GEOGRAPHIES OF TERROR: A CASE STUDY OF GARISSA COUNTY (2011-2012)

BY

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A Research Report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a Masters of Arts Degree in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, 2013.
DECLARATION

This project report is my original work and has not been submitted for any award in any university

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DEDICATION

To my late father Mr. Peter Abong’o Miguta and my mother Philisters Adoyo Abong’o who survived extreme fear to teach me hope in being an academia.
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Despite the contributions and the critique by all the aforementioned, this study remains personal work and limitations herein are not to be attributed to any of the parties.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>African Inland Church.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission to Somalia.</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Operation.</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner.</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Distance Decay.</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Distance Decay Reduction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication and Technology</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation.</td>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces.</td>
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<td>KHCR</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Mileage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District.</td>
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<td>NFDLA</td>
<td>North Frontier District Liberation Army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>North Eastern Province.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>Obstacles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>Sanctuaries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States.</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.</td>
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is to highlight factors that underpin occurrence of domestic and regional terrorism particularly in Kenya between October 2011 and December 2012. During this period Kenya experienced 61 terror attacks. The distribution in Counties targeted was: Garissa County experienced 29, Nairobi County experienced 11, Mandera County experienced 8, Mombasa County experienced 7 and Wajir County experienced 6. The study employs the model (FS) = MI² + SAN + OBS – ICT, where FS refers favourable space to terrorist, MI² refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative information (I) communication (C) and transport networks (T).

Specifically this dissertation has three objectives; first to examine and analyze what underpinned the apparent increase of terror attacks in Garissa County during the period of study. Secondly, to examine and analyze challenges in operationalizing unwritten National Security Policy and its link with the rise of terror activities in Garissa County. Lastly to proffer a research based policy options geared towards containing these attacks.

The central arguments in this study are; first, the increase in terror attacks is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. This is appended on increase of distance decay at Political, Social and Economic levels in Garissa County. The foregoing spawns sanctuaries in time and space that reduces the cost while increasing the utility of terror. The second argument is that this increase is a function of the challenges of operationalizing unwritten National Security Policy at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels of strategy making. The third argument is that the containment of these attacks is a reverse function of the two causes explained above.
CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXTUALIZING GARISSA AS A GEOGRAPHY OF TERROR

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Since independence Kenya has experienced what can be conceived as four phases of terror attacks classified according to time period and actors involved. The first phase of terror occurred in March 1, 1975. There was an attack on Overseas Transport Company (OTC) bus headed to Mombasa. A total of 27 people were killed and another 100 people seriously injured. A group calling itself Poor People Liberation movement claimed responsibility.

The second phase was marked by the terror attack at Norfolk Hotel on January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1981. A total of 20 people were killed and over 80 people sustained serious injuries. This attack was authored by Palestine Liberation Organization.\textsuperscript{1} The third phase was marked by two terror attacks in 1998 and 2002.\textsuperscript{2} The first attack was directed at United States embassy in Nairobi while the second one targeted Kikambala Hotel and an airliner carrying Israel tourists.\textsuperscript{3}

The fourth phase can be said to have begun in earnest with the abduction of a two tourist. A Briton at Lamu Island and a French at Manda Island. These occurred on September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2011 and on October 1, 2011 respectively. The Kidnapping led to the launch of Operation Linda Nchi


(Operation protecting the borders) on October 14th, 2011 by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in pursuit of the Al Shabaab in Somalia.4

It is the fourth phase that raises new dynamics in terror attacks in Kenya. First dynamism is the number of attacks. In a period of 14 months after October 14th 2011, Kenya experienced 61 attacks. The attacks occurred in the following counties Garissa County - 29 attacks, Nairobi County - eleven attacks, Mandera County - eight attacks, Mombasa County - seven attacks, and Wajir County-six attacks.5 Second dynamism is the localization of Al Shabaab’s resistance to KDF incursion by targeting the KDF rear in Garissa County.

In view of the aforementioned, this study is interested in grappling with this emerging geography of terror in Garissa County. It responds specifically to the following questions; what factors underpin the increase of terror attacks in Garissa County in the period of study? How does the operationalisation of National Security Policy in the absence of a written one underpin the rise of terror attacks in Garissa County and how best can terrorism in Garissa County be contained?

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5 Source of this data is Open Source Intelligence from Daily Nation Newspaper and The Standard daily between October 2011 and December 2012.
1.2 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to interrogate and analyze factors influencing the choice of a geographical space as a venue for terrorism. Specific objectives of the study include:

1. To examine and analyze factors that underpinned the apparent increase of terror attacks in Garissa County between October 2011 and December 2012.
2. To examine and analyse the nexus between operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy and terrorism in Garissa County.
3. To proffer research based policy options geared towards containing these attacks.

1.3 Justification of the Study


Two points are conspicuous about the link between these laws and the level of terror attacks in Kenya. First, despite their enactment there are still occurrences of terror in Kenya. This is an indication that enactment of laws alone does not prevent terrorism. Secondly, the foregoing legislations only address the demand side of terror i.e. the push factors to the terrorists. They do not address the supply side of terror that reduces the cost of terror in Kenya hence increasing its attractiveness to terrorists.
Scholars who discuss terrorism from a rational choice perspective include inter alia Frey & Luechinger, Anderson & Carter, Endlers and Sandler.⁶ The questions they seek to respond to are: ‘why groups resort to terror attacks in specific geographies? And what are the best strategies of fighting terror? They argue that terrorists maximize utility by reducing the costs. Thus to address terrorism then the state must increase the cost of terrorism. The shortcoming with this conceptualization is that, it only appreciates the costs incurred by terrorists in economic terms only.

It is the foregoing knowledge gap that this study seeks to address. It reconceptualises the cost of terror to encompass not only Economic costs but also Political and Social costs. This study conceptualizes cost of terror attack to be a function of Sanctuaries and obstacles occurring at the Political, Social, and economic levels.

1. 4 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study was conducted in Garissa County (See Appendix I for Geographical location of Garissa County). The county has a total area of 44,175 Kilometres square (17,056 Square Mileage). The period of study is from October, 2011 to December 2012. The choice of point of entry is informed by the date Kenya Defence Forces crossed into Somalia in pursuit of the Al Shabaab militia.

Garissa County is located in the former Northern frontier district. It is bordered by the Republic of Somalia to the East, Wajir County to the North, Isiolo County to the West, Tana River County to the South East and Lamu County to the North West (See Appendix I Geographical location of Garissa County).

The study faced one major limitation: restricted access to classified documents on terror attacks in Garissa County. To counter this, it used data from online News Networks, Newspapers and published reports on insecurity in Garissa County. These News Networks report real time information on the occurrences on the ground while reports provide analytical perspectives of data collected.

1. 5 Definition of Concepts

4th Generation War Fare (4GW) - This concept is borrowed from Hammes’ conceptualization that 4th Generation War fare is an evolved form of insurgency that uses all available Networks - political, economic, social, military-to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. Examples include modern militias, insurgent groups, gangs and terrorists. This study adopts this definition of 4th Generation War fare.

Distance Decay- This concept is borrowed from the first principle of Geography as described by Tobler. According to him everything is related to everything else in space. The far away they are physically from each other the greater the reduction in the level of influence on

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each other. Ngunyi and Katumanga construct the concepts of Political, Economic and Social distance decays (DD) out of this Geographical principle. The DD represent gap between the state and the individual at Political, Social and Economic levels. The knowledge gap in this definition by Ngunyi and Katumanga is the non-recognition of the resultant mental distance decay that exist between the psyche of the population and the State. To this therefore distance decay is the gap between the state and the population. It may be Political, Social, Economic or the resultant mental distance decay occurring from the former three variations of distance decay.

**Geography**- According to this study geography is the totality of the spatial location of an activity, an idea or a narrative. It encompasses physical geography, political geography, social geographies and economic geography therein. This concept is adopted from Katumanga’s conceptualization that ‘geography’ takes three dimensions physical, mental and virtual geography. What informs this adoption is the mutation in Areas of Operation (AOR) where wars are located. From only physical terrain in the first, second and third generation war faires to mental geographies as the terrain for psychological wars (psyops) and the Information Communication and Technology as virtual geographies for cyber wars in the 4th Generation Warfare.

**Terrorism** – This study adopts definition of terrorism as given by Enders and Sandler. They define terrorism as the systematic use of premeditated violence or threats of violence by

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individuals, sub-national actors or states to obtain economic, social or political objectives through intimidation of a large audience beyond the immediate victims. The major strength that necessitated adoption of this definition is its appreciation that terror is a conscious and rational process.12

1.6 Literature Review

This review of literature examines the shift in the geographies of terror over time, from the Middle East to United States to Europe and finally to Africa? What underpins this shift? It is organized into three sections; the first section discusses the origin global fundamental Islamic terrorism, the second section focuses on Al-Qaeda activities in the Horn of Africa, the third section examines the appropriate conceptual framework for this study.

1.6. (a) Al-Qaeda in Three Decades: Global Perspective

In examination of Al Qaeda as a Global Fundamental Islamic terror group, Mamdani looks at specific historical and political circumstances that resulted into its development. According to him Al Qaeda developed from a convergence of events that took place both inside and outside the Muslim world.13 The key inside event was the development of ideological basis for political violence.

The foregoing ideology emerged when Islamists intellectuals encountered different Marxist-Leninist ideals which had embraced armed struggle in the post World War II period. Of particular significance were the ideas of Abul A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qtub. According to

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13 Mamdani M. (2004). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim; America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books.
Mamdani, these intellectuals were the first to call for a universal jihad, placing violence at the centre of their discourses. To them reform could only be achieved through the seizure of state power and establishing an ideological Islamic state with no borders in the caliphate.¹⁴

The most significant outside event that influenced the rise of Al Qaeda was the involvement of United States under President Reagan’s ‘rollback policy’. This policy called for defeating communists at all costs, even if it meant forming alliances with the most dubious leaders and organisations. In 1979, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invaded Afghanistan. In response United States and Pakistan launched an indirect joint operation by recruiting, training and deploying international Mujahedeen into Afghanistan in support of the Afghan army. This led to the defeat of USSR in 1989.

Three developments took place at the end of this USSR vs. Afghanistan war. They actually shaped the mosaic of Al Qaeda. Firstly, the reorientation of the Mujahedeen mission to forcing United States and its allies out of areas dominated by the Muslim community. Secondly, retention of the Mujahedeen training cell in Pakistan and thirdly international Mujahedeen redeployment back to their States of origin. Although originally concerned with local political matters, the redeployed Mujahedeen would later become Al Qaeda affiliates and aid in the later force projection.¹⁵

The knowledge gap in the foregoing Mamdani’s conceptualization is that, he does not relate the rise of Al Qaeda the internal variables of Afghanistan that makes it more vulnerable to external aggression. Mamdani do not also explain the dynamics of the Afghan state security forces that necessitated the support from International Mujahedeen. It is these questions albeit in

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¹⁴ Ibid.

different time and space that this study grapples with. Rather than studying Afghanistan as geography of terror, this study focuses on Garissa County in Kenya.

