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"Ethnic Conflicts among Pastoralists in Marsabit District: A case study of the Boran-Rendille Conflict"

Submitted
By

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DECLARATION

This Research project paper is my original work and has not been presented for any degree in any other universities.

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This research project paper has been submitted for the examination with our approval as university supervisors.

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ABSTRACT

Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have become widespread and increasingly severe in the Northern Kenya. This study identifies and examines the factors contributing to such conflicts, and discusses issues and priorities for conflict prevention and peace building. On the basis of this examination, a number of conclusions and recommendations are proposed on ways in which the stakeholders could contribute to the concerted efforts of curbing violent conflicts involving pastoralists in Kenya.

Conflicts involving pastoralists associated with resource competition, cattle rustling and wide availability of small arms are widespread and of increasing concern. This study of the Boran-Rendille conflict provides a useful case to examine in depth factors contributing to pastoral conflict and priorities for conflict prevention. The study highlights several consequences of the Boran-Rendille conflict, which has had a negative impact on the communities under focus.

A total of 1050 people have been displaced by the Boran-Rendille conflict in Marsabit District. 70% or 735 of the displaced are women and children aged below 14 years. In addition to displacements, many women have also been widowed by the conflicts further increasing their vulnerabilities to poverty and human right abuses.

The study also found out that Marsabit district is among the ten poorest districts in Kenya in all the development indices. School enrolment rates are far below the national average, majority of the people in the district depend on relief food and are malnourished. Mortality rate is high and so are poverty levels. Water and sanitary services are inaccessible to the majority of the pastoralists.

Rights of the displaced people have been grossly violated as the study found out that there is a strong correlation between displacements and increased rape cases, physical assaults, prostitution, growing number of street urchins and child labour.

Efforts to prevent and mitigate violent conflict involving pastoralists in the district need to address each of the factors contributing to conflict as outlined above. The development of effective actions to tackle each cause of conflict is difficult because these problems are rooted in the people's cultures. However, serious attempts to address these problems can contribute immensely to conflict resolution if they are recognized as such by the communities involved.
A good start could be made by taking measures directly aimed at conflict prevention such as developing mediation and conflict prevention capacities of the communities involved and establishing projects in support of pastoralists need to strategically invest in awareness raising (early warning for early action), training and indigenous peace building processes. Displaced groups must be rehabilitated and re-oriented into mainstream society by aiding them with alternative livelihood
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1. Introduction

The dry lands of northern Kenya, like many arid and semi-arid lands of Africa, have a diversity of ecosystems tuned to a seasonal but highly time-variable and place-erratic pattern of rainfall. Since rainfall is required for seasonal blooms of vegetation used as pastoral forage as well as for water for both human and animal consumption, access to resources is tied to a yearly seasonality of one or two rainy seasons and longer periods of dry conditions. When one or more seasonally expected rains do not occur, an extended dry spell can lengthen into drought and can place greater pressure on available water and grazing land. However, droughts are not in and of themselves catastrophic. They are an expected part of the dryland environment that ecologists have come to identify as "non-equilibrium."

In this environment, the pastoralist is concerned primarily with the management of herd demographics to maximize milk production for household use. Yet this management presents continual challenges. Complex calculations are required involving forage availability paired to water access and the necessity for herd and flock movement to capture maximum potential given the "patchiness" of resources and the diversity of environments, while being constantly vigilant against the possibility of livestock theft.

Over the centuries, pastoral societies in the region acquired and defended territory, in which they lived and raised livestock. Some groups hunted wild animals, and sowed crops in favorable locations. Over time, they evolved systems of natural resource management (NRM) based generally on common tenancy land tenure systems primarily organized for the livestock harvest of available resources.

Boundaries between different ethnic communities have never been static and rigid but are fluid, given the hit-and-miss pattern of rainfall distribution. As a result, negotiation of livestock movement is a constant. Survival is dependent on a web of good relationships that provide for sharing and collaboration. Finely honed strategies of herd splitting, opportunism, defensive capability and raiding to enlarge one's herd all have relevance as
adaptive strategies for survival.

Critical to the success of these strategies are two major concerns: (1) areas of adequate dry season forage paired with nearby sources of sufficient water, and (2) mobility. This is particularly the case when drought is severe and/or protracted. When drought strikes, pastoral systems of NRM require adequate drought reserve areas (some dry season grazing areas serve this purpose, while others do not). Thus, the movement of livestock in response to fluctuating environmental and climatic conditions is essential. Movement is always negotiated between groups. When negotiation fails to secure agreement for temporary grazing rights, action by force is not ruled out. Changes in environmental conditions, even from one microclimate to the next, account for the ephemeral nature of relations between groups.

In the 1990s, there was a serious escalation of conflict between two neighboring groups in the district. Large scale attacks by the Boran on Rendille using modern weapons led the Rendille to respond by escalating their acquisition of modern weapons. There was considerable loss of life, and some areas were abandoned. The conflict is said to be related to the need of the Boran to continue to have customary access to Rendille territory for dry season grazing. The Rendille (and other neighboring groups) are less inclined to share their traditional grazing lands with others than they reportedly were back in the 1960s. The hatred between the two groups now is intense, reducing inclinations toward cooperation.

The challenge now is to determine the actual conflict risks associated with pastoralism in northern Kenya and to identify potential opportunities for peace-building. This requires an analysis of pastoral communities at risk. This case study of the Boran – Rendille conflict sought to undertake such an analysis by drawing on research data supplemented by interviews at local, district level. It also attempted to understand the role the civil society can play in conflict prevention and in the restoration of security in the region.
1.2. Statement of Problem

The already desperate and almost hopeless situation of conflict in the pastoralists regions is scaring. Northern Kenya is arguably the country’s most tumultuous and violent area, where violent-related death is more prevalent than in any other area in the country. The area has been surrounded by so many controversies and hardships throughout its existence, before and after independence. The area covers most of Kenya’s plainlands, arid and semi-arid lands. Northern Kenya is dry most of the year and experiences very little rainfall. Water is thus one of the resources in short supply in this region. Marsabit district neighbors, Ethiopia in the north. This international border present a special problem to the region. With near porous border entry points, it becomes almost impossible to check external influence in this area.

Currently Marsabit district suffers from many problems. Infiltration of sophisticated arms into the local populations; Broken down traditional authority structures for regulating mechanisms of access, management, and control of grazing and water resources leading to intensification of conflicts over scarce resources and cross-border rustling. Declining ethnic reciprocity has entrenched the traditional raiding system and demand for cattle in rebel held areas e.g. Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

Traditionally, in response to severe droughts, pastoralists would move to neighboring areas, which had better range-land and water supply as a coping mechanism. Presently, this movement trend has caused armed conflicts with their neighboring community over limited grazing and water resources. Some of the finest grazing lands are found in Marsabit district. These grazing lands are so insecure, that no livestock can be grazed there. Conflicts in utilization of grazing lands have been common. Further the use of grazing lands that are publicly accessible is increasingly causing severe stress to existing resources.
The ethnic structure of the north consists of complex relations between ethnic groups. Some relations are amicable; others are covertly discriminatory, while others are overtly hostile. None are static. Much of the conflict in Marsabit district is described as ‘ethnic clashes’. These are not clashes between cultures on the basis of culture per se, but between members of different tribes.

Ethnic violence is particularly common around Marsabit mountain, where people of five major ethnic groups (Boran, Burji, Gabbra, Rendille and Samburu) are competing for limited arable land. With the terrible proliferation not just of ordinary guns but also of automatic weapons, ethnic violence has become more common and certainly more lethal than ever before.

There now has emerged a new system of predatory exploitation of economic resources in the form of banditry and cattle rustling (raids) in Marsabit. This problem is manifesting itself in various forms and it is becoming endemic in the district. Traditionally, cattle rustling among the pastoral communities was considered as a cultural practice and was sanctioned and controlled by the elders. However, currently the phenomenon of cattle rustling is causing great concern. In the past there has been a tendency by scholars to trivialize the issue of cattle rustling as a mere cultural practice. Yet, over a period of time there have emerged new trends, tendencies and dynamics, leading to commercialization and internationalization of the practice.

It is the deciphering of these trends and tendencies, which forms the locus standi for this study. The study therefore tackles the following key issues:

- Why has there been an increase in pastoralists conflict in northern Kenya since the 1980s?
- What are the causes and impact of the Boran-Rendille conflict in Marsabit District?
- What is the link between the increase in conflict and the prevailing economic situation in the region?
What is the link between increase in resource use conflict and widespread availability of modern weapons?

Who are the principal antagonists engaged in conflict?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to identify factors that explain the increase in ethnic conflict in northern Kenya by providing an assessment of the conflict situation in the region. The study seeks to understand the sources and dynamics of resource use conflict among pastoralists in northern Kenya through an in-depth case study of the Boran-Rendille Conflict.

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Establish a contextualized, systematic and ordered account of Causes of Conflict among the Boran and Rendille communities in Marsabit District
- Investigate the impact of pastoral conflict in Marsabit District
- Provide a set of recommendations that suggest programming options that NGO’s and other actors can pursue to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict in Marsabit District

1.4. Justification/Rationale of the Study

This study is justified for a number of reasons. Conflict has grown rapidly in Africa in the least three decades, and pastoral areas are among the most vulnerable. Conflict is now widespread in the arid and semi-arid zones, and often overlaps with extreme food insecurity. Many local civil society organizations have programmes to manage conflict, and international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and donors are increasingly preoccupied with understanding conflict and experimenting with solutions. Thus there is an urgent need for a stocktaking of present pastoral conflict. It is the aim of this study to generate useful knowledge about the present status of pastoral conflict in the district and lessons that can be drawn from experience so far of conflict mediation and management.
The existence of widespread conflict is a major hindrance to effective development. It interferes with normal trade and local development efforts, and greatly reduces the willingness of Government officials and NGO staff to work in the areas. The climate of insecurity is a serious impediment to improving economic and social conditions, which are essential to effective, long-term reduction of poverty. Large areas of the northern Kenya have been abandoned because of conflict. Not only has there been a significant increase in violent conflict in the Marsabit district and adjoining areas over the past 20 years, the nature of the violence has also changed during that time. The traditional rules that governed raiding and warfare in the district and surrounding areas have loosened and have been at least partially replaced by more random violence.

It is the understanding of these new tendencies and their relative importance, which is central to any research on the insecurity. Past studies have not given enough attention to a contextual analysis of conflict in the region. The different trends and tendencies operate differently from one locality to another in terms of degree and impact all contributing to the state of violence and lawlessness in the district. This therefore calls for a study to decipher and distinguish these tendencies of conflict and violence and to comprehend their varying significance, implication and relationship. It is only after such qualitative distinctions are discerned that objectivity and not emotionalism can be applied in the understanding of the phenomena of conflict in the district. Findings from the study may be used to inform policy and bring out basis for working out appropriate interventions for peace building and conflict management in the district.

1.5. Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study is targeted at pastoralists living in Marsabit district. The main issue of focus is to understand the causes and effect of conflict at the household and community level.

Due to poor infrastructure, a collapsed road network and general insecurity, the study area has been limited to 6 villages in the in the central division of Marsabit district.
To be clear about the scope of the conflict phenomena that is encompassed, there is need to delimit the focus of the study. It may be useful to think of the focus of the study as a conflict-prone region that is experiencing increased levels and episodes of localized pastoralist violence that is carried out by various groups at different times and places, but that has many common ingredients. Because conflicts are numerous and various in the district, there is a need to more clearly define and identify exactly what types of conflicts are of interest. The conflicts of interest are seen as being typified by significant violence. In the pastoral environments violence seems to be recurrent but sometimes intermittent and it follows broad patterns. The research's objective is not simply to do a point-in-time study but also look at the overall trends in these features and how trends may have shifted over recent years.

