THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI.

LENNAH MGOHI

R5I/63620/10

A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY DEGREE, UNIVERSITY OF NARIJOBI

HHP

OCTOBER 23, 2012
DECLARATION

Declaration by student.

This research study is my original work and has not been presented to any other examination body. No part of this research should be reproduced without my consent or that of the University of Nairobi.

Name: LENNAH MGHOI
Sign: R51/63620/10
Date: 10 [ ] 1 . 7 1

Declaration by Supervisor.

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University of Nairobi Supervisor.

Name: Mr. Patrick Maluki
Sign: / . f r l ^ 0 ^
Date: Institute of Diplomacy & International Studies.
DEDICATION:

This project is dedicated to my late mum and my children.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I thank God for the opportunity and resources to carry out this academic research paper. My family and friends have also been instrumental in ensuring that I do not give up on it. My gratitude also goes to my supervisor for advising and guiding me through the research.
ABSTRACT

On December 26, 2004 an earthquake on the Indian Ocean triggered a deadly tsunami that claimed the lives of over 220,000 people. The tsunami ravaged 11 countries, leaving coastal cities and communities utterly devastated and millions of natives homeless. Due to the severity of the disaster, countries around the globe immediately pledged their support to provide much-needed humanitarian aid. Millions of US dollars in monetary assistance, food, supplies, and other necessities poured into the regions affected by the tsunami. This prompt and generous response from the international community was and continues to be a major factor in the recovery of the destroyed areas. This global concern and response is important while at the same time there are factors that ensure such situations are redeemed on time. This paper looks at the mechanisms put in place to address international disasters and the networks that are available to ensure international disaster cooperation. In addition to this it explains how the international warning system works and what measures should be put in place to improve on its operations as well as the role of communication in this disastrous situation. The role of media and more so the rise of social media action. The research uses the Recognition-primed decision (RPD) which is a model of how people make quick, effective decisions when faced with complex situations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION

Dedication: .................................................................................................................. 1
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ iv
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................. 1
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Public diplomacy and disaster risk reduction ....................................................... 3
   1.1.1 Early Warning System and the Indian Ocean Tsunami ................................ 4
1.2 Problem statement ............................................................................................... 5
1.3 Research objectives ............................................................................................. 7
1.4 Research Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 7
1.5 Justification of the study ..................................................................................... 7
1.5 Literature review .................................................................................................. 8
1.6 International disaster coordination .................................................................... 8
1.7 International Warning System .......................................................................... 11
1.8 Role of communication and social media in disaster risk reduction ................. 13
1.9 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 16
   1.9.1 Recognition primed decision model ......................................................... 16
1.10 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 18
1.11 Sampling technique ......................................................................................... 18
1.12 Data Collection Method ................................................................................... 19
1.13 Chapter outline .................................................................................................. 19

CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................... 20
2.0 Social Media and Disaster Risk Reduction Communication ............................. 20
2.1 The Tsunami, the Influence of Social Media and Communication to Disaster Risk Reduction ................................................................................................................. 23
2.2 Public Diplomacy and International Risk Coordination ................................... 34
2.3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 43
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

Public diplomacy or people's diplomacy, broadly speaking, is the communication with foreign publics to establish a dialogue designed to inform and influence. There is no one definition of Public Diplomacy, and may be easier described than easily defined as definitions have changed and continue to change over time.¹ It is practiced through a variety of instruments and methods ranging from personal contact and media interviews to the Internet and educational exchanges. Coined in the 1960s by former U.S. diplomat Edmund Gullion, the term public diplomacy was originally developed to differentiate international government activities and information from the pejorative connotations associated with the term propaganda.² Traditionally, it was most relevant to state-to-state diplomacy, or the private relations between the leaders and diplomats who represent sovereign states. A nation's foreign exchange programs for scholars and students, visitor programs, language training, and radio and television broadcasting are all activities aimed at achieving the goals of public diplomacy: to improve the public image of a nation to influence foreign policy initiatives with other countries.

Recent scholarship however, illustrates how the concept of public diplomacy has evolved into public affairs, or how the government communicates its policy initiatives with its domestic constituents in a bipartisan manner, and international relations, or how a nation negotiates with publics in other countries to promote national interest and achieve foreign policy goals. The September 11 attacks in New York City and Washington, DC have contributed to the

² What is Public Diplomacy?, USC Center on Public Diplomacy
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/about/whatis_pd
development of a new public diplomacy - referring not only to activity carried out by sovereign states, but also how non-state actors engage foreign publics to influence the international and domestic relations of their countries. Supranational organizations, sub-national actors, non-governmental organizations - even private companies - all contribute to the globalizing environment of new issues and contexts in which public diplomacy now takes place.\(^3\) Proponents of the new public diplomacy point to the democratization of information through new media and communication technology as a new force that has greatly empowered non-state actors and elevated their role and legitimacy in international politics, developing public diplomacy practices of their own.

Public diplomacy incorporates aspects of marketing and public relations like branding to cover countries, regions, and cities, and foreign affairs. International relations scholar Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, or the degree to which a political actor's cultural assets, political ideals and policies inspire respect or affinity on the part of others, has become a core concept in the public diplomacy studies, in which it is used as a tool to leverage negotiable resources.\(^4\)

Furthermore, public diplomacy activities often present many differing views as represented by private individuals and organizations in addition to official government views. More importantly, as social media platforms have grown in popularity around the world, calls for diplomacy to utilize them have also increased. The perception that these new technologies "redefine how foreign ministries communicate and collaborate with publics" by enabling interaction has become widely accepted, even though far fewer understand how platforms like Facebook and

---

\(^3\) Ibid


Twitter actually create opportunities for engagement. While the foreign relations has embraced the concept of using social media tools as another way to engage with audiences around the world, there is confusion about using social media as a public diplomacy tool and skepticism about whether or not its use can prove effective.

1.1 Public diplomacy and disaster risk reduction

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is about supporting local civil society, communities, households and individuals to become less vulnerable and strengthen their capacity to anticipate, resist, cope with and recover from natural hazards. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction puts it as:

"the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events."

National disasters and emergencies are a violent and intermittent component of individual and international life. While scientific knowledge of disaster phenomena such as drought, hurricanes and typhoons, tropical cyclones, avalanche, flooding, earthquake and volcanic eruption and disease transmission has significantly increased, in many instances, predictions of precise occurrence remain problematic. Winchester (2003) attaches the lack of preparedness to difficulty of long periods of dormancy between catastrophic events or between causation and detection. He justifies his reasoning by giving an example like Krakatoa, a triplecone volcanic island in the

^ UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2007
Sunda strait between Java and Sumatra, which had, despite minor eruption, been dormant for over two hundred years, prior to its eruption in 1883.

Irregularity of some phenomena has significant diplomatic consequences, as will be presented in this study; in terms of policy agenda of international and regional organizations. Other factors of whether the issues remain (or otherwise) on the natural disasters of significance for diplomacy are related to location. Many a times, disasters occur in remote regions of states, raising issues of access, over flight, international co-ordination and the presence of external organizations and agencies in moving to or operating in politically sensitive areas. The waves of the tsunami slammed the coastal areas and coastal provinces.

1.1.1 Early Warning System and the Indian Ocean Tsunami

In response to the 2004 tsunami disaster, APEC Senior Officials in 2005 adopted an 'APEC Strategy on Response to and Preparedness for Natural Disasters and Emergencies'. Thus, Leaders urged member economies to further intensify cooperation, including interaction with the private sector, to maximize the use of available regional resources in order to better prepare the region for disasters and to facilitate post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction. That Strategy, as endorsed by the Leaders in November 2005, included a number of measures to strengthen cooperation and technical assistance among APEC economies to address other issues such as avian flu, pandemic preparedness and the enhancement of public and business outreach and risk communication to increase transparency and reduce risk to trade and travellers.

A tsunami early warning system was established in the Pacific following the 1960 Chilean and 1964 Alaskan tsunamis. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) is managed by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and is the operating arm of the
International Co-ordination Group for the Pacific (IGG-ITSU) established by UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) (www.unesco.org/tsunami). No system had been established, prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, covering the Indian Ocean (www.unesco.org/tsunami). The Pacific Early Warning System has 26 as indicated in the UNESCO website member states, namely: Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Guatemala, Hawaii, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Thailand, the Russian Federation, the USA, and the Philippines.\(^7\)

The earthquake began twenty five miles under the seabed. It registered 8.9 on the Richter Scale and generated a tsunami which reached Kenya and Somalia 2,800 miles away.\(^8\) The tsunami traveled in parts at speeds of up to 500 miles per hour (mph), flooding the low-lying islands like Andaman and causing extensive devastation in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Southern India before reaching East Africa. An estimated 300,000 people died in the Indian Ocean tsunami.\(^9\)

1.2 Problem statement

On December 26, 2004 an earthquake on the Indian Ocean triggered a deadly tsunami that claimed the lives of over 220,000 people. The tsunami ravaged 11 countries, leaving coastal cities and communities utterly devastated and millions of natives homeless. Due to the severity of the disaster, countries around the globe immediately pledged their support to provide much-
needed humanitarian aid. Millions of US dollars in monetary assistance, food, supplies, and other necessities poured into the regions affected by the tsunami. This prompt and generous response from the international community was and continues to be a major factor in the recovery of the destroyed areas. Moreover, the significant role of humanitarian efforts has stimulated plenty of debate on the public diplomacy implications for the nations involved in the endeavor to rebuild Southeast Asia. The tsunami has raised questions about how a country's response affects its image and whether humanitarian efforts should be part of a nation's public diplomacy at all.

It is now widely accepted view that a cooperative effort in dealing with emergency preparedness and disaster response is key element in determining the future effectiveness of such endeavours. Political and civil leaders recognize that large-scale natural disasters that affect one economy can affect all economies and hence it is not just a national or regional issue that needs diplomatic engagement as traditionally known, but also the international engagement of non-state actors.

The threat of Tsunami disasters in the Asian region and indeed other potential disasters elsewhere is of great concern not just for states involved but an international problem. As with other forms of disaster risk reduction, prompt and effective measures are key in ensuring its catastrophic nature is avoided or at least minimized. The premise that communities must be directly involved in disaster risk reduction does not imply excluding all external interventions. Indeed, this study investigates the community involvement otherwise referred to as public diplomacy on disaster reduction.
1.3 Research objectives

1. To establish the impact of public diplomacy on international disaster coordination
2. To determining the role of public diplomacy on implementation of early warning system
3. To determine the influence of social media and communication on disaster risk reduction

1.4 Research Hypotheses

1. Effective Public Diplomacy enhances the management of international disasters.
2. Early warning systems helped to reduce the impact of the Indian Tsunami.
3. Public diplomacy positively influences international disaster coordination.

1.5 Justification of the study

When an earthquake hits a war zone or cyclone aid is flown in by an enemy, many ask: Can catastrophe bring peace? Disaster prevention and mitigation provide similar questions. Could setting up a Tsunami warning system bring enemy countries together? Could social media activism on disasters set the groundwork for wider regional and international cooperation?