Rohan Gunaratna in his study of Al-Qaeda describes the group as a generational typology. According to him, the group rose from Muslim Brotherhood mutating into generations of formations that readily use violence. To ensure its continuity, fundamental Islamists terrorist have been opportunity rather than event.16

Gunaratna argues that the world has witnessed four mujahedeen-generations: The first generation were the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The bulk of active members today have embraced open politics. The second generation were the veterans of the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan campaign. Except a few hundred members that form the core of Islamist groups worldwide, the bulk of the veterans have returned to civilian life. The third generation were members of Al-Qaeda and three-dozen Asian, Middle Eastern, African and Caucasian. The fourth generation is post-Afghanistan surviving Al-Qaeda members working with affiliates groups spread in over 60 states mostly active in local and regional political struggles.17

1.6. (b) Al-Qaeda’s Quest for the Horn of Africa

Lawrence Wright traces the genesis of Al-Qaeda activities in the Horn of Africa to Osama Bin Laden moving his operations centre to Sudan in 1992. This was followed by immediate initiation of a series of business developments in and around Khartoum.18 Osama Bin Laden deployed Operative Cadres (Africa Corps) into the Horn of Africa in an effort to spread Salafism and jihadist doctrine. However Al-Qaeda’s Africa Corps ultimately failed to create a

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lasting front in the continent. Logistical challenges coupled with distance and culture could be blamed for this failure.\textsuperscript{19}

By 1996, Al-Qaeda’s African Corps had been routed from Sudan and re-relocated back to Afghanistan. However, the group still sought an alternative centre of command from which to strike the Americans and drive them out of the Middle East. It is then that the group settled on Somalia. It is from there that a team of senior operatives seasoned in military operations, logistics, propaganda and negotiations were deployed from Khartoum into Somalia.\textsuperscript{20}

Counter Terrorism Centre, traces the mission into Somalia to late January 1993. This was led by Atef aka Abu Hafs who designated a team veterans to conduct operation ‘MSK’ (Arabic for holding or grabbing). The centre records those Al-Qaeda members departed from Peshawar, Pakistan through Nairobi en route to Somalia. They were tasked with: one to find a location for military operations that would replace Afghanistan. Two, the location must be near the Arab region. Three, attempt to help the brothers in Somalia and Ogaden.\textsuperscript{21}

Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, p. 1, reveals that Al-Qaeda believed that Somalia would; provide another safe haven for their operations, allow them to target the U.S. in both Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula and provide a steady flow of recruits. The centre records that upon arriving in country, Al-Qaeda in Somalia began establishing three training camps with the agreement of the Somali militant group known as Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). The first two camps were established in Lu’uq and Bussaso in Somalia, and a third was established later in the


Harmony documents, AFGP-2002-600104, pp. 2-4 records that in Nairobi, Al-Qaeda’s ominously named “Team Green,” led by Saif al-Islam, received new members from bases of operation in Pakistan and Sudan.

Harmony, AFGP-2002-800600, p.2 reveal that over 18 months period, Al-Qaeda found more adversity than success in Somalia. Indeed it achieved none of its objectives; it did not promote its Salafi ideology, gain an operational safe haven or manipulate underlying conditions so as to secure popular support and have adequate financing for continued operations. It was majorly hampered by three variables; first, security challenge from the anarchic clan dominated politics in Somalia. Secondly, long insecure logistic and communication lines coupled with limited finances and thirdly, suspicion from the indigenous population and lastly constant risk of Western military interdiction.23

Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia as a failed state would be ideal safe haven for Al-Qaeda. However, the Centre indicates that weakly governed regions such as Coastal region of Kenya provide an environment that is more conducive to terrorists. This can be attributed to. First Weak governance as evidenced by Kenya’s incapacity to interdict the terror group’s actions or effectively disrupt its activities. For example the constant chartering of planes to fly in and out of Lu’uq, Somalia in 1993 Secondly relative stability and basic infrastructure that creates potential Base area from which to support operations in more unstable regions like Somalia. Lastly foreign military forces could not conduct operations because of Kenyan sovereignty.24


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
Priori focuses on geographies closer to Garissa County. He analyses of Al-Qaeda operations in the Horn of Africa. He argues that, Kenya features prominently in the international jihadist agenda to achieve an Islamist caliphate in the Horn of Africa. He traces the operations of Al-Qaeda in the Horn to 1992 when Osama Bin Laden established an Al Qaeda cell in East Africa that was centred in Kenya to support jihadist Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI) in North Eastern Kenya and Somalia.

From 1992 to 1998 the cell used Kenya as logistic support Base of Al-Qaeda’s activities in Somalia. This was through financial transactions, hosting meetings in Nairobi, transfer of arms and travel route by its members. In return Al Itihaad Islamiya provided support for Al-Qaeda’s activities in Kenya amongst the Somali community and the refugees in North Eastern Region. These dynamics have shifted at least in three fundamental ways. First, Al Itihaad Islamiya have mutated into Al Shabaab. Secondly, Al Shabaab merged with Al Qaeda to possibly further the latter’s agenda of having a united Islamic Caliphate- the map of the caliphate is attached as appendix II. Lastly, perpetrators of terror attacks are no longer confined to only refugees. The foregoing points to the fact the variables that are discussed by Priori do not appropriately explain


28 As will be demonstrated in chapter three.
the constant factors that underpin the choice of geography by terrorist. It is these constants that this study investigates using Garissa County as a case study.

1.6.(c) Conceptual Framework

Theoretical underpinning of this study is a continuation of Katumanga’s conceptual framework for identification of favourable Geographies of terror.²⁹ He argues that favourable geography is a function of Costs (C) and value derived- utility (U). Represented as FS= (C, U). He captures the costs to be a function of $\text{MI}^2 + \text{OB} + \text{SAN} – \text{ICT}$. Where by $\text{MI}^2$ refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative Information (I), communication (C) and transport networks (T). The conclusion therefore is that $\text{FS} = \{(\text{MI}^2 + \text{OB} + \text{SAN} – \text{ICT}), \text{U}\}$.

This study conceptualizes the utility aforementioned as an economic function of benefits and costs. Relying on the assumption that benefits derived by terrorist in targeting a specific State is constant as the objective is. (For example Al Shabaab targeting Kenya for a constant objective of deriving Kenya Defence Force out of Somalia and in possible furtherance of Al Qaeda’s consolidation of the Caliphate). Favourable space for terrorists would be a function of only relative cost per attack. Specifically favourable space would be inversely proportional to the costs. Represented by $\text{FS} \propto \frac{1}{\text{C}}$ collapsed into $\text{FS} = \frac{\text{B}}{\text{C}}$ where $\text{FS}$ is Favourable Space, $\text{C}$ is the cost and the constant $\text{B}$ is the benefit derived.

This theoretical framework is complemented by three models; first, the concept of rational behaviour of consumer. This economic model proposes that individuals in a market set up are rational in character always seeking to maximize utility (U). Their behaviour is determined by benefits (B) and costs (C) accrued to them by the choices they make subject to

certain constraints \[U = f (B, C) \text{ subjects to other constraints}\]. The utility that an individual derives from purchasing an alternative good/service determines the decision he would make. Thus if Utility zero is greater than Utility one and the latter is greater than Utility two \((U_0 > U_1 > U_2)\) then a consumer would go for the alternative with the highest Utility \((U_0)\).

This economic model spawns the following assumptions in the study of geographies of terror. (1) That, terrorists can rank their alternative geographical space over the entire field of choice. (2) That, terrorists’ behaviours are transitive, thus if they prefer geographical space A to B, and B to C, then they must prefer geographical space A to C. (3) Finally that terrorist does not have capacity to target all the alternatives of target geographical spaces at the same time.

If the foregoing assumptions are observed, a terrorist’s choice of a favourable geographical space (FS) as a target is directly proportional to the utility \((U)\) derived \(\{FS \propto U\}\). Since utility is directly proportional to the benefits \((B)\) and inversely proportional to the costs incurred \((C)\) - \(\{U \propto B \times 1/C\}\), favourable space \((FS)\) can be said to be directly proportional to benefits \((B)\) and inversely proportional to cost per terror attack \((C)\) - \(\{FS \propto B \times 1/C\}\).

In view of the foregoing, the favourability of a geographical space \((FS)\) would be increased by an increase the benefits derived while it would be reduced by increase in the cost per attack. Therefore for a state to reduce the chances of an attack in a particular venue then it should reduce the benefits and increase the costs of attack. Since benefits is a function of the costs, the latter as the key determinant of the favourability of space for terror attack \(\{FS \propto 1/C\}\). Where FS is the favourable space to terrorist and C is the cost per terror attack.

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31 This assumption is adopted from conditions that must be satisfied by rational consumers in a market set-up; Phillip Hardwirck (1999). Ibid.
The major short coming in the application of this theory in the study of terrorism is its appreciation of the costs as being only economic. However as a political act, costs that inform the behaviour of terrorists as rational actors range from political, social and economic costs. Ngunyi and Katumanga borrow from Hanrahan’s Military Spaces (MS) favourable to guerrillas to explain political and social costs that are involved in terrorism. MS is a function of $M^2 + OB + SAN - CT$, where, $M^2$ refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative communication (C) and transport networks (T).\textsuperscript{32}

Ngunyi and Katumanga further argue that costs that militias, gangs and insurgencies incur are a function of the level of sanctuaries (SAN) and obstacles (OB) occurring in mileage square space. Represented as an equation $FS= M^2 + OB + SAN - ICT$; where, $M^2$ refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative Information (I), communication (C) and transport networks (T). Although these two scholars only base their argument on the rise of gangs, militias and insurgencies; the argument they make are equally applicable to terrorism as a 4\textsuperscript{th} Generation warfare.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite their broadening of the perception of costs in their model, Ngunyi and Katumanga do not explain what factors result into distance decays. This study complements this conceptualization by explaining the factors that result in distance decay. It locates this on the dysfunctional operationalization of National Security Policy as explained by Drew and Snow in their link model of strategy making process.\textsuperscript{34} They contend that strategy making process is a link model which starts from the National Security Policy defining the interest of the state, the


grand strategy developing, deploying and employing all the instruments of power in specific proportions to meet a particular threat. To operational strategy that plans, orchestrates, and directs campaigns within a theater of operations lastly tactical employment of forces in the battlefield in furtherance of the National Interest.35

It is the application of this model that the state continuously reduces the level of distance decay at the social, political and economic levels. Challenge arises when institutions that wield the state’s instruments of power misinterpret or do not properly conceive the National interests and the subsequent unsynchronized operationalization of the National Security Policy at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels. This is mostly the case with unwritten National Security Policy.

1.7 Research Hypotheses

1. That the increase in terror attacks is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. The costs are appended on distance decay at Political, Social, and Economic levels in Garissa County. These distance decays spawn sanctuaries in time and space that reduces the cost while increasing the utility of terror.

2. That the increase of terror attacks in Garissa County is a function of the operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels.

3. That the containment of attacks in Garissa County is a function of reduction of distance decay at the Political, Social and Economic levels. It is also a function of coming up with a written National Security Policy and appropriately operationalizing it at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels.

1.8 Methodology

This study relied majorly on secondary sources of data that reported terror incidents in Garissa County from November 14, 2011 to December 30, 2012. Information was collected on nature of attacks, the venue of attacks, the actors involved and the response from both the state and the civilians. The secondary data was collected through the review of terror incidences reported in Online News Sources. The choice of secondary data was based on the Security nature of the study and the implied inaccessibility to classified information on the terror attacks.

The major weakness of secondary data in this study was the constant mutation of variables involved. To address this weakness this study complemented and cross examined the secondary data by primary data collected through Key Person Interviews and observation. Key Person Interviews on officers from the National Intelligence Service, Kenya Police Anti Terror Unit and Kenya Defence Force involved in Operations and intelligence collection in Garissa County. These officers were selected because they have the monopoly of classified information about terror activities in the county. The major challenge in performing these interviews was the laxity by the respondents to grant the interviews because the security nature of the study. This was sorted out by the assurance that the researcher shall not give out their identities (See Appendix III for the Interview guide).

The study cumulatively put the incidences together and identified variables that contributed to the increment of obstacles and sanctuaries in the area of study that lowered the costs of terror. These variables were collated and subjected to theoretical interrogation to create a picture of what constitute a favourable geography for terrorism. This was mapped against this study’s conceptual framework $FS = MI^2 + SAN + OB - ICT$. 
The study intercoursed criterion-related validity test and content validity test to indicate the degree to which the observations made, the interviews conducted and data from the secondary sources were valid. Criterion related validity test was demonstrated by application of generalities about the data collected on factors underlying terrorism and prediction of occurrence of terror in other locations. Content validity was demonstrated by the extent to which data collected from the secondary sources are verified by the primary sources.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study is organized around five chapters; CHAPTER ONE outlines the problem statement of the study, the research questions, justification of the study, the literature review, the conceptual framework and the supposed hypotheses of this study. The aforementioned components of chapter one gives the background that shapes chapter two, three, four and five.

CHAPTER TWO outlines a historical analysis of the problem statement in chapter one. It discusses the variables that underpin the rise of terrorism in Garissa County in a historical perspective. Specifically it examines and analyzes the origin of terror in North Eastern and Upper Eastern districts of Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo from 1895 to 2010. In deed this chapter analyzes how the political, social and economic distance decay discussed in chapter three are anchored in the colonial era and the subsequent three regimes after independence.

CHAPTER THREE responds to the first question outlined in chapter one. Specifically it examines and analyzes factors that inform increase of terror attacks in Garissa County in the period under study. It examines the mutations in political, social and economic factors identified in chapter two. Specifically this chapter examines and analyzes distance decay in these three variables and how they reduce the costs of terror thus making it a rational decision.
CHAPTER FOUR responds to the second question of this study. Specifically it examines and analyses the nexus between operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy and terrorism in Garissa County. It contends that, increase in instances of terror activities in Garissa County is a function of operationalization of the unwritten National Security Policies at grand, operational and tactical strategy levels. The end result is unsynchronized institutionalized actions that do not progressively reduce the level of distance decays as a measure of reducing time and contracting space available to the terrorist.

