in that resolution that the principles of the UNC form part of IL. However, Curtis questions both the applicability of this resolution to a people that never previously had their own sovereign state, and indeed whether UNGA resolutions can be considered part of IL in the first place.


17 Ibid., p.201.
supported by IL to the same extent as that of a right to self-determination and the right to resistance as argued by Falk and Weston.\textsuperscript{18}

He dismisses the argument that UNGA Resolutions 194 of 1948 and 242 of 1967 do not consider this to be a ‘right’, due to their use of the terms ‘should’ in place of ‘must’ in the former and ‘just settlement’ in place of ‘right of return’ in the latter, arguing that such an argument is both in bad faith and in contradiction to all recognised sources of IL.

As regards IHRL, Quigley cites the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country.”\textsuperscript{19} He also makes reference to an affirmation of this in the ICCPR, to which Israel is equally a party, as well as the assertion of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD) that no one can be denied a right to return to one’s own country on racial or ethnic grounds.

Concerning the refusal of a right of return on the grounds of ‘security considerations’, Quigley argues that the position of the UNSC on Namibia demonstrates \textit{opinion juris} to the effect of a right of return superseding the perceived security concerns of the receiving state, at that time South Africa.

Likewise for Israel’s permanent ‘state of emergency’ since 1948, he points to the 1979 Report of the UN Human Rights Committee’s assertion that a state of emergency may not be declared for an indefinite period, it being understood that to play on the meaning of the word ‘indefinite’ is equally an act of bad faith.

In the same vein, Quigley argues that Jordanian nationality attributed to Palestinians of the West Bank whilst under Jordanian occupation from 1948 to


\textsuperscript{19} UDHR, 1948. Quoted in: Ibid., p.196.
1967 was never intended to be permanent, rather Jordan was simply acting as it should under IL, and therefore cannot be a legally valid reason for claiming that Palestinians should ‘return’ to Jordan instead of what is now territory occupied by Israel.

He then addresses the question of the treatment of Jews in Arab states, arguing that in law countermeasures must be equitable, not directed at ‘Arabs’ in general, for example by denying Palestinians a right to return as a countermeasure to Jews having been expelled from certain Arab states. Moreover, he makes reference to the report of the International Law Commission (ILC) of 1996 concerning State Responsibility to argue that countermeasures must be proportional and never violate basic human rights and peremptory norms.

Finally Quigley tackles the ‘no space’ for a right of return argument, pointing to the 1971 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning the admission of East African Asians from Uganda into the UK as evidence of the invalidation of any such argument in IL, concluding that, in the case of Israel, which continues to actively encourage the immigration of Jews into its territory without limit, to make such a claim is an even more evident example of bad faith.

This question of perceived bad faith on the part of successive Israeli governments is also addressed by Ardi Imseis in his review of Raja Shehadeh’s From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Imseis restates:

“Shehadeh’s overall assessment that the ‘peace process’ is actually proving itself to be an alternate means by which Israel has been able to consolidate –not relinquish – it’s hold on the occupied territories.”

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21 Ibid., p.470.
Imseis summarizes Shehadeh’s argument as so; that the PLO, being most concerned with its recognition by the international community as the official representative of the Palestinian people, gave insufficient importance to the long-term repercussions of any agreements it may enter into with Israel, something that Israel was willing and able to exploit to its advantage.

Of course, here the question arises as to what extent it may be considered advantageous for one side in any negotiation to achieve all its objectives when the other is left with an ultimate sense of injustice; nevertheless it is clear that a combination of political realism, legal acumen, and one might argue cynicism, led to agreements that were disadvantageous to the Palestinians.22

Edward Said elaborates on this idea of a disadvantageous (to the Palestinians) ‘peace process’, arguing that it has more to do with pacification (of the Palestinians) than peace.23 Whilst noting the significance of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s frequent use of the term ‘occupation’ when discussing the ‘road map’, he equates the term ‘performance’ with the Palestinians’ ‘good behaviour’, that is the abandonment of any form of resistance to this occupation.24 Said expresses mixed feelings at the use of the term ‘illegal outposts’ in the Roadmap, arguing that this may imply that larger Israeli settlements closer to the borders between Israel and the territories it captured in 1967 are in some way ‘legal’. He strongly criticizes Israel’s policy of ‘targeted assassinations’ against its

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22 Here Imseis references Shehadeh’s ‘facts on the ground’ such as Jewish settlements remaining under the control of Israel, something that can be understood as a cynical tactic in the ultimate strategy of annexing large areas of highly valued territory in any final settlement, likely as a ‘swap’ for territory viewed by Israel as being relatively worthless.


enemies but is also very critical of the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Prime Minister at the time of Said’s writing, who he accuses of being more concerned with pleasing the ‘white man’ than with the suffering of his own people. Said also makes a point of emphasising the significance of the pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian stance of the tens of millions of fundamentalist, predominantly evangelical, Christians in the US. He argues that they are invariably supporters of George W. Bush’s Republican Party and that their opposition to what they view as ‘sacrilegious’ aspects of the Roadmap would negatively affect Bush’s will to exert any pressure on Israel, without which the Roadmap would be likely to fail.25

Finally, Said turns his attention to the ‘separation wall’, remarking with his characteristic sense of irony that the name is quite apt in that it unlawfully separates many Palestinians’ homes from their land, adding that as much as Bush’s administration had generally condemned it, it was nonetheless they who were funding it.

As to what extent Said was correct about the separation wall being unlawful, the 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ was to affirm Said’s interpretation.26 The ICJ first refutes the argument by Israel that it would be acting ultra vires as a result of the Opinion in question being requested by the UNGA whilst the matter was still on the agenda of the UNSC, stating that the “interpretation of Article 12 has evolved” since the writing of the UNC in 1945 to make this acceptable, in

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25 Said’s prediction turned out to be correct as Bush was reluctant to put any pressure on Israel faced with Sharon’s refusal to halt the expansion of settlements, something that was a prerequisite for the completion of ‘Phase 1’ of the Roadmap to be completed in 2003. Concerning the significance of fundamentalist Christian views on Israel, it is interesting to note that its most influential representative is Pastor John Hagee who hails from, and garners substantial support in, Bush’s native Texas. It is Hagee’s belief that Jews should return to the biblical land of Israel and rebuild their temple on its original site, where the Al-Aqsa Mosque now stands, heralding in the Second Coming of Christ, the loosing of Satan (who Hagee has claimed will be the ‘Head of the EU’) and the Apocalypse. See for example: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5193092.stm

particular since the adoption of UNGA Resolution 377 in 1950.27 It then goes on to reiterate its 1996 Opinion as regards its role in IL to “identify the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them.”28

To this extent, the court opines that the wall is indeed being built on occupied territory and that Israel has obligations as the occupying power. It affirms that the principle of refraining from the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UNC reflects customary IL, citing in this respect the ICJ Opinion in the 1986 Nicaragua v. US case, and states that this equally applies to the Hague Regulations, rendering the issue of whether or not a state is party to them irrelevant.

It equally affirms that the GCIV applies to Israel and that to argue that it shouldn’t due to the absence of a ‘High Contracting Party’ is a misrepresentation of a provision that was worded in such a way as to apply even in absence of aggression, and not to be used to deny victims of any occupation their rights.

It again refers back to its 1996 Opinion to remind that IHRL does not cease under any circumstances and that many aspects of it may be regarded as *jus cogens*, peremptory norms applicable *erga omnes*.