This study examines how and why public diplomacy and related activities do create disaster prevention and reduction. Public diplomacy in this case will be restricted to actions before or after a disaster such as emergency response, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction. Continuous interest and support in humanitarian relief generally helps a nation recover from disasters and crises. This study investigates disaster diplomacy case studies from around the world, in a variety of political and disaster circumstances, with specific reference to the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster of 2004. Disaster-politics interactions have been studied for decades, but usually from a specific political framing, covering a specific geographical area, or from a specific disaster framing. There is need for qualitative work and data limitations are thoroughly analysed. Few
publications bring together the topics of disasters and politics in terms of a disaster diplomacy framework, yielding a grounded, qualitative, scientific point of view on the topic.

1.5 Literature review.
"Disasters, one of man's oldest concerns, dates back to periods of pre-history and myth, yet strangely enough, are hardly an area of critical scrutiny".\(^\text{10}\) Disasters are sudden events, which bring serious disruption to society with massive human, material and environmental losses and these losses always go beyond the capacity of the affected society to cope with its own resources.\(^\text{11}\) Any disaster is a combination of a triggering agent and a set of vulnerabilities - and it is these vulnerabilities, the conditions, which affect the capacity of a society to respond to the triggering agent which is the controllable component of a disaster.\(^\text{12}\) Since disasters cause large-scale damage to human life, their livelihoods, economic and social infrastructure and environment\(^\text{13}\) and these damages have shown a significant increase in the last one and a half decades,\(^\text{14}\) the world is in serious need of a sustained and comprehensive disaster risk reduction strategy.

1.6 International disaster coordination
The development of the international diplomatic efforts in the tsunami crisis was influenced by a number of factors, including the critical attitude of the United States to the UN; the range of UN agencies involved; pressure for a UN-co-ordinating role, particularly from smaller developed donors; and the foreign policy sensitivities of disaster-affected countries.

United States initially attempted to manage the crisis, in line with its 'small coalition' view outside the framework of the UN but later shifted to at least formally accept a UN co-ordinated operation. On December 29, 2004, President Bush announced the creation of a group comprising India, Japan, Australia, plus the United States, to manage the crisis (The New York Times. December 30, 2004). Conspicuously absent were the roles of the UK, a close US ally in the Iraq conflict, the UN and any potential major donor. Nevertheless, the US model was endorsed by Indonesia which had earlier advanced a similar regional proposal.\textsuperscript{15}

At Jakarta one day summit, under pressure the UN and other donor countries, US modified the core group approach.\textsuperscript{16} The summit was attended by the heads of government and/or foreign ministers from all the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries as well as China, the UK, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada, the EU Commission, the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark. Norway, Sweden, Timorleste. South Africa, Russia, Iran, Italy, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were invited as observers.

All these efforts were focused at the development and use of regional donor group and was strongly supported by Japan who suggested that after the Jakarta Summit, the effort to become part of the overall international effort. Japan, via 'quiet diplomacy,' further consolidated its lead

" The Guardian, January 1, 2005
donor position with meetings held with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, with Sri Lanka on January 10, 2005, on medium-term assistance.\(^{17}\)

The tsunami crisis provided an opportunity to use overwhelming military power. Elements of a US carrier group were rapidly deployed off Indonesia and Sri Lanka for large scale emergency humanitarian assistance. In effect, control of hard military power was traded off for possible 'soft' power, image and presentational benefits. Something in the view of Okoth (2010) was a typical style of America foreign policy and diplomacy.

The shift from the Aid Donor Core Group to an effort with substantial UN involvement was an indication of success for the State Department's multilateral diplomacy. The then Secretary of State of US Colin Powell visited the region January 4-7, 2005 and represented his country at the Jakarta Summit. In an unusual piece of domestic public diplomacy, a national appeal to the American public was made via a joint address by Presidents Bush, Bush Senior, and Carter.\(^{19}\)

Though often overlooked, National and foreign policy sensitivities are an important dimension in major international disasters and emergencies. China for instance, has been reluctant to disclose information on major accidents, medical emergencies (such as the 'bird' flu epidemic) or natural disasters. In the case of the 2004 tsunami, sensitive issues arose because of long-standing insurgencies in two of the most affected countries (Indonesia bedevilled by the Aceh separatist movement and Sri Lanka bothered by the Tamil Tigers). Neither Indonesia nor Sri Lanka wished

\(^{^\text{Fin}}\) Financial Times, January 11, 2005

\(^{^\text{O}}\) Okoth, Pontian Godfrey. 2010 USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold War. Nairobi University of Nairobi Press.

\(^{\text{W}}\) The Washington Post, January 8, 2005
to see emergency/separatist issues or their domestic position on these debilitated. The UN Secretary-General signalled unwillingness to link the issues by not travelling to areas of Tamil Tiger influence in Sri Lanka.

1.7 International Warning System

The existence of a successful tsunami warning system in the Pacific region has resulted to a suggestion that a South Asian warning system should be developed. At the moment, vulnerable regions in the United States, particularly the Pacific Northwest, utilize Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to integrate natural, socioeconomic, and disaster information in order to develop holistic mitigation and preparedness strategies. States that analyze risks and communicate warnings effectively are able to mitigate damages better than those that do not implement these precautions. Applying the underlying technology to South Asia or magnifying it to a global scale would require international coordination on a variety of levels; international relations would therefore be very essential in the realization of such a system. Form a political perspective, governments would have to come to a negotiated agreement regarding such a system, and its funding, staffing, and rules of operation. Practically, a warning system would require the international coordination of experts and the physical installation and maintenance of equipment. There are numerous instances of the international community attempting to mitigate the effects of disasters through warning systems for instance, the volatile Pacific region has tsunami, earthquake, and volcanic monitoring, while the African community has moved to prevent and manage its own natural and human disasters. Nonetheless, the development and implementation of such a system requires more than planning and technical expertise; it requires


a political will and commitment from national and international leadership and the development of specific policies relating to the system and its operations. Global public sentiment is pushing politicians toward the development of such a system, but if the suggestion is not implemented immediately, while public interest is strong, the project may be caught up in the quagmire of international politics. The development of warning systems lags behind funding of aid agencies. Charities respond to an immediate human need for disaster relief, while long-term planning tends to involve government agencies and meetings.

The international community should identify areas most at risk from flooding by the tsunami. Production of inundation maps may enable long-term planning for rebuilding and siting of new communities that would be at low risk and for required coastal defense works. The combination of these results with detailed topographic measurements of the sea bed and coastal zones will indicate degree of inland penetration and flooding. Nonetheless, such topographic maps are currently missing for the Indian Ocean region, and detailed sea bed imaging is yet to be carried out.

International focus and cooperation is centered on tsunami warning systems, both to detect tsunamis and to issue warnings to prevent loss of life. These two detached mechanisms involve wave detection sensors and a communications infrastructure to issue the warning for evacuation of coastal areas. Both these mechanisms have associated problems: tsunamis in deep water have

---


a very low wave height and thus require a network of sensors for detection, while setting up the
required local infrastructure for timely and accurate warnings can also be problematic. High
frequency (HF) radar has been used since the late 1970s, and originally had a very short range of
sight. Warning systems rely on the fact that seismic waves travel much faster than a tsunami in
open water. This means that earthquake detection is almost instantaneous and a tsunami risk can
be rapidly calculated, a forecast made, and a timely warning issued.

1.8 Role of communication and social media in disaster risk reduction
Governments have become major communicators in international communication in recent
decades. Governments try to communicate not only with their counterparts through traditional
diplomacy but also with global publics beyond national borders under the name of public
diplomacy. Tsunami prediction, detection, and observation form only part of a good warning
system. The other part encompasses effective communication to enable adequate warning to the
populations of the potentially affected areas. The tsunami warning systems feature multiple lines
of communications, including e-mail, fax, radio, telex and sirens. These systems enable warnings
to be sent to civilian populations, the emergency services and armed forces. There is need to set
up systems in place to ensure that such messages, when received, are acted upon.

Furthermore, tsunami preparedness is important to be able to respond quickly to warnings. A few
public awareness programs exist, which may act as models for an international preparedness
system. TsunamiReady is a US National Weather Service (NWS) initiative that promotes active
preparation with collaboration among federal, state and local emergency management agencies,

the public, and the NWS tsunami warning system for coastal communities at risk of a tsunami.

The initiative includes a number of actions designed to increase community preparedness. These activities include community awareness, assembling a Tsunami Hazard Plan, establishing an Emergency Operations Center, and providing multiple communications and warnings via radio, sirens, and other local media. Efforts to apply this type of communication network to an international scale will need to be significant and calls for public diplomacy.

International organizations recognize the need for clear and efficient communication of tsunami warnings. An international coordination meeting was held at the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, France on 23 March 2005 to determine communication needs.

*The Meeting warranted that Indian Ocean Member States should be fully informed, at the technical level, on tsunami warning and mitigation programmes at the national, regional and global levels. The Meeting adopted a communication technique that provides guidance to all partners regarding the required actions that will lead towards the establishment of an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System. The Meeting also recommended the establishment of an Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG/IOTWS).*

Communications have been important not only for warning services, but also in picking up the pieces of the social aftermath. Immediately after the Indian Ocean disaster, both the BBC and

---

*Pacific Tsunami Warning Center* [http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/tsunamiready/tsunamiready.htm](http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/tsunamiready/tsunamiready.htm)

UNESCO, Paris Coordination Meeting, Towards the establishment of a tsunami warning and mitigation system for the Indian Ocean [http://ioc.unesco.org/indotsunami/paris_march05.htm](http://ioc.unesco.org/indotsunami/paris_march05.htm)

Sky\textsuperscript{27} made a large portion of their websites available for relatives to post details of missing persons and for survivors to post their details, as did the scrolling news ticker tape on the Sky News TV screen. Both these websites have extremely large servers associated with hosting large public access websites, and so have the server resources available for provision of this type of service. The IndoTsunami website, set up on Tuesday 10 February 2005, is dedicated to follow-up activities in the countries devastated by the tsunami and was to report on national, regional, and international action to establish tsunami warning and mitigation systems in the Indian Ocean and other ocean basins.\textsuperscript{8}

Another topic that received a lot of press was the impact of the Internet on the amount and speed that donations came in. The Internet revolutionized the way in which people responded to the tsunami. Strong emotional reactions to the disaster were created, in large part, due to the immediate posting of images and reports of the disaster online. This rapidly spread a sense of crisis that pushed people to donate. People saw the tsunami as a "universal tragedy" and wanted to do anything they could to help. In addition, the ease with which people could make donations further contributed to the success of the international response. The United States is one of the countries that dominated headlines when it came to offering aid and support to tsunami victims. After an initial pledge of $35 million, the U.S. was bombarded with criticism. Jan Egeland, the U.N. emergency relief coordinator, called the American government "stingy." In response to this criticism and the worsening conditions of the disaster, President George W. Bush increased the U.S.'s commitment to $350 million. Still, international critics cited the fact that the U.S. gave

\textsuperscript{27} BBC 2005 www.bbc.co.uk
Sky.com www.sky.com
one of the lowest contributions (less than 1% of its gross national income) while countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, contributed over 2% of theirs. However, journalists and government officials defended the U.S. by discussing the amount of "unofficial" aid that went unaccounted for. This included all of the private donations, volunteering, trade and investment made by ordinary citizens, private companies, and various NGOs throughout the United States.