CHAPTER FIVE recapitulates on this study by specifically responding to four tasks. The first task is the recapitulation of the core objectives of this study; evaluating the extent to which each task has been met. The second task is the recapitulation of the hypotheses of this study. The third task is to anchor the conclusion of this study. The fourth task is to outline policy recommendations for fighting terrorism in Garissa County.
CHAPTER TWO

GENEALOGY OF TERROR IN GARISSA COUNTY

2.0 Introduction

The essence of the state is to stamp its effectiveness in all functions. Core amongst this are strong and effective institutions with the capacity to control and defend its territory. Have a stable, loyal and cohesive population. Exercise sovereign and legitimate power within its territory. Have the economic prowess to meet the demand and supply of her citizenry and finally enjoy the recognition and respect of other states as a credible member of the global community.36

Operationalisation of the foregoing ensures a state with authoritative political institutions. This in turn enhances state sovereignty over a recognised territory. In effect a state must have three interlocking functions: first, sovereignty that confers identity while guaranteeing an arena of politics, secondly political institutions for tangible organization, decision making and intangible symbol of identity and thirdly capacity to guarantee security for her citizenry.37 Capacity in these three dimensions produces the notion of the state.

The forgoing discourse points towards the state as a recruiter of insecurity (particularly terrorism for this study). To the extent that the government neglects the provision socio-economic and political and fails to control the individuals, it reduces the cost of terror and thus increases its organic supply. Containing them by inference implies the state applying a toolkit of actions that seek to increase the costs of terror.


The genealogy of terror in Garissa County can be traced to failed or misconceived process of state consolidation through violence in the Colonial era and the subsequent three regimes since independence. This chapter interrogates the genealogy of terror as an element of insecurity in North Eastern and Upper Eastern districts of Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo from 1895 to 2010.

The chapter recapitulates historical dynamics in an attempt to trace the mutating variables that underlie terror Garissa County. It responds to the question; ‘which historical elements underlie the favourability of North Eastern and Upper Eastern districts of Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo to terror attacks from 1895 to 2010?’ It examines and analyses socio-economic and political distance decay has spawned into sanctuaries and obstacles endearing this space to illicit non-state actors. The core argument is that over time and space distance decay at Political, Social and Economic levels spawned sanctuaries and obstacles that reduced the risks and costs of terrors activities in this space thus making it favourable space.

This chapter is organized into four sections; section one reviews pre-independence history of Kenya and how it anchors insecurity conditions in North Eastern Province and the Upper Eastern Provinces. Section two examines President Jommo Kenyatta’s era and the challenge of North Eastern Province secession. Section three examines President Daniel Arap Moi’s era analyzing his response to insecurity situation in these spaces. Section four examines President Emilio Mwai Kibaki’s Era from 2003 to 2010. It examines his counterterrorism strategies and the dilemma of maintaining support from the Somali and Muslim community in this region.
2.1 Bifurcated State: Pre-Independence Period (1895 – 1963)

Three categories of interrelated variables helped establish this region as a favourable space for non-state insecurity actors. The aspect of closed spaces put in place by the Colonial government, 1908 demarcation of the boundaries of the Northern Frontier District and legislation of policies and laws that legitimized state oppression of the citizens in this region.

The Aspect of closed space was consciously introduced by the colonial state in Kenya. This was through stifling of the natural evolution of state building undertaking to re-invent traditional boundaries. The end result was a net effect of evolving outlines that tended to shape the social identities. This was reinforced by legal, political and socio-economic policies that spawned both open spaces and closed spaces. This in turn determined the quality of life and the social behaviour of the individuals based on their ethnic orientation. This not only determined the quality of life but also anchored the ‘we versus them’ consciousness amongst communities marginalized from the centre of power.

The first level of ‘closed spaces’ was at the national stage, which served to reinforce ethnic consciousness. At this level, all ethnic groups were essentially territorialized, closed in and forbidden from interacting with each other. This ethnic quarantine, evolved in tandem with differentiated economic opportunities that saw communities proximate to sites of colonial economic extraction gain advantage over the rest. It is this relative deprivation that produced the phenomena of multiple identities during Colonial times and the distance decay between the state and communities that perceived them to be relatively deprived.

The political objective of colonial powers was to reorganize population within their colonial boundaries around narrower identities through either recognizing existing identities or a wholesale re-identification of the people. The re-identification process involved exalting the
 communal identities as legitimate and reducing them to single entities for easy exploitation. The end result was a system of state administration anchored in the protection of the regime and not the physical base of the state. This anchored the political distance decay between the state and the population, making the cost of violence cheaper.

Northern Frontier District was created in 1908. This was due to threats posed by the Ethiopian regime to the property owned by the colonialists. Emperor Menelik II claimed rulership over all the Oromo speakers. He therefore wrote to the Heads of states of Britain, Italy, France, Germany, and Russia, stating claim over the territory stretching from Juba River on Lake Turkana (formerly Rudolf) to Marsabit Mountain. To show intent, Menelik deployed his troops in 1899.\textsuperscript{38}

The Colonial Government was reluctant to venture beyond the railway line, the ‘White Highlands’ and the capital Nairobi. However the threat posed by Menelik encroaching into British territory necessitated a national – strategy for the defence of the entire North Eastern region. In 1902, the British established a boundary commission mandated to establish boundary features and to map out citizens’ ethnic identities. In 1908, an agreement was reached and the final line drawn. North of the line became Ethiopia and its South became Kenya. This resulted in the split of several communities (Borana, Gabbra, Daasanatch, Garreh, et cetera) between Ethiopia and Kenya. This boundary stands to this day.\textsuperscript{39}

Of importance in curving this region was the logic of its construction as a buffer zone between the White Highlands and the Ethiopia. In other words the state did not perceive its defence parse as an end in itself but a means to defend what was considered more valuable to the

\textsuperscript{38} Kenya Commission of Human Rights [KCHR], 2000.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
state ‘The White Highlands’. The end result was a security infrastructure anchored in protection of the Highlands and not the physical base of the state (the population, her wealth and the territory).\textsuperscript{40} In effect this increased the politico-security distance decay between the state and the population.\textsuperscript{41}

The colonial Government enacted several legislations specifically targeting the Northern Frontier Districts. Three of these laws were critical in establishing distance decay between the residence of this region and the state. First the Outlying District Ordinance of 1902 effectively closed the Northern Frontier District. Movement in and out of the area was restricted, and entry and exit to and from the region was only possible for bearers of a special pass. Second, the Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance (1934) together with the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance (1933), granted the colonial administrators extensive powers to arrest, restraint, detain, and seize properties of ‘hostile tribes.’\textsuperscript{42} Finally, the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance legalised collective punishment of tribes and clans for crimes committed by their members, once the Provincial Commissioner declared such a tribe hostile.\textsuperscript{43} These laws legalized the

\textsuperscript{40} In his attempt to conceptualize the concept of National Security Policy, Buzan Conceives the state as made up of the Institutions, the idea of the state and the physical base. It is these that are converged by Katumanga in what he refers to as the triage of the state. See Katumanga, M (2012). Grasping the Concept of In-Security. Unpublished Manuscript.

\textsuperscript{41} According to Buzan Securitization of the state should be anchored on three elements of the state; protection of the idea of the state, the physical base and the institutions. See Barry B. (1983, p 40). People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.

\textsuperscript{42} The instrument granting independence was contained in an extra-ordinary issue of the Kenya Gazette; vide Legal Notice No. 69 of 10 December, 1963. Acting under the Provisions of the Kenya Independence Order in Council, 1963, the Queen of England granted Independence to Kenya by virtue and in exercise of the Powers granted to her by the British Settlements Acts, 1887, and 1945, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.

\textsuperscript{43} Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance Act of 1933.
‘distanciation’ between the state and the citizens especially on the relationship between the population and the law enforcers.

2.2 President Jommo Kenyatta’s Regime and the Dynamics of Shifta Campaigns

President Jommo Kenyatta’s presidency and administration of Northern Frontier District (NFD) was characterised by continuities of colonial policies that reinforced the perception of the Somali as being different from other Kenyan communities. Rather than re-orienting the laws and forms of administration towards the involvement of every all Kenyans, Kenyatta reinforced the elite vertical extraction logic.

Many of the Colonial laws remained in force after independence albeit disguised as new Chapters in the constitution. Restricted Districts Ordinance of 1902 became Cap.103 of the Laws of Kenya. Under section 127 of the independence constitution, the president was granted powers similar to those previously exercised by the Colonial governor-general of ruling Northern Frontier District (NFD) by decree. This was in addition to the 1934 law whose continued application was recommended by the Committee on the Bill of Rights at the Lancaster House constitutional talks. Continuous application of the Colonial Policies reinforced the feelings of otherness that spawned out of the Colonial rule facilitating continuous production of sanctuaries to terrorist and obstacles to state security agencies.

Three subsequent amendments to the independence constitution strengthened the states iron first rule over this region. The first was the third amendment which amended the parliamentary majority required for approval of a declaration of a state of emergency, from 65% to a simple majority. The amendment proceeded to extend the period after which a parliamentary

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44 Kenya Human Rights Commission [KHCR], nd.
resolution must be sought from seven to 21 days. The Arbitrary use the state of emergency promoted brutal collective punishment on the communities which served to distance the populace and the state. As a result the police remained suspended and distant from the society reducing the states capacity to reach the individual therein. In reverse the militias and the insurgents gained time and space to consolidate.

The Second constitutional amendment was the extension of the President’s power to rule by decree to Marsabit, Isiolo, Tana River and Lamu districts. The regulations were published under the Preservation of Public Security Act, Chapter 57 of Laws of Kenya as North Eastern Province and Contiguous Districts Regulations, 1966. This gave rise to the implementation of unsynchronised state policies that did not afford the state the unity of effort in curbing insecurities.

The last amendment that reinforced the state draconian rule in North Eastern Province (NEP) occurred in the enactment of the indemnity act in 197. This Act indemnified government security agents working in NEP Isiolo, Marsabit, Tana River and Lamu districts against any claims, loss or damage occasioned by their actions between December 25, 1963 and December 25, 1967. This act sanctified the alleged brutalities and human right abuses by the police and the military in Garissa County. This law effectively shielded the security agents from accountability, leading to increased human rights violations and abuses and subsequent generation of distance decay at the political level.

All these laws were enacted as measurers to counter the shifta insurgency that pitted the government against the NFDLA. Shifta campaigns begun in the December 24th, 1963 with the

46 The Constitution of Kenya, 1964
declaration of State of Emergency. As soon as the state of emergency was declared by the Prime Minister, operation orders were issued to the 1st, 3rd and 5th battalion of Kenya Riffles.\textsuperscript{47} Kenya lost a number of battles in this campaign because of the tactics employed by the army.

The first tactic involved government security agents confiscating, shooting or poisoning animals to hasten the misery of the locals. Camels became a target for the military and the police because of the belief that they were used for transportation of weapon and their milk sustained the lives of people. An estimated reduction in the population of Camels in Isiolo between 1963 and 1970 was a stunning 70 percent. An even sharper decline of 90 percent was recorded in cattle and small stock (such as sheep and goats) as figures for 1971 from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) study show. Similar trends replicated in Garissa District, where the losses were in the region of 93 percent for camels and 68 per cent for cattle, sheep and goats.\textsuperscript{48}

What is apparent in the foregoing tactical strategy is the state’s negation of the fundamental reason for existence of the state. The state exists for the survival of mankind.\textsuperscript{49} Therefore the extent to which it targeted the livelihood of the residents undermined its legitimacy. This led to the inorganic demand of non-state actors including Shiftas.

The second tactic involved constitution of ‘protected hamlets’ for inhabitants of this region. This involved violent confinement of people into protected camps. This restricted the


movement of Somalis a pastoralist community hence disrupting their natural evolution. Some of the camps included Modogashe, Merti, Garbatulla camps. According Abdullahi Gab (a retired military officer) who was involved in the operation, this tactic was meant to isolate the NEP population from contact with and influence of the NFDLA so as to decrease support services by the populace to the insurgents. However the policy had different results as it effectively closed these groups natural evolution in total disregard to their cultural values, interests and activities for example the only food on offer in the camp was Ugali a foodstuff not common in the Somali community. In the end the tactic actually increased sympathy of the populace towards NFDLA.