Significantly, settlements are referred to as a “breach of international law” under Article 49 of the GCIV, the overall conclusion of the Opinion being that the wall is illegal, should be dismantled forthwith, and reparation should be made to those

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27 Ibid., p.2. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the UNC stipulates that the UNGA will not make any recommendation whilst the UNSC is exercising in respect of the matter in question, however UNGA Resolution 377 A (V) of 1950 provides that in the case where a lack of unanimity of the permanent members prevents the UNSC from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the UNGA may exercise its subsidiary responsibility to this respect and make recommendations to Members for collective measures. It is significant to note that Resolution 377 does not put any limit on the collective measures that may be called for when invoking this resolution and no ICJ Opinion to date has concerned itself specifically with the legality of calls for measures involving the use of force under this resolution.

28 Ibid., p.3. The ICJ Opinion in question is that concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996.
Palestinians affected by it with the intention of their situation reverting, to the greatest extent possible, to that of the *status quo ante*.\(^{29}\) Since the time of this Opinion the question has increasingly been raised as to whether the actions of Israel, particularly in the West Bank, could be considered to constitute the ‘crime of apartheid’. In terms of international law, this is defined with reference to the domination and oppression by a state of any ethnic group in any part of the territory under its overall control, for example by deliberately denying members of that group equal access to infrastructure, land, the judiciary, and services provided to the dominant ethnic group of that state.\(^{30}\)

As concerns the West Bank, the apartheid analogy is based primarily on separate roads, checkpoints, unequal access to land and resources, and Jewish-only settlements with Jewish settlers being subject to Israeli civilian law, whereas Palestinians in those areas under Israel’s control are subject to Israeli military law. The ICJ is yet to issue an Opinion on this specific question but it seems clear that, despite Israel’s assertion that its measures are for security purposes only and not to maintain a regime of dominance, the case against it is most persuasive.

Therefore, as regards the significance of IL in explaining the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations, a realist perspective leads inevitably to the

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p.10. Article 49 of the GCIV states in its final paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."

\(^{30}\) Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines the 'crime of apartheid' in terms of inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups, and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.
observation that international law has been rendered virtually insignificant by the pursuit of power and security at any cost by the dominant party in the conflict, Israel, and by the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism in IL constraining Israel to act against its wishes.

From this perspective, Israel’s actions could be considered to be logical and even ‘natural’ in that its overriding priority should rightly be its survival as a state, the consequence of allowing the Palestinians to maximize their own self-interest being a threat to this very survival. Of course, this perspective is most pessimistic and liberalists might well counter that the cooperative aspect of human nature may ultimately overcome the selfish.

The gender-blind reading of international law (IL) leads to the conclusion that it has been of limited significance in shaping Israeli-Palestinian relations, primarily due to the unwillingness of the parties concerned to abide by IL in cases where they did not believe it served their ‘national interest’.

From a gender perspective, however, this outcome is not explained by the ‘realism’ of the actors, rather by the gendered nature of international relations (IR) in the context of which selfish and uncooperative positions can be understood as being ‘realistic’, ‘rational’ and in the best interest of the individual, male or female, or nation acting in this way.

In many ways the position of Israel as regards the Palestinians has been analogous to that of the United States as regards ‘rogue states’, especially as regards the justification of the ‘pre-emptive’ use of force.
This position is argued by Gina Heathcote to be an “affirmation of a
gendered international law and a continuation of a model of international
relations ignorant of its gendered underpinnings.” 31 Heathcote illustrates
this with a ‘domestic analogy’ between the pre-emptive use of force and
provocation defences used in common law to “justify fatal violence against
women who… represent a low-level threat to the honour of the
defendant.” 32

Another example of particular relevance to the attitude of Israel towards
Palestinians is that of the gendered discourse concerning “the rogue terrorist
versus the just male warrior”, the latter keen to point out the suffering of
non-western women and children at the hands of their ‘uncivilized’,
generally Muslim, male oppressors. 33

Here western and westernized women, including feminists, are enjoined to
support the use of force by their ‘more righteous menfolk’ in the name of
the freedom of their ‘Islamicized sisters’ if for no other reason, a narrative
which “ignores the agency of the latter and the sexed and gendered notion of
freedom available to the former.” 34

Heathcote’s conclusion is that it is invariably women who suffer the most
from the use of any form of violence, pre-emptive force included, regardless

Journal of International Law 11:2.

32 Ibid., p.9. Honour is hereby linked to Western hegemony at the level of the state. See also

33 Ibid., p.21.
34 Ibid., p.22.
of how it is justified. This view is reminiscent of that of Hilary Charlesworth who argued that the ‘protection’ offered by states, and international law, to the non-western or westernized woman is concerned more with protecting her ‘honour’, and theirs, rather than her security.\textsuperscript{35}

3.2 The ‘Non-Gender Factors’ in Israeli-Palestinian Relations

The turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century and the half century since the establishment of the modern State of Israel was marked by the Camp David Summit, held in July of the year 2000 in the United States, where both parties acknowledged that any agreed solution to the conflict should be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 of 1967 had called for a ‘just and lasting peace’ within ‘secure and recognised boundaries’ and Resolution 338 of 1973 had reiterated this and called on both parties to begin negotiations to this effect.

The Camp David Summit was ultimately a failure with both parties blaming the other, in particular for not making a realistic offer regarding territory, and the UN also came under criticism, especially amongst Palestinians, due to Resolutions 242 and 338 not having referred explicitly to a two-state solution to the conflict and not having specified the ‘boundaries’ that should form the basis for the negotiations.

The UN was also criticized by Palestinians for not playing an active part in the negotiations and leaving them entirely in the hands of the Americans, who were regarded as favouring Israel (Shamir & Weizmann 2005).

The Second Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, broke out in September 2000 and, although often blamed on the visit of Ariel Sharon, then candidate for the post of Israeli Prime Minister, to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, where he made comments considered to be highly provocative by Palestinians, frustration amongst the Palestinians at the failure of the recent peace talks was undoubtedly a contributing factor.

Security Council Resolution 1322 of October 2000 condemned both the actions of Ariel Sharon and the subsequent violence but no other resolution was passed until Resolution 1397 of March 2002 demanded an end to the violence and, for the first time, explicitly called for a two-state solution to the conflict. A subsequent resolution was passed in November 2003, Resolution 1515, backing the ‘Roadmap’ as first elaborated by the administration of George W. Bush, which envisaged a two-state solution as early as 2005. Despite this, however, the uprising and ensuing violence continued until the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of February 2005, at which Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, elected after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, declared violence would come to an end in return for Ariel Sharon, now Prime Minister of Israel, agreeing to the release of 900 Palestinian prisoners and a significant reduction of Israeli military activity in the Palestinian territories. Once again, the UN played no part in the negotiations, and had not been able to prevent the deaths of
approximately 6000 people, around 5000 of them Palestinians, throughout the course of the Second Intifada (Gaza Situation Report 2009).

In August 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip and in January 2006 Hamas came to power there after defeating rivals Fatah in elections. Following this, Israel and the Quartet on the Middle East, comprising the United Nations alongside the United States, the European Union and Russia, imposed economic sanctions on the basis of Hamas being considered a terrorist organisation, and Israel imposed a blockade of the territory, announcing it would allow in humanitarian supplies only. Palestinians responded to this by repeatedly firing rockets into Israel and this led, on December 27th 2008, to the beginning of what is commonly called the Gaza War, following an airstrike from Israel and subsequent invasion. The Security Council was quick to respond with Resolution 1860 of January 8th 2009, calling for an immediate ceasefire, but this was ignored by both Israel and Hamas. Israel finally completed its withdrawal on January 21st 2009, after somewhere between 1000 and 1500 people had been killed, all but 13 of them Palestinians (Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator 2009).