1.6. Definition of terms

For the purpose of this study the following definitions will be employed:

*Pastoralism* is used to denote a practice whose main ideology and production strategy is the herding of livestock on an extensive base or in combination with some form of agricultural activity.

*Cattle rustling* and *raiding* are used interchangeably to refer to armed attacks by one group on another with the purpose of stealing livestock and not necessarily territorial expansion (Markakis 1993:124).

*Conflict management*: Activities undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical or horizontal escalation of violence (European Commission 1999: 25)
CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This literature review of pastoral conflict focuses on the pastoral districts of northern Kenya, although useful lessons from other areas have been included where appropriate, and most of the conclusions will be valid in other pastoral areas of East Africa. I start in chapter 1 by looking at some of the key features of present pastoral conflict, at the main actors. In chapter 2, I focus on the relationship between conflict and natural resource tenure, and finally the role of customary institutions in conflict management.

2.2. Pastoral Conflict

Pastoral conflict is characterized by a multiple array of actors and influences from national and international sources; the result is a variety of outcomes.

2.2.1. Actors

Age organization

A useful distinction is between youth-driven and elder-driven conflict. Although young men are usually the fighters in both cases, the nature of the conflict and the chance of peacebuilding may change greatly from one to the other. Elders have their own herd and a family. Their interest is in ensuring good relations in order to widen access to resources, to facilitate commercial activities and in general to promote security, although they may also start violent conflicts to gain access to resources or to political power; for example, the clashes in Wajir district in 1992-1995 were driven by the elders (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

Married women feed the family and, in some cases, trade. It is in their interest to secure access to markets, to safeguard their children, to increase milk production. Young men are waiting to start their own homestead; they want to increase their prestige and respect within the community, attract girls and be able to afford marriage. Security offers them
few immediate advantages. They are highly mobile. It is in their interest to shake up existing power relationships within the community and they may prefer to trade security for cattle, money or prestige. Among some groups (for example, Samburu, Gabbra, Boran) the distinction between the elders who sponsor the present warrior age-sets, and the other elders, constitutes a further differentiation of interests.

Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders, but early ethnographers stress that often young men decided in secret and took action quickly without informing the elders of their intentions (Gulliver, 1951). However, large scale daylight attacks typical of escalated conflict and all-out war required a degree of organization and mobilization that was only within the power of elders or war leaders. Control of the pastoral economy used to be a monopoly of the elder age-set (men and women in different ways and degrees): the elders own the livestock, control resources and dispose of marriages. The young are poor by definition, to the point that should a young man inherit a herd and family responsibilities, he would become an "elder" regardless of his age (Baxter, 1979). With respect to warfare, therefore, the notion of pastoralists should be disaggregated, to take account of the antagonistic interests between age-sets.

Age-sets are ritual associations of people that (a) cut across kin linkages, (b) are structured into cycles of initiation, regularly apportioned according a fixed number of years, and named with a traditional series of names, and (c) are associated with specific values and behaviours.

The gada system among the Oromo-Boran for example, has five sets per ritual generation, spaced eight years from one another, so that the sons of set 1 are initiated into set 6, ideally when the men of set 1 are in their forties. Each set is given a name out of a series of seven in cyclical succession (Baxter 1979). Early ethnographers have seen little political relevance in the age systems, understanding generation and age-set organizations as institutions only marginally associated with warfare and mainly with functions of social integration (Gulliver, 1953) or, later, as ideological formations directed towards
creating order and long term-social stability (Baxter, 1993). In other words, age systems have been seen as a tool for ensuring social unity, cutting across kin and agnatic linkages.

More recent political and economic transformations in pastoral societies have further disaggregated the attributes of the status of "elder". Political authority, economic control and age still characterize it, but now often independently from one another. Today for example the social role of elder is not any more a prerogative of age, but can be played by young men as well, if they are wealthy or enjoy political authority, for example as chiefs or councilors. In this way, the antagonism between age and youth cuts across biological age, along the lines of the different component features of elder status, and becomes much more complex. The possible combinations of conflictual interests are thus hugely multiplied.

**Businessmen**

Arms sellers often supply weapons on credit. This practice may be seen as a form of investment, similar to the old practice of richer people "investing" a camel (for a young man with no camel to ride) in Saharan raids and caravans, and taking part of the profit from the operation as payment. Often weapon traders also have a role in marketing raided livestock. According to Goldsmith, the political transformation in Somalia after 1991 'generated a change of *shifta* banditry towards financed and well connected trade barons who recruit from retired army personnel and school-leavers - a new class of professional and sophisticated highwaymen' (1997: 24).

**Mercenaries**

Commercial and political raids are increasingly organized around wage-labour. Some hired fighters may be trained people with experience in armed conflict in neighbouring countries, but many are youngsters with no military training, not necessarily herders but also urban unemployed, school leavers or occasional wage-labourers. There have been cases of groups of "warriors" hired by different ethnic groups to counter-raid for them. (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).
Politicians (MPs, councillors) and warlords

Politicians may facilitate conflict by not intervening (Fratkin, 1994a), or they may directly promote conflict by propaganda or even as a form of political competition before elections. Sometimes raids have been used to generate funds for an electoral campaign (MPC Workshop). Goldsmith (1997) reports cases of administratively appointed chiefs and elected member of local county councils inciting people to conflict. A politician may sometime enhance his reputation by initiating a raid. The instrumental use of raiding for politics is not a recent phenomenon. In his classic monograph on the northern Somali, Lewis (1961) says that the Administration succeeded in lowering the rate of conflicts by fining local political authorities who in any way incited raiding.

Administrators (DCs, chiefs)

Chiefs and DCs may sometime be involved in raids as facilitators or promoters, and take a share in the division of the booty. During the 1992-94 clashes in Wajir, chiefs had a major role in funding and directing the conflict (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

The state

Conflict in pastoral areas is often associated with their marginal location. Pastoralists are seen as not only geographically marginal, but also as politically and culturally marginal. Their presumed distance from modern institutions and from the controlling action of the state is often accepted as a self-evident explanation for widespread violence. However, the equation less state = more violence, which polarizes violent conflict and the state, fails to recognize the latter as a key actor in situations of conflict. On the contrary, evidence from the literature suggests that any analysis of the actors in a situation of conflict should include the state.

(i) The historical impact of the state on ethnic identity.

Interaction with the state plays an important role in the creation of ethnic/tribal identities. Anthropological analysis of the historical processes of construction and reconstruction of
ethnic identities in Africa shows that identity formation in the past was characterized by a high degree of dynamism and fluidity (Sobania, 1991; Lamphear, 1994). Within the context of the fluid and dynamic construction and reconstruction of ethnic identity, tribal labels worked as new poles of aggregation and were readily exploited by people as a way to adapt to a drastically altered socio-economic and political environment (Allen, 1994). With reference to Somali, he shows how even clan communal identity is a product of Somali late-colonial and post-independence interaction with each other and with the state in the context of patriarchy and the capitalist world economy.

(ii) Impact of the state in relation to the administration of justice
In parts of north Kenya the state is technically present (for example through the army and the chief system), but is ineffective (for example the soldiers have no ammunition or fuel for their vehicles). This inaction of the state is dangerous in various ways. From a local point of view the state is never innocuous or absent. The inaction of the state is more likely to be perceived as intentional, deliberate discrimination rather than objective weakness. The state's inaction therefore can contribute directly to escalation of conflict. Furthermore, the presence of an inactive state destroys local initiatives.

As the state monopolizes the role of arbiter and administrator of justice, in the case of violent conflict its functionaries fill the space that may be available for peaceful management of the situation. When their promises are not fulfilled, or when they appear to support one party to the disadvantage of the other, then it is usually too late to seek alternative forms of mediation, and violence is likely to escalate. The authority of the elders, who could provide an alternative forum for justice, is usually associated with the authority of the administration, although not entirely dependent on it. In this way, when the administration loses face with young men impatient to obtain justice, the authority of the elders is also jeopardized and is no longer perceived as a viable alternative. During the clashes between Pokot and Marakwet in 1997 for example, on one occasion a group of Marakwet raided two Pokot herders of more than three hundred cattle. Pokot elders interested Marakwet elders in the return of the stolen animals while Pokot young men were mobilized to look for the animals. At that point the Provincial Administration took
the situation into its own hands, promising to intervene and to help find the cattle. When only 12 animals were returned, it proved impossible to further restrain the youth and the situation went out of control (Wanjala, 1997).

Mutsotso (1994) in his study of the institution of Pokot council of elders observes that whenever there is an alleged raid by the Pokot on their neighbors, the state imposed a fine on everybody without consulting with the "kokwo" to find out the real culprits. Consequently, the innocents people recognize themselves for another raid to recover their stock stolen by the government. The Pokot thus see the state as the greatest cattle rustlers using firearms. (Odegi-Awuondo et al, 1994:65)

Groups of raiders often treat state organizations with contempt, or coopt them. Quite often, the security forces are informed about raids by the raiders themselves, and so played against the target group to prevent a counter raid. Violence is in theory a monopoly of the state, so any kind of violence is by definition a challenge to the state's authority. Open violence, even when it is not directed against the state itself, is always an affirmation of political autonomy from the government (Kurimoto, 1994). In this light, violent and sometimes indiscriminate interventions by the security forces appear very much as primarily directed towards re-establishing the state's unique right to violence, and only secondarily towards conflict resolution. One important turning point in peace building in Wajir was achieved when the Army Commander committed himself 'to stop the looting, rape and other abuses by army personnel when they were out on missions' (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996: 19).

On the other hand, direct conflict-resolution interventions of the state in the form of military operations for disarmament, like those carried out with heavy weaponry (including fighting helicopters) against Pokot, Turkana and Karamojong in the mid-1980s in Kenya (Dietz, 1993), are likely to change the balance of power between different groups, with a consequent rise in violence.

1 Pokot council of elders
2.2.2. National influences

Ethnic conflict and the issue of multi-party representation

In the past ethnic conflicts all over Kenya, including those in the northern districts, have provided the government with a strong argument against pluralism and multi-party representation. Writing on the links between “tribal warfare” and political conflict, Fratkin (1994a) argues that a government policy of low-response or non-intervention in contexts of increasing ethnic fighting is an indicator of vested interests and should be added to the list of the causes of conflict.

Ethnic conflicts and high levels of insecurity allow the government to maintain extraordinary powers in its relations with the population. All the Northeast Province in Kenya remained under a State of Emergency from independence until 1992. This gave the administration the power to kill on sight on the grounds of suspicion (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996).

Commercial raiding

To a certain extent, all raids are “commercial”, not just those usually referred to by the term, in which the promoters and paymasters are businessmen, officers or administrators. The so called “commercial raids”, do not represent a separate category in which “external” interests interfere with pastoral economy. They are probably better understood as an aspect of the wider integration of pastoralists within a market economy. It is usually overlooked that the early 1980s not only saw an upswing in the marketing of light weapons, but was also a turning point in Kenyan development policy for pastoral districts. The adoption of a neoliberal perspective in which the introduction of a market economy had first priority, was seen as the instrument and not, as before, the objective of development (Evangelou, 1984).