The last strategy involved was mass collective punishment of Somali community. This was an extension of the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance (1933) which legalised collective punishment of tribes and clans. An example is an incident in 1966 described by one Ibrahim Dayow to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission when the Kenyan Army came to Hadado in Wajir County.

The military came in more than 30 trucks and they surrounded us. They did not ask us anything. They opened fire on us without any concern. They killed women, men, children, old men and animals. Nothing was left. I remember relatives who were there, most of them died, but only a few escaped. The most painful thing is that I saw my father, Dayow Mohammed Ali. I also remember Hussein and Mohammed were killed during that time. Three of my brothers died there. These were Ahmed, Jilo and Hassan. When I remember that day, I feel like a dead man. It was the most shocking experience of my life. The worst thing was I could not report this incident to anybody. Some of our animals were all killed. Others were taken away from us. Houses were burnt. How did they expect...

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50 Interview with Abdullahi Gab on June 10th, 2013 in Garissa Town.
us to continue living? I slept in the bush for three days. I was shocked and did not know what to do.\textsuperscript{51}

What is apparent in this last strategy is the construction of all Somalis in the Area of Operation as enemies and not part of the state security infrastructure. This is in contradiction to the theory of 4\textsuperscript{th} generational war fare in which the population is the most important intangible centre of gravity whose active or passive support ensures a win.\textsuperscript{52} Because of the brutality of the Army, the population developed fear and mistrust for them. The end result is a population that is politically distant from the military as a state security apparatus and a population that avails little or no information to the Military intelligence network on ground. The non-state actors in reverse gain space and time for planning, organization and consolidation.

Sometime in 1967, the course of the war changed considerably with the announcement of Operation Fagia Shifta (Operation wipe out the Shifta). This was a major counter-offensive against the Shifta fulcrumed on Mao’s logic of winning the population as the Centre of Gravity of the counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{53} The state started by creating incentives to Locals engaged in de-mining of the mines laid by the insurgents. This proved to be a popular measure amongst traders who had lost trucks and merchandise to the explosives. Secondly there were increased joint foot and air patrols. Thirdly Ethiopians were also drawn into the conflict with the signing of a defence pact that dismantled support and protection that the Shifta had been receiving from their kin in Ethiopia. Fourthly, a determined push was made to convert prominent religious, business and


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid
political leaders to the government position. Large barazas were held throughout the province during which the secessionist cause was roundly condemned. Finally, amnesty was offered to former. By the middle of 1967, this multi-pronged operation started to yield results. Valuable intelligence about guerrilla leaders and tactics was received from surrendering Shifta fighters. Military planners used this intelligence to pursue the few remaining active cells still involved in active combat.

2.3 Nyayo Regime and the Politics of insecurity in North Eastern Kenya

During Moi’s era, there were systematic attempts to open up North Eastern Province politically especially during the 1992 general elections. However the regime did not appreciate the importance of economically and socially opening up the space. This engendered economic and political distance decay that produced insecurities in time and space.

A case in point is despite participation in the competitive election there continued to be ethnic violence in North Eastern Province. For example the five year Degodia vs Orma violence from 1991 to 1996 attributed economic relative deprivation of the Orma by the Degodias. Other ethnic/clan conflicts includes; In Isiolo District-the Borana versus a Somali clan, the Degodia; in Wajir District: the Degodia versus the Ajuran, and Mandera and Wajir districts: the Garre versus the Degodia; in Moyale District: the Borana versus the Degodia which led to the Bagalla and Budhudha massacre on October 4th, 1998.

The explanation for the rise of these conflicts though not political can be situated in the Social realm of perceived relative deprivation between the ethnic communities, Robert Merton’s social structure and anomie, broken windows theory and Cloward and Ohlin conceptualization of

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55 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, 1999, pp. 279-283
delinquency and Opportunity. An examination of the 1999 and 2009 population and census data on socio-economic status and its nexus with the level of crime in North Eastern Province ascertain the multiplicity of variables underpinning violence in North Eastern and Upper Eastern Regions.

Table 1: Population of 5 years and above and Highest Level of Education Reached

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level of Education</th>
<th>Number of the population</th>
<th>Percentage of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nil Education</td>
<td>173,142</td>
<td>77.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Primary Education</td>
<td>4,876</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 1-4</td>
<td>14,412</td>
<td>6.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 5-8</td>
<td>12,336</td>
<td>5.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 1-4</td>
<td>9,853</td>
<td>4.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 5-6</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>8,336</td>
<td>3.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>223,705</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1999 Population and Housing Census Volume II (p. 2-34)

Table 2: Population of 5 years and above and Economic Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Active</th>
<th>Numbers of persons</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worked for Pay</td>
<td>14,040</td>
<td>6.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid in Family Business</td>
<td>23,423</td>
<td>10.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in family Farms</td>
<td>47,051</td>
<td>21.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed Persons</td>
<td>24,268</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically Inactive</td>
<td>107,566</td>
<td>48.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>7,357</td>
<td>3.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>223,705</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1999 Population and Housing Census Volume II (p. 3-34)

The above statistics demonstrates that a space in which over a time the state has failed to provide the desired socio-economic demands of the citizens; with an exit rate of 77.4% at nil education and only 0.002% attaining their degrees between 1989 and 1999. This means that
77.4% are chauffeured off from the state active line of formal economic employment, economically distancing them from the state and exposing them to recruitment into illicit militias. 69.423% of the population form the summation of the unpaid in Family Business, the unemployed and inactive Economically Persons most probably feeds the criminal elements in the society as alternative sources of income.

It can be argued that the state’s socio-economic distance decay in North and Upper Eastern Provinces breeds terrorism. J.O. Wilson and G. Kelling’s broken window thesis buttress this assertion. According to these two scholars, when window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken: unattended behaviour leads to breakdown of command and control in the community; thus situations of societal neglect breeds indiscipline, degenerates the society and feeds crime. Therefore, the emergence of terrorists’ cells is a consequence of societal and economic distance decay and the general failure of the state in the socio-economic and political dimensions. This cannibalizes the capacity of the state to control her citizenry.\(^{56}\)

Apart from Social and Economic distance decay resulting from the unsynchronized Political, Social and Economic measures. Another complex scenario for the President Moi’s Bureaucrats was the dynamics of sharing a border with a collapse Somalia state. The collapse of the Somali state converged with a shrinking state through 1990’s Aid conditionalties.

The result was a weak leviathan with lesser capacity to control the movement into her territory. The socio-economic spaces in Garissa County attracted the inflow of illicit regional and individual actors from Somalia. This included inflow of capital from former Somali state officials who invested in Garissa Town. The subsequent creation of the Dadaab camp in 1992

was preceded with an influx of refugees from Somalia. This created a sanctuary of highly militarised individuals who were later recruited for terror, militia and insurgency activities.

The two scenarios presented above and the organic growth of the terrorist elements in Garissa County can also be hinged to the rationality of terror as crime based on Structural Theory of deviant behaviour by Robert Merton. In his article “Social Structure and Anomie”, Merton argues that contradictions are implicit in stratified societies. In such societies culture dictates success goals for citizens whereas institutional access to the goals are limited to the middle and upper strata of the society. Instead of merely conforming while knowing that the legitimate path to success is blocked, members of the lower class would choose deviant alternatives for example terrorism.57

Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, in Delinquency and Opportunity (1960) further Merton’s argument. According to these scholars, it isn’t given that all the lower class will turn to crime as explained by the latter. They argue that only those in the lower class who are predisposed to opportunities to commit crime will.58

The foregoing can be applied in the context of terrorism in Garissa County means that; the inadequacy in the level of education shown in table 1 above leads to unemployment. This limits the economic capacity of the residents to attain comfort and riches (the culturally defined success).59 This pushes the residents into terrorism as a source of economic extraction. The opportunity to engage in terror is offered by continuous of Al Shabaab’s inflow from Somalia.


2.4 President Mwai Kibaki’s Regime and the War on Terror

Former President Emilio Mwai Kibaki came into power in 2002 at the end of the second phase of terror in Kenya.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore his time for reaction to the terror threat was contracted by the immediacy of the threat. He instituted counterterrorism laws specifically informed by the rise of Al Qaeda as a global threat and Al Shabaab as a regional threat both targeting locals and foreigners.\textsuperscript{61}

In responding to the terror threat President Kibaki’s regime tabled ‘The Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003’ in parliament. The bill allowed police to arbitrarily arrest and search property of suspected terrorists. It also allowed investigators to detain suspected terrorists for up to 36 hours. The bill was rejected by parliament under pressure from Muslim population in Kenya.\textsuperscript{62} In 2006, the state re-introduced an amended version of the bill as “Anti-Terrorism Bill 2006”. It was equally rejected at the Parliamentary Committee level. In 2012, the state reintroduced the bill in parliament as ‘Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2012’. This time round it was passed into an Act of parliament and signed into law by President Kibaki in October 2012.\textsuperscript{63} However rather than reducing, terror attacks in Kenya increased with the bill’s enactment. Statistically speaking from October to December 2012, Garissa County experienced six attacks tabulated in table 3.

\textsuperscript{60}Refer to the Statement of the problem.

\textsuperscript{61}Refer to the Statement of the problem.


Table 3: Terror Attacks in Garissa County after the Legislation into law of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>Location in Garissa County</th>
<th>Weapon and Target</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-10-12</td>
<td>Dadaab Refugee Camp</td>
<td>Gun attack on refugees</td>
<td>3 civilians dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-10-12</td>
<td>Mosque in Haghadera Refugee Camp</td>
<td>Gun attack aimed at a Kenya CID officer</td>
<td>1 dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-10-12</td>
<td>Garissa town near First Community Bank</td>
<td>Gun attack aimed at police on patrol</td>
<td>1 police officer dead and 1 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-11-12</td>
<td>Mugdi Market at about 12:30 pm Garissa town</td>
<td>Gun attack aimed at police CID officers</td>
<td>2 police officers dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-11-12</td>
<td>Garissa town</td>
<td>Gun attack at Military officers</td>
<td>3 soldiers dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-11-12</td>
<td>Ifo Refugee Camp in Dadaab Refugee Complex</td>
<td>IED explosion aimed at those registering to vote in 2013 Kenya's General elections</td>
<td>1 civilian injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to table 3 above, terror attacks in Garissa County continued after the signing of the mentioned Bill into law on October 13, 2012. This is an indication that the enactment of the law alone was not enough to fight terrorism without active implementation of the said law. This point is anchored on Cessare Beccaria’s Hedonistic theory which proposes that crime is a manifestation of crisis in the law. Criminals weigh their actions on the potential pleasure derived vis-à-vis the associative potential pain involved. They then rationalize their decisions based on calculation of potential value derived vis-à-vis the risks involved and the potential pain.64

It is these risks involved and the associative pain that draws the link between Cessare Beccaria’s Hedonistic theory and this dissertation’s conceptual framework. What Cessare refers

to as the potential associative pain involved depend on the capacity of the state to reach the individual and inflict the pain. This is a function of the level of distance decay between the state and the individual. The greater the distance decay the lesser the state’s capacity to reach the individual and inflict the pain resulting into rise of more crimes.

As a crime therefore, terrorism is bound to increase to the extent that the associative pain prescribed by the law is lesser than the potential benefit. Worse is the situation when the risk of apprehension and prosecution by the state is even lesser. To this end it can be argued that to the extent that value proposition by terrorists outweigh the associative pain prescribed in the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012, terror incidents would increase.

The value propositions advanced by the terrorist appeal more to the public because the state has failed to provide basic social, economic and political public goods. This therefore explains the logic of terror in Garissa on incapacity of the state. Table 4 and 5 show the level of education reached and the level of economic activeness in Garissa County as at 2009 respectively as indicators of the socio-economic conditions in Garissa County. The explanation thereafter links the data provided for the rationale of terrorism in Garissa County.
Table 4: Population of 3 years and above and Highest Level of Education Reached

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education Reached</th>
<th>Number of the population</th>
<th>Percentage of the Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Attended</td>
<td>379051</td>
<td>66.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Primary</td>
<td>8775</td>
<td>1.5382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>112347</td>
<td>19.6937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>24421</td>
<td>4.2808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>3095</td>
<td>0.5425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>0.4314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Polytechnic</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>0.0417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Literacy</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrass</td>
<td>39662</td>
<td>6.9524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>570473</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5: Population of 5 years and above and Economic Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Activity</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>Percentage of the Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>132705</td>
<td>25.0862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking Employment /No work Available</td>
<td>176406</td>
<td>33.3474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically Inactive</td>
<td>152602</td>
<td>28.8475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>67282</td>
<td>12.7188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>528995</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 shows that 66.445% (379,051 people) of the resident population have no formal education and only 0.4314% (2,461 people) joining the Universities. Correspondingly the level of unemployment and those inactive economically in Garissa County stands at 62.1949%. What is important to note in these figures is the connection between the school attendance and the supply side of terror in this region. The population with no formal education generally feed into the unemployed numbers increasing the supply market for Al Shabaab terrorist. The argument is

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65 According to Kenya integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/6 report; formal education is categorised into primary (Standards 1 to 8), secondary (Forms 1-4) and tertiary schooling (vocational training and university education).
that, economic distance decay lowers the opportunity cost for engaging in terrorism making it a rational choice.