A UN special mission was established in April of that year with South African jurist Richard Goldstone at its head, which released a report in September 2009 accusing both the Israeli army and Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, but these findings were refuted by both Israel and Hamas.
Since this time, no other Security Council resolution has been passed concerning the situation in Israel and the Palestinian territories. A draft resolution condemning all Israeli settlements established since 1967 as illegal and calling for an immediate end to settlement building was vetoed by the United States in February 2011, despite having the support of the other fourteen members of the Security Council and specifically citing the exact words which had been used by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to condemn Israeli settlements in occupied territory.

Palestinians have pointed to this as a clear example of the UN organization’s failure to maintain peace and security in the region due to the ability of the United States to veto any measure that is objected to by its ally Israel (Usher 2011). They claim that the UN is, for this reason, particularly ineffective when it comes to protecting the peace and security, including economic security, of the citizens in Gaza under blockade from Israel.

In September 2011 a United Nations report concerning an attempt to breach the blockade in May 2010, which resulted in the deaths of nine militants, concluded that the blockade was indeed legal, although the Israeli army had used excessive force. Then, in October 2011 the US pledged to veto in the Security Council a Palestinian attempt to be accepted as a full member of the UN and when, on October 31st, Palestine was granted full membership of UNESCO, the US responded by cutting off its contribution, representing 22 percent of the total, to UNESCO’s annual budget.

For its part, Israel has considered the UN as being hostile to its interests since the General Assembly Resolution 3379 of November 1975 which
determined that Zionism is a form of racism. Despite the resolution being revoked in 1991, it appears from its actions that Israel still regards the UN biased in favour of the Palestinians, primarily for reasons of anti-Semitism both declared and unconscious, and therefore is generally unwilling to cooperate with its efforts.

This poses the question of to what extent, if any, the United Nations is able to impose its will on Israel in order to make it conform with what the UN believes is required by international law.

One option which some Israeli diplomats and politicians view as a credible threat as regards enforcement action is the ‘Uniting for Peace’ UNGA Resolution 377 A (V) of 1950.36

This resolution authorizes the UNGA to call upon UN Members to take ‘collective measures’, including ‘the use of force’, to address issues threatening international peace and security at times when the UNSC is unwilling or unable to do so. As regards whether enforcement measures under this resolution are strictly ‘legal’, the ICJ has yet to give an authoritative opinion on the subject.37

Enforcement action was requested by the UNGA during the Korean War of 1950-53 to further the military measures being taken against the People’s Republic of China at that time, despite the opposition of the Soviet Union in

36 See for example http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=213794; Gabriela Shalev, a former Israeli ambassador to the UN, is of the opinion that the potential for enforcement measures under this resolution is real and has been dangerously underestimated by successive Israeli administrations.

37 In the ‘Certain Expenses Case’ of 1962, the ICJ did affirm that the exclusive powers of the UNSC regard ‘coercive or enforcement action’, but did not pronounce at that time on if, and under what circumstances, this could be impacted by Resolution 377. See http://untreaty.un.org/codavl/ha/ufp/ufp.html.
the Security Council. These measures were not specifically called for under Resolution 377, however it is significant that the specific wording of Resolution 377 was reused in Resolution 498 of 1951 calling for such action. This may have established a legal precedent by which the UNGA could, at least in theory and in respect of IL, intervene more forcefully.

The counter argument is that, under Article 11(2) of the UNC, the General Assembly may discuss matters of peace and security but should refer to the Security Council if ‘action’ is required. Proponents of this view might argue that this is why Resolution 337 was invoked in 1956 to create a peacekeeping force during the Suez Crisis despite the opposition of two UNSC Members, the UK and France, but that Israel’s wish not to allow the force on its national territory was respected and no enforcement measures were authorised. The resolution did however authorize military sanctions.

All things considered, the argument is very persuasive that allowing the UN to cease to function as it was intended due to lack of agreement amongst the members of the Security Council goes against the spirit of the Charter. Coupled with the previously cited opinion of the ICJ that the Article 12(1) prohibition against simultaneous action by the UNSC and UNGA has been superseded by practice, the ICJ could well decided at a future date that Article 10 does indeed authorize the General Assembly to recommend enforcement measures, as envisaged by Resolution 377, at least where the

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38 See [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/498%20(V): UNGA Resolution 48 begins by, “Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.” It then, “Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance the United Nations action in Korea,” the action in question being military.]
Security Council is not in reality ‘exercising in respect of any dispute’ due to lack of unanimity.\textsuperscript{39}

This argument has gained force since the reference to a ‘responsibility to protect’ in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The widening recognition of this concept, elaborated during the World Summit from a 2001 report of the Canadian government’s International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, is an indication that the UN wishes to find consensus on criteria which justify enforcement measures on humanitarian grounds and, in order to be most effective, this would necessitate the curtailment of the ‘right’ of any individual state or minority of states to block such measures for their own reasons. Be that as it may, for enforcement measures to be carried out by the UN they need not only to be legal but also likely to achieve their objective. Even with clearly defined and widely accepted criteria, intervention in 1994 to prevent the Rwandan genocide may not have been possible for reasons of practicality, and intervention in Chechnya for those of Realpolitik, invaded as it was by the nuclear power, Russia.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} There is a contradiction here between UNC Article 10 which authorizes the UNGA to discuss ‘any matters’ under the ambit of the Charter and make recommendations as it sees fit, and Article 11(2) which essentially states the same but with the proviso of referring matters to the Security Council if ‘action’ is required. This ambiguity is likely a result of a compromise designed to please both the permanent members and the others, as well as the desire to combine the objective of ensuring peace and security for all with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, it would not be surprising that the ICJ prioritize the ‘spirit’ of the Charter as it did in its 2004 Opinion on ‘The Wall’, authorizing force where possible on humanitarian grounds and even without the consent of all permanent members of the UNSC. Of course, the ‘where possible’ will always be most significant, in particular as regards strong military powers such as Israel with a suspected intercontinental nuclear capability.

\textsuperscript{40} See for example the opinions on this matter of various legal scholars at the request of the UK government:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2813.htm
'Uniting for Peace' was used against one permanent member at the time of the Korean War, against two during the Suez Crisis and against three, including the US, to further the cause of independence for Namibia, but in the case at hand there is not even one permanent member that favours enforcement action against Israel. Moreover, there is arguably only one state in the world with the actual capability to enact such measures and that is the one least likely to want to do so, the United States. It may appear therefore as regards the significance of the UN to the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations that good intentions have fallen victim to Realpolitik.

It is however significant to note that of the eight Secretaries General of the UN elected to date not one of them has been a woman. From a feminist perspective the obvious significance of this is that the collective experience of half of the world's population has been undervalued and the different perspective that women may have contributed due to their different socialization and life experiences has thereby been underutilized. From a more specifically gender perspective, this fact also indicates that people in general, women as much as men, have been socialized to believe that ‘big issues’ on a global scale, those of war and peace which form the top priority of the UN, are best governed by individuals with ‘masculine’ characteristics and approach. This individual is therefore most likely to be male but, even more significantly, it seems at present inconceivable for a woman who does not display these exact same characteristics and approach to be appointed to this position.
This obviously brings us to reflect on the specific characteristics and approach of prominent individuals in the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations and, taking the beginning of the ‘peace process’ as 1993, it does appear, at least from a gender-blind perspective, that relations between the two parties have been influenced to a large extent by the characteristics, and in particular the political ideology as opposed to the gender, of leaders.

It was Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister and leader of Israel’s more left-leaning Labour Party, who took the significant step of recognizing the PLO and granting a degree of autonomy to the Palestinians, for which he was to pay with his life.