The transformation of conflict should be analyzed in light of the ongoing, complex and lengthy integration of pastoralists within a market economy, which is a process of combining what in Polanyi’s terminology (1957) is an economy instituted through reciprocity with one instituted through the market.
2.2.3. International influences

Political disorders in neighbouring countries may increase the availability of automatic weapons in a region. Men from Kenya who enroll as fighters in conflicts across the border, receive military training and weapons that they usually keep if they survive and return. Meanwhile, deserters and ex-combatants drift into Kenya from the areas of fighting in neighbouring countries, swelling the ranks of bandits, or making a living as mercenaries or cheap fighters in commercial raids. Schlee (1989) reports that during the Ogaden war it was common that young men pretended to want to join the guerrillas but, once armed and trained in Somalia, returned to Kenya and gave themselves to banditry. According to Goldsmith (1997), Somali internal conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s had a direct effect on the rate of banditry in northern Kenya, including Tana River and Lamu.

Cross-border political movements such as Oromo nationalism and the growing pan-Oromo identity are changing the way some pastoral societies represent themselves and their relationship with their neighbours and with the Kenyan state. Until a few years ago the term “Oromo” was unknown to ordinary Boran in Kenya. Today, on the contrary, Boran by and large perceive themselves as part of a pan-Oromo identity. On the other hand, the gada generation-set system, ‘by no means an Oromo invention but distributed in independent forms throughout the cultures of Lowland Eastern Cushitic speakers’ (Schlee, 1994: 4), has been constructed within pan-Oromo ideology as the mark of authentic Oromo identity. Since Oromo nationalism has taken up gada symbolism, the Kenyan Boran, amongst whom the gada system is still in use, are seen as a stronghold of authentic Oromo values (Baxter, 1993; Baxter et al., 1996). To the Kenyan Boran such an evolution of their ethnic identity means, in practice, favourable new channels to livestock markets in Ethiopia and the weapons trade — a long-standing difficulty in a central district like Isiolo — as well as an increasing involvement in the political activities of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Kenyan Boran, who are loosing out in Kenya, are becoming involved in south and west Ethiopia.
2.3. CONFLICT OVER RESOURCE TENURE AND USE

All conflicts are ultimately over resources, due to their scarcity in pastoral areas. Scarcity then is explained by different explanatory models, which suggest that natural resource tenure, and management arrangements are an important source of conflict.

2.3.1. Links between conflict and resource management

As a dimension of a broader state of conflict, current conflicts over resources are not just a contingent phenomenon but are to be seen against the background of a history of active land alienation, mass displacements, cultural and physical aggression and political marginalization of pastoral populations. Today, Kenyan legislation on land is still heavily biased towards sedentary groups and agriculture, in continuity with a tradition which began under the colonial administration, according to which the first step to develop pastoral grazing lands is to turn them into farmland. According to Lane and Moorehead (1994) pastoralists' tenure systems are affected by three major longstanding processes: (i) nationalization of resources, (ii) sedentarization of herders and (iii) privatization of range.

**Nationalization**

Nationalization of the range is undermining customary tenure regimes without replacing them with effective systems (Moorehead 1991). This is the case with the provision of public facilities democratically open to “everyone”. By-passing customary tenure without however being managed by the state, such facilities are immediately cause of disputes and are soon monopolized by the most powerful or better armed groups.

**Sedentarization**

The concentration of animals in areas of settlements is likely to have an adverse ecological impact and increase the risk of disease among the livestock. This represents an even higher risk for non-sedentary herders travelling through the area, for whom access
to veterinary facilities may be more difficult. Nonsedentary groups may tend to avoid settlements and interrupt customary institutions of exchange important to maintain cross-cut linkages, such as bond-friendships, livestock entrustments and delayed exchanges (Broch-Due, 1990; White, 1990).

The division of communal rangeland areas into discrete administrative units interferes with customary land-use patterns. Moreover, as the area occupied by a settlement is usually smaller than the ecological land-use unit necessary for the settled group, sedentarization of pastoralists provides the potential for their exclusion (by sedentary farmers) from resources they previously had secondary or perhaps tertiary rights of access to, and facilitates encroachment and alienation in favour of outsiders (Lane and Moorehead, 1994).

**Privatization**

By preventing customary, highly productive, tracking strategies, privatization of pastoral lands reduces the capacity of the land to support livestock. In the long term, privatization increases social polarization and deprives large numbers of people among the poorest sector of the population of crucial resources they need to sustain their livelihoods. (Lane and Moorehead, 1994). Somali pastoralists surveyed in 1996, strongly disapproved of the privatization of land. Among other reasons, they mentioned inter- and intra-clan conflicts, as a result of land enclosure and boundary disputes (including killing between close relatives) (Hashi 1996: 38).

According to Lane and Moorehead (1994), to be effective, innovative land tenure policies for dryland pastoralists must take into account that today customary land tenure systems are irreversibly undermined by the structural changes pastoral society is undergoing. New policies should recognize this transformation of pastoral society and deal with the diversity of interests within it, including a growing rich vs poor polarization, absentee herd owners and the interests of wider economic and political structures.

**Trust land**
The confusion over land tenure is not only a matter of ambiguity between formal and customary law. There are five land registration laws in Kenya. Non-private land falls into two broad categories of Government Land and Trust Land. The latter, which forms most of the pastoral areas, is enshrined in the Constitution and governed by four different Acts (Lenaola et al., 1996). The Constitution (Section 115) gives trust land to county councils to hold in trust for the benefit of the people ordinarily resident on it and in recognition of their rights according to ‘African customary law’. However, a clause in the same section allows for the legal manipulation of customary law by stating that no right, interest, or other benefit under African customary law shall have effect, so far as it is repugnant to any written law. Even without legislative action, customary rights over trust land can be extinguished through the procedure of “setting apart” certain areas (Section 113). This can be done by Parliament or government for the purpose of prospecting for or extracting minerals or oil — directly or in favour of public or semi-public corporations — and by county councils, for any purpose that ‘in the opinion of that county council is likely to benefit the persons ordinarily resident in that area or any other area of trust land vested in that county council’ (Section 117).

Government land, under which many important pastoral grazing lands fall, is controlled by the Commissioner of Lands office and the President. Government land can be, and regularly is, given to farmers as freehold land, but not to pastoralists. In Northern Kenya, large areas of trust land are lost to irrigation schemes, game reserves, wheat farming and other cultivation. Overlapping and contradictory rights of exclusion legitimised by the parallel Acts and tenure systems, lead to lack of respect for the law, often leading in turn to open conflict (Bromley, 1991).

The recent *Legal Framework on Pastoral Land Tenure and Legislation for the Arid Lands of Kenya* finds that ‘county councils have abused the trust placed in them by the law’ and recommends the transfer of such trust land to a different legislative framework (RANTCO, 1998: 23-24). The *Legal Framework* also recommends several amendments to current legislation (included Chapter IX of the Constitution), in order to enable the
recognition of pastoral communities as legal entities and to give legal credence to their traditional authority in the matter of land tenure.

*External interventions*

Confictual situations over access to resources may result from government or development agency intervention, if these affect the status of existing resources or create new ones without integrating them within a specific system of access regulation. For example, among the Boran, only traditional deep wells are subject to controlled access rights. The access to grazing land does not need to be regulated as it is indirectly restrained by the access to water. The availability of water also puts restraints on the size of the herds. The provision of drilled public wells and boreholes in dryland areas, which are not controlled by customary institutions, has allowed herd size to increase. This has affected the relationship between livestock and pastures, generating endless disputes concerning access to grazing land (Lane and Moorehead, 1994; Odegi Awoundo, 1992).

2.3.2. Resource management institutions are also conflict management institutions

A long-standing pastoral development orthodoxy based on the neoclassical paradigm of ecological scarcity still largely informs the analysis of pastoral customary institutions within the framework of resource management. The "new-thinking" in pastoral development (Scoones, 1994), based on the implications of dynamic ecosystem theory, has moved away from the orthodox ecological paradigm but still maintains an ecological focus which unavoidably overshadows other dimensions. Customary institutions are fuzzy. As argued by Jeanvan der Ploeg, far from being a liability, fuzziness is a key element for working efficiently in conditions of unpredictability, as it is precisely this that allows for constant interpretation and change. Consequently, approaches which identify customary institutions according to their "function" within a specific analytical framework (ecological, political, and economic) are likely to underestimate their actual role and mislead those who wish to understand them. If institutions, which also play an important role in conflict management, are first analyzed within an ecological framework
and understood as “resource management” institutions, their potential for conflict management will be hidden, whilst the consequence of their manipulation for conflict management will go unacknowledged.

For example, Boran social life is linked to access to deep wells through complex clusters of use rights (mada‘a) linked to consanguinal ties which are not territorially based. Development agencies have understood the Boran institution of mada‘a as a social unit for natural resource management. However, Helland (1994) shows that if mada‘a ties have served to limit natural resource exploitation such an effect should be seen as a by-product of Boran social organization and not as the function of mada‘a. The organization of water use for the Boran, Helland argues, is not primarily about resource management, but about maintaining peaceful relationships and the Boran way of life. Similarly, Bollig (1993) argues that the among the Pokot network of long-term reciprocal ties in which they are enmeshed, and which form the core of institutions which mediate access to resources, should be seen as one important factor in explaining intra-ethnic peace. Rirash (1992), in his analysis of Somali perceptions of conflict in traditional oral poetry, also underlines that it is the day by day practice of sharing resources that gives existence to brotherhood and social ties, and not the other way round. Lane and Moorehead emphasize that enforced changes in tenure are likely not only to alter the way people relate to land as a resource, but also to have a profound effect on the entire social fabric of society (1994: 117).

The formalization of resource tenure may involve wider risks than just undermining customary institutions for resource management. To the extent to which those institutions integrate complex and dynamic roles which are well beyond the limits of a single analytical framework, manipulation based on a single framework (for example ecological) risks corroding the social capital of pastoral societies just when other development schemes are trying to build it up.

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2 Boran traditional Deep wells
2.4. BREAKDOWN OF THE ABILITY OF CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE CONFLICT

Although it is widely accepted that - as a result of the incorporation of pastoral groups into wider economic and political entities - customary conflict management institutions can no longer cope on their own with contemporary forms of conflict, it is also widely believed that customary institutions still have a specific role to play within wider conflict management strategies of states and other actors. In this section we examine the literature for this evidence.

2.4.1. Reciprocity

Customary approaches to conflict management focus on the needs and desires of people rather than on results, and stress values of respect, honesty, dignity and reciprocity. Beyond the context of single episodes of conflict, are the broader relations of reciprocity and collaboration between different communities that can ensure that the scope of conflict is minimized (Ocan, 1994).

It is the common perception of a condition of reciprocity that it helps to maintain co-operative relationships. Dry lands herders are aware that no matter how good one’s situation might be at the present, at any time in the future one may depend on the favour of those who now one can afford to have as enemies, and vice versa. Reciprocity does not exclude occasional raids and killings, but provides the context and motivation to avoid excesses and, on the other hand, to isolate unusual episodes and deal peacefully with them (for example through compensation) in order to prevent the escalation of violence. Among the agro-pastoral Il Chamus (Njemps) in the Baringo region, for example, those who have had their fields damaged by somebody else’s livestock still usually ask for minimal compensation, being well aware that it is only a matter of time before their own animals are caught grazing in another’s field (Little, 1996). The situation is rather different when the disputes are between herders and farmers.
A degree of tolerance and flexibility with regard to compensation applies also to cases that involve damage to people. It seems to be a widespread custom among pastoralists that the standard compensation, even for cases as serious as murder, is discounted by the damaged party in order to show "good will" (Duba et al., 1997). Reciprocity is a perception as well as a practice. Both sides must perceive the actual or potential advantage of co-operation. Such a perception of reciprocity can be maintained only on the understanding that (a) sooner or later a favour will be needed from the other group, (b) there are not sufficient alternative solutions, (c) the other group is in a position to reciprocate. The question is therefore what kind of events influence these conditions. For example, the prohibition of crossing national borders, even if enforced sporadically, can seriously jeopardize the perception of reciprocity in traditional concessions over grazing and waters under harsh conditions (Oba, 1992). If resources which are part of customary tenure patterns based on reciprocity are made legally inaccessible to one of the parties, this not only creates a potential cause of conflict but, and perhaps more importantly, the condition of reciprocity is interrupted and with it the motivation to maintain conflict at a low level.