Amongst many probable reasons for non-school attendance, one reason stands clear; the inaccessibility of schools to due to the unavailability of physical infrastructure. 80.9% of the school going population live over 5 Kilometre away from public and secondary schools and 88.5% of the population leave 5 Kilometre or more from Tar/Asphalt roads.\textsuperscript{66} These points to the level of non-penetrability of the society by the state and the consequent distance decay at the physical level between the state and the society. As per to our model the greater the level of non-penetration of the society by the Information (I), communication (C) and technology networks (T) the more the favourable the space for terror attacks.

On Health care services; in the year 2005/6, 77% of women in Garissa district delivered at home with only 22.5% delivering in the hospital.\textsuperscript{67} A survey of North Eastern province over the same period (2005/6) reveals that only 25.8% visited dispensaries and hospital due to poverty and the inaccessibility to the health facilities. Point to note here is that the 77% deliveries not done in the hospital is not captured the government statistics on birth rates. The end result is first inaccuracy of data for policy plans and secondly the aspect of Somali aliens disguising themselves as Kenyans in acquisition of National Identity cards. This is later evidenced in Garissa County in the late 2012, when Ms Mohamed (now a resident of Garissa town) disguised herself to be a child of one of the local women; having no data to verify the authenticity of the

\textsuperscript{66} Kenya intergrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/6, pp.33, 239 and 259.

\textsuperscript{67} 2009 Population and Housing Census Report Volume II.
her citizenship, the provincial administration approved her request. Such acquisition of the National ID cards, acts as an obstacle to the state gives the terrorist accessibility to more spaces and expansion of their physical space base of the terrorists.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE ANATOMY OF TERROR IN GARISSA COUNTY

3.0 Introduction

Terror activities in post-independence Kenya can be organized into four phases as discussed in the ‘problem statement. Of particular interest to this chapter is phase four which saw the number of terror attacks in Garissa county increase from zero ‘in phase three’ to 29 attacks in phase four. This chapter questions factors that underpin this increase of attacks. Its objective is to examine and analyze factors that informed this apparent increase of terror attacks. The assumption underlying this objective is that terrorism is premised on rational decision making based on costs incurred by terrorists.

The major argument advanced here is that, increase of terror activities in Garissa County is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. These costs are appended on the level of distance decay at political, social and economic levels between the residents of Garissa County and the state. This spawns Sanctuaries (SAN) for the Al Shabaab terrorists and obstacles (OBS) for the state security agents. The end results is a Favourable Space (FS) for terrorists represented by (FS) = MI^2 + SAN + OBS – ICT.

This chapter is organized into four sections. Section one shall address Social factors and their link to the rise of sanctuaries and obstacle. Section two examines the Political factors specifically the provincial administration system and its nexus with the rise of terror attacks in Garissa County. Finally, section three examines the Economic factors and the logistic sustenance of Al Shabaab in Kenya through illicit trade in ivory and contraband goods.
3.1 Social Distance Decay and the Increase of Terror Attacks in Garissa County

3.1. (a) Relative Deprivation of the Somali Community in Kenya

Garissa County experienced 29 attacks between October 2011 and December 2012. Of these attacks five provide us with revealing points in analyzing the link between relative deprivation and the challenge of containing terror activities. On November 16th, 2012, unidentified gunmen killed two police officers attached to Garissa Criminal Investigation Department in Mugdi Market. Other than indications to have seen two people flee after the gun shots, Mustafa Ali Abdi, a 27-year-old cosmetics merchant, like other merchants was reluctant to provide the police with any useful leads that would identify the latter culprits.69

On October 30th, 2013 two officers taking coffee were ambushed and shot in a cafeteria near First Community Bank Limited at about 2100hrs. The gunmen stole a rifle belonging to one of the officers. One of the victims Constable Eric Mutuku said that he and his colleague had stopped to take a cup of tea when four young men of Somali origin approached them. One of the gunmen shot him twice on the shoulder and proceeded to shoot the deceased twice in the head. The gunmen then fled into the busy streets of Garissa town. Despite efforts set by the police to apprehend the assailants but no arrests were made.70

On December 20th, 2013, two National Bank workers were shot near DRC nightclub. A third person, an officer working with the ministry of information was killed in one of the town’s commercial streets. A fourth person with gun wounds was immediately rushed to Garissa


National Hospital. The four incidents happened simultaneously within a radius of 300 meters. To date the police are unable to trace the killers.\textsuperscript{71}

On November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2012, 3 KDF soldiers were ambushed and killed by armed terror suspects in Garissa Town. The soldiers had stopped to mend a puncture when the attackers struck. The soldiers sustained serious gun wounds and later succumbed. The assailant melted into the market and the attempt by the security personnel to secure information on the assailant failed a factor that saw the military with support of the police responded by burning the market.\textsuperscript{72}

On June, 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2013, a Kenya’s daily newspaper (Daily Nation) reported that fear of terror attacks is driving out non-Somalis working or doing business in North Eastern. As by that date, 10 schools in Garissa County had been forced to close down. This is after Al-Shabaab killed a teacher at Damajale Primary School in Liboi. The teacher hailed from Nyeri County (Central part of Kenya) and his colleagues from outside the region have since fled. In response to the insecurity situation, the government banned the use of taxis in Garissa town; from 1800hrs to 1800hrs. Some of whom had been penetrated by the Al Shabaab terrorist.

What is apparent here is that, these activities seem to be calculated and targeted government agents. For their survival in the Garissa society, the latter had to adopt the cultural practices of the Somalis for example putting-on of hijabs, close down schools and business and

\textsuperscript{71} Abdisalan A. (2012, December 21). Kenya Gunmen Kill three in Garissa

\textsuperscript{72} Cyrus Ombati , (2012, November 19). Three KDF soldiers killed in Garissa. The Standard
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000070991&story_title=Kenya-Three-KDF-soldiers-killed-in-Garissa-
relocation to either rural villages or Mwaroro and Madogo markets in the nearby Tana River County.\textsuperscript{73}

Equally apparent is the non-cooperation demonstrated by the local population in tracing the terrorists. The populace reluctance to cooperate points to the apparent logic of distance decay between the state and the population: the population shows tendencies of alienation or fear both security for their brutal response and probable actions of insurgents.

The foregoing can be attributed to alienation based on identity crisis appended relative on deprivation of the Somalis.\textsuperscript{74} This is caused by systematic alienation of Northern Frontier District as a periphery during successive post-independent regimes as discussed in chapter two. These actions socially alienated the Somali community spawning passive or active support to illicit non-state actors and disloyalty to the state.\textsuperscript{75} The marginalization sharpened the feeling of difference between the Somalis and the rest of Kenyan communities generating “we” versus “them” notion. This bonded the Somalis together in protecting their own against the state which the former perceived to have excluded them.

The necessity of reducing the ‘we versus them feeling’ and the inculcating loyalty in the population is informed by the appreciation that 4\textsuperscript{th} Generation war fare have the population as its centre of gravity. This is not unique to Garissa County. Hobsbawm argues that the guerrilla’s major asset is non-military and without which he is helpless. He must have sympathy and support of the local population who tells him about the movement of his enemy making him

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} As discussed in Chapter 2.
\end{itemize}
immune to hostile weapons and invisible to hostile eyes.\textsuperscript{76} He is like any Robin Hood or a noble bandit who takes from the rich and gives to the poor and escapes the traps laid by policemen and soldiers until he is betrayed by the peasants: any Robin Hood who loses the support of the population is dead, and so is any guerrilla. The population is therefore a swamp.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{3.1. (b) Dadaab Refugee Dilemma}

Kenya’s attempt to contain terrorism in Garissa County is constrained to a large extent by the presence of refugee camps in Garissa County. These camps were set in 1991 to accommodate refugees fleeing civil strife in Somalia. Although they have a capacity of hosting up to host 90,000 refugees, the camps currently hold in excess of 423,496 registered refugees.\textsuperscript{78}

The challenge in these camps is the ease with which Al Shabaab has infiltrated and set up terror cells in them. Mr Albert Kimathi, Dadaab District Commissioner (DC) affirms the same when he says that; Dadaab camp host Al Shabaab militias and ex-combatants running away from Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) troops deployed in Somalia.\textsuperscript{79} Further he attributed the failure of apprehension of the Al Shabaab in the camps to the incapacity of the Kenya’s security agencies to separate Al Shabaab from genuine refugees.

What the DC doesn’t allude to which this study notes is the ability of Al Shabaab to exploit networks in the camps to its advantage in comparison to Kenyan Security forces. This is


\textsuperscript{77} Tse-Tung, (1937/1992).Ibid.


evidenced by the capacity of the terrorists infiltrate the camps, set up cells and covertly use them as arms cache.\textsuperscript{80}

The foregoing is attributed to social distance decay between the refugees and Kenya. Because of the social distance between the two, the refugees find lesser value in revealing identities of the Al Shabaab amidst them to the security agencies. The end result is the latter’s lack of intelligence on the Al Shabaab activities in the camps. This gives the terrorists space and time for logistic and operation planning.

The government response to the transformation of the refugee camps as conduits for arms and terror agent have been reactive: it merely called for the relocation of the camp. Notable reactions are; first, President Mwai Kibaki appeal to United Nations Secretary General Banki-Moon to facilitate the relocation of Somali refugees in Kenya to liberated regions in Somalia. This was on September 24\textsuperscript{th}, 2012 during United Nations General Assembly. The reason he gave for this request was that the camps had become arms cache creating insecurity situation in Garissa County.\textsuperscript{81}

Secondly, on December 17\textsuperscript{th}, 2012 Mutea Iringo (Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Security in Kenya) and Honourable Ongeri (Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs) called for the relocation of all Somali refugees from other towns to Dadaab so as to limit the spread of


illicit weapons from the latter to other towns as a stop gap measure before moving the the refugees to Somalia as per to the president request to the United Nations.  

3.1. (c) Religion and the Politics of indoctrinated Violence

One religious variable that contributed towards distance decay at the social level was Al Shabaab exploitation of the mosque for radicalization of the Muslims. This created distance decay between the Muslim and the Christians in Garissa County. The end result was three folds. Firstly, dislocation of the social fabric that holds the two groups together. Second, rise of violence between the groups and thirdly, the inorganic demand of vigilantes by the groups for protection. Al Shabaab would most likely form vigilantes for one of the belligerent in such an ensuing conflict.

Examples of such sermons are those delivered by Sheikh Mohammed at Jamia Mosque. The sermons consistently hit out at Christian evangelical churches and in effect sharpening the differences between the Muslims and the Christian as narrated by a source in the Kenya National Intelligence Service. According to an interview with a police officer belonging to the Anti Terror Police Unit, the Imams are most concerned with five issues. First, fiery sermons against Islam by the evangelical churches, second fear that Christians are engaged in aggressive proselytism third, Christians being employed as intelligence collectors by the Western state and


84 Interview by a source at the National Intelligence Service in Garissa Town on August 5, 2013.
finally mental construction in the residents that Christians form part of the Kenya’s political architecture that has marginalized them since independence.\textsuperscript{85}

Three attacks on churches demonstrate the foregoing explanation. On July 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2012 Al Shabaab attacked an African Inland Church (AIC). Four men stormed the Church at 1030hrs and shot dead two Administration Police officers manning the gate. They then proceeded into the church detonated a hand grenade and indiscriminately shot at the worshippers. 17 died while 63 were critically injured. The AIC attack coincided with another at the nearby St Mary’s Catholic Church that left three people seriously injured after a hand grenade was hurled at them.\textsuperscript{86} On November 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2012, Al Shabaab hurled grenade at Utawala Inter-denominational Church-Garissa. One policeman died and 14 worshipers got wounded. In response Catholic Bishops of Kenya condemned the attacks on the church.\textsuperscript{87}

Although the attacks were at a tactical level the aim was strategic. To sharpen religious divide between Christians and Muslims so as to cause religious conflict. This would organically endear the rise of vigilantes and therefore Al Shabaab finding a legitimate reason to exist as combatants. This would force a possible redeployment of Kenyan troops from Somalia. Additionally, the attacks targeted the Social Centre of Gravity of Kenya thus breaking the will and cohesion of the public to wage the war against Al Shabaab.