By supporting relief efforts, Americans hoped that their donations would improve the United Status's predominantly negative image abroad. The Christian Science Monitor quoted Chicago donor, Julie Putterman, as saying "I feel like our country has been such a bad citizen of the world in the recent past. " I just felt like it was important for everyone to rally." The belief was that by being "compassionate," especially to Indonesia - the country with the largest Muslim population in the world - other nations would see a more favorable side of the U.S. Furthermore, by having the American military involved in on-site support, the U.S. aspired to present its military forces as an instrument of goodwill, rather than of fear and destruction. Nonetheless, scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer claimed that it would take more than helping a few countries to fix the U.S.'s tarnished reputation in the Muslim world.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

1.9.1 Recognition primed decision model

Recognition-primed decision (RPD) is a model of how people make quick, effective decisions when faced with complex situations. In this model, the decision maker is assumed to generate a possible course of action, compare it to the constraints imposed by the situation, and select the

---

29 Tsunami of Giving: American Donations Flood Relief Agencies - Editorial (Manchester Union Leader, January 4, 2005)
30 Tsunami of Giving: American Donations Flood Relief Agencies - Editorial (Manchester Union Leader, January 4, 2005)
first course of action that is not rejected. RPD has been described in diverse groups including ICU nurses, fire ground commanders, chess players, and stock market traders. It functions well in conditions of time pressure, and in which information is partial and goals poorly defined. The limitations of RPD include the need for extensive experience among decision-makers (in order to correctly recognize the salient features of a problem and model solutions) and the problem of the failure of recognition and modeling in unusual or misidentified circumstances. It is a valid model for how human decision-makers make decisions.

The RPD model identifies a reasonable reaction as the first one that is immediately considered. RPD combines two ways of developing a decision; the first is recognizing which course of action makes sense, and the second, evaluating the cause of action through imagination to see if the actions resulting from that decision make sense. However, the difference of being experienced or inexperienced plays a major factor in the decision-making processes.

RPD reveals a critical difference between experts and novices when presented with recurring situations. Experienced people will generally be able to come up with quicker decision because the situation may match a prototypical situation they have encountered before. Novices, lacking this experience, must cycle through different possibilities, and tend to use the first course of action that they believe will work. The inexperienced also have the tendencies of using trial and error through their imagination.31

Recognition primed decision making is highly relevant to the leaders or officers of organizations that are affiliated with emergency services such as fire fighters, search and rescue units, police, and other emergency services. It is applied to both the experienced and the inexperienced, and how they manage their decision making processes. The Recognition primed decision making model is developed as samples for organizations on how important decisions can affect important situations which may either save lives or take lives.

1.10 Methodology
The research design will be analytical survey. Analytical surveys attempt to describe and explain why certain situations exist. In this approach two or more variables are usually examined to test research hypotheses. The results allow researchers to examine the interrelationships among variables and to draw explanatory inferences. In this study, the researcher seeks to establish the relationship between public diplomacy and communication and social media; early warning systems; and international disaster coordination.

1.11 Sampling technique
Purposive and simple random sampling techniques will be employed in this study. Purposive sampling technique will help in getting information from designated personnel from the ministry of foreign affairs. The basic idea of sampling is that by selecting some of the elements in a population, conclusions will be drawn about the entire population. There are several advantages of sampling as opposed to a census and for this research the reasons are due to lower costs, greater accuracy in results, greater speed of data collection and the availability of population elements will be higher. The ultimate test to a sample design though is how well it represents the characteristics of the population it purports to represent. The sample must be valid. The validity
of a sample depends on two considerations: accuracy and precision. The simple random sampling design is aimed at ensuring high accuracy and precision which will be this researcher's aim.

1.12 Data Collection Method
The study will utilize a quantitative data collection technique. The data collection tool will be a questionnaire\textsuperscript{32} which by definition is a group of structured questions with each item in the questionnaire developed to address a specific objective, research question or hypothesis of the study. In this study the questionnaire will have 2 distinct parts: The first part will collect background information from respondents. The second part makes up the main questionnaire intended to determine the role public diplomacy played in the 2004 tsunami disaster. The questionnaire will contain closed ended questions measured on a 5 Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral 4= Agree, 5= strongly agree.

1.13 Chapter outline
Chapter one is a presentation of the background of the study, the problem statement, study hypotheses and methodology.

Chapter two will cover a review of pertinent tsunami literature in relation to public diplomacy.

Chapter three will present comparative public diplomacy consisting of political system, culture and Interest group systems

Chapter four will present disaster risk reduction strategies with illustrations of past experiences

Chapter five will be conclusion and recommendations

\textsuperscript{32} This tool of data collection will be chosen due to the ease with which it can be administered because all that will be required is to drop the questionnaires to the respective universities in the sample then collect the filled copies after an agreed time.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Social Media and Disaster Risk Reduction Communication

Social media and communication especially the media coverage of humanitarian crises is widely believed to influence charitable giving, yet this assertion has received little empirical scrutiny. Using Internet donations after the 2004 tsunami as a case study, I will show that media coverage of disasters has a dramatic impact on donations to relief agencies, with an additional minute of nightly news coverage increasing the average daily donation for the typical relief agency. Similarly, an additional story in the major Dailies for example the New York Times or Wall Street Journal raises the daily average donations. These results were robust to controls for the timing of news coverage and tax considerations. In addition social media and communications have played a very critical role in the disaster early warning signs after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. For example the Haitian government credits risk reduction measures as such as public awareness-raising, early warning and evacuation systems and training for the reduced loss of life\(^3\).

Earlier researchers of the economics of private giving to charitable organizations shows the primary motivation for giving as either fostering the provision of public goods or increasing one's private consumption. The "public goods" model is exemplified by donors who give based on the anticipated return in some form of public good\(^3\). On the other hand, the "private consumption" model arises when donors derive utility from the act of giving, either because the well-being of others enters their own utility functions directly or because the public approval

associated with giving benefits the donor\textsuperscript{35}. For example, conspicuous donations may signal wealth, thereby enabling donors to interact with individuals in higher socioeconomic strata.\textsuperscript{36} However, individuals may receive a "warm glow" from making charitable contributions even when their donations displace those of other donors, when there are no direct social benefits to donors, and when the beneficiaries of charitable giving are far away\textsuperscript{37}.

Regardless of whether motivated by public goods or private consumption, the majority of American households contribute to charitable causes. For instance in the year 2000, 69\% of U.S. households made charitable donations, with the average contributing household donating $1,942\textsuperscript{38}. Moreover, both the beneficiaries of charitable giving and the level of donations are influenced by world events, as evidenced by the $2.4 billion in donations made to the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, by the $1.6 billion raised by U.S. charities for disaster relief after the 26 December 2004 tsunami, and by the $3.3 billion in cash raised by U.S. charities for disaster relief after Hurricane Katrina. These striking examples of generosity coincided with highly-concentrated media coverage in the weeks following the disasters, suggesting a kind of "CNN effect" for charitable giving\textsuperscript{39}.

As a matter of fact, relief workers have witnessed the link between communication through social media, media coverage and donations that are used to fund daily operations. For example,

private donations to relief agencies during the early stages of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 had been sufficient to support approximately one million displaced Rwandans, but after the tribulations of O.J. Simpson and Tanya Harding eclipsed Rwanda in international news, funding for relief activities began to decline. The perception among many aid workers in the camps for Rwandan refugees (including one of the authors) was that the public had turned its back on the crises, with potentially dire consequences. Oxfam Canada incorporated this perception in a highly successful advertisement in nationally-circulated newspapers. A large headline shouted, "O.J. SIMPSON LIMITED TO TEN VISITORS A DAY."

A good number of evidence shows a systematic relationship between media coverage and the behavior of private donors. For example, an analysis undertaken by the Institute for Philanthropy finds that 14 of 15 surveyed British philanthropists believe that the media has the power to encourage private giving, with 11 of the 15 being inspired by social media to make charitable donations themselves. This study thus assesses the effect of media coverage and the internet on donations to relief agencies and disaster risk reduction in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami, an ideal case study because relief agencies concentrated their efforts on tsunami victims for several months, suggesting that donations to relief agencies were in fact donations to tsunami relief.

---

2.1 The Tsunami, the Influence of Social Media and Communication to Disaster Risk Reduction

On 26th December 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake off the northwest coast of Sumatra triggered a devastating tsunami that spread across the Indian Ocean, inundating coastal communities and claiming victims in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Somalia, Myanmar, the Maldives, Malaysia, Tanzania, Seychelles, Bangladesh, South Africa, Yemen, and Kenya. According to UN Statistics, 229,866 people were either killed or listed as missing (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005), rendering the tsunami one of the deadliest natural disasters in modern history\(^{41}\).

In most of the affected countries and the generally around the world no major occurrences gave competition to the tsunami disaster. Also being a time for holidays people around the world shared information through different platform on the internet and communication through media coverage. Finally, a number of westerners were killed in the deluge, potentially raising demand for media coverage\(^{42}\). Thus, the tsunami disaster encouraged an unprecedented media response. For example, CNN deployed over 80 anchors, correspondents, and producers to provide 24-hour coverage of relief efforts. Similarly, the tsunami dominated the front page of the *New York Times*, garnering over half of the articles on the front page in the week following the disaster, and *Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, The Economist*, and numerous other news magazines featured the tsunami and recovery efforts in multiple cover stories. Indeed, the

---


tsunami dominated worldwide media attention well into January, 2005, much longer than any natural disaster in modern history\(^{43}\).

As evident from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami the value of information from and communication with affected communities was so important to the risk reduction in other later disasters. For example in the Haiti earthquake, aid workers are advised to 'slow down' and take the time to learn the local context, to 'listen more' and be accountable to local people by developing mechanisms to both receive and provide information about the response to communities\(^{44}\). Dissemination strategy was especially developed using local advertising, social media and marketing capacities are cited as effective means to communicate decisions, convey key messages and reach target groups\(^{45}\). In Haiti sound communication and community outreach in a post-disaster setting are also recognized as critical to minimizing crime and looting, maintaining a stable environment and enabling progress in relief and recovery\(^{46}\). Whatever the underlying motivation, trends in donations closely tracked trends in media coverage of the tsunami and the shared information on the social media, suggesting that the media strongly influenced private giving to relief agencies.


In Thailand communication played equally critical role in disaster risk reduction. For example the Early Warning System (EWS) information network is linked to the several government agencies mentioned above. Data on the intensity of seismic and wave activities are received and transmitted via the EWS established by the National Disaster Warning Centre (NDWC). The NDWC receives information from these government agencies, from the DART buoys and from other international agencies, and then verifies and analyses the data. Since its deployment in the Indian Ocean, the Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) system had been working properly and had been sending wave data regularly. Initially, the data was sent to the National Data Buoy Center in the USA and then transferred to the NDWC through the internet. Now the data is transferred directly to the NDWC through Global Telecommunication System (GTS).