After the death of Rabin and a brief period of leadership under Shimon Peres until new elections could be held, Benjamin Netanyahu of the right-wing Likud Party became Prime Minister in 1996 and held the post until 1999, during which time the peace process had difficulty advancing. As is characteristic of right-wing Israelis, Netanyahu was likely inclined to believe that the ideal home for Palestinians would be in Jordan, not the West Bank and Gaza, and that the Oslo Accords were far too generous to the

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41 There is no definitive date at which the ‘peace process’ as concerns Israelis and Palestinians can be said to have begun, although the term was already in use as regards Israel and its Arab neighbours in general at least as far back as the 1970s. However, Israel considered matters of Gaza and the West Bank as subjects of negotiation with Egypt and Jordan respectively until the late 1980s, Jordan not renouncing its claim to the West Bank until July 1988 and the PLO not recognizing Israel until November of that year: Even at the Madrid Conference of 1991 the presence of the Palestinians was only accepted by Israel as part of a ‘joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation’. It was only in 1993 in Oslo, in the presence of then US President Bill Clinton, that the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat, was recognised by Israel, under Yitzhak Rabin, as representing the Palestinian people, and that the Palestinians were accorded interim self-government which was to be followed by a permanent status agreement within five years. On this basis we can consider that the specifically ‘Israeli-Palestinian peace process’ did not begin in any significant way until 1993, twenty years before the time of writing.

42 Rabin was assassinated in November 1995 by a right-wing Israeli activist.
Palestinians by allowing them to move towards statehood before completely eradicating terrorism.\textsuperscript{43} Ehud Barak of the Labour Party was Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001, a period which saw some progress in the peace process. Although ultimately regarded as a failure due to no final agreement having been reached, the 2000 Camp David Summit was clearly concerned with a permanent status agreement that would address and make certain compromises on all issues of significance to both sides. However, frustration at a lack of tangible agreement amongst the Palestinians led to the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada, which included attacks on civilians within Israel, and Israelis, as usual in reaction to terrorism, turned to a right-wing government considered better able to ‘protect’ them.

Ironically, and an example of how terrorism may be counterproductive in general but especially amongst Jews determined to ‘never again’ be passive victims, the intifada led to the election of Ariel Sharon in March 2001. This was particularly ironic as the visit by Ariel Sharon, member of the right-wing Likud Party, to the Temple Mount was, along with frustration with the outcome of Camp David and the general impoverishment of Palestinians, one of the reasons behind the intifada and likely the trigger.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43} To this date it can be argued that “a two-state solution is not part of a Likud (Israeli right-wing) platform” and any statements that may appear to be to the contrary by Netanyahu, such in the ‘Bar-Ilan Speech’ of 2009, are merely “tactical”. See for example http://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-opposed-to-a-palestinian-state-says-hardliner-mk/

\textsuperscript{44} The Temple Mount, as well as being directly above what is considered to be the holiest place in the world for religious Jews, is also the site of the al-Aqsa Mosque, regarded as being the third holiest place for religious Muslims. Sharon’s proclamation that the site would remain eternally under Israeli control was obviously considered extremely provocative by Palestinians, the vast majority of them Muslim, and a cynic might argue that it was a deliberate attempt by Sharon to provoke a violent reaction that would benefit a
Sharon however, though a right-wing politician, was also a pragmatist and not particularly ‘religious’, and for these reasons there still appeared to be hope for the peace process to advance.

The 2002 UNSC Resolution 1397 made specific reference to a ‘two-state solution’, something endorsed by both Sharon and then US President George W. Bush, inspiring the ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ and the ‘Roadmap for Peace’ of that same year. The Arab Peace Initiative of the Arab League offered recognition of the State of Israel by its members in return for a mutually agreed and equitable outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Roadmap set out the stages that needed to be effectuated to achieve this.

However, the first stage entailed a complete halt to settlement building in the West Bank, something that Sharon was unwilling to follow through with, and a complete halt to terrorism on the part of the Palestinians, something that not all Palestinian factions were prepared to accept. In 2005 Sharon led the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza, although retaining maritime and airspace control, a measure that was criticised by Netanyahu and other members of the Likud on both military and religious grounds.

In the face of this arguably dogmatic and ‘idealistic’ opposition, Sharon formed a centrist party named Kadima before succumbing to a stroke in 2006, as a result of which he is in a state of coma until this date.

Ehud Olmert replaced Sharon as leader of Kadima and was Prime Minister of Israel from 2006 until 2009, during which time Israel and the Palestinians right-wing politician like himself. If this were the case, he was most successful and the Palestinians fell once again into the trap of believing that ‘terrorism always works’.
were possibly closer to a final settlement than at any time to date. At the
Annapolis Conference of 2007, with Bush and Palestinian leader Mahmoud
Abbas, a firm and unequivocal commitment was made to a two-state
solution, the parameters of which, in light of the ‘Palestine Papers’ of
2011,\(^{45}\) appear to have followed those of the ‘Geneva Accord’.\(^{46}\)

In 2009 however, Olmert was forced to step down due to an indictment for
corruption which paved the way for the return of Benjamin Netanyahu,
incumbent to this date. Although the second Netanyahu administration has
corresponded with the left-leaning Democrat administration of Barack
Obama in the US, Netanyahu has to date held out on advancing towards a
two-state solution, something that he has always been loath to accept.

As regards prominent Palestinian individuals, the most emblematic was
without doubt Yasser Arafat. Chairman of the PLO from 1969 until his
death in 2004, when he was replaced by current Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas, Yasser Arafat was a controversial figure who has been
accused, like Netanyahu, of finding it too hard on ideological grounds to

\(^{45}\) These were many hundred of leaked documents, released by Al-Jazeera in 2011, which
showed that Olmert and Abbas were indeed in the process of negotiating a two-state
solution that would see the new Palestinian state centred on the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, but with land swaps that would enable Israel to retain many large settlements.
Olmert has since been criticized by the right in Israel for offering too much, in particular as
regards Jerusalem, and Abbas has been criticized for seemingly not according sufficient
importance during the negotiations to the issue of Palestinian refugees.

\(^{46}\) The 2003 Geneva Accord was a non-official agreement between senior Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators that, although not entailing any formal obligations for the two
parties, fleshed out in a 50 page document, supplement in 2009 with over 400 pages of
annexes, the agreements that had been made since Oslo ten years previously. The consensus
was that a two-state solution would have as its key features: borders based on those of the
1967 ceasefire lines but with ‘1 to 1’ land swaps to make them more practical as permanent
borders, West Jerusalem the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem that of Palestine, the Old
City of Jerusalem being undivided but with Israeli sovereignty over Jewish holy places and
Palestinian sovereignty over Muslim and Christian holy places, and compensation and a
right of return for displaced Palestinians but with Israel retaining ‘sovereign discretion’ of
the exact numbers it would allow to return to Israel proper.
accept a permanent two-state solution and preferring to avoid it if at all possible.

It was Arafat who took most of the blame, including even from Clinton,\textsuperscript{47} for the overall failure of the Camp David Summit and from that point onwards he was not considered a credible partner for peace by either Israel or the US. The now President Abbas on the other hand, especially following the revelations of his negotiations with Olmert, is considered to genuinely want a solution that is advantageous for both parties, although he is faced with the considerable disadvantage of having Netanyahu as his counterpart.

What has been absent since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the presence of a female head of state on either side. However, from a gender-blind perspective, this would be considered of little if any relevance and an example put forward to demonstrate this would be Golda Meir.