\textsuperscript{85} Interview by an Anti Terror Police officer in Garissa County on August 2, 2013.


3.2 Politico-Security Distance Decay and increase in Terror Activities

Key politico-security factor that has contributed to political distance decay is the organization and culture of political administrative structures in Garissa County. This is hinged on two factors; first the twisted logic of elite protection that constructs the elite as the objects of security and the population as the threat to the elite. Secondly, corrupt culture in the Provincial Administration that has transformed it to a termite economy for personal gains.

The Provincial Administration in Garissa County is structured around the organizational philosophy of the ruling elite. It concentrates on the protection of individuals in power and their properties as opposed to the physical base. Instead the physical base is constructed as the enemies of the state further increasing the distance between the two. The end result is suspension of the latter above the society with it having limited knowledge about the former.

Lack of information by the provincial administration in Garissa County is demonstrated by several instances. In fact it would be argued that the non-foiling of the recorded 29 terror attacks is partly caused by lack of information. However, two instances clearly demonstrate this lack of information. First, admission by Dadaab District Commissioner (Mr Albert Kimathi) that the state could not separate Al Shabaab from genuine refugees because both had the same language, mode of dress and culture. Second the capacity of Somali immigrants to disguise themselves as Kenyans and acquire National Identity (ID) Cards without being noticed by vetting officers from the provincial administration.

88 Barry Buzan defines the physical base as the most important component of what he refers to as the triage of the state on which security must be based for survival of the state. See Barry B. (1983, p 40). People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.

For instance, Ms Mohamed a lady leaving in a single room one kilometre from Garissa police station crossed Somalia-Garissa County border as an illegal migrant in late 2012. She hired a local at the border who guided her road trip, helped her evade police road block and make her way safely into Garissa town at a fee. Within six weeks in Garissa town the guide delivered to her an original Kenyan Identity (ID) Card. Details in the card indicated that she was born in Garissa and the card issued at Sankuri on November 19th, 2012. Though she was 21 years old, she indicated her age as 19 years to avoid suspicion from the provincial administration and registration officers on why she delayed to make her application. The guide presented Ms Mohamed to immigration officers as her second lastborn to authenticate her claim as Kenyan nationality.

What is apparent in this reconstruction of Ms Mohamed’s narrative is; first, the incapacity of the state to control access to her territory as part of physical base. Secondly, the incapacity of the state to tell who its citizens is and who are not. As a result there is easy accessibility and acquisition of Kenya Identification Cards. These are force multipliers to Al Shabaab as they make easy their movement in Garissa County.

The orientation of the Provincial Administration towards protection of the elites in Garissa County is also demonstrated by the spatial positioning of the Police and the supporting Military detachments within a radius of 3 Kilometres in Garissa town, Kolbi and Liboi areas in Garissa County. All these areas are dominated by elites or senior provincial administrators. In the

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90 Going into the refugee camps could have restricted her movements out of the camps to only when she has special permits.

end greater parts of Garissa County remain unoccupied by the state forces, giving the advantage of force to space ratios to the Al Shabaab militia.

The foregoing contention is borrowed from Max Weber’s ‘stateness’. According to him, the state must wield the monopoly of violent force. Only under such circumstance can it administer a space.\textsuperscript{92} The level of states is therefore measured by the extent of domination of the violent instrument of power in the society. To the extent that Kenya has a lesser force to space ratio as compared to Al Shabaab in certain parts of Garissa County then its capacity to dominate reduces. It is these geographies not dominated by Kenya that Al Shabaab terrorists locate themselves in over time.

The second politico-security variable that makes Garissa County a favourable space for terrorist is corruption amongst the administrators. This is demonstrated by police syndicates aiding of Somali alien illegal movement into Kenya as Mbuzis,\textsuperscript{93} and importation of contraband sugar into Garissa County from Somali by a syndicate between the illegal immigrants, state agents and the Al Shabaab as would be discussed in the section 3.3.

\textbf{3.3 Economic Distance Decay and Sustenance of Terror Activities in Garissa County}

A main effort for Al Shabaab’s sustained attacks in Garissa County is continuous logistic inflow. This lies in its capacity to find and extract resources. The resources are used for recruitment, payments for weapons, bribing of Kenyan security agents and logistic sustenance of their operations in Garissa County. Al Shabaab main sources for logistic sustenance in Kenya are two; contraband sugar trade in Garissa Town and poaching in the Kenyan parks.


\textsuperscript{93} Wafula P. (September 7, 2013). Amina was smuggled into Eastleigh estate for Sh25, 000.00. The Standard Newspaper.
Firstly, Al Shabaab engages in contraband sugar trade in collusion with Kenyan merchants and Kenya security agents. Mr Mohammed Maalim, former County Commissioner for Garissa County argues that this was necessitated by the loss Kismayu port. Apparently the port was Al Shabaab’s economic centre of gravity. Garissa County Development officer Kenneth Rutere puts the value of the contraband sugar-import trade at $1.2 billion annually.

What is most important here to note here are three issues; first, the incapacity of the state to pinpoint those dealing in the contraband sugar. Secondly the value of the trade and its capacity to sustain the logistic demand of Al Shabaab cells in Garissa County. Finally, the sugar trade acting as a conduit for illegal arms into Garissa County. Mr Mohammed Maalim affirmed this when he said that, the sugar trade saw an auto-resupply of arms and ammunition from the ‘rear’ in Somalia to the ‘front’ in Garissa County and a continuance financial sustenance of the militia’s activities in Garissa County.

The second source of logistic support is from poaching. A syndicate of Al Shabaab, Kenya Wildlife Service officers and officials of Kenya Ports Authority facilitates poaching of Ivory in Kenya and subsequent export to the East Asia states. The proceeds from the sales are used to support Al Shabaab activities in Garissa County. On May 25th, 2012, Dr Julius Kipng’etich, the Kenya Wild Life Director acknowledged that Al Shabaab Militia were involved


95 Ibid

96 Ibid
in poaching activities in Kenya for their funding.\textsuperscript{97} Sources within the National Intelligence Service also reveal a symbiotic network involving officers from the Kenya Wildlife, Kenya Ports Authority and Al Shabaab that collude to engage in poaching for symbiotic gain.\textsuperscript{98}

Activities of the syndicate range from Al Shabaab supply of the weapon, Kenya Wildlife Service officers facilitating killing of the Rhinos and the elephants. Lastly, Kenya Ports Authority covertly exporting the ivory as normal containers for export to East Asian States especially China and Malaysia. The funds generated are used for logistic support to Al Shabaab activities in Garissa County.\textsuperscript{99}

Two reasons explain the shift to contraband trade and poaching in Kenya by the Al Shabaab. First, the capture of Kismayu-Al Shabaab’s economic Centre of gravity by the KDF troops on September 22, 2012 and secondly reduction in the amount of proceeds from piracy in the Somali water to its lowest in 2012 (233 incidents) since 1999. Initially meant to logistically dislocate Al Shabaab, the reduction in the mentioned sources of income for the Al Shabaab necessitated a shift their Economic Centre of Gravity. The choice of Kenya was informed by the ease of penetration and illicit economic extraction due corrupt nature of state agents in Kenya.


\textsuperscript{99} Wesangula D. (September 28, 2013). Ibid.
3.4 The Geography of Terror\textsuperscript{100}

The chapter contends that Garissa County is a favourable geography of terror to the extent that there is distance decay (DD) at the social, political and economic levels. Distance decay at these three levels result into sanctuaries and obstacles at each level. At the social level, distance decay results into a sense of ‘otherness’ that informs the residence lukewarm cooperation with the security actors. At the politico-security level distance decay results into incapacity of the provincial administration to effectively administer and ensure law and order. At the economic sector distance decay is animated by increased economic spaces in poaching and sale of contraband sugar.

A favourable geography sums up all these obstacles and sanctuaries at the political, social and economic levels and adds them to the physical area (herein measured in square mileage) less the impact of penetrative Information, communication and technology network. As an equation therefore - (FS) = MI\textsuperscript{2} + OB + SAN–ICT, where FS is Favourable Space for terrorists, MI\textsuperscript{2} refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative communication (C) and transport networks (T).\textsuperscript{101} Having examined the components of a favourable space, the next chapter examines and analyzes the reason why the distance decay exists in Garissa County.


CHAPTER FOUR

MIRRORED IMAGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN GARISSA COUNTY

4.0 Introduction

Internal security policy is the art and science of coordinating the development, deployment and employment of internal security assets supported by other instruments of power to achieve internal security objectives. According to Drew and Snow, internal security policy presupposes the existence of National Security Policy. This policy outlines the interests of the state, object of security and the threats to the interests. It informs the defence, internal security and foreign policies.

The challenge comes in when a state has no written National Security Policy. First there is the presumption that all the state security agencies have a synchronized appreciation of the state interests, objects of security and threats to the National Security. Absence of such a synchronized appreciation results in a dysfunctional operationalization of the policy at grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels. The end result is unprepared state to meet the threat in a battlefield.

Despite these challenges, Reinicke argues that policies do not have to be written. Under such circumstances statements articulated by people in authority and cultures engrained in the

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103 Musambayi Katumanga, Grasping the Notion of In-Security. (Unpublished Manuscript).

institutions assume the position of policy and policy behaviour.\textsuperscript{105} Although this is a fact, this chapter contends that such tendencies are inadequate to the extent that the cultures and statements made by the leaders are only constructed in light of previously and currently experienced threats. This limits their capacity to address the mutating nature of terrorism.

In this regard chapter responds to the second question of this study, ‘how does the operationalisation of National Security Policy in the absence of a written one underpin the rise of terror attacks in Garissa County?’ It examines and analyses the nexus between operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy and terrorism in Garissa County. The assumption here is that written National Security Policy clearly identifies the interests of the state, objects of security and its security threats. If identified then the understanding of policy is synchronized and effectively operationalized in light of the anticipated threats.

This chapter contends that, increased instances of terror activities in Garissa County are a function of operationalization of the unwritten National Security Policies at grand, operational and tactical strategy levels. The end result is unsynchronized institutionalized actions that do not progressively reduce the level of distance decays as a measure of reducing time and contracting space available to the terrorist.

To this end this chapter is organized into three sections. Section one examines the challenges in the operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy at the grand strategy level. It interrogates how the absence informs the development, deployment and employment of economic, political and military instruments of power in Garissa County. Section two examines challenges of the operationalizing unwritten National Security Policy at the Operational level. It

interrogates how this impact on planning, orchestrating and directing a multi layered operation. The last section examines the challenges of operationalizing unwritten National Security Policy at the tactical level. It analyzes the challenges in application of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in the light of the dynamic nature terrorism and the unwritten National Security Policy.

4.1 Unwritten National Security Policy and the Challenges at Grand Strategy Level

Grand strategy is the art and science of coordinating the development and use of all instruments of power including political, economic and military to achieve national security objectives. It relies on clear identification of the interest of the state, objects of security and the threats to those interests. If identified then the understanding of policies is synchronized and effectively operationalized in light of the anticipated threats as per to the assumption of this study. This is only possible when the National Security Policy is written.

In Kenya where the National Security Policy is unwritten there exists unsynchronized interpretation of the Policy. The end result is an ad hoc grand strategy that either emphasizes inappropriate use of military compared to economic and political instruments in fighting terror threats. To add to this, the reliance of ad hoc grand strategy has meant that instruments of power are not developed in advance, deployed and employed in appropriate proportion to handle insecurity situations like terror in Garissa County.

This is evident in Kenya’s war against Al Shabaab in which only military instrument of power was employed. Kenya instituted no political or economic measures in support of the

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military especially to ensure that Al Shabaab do not shift their geographies to the rears of the KDF forces in Garissa County.\textsuperscript{107}

At the lateral level, grand strategy policy informs the Defence, Political and Economic policies. Vertically grand strategy determines the character of institutions including the doctrines, the individuals recruited and the infrastructural components of the institutions in line with the objects of security.