2.4.2 Elders and conflict management

Given a motivation to limit conflict, traditionally the ability of the elder age-set to act as an effective conflict management institution relied on three main sources of authority: (i) control of access to resources/marriage; (ii) being part of a large cross-clan, cross-ethnic, cross-generation network; (iii) supernatural legitimacy (Gulliver, 1951; Spencer; 1973)

To the extent to which these sources of authority have been maintained unaltered, they also define the structural limits of customary conflict management. Examples of cases which fall outside the structural limits are:

- when conflicts are between sections of the elder age-set;
- when conflict is about a new resource over which the elders do not have legitimate customary control (for example drilled wells, formalized land tenure);
• when actors in the conflict do not depend on pastoral economy (for example individual ranchers, new immigrant farmers, new kinds of livelihoods produced or by-produced by development or relief schemes);

• when the scale of the conflict exceeds the size of the elders' network (for example a very large group of raiders gathered through extra-neighbourhood contacts such as school, army service etc.).

According to Duffield (1997), the elders' authority has been undermined by the introduction of a market economy and the increasing polarization of rich and poor, that resulted in labour migration. The youth have found new sources of influence and wealth including the flourishing armed militias of young men and the new income available through banditry. Odhiambo (1996) says that traditional authority is being eroded by the progressive replacement of elders' councils and tribunals with government-appointed agencies and functionaries. Meanwhile, urbanization and increasingly frequent migrations to town of young people, especially men, expose them to other cultures and make them question traditional values.

Another way in which elders may have lost their authority is through increasing distrust from the communities, particularly from the warrior age sets. This may have various causes. One may be the association with an increasingly distrusted administration. The elders may increase their influence and prestige by providing an interface between their communities and local government. When the public sector is reduced, so is role of the elders. In a study of pastoral institutions in Somaliland, Hashi (1996) points out that traditional leaders, having been absorbed by urban political machinery, are rapidly losing the trust of the herders. The same happens when the association with administrative power is used for personal advantage through land speculation or bribery (Galaty, 1994).
2.5. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.

*Violent conflicts* (dependent variable) among pastoralists in Marsabit District can be thought of as emerging from various combinations of three types of interacting sources (independent variables) or Causes of Conflict. These Causes of Conflict (meaning violent conflict) are outlined below:

The Berghof research center for constructive conflict management ([www.berghof-handbook.net](http://www.berghof-handbook.net)) has developed a framework to understand as well as analyze conflict. According to this framework, the eruption and continuance of violent conflicts usually depends on the accumulation of several factors (and thus is multi-causal as well as contingent, not inevitable), it is important to look at all these possible levels in the chain of causation. It should be noted that the conflict sources at each level above may originate both from within the arena of the conflict studied and from outside that arena (such as, for example, the support of insurgencies by neighboring states).

**Structural/Conducive Factors:** These are underlying, pervasive, socio-economic and historical conditions that predispose communities to conflict (often called "root" causes), although they cannot by themselves cause violence. They normally change slowly over time and thus require long-term efforts to remedy.

**Proximate/Enabling Factors:** These are the proximate, intermediating sources of conflict. They include institutional and political processes and organizations that define and aggregate the interests of people and mobilize and channel political and social activity in pursuit of those interests. These can be more amenable to change in the medium or short term though they may require significant effort to address.

**Immediate/Triggering Factors:** These are the particular immediate actions, events, or circumstances that directly provoke specific time-bound instances of violent or coercive behavior. Examples include incendiary public speeches, violent acts themselves such as bombings or the assassination of prominent leaders, precipitous price drops, sudden weather changes, sudden death of herds through an epidemic, egregious human rights abuses, leadership succession decisions, etc. (Ross, 2001:42)
Conceptual Framework

**STAGE 1** (ROOT CAUSES)
- Structural
- Proximate

**STAGE 2** (IMMEDIATE CAUSES)
- Events and trends that fuel conflict

**STAGE 3** (TRANSITION)
- Full-scale conflict
- Disintegration

Decision Point

- Negotiations
- Reforms
- Power-sharing

Adopted from: [www.berghof-handbook.net](http://www.berghof-handbook.net)
STAGE 4
(TRANSFORMATION)

Ethnic domination
Warlordism
Fragmentation

STAGE 5
(OUTCOME)

CHAOS

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Peaceful partition
Conflict resolution mechanisms
New-or reinforced social structure
2.6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Singleton (1980) notes that all empirical studies should be grounded on theory. This study of Pastoralists conflict in northern Kenya will be informed by development and sociological theories.

2.6.1. Conflict Theory

Karl Marx is seen to take a general form of assuming that conflict is inevitable, ubiquitous and an inexorable force in social system and is activated under certain specified conditions. These conditions according to Darendof allow for the transformation of latent class interest into manifest class interest, which under additional conditions lead to the polarization of society into classes joined in conflict. Classes are determined on the basis of the individual’s relations to the means of production. The distribution of property determines the extent of conflict between the dominant and subordinate in society. (Abraham, 1982:67)

This as Marx postulated suggest that those highly ranked and who owns the means of production control the other relations and forms that constitute social life. The bourgeoisie are powerful due to the capitalistic nature of the economy and the proletariats question the legitimacy of this distribution of power. The amount of alienation they feel as a result of the situation will determine the intensity of the conflict. Society breaks into two antagonistic classes; bourgeoisie and proletariats. The disruption of the social situation of the deprived, the amount of alienation, capacity of the members to communicate with one another and the ability to develop a unifying ideology that codifies their true interest determines the resultant nature of a revolution against the bourgeois. (Ritzter, 1992:82).

Weber also opens up yet another area of resources in these struggles for control, what might be called the "means of emotional production." It is these that underlie the power of religion and make it an important ally of the state: that transform classes into status groups, and do the same to territorial communities under particular circumstances.
(ethnicity); and that make "legitimacy" a crucial focus for efforts at domination. Here, Weber comes to an insight parallel to those of Durkheim, Freud, and Nietzsche: not only that man is an animal with strong emotional desires and susceptibilities, but that particular forms of social interaction designed to arouse emotions operate to create strongly held beliefs and a sense of solidarity within the community constituted by participation in these rituals (Collins, 1974: 57).

The theory of conflict that this study assumes therefore is that conflicts involve a perceived clash of interests, which can be pursued either violently and destructively or constructively. Violent conflicts in the Marsabit can be thought of as emerging from various combinations of sources. This include the imbalance of opportunities (such as lack of access to governmental services, the existence of exclusive societies - including the marginalisation of certain identity groups. be they ethnic, youth, women, socio-professional, or religious groups etc. -, or uneven regional development); and the inadequate distribution and allocation of scarce resources and uneven distribution of incomes and wealth (which probably leads to conflict over the management, distribution or allocation of land, wood for fuel, water etc.). In his work on the genocide in Rwanda, Uvin (1998: 103) has stressed the importance of hunger, poverty, inequality and exclusion in explaining violence.

2.6.2. Modernization theory of development

Smelser (1988:387) defines modernization as a complex set of changes that take place in almost every part of society as a society attempts to industrialize. Modernization Theorist Divide the World into two kinds of societies: "modern" and "traditional". This theory of modernization prevailing in the 1950's and 1960s held that the 'backward' or undeveloped countries had to radically change their traditional institutions and values in conformance with modern western models, in order to achieve economic well-being. This inevitably implied urbanization, industrialization, extension of market relationships and bureaucracy, as well as the establishment of a unified school system and a workable public administration, the development of a national language etc.
The theory argues that Europe & North America became modern societies by breaking down the barriers of tradition which held back progress and that If third World societies are to experience economic development and higher standards of living, they must follow this example: this means that the main obstacle to third World development lies in the traditional character of their own societies.

This theory was taken up enthusiastically by African elites as government shaped their policies in the name of progress, development and nationalism. Traditional lifestyles and modes of production were rejected and unified systems were proposed. In the livestock sector, the theme of modernization must be seen in context of the more general efforts of most governments to change the behavior of pastoralists and modify the nature of their systems of production in order to bring them more in line with those of majority of populations and render them more useful for the national economy.

Pastoralism, was thus seen as traditional, irrational and self destructive system of production. According to Van Zwanenberg, the present precarious position of the East African pastoralists should not be viewed simply as that of societies that have lagged behind in the field of development or that have rejected change. In the early nineteenth century the pastoralists were the dominant force in East Africa, but today these societies are dominated, underprivileged and impoverished (Van Zwanenberg & King, 1975).

In Kenya the material bases of the ‘pastoralists’ economy have been disrupted and they can no longer subsist from their herds. Social relationships can no longer be maintained through the traditional systems. In other words, the traditional morality has collapsed following a rupture in the structure of social relationship on which people’s lives were hinged (Markakis 1993:147).

2.6.3. Symbolic Interactionism

This perspective has a long intellectual history, beginning with the German sociologist and economist, Max Weber (1864-1920) and the American philosopher, George H. Mead
Herbert Blumer who studied with Mead at the University of Chicago is responsible for coining the term, "symbolic interactionism," as well as for formulating the most prominent version of the theory.

Interactionists focus on the subjective aspects of social life, rather than on objective, macro-structural aspects of social systems. One reason for this focus is that interactionists base their theoretical perspective on their image of humans, rather than on their image of society (as the functionalists do). For interactionists, humans are pragmatic actors who continually must adjust their behavior to the actions of other actors. We can adjust to these actions only because we are able to interpret them, i.e., to denote them symbolically and treat the actions and those who perform them as symbolic objects. This process of adjustment is aided by our ability to imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of action before we act. The process is further aided by our ability to think about and to react to our own actions and even our selves as symbolic objects. The interactionist theorist sees humans as active, creative participants who construct their social world, not as passive, conforming objects of socialization. (Blumer, 1969).

Thus mankind lives in a symbolic physical, biological and social world, which acts a stimulus to shape his behaviors. In response to factors like drought and famine pastoralists have to redefine their changing situation as a basis of rational selection of adjustment choices. Giving a situation a definition moulds adaptive behaviors and enables people to adjust to a new environment. Therefore if people define situations as real, their consequences are real. What people do in crisis depends on how hard hit they are and the choices available to them. Adjustment behaviors takes place within a group context thus the level of analysis is shifted from the individual to the social system.

This approach emphasizes the interpretation of the change situation as a basis for innovative behavior. The collective definition of situation gives a group consciousness on the parameters of the allowable adjustment choices. Among the Pastoralists in northern Kenya, collective awareness of economic hardship permits and even legitimizes anti-
social conduct like cattle rustling and banditry. These are abnormal behaviors, which pastoral norms do not allow under normal conditions.
CHAPTER THREE

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

In this section the study design will be discussed. According to Singleton (1988) the research design is the arrangement of condition for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure. This chapter discuses the site selection, sources of data and the study unit of analysis. A discussion in the sampling procedure that was used to draw respondents and the most appropriate techniques of data collection and analysis are included in the chapter.