\textbf{3.3 Does Gender Matter: The Case of Golda Meir and Others}

Golda Meir was the first woman to be elected to the highest office of any sovereign state that did not have any family connections to that office. She was born into a modest Jewish family in present-day Ukraine which initially fled to the United States to escape persecution. She grew up to be a dedicated socialist and Zionist (meaning she believed that Jews should return to the land that had once been the Biblical Land of Israel primarily to avoid persecution) and therefore chose to go to live on a kibbutz in Palestine.

\textsuperscript{47} Alan Dershowitz claims that Clinton told him ‘directly and personally’ that Arafat was primarily to blame and that the ‘sticking point’ was the right of return. See http://www.democracynow.org/2005/12/23/noam_chomsky_v_alan_dershowitz_a
in 1921. She was one of the twenty-four signatories, two of them women, of
the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948.

She became Prime Minister in 1969 as the head of Israel’s left-wing Labour
Party and in 1970 accepted a US peace initiative that called on Israel to
withdraw to ‘secure and recognized boundaries’ from those territories
captured during the Six Day War of 1967, in the framework of a
comprehensive peace settlement, despite the opposition of many in her
coalition government.

Following the Munich massacre at the 1972 summer Olympics she ordered
the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, to hunt down and assassinate the
suspected perpetrators, resigning office two years later in 1974 following
criticism of her handling of the war of 1973. This included that from more
left-wing critics who considered she had missed an historic opportunity to
make peace with the Arabs in those years following the Six Day War.48
From this reading, Golda Meir could therefore be considered a
representative Israeli politician of her generation and party, the fact of her
being a woman of little if any relevance.

As regards the impact of prominent individuals on Israeli-Palestinian
relations, at least from a gender-blind perspective, it does appear that the
political ideology of the individual in question, male or female, has had a

48 There is however no consensus on whether it was Golda Meir or Anwar Sadat who was
most to blame for the onset of the war of 1973. See for example Schwartzwald, J., 2008.
“Did Golda Meir Cause the ‘Yom Kippur War’?” New Society: Harvard College Student
Middle East Journal. Last retrieved 31 July 2013 from:
http://newsociety07.wordpress.com/2008/07/09/did-golda-meir-cause-the-
%E2%80%9Cyom-kippur-war%E2%80%9D/
significant impact on the evolution of these relations. It equally seems apparent that the religious ideology of the leader is significant and, although there has generally seemed to be a correlation between the right-wing and more conservative or fundamentalist religious views, this is not always so clear-cut.

For example, Netanyahu has shown himself to be more intransigent on religious grounds than Sharon, despite them both being leaders of the right-wing Likud, in the same way that Rabin had shown himself to be more a person of peace and compromise than Barak, and arguably Golda Meir, despite them all being representatives of the Labour Party.

Moreover as regards the impact of religion on Israeli-Palestinian relations, it should not be forgotten that both Israeli and Palestinian nationalist movements acted as essentially secular movements before 1967, having in common with all nationalist movements the paramount desire for sovereignty over a particular territory.49

However, with the capture of Jerusalem by Israel in 1967 the religious aspect of the conflict was highlighted and indeed the subsequent war of 1973 was initiated against Israel on ‘Yom Kippur’ of that year, the most sacred day in the Jewish calendar.

The right-wing activist who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 was an Orthodox Jew and the more recent Palestinian factions such as Hamas and

49 Many of the Jews who were to be the founders of the modern State of Israel arrived in Ottoman Palestine between the beginning of the 20th Century and the outbreak of the First World War, escaping pogroms in Europe and especially Russia. Influenced as they were by socialist ideology but disillusioned by how it manifested itself in their countries of origin, they set out to establish a genuine classless secular society epitomized by the collective farms known as kibbutzim. See ‘Labour Zionism and Socialist Zionism’: http://www.mideastweb.org/labor_zionism.htmhttp://www.mideastweb.org/labor_zionism.htm
Islamic Jihad which have most strongly opposed Israel are equally the ones that purport to act in the name of Islam.

Be that as it may, Marxist critiques of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict consistently emphasise the secularity of both Jews and Palestinians, often working in solidarity in cities such as Haifa, who they argue became the victims of imperialism: Ottoman, British and ultimately the American imperialism which saw in the Jews of Palestine the best opportunity to consolidate their hold on the region and exploit its resources.50

Frances Raday, when examining from a feminist perspective the interplay of legal, religious and culture factors with that of gender, argues that there is a “confrontation” between monotheistic religions such as those practiced in Israel and Palestine and the “humancentric” modern international human rights doctrine. 51 In the traditionalist cultures and religions prevalent in the Middle East, “the story of ‘gender’… is that of the systematic domination of women by men, of women’s exclusion from public power, and of their subjugation to patriarchal power within the family.”52

50 For example, Bob Avakian, the Chairman of the US Revolutionary Communist Party, argues that the establishment of the State of Israel was an imperialistic crime which set one people that had been the victim of imperialism during the Holocaust against another, which itself had already been oppressed for centuries by other imperialist powers. See Avakian, B., 2010, “Bastion of Enlightenment or Enforcer of Imperialism: The Case of Israel.” Revolution, 213. Last retrieved July 31, 2013 from: http://www.revcom.us/a/213/israel-en.html


52 Ibid., p. 669. Raday goes on to give the example of the Jewish ‘Women of the Wall’ who have been struggling for years simply to be allowed to pray alongside men and in attire “traditionally reserved for men” at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. She notes that even where constitutional courts rule in favour of women this is of limited effect if there is not the political will to enforce the decisions rather than, as is often the case, seek to simply make new legislation to reinstate the status quo ante.
From this perspective, religion is but one manifestation of a culture of patriarchal values and therefore the question of to what extent the factor of religion may impact on Israeli-Palestinians relations would in essence concern the degree of impact of patriarchal values more than anything else.

It could therefore be argued that were women empowered to express their true beliefs, as a result for example of more educational and economic equality but also by being given greater opportunity to dissent from the ‘accepted’ cultural and religious values, they may be in a position to transform this conflictual relationship and demonstrate that any arguments of ‘religious differences’ supposedly at its origin were largely unfounded.

When examining the significance of the lack of equal representation of women in government, a situation that is even more apparent in the Middle East than in most other parts of the world, Nzomo, M. (2002) makes reference to the “critical mass of women needed in government positions for them to be effective” 53 and claims that, “their (women’s) marginality in high level decision-making, including those decisions regarding war and peace, constrain their ability to decisively influence and / or impact on conflict prevention and attainment of sustainable peace”54. What is clearly implied here is that this critical mass of women in government positions would have a positive influence on both the prevention of conflict and its resolution.

54 Ibid., p.18.
However, as regards critical mass Nzomo does anticipate and affirm the proviso of Childs, S. and Krook, M. (2008) concerning the significance of the “relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation,” who nonetheless admit its usefulness in terms of an argument for greater political representation of women, so that “activists are thus unlikely to give up on ‘critical mass’ any time soon.”

Furthermore, as far as the potential ‘positive influence’ of a critical mass of women in matters of conflict resolution is concerned, a counter argument can be made with reference to studies by Lakoff, G (2002) which have demonstrated no gender specificity when it comes to attitudes towards conflict, or towards any other political issues for that matter. He concludes from his findings that attitudes towards conflict depend upon whether one is a ‘liberal’ or a ‘conservative’, which in turns depends on whether the relationship of the state to the citizen is viewed as that of the ‘strict father’ or the ‘nurturing parent’.