The challenge with both the lateral and vertical nature of grand strategy lies at two levels. Laterally, unwritten National Security Policy implies no defined objectives of security and threats to National interests that would inform the defence, political and economic policies. And further inform the development, deployment and tactical employment of instruments of power. Therefore these policies would only be based on past experiences likely not to effectively handle the mutating nature of future threats.

Vertically, there is uncertain nature of the battle field in the war against Al Shabaab. This renders the traditionally informed institutional doctrines guiding the development, deployment, employment of the political and economic instruments as well state security agencies inadequate to fight the Al Shabaab threat.\textsuperscript{108} Indeed the traditional doctrines on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for action at the operational and tactical level are continuously outmaneuvered by the Al Shabaab terrorists in the battlefield. This is demonstrated by the number of attacks in Garissa County in which the perpetrators were not apprehended as discussed in chapter three.


4.2 Unwritten National Security Policy and the Challenges at Operational Strategy Level

Conventionally Operational strategy employs the forces provided by Military policy. It is the art and science of planning, orchestrating, and directing Military campaigns within a theater of operations.\textsuperscript{109} In counterterrorism operations the actors involved in the campaigns would not only be military but also the police, Non Government Organizations, Intergovernmental Organizations, private corporations and other organizations that wield diplomatic, informational and economic power.\textsuperscript{110}

There is a critical symbiotic relationship between Military and Non-military components of these campaigns. These latter components bring expertise that complements the former. At the same time, the civilian capabilities cannot be employed effectively without the security that military force provides. Effective counterterrorism commanders understand the interdependent relationship of all these participants, thus plan and orchestrate their effort to achieve unity of command, unity of effort for coherent results.

The operational level is intended to connect the strategic objectives and the tactical actions, via an operational design. It must be carefully nested within the strategic objectives and desired end states given. And it must adequately direct tactical forces; joint or not, not just in a synchronized and integrated manner based upon the operational environment considering both own capabilities and that of the opponent.

The art of orchestrating suggests that within a campaign, the capabilities of various forces must be combined harmoniously to achieve a synergistic relationship. This is only possible through application of unity of command and effort. To establish effective organized control and


use of violence, the Unity of Command must spread to the entire military component, the police and other actors in the area of operation. This brings forth the notion of the art of direction in operational strategy.

Here directing occurs as an art of command and control of all forces involved in the joint campaigns or operations.\textsuperscript{111} It should be exercised by a single leader through formal command and control systems. It involves a number of activities including; outlining joint Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives; initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

The art of direction presupposes a defined objective prescribed in the National Security Policy. Therefore to the extent that the Kenya’s National Security Policy do not define the objective, the objects of security and the threats to security especially Al Shabaab, then the it becomes impossible to direct the forces towards any specific aim.

The foregoing aspects of operational strategy and the challenge in their realization in the absence of a written National Security Policy play out in the below reconstructed terror attack in Garissa County. This reconstruction shows lack of planning, orchestration and unity of command. On February, 19\textsuperscript{th} 2012 at about 1130 hrs there was an Al Shabaab attack at Hulugho police post. About 30 Al Shabaab militias attacked the post killing a policeman and a civilian. The manpower availability at the police post at the time of attack was six. Kenya Defence Force (KDF) troops stationed at Kolbio-Hulugho detachment barely 2Km away from the scene of the terror attack did not respond to the attacks.\textsuperscript{112}


What should have happened is that the police post would have had necessary manpower in its strength to contain the attack. Secondly, there could have been lateral communication and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for reinforcement between the police and the army in the local areas with no waiting for directions from the Department of Defence Headquarters. This promotes unity of effort, concentration of force and sustenance of tempo to break Al Shabaab’s will and cohesion to attack.

In the contrary to the forgoing, what is apparent in this attack is the size of force in the police detachment and the reaction by the military. In an attack of about 30 militants, the repulsive force of the police is six. This indicates non imagination of the strength of the possible threat posed by Al Shabaab in this geography. The deployment of inadequate number of police was probably based on the ingrained traditional numbers deployed or personal directions issued by a senior officer in the Police structure.

The non-responsive attitude of the military detachment deployed merely 2Km away points towards the lack of priori planning for reinforcements between the military and the police deployed in this region. Even though the constitution mandates the Military to play a supportive role to the civil authority, no policies are in place to direct on how such support would be called upon especially at the tactical level. As a result all communication in emergencies through the police and defence headquarters for command to issued to respective tactical commanders in the areas of operation. This gives time for the terrorists to escape from the scene of the attack And in effect reducing the risk of apprehension.


114 Interview with a Senior Military Officer based in Garissa County on September 5, 2013.
4.3 Unwritten National Security Policy and the Challenges in the Battle Field Strategy

Drew and Snow, define tactics as the art and science of employing forces in the battlefield to achieve a specific national security objective.\textsuperscript{115} The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those military tactics, techniques, and procedures and how they can be applied in the battlefield.\textsuperscript{116} It consists of three interrelated aspects, first, the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions. Secondly, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy and lastly understanding the effects of combat on soldiers.\textsuperscript{117}

Most important to note in counterterrorism is the second aspect of Tactics as an art of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and an intelligent enemy. This makes a direct link between tactics and terrorism, and tactic and the strategic process of developing the tactical commander. This means that, the capacity of the tactical commander to outmaneuver the terrorist in the battle front is directly related to the strategic conception of the threat. This is hinged on clear definition of the national interest, objects of security and construction of the long term threats to those interests.

It can be argued that the level to which Al Shabaab terrorist outmaneuvered tactical commanders in Garissa County is directly proportional to level of strategic non-imagination of the threats and subsequent development of that instrument for employment at the tactical level.

\textsuperscript{115} Dew M. and Snow D. M. Ibid pp 20-21


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
Such imaginations are only possible if the National Security Policy is written down in advance. In response troops fall back to cultures and traditions.

In Garissa County, the inclination of the tactical commanders is towards implementation of traditional way of conducting operations. As a result the capacities of the tactical commanders to effectively counter Al Shabaab attacks in Garissa County are limited. A case in point is the attack on 30th October, 2012 at about 1930hrs. Two Kenya Police officers were shot at while on patrols along ‘Ngamia road-Garissa town’ by Al Shabaab terrorist who escaped with their two G3 rifles and 40 rounds of ammunition. The response of the police manning the main gate nearby police post was to rush back into the camp, only to respond 30 minutes later.118

Tactics as an art constantly vary with the situation; therefore the tactics manual only offers a menu from which to choose. Tactics against terrorists is unique. Here the tactical commander might not have used a particular combination of options before. Therefore when confronted by a situation, he must choose from a variety of possible solutions and adapt their solution to circumstances at the point of engagement. For this reason military doctrine that is prescriptive in nature as culturally ascribed doctrines are a prelude to defeat. They offer little room for innovativeness thus the tactical commander loses as he would be outmaneuvered by a more innovative opponent.

CHAPTER FIVE
RECAPITULATION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter recapitulates on this study by specifically responding to four tasks. The first task is the recapitulation of the core objectives of this study; evaluating the extent to which each task has been met. The second task is the recapitulation of the hypothesis of this study. The third task is to anchor the conclusion of this study in the major arguments presented. The fourth task is to respond to the third objectives in specific to outline the policy recommendations for fighting terrorism in Garissa County.

5.1 Factors Underpinning Terrorism in Garissa County

5.1.(a) The Politics of Distance Decay and Political Economy of Terror in Garissa County

In its first objective is to examine and analyze factors that informed this increase of terror attacks. The assumption underlying this objective is that; terrorism is premised on rational decision making based on costs incurred by terrorists. The major argument advanced here is that, the increase is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. These costs are appended on distance decay (DD) at Political, Social and Economic levels between the residents of Garissa County and the state.

The aforementioned distance decay spawns sanctuaries for the Al Shabaab terrorists and obstacles for the state security agents. In effect this reduces the capacity of the state to dominate the space and control activities therein. This feeds into this study’s conceptual framework that
(FS) = MI² + SAN + OBS – ICT. The greater the distance decay at the Political, Social and Economic levels in the County, the higher the number of sanctuaries and obstacles, the lesser the cost of terror, hence the more favourable the space to terror attacks.

To attain the foretasted objective, factors underpinning terrorism in Garissa County were organized under three broad categories; social factors, political factors and economic factors. In order to establish the social factors that underpin terrorism, the study sought to examine three variables: relative deprivation of the Somali community, Dadaab Refugee Dilemma and the religion as a causal factor of indoctrinated violence.

In examination of the relative deprivation of the Somali Community, the study looked at how continuous marginalization of the Somali community informed terrorism in Garissa County. Collected data on indicators of marginalization included first, accessibility to social, economic and public goods. Secondly, instances of terror incidences and the response by the Somali community. What was apparent the non-cooperation demonstrated by the local population in tracing the terrorists. This response is explained by identity crisis appended in relative deprivation from the colonial era and the subsequent three regimes.¹¹⁹

In examination of the Dadaab refugee menace, this study sort to demonstrate how the presence of Dadaab camp increase the level of sanctuaries and obstacles thus hampering war on Al Shabaab. The assumptions here were; some refugees are either Al Shabaab terrorist, or their sympathizers. The findings revealed that; first, Al Shabaab infiltration and setting up of terror cells in Dadaab camp. Secondly, Dadaab acting as arms cache, thirdly, incapacity of the state security agents to distinguish terrorists from normal refugees and lastly reactive response by the

state. These events can be explained by the social distance decay and the suspension of the state over the refugee camps. The end result is that the state lacks Foucault’s panoptic knowledge that would enable it to penetrate, conduct surveillance and control the ongoing in Dadaab refugee camps.¹²⁰

In examining the religion as a causal factor of indoctrinated violence in Garissa, this study examined how Al Shabaab uses terror to exploit the fault lines between the Christians and the Muslims in the County. This is in a bid to consolidate the geographies in Garissa County and justify their existence. The assumption here is that there exist fault lines between Muslim and Christian residence of Garissa County. The facts collected include; sermons in Garissa Jamia Mosque targeting Christians especially the evangelical pastors, targeted killings of Christians (police or not), terror attacks on churches and response by the Council of Catholic Bishops.

The argument is that Al Shabaab has penetrated mosques. It has used them to advance its discourse against Christians and the State. This is with an intention subverting the population to passively or actively support them. The targeted killings of Christians are meant to draw overreaction from the latter and the state security agencies. Such over reaction would persuade more Muslims to be sympathetic or at least neutral to Al Shabaab activities. Although the attacks on churches and targeted killings are tactical, they have strategic objective of dislocating the intangible social centre of gravity of Kenya thus indirectly defeating Kenyan military in Somaia.

Under the Political factors, this study examined how the Provincial Administration has increased the level of Political distance in Garissa County. The end result was a reduction in cost of terrorism and increase of Al Shabaab’s activities in the County. The facts collected include the

logic of existence of the administration being for protection of the elite and corruption within the institution. The end results are three: first, reduced force to space ratio in certain spaces of Garissa County. It is in these spaces that Al Shabaab locates their activities for they hold dominance of violence over the state. Second, suspension of the administration from the society and subsequent lack of intelligence and lastly corrupt acquisition of valid identification documents in Kenya is a force multiplier to Al Shabaab in Kenya.

Under economic factors this study focused on two variable poaching and contraband sugar trade. It analyzed how they converge in creation of the economic spaces that sustain the logistics of Al Shabaab terrorists in Garissa County. Facts collected included; first collusion between security officers, local tradesmen and Al Shabaab in importation of Sugar into Garissa County. Secondly, information on the contraband sugar being used as carriers of weapons and explosives into Garissa County and lastly presence of a syndicate between Al Shabaab, port officials and officers from the Kenya Wildlife Service in poaching.

5.1.(b) Mirrored Image of the National Security Policy

In its second objective this study examined the link between challenges of operationalizing unwritten National Security Policy and the rising distance decay. The assumption here was that only written National Security Policy clearly identifies the interests of the state, objects of security and its security threats. If identified then the understanding of policies is synchronized and effectively operationalized in light of the anticipated threats.

Operationalization would include appropriate; development, deployment and employment of all the three instruments of power.