The study made use qualitative data collection and analysis methods to assess the causes and impact of ethnic conflicts among Boran and Rendille pastoralists in Marsabit District.

3.2. Site Selection and description

The study was conducted in Marsabit district. Marsabit probably is the driest district in the country with an exception of high potential areas around Mr. Kulal Marsabit and Hurrihills the rest of the district is desolate. It is one of the largest districts in the country with over 97% of the area semi-arid. most of the district is plain lying between 300m and 900m above sea level. It is bordered by Moyale, Turkana and Isiolo. Soils are shallow and poor vegetation too sandy to support life.

The area is predominantly occupied by cushite speaking communities' majority of whom are nomadic pastoralist. The major ethnic groups are the Borana, Gabra, Rendile, Burji, and Turkana. Nomadic pastoralism is the main occupation of the majority of the local residents in the rangelands, as only an insignificant number of people are engaged in crop production and other economic activities within the medium and high potential areas. Agricultural activities are confined to the high potential and medium potential areas around Mt. Kulal, Hurri Hills and Mt. Marsabit which have fertile soil.
Livestock keeping is the most viable way of utilizing the extensive rangelands of the district. Sentimental attachment to livestock limits diversification into other areas of small-scale investment and industrialization, since most pastoralists are not willing to sell their animals to venture into these alternative areas. The predominantly pastoralist population of the district are generally very poor. Most of the basic social services are either lacking or are inadequate. The district's physical environment is fragile and easily degraded and drought is a recurring feature while the physical infrastructure is poorly maintained or totally lacking.

Marsabit is one of 11 districts in the eastern province of Kenya. It is a multi-ethnic tribal district which pastoralist communities share with farmers, and wildlife conservation areas. It includes extensive arid and semi-arid lands as well as arable areas. Pressures on water and land resources have increased greatly in recent years, with increased farming activities, rapid population growth, and periodic drought. Violent conflicts in Marsabit is associated with resource competition, cattle rustling, banditry and wide availability of small arms. It is widespread and of increasing concern. It thus provides a useful case study to examine in depth the factors contributing to resource use conflict and the issues and priorities for conflict prevention.

### 3.3. Unit of Analysis

According to Baker (1994) the social entities where social characteristics are the focus of the study would be the units of analysis. They are the collection of things that will be studied. Baker (1994:102). Thus the primary unit of analysis of the proposed study is episodes of pastoralists violence among the tribal groups in Marsabit District.

To be clear about the scope of the conflict phenomena that is encompassed, there is need to delimit the focus of the study, i.e. define the unit of analysis. It may be useful to think of the focus of the study as a conflict-prone region that is experiencing increased levels
and episodes of localized pastoralist violence that is carried out by various groups at
different times and places, but that has many common ingredients. Because conflicts are
numerous and various in the district, there is a need to more clearly define and identify
exactly what types of conflicts are of interest. The conflicts of interest are seen as being
typified by significant violence. In the pastoral environments violence seems to be
recurrent but sometimes intermittent and it follows broad patterns. The research’s
objective is not simply to do a point-in-time study but also look at the overall trends in
these features and how trends may have shifted over recent years.

In order to identify significant recurrent violence, the study applied a set of rough conflict
magnitude/intensity criteria that looked at the intensity of conflict in a number of
different dimensions. In order for a conflict to be considered “significant and persistent”
for the purposes of this study, it would have to cross the threshold on most of the
dimensions identified. These are: deaths, displaced people, destruction of property, theft
of property, interruption of economic activity, and interruption of administrative activity.

These dimensions could be further refined, and a scale for each dimension could be
articulated, if needed, but the researcher judges that as a rough measuring device, the
simple threshold test will be sufficient to allow one to differentiate minor sporadic cattle
raids from more sustained violence.

3.4. Sampling procedure

Singleton observes that the sampling design refers to that part of the research plan that
indicates how cases are to be selected for observation. Singleton (1988:137)

A list of villages/settlement centers in Marsabit central was obtained from the district
development office and purposive sampling was used to select six villages/settlement
centers representing each of the two ethnic communities—Boran and Rendille—in
Marsabit Central.
Non-probability sampling specifically snowball sampling was used to select elements of the population with experience and insight into the problem of conflict in the district for key informant interviews.

3.5. Data collection methods

Desk Research.

Secondary data was gained through desk research in order to get information on the issue under discussion. The research involved reviewing materials like research reports, records of agencies involved in peace building and conflict management, etc. This included reading extensive reports as well as current academic writing on pastoral development and conflict in the areas of study. Relevant information was extracted for use in the report.

Focus Group Discussions.

Focus group discussions were held with the tribal elders in each of the selected six villages representing the Boran and Gabbra ethnic communities in Marsabit Central. The community interview made use participatory methodologies (Box 1) and a guide to seek information from the selected community.

Key Informant Interviews

These are people who are well knowledgeable on the topic under discussion. Key informant interviews were held with international, national and local NGOs, government representatives, political figures, church leaders, and CBOs, in the district. This method relied on the opinions of the individual subjects or respondents. Snowball sampling was used to select 15 respondents for interview.
Community Leaders Workshop

A Workshop that brought together 22 Community leaders in Marsabit central was held in Marsabit at the St. Stephen’s Training Center. Participants included members of the district peace committee and representatives of elders from Boran and Rendille ethnic communities resident in Marsabit central. The workshop was funded by PSO/Oxfam GB and lasted for three days. The objective of the workshop was to bring the two ethnic communities together to discuss present conflict and peace building and conflict management approaches. Research information for the study was generated through use of Focus group discussions, Group work, presentations and other participatory methods outlined below (Box1)

The research also utilised participatory methods to both collect data and triangulate information. Box 1 outlines the participatory methods utilized in the fieldwork. Furthermore, given the qualitative nature of the research, data collection activities were treated as a phenomenological process. Hence, as issues and questions evolved during the fieldwork, the responses guided the participatory methods and interviews.

BOX 1: PARTICIPATORY METHODS

**Historical Trend Analysis:**
The Historical Trend Analysis examined major events and influences impacting community livelihoods within recent memory. Focus groups of elders were asked to detail both negative and positive events.

**Conflict Mapping:**
Focus group of elders were asked to map their relationship with the other ethnic communities in the district. Peaceful relationship, on way to peace and latent conflict relationships were noted.

**Conflict Ranking:** Ranking of most common triggers and immediate cause of conflicts was done.
3.6. Data Analysis

The first step in the qualitative analysis of the study was to develop thorough and comprehensive description of the phenomenon under study. This description included information about the context of conflict, the intentions and meanings that organize actions by the different actors, and its subsequent evolution. Thus descriptions encompasses the contexts of conflict, the intentions of actors, and the process in which conflict is embedded.

Classification was the second process in the qualitative data analysis. Without classifying the data, we have no way of knowing what it is that we are analyzing. We also cannot make meaningful comparisons between different bits of data. So, classifying the data is an integral part of the analysis. Moreover, the conceptual foundations upon which interpretation and explanation are based lay on it.

Finally description and classification are not ends in themselves but must serve an overriding purpose that is to produce an account for analysis. For that purpose I tried to make connections among building block of concepts of analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction.

The Boran – Rendille conflict is a distressingly good example of ethnic clashes, which have escalated since 1990s around Marsabit Mountain. Marsabit central is a relatively fertile area that has increasingly become settled. The Burji were the first to take up farming in the district, and over the years their settlement have spread eastwards towards Dirbgombo. Then came the Rendille who settled on the eastern slopes of Songa. In 1972 another settlement was created with the sponsorship of the NCCK at Kituruni on the southern slopes of the mountain, some 30 km by road from Marsabit town to enable some drought impoverished Rendille to start a new life as farmers.

The Boran resented the presence of Rendille in what they felt was their land. There subsequently was scrapping back and forth. Tension heightened leading to increased raids.

4.2. The Nature of the Conflict

The Boran–Rendille Conflict revolves around many issues. Traditional pastoralism over the last century and a half has received a series of blows from which it is still attempting to adjust. Violent raids are one symptom of much deeper conflicts and fractures. For centuries, raiding other groups for livestock has been a traditional method of replenishing herds in the wake of drought and disease. In some respects, this raiding can be seen as a quasi-legitimate sharing of resources, permitting groups on the verge of economic ruin and even starvation to reestablish their systems of food production and natural resources management. The proliferation of automatic weapons has, however, greatly exacerbated the consequences of the cattle rustling.

One important finding is that while conflict between the Boran and Rendille is frequent, it is also unpredictable and intermittent. It is not steady and unrelenting. Instead, peaks and valleys characterize it. The periods of peaceful relations are punctuated by small episodes of cattle raiding, and after a series of such raids, one group may mount a major response and violence will escalate. In some cases, there is no escalation.
The Boran and the Rendille Groups in the district have both positive and conflictual relationships with other groups inside and outside the district. Some of the alliances and positive relationships are long standing, even of many years duration, while others last for only a short period of time. Territorial and political affiliations have long been fluid in this region. This is an understandable response to perpetual scarcity and periodic drought. Alliances are political and expedient rather than deeply rooted in a singular cultural or ethnic tradition. This fluidity serves a vital economic function, because it allows pastoralists to avoid the harshest impacts of unpredictable weather patterns and accelerates recovery from “catastrophic livestock losses” by reducing uncertainty.

As a tool to help better understand the Rendille-Boran conflict in the Marsabit district, the study mapped two sets of conflict and peace relationships, one centered around the Boran (Diagram 1), one around the Rendille (Diagram 2). The two maps describe the relationships at the time the fieldwork was done.

The diagrams show a high degree of conflict within the district, and between the Boran and Rendille. The Boran, for example, are in conflict with four communities: the Gabbra, Rendille, Somali and Samburu. The diagram identifies peaceful relations with Burji, Turkana and Konso groups. The groups that surround them sometimes have conflictual relationships with each other.

In the diagram 2, the Rendille are shown to be in conflict with Boran, Turkana and Somali. They have positive relationships with Burji, Gabbra, Samburu and Konso.

The Boran today distinguish between different categories of conflict relations, and this may well be the case with other members of the district. They divide their conflicts as follows (please see the diagram):

- Conflicts with traditional enemies (Rendille, Somali) with whom they consider themselves, in effect, at war;
- Cattle raiding from neighboring groups and
- Clashes with the residents of certain parts of the District over conflicting land claims.
Figure 1
Map of Boran Relationships
October 2003

Legend

\[\rightarrow\rightarrow\text{Conflict}\]

\[\uparrow\downarrow\text{Positive}\]
Figure 2
Map of Rendile Relationships October 2003

Legend:

↔️ Peaceful

⬇️ Conflict
4.3. The Changing Nature of Conflict.

Over the past 20 years there has been a significant increase in violent conflict in the district. This point was widely expressed and often emphasized by individuals interviewed. An increase in the level and severity of conflict over the past 15 to 20 years was widely reported by the Key informants. The table below outlines the historical trends in banditry and cattle rustling in Marsabit district since 1962.

Table 1. Historical trend in banditry and cattle rustling in Marsabit District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nature of Conflict and Actors</th>
<th>No. of animals stolen</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Somali from Wajir attack Boran</td>
<td>400 Cows were stolen, A large number of goats (No. Not specified) were stolen</td>
<td>Government sold Somali animals irrationally and compensated Borans, Disarmament of Somali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Degodia from Wajir attack Boran</td>
<td>300 cows were stolen</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Samburu were attacked by Degodia</td>
<td>5,000 cows were stolen</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Turkana attacked Rendille</td>
<td>10,000 cows were taken, 46 people were killed</td>
<td>Government did nothing, Rendille bought guns and armed themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Boran attacked Rendille</td>
<td>63 rendille killed, 500 cows taken</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Rendille and Gabarra attack Boran</td>
<td>200 livestock taken, Heavy casualty was reported, Displacements of Boran from their villages</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Counter attacks between Boran and Rendille</td>
<td>Each attack reported to authorities</td>
<td>Peace missions formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Counter attacks between Boran and Rendille</td>
<td>Attack reported to authorities</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Counter attacks between Boran and</td>
<td>Attack reported to authorities</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table above, it is clear that there has been a series of attacks in Marsabit district from 1962 till 2003 (when data was collected). These raids involved the Boran, Rendille, Turkana and Somali. They resulted in large numbers of livestock being stolen, people being killed, families' displaced and enmity among the different communities in the district. In most cases, there was little or no effort by the government to compensate the losses resulting from raiding and banditry.

The nature of the violence has also changed over the past 20 years. The traditional rules that governed raiding and warfare in the district and surrounding areas have loosened and have been at least partially replaced by more random violence. The extent and degree to which these traditional rules obtained and were actually observed in prior years was not determined, but key informants invariably said that the rules once were followed. Traditionally, noncombatants were spared. Women, children and the elderly were not killed or injured. The raiding groups could abduct young children and girls, but they were assimilated into the kidnapping groups and not treated as slaves. Recent years have witnessed extreme levels of violence against even women and children.

However, the increase in violence has also led to increased animosity and hatred, and a strong desire for revenge. These factors further inflame the situation, leading to further violence. Many believe that the enormous increase in modern weapons has played a key role in both the increased levels and the changed nature of violence. Traditional raiding and warfare required long training and special skills, and some of these are no longer needed when modern weapons are used. Those who were not expected to defend their livestock under traditional rules can now do so with modern weapons. For this reason, many argue, livestock thieves and raiders shoot and kill women, young boys and elders.

But this reason does not explain the random acts of violence against small children and against women begging for mercy in traditional fashion. It is clear that the tensions and antagonisms between the two ethnic groups have reached very high levels.
4.4. CAUSES OF THE BORAN -RENDILLE CONFLICT

The Boran -Rendille conflicts are caused by many intertwined and intricate factors. The respondents cited cattle rustling/raids, night attacks and road robberies as the main manifestation of the conflict. Majority (88%) of the respondents' cited competition of scarce resources as the main cause of the conflict. Other causes include availability of modern weapons (80%), Poverty (78%) and weakened traditional authority (50%), commercial raiding (40%), and cultural practices (60%).

Fig. 3. Causes of Boran- Rendille conflict

Percent perception of the cause of the Boran-Rendille conflict in Marsabit District based on the number of respondents per cause out of a total of forty interviewed (each cause is independent of the other).

4.4.1. Competition for scarce resources

Competition for scarce resources (grazing land and water) was identified as the single most important factor by several pastoralists interviewed and by individuals working on peace building and development activities in the district, and particularly by those who are themselves of pastoral origin. These sources argue convincingly that the root cause of many conflicts between various groups within the district, as well as the Boran-Rendille conflict, concerns access to and use of Shur and Baddasa dry season grazing areas. Pastoral systems of natural resource management require adequate dry season grazing areas (with sufficient water) for the pastoral system to
function effectively. From the perspective of pastoralists, one of the most serious consequences of the enormous changes that have taken place in northern Kenya in the past 100 years is that pastoralists have lost access to key dry season grazing areas because land was alienated for other uses and/or occupied by other peoples. As noted earlier, the imposition of colonial boundaries in many cases cut off pastoralists from their traditional dry season and drought reserve areas. Over the years some residents of the district have increasingly been able to claim ownership of the lands.

This entitlement is even stronger around Marsabit Mountain where agriculture is practiced. Over a century ago, pastoralists grazed their herds on these lands today, the majority of land on is used for farming, ranging from small plots to large farms. This eliminated an important safety net for pastoralists. Pastoralism is now practiced almost entirely in arid areas of the district and there is some question as to whether pastoralism remains a very viable form of livelihood under such conditions. While hard evidence to prove a per capita decline in cattle do not exist, logic suggests that if larger numbers of pastoralists are crowded onto more marginal lands (due to land alienation), with decreased access to adequate dry season grazing areas, herd size must diminish. Prolonged periods when rainfall is below normal contribute to the problem, affecting the amount, type and nutritional value of pasturage. Intense grazing in such areas has a very deleterious effect on herds.

There is intense competition between the different pastoral groups and particularly between Boran and Rendille for the remaining areas suitable for dry season grazing. The competition is increased when drought is severe and/or long lasting. In some areas, particularly where settled agriculture is practiced in the district, the heightened competition is a result of the increased population pressure. In other, usually drier, areas like the Chalbi Desert it is believed that the number of people actually practicing pastoralism has remained fairly stable, but now they have access to less land than in the past. While competition for resources (specifically dry season grazing areas) has been identified as the root cause of the Boran-Rendille conflict in the district, this competition is itself a consequence of the combination of the various structural causes of conflict. The competition is also evidence of the severe problems pastoralists face in their efforts to continue with their systems of natural resource management.
4.4.2. Traditional pastoral cultural values

Traditional pastoralist culture was cited as another cause of the conflict. The Boran and Rendille have competed for pasturelands and water sources for centuries. Cattle raiding has been, and in many areas remains, a culturally accepted activity. While not all the respondents agree that these values remain appropriate, they are still substantially in effect. Traditionally, livestock raiding is not considered a crime and successful raiders are respected. Killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Livestock raiding has long been one of the most important methods of restocking herds after drought or other calamity.

Another factor driving youth is taunting by girls and women. Boran females, in song and dance, sometimes encourage young men to prove their bravery and gain wealth by raiding for livestock. Tribal prophets or seers also encourage the youth to raid, as the seers themselves receive their (variable) share if the raid is successful.

4.4.3. Modern Weapons

Majority of the respondents cited the infiltration of guns into the district as a major cause of conflict. They hinted that guns were coming from different sources as indicated on the pie chart below.

Fig 4.5. Sources of guns/arms (in percentage) used in the conflict
On the uses of guns, respondents indicated that they use the guns for protection purposes (100%) and raiding the opponents (88%). After further probing, another reason was cited as prestige. This information is presented in the table below.

**Table 2. Uses of Guns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raiding</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study further established that obtaining these guns is not a cheap affair although this does not stop them from acquiring the guns. For instance, an old Gun costs Ksh 15,000 which is equivalent to one bull while M16, the most expensive gun, costs Ksh 60,000, which is equivalent to five or six bulls. It is important to note that the guns are paid for in terms of animals. This can be another reason for rids to acquire more animals to buy guns.

**Table 3. Categories of Guns used and Costs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Gun</th>
<th>Price of Gun in Ksh</th>
<th>Price in Animals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Guns</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>One bull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Four Bulls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK47</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Three Bulls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Six bulls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been an extraordinary increase in the supply and availability of modern weapons in the district since 1980s. Modern firearms first entered the district around the turn of the twentieth century when the Boran obtained rifles from the Ethiopian government and traders. For many years, those Boran with rifles enjoyed an enormous advantage over their adversaries, as the Gabbr a and Rendille still attest. Modern weapons also entered the district during the periods of instability in Somalia. This supply of arms and ammunition continues today, principally from the Sudan, and is well documented. The proliferation of weapons has become an increasingly important income generating activity for some Boran, who are selling both guns and ammunition.
Many pastoralists in the district have come to feel they need modern weapons to protect themselves, their families and their livestock. Both the rival Boran and Rendille groups explained that members of their groups obtained modern weapons for the same reason. Because the government does not provide them with adequate protection, they feel compelled to provide their own security.

4.4.4. Weakening of Traditional Authority Structures

Traditionally, raids were authorized by the group’s elders and were blessed, and even sometimes instigated, by the “seers” However, some erosion in the authority of elders appears to have taken place in the last couple of decades. It is difficult to quantify this erosion and while its degree is assumed to differ across the two ethnic groups, it is not possible after only a brief amount of fieldwork to name the group where traditional authority is most and least eroded. It is interesting to note that urban sources felt that there had been a greater degree of erosion in role of elders than did the Boran and Rendille elders and other pastoralists. Both elders and youth stated that raiding does sometimes now occur without the formal sanction of elders. In some cases, elders, however, described the young men carrying out such raise as a small group of “bad apples,” and not part of the mainstream. When unsanctioned raids occur, elders often seem to be involved in trying to retrieve the cattle that young men in their group raided.

The study heard of instances where the youth themselves refused to return stolen livestock when the elders demanded that they do so. When the stakes are high, the authority of elders may be reinvigorated or unaltered. Their actions can include threats of punishment or actual punishment. Elders may sometimes act in the interests of preventing a retaliatory cycle or they may also act to protect their authority by demonstrating that unapproved raids will be rewarded with severe penalties. The study did not come across sufficient comparative data to determine whether the elders in one group had lost more authority than those in other. Both the Boran and Rendille are likely to have been effected by the simultaneous pull of cultural tradition and the push of modern factors but it might not be unreasonable to speculate that the group furthest removed from traditional culture had witnessed greater erosion. Male elders and opinion lenders generally still play a key role in decision-making. Traditional structures and methods of conflict-resolution still
do provide an important starting point for developing peace and development strategies in the region.

4.4.5. Commercial Raiding
The introduction of commercial raiding represents a major change for the worse in the Boran-Rendille conflict. Powerful, wealthy individuals, including livestock traders, arms dealers and others, sponsor the raids. Young men are hired to carry out a raid, and the organizers may provide guns on credit to the raiders. The cattle are stolen and in some cases are herded into trucks waiting alongside a road. The livestock are then transported or driven on foot without official movement permits and with no respect for the quarantine procedures that are normally followed in Kenya when moving livestock from pastoral areas into the highlands.

Commercial raiding is a very sensitive issue and respondents were reluctant to talk about it in detail. Most of those interviewed recognized that it exists and is a problem, but many referred to activities in neighboring districts and were too nervous to talk about their own district because of the power of those involved in organizing the raiding.

4.5. IMPACT OF THE BORAN-RENDILE CONFLICT.

4.5.1. INTRODUCTION
The Boran-Rendille Conflict has impacted negatively on the victims, especially women and children. Majority of respondents indicated loss of livestock as the major impact of the conflict.
Other impacts include loss of human lives, disruption of trade, injuries, increased poverty, and school closures. Others are revenge, slow or stunted development, displacement and resultant orphaned children.

Case study
The Case of Adi Guyo.
Adi Guyo was living peacefully in a village called Dirib. In 2001, the Rendille and Samburu rustlers attacked her village. Her elder son was killed. Her animals (180 cattle, 20 camels and 160 goats) were taken away. This is all she owned.
"The raiders burnt down our huts (houses) and were forced to flee to Badasa shopping center, where I am living with my children in abject poverty. Other people have run away to solo, Isiolo and Merti. Some even run as far as Ethiopia to join their relatives.

In Dirib, I had a small business where I sold tobacco and sugar. This business has helped me to meet my daily requirements, but after that deadly raid, we are now leaving in poverty. My husband died recently because of starvation.

I have three children in school, but due to lack of school fees. Two have dropped out but the one who is now in class eight, is still continuing. I don’t know her fate since I have no money left now.

After the raid, I got five goats from relatives. Unfortunately, these were also taken away. The raiders had guns and thus overpowered us. At the moment, I am living alone with my children. I fetch firewood. Which I sell for my daily survival. This entirely depends on luck.

At the end of the interview, Adi requested assistance in establishing a small business as an alternative to nomadic pastoralism that is susceptible to raids. She continued to say that such wars result in hunger and because there is no food, problems like prostitution have sprung up.

Michael Lenturo

"I woke up at around 6 a.m. My wife had woken up earlier and had gone to fetch water. I heard gunshots and ran for cover in a nearby bush. When things cooled down, I came back. I found my mother dead and all my goats had been taken away. I started looking for my wife. Then I was told that a woman had been found dead. When I went to check on the dead person, I recognized her. It was my wife. She had been killed as she went to fetch water."
According to the district peace committee records, over 30,000 cattle have been stolen in the past 15 years. The Boran-Rendille Conflict in Marsabit District has displaced a total of 1050 people. 70% or 735 of the displaced are women and children aged below 14 years. In addition to the displacements, many women have also been widowed by the conflicts further increasing their vulnerabilities to poverty and human right abuses.

Table 4. Impact of the Boran-Rendille conflict in selected areas since 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of persons killed</th>
<th>No. of persons injured</th>
<th>No. of people displaced</th>
<th>No. of livestock stolen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baddasa</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirib Gombo</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kituruni</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songa</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Marsabit District Peace Committee

4.5.2 Impact on livestock and Crop Farming

The loss of livestock and livelihood is one of the most visible impacts of the Boran–Rendille Conflict. Statistics provided by the Ministry of Agriculture’s and Livestock Services indicate a steady decline in livestock production since 1994 in Marsabit districts. While cattle rustling may not be the only reason for decreasing production, it is certainly a contributing factor. Not only has livestock theft reduced the number of animals, the day-to-day fear of having animals stolen discourages stockowners from purchasing expensive breeding stock to improve the quality of their herds. The quality of livestock and their products has deteriorated as a result.

Livestock quality is also suffering because the owners reluctant to move their animals to traditional grazing areas at the cattle posts, as these areas are considered less secure. As a result, lands closer to the Boran and Rendille villages respectively have come under even greater stress...
than previously and are experiencing high levels of over-grazing and degradation. Only 30% of livestock owning respondents now rotate their grazing lands on a consistent basis and an additional 8% do so only occasionally.

Five of six villages interviewed report that grazing patterns have been drastically altered. As one elder explains, “This has reduced the grazing area to a very small portion where all livestock gather throughout the seasons of the year.” Grazing animals closer to the village does not ensure their safety and may, in fact, put the village at risk. Respondents from one village revealed that they tried to graze their animals in a more secure area near the village, which resulted in Borans coming to the village with guns in order to capture the animals.

The Conflict has had a deleterious effect on agriculture. Fewer oxen are available for ploughing fields. As a result of cattle rustling and the pressure on these animals has increased. Non-Livestock owners complain that they must wait a long time before animals are available for them to plough, by which time it may be too late. Tractors are available for some people to hire but, again, the waiting list is long and the cost of renting is prohibitive for many. Furthermore, tractors are only capable of reaching the lower fields and villages must be easily accessible by a road. Tractors are simply not an option at Kituruni and Shur villages, and all of the others had a number of fields which tractors are unable to access. As a result many fields go uncultivated.

4.5.3. Reduced economic activity

The impact of the conflict on households, villages and district has been devastating. Cattle rustling coupled with decreasing agricultural production and increasing unemployment, has deepened poverty and desperation. Nearly 90% of respondents state their household economies have been negatively affected by the conflict. A household’s entire wealth and livelihood can be wiped out in one attack. In such circumstances, the possibility of economic recovery is unlikely and the long-term economic viability of the household is threatened. For example, one Rendille elder had stock valued at over Ksh 200,000 stolen in a matter of months. He stated that whereas previously he had been the richest person in the village, he is now one of the poorest.
Income from the proceeds of their animals – by selling an animal or its milk, labour, – pays for such extras as schooling for their children. One respondent lost 50 goats in one night which provided his household Ksh 3,000 worth of milk per year to pay for the school fees of his 5 children. 35 People in all 6 interview villages commented on their declining ability to school their children. Numerous villagers have also observed declining nutritional levels – especially amongst children. The availability of meat and milk has decreased in many villages making it much more expensive to purchase.

4.5.4. Displaced Settlements

The escalating Cattle rustling and banditry and related violence have profound social consequences, bringing fear and insecurity to ordinary people. A number of villages along the Boran-Rendille border have recently been abandoned as a result of the conflict. In one of the rendille villages, homesteads situated higher along the mountain were abandoned in January 2002 after two people were killed and houses looted in raids. Fourteen families were displaced and now rent accommodation in a nearby Songa village. Although policemen are now stationed in the village, the families are still afraid to return. People have had to abandon their homes, their fields, their possessions, and their livelihoods. According to the chief of Kituruni village the effects of such displacement on people are profound, some people have lost everything.

Table 5.1 Displaced villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Ethnic Backgrounds</th>
<th>No.of Househols</th>
<th>Current location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilpus</td>
<td>Rendille</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Songa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leai</td>
<td>Rendille</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Karare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkishon</td>
<td>Rendille</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Karare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kijiji</td>
<td>Rendille</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Karare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badasa</td>
<td>Boran</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Dirib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rukesa</td>
<td>Boran</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Dirib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boru Hro</td>
<td>Boran</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Drib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: District peace committee
4.5.5. Social outcomes

The Conflict has affected relations within villages on a number of different levels. Many of the respondents accuse chiefs of aiding and abetting Cattle rustling. Chiefs allegedly participate in livestock theft in several different ways; turning a blind eye to stolen animals in their villages, protecting thieves, and providing false documentation for stolen livestock.

Some villages are reputed to be havens for Cattle rustlers, places where they can hide animals before moving them in return for supplying the chief with an animal or two. Chiefs are also accused of protecting thieves who operate from their villages.

The conflict has exacerbated intra-household divisions. The issue of whether or not to sell animals, which have not been stolen, is fiercely contested – primarily along gender divides, but also generationally. According to one elder, ‘Cattle rustling is one of the most common issues discussed within families today.’ Women generally want to sell livestock to secure scarce resources and invest in the basic needs of their families, rather than “keep them for thieves” and invite possible injury or death.

There is a widely held sentiment that a Boran is not a Boran without animals. Virtually all cultural practices require animals. However, in every interview village Cattle rustling has drastically reduced livestock holdings. This makes it very difficult for people to contribute to cultural events. Traditional practices are being eroded as a result and may eventually be abandoned.

More than 80% of respondents think that domestic drudgery has increased as a result of the conflict and loss of livestock. This is primarily due to the lack of dung within villages. Many Boran in rural areas use dung to smear the floors of their homes and for cooking; however, now women must use wood for fires. Deforestation in many of the interview villages is evident and many women now spend anywhere from 3 to 6 hours per day collecting wood in addition to their other duties. Previously men may have used oxen to transport large sections of trees, but the lack of draught animals in village’s means women must carry the wood themselves. Unless the rate of Cattle rustling livestock is brought under control, women will have to travel longer distances searching for wood which they say increases the risk of sexual harassment. Furthermore, if
collecting wood takes women outside their village boundaries it causes conflict between villages over scarce resources. In villages where wood is a simply unavailable, household may be forced to spend scarce financial resources on paraffin for cooking and heating.

Protracted clashes and escalation of conflict has caused the breakdown of contact between neighbouring or adjacent communities and the consequent loss of lengthily constructed social networks (for example through inter-clan marriages) and institutions, which have proved to be crucial for coping with uncertainty.

Insecurity in villages and the associated increase in poverty and destitution have contributed to the increased number of people moving to towns. Where already a large majority of the population lives in unplanned settlements, without legal access to land or services. Further pressure on resources in urban settlements is likely to result in the intensification of urban conflicts.

The conflict has affected formal education directly. Teachers abandon conflict-prone areas due to lack of security, and the schools are closed. During episodes of clashes between the Boran and Rendille civil servants, including teachers, either left the affected areas or refused their appointment there; primary schools, and secondary schools was affected by violence. Poverty and destitution further diminishes the already scant possibility that parents have to afford the costs even of primary education.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

The issues related to ethnic conflict within the district are very complex, emotionally charged and politically sensitive. Cattle rustling and banditary have led to the loss of many human lives and the displacement of various population groups. The raiding is accompanied by indiscriminate killing of innocent people, majority of them women, children and the elderly. One morning alone in Kituruni Village, more than 20 people were killed in cold blood courtesy of cattle rustling menace. The practice has undergone fundamental transformation from a cultural practice of replenishing to a more militarized, predatory and destructive practice.

In all Villages visited, conflicts have increased economic hardship as the peoples only livelihoods option, pastoralism, has been ravaged. Cattle have been raided away thereby increasing and abject poverty. Food, crops, cash money and property are looted during the raids. Schools, health facilities and settlements are destroyed. In the Boran-Rendille conflict alone about 15 schools have been abandoned. Similarly market centres such as Songa and Ilpus are virtually deserted. Many roads are no longer useful economically. The Boran, Rendille, Turkana and the Samburu communities have lost between 50% and 80% of their livestock to either drought or cattle rustling. It is extremely difficult for pastoralists to get started over again after such heavy stock losses.

Small arms and light weapons proliferation has made traditional raiding a commercial venture, more deadly and severe. Small arms including automatic and semi automatic weapons have become widely available and are increasingly used in the district. These weapons have come from a variety of sources, including conflict prone neighboring countries (Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Northern Uganda). Each community is trying to arm itself creating a local “arms races”.

There is inadequate policing of Pastoralists areas as both the national and district police and security forces are either unable or unwilling to confront cattle rustlers who have
more often than not struck with impunity. State’s obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is conspicuously under siege in northern Kenya. This has greatly contributed to the spiraling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The state arming of local vigilance groups, popularly known as Home Guards, in response to security problems, has exerbated ethnic conflict rather than ease the situation.

Adequate arrangement to enhance communities’ resilience to cope with severe droughts and to other disasters has not been undertaken in Marsabit District. During droughts, pastoralists livelihoods become particularly precarious. There are worrying incidences of conflict over scarce water and pastures during dry spell, which could last for as long as eight months. Economic insecurity and deprivation during draught has increased the risk of violence and social breakdown.

Approximately 50,000 people are affected by the Boran-Rendille conflict either directly or indirectly and at least 5,000 households are actually displaced from their original settlements.

There is also a serious food shortage among the pastoralist communities in the district. Those hard hit are the displaced and are living in the displacement camps. Women and children are the ones who bear the brunt of these forms of violence. Many of them go without food for days. They depend on wild fruits, which are scarce and seasonal. Cases of malnutrition are rampant in these conflict prone villages such as Ilpus and Kituruni, as communities diet consisting of meat, milk and blood becomes increasingly unavailable. Some have died of starvation.

The Boran Rendille Conflicts chiefly manifested as cattle rustling and sheer banditary activities have devastated pastoralists’ lives and livelihoods in Northern Kenya. This has doubled the percentage of the people living below poverty line (less than a one US$ a day).
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the main findings of the study, a number of recommendations are made to amicably and effectively resolve conflicts in Northern Kenya. Conflicts resolution should be entrenched or made part and parcel of every poverty reduction intervention the District. Conflict sensitivity should be the cross-cutting thematic area of focus in projects' formulation, design, implementation and evaluation. Some for the recommendation include:

1. Establishment and strengthening existing peace building structures

The study recommends the strengthening of the existing and or marginalized indigenous mechanisms and institutions of conflict management. Where such structures are non-existent, new peace structures should be established. Such capacity building interventions would include trainings, formation of linkages and networks and exchange visits to learn from successful case studies. In addition to local peace structures, peace animators/facilitators, various stakeholders (NGO’s and CBO’s), women and youth leaders and religious leaders among others should be trained on conflict transformation and management. Formation of linkages should include increased consultation between local indigenous peace structures and provincial administration (village elders, chiefs, DO’s, DC’s and PC’s). Security and law enforcement officers and local political leaders such as councilors and members of parliament should be enlisted in such consultations, collaboration and linkages.