If the strict father metaphor is predominant, conflict will be viewed as justified when a nation perceived to have ‘done wrong’ is therefore ‘taught a lesson’. A person for whom the nurturing parent metaphor is predominant, however, will place the value of ‘empathy’ above that of ‘discipline’ and the concept of teaching a lesson will thereby be replaced by that of ‘leading by example’. These conflicting value systems will equally apply to issues such as capital punishment, human rights, equality and the welfare state.

The fact that Lakoff identified no gender-based predisposition for one value system over the other could be used to argue that Margaret Thatcher’s decision for Britain to go to war with Argentina in 1982 over the Falkland Islands dispute was less related to there not being a critical mass of women in her government at that time than it was to her being a Conservative Prime Minister.

Likewise, Hilary Clinton’s tendency to emphasize issues of human rights despite there not being a critical mass of women in the current Obama administration could be explained predominantly by her being a Democrat Secretary of State, and there is no reason to believe that Obama wouldn’t have taken the same stance if he had been Secretary of State instead.

It would be equally difficult to make the case that Marine Le Pen in France and Krisztina Morvai in Hungary represent the most extreme far right positions in their respective countries for reasons of critical mass, indeed the fact that both are lawyers by profession may well be more significant than their gender in explaining their authoritarian values, in addition the obvious family connections and upbringing in the case of Le Pen.

Even as regards the current financial crisis in Europe, it is the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who has adopted the ‘strictest’ line, evidently considering increasingly high suicide rates, homelessness and a diminution of the welfare state all to be lesser evils than even a fairly

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56 See: [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/greek-woes-suicide-rate-higher](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/greek-woes-suicide-rate-higher)
moderate increase in inflation, which she presumably thought would harm savers who have ‘done nothing wrong’ that they need be ‘punished’ for.

Be that as it may, when observed in groups of sufficiently large numbers, differences have been observed between the way men and women conceive of the world around them and react to others, regardless of the extent to which these differences in thinking and behaviour can be attributed to socialization as opposed to the effect of hormonal differences.

The most recent studies concerning differences in thinking and behaviour resulting from the effect of hormonal differences have been conducted by Simon Baron-Cohen, Professor of Developmental Psychopathology at the University of Cambridge in the UK.57

Whilst initially focussing on autism, a disorder which affects boys around five times more often than girls, 58 Baron-Cohen discovered that although individuals with autism may have ‘affective empathy’ intact, that is the desire to ‘treat others as you would have them treat you’, they showed deficiencies in ‘cognitive empathy’, the ability to correctly ascertain the mental state of the other.

This, incidentally, was the opposite for psychopaths, another disorder which affects far more males than females,59 who demonstrated normal to high levels of cognitive empathy but deficient affective empathy, meaning that they could use their understanding of the other’s state of mind against them and not feel any remorse for treating them in a way that they certainly would not have wanted to be


treated themselves. Nevertheless, both disorders have in common the fact that they affect predominantly males and involve a deficiency in one form of empathy or another.

The results of Baron-Cohen’s research showed that whilst individuals with autism were demonstrated to have a lower aptitude for cognitive empathy than the average, they were equally demonstrated to have a higher than average aptitude for ‘systemizing’, that is the drive and ability to understand how things work and the underlying rules to explain this, as opposed to the ability to understand what others may be thinking or feeling.

What is significant for this study is that levels of foetal testosterone were positively correlated with a high aptitude for systemizing and negatively correlated with an aptitude for empathising. As foetal testosterone affects individuals before they are born and can experience any form of socialization, Baron-Cohen posited that females would, on average, develop a higher aptitude than males for empathizing, and this is indeed what he found.

Around twice as many females than males of all ages demonstrated a higher aptitude for empathizing as opposed to systemizing, however he was keen to point out that the differences in aptitude observed were averages and do not apply to each individual, and that any hormonally-induced differences are invariably further affected, and doubtless to a significant degree, by socialization.

Be that as it may, he argued that the evidence was overwhelming for at least some degree of pre-natal differentiation and that to totally refute this fact is as unscientific as to argue that socialization is totally irrelevant. For example, moving beyond the increased displays of empathy by female toddlers as opposed to increased displays of aggression by male toddlers that can equally by argued to be
a result of socialization, even when vehemently denied by the parents, new-born baby girls were found to keep eye contact with others for longer than were new-born baby boys.

This is compounded by ethological evidence concerning our closest primate relatives such as chimpanzees, where males in general demonstrate higher levels of aggressive behaviour, corresponding to their level of testosterone, and females show more signs of empathy, for example stroking and patting those that appear despondent, for example as a result of being isolated. It would of course be hard to make a case for this observed behaviour of chimpanzees, so similar to our own, being purely the result of socialization with no biological underpinning.60

These findings seem to imply that, in a world where a higher percentage of people in authority were women, for which it would first be necessary for gender characterizations equating the feminine with inferiority to be discarded, more decisions would be based on empathizing as opposed to systemizing. In other words, the feelings of the other would, on average, be recognized and given more significance by women decision makers than they would by men, with women being correspondingly more tolerant and less dogmatic.

This is particularly relevant in the specific geopolitical context of Israeli-Palestinian relations, where the vicious cycle of the wounded pride of the Palestinians leads to revolt, further subjugation and humiliation as punishment for the revolt, and then again wounded pride. The more predominantly ‘systemizing’ as opposed to ‘empathizing’ mentality may translate into the political realism of thinking only of one’s own self-interest, and may thereby lead to outcomes

detrimental to the self-interest of all concerned due to the negative effects, for example extreme violence towards even innocent individuals, by those whose feelings were not recognized and / or given importance.

The question remains as to whether or not a generally greater capacity for empathy amongst women translates into political opinions more respectful of the feelings of others, less dogmatic and more positive as regards the possibility of finding peaceful ‘win-win’ solutions to differences, and this is something that we shall proceed to further investigate with the introduction of some primary data.
CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

4.1 The Gender Factor: Evidence from Primary Data

Although essentially a qualitative study, some original primary data obtained by means of a questionnaire has been included. The purpose of this data is to assist in further evaluating to what extent, if any, differences between men and woman may translate into political beliefs that could impact, positively or negatively, on conflictual relationships. Due to the limitations of this study, data collected at this stage is intended to provide insights into general differences that could be further investigated amongst various culture specific populations during further research.

The subjects chosen for this section of the study are therefore all students at the University of Nairobi and citizens of Kenya, a fact we believe makes the data obtained from our questionnaire all the more pertinent as regards investigating non-culture specific differences. This is due to the almost total absence in this milieu of the rightwing – leftwing political dichotomy so prevalent in much of the world outside of Africa, a continent where voting still takes place for the most part along ethnic lines.\(^1\) The advantage of this from the perspective of this study is that we can be confident that the responses given reflect each individual’s personal beliefs and not the ‘party line’ of any political faction they feel most aligned with, something that

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\(^1\) For example, in the 2013 Presidential Election in Kenya, the principal candidate of Kikuyu ethnicity, Uhuru Kenyatta, obtained 96.33% of the vote in the essentially Kikuyu populated county of Nyeri, whereas the principal candidate of Lua ethnicity, Raila Odinga, obtained 96.64% of the vote in the essentially Lua populated county of Kisumu, and similar scores were obtained in many other counties throughout Kenya in respect of this same ethnic division. See for example *The Sunday Nation*, Nairobi, Sunday March 10, 2013, pp.2-3.
would logically need to be compensated for by having an immensely higher number of respondents were they not African.