The study found out that; Kenya has no written National Security Policy. This means it has not clearly defined interests, objects of security and the threats to those interests. The resultant effect are two; first reliance on the whims of the top echelon security bureaucrats and institutional traditions in the battlefield. Secondly, disorganized and reactive development, deployment and employment of the political, economic and military instruments of power to threats to National security like Al Shabaab. This conceptualization is pivoted on the Drew and Snow proposition on the process of strategy making. They draw a link model - from the National Security Council that defines the interests and the threats, the grand strategy, the operational strategy and lastly to the tactical employment of force in the battlefield. 122

5.2 Recapitulation of the Hypotheses

This study had three hypotheses; first, the increase in terror attacks is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. It is appended on distance decay at social, political and economic levels in Garissa County that spawn sanctuaries in time and space that reduce the cost of terrorism in Garissa County. Second, the increase of terror attacks in Garissa County is a function of the operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels. Finally, the containment of attacks in Garissa County is a function of Distance Decay Reduction at the Political and economic levels. It is also a function of coming up with a written National Security Policy and appropriately operationalizing it at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels.

First hypothesis: the increase in terror attacks is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists appended on distance decay at social, political and economic levels in Garissa County. This spawns sanctuaries in time and space that reduces the cost while increasing the utility of terror in Garissa County. The assumption here is that terrorists have complete knowledge of the geographies they can attack and can arrange them in order of costs.

Facts collected at the three levels indicate that, increase in distance decay at the Political, Social and Economic levels spawned obstacles and sanctuaries in Garissa County that eventually reduced the cost of terrorism. Reduction of costs implies increased utility and therefore as rational actors, Al Shabaab chooses Garissa County as a favourable geography. This conclusion is pivoted on this study’s conceptual framework that \( FS = M_I^2 + OB + SAN - ICT \) where \( M_I^2 \) refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative information (I), Communication (C) and Transportation Network (T).\(^{123}\)

Second hypothesis is that the increase of terrorism in Garissa County is a function of the operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy. The assumption here is that only written National Security Policy synchronizes the processes of strategy making at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels with the threats and Interests of the state. The study found out that Kenya has no written security policy. This led to presumption of existence or non definition of the national interests, objectives of security and threats to National Security.

The end results are three dimensional; first, at the grand strategy- inappropriate development, deployment and employment of the political, economic and military instruments of power. Second at the operational strategy - poor planning, orchestration and directing all the

forces and non-military elements involved in counterterrorism campaigns in Garissa County. Lastly, at the tactical level the non-development, poor deployment and poor employment of the military and the police as instruments of power at the grand strategy level results in Al Shabaab outmanoeuvring the forces in Garissa County.

The third hypothesis is that the containment of attacks in Garissa County is a function of two activities; first the reduction of distance decay at the Political, Social and Economic levels. Secondly, coming up with a written National Security Policy and appropriately operationalizing it at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels. The major arguments are; first, distance decay reduction reduces the level of obstacles and sanctuaries in space over time thus increasing the capacity of the state to determine the behaviour of the individual. Secondly, the foregoing distance reduction process is only synchronized when the state has a written National Security Policy.

5.3 Conclusion

Using the model \((FS) = MI^2 + SAN + OBS - ICT\), where FS refers favourable space to terrorist, \(MI^2\) refers to square mileage plus obstacles (OB) plus sanctuaries (SAN), minus penetrative information (I) communication (C) and transport networks (T), this study has examined and analyzed factors that underpin Garissa County as a choice of geographies of terror.

Specifically it has addressed three objectives; first examined and analyzed what underpinned the apparent increase of terror attacks in Garissa. Secondly examined and analyzed the nexus between operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy and terrorism in
Garissa County and lastly to proffer a research based policy options geared towards containing these attacks.

The central arguments in this study are that; first, the increase in terror attacks is a function of reduced costs of attacks for Al Shabaab terrorists. This is appended on distance decay at social, political and economic levels in Garissa County To the extent that distance decay exists at the Political, Social and Economic levels; obstacles and sanctuaries shall occur, reducing the costs of terror and rationalizing the choice of Garissa County as geography by the Al Shabaab.

Second argument is that increase of terror attacks in Garissa County is a function of the operationalization of unwritten National Security Policy at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels of strategy making and policy implementation. To the extent that the National Security Policies of Kenya remain unwritten, there remains no-synchronized development, deployment, employment of the three instruments of power. As a result Al Shabaab continuously outmanoeuvres the state security agencies.

The third argument is that containment of terror attacks in Garissa County is a function of two activities. Firstly, reduction of distance decays at the Political, Social and Economic levels. Secondly, coming up with a written National Security Policy and appropriately operationalizing it at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels. The extent of reduction of distance decay in Garissa County determines the capacity of the state to reach and control the behaviour of the individual therein. This increases the cost of individual engagement in terror activities. Such a process of distance reduction is only possible if Kenya comes up with a written National Security Policy that synchronizes activities at the grand strategy, operational strategy and tactical levels to the interests of the state.
5.4 Policy Recommendations

5.4. (a) Distance Decay Reduction at the Social Level

To reduce distance decay at the Social level the state should address the three causal variables; relative deprivation of the Somali Community in Kenya, religion as a causal factor of violence and Dadaab refugees’ dilemma. To address the first variable, the state must address the notion of ‘we versus them’ feeling. This notion is appended on the systematic marginalization of Northern Frontier District during the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes. The solution would be the State equitably distributing public resources to all regions in Kenya.

To address religion as a causal factor of indoctrinated violence, the state should engage in psychological construction of the mentality of the Muslim residence of Garissa County towards supporting war on Al Shabaab. This should start by the government employing Imams who willingly renounce the use of violence and recant ideological commitments to Al Shabaab. This would sow seeds of doubt across those who have been convinced to join Al Shabaab and deter those in the ideological fence from joining. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have successfully leveraged this approach.124 The media too can play an effective role in publicizing ideological retractions, particularly by conducting interviews with those Imams and publishing their articles.

Related to controlling the spread of Muslim fundamentalism, Kenya should engage in aggressive neutralization or discrediting the guiding thinkers of the Al Shabaab Movement. This is be hinged on Abu Yahya’s argument that not all Jihadists are replaceable. There are some individuals who provide a disproportionate amount of insight, charisma and key ideologues

especially the leadership of Al Shabaab in Kenya.\textsuperscript{125} Such are the individuals who should be lethally targeted or imprisoned.

To address the refugee menace, the state must first register the refugees in Dadaab camp in collaboration with the United Nation High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR). This should be followed by spatial location of the refugee the camps noting recording their specific addresses. The addresses should be collated at a central data point accessible to various state agencies administering the camp. This would increases the capacity of the state to conduct surveillance of terror activities within the camps.

\textbf{5.4. (b) Distance Decay Reduction at the Political Level}

The first policy intervention to reduce distance decay at the political level would be a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of the Provincial Administration. From a system of regime consolidation (where the regime is the object of security), to a system that is fulcrumed on the physical base as the object of security.\textsuperscript{126} This should be followed by designating Al Shabaab as a survival threat to this base, development and employment of all instruments of state power towards fending-off this threat.

Secondly the state should create knowledge around the physical base as its object of security. This would inform consistent planning for contraction of distance between the state and the population. This calls for collection of data on social, economic and political grid of every individual. These data should then be arranged and centralized in such a manner that state-

\textsuperscript{125} Brachman J. (2007, Vol 1, No 5). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Barry Buzan defines physical base of the state as the population, her territory and the wealth therein in. It is a component of the triage of the state when constructing the state as an object of security. See Barry B. (1983, p 40). People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.
officers can see them from various sites with less effort on a need to know basis. Additionally, the data should be collated in a single chip through which one would perform all monetary transactions. This reduces the level of invisibility of the individual to the state. Implementation of this policy requires increased investment in Information, Communication networks.

Thirdly the state should institute a supervisory security bureaucracy that inclusive of all citizens in state protection. Population forms the centre of gravity for terror and counter terror wars. Therefore the state must continuously contract the distance between it and the population so as to control the individual behaviour. Such an arrangement should organize the residents into groups for example ‘a number of households’ with one of them as the in charge. The responsibility of the latter would be to have perfect knowledge of the individuals under him and conduct surveillance of activities in his area of responsibility. Additionally the state should conduct minimal military and disaster preparedness training on the individuals to increase their capacity to respond to terror attacks.

5.4.(c) Distance Decay Reduction at the Economic Level

To deny Al Shabaab the opportunities for poaching the state should first, address the issue of corruption amongst KWS officers and port officials. Secondly, increase the capacity of the Kenya Wildlife Service wardens through training and procurement of weapons of greater firepower than those used by Al Shabaab. Lastly the state should apply stringent punishments on the poachers in a bid to increasing the costs of the crime.

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128 According to Dr. Julius Kipngetich ‘Director for KWS’, lack of stiffer penalties for wildlife-related crimes had greatly hampered the fight against terrorism. Fines as low as Ksh 10,000.00 makes the cost of
To counter the contraband sugar trade, the state must convince those involved that it is too expensive and not worth the costs to engage in the trade. This implies that the punishment meted on the offenders are must be too costly than the potential benefits. This measure is based on the Cessare Beccaria’s Hedonistic theory which examines the link between crime and law. According to this theory; crime is a manifestation of crisis in the law.\textsuperscript{129} Criminals rationalize their actions based on potential pleasure derived vis-à-vis the associative potential pain.

The most important to note in the foregoing recommendations is the effort to reduce the economic spaces available for illicit logistic support to Al Shabaab. The support may not necessarily from these two economic variables. This lies in the state’s holistic approach to its construction, reconstruction or reduction in the level of fragility of the state.

5.4.(d) Re-engineering of National Security Policy and the War on Al Shabaab

There is need for development of a written National Security policy in which the grand strategy, the operational strategy and the tactics are anchored.\textsuperscript{130} Such a written policy should inform the development, deployment and employment of all instruments of power at the three levels of strategy making process. Such a National Security Policy in Kenya should be grounded on the defence of the physical base as the object of security. Consequently enemies should be perceived as those actors that pose an existential threat to the physical base. This is informed by poaching cheaper as compared to the prices of the ivory in the market where one kilogram of ivory cost about Ksh. 15,000.00. See Onyango, F. 2011, May 9. KWS seeks stiffer penalties to curb poaching. Daily Nation. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/KWS-seeks-stiffer-penalties-to-curb-poaching/-/1056/1158900/-/mb3upiz/-/index.html


\textsuperscript{130} See Drew, M. and Snow, D. M. (2002). Ibid ... pp14-16
the theoretical appreciation of the population as the most important centre of gravity in war
Clausewitz terms it ‘the intangible centre of gravity.’

The National Security Policy should determine how components of police and military are developed, deployed and employed in support of each other in the war against Al Shabaab. Development involves increasing the capacity of the military, political and economic instruments of power to deal with the dynamics of Al Shabaab. This includes increasing the capacity of the instruments in light of the focused threat. These would involve asking questions like; what should be the qualifications of the recruits? What mode training should the recruits be exposed to? What weaponry systems should be acquired by the security forces? What political and economic developments would suit a successful counterterrorism war?

Deployment should entail the positioning of various Kenya Police Units, Administration Police posts, General Service Unit posts and the military detachments in Garissa County in mutually supportive alignments. This would afford mutual fire support and effective force to space distribution in Garissa County. Additionally deployment also question the quantum of force designated and how it is arrayed with other instrument of power to meet a specific threat.

Employment in the field would address questions on, how the military fit into the police structure in maintenance of internal security. How does the tactical commander laterally call for reinforcement in cases of attack? Who takes Command in cases of reinforcement? What are the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in such a joint internal operations? How such operations are to be sustained logistically?

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To craft an effective National Security Policy and operationalize it, there is need for continuous intelligence production on Al Shabaab. The purpose of such process is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment with emphasis on the population, physical terrain and the Al Shabaab. It also includes an estimation of how the latter would exploit the former two variables.
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APPENDIX I

GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION OF GARISSA COUNTY

Appendix II

MAP OF THE ISLAMIC CALIPHATE

Source: Sullivan B. Fighting the Long War: Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism. Executive Lecture Forum Radvanyi Chair in International Security Studies Mississippi State University. 132

APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW GUIDE TO PERSONNELL FROM KENYA POLICE, ANTI TERROR POLIC UNIT, MILITARY AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

My name is Phelix Ochola Miguta; I am a student at the University of Nairobi. Currently am doing a study on Geographies of Terror: A case study of Garissa Count and that is the reason why I would like to interview you. Your identity shall remain concealed as a security Measure.

1. What factors underpin the rise of insecurity in North Eastern and Upper Eastern Provinces of Kenya since the Colonial period?

2. What are the causes of terrorism in Garissa County?

3. How can terrorism in Garissa County be addressed?