After receiving the seismic information from the DART buoys and/or the national and international agencies, the NDWC undertakes an analysis, using a tsunami model on their mainframe computer, of the likelihood of the generation of a tsunami and which areas are likely to be affected. The model takes account of the magnitude of the earthquake and the bathymetry of the near shore area in the generation of information for decision-making. After receiving the seismic information, the NDWC assesses which of the three seismic awareness zones is likely to be affected. The hazard information is disseminated through the Government Information Network (GIN) which comprises the intranet (OpenCARE), the warning towers, telephone network channels and social network e.g. SMS (capable of sending 5,000 messages/time), auto-

---


fax (capable of sending 150 faxes at a time), call centres for a 1860 number, 280 radio stations and television and Google+, twitter and face book. If an alarm is sounded through the warning towers, the messages are broadcast in five different languages including Thai, English, German, Chinese and Japanese. The intranet NDWC Open exchange for Corroborative Activities in Response to Emergency: (OpenCARE) is one of several information dissemination channels of the NDWC. OpenCARE had four different groups of target audiences: the general public, disaster management agencies, DDPM and related government agencies, and NDWC operating staff.

Short messages are also sent to community leaders, volunteers, health facilities and schools in remote areas where radio and television is inaccessible. In some areas, shortwave radio communication normally used for official purposes in government departments and local government offices as well as for amateur users like fishermen and volunteer networks, is also sometimes used as a supplementary device for warning and rescue missions in areas at risk or affected by earthquakes and tsunamis. Such initiatives were largely community driven and not properly coordinated. The formation of NDWC was basically to supply information and to issue a tsunami warning. However, The National Tsunami Drill on 21 August 2009 showed that a number of technical and non-technical problems still need to be overcome. For example in Ban Thoong-La-ong, one of the 15 coastal communities hardly hit, the main problems related to the

communication of the warning, particularly the areal coverage of the loudspeakers and the reporting and feedback to the administration and coordinating centre\textsuperscript{50}.

There are serious concerns regarding the effectiveness of the EWS in Krabi Province. The main challenges and constraints to the dissemination and communication of the EWS include unreliable warning towers. For example many of the warning towers in Krabi Province were considered unreliable. Of the six Krabi communities the Thai Red Cross is working in, only one had a warning tower that is operational. There are also instances of damage through lightning, for example, at Ban Thalane, theft and vandalism\textsuperscript{51}.

Secondly was the inadequate signage positioning and areal coverage, there were examples of warning towers being poorly positioned and having poor areal coverage. For example, a warning tower in Ban Tha Klong is located on the other side of the estuary. In Ban Nam Khem, the Krabi Provincial Administration Division of Public Works and the CBDRM committee have confirmed that the warning tower covers only a small radius of approximately 300m which means that communities near the coast cannot hear or understand the warnings during strong winds. Similarly, during a visit to Phi Phi Island by SEI and Raks Thai (May - July 2009), it was observed that the warning sirens and announcements were not clearly audible on all parts of the island, particularly the far-eastern end of Ton Sai Bay, where the Phi Phi Island School is located, and the north end of Bang Niang Beach\textsuperscript{52}. In some areas, the warning siren was also


\textsuperscript{52} ibid
found to be disturbed by noise pollution from bars, restaurants, boat engines and construction sites.

The lessons learnt from these challenges resulted into a number of recommendations that have in a substantive way brought a great influence of communication to disaster risk reduction after the Indian Ocean tsunami. The recommendations included; to continuously improve dissemination and communication of information to the public the national government needs to establish monitoring and maintenance systems and undertake regular drills to strengthen disaster preparedness in the community. The successful execution of a robust monitoring and maintenance strategy requires additional financial and technical support for the local authorities responsible.

First was the dissemination of up-to-date knowledge on possible risks and appropriate responses is imperative. There needs to be an emphasis on public relations and increased communication channels at the community level. Information could be circulated through a local disaster-preparedness centre or committee. Other dissemination methods including direct-line EWS to hotels, resorts and restaurants; local radio links to temples and mosques, and community announcement points could be utilized. Secondly, additional funding is required to complete the construction of safe places in designated areas. Community cooperation is required to locate appropriate safe places and onsite inspections are essential for all designated sites. The third recommendation was to improve evacuation signage it is essential that regular monitoring takes place and that information is correct and updated. This included repairing, correcting and

"ibid"
updating existing escape routes and sign boards. Evacuation route signs need to be clearly seen and not obscured from view, arrow signage on the street needs to be made visible and incorrect escape direction needs to be corrected. The development of escape routes that would shorten distances and allow for faster escape was another key recommendation. For example, a new route in front of Lo Da Lum Bay on Phi Phi Island would enable people to escape faster.

Communication become evident among the recommendations, for example public relations material such as maps and escape routes need to be developed to provide knowledge for entrepreneurs, employees and the general populace, including tourists. This material then needs to be appropriately disseminated throughout the region. Phi Phi Tourist Business Association in collaboration with Raks Thai and SEI has developed a large scale map for Phi Phi Island⁵⁴ that displays escape routes and safe areas. Improved foreign language skills of small beach activity operators would enable them to better assist and instruct tourists in emergency situations, thereby creating a safer environment. To increase accessibility, language courses could be run through existing local organizations but financial backing would be needed from government sources⁵⁵.

From the recommendations after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, it is clear that communication is integral in disaster risk reduction. The improvements have in a big scale reduced disaster risks, for example in the Haiti earth quake a range of humanitarian information management tools and mechanisms were used throughout the earthquake response. The inter-cluster Web site OneResponse’ was piloted in Haiti and served as an online platform for the humanitarian

⁵⁴ Raks Thai Foundation and SEI with the Ban Ko Phi Phi, Moo 7 Committee. 2009. Community handbook: Preparedness for disaster, Phi Phi Island, Krabi Province.
community to share operational data and information relating to the response and recovery.

Clusters' information management representatives met on a regular basis to agree on common data standards, exchange information and develop indicators to track the effectiveness of their work.

The earthquake set a number of precedents in terms of communication, media coverage and the use of new technologies for humanitarian response. Many UN and international NGOs and some military actors embraced technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Skype in their work, to coordinate, collaborate and act upon information from the ground generated by people directly affected by the earthquake.

Some credit Twitter with helping the MSF plane land at Port-au-Prince after Twitter users bombarded the US Air Force's Twitter account with demands that the plane be permitted to land—the plane landed less than one hour later\(^6\). The Haitian musician Wyclef Jean used Twitter to raise awareness and mobilise funding for his Yele Haiti Earthquake fund\(^5\), while the Red Cross gained more than 10,000 followers on its Twitter accounts since the disaster\(^5\).

The Red Cross used Facebook in awareness-raising and for rallying support and private donations for its work in Haiti following the disaster\(^5\). Social games accessible through

Huffington Post. 2010b. 'American Red Cross Haiti Relief: How to help Haiti victims, where to submit donations.' \textit{Huffington Post}, 13 January.
Facebook (such as Farmville) raised US$1.5 million from users in 47 countries over a period of five days for the World Food Programme's food distribution work in Haiti.\(^6\)

The earthquake saw an expanding number of actors involved in humanitarian response—both remote and on the ground—introducing a range of innovative information management initiatives. Mission 463614 used text messaging to communicate with communities affected by the disaster whereby Haitians could text their location and urgent needs to the telephone number 4636 to receive aid.\(^6\)

The Thomas Reuters Foundation developed an Emergency Information System (EIS) for Haitians to use to report missing persons and shelter and food issues.\(^6\) Similarly, Ushahidi\(^5\) developed an information system for people to gather data via text messages, email or the internet and visualise it on a map or timeline. Other information actors engaged in the earthquake response are Crisis Commons, Crisis Mappers, Open Street Map, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Sahana.

According to a survey conducted by the University of Michigan and Small Arms following the earthquake, they found that over half of respondents received their national news from radio. The inter-agency initiative Communication with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) composed of media organisations and foundations, NGOs and the UN worked with 27 local radio broadcasters to communicate key messages; such as explanations on the food voucher and distribution system to Haitian communities in Creole via a daily radio programme called

\(^{\text{i}}\) Ibid

Enfomasyon Nou Owe Konnen (Creole for News You Can Use). Wind-up radios provided by the US military were distributed by the NGO Internews. However, it remains to be determined the extent to which such initiatives actually engaged communities to ensure the accountability of humanitarian actors to affected populations.

Throughout the humanitarian response, language has emerged as an issue, whereby many organizations have struggled to identify staff with sufficient command of the French language. Three months after the earthquake, most coordination meetings are still conducted in English, excluding national and local participation.

Media coverage of the delivery of aid distributions raised the issue of divergent perceptions of the response and the disregard of the dignity of affected populations. Media reporting widespread riots accompanying food distributions were rejected by the UN, who affirmed that the overall security situation post-earthquake was calm and that security incidents were sporadic and localized. International journalists in the immediate aftermath of the disaster reported weak coordination and delayed delivery of aid to affected communities, without taking into account the unprecedented logistical and extraordinary coordination challenges faced by more than 1,000 aid agencies operating in Haiti.

Brainard, C. 2010. 'The voice of the affected: How the media are improving humanitarian aid post-Haiti.' *Columbia Journalism Review*, 26 April.

Ibid


Solnit, R. 2010. 'When the media is the disaster: Covering Haiti,' *Huffington Post*, 21 January.

Ibid
The second dimension of the influence of media on disaster risk reduction is the early warning signs. On December 2006, none of the Indian Ocean countries had an effective warning system in place, so the tsunami hit most affected areas without any advance notice and countless lives were lost as a result. For example, the tsunami took between 90 minutes and two hours to reach Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the east coast of India. The waves did not reach Somalia until seven hours after the earthquake and yet people in these areas still died. In the wake of the tragedy, nations around the world called for the establishment of a warning system for the Indian Ocean and placed renewed emphasis on developing systems along their own coastlines. Existing tsunami warning systems like the one established for Japan in 1968 by UNESCO have proven effective in saving countless lives. UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) is organizing efforts by Indian Ocean countries to establish an interim region-wide tsunami-warning system by mid to late 2006. Earlier 2008, a mechanism was established for Indian Ocean countries to receive tsunami warnings from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawai'i and the Japan Meteorological Agency. These distant centers are not, however, always able to accurately assess conditions in the Indian Ocean. They can only detect seismological information and since only a small fraction of earthquakes generate tsunamis; this temporary arrangement is prone to a high rate of false alarms.

Twenty-five of the 27 countries involved have established communications centers to receive interim advisory information and have identified national tsunami coordination loci that will work with each other and the UN in creating a regional network. Needs assessment missions have been completed in 16 countries, and a Master Plan for the regional system will be presented and discussed at the next IOC coordination meeting in Hyderabad, India, on December 12-16, "ReliefWeb, April 12, 2005. "Meeting in Mauritius for a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean,"
2005. At an August meeting in Perth, the countries agreed that seven regional centers would be established. The UN's World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is working to upgrade the Global Telecommunications System for 13 of the countries. These upgrades will allow the distribution of tsunami information and warnings that can then be passed along to appropriate authorities and national warning networks.

### 2.2 Public Diplomacy and International Risk Coordination

On 26 December 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia and subsequent tsunamis killed more than 250,000 people and caused widespread damage in more than a dozen countries around the Indian Ocean. The international response to disaster had a number of challenges including inequalities and accountability of the aid, survivor safety, and national institutional responses were not properly coordinated, assessing and delivering information to some affected regions and international coordination.

The involvement of the public, local authorities, humanitarian bodies, International Non Governmental Organizations and the media played a critical in the response to disaster. The challenges of the response to disaster through review by various bodies changed the general response to disasters after the 2004 tsunami. This prompted the need for continued regional and international cooperation in helping those affected and in rebuilding to a less vulnerable state where people are aware of tsunami threats receive warnings, and know how to react.