The questionnaire was completed by a total of sixty respondents, thirty women and thirty men, identifying themselves as either ‘FEMALE’ or ‘MALE’ (See Appendix), with ages ranging from twenty to forty-eight years of age, but with most of them being in their early twenties. As regards religious affinity, 85% of those willing to indicate this were Christian, in line with the 83% Christians in Kenya identified in the Census of 2009, the remainder being Muslim.² So as not to influence the responses given in any way, the respondents were given the questionnaire by a third party who did not inform them who had commissioned it or the purpose for which the data being collected, something that was also achieved by including questions on a wide range of topics, not all of them being of equal relevance for the purpose of this study. The responses obtained from this questionnaire are discussed in the following chapter.

4.2 Discussion of Results

The first question asked of each individual was whether they considered themselves to be ‘more secular (i.e. less religious)’ or ‘more religious’. The term ‘secular’ was explicitly defined as ‘less religious’ due to this being a term far less widely used in Africa than in, for example, Western Europe, where it is generally viewed as being a positive characteristic of any

² See 2009 Population and Housing Census Results: http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf
democracy. As expected in Kenya, where religion is still very present in the Constitution, the national anthem, the language of politicians and the media, and the educational system, a majority of both females and males identified themselves as being ‘more religious’, 60% and 67% respectively.

However, what may be of most significance for this study is that a far higher percentage of females than males, 40% compared to only 6%, identified themselves as ‘more secular’, and this was 50% to 0% in the case of Muslim females as opposed to Muslim males. Also of interest is that a far higher percentage of males, 27% to 0% of females, chose not to respond to this question. This may be because, with the questionnaire being completed whilst sitting next to classmates, males more than females may have been loath to identify themselves as secular, something often frowned upon in traditional African societies, and on occasion identified with homosexuality. This may be even more so for Muslim males as 100% of them did choose to answer this question, each one of them identifying himself as ‘more religious’ as compared to 50% of Muslim females.

As regards Israeli-Palestinian relations, with steps towards a peaceful solution invariably being made by those leaders identifying themselves as more secular, and with the more religious factions invariably resisting this approach in favour of an ‘all or nothing’ armed struggle for land they believe has been given to them by God, more women than men identifying themselves as secular would likely equate with more steps towards peace
and reconciliation amongst Israelis and Palestinians if there were more women in positions of influence on both sides.\(^3\)

The second question asked respondents to indicate whether they considered themselves to be ‘more right-wing (e.g. Conservative / Republican)’ or ‘more left-wing (e.g. Socialist / Liberal).’ Again, the terms were qualified with examples, due to them being far less widely employed in Africa in comparison to many other parts of the world, in particular the western world. As with the first question, both females and males were in agreement overall, both selecting the ‘more left-wing’ response. Although numerous explanations could be put forward for this result, it was likely at least in part because of the identification of Barack Obama, himself partly of Kenyan origin, with this option.

However, there were significantly more females than males identifying themselves as more left-wing, 87% as compared to 67%, which would again indicate, were these results to be replicated on a larger scale, that more

\(^3\) These steps towards peace, and those individuals and factions resisting them, have already been discussed in detail in previous chapters and with numerous specific examples. Suffice it to summarize at this point by noting that the Palestinian faction Hamas, defining itself as ‘more religious’, has shown less willingness to compromise than has the ‘more secular’ Fatah. Equally, amongst Israeli leaders, those identifying themselves as more secular, both on the left of the political spectrum such as Yitzhak Rabin and on the right such as Ariel Sharon, not forgetting ‘centrists’ such as Ehud Olmert, have shown more willingness to make the territorial concessions which are a precondition for peaceful coexistence. Such concessions have been forcefully resisted by those identifying themselves as more religious, such as the previously mentioned assassin of Yitzhak Rabin and ‘religious’ political factions such as the recent entry into the Israeli governing coalition, ‘HaBayit HaYehudi’, literally ‘The Jewish Home’, a ‘national-religious party’ which does not believe in giving any territorial or other concessions to the Palestinians. See as one further most recent example: [http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=10567](http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=10567)
women decision-makers could reduce conflict as left-wing positions tend to be more characterized by compromise and dialogue than those of the right.⁴

Amongst Muslims the result was 100% females more left-wing as opposed to 75% males, indicating that Moslem women even more than Christian women may view the political left as their ally when it comes to favouring their rights in what is arguably an even more patriarchal environment.

Amongst all those claiming to be more secular rather than more religious, regardless of which religion, 86% claimed to be more left wing as opposed to 76%. This is a significant gap but it is still less significant than that between females and males overall, indicating that sex may be even more determinant as regards political worldview than secularity: this is interesting in the context of conflictual relationships such as that between Israel and Palestine, there being little doubt that it is more difficult for a member of the political right, male or female, to engage in compromise for fear of being accused of ‘weakness’, something they tend to associate with the left.

The responses to the third question, however, seem somewhat inconsistent as regards those to the first, with a slightly higher percentage of females

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⁴ These results were to a certain extent replicated on a larger scale in the US in 2012, with 54% of women choosing to vote for Barack Obama as President over Mitt Romney, compared to only 44% of men. Much as this choice was doubtless largely motivated by women’s rejection of policies seen as unfavourable to them, for example concerning abortion and child welfare, the result nonetheless is an administration more engaged in a peace process which emphasises mutual respect and compromise amongst Israelis and Palestinians: in contrast the right-wing Romney, favoured unambiguously by the Israeli right-wing leader Netanyahu, had made it quite clear that he believed in Israel’s ‘God-given’ right to the region, thereby placing the onus of compromise squarely on the shoulders of the Palestinians.

See for example: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/bam_the_ladies_man_OmRpDK6kjwAHzXaxdWNALO
than males, 57% as opposed to 50%, thinking that religion should have ‘more’ rather than less influence on government. Even so, in the context of Kenyan politics where politicians are generally considered to be highly corrupt and primarily, if not solely, interested in personal financial gain, this result could be interpreted as women trying to make the point that politics, like religion, should emphasise values over power.

The third question concerned gender, with 97% of females compared to 77% of males responding that gender differences are ‘mostly socially constructed’ as opposed to ‘mostly natural’. Here it is important to note that many of the respondents had followed a course on ‘Gender in International Relations (IR)’, and that the percentage of both females and males choosing ‘more natural’ would likely have been far higher amongst the general population. Although a question not as obviously significant for this study as the previous ones, and used as a ‘decoy’ to a certain extent, this result does have the merit of indicating that people, at least in the case of young people, can be trained in a fairly short period of time to question exactly what is or isn’t ‘natural’ in their environment.

Question five asked whether income equality was ‘more’ or ‘less’ important than GDP per capita. As could be expected in Kenya where the extremes between rich and poor are most visible, as are the repercussions of inequality on society as a whole, for example in terms of security, a majority of both males and females felt that income equality was more important.
This response was selected by 80% of males to 70% of females, although 6% of females as opposed to 0% of males chose not to respond to this question. One possible explanation for this is the overrepresentation of women amongst the poor, in Kenya but also on a worldwide level, which may focus the attention of more women than men on reaching a ‘minimum level’ of wealth before addressing the issue of equality of wealth. Of course, this interpretation is open to further debate and investigation which goes beyond the scope of this particular study.

Question six, the last of the ‘secondary’ questions, asked whether citizens should take more responsibility for their own welfare or if it is the government that should take more responsibility for the welfare of the citizens. 67% of females as opposed to 57% of males felt citizens should take more responsibility, a result which can be interpreted in the same light as the previous one: women suffer more than men in situations of poverty and have learnt to take responsibility for their own welfare, therefore they are more likely to reason in terms of it being too unreliable and therefore risky, for self and family, to rely on the government.