The established or strengthened peace committees/institutions should be mandated to identify underlying causes of conflict and violence, equipped with skills to lobby and advocate for communities interests both at the district and national forums.

2. Mediation and dialogue

Inter-community dialogue and or mediation should be promoted before eruption of violence. Such meetings should be used to pre-empt conflicts between different communities. Modeled on customary conflict management mechanisms, elders should be
facilitated to understand, analyse conflicts and come up with joint action plans for necessary intervention to curb the conflicts.

3. Sensitize and awareness creation on conflict and peace building
Awareness and sensitivity are key elements in building a culture of peace. All awareness creation tools and medium should be used as widely as possible so as to shade more light on the severity of inter-ethnic conflicts and the need to uphold and embraced peace in society. Inter-community meetings, radio/print media, songs, Poems, Drama and exhibitions should be used to create awareness on conflicts. The expected impact of this awareness will changes in attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice and deeper understanding of conflicts dynamics.

4. Provision of Security by the state.
The government as a matter of duty should ensure that the security and safety of all Kenyans, pastoralists included, should be guaranteed. Coercive apparatus of the government should ensure that law and order is maintained in the country. More security personnel should be recruited and deployed in the district. Security forces should be armed with appropriated facilities and instructions to apprehend conflict perpetrators.

5. Disarmament and control of arms
All the respondents cited the infiltration of guns into the communities as a major cause of conflict. They pleaded for disarming of the various communities involved, noting that government is the only entity with the mandate, capacity and machinery to do this. However, before disarmament could kick off, the government should strive to understand and unreavel the myth behind gun culture. Questions as to why people acquire guns would be debated upon and consulted widely. The state should first assure by action that it can guarantee the security of all, and then proceed to convince the communities that they (communities) no longer need the guns for everybody is safe.

Disarmament should be a gradual process based on consultation and Consensus building between the government and the concerned communities. It should be not perceived as a
calculated move to make certain communities vulnerable to attack or so. At minimum, disarmament should be done regionally and not restricted to certain locations or regions in Kenya. Mistakes of the past courtesy of forced and selective disarmament should not be repeated.

Institutions like parliament should play a key role in advising the government on how to curb the proliferation of illicit arms. Parliament should debate and sanction military operations aimed at disarming the various armed communities in northern Kenya.

The success of community based peace initiatives stems from the communities’ ownership of the entire conflict management process. A high level of sustainability of peace is attained when a locally formulated framework of conflict prevention and management (agreements, pacts and penalties) is brokered to address conflict. The study recommends that the communities should build on and or formulate an all inclusive, comprehensive, and systematic framework of resolving conflicts. Where necessary, the government should be called upon to enforce communities resolutions.

7. Initiating development programmes
The study recommends that various development projects be initiated to help improve the people’s livelihoods and engage them in productive activities, which will dissuade them from engaging in conflict. The community should be involved in identifying the priority projects from which they will derive direct benefits. Examples would include:
Management and sharing of scarce natural resources e.g. water, pasture
i). Common service projects
ii). Primary and secondary schools
- Hospitals and health centres
- Churches
- Roads linking key areas of the communities thus enhancing social interaction and trade.
When communities are aware of the potential damages conflicts have on these shared services and projects they will play an active role in maintaining peace and security.

iii). Livestock developments
The study recommends the establishment of livestock projects, which will entail treatment of livestock diseases, improvement of breeds and keeping the right number of animals. This will translate to enough milk for sale and consumption thus solving the problem of poverty and malnutrition. Effective marketing of both livestock and livestock products e.g. milk, hides and skins, and meat should be promoted. Cooperative societies that deal with livestock and their products and the moribund Kenya Meat Commission should be revived.

8. Financing of small enterprises
Unemployment and lack of capital to start small businesses is a major contributor to the idleness and poverty that contribute to conflicts. Projects that would enable groups and co-operatives to start income generating projects should be initiated. Such would include:
  i  Livestock trade
  ii  Hides and Skin business
  iii  Posho milling particularly for women
  iv  Honey production and marketing
  v  Retailing
  vi  Jua kali activities such as weaving

9. Establishment and promotion of:
  i)  Youth specific activities
The study identifies the youth as the major actors in the perpetration of violence in the country. Poverty and unemployment make them vulnerable to manipulation mainly by politicians and/or elders to carry out activities that are peace threatening. The study therefore recommends that the youth should be involved in peace processes that take place in their communities. Youth interactions across ethnic divides should also be promoted through sponsoring activities such as youth clubs, sports, music and drama.
festivals. The study also recommends empowering these youth economically through activities like carpentry (such as making of bee hives), sand harvesting and gravel production, quarrying among others. This should be done in partnership with the government to ensure sustainability and follow-up.

ii) **Women specific activities**

The role of women either as perpetrators of violence or providers of enmities for peace cannot be underestimated. The study recommends that specific activities that target women should be supported such as workshops, seminars, exchange programmes and other related activities. During these activities, the women should be equipped with skills to enable them play an active role in conflict transformation and peace building within their communities. Women, especially those displaced by conflicts should also be provided with seed money to start income generating activities as a way of diversifying their livelihoods.

10. **Peace education in schools**

Peace education in schools should be pursued at the policy level so that education policy entrenches peace education and activities in education curriculum. In this initiative, teachers and pupils will be sensitized to do drama and develop songs, poetry, and puppetry among others to be used in peace rallies. Through the same initiative, children will be engaged in drawing for peace competitions that will help in inculcating values/issues of peace in the minds of pupils. These posters will be used in assessing the pupils understanding of the peace issues at the community level.

11. **Emergency relief**

The study revealed that in the event of continued violence, people tend to run away from their homes with almost nothing. The victims lose their houses are razed down. In the event of such situations, the study recommends that victims be assisted with emergency in the form of food, clothing, health facilities and shelter.
12. Facilitation of trauma healing sessions
The study recommends the facilitation of session for trauma healing though counseling and reconciliation. This should be undertaken in the camps hosting displaces. It is aimed at forestalling revenge retaliation as well as giving the victims an opportunity to come to terms with what befell them during the violence.

13. Rehabilitation of destroyed social amenities
Violent conflict is often accompanied by destruction of property. The study recommends that the destroyed community amenities such as schools, dispensaries, cattle dips and other structures be reconstructed.

Internally displaced conflict victims and or families should be provided with materials to rebuild their shattered lives, livelihoods and houses. Such assistance could include construction of houses for the displaced, provision of seed money/revolving fund to enable them start small scale business, construction of schools, hospitals and sanitary facilities or restocking those who are willing to go back to their original homes. They should also be assisted with farm inputs so that they can engage in farming activities.

However, prior to the actual resettlement, several community meeting should held to sensitize the communities to live in peace, and security mechanisms be put place.

15. Improvement of Education
The study shows that the pastoralists' communities under focus place high value on livestock, early marriages of girls (dowry) and ownership of a gun. As a result, they place very little premium on education. The few girls who enroll in school are withdrawn for marriage while boys are mainly preoccupied with herding livestock. This lifestyle, like raiding, also stagnates the general development of the communities. The study therefore recommends the following:
❖ Sensitizing the communities on the value of education especially in the modern competitive world.
❖ Establishing boarding primary and secondary schools.
❖ Enforcing Universal primary Education.
❖ Injecting quality teaching and learning processes into the schools.
❖ Improvement of polytechnics, non-formal and formal education to rehabilitate former combatants and school drop outs.

16. Infrastructure
Poor road networks inhibit movement of people from one place to another, hamper timely and defective dispatch of security personnel to apprehend rustlers and constraints the provision of social services to the communities. The study recommends the improvement of such roads and the construction of other feeder roads that will open up the interior. This will facilitate trade, the general development of the area and mobility of the security personnel during security operation missions. The supply of electricity to these areas will also boost development of the area and this will go along way in solving conflicts.
REFERENCES


Interview Guide

1. Introductions
Hello, thank you so much for giving us a bit of your valuable time today. I am a postgraduate student at the university of Nairobi. I am doing a study exploring the important issue of ethnic conflict among pastoralists in Marsabit District. I am particularly interested in your thoughts, experiences, and knowledge about these issues as they apply to the Boran-Rendille conflict.

2) Contact Information: I want to start by making sure we have accurate contact information for you/your organization.
Group
Name
Primary Contact
Name Address Phone Fax Email
Misc. Contact Info

3) General Conflict Identification
a. Who are the principle antagonists engaged in conflict in the areas that you are most familiar with, i.e. who is fighting and where? What are the major “hot Spots”?
b. What are the general parameters of the Boran-Rendille conflict? How serious? What seem to be the direct conflict triggers for these conflicts? IE cattle raids, boundary disputes, access to water or forage, revenge, others?
c. In the past five years or so, are there any previous “hot spots” that have cooled? When and under what circumstances did this occur?
d. Are there any other potential conflicts that are brewing but have not turned violent?

4) Structural causes of Violent Conflict:
a. How would you describe attitudes toward other ethnic groups among the pastoralists in Marsabit District? Attitudes toward inter-ethnic clans.
b. What about the role of tribal elders, youth, women?
c. What is the current economic situation in your view?
d. Can you describe for me the opportunities that exist for young men, young women, older men, older women, and for future generations?
e. What are the historic factors that influence violent conflict in Marsabit (a history of violent relations between Boran and Rendille groups)?
f. What cultural factors play a role in supporting and enabling violent conflict as “a Way of life”? What do you make of the often-noted Pastoralist culture of Violence, or gun culture? Is violence inevitable for Pastoralists?

5) Proximal causes of Violent Conflict:
a. What is the role of identity groups, ethnic groups, or religious differences in the Boran-Rendille Conflict?
b. Sometimes government policies can either enhance or deepen conflicts depending on how they treat access to resources (land tenure, water) or by virtue of agricultural
promotion patterns, marketing regulations, etc. Are you aware of instances where the policies of the state have brought the two groups in conflict? Please describe.
c. How easy is it for those who may wish to pursue violent conflict to get arms? What role does the availability of arms play? How do people get access to arms?
d. What is the role of traditional leaders, and the long-standing cattle rustling tradition in Marsabit? How have these patterns of leadership and cultural economic practice evolved?
e. How do women in particular either enable or mitigate against violent conflicts?
f. What has been the impact of Boran-Rendile conflict?

6) General Conflict Response Identification:
a. In your experience, who is trying to reduce conflict in Marsabit District?
b. Can you tell us about these activities? Where do they take place?
c. Which/What types of conflict are they attempting to address?
d. What methods do they use?

8) Topics of discussion with NGOS and other Conflict Response Service Providers: Please describe for us the nature and scope of your conflict response activities. Include:

a. Towns in which activities take place
b. Length of time activities have been underway
c. Periodicity – how often do activities take place
d. Resources involved in preparing and delivering activities
e. Number of people who are impacted by activities both directly, and indirectly
f. Other groups, organizations, state agencies or ministries that you cooperate with in planning, funding, delivering, following-up on, or evaluating your activities
g. How do you conceptualize your activities in relation to the Boran-Rendille Conflict?
h. How do you identify the contributions of women in your activity design and implementation? What mechanisms do you use to maximize women’s contributions?