The earthquake was caused by subduction and triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean, killing over 230,000 people in

---


34
fourteen countries, and inundating coastal communities with waves up to 30 meters (98 ft) high.\footnote{It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. Indonesia was the hardest-hit country, followed by Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and the Eastern part of Africa especially Somalia.}

With a magnitude of $M_w 9.1-9.3$, it is the third largest earthquake ever recorded on a seismograph. The earthquake had the longest duration of faulting ever observed, between 8.3 and \footnote{10 minutes. It caused the entire planet to vibrate as much as 1 centimetre (0.4 inches) and triggered other earthquakes as far away as Alaska.\footnote{Its epicentre was between Simeulue and mainland Indonesia.}} 

religious organizations, ethnic groups and also including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments.  

In some circumstances as the disaster was argued to have catalyzed public diplomacy, as Jean-Christophe Gaillard argues in his commentary (8 June 2006) Regarding the role of the tsunami in the Aceh peace process, according to representatives of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), talks between the Indonesian government and GAM leaders secretly started two days before the tsunami (on 24 Dec. 2004). AMM people themselves recognise that the disaster deeply influenced the rapidity and success of the peace process but it did not initiate it. So, disasters catalyse diplomacy rather than create diplomacy. For example 5 January 2006 Indonesia police complete their pull-out from Aceh and on 19 April 2006 Exiled GAM leaders visit Aceh.  

Another notable change of response to international disaster was the bickering between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers, Colombo's travel restrictions imposed on Kofi Annan. India's refusal of much foreign aid, continuing difficulties in Aceh, and Burma/Myanmar's reluctance to open up to foreign relief suggest that once again, disaster diplomacy runs into problems. In the end, a single disaster and the subsequent humanitarian imperative perhaps can rarely overcome years or generations of hatred, indoctrination, and repression backstopped by hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and selfishness from the governments now trying to embrace public diplomacy. It is remarkable that so many people at such a high level, including Colin Powell,
could pretend to be so naive as to think that delivering aid to disaster-hit people can deliver a country from antipathy that leads to violence.

Longer-term effects are harder to gauge. As seen by the abysmal British and American governments’ responses to the tsunami initially, people power can push governments where they do not wish to go. At the individual-to-individual level, public diplomacy can be a significant force for political change, even if the politicians and senior civil servants are narrow-minded and short-sighted. Such grassroots public diplomacy is hard to monitor and demonstrate, yet it might be the most long-lasting and significant achievement of tsunami public diplomacy from the horror of 26 December 200480. The notable achievements were; 19 August 2005 Sri Lanka's government and the Tamil Tigers agree to hold high-level talks but continue wrangling into September regarding the venue. 17 November 2005 Mahinda Rajapakse, promising to take a hardline with the Tamil Tigers and to re-negotiate the ceasefire, wins Sri Lanka's presidential election endorsing his approach to peace talks81.

The 2004 tsunami public diplomacy also to an extent influenced Indonesian-American or Indo-American relations. The preliminary observations appeared not to favor the relation because other factors had been more important in the diplomatic interactions of those pairs. Comments from Washington and Jakarta suggested that the American military operation to bring humanitarian relief to affected parts of Indonesia would be good for Indonesian-American

---

80 Harris, S. 2006 (February). Disaster Response, Peace and Conflict in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka. Part 1
The USA and Indonesia had traditionally had close relations, including military, economic, and political ties. At times difficulties have emerged, such as in October 2000 when a new American ambassador to Jakarta decided to tackle corruption. As well, independence for East Timor, and the Indonesian military's rampant run across East Timor in the run-up to independence caused some complications for Jakarta-Washington relations, although, as usual, Washington was not overly concerned about the human rights abuses, violence, or murders of UN workers and other civilians.

Overall, the American government's 2002 statement that "The United States views Indonesia as the cornerstone of regional security in Southeast Asia and a key trade partner." U.S. interests in the region depend on Indonesia's stability and economic growth." sums up their ties, despite all the ironies present in that statement. USAID had a 7-point programme for Indonesia in 2004, American government aid is hundreds of millions of dollars, American oil interests (of course) are billions of dollars, and the USA represents immense amounts of ongoing trade for Indonesia. In the absence of rash comments by either side, this level of cooperation will continue irrespective of the tsunami.

Similarly, not much will change with respect to the relatively frosty Indian-American relations. India initially indicated that they did not want foreign aid for the tsunami, a particular snub to the


"Ibid

Americans, and any American push for closer ties is—quite legitimately—likely to be seen as muscling in for purposes of attempting political interference in the region.\textsuperscript{85}

The strong potential for a Bush visit to India in 2005—he would become the fifth American president to visit India and the first Republican since Richard Nixon—should be watched closely, because that has a strong potential to significantly change Indo-American relations. The reason is mainly economic rather than disaster-related. Both countries wish to take advantage of the trade opportunities with the other.\textsuperscript{86} As in most instances, many more reasons exist for diplomacy (in this case, money), and are considered to be much more important by the governments involved, than mere human suffering and calamity.

In Indonesia, it would be naive to assume that American tsunami aid will reduce terrorism. Colin Powell sees the relief as "an opportunity to see American generosity, American values in action". The world, Muslims, and non-Muslims, have already had enough of American generosity and values in action through the thousands of civilians killed in the Iraq war and the millions killed over past decades by American governments protecting their own economic and political interests.\textsuperscript{87}

A relief and reconstruction operation even one which lasts months before the media lose interest and the world becomes sidetracked by other important issues such as Hollywood couples and the latest prime-time sitcom has only a small potential for overcoming the deep level of anti-
American hatred which exists in some sectors of Indonesia. For the vast majority of Indonesians who would never resort to violence and who are much more concerned with day-to-day living than with international geopolitics, the aid was gratefully received, but in terms of human beings I (who happen to be Americans) assisting human beings (who happen to be Indonesian) rather than as being an anti-terrorism measure. The survivors also are concentrating on rebuilding their lives and livelihoods while remembering the dead rather than being concerned about national and international security, particularly when the impacts are mainly felt in such remote locations such as Washington, London, and Rome\textsuperscript{88}.

The dynamics of the Aceh rebellion have been affected through utter devastation. Some anti-Western elements might appreciate the aid received. In this case, though, for those who feel such resentment and who would resort to violence in response, the power of American-created and supported long-term disasters and exploitation in Indonesia will likely far outweigh that of American short-term tsunami diplomacy\textsuperscript{89}.

The tsunami was a sudden-onset natural disaster, and local people did most of the search and rescue and life saving. Survivors were rescued by their neighbours and by other survivors using whatever means were at hand. Surviving doctors, nurses and paramedics rendered first aid in makeshift or remaining health facilities. While the fatalities and missing made world headlines, initially it was the survivors who were of most concern locally. The recovery of bodies and...


"Ibid
where possible, dignified burial and mourning came later. In Indonesia, 91 per cent of those interviewed by the Fritz Institute\textsuperscript{90} reported that they had been rescued by private individuals.

In Sri Lanka and Thailand, life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days was led almost entirely by the general public from adjacent areas\textsuperscript{91}. The first few flights to Aceh were jammed with volunteers and official teams from all over Indonesia and the national military played a key role in the initial rescue. In Sri Lanka damage was limited to the coastal strip so local health services did all the main medical work.

Teams formed spontaneously, the skilled and unskilled, rich and poor, one ethnicity or class side-by-side with another. Some uncovered, others cleaned and tended. Some carried, others drove. More gave water, covered, informed or comforted. Local people, officials, the police and the military, the Red Cross/Crescent, religious people, students, different associations, private companies, political groupings - every component of society - responded with blankets, transport, fuel, medicines, materials, equipment, removal machinery and labour\textsuperscript{92}. Private and public vehicles and boats, offices, halls, schools, places of worship and homes all became immediately available. In the Maldives, communities backed by island and a toll authorities used boats to rescue those from islands that were uninhabitable, housing them with host families or in community buildings. Affected families on islands where there was partial damage were similarly re housed. Food was provided from local shops until external help arrived between three and five days later.

\textsuperscript{90}Danida, Sida, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Copenhagen, DFID, Development Cooperation Ireland, BMZ, 2005.
Derek Poate, team leader, Charles Parker, Margaret Slettevold IFAD, Sida, CIDA, 2005.
Ibis
Despite the importance of the local response the very definition of a disaster is that needs exceed local capacities. Outside assistance is necessary from the provincial, national, or international levels, depending on the scale of the disaster. The influence of public diplomacy at this point played a big role at the response from various sectors.

Public diplomacy equally played a big role in response to basic needs. The response moved rapidly from life-saving search and rescue and first aid to protecting, relieving and comforting. Again, the affected populations provided most and first. It is probable that the opinions of affected people have rarely, if ever, been so canvassed as they were in this disaster. In the past it has been less common for affected populations to be asked for their opinions about the aid they have received. This constant surveying of the views of the affected population may be one of the most significant innovations of the tsunami response. The majority of these surveys have not been carried out by implementing agencies seeking to know how well they have done, but by third parties, for academic study or for external evaluation.

For example, the Sri Lanka claim-holder survey conducted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Capacities Report in which 1,055 respondents were asked about how well their necessities had been provided for indicates that nearly 30 per cent responded 'Good'. Asked how well their needs were provided for during the first week after the tsunami, however, the 'Good' answers rose to almost 45 per cent.

"Ibis
The national response was supplemented by a flood of international aid. Appreciation was given for outside aid and the generosity shown by outside helpers. A United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) survey, found that 92 per cent of respondents in Aceh considered that aid agencies had made the most significant contribution in the first year after the tsunami.⁹⁵

23 Conclusion

This chapter brings the empirical relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises, private donations to relief agencies and disaster warning signs. The 2004 tsunami provides an excellent case study because it prompted unprecedented media coverage, unprecedented charitable giving, and a great deal of speculation about the relationship between the two.

Use of communication played a very critical role in response to the disaster through donor funding, and rescue works both locally and internationally.

Though social media was not highly penetrated by the time of the tsunami, use of the internet played a big role in sharing information. For example as discussed in the paper the tsunami that struck most of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, one of the first places people could find photos and videos of the disaster. YouTube was inundated with short clips showing waves slamming over beaches and into the swimming pools at five star resorts. Likewise, photos snapped by phones and digital cameras were being uploaded to Webshots, Flickr, and other online photo hosts.

As for relief efforts, more than 50 contributors put together The South-East Asia Earthquake and Tsunami Blog, which aggregated news and set up a tracker for missing person's reports and

⁹⁵ TNS and UNICEF (2005) ‘UNICEF Tsunami Relief Study: The Views of Affected Children on their Lives and the Tsunami Relief Effort’
humanitarian efforts. The site saw a huge surge in traffic shortly after the disaster, and became a go-to place for survivors to share their stories and information.

Another thing to come out of this disaster was new technology for warning people of incoming tsunamis ahead of time. Three undersea sensors called Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis, will fire off information to satellites and warning centers that can send out SMS alerts in case it picks up on signs of an incoming tsunami.

The coordination had a number of challenges and the lessons learnt played a big role in reducing disaster risks in later disasters like the Haiti earthquake. The sharing of information with the affected population was enhanced; social media has also been greatly used in early warning signs and in educating the people in disaster prone areas in an effort to reduce disaster risks.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 The challenges of public diplomacy in disaster situations

3.1 Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is defined in different ways, but broadly it is a term used to describe a government's efforts to conduct foreign policy and promote national interests through direct outreach and communication with the population of a foreign country. Public diplomacy activities include providing information to foreign publics through broadcast and Internet media and at libraries and other outreach facilities in foreign countries; conducting cultural diplomacy, such as art exhibits and music performances; and administering international educational and professional exchange programs.

Public diplomacy is a term that was first used by the United States Information Agency in the early 1960s. The U.S. Department of State defines public diplomacy as "engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences." Public diplomacy covers a wide range of activities and interactions conducted by a government with its foreign counterparts, nongovernmental organizations, and the public at-large. The stated goal of public diplomacy is to enhance a country's image and reputation through mutual understanding. It goes beyond traditional diplomacy and extends to the general public.

Public diplomacy requires managing overall perceptions of the country as well as developing durable relationships with key individuals and organizations. The government of Romania, for

---

instance, announced recently the launch of a new 67.8 million communication campaign, -Romanians in Europe," aimed at improving the image Romanians have in the European Union, in Spain and Italy more particularly. Public diplomacy can be construed as a way to exercise soft power. It gives developing nations a chance to raise public awareness and appreciation for the country. In turn, public diplomacy can become a source of pride and unity in these countries, empowering citizens to become active ambassadors.

Public diplomacy can be used to great effect in support of policy development but there are difficulties in co-ordinating messages across government, as well as between government and its Non-governmental partners. There is a relative lack of experience of these techniques in the developed world of these techniques and best practice will only become established over time. One common governing principle, however, is that public diplomacy strategies should be governed by a nation's foreign policy objectives.

Non-governmental partners can be important actors in the co-ordination of messages. Some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), for example, recognize that they can share common objectives with government in areas such as governance and the promotion of human rights. Partnerships often rely on the interaction of personalities which can result in outcomes beneficial to a host country's diplomatic objectives. For example, the practitioner-government-celebrity interface during the 2005 G8 Summit had some direct influence on the meeting's outcomes with regard to development strategies in Africa.

There are limitations on public diplomacy. While it can address the demands arising from democratization of the policy-making process, public diplomacy cannot be used to mask failures
in policy. Its potential is both strengthened by the existence of English as the common language and simultaneously weakened owing to the nuances of the language and the potential for misinterpretation of common words.

3.2 Disaster

A disaster is a natural or man-made (or technological) hazard resulting in an event of substantial extent causing significant physical damage or destruction, loss of life, or drastic change to the environment. A disaster can be ostensively defined as any tragic event stemming from events such as earthquakes, floods, catastrophic accidents, fires, or explosions. It is a phenomenon that can cause damage to life, property and destroy the economic, social and cultural life of people.

In contemporary academia, disasters are seen as the consequence of inappropriately managed risk. These risks are the product of a combination of both hazard/s and vulnerability. Hazards that strike in areas with low vulnerability will never become disasters, as is the case in uninhabited regions.98

Disaster related activities can have a short-term impact on public diplomacy, but that over the long term non-disaster factors have a more significant influence. The effects are either positive or negative. For example the during the tsunami Sri Lanka, where conflict resumed irrespective of the 2004 disaster, the Aceh work provides a starting point for comparing different forms of conflict. The potential effect of disaster on public diplomacy at all levels is similar, irrespective of the players involved. In this paper I will focus on the challenges that countries have faced in public diplomacy during disaster situations.

The first question is fundamental: did disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activities? 

Disaster diplomacy' is concerned with the extent to which disaster-related activities - prevention, mitigation, response and recovery - induce cooperation between enemy parties, internationally or nationally. Examples can cover a specific geographic region or country, such as North Korea's international relations following floods, droughts and famines, or they can look at specific disaster events or types. The Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program, for example, produced seismic hazard maps across sensitive international borders, including regions in conflict. Other trans-boundary issues include international cooperation in identifying disaster casualties.

Second, is the disaster-related public diplomacy legitimate? The players involved must be genuinely seeking closer connections, rather than using the events as a public relations exercise, or simply waiting for an opportunity to avoid proceeding further with diplomacy. This question is often difficult to answer, but in case studies of Cuba-US relations, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, opportunities for disaster diplomacy have foundered because at least one party seemed to be looking for an excuse to avoid peace.

Third, how long does the disaster-related public diplomacy last? After the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, new peace initiatives between New Delhi and Islamabad emerged, and the leaders displayed openness and a willingness to move forward. Although a summit six months later collapsed in acrimony, public diplomacy eventually restarted and was then boosted by the earthquake in Kashmir in 2005. 99

Finally, does post-disaster public diplomacy address long-standing development and sustainability issues, including political, livelihood and economic concerns? In most cases, disasters or crises have not led to the resolution or full consideration of longer-term challenges, including those related to livelihoods, environmental management, inequity and injustice. An exception was the successful management of the 1991-93 drought emergencies in Southern Africa, which occurred in the context of rapid and significant political and developmental change across the region.

33 The challenges of disaster related public diplomacy

Evidence so far suggests that disaster-related activities frequently catalyze diplomatic progress, but rarely create it: they can have a short-term impact on diplomacy, but, over the long term, non-disaster factors have a more significant influence. Non-disaster factors include leadership change, distrust, the belief that a historical conflict or complaint should take precedence over present-day humanitarian needs, or priorities for action other than conflict resolution. In some cases, disaster-related activities can exacerbate conflict and reduce the opportunities for diplomacy.

There are multiple reasons why disaster-related activities have less influence on diplomacy than might be expected or hoped. Prejudice, misgiving and mistrust can defeat disaster diplomacy efforts, as demonstrated by the conflict over aid in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. Similarly, Cuba refused American assistance during the 1998 drought, and the US did not accept offers of aid from Cuba, Venezuela and Iran following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In some cases, countries might not need external assistance, or could claim that they do not, so that no basis exists for
attempting disaster diplomacy. Overall, disaster-related activities are not necessarily a high political priority, even after a disaster. Unsurprisingly, factors other than a concern to prevent disasters or save lives when disasters happen tend to be more important in political decision-making.

3.4 Public diplomacy during the 2004 tsunami

On December 26, 2004 an earthquake on the Indian Ocean triggered a deadly tsunami that claimed the lives of over 220,000 people. The tsunami ravaged 11 countries, leaving coastal cities and communities utterly devastated and millions of natives homeless. Due to the severity of the disaster, countries around the globe immediately pledged their support to provide much-needed humanitarian aid. Millions of US dollars in monetary assistance, food, supplies, and other necessities poured into the regions affected by the tsunami. This prompt and generous response from the international community was and continues to be a major factor in the recovery of the destroyed areas. Moreover, the significant role of humanitarian efforts has stimulated plenty of debate on the public diplomacy implications for the nations involved in the endeavor to rebuild Southeast Asia. The tsunami has raised questions about how a country's response affects its image and whether humanitarian efforts should be part of a nation's public diplomacy at all.

The United States is one of the countries that dominated headlines when it came to offering aid and support to tsunami victims. After an initial pledge of $35 million, the U.S. was bombarded with criticism. Jan Egeland, the U.N. emergency relief coordinator, called the American government "stingy." In response to this criticism and the worsening conditions of the disaster, President George W. Bush increased the U.S.'s commitment to $350 million. Still, international
critics cited the fact that the U.S. gave one of the lowest contributions (less than 1% of its gross national income) while countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, contributed over 2% of theirs. However, journalists and government officials defended the U.S. by discussing the amount of “unofficial” aid that went unaccounted for. This included all of the private donations, volunteering, trade and investment made by ordinary citizens, private companies, and various NGOs throughout the United States.

According to Neil King Jr. (2005), the U.S. tsunami relief effort could be a way for America to clean up its tarnished image in the eyes of the Muslim world and the international community. This could be a chance for the nation to repair the damage done in Iraq. But like the international pro-American sentiments after the 9/11 attacks, there's no guarantee an improved image of the US will remain after the disaster relief is gone.100

Millicent R. Jefferson posits that, by supporting relief efforts, Americans hoped that their donations would improve the United States' predominantly negative image abroad.101 The Christian Science Monitor quoted Chicago donor, Julie Putterman, as saying "I feel like our country has been such a bad citizen of the world in the recent past. I just felt like it was important for everyone to rally." 102 The belief was that by being "compassionate," especially to Indonesia - the country with the largest Muslim population in the world - other nations would see a more favorable side of the U.S.103 Furthermore, by having the American military involved in on-site support, the U.S. aspired to present its military forces as an instrument of goodwill,

100 Neil King Jr, The Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2005
102 Mona Charen, Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 2005
rather than of fear and destruction. Nonetheless, scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer claimed that it would take more than helping a few countries to fix the U.S.'s tarnished reputation in the Muslim world.

Less than one month after the tsunami hit Southeast Asia, nations around the world continued to show their generosity by supporting the victims affected by the disaster. The outpour of aid was remarkable. East Timor, which had been invaded and occupied by Indonesia in the 1970s, was now reaching out to its former adversary. Beslan, a Russian town that suffered a terrorist siege in September 2004, offered some of its own relief funds to assist countries decimated by the tsunami.

In spite of the apparent success of the global effort to rebuild Southeast Asia, concerns about long-term support remain in question. Journalists and scholars discussing the difference between pledged contributions and the actual amount of aid given are worried that many of the countries will not follow through with their aid commitments. Skeptics argue that it is one thing to say a country is going to give millions of dollars in aid, but how much the country ends up giving is another story entirely. This issue is fueling debate over whether the surge of international generosity is a genuine effort to help Southeast Asia recover or if it is simply another opportunity for propaganda - a superficial attempt to project an image of goodwill.

Furthermore, ongoing dialogue about the enmity between Muslims and the West remains a recurrent topic in the press. After the Indonesian government expressed its desire to see all American and foreign troops administering disaster relief evacuate the area by March 31st, 2005,
talks of Muslim "hatred" towards America and its allies dominated the news in Europe, Asia, and the United States. Islamic extremists were quoted as saying that the tsunami was a punishment from Allah to all the "heretic" countries that supported the U.S. and its invasion of Iraq. However, the opposition brings to light the fact that the area that suffered the worst damage was Aceh, the most Islamist province in Indonesia. Altercations such as this certainly have wide-reaching effects; the U.S. and its allies continue to have an unfavorable image within the Muslim world, while Islamic hypocrisy moves to damage its own reputation in the international community.

The relief and reconstruction operation during the period and that followed the tsunami in December 2004 opened up Aceh to the world, ending the isolation the Indonesian government had imposed due to a decades-long separatist conflict. In January 2005, the government and the main separatist group, the Free Aceh Movement (FAM), announced that peace talks would be resumed, leading to an August 2005 Memorandum of Understanding. So far, the agreement has held. Determining whether or not disaster diplomacy occurred in Aceh can be done by addressing the six questions outlined above.

First, have disaster-related activities influenced diplomatic activities? The disaster deeply influenced the initial peace talks and the eventual implementation of the August agreement. The involvement of the international community was instrumental, and was motivated in particular by Aceh's need for foreign relief assistance. Later, long-term demilitarization was added to these


Dr. Khaled Batarfi. kbarfl@al-madina.com, *Dhul Qa 'Dah*, January 9, 2005)

considerations, so that post-tsunami reconstruction and post-conflict reconstruction were to some degree side by side. The disaster therefore influenced diplomacy.

Second, is the disaster-related diplomacy legitimate? Both parties appeared to want genuine rapprochement, and neither seemed to be using the events as a public relations exercise. This was shown by the quick demilitarization of Aceh and the relatively rapid political negotiations on its status. Players on both sides appeared committed to making peace work.

Next, how long has the disaster-related diplomacy lasted? While the guns quickly fell silent following the tsunami, and have to date stayed relatively quiet, long-term political reconstruction is still uncertain. Although there is optimism, it would be premature to assume that a long-term solution to the conflict has been found.

Fourth, does the post-disaster diplomacy depend on the characteristics of the post-disaster reconstruction? So far, accusations of slow, unequal, corrupt and poorly planned reconstruction have not been used to threaten the resumption of hostilities. Instead, the reconstruction tends to be viewed as an opportunity to strengthen peace by requiring communities to work together. Again, optimism is warranted, although isolated violence means that mistrust persists, and poor reconstruction could eventually exacerbate pre-tsunami inequities and frustrations. Unresolved pre-tsunami factors and unrelated events could thus be more significant than the tsunami with respect to long-term conflict resolution. The evidence to date, though, suggests that the specific characteristics of the post-tsunami reconstruction have not heavily affected diplomacy.

Finally, does post-disaster diplomacy address long-standing development and sustainability issues, including political, economic and livelihood concerns? The peace deal included a greater
share of natural resources for Aceh, and granted it sovereignty in internal matters. But the Indonesian parliament removed the requirement that local leaders agree to measures touching on Acehnese affairs, and reduced the local share of natural resource revenues from 70% to 60%. This suggests that post-disaster diplomacy did not overcome long-standing political and economic issues, especially Jakarta's reluctance to grant autonomy in regions it controls. Nonetheless, the measures enacted following the tsunami constitute a major change from Aceh's pre-tsunami status.

3i Public diplomacy Lessons from Japan

When it comes to diplomatic achievements, often common citizens can be even more effective than foreign relations specialists. In all likelihood this is because, at the grassroots level, interaction on the basis of pure friendship is possible; whereas in relations between professional politicians, words and actions tend to be determined by national interests.

For example on this topic of public diplomacy, it is worth remembering the example of how China's own image in the world was enhanced by the actions of a pure-hearted young child an example that testifies to how the hearts of adults can be swayed by the deeds of children.

On the afternoon of May 12, 2008, a great earthquake struck China, centered on the northern part of Sichuan Province, leaving some 90,000 people either dead or missing. At the break of dawn the next morning, a three-year-old boy was found in the rubble of a collapsed kindergarten near the quake's epicentre. The boy must have been in great pain, as his arms and other bones had been broken, but he gathered enough strength to as say "Thank you" to the rescue team members who discovered him. He kept repeating his words of thanks as he was taken away on a stretcher.
made from the wooden wreckage of the collapsed building—even raising his right arm over his head to express his gratitude more formally. Photos of this courteous boy were published in China and made an impact, as the image of his dignity touched the hearts of many people around the world.

China has a history of exchanges in the spheres of culture and sports to add sparkle to its diplomacy, such as the exchange of table-tennis players back in the early 1970s (referred to as "ping-pong diplomacy") that helped restore its diplomatic relations with the United States. This might be viewed as an early example of what is referred to in English as "public diplomacy." In the Chinese language that term has been translated in a number of different ways, whether directly using the characters for "public" or more indirectly in terms of diplomacy involving "ordinary people" or "private citizens." In any case, the Chinese have had this diplomatic concept that underscores the importance of non-governmental actors.

3.6 Learning from Japan's Public Diplomacy

The Chinese think there is much to be learned from Japan in the public diplomacy field. The world saw numerous examples of how the Japanese were orderly and helped each other in the aftermath of the unprecedented earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. People living in countries that had often experienced social upheaval during natural disasters were struck by the maturity of the Japanese response to the crisis, reflecting a culture that emphasizes human bonds and a spirit of mutual aid. This also accounts for how Japan has continued to express its gratitude for the assistance it has received from countries around the world, including developing nations.

Takahara, Akio. Personal Interview, 23 November 2005, Harvard University, Cambridge MA.
One noteworthy example of Japan's public diplomacy was the post-3/11 efforts of the internationally acclaimed actor and Hollywood star, Watanabe Ken. In January 2012, he took time out of his busy schedule to attend the gathering of business and political leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland to express in English his appreciation for the support given to Japan.

Many Chinese are taking pride in the fact that China's economic power—as expressed in its gross domestic product—surpassed that of Japan in 2010, to occupy the number-two spot in the world. But the question of whether this achievement has been matched by a growing maturity of China's public diplomacy is debatable. It seems to me that it is only once each member of society is able to enjoy the fruits of prosperity that true affluence emerges in a nation, allowing it to be nourished by a spirit of social compassion and mutual consideration. It seems that it is worth pondering the fact that both Japan and China have the common expression: "Only those with a full stomach and clothes on their back can afford manners."

3.7 Public diplomacy during the Japan Earthquake

While the world is focused on the human tragedy in Japan, the mega-disaster might also bring a diplomatic opening as the US and neighbors reach out to the newly vulnerable nation. The US, whose relations with its long-time ally have been strained over military issues, has mounted a wide-scale relief effort dubbed "Operation Tomodachi" — the Japanese word for friendship. South Korea, where memories of Japanese colonial rule remain vivid, has seen an outpouring of
sympathy and assistance for quake victims.\textsuperscript{109} China and Russia, which both have rocky relations with Japan, have also offered support.

"For most of the post-war period, Japan was seen as this economic behemoth in the region, an extremely prosperous country that had it all," said Weston Konishi, an Asia expert at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. "I think the image of Japan may have changed in the eyes of its regional neighbors. It is no longer all-powerful Japan, but a country that really needs their help."

"Particularly in South Korea, I think there is genuine sympathy, and I think that can play into a thawing of diplomatic relations and perhaps lead to more reconciled dynamics," he said.

In China, Premier Wen Jiabao, has offered any assistance needed, but the rescue teams from China are much smaller than those from South Korea and the US, and Beijing has concentrated on the safety of its own nationals.

Japan, which experiences 20 percent of the world's strong earthquakes, has itself played a prominent role in disaster relief in the past, sending teams after tragedies including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, China. US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, meeting on Tuesday in Paris with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto, said that Japan "is always a very generous donor to any disaster anywhere in the world." "Today, the world comes together to support Japan in its hour of need," Clinton

\textsuperscript{109} Lakahara, Akio. Personal Interview, 23 November 2005, Harvard University, Cambridge MA.
The US military has mobilized helicopters, planes and a dozen ships for Operation **Tomodachi**, delivering food, water and other supplies. US civilian crews are searching rubble for **survivors**. The US and Japan have a six-decade alliance, but relations have been strained since a left-leaning government took charge in Tokyo in 2009 and sought to remove the controversial Futenma military base from Okinawa.

While Japan struggles to recover from the shocking devastation of the March 11, 2011 (3/11) earthquake and tsunami, Japanese public diplomacy also struggles to recover from the damage. **Tourism** campaigns, especially those with a focus of rehabilitating the image of the Japanese are critical, benefiting from support of non-Japanese artists. After the earthquake, many people around the world, including celebrities, sent aid and words of encouragement to Japan. One of the biggest supporters, Lady Gaga, contributed both financially and in raising awareness. Within 48 hours of the earthquake, she collected about $250,000 in donations through her Japanese Tsunami Relief Wristband and, eventually raised $1,500,000. Her subsequent visit to Japan in June conveyed the message that post-3/11 Japan was a safe place to visit. The Japan Tourism Agency (JTA) gave a certificate of gratitude to American artists including Lady Gaga, for their help restoring luster to the tarnished image of Japan. The logo of a Japanese flag with the message "Pray for Japan" appeared everywhere on social media sites following the disaster.

Continuous interest and support in humanitarian relief generally helps a nation recover from disasters and crises. To this end, a short film called "The Tsunami and the Cherry Blossom," nominated for the Best Short Documentary at the Academy Awards, plays an important role. As British documentary maker Lucy Walker said in an interview, the film helps "the rest of the

world understand a bit better how Japanese people rose to this disaster." The film depicts dramatic footage of the tsunami and aftermath, and survivors' interviews juxtaposed with beautiful cherry blossoms, which are a symbol of "death and rebirth" and strengthen the Japanese spirit. As one Japanese man in the movie put it, "The plants are hanging in there, so us humans had better do it, too." More importantly, the cherry blossoms in addition to the film itself, encourage Japanese people to overcome the hardship.

While soft power is helping Japan recover from this disaster, increased tourism is needed to boost the economy as well. In April 2011, foreign tourism to Japan fell 62.5% compared with visits in April 2010. Even six months after the disaster in August, there was a 31.9% decrease in foreign tourism compared with August 2010. In response to this, the JTA planned to offer 10,000 free flights to foreigners called "Fly to Japan! Project." A number of media outlets covered the event. However, Japanese Finance of Ministry rejected this request, commenting that it was questionable that the project would increase foreign visitors and would probably serve as a budgetary handout to non-Japanese travelers. Therefore the request was not included in a governmental draft of the budget for FY 2012, which in Japan, begins in April. The Japanese edition of the Wall Street Journal reported the "Dream Over" of free flights to Japan for non-citizens. Although the "Fly to Japan! Project" was shelved; JTA is now attempting to tackle a decrease in tourism in a number of different ways. Predominantly, it has tried to address concerns about traveling to Japan post-3/11 through blogs and social networking services. In September 2011, the Creative Industries Promotion Office in the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) enhanced the "Cool Japan" nation-branding campaign by creating a new logo "Japan Next," which presents the image of 'national advancing' rather than 'national reverting'. This campaign is part of the government's initiative to bring tourists back to Japan.
In terms of exchange diplomacy, countries such as Russia, Fiji, Croatia, and Poland have accepted exchange students from areas of devastation. On 3/11, the U.S. military began operation "Tomodachi" (which means friend in Japanese).\textsuperscript{112} It quickly became one of the largest, most well-organized, and immediate humanitarian relief efforts for a damaged area. The public-private partnership "Tomodachi Initiative" named after the operation, launched shortly after to "invest in the next generation of Japanese and Americans in ways that strengthen cultural and economic ties, and deepen the friendship between the United States and Japan over the long-term," and support Japan's recovery from the disaster, providing educational/academic, sports, music, arts, entrepreneurship, and leadership programs.

Japan was indeed devastated by the earthquake and tsunami. However, Japan is gradually recovering thanks to the support of the international community. In parallel, Japanese public diplomacy has also been encouraged through tourism campaigns and exchange diplomacy with foreign aid. In order to convey its appreciation to its supporters from overseas, the JTA and Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) initiated a campaign called "Japan. Thank You.,” for its one year anniversary, from late February to April 2012. They commissioned a special logo and poster, which are now displayed in various parts of the world. For example, on March 1, 2012, "Japan week" started in New York, filling many of Times Square's large screens with the "Thank You" logos and the cherry blossom motif. In public diplomacy, communication is the basis for good relationship management. Thanking people from abroad for all of their support is a good start

\textsuperscript{”} Carol Adelman, \textit{New York Times}, January 5, 2005

61
Another challenge of public diplomacy was the potential for a much needed change in stalemated international relations in the Northeast Asia region in the wake of devastation suffered by Japan from the severe earthquake and tsunami. In response to the catastrophe, many countries have given assistance to Japan, their humanitarian concern replacing any current or historical political differences. Even countries that might have territorial and strategic disputes with Japan have extended sincere sympathy to the Japanese people, shelving their differences and giving timely aid.

In these circumstances, tensions previously existing in the Northeast Asia region have experienced some sort of turning point. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was swept into power in September 2009, friction developed in Japan-US relations when the administration of new prime minister Hatoyama Yukio pursued a policy of "drifting away from America and backing Asia."

Also, there were other events in "play," such as the sinking of South Korean warship Cheonan, the Yeonpyeong Island bombing incident, the vessel collision near Diaoyu Island, and the Japan-Russia territorial dispute. These unrelated incidents contributed to a regional pot pouri which upset the delicate North-South Korea relations, China-Japan links and Japan-Russia ties.

As a result, and in a short period, the Northeast Asia situation precipitated into an unprecedented stalemate. The United States was also engaged concurrently in these events in order not to be excluded from the increasing trend of Asian regionalism. The U.S. had conducted large-scale military exercises with allies in the region for the purpose of displaying its military might and sought to use the power of its protection to consolidate its allies' support.
But Japanese who did not condone U.S. strategic deployment in Asia insisted on American withdrawal from its long-established military bases, at least in Okinawa. In a frustrated and impatient response to increasing community distaste for the occupation, a senior American official in March this year made disparaging remarks about Okinawa residents "blackmailing" America, assertions that cost him his job. His claims that Okinawans were unable to even grow bitter gourd well and that they just wanted more money from America to sign on for an extension of military base presence severely damaged their self-respect and cast a new shadow over the bilateral relationship which had been improving under prime minister Kan Naoto.

It was at this general low point in the Northeast Asia region that the sudden and unprecedented earthquake may have brought about something of a turning point. The Chinese rescue team was the first international aid group to arrive in the disaster zone and supportive messages from Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao to the Japanese prime minister and emperor respectively were widely reported in detail in Japan's media. In addition, after providing 30 million yuan in humanitarian aid, China donated another 10 thousand tons of gasoline and ten thousand tons of diesel oil. South Korea donated strategic materials like boric acid and natural gas as well as delivering supportive diplomatic messages. Korean movie stars popular in Japan, like Bae Yong Joon and Choi Ji-woo, made generous donations to disaster funds. The Seoul News even printed in Japanese on its front page a headline expressing deep condolence to the victims.

The U.S. spared no efforts in supporting Japan's rescue, relief and recovery work, sending five destroyers and one cruiser to Fukushima to help its Self Defense Force (SDF) undertake rescue work. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said his country was ready to provide all kinds of
necessary aid and his foreign minister Sergei Lavrov pledged similar support to Japan's new foreign minister Matsumoto Takeaki in Paris. The North Korean Red Cross also sent a condolence message to Japan.

While this earthquake diplomacy has helped to break open the stalemate in the region, Northeast Asia still faces serious challenges. The U.S. aid was provided through American warships, aircraft carriers and transport planes in cooperation with the SDF. In other words, the joint relief work between the two militaries was a continuation of Japan-U.S. strategic cooperation, or, in a sense, additional military exercises and another opportunity for military cooperation. Also, the American media took the opportunity to cast a slight against China by questioning its capacity to withstand earthquakes, unfavorably comparing the estimated 70,000 death toll of the Wenchuan quake in 2008 to Japan's disaster and its fewer casualties. The media asserted that the Chinese government was not being responsible enough with its people's welfare, despite China being quite rich.

South Korea actively provided Japan with aid, but its Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASSI) declared later that the disputed Dokdo Islands (known in Japan as Takeshima) had shifted two more meters away from Japan's main islands. Uncomfortable with the political point of the declaration, Japan subsequently reiterated its claim to Takeshima as its own territory, thus irking the South Koreans. Russia played a positive role in assisting Japan's relief efforts, but the two foreign ministers in Paris also pressed their respective claims over territorial issues. The Japanese foreign ministry is seeking new ways to improve China-Japan ties, and the earthquake does provide new opportunities for better relations between the two peoples. But, the concept of China being a threat has not vanished. When prime minister Kan Naoto ordered the SDF to
deploy 100,000 troops for relief work, officials in the defense ministry complained that one of its prime roles is to monitor the Chinese navy which was not possible if such a large contingent was doing relief work. And when the Japanese foreign minister met with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he expressed concern about North Korea's uranium enriching activities.

*Although* a natural disaster, the tragic earthquake and resulting tsunami could provide rare and *uniting* opportunities for the region beyond the outpouring of compassion and empathy. It is a *real* challenge indeed.\textsuperscript{113} China, Japan, the United States, South Korea, North Korea and Russia *could* all continue to co-exist on the fringes of confrontation, or alternatively collaborate to face the current crises, jointly explore post-quake recovery, build up security mechanisms and *together* address the challenges of global issues. \textsuperscript{114} This could be the biggest outcome of the *earthquake*, a rare opportunity that nature has given to Northeast Asia nations to build up mutual trust.

\textsuperscript{m} Mor, Ben D. 2006. Public diplomacy in grand strategy. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2:157-76.

\textsuperscript{ibid}
4.0 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

4.1 Conclusion

To define and explore disaster diplomacy, the initial question asked was "Do natural disasters induce international cooperation amongst countries that have traditionally been 'enemies'?" Could disaster-related activities, both pre-disaster such as mitigation and prevention and post-disaster such as response and recovery, positively affect relations amongst states which are not normally prone to cooperation? The term "enemy" thus has a wide remit, which is not confined to violent conflict, but refers to states that are not collaborating diplomatically or politically. The first examples that were explored include the earthquakes in Greece and Turkey in 1999, monitoring hurricanes which could hit both Cuba and the United States and preventing a drought disaster across southern Africa. One conclusion from these analyses is that a disaster can significantly spur on a diplomatic process that had a preexisting basis, but a disaster alone is unlikely to generate new diplomacy. Disaster related activities can catalyze, but do not create, cooperation.

Categorization of disaster diplomacy in its different forms provides a solid basis for understanding the theory and characteristics of disaster diplomacy which are then applied to analyzing case studies and spin-offs. Disaster diplomacy has three levels at which it is conducted. The first level is the government level. The India-Pakistan case study falls into this category because the states' governments were at the forefront of disaster diplomacy efforts. The second level is organization-led disaster diplomacy, involving groups that are not governments...
such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, the media, the private sector, lobby groups and research institutes who lead any disaster-related and/or reconciliation efforts. Some disaster diplomacy of this form was evident following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004. The third category is people-led disaster diplomacy in which grassroots support directs the disaster-related and/or reconciliation efforts, although that is often trumpeted or given momentum by the media, as in the Greece-Turkey case study. Furthermore, different combinations of levels can occur. Governments can deal bilaterally or multilaterally or can be brought together by organizations. Organizations might deal directly with governments or with grassroots groups. People from one state can directly approach the government of another state or national/international organizations.

It is disingenuous to suggest that a specific and single framework can or should be developed for acting on disaster diplomacy. While different proposals will provide material for debate, at the practical level, general predictions for how certain disaster conditions or events will lead to positive, negative or no diplomacy are unlikely to stand up to scrutiny. Considering the diversity of outcomes emerging from superficially similar situations (for instance, one earthquake or shared hurricane vulnerability), it appears that disaster-related activities can impact diplomatic activities in a manner chosen by the different actors. Different actors have different goals, adding complexity.

Instead, knowing the availability of different facets, options and measures of success will be most useful for the practical application of disaster diplomacy. Acting on disaster diplomacy means that disaster diplomacy cannot be interpreted as an outcome which starts with a specific
disaster and ends with post-disaster reconstruction. Instead, it is an ongoing process related to the waxing and waning of disaster-related and diplomatic activities and their interactions.

The main lesson is that evidence exists that disaster-related activities can catalyze diplomatic activities but evidence does not exist that disaster-related activities can create diplomatic activities. If actors choose, that catalysis can be made to happen and disaster diplomacy can be put into action.

The principal caution is that disaster diplomacy does not provide the complete answer to conflict. The reason is that a humanitarian imperative rarely dominates diplomatic decisions and actions. Meanwhile, the intermittency of many disaster related activities implies that it is challenging to maintain sustained interest in a peace process based on disaster-related activities. Disaster diplomacy can also be used to create and perpetuate conflict. As shown by the case studies, especially when disaster diplomacy achieved little, disaster-related and diplomatic activities interact in more ways than disaster diplomacy. Motives other than disaster diplomacy tend to dominate those interactions, superseding potential disaster diplomacy outcomes.

The disaster diplomacy situation is not entirely bleak. Disaster-related activities can be opportunities to demonstrate that cooperation can provide dividends—perhaps surprisingly. The long-term results from targeted, shorter-term confidence building activities can be important in international affairs. Even if disaster diplomacy appears to fail, functional relationships amongst individuals and organizations inside and outside of governments often continue afterwards. These relationships provide a potential base for future cooperation. Moreover, many interlinked
factors and activities including transport, trade, culture, sport and economics continually influence diplomacy. If chosen, disaster-related activities can be an influential part of that interplay. People and organizations often form a powerful force for disaster diplomacy, into which governments can tap more successfully, if the goal were agreed upon. Therefore, the disaster diplomacy process can be pursued in different ways once that process is selected.

Disaster diplomacy does have a significant impact. Realistic expectations must be maintained regarding what this process can and cannot do—and what it should and should not do.
References


Army2012www.bbc.co.uk

BBC2012 www.bbc.co.uk

Sky.com www.sky.com

Brainard, C. 2010. The voice of the affected: How the media are improving humanitarian aid post-Haiti.' Columbia Journalism Review, 26 April.


Bruce Robert. 1989. An accurate measurement of the crowd-out effect, income effect,


Daily Nation


Huffington Post. 2010b. 'American Red Cross Haiti Relief: How to help Haiti victims, where to submit donations.' Huffington Post, 13 January.


International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC 2009 report


John Telford and John Cosgrave; Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report; 2006


Kennedy, H. 2010. 'Twitter used to help land plane with aid for Haiti earthquake victims.' NY Daily News, 18 January.


Okoth, Pontian Godfrey. 2010 USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold War. Nairobi University of Nairobi Press.


ReliefWeb, April 12, 2005. "Meeting in Mauritius for a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean,"


Solnit, R. 2010. 'When the media is the disaster: Covering Haiti,' Huffington Post, 21 January


Tsunami of Giving: American Donations Flood Relief Agencies - Editorial (Manchester Union Leader)


UNESCO, Paris Coordination Meeting, Towards the establishment of a tsunami warning and mitigation system for the Indian Ocean

http://ioc.unesco.org/indotsunami/paris_march05.htm

UNICEF UK News Update: UNICEF’s 90-day overview of its Tsunami response.


USAID, "USAID Announces Launch of Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System Program," (press release) August 17, 2005

Giving: American Donations Flood Relief Agencies - Editorial (Manchester Union Leader)


www.unesco.org/tsunami