The final question, question seven, is, like the first two questions, of most significance to this study. Here respondents were asked to select whether in their own personal opinion war ‘is’ or ‘is not’ inevitable. Whilst the gap was not particularly large, more females responded that war is not inevitable, 57% as compared to 53% of males. Were this gap to be confirmed in future studies on a much wider scale, it would be another reason to believe that more women in decision-making would be of benefit in IR.
Not only does a belief in the non-inevitability of war arguably make one far more likely to explore peaceful solutions to conflictual relationships such as that between Israelis and Palestinians, it also indicates that the individual holding this belief may be more likely in general to question ideas about what is ‘natural’, and therefore not so easily surrender to the ‘inevitability’ of even the most unsatisfactory status quo.

4.3 Conclusion and Recommendations

A study of the background to Israeli-Palestinian relations in the geopolitical context of the Middle East has led to two fairly evident observations as regards gender: firstly, women have been largely absent from positions of decision-making on both sides of this relationship throughout its history and, secondly, where they have been present they have not been able to change its persistently conflictual nature.

What is less evident at first but becomes more so with a study of the relevant literature, in particular from a feminist perspective, is that the few women who have acceded to positions of influence have done so by conforming to generally-held gender conceptions concerning the superiority of what are considered masculine characteristics such as firmness, resolve, tenacity and determination to ‘stand their ground’, and by subsequently repressing any greater tendency they may have possessed as compared to their male counterparts of believing in, and by extension seeking out, solutions involving a high degree of compromise.
The broadly universal acceptance of such gender conceptions by both men and women and their inability, and on occasion unwillingness, to recognise them and then challenge them, may have led to the subsequent acceptance by many of the moral validity of states which view even the slightest risk to their security and national pride as justifying actions that repress the human rights of others.\(^5\)

It is not assumed here that pride is the prerogative of the male or the masculine, rather that the form of pride that is by association with the ‘masculine’ more highly valued involves the concept of inviolability of the self, and by extension the state, the willingness never to ‘back down’ and ‘concede defeat’, which can easily be equated with the rejection of any form of compromise, and the desire to make ‘emotion’ submit to ‘reason’, problematic as emotion cannot be disassociated from the empathy required not only to favour compromise but arguably to reason effectively in the first place.

The results of our questionnaire indicate that, although males and females are obviously influenced by the same gender conceptions, and notwithstanding that amongst males and females there are varying degrees of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, it does appear that differences in outlook concerning matters that may be of significance as regards conflictual relationships do indeed exist.

\(^5\) Various studies have demonstrated similarities in the brains, behavioural patterns and reasoning between women and homosexual men, thought to be linked, in addition to any effects of socialization, to the uptake of specific prenatal hormones, notable examples of such research being the studies of Simon LeVay, formerly Director of Human Sexuality Studies at Stanford University and himself openly homosexual. Although beyond the scope of this study to investigate in detail, such studies indicate that any findings concerning a greater capacity for empathy and compromise amongst women may also be replicated in the case of homosexual men, themselves largely viewed in the same way as are women as not ‘masculine’ enough to be ‘good leaders’, and therefore kept away from positions of authority in which they might well prove to be effective in situations where solutions involving compromise are required. See for example LeVay S., (2011). Gay, Straight, and the Reason Why: The Science of Sexual Orientation. New York: Oxford University Press.
In the context of our questionnaire, females were shown to be more ‘secular’ than males, something that would likely be advantageous for anyone seeking a peaceful solution to a conflict in which religious dogma is a serious impediment to compromise, in particular as regards ‘holy sites’. Females were also shown to be more ‘left wing’, equally an advantage in this context as can be observed by the increased willingness over the years of the political left to make the necessary concessions required for peace as opposed to the political right, with its tendency to emphasise a conservative and uncompromising approach to matters relating to religious and cultural tradition. Finally, more females than males believed that war is ‘not’ inevitable; indicating that they would be more likely to trust that any mutually agreed ‘permanent solution’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could indeed be permanent, provided that it was equitable and equally satisfactory to both parties. The contrary belief, that war is inevitable and therefore the interest of the state is to maximise its power, in particular military power, in times of peace, whilst not making concessions, in particular territorial concessions, to what is regarded as a ‘future enemy’, may largely be responsible for Israel having been unwilling to ‘concede’ a viable sovereign state to the Palestinians to date.  

It is therefore argued that the results of this study confirm the hypothesis that gender, in particular as regards the valorisation by many women as well as men of the ‘masculine pride’ that rejects compromise, is the most determinant variable in explaining the failure to ‘normalize’ Israeli-Palestinian relations to date.

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6 This is not to say that there is no chance of reaching a peaceful solution whilst the primary decision-makers are men, and in particular when they are of the political right and identifying themselves as ‘religious’. The psychological profile of the decision-maker in question is always significant, meaning that even the ‘hyper-masculine’ Benjamin Netanyahu might be persuaded to ‘grant’ the Palestinians a state if he could first be persuaded that it could be presented in such a way that he would become a ‘hero’ of the situation, for example with Israelis being convinced that he had ‘sacrificed’ some of his own ‘principles’ in order to protect the motherland, and in particular its women and children, from any eventual disintegration of the state resulting from the non-acceptance by powerful international actors of its treatment of the Palestinians.
Furthermore, that more women acceding to positions of authority would likely increase the chances of this happening in the near future, and it is therefore hoped that both parties will come to this realization and implement policies that render such a situation more likely.

Further research would however be beneficial to confirm the generally greater overall tendency indicated in this study for women to believe in the viability of long-term peaceful solutions and their likely willingness to make compromises, including as regards religious and cultural tradition, in order to make this happen. Such research would ideally seek to obtain data from a far greater number of respondents, ideally many thousands, seeking to confirm to what extent these tendencies can be observed across various populations.

These populations could include, for example, Jews living in Israel, Jews not living in Israel, Jews living in the West Bank, Palestinians living in Israel, Palestinians of the diaspora, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Palestinians living in Gaza. Were the results obtained in our study confirmed across all such populations, this would add even greater urgency to the need to implement measures that would enable those members of society generally most likely to be able to pacify Israeli-Palestinian relations long-term in the context of an equitable two-state solution, or in other words the women, to be in a position to do so.7

7 The discussion of such measures is not the subject of this study, however examples of possible initiatives would be various forms of positive discrimination such as the setting of quotas for members of negotiating teams, members of parliament, cabinet members and ideally even a ruling that the leadership of all political parties must be ‘rotated’ so that no leader may be followed by another of the same sex, something that would lead to a certain level of equity even as regards the highly influential post of prime minister. Of course, there would inevitably be ‘some’ hostility to such measures, hence the importance, in addition to the recognition that men have held the overwhelming majority of decision-making positions in the region for over sixty-five years without being able to reach a mutually agreed peaceful solution, of any further data confirming the hypothesis of women generally being more apt for leadership in situations that necessitate compromise than are men.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX: The Questionnaire

Please circle only 1 response on every line that you feel best describes you and your beliefs  
(Do not circle either response on a line where the meaning is not clear to you)

I am:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more secular (i.e. less religious)</td>
<td>more religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more right-wing (e.g. Conservative / Republican)</td>
<td>more left-wing (e.g. Socialist / Liberal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I believe that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>religion should have less influence on government</th>
<th>religion should have more influence on government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gender differences are mostly natural</td>
<td>gender differences are mostly socially constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income equality is more important than GDP per capita</td>
<td>GDP per capita is more important than income equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens should take more responsibility for their own welfare</td>
<td>the government should take more responsibility for the welfare of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war is not inevitable</td>
<td>war is inevitable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Optional

Full Name:  Telephone Number(s):
Email(s):  Age / Nationality / Religion:
Any Comments: